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PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 17, 18, 22, 23, AND 24, 1973
Book 1
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U. S- GGveromf^nt u^•cu•I^^•nts Depository
Franklin Pierce Lav; Center Library
DSSyB yp>^
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIED CONGKESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 17, 18, 22, 23, AND 24, 1973
Book 1
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-296 O WASHINGTON : 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3.00
Stock Number 5270-01843
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session)
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina, Chairman
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vice Chairman
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, Georgia EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr., Connecticut
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico
Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Fred D. Thompson, Minority Counsel
RUFUS L. Edmisten, Deputy Chief Counsel
David M. Dorsen, Assistant Chief Counsel
Terry F. Lenzner, Assistant Chief Counsel
James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel
Carmine S. Belling, Chief Investigator
Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator
Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel
R. Phillip Haire, Assistant Counsel
Marc Lackritz, Assistant Counsel
William T. Mayton, Assistant Counsel
Ronald D. ROTVtf da, Assistant Counsel
Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel
Howard S. Liebengood, Assistant Minority Counsel
H. William Sbvre, Assistant Minority Counsel
Robert Silverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel
Laura Matz, Administrative Assistant
Carolyn Andrade, Office Manager
Joan C. Cole, Secretary to the Minority
(II)
CONTENTS
HEARING DAYS Page
Thursday, May 17, 1973 1
Friday, May 18, 1973 117
Tuesday, May 22, 1973 191
Wednesday, May 23, 1973 263
Thursday, May 24, 1973 311
OPENING STATEMENTS
Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of North Carolina,
chairman, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 1
Baker, Hon. Howard H., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee,
vice chairman. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.- 4
Talmadge, Hon. Herman E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Georgia,
member. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 6
Gurney, Hon. Edward J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida, mem-
ber. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 7
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., a U.S. Senator from the State of Hawaii, member.
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 8
Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut,
member, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 8
Montoya, Hon. Joseph M., a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico,
member, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 9
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Thursday, May 17, 1973
Odle, Robert C, Jr., former director of administration. Committee for the
Re-Election of the President 9
Kehrli, Bruce A., special assistant to the President 75
Leeper, Paul W., sergeant, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington,
D.C 95
Barrett, John Bruce, officer, Metropolitan Police Department, Washing-
ton, D.C 115
Friday, May 18, 1973
Shoffler, Carl M., officer. Metropolitan Police Department, Washington,
D.C 117
McCord, James W., Jr., former office security assistant to Robert C. Odle,
accompanied by Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., counsel 125
Tuesday, May 22, 1973
McCord, James W., Jr., testimony resumed 191
Caulfield, John J., Assistant Director for Criminal Enforcement, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Department of the Treasury, accom-
panied by John P. Sears, counsel 248
Wednesday, May 23, 1973
Caulfield, John J., testimony resumed 265
Ulasewicz, Anthony, retired New York City Police Department detective. 284
Alch, Gerald, former attorney for James W . McCord, Jr 294
(iH)
IV
Thursday, May 24, 1973
page
Alch, Gerald, testimony resumed 312
Barker, Bernard L., member of Watergate break-in group of June 17, 1972. _ 357
Baldwin, Alfred C, III, a suspect in the Watergate incident of June 17,
1972, accompanied by Robert Mirto, attorney 389
INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE AND COUNSELS
Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr Odle: 9,
17-21, 28, 34, 35, 41, 56, 59-62, 74, 75. Kehrli: 82. Leeper: 109.
McCord: 129, 132, 138, 139, 149-154, 175, 237, 247, 248. Caulfield:
282, 283. Ulasewicz: 290. Alch: 325-333, 353-356. Barker: 363,
364, 387, 388. Baldwin: 391-400, 410, 411.
Baker, Hon. Howard H., Jr Odle: 21,
41-52, 55, 56, 59. Kehrh: 82. Leeper: 105, 109-112. Shoffler:
121-124. McCord: 129, 132-134, 154-160, 188, 189, 191-206.
Caulfield: 280-284. Ulasewicz: 292. Alch: 333-340, 354, 355.
Barker: 364-369. Baldwin: 390, 391, 411-413.
Talmadge, Hon. Herman E Odle: 22, 23.
Kehrh: 83, 84. Leeper: 111. McCord: 160-165, 206-210. Caulfield:
278-280. Ulasewicz: 290. Alch: 341, 342. Barker: 369-374.
Inouj^e, Hon. Daniel K Odle: 26-28,
69, 70. Kehrh: 88-90. Leeper: 112-114. McCord: 171-176,
217-221. Caulfield: 275-277. Ulasewicz: 291, Alch: 347-349.
Barker: 378-382.
Montoya, Hon. Joseph M Odle: 36-41,
72-74. Kehrh: 93-95. Leeper: 115, 116. McCord: 182-188,
227-232. Caulfield: 269-273. Alch: 349-353. Barker: 383-387.
Gurney, Hon. Edward J Odle: 23-26,
62-69. Kehrh: 84-88. Leeper: 112. McCord: 135-137, 165-171,
210-217. Caulfield: 277, 278. Alch: 342-347. Barker: 374-378.
Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr Odle: 28-35,
70-72. Kehrh: 90-93. Leeper: 114, 115. Barrett: 115. Shoffler:
124. McCord: 176-181, 221-227. Caulfield: 273-275. Barker:
382, 383. Baldwin: 391-410.
Dash, Samuel, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Odle: 10-14,
35, 41, 52-56, 58, 59. Kehrh: 75-80. Leeper: 95-109. Shoffler:
118, 123. McCord: 125-133, 135, 137, 141, 232-237. Caulfield:
248, 249, 264-267. Ulasewicz: 284-288. Alch: 312-320. Baldwin:
389, 390.
Thompson, Fred D., Minority Counsel Odle: 14-17,
59. Kehrh: 80-82. Shoflfler: 118-121. McCord: 142-149, 238-247.
Caulfield: 267-269. Ulasewicz: 288-290. Alch: 320-325. Barker:
360-363.
Hamilton, James, Assistant Chief Counsel Barker : 357-359
EXHIBITS
No. 1 — Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb S. Magruder,
dated July 3, 1971 449
No. 2 — Stationery showing Gemstone letterhead, date, source, Exdis/No
Dissem, and warning 450
No. 3 — Memorandum for Jeb Magruder from Fred Malek, dated
February 9, 1972 451
No. 4 — Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from John N. Smith, dated
January 17, 1972 454
No. 5 — Organization Chart of Committee for the Re-Election of the
President, from March to July 1972 11
No. 6 — Organization Chart of Finance Committee To Re-Elect the
President, from April-November 1972 15
No. 7 — Organization Chart of Committee for the Re-Election of the
President, from July to November 19
No. 8 — Chart submitted by Senator Weicker 33
No. 9— White House Organization Chart, 1971-1972 with subsequent
personnel changes noted 77
Page
No. 10 — Photograph — Watergate complex aerial view 99
No. 11 — Photograph — Watergate complex aerial view (close-up) 100
No. 12 — Drawing — Watergate office building in relation to Howard
Johnson's Motor Lodge 101
No. 13 — Drawing — Democratic National Committee Headquarters floor
plan 102
No. 14 — Check from Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President to
Alfred C. Baldwin III, dated Aug. 7, 1972 455
No. 15 — Page 14 of voucher of the Finance Committee To Re-Elect the
President showing travel expenses paid to Alfred C. Baldwin III. 456
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
By Bruce A. Kehrli: Persons separated or transferred from the White
House to the Committee To Re-Elect the President 94
By Paul W. Leeper: List of serial numbers on $100 bills found on the
Watergate break-in group 108
By James W. McCord, Jr.: Recollection of E. Howard Hunt's comments _. 144
By Gerald Alch: Memorandum from James McCord to Gerald Alch.
Subject:Shiftof the Focus of Publicity. Dated October 17, 1972 297
By Senator Baker: Letter, styled "Dear Gerald," signed "Jim" 339
By Alfred C. Baldwin III: Memorandum prepared by Robert Mirto to
the file of Alfred C. Baldwin III, July 6, 1972 389
By Senator Ervin:
Rules of Procedure for the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities 415
S. Res. 60 (93d Cong.) 427
S. Res. 278 (91st Cong.) 435
By Robert C. Odle, Jr. : List of employees of Committee for the Re-Election
of the President and Finance Committee for the Re-Election of the
President, dates of service and former employment 437
By James W. McCord, Jr. : Accounting of How $76,000 Was Spent 448
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
PHASE I: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION
THURSDAY, MAY 17, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington, D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and Weicker.
Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel; Fred D. Thompson,
minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief counsel ; Arthur S.
Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; David M. Dorsen,
James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsels;
Barry Schochet, Ron Rotunda, and Marc Lackritz, assistant majority
counsels; Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders,
deputy minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure,
and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O.
Dement, research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye;
Robert Baca, office of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahan, assistant to
Senator Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; John
Walz, publications clerk.
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR ERVIN OF NORTH CAROLINA
Senator Ervin. Today the Select Committee on Presidential Cam-
paign Activities begins hearings into the extent to which illegal and
improper or unethical activities were involved in the 1972 Presidential
election campaign.
Senate Resolution 60 which established the Select Committee was
adopted unanimously by the Senate on February 7, 1973. Under
its provisions every Member of the Senate joined in giving the com-
mittee a broad mandate to investigate, as fully as possible, all the
ramifications of the Watergate break-in which occurred on Saturday,
June 17, 1972. Under the terms of the authorizing resolution, the
committee must complete its study and render its report on or before
February 28, 1974. Of necessity, that report will reflect the considered
judgment of the committee on whatever new legislation is needed to
help safeguard the electoral process through which the President of
the United States is chosen.
We are beginning these hearings today in an atmosphere of the
utmost gravity. The questions that have been raised in the wake of
the June 17 break-in strike at the very undergirding of our democracy.
If the many allegations made to this date are true, then the burglars
(1)
who broke into the headquarters of the Democratic National Com-
mittee at the Watergate were in effect breaking into the home of
every citizen of the United States. And if these allegations prove to
be true, what they were seeking to steal was not the jewels, money, or
other property of American citizens, but something much more
valuable — their most precious heritage: the right to vote in a free
election. Since that day, a mood of incredulity has prevailed among our
populace, and it is the constitutional duty of this committee to act
expeditiously to allay the fears being expressed by the citizenry,
and to establish the factual bases upon which these fears have been
founded.
The first phase of the committee's investigation will probe the
planning and execution of the wiretapping and break-in of the Demo-
cratic National Committee's headquarters at the Watergate complex,
and the alleged coverup that followed. Subsequent phases will focus
on allegations of campaign espionage and subversion and allegations
of extensive violations of campaign financing laws. The clear mandate
of the unanimous Senate resolution provides for a bipartisan inves-
tigation of every phase of political espionage and illegal fundraising.
Thus it is clear that we have the full responsibility to recommend
any remedial legislation necessary.
In pursuing its task, it is clear that the committee will be dealing
with the workings of the democratic process under which we operate
in a nation that still is the last, best hope of mankind in his eternal
struggle to govern himself decently and effectively.
We will be concerned with the integrity of a governmental system
designed by men who understood the lessons of the past and who,
accordingly, established a framework of separated governmental
powers in order to prevent any one branch of the Government from
becoming dominant over the others. The Founding Fathers, having
participated in the struggle against arbitrary power, comprehended
some eternal truths respecting men and government. They knew that
those who are entrusted with power are susceptible to the disease of
tyrants, which George Washington rightly described as "love of
power and the proneness to abuse it." For that reason, they realized
that the power of public officers should be defined by laws which they,
as well as the people, are obligated to obey, a truth enunciated by
Daniel Webster when he saitl Uiat "Whatever government is not a
government of laws is a despotism, let it be called what it may."
To the end of insuring a society governed by laws, these men
embodied in our Constitution the enduring principles in which they
so firmly believed, establishing a legislature to make all laws, an
executive to carry them out, and a judicial system to interpret them.
Recently, we have been faced with massive challenges to the historical
framework created in 1787, with the moot recent fears having been
focused upon assertions by administration of both parties of executive
power over the Congress — for example, in the impoundment of appro-
priated funds and the abuse of executive privilege. Those challenges,
however, can and are being dealt with by the working of the system
itself — that is, through the enactment of powerful statutes by the
Congress, and the rendering of decisions by the courts upholding the
lawmaking power of the Congress.
In dealing with the challenges posed by the multitudinous allega-
tions arising ont of the Watergate affair, however, the Select Commit-
tee has a task much more difficult and complex than dealing with
intrusions of one branch of the Government upon the powers of the
others. It must probe into assertions that the very system itself has
been subverted and its foundations shaken.
To safeguard the structural scheme of our governmental system,
the Founding Fathers provided for an electoral process by which the
elected officials of this Nation should be chosen. The Constitution,
later-adopted amendments, and more specifically, statutory law, pro-
vide that the electoral processes shall be conducted by the people,
outside the confines of the formal branches of the Government, and
through a political process that must operate under the strictures of
law and ethical guidelines, but independent of the overwhelming power
of the Government itself. Only then can we be sure that the electoral
process cannot be made to serve as the mere handmaiden of a partic-
ular administration in power.
If the allegations that have been made in the wake of the Watergate
affair are substantiated, there has been a very serious subversion of
the integrity of the electoral process, and the committee will be obliged
to consider the manner in which such a subversion affects the continued
existence of this Nation as a representative democracy, and how, if
we are to survive, such subversions may be prevented in the future.
It has been asserted that the 1972 campaign was influenced by a
wide variety of illegal or unethical activities, including the widespread
wiretapping of the telephones, political headquarters, and even the
residences of candidates and their campaign staffs and of members of
the press; by the publication of forged documents designed to defame
certain candidates or enhance others through fraudulent means; the
infiltration and disruption of opponents' political organizations and
gathering; the raising and handling of campaign contributions
through means designed to circumvent, either in letter or in spirit,
the provisions of campaign disclosure acts; and even the acceptance
of campaign contributions based upon promises of illegal interference
in governmental processes on behalf of the contributors.
Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, it has been alleged that,
following the Watergate break-in, there has been a massive attempt
to cover up all the improper activities, extending even so far as to
pay off potential witnesses and, in particular, the seven defendants in
the Watergate trial in exchange for their promise to remain silent —
activities which, if true, represent interference in the integrity of the
prosecutorial and judicial processes of this Nation. Moreover, there
has been evidence of the use of governmental instrumentalities in
efforts to exercise political surveillance over candidates in the 1972
campaign.
Let me emphasize at the outset that our judicial process thus far
has convicted only the seven persons accused of burglarizing and
wiretapping the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the
Watergate complex on June 17. The hearings which we initiate today
are not designed to intensify or reiterate unfounded accusations or to
poison further the political climate of our Nation. On the contrary,
it is my conviction and that of the other committee members that
the accusations that have been leveled and the evidence of wrongdoing
that has surfaced has cast a black cloud of distrust over our entire
society. Our citizens do not know whom to believe, and many of them
have concluded that all the processes of government have become so
compromised that honest governance has been rendered impossible.
We believe that the health, if not the survival, of our social structure
and of our form of government requires the most candid and public
investigation of all the evidence and of all the accusations that have
been levelled at any persons, at whatever level, who were engaged in
the 1972 campaign. My colleagues on the committee and I are deter-
mined to uncover all the relevant facts surrounding these matters, and
to spare no one, whatever his station in life may be, in our efforts to
accomplish that goal. At the same time, I want to emphasize that the
purpose of these hearings is not prosecutorial or judicial, but rather
investigative and informative.
No one is more cognizant than I of the separation of powers issues
that hover over these hearings. The committee is fully aware of the
ongoing grand jury proceedings that are taking place in several areas
of the country, and of the fact that criminal indictments have been
returned already by one of these grand juries. Like all Americans, the
members of this committee are vitally interested in seeing that the
judicial processes operate effectively and fairly, and without inter-
ference from any other branch of government. The investigation of this
select committee was born of crisis, unabated as of this very time, the
crisis of a mounting loss of confidence by American citizens in the
integrity of our electoral process which is the bedrock of our democracy.
The American people are looking to this committee, as the representa-
tive of all the Congress, for enlightenment and guidance regarding the
details of the allegations regarding the subversion of our electoral and
political processes. As the elected representatives of the people, we
would be derelict in our duty to them if we failed to pursue our mission
expeditiously, fully, and with the utmost fairness. The aim of the
committee is to provide full and open public testimony in order that
the nation can proceed toward the healing of the wounds that now
afflict the body politic. It is that aim that we are here to pursue today,
within the terms of the mandate imposed upon us by our colleagues
and in full compliance with all applicable rules of law. The Nation and
history itself are watching us. We cannot fail our mission.
I would like to put in the record at this time the Rules of Procedure*
and a copy of the resolutions and guidelines of the committee.
I would like to recognize at this time other Senators so they may
present their statements and first I recognize the vice chairman of the
committee. Senator Howard Baker, who has been most alert and most
cooperative in the work of the committee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BAKER OF TENNESSEE
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I believe
there is no need for me to further emphasize the gravity of the matters
that we begin to explore publicly here this morning. Suffice it to say
there are most serious charges and allegations made against individuals,
and against institutions. The very integrity of our political process
itself has been called into question.
* See p. 415.
Commensurate with the gravity of the subject matter under review
and the responsibihties of this committee and the witnesses who come
before it, we have a great burden to discharge and carry. This com-
mittee is not a court, nor is it a jury. We do not sit to pass judgment
on the guilt or innocence of anyone. The greatest service that this
committee can perform for the Senate, the Congress, and for the
people of this Nation is to achieve a full discovery of all of the facts
that bear on the subject of this inquiry. This committee was created by
the Senate to do exactly that. To find as many of the facts, the cir-
cumstances and the relationships as we could, to assemble those facts
into a coherent and intelligible presentation and to make recommen-
dations to the Congress for any changes in statute law or the basic
charter document of the United States that may seem indicated.
But this committee can serve another quite important function that
neither a grand jury investigation nor a jury proceeding is equipped to
serve, and that is to develop the facts in full view of all of the people
of America. Although juries will eventually determine the guilt or the
innocence of persons who have been and may be indicted for specific
violations of the law, it is the American people who must be the final
judge of Watergate. It is the American people who must decide, based
on the evidence spread before them, what Watergate means, about
how we all should conduct our public business in the future.
When the resolution which created this committee was being de-
bated on the floor of the Senate in February of this year, I and other
Republican Senators expressed concern that the inquiry might become
a partisan effort by one party to exploit the temporary vulnerability
of another. Other congressional inquiries in the past had been con-
ducted by committees made up of equal numbers of members from
each party. I offered an amendment to the resolution which would have
given the Republican members equal representation on this committee.
That amendment did not pass. But any doubts that I might have had
about the fairness and impartiality of this investigation have been
swept away during the last few weeks. Virtually every action taken
by this committee since its inception has been taken with complete
unanimity of purpose and procedure. The integrity and fairness of
each member of this committee and of its fine professional staff have
been made manifest to me, and I know they will be made manifest to
the American people during the course of this proceeding. This is not
in any way a partisan undertaking, but, rather it is a bipartisan search
for the unvarnished truth.
I would like to close, Mr. Chairman, with a few thoughts on the
political process in this country. There has been a great deal of dis-
cussion across the country in recent weeks about the impact that
Watergate might have on the President, the office of the Presidency,
the Congress, or our ability to carry on relations with other countries,
and so on. The constitutional institutions of this Republic are so
strong and so resilient that I have never doubted for a moment their
ability to function without interruption. On the contrary, it seems
clear to me the very fact that we are now involved in the public
process of cleaning our own house, before the eyes of the world, is a
mark of the greatest strength. I do not believe that any other political
system could endure the thoroughness and the ferocity of the various
6
inquiries now underway within the branches of Government and in
our courageous, tenacious free press.
No mention is made in our Constitution of poHtical parties. But
the two-party system, in my judgment, is as integral and as important
to our form of government as the three formal branches of the central
Government themselves. Millions of Americans participated actively,
on one level or another, and with great enthusiasm, in the Presiden-
tial election of 1972. This involvement in the political process by citi-
zens across the land is essential to participatory democracy. If one of
the effects of Watergate is public disillusionment with partisan
politics, if people are turned off and drop out of the political system,
this will be the greatest Watergate casualty of all. If, on the other
hand, this national catharsis in which we are now engaged should
result in a new and better way of doing political business, if Water-
gate produces changes in laws and campaign procedures, then Water-
gate may prove to be a great national opportunity to revitalize the
political process and to involve even more Americans in the day-to-
day work of our two great political parties. I am deeply encouraged
by the fact that I find no evidence at this point in time to indicate
that either the Democratic National Committee or the Republican
National Committee played any role in whatever may have gone
wrong in 1972. The hundreds of seasoned political professionals
across this country, and the millions of people who devoted their
time and energies to the campaigns, should not feel implicated or
let down by what has taken place.
With these thoughts in mind, I intend to pursue, as I know each
member of this committee intends to pursue, an objective and even-
handed but thorough, complete, and energetic inc^uiry into the facts.
We will inquire into every fact and follow every lead, unrestrained
by any fear of where that lead might ultimately take us.
Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you for the great leadership you
have brought to this committee in its preparatory phases, and my
thanks to Mr. Dash, who has served with distinction as chief counsel
to the committee and Mr. Thompson, who serves as minority counsel
to the committee. I believe we are fully prepared to proceed with the
business of discovering the facts.
Thank you very much.
Senator Ervin. Thank you for that statement.
Senator Talmadge, do you have a statement?
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TALMADGE OF GEORGIA
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, this committee was created
by the U.S. Senate by unanimous vote for investigating any election
irregularities during the 1972 campaign. The vote of the Senate was
nonpartisan, being unanimous. This committee has been organized on
a nonpartisan basis. Its staff is operating on a nonpartisan basis.
Every vote that this committee has cast to date has been nonpartisan.
In my judgment, this committee must get the facts, the full facts,
and all of the facts on a totally objective, nonpartisan basis and let
the chips fall where they may. I am confident that this committee
will do so.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney .
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GURNEY OF FLORIDA
Senator GuRNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This committee begins today history hearings which may well turn
out to be the most significant hearings ever conducted by any com-
mittee of the Congress. This fact should weigh heavily upon the work
of both the Senators and the staff. The eyes and ears of the citizens
of this Nation are watching and listening and so, too, are people
around the world. Here at home there is desire that the wrongdoing
be thoroughly exposed and the wrongdoers brought to justice. This
is being done now. Already in recent weeks 15 key people have
left this administration because of Watergate and aUied scandals,
several have been indicted, two of these are former high Cabinet
officers. We can all take heart that our system of government is
working and working well and rapidly now even though a slow and
faltering start was made in the beginning. Between the work of
prosecutors, grand jury, excellent investigative reporting and this
committee, Watergate is going to be cleaned up.
However, there is another great overriding issue which will be
present with us in these hearings, an issue which is troubling people
not only all over this Nation but also people and leaders of other
nations around the world. What will Watergate do and what will
these hearings do to the office and institution of the Presidency?
That is the question that is uppermost in people's minds and gnawing
away in the pits of their stomachs. What is of great concern is the
effect that Watergate may have on the American Presidency.
I see this concern in daily mail I receive. I hear this concern in
my conversations with people. It is evident in the media reaction
at home and abroad. The signs are in the stockmarket, in the price
of gold and dollars. This concern is part and parcel of foreign policy,
in NATO, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and its oil and in the trade
and SALT talks. The absence of comment from seats of government
and power throughout the world brings to mind the old saying "Don't
rock the boat lest we capsize," and I think this is indicative of the
national concern.
Why is this? The world is intertwined today, interdependent, no
one nation can go it alone. Indeed, to a more-or-less degree we are in
the same boat. Thus, the rocking of the boat by Watergate, its cata-
strophic effect upon the institution of the Presidency, is indeed the
object of serious concern of everyone at home and abroad.
What then must we do here in this committee room in the ensuing
weeks?
Someone once said, and I quote: "The present is fraught with the
future," and so it will be with these hearings. The future cannot be
unaffected by what we do and say in this room. It becomes imperative
that this committee, the committee staff, and the press and public
alike be continually aware that the committee's task is to investigate
and present the facts of the investigation failure. This committee
was not created to try any individual. It was not created to pass
judgment on any individual. Our purpose is to seek the truth, and our
methods and motives must never be suspect or we will fail in our
task. The sense of history certainly rides with these hearings. And
this thought should guide our work to the ends that it be thorough,
yes, completely thorough, but always careful, deliberate, responsible
8
statesmanlike to the end that the system of government and justice
of a free and a democratic society, these United States will work its
will in a fair and impartial and objective manner. By doing that the
committee hopefully can make its greatest contribution and that is,
regardless of the consequences to reaffirm, to reassure, to reestablish the
faith of the people in their Government and its leaders.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR INOTJYE OF HAWAII
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, the hearings which we begin today
may be the most important held in this century. At stake is the very
integrity of the election process. Unless we can safeguard that process
from fraud, manipulation, deception, and other illegal or unethical
activities, one of our most precious rights, the right to vote, will be
without meaning. Democracy will have been subverted.
Mr. Chairman, as I see it, our mission is twofold. First, to thoroughly
investigate all allegations of improper activities in the 1972 Presidential
election so that the full truth will be known and, second, to take steps
to prevent future occurrences of such activities. Our efforts should not
be directed toward punishing the guilty — there are judicial processes
with that aim underway in at least four cities — but to initiate a nation-
wide public debate on our elections and are they w^orking or have they
failed to work?
Like most Americans I have been truly shocked by the revelations
and allegations of the scandal which is unparalleled in our country's
history. The sins of the spies or the saboteurs, the manipulators or
moneymen, the burglars or the buggers must be purged from the very
heart and soul of the election processes.
Mr. Chairman, I must add a word of caution. We have heard many
sensational charges in the past several months and undoubtedly we
will hear many more in the weeks and months ahead. It is vital that
hasty judgments not be made before we have all the facts. This
country will be ill served by another period of McCarthyism. These
hearings should serve to enlighten and to reform. They should lay the
groundwork for a reaffirmation of faith in our American system.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WEICKER OF CONNECTICUT
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
the gut c^uestion before this committee is not one of individual guilt
or innocence. The gut question for the committee and country alike
is and was how much truth do we want? A few men gambled that
Americans wanted the quiet of efficiency rather than the turbulence
of truth. And they were stopped a yard short of the goal by another
few, who believed in America as advertised.
So the story to come has its significance not in the acts of men
breaking, entering, and bugging the Watergate, but in the acts of men
who almost — who almost — stole America.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
9
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOK MONTOYA OF NEW MEXICO
Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Briefly, I want to say
that we bear a heavy responsibiUty to conduct this inquiry fairly,
justly, and most judiciously. I am confident that we will pass this
test and assume this challenge. While a legislative inquiry is dif-
ferent from a court proceeding, I know that we will be respectful of
the rights of individuals, but at the same time, we will be intent on
searching out the truth of all evidentiary components which ostensibly
have posed a threat to our constitutional processes, in particular,
our concept of freedom and our electoral process. With these facts,
we hope to alert the conscience and the vigilance of our citizens and
restore their faith in our electoral process. We hope that this concern
of all Americans will hover over all of us as a mandate for legislation
and other remedies to insure against any future sinister invasions
of the sanctity of our democratic institutions.
Senator Ervin. Counsel will call the first witness,
Mr. Dash. Will Mr. Robert Odle please come to the witness
table?
Senator Ervin. Mr. Odle, stand up and raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the evidence you shall give to the Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Odle. I do; so help me God.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Odle, I understand you have a brief statement
that you wish to read to the committee.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT C. ODLE, JR., FORMER DIRECTOR OF
ADMINISTRATION, COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE
PRESIDENT
Mr. Odle. Thank you. I would like to use this opportunity to
make just one brief point. I joined the staff of the Committee for the
Re-Election of the President more than 2 years ago because I believed
in President Nixon and in his hopes and dreams for America. I still
do.
During my association with the committee, I came into contact
with more than 400 members of its national staff, salaried and vol-
unteer. It now appears tragically that some of those people have
acted unethically. Indeed, two former members of the staff have
been convicted of crimes and if others are guilty, I hope that they will
be exposed and prosecuted. These hearings will help in that purpose.
The point I want to make is this, that when we discuss the com-
mittee, we should remember that in addition to those who did wrong
and who did act unethically, there were a million volunteers across
the Nation and 400 people at national headquarters who did nothing
unethical or illegal. They joined in the campaign because they be-
lieved in the President, a President who opened a door to China,
all too long closed, a President who traveled to Russia and signed
substantive agreements while there; a President who brought an
end to the longest war in our history. I found those hundreds of
10
people with whom I worked for 2 years, most of them, to be among
the finest, most decent, hard working Americans I have ever met and
I was proud to be associated with them in the cause of reelecting a
man who I feel will ultimately be regarded as one of the greatest
Presidents this Nation has ever known.
I want to associate myself with the spirit and the substance of the
opening statements of the Senators which I just heard. I have been
and want to continue to be of assistance to the Senate select com-
mittee in any way I can and I appreciate the opportunity to make
this statement.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Odle, for the record, would you please state
your name and address?
Mr. Odle. Robert C. Odle, Jr., 309 North St. Asaph Street, Alex-
andria, Va.
Mr. Dash. What is your present occupation?
Mr. Odle. I am presently a consultant to the Committee To Re-
Elect the President.
Mr. Dash. Prior to that time, what position did you hold with the
Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. I was director of administration for the committee
from May 1, 1971, until approximately May 1, 1973.
Mr. Dash. Can you tell us when the Committee for the Re-Elec-
tion of the President was set up?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir; it was set up and announced, I believe, on
May 11, 1971.
Mr. Dash. Can you state briefly — for what purpose the Committee
for the Re-Election of the President was set up?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir. In the year 1971, a number of people began to
look at the 1972 campaign. There was the thought that people would
have to be getting to work full time to the President's campaign. They
did not want those people to remain on a government payroll or on a
White House payroll. They did not want that activity at the Repub-
lican National Committee, because at that point, it appeared the
President might have competition in the primaries from two Congress-
men and it would be particularly inappropriate for the RNC to house
Presidential campaign activities. Therefore, the Committee for the
Re-Election of the President was set up in May of 1971.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Odle, who were the initial persons who came
over and formed the Committee To Re-Elect the President or give
it its start?
Mr. Odle. There was Mr. Jeb Magruder, Mr. Harry S. Flemming,
Mr. Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., myself. Dr. Robert Marik, Mr. Herbert
Porter, and a number of secretaries who went there to assist us.
Mr. Dash. Now, of those persons, could you identify who had
positions at the White House before they came over to the committee?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir; Mr. Porter, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Flemming had
been at the White House; he left the White House and went into
private business and then came to the committee, but he had been
there before, and Mr. Sloan, and myself.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Odle, will you please go to the chart.*
Have you seen that chart prior to this hearing?
Mr. Odle, would you first state what that chart purports to be?
•See exhibit No. 5, p. 11.
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Mr. Odle. Yes; this is a chart of the Committee for the Re-Election
of the President until 1972, the initial part of 1972.
Mr. Dash. Up until what time?
Mr. Odle. Up until July 1972.
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir; it is a part of the records that the campaign
staff had asked for.
Mr. Dash. Did you help prepare that chart?
Mr. Odle. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. Does that chart accurately reflect the structure of the
committee?
Mr. Odle. Yes, it does.
Mr. Dash. Could you please point out the particular persons on the
chart and the roles that they played for the committee?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash, the other point I was going; to make is this also shows
the Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President in addition to this
committee and the budget committee between the two committees.
Mr. Dash. What was the difference between the Committee To
Re-Elect the President and the Finance Committee To Re-Elect the
President?
Mr. Odle. The essential function of the Finance Committee To
Re-Elect the President was to raise the necessary funds for the
campaign, to account for them, to keep records, to allocate the funds.
The job of the Committee To Re-Elect the President was to conduct
the national campaign activities. The budget committee between
the two committees was made up of representatives of each and the
function of the budget committee in effect was to decide how cam-
paign dollars ought to be allocated — in other words, how the pie
was sliced.
Mr. Dash. Now, would you point out principally the key persons
on that chart and just briefly state what their position was in the
committee?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Francis Dale, who was president and publisher of
the Cincinnati Enquirer. He was chairman of the Committee for the
Re-Election of the President. Mr. Mitchell, formerly Attorney General,
was campaign director. Mr. La Rue was special assistant to campaign
director. There were eight cochairmen under Mr. Dale, who served,
distinguished citizens from around the country. There were three
divisions. The political division contained five political coordinators.
Their job was to divide the 50 States among them and to organize
State reelection committees in each State — the various other national
programs under Mr. Magruder. Mr. Reisner was his administrative
assistant.
Do you want me to go through all these?
Mr. Dash. No, just the names.
On that chart, you have Mr. Magruder and Mr. Reisner as the
appointment secretary. What was the role of Mr. McCord who appears
on that chart?
Does he in fact appear on that chart?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, he does; he appears here under me. Mr. McCord
was one of about five assistants who worked for me. His job was
office security.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you have
Mr. Odle. That is what he was hired for, office security.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you have Mr. Lidd}- appearing on that chart?
13
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir. Actually, what was done here is an asterisk
was used. Mr. Liddy was general counsel of the Committee for the
Re-Election of the President from December 1 to April 11, 1972.
About the time that the new campaign legislation was taking effect,
Mr. Liddy moved from here to here, the finance committee, where
he became general counsel of that. He was replaced here on April 1.
Mr. Dash. Now, did Mr. Sloan appear on that chart?
Mr. Odle. Yes; Mr. vSloan was treasurer of the finance committee.
Mr. Dash. And do you have Mr. Stans appearing on that chart?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Stans was chairman of the finance committee.
Mr. Dash. And I see Mr. Kalmbach above, in a little box above
Mr. Stans.
Would you explain what Mr. Kalmbach's relation was on that chart?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Kalmbach was associate chairman on the finance
committee until April, the predecessor of the finance committee, the
Fmance Committee for the Re-Election of the President. I do not
believe he had an official role in the campaign after April, although I
believe he assisted Mr. Stans.
Mr. Dash. Now, do we have the chart, the finance committee
chart?*
Now, could you find Mr. Liddy on that chart?
Mr. Odle. Yes; he was counsel.
Mr. Dash. What period did that chart represent — the role of the
finance committee?
Mr. Odle. I would say basically from April to November.
Now, within that time period, various changes were made in indi-
viduals, but that is the basic structure of the finance committee as I
understand it from April 7 until November.
Mr. Dash. Now who was Sally Harmony appearing in that chart?
Mr. Odle. Mrs. Harmony was Mr. Liddy's secretary.
Mr. Dash. Would you just go back now to the first chart for the
moment? Does Mr. La Rue appear on that chart?
Mr. Odle. Yes; Mr. La Rue is right here, special assistant to the
campaign director.
Mr. Dash. Is Mr. Mardian on that chart?
Mr. Odle. At that time, Mr. Mardian was a political coordinator,
one of the five in the political division.
Mr. Dash. Does Mr. Malek appear in that chart?
Mr. Odle. No; Mr. Malek was not a full-time member of the staff
at that time.
Mr. Dash. Would you of your own knowledge or opinion — and
if opinion, express how you have that opinion — those of the original
shift from the White House to the committee? How Mr. Magruder
came over to the committee? Who appointed the various persons
who came over to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President?
Mr. Odle. My understanding at that point in time was that
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell had asked Mr. Magruder to assume
that position.
Mr. Dash. Who appointed Mr. Sloan, to your knowledge?
Mr. Odle. I believe at that point, Mr. Haldeman asked Mr. Sloan
to come over. I can't say, sir, that I know who appointed him but my
best knowledge at that point was that Mr. Haldeman had asked
Mr. Sloan to come to the committee.
•See exhibit No. 6, p. 15.
14
Mr. Dash. Is it your opinion that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman
were playing principal roles in selecting key people for the committee?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Odle, you may be seated. Referring back to
your first chart, the chart which depicts your organization when
Mr. Mitchell was director of the committee, your budget committee,
I believe you said your budget committee was comprised of members
of both the finance committee and the Committee To Re-Elect; is
that correct?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Thompson. What about Mr. Malek? Where was he employed?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Malek came to the committee on a full-time basis
July 1 as his deputy campaign director. He, in addition to that, before
exercised some supervisory function over some of the citizens groups
and also sat in on budget committee meetings.
Mr. Thompson. Was he at the White House prior to this time?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Did he sit in on budget committee meetings at
some time when he was at the White House?
Mr. Odle. I believe so.
Mr. Thompson. Your name is not within this box here, but did
you in fact come to budget committee meetings?
Mr. Odle. Yes; I did.
Mr. Thompson. Who presided over those meetings?
Mr. Odle. I would say the campaign director and the finance
chairman jointly. That would have been Mr. Mitchell up until July 1,
Mr. MacGregor thereafter, and the finance chairman, Mr. Stans.
Mr. Thompson. With regard to Mr. Stans, was his role limited to
raising money or did Mr. Stans also participate in the decision as to
how money would be allocated?
Mr. Odle. I think that Mr. Stans, in the budget meetings, certainly
kept an eye on where the money was going. He sometimes challenged
expenditures. He would say, for example, do we reallj^- need to spend
this amount of money on television advertising this next week.
Yes; he was an active participant in the budget committee meetings.
Mr. Thompson. He voiced his opinion and took some participation
in how the money was being spent, as well as raising money?
Mr. Odle. Yes; he generally tried to put a brake on the spending,
questioning whether expenditures in various categories were needed.
Mr. Thompson. Were all expenditures approved by him, or all
major expenditures approved by him?
Mr. Odle. I would say that in the budget committee sessions, his
agreement was necessary before we could allocate a great deal of
money, say, for television advertising the following week; yes, those
kinds of major decisions.
Mr. Thompson. How large a sum of money would he have to be
talking about before he would normally concern himself?
Mr. Odle. Sir, I couldn't put a number on it. It would be difficult
to do that. It would depend on the kind of thing we are talking about.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Odle, in looking at your chart, is it fair to
assume that from this organization chart, that when Mr. Mitchell was
director, he had more direct control or day-to-day control over the
15
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operations of the committee than when Mr. MacGregor was running
it?
Mr. Odle. From all the outward appearances that there were, I
think Mr. MacGregor shared equally in the role as campaign director
that Mr. Mitchell did.
Mr. Thompson. When Mr. MacGregor took over, it appears that
the citizens division and the political division were then answerable
to Mr. Malek, then the campaign director?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. That was not Mr. Mitchell's situation, was it?
Mr. Odle. No; it was not. What happened there was to take the
two groups of national programs, the two kinds of field programs, the
citizens programs could be called horizontal — the field programs and
the political programs, the State by State select committees — what
you might call vertical programs and they were merged under a second,
deputy campaign director.
Mr. Thompson. Would it be accurate to say that all department
heads reported directly to Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. Odle. I would say that they reported to Mr. Mitchell through
one of the two deputy campaign directors generally. In other words,
the director of the political division reported to the campaign director
through the deputy. The director of the polling operation reported to
the campaign director through the deputy.
Mr. Thompson. But the deputies are part of the division them-
selves, aren't they? So would not the division heads themselves, in
effect, report directly to Mr. Mitchell on substantive matters?
Mr. Odle. Sir, can we clarify who we have got here as division
heads? If you mean that Mr. Magruder and Mr. Malek are division
heads ; yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. All right. What about Mr. Mardian? What about
the political division? Mr. Flemming?
Mr. Odle. Which chart are we looking at right now?
Mr. Thompson. I am looking at the first chart.*
Mr. Odle. The first chart, yes, at that point in time, those five
men reported to the campaign director directly. Those five political
coordinators. That was before there was a second deputy.
Mr. Thompson. All right, that situation was not present when Mr.
MacGregor was campaign director?
Mr. Odle. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. So, in effect, there was m^ore direct control or
more direct relationship between the division heads when Mr.
Mitchell was director, according to the chart.
Mr. Odle. In that sense, yes.
Mr. Thompson. Normally, were all decision memorandums ulti-
mately going through Mr. Mitchell when he was campaign director?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Of course, this chart does not reflect any formal
relationships with the committee or the members of the committee.
Mr. Odle. No, it is an organizational chart.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Liddy here is under the finance committee.
He was with the Committee To Re-Elect previous to what, December
10?
*Chart, exhibit 5 appears on p. 11.
17
Mr. Odle. From sometime in December until approximately April 1,
correct.
Mr. Thompson. Do yoa know the reasons for his transfer from the
Committee To Re-Elect to the finance committee?
Mr. Odle. I think there were two reasons, principally. First, was
that the finance committee found itself a great deal busier because of
this new Federal campaign legislation. The recordkeeping and the
work that had to be done of an administrative nature became very
great and Mr. vStans felt a full-time counsel was needed at that point
in the finance committee. Mr. Liddy found an office on the second
floor and he was down there working and it was just kind of a natural
thing for him to become this new counsel. In addition to that, I do not
think that he and Mr. Magruder were exactly on the best of terms at
that point.
Mr. Thompson. Was the finance committee physically separated
from the Committee To Re-Elect?
Mr. Odle. Initially everyone occupied one suite. Later on the
finance committee remained in that suite and everybody else moved
to different floors, and so at that point in time the finance committee
did occupy a separate suite.
Mr. Thompson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Can you tell me, I think it was stated but I did
not quite get it, how many men came from the White House staff
to the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. Initially, sir?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Odle. Initially, in May of 1971 there would have been Mr.
Magruder, Mr. Flemming, Mr. Sloan, Mr. Porter, myself, and two
secretaries.
Senator Ervin. Who subsequently came from the White House
staff to the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. Well, sir, a number of the people we see on those charts
did. I could point them out for you.
Senator Ervin. Suppose you go to the chart and identify the ones
who subsequentlv came from the White House staff to the Committee
To Re-Elect the' President.
Mr. Odle. I probably should use this chart.
Mr. Magruder — —
Mr. Dash. Identify that chart for us.
Mr. Odle. I am sorry, this is the July 1 chart. Is that the chart
you would like me to review. Senator, the second chart?*
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Odle. Mr. MacGregor was counsel to the President for
Congressional Relations, Mr. Flemming, I mentioned before, Mr.
LaRue had been a consultant, I had been at the White House, Mr.
Faust had been in the scheduling office at the White House,
Mr. Timmons was still there, he never was a member of the staff
but just exercised sort of supervisory responsibility for the convention.
Mr. Shumway had come from the White House as I said earlier,
Mr. Porter had come from the White House. Mr. Malek had come from
the White House, Mr. Chotiner had come from the White House.
Senator Ervin. Where does his name appear on the chart?
Mr. Odle. Pardon?
•See exhibit No. 7, p. 19.
18
Senator Ervin. The last person.
Mr. Odle. Mr. Chotiner, he was director of ballot security. Mr.
Compitan, one of our regional directors came from the White House.
I believe that is all.
Senator Ervin. Is it correct to say that most of the people in posi-
tions of authority, of the highest authorit}^ in the Committee To Re-
Elect the President, came originally from the White House staff?
Mr. Odle. Well, the campaign director, his chief deputies certainly
did. Most of the people from the finance committee did not, and I
would say that among the most divisions that reported to the two
deputy campaign directors it is about evenly split.
Senator Ervin. The head of the committee was former Attorney
General John Mitchell, who occupied the office of Attorney General
until about March 1972, did he not?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And then he became the chairman of the Committee
To Ee-Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you know when he actually assumed super-
vision of the committee?
Mr. Odle. He, I believe, resigned as Attorney General in February
and came to the committee in March, but he took a vacation in
Florida, I do not believe it was until around April that he became
involved in the campaign.
Senator Ervin. Did he have anything to do with the committee
prior to the time of his resignation as Attorney General?
Mr. Odle. Major decision memorandums were sent to him for de-
cision.
Senator Ervin. Decision memorandums were subject to his approval?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Ervin. Before he left the Attorney General's office?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Ervin. Now, what relationship, if any, did Mr. Bob
Haldeman have with the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. No official relationship, of course, but Mr. Haldeman
was assistant to the President and he, I know, was interested in what
the committee was doing, what its programs were and how it was
helping in the reelection of the President.
Senator Ervin. Did he ever give instructions to anybody on the
committee that you know of?
Mr. Odle. Well, he did not become involved directly in that he
had an assistant who worked for him who from time to time, was in
touch with members of the committee.
Senator Ervin. Who was the assistant?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Gordon Strachan.
Senator Ervin. Do you know John Dean HI?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Did he have contacts with the committee from
time to time?
Mr. Odle. I believe that he did.
Senator Ervin. Who had authority to direct the expenditure of
money on the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
19
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20
Mr. Odle. Basically, of course, the budget committee, and then
various divisional managers could, within the confines of that which
had been approved by the budget committee, authorize things. I
authorized for most of the staff members reimbursement for travel
expenses and that sort of thing. Ultimately it would have been the
deputy campaign director, campaign director and the finance chair-
man.
Senator Ervin. As I understand from your testimony, Mr. Kalm-
bach was on the Committee To Re-Elect the President prior
Mr. Odle. Sir, there were two finance committees. When Mr. Stans
resigned as Secretary of Commerce he came to the committee. There
was a Finance Committee for the Re-Election of the President. Mr.
Kalmbach was associate chairman of that committee. Then as the
April 7 deadline approached at the time when the new legislation went
into effect, Mr. Stans, I believe, was anxious that a new committee
begin with a fresh start and 1 do not believe Mr. Kalmbach served
as an officer of that new committee which was known as the Finance
Committee To Re-Elect the President.
Senator Ervin. There was no association between the Committee
To Re-Elect the President and the Republican National Committee
was there?
Mr. Odle. Well, technically, no. In advance of the convention, but
most evervbody at the Republican National Committee was anxious
that the President be reelected and obviously there was a great deal
of work back and forth.
Senator Ervin. But they were in effect separate organizations?
Mr. Odle. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, did Mr. Magruder have any authority to
direct anyone to disburse funds?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Ervin. Can you tell me which members of the Committee
To Re-Elect the President had such authority?
Mr. Odle. Well, you would have — let me start explaining it this
way. Any one of the directors and in any one of these various divisions
had the responsibility to initiate requests for expenditures of funds and
they would pass up through the deputies and up to the campaign
director.
Senator Ervin. And the actual authorization for expenditure did
not come from the heads of divisions, however? They merely made
the requests though, the recommendations?
Mr. Odle. I would say, Senator, a little of each quite honestly.
Let us say, for example, that the director of one of these various divi-
sions wanted to purchase a hundred briefcases for his 50 State chair-
men and vice chairmen to put materials in for their programing. He
would theoretically fill out a check request form and that would go
to his divisional head and then possibly, if I were involved in that, to
the treasurer's office and the check would be written.
Senator Ervin. Now, who had authority to direct the outlay of
substantial sums of money? I would like to have all of the names if
you can give it to us.
Mr. Odle. Well, 1 really cannot answer that. I really do not know,
Senator.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Hugh Sloan was the treasurer of the finance
committee, was he not?
21
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And he was the man who actually disbursed sums
when substantial sums were called for, did he not?
Mr. Odle. As I understand, sir.
Senator Ervin. Do you know what control Mr. Stans had over
the disbursement of funds?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Stans was the finance chairman.
Senator Ervin. In the normal course the finance chairman would
be concerned with the collection of campaign contributions. Did
he have authority, any authority in respect to the disbursement of
them?
Mr. Odle. Ultimately, I think that authority would be his. If
I were to speculate on how much he used the authority that would
just be purely speculation on my part.
Senator Ervin. What about Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. Odle. Well, Mr. Mitchell would not have disbursed any
money, because he had no money, I mean, he had no custody of any
money.
Senator Ervin. Did he have authority or did he exercise authority
to direct expenditure of funds?
Mr. Odle. Yes; I think with Mr. Stans he would have had author-
ity to directly disburse funds. Whether or not he exercised or not
would be pure speculation.
Senator Ervin. What about Mr. Jeb Stuart Magruder?
Mr. Odle. Magruder. I would think in his capacity as deputy
campaign director he would have.
Senator Ervin. How many employees do you say the Committee
To Re-Elect the President had on the books at the time?
Mr. Odle. Over 400.
Senator Ervin. Well, I would like to state that so far as I know,
the committee has no evidence to contradict the assertion that the
overwhelming majority of the men and women who worked on the
Committee To Re- Elect the President were law abiding, conscientious
citizens, and also would like to say as far as I know, that the statement
of Senator Baker to the effect that we have no information thus far
that either the Democratic National Committee or the Republican
National Committee had any personnel who had allegedly committed
any wrongs or alleged unethical action, in fairness I commend that
statement of Senator Baker.
Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I think
counsel has done a very thorough job of inquiring of the witness of the
details of the CRP organizational chart during relevant times in the
1972 Presidential campaign. I will not burden these proceedings by
trying to elaborate on them or to extend into other areas, but there
are other areas, Mr. Odle, that we would like to talk to you about, and
I understand that you are agreeable to returning to this committee
so that we might discuss other aspects of your knowledge of other
matters.
Mr. Odle. Absolutely.
Senator Baker. With that understanding, then, and without im-
plying any sinister purpose, but rather with the full understanding
that you will return, there are other questions on other matters that
22
I want to discuss with you later but I will forego that so that we can
continue with the description of the organization of the Committee
To Re -Elect the President.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Odle, you may be seated, I have only two
or three very brief questions.
Are you aware of any actual political campaign experience in Mr.
Magruder's background?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, I believe he was involved in the 1968 campaign
in southern California.
Senator Talmadge. How about Mr. Sloan?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, he was involved in the national finance com-
mittee in 1968 in New York.
Senator Talmadge. How about Mr. Mardian?
Mr. Odle. Bob Mardian. Yes, he was, I cannot remember his exact
title. He was very actively involved, I believe in the 1968 campaign.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Flemming?
Mr. Odle. Yes, Mr. Flemming was, too. He was one of the regional
directors of the 1968 campaign. He also was active in Virginia politics.
He was elected in Virginia.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Porter?
Mr. Odle. I do not know. I do not think so.
Senator Talmadge. Was that political activity of the gentleman
you mentioned similar to the committee organization that you had
in the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. Did they do similar things?
Senator Talmadge. Yes; was the election experience in previous
campaigns similar to what you had?
Mr. Odle. Some of them were. In the cases of Mr. Flemming and
Mr. Mardian, yes, in the case of Mr. Magruder, I do not think so.
Senator Talmadge. You testified in response to a question, that this
has little relationship, if any, between the Committee To Re-Elect the
President and the Republican National Committee. In view of that
fact would it be fair to say that the Committee To Re-Elect the
President was in fact the campaign instrument solely under the control
of the President and his top White House staff?
Mr. Odle. I would say that the Committee for the Re-Election of
the President was formed exclusively to reelect the President. It had
that as its one concern and its one goal.
Senator Talmadge. Since there was no cooperation between
the
Mr. Odle. Oh, yes, sir; there was close cooperation between the
two.
Senator Talmadge. I thought you stated in response to a previous
question there was very little cooperation.
Mr. Odle. I meant, what I think I said and what I hoped to say
was there was no technical or legal relationship between the two. It
eventually would have been improper but I also said I think that
everybody at the National Committee was doing everything they could
for the President and that, in fact there were relationships between the
two committees.
Senator Talmadge. Why was it necessary to have two committees
then?
23
Mr. Odle. Because, the President was but a candidate for the
nomination prior to the convention. Now I do not think there was any,
there was very much doubt that the President would triumph but
there was, there was a distinct possibiHty of a challenge from Congress-
man McCloskey and challenge from Congressman Ashbrook and there
were contradictions. I do not think it would have been proper for a
body to work for a candidate, for President Nixon with two other
challengers.
Senator Talmadge. Was there any doubt as to his nomination?
Mr. Odle. We hoped not. We were working so it would not be, but
if you recall we were faced with — we were looking back at a situation,
we were looking back at Senator McCarthy's challenge to President
Johnson in 1968 in New Hampshire and how effective that challenge
was.
Senator Talmadge. It has been my experience, it is difficult enough
to keep one campaign committee straight. When you have two in the
field, it only complicates the problem. I repeat the question. You have
testified that a multiplicity of people came from the White House direct
to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. Is it fair to
say that that committee was set up, organized, and directed from the
White House?
Mr. Odle. I would say this: That I would say that those people
who were at the White House had influence over the committee, they
gave it direction, they assisted it but the campaign director of course
was not at the White House, he came from the Justice Department.
And so — [laughter] — I do not mean to try to get around your
question, Senator, I am just saying that it was not exclusively a
White House vehicle, 1 do not believe.
Senator Talmadge. There was no doubt as to where the ultimate
authority lay in that committee was there?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Odle, pursuing the line of questioning that Senator Talmadge
was engaged in, do you know whether at any time the Committee To
Re-Elect ever received any instruction from Robert Dole, the chair-
man of the Republican National Committee?
Mr. Odle. Well, Senator Dole was actively involved, of course, in
the campaign and I know he worked very closely with Mr. Mitchell
and Mr. MacGregor. 1 do not know that Mr. Dole, Senator Dole
would instruct Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Mitchell would instruct Senator
Dole but they certainly worked together.
Senator Gurney. But he was not actively involved in the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, he was chairman of the Republican National
Committee.
Senator Gurney. Do you know whether any Republican National
Committee people were brought over to the Committee To Re-Elect
the President?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, there were people from the National Committee
working at the committee in later stages.
Senator Gurney. Do you recall how many?
Mr. Odle. 1 do not think a great number, I would say less than 10.
24
Senator Gurney. Do you recall what positions they had?
Mr. Odle. To the best of my knowledge, they were working in the
political field.
Senator Gurney. Do you recall whether any people who were key
people on the Committee To Re-Elect the President had ever been
public officeholders before?
Mr. Odle. Well, Mr. MacGregor, of course, was. He was a Con-
gressman from Minnesota.
Senator Gurney. Aside from him.
Mr. Odle. Mr. Flemming was, I think, the first Republican ever
elected to the Alexandria Council. Mr. Mardian has been active in
Arizona and California politics. I don't know that he has been elected.
I don't see any other names I recognize.
Senator Gurney. Was the Committee To Re-Elect the President
involved in any other political campaigns in 1972, the reelection of
Republicans, other than the campaign to reelect the President?
Mr. Odle. It certainly did what it could, I believe, to be of assistance.
Senator Gurney. Well, could you amplify that? Did it directly
involve itself in any other Republican campaigns?
Mr. Odle. Well, I know that when Mr. Flemming became specia
assistant to the campaign director after July, he actively worked with
the Senate and House campaign committees, I believe, in support of
other Congressmen, Republican candidates for high office.
Senator Gurney. What did he do?
Mr. Odle. I am not familiar, sir, with the specific activities.
Senator Gurney. Well, were there any other — can you describe the
policy meetings of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, where
decisions were made what to do about the campaign, or discussions
were had about the campaign?
Mr. Odle. Sir, there was a strategy board. I did not attend those
meetings.
Senator Gurney. Who served on the strategy board?
Mr. Odle. Well, there was Mr. Magruder, there was, I believe,
Mr. Clifford Miller from California. I think Mr. Daly, I didn't go to
the meetings and I can't remember all the people who did.
Senator Gurney. Well, wasn't Mr. Mitchell involved in the policy
meetings?
Mr. Odle. I don't believe he went to those sessions. I believe those
were brought to him in the forms of memorandums.
Senator Gurney. These are the only people that you know that
engaged in any policy meetings?
Mr. Odle. Well, those are the ones I can remember right now off
the tip of my tongue who went to those. I think there were strategy
meetings.
Senator Gurney. How was strategy disseminated from these policy
meetings?
Mr. Odle. Sir, that was not my area. I am sorry, I can't answer
that.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever receive any instructions from any-
body in the White House during your service on the Committee To
Re-Elect?
Mr. Odle. I talked from time to time to Mr. Strachan, who was
the White House liaison. He made some suggestions and ideas. I
believe he said at one time the switchboard was overloaded and over-
25
burdened and he had trouble getting in, would I please hire another
telephone operator. That was the only instruction I remember. There
may have been others.
Senator Gurney. What was the nature of your discussions with
him other than the switchboard?
Mr. Odle. Well, just general things relating to my own activities.
I was in charge of personnel and I was in charge of volunteers, and
things like that.
Senator Gurney. Were your conversations in the nature of a report
to him?
A'Ir. Odle. No, not really. We provided on several occasions reports
and copies of memorandums to Mr. Strachan so he would know what
was going on.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever see, in the course of your duties,
White House personnel in the Committee To Re-Elect office?
Mr. Odle. Oh, yes.
Senator Gurney. Who were they?
Mr. Odle. Well, various people from the White House would come
over into the committee from time to time. The committee was there
for 2 years. The President came over one night and shook hands. There
were a number of White House officials that came to the committee
from time to time.
Senator Gurney. Who made frequent visits?
Mr. Odle. There was a convention strategy group that was looking
into the convention that met at the
Senator Gurney. Who were they?
Mr. Odle. It was made up of representatives of the Republican
National Committee, the committee, and
Senator Gurney. I am talking about White House people.
Mr. Odle. The White House people. That is what I was going to
get to. Mr. Timmons came over from time to time.
Senator Gurney. Anybody else in connection with the convention?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Carruthers, Mr. Goode.
Senator Gurney. What other people came over from time to time?
Mr. Odle. I just can't remember right now, Senator, exactly who it
was who came to the committee from the White House. It was a very
busy time.
Senator Gurney. Well, did you ever see Mr. Haldeman in the
office to Re-elect?
Mr. Odle. Only once. That was when the President came to shake
hands with staff members.
Senator Gurney. And what about Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Odle. I never — I saw him there once.
Senator Gurney. Do you know what his mission was at that time?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Gurney. Or did you just see him come in?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, I just saw him.
Senator Gurney. And Mr. Dean? Did you ever see him come there?
Mr. Odle. Yes, I saw Mr. Dean a couple of times.
Senator Gurney. Do you know what his purposes were when he
visited?
Mr. Odle. No, I do not.
26
Senator Gurney. Do you know anything about the surveillance
operations that may have been conducted by the Committee To Re-
Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. Absolutely not.
Senator Gurney. Do you know anything about any of the sabotage
operations that may have been conducted by the Committee To Re- Elect
the President?
Mr. Odle. Only what I have read in the newspapers.
Senator Gurney. I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Odle, this morning's Washington Post suggests that Mr. Charles
Colson organized at least 30 groups of supporters of President Nixon
to "attack" network news correspondents through ^vrite-in, telephone,
and telegram campaigns to their local stations. I know that one of your
committee charts lists an E. Failer and shows that his area of respon-
sibility is designated as "attack." Who is Mr. E. Failer and what was
he?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Edward Failer was basically, as the chart suggests,
in the attack operation. The idea there was, as I understand it, and I
was not close to it. The idea was to see what the opposition candidate
was saying that day or that week to get an idea what his line was. what
his pitch was that day and then to mobilize some of the other campaign
activities against that, to criticize them, in effect, to say, no, you are
wrong, Senator, it ought to be this way.
That was the basic idea. For example, he would maybe talk to a
couple of his surrogates, who were members of the Cabinet and others
who were speaking up for the President around the country. He would
say, look, maybe we ought to use this line this week in attacking
Senator McGovern. Or then he might go to the press oflBce and say,
maybe we should put out a press release doing thus and so.
That generally is my idea of what he was involved in.
Senator Inouye. He was not involved in the attack of news corre-
spondents?
Mr. Odle. Well, not to my knowledge.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Odle, press reports have indicated that you
participated in the destruction of committee records following the
June 17 break-in at the Democratic national headquarters. What was
your part, if any, in the destruction of these records?
Mr. Odle. I am glad you brought that up, Senator, because I
appreciate the chance to respond to that. There was a story in the
newspapers that I shredded documents the Sunday after the Water-
gate. In point of fact, I was not even in the District of Columbia the
Sunday after the Watergate. How that story got there, I do not know.
But I did not even enter Washington, D.C., that day.
Now, there was another report later on and that report said that I
made a file search and then shredded documents. Again in point of
fact, as administrative officer of the reelection committee, the agents
from the FBI would come to me from time to time and they would ask
me for various documents. Initially, they wanted Mr. McCord's W-4
forms and all sorts of documents that the committee had. And I did
search files in response to those legitimate requests from the U.S.
Attorney and the FBI. 1 then handed over those documents to the
27
FBI. 1 did not shred one document in relation to this campaign, in
relation to any of these things.
Senator Inouye. Did you have a shredding machine in your office?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. Where was the shredding machine?
Mr. Odle. There were shredding machines located on most of the
floors, in a convenient point.
Senator Inouye. As administrative officer, you were not involved
in any shredding?
Mr. Odle. I did not shred; no, sir, I was not. I did not go around
after the Watergate break-in and participate in what was termed a
housecleaning. I did not do that.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Alfred Baldwin stated that he delivered
copies of "bugged conversations" to the committee offices. Were you
ever the recipient of reports of bugged conversations?
Mr. Odle. Absolutely not. If you look back at that, what happened
was that Mr. Baldwin testified that he at one point had sent memoran-
dums from Mr. McCord, the securit}^ director, to me about office
security, and that is quite true. And I have turned all of those over
to the grand jury, to the Democratic National Committee, to Common
Cause, to just about every bodv else that asked for them.
He also testified that he turned over convention memos, that Mr.
Baldwin saw convention memos. But somehow, that got garbled and
when it came out, it came out in the press that for some reason,
Mr. Baldwin took over logs to me and to other individuals.
That is absolutely untrue and as Mr. McCord 's deposition shows,
what really happened was that he wrote Mr. Liddy's name on that
log and brought it to the building.
Senator Inouye. Were you in any other way involved in bugging
activities?
Mr. Odle. Absolutely not.
Senator Inouye. Is it true that you hired Mr. McCord?
Mr. Odle. Yes, it is.
Senator Inouye. Were you aware of his activities on June 17?
Mr. Odle. I was not. I first heard that there was a burglary on
Saturday afternoon, after I finished a meeting about — oh, I do not know,
midafternoon. And somebody came by the door and said, "Have you
heard there's been a burglary at the Democratic National Com-
mittee?" I said, just to some people who were in that meeting, not at
that meeting, they were just there, "That could never happen here,
because I have this guy working for me named Jim McCord, and he
has got this place really tight and all I can say is I am glad McCord
works for me."
And then, of course, it became apparent what had happened.
But no, sir, I did not.
Senator Inouye. Then you were not aware of his associations with
Mr. Liddy or
Mr. Odle. No sir, I was not
vSenator Inouye. I notice also listed there is a John Caulfield,
John J. Caulfield?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Do you know Mr. Caulfield?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, I do. He was the security director of the 1968
campaign. He recommended Mr. McCord.
96-296 O — 73 bk. 1—3
28
Senator Inouye. Press reports indicate that Mr. Caulfield tried
to pressure Mr. McCord to remain silent on the Watergate break-in.
My question is during what period was Mr. Caulfield employed by
your committee?
Mr. Odle. Very briefly, perhaps a month, and it was in the summer
of 1972, I believe, perhaps in May — perhaps in April, it was.
Senator Inouye. Did he, to your knowledge, try to pressure Mr.
McCord in behalf of your committee?
Mr. Odle. Pressure him?
Senator Inouye. Pressure him to remain silent?
Mr. Odle. Well, I just have no knowledge of that. Not to my
knowledge at all. I haven't seen Mr. Caulfield since last summer.
Senator Inouye. Would you describe the functions of your political
division?
Mr. Odle. Yes. sir, the function of the political division was to
divide the States among the various political coordinators, or, as they
become known later, the regional directors, and to set up State reelect
committees in each State and to monitor the success of those com-
mittees.
Senator Inouye. We hear much about dirt}^ tricks and sabotage.
Where did it come in your chart, or did it come in j^our chart?
Mr. Odle. Sir, unfortunately, the chartmaker, when he made
those charts, was not aware of those things.
Senator Inouye. Were you aware of those things?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, I was not.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I request an order to place in
evidence a list of all the employees of the Committee To Re-Elect
the President and the finance committee and the dates of their
service and their prior employment.
Senator Ervin. Would you furnish the committee that?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, I think the staff has already requested it and
I think it has been turned over, but if not, I will be glad to do that.
Senator Inouye. Thank you. -
Senator Ervin. I understand if you have not supplied it to the
committee, you will.
Mr. Odle. If we haven't, we will, yes, sir.*
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Odle, you refer to the fact that you were not in Washington,
D.C., on June 18, is that correct?
Mr. Odle. Um-hum. .
Senator Weicker. Did you participate in the emptying of Mr.
Magruder's desk with Robert Reisner on June 17?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, Mr. Magruder asked Mr. Reisner and myself
to take certain things home over the weekend, because at the time,
it appeared that he was concerned for the security of them. My best
recollection is that I took home a file folder and he took home some
other file folders and brought them back the following Monday or
sometime.
Senator Weicker. Would you be good enough to describe to the
committee as to how you were alerted on June 17, exactly what you
•See p. 437.
29
did in responding to the alert, and your activities within the offices
themselves and when you left — on June 17?
Mr. Odle. Yes; my greatest concern, first of all — first of all, when
we found out that McCord was involved in this thing, I was extremely
concerned. I mean, here was our security director in jail because he
had gone into somebody's office in the middle of the night. My first
thought was that I was suddenly in charge of the guard force, I was
suddenly in charge, directl}^ and personally, in charge of all the office
security. I remember one of the things I did that day was to call the
security supervisor to make certain that we would have a guard come
in that night to relieve the day guard. I was very concerned about
that.
I remember thinking about what we would do to replace Mr.
McCord. We needed somebody in that capacity.
It was a ver}^ serious day. I mean, when you find a man that you
trust and respect is in jail for doing something and that man worked
for you, it is quite a serious thing.
Is there some other area that you are interested in?
Senator Weicker. Well, now, first of all who requested that you
come over to the committee?
Mr. Odle. I had been there. Senator. I was at a meeting that morn
ing that started about 9 a.m. and ended in midafternoon. I had been
there.
Senator Weicker. Now, who made the suggestion that Mr.
Magruder's desk be emptied?
Mr. Odle. Well, I don't — first of all, I am not exactly sure of the
chronology of events. I don't believe that anybody made the sug-
gestion that the desk be emptied, although he expressed concern over
the telephone from California
Senator Weicker. Who was "he"?
Mr. Odle. He was Magruder.
Senator Weicker. What time did he express concern?
Mr. Odle. It would have been sometime late that afternoon.
Senator Weicker. Did you talk personally with Magruder?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Weicker. Will you give the committee your best recol-
lection of that conversation?
Mr. Odle. My best recollection is that he was extremely concerned
that we might be subject to similar activities, that there might be
retaliation, that he was concerned for the security of the office building
and the files and the papers, and he wanted certain things to be taken
home over the weekend.
As I remember it, Mr. Reisner took home a lot of advertising
matters, I believe.
Senator Weicker. Well, if we can stop there for a minute. Was
Mr. Reisner on the phone also?
Mr. Odle. For a time he was, for a time I was, but mv best recol-
lection of it was I went out of the room for a while, I think.
Senator Weicker. Did Mr. Magruder say, "clean out my whole
desk"?
Mr. Odle. No; I don't believe he did, because I don't believe that
was done.
Senator Weicker. Then he must have specified what was to be
cleaned out?
30
Mr. Odle. I believe he did. I don't believe he did that to me. 1
believe he may have. I just don't remember the exact chronology of
all the things that happened that day.
All I know is the way it ended up is that I had a file and Mr. Reisner
had some files and we brought them back the next week.
Senator Weicker. But did you know what was in the files?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Weicker. So in other words, it was a general, not a specific
order, that was given to clean out the whole desk; is that correct?
I mean, how would you know that you cleaned out the right things?
Mr. Odle. I didn't take it, sir. I believe Mr. Reisner took that and
then he gave it to me.
Senator Weicker. And, you did not clean out Magruder's desk?
Mr. Odle. No; I did not"!
Senator Weicker. Your participation in this matter was to receive
files
Mr. Odle. A file.
Senator Weicker. A file from Mr. Reisner?
Mr. Odle. I believe, yes.
Senator Weicker. Then what did you do with that file?
Mr. Odle. I put it in my briefcase, I took some files from my own
desk, that I was concerned about their own safety
Senator Weicker. What kind of files did you take?
Mr. Odle. Budget committee files. The various minutes of the
sessions that I described earlier. I was concerned for their security
and I took them home with me over the weekend.
Senator Weicker. Now, what did you do when you took this file
home?
Mr. Odle. Just left it at home.
Senator Weicker. Put it anywhere?
Mr. Odle. I think I may have put it in the closet or something,
I am not exactly certain.
Senator Weicker. And
Mr. Odle. The briefcase, I think I put in the closet.
Senator Weicker. I beg pardon?
Mr. Odle. I think I put the briefcase in the closet.
Senator Weicker. The briefcase with the film in the closet?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Weicker. Then, what happened to the file?
Mr Odle. Then, on Monday I returned it.
Senator Weicker. You returned the file?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Weicker. To whom?
Mr. Odle. To Mr. Magruder.
vSenator Weicker. To Mr. Magruder himself?
Mr. Odle. To the best of my recollection, yes.
Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Odle, a few more questions. You
mentioned the fact that you came into contact with Mr. Strachan
from time to time.
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Could you give me an elaboration of what from
time to time means.
Mr. Odle. I talked to Mr. Strachan probably two or three times a
week, maybe two times a week. It is hard to say, sir.
31
Senator Weicker. Did Mr. Strachan participate rather actively in
matters over at the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
.Senator Weicker. Can you tell me why, what his specific mission
was?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Haldeman obviously was worried a lot with a lot of
other things besides the campaign. He was the Chief of Staff at the
White House and a very busy man working on Government substan-
tive policies and he was assisting the President. Mr. Strachan wa,s
there to devote himself more to what was going on politically so if
Mr. Haldeman wanted to be aware of what was going on politically
and simply asked Mr. Strachan, Mr. Strachan was simply the eyes
and ears, you might say.
Senator Weicker. I beg pardon?
Mr. Odle. I suppose you might say he was the eyes and ears of
the committee.
Senator WeiCKEr. Mr. Strachan was the eyes and ears of who?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Haldeman. He was liaison to the committee.
Senator Weicker. So any matters that went on in the Committee
To Ke-Elect the President, would it be fair to say they were reported
back to Mr. Haldeman by Mr. Strachan?
Mr. Odle. Well, that was Mr. Strachan's role which was to try to
find out all of the things that were going on at the committee and
make Mr. Haldeman aware of them, yes.
Senator Weicker. Did Mr. Strachan attend the strategy sessions?
Mr. Odle. I think that he may have, yes. I did not attend those
meetings. It is hard for me to say exactly who did.
Senator Weicker. All right.
Now, Mr. Odle, did you ever see in the hallways of the Committee
To Re-Elect the President electronic equipment which would be
electronic equipment for either bugging or debugging?
Mr. Odle. Mr. McCord at least had a machine for a while which
was a defensive measure, as I understand it, that went around to
check for electronic eavesdropping in our building and I believe I have
seen that, yes.
Senator Weicker. So you did see this equipment which you believed
to be debugging equipment, is that correct?
Mr. Odle. I am pretty positive of it, yes.
Senator Weicker. That it was debugging?
Mr. Odle. Well, it was not debugging, it was collecting for coun'^er-
measures, yes.
Senator Weicker. And this equipment was quite visible out there
in the hall?
Mr. Odle. I do not believe, sir, it was in the hall. It was a portable
unit that I believe was in his office at one point, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now, with respect to the citizens division, is
it not true that Fred Malek became the head of that division be-
tween March and June?
Mr. Odle. He exercised supervisory control over the citizens
division. It was by no means a full-time occupation.
wSenator Weicker. When you sa}'^ full-time occupation, do you use
as a criteria his appearance on the payroll, is this what causes you to
indicate he was not full time?
Mr. Odle. No, I would vise the criterion, hours spent.
32
Senator Weicker. In hours spent he was part-time capacity?
Mr. Odle. Very much so.
Senator Weicker. You say he spent part of the time between the
Committee To Re-Elect the President and part of his time at the
White House?
Mr. Odle. There was a guest oflEice that he used from time to time
when he was at the committee and I would say from September 1,
when he resigned at the White House and came to the committee he
spent most of his time at the White House.
Senator Weicker. Most of his time at the White House, but also
some time at the committee.
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Odle, were Jean Roberts and Vicki Chern
secretaries to Jeb Magruder?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Was Sylvia Panarites a secretary for both Bob
Reisner and yourself?
Mr. Odle. She was the receptionist and she worked for both of us,
that is correct.
Senator Weicker. She did work for both of you?
Mr. Odle. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Weicker. Now, under the advertising section is it not
true that the November Group was a New York corporation operating
out of the Committee To Re-Elect the President with Peter Dailey
at the head and Paul Muller as treasurer and Glenn Sedam as secre-
tary, is that correct?
Mr. Odle. I can testify to the first two. I did not realize that Mr.
Sedam was secretary.
Senator Weicker. Now, just two more questions. In Ken Reitz'
function here which I believe is listed as youth, was Tom Bell one of
his assistants? Do you know his table of organization of people who
worked for him?
Mr. Odle. Yes, Mr. Bell was one of Mr. Reitz' assistants and was
one of the first to join his staff.
Senator Weicker. Was Bob Podesta one of his assistants?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Were Marilyn Johnson and Connie Cudd his
secretaries?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Did Ken Smith and Eve Auchincloss work for
Reitz on the speakers bureau?
Mr. Odle. I am not sure of the speakers bureau. They worked for
Mr. Jigg.
Senator Weicker. Was George Gorton college coordinator under
Reitz?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Was Angella Miller in charge of Nixonettes?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Did Angela Harris work on press for Reitz?
Mr. Odle. She was in the press office but she spent most of the
time working on youth activities.
Senator Weicker. Now, in conclusion, I have prepared a chart,*
Mr. Odle, which fills in some additional slots, and I wonder if you
• See exhibit No. 8, p. 33.
33
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might not go ahead and take a look at this chart and tell me whether
it is accurate and if it takes time to do that. Mr. Chairman, 1 would
be perfectly glad to go ahead and have Mr. Odle look at it and for the
record, report back to the committee.
Senator Ervin. That is perfectly all right.
Mr. Odle. I will be glad to go over it right now with you if you
like.
Senator Weicker. I do not want to rush you or have you make
any mistakes.
Mr. Odle. Sure, shall we start and go through it? Mr. Mitchell was
campaign director, Mr. LaRue was special assistant. You have
the five political coordinators here and that is correct.
Senator Ervin. It might be helpful for the record when you refer
to the person instead of referring then as mister, will you give the
names?
Mr. Odle. All right.
Senator Weicker. I would be perfectly satisfied, Mr. Chairman,
to have Mr. Odle do this at his leisure so he makes sure of each person
on the chart.
Mr. Odle. I have no hesitation.
Senator Ervin. 1 understood him to say he can answer the ques-
tions about that chart now.
Mr. Odle. Yes, 1 have no hesitation of going over it with you if
you would like.
Now, Senator, obviously
Senator Ervin. It might be. Senator, it might be helpful if he
would bring it around over here and put it on the stand and take n
ruler and point out things as he sees them.
Mr. Odle. OK, we have Mr. Mitchell here as campaign director;
Mr. LaRue was his assistant, that is correct. We have the five political
directors coordinators at that time and that is correct. 1 believe
Diane Copperman did not work for him, the same about Barbara
Fierce, she did work for Mr. Caprio, Paul Caprio, sir, I do not believe
related to Mr. Kaupman and I thought that he was in the Illinois
campaign and Mr. Caprio was the regional director, and he did have
Illinois as one of his States so possibl}^ Mr. Caprio did but it was
not ai the national headquarters, to the best of my knowledge.
Delores Oilman was Mr. Flemming*s secretary and did work for
Mr. Mardian, and Tom Reed was from California, Dick Richards, 1
believe, was from Utah, rather than Idaho, but he did report, I think
he was one of the political coordinators.
David Allen, Mark Blumfeld were all on that staff. Bob Reisner
was administrative assistant to Mr. Magruder but Vicki Chern was
really more his secretary than Mr. Magruder's, although she did
work for both.
Gene Roberts, Sylvia Panarites, Pat Hutar was in charge of
women's volunteers; Jon Foust, this is correct, Peggy Weismann was
a secretary, Bart Porter was in charge of scheduling. Van Shumway,
public relations and media, Powell Moore, and Ann Dore, Joan
Donnelly, yes; they all work for him.
Mr. Herge did work for Mr. Porter. Bob Teeter had these two
assistants, Ted Garrish, Dan Evans and Nancy Crouch was the name
of the secretary as was Marybeth Koeze.
35
Bob Marik was in charge of research and planning. Breck Fore
was administrative assistant, he later went to the political division.
Bob Morgan was in charge of direct mail and answered telephones.
David Allen moved from here to here both places so that is correct
It may not be correct, I do not know that he did work there. I think
that may be incorrect. These people all did report to Nancy Brataas,
Mr. Sedam was the counsel.
Senator Ervin. Pardon me, I think when you say "these people"
did report, you should give the names to the reporter because he has
to take them down.
Mr. Odle. Glenn Sedam was counsel, Peter Dailey was in charge
of advertising, Mr. Phil Joanou, Mr. Mike Scott, were two people
who reported to Mr. Dailey. I was in charge of administration and
personnel and these two people did report to me. Sylvia
Mr. Dash. Which two people did you mean, Mr. Odle? The
reporter has to have the names.
Mr. Odle. Sylvia Panarites and James McCord.
Over the citizens and voter block group Ken Rietz was in charge of
youth, he was assisted by Tom Bell, Barbara Preve, Bob Podesta,
Marilyn Johnson, Connie Cudd, Ken Smith, Eve Auchincloss,
George Gorton, Angella Miller. As I said before, Angela, Harris
technically was in the press office but she did spend the majority of
her time on youth activities. David Chew, Frank Naylor, veterans;
Dick McAdoo, transients; Bill Stover, physicians, Dan Piltero,
lawyers; Larry Goldberg, Jewish; Dan Todd, elderly; Paul Jones,
black; Clayton Yeutter; Paul Kayser, was head of the business
operations, Mr. Kendall was the national chairman, Mr. DeFalco
was at First Nationalists and he later left the staff, Mr. Armendaris,
Spanish; assisted by Frank Almaguer, Margo Carlyse; Florence, I
do not remember that name but it is probably correct. Betty Jean
Gonzalez, of course, there was, Shearer was over here, too, as well
as at the top of the citizens operation.
Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Odle.
Now, the last question on the subject of advertising, the approving
of advertisements, was this done by the Committee To Re-Elect
the President or was the final say-so given at the White House?
Mr. Odle. I think that Mr. Haldeman had an interest in adver-
tising without any question, and I think that in that case that both
the campaign director, Mr. Mitchell, or Mr. MacGregor and Mr. Halde-
man jointly made decisions on advertising. I would say that was the
one area in which he had an interest more than others.
Senator Weicker. Would you also say that in the area of polling?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. So this again was a joint matter between
Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Odle. There, I would think Mr. Mitchell was the campaign
director, he had final authority, I would say that was the second area
in which Mr. Haldeman was the most interested. That is my guess,
Senator.
Senator Weicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker omitted one question he wished to
ask. It is not your turn but since the examination has gotten wider
in the field, without objection, I am going to give Senator Baker an
36
opportunity at this time to ask a question which he expected to ask
at a subsequent hearing.
Senator Baker. Senator Montoya has not had an opportunity.
I will wait until he has asked questions.
Senator Ervin. Excuse me, Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Odle, by way of preliminary foundation, will you give us your
entire job classification and duties which you perform as head of the
administration and personnel?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
I was basically in charge of office management and that would
include procurement of office space, assignment of office space, pro-
curement and assignment of office supplies, installations of office equip-
ment, desks, furniture, telephones, switchboards, all of the kind of
things that you would expect one to do in the capacity of office
manager. In terms of personnel I was partially responsible for hiring
and firing, particularly at the lower levels, secretarial recruitment was
one of my jobs, finding secretaries.
Senator Montoya. Would that include hiring of secretaries for
the directors?
Mr. Odle. If they requested a secretary, yes.
Senator Montoya. Did you hire any secretaries for any of the
directors?
Mr. Odle. What do you mean?
Senator Montoya. For instance, Mr. Liddy.
Mr. Odle. Yes; I did not. Somebody in our operation found, I
believe, Mrs. Harmony and she was hired as Mr. Liddy 's secretary
after Mr. Liddy interviewed her.
Senator Montoya. Did you arrange for the interview?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Montoya. What about Jeb Magruder's secretary?
Mr. Odle. No; they came with him from the White House.
Senator Montoya. Did you arrange for the allocation of space?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Montoya. Now, please explain how much space you had
at that particular building and was the entire operation under the roof
of one building?
Mr. Odle. At what point in time. Senator, say, in the heat of the
campaign?
Senator Montoya. Let us say from the time that Mr. Mitchell went
onboard as campaign director.
Mr. Odle. We had a suite on the second floor, we had a suite on the
fourth floor. The campaign director had a suite on the fourth floor. We
later, after Mr. Mitchell came aboard, took the entire third floor, we
took the suite on the fifth floor, the suite on the eighth, the suite on the
ninth and suite on the 11th.
Senator Montoya. When you speak of suites do you mean the
entire floor?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, we only had one entire floor in that building
and everything and that was the third. We had suites from as many
as five private offices, say, to 25. That is what I mean when I say suite.
Senator Montoya. Where did you have the file room?
Mr. Odle. What?
Senator Montoya. Where did you have the file room?
37
Mr. Odle. I do not believe we had a file room, sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you have files in different offices?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Now, when you speak of files that I made
available to the FBI, why were you called upon to make these files
available?
Mr. Odle. The subpenas from the FBI were directed to Clark
MacGregor or his authorized representative, and Maurice Stans or his
authorized representative. I turned out to be the authorized
representative.
In addition to that, I was the administrative person of the com-
mittee, the administrative officer and it was sort of natural since I
knew the building fairly well and knew the people fairly well, that I
would be asked to assume that role.
Senator Montoya. Did you have keys to all these files?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Montoya. Did you have keys to the files which you opened
for the FBI?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Montoya. How did you get those keys?
Mr. Odle. I did not necessarily open all the files. What I would do
is they would ask for certain kinds of information and I would go to
the people who had custody of that information and with them try to
find it.
Senator Montoya. All right, who had custody on that occasion?
Mr. Odle. Well, many of the files they wanted were financial mat-
ters so the custody was maintained by the finance committee and I
went to the people in the finance committee to get those files.
Senator Montoya. Let us go the Mr. Magruder's desk. You stated
you opened his desk pursuant to a telephone call.
Mr. Odle. No, sir, I did not. I only had a key to Mr. Magruder's
desk, I did not open his desk.
Senator Montoya. Whose files did you take from whose desks and
that you took home?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Magruder's files, but the desk drawer had been
opened by Mr. Reisner, I assume.
Senator Montoya. So, was that desk opened most of the time?
Mr. Odle. No; I do not believe it was. It probably was not when
I was there.
Senator Montoya. How do you know it was opened by Mr. Reis-
ner?
Mr. Odle. I do not. I said I suppose. I know I did not open it
because I do not have the key.
Senator Montoya. Did you have keys on some of the file cabinets?
Mr. Odle. I had keys to my own file cabinets.
Senator Montoya. Did the others?
Mr. Odle. Other people would have keys to their file cabinets, yes.
Senator Montoya. Where were the secret documents filed and in
whose office?
Mr. Odle. Sir, I did not know that there were secret documents.
Senator Montoya. Well, you did procure a secret document for
the FBI, did you not?
Mr. Odle. No. No; they wanted things — —
38
Senator Montoya. There were certain documents, stated docu-
ments, and you were told where those documents were. Is that right?
Mr. Odle. No; they asked me to produce certain documents as
the Senate committee has done and I went around and tried to find
them for him.
Senator Montoya. Well, then you had availability to most of the
files if you went around
Mr. Odle. Well, I went to people who had custody of files and
asked them if I might have, if they did have this, and
Senator Montoya. All right. Now, what kind of arrangement did
you have with Mr. McCord and what was his job classification?
Mr. Odle. Mr. McCord was hired as security consultant to the
committee beginning in October 1971. He was part time and he was
to be a part-time security consultant. He then became
Senator Montoya. What did you perceive to be his duty as security
consultant?
Mr. Odle. In the broad range, from the time that he began until —
well, he would have, of course, you know, stayed on. A number of
areas. To go through them, the physical security of the building. We
were concerned
Senator Montoya. Was that his prime duty?
Mr. Odle. It was his only duty, physical security of the building
and the people in it. ,
Senator Montoya. And did you ever pay him any money by way
of reimbursement for travel out of Washington?
Mr. Odle. Once he went to New York to inspect the offices of the
November Group and once I believe he went to Chicago to look at
our direct mail warehouse. Wlien he came back, I believe he sub-
mitted expense vouchers, a weekly expense form. I initialed those,
signed them, to reimburse him for his plane fare, and then he would
have been paid; yes. That was customary.
Senator Montoya. Did you authorize him to go to those places for
that specific purpose?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, I authorized him to go to New York to inspect
the offices of the November Group, to Chicago to inspect our direct
mail warehouse.
Senator Montoya. Did he go anywhere else from which he received
reimbursement from the committee?
Mr. Odle. He went to Miami to look at the Hotel Doral, and I
suspect he would receive reimbursement for that; yes.
Senator Montoya. You had to okay all his reimbursements, did
you not?
Mr. Odle. Theoretically.
Senator Montoya. Unless he was paid in cash by some other indi-
vidual who had available cash for that purpose. Did anyone have
such cash available?
Mr. Odle. Not that I knew of, never.
Senator Montoya. Are you aware that any of them, any employee
of the CRP, could have disbursed funds for Mr. McCord 's travel to
other places other than the ones which you have named?
Mr. Odle. No. I was not and when I read in the newspapers that
he had cash, I was very surprised, because the way the system was
set up, those things would go through me.
39
Senator Montoya. What kind of work or consultation transpired
when Mr. Colson would vis t the committee offices and on how many
occasions did he visit?
Mr. Odle. I do not remember seeing Mr. Colson at the committee,
sir.
Senator Montoya. Well, are you aware that anyone was in touch
with him at the White House at any time?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir. People from our committee met with him.
Senator Montoya. Did you ever see Mr. Howard Hunt in that
particular building?
Mr. Odle. Sir, I have never seen Mr. Howard Hunt to this day.
Senator Montoya. Are you aware that he was in touch with any
individuals in the building or the employees of the committee?
Mr. Odle. I never heard his name, even, until after June 17.
Senator Montoya. How long did you keep Mr. McCord on the
payroll after the Watergate bugging?
Mr. Odle. About 1 minute.
Senator Montoya. How were you employed to go to the CRP?
Mr. Odle. I was asked by Mr. Magruder.
Senator Montoya. What were you doing at that time?
Mr. Odle. I was a staff assistant at the White House.
Senator Montoya. And where are you now employed?
Mr. Odle. I am consultant to the committee.
Senator Montoya. Were you employed in any other position after
the election?
Mr. Odle. Yes, from May 1st until May 7th, I was a consultant
for the Department of Agriculture.
Senator Montoya. Who recommended you for this job?
Mr. Odle. People at the White House.
Senator Montoya. Who specifically?
Mr. Odle. I am not exactly certain who initiated tjie call over
there. I suspect the White House personnel office, which would have
done it.
Senator Montoya. Did you receive any communiques or any other
memoranda which were taken as a result of the bugging of Watergate
and the Democratic National Committee?
Mr. Odle. Never.
Senator Montoya. Were you aware that any of this might have
been stored in the building over which you were the administrator?
Mr. Odle. No, sir; I was not.
Senator Montoya. Did you ever discuss with Sally Harmony any
of the memos which she typed for Mr, Liddy relating directly to the
Watergate?
Mr. Odle. No, sir; I did not and have not.
Senator Montoya. Now, you mentioned a few moments ago that
there was communication between the QRP and the Republican
National Committee.
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir; there was cooperation and communication.
Senator Montoya. What kind of liaison went on between the two
committees?
Mr. Odle. Well, sir; I would say, for example, that the people in our
political division would work with the people at RNC's field operations
division. The people in our press office would work with people with
40
their communications oJ0Bce, that sort of thing. I worked with the
administrative guy there.
Senator Montoya. Did you have people going back and forth
between the two?
Mr. Odle. You mean back and forth between payrolls or visiting?
Senator Montoya. No, not on payrolls, but communication between
people. Did you have people going back and forth between the
Republican National Committee and the CRP?
Mr. Odle. Oh, yes, yes.
Senator Montoya. How close were you to each other?
Mr. Odle. They are here on Capital Hill and we were at 17th and
Pennsylvania.
Senator Montoya. You mentioned also that some of the major
decisions were made by Attorney General Mitchell while he was at
the Justice Department.
Mr. Odle. I presume they were. Decision memos were sent to Mr
Mitchell from time to time.
Senator Montoya. What kind of memoranda were sent to Mr.
Mitchell and what kind of major decisions did you have in mind that
you made?
Mr. Odle. Well, it was not I who had them in mind, sir, because
I was not at that level of the campaign. But, for example, we were
involved at that point in staffing and some of the decisions were whom
should we bring aboard to do this job or that job and things like that?
It is hard to think back. That is almost 2 years ago. But I would sav
the major campaign decisions.
Senator Montoya. I will read you this memorandum and ask
you if you know anything about it. It is from the citizens for the
reelection of the President, Washington, July 3 1972, styled "con-
fidential." Memorandum for the Attorney General. Subject,
grantsmanship.
Mr. Odle. Subject what?
Senator Montoya Grantsmanship. Do you know what that
means?
Mr. Odle. I am not certain.
Senator Montoya. That means the business of making grants
in government for a political consideration and for political credit.
And it reads as follows:
Enclosed is a copy of a proposal to insure that the President and his Congres-
sional supporters get proper credit for Federal Government programs. This
proposal was written by Bill Horton in Fred Malek's office with the assistance
of Bill GifTord, 0MB, and Peter Millspaugh, in Harry Dent's office.
If implemented, this should be an effective method of insuring that political
considerations are taken into account.
Signed, Jeb S. Magruder, his initials. And the enclosure is the
memorandum.
Mr. Dash. Could the memorandum be given to the witness, please?
Senator Montoya. You will now be presented with the
memorandum.
Mr. Odle. I recognize the form, sir, of the memorandum, our
stationery, of course. I do not recognize this exact memorandum.
I don't believe I have seen this one. But this is — I don't mean the
subject matter is a similar subject matter, but this is the kind of way
memorandums might have been transmitted to Mr. Mitchell.
41
Senator Montoya. Did you then or did you see similar memoranda
going out of the office of which you were in charge of administration?
Mr. Odle. My memorandums, for example, would have asked
Mr. Mitchell if it would have been proper to take more office space.
I remember one time when we found that none of our people could
find cabs very easily in the streets, if it would be all right if we leased
a car or something like that; yes.
Senator Montoya. How far back was the committee or its ad-
ministrator sending memoranda or memorandums to Mr. Mitchell
at the Department of Justice?
Mr. Odle. I believe after it was there for a while and had been
staffed up. I would say May 1971.
Senator Montoya. And you still presume that he was making
some major decisions in the Department of Justice prior to the time
he resigned as Attorney General?
Mr. Odle. Of course, yes.
Senator Montoya. That is all.
Mr. Dash. Can I have that exhibit back and can we have it
entered in the record?
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 1.*]
Senator Ervin. I will recognize Senator Baker at this time so he
can ask the questions which he refrained from asking when he origi-
nally questioned the witness.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 1 had first
understood that we were going to cover only the organization chart
with this witness and the various interrelationships from that stand-
point. 1 must say I am delighted that we have gone further into the
substance of the subject matter and we have covered a great deal of
testimony that might have been covered in a later appearance by
this witness.
But in view of that, it seems to me that it is appropriate at this
time to pursue some of the things that 1 might otherwise have asked
earlier on.
Mr. Odle, I am particularly interested in June 17. If you don't
mind, and without great length, tell us where you were on June 17.
Mr. Odle. At the committee offices.
Senator Baker. Did you come there at 9 o'clock in the morning?
Mr. Odle. Approximately, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you stay there all day?
Mr. Odle. 1 stayed there most of the day; yes.
Senator Baker. Was there any irregularity in the procedure of the
office or anything that caused you concern at that time with reference
to the activities at the office?
Mr. Odle. Oh, yes, obviously.
Senator Baker. Would you begin describing in your own way
what happened on June 17?
Mr. Odle. Let me give you some examples. The security office
telephoned me.
Senator Baker. Who?
Mr. Odle. One of the guards in the security office.
Senator Baker. Do you know who that was?
♦See p. 449.
42
Mr. Odle. I am sorry, 1 don't.
Senator Baker. Tell me what happened, then.
Mr. Odle. He said, Mrs. McCord is on the telephone. She is looking
for a lawyer. We don't know who she is looking for, can you help her?
I said, I didn't think 1 could, but put her up to me.
She said something to the effect that Jim has been involved in a
project that has failed and he is in jail.
Senator Baker. Jim has been involved in a project which has
failed and what else?
Mr. Odle. And that he has been in the Watergate, and I can.'t
remember the exact words.
Senator Baker. It is important that you try.
Mr. Odle. I know it is important, because it was reported in the
papers as her saying, your project has failed, and Senator, she did not
say that.
Senator Baker. "She" being who?
Mr. Odle. Mrs. McCord.
Senator Baker. The statement of Mrs. McCord as you recall was
that Jim's project has failed?
Mr. Odle. Jim has been involved, something along those lines.
Senator Baker. What was your reaction?
Mr. Odle. Well, one of real shock.
Senator Baker. Did you ask her what project?
Mr. Odle. No, I didn't go into it, because I had been do\\Ti — I had
heard earlier from someone in the press office that there was a possi-
bility that McCord was involved in it, too.
Senator Baker. Go back a step and tell me what you heard in the
press office.
Mr. Odle. Well, I had heard from the press officer that day that it
appeared that McCord was somehow involved in this thing.
Senator Baker. In what thing?
Mr. Odle. In the Watergate thing.
Senator Baker. The Watergate break-in?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Can you tell me who told you?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Paul Moore, who was the press officer that day.
Senator Baker. What did he say?
Mr. Odle. He just kind of insinuated, he didn|t say a great deal
more, that McCord had been involved in that activity.
Senator Baker. Did he say he was in jail?
Mr. Odle. He suggested it.
Senator Baker. What do you mean, he suggested it?
Mr. Odle. Senator, I can't remember it exactly, in all fairness, I
can't remember it.
Senator Baker. Did you come away from that interview with the
impression that Mr. McCord was in jail?
Air. Odle. With the suspicion, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you ask that press officer what had happened or
why McCord was in jail?
Mr. Odle. Later on after I had talked with Mrs. McCord, I believe
I did.
Senator Baker. But you don't remember
Mr. Odle. I have a very hard time reconstructing the chronology
of that day.
43
Senator Baker. You left the press office and went to your office?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, I received a call from Mrs. McCord in my office.
Senator Baker. Is that the first call you received?
Mr. Odle. I only talked with Mrs. McCord once.
Senator Baker. Was that the first call you received after you arrived
at your office on June 17?
Mr. Odle. Sir, I can't answer that. I just don't know.
Senator Baker. You have no recollection of any other call?
Mr. Odle. That is correct.
Senator Baker. And the switchboard operator put you through to
Mrs. McCord and Mrs. McCord said, Jim's project has failed and he
is in jail?
Mr. Odle. That is when it hit, Senator. I guess what I am saying
is — that is when I realized that the man I felt very strongly about was
in prison. I guess that is when it hit.
Senator Baker. What happened, then?
Mr. Odle. Well, she wanted to know if he was employed by the
committee as a paid full-time member of the staff or if he was a
consultant, because I think a bail bondsman was asking.
So, I checked and fo\md that he was a full-time member of the staff.
I told her that. Then she wanted to know about a lawyer and I just
didn't know who the lawyer was.
Senator Baker. What do you mean, about a lawyer?
Mr. Odle. She wanted to know if she could reach a certain lawyer.
She gave me a name. I said I couldn't help her because I didn't
recognize the name.
Senator Baker. Can you tell me the name?
Mr. Odle. It started with an "R." It could have been Raftern or
Rafferty.
Senator Baker. Did she tell you why that particular name?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, because that was a name that appeared in the
paper a few days later. That was the first time I heard that name.
Senator Baker. Have you smce learned who that lawyer was?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did she ask you to recommend a lawyer''
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did she ask you for money?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did she ask you for assistance?
Mr. Odle. No, sh'.
Senator Baker. Did she ask you for anything?
Mr. Odle. Only the information as to whether or not he was an
employee or a consultant.
Senator Baker, That she was at a bail bondsman's office and the
bail bondsman wanted to know if he were a full-time salaried employee
of the Committee To Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Odle. Something along the latter lines and exactly what she
should say.
Senator Baker. And you indicated that he was, she mentioned the
lawyer's name, and that was the end of the conversation?
Mr. Odle. That is right.
Senator Baker. All right, what next happened on June 17?
96-296 O — 73 bk. 1 — 4
44
Mr. Odle. Again, I have a hard time with the chronology.
One of the things that happened — I very honestly don't know if it
happened before or after the phone call — was that 1 saw Mr. Liddy as
I testified at the trial.
Senator Baker. Did he call you or did you call him?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, nobody called anybody. I saw him in the hall.
Senator Baker. I see.
Mr. Odle. He asked me where the paper shredder was.
Senator Baker. The what?
Mr. Odle. The paper shredder. The paper shredder was a very
famous big paper shredder.
Senator Baker. Was there a big paper shredder and a baby paper
shredder, too?
Mr. Odle. Pardon?
Senator Baker. Was there more than one?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. He asked where the big paper shredder was?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you ask him why he wanted to know?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, 1 didn't. I said, it is in there.
Senator Baker. Did he have anything with him?
Mr. Odle. Not at that time. He later came out and said, how do
you work it? 1 said, you press the button.
Then later on I saw him with a pile of papers, perhaps a foot high.
Senator Baker. What was he doing with them?
Mr. Odle. He was on his way into the shredding room.
Senator Baker. Did you see him shred any papers?
Mr. Odle. No; but I assumed he was going to shred them.
Senator Baker. Do you shred papers of that sort or that quantity
regularly?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, I don't.
Senator Baker. Does anyone?
Mr. Odle. Well, I would say this, that there was a concern for
security and people's — let me put it this way, Senator. It didn't
seem that highly unusual at that point. What seemed — in retrospect,
I recognize the importance of it. I see what was going on.
Senator Baker. But at that time, you didn't inquire why he wanted
to know where the big shredder was?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. You didn't inquire what that foot high stack of
documents was?
Mr. Odle. Pardon?
Senator Baker. You didn't inquire what that foot high stack of
documents was?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Baker. But he shredded it?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you help him shred them?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. But you did tell him how to operate the machine?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. What happened next on June 17?
Mr. Odle. Well, let me work backwards from the time I left.
45
Senator Baker. Before you do, you made a statement just now that
you were not overly concerned at the moment about this destruction
of documents, but now in retrospect, you see their importance, but you
were concerned for security. I think that is a paraphrase, a fair para-
phrase of your testimony.
Mr. Odle. Um-hum.
Senator Baker. Why were you concerned about security? What sort
of security? Against what?
Mr. Odle. Sir, I wasn't concerned — I didn't mean to say I was
concerned about security at that time with respect to Mr. Liddy. I
said I was concerned about security in the context of the campaign.
That is why we had a big paper shredder. We were concerned about
that. That was my job.
Senator Baker. Was that security concern heightened by the events
that far on June 17?
Mr. Odle. For a time, it was. I w^as concerned personally that I
would find myself in a position where I was directly and personally
responsible for running a guard force and protecting the offices and
people in those offices and I didn't have a background in security and
I didn't quite know — I didn't have the guy to rely on that I had in the
past.
Senator Baker. What was the general atmosphere in the office at
that time? Were lots of people running around shredding papers?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, that was just the one occurrence.
Senator Baker. Now, what happened next on June 17?
Mr. Odle. Well, later on in the day, there was a man that visited
the committee. He asked to speak to somebody in authority, and I was
around there and I talked to him. He identified himself as a plain-
clothesman from the Police Department and he said that he just
wanted us to know that Mr. McCord was in jail.
Senator Baker. What did you say?
Mr. Odle. I said, I know Mr. McCord is in jail.
Senator Baker. Was there any further conversation?
Mr. Odle. I don't believe that there was. He felt badly about it.
It was brought up to me a while ago in an interview.
Senator Baker. You say he felt badly about it?
Mr. Odle. He felt badly about it, yes, he did. I guess that he per-
haps, when demonstrations or potential acts of violence were going to
occur, he was Mr. McCord's contact with the Police Department.
Senator Baker. Go ahead with the sequence of events on the 17th.
Mr. Odle. I think that was about it. I think that after that, we
removed the files, put them in the briefcase.
Senator Baker. What files did you remove?
Mr. Odle. The ones we described previously. Mr. Reisner took
some files and I took the one file.
Senator Baker. Now, let's examine that just for a moment. Was
there a telephone conversation between you, Reisner, and Magruder
on that date, a three-way phone call?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, there was.
Senator Baker. Can you tell us firsthand of your own knowledge
of the substance of that conversation? And first, what time was it?
Mr Odle. Late afternoon.
Senator Baker. On the 17th of June?
46
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Baker. Tell us as best you can the substance of that
telephone conversation.
Mr. Odle. I really
Senator Baker. Did it involve the files?
Mr. Odle. Yes, it did, I am trying to think of something else it
involved to give you a feel for the conversation. I really cannot do
that. All I remember is that at the conclusion of the conversation, it
was decided that I should take a file and Bob Reisner should take
some other files.
Senator Baker. Mr. Odle, I do not mean to impede the examina-
tion, and I honestly do not mean to try to intimidate you.
Mr. Odle. I understand. Senator.
Senator Baker. But this is an extremely important point.
Mr. Odle Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Let me ask you a few questions about the con-
versation itself.
Did someone refer to the McCord arrest?
Mr. Odle. I think that we probably discussed it on the phone,
yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Do you know who initiated that topic? Was it
you or was it Reisner or was it Magruder?
Mr. Odle. I am sorry, I do not.
Senator Baker. But there was a conversation about the fact that
McCord had been arrested?
Mr. Odle. Oh, yes, sir. By that time, I believe, it was being dis-
cussed through the committee. It was a very serious thing.
Senator Baker. Did you discuss the fact that others were also
arrested and in jail?
Mr. Odle. Well, we knew that there were a group of them.
Senator Baker. Did you discuss what the relationship of these
people was to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President?
Mr. Odle. Well, we knew that Mr. McCord was security director.
Senator Baker. I know you knew it, but I am asking you whether
or not there was any conversation about it?
Mr. Odle. Others, no, I do not believe there was.
Senator Baker. What I am saying to you, Mr. Odle, to short
circuit the thing a little, is was there any conversation like, McCord's
in jail, he is our security director, what are we going to do about it?
