PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
.f^ SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIKD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
TJ. S. Gcverrjinen^- r-""-^.'-^ts Depository
Franklin i'ierce i c-r Library
/^
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, X973
Book 3
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-296 O WASHINGTON : 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3
Stock Number 5270-01963
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session)
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina, Chairman
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vice Chairman
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, Georgia EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida
DANIF.L K. INO UYE, Hawaii LOWELL P. WEICKE R, Jr., Connecticut
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico
Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Fred D. Tnoyipaoy:, Minority Counsel
RiTFUS L. Edmisten, Deputy Chief Ccumel
David M. Dorsen, Assistant Chief o unsel
Terry F. Lenzser, Assistant Chief Counsel
James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel
Carmine S. Bellino, Chief Investigator
Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator
Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel
R. Phillip Haire, Assistant Counsel
Marc Lackritz, Assistant Counsel
William T. Mayton, Assistant Counsel
Ronald D. RoTVtiUA, Assistant Counsel
Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel
Howard S. 'Liebe'sgood, Assistant Minority Counsel
H. William Shvre, Assistant Minority Counsel
Robert Silverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel
Laura Matz, Administrati-ie Assistant
Carolyn Andrade, Office Manager
Joan C. Cole, Secretary to IheMinority
(U)
CONTENTS
HEARING DAYS
Page
Monday, June 25, 1973 911
TuesdaV, June 26, 1973 1021
WITNESS
Monday, June 25, 1973
Dean, John W., Ill, former counsel to the President, accompanied by
Charles N. Shaffer and Robert C. McCandless, counsels 911
Tuesday, June 26, 1973
Dean, John W., Ill, testimony resumed 1021
INTERROGATION OF JOHN W. DEAN III BY MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE AND COUNSELS
Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr 1060-1063
Talmadge, Hon. Herman E 1044-1054
Montova, Hon. Joseph M 1074-1094
Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr 1055-1059, 1063-1074
Dash, Samuel, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 1021-1031
Thompson, Fred D., Minority Counsel 1032-1044
EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
No. 32— (913) Letter of June 18, 1973, to Senator Ervin from Shaffer,
McKeever and Fitzpatrick, law offices 1095
No. 33— (914) Letter of June 19, 1973, to Mr. Dean from Leonard Gar-
ment, counsel to the President 1099
No. 34-1 — (918) Memorandum for John Dean from the President, dated
March 12, 1973, re: College student and demonstrations
(from Washington Post storj-) 1 100
No. 34-2 — (919) Memorandum for H. R.' Haldeman from Jack Caulfield,
dated February 11, 1971, re: Anderson leaks and various
other memorandums 1101
No. 34-3— (922) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from Gordon Stra-
chan, re: Leaks and various other memorandums 1111
No. 34-4 — (923) Information concerning Senator Edward M. Kennedy's
visit to Honolulu August 17-19, 1971 1117
Nos. 34-5 through 34-8 — (923) Submitted for identification only, not for
pubfication, and will be retained in the files of the committee.
No. 34-9 — (925) The proposed budget for "Operation Sandwedge" and
various other memorandums relating to the securitj^ aspects
of the plan 1121
No. 34-10 — (925) Photograph of membership card for Democratic Na-
tional Committee 1133
No. 34-11 — (926) Information re: Congressman McCloskey's New Hamp-
shire Campaign 1134
No. 34-12 — (926) Memorandum to the Attorney General from John Dean.
Subject: Operation Sandwedge 1149
Note : Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the
record.
(in)
IV
No. 34-13 — (928) Copy of agenda prepared b}^ Gordon Liddy for meeting of Page
November 24, 1971, with Attorney General Mitchell and
John Dean 1150
No. 34-14 — (931) Memorandum for Larry Higby fnnn John Dean with
attachments 1151
No. 34-15 — (935) White House memorandum for John Dean from Charles
Colson concerning Howard Hunt, with attachments 1157
No. 34-16— (939) FBI interview of Charles Colson 1 160
No. 34-17 — (943) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman
from John Dean re: O'Brien letter concerning special
prosecutor 1161
No. 34-18 — (954) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re:
Chronology of Howard Himt's activities 1169
No. 34-19 — (957) Memorandums re: Counteractions (Watergate) by
Kenneth Parkinson and John Dean 1173
No. 34-20 — (959) Letter from Congressman Brown to Attorney General
re: Banking and Currency Committee investigation into
Watergate activities 1181
No. 34-21 — (961) Memorandum to John Dean from Kenneth Parkinson
re: 1972 political fihngs 1183
No. 34-22 — (961) Banking and Currency Committee notice of meeting
change and subpena list, with attachments 1190
No. 34-23 — (961) Letter to Congressman Patman from Assistant Attorney
General Henry Petersen re: Extensive public hearings into
financial aspects of Watergate "Bugging" incident 1194
No. 34-24 — (965) Question and answer conversation between Ziegler,
Ehrlichman, Chapin, and Moore. Statement by Dwight
Chapin 1200
No. 34-25 — (967) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean
re: Watergate and Segretti, with attachments 1210
No. 34-26 — (968) Information on campaign spending — HRH and Dean,
dated May 18, 1971 1226
No. 34-27 — (968) Memorandum for Herb Kalmbach from John Dean
re: Bill from Jack Gleason's lawyer on Common Cause law
suit ' 123 1
No. 34-28— (973) White House note to John Dean from Charles Colson
"Now what the hell do I do?" with attachment 1233
No. 34-29— (974) Handwritten note to Mr. John Caulfield re: CIA taking
the blame 1235
No. 34-30 — (976) Document entitled "Relevancy of Intercepted Com-
mim ications " 1236
No. 34-31 — (977) Message given by Saimdra Greene to Mr. Gordon
Liddy " 1 238
No. 34-32 — (980) Memorandum for the President from John Dean re:
Congressional hearings regarding Watergate 1239
No. 34-33 — (982) Memorandum from H. R. Haldeman for John Dean re:
Appointment of minoritj' counsel to " Ervin Committee,"
with additional memos 1 240
No. 34-34 — (988) Agenda — Matters to be discussed and resolved 1243
No. 34-35 — (988) Potential matters for discussion with Senator Baker
(Meeting to be totally off the record) 1245
No. 34-36 — (989) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean,
with attachment entitled "Talking Points for Meeting with
the Attorney General" 1247
No. 34-37 — (990) Memorandum for Larry Higby and John Dean from
Jerry Jones. Subject: Options for Jeb Magruder 1249
No. 34-38 — (991) Memorandum for the files from John Dean. Subject:
Call from Secretary Dent re Jel) Magruder 1251
No. 34-39— (997) Draft letter addressed "Dear Mr. Chairman" from
John Dean with oath attached to bottom of letter 1252
No. 34-40 — (1004) Taped conversation between Dean and Magruder with
attached Camp David envelope 1258
No. 34-41 — (1004) Statement of charges against White House and Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President officials 1261
Note: Figures in ii.uoiitlie.ses indicate page tliat exhibit was officially made part of the
record.
No. 34-42 — (1005) Memorandum for the file re: Maroulis conversation Paee
with Dean on March 29, 1973, concerning Maroulis' client,
G. Gordon Liddy 1262
No. 34-43 — (1006) John Dean's Camp David report with attached hand-
WTitten notes 1263
No. 34-44 — (1010) Summation of Segretti involvement in Watergate case. 1294
No. 34-45 — (1011) Memorandum bv John Dean re: Meeting with John
Mitchell, April 10, 1973 1308
No. 34-46 — (1012) Alemorandum by John Dean of his meeting with Fred
LaRue on April 13, 1973, re: LaRue's appearance before
grand j ury 1311
No. 34-47 — (1013) List of names denoting "Pre, post, and potential o/j"_ . 1312
No. 34-48 — (1015) Message from John Dean to the President, April 15,
1973 1313
No. 34-49 — (1017) Two letters to the President on White House stationery,
dated April 16, 1973. (Letter of resignation and letter re-
questing indefinite leave of absence.) 1314
No. 34-50— (1018) Letter from John Dean to the President, April 16, 1973.
Request for indefinite leave of absence 1316
No. 34-51 — (1018) Draft statement re: Grand jury's investigation into
Watergate and leave-of-absence requests from H. R. Halde-
man, John Ehrlichman, and John Dean 1317
No. 35 — (1062) Document concerning operational restraints on intelligence
collection 1319
No. 36 — (1062) Memorandum for Mr. Huston from H. R. Haldeman re:
Domestic intelligence review, dated July 14, 1970 1324
No. 37 — (1062) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from Tom Huston re:
Domestic intelligence, dated August 5, 1970 1325
No. 38 — (1062) Memorandum from Tom Huston to H. R. Haldeman,
dated August 7, 1970. Subject: Domestic Intelligence Review- _ 1330
No. 39 — (1062) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from Tom Huston,
dated August 25, 1970. Subject: Subversive Activities Control
Board 1331
No. 40— (1062) Memorandum dated September 10, 1970, for H. R. Halde-
man from Tom Huston re: Future air hijaclcings and use of
increased intelligence information 1333
No. 41 — (1062) Note from Sol Lindenbaum to John Dean with attached
memorandums regarding procedures to commence domestic
intelligence operation 1 334
No. 42— (1062) Memorandum dated September 21, 1970, to H. R. Halde-
man from Tom Huston. Subject: IRS and Ideological Organi-
zations, with attachments 1338
No. 43 — (1062) Submitted for identification onlj^, not for publication, and
wiU be retained in the files of the committee.
Note : Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the
record.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
PHASE I: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION
MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washingto7i, D.O.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and TVeicker.
Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Eufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief
counsel : Arthur S. ]Miller, chief consultant ; Jed Johnson, consultant ;
David ]M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
cliief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant ; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye ; Robert
Baca, office of Senator Montoya : Ron Mc^Mahan, assistant to Senator
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flani-
gan, assistant publications clerk.
Senator ER^^N. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will call the first witness.
Mr. Dash. Mr. John W. Dean III.
Senator Er^tn. Stand up and raise your right hand. Do you swear
that the evidence that you shall give to the Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Compaign Activities shall be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God.
Mr. Dean. I do, so help me God.
Senator Er^tcn. You are accompanied by counsel, and I would ask,
your name is John W. Dean III ?
TESTIMONY OF JOHN W. DEAN III: ACCOMPANIED BY CHARLES N.
SHAPFER AND ROBERT C. McCANDLESS, COUNSELS
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator ER^^x. I would ask counsels to identify themselves for the
record. You may be seated.
Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Chairman, mv name is Charles N. Shaffer from
Rockville, Md.. and T am one of ]Mr. Dean's counsels.
(911)
912
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Chairman, I am Kobert C. McCandless of
Washington, D.C., and I too, am one of Mr. Dean's counsels.
Senator Ervin. I would like for members of the committee, the wit-
ness, and counsels for the witness to pay strict attention to what I shall
say.
Mr. Dean appears before the committee and has appeared previously
before the staff of the committee on obedience to subpena from the
committee.
Mr. Dean at all times has claimed that he is privileged against testi-
fying by the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment on the
ground that any testimony lie might give to the committee concerning
the matters the committee is authorized to investigate might incrimi-
nate him and, therefore, he appears involuntarily. The committee has
unanimously in times past, requested His Honor, Judge Sirica, Chief
Judge of the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia, to enter
an order of immunity for the witness under the provisions of sections
6002 and 6005 of the title 18 of the United States Code. The committee
pursuant to those statutes, gave 10 days notice to the Attorney General
of its application to Judge Sirica and at the instance of the Attorney
General, Judge Sirica delayed entering an order until more than 20
days thereafter had expired. He then entered an order of immunity
under the statutes, and Mv. Dean has now been informed of that fact
and has jDreviously been informed of that fact and he is now testify-
ing under this order of immunity granted at the instance of tlie com-
mittee. He appears here involuntarily as a witness pursuant to this
order, and he has heretofore been ordered by the committee to answer
the questions and he has all the testimony he has previously given
to the committee staff and all the testimony which he may give to this
committee is given by him on the basis of the order of immunity. Is
that correct?
Mr. Shaffer. That is correct, Mr, Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Now, if there is no objection on the part of any mem-
ber of the committee, the chairman will define his statement to be tlie
facts on behalf of the committee.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I might say just for the completion
of the record to that effect, that it is also my understanding that in
addition to appearing in response to subpena and after having claimed
his constitutional privileges, after the attachments of use immunity,
as the chairman has just indicated, that counsel for ]Mr, Dean at a
previous executive session of this committee made certain other re-
quests, particularly that the witness waived no rights, that he was ap-
pearing involuntarily and pursuant to subpena, and he filed an applica-
tion to be excused from testifying because of the fear of prejudice effect
on the possibility of his subsequent trial and that he requested that
coverage of the hearings be either in executive session oi- limited in
accordance with the rules of this committee.
I hope it is appropriate to say, Mr. Chairman, that those matters
were taken into account by this committee as a whole in executive ses-
sion and the requests were denied. I think that the record oufrht to
indicate that further for Mr. Dean's, for the completion of Mr. Dean's
situation.
Senator Ervin. I want to thank you and say I join in your view.
913
Mr. Shaffer. We appreciate that, Mr. Vice Chairman, and I would
like, out of an abundance of caution, so that there ^yould be no waiver
for me. to again call to the attention of the committee here and now
before the public session, the content of my letter to the chairman
dated June 18, 1973, which I ask you to rule again on the insertions
contained therein and that it be made a part of this public record.
Senator Ervin. That letter will be printed in the record.
[The letter referred to was marked exhibit No. 32.*]
Senator Ervix. The request by members of the committee sitting
on the left is that you and ]Mr. Dean change places because
Mr. Shaffer. I am going to leave the chair, Mr. Chairman, and
Senator ER\nx [continuing]. Because the reporter sort of obstructs
their view.
Senator Moxtoya. I would like for the reporter to move back a little
so that I can see the witness.
Mr. McCandless. We have one additional matter we would like
to call to the attention of the chair. First of all, the subpena issued
under your rules does subpena all documents, so we conclude that all
material supplied other than his oral testimony, all exhibits and other
documents are under the same subpena and must be and are being
brought forward in that manner.
Also, we bring to your attention again title 18 of the United States
Code, section 798, disclosure of classified information, and section C
saying, ''Nothing in this section shall prohibit the furnishing upon
lawful demand of information to any regularly constituted committee
of the Senate, the House of Representatives of the United States of
America."
We raise that, Mr. Chairman, because as you are very well aware,
and all the membere of the committee, under a ruling by the Honorable
John J. Sirica, this committee came into possession of certain docu-
ments which Mr. Shaffer and I, as counsel to Mr. Dean, have not even
seen ourselves; they are in your possession. If Mr. Dean is to be asked
questions on those documents, he does not have a copy in his possession.
the committee would have to furnisji such a copy to him for him to be
able to refresh his recollection, and we just wanted to make sure that
this section of the criminal code, and your rules, pointed out how
they dovetail as to disclosure of secivt and classified information.
Senator Ervix. Well, we will rule on that at the proper time. I am
expecting, rather, questions on those documents which were furnished
to the committee by Judge Sirica at the request of the committee,
will not come today and we will handle that in due season.
Mr. McCaxdless. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervix. I Avill state myself from my study of the subject, I
think that information or material cannot be classified allegedly in
the interest of national security unless it should not be disclosed to
an unauthorized person because it relates to either national defense
or to our foreign relations with other nations. I am of the opinion
from my study that there is no authority under that statute to classify
any matter merely because it relates to domestic intelligence or in-
ternal security. That is a matter, though, that the committee will rule
on later if it becomes necessary.
♦See p. 1095.
9,14
Mr. McCaxdless. It is also our understandin/i;, and I hope it is cor-
rect, that any doctrines of executive privilege or attorney-clients privi-
lege have already been taken care of by your committee.
Mr. Dash. Yes ; I think I would add to that
Senator Baker. I would like to laise a point in that respect and, in
addition to the points raised by INIr. McCandless which I think is im-
portant to raise in protection of the client's rights. It is my under-
standing, and chief counsel, INIr. Dash, can coriect me if I am in error —
it is my understanding last Monday there was transmitted to the wit-
ness, with copies to the committee and its stali", a letter from Mr.
Leonard Garment, the counsel for the White House or a counsel for
the White Plouse, indicating that the White House would not claim
executive privilege as to this witness' testimony nor would it claim the
privilege of attorney-client and as I recall as Avell. tliat on matters of
the use of documents nominally classified that they would leave to the
discretion of the committee to decide how that should be handled.
Mr. Dash. Tliat is correct, Senator Baker. It initially was an oral
statement given to me by Mr. Garment, counsel for the President. He
followed it up with a letter to Mr. Dean and a cop^' to our committee in
which he put in writing that he was authorized by the President to do
as you just stated.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 33.*]
Senator Baker. And the committee in executive session on this past
Monday, I believe by unanimous vote, I am sure by unanimous vote,
authorized the chairman to act on behalf of the committee in the mat-
ter of the handling of these classified documents.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervix. Certainly, let the record show as to what ]Mr. ]Mc-
Candless states that any documents, that the witness produces are pro-
duced in obedience to a subjiena duces tecum.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, you have a statement you wish to present to the
committee.
Mr. Dean. That is correct, Mr. Dash. But before I commence read-
ing the rather lengthy statement I would just like to make a couple of
comments. First of all, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Vice Chairman and
members of the committee, I sincej-ely wish I could say it is my pleasure
to be here today but I think you can understand wliy it is not.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, could you please take tl;e muToplione and i)ut
it closer so we can all hear ?
Mr. Dean. Certainly. It is a very difficult thing for me to testify
about other people. It is far more easy for me to explain my own
involvement in tliis matter, the fact that I was involved in obstructing
justice, the fact that I assisted another in perjured testimony, the fact
that I made personal use of funds that were in my custodv, it is far
easier to talk about these things myself than to talk about what others
did. Some of these people I will be referring to are friends, some ai'C
men I greatly admire and respect, and paiticularly with reference to
the President of the United States. I would like to say this. It is my
honest belief that while the President was involved that he did not
realize or appreciate at any time the implications of his involvement,
and I think that when the facts come out T h(^i)e the President is
forgiven,
•See p. 1099.
915
Pursuant to the request of the committee I will commence with a
general description of the atmosphere in the White House prior to
June 1972.
The Atmosphere at the White House, Pre-June 1972
To one who was in the White House and became somewhat familiar
with its interworkincTS, the Watergate matter was an inevitable out-
growth of a climate of excessive concern over the political impact of
demonstrators, excessive concern over leaks, an insatiable appetite for
political intelligence, all coupled with a do-it-yourself White House
staff, regardless of the law. However, the fact that many of the
elements of this climate culminated with the creation of a covert
intelligence operation as a part of the President's reelection com-
mittee was not by conscious designs, rather an accident of fate.
These, of coui-se, are my conclusions, but I believe they are well
founded in fact. This committee, however, is not interested in my
conclusions, rather it is interested in the facts as I know them. Rather
than my characterizing the climate and attitudes, I shall — as re-
quested — present the facts which themselves evidence the precursors of
the Watergate incident.
Excessi\t: Coxcerx Over Demonstrators
It was not until I joined the \Vliite House staff in July of 1970 that
I fully realized the strong feelings that the President and his staff
had toward antiwar demonstrators — and demonstrators in general.
But even before my joining the White House staff I was partially
aware of this Presidential concern, a concern that, in turn, permeated
much of the '\Miite House.
During my tenure at the Justice Department, as an associate Deputy
Attorney General, I was involved in representing the Government in
discussions with demonstration leaders regarding the terms of demon-
stration permits for activities in the Capital City. ^ATiile I was not
the decisionmaker, in this capacity, I was in close proximity to the
decisionmaking process and thus realized that the White House (prin-
cipally Ehrlichman) often made or cleared the final decisions regard-
ing demonstration activity.
It was also because of my proximity to those involved with demon-
strations at the Department of Justice that I became aware that the
White House was continually seeking intelligence information about
demonstration leaders and their supporters that would either dis-
credit them personally or indicate that the demonstration was in fact
sponsored by some foreign enemy. There were also White House re-
quests for information regarding ties between major political figures
(specifically Members of the U.S. Senate) who opposed the Presi-
dent's war policies and the demonstration leaders.
I also recall that the information regarding demonstrators — or
rather lack of information showing connections between the demon-
stration leaders and foreign governments or major political figiires —
was often reported to a disbelieving and complaining White House
staff that felt the entire system for gathering such intelligence was
worthless. As I shall elaborate shortly, this attitude toward the intel-
916
ligence-gatherino; capability of the Government reirardinp; demonstra-
tions prevailed thronwh my tenure at the Justice Department and
the White House, and I was hearino- complaints from tlie President
personally as late as ]March 1'2 of this year.
It was when' I joined the White House stafl' in July of 1970 that
I became fully aware of the extent of concern at the "White House
regarding demonstrations and intellip:ence information relating; to
demonstrators. It was approximatelv 1 month after I arrived at the
White House that I was informed about the project that had been
going on before I arrived to restructure the Governmenfs intelligence-
gathering capacities vis-a-vis demonstrators and domestic radicals.
The revised domestic intelligence plan was submitted in a document
forwarded for the President's approval.
The committee has in its possession a copy of that document and
certain related memorandums pursuant to the order of Judge Sirica.
After I was told of the Presidentially approved ])lan. that called for
bugging, burglarizing, mailcovers, and the like. I was instructed bv
Haldeman to see what I could do to get the plan implemented. I
thought the plan was totally uncalled for and unjustified. I talked with
Mitchell about the plan, and he said he knew there was a great desire
at the White House to see the plan implemented, but he agreed fully
with FBI Director Hoover, who opposed the plan, with one excep-
tion : INIitchell thought that an interacrency evaluation committee might
be useful, because it was not good to have the FBI standing alone with-
out the information of other intelligence agencies and the sharing of
information is always good and avoids duplication. After my conver-
sation with Mitchell. I write a memorandum requesting that the evalu-
ation cominittee be established, and the restraints could be removed
later. I told Mr. Haldeman that the only way to proceed was one step
at a time, and this could be an important first step. He agreed.
The Interagency Evaluation Committee (lEC) as it was referred
to, was created, as I recall, in early 1971. I requested that Jack Caul-
field, who had been assigned to mv office, to serve as tlie White House
liaison to the lEC, and when Mr.Caulfield left the White House, ]\Ir.
David Wilson of my staff served as liaison. I am unaware of the lEC
ever having engaged in any illegal activities or assignments, and cer-
tainly no such assignment was ever requested by my office. The reports
from the lEC, or summar-ies of the reports were forwarded to ]\Ir.
Haldeman and sometimes Ehrlichman.
In addition to the intelligence repoi-ts from the lEC, my office also
received regular intelligence reports regarding demonstrators and radi-
cal groups from the FBI and on some occasions, from the CIA. A
member of my staff would review the material to determine if it
should be forwarded to Mv. Haldeman — that is. for bringing to the
President's attention — or sent to another member of the staff who
mic?ht have an interest in the contents of the report.
The committee has in its — Air. Chaii-man, from time to time, I am
going to skip parts of the statement in an effoit to make sure that I
can move as quicklv as possible and get the statement completed in as
short a time as possible.
Senator Ervix. I believe it is important to read the whole statement
since you thought it was important enough to write it.
Mr. Dean. I will honor the chairman's wish.
917
For example, Len Garment would be sent information regarding
Indian uprisings, Mr. Kissinger or General Haig information regard-
ing travels of antiwar groups to Hanoi.
Also prior to and during a demonstration, my office would prepare
summary reports for the President of the anticipated size of the dem-
onstration, any information about the leaders of the demonstration,
and during the demonstration, a description of the activities of the
demonstrators and tlie Government's handling or anticipated handling
of the demonstrations.
Contrary to the policy that had existed before I came to the White
House, I sought to keep the White House out of tactical decisions
regarding the demonstrations. I felt that these were decisions for the
Department of Justice and the police. I felt my job Avas to merely
keep the White House informed as to what might happen or was
happening. My own desires were sometimes superseded when Mr.
Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman did not like the way a particular demon-
stration was being handled. Sometimes they so instructed me to inform
the Justice Department or Chief Wilson of the INIetropolitan Police
and sometimes Mr. Ehrlichman would so inform Justice or the Chief
himself.
As soon as a potential demonstration was in the wind, I began receiv-
ing calls from Mr. Larry Higby, Mr. Haldeman's principal staff as-
sistant, requesting intelligence reports. I also received frequent com-
plaints regarding the quality of the available information, despite the
fact that I felt the White House had the best information available to
the Government.
I became directly and personally aware of the President's own inter-
est in my reports regarding demonstrations w^hen he called me during
a demonstration of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War which
occurred on the Mall in front of the Capitol. This was the occasion in
May 1971 — I believe that is the date — when the Government first
sought to enjoin the demonstration and later backed dow^n. The Presi-
dent called me for a first-hand report during the demonstration and
expressed his concern that I keep him abreast of what was occurring.
Accordingly, we prepared hourly status reports and sent them to the
President.
I was made aware of the President's strong feelings about even the
smallest of demonstrations during the late winter of 1971, when the
President happened to look out the windows of the residence of the
White House and saw a lone man with a large 10-foot sign stretched
out in front of Lafayette Park. INIr. Higby called me to his office to tell
me of the President's displeasure with the sign in the park and told me
that Mr. Haldeman said the sign had to come down. When I came out
of Mr. Higby's office, I ran into Mr. Dwight Chapin who said that he
was going to get some "thugs" to remove that man from Lafayette
Park. He said it would take him a few hours to get them, but they
could do the job.
Senator Erat^x. The audience is here by the consent of the committee,
and I am goinsf to request the audience to refrain from giving expres-
sion of their feelings by laughter or otherwise. I hope the audience
will restrain themseh'es in that respect.
Mr. Deax. I told him I didn't believe that was necessary. I then
called the Secret Service and met Avith INIr. Louis Sims. Mr. Sims said
918
that he felt that the Park Police could work it out. I went out with
Mr. Sims, surveyed the situation, and Mr. Sims talked with the Park
Police. Within 30 minutes the man had been convinced that he should
move to the backside of Lafayette Park. There the sign was out of
sight from the Wliite House. I reported back to Mr. Haldeman and
after a personal look see, he was delighted. I told Mr, Chapin he could
call off the troops.
I also recall that the first time I ever traveled with the President
was on his trip in 1971 to the Football Hall of Fame and on to Iowa
to open a dam. After arriving at the Akron-Canton airport, I noticed
that there was virtually no hostile demonstrator in sight of the Presi-
dent. Later when the President arrived at the motel where he was
spending the night in Akron, I was a few paces behind him as he
walked into the lobby. Across the street were chanting, Vietcong flag-
waving demonstrators. The President, after seeing the demonstrators
told the Secret Service agent beside him, in some rather blunt syno-
nyms, to get the demonstrators out of there. The word was passed, but
the demonstrators couldn't be moved — much to the distress of the
advance men who were responsible for the President's trip.
It was after observing that incident that I talked with several in-
dividuals in charge of advancing Presidential visits that I learned a
major part of any Presidential trip advance operation was insuring
that demonstrators were unseen and unheard by the President.
In early February of 1972, I learned that any means — legal or il-
legal — were authorized by Mr. Haldeman to deal with demonstrators
when the President was traveling or appearing some place. I would
like to add that when I learned of the illegal means that were being
employed, I advised that such ta'ctics not be employed in the future
and if demonstrations occurred — they occurred.
I stated earlier that there was a continuing dissatisfaction with the
available intelligence reports. The most frequent critic was INIr. Halde-
man, but the President himself discussed this with me in early March
of this year, as a part of the planned counteroffensive for dealing with
the Senate Watergate investigation. The President wanted to show
that his opponents had employed demonstrators against him during
his reelection campaign. However, with each demonstration that the
President was confronted with, and each incident that occurred during
the campaign, my office had sought to determine if it had in fact been
instigated by political opponents of the President — Senator IMcGovern,
the Democratic Party, or whomever. We never found a scintilla of
viable evidence indicating that these demonstrators were part of a
master plan ; nor that they were funded by the Democratic political
funds; nor that the}^ had any direct connection with the McGovern
campaign. This was explained to Mr. Haldeman, but the President
believed that the opposite was, in fact, true. I have submitted to the
committee the text of the President's memorandum to me on the
subject.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34—1.*]
Mr. Dean. On Febmary 16, 1973, which was almost a month prior
to this direct request from the President, I had, at Mr. Haldeman's
request, received all the available intelligence on the demonstrations
the President had been subjected to during the 1972 campaign. This
♦See p. 1100.
919
intelligence did not evidence what the President was looking for, but
I turned it over to Mr. William Baroody, telling him the President
wanted a speech as part of the counteroffensive to the Watergate
inquiry. Several weeks later Baroody reported, that he too agreed that
the information wasn't there for a speech.
While there were other things which occurred, that evidence the
concern about demonstrators, I believe the foregoing gives the com-
mittee a good sampling of the degree of concern.
Concern About Leaks
The committee has asked me about concern over leaks. I believe that
most anyone who worked at the Wliite House during the past 4 years
can attest to the concern that prevailed regarding leaks — any and all
leaks. This was a matter of frequent discussions among staff members
and in some instances leaks were investigated by Haldeman's or Ehr-
lichman's office. I have submitted to the committee documents evidenc-
ing the types of investigations made.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 34-2.*]
Mr. Dean. I began to understand the high degree of concern after
I got to know Mr. Jack Caulfield, who had been assigned to my staff.
I would guess that I had been at the White House almost i year,
before Mr. Caulfield told me that he had been directed by Mr. Ehrlich-
man to wiretap a newsman's telephone in pursuit of a leak. Mr. Caul-
field told me that the wiretap was on for only a short period of time
because he believed the FBI had subsequently taken over. He told me
that he had been directed to perform the wiretap when Mr. Hoover
was unwilling, but Mr. Ehrlichman wished to proceed.
The wiretap was undertaken, as I recall, in late 1969 or early 1970.
Caulfield told me that it was performed by Mr. Ulasewicz, Mr. John
Regan, and himself. He later repeated the story to me telling me that
it had been a rather harrowing experience when he was holding the
ladder in a back alley of Georgetown while also trying to keep a look
out as another member of the group was working at the top of the
ladder. He also told me that he received what he referred to as the
"pair numbers" from INIr. John Davies, who was then on the White
House staff, but who had previously been employed or had an associa-
tion with the telephone company before joining the White House staff.
I do not know what information, if anv, they obtained, nor do I
know anv other details other than what I have related above. I have
no idea if the reason for tlie wiretap was related to national security
and I believe Mr. Caulfield told me it was indeed Joseph Kraft's tele-
phone they tapped.
TMiile there was an always present concern about leaks, that concern
took a quantum jump when the New York Times began publishing the
Pentagon Papers in June 1971. After the initial lesral skirmish to
enjoin publication of the napers had died down, the "\"\liite House con-
cern about the problem of leaks had heightened.
To the best of mv recollection — I have been unable to confirm this
throujrh the TNHiite House records^it was late June or earlv Julv
that Jack Caulfield came to me to tell me that INIr. Colson had called
him in, at Ehrlicliman's direction, and instructed him to burglarize
•See p. 1101.
920
The Brookings Institute in an effort to determine if they had certain
leaked documents. What prompted ]Mr. Caulfield to come to me was
that he thought the matter was most unwise and that his instructions
from Mr. Colson were insane. He informed me that Mr. Uhisewicz had
"cased'' The Brookings Institute and that Mr. Uhisewicz had made a
friendly contact with one of the security men in the buikling, but the
security system at the Brookings building was extremely tight and it
would be very difficult to break-in. Caulfield told me that he had so
informed Colson, but that Colson had instructed him to jnirsue the
matter and if necessary he should jDlant a firebomb in tlie building ana
retrieve the documents during the commotion tliat woukl ensue. Mr.
Caulfield said Colson's entire argument for burglarizing the lirookings
was based on a publication he had obtained indicating that the Brook-
ings was planning for the fall — 1971 — a study of Vietnam based on
documents of a current nature, and a former consultant to the Xational
Security Council worked there.
Caulfield convinced me that Colson was intent on proceeding, by
one means or another, so I advised Caulfield that he should do nothing
further, that I would immediately fly to California and tell Ehrlich-
man that this entire thing was insane.
I flew to California on a militarv aircraft courier flight that was
going to San Clemente. I sat with Mr. Robert ]Mardian on the flight,
who told me he was going to see the President about a highly im-
portant matter that he could not discuss with me — a matter which I
will refer to later. AVlien I arrived in California I arranged to see
Ehrlichman and told him that the burglary of Brookings was insane —
and, to persuade him, probably impossible. He said OK and he called
Mr. Colson to call it off, and t called Mr. Caulfield to tell him it was
called off.
It was not until almost 1 year or more later that I learned the reason
for Mardian's trip to see the President. Mr. ]\[ardian later told me. in a
social conversation, that he had gone to see the President to get in-
structions regarding the disposition of wiretap logs that related to
newsmen and "\"\^iite House staffers who were suspected of leaking.
These logs had been in possession of Mr. William Sullivan, an As-
sistant Director of the FBI, and were, per Mr. Mardian's instructions
from the President, given to Ehrlichman.
I had occasion to raise a question about these logs with Ehrlichman
during the fall of 1972, and he flatly denied to me that he had tlie logs.
I did not tell him at that time I liad been told he had them and it was
about February 22 or 23 of this year. Time magazine notified the
White House it was going to print a story that the "\"\niite House had
undertaken wiretaps of newsmen and White House staff and a re-
sponse was being asked for and I further got into the matter.
The White House press office notified me of this inquiry. I called
Mr. INIark Felt at the FBI to ask him first what the facts were, and
second, how such a story cor.ld leak. Mr. Felt told me that it was true,
that INIr. Sullivan knew all the facts and that he had no idea how it
leaked. I then called INfr. Sullivan and requested tliat he drop by my
office, which he did. He explained that after much haggling, that the
wiretaps were installed, but as I i-ecall, Afr. Sullivan said they did not
have the blessing of Director Hoovei-. Mr. Sullivan explained to me
that all but one set of the logs had been destroved and all the internal
9^1
FBI records relatinfj to the wiretaps except one set, had been de-
stroyed and all the material had been delivered to Mr. INIardian, After
Mr. Sullivan departed. I called ]Mr. ]Mitchell who told me he also had
an inquiry from Time magazine and denied to Time magazine any
knowledge of the matter. I did not press him further as to what he
did know.
I then called Mr. Ehrlichman and told him about the forthcoming
story in Time magazine. I told him of my conversations with Felt,
Sullivan, and Mitchell. I also told him I knew he had the logs because
Mr. Mardian had told me. This time he admitted they were in his safe.
I asked him how ]Mr. Ziegler should handle it. He said ^h\ Ziegler
should flatly deny it — period. I thanked him, I called Mr. Ziegler and
so advised him.
Turning now to the so-called "plumbei's" unit that was created to
deal with leaks. I first heard of the plumbers unit in late July 1971. I
do not recall ever being actually advised in advance that such a unit was
being created in the "White House, but I stumbled into it unknowingly
when Mr. Egil Krogh happened to mention it to me. I was not in-
volved in its establishment ; I only know that ]\Ir. Krogh and ]SIr.
David Young were running it under Ehrlichman's direction. Shortly
after Mr. Krogh told me about his unit, he told me that thev were
operatinjz out of a supersecured location in the basement of the Execu-
tive Office Building. He invited me down to see the unit, which I did
and he showed me the sensor security system and scrambler phone.
I never discussed with y[r. Krogh or Mr. Young what they were
doing or how they were doing it. It was through Jack Caulfield that
I learned that Mr. Gordon Liddy was working with Mr. Krogh. I
did not know Liddy personally, although I may have met him. All I
knew about Mr. Liddy was that Mr. Caulfield had told me and was
to the effect that Mr. Gene Rossides of the Treasury Department and
Liddy had a falling out, and Krogh waded into the middle of the
dispute by hiring Liddy and bringing him into the "White House.
I did not realize that Mr. Howard Hunt worked — most of his time
while he was at the "White House — in the plumbers unit until after
June 17, 1972. I had seen Hunt on many occasions in Colson's office,
and finally asked Mr. Colson who he was. He told me that he was
doing some consultant work for him and introduced me. That was the
only time I ever talked with Mr. Hunt.
I am not aware of what success the plumbers unit had in its dealing
with leaks. I recall on one occasion after Jack Anderson printed the
documents from a National Security Council meeting asking Bud
Krogh if they had figured out who leaked the information to Mr.
Anderson. He told me, yes, but that he couldn't disclose the name of
the individual.
As I have indicated, the June 1971 publication of the Pentagon
Papers caused general consternation at the "White House over the leak
problem. On June 29. 1971, the President brought the subject of leaks
up in a Cabinet meeting as a part of a "White House orchestrated
effort to curtail all leaks. As a part of that effort. Mr. Haldeman in-
structed Mr. Fred ^Slalek. Mr. Larry Higby, Mv. Gordon Strachan,
and myself to develop a followup strategy for dealing with leaks.
Mr. Malek and I never took the project very seriously, but Strachan
and Higbv continued to push. I have submitted to the committee
memorandums outlining the project that finally developed.
922
[The documents referred to ^vere marked exhibit No. 34—3.*]
Mr. Dean. Mr. Malek was to take charge and Mr. Haldeman was
to be brought in as the "Lord High Executioner" when a leak was
uncovered. The committee will note from the documents I have sub-
mitted, this project was to complement and not compete with the
plumbers. To the best of my knowledge this project never uncovered
the source of a single leak.
I shall turn now, pursuant to the committee's request of me, from
leaks to the matter of political intelligence, with the hope that my
voice will hold up through this entire statement.
Interest in Political Intelligence
The pre-reelection "White House thrived on political gossip and
political intelligence. I knew of the type of information they sought
even before I joined the White House staff. During the summer of
1969, while I was working at the Justice Department, the then Dep-
uty Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst, called me into his office
and told me that the White House wanted some very important in-
formation. Mr. Kleindienst instructed me to call Mr. DeLoach, then
Deputy Director of the FBI, and obtain from him information re-
garding the foreign travels of Mary Jo Kopechne. I was told that
Mr. DeLoach would be expecting a call from me and once I had the
information in hand, I was to give it to Jack Caulfield at the "^Tiite
House.
This incident stuck in my mind because of the rather sensitive
nature of the information being obtained from the FBI and the fact
that I was made the courier of the information.
To this day I can only speculate that I was asked to convey the
information so that others could deny they had done so should the
matter become known.
It was not until I joined the "White House staff and Caulfield was
placed on my staff that I learned that Caulfield was assigned to
develop political intelligence on Senator Edward Kennedy.
Mr. Caulfield told me that within some 6 hours of the accident at
Chappaquiddick on July 18, 1969, he had a friend named Tony on
the scene, who remained on the scene conducting a private investiga-
tion of the matter and reporting pertinent information back to him.
It was not until this spring that I knew or could remember Tony's full
name — Anthony LTlasewicz. Caulfield told me that Mr. Ulasewicz posed
as a newspaper reporter, and always asked the most embarrassing
questions at any press gathering related to the Chappaquiddick inci-
dent. Caulfield also informed me that his instructions were to continue
surveillance of Senator Kennedy and that he was doinp- so on n selected
basis. I was told by Caulfield that although he had been assigned
to my staff that he would continue to perform various intelligence
gathering functions assigned to him by ]\Ir. Ehrlichman or Mr.
Haldeman.
I recall only once becoming involved in Mr. Caulfield's activities
relating to Senator Kennedy. That occurred in the fall of 1971 when
I received a call from Larry Higby, who later — and I can say later
these talks were followed up with' ]Mr. Strachan, who told me that
•See p. 1111.
923
Haldeman wanted 24:-hoiir surveillance of Senator Kennedy and regu-
lar reports on his activities. I passed this on to Caulfield and we dis-
cussed it. He told me that he thought that this was most unwise
because it would require several men and also could uncover his
activities in that Senator Kennedy was bound to realize he was under
surveillance and given the fact that it could easily be misinterpreted
as someone who was planning an attack on his life, and the police or
the FBI might be called in to investigate. I agreed fully with Caul-
field. After some initial resistance. I convinced Higby that it was a
bad idea to have a dav-in-and-day-out surveillance and it was called
off. Instead, Caulfield was to keep a general overview of Senator
Kennedy's activities and pursue specific investigations of activities
that might be of interest.
Caulfield seldom informed me of his findings, but occasionally he
would bring matters to my attention. For example, Caulfield was
instructed to investigate Senator Kennedy's visit to Honolulu in
August 1971. I have submitted to the committee a copy of his report,
which he passed on for me to see, along with several followup memo-
randums relating to the visit.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34—4.*]
Mr. Deax. Political intelligence often came from unexpected sources.
For example, during this last spring of 1972, a top man at the Secret
Service brought me information regarding Senator McGovern. I
asked Mr. Colson if he were interested. He was very interested and had
the information published.
The persons on the '\^nnte House staff who were most interested in
political intelligence were Ehrlichman. Haldeman, and Colson. As the
reelection campaign drew closer, I would have to say that it was prin-
cipally Colson and sometimes Haldeman w^ho sought infonnation from
my oiSce that had political implication to it. "\^niilc I have been unable
to make a complete review of my office files to document the many types
of inquiries, I do have some documents that evidence a fair sampling
of the type of requests that were frequently made of me and how they
were handled by my office. The documents are extremely sensitive and
could be injurious to innocent people whose names are mentioned in
them. Accordingly. I have submitted them for the committee's use, and
I am prepared to answer any questions the committee may have regard-
ing these documents.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit Xo. 34-5 for
identification only and are not for publication.]
Mr. Deax. In addition to the rather wide ranging types of inquiries
evidenced by the documents I have just referred to, and in addition to
the extensive efforts to obtain politically embarrassing information on
Senator Kennedy, there were also frequent efforts to obtain politically
embarrassing information on Mr. Lawrence OT^rien, the Democratic
National Committee chairman. Senator Muskie, and Senator McGov-
ern. While the involvement of my office in seeking such information
was peripheral, I have submitted to the committee records and docu-
ments which show the efforts of the White House to politically embar-
rass those individuals.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 34-6, 34-7,
and 34-8 for identification only and are not for publication.]
•See p. 1117.
924
Mr. Dean. Again, because of the very sensitive nature of informa-
tion contained in these documents, and the problems that information
might unfairly cause those individuals, I shall not discuss the docu-
ments further, othei- than to point out to the committee that the inter-
est in Mr. Larry O'Brien dates back, from my records, to the time I
first joined the White House stall' in July 19TU, while the interest in
Senators Muskie and McGovern developed as the reelection campaign
developed.
I would now like to turn to a political intelligence and security plan
that was designed for the campaign, but ultimately was rejected.
Operation Sandwtidge
While Caulfield was a member of my staff, the use of Mr. Ulasewicz
slowly diminished, in that I had no need for such investigative work,
and I only requested Caulfield to obtain investigative information
when someone else on the staff requested it. While I did try to find
assignments for Caulfield that related to the work of the counsel's
office it was difficult in that he was not a lawyer.
Mr. Caulfield was aware of this situation and in the spring of 1971
he came to me and told me that he was thinking of leaving the White
House staff and establishing an investigative/security consulting cor-
poration. He felt that there was a need and a market for what he
described as a "Republican intertel" — Intertel being a firm being a long
established firm that has been in existence working in this field. He
told me that he could have a going concern by campaign time and that
his firm could provide investigative/security assistance to the
campaign.
We casually discussed this on several occasions. The basic and initial
concept he had developed was an operation that could be funded by
contracts with corporations. ISIr. Caulfiekl's firm would provide services
for these corporations, but it would also provide free services to the
1972 reelection campaign. I recall telling Caulfield tliat I could not help
him in the intelligence field because I did not have any expertise in
the area but I advised him that he should work with a lawyer in de-
veloping the concept he had outlined to me because it was fraught with
legal problems. For example, I told him corporations are prohibited
under Federal law from making direct campaign contributions.
Shortly after these conversations, Caulfield infosmed me that he had
formed a group to develop a plan to submit to Mr, Ehrlichman, Mr.
Haldeman, and Mr. Mitchell. The planning group intended to become
the principal officers of the corporation once it commenced its activity.
Caulfield and the group spent several months devolopiu:": their plans
and in early August or September of 1971 Caulfield brought me a copy
of a memorandum entitled Operation Sandwedge and told me he
was seeking a meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman to discuss the matter and
requested that T assist him in gettin>r a meetinjr with 'Mv. Mitchell. I
do not know if Mr. Caulfield met with Mr. Ehrlichman. If he did, I
was not present and have no knowledge of the meeting.
I read the memorandum and found it to be a privately operated ex-
tension of the types of things that Caulfield had boon i^orformin^r for
Ehrlichman. T returned the memorandum to Caulfield and told him
I would raise it with ^Mitchell. To the best of my recollection Opera-
925
tion Sandwedge envisioned the creation of a corporation called Se-
curity Consultino; Group, Inc., which was to have offices in Washing-
ton, Chicago, and New York. It was to have an "overt" and "covert"
capacity. The covert capacity would have operated out of New York —
presumably under the aegis of INIr. Ulasewicz — and was to be separate
and apart from the other operations in Washington and Chicago. The
principal activity of the Security Consulting Group, Inc., was to pro-
vide private security for all phases of the campaign, l3ut the New York
"covert" operation would have the capacity to provide "bag men" to
carr}' money and engage in electronic surveillance — if called upon to
do so.
Although I returned the copy of the Operation Sandwedge memo-
randum given me by Caulfield, I did find in my records a copy of the
proposed budget, which reflects some of the items I have just men-
tioned. I also found a number of memorandums relating to the cam-
paign security aspects of the plan. I have submitted these documents
to the committee.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 34-9.*]
Mr. Dean. I did discuss Operation Sandwedge with Mr. Mitchell. I
recsiW that he was not interested at all. He told me that he thought
Jack Caulfield was a fine person, but he felt the principal problems
would relate to security and the problems that demonstrators might
pose to the campaign. Mitchell said he wanted a lawyer to handle any
such operation and asked me to think about candidates. I told him that
Jack Caulfield had requested an opportunity to discuss his plan with
him. and I told him that I told Jack I would convey the message.
Mitchell did not wish to discuss the proposal, so T kept putting Caul-
field off wheji he raised it with me because I liked Jack and did not
want to hurt his feelings, so I continued to keep putting him off.
I also recall that Ehrlichman raised Operation Sandwedge Avith
me. I do not know if this was a result of his meeting with Caulfield or
Caulfield sending him a copy of the memorandum. Ehrlichman told
me that he would like to keep Tony Ulasewicz around during the cam-
paiflfn. but he did not think much of Caulfield's pioposed gi-and plan.
Ehrlichman told me that Mitchell knew about Tony T"^lasewicz and
that ]Mitchell and Jack should talk about Tony's future.
Meanwhile, Caulfield kept requesting an answcn- (m his plans. He
had his heart set on his proposal; he had spent long hours preparing
it and I knew he was going to be very disappointed to learn that it had
been shot down. Every few weeks Caulfield would send an item to me
to prompt me to take some action. I have submitted to the committee
the tvpe of items he would send.
TThe document referred to was marked exhibit No. .'')4-10.**]
^Ir. Dkax. I would iust file them and do nothinsf, as T had decided
that the best course of action to save Jack's feelings was to let the
matter die a natural death through no action. Indeed, that happened.
By November 1971, CaulfieVl realized that his plan was dead and
he abandoned the idea. Realizing this, he told me he would like to work
foi- Mr. ^Mitchell durinji the campaign as an nidc-de-cnmp. and re-
ouested that I assist him in getting an appointment with Mitchell.
T arranged for him to meet with ^Vfr. ^NFitchell on November 24, 1971.
♦Sep p. 1121.
•*See p. 1133.
92l6
Pursuant to Mr. Caulfield's request, I was not present during
the entire meeting, but Jack later said that Mitchell had requested
that he do some investigative work on ^NlcCloskoy's campaign. Ap-
parently, Caulfield convinced Mitchell that some greatly reduced ver-
sions of Operation Sand wedge might be of value, or he was seeking
to show Mitchell what he could do. At any rate, Caulfield continued to
call his intelligence gathering capabilities Operation Sandwedge. I
have submitted to the committee copies of the investigative report that
Mr. Caulfield prepared for Mitchell on the ]McCloskey New Hamp-
shire campaign, and I hasten to add that to the best of my knowledge,
Caulfield employed no illegal procedures in gathering this infoi'mation,
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No, 34—11.*]
Mr. Dean. Pursuant to the request of Mr. Ehrlichman that Mr.
Mitchell determine whether continued funding should be provided for
Mr. Ulasewicz, Mitchell asked me what Ulasewicz had been doing. I
told him that I did not know, but would have Caulfield prepare a
summary of the activities. On January 12, 1972, I informed Mitchell
that Caulfield had prepared such a list and suggested he meet with
him. I will submit this to the committee.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-12.**]
Mr. Deax. I would also note at this point that there is no list cover-
ing that exhibit, because while I thought earlier I did have a list. I
have searched my records that were available and I have no such list
available. There is a possibility that such a list might be available in
my files at the White House.
I do not recall how this matter was resolved, but T believe some ar-
rangement was made to compensate INIr. Ulasewicz, but to my knowl-
edge, he was not used in any manner other than that to wliich T shall
refer later in my statement. Mr. Caulfield and Mr. Kalmbach would
know about the arrangements that were made.
I shall now turn to my knowledge of how an intelligence unit was
established at the reelection committee.
Establishing an Intelligence- Gathering Capability at the
Reelection Committee
To the best of my recollection, it was the spring of 1971 that ^Ir.
Haldeman discussed with me what my office should do during the
forthcoming campaign year. He told me that we should take maxi-
mum advantage of the President's incumbencv and the focus of every-
one in the White House should be on reelecting the President. It was
decided that the principal area of concern for mv office c^hould bo keep-
ing the White House in compliance with the election laws and improv-
ing our intelligence regarding demonstrators. T was also told tliat I
should provide legal assistance in establishing the reelection committee
and insuring that they had their own capacity to deal with the po-
tential threats of demonstrations during the cam.paign and particu-
larly at the convention.
I advised Haldeman that Jack Caulfield was developing a security
plan and that he wanted to discuss his plan with Mr. Mitchell and Mv.
Ehrlichman. I also told him I would seek to get the Intcragonc}- Eval-
uation Committee working on the potential for demonstrations during
•S(^ p. 1134.
••See p. 1149.
927
the campaign and subsequently called Mr. Bernie Wells, the head of
the lEC, to my office and told liim of the concorn of th.e White House
for good intelligence during the coming campaign.
During the months that followed, I devoted most of my time to regu-
lar office functions, keeping abreast of the new campaign legislation
and familiarizing myself with existing election laws, the Hatch Act,
and related laws. It was not until after the proposed Operation Sand-
wedge had been shelved and ^Nlagruder had left the White House to
form the reelection committee, that I began receiving calls from Stra-
chan and ]Magruder that I was expected to suggest a lawyer to head
up the demonstration intelligence operation at the reelection com-
mittee and to also serve as genei-al counsel.
On several occasions Magruder told me that he would like to have
Fred Fielding, my {>riiH'i|.;i! assistant, for this job. Fred Fielding and
I discussed it, but rejected it for several reasons. First, Fielding was
aware of the fact that 1 was considering leaving the White House at
that time — I was actually interviewing for jobs outside of Govern-
ment—and he knew that I would recommend that he succeed me as
counsel.
Second, if I stayed, I would need his assistance during the months
ahead. I might add parenthetically, that as I look back, if I had
accepted the job I was interviewing for at that time, I would not be
sitting here today.
After I informed Mr. Magruder that Mr. Fielding was not avail-
able, he requested that I suggest someone else, because he was desper-
ately in need of an in-house lawyer. Accordingly, I next went to Mr.
Krogh and asked him if David Young might be available and inter-
ested. Krogh told me that Young was very much involved in the
declassification project and could not be spared. The reason Young
had occurred to me is that I had spent several days traveling with him
in mid-October 1971, interviewing prospective candidates for nomina-
tion to the Supreme Court. I might add that during those days of
traveling around the country together he nevei told me what the
plumbers unit was doing or had done. But I felt that Mr. Young was
a bright and extremely capable lawyer who would make an excellent
general counsel, and could handle the security and demonstration prob-
lems of the campaign.
During my conversation with Mr. Krogh about Young, he suggested
that Mr. Gordon Liddy might be available, in that he had just about
completed his work. Krogh spoke very highly of Liddy's legal ability
and said that his FBI/Treasury Department background in law
enforcement would qualify him to handle a demonstration intelligence
and security operation for the reelection committee. I did not know
Mr. Lidd}" but I respected Krogh's judgment, both as to his judgment
of other lawyers and his knowledge of law enforcement. Bud had dealt
with the demonstration problems for the Wiite House before I joined
the stalf. I asked Mr. Krogh to find out if Mr. Liddy was interested.
Several days later Mr. Krogh informed me that Liddy was inter-
ested and asked me to come to his (Krogh's) office and meet Liddy and
describe the job. I did this. I told Liddy that the primary responsi-
bility for the job was to serve as the lawyer for the reelection com-
mittee, but among the responsibilities of the general counsel would be
k<'>?ping abreast of the potential of demonstrations that might affect
the campaign. Liddy said he was interested. Krogh said that lie would
fii-st have to clear it with Ehrlichman. I advised them that Mr. ^Mitchell
928
and Mr. Magruder would be making the decision on filling the post,
and if Krogh got the OK from Ehrlichman, I would set up a meeting
for Liddy to be interviewed by Mr. Mitchell.
WhenMr. Krogh gave me the OK from Ehrlichinan, I called Mr.
Mitchell and told him that Krogh, with Ehrlichman's approval, had
suggested Gordon Liddy for the general counsel post and I arranged
for Liddy to meet with Mitchell on November 24, 1971, after Mr. Caul-
field met with Mr. Mitchell. I attended the meeting with Mitchell and
Liddy, and I have submitted to the committee a copy of an agenda
Mr. Liddy prepared for the interview session.
[The document was marked exhibit No. 34—13.*]
Mr. Dean. "While I cannot recall every detail that was discussed, I do
recall that it was a very general job-type interview. ^Mitchell realized
that Liddy was not familiar with the election laws and asked if I
would assist him in any way I could in getting himself familiar with
those laws. I agreed. There was virtually no discussion of intelligence
plans, other than that Lidd}' would draw up some sort of plans. Most of
the conversation centered around title and compensation. ]Mr. Mitchell
agreed that Liddy would be titled general counsel. I do not recall
the rate of his compensation. I also recall Liddy asking Mr. Mitchell
when he would actually join the campaign, but Mitchell said he did
not know.
After this meeting, Mitchell called me to say that he wanted
Magruder to interview Liddy because Magruder would be the man
working most with him, I so advised Liddy and on December 8, 1971,
INIr. M'agruder requested I bring Liddy over to his office for an inter-
view. The interview in Magruder's office on December 8 was brief
and nonsubstantive. Magruder told Liddy that he had a host of legal
problems that needed attention immediately and pointed to a stack of
papers that I assumed contained the problems that he was concerned
about. There was a brief discussion of Liddy's responsibilities for
demonstrations vis-a-vis the campaign and Liddy said that after he
got acclimated to the committee's problems and needs he would draw
up a plan. ^Lagnider requested that Liddy come to work as soon as
possible, which I believe was the following Monday.
After Liddy was hired at the reelection committee, I informed my
staff — principally Mr. Fred Fielding and Mr. David Wilson — that
they should assist Liddy in becoming familiar with the election laws.
I made my election law files available to Liddy and believe that he
used them and he had periodic contact with my staff and myself on
election law matters.
I can recall that I had several discussions with Liddy about his
responsibilities with the reelection committee in complying with the
election laws. He told me that he had more work than there were
hours in the day to complete it. I urged him to get volunteer lawyers
to assist him and suggested several names of lawyers who might assist
him.
I can also recall that several weeks after Liddy left the "WHiite House
he was asked to turn in his White House pass. Liddy came to me and
asked me to intervene on his behalf so that he might retain his pass
and avoid the cumbersome procedures of clearance every time he
wished to enter the White House. I thought that my office would have
♦See p. 1150.
929
a good deal of contact with Liddy, so I requested that he be permitted
to keep his pass. This request was turned down, however, because
they had decided to provide a fixed number of passes for the people
at the reelection committee and ]Magruder would decide who got the
passes, I so informed Liddy and never heard any more about the
matter,
Liddy's Plax — ^Meetings in Mitchell's Office
The next time I recall meeting with Mr. Liddy — I might say before
this that I did have a brief occasion to see him in early January, I
believe about the 9th through the 14th or 15th, when he attended a
general conference in San Diego on the entire scope of the conven-
tion and the security problems that were goirig to confront the com-
mission in San Diego.
After that, the next time I recall meeting Mr. Liddy was at a meet-
ing in ]Mitcheirs office on January 27, 1972, Magruder called my office
to set up the meeting and only after I called ISlagruder to ask why he
wanted me to attend the meeting did I learn that Liddy was going
to present his intelligence plan. I met Magruder and Liddy at Mitchell's
office. Liddy had a series of charts or diagrams which he placed on an
easel and the presentation by Liddy began.
I did not fully understand everything Mr. Liddy was recommend-
ing at the time because some of the concepts were mind-boggling and
the charts were in code names, but I shall attempt to reconstruct the
high points that I remember as best I can. Liddy was in effect making
a sales pitch. He said that the operations he had developed would be
totally removed from the campaign and carried out by professionals.
PLans called for mugging squads, kidnaping teams, prostitutes to
compromise the opposition, and electronic surveillance. He explained
that the mugging squad could, for example, rough up demonstrations
that were causing problems. The kidnaping teams could remove
demonstration leaders and take them below the Mexican border and
thereby diminish the ability of the demonstrators to cause problems
at the San Diego convention. The prostitutes could be used at the
Democratic convention to get information as well as compromise the
persons involved. I recall Liddy saving that the girls would be high
class and the best in the business. Wlien discussing the electronic sur-
veillance, he said that he had consulted with one of tlie iK-st authori-
ties in the country and his plan envisoned far more than bugging and
tappinjr phones. He said that, under his plan, communication lietween
ground facilities and aircraft could also be intercepted.
I might also add that he gave an elaborate description of intercepting
various microwaves to travel around the country through various com-
munication facilities and T cannot explain to the committee what that
was, because to this day, I do not understand it.
Each maior aspect of his proposal was on a chart, with one chart
showing the interrelationship with the others. Each operation was
given a code name. I have no 7-ecollection of the«e code names. With
rerrard to surveillance, and T do not recall that this was necessarily
limited to electi'onic surveillance, he su.<T^.f>'os<"od several i:»otential tarirets.
T cannot recall for certain if it was during this meeting or at the second
meetinn- in earlv February that ho sup-^est^ed the potential tar.trets. The
targets that T recall he suggested were Mr. Larrv O'Brien, the Demo-
C7\atic headquarters, and the Fontainebleau Hotel during the Demo-
930
cratic Convention. Mr. Liddy concluded his presentation by sajdng
that the plan would cost approximately $1 million.
I do not recall Magruder's reaction during the presentation plan
because he was seated beside me but T do recall Mitchell's ronction to
the "Mission Impossible" plan. He was amazed. At one point I gave
him a look of bewilderment and he winked. Knowing Mitcliell, I did
not think he would throw Liddy out of the office or tell him he was
out of his mind, rather he did what I expected. Allien the presentation
was completed, he took a few long puffs on his pipe and told Liddy
that the plan he had developed was not quite what he had in mind and
the cost was out of the question. He suggested to Liddy iie go back and
revise his plan, keeping in mind that he was most interested in the
demonstration problem.
I remained in MitcheH's office for a brief moment after the meeting
ended, as the charts were being taken off the easel and disassembled
and Mitchell indicated to me that Mr. Liddv's proposal was out of the
question. I joined Magruder and Liddv and as we left the office I told
Liddy to destroy the charts. Mr. Liddy said that he would revise the
plans and submit a new proposal. At that point I thought the plan
was dead, because I doubted if INIitchell would reconsider the matter.
I rode back to mv office with Liddy and Magruder, but there was no
further conversation of the plan.
The next, time I became aware of any discussions of such plans oc-
curred, I believe, on Februarv 4, 1972. Magruder had scheduled
another meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office on a revised intelligence plan.
I arrived at the meeting very late and when I came in, Mr. Liddy was
presenting a scaled down version of his earlier plan. I listened for a
few minutes and decided I had to interject myself into the discussions.
Mr. Mitchell, I felt, was being put on the spot. The only polite way I
thought I could end the discussions was to inject that these discussions
could not go on in the Office of the Attorney General of the United
States and that the meeting should terminate immediately.
At this point the meeting ended. I do not know to this day who kept
pushing for these plans. Whether Liddy was pushing or whether
Magruder was pushing or whether someone was pushing ISIagruder, I
do not know. I do know, in hindsight, that I should have not been as
polite as I was in merelv suggesting that Liddy destroy the charts
after the first meeting. Rather, I should have said forget the plan
completely. After I ended the second meeting, I told Liddy that I
would never again discuss this matter with him. I told him that if any
such plan were approved, I did not want to know. One thiusr was cer-
tain in my mind, while someone wanted this operation, I did not want
any part of it, nor would I have anv part of it.
After this second meeting in Mitchell's office, I sought a meeting
with Mr. Haldeman to tell him what was occurring, but it took me
several days to get to see him. I recall that Higby got me into Halde-
man's office when another appointment had been canceled or post-
poned. I told Haldeman what had been presented by Liddv and told
him that I felt it was incredible, unnecessary, and unwise. I told him
that no one at the White House should have anythin.qf to do with this.
I said that the reelection committee will need an ability to deal with
demonstrations, it did not need bugging, mugging, prostitutes, and
kidnapers. Haldeman agreed and told me I should have no further
dealings on the matter.
931
I assumed the Liddy plan was dead iii that it would never be ap-
proved. I recall Liddy coming into my office in late February or early
March on a matter relatino; to the election laws. He started to tell me
that he could not get his plan approved and I reminded him that I
would not discuss it with him. He stopped talking about it, and we
went on with our business.
I have thought back over the sequence of events and tried to deter-
mine if I in any way encouraged Mr. Liddy and his intelligence plans.
I am certain of this — I did not encourage him to develop illegal tech-
niques, because I was unaware he was developing such plans.
Between the meeting in ]Mitchell's office on February 4, 1972, and
June 19, 1972, I had no knowledge of what had become of Liddy 's
proposal. I did receive a memorandum from Magruder on INIarch 26,
1972 that indicated that Liddy was doinn^ some investigative work for
Magruder, but nothing that appeared illegal. Let me explain.
During the first v^eek of iMaicli 19.2, Lanv Iligb>, Kaldeman's
assistant, called me to request for Haldeman any information that
Caulfield could come up with regarding the funding of the Democratic
Convention in Miami. On March 15, 1972, I forwarded a newspaper
article that Caulfield had discovered on the subject. Later that day
Magruder brought to me a copy of a memorandum from Liddy to
Mitchell regarding an investigation Liddy had conducted — using
Howard Hunt — in Florida. I called Higby and he said that Magruder
had already given him a copy. I told Higby that I did not see anything
illegal by the Democrats based on the information in the memorandum.
I made a notation on the bottom of the memorandum from Mr. Liddy,
but I did nothing further and heard nothing further from Higby on
the subject. I have submitted to the committee the documents I have
just referred to.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 34-14.*]
Mr. Deax. I shall now turn to the events following the "Watergate
incident of June 17, 1972. and begin by telling the committee how I
first learned of the incident.
I will skip the first part here explaining how I ended up being out
of the country when the decision was made in late May and returned
on June 18, from the Far East.
First Knowledge of Watergate Incident
In late May of 1972 the Bureau of Xarcotics and Dangerous
Drugs asked me to deliver a graduation address at its Training
School in Manila, Philippines, on Saturdav, June 17, 1972. I noti-
fied Mr. Alex Butterfield, pursuant to White House procedures
for staff contemplating foreign travel, on June 7, and informed
I\Ir. Butterfield that I planned to depart on June 14 and return
on June 18 and that the trip had been cleared by the State
Department, tlie National Security Council, and Bud Krogh (who
had responsibility for the drug program on the "\^^lite House
Domestic Council). ^Nlr. Butterfield also approved the trip and
I departed for Manila on June 14.
♦See p. 1151.
Note. — Indented matter represents portions of Mr. Dean's prepared statement which
were omitted or summarized in his presentation.
932
I returned from this 4-day trip to the Far East on the morning of
June 18. When I landed in San Francisco, after 20 hours of
flying, I called my assistant, Fred Fielding, to check in and tell him
that I was going to spend an additional day in San Francisco to get
some sleep before I returned to Washington and, accordingly, I would
not be in the office until Tuesday. It was at this time that I first learned
from Mr. Fielding of the break-in at the DNC headquarters. Mr. Field-
ing told me that he thought I should return home immediately as there
might be a problem and that he would fill me in when I got home. I
recall that at first I resisted, but Mr. Fielding, who was not explicit at
that time, told me I should come back so that he could fill me in.
Accordingly, I flew back to Washington and arrived on Sunday
evening. I had a brief conversation with Mr. Fielding and he informed
me that he had learned from Jack Caulfield that Mr. McCord from
the reelection committee was among those arrested in the Democratic
National Committee headquarters on Saturday and also that one of
the Cubans arrested had a check that was made out by Howard Hunt
to some country club. I recall that my immediate reaction was that
Chuck Colson was probably involved. I was truly exhausted at this
point so I told Mr. Fielding that I couldn't do anything at that time
and I went to bed without doing a thing.
On Monday morning, June 19, I arrived at my office about 9 :lo,
my normal arrival time at the office. While reading the news accounts
of the incident, I received a call from Jack Caulfield who repeated
what Mr. Fielding had told me on Sunday evening. Mr. Caulfield in-
formed me that he had received the information from Mr. Boggs of
the Secret Service. I next received a call from Mr. Magruder and, as
best I can recall, Magruder said something to the effect that tliis might
create some problems and I should look into it. He also stated that
this was all Liddy's fault and he volunteered a few harsh epithets
regarding Liddy. I also recall Magruder mentioning something about
how the committee was going to handle the matter publicly but I can-
not remember specifically what he stated regarding this. I told Ma-
gruder that I had just arrived back in the country and did not know
any of the facts surrounding the incident, but I would look into it.
I next received a call from Ehrlichman, who instructed me to find
out what I could and report back to him. I advised Ehrlichman of
my call from Magruder and told him I probably should talk to
Liddy — he agreed. I recall that Ehrlichman told me to find out what
Colson's involvement was in the matter and he also suggested I speak
with Mr. Kleindienst to see what the Justice Department knew about
it. I told him I would report back to him after I talked with Liddy.
I next received a call from Gordon Strachan who said he wanted to
meet with me. I informed him that I would not be able to meet with
him until early in the afternoon. He said he would drop by my office
after lunch.
I next talked with Chuck Colson on the phone. I asked him what he
knew about the incident and he vehemently protested that he knew
nothing and had no involvement in the matter whatsoever. Colson
advised me that Ehrlichman had spoken with him earlier regarding
Mr. Hunt, earlier during that weekend, and Colson said that we should
get together with Ehrlichman as soon as possible. I recall asking
Colson if Hunt still worked for him and again he became very de-
9S3
fensive and stated that he was merely on his paja-oll as a consultant
because Ehrlichman had so requested. He asked me to determine if
Hunt was still on his payroll and I said I would check. Colson also
expressed concern over the contents of Hunt's safe. Several weeks
later — probably 4 or 5 — I learned from Paul O'Brien, who was
representing the reelection committee, that he had learned from ]Mr.
Hunt's attorney, Mr. William Bittman, that Hunt and Colson spoke
on the telephone over the weekend of June 17-18, and that Hunt had
told Colson to get the materials out of his — Hunt's — office safe.
Mr. Hugh Sloan called me to tell me he was worried. At that time
I knew of no reason why Mr. Sloan should be worried so I told him
not to worry. He told me that he would like to meet with me and I
told him that I was trying to find out what had happened and re-
quested we meet in a few days. I do not recall the precise date we did
meet.
I next contacted Liddy and asked him to meet with me. He said he
would come to my office. As he came into the office I was on my way
out. I suggested we take a walk. It was shortly before noon and we
walked down I7th Street toward the Corcoran Gallery'.
I will try to reconstruct the conversation to the best of my memory.
'\Miile I cannot recall every detail, I do indeed recall the major items
we discussed.
Mr. Liddy told me that the men who had been arrested in the DXC
were his men and he expressed concern about them. I asked him why
he had men in the DXC and he told me that ^Nlagruder had pushed
him into doing it. He told me that he had not wanted to do it, but
Magruder had complained about the fact that the}- were not getting
good information from a bug the}^ had placed in the DXC sometime
earlier. He then explained something about the steel structure of the
Watergate Office Building that was inhibiting transmission of the bug
and that they had gone into the building to correct this problem. He
said that he had reported to Magruder that during the earlier entry
of the DXC offices they had seen documents — w^iich I l)elieve he told
me were either Government documents or classified documents — and
Magruder had told him to make copies of those documents.
Liddy was ver}^ apologetic for the fact that they had been caught and
that Mr. ]McCord was involved. He told me that he had used ^Ir.
McCord only because Magruder had cut his budget so badly. 1 asked
him why one of the men had a check from ^Ir. Howard Hunt and he
told me that these men were friends of Hunt and Hunt had put him
in touch with them. I do not recall Liddv discussing any further in-
volvement of Hunt, other than Hunt's putting him in touch with the
Cubans. I asked him if anyone from the White House was involved
and he told me no.
As tlie conversation ended he again expressed his apologv and his
concern about the men in jail. I told him I couldn't help and he said he
understood. He also told me that he was a soldier and would never talk.
He said if anvone w^ished to shoot him on the street, he was ready.
As we parted I said I would be unable to discuss this with him further.
He said he understood and I returned to mv office.
Aft^r returning to mv office I arranged a meeting Avith Ehrlichman
in his office for mid-after7ioon. Goi'don Strachan came to my office
shortly after I had met with Liddy. Strachan told me that he had been
934
instructed by Haldeman to go through all of Mr, Haldeman's files
over the weekend and remove and destroy damaging materials. He
told me that this material included such matters as memorandums from
the reelection committee, documents relating to wiretap information
from the DNC, notes of meetings with Haldeman, and a document
which reflected that Haldeman had instructed Magruder to transfer
his intelligence gathering from Senator Muskie to Senator McGovern.
Strachan told me his files were completely clean.
I spoke with Mr. Kleindienst and he told me that both the FBI
and the D.C. Metropolitan Police were investigating, and he assumed
that the FBI would take full jurisdiction of the case shortly. He also
alluded to his encounter with Lidd}^ at Burning Tree Country Club,
but did not explain this in full until I later met with him. I do not
have a record of when I met with Mr. Kleindienst, but it was either
on Monday, the 19th, or the next day. I will describe that meeting
shortly.
I met with Ehrlichman in the mid-afternoon and reported in full
my conversation with Liddy. I also told Ehrlichman about the earlier
meetings I had attended in Mitchell's office in late January and early
February and my subsequent conversation with Haldeman. He told
me he wanted to meet later with Colson and told me to attend. Ehrlich-
man also requested that I keep him advised and find out from the
Justice Department on what was going on. I did not mention my con-
versation with Strachan because I assumed that Ehrlichman was aware
of this from Haldeman himself.
Later that afternoon I attended a second meeting in Ehrlich man's
office with Colson. I recall Ehrlichman asking where Hunt was. I said
I had no idea and Colson made a similar statement. At that point, be-
fore the meeting had started, Ehrlichman instructed me to call Liddy
to have him tell Hunt to get out of the country. I did this, Avithout
even thinking. Shortly after I made the call, however, I realized that
no one in the "WHiite House should give such an instruction 'owd raised
the matter. A brief discussion ensued between Ehrlichman and myself.
As I recall, Ehrlichman said that he was not a fugitive from justice,
so why not. I said that I did not think it was very wise. At this point,
Colson chimed in that he also thought it unwise and Ehrlichman
agreed. I immediately called Liddy again to retract the request but he
informed me that he had already passed the message and it might be
too late to retract.
Following this brief telephone skirmish refrardin,<r Hunt's travel
plans, the meeting turned to Hunt's status at the 'Wliite House. I had
learned from Fred Fielding, who I had asked to check on it, that Hunt
had not drawn a check from his "White House consultantship since late
March of 1072. But as far as I knew, the records indicated that Hunt
was still a "Wliite House consultant to Colson. After discussions of this
bv Colson, who at this point was disowning Hunt as a inomber of his
staff, Ehrlichman called ^Nlr. Bruce Kehrli and requested that he bring
Hunt's personnel records up to E'irlichman's office. Before Kehrli ar-
rived, Colson raised the matter of Hunt's safe. Colson, without jretting
specific, said it was imperative that someone sret tlie contents of Hunt's
safe. Colson sugo"ested, and Ehrlichman concurred, that I take custody
of the contents of the safe.
935
When Kehrli arrived he was quizzed by Ehrlichman and Colson on
Hunt's status at the "\^liite House. Colson was arouinor that Hunt
should have been removed from the '\^niite House as of IVIarch 81, 1972.
^Ir. Kehrli's records, however, did not so indicate. I have submitted to
the committee memorandums that Colson forwarded to mc on June
19, presenting his arofument. This was later resolved between Colson
and Kehrli, pui-suant to Colson's argument. I always assumed that this
required some alteration of the records, but I do not knoAv this for a
fact.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. M-15*]^
Mr. Deax. Following this discussion, Ehrlichman asked Kehrli
where Hunt's office was located and how the contents of his safe could
be removed. Kehrli explained that he would have to have GSA open
the safe. Colson said it must be done iunnediately and Ehrlichman
instructed Kehrli to have me present when the safe was opened and
that I should receive the contents of the safe. Kehrli said he would call
me when he had made the arrangements and he then left Ehrlichman's
office. Ehrlichman told me to report to him on the contents of Mr.
Hunt's safe and the meeting ended.
Kehrli called my office after I had departed. He talked with Fred
Fielding and asked him to come with him to open Mr. Hunt's safe. I
do not recall mentioning this to Fielding before I departed and I do
not know what Kehi-li told Fielding, but Kehrli was aware from the
earlier meeting with Ehrlichman that I was to receive the contents of
the safe.
After departing the office, I believe I went to ^Ir. Mitchell's apart-
ment. I do not recall who asked me to come to Mitchell's apartment,
and it may have been the evening of the 20th, rather than June 19.
I recall that when I arrived, ]Mitchell, ^Nfardian, and Magruder
were there and I gather had been discussing matters before I arrived.
I recall listening, but can only recall discussions of how to handle the
matter from a public relations standpoint. I have no other recollection
of the meeting.
It was on June 20 or 21 that Strachan and Mr. Eichard Howard
came to my office. Strachan informed me that Haldeman had author-
ized an expenditure by Colson of some funds, but the entire amount
had not been expended and he was turning over the remainder to
me to hold. I told ^Nfr. Strachan that I would hold the funds and would
be accountable for them. I placed the cash, $15,200 in my safe. I
informed Mr. Fielding of my office of the fact that the cash was in
my safe and where it had come from. I felt I should inform Fielding
because I wanted someone to know why the money was in my safe
if anything should happen to me.
The cash remained in my safe untouched until October 12, 1972,
when I removed a packet of bills amounting to $4,850 and placed my
iiersonal check for that amount with the remaining cash. I removed
the $4,850 after I had failed to make arrangements to pay for the
anticipated expenses of my wedding, and my honeymoon. I subse-
quently expended the cash over a several month period of time as my
honejinoon was cut short and the full amount I had anticipated was
not necessary ; thus, I used part of the cash for normal daily expendi-
•See p. 1157.
936
tures. At one point after I had withdrawn the cash I returned part
of it to the safe, and subsequently took it out again when I was later
making another attempt, after the election, to go on a honeymoon.
At no time when I was making personal use of part of these funds
did I plan — or believe — that I would not have to account for the
entire amount at some point in time. However, as I shall state later,
there was great pressure, long before October, to use any and all
available cash to pay for the silence of the individuals involved in the
Watergate and I decided from the outset that I did not want the
money I was holding to be used for that purpose.
1 have never sought to hide the fact that I made personal use of
this money from anyone. I informed my lawyers, 1 informed the
Government prosecutors in April, and I informed ]Mr. Dash at the
outset of our discussions.
The money is presently in a trustee account which was established
after I informed my lawyers of the fact I was holding the funds,
and all the records relating to the creation of that account have been
turned over to the Government and this committee as well, I believe.
As I mentioned earlier in my statement, I met with the Attorney
General, Richard Kleindienst, on either Monday, June 19, or Tues-
day, June 20. I recall that before this meeting I had been asked by
Ehrlichman to talk with Mr. Kleindienst about the scope of the in-
vestigation, and I had already had my meetings with Liddy and
Strachan. When I went to Kleindienst's office I found him totally dis-
mayed and angered that such a stupid thing could occur. He then
told me that over the previous weekend, while at the Burning Tree
Country Club, Liddy — accompanied by ]Mr. Powell Moore — had
sought him out. He said he was incredulous when Liddy stated that
John ]SIitchell had instructed him (Liddv) to tell Kleindienst to get
the men who had been arrested out of jail. He told me that Liddy was
rattled and upset and wanted to talk about the entire matter, but
Kleindienst told me that he cut Liddy off and told him he would not
talk with him.
I told Mr. Kleindienst that I did not have all the facts, but I was
very concerned that this matter could lead directly to the President.
I told him that I did not know if the President was involved, but I was
concerned. I remember Kleindienst saying to me that he certainly
hoped that the President was not involved or that I was not involved
in any criminal activity. I told him that I had no idea that there was
going to be a break-in at the Democratic National Committee head-
quarters and I agreed with his continued assertion of its stupidity.
I told Kleindienst, without giving him specifics, that I did not know
what would happen if the investigation led into the White House, but
that I suspected that the chances of reelecting the President would
be severelv damaged. Kleindienst called Henry Petersen and asked
Petersen to come to his office. "WTiile we were waiting for Petersen,
Kleindienst told me that my superiors at the White House never
understood that once an investigation begins, it runs its full course.
He said that he was always being asked to take care of this matter or
that matter, as if by magic he could make something unpleasant go
away. T said I was well aware of that attitude and that I had never
been able to get through to anyone at the White House that things
just did not work that way.
WTien Petersen arrived at Kleindienst's office he gave a status report
of the investigation. Kleindienst then related my concern to Petersen.
Petersen was troubled by the case and the implications of it. Klein-
dienst had another meeting, so Petersen and I — I believe the other
meeting was in his office, so Petersen and I went into Mr. Kleindienst's
back office and talked further. To the best of my recollection, we did
not discuss specifics, rather it was a general discussion.
I told him I had no idea where this thing might end, but I told him
I did not think tlie White House could withstand a wide-open investi-
gation. The sum and substance of our conversation was that I had no
idea how far this matter might go, but I had reason — without being
specific — to suspect the worst. The meeting ended on that note, that I
hoped I was wrong.
I do not recall ever reporting this meeting to Ehrlichman, because
he had a somewhat strained relationship with Kleindienst and I
thought he would raise havoc that I did not have an assurance from
Kleindienst that he would take care of everything. I did report, how-
ever, that I felt Petersen would handle this matter fairly and not pur-
sue a wide-open inquiry^ into everything the "White House had been
doing for 4 years. I made this statement not because of anything Peter-
sen specifically said, as much as the impression he gave me that he
realized the problems of a wide-open investigation of the "White House
in an election year.
Returning now to the contents of Mr. Hunt's safe, it was mid-morn-
ing on Tuesday, June 20, when the GSA men brought several cartons
to my office, which contained the contents of Hunt's safe. I had learned
earlier that morning from Fielding that the boxes had been secured in
Kehrli's office overnight. Fielding also reported that they had found a
handgun in the safe, which Kehrli had disengaged, a large briefcase
containing electronic equipment, and a number of documents, some
of which were classified. I told Fielding I would like his assistance
later that day in going through the material.
During the afternoon of the 20th, Fielding and I began going
through the cartons of Hunt's materials. I remember looking in the
briefcase, which contained electronic equipment. I frankly do not
know what it was it contained, but it contained loose wires, chapsticks
for your lips with wires coming out of them and instruction sheets
for walkie-talkies. As I recall, there were also some antennas in there.
We then began sorting the documents. The bulk of the papers were
classified cables from the State Department relating to the early years
of the war in Vietnam. These were separated out from the rest of
the papers. The other papers I assumed related to Hunt's work at the
"V^Tiite House. Also, there were personal papers. I will attempt, to the
best of my recollection, to describe the papers and documents that
were found in the safe. I must point out, however, that I personally
did not look at all the documents, rather it was a combined effort by
Fielding and myself to determine what was in Hunt's safe.
First, among his personal papers were copies of his submissions for
his per diem pay as a consultant, a few travel vouchers, and an enve-
lope containing materials of a personal nature relating to his wife.
Among the papers that I assumed related to his work at the "\"\niite
House were numerous memorandums to Chucl/^Colson regarding
Hunt's assessment of the plumbers unit operation and critical of Mr.
96-296 O - 73
938
Krogh's handling of matters ; a number of materials relating to Mr.
Daniel Ellsberg, such as news clippings and a psychological study of
Ellsberg which apparently had been prepared by someone who had
never actually met or talked with Mr. Ellsberg ; a bogus cable — that is,
other cables spliced together into one cable regarding the involvement
of persons in the Kennedy administration in the fall of the Diem
regime in Vietnam ; a memorandum regarding some discussion about
the bogl^s cable with Colson and Mr. William Lambert; some materials
relating to an investigation Hunt had conducted for Colson at Chap-
paquidick, some materials relating to the Pentagon Papers and a
paper*back book containing the published Pentagon Papers.
Upon examining the contents of the safe, I recall that Fielding and
I discussed our concern about the public impact some of these docu-
ments might have if they became public, particularly in an election
year. I requested that Fielding remove the politically sensitive docu-
ments from the others, which he did. The classified State Department
cables were too bulky for my own safe, so I called David Young and
requested that he store them for me in his office, as I assumed at that
time that they would probably be returned to the State Department.
I told Young when he came to pick up the materials that they had
come from Hunt's safe and he should store them — all together — until
I told him what to do with them. Accordingly, Mr. Young took the
State Department documents to his office. The large briefcase was
stored in a locked closet in my office suite, and the politically sensitive
documents and Hunt's personal papers were placed in a safe in my
office. The remaining materials were left in the cartons on the floor in
my office.
I subsequently met with Ehrlichman to inform him of the contents
of Hunt's safe. I gave him a description of the electronic equipment
and told him about the bogus cable, the materials relating to Ellsberg
and the other politically sensitive documents. I remember well his in-
structions : He told me to shred the documents and "deep six" the brief-
case. I asked him what he meant by "deep six." He leaned back in his
chair and said : "You drive across the river on your way home at
night — don't you?" I said, yes. He said, "Well, when you cross over
the bridge on your way home, just toss the briefcase into the river."
I felt very much on the spot, so I told him in a joking manner that
T would bring the materials over to him and lie could take care of
them because he also crossed the river on his way home at night. He
said, no thank you, and I left his office and returned to my office.
After leaving Erlichman's office I thought about what he had told
me to do and was very troubled. I raised it with Fielding and he shared
my feelings that this would be an incredible action to destroy potential
evidence. I think Mr. Fielding appreciated my quandary — when Ehr-
lichman said do something, he expected it to be done. I decided to think
it over. I did take the briefcase out of my office because the closet that
it was being stored in was used by the secretaries in the office and 1
did not have an available safe to hold the large briefcnse. I was also
giving serious consideration to Ehrlichman's instructions. Accordingly,
I placed the briefcase in the trunk of my car, wliere it remained until
I returned it to the office after I had reached a decision that T could
not follow EhT'lichman's instructions. T will explain in a few minutes
how I handled the material in Hunt's safe, but before doing so, I would
like to continue with the sequence of events.
939
Colson's FBI Interview
To the best of my recollection it was on June 20 or 21, that Colson
told me in a casual conversation in the hall outside his office about an
incident that he thought was painfully humorous. He told me that a
member of his staff, Mr. Douglas Hallett, had an office in the same
suite with Mr. Hunt, and Hallett was talking with a wire service re-
porter while Hunt was in the other office. Colson said to me something
to the effect : "Can you believe what a story that reporter might have
had if Hunt had come walking out of his office while Hallett was being
interviewed?"
Colson gave me the impression that this incident had occurred on
June 17 or 19, but I do not recall which. However, I do recall Colson
telling me that it had occurred, as Colson was very concerned about
his relationship with Hunt.
To the best of my recollection the FBI contacted me during the
morning of June 22 and requested an interview with Colson. I so in-
formed Colson, and an interview was arranged for that day. Colson
said that he wanted me present when he was interviewed and also
wanted to meet with me prior to the interview. He was insistent that
I be present because he was concerned that the FBI report of the inter-
view might not be accurate and he wanted someone else to attest to his
story.
Colson came to my office shortly before the scheduled meeting with
the FBI. He said that he did not wish to get into unrelated matters
and he said again that he had no information regarding the Water-
gate. I told him I presumed that the agents would only be interested in
his knowledge about the Watergate and his relationship with Hunt.
The agents arrived, identified themselves, and somewhat to my sur-
prise, gave Colson a warning of his rights, which he waived. I believe
the committee has access to Mr. Colson's FBI interview, which was
rather brief, Colson imparted very little information to them.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-16.*]
Mr. Dean. I did not interject myself into the interview at any time,
but did make some rough notes of items covered. In fact, I believe this
was the only interview where I made any notes at all. I made these
notes because Colson had expressed his concern before the interview
regarding someone later being able to attest to his story.
I have submitted to the committee the very rough notes, which have
also been transcribed from my handwriting — the rough notes that I
hastily jotted down during the interview, and find them very revealing
in light of the statement that was made during the nomination hear-
ings of Mr. Patrick Gray for the FBI directorship, and would like to
digress for a moment regarding the comment that was made during
those hearings that "Dean probably lied" to the FBI as to whether
Hunt had an office in the White House.
Dean Probably Lied
During the interview of Mr, Colson on June 22, the agents asked
him if Mr. Hunt had an office in the White House. Colson responded
that he thought Mr. Hunt had an office in the EOB, but he did not
•See p. 1160.
940
know where it was located. This question came up about midway
thronorh the interview and was not, as I recall, pursued further at that
point by the agents, other than a question to me as to whether it would
be possible to get the room number. I said yes. At the end of the inter-
view and as the agents were departing, they asked me if they could
see— not whether IMr. Hunt had — rather whether they could see Mr.
Hunt's office right then. I told them I would have to check it out and
get back to them.
Those are the facts as I remember them, and Colson happened to
stop by my office on the day that Grav said I probably lied. I asked
Colson for this recollection of the matter and he stated that he remem-
bered it as I had remembered it. At that time I had forgotten that I
had made the notes during Colson's interview, which clearly reflected
that Colson had stated during the interview that Hunt had an office in
the "\'\niite House. A few days after Colson's interview I called the
agents and told them I had the materials from Hunt's office and would
get the material to them shortly.
I learned after ]Mr. Gray made his statement during his nomination
hearing that he based his conclusion on a report, written by the agents,
some 7 months after the incident. "\^nien I talked with Gray about the
matter during his nomination hearings and he informed me that he
did not feel he could retract the statement without creating more
problems, I told him that I did not think that the agents involved
should be brought into the matter because I was sure that thev had
honestly reported the matter as thev had remembered it. I had dealt
with the agents involved on several occasions and felt that they had
called it the way they had remembered it, so I let the matter drop and
decided that I would just have to take the rather unpleasant heat
and live with it.
Mr. Chairman, this could be a point where I could summarize part
of this statement regarding handling of the FBI interview with the
White House and just merely state generally that they follow a very
similar pattern.
Senator Erm:x. That would be all right if you could indicate for the
committee the pages on which the statements are made that you sum-
marize so we can have those pages printed in full in the body of the
record.
^h\ Deax. All right, sir. I will summarize beginning at the bottom
of paere 63 throufrh 66 and merely note to the committee that the
liandling of the FBT interviews at the "White House followed the
pattern that had first been established bv the interview with Mr,
Colson. I cleared this procedure with INIr. Ehrlichman. He felt it was
a good idea I was there. I was there when he was present or when
he was interviewed and T think that the material is self -explanatory
as to any questions that the committee might have regarding those
interviews.
Gexkrai. PTaxdltxg of FBT Ixtervtews at the White House
As pi'eviously indicated the first person to be interviewed at
the White House bv the FBI was Colson and Colson had insisted
that I be present dui'ing his interview and requested I review
the matter with him prior to his interview. The Colson interview
941
formed the oreneral pattern that was followed with other mem-
bers of the White House staff, that is I would discuss with the
person before the interview what I throught the agents would
be interested in and then discuss that person's area of knowledge.
I had reviewed this procedure with Ehrlichman, who fully con-
curred in the procedure. On several occasions, ]Mr. Fielding of
my office also participated in preparing witnesses for their inter-
views with the FBI. Contrary to some accounts that I sat in on
some 14 to 18 interviews at the White House, the only inter-
views I recall sitting in on were Chapin's, Miss Chenow's, Col-
son's, Ehrlichman's, ^liss Joan Hall's, Strachan's, Timmons',
and Young's. Also I was present when Fielding, Kehrli, and I
had a discussion with the FBI about the handling of the materials
in Hunt's safe.
The only FBI interview that differed from the normal pattern
was the interview of Miss Chenow. It was in late June that ^liss
Chenow's fonner roommate notified David Young and I believe
also Bud Krogh that the FBI had been to see her and requested
to know where ^liss Chenow was. The former roommate had said
that the agents had asked about a telephone listed in iSIiss
Chenow's name. The roommate had informed the FBI that Miss
Chenow was in London on vacation. David Young came to see
Fielding and I and said that this girl could not know anything
about the Watergate, but could cause the White House problems
by inadvertently answering questions about the plumbers' oper-
ation, where she had been employed, and that the telephone had
been listed in her name in connection with the plumbers' oper-
ation. Mr. Young was very concerned about ]Miss Chenow being
caught off guard by an FBI agent. Accordingly, I notified Gray
that we would make arrangements to have !Miss Chenow available
to the agents in Wasliington within a few days.
I discussed the problem, that Chenow could cause the "^XTiite
House problems, with Ehrlichman and suggested that someone
bring her back from London for the interview and explain to
her that she should not get into Hunt's and Liddy's activities
while at the White House. Ehrlichman fully agreed and I called
Fielding from Ehrlichman's office and told him he should be on
the next plane to London to get the girl. The two first-class round-
trip tickets were paid for by the White House. There were two
sets because ]Miss Chenow was provided transportation back to
London. I informed Kehrli, who would not authorize such a trip
on my word alone, that I had cleared this w^ith Ehrlichman. I
do not know if Kehrli himself checked with Ehrlichman or
Haldeman. I believe it was on July 2 that Fielding left for London
and returned witli Miss Chenow the next day. He did have some
problem because the address that had been given him was incor-
rect. Fielding and Young briefed ^liss Chenow when she came
back before her interview, and Fielding and I were present when
the FBI interviewed her.