Was there anything like that?
Mr. Odle. That is what I said. I said something to the effect, my
God, I have got to find a new guy. Mr. Magruder said something
to the effect, you sure do, something Uke that.
Senator Baker. Did you say anything about paper shredding?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you say anyting like about getting McCord
out of jail?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you say anything about getting him a lawyer?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you relay the conversation vou had with Mrs.
McCord?
Mr. Odle. I may have.
47
Senator Baker, But you are not sure?
Mr. Odle. But I am not sure.
Senator Baker. Were there instructions given or was there an agree-
ment reached on what you were going to do about removing material
from any place in the Committee To Re-Elect the President office?
Mr. Odle. Sir, to the best of my knowledge, the only material that
was removed were the things that Bob Reisner and I took and we
brought them back on Monday.
Senator Baker. Who told you to?
Mr. Odle. I guess Mr. Magruder did. That is pretty obvious from
the way I, as I reconstruct the conversation.
Senator Baker. Who initiated the idea?
Mr. Odle. It must have been Mr. Magruder.
Senator Baker. Are you sure?
Mr. Odle. Yes, I would think I would be.
Senator Baker. Can you remember what Mr. Magruder told j^ou
to do?
Mr. Odle. No, I cannot remember his words.
Senator Baker. But can you remember the substance of his lan-
guage?
Mr. Odle. The substance of the instruction was that that file, which
I for some reason called the strategy file ■
Senator Baker. Called the strategy file?
Mr. Odle. Which I cafied the strategy file, I guess. And the ad-
vertising files.
Senator Baker. Now, wait a minute. Did Magruder or Reisner
mention a file by name, by category or classive indication, a strategy
file or any other file?
Mr. Odle. I thought that the word "strategy" was used, yes.
Senator Baker. Did you know what he was talking about?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Baker. Did you know where it was?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Baker. All right, what further information was referred
to Magruder or gained during that conversation?
Mr. Odle. Just that that file and the advertising files were to be
removed and brought back on Monday. There was a concern, I believe,
on his part and certainly on my own, for the security of that building.
Senator Baker. Removed and brought back on Monday.
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Baker. By whom?
Mr. Odle. By me and by Mr. Reisner.
Senator Baker. Obviously, somebody has to have had described,
as Senator Weicker indicated earlier, what was to be removed.
Mr. Odle. Mr. Magruder, I believe, did that, because Mr. Reisner
was Mr. Magruder's administrative assistant and reconstructing it in
m}^ mind, he would have done that. I did not know how Mr. Ma-
gruder's desk was organized, or his files. I did not have a key to it.
Senator Baker. You did not participate in the gathering together
of the files to be removed over the weekend?
Mr. Odle. Technically, no.
Senator Baker. What do you mean by that?
48
Mr. Odle. Technically, I did not participate in the gathering of the
files, because I did not gather the file, I did not take the file. It was
given to me, in effect.
Senator Baker. Did you go pick them out?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Baker. Were they gathered together in one place?
Mr. Odle. I am not totally certain. I am not totally certain where
the advertising files were kept.
Senator Baker. Well, at some point, I take it that you mean these
files that were to be taken out over the weekend were gathered up
and parceled out and you took one of them?
Mr. Odle. Um hum.
Senator Baker. Did you know in advance which one you were
going to take?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Who gave it to you?
Mr. Odle. I believe Mr. Reisner did.
Senator Baker. Did he do it with any particular emphasis or was
it a random choice of files?
Mr. Odle. No, I do not think it was a random choice.
Senator Baker. Do you think he gave it to you as a specific file he
wanted you to keep?
Mr. Odle. That Mr. Magruder wanted me to keep, yes.
Senator Baker. Would you describe the file?
Mr. Odle. It was a gray file folder, much Kke the one I have here.
Senator Baker. Would you hold it up so we can see it?
You are describing what I would call a letter size, fight gray file
folder.
Mr. Odle. Legal size.
Senator Baker. Legal size light gray file folder?
Mr. Odle. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Was it sealed or tied in any way?
Mr. Odle. No, much like this.
Senator Baker. What was its thickness?
Mr. Odle. I would say possibly — gosh, I do not know. An inch
and a half .
Senator Baker. What did you do with it when it was given to you?
Mr. Odle. It was in my briefcase and I am not just sure whether
I put it in my briefcase or Mr. Reisner put it in my briefcase, but it
was put in my briefcase.
Senator Baker. What time was this?
Mr. Odle. I do not know. Late afternoon now.
Senator Baker. 5 o'clock?
Mr. Odle. Maybe 6 o'clock, around there. It is hard to say. Then
I took some files from my desk which were important to me and files
I was concerned about. Those were our budget files.
Senator Baker. Why were you concerned about them?
Mr. Odle. Because those are the most important files I maintained.
If there was a problem with our own office or if there was any security
problem, I certainly did not want, you know, those to be published
in the newspaper.
Senator Baker. All right, back to the file that was placed or that
you put in your briefcase. Did you put anything else in your briefcase?
49
Mr. Odle. Those budget files and the other file. Just those.
Senator Baker. Was that two or three files?
Mr. Odle. I believe there would have been two budget files — there
were three ultimately. I think there were just two at that time.
^Senator Baker. Were they all gray?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Not a blue one in the bunch?
Mr. Odle No, sir. Not
Senator Baker. Do you know what I am talking about?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Baker. What am I talking about?
Mr. Odle. Well, there was a blue file. And it contained the things
that Liddy, Mr. Liddy, had given Mr. Magruder.
Senator Baker. When did you find that out?
Mr. Odle. When I read the newspapers.
Senator Baker. Did you look in that file?
Mr. Odle. No sir, I did not.
Senator Baker. Are you certain?
Mr. Odle. Absolutely certain.
Senator Baker. Did you open the cover?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you count pages?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you sign a receipt for it?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker You took it home. Where did you put it?
Mr. Odle. I believe I put my briefcase in the closet.
Senator Baker. Did you lock it?
Mr. Odle. Did I lock the closet?
Senator Baker. Or the briefcase.
Mr. Odle. I might have locked the briefcase.
Senator Baker. Did you inquire of anyone why you should take
home that particular one?
Mr. Odle. No, I gathered it was an important file, just like the
budget files were very important to me; I guessed that file was very
important to Mr. Magruder.
Senator Baker. Did anybody mention to you the word "Gemstone"?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Do you know what the word means?
Mr. Odle. I do not know what it means. I have seen the word in the
newspapers recently.
Senator Baker. Have you ever seen a document like this?
[indicating].
Mr. Odle. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Baker. I am showing you a letter-sized document that is
bordered, approximately 8 by 10 inches, it says "Gemstone" on the
top, "Source", "Date", "Exdis", "No Disem". Other words at the
bottom. Have you ever seen a document like this?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Let the clerk hand it to him.
[Witness is handed document.]
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, might the record note this as an
exhibit?
50
Senator Ervin, Yes; mark it exhibit No. 2.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 2*]
Senator Baker. Do you know what that is?
Mr. Odle. Well, it is speculation, sir.
Senator Baker. I do not want your speculation. Do you have any
information, did you have any information at that time about the
content of that file that might relate to that document, Gemstone?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you ever later learn what was in that file?
Mr. Odle. No, not until very recently.
Senator Baker. Well, do you know now what was in it?
Mr. Odle. Well, I can speculate what was in it.
Senator Baker. You suspect that the Gemstone material was in it?
Mr. Odle. I suspect that things which have no place in a political
campaign were in it; yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Now, once again, Mr. Odle, I am not trying to
trap you. I am trying to establish the contents of that file. You told us
that on June 17, you did not know, that over the weekend following
June 17, you did not look. My question is did you later learn of your
own knowledge what was in that file that you took home with you?
Mr. Odle. Oh, no, never of my own knowledge; no sir.
Senator Baker. Were you ever told by a responsible official on the
Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Baker. Or by anyone else?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Baker. Did Reisner — was Reisner ever requested to take
that particular file home?
Mr. Odle. I do not know. I do not know how it happened. Maybe
it
Senator Baker. In the course of that three-way conversation,
was there a suggestion that Reisner take it and did he decline?
Mr. Odle. I am not certain. That could — well — —
Senator Baker. What is your best recollection on it?
Mr. Odle. I do not think he declined, no. I do not think he declined.
I think he said his briefcase was full of the advertising files and that
I should take this one or something like that.
Senator Baker. Did you ask how come you were the one that was
going to take that one home?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, I would have if I had known what was in it.
Senator Baker. I am about through, Mr. Odle. I have a few other
questions, but not very many.
In a Washington Post story on January 11, 1973, it is alleged that
as personnel director for CRP, you spent the weekend — I assume the
weekend following the Watergate incident — moving from office to
office inside the headquarter's inventoring files, perhaps removing
some. According to one source, whenever Odle would go into McCord's
office, he would order everyone else out of the area.
No records were actually destroyed until after Mardian and La Rue returned
from a West Coast trip on Monday, June 19.
That is from the Washington Post, page A-1, dated September 9,
1972.
•See p. 450.
51
Do you have any knowledge of that newspaper account? Can you
confirm it or deny it?
Mr. Odle. I believe I can deny it. I believe the reporters who wrote
it would deny it today, too, if they were asked.
I do not know how that all came'to be. I destroyed no piece of paper,
not one shred of paper in connection with the Watergate.
Now, let me make a couple of things perfectly clear [laughter]
I did not enter the District of Columbia on that Sunday and I did
not shred any papers that Saturday and I did not conduct a file
search and shred anything the next week. What I did was o be as
helpful as I could to^ agents of the FBI and the grand jury and since
then, Common Cause, the Democratic National Committee, the
Senate select committee, and a lot of other committees, to go through
the committee files and provide documents.
Last night, for example, one of the staff members of the committee
said, I know you are busy appearing before the select committee
tomorrow, but before you do at 10, would you go to the files and get
me floor plans for 10 different floors, because we need them for the
committee's function.
That is an example of what I have been doing since last June.
Senator Baker. We thank j^ou for it.
Mr. Odle. I am glad to be cooperative. I have become a professional
witness lately and a bit of a professional file finder and that is fine.
But when one goes through offices and finds files, that does not
necessarily mean that he takes those files and shreds them. It could
mean that he turns them over to the grand jury.
In going into Mr. McCord's office — Mr. McCord did not have a
private office. It was a security office. There were a lot of guards
sitting around, drinking coffee and whatever. There came a time
with the FBI agents when they wanted to go into that office and they
wanted to meet one of the men in there to talk with him and then they
wanted to go through the files. And sure, we asked all the people to
leave the room.
But Senator, it is just incredible the number of times those things
have been in the newspaper. If I could just mention one example
which is kind of typical and this is not the fault of anyone here or
anybody else. I do not think it is even the fault of the reporters,
because I do not think they have been malicious.
There was a story in the Post, a column, saying a diary was found
belonging to Eugenio Martinez and that in it the initials R.O., H.P.,
and J.M. This could be coincidence, but those are probably the
initials of Robert Odle, Mr. Porter, and Jeb Magruder.
What happened was that that diary was captured by the FBI
agents on June 26th after the burglary. Those were the initials of the
FBI agents who had initiated it for their own purposes of evidence.
Yet the retraction if it ever appeared in Washington, is not one that
I saw. As we go through this thing, we find time and time again where
people who have tried to be helpful have found themselves in news-
papers for totally innocent acts, acts which we undertook to be of
assistance.
Senator Baker. Mr. Odle, I think you have been extremely coop-
erative and the reason I am asking you about these acts is precisely
what you speak of, because so far, the people of the United States
have based their judgment, if they have a judgment, on newspaper
52
accounts, television and radio reports, as they properly should. The
press has done us a billion dollars worth of staff work investigating.
But one legitimate function of this committee, it seems to me, is to
find out what witnesses say about particular allegations made in the
press.
Mr. Odle. That is right.
Senator Baker. I have only one other question I would Uke to ask
in that respect. I refer to an article in the Washington Post on Septem-
ber 23, 1972. The synopsis of it is that Robert C. Odle gave to Jeb
Magruder an internal confidential/eyes only memo of the President's
Re-Election Committee dated 2 days after the June 17 Watergate
break-in purporting to list all the committee payments to McCord and
lists no amount resembling the $3,500 allegedly paid for the radio
receiver. The memo, from Nixon committee personnel director Robert
C. Odle to deputy campaign director Jeb S. Magruder, lists 18 separate
payments to McCord, the highest being $1,091.56 for security services.
Mr. Odle. Sir, that memorandum was a copy of a memorandum
that I prepared for the FBI, that I turned over to the attorney, and
that I testified to for the grand jury. It is merely a copy for information.
One of the first requests of the Bureau was for a complete listing
of every check that has gone to McCord and McCord associates. I
went down to the finance committee and went through the files
and we found all the checks and made a list. We put a list together
and I sent that to the U.S. attorney and I sent a copy to Mr. Magruder,
saying this is a copy of what I have given to the U.S. attorney.
Again, there is an example of where we try to be helpful and we
find ourselves put in a difficult position.
Senator Baker. Mr. Odle, you have been a cooperative witness, I
thank you for your help and it has been a long time now. I have
no further questions.
Mr. Odle. Thank you.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Odle, as counsel, I want to state that 3^ou have been
very cooperative with this committee, but certain of these questions
have come out that would have to come out at another time and we
would have had to ask you to come back before this committee. I
think it is appropriate that we complete this line of questioning.
Following up Senator Baker's question concerning the telephone
conversation which you had together with Mr. Reisner and Mr.
Magruder shortly after the break-in, were you on an extension line
with Mr. Reisner and Mr. Magruder and did you hear Mr. Magruder's
telephone conversation?
Mr. Odle. As I reconstruct it, yes, there were two telephone
instruments in Mr. Magruder's office. I believe I was on one and
Mr. Reisner was on the other.
Mr. Dash. I know you are trying to recall back a considerable
period of time, now, but you used the term the instruction to get a
"strategic file."
Could the conversation have been get the sensitive file? Could that
have been the term used?
Mr. Odle. I don't believe that term was used. And I also, sir,
believe that the "strategy file" was my term, I think I was applying
it to that.
Mr. Dash. And you were on the line with Mr. Reisner?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
53
Mr. Dash. Listening to Mr. Magruder?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Is it then your testimony that you did not hear Mr.
Magruder say to Mr. Reisner with you on the Une, get the Gemstone
folder?
Mr. Odle. Oh, no, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Robert Houston
around this time concerning the files that Mr. McCord kept in the
security room?
Mr. Odle. Yes; not at that time, I don't believe. I believe the
following week.
Mr. Dash. And can you tell us what that conversation was?
Mr. Odle. I was curious as to what was in the files and what was
down there.
Mr. Dash. Have you asked Mr. Houston or discussed with Mr.
Houston removal of anything from that file?
Mr. Odle. No; Mr. Houston indicated that there were some per-
sonal effects belonging to Mr. McCord, pictures and the like, that he
was going to return. He mentioned that to me. I don't remember any
other discussion of removal of an^^thing else.
As I sa}^, I did sort of go through there to see what was in it. Mr.
McCord no longer being with us, it was sort of my responsibility to
do that.
Then I also looked through the files at some length with FBI
agents, I believe.
Mr. Dash. And when you went through McCord's file, was this
a file that was open or was this a locked file?
Mr. Odle. It would have been kept locked at night, probably.
It was open when I went, through it, I believe.
Mr. Dash. Could you just briefiy describe what was in the file
when you went through it? What kind of files?
Mr. Odle. Oh, security reports, things like that; the ID system
that we maintained. When people left papers out of their desk or
forgot to lock their file cabinets, there were security reports, normal
kinds of things.
Mr. Dash. Did you notice any electronic equipment?
Mr. Odle. Yes; there was electronic equipment, but it was basically
the kind of stuff that we used, the committee, for example, the alarm
system. The various doors of the committee offices were alarmed.
There was a central alarm system there so if one of them was opened
in the middle of the night, it would ring and that sort of thing, and
closed-circuit television. It is possible that that machine he used to
check for countermeasures would have been there.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware of any tapes that were in the files?
Mr. Odle. No.
Mr. Dash. Did you see any tapes?
Mr. Odle. You know, that is an interesting question.
Mr. Dash. To your best recollection?
Mr. Odle. I don't think so.
There might have been, but I don't remember.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you recall Mr. Houston ever discussing with
you or telling you that he removed that material from Mr. McCord's
file?
54
Mr. Odle. The things he talked about were Mr. McCord's pictures
and his personal diplomas and certificates and memorabilia.
Mr. Dash. And you do not know of your own knowledge whether
or not he did remove these things, the materials you discussed, the
electronic equipment or any other materials from the file?
Mr. Odle. No; there may have been some things belonging to
Mr. McCord personally which he removed, you know.
Mr. Dash. What kind of things are you talking about?
Mr. Odle. Again, I don't know. He just said he was going to
return Mr. McCord's personal things to him. I saw no problen with
that. I just said we were going to return these things.
Mr. Dash. As administrator, did he ever give you a report or an
inventory of what he took out of that file to return to Mr. McCord?
Mr. Odle. No ; there was a 4-page listing of things in the room that
I saw at one point, but those were not the things
Mr. Dash. Now, do you know the name Gary Bittenbender?
Mr. Odle. That is the policeman that came by that day.
Mr. Dash. Have you ever known him before?
Mr. Odle. No; I never met him.
Mr. Dash. Did he ever come again?
Mr. Odle. No; I have never seen him since.
Mr. Dash. Now, the chart that you described shows Mr. McCord
actually working under you, is that correct?
Mr. Odle. Oh, yes.
Mr. Dash. The chart you showed to the committee shows
Mr. McCord working under your supervision?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. To your knowledge, did there come a time when
Mr. McCord was assigned to work under Mr. Liddy's supervision?
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did you have any knowledge that he was working under
Mr. Liddy's supervision?
Mr. Odle. Absolutely not.
Mr. Dash. Did you ever see Mr. McCord and Mr. Liddy together
at the committee?
Mr. Odle. Not really. I have seen them in the hall from time to
time.
Mr. Dash. Now, you have mentioned, and I think you have already
identified, a memoradum from the committee on committee stationery
to the Attorney General back in 1971. I think you have already indi-
cated that Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Strachan kept a fairly constant liaison
with the committee.
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Are you aware of memoranda from the White House
to the committee discussing the political campaign program and
strategy from time to time?
Mr. Odle. That is fairly broad, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Well, let me show you a particular memorandum of
1972 from the White House and see if — would you just read the — not
the material but what that memorandum is captioned — who it is from?
Mr. Odle. It is from Mr. Ted Malek to Mr. Magruder, coordinating
functions for the campaign organization.
Mr. Dash. And on what stationery is that?
Mr. Odle. White House stationery.
55
Mr. Dash. What date is that?
Mr. Odle. February 9, 1972.
Mr. Dash. And you were at the committee at that time, were you
not?
Mr. Odle. Oh, yes.
Mr. Dash. Are you familar with that kind of memorandum that
would come over from the White House?
Mr. Odle. I have not read this memorandum but I would not think
it unusual for somebody at the White House to say to the committee
what their thoughts were with respect to the campaign structure
organization. People at the White House wanted to see the President
reelected, and I do not see, I would not, I do not know that there
were hundreds of such memoranda but without reading it I could
not
Mr. Dash. Would you want to read that memorandum to yourself?
Mr. Odle. Yes, it is a memorandum describing — it is entitled
"Coordinating Functions to the Campaign Organization." I think
it is a fair description of what it discusses.
Mr. Dash. Does it relate to the role of the Attorney General in
the strategy?
Mr. Odle. Yes, it does.
Mr. Dash. Would you sa}^ that memorandum is merely a suggestion
or does it go further than that?
Mr. Odle. I would say it is a strong suggestion. I think Mr. Malek
and Mr. Magruder at that time were; I do not think either one of
them was in a position to instruct the other.
Mr. Dash. I think so that we now know what is in that memoran-
dum, would you please read it into the record, please, sir?
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Dash, before he does that, would you mmd
if I saw a copy and read that myself?
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I think, if you do not mind, that
neither the record nor the committee presumably have seen this
rather lengthy memorandum and I wonder if counsel would supply
a copy to us so we get the full burden and thrust of what you are
talking about and then if we want to break for lunch or some such,
we could take up this question later.
Mr. Dash. Fine.
Senator Baker. I am sure I cannot follow what the witness is
talking about at this point and I would like to see a copy of this or
any other exhibit that is handed by counsel before we proceed to it.
Mr. Dash. Senator Baker, we will make copies and follow that
procedure.
Now, by the way, in going over the chart, what was the role Mr.
Bob Porter played?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Porter was the director of scheduling.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Powell Moore?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Powell Moore was the assistant director of public
affairs.
Mr. Dash. And now, at the time — have you met or do you know or
did you ever work with Mr. Krogh in the White House?
Mr. Odle. I know Mr. Krogh at the White House; yes.
Mr. Dash. While you were at the White House did you ever attend
a Justice Department task force meeting with Mr. Krogh, Mr.
Mardian, and the FBI?
56
Mr. Odle. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, for the time being those are the only-
questions I have.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Mr. Dash. Could you, Mr. Odle, come back right after the lunch
recess so that the members of the committee can see this memorandum
and perhaps inquire into it?
Mr. Odle. What time would that be, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Ervin. I might state this gavel was given to me by the
Chief of the Eastern Band of the Cherokees to preside over this
meeting.
The committee will take a recess until 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., this same day.]
Afternoon Session, Thursday, May 17, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Counsel was asking questions of Mr. Odle.
Mr. Dash. Will you please give this memorandum to Mr. Odle?
Now, Mr. Odle, I think all members of the committee have received
a copy of the memorandum, and if there is no objection, I would
like for you to read that into the record.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I might say I have no objection to
the memorandum. I did not know what to think before we recessed
for lunch and indicated my desire to have a copy which counsel
has now supplied. You understand, Mr. Dash, this material was
supplied in response to subpena duces tecum on the Committee
To Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Dash. Yes, and Mr. Vice Chairman, it was received last night
and that particular memorandum was given to me by my staff just
prior to my asking a question.
Senator Baker. I have no objection and I am sure we will have
copies in advance hereafter.
Mr. Dash. Yes, we certainly will.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Odle, will you please read it and in reading it,
will you please indicate the classification that apparently appears
on that memorandum.
Mr. Odle. It says: "Confidential, eyes only memorandum for Jeb
Magruder from Fred Malek, subject, 'Coordinating Functions for
the Campaign Organization.' " It is dated February 9', 1972.*
I have given further thought to our conversation of last night and to j'our
February 7 memorandum to the Attorney General. Since I do not yet have an
in-depth knowledge of the campaign operation, it is difficult for my observations
to be precise. Nevertheless, I do have some reservations about the recomnienda-
tions contained in that memorandum which can best be expressed in writing.
Planning: My reservations on your recommendations pertain mainly to the
suggested planning process, but also to the responsibility for implementation.
Do you want me to read the substance of the entire memorandum ?
Mr. Dash. Yes, please. Just comment on it.
* Later entered as exhibit 3, p. 58.
57
Mr. Odle: [reading]:
Planning process : As you know, the Attorney General has asked me to devise a
management audit system by which he can track overall progress and identify
major problem areas for corrective action. Naturally, an integral part of such a
system is the establishment of benchmaiks by which progress is to be judged, or in
short, a plan. Based upon my preliminary thinking on this, I have tentatively
concluded that the planning system should incorporate the following
characteristics ;
The principal focal points of the planning should be the States (with the emphasis
given to key States) rather than the functional areas such as voter bloc activities,
telephone, direct mail, et cetera. Planning by State will help to highlight and
direct management attention to progress on building voter support to carry
individual States — the key to victory.
Planning of the functional activities within a State should be based upon a
clearly defined strategy for obtaining the needed votes for carrying that State,
spelling out, for example, the needed vote margin by distinctive geographical
areas and the organizing and persuasion tactics which will be utilized.
As is implicit in the above two points, the planning should provide a sound
basis for tracking progress and identifying problem areas for corrective action.
The line officials who will be held accountable for results, principally the State
chairmen, should feel as though they have the lead in developing the plans affecting
their areas of responsibility. Naturally, exercising quality control, the national
campaign organization must ensure the plans fit the overall re-election strategy
and capitalize upon polling information.
From our conversation, I would say you generally agree with this. However, from
reading your memorandum your position on these principles is not clear. I believe
they should be clarified prior to proceeding with development of a planning
system.
Responsibility for implementation: I believe there is a strong argument for
having Bob Marik perform this function in view of his sound knowledge of the
campaign operations and his access to research information. However, it is also
important for the "controller" to be intimately involved since these plans will
provide the basis for tracking progress and identifying problems. To do this
effectively, the "controllei" must ensure that the plans provide a sound basis for
monitoring campaign effectiveness. Also, he must be thoroughly familiar with their
content. Perhaps we can meet the needs and capitalize on the strengths of both
individuals by also giving the "controller" a definite part of this responsibility.
Formal decision-making process:
I really wonder whether the sort of staff secretariat operation which you suggest
is necessary. Such a procedure has undoubtedly been helpful up to now, since the
Attorney General has not been present and responsibilities have been shifting
with the growth of the organization. However, with the Attorney General coming
on board full-time soon, with him taking a more direct supervisory role over field
operations, and with the division of responsibilities between the principals being
clarified, I question the need for a staff secretariat system.
In fact, it may be counterproductive. Such systems are inevitably cumbersome
and, therefore, not conducive to the need for fast decisions as the campaign heats
up. Also, due to the sensitivity of the information and the need for speedy action,
many of the decisions will undoubtedly be handled verbally, particularly toward
the end of the campaign. This would undermine the staff secretariat's ability to
coordinate effectively.
I recognize the abuse which can be perpetrated without such a system. However,
given the nature of campaign management the answer lies in appointing competent
division managers and making sure they ' have a clear understanding of their
respective responsibilities rather than creating a cumbersome staff secretariat
system. Of couise, the Attorney General should, and will decide this matter.
I believe it would be a disservice, however, to try to persuade him to lean on a
staff secretariat system rather than bringing in the most competent managers
possible, clearly laying out their lesponsibilities and then holding them fully
accountable for results.
These are, of course, my initial reactions based on quite limited knowledge.
Please note that I am not stating how it should be done, but merely laying out
possible problems that need to be addressed before we get locked in.
Because of the above reservations, I recommend you either pull back the
memorandum or ask the Attorney General to delay action on it pending further
58
coordination with me. Another option would be for me to inform the Attorney
General of my reservations and ask him to defer the decision. However, I do not
think this is desirable and would prefer that you and I work it out in the spirit
of cooperation that must become our trademark.
Frankly, I was taken by surprise last night. After our discussion on Friday
about the need for teamwork and my openly discussing my role, I was surprised
that you unilaterally submitted to the Attorney General recommendations having
a profound impact on my area of responsibility and my working relationship with
him. This was the reason for my rather vigorous reaction. In any case, we covered
that ground fairly thoroughly last night, and I am confident that in the future
we can work together on matters of this sort and resolve or spell out any differences
prior to submitting recommendations.
Mr. Dash. I will not ask you any further questions on that mem-
orandum, Mr. Odle. It was not your memorandum but I just put it to
you on the questioning of the memorandum that had come from the
White House and the format. Would that memorandum be identified
as an exhibit?
Senator Ervin. It will be marked as an exhibit and will be assigned
the proper number.
Mr. Dash. Will the reporter assign the appropriate number to it?
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 3.*]
Mr. Dash. I only have one further memorandum and question for
you. Now, Mr. Odle, you have before you a copy of a memorandum
that has the word "sample" above it,
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Mr. Dash. With the letterhead of Committee for the Re-Election
of the President. Have you seen this sample memorandum prior to
today?
Mr. Odle. Yes. This is — we had in the committee staff manual,
and it talked about everything, about how to make coffee about how
to make memos, how to use the telephone and watch-lights and so on.
Mr. Dash. All right. This being a sample part of the staff manual
that is showing how, would it be fair to say, this was a part of the
staff manual and a sample directing a memorandum from Mr. Halde-
man and how one would direct that?
Mr. Odle. This is correct. This was just showing if someone in
the committee were going to write a memorandum to Mr. Haldeman
or someone else in the White House, this is the form they would use.
Mr. Dash. Does it show in the bottom a copy would be sent to
Mr. EhrUchman?
Mr. Odle. It does but only as a sample, this whole memorandum
is a sample. No; it would not have been that all memoranda to Mr.
Haldeman would be sent to Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dash. Will it not indicate that the memorandum from the
Committee for the Re-Election of the President to the White House
at least went in sufficient number that you required a sample of a
form to use so that you would have a routine method?
Mr. Odle. Yes. We did want to have a routine method, and because
of all the new secretaries who were coming on board and all the
various new people on the campaign staff. We did want to have some
sort of standard memorandum format which everyone used.
Mr. Dash. All right. Will you pick up the memorandum?
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 4 for identifica-
tion only.**]
♦See p. 451.
"See p. 464.
59
Mr. Dash. That is all I have, Mr. Odle.
Mr Odle. All right.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Odle, one or two questions. As I understand
the significance of the first memorandum, the February 9 memorandum
is first of all a memorandum which came from the White House to
the committee and secondly, it refers to the fact that the Attorney
General asked Mr. Malek to devise a management audit system at the
time when he was still Attorney General on February 9. As I under-
stand, he resigned March 1st as Attorney General, and it does reflect
those two facts, is that correct?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir. It would seem to me to be my impression that
the Senator is interested in the memorandum rather than the sub-
stance of the memorandum.
Mr. Thompson. The fact that something was sent.
Mr. Odle. It went back and forth, which is a perfectly natural
thing.
Mr. Thompson. That is all. Those are all the questions I have.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions but
I cannot resist the temptation to say Mr. Odle has been a very good
witness. He has been very forthcoming, he has testified at great length
and it was brought to my attention a few minutes ago that when his
testimony was interrupted for us to go to lunch one of the networks
played "To Tell The Truth." [Laughter.]
Mr. Odle. Well, Senator, I appreciate that comment very much.
I would say this. In fact, if I said I would be happy to be here com-
pletely, I would be committing perjury.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Odle, I have a question or two. You stated this
morning that G. Gordon Liddy and Jeb Stuart Magruder were not
on the best of terms.
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, that was my impression.
Senator Ervin. Do you know what w^as the cause of their lack of
goodwill?
Mr. Odle. Well, I think of one reason and it is probably not that
important, but I moved Mr. Liddy's office at one point from the
fourth floor to the eight floor and Mr. Liddy very vigorously ob-
jected to that and tried to get me to change it and I said I was not
going to do that, I cannot, I need the space, and he appealed that to
Mr. Magruder and Mr. Magruder said "I do not want to get involved
in office space. What Odle says about office space is what I am going
to do about it."
They had a number of serious battles about the location of Mr.
Liddy's office. That is just one example. I think Mr. Liddy was a
little bit older than Mr. Magruder and possibly did not like to receive
it from a younger man, but that is probably speculation on my part.
Senator Ervin. You talked this morning about a shredder.
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. A shredder is a machine that is used to destroy
documentary matters in such a way that like Humpty Dumpty they
cannot be put together again, is that not so?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Ervin. It is used to destroy useless papers and it is also
used to destroy papers which the destroyer wishes to have concealed
from identification and reading, is it not?
96-296 O— 73 ^bk. 1—5
60
Mr. Odle. Well, I would suppose so. It was used primarily during
the campaign so that people would not come into our offices and
maybe copy the papers. You know that happened in the 1968 cam-
paign to the Nixon campaign in that very same building, a columnist
in Washington came in and talked to the team people and said "We
would like your waste paper", and so that was one way of seeing that
that columnist did not get our waste paper.
Senator Ervin. In other words, you did not want the general public,
the great purpose of a shredder is to make it certain that the documents
cannot come to the attention, the contents of the documents cannot
come to the attention, of anyone who might be interested outside of
the organization, in reading those documents.
Mr. Odle. I would think that would be a fair statement, especially
with those people who at that time we were running against.
Senator Ervin. Ordinarily, the purpose of a document is to preserve
a record of what the document records, isn't it?
Mr. Odle. I would suppose so.
Senator Ervin. And what is the purpose of making a record and
then destroying that record?
Mr. Odle. Well, sir, I don't know that there was. I would think
the basic purpose of that shredding machine we were talking about
was to pick up the wastepaper in the evening and not the documents.
Let me say just one thing. We tried from the beginning to save
documents because we thought that this campaign was, despite these
other situations, was a fairly organized, well run, fairly thrifty cam-
paign. [Laughter.]
That seems funny now, I know, but we did think that. We wanted
to save the documents because we thought it might be interesting for
a scholar to go back in 100 years and [laughter].
I can only tell you about our intention. In the light of recent events,
that might appear funny, but I think the point I am making you will
find interesting. But we did save documents. We saved many of them.
Do you know, right now, there are 1,500 cubic feet of committee
documents that have been available at various times to the U.S.
attorney, the FBI, the grand jury. Common Cause, the Democratic
National Committee, and the Senate select committee. We have been
working with all those committees and panels making those documents
available.
But you know, the thing that did not happen after the election
was that we took out those documents and shredded them. We took
them out, put them together, they are housed in one location pretty
much right now and they are there. They were not destroyed or
shredded.
Senator Ervin. In the course of normal events, a man or organi-
zation who is proud of his good deeds and wants them recorded in
history preserves documents, doesn't he?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And has no use for a shredder.
Mr. Odle. Well, I don't know that I could agree with that. For
example, let's say I was preparing a document for the budget com-
mittee's review and analysis and in the course of preparing that
document, I made a lot of notes and those notes went into the thing
and I threw the notes away.
61
Senator, in the middle of that campaign, I would not have wanted
those notes on the front page of the Washington Post, because that
would have given away some of our campaign strategy.
Senator Ervin. Well, you could have locked them in a filing
cabinet, couldn't you?
Mr. Odle. Wastepaper? You could have. I know a Senate cam-
paign did that, rented a warehouse
Senator Ervin. But you could not have put them in the wastepaper
basket and put them in the shredder while you
Mr. Odle. This is a case where I might be writing a memorandum
up or making up something that I would be sending to the budget
committee and I would be having all these notes and taking things
from the notes and putting them in, then I would throw the notes
awa3^ I am talking now about the wastepaper.
The basic purpose of the shredder was not to dispose of documents
or records, it was to dispose of wastepaper.
Senator Ervin. And to destroy wastepaper in such a manner that
its contents could not be resurrected?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, I beheve you said on the 17th, G. Gordon
Liddy came into the offices of the Committee To Re-Elect the Presi-
dent and asked whether there were shredders?
Mr. Odle. Yes, he asked where the large shredder machine was
located, yes, he did.
Senator Ervin. Was he the man ordinarily charged with the duty
of disposing of wastepaper?
Mr. Odle. No, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Ervin. Well, you told him where the shredder was, you
said?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And he took the shredder and he shredded some
documents, did he?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Ervin. Do you know where the documents came from that
he shredded?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Ervin. Did he shred any documents that were in your
custody?
Mr. Odle. Absolutely not.
Senator Ervin. Now, he was the man that was supposed to be in
charge of intelligence operations, wasn't he?
Mr. Odle. That is what it appears to be.
Senator Ervin. Do you think it is reasonable to draw the inference
that the documents he was shredding were documents that related
to the intelligence activities?
Mr. Odle. I do now, sir, today; I did not then.
Senator Ervin. Now, who else was present at that time?
Mr. Odle. Who else?
Senator Ervin. Who else heard him ask for the shredder or saw
him use the shredder?
Mr. Odle. I don't think anybody was there.
Senator Ervin. Were there any papers after that shredded by
anybody else?
62
Mr. Odle. 1 didn't see anj^ shredding that day besides that.
Senator Ervin. Yes, but subseqviently. Was Robert Mardian
present at that time?
Mr. Odle. No, sir. I beheve he was in CaHfornia.
Senator Ervin. And how long after this event was it before he
returned from California?
Mr. Odle. I believe he returned the following week.
Senator Ervin. Do j^ou know anything about any shredding of
papers after his return?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, 1 do not. 1 have read in the newspapers as you
have that he and one other individual shredded papers. 1 have no
knowledge of that and I did not see them shred papers.
There was something called a — referred to as a housing cleaning. If
that existed, 1 did not see it.
Senator Ervin. And you know nothing about any other papers
being shredded after the break-in?
Mr. Odle. That is exactly correct.
Senator Ervin. Do you know whether anybody kept any records
in the division as to the amounts of money that was disbursed for
intelligence work?
Mr. Odle. No, sir; I don't. I assume the finance committee people
whose job it was to keep records kept records. I was not involved in
that area.
Senator Ervin. Have you found in your searches in assisting the
FBI and the various committees you mentioned, have you found any
papers which disclosed how much money was paid G. Gordon Liddy
or E. Howard Hunt?
Mr. Odle. No, sir; I have not.
Senator Ervin. Any further questions?
Senator Gurney. I have a few.
Mr. Odle, we worried the meat off the bone of that phone call at
quite some length this morning, but there are one or two other ques-
tions I would like to ask you about. I am referring to the phone call
between Mr. Magruder and you and Mr. Reisner.
Who initiated the phone call?
Mr. Odle. I don't know. I can't remember. It could have been me,
it could have been Mr. Reisner.
Senator Gurney. Was it initiated from Washington?
Mr. Odle. I believe it was.
Senator Gurney. And why was it initiated?
Mr. Odle. I guess just to discuss the state of the situation at that
point, sir.
Senator Gurney. You mean to discuss the Watergate break-in?
Mr. Odle. Yes, I guess, and the fact that our security officer was
involved in it.
Senator Gurney. I understand the phone call was made from Mr.
Magruder's office, is that right?
Mr. Odle. Yes, that is right.
wSenator Gurney. How far is that from your office?
Mr. Odle. It is about 20 feet from door to door.
Senator Gurney. How is it that you and Mr. Reisner happened to
be together at the time this phone call was made?
63
Mr. Odle. Sir, I can't reconstruct that. It certainly wasn't unusual
for us. Mr. Reisner's office, Mr. Magruder's office, and my office all
opened onto a common area, a hall.
Senator Gurney. Well, but it was a very unusual phone call, and
of course, it is the most important piece of testimony you have given
today.
Mr. Odle. Yes, I know that. Senator, and I am trying to be helpful.
But you know, to reconstruct events that didn't seem at that point
that important is a difficult thing. I mean at that point, the most
important concern that I had was, you know, what are we going to do
about this guard force and do we have men coming on in the morning,
and what are we to do for the replacement of McCord? That was my
concern. That was my problem at that point. That is what seemed
very significant to me. I suddenly found myself very personally in
charge of something I didn't know a great deal about.
Senator Gurney. Isn't that why you called Mr. Magruder, to
discuss those matters with him?
Mr. Odle. We probably discussed that with him. I think I probably
said, well, I will have to hire somebody, and he said, yes, you will.
Senator Gurney. You said the phone call was made later in the
afternoon?
Mr. Odle. I believe so.
Senator Gurney. Had Mr. Reisner been with you all of the day?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Gurney. When did he join you?
Mr. Odle. I saw him for the first time late in the afternoon on that
Saturday.
Senator Gurney. Did he come to see you or did you go to see him?
Mr. Odle. Sir, our offices were in an area almost the size of that
conference table.
wSenator Gurney. Well, you didn't discuss any matters with him
until late in the afternoon?
Mr. Odle. I don't believe so.
Senator Gurney. Well, was the matter that you saw him about
late in the afternoon, let us make a phone call to Mr. Magruder?
Mr. Odle. At some point it seemed appropriate to call Mr. Ma-
gruder. I just can't reconstruct. Senator, exactly why.
Senator Gurney. But that, as I understand it, is the reason why
you and Mr. Reisner got together late in the afternoon?
Mr. Odle. Well, that suggests that we decided in advance of that
that we must get together and call Mr. Magruder, and on the scale
of important things that day, that was pretty low. I can see in retro-
spect what you are driving at and I do appreciate. Senator, the
importance of it.
Senator Gurney. How long was the phone call?
Mr. Odle. 1 don't
Senator Gurney. Was it a short phone call, a long phone call?
Mr. Odle. Maybe 5 or 10 minutes.
Senator Gurney. And the discussion initiated was a recount to
Mr. Magruder about the Watergate break-in and Mr. McCord and
all of the events that you knew at that time?
Mr. Odle. He probably read it in the wire stories, possibly. I mean
that might have been what could have happened.
64
Senator Gurney. How did the discussion about the files come up?
Who brought that up in the conversation?
Mr. Odle. I can't recall, but I assume it was probably that Ma-
gruder did. I believe I was out of the office for a time and I came back
in.
Senator Gurney. You mean you were out of the office during the
time of the phone call?
Mr. Odle. Part of the phone call, as I said before, yes.
Senator Gurney. You were not on the phone call at the time, then?
Mr. Odle. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. And you feel that it is after you came back into
the office that the files were mentioned?
Mr. Odle. I don't know when the files were mentioned. The message
I got from the phone call was, as I said, that that one file was to be
removed and that the advertising files were to be removed.
Senator Gurney. Well, now, then, you received that information,
you and Mr. Reisner. You were in Mr. Magruder's office. Then what
happened? Was an immediate search made for the files?
Mr. Odle. No, I don't think so. I think that probably what hap-
pened was that Mr. Reisner, who was more familiar with the way in
which Mr. Magruder's desk was organized, would have taken the
file. He either gave it to me or put it in my briefcase, something like
that.
Senator Gurney. Well, is it your testimony that — well, let's go
back a little. How did Mr. Magruder pose this question about the
file? Did this seem to be a matter of urgency or a routine matter, or
how did it appear?
Mr. Odle. He was concerned about it.
Senator Gurney. Why was he concerned?
Mr. Odle. He was concerned about it because he feared the
security, he said, of our building.
Senator Gurney. Well, now, of course, the break-in was done by
one of your people — I say your people; one who was working for the
Committee To Re -Elect the President.
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Gurney. Was there some feeling of apprehension that
more of your people would raid your own files?
Mr. Odle. Sir, I don't know. I was possibly concerned about
retribution. I was just concerned about general security. We had
nobody any longer who could handle it for us. I guess his feeling was
that it would just be best if the file was out of the office until he
returned.
Senator Gurney. But why? There must have been some reason?
Mr. Odle. Well, we were concerned. I mean, you know, I took, as
I said, my budget files home with me for the weekend.
Senator Gurney. Was any mention made by Mr. Magruder about
perhaps the issuance of a search warrant by anybody?
Mr. Odle. Not that I recall.
Senator Gurney. Naming these files?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Gurney. Had files ever been taken home before this
discussion?
Mr. Odle. I always used to take some files home to work on Sunday.
65
Senator Gurney. Were you working on somebody else's files?
Mr. Odle. No, no sir, no.
Senator Gurney. All right. Now the phone conversation is finished
and the important part of that was these files, the security of them,
obviously a very important point. What happened after the phone
conversation was over?
Mr. Odle. Well I assume either Mr. Reisner gave me the file,
put it on my desk or something like that.
Senator Gurney. Well, I know but there you are you have got a
phone and Reisner has got a phone and you put them down and then
something happens, has happened.
Mr. Odle. Senator, I am trying to be as cooperative as I can but
to answer that question is to try to invent something.
Senator Gurney. I understand. Well, was a search made for the
files immediately?
Mr. Odle. I do not think a search of that was necessary, Mr.
Reisner was pretty familiar with the way in which Mr. Magruder's
desk was organized.
Senator Gurney. Did he go to the desk and open a draw
or something?
Mr. Odle. Senator, if I knew, if I could remember, that 1 would
tell you. It is very hard to reconstruct today, that it is almost a year
ago. I have told you, you know everything I can think of that relates
to that activity.
Senator Gurney. Well, let me ask you this then. You have no
recollection about the search for the file, that is your testimony?
Mr. Odle. Yes. I have no recollection of that, right. I did not go
through his desk and search his file cabinet.
Senator Gurney. Well, were you in — how long did you stay in
the room after the phone call?
Mr. Odle. Sir, I just do not know.
Senator Gurney. Well, let me ask you this. Do you think it was
5 minutes or an hour?
Mr. Odle. Well, it was probably a lot closer to 5 minutes than it
was to an hour.
Senator Gurney. Did you come back later and receive the file
that you were going to take home from Mr. Reisner?
Mr. Odle. It is possible, and another possibility is Mr. Reisner
brought it into my office.
Senator Gurney. Well, can't we pin it down better than
a possibility?
Mr. Odle. Well, I just, you know, can't quite exactly recollect how
it happened. I think that he gave it to me standing there, he gave it
to me in the office, something like that, he sent it to my office.
Senator Gurney. Is it your testimony then that you had left the
office, Magruder's office and returned to your own after the phone
call and that the file was brought to you there by Mr. Reisner?
Mr. Odle. I am not sure. Senator, I am just not sure.
Senator Gurney. When did you go home that day?
Mr. Odle. I went with my wife to a play that night, to dinner
afterwards.
Senator Gurney. I say when, when did you leave your office?
Mr. Odle. Seven o'clock, I think.
66
Senator Gurney. And the phone call was when?
Mr. Odle. Late afternoon.
Senator Gurney. What about the size — I understand there were
two files, one that you took and one Mr. Reisner took, is that correct?
Mr. Odle. I believe he took more than one. I think he took a number
of, advertising files. I beheve that he kind of filled up his briefcase
and also
Senator Gurney. Why is that recollection, why did you have that
recollection. Did he have these files in his hands at the same time he
had the file that you were going to take in the other hand?
Mr. Odle. No, I think what happened, he had mentioned at one
point that his briefcase was full of these files.
Senator Gurney. Was this when he was in your office?
Mr. Odle. Or when I was in Mr. Magruder's office with him.
Senator Gurney. WTien you were in Mr. Magruder's office?
Mr. Odle. It could have been. Probably it was then.
Senator Gurney. That he said what now?
Mr. Odle. I think his indication was that I was asked to take'
another file home because his files were filling up his briefcase.
Senator Gurney. But wasn't there a discussion about these files
being taken home earlier in the phone conversation with Mr.
Magruder?
Mr. Odle. Yes; and I think that is the reason. Because when he
had these advertising files they were filling up his briefcase and
Senator Gurney. Was it your understanding of the phone call that
you were going to take part of the files too, is not that right?
Mr. Odle. Well, I think they had been discussing that and
Senator Gurney. You all had been?
Mr. Odle. Yes; that is right, and I had gone out of the office and T
believe come back in.
Senator Gurney. So it really was not a matter of a lot of files in
one briefcase, it was a matter of both of you were going to take some
files home?
Mr. Odle. Yes; but I think that perhaps the reason for that was
that he had all the files he could carry or he felt he could carry.
Senator Gurney. What did he say to you when he handed you the
file that you were going to take home, do you recall? Did he say
anything?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Gurney. Well, did he say guard them carefully? What did
he say?
Mr. Odle. I have no recollection of that.
Senator Gurney. Did you understand you were to guard it
carefully?
Mr. Odle. I felt it was an important file.
Senator Gurney. And my recollection is that you carried the file
home and put it in a closet with the briefcase?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Gurney. And it stayed there during the weekend?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Gurney. And then you brought it back Monday morning?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Gurney. Describe that now, what happened when you
brought it back?
67
Mr, Odle. I brought it back, and Mr. Magruder was there, I gave
it to Mr. Magruder.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Magruder was where?
Mr. Odle. I gave it to Mr. Magruder in his office.
Senator Gurney. This is the first thing Monday morning?
Mr. Odle. I do not know. It was sometime Monday. I do not know
that he was back the first thing Monday morning.
Senator Gurney. It was sometime Monday morning?
Mr. Odle. I believe it was sometime Monday.
Senator Gurney. You do not know whether it was morning oj
afternoon?
Mr. Odle. No; I do not, whenever he got back and asked for it.
Senator Gurney. Well now, can you describe the circumstances
surrounding the return of the file? Here is a file that you were pro-
tecting over the weekend because this is important, you bring it
back Monday morning and it seems to me that you would be con-
cerned about what to do with it. So tell us about it?
Mr. Odle. Well, I believe he, in the course of being in his office
with me, he asked me for the file and I went and got the file and gave
it to him.
Senator Gurney. In other words, you had it in your office and did
not return it to his office until he asked for it, is that correct?
Mr. Odle. I believe that is what happened.
Senator Gurney. What did he say when he asked you for the file?
Mr. Odle. "The file you took home, you know, may I have it,"
and I said "Yes."
Senator Gurney. Did he go to your office and ask you?
Mr. Odle. No; I believe I was going to see him that day and I
believe he had seen a couple of other people before he had seen me
and when I got to see him about some other matters that subject
came up.
Senator Gurney. Then can you tell us anything further about
what happened when you handed over the file to him? Did he make
any comment, remark or anything?
Mr. Odle. I do not believe so.
Senator Gurney. Did he seem relieved, elated or depressed or
otherwise?
Mr. Odle. I do not recollect that. I think he felt it was, you know,
I mean I think he felt it was a serious file.
Senator Gurney. Did he look at the file?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Gurney. Put it on the desk, was that it?
Mr. Odle. I suppose.
Senator Gurney. You do not know, you do not recall?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Gurney. You mentioned that you were a consultant now
with the Committee To Re-Elect. What is that job?
Mr. Odle. I am working on winding down the committee offices,
working on some of the bills that are to be billed, sell furniture, and
that sort of thing, attempting to wind it down. I have also been spend-
ing a great deal of time, as I say, you know with various commit-
tees looking into these matters and providing documents and things.
Senator Gurney. Does your job as consultant mean you are no
longer a paid employee?
Mr. Odle. No; I am salaried on a daily basis.
Senator Gurney. Just one other question: Did you handle any
cash payments at all during your time with the Committee To Re-
Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. Yes. At one point in time during the time after the
President had mined the harbor of Haiphong and the campaign com-
mittee was organized in support of that activity, totally. Incidentally,
I received $3,000 or $4,000 from Herbert Porter, who, which was
money that I transferred to a couple of people.
Senator Gurney. Who were they?
Mr. Odle. Well, I remember one of them is Paul Jones, the director
of our black voters division, I think. One of the problems during the
Haiphong thing was that we were spending money for things like
buses and box lunches and other things like that.
Senator Gurney. What were the buses being used for?
Mr. Odle. The buses were being used to bring people to Washing-
ton to support — to rally in support of the President's mining of Hai-
phong which as you know at that point was a very major issue.
Senator Gurney. What did these people do after they came to
Washington?
Mr. Odle. Well, I assume they rallied and they went home.
[Laughter.]
Senator Gurney. Where did they rally?
Mr. Odle. There was a rally on the Capitol steps and some other
activities in the metropolitan area. There was a vigil, I remember,
in the Capitol building in support of that — that Haiphong thing.
Senator Gurney. Who was in charge of that?
Mr. Odle. Well, everybody was working on it, sir. The entire
campaign apparatus that week went to work in support of what had
happened. It was a very crucial time in the campaign, that policy was
of great importance and future policy and everybody was working
on it.
Senator Gurney. You mean all 400 people?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, absolutely. We did it publicly, and we did it
overtly and we did it outwardly. Incidentally, there is one thing,
there has been some suggestion that what was done there in support
of the President's mining of Haiphong was a dirty trick or something
we tried to hide, something like Watergate. It certainly did not seem
that way to us. We did it openly, publicly, we set up a staff about it.
We called people on the telephone and if they felt the way we did,
they sent a telegram, we did not order anybody to do it. I do not
think there was anything wrong about it, and the campaign committee
had to keep together that week, everybody worked hard, pulled
hard. We did not have that opportunity in the Presidential primaries
and we did not have that much of an opportunity to test our
State organizations out in the field and that event gave us an op-
portunity to do that.
Senator Gurney. Was not some one person in overall charge of
this operation?
Mr. Odle. Well, I think the campaign director probably was at that
point.
Senator Gurney. No other person than that?
Mr. Odle. Than the campaign committee?
Senator Gurney. Than the campaign director.
69
Mr. Odle. I am sorry. I would say that since the entire campaign
was involved with this activity that the campaign director, Mr.
Mitchell would have been in ultimate charge of that. Jeb Magruder
of course was working on it, I worked on it full time.
Senator Gurney. What did you do about it?
Mr. Odle. I had meetings, I organized things, I went around to
different people to check up and see how they were doing, and I helped
to write the reports on what we were doing, that sort of thing.
Senator Gurney. Now back to the cash payments that we started
out on, 3^ou mentioned one cash payment was made to a Paul Jones, "
and as I understand that was in connection with this Haiphong
operation?
Mr. Odle. Yes; it was.
Senator Gurney. Who was the other cash payment to?
Mr. Odle. Well, there could have been other cash payments, in
other words, it could have been that Mr. Jones got all of it or part of
it, I can't remember anybody else that I actually gave the cash to.
We were only talking about $3,000 to $4,000 andl know that— I be-
lieve, and I could be, you know, giving Mr. Jones what he does not
deserve because it could have been somebody else and I gave Mr. Jones
the check that I would have obtained from the finance committee but
my best recollection is I did give him some cash and he used that cash
to charter buses.
Senator Gurney. Did you get a receipt for it?
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Gurney. Why, all other disbursements were made by
you — as I understand it — by check is that right?
Mr. Odle. I never signed checks. The finance committee was the
disbursing office. They signed the checks, they made the cash dis-
bursements. We had the power of authorization.
Senator Gurney. You would authorize payments to be made?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. You actuall}^ did not make them?
Mr. Odle. Correct.
Senator Gurney. And you cannot remember to whom else you
may have made the cash payments?
Mr. Odle. Of that $4,000?
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Gurney. 1 do not have any further questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Odle, as I recall the testimony this morning that prior to the
Watergate break -in you had never heard of E. Howard Hunt?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Am I to presume from that that he was not on
the payroll of the committee?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, we were asked about that and we checked and
found he was not. . u • o
Senator Inouye. And you have no official relationship with him?
Mr. Odle. I had never seen him, met him, talked to him or had
any other kind of conversation with him.
Senator Inouye. You have never met him?
70
Mr. Odle. Never met him.
Senator Inouye. It has been reported that the former Secretary of
the White House Domestic Counsel has indicated that you were an
occasional visitor to Mr. Hunt after the break-in?
Mr. Odle. What? I am not aware of that — that it has ever been
reported, but it is not true.
Senator Inouye. You have never
Mr. Odle. Are you referring to — there was a story in the Post a
long time ago about a secretary who worked for Mr. Liddy and Mr.
Hunt at the White House, and that she was trying to describe telephone
conversations between the White House and between that office, and
I think she may have mentioned my name, that was a story. She was
also the secretary, just before that, to one of my best friends, who worked
down at the White House and perhaps that is what she is thinking of.
I am saying, sir, categorically, I have never talked to Howard Hunt, met
him, seen him, written a memorandum to him, received a memorandum
from him.
Senator Inouye. So, to this date you have never seen Mr. Hunt?
Mr. Odle. To this date I have never seen Mr. Hunt, and the
truth as to Mr. Liddy, I met him at the same time in December at the
campaign committee.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker?
Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a few questions, Mr. Odle. I know you have been very patient
and very good and I am tr>ang to refresh your recollection as to the
17th.
Let me see whether or not I might not be of some assistance in that
regard.
Is it true that on that particular evening, you and other members
of the staff were in Magruder's office watching the news on television?
Mr. Odle. We did watch, yes; we watched the evening news.
Senator Weicker. And, just so that we can — I am trying to be
helpful in placing the phone call.
Mr. Odle. I understand.
Senator Weicker. Is it true that the phone call took place after
the television news? Do you recall that?
Mr. Odle. It could have, sir. I thought it took place before. But
it could have taken place afterwards.
Senator Weicker. Who was present when the call was made?
Mr. Odle. I think just Mr. Reisner and myself.
Senator Weicker. When you were watching the television show,
was anybody else in the room with you?
Mr. Odle. I think one of the secretaries was, who was working that
day, yes.
Senator Weicker. And, so, when the call was made, was Mr. —
Mrs. Odle present in the room while you were watching the television
show?
Mr. Odle. She may have been. I do not believe she was. She arrived
a little later.
Senator Weicker. In any event, when the call was made, it was just
you and Mr. Reisner in Mr. Magruder's office?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Weicker. Now, did you ask Mr. Reisner what he was
doing there at that time? It was rather late in the evening?
71
Mr. Odle. I do not remember that I did, no.
Senator Weicker. I know that you do not recall the reference to
Gemstone, but does, or do, the words "sensitive material," does that
ring a bell?
Mr. Odle. Sensitive — no, sensitive material does not. Sometimes
we used the word — "sensitive" does. I mean sometimes you might
label a memorandum in government or the committee, I suppose,
confidential sensitive, possibly, but not sensitive material.
Senator Weicker. Now, did Mr. Magruder make the request that
these particular files that he was searching for at the particular time
that you were on the phone with him?
Mr. Odle. Again, I
Senator Weicker. In other words, at the same moment in time
that you and Mr. Reisner were to call Mr. Magruder, was that the
point in time that a request was made for a search of the files, and did
a search go on while Mr. Magruder was on the line?
Mr. Odle. I do not think so, no. But that recollection is pretty hazy.
Senator Weicker. Is there any recollection that you indicated to
Mr. Magruder during that phone conversation, the files which he
referred to, in fact, were now in hand, they have been found?
Mr. Odle. Sir, I do not think that they were lost. I mean, I think that
Mr. Reisner was fairly familiar with the way in which Mr. Magruder's
office was organized. I do not think that they had been misplaced or
anything. I do not think it would have been difficult for him to locate
the files he was referring to.
Senator Weicker. So you have no recollection whatsoever, then, of
searching for a particular file while you were on the phone
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Weicker [continuing]. With Mr. Magruder?
Mr. Odle. I do not have a recollection of that.
Senator Weicker. You have no recollection as to the fact that
there was a question as to what sensitive material was being referred
to by Mr. Magruder?
Mr. Odle. No, I do not remember that term, sensitive material,
being used.
Senator Weicker. All right, then. One last question.
In the hiring of a high-level personnel on the Committee To lie-
Elect the President, who was involved in the clearances?
Mr. Odle. Could you name an example? That would — you know,
there was not any great strategy or set of circumstances by which
people were hired. I think it would depend on the person as to how it
went.
Let us say, for example, that it was in the political division. The
process would be much different than if it were in some other division.
Senator Weicker. All high-level personnel, would you say that
they were interviewed or cleared by either Mr. Malek or Mr. Strachan?
Mr. Odle. No. No; not necessarily. I think Mr. Strachan may have
interviewed a number of them, yes. But I do not think that that
would have ajjplied in all situations.
For example, in the political division, I do not think that Mr.
Strachan would have interviewed those people that were brought in
under the regional director. He could have, but I do not think so.
Senator Weicker. Was an example Mr. Reisner?
Mr. Odle. Yes; that is another area that that is very possible.
72
Senator Weicker. What is possible?
Mr. Odle. It is very possible that Mr. Reisner might have been
interviewed by Mr. Strachan.
Senator Weicker. Who was in overall charge of the hiring of
personnel for the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Odle. At what point in time?
Senator Weicker. At the period — let us take March, April, May,
June?
Mr. Odle. 1972?
Senator Weicker. Right.
Mr. Odle. I would say Mr. Magruder, Mr. Mitchell, and I would
say in many cases, those people would be cleared by Mr. Strachan.
Senator Weicker. And under the chain of command which you
referred to before would be — could one make the assumption that
clearance by Mr. Strachan did involve Mr. Haldeman, or was this an
independent function of Mr. Strachan?
Mr. Odle. I would say that Mr. Strachan would be looking out for
Mr. Haldeman's interests in the clearance process, yes.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, thank you.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. Just one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.
In view of the testimony which you have adduced with respect to
the meeting that you had with Mr. Reisner to try to get the files
that were in Mr. Magruder's desk, let us reconstruct that scene again.
As I understand it from this morning's testimony, you and Mr.
Reisner went to Mr. Magruder's desk. Is that correct?
Mr. Odle. We were in Mr. Aiagruder's office and we were each
on the telephone. I do not have a recollection of going to Mr.
Magruder's desk, although I could have been sitting at his desk on
the telephone.
Senator Montoya. When I questioned you this morning, you did
not recall who had the key to Mr. Magruder's desk or whether it
was locked. Is that correct?
Mr. Odle. No, no; Mr. Reisner would have had a key to Mr.
Magruder's desk.
Senator Montoya. Well, was it locked or did Mr. Magruder open
it in that instance?
Mr. Odle. I do not know. I do not know.
Senator Montoya. All right. Now, you had been told during the
conversation that these files were very important and that you should
get them out of his desk. It that correct?
Mr. Odle. No; not that I should get them out of his desk, that they
should be taken out, and Mr. Reisner, who knew how the desk was
organized
Senator Montoya. Well, who gave the instructions or who vo-
calized the expression that the files were important and they had to
be taken away from there for security reasons?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Magruder, I suppose, would have.
Senator Montoya. Well, did he do this in the telephone
conversation?
Mr. Odle. I suppose that he did, yes.
Senator Montoya. Well, were you not engaged in that telephone
conversation on another phone with him?
Mr. Odle. For part of the time, yes.
Senator Montoya. Well, did you hear him say that?
73
Mr. Odle. I do not have a recollection of him using specific words
to say that, Senator, but I do remember that — —
Senator Montoya. Well, would that be the connotation of what
he said?
Mr. Odle. I think that is a fair statement.
Senator Montoya. All right. Now, when you and Mr. Reisner
decided to divide the files, he decided, or did you both decide, that
you should take the file which was styled "Strategy'^?
Mr. Odle. That was my style— I mean, that was my word. I
Senator Montoya. Why did you call it the strategy file?
Mr. Odle. I do not know. I assume because it was very important.
vSenator Montoya. Well, did you read it?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, I did not read it.
Senator Montoya. You did not read it at that moment?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Montoya. Why did you call it the strategy file?
Mr. Odle. Well, because something must have been said in the
course of the telephone conversation that made it clear to me that it
was a very important, strategic kind of file.
Senator Montoya. What do you recall was said during the con-
versation that led you to believe that it was a strategy file?
Mr. Odle. I do not know. I do not know, I am sorry. Maybe Mr.
Magruder said it was a strategy file. We did have strategy meetings
and maybe it was a file that contained minutes of strategy meetings.
Senator Montoya. Did it turn out to be a strategy file?
Mr. Odle. Sir, I do not know what it turned out to be, because I
never looked at it.
Senator Montoya. Give me a description of that file and give me
a description of the briefcase in which you transported it to your
home.
Mr. Odle. Well, I would say it was a file similar to the one I
have here. It was a legal size. It was gray in color, light gray. The
briefcase was a standard large briefcase.
Senator Montoya. And all you knew about this file was that there
was something strategic, of strategic importance in it?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And that it was important?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And that it had to be guarded?
Mr. Odle. Well, not guarded in a sense, but Mr. Magruder was
concerned for the security of it.
Senator Montoya. All right. And you took it home in your
briefcase?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Montoya. And it was an open file and you did not read it?
Mr. Odle. No, sir, I did not. I did not even read my budget files
that weekend.
Senator Montoya. Are you a very curious man, Mr. Odle?
Mr. Odle. I was not very curious about reading it that weekend.
I was more interested in reading the Washington Post to find out
what was going on down at the committee.
Senator Montoya. Were you not interested in the file in view of
the extreme interest manifested by Mr. Magruder?
Mr. Odle. I do not know that the interest was extreme. I did not
read the file. I do not know why. Maybe I should have.
74
Senator Montoya. And you never found out what was in it?
Mr. Odle. Well, no, but I can speculate.
Senator Montoya. Well, tell me what was in it from your
speculation?
Mr. Odle. Well, I do not know that that would fair to other
people, Senator. Well, if you ask me to — I have been reading the
newspapers.
Senator Montoya. All right, I will withdraw the question. I will
be fair with you.
Mr. Odle. Well, it is just
Senator Montoya. I will be fair with you.
Now, you say that you disbursed $4,000 in cash?
Mr. Odle. Yes.
Senator Montoya. And that for only part of it can you account
at the present time?
Mr. Odle. Well, my best recollection is giving cash to Mr. Jones.
I cannot remember if I gave him $2,000 or $4,000.
Senator Montoya. All right, that is fine. Now
Mr. Odle. If I gave him the $4,000, the rally report, that accounts
for it all.
Senator Montoya. Who gave you the cash?
Mr. Odle. Mr. Herbert Porter.
Senator Montoya. Had you requested this cash or were they
given to you for a specific purpose without your request?
Mr. Odle. I requested it.
Senator Montoya. What did you request it for?
Mr. Odle. To charter buses and bring people to Washington to
participate in the rally.
Senator Montoya. Were you paying these people to
Mr. Odle. No.
Senator Montoya [continuing]. To come to Washington?
Mr. Odle. I did not disburse the funds beyond to the one person
or the two people. But I do not believe the money went to the people,
sir, I believe it went to the cost of the buses and things.
Senator Montoya. To your knowledge, they were not paid to come
to Washington?
Mr. Odle. Yes, sir, to my knowledge, they were not.
Senator Montoya. So, therefore, on the matter of the Haiphong
supporters, is this all you gave them, a boxlunch and a ride on the bus?
Mr. Odle. To the best of my knowledge, sir, yes. I was not the
one that actually did that.
Senator Montoya. That is all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Let the record show that the charts which were
identified by the witness, are made exhibits, and also, if Senator
Weicker has no objection, we will also make his chart an exhibit.
The reporter will mark them appropriately.
[The charts referred to were marked for identification as exhibits
Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8, and can be found on pp. 11, 15, 19, and 33, respec-
tively .1
Senator Ervin. Mr. Odle, I want to thank you on behalf of the
committee for the very, the total cooperation you have given this
committee in its investigation and I also wish to commend you for
the forthrightness of your testimony and to say that in my judgment,
I have known nothing or heard nothing that has occurred that re-
flects in any way whatever upon you.
75
Mr. Odle. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that.
Senator Ervin. Thank 3^011 very much.
I would Hke to say to the committee that we have one witness this
afternoon who has an engagement to be in a golf tournament to-
morrow, Sergeant Leeper. And since he is to testify only upon the
apprehension of people caught in Watergate, I am going to suggest
that we be as expeditious as possible in our questions, since that
proposition has been well established.
First, we have another witness before Mr. Leeper, but I just want
to say I want to do all I can to facilitate his getting to the golf tourna-
ment tomorrow.
Call the next witness.
Mi. Dash. The next witness is Mr. Bruce Kehrli.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Kehrli, hold up your right hand, please.
Do you swear the evidence you are to give to the Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities to be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Kehrli. I do.
Mr. Dash. Do you have a statement you want to give to the
committee?
TESTIMONY OF BRUCE A. KEHRLI, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT
Mr. Kehrli. I have no opening statement, but I do have a state-
ment I may want to give.
Mr. Dash. Please give your name and address.
Mr. Kehrli. My name is Bruce Arnold Kehrli. My address is
738 South Lee Street, in Alexandria.
Mr. Dash. What is your present employment, Mr. Kehrli?
Mr. Kehrli. I am employed at the White House.
Mr. Dash. What is 3^our position?
Mr. Kehrli. My title is Special Assistant to the President.
Mr. Dash. Now, how long have you had such a position?
Mr. Kehrli. 1 have had the title since January of this year. My
position is actually that of staff secretary, which I have had since
January 1 of 1972.
Mr. Dash. And to whom do you report, Mr. Kehrli?
Mr. Kehrli. Right now to General Commander Haig.
Mr. Dash. And prior to that time, to whom did you report?
Mr. Kehrli. H. R. Haldeman.
Mr. Dash. Now, a chart has been placed upon the easel to my
left. Have 3"ou seen that chart before or something like it?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, I have.
Mr. Dash. And did you assist our staff in the preparation of that
chart?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. Did you want to make some comment?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, I would like to make a statement now about the
chart itself.
Senator Ervin. The reporter will mark this chart with the appro-
priate exhibit number.
[The chart referred to was marked exhibit 9 and appears on p. 77.]
9&^296 O — 73 bk. 1 — 6
7e
Mr. Kehrli. The organization chart was prepared by the committee
and checked with me for accuracy. It is accurate as far as it goes, but it
could be misleading in two ways. First, it shows only those people
about whom information was requested. It does not give an idea of the
many hundreds of people who worked on or around various White
House staffs, some of which, like the Domestic Council and the Na-
tional Security Council, are themselves administratively separate and
independent entities. There are also the working relationships with
members of the Cabinet and with other people in the various de-
partments and agencies of the executive branch. In other words, the
chain of command is not nearly so small or so closely integrated as
the few dozen boxes and names on this chart might indicate.
Second, there are often rearrangements within the White House
staff which is in fact a fairly dynamic organization. This is partly a
function of the nature of the work which involves not only long-range
responsibilities but also, literally scores of short-term projects and
informal ad hoc relationships.
Since many individual staff members have a wide range of responsi-
bilities and each area of responsibility could conceivably have a differ-
ent reporting relationship, some common denominator had to be
chosen as the basis for the chart. The criterion chosen was the formal
administrative chain of command.
This chart describes, then, the fundamental relationships which
existed in the White House during the months it covers and the dates
in parentheses upon which the individuals left the White House
payroll. I shall be glad, to the extent of my knowledge, to answer any
questions the committee may have about it.
Mr. Dash. Now, will you please go to the chart and take a pointer?
Now, Mr. Kehrli, taking your statement in consideration, if at
any time in the explanation you make, you feel that it is important to
describe any other function or any other role of the White House
personnel, please feel free to do so, because the purpose of the chart
is to relate to the resolution of our committee. But please do not feel
constrained to the chart if you feel a full explanation requires you to
do otherwise.
Mr. Kehrli. Fine.
Mr. Dash. Now, on that chart, you will find Mr. Haideman?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, Mr. Haideman is right here. He is in charge of
White House operations. You will notice that under Mr. Haideman,
you will find a number of other suborganizations and as I said, because
this chart was based on administrative relationships, this may be
deceiving and that any number of these people at any point in time
may have had a different reporting relationship, depending upon what
project or what subject area they happened to be working in.
Mr. Dash. But basically, under the organization you have and to
the extent that that chart is relevant, the people who are shown under
Mr. Haideman worked for Mr. Haideman?
Mr. Kehrli. Right, but let me give you an example. For instance,
we have the speechwriters here. Mr. Ray Price is the head of that
group. Now, at any point in time, the President may have called
Mr. Price with a specific request, not one which went through Mr.
Haideman, and Mr. Price may have responded to that request without
ever going through Mr. Haideman.
Mr. Dash. Would you say he may have or would have?
77
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78
Mr. Kehrli. On occasions, he would respond to Mr, Haldeman. On
other occasions, he would not.
Mr. Dash. Now, under the direct line to Mr. Haldeman, who under
that chart would be reporting, based on that chart, to Mr. Haldeman
or through Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Kehrli. Well, any of these people at some point in time would
report to Mr. Haldeman, but as I said before, on occasion, these
people may have reported through another staff member — for instance,
Mr. Dean, who is Counsel to the President, on a lot of legal matters
reported to Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Hunt is listed there as a consultant on that
chart?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, he is.
Mr. Dash. For what period of time, do you know, that he served
in that role?
Mr. Kehrli. I am sorry, I do not have his starting date. I was only
asked to put the dates on on which they left the payroll.
Mr. Dash. When did he leave the payroll?
Mr. Kehrli. That was on April 1, 1972.
Mr. Dash. And Mr. Colson — what was Mr. Colson's position? I
do not think it is shown on the chart.
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Colson was in charge of liaison with outside
organizations.
Mr. Dash. And Mr. Malek's role?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Malek's role at this time was he had charge of
the White House personnel office which was recruiting and placing
people within the administration.
Mr. Dash. All right. Now, Mr. Dean, as you said, would either be
reporting to Haldeman, but as indicated, he would also perhaps be
doing quite a bit of his work with Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Kehrli. That is right.
Mr. Dash. So Mr. Dean's primary responsibilities were through
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. Would that be true?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, it would.
Mr. Dash. And Mr. Chapin, what was his particular capacity and
role?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Chapin was in charge of scheduling the Presi-
dent which included any meetings within the White House, any
trips, any meetings outside of the White House, generally on a long-
range planning basis.
Mr. Dash. Now, going to Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Ehrlichman, I
see is there on a line right next to Mr. Haldeman, is that true?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, he is.
Mr. Dash. And what was his official role?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Ehrlichman was an adviser to the President as
well as head of the domestic council.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Krogh, what was his relationship to Mr.
Ehrlichman?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Krogh was a member of the domestic council
staff. I might add at this point as I said in my opening statement
I can only speak out of firsthand knowledge on the White House
organization itself. The domestic council is a separate entity, has
79
its own administrative procedures and its own administrative
personnel.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware at that point in time that Mr. Liddy
had worked in the White House staff under Mr. Krogh?
Mr. Kehrli. I was aware only because I had heard his name
mentioned. I can't verify that at this time or I couldn't at that point.
I have since then checked and found he was on the domestic council
and left on December 10, 1971.
Mr. Dash. Based on your check, Mr. Liddy did in fact work under
Mr. Krogh?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, he did.
Mr. Dash. Did there come a time based on any check that you
made in assistance in preparing this chart did Mr. Young from Na-
tional Security Council and Kathleen Chenow work with Mr. Krogh
and Mr. Liddy?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Do you know when that shift of relationship occurred?
Mr. Kehrli. The National Security Council records indicate that
David Young was detailed to the domestic council in July of 1971.
We didn't have a specific date. Miss Chenow was on the domestic
council staff at that point.
Mr. Dash. This chart does not show" it. Are you aware of any
time when Mr. Hunt worked with that group that later has become
known as the "plumbers" by Mr. Krogh?
Mr. Kehrli. Under Mr. Krogh, yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Are you aware of that term?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, I am aware of it because I only read about it
in the papers.
Mr. Dash. You are only aware of it because you read it in the
papers?
Now, Mr. Strachan, who is Mr. Strachan and where does it appear
on the chart?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Strachan was on Mr. Haldeman's personal staff
and it appears here.
Mr. Dash. What was his particular function with Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Kehrli. His particular function was liaison with the Repub-
lican National Committee and with the Committee To Re-Elect the
President.
Mr. Dash. Now, are you aware of to your own knowledge as to
how frequently Mr. Strachan was in touch as liaison with the Com-
mittee for Re-Election of the President.
Mr. Kehrli. No, I am not.
Mr. Dash. But that was a main function of his, as you know.
Mr. Kehrli. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And therefore he would be carrying back and forth for
Mr. Haldeman, between Mr. Haldeman and the committee whatever
messages Mr. Haldeman had for the committee or the committee for
Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Kehrli. Carrying, I think, he may not or may not have
carried them but they would have come through him at one point
or another.
Mr. Dash. Mr. MacGregor at one point was a member of the White
House staff as I see on the chart?
80
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, he was.
Mr. Dash. I think you have him on the chart as leaving July 1,
1972. Do you know where he went from that?
Mr. Kehrli. He went to the Committee To Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Magruder is shown on that chart on the other, on
the right-hand side on the communications under Mr. Klein, staying
until May 1, 1971.
Do you know where he went after that time?
Mr. Kehrli. He went to the Committee To Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Dash. I think you have Mr. Odle and Mr. Porter working for
Mr. Magruder and the}^ left approximately, Mr. Odle May 1, 1971,
and Mr. Porter April 29, 1971, according to the chart and do you
know where they went when they left?
Mr. Kehrli. They went to the Committee To Re-Elect the
President.
Mr. Dash. Now, down towards the bottom you have Mr. Hugh
Sloan under scheduling, and I take it under Mr. Dwight Chapin, and
it appears in the chart that he left the White House on March 6, 1971.
Do you know where he went when he left the White House?
Mr. Kehrli. He went either to the Committee To Re-Elect the
President or the finance committee and I would have to check that.
Mr. Dash. And I see on the chart also at the bottom, I guess a line
down from Mr. Haldeman to a box marked political H. Dent and under
that Mr. LaRue, and a date of leaving February 15, 1972.
Do you know where Mr. LaRue went when he left the White House?
Mr. Kehrli. I assume he went to the Committee To Re-Elect the
President. I don't have that.
Mr. Dash. The facts would show that, I take it?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, are you of your own knowledge, and 1 know that
we have asked you to come here to assist us in reconstructing the
White House staff and the relationship around the time relevant to
the 1971-72 period, that would cover the resolution in which we are
engaged in dealing with the Watergate matter, and that this was the
purpose of developing this chart.
Beyond being able to describe the various relationships of these
people and their roles on the chart, do you have any further knowledge
as to their relationship with the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Kehrli. No, I don't.
Mr. Dash. Do you know anything about the duties of Kathleen
Chenow?
Mr. Kehrli. No, I don't.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson?
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Kehrli, if you would like to be seated I think
perhaps it would be better. I have a few questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kehrli, I would like to ask you a few questions about Mr.
John Dean, Counsel to the President.
According to your chart Mr. Dean is immediately responsible to
Mr. Haldeman, is that correct?
Mr. Kehrli. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And according to the chart he would not have direct
access to the President as Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Kissinger, and these
other men you have named would?
81
Mr. Kehrli. Now, I should elaborate on that point. As I said,
depending on the various issues or projects these people were working
on they would have different channels of command. On some issues
John Dean may have had direct access to the President.
Mr. Thompson. Could you categorize Mr. Dean's duties for us?
What types of problems or situations would normally arise that would
draw his attention and require his work?
Mr. Kehrli. Basically he was responsible for seeing that anything
that the President sent out in terms of an official document or procla-
mation, Executive order, things of this nature was correct legally.
He also was an adviser to the President on legal matters and things
like executive privilege. He also dealt with conflict of interest in terms
of bringing people on board the staff and that was his responsibility.
Mr. Thompson. Would you say that his primary responsibility
would be for providing legal opinions and approving legal documents?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, I would.
Mr. Thompson. I know you have here Mr. Finch and Mr. Rumsfeld
as counselors to the President and I assume we can draw a strict
distinction between counsel to the President, Mr. Dean, and coun-
sellors to the President, Mr. Finch and Mr. Rumsfeld.
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, Mr. Finch and Mr. Rumsfeld as counselors to
the President performed a role that included their being spokesmen,
they included special projects and they didn't have any set substan-
tive responsibility but were free to move into any area the President
may determine.
Mr. Thompson. You mentioned the area of executive privilege a
moment ago, would Mr. Dean aid the President in formulating his
legal position on executive privilege?
Mr. Kehrli. He would advise him on it, yes.
Mr. Thompson. The President made a statement on March 2
pertaining to executive privilege, when he stated that the White
House aides would not come down and testify before a committee
formally, and another statement on March 15 of this year when he
stated that Mr. Dean specifically had what might be referred to as
double privilege.
Do you know whether or not Mr. Dean had any input with regard
to the President's legal position on those two statements?
Mr. Kehrli. I can't say that for a fact.
Mr. Thompson. Leaving that subject, Mr. Kehrli, I would like to
ask you this: You mentioned the so-called "plumbers", Mr. Hunt,
Mr. Liddy, who were in the White House at one time. As I under-
stand it one time they were working on the so-called Pentagon Papers,
the leaks pertaining to the Pentagon Papers situation, is that your
understanding?
Mr. Kehrli. My understanding is they were working on a project
related to leaks the timing of it was such that I assume it had to do
with the Pentagon Papers. I know David Young also worked on a
commission on declassification that was set up.
Mr. Thompson. Well, reports have been that these papers concerned
matters of national security.
Do you know why Hunt and Liddy in this particular project would
operate out of the domestic council under Mr. Ehrlichman in this
particular area if they were primarily national security problems?
82
Mr. Kehrli. No, I don't.
Mr. Thompson. Does it seem like a logical situation to you or
unusual situation to you, considering the nature of the domestic
council and considering the nature of the work they were doing?
Mr. Kehrli. Well, knowing the background of Mr. Krogh and Mr.
Haldeman he was once counsel to the President and there were legal
responsibilities dealing with the law and I don't think it was unusual
to have an organization set up like that.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. John Caulfield is not on your chart, is he?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, he is.
Mr. Thompson. Is Mr. Caulfield on the chart? Is he under Mr.
Dean?
Mr. Dash. He is under Mr. Dean.
Mr. Thompson. Did you mention in your testimony his relationship
to Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Caulfield?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Kehrli. No, I didn't.
Mr. Thompson. Would it be accurate to state that often he dealt
with Mr. Ehrlichman on matters?
Mr. Kehrli. No, I don't know.
Mr. Thompson. You don't know that.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Do you know Mr. Richardson?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. What was his assignment?
Mr. Kehrli. He was a writer.
Senator Ervin. And he came in under Mr. Price or one of the
writers with Mr. R. Price and Mr. Buchanan?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin Those are the only questions.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Once again
~r understand that our operating format is to utilize this witness'
testimony for the purpose of establishing an organizational chart
within the White House. I have a number of questions that I wished
to put to the witness that are not related to the organizational chart
as such but in the interest of trying to conserve time and stick to
that operating format, I would ask instead if the witness will agree
to return at a later date so that we may ask him other questions that
are not related to his testimony today.
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. I might also ask, Mr. Kehrli, if, as an assistant
to the President, you are appearing voluntarily or under subpena.
Mr. Kehrli. I am appearing voluntarily.
Senator Baker. Was there any intervention of a claim of executive
privilege on your behalf?
Mr. Kehrli. No, there was not.
Senator Baker. Was there any instruction from the White House
or anyone in it as to how you should conduct yourself with this com-
mittee, especially with respect to where you should cooperate or not
cooperate?
Mr. Kehrli. I was asked to, I was encouraged to cooperate.
Senator Baker. Mr. Kehrli, so that you have some understanding
of what I intend to ask you later, and once again I do not intend to
83
pursue it today, when you return as a witness to testify at a later
sequence of hearings I want to know particularly about the drilling
and opening of Mr. Hunt's safe. I want to know what you found in it,
I want to know what happened to it, and I want to know a number of
other things related to it. But just so that you understand that I am
not asking you those questions now in the interest of time and order-
liness, I hope you will be prepared to respond when you do return.
Mr. Kehrli. I do.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Kehrli, who determined which people in
the White House originally went to the Committee To Re-Elect the
President?
Mr. Kehrli. I don't think there was anj^one person who determined
that. I think it was a joint decision based on the need of the White
House and the committee. If the committee had a need and there was
someone at the White House who was not in position or was in a
position rather that they could leave and they felt that they could
do a better job at the committee then they were able to go to the
committee.
I don't think there was any one being that said you will go.
Senator Talmadge. But there was more than one person who made
the determination ; who was it?
Mr. Kehrli. I would say that, and I don't know for a fact, but I
would imagine that it was probabl}^ made based on discussions be-
tween the head of the campaign committee and Mr. Haldeman, Mr.
Ehrlichman, and other people on the staff.
wSenator Talmadge. Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Mitchell, and who else?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Ehrlichman.
vSenator Talmadge. Mr. Ehrlichman.
Did you see any memoranda from the Committee To Re-Elect the
President, circulating in the White House?
Mr. Kehrli. The only thing that I saw that I can remember is
one that came over with the committee's list of telephone numbers
on it. We did circulate it.
Senator Talmadge. That was the only one?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes.
Senator Talmadge. Did you ever see or have knowledge of any
communication either written or oral between Mr. Mitchell and the
White House staff prior to the time he resigned as Attorney General
concerning the campaign activities?
Mr. Kehrli. No.
Senator Talmadge. Did you see any after July 1, the date Mr.
Mitchell resigned as campaign chairman?
Mr. Kehrli. Not that I remember.
Senator Talmadge. Did you ever receive funds from the com-
mittee or the finance committee for campaign activities?
Mr. Kehrli. No.
Senator Talmadge. None whatever?
Mr. Kehrli. I personally?
Senator Tal:\iadge. Yes.
Mr. Kehrli. At one point I was the contact on the White House
staff for payment of bills that were incurred by the President during
the campaign. We went out of our way to a great degree to make sure
84
that any travel, any events, anything whatsoever that the President
did that could in the least way be construed as political were paid for
by committee funds rather than appropriated funds.
Senator TaLxMADGE. The only funds you received then were the
President's political activity and solely for that purpose?
Mr. Kehrli. That is right.
Senator Talmadge. And they were dispensed for that purpose.
Was there ever any regular meetings held between the White
House staff and committee officials?
Mr. Kehrli. Not that I know of.
Senator Talmadge. None at all?
Mr. Kehrli. No; not that I know of, but, as I said, I was not in
the mainstream of communication.
Senator Talmadge. To your knowledge, never at any time under
no conditions?
Mr. Kehrli. That is right.
Senator Talmadge. That is your answer?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you, sir.
No further questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kehrli, I just want to talk a little bit about the White House
organization and especially those people closest around the President
most of the time more frequently than others.
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Gurney. Wlio else?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator Gurney. Who else?
Did Mr. Ziegler see him?
Mr. Kehrli. Well, Mr. Ziegler, that is right. But beyond that
there would be a tossup as to who was on the staff.
Senator Gurney. How about Mr. Chapin?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Chapin dealt primarily through Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Gurney. What was Mr. Haldeman's previous employ-
ment?
Mr. Kehrli. Pardon me, sir?
Senator Gurney. What was Mr. Haldeman's previous employment?
Mr. Kehrli. He was with the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Co.
Senator Gurney. Where did Mr. Chapin come from before he
came to the White House?
Mr. Kehrli. The same company.
Senator Gurney. Was he brought in by Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes; he was.
Senator Gurney. Who was Mr. Ziegler with before he came to the
White House?
Mr. Kehrli. He was also with J. Walter Thompson.
Senator Gurney. Was he also brought in by Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes; he was.
Senator Gurney. What about Mr. Ehrlichman; was he ever with
J. Walter Thompson?
Mr. Kehrli. No; T don't think so.
Senator Gurney. Was he a very close friend of Mr. Haldeman's?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes; he was.
85
Senator Gurney. What was their past friendship and association?
Mr. Kehrli. Well, the only — only thing I can relate is what I
read, they were evidently friends during college days.
Senator Gurney. Who were you previously employed with?
Mr. Kehrli. I was with J. Walter Thompson. [Laughter.]
Senator Gurney. Who were the people who budgeted the Presi-
dent's time? I mean by that who were most responsible for those
people who saw the President and those people who did not see the
President?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Chapin was responsible for the President's
scheduling and that was done on a weekly and a daily basis, a long-
range weekly scheduling followed up by a daily schedule. Mr. Butterfield
w^as responsible for implementing that schedule.
Senator Gurney. Who was Mr. Butterfield?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Butterfield on the chart on the far right reported
to Mr. Haldeman and he was — he had an office right outside the
President's door and he was responsible for implementing the Presi-
dent's schedule on a daily basis making sure that the appoints were
there on time, that when people came in they were positioned correctly.
Senator Gurney. And he reported to Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, he did.
Senator Gurney. And Mr. Chapin reported to Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, he did.
Senator Gurney. Would anybody who had anything to do with
budgeting the President's time report to anybody else but Mr. Halde-
man?
Mr. Kehrli. No.
Senator Gurney. Are you familiar at all in your job in the White
House with the people the President saw daily during your time there?
Mr. Kehrli. You mean was I aware of his daily schedule?
Senator Gurney. Yes, I mean would you be generally familiar
with the people that he saw?
Mr. Kehrli. I received a copy of his daily schedule so I saw the
names of the people that he saw daily.
Senator Gurney. I see.
Mr. Kehrli. That were on the published schedule. Now, he often
would call other people over and that wouldn't be on the published
schedule calls obviously he couldn't keep it up on a minute to minute
basis. It was issued during the morning and if it was changed during
the day it wasn't worth issuing a new one for the staff.
Senator Gurney. Would you generally be aware of the people who
came to see him even though they were not on the regular schedule?
Mr. Kehrli. No, I would not. My office is located in the basement
of the White House, out of the traffic flow.
Senator Gurney. Of those people that you are aware of who saw
the President, because you did see the daily schedule, did many
Senators ever visit the President?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, quite a few. And he also, he used to have, as
I remember or he still does, breakfasts for Members of Congress.
Senator Gurney. But I mean on a personal basis, talking to them
in his own private office with him personally.
Mr. Kehrli. I don't have an exact number but I do remember
Senators and Congressmen on the schedule, yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Were these frequent visits?
86
Mr. Kehrli. I really can't comment on the number of visits.
Senator Gurney. How about Republican National Committee
Chairman. Was he ever on the visitors list also?
Mr. Kehrli. He was on the visitors list.
Senator Gurney. Very often?
Mr. Kehrli. It is difficult to say how often, he was in there more
than once.
Senator Gurney. Would you say frequently?
Mr. Kehrli. I don't know, how would you term frequently?
Senator Gurney. Well, you term it. I mean you saw the schedule,
I didn't.
Mr. Kehrli. I would say
Senator Gurney. Once a month?
Mr. Kehrli. Once a month is probably correct.
Senator Gurney. That would be about correct?
Mr. Kehrli. That is right.
Senator Gurney. What about other Republican Party people,
State chairmen or other people whose work was within the party.
Did you ever see them on the schedule?
Mr. Kehrli. I may have but they weren't listed as a State chair-
man and I probably wouldn't recognize the names.
Senator Gurney. Well, at any rate the people who saw the Pres-
ident were carefully screened by Mr. Haldeman and those people
that we have talked about here who were brought to the White
House by Mr. Haldeman, is that right?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Haldeman was responsible for putting together
the President's schedule, and based on, I am sure on, conferring with
the President and what time was available and how it was to be used.
Senator Gurney. Would you have any idea how many people on
the White House staff, how many were there, total staff?
Mr. Kehrli. Total on the Wliite House staff approximately 500.
Now there is a confusing point there and I am speaking only of the
White House Office and the domestic council, for instance, the National
Security Council, Council of Economic Advisers, all which are housed
in the Executive Office Building, White House Office complex, are
not included in that 500.
Senator Gurney. I am talking about the 500 staff.
Mr. Kehrli. Yes.
Senator Gurney. Who recruited most of those people? Did you
say?
Mr. Kehrli. It was done — I can speak onl}' from the time in
November of 1970, when I came on the White House rolls, and they
were recruited by the personnel office primarily.
Senator Gurney. Wlio was in charge of that?
Mr. Kehrli. Fred Malek.
Senator Gurney. Who brought Fred Malek to the White House?
Mr. Kehrli. I assume Bob Haldeman did, although I can't answer
that for a fact, because I arrived almost on the same day that Fred
Malek arrived.
Senator Gurney. Is it fair to say that all people who came on
board, regardless of who they were recruited by, were OK'd or
turned down by Mr. Haldeman? Is that fair to say?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Haldeman did want to be made aware, as he
was responsible for them, of all members of the White House staff,
87
all new members, and he was made aware of anyone, by anyone of
the staff members if they w^anted to bring an individual on.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever hire anybody through your staff?
Mr. Kehrli. No, I did not.
Senator Gurney. Did you have a staff?
Mr. Kehrli. I do now. Yes, my staff is primarily career employees.
One of my basic responsibilities is the 280 or so career Government
employees who serve the President, the Office of the President, year
in and year out.
Senator Gurney. I see.
Now, tell me, was one of your responsibilities the White House
payroll?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes. I was responsible for monitoring the White
House payroll.
Senator Gurney. What do you mean by monitoring?
Mr. Kehrli. Well, whenever — for instance, any raises of profes-
sional employees were sent to Mr. Haldeman for approval; I approved
all raises for people below that level — in other words, clerical types,
secretaries.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever handle any moneys that were paid
to White House personnel that were not Federal payroll moneys?
Mr. Kehrli. No.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever handle any cash at any time?
Mr. Kehrli. I did. We had, as I said when I was talking about, one
of my responsibilities being making sure that anything that the
President did or that his staff did in supporting him while he was
participating in a political event was covered by funds from the
Committee To Re-Elect the President as opposed to appropriated
funds. We did have a problem at one point with, for instance, when the
President would fly somewhere and they needed to start the plane,
provision it with food. The way we had it set up was to have the
military people go out and purchase the food, put it aboard the plane.
Rather than having them, and most of them were low-level military
people, put out money and have to be repaid, we brought over some
cash and paid them in advance to buy this food.
Senator Gurney. These were all moneys paid in direct support of
the President?
Mr. Kehrli. Absolutely.
Senator Gurney. At any particular time.
And you testified that you made no cash payments to anybody other
than in this area that you are now describing?
Mr. Kehrli. To the best of my knowledge, yes.
Senator Gurney. Well, now, what does that mean?
Mr. Kehrli. Well, I can't remember.
Senator Gurney. Do you think that you did?
Mr. Kehrli. No.
Senator Gurney. Do you know of any people on the White House
staff who were paid moneys by anybody else that were not Federal
payroll moneys?
Mr. Kehrli. No, I do not; no.
Senator Gurney. Were you responsible for the assigning of office
space in the White House and also in the Executive Mansion?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
88
Senator Gurney. What was the disposition of the office space
assigned to Mr. Liddy and Mr. McCord and Mr. Hunt after they
were removed from the White House payroll, do you recall?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Hunt's office was in a block of space that had
been assigned to Mr. Colson, but we do not assign specific offices
within a staff. We assign a block of space to a staff and let them divide
it up as they wish.
Senator Gurney, And what about Mr. McCord and Mr. Hunt?
Mr. Kehrli. I never knew Mr. McCord.
Senator Gurney. How about Mr. Hunt?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Hunt had an office in room 338.
Senator Gurney. Is that the Executive Office?
Mr. Kehrli. Of the Executive Office Building, that is right.
Senator Gurney. What happened to his office after he was removed
from the Federal payroll?
Mr. Kehrli. It was left within the Colson operation. I do not know
who was sitting in that now. Senator.
Senator Gurney. Is that part of the block of offices of Colson's?
Mr. Kehrli. He had people with various responsibilities within
the Executive Office Building.
Senator Gurney. After these people were removed from the
Federal payroll, do you know whether they had access to their offices
after that time?
Mr. Kehrli. No, I do not.
Senator Gurney. You do not know whether they used the tele-
phones?
Mr. Kehrli. No, I do not.
Senator Gurney. What happened to their file cabinets?
Mr. Kehrli. I know what happened to Mr. Hunt's file cabinets.
Senator Gurney. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kehrli, according to that chart, Mr. Ehrlichman is presently
the chief of the domestic section?
Mr. Kehrli. Domestic council, yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. And Mr. Haldeman is chief of the White House
operation, Mr. Dean, counsel?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. At this moment?
Mr. Kehrli. No.
Oh, I see; yes, sir. That is right. They are still on the payroll through
the 19th, which is this Sunday, and it was based on an agreement
that was made in terms of trying to make sure that they had enough
time to wind down their responsibilities on the White House staff, and
that Avas determined that it was a reasonable amount of time to allow
men with their responsibilities to phase out, get other people who
were taking over their responsibilities briefed on what their responsi-
bilities were and up to speed before they left.
Senator Inouye. Following up on the matter of scheduling, you
have indicated that Mr. Haldeman had final say as to who saw the
President. Am I correct?
Mr. Kehrli. On occasion, he would not have the final say. He
would cover it with the President.
Senator Inouye. Would this extend to telephone calls also?
89
Mr. Kehrli. No, it did not. Mr. Chapin handled the telephone
calls, as I remember it.
Senator Inouye. Is it possible for a U.S. Senator to have called
the President and been put through to him directly?
Mr. Kehrli. I do not know. I am not that familiar with that set-
up.
Senator Inouye. Your chart indicates that Mr. Colson was a
liaison with outside groups.
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Would you describe outside groups?
Mr. Kehrli. Veterans groups, labor groups, groups of that nature.
Senator Inouye. Are you aware of his activities with groups that
have been mentioned in the press that you have not mentioned?
Mr. Kehrli. For instance.
Senator Inouye. It has been suggested that he has been involved
in dirty tricks and
Mr. Kehrli. I am not aware of any dirty tricks.
Senator Inouye. Do you know who Mr. Colson reported to?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Colson reported to Mr. Haldeman for adminis-
trative purposes and on most of the things he did, he also reported
to the President on occasion. I really can't give you a percentage
breakdown, what percent he reported directly to the President or
what percent he reported to Mr. Haldeman. I imagine on some
occasions, he may have reported to Mr. Ehrlichman. Again, this is
only something he knows.
Senator Inouye. What was Mr. Gordon Strachan's role?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Gordon Strachan was a staff assistant to Mr.
Haldeman, who was in charge of liaison with the Committee To
Re-Elect and the Republican National Committee.
Senator Inouye. Did Mr. Ehrlichman get copies of all political
memos as indicated in the exhibit* which was submitted earlier?
Mr. Kehrli. I do not know.
Senator Inouye. I have no further questions — oh, I do have one
question.
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Do you know a Mr. Roy Shepherd?
Mr. Kehrli. No; I do not know him.
Senator Inouye. Have you checked the files to see if he is on the
payroll?
Mr. Kehrli. I know for a fact that he is not on the payroll.
Senator Inouye. If he is not on the payroll, how does one get
admitted to the White House?
Mr. Kehrli. I did some checking on Mr. Shepherd and he was
admitted because he had a pass from another Government agency.
Senator Inouye. What Government agency, sir?
Mr. Kehrli. As I remember, it was the Department of Transpor-
tation.
Senator Inouye. Is he on the payroll of the Department
of Transportation?
Mr. Kehrli. I do not know.
Senator Inouye. But Mr. Shepherd is not on the payroll of the
White House?
Mr. Kehrli. That is correct.
*See exhibit No. 4, p. 454.
90
Senator Inouye. Have you ever met Mr. Shepherd?
Mr. Kehrli. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. Were you aware that he visited one of the offices?
Mr. Kehrli. Not before his name came up.
Senator Inouye. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a few brief
questions.
Mr. Kehrli, when was the last time that you talked, either directly
or on the telephone, with either Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman?
Let me ask the question first as to Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Kehrli. OK. I think I spoke with Mr. Ehrlichman last Friday
or Saturday, and I do not remember which day.
Senator Weicker. And what was the nature of this conversation —
this was after he had left the White House?
Mr. Kehrli. This was after the announcement of his resignation
had been made and while he was winding down his acti^dties at the
White House.
Senator Weicker. So this was directly, face to face?
Mr. Kehrli. No, this was a telephone conversation.
Senator Weicker. I see. Would you indicate the nature of that
conversation?
Mr. Kehrli. We were discussing the disposition of his papers that
had been taken from the office and held in a room.
Senator Weicker. What do you mean by the disposition of his
papers? I do not follow you.
Mr. Kehrli. This was at a time when they were turning back cer-
tain papers to the FBI.
Senator Weicker. What was the purpose in your discussing this
matter with him?
Mr. Kehrli. Well, I wanted to make sure that he was aware of the
fact that they were being turned back, since they were coming out of
his files.
Senator Weicker. In other words, the nature — was the phone
conversation from you to Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Kehrli. That is right. And since one of my
Senator Weicker. To alert him that his files were being taken by
an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
Mr. Kehrli. That is right. One of my responsibilities is the preser-
vation of Presidential papers and that includes filing systems in the
White House and any file systems we have of special assistant papers.
Senator Weicker. Can you give us an}'^ indication of his response
when you so alerted him?
Mr. Kehrli. He was aware of it and said he would check with
Mr. Garment on it.
Senator Weicker. That was the nature of the conversation?
Mr. Kehrli. That was it.
Senator Weicker. That he would check with Mr. Garment?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes.
vSenator Weicker. And when was the last time that you talked to
Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Kehrli. I think it was sometime last week. I do not have an
exact date. We were discussing what he wanted to do with his retire-
91
ment benefits, whether he wanted to continue his health insurance,
things of this nature, the official papers required when he resigned.
Senator Weicker. Did you make a phone call to Mr. Haldeman to
alert him that his records also were being commandeered by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation?
Mr. Kehrli. No; because they weren't.
Senator Weicker. In other words, no papers of Mr. Halderaan's
were taken by the Bureau?
Mr. Kehrli. Not that I know of.
I think we are confusing something here. That is at one point in
time, all the papers were taken and put in one area and there was
extra security put on them. That was the initial movement. Then after
that is the discussion that I had with Mr. Ehrlichman and these were
the papers that were described in a couple of newspaper articles, FBI
files.
Senator Weicker. I am a little bit confused, too, on this point. Do
not let me guide you, but in other words, was there some special reason
why you alerted Mr. Ehrlichman as compared to Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Kehrli. Well, because we are talking about two different points
in time. Immediately after Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman
resigned, all of the papers within their offices and actually all of their
working papers were taken and put in one room, as I understand it —
I was only told this by Mr. Garment — so there w^ould be no problem
wdth any papers disappearing. That happened on the first of May, or
about that time.
Now, we are talking about last weekend.
Senator Weicker. Friday.
Mr. Kehrli. When the FBI had requested some papers back that
had been part of this group, and since they were included in Mr.
Ehrlichman's files, I wanted to make sure that he was aware of the
fact that they had been requested.
Senator Weicker. Did you receive a request from the FBI to assist
in this matter? Is that how it came to your attention?
Mr. Kehrli. No; it came to my attention because I happened to
be walking past the room where we kept the files and I noticed there
were some people in the room making a manifest, making a log of the
different papers, an inventory.
Senator Weicker. And it was at that point in time you called
Mr. Ehrlichman and let him know that his papers were
Mr. Kehrli. Yes; that is right.
Senator Weicker. Now, in conversations that you have had with
staff members of this committee, you have indicated — and you have
also indicated on the chart — correct me if I am wrong — that there
were basically five assistants to the President who reported directly
to him. These men were John Ehrlichman, Bob Haldeman, Henry
Kissinger, Clark MacGregor, and Peter Flanigan.
Is that correct?
Mr. Kehrli. That is right.
Senator Weicker. And you also indicated that the Special Counse-
lors Robert Finch and Donald Rumsfeld also reported directly to the
President but did not have specific operational responsibiUty to the
White House?
Mr. Kehrli. That is correct.
96-296 O— 73 bk. 1—7
92
Senator Weicker. Is it not true that the only people who had
direct access to the President were Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman,
and Dr. Kissinger, and that other people, including Clark MacGregor,
Peter Flanigan, Finch, Rumsfeld, et al., saw the President but only
at the sufferance of one of these three men?
Mr. Kehrli. No; I would say that if they wanted to see the Presi-
dent, then a time would be set up based on the President's schedule and
the President's priorities. And that was something that Mr. Haldeman
was aware of and was able to set up.
On the other hand, the President at any time may have called for
them or anybody else on the staff.
Senator Weicker. But if the initiation of this contact was made
by any of these individuals, they would have to go through one of
the three that I have mentioned, Kissinger, Ehrlichman, and
Haldeman?
Mr. Kehrli. They would go to Mr. Haldeman to see what the
President's schedule was in terms of time. Obviously, his time was
more important than theirs. And in order to make sure that there
was time available to see him, then they would go to Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Weicker. In other words, do you consider as a practical
matter Haldeman, Dr. Kissinger, Ehrlichman, Clark MacGregor,
Peter Flanigan, Finch, and Rumsfeld equal as far as access to the
President?