I will now turn to my first meetings with Mr. Gray, beginning on
page 66 regarding the investigation.
Note. — -Indentecl matter represents portions of Mr. Dean's prepared statement which
were omitted or summarized in his presentation.
942
First Meetings With ]Mr. Gray Regarding the Ixvestigatiox
I believe that it was on June 21 that I first met with Gray in his
office in the late morning regarding the FBI's investigation. At that
meeting he told me he fully realized tlie sensitive nature of the in\esti-
gation they were pursuing and that he had placed his most trusted
senior people in charge of the investigation. I told Gray that I had
been asked to be kept informed about the investigation. ^Mr. Gray
told me that he had been visiting a number of regional offices and
would be doing so in the future. Thus, if I needed any information
I should call ]Mr. Mark Felt in his absence. I might note at this point
that indeed Gray was frequently absent from the city during the course
of the investigation and this irritated Ehrlichman greatly when he
asked me to get information from Gray and Gray was out of the city.
On several occasions, in fact, Ehrlichman instructed me to tell Gray
to return to the city and mind the store. I passed this message to Gray,
but I cannot recall what prompted Ehrlichman to have me do so at
this time.
During my meeting with Gray on June 21 he also told me a man
by the name of Mr. Bates was heading the investigation. I do not know
Mr. Bates, and when I reported this back to Ehrlichman and he asked
me who Bates was, I told him I did not know Bates. I can recall on
several occasions Ehrlichman asking me if I thought that Gray knew
what he was doing and if he had the investigation under control. I
responded that he seemed to be relying on men in whom he had full
trust.
To the best of my recollection, it was during this June 21 meeting
with Gray that he informed me that the FBI had uncovered a number
of major banking transactions that had transpired in the account of
one of the arrested Cubans — Mr. Barker. He informed me that they
had traced a $25,000 check to a ]Mr. Kenneth Dahlberg and four checks
totaling $89,000 to a bank in Mexico City.
I do not recall whether I first learned al^nut the Dahlbero; check
from INIr. Gray or whether I learned about it in a meeting in ^Mitchell's
office by reason of the fact that the FBI was trving to contact Mr.
Dahlberg about the matter and Dahlberg had called ^Nlr. Stans. At
any rate, the fact that the FBI was investigating these matters was
of utmost concern to Mr. Stans when he learned of it. Stans was con-
cerned about the Dahll:>er.q" check. T was informed, because it was in fact
a contribution from Mr. Dwavne Andreas, whom I did not know, but
I was told was a lono-time backer of Senator Hubert ITumphrev.
Neither Stans nor Mitchell wanted ]Mr. Andreas to be embarrassed by
disclosure of the contribution. The concern about the ^Mexican monev
was made a little less clear to me. I was told it was a contribution from
a group of Texans who had used an intermediarv in ^Mexico to make
the contribution. Althoufrh I had not been told. I assumed at that time
that thev were concerned because it sounded to me as if it mi.iht have
been a corporate contribution and clearlv a violation of tlie law.
Mr. Stans also exolained that he had checked with Sloan to find out
how this monev had ended un in ^Nfr. Barker's bank account and Sloan
reported that he had ffiven the checks to Eiddv and reonested that he
cash them: He said he had no idea how Liddv had cashed them, but
surmised that he had obviouslv used Bai'ker to cash tliem. I was also
943
told — and I do not recall specifically who told me this — that this money
had absolutely nothing to do with the Watergate ; it was unrelated and
it was merely a coincidence of fact that Liddy had used Barker to
cash the checks and Liddy had returned the money to Sloan. I was told
that the inyestigation of this matter which appeared to be connected
with Waterofate but wasn't, was unfounded and would merely result
in an unnecessary embarrassment to the contributors. Accordinofly,
Mitchell and Stans both asked me to see if there was anything the
"\^niite House could do to preyent this unnecessary embarrassment. I,
in turn, related these facts to both Haldeman and Ehrlichman. On
June 22, at the request of Ehrlichman and Haldeman I went to see
Mr. Gray at this office in the early eyening to discuss the Dahlberg and
Mexican checks and determine how the FBI was proceeding with these
matters. Mr. Gray told me that they were pursuing it by seeking to
interview the persons who had drawn the checks.
It was during my meeting with Mr. Gray on June 22 that we also
talked about his theories of the case as it was beginning to unfold, I
remember well that he drew a diagram for me showing his theories. At
that time Mr. Gray had the following theories: It was a setup job by
a double agent ; it was a CIA operation because of the number of
former CIA people inyolyed : or it was someone in the reelection com-
mittee who was responsible. Gray also had some other theories which
he discussed, but I do not recall them now, but I do remember that
those I haye mentioned were his primary theories.
Before the meeting ended. I recall that Gray and I again had a brief
discussion of the problems of an investigation in the Wliite House.
Gray expressed his awareness of the Dotential i:)roblems of such an
investigation and also told me that if I needed any information I
should call either Mark Felt or himself. Gray also informed me that
he was going to meet with the CIA to discuss their possible involve-
ment and he would let me know the outcome of that meeting.
On June 23 I reported my convei"sation with Gray of the preceding
evening to Ehrlichman and Haldeman. We discussed the Dahlberg
and the Mexican checks and the fact that the FBI was looking for
answers regarding these checks. I had the impression that either Ehr-
lichman or Haldeman might have had a conversation with someone
else about this matter but this was mere speculation on my part at that
time.
Within the first days of my involvement in the coverup. a pattern
had developed where I was carrying messages from Mitchell, Stans,
and Mardian to Ehrlichman and Haldeman — and vice vei-sa — about
how each quarter was handling the coverup and relevant information
as to what was occurring. I was also reporting to them all the informa-
tion I was receiving about the case from the Justice Department and
the FBI. I checked with Haldeman and Ehrlichman before I did any-
thing. One of the few sets of early documents evidencing this working
relationship with Haldeman and Ehrlichman relates to responding to
Larry O'Brien's letter of June 24 to the President requesting the
appointment of a special prosecutor. I have submitted these documents
to the committee.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 84-17.*]
♦See p. 1161.
044
Mr. Dean. Consistent with tlio reportino; pattern that had developed,
I reported to Mitchell in a meetin<i^ also attended by Mr. Mardian and
Fred LaRiie, Gray's theories of the case as he had related them to me.
This meeting occurred, to the best of my recollection, on Friday after-
noon, June 23 or Saturday morning, June 24. During this meeting
there were wide ranging discussions of the many problems then con-
fronting the reelection committee including such mattei's as the prob-
lem the civil lawsuit filed by the Democratic Xational Committee
could cause, the problem of the Dahlberg and IVIexican checks, and
to the best of my recollection this was the first time I had heard any
discussion (^f the need for money to take care of those who were in-
vohed in the break-in of June 17.
I think also, Mr. Vice Chairman, I might omit the first paragraph
here on page 71 of my prepared statement, and proceed with regard
to my receipt of the reports.
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, it will be entirely agreeable and, as the
chairman asked you previously if you would note that page in your
statement where you would resume by appropriate identification.
Mr. Dean. All right, I will leave out the first paragraph on page 71.
Receipt o^ Reports From the FBI
In addition to the conversations that I was having with Gray
regarding the status of the investigation, I was continually being-
asked by Mardian if I had seen the FBI reports on the investi-
gation, I indicated that no, I had not. Mitchell also thought it
might be helpful if I saw the FBI reports. As the demands in-
creased for this information, I raised the matter with Ehrlichman
and Halcleman and they both thought that I should indeed see the
FBI reports. I first raised this with Peterson, who suggested I
deal directly with Gray.
And I will begin by summarizing and saying to the best of my
recollection it was in early July when I called Gray to discuss the
matter of receiving reports from the FBI. Gray indicated that he
was going to be in his office on Saturday and that I should come to
his office and take a look at the reports in his office. I told him that I
thought it was unwise for me to be coming in and out of the Justice
Department, particularly since most of the guards and people at the
Justice Department knew me. Accordingly, we arranged to meet later
at his apartment and he said that he would discuss the matter with
me then. I recall we took a stroll to the side of his apai'tment building
and sat on a bench in front of the river and talked generally about
the case and I raised with him the matter of my receivino; some of the
raw FBI data regarding the investigation. Grav said that he would
haA'e to check but wanted an assurance from me that this information
was being reported to the President and that was the principal pur-
pose of the request. I assured him that it was being reported to the
President. Even though I was not directly reporting to the President
at that time, I was aware of the fact that Ehrlichman or Ilaldeman
had daily discussions with the President, and I felt certain, because
Haldeman often made notes of my reporting back about the informa-
NOTE. — Indented matter represents portions of ISrr. Dean's prepared statement whieli
were omitted or summarized in tils presentation.
945
tion I was bringino; to their attention, that this information was being
given to the President.
I do not recall when actnally I received the first written information
from the FBI, but I believe it was after July 21 when I received a
summary report that had been prepared on the investigation to that
stage.
I would also like to now summarize to the bottom of the page, and
indicate that when
Mr. Dash. Bottom of page 72.
Mr. Deax. Seventy-two. correct, and indicate that after I did get
possession of the documents, the FBI files, I found them not very
meaningful and later Mv. ]Mardian. ]Mr. Parkinson, My. O'Brien came
over to my office and read the reports, and ]Mardian, they all reached
the same conclusion and I recall ]\Iardian's reaction was that the docu-
ments indicated that the investigation was too vigorous and he was
quite critical of Gray and asked me to call Gray to slow down but I
never made such a call.
It was after I showed a copy of the July 21 report to INIr.
^Mitchell that ^Nlardian insisted that he be permitted to see the FBI
reports. Mitchell agreed, and thought that Paul O'Brien and Ken
Parkinson should also see them.
I recall that when Mardian, O'Brien and Parkinson finally
came to my office to look at the reports, they realized that they
were not very meaningful. It was Mr. Mardian, however, who be-
came very excited because of the scope of the investigation that
Gray was conducting and the tone of the cables he was sending out
of headquarters. Mardian clearly thought that Gray was being
too vigorous in his investigation of the case and was quite critical
of Gray's handling of the entire matter. He demanded that I tell
Gray to slow down, but I never did so.
Summarizing the first paragraph on page 73, 1 would also note that
I never showed any of these reports to any persons who were inter-
viewed bv the FBI and they were only given to INIr. Dick INIoore of the
Wliite House staff when he was working on the Segretti matter for
Mr. Ehrlichman and INIr. Haldeman.
I do not recall ever finding anything in the FBI reports which
I scanned, that was worth reporting to Ehrlichman and Halde-
man and so I never read all of the reports that were sent to me.
The FBI files containing the reports never left my office, nor were
they shown to anyone in the A^Tiite House other than Dick ^Nloore
when Mr. INIoore had been instructed to prepare a report on the
Segretti incident by Ehrlichman. I never showed the reports to
any of the persons who were interviewed by the FBI after theii'
interviews.
First Dealixgs With the CIA
I will turn now to the first dealings I had with the CIA. It was dur-
ing the meeting in Mitchell's office on June 23 or 24 that Mardian first
raised the proposition that the CIA could take care of this entire mat-
NOTE. — Indented matter represents portions of Mr. Dean's prepared statement which
wero omitted or summarized in his presentation.
946
ter if they wished, in that they had funds and covert procedures for
distributing funds. I was personally unaware of the workings of the
CIA, but Mardian and Mitchell appeared very knowledgeable. As a
result of this conversation, which was prompted by my reporting that
Gray thought the CIA might be involved ^Mitchell suggested I explore
with Ehrlichman and Haldeman having the "White House contact the
CIA for assistance. It was also argued that the individuals involved
in the Watergate incident, as former CIA operatives, might com-
promise the CIA in some manner, and the CIA should be interested in
assisting.
On ]Monday morning, June 26, I spoke with Ehrlichman regarding
this suggestion. He thought it was a good idea and worth exploring.
He told me to call the CIA and ex^^lore it with them. I told him that
I had never dealt with anyone at the CIA and did not know Director
Helms. He told me that I should not call Helms, rather General
Walters. I told him I did not know General "Walters either. He then
told me that he and Haldeman had had a little chat — as lie called it —
with Helms and General "Walters a few days earlier about their deal-
ings with the FBI in relationship to the investigation. He was not
specific. He then told me that I should deal with General "Walters
because he was a good friend of the "White House and the "White
House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have
some influence over the Agency. He told me that I should tell General
"Walters that I was calling because he (Ehrlichman) had requested
that I follow up on the earlier meeting thev had and if there were
any problems General "Walters should call him. After my meeting
with Ehrlichman, I telephoned General "Walters. I told him I was
calling at Ehrlichman's request on a matter relating to his previous
discussions with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, and would like to have
him visit with me if possible. He seemed somewhat surprised and un-
certain about my call, so I told him that he might like to check with Mr.
Ehrlichman. He said he would get back to me and he later called me
back to set up a meeting for about noon at that day.
"When General Walters came to my office I told him again that I was
meeting with him at Ehrlichman's request. I made some general com-
ments about the Watergate case. It was from my discussion as a result
of general comment with Walters that I became aware of the fact
that Ehrlichman and Haldeman had discussed the Dahlberg and ]Mex-
ican money. We then discussed the fact that some of the leads that
the FBI were pursuing were, to my understanding, were unrelated
to the Watergate but could result in persons, totally uninvolved, being
embarrassed. I would just like to note to counsel for the record that
some of this is different from the original pagination of my draft
that may have been lost through the transcribing of it here. I also
told him that I understood that the FBI had developed three possible
theories of the case, which I explained and then asked if, in fact, any
of the men arrested were persons that were working for the CIA.
General Walters assured me that they were not. I then told him that
I had been asked to explore every possible means of dealing with this
rather embarrassing and troublesome situation, because some of the
men involved were looking for assistance. I asked him if there was
any possible way the CIA could be of assistance in j^iroviding support
for tlie individuals involved. General Walters told me that while
947
it could, of course, be done, he told me that he knew the Director's
feelings about such a matter and tiie Director would only do it on a
direct order from the President. He then went on to say that to do
anything to compound the situation would be most unwise and that
to involve the OIA would only compound the problem because it would
require that the President become directly involved.
^Miile I cannot recall in detail everything General Walters told me,
I do recall that his argument was most sound and very persuasive. I
told him I agreed with his position fully and I had merely been asked
to explore the potential, which he very rightly stated was too great a
risk. As the discussion ended I asked him that if he had any further
ideas and told him I would appreciate the benefit of his thoughts. I
thanked him for his coming over and his candid answers and he
departed.
Subsequent to my meeting with General Walters, I reported back to
Ehrlichman that Walters had informed me that any involvement by
the CIA in this matter was impossible. I recall that when I reported
this to Ehrlichman, he very cynically said "very interesting". He told
me that I should talk with General Walters further and push him a
little harder to see if the CIA couldn't help out, particularly with
regard to the unnecessary pui^uit of investigative leads. I also recall
Ehrlichman saying something to the effect that General Walters seems
to have forgotten how he got where he is today.
I would like to skip the paragraph on page 77 I'egarding the call
from Gray, and turn to the last paragraph on 77.
I received a phone call from Gray on June 27 in which
he expressed both concern and confusion about his determining if
the CIA was or was not concerned about the FBI investigation. I
was also confused by Gray's call and do not recall at this time
what, if an>i:hing, I did after I received it. However, I do recall
that Ehrlichman had mentioned to me that he wanted Gray to
deal with General Walters rather than Director Helms. Appar-
ently this was the cause of the confusion on Gray's behalf.
On the morning of June 28 I arranged again to meet with General
Walters. I was first embarrassed about requesting the meeting because
he had been most explicit and convincing to me at the first meeting, I
told him that I requested the meeting at Ehrlichman's behest to further
discuss the problems of the Dahlberg and Mexican checks. I told him
what I knew about the matters and that, to the best of my knowledge,
they were not related to the Watergate incident. I then asked him if he
had any suggestions. He expressed sympathy over the situation, but
said there was nothing his agency could do. He again explained rea-
sons similar to his earlier comments regarding CIA involvement and I
expressed my understanding. I then asked him if he had any ideas at
all and he said that it might be possible to explain the matter as an
anti-Castro activity. We had some general discussion of this, but
nothing concrete emerged from the discussion. Before Walters
departed I assured him that I agreed that it would be most unwise to
involve the CIA, and I thanked him — almost apologetically — for
coming by again. At no time did I push him as I had been instructed.
At the conclusion of this meeting I was totally convinced, as I had
Note. — -Indented matter represents portions of Mr. Dean's prepared statement which
wero omitted or summarized in his presentation.
948
been earlier, that the CIA could not and would not be brought in to
solve the problems confronting the White House and reelection com-
mittee as a result of the Watergate incident.
I subsequently informed Ehrlichman and Haldeman that unless the
President directly ordered the CIA to provide support for those
involved that the CIA was not going to get involved. I told them I
agreed with Walters that this would be a terrible mistake and they
both told me they agreed.
Transmitting the Materials in Mr. Hunt's Safe to the FBI
I would now like to explain the transmitting of the materials in
Hunt's safe to the FBI. As I noted earlier, shortly after the FBI inter-
view on June 22 of Colson, and my later instructions from Ehrlichman
to "Deep Six'' the briefcase and shred documents, I had informed the
FBI that I would forward the material found in Hunt's office. After
weighing the implications of Ehrlichman's instructions to destroy the
items I decided that I would not engage in any such activity mvself or
be pushed into it. Accordingly, I asked David Young to return the
State Department cable to my office. I had already returned the brief-
case from my car trunk to my office.
I received several calls from the FBI requesting the material, but
I had not yet figured out how to tell Ehrlichman I was not going to
destroy the material. I knew I had to develop a good argument to give
Ehrlicliman as to why the materials should not be destroyed. On
June 25 or 26 I went to Ehrlichman to explain that I thought the
men who drilled the safe had probably seen the briefcase, that the
Secret Service agent who was present had probably seen some of the
material ; that Mr. Kehrli and Fielding had seen it — and what would
happen when all those people were later asked by the FBI about the
contents of the safe. Then, I said I felt we must turn over the material
to the FBI. With regard to the sensitive documents. I suggested that
thev be given directly to Gray, I told Ehrlichman that, if ever asked
under oath, I had to be able to testify that to the best of my knowledge,
everything found in the safe had been turned over to the FBI.
The FBI agents came to my office, I believe on June 26 or 27.
I gave them one box, which had been packed and told them that
as soon as the other material was packed I would get it to them. When
I got tied up in a meeting, I phoned Fielding and asked him to pack
up the remainder of the materials, which I believe was the State De-
partment cables and the briefcase. He did so and turned over the re-
mainder of the materials, with the exception of the two envelopes
which contained the politically sensitive materials I described earlier.
I spoke with Ehrlichman on the 28th and informed him the material
had been sent to the FBI with the exception of the politicall}^ sensitive
documents. He told me he was meeting later that day with Gray and
I should bring them over at that time.
I went to Ehrlichman's office just before ^Nfr. Gray arrived. I placed
the envelopes on the coffee table in his office. When Gray arrived,
Ehrlichman told him that we had some material for him that had
come from Hunt's safe. Ehrlichman described it as politioallv sensi-
tive, but not related to the Watergate. I told Gray that Fieldins?- and
I had gone through Hunt's documents and had turned over all the
materials to the agents except the documents in these two envelopes.
949
I said we did not believe they related to the Watergate in any way,
but should they leak out they would be political dynamite in an election
year. I believe at that point Gl-ay placed the two envelopes in his brief-
case. At no time while I was present with Gray and Ehrlichman was
he instructed by myself or Ehrlichman to destroy the documents.
Rather, he was merely told that they must never be leaked or made
public. I departed and returned to my office.
The next time the fact of giving these documents to Gray came up
was shortly before the criminal Watergate trial in January of this year.
Fielding. Kehrli, and I were being interviewed by the prosecutors
regarding the handling of the materials in Hunt's safe to establish
the evidentiary chain. At one point in the interview, I asked Henry
Petersen, who' was present with Mr. Earl Silbert, if I could speak
with him privately. At that time I felt I had to tell Petersen that
not all the materials from Hunt's safe had gone directly to the agents,
rather that two envelopes of material, the contents of which I could
not itemize any better then than I can now, had been given directly
to Gray. I told Petersen that if I were to testify I would have to reveal
this fact. Mr. Petersen suggested that the interview be terminated,
which it was, and that they would get back to me and we could com-
plete it on another day. I was not called again and it was not because,
I think, of my knowledge, but because of other intervening events and
a motion that Mr. Bittman had filed not being pursued—but Fielding
and Kehrli testified as to the evidentiary chain at the trial.
I recall that shortly after this meeting in Petersen's office, where I
disclosed these facts to Petersen, I talked with Gray at a Department
of Justice hmcheon. After the luncheon he came up to me and told me
that I must "hang tight" on not disclosing his receipt of the docu-
ments. He also informed me that he had destroyed the documents. I
told Ehrlichman about this shortly after Gray told me he had de-
stroyed the documents, and when Ehrlichman called me just before the
President selected Gray as his nominee for Director of the FBI,
Ehrlichman asked me if I had any problems with Gray and I reminded
him of the destruction of the documents. He indicated that this was
not a problem.
It was after I commenced my informal interviews with the Water-
gate prosecutoi-s in early April of this year that this subiect arose
again. I repeated my story, as I have to this committee. They later
informed me that Gray denied having ever received such documents.
This was the first issue of fact that arose in my discussions with the
prosecutors, so my attorney requested that I take a polygraph test,
which I did. Subsequently, as is now public knowledge, and not to
my surprise because I believe that Gray is both an honorable and
truthful man, he has admitted that he had received and destroyed
the documents.
Mr. Kai3ibach and Silence Money
I would now like to turn back again to the end of June 1972.
After my meetinp-s with General Walters and subsequent meeting with
Haldeman and Ehrliclmian, I informed ]Mr. Mitchell that there could
be no CIA assistance. To the best of my recollection, this occurred on
the afternoon of June 28, in a meetinq- in Mr. Mitchell's office, and I
believe that Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian were also present. There was
950
a discussion of the need for support money in exchanfre for the silence
for the men in jail and if the CIA could not do it they would have to
find money somewhere else. Mr. LaRue indicated that ]Mr. Stans had
only a small amount of cash. I believe he said $70,000 or $80,000, but
more would be needed. After some discussion which I cannot recall
with any specificity at this time, Mitchell asked me to get the approval
of Haldeman and Ehrlichman to use ]\Ir. Herbert Kalmbach to raise
the necessary money. Before I departed the meeting I remembered that
Mr. Mitchell, in an aside for my ears only, told me that the White
House, in particular Ehrlichman, should be very interested and anx-
ious to accommodate the needs of these men. He was referring to ac-
tivities that they had conducted in the past that related to the White
House, such as the Ellsberg break-in.
I conveyed this request to Haldeman and Ehrlichman and they told
me to proceed to contact ]\Ir. Kalmbach. I called ^Nlr. Kalmbach on
June 28, and told him that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell had
requested that he come back to Washington as quickly as possible. He
told me he would take the next flight.
I met Mr. Kalmbach at the ]Mayflower Hotel on June 29. We first
met in the coffee shop, but could not find sufficient privacy to talk,
so we went to his room. I had always been very open in my deal-
ings with Mr. Kalmbach, and I knew that he had stated, after h^
completed his fundraising activities prior to April 7, 1972. that he
did not wish to engage in any further fundraising activities, so I tolrl
him everything I knew about the case at that time, including my con-
cern that it might involve the President himself, but I did not know
that for a fact. I also told him that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and
Mitchell felt it was very important that he raise the money. I told him
that per Mitchell's instructions he should contact Fred LaRue as to
the amoTUits needed and the timing. I knew that Kalmbach was not
happy with this assignment, and he said he was undertaking it only
because ^Mitchell, Haldeman. and Ehrlichman had so requested. I do
not know if Mr. Kalmbach discussed this with any of these persons,
but given the nature of the request, I did not expect him to take it on
my word alone. I had never before given instructions to Kalmbach to
raise any money or never passed on any similar instructions to him.
Subsequent to our meeting, Kalmbach informed me he was depart-
ing to raise the money, but he wanted Tony Ulasewicz to handle any
deliveries because ]Mr. Ulasewicz was the only man he would trust. He
said that he did not have his telephone number and requested that I
call Jack Caulfield and request that Mr. Ulasewicz call him in Cali-
fornia. I called Caulfield and made the request, but I did not tell
Caulfield the reason Kalmbach wanted to have Mr. ITasewicz call him.
Within a week or so, Kalmbach returned to Washington and re-
quested that I meet him in Lafayette Park, which I did. He said that
I could report to Haldeman and Ehrlichman that he had raised the
money and, in fact, he said he had it in his briefcase with him, to the
best of my recollection, he told me he was en route to meet ^Iv. T^lase-
wicz, but wanted me to know tlie iob was done. Followin"- that meeting
and several days later, as I recall, he called me and said that he had
asked Fred LaKue to come to my offline to give him the details of who
was to get how much. I recall that such a meeting did occur in mv office,
but I was on and off the telephone while LaRue and Kalmbach were
going over the figures and T have absolutely no recollection of the
951
details of their discussion. I know that LaRue had the figures on a
sheet of paper and Kahnbach wrote them down in his own code on a
small piece of paper Avhich he placed in his wallet. I have no further
knowledge of how or when or to whom delivery was made. ^Ir. Kalm-
bach merely told me later that it had been done and I passed this on to
Ehrlichman and Haldeman.
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, before you do, it is the wish of the
chairman — he had to go to the floor of the Senate to attend other
business — ^that we continue until about 12 :30 and then recess for lunch,
if that is agreeable to you. I think you might have time to just finish
this sequence and then recess for lunch.
Mr. Dash. There is a break on page 97.
Senator Baker. We will see how far the witness can go until
Mr. Deax. The witness only has the first part of his statement.
Senator Baker. I understand there is another part of about 150
pages or thereabouts. We are anxious for you to go as far as you can,
so you have been reading for 21^ hours, almost, so another 10 minutes,
I think, and then we will break for lunch.
Mr. Deax. Fine.
Discussion of Mitchell and Magruder Remaining at the
Reelection Committee
I would like to return once again to the period of June 21 through
June -30 in the matter of Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder remaining
at the reelection committee. As I had indicated, I had frequent dis-
cussions with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, in which I would report
back to them on information they had requested or report informa-
tion I had received. It was sometime during the last 10 days of
June that I recall a meeting in Haldeman's office in which they
asked me for my recommendation regarding removing Mitchell and
^fagruder from the reelection committee. This discussion preceded my
contacting Kalmbach. At that time I repeated mv knowledge of the
meetings which had occurred in Mitchell's office in January and Febru-
ary when Liddy was presenting his proposal. I told them I did not
know for a fact that Mitchell had ever approved Liddy's plans, but
Magruder had recently inferred to me that ^Mitchell was aware of the
operation. I told them I had never discussed it with ^litchell himself
and the only observation I could make was that the Watergate matter
appeared to be consuming most of Mitchell's time, which might dis-
tract him from the camjoaign.
Witli regard to Magruder, I repeated what Liddy had told me re-
garding ^lagruder's pushing him into doing the break-in at the Demo-
cratic Xational Committee. I also said that I thought there was a
real chance he could be indicted, although INIitchell and Magruder
thought that the matter might be stopped at Liddv. Accordinglv, I
told them I did not think I could make a recommendation regarding
^litchell, but I did recommend that ^lagruder be removed in a grace-
ful manner that would not unduly jeopardize him. They thanked
me, and told me they would take my recommendations under advise-
ment. The next time I heard an}i:hing about this subject was when it
was publicly announced that Mr. ^Mitchell was resigning. I was some-
what startled that ^Magruder was remaining. It was clear that
]Magruder was the only link back to the White House, and Magruder
952
might not stand up if indicted. I recall Haldeman asking me if I
thought ]Magruder would stand up if indicted and I said no. I have
always assumed it was a Presidential decision to keep ]Magruder on
at the reelection committee. Following the decision, Ehrlichman and
Haldeman indicated a greatly increased interest in Magruder's prob-
lems. They were aware of the strategy to stop the involvement at
Liddy, because I reported to them on the story that Magruder would
tell, that is, that he did not know what Liddy was doing. They fre-
quently asked me how ]\Iagruder was doing in relationship to the
FBI and grand jury investigation. I also had calls from ^Ir. Larry ^
Higby as to ^Magruder's status.
I do not know when I first learned of Magruder's proposed testi-
mony, but I did not know that it had ali'eady been fornnilated when I
first heard it. I informed Haldeman and Ehrlichman of the story. "We
discussed it and no one was sure it would hold up. This discussion did
occur before Mitchell resigned. We, of course, knew that it was a fab-
ricated story. Wlien I later learned that ]\Ir. Porter would corroborate
Mr. Magruder's testimony, I informed Haldeman and Ehrlichman of
that. I had never heard Mr. Magruder's story in full detail until just
before his grand jury appearance, in mid-August 1972. when he asked
me if I would be a devil's advocate and question him before he went
before the grand jury. Magruder came to my office, as I recall, the day
before his second grand jury appearance. He told me he had made the
decision himself as to how he was going to handle his testimony and
wanted me to ask him any and all questions I could think of. I spent
about an hour or more questioning him. Shortlj^ after I had this ses-
sion with ^Magruder, Higby called me to tell me that ]\Lagruder had
been to see him, to let Haldeman know he was ready.
Following Magruder's appearance before the grand jury I receii'ed
a call from Higby requesting information for Haldeman as to how
Magruder had done before the grand jury. I subsequently called ]Mr.
Petersen, who said he would find out and call me back. Petersen called
back and said he had made it through by the skin of his teeth. I called
Haldeman and so informed him, and subsequently informed ^Mitchell
and Magruder. I recall that Haldeman was very pleased, because this,
of course, meant that the investigation would not <xo beyond Liddy.
In early September Paul O'Brien came to my office and informed me
that there was an outstanding subpena for ^Magruder's diarv. O'Brien
said that Magruder's diary reflected the meetings in ^MitchelTs office
in January and February with Liddy, Magruder, Dean, and ^Mitchell.
O'Brien also informed me that there had been discussion of destroying
or altering the diary, but he did not think much of that. I agreed that
to alter it would be impossible because it would be discovered by the
FBI laboratory.
I remember talking with Magruder and asking him why ho kept a
diary^ — being somewhat facetious. I told Magruder that he should talk
with Mr. Mitchell about this, because he was probably going to have
to turn the diary over.
Long before the matter of Magruder's diary had arisen, I had talked
with Mitchell about the meetings in January and February in his
office. I told him that should it ever be necessary, I would tostifv that
I knew that he had not approved anything at these meetings. It was
after the matter of Magruder's diary being subponaed and ^fagruder
again being recalled to the grand jury that Mitchell requested that I
953
meet with him and Magruder to discuss how Magruder should handle
this matter before the grand jury. During the meeting at which this
was discussed, I told IMitdiell and IMagruder that I had no idea what
they had discussed before I arrived late at the second meeting in
February. I said I recalled there was some reference to the election
laws at the first meeting and IMagruder could explain my presence with
Liddy at the meetings by reason of the fact of the election laws dis-
cussion. Magruder liked this idea and said that was how he would
handle it. I later learned that Magruder testified that one of the meet-
inns had been canceled, and the meeting that occurred was to introduce
Liddy to Mitchell and had dealt with election law problems. I assume
that these refinements to the story were added by ]Magruder because
they were not discussed at my meeting with ]SIitchell and ]Magnider.
Senator Baker. INIr. Dean, that would seem to be a convenient break-
ing place. I notice that on the next page, 91, you have appearances of
White House personnel before the grand jury, so if you have no ob-
jection to it, the meeting will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
["Wliereupon, at 12 :30 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., this same day.]
Afterxoox Sessiox, ]Moxday, Juxe 25, 1973
Senator Ervix. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Dean, I realize that when you have to do so much reading that
sometimes it gets pretty hard on your voice and any time that you
feel like you need a little break to sort of relieve your voice, let us
know and we will certainly grant it to you.
Mr. Deax. I appreciate that very much, Mr. Chairman.
If the Chairman is ready I will proceed.
When we stopped for lunch I was just commencing on page 91.
Appearaxces of White House Persoxxel Before the Graxd
Jury
]Mr. Deax. I shall now turn from the matter of Magruder's ap-
pearances before the grand jury, to the appearance of the members of
the Wiite House staff before the grand jury.
The handling of the appearances of the White House staff before
the grand jury was very similar to the procedure that had been fol-
lowed with regard to their interviews by the FBI. By that I mean
either Mr. Fielding or myself would discuss with the individual before
he went to the grand jury the likely questions he would be aslvcd, the
unrelated areas that we didn't feel it was necessary for the individual
to net into.
"\Mien Colson learned that he was going to be called before the grand
jury, he was outraged. He felt that the press had been rather hostile
toward him because of his association with Mr. Hunt and his appear-
ance in the courthouse before the grand jury would be most detri-
mental. He was very insistent that something be done about the situa-
tion and asked me to see if I could do anything to help him. I called
Henry Petersen and discussed this with him and asked him if there
was anything that could be done. Petersen told me he would explore
it. Petersen called l)ack and said he appreciated the problem of the
"VMiite House staff' people coming down to the courthouse to appear
96-296 O - 73
954
before the grand jury and he had worked out an arrangement whereby
they could come to the Department of Justice, be interviewed by the
prosecutors with counsel present, and then the prosecutor would take
a sworn statement without counsel present as if it were a secret grand
jury room and later the prosecutors would read the statement to the
grand jury. This procedure was followed, as I recall, for Mr. Colson,
Mr. Krogh, Mr. Young, Mr. Chapin, and Mr. Strachan.
When Secretary Stans learned that he was being called before the
grand jury, he expressed a similar outrage and requested a procedure
like that which had been given to the members of the White House
staff. I discussed this again with Petersen, but he said he didn't feel it
would be possible to follow a similar procedure. Mr. Stans' outrage
continued and finally he raised it directly with Mr. Ehrlichman. Ehr-
lichman asked me why I couldn't do anything with Petersen about this
and I told him that Petersen had done the best he could but that there
was nothing he could do about it because the grand jury wanted Stans
to appear. Ehrlichman would not accept my explanation and called
Petersen and was very harsh in telling Petersen that he should honor
the White House request that Stans not be forced to appear at the court
house to go before the grand jury. I was present when Ehrlichman
called Petersen and felt that he was wrong in doing so. I felt that
Petersen had been more than accommodating and that if he could have
done it, he would, but obviously the grand jury wanted to see these
people and Petereen was not happy with the procedures that had been
followed with the others. It had merely been an accommodation.
Accordingly, I called Mr. Petersen and apologized for the call that he
had received from Ehrlichman.
The only significant matter that I can recall in connection with any
of the grand jury appearances was in connection with Colson's grand
jury appearance also. After Colson returned from his grand jury
interview he sent me a memorandum, a copy of which I have submitted
to the committee — ^which he suggested I might wish to send on to the
prosecutors. I had been present during Colson's interview with the
prosecutors before his sworn statement was taken and I did not find
anything of significance in the memorandum that he had failed to
cover during his interview.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-18.*]
Mr. Deax. I had also received information from Magnider that he
had been pressured by Colson and members of Colson's staff into
authorizing the adoption of Liddy's plans on several occasions and
this information was not reflected in the memorandum that (\)lson liad
prepared. I felt that the memorandum was rather self-serving to ]\Ir.
Colson and I was not convinced that it was totally factual.
The memorandum also came to my attention almost a week after
Colson had sent it to me because, immediately following his appear-
ance before the grand jury at the end of August. I had gone to San
Clemente. I advised Colson that I did not know if everything in his
memorandum was consistent with Magruder's testimony, and I
thought we ought to leave well enough alone. He agreed. Accordingly,
I filed the document rather than forward it to Mr. Silbert.
•See p. 1160.
955
The So-Called Deax Ix\'estigation
It was while I was in San Clemente, at the end of August, that the
President announced at a press conference the so-called "Dean Re-
port'' which cleared everybody presently employed at the AMiite House
or in the administration 'from'^any complicity in the Watergate matter.
This statement was made on August 29. 1972.
I would like to recall to the committee what the ^Y}iite House had
publicly said about this incident prior to the xVugust 29 statement of
the President.
On June 19, Ziegler reported that there was no inquiry being made
by the ■\\nnte House into the matter. On June 20 Ziegler stated that
the case is something that the President will not get into at all despite
the fact that Mr. Hunt had been publicly linked to the White House.
On June 21, Ziegler stated that Colson had assured him that he was
not involved, and the White House repeated the statement that the
President would not get involved. On June 23, the President stated
that, as Ziegler had said, the ^Yl\ite House has had no involvement
whatever in this particular incident.
On July 3, when the President was in California, he ruled out a
special prosecutor and said that the FBI and other authorities will
pursue the investigation thoroughly and completely. And, Ziegler fur-
ther reported on that date that the President would not be getting
special reports on this politically sensitive case since that would be
inappropriate.
Suddenly came the August 29 statement citing the Dean investiga-
tion. I had no advance knowledge that the President was going to
indicate that I had investigated the matter and found no complicity
on the part of anybody at the Wliite House or anyone presently em-
ployed in the administration. I first learned of the matter when I
heard it on a television news broadcast that evening after I had de-
parted from the compound at San Clemente. I was going to walk up
to the residence and listen to the press conference that day because I
had never been to a press conference on the west coast, but, at the
last minute. I returned to my room and later turned on the television
and heard the statement.
Had I been consulted in advance by the President, I would have
strongly opposed the issuing of such a statement for several reasons
which i would have told the President. First, I was aware that Gorclon
Strachan had close, daily, liaison with Mr. ]Magruder and had carried
information relating to wiretapped conversations into the "\^niite House
and later destroyed incriminating documents at Haldoman's direction.
Second, I had never been able to determine whether Haldeman had
advance knowledge or not, and in fact, had never asked him because
I didn't feel I could.
Third. I had always suspected, but never been able to completely
substantiate my suspicion, that Colson was far more knowledgeable
than he protested.
I was very aware of Mr. Colson's efforts to disassociate himself with
Hunt and of Colson's continual production of documents that would
disassociate himself with Hunt. Colson protested too much.
956
Finally, I -was aware of the two meetings that I had attended and
had reported these to both Haldeman and Ehrlichman, I reported to
Haldeman, as I mentioned earlier, shortly after the meetings had oc-
curred when I told him I thought the idea was bad and incredible and
told him that I would have no connection or relationship with the
matter. I had reported this to Ehrlicliman in June 1972, shortly after
the incident. I never understood how the Liddy plan had been ap-
proved and Magruder had indicated to me that there had been White
House pressure to get the plan moving.
Accordingly, I would have been the last to say unequivocally, as
the President so stated, that no one presently employed at the White
House had any advance knowledge of the matter. I did believe, how-
ever, that nobody at the White House knew that there was going to
be a break-in of the Democratic National Committee on June 17
because I don't believe that anyone other than those directly involved
knew that that was going to happen, on that day. I don't know if the
President's statement was meant to be a very literal play on carefully
chosen words or whether he intended to give it the broad-brush inter-
pretation that it later received. However, I would have certainly coun-
seled the President against issuing the statement. And, I was very
unhappy to have my name associated with the statement without being
consulted whatsoever, and put out in front on the issue.
The issuing of the so-called "Dean Report" was the first time I began
to think about the fact that I might be being set up in case the whole
thing came crumbling down at a later time. I subsequently discussed
this with other individuals — ^^Ir. Moore, Mr. Fielding, and Mr.
]Mitchell — and they assured me, but not unanimously, that I need not
worry because they did not believe that anyone at the White House
would do that to me.
The Presidentially Directed CoT7NTEROFrEXSi\^ to the
Democratic Civil Suits
In early September, as the FBI and the Department of Justice
investigations began winding down the concern of the White House
and the reelection committee shifted to the very active investigation
that was being pursued by the Democratic National Committee
throug'h its discoverv proceedings in its civil lawsuit against the re-
election committee. The Democrats were making daily headlines with
their lawsuit.
Senator Er\tx. I would suggest your voice has dropped and I sug-
gest you talk more directly into the microphone.
]Mr. Dean. I will move closer then. I have several hours and I
thought I ought to ease it back a little bit.
On or about September 9 or 10, I received a Presidential request
from both Plaldeman and Colson. The President felt that the best
defense to the actions being pursued by the Democrats, and the charges
and implications that were stemming from the lawsuits being filed by
the Democrats, was our own counteroffensive with our own series of
lawsuits against the Democrats. I recall that Colson called me repeat-
edly and finally reported that he had just come from the President's
Office and that the President wanted action on this as quickly as
humanly possible. I informed Mr. Colson that I was working on it
957
but. that I wasn't going to suggest filing any lawsuit or taking any
action that was not well founded.
I had talked with ^litchell. Ken Parkinson, and Paul O'Brien about
the matter and ^Nlr. Parkinson informed me that he was working on
several potential counteractions. I requested that he submit a memo-
randum to me as soon as possible because there was great interest at
the White House in a counterattack, including the interest by the
President. On September 11, 1972, Mr. Parkinson submitted his
memorandum to me and after the memorandum, I redrafted his docu-
ments for submission to Haldeman. I have submitted to the committee
copies of both Mr. Parkinson's memorandum and the memorandum
I submitted to Haldeman.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 34r-19.*]
Mr. Deax. You will note that my memorandum of September 12,
1972, to Mr. Haldeman has a "P" with a checkmark in the upper
right-hand corner, which indicates that the document was forwarded
directly to, or reviewed by, the President. I later learned that the
President was pleased and wanted a full followup on the items in the
memorandum. The markings on the memo are Mr. Haldeman's
markings.
It was also about this time, later July — early September, that I
learned during a meeting in Mitchell's office that Mr. Rhoemer Mc-
Phee was having private discussions with Judge Richey regarding
the civil suit filed by the Democrats. I believe this fact was known to
Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, Paul O'Brien, and Ken Parkinson — and
later again by McPhee — that Judge Richey was going to be helpful
whenever he could. I subsequently talked with Mr. McPhee about
this, as late as March 2 of this year, when he told me he was going to
visit the judge in the judge's rose garden over the weekend to discuss
an aspect of the case.
Meeting "With the President — September 15, 1972
On September 15 the Justice Department announced the handing
down of the seven indictments by the Federal grand jury investigat-
ing the Watergate. Late that afternoon I received a call requesting
me to come to the President's Oval Office. When I arrived at the Oval
Office I found Haldeman and the President. The President asked me
to sit down. Both men appeared to be in very good spirits and my
reception was very warm and cordial. The President then told me
that Bob — referring to Haldeman- — had kept him posted on my han-
dling of the Watergate case. The President told me I had done a good
job and he appreciated how difficult a task it had been and the Presi-
dent was pleased that the case had stopped with Liddy. I responded
that I could not take credit because others had done much more diffi-
cult things than I had done. As the President discussed the present
status of the situation I told him that all that I had been able to do
was to contain the case and assist in keeping it out of the AMiite Plouse.
I also told him that there was a long way to go before this matter
would end and that I certainly could make no assurances that the day
would not come when this matter would start to unravel.
•See p. 1173.
958
Early in our conversation the President said to me that former
FBI Director Hoover had told him shortly after he had assumed office
in 1969 that his campaign had been bugged in 1968. The President
said that at some point we should get the facts out on this and use
this to counter the problems that we were encountering.
The President asked me when the criminal case would come to trial
and would it start before the election. I told the President that I did
not know. I said that the Justice Department had held off as long as
possible the return of the indictments, but much would depend on
which judge got the case. The President said that he certainly hoped
that the case would not come to trial before the election.
The President then asked me about the civil cases that had been
filed by the Democratic National Committee and the common cause
case and about the counter suits that we had filed. I told him that the
lawyers at the reelection committee were handling these cases and that
they did not see the common cause suit as any real problem before the
election because they thought they could keep it tied up in discoverj^
proceedings. I then told the President that the lawyers at the reelec-
tion committee were very hopeful of slowing down the civil suit filed
by the Democratic National Committee because they had been making
ex parte contacts with the judge handling the case and the judge was
very understanding and trying to accommodate their problems. The
President was pleased to hear this and responded to the effect that,
"Well, that's helpful." I also recall explaining to the President about
the suits that the reelection committee lawyers had filed against the
Democrats as part of their counteroffensive.
There was a brief discussion about the potential hearings before the
Patman committee. The President asked me what we were doing to
deal with the hearings and I reported that Dick Cook, who liad once
worked on Patman's committee staff, was working on the problem.
The President indicated that Bill Timmons should stay on top of the
hearings, that we did not need the hearings before the election.
The conversation then moved to the press coverage of the Watergate
incident and how the press was really trying to make this into a major
campaign issue. At one point in this conversation I recall the President
telling me to keej^ a good list of the press people giving us trouble,
because we will make life difficult for them after the election. The
conversation then turned to the use of the Internal Revenue Service
to attack our enemies. I recall tel]in<T the President that we had not
made much use of this because the "White House did not have the clout
to have it done, that the Internal Revenue SerAace was a rather demo-
cratically oriented bureaucracy and it would be very dangerous to try
any such activities. The President seemed somewhat annoved and said
that the Democratic administrations had used this tool well and after
the election we would get people in these agencies who would be re-
sponsive to the "\^Tiite House requirements.
The conversation then turned to the President's postelection plans
to replace people Avho were not on our team in all the agencies. It was
at this point that Haldeman, I remember, started taking notes and he
also told the President that he had been developing information on
which people should stay and which should go after the election. I
recall that several days after my meeting with the President, I was
talking to Dan Kingsley, who was in charge of developing tlie list for
959
Haldeman as to people who should be removed after the election. I
told Kinfrsley that this matter had come up during my couA-ersation
with the President and he said he had wondered what had put new life
into his project as he had received several calls from Higby about the
status of his pi'oject within the last few days. The meeting ended with
a conversation with the President about a book I was reading.
I left the meeting with the impression that the President was well
aware of what had been going on regarding the success of keeping the
White House out of the Watergate scandal and I also had expressed to
him my concern that I was not confident that the coverup could
maintained indefinitely.
Blockixg the Patmax Committee Hearings
I would next like to turn to the '\"\niite House efforts to block the
Patman committee hearings. As early as mid-August 1972. the AAliite
House learned through the congressional relations staff that an inves-
tigation was being conducted by the staff of the House Banking and
Currency Committee, under the direction of Chairman Patman, into
many aspects of the Watergate incident. The focus of the investigation
at the outset was the funding of the Watergate incident, and other
possible illegal funding that may have involved banking violations.
The ^Yhite House concern was twofold : First, the hearings would
have resulted in more adverse preelection publicity regarding the
Watergate, and second, they just might stumble into something that
would start unraveling the coverup.
The initial dealings with the Patman committee and the reelection
committee were handled by Mr. Stans and Mr. Parkinson. However,
as the Patman committee proceeded, Stans called for assistance from
the White House. I was aware of the fact that the Patman investi-
gatoi^s had had numerous conversations with Parkinson and the inves-
tigators themselves came to the Eepublican National Convention to
interview Stans on August 25, 1972. Upon Mr. Stans' return from the
Republican Convention he met with the investigative staff' of the Pat-
man committee, which I believe occurred on August 30. He was
accompanied at both these interviews by Mr. Parkinson.
At some point in time during these investigations Mr. Parkinson
was put in touch with Congressman Garry BroAvn, who was a member
of the Banking and Currency Committee. To the best of my recollec-
tion, this may have resulted from discussions between members of the
"\Miite House congressional relations staff with the Re):)ublican mem-
bei-s of the Banking and Currency Committee to determine who would
be most helpful on the committee, and Brown indicated his willing-
ness to assist.
On September 8, Congressman Brown sent a letter to the Attorney
General regarding the forthcoming appearance of Secretary Stans and
others before the Patman committee. I have submitted to the com-
mittee a copy of this letter, whicli was, in fact, drafted by Mr. Parkin-
son for Congressman Brown.
[The letter was marked exhibit Xo. 34-20.*]
Mr. Deax. It is my recollection that .Secretary Stans was scheduled
to appear before the Patman committee for formal testimony on Sep-
*See p. IISI.
9160
tember 14. Prior to Parkinson's drafting the letter for Congressman
Brown, I had been asked to discuss the matter with Henry Petersen,
which I did. I told Petersen of the problem and asked him for his feel-
ing about Stans and others appearing before the Patman committee
and what effect that might have on either the grand jury or the indicted
individuals once the indictments were handed down. I recall that
Petersen had very strong feelings that it could be very detrimental to
the Government's ability to prosecute successfully the Watergate case,
but he said he would have to give some thought to responding to Con-
gressman Brown's letter. I had several additional discussions with
Petersen and later with the Attorney General, when Petersen indicated
he did not think he could respond before the scheduled appearance of
Stans on September 14.
The Justice Department did not feel that it could write such a letter
for one individual regarding the Patman hearings and was very reluc-
tant to do so. I also had conversations with Mitchell about this and
reported the matter to Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Tlie Justice De-
partment felt that for them to write such a letter would look like a
direct effort to block the hearings and I frankly had to agree. There-
fore, no response was sent prior to the scheduled September 14
appearance of Stans and Mr. Parkinson himself informed the com-
mittee that Stans would not appear because he felt it would be detri-
mental to the then pending civil and criminal investigations.
It was after my September 15 meeting with the President where
this matter had been briefly and generally discussed and, as the subse-
quent activities on the Patman committee became more intense that
the White House became more involved in dealing with the Patman
committee. On September 25, Chairman Patman announced that he
would hold a vote on October 3 regarding the issuing of subpenas to
witnesses. With this announcement the White House congressional
relations staff began talking with members of the committee as well
as the Republican leadership of the House.
I recall several conversations with ]\Ir. Timmons and Dick Cook
regarding this matter as well as conversations with Haldeman. Tim-
mons and Cook informed me that there v>^as a daily change in the list
of potential witnesses and the list was ever growing and beginning
to reach into the AAHiite House itself. In discussing it with Haldeman
I asked him how he thought the Patman hearings might be turned off.
He suggested that I might talk with Secretary Connally about the
matter because Connally would know Patman as well as anybody. I
called Secretary Connally and told him the reason I was calling. He
said that the only thing he could think of. the only soft spot that Pat-
man might have, was that he had received large contributions from a
"Washington lobbyist and had heard rumors that some of these contri-
butions may not have been reported.
I discussed this matter with Bill Timmons and we concluded that
several Republicans would probably have a similar problem so the
matter was dropped. At this time I cannot recall the name of the
lobbvist whom Secretary Connallv said had made the contributions to
Mr. Patman. Timmons and I had also discussed that probably some
of the members of the Banking and Currency Committee would have
themselves potential campaign act violations and that it probably
would be worthwhile to check out their reporting to the Clerk of the
House. I told Timmons I would look into it.
96,1
On September 26 I received a report I had requested from Parkin-
son after he had one of his associates check the reports of the members
of the committee with the Clerk of tlie House. After I received the
document from Parkinson, a copy of which I have submitted to the
committee, I decided it would be a cheap shot to get into anything of
this nature.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34—21.^]
Mr. Deax. Accordingly, I never reviewed the document that Park-
inson submitted and I have not reviewed it to this day.
While the White House had received through its congressional re-
lations stall' informal reports as to who was likely to be subpenaed,
(^liairman Patman made public his list on October 2, 1972. The indi-
viduals for whom subpenas were to be requested was extensive and in-
cluded several people who had varying degrees of knowledge regard-
ing the Watergate and related matters. This list, for example, included
Alfred Baldwin, Jack Caulfield, persons from the finance commit-
tee, Sallv Harmonv, Fred LaRue, Clark ]MacGregor, Mr. ']Magruder,
Mr. :Mardian, :\Ir. Mitchell, Rob Odle, Bart Porter, Hugh Sloan, Stans,
Timmons. and myself. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the
entire list.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-22.^]
Mr. Deax. As the names on the list had continued to evolve, it be-
came increasingly apparent that the ^Vliite House did not want the
hearings to be held. For example, Bill Timmons took a much greater
interest in the project when he realized early on that his name was
among those who would be called. I say this not because Timmons had
any reason not to appear because I know of no illegal or improper
activity on Timmons' part, rather he had been Avorking to prevent the
hearings from occurring in the first instance through his conversations
with the Republican leaders and members of the committee. This he
knew would put him in an awkward position.
I began receiving increasing pressure from Mitchell, Stans, Parkin-
son and others to get the Justice Department to respond to the Sep-
tember 8 letter of Congressman Brown as a vehicle that Congressman
Brown could use in persuading other Republicans not to vote in favor
of the subpenas. Congressman Brown felt that with this document in
hand he could gi^'e the Republicans and others something to hang their
vote on. I had continued my conversations with Henrv Petersen and
after the indictments had been returned he said that indeed he did feel
that the Justice Department should issue such a letter because of the
potential implications of the breadth of the Patman hearings. The let-
ter was sent on October 2, 1972. I have submitted to the committee a
copy of Congressman Brown's letter ^ and Assistant Attorney General
Petersen's response.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 3-1-23.*]
]Mr. Deax. A number of people worked on ofetting the votes necessary
to block the Patman committee hearings. Mr. Timmons discussed the
matter with the House Republican leaders who agreed to be of assist-
ance by making it a matter for the leadership consideration, which
resulted in direction from the leadership to the members of the com-
iSee p. 11 S3
2 See p. 1190
^ Confrressman Brown's letter appears as exhibit 34—20.
*See p. 1194.
962
mittee to vote against the hearings. I was informed that Congressman
Brown had been working with several membei-s on the Democratic side
of the Patman committee to assist in voting against the hearings or as
an alternative not to appear for the hearings. Timmons informed me
that he was also in direct contact with one of the leaders of the south-
ern delegation who was being quite helpful in persuading the south-
erners on the committee not to vote for the subpenas or in the alterna-
tive not to appear at the meeting on October 3. Also INIitchell reported
to me that he had been working with some people in New York to get
the New Yorkers on the committee to vote against the hearings. He
told me, and I cannot recall now which members of the New York
delegation he referred to, that he had assurances that they would
either not show up or would vote against tlie hearings. I in turn passed
this information on to Timmons, but I did not tell him the source of
my information. On October 3 the vote was held and the subpenas
were defeated by a vote of 20 to 15 and another sigh of relief was
made at the Wliite House that we had leaped one more hurdle in the
continuing coverup.
On October 4, however, Chairman Patman requested a GAO in-
vestigation and I was asked by Stans what this would mean. I told
him that this would be primarily between himself and the GAO but
that since GAO had no subpena power to compel testimony, the scope
of their investigation would have limits. He said he felt that he could
work with Elmer Staats, who was an old and good friend, and not let
this matter get out of hand with the GAO. On October 10, Chairman
Patman decided to proceed without subpena power, and sent letters
to MacGregor, Stans, Mitchell, and mvself. Evervbody who received
such a letter declined to appear and Patman held his hearings with
empty witness chairs and, as I recall the press accounts, "lectured"
the missing witnesses.
The Segretti Matter
I would now like to turn to the so-called Segretti matter. I have
been informed by committee counsel that the subject of alleged po-
litical sabotage will be taken up in subsequent hearings. However, I
have been asked to exolain in full the ):)attern of coverup which
evolved in connection with the AVatergate and related matters and my
explanation would be less than complete in presenting my knowledge
of the subject if I were to omit the so-called Segretti matter. AAHiile the
Segretti matter was not directlv related to the Watergate, the covenip
of the facts surrounding Mr. Segretti's activities was consistent with
other i)arts of the general White House coverup which followed the
Watergate incident. I will not go into extensive detail at this time,
rather I will give the highlights of the pattern that was followed
regarding the dealings of the White House with Mr. Segretti.
I first heard of ]Mr. Segretti when Gordon Strachan called me in
late June and told me that the FBI had called a friend of his by the
name of Donald Segretti, and requested to interview him in connection
with the break-in at the Democratic National Committee. Strachan
asked if I would meet with Segretti. I told him that I would and
Strachan arranged a meeting at the ]Mayflower Hotel where Segretti
was staying. Strachan gave me a very general description of INIr. Se-
963
<rretti-s activities and said that he was a "dirty tricks" type operator
wlio was beino- paid by ^Ir. Kabiibach. He told me that he would
rather have Se^rretti himself tell me what he had been doino; because
lie, in fact, was not aware of all of Se^rretti's activities. He also in-
formed me that ^Mr. Chapin had been involved in hirincr Seo:retti. I
met with ]Mr. Se^retti in the lobby of the ]Mayflower Hotel at which
time he erave me a very broad description of his activities and said that
lie had had contact with a man by the name of Ed Warren, who, by
haviii£r seen subsequent pictures in the paper, he assumed was Howard
Hunt. I told Seofretti to come to my office the next day and we would
discuss the matter further.
When Sejrretti came to my office the next mornins;, he told me of
his relationship with Mr. Hunt and that he had only had incidental
dealiiifrs with him and recalled meetinc: with him twice in Florida and
several subsequent telephone calls. Seofretti told me that Hunt had
"scared him" and that he had reallv decided early-on to deal with him
as little as possible. Seirretti then described how he had been hired and
the fact that he had met with Kalmbach to arran^re his compensation.
He said he wanted to know whether he should mention the fact that
Strachan and Chapin had recruited him and Kalmbach was paying
him when he was interviewed by the FBI.
I told Seoretti that he should answer any and all questions asked
about Hunt and his relationship with Hunt but that he should with-
hold the names of Strachan. Chapin. and Kalmbach. unless the FBI
felt it was absolutelv necessary to have the names. Seo-retti departed
and returned to California.
Several davs after Segretti's FBI interview, he called me and told
me that he thoup:ht his interview had <rone very well. He said he told
the FBI everything he Imew about Mr. Hunt and the fact that he had
no knowledge of the Watergate incident and that the agents had not
pressed him in a manner that required him to reveal the names of
Strachan. Chapin. and Kalmbach. I thanked him for informing me of
the results of his interview and did not hear again from him until
much later.
The next time I heard from Segretti was in August, during the
Republican National Convention in Miami. I received a call from
yir. Chapin who indicated that Segretti was very concerned about the
fact that he was being called before a Federal grand jury in Washing-
ton to investigate the Watergate.
Chapin told me that Segretti was looking for guidance as to his
appearance before the grand jury and that he was concerned again
that he might have to reveal the names of Strachan. Chapin. and
Kalmbach. I informed Chapin that it would be impossible for me to
go to Washington to see Segretti. but if he wished to come to Florida
prior to his scheduled gi'and jury appearance. I would be happy to
meet with him.
After my conversation with Chapin, I called Mr. Petersen at the
Department of Justice and explained the problem that was confront-
ing Segretti. I told Petersen that to the best of mv knowledge Segretti
had no involvement in the Watergate incident but he had had deal-
ings with Hunt in connection with some campaign activities he had
been performing for the A^Hiite House.
964
I also informed Petersen that he was being paid by the President's
personal attorney, Mr. Kalmbach, and that he had been recruited by
Chapin and Strachan. I said that these facts, if revealed, would obvi-
ously be quite embarrassing and could cause political problems during
the waning weeks of the election. Mr. Petersen said that he understood
the problem and would determine what he could do. I subsequently
talked to Petersen again and he told me that he did not believe it
would be necessary for the prosecutors to get into these areas when
Mr. Segretti appeared before the grand jury.
Segretti came to Florida a day or so before his appearance before
the grand jury. To the best of my recollection it was on a Saturday
during the week I was in Miami preparing for the convention. I had
a very brief meeting with Segretti, not longer than 30 minutes, as I
recall in which we reviewed his potential problem. I told him that I
did not believe that the Government was particularly interested in
pursuing the names of Strachan, Chapin, and Kalmbach in connection
with his activities and I doubted if he would be asked any questions
about these areas. I told him, however, if he were asked the questions,
that he should answer any question and every question truthfullv, and
if we were asked the names of who had hired him and who had paid
him that he should give the names. I told him if pressed, he should lay
out the whole ball of wax.
I later learned from Segretti that the names had come out during
the grand jury appearance and I had a discussion later with Petersen
also on the subject in which he told me that Mr. Silbert had tried to
avoid getting into this area and in fact did not ask him tlie question
which resulted in his giving the names, rather that a grand juror liad
asked the question despite the fact that the prosecutors had tried to
gloss over it.
As a result of Segretti's appearance before the grand jury, FBI
inter\dews were scheduled for Chapin, Strachan, and Kalmbach. I had
by this time learned the full story, that in fact Haldeman, in a meeting
with Kalmbach, had approved Segretti's activities and authorized
Kalmbach to make the payments to Segretti. In discussing this wit;li
Chapin and Strachan before their appearances or their FBI inter-
views, I should say, they both had great concern about revealing Halde-
man's involvement. In fact, I recall that Strachan came into my office,
when Dick Moore was present, and said that he would, if necessary,
perjure himself to prevent involving Haldeman in this matter. I told
Strachan that that was certainly not necessary in my estimation, but
lie was indeed, most loyal to Haldeman for taking that position. Dick
Moore made a similar comment.
When the agents came to interview Chapin and Strachan, they con-
tained themselves in their questioning and, to the best of my knowledge
all the answers that Chapin and Strachan provided were truthful, al-
though I must say that, pursuant to discussions I had had witli them
before their interview, they did not volunteer any information that
was not asked for.
When I was in California in late August, I was asked by ]\[r. Ehr-
lichman to meet with Kalmbach and prepare him for his FBI inter-
view resrarding the Segretti matter.
Mr. Kalmbach was very concerned that the interview could lead
into other areas, and had discussed this problem with Ehrlichman.
965
Accordingly, I helped Kalmbach prepare for his FBI interview, and
he later informed nie it had gone well, that they had not asked
questions unrelated to the Segretti matter, and he volunteered nothing.
On October 10, 1972, an article based on leaked FBI information
rej^orted the Segretti story for the first time publicly. Following the
October 10 story there commenced a series of stories involving Chapin,
Strachan, Kalmbach, and, later, Haldeman. These stories created a new
frenzy in the White House press office as to how to deal with the stories.
On Friday, the 13th, I had left Washington to go to Florida to spend
several weeks on a honeymoon, but was abruptly called back to Wash-
ington on Sunday, October 15, because of the cascading leaked stories
regarding Segretti. When I returned, I went to the White House where
a meeting was in session in the Roosevelt room. In attendance at the
meeting were Ehrlichman, Ziegler, Buchanan, Moore, and Chapin. The
l)urpose of the meeting was to prepare Ziegler for his press briefings on
the Segretti-related stories. For a reason that I cannot explain, a sec-
retary to ]Mr. Chapin was present and taking notes during parts of
the discussions and hypothetical questioning and answering of ]SIr.
Ziegler. I believe this is one of the rare occasions where the preparation
of a Ziegler briefing was actually recorded and I have submitted to the
committee a copy of the notes recording parts of that session.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34—24.*]
Mr. Dean. I might also add that this session was not unlike many
other sessions that had preceded it and that were to follow it in prepar-
ing Ziegler to meet with the AAHiite House press corps. It would, how-
over, take me another 200 pages to give that story. After Segretti
became the subject of intense inquiry by the press, Ehrlichman sug-
gested that I advise Segretti to go incognito and hide from the press
and avoid further stories that might result from j^ress interviews of
him. I so advised Segretti and he came to Washington in late October,
because he was very distressed alwut the fact that a number of people
were issuing what he considered to be inaccurate and false stories
regarding his activities.
"\"\lien Segretti arrived in Washington, he was met by "Sir. Fielding
and myself to discuss whether he should issue a press statement him-
self at that time. This subject was also discussed in a meeting at
Mr. Chapin's office attended by Ziegler. Ehrlichman. Chapin, and my-
self, and later by Fielding after he had received a draft copy of
Segretti's proposed press statement. It was decided that it would be
unwise for Segretti to issue the statement, so he commenced his travels
around the United States once again to avoid the press. Mr. Segretti
would periodically call me to tell me that he was in some small town
and had not seen a newspaper or television for several days and was
curious to know what they were saying about him. I would give him
a summary report as to the ])ress co\'erage.
Following the election, I was asked by Haldeman and Ehrlichman
to meet wnth Segretti to determine the extent of the involvement that
Chapin and Stiachan had had with him. Segretti at this time was in
Palm Springs, Calif., where he had been spending the last week before
the election in the desert. I arranged to meet with him on November 10
in Palm Springs, and had planned to spend a week myself relaxing
after the election in Palm Springs. On November 10 I met with
♦See p. 1200.
966
Segretti and, pursuant to an arrangement between Segretti and my-
self, I agreed to tape the interview with him, with the understanding
that I felt it was privileged under the doctrine of executive privilege
and that it would never be released. I have submitted the tape of that
conversation between Segretti and myself to the committee pursuant
to a subpena issued for the material.
My visit to Palm Springs was abruptly interrupted when I received
a call on November 11 from Mr. Todcl Hullin, Ehrlichman's assistant,
requesting that I come to Florida where Ehrliclmian and Haldeman
were accompanying the President, to report on my interview with
Segretti.
Accordingly, I flew to Florida immediately and met with Halde-
man and Ehrlichman on November 12 and played the taped interview
I had had with Segretti for them. I recall that while I was discussing
this matter with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, the President requested
that Haldeman come over to see him. I was surprised on this occasion,
as I had been on other occasions when a similar situation had occurred,
that Haldeman sent a message back to the President that he was meet-
ing with me and would be over shortly to report. I was surprised that
my reporting on Segretti would take precedence over Haldeman's
responding to an immediate request of the President.
On November 15, 1972, 1 arranged to meet with Mr. Haldeman and
Mr. Ehrlichman at Camp David on another subject, which I will dis-
cuss later. During the first part of the meeting, however, the subject
of Chapin's remaining at the White House came up, and I learned
that the President had made a decision, based on the information that
had been imparted to Haldeman and Ehrlichman in Florida, that ]Mr.
Chapin would have to leave the White House staff. Before going to
Camp David, I was aware of this subject being under discussion and
Mr. Moore and I had talked about it. Moore felt that the President
should merely issue a letter of censure to Chapin and let it go at that,
but Moore was unaware of the contents of the tape and had never
heard it. Pursuant to requests of ]\Ioore, however. I did raise his sug-
gestion with Ehrlichman and Haldeman. Haldeman said that he was
i:>ei-sonally too close to Chapin to make a judgment on such a thing and
that if it was going to be done, it was going to be reraised with the
President it would have to be done so by Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman
said that he did not think that it was possible to reraise the matter and
subsequently Chapin resigned from the White House staff.
Discussions of a Written Dean Report
As the press accounts of Segretti's activities lingered on after the
election as well as the continuing Watergate stories, there was serious
discussion about putting out the facts. In late Novembei', I recall a
conversation with Haldeman in his office. We talked about the facts and
he asked my opinion about what would happen if we put them out. I
told him that I thought that the then pending trial would be put back
into a grand jury and it was very likely that Mitchell, Magruder,
Strachan, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Dean could be indicted. He
asked me to elaborate. I said I had no idea nor did I have full knowl-
edge of what happened before June 17 but I did know that there is a
good possibility that any reconvened grand jury could get into ques-
tions of obstruction of justice which would lead right to us.
967
Haldeman said that tlie President wished, now that the election was
over, to get rid of the AVatergate and related matters by laying them
open but based on what I had just told him he said it doesn't seem to
be a very viable option. I told him that I was ready at any time to ac-
count for myself and that I thought we should continue to examine
that option so that the President is not damaged. He then asked me to
attempt to write a report that could be made public : A report that
would be a written version of the so-called Dean investigation that the
President had announced on August 29 and include a new report on
the Segretti matter. I told Haldeman that I thouglit that this could
only create additional new problems because it would be just like a
peek into the tent without letting anyone in and it would be very diffi-
cult to write, but I would do my best.
I did not tell Haldeman that I was also opposed to writing a report
under my name which I felt would come back to haunt me some day.
Accordingly, to follow his instructions I decided that I would draft a
series of carefully worded interrogatories or affidavits for each indi-
vidual whose name had come up in the press regarding political
sabotage and espionage activities. Then based on the affidavits I would
write a summary report and attach the affidavits. I thought that I
would merely waltz over the Watergate matter by referring to the fact
that other governmental investigations, the FBI, and grand jury, had
cleared anyone in the "\Miite House from involvement.
After drafting the document I reluctantly submitted it to Halde-
man on December 5. I have submitted a copy of this document to the
committee.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 84-25.*]
Mr. Deax. Haldeman in turn gave it to Ehrlichman, who made the
editorial changes that appear on the draft. Ehrlichma]i then gave it to
Ziegler. On December 13, a meeting was scheduled in Haldeman's office
to discuss the matter but was subsequently moved to Ziegler's office.
Present at the meeting were Haldeman, ]Moore, Ziegler, and myself.
Ehrlichman had shown up for the earlier meeting in Haldeman's office
but when it was moved to Ziegler's office, he never returned to the meet-
ing, to the best of my recollection. Xothing was resolved at the meeting
and it was a consensus of the group that the AAHiite House should con-
tinue, in Dick Moore's words, to ''hunker dov/n" — do notliing — on the
general theory that no one would be arrested for what they didn't say.
The Haxdlixg of Demands tor White House Moxey
Turning now to the handling of demands for White House money,
I have previously discussed Mr. Kalmbach's raising the money for
the first pressures for support money for silence. These pressures were
continuous and following the election there were increasing pressures
from Hunt for money for himself and the other indicted defendants
as a means of assuring their silence. While this pressure had begun
well before the election, it steadily grew after the election until the
demands were being made directly to the AMiite House for financial
assistance. Before getting into the details of these pressures and how
they were handled, I believe it might be helpful to explain the situa-
tion at the White House regarding the handling and availability of
cash.
♦See p. 1210.
968
In early 1971, 1 was asked by Haldeman to assist in establishing the
reelection committee in that they had no lawyer of their own. My activ-
ities resulted in my learning that there were large sums of cash that
had been left over from the 1968 Nixon primaries and some funds had
been left from the 1970 congressional fundraising efforts. These
moneys, which were referred to as surplus moneys, were held by Kalm-
bach and controlled by Haldeman and Ehrlichman. I have submitted
to the committee a memorandum prepared by Strachan of a meeting
that was attended by Haldeman, Strachan, and myself on May 18, 1971,
which reflects the tight controls Haldeman exercised over the surplus
moneys held by Kalmbach.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-26.*]
jklr. Dean. I have also submitted to the committee documents evi-
dencing that it Avas necessary to have Haldeman's approval, based on a
full explanation of the reasons, for even the smallest disbursement by
Kalmbach of the surplus money.
[The documents referred to were marked exhi])it Xo. 34—27.**]
Mr. Dean. In this instance, I am referring to an expenditure of $813.
It was sometime prior to April 7, 1972, that I learned that cash
was being sent to the White House. I was not told the amount, but I
was asked by Strachan if I could suggest someone outside of the Gov-
ernment who might be willing to hold a large amount of cash in a
safety deposit box. I told him I would have to think about it but later
told liim I couldn't think of anyone.
It was in late June or early July 1972, that I learned that $350,000
of the surplus money had been delivered to the White House prior to
April 7, 1972. I was informed that the money came from the 1968
primaries and that the delivery was made before April 7 to insure
that it not become a part of the 1972 campaign funds.
The $350,000 fund, as I have indicated, was held by Strachan but
I do not know where he held it. It was shortly before Mr. Sloan was
being called to testify in July that discussions commenced on how to
make the $350,000 fund whole and get it out of the 'White House.
There was no easy answer, because there was no place to send it out
without reporting requirements. The concern was that Mr. Sloan
would testify that he was aware of the disbursal of the $350,000 to the
White House. This, in turn, would have created two problems: The
"White House would have been accused of having a secret slush fvmd if
this became public, and second, a $6,800 expenditure out of a $22,000
authorization which had been made presented a potential campaign
act violation for Haldeman, Colson, and Howard. I had numerous
discussions about how to handle this problem with Mr. Stans and Mr.
Parkinson but there was no easy answer.
I also discussed this matter with Mr. Haldeman, telling him that
there was no easy answer. Finally, after the election, Stans indicated
he had cash available and it was decided that Stans should provide
$22,000 to Strachan to make the funds whole and then they could
be removed from the White House and, if necessary, reported. This
plan was approved by Haldeman and Stans was so informed. On the
morning of November 28, Stans called to request that Strachan come
to his office to receive money that he had available. I do not know the
*Seft p. 1226.
♦*See p. 1231.
969
source of the money or whether it was campaign money or any of the
details about the $22,000 that Stans had made available. I could not
locate Strachan and Stans indicated that it should be picked up imme-
diately but I cannot recall at this time the reason he called for the
immediacy. Accordingly, I asked Mr. Fielding to pick up a package
from Stans and give it to Strachan as soon as he could.
I informed Stans that Fielding would be over to pick up the pack-
age but he would not know what he was picking up and when I later
learned that Stans had informed Fielding I was somewhat annoyed
because I felt it was unfair to Fielding. The money was then given
by Fielding to Strachan but no final decision had been made regard-
ing how to dispose of the $350,000.
Having explained the status of the cash at the "White House, I must
now return to the pressure that was being placed on the White House
for the use of these funds which I have just described for payments
to the seven indicted individuals. This pressure began long before
election day in that Paul O^Brien was receiving messages from Wil-
liam Bittman, Hunt's lawyer, that Hunt and others expected to have
more support money and attorney's fees in exchange for continued
silence. The initial payments by Kalmbach had not been sufficient.
O'Brien reported this frequently to oSIitchell, Mardian, LaRue, and
mvself. I, in turn, was reporting to Haldeman and Ehrlichman.
There were discussions in late July, August, and September of using
these funds at the "Wliite House for these payments. I informed Halde-
man of these discussions, but they were still in the discussion stage and
no action was taken.
After the election, the pressure was greatly increased when Colson
received a call from Mr. Hunt, which Colson recorded. Colson brought
the recorded call to me and I, in turn, transcribed it onto a cassette
tape. I have been informed by the committee counsel that the com-
mittee has in its possession a transcript of the conversation between
Colson and Hunt in which Hunt makes demands for money. On No-
vember 15, I arranged a meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman so
that they could hear the tape of the conversation Colson had had with
Hunt and also to infoi-m them of the increased and now threatening
demands that were being transmitted through Hunt's lawyer to Mr.
O'Brien and in turn on to the White House.
Haldeman and Ehrlichman were at Camp David at that time devel-
oping the plans for the reorganization of the executive branch for the
second term of the Nixon administration. I departed on the morning
of November 15 for Camo David with Mr. Walter Minnick, who was
going to Camp David to discuss the reorganization plans with Ehrlich-
man. Mr. Minnick had been doing virtuallv all of the legal work at
that time for Ehrlichman on the reorganization plan and was a member
of Ehrlichman's staff. In fact, I was somewhat surprised that the coun-
sel's office had not been more involved, or involved at all, prior to that
time in the reorffanization plans. After arriving at Camp David.
Ehrlichman. Haldeman, and I went into the President's office in Laurel
Lodge, which wac emntv. I have referred earlier to the fact that in this
meeting the matter of Dwight Chapin's remaining at the "Wliite House
was discussed.
It was after that discussion that I told them of the telephone con-
versation between Hunt and Colson and played the tape for them and
96-296 O - 73
970
also told them of the increasing demands being made for money. I told
them I was going to New York that afternoon because Mitchell had
requested that I come visit him regarding the demands being made and
told them I would also play the tape for him. My instructions from
this meeting were to tell Mitchell to take care of all these problems.
iWhen we came out of this private meeting, Ehrlichman told Mr.
^Nlinnick, who had been waiting to meet with him, that we had been
talking about reorganization matters. This position was taken because
Minnick was at Camp David for that j^urpose and it would seem to be
a very logical thing that I might be discussing with Haldeman and
Ehrlichman. In fact, in our private meeting there was no discussion
of the reorganization at all.
After a brief discussion about reorganization matters, I departed
Camp David and returned to Washington and then flew to Xew York
with Mr. Stans. Stans had told me some days earlier that he was going
to meet with Mr. Mitchell to discuss a number of matters about wind-
ing down the reelection committee and asked me to join him.
Senator Ervix. There is a vote. I will stay here and proceed with
the committee and ask them to hold the vote until I can get over and
somebody can come back and take over so I can get over and vote.
Mr. Dean. Thank you.
Stans had arranged for the meeting with ^Mitchell to take place at
the Metropolitan Club in New York City, because Stans was anxious
to return to Washington as soon as the meeting was over and did not
want to go down to Wall Street and get tied up in traffic. .Vfter the
first part of the meeting where Stans and ^litchell discussed their
problems, Stans departed and I played the tape for ]\Iitchell. I recall
that he had only one reaction to the tape and it was to the effect tliat it
was certainly a self-serving tape for Colson and he wondered what the
hell Hunt was talking about with regard to ]Mitcheirs having perjured
himself. I informed Mitchell that Ehrlichman and Haldeman had
heard the tape and requested that he do what he could to solve the
problem. I received no instruction or really any indication at all at that
time from Mitchell regarding the matters that Hunt liad raised in his
conversation with Colson.
To the best of my recollection, it M^as the first week of December
that Mitchell called me and said that we would have to use some of the
$350,000 fund to take care of the demands that Avere being made by
Hunt and the others for money. He indicated that the money that was
taken out would be returned in order that the fund could be made
whole again. He asked me to get Haldeman's approval.
Prior to Mitchell's call, I had been informed by Col son's secretary
that iSIrs. Hunt had called her at home on a number of occasions to
discuss this problem with her in order that she might pass it on to
Colson and get something done about the problem. Colson had sent
his secretary. Miss Joan Hall, to me with these messa,o-es indicating
that he did not want to talk to her about it but that she should pass
the message on to me. I told INIiss Hall not to talk to Mrs. Hunt and,
if necessary, <i:Qt an unlisted phone number.
After the phone call from IMitchell, T called Haldeman and described
the situation in full to him and that T had told ^Mitchell that T was
very i-eluctant to see "\^liite House money used but tliat he indicated
that it would be returned as soon as thev could raise some additional
971
money. I told Haldeman that I did not think this was a good idea to
further involve the White House in raising money for these men but
I frankly had no ans^yer. Haldeman said he did not like it either, but
since we had the assurance that the money would be returned, I should
inform Strachan that he could make the delivery of the money to the
committee. Following my conversation with Haldeman 1 called
Strachan and told him he should speak with LaRue and make a deliv-
ery to LaRue pui"suant to LaRue's instruction. I also informed
Strachan that he should anticipate the fact that we would get this
money back in the near future. I do not recall how much money was
delivered by Strachan but I believe it was either $40,000 or $70,000.
This delivery did not satisfy the demands and they continued to
be relayed by Mr. Bittman to Mr. O'Brien, who, in turn, would relay
them to Mr. ^Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, and myself, I, in turn, would tell
Haldeman and Ehrlichman of the demands. I can recall LaRue and
O'Brien coming to my office to discuss these demnndr and T told
them that there could be no further use of the White House money
and. in fact, to the contrary, Haldeman was expecting that that money
which had been provided earlier was to be returned in full.
To the best of my recollection, it was some time shortly before the
trial when the demands reached the crescendo point once again.
O'Brien and LaRue came to my office and told me of the seriousness
of the problem. Subsequentl5\ Mitchell called me and told me that
once again I should ask Haldeman to make available the necessary
funds. I called Haldeman and told him of Mitchell's request and the
situation and told him that I thought it was time to get the entire
money out of the ^Miite House rather than continue as we were with,
every few weeks, further bites being taken out of the apple. After
we discussed the matter Haldeman said, send the entire damn bundle
to them but make sure that we get a receipt for $350,000. After receiv-
ing my instructions from Haldeman I called Strachan and told him
that he was to deliver the remainder of the money to LaRue but that
he was to make certain that he got a receipt for $350,000. Strachan
later told me that LaRue had refused to give him a receipt.
With each of these deliveries I am only aware of the fact that
money was delivered to LaRue by Strachan. I have no knowledge of
how LaRue in turn delivered it to those who were making demands
upon the committee, nor do I know how much, in fact, was paid.
Hunt's Status After the Death of His Wife
After ]\Irs. Hunt was tragically killed on December 8, 1972, Paul
O'Brien informed me that he had learned from William Bittman that
Plunt was in A'ery bad shape. He had become extremely depressed
and grieved over the death of his wife.
I also recall that the funeral of Mrs. Hunt created a serious dilemma
for Colson. who had known the Hunts' personally and was very fond
of them both, but was A'ery concerned about in any way publicly
identifying himself with ]Mr. Hunt. Accordingly, he came to ask
me if he should attend ^Irs. Hunt's funeral and I told him that I
thought he ought to do whatever he felt in his heart — that certainly
attending her funeral could not in any way be deemed to show he
was in any way involved with Plunt in the Watergate. Colson ini-
972
tially told me he was ^oino: to attend the funeral but subsequently
decided to send his secretary with a letter to Hunt expressing deep
sympathy over the situation.
It was also after the death of ^Irs. PTunt that I learned from O'Brien
that Hunt's lawyer did not think that ]Mr. Hunt was capable of stand-
ing trial in his then psychological situation, and that he had been
examined by a psychiatrist who had reached that conclusion, Mr,
O'Brien had discussed this matter with ^Mitchell because ]Mr. ^litchell
and I had a conversation in whicli he told me that Bittman thought
that the Government might be of some assistance in resolving Hunt's
problems temporarily by finding a sympathetic psychiatrist to exam-
ine Hunt who would concur in the findings of the psychiatrist who
had already examined and found him not fit to stand trial, Mitchell
asked me to discuss this with Petersen and I said I would. I had a
brief conversation with Petersen about this and he said that if there
was anything that could be done it would, but he did not think that
anvthing could be done regarding this matter.
After the government psychiatrist determined that Hunt was
capable of standing trial, I had a report back from O'Brien that Hunt
was outraged that no one at the White Hous'^ was doing anvthing
to take care of him and, in fact, he thought that the White House and
his friends had turned against him. He was not asking to have anybody
fix his case, but he was merelv asking for someone to give him time
to recover from the tragedy of his wife's death,
I can recall telling Colson about this when I reported to him gen-
erally that Hunt was in rather bad shape and was thinking about
pleading guiltv rather than going through the rigors of a trial in his
present situation. I also told Colson that I had been informed that
Hunt wanted to talk with him, but since Hunt knew that would put
Colson in an awkward position, that he wanted Colson to talk to his
lawyers.
I shall now turn to the matter of Executive clemency for Mr, Hunt
and others.
ExECTrn\'E Clemexcy for Mr. Huxt and Others
I was out of my office from roughly December 22 until the morning
of January 3.
Senator Er\^x. Would you like to take a little recess now?
ISIr. Dean. I think my throat would enjoy that very much, ]Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Ervin. The committee will take a short recess to go and vote.
r Recess.]
Senator Baker [presiding]. Mr. Dean, if you are ready to resume,
the chairman asked me to reopen the hearings and proceed while he
returns from the rollcall vote which has just boon concluded on the
Senate floor, if you would like to take a fut'ther and more lentrthy
break we will be ha})py to do that but if you are ready to proceed we
will proceed.
Mr. Dean. I am ready to proceed. I would just as soon get the state-
ment over.
Senator Baker. Go right ahead.
97S
Mr. Dean. As I was commenting before the break, on page 135
in dealing with the subject of Executive clemency for Mr. Hunt and
others, I was out of my office from roughly December 22 until the
morning of January 3. The latter part of this time I was in California
with other membei'^ of the White House staff and their families on a
short vacation. I received a call on the morning of January 2 while
awaiting takeoff from California in the President's new Air Force One.
The call was from Paul O'Brien, who told me that there were some
serious problems and I should speak with him as soon as I returned to
Washington. He told me that Mr. Hunt was off the reservation. I was
traveling with Haldeman and told him about the call.
TAHien I arrived in Washington that evening, I called O'Brien and he
told me that Hunt was quite upset and wished to plead guilty but
before he did so he wanted some assurances from the White House that
he would receive Executive clemency. O'Brien told me that Hunt
would only take the assurances from Colson and that Bittman had
been trying to reach Colson. I told O'Brien that I doubted if Colson
would be willing to give any such assurance because he was staying at
more than arm's length from Hunt. I told O'Brien that I would have
to talk with him about it in the morning.
On the morning of January 3, I received another call from Mr.
O'Brien saying that the matter had to be resolved immediately because
he had talked to Bittman, and they had been trying to get hold of
Colson without any success. Colson called me to tell me that Bittman
was trying to reach him and asked me if I had seen the letter that Hunt
had sent him. I have submitted a copy of the letter to the committee.
[The letter was marked exhibit Xo. 34-28.*]
Mr. Deax. I told Colson that I had not seen the letter. I had just
returned to my office, and while we were talking I found in my mail a
memorandum from Colson with a letter attached from Hunt in which
he was desperately pleading to have Colson meet with his attorney,
Mr. Bittman. I told Colson that I was aware of the fact that Bittman
wanted to discuss the matter of Executive clemency for Hunt and that
Hunt would only take assurances from him — Colson. As I recall. Col-
son said that he did not w^ant to meet with Mr. Bittman but he would
do whatever I suggested. I told him I would get back in touch with
him.
I next met with Ehrlichman and told him about the situation and
he thought that Colson should meet with Bittman. I do not believe Col-
son was present when I first discussed this with Ehrlichman. I in-
formed Colson that Ehrlichman thought he should meet with Bittman.
In trying to reconstruct as best as I recall what occurred, there was
a meeting in Ehrlichman's office on January 3, after jNIr. Colson had
had a convereation with Bittman about Hunt's potential for Executive
clemency. I recall that when Colson came to the meeting with Ehrlich-
man he was extremely shaken, which was unlike Colson. He was not
specific in his ar,Q-uments to Ehrlichman but he said that he felt it was
imperative that Hunt be given some assurances of Executive clemency.
The meeting in Ehrlichman's office did not last long and Ehrlich-
man said that he would have to speak with the President. Ehrlichman
told Colson that he should not talk with the President about this. On
♦See p. 1233.
974
January 4, I learned from Ehrlichman that lie had given Colson an
affirmative regarding clemency for Hunt and that Colson had talked
with Bittman again about the matter. There was another meeting on
this subject on January 5, in Ehrlichman's office, in wliich Colson
explained exactly what he had told Bittman regarding clemency. He
said that he had told Bittman that he could not give a specific com-
mitment but he gave him a general assurance. He also said that lie
told him that clemency generally came up around Christmas and that
a year was a long time. It was as this meeting was ending that I said
to Ehrlichman that this will obviously affect all of tlie others involved
as the word will spread, and can I assume that the same commitment
extends to all ? He said that no one could be given a specific commit-
ment but obviously, if Hunt was going to get an assurance for clemency
the others could understand that it applied to all.
After the meeting in Ehrlichman's office, Colson told me that al-
though Ehrlichman had told him that he (Colson) should not discuss
this matter with the President, that lie, in fact, thought it was so
important that he had taken it up with the President himself. I also
learned shortly thereafter, as a result of a telephone call from O'Brien,
that Bittman had informed O'Brien that Hunt was satisfied with
Colson 's assurances.
As I shall state later, the President himself raised this subject on
two occasions with me, and told me that he had discussed the matter
of Executive clemency for Hunt with both Ehrlichman and Colson.
The President raised this with me on March 13, 1973, and April 15,
1973.
Catjlfield's Dealings With McCord — January 1973
While I was in California during the late December /early January,
as I referred to a moment ago, 1973, 1 received a call from ]Mr. Field-
ing who told me that Jack Caulfield had received a letter from ISIcCord.
Fielding was not explicit regarding the contents of the letter, and said
that he had taken down the letter and that I could read it when I
returned in the next day or so to the office. I have submitted a copy
of the letter transcribed by Fielding to the committee.
[The letter was marked exhibit Xo. 34-29.*]
Mr. Deax. Within 2 or 3 days of mv return to the office — that is
between January 3 and 5, ]\fr. Caulfield came to my office with the
original letter. I do not know what I did with the original, but I believe
I gave it to Paul O'Brien. I know that O'Brien and I discussed the
matter, because he told me that ]McCord was not cooperating with his
lawver — ^Mr. Alch. O'Brien also told me that Bittman had planned
a CIA defense to the case, but McCord, who initially had been willing
to go along, later refused.
O'Brien subsequentlv talked with Mitchell about the matter, because
Mitchell called me and informed me that he had discussed the matter
with O'Brien, and Mitchell asked me to request that Jack Caulfield
talk with McCord to find out what he was going to do. I told ^Mitchell
I would ask Caulfield to speak with iVIcCord. Wien I later tried to
reach Caulfield he had gone to California for a drug conference. I later
informed Mitchell that Caulfield was out of town.
♦See p. 1235.
975
It was on January 10 that I received calls from both O'Brien and
Mitchell indicating that since Hunt had been given assurance of clem-
ency and that those assurances were being passed by Hunt to the others,
that Caulfield should give the same assurances to McCord, who was
becoming an increasing problem and again I was told that McCord's
lawyer was having problems with him. Both O'Brien and Mitchell
felt that McCord might be responsive to an assurance from Caulfield,
because Hunt, Bittman, and his lawyer, Alch, had lost rapport with
him. I told ^litchell I would do so.
Based on the earlier conversation I had with Ehrlichman on Jan-
uary 5 that the clemency assurance that had been given to Hunt would
also apply to the others, and Colson's description of how he hod given
Bittman a general assurance, without being specific as to the commit-
ment, I called Caulfield later that day to request that he get in touch
with McCord. Caulfield told me that it would be very difficult, because
he was going to be in California for several more days. Caulfield in-
dicated that it would be easier for Mr. Ulasewicz rather than himself
to talk with McCord. because he was tied up with a lot of people at
the drug conference. I said fine, and then gave him the clemency mes-
sage similar to the message that Colson had transmitted to Hunt via
Bittman. Caulfield wrote down the gist of the message, he repeated his
notes back, and I said that was fine, and told him I thought that Mc-
Cord would be expecting to hear from him as soon as possible. Caul-
field said he would have the message delivered right away.
On January 11, I received a call from O'Brien, who asked me if the
message had been delivered bv Caulfield. I told him that it had. O'Brien
told me that ^McCord wanted to speak with Caulfield rersonally and
asked me when Caulfield could meet with McCord. T told him I would
try to arrange it. O'Brien told me he was goins: to be out of town, but
I could reach him if there were any problems. He told me he was keep-
ing Mitchell )50sted and requested I keep him posted. O'Brien said
that we need a firsthand renort. a firsthand readhig on McCord from
someone he will talk with, because he is not talking openly with his
lawyer about what he plans to do. I told O'Brien I would call him
(O'Brien) as soon as I learned anvthing.