Mr. Kehrli. I would not call them equals as far as access to the
President, no, because each of them had different needs to see the
President. The nature of Bob's, Mr. Haldeman's, job was such that
he saw the President quite often. The nature of Mr. Rumsfeld's
and Mr. Finch's jobs were such that they did not need to see the
President that often. They did not request to see the President that
often.
Senator Weicker. Did Dr. Kissinger go through Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Kehrli. I do not think so, and I can't say that for a fact.
Senator Weicker. Now, logs are kept, are they not, as to those
persons that see the President and who telephone the President?
Mr. Kehrli. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. And who keeps those logs?
Mr. Kehrli. Those logs are — actually, it is a compilation. The
White House operators keep track of the phone calls and any number
of people put together the log on who sees the President. It may be
the military aide who is walking along and somebody may walk up
to the President and shake his hand and start a conversation. So he
would be the only one present, so he would be able to put that
together.
The scheduling office keeps a log of his formal appointments.
There is a secretary who sits outside his office who also keeps track
of other people who are called in periodically. So actually, it is a
combination of a number of different inputs that results in the final
listing of people who saw the President.
Senator Weicker. Does Mr. Nesbitt have the responsibility of
keeping logs as to who sees the President?
Mr. Kehrli. Mr. Nesbitt's responsibility is in terms of the daily
diary, which is just what it says, a diary of the President's activities
I
93
and phone calls for that particular day. He gams inputs from various
sources and combines them so that the log shows not only phone calls,
but also shows meetings and business.
Senator Weicker. So this is, if there were any place, this is the
one central place where you would have a fairly accurate description
of both the personal meetings and the phone conversations with the
President?
Mr. Kehrli. It is one place. It is not the only place.
Senator Weicker. Could you tell me what the other place is?
Mr. Kehrli. Well, also within central files, which is the general
filing organization, we have an organization that keeps track of who
saw the President, when they saw him, and also what correspondence
has gone back and forth between them. So, if a letter comes in to the
President, we can pull the background information on him, letting
him, or whoever is going to be drafting the response, know when this
individual writing the letter saw the President last, when he wrote
the President last, and what the response was, if any.
Senator Weicker. All right, just two questions. First of all, where
is Fred Fielding on this chart?
Mr. Kehrli. Fred Fielding was the deputy counsel. He was John
Dean's deputy.
Senator Weicker. And on the chart here, he would be listed
where?
Mr. Kehrli. He would be listed below Mr. Dean.
Senator Weicker. And have you ever worked with Mr. Fielding?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, I have.
Senator Weicker. In what capacity?
Mr. Kehrli. Well, in my capacity as staff secretary, one of my
responsibilities is to make sure that an}^ papers going to the President
are thoroughly staffed, and that includes a legal opinion. Mr. I<ielding
was often the contact for these matters.
Senator Weicker. And then my last question, Mr. Kehrli. At the
time of the 1972 campaign, or prior to it, were there any changes of
your duties, or any additional duties which were given to you, which
were precipitated by the campaign?
Mr. Kehrli. No. In January 1972, I changed" jobs — January 1.
That is when I went from being staff assistant to Mr. Haldeman into
my present position as staff secretary.
Senator Weicker. But at no time did you acquire any duties that
related to the campaign?
Mr. Kehrli. No.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya?
Senator Montoya. Mr. Kehrh, how many people were separated
or transferred to the Committee To Re-Elect the President from the
White House?
Mr. Kehrli. I do not have that exact figure with me. I can look
that up.
Senator Montoya. Would you furnish it for the record?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir, I will.
94
[The following information was submitted by Mr. Kehrli in reference
to the above:]
Persons separated or transferred from the V(' kite House to the Committee To Re-Eled
the President
Name Separation date
Sloan, Hugh W., Jr Mar. 6, 1971
Harlowe, Jayne L. (Miss) May 1,1971
Magruder, Jeb S Do.
Odle, Robert C, Jr Do.
Roberts, Gene E. (Miss) Do.
Jablonsky, D. Lea (Miss) May 21, 1971
Duncan, Martha H. (Miss) June 12,1971
Kaupinen, Allan George Oct. 29, 1971
Smith, Kenneth M Nov. 9, 1971
Shumway, DeVan L Jan. 14, 1972
Koon, Karen L. (Miss) Feb. 12, 1972
Foust, Jon A Apr. 1, 1972
Humphrey, Katherine J. (Miss) July 1, 1972
Licata, Judith Ann (Mrs.) Do.
MacGregor, Clark Do.
Malek, Frederic V Do.
Rausch, Doris (Miss) July 18, 1972
Deane, John Russell, III Aug. 4, 1972
Anderson, Stanton D Aug. 19, 1972
Ochs, Valerie H. (Mrs.) Do.
Jones, Jerry H Apr. 7, 1972
Senator Montoya. How many people did you have at the White
House during the course of last year? What was the largest number
you had on the staff? You mentioned that now you have approxi-
mately 500 on board.
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir; well, at one point, we were at around 510
and then we have our fiscal year 1974 budget is for 480 and we will
be down to 480.
Senator Montoya. So you are effectuating a reduction of approxi-
mately 30 people?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Do you have any on board from other
departments?
Mr. Kehrli. At this point in time?
Senator Montoya. Yes.
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. How many, approximately?
Mr. Kehrli. I do not have the figure on that. I can give you that
figure.
Senator Montoya. Give me a round figure more or less?
Mr. Kehrli. Oh, maybe 15.
Senator Montoya. What was the cause for the reduction in the
budget request?
Mr. Kehrli. The President's request that all parts of the Execu-
tive Office cut back and — that is basically it.
Senator Montoya. Now, during the course of the campaign, you
were in charge of paying everyone on the White House staff, were
you not? You were more or less the one who made the payroll?
Mr. Kehrli. No, sir; well, I was indirectly in charge of the pa5nroll.
We have an accounting operation consisting of career Government
employees who handle the pajrroll and details that go along with that.
95
Senator Montoya. How were those people from the White House
staff who accompanied the President paid per diem when they re-
mained in some places overnight during the political campaign?
Mr. Kehrli. They were paid out of funds from the Committee To
Re-Elect.
Senator Montoya. You had no — you did not authorize the pay-
ment of any funds to these people out of White House funds?
Mr. Kehrli. Not that I know of. And again, as I said, we bent
over backwards trying to make sure that anything that could come
anywhere near being considered political was paid for out of the
Committee To Re-Elect. In fact, I am sure that in many cases, there
were events that were not political in any way, shape, or form, to
avoid any appearance of paying for them out of Committee To Re-
Elect funds.
Senator Montoya. Mr. Chairman, in view of the committee's
policy that we not prolong the testimony of this witness because he
was called for a different purpose other than for matters of substance,
I will defer any further questioning, if he is going to appear again.
Senator Ervin. Well, thank you very much. I understand you are
willing to come back at some future time.
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And also willing to comply with the record that the
information which Senator Montoya asked you about a moment ago
about, the number of people and the identity of people transferred from
the White House staff to the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Kehrli. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kehrli. Thank you.
Mr. Dash. Would Sergeant Leeper come forward?
Senator Ervin. Hold up your right hand. Do you swear the
evidence you should give to the Senate Select Committee on Presiden-
tial Campaign Activities shall be the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Sergeant Leeper, for the record, would you please state
your name and address?
TESTIMONY OF PAUL W. LEEPER, SERGEANT, METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Sergeant Leeper. My name is Paul William Leeper. I am a sergeant
assigned to the Metropolitan Police Department. My address is 2301
L Street NW., Washington, D.C.
Mr. Dash. How long have you been a police officer. Sergeant?
Sergeant Leeper. I am in my 12th year, sir.
Mr. Dash. And a sergeant?
Sergeant Leeper. For the last 2}^, 3 years, sir.
Mr. Dash. And what is your assignment in the Police Department?
Sergeant Leeper. My assignment right now, sir, is I am in charge
of the second district's casual clothes squad.
Mr. Dash. Where does that operate, what is the area, region of the
city?
96
Sergeant Leeper. In the area of the Watergate complex, the White
House area.
Mr. Dash. Was that your position on June 17, 1972?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir. We were working that area.
Mr. Dash. Now, Sergeant, is the dress that you are presently
wearing at this committee hearing the type of dress that you usually
wear in your vocation?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. What is your usual dress?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, we vary it from anything from old Army
shirts, golf jackets, golf hats, casual clothes. I had a pair, on the night
in question, a pair of blue slacks on, a blue jacket with a university
written across the front of it, and a golf cap.
Mr. Dash. And in the police automobile that you use, is this a
marked automobile or unmarked?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir, it is unmarked.
Mr. Dash. Was that the kind of automobile that you were in on
June 17, 1972?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Thank you.
Now, can we first have chart 5. While they are getting the chart,
Sergeant, can you tell us did there come a time sometime early in the
morning of or of June 17 or late in the evening, whatever time it
occurred of June 16, that you received a call to come to the vicinity
of the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C.?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. What was the nature of that call?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, the call came out about 0152 hours on the
morning of the 17th, Saturday, and the call originally came out for
any scout car, which would be a marked car vehicle in the Police
Department and official in it to respond to the Watergate, 2600
Virginia Avenue, to assist a special officer, the official vehicle would
be a sergeant, lieutenant, or a captain's cruiser. These would be
marked vehicles. No one answered that, and the dispatcher, the police
dispatcher came over the air and asked if there was any TAG unit
in the area.
Senator Baker. Any what?
Sergeant Leeper. They refer to us as casual clothes, tactical squads
and they have other squads.
Senator Baker. TAG unit.
Mr. Dash. Authority for tactical unit.
Sergeant Leeper. Tactical unit. Yes, sir, and at this time I was
working in cruiser 727, which is an unmarked police vehicle with
Officer John Barrett and Officer Garl Shoffler.
Mr. Dash. Where were you located when j^ou received that call?
Sergeant Leeper. We were in the area of about K and 30th,
Washington, D.G.
Mr. Dash. How close was it to the Watergate complex?
Sergeant Leeper. Approximately a minute and a half, 2 minutes
away.
Mr. Dash. If you can see the chart which is on the easel, and if
not, can you go to it, do you recognize the photograph that appears
on that easel?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir; it is of the Watergate complex.
97
Mr. Dash. What does it represent?
Sergeant Leeper. The Watergate complex and the Howard John-
son across from it, the Kennedy Center on down from it and just the
general area of the Watergate complex.
Mr. Dash. Is that where you went to with your automobile on
that early morning of June 17?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Can we have that photograph?
Senator Ervin. I^et the record show that photograph
Mr. Dash. Will be marked as an exhibit.
Senator Ervin [continuing]. Will be marked by the reporter as
the appropriate exhibit.
[The photograph referred to was marked exhibit No. 10 and appears
on p. 99.]
Mr. Dash. Sergeant, we are getting a little closer, what do you
see there on that little one?
Sergeant Leeper. That would be the Virginia Avenue side of the
Watergate complex, 2600 block of Virginia Avenue NW.
Mr. Dash. All right. Can we have that next photograph now? Can
the photogra]:)h which has just been exhibited be appropriately num-
bered by the reporter prior to making it an exhibit?
[The photograph referred to was marked exhibit No. 11 and appears
on p. 100.]
Mr. Dash. Now, can we identify this drawing, Sergeant, as to
the Watergate and the Howard Johnson, what does it show to you?
Sergeant Leeper. It shows the Watergate, the sixth floor, Demo-
cratic National Committee in relationship to the Howard Johnson,
which is located across the street from it.
Senator Ervin. It will be marked by the reporter as the appropriate
exhibit.
[The drawing referred to was marked exhibit No. 12 and appears on
p. 101.]
Mr. Dash. Now, did you have anything to do with the Howard
Johnson location, when you arrived in answer to that call?
Sergeant Leeper. No, other than the fact when we were on the
balcony of the Watergate.
Mr. Dash. What balcony was that, Sergeant?
Sergeant Leeper. That was the sixth floor, the balcony of the
Democratic National Committee.
Mr. Dash. Would that be where the space is on the left?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir. Wliere he has it marked, sir, directly
across from the Howard Johnson.
Mr. Dash. Right. Why do we not hold that? Can we have the
next exhibit? Sergeant do you recognize these drawings?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. You have seen them before?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. These drawings were used at the trial of the Watergate
case in January?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And you did testify at that trial?
Sergeant Leeper. I did, sir.
Mr. Dash. When you did, you did use these drawings?
98
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And the numbers that appear on the right hand comer
are the trial exhibits.
Now, of course, the letters show, can you identify that drawing and
what it portrays?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir; that is the layout of the Democratic
national headquarters, the sixth floor.
Senator Ervin. Let the reporter mark it with the appropriate
exhibit number.
[The drawing referred to was marked exhibit No. 13 and appears on
p. 102.]
Mr. Dash. Now, can you, Sergeant, go to the exhibit? [Witness goes
to exhibit.] All right, now, Sergeant, when you received the call
and came to the Watergate complex — could you now indicate on the
drawing where you arrived. Indicate your entry and indicate on the
drawing what you and those officers accompanying you did?
Sergeant Leeper. You want me to start, sir, from the time we
arrived in front of the Watergate?
Mr. Dash. Yes, from the time you arrived in front of the Watergate.
Sergeant Leeper [indicating on the drawing]. After the call came
out we responded in the area of 30th and K, in front of the Watergate
about seven car lengths from the main door going up into the lobby
of the Watergate complex. At that time myself, Officer Barrett, and
Officer Shoffler got out of the vehicle, went up the steps into the
lobby where we were met by a special police officer who had put the
call out.
Mr. Dash. Do you know his name. Sergeant?
Sergeant Leeper. Wills, Burt Wills.
Mr. Dash. You say special police officer, was he an employee of the
Watergate?
Sergeant Leeper. No.
Mr. Dash. To your knowledge?
Sergeant Leeper. No, he is employed for a guard service that is
employed by the Watergate complex.
Mr. Dash. But his responsibilities, as you know it, were as a guard
for the Watergate?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. All right. Continue, Sergeant.
Sergeant Leeper. We conferred with him there in the lobby and at
that time he brought it to our attention he had made his rounds about
20 or 30 minutes prior to this and found tape on one of the doors
leading from the garage into the B-1 level.
Mr. Dash. When you say tape on one of the doors, could you ex-
plain that; what do you mean or what did he mean to you or what did
you understand him to mean as tape on the door?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, at that time, sir, we really did not under-
stand what he meant by it. We responded down to the area where the
tape was found and after looking at the door, the door had been taped
with sort of a light colored masking tape. When the door would shut
from all appearances the door would be locked but the lock is held in
by the tape where the door was shut and it will not lock.
Mr. Dash. So this tape was on the edge of the door?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
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Mr. Dash. Forcing back the lock that would ordinarily spring and
lock the door?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And keeping it from being locked.
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. What did you understand the purpose of that taping to
be then?
Sergeant Leeper. At that time it would give anyone who wanted
to go in and out accessibility without having to use a key or a pick or
something to unlock it.
Mr. Dash. Did you know whether these doors locked from the
outside only or from both sides?
Sergeant Leeper. With the lock in, you could not get in from the
outside. I believe when we investigated that you could not get in also
from the inside, a double locking type of service.
Mr. Dash. So if anybody who wanted to get inside and he was
outside and he did not have a key he would have to tape the edge to
get in?
Sergeant Leeper. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. All right, proceeding, what did you do thereafter?
Sergeant Leeper. At this point, after finding the door, it is not on
this map here, I mean on this chart, but the door leading from the
garage level into a small cubicle was taped, also the door leading from
the cubicle into the stairwell was also taped, and not only the guard
but we had prior knowledge from my crime reports that burglars and
burglar attempts on the eighth and sixth floors of the Watergate com-
plex, and the guard, I think brought it to our attention at that time
they had some problem up there with attempted burglaries. So at that
time, we sent the guard back to the area of the, where we had met him
in the lobby in case, you know, we figured we had somebody inside at
this time. We had a burglar going down on us, we sent him back to
the lobby and myself and Officer Barrett and Officer Shoffler re-
sponded to the eighth floor by way of the stairwells. When we arrived
at the eighth floor, which is the Federal Reserve Board, the door
leading from the stairwell to the offices on the eighth floor was also
taped in the same manner, same type of tape. There was a guard with
us at that time, a guard by the name of Helms, who is a guard for the
Federal Reserve Board, and his two assignments are the eighth floor
and the B-1 level, which they had some offices on, the Federal Reserve
Board.
We began a check of the eighth floor with that guard, he was sup-
posed to have the keys to most of the offices. He could not get any of
his keys to work in any of the office doors and all of them were locked.
We found no other evidence of any tampering with any of the office
doors leading off the main hallway on the eighth floor. At that time we
responded back out to the stairwell. I directed that guard to respond
back to the lobby to assist the other special officer in case anyone who
was in the building could double back on us in any way. At that time
Officer Barrett responded to the ninth floor and Shoffler and myself
responded down to the seventh floor.
Mr. Dash. You were going down the stairwell, is that right?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir. We were in the stairwell right now, in
the Watergate complex, it would be this stairwell here, these stair-
wells here, sir.
104
Mr. Dash. And going down from the eighth?
Sergeant Leeper. Myself and Officer ShofRer are going down
preparatory to checking the ninth floor.
The seventh floor door leading from the stairwell was locked. There
was no evidence of any tampering of that door. We responded down
to the sixth floor, the door leading from the stairwell had been taped
in the same manner. At that time I responded to the corner stairwell
and yelled for Officer Barrett to meet us
Mr. Dash. When you use the term "responded" Sergeant, you
mean you went in?
Sergeant Leeper. I walked around about halfway up the seventh
floor and yelled for Barrett. I said we have another door taped and
responded here and come down here to assist us. At that time the
three of us went into the sixth floor of the Watergate complex, which
is the National Democratic Committee. We came in through here.
We began a check of the offices that were open, some were opened,
some were closed, when we got into this area we responded down to
this area.
Mr. Dash. Officer, excuse me, when you went in was it dark, was
it light, were there any lights on?
Sergeant Leeper. There were some lights on, yes, sir, and we, as
we checked each room we would flip the light switch on.
Mr. Dash. You were flipping lights on?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir, on and off. This door here was locked
tight, we came back up this hallway and began a search of these
floors here, myself and Officer ShoflEler went into this room because
this door here was propped open with a chair, which would, you know,
which led us to believe we might have surprised somebody and ran
out on the balcony. We went out on the balcony and began a search of
the terrace.
Mr. Dash. You are now referring to the time you testified a little
earlier?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Going out on that balcony, that is the balcony you
referred to?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir, that is the balcony right across from
the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge.
Mr. Dash. What, if anything, did you see when you went out on
that terrace?
Sergeant Leeper. We searched the terrace with negative results
but as we were coming back in Officer ShofRer said to me, he said,
"Do you think that man," something to the effect "that man across
the street who sees us/' because at the time we had an — Officer
Shofller
Mr. Dash. When you said across the street, do you mean on the
pavement?
Sergeant Leeper. No; at the Howard Johnson, on one of the
balconies of the Howard Johnson.
Mr. Dash. Is that a level sort of parallel to the terrace where you
were on?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir. And Officer Shoffler had his weapon
out at the time, and he called it to my attention, he says that man
across the street is watching us, I wonder if he called the police.
105
Senator Baker. Just one second, just a second, I do not mean to
unduly interrupt counsel, but just so I can keep the continuity in
my mind, that man across the street was in the Howard Johnson?
Sergeant Leeper. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Where?
Sergeant Leeper. He was out on the balcony. I did not see him,
Senator. It was just called to my attention by Officer Shoffler.
Senator Baker. But you knew he was watching you?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. How long did he watch?
Sergeant Leeper. I do not know, sir. I did not even look over.
I just
Senator Baker. You had your guns out?
Sergeant Leeper. I did not have my gun out but Officer Shoffler
had his weapon out.
Senator Baker. And you were on the floor of the DNC, the Demo-
cratic National Committee?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. The balcony outside?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, it is referred to as the terrace.
Senator Baker. Who was that fellow?
Sergeant Leeper. It was later found to be James Baldwin.
Senator Baker. Do you know how long Baldwin watched?
Sergeant Leeper. I think from the time we pulled up in front here,
sir.
Mr. Dash. AH right. Then, what did you do? Did you leave the
terrace at that time?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir, we responded back in the area of the
hallway and we met up again with Officer Barrett down to this area,
checking the offices that were open as we came down the hallway, and
we came into this room here through a glass door. Officer Barrett was
the first man foflowed by myself and Officer Shoffler. Officer Barrett
responded up to this area here and I started into this little secretarial
cubicle here, Officer Shoffler was somewhere in this area and at this
point I heard Officer Barrett yell: "Hold it, come out."
Mr. Dash. Where was that voice coming from?
Sergeant Leeper. Officer Barrett?
Mr. Dash. Yes; where was that voice coming from?
Sergeant Leeper. Right in this area here, Officer Barrett was right
in this area. At this time I responded back out of the cubicle into this
cubicle, jumped up on the desk, drawing my weapon and when I
looked over this glass partition there were five men standing in front of
a desk with their hands either raised above their heads or at least
shoulder high wearing blue surgical gloves.
Mr. Dash. What, if anything, did you see them doing at the time
that their hands were up when you had your guns out on them?
Sergeant Leeper. wSome of the gentlemen, sir, had tried to remove
the gloves by using, you know, taking one hand and trying to throw it
off with the other.
Mr. Dash. Did you notice any kind of equipment or paraphernalia
in and around where you found the men?
Sergeant Leeper. Ves, sir. One of the men had, was carrying an
a.w.o.l. bag, an overnight bag, semilarge brown bag with his coat
106
draped over it contained various items, cameras, bulbs, clanips for
clamping the cameras to the desk, walkie-talkies, things of this sort.
Mr. Dash. Now, just going down toward the corner there from
that room where you apprehended the men, the corner toward the
bottom right corner, go all the way down to the large office in the
corner there.
Sergeant Leeper. Right in here, sir.
Mr. Dash. No; the large office in the corner, the ver}^ edge, whose
office is that?
Sergeant Leeper. That is the office of the chairman at that time
of the Democratic Party was Lawrence F. O'Brien.
Mr. Dash. And was there entrance to that office from or access to
it from where you found the men you apprehended?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir. As you can see by the chart, sir, you
had access to that office.
Mr. Dash. And next to that office, to the left, whose office was that?
Sergeant Leeper. That is the deputy chairman, sir, Stanley L. Gray.
Mr. Dash. Now, you at that point, what did you do with the men
he apprehended at that point?
Sergeant Leeper. We ordered them out from behind the desk and
lined them up along the wall, facing the wall, hands on the wall, feet
spread apart, and at that time I informed them who we were, they
were under arrest for burglary and advised them of their rights and at
that time, I directed Officer Barrett to begin a systematic search of
each man.
Mr. Dash. Did you notice anything unusual about these men when
you arrested them, the way they were dressed?
Sergeant Leeper. They were well dressed, sir, in either suits, sport
coats and ties.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you know the names of those people, did they
give their names at that time to you?
Sergeant Leeper. At that time, no, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did they give any names to you?
Sergeant Leeper. Later, when they were booked in the precinct,
taken to headquarters, 2301 L .Street, they gave us names which later
proved to be false names, aliases.
Mr. Dash. Did you later find out who they were?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Could you name the persons who you arrested in that
location b}"^ the names that later found out who they were to be?
Sergeant Leeper. Frank Sturgis, Bernard L. Barker, James
McCord, Eugenio Martmez, and I think it was Virgilio Gonzales.
Senator Ervin. Virgilio Gonzales?
Sergeant Leeper. I believe that is the way he pronounces his name.
Mr. Dash. Did you accompany them down to the station house?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir, we sent three of them down in a patrol
wagon, one was transported, I think Mr. McCord, was transported
in 83 scout and I transported Mr. Barker in the old clothes TA(>
unit, the unmarked cruiser.
Mr. Dash. At a later time did you come back and make any search
of an}^ room in the Watergate complex?
Sergeant Leeper. I came back to the Watergate complex but the
search was made by the Mobile Crime Unit. At the time we could
107
get in touch with them they handled all the searching of the rooms
and all the fingerprinting and processing.
Mr. Dash. What rooms were searched?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, the Mobile Crime did a search of the
whole complex — sixth floor complex. The conference room, all these
rooms along here.
Mr. Dash. Were there any other rooms in the hotel or any other
place of the complex that was also searched?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir. We obtained search warrants at about
2:30 in the afternoon, that would be Saturday afternoon on June 17,
and went into rooms 214 and 314 of the Watergate Hotel.
Mr. Dash. What led 3^ou to get such search warrants?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, we checked the guests, the register, to see
who was registered at the Watergate and I think they also checked
the Howard Johnsons across the street and some of the fictitious
names these gentlemen had used were on the register of the Watergate
Hotel
Mr. Dash. Could you say briefly what, if anything, was found in
the search of that hotel?
Sergeant Leeper. More electrical equipment, more blue surgical
gloves, about ,$4,200 in $100 bills, all in sequence, all brand new $100
bills ; some electronic equipment. I guess that is it.
Mr. Dash. Sergeant, could you shed any light — were you present
or do you have any knowledge of any check that was found on any
one of these defendants or notebooks that had the name, E. Howard
Hunt?
Sergeant Leeper. I was on the search team that went into room 214
of the Watergate Hotel. It was myself and Detective Robert Dennell
of our Department, Carl Shoffler, an agent from the Washington
field office of the FBI; and also one of the men from Mobile Crime,
Don Cherry, assisted us. At that time, it was called to my attention
that they did find a book with the name
Mr. Dash. Found what, sir? ..."
Sergeant Leeper. A small notebook, as you described it, with the
names that you had brought out in it.
Mr. Dash. The name E. Howard Hunt? Is that the name?
Sergeant Leeper. I believe it said, "E. Hunt, W.H.", on it, sir.
Mr. Dash. Are you aware of finding on the person of any defendant
or anyone in the room any check that was signed by Mr. Hunt?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
Mr. Dash. Did you do anything else that evening or that morning
or the following da}^ with regard to the defendants?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, I was at the second district headquarters
when we began processing these men for court. I did not do actually
any of the paperwork. We were assisted by some detectives, and
Officer Barrett stayed on the scene out at the Watergate. He was
trying to get in touch with somebody from the Democratic National
Committee and later, Mr. Stanley Greigg came down. He was brought
to the station with Officer Barrett, at which time, he was shown the
five defendants to see if they had any right to be in the building, be
in that area, the sixth floor, at which time he stated they did not.
Mr. Dash. At the time of the arrest, did you notice whether any
of those persons apprehended were employed or had any relationship
with the Committee for the Re-Election of the President?
96-296 0—73 bk. 1—8
108
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did you leam at any time that any of them did?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, after it hit the wire services and the press
started picking it up, yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. You learned it from the press?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions.
Did you find any money on any of the indiv' duals that were
apprehended?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir, we found quite a bit of money — well,
not quite a bit. I would say about $3,600, all in $100 bills, all in thft
same sequence.
Mr. Dash. Was it $3,600?
Sergeant Leeper I could give you a close est'mate, like •
Mr. Dash. Would you leave the chart now and go back to the table?
Now, would you refer to your records and give us a more specific
statement as to the amount of money you found on any of the indi-
viduals and also in the hotel room?
Sergeant Leeper. Also, from the defendant, Edward Joseph
Hamilton, which would be Frank Sturgis, was approximately $215 in
bills. From the defendant Frank Carter, which would be Bernard
Barker, was approximately $230 in bills, two of which were $100 bills,
and also Sturgis, two of the $250 he had was in $100 bills.
From the defendant Jean Valdez was $814 in bills, seven of which
were $100 bills.
Mr. Dash. Who is Valdez?
Sergeant Leeper. That would be Martinez, Eugenio Martinez.
Mr. Dash. From Earl Godoyn was $230 in bills, He would be, his
real name would be Virgilio Gonzalez, was $230 in bills, two of which
were $100 bills.
From Mr. McCord, using the alias of Edward Joseph Warren,
no money was found on him.
Mr. Dash. Are you acquainted with how much money was found in
the room, when the room was searched in the hotel, the apartment in
Watergate?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir, there was $3,566.58. There was four
packs of brandnew $100 bills, eight in a pack, so it would be $3,200 in
$100 bills, all in the same sequence.
Mr. Dash. Did you or someone make a record of the serial numbers
of those bills?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir, the Mobile Crime, which was Don
Cherry, was on the scene with us.
Mr. Dash. Would you provide the committee with a list if we do
not already have it of those numbers? It is not necessary to read them
at this point in the record.
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
[The list of serial numbers on $100 bills requested of the witness
follows :]
C 03642257 A through C 03642264 A.
F 02457423 A through F 02457430 A.
F 02457433 A through F 02457440 A.
F 02457503 A through F 02457510 A.
109
Mr. Dash. Now, did there come a time when after the defendants
were apprehended at the station, did any attorneys appear on their
behalf?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir, and I will state to you these gentlemen
refused to make any phone calls and refused to have us notify anyone
at all.
Mr. Dash. So they did not make any phone call out that you
know of?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir, it was around, probably around 9 or 9:30
Saturday morning, still in the a.m., that two attorneys did come to
the second precinct headquarters at 2301 L Street and state that they
were there to represent the five defendants.
Mr. Dash. Do you have their names, Sergeant?
Sergeant Leeper. Their names were Douglas Caddy and Mr.
Rafferty's name. I do not know his first name. It might be James
RafFerty, I think.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any further questions.
Mr. Thompson. I will defer to the Chair, Mr. Chairman. I do not
have any questions.
Senator Ervin. What was the name of the second lawyer?
Sergeant Leeper. Mr. RaflFerty, sir.
Senator Ervin. What time did they appear?
Sergeant Leeper. It was around 9 o'clock.
Senator Ervin. They appeared notwithstanding the fact that no
phone calls had been made by the persons arrested?
Sergeant Leeper. That is correct, Senator. The defendants made
no calls. In fact, they would not let us call anyone for them. They
wanted no calls made.
Senator Ervin. The serial numbers of these $100 bills were new
bills?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you took the serial numbers of all the bills
down and you will supply the serial numbers to the committee?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
wSenator Ervin. I have no further questions. Senator Baker?
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will try
my best to be brief.
Sergeant, what time did }*ou ordinarily work? What was your shift?
Sergeant Leeper. We were working the 4 to 12 shift, sir.
Senator Baker. 4 in the afternoon to 12 midnight?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. I take it you worked late this time?
Sergeant Leeper. Very late, sir.
Senator Baker. Was that on account of the workload or some
other reason?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir; we have quite a few office buildings in
our area. We have quite a few burglaries in these office buildings.
Senator Baker. Is that part of the TAC squads or casual clothes
squad's responsibilit}^ to canvass and protect these office buildings?
Sergeant Leeper. Any type of crime, sir, mainly street robberies,
commercial robberies, burglaries, larcenies of autos — we work over
quite a bit.
Senator Baker. This was 11:52 in the morning when you received
the call. Was the call to you or did you volunteer to take the call?
110
Sergeant Leeper. We volunteered to call when the dispatcher
stated, "Is there any TAG unit in the area?" At that time, Officer
Shoffler picked up the mike. He was riding on my right. 1 was driving.
He stated, "We are a TAG unit and we have a sergeant on board."
That is how we got into the affair.
Senator Baker. I am not trying to imply anything, but this was
almost 2 hours past your regular shift?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Now, you have described for Mr. Dash at some
length how you entered the building and went to the sixth floor,
where the Democratic National Gommittee headquarters was then
located, and I understand that you and who else were on the balcony? '
What was the name of the other officer?
Sergeant Leeper. Officer Shoffler, Garl Shoffler.
Senator Baker. At that time no one had been discovered inside?"
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir.
Senator Baker. And you and Shoffler were on the Virginia <
Avenue side, facing the Howard Johnson Motel?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And you or Officer Shoffler saw a man on the
balcony across the street, at Howard Johnsons?
Sergeant Leeper. I did not see the man, sir. It was brought to
m}'- attention by Garl. He said, "I wonder if that man over there is
going to call the police."
Senator Baker. Wliat did you say to that?
Sergeant Leeper. The way we were dressed, him having his gun
out.
Senator Baker. Was the gun clearly visible?
Sergeant Leeper. It was described in court by Mr. Baldwin in
much detail, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. What did Mr. Baldwin do, do you know?
Sergeant Leeper. I believe at that time, he was on a walkie-talkie,
talking to one of the gentlemen who was down the hall from us.
Senator Baker. Did 3^ou see that?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir. This is just what he has testified to in
court.
Senator Baker. That is what Mr. Baldwin said?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Is Mr. Shoffler here with you, Officer Shoffler?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Have you ever discussed with him whether he sawj
what Mr. Baldwin did or not?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir. I do not beHeve — once Mr. Baldwin had
went off the balcony of the Howard Johnson, there would have been
no way that Garl could have seen what he had done. As a matter of
fact, we were moving pretty fast. We were coming off the terrace,
going back in to Officer Barrett inside to search the rest of the building.
Senator Baker. Was there any doubt in your mind that Baldwin
saw you and wShoffler on the balcony?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir. In fact, Senator, in court, he described
my outfit almost to a "T", what I was wearing.
Senator Baker. I think, Mr. Ghairman, at some point — not today, li
obviously, but I would like to have Mr. Shoffler called as a witness. P
I would like to hear his firsthand testimony in that respect.
Ill
I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge?
Senator Talmadge. Sergeant, let me ask you about the demeanor
of the people you arrested. Did they seem alert, competent, sure of
.themselves?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
I Senator Talmadge. Did they act like they felt sure someone would
take care of them?
Sergeant Leeper. I will say this. Senator, they were probably five
'of the easiest lockups I have ever had.
Senator Talmadge. Then you knew from the demeanor of the people
you arrested, the prisoners, the sophistication of their equipment and
their dress, that you did not have ordinary burglars on your hands,
did you not?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. From the time you arrested the suspects on,
did you ever have any contact with FBI agents or the U.S. attorney's
office personnel?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir, and the FBI agent that worked closest
with us on this case was Special Agent Lano, Angie Lano. At the time
of the search warrants, when we went down and got the search war-
rants and served the search warrants, we were assisted by Chuck
Work, assistant U.S. attorney. He assisted us in the search warrants
and assisted us when we served the search warrants on the two rooms
! at Howard Johnson and the vehicle located in the basement — I am
I sorry, the Watergate and the vehicle locked in the basement of the
Watergate.
Senator Talmadge. Did you have any further contact thereafter?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, when we went to court on the case, sir,
the case was handled by U.S. Attorney Earl Silbb/t, Mr. Donald
Campbell, and Mr. Seymour Glanzer.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
No further questions, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, might I impose on my colleague
just for 1 minute? There is one question I wanted to ask. It will not
take me but a second.
You testified. Sergeant, as I recall, that no telephone calls were
made by the prisoners?
Sergeant Leeper. That is affirmative, sir.
Senator Baker. But the next morning at 9 a.m. or something or
other, two lawyers appeared?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did anyone else besides lawyers appear?
Sergeant Leeper. No, other than Mr. Stanley Greigg, who we
brought down to the station in order to — was used as a complainant
on the 251, which is a police report. And, of course — well, there was
a lot of police. You mean, other than police personnel?
Senator Baker. Yes, other than police personnel. Did anybody
appear to make bond for them or to talk to them or to represent
them whether they were lawyers or anyone else?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir, not to ray knowledge.
Senator Baker. Who would know that?
112
Sergeant Leeper. Well, I was there from the time of the arrest
until 7 o'clock Saturday night and I had no occasion to meet anyone,
you know, other than the two lawyers who came in. In fact, I did
not talk to them, they talked to Assistant Chief Wright.
Senator Baker. So you are assuming that no one else talked to
these prisoners from the time you took them to the station house
until 7 o'clock in the evening of June 17, except the two lawyers
which you have identified, other than police officials, FBI officials
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Anybody else?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney?
Senator Gurney. Sergeant, did you or any of the other police at
the station house find out how these lawyers knew these people were
there under your custody?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir. I believe when they came in — I did not
talk to them when they came in, but I understand they said to the
station clerk, the first police officer they had contact with, we are
here to represent the five men who were locked up.
Senator Gurney. No one asked who advised them?
Sergeant Leeper. No ; the officer did not. He should have asked
them at that time what are their names, but he did not. He just
referred them to Assistant Chief Wright, who talked to them from
then on.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever find out who did call them?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. No further questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. Sergeant Leeper, you have indicated that the
men you arrested all gave false names?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. In a physical search, did you come across any '
identity papers, papers to identify these men?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, Senator, Mr. Sturgis, Frank Sturgis who J
used the name of Hamilton, he had a visa from Mexico in an alias ij
name. Mr. McCord, I am not sure on the driver's license. Also, Mr
Sturgis had a driver's license, I believe, either from New York State t|
or Massachusetts, in a
Senator Inouye. Was it made out in their real names?
Sergeant Leeper. No; he also used the name of Frank Fiorini. He
had about three or four different aliases.
Senator Inouye. And all of these identity papers were in theil
false names?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Did you check and see where they got these
identity papers?
Sergeant Leeper. No, Senator. After the arrests were made am
the defendants booked, a lot of the leg work, so to speak, the investii
gative work was picked up by the Washington field office and oui
burglary squad. It was almost in reality taken out of our hands.
In other words, we did not go over to National Airport and findj
out what plane they had flown in on and things like that.
113
Senator Inouye. Are these identity papers still available?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir. The}^ are either held by the U.S.
attorney's office, which is still, you know, involved in this case, or they
would be down at our property office.
Senator Inouye. Were they very professionally made?
Sergeant Leeper. I couldn't comment on that, sir. I don't think
I have the quahfications to say that, whether they were or they
weren't.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, may we request to have these
identity papers?
Mr. Dash. I think we have some of the exhibits that were turned
over by the police department.
Mr. Thompson, do we have that?
Senator Inouye. Mr. Leeper, you have indicated that in the service
of 3^our search warrant, you had an assistant U.S. attorney, Mr.
Charles Work?
Sergeant Leeper. That is affirmative, sir.
Senator Inouye. Was it the usual procedure to have an assistant
U.S. attorney in a burglary case?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir, but it being where this burglary had
occurred, the dress and manner of these men, we felt that it was just
a little bit bigger than the average burglary. That is all I can say.
Senator Inouye. And the District of Columbia Police Department
requested the arrest
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir, I think Inspector Charles M. Monroe
was the night inspector who assisted us on it and I think he requested
the chief U.S. attorney
Senator Inouye. You also testified that you had a meeting with
Mr. Silbert.
Sergeant Leeper. I have had many meetmgs with him, yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. What is the nature of the conversations?
Sergeant Leeper. Preparing myself. Officer Barrett, Officer
Shoffler, for the case that went to court.
Senator Inouye. It has been reported that when Mr. McCord was
taken to the station, he was recognized by several officers. Is that true?
Sergeant Leeper. Senator, I didn't leave that station, just for on
and off, you know, maybe to go down to the Watergate to serve the
search warrant, until 7 o'clock the next night. I didn't go to court
with Mr. McCord. He may have been recognized down there. I can't
answer that, sir.
Senator Inouye. What happened to the property that was taken
as a result of the search warrant?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, like I stated before. Senator, some of the
property is down at our property office and I understand some of it is
being used by the U.S. attorney's office in the processing of the case.
Senator Inouye. Well, this list was made on Saturday, wasn't it,
after the search?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Why is it that it wasn't available until the 19th
at 5 p.m.? I was told that an official of the Democratic National Com-
mittee wanted to have a list of those things that are— were taken
out and the police department could not furnish him with this until
5 p.m. on the 19th.
U4
Sergeant Leeper. I couldn't answer that, sir. Once the property
left our hands, it is handled by Mobile Crime. That is their purpose.
They have officials down there and you would have to go through 1
them.
Senator Inouye. Who had charge of the investigation by the D.C.
Police Department?
Sergeant Leeper. Inspector Prete, who was at that time inspector.
He is deputy commander of the CID.
Senator Inouye. During the handling of this case, did you ever
receive any special instructions or advice from anyone?
Sergeant Leeper. No, other than what I have said before. We had
meetings with the U.S. attorney's office, just preparing us to go to
court on the case, which is just the normal — if you have any type of
case, you usually meet with the U.S. attorney prior to your going into
the courtroom.
Senator Inouye. When was the investigation discontinued by the
Police Department?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, for us. Senator, it w^as almost discontinued
other than testifying in court that Saturday. In other words, the in-
vestigation, the running doA\Ti of the different leads, was handled by
our burglary squad and, of course, the field office. As far as Officers
Barrett, Shoffler and myself, other than testifying in court, that \
ended on Saturday.
Senator Inouye. Is this case closed as far as the D.C. Police De
partment is concerned?
Sergeant Leeper. I couldn't answer that right now, sir.
Senator Inouye. I understand that the chief FBI agent in charge,]
Mr. Lano
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye [continvdng] . Called your department on June 2
complaining of leaks of information to the press. Did he make such
call?
Sergeant Leeper. I don't know, sir. He didn't make such a call to
myself.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker?
Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a few very brief questions, one for Sergeant Leeper and thena
one for Officer Barrett.
Sergeant, do you think that the result would have been any different
if it had been uniformed poUce in a marked car that had arrived to
take care of this matter?
Sergeant Leeper. Yes, sir; I don't think there would have been an
apprehension.
Senator Weicker. Why do you say that?
Sergeant Leeper. Well, because of the fact that Baldwin
would have made a marked car. It has "Police" written on it in six
places. It has a domelight on top of it. The officers would have been
dressed in full uniform. There would have been no doubt that it was
police. I think that just gave us an edge of, say, 5 minutes and Baldwin
didn't make us until he seen Shoffler's gun on the terrace. Then at
that time, I don't think he really knew for sure if we were police or
not, but he felt it was probably some type of security force, you know,
maybe the security force for the Democratic Party.
115
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question
of Officer Barrett. I understand he is here; might he be sworn, Mr.
Chairman?
Senator Ervin. Yes. Maybe we had better get through with this
witness before we have another one.
Senator Weicker. Was it the intention to call Officer Barrett?
Senator Ervin. Well, Mr. Barrett, will you stand up; hold up your
right hand. Do you swear that the evidence which you shall give to
the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Mr. Barrett. Yes; I do.
Senator Ervin. John Barrett, what is your other name?
TESTIMONY OF JOHN BRUCE BARRETT, OFFICER, METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, B.C.
Officer Barrett. John Bruce Barrett.
Senator Ervin. John Bruce Barrett, and you might state your resi-
dence and occupation for the record.
Officer Barrett. I am a policeman assigned to Second District
Headquarters, 2301 L Street NW.
Senator Weicker. Officer Barrett, were you the first one to actually
apprehend or see the group of individuals in that room?
Officer Barrett. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. At that moment in time did you hear anything
that might have been a conversation coming over a walkie-talkie?
Officer Barrett. No, sir; I did not hear anything, I just saw
something.
Senator Weicker. What did you see?
Officer Barrett. I saw an arm ; I stopped in the position before I
entered the secretary's office outside of Chairman O'Brien's and I
hesitated there for several minutes because it was dark back in the
partitioned area, and while hesitating at that partition I saw a man
down in a crouched position as if hiding by stooping — when the
shadow passed my face, I was startled and that began the whole mess.
Senator Weicker. And, just in conclusion, were these individuals
in possession of a walkie-talkie?
Officer Barrett. Yes, sir; Mr. Barker had a walkie-talkie in his
possession.
Senator Weicker. Did any communication come through that
walkie-talkie at any time?
Officer Barrett. There may have been some communication; I did
not personally hear anything. I was too concerned.
Senator Weicker. Sergeant Leeper, did you hear any communica-
tion come over the walkie-talkie?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. I just have one or two questions, in order to
clear the record. Would you state for the record the names of the
individuals that were apprehended that night and also the different
aliases that applied to each one?
116
Sergeant Leeper. All right, Senator. James McCord, Jr., used the
alias of Edward Martin. Bernard L. Barker used the alias of Frank
Carter. Frank Sturgis used the alias of Joseph E. Hamilton and also
Frank Fiorini. Eugenio Martinez used the alias of Jean Valdez;
Virgilio Gonzalez used the alias Raul Godoyn.
Senator Montoya. And you indicated, I believe, that they were
registered there at the Watergate Hotel under their aliases.
Sergeant Leeper. I do not think all four of them had signed the —
I would have to look back at the duplicates we have.
Senator Montoya. How many rooms did they have?
Sergeant Leeper. They had two rooms at the Watergate — 214 and
314.
Senator Montoya. Just one more question. What happened to the
man across the street — Mr. Baldwin? Did you make any move or
did the Police Department make any move to investigate what was
going on in that particular room or did you communicate any sus-
picion to the burglary staff at the Police Department to follow through
on that?
Sergeant Leeper. Not at that time; no, sir.
Senator Montoya. When was this done?
Sergeant Leeper. We made no communication with any Wash-
ington field office or our burglar squad with reference to this man.
We had seen no significant matter at that time, you know, it did
not mean anything to us at the time.
Senator Montoya. You did not include that in your report?
Sergeant Leeper. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock
tomorrow morning.
Thank you very much.
Sergeant Leeper. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to resume at
10 a.m., Friday, May 18, 1973.]
FRIDAY, MAY 18, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington, D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
I ! Gurney, and Weicker.
I Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel; Fred D. Thompson,
I minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief counsel; Arthur
S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; David M. Dorsen,
James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsels;
Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsel; Donald G. Sanders,
H. William Shure, and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels;
Joan C. Cole, secretary to the minority; Pauline O. Dement, research
j assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert Baca,
' office of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Marc Lackritz,
i Ron Rotunda, assistant counsels; Eugene Boyce, hearings covmsel;
John Walz, publications clerk.
Senator Ervin. I address these remarks to the committee members.
It has been suggested by several members of the committee that when
the Senators question the witnesses in the first go-around they
limit themselves to 10 minutes and have as many rounds as they
want to, but that is so each Senator gets the opportunity, a reasonable
time for questioning.
If there is no objection I would ask unanimous consent that the
Chair be allowed to limit each go-around to not more than 10 minutes
questioning, with the understanding you can come back later as
many times as you want to.
Will counsel call the first witness?
Mr. Dash. Officer Shoffler.
Senator Ervin. Do you swear that the evidence you shall give to
i the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Mr. Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. For the record, Officer Shoffler, will you give your full
name, address, and what your present occupation is?
TESTIMONY OF CARL M. SHOFFLER, OFFICER, METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT
Officer Shoffler. Carl M. Shoffler, police officer.
Senator Gurney. Officer, if you would pull the mike a little closer
to you I think we would hear better.
Mr. Dash. Will you repeat your name?
(117)
118
Officer Shoffler. Carl M. Shoffler, sir. Police officer assigned to |
special services bureau, address is 300 Indiana Avenue NW.
Mr. Dash. Were you on duty in the early morning hours of June 17,
1972? j
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir. j
Mr. Dash. And what particular outfit or unit were you assigned j
to? '
Officer Shoffler. Second district tactical squadron, casual clothes
unit.
Mr. Dash. Were you at that time traveling with Sergeant Leeper?
Officer Shoffler. Sergeant Leeper and Officer Barrett and I were
partners that particular evening.
Mr. Dash. Did you answer with those other officers a call to come
to the Watergate complex?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions of the witness, Mr. Chair-
man. I think Senator Baker has some questions.
Mr. Thompson. One or two ciuestions.
Officer Shoffler, do you recall when you received the word from
headquarters to answer this call at the Watergate? Were you in the
car with Sergeant Leeper?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know, do you remember whether or not
you responded to the effect that a uniform car should not be sent?
Officer Shoffler. On runs on a casual vmit response, if a casual
clothes unit takes the run normally a uniform car stays out of the area.
I do not recall if particular instructions were given to them on that
evening to stay out of the area.
Mr. Thompson. But it would not have been unusual for you to make
such a request?
Officer Shoffler. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. What time of the morning was this?
Officer Shoffler. Approximately 1 :52 a.m.
Mr. Thompson. Were you working past your regular duty hours on
that occasion?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. What were your regular duty hours?
Officer Shoffler. 4 p.m. to 12 p.m., sir.
Mr. Thompson. Why were you working overtime that particular
night?
Officer Shoffler. Our tactical squadron deals with whatever par-
ticular crime problem is — a problem at that time. We were having, we
were experiencing a problem with office larceny and burglaries in the
downtown area, and felt that working over may produce results.
Mr. Thompson. When you got there at the Watergate who did you
meet at the Watergate complex?
Officer Shoffler. The guard, Mr. Frank Wills.
Mr. Thompson. What did Mr. Wills say to you at that time?
Officer Shoffler. Mr. Wills stated that he had discovered the doors
had been taped in a manner as to allow entrance.
Mr. Thompson. Did he state anything else to you?
Officer Shoffler. I asked him if there had been any prior burglaries.
We were aware of prior burglaries in the building but not at the partic-
ular floors. Mr. Wills related to us there had been burglaries, I believe,
on the sixth and eighth floors.
119
Mr. Thompson. What prior burglaries were you personally aware of
besides what Mr. Wills told you?
Officer Shoffler. We were just aware of burglaries from our crime
sheet at that particular address. I do not believe any of us were aware
of any details.
Mr. Thompson. Did you observe tape on the locks of the doors at
the Watergate complex?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Which doors?
Officer Shoffler. We went down to the garage level with Mr. Wills,
so he could explain to us what he had discovered, and the doors at the
garage level both had tapes on the locks.
Mr. Thompson. What did you perceive as you entered the Water-
gate?
Officer Shoffler. When we originally arrived at the scene?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Officer Shoffler. Through the front door, the lock.
Mr. Thompson. You went down, through the front door, down
to the B-2 garage level. Did Mr. Wills go with you to show you that
tape?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. All right. After that, what did you perceive?
Officer Shoffler. At that time myself. Sergeant Leeper, and Officer
Barrett responded up to stairwell, we ascertained from the guard that
the stairwell and the elevators were the only ways out of the building
so we felt that it would be best if we went up the stairwell, we might
possibly surprise someone in the stairwell.
Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Wills go with you?
Officer Shoffler. I believe Mr. Wills at that point responded to
the elevator and I believe he went to get the guard to the eighth floor
because he had keys for the doors.
Mr. Thompson. Guard for the eighth floor?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Was there a guard especially designated to guard
the eighth floor?
Officer Shoffler. It was my understanding there was a guard for
the eighth floor, yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did you find tape on the door of the eighth floor
leading from the stairwell?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. How many other doors did you find tape on?
Officer Shoffler. We made a fast search of the eighth floor and
were able to determine there were no signs of forceful entry into any
of the offices on the eighth floor and we immediately, within a few
minutes responded back down checking the stairwell as we went down
and found tape on the sixth floor door.
Mr. Thompson. What is located on the eighth floor?
Officer Shoffler. The National Democratic Committee.
Mr. Thompson. On the eighth floor?
Officer Shoffler. On the eighth floor. Federal Reserve.
Mr. Thompson. And it was on June 17th?
Officer Shoffler. That is right.
Mr. Thompson. And on the sixth floor the Democratic National
Headquarters or was at that time?
120
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Is that correct? You checked the eighth, wenj
down to the sixth, found tape on the door of the sixth and proceedec
inside, is that correct?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Were you the officer who went on to the balcony
there?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did you observe anything across the way at the
Howard Johnson motel across the street?
Officer Shoffler. I noticed a gentleman about our level tha^
appeared to be observing us.
Mr. Thompson. What caused you to reach that conclusion? Was
he just looking in your direction?
Officer Shoffler. He was looking in our direction, yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Was he by himself?
Officer Shoffler. Yes; to the best of my knowledge.
Mr. Thompson. Was he conspicuous, were there any other persons
out there?
Officer Shoffler. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Could you determine his features?
Officer Shoffler. At that particular time because of the fact we
were moving in more or less a hurried pace, the only thing that I
really did pay attention to was the fact that there was a subject over
there. I was interested in this, in the fact that my dress and the fact
that I had at that point my weapon out
Mr. Thompson. What I am really getting at is what in your mind
could he, to make you very well
Officer Shoffler. I believe he saw us very well.
Mr. Thompson. The room where you were there on the balcony,
was it light?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. What was your dress at that time?
Officer Shoffler. It was casual clothes, I believe I had a cutoff
army jacket on, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Could you tell whether or not this man across the
way had a walkie-talkie?
Officer Shoffler. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. You could not tell. Was this because of your haste
or because of the lack of light where he was?
Officer Shoffler. More so probably because of our haste.
Mr. Thompson. Because of the light?
Officer Shoffler. Because we were in a hurry.
Mr. Thompson. Because you were in a hurr}^
Did you observe him closely enough to tell in your mind that he
was probably observing you?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did you make some comment to your fellow officers
about that?
Officer Shoffler. Because of our dress, I felt that he may possibly
call the poHce and they might with sirens and lights respond.
Mr. Thompson. Do 3^ou know the dispatcher who took this call
this night from Mr. Wills or whoever it was there at the Watergate
and called in this particular burglary?
121
Officer Shoffler. This will be from my recollection of our inter-
: view approximately a few weeks after the burglary and at that time
I believe the dispatcher told me that the guard had placed the call.
Mr. Thompson. The guard placed the call. Do you know the name
of the dispatcher?
Officer Shoffler. I will have the name shortly, sir.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Are those calls recorded in any manner?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir, for a period of 2 months.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know whether or not there was more than
one call made that night?
Officer Shoffler. I do not know, sir, I believe there was only one
call made from our conversation.
Mr. Thompson. Are those records of those calls periodically
destroyed by the police department?
Officer Shoffler. As I said, sir, I believe they keep them for 2
months and then destroy the tape.
Mr. Thompson. Unless a special request is made that they be
retained; do you know whether or not they were retained in this
instance?
Officer Shoffler. I beUeve that the U.S. attorney's office re-
quested a transcript of the statement.
Mr. Thompson. Have you seen the transcript yourself?
Officer Shoffler. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. But I think it may be available in the district,
attorney's office.
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Did anyone request you to work over-
time that night?
Officer Shoffler. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Any further questions?
Senator Baker. Yes, sir, I have a few.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thompson, I believe, has covered the events of that night very
carefully and I have only a few questions to ask, a few further questions
to ask.
When you arrived at the sixth floor, how many doors were taped?
Officer Shoffler. To the best of my recollection at this point, only
the door leading from the stairwell into the floor, the entrance.
Senator Baker. The stairwell to the fire escape or the stairs that
lead from the sixth floor to the lower floor?
Officer Shoffler. That would be the stairwell that leads from the
sixth floor to the lower floors.
Senator Baker. Yes, is that also the fire escape?
Officer Shoffler. Both stairwells are together. I imagine that is
the fire escape also, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Yes, do you have to have a key to get through
that door to the fire escape as well as to get into the building, into the
floor?
Officer Shoffler. It is necessary to have a key to gain entrance to
the floor from the stairwell, but it is not necessary to have a key to get
from the floor to the stairwell.
Senator Baker. Was there any other door taped that you have any
recollection of?
122
Officer Shoffler. On that floor?
Senator Baker. Yes, sir, the door to the DNC, the Democratic
National Committee, was not taped?
Officer Shoffler. The two glass doors around the other side there,
you mean?
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Officer Shoffler. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
Senator Baker. Or any doors inside the DNC?
Officer Shoffler. No, sir.
Senator Baker. So with the tape on the door from the stairway to
the main sixth floor, if you assume for the moment that it was taped for
a sinister purpose, you would only need to have a tape to get into the
sixth floor, you would not need a tape to get out from the sixth floor?
Officer Shoffler. I believe that is correct, sir, yes.
Senator Baker. Now, you went out on the balcony on the sixth
floor, is that correct?
OflEicer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you have a flashlight?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Was it lighted?
Officer Shoffler. I believe I used it on the corner of the ledge.
I had gone out on the ledge.
Senator Baker. Were you clearly visible on that balcony?
Officer Shoffler. I believe — I imagine you are referring to from
the Howard Johnsons.
Senator Baker. That is what I am referring to.
Let me short circuit the inquiry by saying that I am trying by this
line of questioning to establish these things: That you were on the
balcony; that the balcony is across the street from Howard Johnsons;
that a man was over there who we later learned was named Baldwin;
that you were clearly visible, that you had a flashlight, that you
had your pistol; that Baldwin was there and in your judgment, he
saw you. If all those things are so, you may say so.
Officer Shoffler. All those things are so, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. What did Baldwin do?
Officer Shoffler. What did I later find out he did?
Senator Baker. No, what did you see him do?
Officer Shoffler. Oh, he just stood there, Senator.
Senator Baker. When did the additional poUce arrive? When didi
the uniformed police and the police marked cars arrive? How long)
after you arrived?
Officer Shoffler. I would imagine it would have been approxi-
mately a half hour after the arrest.
Senator Baker. Do you know who made the call on that, or did iti
arrive in the ordinary course of events?
Officer Shoffler. Sergeant Leeper requested transports.
Senator Baker. Did he do that after you went into the Watergate i
or while you were still in your patrol car?
Officer Shoffler. Oh, after we had made the arrest. That is
Senator Baker. Oh, I see, after you had made the arrest?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Now, when you got inside and made the arrest —
by the way, who made the arrest, who made the first discovery of
the intruders in the Democratic National Committee offices?
123
Officer Shoffler. Officer Barrett first.
Senator Baker. Were you with him at the time?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Was there any communication by walkie-talkie
or— by w^alkie-talkie, that you heard or know of?
Officer Shoffler. I heard none, no, sir.
Senator Baker. The name of the building guard was
Officer Shoffler. Mr. Frank Wills.
Senator Baker. Mr. Wills. And you met Mr. Wills in the lobby
of the Watergate?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. What was his state of mind or appearance? Was
he agitated or calm?
Officer Shoffler. Mr. Wills is a type of person that is very hard
to judge his demeanor.
Senator Baker. What did he tell you?
Officer Shoffler. He was saying about he felt there was somebody
inside possibh^, that at one time he had seen tape on a door and he
removed the tape and later on, he saw the tape was back, and
Senator Baker. Did he say what floor that was on?
Officer Shoffler. He kept indicating, I believe he kept indicating
the garage door at the B-2 level, because when we asked him to show
us, that is immediately where he took us.
Senator Baker. Did he ever speak of the tape on the sixth floor
or the eighth floor?
Officer Shoffler. At this time, I have no recollection of him speak-
ing of tape on those particular doors, sir.
Senator Baker. Did Mr. Wills make any reference to the Demo-
cratic National Committee?
Officer Shoffler. I do not believe, as again my recollection, I do
not believe he at any time indicated what he knew was on the sixth
floor except I think he informed us that there were burglaries on the
sixth floor and he was aware of that.
Senator Baker. Did he make any indication as to why he did not
call you when he first found the doors taped, but rather only after
they were retaped?
Officer Shoffler. I believe when I interviewed him later, he told
me that his suspicion was aroused only after the second time, be-
cause he had thought that possibly employees of the building or some-
one doing work in the building, as a convenience, taped the doors to
keep them open.
Senator Baker. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Ervin. Any further questions?
Mr. Dash. Just to clarify the record. Senator Baker asked you a
question concerning whether or not the tape was needed if one was
inside the room in order to get out and I think you said that one did
not. Sergeant Leeper yesterday testified that these doors were locked
both inside and out, so that if you were inside, you would need a
key to get out, and therefore, it was his testimony that the tape was
necessary to get out. Do you have information on that?
Senator Baker. All right, now, Mr. Chairman, just a second.
You know, we are not in a court of law. We don't proceed by evi-
dentiary rules, but the witness testified yesterday very clearly in one
96-296— 73— bk. 1 9
124
respect and this witness has testified very clearly today. I think we
ought not to try to lead the witness into a different statement. I
think both statements stand on their own merit and we ought to leave
it there.
Mr. Dash. I am just asking the question, Senator, as to whether
he knows these doors are locked from inside and out.
Senator Baker. He has alread}' testified that you need a tape in
order to gain entrance but you do not need the tape to get out.
Senator Ervin. I see no harm in the question. I think we can
probably let him answer.
\h\ Shoffler. There was, even at the time of the arrest and the
small investigation we did after, we weren't able to determine too
much about the door. This morning I placed a call to clarify it and
was informed that certain offices in that building, you do need a key
for both ways. But they have a buzzer system because of the fire
regulation to get out of the office. That particular office didn't have a
buzzer system and you could have free access from the floor to the
stairwell.
Senator Baker. So you did not have to have a key to get out?
Officer Shoffler. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker?
Senator Weicker. OfP-cer vShoffler, how long were you on the
balcony?
Officer Shoffler. I would estimate 3 or 4 minutes.
Senator Weicker. And how long after you believed Baldwin to
have seen you when you apprehended the defendants?
Officer Shoffler. It would have had to have been within 5 or 6
minutes, 5 minutes at the absolute most. We went immediately from
the balcony to the hallway, down the hallway, the three of us, then
Officer Barrett observed movements behind a screen and the arrests
were made.
Senator Weicker. So the time was, the time from when you say
you believed Baldwin to have seen you, to the time that you ap-
prehended the defendants was 5 minutes?
Officer Shoffler. At the most, yes.
Senator Weicker. At the most. And the time that you were actu-
ally on the balcony, again about 2 or 8 minutes?
Officer Shoffler. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Could you give me an answer on that?
Officer Shoffler. I would think that the whole time, from his
observation of me on the balcony to the arrest, would have been 5,
6, 7 minutes at the most.
Senator Weicker. And the actual time spent on the balcony.
Officer Shoffler. Two to three minutes.
Senator Weicker. Two to three minutes.
I have no more (piestions.
Senator Ervin. Thank j^ou, Mr. Shoffler.
Call the next witness.
IMr. Dash. Mr. James AlcCord.
Senator Ervin. Mr. McCord, raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you shall give to the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
125
Mr. McCoRD. I do, sir.
Mr. Dash. Mr. McCord, will you bring the microphone closer to
you so we \vi\\ hear you.
Now, for the record, will you first state your name and address?
TESTIMONY OF JAMES W. McCORD, JR.; ACCOMPANIED BY
BERNARD PENSTERWALD, JR., COUNSEL
Mr. McCoRD. James W. McCord, M-c-C-o-r-d, Jr., the address is
No. 7 Winder, W-i-n-d-e-r, Winder Court, Rockville, Md. 20850.
Mr. Dash. Are you accompanied with counsel this morning?
Mr. McCoRD. I am.
Mr. Dash. Will counsel please identify himself?
Mr. Fensteravald. Yes, my name is Bernartj Fensterwald, Jr. My
business address is 810 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C.
Mr. Dash. Mr. McCortl, prior to your testimony, do 3"ou have any
preliminary statement to make, that you wish to make to the
committee?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, there is. I would like to state, as I did when I
appeared at the executive session of this committee, that I would like
to be as accurate as I can, that some of the dates that I will refer to —
there are approximately 75 to 100 different dates — I will try to recall to
the best of my memory. Some may be in error.
As I stated when I first appeared, some matters go back some 12 or 14
months and some of the matters that are of interest to this committee
I have therefore set forth in writing, attempting to reconstruct my
memory to the best of my abihty. 1 may refer to some of those memo-
randa during this meeting and to other notes that pertain to dates, and
I hope you will bear with me and understand my reasoning in that
regard.
I state fmalh^ that my participation in the W^atergate operation on
my part, for whatever reasons I ma}" have had at the time, whatever
rationale I ma}^ have had at the time, was an error, was a mistake,
a ver^- grave mistake, which I regiet.
I am ready to proceed with the ciuestions.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Now, is it a fact now, Mr. McCord, that you presently stand con-
victed on a multicount P^'ederal indictment charging burglar}', elec-
tronic surveillance and conspirac}^ arising out of the break-in of the
Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Are you now awaiting sentence on that conviction?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr Dash. W^hat is your professional background, Mr. McCord?
Mr. McCoRD. I was born in 1924 in Waurika, Okla. I worked first
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1942, 1943, in Washington,
D.C, in New York City. I, subsequently from 1943 to 1945, was an
Army Air Corps officer. From 1948 to 1951, I worked as a special
agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in San Diego and San
Francisco, Calif. I worked from 1951 to 1970 with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency as a security officer. I retired from that agency in
August 1970 after 25 years Federal service.
Mr. Dash. Now, officially, during your service with the CIA and
FBI, did you receive any awards or commendations for your service?
126
Mr. McCoRD. I received on retirement in August 1970 the Dis-
tinguished Service Award for outstanding performance of duty with
CIA. I received some others.
Mr. Dash. Now, prior to your arrest, indictment, and conviction
relating to the Watergate incident, were you ever arrested, charged
with a crime, or the subject of any complaint or disciplinary pro-
ceeding in your life?
Mr. McCoRD. I have had traffic violations in the Washington
area; yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Is that all?
Were you an employee of the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes."^
Mr. Dash. What position did you hold and what were your duties?
Mr. McCoRD. I came aboard first as a security consultant part
time in September of 1971.
Mr. Dash. By the way, how did you get that job?
Mr. McCoRD. I was introduced initially by Mr. John Caulfield
and Mr. Odle, the Director of Administration who testified yesterday,
and based on that interview was employed part time and then full
time in January, the first of January 1972.
Mr. Dash. Now, what were your duties in that position as security
chief?
Mr. McCoRD. The duties were essentially the function of the
protection of the property and the lives of the personnel of the com-
anittee in that facility there and subsequently^ in the facility at Miami,
¥'la., that the committee and some of the White House staff would
occupy during the Republican Convention in August of 1972. The
duties were primaril};^ those of physical security protection of per-
sonnel security, some document security, and some protective work
for the family of John Mitchell.
Mr. Dash. Now, were those duties, and that assignment that youi
have just described under whose direction did you work?
Mr. McCoRD. Primarily under the direction of Mr. Robert Odle
who was my immediate supervisor in the committee. The responsi-
bility with Mr. Mitchell and his famil}', I received directions from
him, from Mrs. Mitchell, from Robert Odle and Mr. Liddy.
Mr. Dash. Did there come a time when you worked under the
direction of Gordon Liddv?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. What was Mr. Liddy's position at that time?
Mr. McCoRD. He was at first from December until about March
19 — December 1971 to about March 1972 — general counsel for the
Committee To Re-Elect the President. Thereafter he was — occupied
the same position with the finance committee for the reelection of the
Presiden t.
Mr. Dash. When did this arrangement begin or, in which capacity
did you work under his direction, Mr. McCord, with Mr. Lidd}^?
Mr. McCoRD. The first discussions of the arrangements began some-
time in January 1972. Early January.
Mr. Dash. Could you briefly state for the committee, Mr. McCord. !'
what it was that Mr. Liddy wanted 3^ou to do?
Mr. McCoRD. I can give a bit of a background if you want that.
When he fii'st came aboard the committee in December 1971 he began
to — we struck up an acquaintance, we had had a contact on it, and
127
he began to question me regarding the state of the art of certain
technical devices, for one thing. Listening devices and so on which
appeared to be at that point in time a professional interest, a normal
professional interest of someone who had worked in the field of law
enforcement. We discussed as well the common topic of common
interest to him and to me, and to others who were senior on the staff of
anticipated demonstrations and possible violence that might be coming
up in San Diego, Calif., which was originalh^ scheduled to be the con-
vention site for the Republican Convention in 1972 in August. The
discussions
Mr. Dash. Could 3-ou raise vour voice a little if vou can, Air.
McCord.
Senator Baker. It might help — if I can interrupt just for a minute,
Mr. McCord — I believe it might help if the panel operator might give
us some advice in that respect if j^ou could be a little further away
from the microphone and talk a little louder because we are having a
difficult time up here trying to hear you.
Mr. McCord. I think I am a little hoarse; if you can turn up the
volume it might help.
Mr. Dash. Would you continue?
Mr. McCord. Yes.
Gradually the discussion in December, January, February of 1972
with Mr. Liddy, gradualh' developed into more and more conver-
sation on his part with me in the offices of the Committee for the
Re-Election of the President regarding technical devices and political
matters pertaining to the forthcoming convention and that became
apparent that he had an interest in several areas of intelligence
gathering pertaining to the Democratic Party and the Democratic
Convention, and in which it was contemplated or planned by him and
by others whom he referred to in these conversations as John JSIitchell,
John Dean, counsel to the President, Jeb ]\Iagruder then in January
the interim director of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, in
which it appeared that those men, the four of them, were in the, by
late January, the planning stage in which political intelligence was
to be discussed at meetings at the Attorney General's office, Mr.
Mitchell's office, and in which Mr. Lidd}^ was seeking from me certain
information regarding the costs and the types of electronic devices
that could be used in bugging. That the part of the budget proposal
which he was working, working on, the second part dealt wdth photog-
raphy operations, clandestine photography operations, and a third
party dealt with the broad area of political espionage, political
intelligence.
Mr. Dash. Specifically, Mr. McCord, when 3'ou speak of political
activity, political intelligence, bugging activities, what do you mean
in terms of how that was to be attained; trj^ to be as specific as you
can, from your knowledge of what ]Mr. Liddy told you.
Mr. McCord. The area of political espionage and intelligence — I
can set that one aside yery quickly. He did not elaborate on in many
details at all to me personalty. Apparentl}^ others were involved with
him which I can refer to later in the conversation — specifically Mr.
Hunt, E. Howard Himt.
The topic of photography, clandestine photography, in which he
was preparing the budget and preparing to meet with the gentlemen
I have referred to before, in planning sessions, dealt with photographic
128
equipment and the cost of photographic equipment and specific items
of equipment that would be used against the Democratic Party, the
Democratic hierarchy in Washington primarily, but also in Miami,
Fla. The electronic devices which he referred to specifically, were of a
variet}^ of types.
Mr. Dash. I am not asking specifically what the types were, but
how were they to be used, where were they to be placed from your
understanding?
Mr. McCoRD. The initial interests specified by Mr. Liddy in this
regard were, No. 1, against Mr. Larry O'Brien, then chairman of the
Democratic National Committee in Washington, D.C., at his resi-
dence and subseciuently at his office in the Watergate office building;
perhaps other officers of the Democratic National Committee. The
McGovern headquarters in Washington, D.C., were mentioned quite
early in 1972. And there was some general reference to the Democratic
National Convention facility or site wherever it might be located at
this convention in the summer of 1972.
Mr. Dash. All right now, Mr. McCord; in connection with this
assignment, in which you were having these discussions with Mr.
Liddy, did you come to associate yourself with Mr. E. Howard Hunt,
Bernard Barker, Eugenio Martinez, Frank Sturgis, and Virgilio
Gonzales?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes; I did.
Mr. Dash. And as a result of that association and your agreement
with Mr. Lidd^y, did you with Mr. Barker, Sturgis, Martinez, and
Gonzalez illegally enter the Democratic National Committee head-
quarters on two occasions one on or about May 30, 1972, and the
other in the earlj^ morning hours of June 17, 1972?
Mr. McCoRD. I did.
Mr. Dash. On the first occasion on or about May 30, 1972, you
installed two telephone interception devices or wire types on two
office telephones; one on the telephone of Spencer Oliver and the
other on the telephone of Lawrence O'Brien?
Mr. McCoRD. I did.
]\fr. Dash. Leading aside for the time being wh}^ you broke into
the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate
on the second time on June 17 and what circumstance led to your
arrest, you were in fact arrested by plainclothesmen of the District
of Columbia Aletropolitan Pohce shortly after you entered; is that
true?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Is that the arrest which led to your reconviction?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct
Mr. Dash. Will j^ou tell the committee, Mr. McCord, why, after a .
lifetime of work as a law enforcement officer without, as you have
testified an}' blemish on your career, did you agree with Mr. Liddy
to engage in his program of burglaries and illegal wiretapping and
specifically the two break-ins on May 30 and June 17 of the Demo-
cratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate?
Mr. McCoRD. There were a number of reasons associated with the
ultimate decision of mine to do so. One of the reasons, and a very
important reason to me was the fact that the Attorney General him-
self, Mr. John Mitchell, at his office had considered and approved the i
operation, according to Mr. Liddy.
129
Secondly, that the counsel for the President, Mr. John Dean, had
[):irticipated in those decisions with him. That one was the top legal
officer for the United States at the Department of Justice, and the
second gentleman the top legal officer in the White House and it was
a matter that had currently been given
Senator Baker. Stop there, if you will, just for a second. I know
you said you had approved according to Liddy, did you have per-
sonal knowledge of Mr. Dean's participation or uas this also according
to Mr. Liddy?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Dean's participation came to me through two
sources, one was Mr. Liddy, one was Mr. Hunt, E. Howard Hunt, in
discussions which subsequently came to me, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. I might say if I may, Mr. Chairman, that we have
no desire to try to impede the progress of the testimony or to try to
adhere strictly to the rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule, which
would otherwise apply in a court of law, but it would be helpful to me
and I believe to the committee, if in each instance when the informa-
tion you give us is not of your own personal first-hand knowledge, you
identify it as such and give us the source.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir: I believe I was responding to the question
of counsel, what were my reasons which involved in my case, a con-
clusion and motivation and intent as opposed to what someone had
told me.
Senator Ervin. We will adhere as much as possible to the rules of
evidence which have been established and used in all the courts and I
would siiy that your testimony is to the eflfect that you were assured
by Mr. Liddy that John Mitchell and John Dean and Jeb Magruder
had approved Mr. Liddy's proposed operations, and you also received
assurance not only as to Mr. Dean from Mr. Liddy but also from Mr.
Hunt. That was based on what you were told by Mr. Liddy and Mr.
Hunt.
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ervin. I would say that under the rules of evidence this,
at the present stage of this hearing, will not be admissible to show any
connectioln with this matter by John Mitchell, John Dean, or Jeb
Magruder but that the testimony which Mr. McCord is giving is
relevant to show the motives which prompted Mr. McCord to partici-
pate in the matter.
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir; I am ex})laining, I am not a lawyer, I am a
layman, I will try to give the information of my knowledge, whether
it is first hand or second hand for the benefit of this committee and
you can stop me at what point you may feel is proper to do so.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, if I might just elaborate at that
point, I thoroughly agree with the statement made by the chairman,
I associate myself with him as to its content and form and, once again,
I am not trying to impede your testimony. But it would be very
helpful to us when your information is not first-hand information
you can identify it as such for our record.
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Mr. Dash. Did you have any knowledge, directly or indirectly,
that would lead you to believe or have information that the CIA was
involved in this plan?
130
Mr. McCoRD. I had just the contran^, that there was no mdication,
no intelHgence, no statements to me that this was a CIA operation,
that quite the contrary, that it was an operation which involved the
Attorney General of the United States at that point in time. Subse-
quently he became the director of the Committee To Re-Elect the
President, involved the counsel to the Wliite House, involved Mr.
Jeb Magruder and Mr. Liddy, who was then general counsel, at that
point in time of the Committee To Re-Elect the President and
subsequently, was the finance committee general counsel, therefore,
in my mind there was an absolute certainty that the CIA was not
involved, neither did I ever receive any statement from any of the
other codefendants at any point in time up to June 17 or subsequently,
that tliis was a CIA operation.
Mr. Dash. For the record, j^our restatement of your belief that the
Attorney General, Mr. Magruder, other than Mr. Liddy, was hearsay
based on what Mr. Liddy told you and ]\Ir. Hunt?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, would 3^ou have acted any differently with regard
to this plan if you believed that Mr. Liddy was masterminding these
plans on his own?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, I would.
Mr. Dash. And what would you have done?
Mr. McCoRD. At the proposal for the operation that Mr. Liddy or
Mr. Hunt or an}'' other individual acting separately and apart from the
Wliite House and the Department of Justice, I would not have par-
ticipated, I have a personal opinion that some others woidd not have
participated but that may not be relevant to 3'our question. My
question is a categorical answer to that, I would say that the decision
made to participate was not one made immediately but only after I
saw that the gentlemen involved given careful consideration to this
operation over a period of time, including a 30-day waiting period
which to me was highly significant.
Mr. Dash. Now, ]Mr. McCord, did you engage in any other break-ins
or wiretaps on 3^our own or with Mr. Hunt, Mr. Liddy, or others such
as the break-in in Mr. Ellsberg's psvchiatrist's office?"^
Mr. McCoRD. I did not.
^Ir. Dash. Now, after 3'our arrest which axu testified to, did 3-ou
receive anv monev?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. From whom did vou receive that mone3'?
Mr. McCoRD. From the wife of E. Howard Hunt, Airs. Hunt.
Mr. Dash. Can 3'^ou tell us hew much mone3^ vou did receive?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, I received legal fees of $25^000 for the payment
of law3'ers. I received a continuation of salar}- from Jul3^ through
Januar}' at the rate of $3,000 a month, which the*^ others were receiving!
as well.
Mr. Dash. Did 3^ou have knowledge, information, and belief as to
where this mone3' came from?
Mr. McCoRD. I was told that it came from the Committee To Re-
Elect the President by Mrs. Hunt.
Senator Ervin. The same thing appHes, the same rule, that it would
be hearsa3' as to the committee and would not at this stage of the
hearing be evidence to connect the committee with it.
131
Mr. Dash. Now, after your arrest and at the time of the indictment,
after the trial or during the trial, did you receive any pressures, sug-
gestions from any person concerning what jon should do about that
trial with regard to A'our plea, behavior, or conduct?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes; I did.
Mr. Dash. Would you now please state to the committee from whom
you received such directions or pressures, and what it was?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes; it extended over a period of time beginning, to
the best of my recollection, in late September or early October 1972,
and it continued through the night before my conviction on January 29,
1973. The persons who communicated information to me, which I
construed as political pressure, included Mr. E. Howard Hunt, Mrs.
Hunt speaking for Mr. Hunt, she stated, mv attorney, Mr. Gerald
Alch, Mr. John P. Caulfield
Mr. Dash. Will you please repeat again the name of your attorney
that you just said?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Gerald, G-e-r-a-1-d, Alch, A-l-c-h, and Mr. John
Caulfield, C-a-u-1-f-i-e-l-d, who had originally hired me for the position,
or who had interviewed me for the position with the Committee To
Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Dash. Now, with Mr. Hunt, and with. Mrs. Hunt, recognizing
that you are dealing with hearsay, when you heard that said, what
another person said, what was communicated to you by his presence?
Mr. McCoRD. In regard to Mrs. Hunt or Mr. Hunt?
Mr. Dash. Well, first, Mr. Hunt.
Mr. McCoRD. Conversations with Mr. Hunt began, to the best of
my recollection, in late September or earlj^ October 1972, when I was
seeing him at the courthouse on various pretrial exercises or events,
motions, that were transpiring, in which we would talk about various
matters, including the situation that we were in, what the trial ap-
peared to be at that point in time — that is, what the future looked like
for us; and in telephone conversations, with him to me. In other words,
both in person and by telephone, Mr. Hunt stated that the defendants
were going to be pro%aded with, given Executive clemency after a period
of time in prison, if interested, if the^y would plead guilty, and were
sentenced, in a plea of not guilty, that the}^ were going to be given
financial support while they were in prison; that is, their families would
be; and that rehabilitation, not specified, but rehabihtation, perhaps
a job, would be provided for the men after the release from prison.
Mr. Dash. All right. Let us leave out for the moment Mrs. Hunt.
Would you now proceed to any conversations you had leading up to
contacts with Mr. Caulfield and what Mr. Caulfield did state to you?
Mr. McCoRD. I have a statement, sir, in this regard.
Mr. Dash. Do you have copies of that statement for the committee?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Could 3^ou please, Mr. Fensterwald, provide copies for the com-
mittee?
Mr. Fensterwald. Yes.
Senator Montoya. Mr. Chairman, I would like for the witness to
summarize the record just briefly, if he will — I mean, summarize the
statement, unless he is going to read it in full.
Mr. Dash. He wants to read it.
Mr. McCord, what led you to prepare the statement? Why have
you prepared that statement?
132
Mr. McCoRD. I prepared it, sir, for accuracy's purpose because of
the nature of the information that is contained therein, as I have done
with some previous statements to this committee, where I felt that
my best recollection, as best I can recall it, set down in writing, would
be the most accurate way of doing it rather than, in effect, under the
pressure of lights and cameras and what have you, make statements
that might either be misconstrued or might be inaccurate on my part,
and in order to set it forth as briefly as I know how.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Now, will you please read the statement, and will you read it clearly
so we can all hear it now?
Mr. McCoRD. I will state as a preliminary that the dates of the
telephone calls that I refer to in this statement are to the best of my
recollection; they may be inaccurate by a day or two, but they are
the best recollection I have of the dates on which the calls occurred.
The subject is political pressure on the writer to accept Executive
clemency and remain silent.
Political pressure from the White House was conveyed to me in
January 1973 b}^ John Caulfield to remain silent, take Executive clem-
enc}^ by going oft" to prison cpiietl}^, and I was told that while there, I
would receive financial aid and later rehabilitation and a job. I was
told in a January meeting in 1973 Avith Caulfield that the President of
the United States was aware of our meeting, that the results of the
meeting would be conveyed to the President, and that at a future
meeting there would like!}" be a personal message from the President
himself.
Senator Ervin. I would like to state at this point that the testi-
mony of Mr. McCord as to what was told to him by John Caulfield
would not be accepted in a court of law to connect the President with
what Mr. Caulfield was doing, but it is admissible to show whether or
not Mr. Caulfield was a party to any agreement to connect the
President for any information on what is kno\VTi as the Watergate
affair, but it is not received in connection to the President at this
stage.
Senator Gurney. I think it ought to be pointed out at that time
that at this time, January 1973, it is my understanding that Mr.
Caulfield was not in the White House at all, but was emplo3'ed, I
think, by the Treasmy Department.
Mr. Dash. That is right.
Senator Gurney. I hope we can correct these things as we go along.
You have all kinds of inferences here that are inaccurate and are
casting aspersions that are going to damage peoples' reputations.
Mr. McCoRD. I only say in my statement that political pressure
was conveyed to me by Mr. Caulfield which he attributed to the
White House without citing
Senator Baker. May I ask the counsel if Mr. Caulfield is under
subpena?
Mr. Dash. Mi-. Caulfield is under subpena and ^\iIl be brought
right after this witness.
Senator Baker. Is he under subpena at the present time?
Mr. Dash. His covmsel has been informed that he wants to testify
and he will acce|)t a. subpena.
Senator Baker. The answer is that he is not under subpena, and my
request of the chairman is that a subpena be issued in standard form
133
for Mr. Caulfield to testify and that lie be scheduled to testify im-
modiately next succeeding this witness.
Mr. Dash. This was our understanding.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, will 3'ou take care of that request?
Senator Ervin. Yes, I will sign it as soon as I can get somebody to
prepare it.
Mr. Dash. We have contacted his counsel and have been told by
him that he is prepared to accei)t the subjiena.
Will you please proceed with your reading of the statement, Mr.
McCord.
Senator Ervin. I would like to reiterate that what Mr. McCord
says Caulfield told him is admissible to show what Caulfield did and
said to you, sir, as a witness taking action or a friend taking action.
It is not relevant to j^rove any connection with the White House or
the President.
You may proceed now.
Mr. ]\IcCoRD. The sentence which follows the last sentence which I
read from the memorandum reads, "The dates of the telephone calls
.set forth below are the current" — and that word is mistyped. It
should be correct dates — "to the best of my recollection."
The .secoml paragraph is: On the afternoon of January 8, 1973, the
first da3^ of the Watergate trial, Gerald Alch, my attorney, told me
that William O. Bittman, attorney for E. Howard Hunt, wanted to
meet with me at Bittman's office that afternoon. When I asked wh}^,
Alch said that Bittman wanted to talk vnth me about "whose word
I would trust regarding a White House ofi'er of Executive clemency."
Alch added that Bittman wanted to talk with both Bernard Barker
and me that afternoon.
I had no intention of accepting Executive clemency, but I did want
to find out what was going on, and by whom, and exactly what the
Wliite House was doing now. A few days before, the White House had
tried to lay the Watergate oj)eration off on the CIA, and now it was
clear that I was going to have to find out what was up now. To do so
involved some risks. To fail to do so was in my opinion to work in a
vacuum regarding Wliite House intentions and plans, which involved
even greater risks, I felt.
Around 4:30 p.m. that afternoon, January 8, while waiting for a
taxi after the court session, Bernard Barker asked n\y attorneys and
me if he could ride in the cab with us to Bittman's office, which we
agreed to. There he got out of the cab and went up toward Bittman's
office. I had been under the imi)ression during the cab ride that Bitt-
man was going to talk to both Barker and me jointly, and became
angered at what seemed to me — I can finish the statement, sir. if you
want. I am giving opinion. If you want opinion, I will finish the
statement. If you want me to delete opinion, I will not finish the
statement. I am setting forth the facts and what was going through
my mind at the time.
Mr. Dash. Continue to read the statement, please.
Senator Baker. I think it is fine, Mr. McCord, for you to go ahead
and read the statement, but once again, to the extent that you can,
would 3'ou identify as you go along those things attributed to other
people that 3'ou do not know at firsthand? I have no objection, of
course, to j^our stating what went through your mind. Your statement
is significant in terms of your conduct, not necessarily in terms of the
134
facts themselves. And it is relevant to this committee's inquiry as it
relates to your conduct at one point or the other.
The request I made a few moments ago was that while some of your
testimony will be hearsay in the strict sense, simply identify those
parts, that information which 3^ou give us in this statement, which j^ou
received secondhand.
Mr. McCoRD. Most respectfully, sir, I shall try to do so. What I am
reading now is firsthand.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Mr. McCoRD. The sentence that I began: Around 4:.30 p.m. that
afternoon, January 8, while waiting for a taxi after the court session,
Bernard Barker apked my attorneys and me if he could ride in the cab
with us to Bittman's office, which we agreed to. There he got out of
the cab and went up toward Bittman's office. I had been under the
impression during the cab ride that Bittman was going to talk to both
Barker and me jointly, and became angered at what seemed to me to
be the arrogance and audacity of another man's lawyer calling in two
other lawyer's clients and pitching them for the White House. Alch
saw my anger and took me aside for about a half hour after the cab
arrived in front of Bittman's office, and let Barker go up alone. About 5
p.m. we went up to Bittman's office. There Alch disappeared with
Bittman, and I sat alone in Bittman's office for a period of time,
became irritated, and went next door where Bernard Shankman and
Austin Mittler, attorneys for me and Hunt respectively, were talking
about legitimate legal matters. I might add at this point parentheti-
cally no knowledge whatever that either Bernard Shankman or Austin
Mittler had any knowledge of whatever of the events which I am
discussing in this memorandum.
Alch finally came back, took me aside and said that Bittman told
him I would be called that same night by a friend I had known from
the \\^iite House.
Senator Baker. Now, at that point, I take it that that is second-
hand information?
Senator Ervin. That is testimony of what he says that his lawyer
told him Mr. Bittman said. Of course, as far as Bittman is concerned
and the White House is concerned, it is hearsay, but it is his own
knowledge.
Senator Baker. I entirely agree, Mr. Chairman. The point I am
making is I want to separate the wheat from the chaff and what his
Iaw>'er told liim clearl}^ is primary evidence. What his lawyer told him
that someone else told him is clearly hearsay after that. But once
again, I am not trying to exclude it. I wish simply to identify it as we
go along.
Mr. McCoRD. I believe I stated it, sir, as it occurred, which was
that this was a statement by Mr. Alch.
My statement was that: Mr. Alch finally came back, took me aside,
and said that Mr. Bittman had told him that I would be called that
same night by a friend I had known from the White House.
I assumed this would be John Caulfield who had originally recruited
me for the Committee for the Re-election of the President position.
About 12:30 p.m. that same evening, I received a call from an
unidentified individual who said that Caulfield was out of toN\^i, and
asked me to go to a pay phone booth near the Blue Fountain Inn on
135
Koute 355 near my residence, where he had a message for me from
Cdulfield. There the same individual called and read the following
message :
"Plead guilty.
"One year is a long time. You will get Executive clemenc}'. Your
family will be taken care of and when you get out you wall be reha-
bilitated and a job will be found for you.
"Don't take immunity when called before the grand jur^^."
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. McCord, did you recog-nize that voice at all?
Do you know who was speaking to you on the telephone?
^Ir. McCoRD. I do not know who the man was, the voice I heard
over the telephone before in previous calls.
]\Ir. Dash. And, therefore, it is not your testimony from your
reading that statement, it was Mr. Caulfield who was speaking to
you
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And, therefore, it is somebody else telling you, you
believe that he was repeating a statement ]Mr. Caulfield but not a
direct statement to you from Mr. Caulfield?
Mr. McCoRD. He so stated he was repeating a statement from Mr.
Caulfield, and he repeated the statement twice, that is correct.
Mr. Dash, Right. Can we continue, please?
Senator Gurney. Can we find out more about these other calls
where he heard this same voice? What were they, what did they in-
volve, what were they?
Mr. McCoRD. wSir, I can give them to you now or at the end of the
statement, as you prefer and I am willing to do either that the com-
mittee desires.
Senator Gurney. Well, they are ver}^ important, I would like to
have them now.
Senator Ervin. Senator, if he reads the statement, he states in his
statement, it is on the 8th of January and fu'st he said that his lawyer,
Mr. Alch, told him that, Bittman said he would receive a call from
a friend he had known from the White House, and he said at 12:30
p.m., the same day, that is after midnight on January 8, that he
received this phone call from an unidentified individual.
Senator Gurney. Yes, Mr. Chairman, what he also said was that
he recognized the voice because he had heard it in previous phone
calls, and m}^ question was when and what were these previous phone
calls about. This is a very important matter.
Mr. McCoRD. The previous phone calls, the story gets a bit com-
plex, I v/ill be glad to do it either way you prefer, I believe it would
have more continuity if I finished that first.
Mr. Dash. To clarify it for Senator Gurney, do you know the voice,
do you know the identity?
Mr. McCoRD. I heard the voice before, I do not know the identity
of the man who called.
Senator Baker. I don't think it will take long to do what Senator
Gurney wishes to do, what he is talking about. I think it would be
better to go ahead with the question and I would request that Senator
Gurney proceed at this time.
Senator Gurney. Would you proceed.
Mr. McCoRD. I would be glad to.
136
Sometime in July, 1972, shortly after I got out of jail, which was
in June 1972, about mid-day there was a note in my mailbox at my
residence and when I opened the letter, which had not been stamped
nor sent through the mails it was a note from Jack Caulfield signed
"Jack" which said, "Go to the phone booth on Route 355 near your
home," and he gave three alternate times at which I could appear at
the jihone booth for a telephone call from him.
To the best of my recollection, one of those times was very shortly
thereafter, an hour or two later, and another time was the next day
and that seems to me that the third time was the following evening.
I went to the telephone, to that telephone booth on Route 355 that
afternoon, the same afternoon, as I best recall, and I heard the voice
that I have referred to in this memorandum of today. I do not know
the individual's identity, he had an accent that 1 would refer to as a
New York accent. He said that he had formerly worked for Jack
Caulfield. He said, "I am a friend of Jack's, I formerly worked with
him. Jack will want to talk with you shortly. He will be in touch with
you soon."
I received a call subsequently from Mr. Caulfield. To the best of
my recollection it came to my home first and it said, "Go to the same
phone booth on Route 355," which I did, and there Mr. Caulfield
told me that he was going overseas in a few days. He said, "If you have
any problems" if you have any problems, "call my home and leave
word and I will call you back from overseas to your residence."
He said, "Wlien you call my home ask for Mr. Watson."
Senator Gurney. Mr. Watson?
Mr. McCoRD. Watson. He said, also, "After my return if you ever
need to call me at my office," he gave a number, the office number
and he said, "Simply leave word that Mr. Watson is calling."
So it was a name that both of us were to use, my name and his
name. I did not contact him during the next 30 days and I next heard
from him, to the best of my recollection sometime in September 1972,
on a Sunday afternoon.
I can't recall the exact date but I do recall that Mr. Clark Mac-
Gregor, then the head of the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President, had just finished a television appearance on one of the talk
programs such as Meet the Press, and Mr. Caulfield called me at
home and again asked that I go to the telephone booth on Route 355,
which I did. He stated that he had trouble getting my home number
because it was an unlisted number, and he stated, "We are worried
about you"— this is Mr. Caulfield's statement [laughter] and he
went on then to read briefly the words of a deposition which he planned
to give to the Democratic National Committee, I had read in the
papers a few days before that he had been scheduled as a witness
before the Democratic National Committee, and he read the deposi-
tion to me indicating that this was, in effect, what he planned to say
in the deposition.
There was some reference during the conversation to something
doing with a double agent in quotes; Mr. Clark MacGregor, as I
recall, in his television appearance had referred to the possibility of
there being a double agent in the Watergate operation and the
inference was that it was A4r. Baldwin, and I told Mr. Caulfield that
so far as I was concerned whoever had drawn that conclusion had
drawn absolutely an erroneous conclusion, that I had seen absolutely
137
nothing that would indicate such, and I simply wanted to go on the
record with Mr. Caulfield to that effect.
Senator Gurney. We do want to get back to the statement but, in
sort, what you are saying is that \Ir. Caulfield's friend Watson by
liame is the man whose voice you heard?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir, that, most respectfull}' — that is not what I
said, sir.
wSenator Gurney. Go on.
Mr. McCoRD. I believe Mr. Caulfield used the name Watson. It was
not his friend.
Senator Gurney. I see.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
vSenator Gurney. All right. Go on. How many times did you hear
this unidentified voice?
Mr. McCoRD. To the best of my recollection I heard the voice prior
to the January call two or three times. 1 cannot be absolutely sure but
at least twice before January.
Senator Gurney. Were these in connection with contacts with
Caulfield?
Mr. McCoRD. Always.
Senator Gurney. Yes. I just wanted to make sure.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Thank you.
Mr. Dash. Will you proceed with the statement from where you
left oft', Mr. McCord, and I guess the prior sentence so we can have
continuity.
Mr. McCoRD. I believe my last sentence that I read was: The
same message was once again repeated, obviously read.
I believe that appears in the statement you have on page 3.
The next sentence was that: I told the caller I would not discuss
.such matters over the phone. He said that Caulfield was out of town.
On Wednesday evening, January 10, the same party, to the best of
my recollection, called and told me by phone that Jack would want
to talk with me by phone on Thursday night, the following night,
January 11, when he got back into town and requested that I go to
the same ];)hone booth on Route 355 near the Blue Fountain Inn. He
also conveyed instructions regarding a personal meeting with Mr.
Caulfield on Friday night, January 12.
On Thursday evening, January 11, the same party called me at
home and told me that Caulfield's plane was late and that he —
speaking of Caulfield — wanted to meet with me personally the same
evening, that is Thursday evening, after arrival. I told him that I
would not do so but would meet with him Friday night if he desired.
Later that evening, Thursday evening, about 9:30 p.m., Caulfield
called me on my home phone and insisted on talking with me but my
family refused to let him do so, since I was asleep.
On Friday night, January 12, from about 7 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. I
met with Caulfield at the second overlook, that is overlooking the
Potomac at the parking area for looking at the Potomac area on
George Washington Parkway in Virginia.
Mr. Dash. Mr. McCord, how did you know to go there? How was
it arranged?
138
Mr. McCoRD. I believe it was stated in the Thursday evening call
at which this unidentified party said Caulfield would want to meet
with me personally and on Friday night said go to the second over-
look on George Washington Parkway and he specified the time and
that is what I followed through. I met with Caulfield at the second
overlook on George Washington Parkway, that is the second one
leaving Washington and going out to Virginia and talked with him
in his car, in his automobile. Caulfield advised that he had been
attending a law enforcement meeting in San Clemente, Calif., and
had just returned. I advised him that I had no objection to meeting
wdth him to tell him my frame of mind but that I had no intention of
talking Executive clemency or pleading guilt}^; that I had come to
the meeting at his request and not of my own, and was glad to tell
him my views.
He said that the offer of Executive clemency which he was passing
along and of support while in prison and rehabilitation and help
toward a job later "was a sincere offer." He explained that he had
been asked to convey this message to me and he was only doing what
he was told to do. He repeated this last statement several times during
the course of the meeting we had then, and I might add during sub-
sequent meetings which he and I had.
My response was that I would not even discuss Executive clemency
or pleading guilty and remaining silent, but I was glad to talk with
him, so that there was no misunderstanding on anyone's part about
it.
I might explain that the trial was going on during this period, this
was the first week of the trial which began on January 8.
Caulfield stated that he was carrjdng the message of Executive
clemency to me "from the very highest levels of the White House."
He said that the President of the United States was in Key Biscajme,
Fla., that weekend, referring to the weekend following January 8,
the following meeting that we were in then, and that the President
had been told of the results of the meeting.
Senator Ervin. Now the same rule previously announced that
this evidence is competent to show what, if anything, John Caulfield
did to induce Mr. McCord to plead guilty and keep silent — it is not
any evidence at the present state of the hearing that connects or that
makes any indication whatever and has any relevancy as to the
President.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. McCoRD. He further stated that "I may have a message to
you at our next meeting from the President himself."
I advised Caulfield that I had seen the list of witnesses for the
trial and had seen Jeb Magruder's name, appearing as a Government
witness. I advised him that it was clear then that Magruder was
going to perjure himself and that we were not going to get a fair
trial. Further I told him that it was clear that some of those involved
in the Watergate case were going to trial, and others were going to
be covered for — I was referring to John Mitchell, Jolm Dean, and
Magruder — and I so named those individuals incidentally in the
conversation, and I said that this was not my idea of American
justice. I further •
139
Senator Ervin. The same ruling applies so far as John Mitchell,
John Dean, and Magruder are concerned, that is that it does not
connect them legally speaking.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
I fm'ther advised Caulfield that I believed that the Government
had lied in denying electronic interception of my phone calls from
my residence since June 17, 1972, and that I believed that the ad-
ministration had also tapped the phones of the other defendants
durmg that time. I mentioned two specific calls of mine which I had
made during September and early October 1972, which I was certain
had been intercepted by the Government, and yet the Government
had blithely denied any such tapping. These were my words to Mr.
Caulfield.
I compared this denial to the denial that the Government had
made in the Ellsherg case, in which for months the Government had
denied any such impermissible interception of the calls and yet in
the summer of 1972 had finall}'- been forced to admit them when the
judge ordered, by court order, a search of about a dozen Government
agencies, and calls intercepted were then disclosed.
I might state separate from the record at this point, that as I have
previously stated, 1 had no knowledge whatever of any acti^dty,
monitorially or what have you, of Mr. Ellsberg's calls as have pre-
viously come out — as have earlier come out in the newspapers in
the past few days. It is purely coincidence that I happen to mention
the Ellsherg case at that time, I had been following the case in the
papers and I knew the history of the case.
To go on with the statement: I stated that if we were going to get
a fiction of a fair trial, through perjured testimon}'' to begm with,
and then for the Government to lie about illegal telephone intercep-
tions, that the trial ought to be kicked out and we start all over again,
this time with all of those involved as defendants. At least in this
way, some v/ould not be more equal than others before the bar of
justice and we would get a fair trial.
The Executive clemency offer was made two or three times during
this meeting, as I recall, and I repeated each time that I would not
even discuss it, nor discuss pleading guilty, which I had been asked to
do in the first telephone call received on the night of Januar}^ 8, from
Caulfield's friend, whose ideutit}^ I do not know. I told him, referring
to Mr. Caulfield, that I was going to renew the motion on disclosure
of Government wiretapping of our telephones.
Caulfield ended the conversation by stating that he would call me
the next da}^ about a meeting that same afternoon, Saturday", Jan-
uar}^ 13, and that if I did not hear from him, he would want to talk
with me by telephone on the evening of Monday, January 15, 1973.
I did not hear from Caulfield on Saturday but on Sunday afternoon
he called and asked to meet me that afternoon about an hour later
at the same location on George Washington Parkway. He stated that
there was no objection to renewing the motion on discovery of Govern-
ment wiretapping, and that if that failed, that I would receive Execu-
tive clemency after 10 to 11 months. I told him I had not asked any-
one's permission to file the motion.
He went on to saj^ that, the President's ability to govern is at
stake. Another Teapot Dome scandal is possible, and the Government
96-296—73 — bk. 1 10
140
raa}^ fall. Everybody else is on track but you. You are not following
the* game plan. Get closer to your attorney. You seem to be
pursuing your own course of action. Do not talk if called before
the graiid jury, keep silent, and do the same if called before a
Congressional committee.
I might add that two congressional committees had, prior to Jan-
uary 8— prior to that date — been conducting investigations into this
case. I believe it was the Patman committee and Senator Kennedy's
committee.
My response was that 1 felt a massive injustice was being done,
that! was different from the others, that 1 was going to fight the
fixed case, and had no intention of either pleading guilty, taking
Executive clemency or agreeing to remain silent. He repeated the
statement that the Government would have difficulty in continuing
to be able to stand. I responded that they do have a problem, but
that I had a problem with the massive injustice of the whole trial
being a sham, and that I would fight it every way 1 know how.
I should make a correction in the sentence I just read in saying
the whole trial being a sham, because I did not at that point in time
make any reference at any time to Judge Sirica to the contrary of
his being anything but an honest and dedicated judge, and I do not
want the sentence to be misread.
He — -talking about Caulfield — asked for a commitment that I would
remain silent and I responded that I w^ould make none. I gave him a
memorandum on the dates of the two calls of mine in September 1972
and October 1972 that I was sure had been intercepted, and said that
I believed the Government had lied about them. He said that he
would check and see if in fact the Government had done so.
On Monday night, January 15, 1973, Caulfield called me again at
the phone booth on Route 355 near my residence. I informed him
that I had no desire to talk further, that if the White House had any
intention of playing the game straight and giving us the semblance of
a fair trial they would check into the perjury charge of mine against
Magruder, and into the existence of the two intercepted calls previ-
ously referred to, and hung up
On Tuesday morning, the next morning, about 7:30 a.m., Caulfield
called my residence but I had already left for court.
On Tuesday evening, Caulfield called and asked me again to meet
him and I responded not until the}^ had something to talk about on
the perjured testimony and the intercepted calls. He said words to
the effect "Give us a week," and a meeting was subsequently arranged
on January 25, 1973, when he said he would have something to talk
about.
About 10 a.m., on Thursday, January 25, 1973, in a meeting lasting
until about 12:30 a.m., correction — 12:30 p.m. — we drove in his
car toward Warrenton, Va., and returned — that is, we drove there and
returned — and a conversation ensued which repeated the offers of
Executive clemency and financial support while in prison, and re-
habilitation later. I refused to discuss it. He stated that I was ''fouhng
up the game plan." I made a few comments about the "game plan."