I called Caulfield on January 11 and told him that McCord wanted
to meet with him and asked him if he would do so and take McCord's
pulse as to what he nlannod to do. He told me ho would meet McCord
as soon as he returned to Washin.o'ton.
On Friday, June 12, INIitchell called me for a report. I told him I
thought I would hear from Caulfield after he talked to McCord. Caul-
field called me at home Friday night to inform me that he had met
with INfcCord and sufircrested we meet at my office in the morning so he
could give me a report, that was a Saturday morning. T said fine, and
on Saturday morning we met and he p-ave me a repoi't. The sum and
substance of the report was McCord had not decided what he was
.ofoing to do, but that he wanted his freedom. Caulfield reported that
IVrcCord was very annoyed at Magruder. He had seen a picture of
Ma^ruder in the paper which had peeked his annDvnnco. He also told
Caulfield that lie had a plan that would enable him to get his case
dismissed, but his lawver had not helped him with the matter and the
Government had lied to him. He explained that he had made calls to
pertain foreijrn embassies, and that these calls had been recorded, but
the Government would not admit it.
976
During this meeting with Caulfield I received a call from either
John Mitchell or Paul O'Brien requesting a report en the meeting. I
told the caller that I was getting a report from Caulfield and would
call back. Caulfield told me that McCord was very adamaiit about his
plans to gain his freedom through the phone calls that he had made to
the foreign embassies. I told Caulfield I really did not understand why
IMcCord thought he could get his case dismissed by reason of the wire-
taps, but I would give the matter some thought. Caulfield told me that
it was his assessment that McCord would only respond to a direct
request from the President.
I told Caulfield that he couldn't make such a statement because I
had no such request from the President, but suggested he meet again
with McCord and keep him happy bv telling him we were checking
out the matter of his conversations M^ith the Embassies.
Later that afternoon, Caulfield reported again to me that McCord
was only interested in his theory about the calls to the Embassies. I
told Caulfield to keep in touch with McCord. but I couldn't promise
anything about his calling the Embassies. I told Caulfield to have
McCord give him a memo on whv he thought that his calls to the
Embassies would result in dismissal of his case. I called O'Brien and
told him what had transpired. On Monday morning I reported to
Mitchell what Caulfield had reported.
Tt was sometime during this period that a result of my reports of
Caulfield meetings with McCord, that O'Brien, JNIitchell and INIr. Alch
discussed having F. Lee Bailey, Alch's partner, meet with McCord and
inform him that he would personally handle his case on appeal.
Mitchell was to talk with Mr. Bailev about this. I do not know what
happened regarding this proposed plan.
On Januarv 19 or 20, Mr. Caulfield brought me copies of McCord's
memo regarding his intercepted conversations to the embassies. I have
submitted these documents to the committee.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-30.*]
Mr. Dean. I never did anvthing with these documents, other than
inform Mitchell I had received them and I showed them to Mr,
O'Brien in my office. I do not recall e^•er talking with anyone at the
Department of Justice, regardinof McCord's pro]:)osal. At this time I
concluded that McCord was going to do what he thought best for
himself.
Handling Liddy's Call to Krogh — January 1973
On January 4, Gordon Liddv called Mr. Krogh. Krogh's secretary
received the call and Liddy said that he had received a letter from an
investigator for the Senate Commerce Committee about his relation-
ship with Krogh. The letter was part of an investigation being con-
ducted by the committee staff in connection witli Krosh's nomination
hearings for the Under Secretary of Transportation post. Liddy
wished to speak to Krogh, but the call was not put through to Krogh.
Krogh came to my office and asked what he should do. He said he
wanted to be able to testify at his confirmation hearing that he had not
spoken with Liddy since long before the "Watei-o-ate incident. I told
Krogh that his secretary should return the call. We then worked out a
♦See p. 1236.
977
response which Kro^h wrote down for liis secretary and she returned
the calL I have submitted to the committee the document jtrepared In'
Mr. Krogh's secretary after the call was returned to Mr. Liddy — and
I miffht note that was not in the exhibits when I assembled them last
ni^ht but I do know where it is, on the table at home.
Senator Bakek. I take it you will supply that document later in your
testimony ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, Senator ; I will.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-31.*]
Mr. Deax. On Friday afternoon, January 5, I received a report
from O'Brien that Liddy had been rather miffed and annoyed that
Kix)gh had been unwilling to s]:)cak with him. I reported this to Krogh,
who asked if I would personally see what I could do, because Krogh
felt sorry for Liddy but just couldn't talk with him. I agreed I would
do something and on Saturday, January 6, T called Liddy from my
house at his home. It was a brief call in which I told him the reason
Krogh had not called and told him that Krogh had great sympathy
for his plight. Liddy said he understood. The only thing T can recall
Liddy saying to me was that he hoped that there would be some money
forthcoming for his lawyer. I said I would pass that message along.
I also expressed sympathy over his situation and the call ended. I
later reported to Krogh that Liddy understood why he did not speak
with him personally and Krogh appreciated it.
Retrievixg CIA Material From the Department or Justice
Now I am going to turn to the receiving, the retrieving CIA mate-
rials from the Department of Justice in connection with the
investigation.
As a result of a conversation I had with Ehrlichman, I was asked
to attempt to have the CIA retrieve from the Department of Justice
information relating to Hunt's dealings with the CIA. To understand
Ehrlicliman's request, I must provide some background. During the
course of the Watergate investigations, the prosecutors had requested
material from the CIA and, because of the fact that this material
related to the "White House, the CIA had informed the White House
of the request. The first incident when this came up was regarding
the fact of who had made the initial request to the OIA to assist Hunt.
General Cushman had been the Deputy Director of the CIA at the
time the matter occurred, and when he was asked, he reported that
he had been requested from John Ehrlichman. When Ehrlichman was
informed of this, I believe by General Cushman, he denied the fact
that he had ever made such a request, and told Cushman that he had
never been asked for such assistance.
Subsequently, General Cushman prepared a memorandum that indi-
cated that the request had come from either Ehrlichman, Colson, or
myself. Ehrlichman forwarded a copy of this document to me and
asked if I would get this matter taken care of. I told him I thought
it was somewhat strange that my name was on the memorandum from
Cushman in that I had never spoken with Cushman in my life.
*See p. 1238.
978
He then asked me if I did not think it wonld be better that Cushman
mentioned no one since he conld not remember who it was. I remember
suspecting at the time, as I do today, that Ehrlichman had had my
name inserted in the memorandum as a means of g-ettinfj me to make
sure that Cushman would have no names in the memorandum at all.
I remember calling General Cushman and telling him that I had
received from Ehrlichman a copy of his memorandum and that I was
somewhat surprised to find my name in it because this was the first
time I had ever spoken with him. He agreed that we had never talked
and I said that Ehrlichman had suggested to me that, if he could not
remember w^ho it was, he, Cushman. ])robal)ly should not mention
anyone.
A short time later, another memorandum on this subject of who
had asked for Hunt to have the assistance of the CIA come forward
from General Cushman and this time no names were mentioned at
all. It was after this episode in getting the Cushman statement cor-
rected that I had an occasion to discuss this with Colson. Colson told
me that he had been present when Ehrlichman had made the call to
Cushman.
The other CIA material relating to Hunt's dealings with the CIA
emanated from a series of questions that had been asked by the Water-
gate prosecutors. I recall a discussion with CIA Director Helms and
one of his deputies in Ehrlichman's office when they went over the
type of material that they would be providing to the Department of
Justice.
I subsequently had occasion, while at the Department of Justice,
to talk with Henry Petersen about the CIA material and he showed
me a copy of the inforaiation the CIA had provided him, and he told
me Mr. Gray had the same material. I remember that the document
had attached to it a number of photographs which had come from a
camera — again my text has gotten confused — had come from a camera,
the camera which had been returned by Hunt to the CIA. It is a
camera that had been borrowed by Hunt from the CIA. The pictures,
which had been processed by the CIA, included a picture of Liddy
standing in front of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.
I informed Ehrlichman about this and that is the reason that he
subsequently requested that I seek to retrieve the documents before the
Senate investigators srot a copy of the material.
I discussed this with Petersen, but he said that thev had received
a letter in early Januarv of this year from Senator INIansfield re^rarding
the maintenance of all records relating to the case and that the only
thin.of that he could do would be to extract the document and leave
a card to the effect that the document had been returned to CIA.
I reported this to Ehrlichman and he told me that he thought that
the CIA ought to get all of the material back and that no card should
be left in the file and that national security grounds should be used to
withhold release of the information.
On February 9, 1973, 1 sjwke with Director Schlesinger of the CIA
and asked him if it would be possible to retrieve the material that had
been sent to the Department of Justice in connection witli the Water-
gate investigation. I told him that I liad discussed this with the
Department of Justice and they indicated that they would merely leave
979
a card in their files indicating that the material had been returned
to the CIA.
I subsequently had a visit from General Walters in late February
at which time he told me that the CIA was opposed to retrieving the
material and leaving a card indicating that they had so retrieved it
because they also had been requested by the Senate not to destroy any
material relating to the case. I told Walters that I did not suggest that
the material be destroyed; rather I thought that national security
grounds might justify withholding release of the information to Senate
investigators. He said it simply could not be done and I dropped the
matter.
As I will explain later in a meeting with Mr. Krogh, the fact that
this material was in the possession of the Department of Justice meant
to me that it was inevitable that the burglary of Ellsberg's psychia-
trist's office would be discovered. I felt that any investigator worth his
salt would certainly be able to look at the pictures in the files at the
Department of Justice and immediately determine the location and
from there discover the fact that there had been a burglary of the
office that was in the picture.
I would now like to turn to the "Wliite House plans for dealing with
this committee.
White House Plav for Pftjpetuatixg the Coverttp Throtjghotjt
THE Senate Watergate In\t:stigation
Even before the Watergate criminal trial in January of this year,
there had been press reports and rumors that the Senate planned
independent hearings on the Watergate and related matters. The Wliite
House Congressional Relations Staff reported that the subject of Wa-
tergate hearings was being discussed in the Senate Democratic Policy
Committee, but thev did not know the substance of those discussions.
I was aware of the interest of Ehrlichman and Haldeman in the pros-
pects of such hearings because they had discussed it with me. and
Bill Timmons told me they had discussed it with him.
On December 13, 1972, Timmons informed me that Senator Jackson
was coming to the White House for a meeting with the President.
Timmons said that Senator Jackson was a member of the Senate
Democratic Policy Committee and had an excellent rapport with the
President. Timmons asked me what I thought about having the Presi-
dent inquire of Senator Jackson regarding the potential of a Senate
inquiry into the Watergate. I responded that I thought it was a good
idea, but would have to check. Timmojis said the meeting with Senator
Jackson was going to be without staff present, and asked me to draft
a memorandum to the President raising the issue. I told him I would
check with Haldeman.
I prepared a memorandum for the President and went to Halde-
man's office, but he was not there. He was in the President's office with
Mre. Ann Armstrong, who was discussing with the President joining
the "Wliite House staff. A meeting had been scheduled in Mr. Halde-
man's office at which Ehrlichman, !Moore, Ziegler, and I were to attend.
Wien Ehrlichman came to Haldeman's office for the meeting I raised
the matter of the President's asking Senator Jackson about the hear-
ings because I did not have authority to send memorandums directly
980
to the President. Ehrlichman thought it was a good idea, so I walked
the memorandum down to Alex Butterfield to take to the President
before the meeting. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the
memorandum.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-32.*]
Mr. Dean. When Haldeman returned to his office with Mrs. Arm-
strong, Ehrlichman, and I were in his office, waiting. But he asked us
to leave and proceed with the meeting in Ziegler's office where Moore
and Ziegler were waiting.
I have referred earlier to the substance of this meeting of Decem-
ber 13 in discussing the proposed written Dean report. Ehrlichman
returned to his office and Haldeman later came to the meeting and
told me that he had blocked the memorandum regarding the Water-
gate inquiry from going to the President. He, in fact, had the original
memorandum with him and had drawn a line through it. I told him
that Timmons had suggested it and that Ehrlichman had also ap-
proved it. He said he had not known that, and made a notation on the
memorandum to the President and immediately sent it back to Butter-
field to give to the President. I learned that day from Timmons, who
later met with Senator Jackson, that the Senator did not know what
the Senate Democratic Policy Committee was going to do about the
Watergate. I do not know if the President discussed this subject with
Senator Jackson.
Timmons continued to report to Haldeman and me that there were
rumblings on the Hill that the Senate was going to proceed with hear-
ings. Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administrative Practices
and Procedures had been conducting an investigation for several
months, but it was uncertain as to whether they would proceed.
It was learned in late December — early January that Senator Mans-
field was pushing hard for Watergate hearings, but there was a debate
as to who should handle the hearings.
It was learned in late December — early January that Senator Mans-
field had sent letters to Senator Eastland and Senator Ervin regard-
ing the holding of hearings. Before that letter became public, however,
both Wally Johnson and Fred LaRue had informed me tliat they had
talked with Senator Eastland. The White House wanted Senator East-
land to hold such hearings because they feJt that Senator Eastland
would be friendly and that the White House had more friends on the
Judiciary Committee than on Senator Ervin's Government Operations
Committee.
I was told that the White House congressional relations staff was
doing what it could to get the hearings before Senator Eastland's
committee. On January 11 of this year, the Senate Democrats formally
voted that Senator Ervin would head the inquiry into the Watergate
incident and related matters, and I must add. nnich to the displeasure
of the White House.
On February 5, 1973, the chairman introduced his resolution to
create this committee. An advance copy of that resolution was for-
warded to me by Timmons and I was subsoqucMitly requested to attend
a luncheon meeting with Ehrlichman, Timmons, and Johnson to dis-
cuss the resolution. Ehrlichman was tied up in another meeting and
never attended. I was asked what I thought about the resolution and
♦See p. 1239.
981
did I have any suggested amendments that the Republicans might
offer. I had not had an opportunity to study the resolution closely so
I reread it and ottered a few suggestions off' the top of my liead : that
it be broadened to cover other elections than the 1972 Presidential
campaign; that the minority membei*s have adequate staff; that it be
bipartisan with equal representation of the Republicans and Demo-
crats, and that the minority members have the i)ower to call for an
executive session when they believed it necessary.
Wally Johnson indicated that he could get someone at the Depart-
ment of Justice to draft amendments and that he and Timmons would
peddle them to friendly Republicans.
I later had discussions with Haldeman and Ehrlichman about the
Senate hearings and they felt that it was time to develop a strategy
for dealing with the Senate situation. I received what I interpreted as
mild criticism that I wasn't getting the White House prepared for the
forthcoming hearings and it was recognized that we were fast moving
into an uncontrollable, if not hostile, forum. We had made it through
the trial without any problems, but the Senate hearings were a new
and possibly larger problem. Accordingly, I suggested that there be a
meeting called where these mattei-s could be ciiscussed. I also suggested
that we might call on Mr. Bryce Harlow. Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and
Mitchell all agreed that Mr. Harlow's counsel would be most helpful.
Accordingly, I had my secretary schedule a meeting in Ehrlichman's
office on February 6, 1973. I recall that it was at some hardship that
Mr. Harlow attended, in that he was scheduled to fly to Arizona that
day, but I explained to him that my superiors were anxious to focus
on the problem and wanted his advice.
Prior to this meeting, but after my meeting with the President in
September when he had mentioned to me that Mr. Hoover had told
him that he (the President) had been bugged during his 1968 cam-
paign, the thought of getting this information out had been discussed.
I can recall discussing it with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, and in turn,
discussing it with Mitchell. Haldeman, and Ehrlichman wanted
Mitchell to get the information from Mr. DeLoach. I so informed
Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell informed me that he was trying to get the facts
regarding the bugging from DeLoach, whom he believed would have
known if it had, in fact, happened. Mitchell had talked to DeLoach
prior to the February 6 meeting and had received some information,
but not much.
The meeting assembled in Ehrlichman's office. INIitchell was late in
arriving because of a delayed flight from New York City. Those pres-
ent were Ehrlichman, Haldeman, finally Mitchell, Harlow, Moore, and
myself. "When Mitchell arrived, he reported that there had been some
surveillance by the Johnson administration, but DeLoach was unaware
of a buge:ing of wiretap. I remember that I told Harlow that I thought
he had been recorded when he was traveling with the Vice President
in 1968. I based this on a conversation I had had with Mitchell earlier.
The surveillance that DeLoach reported to Mitchell was related to
Mrs. Anna Chennault and a foreiirn embassy. Also the telephone toll
records from the Vice Presidential candidate Agnew's airplane when
he had stop))ed in Albequernue, N. Mex., had been checked by the FBI.
The meeting then turned to a general discussion of the proposed
amendments and Timmons was called from the congressional leader-
982
ship meeting that was then in session in the Cabinet room. Timmons
reported that the Senate was going to begin debate on Senator Ervin's
resohition that afternoon. Timmons was instructed to rec[uest Senator
Hugh Scott to come to his office after the leadership meeting and I was
instructed to go to Mr. Timmons' office to explain the amendments to
the resolution to Senator Scott. I was also told that I should tell the
Senator — Senator Scott — to raise the 1968 bugging incident as a reason
to expand the scope of the resolution wdth reference to prior Presi-
dential elections. I left to brief Senator Scott with the feeling that the
meeting had accomplished nothing. I went to Timmons' office, had a
brief meeting with Senator Scott, and, as I was returning to my office,
I ran into Dick ^loore who told me that he felt that the meeting had
been useless. I agreed.
On February 7, Timmons informed me that the White House amend-
ments had been virtually rejected out of hand and the resolution
adopted 77-0, Timmons told me he had discussed with Haldeman the
possibilities of susfgesting names for the Republican side of the Select
Committee with Senator Scott, and Scott seemed receptive. On Febru-
ary 8, the members of this committee were named and I recall Timmons
telling me that Haldeman had "chewed him out," but Timmons told
me Scott had never given him a chance to make any recommendation.
On February 9, I had planned to go to Florida for a week or 10
days. The President had departed for San Clemente, and it appeared
that everyone could relax for a while. In midafternoon, however, my
plans were changed when I received a call from Ehrlichman in San
Clemente telling me that he wanted IVIr. Moore and me to come to
California that night so that he could discuss in full detail the prob-
lems of how to deal with the forthcoming Senate hearings. Ehrlich-
man indicated that he and Haldeman were going to have some avail-
able time over the weekend, so we should come immediately. I contacted
Mr. Moore, who was about to take a train trip to southern Virginia
with his young son and wife. ISIoore said that since he was packed he
would merely fly west instead of training south. INIv wife and I and
the Moores all flew to San Diego on the evening of February 9.
The La Costa Meetixgs
Evervone was staving at the La Costa Resort Hotel, south of San
Clemente. The meetings with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Moore and
myself ran for 2 days, and I would estimate they involved between 12
to 14 hours of discussion. The meetings began on Saturday morning,
February 10. at San Clemente, but the discussion did not begin to take
any focus until Saturdav afternoon and Sunday, when we met in
Haldeman's villa at La Costa. Based on notes T took during the meet-
ing I will attempt to reconstruct what transpired. I should also point
out that before I departed San Clemente to I'eturn to La Costa T was
given several memorandums, which I have submitted to the committee,
which directly relate to what occurred at La Costa.
[The documents were marked exhibit No. 3-1—3.3.*]
Mr. Deax. I did not look at these memorandums until several davs
after the meeting and was rather surprised that Haldeman would state
in writing specific instructions to me regarding his thoughts on pei'-
*See p. 1240.
983
petuating the Waterffate tactics or the coverup by a coiinteroffensive
against the forthcoming Senate hearings. "What had happened by this
point in time was that the coverup had become a way of life at the
White House, and having made it to this point, those involved were
becoming careless and more open about it. Also, the Senate was differ-
ent than the courts, grand jury, FBI, and the like that had been dealt
with earlier.
Before turning to the substance of the La Costa meetings. I would
like to note that Mr, Moore and I had talked on many occasions about
the Watergate aft'air and the damage it was doin.g. Mr. Moore is the
only person — other than Mr. O'Brien on a few occasions— to whom I
ever expressed my deep concern about the matter, particularly the
coverup. AMiile Moore did not know all the facts he knew a great deal
and was becoming increasingly aware of the dimensions of the prob-
lems. I talked to Moore far differently than anyone else. I talked to
him about how we could end this matter once and for all. I expressed
my concern to him often about how to end the matter before it ruined
the second term of the President, I was concerned that it was not going
to simply go away, and I had learned that the press was becoming
aware of other illegal activities at the "\"\niite House, I never discussed
these other matters with ]\Ioore, but I told him the coverup was bigger
than the "Watergate incident per se. The more that we talked about it
the less we could find a solution — so the coverup proceeded.
As I have indicated, the purpose of what I call the La Costa meet-
ings, was how to deal with this committee's investigation of the Water-
gate. The Watergate trial was over and that problem appeared to be
over. The next major problem was the Senate hearings. It was realized
that it was going to take an all-out effort by the White House to deal
with the Senate inquiry, because of the scope of the resolution, the
composition of the committee, the investigative powers of the com-
mittee, and the general feeling that the Senate was a hostile world for
the White House, Haldeman and Ehrlichman were disappointed that
the efforts to influence the Senate resolution creating the Select Com-
mittee had failed, as well as the White House efforts to recommend
members to the Select Committee. Thus, the focus of the discussion was
how to deal with the committee henceforth.
It was during the morning meeting in Ehrlichman's office at San
Clemente that there was a discussion of the members of this com-
mittee. Ehrlichman said that the "White House could not look for any
help from the Democrats. I recall that when we were discussing the
Democratic members of this committee, and I read from the Con-
gressional Directory the data on Senator Inouye, Ehrlichman said that
his name is pronounced "Ain't-no-way" and then said, indeed, there
ain't-no-way he's going to give us anything but problems. [Laughter.]
The Republican members of this committee were also discussed in
that morning meeting. It was Ehrlichman who was doing most of the
assessing, but occasionally Haldeman would add a comment. Senator
Weicker was an independent who could give the "\^^lite House prob-
lems. Senator Gurney would help the White House and would not have
to be told to do so. I recall that Ehrlichman said that Senator Gurney
needs the "^^Hiite House because former Congressman Cramer may
take him on in his next primary. Senator Gurney was considered a
sure friend and protector of the President's interest. Senator Baker
was an unknown, and neither Haldeman nor Ehrlichman knew which
way he might go. [Laughter.]
Senator Ervin. The audience will please refrain from demonstrating
in respect to the testimony.
Mr. Dean. I might add that in a subsequent discussion I had with
the President he also reached a similar conclusion regarding the Re-
publicans. He thought that Senator Baker might help, but he was not
sure. He was confident, however, that Senator Gurney would protect
the "V\Tiite House and would do so out of political instinct and not have
to be persuaded to do so.
The long and short of this morning discussion was that the White
House had one friend— Senator Gurney — and the possibility of wooing
and winning another.
Later, after the meeting had reconvened at La Costa, the discussion
turned to a general approach about how to deal with the Select Com-
mittee. Ehrlichman suggested that it should be publicly analogized
to the ITT hearings — that is, the hearings were a waste of time to the
Senate, they were very partisan, and ultimately repudiated by the
Senate when Kleindienst was confirmed. After a general discussion,
Ehrlichman and Haldeman concluded that the theory for dealing
with this committee should be as follows : The White House will take
a public posture of full cooperation, but privately will attempt to
restrain the investigation and make it as difficult as possible to get
information and witnesses. A behind-the-scenes media effort would be
made to make the Senate inquiry appear very partisan. The ultimate
goal would be to discredit the hearings and reduce their impact by
attempting to show that the Democrats have engaged in the same type
of activities.
During the meeting on Saturday afternoon (February 11), Ehr-
lichman instructed me to call Wally Johnson and tell Johnson that he
was to go visit with Senator Baker during the then congressional
recess to find out how Senator Baker planned to operate — that is,
was he going to be friend or foe — and to ask Senator Baker how the
Wliite House could aid him, particularly regarding the selection of
the minority counsel. Prior to making the call, I asked Ehrlichman if
I should arrange to give Johnson some kind of briefing before he went
to see Senator Baker, so that he would know fact from fiction wlien
talking with the Senator about the Watergate. Ehrlichman said that
was not necessary. I called Mr. Johnson while the discussions pro-
ceeded and passed the message to him. He said he would proceed
immediately.
At one point in the meeting, Ehrlichman raised the question of
whether or not the Select Committee was going to be able to obtain
the grand jury minutes and other investigative records from the FBI
and the U.S. Attorney's Office. I said I did not know and tlien a dis-
cussion of possible legal options ensued. No one really knew what the
law might be regarding this matter, but Ehrlichman stated that the
Attorney General will have to be told that the Justice Department
should resist turning over such records, and that I should get word
back to the attorneys for the defendants that they should fight the
release of these investigative records to the Senate on the grounds that
it would have an adverse impact on their appeals.
985
When discussing how to handle the press coverage of the Senate
hearings, Haldeman suggested that Pat Buchanan be used as a watch-
dog of the press. Mr. Buclianan could prepare speeches on the biased
press coverage. He could write op-ed articles and actually attend the
hearings and be a White House spokesman to take the pressure off
Ziegler's daily briefings. It was decided by Haldeman and Elirlich-
man that Mr. Baroody's White House attack group — a group of media-
oriented White House aides who meet virtually every morning to
determine how to counter adverse news or push White House pro-
grams — should not be involved.
There was also discussion during the La Costa meeting of the role
the reelection committee would play during the Senate hearings. It
was decided that the reelection committee should have a new titular
head. Several names were suggested and rejected and the matter was
left unresolved. However, it was decided that the reelection committee
should beef up its legal and public relations staffs. Paul O'Brien and
Ken Parkinson should be given any additional legal staff they wished,
as they would be responsible for handling witnesses from the com-
mittee" who would be called to the Hill to testify. Mr. Van Shumway,
who had been handling press relations for the reelection committee,
would be asked to remain on and provided with any additional staff
he needed. ^Ir. ]Moore would have general oversight of ^Slr. Shumway's
operation.
At one point, Haldeman suggested that the reelection committee
hire private investigators to dig out information about the Demo-
cratic campaigns. I raised the wisdom of this because I thought it
was more political surveillance. The matter was left unresolved.
There was lengthy discussion of the importance of the minority
counsel. Mr. Moore related back to some episodes during the McCarthy
hearings. Both Ehrlichman and Haldeman felt very strongly about
having a man, as minority counsel, who would work with the White
House. A number of suggestions were made and discussed. Ehrlich-
man thought that Mr. Fred Buzhardt would be an excellent choice.
I was asked to come up with some names for consideration as soon
as possible and report back.
It was toward the end of the meeting on Sunday afternoon, Febru-
ary 11, that Ehrlichman raised the bottom line question : Avould the
seven Watergate defendants remain silent through the Senate hear-
ings? I say this was a bottom line question because the entire strategy
was based on this continued silence. I reported that I could not answer
the question because I did not know. I said that I understood that
they were still demanding more money, but as we had discussed pre-
viously, there was no more money available. I told both Haldeman
and Ehrlichman that I had carried their messages to Mitchell, that
this is something that they would have to take care of — I think the
transcript is confused, this ^vas something he should take care of, he,
Mitchell, but that thev were aware of Mitchell's feelings that this was
something that the White House should be concerned about. I said as
far as I was concerned, that they would have to take this up with
]\ritchell in tliat ^Mitchell felt it was a matter for the White House.
At this point, Ehrlichman told INIr. Moore — who was hearing all
this for the first time— that he, Mooi'e, should go to Mitchell and
96-296 O - 73 - 6
986
simply lay it out that it was Mitchell's responsibility to raise the nec-
essary funds for these men. It had been decided at the outset of the
first day of the meetings that Moore would go to New York and report
to Mitchell on what had been resolved regarding dealing with the
Senate hearings, and now Ehrlichman was telling Moore that an im-
portant element of his visit with Mitchell would be for him to get
Mitchell to raise the necessary future funds for the seven Watergate
defendants.
The meeting concluded on this item and Moore and I departed to-
gether. I told him as we walked back to our rooms that I was very
distressed that this had come up in his presence, but that he now had
a very real idea of the dimensions of the situation. I told him I did
not think that he should get involved in carrying such a message to
Mitchell. Mr. Moore was concerned, but felt that he had an obliga-
tion to do what Ehrlichman and Haldeman expected of him, but he
did not understand why they thought that he could change MitchelFs
mind. Shortly after Moore and I departed, I went to Los Angeles to
join my wife at her mother's home and we left for Florida the next
morning, February 12, 1973.
Following Up on the La Costa Meetings
Wliile in Florida, I received calls from Higby, Moore, Johnson, and
others following up on the matters that had been set in motion at the
La Costa meeting.
On February 13, I received a call from Johnson, who informed me
that he had talked with Senator Baker by telephone. He told me that
he had informed Senator Baker tliat he would serve as the White
House liaison to the Select Committee.
Johnson reported that Senator Baker had told him that a personal
visit was not necessary, that they could talk when he returned to
Washington from Tennessee. Johnson said that he had discussed the
minority counsel position with Senator Baker, and the Senator said
he did not want any official input from the ^^Hiite House and had
already given some thought to the qualifications he was seeking in his
minority counsel.
Johnson reported that the Senator had 50 names already under
consideration and planned to make his selection in the next few days.
Johnson told me that he didn't think Senator Baker had ruled out the
White House's making some suggestions, but we would have to move
quickly.
Mr. Johnson also reported that Senator Baker had told him that the
White House should be concerned about the President's posture vis-a-
vis the Senate inquiry.
Finally, he reported that Senator Baker had indicated that he and
the chairman would be getting together after the recess and would
discuss staffing and procedural matters at that time. I passed this
report to Haldeman via Mr. Higby.
On February 14, Paul O'Brien came to visit me in Florida. He
arrived in the evening and we went out to dinner. Nothing of sub-
stance was discussed that evening other than some hand wrinffing over
the p-eneral situation. O'Brien came to Florida to get a report from mo
on what had occurred at the La Costa meetinc;. He told mo that
987
]\Iitchell wanted him. O'Brien, to get my version of tlie meeting, as
well as the report he was getting from Mr. ISIoore.
On February 15, after a late breakfast, O'Brien and I took about a
2 hour walk down the beach, at which time I told him what had
occurred at La Costa. I told him that Moore had been dispatched to
New York by Haldeman and Ehrlichman to tell Mitchell it was his
responsibility to raise the future money for the convicted defendants.
O'Brien's reaction — as he was well aware of Mitchell's feeling that
this was Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's problem and not his — was that
Mitchell would probably go through the roof.
After returning from our walk we talked about the fact that I had
been requested to suggest names for the minority counsel. It was during
this conversation that I thought of Mr. Martin Hoffman, whom I knew
to be a very capable lawyer then serving as general counsel of the
Atomic Energy" Commission, and a person who had worked on the Hill.
I called Mr. Hoffman and asked if he was interested. He said he
was. but he did not know if Senator Baker would be because they had
had a difference of opinion over a matter at the AEC. He said, how-
ever, he had done some work for Senator Baker in the past and liked
him very much.
I then called Ehrlichman and he agreed that Mr. Hoffman would be
a good choice. Xext I called Haldeman and he said OK if Ehrlichman
said OK. during my conversation with Haldeman he told me he had
learned that the chief counsel's job had been offered to Mr. Ken Keat-
ing and Mr. Keating had sent a feeler to the White House as to whether
he should be interested. Haldeman asked me to think about it.
After talking with Ehrlichman and Haldeman about ]SIr. Hoffman,
I called Timmons and Johnson and asked them to float ]\Ir. Hoffman's
name to Senator Baker. Mr. Timmons called me back later and said it
wouldn't float because the Senator had indicated he had had some
problem with ^Slr. Hoffman and Chairman Schlesingcr over an AEC
matter. He liked Mr. Hoffman but said he was still miffed at him.
Later that day I called Mr. Moore, but learned he had gone to Xew
York to see INIitchell. I had talked with Moore earlier that week, but
had forgotten he was going to Xew York on the 15th.
Paul O'Brien called Mitchell in the inidafteinoon to report our
conversation. I was in and out of the room while he was on the tele-
phone talking to ^Sritchell as I didn't feel it was my business to listen
to his conversation. I talked briefly with ]\ritchel] at the end^ of the
conversation he had with O'Brien. He talked about the possibility of
Mr. Keating as chief counsel. INIr. Mitchell seemed intrigued by the
idea, but doubted if Mr. Keating would accept. After T hung up,
O'Brien reported that Mr. ]\Ioore had brought up the money raising
matter, but Mitchell just didn't discuss it at nnv length with ^Nfoore.
O'Brien departed Florida late that afternoon and my wife and I got
away from the telephone for the next 3 da vs.
I returned to the office on Monday. February 10. and spoke with
Haldeman on either the 19th or 20th. He requested that T draw up an
agenda for a meeting with the President reirarding matters which the
President should reflect on as a result of the La Costa meeting and
subsequent matters which had come up. Mr. Haldeman and T went over
the high points of what should be raised, indudino- items that had not
come up at La Costa, such as Magruder's desire to return to the 'V\niite
988
House staff and sending Mr. Stans to the Senate for a confirmable post
as a tactic to counter the Watergate hearings.
I prepared the agenda. I thought that I was going to attend the
meeting with the President, but Haldeman called for the agenda, and
not me. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the agenda.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. P)4-34.*]
Mr. Dean. You will see that the agenda deals witli five items to be
discussed and resolved with the President :
1. Senator Baker's requested meeting with the President;
2. Submitting Secretary Stans' name for a confirmable position ;
3. ^YhRt to do with Mr. Magruder ;
4. Using Mr. Buchanan during the Senate hearings; and
5. Getting the Attorney General back in touch ^\-ith the White House.
Subsequent to Haldeman's meeting with the President, he informed
that : The President would meet with Senator Baker; T should discuss
with Mr. Stans his interest in a confirmable position ; Magruder could
not return to the "N^Hiite House staff; Buchanan could not be used at
the Senate hearings; and the President would meet with the Attorney
General.
I have not explained at this point the details of this rather signifi-
cant document, but I believe the document is rather self-explanatory
of the continuing coverup and I will, of course, answer anv questions
about it. I was not present when the President and Haldeman dis-
cussed these matters, but I had discussed them with Haldeman before
he went to see the President and he informed me of the President's
decisions after the meeting; thus, I assume that the agenda I had
prepared was the basis of their discussions.
On February 20, or 21, Mr. Timmons told me he had arranged for
the President to have an off-the- record, private meeting with Senator
Baker. As vou will note from the agenda I referred to just a moment
ago, Mr. Timmons had reported that the Senator had told Timmons
he wanted guidance and Timmons' interpretation was that the Senator
wished to help the T^^ite House. Haldeman told me to prepare a
briefing paper for the President and bring it directly to him rather
than routing it throusrh normal channels. I have submitted to the
committee a copy of the agenda T prepared for the President's meet-
ing with Senator Baker.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-3.5.**]
Mr. Deax. After the President met with Senator Baker I was
informed bv ETaldeman that the Senator had anpeared to be verv inter-
ested in beinof cooperative and the President had the impression that
he might be helpful. This, of coui'se, was the White House hope, but
nothing that was reported from the meeting made this anything more
than a hope.
Also, Senator Baker told the President that he wanted his contact
point to be Mr. Kleindienst, rather than someone on the White House
staff. Haldeman told me that Senator Baker had urged the President
to waive executive privilege and send members of the White House
staff to the hearinirs as quickly as possible, but the President
had told Senator Baker that he was going to hold the line at
written interrogatories.
*See p. 1243.
♦♦See p. 1245.
089
Finally. I wa.j told that both the President and Senator Baker had
discussed that there should be an effort to get the hearings over as
quickl}' as possible.
This report of the meeting which Haldeman gave me was later con-
firmed in discussions I had with the President myself in early March
of this year.
On February 22, Mr. Haldeman requested that I prepare a briefing
paper for the President's meeting that day with Attorney General
Kleindienst. Throughout the "Watergate investigation Haldeman and
particularly Ehrlichman, had complained about Mr. Kleindienst's
passive role in the investigation and prosecution. Haldeman and Ehr-
lichman were both aware of the strained relationship between Klein-
dienst and the "White House. I knew that Ehrlichman was riding hard
on the Justice Department in an effort to undermine Mr. Kleindienst.
I also knew from conversations with Kleindienst that he had little
affection for ^Nlr. Ehrlichman.
The Senate "Watergate hearings presented the real possibility of the
Justice Department having to make fnrther criminal investigations
that would lead back to the "\"Miite House. Accordingly, the President
was the only one who could bring Mr. Kleindienst back in the family
to protect tiie "White House and this meeting was designed to do just
that. As a result of Senator Baker's request that Kleindienst be his
contact point, the President had a perfect vehicle to solicit Klein-
dienst's assistance during the hearings and, if anything should develop
during the hearings, to not let all hell break loose in a subsequent
investigation.
I have submitted to the committee a copy of the briefing paper I was
requested to prepare.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-36.*]
Ml-. Deax. I know that this document went to the President because
just before the meeting was to occur, I realized that the President
might not understand the reference to the fact that Kleindienst was
considering one particularly attractive offer from a law firm that he
was likely to accept. I called Haldeman to explain this, but Haldeman
said the paper had gone in and the President would understand that
this was a reference to Governor Connally's law firm because Governor
Connallv had discussed it with the President.
The President subsequently discussed this meeting with me in early
March, He told me that he would continue to call Mr. Kleindienst from
time to time, but I should also make certain that Kleindienst was work-
ing closely with Senator Baker in preparation for the Select Committee
hearings.
As I mentioned earlier, I had also been informed that the President
had made a decision that INIagruder could not return to the White
House. ^Slagruder had been working at the inaugural committee and
even before the inauguration he told me that he had called Mr. Higby
requesting a meeting with Haldeman to discuss his future. After the
inauguration, ]\Iagruder told me that he had to decide what he was
going to do. Prior to that meeting I had informed Haldeman that Mr.
O'Brien liad had some discussions with Magruder and that Magruder
had indicated that Haldeman and Colson were very much involved
in the planning and approval of the Liddy operation.
•See p. 1247.
990
After Magruder met with Haldeman in late January 1973, I had
occasion to see him in the hall of the EOB. He told me that he had
talked vrirh Haldeman and Mitchell about running for office in Cali-
fornia and was planning a trip to California to test the water. He said
now was the time, because he felt he could get good financial backing.
I felt Magruder was in for some serious problems bftth before the
grand jury and the Senate hearings, but without saying this to him, I
tried to dissuade him from running for office until this entire matter
had been resolved.
Shortly after this conversation with Magruder I phoned Haldeman
and told him that I thought INIagruder was making a mistake in going
to California in pursuit of an elected office.
Haldeman agreed and said he was going to call Bob Finch and
suggest that when Magruder met with him. Finch, tliat he l)e dis-
suaded. He asked me to call Kalmbach and make a similar suggestion,
which I did, and Kalmbach said he would do it.
After Magruder returned from California he had decided that he
wanted to stay in Washington. He was pushing hard to return to the
White House staff, and work on the Bicentennial program. No one had
the heart to tell INIagruder that the President had said that he could
not return to the Wliite House staff. It was during this period of time,
which I believe was mid-February, Magruder had a conversation with
Mr. O'Brien, in which he told O'Brien that he had received his final
authorization for Liddy's activities from Gordon Strachan and that
Strachan had reported that Haldeman had cleared the matter with
the President. I reported this to Haldeman, who expressed concern
over Magruder's statement. After I reported this information, the
"White House efforts to find a job for ]Magruder became intense. Halde-
man assigned Mr. Higby to the task. Higby called me to discuss the
general type of job that I thought would satisfy Magrudor and tlien
Higby instructed Mr. Jerry Jones, the head of the White House per-
sonnel operation, to find an available, high level, nonconfirmable posi-
tion for Magruder.
During the time when Mr. Jones was reviewing all the potential
jobs for Magruder, I recall that Magruder dropped by my office and
told me he had discussed his potential problems in full with both
Higby and Haldeman. He asked me for my assistance and support
in finding him a job. I assured Magruder I would help. He also indi-
cated that Mitchell was trying to help get the job matter resolved.
On February 28, Mr. Jones submitted a memorandum to Higby
and myself, a copy of which I have submitted to the committee.
fThe document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34—37.*]
Mr. Dean. After Haldeman reviewed the memorandum, a mooting
was scheduled for Magruder to meet with Plaldeman and T Avas asked
to attend.
This meeting occurred during the first week of INIarch and ^Nfagruder
explained to Haldeman at the meeting that he did not want to leave
Washington. Haldeman told Magruder that his working at the Bicen-
tennial was not realistic, but to consider the position at the Depart-
ment of Commerce as an Assistant to the Secretary for Policy
Development. ^Magruder said he was interested but wanted som.o assur-
♦See p. 1249.
991
ance from Haldeman that if he made it throiic^h the Senate hearings,
as he had the grand jury and trial, that he conld have a better job later.
ITaldcman said that he could not make a firm promise, but that
he would do all ho personally could do to assist. This was good enough
for ]\Iagruder. Haldeman said that Mr. Jones would be told to pro-
ceed with Secretary Dent to get the position at the Commerce Depart-
ment finalized.
On ^Nlarch 5, I received a call from Secretary Dent regarding his
hiring ]\Iagruder. I did not want to tell Secretary Dent that ']Magru ' i'
was totallv free from future problems so I was evasi^-e with 'li:.,
hinted that Magruder might have some problems. Because I regretted
misleading him. I prepared a memorandum for my files — something
I seldom do — ^^because I felt ^lagruder was, in fact, going to have
jn-oblems. In fact, I thought everyone was going to have problems.
I have submitted a copy of this memorandum reflecting this con-
\ersation with Secretary Dent to the committee.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-38.*]
Mr. Deax. I would now like to turn to the meetings I had with the
President in February and March of this year.
I have described to the committee several matters that followed the
La Costa meeting Avhich directly involved Presidential decisionmaking
and Presidential involvement. I would now like to turn to my direct
dealings with the President which began in late February of 1973
wnth regard to the Watergate and related matters. I feel I can best
set forth what transpired at these meetings by discussing what
occurred at each meeting.
Meeting or February 27
This was the first meeting I had had with the President since my
September 15, 1972, meeting which related to the Watergate. It was
at this meeting that the President directed that I report directly to
him regarding all Watergate matters. He told me that this matter
was taking too much time from Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's normal
duties and he also told me that they were principals in the matter,
and I. therefore, could be more objective than they. The President
then told me of his meetings with Senator Baker and the Attorney
General. He told me that Senator Baker had requested that the Attor-
ney General be his contact point and that I should keep in contact
with the Attorney General to make sure that the Attorney General
and Senator Baker were working together. He asked me to follow
up immediately to determine if the Attorney General and Baker had
met. I informed him that I had earlier discussed this with the Attorney
General and the Attorney General was planning to meet with Senatoi
Bakei and Senator Ervin to discuss turning over FBI data regarding
the Watergate investigation.
A brief discussion followed in wdiich the President recounted, what
had already been reported to me by Haldeman, that he had told
Senator Baker that he would not permit Wiite House staff to api^ear
before the Select Committee, rather he would only permit the taking
of written interrogatories. He asked me if I agreed with this and I said
that written interrogatories were something that could be handled
•See p. 1251.
992
whereas appearances might create serious problems. He told me he
would never let Haldeman and Ehrlichman go to the Hill. He also
told me that Senator Gurney would be very friendly to the White
House and that it would not be necessary to contact him because the
President said Senator Gurney would know what to do on his own.
On the way out of his office he told me I had done an excellent job
of dealing with this matter during the campaign; that it had been
the only issue that McGovern had had and the Democrats had tried
to make something out of it but to no avail. I told him as we were
walking togetlier out of the office that I had only managed to contain
the matter dviring the campaign, but I was not sure it could be con-
tained indefinitely. He then told me that we would have had to fight
back and he was confident that I could do the job.
Meeting of February 28
I had received word before I arrived at my office that the President
wanted to see me. He asked me if I had talked to the Attorney General
regarding Senator Baker.
I told him that the Attorney General was seeking to meet with both
Senator Ervin and Senator Baker, but that a meeting date had not yet
been firmed up. I told him that I knew it was the Attorney General's
wish to turn over the FBI investigation and the President said that
he did not think we should, but asked me what I thought of the idea.
I told him that I did not think that tliere Avas much damaging in-
formation in the FBI investigation, although there could be some
bad public relations from it. He told me to think about this matter.
He also said that he had read in the morning paper about the Vesco
case and asked me what part, if any, his brother Ed had had in the
matter. I told him what I knew of his brother's involvement, which
was that he was an innocent agent in the contribution transaction.
We then discussed the leak to Time magazine of the fact that the White
House had placed wiretaps on newsmen and "WHiite House staff people.
The President asked me if I knew how this had leaked. I told him that
I did not; that I knew several people were aware of it. but I did not
know any who had leaked it. He asked me who knew about it. I told
him that Mr, Sullivan liad told me that he thought that Director
Hoover had told somebody about it shortly after it happened because
Hoover was against it and that Sullivan said that he had heard that
this information had gone to Governor Rockefeller and in turn had
come back from Governor Rockefeller to Dr. Kissinger. We then
talked about the executive privilege statement and the President ex-
pressed his desire to get the statement out well in advance of the
Watergate hearings so that it did not appear to be in response to the
Watergate hearings. We also discussed Mr. Mollenhoff's interest in
the Fit/frernld case, and he asked me to look into the matter for
Mr. Mollenhoff.
Before departinqr his office, he ajrain raised the matter that T should
report directlv to him and not throu^rh Haldeman and Ehrlichman.
I told him that T thought he should know that I was also involved in
the post- June 17 activities regarding Watergate. I brieflv described to
him why T thought I had legal problems, in that I had been a conduit
for many of the decisions that were made and, therefore, could be
99S
involved in an obstruction of justice. He would not accept my analysis
and did not want me to get into it in any detail other than what I had
just related. He reassured me not to worry, that I had no legal prob-
lems. I raised this on another occasion with the President, when Dick
^Nloore was present.
Meeting of March 1
The first meeting on this date and the afternoon meeting which
occurred on ]\Iarch 1, related to preparing the President for his forth-
coming press conference. The President asked me a number of ques-
tions about the Gray nomination hearings and facts that had come
out during these hearings. In particular, I can recall him stating that
there should be no problem with the fact that I had received the FBI
reports. He said that I was conducting an investigation for him and
that it would be perfectly proper for the counsel to the President to
have looked at these reports. I did not tell the President that I had
not conducted an investigation for him because I assumed he was well
aware of this fact and that the so-called Dean investigation was a
public relations matter, and that frequently the President made refer-
ence in press conferences to things that never had, in fact occurred.
I was also aware that often in answering Watergate questions, that
he had made reference to my report and I did not feel that I could
tell the President that he could not use my name. There had been con-
siderable adverse publicity stemming from the Gray hearings and the
fact that Gray was turning over FBI information to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, which caused the President to tell me at this
morning meeting that Gray must be "pulled up short." He told me
that he had talked with the Attorney General to tell him to read the
chapter in his book "Six Crises,'' dealing with the Hiss case regarding
the lack of cooperation which Truman and the FBI had given to his
investigation. He also told me the FBI Watergate materials should
not be turned over by Gray. I informed him that I had had a meeting
several days prior with IMr. Sullivan who had been at the FBI for
many years and Sullivan had alluded to the fact that the FBI had been
used for political purposes by past administrations. I cited a few
examples that ]Mr. Sullivan had given me. The President told me to
get this information from Sullivan. The President told me that he
Avas readino; a book at that time called "The 13 Mistakes of Kennedv."
and he told me that I should read the chapter regarding Kennedy's
use of the FBI. He also told me that I should gather any material I
could o-ather regarding the uses and abuses of the FBI bv past admin-
istrations so that we could show that we had not abused the FBI for
political purposes.
The President told me that he was convinced that he had been wire-
tapped in 1968 and the fact that DeLoach had not been forthcoming
indicated to the President that DeLoach was probably lying. He told
me that I should call Don Kendall, DeLoach's employer, and tell him
that DeLoach liad better start telling the truth because "the bovs are
coming out of the woodwork." He said this plov may smoke DeLoach
out. I might respond that I never did call ]Mr. Kendall. He also asked
me who else might know about the bugging of his 196S campaign and
I sugsrested that ^Nlr. Tolson, Hoover's former assistant, might have
some knowledge of it. He told me that he probably ought to call Mr.
994
Tolson and wish him happy birthday or good health and possibly get
some information from him when lie was talking to him. The dis-
cussion then turned back to the Hiss case and I reminded the Presi-
dent of the strong statement he had made in 1950 regarding Truman's
refusal to provide his committee with information, and that speech
might be raised at his press conference. He asked me to go get a copj
of that speech. 1 returned to his office shortly with a copy of the speech,
and he asked me to discuss with him how it could be differentiated
from the present situation.
During the March 1 afternoon meeting the President also asked
me some questions about executive privilege and the timing on the
release of the executive privilege statement which he had discussed
in his press conference on January 31. I told him that the statement,
as far as I was concerned, was ready for release and merely would
require the signoff of a handful of other people. I told him I thought
it could be out within a week.
It was during the days after this series of March 1 meetings with
the President that the name Dean began coming increasingly to the
forefront in the Gray confirmation hearings, and the rumblings were
that there was going to be a situation where Dean could be called
to the committee to testify and a number of Senators were anxious to
use me as a vehicle to test executive privilege. On ]March 4 or 5, I
had a conversation with Ehrlichman in which I might add occurred
in the hall of the West Building, in which I told him that I thought
it would be very difficult to maintain a court test of executive privilege
over me, when in fact I had only met with the President infrequently
and had had very few conversations with him that would be protected.
It was following this conversation with Ehrlichman that I began
meeting and talking with the President, at his request, with ever
increasing frequency. The Presidential meeting of March 6.
Senator Erm:n [presiding]. A vote has been called on a 10-minute
basis. I expect the committee had better go and come back. We will
finish this statement this afternoon.
[Recess.]
Senator Er\^x. The committee will resume.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, you can proceed. Senator Weicker is here
making a quorum, as required by our rules.
INIr. Dean. Thank you.
Meeting of March 6
This meeting was brief and a general discussion of the status of
the Gray hearings and the President reminded me again that I should
report directly to him and not involve Haldeman and Ehrlichman
with Watergate-related matters.
Meeting of INIarch 7
The President was very unhappy with Gray's performance before
the Senate Judiciary Committee. In my meeting with him on this date
he made a reference to the fact that Grav's comment regarding my sit-
ting in on tlie investigations by the FBI was absurd. He felt it was
perfectly proper that I was present at those interviews and said that
Gray's attitude that he "jolly well" went forward because he had no
995
alternative was absurd. I also discussed with the President the fact
that Ziegler was considering endorsing the ACLU letter to the Judi-
ciary Committee regarding the turning over of FBI materials. The
President thought that that was a good idea. At the end of the meeting
the President instructed me to tell the Attorney General to cut off
Gray from turning over any further Watergate reports to the Senate
Judiciary Committee. lie said this just had to cease.
Meeting of March 8
I had a very brief meeting with the President on this date during
which he asked me if something had been done to stop Gray from turn-
ing over FBI materials to the Senate Judiciary Committee. I told him
I thought that the matter had been taken care of by the Attorney
General.
Phone Con^-ersation of March 10
The phone conversation of March 10. The President called me to tell
me that he felt we should get the executi\e privilege statement out
immediately: that this should be done before I was called before the
Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the Gray hearings so
that it would not appear that the statement on executive privilege was
in response to the action by the Senate committee.
Meeting of March 13
This was a rather lengthy meeting, the bulk of which was taken up
by a discussion about the Gray hearings and the fact that the Senate
Judiciary Committee had voted to invite me to appear in connection
with Gray's nomination. It was at this time we discussed the potential
of litigating the matter of executive privilege and thereljy preventing
anybody from going before any Senate committee until that matter was
resolved. The President liked the idea very much, particularly when
I mentioned to him that it might be possible that he could also claim
attorney/client privilege on me so that the strongest potential case on
executive privilege would probably rest on the counsel to the President.
I told him that obviously, this area would have to be researched. He
told me that he did not want Haldeman and Ehrlichman to go before
the Ervin hearings and that if we were litigating the matter on Dean,
that no one would have to appear. Toward the end of the conversation,
we got into a discussion of Watergate matters specifically. I told the
President about the fact that there were money demands being made
by the seven convicted defendants, and that the sentencing of these
individuals was not far off. It was during this conversation that Plalde-
man came into the office. After this brief interruption by Haldeman's
coming in. but while he was still there. I told the President about the
fact that there was no money to pay these individuals to meet their
demands. He asked me how much it would cost. I told him that I could
only make an estimate that it might be as high as $1 million or
more. He told me that that was no problem, and he also looked over at
Haldeman aiid repeated the same statement. He then asked me who
was demanding this money and I told him it was principally coming
from Hunt through his attorney. The President then referred to the
fact that Hunt had been ])romised Executive clemency. He said that he
996
liad discussed this matter with Ehrlichman and contrary to instruc-
tions that Ehrlichman had given Colson not to talk to the President
about it, that Colson had also discussed it with him later. He expressed
some annoyance at the fact that Colson had also discussed this matter
with him.
The conversation then turned back to a question from the President
regarding the money that was being paid to the defendants. He asked
me how this was done. I told him I didn't know much about it other
than the fact that the money was laundered so it could not be ti-aced
and then there were secret deliveries. I told him I was learning about
things I had never known before, but the next time I would certainly
be more knowledgeable. This comment got a laugh out of Haldeman.
The meeting ended on this note and there Avas no further discussion
of the matter and it was left hanging just as T have described it.
Meetings or March 14
The meetings which occurred on this day principally involved pre-
paring the President for a forthcoming press conference. I recall talk-
ing about executive privilege and making Dean a test case in the courts
on executive privilege. The President said that he would like very
much to do this and if the opportunity came up in the press conference,
he would probably so respond. T also recall that during the meetings
which occurred on this day, that the President was going to try to
find an answer that would get Ziegler off the hoolv of the frequent
questions asked him regarding the Watergate. He said that he was
going to say that he would take no further questions on the Watergate
until the completion of the Ervin hearings and that Ziegler in turn
could repeat the same statement and avoid future interrogation by the
press on the subject.
Meeting of March 15
It was late in the afternoon after the President's press conference
that he asked Dick Moore and I to come ovei- to visit with him. He was
in a vei-y relaxed mood and entered into a general discussion about the
press confei'ence. The President was amazed and distressed that the
press had paid so little attention to the fact that he had made an
historic announcement about Ambassador Bruce opening up the liaison
office in Peking. He said he was amazed when the first question follow-
ing that announcement was regarding whether or not Dean would
appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the
Gray hearings. The conversation then rambled into a. discussion of
the JEfisfi case, and ]Nfr. Moore discussed his memory of the President's
handling of the case.
Meeting of March 16
This meeting was a discussion with Ziegler on how to follow up on a
number of matters that had arisen in the press conference of the
preceding day.
Meeting of March 17
This Avas St. Patrick's Day and the President was in a very good
mood and \ery I'claxed and avo engaged in a rambling conversation
Avith only some l)rief reference to the Gray hearings and the problems
that were then confronting the White House regarding the President's
997
statements on executive privilefre and liis willingness to go to court on
the matter. He opined that he did not think that the Senate would be
dumb enough to go for the bait he had given them but he was hopeful
that they might.
Meeting of March 19
As I best recall this meeting, it was a rather rambling discussion
regarding media problems in connection with the Gray hearings. As
the discussion proceeded, I suggested that ]Mr, Moore might like to
engage in this convei^ation with us. There was some discussion of
Senator Ervin's appearance the preceding Sunday on ''Face the Na-
tion," and whether or not it would be appropriate for me to respond to
some of the points that were being made regarding my requested ap-
pearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee. I told the President
that I would work with Dick INIoore in preparing a draft response.
Meetings of March '20
The President had called me earlier that morning to tell me that I
should work up a draft letter of response as a result of the discussions
that we had had the preceding evening with ]\roore. I told him I was
drafting a letter and he told me as soon as I had the letter prepared
that I should arrange to meet with him. Shortly after lunch, I took over
a draft copy of the letter which I had developed with Mr. Moore and
I have submitted a copy of that draft letter to the committee.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-39.*]
Mr, Deax. Tlie President read the draft and we discussed it. There
was no resolution of the prol:)lem. He told me to talk with Ziegler. I
told him that if T did this as a sworn statement, that I was going to
obviousl}' redraft it very carefully before I signed any affidavit on the
letter.
It was during the afternoon of March 20 that I talked again with
Dick ^loore about the entire coverup. I told Moore that there were
new and more threatening demands for support money. I told him
that Hunt had sent a message to me — through Paul O'Brien — that he
wanted $72,000 for living expenses and $50,000 for attorney's fees and
if he did not receive it that week, he would reconsider his options and
have a lot to say about the seamy things he had done for Ehrlichman
while at the '^^Hiite House. I told Moore that I had about reached the
end of the line, and was now in a position to deal with the President
to end the coverup. I did not discuss witli ]Moore the fact that I had
discussed money and clemency with the President eai'lier. but I told
him that I really didn't think the President understood all of the facts
involved in the "Watergate and particularly the implications of those
facts. I told him that the matter was continually compounding itself
and I felt that I had to lay the facts out for the President as w-ell as
the implication of those facts. INIoore encouraged me to do so.
Phone Conversation of IMarch 20
TVhen the President called and we had a rather rambling discussion,
I told him at the conclusion of the conversation that evening that I
wanted to talk with him as soon as possible about the Watergate matter
•See p. 1252.
998
because I did not think that he fully realized all the facts and the
implication of those facts for people at the White House as well as
himself. He said that I should meet with him the next morning about
10 o'clock.
Before going in to tell the President some of these things, I de-
cided I should call Haldeman because I knew that his name would
come up in the matter. I called Haldeman and told him what I was
going to do and Haldeman agreed that I should proceed to so inform
the President of the situation.
Meeting of March 21
As I have indicated, my purpose in requesting this meeting par-
ticularly with the President was that I felt it necessary that I give
him a full report of all the facts that I knew and explain to him what
I believed to be the implication of those facts. It was my particular con-
cern with the fact that the President did not seem to understand the
implications of what was going on. For example, when I had earlier
told him that I thought I was involved in an obstruction of justice
situation he had argued with me to the contrary after I had explained
it to him. Also, when the matter of money demands had come up pre-
viously he had very nonchalantly told me that that was no problem
and I did not know if he realized that he himself could be getting in-
volved in an obstruction of justice by having promised clemency to
Hunt. What I had hoped to do in this conversation was to have the
President tell me that we had to end the matter — now. Accordingly,
I gave considerable thought to how I would present this situation to
the President and try to make as dramatic a presentation as I could
to tell him how serious I thought the situation was that the coverup
continue.
I began by telling the President that there was a cancer growing on
the Presidency and that if the cancer was not removed that the Presi-
dent himself would be killed by it. I also told him that it was important
that this cancer be removed immediately because it was growing more
deadly every day. I then gave him what I told him would be a broad
overview of the situation and I would come back and fill in the details
and answer any questions he might have about the matter.
I proceeded to tell him how the matter had commenced in late Janu-
ary and early Februarv but that I did not know how the plans had
finally been approved. I told him I had informed Haldeman what was
occurring, and Haldeman told me I should have nothing to do with it.
I told him that I had learned that there had been pressure from Colson
on Magnider but I did not huve all the facts as to the degree of pres-
sure. I told him I did not know if Mitchell had approved the plans but
I had been told that Mitchell had been a recipient of the wiretap in-
formation and that Haldeman had also received some information
through Strachan.
I then proceeded to tell him some of the highlights that had occurred
during the coverup. I told him that Kalmbach had been used to raise
funds to pay these seven individuals for their silence at the instructions
of Ehrlichman. Haldeman, and Mitchell and I had been the conveyor
of this instruction to Kalmbach. I told him that after the decision
had been made that Magruder was to remain at the reelection com-
999
mittee. I had assisted Magruder in preparing his false story for pres-
entation to the grand jury. 1 told liim that cash that liad been at the
White House had been f unneled back to the reelection committee for
the purpose of paying the seven individuals to remain silent.
I then proceeded to tell him that perjury had been committed, and
for this coverup to continue it would require more perjury and more
money. I told him that the demands of the convicted individuals were
continually increasing and that with sentencing imminent, the demands
had become specific.
I told him that on Monday the 19th, I had received a message from
one of the reelection committee lawyers who had spoken directly with
Hunt and tliat Hunt had sent a message to me demanding money. I
then explained to him the message that Hunt had told Paul O'Brien
the preceding Friday to be passed on to me. I told the President I'd
asked O'Brien why to Dean, and O'Brien had asked Hunt the same
question. But Hunt had merely said you just pass this message on to
Dean. The message was that Hunt wanted $72,000 for livuig expenses
and $50,000 for attorney's fees and if he did not get the money and get
it quickly that he would have a lot of seamy things to say about what
he had done for John Ehrlichman while he was at the White House.
If he did not receive the money, he would have to reconsider his
options.
I informed the President that I had passed this message on to both
Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman asked me if I had discussed
the matter with Mitchell. I had told Ehrlichman that I had not done
so and Ehrlichman asked me to do so. I told the President I had called
Mitchell pursuant to Ehrlichman's request but 1 had no idea of what
was happening with regard to the request.
I then told the President that this was just typical of the type of
blackmail that the Wliite House would continue to be subjected to and
that I didn't know how to deal with it. I also told the President that I
thought that I would as a result of my name coming out during the
Gray hearings be called before the grand jury and that if I was called
to testify before the grand jury or the Senate committee I would have
to tell the facts the way I know them. I said I did not know if execu-
tive privilege would be applicable to any appearance I might have
before the grand jury. I concluded by saying thot it is going to take
continued perjury and continued support of these individuals to per-
petuate the coveruj^ and that I did not believe it was possible to
continue it; rather I thought it was time for surgery on the cancer
itself and that all those involved must stand up and account for them-
selves and that the President himself get out in front of this matter.
I told the President that I did not believe that all of the seven de-
fendants would maintain their silence forever, in fact, I thought that
one or more would very likely break rank.
After I finished, I realized that I had not really made the President
understand because after he asked a few questions, he suggested that
it would be an excellent idea if I gave some sort of briefing to the
Cabinet and that he was very impressed with my knowledge of the
circumstances but he did not seem particularly concerned with their
implications.
It was after my presentation to the President and during our subse-
quent conversation the President called Haldeman into the office and
1000
the President suggested that we have a meeting with Mitchell, Halde-
man, and Ehrlichman to discuss how to deal with this situation. What
emerged from that discussion after Haldeman came into the office was
that John Mitchell should account for himself for the pve-June 17
activities and the President did not seem concerned about the activities
which had occurred after June 17.
After I departed the President's office I subsequently went to a meet-
ing w-ith Haldeman and Ehrlichman to disc-uss the matter further. The
sum and substance of that discussion was that the way to handle this
now was for Mitchell to step forward and if ]MitchoH were to step
forward we might not be confronted with the activities of those in-
volved in the "White House in the coverup.
Accordingly, Haldeman, as I recall, called Mitchell and asked him
to come down the next da}' for a meeting with tlie President on the
Watergate matter.
In the late afternoon of ]March 21. Haldeman and Ehrlichman
and I had a second meeting with the President. Before entering this
meeting I had a brief discussion in the President's outer office of the
Executive Office Building suite with Haldeman in which 1 told him
that we had two options:
One is that this thing goes all the wav and deals with both the pre-
activities and the postactivities, or the second alternative; if the
coverup was to proceed we would have to draw the wagons in a circle
around the A\niite House and that the "V^liite House protect itself.
I told Haldeman that it had been the White House's assistance to the
reelection committee that had gotten us into much of this problem and
now the only hope would be to protect ourselves from further
involvement.
The meeting with the President that afternoon with Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, and myself was a tremendous disappointment to me
because it was quite clear that the coverup as far as the White House
was concerned was going to continue. I recall that while Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, and I were sitting at a small table in front of the Presi-
dent in his Executive Office Building office that I for the first time
said in front of the President that I thought that Haldeman, Ehrlich-
man, and Dean were all indictable for obstruction of justice and that
was the reason I disagreed with all that was being discussed at that
point in time.
I could tell that both Haldeman, and particularly Ehrlichman, were
very unhappy with my comments. I had let them very clearly know
that I was not going to participate in the matter any further and that
I thought it was time that everybody start thinking about telling
the truth.
I again repeated to them I did not think it was possible to per-
petuate the coverup and the important thing now was to get the
President out in front.
Meeting or 'Makch 22
The arrangements had been made to have a meeting after lunch
with the President with Ehrlichman, Haldeman. ^Nfitchell. and myself.
Mr. Mitchell came to Washington that morning for a meeting in
Haldeman's office in which Ehrlichman, 'INlitchell, Haldeman. and
1001
myself were present. 1 recall that one of the first things that Ehrlich-
man asked of Mitchell was whether Hunt's mone}- problem had been
taken care of. ^Mitchell said that he didn't think it was a problem any
further. There then followed a general discussion of the status of
the Senate hearings, and the discussion never got down to specifics.
It had been my impression that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were
going to try to get Mitchell to come forward and explain his involve-
ment in the matter. This did not occur. ]\Iitchell said that he thought
everything was going along very well with the exception of the posture
of the President on executive privilege. He said that he felt that the
President was going to have to back down somewhat or it would appear
he was preventing information from coming out of the Wliite House.
I recall that Ehrlichman left the meeting before it had terminated
because he was going to meet Secretary Shultz, who was coming in
from out of the country. I was also called out of the meeting about
noontime when a message was sent to me by Ziegler that it was impor-
tant he see me immediately. This had to do with the statement that
was running on the wires that Gray had said that I had probably lied
and Ziegler wanted to know how to handle it. Accordingly, I departed
the meeting and went into a meeting with Ziegler and Moore to dis-
cuss Grav's comment. I returned to Haldeman's office where ^Mitchell
and Haldeman and I had lunch.
During lunch there was some continued conversation about the gen-
eral problems. ]\Ir. Mitchell raised the fact that F. Lee Bailey, who
had been very helpful in dealing with McCord, had a problem that he
would like to bring up. He said that Mr. Bailey had a client who had
an enormous amount of gold in his possession and would like to make
an arrangement with the Government whereby the gold could be turned
over to the Government without the individual being prosecuted for
holding the gold. Mitchell was addressing his request for assistance to
Haldeman but Haldeman was nonresponsive and the matter was
dropped.
I again departed Mr. Haldeman's office to have further dealings
with Moore and Ziegler and Haldeman told me that there would be a
meeting in the President's EOB office about 1 :30 and that I should
come directly from Ziegler's office when I got my problem worked out
regarding Gray's statement. I arrived about 1 :30 in the President's
Office but the President was not ready to hold the meeting yet.
The meeting with the President, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, INlitchell,
and me was again a general discussion of the Senate Watergate hear-
ings situation and, did not accomplish anjiihing. Rather it was a fur-
ther indication that there would be no effort to stop the coverup from
continuing. I recall that Mitchell told the President that he felt that
the only problem that he now had was the fact that he was taking a
public beating on his posture on executive privilege ; that the statement
on executive privilege was too broad and that probably something
should be done to change his posture on the matter.
Mitchell was not suggesting that members of the White House go
to the Hill to testify, rather that some more cooperative position be
developed to avoid the adverse publicity. It was at this time that the
President said that Kleindienst was supposed to be working these
things out with Senator Baker and he apparently had not been doing
so. The President said that Timmons had told him that a member of
96-296 O - 73
1002
Senator Baker's staff was very desirous of a meeting to get guidance.
It was at this point that the President called the Attorney General
and told him that he should get up to meet with Senator Baker as
soon as possible and get some of these problems regarding executive
privilege and the turning of documents over resolved with the com-
mittee immediately. After the conversation with the Attorney General,
there was a continued discussion of how to deal with the Ervin com-
mittee. I asked the President to excuse me from the meeting for a
moment because I was working with Ziegler on a response to a state-
ment that Gray had made. The President asked me what that was
about and I then explained to him about Gray's statement. I told him
what Gray had said and I also told him what the facts were. He ex-
cused me to use the telephone in his office and said that I should get
that resolved as quickly as possible.
Wlien I returned to the conversation with the President, Mitchell,
Haldeman, and Ehrlichman, they were still talking about dealing with
the Ervin committee. The President told me that the White House
should start directly dealing with the committee and that I should go
up and commence discussions with Senator Ervin as to the parameters
of executive privilege.
I told the President that I did not think this would be wise because
I was very much the party in issue with regard to the Judiciary Com-
mittee hearings and that it would be unwise for me to go to the Hill
and negotiate my own situation. The President agreed and Ehrlich-
man said that he would commence discussions.
The meeting was almost exclusively on the subject of how the White
House should posture itself vis-a-vis the Ervin committee hearings.
There was absolutel}^ no indication of any changed attitude and it was
like one of many, many meetings I had been in before, in which the
talk was of strategies for dealing with the hearings rather than any
effort to get the truth out as to what had happened both before June
17 and after June 17.
Following this meeting with the President, it was apparent to me
that I had failed in turning the President around on this subject, Imt
Ehrlichman and Haldeman began taking over with regard to deal-
ing with a new problem, which had become John Dean, as they were
aware of the fact that I was very unhappy about the situation.
Trip to Camp David
On Friday mornino:, March 23, my house was surrounded by camera
crews as a result of Gray's statement the day before, that I had
"probably lied." xVccordinglv, I decided to wait until the camera crews
departed before going to the office. It was midmorniiKr when Paul
O'Brien called to tell me about Judge Sirica's reading ^NfcCoiTrs letter
in open court. O'Brien gave me the high points of the letter as thev
had been reported to him by someone from the courthouse. He also
told me that McCord had onlv hearsay knowledge. I then called
Ehrlichman to tell him about it. He said he had a copy of the letter and
read it to me. I asked him how he received a copy so quickly.
He responded : "It just came floatin.o- into my office." He asked me
what I thought al>out it and I told liim I was not surprised at all
and repeated to him what O'Brien had told me that ^VfcCord ])robablv
had onlv hearsav knowledge. He asked me if I was in mv office and
1003
I informed him that I was a prisoner of the press and would be in
shortly.
After my conversation with Ehrlichman, the President called. Re-
ferring to our meeting on JMarch 21 and McCord's letter, he said:
"Well, John, you were right in your prediction."' He then suggested
I go up to Camp David and analyze the situation. He did not instruct
me to write a report, rather he said to go to Camp David, "take your
wife, and get some relaxation.*- He then alluded to the fact that I had
been under
Senator Erm:x. I will have to depart because I have less than 5
minutes to get over there. This is good training for running in the
Olympics.
[Recess.]
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, we are not trying to hurr}- along but I
stayed on the floor of the Senate until this rollcall began because in
the last short rollcall vote Senator Weicker and I missed the vote and
one or two others did, and so we are going to interchange in the interest
of time. If j-ou do not mind you might continue now.
Mr. Deax. Thank you, Senator.
He then alluded to the fact that I had been under some rather intense
pressure lately, but he had been through this all his life and you
cannot let it get to you. He said that he was able to do his best thinking
at Camp David, and I should get some rest and then assess where we
are and where we go from here and report back to him. I told him
I would go.
'Sly wife and I arrived at Camp David in the midafternoon. As we
entered the cabin in which we were staying, the phone was ringing.
The operator said it was the President calling but Haldeman came on
the phone. Haldeman said that while I was there I should spend some
time writing a report on everything I know f.bout the Watergate. I
said I would do so. I asked him if it was for internal use or public use.
He said that would be decided later.
I spent the rest of the day and the next day thinking about this
entire matter. I reached the conclusion, based on earlier conversations
I had with Ehrlichman, that he would never admit to his involvement
in the coverup. I did not knoAv about Haldeman, but I assumed that
he would not because he would believe it a higher duty to protect the
President. The more I thought about it the more I realized that I
should step forward because there was no way the situation was going
to get better — rather, it could only get worse, ^fy most difficult prob-
lem was how I could end this mess without mortally wounding the
President. I had no answer, because T felt once T came forward the
matter would be for the American people to decide, and not for me to
decide. T finally concluded that I would have to tlnnk of some way for
the President to get out in front of the matter, despite what happened
to evervbodv else.
I called INIr. Moore and talked with him about it. We talked about
a Presidential speech, where thp President would really lay the facts
out : we talked about immunity for eveiyone involved : we talked about
a special Warren-type commission that would put the fncts out: we
talked about some half measures that miafht satisfy the public interest :
but we both renlized that nothing less than the truth would sell. As T
mentioned earlier, Moore and I had talked about some of these con-
1004
cepts on previous occasions, but we still did not have an answer that
would bring the full truth out because of the criminal implications
of the behavior of those involved.
On Saturday, I began reconstructing all I knew and began writing
a rei^ort. I spent Saturday afternoon and evening, Sundaj', and Mon-
da}' reconstructing and writing. On Monday I asked my secretary to
come to Camp David, bring certain documents that I had requested,
and commence typing. I did not realize how difficult it would be to
reconstruct my knowledge from memory. I had not kept a diary or
even a calendar of all my activities, thus, I have been reconstructing
my knowledge of this matter since March 23 to this day.
On Sunday e\ening, March 25, 1 was informed that the Los Angeles
Times and the AVashington Post were going to print a story that Ma-
gruder and I had prior knowledge of the June IT bugging of the Demo-
cratic National Committee. I considered the story libelous then, as I do
today. Upon learning that the story was going to be printed, I contacted
an attorney, Mr. Tom Hogan, who was familiar with libel law. We dis-
cussed the matter. He then decided to put the newspapers on notice to
preserve a libel suit in the event they printed the story. I also told Mr.
Hogan that when I returned from Camp David that I wanted to talk
with him about this entire matter and asked him to think about some-
one who was a good criminal lawyer because I was planning to take
certain steps in the near future. I might add that it was my thinking
at that time that I would explain all the facts to a knowledgeable
criminal lawyer to determine the potential problems of everyone in-
volved — from the President on down^ — to get independent advice on
what I should do.
On Monday morning, Marcli 26, I had a conversation witli Halde-
man about the story in the Los Angeles Times. I told him I was pre-
pared to file a libel suit and had retained a lawyer to put the newspapers
on notice. I told him that he knew that I had not known of the June 17
"Watergate ]n*eak-in in advance, that my knowledge of tlie entire mat-
ter ended with the second meeting in Mitchell's office. I told Haldeman
that Magruder knew that I had no prior knowledge, but I did not
know if he would admit it publicly. Haldeman concurred in the fact
that I had no prior knowledge and suggested I call Magruder and tape
his conversation.
I did call Magruder and by using a dictaphone held to the receiver,
I recorded the call. I have submitted a transcript of this conversation
to the committee ; the long and short of this conversation was that
Magruder acknowledged that the newspaper accounts were a "bum
rap" for me because I had not had prior knowledge of the break-in.
[The transcript was marked exhibit No. 34—10.*]
^Ir. Dean. My secretary arrived at Camp David on ]Monday after-
noon and began typing the report. On ^Monday night, I had given addi-
tional thought to how the President might get out in front of this
matter and how we could get everyone involved to speak the truth. I
called Moore, who is fairly conservative in his solutions to problems,
and told him of my idea, which I said was so far out that I thought it
might solve the awful pi-oblem. I have submitted to the committee a
co))y of my notes outlining my concept.
[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-41.**]
*Spo p. 125R.
**See p. 1261.
1005
Mr. Deax. In brief, the President would create an independent
panel — tliat would be investitrator, prosecutor, and judfre and jury for
everyone involved. It would have the power to remove officials from
office, levy fines, and impose criminal sanctions. It was designed to give
every man a fair and full hearing, and proceed in a manner where
people would not be tried publicly.
Finally, after all the facts were in, the panel would render its judg-
ments on the individuals involved and report to the public. I might
note that if the special prosecutor and this committee were merged,
made independent, and proceeded in camera, it would be very close to
the concept I liad proposed back on March 26.
Moore liked the idea and suggested I call Haldeman, which I did.
He was intrigued, but not overwhelmed. It was becoming increasingly
clear that no one inxolved was willing to stand up and account for
themselves.
After I had read in the newspaper on Tuesday, March 27, that the
President had called me on Monday morning, March 26 — which he had
not — and expressed great confidence in me and the fact that I liad not
had prior knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Com-
mittee. I decided to attempt to contact Mr. Liddy, who was the one
man who could document the fact that we never had talked about his
plans following the February -i meeting in Mitchell's office. I called
Paul O'Brien and asked him how I could get in contact with Mr.
Maroulis, Mr. Liddy's attorney. O'Brien gave me Maroulis' phone
number, but told me I could not reach him until late in the afternoon.
I called Mr. ]Maroulis about 5 :30 and asked him if I might get some
sort of sworn statement from Liddy regarding my lack of prior
knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Committee. I
told him of the two meetings in IMitchelFs office, and that ]Mr. Liddy
and I never talked about his plans after the second meeting. To this
day. I am convinced that if and when Mr. Liddj^ ever talks, he will tell
the truth as he knows it. I was hopeful that he would give me some
sort of an affidavit attesting to the facts, but his lawyer was concerned
about his fifth amendment problems.
Mr. INIaroulis called me back on iNIarch 29 after I had returned from
Camp David, after he had talked with ]Mr. Liddy. I requested O'Brien
to make a memorandum of the call, as he was with Mr. Maroulis when
he made the call. I have submitted to the committee a copy of this docu-
ment in which IMaroulis advised me his client could not make such a
statement because it might result in a waiver of his fifth amendment
privileges, that to give such a statement could be detrimental to others,
but Liddy did wish to convey that his reasons for not providing such a
statement was not because he disagreed with the facts, but because of
the advice of counsel.
[The document was marked exhibit Xo, 34-42.*]
]Mr. Deax. It was the day before I received this call, ]March 28, that
Haldeman had called me at Camp David and requested that I return to
Washington. He told me that he was meeting with jNIitchell and
Magruder and that thej^ wished to meet with me. I told Haldeman that
I really did not wish to meet with Mitchell and INIagruder, but he was
insistent that I return and meet with them. I returned from Camp
David about 3 :30 and went directly to Haldeman's office. He told me
*See p. 1262.
1006
that Mitchell and ISIagruder were waiting in another office for me. I
asked him why they wanted to talk to me and he said that they wanted
to talk to me about my knowledge of the meetings in Mitchell's office.
I told Haldeman that they were both aware of the situation and I was
not going to lie if asked about those meetings. Haldeman said that he
did not want to get into it, but I should go in and work it out with
Mitchell and Magruder.
Before discussing the meetings with Mitchell and IMagruder, I feel
I should comment on my reaction to the discussion I had just had with
Mr. Haldeman. Knowing how freely and openly he had discussed
matters in the past, I could tell that he was back-peddling fast. That
he was now in the process of uninvolving himself, but keeping others
involved. This was a clear sign to me that Mr. Haldeman was not
going to come forward and help end this problem, rather, he was begin-
ning to protect his flanks. It was my reaction to this meeting witli Mr.
Haldeman and his evident changed attitude, and my earlier dealings
with Ehrlichman where he had told me how I should handle various
areas of my testimony should I be called before the grand jury, that
made me decide not to turn over to them the report I had written at
Camp David. T have submitted to the committee a copy of the Camp
David report, part of which was typed by my secretary at Camp David
and the remainder in longhand, which I had not put in final narrative
form before I was called back to Washington.
[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-43.*]
Meeting With Mr. INIitchell and Mr. Magruder
]Mr. Dean. After departing ]\Ir. Haldeman's office, I went to meet
with Mitchell and ^Magruder. After an exchange of pleasantries, they
told me they wished to talk to me about how I would handle any testi-
monial appearances regarding the January 27 and February 4 meetings
which had occurred in Mitchell's office. I told them that we had been
through this before and they knew well my understanding of the facts
as they had occurred at that time. ]\ritchell indicated that if I so testi-
fied, it could cause problems. ]\Iagruder then raised the fact that I had
previously agreed, in an earlier meeting, that I would follow the testi-
monial approach they had taken before the grand jury.
I told them I recalled the meeting. INIagruder then said that it had
been I who had suggested that the meetings be treated as dealing
exclusively with the election law and that explained my presence. At
this point in time, I decided I did not wish to get into a debate regard-
ing that meeting. They both repeated to me that if I testified other
than- they had it would only cause problems. I said I understood that.
I told them that there was no certainty that I would be called before
the grand jury or the Senate committee and that if I were called, I
might invoke executive privilege, so the question of my testimony
was still moot. I did not want to discuss the subject further so I tried
to move them off of it. They were obviously both disappointed that I
was being reluctant in agreeing to continue to perpetuate their earlier
testimony.
The only other matter of any substance that came up during that
meeting was when I made the point that I had never asked Mitchell
•See p. 1263.
1007
about his involvement in the matter and I had no intention of asking
him at that time. I said to this day I do not fully understand how
tlie Liddv plan got into operation and can only speculate based on
the tidbits of information I know. I then offered my hypothesis of
what had happened, that is, that at some point after the second meet-
ing in ^litchell's office there had been pressure put on to get the plan
approved and that it had been approved without anyone really under-
standing its full import. ]Mitchell said somethino; to the effect that
my theory was not far from wrong, only they thought it would be
three or four times removed from the committee. The meeting termi-
nated shortly thereafter. It was not a lengthy meeting and as far as
Magruder and Mitchell were concerned, it was certainly less than
satisfactory for them.
IMarch INIeeting With IMr. Egil Krogh
On either ]March 28 or 29. IMr. Krogh came to my office because he
happened to be in the Executive Office Building. He said he had come
to express sympathy for me as a result of the adverse publicity I had
received during the Gray hearings. He then began telling me that he
had not himself had a good day since his own confirmation hearings
and that he had been haunted bv his experiences at the "^^Hiite House.
I told Krogh that I thought that there was a very likely possibility
that the Senate "Watergate committee could stumble into the Ellsberg
burglary. I told him that there were documents in the possession of
the Justice Department which had been provided by the CIA in con-
nection with the "Watergate investigation which contained pictures
of Liddv standing in front of 3Ir. Ellsberg's doctor's office in
California.
I told him that I had learned from the CIA that these pictures had
been left in a camera returned bv Hunt to the CIA and the CIA had
developed the pictures. I said I did not believe that the Justice Depart-
ment knew what the pictures were all about but that any investigator
worth his salt would probably track down the incident as a result of
the pictures.
I told him that Ehrlichman had requested that I retrieve the docu-
ments from the Justice Department and get them back to the CIA
where they might be withheld from the committee investigators but
the CIA had been unwilling to do so.
Krogh was very distressed to hear this news but said that maybe it
was for the best in that he had personally been haunted b}' this inci-
dent for so Ions: that he would like to get it out in the open. "We then
entered into a discussion about the incident and I asked him if he had
received his authorization to proceed with the burglary from Ehrlich-
man, knowing well that Krogh would not undertake such a mission
himself.
Krogh responded that no: he did not believe that Ehrlichman had
been aware of the incident until shortly after it had occurred; rather,
he had received his orders right out of the "oval office." I was so sur-
prised to hear this that I said, "You must be kidding." And he repeated
again that he had recei^'ed his instructions out of the oval office.
Mr. Krogh also indicated to me that he thought he might have per-
jured himself during his confirmation hearings and he was very both-
1008
ered by that. He said he thought he had been asked some questions
about the Cubans that he probably could have ans^Yered but was afraid
to open up the whole area of the plumbers' operation so he did not
properly answer the question.
He had never really studied his transcript to determine if he had or
had not perjured himself but he was concerned about it. I told him
that there might be a possible solution to his problem if there was some
way we could get him immunized on a national security basis and get
the matter out in the open on that basis, or some sort of procedure that
would remedy his plight. I said I did not have anything specific in
mind but it is something that we might talk to Henry Petersen about
sometime in the future.
Shortly after Krogh left my office, I had a call from Ehrlichman
who told me that Krogh had been in to see him about the matters we
had just been talking about. He said that he was convinced that Krogh
had not perjured himself, but he requested that I call Petersen to
explore how we might deal with Krogh's situation. I told Ehrlichman
that I did not think it was an appropriate time to call right now, but
that maybe we could in the near future, before the Senate committee
came across the documents at the Justice Department that would
unravel this entire matter. I never called Petersen on this matter.
Meeting With the Prosecutors
Following my meeting with Mitchell and Magruder on March 28,
I realized that I was under pressure from both \a ithin the White House
and without to either not testify or falsely testify. I had earlier dis-
cussed with Ehrlichman that if I was called upon to testify that I
would probably be asked questions about the Dean investigation, my
dealings with the FBI, the handling of the material in Hunt's safe,
and the like.
I recall testing Ehrlichman's reaction to my testimony and I got
the result that I expected. He had asked me for an example of a prob-
lem area. I then told him that I would probably have to explain the
delay of turning materials over to the FBI from Hunt's office. I said
that the reason I had delayed was because of his instructions that I
"deep-six" and shred the evidence. Ehrlichman told me that he didn't
think that I would have to explain the delay that way, rather that I
could say that I was making an inventory. I told him that I had not
made an inventory and he said, "Well, I'm sure you'll think of
something."
I have mentioned that I had received what I considered an indica-
tion from Haldeman when I had met with him preceding the Magruder
and Mitchell meeting on the 28th that he was protecting himself.
I also realized that w^hen Ehrlichman had called me after my con-
versation with Mr. Krogh, that he was trying to tell me that what
Krogh had earlier told me might not be correct and I felt that he was
somewhat unhappy that Krogh had given me the information he had.
By March 29, Ehrlichman and Haldeman fully realized that I was
not playing ball and, in fact, could present a serious prol)lem to them.
It was also evident to me that they were doing everything they could
to protect themselves against my knowledge.
1009
I had been in continuous contact since March 25 with my attorney,
Tom Hogan, regarding whom lie felt was the best availalDle man in
the criminal law field that I might discuss this entire matter with.
We had talked on several occasions about Charles Shaffer, whom I
had met several years ago and regarded highly as a criminal lawyer.
On March 28' and 29. however, I made several other calls to friends
to ask them for suggested names of knowledgeable criminal lawyers,
but decided on March 30 that I would retain Mr. Shaffer if he were
available. Mr. Hogan informed me that he was and we arranged to
meet with him.
The President, along with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, were going
to be in California for a week or more in connection with the Presi-
dent's meeting with President Tliieu of South Vietnam and I felt that
this would give me an opportunity to decide how best I could come
forward and end this matter. I had decided that I was going to inform
the prosecutors of what the case was all about but before I. did so
I felt that I should consult with counsel to determine the scope of
my own problems.
On ]March 30. shortly after lunch, I met with Mr. Hogan and Mr.
Shaffer. I spent 5 hours telling them everything that I could remember
and telling them that I was unwilling to continue in the coverup.
Mr. Shaffer advised me to avoid further conversations regarding this
subject and said that he would like to talk with me again on Monday
morning prior to his seeing the prosecutors.
Accordingly, we met again on Monday morning, April 2, and dis-
cussed the matter for several hours more. That afternoon, my attorneys
went to the Govei-nment prosecutors and told them that I was willing
to come forward with everything I knew about the case.
From the outset 1 was confronted with the problems of executive
privilege, attorney-client privilege, and national security. Thus, it
was agreed until these problems were resolved that I would exclude
matters involving the President from these conversations. I was also
uncertain of many of the dates and details of the facts that I had
general knowledge of so I began reconstructing a chronology of events.
As each session progressed. I was able to provide more information,
more leads, and more explanations of the interrelationships within
the White House and the relationships of persons who were involved.
During the period of April 2 until April 15, the meetings I had
with the prosecutors were initially focusing on the activities which
had led ud to the June 17 break-in at the Democratic National Com-
mittee and all the knowledge I had regarding the events before June
IT. but as our discussions evolved and I began telling them more and
more of the coverup. their interest began to focus more and more in
that area.
As I beo-an explaining what T knew, it was evident that the prose-
cutors had no conception of how extensive the coverup was so I tried
to provide them with all the details that I could remember. Also, as
tlie conversations regarding the coveru]:) began to get into more and
more specifics, we moved into areas that came closer and closer to the
President, but prior to April 15 I did not discuss any of the areas of
Presidential involvement.
1010
Events Leading up to the President's Statement of April 17
During the time I was having conferences with the Government
prosecutors, I was avoiding conversations with Mitchell, Ehrlicliman,
and Haldeman as much as I could. However, on several occasions I
did talk with Ehrlicliman while he was in California. At one point
he called me and asked if I had completed my report that I had been
working on at Camp David. I told him it was still incomplete. He
said that I should send him whatever I had completed. I told him
that a section dealing with Segretti's activities, which had been pre-
pared by Dick Moore, but which I had not reviewed myself, was com-
plete as far as I was concerned and I would send it on to him. He said
I should send it to California immediately on the DX machine. He
said that Haldeman was interested in getting these facts out now
because the timing might be good. 1 sent the report that had been
written by Mr. Moore, a copy of which I have submitted to the
committee.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 3 1 11 .*]
Mr. Dean. I also had a conversation with Mitchell about Paul
O'Brien going out to visit with Haldeman in California. Mitchell told
me that he wanted O'Brien to go out and visit with Haldeman and that
he had worked out the meeting. 1 felt like telling ^Mitchell that I
thought that when I learned the meeting had been switched from
Haldeman to Ehrlicliman, that O'Brien was being set up, that Ehrlicli-
man would probe him on everything he knew about 5litcliell, Dean,
and anyone else involved. I did not know if this in fact occurred, but
knowing that Ehrlicliman and Haldeman were very busy protecting
their flanks, I would have to believe that it did occur. I have never
talked with O'Brien about what did occur during his meeting with
Ehrlicliman.
Ehrlichman also asked me if I knew when I would be called before
the grand jury. I told him I did not, but that my lawyers were dis-
cussing the matter with the prosecutors. I did not tell him that I had
already met with the prosecutors but he told me that he wanted to
know when I was going to be called because he wanted to talk with
me before I appeared.
I believe that the President returned from California on Sunday,
April 8. I was scheduled to meet with the prosecutors that afternoon.
My attorneys had been discussing my testimony with the prosecutors
and they had worked out an arrangement whereby I could give the
prosecutors my knowledge directly and what I told them would not
later be used against me if they should prosecute me. I felt that I
should tell Haldeman that I was going to meet with the prosecutors
personally so I called him in California on the morning of April 8
before they departed for Washington. I made the call from Mr. Shaf-
fer's office and when I told him this he said that I should not meet
with the prosecutors because, as he said, "Once the toothpaste is out
of the tube, it's going to be very hard to get it back in." After this
comment, I did not tell Haldeman whether I would or would not meet
with them and in fact the meeting w^ent forward. During the meeting
and while the President was flying east, I received a call from Air
•See p. 1294.
1011
Force One from Hig*by, who asked me to be in Wisdom's (Ehrlich-
man's code name) office at a certain time for a meeting. I believe the
meeting was set for 4 or 5 o'clock.