He said that "they" had found no record of the interception of the
two calls I referred to, and said that perhaps it could wait until the
appeals. He asked what my plans were regarding talking publicly,
and I said that I planned to do so when I was ready; that I had
141
discussed it with my w\(e and she said that I should do what I felt
I must and not to worry about the family. I advised Jack that my
children were now grown and could understand what I had to do,
when the disclosures came out. He responded by sa^'ing that: "You
know that if the administration gets its back to the wall, it will have
to take steps to defend itself." I took that as a personal threat and
I told him in response that I had had a good life, that my will was
made out, and that I had thought through the risks and would take
them when I was ready. He said that if I had to go off to jail that the
administration would help with the bail premiums. I advised him
that it was not a bail premium, but $100,000 straight cash and that
that was a problem I would have to worry about, through family
and friends. On the night before sentencing, Jack called me and said
that the administration would provide the $100,000 in cash if I could
tell him how to get it funded through an intermediary. I said that
if we ever needed it I would let him know. I never contacted him
thereafter; neither have I heard from him.
That completes the statement.
Mr. Dash. That completes it. I have one more question, Mr.
McCord.
Have you ever made that statement before this Select Committee
other than when you appeared before minority counsel and myself
a couple of days ago? Have you ever made that statement before
this committee, before the grand jury, or before any investigating
body until this time?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Would you please state to the committee why, when
you were making statements at earlier times before this committee,
before the grand jury and other inciuiring bodies, you failed to disclose
that information?
Mr. McCoRD. I will be glad to.
I \vill take the grand jury and get that one out of the way. When
I appeared before the grand jury, I told them that — ^I raised the
question about political pressure, any pressure that had been put
onto me by the Hunts. I told them also that there was a personal
friend who was involved also in political pressure against me; that
personally, at that point in time, it was a very painful thmg to go
into it, that I would be glad to do it at a later time, that I hoped they
would defer that question until subsequent questioning and I would
be glad to answer it. They said they would do so.
I believe when I appeared before the committee on March 28,
your Senators asked me the same question and I said, yes, there had
been political pressure applied to me, that one such pressure had
been by a Government — one of your Senators asked me if it were by a
Government employee— I think vSenator Montoya. I responded, yes.
He asked me if it were anj'one at the White House. I said, no.
He asked if it were from the Department of Justice, and I said, no.
It was clear, I think, to the committee that I would like to be able
to answer that question at a later time. The reason for the delay was
that I wanted to be as accurate as I could about the information, get
it all together, because it involved the President of the United States,
in my opinion, and it was a very serious matter and I wanted to be
very careful about it and accurate.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
142
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson?
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCord, I would hke to Hmit my questions to one area. That
is what you know about the planning of the Watergate break-in.
First of all, I would like to separate what Mr, Hunt told you some-
one said about it from what Mr. Liddy told you someone said about
it.
Did Mr. Hunt indicate to you that he knew anything about these
meetings that Mr. Liddy referred to with Mitchell, Magruder, and
Dean?
Mr. McCoRD. The question is, did Mr. Hunt indicate
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCoRD. That he knew anything about the meetings?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, he did.
Mr. Thompson. What did he say about those meetings? Did he
indicate he was present at any of those meetings?
Mr. McCoRD. I am trying to recall exactly the context of the dis-
cussion. Do 3'OU want me to go into that as well?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCoRD. The meetings, as best I recall, in which these ref-
erences by Mr. Hunt took place, took place in Mr. Hunt's office, in
the Robert F. Mullen Co. offices at 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue. They
took place in April and May of 1972. To the best of my recollection,
Mr. Liddy was present in all of the discussions.
Mr. Liddy, during those discussions, as best I recall, would raise
the topic that the planning and the progress of the operation itself
was going forward, comments about what Mr. Mitchell was saying
to him about what could be done in terms of the priorities of the
operation; that is, which ones were to be done first and second.
Mr. Hunt's comments, his exact words I cannot recall, but his
comments made to me — and not to me, made in three-way discussions
that were taking place during that period of time, indicated to me
that he had separate, independent knowledge, perhaps from Mr.
Liddy, perhaps from other sources, of his o\vn that Mr. Mitchell
and Mr. Dean and Mr. Magruder had planned the operations in the
Attorney General's office to begin with and that at least Mr. Mitchell
and Mr. Magruder had had subsequent discussions after the first
meeting in the Attorney General's office, and that Mr. Magruder and
Mr. Mitchell had had discussions with Mr. Liddy in Mr. Mitchell's
offices at the Committee To Re-Elect the President regarding the
ongoing plans to carry out the operations.
Does this answer your question somewhat?
Mr. Thompson. Well, I think it naturally raises several other
questions. What did he say, as best you can recall, to indicate to you
that he had any independent knowledge other than what Mr. Liddy
might have told him?
Mr. McCoRD. I think he would refer to comments regarding
this as you and I have discussed before.
Mr. Thompson. That would not fall in that category, would it?
Mr. McCoRD. It would fall in that category.
Mr. Thompson. The things Hunt had learned separate and apart
from what Liddy had told him?
143
Mr. McCoRD. It would fall into two separate categories. I said
one, what Mr. Liddy had told him before and second, what he had
learned from others. I mentioned to this committee the name of
another indi\ndual, but I will not mention it at this point, that Mr.
Hunt referred to in conversations, in which they were talking about
the Watergate operations and the planning for the operations and so
on. The statement
Mr. Thompson. I think you should refer to the name.
Mr. McCoRD. He referred to the name of Mr. Colson. That was
interjected into the conversation by Mr. Hunt in the meetings with
Mr. Liddy and me in his offices, Hunt's offices, at 1700 Pennsylvania
Avenue, and specifically, when Mr. Hunt had a plan, a typed plan,
operational plan, for the entry of the Democratic National Committee
headquarters.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall anything that Mr. Hunt said to
you about Mr. Colson's involvement or did you just get the general
impression that Mr. Colson was involved in some way from what
Mr. Hunt told you?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe my previous testimony, which I will
restate before this committee, was to the effect that when I had met
Mr. Hunt in his offices at 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue with Mr. Liddy
that he had referred to his previous work at the White House for Mr.
Colson, referring to him as his superior; that during the session that
Mr. Hunt, Mr. Liddy, and I had in Mr. Hunt's offices, Mr. Hunt had
a typed plan that he had typed himself, step-by-step, for the entry of
the Democratic National Committee headquarters; that at one point,
he held this plan in his hands, and his words were, he interjected the
name of Mr. Colsoi into the conversation at that point, words to the
effect, 'T will see Colson." And he held the paper in his hand in this
sense.
From that statement, I drew the conclusion that he was going to
see Mr. Colson and discuss our giving him the operational plan. That
is a conclusion, but this is also the words as best I recall, with which
Mr. Hunt raised the name of Mr. Colson.
Mr. Thompson. I am sure that will need to be pursued. But getting
back to ni}^ original point, is that innocent of knowledge Mr. Hunt
had of these meetings we referred to? He did not bring Mr. Colson
into the conversation with regard to these particular meetings that
you previously refen'ed to, did he?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe you asked me if he appeared to have
knowledge. I said he appeared to have knowledge of the previous
meetings of the Attorney General, in the Attorney General's office,
of Mr. Liddy, Mr. Magruder, and Mr. Dean, and my response was
to the effect that he had it from Mr. Liddj^ from what he told me,
, and I believed also that he had this information from others.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I do not want to belabor the point.
. Mr. McCoRD. I am glad to answer the questions.
Mr. Thompson. You say that you think he had independent
knowledge, and, of course, this is a serious matter. I think we have to
determine whether or not we are relying on Mr. Liddy, or Mr. Hunt
and Mr. Liddy for this information, which of course, is extremely
important information. Anythmg you can state that Mr. Hunt told
you to indicate that he had any independent knowledge of these meet-
144
ings, I think would be very relevant. You can do it now or supply — you
have supplied several memorandums that are very helpful in that
regard; if you want to do that at a subsequent time, I think that
would be appropriate.
Mr. McCoRD. I would be glad to submit the committee a memo-
randum if that would be helpful to you, and set it forth in exactly the
detail as best I recall.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Anything Hunt told you indicating that
he knew of these meetings independent of what Liddy told him.
Mr. McCoRD. All right.
[The following information was submitted in reference to the above.];
Recollkction of E. Howard Hunt's Comments
Mj' best recollection of Hunt's comments regarding meetings in the Attorney
General's offices, those of John Mitchell, were that ]Mitchell, Dean and Magruder,
along with Liddy were present in at least the first two meetings, and that these
meetings were in Januar_v or February, 1972, at which time plans and discussions
were held by those jjresent regarding bugging, ])hotography and political espionage
operations to be conducted against Democratic installations during 1972. These
comments were made to me by Hunt during meetings with him in April-Jime
1972 in which he stated that he had received this information independently from
Lidd}^ and other unnamed persons.
Mr. Thompson. Now, let us get back to the meetings in a little bit
more detail, Mr. McCord. How many meetings did Mr. Liddy say
there were when the overall surveillance operations were discussed?
Mr. McCoRD. At what point in time?
Mr. Thompson. Well, how many meetings overall, up until
June 17, did Mr. Liddy indicate that he, Mitchell, Magruder, and
Dean, or any combination of these people, had to discuss generally?
Mr. McCoRD. He did not say the number. It was stated to me in
various and sundry meetings with Mr. Liddy between January and
June 17, by Mr. Liddy that he had had several meetings with Mr.
Mitchell, that there appeared to be ongoing meetings with Mr. Mitchell
from the planning stage until the completion of the plans for the
second entry operation on June 17, that there appeared to be contin-
uous discussions between at least Mr. Liddy and Mr. Mitchell, and
sometimes Mr. Magruder, according to statements which Mr. Liddy
made to me and they began with the planning and they continued
through the ongoing operation itself, the monitoring and the planning
for the second operation and discussions at various stages according
to Mr. Liddy of the various priorities of the bugging and photography
operations, what was to come first, w^hat was to come second.
Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Liddy come to you after each important
meeting or after each meeting where these plans were discussed and
give you a summary of the meetings, what was discussed and what
the conclusions were?
Mr. McCoRD. Not after each meeting at all, but we would see each
other regularly during the week. I would say not once a day but every
other day, most weeks between January and June 17. Sometimes he
would tell me, I am getting ready to go up to see the Attorney General
to discuss this operation, referring to the Watergate operation, to
discuss the operations that he had planned.
Sometimes he would tell me, I have just come back from that opera-
tion, concluding what we are going to do now.
145
Mr. Thompson. Were some of these meetings, according to what
he told 3^011, while Mr. Mitchell was still Attorney General?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. And some after he came to the Committee To
Re-Elect?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Were money figures discussed?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes.
Mr. Thompson. According to what he said — according to Mr. Lidd}'',
what was the original proposed budget for the overall surveillance
operation? I assume we are talking about the overall operation, not
just the Watergate break-in; is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. We are talking about three categories — political
espionage, photography operations, and electronic operations, and
the original figure in February that Mr. Liddy proposed, as I saw it
in waiting, in a draft on his desk on one occasion and in a typed mem-
orandum on a second occasion, was approximately $450,000.
Mr. Thompson. All right, according to him, was that budget
approved?
Mr. McCoRD. The sequence of the events were that there were
planning meetings in January or February oi* both in the Attorney
General's offices, in which Mr. Dean and Mr. Magruder, Mr. Liddy,
and Mr. Mitchell discussed the original amount, the $450,000 amount,
and subsequently, approximately 30 days after the first formal
meetings that I heard referred to by Mr. Lidd}^, there was a figure of
approximately $250,000, which he said had been approved for the
operation. And he referred also to some additional funds which he
had in the order of approximately $100,000, but that figure is not
absolutely certain in my mind, with a total of something around
$300,000 m- $350,000.
Mr. Thompson. According to him, was this money problem the
need for subsequent meetings? Was that a concern of the people
involved? W^as there quite a bit of discussion as to exactly how much
money should be spent on this project?
Mr. McCoRD. Money was a topic that he said was discussed. He
said the individual operations were discussed — that is, specifically
the three parts of his budget which he had prepared on charts, which
he had taken to at least one of the meetings. That is the three parts
of political espionage and photography and so on. It was not limited,
the discussion was not limited to the matter of funding. My under-
standing was all aspects of the operation were discussed in those
meetings by the four individuals.
Mr. Thompson. Let me just ask you this. Did he tell you that John
Mitchell ever told him that this budget is just too high and you will
have to do it for less or something to that extent?
Mr. McCoRD. No; he did not.
Mr. Thompson. Did he ever tell you that they specificafiy dis-
cussed the Watergate operation in any of these meetings?
Mr. McCoRD. Which meetings are you referring to?
Mr. Thompson. I am talking about any meetings, which he had
with the Attorney General, when any of these other people were
present.
Mr. McCoRD, Oh, yes, sure.
146
Mr. Thompson. That the Watergate break-in specifically was
discussed?
Mr. McCoRD. Very definitely.
Mr. Thompson. What did he say about that particular discussion?
Mr. McCoRD. It was a contiguous discussion. He sat in with Mr.
Magruder from the earliest planning session in January through the
first entry operation, Memorial Day weekend and then even to the
second operation in June and he talked to me at various times and it
was clear from what he said that their committee, that Mr. Liddy was
having such meetings, he stated they were having such meetings
m which the Watergate operation was a part of, Watergate referring
to the Democratic National Committee headquarters himself. So I
would say there were many such discussions by Mr. Liddy with me in
which he stated that meetings had occurred with Mr. Mitchell and
Magruder specifically on this after February.
Mr. Thompson. You mentioned, I believe, that you had frequent
contact with Liddy. Did you have frequent contact with Mr. Magruder
at the Committee To Re-Elect?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, I did.
Mr. Thompson. Would you see him on a daily basis?
Mr. McCoRD. We would see each other on a daily basis. We would
speak hello, exchange greetings. My point of contact at the committee
was his deputy, Mr. Odle. ^^ly business was transacted primarily
with Mr. Odle, their offices were adjoining.
Mr. THo:\rpsoN. Their offices were close together?
Mr. McCoRD. So we would see each other frequently in that sense.
Mr. Thompson. Just to speak or did you ever discuss any substan-
tive matters concerning the re-election of the President or the oper-
ation of the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. McCoRD. We had some meetings, one particular meeting wdth
the Attorney General and Mr. Magruder lasting over an hour in
which we discussed overall security of the committee and the security
of the Mitchell family.
Mr. Thompson. You had a meeting with the Attorney General and
Mr. Magruder?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Wliere was this meeting?
Mr. McCoRD. In Mr. Mitchell's office on the fourth floor in the
law office suite that he occupied.
Mr. Thompson. Wlien did this meeting occur?
Mr. McCoRD. Sometime in March 1972.
^ Mr. Thompson. March. This would have been after your discus-
sions with Mr. Liddy?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Concerning what was going on with Mr. Liddy,
Mr. Magruder, and Mr. Mitchell?
Mr, McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Was anvbodv else present besides yourself and
Mr. Magruder and Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. McCoRD. Just the three of us.
Mr. Thompson. Just the three men. Did you take that opportunity
before you decided to engage in this particular operation to inquire
of them as to whether or not this was, in fact, going on with their
approval and, in fact, had been done pursuant to their plans?
Mr. McCoRD. No; there are some reasons for that and I can tell
>roii if you would like to know them.
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCoRD. One was at that point in time the operation itself
lad not been funded. That did not come until roughly a month later,
^t was not absolutely clear that the operation itself would in effect
^et off the ground. I think the general assumption on the part of
Liddy and certainly me was that until the funding came through that
there was really nothing that could be absolutely counted on in terms
3f sometliing going forward. It would appear to me, it appeared to
me, not only premature for me to discuss it if it were to be discussed
but there were other reasons for my not discussing it ^^dth them which
^vere essentially this. It was essentiall}^ this: That in the talking stages
with. Mr. Liddy of my participation in the operation, I told him that
[ would like to be — that I would like to convey to him a request that
ither Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Magruder be advised that I would be or
might be a participant in the operation so that if I disappeared from
the committee offices at some particular time and somebody in a
senior position of authority would be aware that it might be in con-
nection with this operation, and in specific wanted to be assured that
Mr. Odle, if he came to Mr. Magruder or Mr. Mitchell, inquiring
about my whereabouts that someone in authority would be in a posi-
tion to say "He is off on some other business, don't worry about it."
I did not expect, however, that at that point in time or even later
that they would acknowledge to me that they were aware of my
participation. I think in terms of some other things I have said to
this committee about deniability and so on I assume just the opposite,
that they would not indicate overtly to me they were aware that I
was participating.
Mr. Thompson. And you would be in a position of having to com-
pletely trust Mr. Liddy?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr, Thompson. In seeing that he had informed them.
Mr. A'fcCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Did he tell 3"ou in fact he had informed them?_
Mr. McCoRD. No; he did not tell me, he assured me that he did
and that was sufficient for me at that point in time.
]\Ir. Thompson. But he subsequently told you that he told them
about your involvement?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate to you that they knew of j^our
involvement?
Mr. McCoRD. There never was an}" problem that indicated that
they did not know, for example, that I participated. If there had
been, I would have raised it as an issue at that point in time in order
to get the matter sorted out. There never was any serious problem
at any time that came up in accoimting for my time, for example,
which really did bring it to a head. Had it done so, I would have
inquired. But there was no reason to doubt what I am saying, there
is no reason to doubt Mr. Lidd3^'s word.
Mr. Thompson. At that time in March 3'ou had pretty much made
up your mind, I assume, that if the thing was funded jou would
participate for the reasons that you have given?
148
Mr. McCoRD. The decision process, I think, on my part took
place after the 30-day dehiy that I referred to here in which it ap-
peared that this whole matter was being considered, reconsidered,
discussed and so on by Mr. Mitchell. It was also very material to
me that he had considered it while in the Attorney General's office,
that the discussion had taken place there and he apparently had
approved it and so on, but I had some reasons for considering that
30-day delay important, and this was part of my motivation.
Mr. Thompson. One or two more cjuestions. You say you saw Mr.
Liddy often and you saw Mr. Magruder often and you had this one
meeting with the two of them. Did anything they said to you or did
anything that you overheard them say to other people, any telephone
conversations that 3 ou might have accidentally heard, indicate to you
that what Liddy was telling you was in fact true or did any of these
things in your mind corroborate what Mr. Liddy was telling you?
Mr. McCoRD. About what, the meetings with the Attorney General
in his office? Certainly the fact there were charts, for example, Mr.
Liddy had some charts which I have described to this committee
before, which he said cost some $7,000 to prepare in which he set
forth the plans, as I understood it the cost of the operation, the fact
that he would go to so much trouble and to so much expense it was
obvious to me this was officially approved by somebody in the opera-
tion within the committee itself and the Attorney General in order
for that amount of money to be spent for material of this sort to go
to that much trouble.
Mr. Thompson. Pardon me, did you ever see the charts themselves?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes; I saw the charts when he brought them in the
day before he said a meeting was scheduled with the Attorney General,
he pointed to the chart and said "These are for the briefing with the
Attorney General tomorrow. These are connected with the papers
which I have shown to you," the draft and the type of budget draft
that he had and showed to me on a day or two before. He did not
unwrap the charts themselves. They were in brown wrapping paper.
He said they had been prepared commercially, locally — not locally,
he said they had been prepared commercially and he subsequently
told me that he had been told by John Dean to destroy the charts,
and because they cost so much he did not plan to do so.
Mr. Thompson. So again he told you he had charts and you saw
what appeared to be charts in brown wrapping paper, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. I saw it, that is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And he told you how much the charts cost?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And he told you he was using these charts in dis-
cussion with the Attorney General and others?
Mr. McCoRD. Correct!^
Mr. Thompson. So far as conversations b}' these gentlemen con-
cerning their participation, were there any conversations or anything
that they said that you heard which indicated that what Mr. Liddy
said about the meeting discussing these things was true?
Mr. McCoRD. By these gentlemen you are referring to?
Mr. Thompson. I am talking about Mr. Mitchell, ^Ir. Magruder
or Mr. Dean.
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct. They did not discuss it with me.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
149
Did you find Mr. Liddy, in his actions — did you consider him to be
a level-headed individual at all times, a man of good judgment?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Liddy — I will answer the question this way —
Mr. Liddy was obviously very busy at the committee and most of his
work appeared to me to be occujned with committee legal matters
for both the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and for
the Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President. My understanding
from the staff members around him was that he was a very competent
lawyer, that there never was any question of his legal knowledge and
his legal competence. Quite the contrary, I heard complimentary re-
marks about the fact that he was a very sharp law3^er, in fact, he had
something to do with either the writing or ]}erhaps not the writing of
the cami)aign law, Federal campaign law, but in connection with its
interjH-etation. I know he was called on to interpret the law, this I
heard.
Mr. Thompson. Of course, I am not limiting you, you understand,
to your opinion of his legal knowledge and legal ability. I am talking
about him as a man. how you judge him. Did you ever hear, for
exami)le, that he had shot a pistol in a restroom?
Mr. McCoRD. No; I did not.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever hear, for example, that he had made
a threat against Mr. Magruder, the}" were having difficulties?
Mr. Mc'CoRD. Never did.
Mr. Thompson. Were you aware that he and Mr. Magruder had any
personality conflict?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh yes, sure.
Mr. Thompson. You were?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. What is the extent of vour knowledge concerning
that?
Mr. McCoRD. Essentially there was a personality difference between
the two men and that something had been worked out for him to take
the position with the finance committee.
Mr. Thompson. That brought about his switch from the Committee
To Re-Elect to the finance committee?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. McCord.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Mr. McCord, there is evidence here that the five
men arrested in the Watergate on and after midnight on the 16th
and 17th of June had some hundred dollar bills, new $100 bills in
their possession or in their rooms. Where did that money come from,
if you know?
Mr. McCord. I do not know, sir.
Senator Ervin. Did you have any of it?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. Then, you say that from after the return of the
bills every indictment in September down to the last day of the trial,
that 3^ou were urged to plead guilty and remain silent by a number
of people. Did Mr. Hunt ever urge you to plead guilty and remain
silent? That is, E. Howard Hunt?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And Mr. Howard Hunt
Mr, McCoRD. I am trving to recall, sir, the exact words.
150
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. McCoRD. The words most frequently used b}^ Mr. Hunt with
me was that Executive clemencj^ would be available to me.
Senator Ervin. Yes. How msmy times did he urge you to plead
guilty? That is, Hunt.
Mr. McCoRD. I mean to correct that statement. I do not recall Mr.
Hunt using those words with me to plead guilty.
Senator Ervin. Did he urge you to or not to remain silent?
Mr. McCoRD. Not in the exact words; no, sir.
Senator Ervin. What words did he use as far as you remember?
Mr. McCoRD. He used words to the eflect that, he used words
stating that "Executive clemency is going to be made available to
us" and he spoke in terms as though it already had been committed,
I say already, already as of the time that he first mentioned it to me.
Senator Ervin. Now, you stated that you were paid some money
through the instrumentality of Mrs. Hunt, and also that your lawyer'
fees were taken care of, as I understood you?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Do you know who paid 3^our law^^er fees?
Mr. McCoRD. I was told that both monej^s came from the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President.
Senator Ervin. Do you know the amount of jour lawyer fees?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. What was it?
Mr. McCoRD. The amount I received from the committee was
$25,000.
Senator Ervin. Now, did your la^vA^er urge 3"ou to enter a plea of
guilty? I am talking about Mr. Gerald Alch.
Mr. AIcCoRD. I do not recall that, no, sir.
Senator Ervin. But he did go with vou to Mr. Bittman's office?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And Mr. Bittman was the law^'er for Mr. Hunt,
was he not?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And then after that, you did not talk to
Mr. Bittman yourself?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. But Mr. Alch did?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And after his conversation with Mr. Bittman he
told you that Mr. Bittman urged you to plead guilt}^ and remain silent
and said you would get Executive clemencj"?
\Ir. McCoRD. I will correct that, sir, if I left that impression. I
beheve the words were that in the afternoon of January 8, Mr. Alch
said that Mr. Bittman wanted to talk \v4th me about "whose word I
would trust regarding a White House offer of Executive clemency" and
then at the meeting at his office Mr. Alch came back to me after a meet--
ing with Mr. Bittman and told me that I would be contacted by "ai
friend I have formerly known in the A^liite House," and contacted
that evening. I believe that was the substance of that conversation.
Senator Ervin. How long had j^ou known — when did you first'
know John or Jack Caulfield?
Mr. McCoRD. I first met him in early 19— early September, 1971.
I had heard of him before.
151
Senator Ervin. Wliere was he working at the time you first met
him?
Mr. McCoRD. At the Wliite House.
Senator Ervin. Did he have any connection later ^\ith — rather, I
believe you stated that you were employed by the Committee To
Re-Elect the President on the recommendation of Mr. Caulfield?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Did Mr. Caulfield later have any association with
the committee?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And after that association did he go to one of the
executive departments?
Mr. McCoRD. I understood from him that he did, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Do you know which Department?
- Mr. McCoRD. I believe it was the Treasury Department.
Senator Ervin. Do you know what position he held there?
Mr. McCoRD. It was a senior position with the, I believe it is
called Alcohol Tax and Fire Arms Division of it.
Senator Ervin. Was he working in the Treasury Department at
the time that he had the meetings with you?
Mr. McCoRD. He told me that, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
As I recall, you met with him first on Friday, January 12, somewhere
on the George Washington Parkway?
Mr. McCoRD. It was that Friday, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Did he give you any reason why he wanted to meet
you on the George Washington Parkway instead of seeing you at his
home or your home?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. Who was present at that meeting?
Mr. McCoRD. Just the two of us.
Senator Ervin. And at that time he urged you to plead guilty, the
case was still pending, was it not?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. It was just about the time the trial started was
it not?
Mr. McCoRD. This was the first week of the trial.
Senator Ervin. And he urged you to plead guilty and assured you
that if you pleaded guilty you would receive Executive clemency and
also be given a chance after you served a sentence, to help to be
rehabilitated to a job, did he not?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe all is correct except the words ''plead guilty"
and I will try to restate that for accuracy. The words "plead guilty"
have been used over the telephone to me by this unknown unidentified
individual whose voice I described and subsequently
Senator Ervin. That was prior to the meetings?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now then — excuse me, do you have something
further?
Mr. McCoRD. Well, in the conversation on the 12th of January
and in the two subsequent meetings the words "plead guilty" would
come up in this general language. "Are you going to plead guiltj^?"
Or, "How about pleading guilty?" Or "What is your feeling about
pleading now?"
152
Senator Ervin. Now, this meeting was arranged at his insistence,
wasn't it?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Then you met him again on Sunday, January 14,
on the George Washington Parkway?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. What was the conversation with him at that time
or rather was that meeting held at his instance?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. What occurred at that time?
Mr. McCoRD. Let me refer to my notes to be correct.
The discussion was that there was no objection to renewing the
motion on discovery of government wiretapping and that if that failed
I would receive Executive clemency after 10 or 11 months, and then
the conversation w^ent on to say that the President's ability to govern
is at stake. Another Teapot Dome scandal is possible and the govern-
ment may fall. Eveiybod}' else is on track but j^ou, you are not
following the game plan, get closer to your attorne}'.
Senator Ervin. Did that conversation occur in the automobile or
did you get out of the automobile?
Air. McCoRD. No, sir; it was out of the automobile and it would
be 50 feet, I would guess, from his car where we walked dow^n toward
the Potomac River from the overlook, just the two of us were present.
Senator Ervin. The first conversation was on Friday, January 12,
and that all occurred in the automobile?
Mr. McCoRD. The other two meetings were in his automobile.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
And then on j^our second meeting on Sunday, January 14, you got
out of the car and walked in the woods toward the Potomac River?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, after that time you got several phone calls
from him urging that you meet him again, did you not?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes,'^sir.
Senator Ervin. And you told him you didn't know anything
further, that 3^ou had already made up your mind you would not
accept Executive clemency, that you thought that it would be impos-
sible for you to get a fair trial, and that you had hopes that on account
of that, your belief that you had been wiretapped that the trial might
be set aside, did a^ou not?
Mr. McCoRD. '^ Words to that effect, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And so he kept insisting on you by phone to meet
him and you met him on Thursdaj^ January 25, 1973?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. 1972?
Mr. McCoRD. 1973.
Senator Ervin. Now that is when you say you were in his auto-
mobile?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. In a direction down towards Warren ton, Va.?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. What did he say on that occasion?
Mr. McCoRD. We had about a 2-hour conversation. There were
repeated offers of at various times during the discussion of Executive
153
clemency and financial support following prison rehabilitation. There
were discussions about the game plan that we referred to. There were
discussions about the two telephone calls, and his comment that that
could possibly affect appeals if they found no records of them.
Senator Ervin. You thought ,your telephone had been wiretapped
and he told you he had investigated that and found out it had not?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, there was a time when he made a statement
to you which you interpreted to be something in the nature of a
threat, what was that?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe the words were, the words were, it is not
my belief, it is my recollection, that the Avords were ''You know that
f the administration gets its back to the wall it will have to take steps
bo defend itself."
Senator Ervin. He told you in that conversation, in the previous
conversations, did he not, that all of the other people involved, that
lad been arrested in connection with the break-in were going along
vitli the way he wanted them to go but you were the only one who
tvas not going along with the game plan?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe the words were, "that everybody else is
I'm track but you." Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, did you ever discuss with Mr. Liddy the
exercising of electronic surveillance over the office of Senator Aiuskie?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And
Mr. McCord. I will correct that, sir, we discussed the lease of a
Duilding, I don't recall electronic surveillance except in some broad
general terms this might be a future target. There was nothing beyond
jhat and this was stated in February 1972.
Senator Ervin. Now, Senator Muskie was one of the candidates
"or the Democratic nomination for President at that time?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Did you rent any office near the Muskie head-
quarters?
Mr. McCord. I did.
Senator Ervin. Where were the Muskie headcpiarters?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe the address was listed as 1972 K Street
)ut it was next to 1978 K Street which was an office location that I
eased at the request of Mr. Liddy.
Senator Ervin. Where was this office located with reference to the
leadquarters of Senator Muskie?
Mr. McCoRD. It was the next building to Senator Muskie's office.
Senator Ervin. And I believe the lease was taken in your name
md that of John B. Hayes?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Wlio was John B. Hayes?
Mr. A'IcCoRD. That was another name for Mr. Liddy.
Senator Ervin. And later, Mr. Mc Govern took over these head-
ilpiarters from Senator Muskie, didn't he?
'j Mr. McCoRD. I think after June 17th, yes sir.
I Senator Ervin. Was there ever any discussion between you and
Mr. Liddy about exercising any kind of surveillance over Senator
McGovern's headquarters?
154
Mr. McCoRD. There were, sir. They were in the context of the
location on Fh'st Street primarily.
Senator Ervin. And this room was rented for possible use of thai
commission, was it not?
Mr. McCoRD. 1908 K Street was, yes sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, do you remember how long the lease of th<
room contiijued?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, it continued until July 1972, when I can
celled it.
Senator Ervin. What was the amount of rent that was paid {
month for the room?
Mr. McCoRD. $275 a month.
Senator Ervin. The total rent, then, was about $2,220 that \o\
paid for, was it not?
Mr. McCoRD. There was a settlement fee that I negotiated witl
the people who owned the lease, which I think included anothe
month's or two payment after July.
Senator Ervin. Did a^ou ever make any effort to bug Senato;
Muskie's or Senator McGovern's headciuarters?
Mr. McCoRD. Never Senator Muskie's. Senator McGovern's
there was a visit to the office by me, I believe on two — on thre^
occasions in toto, on one of w^hich I had some electronic equipmen
with me but it was never installed because there were other peopL
working there at the time.
Senator Ervin. In other w^ords, you never found any time that th
office was empty?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. You know who paid the rent on this office?
Mr. McCoRD. Wliich one, sir?
Senator Ervin. Up there by the JMuskie and McGovern head
quarters?
Mr. McCord. The one at the ISIuskie office, Air. Liddy furnishei
the funds for that and furnished a cashier's check to pay for it.
Senator Ervin. Thank j^ou very much. I believe I have used m}' lii
minutes.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, it is almost 12:15 now and I wonde
if it might be better if we conferred further examination of the witnes
until this afternoon.
Senator Ervin. What is the will of the committee?
The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
(Wliereupon at 12:12 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvem
at 2 p.m., the same day.)
Afternoon Session, Friday, May 18, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. McCord.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. We have covered your testimony at rather greal
length, and we have had the questions now of counsel and of th(
155
chairman. I \nll try to confine my questions to an elaboration or an
extension of those subjects that you have already covered, for the
sake of developing either further information or a clearer understand-
ing of those things that have already been touched.
"Without trying to retrace your steps, I wdsh you would tell me if
this is a fair summation and narrative of your testimony. That you
worked for the FBI, that you worked for the CIA for 19 years, that
fou worked for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President,
in a consultative capacity and then as their security officer, that you
involved yourself in certain electronics surveillance operations under
the direction of Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt and possibly others, that
^rou were_ one of those found inside the Watergate complex, the
Democratic National Committee headquarters in the early morning
lours of June 17, 1972; that you were taken to jail; that you were
subsequently released on bond, there were subsequent conversations
3y telephone from an unidentified person, and from a Mr. Caulfield
»vith respect to how you should conduct yourself specifically suggest-
ng that you should plead guilty; that you were led to believe, at
east, that there would be a promise of Executive clemency, that your
amily would be taken care of while you were in jail, when you were
•eleased that you would have a job, that you pled umocent at the
Tial mstead of guilty, one of the two who pled innocent; that you
vere convicted on a multicount indictment, that you are now awaiting
;entence ; that you have appeared previously wdth this committee in
ixecutive session and with the staff of this committee on previous
)ccasions;_that you now appear to testify before us mthout any grant
)f^ immunity from this committee, although you are convicted of
Times involving much of the material presumably about which you
-estified.
I do not mean that to be an absolute recapitulation of your testimony
)ut is that generally a fair statement of your involvement?
Mr. McCoRD. I think basically, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Could we start at the beginning, Mr. Hunt— and
ell us what your job was with the CIA— I mean, Mr. McCord, I am
iorry. [Laughter.] I do not know who I am sorry to but I am sorry.
Mr. McCoRD. My duties were generally in the security field as a
:ecurity officer there with the agency and with which I served for
;ome 19 years, under which I served in the United States and overseas
iliat covered a wide variety of duties related to that function of that
f.^'ederal agency. I am met, and I am at a loss how to proceed in detail
)n that activity because of the numerous secrecy agents which I
igned and which I understand I am in violation of the National
security Act if I disclose in pubhc testimony.
Senator Baker. What I am really driving at, Mr. McCord, is
vhether or not you were a director or the Director of Security for the
^lA in terms of installation of security, protective measures against
ilectronic surveillance and the like.
Mr. McCord. No, sir, I was not the Director of Security and I did
lot testify to that, sir. I said I was a security officer with them and I
annot go into details of the exact work that I was involved with there
)ecause it does involve a violation of the National Security Act, as I
mderstand it.
96-296 — 73 — bk. 1 11
156 I
Senator Baker. I do not wrait to lead you into that but I gues
what I am really reachmg for was whether or not as a result ot you
previous experience at CIA or otherwise you were acquainted mth an.
thoroughly f amihar with electronic surveillance techniques and clandes
tine operations such as that which was conducted at the Watergate
':^[r McCoRD. I am still— basically still— m the same position, sn
respectfully, sir, in face of the split leguhty of this problem, one c
trying to cooperate ^^ath you fully and the other one trying to compl;
with what I previously stated. .
Senator Ervin. It is a little difficult to hear you. I believe if yoi
would move the microphone in front of you and just talk a httle bi
louder it would be better.
Air. xVIcCoRD. Yes, sir, I win try to. .. . . n
Senator Baker. I am not going to spend much time on it but reall;
ah I am reaching for is whether or not you were familiar with elec
tronic surveillance tecliniques, and vnth clandestine operations sue
as was conducted at the Watergate regardless of how 3^011 knew it _
Mr McCoRD. I learned some electronics from the i^Bi, sir. i thm
I can answer that question without violating the general problen
the other thing. , -ntr . ^ i
Senator Baker. Fine. Did you enter the Watergate complex (
the Democratic National Committee on one or more than on
occasion? . ^x • i ^ -^.i. o
Mr. McCoRD. The Democratic National Committee.'
Senator Baker. Yes, sir. .^ . , . i ^u ^
Mr. McCoRD. I beheve I have testified that twice and that
correct, su\ i ^ ^ x- o
Senator Baker. All right, sir. When was the first time.^
Mr. McCoRD. Memorial Day weekend.
Senator Baker. Do you remember the date?
Mr. McCoRD. 1972.
vSenator Baker. Do you remember the day?
Mr. McCoRD. I can check it. The evening of May 2/, 19/2.
Senator Baker. About what time?
Mr. McCoRD. 1:30 p.m., that evening, or it could have been tl
following day. i • o
Senator Baker. Wlio was with you on this first break-m.^
Mr. McCoRD. The other— the seven Cuban Americans that
have testified to previously, I beheve, in this committee.
Senator Baker. What did you do? • at ^- j
Mr. McCord. The entire group went into the Democratic ^ ationi
Committee through an entry into, the door itself. I went in an
joined them to perform the work of the electronic assignment tin
1 had as a member of the team. ^
Senator Baker. What was the electronic assignment that you Uao
Mr. McCoRD. Installation of the technical buggmg devices m tt
Democratic National Committee that were previously autnorized^D
the Attorney General. i 1 1
Senator Baker. Did you have instructions as to where they slioui
be placed?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Senator Baker. Where?
157
Mr. McCoRD. In the offices themselves in connection with senior
personnel officers of the Democratic National Committee, and specifi-
cally, Mr. O'Brien's telephone extension.
Senator Ba.ker. How many bugs did you plant?
Mr. McCoRD, Two.
Senator Baker. And where were thej^?
Mr. McCoRD. Two were in offices that face Virginia Avenue. I
think you have a sketch up on the board.
Senator Baker. One of them was on Mr. O'Brien's telephone?
Mr. McCoRD. That was an extension of a call director, that was
identified as Mr. O'Brien's. The second was Mr. Oliver's
Senator Baker. The second one was where?
Mr. McCoRD. In a telephone that belonged to Mr. Spencer Oliver,
who is an executive director of the democratic State chairmen of the
organization.
Senator Baker. Were you specifically instructed by someone to
olant those two bugs or just the O'Brien bug? Would you give us some
letail on that?
Mr. McCoRD. Sure.
Mr. Liddy had passed along instructions from Mr. John Mitchell.
He set the priorities. Mr. jMitchell had stated priorities of the installa-
ion were first of all, Mr. O'Brien's offices and such other installations
IS that might provide information of interest to Mr. Mitchell and to
vhoever else the monitoring was to go to beyond Mr. Mitchell.
Senator Baker. So the Oliver phone was bugged more or less by
y^our choice, then, as distinguished from the O'Brien phone?
Mr. McCoRD. No, I think the basic choice was this; the wording
rom Mr. Liddy was that Mr. Mitchell wanted it placed in a senior
)fficiars office, if not Mr. O'Brien's office, some other; in other words,
Avo such installations.
Senator Baker. Did you tape the doors on this ffi'st break?
Mr. McCoRD. No, I did not, Mr. Hunt did.
Mr. Baker. But they were taped?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Now, you weren't apprehended on this first oc-
casion, Memorial weekend. What was the purpose of the second
ntry into the Democratic national headquarters?
Mr. McCoRD. You want hearsay information again, of course.
Senator Baker. Yes, as long as it is identified as hearsay.
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Liddy had told me that Mr. Mitchell, John
Vlitchell, liked the "takes" in quotes; that is, the documents that had
jeen photographed on the first entry into the Democratic National
!3ommittee headquarters and that he wanted a second photographic
)peration to take place and that in addition, as long as that team was
oing in, that Mr. Mitchell wanted, had passed instructions to Mr.
Jddy to check to see what the malfunctioning of the second device
hat was put in, second, besides Mr. Oliver's, and see what the problem
v^as, because it was one of the two things — either a malfunction of the
equipment or the fact that the installation of the device was in a room
vhich was surrounded by four walls. In other words, it was shielded,
md he wanted this corrected and another device installed.
He also said Mr. Mitchell wanted a room bug as opposed to a device
'U a telephone installed in Mr. O'Brien's office itself in order to trans-
158
mit not only telephone conversations but conversations out of the
room itself, beyond whatever might be spoken on the telephone.
Senator Baker. Were the same people involved in the first break-in
and the second break-in?
Mr. jNIcCord. Those associated with the second break-in were Mr
Hunt, >Mr. Liddj'-, and me, and four of the seven Cubans that were
on the first operation, Cuban-Americans.
Senator Baker. All right, sir, would you describe for us then the
responsibilities, if there was an additional responsibility^, of those
involved in the second break-in?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Liddy was in overall charge of the operation.
Mr. Hunt was his assistant, Mr. Barker was the team captain of the
group going in. My job was that of the electronic installation and the
others of the group, the other Cuban-Americans, had functions
divided into two categories; one of photographing certain documents
\vithin the committee, a couple of men had the function of generally
being lookouts while we were inside.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr, McCord.
Who placed the tape on the locks on the door on the second occasion'
Mr. McCoRD, I do not know.
Senator Baker. Who replaced it after it was first removed?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not know.
Senator Baker. Did you know while you were inside the comple:
that the tape had been removed and replaced?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes,
Senator Baker. Can you recall who told you that?
Mr. McCoRD. Well, I think it was apparent — well, the sequence o
events simply was that the four men, four Cubans went upstairs t'l
the Democratic National Committee to begin work on the door,
received a call from the Howard Johnson Motel in the room directl;
across from the DNC, from Mr. Hunt, stating that the door was noA
open, speaking of the basement door, and that I should come up an»
join the men, and I did so.
Senator Baker. Mr. McCord, did you employ Mr, Baldwin?
Mr, McCoRD, Yes, I did.
Senator Baker. Did you contact him and ask him to come t'
Washington to discuss temporary employment which might ripen inti
permanent employment after the election?
Mr. McCord. No, sir, it was not put in that vein.
Senator Baker. Is that the general text of your conversation?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir, it is not.
Senator Baker. All right. I am quoting from a Washington Pos^
story of October 8, 1972, which in sjnaopsis form says, McCord me
Baldwdn in the Roger Smith Hotel, emphasized that while his joi
might be temporary, that it might prove to be a stepping stone to
permanent job after Nixon's reelection.
Could you comment on that account, please?
Mr, McCord. That part fits what — the question that you hat
before was not exactly the case.
1 called Mr. Baldwin and asked him if he were interested in a jol
as a security officer for Mrs. John Mitchell, who we'd been asked t«
provide a security officer for. He stated that he would be interested
.v!
159
I asked him to come to Wasliington the next morning and discuss
the matters in connection with the discussions which took place that
day between me and him and Mr. Fred LaRue, who made the sub-
sequent interview of him. Mr. BaldAvin raised the question of whether
or not there might be employment later. My statement to him
roughly was that the position here at that point in time was only
through November and that my assumption was that if he did a good
job on it, there might be something else for him but there was no
promise by me or Kir. LaRue and I am sure Mr. Baldwin took it
that way.
Senator Baker. Did j^ou supply Mr. Baldmn with a .38 pistol?
Mr. McCoRD. No, I did not.
Senator Baker. Did anyone supply him with a .38 pistol?
Mr. McCord. Yes.
Senator Baker. Wlio did?
Mr. McCord. That was obtained, given to him by Mr. LaRue,
who had the weapon in his office. It belonged to Mr, Jack Caulfield.
Senator Baker. Was it done in your presence?
Mr. McCord. I can't recall specificall}^ It may well have been.
It was done subsequent to an interview of Mr. Baldwin with Mr.
LaRue. One of two things happened. Either Mr. LaRue gave it to
him directly or Mr. LaRue called me or one of the men up to his
office and sent the gun down to him or gave it to him, or one of the
other men did. In any case, I was quite aware that he had it.
Senator Baker. Just one of two more questions.
I see the chairman looking at his watch over here and I don't
want to run excessiveh^ long. I will have other questions as the second
round of inquiries starts. But let me try to close out this line of
questioning this way.
First, did you ever conduct electronic surveillance or clandestine
activities against anyone other than the DNC, the Democratic
National Committee, "at the Watergate complex, and the McGovern
headquarters which you have already described?
Mr. McCord. No.
Senator Baker. Mr. McCord, please tell me whether or not you
knew that this sort of activity was illegal?
Mr. McCord. I knew certain things that came to me at the be-
ginning of the operation and early in the operation which indicated
that it might be legal, may well be legal, and I was so advised.
Senator Baker. By whom?
Mr. McCord. First of all, if I may explain, coming through Mr.
Liddy and coming through my knowledge of the Attorney General,
who was then Attorney General, and that was that the Attorney
General, first of all, had the authority on his own signature to approve
wiretapping v,ithin the United States for either national security
reasons or for domestic security reasons.
Senator Baker. What was your motivation? Why did you do this?
Mr. McCord. There were several motivations, but one of the basic
motivations was the fact that this man, the Attorney General, had
approved it in his offices over a series of meetings in which he had
obviously given careful consideration to it, while he was the top legal
officer of the U.S. Government, and that the counsel to the President
had sat in with him during such discussions; the fact that I was advised
160
that it was within the Attorney General's purview and authority to
authorize such operations if it were in the national interest to do so.
Senator Baker. Did you believe that?
Mr. ]\[cCoRD. I believed that he had the authority to do it. I be-
lieved that several things — not only was I told certain things pertain-
ing to some matters I previously testified to, to this committee regarding
Las Vegas and an incident out there, but I was also aware that many
things come over the Attorney General's desk that I was not privy to,
thatAIr. Liddy was not privy to, but which the Attorney General was
privy to, matters which might come to him through highly sensitive
sources, wiretap information, which might provide a justification for
such an operation, a justification beyond what was known to me.
I can put it conversely as well. I knew that, I felt that the Attorney
General in his position as the top legal officer, if this operation were
clearly illegal, would turn it doAvn out of hand, that he would have no
trouble making a decision on the matter immediately. I knew from
previous contact with him that he was a very decisive man, that he
did not agonize over decisions, and yet apparently, he took this one
under careful consideration and considered it for some 30 days in
making the decision, and frankly, I had it, my conclusion was that he
took it as well to higher authority and got a final approval from his
superior before embarking upon this task.
Quite candidly and quite frankly, this is exactly my motivation, my
reason, the basic motivation of mine for being involved.
Senator Baker. This was your assumption or your basis for
judgment that the Attorney General must have done that? Do 3^ou
have any evidence or any information that he did do that?
Mr. McCoRD. The evidence that the counsel to the President
sat in vnth him, on the meetings of this and, therefore, both the
Wliite House was represented and the Attorney General of the
United States were represented in this decision and that this 30-day
delay to me, I drew the conclusion that the Attorney General himself
had conveyed the decision to his own superior for final decision.
Senator Baker. You spoke of a SO-da}^ period in your earlier
testimony. Is that the same 30-dav period?
Mr. AicCoRD. That is right. It'is a 30-day period.
Senator Baker. In your previous testimony you indicated, I
thought you had said, you thought about 30 days for it before you
did it. But I am not sure tliis is the testimony. Is this the same 30-day
period you are speaking of when you think the Attorney General
looked into it 30 daj^s before deciding?
Mr. McCoRD. That is right, sir.
vSenator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions but I will
defer to my colleagues for questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCord, 3'ou have made some very serious charges implicating
the President of the United States probably as an accessory after
the fact, the former Attorney General of the United States as probably
an accessory before the fact and perhaps guilty of a conspiracy
involving the Watergate bugging, your testimony was predic^atecl upon
hearsay- that would not be admitted in a court of law. If you told
this committee what is authentic, I think that it would require a
good deal of corroboration.
161
Yon testified this morning that Mr. Caulfield was purported to
offer Executive clemency to you, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir. i ^ -i^ .•
Senator Talmadge. Anyone else approach you about Executive
clemency besides Mr. Caulfield?
Mr MoCoRD. I mentioned Mr. Hunt.
Senator Talmadge. That is two. Anyone else? a r tj .
Mr McCoRD. Mrs. Hunt conveyed a message from Mr Hunt.
She was obviously not speaking for anyone but himself. She was
conveving it for him and so stated. , ^^ > r r-. ic u
Senator Talmadge. Anyone besides Mr. Hunt or Mr. Caulfield
approach you on the question of Executive clemency.''
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. "VYlio? , . i
Mr. McCord. My attorney, Gerald Alch, A-l-c-h.
Senator Talmadge. Gerald Hawkins?
Mr. McCord. Gerald Alch.
Senator Talmadge. A-l-t?
Mr. McCord. A-l-c-h.
Senator Talmadge. A-l-c-h?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir. i ^
Senator TAL^L\DGE. Do you know who approached your lawyer
about Executive clemency?
Mr. McCord. No, sir. . . ,.
Senator Talmadge. Your testimony is that three different indi-
viduals approached you on the idea that you would plead guilty,
and keep quiet and as a result thereof you could expect Executive
clemency, is that correct? .. i ,^^
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir, and I believe I mentioned a message con-
eyed, which mentioned Executive clemency by Mr. Alch on January 8
from another individual. _
Senator Talmadge. \Mro vv^as that individual.''
Mr. McCord. Mr. William Bittman, B-i-t-t-m-a-n.
Senator Talmadge. William Bittman. Who is he?
Mr McCord. He was the attorney for Mr. Hunt. ^
Senator Talmadge. You testified this mormng a Dout several
different meetings and conversations with Mr. Caulfield lou cJso
testified that Mr. Caulfield, I believe, placed in your mailoox a note
that was not sent through the U.S. Postal Service nor post office and
was sisrned "Jack", is that correct? , . -.^ . t +i w.v T
:Mr^MrCoRD. I believe, sir, that is basically correct, itiimii i
said that the note was placed by another individual who said he was a
friend of Mr. Caulfield. 10119
Senator Talal^dge. The note was not from Mr. Caulfield .''
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, the note was from Mr Caulfield but tiie
individual who subsequentlv talked to me on the phone first tnij
unidentified stranger said tha^t he himself, the stranger, had placed
the note in mv mailbox from Jack. ,;„..or1
Senator TIlmadge. From Mr. Caulfield, the note was signed
"Jack"?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir. ^
Senator Talmadge. And did you receive that note:
Mr. McCord. Yes, sii\
Senator Talmadge. Do you have that note now.''
162
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Do you know where it is?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Wh}^ did you destroy it?
Mr. McCoRD. Quite frankly sir, I cannot recall. There have been
so man}^ events since that date, that I suspect it was simply thrown
out in the trash.
Senator Talmadge. Wliat was the subject of that note?
Mr. McCoRD. The subject said, "Please go to phone booth on
Route 355 on one of three different times," that one day, the day of
the note, and two alternate dates, the following date and another one.
Senator Talmadge. You also implicated the former Attorney
General, Mr. T>vlitchell, in your testimony had approved and had at
least known of the plan and at least an accessory to the Watergate
bugging. Did you ever have any conversations with Mr. Mitchell
yourself about that operation?
Mr. McCoRD. About the Watergate operation itself?
Senator Talmadge. Or any other surveillance or espionage?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Neither about Watergate nor any other espio-
nage activity?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Taltniadge. How many different individuals talked to
you and purported to speak for Mr. Mitchell about the Watergate
operation or any other bugging operation?
Mr. McCoRD. Speaking for Mr. ^Mitchell purportedly, Mr. Liddy
only as speaking for Mr. Mitchell.
Senator Talmadge. All right, Liddy is one.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Who else besides him?
Mr. McCoRD. And Mr. Hunt raised the name of jNIr. Mitchell in
the context that I have testified to this morning, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Both Liddy and Hunt told you
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. That this operation had been approved bv
Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Any others besides those two?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. You testified this morning about a meeting in
Mr. Mitchell's office. Was there more than one meeting with the
Attorney General or only one?
Mr. McCoRD. I just said there were more than one meeting.
Senator Talmadge. In which you personally were involved?
Mr. McCoRD. I did not attend but I was told by Mr. Liddy there
was more than one meeting that took place. I had heard him mention
two specifically.
Senator Talmadge. Did you yourself ever attend a meeting in
Mr. Mitchell's office?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. On any matter.
Mr. ]McCoRD. I attended meetings, yes, in his office at the Com-
mettce To Re-Elect the President when he subsequently came over
and I visited at his offices at the Attorney General's office at the
163
Department of Justice in December on another matter but not to
discuss these particular operations.
Senator Talmadge. How many different visits or conversations
did you ever have with Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. McCoRD. Numerous, sir.
Senator Talmadge. A dozen, 15, 20, more?
Mr. McCoRD. I would guess 15.
Senator Talmadge. Does he know you by 3'our name?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. You know him?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. You called him Mr. Attorney General, I
presume?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Wliat did he call you? [Laughter.]
Mr. McCoRD. Before June 17th? [Laughter.]
Senator Talmadge. Before and after.
Mr. McCoRD. I haven't seen him since June 17th. He called me
Jim, I believe.
Senator Talmadge. He called you Jim so 3'ou were on a first-name
basis with him. And that is the only evidence that you have that would
involve either the President of the United States or the Attorney
General?
Mr. McCoRD. I am sorry, sir, I missed the question.
Senator Talmadge. The evidence that a-ou have just reported
including the individuals that you have named, based on what they
heard others say which is hearsay, is the only evidence that you had
involving either the President or the former Attorney General, is that
correct?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir, the charts, for example, that I have de-
scribed here earlier.
vSenator Talmadge. I am sorry, I can't hear you, the what?
Mr. McCoRD. The charts of Mr. Liddy which Mr. Liddy
Senator Talmadge. Targets?
Mr. MccoRD. The charts.
Senator Talmadge. The charts?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, the cardboard charts, were one other
evidence of his meetings with Mr. Mitchell, and subsequently the
mone}^ which ]\lr. Lidd}^ transmitted to me for use in the operation
he stated came through the duties to the organization of Mr. Mitchell.
wSenator Talmadge. Those charts you are also relying on is hearsay
testimony on that.
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct, sir. That is correct, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Now what made you think that either Mr.
Caulfield or Mr. Hunt had authority to offer Executive clemency
to you?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Caulfield because he told me that he was con-
veying a message from the ver^^ top level of the White House.
Senator Talmadge. You assumed when he said top level that
meant the President of the United States?
Mr. McCoRD. I assumed it meant one of three people, sir.
Senator Talmadge. All right; name them.
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrhchman, or the President.
164
Senator Talmadge. And what made you think thp.t Mr. Hunt had
authority to offer Executive clemency?
Mr. McCoRD. I did not beheve that he had the authority but I
beHeve that the message he was conve^ang probably — that the message
did originate with the White House because of several things: One.
that I knew from conversations with, him and with his wife that he
was in touch with the attorneys for the Committee for the Re-Election
of the President, for one thing.
Senator Talmadge. Wlio was Mr. Hunt's immediate superior?
Mr. McCoRD. His immediate superior at the White House, as ]
understood it from him, was Mr. Charles Colson, if that is youi
question, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Colson. He was counsel to the President?
Mr. McCoRD, I believe he was on the "Wliite House staff, this is
prior to June 17.
Senator Talmadge. You testified this morning about the rental oi
office space near the McGovern-Muskie headquarters, I think it was
originally Senator Muskie's headquarters, and thereafter Senatoi
McGovem's. Do you know who approved the rental of the office thai
you operated out of on 1908 K Street NW., directly adjacent to th(
Muskie-Mc Govern headquarters?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Liddy stated that in connection with the overal
Watergate operation — coirection — in connection with the overal
operations that he was discussing with Mr. Mitchell that this spac(
was desired and would I arrange to have it leased and I did so.
Senator Talmadge. That was the reason you leased the space'
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. When was the da}^ you attempted to enter th(
Mc Govern headquarters here in Washington?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe the first date would have been abou
May 15 when Mr. Hunt introduced me to a young man called by tin
name of Thomas Gregory, introduced me at, I believe, the Howarc
Johnson restaurant, and subsequent to that introduction at aluncheoi
we went to the Mc Govern headquarters, it seems to me in the after
noon or late afternoon, and took a brief walk through the buildim
itself, going in the front, coming out the back door mainly to see th<
layout of the offices. It took perhaps 5 to 10 minutes.
Senator Talmadge. Wlio else was involved?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Thomas Gregory who worked for Mr. Hunt
Senator Talmadge. Just you and Mr. Gregory?
Mr. McCoRD. That went in; yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Who gave the orders to attempt to enter tht
building, the Mc Govern headquarters?
Mr. McCord. On that particular occasion Mr. Hunt did. It hac
been previously agreed to, directed — correction, had been requesteo
by Mr. Liddy.
Senator Talmadge. Why were you told that it was necessary to
enter the Watergate complex on the weekend of June 17, 1972?
^ Mr. McCoRD. A twofold purpose, the first being to do for the
time, the photography team, to do photocopy work of documen
within the Democratic National Committee and, second, to insta
additional listening devices within the Democratic Nation
Committee.
165
Senator Talmadge. I believe my time has expired. I will yield
at this time for other questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr, McCord, in response to a question from Senator Baker you
said that you thought that what you were doing in this operation was
legal. Now, of course you spent some years in the FBI, didn't you?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. And also in the CIA?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. You ran your own security company?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. You were charged at the trial with several
counts, as I understand, conspirac}'', intent to steal property, entering
the Democratic national headquarters, attempted interception of
telephone conversations and attempted interception of oral conversa-
tions as well as possession of a telephone listening device, and an oral
communications device.
Now, is it your testimon}^ that you thought that all of these acts
there on June 17 were legal?
Mr. McCoRD. It is ni}^ testimon}^, sir, if I may repeat a portion of
it, that the Attornev General had the authority to authorize it. It
was my experience that he did, in fact, authorize wiretapping and
other related activities that were within his purview. That he could,
and would have turned it down out of hand at the ver}^ begiiming of
the operation itself if, in fact, it were clearly and beyond any question
illegal, because I was ad\ised that it was
Senator Gurney. But authorizations by the Attornej^ General for
wiretapping made, of course, in connection v.ith national security
cases or crime, trying to find out about organized crime, all of this in
the purview of the Attorney General's office, wasn't this authorization
an operation which had to do with the Committee To Re-Elect the
President; hasn't that been 3'our testimony?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
My testimony was that it appeared to be that this operation was
really threefold ; that it was set in motion while the Attorney General
was Attorney General.
Second, that the White House was a party to the authorization
itself, and to the justification for the operation, because tlie counsel
to the President had sat in on it.
Third, the Committee for the Re-Election of the President was
represented in those discussions and that they may have been the
funding mechanism for it and fourth, because of a time delay here
and my knowledge of the relationship of Mr. Mitchell with his imme-
diate superior, my conclusion was that his immediate superior
approved and set in motion that operation and, therefore, it had all
of those implications to me, that it was just not simpl}^ a Committee
for the Re-Election of the President operation because it began with
the Attorney General while he was the Attorney General.
Senator Gurney. The activities, though, that you were doing,
as I understand this course of events, were supervised by Liddy and
Hunt, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. They were agents, as I understand it, for the At-
torney General and for the White House.
166
Senator Gurnet. Well, that is not the question I asked. I said
that they were the ones that were supervising and guiding your
activities, were they not?
Mr. McCoRD. They were the immediate supervisors, but not by
my understanding
Senator Gurnet. And were they not working for the Committee
To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Hunt never did, to my knowledge. 1 believe
there has been testimony to that effect by Mr. Odle.
Senator Gurnet. Who was Mr. Liddy working for during this
period of time we are talking about?
Mr. McCoRD, Mr. Liddy had two responsibilities. One was general
counsel originally for the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President and the second was general counsel for the Finance Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President.
Senator Gurnet. The activities that you have described — that is,
bugging the Democratic National Committee and photographing, as
I understand, documents there, as well as the McGovem and Muskie
operations — those all had to do with a poUtical campaign, did they
not?
Mr. McCoRD. I think what we have not discussed here are some
of the other things that went into my motivations and to the explana-
tion by Mr. Liddy to me of the reasons for undertaking this operation
at Democratic National Committee, which included electronic,
photography, those two operations specifically, but the overall opera-
tion was not limited to that, either in the original planning or in the
authority b}^ the Attorney General.
Senator Gurnet. Well, did anything you do in this area of bugging
and electronic surveillance have anything to do with anybody or any
activity other than a political campaign of somebody?
Mr. AIcCord. It came into being because of the, one of the basic
motivations of mine, which I had not been concerned with, the
violence-oriented demonstrators that we have previously discussed
in testimony before this committee.
Senator Gurnet. I do not want to interrupt and guide, but it
would be helpful, Mr. McCord, if j^ou were responsive to the questions.
Did you do any electronic bugging or surveillance that had anything;
to do with an^^body or anything that did not involve political activity?
Mr. McCoRD. No, no, sir.
Senator Gurnet. You did not spy on the Russians, the Chinese, on
anybody like that?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Well, do you not think that at some time, it
might have occurred to you that perhaps these were illegal things
and did not really have anything to do with national security?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes, it occurred to me at the time the matters
were being planned and being discussed. It has occurred to me since,
yes.
Senator Gurnet. Then, why did you go ahead with it? ;
Mr. McCoRD, For basically the reasons I have stated, but those
were not the only reasons. The fact that the Attorne}'- General, the
Wliite House itself, and in my personal opinion, the President of the
United States, I felt, had set into motion this operation. Because
167
of the close relationship of Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean and the fact
that Mr. Dean worked with the President.
Senator Gurney. In other words, even though you — if I am ex-
pressing your thoughts correctly — you believed it to be illegal or
were highly suspicious that it was, that nonetheless, because the
Attorney General, in your opinion, was ordering this, then you ought
to go ahead and do it? Is that a fair thing to say?
Mr. McCoRD. Sure, it is a gray area, no question about it. But
because the Attorney General in his position, and because the White
House was involved in it, these matters were matters on which my
decision turned. I realized the illegality under normal circumstances,
but I also realized that the Attorney General can make matters legal
by his signature on a piece of paper, or his oral authorization of it,
which he does do in domestic subversion cases and national security
cases where electronic surveillance is involved. And it has been done
hundreds of times.
Senator Gurney. I would like to ask a question about this mem-
orandum that you presented to the committee today, entitled "Polit-
ical Pressure on Writer To Accept Executive Clemency and To Re-
main Silent."
Now, as I understand it from your testimony contained in here and
other things that 3^ou have said, you were ver}^ troubled by the fact
that, one, you were presented with this business of Executive clem-
ency and a promise of your family being taken care of, and also a
job later. I guess you did not think this was the right thing to do,
and perhaps you were not too convinced that it would happen and
that you also were afraid that perjury was going to be engaged in
in the trial.
Am I fairly stating your reactions about this?
Mr. McCoRD. Somewhat, yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Well, it strikes me as very curious that you ap-
peared before the grand jury, of course, before the trial. You were
there at the trial. As I understand it, the judge himself expressed
indignation during the proceedings at one time that he was not getting
the full story.
You appeared, of course, before the Senate select committee some
weeks ago for a whole afternoon and we were not able to cover all of
the testimony, of course, you did promise us that you would come
back and advise us fully of everything that you knew, that you would
give us memorandums, as I recall. And jet this very important
testimony here, which involves Executive clemency, including the
President of the United States we just learned about 2 days ago.
Why the lateness of this? Why did you not inform us before of this?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe I stated the reason, because it involved
directly, in m}^ opinion, the President of the United States. I think I
can answer some of your other questions that you raised here about
why I — the reason I did not come forth before.
Senator Gurney. I did miss a part, I am sorry.
Mr. McCoRD. I said because it involved directly the President of
the United States. It also involved an individual that I considered a
personal friend, Mr. Jack Caulfield. I testified to your committee at
the very beginning that this was a rather painful matter for me to
come forward with at the particular time that you first inter\aewed
168
me. I said I had no reluctance in giving the information, that I would
do so subsequently, and I did do so subsequently. I disclosed it to
your committee 2 days ago.
But I think primarily it is because it involved the highest officer
in the land, the President of the United States.
Senator Gurney. Let me ask something about the salary and
monej' arrangements, Mr. McCord.
What was your salary with the Committee To Re-Elect the President
for your security work?
Mr. McCoRD. The salar}^ was a gross salary of $20,000 a year.
Senator Gurney. Twenty?
Mr. JMcCoRD. Twenty.
Senator Gurney. Twentj'^?
Mr. McCoRD. Twenty.
Senator Gurney. That is the contract. That was the arrangement
when you were engaged on what 3^ou were going to be paid, is that
correct?
Mr. McCoRD. It was not the original salary. The original salary
was $625 a month, approximately, when I was first engaged as a
consultant.
Senator Gurney. But that was for part-time work?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. But then when jou came onboard full time, it
was raised to $20,000?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. And when was that?
Mr. McCoRD. The fhst of January 1972.
Senator Gurney. Now, then, as you have testified, you learned
from Mr. Liddy his curiosity about electronic devices and this led,
of course, to his asking you if you would participate in what we now
know as the Watergate affair. And this occurred — what date was that
now, approximately?
Mr. McCoRD. The conversation began in January and
Senator Gurney. I mean when you agreed to go into the Watergate
affair?
Mr. McCoRD. Approximately somewhere between 30 days after
the initial conversation with Mr. Liddy, when he said he was going to
see the Attorney General in the Attorney General's ofiice, approxi-
matelj^ at that period.
Senator Gurney. And that would be, as I recall, probably in March
sometime?
Mr. McCoRD. Late February or March, yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Well, was there any raise or increase in salary
around this time as far as your work is concerned?
Mr. McCoRD. There was none anticipated and none received.
Senator Gurney. Did it ever occur to you that if you were going to
engage in rather hazardous acti^dty, and they certainly resulted in
that finally, as we know, that perhaps a higher rate of pay would be
something,' that would be fair and equitable as far as you are concerned?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes. 'J'here was a provision in the budget which
Mr. Liddy labeled as "overhead," which provided that compensation.
Senator Gurney. Well, would you describe that to the committee,
what that "overhead" was?
169
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, approximately $2,000 a month during the period
C)f time that the operation was underway.
Senator Gurney. And that began when?
Mr. McCoRD. April 1972.
Senator Gurney. And how was that paid?
Mr. McCoRD. In cash by Mr. Liddy.
Senator Gurney. How many of those payments did you receive?
Mr. McCoRD. There were payments through June. I think they
totaled approximately $16,000. I do not recall specifically, but I
have the notes here if I may refer to them.
Senator Gurney. Now, then, would you describe to the committee
the other pay arrangements after the break-in and after you v/ere
apprehended?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir. The pajmients were made by Mrs. Hunt.
Senator Gurney. In what amounts and at what time?
Mr. McCord. Calls came to me by Mr. and Mrs. Hunt in July.
Senator Gurney. How much?
Mr. McCoRD. We were paid in cash. There was a lump-sum pay-
ment in August — in July of 1972 — for 5 months "salary," in quotes,
at $3,000 a month, total of $15,000, and subsequently legal fees.
Senator Gurney. And when was that?
Mr. McCgrd. In November, as I recall it, of 1972, and subse-
cpiently
Senator Gurnet. And how much was that?
Mr. McCoRD. Total of $25,000 for legal fees.
Senator Gurney. That was November, then?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Senator Gurney. Go on.
Mr. McCoRD. And then again in November, 2 months pavment of
$3,000 each, a total of $6,000.
Senator Gurney. So it was $15,000, $25,000, and $6,000; is that
correct?
Mr. McCord. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. And those all came from Mrs. Hunt?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. Did anybody else pay you any cash?
Mr. McCoRD. No.
Senator Gurney. How much did vou pay your lawyer?
Mr. McCoRD. Approximately $30^000.
Senator Gurney. Thirty?
Mr. McCoRD. Thht}^, yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Were there any other pa3^ments?
Mr. McCoRD. There were other pa3^ments to another lawyer which
I had and Mr. Rothblatt, which I made some pa}aiients to.
Senator Gurney. I don't particularly want to pry into that unless
you want to give the information?
Mr. McCoRD. Whichever you prefer.
Senator Gurney. I am interested in some other pajinents, though.
Weren't there pajinents made as far as either purchase of equipment
or expenses in connection with the electronic business?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, j-es. I testified to that in executive session, sir,
in which there was a total received of approximately $6,000, I believe,
a total of $76,000 in all for equipment and other related costs, $61,000
170
as an initial payment and about $4,000 subsequent — $5,000 subse-
quently for additional equipment purchases.
Senator Gurney, Now, did you say 61 and 5?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. I thought you said
Mr, McCoRD. There is a total of $76,000 in all, which covered all
pajnnents for all purposes prior to June 17, 1972.
Senator Gurney. There was another $10,000 payment later?
Mr. McCoRD. No sir, there was an initial $61,000 plus $5,000 for
equipment, plus another $11,000 subsequently, but a total of $76,000
prior to June 17, 1972.
Senator Gurney. Now, I do not want to quibble, but I have 61, 5,
and 11.
Mr. McCoRD. That is a total of $76,000.
Senator Gurney. Seventy-seven that brings to me. A total of
$77,000?
Mr. McCoRD. Sixt3^-one — I am sorrA^ sir; 61 and 4 are 65 and 11 —
the total amount was $76,000. I will get the figures.
Senator Gurney. Sixty-one, 4, and 11, is that it?
Mr. McCoRD. I can recite them for you. April 12, $61,000 plus
$4,000, a total of $65,000; May 8, $4,000; Memorial Day weekend,
two $1,000 amounts; m June, $5,000. A total after May 8th of $11,000.
The total of that is $76,000.
Senator Gurney. Now, then, how was this disbursed?
Mr. McCoRD. In cash by Mr. Liddy.
Senator Gurney. I mean how did 3^ou spend it?
Mr. AIcCoRD. Would you like the expenditures? They were ex-
pended in cash for the most part. There were some by check for some
walkie-talkie equipment.
Senator Gurney. Do you have a detailed account of how you spent
it?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes.
Senator Gurney. Do you have it with you?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes sir.
Senator Gurney. Is it a long one? Will it take some time?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes sir, it is rather lengthy. I can read it if you want.
Senator Gurney. I wonder then, Mr. Chairman, if we could receive
that for the record. I do not really see an}^ point in going all through
that.
Senator Ervin. If j^ou will let the committee have the account,
we will make a copy and return your original to 3^ou.
Mr. McCoRD. All right, sir, we can do that.*
Senator Gurney. But my understanding is that the account which
you are going to present the committee shows the complete disburse-
ment and spendhig for $77,000, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. $76,000, sir, as I recall it.
Senator Gurney. $76,000?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct. There were budget receipts and so on
that were prepared on this and were shown to jNlr. Liddy, referring for
all the payments.
•See p. 448.
171
Senator GuRNEY. Just one other question. There was some discus-
sion eariier this morning about the Ellsherg case. My recollection is
that your testimony was that there is no connection between the
Ellsherg case and Watergate. Is that correct?
Mr. McCoRL. No sir, that was not my testimony. My testimony
was that I had no knowledge of the wiretapping that allegedly occurred
in connection with the Ellsherg case, nor did I have am^ knowledge of
the break-in in connection with the doctor's records oi Mr. Ellsberg.
That was the intent of my testimony. I vnW make that correction now
if I misled 3'ou.
Senator Gurney, Well, do 3^ou think there is some connection
between your Watergate operation and the Ellsherg case?
Mr. McCoRD. There apparentl}^ is in the personnel that were in-
volved, yes sir, as I understand it from the newspapers. You do not
know for a fact.
Senator Gurney. Not as far as you and the people under you were
concerned?
Mr. AlcCoRD. I had no people under me except Mr. Barker.
Senator Gurney. How about those in the Watergate affair?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not Icnow the role of the others in the Watergate
and whether they may or ma}^ not have been involved. They have been
so reported in the papers, but I do not know for a fact.
Senator Gurney. My reason for asking this, I understand there was
electronic equipment which was obtained by, I think, Mr. Liddy and
Mr. Hunt in the Ellsberg affair. And they, of course, did have super-
visory control and authority over you to some extent. Did you use
any of that electronic equipment? Or did you purchase all your own?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not know what electronic equipment was that
you are referring to here, sir.
Senator Gurney. Well, all I know is what I read in the newspapers
on that, but did you purchase all of the electronic equipment devices
that you used?
Mr. McCoRD. That I used, yes sir. I do not know what Mr. Hunt
used.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, that is all.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Mr. McCord, I have been much impressed by your background, you
have received two academic degrees from two different universities,
you are a colonel in the Air Force Reserve, you have had veiy distin-
guished service of many years wdth the FBI, very distinguished
service Vvdth the Central Intelligence Agenc}'. From that I beheve
I can assume that you are better versed than the man on the street
when it comes to what is legal and what is not legal, is that assump-
tion correct?
Mr. McCoRD. I am not a lawyer, sir, as I testified to you. I have
a working knowledge of the law, yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. You are acquainted with what national security
is all about?
Mr. McCoRD. I certainly am.
Senator Inouye. I would assume that being involved in the
Government ail these years that your concern with our activities
would be a bit more acute than the average citizen. For example,
96-296— 73— bk. 1 12
172
were you aware that Mr. Mitchell was the chief campaign manager
in the 1968 election?
Mr. McCoRD. I beheve I heard that, yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Were you aware at the time that you were dis-
cussing the possibility of tlie clandestine activities that Mr. Mitchell
was considering going over to the committee to become chairman of
that committee?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Were you aware at the time of your discussion
when he was Attorney General that he was actually in control of the
campaign activities?
Mr. McCoRD. I did not know the full extent to which he was in
control. I knew there were meetings w4th him by senior people from
the Committee for the Re-Election of the President.
Senator Inouye. You knew he was actively involved in matters
political?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. And you were aware that the Democratic Na-
tional Committee was a political organization?
Mr. McCoRD. Beyond au}^ question.
Senator Inouye. And you are aware that Mr. Muskie, Mr. Mc-
Govern were also political citizens?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. That they were seeking the presidency of the
United States?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. You were also aware that Mr. O'Brien was a
politician?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes; indeed.
Senator Inouye. I gather from your prior testimony that you had
received instructions on taking pictures?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. Someone in your group had instructions?
Mr. McCoRD. One of the members at least; yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. What sort of pictures did you take?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not know, sir, I did not see them.
Senator Inouye. You did not see any copies?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. You did not hear of any instructions?
Mr. McCoRD. In a general sense, I do not know the specific targets,
but yes, I heard them discussed by Mr. Hunt with the team members
generally and I heard the team members refer to them but I do not
have specifics as to what they are, what was copied.
Senator Inouye. Did j^ou have anj^ reason to suspect Mr. Mc Gov-
ern, Mr. Muskie, or Mr. O'Brien were involved in activities which \vere
inimicable to the United States and contrary to the national security,
more specificall}^ to overthrow the Government?
Mr. McCoRD. When I previousl}^ referred to a comment that Mr.
Liddy made to me in connection with the Las Vegas trip, two trips
that he was making for this committee.
Senator Inouye. You had reason to believe that these men were
involved in activities which would be dangerous to the existence of
the United States of America?
173
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. Then, why did you carry on these activities? You
\\ ere well aware of what national security was all about. Were they
involved in syndicated criminal activity?
Mr. McCoRD [conferring with counsel]. I can go into the reasons
behind some of the motivations that I had if you want me to do so,
sir, which pertain to testimony I previously had given relating to
the
Senator Inouye. I believe it is ver}' important because I for one
would like to know why the sudden change of heart.
Mr. McCoRD. In what, sir?
Senator Inouye. In being concerned about justice and legality.
Because I cannot believe that you were not aware of the illegality of
all these acts and that these were political activities?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, I have admitted that the acts were both
wrong on my part, it was a mistake on my part, I stated that at the
beginning and I restate it at this time but the motivation
Senator Inouye. Were you aware at the time you were on the
sixth floor of the Watergate that it was illegal?
Mr. McCoRD [conferring with counsel]. Yes; of course.
Senator Inouye. Why did you, as one who has served his country
so well, as a colonel in the Air Force, distinguished service in the FBI
and CIA decide to carry out these illegal acts? The only thing you
have done wrong so far is to receive a traffic ticket.
Mr. McCoRD. Sir, I can repeat mj situation that held me into the
decision to join in this operation which involved a series of discussions,
which involved the White House itself, the counsel to the President,
that top lawyer, involved the top law^^er of the Committee for the
Re-Election of the President and involved the Attorney General
himself in his capacity as Attorney General of the United States who
had the authority. I realize that acts are illegal, that these acts are
illegal, under normal circumstances but that he has the power and
authority to make them legal by his oral approval of it, and particu-
larh'-, in particular, about what I was convinced was his approval.
Senator Inouye. You knew the Attorney General was soon to
become chairman of the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
]Mr. McCoRD. I was aware of it but I was also aware that the
matter had been approved while he had been Attorney General, had
been considered while he was Attorney General, had been considered
jointly with the counsel to the President and while he was Attorney
General.
Senator Inouye. On all the front pages of the U.S. press you had
comments about Mr. Mitchell to become soon the chairman of this
party?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. So you knew that his activities may be political
in nature?
Mr. McCoRD. They very well may be and part of the reason
attributed to the operation was political, no question about it, but
I had previously stated as well that I was convinced that over his,
I knew over his, desk came many matters which I had no knowledge
of and, in particular, I was concerned about violence and demonstra-
tions, particularly violence which already were being reported to be
174
occurring, that planned to occur, to take place, at the Republican
National Convention in Miami. We had many reports of it, first of
all, at the convention of San Diego upward of a quarter of a million
people. I was also aware that the Attorney General in his capacity
had very broad access to information which I felt I might not be
privy to and Mr. Liddy might not be privy to, but which would,
could, and would have a bearing, possibly would have a bearing upon
the relationsliip of, association with, some of these demonstrators to
certain members of either the Democratic National Committee or to
the McGovern headquarters and in fact one of the groups now under
indictment in Tallahassee, Fla., did in fact have an office within the
Democratic National Committee.
Senator Inouye. Was it your beUef that people Hke Mr. O'Brien,
Mr. McGovern, and Mr. Muskie were involved in a conspiracy to
plan violence?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. Where was the national security involved as far
as these three men were concerned?
Mr. McCoRD [conferring with counsel]. Sir, I can restate what I
previously stated before this committee in terms of violence that
had already occurred, which involve bombings in a couple of States,
which involved violence and demonstrations against our committee,
which involved bomb threats against the Committee To lie-Elect
the President, which involved violence in the building, which involved
threats to Mr. Mitchell and Mrs. Mitchell, and I recited those in
considerable detail, concerning the violence that was planned for the
Repubhcan National Committee and some of which were reported
as early as 1971 and targeted against the Committee for Re-Election
of the President. There had been reports they were in both groups
in McGovern headquarters and the Democratic national headquarters
some of the staff members working closely with the violence groups
and, as I believe I testified to, that part of these informations we
expected to obtain are the wiretap itself would have to do with calls
and conversations and coordination between such gi'oups and staff
members in the Democratic National Committee. That was not the
only purpose of the wiretap; I understood that part of the purpose
was political intelUgence, political intelligence for the Committee
for Re-Election of the President and the White House out at the
Democratic National Committee and out at the McGovern head-
quarters, that was one factor.
Senator Inouye. Do you want the committee to believe at the
time you made the decision to be involved in these illegal acts you
felt that men like McGovern, Muskie, and O'Brien were involved
in this national conspiracy of bombing and inciting violence?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir; I did not testify to that and I do not want
the committee to believe that. I was just telling what my reason
and motivations were at the time and what they surrounded which
was the participating by the Attorney General.
Senator Inouye. And yet you indicated that one of your projected
plans called for the bugging of Mr. O'Brien's private residence; is
that not so?
Mr. McCoRD. No, that it was initially proposed that that be done.
That is what was never done, that his ofl&ce was bugged, yes, sir, in
the Democratic National Committee.
175
Senator Ervin. Would the Senator pardon me.
Senator Inouye. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. It was the ofl&cial position of the Department of
Justice that they could bug to discover domestic subversion without
a warrant, without appljT-ng for a warrant, and, by a strange co-
incidence, it was June 19, 1972, when the Supreme Court first handed
down a unanimous decision rejecting that position of the Department
of Justice.
Mr. McCoRD. I think there is also, sir, if I may add at this
point
Senator Inouye. I am aware of that, Mr. Chairman; I just want
to have Mr. McCord to tell us that these men were involved in
domestic subversion and Mr. McCord is not just another citizen.
He is a colonel in the Air Force, holds two degrees from two uni-
versities, a very learned man of distinguished service with the FBI
and CIA.
Changing the subject, sir, now, did you have a contingency plan
in the event of arrest?
Mr. McCord. Did I have — or did the group have?
Senator Inouye. Did the group have.
Mr. McCord. There were very general contingency plans, the
main contingency planning was mainly access from the building
itself in case the men were caught.
Senator Inouye. What about attorneys?
Mr. McCord. None that I knew of, no, sir.
Senator Inouye. I gather from prior evidence that all of 3'ou
had aliases.
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. One man had a Mexican passport made out under
an alias, another one had a driver's license in New York made out
in a phony name and another one from Massachusetts and hkew^se;
where were these identity cards made?
Mr. McCord. I do not know, sir.
Senator Inouye. Where was yours made?
Mr. McCord. I do not know, sir. It was given to me by Mr. Hunt
and I have no idea.
Senator Inouye. You did not ask?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir; I can explain how I received it, if that is any
help to you.
Senator Inouye. Was it a professionally made identity card?
Mr. McCoRD. It appeared to be.
Senator Inouye. Can you tell us how you got it?
Mr. McCord. Yes; the evening of June 17 Mr. Hunt handed some
identification to me and said, "Put this in your pocket in case you
need it when you go by the guard, if you go by the guard, and he asks
any questions concerning who you are."
I took it and glanced at it briefly and put it in niy pocket. The
identification was under the name of Edward J. Martin. _
Senator Inouye. You have indicated that your activities were
limited to just two Watergate break-ins and an attempted one planned
for the Muskie and McGovem headquarters, is that correct?
Mr. McCord. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. You were not involved in any other activity?
Mr. McCord. No, sir.
176
Senator Inouye. Was Mr. Odle aware of your activities?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. Did you at any time discuss the possibility of other
activities?
Air. McCoRD. To the best of my knowledge he was in no way in-
volved in any of the Watergate planning or the operations himself.
Senator Inouye. The liighest officials that you have met, according
to your statement, is Mr. Liddy and Air. Magruder?
\1y. McCord. Met in what connection, sir?
Senator Inouye. Directly involved in this activity.
Mr. McCord. Met with Mr. Liddy only. I had many meetings with
Mr. Mitchell and Magruder.
Senator Inouye. Did you have any contact \A-ith Mr. Dean directly?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Did you discuss this matter directly \vith Mr. Dean?
Did you have any direct contact with the Attorney General?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Did 3'OU discuss this matter?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir. I previously testified to that. I did not. I
testified to the reason.
Senator Inouye. Were you meeting the Attorney General at the
time 3^ou were planning this Watergate activity?
Mr. McCoRD. I did not meet with him in planning sessions. I saw
him regularh' during that period; yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. You were not curious enough to bring it up with
him.
Mr. McCoRD. I trusted Mr. Liddy who said he would discuss it
with him. I felt if the Attorney General cared to discuss it with me he
would raise it.
Senator Inouye. You had no desire to bring it up on your own?
Mr. McCoRD. I had no reason to question that Mr. Liddy would
not mention to him I was not participating. I had no desire to proceed
beyond that. He said that he would and I accepted his word for it.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I beheve ni}^ time has expired;
thank you very much, sir.
Thank you, Mr. McCord.
Senator Ervin. Senator Wcicker.
Senator Weicker. Thank vou, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCord, who hired Al Baldwin?
Mr. McCoRD. I did, sir.
Senator Weicker. Did 3-ou hire him or was it a decision involving
you and another person?
Mr. McCoRD. His initial employment was in a sequence of an
interview by me and a subsequent interview vcith Mr. Fred LaRue
of the committee in which the final commitment was made by Mr.
Lallue, that is the sequence.
Senator Weicker. So actually the final decision as to jNIr. Baldvrin's
employment was made b}' Mr. LaRue, is that correct?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. McCord, do 30U know Robert
Mardian?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. In what connection do you know him?
177
Mr. McCoRD. I first met him when he came to the Committee for
the Re-Election of the President.
Senator Weicker. Wlien 3^011 say you first met him, would you care
to describe that meeting?
Mr. McCoRD. I beheve the first meeting with him was in May, hite
May as best I recall, when he came to, shortly after he came to, the
committee and as I recall his driver was being employed by the com-
mittee as a driver and we had some discussion in that context at that
time.
Senator Weicker. You had discussions with Mr. ^'lardian or with
his driver?
Mr. McCoRD. With Mr. Mardian.
Senator Weicker. Can you give me the substance of those
conversations?
Mr. McCoRD. That conversation was something to the effect that
the driver v>^as being considered as a driver for Mr. Mitchell, and I
inquired about the man's background and he stated that he had been
a very satisfactory driver for him and he felt he would do a good job
for Mr. Mitchell.
Senator Weicker. Did you know what position Mr. Mardian held
at the time that 3^ou talked to him?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes.
Senator Weicker. Could you please state to the committee what
that position was?
Mr. McCoRD. He Avas, as I recall, a sjiecial assistant to Mr.
Mitchell and one of functions that Mr. Mitchell had for him for the
committee.
Senator Weicker. I beg jour pardon?
Mr. McCoRD. He was a special assistant to Mr. Mitchell.
Senator Weicker. Will 3'ou describe what you understood his
duties to be as a special assistant to Mr. Mitcliell?
Mr. McCoRD. I understood general assignments for Mr. Mitchell.
I did not know the specific details of everything that he was involved
with at all. We talked a bit about Miami and the Miami convention
and our concern over security there and I knew that he had some
functions in connection with that.
Senator Weicker. At the time of our first executive session, Mr.
McCord, I asked you a question in what connection did you know
Robert Mardian, and 3^ou took the fifth during that sworn interview.
Is there any reason why you v/ould not like to or go ahead and
describe now why you thought it was necessary" at that moment in
time?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe it was taken on the advice of counsel at
that point in time. I can't recall the specific cpiestions, question that
was asked at that period. If it can be recited I can give you the reason.
Senator Weicker. The specific question was, "Have you had any
contact with Robert Mardian at any time?
"Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
"Senator Weicker. Could j'^ou describe to the committee what
that contact consisted of?
"Mr. McCoRD. I will take the fifth on that."
Mr. McCoRD. There had been — I can give 3-ou now my reasons
as best I recall for that.
178
There had been an article m Time magazine, it seems to me in
August or so, 1972, in which there was an allegation against Mr.
Mardian, as I recall it, that he was not only in charge of the Watergate
operation but that he had some other political intelligence activities
that he was carrying on that he was involved with in the Committee
To Re-Elect the President. I knew that I had no knowledge of his
involvement in the Watergate operations themselves. I knew that he
had some function in connection with the — some function in con-
nection with the convention at Miami. And I believe that was the
reason that I took the fifth at that time, as I recall.
Senator Weicker. Did you or the Committee To Re-Elect the
President receive reports from the Internal Security Division of the
Justice Department?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Weicker. Was Mr. Mardian head of that division?
Mr. McCoRD. He had been, sir.
Senator Weicker. Did you receive copies of FBI reports?
Mr. McCoRD. I can explain a partial answer to that, su', if you want
me to, an answer that involves FBI reports.
I have raised with, I believe, Mr. Odle the problem of receiving
adequate information concerning violence in demonstrations that
might affect the committee headquarters in Washington and sub-
sequently, the committee headquarters in Miami, and I asked if there
were any way in which there could be some type of liaison to receive
information from the FBI specifically, because I knew that they would
have information that was not available to us and we knew that such
information was being made available to other parties for the con-
vention itself if it directl}^ affected those parties.
As I recall, he sent a memorandum to Mr. Mitchell asking for
approval of my contact with that organization.
The next that I heard was a call from Mr. Mardian in which he
referred to that memorandum and he stated that Mr. Mitchell had
given approval to my contact to acquire that type of information and
that I should go to the Internal Security Division of the Department
of Justice where such information as did affect, might affect, the se-
curit^^ of the committee would be made available to me some of which
was as I have described in those reports, yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. So you received data from the Internal Security
Division of the Justice Department?
Mr. McCoRD. I did.
Senator Weicker. And 3^ou received data from the FBI?
Mr. McCoRD. Not from the FBI directly, no, sir.
Senator Weicker. From whom did you "receive such data?
Mr. McCoRD. From the Internal Security Division. I do not believe
the FBI was ever aware of that.
Senator Weicker. And from what individual did j^ou receive such
information?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe it was through the Chief of the Evaluation
Section. I believe his name was Mr. John Martin.
Senator Weicker. I am sorry. I did not hear the name.
Mr. McCoRD. John Martin.
Senator Weicker. John Martin was your contact?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
179
Senator Weicker. At the Internal Security Division of the Justice
Department, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Weicker. Would it be correct to say that Mr. Martin is
chief of the analysis and evaluation section?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. And where did you meet Mr. Martin?
Mr. McCoRD. At his office in the Department of Justice.
Senator Weicker. Who knew, aside from Mr. Martin, that you were
receiving this material?
Mr. McCoRD. His deputy at the evaluation section. I believe the
name is Lisker, I am not absolutely certain.
Senator Weicker. I am not anxious to have any names here unless
there is to be some identification.
I have before me a position report on this Internal Security Divi-
sion. Could you tell me whether or not the name listed as deputy
there is a name that you recognize, where I stopped reading?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct, sir.
Senator Weicker. Would you please give the name, then, for the
committee?
Mr. McCoRD. J-o-e-1, Joel, Lisker, L-i-s-k-e-r.
Senator Weicker. All right, then, to repeat again the question we
were working on, who knew you received the material, who else
besides Mr. Martin and Mr. Lisker?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Martin, of course. Mr. Mitchell had initialed
the memorandum that I subsequently saw on this, Mr. Robert Odle;
at least those persons.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Odle?
Air. McCoRD. Mr. Odle, j^es, sir.
Senator Weicker. You say there was a subsequent memorandum?
Mr. McCoRD. The memorandum which Mr. Odle wrote on this
subject I subsequently received, which had Air. Mitchell's initials on it.
Senator Weicker. Do you feel or do you know whether or not
similar information, similar access to this information was given to
the Democratic Party?
Mr. McCoRD. I understood that they did have through some
channels some access to information of this type; v/hether it came
from that office, I do not know.
Senator Weicker. Was the information which you received the basis
for the apprehension which you described in answering the questions
of Senator Inouye relative to your activities?
Air. AIcCoRD. It added to my apprehension, sir. It was not the
basis. It came some weeks after my decision, but it added to that
apprehension, because it dealt specifically with violence at the Repub-
lican National Committee.
Senator Weicker. Now, I would like you to describe for me as best
you can the types of information, in further detail, that you received
from the Internal Security Division. Did you receive from the Internal
Security Division, for example, or from the FBI any information as it
related to the candidates or their staffs?
Air. AIcCoRD. Yes, sir, there was one such report that I do recall
specifically.
Senator Weicker. Can you give me details on that report?
180
Mr. McCoRD. One such report dealt with, as I recall, a funding
operation that was reported in which the McGovern committee
purportedly funded a so-called barn storming tour of several members
of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War on the west coast, as I
recall, starting from Los Angeles, Calif., and going up the coast. It
came concurrently with some other information that that same group
was planning violence at the Republican National Convention involv-
ing danger to, threats to life of individuals. I think that was succeeded
very shortly, in a matter of days, by the indictment of members of
the Vietnam Veterans Against the War at Tallahassee because of the
violence that they did plan, including a number of things that would
endanger the lives of the people at the Republican National Con-
vention.
Senator Weicker. I want to be most careful on the grounds that
we are covering.
Mr. Chairman, let me say this, that I would like to proceed for a
few more minutes if I might, with the idea that the committee should
pay very close attention to what ob^^ously is a very serious matter.
It is certainly the first time that I think I have ever known that the
Internal Security Di\asion of the Justice Department and the FBI
were participating rather actively in a campaigTi, and I think that the
facts should be laid out most carefully.
Now, can 3'ou tell me precisely what the dates were on which this
type of activity took place? In other words, when you first made
your contact with Mr. Martin and started to receive this type of
material?
Mr. McCoRD. Mv best recollection would have been within the
last 2 weeks of May"^1972.
Senator Weicker. In the last 2 Aveeks of Mav, 1972, and you re-
ceived this material between Ma^' of 1972 and when 3'ou were caught
at the Watergate, is that correct?
Mr. McCoED. June 17, ves, sir.
Senator Weicker. Of 1972?
Mr. McCoRD. 1972.
Senator Weicker. Have you ever been on the fourth floor of the
Triangle Building?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe that is the offices of the evaluation section,
sir, if my memory is correct.
Senator Weicker. Well, the Triangle Building is at 9th and D
Streets. Have you ever been on the fourth floor of that building?
Mr. McCord. If that is the offices of the analysis and evaluation
section, I have been there, yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. And this, as you understood this, you were with
the intelligence evaluation committee at that time, or with the officers
of it?
Mr. McCord. With the Internal Security Division, Mr. Martin's
particular office there, yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. And on how many different occasions did you
get this material from Mr. Martin and was he the only one that
passed this information on to you?
Mr. McCord. It would have been either Mr. Martin or Mr. Lisker.
It was normally done in their offices when I would visit their offices.
I recall a few occasions on which there were phone calls from theseJ
ISl
ocntlernen, one of the two of the gentlemen; when we had 60 to 75,000
demonstrators in Washington and there tippeared to be seme in-
formation of relevance affecting the possible fiscal security of our
iiistahations by demonstrators that were then in the city, and I
would get a call in that connection from one of the two men, saying,
in effect, M^e think you ought to be aware of thus and so information.
I recall specifically one such call dealing with the bombing of the
Pentagon at that time.
Senator Weicker. Again, I just want to repeat my first questions.
On how many different occasions did you receive this material?
Mr. McCoRD. Almost daily, sir.
Senator Weicker. Almost daily?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. And the nature of the material given to you
related to groups, is that correct, individuals?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Individuals?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Both political and nonpolitical?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now. when you received this material, what did
you do with it?
Mr. McCoRD. If it were of sufficient consequence. I would pass it
along to Mr. Mitchell's office, usually through Mr. Odie. Quite often,
I woiiJd put it in a memorandum for him for distribution to those
other staff members of the committee who would normally want to
know of forthcoming demonstrations in the Washington area, some of
which might affect the committee.
Senator Weicker. Why did you feel this was — now, you would
pass this on to Mr. Alitchell at the Committee To Re-Elect the
President, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes. sir. and other staff members.
Senator Weicker. Well, and other staff members. Who is "and other
staff members"?
Mr. McCoRD. About six cf the senior staff members, which included
Mr. Sloan, who passed it to -Mr. Stans, included Mr. Liddy, included
Mr. Odle, included the prospective officers for Mr. Mitchell's wife,
Mrs. Mitchell, and two or three other division chiefs there unde^
Mr. Mitchell.
Senator Weicker. And tliis almost on a daily basis?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. And this is material Mdiich you yourself received
and you yourself distributed?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Well. Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of other ques-
tions, but I am afraid I am going to have to digest that one for a few
minutes and I would like to defer to j^ou to have other ciuestioning
take place. I would hope that there will be an opportunity to proceed
to further questioning on this.
Senator Ervin. I might state that Senator Inouye has to go at 4
o'clock and it might be advisable for us to recess at 4 and let the
witness come back on Tuesday.
Senator Weicker. I beg Senator AIontoA\a's pardon and thank you,
Senator.
182
Senator Montoya. Thank yon, Mr. Chairman.
]\lr. McCord, going back to the time that you were hired, I would
like to ask vou if you had a personal acquaintance Avith the President?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. Had you worked with him in any capacity?
Either while he was Vice President or before?
Mr. McCord. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. Had you done an 3' work in his behalf while
you were Avorking for the CIA?
Mr. McCord. I was a staff member of the CIA while he was Vice
President. He may have had access to material or reports which I
wrote.
Senator Montoya. Did you ever speak to him during those same
times?
Mr. McCord. I don't recall it; no, sir.
Senator Montoya. Who was the person who recommended you
for this particular job assignment?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. John Caulfield.
Senator Montoya. And where did you meet him?
Mr. McCoRD. At the ExecutiTe Office Building in Washington, D.C.
Senator Montoya. jind where is that Executive Office Building
with respect to the White House?
Mr. McCoRD. It adjoins it. It is on the Wliite House giounds.
Senator Montoya. How many visits did you have with Mr. Caulfield
before you were hired?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe it was three or four, sir.
Senator Montoya. And why did you have three or four visits?
Were they extensive inter^dews and did you go into the details of
your assignment?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir. They were twofold, for twofold purposes.
They were an opportunity for ]Mr. Caulfield to interview me per-
sonally and learn more about me and my backgroimd, and secondly,
an opportunity for him to discuss the nature of the job that would
be coming up in the campaign.
Senator Montoya. Did Mr. Caulfield at that time discuss with
you the clandestine nature of your assignment?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. When did you and ]Mr. Caulfield, if you did,
engage in such a conversation?
Mr. McCord. I believe it followed the June 17 break-in.
Senator Montoya. That is when he was discussing with you the
possibility of clemency?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Or shortly after the June 17 break-in and before
the trial? Which was it?
Mr. ]\lcCoRD. My first conversation with him was shortly after
June 17, sometime in July or August.
Senator Montoya. And was he an employee of the White House
at that time?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. Where was he employed?
Mr. McCoRD. He was either employed or due to be employed at
the Treasury Department in the position I mentioned earlier.
Senator Montoya. And what was that conversation about?
183
Mr. McCoRD, This was a conversation about which I referred
this morning, a telephone call in which he stated that he was making
a trip overseas and that if I needed to reach him, to call his home and
leave word and he would call me back.
Senator Montoya. Now, after you had your three interviews with
him, who else did you see prior to being hired on a part-time basis
in October of 1971?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Robert Odle at the Committee for the Re-
Election of the President, to make an initial interview with me,
with Mr. Caulfield present.
Senator Montoya. And were you hired pursuant to this interview?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And you became a part-time employee of the
operation there?
Mr. McCoRD. I did.
Senator Montoya. Did you at any time discuss with Mr. Odle
the triple assignment which you related this morning was your
assignment, or was the nature of the operation with respect to
Mr. Liddy's involvement?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir; I did not discuss that with Mr. Odle.
Senator Montoya. Now, when you stated this morning that one
of the assignments, or that the total assignment would involve getting
photographic information, political espionage, and electronic sur-
veillance, when did you fhst find out about the composition of your
entire operation?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe it would have been in April 1972, when I
met Mr. Hunt for the first time.
Senator Montoya. And I believe you have previously stated that
during the course of February, you were in touch with Mr. Liddy
and other individuals with respect to planning for the clandestine
operation which later turned out to be Watergate?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And where did this take place?
Mr. McCoRD. The first part of your question, sir, was when?
Senator Montoya. Where did the initial conversations with respect
to the Watergate planning take place?
Mr. McCoRD. In Mr. Liddy's office at the Committee To Re-
Elect the President.
Senator Montoya. Was this in February?
Mr. McCoRD. January and February initially; yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And who else was in on this?
Mr. McCoRD. No one else, sir.
Senator Montoya. And were you aware that a plan was being
formulated?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, su-.
Senator Montoya. And were you also aware that the plan was
being formulated for submission to the Attorney General?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, su-.
Senator Montoya. And did you provide any input into this plan?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator Montoya, What kind of input did you provide?
Mr. McCoRD. In the nature of uiformation Mr. Liddy sought
about different costs of equipment, electronic equipment and the
184
different components that he was interested in, the transmission
deAdces and the receiving devices in particular.
Senator Montoya. And did you discuss with Mr. Liddy at that
time as to manpower requirements and other necessary details to
carry out the plans?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Give us the substance of those conversations.
Mr. McCord. He was interested in the overall cost, first of all,
of these types of operations, specifically referring to electronic oper-
ations, what the pieces of equipment would cost, what it took to receive
them, what types of receivers were best. He was interested in the
best type of equipment in this sense for this operation. He wanted
to know how many pieces of equipment it would take for the Demo-
cratic National Committee, for example, to transmit and receive
transmissions from the Democratic National Committee headquarters;
secondly, in connection with the McGovern committee headquarters;
and thu'dly, in connection mth the Democratic National Convention
site in Miami, Fla.
Senator Montoya. What was the value of the equipment that
you used at the Democratic National Committee?
Mr. McCoRD. I would guess about $15,000 in total but I am not
sure.
Senator Montoya. $15,000? _
Mr. McCord. Fifteen, yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. What was the value of the equipment that
you used in Miami?
Mr. McCoRD. I did not use any there, sir.
Senator Montoya. Were you contemplating using the same equip-
ment from the National Committee at the National Convention in
Miami?
Mr. McCoRD. No, su*, that was separate equipment.
Senator Montoya. Where else were you going to use equipment?
Mr. McCoRD. Those three places that I have stated — the Mc-
Govern committee headquarters. Democratic National Committee,
and the convention site for the Democratic Party in Miami, Fla.
Senator Montoya. Doesn't it stand to reason that for the expendi-
ture of $65,000, you were going to launch quite a few operations?
Mr. McCoRD. There were three separate locations and it would
take
Senator Montoya. Well, at the rate of $15,000 apiece, you would
have some equipment left for other operations.
Now, why was the budget so high?
Mr. McCoRD. Well, I think to ansAver your question, sir, there was
planned, for example, for the Democratic National Committee two
separate operations there, not just the one that v/as initially planned.
Mr. Liddy budgeted for what he felt was adequate equipment for all
three locations and it would not simph^ take just — you asked the
question of how much was the value of the equipment that was in-
stalled and I gave the figure of about $15,000.
The additional equipment that was taken in was an additional cost
factor there.
Does that answer your question, or have I not?
Senator Montoya. Let me ask you this: Did you assume wiien you
purchased this equipment for an approximate sum of $65,000 that it
185
would be used solely for the three operations about which you had
testified, or did 3^ou assume that this equipment would be used for other
operations, to which you would not be related in involvement?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes, sir. This was a part of it.
Senator ]Montoy . Sir?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, the walkie-talkie equipment, for example, was
scheduled, as I understood it, for use in certain surveillance operations
by the Cuban mdividuals referred to against demonstrators and vio-
lence-oriented groups in Miami, Fla. So that was an example of my
reasons for answering yes to your question.
Senator Montgya. So then am I to assume that other than 3'our
own involvement, there could have been other mvolvements in other
parts of the country, or even in Washington?
Mr. McCoRD. The communications, the walkie-talkie equipment
specifically, I knew of no other immediate planned use of the electronic
equipment; such could have been possible.
Senator Montoya. How much telephone tapping equipment did
you buy and was this just barely sufficient, or was this in surplus after
you had serviced the needs for the three places Avhich you had in
mind at the time, namely, the Watergate, the Democratic convention
in Miami, and the McGovern headquarters?
Mr. McCoRD. In the neighborhood of $45,000 worth of equipnrent
planned for those three locations and possible other use against
demonstrators m Miami.
Senator Montoya. You had $20,000 left in equipment, would you
say?
Mr. ]McCoRD. Perhaps more than that, sn\
Senator Montoya. How much more?
Mr. McCoRD. You are referring to the — I mentioned the, $15,000.
Senator Montoya. And then it stands to reason that you could
reuse some of this equipment you were using at Watergate and that
you intended to use at Miami and also at McGoveni headquarters,
is that not correct?
Mr. AlcCoRD. No sir, I believe they were planned to be used
concurrentl3^
Senator Montoya. Sir?
Mr. McCoRD. I think it was planned to be used in three separate
operations concurrently.
Senator Montoya. Did you have any other employees under you
or under your direction who were performing any of the activities
within the master plan that j^ou worked on initially?
Mr. McCoRD. Just Mr. Bald^\^n.
Senator Montoya. And you stated that one of the purposes or
objectives was to gather photographic information. Now who was in
charge of this division?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Hunt.
Senator Montoya. And who was in charge of political espionage?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Liddy, as I understand it, and Mr. Hunt were
jointly involved in the two. I understood Mr. Liddy was in charge.
Senator Montoya. All right. Wlio was involved in electronic
surveillance?
Mr. McCoRD. I was.
Senator Montoya. All right.
186
Did you employ anyone to help you in this endeavor?
Mr, McCoRD. Mr. Baldwin only at that point in time.
Senator Montoya. Wlio employed the Cubans?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Hunt, to my understanding.
Senator Montoya. Now, do you know whether Mr. Hunt recruited
them in Florida?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not know, sir.
Senator Montoya. How were the Cubans procured?
Mr. McCoRD. That I do not know, sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you also have something to do with work-
ing out the arrangements for the security of the Attorney General
and Mrs. Mitchell at their home?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes sir.
Senator Montoya. What specifically did you do in that respect?
Mr. McCoRD. Myself was to secure at Mr. Mitchell's requests a
security officer for Mrs. Mitchell beginning in March, May, April,
1972, and to generally oversee the security of their apartment at the
Watergate Hotel, Watergate Apartments, and to insure that there
was security protection for their daughter who was attending school,
a young daughter, teenager in Washington, and specifically, in
particular to see there was a security officer accompanying her when
she traveled.
Senator Montoya. How many times did you visit the apartment?
Mr. McCoRD. Numerous times.
Senator Montoya. Did you converse with Mrs. Mitchell or the
Attorney General during those visits?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes sir.
Senator Montoya. What did you converse about?
Mr. McCoRD. Mainly matters relating to those functions, the
security functions and in particular a security officer to travel with
her and security of their apartment.
Senator Montoya. So you were very well acquainted with Mr.
Mitchell?
Mr. McCoRD. Y^es sir.
Senator Montoya. Now, will you state, are you aware of what
happened to Mrs. Mitchell in California?
Mr. McCoRD. No sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you manifest any concern in view of the
fact that you had hired these people to guard her?
Mr. McCord. In connection with the Cafifornia matter, you are
referring to?
Senator Montoya. Y^es.
Mr. McCoRD. I was in jail at the time.
Senator Montoya. You were concerned about yourself only at
that time?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes sir.
Senator Montoya. Now you wi'ote a letter, Mr. McCord, to Judge
Sirica in which you indicated a belief that retaliatory measures would
be taken against you, your family, and your friends if you should
disclose facts relating to the affair, and you stated in your letter such
retaliation could destroy careers, income, reputations of persons who
are innocent of any guilt whatsoever, whatever.
Now can you give us the basis or the foundation for tliis particular
belief which you communicated to Judge Sirica?
187
"Mr. McCoRD. I believe I have testified previously that it was
primarily family concerns that were expressed by my wife that such
could happen physically if I decided to talk, they were not concerns
trying to deter me but simply a natural family concern for myself
and my family which in turn were relayed to me.
Senator Montoya. Were any of these communications by known
individuals or were they just relayed to your wife more or less second-
hand?
Mr. McCoRD. They were relayed to me secondhanded. I think
the other half of the answer is, has to do with, the statement I read
this morning. I do not think it concerned me greatly but I know that
it had some effect upon my wife.
Senator Montoya. Now when Mr. Liddy unfolded this plan to
you did he indicate to you how you would be taken care of in case
anything happened?
Mr. McCord. No sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you have an}^ concern that something
could happen and then what would they do in that case?
Mr. McCord. Perhaps I do not understand the question, sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you at that time when the plan unfolded
before your very eyes, was unfolded before j^our very eyes by Mr.
Liddy, did you feel any concern for what might happen and who
would take care of the situation if it did happen?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Senator Montoya. Wliat kind of concern did you have?
Mr. McCoRD. I think the concerns that what did happen might
happen.
Senator Montoya. Well, now, when you were arrested at the Water-
gate and taken to jail, two attorneys apparently appeared there the
next morning. Who were those attorneys?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Rafterty and Mr. Douglas Caddy, C-a-d-d-y.
Senator Montoya. Who sent them there?
Mr. McCoRD. I did not know at the time. I have since understood
that Mr. Hunt had a part in arranging for their appearance.
Senator Montoya. Was anyone — was anything said to you by
these attorneys to keep quiet or not divulging anything or even the
source of your employment?
Mr. McCoRD. There was a brief discussion with all of the defendants
at that fu-st meeting, if that is what you are referiing to, at the place
where we were arrested.
Senator Montoya. Where was this discussion?
Mr. McCord. In the Second District Precinct in Washington,
police precinct.
Senator Montoya. Now, you also indicated that you visited other
places. Now, during your employment with the committee, what
places did you visit throughout the country other than New York
:about which Mr. Odle testified yesterday?
Mr. McCoRD. Chicago.
Senator Montoya. I believe he testified about Chicago. What other
places did you visit?
Mr. McCoRD. Miami, Fla; Miami, Fla.
Senator Montoya. How long did you stay there?
Mr. McCoRD. Two or 3 days.
96-296— 73— bk. 1 13
188
Senator Montoya. What was your mission there?
Mr. McCoRD. It was along, that was along, with about a half dozen
White House personnel to review the overall planning for the use of the
Doral Hotel which was to be used in August 1972 as, for both offices
and residences for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President
staff and for the White House staff, both. My task there was to look
over the security needs and to recommend measures to appropriate
to those needs.
Senator Montoya. Wlio went to Miami to plan the security for the
Democratic National Committee?
Mr. McCoRD. The Democratic National Committee?
Senator Montoya. And the convention, you indicated you had an
interest in that.
Mr. McCoRD. I did not. I do not know, sir, I did not.
Senator Montoya. Did you not state that there would be some
effort made to carry on a surveillance program at the Democratic
National Convention?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And who was assigned to that task, if you
know?
Mr. McCoRD. I knew Mr. Hunt had some activity in that regard.
Senator Montoya. Did he hire other people, to your knowledge?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe he utilized some of the other men that were
in the Watergate operation. I had understood that from him, I was
not certain as to the exact nature.
Senator Montoya. You were on two pa3Tolls, apparentl}^ when
Mr. Liddy hired you for this clandestine operation. You were on
Mr. Odle's payroll as well as Mr. Liddy 's, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct, sir.
Senator Montoya. And you were receiving hov/ much from Mr.
Odle and how much from Mr. Liddv on a monthly basis?
Mr. McCoRD. Approximately one-twelfth of the $20,000 a vear
salary from Mr. Odle; $2,000 from Mr. Liddy.
Senator Montoya. Did 3^our attorney at any time communicate to
vou that there had been some offers of clemency, that is, your attornev,
Mr. Alch?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Will 3^ou state what 3^ou received by way of
mformation in that resjject?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Please do so.
Mr. McCoRD. It is my recollection that the date was in late Sep-
tember or early October 1972 when Mr. Alch was in town, came to a
meeting, he said, with Mr. Bittman and stated that Executive clem-
ency and financial support and rehabilitation would be made available
to the defendants in the case, including me.
Senator Montoya. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker will ask you one question and then
we will adjourn.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. McCord, it is 4 o'clock and we are going to
adjourn shorth^ and my question does not require an answer today.
We can take it up when you return on Tuesday. What I am about
189
to say in no way disparages your testimony because you have been
meticulousl}' careful, I believe, in your testimonjT^; you have been very
exact in the answers you have given to counsel and to members of the'
committee. I must say I am impressed with the thorouglmess with
which you prepared memoranda today, and previously in j'our testi-
mony before this committee in executive session. All of those tliinga.
are commendable and we thank you for them.
I practiced law for almost 19 years before I came to the U.S.
Senate, and I had a lot of mtnesses at one time or the other, and I
came to recognize a syndrome that I think may be present today,
and that is, sometimes I had a witness on the stand who would tell
me the answer to the question I asked exactly, and sometimes if I
did not know what question to ask I would not get an answer.
Now the judicial system of the United States is a marvelous thing.
It is made up, really, of an adversary conflict between a defendant
and a plaintiff or between the State and the defendant.
But this committee is not engaged in an adversary conflict. We are
engaged in a fact-finding mission to get all of the information we can.
I think you and Mr. Fensterwald, who is a very fine attorney, know
the principal matters that we are tr3dng to establish, and you have
covered with very exact answers many of the items that deal with the
subject of this inquiry.
M}^ question to you is this: Based on A^our references to other
motivations, based on j-our reference twice, I beUeve, to a trip to Las
Vegas, based on your reference to other people from time to time,
based on the fact that part of the information that you might seek to
obtain was national security and part was political, based on a sketchy
description of some of the things, some of the threats that were passed
on to you by the Internal Security Division and the like, I am led to
wonder if we do not have that situation where the committee does
aot know what to ask you, and really we do want to know.
So, would it be possible, Mr. McCord, for you and your attorney
to return on Tuesday, and supply us any information you think
relevant to the scope of this inquiry, whether we have got enough
sense to ask for it or not. Would you be willing to try to do that by
Tuesday?
Mr. McCoRD. I will.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much.
Senator Ervin. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock Tuesday.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene
It 10 a.m., Tuesday, May 22, 1973.]
TUESDAY, MAY 23, 1973
i U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington, D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
(chairman), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and Weicker.
Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel; Fred D. Thompson,
minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy ciiief counsel; Arthur
S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; David M. Dorsen,
James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsels;
Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsel; Donald G. Sanders,
H. William Shure, and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels;
Joan C. Cole, secretary to the minority; Pauline O. Dement, research,
assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert Baca,,
office of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Marc Lackritz,
Ron Rotunda, assistant counsels; Eugene Boyce, hearings counsel;
John Walz, publications clerk.
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Dash. Senator Baker will be opening the questioning of Mr.
McCord. But before that, Mr. McCord, it has come to our attention
that there is concern among a number of Cuban- Americans and others
of Latin nationaUties that in your reference during your testimony,
and I am not suggesting that it is your intention to cast any aspersions
but that you have referred to others who participated with you by
their proper names but in your reference to those who are Cuban-
Americans you have referred to them as Cubans. Would you in your
testimony in the future when referring to the participants who worked
with you, use their proper names and when not necessary not use a
nationality or ethnic reference,
TESTIMONY OP JAMES W. McCOUD— Resumed
Mr. McCord. I would be very glad to.
■ Senator Baker. ISIr. Chairman, thank you very much.
■^ Mr. McCord and Mr. Fensterwald, I appreciate^ your agreeing
on Friday to respond to rather general and even possibly ambiguous
questions. But to reiterate the question, so it is in perspective for
today's hearing, my purpose is this: I remarked that I felt your
testimony had been vqtj thorough and very exact. We are grateful
for the several memorandums that you provided the committee and
(191)
192
from which you have testified which I believe adds to the element of
concern and the element of sensitivity to exactitude which is ex-
hibited. I also express the concern that notwithstanding ver}^ thorough
interviews and one executive session with the committee, I continue
to have the feeling that there is still a substantial amount of informa*
tion which you may not tliink is relevant to this inquiry but which,
in fact, may be relevant in terms of other witnesses or in terms of the
general pattern which emerges. I indicated, therefore, that I would
be grateful if jou would search j'our mind and recollect within the
boundaries and framework of the jurisdictional ciualifications of this
committee and withm the scope of the general areas of inquiry which
we have probed so far.
As you probabl}^ know, the resolution. Senate Resolution 60, which
was passed by the U.S. Senate, provides for an investigation into
Presidential campaign activities in 1972, to ascertain whether or not
there were illegal, miproper, or unethical activities. Beyond that, Mr;
McCord as 3^ou and Mr. Fensterwald can surmise this committee is
interested in broad categories. We want to know, of course, of illegal
activity or activity which is now known to be illegal, such as the break-
in at the Watergate, the Democratic National Committee. The so-
called coverup, the allegations that efforts were made by some to con-
ceal the involvement or connections involved. The money that was
involved in the campaign activities, the source, the accounting pro-
cedures involved, if any, and the disposition of those funds and foi
what purpose. We want to know who is involved and what their rela-
tionships are. Those are the general areas that we have probed so far.
M}^ reason for reiterating it is to put, I hope, your further reasons in
perspective and to add one additional caveat. Not only do I not know
what I might ask you in these respects bej^ond what you have testi-
fied, but I do not want to limit you by a description that I have made
of the contribution that 3^ou can make to this committee. I believe
you to be a very, very important witness, and I reiterate tliis is not
an adversary proceeding.
You are not a defendant in this forum and I am not a prosecutoD
of a defendant.
So with that, Mr. McCord, if 3"ou have a further statement to makq
I would be grateful for it. That may or may not generate furtheil
questions that I will have as we proceed with the testimony.
Mr. McCoRD. All right, sir. I will try to give as much information
as I can. I realize the very large scope of the committee's activities.
I realize that it is also possible that the committee may have an
impression from me which I apologize for that I may have morei
information to offer than I really do. I think I will do my best to seti
forth in this memorandum today, this statement, things that havei
come to mind that it would appear you would be very interested in
and to respond to questions therefrom and to do an3'thing further!
that the committee may want to amplify what I have said or develop
any further information that may be helpful to you.
Senator Baker. Thank jou.
Mr. McCoRD. One of the statements that we did not get into onJI
the last meeting, I think primarily because of the factor of time, was
a memorandum which I had written to the committee dated May 4,
1973, the subject of pressure on the defendants to blame the Water-
193
gate operation on CIA, and other matters. I am prepared to go into
that statement at this time if it has your approvah
vSenator Baker. Thank you very much. Is that letter a part of
the record?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Do a^ou have a copy of it?
Mr. McCoRD, Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Might it be introduced, Mr. Chairman, as an
exhibit?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Senator Baker. I understand copies have not been suppUed to the
committee but if there is no objection, I would like to ask it be made
an exhibit in the record at this point.
Senator Ervin. I think it might be well to have it printed in full at
this point in the record.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Mr. McCoRD. I will read the statement.
I have previously referred to political pressure which was applied
to the seven Watergate defendants.
One area of pressure which was applied was that of December 1972,
in which intense pressure was applied on some of the defendants to
falsely claim for purposes of a defense during the trial in January 1973,
that the Watergate operation was a CIA operation. This would have
had the effect of clearing the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President and the White House of responsibility for the operation.
In two separate meetings in December 1972, it was suggested that I
use as my defense during the trial the false story that the operation
was a CIA operation. I refused to do so.
I was subsequently informed by Bernard Barker just before the
trial began in January 1973, that E. Howard Hunt and other un-
named persons in Miami had brought intense pressure to bear against
the Cuban-Americans and b}^ those — I will digress from the record to
read to whom I was referring — and the identities of these persons
came to me in conversations with Mr. Bernard Barker and some of
the other individuals involved, specifically I was referring to Mr.
Bernard L. Barker, to Mr. Eugenio R. Martinez, to Mr. Frank A.
Sturgis, to Mr. Virgilio R. Gonzales — I mil restate the sentence.
I was subsequently informed by Bernard Barker just before the
trial began in January 1973, that he, Howard Hunt, and other un-
named persons in Miami had brought intense pressure to bear against
the Cuba,n-Americans who were defendants to use the same story
that it was a CIA operation, as their defense, that my stand taken
against it had been the decisive factor causing this ploy to be dropped,
and that Hunt was very bitter about it. Mr. Hunt's bitterness was
later revealed early in the trial when the Cubans advised that Hunt
had said that I "was responsible for our being in the plight we were in
for not going along with the CIA thing."
At a later time, I heard from Barker that he had been told that
Cuban money was suspected of being funnelled into the Mc Govern
campaign. I have no knowledge that this suspicion was ever verified.
The two December 1972 meetings Avith me were on December 21,
1972, and on December 26, 1972. Present at the first meeting with me
at the Monocle restaurant in Washington, D.C., were Gerald Alch
194
and Bernard Shankman, my attorneys. Present at the second meeting
was Gerald Alch, and the meetmg was at his office in Boston, Mass.
Alch stated that he had just come from a meeting with Wilham O.
Bittman.
In the first meetmg, Alch stated that he had just come from a meet-
ing with William O. Bittman, attorney for E. Howard Hunt, and I
received the impression in the discussion that followed that Alch was
conve^ong an idea or request from Bittman. There followed a sugges-
tion from Alch that I use as my defense during the trial the story
that the Watergate operation was a CIA operation. I heard him out
on the suggestion which mcluded questions as to whether I could
ostensibly have been recalled from retirement from CIA to partic-
ipate in the operation. He said that if so, my personnel records
at CIA could be doctored to reflect such a recall. He stated that
Schlesinger, the new Director of CIA, whose appointment had just
been announced, ''could be subpenaed and would go along with it."
I had noted in the newspapers of that day, December 21, 1972, that
it had been announced by the Wliite House that Mr. Schlesinger had
taken over as Director of CIA, and that it had been decided that
Pat Gray would be supported by the White House to be permanent
Director of the FBI.
Alch went on to mention testimony, or a statement, made ta
Federal authorities by Gary Bittenbender, a Metropolitan Police
Department imdercover police officer, whom I had seen at the court-
house, on June 17, 1972, when the five of us who were arrested were
arraigned, in wliich Bittenbender purportedly claimed that I had
told him that day that the Watergate operation was a CIA operation.
I advised Alch that if Bittenbender had made such a statement under
oath that he had perjured himself, and that I had not made such a
claim. Bittenbender can be interviewed to determme the circumstances
under which he had made such a statement, and whether his statement
was, in fact, an honest error of impressions based on events which
occurred m court on that day, which could have misled him. Those
were that some of us were identified in the hearmg in court as formerly
connected with CIA.
Alch went on to mention the name of Victor Marchetti whom he was
considering calling to describe CIA training in which its employees
were trained to deny CIA sponsorship of an operation if anything
went wi'ong and its participants were arrested. He also requested that
I meet with him in Boston on December 26, 1972, which I did.
There he opened the discussion by showing me a written statement
of an interview with Bittenbender in which Bittenbender claimed that
on June 17, 1972, I had told him that the Watergate operation was a
CIA operation. I repeated to Alch my earlier statement, that Bitten-
bender had either perjured himself, or had made a false statement to
Federal authorities. I told Alch that I could not use as my defense the
story that the operation was a CIA operation because it was not true.
In addition, I told him that even if it meant m}^ freedom, I would not
turn on the organization that had employed me for 19 years, and
wrongly deal such a damaging blow that it would take j^ears for it to
recover from it, and finally that I believed the organization to be one
of the finest organizations of its kind in the world and would not let
anyone wrongly lay the operation at the feet of CIA.
195
By now, I was completely convinced that the Wliite House was
bohind the idea and ploy which had been presented, and that the
AVhite House was turning ruthless, in my opinion, and would do what-
ever was politically expedient at any one particular point in time to
accomplish its own ends.
In addition, I earlier had determined to tell the true story of the
Watergate operation, and it was now only a matter of a propitious
time to do so.
On Frida}^, December 29, 1972, I visited Bernard Shankraan's
office in Wasliington, D.C., and let him read a statement which I had
prepared, wliich I proposed to read to the press on December 30, 1972,
releasing Alch as my attorney. I believed that although Shankman
had been present at the first meeting he was not a party to the events
previously described. Shankman suggested that I give Alch an
opportunity to meet \vith me and explain why he had undertaken the
course which he had, and such a meeting was set up for Tuesday,
January 2, 1973, in Washington.
Alch failed to appear, and I delivered a letter to Judge Sirica, releasing
Alch as my attorney. Alch immediately called, asked to meet with me
on January 3, 1973, and asked to continue as my attorney. We met and
Alch stated that he, in conveying the request made of me on December
21 and December 26, 1972, was acting out of what he felt to be my
own best interests. By this time, I was convinced that the ploy to lay
the operation at CIA's doorstep had been headed off, and agreed to
give him a second chance.
By this time, I was also convinced that the White House had fired
Helms in order to put its own man in control at CIA, but as well to
lay the foundation for claiming that the Watergate operation was a
CIA operation, and now to be able to claim that "Helms had been
fired for it." There had been indications as early as July that the
Committee for the Re-Election of the President was claimmg that the
Watergate operation was a CIA operation. Mrs. Hunt had told me in
late July 1972 that Paul O'Brien had told Howard Hunt in July that
the Committee To Re-Elect the President had originally informed him
that the Watergate operation was a CIA operation. Mrs. Hunt said
that her husband had denied to O'Brien that it was a CIA operation.
By early December 1972, it appeared that the White House was
beginning to make its move. The events of December 21 and December
26, 1972, only confirmed this in my mind.
Further, based on an earlier discussion with Robert Mardian in
May 1972, it appeared to me that the White House had for some time
been trying to get political control over the CIA assessments and
estimates, in order to make them conform to "White House policy."
One of the things this meant to me was that this could mean that
CIA estimates and assessments could then be forced to accord with
DOD estimates of future U.S. weapons and hardware needs. This
could be done by either shifting an intelligence function to DOD from
CIA, or by gaining complete control over it at CIA.
' Among other things, this also smacked of the situation which
Hitler's intelligence chiefs found themselves in, in the 1930's and
1940's, when they were put in the position of having to tell him what
they thought he wanted to hear about foreign military capabilities
and intentions, instead of what they really believed, which ultimately
195
was one of the things which led to Nazi Germanj^'s downfalL "When
Unked with what I saw happening to the FBI under Pat Gray —
poHtical control by the White House — it appeared then that the two
Government agencies which should be able to prepare their reports,
and to conduct their business, with complete integrity and honesty,
in the national interest, were no longer going to be able to do so.
That the Nation was in serious trouble has since been confirmed in
my opinion by what happened in the case of Gray's leadership of
the FBI.
E. Howard Hunt has additional information relevant to the above.
Hunt stated to me on more than one occasion in the latter part of
1972, that he, Hunt, had information in his possession which "would
be sufficient to impeach the President." In addition, Mrs. E. Howard
Hunt, on or about November .30, 1972, in a personal conversation
vnth me, stated that E. Howard Hunt's attorne}^, WilUam O. Bittman,
had read to Kenneth Parkinson, the attorney for the Committee To
Ee-Elect the President, in which letter. Hunt purportedly threatened
"to blow the White House out of the water." Mrs. Hunt at this point
in her conversation with me, also repeated the statement which she,
too, had made before, wliich was that E. Howard Hunt had informa-
tion which could impeach the President.
I regret that tliis memorandum has taken this length to set forth.
In view of the nature of the information wliich I had to furnish,
however, it appeared that there was no other way to adequateh" set
this material forth, and to do so in the proper context, without de-
leting material highly relevant to the events being reported. I shall be
glad to appear and answer questions under oath on the material
which appears in this memorandum. It has my signature.
I have a further addition relevant to that in the statement which I
could read at this time.
The topic of it is the December 1972 letter to John Caulfield. This
letter is relevant to the May 4, 1973, memo submitted to Senate
Watergate committee and the Federal grand jur}", on the subject of
pressure to place the blame on CIA for the Watergate operation.
A letter was written to John Caulfield during the week of Decem-
ber 25, 1972; reference to tliis letter appeared in the press the last
weekend. And geared — speaking of my own feelings and at the time
the letter was wi'itten — and geared because of what appeared to me
to be a ruthless attempt by the Wliite House to put the blame for
the Watergate operation on CIA where it did not belong, I sought
to head it off by sending a letter to Caulfield. This letter was couched
in strong language because it seemed to me at the time that this was
the only language that the White House understood. The letter read
in substance as follows, to the best of my memory:
"Dear Jack: I am sorry to have to wiite you this letter. If Helms
goes and the Watergate operation is laid at CIA's feet where it does
not belong, ever}^ tree in the forest mil fall. It will be a scorched
desert. The whole matter is at the precipice right now. Pass the mes-
sage that if they want it to blow, they are on exactly the right course.
I am sorry that you will get hurt in the fallout."
The letter was unsigned and did not contain an}^ message re^
questing an}^ contact with Caulfield, nor any request for the White
House to get me off in the case. I, in fact, sought no such contact at
197
any time. If I had wanted to talk with Caulfield, it would not have
been necessary to go through any complicated arrangements and a
trip to William Bittman's office as occurred on January 8, 1973. I
need only have made a phone call to Caulfield's office or home. At
no time did I ever initiate any such call to Caulfield.
Now, the above letter to Caulfield brings to mind another set of
communications of mine on December 6, 1972. On December 4, 1972,
Judge Sirica had stated in open court that the jury in January 1973,
would want to know wlio had hired the men for the Watergate oper-
ation and why.
On December 6, 1972, the Washington Star carried an article which
appeared to me to be an administration-planted story answering
Judge Sirica's query stating that "Reliable sources state that jMcCord
recruited the four Cubans and that they believed that they were
working for the President on an extremel}^ sensitive mission." This
was untrue.
This appeared to me to be laying the groundwork for a false claim
at the trial that I was the "ringleader" of the Watergate plot. This
would draw attention away from Hunt and Liddy, and I believe
possibly away from the Wliite House, since both of them had formerly
worked at the White House and I had not.
That same evening December 6, 1972, I sent telegrams to William
O. Bittman, attorney for Hunt, and Bernard Barker's residence in
Miami, Fla., stating that the story was untrue as they both knew^
and I asked for conmients by return mail from Barker. I also wrote
Hunt a letter on the matter stating that as he also knew, the story was
untrue and he could either correct it or I would do so. Copies of the
telegrams can probably be obtained from the Western Union Co.
With the letter to Caulfield in late December 1972, I was trying to
head off an effort to falsely lay the Watergate operation off on CIA.
In the telegrams and letter to Hunt and the others in December 1972,
that I have just referred to, I was trjdng to head off an effort to
falsely lay the recruitment of the Cubans off on the writer which
would, in turn shift the focus of the trial off of those formerl}' con-
nected with the White House, namely, Liddy and Hunt than from
those who in effect had actually recruited them, namely Mr. Hunt.
I have some other memorandums in the statements that I have here
to read, and I can answer your questions at this point or proceed to
the reading of the statement, as you w^ould prefer.
Senator Baker. If it is agreeable with the chairman, Mr. McCord,,
I would prefer that 3^ou go ahead and read the material that you have.
Mr. McCoRD. Newspapers over the weekend have also referred
to some calls to some local embassies. I will try to explain those m the
statement that I will read at this time.
In July 1972, Mrs. Hunt had told me that Paul O'Brien, attorney
for CRP, had told her husband that when the Watergate case broke in
June, the Committee for the Re-Election of the President told O'Brien
that the Watergate operation was a CIA operation, I believe I referred
to this in the earlier statem.ent. She said that Howard Hunt had ex-
ploded at this and told O'Brien that this was not true; that it was not a
CIA operation. A few days later Mrs. Hunt told me that the CRP
law^^ers were now reporting that the administration was going to
allege at the trial that Liddy had stolen $16,000 and had bribed Hunt
m
and McCord to perform the operation. I told her that it looked like
they were now changing their cover stories, referring to the adminis-
tration and I would not sit still for either false story, and I shortly
wrote my attorney, Gerald Alch, repeating this information and
setting forth these same views of mine.
In September 1972, the indictments came out and no one was being
indicted among the higher ups, so there looked hke a further coverup
to me.
Also in September and October 1972, there began to be a series of
telephone anomalies on my phone that indicated to me that the
phone had been tapped. Further I had read in August 1972 in News-
week magazine, I believe that Ellsberg had tried for 5 months to get
the Government to admit wiretapping of his phone calls, and those of
-his attorney and the Government denied such calls until a court
order forced a search of 12 separate law enforcement agencies and
turned up telephone interception of Leonard Boudin's calls to the
Chilean Embassy.
I knew that the Government had also lied about wiretapping in
the Coplon case and in the Hofa case for several weeks until dis-
closure was forced from them. In an effort to test the truthfulness of
the Government on a forthcoming motion for disclosure of wiretapping
of the defendants' phones in the Watergate case, including my own, I
made two calls in September and October 1972 to two local embassies.
On October 10, 1972, 1 asked for the filing of a motion for Government
disclosure of any interceptions and 2 weeks later the Government
came back with a denial of any, saying a search of Government
records had been made. I knew that 2 weeks was too short a time to
search 12 different Government agencies for such records, and beheved
the Government was not telUng the truth.
In January 1973, after Caulfield had initiated contact with me, I
advised him of the perjury of Jeb Magruder and of the two telephone
calls I have just referred to, plus the other indications to me of illegal
interception of tcvj phone calls, and asked Jack to check into both. He
came back a few days later and said that the Government had found
nothing on the phone calls. He did not say what he had done about the
information of perjur}^ by Magruder.
In January I also asked my attorney to renew the motion for
discovery of interception of my calls so there could be such a motion
on the record and I beheve he did so on January 17, 1973. I knew
that the two embassy calls would be insufScient to overturn the case,
because all that would happen would be for the Government to take
the information to the bench and for the judge to declare the informa-
tion not relevant.
Furthermore the Government would state that the information
would not be used against me in evidence anyway. I did beheve that
such disclosure would be a w&y of testing the truthfulness of the
Government regarding such illegal interceptions and I was greatly
concerned that there had been other illegal interceptions of my
telephone conversations and those of the other defendants beginning
June 17, 1972. ^
Further, I did believe that if sufficient illegal interceptions of my
phone calls had occurred such would have a bearing on my case. I still
199
believe there was such an interception just as Dr. Ellsberg beheved
that his own phone calls had been intercepted.
There is an attachment to this, the New York Times of today's
date. The title of the article ''Warning Against Blaming of CIA Laid
to McCord."
Continuing on a separate subject in a statement, if that is 3'our
desire.
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCoRD. The topic of this memorandum is "Sanction of the
Watergate Operation."
John Mitchell, by virtue of his position as Attorney General of
the United States, and John Dean, by vii'tue of his position as counsel
to the President, hy their consideration and approval of the Watergate
operation, in my opinion, gave sanction to the Watergate operation
b}^ both the White House and the Attorney General's offices.
I had been accustomed to working in an atmosphere where such
sanction by the White House and the Attorney General was more
than enough. As with Wliite House staffers, it was not my habit to
question when two such liigh offices sanctioned an activity — it
carried the full force and effect of Presidential sanction.
For the preceding 30 years I had been working in an environment
where if there were ever any question of the legality of a matter or an
activity it would alwaj'^s be sent to high legal officials for a legal
decision on the matter, where if they sanctioned it, that was sufficient.
I can elaborate on tliis another way. Left alone, I would not have
undertaken the operation. I had plenty of other tilings to do in con^
nection with my security work at the Committee To Re-Elect the
President. Liddy wanted help. He came to me seeking that help with
the word that it had the approval of the Attorney General and the
counsel to the President. He said that it was part of the CRP mission,
in order to obtain information regarding not only political intelligence
but also regarding violence-oriented groups who would be planning
violence against the committee in Washington, and later at the August
convention site, therebj'' endangering the fives and property of the
committee and its personnel. My mission was protection of such lives
and property. Uppermost in everyone's minds, at that point in time
and certainly in mine, was the bloodshed wliich had occurred at the
1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, and I constantly
sought intelUgence from any source which might help forewarn us and
help us avoid in 1972 that danger to the lives of our people.
The right to demonstrate, or the right of peaceful assembly is a
right guaranteed by the Constitution. I took absolutely no issue with
that. It was the 2 percent to 3 percent of the demonstrators who
focused on violence, damage to life and property-, that concerned me.
In 1969 we had seen the bombing of the Capitol Building itself. In
May 1972 we had seen the bombmg of the Pentagon with the equiva-
lent of 18 sticks of dj^namite. In February 1972 there were four pipe
bombs emplaced at a police station in Manchester, N.H., one of
which went off prematurely, and mangled the arm of the young man
who had reportedly emplaced them. Caught with him was a young
lady who had in her possession four letters which said, "we have just
bombed the offices of the Committee To Re-Elect the President in
New Hampshire." Found in her apartment were the makings of other
200
pipe bombs. It was clear to me and to others that the intentions of
the two were to go on from the poHce station and drop off other
bombs at the CRP offices in Manchester, where there liad been demon-
stration and trovible a few days before. _
Only their arrest preempted that action. A few days later in Oak-
land, Cahf., another pipe bomb was emplaced on the first floor of the
Republican county headquarters and blew out all of the windows and
damaged a pillar to the building. Luckily no one was injured or killed.
Already in February there was a pattern then of bombings beginning
to develop against the committee and against Republican offices.
Subsequently, in Austin, Tex., the offices of Senator Tower were
destroyed by a firebomb which, I belieye, as I recall did a million
dollars worth of damage and destroj-ed irreplaceable files. So the con-
cern was not of a theoretical threat, but of a realistic threat of violence,
and I wanted advance notice from anywhere I could receive it, of action
planned against us of this sort — advance notice, advance warning, so
we could take measures to protect against it and protect our people's
lives. Propert}^ could be replaced. Lives could not.
Questions were on my mind like : Wlio are the?e people who bombed
in New Hampshire, in' Oakland, the Pentagon Building, the Capitol
Building? How are they funded? Who are they working with? Is anyone
in collusion with them, encouraging them, or funding them? The
Vietnam Veterans Against the War was one violence-oriented group
that was already saying in the spring of 1972, that they were going to
cause destruction to life and property at the August Republican
Convention, using in their own words, their own bodies and weapons
as the spearhead of the attack there — these are their exact words, and
some of them have since been indicted in Tallahassee, Fla., with
additional plans to damage the life and property in the convention.
Later in the summer of 1972 the WAW did in fact have offices in
the DNC in Washington, as I understand. I had also received informa-
tion from the Internal Security Division in May 1972, that some
individuals in Florida planned to forge college press credentials to get
into both the Democratic and Republican Convention sites, and
blow up the communication centers of both parties there and cause
havoc on the convention floor. That information was part of the
basis for my going to Miami in June 1972, with members of the
White House staff to survey and strengthen the security of the Doral
Hotel where both the Wliite House staff and the CRP staff were to
have both offices and quarters for July and August 1972. Some 30
recommendations were made as a result of that survey, to help
protect against such violence, and I believe that most were put into
effect before the convention.
Now, we also had word from CRP sources alleging that the
McGovern committee had "a pipeline" directly into the offices of the
Committee To Re-Elect the President in Washington ; allegedly, they
were feeding out, on a regular basis, policy position papers, that is,
plans and strategy, which were rather important to the. success of a
candidate's campaign. If the other side is reading your poker hand, he
can negate your plans.
We had word that one of the volunteers at the Committee To Re-
Elect the President had in fact prior to coming aboard the committee,
threatened the life of John Mitchell and of other persons. Tliis was at
201
about the same time Governor Wallace was almost killed in an assas-
sination attempt. There were numerous threats in writing and by-
phone against John Mitchell and his wife. One such call came to the
unlisted telephone of Mrs. Mitchell at their apartment and got her
greatly upset, as it would anj^ woman, because it appeared that even
the unlisted telephone number appeared then no longer safe.
We certainly had sufficient indications that violence-oriented groups
were out to endanger both life and property. With some 250,000
demonstrators planning to go to the convention in early 1972 and there
were statements that some would be out to commit violence. The
questions were: Wlio are such people? Who is funding them — encourag-
ing them? Who is in collusion with them? What are they planning next
and where? Are any of them being supported and encouraged by any
staff members of the McGovern committee or DNC? I had no indica-
tion whatever that Larry O'Brien or Senator McGovern had either
any knowledge of or part in such — just the contrar}'^, I was completely
convinced that they did not. But I was not so sure that, without
their knowledge, other staff members might not be working belihid
their backs to quietly encourage groups such as WAW.
McGovern's early political base was with some of the radical
groups. My questions were, Wliat was the extent of such encourage-
ment, if any, and how far did it go? Did they let such groups use their
telephones and work in their offices? There were indications in the
summer of 1972 that such groups actually did just that in California
and in DNC headquarters, in Washington. These then were some of
my concerns, in my role as security chief of the CRP; I felt that the
Watergate operation might produce some leads answering some of
these questions, and I had been ad\nsed that the operation had the
sanction of the White House and of the Attorney General, while he
was Attorney General.
In hindsight, I do not believe that the operation should have been
sanctioned or executed, nor should I have participated. However, you
asked me about some of my previous motivations and what some of
the atmosphere was in Miami. Those are some of the tilings that
make up my atmosphere and some of my motivations.
My next statement has to do with the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee I previously referred to in the CIA memorandum, wliich I
referred to Mr. Robert Mardian.
In ^lay 1972, Robert Mardian had told me that he, John Mitchell,
Robert Haldeman and John Ehrlichman were key members of an
"Intelligence Advisory Committee." I now assume that this was the
Intelligence Evaluation Committee, referred to, I believe, in the New
York Times of May 21, 1973.
I have previously submitted a tape to the Senate Watergate com-
mittee which I believe contains material which was the product of
that committee, and which I obtained from the evaluation section of
the Internal Securitv Division of the Department of Justice, a contact
established through Mr. Robert Mardian, in May 1972.
I have no knowledge of the sources of that committee.
Robert Mardian, during a brief conversation in June 1972, stated
that he was going to be "in charge of intelligence operations at Miami
during the convention." He did not elaborate further.
202
The next item is headed "Las Vegas Matter," wliich was referred
to in the previous testimony on Friday.
In January or February 1972, Gordon Liddy told me that he was
going out to Las Vegas, Nev., in connection with casing the office of
Hank Greenspun, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.
Liddy said that Attorney General Jolin Mitchell had told him that
Greenspun had in his possession blackmail type information involving
a Democratic candidate for President, that Mitchell wanted that
material, and Liddy said that this information was in some way
racketeer-related, indicating that if this candidate became President,
the racketeers or national crime syndicate could have a control or
influence over him as President. M3'' inclination at this point in time,
speaking of today is to disbelieve the allegation against the Demo-
cratic candidate referred to above and to believe that there was in
reality some other motive for wanting to get into Greenspun's safe.
Liddy told me one day in February 1972 that he was going out to
Las Vegas, and might need my help if there was an alarm system in
the offices, when an entry operation was mounted to enter a safe in
Greenspun's offices to get the information. A few days later Liddy
told me that he had been to Las Vegas and looked over the offices
and that there was no such alarm s^'stem, and my services were not
needed.
Subsequently in about April or May 1972, Liddy told me that he
had again been to Las Vegas for another casing of Greenspun's offices.
Liddy said that there were then plans for an entry operation to get
into Greenspun's safe. He went on to say that after the entry team
finishes its work, the}^ would go directly to an airport near Las Vegas
where a Howard Hughes plane would be standing by to fly the team
directly into a Central American country so that the team would be
out of the country before the break-in was discovered.
Around the same time Liddy made this last statement to me about
the Howard Hughes plane, Himt told me in his office one day that he was
in touch with the Howard Hughes company and that they might be
needing my security services after the election. He said that they had
quite a wdde investigative and security operation and asked me for my
business card and asked if I would be interested. I said I would like
to know more about what was mvolved, gave him a card, but never
heard from him again on this subject. However, I did read in the
newspapers after July 1, 1972 that Hunt had apparently handled a
Howard Hughes campaign donation to the Committee To Re-Elect
the President sometime in 1972. Gordon Lidd\' told me in February
1972 that he, too, had handled a Howard Hughes campaign check, a
donation to the 1972 campaign. This is the extent of my knowledge
on this matter.
That completes my prepared statement and I vdW be glad to answer
any questions.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chaii-man, thank you very much.
Mr. McCord, I am very grateful, I think you supplied a great
deal of additional mformation and it raises a great number of new
questions and I am sure my colleagues on the committee will want to
pursue that or other questions, so I will not detain you long in this
first series of questions.
203
I think that your further ehiboration and extension of j'our state
of mind or motives in the several operations and especially the
Watergate operation now appears more clear, at least to me.
Let me try to paraphrase the essence of your motivation, if I may,
and if I am ^^Tong for goodness sakes tell me so, but I want to know
if this is the general message that 3^ou are givmg us.
One, you had a long background of experience -with Government
agencies, the FBI and the CIA. You had become accustomed to
activities related to sensitive matters, security matters, and to taking
direction and accepting at face value the representations of the
orders or the purported orders of very high officials in the Govern-
ment, particularly the Justice Department and the White House.
That for a variety of reasons, when you were called on to enter the
Democratic National headquarters in Washmgton at the Watergate
complex, for a variety of reasons, including your general knowledge of
threats against Attorney General Mitchell and his family, threats
against others, pipe bombings, fire bombings, threats of violence and
the like, coupled with your concern for national securit}^ matters, if
that is the proper way to characterize it, that jon decided on the
assumption that your authority was complete, that you no longer
need to concern yourself with the legality of it, that based on this
information that you had, and based on the assurances which were
forthcoming, that it seemed appropriate that you would undertake
that entry. Is that a fair statement of your general motivation at the
time?
Mr. McCoRD. I would thmk so, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. McCord, did you have any motivation to enter
the Democratic National Committee for political purposes as distin-
guished from security purposes? It is not important in terms of the
facts and the proof but it is important in terms of j^our state of mind.
Mr. McCoRD. Let me answer it in a couple of sentences, if I may.
I was fully aware that others had such motivations. My own motiva-
tions I have stated here. I had a role to play in the sense of an electronic
component of the team and I played that role.
Senator Baker. Mr. McCord, speaking of electronic surveillance,
do you know of or did you ever investigate the bugging of Republican
headquarters of the Committee for the lie-Election of the President
headquarters here. New York, or elsewhere?
Mr. McCord. Yes, su*.
Senator Baker. Would you describe that for the committee?
Mr. McCord. It was a regular ongoing activity at the oflSces in
Washington and at the New York arm of the Committee for the Re-
Election of the President, which was referred to as the November
Group; they had offices, I believe, on Park Avenue in New York.
It was done on a regular basis. It was done frequently at the end of
the day or the begimiing of the day or during sensitive conferences
that were going on, in order to determine if in fact there was any activ-
ity of this sort happening against the Committee for the Re-Election
of the President.
Senator Baker. Did you discover any incident of that sort?
Mr. McCord. There was one incident on June 16 of some concern
at the New York office of the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President. There had been earlier signs of possibly some illegal activity
96-296— 73— bk. 1 14
204
at those oflBces prior to June 16, which I would describe, if you would
Kke.
Senator Baker. I would like.
Mr. McCoRD. On the afternoon of June 16, 1972, about mid-
afternoon, I received a call from the head of the office of the November
Group in New York City, who stated that he and his entire office
staff were quite concerned about an incident that had just occurred.
He went ahead to relate that one of the secretaries at the office had
received a call from a male individual in Los Angeles, Calif., and
that she had immediate!}^ told that party that she would call him back
on the WATS line, which is a leased line, call him back on that line
and immediately did so. She called him, as I recall, at the Beverley
Wilshire Hotel, although I cannot be absolutely certain, at the phone
booth there. And during the conversation that the two of them had.
about a few minutes into the conversation there was a click over the
phone which was heard by her and by the male on the other end oj
the line, and what appeared to be a tape recording was plaj^ed over
the telephone line which was, as she described it when I talked with
her, an anti-Nixon and antiwar harangue.
Senator Baker. Mr. McCord, could I interrupt you for a moment;
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. I understand this to be a call that was initiated
from New York on a WATS line; that is, a flat rate monthly telephone
line all over the country?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. To a number in California?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Can you say whether or not the situation yoi
described does in fact constitute a tapping or an intrusion into thai
circuit by someone unauthorized?
Mr. McCord. It clearly appeared to be. I had not the slightest
doubt about it, and neither did the telephone company in New Yorkl
when I called them that afternoon.
Senator Baker. Did you ever locate the source of that tap?
Mr. McCoRD. I can relate what we did, what incidents occurred.
Senator Baker. Would you do that for me?
Mr. McCord. I immediately called, after we heard of this, to the
chief security officer in the New York Telephone Co. He had previously
been contacted by the November Group offices, stated that they were
Avorking on the matter trying to trace the point of interception of the
call, along the numerous points of access to the telephone line withb
or beyond the November Group offices themselves. That that in-
vestigation was to continue throughout the weekend and that reports
would be forthcoming as to what they had learned about it. There
appeared to be no doubt from what he was saying that they also
considered it an illegal interception of telephone conversation.
Senator Baker. Were there other incidents of telephone tapping
against the Republican National Committee or the CRP or any other
Republican-affiliated group brought to your attention or which j^ou
investigated?
Mr. McCord. There were two earlier occasions at the November
Group offices when I was called to the November Group offices
from Washington in which they had highly suspicious telephone
205
anomalies, as it is known. Telephone conversations within the ofBce
it>elf of when another person picking up a telephone extension on a
different line, for example, not connected with the one in which the
call was being made, could overhear the conversation that was going
on. Other strange anomalies, clicks and so on of a wide variety that
indicated some problems in the telephone area. They had, in turn,
■contacted the telephone company. The telephone company had made
a search, made a search of the offices itself, of the phone system, so
they stated, and I did further checking of my own at that point in
time of both of the two previous events, and we found nothing within
the telephone system within the offices itself. That did not eliminate
the possibility that beyond the office anywhere within the system at
which there were points of access to the telephone lines that someone
might not have been monitoring the conversation.
Senator Baker. Mr. McCord, I am not trying to create the im-
pression that because there were apparently taps on the Republican
phones, that that justifies taps on the Democratic phones. I do not
believe that, but I am anxious to know your state of mind and the
reason and rationale for your security operations, includmg the
break-in into the Watergate.
Now, my final question in that respect is, did jou ever discover
the source or responsibility for any of these efforts at electronic
interception on the Republican operations?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir. Specifically, the November Group, we did
jiot know that it was continuing after June 16, and I did not, never
Teceived the results of that inquiry.
Senator Baker. Did vou once work for the Republican National
•Committee, Mr. McCord?
Mr. McCord. Yes, I did during the same period I was with the
'Committee for the Re-Election of the President, which I previously
mentioned to your committee.
Senator Baker. Yes, sir. Can you give us the dates and circum-
stances and the nature of 3"0ur employment?
Mr. McCord. Yes. I was emploj^ed by them as a part-time con-
sultant during the period of roughl}^ October 1, 1971, concurrent
with that of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President,
and extending through June 17.
Senator Baker. June 17, 1972?
Mr. McCord. That is correct, June 17.
Senator Baker. Can you tell us who employed you?
Mr. McCord. Yes. The director of administration at the Repub-
lican National Committee.
Senator Baker. Do you know who that was?
Mr. McCord. Barry Mountain, M-o-u-n-t-a-i-n,
Senator Baker. Was he the only one 3^ou talked about employment?
Mr. McCord. I talked to others there but he was my principal
point of contact.
Senator Baker. Did you ever talk to the chairman of the RNC
about your employment?
Mr. McCord. 1 talked to the cochairman, Mr. Tom Bevens. I do
not believe I had any contact — I talked to both cochairmen, I do not
believe I had any contact beyond that.
Senator Baker. Who was chairman at that time?
206
Mr. McCoRD, I believe Senator Robert Dole.
Senator Baker. Did jou ever talk to him?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Was there ever any clandestine, covert, illegal,,
improper, or unethical conduct involved in your security operations
for the RepubUcan National Committee?
Mr. McCoRD. Absolutely none whatever.
Senator Baker. I have a number of other questions, Mr. Chairman^
but I have taken more than my time. I would ask if I may, a single
last question and then I will yield to my colleagues.
You recognize the term Gemstone?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Can you describe for us what it means?
Mr. McCoRD. That term I first heard, first read about in the news-
paper itself referring to, according to the newspaper accounts, re-
ferring to it as a code name for the monitoring, the typing of final
monitoring logs of report or logs coming out of the National Demo-
cratic Committee. I did not as such know it during the operation but
I know something about the nature of the paper that it was on. I
think that code name had some reference to that.
Senator Baker. Is it fan* to say the term Gemstone is a code name
that covers work product in the accumulation of information of your-
self and 3^our teams' efforts in the intrusion of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee headquarters at the Watergate?
Mr. McCoRD. So I have been led to understand.
Senator Baker. Do you have tape recordings of your interceptions
of the Democratic National Committee?
Mr. McCoRD, No, sir.
Senator Baker. Or do you have photographs or any other informa-
tion that was gained by this entry?
Mr. McCoRD. There is no tape recordings, there are no photographs,
I can think of nothing else at the moment.
Senator Baker. Are there any tape recordings of the telephone
conversations?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir, none were ever made.
Senator Baker. Where is the information that you gained? Is it in
the Gemstone file? Does the U.S. Attorney's office have it? Wliere is it?
Mr. McCoRD. The material which I had received from — Mr. Bald-
win was doing the monitoring, Alfred Baldwin — was turned over, all
of it, to Mr. Liddy, Gordon Liddy.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much, Mr. McCord. I am very
grateful. I tliink you responded in a very thorough and very eloquent
way to the question I put on Friday and I am very grateful to you.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge?
Senator Talmadge. Mr. McCord, among other things in your tes-
timony tliis morning, you stated that many efforts were made to
persuade you or to coerce you to state that the bugging operation on
the Democratic National Committee was a CIA operation.
Will you state the individuals who urged you to do that? One j'ou
stated was Mr. Hunt. Am I correct?
Mr. McCoRD. Sir, I believe I will correct that impression if I left
it. I had heard from Mr. Bernard Barker specifically that Mr. Hunt
had brought pressure to bear upon Air. Barker and the Cubans to
207
use as their defense that tliis was a CIA operation. Mr. Hunt did not
directly put that pressure upon me. Others did.
Senator Talmadge. Barker reported to you that Hunt had urged
you to do so, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. That is right.
Senator Talmadge. Barker, as I understand it was one of the
people involved in the Watergate operation, was he not?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Barker, I believe, has been granted immunity
and has not been convicted. Is that correct?
He pled guilty and was convicted?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Now, who else besides Barker was involved in
urging you to blame this on the CIA? You stated two other names. I
think one of them was Bittman and the other one was named Alch?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, I referred to conversations with Mr. Gerald
Alch and Mrs. Hunt.
Senator Talmadge. Tell me who Mr. Alch is. Give me his full name.
Mr. McCoRD. Gerald, G-e-r-a-1-d, Alch, A-l-c-h.
Senator Talmadge. Now, who is Mr. Alch?
Mr. McCoRD. He was my defense attorney through the trial in
January 1973, whose services I had engaged at that time.
Senator Talmadge. And he had no connection with the Committee
To Re-Elect the President, did he? He was your own lawyer?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And he urged you to blame it on the CIA,
-did he?
Mr. McCoRD. He urged me to use that as my defense.
Senator Talmadge. All right, now. "Sir. Alch and who else urged
3^ou to do that?
Mr. McCoRD. I beheve I have stated in my testimony that
stories were circulating earlier stemming out of the Committee for
the lie-Election of the President that the committee lawyers them-
selves had been told that early in July
Senator Talmadge. Let's get specific now. I don't want stories
circulating. I want you to name the da3's, names, and places. That is
evidence. Rumors are not.
A/lr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
The details as I have related them in the memorandum which I
have read this morning on the topic of the CIA, pressure to lay it at
the feet of the CIA, covers the full extent of my knowledge, sir, of
any pressure upon me and it came principally through the attorney
liimself. So insofar as I personally was involved, that was the source.
Senator Talmadge. All right, now. You have named Mr. Barker.
Mr. McCoRD. That is right, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And you have named Mr. Alch?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Who was your own law^^er?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And I believe in your own testimony in chief,
the memorandum you read, you also referred to a man by the name
of Bittman, did you not?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
208
Senator Talmadge. Now, who is Mr. Bittman?
Mr. McCoRD. Bittman is the attorney, WiUiam O. Bittman, the-
attorney for E. Howard limit, one of the other defendants.
Senator Talmadge. All right, did he have any connection withi
the Government in &nj way or any connection with the Republican
National Committee or the Committee To Ee-Elect the President?'
Mr. McCoRD. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Wliat I am trying to get at is the source of
this pressure that you have contended was brought upon j^ou to blame
this on the CIA. Thus far, you have not connected that either ^dth'
the Committee To Re-Elect the President or the White House or
any other individuals, to my knowledge. One was your own lawj'er,
one was engaged in the crime with you, and the third one was the law^^er
for Mr. Lidd}^, was it — Bittman?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Hunt.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Hunt?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.-
Senator Talmadge. He was Mr. Hunt's lawyer. And those three
individuals are the only ones that urged you to blame this on the CIA.
Is that a fair statement?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir; that is essentially correct.
Senator Talmadge. So no one else anywhere whatever urged you.
to blame it on the CIA except these three individuals, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. None that I can recall at this time, no, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Now, did Mr. Barker or the other of the so-
called Cuban-Americans ever come to you during the trial and tell
you that they had been offered Executive clemency by Mr. Hunt?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Will 3^ou describe the attitude and the
demeanor at that time?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir. Mr. Barker specifically — I can recall
specifically during the first week of the trial and beginning on the.
first day, on Januaiy 8, Mr. Barker came to me in the corridor outside,.
I believe, the courtroom of the U.S. District Court Building in Wash-
ington during breaks in the court proceedings and proceeded to relate
to me the pressure which he said was being imposed upon liim and
upon the other men who were defendants — Mr. Sturgis, Mr. Gonzales,
]\Ir. Martinez, pressure that he stated was stemming from Mr. Hunt
and other unnamed individuals, to plead guilty and to go off to jail
or prison and ultimately to receive Executive clemency and to receive
financial support for their families while they were in prison and
promises — and he stated promises were made that they would be given
help in obtaining a job or rehabilitation at the prison. Mr. Barker
spoke to me several times during that w^eek regarding that particular
pressure upon him which he described as intense.
He stated first that he was planning not to plead guilty and then
subsequently, as the days progressed during the week itself, he began
to tell me that he was thinking more and more seriously about it,,
and as I recall, about Wednesda}?" of that week, roughl}'^, in that week
sometime, he seemed to have his mind made up that he would go ahead
and accede to the pressure and plead guilty, and he put it m, in
just about those words, and to accept the Executive clemency.
209
He was in a pretty highly emotional state at one point in time, the
first day or two, stating that he was fighting the pressure as best he
was able and it was clear from his demeanor that he was very worked
lip and ver}'^ emotionally overwrought, split between what he was
b<'ing forced to do and what he felt perhaps he ought to do in going
alioad to proceed with the case and to see if he could get a fair trial.
He was not the onl}^ one. His family, his wife, and his daughter,
related the same pressure to me, sometimes in his presence.
Senator Talmadge. Did any of the other so-called Cuban-Ameri-
cans besides Mr. Barker relate similar pressure?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, all of them.
Senator Talmadge. Every one of them?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Now, did Mr. Hunt or Mrs. Hunt ever give
you SLiry information that they were sent to you by the Committee To
Ke-Elect the President or the White House or anybody to do this?
Mr. McCoRD. Executive clemency?
Senator Talmadge. Yes.
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Will you relate that?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir; during the meetings, personal meetings and
telephone meetings beginning in July 1972 concerning money be-
ginning in about October 1972, concerning Executive clemency — the
term "Executive clemency" I fii'st heard, I believe, from Mr. Hunt in
early October — late September or early October — when I would see
him at the courtroom or when he would call me by telephone. There-
after, he subsequently mentioned it in almost every call. His wife
referred to it. In substance, what they were saying was that the defend-
ants were being promised Executive clemency if they went off to prison
and had to serve time. Sometimes the words "Executive clemency"
would be followed or accompanied by other statements about fuiancial
support and rehabilitation.
Senator Talmadge. Did Mrs. Hunt state who gave her authority
to make such a promise?
Mr. McCord. My recollection of her conversations were that
she was saying that she was transmitting this word to me from her
husband. She did not specifically mention that I can recall now who
gave it to him. 1 can draw only one conclusion as to where it came
from, because — —
Senator Talmadge. She did not state the source of her authority
to make that promise, though?
Mr. McCord. I can't recall such statements on her part.
Senator Talmadge. Who did she say she was m communication
with?
Mr. McCord. With the attorney's for the Committee To Re-
Elect the President, the attorneys for the committee.
Senator Talmadge. Wlio specifically? More than one individual is
involved with the committee. I want you to name specific names if you
know.
Mr, McCord. I can tell you what she stated, sir, if this is what you
want.
Senator Talmadge. Tell me what she stated. This is the question
I asked you.
210
Mr. McCoRD. Yes sir. She stated that she herself was in communi-
cation with Mr. Kenneth Parkinson, one of the attorneys for the
Committee To Re-Elect the President. She stated that her husband,
Mr. Hunt, had been in touch in July with Mr. Paul O'Brien, also an
attorney with Mr. Parkinson for the Committee To lie-Elect the
President.
Senator Talmadge. Mrs. Hunt, 1 believe, was the intermediary
that transmitted money to you?
Mr. McCoED. She was, sir.
Senator Talmadge. How much did she transmit, all told?
Mr. McCoRD. $46,000, as I recall, of which about half was
attorneys' fees.
Senator Talmadge. $46,000?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes sir.
Senator Talmadge. Of which about half was to be used to paj
your attorney's fees?
Mr. McCoRD. $25,000, yes sir.
Senator Talmadge. And the other was to be used to pay youi
salary?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes sir.
Senator Talmadge. And your salary was $3,000 a month, ]
remember?
Mr. McCord. Yes sir.
Senator Talmadge. All paid in brand-new $100 bills, is that true'
Mr. McCoRD. Most of it, sir.
Senator Talma gde. Any of it in checks?
Mr. McCoRD. No sir.
Senator Talmadge. All in cash?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Can you state why they paid in cash and noi
by checks?
^Mr. McCord. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Did you not think that was an unusual methoc
of payment?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Did it cause you to wonder about the circum-
stances of that involvement?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And how long did your salary continue to be
paid? When was the last time you received the $100 bills in payment
of your salary of $3,000 a month?
Mr. McCord. The last payment was December 2 and it was a
payment for December through January.
Senator Talmadge. In other words, you have been paid througH
January and not since that time?
Mr. McCord. That is correct, sir.
Senator Talmadge. My time has expired, has it, Mr. Chairman?
I do not want to usurp the time of others.
Senator Ervin. You used 13 minutes.
Senator T-^lmadge. Then I yield at tliis point to my colleague.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney?
Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCord, one or two other questions about Mr. Barker. WhatI
was your relationsliip with Mr. Barker in the Watergate affair?
2U
Mr. McCoRD. My relationsliip, again, about a week, 4 or 5 days,
perhaps, before Memorial Day weekend, in which I first met him and
he was described to me as the team captain for the group going into
the Democratic National Committee. My relationsliip with him was
as a member of the team that went in.
Senator Gurney. Was he in charge or were you in charge?
Mr. McCoRD. He was in charge, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did you see him much after that?
Mr. McCoRD. I saw him during that Memorial Day weekend.
I saw him on the first meeting at the Manger-Hamilton Hotel about
May 24, when I first met him. I saw him the June 17 weekend. I
saw liim occasionally at the courthouse in the fall of 1972, when
we would be there for hearings. I saw him, of course, during the trial
period that I have referred to in my testimony today.
Senator Gurney. Did you see him at all between the time of the
break-in incident and when you went to court?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir, I was in, during the first week, first 4 or 5
days after we were arrested, we were in the same accommodations
in the D.C. jail.
Senator Gurney. Wliat kind of man would you say he was — was
ie dependable?
Mr. McCoRD. I Uked Mr. Barker.
Senator Gurney. So you would say he was a man of reliability
i,nd dependability?
Mr. McCoRD. In the things I did with him and worked \dth him,
tie was a reliable person.
Senator Gurney. When you had these discussions with him on the
pressure on him to plead guilty and take advantage of this Executive
lemenc}^ — and how many occasions did 3"ou and he discuss that?
Mr. McCoRD. It began on or about January 8 and continued for
that fu'st week, during the first week of the trial, most of the days in
the trial — most of the first week. So it was roughly a week that these
conversations would occur.
Senator Gurney. And they occurred every day, would 3^ou say?
Mr, McCoRD. I know that they occurred— my recollection is that
they occurred each of the first 3 days of the trial and that something
w^as said about them the following 2 days, Thursday or Friday. I
can't recall specifically what, because I believe his mind was pretty
(veil made up at that time. I do not think there was too much discus-
sion after the first days.
Senator Gurney. What were his reasons for discussing this Mdth
you, to seek yom* advice or to ask you if you were receiving pressm'e
too, or how did the conversation come up?
Mr. McCoRD. It was generally in the sense, "We were receiving this
"pressure, I am torn up in trying to decide what to do. WTiat are you
planning to do," and some advice was sought and what I thought
Etbout acceding to the pressure.
vSenator Gurney. In other words, they were rather extensive and
serious discussions; is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. They would run, I would say, 5 to 10 minutes,
maybe 15 during court breaks primarily.
Senator Gurney. Well, who did Mr. Barker say to you was ap-
plying the pressure to him?
212
Mr. McCoRD. My recollection is that he stated Mr. Hunt. He also
referred to other unnamed persons and I do not know who they were.
Senator Gurney. Well, you mean he said, ''There are other un-
named persons whom I do not know w-ho are applying pressure to
me," and he said there were some other people and that is all I heard.
What were these other people doing?
Mr. McCoRD. Applying pressure, so he stated.
Senator Gurney. Well, were they talking to him?
Mr. McCoRD. So he said.
Senator Gurney. Where were they talking to him?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not know. He did not say.
Senator Gurney. Were they calling him on the phone?
Mr. McCoRD. He did not state, sir.
Senator Gurney. Now, during this time, I guess you were out ol
jail on bail, both j^ou and Barker; is that true?
Mr. AIcCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Do you know where he was living at this time?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe in Miami, most of the time. He was in
Washington sometimes for court appearances.
Senator Gurney. But no other name was mentioned in these
conversations except the name of Mr. Hunt?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever ask him who was applying this
pressure besides Mr. Hunt?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Weren't you curious?
Mr. McCoRD. I was curious but I assume quite frankly that it was
someone closely connected with Hunt, somebody that Hunt was
obviously very closely associated with, perhaps somebody thai
Barker and Hunt had known together, I do not — I did not pursue it
beyond that point. My primary concern was with the fact that Mr.
Hunt was doing it, and I expressed some views on that.
Senator Gurney. Now then, you mentioned also that pressure was
being applied to the others who were apprehended in the WatergatCj
the four people Sturgis, Martinez, Gonzales; is that their names?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. And then one other whose name has slipped me
for the moment. Did they ever tell you who was applying pressure to
them?
Mr. McCoRD. My recollection is that they stated Mr. Hunt
There was some, I have a vague recollection that the names of, it was
put in the same context that Mr. Barker did that others were doing
so. That is a very vague recollection. I can be sure only about the
name of Mr. Hunt.
Senator Gurney. Well now, let's take them one by one. When and|
where did Martinez say to you that pressure was being applied to him?
Mr. McCoRD. In the corridors of the, I believe it is called the, out-
side the. Ceremonial Court Room of the District Court Building in
Washington, D.C., to the best of my recollection on at least each of*
the first 4 days of the trial beginning on January 8, during breaks ini
the court session.
Senator Gurney. And in these conversations what names did|
Martinez mention?
213
:Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Hunt.
Senator Gurney. Did he mention any others?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did you ask him about any others?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
' Senator Gurney. What about Sturgis?
Mr. McCoRD. If I may explain usually Mr. Martinez and
Mr. Gonzales were together during these conversations and the conver-
sations were in the form of something like a three-way discussion
between me, Mr. Martinez, and Mr. Gonzales. Mr. Sturgis, I would
say, mentioned it to me perhaps at the most once or twice that week.
The others mentioned it, I would say, the first 4 days of the first week
■of the trial.
Senator Gurney. But none of these men ever mentioned any other
name other than Mr. Hunt?
Mr. McCoRD, No, sir.
Senator Gurney. And none of them ever either mentioned or
speculated who was giving Hunt the authority to apply this poUtical
pressure or offer of Executive clemency to all of 3^ou?
Mr. McCord. No, sir. There, the focus of their concern was, it
was in terms of what should they be really doing about it and what
■concern they had if they did not do it or if they turned it down what
would be their future, what was going to happen during the trial,
■so there wasn't much at all in the way of who was doing it and where
it came from. Our general context of our discussion was that every-
body understood that there was only one place that Executive clemency
'can stem from so nobody had any reason for discussing it.
Senator Gurney. Yes, 1 would understand that, too, but of course
this would be a very important matter.
Mr. McCoRD. 1 understand.
Senator Gurney. Pleading guilty and then serving a prison term
:and then of course being able to get out of the prison term by a pardon
and I am carious that no one thought to inquire where this was coming
irom other than from Mr. Hunt.
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. But no one ever did?
Mr. McCoRD. Well, they may well have done so.
Senator Gurney. But they did not mention it to you?
Mr. McCoRD. They did not mention it to me.
Senator Gurney. You mentioned in the statement about the CIA,
at least the statements were certainly very shocking. They involve a
new man coming on board the CIA, a change from Mr. Helms to
another man and the fact that the new man could be, could work
with and dealt with and your records might have been able to have
been doctored all in this so-called CIA coverup. Would you go into
that at more length? Where did you get this information?
Mr. McCoRD. What I transmitted to you, sir, and this is the source
of it, were the words as I best recall it transmitted to me, communi-
cated to me, by Mr. Alch in the two meetings that I referred to, one
at the Monocle Restaurant here in Washington, near a couple of
blocks from here about, on December 21, and the second
Senator Gurney. Now could you describe how that came up
'because this is extremely important.
.'214
Mr. McCoRD. Al'l right, sir.
Seoiator Gurnet. Why did you happen to go there with him in the
first place?
Mr. McCoRD. My recollection is that I had been called the day
before by Mr. Alch when he had come into Washington to, prepared
to, appear for a court hearing, something to do with a court hearing
regarding some, I believe, admission or entry of tape recordings of
Mr. Baldwin's statements to the press into the acquisition of those
tapes by the court, and he had first stated that he was planning to see
me the day before and then he subsequently called that day before
and said, "No, we will meet tomorrow afternoon" or "We ^vill meet
tomorrow, and I will call j^ou," and he did call me early in the after-
noon of December 21 and said "Why don't j^ou meet us for lunch at
the Monocle Restaurant, I have got some things I want to talk with
you about." So I came to the Alonocle Restaurant.
Senator Gurnet. Who is us, did he have someone else mth him?
Mr. McCoRD. Well, he had Mr. Bernard Shankman, my local
attorney. He did meet with us.
Senator Gurnet. But he did not mention to you the subject of the
visit?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Did you ask him?
Mr. McCoRD. I think he mentioned, to my best recollection, he
said something we should be talking about our defense at this point
at this time or in this meeting, something along this line.
Senator Gurnet. Go on.
Mr. McCoRD. I do not remember exactly. So we met, I responded
to his call and came down to the Monocle Restaurant. Tlie three of
us sat and he related questions in the statements I have read to you
here. I do not recall Mr. Shankman participating in this substantive
conversaton, he may have but I do not recall it.
Senator Gurnet. Now, would you recall again what he said
specifically about the CIA?
Mr. McCoRD. All right, sir. I have set it down in writing and I
would frankly like to refer to it because I have spent a lot of time in
putting it down.
Senator Gurnet. I wish you would because it is sometimes veiy
hard to follow every word.
Mr. McCoRD. I stated as I best recall, that he had just come from
a meeting with WilHam O. Bittman, attorney for Mr. Howard Hunt.
He stated that he had a suggestion concerning what I use as my defense
during the trial which was that I use as my defense that the Watergate
operation was a CIA operation, I do not recall exactly what I said in
response except to say something to the effect that you are my
attorney, what is your counsel on this, do you think I should?
Senator Gurnet. Go ahead.
Mr. McCoRD. And his response was, "Yes, I think so," and he
proceeded to discuss, to ask some questions of me. He said, he asked
whether I could be ostensibly recalled from my retirement. That is»
a person once retired, can he be recalled, and I said, yes, he can, and
he said, "Well, you can ostensibly, we could use as our defense 3'ou
could ostensibly have been recalled to the CIA to undertake the-i
Watergate operation, could j^ou not?" and I said it is technicall}^ pos-
215
-ible or words to that effect. That he said if so, then, my personnel
cords at CIA could be doctored to reflect such a recall, and this is
ui}^ best recollection of the exact words.
Senator Gurney. Well now, who was going to do that?
Mr, McCoRD. He did not say.
Senator Gurney. Did you ask him?
Mr. McCoRD. No. I was listening to the rest of the story.
Senator Gurney. Did you make any comment on the record being
doctored at the CIA? After all, how long were you there, 19 years?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did j^ou make any comment on that?
Mr. McCoRD. I think I have stated in my statement here the
situation I was in which was essentially one of wanting to hear out the
story, what it was all about and I was really trying to figure out sort
of what is going on at this point in time.
Senator Gurney. Go on.
Mr. McCoRD. I wanted to hear the rest of the statement out.
This statement, during the conversation, and it might not be in this
exact sequence of the things I have stated here but these are the things
that were said during the conversation, one statement may have been
reversed with another but these statements were made. He said that
Schlesinger, the new Director of CIA, whose appointment had just
been announced, could be subpenaed and would go along with it,
that was his quote.
Senator Gurney. Schlesinger could be what?
Mr. McCoRD. Could be subpenaed.
vSenator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. McCoRD. And would go along with it.
Senator Gurney. Did you ask him how he knew this would occur?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did he offer any evidence as to how he knew
that Mr. Sclilesinger would "go along with it?"
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Go on.
Mr. McCord. He went on to mention some testimony. He did not
have any paper with him but he went on to mention some testimony
by Mr. Gary Bittenbender, and he recited testimony that he said
Bittenbender had given in which Bittenbender purportedly claimed
that I told him the day of the arrest that the Watergate operation
was a CIA operation. My response was that if such a statement had
been made it was perjured testimony or a false statement.
Senator Gurney. Why did he bring that up, do you know?
Mr. McCoRD. I can give you an impression if you want an
impression .
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. McCoRD. Which was that, and that impression stems from what
I later saw in his office which was a written statement, my impression
was that he had received access to seme type of interview with Mr.
Bittenbender in which such a statement was obtained, perhaps by
the Federal authorities in some case.
Senator Gurney. Go on.
Mr. McCoRD. He said he could be interviewed — correction. He
went on to mention the name of Mr. Victor Marchetti, who he re-
216
ferred to as writing a book about CIA and he said we could subpena
Marchetti and have him testify/ about customs and traditions of CIA
agents in case the}' are arrested, or caught wherein the}^ are trained to.
deny any connection with CIA.
Senator Gurney. Well now, how would this help you?
Mr. McCoRD. My understandmg of the reason he was saying it,,
and I recall so much of the part of the statement to the effect that this
wculd la}^ the background if Mr. Marchetti were called to the stand
and asked to testify he would furnish statements to this effect that it
would lay a background during the trial itself for an}'' denials that
might come up either by CIA or by the defendants, that this was, in
fact, a CIA operation, which, of course, it was not.
Senator Gurney. Of course, if they were going to back you up
through the Director itself they would hardly deny the story at the
same time, would they?
Mr. McCoRb. Well, not much went into — there was not much
discussion of what in effect the CIA Director would or would not say
either in responding to a subpena to testify hard in terms of testimony
itself concerning the men.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I wonder if I may
ask one or two questions on another matter, I do not think it will
take long.
The Chairman. If there is no objection, you may.
Senator Gurney. Thank you.
Mr. McCord, how much were you being paid by the Republican
National Committee for its work?
Mr. McCoRD. $625 a month, as best I recall, $625 to $650, in the
beginning of the period of October, of roughly October 1 through the
same period of my employment with the Committee To Re-Elect
the President. The subject of this employment at both locations was
discussed with both men who I worked with, which included both
!vlr. Liddy and Odle.
Senator Gurney. This was in addition to $20,000 a year by the
Committee To Re-Elect plus the $2,000 a month hazardous pay
Mdien you entered into the Watergate operation, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. Did you receive any pay from anybodj else for
any activity during this period of time?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not recall any, sir.
Senator Gurney. You did not receive any?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not recall any.
Senator Gurney, Tell me, did you ever participate in any other
electronic surveillance activity hke this pohtical surveillance of any
kind?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. How about in previous years, previous campaigns?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever discuss with anybody at the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President or the White House, for that matter
aside from Mr. Lidd}^, this business of bugging the Watergate? My
understanding was that your conversations were with him at first,,
that is correct, is it not?
217
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir. The only two people thej^ were discussed
with were Mr, Hunt and Mr. Liddy and I have stated my reasons
for so doing.
Senator Gurney. But you did not discuss it at any time with
anybody else?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did a^ou ever suggest to anybody at any time in
1971 or 1972, that this would be a desirable operation?
Mr. McCoRD. Did I suggest it?
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. McCord. Absolutely not.
Senator Gurney. The idea came from Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt?
Mr. McCoRD. That is the first time I heard it.
Senator Gurney. Thank you verj^ much.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. Thank you, sir.
]\ir. McCord, 3''ou testified last week and this morning that you
were receiving almost on a daily basis information from the Internal
'Security Division of the Justice Department and from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Would I be correct in designating the type
of information you received as classified?
Mr. McCoRD. Sir, I can tell jou how the information was de-
scribed, to me, which is, I think, relevant to your question and I will
do that if you would like.
Senator Inouye. Would you please?
Mr. McCoRD. The information, as I recall at this point in time, was
described to me by the two men who made it available.
Senator Inouye. Who are the two men?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. John Martin and Mr. Joel Lisker.
Senator Inouye. What were their positions?
Mr. McCoRD. Chief and Deputy Cliief of the Evaluation Section
of the Internal Security Division.
Senator Inouye. Of the Justice Department?
Mr. McCoRD. Of the Justice Department, yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Did the}'^ ever advise jon as to whether they were
authorized by higher authorities to provide 3^ou with this information?
Mr. McCoRD. My best recollection, sir, of the answer to that ques-
tion is that when Mr. Martin first talked with me, when I first went
to see him after Mr. Mardian had told me, Robert Mardian had told
me that an'angements, that he had made arrangements for me to have
access to such information from the Internal Securit}'' Division, and
I went to Mr. John Martin's office for the first time, my recollection
is that he told me two thhugs in that regard. One is that he had received
some word from Mr. Mardian asking that I be given access and that
he had checked it out with his people, referrmg to his superiors.
Senator Inouye. Was the t3'pe of information received the type
generally made available to the public?
Mr. McCoRD. To the public?
Senator Inouye. Yes, sir. Was it public information?
Mr. McCoRD. I don't think so, sir. I don't believe so.
Senator Inouye. Then it was classified information of some nature?
Mr. McCoRD. I was told that it was unclassified information. I
do not recall seeing classification stamps on any of the information.
218
I might add — I believe your first question was that I contacted the
FBI on this type of information. I apologize if I left that impression.
I never contacted the FBI. My only contact was through the Internal
Security Division.
I do not recall classification stamps on the information. There may
very well have been such. I do not recall it.
Senator Inouye. At that time, were you legally and appropriately
authorized to receive such information? Were you cleared to receive!
such mformation?
Mr. McCoRD. I had a clearance, sir, top secret clearance in connec-
tion with position, reserve positions in the military.
Senator Inouye. At the time of the receipt?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. I have been advised that at the time of the break-
in, you had in your employment a man named Louis Russell, is that
correct?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct, sir.
Senator Inouye. Was he near the Watergate during the time of the
break-in?
Mr. McCoRD. I would like to respond to that, because Mr. Russell
has been very unfairly treated in terms of his name being raised in
this case, and I will explain the circumstances as he has told them to
me and which I believe, which are these.
He stated that he was not there the night of the break-in at the
Howard Jolmson Motel or anywhere in the vicinity. He told me that
the night before, which would have been the night of June 16, I be-
lieve—June 15 — the Thursday night — that he had gone to the Howard
Johnson Motel restaurant to have dinner and that he had gone there
with a woman companion, who — they on a regular basis ate at the
Howard Johnson restaurant as a custom over some years; that she
normally went to the Watergate hairdresser, one of them, for her
hairdo, and they would go over to the Howard Johnson restaurant
and have dinner.
Senator Inouye. Was he in any way connected with the bugging?
Mr, McCoRD. Absolutely none, in no form whatever.
Senator Inouye. It has been reported that Mr. John Dean, formerlyi
of the White House staff, wanted the bugging operation carried outi
in such a way as to provide the Attorney General, Mr. Mitchellj
deniability.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Have you heard of this phrase?
Mr, McCoRD, Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. What is your understanding of the meaning of»
this term, "deniability"?
Mr, McCoRD, That if something goes wTong, a person can claimi
that he had no connection with the operation.
Senator Inouye. Was this explained to you?
Mr. McCoRD. The word was mentioned to me and I can describe
how it was mentioned and the context, if you would like.
Senator Inouye. Please do so.
Mr, McCoRD. Which was to the best of my recollection, the day
after Mr. Liddy met in January, I believe the first or second — either
the first or the second meeting with the Attorney General, in the
219
Attorney General's office, which he came back from that meeting
stilting that, relating what had transpired during the meeting, and
then sa3dng that Mr. John Dean had contacted him after the meeting
and told him that he thought the operation was going to be approved
and that there would have to be some wa}' of giving deniabilit}^ to
Mr. John Mitchell in connection ^\ith the operation. My recollection
is that Mr. Liddy amplified that by some statement to the effect
at that meeting that if anything ever blew the operation, Mr. Mitchell
could claim .that he had no part of it.
Senator Inouye. How did you propose to accomplish this
deniability?
Mr. McCoRD. He didn't state, but it appeared to me that that
statement really had no validity at a later time, because from other
statements of Mr. Liddy, there were continuous meetings of him and
Mr. Mitchell, extending up through, say, the week of June 17, and
that therefore, the statement was essentially meaningless, because
had it been planned that Mr. Mitchell had deniabilit}-, the events
that transpired after Februar}^, after the statement was made, essenti-
ally negated the opportunity for in any way that Mr. Mitchell could
disclaim connection. If, in fact, for example, after that first one or
two meetings he had no further connection with the operation with
Mr. Liddy, then perhaps there would have been deniability. But by
continuing to meet with Mr. Liddy as Mr. Liddy related to me on
numerous meetings between February and June, there was essentially
no valid claim that could be made to deniability.
Senator Inouye. I recall some account of your relationship with
embassies. I am a bit confused about that.
Did you call embassies in relation to Watergate or did you mention
embassies to any other contacts?
I am curious, were embassies bugged, too?
Mr. McCoRD. I have no knowledge, sir, of any contact with
embassies, bugging of embassies, or any clandestine operations di-
rected against embassies by any members of the team, the seven
members of the team or anyone else connected with them.
Senator Inouye. You did not discuss the matter of surveillance
of embassies with the committee staff?
Mr. McCoRD. In the statement this morning, two phone calls
that I referred to after June 17. But I have no knowledge prior to
June 17.
Senator Inouye. Wliat were these phone calls about?
Mr. McCoRD. I can answer it again, if I may, sir.
I have stated that, the fact that in September and in October
1972, I made two phone calls to two local embassies, made some
very brief statements over the phone— I don't recall the nature of
the inquiry of the fu'st phone call.
The second one was a phone call lastmg 2 or 3 mmutes. The calls
were made from my residence. The purpose of both calls of mine,
tJiese two calls, was possibly to test the truthfulness of Government
response.
When the motion was filed 2 or 3 days later — that is, October 10,
1972 — requesting Government disclosure of intercepted telephone
calls of mine from any time during 1972, I was convniced that our calls
were being intercepted from our phones in our home. I am still so con-
96-296— 73— bk. 1 15
220
vinced that that transpired, particularly in September and October
1972, when there were numerous indications of it.
Senator Inouye. During the period April, May, and June of this
year, according to your memo, you received the gross sum of $76,000
for expenses?
Mr. McCoRD. In connection with the Watergate operation, yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. This was over and above your pay, am I correct?
Mr. McCoRD. This was money given to me by Mr. Liddy for the
purposes of purchasing equipment and paying related expenses con-
nected mth the Watergate operation, yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Did this include your personal pay?
Mr. McCoRD. This included a category of money that I said was
referred to euphemistically as "overhead" which was supposed to cover
my personal travel expenses and compensation for whatever time was
involved in this and compensation for related expenses.
Senator Inouye. Then your salary for the months of April, May,
and June for the Watergate intrusion was $12,000?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe that is correct. I have heard that figure
before.
Senator Inouye. Then you had legal fees of $18,800. Who received
the $18,800?
Mr. McCoRD. One of my attorneys.
Senator Inouye. All $18,800?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. I notice here under equipment, "miscellaneous
purchases, $12,750".
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Were they small purchases?
Mr. AicCoRD. That is a fairly large amount of money.
Senator Inouye. Because I have noticed you have listed items
costing $400 specifically.
Mr. McCoRD. These were purchases from several different loca-
tions in New York City, in Chicago, and some in Washington. The
exact names of the ones that I purchased equipment from, names of
the stores and what have 3^ou, I listed where I could earlier in this
thing. I could not recall all of them because there were about, I would
say, 20 or 21 different firms that equipment was purchased from.
And there was purchased out of this $12,000 that you have referred
to here quite a number of accessories of different types, in equipment
that we were using, in particular, some purchases in New York City
from firms that I can't recall the names of at this point in time. I
have tried to reconstruct the exact cost where I can and I put into
this other categor}^ exact costs that I can't remember.
Senator Inouye. They were not for personal expenses?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. And in fifing your income taxes, did you include
$12,000 of your income?
Mr. McCoRD. My income — I have asked for an extension of filing
of iiu^ome tax in order to be sure specifically that everything is in-
chided that should be included and just how I am to report the source
of the money that I received; exactly who do I state gave me the
money that we reported in that income tax. ^
221
Is it the Committee To Re-Elect the President? Is it somebody
else?
Senator Inouye. Do you have any knowledge of who prepared
Mr. Liddy's $7,000 charts?
Mr. McCoRD. No.
Senator Inouye. Do you happen to know wh}^ they were so
expensive?
Mr. McCoRD. ]My understanding was that he wanted some pro-
fessionally prepared charts and that to get them in a hurry, he had
to pay some sort of a premium to get them as quickly as he wanted
them.
Senator Inouye. Do you know what happened to these charts?
Mr. McCoRD. He stated that he had been told to destroy the
charts by Mr. John Dean but that he did not plan to do so. He planned
to stash them away because they cost so much money. What he did
with them, 1 don't know.
Senator Inouye. That is all I have.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker?
Senator Weicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCord, I would like to clear up one technical point. You
placed the actions of your former attorney, Mr. Alch, in what might
be charitably called an unfavorable light and I assume that if this
committee chooses to hear Mr. Alch's side of the story, you are not
going to raise the point of attorney-cUent privilege, right?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. McCord, 1 would like to go back to
the questioning that I started last week, and start at the beginning
with your first visit to the Triangle Building.
Would you tell the committee who attended the meeting, the first
meeting at the Triangle Building?
Mr. McCoRD. I will state my recollection. 1 beUeve I was the only
one from the Committee To Re-Elect the President who attended,
along with Mr. Joel Lisker, Mr. John Martin, the two men I referred
to as the chief and the deputy chief of that activity. We met in
Mr. John Martin's office. We talked, I would guess, for probably
45 minutes. We talked on the general subject of access of mine to the
reports. He repeated— stated the two matters that 1 repeated, that
he had received a call from Mr. Mardian and that he had checked it
with his superiors.
Senator Weicker. Was Mr. Houston present at the first meeting?
Mr. McCoRD. 1 don't recall that Mr. Robert Houston, who is one
of my assistants, was present at the first meeting. He may have been.
My recollection is that he was not. I think he appeared later when I
had other duties to perform, I think particularly when I went to
Miami to do the survey I referred to here.
Senator Weicker. In other words, there were subsequent times
when Mr. Houston might have been with joix —
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker [continuing]. At the Triangle Building? Is that
right?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
1 can recall a couple of times.
222
Senator Weicker. Now, at this first meeting, would it be fair to
say that the procedures were discussed by which you would have,
access to this information?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe so; yes, sir. ''_
Senator Weicker. And were the procedures included — was access
to this information in your going to the Triangle Building, is that
correct?
Mr. McCoRD. Primaril}^
Senator Weicker. Primarily.
Was it also discussed that this particular section, on its own initia-
tive, could go ahead and contact you at the Committee To Re-Elect
the President?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now, you have had fairly extensive experience
with both the F'BI and the CIA. Is it possible for you to identify
material that has been obtained from wiretaps, or is that an impossible
situation?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir; I could not, and in answer to your question,
if it refers to this group, that 1 saw nothing
Senator Weicker. No, no, please, my question is in a much more
general sense. Is it possible — specifically is it possible for jqm with
your background to identify which materials were obtained from wire-
tap?
Mr. McCoRD. I would say it would be exceedingly rare that I
would be able to do so.
Senator Weicker. So it is also true, then, that in those circum-
stances, material set before you could or could not have been ob-
tained from wiretaps, is that true?
Mr. McCoRD. Possibly, yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now, I know that you made an effort at the last
hearing to state your recollection of what materials j^ou received.
Have you given an}^ additional thought to that? Is it possible for you
to be a little more complete than you were the last time as to what
documents and t^^pes of information jow received from this particular
division of the Justice Department?
Mr. McCoRD. I can recall one or two things specifically.
I believe I made reference in my earlier testimony today to informa-
tion about the forgery of college press credentials in connection with
plans of more than one individual to gain access to both the Demo-
cratic National Committee Convention site at Miami and the Repub-
lican National Convention site, and specifically to use such forged
credentials for the purpose of getting access to the communications
center and blowing up those centers. This report 1 distinctly rem^ember
seeing and passed some information on it along to wxj own superiors;
Senator Weicker. Well, I don't intend to take up the time of the
committee here, but I wish that you would, as best you can, think .
about this matter. If there are any other matters which came into your
possession which you have not told the committee about, would you
be good enough to supply the committee Avith memoranda on that?
]Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, I mil do so. '
Senator Weicker. Let me ask you, do you still have in your pos-
session any of the documents which a'ou ree^ved from this divisioHil
of the Justice Department?
223
Mr. MeCoTRD. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. What happened to this material, then? Was it
destroyed?
Mr. McCoRD. I don't recall our taking any material at all from the
Internal Security Division offices. I dictated a memorandum at their
othces onto a tape of one report that I had read and turned that tape
over to your committee sometime back.
Senator Weicker. Now, on what particular occasion did the
Internal Security Division take the initiative and call you?
Mr. McCord. Particularly during the last 2 weeks of May 1971
when there were sizable numbers of demonstrators in Washington,
and their plans were being formulated by some violence-oriented
elements within whose demonstrators for confrontation Avith the
police, confrontation with them. I recall one specific report where I
received a call from one of those two gentlemen stating that there
had been evidence come to light that the bombing of the, one of the,
rooms in the Pentagon which had appeared, the evening ki which it
had appeared, in the paper the day before that this had been deter-
mined to be caused by what is known as a plastic C-4 explosive, the
equivalent of about 18 sticks of dynamite, and he was alerting me
that to the effect that there was this plastic explosive bemg used
and, as a matter of essentially some forewarning that someone had
in their possession this type of plastic explosive.
Senator Weicker. Mr. McCord, did you actually receive any FBI
reports while at the Internal Security Division?
Mr. McCord. I saw some material that was attributed to the
FBI. I did not take any with me. I made extracts of some of the
material that was sho\vn to me.
Senator Weicker. Now, is it possible for you to go ahead and
segregate the FBI material from the other matters that you have
been discussing here this morning? Is there anything that stands out
in your mind that specifically could be attributed to the FBI?
Mr. McCord. I cannot recall in terms of what I testified to today
that that material came directly from FBI sources. My memory on.
where it came from at this point in time is not that clear.
Senator Weicker. Now, those were the major calls from the
Internal Security Division, were they again Mr. Martin and Mr.
Lisker?
Mr. McCord. Primarily Mr. Lisker.
Senator Weicker. Primarily Mr. Lisker?
- Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Were they alwaj^s made to you?
Mr. McCord. To Mr. Houston and me, primarily.
Senator Weicker. But either you or Mr. Houston received these
ealls?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now, in your journeys to the Internal Security
Division, did you ever have occasion to meet Mr. Guy Goodwin,
the Chief of the Special Litigation Division?
^ Mr. AlcCoRD. I do not believe so, sir. I do not recall that name.
Senator Weicker. You have indicated recently that the Vietnam
Veterans Against the War had an office in the Democratic National
■ ■ V- Ifanalnl oil) mo.
224
Committee or Mc Govern headquarters. Where did you receive that
information?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not recall the source of it now, except that it
came to me some time during the summer of 1972.
vSenator Weicker. When you say in the summer of 1972, was it
before June 17?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. After June 17?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. How many times were you personally in contact
with Robert Mardian?
Mr. McCoRD. I can recall two or three times.
Senator Weicker. Was this when he was still at the Internal
Security Division or at the time he had left that division and was
working for the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. McCoRD. Only after he had come to the Committee To Re-Elect
the President.
Senator Weicker. You say that you had two or three personal
meetings with him?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Were there additional contacts with him by
phone?
Mr. McCoRD. I think there was a call or two separate from the
meeting, as I can recall one or two calls in connection with the driver
that Mr. jMardian had that we were considering for use at the
committee.
Senator Weicker. Now, can you give me an indication as to the
matters which 3'ou and Mr. Mardian discussed?
Mr. McCoRD. I can recall the subject of the driver that I have
just referred to.
Senator Weicker. You referred to that at the last hearing also?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. So I think it is well placed on the record.
Mr. McCoRD. The subject of the access to the materials that we
have been discussing at the Internal Security Division with one
meeting in connection with that that I can recall. There may have
have been one other meeting, I cannot be sure whether two or three
meetings, but if it was it is the second or the third meeting, but
the other two topics that have been raised in my memorandum,
they were discussed.
Senator Weicker. At any time while you were at the Internal
Security Divi: ion, did jou see Gordon Liddy there?
Mr. McCoRD. I am sorry, I was not listening, what was the
question?
Senator Weicker. At any time that you were at the Internal
Security Division, did vou see Gordon Liddy there?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. Do you have any knowledge that Mr. Liddy
ever waa at the Internal Security Division?
Mr. McCoRD. I had no knowledge before June 17. After that I
read in the papers that he had some access.
Senator Weicker. Now, just a few more questions. To move for
a minute away from the Internal Security Division matter, in your
225
letter to Judge Sirica dated March 19, 1973, you said that you could
not feel confident in testifying before a grand jury whose U.S. attorneys
work for the Department of Justice. Why did you make that
statement?
Mr. McCoRD. Because I believed that because of the fact that
the U.S. attorneys work for the Attorney General and the Attorney
General works for the White House that whatever information I gave
to the grand jury would be immediately passed to the White House,
who it seems to me, at that point in time had an adverse interest
in what I had to say.
Senator Weicker. Was there anything in their conduct, was there
anything in their conduct toward a^ou, that gave you a basis for that
statement?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now, lastly, did you have any conversation
after June 17 with Alfred Baldwin?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. How many conversations did you have?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe I had two telephone conversations with
him, maybe three, immediately after, almost after our arrest, after
I returned home from the District of Columbia accommodations at
the jail, and then I saw him twice, I believe, at the U.S. Attorney's
Office in July when he was planning to appear for testimony.
Senator Weicker. Can you give me the nature of your telephone
conservations with Mr. Baldwin?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, I can, and I can tell you that it is my under-
standing those calls were taped or recorded otherwise. My best recol-
lection is that when I returned home around the — somewhere around
the 2.3d of June — that there was a note from Mr. Baldwin askmg me
to call him at his home in Connecticut, which I did, and during that
call my recollection is that he told me that he had called the Committee
To Re-Elect the President, and I believe he said he talked to Fred
LaRue and told him that he had been involved in the Watergate
operation, that Mr. LaRue had expressed surprise that he had been
so involved and Mr. Baldwin said that he asked him some questions
about what help he was going to get from the committee itself of any
kind and I think particularly in terms of legal fees and so on. He asked
me, I believe he said, I cannot separate the phone calls out at this
point in time, I can give you the substance of them if you want me to
state them.
Senator Weicker. All right. Just go on,
Mr. McCoRD. In those calls he said that, I believe one of the
attorneys for the Committee To Re-Elect the President had subse-
quently come up to Connecticut to see his attorney there. He did not
say what was discussed. He asked a question of what the committee
was doing, what knowledge I might have of the submission of expense
accounts which Mr. Baldwin had previously submitted for his travels,
while a security officer with Mrs. Mitchell, and I told him that I really
did not know what the committee had done about it and I could not
recall at that point in time whether there were really copies of any of
those expense vouchers in my safe at the office but that that he should
recompute what he figured was going to be due him and to send it to
226
the Committee To Re-Elect the President, which I felt would reim-
burse him, and I understand they subsequently did.
There was some discussion, I am sure, about what he planned to
do in terms of pleading guilty or not. Some discussion about his re-
quest for appearance before the grand jury in July. I am sure there
are other matters but I cannot recall them right now.
Senator Weicker. Who initiated these phone calls, did Mr. Baldwin
initiate them or did you initiate them?
Mr. McCoRD. No, he left a note for me first of all, to call him, and
then he gave me subsequent instructions as to some other numbers I
was to call him at in Comiecticut, two or three different numbers, and I
called those numbers and sometimes I called him at home and he
would say, "Call me at a couple of other numbers," and I would call
him at those numbers. My belief was that they were either — at that
time they were probably his attorneys' offices; I believe others there
may have been some FBI offices involved in it who were monitoring the
conversation.
Senator Weicker. You believe that you were calling Mr. Baldwin
at FBI offices?
Mr. McCoRD. Well, I have so understood that the conversations
were being taped at that time.
Senator Weicker. Let us separate this; there are two statements
made here and I want to be very careful and you want to be careful
about what is being said. No. 1, you had made the statement that you
believe these conversations had been taped, correct?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now, No. 2, are you sayuig that you believed
these conversations to have been taped at FBI offices?
Mr, McCoRD. I would guess at this point in time that one or two
things happened. That perhaps the calls were made at his attorney's
offices with FBI agents present listenmg to the calls or perhaps that
the calls were to an unlisted FBI phone.
Senator Weicker. So, in other words, you believe there was FBI
involvement either in the offices of his attorney or actually at FBI
offices insofar as your phone calls to Baldwin are concerned?
Mr. McCoRD. FBI or Government
Senator Weicker. Or Government?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Senator Weicker. Government personnel were involved in these
telephone calls?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. You mentioned the other day in your testimony
that you had read of the possibility of Mr. Baldwin being a double
agent and that you had no evidence to that effect. Is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. Where did this first come to your attention?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe I testified that I first heard the allegation
over the TV interview on a Sunday by Mr. Clark MacGregor of the
committee. I think I also read some references to it in the newspapers
at about that time that the committee was handing out the story that
Mr. Baldwin was a double agent, and I believe I also testified Friday
that I told Mr. Caulfield I felt this was absolutely untrue.
Senator Weicker. You told who it was untrue?
227
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Caulfield.
Senator Weicker. Why would you have told Mr. Caulfield?
Mr. McCoRD. Because he called me that same day that Mr.
MacGregor made his statement over the TV and it appeared an hour
or two earlier and I was a little bit concerned that this sort of story
would be floating and I told Caulfield I had no knowledge of it and I
did not believe it.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Senator Weicker.
It is 12:20 now. The chairman found it necessary to leave for other
important business. I would like to continue with Mr. McCord to
finish the questioning with Senator Montoya, which I hope we can
conclude around 12:30. And then to ask Mr. McCord to return at 2,
when the committee will reconvene when I understand that both the
majority and minority counsels may have some additional questions,
but I hope we are coming close to the end of your rather extended
testimony.
Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCord, A\ith respect to your suspicion that your phone had
been tapped at your home did you conduct any investigation around
your premises to determine whether there was actually a phone tap?
]Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And what did you find?
Mr. McCord. I had some equipment in September 1972 that
normally when you go through a particular procedure with it if there
is an extension, a telephone extension off of the phone you are testing
or if certain types of devices are being used on the line there is an alarm
that is sounded somewhat like a buzzer and I would make these
tests periodically through the fall of the year and it would go into the
alarm during some of the tests. There were also many phone calls
that had some very unusual things would occur when a call would
come in in which we would hear an extension be picked up shortly
after the call and other things.
Senator Montoya. Permit me to ask you this question. Then, on
the basis of your investigation, are you concluding definitely that
your phone had been tapped?
Mr. McCord. I had no doubt then, sir, and I have no doubt now.
Senator IMontoya. Were you also under the impression that as
you spoke to other parties that your conversations may have been
recorded during the time you communicated with anybody?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. About this case?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir, about this case.
Senator Montoya. On how many occasions did you suspect this
or were you certain that this occurred?
Mr. McCord. I would say at least a half dozen times, perhaps more
during September and October, particularly, of 1972.
Senator Montoya. And when you mentioned the occurrence of
these things to Mr. Caulfield, 1 believe you indicated that you cited
only two instances?
tlr. McCord. I referred to the two specific calls I was concerned
about but I told him also about all these other things that had been
happening that led me to believe that the phone was tapped.
228
Senator Montoya. Did you complain to anyone else?
Mr. McCoRD. I made a lot of complaints to my lawyer in terms of
filing motions, to Mr. Bittman when I discussed it with him. These
motions went in the record.
Senator Montoya. Did you allege these occurrences in your
motions?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Now, with respect to your statements in your
previous testimony that you were under the impression that the
rresident knew of the clemency offer, would you please refresh my
memorj^ as to the actual conversations that led you into this beUef?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, su-. The information that, and knowledge that
led me to believe stemmed with conversations, stemmed from con-
versations with Mr. Liddy — Gordon Liddy — in January and February
of 1972, in which he told me about the meetings mth the Attorney
General in the Attorney General's offices with Mr. Dean present in
which the operation was deliberatel}^ stated at length that the process
and consequence of the operation were discussed by those present,
presumably meaning the advantages and disadvantages of them in
what appeared to be the deliberate consideration, careful considera-
tion, given to the operation by the Attorney General. 1 beheve I
stated that there was a 30-day delay which to me seemed quite
significant. I beheve I stated that the Attorney General was in my
opinion, a very decisive man.
Senator Montoya. Mr. McCord, I do not know whether you under-
stood my question.
Mr. McCoRD. All right, sir.
Senator Montoya. But we are going back to January of 1972, in
relating what transpired there. My question was: What led you to
beheve that the offer of clemency had the endorsement or approval of
the President?
Mr. McCoRD. I am sorr}^, sir. I misunderstood the question. The
statement from Mr. Caulfield to me.
Senator Montoya. Will vou relate those statements again?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Mr. Caulfield stated that he was carrj-ing the message of Executive
clemenc}'" to me.
Senator Montoya. Did he state so specifically?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir. "From the very highest levels of the Wliite
House," these were his exact words.
He stated that the President of the United States was in Key
Biscayne, Fla., that he already had been told of the forthcoming
meeting with me. This was, I believe, on Friday, January 12, that
the President had been told about the forthcoming meeting with me
and would be immediately told of the results of the meeting.
Senator Montoya. Did you check with Mr. Liddy after your
meetings to ascertain whether or not the offer and your response had
been communicated to the President?
Was there any followup on vour part?
Mr. McCoRD. With Mr. Liddy, su-?
Senator Montoya. With Mr. Caulfield.
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Caulfield? I would like to answer the question
this way, if I may.
229
He told me that the results of the meetings would be communicated
with the President, that meeting of January 12, that Friday, that the
results of the meeting he and I were then having, was then having
would be communicated to the President, and he said, "I may have a
message to you at our next meeting from the President himself." This
is an exact quote.
Senator Montoya. Did you ever receive a message through Mr.
Caulfield purporting to be a communication from the President?
Mr. McCoRD. He came back to me at subsequent meetings discuss-
ing Executive clemency and a large number of other matters. He did
not specifically state that the President said them.
Senator Montoya. Now, jou mentioned that you received a note
in your box from Mr. Caulfield which was signed "Jack". You also
mentioned a letter that you wrote to Mr. Caulfield which you addressed
"Dear Jack".
Now, were you on a fu-st-name basis with Jack Caulfield?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. How long have you known him?
Mr. McCoRD. I first met him when he contacted me about the job
at the Committee To K,e-Elect the President in September. That was
my first meeting with him, the first time I met him.
Sena^tor Montoya. Was he the only one connected either with the
White House or the committee to ask you to come to work?
Mr. McCoRD. No, sir, the first person that contacted me conveyed
a message to me that — the first person was an individual in the
Secret Service that I had kno^^^l and he said that there was a pos-
sibility of a position open in campaign security work during the 1972
campaign and did I have any interest. My answer was — this gentleman
called me by phone in September 1972, in about a 1-, 2-minute
conversation. My answer was that I would have liked to have heard
more about it.
He said, well, you may be getting a call. I shortly did receive a call
from Mr. Caulfield.
Senator Montoya. Who was that person in the Secret Service?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Alfred Wong.
Senator Montoya. Now, going to the matter of receiving reports
from the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, I
do not want to belabor this point, but how many reports did you
receive from this Division?
Mr. McCoRD. I have a little bit of trouble answering this question,
because. Senator, the number of meetings I had with him I could
probably guess at. The number of reports I saw there, separate
indi^ddual reports, would be a sizable number and I could not estimate.
Senator Montoya. How many meetings did you have with hun?
Mr. McCoRD. It seems to me the meetings began in late May 1972,
and contmued until close to June 17. I was gone a portion of that
period to Miami, Fla.
Senator Montoya. So how many meetings would you say that is?
Mr. McCoRD. I would estimate a half dozen.
Senator Montoya. And how many reports did you see; more or
less?
Mr. McCoRD. Probably 25 or so.
Senator Montoya. How many copies of reports did you take back
with you?
230
Mr, McCoRD. I took none back with me, sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you make any notes?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
. Senator Montoya. And what were these reports about generally?
I do not want to go into the specifics.
Mr. McCoRD. About planned violence in Washington and in Miami,
Fla., specifically m connection with the Republican National Con-
vention, some in connection with the Democratic National Con-
vention, in which there were plans to forge the college press credentials
that I have referred to.
Senator Montoya. Who did you deal with at the Internal Security
Division?
Mr. McCoRD. Mamly, Mr. Lisker, Joel Lisker.
Senator Montoya. Did you deal with others?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Martin.
Senator Montoya. Now, did you have any access to any FBI
reports?
Mr. McCoRD. Some of the material which I saw was referred to or
identified as FBI material.
Senator Montoya. ^y whom?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe Mr. Lisker.