I departed from the meeting with the prosecutors to go into the
White House. I went to Ehrlichman's office. There I found Ehrlich-
man and Haldeman who had just arrived from Andrews Air Force
Base and we chatted for a brief moment about their trip. I raised the
fact that I had read in the paper that morning that Colson had taken
a lie detector test. I said that I hope everyone is willing to take such
a lie detector test because it will proba]:)ly be necessary now that Colson
has taken a test. They asked me if I had met yet with the prosecutors
or knew when I would be called before the grand jury. I avoided a
direct answer to the question by saying that my lawyers were still
having discussions with the prosecutors about my appearance before
the grand jury. I was then asked some questions about testimonial
areas but I gave them evasive answers. Even these evasive answers,
which raised matters which related to them, brought forth responses
that they did not remember it quite as I did.
During the week of April 9 to April 14, I had several conversations
with Ehrlichman and Haldeman but I tried to avoid them as much
as possible. I recall some discussions however regarding getting
IMitchell to step forward. The theory that had been discussed before
they went to California was becoming the policy — "If Mitchell takes
the rap the public will have a high level person and be satisfied and
the matter will finally end." I felt during each encounter I had with
them that I was veiw much a problem for them but they did not want
me to know that they felt so. However, after having been involved
with them for months on end in this matter, it was very easy for me
to recognize a clianged attitude, and on occasion they were almost
patronizing in dealing with me.
On Monday. April 9, Mitchell called me and told me he was coming
to Washington and wanted to meet with me. I informed Ehrlichman
and Haldeman of ^Mitchell's request and they both wanted me to meet
with him. I also discussed this with counsel and there was some discus-
sion with the Government about the meeting. The prosecutors were
interested in mv taping the conversation but I told them I tliought it
was most unfair to do. to JMitchell, and that I would not go in and set
him up.
After discussing this further with my attorney, and rejecting the
suq:i>estion that I record the conversation, I agreed to meet with
Mitchell but I had been instructed by counsel to prepare a memoran-
dum of the meeting as soon as the meeting was over. I agreed to do
this and I have submitted a copy of that memorandum to the
committee.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-45.*]
Mr. Dean. The sum and substance of the meeting was that if and
when I were called to testify I would testify fully and honestly. Mit-
chell said that lie understood and did not suggest tliat I do otherwise.
He did, howevei-, believe that mv testimony would be verv harmful to
the President and said that he felt that I should not testify if at all
possible. I reported my meeting with ]Mitchell to Haldeman and
Ehrlichman later.
♦See p. 1308.
1012
There were other discussions that week in which Haldeman and
Ehrlichman talked about pinning this entire matter on MitchelL I
listened with some interest because I did not feel that they would suc-
ceed at this and I felt that also they would have to bo thinkino; about
liow to handle the coverup activities and felt that I would undoubt-
edly be the target for them to pin everything with regard to the
coverup on. As Haldeman and Ehrlichman began to discuss more
about getting Mitchell to take the blame for authorizing this plan in
the first instance, I began to increase my conversations with the prose-
cutors about the coverup. The more I told the prosecutors about the
coverup the more interested they became iii it. At this time, Haldeman
and Ehrlichman were still unaware of my direct dealings with the
prosecutors.
On Friday, April 13, Fred LaRue came to my office to see me. Before
he arrived in my office I again contacted my attorney to advise him
that LaRue wanted to see me and I asked wliat I should do. He again
said he thouglit I ought to meet with LaRue, not to get into testi-
monial areas, but to make a memorandum of the meeting, I have sub-
mitted a copy of that memorandum to the committee.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-46.*]
Mr. Dean. When LaRue and I met, LaRue told me that lie thought
he was going to be called before the grand jury shortly and he wanted
to know what I was going to do if I was called. I told him I was going
to tell the truth. I told him I did not believe we should talk about
testimony because we could be asked that very question in and of
itself before the grand jury. LaRue said, "Let me just ask one ques-
tion." He asked me if I had made anv decisions on the money and I
told him that I had not but I had merely passed messages along and
returned messages. He said that he had assumed that to be the case
and asked me how I was going to handle the persons above me who
were involved. I told him again that I was going to withhold nothing
from the grand jury and if asked I would respond.
oSIr. LaRue also said that he needed some legal advice and I sug-
gested that rather than getting it from me that he ought to get inde-
)3endent counsel. I liked Fred LaRue very much and felt very sorry
for him realizing that this probably would be the last conversation
we would have for some time and that he was in the middle of this
matter not necessarily by his own choice but by the circumstances he
found himself in at the time.
The strategy that was now developing was a partial uncovering of
the coverup: that is, to get ]\Iitchell to step forward. On Friday,
April 13, I went to Ehrlichman's office where Ehrlichman and Halde-
man were present and discussing a meeting that they had just had
with Colson and his attorney, INfr. Shapiro.
They informed me that Colson had developed a plan to deal with
the matter and that was that ^Mitchell should be smoked out. Ehrlich-
man said that Colson had concluded that obviously '^Mitchell had
signed off on this matter and he should take responsibility for it to
end this thing. Ehrlichman also said that Colson had some other ideas
including the fact that the Gray hearings had been very damaging
to me publicly and I should certainly not take any position out in
♦See p. 1311.
1013
front dealing with the Ervin committee hearings because of this. I
miglit add that Ehrlichman and Haldeman were most cynical about
Colson's suggestions and said to me that he was really scrambling to
protect himself.
After discussing the Colson plan they told me that Mitchell would
bo coming down to talk about this entire matter. There was some dis-
cussion as to how to smoke ISlitchell out. By the week's end it had
been decided that the President would meet with ^Mitchell and ask
liim about his knowledge and hopefully the President would be able
to get ^Mitchell to come forward. I told them I doubted very seriously
if ^litchell would say anything to anyone about this matter. While
these discussions were going on, the President called Ehrlichman
and they had a brief discussion about the matter. I also recall that at
one point in the conversation Ehrlichman said that "He's right here,"
referring to me.
On Saturday, April 14, I requested my attorney, Mr. Shaffer, to
come to my office. I told him that ]Mitchell was coming down to meet
with the President and that there was going to be an effort to smoke
him out. I asked him if he had any ideas as Ehrlichman and Halde-
man had asked me if I had any ideas. Mr. Shaffer gave me a former
prosecutor's answer that what Mitchell needs is a good cross-
examination.
I told him I did not think that that was possible by the President
because the President was not the cross-examining type. He also made
a couple of other suggestions which would have resulted in the Presi-
dent having to appear before the grand jury if he got any admissions
from i\Ir. Mitchell. I passed these suggestions along subsequently to
Ehrlichman and Haldeman but the}^ were not viable suggestions.
Mr. Shaffer and I then sat down and began reviewing all the facts
that I had related to him. I told him I wanted his opinion based on
conversations with the prosecutors and his own knowledge of the
criminal law as to who had problems and who could be indicted and
who were the targets of the grand jury. ]Mr. Shaffer and I discussed
this for awhile and then I prepared a list of who was likely to be
indicted as the investigation proceeded.
I had guests for lunch and it was after lunch that I met with Dick
Moore. I had the list in front of me and I thought that I would see
what INIoore's reaction to it was because I was planning to take it to
Ehrlichman and Haldeman later. I showed the list to Dick INIoore and
told him it had been prepared based on conversations with my attorney
and his knowledge of the involvement of various persons.
I told him that I felt that everybody on this list was a potential
subject of an indictment. When I showed Moore the list ho was quite
upset. He said that if indeed that occurred it would be a tremendous
tragedy to the country. He was shaken by the list and the seriousness
with which I discussed it with him, but I was very serious in my desire
to stop the coverup with Ehrlichman and Haldeman so I was appre-
ciative for Moore's reaction. I have submitted a copy of the document
I prepared to the committee.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-47.*]
Mr. Deax. Later that afternoon I wont to Ehrlichman's office where
Ehrlichman and Haldeman were discussing Mitchell's visit. I learned
•See p. 1312.
1014
that Mitchell had met briefly with Ehrlichman but not with the Presi-
dent. Ehrlichman said that Mitchell was not talkino- which certainly
did not surprise mo. And I certainly was not surprised that he would
not talk with Ehrlichman eitlier. I then pulled the list I had prepared
out of my pocket and told them tliat I had discussed everyone's prob-
lem with my lawyers and my lawyers had had conversations with the
prosecutors as well and I thought that the following persons would be
indicted. I then read them the list. I told them that my attorney had
learned from his discussions with the prosecutors that not only was
Dean the target of the grand ]ury but Ehrlichman and Haldeman
were also very much targets of the grand jury, Ehrlichman said that
he had just talked with Kleindienst a few days earlier about the grand
jury and that he had no such report from Kleindienst. I said that my
lawyer appears to know more than the Attorney General does because
I believe he is probably more informed in that he had had direct con-
versations with the prosecutors. I did not tell them at that point that
I had had private meetings with the prosecutors or that I had told
the prosecutors of the extent of involvement of Haldeman and Ehr-
lichman. When this meeting ended I was quite confident that I had
gotten the message through to Ehrlichman and Haldeman that they
had a serious problem themselves and I had put them on final notice
that I was not playing the coverup game any longer.
It was late that night that I realized that indeed, my message had
gotten through. About 1 o'clock on Saturday niglit or Sunday morn-
ing, I received a call from Mr. Shaffer. He said that the prosecutors
had called him and that they were going to have to ))reach the agree-
ment they had made regarding keeping all of my conversations with
them private. The prosecutors had reported to Mr. Shaffer that the
Attorney General had called Mr. Petersen and them and wanted a full
report on everything that was going on before the grand jury and
where the grand jury was headed. The meeting with tlie Attorney
General was to occur about 2 a.m., at the Attorney General's home.
The prosecutors also reported that the reason thev felt they had to
breach the agreement was because the Attorney General was being
summoned to the President's office the next morning to discuss the
entire matter. I told Mr. Shaffer that I had hoped to tell the Presi-
dent personally that I had gonp to the prosecutors several weeks ago
but that I had understood why this was occurring and obviously there
was nothing we could do about it. I told Shaffer that we certainly
have gotten the message through to Ehrlichman and PTaldeman that
thev have problems and that the co\orup mav begin to uni-avel at last.
On Sunday, April 15, I went to Mr. Shaffer's office for an all-day
meeting. I learned durinsr the day that Ehrlichman had been trying
to reach me during the better part of the dav but I decided not to
return his cpH. When T returned home abont 7:30, the White House
operator called me again and said that Ehrlichman had been trying to
reach me. T then returned his call. Ho told me that ho was <roinfr back
to the office to do some work that ni.o'ht and would bo in about S p.m.
and would like to meet with mo very much. T told him I would luoet
with him.
I was quite aware of the reason that Ehrlichman wanted to meet
with me because I was sure that ho had learned from the President
what was going on as a result of the President's mootinG: with Klein-
1015
dienst and Petersen and the fact that I had been to the prosecutors
had obviously come out. As I have noted earlier, I had not at any time
discussed Presidential involvement with the prosecutors so the dis-
cussions that Petersen and Kleindienst had with the President obvi-
ously focused on the involvement of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean,
Mitchell, Magruder, Strachan, and others that I had discussed. After
Ehrlichman's call, I called ]\Ir. Shaffer and we discussed the wisdom
of the meetino-s. I told him I did not want to meet with Ehrlichman
and he aorreed. Subsequently, I tried to reach Ehrlichman to turn the
moetiuir off but I learned that he was already en route to the office.
I called Mr. Shaffer back and told him that I thought I ought to
meet with the President and I should call Rosemary Woods and have
her give a message to the President. He said that he saw no problem
with my talking with the President to tell him why I had gone to
the prosecutors. I attempted to reach Rosemary Woods but she was out
of the city. I then wrote out a message for the President and phoned
Mr. Higby and requested that Higby relate the matter to Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, and on to the President. I have submitted a copy to the
committee of the message I sent to the President at 8:15 Sunday,
April 15.
[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-48.*]
Mr. Deax. In short, I told the President that I hoped he did not in-
terpret my going to the prosecutors as an act of disloyalty, that I did
not wish "to speak with Ehrlichman at this time, that I would meet
with him if he wished to discuss the matter with me, and that I
thought that he should get his legal advice from Henry Petersen.
Witliin 45 minutes of sending this message I had a call from the
"Wliite House operator informing me that the President wished to
meet with me at 9 o'clock.
It was shortly after 9 when I arrived at the President's EOB office.
As I was driving into the White House I wondered to myself if the
meeting was a set-up. By a set-up I mean, was the President going to
try to smoke out of me what Ehrlichman and Haldeman obviously had
been trying to do and had not been able to do, would not be able to get
out of me because they knew very well that I would not play any games
with the President. I decided I could not worry about that and I had a
duty to explain to the President why I was doing what I had done.
Meeting With the President — April 15
The President was very cordial when we met. I was somewhat
shaken when I went in to meet him because I knew I had taken it upon
myself to end the coverup and what I had started was going to cause
serious problems for the President. I shall attempt to recall the high-
lights of the conversation that transpired on the meeting which oc-
curred about 9 o'clock on April 15.
I told the President that I had gone to the prosecutors. And, that I
did not believe that this was an act of disloyalty but, rather in the end
it would be an act of loyalty. I told him I felt this matter had to end.
I informed the President that I told the prosecutors of my own in-
volvement and the involvement of others. At one point in the conver-
sation I recall the President asking me about Haldeman's knowledge
♦See p. 1313.
1016
of the Liddy plans. He asked me if I had told him earlier about the
fact that I had met with Ilaldeman after the second mootino; in Mitch-
ell's office and told Haldeman what was <2:oin;2: on and my reaction
to what was going on. I told the President that I had reported this
fact to him earlier. The President then made some reference to Henry
Petersen asking about why Haldeman had not turned it off at that
point and told me to testify that I had told Haldeman about the meet-
ing in Mitchell's office. The President almost from the outset began
asking me a number of leading questions, which was somewhat unlike
his normal conversational relationships I had had with him, which
made me think that the conversation was being taped and that a record
was being made to protect himself. Although I became aware of this
because of the nature of the conversation, I decided that I did not know
it for a fact and that I had to believe that the President would not tape
such a conversation.
Some question came up, by the President, as to whether I had im-
munity. As best as I can recall, I told him my lawyers had discussed
this with the prosecutors but certainly I had no deal with the Govern-
ment. He told me that he did not want to do anything to hurt my
negotiations witli the Government. I do not recall his comment on his
comment regarding that. I also recall that the conversation turned to
the matter of L/iddy not talking. He said something about Liddy was
waiting for a signal and I told him that possibly he was waiting for a
signal from the President.
I discussed with him the fact that maybe if Liddy's lawyer met
with him that Liddy would begin to open up because I said that I
thought that that would be very helpful if Liddy did talk. It was
during this part of the conversation that the President picked up the
telephone and called Henry Petersen and pretended with Petersen
that I was not in the room but that the matter of Liddy's coming for-
ward and talking had arisen during our conversation. The President
relayed to Petersen that if Liddy's lawyer wanted to see him to get
a signal that the President was willing to do this.
The President also asked me about Petersen and I told him if any-
one could give him good advice Henry Petersen could. The President
also asked me if I remembered what day it was in March that I had
reported to him on some of the details of the Watergate matter. He
said that he thought it was the 21st but was not certain. I said that
I could not recall for certain without checking.
At another point in the convei'sation the matter of the degree of
discussions that I had had with the prosecutors came up and I in-
formed the President that I had had no discussions with the prose-
cutors relating to conversations I had had witli him or in anything
in the area of national security. The Pi-esident told me that I could
not talk about national security areas and that I should not talk about
conversations I had had with him because they were privileged
conversations.
Toward the end of the conversation the President recalled the fact
that at one point we had discussed the difficulty in raising money and
that he had said that $1 million was nothing to raise to pay to main-
tain the silence of the defendants. He said that he had, of course, only
been joking when he made that comment. As the conversation went
on, and it is impossible for me to recall anything other than the high
1017
points of it, I 'became more convinced that the President was seeking
to elicit testimony from me and put his i:)crspective on the record and
get me to agree to it.
The most interesting thing tliat happened during the conversation
was, very near the end. he got up out of his chair, went behind his
chair to the corner of the Executive Office Building office and in a
nearly inaudible tone said to me he was probably foolish to have dis-
cussed Hunt's clemency with Colson. I do not recall that I responded.
The conversation ended shortly thereafter.
As I was on my way out of the office after exchanging parting
pleasantries, I told the President that I hoped that my going to the
prosecutors and telling the truth would not result in the impeach-
ment of the President. He jokingly said, "I certainly hope so also,"
and he said that it would be handled properly.
^Ieetixg "With the President — April 16
I received word on ^Monday morning, April 16, that the President
had requested I come to the oval office. I arrived at his office about
9 i-tS. and rather than going to the reception entrance normally used by
other members of the staff and mvself, I went into ]Mr. Steve Bull's
office. ^Ir. Bull is the one who had informed me that the President
wanted to see me, so I went to his office.
Mr. Bull told me I would have to wait a few minutes because the
President was in another meeting. A few minutes later Haldeman and
Ehrlichman emerged laughing from the President's office and when
they saw me in Mr. Bull's office their faces dropped. I said hello, they
put on a serious — they said hello, put on a serious look and departed.
I went into the President's office.
The President told me that he had been thinking about this entire
matter and thought it might be a good idea if he had in his drawer a
letter from me requesting that he accej^t my resignation or in the alter-
native an indefinite leave of absence. He said that he had prepared two
letters for my signature and he would not do anything with them at
this time but thought it would be good if he had them. He then passed
me a manila file folder with two letters in them. The President said
that he had prepared the letters himself and that no one would knoAv
I had signed them. I read the letters and was amazed at what I was
being asked to sign. I have submitted to the committee copies of the
letters, but since they are very brief, I will read them.
[The letters were marked exhibit No. 34—49.*]
Mr. Deax. The first letter, dated April 16, 1973, read :
Dear Mr. President, in view of ray increasing involvement in the Watergate
matter, my impending appearance before the grand jury and the probability of
its action, I request an immediate and indefinite leave of absence from my posi-
tion on your staff.
The second letter, which was even more incriminating, read :
Dear Mr. President, as a result of my involvement in the Watergate matter,
which we discussed last night and today, I tender you my resignation, effective
at once.
*See p. 1314.
96-296 O - 73 - 8
1018
After reading the letters, I looked the President squarely in the eyes
and told him that I could not sign the letters. He was annoyed with
me, and somewhat at a loss for words. He said that maybe I would like
to draft my own letter. I told him that the letters tliat ho liad asked me
to sign were virtual confessions of anything regarding the Watergate.
I also asked him if Ehrlichman and Haldeman had signed letters of
resignation. I recall that he was somewhat surprised at my asking this
and he said no, they had not but they had given him a verbal assur-
ance to the same effect.
He then elaborated that Haldeman and Ehrlichman had said that
if they were called before the grand jury they would seek an indefinite
leave of absence. They had given him their verbal assurances. I tlien
told the President that he had my verbal assurance to the same effect.
It was a tense conversation, but I was not going to sign the letters
under any circumstances.
As I sat there talking with the President, I had very much on my
mind the laughter in Ehrlichman's and Haldeman's voices when thev
walked out of the office before they realized that I was waiting outside
to see the President. To break the impasse the President said that lie
would like me to draft my own letter and report back to him later. He
said that he was working on a statement regarding the Watergate and
the recent developments that had come to his attention as a result of
his meetings with Kleindienst and Petersen and would appreciate my
thoughts. He said that he would also like a suggested draft letter for
Haldeman and Ehrlichman or maybe a form lettei- that e^•eryone could
sign. I told him I would draft a letter and would report back to him.
The President called me to come to his EOB office about 4 that
afternoon. He asked me if I had drafted a letter. I said that I had as
well as I had prepared some thoughts for his statement. He asked to
see the letter, a copy of which I have submitted to the committee —
but again shall read it because it is very brief :
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-50.*]
Dear Mr. President :
You have informed me tliat Bob Haldeman and .John Elirlicliman liave verbally
tendered their requests to be given an immediate and indefinite leave of absence
from your staff. By this letter I also wish to confirm my request that I be given
such a leave of absence from your staff.
Mr. Dean, After the President read the letter, he handed it back to
me and said it wasn't what he wanted. [Laughter,]
Senator Ervix. The audience will please refrain from laughter.
Mr. Dean. I then told him that I would not resign unless Haldeman
and Ehrlichman resigned. I told him that I was not walling to be the
White House scapegoat for the Watergate. He said that lie understood
my position and he wasn't asking me to be a scapegoat. I then gave him
my recommendations of the draft statement. Before lie read the draft
statement he said that he had checked his records and it lias been on
March 21 that I had met with him and given him the report on the
problems of the Watergate and its coverup. I have submitted to the
committee a copy of the draft statement I prepared for tlie President.
[The document referred to Avas marked exhibit No. 34-51.**]
Mr. Deax. The gist of the statement was twofold : First the Presi-
dent had learned of new facts in tlie case over the weekend and as a
*Rpe p. 1316.
**See p. 1317.
1019
result of this information coming to his staff and had directed Henry
Petersen to take cliarge and leave no stone unturned: secondly, that he
had accepted requests from Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean to be
placed on leave of absence. The President said virtually nothing about
the statement and after reading it told me to talk with Len Garment,
who he said was also preparing a draft statement.
After departing from the President's office, I called ]Mr. Garment
and told him that the President had requested I give him my input on
the draft he was developing. jNlr. Garment said he would come by my
office, which he did. I gave him a copy of the draft statement, and he
told me that he and I were thinking along similar lines, that is. that
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean had to resign. I told him I was ready
and willing but only if Haldeman and Ehrlichman resigned as well.
Call From the President — April 17
The next time I heard anything about the draft statement was on
April 17, when the President called and informed me that he had
decided not to request any resignations until after the grand jury took
action and that he would issue a statement very shortly. That statement
of April 17 is a matter of public record. I would only like to point
out one or two items about the statement. The President said that on
March 21, as a result of serious charges which came to his attention,
some of which were publicly reported, he began an intense new in-
quiry into this whole matter. I would merely refer the committee's
attention back to my earlier testimony as to what the President did
after my report to him on ISIarch 21 as to the White House's deep
invohement in tlie coverup. In short, the President commenced no
investigation at all. Rather, the President, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman
commenced to protect themselves against the unraveling of the
coverup.
Secondly, I would also like to raise the paragraph that had been
put in the statement that no one in a position of major importance in
the administration should be given immunity from prosecution. "While
this statement went virtually unnoticed in the public, it was very evi-
dent to me what the President was saying: Dean will not be a witness
against anyone so the Government might as well stop dealing with him.
The Deax Scapegoat Statement axd Requested Resigxation
On Monday night, April 16, I had learned that the President had
informed the Government that he allegedly had taped a conversation
in which I had told him I was seeking immunity from the Government
in exchange for testimony on Haldeman and Ehrlichman. I have no
recollection of ever telling the President that I was so negotiating with
the Government and the President told me very specifically tliat he
did not want to do anvthing to interfere with any negotiations I was
haviufr with the Government.
"Wlien I learned this from my attorney I suggested that he request
that the Government call for the tape aiid listen to the tape because I
told him it must be a reference to the meeting I had with the President
on April 15 and if that conversation were taped the Government would
have a prettv ffood idea of the dimensions of the case they were dealing
with. I was referring to the fact that the President had mentioned
1020
the million dollar conversation and the fact that he had talked to
Colson about clemency for Hunt. I do not in fact know if such a tape
exists but if it does exist and has not been tampered with and is a com-
plete transcript of the entire conversation that took place in the Presi-
dent's office, I think that this committee should have that tape because
I believe that it would corroborate many of the things that this com-
mittee has asked me to testify about.
When the President issued his statement on April 17 in which he
was quite obviously trying to affect any discussions I ^yas ha^dng with
the Government regarding my testimony by inserting the phrase
therein regarding "no immunity" and combined with the fact that he
had requested that I sign a virtual confession on Monday of that week,
I decided that indeed I w^as being set up and that it was time that I
let the word out that I would not be a scapegoat. Accordingly, on April
19, 1 issued a statement to that effect.
After my statement of April 19, I had virtually no contact with the
members of the ^^Hiite House, staff. I did have occasion to speak with
Mr. Garment however. I recall asking him who had placed the ''no
immunity" paragraph in the President's statement. Garment said while
he did not know for certain, he believed that Ehrlichman had placed it
in the draft because it had not been there in the earlier drafts, but was
in the draft that emerged from Ehrlichman's consideration when
Ehrlichman went over the final statement with the President.
On April 22, Easter Sunday, the President called me to wish me a
Happy Easter. It was what they refer to at the A^Hiite House as a
"stroking" call.
On April 30, while out of the city, I had a call from my secretary in
which she informed me that the wire services were carrying a story
that my resignation had been requested and accepted and that Halde-
man and Ehrlichman were also resigning.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my rather lengthy statement. I apolo-
gize again for its length, but I have sought to comply with the com-
mittee's request to provide the committee with a broad overview of my
knowledge of this matter.
Senator Ervin. Without objection on the part of any member of the
committee, the chairman at this time will admit into evidence all of
the exhibits identified by the witness in the course of his testimonv
except exhibits Nos. 34-5, 34-6, 34-7, and 34-8 whose admissibility will
be considered later by the committee.
The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning.
[Whereupon, at 6 :05 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 10
a.m., Tuesday, June 26, 1973.]
TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1973
U.S. Sexate,
Select Committee ox
Presidextial Campaigx Actim:ties,
Washington, D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10.05 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and Weicker.
Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred D.
Thompson, minority counsel ; Rufus Ij. Edmisten, deputy chief coun-
sel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
David yi. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Eugene Boycc, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert
Baca, office of Senator Montoya; Ron Mc]\Iahan, assistant to Senator
Baker ; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker ; Ray St. Armand,
assistant publications clerk.
Senator Er^tcx. The committee will come to order.
The committee counsel will question the witness.
Mr. Dasti. Mr. Dean, you stated, did you nor, that well before the
so-called Liddy plan spelled out in meetings on January 27 and Feb-
ruary 4. 1972, that there was an atmosphere in the White House con-
ducive to the bugging and break-in of the Democratic Xational Com-
mittee headquarters. Is that true ?
TESTIMONY OF JOHN W. DEAN III— Resumed
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Let me very briefly summarize the key plans and activ-
ities which you state in your statement created such an atmosphere.
The first I understand was an overall intelligence plan developed by
the time you had already arrived at the White House in July of 1970
by "\Aniito House leadership or including White House lead'ershii^ to
deal with internal security and domestic dissent which included such
activities as illegal break-in and wiretapping and these are the papers
which I understand you submitted to Judge Sirica and which this
committee has received from Judge Silica ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct, and I believe that was indicative of a
concern that existed regarding that particular area of problem.
(1021)
1022
Mr. Dash. Then there was the so-called plumbers operation set up
in the White House in 1971 under Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Krogh
utilizing Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to investigate leaks such as the
Pentagon paper leaks, which utilized such tactics as break-ins, photo-
graphing and bugging, and then there was Operation Sandwedge rec-
ommended by Mr. Caulfield but never finally approved which had
covert features to it such as the use of bagmen and wiretapping.
Now, generally, is that the context in which you described the
atmosphere that was conducive to such activity as break-ins and wire-
tapping in the "WHiite House ?
Mr. Dean. I think, Mr. Dash, you have capsulized some of the high
points of the concerns I expressed yesterday.
Mr. Dash. I am attempting just to capsulize and not go over j^our
lengthy statement.
Mr. Dean. I understand.
Mr. Dash. Therefore, in addition to your testimonj^ about the Presi-
deiit and the Wiiite House staff members' obsession over demonstrators
and leaks, is this then a brief and fair summary in a nutshell of the
kind of practices the President to some extent and White House offi-
cials such as Haldeman and Ehrlichman, had approved or considered
to crush internal dissent or obtain political intelligence ?
Mr. Deax. I think that this is indicative, INIr. Dash, of the fact that
the 'N'Vniite House often took it upon itself to obtain information or
resolve a problem when it felt that an agency of the Government was
incapable or unsatisfactory in dealing with the problem, that the '\Vliite
House itself felt that they were quite capable of handling the problem
and thereupon would handle the problem.
Mr. Dash. Well, therefore, ]\Ir. Dean, when Liddy. Hunt, ]McCord,
and their crew broke into the Watergate in ]May and June of 1972. this
really was not an extraordinary action from the standpoint of the
White House which had approved or engaged in similar missions for
a period of at least 2 years prior to the Watergate, was it?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I believe I described in my statement yesterday,
the preceding things that had occurred in a sense were precui'sors but
I think that the fact that the break-in occurred was not as a result of a
conscious design as much as an accident of a culmination of many of
these elements.
Mr. Dash. I understand that. But recognizing that some of these
earlier plans had the approval of such things as break-ins and wire-
tapping and things of that covert activity, the break-in at the Demo-
cratic National Committee headquarters was not extraordinary in con-
text of those plans, would that not be true ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Dash. Therefore, on the basis of your own statement, would
it be fair to sa}^ that the true concern of those who approved such
tactics in the past, such as INIr. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, as you have
stated, would not be that there was a break-in but that the Committee
for the Re-Election of the President burglars had been caught at it?
Mr. Dean. You say the concern was
]Mr. Dash. The concern really was that they had been caught rather
than that they had broken in.
iSIr. Dean. I think that is correct.
Mr. Dash. Let us examine, INIr. Dean, your denial of your own
complicity in the Watergate itself in ]May and June of 1972.
1023
Is it not true that althougli you expressed amazement at the mind
bofrg'ling, as you described it, Liddy plan remembered in a show-and-
tell meeting- in the Attorney General's office on January 27, 1972,
you, along with ]Mr. ]Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, did encourage Liddy
to scale down this plan and budget, and you didn't tell him to stop
the activity ?
]\Ir. Deax. That is correct, and I might add that with hindsight,
as I think I indicated in my statement yesterday, I probably should
have been much more forceful in trying to stop the plan at that point
when I, in fact, myself realized it was something that should not
occur.
Mr. Dash. "Well, ^Ir. Dean, after the scaled down Liddy plan was
presented in Mitchell's office in February 4, 1972, which omitted the
activity of nuigging, kidnaping, or prostitution, but included primar-
ily electronic surveillance or break-ins, you say you disassociated your-
self from it. As the White House representative you did not, in fact, tell
Liddy to stop it ; did you ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And although you say that you told Haldeman that the
White House should not be involved with the plan, you did not rec-
ommend that Haldeman put a stop to it, which you knew he could
have done if he wanted to ?
]Mr. Deax. Well, again I must rely on hindsight. Given the circum-
stances that were existing at the time, I felt that someone wanted this,
I knew I didn't want it. I knew I had put those on notice involved
that I was going to have no part in it. I had similarly and with regard
to operation Sanclwedge, let it die a natural death. I assumed the same
thing was going to happen. Quite obviously it did not happen.
^Ir. Dash. But so far as Liddy was concerned, ^Ir. Dean, your
actions were consistent, were they not, with his getting the impression
that you were merely establishing deniability for the Attorney Gen-
eral and the White House should the plans go forward, is that not
true?
^Ir. Deax. I don't know if Mr. Liddy had that impression or not.
]Mr. Dash. Would it be consistent with his having that impression?
Mr. Deax'. He could have well have had that impression, yes.
'Sir. Dash. Xow. during January and June of 1972, did you, in fact,
know that Sir. Magruder, who has testified before this committee, was
giving Gordon Strachan full reports of the Liddy plan, including
the break-in and the fruits of the break- in ?
Mr. Deax. Xo. I did not. I was just — while you were asking that
question. I was thinking about your last question still, and I recall
something that Mr. Krogh had told me when I first discussed with him
Mr. Liddy going over to the reelection committee. He told me that
Gordon Liddy is a man who needs guidance. Gordon Liddy didn't get
any guidance that I can see while he was there from anyone that I
know, and that could explain partially the reason that he was sent
over to prepare one thing and something else evolved unbeknownst to
those who had sent him over.
Mr. Dash. But you didn't give him any guidance yourself ?
Mr. Deax. Xo. I did not.
Mr. Dash. Xow, going back to my next question, I think you have
answered the question that you did not know that between the period
1024
of January to June 1972 that Mr. ]Ma<2:nKler. according to liis own
testimony here, was giving reports to Mr. Gordon Straclian of the
Liddy plan and, in fact, the break-in and the fi'uits of the break-in.
Now, in fact, after the June 17 break-in and more specifically on
June 19, I think your statement indicates that you were told by Mr.
Strachan that he destroyed, at the direction of ]Mr. ITaldeman, certain
intelligence reports that came from the CRP. is that not true?
Mr. Dean-. That is correct.
Mr. Dash, So at that time, you did hayo some knowledge of Mr.
Strachan's knowledge?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Could you tell the committee' exactly what Mr. Strachan's
role in the White House was and his activities and responsibilities.
Mr. Deax. Mr. Strachan was placed on ]Mr. Haldeman's staff to
serve as the liaison individual from tlie White Plouse to the reelec-
tion committee, and to deal with other members of the White House
staff who were working on problems relating directly to the political
faces of the reelection problem. I was aware of the fact that he was
having frec{uent contact with Mr. Magruder regarding the reelection
committee, that he had received copies of documents that any of us
would send regarding election law problems or othei- peojole who send
to the reelection committee so that he was aware of everythino- that
was going out of the White House as well as coming into tlie White
PIousc from the reelection committee.
Mr. Dash. How close was his relationship wilh ]Mr. Haldeman. and
what were his responsibilities to Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Deax. Well, I assume that from the time he went on, it was a
regular reporting relationship. ]Mr. Haldeman is an excellent manager
of people. I recall that one document I submitted to you yesterday of a
meeting that occurred in May of 1971 evidences that when there was
a meeting that occurred in Mr. Haldeman's office, Mr. Strachan obvi-
ously took rather complete notes of the meeting and sent me a copy of
the meeting, I was unaware of the fact that he was even taking notes
at the meeting.
Mr. Dash. Well, if Strachan did in fact receive reports from Ma-
gruder in the Liddy operation, do you have an opinion as to whether
he Avould have forwarded these reports to Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Deax. I would only have an opinion, ]\Ir. Dash.
Mr. Dash, What is that opinion ?
Mr. Deax. ]My opinion is that he would report everything he knew
in some form to Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Dash. And did you know what Mr. Haldeman's relationships
and duties were with the President during the period January to June
1972?
]Mr. Deax. Well, I think that everybody who worked at the White
House was generally aware of the fact that Mr. ITaldeman was the
virtual link between a number of, a large number of the White House
staff and the President as to what would go in to the President, and he
would take and summarize and boil down and report to the President
regularly all information that was pertinent and important that should
come to the President's attention.
Mr. Dash. What was the relationship in the matter of time that Mr.
Haldeman had with the President — was it a daily relatio ship or
weekl y ? What was his contact ?
1025
Mr. Deax. I would say that Mr, Haldeman spent more time with the
President than any other member of the White House staff.
Mr. Dash. Therefore, do you have an opinion as to whether Mr.
Haldeman would have reported the information he received from
Strachan about the DNC break-in plan and the break-in itself to the
President- — an opinion based on your knowledge of his relationship
with the President ?
]Mr. Dean. I believe he probably would have reported it.
]Mr. Dash. I want to ask you some questions, Mr. Dean, about your
handling of cash given to you by Mr. Richard Howard, in the amount
of $15,200, which you have included in your statement. To your knowl-
edge, this money came from the $350,000 sent to the White House
before April 7, subject to ]Mr. Sloan's statement? Is that true?
Mr. Deax. That is true. I did not know it at the time it was given to
me. but I later learned that was the source of the money.
Mr. Dash. Xow, to your knowledge, the $22,000 has been taken from
this amount to pay for advertising, but only $6,800 was in fact used,
leaving a balance of $15,200 ?
]Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. How did it come about that you were given this $15,200
in cash ?
'Mr. Deax. The week after or during the week immediately following
the break-in. ]Mr. Strachan and Mr. Howard came to my office and said
that they had some cash and that they asked me to be the custodian for
the cash. They were not terribly explicit at that time. I told Mr.
Strachan I would keep the cash and be accountable for the cash.
]Mr. Dash. Do you know why he gave it to you rather than put it
back in the original pot of $350,000 ?
Mr. Deax. I do not.
Mr. Dash. What did you do with the money ?
Mr. Deax. I put it in my safe.
Mr. Dash. I think you have already told us in your statement thai
you took the $4,380 from the money for your wedding, honeymoon,
and personal expenses, leavino; an lOU and your personal check in
the safe. Did vou ever repay this amount ?
^Ir. Deax. I did not repay it until I opened a trustee account, when
a subsequent check was neirotiated to make the funds whole at that
time. That was in April of this year.
Mr. Dash. Now, there came a time, did there not, INIr. Dean, when
the $350,000 uuder Haldeman's control was needed for payoff money,
and you sufifgested that before any of it was sent back to the committee
or Mr. LaRue. that it be made whole again with regard to the $22,000
that liad been taken out of it ?
]\Ir. Deax. That is correct. Those discussions be.qfan as early as late
July and August of 1972, about making the fund whole.
]Mr. Dash. Was it your suggestion, ]Mr. Dean, or one that you
approved of. that ]Mr. Stans of the Finance Committee for the Re-
Election of the President should provide this $22,000 from the com-
mittee funds to send that over to the White House to make that
$350,000 whole?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Since you had in your safe $15,200 from the original pot,
why did you not return it and request of CNIr. Stans only the amount
requested for the advertising, which was only $6,800?
1026
Mr. Deax. Well, you would have to s;o back into the time sequence
again. There was a request for any and all available cash, far before
they started speaking of the $350,000 cash fund, when ]Mr. Kalmbacli
was collecting the cash. Mr. Stans had some money that was used. They
were looking anywhere they could look to find any available cash.
It was at this point, I knew that I had the $15,200 in my safe and
I decided at that time that I was not going to let that money be used
for that purpose, because I did not want to become further involved
in that particular aspect of the coverup.
Mr. Dash. And you made that decision despite the fact that you had
been a key figure in getting ]Mr. Kalmbach involved in the original
payoff ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, in your statement, you have described a number of
meetings and activities occurring: immediatclv after the arrest of the
CRP burglars in the Democratic National Committee headquarters
in the Watergate on June 17, 1972, and continuing for several months
thereafter, involving such persons as INIr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman,
Mr. Colson, Mr. Mardian, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, jNIr. ISIagruder,
yourself, and others.
Isn't it your testimony that this flurry of activity represented a
massive coverup operation to prevent the prosecutors, the FBI, and
the public from learning of the involvement of high "\^niite House or
CRP officials, either in the Watergate break-in or embarrassing earlier
illegal activities of a similar nature such as the Ellsberg break-in?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. And did not this coverup require a number of strategies
such as perjury and subordination of periury of ]\Iagruder, Porter,
and others, and the undermining of the judicial process and pavoffs to
indicted defendants to maintain their silence, thereby limiting the
FBI inquiry so they would not stumble on other illegal intelligence
activities of the "\^^ite House ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And is it not true that you played a role in all of these
coverup activities?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Did you do these things on your own initiative. Mv. Dean,
or at the direction of anybody else ?
Mr. Dean. I would have to say that to describe it, I inherited a
situation. The coverup was in operation when I returned to my office
on Monday, the ninth, and it just became the instant way of life at
that point in time and I participated in that and engaged in these
activities along with the others.
I was taking instructions
Mr. Dash. From whom were you taking instructions?
Mr. Dean. I was taking instructions from Mr. Hakleman and Mr.
Ehrlichman, I was taking instructions and suggestions from Mr. ]Mit-
chell and Mr. Mardian.
I was a conveyor of messages back and forth between each group
and at times. I was makins: surrffestions myself.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, I don't think the record is clear from the state-
ment. You held an impressive title. Counsel to the President, and I
understand had quite a big office. But could you tell us just what in
1027
fact was your relationship with Mr. Haldeman and INIr. Ehrlichman
in your position with the "White House ?
Mr. Dean. "Well, I learned before I went to the "White House that
the title was probably the best part of the job. My reporting relation-
ship was directly to %h\ Haldeman, but because ^Ir. Ehrlichman had
formerly been the Counsel, he maintained a very active intei-est in
manv of the things of the Counsel's office.
So that most of the work of the Counsel's office was really related to
technical legal problems, making sure that the t's were crossed — or that
the i's were dotted and the t's were crossed on certain documents, to
examine questions on timing, on pocket vetoes, to work with the De-
partment of Justice in making sure that they were preparing even
legal positions on issues that were of importance to the White House.
I had a number of dealings with the persons who were working on the
Nixon foundation and did some personal work on the President's San
Clemento properties and other personal things like that for the Presi-
dent, where I was the conduit to the law firm that was handling this
for the President.
I would not say that it was a policymaking position, by any means.
Mr. Dash. And to a large extent, you were, in fact, reporting to
either Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
INIr. Dash, Xow, given such a massive coverup which you have in-
cluded in your statement and that was under way the
Mr. Deax. T might add one thing. There was one role that the office
had also that is what I described as a firefighting role. For example,
after the Lithuanian defector situation came up, Ehrlichman and
Haldeman, and I assume the President, Avould set the policy and after
they had finished with their interest in the matter, I was the man
who had the, sort of the cleanup on the details. This happened also,
for example, with the C alley case. After the initial flurry, the decision
had all bepn made, some of the decisions I didn't fully agree with, but
I had my — you know, I sent memorandums in. Decisions were made
and I was the guy who had to answer 100,000 letters that came in. So
T would add that footnote.
Mr. Dash. All right, taking that into the context, as I was begin-
ning to state, such a massive coverup operation that was underway
with the approval and with the direction at times of Mr. Haldeman,
Mr. Ehrlichman. and Mr. Mitchell, do vou have an opinion — and I am
asking you at this point for just an opinion — as to whether the Presi-
dent would have been informed of this coverup operation from its
inception?
Mr. Deax. Mr. Dash. I think it is unfair to ask me opinions. T can
surmise from the way T know the "Wliite House operated. I will say
this, that in my statement, I indicated that I had reached a conclusion
in my own mind when I went to the Attornev Greneral. for example,
that this thing might well go right to the President. I would say that
that evidence is an opinion, that I was concerned that it did, knowing
how the "White House operated, knowing how the reporting informa-
tion went up to the President.
Mr. Dash. "Well, the question was put to vou iust on the basis of
vour knowledge, your intimate knowledge. I take it. of how the '\^niite
House operated and what Mr. Haldeman's relationship to the Presi-
dent was as you have already testified.
1028
But actually, according to your own statement, in fact, you learned
firsthand, did j^ou not, that the President did know about the coverup
when you met with him on September 15, 1972, the day the indict-
ments came down cutting off the involvement of Liddy. Is that so ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. When the President told you on September 15, as you
say in your statement, that Bob Haldeman had kept him posted on
your handling of the Watergate case, and complimented you on the
good job you had done and expressed his appreciation on the difficulty
of j'^our tasks, did you have any doubt in your mind what the President
was talking about ?
Mr. Dean. No, I did not.
Mr. Dash. Indeed, Mr. Haldeman not only knew about how you had
handled the Watergate case but, in effect, he had directed the opera-
tion, did he not, which included payoffs to defendants, perjury, and
limiting the FBI investigation ?
Mr. Dean. I do not believe by September 15 that the $350,000 pay-
ment had been involved but the Kalmbach payment had been involved
so I would say, yes, that he had as well as being aware of the perjur3^
Mr. Dash. Actually, the payoffs began fairly early.
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Not the final ones.
Mr. Dean. That ds right.
Mr. Dash. Now, if the President had been kept posted by Mr. Halde-
man as to how you were handling the Watergate case he would have
known of these illegal acts and, according to your statement, did, in
fact, congratulate you for your successful performance of these acts,
would that not be true from your point of view ?
Mr. Dean. I think that is true.
Mr. Dash. Now, even further, Mr. Dean, you say in your statement
that you told the President on that occasion, September 15, with re-
gard to the civil suit filed by the Democratic National Committee, that
the lawyers for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President had
been making ex parte contact with the Federal judge handling the case
and the judge was understanding and trying to be accommodating.
Now, putting it bluntly, ISlr. Dean, were you not telling the President
that you understood that the CRP had a ''fix" in with the judge?
INIr. Dean. I do not think, INIr. Dash, I would use the word "fix." I
think I was indicating to the President that the lawyers had some in-
fluence on the handling of the case and that thev could slow down the
case so that it would not be an embarrassment before the election. When
I think of the word "fix" I think that means the outcome of the case is
going to be influenced. I do not know that that was the fact because I
do not know the specifics and I do not believe that to be the case.
Rather, it was a process whereby they might get some favorable rulings
out of the judge to slow it down before the election.
Mr. Dash. You would soften the word to "influence" rather than
"fix"?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I would.
Mr. Dash. All right. Now, accordins; to your statement, did the Presi-
dent not sav to vou. on beiner apprised of this special influence with the
judge. "Well, that is helpful"?
Mr. Dean. He said somethino; to that effect ; yes, that is correct.
1029
yh\ Dash. Therefore, Mr. Dean, whatever doubts you may have had
prior to September 15 about the President's involvement in the cover-
up, did you have any doubts yourself about this after September 15 ?
Mr. Deax. Xo, I did not.
Mr. Dash. Is it not true, Mr. Dean, that based on the statement you
have (jiven this commitee, that not only did the President express his
approval to you on September 15 of your coverup activities leading
to An indictment of no one higher than Liddy but after September 15
the President took an active part in the coverup? Or let me briefly
summarize, and very briefly, your statements concerning this and please
tell me if this is an accurate summary of what you have stated in your
long statement. One, after telling the President on September 15 that
you could not assure that the coverup would not unravel, it, in fact, did
begin to unravel in January 1973, when Hunt pressed for a promise
of Executive clemency : and that you learned from ]\Ir. Ehrlichman in
January and from the President himself on March 13, 1973, that the
President, when apprised of Hunt's pressure, authorized giving Hunt
assurances concerning Executive clemenc}'. Despite your explicit state-
ment in your meeting with the President on February 28, 1973, of your
culpability for obstruction of justice, the President, according to your
statement, reassured you that you had no legal problems.
In your meeting with the President on March 13. when you apprised
the President of increasing payoff demands from Mr. Hunt, which you
estimated would cost as much as $1 million, the President, according
to your statement, responded that that amount of money would be no
problem, and inquired as to how such payment could be made leading
to a discussion by you in the presence of the President, of laundering
money and secret drops. And despite your lengthy explanation to the
President when you met with him on March 21 concerning the crimi-
nal involvement of various White House and CRP officials including
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Colson. yourself, Mr. Magruder.
and the increased demands for payoff money requiring more coverup
activity on the part of the A^Hiite House, the President took no affirma-
tive action to end the coverup. And that, indeed, the President made,
according to your statement, specific plans to deal with this Select
Committee of the Senate to prevent it from being effective, and sought
to further the coverup by attempting to have Mr. Mitchell acknowl-
edge his guilt in approving the Liddy plan v-'ith the hope that this
would satisfy the various investigating bodies; and, finally, when you
would not continue to participate in the coverup. according to your
statement, but retained counsel and went to the U.S. attorney's office
and began to tell what you knew about the Watergate case, the Presi-
dent sought to protect Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, who had
been clearly implicated by you and asked that you submit to him a
letter of resignation. Is that a fair summarization or brief in terms of
your long statement, of your meeting you had with the President and
the information you had with him ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, it is.
Mr. Dash. "\Miy is it you waited until April 15 before j'ou told the
prosecutors of your knowledge of the President's involvement.
Mr. Deax. I didn't tell them on — it was after April 15 that I did.
Preceding that time my lawyer and I had first of all had discussions
about matters of executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, and
1030
national security matters. We saw there were legal problems, although
we had resolved in our own mind these were not problems as far as
preventing the necessary disclosures of the contents of some of these
conversations. However, I must be very candid, I was hopeful that the
President himself would step forward and tell of his involvement in
some of these things.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Dean, you opened your statement when you
began to testify before this committee yesterday by purporting to
soften the blow concerning the President by stating that you do not
believe the President realized the full implications of his involvement.
Now, if you have told the truth before this committee about what the
President said to you on September 15 and what you said to him, and
as to the subsequent meetings you had with the President, can you
honestly believe that the President, as a lawyer, and a sophisticated
man in politics, was not aware of the full implications of the co\erup
activities ?
Mr. Dean. ]\Ir. Dash, I think my opening remarks were more directed
at the human side of the situation than the legal side of the situation,
that he had — he didn't realize the implications as far as what this
would mean to people he had worked with for a number of years, people
he was very fond of and I was not necessarily referring to the full
legal implications of some of his activities.
Mr. Dash. Well, do you have a belief as to whether or not he did
have knowledge of the implications, the legal implications of this
coverup activity ?
Mr. Dean. I cannot put myself in the President's mind.
Mr. Dash. Based on the facts you have given this committee ?
Mr. Dean. Based on the facts I have given this committee, I would
think the President would certainly have some appreciation of the legal
problems involved ; yes, indeed.
Mr. Dash. Is this the first time, Mr. Dean, you have told your story
about your involvement and the involvement of others, including the
President, under oath ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Including, of course, the executive session at which you
appeared before this committee ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now it is obvious to you, is it not, that your principal
assertions which constitute accusations against the President of the
United States, of involvement in the coverup of the Watergate case
are based almost solely on your own account of either private meetings
with the President or meetings with Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman
where they were present ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. I would add the fact that I was aware of
the fact that often when I was in a meeting with Mr. Haldeman and
Mv. Ehrlichman that IVIr. Haldeman was taking notes and often those
notes — immediately following the meeting those notes were taken with
Mr. Haldeman directly into the Presidents' office but, of course, I was
not present at the time of some of those discussions.
Mr. Dash. Do you have any copies of those notes ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I do not.
Mr. Dash. Are you aware of any other records of the content of
these meetings which are the focus of your statement ?
1031
'Sh'. Deax. One of the meetings I had in !March, early March of this
year I did compare notes and some of the notes were taken because I
had a number of instructions from the President and based on those I
did make notes. I am also aware — not aware, but I was told by the Gov-
ernment prosecutors that the President had taped a conversation be-
tween himself and me, and that as a result of that there apparently
may be a tape in existence and I believe that would be the April 15
meetino- that would record that conversation.
Mr. Dash. The notes you referred to, have they been submitted to
this committee?
Mr. Deax. I don't believe they have but they are available. They
are in my testimony, of course, the substance of the notes but they
certainly are available for the committee.
]\Ir. Dash. Would you submit them as an exhibit to this committee?
Mr. Deax. Yes, I would be happj'^ to.
^Ir. Dash. Are written or reported records of such conversations
with the President regfularly made at such meetings?
Mr. Deax. Xot to my knowledge.
Mr. Dash. Officially or regularly ?
Mr. Deax. Xo. I would say this: That often after a Presidential
meeting when there is a staff member present, not necessarily staff
meetings but when outsiders come in and there is a staff member pres-
ent a summary is made of the meeting but, of course, these are not, they
were not the types of meetings where summaries would be made.
]\Ir. Dash. INIr. Dean, you have made serious charges before the
committee.
Do you have any special motive in making these charges such as a
hope for immunity before the prosecutors ?
You have already received immunit}- before this committee which
is only use immunity and does not prevent your being prosecuted for
any crimes that the prosecutors have evidence against you.
Do you have any motive in making these charges against the Presi-
dent based on tlie fact that this may lead to giving you immunity from
the prosecutors?
]Mr. Deax. Mr. Dash, I have been asked to give testimony. That
testimony happens to involve the President of the T'nited States. I
don't plan to use. I have no motive in giving that testimony to try to
obtain immunity from the prosecutors ; no, sir.
Mr. Dash. I guess you are full^y aware, ]Mr. Dean, of the gravity of
the charges you have made under oath against the highest official of
our land, the President of the United States.
Mr. Deax. Yes, I am.
]Mr. Dash. And being so aware, do a^ou still stand on vour statement ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, I do.
jSIr. Dash. ISTr. Chairman. I have no further questions.
Mr. Deax. I might add this, Mr. Dash, I realize it is almost an im-
possible task, if it is one man against the other that I am up against
and it is not a very pleasant situation but T can only speak what I
know to be the facts and that is what I am providing this committee.
Senator Ervix. 'Mr. Dean, do vou wisli to take a break?
Mr. Deax. T am here at the will of the committee and whatever the
Chair would like.
1032
Senator EmTCN, We will proceed then.
]Mr. Thompson,
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, INIr. Chairman.
Mr, Dean, you have, of course, made some serious accusations witli
regard to coverup of criminal activities, and wo have heard other testi-
mony about the coverup of certain criminal actiA'itios and. of course,
the responsibility for prosecuting those criminal activities did lie with
the Department of Justice.
I would like to ask you a few questions based upon some of your
testimony yesterday concerning your contacts with ^h\ Petersen. If
I remember correctly, it was on the 19th or 20th of June that you first
had contact with IMr. Petersen about the "Watergate break-in.
Mr, Deax. The first time I had contact with ^h\ Petersen is when
the Attorney General called Mr. Petersen to his office and tliat was
either on the 19th or the 20th.
Mr, Thompson. Do I recall your testimony correctly that you told
him that you did not believe the Wiite House could stand a wide-open
investigation ?
Mr. Dean. I told him, we discussed the implications of a wide-open
investigation and how embarrassing that could be in an election year,
that is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Well, did he indicate to you in anv way that he
would carry out anything less than a wide-open investigation of this
matter ?
Mr. Dean. As I testified yesterday, I don't recall ■Nlr. Petersen say-
ing an}i;hing specific, I left the meeting with an impression that ]\rr.
Petersen would be fair in an investigation of the White House and that
that interpretation of fairness would mean that we wouldn"t haA'e an
investigation of evervthing that occurred in tlie White House for 4-
years.
Mr. Thompson. That was your interpretation of the use of the
phrase, "wide-open investigation" ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. I would tliink a wide-op-^n investio"ation would
mean a complete, thorough investio-ation of charges tliat were going
around at that time and specificallv, all of the ramifications of the
break-in of the D:N'C.
Do I understand your testimony to be that you were only concerned
that he not s:o back into the prior 4 years to lirinq- np unrelated
matters that had nothing to do with this pai^ticular incident?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Thompson, I am trving to recall a meeting of. of
couree, over a year ago and the highlights of my recollection at that
point are that we discussed what this would mean if this investigation
led all the way to the President.
Mr. Thompson. Pardon me. Did vou discuss the possibilitv of Presi-
dential involvement with him? I thouirht you said yesterdav that you
had that in your own mind, but you did not discuss it with him at that
time.
Mr. Dean. I believe T discussed them with Kleindienst and Klein-
dienst conveyed my concern to Mr. Petersen and it is verv j^ossible
that it was reraised again when Mr. Petersen and I departed from
Mr. Kleindienst's office.
I do recall the note that the meetings ended on, that I hoped that
my fears suspecting the woret were not true.
1033
Mr. Thompson. Did you have the impression when you talked to
Mr. Kleindienst and Mr. Petei-sen that Mr. Ehrlichman was depend-
ing on you to take care of the situation or to get them to take care of
the situation so that the "Wliite House would not be hurt ?
Mr. Deax. At this point, I was merely a messenger. I was conveyor
of information back and forth and I was being sent to different assign-
ments to find out information at this point in time. "When I talked to
Ehrlichman and he asked me to find out what the Justice Department
was doing, he wanted to find out how extensive their investigation was.
As time evolved, there was frequent criticism of the scope of the
investigation by Mr. Ehrlichman.
There was, very clearly, the concern at the White House that the
investigation would come right back into the White House.
Mr. Thompsox. You testified that you told Mr. Petersen that you
had in fact delivered certain documents to Patrick Gray, that you did
not discuss with Mr. Silbert or anyone else your delivery of those docu-
ments to him and no one else knew about it, presumably, except Mr.
Ehrlichman.
Do you know what he did after that, whether or not he made any
inquiry of Mr. Gray, for example, as to whether or not this in fact
was true ?
Mr. Dean. I have heard after the fact in my discussions with the
prosecutors this spring about the matter that apparently, Mr. Petersen
went to Mr. Gray and immediately raised it with Mr. Gray, and at
that point in time, Mr. Gray denied to Mr. Petersen that he had ever
received such documents.
So I assume that happened very shortly after I had reported it to
Mr. Petersen and as I testified yesterday also, shortly after I had
reported it, Mr. Gray came to me at a luncheon at the Department of
Justice and said, "Hang tight, John, with regard to that matter."
Mr. Thompson. You mentioned a telephone call from Mr. Ehrlich-
man to Mr. Petersen about Stans having to go down and testify before
the grand jui'j', something to the effect that Silbert was acting like a
local prosecutor and Mr. Stans should not be treated this way, and so
forth, and used rather abrasive terms to Mr. Petersen.
Do you know what Mr. Petersen's response to Mr. Ehrlichman was
during that conversation ?
Mr. Dean. I do not know, but I can only speculate that Mr. Petersen
isn't the type of man who is easily pushed around. And I don't know
what the sum and substance of it was. I subsequently called Mr. Peter-
sen myself, after I had departed Mr. Ehrlichman's office, and apolo-
gized for the call. Petersen didn't seem particularly upset by the fact
that he had received the call.
"\Anien I talked to him, he was annoyed at Ehrlichman. but I might
also add that Mr. Ehrlichman had been sort of riding hard on the
Department of Justice for some time and there was a certain degree of
animosity between Ehrlichman and the Department.
Mr. Thompson. The reason I am making these inquiries is that his
name was mentioned and I think it was rather unclear, at least to me,
anyway. As I understand your statement now, just based upon your
knowledge, you know of no impropriety on Mr. Petersen's part in
conducting his part of the investigation ?
96-296 O - 73
1034
Mr. Dean. I know of no impropriety. I think he tried to be very
fair with the White House in dealing with the White House and the
fact that we had an investigation going on in a political year, that it
could result in embarrassment on countless occasions. The entire ar-
rangement to have the Wliite House staff, for example, appear at the
Department of Justice rather than go to the courthouse was merely
designed to save the fact of the embarrassment that would arise po-
litically of members of the AVliite House staff appearing at the court-
house, all the cameras and pictures and speculation that are likely to
run from that. That was aborted by simulating the grand jur}' situa-
tion in Mr. Petersen's conference room.
Mr. Thompson. You mentioned also Mr. Ziegler, and of course, we
all know the statements that he continuously made during this matter.
Who was supplying Mr. Ziegler his information ?
Mr. Dean. I would say that basically, I supplied a large amount of it.
I think that Mr. Ziegler would check many times with Mr. Ehrlichman,
sometimes with Mr. Haldeman, and often with the President himself,
he would check out a given statement. At times, I was called — I say
often — not on a daily basis, by any means, but with some frequency.
That was how Ziegler could sort of wade through a story without be-
ing factual- — being factual, but without actually going out and lying
on a given matter, how he could hedge and bob and weave. I think
that the exhibit that I submitted is very typical of the type of ap-
proach that he would take. He would take, you know, an offensive ap-
proach rather than to really admit a given set of facts. Because he
could not, you know, I would tell him he could not admit the facts.
Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Ziegler know the truth ?
Mr. Dean. No, he did not. In fact, that was a very difficult situation.
Mr. Ziegler, on countless occasions, asked me to brief him. I on several
occasions asked Mr. Ehrlichman if I could brief Ziegler. I was given
very specific instructions that I was not to brief Ziegler. In fact, this
briefing of other people occurred on a number of occasions. It occurred
in connection with Mr. Johnson visiting, Wallv Johnson. It occurred
with Clark MacGregor before he went to, actually, while he was at the
Republican National Convention.
He was very desirous of knowing the facts. Pie was having intense
press inquiries at that point in time. One time, he called me to his room
and he said, I have to have the facts.
Well, I called Ehrlichman and said — I had known INIr. MacGregor
for a number of vears, going back to mv time on the House Judiciary
Committee, and I felt very awkward. I said, I will liave to check this
out with Mr. Ehrlichman. I called Mr. Ehrlichman and he told me I
could not brief MacGregor.
'So as MacGregor didn't have the facts when he would make public
statements, Ziegler didn't have the facts. Ziegler was quite annoyed,
but I told him that I could not give him the facts.
Mr. Thompson. Would it be fair to say, then, that on occasion, on
numerous occasions, you misinformed ]Mr. Ziegler with regard to tlie
true facts of the matter?
Mr. Dean. I would not say misinformed him as much as to tell him
how to take the offensive so that he could save a given situation. I can
think of one occasion where we talked about the secret fund that was
at the Wliite House and he said, how do I handle that ? I said, well that
1035
is a matter of interpretation. It is a secret to some people, but since
we know of it. it obviously is not a secret, so you don't need to say it is
a secret fund. So that is the way that was handled.
On, for example, the leaking to Time magazine of the story regard-
ing surveillance of the White House staff and newsmen, that did pre-
sent a real quandary to me, so I called Ehrlichman for guidance. I was
aware what happened. I asked Ehrlichman for guidance on how to
handle it. He said, just flat out deny it. Xow, that was a flat out lie.
Mr. Thompsox. All right. Did you tell Ziegler on occasion that there
was no White House involvement ?
Mr. Deax. That there was no "Wliite House involvement ? I told Mr.
Ziegler that there was nobody that I knew of who was involved or had
prior knowledge of the June 17 break-in. I alwajs dealt in very close
literal words that continually got broader brush.
]Mr. Thompsox. What was it that you said here yesterday about Mr.
Strachan having told you that Haldeman ordered him to destroy docu-
ments ? I believe one of the conclusions you drew in your statement was
that Hadelman in fact must have known about the situation or he
would not have told Strachan to do what he told him to do.
Mr. Deax. I did not notice — I did not know Haldeman's involve-
ment for a fact, I do not know it today.
Mr. Thompsox. Do you know anything
;Mr. Deax. I have been asked for an opinion this morning.
Mr. Thompsox. You do not know any more today about that matter,
I assume, then you knew when you told Mr. Ziegler what you told him
about White House involvement ?
INIr. Deax. That is correct.
Mr. Thompsox. Mr. Dean, let me ask you a few questions about your
actions after the Watergate incident and by asking questions about
your own personal involvement. I hope I am not appearing to be
badgering you in any way, but I am sure you understand that your
actions and motivations are very relevant ?
Mr. Deax. In fact, if I were still at the White House, I would prob-
ably be feeding you the questions to ask the person who is sitting here.
Mr. Thompsox. If I were here as I am, I would have responded as I
have responded, that I do not need questions to be fed to me from any-
body.
After the break-in, I believe that 3'ou had a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's
apartment with Mr. INIitchell, Mr. Mardian, Mr, Magruder, on the
19th, after you returned to Washington ; is that correct ?
Mr. Deax. As I testified, to the best of my recollection, that was
either on the 19th or the 20th. I arrived at the meeting, the meeting was
already in session. I do not have any recollection of that meeting other
than the fact that there was discussion while I was there of the public
relations handling of the matter. That was at the end. It was certainly
at the end of a day that it occurred, either on the 19th or the 20th and I
do not have a clear recollection of which day that was.
Mr. Thompsox. You did not discuss the facts as to what had actually
hanpened and who was res]X)nsible ?
Mr. Deax. Not at that time that I recall.
^Ir. Thompsox. Had you previously that day met with Mr. Liddy?
Mr. Deax. Yes, I had.
1036
Mr, Thompson. And he told you, I believe, that Magruder had
pushed him?
Mr. Deax. I sat and listened at that meeting more than talking at
that meeting and I do not recall that I reported that at that particular
time.
Mr. Thompson. I did not ask you if you had reported it, I just
asked if you had tliat understanding?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did.
Mr. Thompson. And in your listening to Mr. Mitchell and ]Mr.
]\Iagruder, of course, you realized that there were three of the same
four individuals that sat in on two meetings at which these matters
were discussed — wiretapping and that sort of thing. Was that not a
sort of strange feeling that you must have had there on that occasion ?
Did not your mind go back to those previous meetings? Did you not
wonder whether or not in fact Mr. Liddy had bv-^cn given tlie go-ahoad ?
Mr. Dean. That had already occurred to me when I met with
Mr. Liddy I realized what had happened. Before I met with Liddy,
I talked with ^lagruder. ]Magruder had told me this was all Liddy's
fault. It was very clear to me then that Liddy had proceeded, either
with or without authorization. It was after I talked with Liddy that
I was very clear in my understanding that Liddy had been given
authorization to proceed.
Mr. Thompson. You never talked to Mr, IMitchell about it?
Mr. Dean. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Wliat had been your professional relationship with
Mr. Mitchell while you were at the Justice Department ?
Mr. Dean. I had a very — I would have to say it was sort of a father-
son relationship in many ways. Mr. Mitchell was very friendly to me.
He gave me some of the best assignments, I thought, in the Depart-
ment of Justice, He counseled me before I went to the White House
that I should not go to the "Wliite House, He said I ought to stay at
the Department of Justice, I liked Mr, IMitchell very much,
Mr, Thompson, Were you concerned about his personal involvement
after you heard about the break-in ?
Mr, Dean, I indeed was but, as I say, Mr. Mitchell to this day there
has been only one indication and that was on a meeting on INIarch 28
that he has given me any indication that he had any involvement in
this thing at all and that was when I hypothesized to him what I
thought had happened and he said something to the effect "Well, yes,
it was something like that but we thought it was going to be two or
three times removed from the committee."
Mr. Thompson. Wlien you turned over the documents from Hunt's
safe to Mr. Gray, I believe you stated that you did not tell him to
destroy them but that they were politically sensitive,
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. I think I described them as political dynamite.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever tell him to destroy those documents?
Mr. Dean. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. On any subsequent occasion, did you not call ]Mr.
Gray and ask him whether or not he had in fact destroyed those
documents ?
1037
Mr. Dean. No, Mr. Gray and I discussed the documents at one of
the meetings in his office in, I think, early July or sometime of that
nature, in which he told me that he had taken the documents to Con-
necticut and he had them there, and either indicated to me that he
was planning to read them or had read them. I am very unclear on
that. At that time he had mentioned nothing about destruction of the
documents, and it was not until after I had my meeting in January,
early January, with ]Mr. Petersen, and subsequently met with Mr.
Gray that he told me he had destroyed the documents.
Mr. Thompson. Did he say when he had destroyed them ?
Mr. Dean. No, he did not.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know when he destroyed them ?
Mr. Dean. No.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever call him and ask him if he had read
the documents ?
Mr. Dean. No, I did not.
Mr. Thompson. What was the purpose of vour discussions with
Mr. Walters of the CIA ?
INIr. Dean. Which discussions are you referring to ?
Mr. Thompson. I am talking about the June 26, June 27 — were there
two or three ?
Mr. Dean. Well, to the best of my recollection there was a meeting
as a result of a meeting that had occurred in INIitchell's office in which
the decision had been made that there was some need for some sort
of support, and there was a discussion in Mitchell's office about
the fact that the CIA would have the facilities to do this and the
fact that these were CIA people and the CIA should have an interest
in doing tliis sort of thing. It was from there I went to discuss this
with Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Ehrlichman told me he thought it was a
good idea that I explore this and that he told me I should talk to
General Walters. I told him at that time I didn't know the people at
the CIA, I didn't know Helms, I didn't know Walters. He told me
"Well, you tell Walters to call me if you have any problems." So the
purpose of that meeting was for me to explore if there was any pos-
sibility that the CIA could be of assistance in dealing with these
problems.
Mr. Thompson. Was it not the purpose of that meeting to get the
CIA to help you in the coverup ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it was.
Mr. Thompson. Didn't you state to INIr. Walters that in fact wit-
nesses were wobbling and could cause problems ?
IVFr. Dean. I think I used somethino; of that nature.
Mr. Tpiompson. Didn't vou ask him whether or not the CIA could
possiblv be used to raise bail for some of these defendants ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. I believe you also delivered a message to Mr. Hunt
through Mr. Liddv to tell him to get out of the country, is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. I think, as I recounted that yesterdav. that there was a
meeting in Ehrlichman's office on the evening of the 19th.
Earlier I had met with him. he told me to attend this meeting and
Mr. Colson was present. Before the meeting really got underway
Mr. Ehrlichman asked where is Hunt and I said I have no idea. Mr.
Colson made a similar response, that he had no idea. Ehrlichman then
1088
told me to call Liddy and tell Hunt to get out of the country. I made
the call. Subsequently I began to think about the call I had made and
I reraised the wisdom of making such a call. We had a brief discus-
sion about the call. Ehrlichman — ^or Colson agreed that it was a rather
unwise call. Later Ehrlichman concurred. I tlien went immediately
back to the phone — ^I would say all this transpired witliin a 30-minute
time span — I went back to the telephone, re-called Liddy who was still
employed at the reelection committee, and told him to retract the
earlier request that I had made for Hunt to leave the country.
I had — he told me something to the effect that he didn't know if that
was possible, that the message had already been sent, and I to this day
don't know whether the message was retracted or what happened to
Mr. Hunt.
Mr. Thompson. So, to summarize your answer, the answer is yes,
you did make the call and subsequent to that you had second thoughts
about it and tried to retract it ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Would that be correct? I believe on the 29th you
talked to Mr. Kalmbach about raising money for the coverup. You
said at that time you told him substantially everything that you knew.
I believe that you helped Mr. Magruder in preparing himself for testi-
mony before the grand jury in August. I assume you knew he was
going to perjure himself in that grand jury testimony.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Would you tell us how you obtained the FBI 302's?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I said in my statement yesterday, I am not
terribly clear on when I did actually first receive them. I had some
preliminary discussions with "Sir. Petersen about it and ]Mr. Petersen
suggested I deal directly with Gray on the matter. I had some dis-
cussions with Gray about it. Initially, as I recall the sequence, there
was a summary prepared or, I might add this, Mr. Gray offered to
me to come over to his office and read the reports. I might have even
looked at some of the reports initially in his office but it was after I
received the July 21 summary of the FBI investigation to date and
showed that to Mitchell and Mardian that they said that they thought
that I should permit ]Mardian, and ]\Iitchell said O'Brien and Parkin-
son as well, the right to look at these investigative reports and discuss
this with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, they thought it was a wise idea
to follow what the FBI were doing.
Mr. Thompson. That is a different area, Mr. Dean.
If you want to elaborate on that a little later, fine, but I want to
be
Mr. Dean. I don't know the precise date I started receiving reports.
Mr. Thompson. Are you definitely stating you said to INIr. Peter-
sen, "You deal directly with Pat Gray on this matter" ?
!Mr, Dean. That is my best recollection.
Mr. Thompson. Did not in fact ]Mr. Kleindienst tell you that the
only way he would make FBI 302's available was that he would deliver
them directly to the President himself if the President asked for
them; that he wouldn't give them to you?
Mr. Dean. That is possible but I don't recall that. I had a very
happy relationship with INIr. Kleindienst. The way you have stated
it is certainly not the way Mr. Kleindienst stated it to me.
1039
j\Ir. Thompson. You said it is possible. Would that not be
i\Ir. Deax. He might have said, you know, "If you want those at
the White House they ought to go to the President." I don't recall any
such conversation, frankly.
]Mr. Thompson. Did you ever tell Mr. Kleindienst that you were
reporting on your investigation directly to the President?
Mr. Dean. Did I report that to Kleindienst?
Mr. Thompson. That you told Mr. Kleindienst that you were re-
porting to the President.
Mr. Dean. Xot until I began reporting to the President did I ever
tell the Attorney General that the President had instructed him to do
a given thing or ask that he do something.
Mr. Thompson. I am not talking about what the President was tell-
ing him to do. I am asking whether or not in June or July of 1972 you
told ]Mr. Kleindienst, at that time, that you were reporting directly to
vhe President.
Mr. Dean. I believe I told that to Mr. Gray, not Mr. Kleindienst.
Mr. Thompson. But you did not tell that to Mr. Kleindienst when
you were attempting to get FBI material ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever call Mr. Sloan in October of 1972 or
thereafter or his attorney and talk to him about the possibilities of his
claiming his fifth amendment privileges ?
]\Ir. Dean. Yes, I did. I tried to reach Mr. Sloan. I had had a call
from, as I recall, Mr. Parkinson, there had been considerable discus-
sion about Mr. Sloan at the White House and at the reelection com-
mittee. In fact, Mr. Sloan at that time seemed to be looking for a
confessional of any source he could find, and reporting everything he
knew. Ehrlichman knew this, for example, before Sloan sought him
out.
Other people at the White House knew this. I think that is one of the
reasons that Ehrlichman did not want to talk with Mr. Sloan. Mr.
Sloan came to see me on a number of occasions because I would talk
Avith him and I reassured him on a number of occasions I didn't think
that the fact he was treasurer would necessarily result in him haying to
face criminal charges as a result of some of the misappropriations of
funds that had occurred there.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever tell him or his attorney ?
Mr. Dean. I am .o-ettinj? to that. I am trying to give you the
preface of why I said that. Mr. Sloan was headed for Florida to
testify in the trial, was going on down there with regard to Mr.
Barker at the request of, receiving this information from Parkinson,
he was going, tried to reach Mr. Sloan at his attorney's office, and
Sloan not being there, as I recall, I asked Mr. Stoner or Triest ( ? ) , I
think it was. Miss Stoner, Stoner and Sloan had already left and
Triest was there, was he prepared to have his client take the fifth
amendment because he certainlv would be a hero in the eyes of people
around the White House if he did.
Mr. Thompson. All right, ]\Ir. Dean, let me move now, if I may, to
why you have talked about vour involvement in the coverup, why you
participated in the coverup. In any way was it because of the fear that
you had about your own personal involvement up until that time?
When you heard about the break-in at the DNC what w^ent through
1040
your mind ? Did you have fear concerning your own personal involve-
ment in the matter up until that time ?
Mr. Dean. When I first heard of the break-in on Sunday the 18th, I
frankly thought that it involved Mr. Colson, as I believe I testified.
It was on Monday I learned
Mr. Thompson. Why ?
Mr. Dean. A^^iy ? Well, I was aware of the fact that Mr. Colson had
suggested burglaries in the past, specifically the Brookings Institute,
and the name Hunt I immediately associated with Colson.
Mr. Thompson. Wlien did you learn about the name Hunt ?
Mr. Dean. I think I first met Mr. Hunt in August.
Mr. Thompson. I am sorry, when did you find out that INIr. Hunt
was involved in some way in the break-in ?
Mr. Dean. On Sunday, I did not know about the break-in, I knew
about the fact there was a Cuban who had a check written out to INIr.
Hunt to some country club in his possession when he was arrested.
Mr. Thompson. You learned this in your telephone call from Cali-
fornia or did you learn this after you returned to Washington ?
Mr. Dean. I learned this after I returned on Sunday night, the 18th.
Mr. Thompson. So I assume your immediate reaction — you returned
to Washington and learned about the Hunt matter ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, and my reaction that Colson was involved.
Mr. Thompson. Go ahead in regard to yourself.
Mr. Dean. Yes. Then, on the 19th when I talked to Magruder and
learned that he had indicated it was Liddy's fault and after talking
to Liddy, I was not personally concerned about myself because I knew
very well that I had not authorized any such thing, that I had not
known about anything from Februar}^ until that time.
Mr. Thompson. Let me explore that point with you, not necessarily
from the standpoint of whether or not you did in fact have any cul-
pability at that time, but what it might appear to be. After all, you
had introduced Liddy to Mitchell, had you not ? I believe you had in
fact recommended, or sent, anyway, ]Mr. Liddy over to the Committee
To Re-Elect. You explained how this came about — starting from the
standpoint of somebody investigating the matter from outside — ^that
you sent Mr. Liddy to the Committee To Re-Elect. You did attend the
March meeting when these matters were discussed ; you did attend the
February 4 meeting when these matters were discussed. Very possibly
when somebody talked about these meetings, very possibly it could get
out that a conspiracy of some kind was in the making. You know the
law of conspiracy, generally; if a person involves himself in a con-
spiracy and one of his coconspirators subsequently commits an overt
act, he very well may be held responsible for what one of his cocon-
spirators does. You are a lawyer. I am sure you realize that.
Liddy did come to you after those meetings in February and ISIarch
to solicit your help in getting this plan approved and you said vou
turned him off at that time. Strachan and Magruder did call you when
they were having trouble with Liddy to get you to help them on one
of their problems with Liddy. Evidently. Strachan or Magruder or
Liddy himself felt that you had some involvement.
Mr. Dean. Maybe we can come back at some other time and I will
explain that to you.
Mr. Thompson. All right, I am finished. I am talking about all of
these things. Did you not, at one point, say to yourself, it looks like
1041
I am possibly involved in this thing or very much involved in this
thing, therefore, I am going to participate in a coverup ?
Mr. Dean. When I learned, for example, talking to Mr. Strachan,
that he had been instructed to destroy records, that was my greatest
concern at that time. If it had been merely John Dean, we would have
had far fewer pix>blems, because I would have been willing to step
forward as I did with Ehrlichman. I told him exactly what my in-
volvement was when I was first asked by him what it was. Tlie stakes
were too high regarding any pei'sonal feelings that I had regarding
myself. I had no criminal problem. If they wanted to fire me on the
basis of the involvement I had, fine. If we could reelect the President,
fine. Jolin Dean certainly would not stand in the way of that. People
were removed from the White House for far less.
Mr. Thompsox. "\^^lat you are saying is that you had no concern
for your own welfare, but you just wanted to stay on to help out others ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I found myself helping out others with-
out — I was in the process before I began thinking about the process.
Mr. Thompson. Why did you not tell the Federal prosecutors when
you first made contact with them ? I believe it was April 2 of this year
when your attorney first made contact with the Federal prosecutors.
I am still not quite sure in my own mind why you did not, evidently,
relate to them the nature of the President's involvement or the f a'^t that
the President was involved to some extent.
Mr. Dean. Well, of course, it was not my presence at the meetings,
so I am not aware of what was discussed. ]NIy lawyer and I did discuss
it. We were aware of the fact that there were attorney-client privilege
problems, there was executive privilege, there were national security
matters and I frankly was hopeful that at some point, when the Presi-
dent returned, I would have a chance to go in and tell the President,
this is the way I saw it ; this is what I have done, and ask him, based
on that, expect him to come forward and explain his involvement the
way I thought he would.
Mr. Thompson. T^Hien were you terminated at the T^Hiite House, Mr.
Dean?
Mr. Dean. My resignation was requested and accepted on April 30.
Mr. Thompson. Without your involvement ?
Mr. Dean. Without my involvement.
Mr. Thompson. So you had from April 2 to April 30 in which to do
what vou are talking about, meet the President and try to get him to
step forward.
Mr. Dean. Let me eet this straight. I am talking about the period
from April 2 to April 15, there were no discussions with the President,
From April 15 on, I beo-an inferentiallv, because it was impossible to
explain things, explaininsr the highlights of some of the things that
involved the President without .<Tetting terribly specific with him, but
giving him very broad ideas of some of the areas that were involved.
AFr. Tttomp>*on. If vou were interested in his cominjr forward, why
did vou not tell him that you were talkinsf to the prosecutors or that
vou had made snmp contact with the prosecutors ?
Mr. Dean. Well, T met with him on the 21st. I met with him again
on the 22d, called again on the 23d- T had given him what I thought
was the most dramatic wav I could tell him what the situation was.
Xothing happened as a result of that.
1042
He then went to California. When he came back from California,
I noted that there was — Avell actually, when I came back from Camp
David on the 28th before they went to California — he had been in
Florida in the interim ; there was a very changed attitude about me at
that point in time. I was getting signals from Hakleman in my meet-
ings with him. He directed me to come down, really, from Camp David.
He said, vou just cannot hole up up there.
I said I do not want to talk to Mitchell.
He said, I think you have to come down and talk to Mitchell.
It was very clear to me Mr. Haldeman wanted me to come down
and talk to ^Mitchell and Magruder. I saw a very different Bob Halde-
man than I had dealt with over the last year. That was clear to me
that there was a new concern and I had become a concern. It was for
that reason that I did not turn over the report I had written at Camp
David. The whole atmosphere changed after — really, after I had gone
to Camp David. Probably the greatest change occurred in the meet-
ing on the afternoon of the 21st or the 22d, when Ehrlichman, Halde-
man, and I met with the President, and I said in front of the President
for the first time ever that I thought I had kept this agreement, every-
thing was being said, because I said Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Dean
are all indictable.
INIr. Thompsox. Let us consider what your motivations would be
at that time. You mentioned first of all, the attorney-client privilege,
in which, of course, I assume vou are talking about conversations that
you would have had with the President.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. But there was an abundance of evidence that you
could have given which would not have involved attorney-client priv-
ilege, based on what you told us.
Mr. Dean. As I say, we were researching it at the time and we con-
cluded that there was no attorney-client privilege.
Mr. Thompson. I am talkino: about what Ehrlichman told you.
According to your testimony, Ehrlichman told you that the President
had approved Executive clemencv for Hunt to try to keep his mouth
shut. You talked about Colson telling you that the President approved
Executive clemency for Hunt to keep him quiet.
You have testified that Krogh told you that he got his instructions
for the Ellsberg psychiatrist's break-in from the oval office. None of
those things involved communications with the President. It could not
have possibly involved the attorney-client privilege, could it?
Mr. Dean. They could not involve the attorney-client privilege, no.
Some of them involved conversations I had had directly with the
President, yes. Some of them did not.
As I say, there was also the executive privilege question, there were
national security questions. We had resolved that in fact, these did
not apply.
Mr. Thompson. Did you tell the prosecutors about the Ellsberg
break-in ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did.
Mr. Thompson. So you had resolved that question ?
Mr. Dean. No, I did not tell them the totality of it. "\^niat I said was
that thev had evidence in their files that thev should reexamine, because
it indicated a break-in. I did this because there is case law my lawyer
1043
told me about. He said, John, you are committing another crime if you
do not tell and you have to reveal this to them and they are on that
case. He said, there is an ongoing: prosecution. You must give tliem
enough so that they can look at their files and make the determination.
Mr. Thompson, Mr. Dean, is it your testimony that you -were not in
effect bargaining for immunity or seeking immunity ?
Mr. Deax. My lawyers were very heavily discussing immunity
with tlie prosecutors at that time.
Mr. Thompson. And you failed at the U.S. attorney's office in that
attempt, did you not?
Of course, I might add that that is a very proper thing for attorneys
to pursue. The fact is they were.
Mr. Dean. That is right. What happened is my lawyers worked out
what they called a Dhase I with the
Mr. Thompson. Phase I ?
IMr. Dean. Phase I, in which I would-
]Mr. Thompson. You did not have any better luck than the other
phase I.
Mr. Dean. I would discuss with the prosecutors everything I could
remember, everything I could tell them and the evidence could not be
used against me so they could assess what they wanted to do with that.
That was the design of phase I, which I did.
Mr. Thompson. All right. And then contact was made with Mr.
Dash.
Mr. Dean. Mr. Dash made contact with us.
Mr. Thompson. "Well, either way you want to put it, you discussed
the matter with Mr. Dash, who very properly, of course, was seeking
any information he could get and talked with you about these matters.
Then, for the first time, as far as I know — you correct me if I am
wrong — after that, some time after that, the stories started appearing
quoting sources close to you to the effect that you had met with Nixon
more than 40 times to discuss the coveru}), that Nixon had substantial
knowledge about what the White House people were doing and all
those things.
Now, I do not want to leave an unfair implication if I am wrong
about this, but the obvious question is whether or not you went to the
prosecutors, gave them what you thought might be enough to get im-
munity; having failed there, came to this committee and offered a
little more in order to get immunity for this committee. Was that or
was that not your strategy ?
Mr. Dean. I believe that is not correct.
Mr. Thompson. In what points does that thesis break down?
Mr. Dean. Phase I had effectively gone into abeyance.
Mr. Thompson. Were we considered phase II ?
Mr. Dean. No, no, I am talking about the off the record discussions
with the prosecutors had gone into abeyance by the time Mr. Dash con-
tacted us, because we were giving them so much information so fast
and the thing was tumbling so quickly that they were in pursuit of it
and it became more and more difficult for me.
There also was the increasing demand for a special pi-osecutor. The
prosecutors didn't know their own status.
Meanwhile, ISIr. Dash asked to discuss it with my attorney and
he said, you are going to be called, you are going to be called soon and
I want to know what it is all about. So he was given the story.
1044
Mr. Thompson. Of course, you did get immunit}^ from this com-
mittee, use immunity.
One last question, Mr. Dean. The reason I ask this, of course, is that
your statement is replete with references about your desire to uncover
the coverup and your desire to tell the truth in all these matters.
Before you were forced out of the White House — as you stated, you
started making contact with the prosecutors on April 2 of this year;
you had substantial difficulty with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman
concerning their desire to get Mitchell to take the rap and get them off
the hook. Why didn't you resign, call a press conference, and tell the
entire truth about the matter if you wanted it to come out, substan-
tially before you
Mr. Dean. When I was at Camp David — I went up on the 23d. On
the 25th, I talked to a lawyer and I told him I wanted to take some
steps. He cautioned me, saying, for gosh sakes, don't do anything until
you do talk to a lawyer.
So it was when I came back from Camp David on the 28th that I
again began calling to obtain a criminal lawyer. He told me — he said,
John, he said, I know you want to get the truth out. and that was the
first thing we told the prosecutors. He said, you don't have to run in a
machinegun to do it. You have a Constitution, you can protect your
rights, you can go forward, and if I am going to represent you, I am
going to represent you the best way I know as a member of the bar
and I will give you the best counsel I can. I have tried to follow his
counsel and simultaneously get the truth out.
Mr. Thosipsox. Fine. Just one small matter. I don't w\ant to leave
any inferences from the story I quoted a minute ago concerning your
meeting with Mr. Dash. I don't know the source and this is not the
proper time to find out the source. The only thing I am sure of is that
it was not Mr. Dash. I just want to put that on the record.
I have no further questions.
Senator Erwn. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dean, you realize, of course, that you have made very strong
charges against the President of the United States that involves him
in criminal offenses, do you not ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Talmadge. What makes you think that your credibility is
greater than that of the President, who denies what you have said?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I have been asked to come up here and tell
the truth. I have told it exactly the way I know it. I don't say that I —
you are asking me a public relations question, really, in a sense, why I
Avould have greater credibility than the President of the United States ?
I am telling you what I know. I am telling you just as I know it.
Senator Talmadge. Now, you are testifying, I believe, under use
immunity that this committee has granted to you.
]Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. You would not be here testifying today had we
not granted that use immunitv, would you ?
Mr. Dean. I would probably be before the prosecutors downtown.
Senator Tal^nfadge. Xow, you refused to testify before the grand
jury, I believe, did you not ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
1045
Senator Talmadge. You pled the fifth amendment there ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. You have been bargaining with them for im-
munity which has not yet been granted. Is that an accurate statement ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Talmadge. Now, there have been various reports in the
press ; I know nothing whatever about their credence. Did you see an
article in one of the Washington papers that you were kicked out of a
law firm here for violation of the canon of ethics ?
Mr. Deax. I did, sir.
Senator Talmadge. "Would you like to comment on that ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, I would. To explain that is that I learned about that
sometime after it had occurred. That was when I had left — I had been
on the Hill working with the House Judiciary Committee. I had gone
to a newly formed commission that was working on a revision of the
Federal criminal laws and the Civil Service ran a normal civil service-
type examination. As a result of that, they went to a former employer,
tiie employer indicated he had dismissed me for unethical reasons. The
Deputy Director of the Commission brought this to my attention and
said, is this true ?
I said, I am flabbergasted to see this. I called a friend who had been
in the firm at the time, who is another lawyer. I asked him if he would
go to the person who had made the charge and see if he could find out
what in the world this is all about. I explained to him the entire set of
facts and circumstances that had occurred. As a result of this man go-
ing to see the former partner who had dismissed me, the statement was
retracted in my civil service record.
Also, I should note, one of the reasons that I was prepared to go to
the ethics committee at that point in time is because I was operating
on the advice of counsel when I was involved in this investment, while
I was still at this law firm, and I believe we had really a question of
personalities rather than a question of ethics involved.
I would be happy to submit to the committee for its record the letter
of counsel that I was operating on at the time this incident occurred,
that I had sought legal advice as to whether this was proper or im-
proper because I did not want to engage in it if it was improper.
Senator Talmadge. If you will submit that for the record, we will
appreciate it. I judge from your statement that that was an unfair and
unfounded attack on your professional ethics.
Senator Er^ttx. I would suggest that he read it.
]\f r. Deax'. "Would you like me to read the letter ?
This is a letter to the man who investigated the matter. It is from
^Ir. Earl Stanley of the firm of Dow, Lohnes & Albertson :
Dear Mr. TAPTirn : This will confirm and supplement my recent conversations
with yon concerning events preceding and to some degree surrounding the resig-
nation in early February 1966. of Mr. .John Dean from the law firm of "Welch &
Morgan. Washington, D.C.
As you know. Mr. Boyd Fellows approached me in October of 1965 about the
possibility of representing an anplicant for a construction permit for a new tele-
vision broadcast station in St. Louis. Mo. At that time. Mr. Fellows was. in es-
sence considering various law firms in Washington as communications counsel
for a groun which he was putting together to apnly for a St. Louis Television
authorization. I had known Mr. Fellows for some time before he approached me
and as a result of our initial contact, I told him I would be pleased to represent
1046
his group and to assist them in any way that I could in the filing and prosecution
of their application at the Federal Communications Commission.
At that time, Mr. Fellows' plans appeared to be very much in the preliminary
stages. No corporation had been organized, specific program plans had not been
formulated, and few if any of the other necessary investigations and work pre-
liminary to the preparation of the application had been completed.
At our initial conference, Mr. Fellows pointed out that he was then employed
as a television management expert at Welch & Morgan and that his name had
appeared in other applications for television authorizations which have been filed
by that firm, including one in St. Louis, Mo. It was my understanding that the
firm of Welch & Morgan would probably eventually own approximately 30 per-
cent of that St. Louis television operation, consistent with the pattern followed
by the firm in connection with other television authorizations. I told Mr. Fellows
that insofar as he was concerned, there was no problem of ethics involved since
he was not a practicing attorney. My recollection is that Mr. Fellows had already
made known his plans and proposals to one or more partners of Welch & Morgan.
I did advise Mr. Fellows that when, if and shortly before the application for his
group was filed, due to Commission requirements he would have to sever con-
nections with the other St. Louis television group.
At our conference in October, Mr. Fellows also discussed with me the possi-
bility of Mr. John Dean becoming a part of the group. Mr. Dean was then a
recent associate at Welch & Morgan, but according to my recollection was con-
templating the possibility of a change in positions. I was told that Mr. Dean's
participation in the group was to be largely that of an investor, that he did not
desire, plan or feel qualified to advise the applicant corporation in any way as
to the preparation of its application, and that I would be relied upon for such
advice and guidance. I advised Mr. Fellows that, in my opinion, it would not be
unethical or improper in any respect for Mr. Dean to become a part of the group
recognizing that if and when the application was filed at the Commission, he
should plan to resign from Welch »& Morgan because of that firm's interest in
another St. Louis group.