Senator Montoya. Did a^ou check these particular reports and did
you see &nj attribution to the FBI on the face of the reports?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes sir, some of them.
Senator Montoya. Another question that I want to clear up. You
mentioned the Las Vegas trip. You mentioned that there were two
trips made, either by Mr. Lidd}^ or Mr. Hunt — which was it?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Liddy.
Senator Montoya. One w^as to case the Greenspun office to de-
termine whether or not a break-in could take place. Is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir. I understood both trips were for that
purpose.
Senator Montoya. All right. Was there any actual break-in?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not know of any, sir.
Senator Montoya. And you went to work for the Republican
National Committee in October and you worked with them and for
them until January, is that correct, January 1972?
Mr. McCoRD. No sir, the relationship continued until June 1972.
Senator Montoya. Then you were on their payroll at $600 a month?
Mr. McCoRD. Approximately.
Senator Montoya. You hadn't mentioned this before, because I
inteiTogated you about the paj'^roll at the CRP. You were on their
payroll, too, were you not?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir, I mentioned these matters in the executive
session to the investigators and I apologize if I appeared to mislead you.
Senator Montoya. What was your salary with the CRP from
January'' until June 17?
Mr. McCoRD. Gross salary was
Senator Montoya. On a monthly basis.
Mr. McCord. Monthly basis, the net pay was about $1,250 a
month.
Senator Montoya. Who emplo3^ed you at the Republican National
Committee?
231
Mr. McGoRD. Mr. Barry Mountain.
Senator Montoya. What is his capacity there or what was his
capacity at that time?.
Mr. McCoRD. Director of administration.
Senator Montoya. And how Jong did you work for the Republican
National Committee again?
Mr. McCoRD. I was on their payroll through some part of June,
approximateiy the middle.
Senator Montoya. Now, you mentioned also that in December,
some of you or ail the defendants got together somewhere for a strategy
meeting mth respect to the trial. Is that correct?
Mr. McCord. I can't recall that testimony, sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you get together at any time in December
or before the trial mth respect to a trial strateg};"?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Montoya. With the other defendants?
Mr. McCoRD. No sir, only a general discussion Avith Mr. Barker
a day or two before the trial.
Senator Montoya. And did you discuss anything there with respect
to the offer of clemency or any help from the individuals at the White
House or in Government or at the CRP?
Mr. McCoRD. 1 can recall some conversations that took place at
this meeting, at which Mr. Barker was talking about pleading guilty
or not plead guilty. I can't be sure whether Executive clemency was
mentioned at that point in time. I think now it was.
Senator Montoya. By whom?
Mr. McCoRD. By Mr. Barker, stating that Executive clemency
had — he understood it had been mentioned by Hunt or promised to
Hunt.
Senator Montoya. And were you in constant touch with Mr. Hunt
during the course of the trial?
Mr. McCoRD. Not contact as such. 1 saw him during the first week
of the trial, before he pled guilty. I did not see him thereafter.
Senator Montoya. Now, there was an article, a statement by Mr.
Caulfield on Saturday, and I will read this statement quoting him. It
was a press statement:
I have briefly reviewed Mr. Mc Cord's statement before the Senate Select
Committee, and while it does not fulh^ reflect my best recollection of the events
which took place between he and I during January of this j^ear, it is true that I
met with Mr. McCord on three occasions in Januarj' and conveyed to him certain
messages from a high White House official.
Now, do you have an}' dispute with that statement?
Mr. McCoRD. Do I have any what, sir?
Senator Montoya. Dispute with that statement?
Do you question the accuracy of that statement?
Mr. McCoRD. He apparently has a separate recollection than I do,
"sir, from his statement, so there must be some differences of opinion
as to what was said. I do not know what he might mean at this point in
time.
vSenator Montoya. But in view of his statement, you still state
that what you said to this committee was correct as far as you knew
and as far as you recall?
232
Mr. McCoRD. It is accurate and correct to the best of my recol-
lection, yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Why did you turn down the overtures toward
Executive clemency?
Mr. McCoRD. Well, there are a number of reasons. In the first
place, I intended to plead not guilty. I intended to fight the case
through the courts of appeal, and I never had any intention of taking
Executive clemency or pleading guilty, either; both of which were
usually connected together when the terms were used. In other words,
if you plead guilty, there will be Executive clemency offered to you.
My basic position was essentially that I would not even dispute it,
either one.
Senator Montoya. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Baker. Thank you. Senator Montoya.
[Whereupon at 12:40 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at
2 p.m., the same day.]
ArTERNOox Session, Tuesday, May 22, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will proceed.
Mr. Dash. Mr. McCord, I just have a few questions. There were
many questions put to you for the period of your testimony, and I
just have a few, and I do understand Minority Counsel Thompson
has some questions.
I think that one of the areas that has not been covered is the role
of the person who was on the other side of the wiretap which you
installed the end of May 1972. Now, did you employ Mr. Alfred
Baldwin for that purpose?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. What was his particular assignment with regard to
monitoring the wdretap?
Mr. McCoRD. His assignment was to listen on a radio receiver
that received the transmissions from the Democratic National Com-
mittee telephones, in which the electronic devices had been installed
in connection ^vith the two dates of Memorial Day weekend and
June 17, 1972.
Mr. Dash. Where was he located when he was doing this monitoring?
Mr. McCoRD. On the seventh floor of the Howard Johnson Motel
across the street from the Democratic National Conmaittee
headquarters.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. McCord, can you see the chart on the easel
there? [Exhibit No. 12, p. 101.]
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. The drawing purports to show the Howard Johnson
on your right and the Watergate Office Building on your left. Now,
does it represent the room 723 which was used by Mr. Baldwin for
monitoring of those telephones?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, it was.
233
Mr. Dash. And he was just right across the street in doing that?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. In his monitoring how was he recording what he was
hearing?
Mr. McCoRD. He was Hstening with headphones to the conversa-
tions that were being transmitted and would take down the substance
of the conversations, the time, the date on the yellow legal-sized
scratch pad, and then ultimately would type them up a summary of
them by time, chronological summary, and turn that typed log in
to me and I would deliver them to Mr. Liddy.
Mr. Dash. Did you deliver them to Mr. Liddy directly?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, did there come a time when you were delivering
those logs that they were retyped?
Mr. McCoRD. I know of at least one instance in which that occurred
because I saw them being retyped.
Mr. Dash. Was it your understanding that that occurred on more
than one occasion, even though you yourself may not know?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Dash. What was the purpose of retyping the log, did Mr. Liddy
explain that to you?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe some general explanation, in substance that
he wanted them in a more final complete form for discussion with Mr.
Mitchell and whoever else received them.
Mr. Dash. Now, who did this retyping?
Mr. McCoRD. Sally Harmony, H-a-r-m-o-n-y, who was the secre-
tary to Mr. Liddy at the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President.
Mr. Dash. Did you have occasion to observe her typing the logs?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. Did you have occasion to talk to her while she was
doing it?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. In that conversation you had with Sally Harmony,
did she give you any indication that she understood what she was
doing when she was retyping that log?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, she did.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, could j^ou briefly describe, without
going into any of the contents what a log would be, what actually
would be entered on the log which Mr. Baldwin would first type and
then be retyped by Miss Harmony?
Mr. McCoRD. It would be similar to any other telephone conversa-
tion that one person might make to another beginning with a state-
ment on his log of the time of the call, who was calling who ; a summary
of what was said during the conversation itself, including names of
persons who were mentioned that Mr. Baldwin apparently believed
were of sufiicient significance to set forth in the log.
Mr. Dash. Then it would be true that anybody reading that would
have no difficulty kno^dng it came from a telephone conversation?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. I think you testified earlier, and I just wanted to get it
clear for the record, that your discussions with Mr. Liddy concerning
meetings he had with the Attorney General, indicated that Mr.
234
Liddy was actually meeting with the Attorney General, with regard
to this operation?
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. All the way up to what time, what was the last date
that Mr. Liddy indicated that he had a rheetmg with the Attorney
General regardmg this particular bugging operation?
Mr. McCoRD. My best recollection is immediately before June 17
during — I would estmiate, during that week, immediately preceding
June 17.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Liddy indicate what the nature of that meeting
was?
Mr. McCoRD. All I can recall at this point is some conversation,
as a general conversation to the effect that "We discussed getting
ready for the operation that is coming up" and I think just the overall
planning for the operation.
Mr. Dash. Going back very briefly to the information that you
were getting from the Internal Security Division, was your trip to
Miami related in any way to the Department of Justice's investiga-
tion of the Veterans Against the War in Vietnam?
Mr. McCoRD. No.
Mr. Dash. Was any of the investigation that ^'•ou engaged in with
regard to that group related to the Department of Justice investiga-
tion?
Mr. McCoRD. In Miami, you mean?
Mr. Dash. Or any other place.
Mr. McCoRD. I am sorry, would you mind restating that question?
I am not sure I quite followed.
Mr. Dash. I think in jour testimony you indicated that informa-
tion you were receiving from the Internal Securit}-^ Division and
other information related in some respects to activities of the Veterans
Against the War in Vietnam?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Was 3^our activity in getting that information for any
investigation you were conducting on behalf of the committee
related in any way to any investigation the Department of Justice
was making of the same group?
Mr. McCoRD. If by that it is meant that whatever information
I was acquiring separate and apart from the Internal Security Divi-
sion was being transmitted to them the answer would be "No." It was
a one-way street, it was at that time.
Mr. Dash. Now, you have named in the second break-in in the
Watergate four persons— in addition to the involvement of Mr.
Liddy and Hunt and j'^ou — named Mr. Barker, Mr. Martinez, Mr.
Sturgis, and Mr. Gonzales. I tliink you also mentioned that in the
first break-in there were three additional persons.
Could you name them for the record, please?
Mr. McCoRD. I don't know that I know the names for certain.
I have been shown some photographs by the FBI, if jou. want me to
relate that.
Mr. Dash. Have you identified photographs of persons who did
accompany you in the first time?
Mr. McCoRD. I have seen two photographs of men that I believe
were in that first operation.
235
Mr. Dash. As a result of that identification did you then learn
what their names were?
Mr. McCoRD. I heard the names, the names that I originally —
what I am trying to say, the names I originally heard were apparently
not the true names so I can't associate the two together that way but
the photographs, one individual was, I believe, that I made a probable
identification was a Mr. Felipe Diego, and the other name associated
with the photograph that I identified was a Air. Reinaldo Pico.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. McCord, I have placed at your table a tele-
phone which is not connected to anything. Wliat I would like you to
do, because you testified to the particular bugging operation of the
Democratic National Committee headquarters, if you would demon-
strate to the committee the manner in which you placed the so-called
bug in the telephone.
I would like to ask the party who has the custody of the receiver to
please take the receiver over to the table.
Mr. McCoRD. jVfy counsel asked for assurance that I will not be
prosecuted on this installation.
Mr. Dash. As I said, the telephone is not connected and no con-
versation is involved.
Now, I also will show 3^011 an item which was entered as an exhibit,
[Government exhibit 16(b)] at the trial, and I understand was taken
from either your possession or in the vicinity of where you were when
you were arrested. I think it is a miniature transmitter in a telephone
and I ask you to identify that.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes; I believe this is the one entered into evidence.
Mr. Dash. Now, will you identify exactly what that is?
Mr. McCoRD. Tliis is a radio, essentially a radio transmitter which
is powered by the power within the telephone system, the telephone
line itself, and that transmitter is, was connected or was for the
purpose of being connected into the telephone itself for the purpose of
transmitting those conversations over the phone.
Mr. Dash. When that transmitter is connected in the telephone, is
it capable of picking up both sides of the conversation?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And broadcasting it to another place?
i'Mr. McCoRD. Yes; it is.
Mr. Dash. Will you just demonstrate, not actuallj^ attaching it,
how you would place that in the telephone that is before you?
Mr. McCoRD. The cover would be taken off the telephone
Mr. Dash. Could you lift the base a little so that the Senate com-
mittee can see what you are doing?
Air. McCoRD. The cover would be taken off the telephone and two
of the wires connected with this would be interconnected in series
with the wiring within the phone itself.
This is the antenna which would be concealed underneath the
telephone mechanism. The device itself would be likewise concealed
under some portion of the telephone mechanism — there are three or
four places that it could be put — and essentially, that is the technique
of the installation.
Mr. Dash. All right. Now, since you are talking about a trans-
mitter in a broadcasting unit, would there be any wires going from
that telephone to the receiving unit which Mr. Baldwin was monitor-
ing so that he could hear what was going on in that telephone?
9(5-296— 73— bk. 1 16
236
Mr. McCoRD. No; it would be in effect, a small radio transmitting
station, comparable, perhaps, to a very small scale of a radio station
transmitting to a receiver in your home.
Mr. Dash. I will ask you to look at the kind of large receiver which
was placed on the table which was entered into the trial as an exhibit
[Government exhibit 105] and is that the receiver that was used by
Mr. Baldwin over at the Howard Johnson Hotel?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Dash. I take it that you identified it as his?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, could you tell us the value of the receiver and what
its potential is?
Mr. McCoRD. It is a very sophisticated and complex receiver with
what is called a very high degree of sensitivity; that is, it is capable of
picking up very weak transmissions. Normally, it sells for about $6,500.1
This one, I believe, is a used version of that. It is capable of covering a
wide span of megacycles — kiJocycle-megacycle range, almost to the
very lowest or the very highest radio transmission can normally operate
on.
Mr. Dash. What was the range of the httle transmitter that you
would install in the telephone? How far would it transmit?
Mr. McCoRD. It is a ver}^ hard thing to state specifically because it
depends on so many variables. But the distance from the Watergate
from the Democratic National Committee headquarters to the motel
room at the Howard Johnson Motel, that transmission for this particu-
lar type instrument is received very well by this tyjie of receiver and
comes through very well. In Une of sight, that range, that distance, is a
normal transmission for a radio transmission.
Mr. Dash. You have testified that the receiver is a very sensitive
receiver. Why was it necessary in this case to use a very sensitive
receiver?
Mr. McCoRD. Because the object was to, the technical objective
was to get the very minimum transmission possible out of that par-
ticular location so that other persons cannot pick up those trans-
missions in other locations. Within the Washington area, it is a very/
high density area of transmissions and it would be very easy unden
norma] circumstances for someone else to also hear the conversation)
being intercepted unless it was an extremely low-powered transmission.
Mr. Dash. Was that to avoid detection?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And was the microphone to be used — transmitter — ai
low-powered transmitter?
Mr. McCoRD. Very low.
Mr. Dash. And yet you were able through that receiver to get ai
very clear sound when it was monitored by Mr. Baldwin?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, it took us about 2 days to find it. It was so low
in output, so weak a signal, that it took a great deal of work, yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, once you put such a transmitter in the telephone i
as you indicated, you could conceal it so that it is not readily visible,
even though the telephone was opened. Once j^ou put it in there with
no wires attached, using the current of the phone itself, how long could
that transmitter actually transmit to that receiver? Over what period
of time?
237
Mr. McCoRD. Under normal circumstances, a lot of variables again,
such as the quality of the components, it would transmit for some
months. Perhaps a year or so.
Mr. Dash. Perhaps a year?
Mr. McCoRD. Um hm,
Mr. Dash. And this therefore could have gone on way beyond
June 17, could it not?
Mr. McCoRD. That is right.
Mr. Dash. Now, when Mr. Spencer Oliver, who we understand,
whose phone was one of the phones on which such a device was used,
or Mr. O'Brien's phone or one of the extensions was used, if he lifted
his telephone to make a conversation with that kind of device which
you have just described installed in it, would he hear a deadening on
the line or would he know or have any indication that his phone was
bugged or tapped?
Mr. McCoRD. He would receive no indication.
Mr. Dash. Therefore, is it your testimony that a professionally
tapped telephone does not give any indication to the person who is
usiug the telephone that his phone is tapped?
Mr. McCoRD. There is a yes and no answer, depending on the type
of devices installed and the professionalism of them, and some other
things; yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And actually using a transmitter ia a telephone isn't
the typical way of tapping a telephone, is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. This is correct.
Mr. Dash. This was a very special procedure that you used for this
particular occasion?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, it was'.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. I have about two, which will be the first for this
day.
Who made arrangements for you to receive what you received on a
daily basis, the documents from the Internal Security Division of the
Department of Justice?
Mr. McCoRD. Mr. Robert Mardian made the contact with, as I
understood it, with the Internal Security Division, where he had
formerly worked.
Senator Ervin. At that time you made the contact, he was working
with the Committee To Re-Elect the President, having retired from
his Justice Department job?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. He had been the head of that particular Division
in the Department of Justice before he was transferred to the
committee?
Mr. McCoRD. So I understood, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, when Mr. Caulfield came to see you, or rather,
when he met you on three occasions and took you out twice on the
George Washington Parkway and one time toward Virginia, was he
driving his own automobile or a Government-owned automobile?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe he was driving his own automobile, I am
sure, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. That is all.
238
Mr. Thompson?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCord, I know you have been here a long time and I appre-
ciate that fact, but I do have a couple of rather pointed questions I
would like to ask you. I don't fanc}'- myself in a role as a prosecutor or
a defense lawyer, but I feel there are a couple of things that I need to
ask you about, in quest of clarity and I j)lan to do so in that spirit.
I am sure you understand.
Mr. McGord, there was some testimom', some previous testimony
concerning the use of tape on the locks of the doors of the Democratic
National Committee, and you testified, I believe last Friday, in re-
sponse to a question by Senator Baker:
''Who placed the tape on the locks of the door on the second
occasion?"
You responded: "I do not know."
The second occasion being the June 17 break-in as opposed to the
first occasion, which I believe you said was May 27.
According to the civil deposition that you gave on A])ril 30, 1973,
in a suit brought by the Democratic National Committee against
you and others, on page 167 of that deposition, your testimony is
related as follows :
The reason for checking it— first of all — on the way over, I checked the back-
door of the DNC of the Watergate Hotel office building basement level. The
reason for checking it is that at the earlier meeting, earlier that evening, it had
been decided that I would be elected to go into the DNC and tape the doors, so
there could be ready access for them to get in and the man at the locksmith
wouldn't have to pick a series of doors to get in. I did that. It took perhaps ten
minutes.
Could A^ou explain that description for us?
Mr, McCoRD. Sure, because I believe your question was who
taped the lock on the second occasion. They were taped — at least I
understood the question that wa}^ — the June 17, they were taped on
two different occasions and ni}" response, if it was not clear, was
intended to convey this idea, that I taped it on the first occasion that
they were taped on the evening of June 17 and that someone else
did the second taping that evening, perhaps an hour or so later. Among
the other four men, the other four defendants, just which one did so,
I don't know. That is what I was trjdng to convey.
Mr. Thompson. I see.
How many doors were taped on the second time?
Mr. McCoRD. I think there were several, because there are several
doors that normalh^ would be taped, perhaps a half dozen or more.
There is about three down on the lower level and then there are some
doors up entering the corridors from perhaps the fourth, fifth, sixth,
seventh floors that I believe were taped that evening.
Mr. Thompson. Had the tape been removed from those doors?
Mr. McCoRD. I do not know about the corridor doors. The^^ were
not removed when I saw them on the lower level doors, the three or
four down there.
Mr. Thompson. Of course, there would be no need to retape them
had not the tape been removed, would there?
Mr. McCoRD. Let us see if I understand the question. There would
be no reason to retape them?
2m
Mr. Thompson. To retape the doors the second tune if the first
tape had not been removed.
Mr. McCoiiD. No, that is correct, that is correct.
Mr. Thompson. You heard Officer Shoffler, I beheve, Mr. McCord,
testify last week that when the doors were locked at the DNC one
could" get out of the office building without a key or without having
the door taped. Could you explam, first of all, what was the need to
tape the doors once you were inside and, secondh^, why did no one
seemingly have the presence of mind to remove the tape on the B-2
level, leaving it there for the officers to find?
Mr. McCoRD. Well, I think you almost have to see the different
doors involved to be able to understand that situation and it involves
this: There are, there are some stairwells coming down off the different
floors and even stairwells off of the different floors, six or seven that
coiled down like a rope. That is, you may go on down into the stairwell
off of the corridor from one exit and it will go down one stairwell
and you go around the comdor and it will go down another one and
you go down a separate stairwell, the two of them wind down. Some
of those doors are at night locked from both sides, as I recall, so that —
some are not, let me correct that. Some are locked from the inside.
Those that were locked so that if you were trying to get out of the
comdor down into a stairwell late at night you could not get into
the stairwell. But 3^ou might be able to go up a couple of floors, say,
to the eighth floor and 1 think there was a door open there, and you
would have to come down and then go into, say you wanted to get
down back to the sixth floor and get into the corridor, go into that
door from the stairwell side you could get in. So that door, for example,
would have to be taped if you had in mind getting out in a hurry and
getting down, it would have to be taped from, you had to plan it
from, "the stairwell side first. Some of these other doors locked from
both sides. It is a pretty
Mr. Thompson. I believe you almost have to be there to understand.
Mr. McCoRD. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Is this the reason the eighth floor door was taped
on the 17th?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did you personally check out the doors, check
the situation to determine whether or not the tape would be needed
in particular doors when you went in to tape those doors or did
anyone check that?
Mr. McCoRD. Well, we knew from the previous operation on
Memorial Day that they would have to be taped if you were going
to plan to leave in a hurry if j^ou got caught there, for example, if
the police came in on you before you got in, you would have to tape
the doors, otherwise, you could not be sure that ^'■ou could get out.
Mr. Thompson. What about the answer to the second part of my
question: You are an experienced man, CIA and FBI, and evidently
these other men were experienced in their own way, and yet the tape
of the B-2 level, readily accessible to anyone coming by there to
check as the officer did, was left on the door. You did not remove the
tape. Why was that done and, secondly, why was the risk taken to
go back up into the DNC with no means of escape? Evidently, once
you were caught, after you had seen that someone had removed the
240
tape, and for all practical purposes you had to assume that someone'
was aware that somebody was trying to get in or had already gotten
in, why was that decision made to start with? Why was the decision
made to go back in there after you knew someone had been tampering
with that door?
Mr. McCoRD. It is a good question, because we had a lot of dis-
cussions on it later.
Mr. Thompson. Where?
Mr. McCoRD. In jail. [Laughter.]
We came by the lower level door that originally had been taped/
assuming that the tape was still there when you could get right on in
without any delay, this is all of the five men together, getting ready to
go up into the Democratic National Committee headquarters and we
found that that tape had been taken off and the door was now locked,
speaking of the basement level, so we regrouped, so to speak, right
below the restaurant in the Watergate Hotel and talked over what to
do and it was agreed that the locksmith and, I believe one or two of the
men, would go back over and make an effort to pick the lock to get in,
and that
Mr. Thompson. Why? Why was that decision reached after you '-
knew that someone had detected your being there previously?
Mr. McCoRD. All right, let me add, the decision was there to send
the locksmith back over and let him start to work in order that there
not be any more delay in time, and for the other men. Barker and I
beheve one other, go back up to Mr. Hunt's room and discuss the
situation with Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy in terms of whether they fee)
what we should do next, should they go ahead and pick them, try tc
pick the lock and get on in or should we call it off, and for me to go back
over to the motel and wait for a word on what was to be done ; under-
stood, well understood, this was a calculated risk in sending them back
over to begin picking the lock but, on the other hand, the more time j''
that went b}'", the fewer people there would be around the Watergate
Hotel and the more conspicuous the men would be and, therefore, that
had some risk in terms of delajdng the matter aiij further. So we sort •^
of decided to go in both directions — to go ahead and start to go in, to
go back up and talk it over with Hunt and Liddy and see what they
wanted to do.
Mr. Thompson. Who made the ultimate decision as to whether or
not you were going back in that night? You say that there was a risk in
waiting, j^ou mean waiting any later that night or waiting for another
day or another week or what?
Mr. McCoRD. Well, there were risks in waiting any longer that
night, for example.
Mr. Thompson. Why not call the whole thing off and come back ini
2 or 3 nights?
Mr. McCoRD. Well
Mr. Thompson. It looks like a pretty good idea now, doesn't it?
Mr. McCoRD. It does, very good. [Laughter.]
It was made on the basis that, first of all, as I say any further delay
in time made five men stand out that much more that night, any delay
of time that night, made five men stand out that much more arouna
the hotel and around the Watergate Office Building and therefore
rather than to lose that time the decision was to go both ways, to send
the locksmith over and start to work with it and send the other men
241
)ver to talk with Liddy and Hunt to see whether or not they wanted to
)roceed or not.
Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you another question in regard to an-
)ther subject. As I understand j^our testimony, it has been that I
jclieve on July 27 of 1972, you received the first payment from Mrs,
lunt of $15,000?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. And that was to do you through November, I
)eUeve?
Mr. McCoRD. Right.
Mr. Thompson. That you received some additional money in
December which was to be payment in advance for the rest of De-
iember and Januar}^?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes; that is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall the date of the payment in December?
Mr. McCoRD. I beheve it was the 2d of December.
Mr. Thompson. December 2d?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. You mentioned the letter that you wrote co Mr.
^aulfield, the anon3anous letter in December. Do you recall the date
n December of that letter?
Mr. McCoRD. No; I do not. I remember the week which was the
v^eek following Christmas, December 25.
Mr. Thompson. The latter part of December?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. So the letter to Mr. Caulfield was after you re-
;eived the No. 2 payment?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. What was that payment, how much money was it?
Mr. McCoRD. It was one of the 2 months' payments for the salary,
or December and for, I think, additional money, $13,000 for lawyers'
ees.
Mr. Thompson. Was there some question in the latter part of
Slovember or during December as to whether or not additional money
v^ould be forthcoming?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes; there was. It was a question on Hunt's part and
Vlrs. Hunt communicated that question to me, and I think that
)robably had something to do with the letter that he wrote and that
have described, a three-page letter that was read to one of the law-
yers.
Mr. Thompson. Did it have anj^thing to do with your letter that you
\^rote to Caulfield?
Mr. McCoRD. None whatsoever. My letter had to do with my
mger about this plan to lay this operation on CIA, and I think the
etter sort of indicates that.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. McCord, you have stated that j-ou were con-
■erned from sometime shortly before the trial I believe up until re-
;ently, that the trial was a sham, that the trial was fixed, that there
ras a miscarrying of justice, and I assume you are talking essentially
ibout the fact that some of the right people were not being prosecuted,
.nd you were not being free to arrive at full disclosure by the Govern-
Qent; is that correct?
Mr. McCoRD. If I can state it more precisely it was the fact there
vas perjured testimony at the trial itself by a key mtness, and that
242
key mtness was Mr. Jeb Magruder, his testimony was perhaps the
most important testimony in the whole trial.
Mr. Thompson. Pardon me just a moment, the basis on which you
say his testimony was perjured, I assume, has to do wdth what Mr
Liddy has told you about Mr. Magruder; is that not correct?
Mr. McCoRD. Told me before June 17 and the comments we ex-
changed at the time Mr. Liddy — excuse me — Mr. Magruder was up or
the stand stating that he knew nothing about the Watergate operatior
prior to June 17.
Mr. Thompson. So the answer to my question is "Yes."
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Go ahead; that was the basis of you]
statement.
Mr. McCoRD. No, not quite, not completely. There is also a facto]
that Mr. Magruder in addition to testifjdng that he knew nothing
about the Watergate operation and his testimony being probably tha
of the most important witness in the trial, also could have named other;
who were principal in the case, specifically Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean
according to the information I had from Mr. Liddy in which I had n<
doubt about.
Mr. Thompson. You could have, too, could you not?
Mr. McCoRD. I could have too; right.
Mr. Thompson. Why didn't you?
Mr. McCoRD. I will be glad to talk that one over, too. Wliy di(
I not get on the stand?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
I think that is a fair question. It seems to me again according to th'
statement of your attorney there at the time, Mr. Alch, your defense
was essentially as you stated to Senator Baker here today, that yoi
felt that because of violence in the country and so forth, that actualh
it posed a threat, possibl}^ to your life and the lives of other people
that is in the record according to Mr. x4.1ch.
Mr. McCoRD. Sure.
Mr. Thompson. I take it your defense was not that at that timi
part of your motivation was, as 3^ou have stated here before thi;
committee that you thought you had the right possibly to go ahea(
without being in any legal difficulty because of Mr. Mitchell's involve
ment, part of Mr. Dean's involvement, which is part of what you tok
us. Evidently you didn't tell Mr. Alch that; Mr. Alch didn't use tha
as part of your defense. I am wondering in answer to those questions
why didn't you come forward at that time and why didn't you tel
Mr. Alch what could have been an even more significant part of you]
defense at that time.
Mr. McCoRD. Well, I had many conversations with Mr. Alch abou'
the facts in the case, and the other principals involved and the decisioD
of mine as to when to come forward with the information which I dio
as basically my decision and it was a day at a time decision on my pan
as to when ^\'as the proper issuance time to tell the facts on this case
Mr. Thompson. You waited until
Mr. McCoRD. I waited until I had an opportunity to tell, No. l>
a man I beheved to be an honest judge, Judge Sirica; No. 2, to tell t "
committee so there would be a proper forum for all of the facts to co
out and to be discovered.
243
r felt, for example, durins; the trial itself that if I came forward and
told the story at this point in time, in light of the nature of the
information I had which some people have described as hearsay or
secondhand, the rules of evidence as I imderstand it may have excluded
some of that information being provided in testimony, or at least I
felt that all of the facts would not be developed during the trial if I
got up on the stand and related them. To me it was a matter of when
was the right time to tell it and this was a most difficult decision. It
was not influenced by money or anything else. It was influenced by
basically my own reasoning as to Avhen was the right time to tell the
story so that there would be an adequate forum for development of
all of the facts in this case. I think my decision has been the right one.
I think I told Judge Sirica first and I told this committee second and
I am fully convinced that was a right decision.
Mr. Thompson. Was there an}^ doubt in your mind that you would
come forward at that time to Judge Sirica, that he would not have
taken the appropriate action that the matter would not have been
handled? According to the trial transcript Judge Sirica practically
pleaded with anyone to come forward and tell the truth. He states
here on page 1499 of the trial transcript:
"If they know anything about this case, if they want to talk to the
grand jury it is not too late. That is up to them. I mean I alwa^^s
operate under the theory that the truth never hurts anybod}^ If they
wait until they are convicted and then they decide to talk well, I
can't ssiy anything about that but I think if they are going to talk, if
there is anything in their mind along those lines, the time for them to
do it is during the trial."
He was stating that.
Mr. McCoRD. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Was there any doubt in your mind that you would
be compromised in any way if you went forward and told Judge
Sirica back in January?
Mr. McCoRD. Not Judge Sirica in the least. He is the lone man I
felt like I could depend on in this case.
Mr. Thompson. He is also the man who would be sentencing you
shortly.
Mr. McCoRD. That is true, too. That is true, too, but what I am
saying about my belief is the man is honest and genuine but you asked
my reasons, and my reasons were the ones I have stated, and I think
that the decision as to the timing of saying what I did was right and
I don't regret that decision; I believe I was upset, as I told you earlier,
that quite frankly the facts would not have come out and been devel-
oped by this committee in the way that they have.
Mr. Thompson. But you were, of course, receiving monej^ during
•this period of time also, were you not?
Mr. McCoRD. I was receiving money until December 2, but
quite frankly, as I told the people who were sending me it, it had no
bearing on what I was saying or was going to say.
Mr. Thompson. You told Mr. Caulfield that there was a possibility
that you could get your case thrown out of court because of a wire-
tap. Did that enter into your decision to hold out?
Mr. McCoRD. No.
Mr. Thompson. And not come forward?
244
Mr. McCoRD. No, it did not.
Mr. Thompson. Were you not trying at that time with Mr
Caiilfield to get him to get the Government to admit an illegal wiretap
so your case would be thrown out?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes. Let me repeat what I said before so things
will be as clear as I know how to make them.
I said I thought the case was a sham, that the trial was a sham
because of the perjured testimony and because of withholding a pile
of material, No. 1 by gentlemen who would be hurt, which would
involve a number of higher-ups in the case, and No. 2, we were not
getting a fair trial. I have said this in many wa3's, in fact. I thought
the fact that we ought to have — justice, as far as I was concerned
demanded that the case be kicked out and started all over again or
this thing and start all over in a circumstance that, No. 1, we get 8
fair trial. We were not getting a fair trial. Perjury was being committee
b}' key witnesses.
Mr. Thompson, You were interested in your fair trial, of course
as your constitutional right.
Mr. McCoRD. For all fair trials.
Mr. Thompson. In your eyes, did Mr. Magruder's failure to tel
the truth about it prejudice your case?
Mr. McCoRD. Of course. If he was a key witness and all othei
testimony seems to fall into place around his testimony and he wa^
withholding the names of principals in the case itself, I would saj
that prejudices the case and it puts a completely, totally differen
light on the case.
In other words, the trial itself was appearing to indicate that Mr
Liddy was the sum total of this operation, that he was the leader, thi
director, the funder, the whole package, and that the case cut off a
this level. It did not. Obviously, the case extended much higher.
Mr. Thompson. In other words, Mr. Magruder should have come u
and implicated higher-ups so that you would not have to. Is that the
way his testimony prejudices your case?
Mr. McCoRD. And he could prove it.
Mr. Thompson. That is the way you looked at that, because—]
assume there was no controversy over the fact that you were caughi
with four other men, huddled behind a desk, with burglary tools or
you and eavesdropping equipment on you?
Mr. McCoRD. No argument about that at all but I thought undei
any circumstances, at least a man deserves a fair trial.
Mr. Thompson. Absolutely.
Mr. McCoRD. And that we were not getting it.
Mr. Thompson. Absolutely.
You mentioned your calls in September and October to the Chiliao
Embassy and the Israeli Embassy, Let me ask you this: What waa
the purpose of those phone calls?
Mr. McCoRD. I think I previously stated — If not I ^^^ll restate it —
to try to test
Mr. Thompson. Try to test?
Mr. Cord. Try to test the accuracy of the Government's response
regarding intercepted conversations of mine, I was concerned that
there had been wiretapping since Jime 17 of my telephone conversa-
tions, and this would provide a test to see if in fact, all the Govern
245
ment records of the Government, some 12 agencies, had ui fact been
•searched; the inferences by the response of the Government 12 days,
14 days after a motion was filed was there is nothing on the record
in the Government of any interception of Mr. McCord's calls any-
where, and I knew that as I have stated, it takes more than 14 days
normally to search 12 different Government agencies for records of
such telephone calls.
Mr. Thompson. How was this a test, Mr. McCord? Did you think
or did you know that these embassies had been bugged?
Mr. McCoRD. I had assumed that they were.
Mr. Thompson. You assumed that they were?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. And you based this assumption on your motion
alleging that you were the subject of illegal surveillance?
Mr. McCoRD. No, that is not quite right. If I left that impression,
I did not mean to.
Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you this: If you assumed that they were
bugged, would it be incorrect to say that possibly you called those
embassies in order to more or less pull yourself up by your own boot-
straps and have your conversations intercepted and perhaps get the
Government in a position where it would have to deny or admit that
those embassies were in fact bugged and, therefore, might dismiss
your case on that basis?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, yes, if I may answer your question, oh, yes, I
stated that this morning. I read it in the statement.
But to finish the rest of the story. Let us suppose that any calls
were intercepted at any point in time. The normal procedure would
be for disclosure by the Government of those calls in camera before
the judge himself and the judge to tletermine the relevancy of those
■calls. It was clear that those calls were not relevant to the trial itself
and were not going to be entered in evidence. Therefore, the case
could not be adjourned.
Mr. Thompson. I want to interrupt you at that point. Pardon me
for interrupting.
Of course, this was a long time after the fact. Did you realize this
point of law at the time you called these embassies?
Mr. McCoRD. Oh, I have had a pretty clear knowledge of the law
since June 17, through what is called jailhouse law3^ers who do as much
as anybody can.
Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Liddy advise you?
Mr. McCoRD. I think I talked ■v^'ith him, yes, quite a few of them,
about the predicament we were in. But he did not discuss this partic-
ular point.
Mr. Thompson. What you are saying is that at the time you made
these calls, you realized that they would be possibly intercepted. You
realized even at that time that they possibly might be irrelevant.
Mr. McCoRD. I knew they were irrelevant. There was no possi-
bility in it.
But I had read, to finish the rest of it, I had read, for example, in the
month before the Dr. Ellsberg situation, where the Government had
for 5 months denied that there were any interceptions of Mr. Ellsberg's
calls or calls of his attorney. Yet, it was not until the defense attorneys
required, requested a court order be issued searching the records of 12
different agencies and some 30 to 45 days later, calls, intercepted calls
of Mr. Boiidin were then disclosed by the Government showing that
calls actually had been intercepted when previously they had been
denied.
Mr. Thompson. Calls to these two embassies?
Mr. McCoRD. No.
Mr. Thompson. Why did you mention these two embassies? What
made you assume that these embassies were bugged?
Mr.'^ McCoRD. At random.
Mr. Thompson. I beg your pardon?
Mr. McCoRD. At random.
Mr. Thompson. You picked them at random?
Mr. McCoRD. Um hm.
Mr. Thompson. Because you read in the papers that some people
have alleged in times past that governments do these sort of things
against one another. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. McCoRD. Somethmg like that.
Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you another question on another
subject.
I beg your pardon?
Mr. McCoRD. I believe my attorney says something like that.
Mr. Thompson. These FBI reports and Internal Security docu-
ments that we have been talking about now, could you tell me — are
you talking about classified material that is improper to be dissemi-
nated to political parties, or are j^'ou talking about materials that you
disseminated to both parties, local police chiefs and things of this
nature? I understand the FBI does disseminate a certain amount of
material. I do not know about the Justice Department, but perhaps
you do. Could jou give us some idea as to the nature of these docu-
ments that were talked about?
Mr. McCoRD. Of course, Mr. Mardian, who headed that division,
could give you an accurate statement of the facts. I am drawing a
conclusion, and my conclusion now, this is not only an appropriate
thing to do, I think it is a ver}^ necessary thing to do to both jmrties,
lor example, when a convention is forthcoming and there is violence
anticipated.
Let me put it another way. I think to fail to disclose to either party
prior to such a convention where violence is anticipated and lives
may be lost is almost criminal dereliction where it could have been
prevented by disclosure of anything of this type, that had they re-
ceived it, they perhaps could have taken steps to prevent the loss of life
or destruction of property. I thought it was entirely apj^ropriate at that
time.
Now, your question as to classification. I understood the material
was, had been declassified or was not classified. My memory is not as
clear as it should be. Some of it may well have been classified. I do
not know. But I felt the pro])riety of it was entirely proper.
Mr. Thompson. At the time, you did not feel that you were dealing
with classified documents or you were getting anything that was
improper for 3''ou to get?
Mr. McCoRD. I did not feel there was anything improper. Quite
to the contrary, as you said, I felt to fail to get it is to fail to get in-
formation that protects tlie lives of people you are charged with
protecting.
247
JVIr. Thompson. Did you know, or did you have an understanding
during this period of time as to whether or not the Democratic Party
also had this material available to them?
Mr. McCoRD. I had an understanding that the Democratic Party
was getting some comparable type of information. From whom they
got it, through what channels, I do not know.
Mr. Thompson. All right; one more question, Mr. McCord. You
mentioned you discussed the logs in connection with just what I asked
you about a moment ago. To whom were these logs sent?
The record is not clear about this and I think in fairness, you should
set the record straight.
Specifically, I refer to a story printed in the Washington Post on
one occasion, stating that supposedly Mr. William Timmons, Gene
Sedam, and Mr. Robert Odle received these logs. Do you know whether
or not on an}^ occasion any of these men ever received the results of the
wiretaps or the buggmg that you were carrying out?
Mr. McCoRD. I have — am perfectly certain in m^^ own mind that
none of them received it. I think something of Mr. Baldwin's memory
was in error if and when he made such a statement. I can understand
how he made it at the time. I have no knowledge that they did receive
it, I do not know whether they did receive it. They certainly did not
receive it from me.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know if they were involved in any manner
in this?
Mr. McCoRD. Absolutely not.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. McCord.
Mr. Chairman, I am finished.
Senator Ervin. Mr. McCord, Mr. Thompson asked you M^hy you
did not speak earlier. At the time the trial was in progress and until
after the trial, you had knowledge or at least information that all of
the people involved with you, including Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt,
were receiving compensation from the Committee To Re-Elect the
President?
Mr. McCord. I believe that is accurate; yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you had witnesses at the trial and you had
seen and heard the deputy director or deputy chairman, or w^hatever
they called him, of the committee, Mr. Magruder, give testimony
which you believed to constitute perjury?
Mr. McCord. I did, sir.
Senator Ervin. You had been urged by your law3^er to keep silent?
Mr. McCord. Well, my law3'er had communicated to me the
matter of Executive clemency. I cannot recall that he tried to get me
to keep silent.
Senator Ervin. Now, Mr. Caulfield had come on the scene three
times and urged yon to keep silent?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you felt at that time there was nobody else
that you knew that knew anything about this that you thought was
willing to speak at that time?
Mr. McCord. No other defendants; no, sir.
Senator Ervin. So if you had come out and said anything, 3^ou
woukl have been, the lone voice, would you not, as far as you could see?
Mr. McCord. A two-part answer.
248
I communicated my concern to Mr. Caulfield, a law enforcement
ofl&cer, an assistant director of the Alcohol and Tax Unit.
Senator Ervin. Well, were you influenced by the criticisms of
certain people who had asked j^ou to postpone making any statements
until later?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir; I was.
Senator Ervin. I would like to make a statement on behalf of
myself as an individual and member of the committee, not as the
chairman. I would like to thank you for your cooperation with the
committee in its effort to ascertain the facts about this matter.
Mr. McCoRD. Thank you, sir. Can I respond?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. McCoRD. I think, sir, that this country at this point in time,
in having the very distinguished Senators and the staff that we have,
is extremely fortunate in having such great men here to probe into
this without fear of where it is going to end and develop all the facts.
I am grateful.
Senator Ervin. You will be available for further testimony if this
committee decides to call 3^ou?
Mr. McCoRD. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Thank you.
Counsel will call the next witness.
Mr. Dash. Call Mr. John J. Caulfield, please.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Caulfield, stand up, please.
Hold up 3^our right hand.
Do you swear that the evidence that you give the Senate vSelect
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities to be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothmg but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Caulfield. I do.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Caulfield, as I understand it, you will be
available to the committee later if it wants to get 3^ou or to get any
information from you other than that which j^ou may give on this
occasion?
Mr. Caulfield. I understand, sir.
Senator Ervin. Thank you.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, there is a vote going on.
Senator Baker. Before we proceed, I note that signal lights indicate
that there is a rollcall vote in progress in the Senate.
Might I suggest, Mr. Chairman, if the members of the committee
agree, in the interest of time and expediency, that we might consider
part of the committee going to vote now and part of it going at the
5-minute warning buzzer and permit this witness to begin, at least,
with the reading of his statement?
Senator Ervin. I think that would be very wise.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Caulfield, would you for the record, please state
your full name and address?
TESTIMONY OP JOHN J. CAULFIELD, ACCOMPANIED BY
JOHN P. SEARS, COUNSEL
Mr. Caulfield. My name is John J. Caulfield, I reside at 5205-
Concordia Street, Fairfax, Va.
Mr. Dash. Are you accompanied at this hearing by an attorney?'
I 249
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, I am.
Mr. Dash. Will the attorney please identify himself for the record?
Mr. Sears. My name is John P. Sears. I am an attorney in Washing-
on, D.C.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Sears, there is another microphone.
Mr. Caulfield, you have a statement which j^ou wish to either submit
o the committee or read to the committee?
Mr. Caulfield. I would prefer to read it, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Every member of the committee, I understand, has
eccived a copy of that. Would you now commence to read 3^our
statement?
Mr. Caufield. Yes, sir; I will.
My name is John J. Caulfield. I was born on March 12, 1929, in the
Bronx, N.Y. I was educated at the local parochial elementary school
md Rice High School in Manhattan. Ui:)on completion of my high
5chool education I received a partial scholarship for basketball at
W&ke Forest University.
After 2 years I was forced to leave college owing to the fact that
ny famih^ could not supply enough additional funds for me to con-
tinue my education. For a short time thereafter I worked as a bank
:eller before joining the New York Telephone Co. in 1949 as a
Iraftsman.
In November of 1950 I was drafted into the U.vS. Army where I
served in the Signal Corps until I was honorably discharged in
N'ovember of 1952. Prior to being drafted, I had taken the civil
service examination for appointment to the New York City Police
Department.
While still in the Army, I received notification that I had passed
:he examination and on June 1, 1953, I joined the police department
is a patrolman. In August of that year, having graduated from the
Police Academy, I was assigned to a Bronx precinct where I walked
I beat and was assigned to a sector car which covered one area of the
3recinct.
Owing to an award wliich I received for the arrest and conviction
Df a ring of seven people involved in a series of robberies, I was pro-
noted to the position of detective on September 25, 1955. Between
that time and June of 1966, I was assigned to the Bureau of Special
services where my duties consisted of monitoring the activities of
terrorist organizations and frequent assignment to VIP protective
duties.
My activities in regard to militant terrorist groups consisted of
nonitoring and compiling intelligence on their overt activities, news-
paper research, interviewing informants, investigating what relation-
ships existed between these groups, and generally familiarizing mj^self
svith the progress of their activities. Examples of the groups which I
investigated included the Communist Party, Cuban militant organi-
zations, as well as a variety of Latin domestic revolutionary groups
mho planned or were suspected of planning various kinds of unlawful
activities. During this time I received a number of awards in connection
iwith my work, some of which were :
I 1. In 1958, I received a Meritorious Police Award owing to the
'seizure of a store of contraband weapons destined for Ireland. I
might add parenthetically that my father has not yet gotten over that.
250
2. In 1959, I received an Excellent Police Award for arrest and
conviction, in cooperation with the FBI, of the prime Castro agent
operating in the United States in 1958.
3. In December 1964, I received a Meritorious Police Award for
the arrest of the perpetrators of the bazooka shelling of the United
Nations.
4. In 1965, I received an award for participating in the arrest and
conviction of a group of French-Canadians and domestic militants who
had plotted to destroy the Washington Monument, the Statue of
Liberty, and the Liberty Bell.
My protective duties in regard to VIP assignments consisted, among
other things, of coordinating the activities of Secret Service agents
with the New York Cit}^ Police Department in the political campaign
of 1960. During the 1960 campaign I was assigned to both candidates
when they visited New York and I got to know Mr. John Sherwood
who was in charge at that time of Vice President Nixon's Secret
Service detail.
Senator Baker. Mr. Witness, would you suspend for just a moment?
The signal system indicates there is now 5 minutes before the end ol
the rollcall.
Might I ask the committee if there is any objection to the witness
continuing to read this statement in the presence of counsel, even
though Senator Weicker and I as the onh^ two committee members
remaining have to go out now and vote. If there is any objection on
behalf of the committee or on behalf of the witness or his attorney,
we will have to suspend. But inasmuch as A^our statement is 26 pages
long and each member has a copy of it, if you have no objection, ]
suggest that we proceed.
Mr. Sears. We have no objection.
Mr. Caulfield. May I proceed?
Mr. Dash. Yes sir, proceed on behalf of the committee.
Mr. Caulfield. In May of 1968, I received a letter from ]Mr
Sherwood indicating that there was a possible position in the upcoming
Nixon campaign for the Presidency for a person to serve in the security
area. I telephoned Mr. Sherwood and substantiated what he had said
in the letter and he told me that Mr. H. R. Haldeman would interview
me if I were interested. Mr. Sherwood arranged an appointment for
me with Mr. Haldeman at 450 Park Avenue in New York, which was
the campaign headquarters, and I was hired.
With the assassination of Robert Kenned}'^ in earh^ June, my duties
changed and ultimately, starting with the end of the 1968 convention,
I became responsible to Mr. John Ehrlichman for being sure that the
staff quarters and working areas of the Nixon campaign traveling
staff were secure as we moved from city to city during the campaign.
Mr. Ehrlichman was pleased with my work durmg this time, and on
election night in 1968 he told me that in view of my work he would be
happy to recommend me if I had any interest in obtaining a position
with the Federal Government in Washington.
A few daj^s after the election I called Mr. Ehrlichman in Key
Biscayne, Fla., and told him I wished to be considered for the positio]^
of Cluef U.S. Marshal. He told me that he would speak to Mr. Halde'
man about this and get back to me. Subsequently a meeting w
arranged with Mr. John Mitchell at the Pierre Hotel in New Yorl
251
it which Mr. Mitchell told me that while my work was highly thought
)f, there had been a decision made to "semimilitarize" the U.S.
Marshal's Office and therefore they were considering a retking, high,
nilitary official for this post. Betv/een December 1968 and April of
L969, I was interviewed for and pursued a variety of possible ap-
Dointive jobs in Washington.
In late March 1969, 1 received a telephone call from Mr. Ehrlich-
nan who asked me if I would visit him in his office a day or two later.
[ did so and at that meeting he asked if I would be willing to set up a
Drivate security entity in Washington, D.C., for purposes of providing
nvestigative support for the White House. I told him that I would
:hink this over but b}^ the time I had returned home that evenmg, I had
iecided that I did not \^dsh to do this. I called him the next day with
I counterproposal, namely, that I join the White House staff under
Mr. Ehrlichman and, besides providing liaison functions with various
aw enforcement agencies, thereby be available to process anj?^ investiga-
ive requests from the White House. I mentioned to him that if he
igreed with my proposal I would intend to use the services of one Mr.
inthony Ulasewicz who was a detective with the New York City
Police Department nearing retirement. He said he would think
ibout it and get back to me.
A few days later I received a call from his office asking if I would
;ome to Washington to discuss the matter and that meeting resulted
n my appointment to the White House staff on April 8, 1969.
My duties at that time consisted of being a White House liaison
vith a variety of law enforcement agencies in the Federal Govcrn-
nent, through arrangements worked out with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr.
Herbert Kalmbach, and Anthony Ulase^\dcz. Mr. Ulasewicz retired
rom the New York City Police Department and was paid on a
nonthly basis by the Kalmbach law firm, that employment com-
nencing on July 9, 1969. During the next 3 years, first on orders
rom Mr. Ehrlichman and later in some instances, on orders from
Mr. John Dean, Mr. Uio.sewdcz, under my supervision, performed a
?"ariety of investigative functions, reporting the results of his findings
,0 the White House through me. I do not fully recall all of the inves-
igations performed in this fashion but have available a list of those
vhich I do recall if the committee wishes to examine it.
In July of 1970 Mr. John Dean became counsel to the President
md Mr. Ehrlichman was named to the position of Presidential Assist-
mt for Domestic Affairs. Thereafter I worked directly for Mr. Dean,
3ut on occasion, Mr. Ehrlichman continued to call upon me directly
or investigative work involving the services of Mr. Ulasewicz.
In the spring of 1971, I began to notice that, for some reason, the
imount of investigation work handled by Mr. Ulasewicz through me
lad diminished. Much of the talk around the White House was be-
ginning to center more and more on the 1972 Presidential election and
began to examine ways in my mind in which I might become in-
olved. Since I had performed security duties in the 1968 election
ampaign, and realizmg some of the security demands of a Presidential
ampaign, I mshed to become involved in the security area of the
campaign.
Toward that end, I composed a memorandum suggesting that an
>utside security capability be formed to handle the demand of the
96-296 — 73— bk. 1 17
252
1972 campaign. Such an organization would have a capability to per-
form various security functions to insure the security of the traveling
staff, the Committee To Re-Elect the President headquarters, the
convention site and would employ various guards and security people.
In short, I was suggesting the formation of a capability to cover all
the security needs of a Presidential campaign. The name I gave to
this suggested operation was "Sandwedge."
I further suggested that I leave the White House staff and set up
this security entity, if it were approved, and suggested a budget of
approximately $300,000 to $400,000. I gave the memorandum to
Mr. Dean and got the strong impression from him that it went to
higher levels, but I have no knowledge of who saw it. During the
summer of 1971, I had high hopes that my proposal would be ac
cepted and had one other direct conversation at lunch about its con
tents with Mr. Dean and with Mr. Jeb Magruder. Between the end
of June and October of 1971, I inquired of Mr. Dean as to the status
of my proposal on numerous occasions but ultimately was told bj
Mr. Dean that he didn't think my suggestion was "gomg anywhere.'
I was disappointed that my memorandum had been refused. I nexi
spoke ^^ith Mr. Dean concerning obtainmg a position as a persona
aide to John Mitchell, when be became campaign director. Mr. Dear
agreed to ask Mr. Mitchell if such a position was available; he did so
and on November 24, 1971, he accompanied me to an interview a
Mr. Mitchell's office.
I explained to Mr. Mitchell that what I wanted was a positioi.
similar to that occupied by Dwight Chapin in relation to the Presiden
and that in addition to handling the kinds of activities that Chapii
handled for the President, I could be of value to Mr. Mitchell as :
bodyguard. Mr. Mitchell listened to what I had to say but was non
committal as to what status I would occupy with him. He said, how
ever, that we would "get that all straightened out when I arrived a
the reelection committee." He was unsure as to when he would joii
the reelection committee but thought that it would be sometime u
January or February of 1972. I left his office and walked back to th(
White House by myself. Mr. Dean remained and as I was walking
through Mr. Mitchell's outer office I noted Mr. Gordon Liddy sitting
with Mr. Dean evidently waiting to see Mr. Alitchell.
At that time, I was sure I had a position with Mr. Mitchell but tin
nature of my duties was quite unsettled. Ultimately, on the 1st o
March 1972, I went to the reelection committee to commence m]
duties there. It soon became clear to me that Mr. Mitchell regardec
me only as a bodyguard which was not what I had had in mind at all
During March I took two trips with Mr. Mitchell outside of Washing
ton, one brief trip to New York City and the other to Key Biscayne
Fla. Since Mr. Mitchell regarded me as his personal bodyguard ]
carried a revolver in my briefcase.
By the time the trip to Florida occurred in late March, I was alreadj
in touch with a friend of mine at the Treasury Department aboui
possible employment there. After being in Florida for approximatelj
2 to 8 days, I received word that my house in Fairfax, Va., had beer
burglarized and so I flew home to attend to my wife and family. Mri
Fred LaRue had joined us in Florida after our arrival and upon mj
departiu'e, he asked that I leave my revolver in his possession since
253
Mrs. jNIitchell would ''feel better" if there were a revolver on the
premises. I gave my revolver to him and ultimately received it back
in May of 1972, after LaRue had given it to Mr. James McCord for
safekeeping upon Mr. LaRue's return from Florida.
Once I returned from Florida I performed no more duties of any
kind for Mr. Mitchell and had formally decided to seek employment
at the Treasury Department which I ultimately obtained. On April
28, I started working for the Treasury Department and then became
Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Enforce-
ment and on July 1, 1972, I became Acting Assistant Director for
Enforcement, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.
In September of 1971, I received a call from Mr. Barry Mountain
of the Republican National Committee who informed me that John
Ragan was leaving his duties as security officer for the national
committee, the Republican National Committee.
He asked me if I knew of anyone who would be interested in the
position and I said no, but that I would check around. I sub-
sequently asked Mr. Al Wong, a Deputy Assistant Director of the
Secret Service, if he knew of anyone to recommend for such a position.
He told me that he could recommend highl}'' a former colleague and
retired CIA agent, Mr. James McCord, and gave me liis telephone
number. I then called Mr. McCord and invited him to m}^ office for an
interview. Mr. McCord provided me with a resume and, as a result of
nw interview mth him, I called Mr. Mountain and arranged for Mr.
McCord to see Mr. Mountain. He did so, and was thereafter hired by
the Republican National Committee.
Since before leaving his emplo3nnent, Mr. Ragan had intended to
handle security for the Committee To Re-Elect the President offices
as well as the national committee, it was natural that Mr. McCord
upon being liired by the national committee was soon interviewed by
Mr. Robert Odle, the office manager of the Committee To Re-Elect
the President and in late December or early January Mr. McCord was
hired by the Committee To Re-Elect the President also. I had been
consulted about him by the reelection committee and recommended
hini for this position also.
Between our original meeting in September of 1971, and June 1972,
Mr. McCord and I grew to be personal friends even though we did
not physically see each other frequentl}'' with the exception of the
month of March 1972, when I saw him on a daih^ basis at the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President. During this period we casually
discussed on some occasions the possibility of going into business to-
gether after the election campaign was over and Mr. McCord felt
quite beholden to me since he felt that I had been responsible for
placing him at the national committee and the Committee To Re-
Elect the President.
In May of 1972, we had lunch together at the Hay Adams Hotel in
Washington. I had just begun my assignments at the Treasury De-
partment and we discussed my plans and hopes for expanding mv
duties and he stated at that time that I should "keep him in mind" if
I were looking for consultant help in carrying on investigations.
In July of 1972, and that date may well be \vrong and I don't know
but my recollection of the date was July of 1972, in July of 1972,
after his arrest, I had Mr. Ulasewicz callhis home and tell him to go
254
to a designated public telephone booth near his house where I would be
calling him. I called him at that public telephone and simply asked
him if there was anything I could do for him or his family at this time
of personal difficulty. No one had asked me to make this call and I
was motivated entirely by my own personal concern for his condition
and that of his family.
To deviate a bit here I noticed Mr. McCord indicated here his
conversation with me on that occasion coming of a story relative to a
double agent Alfred Baldwin. I do recall him mentioning that, I did
not when I made this statement, that is in fact correct.
I did not see or hear from Mr. McCord again until I received an
anonymous letter at my home in December of 1972. It was typewritten,
a note approximately two paragraphs in length and, to the best of my
knowledge said:
Dear Jack — I am sorry to have to tell you this but the White House is bent on
having the CIA take the blame for the Watergate. If they continue to pursue this
course, every tree in the forest will fall and it will be a scorched earth. Jack, even
you wUl be hurt in the fallout.
I examined the letter and found that it was postmarked in Rockville,
Md., and thereby believed that the letter was from James McCord
because he lived in Rockville. I called Mr. Dean's office and spoke
with Mr. Fielding, an assistant to Mr. Dean, and read the letter over
the telephone to him. Thereafter I went to Mr. Dean's office and gave
him the letter.
In early January of 1973, 1 was attending a drug conference in San
Clemente, Calif, when I received a telephone call in my hotel room
from Mr. John Dean. He asked that I go outside the hotel and call
him back from a public telephone, wliich I did. He told me that he
had a very important message which he wanted me to deliver to
James McCord, that Mr. McCord was expecting to hear from me and
McCord would understand what the message referred to. He said the
message consisted of three things:
1. "A year is a long time;"
2. "your wife and family will be taken care of;"
3. "you vnll be rehabilitated mth employment when this is all over."
I immediately realized that I was being asked to do a very dangerous
thing and I said to Mr. Dean that I did not tliink it was wise to send
me on such a mission since Mr. McCord knew, as many others did,
that I had worked closely with Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrhchman at the
White House and therefore it might be quickly guessed that any
messages I was conveying were probably from one of the two. The
reason I raised this question with him was because, very frankly, I did
not ^vish to convey the message. Mr. Dean asked if I could think of '
any other way to do it and I suggested that perhaps I could get Mr.
Ulasemcz to convey the message over the telephone anonymously,
stating that the message had come from me.
Mr. Dean felt this would be all right so I hung up the telephone and
■called Mr. Ulasewicz in New York. He did not wish to convey the
message at first but I convinced him to do it merely as a matter of
friendship to me. Mr. Ulasewicz called Mr. McCord's home, and
presumably, delivered the same message which Mr. Dean had given
to me. He then called me back in California, and reported that he had
delivered the message and that Mr. McCord's attitude had been one of
255
satisfaction. I was glad to hear this since I had felt this probably-
meant that Mr. McCord had been in some stage of negotiation about
his status and that this message had probably relieved his mind.
At this point m. time, my impression was that obviously there ha4
been some negotiations going on between Mr. Dean's office and Mr.
McCord in regard to Executive clemency, such negotiations probably
being carried on through third parties and that Mr. McCord had
wanted to hear the message which was transmitted to him through a
reliable source, such as myself.
I called Mr. Dean and told him that the message had been dehvered
by Mr. Ulasewicz and that Mr. McCord had seemed satisfied.
The next day I received another telephone call from Mr. Dean at
my hotel in which he said that Mr. McCord wanted to see me as soon
as I got back. I objected to seeing Mr. McCord, but finally Mr. Dean
got my concurrence to do so. My impression was that Mr. McCord
wanted to say something to me and I was not instructed to say
anything more than what had been in the message to him.
I called Mr. Ulasewicz and asked him to arrange a meeting with
Mr. McCord the following evening when I was to arrive back in
Washington. Mr. Ulasewicz called me back and said Mr. McCord had
agreed to meet with me at the second overlook on the George Wash-
ington Parkway but that, different from Mr. Ulasewicz's last con-
versation with Mr. McCord, Mr. McCord sounded quite irritated and
annoj'-ed.
Owing to a delay in my airplane flight from Cahfomia I was unable
to meet with Mr. McCord on the night of January 11 as I had in-
tended. When I arrived in Washington on the evening of January 11,
I did attempt to call Mr. McCord but was told by a member of his
family that he had retired for the evening. Mr. Ulasewicz had already
conveyed instructions to Mr. McCord for holding our meeting on
Friday night, January 12. At approximately 7 that evening I met
with Mr. McCord at the second overlook on the George Washington
Parkway. He joined me in my car and as I recall the conversation,
I first apologized to him for my delay in getting to see him due to my
presence in Cahfornia and the late arrival of my airplane. I also said
I was sorry if he had been irritated by receiving the anonymous calls
from my friend.
He said somethmg hke, "OK, that's OK, Jack." I said, "I guess
you received the message then?"
Mr. McCord then said words to the effect: Jack, I am different from
all the others. Anybody who knew me at the CIA knows that I always
follow my own independent course. I have always followed the rule
that if one goes [I took this to mean going to jail] aU who are involved
must go. People who I am sure are involved are sitting outside with
their families. I saw a picture in the newspaper of some guy who I am
sure was involved sitting with his family. I can take care of my family.
I don't need any jobs, I want my freedom.
I stated that I was only deUvering a message and had nothing to do
with its formulation or had no control over what was being done. I
sympathized with Mr. McCord's situation and made remarks such as,
I can't understand how this all has happened, I'd give anything if I
had not recommended you for your two jobs with the Kepublican
Party.
256
I did try to impress upon Mr. McCord that I was simply a messenger
and was not too pleased to even be doing that. I did say that the
people who had asked me to convey the message had always been
honorable toward me and that I thought it was a sincere offer.
He asked me who I was speaking with at the Wliite House and I
said I could not reveal any names but that they were from the "highest
level of the White HouseV'
He continually said that all he was interested in was his freedom
and that he was not pleased that others who he felt had been involved
were not suffering the consequences that he was. In the context of
demanding his immediate freedom, he said that he knew of a way in
which his freedom could be obtained and asked me if I could convey
his plan to the people at the White House with whom I was talking.
His plan, simply, was as follows: On two occasions, one in Sep-
tember 1972 and the other in October 1972, Mr. McCord told me
that he had called telephone numbers at foreign embassies in Washing-
ton and he stated he was sure these embassies were subjects of national
securit}^ A\dretaps. On both occasions he had stated that he was a man
involved in the Watergate scandal and, without giving his name, had
inquired as to the possibility of acquiring visas and other traveling
papers necessary to travel to these foreign countries.
It was Mr. McCord's theory that if the Government searched its
Aviretap records, it would find records of these two calls. Meanwhile,
Mr. McCord and his attorneys would make a motion in court, aimed
at dismissing the case against Mr. McCord because of the use of
"wiretap evidence b}^ the prosecution. Mr. McCord's idea w^as that
when the U.S. attorney was told that at least two of i\Ir. McCord's
conversations had been intercepted over a national security wiretap,
he would be forced to dismiss the case rather than reveal that the two
embassies in question were the subject of national security wiretaps.
Mr. McCord was quite adamant in saying that he was sure the
Government could secure his immediate release if they wanted to
help him and, other than the publicity incumbent on the Government
for being forced to dismiss the case against him, such an approach
would save the administration any real embarrassment. He gave me
a note with, the dates of the two convei-sations that he referred to and
told me that he knew this kind of thing had been done before, most
recently in the Ellsherg case and that he saw no reason why the Gov-
ernment could not at least accomplish this for him. I told Mr. McCord
that I would get back to him on the wiretap situation and would
probably be calling him in a day or two to set this up. I agreed to
carry this message concerning \viretaps back to the Wliite House and
the meeting ended.
At no time in our first meeting do I recall saying anything about
the President but I specifically renewed the offer of Executive clemenc}',
as indicated above and referred to it as coming from "the highest
levels of the White House." At some point in the conversation Mr,
McCord said to me, "Jack, I didn't ask to see you." This puzzled
me since my clear understanding from Mr. Dean was that McCord
had specifically asked to see me.
In any event, I called Mr. Dean on Friday night, January 12, and
reported that Mr. McCord did not seem interested in accepting the
offer made in Mr, Dean's original message to him, that Mr. McCord
257
wanted his immediate freedom and that he, Mr. McCord, felt that he
had a way to obtain that freedom. I then mentioned over the tele-
phone, McCord's idea for securing his freedom because of the use of
niUional security wiretaps and said that I wished to discuss this matter
directly with Dean.
The following day I saw Mr. Dean in his office in the White House
and explained to him Mr. McCord's suggestion for obtaining his free-
dom, as Mr. McCord had described it to me. Mr. Dean said, "Well,
I'll check on that." He then turned the conversation back to the offer
of Executive clemency. To the best of my knowledge he said, "Jack, I
want you to go back to him — McCord — and tell him that we are
checking on these wiretaps but this time impress upon him as fully as
you can that this offer of Executive clemency is a sincere offer which
comes from the very highest levels of the White House."
I said, "I have not used anybody's name with him, do you want me
to?"
He said, "No, I don't want you to do that but tell him that this
message comes from the very highest levels."
I said, "Do you want me to tell him it comes from the President?"
He said words to the effect, "No, don't do that; say that it comes
from way up at the top."
I told Mr. Dean I would get back to Mr. McCord and that indeed, I
had told Mr. McCord that I would.
At the meeting with Mr. Dean he also impressed upon me that this
was a very grave situation which might someday threaten the Presi-
dent, that it had the potential of becoming a national scandal and
that many people in the White House were quite concerned over it.
Mr. Dean said that none of the other then-defendants in the Water-
gate burglary "were any problem," and that Mr. McCord "was not
cooperating with his attorney."
I have been asked at the U.S. attorney's office and by Senate in-
vestigators, and have tried as best I can to recall what impressions I
had at this particular point in time. As best as these impressions can
be stated, I believed that I was going back to see Mr. McCord to again
extend an offer of Executive clemency and that by my doing so I was
doing a great service for the President of the United States in a very
sensitive matter. At no time, either before or after this meeting with
Mr. Dean did I ever speak to any other White House officials about
this offer of Executive clemency. I specifically never spoke to the
President of the United States and have no knowledge of my own as
to whether he personally had endorsed this offer or indeed whether
anyone had ever discussed it with him. Since I had worked extensively
for Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman and had formed an impression that
Mr. Dean rarely made decisions on matters of consequence without
speaking to Mr. Ehrlichman, my guess was that when Mr. Dean re-
ferred to "high Wliite House officials" he at least meant Mr. Ehrfich-
man. I know that he was in conversation with someone about my
contacts with Mr. McCord since, when I was in his office on January
13, he received a telephone call and I heard him say, "I'm receiving a
report on that right now" to the party on the other end.
At any rate, I then called Mr McCord and arranged a meeting with
him, again at the second overlook of the George Washington Parkway
early in the afternoon on Sunday, January 14. On this occasion we
,258
both got out of our cars and walked do\vn a path from the overlook
toward the Potomac River.
Tills meetmg lasted only 10 to 15 m.inutes. I did most of the talking.
I told Mr. McCord th?.t the "Wliite House was checking into the
wiretapping situation and that I had been asked to impress upon
him once again that the offer of Executive clemency was a sincere and
beUevable offer coming from the very highest levels of the White
House. I explained to him that among the reasons why I believed that
such a commitment would be kept were that the Wliite House ofhcials
Mdth whom I v/as in contact were extremely'- concerned about the
Watergate burglar}/- developing into a major scandal affecting the
President and therefore such a promise would not be given lightly,
I told him that the White House officials with whom I was talking were
complainmg because the}- felt that Mr. McCord was the only one oi
the Watergate burglary defendants who was refusing to cooperate.
At no time on this occasion or on any other occasion do I recall telling
Mr. McCord to keep silent if called before the grand jury or any
congressional committees.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Caulfield, we have another vote. I think maybe
you had better pause until we get back.
[Recess.]
Senator Ervin. The committee will resume.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Caulfield, you were in the midst of your statement,
I suggest you go back a sentence or two so we will have continuity.
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Actually, perhaps you should go back a little further.
Mr. Caulfield. I will pick up a couple of sentences, Mr. Dash.
I told him that the White House oflBcials with whom I was talking
were complaining because they felt that Mr. McCord was the only one
of the Watergate burglary defendants who was refusing to cooperate.
At no time on tliis occasion or on any other occasion do I recall telling
Mr. McCord to keep silent if called before the grand jurj^ or any
congressional committees.
His response to my conversation was that he still wanted his im-
mediate freedom and he felt strongl}'' that if the White House had any
interest in helping him secure that freedom that they could do some-
thing about the two telephone calls which he was sure had been inter-
cepted. I told Mm I would check on this matter again and get back to
him.
_ I was not attempting to exert pressure on Mr. McCord by telhng!
him of comments I was hearing from the White House; merely, I was
attempting to let him know the kinds of things I was hearing from Mr.
Dean concerning the Wliite House's attitude toward him if that would
be of any assistance to him.
Later on Sunday I telephoned Mr. Dean to report on my meeting!
with Mr. McCord. I told him that in my opmion Mr. McCord has^
absolutely no interest m the offer of Executive clemency. I told Mr.
Dean that Mr. McCord was still adamant in his belief that the White
House had the power to have the charges against him dismissed if it
would merely pursue the wiretaps which he had mentioned. Mr. Dean
said that I should tell him that there wasn't much likelihood that
anything would be done about the wiretap situation and, in response
to my comments about McCord's refusal to consider Executive clem-
259
mcy he said something Uke, "Well, what the hell does he know,
myway?"
Mr. Dean told me to go back to Mr. McCord again and ''com-
miserate" with him but he did not ask me to renew the offer of Execu-
tive clemency. I guessed that the reason why he wanted me to see Mr.
McCord again was simply to maintain a friendly relationship with him
m case there was a need for am'' further conversation with him through
me. I probably would have met agam with Mr. McCord anyway, since
[ felt badly about his predicament and I considered him a good friend.
In an}^ event, on Monday, January 15, I called McCord to report
that nothing seemed to be happening in regard to the wiretap situa-
tion. He became quite angry over the telephone and reaffirmed his
belief that if the "VVliite House realh=" wanted to help him they could
io so by using the method he had suggested and that he knew that Mr.
Magruder (who was then going to be a Government witness) was
^oing to perjure himself. I also mentioned getting together with him
3ut he said he had no interest in seeing me unless I had something
more to talk to him about. He was quite upset so I did not pursue the
matter further.
On Tuesday, January 16, I again called him in an attempt to meet
ivith him and he again was highly irritated about the White House's
ilure to do something about the ^viretap situation and again men-
tioned Mr. Magruder. I said I would inquire further about the wire-
taps and I might have something for him "in a week or so."
Subsequently I called him and arranged to micet with him again,
the exact date of this meeting being unsure in my mind. We again met
at the overlook on the George Washington Parkway, he got into my
ar and we drove out the parkway, pursuing a course in the general
direction of Warrenton, Va. I have no speciiic recollection as to how
ong we drove but I would say that it was an hour or two.
I would characterize this conversation as a very friendly one in
which a large portion of the time was spent discussing our respective
families, how my job at the Treasury Department was going, and
various other purely personal matters. I gave him my private telephone
number at the Treasury Department and told him that if he or his
wife ever wanted me to do anything for them, they should feel free to
call me. I told McCord that if he or his mfe should decide to call me,
to simply use the name "Watson" and I would know who it was.
Frankly, this was merely a device to save me from any possible
Bmbarrassment.
I do not have a specific recollection as to how it arose, but I believe
lie asked me if he was still the only one of the Watergate defendants
that the White House was concerned about. I said that I thought he
was, but that I had no knowledge of what relationship existed between
the Wliite House and the other Watergate defendants. He said that the
Cuban defendants were quite nervous and in his opinion, might make
a statement at any time and that I "could pass that along for whatever
it was worth."
I told him there was absolutely no hope, in my opinion, of the White
House ever doing anything about the ^aretap situation and asked him
when he thought he might make a statement. He said that he had not
decided that yet, but that he had spoken to his wife and family and
that he felt free to make a statement whenever he thought the time
was right.
260
I again asked if there was anything I could do for him. He said one
thing that I could do was to see whether bail money could be raised
for him pending an appeal in his case. I said I would check into this.
Toward the end of our conversation, realizing that he definitely was
going to make a statement on the Watergate burglary at a time of his
choosing and that such a statement would in all probability involve
allegations against people in the White House and other high admin-
istration officials, I gave him what I considered to be a small piece of
friendly advice.
I said words to the effect that, "Jim, I have worked with these
people and I know them to be as tough-minded as you and I. When you
make your statement don't underestimate them. If I were in your
shoes, I would probably do the same thing."
I later called Mr. Dean and advised him of Mr. McCord's request
for bail funding and he said words to the effect that, "Maybe we can
handle that through Alch." Some time later, Mr. Dean called me and
asked me to tell McCord that the bail money presented too many
problems and that maybe consideration could be given to paying
premiums. I later called McCord and reported this. His reaction was,
"I am negotiating with a new attorney and maybe he can get it
handled." This is the last conversation I had to date with James
McCord.
Although this is a lengthy statement, I wish to make two further
points: At no time in any conversations with Mr. McCord did I advise,
pressure, or threaten him in an attempt to make him accept the offer
of Executive clemency. I viewed my role simply as one of a messenger
and while I tried to give both Mr. Dean and Mr. IMcCord the full
flavor of what was going on at both ends of this message-transacting
process, I actively refrained from injecting myself into the process at
either end. I realized at the time of my first conversation in January
that I was involved in questionable activity but I felt that it was
important to me to carrj^ this message for the good of the President.
I have previously testified before the grand jury and have spoken on
two other occasions with the U.S. attorney's office and have spoken on
two occasions as well with Senate investigators. Although I have dis-
cussed the matter of whether any of my actions could be viewed as
violations of the criminal law with my attorney and have been advised
of the availability of privileges and possible attempts of securing
immunity from prosecution, at no time have I refused to answer any
questions in regard to my conduct and I have felt that it is more
important that I be able to speak freely about my involvement in
actions herein, than to have whatever protection might be rightfully
mine under my constitutional and executive privileges. I hope that
what I have to say here today will assist the comxmittee in its investiga-
tions and if, upon a hearing of all the facts, it is thought that I am
guilty of some wrongdoing I will still feel that the truth is my best
defense.
Senator Baker. Mr. Caulfield, we thank j^ou very much for your
lengthy but very useful statement. It is now 4:10 in the afternoon. The
chairman has been called to the floor of the Senate to participate in the
debate on a matter now pending on which we will shortl}^ vote. Before
he left the committee he suggested that we conclude your pre])ared
statement today on the condition that you and your attorney are
261
agreeable to returning in the morning at 10 o'clock so that the com-
mittee and staff can proceed with interrogation. Is that satisfactory to
you?
Mr. Caulfield. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Baker. Then, the committee will stand in recess until 10
o'clock tomorrow morning.
[\Miereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at
10 a.m., Wednesday, May 23, 1973.]
WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington, D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and Weicker.
Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel; Fred D. Thompson,
minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief counsel; Arthur
S. Miller, chief consultant ; Jed Johnson, consultant; David M. Dorsen,
James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsels;
Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsel; Donald G. Sanders,
H. William Shure, and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels;
Joan C. Cole, secretary to the minority; Pauline O. Dement, research
assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert Baca,
office of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker; A. Seaiie Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Marc Lackritz,
Ron Rotunda, assistant counsels; Eugene Boyce, hearings counsel;
John Walz, publications clerk.
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. I would Uke to
reiterate what I stated yesterday that Mr. Caulfield is to return later
and that the questions at this appearance will be restricted to matters
deahng with the communications between him and Mr. McCord. In
respect to the questions of counsel
Senator Gurney. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire what the pjan of
the committee is on the witness following Mr. Caulfield?
Mr. Dash. Yes, the witness follo^vdng Mr. Caulfield will be Tony
Ulasemcz M'ho will be the individual who has been identified as the
person who made the telephone call to Mr. McCord and that he will
be called specifically to testify as to that role. He too will be available,
Senator Gurney, to come back and to testify on other matters which
he has to testify before this committee.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Chairman, as I understand that last evening
counsel interviewed the attorne}^ the former attorney, for Mr. McCord
and that his statements were in startling conflict and contrast with
what Mr. McCord had told us here the other day and I would think
it would be extremely important that we get this witness on just as
soon as possible and I, as one committee member, would Hke to see
him on this afternoon and I think his testimony is in total conflict wdth
what Mr. McCord said and I think he shouJd be called just as soon as
we can get him just before the recess before we call Tony.
(283)
264
Mr. Dash. We can do that, Mr. Chairman. It is true Mr. Alch
did come in and did request he be called and we thought we would
call him immediately after Tony Ulasewicz but there is no reason
why he could not be called immediately after Mr. Caulfield.
Senator Gurney. I wish he might.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, let me make a suggestion, if I may,
I think Senator Gurney's point is well taken. However, in the interest
of continuity and in keeping with the preparation of the committee
let me make an alternative suggestion, if I may. Let us finish with Mr.
Caulfield today, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest, which I think we
can do in a reasonably short period of time since Mr. Caulfield, I
understand, is agreeable to return and to explore other matters not
related directly with the subject matter of his testimony thus far,
t-hat we go forward then with the next witness who is
Mr. Dash. Tony Ulasewicz, which I think will only take about
10 minutes.
Senator Baker. After we finish that we mil call Mr. Alch and that
will result in some continuity and then also be in accord with Mr.
Grurney's request. I am sure Mr. Alch will be on the stand today.
Senator Gurney. That is what I want to be sure, he does get on
the stand. We have taken a good deal of time in the questioning,
in fact, I have used my own fair share but I do think it is awfully
important that we get Mr. Alch on today because his testimony is
going to be in such sharp contrast and contradiction to what we
learned from Mr. McCord earlier and I think we ought to get it to
clear up some of these things that are hanging around the room here.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding then
that only so we might present a logical picture we Avill restrict our
questions to the matters that Mr. Caulfield raised yesterday in his
testimony but certainly that there are no restrictions and no bars
as to future testimony and that he will be recalled for anj'- questions
we want to ask, is that correct?
Senate Ervin. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Caulfield, because your statement was a lengthy
one, and there was a recess over the evening, let me seek to briefly
summarize the essential highlights of your statement that you gave
to the committee, and please correct me if anything I say is not con-
sistent with your understanding of your statement.
In December of 1972 you received an unsigned note which j-^ou
understood came from Mr. McCord which complained of a White
House effort to blame CIA for the Watergate and threatened that
"all the trees in the forest will fall," if this effort continued.
In early January 1972, while you were in California, you received a
telephone call from John Dean from Washington asking you to de-
liver the following message to Mr. Dean.
"1. One year is a long time. 2. Your wife and family will be
taken care of. 3. You will be rehabilitated with employment when
this is over."
You did not want to deliver the message but you thought that it
could be delivered through Mr. Tony Ulasewicz and Mr. Dean agreed
to do it that way.
265
TESTIMONY OF JOHN J. CAULPIELD— Resumed
Mr. Caulfield. Mr. Dash, can I interrupt a second, the correct
pronunciation is Ulasemcz.
Mr. Dash. Ulasewicz.
Mr. Caulfield. Right.
Mr. Dash. You did call Mr. Ulasewicz and you asked him to de-
liver this message, and although he himself at first was reluctant he
did agree to deliver the message and he did call Mr. McCord and
reported back to you that Mr. McCord appeared satisfied and you
reported this to Mr. Dean.
The following day you received another call from Mr. Dean in-
forming you that Mr. McCord wanted to see you when you returned
to Washmgton. You had Ulasewicz arrange the meeting which was
set for Friday, January 12, at the second overlook on the George
Washington Parkway. In substance you emphasized that you were
only a messenger, that the offer you were conveying of Executive
clemency was from the highest levels of the White House, and that it
was a sincere offer. Mr. McCord's response in substance was that he
wanted his complete freedom and even suggested a plan which in-
volved proffering that the Government had wiretapped liis telephone
calls, that he had made two calls to foreign embassies whose phones he
believed were wiretapped. You do not recall sajdng anything about
the President to Mr. McCord but you did transmit an offer of Execu-
tive clemenc}^ to Mr. McCord which you told him came from the
highest levels of the White House. You reported this meeting to Mr.
Dean on the telephone. The following day you met with Mr. Dean
and he told you to go back to Mr. McCord and impress upon him as
hiWj as you could that the offer of Executive clemency was a sincere
offer and when you asked if 3'ou should mention any names, such as the
President, he said no, but told you that you should say that the offer
came "from way up top." Mr. Dean also expressed his concern over
this matter as a grave situation that could threaten the President
and could become a national scandal. That none of the other de-
fendants in the Watergate case were any problem and Mr. McCord
was not cooperating with his attorney.
You again met with Mr. McCord at the second overlook on the
George Washington Parkway on January 14 for a short while, and
conveyed the message of concern over a national scandal w^iich could
threaten the President and that McCord was the only one of the
defendants not cooperating. Again, McCord expressed his interest to
you in securing his freedom and wanted you to do something about
the wiretaps he had mentioned to you earlier.
You telephoned Mr. Dean that same day and told him that Mr.
McCord was not interested in Executive clemency, and that Mr.
McCord believed that the Wliite House could help him get the charges
dismissed by svipplying proof of the wiretaps for him.
You had a fhial meeting with Mr. McCord on a date you cannot
recall but about the third week in January where you picked him up
in your automobile on the second overlook on the George Washington
Parkway and drove for about an hour or 2. At this time you told him
that the Wliite House could not do anything for him about the wiretap
266
problem and there was a lengthy conversation which for the most
part involved other subjects than Watergate. You concluded during
that conversation that Mr. McCord definitely was going to make a
statement on the Watergate burglary and it would probably involve
allegations against people in the White House and other high admin-
istration officials. You gave him what you indicated to the committee
as friendly advice to the effect, "Jim, I have worked with these people
and I know them to be as tough -minded as you and I. Wlien you make
your statement don't underestimate them. If I were in your shoes I
would probably be dohig the same thing."
You also had received from Mr. McCord some reference or request
to do something about bail and you were not able to accomplish
anything on the bail issue during further contacts with him. That at
no time did you talk with the President about this matter or mention
the President to Mr. McCord concerning the offer of Executive clem-
ency but that you carried this message to Mr. McCord because you
felt it was for the good of the President.
Is that basically a fair summary- of the gist of the contacts with Mr.
McCord and Mr. Deem that were contained in your statement?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, although you state that you made no mention of
the President to Mr. McCord during the meeting, you do know, do
you not, that the President is the only person in this country who can
grant Executive clemency in a Federal criminal matter?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Dash. Did you understand when you were speaking with Mr.
Dean that Mr. Dean wanted you to transmit the message to Mr.
McCord that the offer of Executive clemency was made with the proper
authority?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Was it your intention during the meetings with Mr.
McCord to leave him with the clear understanding that the persons
with authority to make such a representation of Executive clemency
were in fact extending this offer to him?
Mr. Caulfield. Just repeat that for me, Mr. Dash?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Was it your intention during 3^our meetings with Mr. McCord to
leave him with the clear understanding that persons with authority
to make such a representation as to Executive clemency were in fact
extending this offer to him?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
But, of course, I have not and did not at that time have any direct
knowledge that the President had made such an offer, endorsed such
an offer, or in any way was involved in that offer.
Mr. Dash. I understand that.
Mr. Caulfield. Right.
Mr. Dash. Looking back, Mr. Caulfield, what do you see your
role to have been m this relationship and what did 3^ou think about it?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, as I have indicated in m.y statement, Mr.
Dash, I viewed myself as a messenger between Mr. Dean and Mr.
McCord, exchanging information back and forth on the ongoing
negotiations, wliicli obviously had been taking place prior to the time
that I had received the telephone call in California.
267
Mr. Dash. And was it your understanding at that time, especially
with the discussions you had with Mr. Dean, that there was serious
concern at the White House, at least Mr. Dean was conveying to you,
involving a possible scandal, that there was a real effort to get Mr.
McCord to accept this offer because of the concern or trouble that
probably he might be able to raise in the Watergate case?
Mr. Caulfield. That was mj clear impression, Mr. Dash, yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And you were being asked to do this because of your
friendly relationship v/ith Mr. McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson?
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Caulfield, as I understand it, you have been a personal friend
of Mr. McCord's, is that correct?
Mr. Caulfield. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Would you still say that relationship exists as
far as you are concerned?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir, I still consider Jim McCord my friend.
Mr. Thompson. As you were talking to him about the possibility
of Executive clemency and he was responding to you, what would
you say, according to what he told you, his primary interest was?
Mr. Caulfield. Very frankly, sir, as I reflect back upon the con-
versation, it is very clear in my mind that Jim McCord was concerned
about his freedom and was taking the steps that he believed to gain
that freedom totpJly. He was uninterested in any deals of a year is a
long time or other statements like that. He, in that first conversation
at the car, made it crystal clear to me that he was different from the
others, that I could check it if I wanted to, that he wanted his freedom,
period.
Mr. Thompson. In other words, he was not necessarily disinterested
in any deals, but he was not interested in any deals that would not
produce his freedom. Is that a correct statement?
Mr. Caulfield. That is correct. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. As you state here in your statement, he continuall}''
said that all he was interested in was his freedom and he was not
pleased that some of the others that had been involved were not suffer-
ing as he was suffering, is that correct?
Mr. Caulfield. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. You referred also in your statement to his plan, a
plan which he had which he thought would produce his freedom. I
believe you referred to his two telephone calls in September and
October of 1972 to two embassies.
Mr. Caulfield. Yes sir.
Mr. Thompson. According to what he told you, was it your impres-
sion that he beUeved that these two calls were made in order to
ultimatel}^ produce his freedom, put the Government in an embarrass-
ing position, and therefore produce his freedom?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes sir.
Mr. Thompson. All right, now. Let me ask you about your relation-
ship with Mr. Ehrlichman for just a few moments.
How long did you work for Mr. Ehrlichman when he was counsel
for the President?
96-296— 7:i—bk. 1 18
268 ^
Mr. Caulfield. From the day that I arrived at the White House
on April 8, 1969, formally, through July 1970, when Mr. Ehrhchman
moved over to the Domestic Council, and then on an informal basis
from that time until the time I worked at the White House.
Mr. Thompson. Then after Mr. Ehrlichman left the Office of Counsel
for the President, Mr. Dean was his successor; is that correct?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes sir.
Mr. Thompson. You remained, then, under Mr. Dean; is that
■correct?
Mr. Caulfield. That is right.
Mr. Thompson. Did you have any contact or any continuing re-
lationship Avith Mr. Ehrlichman after Mr. Ehrlichman left to go to
the Office of Domestic Affairs?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, only on rare peripheral matters relative to
the investigations that I indicated in my statement.
Mr. Thompson. And while you were working for Mr. Ehrlichman
directly, as I understand it, you had possibly more than one function
with one of those to carry out certain investigations?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, I had many other functions, sir, but that was
one small part of my duties at the White House.
Mr. Thompson. And you continued to do some of these matters for
him pursuant to his direction after you left that office?
Mr. Caulfield. On very rare occasions, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Would you on some occasions act as an intermediary
between Mr. Ehrhchman and Tony Ulasewicz, for jobs which Mr.
Ulasewicz would do?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes sir.
Mr. Thompson. Would you say that would be on frecpient occa-
sions?
Mr. Caulfield. That would be infrequent after July of 1970.
Mr. Thompson. But occasionally.
Mr. Caulfield. Oh, yes; yes sir.
Mr. Thompson. Now, Mr. Caulfield, in your statement here, you
state that you were guessing that Mr. Dean probably was referring to
Mr. Ehrlichman when he referred to high White House sources?
Mr, Caulfield. Yes, that was my guess.
Mr. Thompson. That was your guess at that time?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes sir.
Mr. Thompson. You also state, "I know he was in conversation
with someone about my contact with Mr. McCord, because when I
was in his office on January 13, he received a telephone call and I heard
him say 'I am receiving a report on that right now'."
Were you referring to Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Caulfield. No; what I am saying is that the call came in, that
there were no names mentioned. Mr. Dean said, I am receiving — there
was, apparently the party calling made some comments. Mr. Dean
said "I am getting a report on that right now."
Mr. Thompson. Oh, I see, this conversation that you overheard was
Mr. Dean with someone?
Mr. Caulfield. I mean in Mr. Dean's presence, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Thompson. I see. And you assumed that that conversation
perhaps was with Mr. Ehrlichman or possibly with Mr. Ehrlichman?
269
Mr. Caulfield. Possibly with Mr. Ehrlichman, but I have no way
)f knowing, sir.
Mr. Thompson. You feel very definitely in your mind that he was
talking with someone else about it, is that correct?
Mr. Caulfield. I want to be careful there, sir, because I just do
lot know where the call came from. If it was coming- from outside, it
ould have been someone else. If it was coming from within the
W^hite House, then it was someone in the White House. So — by that
[ mean, sir, there is an interoffice telephone system. Now, I do not
;cno\v and have no way of knowing whether that was an interoffice
:?all or whether or not it was a call coming from outside. So that is
why I mentioned it that way.
Mr, Thompson. What would you say was the relationship between
Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman during this period of time? Did
Mr. Dean in many matters in efi^ect report to Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Or answer to Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir; on many matters having to do with
Mr. Dean's work as well.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ev^er talk with Mr. Ehrlichman about this
matter, this business of possible Executive clemency for Mr. McCord
with anyone?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. You never did?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever talk to anyone there at the White
House besides Mr. Dean?
Mr. Caulfield. Absolutely no one but Mr. John Dean.
Mr. Thompson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. If there is no objection, I would like to exchange
places for questioning witnesses with Senator Montoya and let him
take my place and I will take his place.
Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. There are no objections. You may proceed.
Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Caulfield, I think we had better get your background and
employment duties at the White House in better perspective. What
exactlv were you doing when you went to work at the White House
in April of 1969?
Mr. Caulfield. My prime duties at the White House was to act
as liaison primarily with the U.S. Secret Service and other Federal
law enforcement agencies. As I indicated, I worked under Mr. Ehrlich-
man, Mr. Krogh was under Mr. Ehrlichman as well. From time to
tune, I would be assigned major projects that came up in the law
enforcement area.
For example, shortly after coining to the White House, I was
assigned to the then-emerging drug abuse task force that subsequently
emerged as Operation Intercept.
Senator Montoya. Well, were you workmg directly under Mr.
Ehrlichman? Or were you working under Mr. Dean?
Mr. Caulfield. No, Mr. Dean, su-, was not at the White House
at that time. This is — you asked — I think the question was what were
270
my duties when I went into the White House? Wlien I went into the
White House, Mr. John Dean was not yet there. He was at the
Justice Department.
Senator Montoya. As I understand, you went to work at the White
House in April 1969 and you worked there until March 1972.
Is that correct?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. All right.
Were you on the pajToll of the White House or were you being paid
by someone else?
Mr. Caulfield. No; I was on the White House payroll, sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you ever get paid from the President's
attorney?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. And were you assigned to the White House
payroll or were you on the Treasury payroll?
Mr. Caulfield. I don't quite understand.
Senator Montoya. Were you working or being paid from the payroll
attributable to the Department of the Treasury or to the White House?
Mr. Caulfield. The White House payroll, sir.
Senator Montoya. All right.
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Now, did you come in contact quite frequently
with Mr. Elirlichman?
Mr. Caulfield. In the course of my duties, yes, sir, not on a
daily basis certainly but I would be working with his staff people,
Mr. Egil Krogh when I first went in there, as I have indicated I
would be assigned major projects. I was the White House representa-
tive for the Marihuana and Dangerous Drugs Task Force that began
in the spring of 1969.
Senator Montoya. All right.
Now, in the course of your emplo37ment at the White House what
relationship did you have with Mr. Dean when he came onboard?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, Mr. John Ehrlichman, when I was working
for him coming aboard the White House was counsel to the President.
Wlien Mr. Ehrlichman became the Presidential assistant and headed
up the Domestic Affairs Council, Mr. John Dean came in and became
the counsel to the President, and I remained in the office of the Counsel
to the President under Mr. Dean, my direct supervisor.
Senator Montoya. Did he assign many things to you?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Did Mr. Ehrlichman continue to assign things
to you to do?
Mr. Caulfield. As I have indicated, Senator, only on rare occasions
after Mr. Ehrlichman became Assistant to the President for Domestic
Affairs.
Senator Montoya. Did Mr. Haldeman assign things to you?
Mr. Caulfield. On only one or two occasions that I could recall,
Senator. Very rarely, in fact almost never.
Senator Montoya. All right.
You mentioned that you had interviewed Mr. McCord for his
emplo^TTient at the executive offices and recommended him to go to
^vork for the Committee To Re-Elect the President. That is correct,
isn't it?
271
Mr. Caulfield. Well, that is essentially correct, sir. The recom-
mendation was for employment at the Republican National Com-
mittee initially and flowing from that Mr. McCord was hired by the
Committee To Re-Elect.
Senator jMontoya. How many interviews did you say you had
with Air. McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. I recall two. I recall a luncheon when it was
alread}^ established that he was on board.
Senator Montoya. Wlio did you clear with at the White House
before he recommended Mr, McCord for that appointment?
Mr. Caulfield. I didn't clear anybody, sir.
Senator Montoya. Who did you call at the Republican National
Committee?
Mr. Caulfield. I called Mr. Barry Mountain who was the then
deputy chairman for administration.
Senator Montoya. Had he asked you to recommend someone?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Was there a job classification for the individual
that he wanted?
Mr. Caulfield. No. As I recall, the way Mr. Mountain explained
it to me the}^ wanted someone to come up and do a security survey
and possibly following the survey the party who did the survey would
be hired as a supervisor of security at the Republican National Com-
mittee.
Senator Montoya. Was there any discussion with respect to that
classification that the man who would be chosen and the man that
you might interview should be qualified in espionage activities for
the party?
Mr. Caulfield. Absolutely not, sir.
Senator Montoya. Were you aware that that was one of the com-
petencies that this man should have anyway?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
In re\aemng Mr. McCord's qualifications they appeared to me from
a career experience in security work to be absolutely outstanding, and
his credentials appeared to be impeccable.
Senator Montoya. What did you conceive with respect to the
game plan that was going on at the time?
Mr. Caulfield. I beg your pardon?
Senator Montoya. Mr. McCord mentioned that you had told
him that he was ruining the game plan. What did you conceive that
to be?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, sir, I do not recall Mr. McCord saying
"game plan" but it was obvious to me that there were negotiations
going on with respect to this Executive clemency for Mr. McCord.
Senator Montoya. Then let me read to you from Mr. McCord's
statement on page 9. I read as follows: "I refused to discuss it. He
stated that I was fouling up the game plan. I made a few comments
about the game plan." That was Mr. McCord's statement on page 9.
Do you recall that conversation?
Mr. Caulfield. I do not recall those words, Senator.
Senator Montoya. Well, what words akin to that were uttered
by you in the presence of Mr. McCord?
272
Mr. Caulfield [conferring with counsel]. Senator, I am a little
confused on your asking me — I have no recollection of Mr. McCord —
of me saying to Mr. McCord he was fouling up the game plan. My
statement does not indicate that.
Senator Montoya. Well, let me read an extended text of that
statement. On page 9 "About 10 o'clock a.m., on Thursday, January
25, 1973, in a meeting lasting until about 12:30 a.m. we drove in his
car toward Warrenton, Va., and returned, and a conversation
ensued which repeated the offers of Executive clemency and financial
support while in prison and rehabilitation later. I refused to discuss
it. He stated that I was fouling up the game plan. I made a few
comments about the game plan."
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Mr. Montoya. You recall that?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir, I do not. As I indicated in my statement
this trip here was one of friendly conversation between two friends
I have no recollection of offering him Executive clemency on thai
occasion. I have no recollection about stating that I was fouling up
the game plan.
Senator Montoya. Did Mr. Dean tell you why he was calUng yoi
to get in touch with McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. When was that?
Senator Montoya. When he called you at San Clemente.
Mr. Caulfield. He indicated to me that he had a very importani
message that he wanted to be delivered to James McCord.
Senator Montoya. I understand that. But did he tell you why h(
had chosen you for that mission?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir, he did not.
Senator Montoya. Did you ask him?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir. He knew, of course, that I had knowi
Jim McCord.
Senator Montoya. How did he know? Had you discussed Jin
McCord wnth him?
Mr. Caulfield. I had been over to the committee. Eventually
after he was hired I am sure I mentioned to Mr. Dean that thij
fellow McCord is hired, he appears to be outstanding. He was wei
aware that I knew Jim AlcCord; there was no ciuestion in anj^body'j
mind.
Senator Montoya. Did you get in touch after Watergate with Mr
Dean to indicate to him about your friendship \vith Jim McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. Would you repeat that. Senator, please?
Senator Montoya. Did you get in touch with Mr. Dean and
communicate your friendship with Jim McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. When, sir?
Senator Montoya. After the Watergate break-in.
Mr. Caulfield. We had conversations. I expressed shock on many
occasions that James McCord was arrested at the Watergate.
Senator Montoya. No, but the point I am trying to make, Mr.
Caulfield, is that you had two or three interviews with Mr. McCord;
they were short in duration.
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
vSenator Montoya. Preliminary to his being hired?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
273
Senator Montoya. There were other people at the Re]Diiblicaii
National Committee and at the Committee To Re-Elect the
President
Mr. Caulpield. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya [continuing]. Who knew Mr. McCord better
than you did, presumably because he worked \vith them for a longer
time and I am wondering why Mr. Dean selected you to carry on this
mission of offering Executive clemency to Mr. McCord when there
were other people within the organization of the national committee
and the CRP who had developed a better and more intimate acquaint-
ance with Mr. McCord.
Mr. Caulfield. Well, of course, I am sure that Mr. Dean trusted
me, and in reading some of the thmgs that might have gone on before
there Avas apparently a need for someone from the White House to
bring a message to him, and certainly Mr. Dean knew that I knew Jim
McCord, and then I would like to reiterate that I received a letter in
December which I had brought to Mr. Dean's attention wherein it was
alleged that the White House was involved in attempting to place the
blame on CIA. So all of these things Air. Dean knew. Mr. McCord
sent me the letter; Mr. Dean knew that.
Senator Montoya. Did you ever inquire of Mr. Dean when he was
telling you just what to saj^^ to Mr. McCord, did you ever inquke from
him as to the high sources and who they were?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, sir, in the first telephone call this was all
just him asking me to go and deliver this message to Jim McCord. Sub-
sequently, as I have indicated in my statement, we did have a con-
versation after the first meeting.
Senator Montoya. Now, you mentioned that Mr. Dean had in-
structed you to say that it comes from way up at the top.
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. What did you conceive that to be at the time?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, sir, in my mind I believed that he was
talking about the President. Although, agam
Senator Montoya. How would you have interpreted that without
any further explanation? The same way?
Mr. Caulfield. I do not understand. Senator.
Senator Montoya. You mentioned that it was your impression that
it must have come from the President. Now, did you, when you reached
that impression, question Mr. Dean any further about it?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. My time has run out so I will not pursue that
any further.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Baker?
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow your example.
I would offer to jdeld to Senator Weicker at this point. I beheve that
he may or may not wish to yield to Senator Gurney.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I just have two or three brief
questions; then I will yield.
Mr. Caulfield, turn to page 19 of your testimony. You state there,
"I have been asked by the U.S. Attorney's Office and by Senate m-
vestigators and am trying as best I can to recall what impressions I
274
had at this particular point in time. As best as these impressions can be
stated, I beUeved that I was going back to see Mr. McCord to again
extend an offer of Executive clemency and that by my doing so I was
doing a great service for the President of the United States in a very
sensitive matter."
My first question to you, very simply, is this: Using your own words,
I would like you to comment and explain to me why it is — why it
is — that 3^ou thought j^ou were doing a great service for the President
of the United States?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, sir, to go back a little bit, it was a great
honor for me to serve as a member of the President's staff. I ha,d
come from a rather humble background, a police officer. I did receive
this great opportunity to serve on the President's staff. I felt very
strongly about the President, extremely strongly about the President.
I was very loj^'al to his people tha,t I worked for. I place a high value
upon loj^alt}^. Now, out of the blue, I am injected into this scandal.
I am being asked by one of my former superiors to deliver a message
that I know to be Executive clemency. I tried to avoid it, as my state-
ment indicates. I imposed upon my friend to do it, hoping that all
parties would be satisfied. I was not successful.
I was brought back in again to it, now being asked to see Mr,
McCord directly. I did go to see him.
Now I am becoming further implicated into this matter. I had
this conversation with John Dean, who was the counsel to the Presi-
dent. I had been there 3 3^ears. I know what the relations are and how
they exist. I make certain judgments based upon those relationships.
In my mind, I felt that the President probably did know about it.
Now, I am going out the door, to become more specific, and it
crossed my mind that this conceivably was for the President. I
believed it. I had to think about that. And based upon all of that
background, I believed I was doing something for the President of
the United States, and I did it, sir.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Caulfield, you have lived a life dedicated
to the law. In the very beginning of your statem.ent, you cite a career,
a ver}'^ fine career, one that was recognized time and time again. Let
me ask you this question.
I read on page 24 of your testimony, where you are talking to
McCord and where you have given a friendly piece of advice, and you
say, "Jim, I have worked with these people and I know them to be
as tough-minded as you and I. When you make your statement,
don't underestimate them. If I were in your shoes, I would probably
do the same thing."
I read that, and you tell me if I am v/rong, as the testimony of a
man who is in conflict. On the one hand delivering a message to a
friend; on the other hand, a man whose whole career has been dedi-
cated to honesty and seeing the truth come out. Would that be a fair
description of a conflict that was occurring within you at that time?
Mr. Caulfield. There was a definite conflict, Senator. You are
absolutely right. I know when Avi'ongdoing is occurring. 1 have indi-
cated here that I knew that the offer of Executive clemency in this
matter was wrong, yes sir, I knew that. But what I am saying to you,
sir, is that my loyalties, and especially to the President of the United
States, overrided those considerations.
275
Senator Weicker. So actually, there was a conflict between jour
lo^^alties, and it is interesting that you used the very word that I had
in a written question before you made your statement. Did you feel,
at this moment in time, a conflict between your loyalties to the Presi-
dent and a life dedicated to law and the pursuit of truth?