The subject of Mr. Dean's participation in the St. Louis group was also men-
tioned at a luncheon meeting which I had with Mr. Fellows and Mr. Dean in
November of 1965 at Costin's Restaurant in Washington, D.C. My recollection
of the details is quite vague but I am certain that I told Mr. Dean the same
thing that I had earlier told Mr. Fellows.
I might say in conclusion that I have always regarded Mr. John Dean as an
extremely honorable, conscientious, careful and able man. His honesty and his
integrity, in my opinion, are both 'beyond question. His care and his conduct in
connection with his participation in the application for a television authorization
in St. Louis demonstrated these very qualifications.
As to what occurred between Mr. Dean and Mr. Welch of Welch & Morgan
at the tme Mr. Dean resigned in February of 1966. I have no personal knowledge.
I do know that at the time application of Mr. Fellows' group, Greater St. Louis
Television, Inc., was filed in March. 1966, Mr. Dean was no longer an associate
with Welch & Morgan.
The above is according to my best recollection and knowledge. If you have
any questions or need some further details, please let me know.
With kindest regards, Cordially yours.
Senator Talmadoe. I believe yon testified that you met with the
President in ]March of this year and informed him fnllv about vour
participation and the participation of others in the coverup of the
Watero:ate incident and, at that time, as I recall, vou told the President
that both you, ^Nlr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Haldeman were indictable,
is that correct?
]Mr. Deax. That was in an afternoon meetintr when I met with him
which I believe was on the afternoon of the 21st.
Senator Talmadge. Was anyone there besides vou and the President ?
■Mr. Deax. Initially Mr. Zieo:ler was in — at the meetino; in the morn-
ing it was only the President and I initially. At the end of the con-
versation he called Mr. Haldeman in to request that Mr. Haldeman
get ahold of Mr. Mitchell, to get Mr. ^Mitchell down there for a meeting
1047
the next day. In the afternoon, Mr. Ziegler was in the office for a
very short period of time and then left as the meeting commenced
with Ehrlichman, Haldeman, the President, and myself. So there was
no other pereon than those involved.
Senator Talmadge. What was the President's reaction when you
told him about the complicity of the individuals in the White House?
]\rr. Dean. Well, I felt he had not gotten the message that I was
trying to convey through to the President, and I think that the subse-
quent meeting that afternoon and the meeting the next day with the
President indicated to me that there was more concern about this
committee and its hearings than doing anything affirmative about
wliat I told the President. In fact the strategy was then developing
that John Mitchell should step forward and if he did that there would
be lack of concern and interest in the postactivity as opposed to the
preactivity and hopefully they would all go away.
Senator Talmadge. What did the President say when you told him
about these individuals?
]Mr. Deax. About which individuals, Senator?
Senator Talmadge. Of you and Ehrlichman and Haldeman all being
subject to indictment.
]Mr. Deax. I don't recall the President's reaction as much as I re-
call ]\Ir. Ehrlichman's reaction when he expressed displeasure. There
was a general discussion, and I was just amazed at the discussion going
on and I just kept shaking mv head because the President would say
to me "Do you agree with this?" And I would say "No, I don't," and
finallv I said "the reason I don't agree with this is because I think
that Mr. Haldeman, INIr. Ehrlichman, and I are indictable for obstruc-
tion of justice."
Senator Talmadge. Did the President seem surprised when you gave
him this information ?
Mr, Deax. No sir, he did not.
Senator Talmadge. I believe at the same time he discussed with you
that he should not have talked with Mr. Colson about Executive clem-
ency, did he not ?
Mr. Deax. No, sir, that was a meeting— that occurred on two times.
On March 13 when he had asked me where the pressure was coming
from for the money he told me about the fact that Colson had come to
see him despite Ehrlichman's instructions that he not do so, and he
expressed annoyance at f^at occasion.
Then, on April 15 of this year at the very end of the conversation
I remember very vividly the President getting up out of his chair,
walking behind the chair to the corner and in a very, very audible —
almost inaudible tone, turned to me and said, "I was probably foolish
to talk to Colson about clemency for Hunt, wasn't I ?"
That was his statement.
Senator Talmadge. Now, to turn to another matter. Do you have
any idea why it was you that INIr. Ehrlichman asked to check into the
brenk-ip affair immp^^atelv after the Watergate entrance ?
Mr. Deax. I would only assume because I had become the White
House firefighter at that time and I was given assignments of this
nature whether it was the, as I say. the Lithuanian defector or any
conflict of interest problem that came up, I investigated a lot of those.
1048
I dealt with all of the Presidential appointees before they were ap-
pointed to clear them for conflict problems or any problem that came
up, any improprieties that had come to our attention was sent to my
office so we could investigate them and find out if they could be em-
barrassing to the President so it was very natural, of course, for it to
come to me.
Senator Talmadge. Did you really believe Mr. Liddy when he told
you that no one in the TVliite House was involved ?
Mr. Deax. Well, given the nature of my statement in reflecting back
at that time he did not even mention to me Hunt's involvement, and
how much Mr. Liddy would know about White House involvement in
this I do not know. I think that he would only have probably hearsay
knowledge from Mr. Magruder in his dealings with Mr. Magruder as
to who in the ^\^iite House would or would not be involved. I do not
know what dealings he had with the "\'\niite House other than the deal-
ings he had with me.
Senator Talmadge. Let us see if I have the sequence on the imme-
diate aftermath of the break-in correct now.
Immediately upon your return to Washington after the break-in in
June, you saw Mr. Liddy, whom you knew had provided massive
intelligence plans to Mr. Mitchell, is that correct ?
Mr. Deax. Well, sir, I will give you the sequence. As I arrived back
on Sunday night, the 18th, I was informed hy my assistant that
McCord had been arrested, one of the individuals arrested and that one
of the Cubans had a check from INIr. Hunt. The next morning I had a
conversation with INIr. Caulfield, who repeated the same thing to me. I
then had a call from Mr. Ehrlichman or I had a call from Mr.
Magruder who told me that this whole thing is Liddy's fault and I
should look into it. I then had a call from Mr. Ehrlichman who. I
reported to him that this was, had been, told me and he said "I think
you ought to meet with Liddy." I then met with Mr. Liddy about noon
and he gave me his report. It was in that afternoon that Mr, Strachan
came into my office and told me that he had been instructed by ]Mr.
Haldeman to destroy documents.
Senator Talmadge. You Imew, of course, that Mr. Liddy had pre-
sented massive intelligence plans to Mr. Mitchell, I believe you were
there on two occasions ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, I was.
Senator Talmadge. Then vou testified that Mr. Strachan told
Mr. Deax. Senator, I might correct that they were massive on the
first occasion and a very tailored-down version on the second and, I
must say I was very late in attending the second meeting and the meet-
ing was shortened after I arrived.
Senator Talmadge. Each meeting was scaled down further ?
Mr. Deax. That is right.
Senator Talmadge. Intelligence plan. Then, Mr. Strachan told you
that Mr. Haldeman ordered him to go through Mr. Haldeman's files
and destroy materials which included documents relating to wiretap
information from the Democratic National Committee, is that correct ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. Then vou told Mr. Ehrlichman about the meet-
ings with Liddy and Mitchell and about your subsequent conversations
with Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Ehrlichman's reaction in a meeting
1049
which Mr. Colson attended, was to tell you to get Liddy to have hmi
tell Hunt to get out of the country, is that correct ?
Mr. Deax. Well, you are tying two meetings together, Senator. I
might straighten that out for you. The meeting I reported to Ehrlich-
man was in midafternoon and Mr. Colson was not present. I was
reporting ni}^ meeting with Liddy at that point. I did not discuss
with him the facts that Strachan had brought to my attention because
I assume he was aware from his conversations with ]\Ir. Haldeman
that that in fact had occurred.
He told me to come back to a meeting later that evening with Colson.
He said he was aware of the fact that Colson wanted to meet with him
and I should be present at that meeting.
Senator Talmadge. Then shortly thereafter Mr. Ehrlichman told
you to throw the contents of Hunt's safe in the river, is that correct?
Mr. Deax. That is correct. Well, he told me I should throw the brief-
case in the river and he told me to shred the documents.
Senator Talmadge. Now, after all of those facts occurred, were avail-
able to you, why did you not, as counsel to the President, go to him at
that time and tell him what was happening ?
Mr. Deax. Senator, I did not have access to the President. I never
was presumptuous enough to try to pound on the door and get in
because I knew that just did not work that way. I know of efforts of
other "\'\^iite House staff to get in, I have seen, for example, one of the
reporters sitting in this room, Mr. Mallenhoff, memorandums he tried
to send in to the President and they are just blocked when you try to
send information in.
Senator Talmadge. You mean you were counsel to the President of
the United States, and you could not get access to him if you wanted
to, is that your testimony ?
Mr. Deax. No, sir ; I thought it would be presumptuous of me to try,
because I felt, I was told my reporting channel was Mr. Haldeman and
^Ir. Ehrlichman and I was reporting everything I knew to them.
Senator Talmadge. It seems like to me after finding evidence of a
conspiracy of this magnitude it was incumbent upon you as counsel
to the President, to make every possible effort to see that he got that
information at that time.
Mr. Deax". Senator, I was participating in the coverup at that time.
Senator Talmadge. Now, another question. When you met with At-
torney General Kleindienst on the 19th and 20th of June, I believe,
there you told him you had no idea there would be a break-in at the
Democratic National Committee headquarters. Did you tell him about
the meetings of January 27 and February 4, 1972, with Mr. Liddy and
Mr. Magruder and Mitchell during, when buggings were considered ?
Mr. Deax. No, sir ; I did not.
Senator Talmadge. Why did you not tell him at that time?
Mr. Deax. Because I knew that would put him in a position that he
would have to pursue his investigation that way. and Mr. Kleindienst
had told me when we talked generally, in very broad generalities about
the thing that he said he would never sit in the Attorney General's
office and prosecute Mr. ^Mitchell and I did not want to put this on
Mr. Kleindienst at this point in time.
96-296 O - 73 - 10
1050
Senator Talmadge. In other words, you were still participating in
the coverup.
Mr. Dean. Well, this meeting had occurred on the 19th or 20th.
Senator Talmadge. Yes.
Were you chosen to tell Mr. Kalmbach, ]Mr. ]\Iitchell, Ehrlichman
and Haldeman wanted him to raise money to pay for tlie silence of
the Watergate defendants ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I became the courier of good and bad news be-
tween the committee concerning what each quarter was doing concern-
ing the coverup. I think that occurred for this reason : One, Mr.
Mitchell had known me and trusted me with this type of information
and, Haldeman and Ehrlichman knew and trusted me. There was a —
particularly after — this reporting requirement or requirements, this re-
porting scheme, developed very early on. Ehrlichman and Mitchell,
I would have to say, had a rather strained relationship and this made
it convenient to avoid some of those strains, and there was also a long-
standing competition between Mr. Mitchell and certain persons in
the White House so that this made it convenient, they didn't want to
deal with one another so I was the convenient vehicle to deal with.
Senator Talmadge. Did you think it was part of an effort to make
you the fall guy in the plan ?
Mr. Dean. I didn't raise the fall guy — it made it very easy for them
to protect themselves to say that this was all Dean if anything ever
went wrong. I was aware of that but I didn't begin to think about
that until the August 29 statement and at that time I began discussing
it with other people because I was right square in the middle of the
coverup, and now my name was being put out in front of the whole
thing as clearing everybody of complicity and I say this may be a
natural, I had seen it happen before. I had seen situations like this
occur where people who had not actually done something take the
blame for it to avoid embarrassing others higher up and I felt it was a
real possibility.
Senator Talmadge. Why have you always assumed it was a Presi-
dential decision to keep Mr. Magruder on at the Committee To Re-
Elect the President ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I assumed that for two reasons: First of all, it
was very clear by the time Mr. Magruder or these discussions came up
the strategy was developing that the matter could stop at ]Mr. Liddy,
that they could hold it there, then there could be no links in the White
House through Mr. Magruder and nobody at the top of the Re-Election
Committee would be damaged.
Mr. Magruder was the deputy director, he was involved. I reported
the fact he was involved. Mr. Mitchell, who I didn't know was
involved or not, they were asking me whether I thought he should
leave or stay in the campaign. I cannot conceive of a discussion of these
factors not coming up in a conversation with the President about
what was happening over at his reelection committee.
Now, it is presumptions or it is a presumption on my part but
given the, you know, this is the number one and two men at the re-
election committee.
•Senator Talmadge. You testified that you always suspected that
Mr. Colson was far more knowledgeable than he protested.
What led you to that conclusion?
1051
Mr. Deax. Well, the fact that Mr. Magruder had told mc of numbers
of — ^^the fact that the stalf had contacted him regarding implementing
the jilan. The fact that ]Mr. Hunt had a very close relationship with
Mr. Colson, that the memos that I found in Hunt's safe indicated that
Hunt had a practice of reporting regularly to ]Mr. Colson on things
that occurred, and I found it very hard to believe that 'Mv. Hunt and
Mr. Liddy would walk into Mr. Colson's office and tell him that they
didn't have some security plan or something like that and then per-
suade Colson on a call like that or on a statement like that to call
Mr. ]SIagruder to have his staff subsequently follow up with additional
calls and tell them to get that plan going.
Senator Talmadge. You testified that you had to report to the Presi-
dent through Mr. Haldeman or through Mr. Ehrlichman. Were you
closer to the President on the Watergate than in any other area?
^Ir. Dean. Do you mean when I did begin rej^orting to him?
Senator Talmadge. Yes.
]\Ir. Deax. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Can you account for that?
]\rr. Deax. Well. I can only tell you what the President told me.
He told me that this matter was taking up too much attention of
]Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman which, indeed it was very consuming
for everybody that was involved in it. Xo one could leave the store
very long for fear that something would go astray so it was some-
thing that everyone had to stay on top of. That the trial was over, we
were moving into the Senate phase, had a grand plan that had been
hiid out over a weekend of some 12 and 14 hour meetings. The Presi-
dent, I assume, thought that now that the plans had been laid the
policies had been made, "have ]Mr. Dean rep)ort to me and I will deal
with him directly on the matter."
Senator Talmadge. Did Mr. Haldeman have direct access to the
President ?
Mr. Deax. Indeed he did, sir.
Senator Talmadge. ]\Ir. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, he did.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Colson ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, he did.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. :Mitchell ?
Mr. Deax. I don't believe that Mr. Mitchell had any dealin^rs with
the President, to my knowledge other than one or two social visits in
Florida with him from the time he left the campaign until the meeting
that occurred on June 22. I know they had sort of a good chat about
what everyone had been doing at that time, very social chat at the end
of the meeting. I was asked by the President to make arrangements
so Mr. ISIitchell could use his outer office in the Executive Office Build-
ing and while I was doing that they were having a chat about what was
happening among some of the partners. I know also that the President
stopped in his old law firm at one time but I think these were strictly
social dealings.
Senator Talmadge. That was :March 22, I believe rather than
June 22?
Mr. Deax. Yes, excuse me, March 22.
Senator Talmadge. :Mr. Kalmbach had immediate access to the
President ?
1052
Mr. Dean. No sir.
Senator Talmadge. He did not.
Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge. I think the President periodically
called Mr. Kalmbach when he had some specific item he wanted to take
up regarding the residence in California. I was often the conveyor of
information to Mr. Kalmbach for the President and these requests had
come to me from Haldeman or Ehrlichman. They dealt with the per-
sonal side of the President's business. 1 think that — I don't know of
other than social gatherings, White House dinners or the like, where
Mr. Kalmbach might have been present. I know his partner, Mr.
DeMarco, and I would always take the tax return in to be signed and
those would be rather mechanical sessions so I can't say that Mr.
Kalmbach had access to the President, no.
Senator Talmadge. What was Mr. Mitchell's relationship to the
President, the same — was it the same over the entire period that you
were at the White House ?
Mr. Dean. I don't really know. I know that Mr. Mitchell and the
President had frequent contact. I can recall while I was at the Depart-
ment of Justice and I would be in the Attorney General's office and the
President would call him. I know Mr. Mitchell would have no hesita-
tion to pick up the phone and call the President. I know that Mr.
Mitchell attended a number of meetings with the President, private
meetings, on a regular basis while he was still Attorney General. I was
also told they had a number of evening meetings and some planning
for the campaign as they moved toward a campaign and I often
thought back to a comment that I was told when I was first interviewed
at the Pierre Hotel to come to the Department of Justice that Klein-
dienst told me that this Attorney General will probably be as close to
this President as Robert Kennedy was to President Kennedy.
Senator Talmadge. And throughout your statement you indicated
that you met with or were ordered to work with either Mr. Haldeman
or Mr. Ehrlichman. What was the relationship between you and these
advisers ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I would report to them or get assignments from
them.
Senator Talmadge. What was their relationship between themselves ?
Mr. Dean. I think that Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman have a
relationship that goes back a number of years from college days. They
were good friends. They were very close, they worked very well to-
gether. I think that, of course, that Mr. Ehrlichman dealt more with
substantive matters whereas Mr. Haldeman dealt with procedural
matters at the White House. I think Mr. Haldeman from time to time
would make substantive suggestions but he would restrain himself
because of the mere mechanics of keeping an operation of the dimen-
sions of a Presidency going.
Senator Talmadge. Did they keep each other informed as to what
they were doinsr ?
Mr. Dean. I would assume they did, yes. I would say, you know, on
selected areas. I would not say that Mr. Ehrlichman would tell every-
thing to Mr. Haldeman he was planning on in a given area of domestic
policy. He would go directly to the President on that.
Senator Talmadge. Do you have a copy of your exhibit No. 34-28*
before you?
*See p. 1233.
1053
Mr. Deax. I do not have the exhibit.
Senator Tai.madoe. I will ask the staff to plense hand you one. It is
an interestino; document and I Avould like to have your comment on it.
Do YOU have it now ?
You will note that it is on White House stationery dated January 2,
1973, very brief and to the point :
To : John Dean.
From : Charles Colson.
Now what the hell do I do?
Tell US the sifrnificance of that. [Laughter.]
Mr. Deax. Attached to that, there was a very small memorandum or
note u)) in the corner. Attached to the letter is the second part of the
exhibit. It is a letter from Howard Hunt to Mr. Colson. This came to
me while I was — ^to my attention, while I was. on a telephone conver-.
sation with Mr. Colson and having just returned from California. I had
had a conversation with ]Mr. O'Brien in the evenino; of the 2d of Jan-
uary concerninof Mr. Plunt's status and his desire to plead ouiltv and
to <ret assurances for Executive clemency. I had a call from ]\Ir. O'Brien
the next morning on the same subject. I had a call from Mr. Colson
who told me Mr. Bittman was trying to reach him. He asked me if I
had seen this letter and I said I had not, and while we were talking, I
dug the letter out of my mail.
As a result of this letter and our conversation he asked me, he was
indicating that he didn't — he still wanted to keep at ann's length from
Mr. Hunt. He had throughout the mattei' tried to keep at arm's length
to Mr. Hunt. I told him I would have to talk to ]Mr. Ehrlichman before
I could make anv suggestion. I went to Ehrlichman, told him the situ-
ation and ]Mr. Ehrlichman told ]\Ir. Colson he thought he ought to
meet with ]Mr. Bittman and subsequently they did meet.
Senator Talmadge. Now, will you look at exhibit Xo. 34— IT* that
you inserted in your testimony yesterday. It is also an interesting docu-
ment. As I recall your testimony as you i:)resented that yesterday, it is
a list of all of the people that you thouglit had violated the law and
what the laws may be that they violated, is that coi'rect ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. Let us start with the top of the list, now. That
is in vour own liandwritinc;, is it not ?
ISIr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. This is a copy thereof ?
]Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. What is the significance of the letters in the top
lefthand part of that sheet?
Mr. Deax. The list is broken down into two parts. Senator. One says
"pre" and the other is "x)Ost."
Senator Talmadge. By "pre," you mean prior to the Watergate
break-in ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. The planning and discussion of those events?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator TAi,:\rADGE- And vou list in that category Mr. jMitchell, Mr.
!Magruder, and ^Ir. Strachan, is that correct ?
*See p. 1312.
1054
Mr. Dean. That is correct. ,
Senator Talmadge. Now, you have a star by Mr. Mitchell's name and
no star by Mr, Magruder.
Mr. Dean. Maybe if I explain the whole list, it would save some
questions for you.
Senator Talmadge. Surely.
Mr. Dean. I have listed for pre : Mitcliell, Magruder, Strachan ; post :
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, LaRue, Mardian, O'Brien, Parkinson,
Colson, Bittman, Kalmbach, Tony — I have by that the word "source."
I will explain that in a minute ; Stans.
Now, beside several of the names, after I did the list — just my first
reaction was there certainly are an awful lot of lawyers involved here.
So I put a little asterisk beside each lawyer, which was Mitchell,
Strachan, Ehrlichman, Dean, Mardian, O'Brien, Parkinson, Colson,
Bittman, and Kalmbach.
Then I put, as we were discussing the development of the list, the
evidence that I knew sort of firsthand or had reason to believe that
others had firsthand evidence of, that I thought that a very strong
case might be made against. The ones that I was not as sure about
were those I put a questionmark on. This was just something I was
working out in my own mind in a discussion I had with my lawyer
as a result of discussions he had also had with some of the prosecutors.
Senator Talmadge. Any significance to the star? That they are all
lawyers?
Mr. Dean. No, that was just a reaction myself, the fact that how in
God's name could so many lawyers get involved in something like this ?
Senator Talmadge. What do the checkmarks indicate on the left-
hand side of the paper ?
Mr. Dean. I do not know.
Senator Talmadge. Now, you have presences there and some other
things there. I presume — what is that language on the right?
Mr. Dean. That is because I had had earlier discussions with Ehr-
lichman and Haldeman about this and they asked me, what is the
obstruction of justice? So I dug out the obstruction of justice statutes,
which were sections 371, which I believe is the conspiracv statute, and
1503, and put the sanctions beside them — 5 years and $10,000, 5 years
and $5,000 for potential obstruction of justice.
When I took this list to Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman, Mr.
Ehrlichman said, well, I may have to take — he said, I do not think
this sounds like an obstruction of justice.
I said, well, you may want to look at the statute. I said, particularly
read the annotations of the statute, because I think you will find some
case law which indicates that obstruction of justice is as broad as the
imagination of man to obstruct justice.
Senator Talmadge. So your significance, then, was that those gentle-
men had violated those statutes and were guilty of those particular
offenses which carried either a 5-year sentence and $10,000 and 5 years
and $5,000, is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. Senator.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you, ]\Ir. Dean.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 12 :05 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., this same day.]
1055
Afterxoox Session, TtTiSDAY, June '26, 1973
Senator Ervix. The committee will come to order.
Senator "Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dean, I would like to completely change gears from the testi-
mony wliich you gave this morning and go back to the beginning of
the statement you made yesterday in order to put this in its proper
context because it is so completely different from what was discussed
this morning and yesterday. I am going to read the early portions ^
your statement in order to set the framework for the questions I am
going to ask.
This is quoting from your statement of yesterday.
It was when I joined the White House staff in July of 1970 that I became fully
aware of the extent of concern at the White House regarding demonstrations
and intelligence information relating to demonstrators. It was approximately
one month after I arrived at the White House that I was informed ahout the
project that had been going on before I arrived to restructure the Government's
intelligence gathering capacities vis-a-vis demonstrators and domestic radicals.
The revised domestic intelligence plan was submitted in a document for the
President.
The committee has in its possession a copy of that document and certain
related memoranda pursuant to the order of Judge Sirica.
I want to inform the chairman and members of the committee so
there is no apprehension here, I do not intend to go into the memo-
randum of 1970. I understand that there are matters contained therein
which the chairman is handling at the present time so it is not my
intent to go into that document.
After I was told of the Presidentially-approved plan, that called for bugging,
burglarizing, mail covers, and the like. I was instructed by Haldeman to see
what I could do to get the plan implemented. I thought the plan was totally
uncalled for and unjustified. I talked with Mitchell about the plan, and he said
he knew there was a great desire at the White House to see the plan imple-
mented, but he agreed fully with FBI Director Hoover, who opposed the plan,
with one exception. He thought that an interagency evaluation committee might
be useful, because it was not good to have the FBI standing alone without the
information of other intelligence agencies and the sharing of information is
always good and voids duplication. After my conversation with ^litchell, I wrote
a memorandum requesting that the evaluation committee be established, and
the restraints could be removed later. I told Haldeman that the only way to
proceed was one step at a time, and this could be an important first step.
He agreed.
The Interagency Evaluation Committee (lEC) was created, as I recall, in early
1971. I refiuested Jack Caulfield, who had been assigned to my oflice, to serve as
the White House liaison to the lEC, and when Mr. Caulfield left the White House,
Mr. David Wilson of my staff served as liaison. I am unaware of the lEC ever
having engaged in any illegal activities or assignments, and certainly no such
assignment was ever requested by my office. The reports from the lEC, or sum-
maries of the reports were forwarded to Haldeman and sometimes Ehrlichman.
In addition to the intelligence reports from the lEC, my ofiice also received
regular intelligence reports regarding demonstrators and radical groups from the
FBI and on some occasions, from the CIA. A member of my staff would review
the material to determine if it should be forwarded to Mr. Haldeman — that is,
for Ivrin.ging to the President's attention — or sent to another member of the staff
who might have an interest in the contents of the report.
And then you give several examples relative to Mr. Garment and to
Mv. Kissinger.
Xow, on the bottom of page 13, you refer to another incident that
occurred.
,1056
It was not until almost a year or more later that I learned the reason for
Mardian's trip to see the President. Mr. Mardian later told me in a social con-
versation, that he had gone to see the President to get instructions regarding the
disposition of wiretap logs that related to newsmen and White House staffers
who were suspected of leaking. These logs had been in possession of Mr. William
Sullivan, an Assistant Director of the FBI, and were, per Mr. Mardian's instruc-
tions from the President, given to Ehrlichman.
I had occasion to raise a question about these logs with Ehrlichman during the
fall of 1972, and he flatly denied to me that he had the logs. I did not tell him at
that time I had been told by Mardian that he had the logs. About February 22nd
or 23rd of this year. Time Magazine notified the White House it was going to print
a story that the White House had undertaken wiretaps of newsmen and White
House staff and requested a response.
The White House Press OflBce notified me of this inquiry. I called Mr. Mark
Felt at the FBI to ask him first, what the facts were, and secondly, how such
a story could leak. Mr. Felt told me that it was true, that Mr. Sullivan knew all
the facts and that he had no idea how it leaked. I then called Mr. Sullivan and
requested that he drop by my ofiice, which he did. He explained that after much
haggling, that the wiretaps were installed, but as I recall, Mr. Sullivan said they
did not have the blessing of Director Hoover. Mr. Sullivan explained to me that
all but one set of the logs had been destroyed and all the internal FBI records
relating to the wiretaps except one set, had been destroyed and all the material
had been delivered to Mr. Mardian. After Mr. Sullivan departed, I called Mr-
Mitchell who told me he also had an inquiry from Time Magazine and denied to
Time Magazine any knowledge of the matter. I did not press him further as to
what he did know.
I then called Mr. Ehrlichman and told him about the forthcoming story in
Time Magazine. I told him of my conversations with Felt, Sullivan and Mitchell.
I also told him I knew he had the logs because Mr. Mardian had told me. Tliis
time he admitted they were in his safe. I asked him how Mr. Ziegler should
handle it. He said Mr. Ziegler should flatly deny it — period. I thanked him, called
Mr. Ziegler and so advised him.
Now, Mr. Dean, this sets the general framework as to the areas of
my inquiry this afternoon.
The first question that arises is that, during the course of questioning
by this committee, Mr. McCord stated that ho went to the Internal
Security Division and obtained from a Mr. John Martin and Mr. Joel
Lisker information which he brought back to the Committee To Re-
Elect the President and disseminated among the various members of
the Committee To Re-Elect.
My first question to you is based upon the visit which he made shortly
after Mr. McCord's testimonj^ to the Internal Security Division and in
talks which he had with Mr. Martin, and Mr. Kevin Moroney, and it
relates to the fact of whether or not you know who authorized the re-
lease of this information by Messrs. Martin and Lisker at the Internal
Security Division.
Mr. Dean. Senator, I have only a general awareness of this area,
and to the best of my recollection, and I don't know, I don't recall who
told me this, but there was an arrangement that was worked out by ]Mr.
Mardian before he departed the Department of Justice to join the
reelection committee.
Senator Weicker. In other words, the arrangement of releasing in-
formation from the Internal Security Division to McCord was autlior-
ized by Mardian. This never came to your attention as being authorized
by anybody in the "^^^lite House ?
Mr. Deax. I don't recall that it did. My office did have dealings, as I
have said, with the Internal Security Division. I don't recall specifi-
cally this subject cominsi; up. I recall subsequent conversations in which
Mr. INIardian told me that he had made an arrangement of some sort
after it was initially arrived at.
1057
Senator Weicker. But, of course, at this moment Mr. Mardian is
over at the Connnittee To Re-Elect the President and Mr. Olson is at
the head of the Internal Security Division?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. Did your office have an}^ dealings with Mr. Olson ?
]Mr. Deax. No — well, I had dealings with him but they were on
departmental matters where the practice had evolved that when the
department was going- to release in a major case electronically obtained
evidence under a court order the}" would notify the White House of
this procedure.
Senator Weicker. Could you amplify on that ? I am not so sure I
understand.
]Mr. Deax. Well, when a major case was going on, and a defendant
would call for whether or not there was any electronic surveillance of
his conversations at any time and the Government made a decision to
release this information if it was a very political or sensitive case, this
matter would be brought to the attention of the White House and ]Mr.
Olson would generally inform me that he was going to do this.
Senator Weicker. Then can you give me some specific examples of
cases that involved that kind of release of information ?
^Ir. Deax. Well, I am trying to think; it was some of the more
celebrated cases in connection with antiwar demonstrators and I can-
not recall with an}' specificity and having not had an opportunity lo go
back to my files it is rather difficult to remember this off the top.
Senator Weicker. Is it a fact, Mr, Dean, that Mr. Olson and Kevin
]Moroney came to your office, at least on one occasion, maybe there are
others, to give you information relevant to the law on foreign
contributions ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, they did. I recall a conversation with them both
about it ; I don't recall whether it was in my office or telephonic in
which I raised the subject. I had always assumed that foreign contri-
butions were prohibited under the law. I had been asked by Mr. Stans
at one point, who had received a memorandum from Mr. Liddy when
he was serving as counsel to the finance committee, indicating that
this was a proper contribution to receive. I had occasion to talk to
Mr. Olson and Mr. ]\Ioroney about this and. they had reached another
conclusion. They felt it was not from their reading of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act. that unless the individual was an agent in
fact and not a principal that such a contribution was not violative of
the Federal Law.
Senator Weicker. VThy would you seek such information from the
Internal Security Division of the Justice Department ?
Mr. Deax. Because they had jurisdiction over that area of the law.
Senator Weicker. What were your contacts with the Internal Secu-
rity Division ?
Do you feel any information that was supplied to your office from
the Internal Security Division might have had some sort of political
impact ?
Mr. Deax. Well. I think some of the reports that the lEC prepared
had political implications to them but those did not go outside of the
^Miite House.
Xow, I would have to review those reports and I have not done that
either regardinof demonstrations and the like. I did, as I mentioned in
1058
my testimony, after I had talked to Mr. Haldeman about what my
oflice should be doing regarding the forthcoming election I called Mr.
Wells who was then the head of the lEC or Mr. Caulfield brought
him over and told him that the White House was very anxious to
have the best intelligence possible regarding the potentials of demon-
strations during the forthcoming campaign.
Senator Weicker. And so you maintained a liaison with the lEC ?
Mr. Dean. I would say that of all my contacts with the Justice
Department my most infrequent contacts were with the Internal Secu-
rity Division.
Senator Weicker. All right, now, I have in my hand a position
report on the Internal Security Division, as of April 15, 1972. It is the
same report which already has been brought to the attention of the
committee, which I submitted to Mr. McCord to identify those in-
dividuals with which he had contacts, specifically, Mr. Martin and
Mr. Lisker.
In this position report dated April 15, 1972, under the Office of
Analysis and Planning, there are listed Bernard Wells, Executive
Director of the IDIU, and two assistants, James McGrath and Joyce
Webb. Again, in the interviews which I had at the Internal Security
Division, after Mr. McCord's testimony, it was explained to me quite
openly that in fact, this office of Analysis and Planning and this posi-
tion of Director of the IDIU were a cover for the lEC. This report
is dated April of 1972. I will be glad to have you take a look at it.
Does this in any way relate to recommendations you had made at an
earlier date ?
Mr. Dean. Well, now, the IDIU was a unit that was in existence
at one point in time in the Justice Department.
Senator Weicker. Right.
Mr. Dean. It was basically a newspaper clipping operation to follow
what the demonstrators were doing, and as I understand, they sub-
scribed to the magazines and publications of the Xew Left to try to
just analyze from those publications what they were doing, as well as
anything else they could pick up.
When the decision was made to establish the lEC, the IDIU unit
was virtually defunct at that time and as I recall, there was discussion
about the fact that the IDIU did exist and that it could very easily
be the explanation for the lEC, which was not due to be a publicly
known intelligence evaluation group. This was the decision, to put the
IDIU cover over the lEC.
Now, as I recall, the initial person that was placed in charge of
the lEC was INIr. Doherty, who had been with the Internal Security
Division for quite sometime but was planning on retiring at some
point. There were also suggestions that others — somebody else might
come in and head this unit up.
Senator Weicker. Well, I appreciate your answer and vou have an-
swered my question. If we can just track this in logical time sequence,
that is all.
So it is true that the concept of the lEC does sit there covered by the
office of Analysis and Planning, the position of IDIU, is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
1059
Senator Weicker. "Was this the subject of a letter which you wrote
John Mitchell?
Mr. Dean. I believe in the documents that I turned over to the court
initially, there was a memorandum in there that was based on a con-
versation that ]\Iitchell and I had had as to how to establish this very
small segment of a rather large and dramatic plan. Xow, whether that
was in that document or not, I cannot recall. I have not reviewed those
documents virtually since the time they were written. So you are ask-
ing me to recall something that is about 3 years old and I am not
terribly fresh in my recollection on it.
Senator Weicker. In other words, when I show you a position report
that is dated April 15 of 1972, which has in the position report a unit
whicli both of us have identified as the lEC, under the cover of the
IDIU, this was the recommendation made back in the summer of 1970.
Is that correct ?
]\Ir. Deax. I think that is an accurate statement to the best of my
recollection.
Senator Weicker. I am not talking about illegal activities
Mr. Deax. No ; I know exactly what you are talking about.
Senator Weicker. Nothing else, just setting up of the unit as recom-
mended in the summer of 1970, it does still exist in the office of Analy-
sis and Planning section, IDIU ; is that correct?
]Mr. Deax. To the best of my recollection, it is, Senator, but as I say,
I would have to check documents in my own office to remember the
accuracy of that and that is generally the way I recall it occurring, yes.
Senator Weicker. The first step, then, was taken in setting up the
structure?
Mr. Deax. Was that the first step ?
Senator Weicker. Yes, right.
Mr. Deax. I think the step, the first step, was the decision to take a
verv small part of the plan, the only part of the plan that was not
illegal, and begin with that. And then there was a series of correspond-
ence, and I believe I liad some meetings with Mr. Mitchell about this
in his office and we discussed some of these concepts.
Senator Weicker. Do you have any idea when those meetings took
place?
]Mr. Deax. Well, they would have occurred about the time that my
initial memorandum went over, either preceding it and so that followed
it. There was still resistance at this point in time on the part of the
FBI as to its participation in the unit and it was as a result of this
resistance by the FBI that ]Mr. Haldeman told me to talk to Mr.
^Mitchell about it and ]Mr. Haldeman also said, as I recall, that he was
willing to come over and talk to ]Mr. ^Mitchell himself about it if I
had any problem.
Senator Weicker. ]Mr. Chairman?
Senator Ervix. Do you wish to use one of these documents?
Senator Weicker. I would very specifically like to use the docu-
ment, ]Mr. Chairman, which is the letter sent by Mr. Dean to Mr.
Mitchell.
]Mr. ]\IcCaxdless. ]Mr. Chairman, is that one of the national security
documents ?
1060
Senator Ervin. Yes. I might state for the record that yesterday,
Senator Baker and myself, by authority of the unanimous vote of the
committee, sent the following letter to the White House :
June 25, 1973.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President: A former White House employee, John W. Dean III,
delivered to his honor. Judge John J. Sirica, Chief Judge of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, certain documents. Judge Sirica subsequently
ordered copies of these documents delivered to the Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities. These documents may be briefly described
as follows :
1. A docimient which is entitled "Special Report Interagency Committee Intel-
ligence," which constitutes a review of the systems by which foreign and domestic
intelligence is collected 'by the FBI, CIA, DIA, and NSA. Tliis document is 43
pages long, and is signed by the then heads of the four intelligence gathering
agencies.
2. A document entitled "Recommendations" which relates to operational re-
straints on intelligence collection. This document was apparently prepared in
June 1970, tout does not bear the day of the month on which it was finalized.
3. A memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Tom Charles Huston dated July
14, 1970.
4. A memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman dated August
5, 1970, which relates to domestic intelligence.
5. A memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman dated August
7, 1970, which is entitled "Domestic Intelligence Review."
6. A memorandum from John Dean to the Attorney General relating to the
Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit dated September 18, 1970, which bears
the notation that it was returned to John W. Dean by the Attorney General's
Office on March 3, 1972.
All of these documents are marked "Top Secret," except the memorandum from
Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman dated August 7, 1970, which is marked
"Confidential."
The committee agrees that the first numbered document relates in substantial
part to foreign intelligence, and ought not to be disclosed. It believes, however,
that all of the portions of the other documents which relate to domestic intelli-
gence or internal security should be released at the hearings, and for this reason,
the committee has unanimously authorized and directed us as chairman and vice
chairman to ask you forthwith to declassify them.
In addition, the committee has authorized and directed us to request that you
declassify two additional documents which have been printed in the New York
Times and the Washington Post, insofar as they relate to domestic intelligence
and internal security. These additional documents are as follows :
1. A decision memorandum dated July 15, 1970, bearing the title "Decision
Memorandum, The White House, Washington."
2. A document entitled "Organization and Operations of the Interagency Group
on Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security."
The committee desires to interrogate witnesses concerning these documents,
and for this reason, respectfully requests that you forthwith declassify them.
Sincerely yours,
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
Chairman,
Howard H. Baker, Jr.,
Vice Chairman.
Senator Er\t[x. This morning, I received the following letter.
The White House,
Washington, June 26. 1973.
Dear Senator Ervin : In a telephone discussion this morning with Mr. Rufus
Edmisten of your staff. Fred Buzhardt and I stated that the Senatf Select Com-
mittee should use its discretion with respect to the utilization of the documents
referred to in your letter to the President dated June 25. 1973. It is our under-
standing that the agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence
1061
areas have provided extensive advice to tlie Senate on these documents. In this
connection, Mr. Edmisten stated that the Committee intended to utilize only those
portions relating to domestic intelligence activities, and would not make public
any material referring to any foreign intelligence activities or capabilities.
5lr. Edmisten asked that I confirm this conversation to you in writing during
the luncheon recess, which I am pleased to do.
Senator ER^^x. Novr, as I understand it, Senator Weicker, you wish
to interrogate the witness about one of these documents and I would
suggest that in order to have the thing in consecutive order, that we
ask the witness if he can identify all of the copies of the documents
referred to in this letter.
Mr. Dean. I think, ]Mr. Chairman, that Senator Weicker is referring
to the memorandum that I wrote to the Attorney General.
Senator Ervix. Yes. Before you do, I would like to give you copies
of these papers.
]Mr. Deax. I would like to see them to refresh my recollection of
the documents.
Senator Ervix. We might give you copies of two other documents
which are not chissified. One is a memo to II. E. Ilaldeman from Tom
Charles Huston, dated August 25, 1970, referring to SACB appropria-
tions, and a memo to H. K. Haldeman from Torii Charles Huston dated
September 10, 1970, neither of which is classified.
Mr. Shaffer. May we have permission to look at them, Senator ? We
have never seen them before.
Senator Er\t:x. Yes.
In other words, preliminary to Senator Weicker continuing his
examination. I want you to identify all the documents and order them
admitted into the record. The question then that will be asked of INIr.
Dean is whether or not he can identify these documents as having been
copies of documents which he delivered to Judge Sirica and which
Judge Sirica ordered delivered to this committee.
Mr. Shaffer. Senator, just out of an abundance of caution, I would
like to advise the chairman that, although his lawyers participated in
the delivery of the documents to Judge Sirica, it was done by Mr.
Dean placing the documents in a safe deposit box and the keys then
being delivered to the court and the docimients never came into our
possession, nor did we see them.
Senator Baker. ]\Ir. Chairman, do I understand Mr. Shaffer to say
that in an abundance of caution, he wishes to indicate that he and ]Mr.
McCandless ha^e not previously received possession of these docu-
ments ?
Mr. Shaffer. That is right.
Senator Baker. I think it would be a]:)propriate, Mr. Chairman, if
you concur to state that on behalf of the committee, we think it is
desirable and essential for counsel to be able to confer now with Mr.
Dean on these documents on our authority.
Senator Ervix. I agree with you absolutely.
The committee will take a recess or stand at ease until the attorneys
and Mr. Dean can confer about these documents.
[Recess.]
Senator Ervix. Everyone take your seats, please.
Can you identify those documents, as being true copies, with certain
deletions of matters relatino- to foreign intelligence, as being copies of
the documents you delivered to Judge Sirica ?
1062
Mr. Dean. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Xos. 35 thru 42.*]
Senator Ervin. There is one other document. I am groing to ask INIr.
George INIurphy, Deputy Director of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, who has had custody of these documents since they were
delivered by Judge Sirica's order to this committee, to show you an-
other document which is not inchided among those copies, and ask if
you can identify that document handed you by Mr. Murphy as being
one of the documents you delivered to Judge Sirica.
Mr. Dean. This is a copy of the original.
Senator Er\t[n. A copy.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator EnAaN. Yes. Does it have some identification mark?
Mr. Dean. Yes. It is a Special Report Interagency Committee on
Intelligence Ad Hoc dated June 1970 with the chairman indicated
J. Edgar Hoover, with a classification on it.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 43 for identifica-
tion only and is not for publication.]
Senator ER^^N. You can return that to Mr. Murphy now.
Mr. Dean. It has top secret comment classification on it.
Senator Er\^n. I want to take this occasion to thank Mr. Murphy,
the Deputy Director of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, for
acting as custodian of these documents since they were delivered to us
by Judge Sirica and for the great help which he has given to the coni-
niittee in respect to the contents of the documents and respect to their
sensitive nature. We cannot thank you too much, Mr. Murphy. I am
going to ask you to retain jurisdiction of the originals of these docu-
ments and also we have no copy of that first document there.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Er\^n. The committee is anxious to avoid disclosing any
matters which affect national security, which are matters defined as
matters relating to national defense or relating to our relations with
other nations and for this reason we will not make this first document
public.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word in that respect ?
Senator ER^^N. Yes.
Senator Baker. I, too, would like to join in commending Mr. Mur-
phy who, in addition to being Deputy Director of the Joint Atomic
Energy Committee staff, is the security officer of the Atomic Energy
Committee.
I am a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and while
we are going along with bread and butter, I would like to thank Con-
gressman Mel Price, who is Chairman, for consenting to the additional
burden on the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to assure
the storage of these documents was done in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
Senator Er\t[n. One other question and then I will turn you back to
Senator Weicker. How^ did you get possession of these documents,
including the one that Mr. Murphy retained custody of ?
Mr. Dean. The docvmients w^ere originally in the possession of Mr.
Tom Huston, who had been assigned, I believe, directly by the Presi-
dent to work on this project. Wlien I came on the White House staff
*See pp. 1319-1338.
1063
Mr. Huston was placed on my staff and was on my staff for some time.
I had a general awareness of the fact that he was working on this proj-
ect but none of the specifics. At the time Mr. Huston was departing
the start' he turned over the documents to me that I had possession of.
Some of the documents that are contained, and I maintained in the file,
I had never seen before the time he turned tliem oa cr to me. The only —
I had seen the basic documents shortly after I joined the White House
start' when Mr. Haldeman told me that Mr. Huston had been working
to get the plan implemented, but there were some difliculties in imple-
mentation. That is basically how I came in contact with the matter.
Senator Ervix. Have you had the physical custody of these papers
since that time?
]Mr. Deax. Well. I had them until I took them and placed them in a
safety deposit box under an instruction of Senator ]\Iansfield that any-
thing that might have any bearing on this entire matter should be
preserved.
Senator Emax. Senator Weicker, you may resume your examina-
tion. I thought it was wise to bring all of the documents in evidence
that we think ought to be put there.
Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now. j\Ir. Dean, would you be good enough then to read to the com-
mittee the memorandum from you to ]Mi-. Mitchell which, I believe —
now, I have got to rely on my memory of several months' time since
I liave seen these things, dated in September 1970 ; is that correct ?
Mr. Deax. September 18, 1970.
Senator Weicker. September 18.
Mr. Deax [reading].
^lemorandiim For the Attorney General :
Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, September 17, 1970, I suggest the fol-
lowing procedures to commence our domestic intelligence oi>eration as quickly as
iiossible.
1. Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit. A key to the entire operation will
be the creation of an interagency intelligence unit for both operational and evalua-
tion purposes. Obviously, the selection of persons to this unit will be of vital
importance to the success of the mission. As we discussed, the selection of the
personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step for several reasons. First,
effective coordination of the different agencies must be developed at an early stage
through the establishment of the unit. Second. Hoover has indicated a strong
opposition to the creation of such a unit and. to bring the FBI fully on board,
this seems an appropriate first step to guarantee their proper and full participa-
tion in the program. Tliird, the unit can serve to make appropriate recommenda-
tions for the type of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the
various agencies. In regard to this third point, I believe we agreed that it would
be inapnronriate to have anv blanket removal of restrictions: rather, the most
appropriate procedure would be to decide on the tyjie of intelligence we need,
based on an assessment of tlie recommendations of this unit, and then to proceed
to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence.
To proceed to create the interRgency intelligence unit, jiarticularly the evalu-
ation srroup or committee. I recommend that we request the names of four nomi-
nees from each of the intelligence agencies involved. "Wliile the precise composi-
tion of the unit may vary as we giin exnerience, I think that two members
should be anpointed initinlly from each agency in addition to your personal
representative who should also be involved in the proceedinss. Because of the
interagency a^nects of this reouest. it would ])robably be best if the request came
from the White House. If you asree. I will make such a request of the acenc.v
heads: however, I feel that it is essential th.Tt yon work this out with Hoover
before I have any den lines with him directly.
2. Housing. We di'^cussed the approprinte hou.c'ns: of this o))er!)tion and, upon
reflection, I believe that rather than a White House staffer looking for suitable
1064
space, that a professional intelligence person should be assigned the task of locat-
ing such space. Accordingly, I would suggest that a request be made that Mr.
Hoover assign an agent to this task. In connection with the bousing problem, I
think serious consideration must be given to the appropriate Justice Department
cover for the domestic intelligence operation. We discussed yesterday using IDIU
as a cover and as I indicated I believe that that is a mosit appropriate cover. I
believe that it is generally felt that IDIU is already a far more extensive intelli-
gence operation than has been mentioned publicly, and that the IDIU operation
cover would eliminate the problem of discovering a new intelligence operation in
the Department of Justice. However, I have reservations about the i^ersonnel in
IDIU and its present operation activities and would suggest that they either be
given a minor function within tlie new intelligence operation or that the staff be
completely removed. I have had only incidental dealings with the personnel, other
than Jim Devine, and cannot speak to their discretion and loyalty for .such an
operation. I do not believe that Jim Devine is capable of any major position
vplthin the new intelligence operation. However, I do believe that he could help
perpetuate the cover and he has evidenced a loyalty to you, the Deputy and
other key people in the Department of Justice, despite his strong links with the
prior Administration. I would defer to your judgment, of course, on any recom-
mendation regarding Jim Devine's continued presence in such an intelligence
operation.
3. Assistant to Attorney General. We also discussed the need for you to have
a right hand man to assist in running this operation. It would seem that what
is needed is a man with administrative skills, a sensitivity to the implications of
the current radical and subversive movements within the United States, and
preferably, some background in intelligence work. To maintain the cover, I would
think it appropriate for the man to have a law degree in that he will be a part
of the Department of Justice. You suggested the possibility of using a prosecutor
who had had experience with cases of this type. Accordingly, I have spoken
with Harlington Wood to ask him to submit the names of five Assistant U.S.
Attorneys who have had experience in dealing with demonstrations or riot type
cases and who are mature individuals that might be appropriately given a sensi-
tive assignment in the Department of Justice. I did not discuss the matter in any
further detail with Wood other than to request the submission of some nominees.
I w^ould also like to suggest that we request names from the various intelligence
agencies involved for personnel that might be appropriately involved in this
activity or w'ho might serve as your assistant.
In summary, I recommend the following immediate action :
(1) You meet with Hoover, explain what must be done, and request his
nominees for the interagency unit.
(2) You request that Hoover assign an agent to the task of locating
appropriate housing for the operations.
(3) I request that other involved intelligence agencies submit nominees
for the interagency unit.
(4)1 request from the agencies names of appropriate personnel for assign-
ment to the operation.
Finally, I would suggest that you call weekly meetings to monitor the problems
as they emerge and to make certain that we are moving this program into imple-
mentation as quickly as possible.
It was signed, and had a note at the bottom.
Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that if you would like him to join you
in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy to do so.
Senator Weicker. Thank yon, Mr, Dean.
Now, this, in other words, refers to that portion of yonr statement
yesterday where von sav : "I wrote a memorandnm reqiiestinpf that the
Evahiation Committee be established and that the strings conld be
removed hater. I tokl Haldeman that the only way to proceed would
be one step at a time and this would be an important first step and he
agreed."
jNIr. De.vx. That is correct.
I miffht footnote that with the remark that T was quite aware of a
.ofreat interest in the matter,, and after some discussions with Mr.
Huston, who still had a hope that the entire plan would be adopted,
1065
I had reached the conchision that there was no way the whole plan
was going to be adopted and that the only thing that was essential
was the lEC and that this wonld satisfy everybody that we were at
least doing something to solve the problem and this was a first step
that seemed to solve or to resolve that pressure with everybody.
Senator Weicker. So. after this memorandum was written, you pro-
ceeded to set up the lEC insofar as the structure, the placing of it, in
the Internal Security Division, is that correct?
Mr. Deax. I think what happened is, and I am not terribly familiar
witli the mechanics of how this actually did occur, I believe that Mr.
Mitchell did have a coTivei^ation with ]Mr. Hoover and reached some
agreement as to their participation. I don't know how the decision
was made to place it in the Internal Security unit, but I did learn
about it at some point because they told me they had space that they
had set aside in the Internal Security unit's office, which was separate
and apart from the Department of Justice, the main Department of
Justice.
And I had learned that Mr. Doherty would be sort of the man that
would be heading the operation initially.
Senator AVeicker. INIay I ask you this question in relation to Mr.
Doherty?
Was there any discussion at this time about this unit's first head
being ]\Ir. Earl Sharp?
Mr. Deax. Yes, there was.
]\Ir. Ehrlichman was aware of this as well and Judge Sharp, who
was a friend of Mr. Ehrlichman's, apparently had been — as I recall,
he was an elective judge and he either hadn't been reelected or some-
thing of that nature, an appointment had run out, and he was not
currently sitting on the bench anywhere, and ^Ir. Ehrlichman thought
this would be an excellent thing for him to do and invited him to
come to Washington.
We had a number of meetings on it and the more he looked at it,
the less he decided he wanted to get involved in it.
Senator Weicker. So that the first head was Mr. John Doherty?
Mr. Deax. I believe that is correct.
Senator Weicker. Did you hold anv discussions in 3'our office with
Mr. Sharp or Mr. Doherty'relative to the lEC ?
Mr. Deax. I am sure probably with both individuals, yes.
Senator Weicker. And what other persons would have been present
at those meetings ?
Mr. Deax. Well, I can't recall anybody else being present when I
talked to Judofe Sharp. 1 know that — I do recall tha*" when he decided
that he wasn't interested, because, one, he felt he didn't know much
about this field, that he would have a whole education to become ac-
quainted with it — I think he spent a couple of weeks looking into the
matter, I think he learned that it was going to be some sort of, going
to be a secret operation that he would be running in the Department
of Justice and he wanted to be able to explain iust what he was doing
with people back home and he didn't want to have to say, I can't tell
3'ou what I am doing in Washington.
We had a number of discussions about other assignments for him
and he did some very valuable legal work for my office in connection
with some trade matters that had come to my office for resolution.
96-296 0-73-11
1066
Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Dean, then Mr. Doherty was the first
head and he was succeeded by whom ?
Mr. Dean. I believe by Mr. Wells.
Senator Weicker. By Mr. Bernard Wells ?
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Senator Weicker. All right.
So from the time of your memorandum at the time of your talk
with Haldeman as to the setting up of the mechanics of the operation,
administering of details of the operation, does it come as any surprise
to you, that listed under the Office of Analysis and Planning in the
Internal Security Division of the Justice Department as of April 15,
1972, is a listing of Bernard Wells, Executive Director, IDII"'. with
Mr. James McGrath and Joyce Webb listed under that ?
Is this basically, then, the plan that is suggested in your memoran-
dum to John Mitchell ?
The ink marks and the scribblings are mine and my staff's.
Mr. Dean. I can't glean an awful lot from this chart.
Senator Weicker. There is no mention of lEC there, is there ?
Mr. Dean. No, there is not, and the documents that all came to me
were clearly marked "lEC" on them when they came over.
Senator Weicker. And they came over from ^Ir. Wells ?
Mr. Dean. They came over from Mr. Wells.
Senator Weicker. Would you read to the committee what Mr. Wells
is listed as in that document ?
Mr. Dean. Executive Director, IDIU.
Senator Weicker. You have also stated that to the best of your
knowledge, no illegal activities were conducted by the lEC ? I would
like to get into the matter of your contacts. Let me ask you one ques-
tion before you go on to your contacts with the Internal Security
Division.
Statements have been made tliat there was a rescission by the Presi-
dent of the 1970 plan. "WHiy all this business ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, at one point — I do not know about the
rescission. That is something that I do not know. I knew tliat tliei'e
was a squabble going on between principally Mr. Huston, representing
the White House, and the FBI. Mr. Huston talked to me on a number
of occasions about the matter. I knew that Mr. Mitchell, when I talked
with him about it, both telephonically and when I met with him, was
opposed to the grand plan that is in that manual, and I think what
Mitchell and I decided was the best course was to do the minimum
amount possible that might satisfv people that something was being
done. And that was to create the lEC.
Senator Weicker. Now, it is possible, then, that one of two things
might have happened. Either there could have been a rescission by the
President, the word of which rescission you never received. That is a
possibility, is it not ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I note that their memorandum in here tliat follow
the date of the memorandum I sent and memorandum I had not seen,
and I recall that ]Mr. Huston was still trying to do something about
this, even after I sent that memorandum.
Senator Weicker. Yes, but let me
Mr. Dean. So to answer your question, it is very i'>ossil)le that I
would not have been aware of, in fact, I was not aware at all of a
rescission.
1067
Senator Weickek. It is also possible there was no rescission.
Mr. Dean. And I was not aware in full of an approval. I had a
general awareness that, you know, I was told to see what you can do to
get this plan implemented.
Senator AVeicker. But insofar as your firsthand knowledge, and that
is all I am interested in
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. You did implement the first step of the plan ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. Xow, could you tell this committee in your own
words of any other contacts that you had with the Internal Security
Division insofar as information that could have a political value? Did
you have any contacts with the Internal Security Division yourself?
Mr. Deax. As I mentioned in my statement, there was a continual
request for information regarding demonstrations and particularly
information that would embarrass individuals in connection with their
relationship with demonstrators or demonstration leaders. The princi-
pal liaison
Senator "Weicker. Outside of the area of demonstrations, did any
information come to you from the Internal Security Division which
could have a political value ?
'Sir. Deax. I am sure it could have, but without looking at my files,
it is impossible for me to remember what might be.
Senator "Weicker. Did vou have any direct contact with Division 5
of the FBI?
Mr. Deax. Division 5 of the FBI ?
Senator "Weicker. That is Mr. Sullivan's division.
Mr. Deax. I knew Ylr. Sullivan, but I do not recall haying any con-
tact with him when he was at the Internal Security Division.
Senator "Weicker. All right ; with the CIA ?
Mr. Deax. No.
Senator Weicker. With the Metropolitan Police ?
Mr. Deax. I talked to them — in connection with demonstrations, I
had a number of conversations with the ^Metropolitan Police. In fact,
I had on my telephone, I had a number of private lines that would go
directly to "command posts that were concerned with demonstrations.
There was one that went to the Defense Department, there was one
that went to the Justice Department, to what I should call the old
IDTU Unit, which did become operational at demonstration time. I
had contact, a telephone line to the Mavor's command post, and one to
the Secret Service command post. So during demonstrations, I did
receive information from all those places.
Senator Weicker. To ffet over this particular area of inquiry, and I
do not want to prolonq- it. insofar as Division 5, the CIA, the Metro-
politan Police, military intelligence
Mr. Deax. I am not aware of where the intelligence
Senator Weicker. Did vou receive any information from these en-
tities which was of a political nature — and I do not consider informa-
tion on demonstrations to be of a political nature : it is somethinor that
could be applied to all sides — but that could be useful politically?
Mr. Deax. Senator, I wouVl like to be able to tell vou that I can
vocalk but T cannot recall and what the answer mi^-ht be to resolve the
question is that the committee mi^ht want to go throuQ-h my files and
see what is in there and that would answer the question. Because I have
1068
not destroyed any documents and anything I received would be there.
My files, of course, are still locked up in the basement of the White
House.
Senator Weicker. All right. Let us move on to your comment on
page 14, where you refer to your conversation with Mr. ]\Iardian.
It was not until almost a year or more later that I learned the reason for Mar-
dian's trip to see the President. Mr. Mardian later told me, in a social conversa-
tion, that he had gone to .see the President to get instructions regarding the
disposition of wiretap logs that related to newsmen and White House staffers
who were suspected of leaking.
Now, can you expand on the conversation which you had with
Robert Mardian at that time ?
Mr. Dean. To the best of my recollection, the conversation was a
very, very minor part of a very rambling conversation when I recalled
the fact that we had gone to San Clemente together and had gone to
visit a friend of his in San Clemente and spent some time together. I
was out there for one purpose — that was to turn off a burglary of the
Brookings Institution. He told me that he could not tell me what he
was out there for. I recall he went down to San Clemente at the same
time I did and I waited for him to have his meeting. He did not tell
me after the meetings what had occurred. Then it was in recounting
the fact that our visit with this friend of his out in California, when I
finally asked him, I said. Avell, what in the world were you doing out in
California ? He said, Avell, there were some wiretaps and I had gotten
the logs from Sullivan and I had to get instructions on what to do with
them and I was told to give them to Ehrlichman.
It was a very fleeting conversation, but it stuck in my memory.
Senator Weicker. All right. You then say, you have in your state-
ment, since I had occasion to raise a question about these logs with
Ehrlichman during the fall of 1972, what was that occasion ?
Mr. Dean. I tried to recall that as I was preparing my statement
and something did occur in which I asked Ehrlichman directly about
the loirs and I cannot recall specificallv what it was. Again it wasn't
something that was of the moment of the Time magazine inquiry but
it was a reference to something about newsmen. There had been on
the rumor mill at the White House for some time this fact that the
White House had instructed a surveillance of White House staff mem-
bers and newsmen in dealing with leaks and I asked Ehrlichman about
it. I said "Do you have the logs?'' and he said "Xo." And I let it drop
at that.
Senator Weicker. Even though at that moment in time
Mr. Dean. I knew he had the logs.
Senator Weicker. You were under the impression from a talk with
Mr. Mardian that he did have the logs. You had the logs?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. I beg you pardon, he had the logs ?
Mr. Dean, Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Then comes February 22 or 23 of this year, and
to paraphra.se vour testimonv I gather vou were placed in position of
trying to find out about the leaks with the FBI relative to a potential
Time magazine story?
Mr. Dean. That is rieht.
Senator Weicker. So you interviewed Mr. Sullivan ?
1069
'Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. Would you describe to the committee the nature
of that interview ?
Mr. Deax. After I learned of the inquiry, I called Mr. Mark Sul-
livan or Mr. Mark Felt and asked him, first of all, if in fact it were
true because I had never had a confirmation from anyone; I thought
I ought to get a direct confirmation. He told me "Do you really want
to know V' and I said "Yes, I think I should know," and he told me that,
'•Yes, it had occurred,'" and said that "Bill Sullivan has all the facts on
this. He was involved in it and he knows all those facts." I then asked
Felt if he knew how it had leaked and he said he didnt have any idea.
I then called Sullivan and told him that, I asked him if he would
come to my office, and he did come to my office, and I said that I had
this inquiry from the press office i^garding this and I had some in-
formation that in fact it had happened, and I wondered what the facts
were, and Mr. Sullivan then recounted the fact that he had been in-
volved in this and told me that he had at one point gotten the most
trusted people in the "Washington field office to undertake the function.
That subsequently he had, when Director Hoover was trying to get
copies of the logs that he had either before that time or contemporane-
ously with this time, he had told the Washington field office people
to destroy all of the other logs so it ended up there was one set of logs
and related memorandums that were in the custody of Sullivan, and
there was some removal of these persons' instructions and I don't have
all these details because Sullivan didn't give them to me, and give them
to Mardian, and INIardian had possession of them appar-^ntly at the time
he went to the west coast to get instructions as to what he was to do
with them.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Dean, let me be very clear here so we try to
put this story together. You were informed earlier in 1972 by Mr.
Mardian that he has in his possession the logs of the Kissinger taps,
is that correct ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct, No, not that he has them, that he had
turned them over.
Senator AVeicker. He had received them and he had turned them
over to Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. And then in 1973 in an interview with Mr. Sulli-
van, Mr. Sullivan indicated to you that the taps were accomplished
by the Washington field office of the FBI. That they had a set of the
logs and the taps, he had a set of the logs and taps or the logs and the
summaries, I beg your pardon, the logs and summaries.
Mr. Deax. Yes, that Sullivan had them in. No, Sullivan told me that
he had turned them over to Mardian.
Xow one or the other, at the time that the Time magazine inquiry
came in there was also an effort, to determine how this had leaked and
that was very much a part of the conversation I had with Sullivan as
to how this could leak, and I recall discussing with Sullivan also who
else knew about this, and he told me that he thought that Hoover had
told and he mentioned the name of the person and I cannot recall it at
this time, and this person, in turn, had mentioned that he understood
to Governor Rockefeller and Governor Eockefeller in turn told Dr.
Kissinger. Also in dealing with Mr. Felt I had asked him if he had
1070
any idea how it had leaked because there was concern as to what the
source of the story was as well as the leak.
Senator Weicker. Did Mr. Sullivan indicate to you that summaries
of the logs had gone to several persons in the White House j
Mr. Dean. When I was dealing with Sulli\an, he didn't seem to
know the final disposition of the logs and we didn't discuss whether the
logs had gone over to the White House at that time, during the time
that they were, the wiretaps were being taken.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Dean, I am not talking about the final dis-
position of the logs and summaries but rather where the summaries of
the logs went at the time that they were being done.
Mr. Dean. No, sir, Sullivan did not tell me where they had gone, to
the best — ^I have no recollection of that and I think I would have
remembered it.
Senator Weicker. I mean be very careful on this point. He indicated
to you, No. 1, according to the testimony that you set down to the best
of your recollection that Mr. Hoover disapproved of these particular
set of taps, is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. That is the impression I had. I liad been told sometime
before after Mr. Mardian left the Department of Justice and went
to the reelection committee that sometliing had to be done for Bill
Sullivan. Now he always worked on the assumption that I knew that
Sullivan had done some very important thing for the White House.
I was never clear on exactly what it was that Mr. Sullivan had done
that the White House owed him some favor for. But I can recall on
repeated occasions this coming up and also it came up with respect to
a man by the name of Mr. Brennan and who was with the FBI. I was
somewhat on the periphery of this and was never quite clear and tlie
best I can do now I am just trying to put together the tidbits of knowl-
edge that I did have.
Senator Weicker. Well, you interviewed ISIr. Sullivan yourself as to
his involvement in the Kissinger tap situation ?
]\Ir. Dean. Yes, I did.
Senator Weicker. And I just want to make sure what it is that — —
Mr, Dean. I think if you were to talk to Mr. Sullivan he would call
I was most interested in how it had leaked because ]Mr. Felt had told
me in fact it had happened. I was, of course, aware of the taps occur-
ring because of the information that ]Mardian had given me and I do
not recall exactly when Mardian had told me this but I was merely
collecting a wliole series of tidbids of information as mucli information
at the Wliite House that did come to me was through tidbits, ]My im-
mediate focus at the time I was dealing with Sullivan was how in the
world we were going to deal with the story that was in Time magazine
and after I collected the information I was able to collect as to who
did know I called Ehrlichman and told him the facts and he said
"Deny it."
Senator Weicker. Did he tell you who prepared the summaries of
the logs ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; he did not.
Senator Weicker. ]Mr. Chairman. T tliink one point that I would like
to make clear here is that I have had a rather lengthy discussion witli
^Ir. Sullivan on the subject matter which is being discussed here now. I
know that it would not be fair for me to state what the substance of
1071
that conversation was, I would much prefer to have it with INIr. Sulli-
van and I would hope when we are throug:h with this particular wit-
ness we will give Mr. Sullivan the opportunity to explain his particular
ix)le in this matter.
In your talk with Mr. Sullivan, or in j^our contacts with him, was he
ever requested to prepare a memorandum relative to FBI involvement
with other Presidents insofar as the political aspects were concerned?
Mr. Dean. Yes, he was. As I mentioned that in my statement, when
I had mentioned to the President the fact that I had met with INIr.
Sullivan and he had alluded to other activities by the FBI over the
preceding jGurs the President was very interested and asked me to
obtain the information from Mr. Sullivan, and on several times I
asked ISIr. Sullivan if he could put this into documentary form, and
he said he could. He himself typed out a memorandum that contained
his best recollection of some of the political uses that have been made
of the FBI by preceding administrations. That was originally one of
my submissions to the committee and it is a classified document by
Mr. Sullivan himself. He told me it was going to have to be declassified
before it could be turned over but by the reference to it in my state-
ment I meant to call it to tlie attention of the committee and the com-
mittee is certainly welcome to have that document.
Senator Wetcker. All right. Is there any other use that you made
or the Wliite House made of the FBI on matters that come to your
recollection now?
Mr. Deax. I can recall again, after the fact, getting involved in a
situation that involved an FBI investigation that was made of Mr.
Daniel Schorr, and when I learned about that after the fact I was
told that what had happened is that Mr. Higby, who was Mr. Halde-
man's assistant, had received a request from Mr. Haldeman when he
was traveling with the President, to direct the FBI to do an investi-
sration of ]Mr. Schorr. Mr. Hoover proceeded with the investigation
but, to the dismav of the ^^^lite House, he did a sort of a full field
wide-onen investigation, and this became verv apparent. So this put
tlio White House in a rather scrambling position to explain what had
hapnened. The long and short of the explanation was that Mr. Malik,
who at the time knew nothing about this said that Mr. Schorr was
]>eing considered for a post and that this was a part of a preliminary
investigation in consideration of Mr. Schorr for a Presidential
appointment in, I believe, the environmental field.
Senator "Wetcker. All right. Anv other instances that you recollect
as to the use of the FBI by the A^Hiite House along these lines?
Let me give you a broad range, mark these down so you do not have
to remember them, this type of situation that either involved the FBI
or the Internal Revenue Service, CIA, ^Military Intelligence, Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms, Secret Service.
Mr. Deax. Let me start from the bottom of the list back. I do recall,
and I mentioned in mv statement a rather broad reference to the fact
that intelligence came from surprising sources sometimes. At one point
one of the top officials at the Secret Service brought me a small intel-
ligence printout regardino- Senator ]McGovern and just left it with
me and said "I thought that this might be of interest to you."
1072
It had to do with Mr. — with Senator McGovern attending a fund-
raising function, I believe in Philadelphia, and apparently there were
some references in the intelligence statement to the fact that either
Communist, former Communist supporters were going to attend the
fund raiser.
I took the document to Mr. Colson and I said, "Are you interested
in this? I assume it was given to me not to bury in my files," but I
said, "I do not think you can reveal the source of the information."
He said, "I am very interested in it." He took it and later told me
he had made arrangements to have it published.
Now, with regard to the ATF, Mr. Caulfield was at ATF after he
left the White House and going by way of the reelection committee,
and from time to time I would send over tidbits of information regard-
ing individuals. Some of this might be reflected in my files because I
cannot recall ever doing anything with this information other than
filing it.
The CIA, I do not recall myself receiving anything that we might
call politically embarrassing information from the CIA about any in-
dividual. The memoranda I received from the CIA were straight
classified documents regarding activities of some antiwar demon-
strators or people traveling to Hanoi and things of this nature. Also,
foreign funding of domestic radical groups and things of this nature
which I would forward generally to Dr. Kissinger or General Haig.
With regard to the FBI, I mentioned that — IRS, I think that you
will find in either exhibit 34—5 or possibly maybe 34-6 reference to some
use of the Internal Eevenue Service and requesting information or
dealing with situations in regard to the Internal Revenue Service.
I am also aware of the fact that after an article was published on
Mr. Rebozo I got instructions that one of the authors of that article
should have some problems. I did not know how to deal directly with
the situation. I discussed it with Mr. Caulfield. I was reluctant to call
Mr. Walters, who was the head of the Internal Revenue Service and
suggest that he do anything about this. Mr. Caulfield apparently had
friends in Internal Revenue Service and I believe he told me he was
able to accomplish an audit on the individual. What the consequence
of the audit was I do not know.
Senator Weicker. "Who is the individual ?
Mr. Dean. I do not recall for certain. It was one of the, I think it
was one of the Newsday persons who worked on a rather extensive
article on INIr. Rebozo.
Senator Weicker. All right.
Are there any other instances of which you have firsthand knowl-
edge in this
Mr. Dean. As I say, if I were to spend a week or so in my files, I
could probably on chapter and verse everything that had come to my
office in this regard.
But I am trying to come off the top and tell you what I can recall off
the top.
Senator Weicker. I would hope, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Chairman, that
Mr. Dean would do just tliat and refresh his recollections as to whether
there is anything further that he has been unable to come forth with
at this time.
1073
Mr. Dean. The "White House has made an arrangement whereby I
can go to my files, but I nuist say it is a ratlier awkward arrangement.
There are some five file cabinets that are all safes and there is no desk
in the room to work and I must work under the supervision of a Secret
Service agent and there is no place to sit down with any comfort in
writing, so it is a little difficult to get in there and do anything.
Hopefully, if I were to do that, we can make arrangements so 1 can
get in and spend the time that would be necessary to go through the
files.
The other thing is, of course, I have to do this all by handwriting,
because I am not allowed to make any copies of anything in my files.
Senator Weicker. I see.
Just briefly— and this will end my questioning, and I apologize to
the committee for taking so much time, but it is a subject that I confess
I don't have every last bit of information on. It is a difficult thing to
piece together, but I think it is a very important part of the story. I
think it has become clear this afternoon that another step has been
taken, another step further along the road from testimony that Mr.
McCord gave, whereupon he was receiving information from the In-
ternal Security Division; another step wherein, at least insofar as the
structure of the plan of 1970, which included bugging, breaking in,
burglary and the like, and the mechanics and the administration was
concerned, that the first step was taken ; and also, that even though
that particular unit did not invoH'e itself in any illegal activities, cer-
tainly the security arms of the U.S. Government were in various in-
stances which you have cited utilized for purposes not intended.
Would that be a fair summation of what we are talking about?
IMr. Dean. I am not njiite sure of the end of vour summation there.
I wonder if you could repeat. You said that security arms were used — —
Senator Weicker. That is correct. Even though the lEC itself did
not engage in any illeiral activities, do you consider the m.atters that
you have spoken of, whether it be an FBI investigation of an individ-
ual or an I"RS audit, to be legal and proper activities by those security
arms?
Mr. Dean. As I say, I don't know of the lEC itself preparing
I'tolitical material.
Senator Weicker. I understand.
]Mr. Dean. I do. of course, kriow and as I have submitted in docu-
ments, other agencies were involved in seekinjr politically embarrassing
information on individuals who were tliought to be the enemies of the
"\^^lite House.
I might also add that in mv possession is a rather, verv much down
the line to what you are talking about, is a memorandum that was
requested by me to prepare a means to attack the enemies of the "^^Hiite
House.
There was also maintained what was called an enemies list, which
was rather extensire and continually being updated.
Senator Weicker. I am not going to ask who was on it. I am afraid
vou mi.frht answer.
I wonder, are these documents in the possession of the committee?
1074
Mr, Dean. No, but I would be happy to submit them to the com-
mittee. They didn't fit within the request that I had with counsel as to
the documents he wished to have produced, but if the committee does
wish them, I will be happy to submit them.*
Mr. Dash. My. Chairman, I think the committee would like very
much to have a copy of that memorandum.
Mr. Dean. All rif^ht, sir.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, ]Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator ]Montoya.
Senator jNIoxtoya. Thaiik you, Mr. Chairman.
j\Ir. Dean, you mentioned in yesterday's testimony about the brief-
ings that were being given to ]Mr. Ziegler prior to his making public
statements with respect to this situation involving the break-in at the
Watergate.
Now, will you please give me a little more information as to the
intensity or the extent of these briefings ?
INIr. Dean. I think that the intensity would depend upon the subject
matter at a given point in time. The one I have pointed out was the
October 10 situation when the Segretti story began breaking. I was
not always present when Mr. Ziegler was being prepared but was often
asked questions by him on how to handle a question or the like.
"When stories started leaking in various areas, at that point in time.
I was particularly asked what we may expect next. At one point in
time, I recall when Mr. Baldwin's testimony was printed in the Los
Angeles Times, I read the FBI interview of Mr. Baldwin to see if in
fact, everything that he had told the Times had yet been printed. We
talked about that.
Often Mr. Moore was present when I was with ]Mr. Ziegler and
i:)reparing him for his morning briefing. Often, he would clieck with
Mr. Haldeman if the story related directly to him or particularly with
Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator Montoya. INIr. Dean, I am referring specifically to the brief-
ing that Mr. Ziegler received with respect to the responses which he
made about White House involvement in the Watergate affair.
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I believe I cataloged many of those in my
statement.
Now, some of those occurred before Mr. Ziegler and I had even
talked about the matter.
Senator Montoya. Wlio would ordinarily brief him? Would it be
Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman, or who would approve his state-
ment?
Mr. Dean. It would be Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, or the
President.
Senator Montoya. I notice that the President also made some state-
ments. Wlio briefed the President prior to his making these statements
with respect to inquiries about the Watergate and the White House
involvement ?
Mr. Dean. "What would happen or what occurs before Presidential
press conferences, a briefing book is prepared and a number of people
contribute to tliat briefing book as to anticipated questions. The people
who are familiar with the press and anticipated questions that tlie
*Thp flocnments rofprred to y:erc lator submitted in hearing of June 27 and will appear
in Book 4 as exhibits Nos. 44 thru 56.
1075
press might ask will send around to various members of the staff
suggested questions and ask for their suggested answers. These often
go to several people. Oftentimes, the "Watergate questions would come
to me. Oftentimes, they would come to Dick Moore as well and each
person, in fact. Dick Moore and I would often sit down and work
them out together and then take them to ISIr. Buchanan, who was
compiling this briefing book.
Senator Moxtoya. Would you say that you participated in most of
the briefings where the President made positive statements about the
"Watergate affair?
^fr. Deax. I would say I either contributed to the briefing book or
later, when I began meeting with the President in ]\Iarch, had direct
conversations with him when he asked me about a reaction to a par-
ticular question.
Senator Moxtoya. Now, let's go into the statements made by the
President — ^I have copies here. On August 29, 1972, the President made
this statement:
In addition to that, within our own staff, under my direction, counsel to the
President, Mr. Dean, has conducted a complete investigation of all leads which
might involve any present members of the White House staff or anybody in the
government. I can say categorically that his investigation indicates that no one
in the White House staff, no one in this administration presently employed, was
involved in this very bizarre incident.
Xow, did you participate in that?
]Mr. Deax. Xo. sir, not at all. I was totally unaware of it and do
not know who did prepare that for the President.
Senator ]Moxtoya. "\Yas the President telling the truth when he
made that statement ?
]Mr. Deax. "Well, as I said in my statement yesterday, I would have
counseled the President against the statement and I cited the reasons
why I would have counseled the President against the statement be-
cause of the knowledge I had as to the fact that documents had been
destroyed that were incriminating to ]Mr. Haldeman; the fact that I
had suspicions about other people's involvement.
As I said yesterdav also, if that were to be a literal statement as
to somebody being involved in the very particular incident which
occurred on June 17. which, the wav it reads, does not indicate that,
but if it originally was designed to do that, that would have been a
true statement.
Otherwise, I think it was a little broad.
Senator ]Moxtoya. Now, on October 5, 1972, the President made this
statement
Senator Er\tx. "We have a vote. "We will recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Emix. Senator, you may proceed with the interrogation.
Senator Moxtoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dean, now I ask vou about the press conference of October 5,
1972. held by the President, and I quote from his press conference as
follows:
Incidentally, I conducted the investigation of the Hiss case. I know that is
a very unpopular subject to raise in some quarters, but I conducted it. It was
successful. The FBI did a magnificent job, but that investigation involving the
security of this eountrv was basically a Sunday school exercise compared to the
1076
amount of effort that was put into this — meaning the Watergate — I agreed with
the amount of effort that was put into it. I wanted every lead carried out to the
end, because I wanted to be sure that no member of the White House staff and
no man or woman in a position of management responsibility in the Committee
for Re-Electiou had anything to do with this kind of reprehensible activity.
Now, would you say that the President was correct in making those
statements at that time?
Mr. Dean. I can say this, Senator. I certainly did not brief him or
prepare anything for the briefing book that would have led him to
make that statement. And I can also say once the indictments were
handed down, it became the^ — what I would have to call the PE tech-
nique of the White House to say tliat, well, everybody in tlie White
House is clean and this was repeated by Mr. Ziegler and in tniii, used
by the President.
Senator Montoya. Well, would you agree with his ajipraisal that his
job in the Hiss case was a Sunday school exercise com[)ared with this
effort?
Mr. Deax. Well, I am not that familiar with his effort. It is true
that the FBI investigation was extensive, but it obviously was not
complete.
Senator Montoya. Now, on March 17, 1973, the President made
another statement :
I will simply say with regard to the Watergate case what I have said pre-
viously, that the investigation by Mr. Dean, the White House counsel, in which,
incidentally, he had access to the FBI records on this particular matter, because
I directed him to conduct this investigation, indicates tliat no one in the White
House staff at the time he conducted the investigation — that was .July and
August — ^was involved or had knowledge of the Watergate matter.
Now, is that a correct statement ?
Mr. Dean. As I testified yesterday, that came up, I believe, in my
meeting preceding his press conference. He said that — that was
March 17, the date on that ?
Senator Montoya. March 2, 1973.
Mr. Dean. March 2, correct.
On March 1, w^hen I met with him, he was verv annoyed at the fact
that Gray was making comments about Dean sitting in on the FBI
investigation and things of this nature were coming up. It was his
assessment that there was nothing wrong with this. He told me that.
These were thoughts that he, himself, had raised and as I testified yes-
terday, I do not feel or I did not feel at the time that he was raising
this that I could tell him that he could not use my name further for the
so-called Dean report. I was quite aware of the fact that he nnist be
aware of the fact that I had not conducted such an investigation for
him because he had never received a report from me on it.
Senator Montoya. All right. Now, on April 17. 1973, the President
said this : "I condemn any attempts to cover up in this case, no matter
who is involved."
Do you believe he was telling the truth on that date ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. Will you state why ?
Mr. Dean. Well, because by that time, he knev,- the full implications
of the case and Mr. Haldeman and Mv. Ehrlichman were certainly
still on the staff at that point in time and there was considerable
resistance to their departure from the staff. I had told the President
1077
that I would not leave the staff unless they resigned. Yet, it was not
until the 30th that those resignations occurred.
Senator Montoya. Xow, on April 30 he made this statement :
We must maintain tlie integrity of tlie White House and that integrity must
be real, not transparent. There can be no whitewash at the White House.
Is that a correct statement ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I would like to make this comment regarding the
April 30 speech. As I testified yesterday, after I issued my statement
that I would not be a scapegoat I had virtually no contact with mem-
bers of the staff. However, I did have occasion to talk to Len Garment
and when the President went off to Camp David to prepare his major
address, which is the one you are referring to. I told Mr. Garment, I
said, "I have no way to get this message through to the President at
this point in time. However, I would ask you one thing, Len." I said,
"Would you please tell the President in your own words that he not
give a cosmetic speech," and I asked him to do what he could to get the
President to lay out the facts as the President could have laid them out
at that time.
Senator Montoya. Do you know whether he followed through on
that ?
Mr. Dean. He did not follow through on that.
Senator Montoya. Now, on May 22, 1973, the President made this
statement :
With regard to the specific allegations that have been made I can and do
state categorically.
1. 1 had no prior knowledge of the Watergate operation.
2. I took no part in nor was I aware of any subsequent efforts that may have
been made to cover up Watergate.
3. At no time did I authorize any offer of Executive clemency for the Water-
gate defendants nor did I know of any such offer.
4. I did not know until the time of my own investigation of any effort to provide
the Watergate defendants with funds.
5. At no time did I attempt or did I authorize others to attempt to implicate
the CIA in the Watergate matter.
6. It was not until the time of my own investigation that I learned of the
break-in in the ofiice of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and I specifically authorized
the furnishing of this information to Judge Byrne.
7. I neither authorized nor encouraged subordinates to engage in illegal or
improper campaign tactics.
Now, will vou respond as to the correctness of this particular state-
ment bv the President ?
'Sir. Dean. In its totality or point by point ?
Senator INIontoya. Point by point, if you can or you might start
out by respondinis: to it in totality.
]\Ir. Dean. Well, in totality, I think there are less than accurate
statements in the statement. Let me take it point by point.
I do not know, I have no firsthand knowledge if the President had
prior knowVdge of the Watergate operation. Avith regard to point 1.
I believe the President was aware of an effort to cover up the
Watergate, point 2.
Senator ]\Iontoya. Will you state the particulars?
Mr. Dean. As far as T know, the first time I had firsthand knowledge
that he was aware of this was on September 15 when I met with him
shortly after the indictments.
Senator IMontoya. That was on September 15, 1972 ?
1078
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Moxtoya. What specific knowledge did lie have at that time,
what knowledge was imparted to him ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I have testified earlier, I was aware of the fact
that Mr. Haldeman frequently took notes when I was reporting to
him and would immediately leave from my reporting session to go to
the President's office with these notes. There were occasions when,
before this date, when I would meet with him when there would be a
call from the President and ]Mr. Haldeman would indicate that "INIr.
Dean is giving a report on information he has,'' and would delay until
that report was completed. So I assumed most of what I was reporting
was being reported to the President,
When he talked to me on the ISth^ — it is very eas}^ to tell, if you are
talking on the same wavelength with a man, and there was certainly no
doubt in my mind that we were talking on the same wavelength about
the fact that it had been successful in keeping it out of tlie "\"\niite House
because of the fact that it had been held, the indictments had been held
at the Liddy level and gone no higher.
And certainly, this statement was issued on ^Slay 22, 1973, and on
March 21 I certainly told the President everything I knew at that
point in time. And also I would indicate that some of the conversa-
tions I had with him in February again indicated to me that he under-
stood what was happening. He had complimented me again on the
first meeting on the 27th on my handling of the matter during the
campaign, and I cannot imagine him complimenting me if he did not
understand what ho was complimenting me on.
vSenator ^NIoxtoya. Well, as a matter of fact, on February 17, or
27, 1973, the President directed that you report to him regarding all
Watergate matters, did he not?
]Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator ]Moxtoya. Who did he give those instructions to?
Mr. Deax. He gave them directly to me.
Senator ]Moxtoya. Did you relay them to ]\Ir. Haldeman and Mr.
Ehrlichman?
'^Ir. Deax. No; he told me I should not deal with Haldeman and
Ehrlichman. PTe told me that the Watergate matter was consuming
too much of their time and taking them away from their normal duties
and tliat henceforth I should report to him. I should submit this,
because this in the light of the fact that he had been involved in a
number of Presidential decisions which were reflective of some of
the agenda which I had submitted to the committee, and he saw very
clearly there was going to require a lot more of their time.
Senator ^NIoxtoya. Why would the President be so concerned about
Mr. Haldeman and ]Mr. Ehrlichman spending so much time away
from their normal duties on Watergate if his people were not involved
and he had no knowledge of any involvement on the part of his people
or anyone in the White House?
yiv. Deax. Well, sir, I happen to believe that he did have knowledge.
Senator ]Moxtoya. Would you say that because he had this knowl-
edge he was expressing concern about the time expended by Mr.
Ehrlichman and ^Nlr. Haldeman on this affair?
^h\ Deax. T would think that by that time I had earned my stripes,
so to speak, as capable of handling the coverup on my own, and that
1079
I no lonofer needed to have the daily reporting with Ehrlichman and
Haldcman as to what I should do and how I should handle things
and that was the reason for the request that I report directly to him
and got guidance from him.
Senator Moxtoya. In other words, it was your feeling as we say
in the West that you had earned your spurs ?
^Ir. Dean. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Montoya. Xow, on September 15
^Ir. Deax. Do you want me to complete the points on the speech?
Senator ]Moxtoya. Yes, if you will; I am sorry.
Mr. Deax'. On point Xo. 4, he indicated his own investigation
started on the 21st. I had a conversation with the President on the
13th myself in which he mentioned the fact that he had talked to
Colson and Ehrlichman regarding clemency for ]\Ir. Hunt, and also
prior to that I was aware of the fact that Mr, Colson told me in Jan-
uary, January -1 or 5, that he had talked to the President. Ehrlichman
told me he had talked to the President and that message was, in turn,
relayed to Mr. Bittman and then rela^'ed to Mr. Hunt.
Subsequent to that on April 15 the President again repeated the
fact that he had talked to ^Mr. Colson about clemency for Mr. Hunt.
So I don't think that is quite an accurate statement.
Senator ^Mox'toya. Well, as a matter of fact, you did relay some
information to, was it Caulfield so that he could in turn relay such
information to Mr. McCord about clemency ?
Mr. Deax". That is correct.
Senator Moxtoya. And when was this ?
^Ir. Deax'. That was in roughly, January 10, as I recall the date was.
Senator Moxtoya. Did you not tell Mr. Caulfield at that time that
this promise of immunity was coming from somebody at a very high
level at the "White House ?
Mr. Deax'. Yes. I did. But Mr. Caulfield, when we talked about it
specifically, and it was not at that time, after he told me that he
thought the only thing that would turn !Mr. IMcCord around was a
direct request from the President, and I told him that he could not do
that because T had no such request from the President, although I did
have the general assurance that clemency would be since it would be
given to ]Mr. Hunt it should also apply to others.
Senator ]\Ioxtoya. What motivated you to tell Mr. Caulfield that he,
in turn, tell Mr. McCord that the promise of immunity was coming
from the A'ory top at the White House ?
Mr. Deax'. Because of ]Mr. Caulfield's concern that it would take
a statement of that nature to persuade Mr. McCord as to the authen-
ticity and sincerity of the offer of clemency.
Senator Mox'toya. What authority did you have or what background
did vou muster in justification for making this statement to Mr.
Caulfield?
Mr. Deax. On the 5th, as I recall it was, of January, after Mr. Colson
had talked to 'Sir. Bittman he called a meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's
office and reported how he had handled the offer of clemency, the
assurances of clemencv to ^Nlr. Hunt. At that meeting I said to Mr.
Ehrlichman, T said "'The word will jzet out to the others that this offer
has been made and can I assume that this also applies to the others."
And he said ''Yes, of course vou can." It was from that, and then when
1080
Mr. Mitchell asked me to make sure that jNIr. McCord had the same
assurances, that I took my action.
Senator Montoya. Did Mr. Mitchell indicate to you that he had
assurances from the White House at the time ?
Mr. Dean. No, but he was quite aware of the fact that the assurances
had been given from the President as a result of conversations that he
had had with me and with Mr. O'Brien who was aware of the pro-
cedure that had occurred.
Senator Moxtoya. How did Mr. O'Brien know about these assur-
ances ; who had communicated these assurances to him ?
Mr. Dean. I informed him of the procedure that had gone on and
he was aware of the fact that Colson had given assurances to Mr. Bitt-
man who, in turn, had given them to Mr. Hunt,
Senator Montoya. And did Mr. Colson communicate these assur-
ances also, or the content of these assurances, to Mr. Mitchell so that he
could, in turn, endorse what j^ou were doing ?
Mr. Dean. I don't believe Mr. Colson talked to Mr. Mitchell at all
about it, no, sir.
Senator Montoya. In other words, Mr. Mitchell knew because he
had heard from you that these assurances had been given, is that it?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Now, on point No. 5, I don't laiow what happened in the first meet-
ing that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman had with Director Helms
and General Walters. I was not given a specific report of wliat occurred
at that meeting, so I cannot testify with any firsthand knowledge on
that and I only know what, in scanning the newspapers, some of the
things I have subsequently learned about that. So I have no firsthand
knowledge on that.
Senator Montoya. You didn't work on the arrangements to try to
get the CIA to come into the picture and modify the impact ?
Mr. Dean. This was subsequent to the meeting that Haldeman and
Ehrlichman had with the CIA when I first met with them, and I was
doing this per Mr. Ehrlichman's instructions that lie thought it was a
very good thing that I explore with the CIA if they would provide
some assistance.
Now, on point No. 7 — excuse me, on point No. 6, 1 made some refer-
ences, as I recall, to this with the President in a meeting in ]\Iarch,
that my only knowledge of Presidential knowledge in there is hearsay
and that is what Mr. Krogh told me in a meeting in my office on either
March 28 or 29 of this year, in which we were talking about the fact
that this matter might come out. I told him about the documents that
I had been unable to retrieve from the Department of Justice, and I
had asked him — knowing ]Mr. Krogh, I didn't believe he would do
anything like this without higher authorization — whether iMr.
Ehrlichman had authorized it. He told me no, he hadn't, that his
instructions had come right out of the oval office. I was startled by
the comment and I said to him, you have got to be kidding. And he
repeated the same comment to me again.
So I don't know about the — I say I only have hearsay knowledge
on that matter as to whether that is the correct or incorrect statement.
Senator Montoya. What about point No. 7 ?
Point No. 7 is as follows : "I neither authorized nor encouraged sub-
ordinates to engage in any illegal or improper campaign tactics."
1081
Mr. Deax. I have no firsthand knowledge about that at all. I only
know what I testified about with regard to Mr. Segretti, the fact that
it was authorized by Mr. Haldeman and in turn funded by Mr.
Kalmbach.
Senator Moxtoya. Let us go into Mr. Ziegler's press statements.
On June '20. 19 r2, he made this statement which appeared in the Wash-
ington Post. He told reporters in Florida, who were with the President,
that he would not comment on a "third-rate burglar}' attempt."
Xow. would you agree with me that that was not a third-rate bur-
glary attempt?
]\Ir. Deax. I would agree it was not a third-rate burglary attempt
and I have no idea what the source of this story was.
Senator Moxtoya. How would you characterize the Watergate
burglary ?
Mr. Deax. That is probably the most difficult question that has been
asked yet.
I guess I would have to say that it was probably the opening act of
one of America's great tragedies.
Senator ]\1oxtoya. Well, you answered it very well.
Xow, on October 17, 1972, Mr. Ziegler's statement appeared in the
Xew York Times. He told reporters as follows:
It goes without saying that this administration does not condone sabotage or
espionage or the surveillance of individuals or source stories that make broad,
sweeping charges about the character of individuals.
He also said—
I am not going to comment on stories based on hearsay or where innuendo
or character assassination is involved. I am not going to dignify that with a
comment.
Now, would you say that the administration was engaged in tech-
niques such as were condemned in this statement by Mr. Ziegler at the
time and during the campaign of 1972 ?
Mr. Deax. I would say that these things did occur. I would also say,
as I believe I mentioned in an earlier question with Mr. Thompson,
that the degree of Mr. Ziegler's briefing varied. At times, he was told
enough that he could handle the story.
I also believe I testified that I thou.^ht it would probably take me
another 200 pages of testimony to explain all those briefings. I have
not had an opportunity to go back through all of Ziegler's briefings to
determine, for example. I could spot very easily which briefing I helped
him on and which I didn't. But I haven't done that. Senator.
Senator !Mox'tota. Then do I understand you to say that there are
briefing papers for every press conference by yir. Zief?ler and for every
press conference by the President available at the "Wliite House?
Mr. Deax. Yes. sir. Every time Mr. Ziegler gives a briefing, it is
recorded by a court-reporter-type situation and that is kept in record
form and those are distributed to various members of the White
House staff. But again, I have not had access to get back to these.
Senator Moxtoya. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you and coun-
sel to subpena these briefings, the briefing papers, so that they will
become available to this committee.
Mr. Dash. Yes, Senator Montoya. we are in the process of getting
them.
96-296 O - 73 - 12
1082
Senator Montoya. And did you also state that the President received
news summaries periodically with respect to commentaries about him
in the news media or other media ?
jNIr. Deax. The President received a daily news summary that was
composed of basically the wire service stories from the preceding eve-
ning. I do not know what time the cutoff was, generally about 12 or
1 o'clock at night, and then it was produced so it would be on his desk
in the morning, summarizing all the preceding day's news.
Senator Montoya. Are these also filed in the archives of the White
House ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, they are. I might make a comment with regard to
those.
The news summaries were really a source of a lot of action by White
House staff. When the President read the news summaries, he would
make notations on the news summaries, and in turn, those would be
transcribed into action memorandums for various members of the staff
to follow up on. Reading the news summary would prompt the Presi-
dent to take certain actions. These are, of course, kept in the possession
of the White House.
Senator Montoya. I would like to make a similar request with re-
spect to these news summaries, Mr. Chairman.
Now, going back to >\Ir. Ziegler, on October 16, 1972, a statement
appeared in the New York Times on October 17. The statement reads
as follows : "The opposition has been making charges which have not
been substantiated." Would you say that this is correct?
Mr. Dean. I think that probably at that time, they had not been
substantiated, no, so it probably is correct.
Senator ]Montoya. On October 25, 1972, another statement by Mr.
Ziegler appeared in the Washington Post, where he termed the reports,
the Post reports, "a blatant effort at character assassination that I
do not think has been witnessed in the political process in some time."
Mr. Dean. What was the date on that, please. Senator?
Senator INIontgya. October 25, 1972.
Senator Ervin. AVe will have to go and vote.
Mr. Dean. Fine.
[Recess.]
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Senator Montoya. Before the recess I was reading you a quotation
from a press statement delivered by Mr. Ziegler which appeared in
the Post. He stated : "A blatant effort at character assassination that
I do not think has been witnessed in the political process for some time"
had occurred.
What comment do you have to say about that ? "\ATiat do you think
about that?
Mr. Dean. Senator, it is hard for me to — what was the date on that
again ?
Senator INIontoya. That was October 25, 1972.
Mr. Dean. It is hard for me to relate to specifically which story he
was referring to. About the time, as I recall, the Segretti stories Avere
evolving, it had started on October 10. Finally, it i-eached the point
of directly tying in Mr. Haldeman on source stories, and I can only
assume that this is the
1083
Senator ^Ioxtoya. The reaction to it ?
Mr. Deax. The reaction to that story, 3^es.
Senator Moxtoya. On April 18, 1973, in the Washington Post, this
statement appeared: "Mr. Ziegler met with reporters and said that all
previous White House statements about the bugging were inoperative.
Ziegler emphasized the President's statement today is the operative
statement."
Xow, can you tell us what motivated Mr. Ziegler to make this state-
ment, what transpired prior to the making of this statement at the
T\niite House, if .you know ?
Mr. Deax. I believe what transpired as you compare that statement
to the chronology of my testimony, you will see that that was the week-
end that the Attorney General and ^Ir. Petersen reported to the Presi-
dent the direction that the grand jury was headed in and the fact that
I had been to the prosecutors had been revealed and the fact that I had
told the prosecutors the involvement of others in this matter, includ-
ing those at tlie White House. It was as a result of that and the Presi-
dent's statement of the iTth when he went out to explain and further
elaborate on the President's statement that he made the inoperative
comment.
Senator ]Moxtoya. Then let us get back to Mr. ]\Iitchell with whom
you felt a father-son relationship, and perhaps justifiably so; what
were the reasons for your going to Mr. Mitchell's office at the time
that Mr. Liddy first presented his plan, and then subsequentlv on
February 4, when there was a scaling down of the initial plan ? A^Hio
sent you there and what was your mission ?
Mr. Deax. Well. I was called — it was a meeting called by Mr.
Magruder. My secretary informed me of the fact that the meeting
had been scheduled. I did not know the substance of the meeting so I
called ]\rr. Magruder to ask him what the substance of the meeting
was going to be, and he told me that Mr. Liddy was going to present
his intelligence plan at that point.
Senator Moxtoya. Did you have any instructions from Mr. Ehrlich-
man or ^Nlr. Haldeman to attend those meetings ?
Mr. Deax. Well, very early in the preceding yeai it had been my role
to make sure that the reelection committee had a capacity to deal
with demonstrators. '\^nien I had first talked to ^fr. Lidd^- about his
job. I had explained that one of the responsibilities of his job would be
to deal with demonstrators in the security system and particularly
with regard to the convention. '\'^'lien he was interviewed by
]\Ir. ^Mitchell on Xovember 24, I think you will find in the exhibits a
copy of the agenda that Mr. Liddv prepared regarding his job. Therein
you will find a one-line in a rather limited ao-enda that would have
something to do with intelligence. That was discussed at that meeting
that he would prepare an intelligence plan for dealing with demon-
strators. Subsequentlv. when he met. when ]Mr. Liddy met. with Mr.
Magruder on December 8. he also said that he would develop appro-
priate plans for dealing with demonstrators. So it was quite logical,
and I assumed that Magruder felt given the fact that one of my "\Miite
House responsil)ilities was to deal with demonstrators and deal with
demonstration intelligence, that T would be interested in seeing what
Mr. Liddy's plan was, so I in turn v^-as invited.
1084
Senator Montoya. Would you say that your presence there was a
followup of interest emanating first from tlie initial memorandum that
you sent Mr. Mitchell about the interagency group ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir, I would not say there was any relationship
between that memorandum and the Liddy meeting at all.
Senator Montoya. Now, at that initial meeting I understand from
your testimony, Mr. Liddy discussed possible tai'gets and mentioned
the DNC, the Democratic National Committee headquarters, the Fon-
tainebleau Hotel, and Mr. O'Brien.
Now, in what context were these three targets mentioned ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, I cannot recall for certain whether tar-
gets were discussed at the first meeting or the second meeting. I am not
able to separate the meetings as to that discussion. I know that I
arrived very late at the second meeting, and I was only there a very
brief while before I injected myself into the meeting
Senator Montoya. I do not think that is relevant because the dates
are too close.
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Senator Montoya. But in what context when you heard it, were
these targets discussed ?
Mr. Dean. For political intelligence.
Senator Montoya. And was a possible break-in into the Democratic
headquarters discussed at that time ?
Mr. Dean. Not a break-in. Just that these would be targets for polit-
ical intelligence.
Senator Montoya. Well, would you not assume that that would
involve a break-in, or pilfering of documents ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, I think that is true. I was aware of the fact that
frequently a campaign technique was used to put friendly people to
one cause in the campaign headquarters of another. It was not all
spelled out at that point in time other than the fact these would be tar-
gets for political intelligence.
Senator Montoya. Well, would you not say that this was coming
very close to a discussion of what later became known as Watergate?
Mr. Dean, I would, yes.
Senator Montoya. All right.
Now, you indicated that Mr. Mitchell and the President met fre-
quently to discuss campaign plans. Where did they meet?
Mr. Dean. I only have that on hearsay. Senator. It was just one of
those things it was rumored that Mr. ISIitchell and the President and
Mr. Haldeman and sometimes Mr. Connally and the like, would get
together in the evening and discuss general tactics.
Senator Montoya. I think everybody in the country- knows that they
met.
Mr. Dean. I know it. I have no specific knowledge ; I never attended
any of the meetings.
Senator IMontoya. I thought you knew about it.
Mr. Dean. That is right.
'Senator Montoya. Now. do you know whether or not the President
met with the Mitchells at their home ?
Mr. Dean. I have no idea, Senator.
Senator Montoya. Do you know whether or not Mrs. Mitchell was
ever present at any of these meetings, be thev at the ^Mitchell's home,
at the White House, or Key Biscayne or San Clemente ?
1086
Mr. Deax. I believe she did accompaii}- the Attorney General, but
I could not tell you with any specificity that she attended any meetings
with the President when the Attorney General was having these
discussions with the President.
Senator ]\Ioxtoya. I am very concerned, Mr. Dean, about the truth
that might come out of these hearings and whether or not your credi-
bility will be sustained by the American people or whether or not the
President's will be sustained or tarnished, and that is why I am asking
you these specific questions about the reliability of press statements by
the President, by 5lr. Ziegler, and by statements that you have made
in your testimony of yesterday. Xow- •
Mr. Dean. Senator, I just might add that I have one ally only, and
that is the truth as I know it and I can speak it, and I realize the
implications when I talk about the President that my one ally is the
truth.
Senator IMoxtoya. Now, I have read press comments, and I have
become fully cognizant of dift'erent efforts which have been made to
discredit your testimony before this committee in recent days, one of
which was the release of information dealing with your obtaining
$4,800 from the cash fund. The other was the leaking out by sources
unknown of an allegation tliat you had applied in concert with others
for a television license while 3'ou were working for a law firm. Now,
this has been rebutted this morning, and I will not go into the au-
thenticity of this. But did it ever occur to you that you had gone
through a complete checkup before you were employed by the De-
partment of Justice and before you were em.ployed by the "NAHiite House,
and that this information necessarily had to turn up in your folder or
dossier collected by the FBI. and that you had to either explain it or
the dossier explained whatever allegation was made with respect to the
TY license per se ?
Mr. Deax. I am well aware of that, because when I was first inter-
viewed bv Mr. Haldeman, he had a copy of mv FBI report from the
Justice Department. I gathered from his review of the FBI report
that this material was in the FBI report. He asked me for some com-
ments on it. I told him about the fact that I thought it involved more
personalities than anythiiig else, that I had been prepared to take it
to an ethics committee at the time, that I had had a lawyer friend who
had been at the firm at the time to check it out. that I had been operat-
ing on the advice of a verv senior and distinguished member of the
communications bar. and that I thouq-ht it was really a matter of per-
sonalities more than facts and that I had not pursued the matter be-
cause it had been retracted later and I was satisfied with that. So this
was reviewed and this obviously was investigated by the FBI before I
went to the Justice Depai'tment originally, and then subsequently to the
"\'\^iite House.
Senator !Moxtoya. So apparentlv this was picked out of context and
released by someone. Do vou have any conjecture about that?
Mr. Deax. I dicln't understand vour question. Senator.
Senator INIoxtoya. So apparently, the allegation that you had ap-
plied for a TV license in coniunction with otTiers while you were em-
ploved in a law firm that Avas handlino- almost a similar application,
apparentlv. this allegation was apparently picked out of context from
vour file bv someone.
1086
Mr. Dean. That is correct. I understand that it was leaked by some-
one to a member of the press and in turn reported.
Senator Montoya. Wlio do you think leaked it? What is your
opinion ?
Mr. Dean. Well, that would be highly speculative. At that point in
time, I don't know. I have heard of subsequent efforts to discredit me
and a rather concerted attack to discredit me.
Senator Montoya. Have you felt that they were serious efforts?
Mr. Dean. Well, I am quite aware of the fact that there are a num-
ber of investigators who have been privately retained to visit friends,
visit stores I deal with. It has run the gamut — places where I bank,
every conceivable inch of my life has been gone over, Senator.
Senator Montoya. Now, tell me more about it. I mean not your life,
but about the efforts made by the "\^%ite House.
Mr. Dean. Well, I have learned this from people who have said,
who have called and tried to get verification on stories and the like.
I can tell you the absurdity of some of the stories.
For example, I borrowed a friend's car, a friend of my wife's one
of her girl friends, and I drove that car for several days. My wife
went off to Florida with some friends of hers for a couple of days.
The next thing that was on the rumor mill was that I had left my
wife and was living with some beautiful foreign woman. That went
around for awhile. It was not printed, but it has been gossiped.
I have been charged with being afraid — I have been charged with
being afraid to go to jail for reasons of homosexuality. That was
attributed directly to one of my lawyers. Now, the story is absurd, but
again it is a typical character assassination technique.
There have been efforts to say that I received $100,000 of missing
campaign money. There is no truth to that whatsoever and there is no
conceivable way they will ever substantiate a story like that.
Every neighlDor has been probed. As I say, some of this has been
press inquiry and quite legitimate press inquiry. Other of it has been
by privately hired investigators.
Senator Montoya. Now, how long did you know ]Mr. Lidd}^ before
he was hired by the Committee To Re-Elect the President ?
Mr. Dean. I didn't know Mr. Liddy until I had — I may have met
him once while I was at the Department of Justice at a rather large
meeting, when I was in the Deputy Attorney's office. There was a
program called "Operation Intercept," which I was not directly in-
volved in.
It was a drug program and I understand that ]Mr. Liddy was in-
volved in that.
l^Hien I did meet him once at the White House, he referred to the
fact that I had met him earlier. I don't recall that.
The first time I ever talked to INIr. Liddy was in, let's see, I guess
it was late October, when I began talking to Kroph about whether he
was interested or not in the p-eneral counsel position at the reelection
committee. I was unaware of his activities with the plumbers unit, I
had only known that he had been in a dispute with his emplover at the
Treasurv Department, Mr. Rossides, and there had been quite a fiery
exchange between the White House and the Treasurv Department and
the like for the White House intervei-iinjx in this dispute and hiring
Mr. Liddy and bringino- him to the Wliite House. This I got from ]Mr.
Caulfield, who had friends in the Treasury Department.
1087
Senator Montoya. AMien was the first time that you knew about
Mr. Liddy and ]\Ir. Hunt working together ?
Mr. Deax. I don't believe I really realized that until after the break-
in. It just didn't occur to me, the fact that they were both in the
plumbers unit. I was unaware of the fact, for example, that Mr. Hunt
spent most of his time as a consultant for the White House working
for the plumbers.
Xow, I ma}" have been told, but it didn't occur to me.
I learned, I believe it was in April or May of 1972, 1 had heard the
rumor about the break-in at the Ellsberg psychiatrist's offVe iuk..
had heard that Hunt and Liddy had been involved in this. So it was
much after the fact of their actual working together that I learned
of the fact that they had worked together.
Senator ]\Ioxtoya. Had you seen them around the White House
talking together, on or about March or February of 1972 ?
Mr. Deax. Xo. sir ; I cannot say I did.
Senator ]Moxtoya. Xow. when you were having discussions with
]Mr. Liddy at the CRP, did he ever tell you about his activities other
than being chief counsel for the CRP ?
Mr. Deax'. Well, if I recall our initial dealings after he went over
there, my responsibility with him was to get him very aware of the
election laws. He had not had any experience in this area. I informed
my staff that they should cooperate with him and assist him. I made
my files available. We had a new election law to deal with, to interpret,
to understand. Regulations were being issued by the GAO, and we had
a munber of discussions on those.
I also encouraged him, because he frequently told me that there was
more work than one man could handle, to get himself some volunteer
lawyers and I suggested some names of lawyers who I thought might
be of assistance to him.
Senator ]Moxtoya. Well. I am not speaking of his duties as chief
counsel. Were you aware that he was performing other duties?
Mr. Deax'. I think the only time I was aware — I was unaware of his
developing his plan; no. sir. That has been always one of the great
mysteries to me, what happened from the time he went over there — I
giiess it must have been December 10, because as I recall, it was 1 or 2
days after Mr. Magruder had interviewed him that he went to work —
what happened between December 10 and January 27 and my concep-
tion of what his responsibilities were and possiblv his own or others
conception dramatically changed. There was nothing in my conversa-
tions with him that indicated anything other than the fact that he was
going to have a plan for dealing with demonstrators and convention
security.
Senator Mox'toya. Well, weren't you kind of curious as to what had
happened to the scaled down plan which involved the expenditure of
$250,000 and which was discussed by Mr. ]\Iitchell. Mr. Magruder,
yourself, and Mr. Liddy ?
Mr. Deax. You mean between the meeting on the 27th and the
fourth ?
Senator Mox'toya. February 4.
Mr. Deax-. February 4. Well, after the meeting on the 27th, I was
frankly very surprised, given the precedent that had been followed
before with Operation Sandwedge, that Mr. Mitchell even reconsid-
ered the matter. I think that he expected, when the meeting was
reconvened, that there was going to be something totally different than
1088
it was. It was when I came in that meeting late and it was the same
type of discussion going on that I interjected myself and terminated
the meeting.
Senator Montoya. "When were you first aware that the scaled down
plan had been approved by Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr, Dean. As I think I testified, I have never asked Mr. Mitchell
directly whether he approved the plan or not. Mr. Magruder
Senator Montoya. Well, were you aware
Mr. Dean. Yes, after June 19, when I was having- conversations with
Mr. Magruder, he indicated to me that Mr. ]\Iitchell had authorized
the plan, that he indicated also that the "W^iite House was recipient of
the information, and he indicated at that time that there had been
pressure from tlie TVHiite House to get the plan moving. But it was
never very clear as to exactly what had happened.
Senator Montoya. Well, did you have any conversations with jNIr.
Strachan, who was the emissary or liaison between the CRP and ^Ir.
Haldeman or Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, that raises a point that came up in the questioning
that Mr. Thompson was going into this morning. At one point, Mr.
Strachan called me and told me that Mr. Magruder and ^Ir. Liddy
had had a serious falling out. I believe Mr. Magruder raised the fact
with me that he just could not work with Liddy. Strachan got in the
middle of it and called me and he said, what should I do ?
I said, I have no idea, but I would suggest now that Bob Mardian
is over there, that if there are personality problems and personnel
problems, that Mr. Mardian handle it. That was my recommendation
to Mr. Strachan and it was only later that I heard that he had been
moved from the reelection committee to the finance committee.
Senator Montoya. Had you become aware since the break-in that
Mr. Magruder was transmitting memorandum through Mr. Strachan
to Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Dean. Not to Mr. Ehrlichman. I was aware from a conversation
I had with Mr. Strachan on the 19th that he had destroyed documents
that indicated that he was transmitting this information back to the
I'VTiite House.
Senator Montoya. And why would Mr. Haldeman destroy these
documents if he was not aware, and still professes unawareness, of
anyone at the White House being involved in the Watergate affair
prior to June 17 ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I think I have said before. Senator, publicly, it
is inch by inch that the truth is coming out.
Senator Montoya. Would you say that in view of the correlation
of events, in view of Mr. Strachan's missions between the CRP and
Mr. Haldeman, in view of the admission by Mr. Jeb INIagruder that ho
was sending this memorandum to Mr. Haldeman as well as to Mr.
Ehrlichman about all these things, that Mr. Haldeman as well as Mr.
Ehrlichman were fully aware of what Mr. Liddy's role was with re-
spect to collecting intelligence, and with respect to the possible plan of
breaking into the DNC, the McGrovern headquarters or the O'Brien
suite at ISIiami during the Democratic convention ?
Mr, Dean. You have drawn, that is, a rather broad conclusion. But
I would say this : That I think that anything that was transmitted
to Mr. Strachan, Mr. Strachan was a very good, thorough, capable
man. Anything of an}^ import that came to his attention he would
1089
regularly report to Mr. Haldeman, and I can only assume that material
that came to Mr, Strachan was reported on to 5lr. Haldeman.
Senator jNIoxtoya. Well, I can only assume from your testimony
and what has been adduced before this committee heretofor by other
witnesses that ^Ir. Haldeman and ]Mr. Ehrlichman were very precise
in the missions that they undertook and in exacting performance by
those to whom they made assignments of missions. Would not you
say that that is a correct statement ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir ; I would.
Senator Moxtoya. And in view of that, is it your supposition that
there was no way that ^Ir. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman could plead
ignorance of any part of the involvement on the part of the CEP,
Mr. Liddy, or any other personnel connected with the CEP in the
planning before the Watergate incident on the burglary at the
Watergate ?
Mr. Deax. Well, I would have to separate out for a moment Mr.
Haldeman from Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Strachan reported directly to
Mr. Haldeman. He did not report to Mr. Ehrlichman. Anything that
Mr. Ehrlicliman would know about this would have to have come
from conversations with Mr. Haldeman. So I would only, I can only,
say that under the reporting arrangement that information that did
come from Mr. Strachan, knowing Strachan as being very thorough,
particularly in information I rej^orted to him always seemed to get to
Mr. Haldeman, that any major information that came to him was
reported. But I can only say that if ]Mr. Haldeman and ]Mr. Ehrlich-
man had conversations about it, Mr. Ehrlichman would know about
this.
'Senator ]Moxtoya. They were verv^ close, weren't they ?
Mr. Deax. They were good friends ; yes, sir.
Senator ]\Iox*tota. Would you say they conversed very warmly, very
frankly with each other ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, sir.
Senator ^Moxtoya. Then, did you call Mr. Caulfield in January of
1972 when you authorized him to deliver a message to ]McCord, and
did you ask him at the time to say to McCord, and I quote "A year is a
long time. Your wife and family will be taken care of. You will be
rehabilitated with employment when this is over." Did you say that?
Mr. Deax'. Yes, I did. That was the result of a conversation in
which I — he was on the west coast and I was in my office, I called him
and transcribed the gist of what I was sayinir. read it back to me later.
that is virtually what it was, that I said to him. and I told him "Fine,"
and that is what he should report.
Senator ^Moxtoya. Xow wlien you discussed the coverup with respect
to Watorofate, at San Clemente, did these meetings take place at the
home of the President ?
Mr. Deax'. Xo, sir. San Clemente is a general term for a situation
where the President's residence is located at one place, and then right
adioinino: that there is a compound of office space.
Senator ^Ioxtota. T mean the compound ?
Afr. Deax. All ridit.
The first meetinfr took place', the morning meetinsf on the 10th,
benfan in ]\[r. Ehrlichman's office This was what T described as we
were assessincr the various members of this committee. It was from
1090
there we went to lunch. We had lunch at the staff mess and we talked
on. We then adjourned because nothing- was happening. It w^as a very
loose and fleeting meeting. With generalities and there were interrup-
tions because Mr. Haldeman had calls and Mr. Ehrlichman had calls.
It wasn't until we went back down south to La Costa and met later in
]Mr. Haldeman's, and I think it was being shared by Mr. Ehrlichman,
a large villa, a suite with rooms on each side, we met in the living room
area and there we discussed for many hours the situation and we met
there again the next day, and discussed this matter for many days or
hours. ,
Senator Montoya. Give me the dates of those meetings.
Mr. Dean. They were on the 10th and the 11th of February.
Senator Montoya. And give me substantially the conversations that
took place with respect to the coverup, and the individuals to whom
you might ascribe these conversations.
Mr. Dean. Well, the thrust of the conversations were after some
general discussion there evolved theories on how to deal with this
committee, in other words, that there would be a public posture of
cooperation and privately we would make it as difficult as possible
to set investigative materials and witnesses.
There would be an effort to discredit the committee bv painting it
very partisan through a behind-the-scenes media effort. That there was
also discussion of how to make sure that there were raised also the
problems that the Democratic Party might have been engaged in but
at that point there was nothinfr specific to raise. We were hopincr to
find things. In fact at one point in the conversation it was suirgested we
hire private investi.o-ators, Mr. Haldeman su<rgested this I raised the
fact this is more political surveillance and that is the last thing in the
world we need.
Then, I think I tried to recount most of this in mv testimony and I
will be happv to do it all ac:ain for vou if you would like me to.
Senator Montoya. Do vou know whether or not since the Watergate
entry, do vou know whether or not the CRP, the A^liite House, or any-
one else under the auspices of the CRP was hired to conduct a gather-
ing of more intelligence or invasions of, or to engage in the invasions
of the ri,q:ht of privacy of individuals ?
Mr. Dean. I onlv know of the fact that that has been done with
regard to me and I don't believe it has been done bv those entities. It
mififht be indirectly but I have no firsthand knowledge of that.
Senator INIontoya. Do you know whether or not there were any
other buggings other than the ones that you have mentioned or any
eavesdropping through electronic devices ?
Mr. Dean. Xo, sir, I think I have mentioned those that I am aware
of.
Senator Montoya. In what respects did vou discuss the possible
blocking or impeding of the Senate investigation at the "\^niite House
at any time ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, as a result of the La Costa meetings there
were set in motion a host of followup activities. I think some of the
agenda that you see in my submissions for meetings indicate the thrust
of things that were developing at the La Costa meeting. I think in
particular some of those agenda are self-explanatory as to the tactics
and the thoughts as to how to deal with the situation.
1091
Senator ]Moxtoya. When you informed Lidcl}- to get Hunt out of
the country who had instructed you to do this ?
Mr. Deax. This was
Senator Moxtoya. And what conversation actually took place prior
to your informincr Mr. Liddy to get Hunt out of the country ?
Mr. Deax. This occurred on Monday the 19th of June in 1972. It was
a late afternoon meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office with Mr. Colson.
The first question before the meeting got down to any substance was
raised by Mr. Ehrlichman as to where Mr. Hunt was. He asked me
and I said I had no idea. He asked ISIr. Colson and Mr. Colson made a
similar comment.
I was then asked by ]\Ir. Ehrlichman to call Mr. Liddy and tell
Mr. Liddy to tell ]Mr. Hunt to get out of the country. I did that. It was
a short time thereafter that I began to think about the wisdom of hay-
ing made that call and re-raised it. There was a brief discussion
between Ehrlichman and myself, and finally Mv. Colson entered the
discussion and he said he also thought it was a very unwise idea. Ehr-
lichman concurred. This all took place within about, oh, 15, 20 minute
span and I was asked to call Mr. Liddy back and retract the instruc-
tion. I did that. Liddy said to me he didn't know if it was possible
because the message had already been passed and I have no further
knowledge of whether, in fact, Hunt did leave the countr}- or not as a
result of that.
Senator Moxtoya. AVhen was the first real meeting to organize the
coverup and who was present at that first meeting ?
ISIr. Deax'. I think that the coverup is somewhat similar to the plan-
ning of this whole thino-. that just sort of happened. I knoAv that when
I came back from out of the country there had already been significant
events which had occurred. The coverup was already- — it had begun
and was. in fact, in place and was going.
Senator Moxtoya. "^Aliat information did you have with respect to
the involvement of any officials in the '\\niite House on that initial
staflre of the coverup ?
]\Ir. Deax'. "Well, it was on Monday the 19th that I was gaining in-
formation. I think the first very revealinir information was that ]Mr.
Strachan had destroyed files at Mr. Haldeman's suggestion. I also—
that morning I had had a call from Ehrlichman who asked me to find
out what yir. Col son's involvement was in this matter.
Senator ^Foxtoya. Did you advise tlie President or ^Slr. Haldeman
or ]\Ir. Ehrlichman about the authority that might exist under law
for the covert activity that was to ensue as a result of the organiza-
tion of the plumbers ?
^Ir. Deax'. I wasn't involved in the establishment of the plumbers
and it was somewhat by accident that T was talkinfr about Bud Krogh
who T had known well and was partially responsible for my coming to
the '\Miite House, as a matter of fact, when I realized that a plumbers
unit or whatever the proper name was for it was being established.
At that time he told me that they had an operation that was seekincr
to determine major leaks. He invited me down to see the unit. He said.
"We have a new sensor security system, and you might be interested
in seeing it-" so T went dowii and looked at it. and saw their scrambler
phone and that was about the extent of it.
1092
Senator Montoya. IVho devised the shelter of executive privilege
as part of the coverup ?
Mr. Dean. Well, the — I wouldn't say there was a conscious decision
at any point in time to use executive privilege as a part of the coverup.
It was always in existence with regard to White House staff because
no one, the President's policy was he didn't want the staff coming up.
It began to take a very severe focus during the — first of all, during the
Patman hearings that if push had gotten to shove in those hearings
that privilege would have been declared on Timmons and myself.
Senatoi Montoya. You mean to tell me that you and Mr. Haldeman
and Mr. Ehrlichman didn't discuss the use of executive privilege?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir ; I was getting to that.
Senator Montoya. As a coverup ?
Mr. Dean. That was the first time it had occurred when there was
some discussion of it that was with regard to the Patman hearings in
late September or early October. That was the only congressional
problem that arose. It was during the Gray hearings when my name
moved to the information front that we began discussing using or
litigating with Dean the issue of executive privilege, possibly being
the strongest, and these were the discussions I had with the President
whereas if we were litigating the matter with Mr. Dean there would
be no other witnesses from the White House who would have to appear
because he would have the perfect reason that this matter is under
litigation.
Senator Ervin. We will take a 5 minute recess to vote.
[Recess.]
Senator Erm^n. The committee will resume.
Senator Montoya. Mr. Dean, I only have three or four questions to
ask of you. I want to clear this matter up with respect to Mr. ISIitchell.
On pages 225 and 226 of your statement, you mention that there was
a move afoot at the White House to try to get Mr. Mitchell to accept
the blame for the entire affair. Now, can you tell me who the prime
mover of this attempt was at the Wiite House ?
Mr. Dean. It is very difficult for me to say who the prime mover
was. At the time this first was discussed, it was after I had reported
to the President on the 21st what I thought were the implications of
this entire matter and subsequently, I had a meeting with Haldeman
and Ehrlichman and then another meeting with the President. It was
early discussion — I recall one p:irticular incident that occurred out-
side of the President's Office before he went into a meeting in ■which I
said that there are two options. One is everything pre and post is going
to have to be laid out or, second, the "N^Hiite House is going to have
to surround itself with wagons and start protecting itself. It was in
subsequent discussions with the President when it was evolving that
I was argiiing that both pre and post had to be disclosed, but there
was evolving the thought at that point in time that if we merely deal
with the pre situation, that the post might go awa3^ I did not believe
that and it was i-eally Avhen the Presidential ]:)arty came back from
California that early discussions of this concept had evolved into a firm
policy.
So I also mentioned that there was a meeting on the 22d where
Mr. Mitchell came down. I assumed at that time that Mr. Ehrlichman
and Mr. Haldeman were going to do something to try to bring Mr.
1093
Mitchell forward on this issue because of the earlier discussions that
had been held. To the contrary, the discussion realh revolved around —
first of all, Mr. Ehrlichman asked, has the Hunt problem been taken
care of, the demands that he was making, and Mr. Mitchell reported
that that did not seem to be any problem.
There were general discussions again about the status of the White
House vis-a-vis this committee on executive privilege. I went to a meet-
ing that afternoon with the President and it was a repeat of the same
thing that had occurred on several previous occasions.
So I really cannot say that that policy evolved until after they
returned from California.
I recall on the 13th
Senator ]\Ioxtoya. Did you not indicate that there had been some
discussion in California about making Mr. Mitchell the fall gny'i
Mr. Deax. Well, I do not know that. I was not in California. I am
aware of another situation where Mr. Colson and Mr. Shapiro came
to meet with Mr. Ehrlichman and ]:»ossibly ]Mr. Haldeman — I was not
]n-esent, but I did hear them both discussing it on the afto-noon of the
13th — in which Mr. Colson had laid out the theory that Mr. Mitchell
should be smoked out and this might resolve the w^hole problem.
Senator ^Ioxtoya. Did you hear any discussions by Mr. Haldeman
or Mr. Ehrlichman with respect to the same thing ?
Mr. Dean. I guess I did. In fact, during that conversation, Mr. Ehr-
lichman was on the telephone with the President at one point in time,
I recall, and it was — it had been planned that Mr. Mitchell would come
down that Saturday, Saturday, the 14th.
Senator ]\Ioxtoya. Who arranged for Mr. ]\Iitchell to come down ?
Mr. Deax. I believe that Mr. Haldeman called him. I am not sure of
that, though.
Senator Mox'toya. Xow, in view of your strong feelings for Mr.
^litchell. why did you not apprise him of this move by the White
House ?
Mr. Deax'. I had already gone to the prosecutors by this time and
was in discussions with the prosecutors and I was trying to avoid any
situation that would further involve me, but yet, I was not revealing
to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman that, in fact, I was having dis-
cussions with the Government about the entire situation. It occurred
to me at one time, when I learned that Mr. O'Brien was going to Cali-
fornia to meet with Mr. Ehrlichman at a suggestion of Mr. Mitchell
that he do so. that this could well be a setup situation. But I did not
apprise him of it because I. myself, was dealing with the Government
and I had stopped the coverup, as far as I was concerned. I was no
longer involved in it.
Senator Moxtoya. Xow, were you aware all throughout your deal-
ings with respect to this affair of the implications that you might be
chargeable with violation of the law for obstructing justice?
Mr. Deax'. Yes, I was. I do not know when I first began to think
about it. but I did certainly think about it from time to time, and I
can recall discussing it directly after the election with Mr. Haldeman.
We had a discussion about a written Dean report. He asked me what
would happen if all the facts were laid out. I told him what would
happen, and I said that I thought that ultimately, a reconvened grand
1094
jury, which would occur if the facts were laid out, would end up in
potential indictments of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean.
Senator Montoya. Well, let me ask you this question. How do you
expect us to resolve the truth in this matter when you state one story
and you have testified here and made yourself subject to cross-examina-
tion and the President states another story and he does not appear
before this committee? I am not implying that he should. Now, how
do you expect us to resolve this ? Can you give us any information as
to how we might resolve it ?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Chairman, I think this. I strongly believe that the
truth always emerges. I do not know if it will be during these hearings ;
I do not know if it will be as the result of the further activities of the
special prosecutor. I do not know if it will be through the processes of
history. But the triith will out someday.
As far as any issue of fact, and I am not suggesting this with the
President, of any individual where I have a difference of opinion or
different statement of the fact with that individual — this has occurred
once, in my early meetings with the prosecutors — I am quite willing to
submit myself to a polygraph test on any issue of fact with any
individual who says that what I am saying is less than truthful.
Senator Montoya. Wliat really made you change and start coming
up and coming out with the truth of this matter as you have related
it ? What motivated you ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I think that it was after the first of the yearthat
I had serious reservations as to whether the coverup could continue.
T must say that from June 19 on, I have not had a very pleasant day
in my life. This has been a haunting situation for me.
As early as September, when I began talking with my now wife
about getting married, I told her that somewhere down the road, it is
going to be a very rough situation, because at that time — I did not
explain it to her, because I just realized that something like this could
not go on indefinitely. At one point, I reached the end of the line and
just decided that I could not continue it. I just did not have the con-
stitution internally to proceed with what was going on. So I decided
to start swimming the other way.
Senator Montoya. Do you have peace of mind now about what you
have done ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. In disclosing everything that you knew, do you
have a peace of mind and a clear conscience ?
]Mr. Dean. I am not here as a sinner seeking a confessional, but I
have been asked to be here to tell the truth, and I had always planned
at anv time before anv forum when asked to tell the truth.
Senator Montoya. A^Hiat I am trying to ask vou, do you feel better
now that vou have told evervthing rather than hidinsr it ?
Mr. Dean. Indeed T do, sir. It is a verv difficult thing to hide, and,
as I explained to the President, it would take perjury upon perjury,
upon perjury, if it were to be perpetuated. I was not capable of doing
that, and I knew that mv dav of beinqf called was not far off.
Senator Montoya. That is all. Thank you, sir.
Sonntoi- Ervin. Tlie committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock
tomorrow.
[Whereupon, at 5 :40 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
10 a.m.. Wednesday. June 27, 1973.]
1095
EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Exhibit No. 32
Shaffer, McKeever and Fitzpatrick
342 HuNOERPOBD Court
RocKViLLE, Maryland 20850
CMARLCS M. SH
(30I) 7e2-ieoo
ItCK C. McKCCVCR tUITK •
CT or COLUM91A orrict
NTZPATAK
UBO CONNICTICUV AVKMUC
» V*«N CAH*DA. JH WASHINOIOMD e tOOS«
June 18, 1973 ..T.m.PAT,..c«
The Honorable Sam J. Ervln, Jr.
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities
1418 New Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Ervin:
In the strongest terms possible we wish to register an objec-
tion In behalf of our client, John W. Dean, III, who is scheduled to appear'
before your Committee in Executive Session preparatory to a public appearance
before your Committee covered by national television and other news mediaf
As the transcript of the proceedings will reflect, we immediately raised thlff^
objection on Friday, June 15, 1973, when our client first appeared before The
Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr., the Vice Chairman of your Committee, artd
the staff.
As lawyers for Mr. Dean charged with the guardianship of hfs
legal welfare, and as officers of the Court, we respectfully call your attention
to the fact that the Executive Branch is conducting a Grand Jury inquiry and as
late as May 22, 1973, in an unusual but nonetheless official communication
the United States Attorney and his Assistants in charge of the inqiiiry advised
our client that they intended to seek his indictment and would not drop charges
against him but would permit a guilty plea to a one count indictment charglngf
a conspiracy to obstruct Justice. Although the offer has not been accepted,' Mf.
Dean remains a jjrospective defendant against whom the prosecutors seek a <'
Grand Jury indictment.
Accordingly, at this juncture we are very much concerned about:
(1) our client giving any testimony at this time (notwithstanding the "use" im-
munity your Committee has accorded him) because of his status as a prospective
1096
targeted defendant, and (2) the effect nationwide television and other publi-
city accorded to your hearings during our client' s testimony will have upon
the basic rights of our client to a speedy, fair and impartial trial.
As you well know, assuming but not conceding the prosecutors
will be in a position to overcome their obvious problem about leads furnished
them by our client, your nationally televised Committee hearing, at least dur-
ing our client's appearance, will afford the public a wide-spread preview of
the prosecution's case against our client without any of the safeguards that
would attend a criminal trial.
Our concerns are not novel but are well-founded and are shared
In many quarters of the legal community including the Special Prosecutor, The
Honorable Archibald Cox, who, according to press reports, first tried to dissuade
you and your Committee from further proceeding publicly. We know when he fail-
ed in that endeavor the Special Prosecutor, in an effort to curb some public as-
pects of the'Committee hearings, sought an Order from The Honorable John J.
Sirica, Chief Judge of the United States District Court, to condition the confer-
ral of "use" immunity to our client upon the absence of television and/or national
media coverage which the Chief Judge refused to do.
Understanding that Mr. Cox's legal maneuver was a novel one,
was contrary to the terms of the Congressional "Use" Immunity Statute, Title 18,
United States Code, Section 5005, flew in the face of the Constitutional doctrine
of Separation of Powers and relying upon the early learned maxim " Quad vanum
et inutile est , lex non requirit " Co. Litt. 319, we abided the inevitable Court
ruling and now timely address our request in the forum having the pov/er to grant
The facts will show we have never been a volunteer before this
Committee or any other public testimonial forum. Your records will show that _^^
on May 9^ 1973, we were subpoenaed to appear, to testify and to produce "on^^'^'^
May lOth'Jwiich date has been adjourned) documentary evidence about the mat-
ters you ^ave under inquiry. Were it not for your subpoena our client would not
appear in a public forum but would have continued his cooperation with the pro-
secutors in secret as outlined in an affidavit of his counsel dated June 11, 1973,
and recently filed in support of a motion to quash his Grand Jury subpoena (a copy
of which Is attached hereto).
1097
since one branch of the Government has stated its intention
to prosecute and another branch has stated and demonstrated Its intention to
publicly legislate, our client - on the one hand being the prospective defend-
ant and on the other hand the compelled witness - is caught in the middle.
Since Constitutional rights are involved, we ask you and your
Committee to recognize what the Coui-t noted in Delaney v. United States, 199
F.2d 107, 110, 112-113 (1st Cir. 1952):
"One cannot assume that the average Juror is so „-.y'-
endowed with a sense of detachment, so clear in ' n;-* j
his introspective perception of his own mental
processes that he may confidently exclude even
the unconscious influence of his preconceptions
as to probable guilt, endangered by a pervasive
pre-trial publicity. This is particularly true in
, the determination^ of issues involving the credibility
of witnesses , "v
(Emphasis added).
Being compelled to testify before your Committee our client must
tell the truth. That truth is not limited to the actions of others but includes his
own as well. Publicity about our client's involvement will completely vitiate
the safeguard of your "Use" Immunity Statute which on its face is designed to
Insure that our client will not be convicted out of his own mouth but rather upon
evidence from others. How can anyone assure that a Jury drawn from a commun-
ity saturated with news media coverage of our client's testimony, will ever be
in a position to give him a fair trial?
Accordingly, we earnestly and respectfully request in the altem-
aEtlve (1) you excuse our client from any testimony at this time, and/Or (2) should
he be required to give testimony, he give it only in Executive Session under the
strictiffes of Rule 27 of your Rules of Procedure and that such testimony not be
made public until after the Govenunent concludes its iTosecution of him, and/or
0} if OOF client is requirol to testify in public, the sessions not be televised
or recGcded by movie film for subsequent presentatlcm on television.
We trust you will not intaTsret the postlon we take as obstruc-
tive <d the announce alois of your Committee's work but will realize the
96-296 O - 73 - 13
1098
clrcumstauces in which our client now finds himself requires the action
we take.
Respectfully,
SHAFFER, McKEEVER & FITZPATRICK
and
ROBERT C. McCANDLESS
1819 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Of Counsel
mle
1099
Exhibit No. 33
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA8HINOTON
June 19* 1973
Dear Mr. Oeant
I am authorised by the President to inform you that the
President will not invoke executive privilege, and you are
released from any attorney- client privilege with regard to
testimony you may give concerning the Watergate break-in, [
efforts to cover it up, or any other matters relevant to the
inquiry of the Senate Select Committee.
■*■•■
Insofar as you may have information that is related to national .
8 purity, it is for your counsel to advise you what lawfully may
be disclosed. The President is not authorizing any release
of legally protected national security nnaterial. _^^^
1 advised the Senate Select Committee of this yesterday, and
I am writing you so that you may have direct inforxnatlpn aboul l^-
this. . '' - ^l:
Sincerely,
AA^^^^^J^
Leonard Garment
Counsel to the President
Mr. John W. Dean UI '
100 Quay Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
cc: Mr. Samuel Dash, Seziate Select Committee
Mr. Fred Thompson, Senate Select Committee
Exhibit No. 34-1
March 12, 1973 — [Note: This is one where you will make only one copy for my
file and deliver the other copy to him — it is private]
MEMO FOR JOHN DEAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT
I noted the story in the Post this morning (3/11/73) with regard to some col-
lege student who had been hired to get some information with regard to demon-
strations which might be useful in keeping those activities from developing into
violence or have other unpleasant consequences. It is difiicult for me to under-
stand why we have not done an adequate job of getting the facts out chapter and
ver.se, on the mas.sive activities of McGovern and the so-called peace groups in
funding demonstrations against me, members of the family and others during
the campaign. As you are aware, there were virtually no demonstrations whatever
on our part against their meetings. This I had ordered at the beginning of the
year. On the other hand, I cannot recall a meeting in which I participated where
there were not demonstrations, including the non-political type meetings like
the one at the Statue of Liberty.
There was hard evidence of the McGovern people supporting and inciting the
violent demonstrations in San Francisco which resulted in several thou.sand
dollars in property damage. There was also hard evidence of the McGovern head-
quarters inciting the demonstration in L.A. the following day. And it would be
hard for me to believe that the fire bombing of our Phoenix headquarters, with a
lo.ss of $100,000.00 was done by one of our own people. It would seem to me that
the facts on such activities should be accumulated and that somebody — perhaps
Goldwater is the only man who has the guts to do it — should blast the McGovem-
ites for their vicious activities. Needles.s to .say, it would be helpful if Hruska or
someone on the Ervin committee on our side could see that at a time they are
investigating our campaign activities they are also investigating the charges
that have been made against their actions. I have rai.sed this ix)int to no avail
on previous occasions. Perhaps you now can follow through and .see that some-
thing is done. Give me a report at your convenience.
(1100)
1101
Exhibit No, 34-2
memorandum
the white house
WASIIINCTOJ;
February 11, I97I
CONFID]i£!TTAI,
MiMOlUinXJM FOR II. R. MIDK4AN
FRQ-I: ■ JACK CAUIJ-IEID
/\
SUBJECT: ANDERSOTI LE/lTCS .Aim "ALLEGED ACCESS TO PRESIDHIITIAL
Fiis-ibii/a^fDA
During his recent appearance on the Dick Cavctt Shov;, Jack Anderson made
the follovTing coniraents:
"I have access to intelligence digests because people . *
show them to us . " . . '
" - - some of the President's private memos, some of the
'transcripts of confidential ir\iimt«p."
"Tv70 thirds of the State of the Union Message tv.'O or three
days before it vras delivered."
"I can assure you that if the President knew vho was leaking
these memos, he would be fired tomorrow. "
>Iriter has analyzed the Anderson columns for the three month period pre- "■".
ceeding the State of the Union leak, as well as discreetly conferring with -
selected V.'hite House staff members. Resultingly, the foDJLowing observations
are offered : /f
a) Anderson does, indeed, have access to intelligence digests, andW.,
proves it on a daily basis. It also appears his reference to private , '
Pi-esidential memoranda is valid, but most likely when such material leaves;
the V/hite House and is circulated on an agency level. On more than one
occasion, examination of a Presidential quote in context indicates strongly .
that the leak came not from within the V/hite House, but from the agency
concerned with the subject matter. . , '- ^,\
B) Anderson's comment regarding "some of the transcripts of confidential'
"Binutes" possibly refers to verbatuia quotes of comments made at V/hite House:? ;;
leadership meetings. ■■■'>' ; . '
Tv70 of the V/hite House st?.ff members intervievfcd independently expressed the -p
view that Senator Hueh Scott or a m.embcr of Scott's staff are suspect. If.' •"••)!
you were not aware of thif; possibili^ and wish the names of the staff mcnbera,
■tbey will be furnished to lariy Higby upon request. ■ ..\ :>:
1102
Memorandum for H. R. Haldernan .RE: Anderson.
From: J. J. Caulfleld
Page tvra • " i ' ■ ,
Examination of the Anderson colvunns of Januai-y_ 21^ 22 and 23, all of vhich
are concerned vith the reorgani^'.ation of the federal government, apparently
refers to his State of the Union comiuent indicated above. ■ , '. '
In this connection, it lias been determined that all of the above information '
contained in those three articles appeared in one black bound, working
looseleaf booklet, Furtlier, thatt./elve late copies of such booklet vera ;
prepared and foruardcd to the Office of Management and Budget from the
Domestic Council under strict secairlty conditions in advance of the Anderson
leak. ;. :
An e>:araination of the subject document, along with a studied reviev; of the
subject A.nderson columns indicates tliat the book was made available ,.,,' '.- ;.'
to Anderson, most likely in its entirety, , ' .- r
Domestic Council members intervievred make a valid case for the leak to be <<■•'*
pinned on Oi-IB, Human Resources Section, I, personally, vrish to reserve ■.' ' ■ '!■
judgment until luore evidence is at hand. It has been brought to my atte,ntion ;;
that Geortit: Sljulo/^ iias buwn appx'iscu uf tiitise suspicions, and has taken the _'5^
position that a "smoking out" type investigation would be inadvisable.. ,,. '";5
Eesul tangly, I do not feel it proper to proceed with this aspect of the inq^uiry^ ;
unless or until you so advise. . " ' '.;,'
Having looked at this matter with all its serious implications for the future, ,.,.;
I feel it advisable to imiiediately suggest that all of the section chiefs on ■<^.'
the V/hite House staff be briefed by your office v/ith a view tovrards a miniraization
of leaked material and comment. I also suggest that an overt firing of a person i-.
directly connected with a leak would go a long v.'ay towards making the ability .■.'.,,.
of the Andersons of the vrarld to gain VJhite House information both difficult '
and hazardous. .\.i{
•Please advise. f
1103
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 1, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR .
ALEXANDER BUTTERFIELD
FROM: TRUDY BROWN
I discussed the attached memo from
Bob Brown informally with Bob Haynes of FB^.
He advised that a type of investigation
Mr. Brown is asking for v/ould be almost /^
iiixpos £)iuie.
I believe this is out of my area of '•
responsibility and therefore would like your
-reactions.
1104
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 28, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TRUDY BROWlSi
// y
FROM: ROBERT J. BROWN ^.<;/^ i/
SUBJECT; FBI Check on News Leak
I would appreciate it if you would have the FBI .v->
make a rundown on who is letting out information
of the sort enclosed with this memo. This is a '
matter of great concern to me and I would like a*
report on it.
Thanlcs.
Enclosures
cc: Mr, John Ehrlichman
1105
■ NoAoAoBoBo NEWS
Naiional Assccfelion To Advance Black Business
P.O. BOX 12978
YORK, N.Y. 10019
FOR UAMEDIATE REIEASE
FOR PUBLIC NOTICE
WHITE HOUSE AIDE BUXTKING MINORITY ENTERPRISE APPOINTMENT
John Ehrlichman, Special Assistant to the President/ has another
running battle going on. It will be well worth watching to ccc -»
Whether or not he wins this one as he did at Treasury on the
appointment, of an IRS director.
Ehrlichman backs Jay Leanse, a close friend of his, who has never "
had any experience in minority enterprise. Even when he wrote
Ehrlichman a personal letter/ he indicated that his ihterests were \
in HEW or KVD. He has become/ by virtue of Ehrlichman's endorse-
ment/ an instant expert on minority enterprise.
Secretary Stans is holding up the appointment waiting for the White
House Aide to give him the go ahead to appoint a minority to the
directorship of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise.
-30-
1106
(Date Illegible)
Mr. John D. Elirlichman
The White House
Washington, D.C,
Dear John:
For most of the twenty years since U.C.L.A. I've been in
general and sales management of paint and chemical manufac-
turing businesses in which I've had equity. In I965 and
through 1967 I was associated with W. Ross Campbell Company,
a prominent Los Angeles Realty and Mortgage brokerage firm.
I was a vice president and director of the Los Angeles
Junior Chamber of Commerce and have been an active parti-
cipant in various Jewish and community organizations.
My field is marketing and management, I am highly oriented
toward "people and organizations." My interests generally
are in HEW or HUD but I'm open to suggestion and willing to
relocate.
Joyce is in a masters program in the Graduate School of
Public Health at U.C.L.A. John, our oldest son, is I8 and
completing his senior year at a boarding school near Los
Angeles. Tom, 15, is a jimior and Steve, 12, a 7th grader.
John, I'm a registered Republican, I'm available and would
welcome enthusiastically the opportunity to work for you
again.
Sincerely,
s/s Jay
Jay I. Leanse
29^0 Cavendish Drive
Los Angeles, California 90064
213-839-2639
JIL/tps
A TRUE COPY
1107
July 1. 1971
MEMORAKDUM FOR;
FROM:
SUBJECT:
MR. JOHN J. CAULFIELD
ALEXAI\TDER P. BUTTERFIELD
Mr, Robert Brov.-n*B InvDr.tlr^atlon Reduest
$
I would appreciate your rsviowing tl^e attached material and advising '':
Bob Brown as to v/hlch (if any) af^ency or organiaatioa conducts
invcDtigationo of the tj-pe ixo Id requesting, A '.
AttacKmcnt
cc: .yl^lr. John \7- Dnan. lU
1108
THE WHITE HOUSE
W A S H I N G T O N
July 12, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
JOHN DEAN .
JACK CAULFIELD
Bob Brown's Investigative Request
1. Inquiry has ascertained tlie following:
a) The Post Office box number on the
attached letterhead is non-existent.
b) Credit Bureau and telephone company
checks reveal no information as to the
existence of an organization known as
the National Association to Advance ; "
Black Business. • '
2. The above developments suggest a clumsy covert :
. atteinpt to embarrass whomever. Bob Brown has
• . been so advised. Further, he has agreed that any
future leads regarding this matter will be forwarded
to my office. , ,
MEMORANDUM
1109
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASniNOTON
July 1, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
MR. JOHN J. CAULFIELD
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
Mr. Robert Brown's Investigation Request '
I would appreciate your reviewing the attached material and advising ■•
Bob Brown as to which (if any) agency or organization conducts •.
investigations of the type he is requesting.
Attachment
cc; ^.^r John W Dean Ttt
1110
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH : N GTON
September 2U, I97I
SUBJECT: J.D.E. REQUEST
A feniale Nixon campaign vorker presently working at
H.U.D. 's northeast regional office has expressed
concern to an intermediary party about the relation-
ship of the subject and the General Counsel in the
northeast region. Assertedly, the General Counsel
has been providing the subject inside information
on H.U.D. contracts and operations in that area.
Further, it is asserted that the subject has acquired
significant sums of money resulting from this re-
lationship.
nil
Exhibit No. 34-3
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
H. R. HALDEMAN
GORDON STRACHAN
Lrcaks
Dean, Malek, and I met to develop a strategy for handling leaks.
It would be helpful to realize that there arc five distinct types of leaks;
only some of these are detcrrable. The types include: a) the August
SALT leak promptijig the lie detector tests at State. The individual
consciously violated the lav,' to protect his own view of the
national interest- -non-deterrable ; b) the September SALT (accidental
war agreement) leak: too many individuals (all of Congress and our
NATO allies) knew and so the information is not controllable--
non-deterrablc; c) the self-serving leak wiiich strengthens the individual's
policy position by acquiring public support before the final decision is
made -- deterrable; d) the ego-stroke leak where the individual either
wants to sec his name ir. print or to be k^iown as one v.-ith inliuencc --
deterrable; and e) the careless leak resulting from either a slow
individual with information and a foot reporter or too much liquor --
deterrable.
The "self-serving leak" for policy position advantage has been partially
deterred as a result of the Ju:ie 29 Cabinet meeting.
Following the June 29 meeting ih your office. Dean, Malek, Allin and
Ihavc reviewed eleven cases for possible Haldcman action as "lord high
executioner" to slop leaks, Malek and Dean arc of the opinion that none of
the eleven cases would have been appropriate for Haldcman action. The
subject should be raised again in a future Cabinet meeting and in the
8:00 a.m. and 8:15 a.m. meetings.
The conscious violator of the law leak should be handled as the August
SALT leak-is now -- firm FBI investigation and full criminal penalties.
Any dctcrence is fortuitous.
Tlie last two, the ego- stroke and tlic careless leak, can be deterred by:
a) Careful placomcnl of a Buchanan drafted story to the effect
that as a result of the SALT leaks a White House investigative
unit of Dud Kro!jh, Jolin Di-an, and Fred Malek lias been csla-
bHshod to monitor leaks. The thrust of the story v.'ould be the ,
1112
DRAFT
positive Roscoe Drummond theme that good government requires
this type systenn to assure loyal burcacrats;
b) Periodic soundings in the bureacracy aimed at detecting the level
of concern about leaks and to indicate White House interest in the
subject. These could be conducted by Dent's departmental
contacts;
c) Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and I'Cissinger should meet with their
respective staffs to emphasize the following points:
1. The political year is upon us;
2. The media will be watching for and pushing wedges in
any cracks;
3. This has been an excellent year in terms of policy decision^*-
These positions should be consolidated by not permitting
leaks to vinderinine our unified approach to the re-eloction
of the President;
4. The ineeting should not be similar to the 1970 Campaign
meeting with the notorious leaks (Safire, Timmons, Dent,
Finch, Magruder, KJein, Colson), which had a very
negative effect.
1113
September 27, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL — EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR: FRED MALEK
FROM: H.R, HALDEMAN
SUBJECT: Leak Situation
Gordon reports that you, Higby and Dean met to review the leaJc
situation and procedures for handling them« Based on the report
of the meeting, it is my understanding that you will take personal
charge of this project,
John Ehrlichman has the feeling that there has been an increase
in the number of leaks lately. Please discuss this with him as
the first step in a high priority program of pinning down the sources
of leaks and cutting them off.
Bi-weekly reports on what action you've taken and the results will
be expected with the first one due on Monday, October 11.
cc: Mr. Dean
v^
Mr. Strachan
A TRUE COPY
-296 O - 73 - 14
1114
CC ' -al^^Vi, A^.4ft-^
^_. -„_ . « ^*L li
MKMOKA . :
TME WHITE HOUSE
WAtUINOTON
CONFIDENTIAL o ,
September 29, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ' FRED MALEK
SUBJECT: Leaks
7Wf
The purpose of this memo is to brief you on my plan for dealing with the
problem of leaks.
BACKGROUND
Since the President's forceful direction on this problem, there have been a
minimum of major improper disclosures requiring your attention. However,
the number of minor, hard to track down, infractions has continued, hi fact,
a CIA study predicts that at the present rate, we will have 4 times the num», *•
ber of improper disclosures of national security information this year as
wc had ir. 197"0. Thic ctudy i= attached -xt Tab A, and John Ehrlichman tellP
me it is the basis for his recent comments to you on this subject.
PLAN OF ATTACK
Responsibility for dealing with this problem has been centralized with me.
However, it will be necessary to have separate approaches for national secu-
rity leaks and domestic leaks.
National Security. As you know. Bud Krogh and David Young, under
Ehrlichman's direction, are already conducting a confiprehensive investigation
of national security leaks. They plan to continue this, and any efforts on my
part to actually investigate wovild be redundant. Rather, my role will be to
keep infornned of their efforts, to crack down hard on any violators who are
uncovered, and to report to you on any cases needing your intervention.
Their problenn to date is identifying the violators, but I feel they are on the
right track.
Donrtcstic. This covers all leaks not involving national security, some
of which could involve State or DOD. There are, of course, a large number
of minor infractions in this area, and I do not believe we at the White House
1115
should try to locate the origins except in the most obvious cases. Rather, I
plan to remain continually alert to leaks, forcefully call them to the attention
of Department Heads, insist on actions, and follow through to ensure actions
are taken. Where nnultiple sources are involved, we would coordinate the
follow througli from here. When a violator is identified, I would ensure a
hard crackdown.
Specific steps I plan to take in approaching this problem are as follows:
1. The memo at Tab B has been sent to Cap Weinberger
and Ken Cole, reiterating my request for their assistance
in spotting improper disclosures. I will follow up with them
as needed to gain their cooperation.
2. Mort Allin will continue to scan newspapers and the news
summaries and call my attention to observed leaks,
3. On each legitimate leak spotted, I will follow up force-
fully with the Departn-icnt Head, insisting on a thorough
investigation to identify the source. Most of these will not
bring results but at the least will increase consciousness
and attention to tliis matter. This should have an important
preventive maintenance effect.
4. We will work through our politically loyal personnel con-
tacts in each Department to spot leaks, identify culprits,
and raise the general degree of attention to this problem.
This will be sonnewhat duplicative of 3 above, but will give
us another avenue to help get results.
5. I expect the need for your involvement to be minimal,
but I will prepare an action memo and talking paper for all
cases requiring your attention.
6. At the end of each nnonth, I will submit a progress
report to you, outlining the cases considered, actions taken,
and results. I believe this would be more effective than the
bi-weekly reports suggested in your 9/27 memo.
A major part of my thrust is to increase awareness of and attention to the
problem on the part of top-line officials. They must be held responsible for
leaks in their units and sliould be required to take forceful preventive as well
as curative measures. To ensure the top line officials give added attention
1116
to this, however, we need additional Presidential direction. I recommend
that the President raise this in an early Cabinet Meeting. He could cover it
quickly as a follow on to the session of several months ago, ask for an
aggressive action plan in each Department to- deal with tliis problem, and
designate me as the follow up person to counsdfl on the plans and work with
them as needed on implementation. If you approve of this concept, I will
prepare a tallcing paper and coordinate with Alex on scheduling.
Approve
Disapprove
The combination of the ahpve should have some impact. However, the greatest
impact \vill be achievpd'oy finding and making an example of violators.
Please let me know whether you have any general comments or would like
some modificfi'tion in this plan of attack.
Attti c ''.Snent £
1117
Exhibit No. 34-4
SUBjrcT: E^ VISIT TO HOKOUILU AUGUST 1?-].^ 1971
Indicated below arc the results of an on the scone check of the
moveraentG of E:;1C during his ."iop-off visit to Honolulu enroute
from India;
Ei'DC arrived in Honolulu alone aboard Pan American Flif\ht ;?2 from
India via Tokyo (he didn't G-t off filane jn Tokyo) at 11:00 AI^I
August I'l'th. A ru::nin£i press :intervie\/ took place with Kennedy
obviously reluctant to ma!:e any statement. His only corcment was
V7ith regard to the President's econoinic moves which he character-
ized as "sound, but late". He departed the airport quickly with
two friends identified as follows:
a) John V7. Goeraans
Attorney
Resides in V.'aialua City^ close to Honolulu
Fonner HIK classmate and Aide to botli Jack and
Robert Kennedy
B) John Carl V/arnecke
Architect
Friend of Kennedy family
Designer of JFK gra^^ewight
Ostensibly, B'JC's visit wos for the purpose of evaluating the
creation of a National Park at t>ie site of a black coral reef
island off the Honolulu coast. The reef bears an identifiable likeness
to the profile of the late JTK. It was determined that a local
Democratic Councilman, Joseph E. Eulgo (Maui Island) is handling
the project on behalf of E-IFC.
H^IK made no public appearances during his stay in Honolulu. Inquiry
ascertained that he occupied the private estate of one J. Otani,
located at Diamond Head Road, Honolulu. Otani is initially described
as a wealthy Japanese industrialist (attempts will be made to identify
him further) .
Discreet inquiry determined that Kennedy used the estate solely for
sleeping purposes, took only his breakfast meal at t>iat location
and quietly visited friends at other locations on the island.
It is knovm that he played tennis on August l8 at the estate of one
Lloyd Martin identified as a wealthy Honolulu contractor. Partners
in the tennis match were Mrs. .Warnecke, Mrs. Martin, Lloyd I-lartin and
H4K.
1118
II4K
An extensive survey of liotels, discreet cocktail loun;v;on and
other liideavjays vas conducted v;ith a vicv/ tovards determining
a covert K-K visit. The results vore n egative .
Additional co,nipanion3 of B'HC at the estates mentioned vere:
Stan llimcns
A friend of V'arnecke's 'and
V/alttr Taf^av^a,
A friend of Jiartin's
It A7as also determined that durJnfi his island stay E-3C worked
on a speech vhich A:as civen 8/26/7I at the National Press Club
in Washlnfiton on tl)e subject of Pakistan.
As previously reported, rcaterial relating to this matter vas
forwarded to Lyn Nofziger for use in the Monday publication. A
review of the 8/30/7I issue indicates some of the material \ra.s
in fact used in the EK- Pakistani article.
In conclusion, it is believed that EK activity dCillng his stay
in Honolulu was adequately covered. Ko evidence was developed
to indicate that his conduct v."as improper.
}Iyahnispoft sources indicate KUC will remain in that area until
reconvenes. A discreet, inquiry at llyannis is programned by our
source during this period.
1119
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA S H 1 N G T O N
October ll+, I97I
MB^ORAKDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN
FROM: JACK CAULFIELD
SUBJECT: mK- TOYOTA
y
/,
L"
Dick Allen has passed information to HRH indicating
Kennedy people have engineered a regional Toyota
franchise in New England.
Ify memo of August indicating Et-K visited with an
as!serte^ J^'^^nese ipdus'^'rialist C J« O'^-ani - *T^t
further identified) during a two day layover enroute
from India nov7 suggests a follow-up on J. Otani.
Such inquiry is underv/ay.
1120
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA S H I N G T O N
October 20, I97I
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, I
FROM: JACK CAULFIELD
SUBJECT:
J. OTANI
Inquiry to date has determined the' following
Otani is a multi-millionaire Democrat with extensive real
estate and business holdings in Hawaii. He is President
and General Manager of the Otani Company which is a
successful wholesale seafood enterprise.
Sources advise that Otani significantly controls local politics
in Honolulu to the extent that he is referred to as the "Mayor
Maker" .
.He is a frequent visitor to Honolulu's Customs area, particularly
vhen important Japanese visit the island .
U.S. Customs sources contacted in this regard were unaware of
any relationship between Otani and Toyota. Since there apparently
exists a friendly relationship betv/een Otani and Customs officials
in that area, further inquiry through this source is deemed
Inadvisable.
Other means of inquiry designed to prove or disprove the
allegation are currently being explored.
cc: JR. Allen
1121
EXHTOIT No. 34-9
VJASiUHGTON - R}L'SP0NSIBILITIE3
SAMRIES President 3^,000
Vice-Ii-eGident 36,000
Adjnin. Asst. 20,000
Secretary 15,000
Klectronics -
Security Expert 25^000
OFFICE
$132, 000
Kental 10, 000
Furn.iGhinGS 5, 000
Eciuip-ient ' 5,000
Utilities (telephone, etc.):L2,000
Security Devices 2,000
Accounto.nt - Legal
Fees 10, OOP
$ ^^000
TRAVFTi-
(Clcints - opcratJ.Yes -
Prenident
Vice-President
Security Expert 50,000
$ 226, 000
TOTAI.: vZASHIi^IGTON, IIE^a' YORK, CPIICAGO $ 511,0 00
TRAVEL
1122
CHICAGO
SAIARIES
Head
Secretary
$36, 000
11^,000
$ 50, 000
OFFICE
Rental, equip:nent, etc. 5^000
(Clients)
10, 000
OPERATIOIIS SUPPORT
(informants, Special Projects)
10, OOP
$ 75,000
1123
imi YORIC
Salaries
Head
Operative
Operative
36,000
25', 000
2^,000
$ B&, 000
Travel
11/71-11/72
(To include aeals,
lodgirig, airfare,
car rental)
Head
Opera.tive
Operative
18,000
18,000
18,000
$ ^^i+Tooo
Operation^
InforiPantc Turfd -
Spe c i a,l Fi-o j C:c ts
Headquarters, il.Y.C.
(Apartnent, false
identities, r.ail drops,
telepb-one , etc . )
l'kxuj.p:r.snt - 'Jlectrcnic -
Su i-ve i 1 Ian c o_)
Telephone Credit cards
s^>
50,000
.5,000
15,000
10^000
70,600
$210, 000
$100, 000 Open ended
1124
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA S H I N G T O N
September 17, I97I
MB-IORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III
FROM: JACK CAULFIELD
SUBJECT: SECURITY - CAMPAIGN '72
The attached memorandum represents an analysis of the
overall security requirements for Campaign '72 at the
Republican National Committee, I7OI Pennsylvania Avenue
and at San Diego.
Consistent with the Sandwedge memo, it expands upon the
overt involvment of the Security Consulting Group*, Inc.
in a manner that would be credible, readily accepted
and, most importantly, badly needed.
Since the plans for the Nixon Campaign traveling
staff are presently unknown, no analysis was made in
vill have to be taken to ensure the integrity of that
operation. There is time for that, however.
1125
iiiTRor/j';T ron
The bro?.d iMnr.e oT r.cr.zxtivc jcjUlical activity acsoclatcd with
a Presidential Ccr..in.irjp. rar.dotes tliat a conti-ollinc cecurity
entity he rslcb?. i^licO. and pro^rajrx.cd to effectively minir,iize, in
practical fobhion, the l;azarQ3 for oo.TiproniiEe by oppoaition
forces e.'.)d tliereby crii;urc the si.ooth function of Republican Party
busiucsc during; 1972.
It is Uic puj-poHC of t'.la paper to cauf^e fjOcus to be brought
upon thor.e ;jrcas rc;qiiirin;3 cucl; security capability. In addition,
indication irj ^ivcn as to ho-.r tlie Security Consulting Group of
Vashinf.ton, Inc., the proposed risrr.s f cs" the coniT.ercial security
entity, ■i.'ill be able to function in this regard A.-hether it be fro.-n
an oi.>3rational or ovei-vJei; standpoint, as follovrs:
a) fepublicn n ration a l Cc~: :: itxce
Immediately cftcr C.'/cpaifn 'oB, Bob Kaldcr.an authorized the
author of this papr;r to institute and overviev; a security pro^rjun
at the Republican national Co— -littce. This prograju has been onr;oin3
for tuo years and a continual overviev: has been structured. Attached {l.-JD
"A") is an account of the security procedures presently in place at
the Coi'!3-.it!:ee.
They ere found to be generally satisfactory vrith the exception of
a requi rcir.cn t to tig hten up the P inkc'rton effort to include an analysis
of llie quality of tlicir personnel and institute a^ polycraph
examination of each c^nrd v/orI;inc; at tlic Coirjnittce.
For health rensonr, John Itaf;nn vill not be able to continue to
pcrfoi-in In tliis area during the coming monthr;. Jaiiics Mc Cord,
1126
a hichly qualified ^'cpjblicun career Eccurlty professional,
(tab "IJ") vill be retained r.s e consultatii; to the Security
Consulting Croup nnc: vill perfoiin operational overview' duties
at the Cov,".dtteo vwl clscvrhcrc, as indicated, on a scheduled basis
under the directior. of the orcani'/ation.
1701 ro!irfiylvr.n Ja /■vcnv.e
The Security Con-j-jllliiii Group, Inc. -i/ill initiate (l»c Cord) and
Bupervisc a con-.prohc:;Givc r.ecu^'ity system tt the above location.
Tlie procedr.res ei-.lohliL;hed &.t the R.IT.C. (TAE "A") vill be tailored
to conforn to thr- cxp^.ndinr; roquireii;ento of I7OI Pennsylvania.
In addition, the follo-./ing arc-as of security concern vill be
addressed, evaluai-cd and proi;r::r--!ii3d :
A) the reyuironont that a sclioduled ELDJTROillC COUHTEHIKaSUPJCS
SYSTH-I be cctablich'-:d to include:
1) Office t«.'lepho:ie net\:orl:
2) Conference roo.v.s
3) ResiOcnce phones of key political staff in
V'ashinston
KOTE: Tlie syster.i established vill be adaptable to the Ilixon
staff and G.O.P. needs at Can Dicco.
B) Tlie ability to recruit a tvo wan bodyguard protective detail
for the Attorney General throuchout Cajapaisn *^2 is at hand.
Because the A.G. may have personal preferences in this area, no
cteps vill be taken, until ndviccd.
C) Computer Security - An inspection capability to ensure the
intccrity of the Republican computer cystemu used in Cwiipulen '^2.
1127
D) Poll Cccurily
A security cop-^'ility clC3:iGntd to ennurc the ccnfidentiallty
of key polls inntlUit'Jcl by lyOJ. operatives vill be pro^ramned .
F) Undoubtedly, additional cccuri-ly requirements ctoraiinfj
from the 1701 ororrition vill Leco.ns evident as the cainpaicn
prosresses. Tlie f;l>ove described f;tructure ■t/ill pernit a
professional ic^p^uje to the:;e needs .
R dpublJccn H a tirp :' ' Cci :'.ventio.i ■
The vast private i.e:.urity need.': c? the Ilixon teai-i and I'epublican
Party at San Die^o can be ber.t i;::plen3ntcd in the follovin^ ranner:
a) ni?:on r^t pff Ile ndo'j r.rtc- vs at t he Sheraton h ote l, liarbor Tsl ind
The Security Consulting Crc^'.p, Inc. ■J'ill be cliar^ed vith total
ad hoe Eccurity-reccpiionict entity i.'.lll be cstablifihed utilizins
off duty reserve deputy sheriff .'j fro.-n the San Dieco Sheriff's office
and Ilixon fcLiale volunteers. The Sheriff of San Diego County, Joan I>jffy,
(Nixon ?.ei:i:blican) has acrecd to provide such personnel, escured that
they -vill be younc, bright and capable and, ji.-portantly, that they
all vill be Republicans. It vas agreed that a reasonable vage vould
be paid tliose performing in this regard fro.n Nixon Staff funds.
The nboYC procedure is strongly recoiLucndcd to ensure that the
Nixon Staff team vill have qvialified and loyal security personnel
under proper controls at the iuportant Sheraton Hotel (see belovf)-.
1128
Includorl in the re: i-oi-'.nibJ] lilc.-'; of the Cccurltj Coiir;uItir.[- Croup
at th2 holcl vjj.ll bj the .ti;r;ti tution of u sophicticDtcd photo-ID
Bystor.i ar.'.l e?.ov:'.tor cjcaraufc process clc-jicncd to minimize the
hazard o<' dict'i'hr.nc'j, urr.'arrautcd accccc to senGitivc v/ork areas
and the like.
B) Cprvcno'cn r'::-';-it yj C-;n Dicr ro ,
The n.lI.C. h?.3 ;;clc;ctcd Cdy Fich of Vir.consjn to be the Gereeant
at AriDs lor the CoMveation. In that position he v;ill have cecurity
and iinhcr rcrporinilbii j tier, uitbin the Convention Hall and at the
COP lle^dqx'.arter:: ai -..lie Ro.val Inn a-j; the V.'iiurf during the Convention
period.
Dick Ilsr/.'an has cSr.ri the cutlior to have the Security Consulting
Croup act in an tc'vicory cap:_city in this regard and lidtiate a
cojaiTChciiijivc cost r.urvey of ths secuTity requirecents for the
COP llckdr.ucrtczjj orA Convention Hull. Further, Heri'ian hiS ashed
that qualiificd profcruionuls be recruited to assist Fish in this
regard. Tliis vemicjit hris been aj^reed to and such survey vill be
conducted by the-; r.ubjcct orcanization and i;ubnittcd to the ArrRn5eT2nts
Coonsittec for revjcv at the earDiest possible tinse.
It io noted that various private detective agencies aJ*c already
atter.iptins to use l^cpublicnn jx)litical influence to obtain vliat vlll
be a prestigious nnl lucrative contract at San Weco. Iv'hile the Cecurity
Consulting Group v/jll ensure that all interested parties get
consideration, the ability to jicrform should be considered the
1129
prine factor in ii\.'ardin3 tho contract and rcco:rL'ucndations ^;ill
be r-r.dc acrordiiiGly. At-loched (TAB "C") in a recent article
in the V.'a3hi.n.::konicn I!<;ar'.inG clearly indicatinc the- poor quality
of private iiccurJ.ty perijcniiel in VJu^fihinrton. Generally speaVtint;, the
BQiiie pattern applies •natioM\ndc . (It is this factor that stronGly
Buccests the use of reserve deputy Sheriffs at the Nixon Staff
headciuarters as indicated above).
lit eddition to the Sports Arena and G.O.P. hof-dquarters
hotel, early cir^n-s ind-Jcato the posnilility of a security need
at other ]ocatioi:3. For exuiiple, the Nixon staff is conteisplr.tinc
the hoursin^r of a lar^e croup of 18 year olds at a local San Die~o
collcn<^ for rally purposes. AduitionalDy, the Arranc:cn-;tntD
CoiniRittee is loohinf^ at the possible u£^c of a pier near the Royal
Inn at the \nnrf as a Ci.O.P. A:orkinj4 area.
When these and other like them decisions are nade, the Security
Consultin3 Group can effectively program the security requirements
after it Is deterniincd vhetlier operational activity or advisory
cervices are needed.
96-296 O - 73 - 15
1130
I\c-v..w-i.^ August 26, 1971
MEMORA.NDUM TO: RNC EMPLOYEES
FROM: .BARRY MOUiu/ua -j
;;tai.\ [/-v /
RE: SECURITY PROCED'JRES
Over the past' sc'veral r.onths
nurnsrous r.sasurc-s heive been tc".!;cn to up^'.^ado seciiri'cy for the bor.e.'it
of the Rc-pLibncen ilacicnc;! Cc:7.niittee. K;ny of thase steps, v.'aile nc:
readily visible to zi'.e e.'::ployee in his or her day-to-day operacio.i, •..ill
help with overall security needs and precautions as we ready for the '72
nevertheless, some of these pre-
cautions still require the wholehearted cooperation of everyone in the
building. Therefore, please read these instructions carefully and re-
tain them for future reference.
I. SECURITY OF FICE AND
GU;"^D S£sVrC£
John Ragan, former F. B. I. agent
and security officer for the '68 cair.pairn, is retained by t'ac National
Committee and the Citizens Coa.:nittee to oversee security measures. Mr.
Ragan's office is on the 1st floor in Mr. Underwood's section. His tele-
phone extension is 6517.
Between 5 p. m. and 9 a. m. on
weekdays and all day Saturday and Sunday, the Pinkerton Agency is re-
tained for guard service. They are a bonded service and are required
to fully adhere to certain specific regulations. Therefore, your cooper-
ation is requested in dealing with tho:,i. The guards will have hone pr.one
numbers of all crr.ployoes but are instructed not to give them out except
to another employee. In case of an crr.crgcncy he has been instructed to
call certain key employees for additional instructions.
II. Lf-iPLOYCf lOrf^TIFICATlON'
All full -tine employees should
have identification cards with then at all times. All other individuals
should be listed at the reception desk and should be prepared to produce
1131
a driver's license or other suitable identification v/honc-vcr requsstsd
by tiic roccptior.ist or gjcrd. People arriving bovcre 8:30 a. v.. or
leaving after 6:C0 p. n. arc- rec;uircd to sign the register at tha
reception desk.
III.' VISITORS
.Visitors are to be logged in
and out at the reception desic at all ti.T.es.
When individual offices are
expecting visitors, please notify the reception desk v/hcnever possi-
ble. The receptionist will r.uke certain ti:at they are well received
in the Lobby until sucn ti.T.e as they are rciCy tc be received.
Effe c tive Senterriber 1s t, all
visitors will be escorted to their appoiivc.ueni: cy iVie secretary or
designated er.iplcyee of the office being visited. This is a startoard
security procedure which will be enforced.
Unfortunately, in the past
there has been loss of valuables and poclcetbccks, v.aich is possii^ly
attributed to lack of control over outsiders. Let r.e remind you,
therefore, that all fe.v.ale e::ployees should keep their pocketbocks cut
of sight in a cra'.,er or ceoinet. iven should not leave .jackets con-
taining v/allets unattended in the open.
IV.- FACILITY ACCZSS
^' HELI VERIES - A receiving
clerk's station has been installed at the back cccr vnzn access ceing
only through the supply office. In addition, TV nonitors are also
located in this office so as to give daytire coverage to the garac;e and
parking lot. All rr.erchant deliveries are zo be rou:ed ihrouon this area
and deliverytr.en will no longer have free access to the building.
B. GARAG E - The c;arago door
will be closed at all tinges and opened only for e.vcry or exit by a ve-
hicle. The interior ranp and tiie exterior apron are new constantly
monitored by closed circuit television car.eras. These monitors will be ■
controlled at night by the guard at the reception desk and during the
day solely by the receiving clerk.
For exit and entry in the
garage, a doorbell has been installed on either sice of the garage door.
The bell will ring at the r.onitoring stations and the door will be open-
ed by remote control.
C. Orncrs - Keys have been
issued to the Chairman's, Co-Chainnen's and Divu.K.ii Heads' offices, and
each s cction i s rospon'. ihl o for sectiri t v v.' i v t . i n t h .-^ i r ov.t; a re a . .' I r . R a r a n
and otners mil periodically ii.ake sccui-jty c.ioc:^s i,o as to naintain co.urol
over the syr.tcn; The r.'.aintenance people will KOT have keys to private
Offices, and therefore, wastebaskets, ashtrays and other items for cleaning
1132
should be loft CL'tsici cha privute office in t'r,2 cvoninr, ualc-ss
other arranccrr.snts ere ir.zd^.
V. fiA\"DLlf:G A:n'D ST0.?A 3E cf
All confidential r'.iiarizil is to
be locked v^i u;-,Gn2vcr an area is not attc.-^.dod. IccaViyj alj_ desks and
cabinets should be Icclxd. If t.Vis is not possible, each ccpartcent
head sho-jld designate certain cabinets for s«;o;'aye of specific types of
material. .\'o sensitive material should be left en top of desks over-
night. A SLifficienc nu.T.eer cf Icckec file cabinets are available to
handle everyone's needs.
. .A shredding nachino is located
in the Mail Roor:i on 3-2 for disposal cf confidential r.aterial. .The
dispatch officer v;ill pick up such iter.is cz the end of eacn day for
shredding, or each office can personally take such r.^aterial to E-2.
All offices will be supplied with wastebsskots and bags for this
material.
VI, em:rge::cie$
i
Everyone should be aware of the
location of the fire extinguisher closesi: to his desk and also of the
location of tne rrre alam switcn. ine fire aiann systeni nowever, is
for building notification cnly end dees not autor,iatically alerc the
fire departr.ent. Such notification r.ust be rr.ade cnrourli our switch-
board operator, by calling the fire cepartr.-.ent (iiO 2-1515) or by use of t^
fire alara box located at 1st and "D" S'creet, S. E.
Fire drills will be held periodical-
'ly and in the event of evacuation:
1) Use either staircase but do NOT
use the elevators.
2) Leave the building by either
the front or back door and proceed to a point at least 300 feet fror.i the
building.
Listed below are emergency num-
bers for your infonnation:
POLICE 626-2375
FIRE DEPARTMENT HO 2-1616
. JOHN RAGA^L .....EXT. 6517 or (516) 798-4S81
PINKERTO:i 2/14-3500
cc: John Ragan .
Pinkcrton Guards
Receptionist
f
1133
Exhibit No. 34-10
The Democratic Party is proud
to present you with your
Membership Card. . . .
Participating Mombcrsiiip
Program
2600 Viroinia Avenue. N.W.
Washington. D.C. 20037
<■!
^^
yr>
Dsinocralic
V»i ':_.••■;. ■-.
H'ofAinC.on. D.C.
Thit cerlificM ihct
V.
i;S:.SOCii.-i2JZ :'.. t.'
ti/ the
J
This card ocknov.'ledges v;ith our sincere thanks your Membership Contribution. You will find
. space on the back to rccorc) the names o( your Congressional representatives.
Here's another v/av vcu c-m cor
jtyour rany. .
Your Participating Membership is most appreciated. You
can help even more by sending us the names of others
that you think would also v:ant to support our efforts.
Narro
Sued
City ..
Stale Zip
Name
Street
City ..
Name
Street
City ..
Name
Sticet
City ..
1134
Exhibit No. 34-11
SUBJECT: McCloskcy's Now Hampshire Cnmp;<i(Tn
1. As dircclcd, an investigative team conducted r. series of
discreet inquiries and oljservationc in New Hampshire with a
view towards an evaluation of Paul N. (Pete) McOoskey's
N. H. organization and plans to cliallcnj^c tlic President in
th(i March 1972 New Hampshire presidential preference
primary. This activity took place dliring the period 11/18-11/21.
.The results are as follows:
A) ORGANIZATION ■ .• '
Volunteers - The >.'IcCloskcy volunteer headciuarters is
located at 101 Norlli Main Street, Concord, New Hampshire,
Telephone ii 683-224-1966, It is a one room storefront operation
typical of a small towai election headquarters.
There is a marked lack of activity at the headquarters, siaiied
primarily oy youths in their middle to late twenties. In addition,
there appears to be little interest expressed by the local Concord
citizens witli the current operation.
Pretext press intervicv/s conducted at the location determined th.c
identities and assignments of the present volunteer personnel:
Michael Brev/cr Campaign Manager for
28 years of age New Hai-npshire (Receives salary)
Field Rciciiardt New England Coordinator
23 years of age McCloskcy Volunteers
Resides in Waterville, Maine, (Receives Salary)
graduate of Colby College, Maine
Former Chairman of Maine College
Republicans . . ' " • • •
1135
Eric Schnapper
26 years of age
Charles Brcrcton
29 years of age
Previous invol v'cmcnt as
organizer in Peace Movements
Nancy Payne
24 years of age
John Mudge
22 years of age
Resides Lyme, N. H.
Grandfather founder of
Mudge, Rose law firm
Christopher Finch (no relation)
24 ycarS" of age
Aide to Campaign Manager
Youtli Organization-Voter
Registration Coordinator for
McCloiikcy Volunteers
(Receives Salary)
Office Manager
Regional Coordinator
McClosl;cy Volunteers
(See attachment)
Regional Coordinator
McClosl;cy Volunteers
Cair>T>:'i"n Workev
Kathy Gonzalez
Woodside, Calif.
(McCloskey's hoine district)
CaiTipaign Worker
Youthful enthusiasm was expressed by all of tlic above during the
course of pretext press interviews. The main focus of this liead-
quarters is to supply logistical and contact support for a campus
registration effort scheduled to become full blov/n in January.
It was dcterinined, hov/ever, that the organization's efforts to
date have been discouraging. Encouraging support has only
been achieved on four campuses to date. Deep concern v/as
expressed over the expected organizational thrusts of Muskie,
McGovern and Jackson in tliat tlicir respective constituencies
arc closely aligned plnlosopliically willi McCloskey and rcsultingly
threaten their campus voter registration efforts.
.the presence of
Close questioning of the above staff reveals jnoncy problcnis.
All financing is controlled froin the Washington headquarters.
Within the last wecli 'mailing of campaign literature from the
volunteer hcadciuarlcis was c\irtailcd because of a shortage of
funds. Negligible amounts arc coming direct to the volunteer
operation.
1136
The voUinlccjG arc placing their hojics upon an accelerated
appearance schedule hy McCloskcy to begin alter Congress '
adjourns for tlie holiday recess.
In any event, it is clear that McCloskey docs not have a
" McCarthy Youth Movenic-nt " going in New Ilampsliire at this
time. Worliing ayainst that potential is the lack of the war as
an issue and the expected heavy thrusts of the Democratic
candida:tcs after the first of the year. Unless an incident
or event occurs whicli can project NlcCloskey ir»to the headlines
and capture the ima.gination of the yoimg, it is doubtful ihzii
he crfn gear the existing organivialional' volunteer framework
(and that's all it is) to a successful effort.
BUSINESS COMMUNITY SUPPORT
Inquiry has dctcrinincd lliat tlic below identified Concord
businessmen arc actively supporting McCloskey' s New
Hampshire canipaign:
Malcohn White - Mayor of Concord
CcticorJ iic-w.spj'.pciG report tliat While openly pledged
support for McCloskey on August 9, 1971 during a ceremony
opening the Volunteers for McCloskey headquarters.
J. Richard Jackman
Described as a prominent Concord Republican. Retired
President of Ruinford Press Inc. , Chairman of N. H. delegation
to '64 Republican N'ational Convention; '64 Cliairman of Draft
Lodge Committee. Past international President of Adminis-
trative Management Association and Printing Industries of
America; President of Concord Hospital; Member of City
Council, Chairinan of Housing Authority; Director of Concord
National Bank.
Jackman' s announced support of McCloslcey in October
caused significant enthusiasm aniongst McCloskey' s supporters
in New Hampshire.
1137
Paul O. Bofinger
East Concord Conservationist. Forrester for Society for
the Protection of N. H. Forests. (Conservation is a sensitive
issue in New Ilainpshire).
Robert H. Reno
State Chairman for McClosUey's campaign in primary.
Lawyer in Concord law firin of Orr and Kcno, 95 N. Main Street,
Concord.
Reno has had no significant previous political experience.
An examination of the 12 member lav/ firm indicates both
the Mayor and Charles F. Leahy, Administrative Assistant to
Governor Peterson are listed as practicing attorneys.
Reno's present focus is concentrated on obtaining 1,000
signatures of registered voters (500 from each congressional
district) for submittal to the Secretary of State along with a
$500 filing fee for each district. The filing deadline is January 6,
1972. l^ocal key political reporters were contacted in this regard
and they expressed tlic opinion that McCloskey's oj^eralion could
produce the required nuniber of signatures, but that they may have
difficulty.
It might v/ell be desirable for Nixon political loyalists in
New Hampsliire to take a close look at the progress of this effort
and if trouble in gaining tlie required amount of signat\ires becomes
evident, consideration could be given to apply pressure to have
the lav/ firm (where pressure opportunities exist) drop its support.
Conceivably, this tack could cause the entire operation to fold
prematurely.
13) FUNDING
Clearly McCloskey is having serious nnoney problcir\s as
mentioned above. His inain sources to date have been identified
as coming fron^ Now York and California. Norton Simon, who
Tran unsuccessfully against George Nhirjjhy in the California
Senate primary of 1970 is a jnajor contributor.
1138
It is reported tl.at Norton in mid-July provided $50, 000
in 6ccd money for a nationwide effort.
Anotlicr major California contributor is Albert R. Schrcck,
Director of the San Franci.'jco Art Institute.
On the Kast Coast McClo.sI;cy has sought and accepted
what is described as "N. Y. Peace Money. " A New York City
party in the S]5ring of 1971 raised $11, 000 whicli was used to
finance a trip to Southeast Asia. Sonie of those attending the
party were:
Stewart Mott - Left wing phila.nthropist
Howard Stecn - ]J)jeyfus Fund
Sam Rubin - Invci^tor
It was determined tliat former Kennedy staffer, Charles Daly,
was instrumental in this particular effort. Daly accomjianied
McClosk(!y on the trip.
IVlcCloskcy has accepted nvimerous paid speaking cngagejncnts
before a grou):) known as the Business Executives Move for Vietnam
Peace (BEM). Attaclicd is a description of the organization.