Mr. Caulfield, Yes, sir. That is correct. And also that I was
hopefully being able to help a friend.
Senator Weicker. Then lastly, Mr. Caulfield, on page 25, yon
state: ''That I reahze that at the time of my first conversation in
Januar}^ that I was involved in questionable activity but 1 felt that
it was important for me to carry this message for the good of the
President." Was there a conflict in your mind betvv'een doing an act
for the good of the President and an act that would be for the good of
the country?
Mr. Caulfield. That is a tough question. Senator. All I can say is
that I did what I did for the reasons that I have stated.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge?
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I yield to the
distinguished Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Mr. Caulfield, am I to conclude from your responses to Senator
Weicker, that you were aware that you were involved in a criminal
act of obstructing criminal investigations?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. On your first call to Mr. McCord soon after the
Watergate break-in, 1 notice from your testimony that you contacted
Mr. Ulasemcz?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. For a man on the Kalmbach payroll doing espion-
age work, to go through some very secretive process to get in touch
with him makes me ask: Why all this secrecy Avhen, as you have
stated, it was just to convey your sympathies to Mr. McCord? Whj'
did you go through all this secret movement? Were you afraid that
the phones were tapped?
Mr. Caulfield. Are you speaking about my call to, asking Mr.
Ulasewicz to call James McCord, sir?
Senator Inouye. Yes, why did you go through all that secret stuff
to get in touch Adth Mr. McCord. According to your statement, all
you wanted to say is I feel sorry for you, can I do anything for vou.
Is that right?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir. To have spent a career in security work
as I have, and as Mr. McCord had, and to watch the daily accounts
of the Watergate developments from June 17 on, it certainly oc-
curred to me, sir, that any conversations taking place over Mr.
McCord's home telephone conceivably could have been the subject
of some type of wiretapping by either governmental parties or other
people who were concerned about Mr. McCord. Plus the fact, sir —
well, I should go back a Uttle bit.
Tlaat impression, and Mr. McCord, I undertstand, has indicated
that he had the same concerns, indicated to me that a circuitous route,
if I wanted to speak to him, would be the appropriate way to do it, sir.
276
Senator Inouye. I would like to call your attention to page 16 of
your prepared remarks, in which you describe Mr. McCord's plan.
This plan called for Mr. McCord's calling two foreign embassies and
telling the official in such embassies that he was a defendant in the
Watergate case and requesting a visa. From this, did you gather that
Mr. McCord was trying to blackmail the U.S. Government?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. Or were you aware that if he carried out this plan,
it would place in jeopardy the national security of the United States
of America?
Mr. Caulfield. That is a two-part question, now.
Are you asking did I think that this was a blackmail?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir; I didn't think that this was a blackmail.
I viewed this as an attempt on the part of a man who was distraught,
who wanted his freedom and had come across a means of obtaining
that freedom. I did not consider it to be blackmail, sir. I considered
it, based upon my conversation with Mr. McCord, that he was
distraught.
Senator Inouye. Didn't you think that there was a risk of com-
promising the security apparatus of the United States? As he pointed
out, the Government would have to dismiss the case or admit thai
there were taps on these two embassies.
Mr. Caulfield. Well, sir, again in passing these messages back
and forth, and I passed this one back to Mr. Dean, certainly a mattei
of this type would, in my judgment, work its way up to any questions
of policy and national security.
Senator Inouye. Did you think that this was a reasonable plan'
Air. Caulfield. I thought it was an interesting one, sir.
Senator Inouye. You didn't think it was illegal or dangerous'
Mr. Caulfield. Sir, again, it is possible that these thoughts crossec
my mind, but I have no recollection of it. And again, I am being pui
in a position of being a messenger and I was focusing on that. I wasn'i
giving consideration to all of the nuances, serious nuances, that woulc
be included.
Senator Inouye. Now as you sit here as a witness, do you considei
that that plan was dangerous or illegal?
Mr. Caulfield. I can't judge that. Senator. It is certainly a serious
matter.
Senator Inouye. Do you think it is proper to set up a governmeni
in a trial like this?
Mr. Caulfield. No, I don't think it is proper to set up the govern-
ment, sir.
Senator Inouye. On page 24, this is one sentence that puzzles me
It says, "When a^ou make your statement, don't underestimate them.'
What did 3^0 u mean by that?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, as I indicated in the statement, this was ar
extremely friendly conversation. Senator, I don't know if this has
come through in my statement. We were talking now for an hour, ac
hour and a half about families, my boys, his children, his wife, my
job. He gave me the suggestion that he might be able to help me in
liaison with the Post Office, as I recall. This was all a very cordial
conversation under very difficult conditions amongst friends.
277
Now, as I indicated, I was convinced in my mind that he was going
to go ahead at some point in time and make a statement. And looking
at the broad picture, I could envision an ordeal for him, significant
Drdeal. He could be effectivel}" on the other side of the people that I was
balking to.
I was a friend. I don't know if he fully appreciated that, but that
ivas the intent of m^^ remarks, to let him know.
Senator Inouye. You were giving him friendly advice?
Mr. Caulfield. That is right, sir.
Senator Inouye. You were giving him friendly advice?
Air. Caulfield. Yes, sir. That is right, sir.
Senator Inouye. Not to underestimate it, what did 3'ou mean?
Mr. Caulfield. Not to underestimate the tough-mindedness of all
the players in this game.
Senator Inouye. What did you think that the other side would do
to Mr. McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. I had no idea. It is apparent that Mr. McCord
apparently has misinterpreted that, looking at his statement but that
was not the intention. 1 would sa}'^ that to a friend that was about to
nake a major decision that would be tough and I did.
Senator Inouye. I thank 3^011 veiy much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurne^'.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Caulfield, 3"our testimony certainly has been veiy full and ^ery
slear. I just want to press home one or two points,
Keferring to the previous testimon3^ b3'' Mr. McCord, at page 320 of
the record, he had this to say about his conversations and meeting
^vith 3'ou.
"Caulfield stated that he was carr3-ing the message of Executive
lemenc3'- to me from the very highest levels of the White House. He
?tated that the President of the United States was in Ke3" Biscayne,
Fla., that weekend," referring to the weekend following Januar}' 8,
'following meetings that we were in then, and that the President had
been told of the results of the meeting."
Did 3^ou ever learn that the President had learned of the results of
^113^^ of your meetmgs with Mr. McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. Absolutel3^ not, sir.
Senator Gurney. He also stated this further on in the testimoiw on
the next page. "Mr. McCord. He," meaning 3'ou, "further stated 'I
may have a message to 3"ou at our next meeting from the President.' "
Did you ever tell him that?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did 3'ou ever have an3^ communication with the
President of the United States with regard to this so-called Executive
clemency offer to Mr. McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. None whatsoever, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did 3'ou ever hear Mr. Dean in an3" of jout
Donversations with Mr. Dean ever refer to the fact that he had
informed the President of any of these meetings?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did Mr. Dean ever sa3' to 3^011, "The President
las instructed me to make this offer of Executive clemency to McCord
278
through .vou," or through anj^body else as far as that is concerned?
Mr" Caulfield. Absolute!}^ not, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever apply any pressure to ]Mr. ^.IcCo^d
in any of these meetings for him to do anything in regard to this
upcoming trial?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever urge him or advise him to pleac
guilty?
Mr. Caulfield. Never.
Senator Gurney. This point has been covered but it is importan"
because of Mr. McCord's testimony. M}'- understanding is that jom
understanding about these calls to the Embassy and the mretaps or
the Embassies that this was his theory of defense, a way that h«
could get out of it by having the case dismissed if these wiretaps hac
occurred, is that correct?
Mr. Caulfield. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. Did Mr. McCord ever discuss with you what othe
plans he might have if he were found guilty at the trial?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. One final question. You served for some tim^
under Mr. Ehrlichman in the White House. For how long a i^eriod
Mr. Caulfield. From April 8, 1969, through July of 1970.
Senator Gurney. Did 3^ou see quite a bit of him durmg this time
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir; I would not characterize my time unde
Mr. Ehrlichman as frequent visits. I would be working very closel;
with his staff people, primarily Bud Krogh, who had a variet}^ o
duties in the Federal law enforcement area, and I would work primaril;
through Mr. Krogh into Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator Gurney. But you were generally familiar with some of th
missions or the work that Mr. Ehrhchman was carr3"mg on in th
White House, is that fair to say?
Mr. Caulfield. Generally familiar, 3^es, sir.
Senator Gurney. Would you say that it was also a fair thing t'
say that Mr. Ehrlichman undertook a great man}^ missions, a goo(
deal of work in the White House, in his duties on his own, on his owi
independent carrying out, is that a fair thing to say?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, of course, I have no wa}^ of knowing that
Senator.
Senator Gurney. Would that be your impression?
Mr. Caulfield. It is possible. Senator.
Senator Gurney. I do not have any further questions, Mr
Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Caulfield, are 3-ou still on the Federa
payroll?
Mr. Caulfield. I am in what the}^ call administrative leave statui
because of these developments with the Treasury; yes, sir, as of this
moment, yes, sir, I am still on the Federal payroll.
Senator Talmadge. Getting a check?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. But you are on leave?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
279
Senator Talmadge. Did you call Mr. John Ehrlichman immediately
iter the break-in at the Watergate on June 17?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. What did he say?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, I received a telephone call on the afternoon
>f June 17, which is the date of the break-in, the date of the break-in,
bout 3 or 4 p.m., as I recall, from a gentleman I worked with in the
J.S. Secret Service, Mr. Patrick Boggs, and he called me and he said,
Do 3^ou know Jim McCord?" and I said "Yes, I know Jim McCord."
^d he indicated, he said: "Well, we have received a report that there
s a break-in at the Democratic National Committee. We are concerned
)ecause of our protective capabilities or responsibilities, rather, in that
irea. We have some agents checking into it. Some of the people appear
lot to have given their correct names and we are getting a report that
me of those not giving the correct name is Jim McCord."
He said "Now, do you want to call John Ehrlichman or should I call
nm?"
After I had recovered from the shock, I indicated: "Well, you go
ihead and try and reach him and I will try to reach him as well."
And I called the "White House board and I was told that he was en
■oute to his residence. B}'- the time that I did reach him Mr. Boggs had
dready contacted him. And I said to Mr. Ehi'lichman, I said, "John,
t sounds like there is a disaster of some type. Did you speak to Mr.
Boggs?" He said, "Yes, what is this all about?" I said, "I haven't got
:he foggiest notion what it is all about but they are saying they believed
Tim McCord, who works for the committee, has been arrested in a
burglary at the Democratic National Committee."
He said, I forget what he said exactly, I think it was a long silence,
as I recall, and I said, "My God, you know, I cannot believe it." He
5aid, "Well, I guess I had better place a call to John Mitchell." I said,
"I think that would be very appropriate." [Laughter.]
Senator Talmadge. Who said it sounds like a disaster, you or
Vlr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Caulfield. John J. Caulfield.
Senator Talmadge. Why did you have Mr. Ulasewicz call Mr.
McCord rather than calling McCord yourself?
Mr. Caulfield. In this July call?
Senator Talmadge. Yes. This anonymous, mysterious call with the
New York accent. [Laughter.]
Mr. Caulfield. Are we talking about the January call or the July
Icall?
Senator Talmadge. We are talking about the call with no name that
Mr. Ulasewicz is alleged to have made at your request and the request
of John Dean.
Mr. Caulfield. Oh, well again I did not want to make the call
Senator. I knew how serious it was, how dangerous it was, I explained
to John Dean that I did not want to do it. I had to focus completely
on the seriousness of the misconduct but intuitively I knew that I was
wi-ong, and I just did not want to do it, and as I have indicated in my
testimony I tried to get out of it and I felt that because I had asked
Mr. Ulasewicz previously to set up this telephone arrangement with
Mr. McCord outside of his residence that he could, when Mr. McCord
received a call he would, understand that it was coming from me.
280
This was my way of getting the message deUvered without getting
involved.
Senator Talmadge. Whom were jou working for at the time you
relaj^ed Mr. Dean's message to Mr. McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. In January?
Senator Talmadge. Yes, su\
Mr. Caulfield. I was the Assistant Director of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.
Senator Talmadge. Now, on behalf of whom did you assume Mr.
Dean to be speaking, talking of when he spoke of Executive clemency
to Mr. McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, as I have indicated coming from Mr. Dean,
having worked with him, I assumed that there were others at the White
House who were involved in this matter in terms of the offer.
Senator Talmadge. Who did you think was the real author of the
message, Mr. Dean or someone else?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, su", again I believe that conceivably, very
conceivably, that if we are going to talk about others that quite
possibly Mr. Ehrlichman. I had no way of knowing that, Senator.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions,
thank you, su\
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker?
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Caulfield I won't take very long but necessarily I expect the
points I want further elaboration on in the questions I have may be at
least in part repetitious. Do you have any idea why Mr. McCord chose
you to send that letter to?
Mr. Caulfield. Well, I do not — of course, I do not know but Jim
McCord knew I worked at the White House. He knew that I had
worked for Mr. Dean.
Senator Baker. The answer is you don't know. Did Mr. McCord
ever tell you why?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir. He did not.
Senator Baker. Did he confirm that he wrote the unsigned letter to
you?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes. I think there was just a brief conversation
about it in our first conversation in the car.
Senator Baker. Did he indicate to you why he wrote the letter at
all? You have told me now that he did not indicate why he chose you
to write the letter — did he indicate to 3'ou why he wrote the letter?
Mr. Caulfield. I think in substance what he said was what was
in the note, you know, the CIA, the White House will do this thing to
the CIA, I am not going to stand for that.
Senator Baker. Did he tell you why the White House was going to
blame this on the CIA?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir, I have no recollection of that as to wlw.
Senator Baker. He didn't elaborate on that point at all?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you have any indication or evidence or sus-
picion that the White House was trying to "blame it on the CIA"
independent of your conversation with Air. McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. Senator, the whole letter was — upset me quite a
bit. You know it was unsigned and I assumed it was Air. McCord, and
the last sentence bothered me.
281
Senator Baker. Did you ask him why he felt they were going to
blame it on the CIA?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Caulfield, it seems to me that a defendant in
those circumstances or a suspect who had been arrested on charges
such as Mr. McCord had been arrested, have three possible alternative
courses of action. I am speaking now in the hypothetical sense: He
can plead guilty; he can plead not guilty and defend himself on the
facts; or third, he can try to contrive a way to create circumstances
which would result in his exoneration separate and apart from the
fact.
Would that be the range of possibilities that presented themselves
to Mr. McCord at the time?
Mr. Caulfield. In my judgment?
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Now let's focus on the third. Obviously he pled
not guilty. This record has reference, extensive reference, to efforts
allegedly to induce him to plead guilty and receive Executive clemency
which he declined to do. He pled not guilty. He was convicted. But
before his trial and conviction or at least during the time of his trial
and before his conviction this conversation with 3^ou, as I understand
it, and please excuse me for being repetitious but I want to fix it
clearly in my mind in relation to the alternatives that were available
to Mr. McCord, at the time of this conversation the trial was going on
or at least he had not been convicted yet, is that correct?
Mr. Caulfield. That is my recollection, 3'es, sir.
Senator Baker. The trial was actually in progress, was it not?
Mr. Caulfield. I am not absolutely certain, I believe it was but
dates are
Senator Baker. And Mr. AlcCord told you he was not going to
plead guilt}^ He was not interested in Executive clemency, he was
not interested in the year, that that was a long time, that he wanted
out free and clear, is that the essence of it?
Mr. Caulfield. That is the essence of it, Senator.
Senator Baker. And that he wouldn't settle for anything less?
Mr. Caulfield. That is right.
Senator Baker. And that to achieve that end he had arranged and
contrived to phone two foreign embassies whose telephones he knew
or suspected to be tapped, presumabl}'^ illegall}^ or at least embarras-
singly to the U.S. Government so that those calls could be subpenaed
by his attorneys and produced in court as evidence of illegal surveil-
lance so that the prosecution against him would have to be thrown
out or at least so that the Government woidd be so embarrassed by
these alleged taps on foreign embassies that they would dare not
prosecute him further, is that the fair intendment of what Mr. McCord
told you?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. McCord was holding hostage either the em-
barrassment of the U.S. Government with respect to wiretaps on
foreign embassies or he was holding hostage the illegality of those taps
on foreign embassies. Was that the thrust of his design for a defense
at the time of that conversation?
f
)
282
Mr. Caulfield. That is my interpretation, sir, of his comments at
that time.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much.
Senator Ervin, Now, the trial had begun at the time you had these
meetings with McCord in January?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes.
Senator Ervin. And presumably, McCord knew something about
the conversations wliich are occurring between the defendants and
their law3?^ers, did he not?
Mr. Caulfield. Presumably, Senator, yes, sir.
vSenator Ervin. And had you not heard alleged statem^ents in the
press or heard statements over the TV to the effect that since certain
men, Barker and McCord, had previously worked for the CIA, that jj
there v/as some suspicion that the CIA was involved?
Mr. Caulfield. I think probably in the minds of many people at
that time, that was the suspicion. I do not know whether or not I sus-
pected that. But, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, McCord knew you were a lawy^er for the
President and also knew you were his friend, did he not?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. So he wrote you a letter which was susceptible of
the interpretation that he was giving you a warning that there was
no validity to the claim that the CIA was responsible for Watergate?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And did you not entertain the opinion after receiv-
ing that letter that McCord probably ^\Tote it believing that you
would communicate its contents to Mr. Dean, at whose instance
you had interviewed McCord?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir; and I did just that.
Senator Ervin. And you did that?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, you testified under the questioning of Senator
Weicker to the effect that your training in law enforcement had given
you a conviction that it was wrong to attempt to suppress testimony
by an offer of Executive clemency.
Mr. Caulfield. No question about that. Senator.
Senator Ervin. And also that you had a sense of loyalty to the
President?
Mr. Caulfield. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Ervin. And also that you considered Jim McCord your
friend and appreciated the fact that he was in a very unfortunate
situation and you were motivated not only by your loyalty to what
you thought, the loyalty to the President and by what assurance you
had received from Mr. Dean that if McCord did not go along with
the other defendants and cooT)erate with his lawyer, that there might
be a scandal against the President?
Mr. Caulfield. That is exactly right. Senator.
Senator Ervin. So you were compelled to choose between your
loyalties, and that was the reason you were willing to carry the
message from Dean to McCord, notwithstanding the fact that you
did not ap))rove of offering Executive clemency in return for suppress-
ing the testimony?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
283
Senator Ervin. Well, it is proof of what my old philosophy pro-
essor told me, that the greatest trials we have in this world is when
'■ou are compelled to choose between different loyalties, some of which
Te conflicting. And you were trying to protect the President, you
vere trying to aid a friend, and you were trying to carry out a mission
rhich you accepted somewhat reluctantly from the man that you
:new — that is, John Dean — whom you knew to be the President's
ounsel and whom you knew would be actuated by the desire to
»rotect the President against any scandal?
Mr. Caulfield. Absolutely correct, Senator,
Senator Ervin. Now, when you performed this mission for John
)ean on these three occasions, what did you expect or, rather, what
lid you understand was expected of McCord in return for Executive
leniency?
Mr. Caulfield. I believed that in terms of the context of the
iiessage, a year is a long time, that it would be some time less than
year.
Senator Ervin. Did you infer from your conversation with Dean
hat under Dean's statements, McCord was expected to plead guilty,
:eep silent, receive a short sentence, and then receive clemency?
Mr. Caulfield. If he accepted the offer, that would be the way I
v^ould interpret it, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, you were asked a question if Mr. Ehrlichman
lid not do some tilings on his own accord, on his own authority.
For whom was Mr. Ehrlichman working?
Mr. Caulfield. Sir, he was working for the President of the United
)tates.
Senator Ervin. Did you know of your own knowledge of any time
hat Mr. EhrUchman did things on his own accord, out of his own
lead and imagination?
Mr. Caulfield. I am sure he has many times, Senator.
Senator Ervin. And you are unable to tell me whether he was act-
ng on instructions or acting out of his own head and imagination?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir. If I were given an assignment, I would go
ihead and do it.
Senator Ervin. And when you called Mr. Ehrlichman shortly after
he break-in, in June, or sometime about in July, you think Mr.
^ihrlichman told you he thought he had better call John Mitchell and
ou said you thought it would be a good idea?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And John Mitchell had been Attorney General at
hat time, and had just resigned as director of the Committee To
ie-Elect the President, a short time before?
^Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. That is all I have.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, might I ask one more question?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Senator Baker. Mr. Caulfield, you have testified at length and
extensively about matters of great importance in which you had a
lirect involvement.
Mr. Caulfield. I beg your pardon, Senator.
Senator Baker. Mr. Caulfield, you have testified at length and
sxtensively about important matters in which you had a direct
nvolvement?
96-296— 74— bk. 1 19
284
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. You are aware of the nature of those transactions?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And the possible consequences from them?
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Caulfield, have you ever been requested to or
have you ever suggested that there be any claim of Executive pri\alege
on your behalf?
Mr. Caulfield. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Have you ever requested immunity from prosecu
tion from this committee, a grand jury, or anyone else with respect
to the information that you have given?
Mr. Caulfield. Absolutely not, sir.
Senator Baker. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervin. I want to thank you for appearing before the com
mittee and for your testimony, and with the understanding that you
will return later at the request of the committee, jou. are excused at
this time.
Mr. Caulfield. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dash. Will Mr. Anthony Ulasewicz come to the witness table
please.
Senator Ervin. Will you raise your right hand?
Do 3^ou swear that the evidence that you will give to the Senatt
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help jou God'
Mr. Ulasewicz. I do.
Mr. Dash. Be seated, Mr. Ulasewicz.
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes.
Mr. Dash. ]\'Ir. Ulasewicz, for the record, would you please stat(
your full name and your address.
TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY T. ULASEWICZ
Mr. Ulasewicz. My name is Anthony, middle initial T. last name
U-1-a-s-e-w-i-c-z. I reside in the town of Day, D-a-y, Saratoga Countj
in the State of New York.
Mr. Dash. And you are appearing alone, without an attorney?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Ulasewicz, I understand that you have had a policf
career. Will you please give us that professional background?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, I was appointed to the New York City Polict
Department February 17, 1943, and left the department on oi
about Jul}^ 9, 1969. I was a detective first-rate in a command
known as the Bureau of Special Services and Investigations of thf
New York City Police Department. I spent 21 years in that command,.
6 years without a uniform.
Mr. Dash. Could you briefly describe what your duties were in that
assignment?
Mr. Ulasewicz. The Bureau of Special Services conducted in-^
vestigations regarding organizations or groups in the city who might
be a ])roblem at any time. These were groups, perhaps dissident
groups with governments in their own background nations. We
285
provided security for visiting personages and any causes or demon-
strations that might have resulted in difficulty to the city.
Mr. Dash. How long have you known Mr. John Caulfield?
Mr. Ulasewicz. For about 10 years.
Mr. Dash. Did you meet him diu-ing your service in the police
department?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, while I was in the Bureau of Special Services,
Mr, Caulfield became part of the command for some time and then
left for another command and that is how we started our friendship.
Mr. Dash. Now, in July of 1972, did you receive a call from Mr.
Caulfield?
Mr. Ulasewicz. In June of 1972.
Mr. Dash. In June of 1972. Can you just briefly tell us what the
nature of that call was?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes.
Mr. Caulfield called me somewhere about the 25th or 26th of June
and asked me to come to see him in Washington, D.C., the next day
on a personal matter. I met with him around noontime. He mentioned
that he was thinking of contacting Mr. McCord, a friend of his, that
he did not have his telephone number. It was unlisted, it had been
changed. And he said would I assist him in arranging for an appoint-
ment so that he may speak — not me, but speak with Mr. McCord.
Mr. Dash. Then what did you do?
Mr. Ulasewicz. I said, all right, if you do not know any other, if
you want my help, I will do it. I did not question him in any way.
He asked me could I do it as soon as possible? I said, I will do it
right now. I said. No. 1, you will have to give me some kind of iden-
tifying information, how will Mr. McCord know that it is you that
is contacting him?
What I did was I wrote a note on a plain piece of paper and told
Jack I would deliver that to Mr. McCord, setting up a telephone and
he can then have his conversation. The purpose of this call, he said
he wanted to help Mr. McCord, express his sympathy, et cetera, they
had been such good friends in the past.
I wrote a note, arranged — I told Jack that I must have some
identifying information so that this thing, that Mr. McCord would
believe it is he. He said, well, there was an incident recently in which
Mr. Caulfield left his raincoat somewhere, and I put that — that was
the identifjdng information, that I am a mutual friend for whom you
recovered a raincoat.
Mr. Dash. Did you, in fact, take that note?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Where did you deliver it?
Mr. Ulasewicz. I proceeded immediately to the area where Mr.
McCord resides. Mr. Caulfield had given me the address. I looked
around through the area, located a place, a Blue Inn or something,
which has a large parking lot, two telephone booths isolated by
themselves.
I took the two telephone numbers of the booths, put them on the
note, put two dift'erent times, like 2:30 and 4:30, and then wrote on
the note about a mutual friend washes to speak to you, or words to
that effect; you recently recovered a raincoat of his. It was not signed.
286
I then proceeded — this telephone booth is within the vicinity, of
course, of Mr. McCord's residence. I then took the note. I went to
Mr. McCord's residence, placed it in the letter box, and walked
away.
I then called from some area not too far, I called Mr. Caulfield and
informed him that it was done.
Mr. Dash. Now, later, in January 1973, did you again receive a
telephone call from Mr. Caulfield?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. Where — did you know or did he indicate he was calling
from?
Air. Ulasewicz. He indicated he was calling from California. I
think it was the San Clemente Inn in California.
Mr. Dash. And what, if anything, did he tell you in that telephone
■conversation?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Well, he indicated to me that he wished another
favor concerning Mr. McCord. He would Uke me to contact Mr.
McCord and deliver a message. And as Mr. Caulfield says, there was
a loud silence.
I said, "Jack, you realize that what you are asking is a very unusual
request for many reasons — the timing; it is a different situation than
it was in June, prior to it, et cetera."
He said, "Tony," or something like this in response, "you know I
am here on meetings, I am conducting meetings, I am very busy,
there is interruptions. I can't do a thing like this from here. It would
be very inconvenient. I know that what I am asking is, I wouldn't do
it except I know that you are a friend and I can ask you to do it."
He said, "I wouldn't ask anyone else, I don't know who else I
can ask."
He said, "Things are being pushed on me. I don't want to get into it
or I wouldn't ask you to do it."
I said something that, well, Mr. McCord, of course, being a good
wdreman. Jack, anything that is said to him, it can be expected it is
probably recorded.
He said, "if this ever comes out, I will definitely admit that I asked
you to do this, and under these circumstances and on a friendship
basis."
Mr. Dash. What was the message that Mr. Caulfield asked you to
give Mr. McCord?
Mr. Ulasewicz. To the best of my recollection, the message was in
five or six phrases. It was — let's see now. I don't have the original
notes. I wrote the phrases lightly after I agreed. It was, "A year is a
long time. No one knows how a judge wUl go. Your family will be
provided for. Rehabilitation and job opportunities will be provided
for."
During this conversation, which incidentally, occurred at a tele-
phone booth in the town of Day, and the telephone system is not the
best, it wasn't too clear and I thought Mr. McCord asked me to
repeat something.
Mr. Dash. Right now, I am asking you to recaU the message or the
telephone call you had from Mr. Caulfield.
Mr. Ulasewicz. Oh, to Mr. Caulfield?
Mr. Dash. What Mr. Caulfield asked you to tell Mr. McCord.
287
Mr. Ulasewicz. Oh, well, I finished with Mr. Caulfield and he gave
me the number and I then went in and made this call to Mr. McCord.
Mr. Dash. The message you gave to Mr. McCord was not your
own message, was it?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Oh, no, Mr. Caulfield's message.
Mr. Dash. I take it the message you gave to Mr. McCord was the
same message you have given?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Same message, yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. All right, then you can go ahead and say what you
told Mr. McCord, but before that how did you contact Mr. McCord?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Mr. Caulfield gave me a telephone number to
Mr, McCord's residence. I did not have that number, so he provided
me with the number, but I did have, I told him I did have, the num-
ber to the telephone booth and I had those and I contacted Mr.
McCord at his residence.
Mr. McCord was not surprised at the phone call apparently and
I said, "Go to the phone," and he did have the telephone where it
was, identical with the June message.
Mr. Dash. Now Mr. McCord did call to the telephone booth.
Did he call you or did you call him?
Mr. Ulasewicz. No; I called Mr. McCord.
Mr. Dash. And you did reach him at the other end ot the line?
Mr. Ulasewicz. I did reach him, right.
Mr. Dash. What, if anything, then now did you tell him that
Mr. Caulfield asked you to tell him?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Right.
I told him I had a message from Mr. Caulfield and that I went
into this message as I just said, "A year is a long time. No one knows
how a judge will go. Your family needs will be provided for, rehabilita-
tion and job opportunity will be provided for,"
In the course of the conversation Mr. McCord said something I
didn't quite understand, I repeated a phrase or two of this. And
there was something about "Don't know whether he asked me to
plead guilty or is that part of my message," and that is all I recall
of the message.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall saymg anything about immunity, did
immunity come up in the discussion?
Mr. Ulasewicz. I don't recall, it may ver}^ well have happened.
I have heard Mr. McCord's testimony here, of course, as everyone
has, and I searched my mind very strongly on the matter because I
still believe Mr. McCord could have been taped and might have
it on tape; I don't know, but knowing that possibility, I certainly
searched my memory and this is the best I can remember,
Mr. Dash. And it is possible in your searching your memory that
the idea of pleading guilt^^ came up during the conversation.
Mr, Ulasewicz. It is quite possible it might have been in it.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Now, what did Mr, McCord say after you gave him that message?
By the way, when you gave him that message did he know who
3^ou were?
Mr. Ulasewicz. No; I never met Mr. McCord in person prior — at
any time.
Mr. Dash. Did you identify j'^ourself by name?
288
Mr. Ulasewicz. No; I went right into it, "I have a message from
Jack Caulfield," and his response indicated to me that he was expect-
ing a message apparently. I went right into it and he thanked me and
seemed satisfied.
Mr. Dash. What did you do after that?
Mr. Ulasewicz. I called Mr. Caulfield back in California and told
him I relayed the message that he had given me, and that Mr. McCord
did not seem surprised, and that he seemed satisfied.
Mr. Dash. Did you have any other contact with Mr. McCord on
the telephone?
Mr. Ulasewicz. The next day Mr. Caulfield called me again and
asked me to once more deliver a message to Mr. McCord.
Mr. Dash. What was that message?
Mr. Ulasewicz. That message was, Mr. Caulfield said to me that,
to explain, to make sure that Mr. McCord realizes that he is in Cali-
fornia, that he, Mr. Caulfield, is in California, that he will meet with
him as soon as he returned, first order of business, from California, to
set up a tentative, a meet on the second overlook on Washington
highway or parkway, and to get that message to him and then call
back and verify it.
Mr. Dash, Did Mr. Caulfield pick that particular location?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, he did, and he said he knew I was not
familiar with that area but he said, McCord would know the area.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Then were there any other contacts you had on the telephone?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Mr. Caulfield called me once more after that and
he said that he had planned to leave a day earlier. His plane, however,
was delayed, would I tell Mr. McCord that as soon as he landed that
same evening he will contact Mr. McCord and try to meet him im-
mediately rather than the following day as I originally conveyed my
message.
Mr. Dash. What did Mr. McCord respond to that?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Mr. McCord was very annoyed. He told me, he
kind of brushed me off, said, "I have people here. I have my own
family problems, I know you are doing what you think is right,"
something to that effect. He spoke kind of rapidly and he said: "You
can tell Jack that I will meet only as originally scheduled," meaning
the, originally the second call, the overlook on the Washington
Parkway.
Mr. Dash. Did you report that back to Mr. Caulfield?
Mr. Ulasewicz. No, I couldn't report that back to Mr. Caulfield.
Mr. Dash. That was the last contact?
JVir. Ulasewicz. That was the last contact I had in this matter
with either of the two gentlemen.
Mr. Dash. All right, I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Ulasewicz, was not Mr. Ehrlichman responsible
for your being hired originally at the White House?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did he direct your work while you were at the White
House?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Mr. Caulfield directed my work.
Mr. Thompson. He did.
289
Was that at the direction of Mr. Ehrlichman? Did he direct Mr.
'Caiilfield? _ ,. ,^.:,;.,
Mr. Ulasewicz. That was my impression.
Mr. Thompson. Between the first telephone call that you made to
Mr. McCord until after the trial, did you discuss the calls that you
were making with Mr. Ehrlichman or anyone else at the White House?
Mr. Ulasewicz. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. You only discussed these matters with Mr.
Caulfield?
Mr. Ulasewicz. And no one at any time.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Did you see your role as someone Avho was delivering certain words
which 3^ou took down, say, in writing and repeated or did you see your
role as someone who was supposed to engage in conversation with Mr.
McCord and paint a picture for him, so to speak?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Absolutely not, strictly as a messenger to give
these phrases over to him, and I did not — I originally did not repeat
them in their full context from Mr. Caulfield. My recollection is I
gave phrases
Mr. Thompson. All right. When Mr. McCord responded to those
words did you engage in conversation with hhn then?
Mr. Ulasewicz. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. According to your best recollection, was there ever
any discussion between Mr. McCord and yourself about the fact that
he should not testify at the trial?
Mr. Ulasewicz. I do not recall it.
Mr. Thompson. Was there ever any discussion, to the best of your
recollection, between Mr. McCord and yourself that he should plead
guilty?
Mr. Ulasewicz. It may have been. I do not recall.
Mr. Thompson. Well, if it may have been, would this have been in
your original message or would this have been pursuant to a
conversation?
Mr. Ulasewicz. No, it would have been in the original message
which was that only time, only that first call.
Mr. Thompson. All right. This was not m your direct testimony.
This was not a part of your direct testimony. Is it your opinion that it
was not in your original message or that it possibly could have been?
Mr. Ulasewicz. It could have been in the original message.
Mr. Thompson. So you do not remember what you told him?
Mr. Ulasewicz. From the best of my recollection these three
phrases are positive about the message would be about "a year is a long
time, no one knows how a judge wiU go. Your family needs will be
provided for, rehabilitation, and job opportunities". When there was a
pause there may have been something on plead guilty or so but I was
.giving the message as rapidly as I could as I wanted to finish the
matter.
Mr. Thompson. Pardon me, you say that may have come about or
■discussed when there was a pause?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes. Mr. McCord said something that I did not
quite understand so I repeated my message.
Mr. Thompson. This pause, would this still be part of your original
message?
290
Mr. Ulasewicz. Original message. These only came in the origi
nal — any discussion of the, regarding the, judge and all that busines
came only in the first conversation. The second conversation was t'
make the appointment, and the third conversation was to inform hir
that Mr. Caulfield would try to get to him a day sooner.
Mr. Thompson. You did not seek to interpret in any way what th
message meant?
Mr. Ulasewicz. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. To Mr. McCord?
Mr. Ulasewicz. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Caulfield ever tell you who was directin
him in this matter?
Mr. Ulasewicz. He did not.
Mr. Thompson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Did you not infer, in other words, you made th
statement to Mr. McCord which Mr. Caulfield had asked you to make
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Was it not implicit in that statement that he woul
get these advantages if he entered a plea of guilty?
Mr, Ulasewicz. I would assume so, yes, definitely.
Senator Ervin. You certainly did not construe this statement he :
going to be rehabilitated and given, serve
Mr. Ulasewicz. No, sir.
Senator Ervin [continuing]. Serve only a year in jail and get th
fine treatment if he fought the case?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Absolutely. I did not mean to infer any such thini
definitely.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker. If not, I will pass directly to Senate
Gumey, and then Senator Talmadge.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions (
the witness.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge?
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Ulasewicz, had you been aware of th
Watergate affair at the time you were asked to make the call?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes sir.
Senator Talmadge. Why did you agree to serve as a contact in thi
situation?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Because of my friendship with Mr. Caulfiel
and in his original call to me with my arguments as to why I did no
want to — from his demeanor, his conduct, I could see it was ver
important to him. He was in seme kind of a position that caused hir
great concern and as a friend I said I would do it.
Senator Talmadge. Did you assume that Mr. Caulfield's authorit;
was coming from higher authority in the White House?
Mr. Ulasewicz. I assumed it was coming from at least Mr. Dean
somebody above Mr. Caulfield.
Senator Talmadge. Did you believe that these White House sourcei
would approve what you did?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, I suppose so.
Senator Talmadge. Were you paid for your services in your contac
with Mr. McCord?
Mr, Ulasewicz. No sir. I was on no one's payroll at the time oi
these conversations in January. I was not in anyone's employ, ]
might say.
291-
Senator Talmadge. I have no further questions at this time, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker?
Senator Weicker. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
According to Mr. Caulfield's testimony you were a member of a
"private security entity in Washington, D.C., providing investigative
support for the White House" is that correct?
Mr. Ulasewicz. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. You worked under Mr. Caulfield but were on the
payroll of Mr. Kalmbach?
Mr. Ulasewicz. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. What were you receiving as salary from Mr.
Kalmbach?
Mr. Ulasewicz. $22,000 a year plus expenses.
Senator Inouye. Are you still on Mr. Kahnbach's payroll?
Mr. Ulasewicz. No sir.
Senator Inouye. When were you taken off the payroll?
Mr. Ulasewicz. In 1971 — well, to the end of the year of 1972.
Senator Inouye. What was the nature of your work?
Mr. Ulasewicz. It was supporting, as an outside supporting
investigative to Mr. Caulfield.
Senator Inouye. Will you describe some of your duties. One of the
newspapers described you as the super spy. Is that a correct statement?
Mr. Ulasewicz. The newspapers have painted quite a few pictures
of me recently, but I was no spy, of course, of any kind. I did inves-
tigative work in support of whatever Mr. Caulfield related to me. I
did no slanderous spying as the newspapers' allegations, et cetera. I
could best put in its category is probably supporting anybody who is
conducting legitimate investigations. I used no wiretaps, I never used
any surveillance, et cetera.
Senator Inouye. You considered your work to be legal?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Absolutely legal, yes, sir. I took — when I left the
police department, I left a fine ongoing career not to get involved in
anything illegal and I made a stipulation at the time with Mr.
Ehrlichman at the time the job was taken. Mr. Caulfield knew I would
not go for it.
Senator Inouye. In this special assignment you undertook from
Mr. Caulfield to serve as contact with Mr. McCord, were you aware
you were being an accessory to the crime of obstructing a crimi-
nal investigation?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir. I knew that it was wrong.
Senator Inouye. You knew you were an accessory to a crime?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir.
. Senator Inouye. But as a matter of friendship you proceeded?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir.
, Senator Inouye. Did you have other assignments of similar
nature?
Mr. Ulasewicz. No.
Senator Inouye. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Senator Inouye.
292
I might say the question has not been asked you but I will put it
now, while we are limiting our inquiry to a single set of events and
circumstances, do I understand that you are willing to return and to
testify further at the pleasiu-e of the committee on other matters that
you may have knowledge of?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Very good.
Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. I have no questions.
Senator Baker. Senator Montoya has no questions.
Let me ask one question or one line of questions, it really does not
bear much on the matter at hand though; did I understand you to say
McCord was a pretty good wireman?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Well, from what I have read in the case and from
the fact that Mr. Caulfield hired him, I would say he was one of the
best wiremen in the business. [Laughter.]
Senator Baker, I am not familiar with the term, what do you
mean a pretty good wireman?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Well, a wireman in poUce parlance would be
anyone who is familiar with applying wiretaps, any type of surveil-
lances by electrical means, and so forth in a room, on a person, in an
automobile, in a tire, or any place and I would say he was a good man.
Senator Baker. Is that a term of general usage in your trade?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir. However, I was never a wireman.
[Laughter.]
While I was in the police department man}^ of the functions that we
did, of course, they were all legal with proper papers, et cetera, and
judicial permission, we have some of the finest wiremen in the depart-
ment. [Laughter.]
So it would be a thing of common knowledge to myseK or anyone
else.
Senator Baker. You think your wiremen were better than McCord's
wiremen?
Mr. Ulasewicz. I will tell you, any old retired man in the New York
City Police Department who would become involved in a thing hke
that, he thought he had to for whatever reason it was, he would not
have walked in mth an army, that is for sure. [Laughter.]
Senator Baker. He would not have walked in mth an army.
Would he have walked in with identification papers and serial
numbered $100 bills and address book?
Mr. Ulasewicz. He probably would have walked in like any decent
common looking citizens, laid something in the right place and walked
right out and that would have been the end of it for a long time.
[Laughter.]
You see, I must be honest here, Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator Baker. How could you have gained the information, how
could you have gained the information that Mr. McCord obviously or
apparently was seeking, that is, a telecommunication link with what
was going on in the Democratic National Committee without going
in there with an army and taping the doors and all the rest.
Describe to us how else that might have been done by a good man.
Mr. Ulasewicz. Well, a wireman would only do wires. He might not
necessarily be a good man for a different type of investigation. If it is a
293
question of obtaining information from the Democratic Party, Repub-
lican Party, or anybody else the easiest way is to write a postal card
asking them to mail you all their leaflets, they will put you on their
mailing hst and you will have everything. If it is all written they will
do it.
Senator Baker. Politicians are pretty anxious to add to their mailing
list.
Mr. Ulasewicz. Politicians are the most vulnerable people in the
world, in my last 3 years of experience, to any kind of scandal, et cetera.
1 do not say they are guilty of it because I still have to come back here.
[Laughter.]
But because of the type
Senator Baker. The last thing on earth I would want to do is to
convert your testimony into self-serving purposes for this committee
but you do not have any good wiremen on us, do you? [Laughter.]
Mr. Ulasewicz. It looks hke there are plenty of them here.
[Laughter.]
Senator Baker. You laiow that is not a very good answer. You are
heightening my concern. pLaughter.]
Mr. Ulasewicz. I have none on anybody. Thank you.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. I understand that you will come back when the com-
mittee requests you for further evidence?
Mr. Ulasewicz. Definitely, Senator.
Senator Ervin. Thank you, thank you very much.
I think it is almost recess time and it is better to recess untU 2 o'clock
and then start with the next witness.
[Whereupon, at 11 :45 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at
2 p.m., this same day.]
Afternoon Session, Wednesday, May 23, 1973
Senator Baker [presiding]. The committee will come to order.
The chairman has asked me to announce that he is on his way from
a meeting of the Judiciary Committee which, as you know, is con-
sidering the nomination of Mr. ElUot Richardson to be Attorney
General of the United States. That he and Senator Gumey, a member
of the Judiciary Committee, wiU be here momentarily. He asked
me, however, in the interest of time to convene the committee,
and to proceed with the opening statement which we understand
Mr. Alch is now prepared to give.
Mr. Dash. I see Mr. Gerald Alch is at the witness table. Will you,
Mr. Chairman, swear the witness?
Senator Baker. Mr. Alch, would you hold up your right hand?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Will you please state your name?
Mr. Alch. Gerald Alch.
Senator Baker. Mr. Gerald Alch, do you solemnly swear that the
testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Alch. I do.
Senator Baker, You may be seated.
Mr. Dash. Now, the committee has been supplied 13 pages of a
statement that Mr. Alch will be reading. Our committee staff has
294
done the typing and reproducing of this for Mr. Alch, having supplied
a copy of his statement, and the rest of it mil be available to the
committee during the course of the reading of the statement.
Mr. Alch, for the record, will you give your full name and address?
TESTIMONY OF GERALD ALCH, ATTORNEY
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
M}^ name is Gerald Alch, A-l-c-h. My address is 954 West Roxbur}-
Parkway, Chestnut Hill, Mass.
Mr. Dash. And you did prepare a statement which you wish to
read to this committee?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Will you proceed reading that statement?
Mr. Alch. Thank you, and I will.
May it please the honorable committee, in all candor, I am about
to give testimony with a certain degree of regret. This is because those
areas to which I shall address myself are areas which I, as a criminal
defense attorney, believe to be somewhat sacred. They reflect conver-
sation between a lawyer and his client, uttered in the course of a
relationship wherein I was exerting my best efforts to protect the
interest and welfare of James W. McCord. I take most seriously the
well-established attorney-client privilege. Nevertheless, in my judg-
ment, Mr. McCord, in his testimony before this honorable committee
on Friday, May 18, 1973, and in other prior disclosures, both written
and oral, has waived such pri^dlege which I have been informed he has
acknowledged. Mr. McCord has made allegations concerning my con-
duct in the defense of his liberty. These allegations are, in some
instances, completely false and in other instances, have been twisted
out of context into untruths, presumably to serve his present purpose,
whatever that may be, but that impugn my personal standards of
ethical and legal behavior. I accordingly believe it now to be ni}' duty
and responsibility to respond and I have accepted the invitation of this
honorable committee so to do for which I am most grateful. Here, then,
is a true narrative of my representation of ]Mr. McCord.
In July of 1972, m}- office received a telephone call from Mr. McCord
requesting an appomtment. On a Saturday morning during that month,
I met with him for the very first time. He identified himself as one
of those arrested in the Watergate building on June 17, 1972. He told
me that he had taken a calculated risk in doing what he did and was
prepared to face the consequences. Within that framework, however,
he indicated he wanted the most effective legal representation possible
and asked whether or not my partner, Attorney F. Lee Bailey, would
be interested in representing him. I told him tliat I had advised Mr.
Bailc}^ of ni}^ appointment with him and that he, Mr. Baile}', was not
interested in representing any defendants in tliis particular case.
Mr. McCord told me as a result of his impression of me, he desired
my counsel. A fee of $25,000 plus expenses was quoted and agreed
upon by Mr. M<'Cord. Arrangements were made for the payment of
this fee over a period of time, which arrangements were ultimateh'
met by Mr. McCord, although over a longer period of time than
originally agreed upon. I aske<i Mr. McCord to give me specific details
attending the Watergate break-in, but he specifically declined to do so
295
except to state his personal motivation for so acting, that is, as he
told me at that first meeting, the protection of others. I explained to
him that since he had been physically apprehended in the Watergate
complex, he could obviously not deny that fact and inquired as to his
motivation in so acting. He told me that as chief of security for the
Committee To Re-Elect the President, he had received information
to the effect that various antiwar demonstrations by groups vv^hich he
described as "radical" were being planned for the upcoming Presi-
dential election and that these demonstrations had, in the past and
would invariably in the future, lead to violence or the threat thereof
to various prominent Republican officials, including, but not limited to,
members of the Committee To Re-Elect the President and including,
but not limited to, the President of the United States. I told him that
I would explore whether or not this motivation could, in an}' way, be
embraced by a recognized legal defense. He told me that he wished me
to come to Washington, D.C., and meet with an attorney by the name
of Paul O'Brien, whom he described as one of the counsel to his
emploj'er, the Committee To Re-Elect the President. He desired that
I contact Mr. O'Brien and advise him of his — Mr. McCord's — position.
Shortly thereafter, I traveled to the Capital and telephoned Mr.
O'Brien for an appointment. Mr. McCord drove me to Mr. O'Brien's
office, whereupon I met with Mr. O'Brien and a gentleman introduced
to me as Mr. Kenneth Parkinson. I introduced myself, told Mr.
O'Brien I had been retained to represent Mr. McCord and was here
at Mr. McCord's direction to inform him as a representative of Mr.
McCord's emploj^er, the Committee To Re-Elect the President, that
Mr. McCord was, as he had told me, prepared to face the consecpiences
of his acts. Mr. O'Brien and I exchanged office telephone numbers
and the meeting, which had lasted for approximately 15 minutes,
terminated.
My first official act on behalf of Mr. McCord was to represent him
at a pretrial indictment probable cause hearing before a superior
court judge m the District of Columbia. All other defendants had
waived such a hearing, but 1 decided to utilize it, as best I could, for
discovery purposes. Mr. McCord was most mipressed with my in-court
presentation and he told me so. I subsequently accompanied him, his
wife, and daughter before the Federal grand jury. At one point, prior
to indictment, I was advised by the prosecutors, Mr. Earl Silbert
and Mr. Seymour Glanzer, that they possessed independent evidence
that equipment utilized in the monitoring of telephone conversations
from the office of the National Democratic Committee had been
delivered to Mr. ^McCord's home in the presence of Mr. McCord's
wife on the night of June 17, 1972. They advised me of the possibility
of Mr. McCord's wife being indicted as an accessory after the fact,
but indicated this would not be done if the equipment was produced.
I discussed this with Mr. McCord and he requested me to work out
the best arrangement possible, but to do anything and everythmg to
protect his wife whom he said had no involvement in his activities.
Accordingly, an arrangement was agreed upon with the prosecutors,
whereby the equipment was surrendered to them with the agreement
that they would not divulge, during trial, the fact that this particular
equipment was obtained from Mr. McCord. Mrs. McCord was not
296
indicted and the Government kept its word with regard to the manner
in which said equipment was mtroduced during trial.
In the ensuing weeks and months, during my many contacts with
Mr. McCord, he continuously insisted that his only purpose in
participating m the Watergate break-in was to protect his employers
and other Republican officials from threats of violence. He would,
almost daily, send to me clippings from various newspapers published
throughout the country, reflecting reports of antiwar group activities
which in some instances involved violence. In fact, at one point, he
sent to me a typed memorandum reflecting this alleged motivation for
his conduct, which memorandum included various legal citations of
law, which he believed to be in support of the defense he Avished me
to present. I have made available to this honorable committee copies
of three such memorandums, which was accompanied by a hand-
written note from Mr. AlcCord which reads as follows: Dated July 13,
1972. "Gerald, I well understand that it is your job and not mine to
work up a defense. Nevertheless, I have been putting together some
ideas and collecting every newspaper clipping I can find which may
be of help later. I am strongly oriented toward the grounds of self-
defense and defense of others and of property as my defense. I believe
we can make the strongest defense on these grounds. We both of
course have to talk this out at length and you have the final say in this
matter. With best regards, Jim."
I read this, may it please this honorable committee, to emphasize
this fact: That Mr. McCord was from the beginning, in complete
agreement with the defe se ultimately presented in his behalf. At ^o
time, did he ever state to me that he beUeved the Watergate opera-
tion to be legal as a result of the alleged involvement of the then
Attornej^ General, the counsel to the President, or anyone else. As a
matter of fact, during one of my many conversations with Mr. McCord
on this subject, I told him that my legal research revealed that the
defense of the protection of others required that the perpetrator not
know he was breaking the law.
I said to Mr. McCord, "No jurj^ will ever believe that a man with
your background with the FBI and the CIA would not reaUze he was
breaking the law in breaking into an office at night, wearing surgical
gloves and armed with eavesdropping equipment."
He laughed and agreed that such a contention was, in fact, legally
untenable. I further explained that the reason for his actio^^s, as he
had explained them to me, would be more properly embraced by the
legal defense of "duress," wherein the perpetrator felt compelled to
break a law in order to prevent a greater evil. Mr. McCord had
explained to me his belief of a direct relationship between these po-
tentially^ violent antiwar groups and the Democratic Party and that
his participation in the Watergate burglary was accomphshed in the
hope of obtaining advance eviderce of planned potentially violent
demonstrations.
I advised that the law of "duress" allowed for the perpetrator to
possess criminal intent, that is, to know that he was breaki'g the law
and that therefore, based upon what he had told me with regard to
his own motivation, this defense was not only compatible therewith,
but in my opinion, constituted the only defense available. Mr. McCord
wholeheartedly agreed. And I commenced to prepare the case on this
basis.
297
I also received from Mr. McCord ap outline of a proposed book he
was in the process of writing entitled "Counter Espionage Agent for
the Republicans — The True vStory of the Watergate Case." It was an
outline, listing such chapters titled "The Beginnings"; "The Com-
mittee To Re-elect the President"; "Background to Violence and
Political Espionage"; "Jack Anderson, the Man Wlio Brought vou
the Eagleton Case"; "The PoUtical Opposition"; "The Watergate
Incident, The True Story"; "The Defendants"; "The Grand Jury";
"The Lawyers"; "The Investigators"; "The Congressional Com-
mittees"; "The October Phase"; "The News Media"; "The Final
Story"; with a prolog, as the book goes to print, "If the Democrats
Had Had Alarms and Guards."
Copies of this outline have also been provided to this honorable
committee. All of these memorandums, I may add, gentlemen, were
provided to me by mail directly from Mr. McCord.
In this regard, on September 19, 1972, one of my associates from
my office, Mr. John Albert Jolmson, appeared with Mr. McCord for
arraignment with Chief Judge Sirica, since I had a court commitment
in another State. Mr. McCord told Mr. Johnson that he was in the
process of writing a book and desired our opmion as to whether he
could have this book published prior to election day. He told Mr.
Jolinson that he felt that any publication after Presidential election
day would not be worthwhile monetarily. Mr. Johnson reduced this
conversation to a file memorandum, copies of which also have been
presented to this honorable committee. When Mr. Johnson advised
me of this, I told Mr. McCord that in my opinion, no such publica-
tion should be contemplated prior to trial. ]\Ir. McCord, reluctantly
it appeared to me, agreed to follow my advice.
There were other memorandums that I received from time to time
from Mr. McCord which suggested for consideration other potential
defense material which I rejected. One such memorandum, copies of
which have been provided to this honorable cormnittee, listed and
discussed such topics as "the Mafia and Democratic National Com-
mittee Funds and Personnel"; "Flying Tigers and Anna Chenault";
"Israel and the Mafia." Said memorandum as you honorable Senators
will note in the copies provided to you, also mentioned the names of
other individuals and law firms, which names I choose not to bandy
about in this public hearing.
On several occasions, Mr. McCord told me that he was convinced
there existed a concerted effort on the part of his codefendants and
their counsel to make him the "fall guy" of the Watergate operation.
On one particular occasion, he mailed to me a memorandum, copies
of which you also have. For the record, said memorandum reads as
f oUows :
October 17, 1972.
Subject: Shift of the Focus of Publicity.
Jerry, about a week ago, Newsweek Reporters told my men that the FBI had
been leaking information to them relative to my case and some of the material
would appear in the next two issues. Last week, one item appeared regarding an
office of mine rented on K Street, D.C. This week's issue, October 23 date, carries
for the first time an allegation that I was the "ring leader" of the Watergate opera-
tion. Instead of being fourth down the ladder from Liddy, Hunt, and Barker,
I am now the "ring leader", according to the FBI. This had been predicted, that I
would try to be made the focus in order to draw the attention away from the
W.H. men, Liddy and Hunt. I could see it coming as early as August and more
particularly, 2 weeks ago, when you and I talked. The FBI leaks to Newsweek
are no accident. It is as predicted. Jim.
298
I advised Mr. McCord that I had kept abreast of newspaper cover-
age of the Watergate incident and that in all honesty, could discern
no effort on anyone's part to foist upon him prime responsibility for
the offenses charged. He disagreed with me and I told him that I
would subsequently discuss the matter with other defense counsel.
At another time prior to January 1973, Mr. McCord advised that
he had made telephone calls to the Israeli Embassy on September 19,
1972, and to the Chilean Embassy on October 10, 1972. He did not
divulge the contents of these telephone conversations. He explained
his purpose as follows:
He told me he was convmced that the Government had telephone
taps on the phones of these Embassies, but would not admit to such
activity. He was certain that his calls had been intercepted. He
instructed that I make a motion in court requiring the Government
to disclose any and all intercepted communications in which he was
involved. His theory was that the Government, rather than reveal
such activity, would dismiss the case against him.
I asked him what these calls were about. He told me that they were
phone calls relative to the case. I now understand that these phone
calls were not of any relative substance which fact Mr. McCord had
not told me originally.
I received a letter from him dated August 23 reflecting these
thoughts, copies of which I have made available to this honorable
committee. It is a two-page letter and in the interest of expediency,
I shall not read the letter in its entirety. It deals with the subject
of the consequences the Government intercepting telephone calls.
However, I would respectfully call to the attention of this honorable
committee the last paragraph of the letter, which reads as follows:
"Enjoyed the visit with you and appreciated your visit. I have got
a great lawyer and am well aware of that fact. With best regards,
Jim."
In addition, I have provided this honorable committee with copies
of undated memorandum from Mr. McCord, reflecting four telephone
calls: one from Chile to McCord's office; another from Mr. McCord's
office to the Chilean military attache; a call to the Israeli Embassy
from Mr. McCord's home, and a similar call to the Chilean Embassy.
I would respectfully invite the committee's attention to the fact
that the first two of these calls occurred prior to my ever meeting
Mr. McCord, before I ever represented the man. As a result thereof,
I made an appropriate motion for disclosure of any Government
electronic surveillance in any May pertaining to Mr. McCord. Mr.
Silbert's response was that he had no knowledge of any such surveil-
lance. Again, at my client's insistence, I made a second similar motion
at the bench during trial, explaining to Chief Judge Sirica that I was
doing so at my client's insistence that such calls had, in fact, been
made and had been electronically intercepted.
The Government again stated its total lack of knowledge of any
such activity and accordingly, no action was taken on my motion.
My actions in this regard were consistent with and occasioned by my
determination to defend my client to the best of my ability by utilizing
any and all legal and proper means. In retrospect, I must conclude
that my efforts were not, to say the least, appreciated.
With regard to opportunities presented to Mr. McCord to tell all
that he knew with regard to the Watergate operation, I state the
following :
On or about October 25, 1972, the Government conveyed to local
counsel, my local counsel, Bernard Shankman of Washington, and m}^
associate, Mr. Johnson, an offer to accept from Mr. McCord a plea
of guilty to one substantive count of the indictment and in return for
his testimony as a Government witness, a recommendation of leniency
would be made to the court. The Government indicated, however,
that it could not and would not recommend any type of sentence
which would allow Mr. McCord to remain at libert}'. This offer was
transmitted to Mr. McCord and was unequivocalh" rejected.
In November of 1972, a second plea offer was received from the
prosecutors. At this time, the offer was essentially similar to the first
offer, except that Mr. McCord would have to plead to three counts of
the indictment instead of one. The explanation for this change of
position was that the Government's case had grown considerably
stronger. This offer, which also involved Mr. McCord's testifying as a
Government witness, was related to and again rejected bv Mr.
McCord.
I advised Mr. McCord after an in camera session with Chief Judge
Sirica, during trial, that there still existed an opportunity for him to
ap])ear before the grand jur^^, even at that stage of the trial, to make
full disclosure. I have been informed that the committee has been
provided with a transcript of that in camera proceeding and I,
therefore, will not attempt to paraphrase the words of Chief Judge
Sirica, nevertheless, I relayed this information to Mr. McCord and
this third opportunity was turned down. I take the liberty of bringing
these three instances to the attention of this honorable committee
since, in my opinion, Mr. McCord, in portions of his testimon}'^ before
you on May 18, 1973, implied that I had pressured him to plead
guilty and remain silent. Senators, I state to you that this is not so and
respectfully refer you to the question asked of Mr. McCord b}^ Senator
Ervin on May 18, 1973 and I quote, Question. "Now, did your law^^er
urge you to enter a plea of guilty? I am talking about Mr. Gerald
Alch." Answer. "I do not recall that, no, sir." That portion, at least,
of Mr. McCord's testimony, is accurate.
With regard to the allegations of Mr. McCord to the effect that I
suggested that the CIA be brought into the case in a defense posture,
state the following:
As heretofore explained, I had decided to base Mr. McCord's
defense on the theory of "duress" for two basic reasons. First, it was
the only legally recognized defense that I felt was supportable; second,
more importantly, it appeared to be the factual truth, based upon
Mr. McCord's explanation of his own motive. In December of 1972,
attended one of several meetings of defense counsel, the purpose of
which was to discuss various aspects of trial strategy. I proceeded to
explain the defense that I was contemplating, duress, A discussion
ensued wherein some of the other defense attorneys reasoned that this
"security motive" and by that they were referring to my contemplated
defense of duress based on what Mr. McCord had told me, would be
applicable only to Mr. McCord in view of his position as chief of
96-296 — 73— bk. 1 20
300
security for the Committee To Re-Elect the President. In the general
discussion that followed, the question arose as to whether or not the
CIA could have been involved. It was pointed out by others, and I
emphasize by others because at this point my defense of Mr. McCord
had been formulated based upon what he had told me, and with his
concurrence, it was pointed out by others that all of the individuals
apprehended in the Watergate complex had some prior connection
with the CIA and that one of the Cuban-Americans had been in
possession of what appeared to be CIA-forged documents.
Before the meeting went on to other topics, it was agreed that each
lawyer would ask his respective client whether or not he had any
knowledge of any CIA involvement. When the meeting terminated,
I telephoned Mr. McCord at his office by prearrangement and asked
him to meet with me and local counsel, Mr. Shankman, at the Monocle
Restaurant for lunch. During lunch, which lasted for approximately
45 minutes, I asked Mr. McCord whether, to his knowledge, the CIA
was in any way involved with the Watergate venture. He did not
directl}^ respond to this specific question, but did become quite upset
at what he believed to be the antagonism of the White House against
the CIA. He cited the dismissal of Helms — of Mr. Helms, as CIA
Du'ector and the appointment of Schlesinger in his place, as an at-
tempted "hatchet job" by the administration against the CIA. He did
venture his observation that if any CIA officials were subpenaed that
they would not and could not compl}* with said subpena. Because of
the brevity of the luncheon and because of the ob\'ious need for more
detailed pretrial preparation meetings, I asked Mr. McCord to come
to Boston in a few da37^s, which he agreed to do.
On or about December 26, 1972, Mr. McCord came to Boston and
initiated our conversation by stating that the CIA was not involved
and that he would have no part of any attempt to involve that agency.
He asked that I relay this position to other defense counsel at our next
meeting, which I agreed to do, and in fact did.
I did not, after advising other defense counsel of Mr, McCord's
denial of CIA involvement, engage with other counsel in any further
conversation of any potential defense involving the CIA. At no time
did I suggest to Mr. McCord that the so-called CIA defense be utilized,
for the defense of "duress" had already been agreed upon, but I merely
asked him whether or not there was a factual basis for this contention.
Mr. McCord's allegation that I announced my ability to forge his CIA
personal records with the cooperation of then acting CIA director, Mr.
Schlesinger, is absurd and completely luitrue. I have never had the
privilege of meeting Mr. Schlesinger nor the privilege of talking with
the man. No such statement was ever made. I had no contact with the
Director of the CIA, let alone an agreement involving the forging
of documents.
My local counsel, Mr. Bernard Shankman, who was present at the
Monocle, can corroborate that I did not say that. The remainder of
my discussion with Mr. McCord in Boston was devoted to further
analysis of the "duress" defense and when the meeting ended, I told
him that I would keep in daily telephone contact with him until our
next meeting which I tentatively scheduled for the first week of
January 1973.
301
Between. December 26, 1972, and the first week of January 1973, I
attempted to contact Mr. McCord on several occasions by telephone,
but each time that I called, I was told that he was not in and my
requests for a return call were not answered. This puzzled me, for vip
to that point it was Mr. McCord's habit to return my calls immedi-
ately upon his recei^dng any message from me so to do. On or about
January 2, 1973, I received a call from local counsel, Bernard Shank-
man, who advised me that Mr. McCord had or was about to deliver a
letter to Chief Judge Sirica, dismissing me as his counsel. This was a
shock to me, for at our last meeting in my office on December 26, 1972,
we parted on a most cordial note, and in complete agreement upon
the theory of his defense. I asked Mr. Shankman to advise Mr. McCord
that I would fly into Washington on January 3, 1973, to speak with
him on this matter. I did meet with Mr. McCord after I had learned
that a letter of dismissal had, in fact, been given to Chief Judge Sirica
and that Chief Judge Sirica's position was that I was still counsel of
record and that this development would not afford a basis for a con-
tinuance. When I met Mr. McCord, he picked me up at the airport in
Washington. I expressed astonishment at liis action and asked him
why he had acted in that way. Mr. Shankman had told me that one
reason cited to him by Mr. McCord was the question regarding the
CIA defense. I brought this up to Mr. McCord and said to him in
substance, "I thought that issue was laid to rest during our last meeting
in Boston when you denied any factual involvement on the part of
the CIA." He agreed that it was, but said that was not the reason for
his letter. He claimed that I had not been maintaining sufficient con-
tact Avith him, and that he was unsure of my being adequately pre-
pared for trial. I told him that in my opinion, this was not so; that he
had the right to any lawyer of his choice and that if he wished to
dismiss me, that was his prerogative; I pointed out what I had viewed
as a most satisfactory attorney-client relationship based upon mutual
trust and confidence, and suggested that if he had any grievance with
me that he should advise me of the same, face to face, rather than re-
fusing to answer my phone calls and unilaterally, without my knowl-
edge, delivering to the judge a letter of dismissal. When I said this,
he became defensive, apologized for what he described as a "lack of
communication and misunderstanding," and expressed his desire to
maintain me as counsel. Again, he voiced his confidence in me and
extended his hand in affirmation of that confidence.
On January 8, 1973, the fii'st day of trial, I learned that Mr. Wilham
O. Bittman's client, Mr. Hunt, had offered to plead to any and all
counts of the indictment immediately prior to trial, but that Chief
Judge Sirica had said that he would not entertain any change of plea
until after jury selection and opening statements.
This appeared to me to be highly prejudicial to my client, for it
would tend to give the jury the impression that after the Govern-
ment's opening statement, one of the defendants had thrown in the
towel, so to speak, overwhelmed with the weight of the evidence
against him. I felt this could and should have been avoided by a
change of plea being resolved prior to the commencement of trial,
since this had been the request of defendant Hunt. I had told Mr.
McCord that our routine, once trial began, would be for him to spend
some time each day immediately after court with Mr. Shankman and
302
in3^self to review what had gone on that day and to discuss what was
to happen the folloAving day. I wanted to discuss with Mr. Bittman
the details of his chent's proposed change of plea in order to ascertain j
whether or not there would be a basis for a mistrial. It was agreed that
we would meet at liis office immediatelj' after court was concluded for
that day. Mr. Shankman, Mr. McCord, and I hailed a cab and at the
last minute, codefendant Barker asked if he could ride in the cab with
us. Where at that time Mr. Barker was going, or why he was going to
Mr. Bittman's office, as I eventually ascertained, 1 do not know.
There was no significant conversation with Mr. Barker in the cab.
Mr. McCord has alleged that I told him that the purpose of going to
Mr. Bittman's office was that Mr. Bittman wanted to talk with him,
Mr. McCord, about "whose word he would trust regarding a White
House offer of Executive clemency/' and that Mr. Bittman wanted to
talk to Mr. Barker as well. This is not true. I merely said to Mr.
McCord that prior to the scheduled daily post-court meeting between
he, Mr. Shankman and myself, that we would stop at Mr. Bittman's
office, for I wanted to discuss mth him the ramifications and details of
Mr. Hunt's proposed change of plea. Wlien we arrived at Mr. Bittman's
ofiice, Mr. McCord has alleged that I sensed his anger at Mr. Barker's
presence, and therefore, delayed going up to Mr. Bittman's office for
approximately 30 minutes. The simple truth is that I suggested when
we got out of the cab that we three have a cocktail and Mr. McCord,
Mr. Shankman, and I went into a restaurant directly across the street
from Mr. Bittman's office for just that purpose.
When we arrived at Mr. Bittman's office, I went with Mr. McCord
and Mr. Shankman to the firm's library and went back to Mr. Bitt-
man's office to see if he was there. I had a discussion with him, Mr.
Bittman, in which he confirmed the judge's refusal to entertain any
change of plea b}^ Mr. Hunt until after opening statements. At this
point, I recall mentioning to Mr. Bittman that I felt my client was
becoming a bit paranoid, that he felt he was being made the "patsy"
or "fall guy." I mentioned it at that time since in my mind, that
allegation made to me by Mr. McCord seemed inconsistent with
Mr. Hunt's desire to plead guilty. After I mentioned Mr. McCord's
apprehension, my recollection is that Mr. Bittman said in words or
substance, "Tell Mr. McCord he will receive a call from a friend
of his." Mr. Bittman did not mention the "White House" as alleged
b}'' Mr. McCord. The identity of this friend was not made known
to me, nor did I make inquiry in this matter. I considered the pos-
sibiHty, without actually knowing, that the purpose of this call
was to allay Mr. McCord's fears that his codefendants were turning
against him, and that the caller could very well be Mr. Bittman's
client, Mr. Hunt. This was surmised on my part. I considered this
possibility in view of the context of the conversation immediately
preceding Mr. Bittman's remark, that is, my statement in accord-
ance with Mr. McCord's request, of his apprehension with regard
to his codefendants. I subsequently told Mr. McCord just what
Mr. Bittman had told me, that he would receive a call from a friend.
I did not mention the words "the White House" because Mr. Bittman
did not mention those words to me. Mr. McCord nodded, said,
"OK" and had no further response to my statement.
Some time later, as the trial was in progress, Mr. McCord told me
that he had been in contact with a man by the name of Caldwell.
303
rhat is how I remember it as he told me. He specifically stated
that he did not wish to tell me who this man was or the subject
Qiatter of his conversation with him. In response, I told Mr. McCord
that that was his prerogative. In this regard, I respectfully invite
the attention of this honorable committee to Mr. McCord 's letter to
Chief Judge Sirica of March 19, 1973, of which I had no i)rior knowl-
3dge. I respectfully refer to the next to the last paragraph on page 2
of this letter and I have provided copies of this letter to this honorable
ommittee, where, after alleging complaints of various topics, in-
cluding, but not limited to, allegations of political pressure applied
to the defendants to plead guilty and remain silent, Mr. McCord in
the second to last paragraph on page 2 stated — and this letter was
vVTittcii without my knowledge, and I quote :
"I have not discussed the above with my attorneys as a matter of
protection for them."
Mr. McCord has alleged that the subject of Executive clemency was
discussed on this day, January 8, 1973. This is not true. In late 1972,
during one of the pretrial meetings of defense lawyers in Washington,
I had an occasion to say to Mr. Bittman, ''Bill, what do you think
our clients will receive as a sentence should they be convicted?"
Mr. Bittman responded in substance, as if he were theorizing, "You
can never tell, Christmastime rolls around and there could be Ex-
ecutive clemency." I scoffed at this notion and told Mr. Bittman that
m my opinion, the President would not touch this case with a 10-foot
pole, let alone exercise Executive clemency. This subject had not been
on any agenda, but arose in what I characterize as "lawyers' talk."
Subsequently, but not on the same day, I mentioned this to Mr.
McCord in a most skeptic manner, and said to him, "Jim, it can be
Christmas, Easter, and Thanksgiving all rolled into one, but in my
opinion, the President would not touch this with a 10-foot pole, so do
not rely on any prospect of Executive clemency."
]\Ir. McCord laughed and agreed with me. That was the only
occasion that the words "Executive clemency" were ever mentioned
by me to my client. I have neither met John Dean nor spoken to him
in mv life. I have neither met John Caulfield nor spoken to him in my
life. '
During the trial, I presented to Chief Judge Sirica my contemplated
defense theory of "duress" supported by a memorandum of law.
Several days later, after receiving a written response from the Govern-
ment, the court ruled as a matter of law that this defense did not
apply to this case, thereby precluding me from presenting evidence
in support thereof and from relying upon it in closing argument.
After opening statements, Mr. Hunt and the four others — the four
Cuban- Americans — pleaded guilty at which time I filed a motion for
mistrial, which was denied.
Wlien this happened, I explamed to Mr. McCord that the only
possible remaining defense was the general defense of "lack of criminal
intent" but advised him that in my opinion, it had little or no legal
merit for it was asking the jury to believe that he did not know he was
breaking the law when he broke into the Watergate complex and that
this, to^say the least, was not very "salable". Mr. McCord indicated
his understanding of our position, told me that he was, nevertheless,
most pleased with my exerting my best efforts with regard to the
proposed theory of "duress" and asked whether or not the judge's
304
ruling could be a point of appeal in the event of conviction. I told him
that it could and would be, that the record had been made in that re-
gard, and he indicated his complete satisfaction with the then existing
situation.
As the trial approached the completion of the Government's case,
I conferred with Mr. McCord at one of our daily post-trial meetings
and told him that a decision would have to be made regarding whether
or not he would take the stand. I explained to him that if he elected
to testify, it would be his obligation to answer any and all relevant
questions. It was at this time that Mr. McCord told me that he had
evidence to the effect that the Watergate operation had been approved
by John Mitchell. I asked him the nature of the evidence and he told
me he had been so advised by Mr. Liddy. I asked him if he had anj
other corroborative evidence and he told me he did not. I told hiir
that although this was technically hearsay, it would be admissibk
as a declaration by one coconspirator to another and told him tc
understand beyond any doubt, that should he take the stand, thai
question would in my opioion be asked and an answer required. ]
told him that if he elected to take the stand, full disclosure would b(
necessary; that I was with him all the way, but that this crucia
decision of whether or not to testify could only be his, I did advis<
him, however, to resolve this question as soon as possible and no
advise me of his decision at the last minute, thereby precluding
adequate time for preparation of direct and cross-examination.
As the trial progressed and the time for decision was at hand, Mr
McCord asked me what I thought the grounds of appeal would be ii
the event of conviction. I reviewed them with him mentioning sucl
things as the court's denial of my motions for mistrial, based upon tin
timing of the change of plea by his five codefendants, as well as th'
ruling by Chief Judge Sirica precluding the defense of "duress". Hi
told me that he had decided not to testifj^. I asked him if he had an^
reservations regarding that decision and he said he did not.
As the jury announced its verdict, I immediately asked the chie
judge to be heard on the matterof bail, which request was denied. Th(
court advised that the motion be put in writing so as to allow th(
Government to respond. I immediately set to work upon this, urgec
the prosecution to respond as quickly as possible and, several days
later, a hearing was held, at which time bail was set at $100,000.
What 1 am now about to relate is not for the purpose of self-com-
mendation, but is stated to show and emphasize the relationship that
existed between Mr. McCord and 1 from the begmning to the end ol
the trial. There was not a day of trial that passed without Mr. McCoro
shaking my hand at the end of each day and telling me what a superlai \^
tive job I had done. He used adjectives such as "terrific," "outstand-i j,
ing," and expressed his total and unequivocal satisfaction and appre-i i,
ciation for my efforts. I remember the day of final argument when
present in the courtroom were Mr. McCord's wife, his son, his
daughter, and his parents. After my final argument, they all came up
to me and profusely thanked me for the words 1 had uttered on Mr:
McCord's behalf. They said they were proud of my description of
Mr. McCord and that they were "thrilled to sit there and hear it.'*
Mrs. McCord had previously told me of her anxiety over what the
effects of the trial might have on her son who was a student at the
305
Air Force Academy. On the day of the final argument, she asked if I
30uld obtain for her a copy of the argument so that she could give it
to her son. When the jury announced its verdict of guilty, Mr. Mc-
Cord turned to me, he extended his hand and said, "There is no one
bhat could have done a better job than you did. You are a terrific
lawyer and I shall always be grateful to you." It was, to me, an
emotional moment. My local counsel, Mr. Shankman, can be a
writness to this.
To further demonstrate the status of my relationship with my
3lient, I have provided this honorable committee with a copy of my
better to Mr. McCord dated February 6, 1973, while he was incarcer-
ated at the District of Columbia jail. 1 specifically refer the attention
3f this honorable committee to the third paragraph of that letter
Which reads as follows, this is my letter to Mr. McCord: ''I again
'eiterate to you that I shall continue to do everything possible on
7our behalf and shall stay with you in all that may lie ahead. Having
1 client convicted can never be a source of gratification to an attorney.
[ will, however, always remember your vote of confidence in me before,
iuring, and after trial."
I immediately commenced my efforts to effectuate Mr. McCord's
'elease on bail. The record will reflect that a petition to reduce the
3ail set by Chief Judge Sirica was filed in the Court of Appeals for
:he District of Columbia at the earliest possible time. I made several
visits to Mr. McCord in the District of Columbia jail. I remember his
expressing dissatisfaction at being placed in a maximum security area.
I immediately spoke to the prison superintendant and asked if any-
thmg could be done. No commitment was made, but 1 was told that
ny request would be given every consideration. 1 remember that
approximately a week after the trial ended, my wife and I went on a
i-day vacation to Jamaica and even then, I made at least one, if not
two, daily phone calls to Mrs. McCord on the question of bail. My
3oncem. was to effectuate the release of my cUent as soon as possible.
I recall my first visit to Mr. McCord at the jail. When he first saw
me, he was approximately 20 feet away. He broke out into a wide
amile, extended his hand and accelerated his pace. He told me how
?lad he was to see me so that he might again express his gratitude for
□ay efforts in his behalf. I told him of my immediate appellate action
regarding bail and of my daily telephonic contact with his wife, and he
thanked me profusely. I remember him telling me how fortunate he
felt to have me working so hard as his attorney and he again re-
emphasized his belief that my job for him was beyond reproach.
He told me that his wife was contacting friends with regard to bail,
but he specifically asked that I call a man by the name of Bernard
Fensterwald, whom he said might be very helpful in raising bail. This
was the first time I had heard the name. I did not ask who this man
was, or what his relationship to Mr. McCord was, merely made note
of his name and telephone number and called him from the pay phone
at the jail, immediately after leaving Mr. McCord.
I introduced myself as Mr. McCord's attorney and told Mr. Fen-
sterwald the purpose of my call. He told me that he thought he could
arrange to meet the bail requirements within a matter of days; that
he had friends with whom he was in contact; that these friends stated
306 '
that things "looked good" and that I should stay in daily contact
with him.
I immediately related this hopeful news to Mrs. McCord and she
was understandably overjoyed at the prospect of her husband's
imminent release. Daily phone calls were made to Mr. Fensterwald.
I was not always able to reach him directly, but when I did, he would
tell me that his friends were still working on it and to keep in daily
contact. Several days passed. The word from Mr. Fensterwald was
still inconclusive, that is, he was still waiting word from other people.
Then, during one of my telephone calls, he told me that these other
contacts had fallen through, but that he was ready, willing, and able
to personally borrow the full amount of $100,000 and that he could do
so by "just going do^vn to the bank and signing the note." He told me
that his motive for so acting was that he was "outraged" at the high
bond set by Chief Judge Sirica and felt this to be a gross injustice,
which he was taking upon himself to rectify.
This was, I believe, in February of 1973. I told him I would call
him the following day. When I did so, he told me that he had been
refused by the bank, but that he was looking to another source for
funds. He did not specify, nor did I ask the identity of the source. He
did tell me, however, to ascertain from Mrs. McCord, how much she
could raise through friends and relatives so that he could attempt to
come up with the balance.
I again visited Mr. McCord and advised him of the progress. He
had been in jail some 2 weeks now, and I sensed his anxiety was
increasing. He told me that when I spoke to Mr. Fensterwald again, I
was to be sure to relate to him his — Mr. McCord's — gratitude. I left
Mr. McCord, went to the phone booth in the jail, called Mr. Fenster-
wald, and related McCord's thanks. Mr, Fensterwald's reply was, and
I quote, "I don't see how he can send his thanks to me because I never
even met the man." This seemed unusual to me, to say the least, that a
man would be doing what Mr. Fensterwald said he was trj^ing to do
for someone he had never met, but I was not about to look a gift horse
in the mouth. My sole concern was for m}^ client, and my immediate
objective was to effectuate his release on bail. Mrs. McCord subse-
quenth^ advised that she was able to raise $60,000. 1 related this to Mr.
Fensterwald who said he would be able to produce the remaining
$40,000. This was shortl}'- thereafter accomplished, and Mr. McCord
was out on bail awaiting sentencing.
In the following days, I was involved with legal commitments which
took me out of Boston, but kept in telephonic touch mth Mr. McCord.
Our relationship remained most cordial. Wlien the date of sentencing
arrived, I was engaged in trial in Federal court in Chicago, 111., before
the Honorable Judge Hoffman. I asked for and received permission to
adjourn the trial for the day of sentencing, so that I might be present
with ]Mr. McCord in court.
This was the day when Chief Judge Sirica read in open court Mr.
McCord's letter of March 19, 1973, of which I had no prior knowledge.
When Chief Judge Sirica called a 20-minute recess immediately
following his reading of the letter, I sat with Mr. McCord at the coun-
sel table and asked him why he had not informed me of his intentions. .
He apologized for so doing atid again repeated that he had not advised
me of his allegations in the letter as a matter of my own protection. I
asked him what he wanted me to do. He told me he wished to speak
307
privately, with me being present, to Chief Judge Sirica regarding the
allegations of his letter, and asked that I advise the court of this
request.
During this conversation, a man approached Mr. McCord and said
in what I can best describe as a whispered or hushed manner, "If
you need an office, you can use mine right after court." Mr. McCord
nodded, and I asked Mr. McCord who this man was. Mr. McCord
identified the individual and introduced him to me as Bernard Fenster-
wald. This was the first time I had met the man with whom I had had
so much telephone contact pertaining to bail. Mr. McCord said to
Mr, Fensterwald, in my presence, "The one thing I feel sorry about
is keeping Gerry in the dark and pulling this on him." Mr. Fenster-
wald replied, "Sorry hell, let it all hang out."
When court reconvened, I related to the chief judge Mr. McCord's
request, which at that time was granted, and an in camera meeting
was tentatively set up for the following week. I naturally was em-
barrassed at not having been advised by my client as to so crucial
and dramatic a move — I'm talking about the letter to Chief Judge
Sirica — but reasoned to myself that, after all, I had been away, en-
gaged in trial, and Mr. McCord's apology seemed most sincere, and
I, therefore, chose not to make an issue out of this failure of
communication.
This, I recall, was on a Friday. It was on that day that Mr. Samuel
Dash, of the Senate Select Committee, came to me, introduced himself,
and asked if he could converse with Mr. McCord or said that he was
interested in doing so. I told him that it was Mr. McCord's immediate
request to speak with Judge Sirica, and that I would be happy to
relay to Mr. McCord Mr. Dash's request. I then resumed my Chicago
trial and in the newspapers read that Mr. McCord had begun to con-
fer with Senate investigators. I found out about it that way, reading
it in the newspapers.
Subsequently, Mr. McCord called me and said that since I was
away on trial and that since things were "breaking so quickly," didn't
I think it was a good idea for him to retain local Washington counsel.
I said, yes, I thought it was a good idea. He asked me if I had any
objection to Mr. Fensterwald, I said I had none, and Mr. McCord
advised me this would be done.
My next contact with Mr. McCord was when he and I and Mr.
Fensterwald met the night before our last court appearance before
Chief Judge Sirica at which time in court that da}^, the sentencing
was continued until June 16, 1973. Mr. McCord was extremely upset
over what he believed to be unfair newspaper coverage of his dis-
closures. He kept smashing his fist on my suitcase. At this point, Mr.
Fensterwald said to Mr. McCord, "The reporters have been asking
me whether or not you or I had ever had any past relationship. I
told them that we had." This was Mr. Fensterwald speaking. At this
point, Mr. McCord looked up with a surprised expression. Mr. Fenster-
wald said, "Well, after all, you have in the past submitted to me checks
which were donations to the Committee for the Investigation of the
Assassination of the President." Mr. McCord smiled and said, "Oh,
yes, that's right."
Prior to the court appearance of the following morning, at a meeting
at Mr. Fenstenvald's office, it was agreed that since mj immediate
3dS
trial schedule called for me to remain in Chicago for an anticipated
period of 6 to 8 weeks, that Mr. Fensterwald would continue to
represent Mr. McCord in my absence, both in the criminal matter
and in all hearings before the grand jury and this honorable committee
but that upon the completion of my trial duties, 1 would again assume
my role as counsel in all matters. That morning, in court, 1 asked for
and received a continuance of sentencing to June 15, 1973. I advised
the court of Mr. McCord's desire to cooperate fully with both the
grand jury and Senate committee, and further advised of Mr. McCord's
preference to first testifying before the Senate committee. When court
was over, 1 said to both Air. McCord and Mr. Fensterwald that I
would be happy to continue my representation of Mr. McCord, but
asked that in the future, as long as I continued in that capacity, I at
least be given the courtesy of being kept abreast of Mr. McCord's
activities, so that I would not again be embarrassed.
Both Mr. McCord and Mr. Fensterwald agreed that this was proper,
Mr. McCord agam apologized to me and Mr. Fensterwald told me
that he would call me "wherever I was every day," even if he had
nothing to tell me. The meeting ended with all of us shaking hands,
and 1 flew out of town. I have not seen either Mr. McCord or Mr.
Fensterwald since that time.
Subsequently, while I was still on trial in Chicago, I did receive
several phone calls from Mr. Fensterwald, although not daily as he
had promised, and I might add, although not reflected in the memoran-
dum, for the sake of accuracy, some of these calls I received when I
was stajdng at the Holiday Inn on Lake Shore Drive in Chicago.
Another of these calls I received when I was staying at the Sheraton
Hotel in Chicago.
In one of these conversations, he said to me — this is Mr. Fenster-
wald talking — "what do you think of all that is going on?" referring
to the disclosures being made by Mr. McCord to this honorable
committee. I replied, "Whatever is right for Jim McCord is all right
with me," Mr. Fensterwald replied, and I quote, "We're going after
the President of the United States." I replied that I was not interested
in any vendettas against the President but only in the best interest
of my client, to which Mr. Fensterwald replied, "Well, you'll see,
that's who we're going after, the President."
I might add at this point. Senators, although it is not contained
in the memorandum, an investigator from my oflBce was in my hotel
room when this conversation took place. And I recall putting the phone
dowm and turning to my investigator, whose name is John McNally
and said to him, "You will never believe what I just heard on the
telephone," and I told him.
His response to me was "Too bad you didn't have that recorded."
During another telephone conversation with Mr. Fensterwald,
he stated that he was most displeased with the reaction of the Republi-
can members of this honorable committee, to Mr. McCord's submitted
memorandum and further stated that "I'll submit memorandums but
I don't want the Republicans to see them."
During a third telephone conversation, he advised of Mr. McCord's
intention to hold a national press conference. I replied that in my
opinion, this would demean Mr. McCord's position and that he should
stay within the framework of both the grand jury and the Select
Committee. I further stated that to hold such a press conference
309
could conceivably antagonize Chief Judge Sirica. Mr. Fensterwald
replied that he would attempt to obtain approval of such a press
conference from Senator Ervin, and that if such approval was ob-
tained, this would be presented as a mitigating factor in the event of
Chief Judge Sirica's displeasure.
Subsequently, my contact with Mr. McCord and Mr. Fensterwald
diminished and I immediately, after the completion of my Chicago
Federal case, commenced a 5-week murder trial in Cook County,
Chicago. On May 8, 1973, my secretary gave me a message reflecting
a call from the Los Angeles Times from a reporter Avhose name I
recall to be Jackson, in regard to a four-page memorandum of Mr.
McCord, involving the CIA that was about to be published the
follo^\ing morning. I called Mr. McCord that night, was told by his
wife that he was not in, and I left a message for him to call me. He
never did. The following day, the New York Times pubhshed a
memorandum by Mr. McCord, alleging that I had stated that I
could obtain forged CIA documents with the cooperation of the
Director of the CIA. I again called Mr. McCord and his wife told me
that he was at a meeting and that she would once again relay my
message to him, but he never called.
At approximately 5:30 p.m. on May 8, 1973, I contacted Mr. Fen-
sterwald by telephone and asked him to explain these false allegations
made by Mr. McCord. Mr. Fensterwald stated, "I can only hazard
the guess that it is the result of Mr. McCord's faulty recollection."
He added, "I can tell you one thing, it's a terrible cliche, but I think
you will agree with it, that there is no zealot like a convert." I have
had no further contact from Mr. McCord.
Mr. McCord has accused me of exerting pressure upon him, but
I respectfully request this honorable committee to take note of the
following facts :
1. Mr. McCord did not plead guilty.
2. He admitted, under oath, in response to a question put to him
by Senator Ervin, that I never urged him to enter a plea of guilty.
3. In his letter of March 19, 1973, to Chief Judge Sirica, in referring
to his allegations of improprieties, including but not Hmited to political
pressure, stated, and I quote: "I have not discussed the above with
my attorneys as a matter of protection for them."
4. Mr. McCord proceeded to trial with a defense based upon what
he told me to be the truth.
I have done nothing wrong and am, therefore, not afraid, but I am
upset as a practicing criminal trial lawyer. I must confess that I am
the type of criminal defense attorney who, rightly or wrongly, gets
emotionally involved with his cUent's cause. I remain fully cognizant
of the fact that a man's Uberty is at stake, rather than a determination
of dollars and cents. I ask my cUent to take me into his confidence
and I reciprocate. I keep him constantly advised of my thoughts and
theories. To me, this attitude of complete disclosure is based upon my
interpretation of the duty I owe to the man that I am defending. How
can a lawyer eft'ectively represent his cUent when faced with the pos-
sibihty that the man for whom he is working night and day is con-
stantly making a record of privileged conversations with the intent
of subsequently violating this privilege by making false accusations
and by selectively extracting statements out of context and twisting
them into untruths?
Can a defense attorney function properly under such circum-
stances? I have always made a practice not to comment on matters
of wliich I have no knowledge. Mr. McCord has made accusations
directed toward many men. I am in no position to judge his credibiUty
in that regard. I do, however, have firsthand knowledge of his relation-
ship with me, and in regard to his accusations against me, he is nat
telUng the truth.
As I watched Mr. McCord on national television on May 18, 1973^
and listened to him falsely accuse me of professional misconduct,
which accusations are false in every respect, I immediately and vividly
recalled his praise for me throughout the trial, his confidence expressed:
to me at the time of the guilty verdict, and his further expression of
gratitude during the period of his incarceration, and I asked myself
"What kind of a man is this?"
I stand ready to answer all questions.
Senator Ervin. We have to vote in just a few minutes on the nom-
ination of Mr. Richardson to be Attorney General, and this is a long
statement and I think the comanittee, as I understand it, thinks it
would be better to adjourn now and come back in the morning to
begin the questions, so we will stand in recess until 10 o'clock in the
morning.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Thursday, May 24, 1973.]
k
THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington, D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room
518, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
nan), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
jrurney, and Weicker.
Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel; Fred D. Thompson,
ninority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief counsel; Arthur
Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; David M. Dorsen,
Tames Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsels;
3arry Schochet, assistant majority counsel; Donald G. Sanders,
i. William Shure, and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels;
foan C. Cole, secretary to the minority; Pauline O. Dement, research
issistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert Baca,
)ffice of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to vSenator Weicker; Marc Lackritz,
Ron Rotunda, assistant counsels; Eugene Boyce, hearings counsel;
John Walz, publications clerk.
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
The committee has had a meeting this morning and decided to hold
learings in addition to those previously scheduled for the 12th, 13th,
md 14th of June, to hold hearings on the 5th, that is Tuesday, the 5th
iay of June, Wednesday, the 6th day of June, and Thursday, the 7th
3f June.
The committee has received requests from Mr. McCord and Mr.
Fensterwald for an opportunity to be heard before the committee.
The committee is going to pursue the list of its scheduled witnesses.
The committee will extend to Mr. McCord and Mr. Fensterwald an
Dpportunity to furnish statements in writing of what they Avish to
testify to, under oath, under sworn statements, affidavits, and also
^ve them an opportunity to meet with the staff and see what it is
they want to testify. But the committee does not intend to get bogged
3own with the controversy between lawyers neither of whom, accord-
ing to the evidence before the full committee, have any personal knowl-
edge of the matters that the committee is investigating, except insofar
as they gained it through the trial. So we will proceed at this time on
the assumption that if Mr. Fensterwald and Mr. McCord wish to tes-
tify further before the committee they will first give us a sworn state-
ment of what they propose to testify to and consult with the staff. We
5ee no reason to put Mr. McCord on the stand to repeat anything he
has already said before, and we see no reason to try to decide a contro-
versy between the two lawyers with respect to their personal conversa-
tions at this time, and we will proceed with any further questioning.
(311)
312
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I might say
I entirely concur with the statement that the chairman has made
I think it would not serve the purpose of moving these hearings witt
expedition to get into rebuttal, surrebuttal and rerebuttal. I do think
that it is important that the rights and the reputation of every witness
be protected. Therefore, I am dehghted that the staff will conduct
a further interview with Mr. McCord and will now interview Mr
Fensterwald in order to advise this committee on the desirabihty o
having them as witnesses under oath at a later time but I think W(
ought to proceed and I am happy to concur in the statement of tht
chairman that we should proceed with the ordinary witness list an(
I am especially pleased that in the interest of reaching the facts a;
soon as possible that we are going to have this extra session so that wi
can proceed quickly.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, just one further comment. Mr. Fen
sterwald did inform me just before the committee convened he woulc
immediately after Mr. Alch's testimony file a sworn statement witl
the committee.
Now, Mr. Alch
TESTIMONY OF GERALD ALCH, ATTORNEY— Eesumed
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Could you again tell us, you indicated what fee yoi
received from Mr. McCord. What was that fee?
Mr. Alch. $25,000 plus expenses which expenses have not beei
received yet.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Could you tell us in what form you received that money?
Mr. Alch. Periodic payments in cash with the exception of the las
two installments which were in the form of cashier's checks in rela
tively smaller amounts of $1,700. The bulk of the money received wa
in cash in $100 bills.
Mr. Dash. $100 bills.
Did you have any knowledge or information or belief as to whert
the money was coming from?
Mr. Alch. No, sir, and I believe that in one of Mr. McCord'
depositions he stated that at the time he paid me my fee he did no
tell me where it came from except that it came from him.
Mr. Dash. Did you in October 1972 ever meet with Mr. McCorc
and urge him to urge the Committee To Re-Elect the President to
give him more money so that you may have more additional fee?
Mr. Alch. No, sir. There was a conversation where, as I explaineo
yesterday, the original payment of fees, the schedule of the originaj
payment of fees was not being adhered to by Mr. McCord, and 1
asked him whether or not, when I might expect more money in accord
ance with the schedule that he had told me. He told me that, to beai|'
with him, that it would be forthcoming, and I told him that I would
Mr. Dash. Now, it was obvious, Mr. Alch, from the length of youi
statement, and the manner in which you delivered it, that you were
quite upset with your former client's statement.
J-;; ;
313
What I would first like to do, and I think it would be helpful to
isolate the specific statements made by Mr. McCord which you find
and did find objectionable, and correct me if there are additional ones
but I think there are two main areas that I have isolated in his state-
ment and your statement.
One, his statement in his memorandum of Maj' 4, 1973, that on two
occasions, one in the Monocle Kestaurant, and another time in Boston
that you suggested that he base his defense on CIA involvement, and
in that the reference to what you might be able to do with Mr. Schles-
inger in terms of forged documents and things of that nature.
The second area of complaint is his statement that you participated
in having him exposed to an offer of Executive clemency. These appear
to me to be the two main areas of his statement which I think you find
objectionable and that was covered by your statement.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Right.
Now, as to Mr. McCord's first complaint that you suggested he use
CIA involvement as a defense, it is true, is it not, that the question, at
least of CIA involvement, was the subject of discussion between you
and Mr. McCord on two occasions in December, one at the Monocle
Restaurant and another time in your office in Boston?
Mr. Alch. Wliy, this way, Mr. Dash. I specifically asked him whether
or not there was any factual basis to the contention that the CIA was
involved.
Mr. Dash. Yes. But there was that discussion. You did raise that?
Mr. Alch. I said it just that way.
Mr. Dash. Right.
Did you on either occasion show Mr. McCord a statement from a
D.C. police ofiicer, Gary Bittenbender, indicating that Mr. McCord
told Bittenbender that Watergate was a CIA operation?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir. That statement had been provided to me pursu-
ant to my discovery motions filed in the case by the Government.lt
was a report in which it quoted a D.C. policeman, Mr. Bittenbender,
by name, as saying that at the time of Mr. IMcCord's arrest, I believe
at the District of Columbia jail, Mr. McCord said, referring to the
other four men who had been arrested with him, "These are all good
men, ex-CIA men." I naturally called that to my client's attention
because there loomed a distinct possibility that that statement might
be introduced against him at trial. In fact, it was not.
Mr. Dash. All right. Now, Mr. Alch, in the statement that you
submitted to the committee, as you read it, that was not included in
that statement; is that true?
Mr. Alch. It was not, sir.
Mr. Dash. There is no reference to your mentioning to Mr. McCord
that you did have that statement from officer Bittenbender?
Mr. Alch. It was not, sir. I believe I mentioned it when I met with
you the night before my testimony.
Mr. Dash. That is true; but is there any reason why that was left
out of your statement?
Mr. Alch. No, sir,
Mr. Dash. Did you ever mention during either of the two meetings
at the Monocle Restaurant and in your office in Boston when you asked
Mr. McCord about the CIA involvement, the name Victor Marchetti,
who might be a witness on CIA trainmg?
314
Mr. Alch. I did mention the name Victor Marchetti, not in the con-
text of his being a witness. It came up this way: In the course of dis-
cussing Mr. McCord's background with the CIA, I mentioned to him
that I had recently heard that a man by that name had come out with a
book about the CIA. I mentioned that to Mr. McCord. He said to me
words to the effect that Mr. Marchetti was not in good grace with the
CIA or any ex-members of the CIA. He said he did not think highly of
the man and that was the extent of the conversation.
Mr. Dash. Did you know Mr. Marchetti at all?
Mr. Alch. Never met the man in my life.
Mr. Dash. Was there an}^ discussion as to whether Mr. Marchetti
would be a good witness on CIA training to indicate that CIA men
are trained to disavow any relationship with the CIA?
Mr. Alch. There was a discussion with Mr. McCord with regard
to his background with the CIA. In that context, I mentioned to
him whether or not Mr. Marchetti's book might be a good reference
point. He said it would not be.
Mr. Dash. Now, after your meeting of December 1972 at the
Monocle Restaurant with Mr. McCord, did you call your partner,
Mr. Bailey, and raise the question of the CIA defense?
Mr. Alch. I did.
Mr. Dash. What was the nature of that call and what did Mr.
Bailey have to say?
Mr. Alch. I would constantly keep Mr. Bailey advised of the
development of all cases that I was working on. In the course of my
conversation, and this conversation took place after the meeting
at the Monocle but prior to my meeting with Mr. McCord in Boston,
I told him of the conversation that had taken place in the lawyer's
office and told him that I had asked Mr. McCord whether or not
there was any factual basis to the CIA involvement. As I told you
yesterday, Mr. McCord did not specifically respond to that question.
It was my impression that that topic was going to be raised at our
next meetmg in Boston.
Mr. Bailey told me that unless Mr. McCord or anyone else could
come up with any factual evidence of any CIA involvement, that if
Mr. McCord wished to pursue that defense without any such factual
evidence, that I was to withdraw from the case and that I was to
tell that to Mr. McCord.
When Mr. McCord met with me in Boston at our next meeting,
he initiated the conversation by saying to me, there is no CIA in-
volvement and I will have no part of anything that is going to put
the blame on the CIA. That rendered my withdrawal direction from
Mr. Bailey moot.
Mr. Dash. Right, but that was a significant discussion with Mr.
Bailey, was it not, concerning the CIA involvement, or the defense
of the CIA involvement?
Mr. Alch. I would not say it was significant in the sense that I
keep Mr. Bailey advised of all cases which I am involved in and which
he is not involved in. He is the head of the office and his policy is
that I let him know what I am doing all the time.
Mr. Dash. But it did raise the possibility of Mr. Bailey's sugges-
tions to you that you mi^ht withdraw from the case if it was put?
Mr. Alch. That was his suggestion to me. If there was no such
defense rendered, fine.
315
Mr. Dash. But that was not put forth in 3'oiir discussion with the
committee?
Mr. Alch. It was not.
Mr. Dash. In j^our statement on page 10, you sa,y during the
meeting with defendants in December, and prior to your Monocle
meeting with Mr. McCord, "The question arose as to whether the
CIA was involved."
Would you tell us how the question arose, who raised it?
Mr. Alch. This was at the meeting in Mr. Bittman's office attended
by the lawyers?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Alch. It was at that point that I wanted to announce to my — ■
to the other defense counsel, what my contemplated defense would be.
I did so. I told them that I was contemplating the defense of duress
based upon what my client had told me. The reaction seemed to be
that this would only be applicable to Mr. McCord in view of his being
chief of security and that this particular defense could not inure to the
benefit or could not be utilized b}' any other defendant. My response
was, well, that is ni}^ contemplated defense; that is what I am going
forward on.
It was at that point that the question was raised of whether or not
there was any CIA involvement.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you know how that question was raised? Who
raised it?
Mr. Alch. I am not sure. It may have been Mr. Bittman. I cannot
be positive. That is a possibility. But may I stress that when it was
raised, it was raised in this tj^pe of wa}^: Is there any CIA involvement
in this thing? And at that point, it was pointed out, the fact that all
defendants had some prior connection with the CIA and at least one
of them had been found Avith documents which purported to be or
were alleged to be forged CIA credentials.
Mr. Dash. Then, as I understand from j^our statement, each of you
were going to contact your clients and ask that question of them?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, were 3'ou aware, Mr. Alch, of every contact that
may have been made with your client by others who may have sug-
gested the defense of CIA involvement to them?
Mr. Alch. No, sir. I only knew what he told me.
Mr. Dash. Therefore, an}^ pressure that could have been visited
upon Mr. McCord, you might not have been aware of, is that correct?
Mr. Alch. Entirely. As I pointed out yesterday, Mr. Dash, I do
not come before this honorable committee to offer any judgment or
opinion on allegations of Mr. McCord which pertain to activity not
involving me. I do not know about those things. I came here to refute
what he said about me.
Mr. Dash. Now, for example, are you aware that in December,
which is the very month you raised the question of CIA involvement
with McCord, that Mr.'^ McCord sent Mr. John Caulfield a note
complaining of a Wliite House effort to blame the CIA for Watergate
and threatening "That all the trees in the forest would fall if this
effort continued."
Were you aware of this?
Mr. Alch. I was not.
96-296 — 73— bk. 1 21
316
Mr. Dash. So il is no fiction, reall}^, that Mr. McCord was deeply
concerned over what he beheved was a conspii'acy to have him
imphcate the CIA in the Watergate case?
]\Ir. Alch. I have no knowledge to contradict that statement by
Mr. McCord.
Mr. Dash. Actually, according to A'our own statement, when you
first raised the CIA involvement with Mr. ]\lcCord in the Monocle
Restaurant, you said he did not really respond to it, but launched
into a complaint about how the White House was treating the CIA.
I think that was your statement.
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Therefore, Mr. Alch, when 3"ou raised the question of
CIA involvement with him for the very first time after the meeting
with I\lr. Bittman and the other lawyers, it is likely, is it not, taking
into consideration the entire circumstances of Mr. ]\IcCord's concern,
that Mr. McCord could have concluded that you had joined in the
conspirac}^ he honestly believed existed to blame the CIA in the
Watergate case?
Air. Alch. In my judgement, that would be giving him the benefit
of a doubt to which I do not believe he is entitled, for this reason:
I suppose, hypothetically speaking, that it is possible for a man to
misinterpret a question put to him as to whether or not the CIA was
involved on the one hand, and a suggestion that it was on the other.
That is a point of discrepancy, in answer to a hypothetical question,
could possibly be the subject of a misinterpretation.
However, on his allegation that I said to him words to the effect
that I could cause his personnel records to be doctored and that the
Director of the CIA would go along with it, it escapes me how that
type of allegation can be a misunderstanding. I did not saj^ it. You
can't infer words of that nature unless they were said and I did not
say it. And most fortunately, there was a third person present at this
meeting.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Let us move now to the next area of complaint. That is Mr.
McCord's indication or implication of you that you participated in
having him exposed to the pressures to accept an offer of Executive
clemenc}'.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, it is true, is it not, that you might have also been
not aware of pressures from other sources or from Mr. Hunt or of any
contacts from the Committee for the lie-Election of the President or
the White House, concerning Executive clemency, and therefore, might
not have been aware of all that might have been going on concernmg
the CIA?
Mr. Alch. That is true. I may not have been aware of it because
I had no knoAvledge of that if it, in fact, happened.
Mr. Dash. Now, were you, for example, aware that Mr. Hunt may
have been in frequent contact with the Committee for the Re-Eiection
of the President officials or White House officials?
Mr. Alch. I was not. I rarely saw Mr. Hunt and, as you know^
when the trial started and his plea of guilty w^as accepted by Chie"
Judge Sirica, he was out of it.
Mr. Dash. It is true, though, is it not, that you did go to the office
of Mr. Bittman, Mr. Hunt's lawyer, with Mr. McCord on Januar}' 8^
the first day of the trial?
317
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Then you had a private meeting with Mr. Bittman
while Air. McCorcl was in another part of the office?
Mr. Alch. I had a meeting with Mr. Bittman, a discussion with
Mr. Bittman. I hesitate to call it a private meeting because, as I
explained yesterdaj^, we walked into the office, came into the library
of the office where other lawyers were seated. Mr. Bittman was not
there. I walked back to his office to see if he was there. He was.
Mr. Dash. Was anybodj^^ else in the office?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. So you were alone with Mr. Bittman?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. In j^our statement j^ou acknowledge that Mr. McCord
was incensed, and I think in your words "paranoid," because he be-
lieved other defendants, including Bittman's client Hunt, were trying
to make him the fall guy.
Did 3^ou think or did you not think that you were onh" adding to
his concern by meeting with Mr. Bittman alone, not in Mr. McCord's
presence?
Mr. Alch. No, because I had told Mr. McCord wh}^ I was going to
Mr. Bittman's office instead of immediately going back to my hotel
where it was arranged that each day after trial he, I and local counsel
would meet to discuss what had happened that day and was gomg to
happen the next day. I told him wh3=^ I wanted to speak with Mr.
Bittman. I wanted to find out the ramifications of the proposed change
of plea by Mr. Bittman's client, Mr. Hunt, which I felt could possibly
be the predicate for a motion for a mistrial which I eventually filed.
Mr. Dash. How long did that meeting with Bittman last?
Mr. Alch. Approximately 15 minutes at the most, maybe less.
Mr. Dash. And after that meeting or at the conclusion of it I
understand from j^our statement that Mr. Bittman told 3'ou to tell
Mr. McCord that he would receive a telephone call from a friend that
night?
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Did you ask Mr. Bittman who would call your client or
what the message would be?
Mr. Alch. I did not.
Mr. Dash. Why not?
Mr. Alch, I felt it was of no importance to me. I surmised in my
mind that this call was in connection mth Mr. McCord's fears that his
codefendants were plotting against him. If I had to guess that who I
thought was going to call I thought it may have com^e from Mr.
Bittman's client, ]Mr. Hunt.
In any event, the remark was made as I was walking out of the office
and I had said OK, went back to the librar}^ and relaved that message
to Mr. McCord.
Mr. Dash. You did relay that message to Mr. McCord that he
would get a call that night?
Mr. Alch. No, not that night, I just said "Mr. Bittman said you
would be getting a call from a friend," and I also told Mr. McCord, I
said, 'T went in there and told him at your request you are feeling that
you were being ganged up on, so to speak, by your codefendants and
Mr. Bittman said you will be getting a call from a friend."
318
Mr. Dash. Now, this committee has ah-eady received evidence,
actually just prior to your testimonj^ that a call, in fact was made and
M^as received b}^ Mr. McCord, and that it originated from Mr. Dean
in the White House to Mr. John Caulfield, to Tony Ulasewicz and
set the stage for a meeting on the George Washington Parkway between
Caulfield and McCord in which Caulfield extended an offer of Executive
clemency to McCord "from the highest levels of the White House."
That testimony has come before the committee.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did you know of that call or that meeting?
Mr. Alch. I did not.
Mr. Dash. Then, therefore, since it was you, Mr. McCord's lawyer,
who transmitted to Mr. McCord his first notice of a telephone call,
he was to receive on the night of January 8, and that Mr. McCord
knew you were conveying a message from Mr. Bittman, and it was
that call which ultunately resulted m a meeting where an offer of
Executive clemency was made to your client, presented as coming from
the highest levels of the White House. Really, was it so unreasonable
for Mr. McCord to conclude that you were involved in setting him up
for such an offer of Executive clemency?
Mr. Alch. If he made that conclusion it was factually false. But
let us suppose he did make that conclusion. This was in a period of
time, as the trial was just about to commence, where I enjoyed with
him what I considered to be a very fine relationship. Whj^ would he
not have come up to me and asked me about it or told me something
to the effect that pursuant to your message to me I got a call last
night? That never happened.
Mr. Dash. Well, at that time perhaps he had begun to distrust
you, Mr. Alch — that he needed you as counsel for his trial but after
that call perhaps he had lost confidence in you.
Mr. Alch. In response to that, Mr. Dash, from what I know of Mr.
IMcCord, it would seem to me rather or highly unlikely that he would
go to trial with a lawyer whom he did not trust.
Mr. Dash. He actually mentioned to you that he received a call
from a man, you will recall, named Caldwell?
Mr. Alch. Not the next day.
Mr. Dash. Not the next day?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash, And then he refused to discuss that with you any
further?
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, also Mr. Caulfield in his testimony before this
committee stated that at one of his meetings
Mr. Alch. Mr. Dash, may I add one thing to the last question, if I
may?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Alch. When Mr. McCord told me that he had received a call
from a man named Caldwell, and specificaUy refused to tell me who he
was or what the nature of the conversation was, what I did was to see
whether or not there would develop any tampering or modification or^
interference with my advice to Mr. McCord as his counsel or whethe.
or not I was suddenly going to be met with suggestion to change the|
trial strategy that Mr. McCord and I had already agreed upon.
319
Air. McCord was free to see whomever he pleased but at no time
did indications ever come to me that either Air. McCord of his own
domg or potentially as a result of being talked to by others was either
disregarding my advice, modifymg my advice, or introducing a new
approach to the trial. That never liappened.
Mr. Dash. In your relationship with Mr. McCord, did you find Mr.
McCord a suspicious individual?
Mr. Alch. I hesitate to use the word suspicious. There were times
^^■hen I would communicate with him and ask him for positions or in-
formation on particular topics, and he would not give me immediate
responses. His attitude would be or his response would be "Let me
think about it" or words to that effect, and days would pass and then I
would get a definitive response. Whether or not that can properly
serve as a i)redicate for a conclusion of one being suspicious I hesitate
or I can't say.
Mr. Dash. 1 think in your testimony and in your statement you
have indicated that he really did not give you all the information that
has now come forward. That he did not confide in you concerning
everything about the case.
Mr. Alch. That attitude commenced from my ver}^ first meeting
with him but I might say in my experience as a criminal defense at-
torney complete disclosure by a client is not something that happens
in every case.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Caulfield, in his testimony before this com-
mittee, stated that at one of the meetings that he had with Mr. Dean
during the time he was making offers of Executive clemency to Mr.
McCord, that Mr. Dean told him, Mr. Caulfield, that Mr. McCord
was "Not cooperating with his attorney." Could Mr. Dean have re-
ferred to or been referring to anyone other than you?
Mr. Alch. Well, the fact is that I was Mr. McCord's attorney
at that time, to my knowledge, and the only reason I add that caveat
is this: I was informed that, when — I was not informed, when I read
a transcript of, I believe, Mr. Caulfield's testimony, I believe he said
that in one of his meetings with Mr. McCord prior to the completion
of trial, that the subject of bail came up, and Mr. Caulfield stated,
"Maybe 3'our law^-er Alch can handle it," or words to that effect, to
which, according to Mr. Caulfield, Mr. McCord replied, "Well, I am
negotiating with another lawyer. Maj'be he can handle it."
Now, this was before the trial ended. His present lawyer is Mr.
Fensterwald. I had no contact or even knowledge that such a man
existed until after Mr. McCord's incarceration. So I now thmk and ask
myself, was Mr. McCord in any contact with any other attorney during
the trial?
If that statement about "I am not cooperating with your attorney"
or "Get close to 3^our attorney" was directed toward me, I can't
explain it because, as I have explained to the committee yesterday,
Mr. McCord was cooperating with me every da3^
Mr. Dash. Could it be explained, and again having already tes-
tified, I think twice that morning a'ou were not aware of all contacts
that might have been made b}^ others concerning your client or others
in the White House? That it could be or could it be likety that some
contact b}^ other defendants or their counsel were being made with the
White House during which your representation of your client could
have been discussed?
320
Mr. Alch. Mr. Dash, it is possible only because I don't know,
Mr. Dash. You don't know and therefore — — -
Mr. Alch. I am in no position to refute or confirm.
Mr. Dash. And a'ou have no other explanation of why Mr. Dean
might have made that statement?
Mr. Alch. I do not. As I told the committee yesterday, I had
never met the man nor spoken to him in my life.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson?
Mr. Thompson. Thank jou, sir.
Mr. Alch, let me ask a^ou a few questions. Going back to your
original testimony concerning the sequence of events as you described
them, what evidently was going on in Mr. McCord's mind as he
relayed these things to you — his thoughts about his own defense and
those matters?
First of all, as I understand your testimony concerning matters
which Mr. McCord considered to be important to his own defense, he
raised the matters of the tapping of his line and the bugging of the
lines of the Chilean or the Israeli Embassies.
Now, how did he explain this to you? How did a^ou indicate that that
could or would be a defense for him?
Mr. Alch. He analogized that to a situation which he said arose in
the Ellsberg case. That if I made a motion for disclosure of such
intercepted telephone calls which he thought were intercepted, that
the Government, because of embarrassment or national security
reasons would refuse to divulge it and would, therefore, in lieu of
divulging it dismiss the charge against him.
Mr. Thompson. According to what he told you did he consider this
a complete defense for him, that this would extricate him from the
situation and cause his case to be dismissed?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir, he didn't sa}^ it was a complete defense. He
described it as a means of effectuating the dismissal of the charges
against hini.
Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate whether or not he placed the calls
to those two embassies specifically for that purpose?
Mr. Alch. He did.
Mr. Thompson. I believe j^ou stated he also furnished you mate-
rials concerning the Mafia and the DNC, Israel and the Mafia, Jack
Anderson and Government contracts, these matters. Did he indicate
in an}'^ way that these could possibly be used as a defense for him or
could help his defense in any way?
Air. Alch. When he gave me that material, he said, let us get on
the offensive, let us make the Democrats — put the Democrats on the
defense. He said, let us stir up something.
When he told me that and when he sent me the memorandum, I
simply took no action on it.
Mr. Thompson. Concerning his book. Counter Espionage Agent for
the Republicans, I believe you said was his proposed title, what was
liis reason, according to him, for wanting that book to be published
before the election? Was it because he wanted the dissemination of
information?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. What was his reason, according to what he said?
321
Mr. Alch. I had been advised by my associate, Mr, Johnson, who
attended the arraignment of Mr. McCord m Washington, that Mr.
McCord said to him, would it not be better monetarily for me if this
book were published before the Presidential election?
Mr. Thompson. As time went on, you mdicated that he had sus-
picion of the codefendants, he thought that he was going to be a fall
guy, that he wanted to shift the focus of publicity?
Air. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. I believe in December, you had your conversation
Avhen the business of the CIA was first broached, and m January, I
believe you said you heard of a dismissal letter that he had filed.
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And you were his attorney at that time; is that
correct?
Mr. Alch. I was and technically still am.
Mr. Thompson. You were attorney of record at that time?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did he give you any notice of the fact that he
was filing a letter of dismissal against you?
Mr. Alch. None whatsoever.
Mr. Thompson. During the trial, you said thmgs worked out be-
tween you, you said during the trial he praised you.
Mr. Alch. Constantly.
Mr. Thompson. You said you never urged him to plead guilty?
Mr. Alch. I never did.
Mr. Thompson. Now, after the trial, your first contact with Mr.
Fensterwald, I believe you said, was when the bond situation arose.
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And he indicated that he could take care of the
entire $100,000?
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And he fhially came up mth $40,000 of the
$100,000?
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Mrs. McCord taking care of the remaining part
of it?
Mr. Alch. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Fensterwald indicate to you whether or
not it was his oam.i personal money or whether or not he was raising
the money from other sources?
Mr. Alch. He mdicated he was raising the money from other
sources which he did not designate.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know to this day where he got those funds?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. The first day you met him was March 23 or 24?
Mr. Alch. That was the day, whatever the day was that Chief
Judge Sirica read Mr. McCorcl's letter.
Mr. Thompson. And again, the letter to Judge Sirica, you had no
notice concerning that?
Mr. Alch. None whatsoever.
Mr. Thompson. And in your conversation with Mr. Fensterwald, as
1 understand it, as he explained it to you, the reason for his releasing
the statement concerning your trying to get him to blame it on the CIA,
322
which again you had no notice of, as I understand, until it was brought
to your attention
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. That an L.A. Times reporter had been given the
story back in December?
Mr. Alch. Let me explain just exactly how that happened.
The day before the memorandum was published, on one of my
office secretarial note pads, my secretary advised that a call had come
in from a Mr. Jackson of the Los Angeles Times to the effect that a
story was about to break, a memorandum alleging or talking about the
CIA, Mr. McCord, and me.
Mr. Thompson. That is the first row heard of it?
Mr. Alch. The very first.
I called up Mr. McCord, could not reach him. The next day, the
memorandum appeared in the newspapers. I got a copy of the New
York Times, read it, put another call in to Mr. McCord. I was told he
was at a meeting and that the message for him to return my call would
be given to him, and that is when I called up Mr. Fens terv^^ aid.
When I asked him about this, Mr. Fenstenvald said, I had told
Mr. McCord to tell you ; I am surprised that he did not.
I asked him to explain the reason for this memorandum, which con-
tained false allegations. Mr. Fenstenvald told me something to the
effect that Mr. McCord had given this story back in December.
Mr. Thompson. Before the trial?
Mr. Alch. This was before the trial. He had given this information
back in December and when he heard — when Mr. McCord heard that
the story was about to be published, Mr. Fensterwald said that Mr.
McCord wanted to beat the newspapers to the punch and submit his
own memorandum in advance of publication.
Mr. Thompson. Wlien Fensterwald told you that they were going
after the President of the United States and repeated that statement,
did you ask him if he had any information that McCord did not have
that would implicate the President?
Mr. Alch. I did not. My onl}^ response to him on the telephone was
as I stated yesterday, I am not interested in Siuy personal vendettas.
At that point, after I ended the conversation, taking Mr. Fensterwald 's
statement at face value, he obviously was, to say the least, antagonistic
toward the President. It appeared to me, and this was a surmise, that
Mr. Fensterwald might be using ]\lr. McCord as a means for this
particular goal or objective which he stated to me.
What I proceeded to do as best I could, being on a trial in Chicago,
was to keep abreast of the newspapers to see the nature of the mem-
orandum and the testimony that Mr. McCord was giving.
The first mention, to my recollection, of Mr. McCord referring to
the President was when he referred to an alleged executive offer of
clemency coming from the President last Friday.
Mr. Thompson. That is the first time in all of your dealings with
Mr. McCord, throughout the trial and otherwise, of his mention of
the President?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir, and I was in contact with one of Mr. Dash's
assistants that night.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know how long Mr. McCord had known
Mr. Fensterwald?
Mr. Alch. I do not.
323
Mr. Thompson. Was there ever any discussion in your presence
between the two of them as to what amount of time or any previous
( nutact they mio;ht have had?
Mr. Alch. The only discussion which might have been embraced
by that question was one I referred to A^esterchw, in my hotel room the
iiiuht before our last in-court appearance, where Mr. Fensterwald said
that reporters had been asking him if he had any prior relationship
with Mr. McCord. And he said, I told him I had. Mr. McCord looked
ui) with a surprised look on his face.
And Mr. Fensterwald said, sure, don't 3^ou remember, there were
checks that j^ou donated to the committee to investigate the assassina-
tion of the President, words to that effect.
Mr. McCord countered by saying, oh, yeah, yeah, that is right.
Mr. Thompson. Do aou know what relationship Mr. Fensterwald
has to the committee to investigate assassinations?
Mr. Alch. No sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did it not appear strange to you, did it not cause
you then to inquire about any previous relationship or just exactly
what Mr. Fensterwald's role was to be? You were attorney of record;
3'ou were supposed to be handling the case. Here is a man who comes
to you indicating that he is a stranger to Mr. McCord, but he is trying
to raise a hundred thousand dollars for him. He evidently has some
connection with a committee to investigate assassinations. Did you
not inquire into this situation?
Mr. Alch. My first inquiry was when the name was mentioned to
me and Mr. McCord told me that he was a friend who could help with
bail. Mr. Fensterwald himself later told me the reason for his motiva-
tion or for his actions were to justify what he termed "an outrage."
He was referring to the $100,000 bail.
At the point where this conversation came about to which I have
just referred, the very next morning — it did bother me. Consequently,
the ver}' next morning, I called them both together outside the corridor
of the courtroom, and I said, "Look, if you want me to remain as
attorney of record, yon have got to keep me abreast of everything that
you are going to do. I do not want to be embarrassed again." I had
been Avhen the letter to Judge Sirica was delivered.
That was when Mr. Fensterwald said to me, "I will call you every
single day even if I have nothing to tell you." Keeping in mind that
prior to this, Mr. McCord had called me and said, "You are away on
trial, I need someone local, do you have any objection if I retain
someone in Washington?"
I said "I have none."
Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you one sei'ies of cpiestions in a specific
and isolated area as to your visit to Mr. Bittman's office.
Mr. Alch. Yes sir.
Mr. Thompson. I am not going to second-guess 3"our trial tech-
niques or whatever. From the record, I think it appears that you did
a very fine job when a client was caught redhanded. But some things
just do not seem to fit together.
For example, would you tell the committee, when you came out of
Mr. Bittman's office and spoke to Mr. McCord, told him he would
receive a call, what other conversation did you have? What did you
say, where did you go? Did you leave together?
324
Mr. Alch. We went back to my hotel room, as we did, perhaps,
with maybe one or two exceptions every day after the trial. That was
the t3^pe of relationship we had. I insisted that each day after court,
he would come back with me to discuss what went on. I would have
the discovery material for the next day as far as witnesses were con-
cerned, other matters that may come up. I would discuss this with him.
It was that type of thing. At that point, we were talking about jury
selection and I recall the discussion that particular afternoon, after
we left Mr. Bittman's office, over my displeasure — respectfulh^ as
far as Chief Judge Sirica is concerned— at the proposed manner of
jury selection. I didn't think there was enough time being given to
Mr. Thompson. You didn't need your client to sit down with you
and Bittman and the other lawyers to discuss this, did you? Couldn't
you discuss it privatel}^? Couldn't he wait in the motel room or what-
ever while the lawyers talked? Wliy didn't you send him on? Why did
you have to bring him to Bittman's office with you?
Mr. Alch. He had no car with him. He had gone to the courthouse
in a cab. As the custom turned out to be, we would go back to my
hotel room in a cab.
I said to him, ''Jim, I want to go back and talk to Bittman about this
matter of his client's change of plea; come on with me and as soon as
I am through, I will tell j^ou about it and we will go back to my hotel
for further discussion."
That is the way it happened.
Mr. Thompson. And Barker just happened to get into the cab; he
didn't indicate the reason he was getting into the cab?
Mr. Alch. That was exactly the M^a}^ it happened.
Mr. Thompson. Wliat happened to him? Did he go to the office with
3^ou, did he leave with you?
Mr. Alch. He walked into the building in which Mr. Bittman's
office is. I did not. Mr. INlcCord, Shankman, and I went across the
street to get a drink. Wlien I came up to Mr. Bittman's office, I
didn't see Mr. Barker. As to why he was going there, as to how long
he sta3'ed there, as to whom he saw there, I simpl}" have no knowledge.
Mr. Thompson. Wlio was Barker's lawj^'er?
Mr. Alch. At that timC; it was Mr. Henrj" Rothblatt.
Mr. Thompson. Is Mr. Rothblatt's office in that building?
Mr. Alch. I am not sure. I know Mr. Rothblatt had an office very
close to Mr. Bittman's office. I know that because when it was decided,
since there were out-of-town lawj^ers involved, where we would meet
whenever we would meet, Mr. Rothblatt agreed to meet in Mr. Bitt-
man's office because he had an office either in the same building or
close to it. It may have been in the same building. I don't know.
Mr. Thompson. You were going in to discuss this situation which
concerned 3'ou, Judge Sirica's ruling, with Bittman, which is essentialh''
a conversation probabl}' addressing itself to lawyers.
Wliy didn't you take Mr. Shankman, your associate, in to talk
with you?
Mr. Alch. No particular reasons. Mr. Shankman was privy to all
of my trial strategy. What happend was we walked into the library,
put our briefcases do\vn, other lawyers were there. I just got up and
said, "I want to go back and see if Bill's in his office." And I did.
Mr. Thompson. You found him there and left your cocounsel in
the library with Mr. McCord?
325
Mr. Alch. That is right.
Mr. Thompson. Did he ever see Bittman as far as you know that
day?
Mr. Alch. Who?
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Shankman.
Mr. Alch. Mr. Shankman?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Alch. I beheve he may have said hello and goodby to him.
It was not a long stay at Bittman's office.
Mr. Thompson. There was no particular reason why you wanted
to talk to Mr. Bittman out of the hearing of anyone else?
Mr. Alch. Absolutely not. As a matter of fact, I told Mr. McCord
what the discussion was with Mr. Bittman.
Mr. Thompson. Wlien Bittman said that he would receive a call
from a friend, didn't you ask who that friend was?
Mr. Alch. I did not.
Mr. Thompson. Didn't it concern you as a crimmal defense lawyer?
Wlien anybody else is making a contact with your lawyer, whether
it is another lawyer, a third party, another defendant, isn't that
something that concerns a defense lawyer in the trial of a case?
Mr. Alch. Mr. Thompson, as I say, in the context of that remark,
my assumption was that it could very well have been a call from Mr,
Hunt or some of the other codefendants. I don't know.
Mr. Thompson. Wouldn't that have concerned you? Codefendants
sometimes have different interests, don't they?
Mr. Alch. At that point in the trial, I was not aware of any
conflict.
Mr. Thompson. But there is always the possibility, isn't there?
Mr. Alch. Wlien you are begmning a trial and your client and you
are in complete agreement on a presentation of a defense, that was
my main concern.
Mr. Thompson. And then coincident!}^, he did receive a call?
Mr. Alch. So I am informed.
Mr. Thompson. So other testimony has proven.
Mr. Alch. So other testimony has told me.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know how we can make this jum]) from
Bittman's statement to you about a call from a friend to other testi-
mony that he did receive a call shortly after that?
Do you know whether Bittman called Dean, or what is the answer
to it? Did you make any inquiry?
Mr. Alch. No, and I can't answer the question, because I have no
knowledge of it.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
No further questions.
Senator Ervin. I believe Sir Edward Coke said that one scratch of
a pen is better than the slippery memory of a multitude of witnesses.
Hasn't that been proven true in your practice as trial lawA^er?
Mr. Alch. I am not sure I understand the significance of the
, remark.
Senator Ervin. Well, where two men communicate with each other
by word of mouth, isn't there a two-fold hazard in that connnunication,
in, first, that the man who speaks may not express himself clearly, may
not say exactlj'^ what is in his mind? And if he does, the man who hears
it may put a different interpretation on the words than the man who
spoke them?
326
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Yes. And that is very well illustrated by something
that came out here this week. Mr. McCord testified that Mr. Caulfield
told him that the President was interested in this offer of Executive
clemenc}- and Mr. Caulfield said he never mentioned the President's
name, he merely said the highest levels of the White House. So, Mr.
Caulfield meant one thing and Mr. McCord understood another from
the words.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And I believe you made a little mistake yourself in
your statement. You were talking about, you said that 3'ou understood
Mr. McCord to say ''Caldwell" when he was obviousl}^ talking about
''Caulfield," which is quite a natural mistake.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir, that is my recollection.
Senator Ervin. I think you are a little irritated with your client,
I do not blame you, I got irritated with my clients when they did not
take my advice and went around talking to other people.
Mr. Alch. Senator, if I may, you as a lawyer can well appreciate
the fact that you do your best for your client. If he is pleased, that is
the ultimate goal. You cannot guarantee whether he is going to get
contacted or acquitted. Wliat upset me is how the man turned on me
with what I have alleged and believe with all my heart to be false
accusations in the manner, in the framework of which he did. Of
course, I am upset.
Senator Ervin. Well, the first thing, as you stated to Mr. Dash,
you were offended by his apparent charge that you had suggested to
him that they blame this on the CIA.
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. Let us see if there was not a little justification for
him in makmg a mistake on that.
You testified 3'ou attended a meeting of all of the la^^yers involved
in the case.
Mr. Alch. Yes, su-.
Senator Ervin. As I understand, Mr. Bittman was appearing for
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Henry Rothblatt was appearing for Sturgis and
Martinez and Gonzales and Barker, and you were appearing for
McCord and who was appearing for Liddy?
Mr. Alch. \h\ Peter Margoulis.
Senator Ervin. Yes. Now, there was a meeting of most of these
lawyers and it had been pointed out in the press that Mr. Sturgis had
apparently CIA credentials issued in the name of Mr. Martin, I
believe.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. It was also apparent, in that it came out in the press,
that other members of those of the group who broke into the Water-
gate had false credentials?
Mr. Alch. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ervin. And the press had suggested since McCord had
been involved in the CIA, and Hunt had worked for the CIA, and
Barker had been in the Bay of Pigs operations, CIA and possibly
others, that perhaps there was a CIA involvement. Was that not
speculated in the press?
Mr. Alch. In the press; yes, sir.
327
Senator Ervin. And at this meeting, of course, the first thing a
lawyer tries to find ont from his chent is what kind of defense., if any,
he has got, is that not true?
Mr. Alch. Of course.
Senator Ervin. So the lawyers would be discussing at that time
what possible defense they had, and it was suggested by one of the
other counsel that perhaps they could get evidence that would sustain
a defense that would lay this break-in on the CIA, was it not, at the
meeting with la\vyers?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir. But, Senator, I do not mean to split hairs but
I do wish again to point out that it did not come out in the sense
that "let us make this a CIA defense." It did not come out that way.
It was not presented that way. The way it was presented was, could
this be a CIA defense because of all of these things? Let us go back
and ask our client. That is the way it happened.
Senator Ervin. Well, the only way the lawyers can find out whether
their clients have a defense is to discuss matters like this.
Mr. Alch. Ask them.
Senator Ervin. And try to investigate it.
Mr. Alch. Of course.
Senator Ervcn. And it was suggested in this meeting of lawyers by
some attorney other than yourself?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. That the lawyers involved should try to ascertain
from their clients whether the CIA was involved, whether they had
any knowledge enough to implicate CIA, was it not?
Mr. Alch. That is right.
Senator Ervin. And immediately after that j^ou went in and talked
to Mr. McCord about it, did you not?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Asked him?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, do you not think that it is possible that a
man who had read in the newspapers about the alleged involvement
of the CIA or the suggestion involving the CIA, who is asked by his
attorney about the matter might think that his attorney was indi-
cating to him that that was a possible defense?
Mr. Alch. No, for this reason: If it was that type of potential — •
if it was that type of potential misunderstanding, assuming arguendo
this might be so. But in Mr. McCord's statement he brought this out
under the general heading of pressure, my bringing pressure upon him,
which to me negated or diminished the chances of it being a misun-
derstanding. To me, it implied more, it sounded more of intentional
misrepresentation.
Senator Ervin. Well, the word "pressure" is used by different
people. There are all kinds of pressures, are there not? There are
heavy pressures and light pressures.
Mr. Alch. True.
Senator Ervin. Now, it is in evidence here that Mr. McCord in
December, previous to the time of the trial, had become so much
concerned about the possibility of involvement of CIA that he had
written a letter to Mr. Caulfield saying in. effect, it would be a mistake
to involve the CIA because if they did, all the trees in the forest
328
would fall and there would be a scorched earth. Do you not know
that Mr. McCord showed extreme loyalty to the CIA?
Mr. Alch. Don't I know it now?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Alch. I know that is what he says, yes.
Senator Ervin. Did 30U tell Mr. McCord when you met with
other law^^ers that you all were discussing the possible defenses?
Mr. Alch. I did.
Senator Ervin. Now, in all fahness to Mr. McCord, do you not
think it is possible that Mr. McCord thought that you thought they
ought to see if they could involve the CIA? Just in fairness to him?
Mr. Alch. I will answer it as fairly as I can in this manner, sir.
I do not enjo}'^ coming down asking to appear before this honorable
committee for which I am most grateful, and in effect calling a man a
liar. My nature is such that I do not enjoA^ doing it.
What you are suggesting is that there may have been, if I may
take the liberty of interpretmg your remark, that there may have
been a misunderstandmg on Mr. McCord's part about that par-
ticular aspect of it. With the exception of my objecting to him cat-
egorizing that as pressure, that may be. I am not looking to bury
Mr. McCord. My presence here is a reaction, not an action. But I
keep going back to this: You cannot interpret a lawj^^er saying "I
am gomg to forge CIA documents with the assistance of the CIA
Director," out of my sa^^ing "Wliat do you want for lunch," or "see
you in Boston," or "we are discussing a CIA defense." Either those
words Vv^ere said or they were not.
Now, when I watched television last night. Senator, I heard and
saw Mr. McCord again reiterate that I said those words. I have
already advised the committee that at this meeting there was another
lawyer present, I mvite you to contact him. However, I also saw
Mr. Fensterwald deii}'^ that he said to me on the telephone, "We are
out to get the President."
Senator Ervin. Well now, wait a minute on that. Did Mr. McCord
ever mention the President to you at any time in any conversation
he ever had with you?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. And Mr. McCord was not present so far as you
know, and did not overhear an}^ of the phone conversations between
3'ou and ]Mr. Fensterwald on that point?
Mr. Alch. Not to my knowledge, but my record
Senator Ervin. So far as it appears down to this day, there is no
evidence that ]\lr. McCord ever mentioned the President of the
United States except he said that Mr. Caulfield mentioned the
President of the United States in a conversation with him.
Mr. Alch. That is correct. Except that when the remark was made
to me by Mr. Fensterwald, he was Mr. McCord's counsel and he said
we — he used the word "we".
Senator Ervin. The minds of human beings are very fallible I
found through a long practice of law — and also legislative bodies,
and I have heard a lot about this, and read a lot in tryhig to prepare.
I have got much information and misinformation about this matter
and I do not know the precise source of all of these things.
Now, Mr. McCord says, someone, I believe he said you, suggested
thai if they changed the record at the CIA to show he had been called
329
back to dut}'', there miglit be a chance to have a defense of that kind.
You say 3^011 never said that?
Mr. Alch. Mr. McCord said much stronger words than that, Sena-
tor. He said I told him that I could effectuate the forgery of his CIA
records with the cooperation of the CIA Director. That is pretty strong
talk.
Senator Ervin. I do not believe that is the testimony Mr. McCord
gave this committee.
Mr. Alch. The record, of course, will clear it up.
wSenator Ervin. The record will speak for itself. My recollection,
and I do not guarantee, but my recollection is that he said jou, or
somebody, said that by letting the record of the CIA show — wait a
minute now, here is McCord's statement. He said "Alch said," that is
vou, "my personnel records at CIA could be doctored to reflect such a
recall. He stated Schlesinger, the new Director of CIA, whose new
appointment had just been announced, could be subpoenaed and would
go along with it."
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. He did not accuse j^ou of anything except saymg
that the records could be doctored, that you advocated that. You were
just expressing a surmise?
Mr. Alch. Well, Senator, perhaps through a law^^er's — and an ex-
perienced Iaw3^er's — eyes, looking at it really close, dissecting it, that
conclusion might be proper. But not to the average person who reads
it on the street.
Senator Ervin. Now let's see, you also, if I infer from your state-
ment, you also took offense of the fact that Mr. McCord had stated
that you had recommended he enter a plea of guilty. Am I correct in
that?
Mr. Alch. No, sir. I specifically pointed out that in response to
your question, he said I did not.
Senator Ervin. Let's talk about this plea of guilty a minute. You
stated in your statement that you learned from Bittman that Hunt
was contemplating pleading guilty?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you also learned that later, a short time later,
that Henry Rothbiatt's clients were contemplating pleading guilty?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you discussed with McCord the fact that this
would be a very bad thing to happen to his defense?
Mr. Alch. No, sir. I told him that I was of the opinion that it would
prejudice him because of the reaction to the jury.
Senator Ervin. Yes. Well, that would be prejudicial to his case,
would it not?
Mr. Alch. His case but not his defense.
Senator Ervin. Now, as a matter of fact, the assistant district
attorney in charge of the case three times approached you with a view
to negotiating a plea of guilty?
Mr. Alch. Two times.
Senator Ervin. On the part of McCord?
Mr. Alch. Two times to my recollection.
Senator Ervin. And I would not criticize you a bit if j^ou recom-
mended a plea of guilty because you had a client who was caught
redhanded at the burglary and the defense was on very precarious
330
grounds at best, and so if he did say that 3^011 urged him to plead
guilty, I think it would be a compliment to your intelligence as a
lawyer rather than a reflection on it.
Mr. Alch. With all due respect, I reject the compliment, for this
reason, Senator: First of all, because he specifically said to 3'ou I
never suggested that he enter a plea of guilty. The reason, when this
proposition was put to me, or this offer was put to me by the Govern-
ment, I practice tliis wa}^, I do not — that is too important a decision
for me to make. I simpl}^ take it back to the client and say: ''Here it is;
what do you say?" He said, "No."
Senator Ervin. Well, you never recommend to a client?
Mr. Alch. When I get an offer?
Senator Ervin. I will have to confess that I have recommended to
many clients that they plead guilty and I felt like I was serving their
cause the best.
Mr. Alch. I am not saying anything like that was improper. All I
am saying, in this particular instance. Senator, I just brought it back
to him and said, "Here is what is available to you."
Senator Ervin. You are not taking any offense at any possibihty
that McCord may have said that you recommended to him that he
should plead guilty?
Mr. Alch. No, because he said just the opposite.
Senator Ervin. Yes, good; so we will have no controversy over that.
So you are not falling out with him on that?
Mr. Alch. No.
Senator Ervin. Let us go to Executive clemency. You did attend a
meeting with Mr. Bittman?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, Mr. Bittman was representing Hunt?
Mr, Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. You knew that Hunt had been a consultant in
the White House or the Executive OfiBce?
Mr. Alch. I honestly was not just sure of what Mr. Hunt's position
was.
Senator Ervin. You knew he had been working for the Committee
To Re-Elect the President, didn't you?
Mr. Alch. That I did.
Senator Ervin. And j^ou do not know what contacts were had
between Mr. Hunt and any of his former associates m the Committee
To Re-Elect the President or between his counsel and any of those
people?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. But you did have a discussion with Mr. Bittman
in which Mr. Bittman mentioned Executive clemency, did you not?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir, in the context that I described.
Senator Ervin. In other words, when Mr. Bittman was discussing
with you the fact that his client, Mr. Hunt, might plead guilty or had
determined to plead guilty, I do not remember which, you discussed
with him, not Executive clemency, but what?
Mr. Alch. No, sir; I tried to make clear yesterdaj^ with Mr. Bitt-
man where the words "Executive clemency" came up did not happen
on January 8. It happened some time in late 1972 and when it happened,
when I said to him just in a casual conversation, "What do you think
our clients are liable to receive for a sentence if they are convicted?"
331
just like that, and that is when he said to me — and in not a veiy author-
itative tone I might add — "You never can telL Christmastime rolls
around, Executive clemency might come into the picture. Forget it.
The President won't go near it."
Senator Ervin. You participated in the trial and heard the
evidence.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you know that it was proved on trial as shown
on the trial or at least evidence tended to show that the notebook of
Mr. Hunt which was introduced into evidence had the White House
phone number on it, didn't you?
Mr. Alch. If it was, I certainly don't recall.
Senator Ervin. You don't recall it?
Mr. Alch. Because Mr. Hunt's local counsel — I don't recall.
Senator Ervin. Anyway when you asked ]\Ir. Bittman what kmd
of sentences the clients might get if they were convicted he said,
"Well, it might be Executive clemency," didn't he?
Mr. Alch. He didn't say it that way.
Senator Ervin. Well, he said Christmas was coming.
Mr. Alch. That is right. [Laughter.]
Senator Ervin. And he at least indicated that he thought parts of
executive's hearts became kinder around Christmastime than any
other season of the year.
Mr. Alch. Senator, let me say this. He did not respond in this
type of way, he did not say, "Now, look, Christmas is coming, they
are gomg to get Executive clemency." It wasn't that type of conversa-
tion. What he said to me was in sort of a theorizmg w^ay, "Well, just
as Christmastime comes around there may be Executive clemencA^"
I immediately responded as I told you j^esterday that "There is no
chance of that happening, in my opinion."
Senator Ervin. You said, on page 16 of your statement:
I had occasion in late 1972 during one of the pretrial meetings of defense lawyers
in Washington, I had occasion to saj' to Mr. Bittman, "Bill, what do j-ou think
our chents will receive as a sentence should they be convicted?" Mr. Bittman
responded in substance as if theorizing, "You can never tell. Christmastime rolls
around and there could be Executive clemency."
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir. Those are his words, to the best of my
recollection.
Senator Ervin. So I thmk that was sort of right to have an idea
that Christmas had some relation to Mr. Bittman's remarks.
Mr. Alch. In the context of the way he uttered it.
Senator Ervin. Well, now, you agree j^ou left that meeting and
then you saw Mr. McCord. Later you discussed the cjuestion of
executive privilege with Mr. McCord, didn't you?
Mr. Alch. I didn't discuss the question, I relayed to him the
conversation I had with Mr. Bittman.
Senator Ervin. Yes, and you relayed the conversation in which
Bittman had said m effect that a^ou can never tell, Christmastime
rolls around and there could be Executive clemency.
Mr. Alch. I did with a smgular addition of my own.
Senator Ervin. Yes, and you said it was absurd to expect Executive
clemency, the President wouldn't touch it wdth a 10-foot pole or
somethmg like that.
Mr. Alch. That is what I said.
00-296— 73— bk. 1 22
332
Senator Ervin. And McCord agreed with you?
Mr. Alch. He did.
Senator Ervin. Now, you, on one occasion, told Mr. McCord that
Mr. Bittman, rather Mr. Bittman told you m one of these meetings
of the lawyers, that Mr. McCord was going to receive a message, a
telephone call.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And didn't you ask Mr. Bittman what business
other people had — ^you had been talking about the case, hadn't you?
Mr. Alch. At that particular point we had been talking about my
client's apprehension that his codefendants were conspiring against
him.
Senator Ervin. Anj^way he told you — your client — somebody else
was going to communicate by telephone with your client?
Mr, Alch. Yes, su\
Senator Ervin. And it was a short time after that, according to
the evidence, your client did receive a telephone call and had three
conferences with Mr. Caulfield.
Mr. Alch. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Ervin. Well, the evidence shows it although you don't
know it.
Mr. Alch. Yes.
Senator Ervin. But you convej'ed the message which Mr. Bittman
gave you about Mr. McCord going to receive a telephone call, didn't
you?
Mr. Alch. I tried to tell my client everything.
Senator Ervin, Yes.
Don't you think it is reasonable now, he got a call, and you told him
in advance that he is going to get the call, and then he receives a call
and had some negotiations, or conversations at least about executive
privilege, you don't think Mr. jMcCord is liable because in his mind he
associated those conversations he had pursuant to this telephone call
with you? Can't you see where he would reasonably draw a deduction
that the telephone call which resulted in this indicated that you knew
something about Executive clemencj''?
Mr. Alch. No, for this reason. I again reiterate how close we were in
our contact and in what we would tell each other. If he thought, and
he has now labeled this as im])roper conduct on my part, the question I
keep asking mj^self is that if he did make the surmise and conclude
that I was engaged in improper conduct, this was before the trial be-
gan, or was it before the trial began or whenever it happened, whj
wouldn't the man come up to me and confront me with it? That is what
I don't understand.
Senator Ervin. Well, you go and tell him that he is going to receive
a phone call.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And he does receive a phone call.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And as a result of receiving a phone call, he has an
offer of Executive clemency made to him.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you say that it wasn't reasonable for him to in-
fer from those facts that you knew about the offer of Executive
clemency?
333
Mr. Alch. I say it was not reasonable for him to infer or assume and
later allege tliat that was in any way the basis of improper conduct on
my ])art.
Senator Ervin. Well, I don't infer it was, Mr. Alch.
Mr. Alch. Wliat, sir?
Senator Ervin. I used to be a trial lawyer. I was always interested
when I had a client, especially one who had no defense. I was always
glad of the prospect of getting any kind of clemency. I do not see that
it reflects on you. It might be a glory to your competence as a lawyer
or to your judgment as a counsel to try to do so. It is no reflection
on you. It is to your credit.
Mr. Alch. No, sir. I did not know about it. If any type of legitimate,
legal offer came from the Government that would benefit my client,
I would put it to him. I certainly would not keep it from him.
Senator Ervin. Just one question about the book. The Scriptures
say, "Much study is a weariness to the flesh and of making books
there is no end." It seems that everybody who gets into jail today
wants to write a book about it.
When Mr. McCord talked to Mr. Johnson at the time about writing
a book, he was out of a job, w'as he not?
Mr. Alch. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Ervin. You do not know that your client was out of a job?
Mr. Alch. No, sir, he had electronic — not electronic— surveillance —
McCord Associates.
Senator Ervin. Do you know that he had been fired by the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir, but he also told me that he had income from
McCord Associates. I would call him sometimes at the office.
Senator Ervin. But notwithstanding the fact that he was paying
your fee, you did not suspect he might be in penurious chcumstances?
Mr. Alch. That was a possibility.
Senator Ervin. I might say if Mr. McCord wanted to write a book
about Watergate, he could make A. Conan Doyle turn green with
envy.
Mr. Baker.
Senator Baker. I thank the chairman for the opportunity to
proceed now to inquire of this witness about matters that concern
me very greatly.
The chairman has alluded a number of times to his distinguished
career in North Carolina as a trial attorney and as a judge. I must
say, Mr. Alch, that you are now in a position of having been interro-
gated by one of the best. I am not sure w^hich interrogation it was,
that of a lawyer or of a judge, but you know that you have been
interrogated.
Mr, Alch. I deem it an honor.
Senator Baker. Now, not to try to emulate the sterling example of
the chairman, but I also recall that when I tried cases in Tennessee,
when proof was concluded, when the judge charmed the jury, he said
something to this effect: He said, ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
you will now take the evidence as adduced in the hearing room from
all of the witnesses. If j^ou find any testimon}^ of witnesses in conffict,
you will reconcile it if you can. If you cannot, then you will look to
the testimony of other witnesses, the circumstantial e\ddence if avail-
able, the documentary evidence or demonstrative evidence if appro-
334
priate, and then you will weigh and balance that evidence and make
your judgment as to where the truth actualh'^ lies.
Now, while that is a charge used in essence by the courts in my
native State of Tennessee, I think it fairly summarizes the dilemma
that we are faced with here as committee members. We are not judges
and we are not a jury, but we most assuredly are after the facts, the
truth, and it is now apparent that we are going to have to tr}^ to
reconcile differences in testimonj^ if we can; and if we cannot, look to
the testimony of other people, demonstrative evidence to circum-
stantial evidence, to try to find where the truth lies.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Now, in the time I have before me, still remaining
to me, Mr. Alch, I want to suggest two or three things that appear to
be in conflict, and I want you to suggest to us how we might go about
reconciling those apparent discrepancies or how we might go about
shedding additional light on the subject matter.
Begin with the allegation as I understand it of Mr. McCord as
stated on page 2 of his testimony as follows: "There followed a sug-
gestion from Mr. Alch that I use as my defense during the trial the
stor3^ that the Watergate operation was a CIA operation." This is Mr.
McCord speaking.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. "I heard him out on the suggestion,, which included
questions as to whether I could ostensibly have been recalled from
retirement from the CIA to i)articipate in the operation. He said that
if so, ni}' personnel records at CIA could be doctored to reflect such a
recall. I stated that Schlesinger, the new Director of CIA, whose
appointment had just been announced, could be subpeaned and would
go along with it."
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. You previously testified that 3^ou did not say that
to Mr. McCord. Is that correct?
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Did anyone say that to Mr. McCord in your
presence?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Do 3'ou have anv knowledge of anvbody saying
that to Mr. McCord?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Then there is a conflict between your testimony
and that of Mr. McCord. Do you have any suggestions as to how this
committee can reconcile that apparently irreconcilable difference in
proof and give us some indication of A\here the truth lies?
Mr. Alch. Two.
Senator Baker. Tell us.
Mr. Alch. One, speak to the thhrd party \\ho \\"as there.
Senator Baker. Who was there?
Mr. Alch. Mr. Bernard Shankman.
Senator Baker. Is he under subpena, ]\Ir. Counsel?
Mr. Dash. We have been interviewing Mr. Shankman.
Senator Baker. Would you make a notation that I v, ould like to
speak I0 ]\lr. Shankman.
Would you go ahead, sir?
335
Mr. Alch. If that shoiikl prove inconclusive with regard to this
discrepancy and with regard to the discrepancy that Mr. Fensterwald
denies that he told me that he was not going after the President
Senator Baker. No, no, Ave will get to that in a minute.
Mr. Alch. Very well.
Senator Baker. Confine yourself if you will to the allegation made
by Mr. McCord, contained on page 2 of his statement, with respect
to the defense of the recall of the CIA and the doctoring of his records
to reflect that. Is there anything else except Mr. Shankman's possible
testimony that you can suggest to us that might shed some light on
that apparent conflict and the testimony of you and Mr. McCord?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
I suggest that both Mr. McCord and I, if he is willing, submit to
a i)olygraph test conducted by a competent examiner, accredited by
the American Polygraph Association. I state my willingness to do so.
Senator Baker. Do you have any other suggestion?
Mr. Alch. No, not at this time.
Senator Baker. It is further suggested by Mr. McCord that on a
number of occasions, intense pressure was brought to bear on him to
involve the CIA. I do not have that page reference before me, but I
hope that is a fair summation of the thrust and burden of Mr.
McCord's testimony. You have denied the suggestion that you consider
fabricating a defense of recall to the CIA. Can you shed any further
light on whether there were other or give occasions on which you
suggested that we "pack it oft'" on the CIA?
Mr. Alch. I never did.
Senator Baker. Did you ever bring intense or any pressure to bear
on Mr. McCord on this or any other subject?
Mr. Alch. I did not.
Senator Baker. Do you have any suggestion on how this committee
might reconcile that apparent conflict, how we might find the testi-
mony of other witnesses, circumstantial evidence or demonstrative
evidence, or other information that might tell us where the truth lies?
Mr. Alch. As to pressure that I put upon him?
Senator Baker. No, tell us if you know of any other information,
save and except the testimon}- given to this committee by Mr. McCord
and by you, that might shed some information on who is telling the
truth, 3^ou or Mr. McCord?
Mr. Alch. As to what particular point?
Senator Baker. As to the point that intense pressure was brought
to bear upon him repeatedly to tr}' to make it appear to be a CIA
operation.
Mr. Alch. To my knowledge, my activity to which he points was
that meeting at the Monocle Restaurant. You can correct me if I
am wrong, but in my reading of Mr. McCord's testimony, that is the
only instance in which he says that I pressured him with regard to CIA
activity. I have already given you my two suggestions as to how to
find out who is telling the truth. To ni}- knowledge, he has not cited any
other examples of my allegedly pressuring him to adopt a CIA defense
falsel}^
Senator Baker. Moving then to another subject, it would appear to
me a material conflict between your testimony and the statements of
Mr. Fensterwald given publicly after our hearings on yesterday may
336 i
produce for this committee a similar dilemma if, in fact, Mr. Fen-
sterwald makes a statement or testifies. That relates j^our allegation
that Mr. Fensterwald said, "We are out to get the President."
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. I understand this question is premature. Therefore,
I saved it till last. But in anticipation of the fact that ISlr. Fensterwald
may deny that, and I rather suspect that he may
Mr. Alch. I believe he already has.
Senator Baker. I believe he has not here, but I believe he has
publicl}^ outside this hearing room
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Would you now tell us what method you could
suggest to bring the testimony of other witnesses to bear or other
circumstantial evidence or any evidence, to try to find who is telling
the truth in that respect?
Mr. Alch. Polygraph.
Senator Baker. Can you suggest anything else?
Mr. Alch. It was a head-on conversation. To my knowledge,
nobod}^ was — I know nobody was listening in on my end. To my
knowledge, nobody was listening in on his end. I do not know.
Senator Baker. Did you tell the committee that 3^ou turned
immediately and spoke to an associate?
Mr. Alch. Yes; Mr. John McNally.
Senator Baker. How soon did you do that? Was it immediately
after the conversation?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. You are familiar with the term, res gestae?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. With reference to the hearsay rule?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. I do not know" if it could serve your owai purposes,
but does it fall within the scope of that?
Mr. Alch. It could very well.
Senator Baker. Mr. Alch, there are other conflicts, but I will not
go further with them at this point. We cannot try a case with one
mtness and certainly not with the testimony of a lawj'er. I have never
in my fife been in a situation where two lawA'ers were potentially in a
swearing contest, but that looks like where we are headed.
Now, I want to move on to another subject matter. The chairman
has suggested that it might be a glory to your competency as a lawj^er
and your judgment as a counsel had you advised Mr. McCord to plead
guilty, that after all he was caught, as the chairman put it, I believe,
redhanded in Watergate. He was indicted on what — seven counts, or
eight?
Mr. Alch. Seven, I beUeve.
Senator Baker. Did you ever consider advising him to plead
guilty? • , . .
Mr. Alch. I did not, for this reason. He told me from the begmmng
he did not want to. He told me he wanted to go to trial and he told me
the defense he wanted to use based upon what he claimed to be the
true motivation of his actions.
Senator Baker. What did he tell you to be the true motivation
of his actions?
337
Mr. Alch. His attempt to obtain advance warning of planned
violent demonstrations by radical antiwar groups, as lie put it, which
would, in his opinion, lead to \dolence to prominent Republican
officials.
Senator Baker. And he said that in relation to the entr}' into
the Democratic National Committee?
Mr. Alch. He did.
Senator Baker. Not into the headquarters of the Weathermen or
any other group, but the DNC, the Democratic National Committee?
Mr. Alch. That is what he told me was his reason for doing what
he did.
Senator Baker. Did you advise him that that was or was not an
available defense?
Mr. Alch. I told him I would look into it. I did. He was talking and
submitted memorandums to me under the topic of defense of others.
My research told me or showed me that this particular defense did
not permit the one claiming not to know that he was breaking the
law.
I told him so.
Senator Baker. Did you then tell him that the defense was not
available?
Mr. Alch. That particular one, but I also told him that there was a
similar related defense which particularly allowed the perpetrator to
know that he was breaking the law. That was the defense of duress.
That defense was presented in his behalf and when Chief Judge
Sirica ruled as a matter of law that it was not applicable to the facts,
I made mj offer of proof.
Senator Baker. Did the U.S. Attorney's Office, did the Justice
Department, or anj^one else contact you to try to induce or even to-
discuss the matter of your client pleading guilty?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. When?
Mr. Alch. As reflected in my statement, there were two times.
The dates appear in my statement.
Senator Baker. One to plead guilt}^ on one charge of the indict-
ment?
Mr. Alch. And become a Government witness.
Senator Baker. And the second time to plead guilty to three or
four counts
Mr. Alch. Three, and become a Government witness.
Senator Baker. Were there any other offers?
Mr. Alch. From the Government, no, sir.
Senator Baker. Were there any suggestions of Executive clemency?
Mr. Alch. No, sir. The onh^ other, and I do not want to charac-
terize it as an offer. It was not an offer. But as a result of a meeting
in chambers with Cliief Judge Sirica during the trial, I came out
and advised my client that it was not too late to go before the grand
jury.
Senator Baker. Mr. Alch, j'ou have previously stated that the way
you practice law, the decision on whether to plead innocent or guilty
is too important for you to decide; it must be left to your client. I
admire your rectitude in that respect, but I doubt your judgment. And
I really wonder, and I put this to you in a very blunt and in a very,.
338
very cruel wa}^ I reall}' wonder if there is not a balancing judgment
to be made in the minds of the expert retained as counsel to advice
him on the trial of his rights, on the one hand the likelihood of prosecu-
tion and conviction, and on the other hand, advantages of pleading
guilty on one or four counts of the indictment.
Mr. Alch. Senator, I was not moot on that point at all. My
discussion — in my discussions with Mr. McCord, as we were talking
about the defense which we ultimately used, I pointed out to him that,
No. 1, it was the onlv possible legally recognizable defense I could
think of; and also told him that in my opinion, the chances of success
were less than 50-50.
Senator Baker. All right. At that point, what was Mr. McCord's
reply?
Mr. Alch. "I want to go to trial on that defense."
Senator B \ker. On that defense?
Mr. Alch. On that defense.
Senator Baker. When did he then bring up the matter of his
contrived wiretap, I mean conversations with embassies that he
suspected or knew of wireta]:)s? Was it before or after your conversa-
tions with, him about the possibility of pleading guilty either to one or
four counts of the multiple count indictment?
Mr. Alch. I am not sure.
Senator Baker. All right, skip that. Tell me what your reaction
was when Mr. McCord told you of the two embassy phone calls.
Mr. Alch. I asked him what the phone calls were about. He told
me they were phone calls relative to the case, no more.
Senator Baker. Did he tell 3'ou that he suspected they were tapped?
Mr. Alch. He did.
Senator Baker. Did you ask him how he knew" that?
Mr. Alch. I did.
Senator Baker. Wliat did he say?
Mr. Alch. "I know they are."
Senator Baker. I know they are?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you ask him anything else?
Mr. Alch. I asked him, how do you know? He said there was a
similar situation in the Ellsberg case.
Senator Baker. When was the Ellsberg case tried and dismissed?
That was a long time after this?
Mr. Alch. No; he gave me a memorandum. I think it is one of
the papers I submitted to the committee in which he cited the Ellsberg
case.
Senator Baker. When was that? Do you have
Mr. Alch. I do not have a copy with me, but it is one of the docu-
ments I submitted.
Senator Baker. Mr. Counsel, do you have that?
Now, you are a lawver. You are a member of the bar of the District
of Columbia?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Of the State of Massachusetts?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Do you understand your obligations as an officer
of the court?
Mr. Alch. Of course.
339
Senator Baker. Did 3^011 have the impression that 3'oiir chent was
T^dng to manufacture and contrive a method by which the Govern-
nent would be required to dismiss this case, notwithstanding his
ruilt or mnocence?
>,Ir. Alch. No, sir. I did not take this to be a frivolous attempt or
iction on his part. When he told me that these calls were relative to
:he case, at my client's instruction, I presented the motion.
Senator Baker. Had he not told 3'ou the calls were relative to the
:ase, what would you have done? Would 3'ou then have had an
ethical dilemma as an attorne3^?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir. If I had thought in mv own mind that. No. 1,
:he calls were not made or that, No. 2, the3' were made for frivolous
Durposes and of no consequence nor relation to the case, I certainly
vould have.
Senator Baker. I have here a letter stx'led "Dear Gerald," dated
August 23 of what 3'ear?
Mr, Alch. It would have to be 1972.
Senator Baker. I am going to read it into the record, Mr. Chair-
nan. It won't take but a few minutes. The letter is signed "Jim" in
Den. [Reading]:
Dear Gerald:
This case of Ritsso and EUsberg v. Byrne was filed about an hour before I picked
t up at the Supreme Court today. It appeared directly on target for us so made
i copy.
Petitioners are making a pitch of course for government dismissal of the case,
ather than disclose the Chilean Embassy foreign wiretap, in wliich Boudin's
conversations were recorded.
Petitioner's reasons for granting the writ are dirccth' relevant to our situation
n that they are arguing that:
1. On constitutional grounds, the determination of the relevance of wiretapped
lonversations be made in adversary proceedings, rather than in camera.
2. The refusal of the lower court to compel discover^" and to conduct an ad-
versary hearing is in conflict with the pro\isions of the two wiretapping statutes —
;he Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.
3. Wiretaps for foreign intelligence puri^oses — and their constitutionality with-
out a court order — are at issue and their legality needs to be determined bj^ the
Supreme Court in its October session, in order to set this case to rest one way
Dr another.
Though Justice Douglas is in the minority, his comments set forth in the
appendix are a pretty fair summary of the thinking of the court as expressed in
ts two recent decisions (June 19 and June 26th of this year) on the wiretapping
ssue.
In any case, I would bet m.y last dollar that the Supreme Court will rule that
(a) the determination of the relevance of wiretapped conversations be made in
adversary proceedings, rather than in camera, and the identity of the person or
organization on whose phone the tap was made be made known to the defense
and (b) the refusal of the lower court in the EUshcrg case to compel discovery
and to conduct an adversary hearing is in conflict with the two wiretapping
tatutes cited above;
In my own case there are three possibilities relevant to the above:
1. In the Spring of this year, telephone calls were made from my office jjhone
Tom a young Chilean employee of mine, to the Chilean military attache's resi-
lence in D.C.; and calls were received from Chile (from members of his family),
to him at my office phone at night. As an employee of mine, he would appear to
stand in somewhat the same situation as the petitioner's consultants in the EUs-
berg case (page 3 Jurisdiction), if those calls were tapped on national security
grounds by the government.
2. If taps were placed on my home and/or office phones by the government on
the authority of tlie Attornej" General, without court order, during the first week
Ill
340
after my arrest on June 17th, they would he illegal, according to the Supreme
Court decision of June 26th in the case of U.S. v. U.S. District Court of Eastern
Michigan. There is a fair chance that there were such taps during that period on
my phone because at that time, the stories in the press, and the bond hearings,
were full of innuendo that the Watergate operation may have been a Latin-
American or anti-Castro operation out of some type. A tap on domestic security |(W
grounds on the Attorney General's authorization only (now illegal) would be a
fair likelihood.
3. Any calls by me, subsequent to June 17th, to any organization on whom
there was a national security wiretap, would, on motion, have to be disclosed to
the defense if any of the 3 arguments set forth in the Ellsberg writ, under reasons
for granting the writ, prove successful before the Supreme Court. If not disclosed |ier
then prosecution would have to be dropped.
The two slip opinions in the Cclbard Case (June 19th) and the U.S. v. U.S.
District Court of Eastern Michigan (June 26th) were mailed to you about 3 weeks
ago. I'll be copjing the rest of the appendix to the Ellsberg writ of certiorari
tomorrow and mail it to you. Hope you find some encouragement in this.
There are two things about that, Mr. Alch, if I may. It is an ex-
traordinarily thorough legal document.
Would you admit that?
Mr. Alch. If it came from a layman, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And second, that it would appear to you that
3'our client was conveying to you the possibility that those telephone
calls he made to the Chilean Embassy could form the basis for dis-
missal because of nondisclosure of wiretaps on those embassies of the
U.S. Government.
Mr. Alch. That is what he was conveying to me.
Senator Baker. Did you then or do you now think of that as an
effort to contrive defense?
Mr. Alch. No, sir. Because I asked him if these calls were relative
to the case. He told me that they were. When a client comes up to
3^ou and says, "I have been making calls which I believe were tapped,
I think if the Government refuses to disclose them, it may result in
the dismissal of the charges." After having been told b}^ him that they
were relative to the case, I felt it my duty to present a motion.
Senator Baker. I won't proceed further except to say, Mr. Alch,
are you telling this committee that the only thing that saves that
situation from being a contrived defense which you should have
objected to as counsel and as an officer of the court was the single ^I
representation by your client that the material was relevant?
Mr. Alch. Not at all. Let's suppose those calls w^ere intercepted.
Let's suppose the divulging of those interceptions would have led
to very, very material evidence or evidence which led to other evidence
that the Government was going to introduce. That can only be'
ascertained by, No. 1, having the Government come forward and
saying, yes, we did intercept some calls.
Then, according to my understanding, the judge looks at it, sees its
relevancy, sees if it taints any other evidence.
Senator Baker. I understand.
Mr. Alch. It is quite important.
Senator Baker. The distinction you make then, is that on the
basis of filing a motion for discovery the representation of your
client that the cause is relevant to his defense is sufficient, but to
go forward beyond that you needed the substance of the messages
as intercepted, if in fact they were intercepted.
Mr. Alch. I had to know what they were in order to see what, if
anything, can be done with them.
341
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Alcli.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, it is perfectly obvious, of,
Durse, to all members of the committee that the testimony of Mr. Alch
aries significantly from that of Mr. McCord in any number of
istances. I want all witnesses to be put on notice that at an appro-
riate time wherever there is any evidence of perjury, I expect to ask
le staff of this committee to submit a transcript of that possible
erjury to the appropriate prosecuting attorney for action as the
tuation may arise.
Now, Mr, "Alch, how did it happen Mr. McCord selected you as his
ttorney?
Mr. Alch. He called my office and requested an appointment. That
; all I know about it.
Senator Talmadge. You had never met him before?
Mr. Alch. Never in my life, sir.
Senator Talmadge. You do not know who suggested that he call
our office?
Mr. Alch. I do not, sir.
Senator Tal:\[ADGe. And when he called your office, j^ou gave him
n appointment?
Mr. Alch. I did not, but whoever he spoke to set up one, and I
ept it.
Senator Talmadge. And then, he came to see 3^ou in Boston?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And he employed 3^ou at that point?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Now, did ]Mr. McCord ever tell you at any time
hat he thought he was acting legall}^ in this matter because of the
ivolvement of Air. Mitchell or Mr. Dean?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Talaiadge. In a statement that you gave to the members
f the staff of our committee on May 22, 1973, in the presence of Mr.
lam Dash, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Silverstein, Mr. Shure, Mr. Hamilton,
>Ir. Edmisten, I read the following: "As the trial progressed, a deci-
ion began to loom as to whether McCord would take the stand. I
,sked him what he could testify to. At that point he said that the
¥atergate operation had been approved by John Mitchell. I asked
dm liow" he knew this, and he said Liddy told him."
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Tal:\iadge. How do 3'ou explain that discrepancy in your
vidence?
Mr. Alch. I respectfully submit it is not a discrepancy. Wlien he
old me that, he did not tell me that in am' way implying that that
ustified the operation and made it legal. He never told me that be-
ause Liddy told him that Mr. Mitchell was involved that it was legal.
ie merely told me that that is what Liddy told him. At no time when
le told me that was it in the context of him saying to me, "And,
hercfore, I think it is legal."
Senator Talimadge. As a good lawj^er, did you not pursue that ques-
ioii at that time, as to whether or not Mr. Mitchell was involved,
md if it had been approved by him, it would have been legal, would
t not?
342
Mr. Alch. Because — I do not know — because from the very begin-
ning I had specifically asked Mr. ]\IcCord in discussing the defense we
ultimately arrived upon, whether or not he had acknowledged the fact
that he knew he was breaking the law when he did what he did ; he
said he did not understand he was breaking the law.
Senator Talmadge. Now, does the Attorne}^ General have authority
to authorize wiretaps?
Mr. Alch. I believe he does through appropriate court order.
Senator Talmadge. Does he have to have a court order?
Mr. Alch. I believe he does.
Senator Tal]\iadge. I do not believe it required one at that time.
I think if the Attorney General had authorized the wiretap and had
directed Mr. McCord to carry it out, I think it actually would have
been legal. I think the authority for authorizing the wiretap alsc
carries with it the authority of breaking and entering. You did not
further investigate that point that Mr. McCord suggested to 3^011
at that time, did you?
Mr. Alch. No, sir, because, as I sa}^ when he did give me that
information, it was not in the context of him saying what I did was
legal.
Senator Talmadge. I have no further ciuestions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Alch, we have plowed and replowed about
every point of contradiction between you and Mr. McCord many
times, so I will not go into those. But there is one thing we have not
discussed yet, though, and that is Mr. McCord 's letter to Judge
Sirica. That actually touched off the Watergate affair.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. So I think we ought to discuss that perhaps
just a moment or two here.
I have the letter before me, I will not read it all, but I will take up
the various points that he brought out as to why he wanted to talk to
the judge.
The first point he mentions there was political pressure applied to
the defendants to plead guilty and to remain silent. Now, of course, we
have touched upon that to a certain extent here in the questioning of
you, but can you give us anj^ further light on that?
Mr. Alch. I cannot, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did he ever discuss with you at any time, either
from the time he first engaged you as his law^^er until the time he
dismissed you as his lawyer, anything about anj^ political pressure
brought against any defendant in the Watergate affair?
Mr. Alch. He did not, as I believe he stated in that letter.
Senator Gurney. One thing that Mr. McCord did testify to earlier
was that he had some conversations during the trial with Mr. Barker
and also with Martinez, Gonzales, and Sturgis. As I understood the
testimom^ it was during recess periods or after the trial, he would
see them in the corridor, he would talk to them, and that is when this
business of political pressure came up; that is, the other defendants
saying that political pressure was being brought on them, they did
not know exactly what to do about it. His testimony seemed to
indicate they were trying to find out w^hat he was going to do. Were
you with your client most of the time during this trial; what I am
343
trying to find out was, of course, were you present at any of these
talks, and were you with 3'our dient most of the tinie?
Mr. Alch. I thought I was; as I review his testinionj', there appar-
ently was a great deal of activity on his part to which 1 was not privy
either by being present or having knowledge.
Senator Gurney. Well, on that score, Mr. Alch, would you describe
to the committee how you and your client were together during the
trial from the first time that you met in the morning or whenever the
trial began until the end of the day? Would you describe that?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir. On most occasions he would pick me up at my
hotel. We would drive to court. I cannot say that during every 5- or
10-minute recess I stayed by his side. I am sure there were many occa-
sions when I conversed with others. At lunchtime, we would walk
over to, I believe it is the museum near the courthouse; we would
have lunch there. I did not always have lunch with Mr. McCord. On
some occasions I did and on some occasions I did not. When the
court would adjourn for the day, he and I and Mr. Shankman would
take a taxicab to my hotel. Sometimes Mr. Shankman would come
right up with us, other times he would go up to his office, which was
directl}^ across the street, to check on phone calls, and we would have
a discussion on what happened that day, and what was about to
happen the next daj", and Mr. ]\IcCord would go home.
AI}^ next contact with him would be to repeat that procedure the
following day.
Senator Gurney. Were you with him at any time that he had
discussions with Mr. Barker or these other men?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. At no time did he mention to you anything about
political pressure either before, during, or after the trial?
Mr. Alch. The first time he mentioned it to me — well, he did not
mention it to me when I turned to him about that letter and asked
him specifically not about political pressure but why lie had done
this without telling me.
Senator Gurney. What did he say to that?
Mr. Alch. He orally repeated what he said in the letter. He had
not told me because — for my protection.
Senator Gurney. Wh}" did he think j^ou needed protection?
Mr. Alch. I do not know.
Senator Gurney. And not confiding in you as his attorney.
Mr. Alch. I do not know.
Senator Gurney. Then, the next point he makes here, No. 2 —
Perjury occurred during the trial in matters highly material to the very structure
orientation and impact of the Government's case and to the motivation and
intent of the defendants.
Did he ever discuss any perjury that he thought had been committed
at the trial?
Mr. Alch. No, sir. The closest he ever came to that was when Mr.
Magruder was testifying and he leaned over to me and called, he
swore at Mr. Magruder, period. Wlien I cross-examined Mr. Ma-
gruder— this is why it sticks out in my mmd — in trying to support my
defense, I asked Mr. Magruder if he knew Mr. McCord, if he could
observe his duties. He said he could, and he said — I asked him to give
344
me his opinion or to describe the manner in which he carried out hi
duties and he had nothing but superlatives for him. That is it.
Senator Gurney. In his testimony before the committee, as I recal
Mr. McCord had mentioned either before or during the trial he wa
afraid perjury was going to be committed but he never discussed thi
with you at any time?
Mr. Alch. No, and again I referred to that admission of his in hi
letter.
Senator Gurney. Wliat about the motivation and intent of th
defendants — did he ever discuss that with you?
Mr. Alch. No, sir. Keeping in mind
Senator Gurney. Except his own, of course.
Mr. Alch. Of course. But keeping in mind that after the first 2 or
days of trial, there were only two defendants.
Senator Gurney. Yes. But he never discussed the motivation ani
intent of any of the people vdio were arrested in the Watergate affair
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Then, he goes on to say No. 3, "Others involve
in the Watergate operation were not identified durmg the trail whe
they could have been those testified."
Did he ever say to you anything about that?
Mr. Alch. He did, in this sense: Durmg the trial, as I said yestei
day, when we w^ere talkmg about whether or not he would take th
stand to testify, I asked him what the nature of his testimony wouL
be, and that is when he told me that Mr. Liddy had informed hir
that Mr. Mitchell had known and/or approved of this operation.
Senator Gurney. Now, on that score, why do you think he brough
that up? I remember that you had discussions with him about it as t
whether he would testify or not but why do you thmk he brought thi
up? Wliat was his motivation?
Mr. Alch. I can only guess. It happened when I asked him, whe:
we were trymg to decide whether or not he would take the stand,
said to him, "Now, tell me, when you get up there, you are going t
have to tell all that you know, just what do vou know about thi
thing?"
Our defense of duress had been turned down b}" the court. That i
when he told it to me. Why he chose that time to tell it to me,
honestly do not know.
Senator Gurney. Well, did you ask him, "Now, if Mr. Mitchell ii
involved in this, how is this going to help a^ou in the defense that wi
are presenting to the court here?"
Was that discussed?
Mr. Alch. I did tell him, first of all, I asked him, "Wlio told a^ou?'
He said Mr. Liddy. I said, "Do 3'ou have any other corroboration of this?'
He said, "No." Well, j^ou know that this is not a part of our defense
the defense of duress. It was not a part of, and the onh?- actual defense
we had, was just to argue a general lack of criminal intent, which ]
told him was not going to amount to much. It was in that respect thai
I told him that, but I did tell him that despite the relevancy or lack ol!
relevancy to his preferred defense, that was going to come out iii|
response to questions put to him if he elected to take the stand. He
elected not to do so.
wSenator Gurney. No. 5, he says:
345
Sueh statements, some statements, were unfortunatelj^ made by a witness which
left the court with the impression that he was stating untruths or withholding
facts in his linowledge when, in fact, onlj^ honest errors of memory were involved.
Wlio was he talking about there? What was involved in that?
Mr. Alch. I am not sure. But I believe he was talking about Mr.
Baldwin, I am not sure. I believe he was talking about Mr. Baldwin
when Mr. Baldwui said that he could not or thought that the letter or
the man to whom he was to deliver the logs at the Committee To
Re-Elect the President had a German-sounding name and at one
point, whether it was before or after trial Mr. McCord mentioned to
me that the log had, in fact been addressed to Mr. Liddy, and that
this was an honest mistake in recollection on Mr. Baldwin's part.
That maA^ be what he was referring to.
Senator Gurnet. That was not discussed during the trial with you?
Mr. Alch. Not to my knowledge.
vSenator Gurnet. This was afterward?
Mr. Alch. It may have been, I am not sure. It could be when
Baldwin w^as testif3dng to that effect, Mr. McCord ma}" have turned
to me and ad\dsed me of that, that I think he is mixed up because I
remember that the name on the envelope was Liddy and that there
was a guard there with a German-sounding name and he is confusing
it, he may have told me that at the time of Mr. Baldwin's testimonj^
Senator Gurnet. Apparentl}" it is not a very important point but
something that he remembered about the course of the trial.
Mr. Alch. A]5parently.
Senator Gurnet. No. 6 m his letter to the judge says this:
My motivations were different from those of the others involved but were not
limited to or simply those offered in my defense during the trial. This is no fault
of my attorneys but of the circumstances under which we had to prepare our
defense.
Wliat can 3^ou tell us about his motivations being different from
those of the others?
Mr. Alch. I can only tell j^ou two things: No. 1, he told me that his
motivation, that is the protection of others, was peculiar to him. As
to his reference to other areas which we did not pursue through no
fault of any attornej^s I don't know but I can only surmise he was
making references to areas of which he had made no disclosure to me.
Senator Gurnet. Do you know if he wrote the letter or if anybody
else wrote the letter?
Mr. Alch. The letter to Chief Judge Sirica?
Senator Gurnet. Yes, what I am reading from.
Mr. Alch. The onh^ information that I have that could in any way
be interpreted as an answer to that question is this: When I called up
Mr. Fensterwald the night of the day that the memorandum came
out alleging that I had told him about the forgmg of CIA documents,
and I asked him why this had been done he made a reference — Mr.
Fensterwald made a reference — m the telephone conversation, that
"This was a bomb just like the one we dropped on you back before
Judge Sirica."
It stuck out in m}'^ mind because of the use of the word "we."
Whether it was intentional or nonintentional, I don't know. That is
what was said.
346
Senator Gurney. I take it what you are sajdng is that in your own
mind you surmised that together they had drafted this letter which
went to the judge.
Mr. Alch. At that point, I did.
Senator GuR><rEY. Of course, at that point JNIr. Fensterwald was
not Mr. McCord's attorney, was he?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Gx^rney. I mean to your knowledge.
Mr. Alch. Well, I know this much, I don't know whether or not
he was in contact but I had not yet entered his appearance as attorney
of record.
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Speaking of that you mentioned, I think at one time, and I can't
remember now, but it was in the courtroom, you were coming out
of the courtroom, that this unkno^\m man rushed up and said to
McCord, "You can use ni}- office." Wlien did that occur?
Mr. Alch. In the 20-minute recess that Judge Sirica allowed us
to more or less react to his reading of the letter. I stayed in the court-
room with Mr. McCord. It was at that time that Mr, Fensterwald
came up and whispered to Mr. McCord, "If you need an office after
this is over use mine."
Senator Gurney. This was immediately after the letter affair?
Mr. Alch. Immediately after that was read m court.
Senator Gurney. Why did he do that?
Mr. Alch. I don't know.
Senator Gurney. Do you think he might offer an office to you?
Mr. Alch. That would be more appropriate but as to wdiy he made
the offer to Mr. McCord I don't know.
Senator Gurney. Did he, McCord, identify Fensterwald as Fenster-
wald at that time?
Mr. Alch. When I asked who this gentleman was Mr. McCord
said this is Mr. Fensterwald. I turned around and said, "Oh, I talked
to you a great deal on the telephone, how do you do."
And that is when Mr. McCord said to him, "The only thing I am
sorry about is pulling this surprise on Gery."
Mr. Fensterwald said, "Surprise, hell. Let it all hang out."
Senator Gurney. The testimony before us shows, as you know,
that McCord and Caulfield met on some occasions and talked about
Executive clemency.
Mr. Alch. Yes, su\
Senator Gurney. Did McCord ever discuss this with you at any
meetings or conversations— or conversations he ever had with Caulfield?
Mr. Alch. Other than to say that he had received a call from a
man whose name I recall to be Caldwell, that he would not tell me
who it was or what he was talking about. I told him that was his
prerogative and as I explained this morning my concern was to see
whether or not there would be any indication that my counsel to him
was being disregarded, tampered with or modified.
Senator Gurney. But he never mentioned Caldwell as you called
him ever discussing Executive clemenc}^ with you?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. One final question, Mr. Alch.
347
Back to the Bittman meeting, and Barker's going with you in the
taxicab to the meetmg. Did ^''ou ever have any discussion at any time
with Mr. Barker about what came out of this meeting with Mr. Bitt-
man?
Mr. Alch. No, sir. I never saw Mr. Barker that day after he got
out of the cab, and the reason in my statement I put down there was
no significa,nt conversation is because my recollection is that there was
no conversation, and then it da"\vned on me I must have said "hello"
and "goodbye" to him so I put down no significant conversation.
Senator Gurney. But you never had any discussion with him either
at any other time?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank vou very much.
Mr. Alch
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. You have described Mr. F. Lee Bailey as the head
of j'^our law firm; isn't that correct?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. You have also testified that as a matter of prac-
tice and procedure you consulted with Mr. Bailey on every step,
ever}^ development in any case under your jurisdiction?
Mr. Alch. Well, I would not say every step of every case but we do
confer and I do give him more or less progress reports on the case.
Senator Inouye. Does he also advise you as to what you should
be doing?
Mr. Alch. On occasion he tells me what in his opuiion would be the
right thing or the wrong thing to do.
Senator Inouye. And is this a partnership?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. Are you an emploj^ee of Mr. Bailey?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. The fee that was received from Mr. McCord,
the $25,000 going to the law firm or going to you?
Mr. Alch. Unfortunately it goes to the law firm.
Senator Inouye. It goes to the law firm.
You have testified, if I recall, that Mr. McCord really wanted Mr.
Bailey to represent him; isn't that correct?
Mr. Alch. That is what he told me.
Senator Inouye. And that Mr. Bailey had indicated that he did
not want the case?
Mr, Alch. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. But you decided to take the case.
Mr. Alch. Wlien I told Mr. McCord that Mr. Bailey did not
want it, he said, "Well, you look all right to me, you impress me
enough. Will you represent me?" and I said, "Yes."
Senator Inouye. Do you know why Mr. Bailey did not want this
case?
Mr. Alch. No sir, it might have been his commitments, his lack
of time, I do not know.
96-296— 73— bk. 1 23
348
Senator Inouye. Under ordinarj^ circumstances, or shall I say in
normal times, I would not be asking you the following questions.
However, because of the bizarre nature and circumstance of the
matter before this committee, I feel compelled to ask you these
questions.
Mr. Alch. I understand, Senator.
Senator Inouye. No. 1, was Mr. Bailey indicted by a Federal
grand jury?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. When did this happen?
Mr. Alch. To my knowledge, the indictment came down May 18,
1973.
Senator Inouye. Did you discuss 3'our appearance before this
committee with Mr. Bailey?
Mr. Alch. Only to the extent that I advised him that I had received
a telegram from Mr. Dash marked "urgent" asking that I contact
him, and I did so.
Senator Inouye. Has this indictment in any way influenced jour
appearance before this committee?
Mr. Alch. I do not see how it could.
Senator Inouye. Have you been in contact with any person
officially or otherwise connected with the Committee To Re-Elect
the President or the administration?
Mr. Alch. I have been in contact, as I explained yesterda}', with
Mr. Paul O'Brien who was introduced to me or who — to whom I
was directed by Mr. IMcCord, and who was described by Mr. McCord
as counsel to the Committee To Re-Elect the President.
Senator Inouye. My question is have you been in contact since
]Mr. Bailey's indictment?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. So the indictment has not in any way affected
your testimony?
Mr. Alch. Absolutel}^ not, Senator.
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to, if I may, bring up another matter.
I concur with your statement, Mr. Chairaian, that we should let
the chips fall where they may, and the committee's investigation
should go wherever the path leads. In the last few days, Mr. McCord
has raised many serious charges, especially against several political
organizations and members of the Democratic party. I believe these
charges should be investigated, and that any Democrat involved in
any illegal activit}^ should be prosecuted or on the other hand if these
charges have no substance the air should be cleared. As we all recall,
Mr. McCord, in his testimony Fridaj^ and Mr. Alch today, main-
tained that one of the major motivations for taking part in the bugging
of the Watergate offices was his knowledge of "calls and conversation
and coordination" between staff members of these political organiza-
tions and violence groups.
Mr. McCord has implied that his daily review of materials from
the Internal Securit}^ Division ma}^ have fed his belief or at least did
not refute his fear.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, very respectfully I wish to recommend
that the committee submit a jfomial request to the Justice Department ,
349
more specifically the Internal Security Division, that it provide this
committee whatever evidence and information it has collected which
indicates the existence of a criminal conspiracy or the involveinent of
the Democratic National Committee or any of the Democratic Presi-
jjdent^al candidates named in Mr. McCord's testimon}^, to wit, Mr.
Muskie or Mr. McGoveni with any violence groups to carry out
unlawful acts.
Senator Ervin. As I understand it, the staff of the committee has
been trjdng to investigate this field.
Apart from this, I would make an observation. Ever since 1 have
been in Washington, 1 found there are a lot of people in authority in
Washington who see subversives and dissenters and ghosts hiding
under the beds and every rosebush and, unfortunately, some of them
get into a security position but I certainly agree with you this should
be looked into.
Senator Inouye. Because I consider
Senator Ervin. I will ask the staff to prepare a letter to make that
request to the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice.
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. I have a few questions, Mr. Chairman.
Air. Alch, what were the exact words or the mental attitude of Mr.
McCord when you confronted him with the offer to plead to one
harge in exchange for him being a Go\ernment witness, assuming
that you did not recommend it?
Mr. Alch. He said words to the effect "no deal."
Senator Montoya. What else did he say?
Mr. Alch. Just "Tell them I am not interested in that type of
iiTangement."
Senator Montoya. Now this was communicated to Mr. McCord as
1 result of your meetmg in the office of Mr. Bittman, is that correct?
Mr. Alch. Are we talking about — I may have misunderstood you,
Senator, are you talking
Senator Montoya. As I understood your testimony you went to
Mr. Bittman's office on January 8?
Mr. Alch. Yes sir.
Senator Montoya. You went into a private conference with him?
Mr. Alch. Yes sir.
Senator Montoya. And you discussed with him the possibility that
Mr. Hunt was gomg to offer a plea of guilty?
Mr. Alch. Yes sir.
Senator Montoya. Now, did you at that conference ascertain or
lid you at that conference receive the suggestion or analyze the
suggestion from the prosecutors as to what they might do if Mr.
McCord would plead guilty?
Mr. Alch. No sii'.
Senator Montoya. Did you discuss it with Mr. Bittman?
Mr. Alch. I did not.
Senator Montoya. I understand from your testimony, of course,
-hat these conferences or offers by the prosecutors took place in the
'ourtroom; is that correct?
350'
Mr. Alch. Either in the courtroom or at their office.
Senator Montoya. Yes,
Now, did you attend any other conferences in Mr. Bittman's office?
Mr. Alch. Yes sir.
Senator Montoya. When was this?
Mr. Alch. The exact dates I do not recalL I recall the purposes.
One such purpose was to prepare motions, memorandums, affidavits
in support of motions; one such occasion Mr. McCord accompanied
me up there. The reason
Senator Montoya. But you remained outside?
Mr. Alch. No, no, he came in with me on this particular occasion
to which I am referring because we were using Mr. Bittman's office
and secretarial help because of logistics problems, whenever immediate
typing had to be done.
Senator Montoya. Now, on what date did you and the lawyers for
the other defendants meet to work out the strategy for the trial?
Mr. Alch, There were several meetings. I cannot specifically recall
the dates. I could tell you that there were, to my recollection, perhaps
three or four in the late fall and winter— in the late months of 1972.
Senator Montoya. During what particular conferences did the
matter of the CIA involvement being used as a defense occur?
Mr. Alch. Mr. McCord claimed it was December 21, 1972. It could
very well be. He may very well be right about that.
Senator Montoya. Well, with respect to that conference what
transpired specifically?
Mr. Alch. As I told the other Senators, I announced what my de-
fense was going to be. The response was "Well, this applies to your
man but it does not do us any good." At that point, the question was
asked "Is this a CIA operation?" In the conversation that followed, it
was pointed out that some of the defendants, if not all of them, had
prior CIA connections, that one of them had been caught with docu-
ments which purported to be CIA-forged credentials, and each laAvyer
agreed to ask the client whether or not there was in fact a factual basis
for CIA involvement and then we went on with the conference.
Senator Montoya. Who brought up the matter of using the CIA
involvement as a defense? '
Mr. Alch. I have told the Senators, I am not sure. It nlay have
been Mr, Bittman, it may have been one of the other defense attorneys.
I just do not have specific recall.
Senator Montoya. Were any of the defendants present at this con-
ference? .
Mr. Alch. I believe that — ^I believe Mr. Liddy waS present.
Senator Montoya, Did you communicate specifically to the con-
ference and those attending that Mr. McCord would have none of that?
Mr. Alch. Not at that time because I hadn't discussed it with him
After I discussed it with him and he told me that— at a subsequent
meeting, I did say to them, "Mr. McCord says there is no CIA in-
volvement and he will have no part of any allegations to that effect."
Senator Montoya. When did you discuss it with him? MJote or less?
Mr. Alch. It was late in the year. -:...; j ... .,.! .
/Senator Montoya. Was that in December? -.roTvioiA •.'•j.ri.iar-^
Mr, Alch, December 21, 1 believe. And then a fey^d'ays Idter in'l
Boston. .;,.;;;
351
Senator Montoya. Then Mr. McCord advised Mr. Shankman, your
local participator in the defense, that he did not want to communicate
with you for the reason that you were trying to get the CIA involve-
ment in as a defense. That is correct, isn't it?
Mr. Alch. That is what Mr. Shankman told me Mr. McCord told
him.
Senator Montoya. And that is what 3^ou testified here.
Mr. Alch. Wliat I said, sir, was when I confronted Mr. McCord
after the letter of dismissal had been given to Judge Sirica, I told him
that Mr. Shankman had told me the reason for his being dissatisfied
was this CIA-contemplated defense and I said to him in words or
substance, I thought that was laid to rest at our last meeting, to which
he replied, "That is not my reason. My reason is I don't thmk you are
communicatmg with me enough, I don't think you are adequately
preparing the case," et cetera.
Senator Montoya. Did you feel any time that Mr. McCord was
not giving you all the material facts to present an adequate defense?
Mr. Alch. Well, I knew from the very beginning by what he told
me. When I asked him what is involved, he said, *T am just gomg to
tell you what my motivation was."
Senator Montoya. Well, 3'ou indicated in testimony that he would
not give you in man}^ instances immediate responses.
Mr. Alch. That is right.
Senator Montoya. And there would be days of lapse and then he
would come back with defense answers.
Mr. Alch. Yes, and mostly in written memorandums.
Senator Montoya. Well, did this not disturb you in trying to
present an adecpiate defense?
Mr. Alch. It puzzled me a bit, because when I
Senator Montoya. Did it ever occur to you that in view of that
attitude by Mr. McCord and his failure to respond to your questions
and divulge all the necessary information, that you might consider
withdrawing from the case?
Mr. Alch. No, sir, for this reason. What I would ask him to give
to me was corroboration of a lot of things. From the very beginning, he
said, this is why I broke into the Watergate. And I would say to him,
well, can you give me reasons documenting or corroborating your
intention? And he would say, let me think about it.
Then I would get in the mail memorandums, some of which I have
made available to this committee, outlining, here is my reason, here
is the information I was receiving.
Senator Montoya. All right. Then during your meeting of January 8,
3^ou indicated that Mr. Bittman had told you when you expressed
Mr. McCord's concern about what was going on, that he was being
made the fall gu}', you indicated that Mr. Bittman had told you, tell
McCord that he will receive a call from a friend.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Now, did you at that time ask Mr. Bittman
what that call would be about?
Mr. Alch. I did not.
Senator Montoya. Did it arouse your curiosity?
■ _Mr. Alch. To the extent I surmised that it had something to do
with his fears or his suspicions that his codefendants were ganging
352
up on him, because Mr. Bittman said it right after I made that
remark to Mr. McCord.
Senator Montoya. You are an inquisitive lawyer. You didn't ask
any questions as to who might be calling your client on that night?
Mr. Alch. I did not. I assumed that it was going to be or could
have been Mr. Hunt.
Senator Montoya. And did you ask Mr. McCord when you told
him this who might be calling him that night?
Mr. Alch. I did not.
vSenator Montoya. Did you speculate as to what the call might be?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. What did you speculate to him about?
Mr. Alch. The purpose — I didn't speculate to him. I speculated
in m}^ own mind that the purpose might be to allay his fears.
Senator Montoya. Now, after Mr. McCord s)>oke to this alleged
friend, did you ask him the next day what the call was about?
Mr. Alch. No, sir, it didn't come up the next day. It was some
days later, and I don't exactly recall how many days it was.
Senator Montoya. And you had no curiosity in 3'our mind about
this thing at all?
Mr. Alch. No, sir. I was preparing a case; we were selecting a iury.
I had my hands full.
vSenator Montoya. All right, now, when you discussed — or did you
discuss with Mr. Bittman the offer of clemency?
Mr. Alch. In the context that I have described, yes, sir.
vSenator Montoya. Do you believe or did you have reason to believe
Mr. Bittman was serious about this offer of clemency?
Mr. Alch. In my opinion, he was not.
vSenator Montoya. Did you discuss with Mr. McCord the possi-
bilities of clemency in the event that he should plead guilty?
Mr. Alch. No, sir, the only time I discussed clemency with him
was when I relayed to him my discussion with Mr. Bittman, and I
told him in words or substance, don't rely on it because it won't
happen.
Senator Montoya. Now, at the time that you were advised that
Mr. Hunt would plead guilty, did you ever entertain the notion, or
was there ever any discussion to the effect that the plea would be in
exchange for a later grant of Executive clemenc}^?
Mr. Alch. No, sir, because the reason given to me by Mr. Bittman
was that Mr. Hunt was so emotionally upset over the death of his wife
that he simply could not stand the rigors of the trial. That is what
was told to me.
Senator Montoya. Were you aware or did j'^ou have any sus-
picions that Mr. McCord or any of the defendants were being offered
clemency in exchange for a plea of guilty?
Mr. Alch. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. Were you aware of any interest on the part
of any people at the White House that in the event Mr. McCord
would plead guilty, there would be some favoritism with respect or
m the direction of clemency from the Wliite House?
Mr. Alch. No, sir, I don't know anybody at the White House,
vSenator Montoya. Now, I recognize the two positions taken here
from the testimony of Mr. McCord and you.
353
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Now, Mr. McCord has already pleaded guilty
or has been found guilty by the court and jury, and he is up for
sentencing. He has nothing at stake now except waiting for the
mercy of the judge in the sentencing procedure.
Now, there is this obvious contradiction in the testimony. And I
see that Mr. McCord's testimony will serve him no further except
to say the truth.
Now, you have denied his testimony m your statement. My ques-
tion to you is what would be the consequences to you as an attorney
should the McCord allegations be found to be true?
Mr. Alch. Are you talking about the allegations that I
Senator Montoya. With respect to you.
Mr. Alch. Well, what specific allegations? All allegations which I
have denied, 1 saj^ are not true.
vSenator Montoya. Now, you have an interest in tr3ing to dispel
the veracity of Mr. McCord's allegations in that if they would be
found to be true or credible, you would be subject to some ethical —
some reprisals — from some grievance committee or from a court;
would that not be true?
Mr. Alch. Perhaps, as I look upon it now. M,y immediate reaction
when I heard them. Senator, was that the man is telling things about
me that are not true, that accuse me of improper, illegal conduct, and
I want an opportunity to refute those allegations.
Senator Montoya. So you have a very specific interest — with which
I do not quarrel — in appearing before this committee to dispel what
has been said about you by way of casting aspersions on your integrity?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. That is all.
Senator Ervin. I want to ask two or three C|uestions.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Mr. McCord told 3'ou that he had been furnished
information from the Internal vSecurity Division of the Department of
Justice and from other sources, which led him to believe that there
might be some violence practiced against the President or his surro-
gates in the campaign, did he not?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And that was the kind of defense he wanted to
interpose, was it not?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you studied that defense and briefed it and
Judge Sirica held, during the progress of the trial, that he would charge
that that defense was imavailable, legalh^ speaking?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Then the only defense j^ou were left mth was the
defense of lack of criminal intent on the part of Mr. McCord?
Mr. Alch. If it can be called a defense; yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Well, as you told him, that was a very weak defense,
and I think that is because it is a rule of law, is it not, t hat every man
is presumed to intend the natural consequences ot^is own acts, and
the natural consequences of McCord's own acts was that he was
caught in the Watergate?
Mr. Alch. That is correct.
354
Senator Ervin. Now, you suggested that you might solve some
conflict in testimony by a polygraph test?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Do you not know, as a lawyer, that polj^^graph tests
are not admitted in evidence in any court in the United States?
Mr. Alch. I know — I believe that in some jurisdictions, Senator,
if there is a stipulation by the adversary parties to the effect that
whatever the results are, if the judge in the case determines that it is
given by a competent examiner under proper circumstances, it is
admissible.
I also know of recent Federal decisions. The reason I say this is
because, as a defense attorney, we sometimes utilize that, both for
investigation and to try to get it into evidence.
I am also cognizant of recent Federal decisions which have held
that under certain circumstances, it is admissible.
Senator Ervin. Do you not know, as a lawyer, that the over-
whelming majority of all judicial decisions are to the effect that poly-
graph tests will not be received as evidence?
Mr. Alch. Senator, I was asked by Senator Baker as to snay sugges-
tions I could offer as to how to resolve the question of credibility, which
understandably, to me is most important. I gave the Senator that
answer.
Senator Ervin. My question had no relation to that. Mj'' question
was do you not know, as a lawyer, that results of polygraph tests are
not received as evidence by any court in the United States?
Mr. Alch. I do not. I believe that there are certain jurisdictions
now, today, there are opinions which state they are admissible. I
believe, and this is just my opinion, that, as time goes on, they will
eventually be admissible. But I think they are admissible in some
jurisdictions today.
Senator Ervin. My question is this: Do you not know, as a lawyer,
that the overwhelming majoritj?" of all courts in the United States
hold that polygraph tests are not admissible in evidence?
Mr. Alch. Yes, but the trend, in my opinion, is beginning to go
the other way. And I think it should. I have faith in them.
Senator Ervin. There are 86 different Federal judges in the United
States — district judges. No, more than that. There are 86 separate
Federal districts in the United States and an old lawyer in St. Louis
made a speech some time ago in which he said :
Do not waste your time looking up the law in advance, because you can find
some Federal district court decision that will sustain any proposition you make.
Mr. Alch. Senator, I know from my own experience that a great
many, if not all, prosecutors heavily rely on them.
Senator Ervin. Yes. I happen to have made a study of polj^graph
tests, and I call them 20th century witchcraft. I think a guilty person
who is calm can pass one without unj difficulty, and a truthful person
who is nervous could pass one with great difficulty.
_ Senator Baker. I would like to say something, and I will say it
either now or when you finish.
Senator Ervin. Say it now.
Senator Baker. To begin with, I did not bring up the question of
the lie detector test — the polygraph test. I asked the witness very
355
properly for any suggestions he had as to how we could arrive at the
truth in a contradictory situation.
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. This is not a court of law. We are not bound by
the rules of evidence. If we were, we would not have gotten two-thirds
of the testimony we have. We would have been out on the hearsay
rule. But this is a factfinding group and I am not suggesting that we
compel these witnesses to take a polygraph test. But I must say, Mr.
Chairman, that if these people who are in conflict want to do that, I
think we would do a disservice if we did not permit them to and receive
that for whatever it is worth.
If I were a sitting judge and had to decide whether the results of
that test were hearsay or not, I would be hard put to conclude that
it was not hearsay or was not in violation of a constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination. But I am not a judge. I hope I never am a
judge.
Senator Ervin. Well, I have followed the rules of evidence so far as
I can, because I think the experience of the rest and the administration
of justice shows it is about the best way to ascertain truth.
Senator Baker. Let me make a suggestion, Mr. Chairman, if you
will hsten to me for just a second. I would hke Mr. Dash to hear it,
too. And I do not have any idea what Mr. Fensterwald will say about
that, about whether he wants to take a polygraph test or not. If he
does not, there is nothing anybody is going to do about it. Nor is
anybody, as far as I am concerned, going to make any comment on it.
That is yet to be determined.
But if we are suddenly going to be bound by the rules of evidence,
we have given them only the most glancing pass so far in this hearing.
Then I would suggest as an alternative possibility, Mr. Chairman,
that if it is indeed the embodiment of 20th century witchcraft — which
I do not beheve, because I think virtually every police department in
the United States now uses it in its investigative work — I would
suggest mstead the possibility that the staff — that the staff as a part
of its investigative technique, undertake those results and then this
committee "will decide whether it has any value or not.
Senator Ervin. Did not Judge Sirica state several times during the
course of the trial on criminal charges, that the lawyers on neither side
of the case were asking the right questions in respect to who or whether
the accused were hired to break into Watergate, and if so, by whom
they were hired?
Mr. Alch. My recollection, Senator, is that if those questions were
asked b}^ Chief Judge Sirica, they related to the prosecution.
Senator Ervin. Yes. Now, as a matter of fact, did it not come out in
the evidence that Sturgis, Barker, Martinez, and Gonzales had
approximately $4,200 in bills whose serial numbers showed that they
came from the campaign funds contributed to reelect the President?
Mr. Alch. I have no specific recall. That may be correct.
Senator Ervin. You do not recall that?
Mr. Alch. Not specifically.
Senator Ervin. Do you recall it otherwise than specifically? Do you
not recall evidence to that effect?
Mr. Alch. I do not recall the exact amount. I remember that there
was money introduced.
356
Senator Ervin. And do you not know that they were traced in the
evidence, the serial numbers, to a bank in Miami taken out of the
$114,000 deposited, $89,000 of which came out of the Mexican bank
and $25,000 through a check of Mr. Dahlberg?*
Mr. Alch. I believe that was the evidence.
Senator Ervin. You were told by your client that John Mitchell was
involved and he told you that he had been told that bv Liddy, did he
not?
Mr. Alch. He did.
Senator Ervin. And he knew that Liddy and McCord and Hunt had
all worked for the Committee to Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Alch. He did.
Senator Ervin. Yes; and Mr. Magruder. Were any questions asked
by anybody to indicate whether or not anybody other than those
three were involved in the Watergate?
Mr. Alch. By me?
Senator Ervin. By anybody.
Mr. Alch. I do not recall. I did not. Disclosure from Mr. McCord
regarding what ]Mr. Liddy told him came after Mr. Magruder had
testified.
Senator Ervin. Now, as a matter of fact, did not the Department of
Justice maintain, clear up to the Supreme Court of the United States,
that the Attorney General had the right and power to exercise elec-
tronic surveillance over persons suspected of domestic subversion
without gettmg an order of the court, or the President, acting through
the Attorney General?
Mr. Alch. I do not recall that. If you are referring, and I am asking
this respectfully, are you referring, Senator, to when there was an
appeal regarding whether or not the contents of the monitored calls
should be divulged?
Senator Ervin. Yes, but do you not know as a lawyer, talking about
several district court cases on that point, some of which held that the
President had the inherent power to wiretap without an order of the
court in cases of domestic subversion, and others held to the contrary?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And finally, the Supreme Court of the United States,
2 days after the Watergate break-m, handed down the unanimous
decision that that power did not exist?
Mr. Alch. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
Mr. Alch. Am I excused, Mr. Chaii'man or shall I return?
Senator Ervin. We will excuse j^ou, subject to recall.
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., this same day.]
Afternoon Session, Thursday, May 24, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Counsel, Mr. Hamilton, will call the first witness.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Bernard L. Barker, please.
•Checks will appear as exhibits Nos. 21-25 in "Phase I, Watergate Investigation, Book 2."
357
Senator Ervin. Mr. Barker, do j'oii solemnly swear that the evi-
dence you shall give to the Senate Select Committee shall be the
tinith, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Barker. I do.
Senator Ervin. Let the record show that the witness is testifying
under an order of immunity entered b}' Judge Silica pursuant to the
resolution and request of the committee under sections 6002 and 6005
of title 18 of the United States Code.
You may take your seat, Mr. Barker.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Barker, would you state 3'our full name,
please?
TESTIMONY OF BERNARD L. BARKER
Mr. Barker. My name is Bernard L. Barker.
Mr. Hamilton. And where do you reside, Mr. Barker?
Mr. Barker. At present I am in Cell Block 4, District of Columbia
Jail.
Mr. Hamilton. And where is your home residence?
Mr. Barker. 5229 Northwest'Fourth Street, Miami, Fla.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Barker, would you please give us the date and
the place of your birth?
Mr. Barker. March 17, 1917, Havana, Cuba.
Mr. Hamilton. And were your parents American nationals?
Mr. Barker. Both my parents were American nationals. My
mother was an American national of Cuban descent.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, Mr. Barker, did you serve in World War II?
Mr. Barker. That is con-ect.
Mr. Hamilton. And were you a prisoner of w ar?
Mr. Barker. That is coirect.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Barker, do you now stand convicted in regard
to your role in the break-in of the Democratic National Committee
headquarters at the Watergate on June 17, 1972?
Mr. Barker. I do.
Mr. Hamilton. Did you also participate in a break-in of those
headquarters on the Memorial Day weekend of 1972?
Mr. Barker. I did.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Barker, who recruited you for these activities?
Mr. Barker. E. Howard Hunt.
Mr. Hamilton. And was Mr. Hunt your supervisor in the Watergate
operations?
Mr. Barker. That is correct.
Mr. Hamilton. And had Mr. Hunt also been 3'our commanding
officer in the Bay of Pigs operation?
Mr. Barker. The words "commanding officer," I was Mr. Hunt's
principal assistant in the Bay of Pigs operation.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Barker, was the first Watergate-type affair that
you participated in the break-in of the office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychia-
trist in September of 1971?
Mr. Barker. That is correct.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, for these activities, the Watergate operations
and the EUsberg affair, were you paid by Mr. Himt for your participa-
tion in these matters?
Mr. Barker. No.
358
Mr. Hamilton. Well, if you received no pay, Mr. Barker, what
was your motivation for participating in these operations?
Mr. Barker. The original operation was the Ellsberg operation.
It was explained to me that this was a matter of national security.
After this operation, the second operation was on Mr. Hoover's
death and this was an operation to give assistance and to infiltrate a
group of persons who were at the Capitol steps.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Barker, would you put the microphone a bit
closer to your mouth, please.
Mr. Barker. The third operation was the first entry into the Water-
gate. There was a second entry at the Watergate when we were
captured. At no time was I told any different from the original motiva-
tion for which I had been recruited.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Barker, is it correct that part of your motiva-
tion for participating in these operations was to gain later assistance
from Mr. Hunt and others in high places for a Cuban liberation opera-
tion, is that correct?
M 
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