In an effort to sustain the New Hampshire effort, McCloskey
in October closed down his West Coast campaign Iieadquarters
and now operates only out of Concord and Wasiiington. Resultingly,
it is believed that v.!iilc money is short, he will have enough to
continue the N. II. priniary battle.
NOTE: A small newspaper piece in October stated that
former Kennedy TV produce)-, Charles Guggenheim, had agreed
to work for McClosl;ey. This sliould be watched, Guggcnhciin
is a pre. .
ISSUES AND STRATEGY
McCloskey has assertedly finished his book for Random House.
The book directs itself to lii? campaign tlicmes as follows:
1139
1) Peace in Viclnam
2) Truth in Government
3) Independence of the Judiciary
4) Maintenance of the Kepublican tradition
in Civil Rights
All signs indicate that with the war winding down McCloskcy
is focusing on Trulli in Government as his main issue. This
thrust v/ill be priinarily directed to the youth campus vote.
McCloskey is vulnerable, however. In an Evanston,
Illinois, speech he came out strong in favor of tlie draft. lie •
is also on recoid as supporting free abortions in a California
speech. Assertcdly, tl.is position caused him Catholic vote
problems in his district.
Much lias been said in the New Hampshire media about the
White House feud with Governor Petersen. The Governor is
apparently annoyed over the preferred W. H. treatment given
William I..oeb of the Manclicstcr Leade r and the key campaign
spot given to Lane Dwinell.
Wide coverage v/as given to the appearance of the Governor
and N. H. state official Stuart Lamprey at the opening of McCloskcy' s
headqviarters.
A mending of the fences in this regard might v/ell diffuse
any adult protest vote which, might be present and leave McCloskey
solely with the highly competitive youth vote.
NOTE: While there was a close July liaison between
McCloskey and Alard Lowenstcin, little has been heard of this
relationship since. Because of Lowenstcin' s success in '68 with
the McCarthy forces, an alert should go up if he surfaces with
McCloskey.
SUMMARY
A) McCloskey has only a volunteer youth frajncwork presently
in New Hampshire. TJie effort has not caught fire.
1140
B) The higlily oigani-/.cd and funded Dcmoci-atic cainpaigns
arc expected to liurt McClor.kcy's cffoits.
C) Funding will be a continual debilitating problem.
t>) Truth in Government will be his main issue. McCloskcy
is vulnerable if an attacl; is desirable.
E) Republican infighting is helping McCloskey's efforts.
NOTE: Future action by the investigative team
to be discussed privately.
1141
BusiNFSS prAixuTiVT-s MOVE TOW VTi:T?rA?' PEACE (ni::.!)
BEM is rcf:istorcd \7itli tho Conf^i'cc?; of tho United
States as r. Roivistcrca Politic;:! IjObby. It is self -docarihcd
fts a national ori;;inizatioa which bolicvos the v/ar in Vietnam
is contrary to t)ic interests of the United States and that
business c-xccutivcs nhould provide realir:-.tJc loadoifjhip in
foreign affairs. As of April, 1071, hcadciuartcrs of tliis
orcanization was located at 901 1,'orth llov/ard Street, Ealtir.'.ore,
Maryland,
Members of tJie By:*.' Executive Corr.initteo are
Henry E. Niles, Chairi.ian, Haltiiaore Life Iv.siu-anco Covoi^any,
Baltii.iorc, Maryland; VriTlian ¥. Ti^cher, Jr., President,
Fischer Macliine Cof.ipany, Diiladel j.hia , Peni:?3ylvania; Jo:-;eph E. ,
McDov.-ell, Chairnrai, Servoi-alion Cory.oratioi-. , Nvv/ Yor!: , liov/ York;
and Erv.'in Abnor L'alh, President, Sail:, V.'ard £-. \i'alk, Inc.,
Chicaco, Illinois.
Information f\irnjihcd this Bureau indicates tliat
members pay rcfiular duos of ^100 per year, patron ir.cinbcrs
pay $1,000 per year, and a life tiien-.bership is $5,000.
'BEM held a rally in Chicago, Illinois, on 10-1-71,
■Purpose of tlie ra]ly v.as to focus attention tJiat the Vietnani
war continues, that people are b3i:-:t: hilled and to lu-mor
outstanding: peace advocates. About 2,000 persons voi'o in
attendance and fornor U. S. "Attorney Gonor.'il IlaMsey Clai^l;
was Master of Ceren^.onies. Anionr; tl\o-re receiving the Yiyi'.
American peace A\.nrds were Daniel Ellsboi-f;, Joan Daez,
Wayne :.!orse, Ra'..':scy Clark, Ralph Abcrnr.thy, L'on.jarjin Spock
and Senator Fulbriclit. Darinjj t)ie rally Joan IJacz rer.ioved
tv/o American flap.s froii: their stands and placed them on the
floor. Some of the audience protested. Tlie flar,s v.ere later
restored to their stands by Clark and Conci'cssman Paul
McCloskcy, Jr,
1142
December I, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM: JOHN DEAN
Attached is uornc additional informp.tion which
Jack h'-is collected re McClo::!:ry' ti operation,
I Jiavc tlto pat cod a copy cvlcn^ to Jcb Magrudci'»
bcc: Gordon Strachan
1143
SUBJECT: MC. CLOSICK 'S APPi:\P/aiCE AT
DAR'EIOUTH UIIIVERSIT'f C.UIRJS
ON IIOVEIIBKl^ 29, 1971
1. Investigative coverage v/as civen this McCloskey appearance
vith the follo'./inc results:
McCloskey 's appearance lasted approximately one hour
during vhich he cave a prepared 20 minute speech follo'./ed by a
question and e.ncver period. His main thenie focused upon the
threat of concentrated ^/"ealth to the electoral process; the
abuses involved in cainpaign contributions and his personal
support for the ta::payer dollar checl: off proposal presently
before Congress .
McCloshey's appearance at Dartnouth resulted frcn: an
Invitatici"! offered by the university's 5tud'='nt or^a^i-^^tion. The
850 seat auditorium vas filled to capacity.
It is pointed out that similar invitations have been
extended to other presidential candidates. In this context the
turnout can be considered pro forma.
McCloskey appealed to the students to join his
Kew Ilampshire volunteer organization. Membership applications
vere distributed to all attendees. It vas discreetly determined
that a total of 10 volunteers signed up.
Vhile McCloskey v/as r/armly applauded at the conclusion
of his remarks, he proved vulnerable in the question and ans\;er
period vhcn asked to Justify his support of the Draft. The
reaction to his explanation of support \;as decidedly poor.
1144
He vas also cloGely qucGtioned by pro-Israel students
on his lack of support for Israeli arras from the U.S. A^iain, a
poor reaction to his response vas ascertained.
He adnittcd under questioning that he has received heavy
financial support fro.-n Norton Siiaon of California.
It can be concluded that his Dartmouth appearance, vhile
sympathetic in nature, failed to evidence any nushrooaing support
araongst ca;npus youth. i
NOTE: A follov/-up visit to McCloskey's concord, II. H. volunteer
headquarters, fails to indicate any change in the lethargic activity/
observed tvra weeks a^o. There is still no evidence of increased
funding or volunteer personnel.
It was also determined that a strategy session is presently
ongoing in V.'ashington, D.C. The topics of discussion assertedly an
a) Uom to counter the heavy I'uskie, McGovern, Yorty II. H.
campaigns.
B) How to counter the apparent loss of Governor Peterson
support. (This is vie\/ed as discouraging and suspectt
as coming from Vfhite House pressures)
■ Other steps, previously discussed, designed to develop inter:
intelligence are ongoing.
1145
SUBJIET: STUDKNT PniPTRATIOII OF !!C CLOSKEY VOLUIITEfJR
headquartj;r3, 32S PE;ni:T^LVAriiA ayihue,
WASHINGTON, B.C. DURIIIG UlJiKEID OF
DECEI-ffiER 11-12, 1971
A Sandwedce engineered penetration of He Closkey's volunteer
headquarters in U'aGhincton, D.C. took place durins the v/eekend
of December 11-12, 1971 with the following results:
The operative arrived at the headquarters on Saturday morning
and was v;ell received. There was a marked lack of activity
during the entire day, with a total volunteer participation
of only four persons . The operative v/as advised that there
was little need for volunteer work at the Vfeshington headquarters,
but a dire need for volunteers to work at the Concord, N. H.
Headquarters. He was advised to call and speak with Nancy or
Bruce at 603-22U-I966.
The vorkers appeared to emphasize that the office is in dire
need of money at the present. One of the volunteers indicated
that his father had donaLed ^^2,500 recently (because the workers
identified themselves only by first name, the operative did not
attempt to pursue the identity of the contributor).
Operative indicated a willingness to work for Mc Closkey in
New York City. He was told that there were no Mc Closkey
volunteer offices in Hew York City at this time and that the
prime and only drives now ongoing with respect to campuses is
Vithin the New Hampshire area.
Operative determined that the 32^ "C" Street headquarters, from
vhich the main V/'asliington campaign principals operate, was closed
this weekend and the "C" Street staff was believed to be in
Wisconsin dealing with political matters.
Operative had lengthy conversations with the four volunteers
and it was determined that although there v/as enthusiasm, the
reports coming back from N. H. indicated that things v;ere not
going well there. Lack of money and adult apathy appeared to be
the main causes of the discouraging report. The volunteers were
banking heavily upon Mc Closkey's increased schedule in N. H.
beginning next week.
Throughout the entire day on Saturday there were no visitors to
the office and no incoming phone calls. The workers busied
themselves stuffing envelopes with leaflets. The operative assisted
in this effort. He engaged in the same activity on Sunday morning
and departed without incident.
In view of the foregoing, it v.'ould appear that best future use cf this
activity should be focused in N.H., csp'jcially d'aring Christnus recess
vhen nllopcdly the He Closkey effort will increase. Arrangements
have been m.ude accordingly and va-ittcn results will follow.
96-296 0-73
1146
The White House
V/AkHINCTON
Date 12/7/Tl
TO: JOM'W. DliMl, III
FROM: 001!U J. CAULFIELD
ACTION:
Approval /SI ana ture
, ComTi3nts/Recor;.T.2ndations
For Your Tnforp?.t"»on
File
REMARKS:
The A.G, should see these. They are
very consistent with my report.
[Tues., Nov. 30, 1971]
REP. McCLOSKEY BECOMING A CRUSADER WITHOUT CAUSE
(By Robert S. Allen)
Washington — Rep. Pete McCloskey is dropping some curious hints for an
avowedly dedicated anti-Nixon crusader.
The militant California maverick Republican is intimating that if his ram-
bunctious "dump Nixon" campaign is a dud, he may pull a Mayor Lindsay and
bolt to the Democrats.
Unquestionably another potent motivating factor is the likelihood McCloskey
may be redistricted out of Congress.
With California due to get five more House seats, for a total of 43, McCloskey's
11th District is very apt to be extensively modified — to his disadvantage. In
each of his three elections, he won largely as a result of Democratic backing —
which would be lost to him in a projected geographic reshufiling.
So McCloskey apparently is hedging his political gambols !
The strident Californian's "dump Nixon" electioneering in New Hampshire's
first-in-the-nation March 7 presidential primary has gotten nowhere. His anti-
Vietnam haranguing has won him some cheers from dovish students but the
general public is giving no evidence of being impressed.
As one veteran local observer remarked, "So far, McCloskey is running like a
dry creek. I'm beginning to wonder whether he'll stick it out until March."
That's a good question.
In recent weeks, McCloskey had to sharply prune his campaign staff and
expenditures due to lack of funds. The flow of contributions he had counted on
hasn't materialized — and there are no indications his finances will improve.
Undoubtedly, a key reason is that his one and only issue, Vietnam, is steadily
fading out of the picture.
McCloskey is finding himself in the unhappy position of being a loud and
clangorous crusader with a vanishing cause. And in politics, that never pays off —
either in votes or campaign funds.
(1147)
1148
DRIVE $45,000 IN THE RED, McCLOSKEY SAYS
WotiLD Go IN Debt to Finish Campaign
(By Carl Greenberg, Times Political Writer)
Rep. Paul N. (Pete) McCloskey Jr. (Calif.) said here Monday his campaign
for the Republican presidential nomination is about $45,000 in debt.
But, said the congressman who wants to unseat Presidi^nt Nixon and has
entered New Hampshire's March 7 primary, "I'll go in debt to finish out this
campaign if I have to."
McCloskey's disclosure was made at a press conference before he and former
New York Democratic representative AUard K. Lowenstein, national chairman
of Americans for Democratic Action, addressed 1,000 guests at a Beverly Hilton
luncheon of Women For, a volunteer nonpartisan organization.
McCloskey said he has no commitment from Los Angeles industrialist Norton
Simon to continue aiding him financially.
He said Simon had contributed to an ad in the New York Times that cost
$7,800 and that the ad had "approximately paid for itself," but that other
newspaper ads so far have not.
The ads followed a speech by Vice President Agnew in which he said that
McCloskey was running so short of funds that he had been forced to sell his
painting of "Benedict Arnold crossing the Delaware" — a crack McCloskey con-
strued as charging him with being a traitor.
The Administration's handling of the undeclared war between India and
Pakistan was criticized by McCloskey, who cited a statement last Friday by an
unidentified State Dei>artment official saying India was largely to blame.
McCloskey said that the people of East Pakistan have been "systematically
executed."
Although he had previously commended Mr. Nixon for his planned trips to
China and Russia, McCloskey said people are skeptical about the Peking trip,
which he contended has diverted attention from the fact the Vietnam war has
not been ended.
McCloskey also charged that Congress has abdicated its role in making political
decisions and that its members are concerned primarily with getting elected.
Lowenstein, who led the "Dump Johnson" movement in 1968 and is trying to
do the same to Mr. Nixon, said that "We have an obligation and debt to help
this extraordinarily courageous man," referring to McCloskey.
1149
Exhibit No. 34-12
January 12, 1972
MEMORANDUIvl FOR:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM:
JOHN DEAN
SUBJECT:
Operation iSantiv/odec
As a result of our recent conversation, I asked Jack
Caulfield to prcp3.re a Guininary of liis activitlcB so
that you could review them. Ilov/evcr, because of the
sensitivity of this information, I v/ould like to suggest
that you briefly meet v/ith Jack and go over this
material.
Operation Sand\ved<To v/ill be in need of refundinr: at
th'^ end of thic month f.o the time is quite appropriate
for sucli a review. If you ha.ve any questions that I
can be of assistance in ansv/erinjj, please give me a
call.
1150
Exhibit No. 34-13
meeting between attorney genj^iial mitchell, john
dean, and golldon liddy, wednesday, november 24, 1971,
AT 10:00 A. M.
Suggested Items For Discussion
I. Chain Of Cominand
A. Organization '
B. Who will eventually head up cariipaign?
C. Wlio performed proposed Liddy function in 1968?
II. Scope Of Responsibility
A. Finance
(1) Federal (Corrvipt Practices Act)
(2) State and local reporting requirements
(3) Creation and dissolution of working committees
(4) Creation and dissolution of funnel committees
B. Primary election questions (qualification, filing and withdrawal)
C. Intelligence , , ;
D. Advertisiiig contracts
E. Radio and TV contracts ■ ■';'
F. Transi^ortation leases ''
G. Real estate leases
H. Legal questions relating to convention (credentials)
I. Insurance
III. S upport
A. Staff
B. Local volunteer lawyers
C. Lawyers for Nixon . '
IV. Future Role Of Comniittee To Re-elect President Nixon
V. What Is Present Posture On Publicizing Activities Of the Committee
VI. Title And Compensation .
Gordon Liddy
1151
Exhibit No. 34-14
March 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HICBY
FROM: JOHN DEAN
While v/c arc ntill purcuin^ this matter, the attaclicd
newspaper article is an accurate account of all the visible
funding of the Democrat Convention.
Wc are still pursuing any "invisible" funding and I v/ill
report ■forlhv.'ith.
I am not cnc.ou varied at this point that we are going to find
anytniri^ evxue:icUig in:ipropricn7 -- bciieve it or noci
1152
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
MEMORANDUM
• March 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO THE HONORABLE JOHN N, MITCHJ!lL
FROM: . G. GORDON LIDDY A
SU B J ECT : Democratic National Convention Finance Investigation
Below is a summary of the results to date of the investigation,
vhich began March 12, 1972.
Howard Hunt reported on March 13, 1972:
The following individuals are members of the Tourist Development
Authority and in addition to donating funds themselves to the
DKC they have served as conduits for other funds.
1) Jesse Weiss - owner of Joe's Stone Crabs Restaurant
2) Bob Olin - Seville Hntpl
3) H. Bant - Seville Hotel
A) Jack Gordon (Chairman of the Authority) '
5)' Hans Marcuse - Algiers Hotel
6) Herbert Rolbin - Carillion Hotel
7) William Leonard (not further identified)
8) Ben Grcnold {o\n\er of a number of drug stores)
Information indicates that the exposition areas will be located
in two places: the Fontainebleau Hotel and Convention Hall. The
Mancraft Agency, a national organization specializing in such
expositions, is the agent for booking space. However, all space
bookings must go through, and have the approval of, James Teague,
an employee of the Democratic National Committee, whose business
telephone number for Miami is 305-538-5375.
. Mancraft has an agent, one Barry Block, at the Fontainebleau, but
he can do nothing without Teague 's approval.
Hunt advised further that the Spanish language (Cuban) radio in
Miami is carrying a news item to the effect that the Republicans
are "looking around town" to "get something on the Democrats,"
in connection with the convention.
1153
Honorable John N.
March 15, 1972
Page 2
Mitchell
A pretext attempt was made to book exposition space in the
Fontainebleau. The reply was that all Fontainebleau space
has been booked and that the only space rcnaining is in
Convention Hall.
On March 14, 1972, T-1 described as an experienced political
correspondent for major news media in the ^liami are?, but who
has not reported previously and whose reliability is, therefore,
untested, advised as follows:
The GFC (Florida-Askew) raised one million dollars. He advised
further that the Democratic National Committee is receiving a
25 per cent kickback from the funds raised through the exposition
to be held at the Fontainebleau Hotel and Convention Hall during
the Democratic National Convention to be held in Miami Beach
in July, 1972.
A transcription of the tape-recorded interview of T-1 is attached
at Tab A.
ADMINISTRATIVE
Investigation at Miami and Miami Beach continues.
K'
^
/
/■
1154
Q. The question was on the Governor's Finance Conimittee.
A. That was strictly raised by Askew and Bob Morgan, who is the old Democrat fund
raiser here in Dade County - he's a CPA - and Dave Walters, who is the old other
bag man here in Dade County. They put the arm on- a bunch of industries and ' ' \
businesses in Florida, and they work with the Committee of One Hundred out of
Palm Beach, and they cane in with - what I'm reliably told - the Governor's Finance
Committee came up with a million dollars. One million.
Q. Were there any names of specific persons?
A. They never had to make any announcement - it's not mandatory that you have to
announce, but I do know that they got Associated Industries of Florida, for
example, gave, as I recall the figure, $10,000 - that's a lobbying organization
In Tallahassee. All of the big industries in Florida: the St. Joe Paper
Company; the Lehigh Portland Cement; the Florida East Coast and Seaboard
Airline railroads; and the airlines and the tourist operated attractions and
so forth_. The money all wound up in a common kitty at the end, which was the
Governor's Finance Committee.
Q. Did the Tourist Developm.ent Authority go into that same kitty? . . ..'
A. Their money went in v;ith the other half million of goods and services promised.
They may have to come up with - they committed themselves - TDA committed
themselves - either for 50 or 100, I forget which it was. Let me think here.
One hundred thousand. But it was based on them - I'm trying to think how to ,,
explain this - They come in v;ith services, that's their big thing. They're
going to man and staff a 24-hour day press central office, around the clock
swlLchboaru, -lor Lhe uieuia thdL are here for tut: coverage of L'uc convention.
And that, of course, will cost them some money - to have it staffed; but they'll
. use their own people. So they'll write that off as part of their $100,000
commitment. They will also wheedle ten or twelve free rental cars - Hertz or
• Avis - through Frank ; connections, like, you know, if you let us
have ten cars for the convention, why the next convention that comes down here
we'll try to suggest they use your rental cars. So they'll provide X number
of cars and pro-rate that out as part of their $100,000 commitment.
Typewriters - they'll rent X number of typewriters and put them over in the
offices in the press rooms, and they'll charge that off to their $100,000
commitment. That's the way theirs" works, and then they'll come up with cash,
as a. part of it. But they'll try to get away with as much In the way of
services as they can by charging the convention at the full rate. The type-
writers are a good example: They can make a deal with the typewriter rental
company here in Dade County to get 200 typewriters for one week for a rental
figure, we'll say of $20,000 for these 200 electric typewriters. That's
the retail going rate. They'll charge the Convention Finance Office the full
amount. But then they'll chisel the typewriter company and say, "VJhy don't you
give us a discount on it," and they'll get it for $5,000 less and that would be
money they kick back.
Q. On the TDA, do you remember who the principal person was on that?
1155
A. At the time they made the cormitment the main guy that was the sparkplug of It
was Jack Gordon. I don't think he is on the TDA any more, because he quit when
they had the big hassle, but this commitment was made months and months ago,
not just recently. They were fighting for this convention back a year ago.
So they made the offer way last summer, last fall, almost a year ago. And
Gordon was the key guy, because he knew all of the Democrat National Committee
guys. He knew Larry O'Brien and he knew Humphrey, who was the titular head
of the party, and he knew Humphrey's Finance Chairman and, he was the key
guy-
Q. This rental space that they have over there' at the Fontaineblcau?
A. The Fontainebleau estimates an income of between $80,000 and $100,000 and the
Democrat National Committee gets back 25% of whatever they bring in.
Q. They have a 25% kickback? ■ "
A. Right.
Q. Have you heard anything about anybody named Teague being involved in this?
A. The name sounds familiar, but I can't place it.
Q. When we checked previously on getting space here, now they have kind of an
agency, this is the guy that they referred us to, and I 'thought maybe you had
heard.
A. Wliat was that" for?
Q. Getting space for the expositrion at the Fontainebleau for some company that we
asked. About a v;eek ago a friend of mine had a call to try and reserve some
space over there and they told him it was sold out, and referred hin to tliis
man Teague. And he said that probably at Convention Hall they could find some
space.
A. As I say, the name sounds familiar, but I can't place who he is. I can't believe
the Fontaineblcau is sold out, are they They're also pretty good at whip-
sawing and yo-yoing a guy around here, too. Like, "Gee, Mr. Smith, we can't
give you any space at the Fontainebleau but we got a little space here at
Convention Hall - here in the middle of the boondocks." "Well that's so far from
everything" — "well let us look around." Then all of a sudden a day later,
"Hey, just got a cancellation, but let me tell you - he had already paid in
advance so you'll have to pick that up plus this other fee here, and the
insurance and so on." This is an old game.
Q. I heard that there was a list of 35 persons in the Governor's that
were going to be taken care of.
A. Of course they are going to take care of people.
Q. But there was a definite ],ist of 35 people .in that Governor's Committee that had
given a' certain amount.
1156
if/8/T2
FOR: JOHN W. DEM, III
FROM: JACK CAULFIEU)
According to Andy Shea, Assistant to the Democratic
National Committee Treasurer Robert Strauss, the following
is their account of the means for raising $950,000
for the Democratic National Convention in Miajni:
Miami Beach Tourist Development Authority $250,000
Fund raising committee organized by
Governor Askev/ $100,000
Miami Beach Hotels $100,000
Goods and Services (Construction, shuttle
busses, off duty police and general
security) * $500,000
* The City of Miami will provide $250,000 of
the above figure. Individual cities in .
.Dade and Brov/ard Counties and zhe Daae
County government will provide the additional
$250,000 in goods and services.
MEMORANDUM
1157
ExraBiT No. 34-15
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 19, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSONv
SUBJECT:
Howard Hunt
Dick Howard just discovered the attached in his chron file; this
is a copy and Bruce Kehrli is looking for the original. I think
it can be flatly and clearly said that his services here terminated
on March 31, 1972. There is also attached a report of a conver-
sation which Joan Hall had with Howard Hunt approximately 6 or
8 weeks ago.
1158
March 30, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR BRUCE KEHRLI
We would like to accommodate Howard Ewnt on
the attached and would like to do it right away
and then totally drop him as a consultant so that
1701 can pick him up and use him.
Howard has been very effective for us, but his
most logical place now is consulting 1701. The
attached could be a major problem and we would
like to do everything we can to accomplish this
and help him in this way. Please let me know.
W. Richard Howard
A TRUE COPY
MEMORANDUM
1159
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 19, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES COLSON
FROM: JOAN PIAL,'5
SUBJECT: Discussion \vith Howard Hunt
4
For the record, approximately 6 or 8 weeks ago in a casual
conversation, I asked Howard Htjnt why he had not turned in
any time sheets. He replied, "That is being taken care of
elsewhere. " I did not inquire any further and the subject was
dropped. (Note: I had initialed his time sheets each month
and was merely curious why I had not received one. )
»i
1160
Exhibit No. 34-16
# how did hunt come to staff?
cc as a consultant. i knew him. pentagon papers needed someone
to review. knew that he was capable.
# how did you know him?
cc social
# associated wtth cia?
CC NO
# POINT THAT WORKED ON DECLASSIFICATION PROJECT -- WHO?
CC DAVID YOUNG
# STATUS: CC SAID ADVISED IN MARCH THAT HIS OFFICE ADVISED HIM
NOT USING HUNT.
# HUNT HAD OFFICE IN WHITE HOUSE
# . DO YOU KNOW A MISS HASTINGS - NO
# DO YOU KNOW CADDY - NO
# DO YOU KNOW ARRESTED INDIVIDUALS - NO
# ALFRED BALDV\nN - NO
# DID YOU HIRE HUNT FOR SPECIFIC JOB - NO
# DO YOU KNOW WHO FINANCED HUNT? - ONLY SALARY HERE,
MULLEN & BOOKS
# WORKED YOUR OFFICE RE LEAKS - NO
1161
Exhibit No. 34-17
the white house
WAS H I N GTON
June 26, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
FROM: JOHN DEAN
SUBJECT: O'Brien Letter Re
Special Prosecutor
Attached at Tab A is the Larry O'Brien letter. Attached
at Tab B is a draft response from the Attorney General.
At Tab C js a White House response from me.
I would recommend that Kleindienst respond as quickly
as possible. Colson concurs. ^* C>*-^0~ Ci>&} Ci^t'C' ♦
Ag r e e 7
Disagree
Comment
-296 O - 73 - n
aA
1162
NAT lONAL C( AIMI f rCL 2>M ) Virr.ini,^ Avt-nvc, NW . W.i^hinrjon, D. C. 20037 (202) 333-fS750 .'
LAW.iNCi F. O-B.iEH •
June 24, 1972 - ■
Dear Mr. Pretidsni:
Last week a group of men wcs appreliendcd after breaking into ihe notionc. hccdc; ' I'.ers
of ihc Demo ntic Part/. I am sure you will agree that Ineir oction constituted art infiinga-
menf of the F' ;t Amor.drr.ciit rig!., of polliical asiociction of '".ions of American citizens.
The pr. mpt and fair invejtir'alion cf tlii; matter is of the era concern to all Americans,
regar. jss of political c.ffii 'aricrj.
During the past week there ' ve been numerous reports in the press which arc profoundly
disturbing. Of pcriiculcr cc::cern arc those report: which indicate t reialionship cr the
action of these men last week to official orgn-s of the PLpublican .irty, members of the
While House staff and security agencies of ih. United Z :tes Government.
Mr, James W. /vAcCorJ, Jr., one of the men who was o rested at gunpoint by the police,
was closely ossocicle'l Vi'Ith The Comr.iitloc for the ue-cleciion of ihe President and wiih
the Rep-jbl icon N'ritlonal Ccmmittee. Mr. McCord was the Security Coordinator for The
Committee for the Re-slsction of ihe President and the P>epubllcc:i Nclicnal Committee.
Mr. M'_Cord and the m n oppr' hended with him at the time of the ar"e5t had walkie-tallcle
radios whicli wrre cjilici: .' lo operali on chani:.::!s granted by the F- Jer^il Coir.municctic-rts
Commisslpi. exclusively for the use of ihe Republica.'i Natio'iol Committee.
The events that hove been revc:!c-d to date, particularly in the context of a presidential
campaign, make this cose one of vital importance. I am sure you share my concern that
the inves;' rion of this matter and its eventual prosecution be conducted In a manner that ,
will credit ..;e' Interrliy of ihe American j 'Iclal process. Of equal importance is the need
to assure that all Americans can be confident that this Investigation Is conducted promptly
and with complete ohjectlvlty and fairness to all concerned. At stake here are Amsrica's
most cherished constitutional rights — rights of free speech and free association.
I Accordingly, I respectfully request that you direct the Attorney General to appoint a. ' ■ ' '
Special Prosecutor of unimpeachable integrity and national repufatIon,a"d provide him
with whatever resoiirces he requests to investigate the facts surrounding this violation of
First Amendment rights end to pro:ecute those respcnsible to the full extent of the law.
Sincerely,
Lawrence F, O'Brien
Chairman
Tlio President
The White House
1163
DRAF T
Dear Mr. O'Brien: ,
This will acknowledge receipt and thank you for your letter of
June 24, 1972 to the President, which has been forwarded to me
for response. ■, ,
You may be assured that the recent incident involving the
breaking and entry of the headquarters office of the Democratic
National Committee is being fully and thoroughly investigated
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that this Department
will prosecute violators of the Federal law to the fullest extent.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Kleindienst
TAB
' B
1164
DRAFT
Dear Mr. O'Brien:
Thfe President has asked me to respond to your letter of
June 24, 1972, requesting that he direct the Attorney General
to appoint a special prosecutor in connection with the recent.
breaking and entry of the headquarters office of the Democratic
National Committee. The President is confident that this ..,,..
matter is being fully investigated by the FBI and that the ;Xj-^'
Department of Justice will prosecute all violators of the f^;^-?
federal law in a manner consistent with the high integrity ''■'■^.'
and traditions of that Department and the American judicial
system.
Sincerely,
John W. Dean, III
Counsel to the President
I
1165
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N G TO N
June 26, 1972
ADI.IINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTI/r
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. IIALDEM/- T
JOHN EHRLICMMAN
^
FROM: JOHN DEAN ^
SUBJECT: O'Brien Letter Re
Special Prosecutor
Attached at Tab A is the Larry O'Brien letter. Attached
at '-'ab is a draft responre froni the Attorney General.
At Tab C is a White House response froin ine.
I would recoinniend that Klci; He \Gt respond as quickly
as possible. Colson concurs.
Agree
£
Disagree
Comment
,*«ssa°'''
9 eo
aA
1166
DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL COiN'.'vUirEi: 2(M> V iifjini.y ,\ ,;, v(: NV <V.»)i »i/ ;!on, DC. 20037 (202) 3ii -f>750
L»W.[HCI F. O , .N
Jun 24, 1972 , , TAB
Dear Mr. Preold-.it: A
Last week a group of men was cpprehendsd offer breaking Into the noticncl headqucri'is
of the Democraflc Pcrty. I am sure you will agree thai ihelr action constituted an infringe-
ment of flie Firit Arr.si-.dr.-.cnt right of political association of inillions of Amc 'can citizens.
The prompt and fair Investig ion of ihis matter Is of ihe gravest concarn to all AmsriccMs,
. regardless of political cffilicfion.
During the past week there have been numerous reports in the pr- vhl'-h are pr 'oundly
disturbing. Of particular concer:: e ihose reports which Indicaicj a relationship of the
action of these men las! week to ofricial organs of the Repubi' an Party, members of the
While House r-tcFf and sccuriiy agencies of the United States Governmcnl
Mr, James W. McCord, Jr., one of ihc rr n who wos arretted at gunpoint by the police,
was closely associarod with The CommilSee for ihe Re-olecticn of the Prsjideat and v/lth
the Republican National Ccnmiil % Mr, McCord v.'cs the Security Coordinate Tor The '
- Commi''"ce for the Re-clec;I.. . cf . ;e President and the Republicon National Ccmmiiiee :
Mr, t\' "ord and ihe men apprc-lic Jed \A'th him :t the time of the arre5' had v.-al'-ie-tclrcie ■
radios which ■ 2re aulhorized to cpsrafa on chatiiiels grar,led by iha Fer'eral Communico;' is
Comuhsicn cxclusiveiy for the uso of the Ropubilcon Not'cr.cl Corr.rnlti 3. ■ "'
The events that have Irien revealed to daiti, porticulorly in the confe;;t of a p; i'dential
campaign, molce this case or.e of vitol Impcrtcncc-. I am sure you share my concern that
the investigation of this maiter and its eventual prosecution be conducted in a manner that
will credit the integrily of the American judicial process. Of equal importance is the need
to assure that all Ame. icons can be confident that this investigation is conducted promptly ,
and with complete objectiviiy end fairness to all concerned. At stake here are America's
most cherished constitutional rights — rights of free speech and free association.
1 Accordingly, I respeclfully request that you direct th e Attorney Gencro! to ap point a i
Speciol Pro'ocutQr of unimiieccl^cbie intoprily and naticnol repuiation,and provide him ' ]'.';■
with wliatever re: . -es he rcqussts to investigate the facts surrounding this violation of '■ '■
First Amendment rig'iis and to prosecute those rerponsiblo to the full extent of the law. , ;',
Sincerely, • ..,-■'
' ■' ■ 7 • '
Lawrence F. O'Brien
.Chairman
The President
The White House
1167
DRAFT
Dear Mr. O'Brien:
This will acknowledge receipt and thank you for your letter o£
June 24, 1972 to the President, which has been forwarded to me,
for response.
You may be assured that the recent incident involving the
breaking and entry of the headqxiarters office of the Democratic
National Comin'^tee is bein^- fully and thoroughly investigated
by the Fedcr-J Bureau of Investigation, and that this Department
will prosec\'.te violators of the Federal law to the fullest extent. T ^
if:' ■■;;■■'
Sincerely,
Richard G. Kleindienst
1168
DRAFT
Dear.Mr. O'Brien:
The President has asked me to respond to your lettei- of *.*;*f,'!)
June 24, 1972, requesling that he direct the Attorney General"
to appoint a special prosecutor in connection vAth the feceiii ■(■*.
breaking and entry of the headquarters office of the DemoC/t;4f?i^'i
National Coniniittee, The President is confid it that: this.'
matter is being fully investigated by the FBI and that the i
Department of Justice will prosecute all violators of the
federal law in a manner consistent with the high integrity ;,,,.,
and traditions of that Department and the American judicial
system.
Sincerely,
John W. Dean, III •
Counsel to the President
TAB.
C
1169
Exhibit No. 34-18
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASIIINOTON
August 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN
FROM:
Over the past two days I have been trying to reconstruct the chronology
of Howard Hunt's activities liere as accurately as I can recall thcni.
Oui" records are simply not that complete. I had the feeling that I was
wandering somewhat on dates during;; tlie interview at Justice yester-
day; but frankly I had not tried to put all the dates in sequence in
preparation. I cannot find new records here that are any more
helpful other thaia one memo which I dictated immediately after the
Watergate episode broke in the press. I am attaching' a copy. If
"you think it would be helpful you can send it along to Mr. Silbert.
I should have reviewed the attached nnemo before appearing yesterday
hiif T hart foranffpn T had it, T wrote the nttached. by the way. in order
to have my best recollection in the files in the event the history of
this ever arose at a later time. At the tiine I remember straining
very hard to try to remember the specifics of any meetings; I cannot
be sure that my memory is all that precise.
In any event there is no substantial variance between this and what I
testified to except this is more specific. As I Say, if you think it would
be helpful, it should be passed on to Mr. Silbert.
Also, as I went through some of the records las^t night I found the
attached file copies of 4 inemos which had been submitted by my office
involving Howard Hunt's travel expenses. You may recall yesterday
that Silbert asked me about authorized travel. I authorized two trips -••
one to Massachusetts and one to Denver. The attached, however,
refers to other trips which were not authorized by me although obvi-
ously the expenses were submitted through me. I do not ever recall
signing any of these and the one expense request as to whicli there is
a xerox original attached contains a "CWC" as initialed by Joan Hall.
I assume that Joan handled all of these in the same way that she handled
the vouchers for time spent as a consultant. If I did sign any of these,
1 do not recall or I certainly did not focus on them at the time. In any
event, they are attached for whatever v.ilue they have.
1170
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Howard Hunt
The last time that I recall meeting with Howard Hvmt was mid-
March. According to my office records, the date was March 15.
At that time I was \mder the impression that Eunt had left the
White House and was working at the Committee for the Re-election
of the President.
I may have seen Hunt once or even possibly twice subsequent to
that time. These were (or this was), however, a chance encounter.
I do recall seeing him outside of my office during a day this Spring;
I recall inquiring about his health since he had told me in March he
had bleeding ulcers. During the brief conversation in the corridor,
nothing was discussed or any of Hunt's work or his areas of responsi-
bility. As I recall, he merely told me that he had been very busy
and that after getting some rest, his health had been restored.
I also talked to him on the telephone the night Governor Wallace was
shot simply to ask him for his reactions on what he thought might
have been the cause of the attempted assassination. (Hunt was known
of something of an expert of psychological warfare and motivations
when in the CIA.)
The only other communication I can recall subsequent to March 15
was a memo I sent to Howard in connection with what I thought his
duties were at 1701, i.e., security at the Republican Convention.
Steve Bull told me he had a friend in Miami who had been stationed
in the White House but was now in the Miami office of the Secret ServiC'
who wanted to be of help to whoever was handling security for the
convention. I merely sent Hunt a note suggesting that he get in touch
with Bull's friend.
1171
2.
'o the best of my recollection. Hunt came to me during the month
f January and said he had no work to do here and no one was giving
im any assignments and that this was the only campaign year he
ould ever probably have a chance to participate in, that he cared
nly about one thing, the re-election of the President, and that he
anted to be of help in any way he could, for pay or not for pay, I
old him I had nothing in my office, but that I thought once the Com-
ittee was organized and Mitchell was in charge, there would be work
or him to do at the Committee. I told him that I would be sure the
ommittee was aware of his desire to help. I did nothing further.
few weeks later Hunt dropped by my office with Gordon Liddy, from
he Committee. I believe this was in February, possibly early in the
onth, although my office records do not show the visit. Hunt said
e was in the building and Just wanted to talk briefly. Both he and Liddy
aid that they had some elaborate proposals prepared for security
ctivitles for the Committee, but they had been unable to get approval
rom the Attorney General. I explained that Mitchell would soon be
t the Committee and that they should be persistent and see him because
5 was the only one who could authorize work they woiild be doing. I
ave a vague recollection that Liddy said, "We (referring to Hunt ajid
Lmself ) are now over at the Committee working and we are anxious
3 get started but can't find anyone who can make a decision or give
3 the green light" or words to that effect. While Liddy and Hunt were
1 my office, I called Jeb Magruder and urged them to resolve what-
/er it was that Hunt and Liddy wanted to do and to be sure he had an
pportunity to listen to their plans. At one point. Hunt said he wanted
3 fill me in and I said it wasn't necessary because it was of no
Dncern to me, but that I wovild be glad to urge that their proposals,
latever they were, be considered. There was no discussion that I
an recall of what it was that they were planning to do other than the
act that I have the distinct in^jression that it involved security at
le convention and/or gathering intelligence during the Democratic
ational Convention,
1 March, Hunt sent me a memo explaining that when he retired from
le CIA he had failed to designate survivor benefits for his wife and
1 view of the fact that he had had severe ulcer attacks, he wondered
f this coiild be changed in view of his present government service. I
Did him to take the matter up with Dick Howard, which he did. Dick's
smo to Kehrli, copy attached, was the result. I assume Dick Howard
Lscovered at this time that Hxint was still on the rolls even though not
Drking for us.
1172
3.
i had assumed throughout Hunt's tenure in the White House that he
was charged to someone else's budget. I signed the original request
for him to be a consultant because everyone else was in California at
the time it was decided to bring him in. Shortly after he came on
board J however, he was assigned to David Yo\mg and Bud Krogh and
I didn't consider at any time after that that Hunt was under my super-
vision or responsibility.
From time to time after Hunt had come on board, he did talk to me,
normally to express his frustrations in being unable to get things
through the David Young operation. Of course, on occasion also we
talked socially and about politics, something Howard and I had done
from time to time over the years.
Charles W, Colson
A TRUE copy
1173
Exhibit No. 34-19
couimiE ACTioris 9/11/72
1, Complaint for Malicious Abuse of Process by Committee for the
Be-Election of the President end Finance Committee to Re-Elect the
President against Lav;rence O'Brien,
Based upon unfounded civil action brought against Committee
for the Re-Election of the President by O'Brien. The only nexus betv/een
the V/atergate incident of June lyth and the CRP being the fact that James
W. McCord was at the time an employee of the CRP. O'Brien continues to
issue statements and is quoted in the press as saying that the suit was
not brought for damages but to expo.se for partisan political purposes
and to pre-occupy the Republicans during the campaign. ',>.-■ **
Common Law of the District of Columbia supports such a suit.
Constant use of subpoenas for records and witnesses .who are employees
of the CRP and the Finance Committee corfititute malicious abuse.
A. Deposition schedule v;ould normally begin 20 days after service of
complaint or earlier if advanced by the Covtrt on proper motion, Depositions
would be noted for:
(1) Lawrence O'Brien
(2) Frank Mankiewicz
(3) Gary Kart
(U) Members of the Democratic National Committee as of ui;..
June 20, 1972 (date original suit brought)
(5) Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Democratic National
Committee, as of June 20, 1972.
1174
DepoEitions to run daily until all facts with respect to the
information upon which the suit was brought in June has been discovered.
B. Motions to Produce Minutes of meetings of DNC or its Executive
Committee to expose authority, if any, to b^ing action on June 20,
2. Complaint for Libel*. Stans v. O'Drien.
Complaint based upon false, malicious and libellous statements leaked to
the press by O'Brien through his counsel. Substantially the same allegations
as contained in the Amended Complaint, but before the Amended Complaint
had been filed in the United States District Court. Leaks occurred in the
early morning hours of September 11, 1972 while Amended Complaint was not
presented for filing \intll the afternoon of that day.
Libel based upon statement that Stans funded the Watergate
incident of June 17th v;ith $im,000 in checks transmitted to Barker.*
The facts were well known to O'Brien as they had been the subject of the
GAO RejKDrt and Stans' response thereto' i — both published.
Deposition and discovery schedule v;ould essentially be the
same as in Complaint for Malicious Abuse of Process. .. .-<
The statement made concerning Stans is libelous per se ;
imputation of a crime. However, under Kev/ York Times v. Sullivan ,
376 U.S. 25^ {'^9^) and cases following, Stans would, because he is in
a public position and is essentially a public figure, be required to
plead and prove actual malice, ill will, hatred on the part of O'Brien.
"That is, O'Brien may publish with impunity false and libelous statements
regarding Stans unlegs Stans can prove actual malice.
1175
Actual malice may also be CEtablished upon a showing.of :V'
gross negligence. . ,• , . i ^^ ''.
The facts knovm to us do not support a claim of actual malice.
On the contrary, the dialogue bctv;een Gtang and Andreas would indicate
that indeed O'Brien harbored no actual malice toward Stans. Furthermore, ' ' ,*
O'Brien might contend that the leak was his counsel's doing and not his.
A libel suit by Stans against O'Brien or others is not recommended,
Senator Barry Goldwater prevailed against Ginsberg because the latter was
demonstrably guilty of actual malice — the preparation by Ginsberg, of .
false statements and doctored statements of psychiatrists allegingvthat
Goldwater was a Nazi, homosexual and insane. .. . i. , j'.
3. The cause of action of malicious abuse of process set forth in, Section 1 .
may also l)e made in the way of a counterclaim in the event the Amended
Complaint is permitted to be filed by Richey, J. , , ;
k. Cause of action against O'Brien for violation of the First Amendment . '
rights of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and the
various Finance Committees. Freedom of Speech, the right to associate -
for political purposes and to advocate political positions in support of
a Presidential candidate have been impaired by the actions and statements _v-
of O'Brien and the DNC. We have made this contention from the outset in
our:
A, Motion to Dismiss the Complaint brought against the CRP; , . ;, '.}
B. Proposed Motion for Protective Order 'in the nature of an injunttion
to stop all further discovery in the civil case.
1176
This cause of action v;ould support a separate and distinct
civil action against O'Brien, et. al., by the CRP.and the finance com- •
mittees — or a counterclaim in the event Judge Rlchey permits the Amended
Complaint to be filed, *■ .! >
5. Senator Dole does not have a cause of action as Chairman of the '■f,
Republican national Committee and the members thereof, as O'Brien's ' •
statements and action.? have not been directed at the RNC or Dole but at , ; .^
the rather separate and distinct CRP,,the finance committees, their member^ •,
and personnel. : ^ .
6. Ko cause of action exists at this time against Common Cause or John ,'
Gardner for simply bringing their lawsuit against the finance committees. :.
If the case is dismissed and evidence developed that John Gardner harbo];;ed ''<
ill will or hatred toward individual defendants, a cause of action for ,"'
malicious abuse of process v/ould lie, - ' '' '■'•%
7. A Complaint to the Fair Campaign Practices Committee (ujicertain about :;
the proper name) with respect to the statements and actions of O'Brien, et^ -
al, would provide no relief to those injured but may be of some political
value.
/ Kc'nneth Iv'ells i'arkinson
I
1177
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTON
September 12^ 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL .
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: • JOHN DEAN
SUBJECT: Counter Actions CWatergate)
Set forth below are potential counter actions that are either about to be
filed or under serious consideration. While the list is not exhaustive,
it contains several potentials that could place us on the offensive; We
are working to develop other Nvell founded actions.
Connplaint for Malicious Abuse of Process
This action will be filed by the Committee for the Re- Election of the '
President apd the Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President agarin'st
Lawrence O'Brien. The filing of this action was announced yesterday
by Clark MacGregor and it will be filed after the Amended Complaint
in the O'Brien civil case is filed.
This action is based upon the unfounded civil action brought against the''
Committee for the Re- Election of the President by O'Brien. O'Brien
and Edward Bennett Williams continue to issue statements and are ■■"
quoted in the press as saying that the suit was not brought for damages
but to expose for partisan political purposes and to pre-occupy the
Republicans during the campaign. Under the common law oi the *-'
District of Columbia, the constant use of subpoenas for records and
witnesses who are employees of the CRP and the Finance Committee '''
for the purpose of exposure and harassment constitute malicious abuse? ■•
of process. ■',
The depositions would normally begin 20 days after service of the
complaint or earlier if advanced by the court on proper motion. Deposi-
tions would be noted for:
-- Lawrence O'Brien
-- Frank Mankiewicz
96-296 O - 73 - 18
1178
-- Gary Hart
-- Members of the Democratic National Committee as of . -r'
June 20, 1972 (date original suit brought) i ,. ,
-- Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Democratic National
Committee, as of June 20, 1972.
Depositions will run daily until all facts "with respect to the information
upon which the suit was brought in June hae been discovered.
Also, motions to produce minutes of meetings of DNC or its Executive
Committee to determine authority, if any, to bring the civil action of
Jxaae 20 will be filed.
NOTE : Depositions are presently being taken of members of the DNC
by the defense counsel in the O'Brien suit. These are wide ranging
and will cover everything from Larry O'Brien's sources of income'
while Chairman of the DNC to certain sexual activities of employees
of the DNC. They should cause considerable problenns for those
being deposed.
Complaint for Libel: Stans v. O'Brien
A complaint based upon the false, malicious and libelous statenaeiits v .V ,
leaked to the press by O'Brien through his counsel is under consideration.
This action would attack substantially the same allegations as contained
in the Aijiended Complaint, but made before the Amended Connplaint
had been filed in the United States District Court. Leaks of these
allegations occurred in the early morning hours of September 11, 1972.
while the Amended Complaint was not presented for filing until the
afternoon of that day. A libel action cannot be based on the Amended
Complaint per se as it is privileged. ►
The libel is based upon the statement that Stans funded the Watergate
incident of June 17th with $114, 000 in checks transmitted to Barker.
The fact that this is false was well known to O'Brien, as Stans had
made sworn statements to the contrary in the GAO report as well as
his deposition in the civil case.
The deposition and discovery schedule would essentially be the same
as in the Complaint for Malicious Abuse of Process. .;, ■;
1179
The statement made concerning Stans is libelous per se; imputation
of a crime. However, under New York Times v. Sullivan and cases
following, Stans would, because he is in a public position and is
essentially a public figure, be required to plead and prove actual
malice, ill will or hatred on the part of O'Brien. That is, O'Brien
may publish with impunity false and libelous statements regarding
Stans unless Stans can prove actual malice'.
Actual malice may also be established upon a showing of gross neg-
ligence, which appears more likely in the instant situation.
The facts known to us do not support a claiin of actual malice. On
the contrary, dialogue between Stans and Andreas would indicate
that indeed O'Brien harbored no actual malice toward Stans. Further-
more, O'Brien might contend that the leak was his counsel's doing
and not his. However, the filing of the action would have obvious
media advantages.
Counterclaim: Abuse of Process
The cause of action of malicious abuse of process set forth above
may also be made in the way of a counterclaim in the event the Aanended
Complaint is perinitted to be filed by Judge Richey.
First Afnendment Action
A cause of action against O'Brien for violation of the First Amendment
rights of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and the
various Finance Committees is under consideration. Freedom of
Speech, the right to associate for political purposes and to advocate
political positions in support of a Presidential candidate have been
impaired by the actions and statements of O'Brien and the DNC. This
contention has been made from the outset in our:
-- Motion to Dismiss the Complaint brought against the CRP; ,
-- Proposed Motion for Protective Order in the nature of an
injunction to stop all further discovery in the civil case.*' " ". "
This cause of action would support a separate and distinct civil action
against O'Brien, et al. , by the CRP and" the finance committees -- or
a counter claim in the event Judge Richey permits the Amended Com-
plaint to be filed.
'^
1180
Action by Senator Dole
Senator Dole does not appear to have standing for a cause of action
as Chairman of the Republican National Committee, as O'Brien's
statements and actions have not been directed at the RNC or Dole
but at the rather separate and distinct CRP, the finance committee8>-
their nfiembers and personnel.
Action Against Common Cause
Ko cause of action exists at this time against Common Cause or
John Gardner for simply bringing their lawsuit against the finance
committees. If the case is dismissed and evidence developed that |;'',
John Gardner harbored ill will or hatred toward individual defendants,
a cause of action for malicious abuse of process would lie.
!t tl jThis is not to say, however, that public pressure should not be placed"
'f ifj^ Ion Common Cause to institute a suit against the known violation of
rthe campaign law by the McGovern organization.
Complaint to Fair Campaign Practices Committee
XX coiVapxaiiit to the X- air \_»c*rjripc*igTi jPi'iiCfciccc %^GrT*mi^vCC v.it*. rccpcCto
to the statements and actions of O'Brien, et al. , and their misuse of*
the courts 4:0 harass the Re- Election Comnnittee would provide no
relief to those injured but could be of some political value. Most ' . •'
people do not know what this Committee does and would interpret the,
action as founded upon a real grievance.
Action to Enjoin McGovem Finance Committee
For several weeks Ave have been quietly collecting information re-,
garding a blatantly illegal action by McGovern to operate his fund
raising activities through a District of Columbia corporation. We
have been waiting for the September 10th GAO report to be filed by
this corporation/committee to determine if they have in fact been /
so operating. Today's Washington Post confirms that indeed McGovern
is using a corporation contrary to the federal criminal prohibition.
I have assigned a Task Force to do nothing but work on every possible
action we can charge against this activity and develop a means whereby
Someone can go into court as soon as possible and enjoin this blatant
violation of the laws. ' We may have struck gold in that we may have
our first chance to really hit them where they are already hurting ■
the most (i. e. , fund raising).
1181
ExraBIT No. 34-20
Congress! of tfje ?Hnitcb states!
J^oMt of i^epresentatibetf
Room 2-1-36 Fcdzr*
74 North WA-iM.i
maebinstott.m.€. 20515 Tc^-o..:<.,e,.
September 8, 197:
The Honorable Richard G. Kleindienst
Attorney General of the United States
Departr.ent of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
It no doubt has coiae to your attention that the Banking and Currency Conmittee
of the House of Representatives, upon which I serve, has, through its Chainr.an
and activities of staff members, become interested and involved in the inves-
tigation of the so-called Watergate bugging incident.
Although many of us on the Coir.;nittee may question the wisdom of still a
further investigation of this matter under the auspices of our Con-unittee, it
would appear that some of the financial transactions tangential to the incident'
may come within the purview of our Comaiittee's jurisdiction and, therefore, the
Chairman of the Committee may be justified in the interest he has expressed.
However, the plans of the Chairman for pursuit cf this investigation have raised
a serious question in my mind.
The notice members have received from the Chairman indicates that the full
Couimittee will meet at 10:00 A.M., Thursday morning, September 14 to hear
testimony from The Honorable Maurice Stans, Chairman of the Finance Committee
of the Committee to Re-Elect the President, as well as the testimony of Phillip
S. Hughes, Director of the Office of Federal Elections, General Accounting Office,
concerning their Icnowlodge of the "financial aspects of the Watergate burglary."
I am sure the testimony of these gentlemen would add significantly to the
Committee's knowledge of the incident; however,' I am well aware of the restric-
tions which have been placed on or are applicable to the testimony of Mr. Scans
regarding this matter and feel that in the interest of all concerned your advice
with respect to the propriety of Mr. Staas testifying before our Committee in
either Executive or Open Session should be sought.
Specifically, I would appreciate as prompt as possible answers to the following
questions:
1) Would it be inappropriate or improper for Mr. Stans to testify
before our Banking and Currancy Committee with respect to his
knowledge of the financial aspects of the Watergate incident in
view of the embargo which has been placed by Judge Richcy on his
testimony by deposition which has been taken in the civil suit
arising out of the Watergate incident?
1182
2) Would it be inappropriate or improper for Mr. Stans to testify
before our Corunittee with respect to this matter in view of the
pending action of the Grand Jury in returning criininal indictnients
arising out of the Watergate incident?
3) Would it be inappropriate or improper for Mr. Stans to testify
before our Conunittee with respect to this «.atter because of the
impact publicizing of such testimony might have on the ultimate
trial of any or all of those indicted as a result of the Grand
Jury action, especially insofar as such publicity might be used
as a basis for a claim that the accused, or any of them, may have
been prejudiced thereby?
I realize that your office is not technically' involved in the civil action.
However, your opinion with respect to the substance and significance of Judge
Richey's Order placing an embargo upon the testimony of Mr. Stans in that
action would be most helpful.
With respect to question "2" above, it has also occurred to me that the
absolutely secret nature of the Grand Jury deliberations makes it impossible
for any of us to know whether or noc Mr. Stans might be called upon to testify
before our Committee with resnccc to matters which he may have been called upon
to testify about before the Grand Jury, if he so testified, and that his tes-
timony before the full Committee would be violative of the secrecy mandates
of the Grand Jury proceedings.
Inasmuch as I know not what position Mr. Stans will take with respect to the
Chairman's request that he appear to testify before our Committee on Thursday,
I ask these questions only for the purpose of being better informed should a
confrontation arise and should I be called upon as a member of the Committee
to support or oppose v;hatever position is taken by Mr. Stans on the Chairman's
request for his appearance. I hasten to add that although this inquiry relates
only to Mr. Stans' testimony, it is equally relevant to whomever else, similarly
situated, the Chairman might feel prompted to call as a witness should this
investigation be expanded upon.
In view of the significance of the questions X have asked and the limited
time involved, I urgently request that my questions receive your immediate
attention and response.
With best regards.
Respectfully,
GARRY BRO\iR\'
1183
Exhibit No. 34-2i
memorandum
to: mr. joiin dean - . •
FROM: KENNETH WELLS PARKINSON September 26,1972
Attached are memoranda prepared by this office on September 13,
1972 in connection with the political filings of political committees
registered under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 on behalf
of members of the House Committee on Banking and Currency. Sheets 1
and 2 list in the lefthand margin the names of the members of the
Committee, and in the righthand margin reports filed, by committees on
.^their behalf. Sheets 3 and A show the names of the members of the
Committee, in the lefthand m.argin and the names of political committees
acting on their behalf in the righthand margin. Sheets 5 and 6 show
the numbers of the political committees in the lefthand margin and
key into Sheets 3 and 4, and across the page the filings for each of
these committees are shown.
Ij^UJ^u^
1184
Congrcssnan
Patman
Barrett
Sullivan
Reuss
Ashley
Moorhead
Stephens
St. Germain
Gonzalez
Minish .
Hanna
Gettys
Annunzio
Rees
Bevill
Griffin
Hanley
Brasco
Chappell
Koch
Cotter
Mitchell
Widnall
Dwyer
Johnson
Stanton
Blackburn
Brown
Williams
Nylie
Heckler
Reports Filed i
5th day report
September 10 report
September 10 report
September 10 report ' ij^jV-t
5th day report S June 10th report
5th day report S^ept. 10th report
Sth*day report § Sept. 10th report
5th day report
Sept. 10th report
15th day report 5 June 10th report
15th day report 5 June 10th report
5th day report G 15th day report
Sept. 10th report 6 June 10 report
June 10th report
15th day report 5 5th day report
Not listed
"other report" 6 June 10th report
June 10th report
June 10th report
5th day report 5 15th day report
June 10th report 5 5th day report
Sept. 10th report
5th day report
5th day report 5 June 10th report
June 10th report
15th day report ^ 5th day report
15th day report 5 Sept. 10th report
June 10th report
5th day report G ISth day report
September 10th report
1185
Congressman Reports Filed j ,
Crane September 10th report fi Ju^e'
10th report
Rousselot September 10th report fi June
10th report ',< '
McKinney Sth day report Q June 10th report
Lent June lOtfi report .ff ISth day report
Archer June 10th report 5 15th day report
Frenzel ' Sth day report ■■ ..
1186
(D
Barrett
Sullivan
Reuss
Ashley
Moorhead
Minish
Hanna
Gettys
Aiuiunzio
Rees
Bevili
Hanley
Bra SCO
Chappell
Koch
Cotter
Mitchell
Widnall
Johnson
Stanton
Election Conmittee (s) ",-
^5 Democratic County Executive Committee ;
(2) Machinists Non-Partisan Political League •
??) Reuss for Congress Committee
f Ashley for Congress Committee i ,''
Ashley Re-election Committoe
(t) Engineers Political 5 Education Committee
pN The Moorhead Campaign Committee
(^ Engineers Political 6 Education Committee
g) American Federation of Teachers Committee
on Political Education
(^ Drive, New Jersey Teamsters
Ao Citizens for Minish
^^Joe. Minish Dinner Committee
./^Joseph J. Minish Campaign Fund
(Jl) Congressman tlanna Committee
($5) South Carolina Political Action Committee
Qy Tom Gettys Ke-election Committee
(^ Annunzio for People Committee
/^ Rees for Congress Committee ■"* '
© Friends of Torn Bevili
(^ Alabama Medical Action Commit'tee
r^j Chenango Cty. Democratic Committee
(-"/^^ Delaware Cty. Democratic Committee
y^^ Independent Citizens Committee for the
^-^ 32nd District
^y Citizens Committee for Re-election of
.'.'■ Congressman Brasco
i^rM Bill Chappell Dinner Committee
@ Committee for a Better New York
(^ New Yorkers for Re-election of Ed Koch
M^ Cotter for Congress Committee
^^ Active Ballot Club
^) P.J. Mitchell Campaign for Congress Committee
(^ D.C, Committee for Re-election of W.B.
Widnall
(2^ Citizens for Re-election of William
Widnall
^^ Citizens ComnLztee for Widnall
(?r9 Johnson to Congress
nj? Trumball Cty. r.cpublican Central Committee
-^ Lake Cty. Republican Executive Organization
^..,; Lake Cty. Fedcr-ation of Women's Clubs
^_;v' Bill Stanton fcr Congress Committee
/•O! Geauga Cty. Republican Finance Committee
1187
Election Committce (s)
The 250 Club
The Ben Blackburn Campaign Fund
Blackburn for Congress Committee
®
!p) Garry Brown for Congress
^
%
^
Regular Republicans Committee of
Delaware Cty.
L.G. Williams for Congress Committee
Wylie for Coryjress Committee
OCA Political Action Committee
Madison Cty. Republican Central Committee
Franklin Cty. Republican Executive Committee
Womans Republican Club of Wellesley
Crane for Congress Committee
Committee to Re-elect Congressman John
Rousselot
Victory '72 Committee
McKinney for Congress Committee
Mc^inney for Crngress Action Committee
McKinney Victory Dinner Committee
Independents and Democrats for McKinney
Fairfielders for McKinney
Volunteers for McKinney
Students for McKinney
Committee to Re-elect Stew McKinney
Lent for Congress Committee
Nassau Cty, Republicans Committee
Archer for Congress Committee
Frenzel Volunteers Committee
1188
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1190
V,ntCHT P
W:li iaM I
HtKRV S.
Exhibit No. 34-22
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTCE ON BANKING AND CURRCNCY
NiNCT v-SecoND CoNcnrss
2129 nAVtlURN HOUSE OFFICE DUILDINCj
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
WILLI*
FLOfiC
ALOln
October 2, 1972
X2%-tU7
COM>:iTTE'' KOTICK
I'D: All Members of )Iouse Conmittee on Banking and Currency
FROM: Wright Patman, Cliairman
SUBJECT: Notice of Heeting Change and Subpoena List
Tuesday
October 3
10:30 a.m.
2128 KHOB
Attached for your information is a list of
individuals and institutions for v.'liom subpoenas
will be requested at the irccting of the full
Co~jiiittcc tomorrow.
The meeting has been rescheduled for 10:30 a.m.,
Room 2128 Rayburn iluildin;;, rather than at
10:00 a.m., as previously indicated in the
notice of September 25, 1972.
'
1191
INDIVIDUALS AND IN'STITUTION'S FOR V.^10M
SUCPOENAS WILL BE REQUESTED
Robert Allen -- President of Gulf Resources and Chemical Corporation
of Hou-ston, Texas, and Texas cliairman of the campaign committee, who
is involved in the Mexican transfer.
American Telephone and Telegraph Company and all Federal and State
licensed telephone coivipanies, including:
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company
Southv;esLern Boll Telephone Company of Houston, Texas
Southern Bell TclepliC'iie Company of Miami, Florida
D^jayne Andreas -- One of the applicants on a successful national bank
charter and a contributor of $25,000 to the Nixon campaign,
Alfred Baldwin -- A former employee of the Coinnittee to Re-Elect the
President and reportedly transcribed conversations overlieard at the
Democratic tCational Conriiittco,
Paul Barrick -- Present treasurer of the Conmittee to Re-Elect the
President.
Records relating to the Mexican transfer of campaign funds in the
possession of appropriate Federal Reserve Banks and the Internal
Revenue Service.
John Caulfield -- A former employee of the Committee to Re-Elect the
President and one who has knowledge of those wiio had access to the
secret campaign commitcee funds in the possession of Hugh Sloan and
Maurice Stans.
Arden Chambers -- An employee of the Committee to Re-Elect the President
and presently secretary Co Maurice Stans.
Maury Chotincr -- Reportedly an investigator for the President of the
involvement, of the Cominittee to Re-Elect tlie President in the Watergate
case.
Chase Manhattan Bank -- One of the institutions involved in the payment
of the checks drawn on the Banco Ir-.ternacioaal of Mexico City,
Contini-ntal Illinois Dank and Trust Company of Chicai;o -- One of the
institutions involved in the payinent of the checks drawu on the Banco
Intcrnacional of Mexico City.
1192
Kenneth II. Dahlbcrg -- The midwest chairman of fundraising for the
Committee to Uc-L'lcct the President and one who was involved in the
Andreas contribution.
John Dean -- An employee of the Wiite House and one who has reportedly
investigated the involvement of the Committee to Re-l^lcct the President
in the Watergate case.
Edward Failar -- An employee of the Committee to Re-Elcct the President
and one who has knowledge of v;hether the campaign cornmittee attempted
surveillance of political activities.
Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President and other committees related
thereto.
Financial institutions whicli have in the past or in. the, present maintained
accounts for the Finance Committee to Re-Elcct the President or related
committees, including:
National Savings and Trust Company of Washington
First National Bank of Washington
Riggs v\'ational Bank
American Security and Trust Company
First City National Bank of Houston -- It is believed this bank was
involved in the transfer of the Mexican funds.
First National Bank Building, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.U. ,
Washington, D.C. •- tlie building in which the Finance Coircnittee is
quartered.
First National City Bank of New York -- One of the institutions involved
in the payment of the checks 'drawn on the Banco Internacional of Mexico
City.
Harry Fleming -- An employee of the Conmiittee to Re-Elect the. President an
who it is believed has knowledge of the operating procedures of the
campaign cor.rjittce.
Sally Harmony -- An employee of the Finance Conaittee to Re-Elect the
President and former secretary to G. Gordon Liddy.
Gulf Resources and Chemical Corporation and all its subsidiaries.
Frederick l.a Rue -- An cinployeo of the Corrnitteo to Re-Elcct the
President. He reportedly had access to the Committee safes and
is said to have participated in destruction of Co::imittec documents.
Clark MacGregor -- Campaign director of the Committee to Re-Elect the
President.
1193
Jcb Stuart Maeruder -- An employee of the Committee to Rc-Eloct the
President vho reportedly was involved in' the withdrawal of $300,000
from the ca-.paign committee's secret fund cannarked for sensitive
political projects.
Robert C. Mardian -- An ewployee of the Committee to Re-Elect the President
wlio reportedly lias made an investigation of the involvement of the campaign
committees in the Watergate case. ' . ■
John N, Mitchell -- Former Attorney General and former campaign chairman
for the Ccrrriittee to PvC-Elect tlie President.
Robert Odlc -- Personnel director of the Committee to, Re-Elect the
President ar.d reportedly involved in the destruction of Committee
records.
Herbert L. Porter -- Scheduling director at the Committee to Re-Elect
the President and one who has knowledge concerning the use of the
secret funds.
Ectore Reynaldo -- An official at the Republic National Bank of Miami
who handled the conversion of $114,000 in checks to cash for Bernard
Barker.
Republic National Rank of Miami -- The bank in which Bernard Barker
maintainid an account which was used to cash $114,000 in checks
belonging to tlic campaign coinmittee. _ .
Hugh W, Sloan -- Former treasurer of the Finance Conmittoe to Re-Elect
the President and a long-time associate of Maurice Stans.
Maurice H. Stans -- Chairman of the Finance cu;.imItLee to R>. -Elect the
President.
The Bank of .\merlcn -- One of the institutions involved In the payment
of the ch«.cks drawn on the Banco Tntornacional of Mexico City.
Will'iam TL.r^ons -- An employee of the White IIouso who reportedly received
memos containing material from eveasdropping efforts directed at the
Democratic '.'ational Committee.
Tlic Watergate Hotel, 2690 Virginia Avenue, N.W. , Washington, D.C.
Watergate Office Building, 600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. , Washington, D.C.
Watergate Ease Apartments, 2500 Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Watergate South Apartments, 700 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. , VJashington, D.C.
Watergate West Apartments, 2700 Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
96-296 O - 73 - 19
1194
EXHTOIT No. 34-23
Honorable Itright: Pateaa
Chairaaa
Cornnittaa on Bcnld.nr5 and Currency
House of ?u;pre3C;ucai:iva3
yashin^Ccn, D, C,
Dear Mr* ChajLrsiaa:
Cotit^rassaria G^irry Brc-.-ti lias i n fo jr:::o<i ua by letter o£
Septsdhar 26 that the- (CcrrrjLctGQ oa BcixLiiii;^ and Currcijcy ox
the Houce of Representative;! is ccxinidcjrxns; er'tcnoive pmbiii
hearin-^s iato finmcial aspects of tho so--caiied Watergsce
"bulging'* inciuoac, Mr, Brc.m'a letter and recent ne'-^3-
paper reports oi tha Cor-.iiittC'e's plans iudic;r-ta thai:: ths .
Corrrilttaa i^ay hciir a nuirjbai" of parscriS 'uho ar-s lilcoly to
be called as uitiiessca for the Govenrr?nt or for tha d^xan-
danta in tha psndin^^ crimlaai prcsccutiou ox sevan perscaa
indlctad in ccroioction vita the Watorgata incidcTit.
\vhile It is of course iniportazit that tha public be
fully infor:r-ad concerning the suajoct cantar invoivad i:a
ths Co::r:3ittaa'3 haarin.^3, tha Depari::z.'.n£ of Justice feols
obliijad to craw to ths attancicri of tha Ccr:::nitt5a socua
law eaforcemenc and civil libarriea* corisidaraticna that
raay bear on ths dasirability or propriety of such hearings
being held shortly boxora che criraiiriai trial at vhich soma
of thase persons ara lilcely to ba called as uitnasses.
The pvialic intar33t in a prczipt and Gucccoafui prosecutioa
cay ba irnperiled by \;idely publicized hearings ha id at this
ticia. And tha basic ri;ihts of ths defendants to c Gpc-ady,
fair and icioartiai trial n:ay be jeopard i:2:ed by prejudicial
publicity or tha dalay en^andarad by it.
1195
In a reriarkably similar situation sorp.e 20 years ago,
the conviction of a fomor public official for corruption
V7as vacated by the United States Court of Appaalo for tha
First Circuit because of the pretrial publicity engendered
by a congressional investigation botJ7Gen the time of
indie tir.ent and the tima of trial. The official, a
Collector of Internal Revenue, was reir.oved frcra office and
indicted on various charges of corruption in office. Prior
to the trial, the liouse VJays and Meaiis Cocraittea conducted
an investigation and public hearing of the official's con-
duct, over the protest of both his counsel and the Depart-
ment of Justice. The Government exprecsed its concern to
the Con^ai ttae with respect to what the court subsoa\iently
found to be the case: "the coiiniittee hearing afforded
the public a previevj of the prosecution's case against
Delaney with.out, hc'raver, the safeguards that would attend
a crininal trial." Sclanev v. United States^ 199 F.2d 107,
110 (C.A. Ij 1552). 11-13 dcfend;;ni:-s objecticn to tho
hearing V7aa^ of course, the adverse publicity which the
court also fovind had prejudiced the fairness of tha trial.
In Delaney tho court Gnph^.sized that the prejudicial
publicity haa been generated by the Goverriitent, rather
than by indeoendent Dress inquiry. It held that tha fact
that the hearing vras not conducted hy tha sar:2 branch of
Government responsible for the prosecution did not diminish
the ham to che defendant. "l^'^'J^^ perceive no difference
bet^'Teen prejudicial publicity instigated by the United
States through its e-.^ecutive arm and prejudicial publicity
instigated by tho United States thrcuch itr, Icsi.'slativa
arm." 139 F.2d at 114. ^Tnile the court did not question
tho authority of Ccn~ra39 to proceed XTith the hearing
while the indictr:snt ';7as pending;, it held that tha consti-
tutional rights of the defendant were nevertheless entitled
to protection either by a change of venue or a delay in the
trial sufficient to offset the adverse publicity,"
* Supreme Court decisions subsequent to the Delaney case
reinforce the Si:;th iVirendinenc right of a crininai defendant
to a speedy trial and 3u;55est that a lengthy continuance
roay prevent a subsequent orosecucion, at least where the
defendant requests an early trial. See Dickey v. Florida ,
393 U.S. 30 (1970); laoofer v. Morth Carolina , 336 U.S.
933 (1967).
1196
"We think that the United States is put to
a choice in this matter: If the United States,
through its legislative department, acting
conscientiously pursuant to its conception of the
public interest, chooses to hold a public hearing
inevitably resulting in such damaging publicity
prejudicial to a pending indictment, then the
United States must accept the consequence that
the judicial department, charged with the duty
of assuring the defendant a fair trial before an
impartial jury, may find it necessary to postpone
the trial until by lapse of time the danger of
prejudice may reasonably be thought to have been
substantially removed," Id., at ll4.
Other courts, in discussing Delaney , have suggested
that the congressional committee should not have conducted
the public hearings prior to the defendant's trial. The
Second Circuit, in United States v. Flynn , 2l6 F.2d 354,
375 (C.A. 2, 195^)i, ~cert . denied , 34« U.S, 909, suggested
that the hearings should either have been postponed until
after Delaney 's trial or held in private. Similarly, in
Silverthorne v. United States , 400 F.2d 627, 633 (C,A. 9,
T^S^ the court commented: %niile the reversal in Delaney
was necessitated because of the fact of prejudicial
publicity, this result is inextricably boimd up in the
rationale that such publicity was caused by the action of
the United States Government at a time when restraint
would have been the more prudent course of action."
This emphasis on governmental involvement in the
generation of adverse publicity has been repeated by the
Supreme Court. In Rideau v. Louisiana , 373 U.S. 723
(1963), the Court found a violation of due process in
the trial of a defendant in the same parish where tele-
vision publicity of his interrogation by the sheriff was
intense.
"Under our Constitution's guarantee of due process,
a person accused of committing a crime is vouch-
safed basic minimal rights. Among these are the
right to counsel, the right to plead not guilty.
A TRUE COPY
1197
and the right to be tried in a courtroon presided
over by a judge. Yet in this case the people
of Calcasieu Pariijh sav and lieard^ not once but
three times, a 'trial' of Ridcau in a Jail, pre-
sided over by a sheriff, where there vzaa no
la^^yer to advise ilidaau of his rinhc to stand
inut6." 373 U.S. at 726-27 (footnotes omitted).
The courts, largely because of a proper concern for
freedora of the press, have been reluctant to regulate
press coverage of sensational trials. At tha sania time,
the courts have tha responsibility to preserve tha right
of criminal defancumts to an ii::n3artial trial. Perharjs
tha cost ezitcnsiva judicial discucsicn of the baL-incajag
of these intaresta in recent yearn x:as tha decisica In
SheoT^ard v. Han^^c^ll, 334 U.S. 333 (1966). There the
Court again vacacea a criminal conviction because or
excessive publicity, not only prior to but curing tha
trial. V-"hile taare v;era a variety of factors involved
in that case, tha Court eriphasized the special obliga-
tion of insuring that govamnent officials, in that case
the prosecutor, police officers, and the coroner, not
contribute to the production of adverse publicity. 334
U.S. at 359.
The United States District Court here in the
District of Colurribia has recognized its responsibility
in this regard by adopting a special rule to guard
against adverse publicity prior to criirdnal trials.
Rule 100 of the Court's rules strictly enjoins court
personnel and pirosecutors not to discloca niattex preju-
dicial to the defendant and furtlier authorizes the judge
in a V7idely publici::ed or sensational case to issue a
special order governing extrajudicial statscents by
parties and vitnesses. It was this rule that Judge Rlchey
invo'.ced in a pending civil action, also emanating fro:n the
Watergate incident, in order to protect the rights of the
criminal defendants.
This Departnient is seriously concerned that public
hearin;;3 on matters related to the '.'atergatc case at this
1198
tims may not only JGOpardize the prosecution of the case
but also seriously prejudice the rights of the defendants.
It is distinctly possible that rvitters ^;hich adversely
reflect on the defendants, and which would not be admiss- '
ible at the criciinai trial, will become known to the public
and to potential jurors as a result of the proposed con-
gressional investigation. This wa3 the result of the
advance publicity in the Sheonard case and was one of tha
principal reasons for tha reversal of the conviction.
This matter of prejudice through adverse pretrial
publicity has been a natter of grave concern to all lawyers
in the United States. It was for this reason that tha
American Bar Asfjociatj.on coirmissicned a study of the prob—
lenj as part of its fonrailation of niniiiram standards for
the administration of criminal justice. In the report on
Fair Trial and Free Press the Con:mittee on Mininuia
Standards observed:
"Freedoia of speech and of the press are
fundamental liberties guaranteed by the United
States. CouDtitution. They must.be zealously
prcser^/ed, but at the same time must be exer-^
cised v;ith an awareness of the potential impact
of public statements on other ftmdamental rights,
including tha right of a person accused of
crime, and of his accusers, to a fair trial by
an impartial jury.
-A-:">V -.V ^ xt is important both to the community
and to tha criminal process that the public be
informed of tha coirmission of crime, that corrup-
tion and misconduct, including the improper
failure to arraign or to prosecute, be exposed
V7hanever thay are found, and that those accused
of crima be apprahanded. If, hov/ever, public
statem.ents and reporting with respect to these
mattars assume cha truth cf what zizy be only
a belief or a suspicion, thay may destroy the
reputation of ona who is innocent and may
seriously endanger the right to a fair trial in
tha event that fornial charges are filed.
-;c --v -.V Vr [d] uring tha period prior to trial,
public statam.ancs originating from officials.
1199
attorneys, or the neva media that assirne the
guilt o£ the pcrncn char,^sd, that include
inaccurate or inadniisaible information, or
that serve to inflama the ccr^xojniL'y, may "n
undemiiiQ the judicial proc&oa by raalclng
ttnobtairuibla s j^ry satisfying tha requisite
standard of impartiality." pp.. 16-17,
CoLszaittaes of Cono:ress have been careful in the past
to give proper regard to ia^7 GnzorceL.-;imc and civil liber-
ties' concerns in psrforsin^ thair investigative functions.
The Bepartr.rnit of Juatice is iiighly concerned that a wall
publicized congressional investigation at this ti^a.i will
jeopardize the rights of criminal defendants and endanger
the prospects of a prcnpt and success:cul prosec-ution. For
these rea„~on3 the Deoartiri^ent, as it did in the Del.•?n:^^?^
case, aslcs chat the Ccnmittae ^ive serious consideration
to these concerns before hoidin'^ hearinc^s on chis niatter
V7bich x/ill undouotediy cczi:2 co trial in the very near
future.
Sincerely,
Henry S. Petersen
Assistant Attorney General
Criniinal Division
1200
Exhibit No. 34-24
ZIEGLER: Dwight Chapin has already made it clear that the story
was fundamentally inaccurate and one based on hearsay.
Now there have been a number of stories which have
appeared over the last f(/w days -- and over the last
few months -- that you gentlemen have asked me about.
All of these stories have been based on hearsay or
on sources which have not been identified. These
stories have resulted in substantial confusion. All
of them seem to be lumped together as the Watergate
affair. The Watergate affair is one that has been
thoroughly investigated and seven men have been
indicted. It has been one of the most extensive
investigations in history. • . .
The other stories that have run don't relate to the
Watergate where criminal action is involved. ', ,
But still we see such stories as espionage, sabotage,
spying, surveillance -- all being charged to activities '
of the Re-election Campaign. But none of the charges
are based upon anything more than hearsay or • ■ •
unidentified sources.
1201
Now I can tell you I have nothing more to say or add
on this subject beyond what Dwight Chapin said in his
statement - but I will tell you this. At no time has
anyone in the White House or this Administration condoned
such activities as spying on individuals, surveillance
of individuals , or sabotaging campaigns in an illegial
way. The President has said before and I will repeat
it again. He does not condone this type of activity.
Now three weeks before the election there is a flurry
of sensationalism. I ani not going to inject the White
House into these stories. I am not going to assume
the resiDonsibility from this podium and from the
W^hite House Press Rooin to answer every unfounded
story based on hearsay or unidentified sources. . , .
every story based on-some sensational charge during
this period. ...
E?IRLICHMAN We are going to see all kinds of Presidential friends,
Presidential staff, Presidential relatives, dogs, etc.
pictures on the front pages of the local newspapers
1202
to counteract the fact that McGovern is two to one
behind. I am not going to try t o cope with these
unfounded stories. ■ '
CHAPIN I am not going to dignify desperation politics.
QUESTION Ron, that was a self-righteous, self-serving statement.
Simply, is the answer yes or no? Did Dwight Chapin,
the President's Appointments Secretary - a man who
meets with the President regularly - hire Segretti
and Instruct him to engage in sabotage?
ZIEGLER Gentlemen, I have nothing to add to what Mr. Chapin ^^
has already said on this and that is that the story is
fundamentally inaccurate and based on hearsay.
QUESTION But Ron, why don't you just ask Dwight or why
doesn't the President just ask him. Did he or did
he not hire Segretti?
ZIEGLER GentleiTien, I have nothing to add to what Chapin has
already said on the subject.
QUESTION Are you telling us that you won't say wlicther or not the
President condones activities such as sabotage, espionage,
surveillance?
1203
ZIEGLER If you would listen to what I said, you will note that I
stated that the President in no way condones this type
of activity and no one in the White House under any
circumstances direcl'cd, encouraged, or suggested that
people at any level in the campaign involve themselves
in survelliance of individuals, spying on individuals,
stealing documents or any illegal or repulsive steps
such as have been charged in the source
sensational stories that have been published.
QUESTION Is it trvie that Segretti was a close, personal friend
of Chapin' s? , ,., '
ZIEGLER Mr. Chapin covered that in the statemient. ^
QUESTION When was the last time that Chapin saw Segretti?
ANSWER I don't know.
QUESTION Why don't you ask him?
ANSWER Gentlemen, I told you I have nothing to add.
EHRLICHMAN We just don't take as seriously as you do these
campaign pranks. Some of you for your own purposes
have blown these into something that is not there.
ZIEGLER I don't think we can take on the press.
1204
EHRLICHMAN Dwight Chapin is terribly offended at the treatment he
got over the weekend. I approached him to the
possibility of coming out here. He said he would
never again speak to any member of the press and he
would lilie your apologies. . .
MOORE This refers to a statement of policy and it is clear
that it is the right one. What is the right of anyone to
expect an answer from this podium on a story which
is based on sources you will not reveal. Good citizens
are being filiifixMi;x vilified based on irresponsible,
unidentified stories and stories whicli draw broad-
sweeping conclusions. You have this right under the
First Admendment make charges on hearsay
evidence. . . Today you had a four-column picture in which
Dwight Chapin was named as a contact in sabotage. The
person who said it was not named. To take this
xdmitEd adniittcdly unsupported, non-knowledge
Hmik and assert it as knowledge to the point where
you may do so, but it does not give you a right
to expect an answer from the President's Press Secretary
1205
or from the President of the United States. When and if
anyone comes in here with evidence of wrongdoing-
you will receive an answer. Until that occurs, we will
go on to the next question or next subject.
Jim Mitchell -- fund. He denied it.
. Bill Timmons -- he denied it.
Clawson and the letter - he denied it.
In none of these cases was the source for the
story revealed, but these men for the rest of their
lives will have to live with these charges for which
they have no recourse.
QUESTION If you feel so strongly about this, then why don't you
just deny it?
These are the rules. Mr. Chapin has asked- me to
make a voluntary statement. As a man who has
worked in campaigns for X number of years and
have seen many pranks and hoaxes, it occured to me we
should have our own Dick Tuck in this campaign. Gordon
Strachan recalled that our old friend, Don Segretti,
1206
was coming out of the 7\rmy in September. We called
him and he expressed interest in the assignment-
of being a counter-agent
on that basis I said to him that perhaps I could get
an okay for you to be supported and take off on your
own on activities as long as lliey are legal.
I referred him to Mr. Kalmbacli who did supply
funds wliich would allow him to act on his own for a
few months. . I did this on my own without any
•knowledge or encouragement or authority.
I have read nothing to the contrary that Segretti has
done anything illegal or inconsistent witli traditional
stories in politics -- and the most I heard was a post
card or clipping from the newspaper.
I have noted that nothing has been said that anything
was illegal or of any consequence.
Then you might read a statement from the President
of the United States Dwight Chapin is one of
the most able and most respected men on my iaff.
In my opinion, he made a mistake in encouraging
1207
ZIEGLER
MOORE
prarics. However, this has occurred in my campaigns
in the past and had no effect there. I am sure these
pranks have had no effects here.
EHRLICHMAN Two exceptions =-- the government and the White
House. Chapin is the Wh i te House and the separation
you bridge the separation when you get
the President in it.
Who paid hiin and how was he paid?
On Mr, Chapin' s recommendation that he was going to
further the cause of the campaign, Mr. Kalmbach
paid him.
If we are doing something about them, there are a host
of charges liere and we are looking into them and we are
going to have a response for you.
We malce investigations and we check the evidence.
It is being looked into We are looking into it.
We don't have the answers.
Does the President have any reaction?
Yes, he is absolutely revolted and distressed that the
word sabotage is connected by picture and name
of a man whom he considers based on an
unsubstantiated story.
DE/^N
MOORE
DEAN
MOORE
1208
RESPONSE A
Let's get to the question of precisely what the allegation is. With
regard to the Watergate, it was quite evidently a crime -- a serious
crime -- With regard to the other allegations they range from
allegations of political high-jinks, pranks and hoaxes, all the way
to more serious matters such as spying and surveillance on individuals.
The President is under no obligation to comment upon these charges
for the reason (e) They are unsubstantiated; (b) they are unsupported,
and (c) in our judgment, both the timing, character, and the placement
of these stories is political in character. The purpose is to focus
attention' froixi the central issues of the campaign. The President
is under no obligation nor should he get into discussion or comment
on these tactics.
RESPONSE B
I have already made my comment that (a) Dwight Chapin did direct
the hiring of Segretti, that (b) once Segretti was hired, the day to day
activities were not Chapin's responsibility.
RESPONSE C
The President does not comment on allegations of campaign tactics.
i. e. irrilitants at the rally in Californiar.
1209
^o//s/^j
STATEMENT BY D WIGHT CHAPIN
As the Washington Post reporter has described it, the
story is based entirely on hearsay and is fundamentally
inaccurate." ,
For example, I do not know, have never met, seen, or
talked to E. Howard Hunt. I have known Donald Segretti
since college days but I did not meet with him in Florida
as the story suggests and I certainly have never discussed
with him any phase of the grand jury proceedings in the
Watergate case.
Beyond that I don't propose to have any further comment.
-72.
7^ /Jyr
96-296 O - 73 - 20
1210
Exhibit No. 34-25
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTON
December 5, 1972
RESTRICTED/ EYES ONLY
FOR THE ADDRESSEE ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR: - H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JOHN DEAN /,*]/
SUBJECT: Report Re Watergate and Segretti
After having reworked innumerable draft reports, I have developed the
following approach for releasing the report:
Attachment A : A draft statement for Ziegler to read to the press,
Attachmeiit B : Drafts of sworn depositions of White House staff -
who have been alleged by the media as having been involved. Ziegler
would also release these at the time he briefed on the subject.
NOTE: Included. at this time are:
Dwight Chapin • '
• * Gordon Strachan
If this approach is agreed upon, the following should also be
included:
H. R. Haldeman
Ken Clawson
The above approach is suggested as a means of getting the information
out in a form that is both credible and not unnecessarily harmful to the
individuals involved. It avoids the questions of how Dean reached his
conclusions and also puts congressional investigators on notice that this
is all they can ever expect. Also, the depositions are unimpeachable
and put the matter into a proper perspective.
While, as you know, I am not sure that we need a report at this tinr^e,
if such a report should be issued this approach would do the job. Dick
Moore has worked with me on this matter and agrees.
1211
Attachment A
DRAFT
STATEMENT BY RON ZIEGLER RE DEAN REPORT
As you are aware, following the so-called Watergate
incident the President directed John Dean, Counsel to the President,
to conduct a complete investigation of the matter to determine
whether any present niember of the White House staff or anybody
employed in the government was involved in that bizarre affair.
On August 29, 1972 the President announced Mr. Dean's findings
that no one pi^ee-en-feiy employed in the White House or in the
Administration was involved in the incident.
Since that time, in the waning weeks of the campaign,
there were additional charges made of Adininistration officials
being involved in alleged acts of political espionage and sabotage.
As a result, the President directed Mr. Dean to conduct an additional
• A
investigation into these charges.
Mr. Dean has reported the findings of this additional
investigation to the President.
This investigation resulted in the following findings:
-- After investigation of all charges which might involve
any persons l^-'ff3^h,£\J^ employed in the White House or in the
Administration, as well as consultations wdth the FBI and with the
chief prosecutor handling the criminal action, it can be reaffirmed
there was no involvenient by any such people in the incident which
occurred at the Watergate on June 17, 1972.
1212
-- No one in the Administration was in any way involved
in the incident in New Hampshire involving the so-called "Canuck"
letter, and more specifically, the charge alleging the source of
that letter to be Mr. Ken Clawson of the White House staff is
untrue and totally without foundation. Nor, it should be noted,
was any information developed which shed any light on the origin
of the letter.
-- There is no substance whatever to the charge that any
person in the Administration "directed some 50 secret agents in
sabotage activities;" to the contrary, no one in the Administration
directed any such activities.
--In late summer of 1971, Mr. Gordon Strachan and
Mr. Dwight Chapin, both White House staff members, encouraged
Donald "Tick" Segretti, an old college friend who was finishing his
active duty military service, to become a political prankster. The
idea to enlist such a prankster was Mr. Chapin' s. Based upon his
experience in five political campaigns, he had become aware that
certain individuals such as the celebj=^+ed Dick Tuck conducted
pranks designed to harass and disrupt Republican campaigning and to
embarrass the President. V;lj'ecr©fAy@, J*e^ took it upon himself to
A
initiate similar activity against opponents of the Republican Party,
and when he and Mr. Strachan heard that Tick Segretti, who they knew
to be a practiced practical joker, was seeking employment
they decided to approach him.
1213
Once Segretti was approached and b'^ enlisted neither
Strachan or Chapin or anyone in the White House directed or controlled
A
any of Segretti's activities. Rather, by the very nature of this task
he received directions from ite oiie-ai^S was to operate on his own
/V A J
initiative and use his ingenuity to perform political pranks.
Mr. Segretti received no government funds, but instead was
paid from available political funds. Paynient was made by a
Republican fvind raiser to whom Segretti was referred by Chapin.
* - - There is no basis whatever to the allegations that
H. R. ^Haldeman had access to any secret campaign slush fund, O^
directed political sabotage activities, tVor was interviewed by the
FBI regarding these alleged activites and the Watergate incidenti3_A \<-t.
These charges are all totally without substance. Mr. Haldeman
at soine point in time was advised by Mr. Strachan that a political
prankster was operating in the primarie s on behalf of the Republicans,
but he was told that tliis individual was working on his" own initiative
and he had no knowledge of any specific activities of that individual,
nor did he even knov/ his name.
-- There was no evidence uncovered in this investigation
which in any way links Mr. Segretti with the Watergate incident
or the alleged activities of those charged with a crime in
connection with the incident and, indeed, Mr. Dean is
satisfied that there was in fact no such connection.
1214
Attachment B
DRAFT
SWORN DEPOSITION OF DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
Question:
It has been alleged in the media, that you told the FBI that
you hired Donald Segretti "to disrupt the Democratic [primary]
campaigns. Is that allegation true?
Answer: '
To the best of my recollection I told the FBI that I had en-
couraged Don to become active as a political prankster in the
Democratic primaries. Let me be more specific:
Having been closely involved in five political campaigns, I
had become acutely aware of being subjected to the wide variety
of intelligence and harassment tactics which are used against candi-
C ^^'
dates by their opponents. For example, the most c elebr ated YlcrS^ ^<^5~w-
exponant of these tactics was Richard Tuck who has been widely
publicized over the years fo:i; his success in infiltrating the Republican
camp, obtaining information about their plans and engaging in so-called
political pranks to disrupt or harass their operations. In fact, I
understand that the reports filed by the McGovern Campaign Committee
reveal that Tuck was on their payroll as recently as this spring.
I had also been keenly aware, through direct experience and
observation, of the extent to ■which organized activities of demonstrators
can disturb, and in some instances disrupt, a political campaign.
1215
And, I have come to understand how important it is to know in
advance when disruptive tactics of this kind are going to be used
against us.
In the summer of 1971, knowing that the primary campaigns
would soon be underway, I concluded that it would be wise if our
side could have a "Dick Tuck" of our own who could fill the dual role
of obtaining information about political pranks which might be directed
against us, and also engage in corresponding activity against the
opposition.
I was aware that an old college friend, Donald Segretti,
would shortly be completing his army service. He and I had been
active in campus politics at U. S. C. and I thought he would be an
excellent choice for the role I have described because on campus he
had been energetic and imaginative and, indeed, a prankster. I
■ comniunicated with him atid arranged to meet with him in Washington.
When Don came to Washington my wife and I, joined by
Gordon Strachan and his wife, had him to dinner at our hon"ie. While
the evening was basically a social reunion, as Gordon had also been
a college ma-te, we did discuss in generalities the pranks that we
have been exposed to in previous campaigns. We asked Don if he
would be interested in being such a prankster, but nothing was
resolved that evening.
' Sometime after our meeting in Washington Segretti
telephoned from California and said he would like to be our Dick
Tuck as we discussed.
1216
Question:
It has been alleged in the press that you told the FBI that
Segretti was paid for his activities by Herbert Kalmbach. Did you
make these arrangements?
Ans'wer:
Yes, I made these arrangements. It is really unfortiinate,
however, that Herb Kalmbach' s name has been brought into this over-
publicized matter. Herb has absolutely no involvement in or knowledge
of what Segretti was doing. Let me explain, to the best of my recollec-
tion, exactly how these arrangements were made.
After Segretti expressed interest in becoming a political
prankster, I told him to get in touch with Herb Kalmbach, who w^ould
make arrangements for his reimbursement for time and expenses.
To date, I have no specific or first hand knowledge of how much
.Don was paid other than that he would receive a salary of approxi- ...
mately $16,000 plus expenses.
I called Kalmbach and told him that I had requested that a
person by the name of Segretti get in touch with him and asked
Kalmbach if he could make arrangements to pay him a salary plus
expenses. I informed Kalnnbach that Segretti ■would be engaged in
—political activity, but v/e never discussed what Segretti ■would be doing,
Kalmbach stated that he would make such arrangements and we have
never discussed the matter since that time.
1217
Question:
How often did you have contact with Segretti?
Answer;
Although I never directed any of his activities, I did suggest
to Segretti that he come to Portland, Oregon, in September, 1971
where tlie President would be attending a meeting at the Benson Hotel.
It was known that hostile demonstrators would be present, and indeed
they were, and I thought it would be educational for Segretti to observe
the kind of activities which were being directed against the President,
and which we would expect to encounter in the political campaign. I met
with Segretti once during this visit, and I was the only member of the
white House staff to do so.
It was shortly after this that I was assigned to lead the advance
trips to the Peoples Republic of China, and to accompany the President
on the trip itself. Thus, in the late fall of 1971, and all of January
and February, 1972, I was totally immersed in the preparations for
the China trip, including two advance trips, and in the Presidential trip
itself, February 17-28.
Upon my return from China, I was given the same assignment
with respect to the forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union which in-
volved an advance trip to Austria, Poland, Russia, the Ukrain and
Iran, followed by the Presidential trip itself in late May.
1218
During the periods of time I was working on the Presidential
trips, I recall Segretti would sometimes call, but I often was unable
to speak with him because of the press of business. However, I am
sure I did speak with him on the phone, and can only guess that during
the period of September 1971 to June 1972 I may have spoken with him
times.
1219
Question;
Were you aware of what Segretti was doing?
Answer:
To this day my knowledge of Don's specific activities is
extremely limited. I am certainly not aware of Don engaging in
any unlawful or even sinister type activity and I believe I know
him well enough to say that he, in fact, would not be party to any
such activities.
When Don contacted me by phone or sent me a news
clipping, it would relate to some hiimorous hoax. I iTiight add
that I never had the impression that anything he was doing was
very significant.
1220
Question;
Did you ever direct any political sabotage or espionage
activities through Segretti or anyone else?
Answer: *.
When I first met with Don, I explained that he would be on his
own and he would have to make his own judgements regarding his
activities. I further explained that the only purpose that a prankster
could have in the Democratic primaries would be to cause an
impression of general party confusion and general ineptness.
I also suggested that Segretti travel to ti^^key primary states
and become familiar With the political activities of the Democratic
candidates. 1 also suggested that he might obtain information about
the schedules of our opponents and any activities directed against us.
I am as certain as any person can be that there was never any
discussion between us of "sabotage, " "espionage, " "surveillance
of candidates or their families, " "compilation of dossiers, " or any
activities which would be unlawful. In fact, I know that Don would
never participate in any such activities.
1221
Question:
Did you ever discuss Segretti's activities with the President?
Answer;
No. I have never discussed this subject with the President
at any time.
Q uestion:
Did you ever discuss Segretti's activities with H. R. Haldeman?
No. I cannot remember ever having discussed Segretti
r this matter in general with Haldeman.
1222
DRAFT
SWORN DEPOSITION OF GORDON STRACHAN
Question:
Will you state what your association with Donald Segretti
has been?
Answer:
I have knowTi Don Segretti, whonn we used to call by the
nickname "Tick, " since we were both students and fraternity
brothers at U. S. C. I had seen or been in touch with "Tick" from
time to time since graduation from college, and sometime in mid-
1971 he got in touch with me to say that he was soon to be discharged
from active service in the army and that he would be inter-ested in
finding a job in the political area, I told him if I heard of anything
I would -let him know.
I remember later mentioning Segretti' s interest to Ehvight
Chapin, who was also a college friend of Tick's and mine, and later
we discussed the possibility that Tick might well be a good choice
to work for the Republican Party as a political prankster. The idea
would be for him to do the kind of things for the Republicans that
people like Dick Tuck had done to our side in past campaigns and
would undoubtedly be doing again. We both agreed that Segretti would
be an excellent choice, and Chapin got in touch with Tick and the
three of us later met for dinner in Washington where we discussed
some of the kinds of stunts that would be involved. I recall that
1223
Segretti expressed interest, but I understand that it was not until
some days or weeks later that he got in touch with Chapin and told
him that we would like to take on the activity we had discussed.
Thereafter, Chapin told me that he arfanged for Segretti to meet
Mr. Kalmbach in California who would make arrangements for
Segretti to be hired and compensated. I understand tint Mr.
Kalmbach was the custodian of funds available for the primary
campaign.
1224
Question;
How often were you in contact with Segretti?
Answer:
I saw or heard from Segretti perhaps four or five tinnes
in 1971 and 1972, but I never had any knowledge as to what actual
activities he might have been engaged in. The last time I heard
from Segretti was in June of 1972 when he phoned me, and we met
for lunch at the Mayflower Hotel. On that occasion, Segretti told
me that he had been contacted by the FBI, and they wanted to
interview him. I told him that I had no idea why they were calling
him, (Ed. Note: This answer to be completed after further review
of JWD investigation material. )
1225
Question;
Did you direct any of his activities?
Answer:
No.
Question:
Did you ever discuss Segretti's activities with Mr. Haldeman?
Answer:
(Ed. Note: This answer to be completed after further review
of JWD investigation material. ) ''
Question:
When was the last time you had contact with Segretti?
Answer:
To the best of my recollection, he last called me in
June or July to tell me that the FBI want'ed to interview him.
He wanted to know if I knew why and I told him I had no idea.
i
96-296 O - 73 - 21
1226
Exhibit No. 34-26
CAMPAIGN SPENDING - HRH AND DEAN, MAY 18, 1971
1. The pending issue is the mechanics of reporting or not reporting
for the 1701 activities. If 1701 is considered a "re-nomination
Committee" it can be treated as a non-reporting activity. None
of the Democratic candidates are currently reporting according
to Dean. It is Dean's view that the legal question may have
changed after the formation of the Committee was announced
because of the choice of the word "re-election".
2. Dean and H agree that the expenditure should be kept low so that
if the decision to report is made the facts don't look to bad.
Large expenditures, and the activities with the milk money, would
remain non-reporting.
3. The Attorney General concurred with the advice to do a mass mailing
to 1000 to 2000 people from a list held by Lee Nunn. The letter
would be signed by Frank Dale. Milbank has been approached and
is not opposed.
4. Dean reported that Nunn is requesting use of the "500,000 White
House List". If the list is not to be used now, could it be used
later?
H - "I don't think that we can."
Dean - "What about interspersing the lists?"
H - "Ever been done before? Under LBJ?"
I
__ 1227
Dean - "VVill check and discover."
H - "Sort of interesting to get a run on the list and clean it up now."
Dean - "VVhat was the criteria for setting up the list?"
H - "It is merely a list of people' who indicated support for the
President. "
Dean - "There will be a 7-day turn around for any mailing."
'There will also be some telephone solicitation to establish a
'operating' activity."
H - "The Committee will be collecting funds in its own name."
Dean - "The pledge money that Kalmbach is seeking is to be brought
in under the theory 'get as much as possible as soon as possible'.
H - "Nunn is also pushing separate from Kalmbach and getting it in fast.
"Strachan should push Kalmbach and Sloan to move on their money now ."
H - "Kalmbach'spledges for 10 - can't they be put ' to work?"
Dean - "Maybe we should make arrangements for polling research, etc.,
and make payment now."
H - "Opposed to paying people in advance of work delivered: What about
the possibility of creating a polling consultant - we give the money
to him now and as our agent he holds the cash until the poll people
actually deliver: presumably, he would pay income tax on the interest,
but the interest could be his fee. We will have to do some checking
on that. "
1228
H - "We should begin moving at once because when the law is passed
it will be effective immediately (of course, 10 days for the President
to s j.gn) . "
Dean - "Much campaign money has lost earning power money anyhow."
Dean - "To review the guidelines for Sloan: 1. He can not assure
contributors that there will be no gift tax liability; 2. The
reporting and disclosure requirements from the law are also open
and so Sloan can give very little assurance to the contributors that
he can comfort."
H - "What about the possibility of getting the money in nov/ with
the understanding that we would reimburse them for the gift tax:
argue reduce the amount by the amount of the gift tax."
Dean - "Ottinger family paid three quarters of one million dollars
in gift tax. "
Dean - "Sloan creating committees with 200 chairmen and bank supplies
the treasurer. "
Dean - "We will have to look into the question of agreement to reimburse
on the gift tax point as well as the question of the possibility of
putting, some of the 10 in pledges in municipal bonds to prevent federal
tax liability."
Dean - "Evans, Nunn and Sloan have raised the surplus funds question."
1229
H - "Forget this) "
"No, the surplus funds are not to go into 1701 - there is no need
for cash in the 1701."
Dean - "What about the milk money? Our current thinking is to keep
it totally separate and not even use the same bank."
H - "Agree"
Dean - "What should the milk money be used for?"
H - "The Citizens Committee can submit a budget at the appropriate
time and in the meantime, the money can sit in the bank."
Dean - "Salaries at the Citizens Committee are currently being paid'
through a Kalfnbach Trustee Account, so it is surplus money."'
H. - Fleming should not have access to the Kalmbach surplus money nor
the 70 surplus money.
H - Strachan is to discover the source of the original 35 given to
fleming and cover with Kalmbach that he is not to move any OjJ che
surplus money without express approval from H and no such approval
has been given.
Dean pointed out that the expenses of the Citizens Committee ^;ould
be approximately 35-40 thousand per month.
Dean - Why can't the current mailing be a cover for the other availab."L;
money? Since presumably the amount received from the mailina V7ill noi
be sufficient to cover the .operating expenses.
1230
H - VThy can't the milk money be funneled into comniittees aiui liitu
1701 to pay operating expenses?
Dean, it is my understanding that the White House is to be coTnpletoly
hands off the milk money. ,
H - Agree '
H - The milk money can pay for the 1701 activities up to the campaign.
Dean summarized the remaining open questions:
1. Whether to be a reporting or non-reporting committee.
H - Why report?
2. No surplus money is to be extended ever.
3. The direct mailing is a go and expenditures should con.^ out
of what is raised.
4. The milk money is to pay for operating expenses.
H - The operating people need not know the source of the money: The
operating people should merely submit a budget and budget revisions
for expenditures which they incur. They need not know the mec.i'i.nism
for covering the expenditures.
H - Any tap of Kalmbach or reserve funds must be cleared by II.
1231
Exhibit No. 34-27
July 21, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL/ EYES OIs^LY
MEMORANDUM FOR: HERB'KALMBACH
FROM: JOHN DEAN
Attached is a bill from Gloaoon's laNvyer repreccnting him
ixi tlic Common Cauoe la.\v suit. I have requceted that
Gordon Strachan clear thio with Haldeman, although it is
a miiior expenditure, and that you reiniburse Gleaeon
for tho expenditure. I would suggest that you deal directly
with Gleason on this matter and <^ct in touch with mo
regarding tl?.ldeinan'£3 reaction, if I have not already
informed you of his approval.
Plcace give me a call if you have any qucctions.
cc: Gordon Strachan
1232
LAW OFFICtS
"WILNER. SCHEINEli & GHEELEY
2021 L STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
Mr. Jack A. Gleason . , July 1, 1971
The Washington Consulting Group
3524 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20007
Legal Services, June, 1971:
Telephone and personal conferences,
correspondence and research; nego-
tiation, preparation and filing of
stipulation suspending effectiveness
of subpoena . .
Out-of-Pocket Disbursements . . .
(Photocopies-$31. 70; Cabs-$2. 00)
1233
Exhibit No. 34-28
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1/2/73
TO: John Dean
FROM: Charles Colson
Now what the hell do I do?
1234
HOWARD HUNT
December 32, 1972
By Hand
Hon. Charles W, Colson
Special Counsel to the President '
The VJliite House
Washington, D. C,
Dear Chuck:
The children and myself were touched by your letters,
and vv-e deeply appreciate your sympathy, I am unable to i-'cconcile
myself to Dorothy's death, much less accept it.
For years I was aware that I depended upon Dorothy,
but only now do I realize hoi\? profound that dependence V7as.
Her death, of course, changes my personal equation
entirely, and I believe tliat my paramount duty now and in the
future is to my children, particularly to my 9--year-old t;c!n who
was unusually dependent upon his moLher, particularly since last
June ' s- tumult began.
I had understood you to say that you would be vjilling
to see my attorney. Bill Bittman, at any time. After my v.'ifo's
death I asked him to see you, but his efforts v.'ere unavailing.
And though I believe I vinderstand the del.icacy of your overt
position, I nevertheless feel myself even more isolated than
before. My wife's death, the inunlnent trial, my present mental
depression, and my inability to get any relief fi'om my pre.-, ^nt
situation, all contribute to a sense of abandonment ]jy fri.'.Js
on Vv'hom 1 had in good faith relied. I can't tell you hovj ;ii;;ooc-
tant it is, under the circiuiistances, for Bill Bitbnan to have the
opportxmity to meet with you, and I trust that you will do me
that favor.
There is a limit to the endurance of any man trapped
in a hostile situation and mine was reached on December 8th. I
do believe in God - not neccssai^lly a Just God but in the gover-
nance of a Divine Being, His Will, however, is often enacted
through human hands, and human adversaries ai^e arraigned against
line.
Sincerely, and in friendship.
1235
Exhibit No. 34-29
'Post riAfl-v-i^ti 2-c>c.viU((_u£- i^>:i. l)e=e 7_8 TX- Pl^
^2^^'b . bec^. 2-^,-7 2- -^
. f^&uT VdO W-Ar'b TO IclMou) ,
.^A-(t) . /&^ c^aS Pter, u3(x(^&ee. ^t 1)c>:^s mot e(^'L.o/oc5
.^O-ULH Te-<i& (M TH£ FoiZ&Sr Uijc_i_ FALL.
i^ A-T TH<^ P/^e^iP6. rOoLx)^
c30ST P4SS Ti4C. rt€S^A-Gfe TH-AT if T>+6-V uJ/^U^T tT T^
I'm 5o,e^v{ Tt^A-T VOO U)tL(_ Gi<^T »-Ju/2.T iM_ TH6
I
1236
Exhibit No. 34-30
"X . Relevancy of Intercepted CommunicQtiona
1. My cell to the Chilean Ecibaooy on Oct 10 1972 vas relevant in thni
the I.' tcrgato esse was diECucsed.
2. Justice Douglas en July 29 1972 in a hearing on tho application for
stay in the Ellcl^erg Case, caid:
" \7a (tha Supreca Court) held in Aldarman v. U.S. , 394 U.S. 165, 182
(1968) tliQt tlia icaue of relevancy should not be resolved in car.iera,
but in an r.dvercary proceeding. Aldernan \jould be greatly undercut
if tha issue of relevancy could ba resolved in caccora, end if ths
triS.1 court ruled or,ainGt the defendants on tl;s cv2rits and tlicn
detcrtaincd that tliey had no " standin:_;''to cor.^piain,"
(Pet for V;rit of Cert, to U S Court of A?p. #72-307 US Sup CC)
jl ^!and3ted Disclosuro of Imoenniscably Intercepted
• -__ crrTrTeri-aLrc'ris "" '"~
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 provides in tho pertinent pari; (84
Stat 935, 18 USC 3504)
" Litigation concerning sources of evidence.
(a) In any trial , hearing, or other proceeding, in or before any
court, frand jury, departnant, officer, agency, regulatory- body
'or other authority of tlie United Ltatea -
(1) upon a claia by a party aggrieved that evidence is insdmissible
becnucs it is tha nrtciary product of an unlav;ful act or because it v.-as
obtained by tha e.xnioitation of nn unlawful act, the opponent of
the claira sl'.all affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged
unltluful act;
(b) As used in this section " unlavjful act " means any act tha ul^s of ct.'j
electronic, uachanical, or other device (as defined in section 251C(5)
of this title) in violation of the Constitution or lauo of tha
United fjtates or any regulation or standard promulgated pursuant
thereto".
In the Ellsberg Case, on Jan 24 1972 the defense during pre-trial proceedings
moved for discovery of electronic surveillance information with resi^ect to
the petitiioners , ttieir attoruays and legal consultants. They had no reason
to believe that such inforniaticn \;ould necessarily be used as evidence
against them, but rade tl'.e notion under the provision od the Org Crir.e Control
Act of 1970. The g.ovt \ja3 forced to disclose such icnarmissably intercepted
conversations, to v;it, ti;o piioue calls intercepted of the defense ctcovaoy,
one of wuich was to t!ie Ciiilcan L;;:iba53y in l.'ashington DC.
( p 3 Ellsberg Writo of Cert 72-307 U S Supreme Court)
1237
In the Cblnlbua Crine Control Dill of 1963, and the Organized Crlrjs Coat.iol
Bill of 1970, Congress n-rfl".t od di scloniiro , on motion from a defense r.ttornoy,
of ALL lI-2?2rjlISSAi;LY linz.XELriLn CC:;;'x:?^ATIC::S - not just those relevriV.r. to
a case, or intended to be introduced into evidence. The Senate report o.\
the O.anibuo Crina Control Eill of 1963 sets forth clearly that Congrccsional
intent, end the fact that It was Incorporated into law as a protection for
the defendant.
The imperolssably Intercepted converEationa of McCord's included:
1. A loag-dlstance call from Chile to llcCord'c office phone in the Spring of 1972.
2. Local calls frora liiCord'o office phone in the Spring of 1972 to the
Ciillean Military attache's residence and office phona in the sp l.'achtngtoa orca.
3. Calls by McCord from his residence phona to the folloulng Embassies:
Septetnber 21, 1972 to the Israeli Embassy 8:35 am from 762-8720
October 10, 1972 to the Cliilean Embassy 4:50 pm froa 762-8720
A. Agencies involved: FBI, HSA, and CIA
^^
Jack Caulfield
Fairfax, Virginia
1238
Exhibit No. 34-31
Message given ;by Saundra Greene to
Mr-. Gordon Liddy - January ^, 197Z
5«15 P.M.
Hello Gordon - (Mr. Liddy)
I've talked with Bud and he really regrels he can't
talked to you at this time because of the confirmation
hearings coming up. But he hopes you would not talk to
Mr. Sutcliffe in light of the impending case. Bud believes
that Sutclife does not expect a return call from you.
Saudrai This should be sum total of your remarks.
Be kind, solicitous, happy to hear his vo"ice, etc. But
do not get in to a protracted discussion with him on any
subject.
Saundra made call to Mr. Liddy at 5«08 P.M. After repeating
the verbatim message above to Mr. Liddy, Mr. Liddy saidi
"OK. Thank you very much."
This was all Mr. Liddy said on the phone. Saundra reached
him at 659-9010, which is the number of a law firm. Saundra
reported that Mr. Liddy sounded subdued, but not depressed.
I
1239
Exhibit No. 34-32
December 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JOHN W. DEAN
SUBJECT: Congressional Hearings regarding Watergate -
(Meeting with Sen. Jackson)
Hard Information on the prospects of Congressional hearings on the
Watergate, Segretti, etc., is virtually unavailable because the
Democrats are not willing to talk about it. There has been some
Information, however, indicating that the Senate Democratic
Policy Committee has taken a position on the matter. Senator
Jackson is a member of that Committee and may have some hard
information on this question.
I would like to recomment that if an opportunity arises in your
conversation with Senator Jackson this afternoon you might ask
him if there are going to be such hearings - and when and which
Committee.
A TRUE COPY
I
1240
ExmBiT No. 34-33
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTO N
February 9, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR : JOHN DEAN
FROM : H.R. HALDEMAN
Obviously the key on the Ervin Committee is the minority staff
and more importantly, the minority counsel. We've got to be
sure we get a real tiger, not an old man or a soft-head, and
although we let the connmittee membership slip out of our grasp,
we've got to find a way to be sure we get the very best man we
can for counsel.
Also, you should go ahead and have Kleindienst order the FBI
project on the 1968 bugging so as to gather the data on that and
get. the fullest possible information.
Also, Mitchell should probably have Kendall call DeLoach in
and say that if this project turns up anything that DeLoach hasn't
covered with us, he will, of course, have to fire him.
1241
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N G TO N
GONFIDtllilAL
February 10, 1973
IVIEMORANDUM FOR : JOHN DEAN
FROM : L. HIGBY
u
As I'm sure Bob's probably mentioned to you, we need to get
a thorough itemization as quickly as possible of all the disruptions
that occurred in the campaign. We'll need this for our Watergate
tactics with the Ervin Committee. That is, the Democratic planned
activities at the Century Plaza together with pictures, indications of
violence and Communist activity and all that sort of thing - the
violence in San Francisco - the headquarters burning in Phoenix "
and other areas - the demonstrations at the Statue of Liberty, etc.
96-296 O - 73 - 22
1242
February 10, 1973
MBI/iOIlANDUr/I FOR i JOHN DEAN
FRCIvI : ri.R. H/iLDEIv4/iN
Wo ncod to cc-t cur people to vnxt out tho ctory on the foreign or
Comniunint iTjOaoy lliat v/ao uncd in r>uppo?t of don^onotrationo
acainijt tho Fre'ddcnt in 1972. AVc chould tio all 197^ damon-
otrationa to IvicGovern and thus to tho Damocrato ap part of
tho poaca n-jOvcn:i3n,tt • *, •
The iavo.'jti^alicn chould bo brought to include tho peace iriove-
msnt wliich Icado directly to McGovern end Toddy Kennedy,
Tliio in a [;cod countcrcffcriaivc to be developed, la this conr.cctioa
wo need to itomi::c c.U the dlcruptiono Duch ao tho Century Plasa,
San Frr>,ncl-:;co, iJtaluc of Liberty, and eo on.
You phould dcfii:itely order Gray to go ahead on Cho FBI Inv^^ctisatioa
ajja.innt tho.oo who tr-ppcd Kiiion and Ajjnew in 1968.
Wo need to develop tho plan on to v/hat extent the Democrato were
responciblo £oi- ihe doxnonoti^^.tiona that Iciid to violence or dio-
ruption » ■
There's alco tho qucction of whether v/o chould let cut the Fort V.'aync
aCttry now - that v/o ran a clean camcxiign coniparcd to theirs of libel
and Dlandcr cuch ao aijainst Rcboao, etc.
V/c co\jld lot Evano and Novak put it out and then be aohed about It
to make the point that v/o knew and the Precident oaid it wao not to
bo uced any under circumctancea. In any event, vrc have to play
a very hard j-amo on tliin wholo thinp and cot our invcDti£ationo
golnr; afi a covmtor movo.
1243
Exhibit No. 34-34
AGENDA
Matters to be discussed and resolved:
(1) Baker mectinp with President:
-- Baker requested secret meeting re Watergate hearings.
-- Baker told Timinons he wantfe guidance, but to maintain
his purity in the Senate he doesn't want anyone to know
of meeting with the President.
-- Timmons believes that Baker wants to help.
-- Timmons does not feel Baker would object if there was
staff present during meeting, so long as fact of meeting
never gets out,
-- Meeting would be excellent chance to find out what Baker
plans to do and set up channel to work with him.
(2) Sending Stans up for Confirmation:
-- We don't know if Stans wants to do this, but we 'do know
he wants to be rehabilitated and isn't afraid to tell his
story publicly,
-- Confirmation hearings would help defuse Watergate
hearings, and the more of this we get to the public,
the less impact the Watergate hearings per se will have.
-- Tliis should be resolved quickly, because it will only be
helpful if it occurs prior to AV^itergate hearings. (Stans
has requested to sec Dean on Feb. 28th -- upon his return
from Jamaica. )
(3) Wha-t to do v%^itii Magrudcr :
-- Jeb wants to return to White House (Bicentennial project).
-- May be vialnerable (Sloan) until Senate hearings are completed.
-- Jeb personally is prepared to withstand confirmation hearings.
(4) Use of Buclianan as Observer /Spokesman to keep press coverage
honest:
-- Watergate press coverage to date has been dishonest and
libelovis. Pat covild call them to task.
-- The hearings are going to be partisan. Pat covild make
certain that the public understands this.
1244
-- Teddy Kennedy is a moving force behind the hearings --
this can and should be documented. Pat could do this well.
-- The public docs not percieve Buchanan as being that close
to the President. The basic question is whether the White
House is going to sit quietly and take the unwarranted
abuse that is bound to come from hearings. We can't run
a secret counter PR effort so why not do it openly and
respectfully -- Pat can do t^at.
'-- Buchanan's role will eliminaternuch of the heat that
Ziegler will otherwise recieve and Ziegler could even
have Pat brief from time to time.
(5) Getting the A. G. back on the reservation;
-- A. G. is merely biding his time until he returns to private
sector.
-- A. G. is extremely loyal to the President and if asked to
take an active concern in these hearings (and their fall out)
would do so -- otherwise he will probably do what is best
for his own self interest. *
-- A. G. should be asked to remain in office at least one full «.
year from this date (i. e. , until hearings have passed)
because hearings may well result in request for additional
action by DOJ. A. G. can get Henry Petersen -- who has
the greatest loyalty for the A. G. -- to handle sensitive
problems with ease. We can't afford bitterness in the DOJ
nor can we risk a new A. G. being able to grappel with some
of the potential probleins.
i
1245
Exhibit No. 34-35
PotonlialM.iltcrs for Discussion with Son. Raker
Meeting tn bo totally off the record
Time: 30-45 Min.
Staff: T>miiicuis nnd Di„Tin r
General
-- Take Baker's pulse and find out how much he wants to help
keep this from becoming a political circus. "
Baker can be assured tliat no one in the White House had
any kno\s'ledge tliat tliere was going to be a break in and
bugging of the DNC.
-- If Baker appears to be truly desirous of cooperating -- and
the fact he is seeking guidance may so indicate -- he might
be told that there are matters unrelated to the bugging
incident per se (e. g, , Segretti, Kalmbach) that could be
embarrassing and tarnish good people whose motiyes were
the highest. Surely he can appreciate that things which
occur at the White House have a degree of sensitivity that
occur no where else in governnient.
1968 Bugging
-- Tell Baker that J. Edgar Hoover personally informed the
President shortly after taking office that his campaign had
been bugged. Presently seeking to obtain documentation
and evidence of the 1968 incidents.
Appearances of White House Staff Members before Senate Committee
-- Statement coming out shortly on the matter of Executive privilege.
(Draft attached)
-- Cannot state at this time if such witnesses will be provided to
Committee. Must wait to determine how the issue develops.
-- A possible resolution of the problem may be that when the
Committee believes a Wliite House staff member is essential
as a witness, we can compromise and agree upon a sworn
written interrogation.
1246
General Guiclance
-- Seek to get hearings over as quickly as possible because
they really are a potential witch liunt. The President can
note that hearings of this type damage all government
officials ajid the institutions of government. The public
wants to believe the worst about all politicians and
hearings of this type are going to damage all elected
officials.
-- Committee procedures should protect the rights of
minority members to infornnation, calling its own
witnesses, notice of meetings, etc.
-- Minority Counsel should be tough, aware of the way things
operate in Washington, and able to handle a fellow like
Sam Dash who has been selected as Majority Counsel.
Dash is a partisan.
Communication witli Wh.itc House
■ - Wally Johnson should be initial contact point, but if Baker
feels he wants to raise something that he chooses not to
discuss with AVally, then arrangements can be made to
meet with Dean. (NOTE: Frankly, the naming of Dean
as the man who deals with the President on such nnatters
preserves our posture on Executive privilege should Dean
be called as a witness, )
Note:
Have just learned that Baker has publicly announced the appointment
of Fred Tliompson as Chief Minority Counsel. Timmons has rccommend<
George Webster as our candidate.
1247
EXHiBrr No. 34-36
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N G TO N
February 22, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JOHN DEAI
I did not use the prescribed format because I understand
that you do not want this to pass into the channels.
1248
Talking Points for Meeting \vith the Attorney General
Background :
Klcindienst is biding his time u'ntil he returns to private
law practice. He has discussed j'oining several law firms,
and has a particularly attractive offer from one that he
'would probably like to accept.
-- Kleindienst is less than enthusiastic about helping to solve
some of the tough problems ^elated to the forthcoming
Watergate hearings. He doesn't want to get himself
involved in any controversy at this time.
Themorale at the Department of Justice is low because
theyare extremely loyal to Kleindienst, but think the
White House is trying to force him out.
-- Kleindienst is extremely loyal to the President and will
do anything asked of him by the President.
Recommendations :
-- Kleindienst should be asked to remain in office at least
one full year from this date (i. c. , until after the Watergate
hearings liave passed), because the hearings may well
result in a request for additional action by the Department
of Justice. We can't afford bitterness at Justice nor can
we risk a new Attorney General being able to handle some
of the potential problenns.
-- Kleindienst should be asked to follow the hearings closely
and keep us apprised of any potential problems from a
Departn-ient of Justice standpoint.
-- Kleindicnrst should be given the feeling that he is an important
member of the team and it is not merely becaur e of these
hearings that he is being asked to stay on.
1249
Exhibit No. 34-37
the white house
WAS H I N GTO N
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
February 28, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
LARRY HIGBY
JOHN DEAN
JERR
Options for Jeb Magruder
Listed below arc nine possible options for Jeb. Some will break more
china to secure than others; where there are problems, I have so noted
thein.
1. Assistant to the Secretary, or Deputy Under Secretary
of Commerce for Policy Developinent, PA, Level IV. Would replace
current. Special Assistant to the Secretary of Conimerce, Schedule C,
Level V, authorized by E„ O, 11510. Dent is interested and we are
sending Jeb's resume over.
2. Assistant Secretary - Coi-nptroUer of HEW, PA,
Level V. Would require cancellation of E. O. 11251 and reissuance of
an E. O. to make the position a PA. The position has never been
designated in terms of its appointment authority, but is currently
filled by Bruce Cardwell on a career basis (by fiat). Even if the
position were made a PA, Cardwell would still have career rights
to the job. He must be promoted elsewhere and is being considered
for social security position.
3. Deputy Under Secretary of HEW for Management
Operations, PA, Level IV. Would have reporting to him the Assis-
tant Secretaries for Administration (career, AP, Level V) and Comp-
troller (AP, Level V). Would require E. O. and Level IV position
from pool. Could utilize one of two HETW pool levels being cancelled;
Counsellor to the Secretary (E.O. 11550) which is vacant, or Special
Assistant to the Secretary for Health Policy (E.O. 11604) currently
occupied by Roger Egeberg (D-Calif. ) who was "bumped" into that
created position from his post of Assistant Secretary for Health and
1250
Scientific Affairs. This option would have to be approved by Malek
and Weinberger and is not presently planned as an organizational
move. An additional problem would be that Marik, who is going
into the Administration job would probably have difficulties in being ■
layered with Magruder.
4. Special Representative to, the Canal Zone Negotiations,
Level U, PA, carrying the rank of Ambassador. Anderson feels that
State would put up strong resistance to Magruder for this position based
on experience required and the delicate nature of the current negoti-
ations. We should only undertake this option if we're willing to cause
an uproar with Rogers.
5. Director, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, Department
of Interior, PA, Level IV. Would require cancellation of E.O, 11262
and a new one issued in its place. The position is currently a Schedule
C, Level V and is vacant.
6. Associate Director of USIA for Research and Assess-
ment, Schedule C, Level V. Could issue an E.O. making the position
a PA. Currently vacant. Keogh would resist placing Magruder along-
side Strachan on the grounds of not wanting to load his office with
"Watergate problems. "
7. Deputy Director of SBA, Schedule C, Level IV. Could
publish'E, O. making position PA. Currently occupied by Tony Chase
who would be a top flight General Counsel for a large Department or
a Federal Judge. We do not now have a General Counsel position for
Chase although the Commerce job will probably be open within the
next three or four months.
8. National Director, U. S. Savings Bond Program, De-
partment of Treasury, PA, Level IV or V. Would require E.O. and level
from pool. The position is currently a NEA, GS-18 and is vacant. I
doubt Jeb would take this job. .
9. Deputy Chairman and/or Executive Director of the
National Endownmcnt for the Humanities, PA, Level IV. Would re-
quire E.O. and level IV or V from pool. Chairman is a Level III and
does not have a Deputy Chairman/Top Staff Executive. In the twin
National Endowment for the Arts the Chairman (Level III) does have
an NEA, GS-18, Deputy Chairman who serves as the top staff executive.
I doubt Jeb would take this ppsition.
In summary, my top two recommendations would be the Commerce
planning job or the Comptroller job at HEW. All the others would -
create difficulties of one kind or another were we to place Jeb
into them.
1251
Exhibit No. 34-38
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N G TO N
March 5, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES
FROM: JOHN DEAN
SUBJECT: Call from Secretary Dent
Re Jcb Magriider
Secretary Dent called this date to inquire about hiring Jeb.
He asked if there was any unreasonable risk in hiring Jeb.
I responded that I thought Jeb could do an outstanding job
for him. That Jeb had discussed several positions in
government with the White House, but had selected the
position at Comixierce as the one he was most interested in,
I told him that it was possible that Jeb could get soine bad
'publicity in coming weeks, but it should not be long lived.
Dent said he didn't want to make this move blindly, without
my checking. I told hini that Bob Haldeman and I had
discussed the matter and that we tiiought Jeb could do a
good job at Commerce.
1252
Exhibit No. 34-39
DRAFT
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As you l^aiow, in his statement of March 12, 1973, and
in his press conference of March lb, 1VV3, the President has
reiterated his policy that members of the White House staff
will cooperate fully with Committees of the Congress, and will
stand ready to supply relevant information requested by such
committees, all in accordance with the President's constitutional
responsibility to preserve the separation of powers.
Pursuant to the President's policy, in my letter of
March 14 I offered to provide the committee with any information
it might seek from me relevant to the nomination of Mr. Gray
to be Director of the F. B. I. To date, there has been no response
to that offer. However, since individual members of your
committee have made public statements on the floor of the
Senate and on national television requesting that I sxipply certain
information, the President has instructed me to respond
voluntarily to those public requests without waiting for a formal
action by the committee. Specifically, 1 refer to statements
made by Senator Ervin on a national network television program
(Face the Nation, Sunday, March 18, 1973. ) and the statements
made by Senator Robert Byrd in the Senate (Congressional Record,
March 14, 1973. )
1253
Accordingly, I am happy to give to the committee the
benefit of all the facts I know concerning the matters which these
gentlemen have publicly raised.
First , it has been suggested that the White House was
uncooperative and sought to make the investigation difficult for
the F. B. I, This is not true and no one has ever shov/n any
evidence to support that allegation.. The White House sou'g'ht to
fully and coniplctely cooperate with the F. B. I. , the U. S.
Attorney's Office and the Grand Jury investigations of the so-
called Watergate case. All information and witnesses were
furnished as quickly as possible. All witnesses were told to
answer all questions asked of them by the investigators. I knov/
of no effort to withhold any information requested from any
individual.
Second, it has been suggested that the fact that I conducted
an investigation of this matter at the direction of the President
made it inappropriate for me to obtain F. B. I. information
relative to their investigation. To the contrary, in an investi-
gation of this importance it was incunnbent on me to obtain all
available information from every appropriate investigative
resource, and I would have been derelict indeed if I had not
requested information from the F. B. I.
1254
Third, it has been alleged that I in some way influenced
Mr. Gray's conduct of the investigation of the so-called Watergate
case. To the contrary, Mr. Gray infornned me that he had given
instructions to have the most complete and thorough investigation
that the FBI could undertake. I advised Mr. Gray that the
President wanted such an investigation and the White House was
prepared to cooperate in any way possible.
Fourth, Mr. Gray has been criticized for permitting
me to be present during FBI agent interviews of persons at the
White House. It should be understood that at no time, during
any of the interviews, can I recall ever injecting myself into
the interview by cutting off questions, or instructing an inter-
viewee not to answer. I was present at these interviews because
in virtiaally every case the person being interviewed requested
that I be present and in no case did any object. On this question,
I note that Mr. Gray testified that in each of the 61 interviews
of ennployees of the Democratic National Committee one Committee
lawyer was present at the Committee's insistence.
Fifth, it has been alleged tliat I showed FBI interviews
to Mr. Donald Segrctti. This is a totally false allegation. I did
not sliow Mr, Segretti FBI materials at any time. I should add
that the materials Mr. Gray provided me never left my custody
and control, and therefore no one else could have shown Mr.
Segrctti the materials I was given by Mr. Gray,
1255
Sixth, it has been alleged that the materials Mr. Gray-
provided me were shown to persons at the Committee for the
Re-Election of the President in connection with the FBI inter-
views of Mrs. Hoback. This is also totally false and without
foundation, Tlie fact of the matter is 'that I did not even possess
such inforination at the time it is alleged I did. Also, I under-
stand tliat the persons who discussed the fact of Mrs. Hoback' s
interviews with her have publicly slated that they learned that
Mrs, Hoback had confidential interviews with the FBI from
colleagues of Kirs, Hoback at the Re-Election Committee.
Seventh , it has been alleged that my relationship with
Mr, Gordon Liddy should have made me "suspect" to the FBI
insofar as supplying me with information. This charge appears
to be an effort to create guilt by association. The facts, I believe,
speak for themselves. The Committee for the Re-Election of
the President needed a genexal counsel and could not continually
rely on volunteer lawyers. I was asked by Mr, Magruder,
Deputy Campaign Director, if I would give up my own deputy
to serve as General Counsel far the Committee. When I informed
him I needed by deputy, he requested that I assist in finding hini
a counsel. I agreed to assist. Mr.^ Liddy was recommended to
me as a fine lawyer and I passed this r econimcndation on to
1256
Mr. Magrvulcr, Once Mr. Liddy was hired, my staff and I
provided him with background information regarding the relevant
campaign laws that the Committee would have to comply with and
on a few occasions my staff and I had discussions with Mr. Liddy
on matters relating to election law compliance. I might add that
I have recommended countless other lawyers for positions in and
out of government and I also recommended the man who replaced
Mr. Liddy as counsel to the Finance Committee. In short, my
relationship to Mr. Liddy was limited to problems involving
campaign law compliance , and I frankly cannot recall the matter
that Mr. Magruder has testified about regarding discussion of
Mr. Liddy's FBI backgrovmd and its possible usefulness in
intelligence gathering at the time Mr. Magruder interviewed
Mr. Liddy for the job of General Counsel.
Eighth, I can state flatly that everything that was found
in Mr. Hunt's office and safe and sent to my office was turned
over to tlie FBI expeditiously.
Finally , soine questions have been raised regarding
my working relationship with Mr. Colson, who was then a member
of the Wliite House staff.. I am somewhat at a loss to determine
the relevancy of this question. Mr. Colson has stated under oath
^
1257
that he had no knowledge of or involvement in the so-called
Watergate affair. I have had no special working relationship
with Mr, Colson; rather my office's dealings with him have
been as with other White House offices.
Mr. Chairman, in this lctt6r I have been responsive
to the questions which have been publicly raised by members
of your Committee not only on the Senate Floor, but on national
television. For those who honestly seek information, I have
sought to give thein tlie facts as I know them. For those who
want a political side show I suspect my candor will be ignored
and the show will go on. Nevertheless, in accordance with the
President's desire, and consistent with his stated policy, ibixsTisin
ikd:iyx\tii■iii■lg:±HXI^a>3ponIi:tH^a•2>yv:f^IrlJ3aXKX]XEC^£±iox>^clhE>^^
yoti niay coiuit on my continued willingness to supply any relevant
information the Coinmittce may request.
Respectfully submitted.
John W. Dean, III
Counsel to the President
OATH
The foregoing statements are true to the best of my knowledge, so
help me Cod.
96-296 O - 73 - 23
Exhibit No. 34-40
Dean : Is he in. John Dean calling.
Magruder: Hello.
Dean : Hi, Jeb.
Magrudeb: Hello.
Dean : How are you doing?
Magruder : I'm doing fine ; how are you doing?
Dean : Pretty well, incredible.
Magruder: Is it?
Dean : Just incredible.
Magruder : Well the L.A. Times, God, we got splashed all over that one, let me
tell you.
Dean : Is that right?
Magruder : I haven't seen it yet but my friend called me, said Christ you take
up the whole front page.
Dean: Is that right?
Magruder : Yea, you and I, pictures, the whole works.
Dean : I'm taking a bum rap, Jeb.
Magruder : Well I know that.
Dean : That's the incredible thing.
Magruder : We've got to figure — John, I think we gotta just figure out how we
can handle this. I don't know what we — I mean I don't know what we can do
right now, I don't know if there is anything we can do right now.
Dean : We'll just have to take the heat right now until the thing sorts itself out.
I can't conceive of how McCord could have that impression.
Magruder : Now I'll tell you what — John, can we talk here?
Dean : Yea.
Magruder: Okay. Here's what I figure has happened. And I'm positive of this.
One, John, there is absolutely no substantive evidence that McCord could pos-
sibly have in any way, shape or form that could connect anyone other than the
seven of us. Okay.
Dean : Yes.
Magruder: I'm positive of that. Now I've gone right — you know I just went
back through the process, was there anything at all that even could remotely
imply any connection. Okay.
Dean : Y^s.
Magruder : So there is no evidence of what I call documentation. Now what he
probably may have. John, is that when Liddy probably was working up numbers
for his own benefit, and doing that kind of work, he probably used McCord to do
that, because McCord bought all his equipment according to Silberts.
Dean : But Liddy knows damn good and well that the last time that I. for
example, had any conversation with him on that thing was when we walked out
of that office and I told him I could not talk to him about it any further and he
never — he — he never once ever raised it.
Magruder: I'm sure he must have raised — I'm sure thought when he talked to
his friend McCord
Dean : He was a name dropper.
Magruder: He's a name dropper. And I'm sure he said that well you know I
don't really trust this idiot Magruder but Mitchell and Dean and Haldeman are
all behind it and Gordon Strachan, I'm sure that obviously Mitchell's name will
come up and I would take a guess if he still said "others" if you noticed, which
is pure
Dean : That's right, that's right.
Magruder: So he is going to be talking probably about ^litchell and I would
take a guess either Gordon Strachan or Colson. That would be ray guess.
Dean : Just incredible.
Magruder : So. one. he had no substantive evidence, I'm positive of that : tw-o,
what he is probably referring to is simply discussions that Liddy had with him
as they sat around drinking at the Watergate. You know — and only that. McCord
never met with either myself or anyone else at our committee.
(1258)
1259
Dean : Yes.
Mageudee : Never, so there is no personal discussion lie would have of any kind.
Dean : Well I thought maybe I was losing my mind. But I know — I know what
I know and I know that one, I tried to turn the damn thing off.
Mageudee: Right.
Dean : I know that I'd told Haldeman after that meeting that it had to be
turned off. Now what happened in the interim 1 don't have any idea, I don't want
to know, I can only opine and speculate.
Mageuder. I would hope so, John, of course on that meeting that I have testi-
fied that that meeting that we've had with Liddy and Mitchell was simply on
the general counsel's job and so on.
Dean. I understand.
Mageuder. I mean that's important I think, you know for Mitchell's and my
Dean. Well I don't plan to go out and talk in any forum.
Magruder. You know, if we ever get to the grand jury stage, I think they —
I have testified that that meeting that you and 1 had was one meeting, not two,
and that we had a meeting with Mitchell that just went over — since you had been
helping me as a counsel — that we just went over the general framework of the
job and the new law and those kind of problems, the typical cursory sort of
post-employment meeting. That that was the extent of it.
Dean. Well I was just trying to get straight in my own mind, you know, in
case a guy like Liddy goes and starts giving his side of the story and
Magruder. Well, if he did, of course what he would say is . You know
that's one thing I would hoi>e we'd be working on and that part is Liddy.
Dean. Yea.
Magruder. But McCord's information would only be hearsay, it would only
have been from Liddy.
Dean. Okay, Jeb, well all we can do is sit tight right now.
Mageuder. A couple of other points, John, let me ask you. Parkinson wants to
sit down with me and is going to represent me and as far as I'm concerned that's
appropriate.
Dean. I think that that's a personal decision of yours, by yourself, and that
you know he's knowledgable and I think that's quite a good idea.
Mageuder. AVell I mean, you know, from my standpoint, it would seem that
somebody who is well aware of the situation and it would look funny it would
seem to me if I changed attorneys.
Dean. I agree, I think that's a good idea for you.
Magruder. And he is certainly qualified.
Dean. And I do think you ought to have counsel too.
Magruder. What?
Dean. I do think you ought to have a lawyer who's representing you per se.
Mageuder. Well that would be what he would — you mean another one?
Dean. Well I mean no — I mean like Parkinson.
Mageudee. Right, well that's what I thought because I think for sure we're
going to have to — I'm going to have to rely on you or whatever when we have
to go down to the grand jury.
Dean. I would imagine that day is coming.
Mageudee. That's right. Of course, I think we have a hell of a case on the
bond and who placed the bond for him and the written statement, how well it
was done and why he waited until the last day. To me that makes it very clear.
Dean. I don't, I'm not aware of what you are talking about.
Mageuder. McCord. In other words, where did McCord get his bond. You
know, he got it from a Democratic lawyer. He's got a new lawyer. He's obviously
made a deal and a person in that position obviously is panicked facing 8 years
or whatever he is facing. And he'll throw out names all over the place, John.
Dean. I suspect that's true.
Magruder. Just because he knows that's what they want to hear. If you read
his letter, his letter is a perfect letter obviously not written by an individual
but by a lawyer.
Dean. I wonder if he drafted it?
Magruder. And he's talking about fifth amendment, sixth amendments rights,
all sorts of things that .
Dean. Yea, okay, just hang in.
Magruder. Yea, well that's what I planned on doing and I just wanted to
check with you from your standpoint. But I'm positive there's no substantive
evidence of any kind.
Dean. Okay.
1260
I
\
I
\
^
^
W
Q
<
Exhibit No. 34^-41
Statement of charges against W/H and CREP oflScials.
Remarks putting charges in perspective — Items which RN has been subject
to — and things he is aware of from a life in politics.
Rebuttal of charges from information that has been reported to him and state-
ments made by others who have been charged.
Polities of the present situation —
— Press is publicly charging people on hearsay
— Senate committee has prejudged situation
— FBI has been falsely charged
— DOJ is .-^aid to be less than diligent
No man is above the law, but no man can get a fair hearing in the present
situation. Men are being charged with crimes, when I know they have not
committed them.
The public is entitled to the facts, and the men who have been alleged to be
involved are entitled to fair and just treatment. Accordingly I have today con-
vened an independent panel that will have an unprecedented power to examine
the charges and mete out justice.
(1) Every individual who has been charged with involvement in con-
nection with the Watergate affair has agreed to submit to interrogation of
the panel — and, upon request of the panel on the individual — to submit to
a polygraph test.
(2) These people have also agreed to waive any right to trial by jury,
5th Amend., etc. in that the panel is impowered to cause removal from fed.
employment, levy fines, and if the facts warrant — impose personal sanctions.
(3) The same offer shall be available to the 7 persons who have been
indicted, tried & pleaded guilty in the Watergate case. If they choose to
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the panel — and I am hopeful they
will — they shall be treated as others. If they do not, all information they
have provided or plan to provide, will be considered by the panel in its
deliberation of the whole situation.
(4) No judgments will be made by the panel until it has received all the
facts it deems necessary and it may call upon any federal investigative
agency for assistance in assembling such facts.
(5) This panel shall make a full public report of its findings and the
reasons for its actions with regard to such individual submitting to its
jurisdiction.
Note : This printed matter Is from handwritten notes by Mr. Dean which were not
legible enough for photography. The original copy is retained in committee files.
(1261)
1262
Exhibit No. 34-42
March 29, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
At approximately 4:00 P.M. on Thursday, March 29,;.
1973, Mr. Peter Maroulis spoke with Mr. John Dean over the
telephone from this office. Mr. Maroulis stated that in ' -
response to a request from Mr. Dean for a statement under',.
oath from Mr. Maroulis' client, .G. Gordon Liddy, as to the
non-involvement of Mr. John Dean in the Watergate matter,
that he, Mr. Maroulis, had advised his client that such a
statement would not be appropriate at this time for the
following reasons: -\-'X:^
1. That if Mr. Liddy were to make such a staterrtent,
it was conceivable that it could later be construed against
Mr. Liddy to the extent that a selective speaking out on the
subject waived his Fifth Amendment privilege.
2. That to give a statement as to one specific * •
individual only could be detrimental to other individuals
who were not mentioned.
3. Mr. Maroulis also stated that his client wished;.
to convey to Mr. Dean his personal desire to be helpful in •,
this matter and to assure him that his. decision reached '.at' -
this time was predicated on the legal advice of his counsel.
P.L.O'B. .V. , ;,
gk
Exhibit No. 34-43
Pre June 17th
(I) White House involvement and Knowledge of Liddy's Intelligence Operation
at CREP.
During the entire first four years of the administration the President had
been subjected to mass clemonstratious relating to the war in Vietnam. I do not
remember exactly when, but believe it was in June or July of 1971, that HRH
asked me to make a recommendation as to how the Re-Election Committee should
handle the problem of demonstrators. HRH raised this with me, because one of
my White House responsibilities has been to keep informed regarding potential
demonstrations that might affect the President. I had been involved in this area
while at the DOJ and when I went to the White House my oflfice served as a
liaison oflSce for metropolitan police/FBI/DOJ and SS intelligence regarding
demonstrations.
Haldeman and Ehrlichman have always been critical of the insuflSciency and
weakness in the intelligence that has been provided to the White House by
various federal agencies regarding demonstration activities. The intelligence
always seemed to be too little and too late. While the evidence would appear
that the demonstrations were well orchestrated and well financed, no one could
every [sic] find hard information as to who was behind it and what motivation
might exist other than the obvious anti-war theme.
The demonstrations were having a dual impact on the President. First, it made
the atmosphere of public opinion much more diflScult for the President to negoti-
ate an honorable peace in Vietnam and secondly, when the government dealt
firmly with the demonstrators we would be charged with oppressive tactics even
though the demonstrators were seeking to tie the government into knots.
There were several efforts to improve the government's ability to gather in-
telligence regarding demonstrations, but these efforts really never accomplished
much. For example, before I came to the White House, a study group headed
by Tom Huston had re-examined the entire structure of the domestic intelligence
security operation, but the plan that was ultimately developed by the study
group was vetoed by Hoover because of the fact that it would have involved the
FBI assuming less than a dominant position in the intelligence community. A
compromise arrangement was worked out with Hoover to establish within the
Department of Justice a coordinating team of all the domestic intelligence
agencies but the product was less than satisfactory and often the newspapers
appeared to have more information than the intelligence gatherers.
When Haldeman would read the reports regarding demonstrations he would —
and rightly so — express continual dissatisfaction. I assume it was because of the
weaknesses of the government system that Haldeman urged that consideration
be given to the campaign committee developing its own capability to deal with
demonstrators in the forthcoming Presidential campaign. Not only did we expect
problems for Presidential anoearances, but it w-as also felt that the demonstrators
would seek to cause extremely serious problems for the Republican 1972 Conven-
tion with the aim of creating a similar situation as that which occurred at the
1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago.
It was suggested that the i)erson who head up this operation be a lawyer who
could also serve as general counsel to the Committee and it was not anticipated
that the intelligence operation would be a particularly consuming activity. Jeb
Magruder indicated to me that he would like to have my Deputy Counsel, Mr.
Fred Fielding, assume the position of General Counsel and the man to be con-
cerned with demonstrations and security. I discussed the matter with Fielding,
but we agreed that it would handicap my oflice's operations greatly if he were to
leave the office during the chaos of a campaiem year. I informed Magruder that
I could not let Fielding go, because I couldn't get along without him. Magruder
then asked if I would recommend some other lawyer who could fill the function.
I next discussed this with Bud Krogh because Bud is a lawyer and had had
responsibility for demonstrations prior to my arrival at the White House. I
suggested that David Young, who worked for Bud, might make an excellent
(1263)
1264
man for the job, but Krogh informed me that it was not feasible because Young
was too busy on the declassification project. Krogh did, however, suggest Gordon
Liddy as a man who could do the job. He told me that Liddy was a fine lawyer,
had prepared some excellent legal documents for him and that he was a fast
study on the law, and he was quite confident that he would quickly grasp the
campaign laws. Krogh also told me that Liddy had an FBI background and
assumed that his background with the FBI would qualify him for dealing with
the demonstration problems during the campaign. Krogh informed me that he
would have to check with Ehrlichman before he signed off on his recommendation
which he did and after that I informed Mitcheell [sic] and Magruder that I had a
recommendation.
I frankly do not recall if I explained the job to Liddy or if Bud Krogh explained
the job to Liddy. However, I do recall that I informed Liddy that one phase of
the position would involve his tracking on domestic intelligence regarding dem-
onstrations and the threat of demonstrators to the Republican Convention. I
informed him that I was not an expert in intelligence and did not have any idea
how such operations were conducted, but he assured me that he was familiar with
intelligence gathering and would be able to handle the post. I arranged for John
Mitchell to meet with Gordon Liddy on November 24, 1971, for a job interview. I
attended the meeting and attached is a agenda that Liddy had prepared for the
meeting and passed out at the meeting. As I recall the meeting, it was a normal
job interview type meeting in which Mitchell asked Liddy about his background
and his knowledge of the election laws. I had already informed Liddy that I
would do everything possible to assist him in becoming familiar with the election
laws, including the new election law, the passage of which was imminent.
Liddy thought I could be very helpful to him in getting geared up with regard
to the election laws, that they were complex, that they must be followed to the
letter. I do not recall any discussion of intelligence operations at this meeting
other than the fact that Liddy said he would put together the plan for Mr.
Mitchell's approval. The interview also involved discussions in some detail
regarding salary and title, which were agreed upon but I am unable to recall the
specific salary although I do recall Mitchell agreed that Liddy .--hould be called
the General Counsel.
After this meeting, I recall that Magruder requested that I bring Liddy over
for an interview with him in that Mitchell had said to him that he would have
the final say as to whether or not Liddy was acceptable to him because he was
the person who would have the working relationship with Liddy. I explained
this to Liddy and Magruder asked that we come over on Friday, December 8,
1972 (?) at which time Magruder interviewed Liddy also. Again, there was no
discussion of Liddy's intelligence responsibilities other than Jeb's expressed
concern regarding the demonstration threat to the Convention. Liddy indicated
that he thought he could be helpful in getting information regarding demonstra-
tors for Magruder and that he would draw up a plan. At that meeting Magruder
agreed to hire Liddy and asked him to start as quickly as possible.
The next contact that I had with Liddy was through a man in my ofiice,
David Wilson, who I had instructed to provide Liddy with all background mate-
rial on the election laws and to tell Liddy some of the areas that he should have
particular concern with.
On January — , 1972, Magruder requested that I attend a meeting in Mitchell's
office with Gordon Liddy. At the time I went to the meeting, I had no idea of
the subject matter to be discussed, but when we were going over to the meeting
together, I learned that Gordon was going to present his proposal for an intel-
ligence operation. Liddy had urejiared a series of charts to explain his plan but
I frankly had some trouble following it as Mitchell later told me he did, because
all of the operation*^ were in unusual code names. However, I do reciH 'ome of
the items that were in the plan. I recall that it called for a $1 million budget,
and included such recommended rajiacities as the ability to kidnaj) demon-
stration leaders in an effort to throw the demonstrators into disarray, strong
arm teams, teams to infiltrate operations with demonstrators, and the ability
to conduct, what Liddy called the most sophisticated electronic surveillance in the
world. The plan also set forth how convention security could be handled, and
general security for other aspects of the campaign to deal with demonstrators.
As the plan was unfolded I felt sorry for Liddy because he thought he was
providing the answers for the intelligence needs, but I kiipw that .Tolin Mitchell
would never agree to any such proposal or plan. I didn't know how Mitchell
would turn it off, but knowing John Mitchell, I knew he would not blast Liddy
1265
out of the room, rather would subtly tell him that this was not what he had in
mind. In fact, the meeting terminated with Mitchell telling Liddy that this is
not what he had in mind, that it was a little exhorbitant, and more extensive
than anything that would be needed. Liddy i*aid that he understood and would
provide another plan.
After the meeting, I talked with both Mitchell and Haldeman and Magruder
and informed them that such a plan was disaster. I advised Jeb that he had
better guide Liddy before the matter goes further.
On January — , 1972, Jeb requested I attend another meeting with Mitchell and
Liddy and himself. I had not at any time discussed this plan further with him,
although I do recall him telling me that he was going to totally revi.>^e it. I
arrived at this second meeting very late and Liddy was in the process of present-
ing his revised plan.
After sitting in the meeting for approximately 15 or so minutes and hearing
the same sort of things starting to come out again, as have been contained in the
earlier plan, I could see that Mitchell was very upset, but trying to maintain his
composure. I must also say that I was frankly quite upset and decided that I had
best interject myself into the matter in an effort to cut it off from any further
discussion. I told Liddy and the others that the things that were being discussed
here could not be discussed with a man who is the Attorney General of the
United States and if there was going to be any intelligence operation, it would
have to be taken up at another time. I felt that I got Mitchell off the .spot without
embarrassing Liddy who agreed that this would be disciLssed sometime after
Mitchell had come over to the Re-Election Committee. Again, I felt sorry for
Liddy, and I felt no one had given him any guidance as to what was or was not
expected of him, but I did not believe it was my role to get any further involved
other than to attempt to stop what it saw developing.
After the meeting, I informed Liddy that I could never discuss his intelligence
operation with him further, and that he .should not look for me for any guidance
on the matter. I informed him that our dealings would have to be limited .strictly
to matters of election law and Liddy said he would honor that request. I never
discussed the subject with Gordon Liddy again.
Also, after that meeting. I informed Haldeman of what had transpired in
Mitchell's office and the fact that I had interjected myself into the meeting in an
effort to cut it oft'. I told Haldeman that I bad informed Liddy that I would not
discuss this subject with him further, and that if anything like this was develop-
ing in the White House, I had to stay totally out of it. Haldeman fully agreed
and told me that I should not become involved in any way with the Re-Election
Committee intelligence operation and I never did.
I never received any intelligence from the Re-Election Committee and I cannot
recall ever providing the government intelligence regarding demonstrations to
the Re-Election Committee, rather, I provided all such information directly to
Haldeman via Strachan. I have no knowledge before the incident which occurred
on June 17th, as to what was or was not done regarding Liddy's intelligence
gathering functions. And I never discussed this subject vnth any other person
at the Re-E'ection Committee before June 17th.
POST June 17th
(1) The Dean Investigation
I landed in San Francisco on June 18th, having been out of the country to
give a speech on drug law enforcement. I called Fred Fielding of my office to
check in and he informed me of the news story regarding the break in at the
DXC headquarters.
I arrived in Washington, D. C. late in the afternoon of June 18th and Fielding
informed me that one of the men arrested had a letter with a check signed by
Howard Hunt in his possession. I realized at that point that I would be asked
to assemble all of the facts so that the White House could be fully informed as
to what had transpired and how it might affect the President. Having been on
an airplane for approximately 25 hours, I did nothing further than evening.
On Monday morning, after reading all the news accounts of the incident, I
spoke with John E. who instructed me to get the facts together and report to
him. I called the A.G. to ask him what facts he knew and he .said that both the
metropolitan police and the FBI were investigating. He also told me that Gordon
Liddy and Powell Moore had tracked him down on Sunday, June 18th, at Burning
Tree CC and Liddv had .said he must talk with him about the man who had been
arrested at the DXC. The A.G. said he refused to talk with Liddy about the
matter.
1266
I then called Liddy and requested he come to my office. When he came over I
suggested we take a walk. I asked him what he knew about the incident which
had occurred at the DNC and he told me that this was his operation that had
gone bad. He told me that he had been pushed into doing it, when he did not
want to do it. He said that they had been in the DXC before and the bug they
had placed in the DXC was not transmitting properly, so they were seeking to
correct it. He also said that they had observed what appeared to be stolen
classified documents in the DXC and had been instructed to make copies of them.
I asked Liddy if anyone at the White House was involved and he told me no.
I did not ask him who pushed him to do this, but he intimated it was Magruder.
I did not question him further about the incident.
Liddy also expressed concern for those who had been apprehended and I told
him there was nothing I could do. He said he understood. He told me that he
deeply regretted that the matter had occurred and ho planned to remain totally
silent. As we parted I rememl)er he said you can count on me to be a soldier.
I told him that I was trying to ascertain the seriousness of the problem — in that
it was obviously a political bomb shell — and that I would not have any further
contact with him. He said lie understood and we parted.
During the days and weeks that followed 1 discussed the incident with everyone
who I thought might have any knowledge or involvement. Set forth below are the
findings from these conversations.
Chuck Colson
Because of Colson's relationship with Hunt, I thought he may have either
knowledge or involvement in the matter, but Colson assured and reassured me
that he had no involvement whatsoever.
Colson told me that he was aware of the fact that Hunt was working with
Liddy. He said that in late January — early February (V), 1972, Hunt and Liddy
came by his ofiice late one afternoon to visit him. He said that it was a casual
"stop-by" type visit and during the course of their conversation Hunt and Liddy
mentioned to Colson that they had an intelligence oi>eration plan, but they could
not get anyone at CREP to focus on it and sign off. Colson says that they em-
plored upon him to call CREP to see if he could get some action. Colson stated
that he called Magruder and told Magruder that he did know what Hunt and
Liddy had for a plan, but they should not be left hanging. Someone should focus
on it and make a decision one way or the other.
Colson told me that the only time he requested Hunt to do anything for him
after that was during the ITT hearings, when he requested Hunt to go to Denver
to intervie,w Dita Beard. Colson states that he wanted to know if Beard had
really written the famous memo and decided to sent Hunt to find out. When Hunt
was in X^^lson's office, Colson asked him how he was going to pay for the trip.
Hunt then telephoned someone and said he needed $1,000 and solved the problem.
Magruder has intimated to me that Colson had more involvement than Colson
says. Magruder says that they let Liddy and Hunt proceed with their intelligence
operation becau.se Magnider was concerned that Colson might try to take over
the operation himself and they did not want Colson involved. However, ^lagruder
feels that Colson was aware of everything Hunt and Liddy did and that Colson,
in fact, gave Hunt assignments from time to time. Magruder says that the
Brigham Young student — Gregory — was working for Hunt to get scheduling in-
formation for Colson. Magruder says he had no use for such information, but
Colson did.
Magruder also says that he received more than one call from Colson telling
him to approve the Himt and Liddy intelligence operation, and it was Colson
who was pushing to get something done. Colson denies this.
Colson received a letter from Howard Hunt on . (Attach-
ment This letter would appear to indicate that Hunt is saying that
Colson was not involved in the incident at the DXC headquarters.
Colson received a telephone call from Howard Hunt on Dur-
ing the course of that conversation Hunt states that Colson had nothing to do
with the incident at the DXC headquarters. Colson recorded the conversation.
(Attachment , )
Oolson has stated under oath on two occasions that he was not involved in
the incident. These statements were contained in depositions — one for the federal
grand jury investigation and the other (Attachment ) in connection
with the civil lawsuit filed by the DNC.
1267
JE
I found that B had absolutely no knowledge regarding the intelligence opera-
tiuns at the CREP. Bud Krogh had discussed with E that he was recommending
Liddy to serve as General Counsel at the CREP and the fact that Liddy might
also be given responsibilities for intelligence regarding demonstrations that
would affect the campaign. However, E had, to the best of my inquiries, no
knowledge of anything Liddy was engaged in after his departure from the
Domestic Council staff. I also found that E had only incidental dealings with
Liddy while he was on the Domestic Counsel staff and knew of his work in the
area of gun control, narcotics, and that he worked for David Young and Bud
Krogh on the problem of leaks and matters relating to national security.
E only recalls one occasion meeting with Howard Hunt, in connection with
an interview Hunt had conducted with a former CIA operative and relating to
a matter of national security. E was aware of the fact that Hunt had been
l>laced on tlie White House stnff as a consultant. Colson had recommended re-
taining Hunt in connection with the Pentagon Papers matter and E-^aceording
to Colson — told Colson to place him on his (Colson's) staff.
Bud Krogh
Krogh has testified twice under oath regarding his relationship with Liddy and
Hunt. Once before the federal grand jury investigating the incident at the DNC
headquarters, and once at his confirmation hearings (Attachment ).
My independent inquiry confirmed that Krogh had absolutely no knowledge
regarding any activities of Hunt or Liddy once they departed from the White
House. When Krogh recommended Liddy to me as a person who would make
an excellent General Counsel and as a person who could assist the CREP in
keeping abreast of the problems that demonstrations might cause, the campaign,
he told me that Liddy has an outstanding legal mind. He cited several examples
of legal briefs Liddy had prepared and told me that he was confident that Liddy
could quickly and thoroughly grasp the campaign laws.
1268
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1294
EXfflBIT No. 34-44
- i am sunmiarizing in this memorandum the
results of my separate investigation of the so-
called Segretti case, particularly as it relates
to members of the White House staff.
I think this report is important at this
time because of the increasing tendency in the
public media
to use the term Watergate as an umbrella covering
a variety of unrelated campaign activities including activit
participated in by members of the Administration and
White House staff- B'ecause the Watergate involved
proven criminal activity, irirztriitiB the word thus
becomes a tool for establishing guilt by
..©s^oc.iation.. This., technlg-ue. has beati. used with
peurticular effect in connection- with the Segretti
case.
The fact is, of course, that neither
Segretti nor his activities had any connection
with the Watergate. This is a conclusion not
.only of the FBI , but it appears to have been the
conclusion- of the grand jury and the United States
Attorney. It is also the clear conclusion which I
have reached as the result of my own investigation.
In view of the forthcoming hearings of the
Ervin Committee with the attendant media coverage,
I thought it appropriate to submit this separate
report on the Segretti matter at this time.
1295
The only two members of the White House Staff who
have had any contact with Donald Segretti since your
Administration came into office are Dwight Chapin, former
Deputy Assistant to the President and Gordon Strachan,
former Staff Assistant.
Both Chapin and Strachan had been close friends of
•Segretti when all three were undergraduates at U.S.C.
some twelve years ago, and all three were active in campus ;
politics as members of a "reform" group. Their more
recent contact with Segretti stemmed from their con-
clusion, based primarily on Chapin 's experience in
earlier campaigns, that in 1972 your candidacy would
be" subject to the kind of political tricks, harassment
and intelligence activities which seem to have been a
part of the American political process for more than
a century. (For example, history records that Abraham
Lincoln's nomination in 1860 might not have been brought
about except for the circulation of thousands of bogus
tickets to the Convention Hall in Chicago, which enabled
the Lincoln supporters to pack the galleries and stampfede
the Convention with cries of "We want Abe.") More recently
the most celebrated practitioner of these political tactics
has been Dick Tuck, whoso clandestine activities plagued
not only your campaigns but other Republican campaigns
since 1960. The records filed with the office of the
1296
Coiaptroller General pursuant to the new campaign statutes
reveal that Mr. Tuck was officially on the payroll of the
McGovern campaign committee for at least part of the
primary period during 1972. However, the activities
for which he was paid have never surfaced.
In any event, it was Mr. Tuck who inspired
Chapin and Strachan to contact Mr. Segretti, and the
narrative of their connection with him is as follows:
1. Chapin and Strachan recall that during the period
of May or June, 1971 they had had conversations
in which they concluded that this time around it
would be wise and proper for the Republican
campaign organization to have a "Dick Tuck" of
its own. At about this time, Strachan heard
by mail or phone from Segretti that he had
returned from Army service in Vietnam and was
soon to return to civilian life. Segretti
inquired of Strachan whether there might be an
employment opportunity, for him in the Government
1297
or in the forthcoming political campaign. Strachan
discussed this matter with Chapin and both agreed
that Segretti, whom they knew to be imaginative
and energetic from their days in college, would
be an ideal candidate for the role they had in
mind.
2. Shortly thereafter, Chapin telephoned Segretti
and suggested he meet with Chapin and Strachan
in Washington. They did meet in Washington in
late June or early July, 1971, and Chapin and
Strachan discussed with Segretti the kind of role
they had in mind. They made reference to Dick
Tuck and cited the kind of harassment of the
campaign activities of opposition candidates
which Tuck has engaged in over the years. At one
point, Strachan described the type of activity as
"black advance", a term used in political campaigning
to describe the planning of measures to harass the
opposition or to detect and guard against harassment
by the opposition.
3. In this discussion and in at least one other sub-
sequent discussion, Chapin and/or Strachan advised
Segretti that once he undertook this employment
he would travel about on his own and would make his
own decisions as to the activities he. might engage in.
1298
It is my conclusion that this is the way
Segretti did in fact operate, and neither
Chapin or Strachan "directed" anything he may
have undertaken or done.
4. On this occasion, and on at least one other
occasion, Chapin and Strachan reminded Segretti, .
a lawyer, that he should not engage in any activity
that could be considered illegal in any way.
5. Segretti stated that he would think the matter
over, and about two v/eeks later, he telephoned
either Chapin or Strachan to say that he was
interested in going ahead. At about this point
in time, Strachan talked with W. and suggested
that the Republicans would need a person v/ho
could engage in covert activities and intelligence,
and described the proposed role as a Republican
Dick Tuck. Strachan stated that he and Chapin
had a qualified candidate for the assignment, an
old 6ollege friend who had engaged in campus
politics with them at U.S.C. W. agreed with the
proposal and told Strachan that he and Chapin
should go ahead and implement it. W. was not given
the name or identity of Segretti, never met or
communicated with Segretti or received any reports
from that point on.
1299
Strachan told Chapin that their proposal had
received a go-ahead from W.
6. At about this time, Herbert Kalmbach met with
Strachan/ and Strachan advised him of the plan
to hire a young lawyer. Strachan did not describe
the proposed duties except to indicate there would
be considerable travel involved. Strachan and
Kalmbach concluded that an appropriate salary for
a lawyer of this age and experience would be at
a rate of $16,000 per year.
Shortly thereafter, Chapin telephoned Kalmbach,
who had returned to California, gave Kalmbach
Segretti's name and phone number, and requested
Kalmbach to work out the arrangements for compen-
sation. Chapin did not know what those arrangements
would be, Kalmbach did telephone Segretti who
came to Kalmbach 's office in Newport Beach. They
agreed on $16,000 plus expenses.
7. Kalmbach states that he made several payments to
Segretti, most of them in cash, that these payments
were made during the period from September, 1971 to
March, 1972 and the total amount representing both
1300
salary and expenses was between thirty and
forty thousand dollars. Kalmbach states that
the source of these funds was contributions
received prior to the enactment of the election
law which became effective April 7, 1972. Kalmbach
has stated that he recalls meeting Segretti in
person only twice.
8. Shortly thereafter, Chapin was in California
and met Segretti for lunch. Segretti asked
how he should get started, and Chapin suggested
of the subject
that "to get a feel"/ he visit primary states
and learn what he could about the political
process and about the campaign activities of
the primary candidates. Chapin then recited
to Segretti the list of primary states and
there was a general discussion of political
strategy.
Shortly thereafter, Segretti began his travels
which continued through June of .1972. During
that ten or eleven month period, Chapin saw him
in person two times in Washington and once in
Portland, Oregon. The Oregon meeting had been
suggested by Chapin because the President was
making a visit to Portland, and it was expected
1301
that there would be hostile demonstrations, and
there were. It was Chapin's view that it would
be helpful for Segretti to see first hand how
advance plans are implemented and how logistic
and crowd problems are handled.
As to other communication with Segretti, Chapin has
stated that he heard from him not more than every
two or three weeks, usually a note or an envelope
containing a clipping referring, to some humorous
campaign incident. There was an occasional phone
call, but more often than not, Chapin was out
of his office or tv;oo busy to take it.
It was in the fall of 1971 when the President
designated Chapin to be in charge of the arrangements
for the President's visit to the Peoples Republic
of China, and to head the team which would make two
advance trips there and later accompany the Presidertt.
In order to prepare for the trips, Chapin moved
into an office in the air raid shelter in the sub-
basement and was relieved of other duties. His
three trips to China took place
and , •
Upon the completion of the Presidential trip to
- Pekin, the President designated Chapin to perforin
5-296 O - 73 - 26
1302
the same function in connection with the
President's trip to Moscow, Iran and Poland, with
a stop-over in Austria. Making these plans became
a time consuming occupation. He led an advance
trip and accompanied
the President May to May ^ .
Chapin states that during most of the active
primary season in the first half of 1972 he was
either out of the country, or far too occupied
to be able to direct of have meaningful communication
with Segretti, even if he desired to do so, which
he did not.
11, During these same ten or eleven months, Mr. Strachan
was almost totally out of touch with Segretti.
During 1972, he recalls no communication at all
until after June 17 when Segretti telephoned Strachan
to tell him that he had had a request from the FBI
for an interview,
12. Following that phone call, Segretti came to
Washington and met with Strachan and me. I advised
Segretti to return to California, contact the FBI,
and arrange to be interviewed by them. This was
the first time I had ever seen Segretti, and I was
1303
unaware of his existence until Strachan advised
me of his phone' call and of his desire to meet
with me.
In August, just before the Republican National
Convention at Miami Beach, I received a phone
call from Segretti who advised me that he had nov/
been subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury
which was investigating the Watergate case. At
his request, I met with him very briefly and
advised him that he should answer all questions
asked by the grand jury, and answer them truthfully,
I never showed him any FBI reports or any other
documents .
13. FBI reports which had been furnished to me never
were. out of my custody, so I can also state that
none was shown to Segretti by any other member of
the White House staff.
1304
CONCLUSIONS:
1, Neither Segretti nor any of the activities
he is alleged to have engaged in had any
connection with the Watergate case.
2, Neither Chapin nor Strachan engaged in any
illegal activity.
3. Chapin and Strachan were responsible for
the hiring of Segretti and they arranged
for him to receive a salary and expense
money.
4. Neither Chapin nor Strachan "directed"
Segretti 's activities, and their information
as to what his actual activities were, was
fragmentary and infrequent. In the initial
phase, however, they provided him guidance as
to the kind of activity he might engage in,
namely, the type of harassment of rival candidates
which, for better or worse, has long been a part
of the TVraerican political cEimpaigns and which is
exemplified by the type of activity conducted
against Republican candidates by persons like Dick Tu>.
1305
>. Chapin gave Segretti suggestions and guidance
as to what states he should visit and specifically
urged him to visit New Hampshire, Florida and
California.
>. Chapin and/or Strachan did say to Segretti that
one objective of his activity should be to create
such confusion among the primary candidates that
it would be difficult for the Democratic Party
to come back together after the Convention.
7. In their original discussions Chapin and Strachan
suggested to Segretti it would sometimes be ad-
visable to recruit local assistance, either on
volunteer or paid basis. If Segretti did recruit
any persons to assist him, this was not reported
by Segretti to either Chapin or Strachen.
8. There is no evidence that the so-called Canuck
letter about Senator Muskie was inspired directly
or indirectly by Segretti. Contrary to the report
in the Washington Post, Deputy Press Secretary Ken
Clawson had no connection whatever with the letter
and no advance knowledge of it.
1306
9. Kalmbach had no connection with Segretti
or his activities other than to make the payments
to Segretti which he described in his statements •
to the FBI.
10. W. gave his approval in principle to the
proposition that the Republican side should have
a "Dick Tuck" of its own, but he did not know
who that person v;as to be, and had no knowledge
of his subsequent activities.
11. Beginning in early 1972, Segretti had contact
with E. Howard Hunt and may have had some relation-
ship with him in Segretti 's activities in the
field. This contact with Hunt had nothing whatever
to do with the fact that Hunt was separately involved
in the burglary and wiretapping at the Watergate.
Neither Chapin nor Strachan had any contact with
Hunt at any time.
12. The concern of Chapin and Strachan that hostile
activities would be conducted against the President
in his campaign appearances proved to be well
founded. In every campaign stop, Mr. Nixon was
confronted with organized hecklers, hostile or obscene
1307
signs, and consistent attempts to drown out
his voice so that his audience could not hear
him. In San Francisco, his appearance was
greeted by organized violence which caused
extensive damage in and around the hotel where
the President was speaking. And, at the
Republican Convention, the unlawful disturbances
in the streets of Miami Beach were serious and
highly organized.
1308
Exhibit No. 34-45
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES April 12, 1973
Re: Meeting with John Mitchell
Wasliington, D, C. Law Office
Time: 1:00 - 2:20 PM •
April 10, 1973
Mitchell had called the day before requesting that I meet with
him in Washington. E and II both told me I should meet with him
to tell him that I would be going before the grand jury. Accordingly,
I ag-reed to the meeting, after having so advised my counsel.
The meeting began at approximately 1:00 PM and after an
exchange of pleasantries about N. Y. vs. Washington weather, I told
Mitchell that I thought it would be inappropriate to discuss testimony
as it might relate to my appearance before the grand jury.
I told him that I was aware of the fact that he hoped that I
would not appear before tlic grand jury, but my options were limited.
I then told hiin my potential options.
___ Take tlic 5th Amendment. I told him I thought this wovild
not only hurt ine personally, but that it would also hurt the President.
I also said that the government would undoubtedly ii-ximunize me
and force my testimony.
-- I told him that I had fully explored the lawyer-client
privilege and that it just would not hold water. In fact, I thought
it would create niore problems tlian it might resolve. Also, I said
that Sirica lias already rejected it in this case twice and would
undoubtedly do it again should I invoke it.
-- I told him that executive privilege could only be invoked by
the President and he had already announced that he would not invoke
it with regard to White House staff appearing before the grand jury.
Mitchell suggested that I involve it myself and refuse to testify. I
told him that such action would put me in contempt of court, and I
preferred the basement of the Senate (with bean soup) to the D. C.
jail. Mitchell seemed to express some hope tlvat the President might
invoke executi\c privilege on inc alone -- to be consistent with liis
position on me vis-a-vis the Congress.
1309
-- I told him llic present thinking at the White House was that
I should testify before the grand jury. I said I appreciate that my
testimony could cause hiin problems, and because of my personal
feeling toward him 1 found this a dreaded situation.
Mitchell asked mo to review once again the seqvience of meetings
in his Department of Justice office in January and Febrilary, which I .
did. He indicated lliat tliere may have been discussion at those meetings
of election laws. I did not respond.
.Mitchell also asked me what I would say about the post June 17th
activities and I related two matters to him, i. e. , the fact that he
requested me to arrange with E and H to use Kalmbach and his
several requests that I liavc H authorize the use of the $350,000.
He made no comment on this at all.
I also expressed to Mitchell that I felt this entire matter was
most damaging to the P and that it had to end. I told him that it was
personally ruining iny ov/n life, and I was somewhat unhappy being
in the middle of something I had tried to prevent from occurring in
the first instance. I told him that I thought the truth was going to
emerge and I personally was not concerned about the truth. I also
told hiin that I !iad learned that Liddy had had soine limited off-the-
record conversations v.dth the U. S. Attorney's office, but I did not
know the substance of the conversations.
I told Mitchell that I hope that my testimony would not start
some sort of "pissing match" between foriner conamittee people and
the White House -- or within the White House. I explained that I
have always been the man in tlie middle of tliis nightinare, and that
I meant no harm to anyone, but I had to start protecting myself.
I told him I only know wiiat I laiow, and even to this day I don't know
how or why the Watergate incident occurred. I reminded him that
I have never asked he or Jcb -- flat out --to explain their involvement.
I told liim I did not want to know even now.
I told him that I had been selfless in my trying to assist with
this matter during the campaign, but I now had to protect myself
froin becoming everybody's scapegoat for things I was not responsible
for. Mitchell agreed that I had been selfless and sliould not have to
suffer for others.
1310
Mitchell indicated that he had met with Magruder earlier that
day and Magruder was going to take the same position he had taken
all along. Mitchell said that one of the things that Magruder had
mentioned to him was that Liddy had told Magruder that I advised
Liddy that he was to have a $1 million budget. I told Mitchell that
I could not recall ever having told Liddy what his budget would be
and If Liddy in fact said or believed that, he had a totally false
impression or recollection.
Mitchell also told me he planned to "stone wall" the charges
against him, Mitchell asked me if I would advise him of my testimcrv
after I might appear before the grand jury. I told him I did not kno".".'
if rule 6E restricted this, but I told hina I would raise it with my
lawyers. At this time, and for the first I think anyone has suggested
it, I told him that he should have a lawyer and our lawyers coulH tail-:
about such matters. I got no reaction from Mitchell on this suggestlca.
I also at one point in the meeting told Mitchell that I could
always take the "chicken- shit" route and disappear. I said if I
weren't around to testify, I v/ouldn't cause anyone any problems.
Mitchell said "tell nie where yovi are planning on going" as he might
like to join me. I told him I wouldn't go withovit my wife, and he
laughed at that -- (implication being that life with Martha is difficult'-.
Mitchell during the meeting sought to impress upon me that
my testimony might be very embarrassing to the President and for
that reason I might reconsider any appearance at all. I told him I
thought the people at the White House were fully aware of the
implications of my testimony.
The meeting ended when he received a phone call.
I feel that he was left with the impression that I would be
testifying, although the options of my not appearing were still
vmder consideration -- but not much consideration.
1311
Exhibit No. 34-46
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES
Meeting with Fred LaRue
Friday, April 13, 1973
3:30 - 3:45 PM EOB 106
Fred LaRue called this AM to request a meeting- with me. After
consulting with counsel, I agreed to see him.
LaR\ie advised me that he expected to be called before the grand
jury and w^as aware of the fact (presumably via O'Brien) that I also
would be called shortly. LaRue wanted to know what I was going
to say about Kalmbach and the $350, 000.'
I advised him that I v/as certain I would be asked by the grand jury
who I had talked with recently about these matters and therefore
I did not wish to discuss my testimony -- other than to say that
I was going to answer all questions asked me to the best of my
knowledge.
LaRue said he was very concerned about this whole matter and the
affecfit w^a^ having on'the President. He said he was prepared to
tell the grand jury what he knew, but he honestly couldn't remember •
how he first became involved, or what all he had done. He said he
didn't. want to cause O'Brien or Parkinson any problems.
He asked me if I had made any decisions on money, and I^told him
no I had not, I merely passed messages along. He said that he had
assumed that to be the case and asked how I was going to handle that.
I told him again that I was going to withhold nothing from the grand
jury and if asked I would respond.
I asked him what Mitchell was going to do and he said Mitchell told
him he was going to fight it out. He said that he was extremely close
to and fond of Mitchell, but a lot 'of innocent people were getting hurt
because of Mitchell (inference to protect Mitchell). He said that
Magruder was really in a bad way Ijecause of his loyalty to Mitchell.
LaRue said he needed some legal advice, as to whether he had been
involved in an obstruction of justice. I told him that he should get a
lawyer, because I did not have any first haftd knowledge of the full
extent of his activities, but that the federal statutes were very broad
with regard to what could be considered obstruction.
1312
Exhibit No. 34-47
%.^ ^^^,-
la (iu^_.
y_ ^ j_ o'/i?/^.
_J7^N5__2
^S-?/ .s-///£)
,_.?/JF*3 5-/ if 5-
Exhibit No. 34-48
Message to the P
8:15
Sun April IStli
To Higby from H— to P
also inform E
(1) I hope you understand that my actions are motivated by total loyalty to
you & the I're.sideiicy. If that is not clear now, I believe it will become clear.
(2) E has re<iuested to meet with me tonite, but I believe it is inappropriate
for me to meet with him at this time.
(3) I am ready & willing to meet with you at any time to discuss the matter.
(4) You should take your counsel from Henry Petersen who I assure you
doesn't want the Presidency hurt.
Note. — This Is printed from handwritten notes which were not legible enough for
photographing. The original copy is retained in committee files.
(1313)
1314
Exhibit No. 34-49
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H 1 N GTO N
April 16, 1973
Dear Mr. President:
As a result of my involvement in the Watergate
matter, which we discussed last night and today,
I tender to you my resignation effective at once.
Sincerely,
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
1315
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTO N
April 16, 1973
Dear Mr. President:
In view of iny increasing involvement in the Watergate
matter, my impending appearance before the grand
jury and the probability of its action, I request an
immediate and indefinite leave of absence from my
position on your staff.
Sincerely,
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
1316
Exhibit No. 34-50
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTO N
April 16, 1973
Dear Mr. President:
You ha.ve informed me that Bob Haldeman and
John Ehrlichman have verbally tendered their
requests to be given an imrrtediate and indefinite
leave of absence from your staff. By this letter
I also wish to confirm my similar request that I
be given such a leave of absence fromi the staff.
Sincerely,
John W. Dean, lU
Counsel to the President
Honorable Richard Nixon
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
1317
Exhibit No. 34-51
Draft Stateme nt
4/16/73
As a result of information broguth to the attention of my
staff in the past few days, I requested this past weekend that
Attorney General Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General
Petersen inform me of the grand jury's progress in its investigation
of the facts surrounding the Watergate break-in and other matters.
As a result of my meetings, I have taken several steps to insure .
that all the facts are fully developed.
(1) I have directed that Assistant Attorney General Henry
Petersen, a man who has served in the Department of Justice
through several Administrations, take full and personal charge of
all aspects of the Department of Justice's role in the matter.
(2) I have personally instructed Mr. Petersen that the
investigation is to leave no stone unturned.
(3) I have today received requests from Mr. H. R. Haldeman,
Mr.- John Ehrlichman and Mr. John Dean to be placed on an
immediate leave of absence. This action results from discussions
I have had with these men over this past weekend (April 14, 15, 1973)
and today (yesterday).
In accepting their reouests I strongly caution against public
speculation. I will not comment on this action at this time, and I
have instructed others who are aware of my decision not to comnient
on the matter. I do want it to be known, however, that this action
should not -- and cannot --be construed as impugning misfeasance
or malfeasance on any man, rather each man has requested the
96-296 O - 73 - 27
1318
action as a result of the discussion I have had with him.
(Alternate Paragraph (3))
I have advised all members of the White House staff who will
be called before the grand jury that, effective immediately, they
will be on administrative leave until such time as the grand jury
completes its inquiry. In this connection, I have not even spared
from this decision my closest staff advisers and included in this
action are H. R. Haldcman, Assistant to the President, John
Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs,
and John Dean, Counsel to the President. I want to caution that
this action should not -- and cannot -- be construed as impugning
wrongdoing on the part of any individual and to speculate otherwise
is unfounded and unfair.
I have repeatedly stated that the grand jury is the appropriate
forunn for the development of these facts and I again want to assure
the American people of my continued full cooperation in resolving
this matter. There have been many unanswered questions relating
to this matter, and I am going to inake certain that all these
unanswered questions are fully answered.
1319
Exhibit No. 35
,j. . '' TOP SECRl'^T
rlAKDL-: VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
OPERATIONAL RE'^'traINTS ON INTELLIGENCE CQLJ.EQTIC2N
B. Electronic Surveillances and Pcnctrntions. (pp. 26-Z8)
Recommendation:
Pr'r^sent procedures should be changed to permit
intensification of coverage of individuals and
groups in the United States who pose a major
threat to the internal security.
Rationale:
At tlie present time, less than 65 electronic
penetrations arc operative. This includes
coverage of the CPUSA and organized crime
targcLs, with only a fevv' autliorized against
subjects of pressi!ig internal security interest.
TOP SECRET
1320
TOP SECRET
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Mr. Hoover's statement that the FBI would not oppose
other agencies seeking approval for and operating
electronic surveillances is gratutious since no other
agencies have the capability.
Everyone knovvledgable in the field, with the exception
of Mr. Hoover, concurs that existing coverage is grossly
inadequate.
C^ Mail Coverage (pp. . 29-31)
Recommendation:
Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed.
Rationale:
There is no valid argument against use of legal mail
covers except Mr. Hoover's concern that the civil
liberties people may become upset. This risk is surely
an acceptable one and hardly serious enough to justify
denying ourselves a valuable and legal intelligence tool.
Covert coverage is illegal and there arc serious risks
involved. However, the advantages to be derived from
its use outweigh the risks. Tliis technique is particular!
valuable in identifying espionage agents and other contact
of foreign intelligence services.
D. Surreptitious Entry (pp. 32-33)
Recommendation:
ALSO, present restrictions sliould be modified to permit
selective use of this technique against other urgent and
high priority internal security targets. cil^l-Tt.
TOP SECRET <W-
1321
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Rationale:
Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it amounts
to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result
in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it '
is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the |
type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any ,'
other fashion.
The FBI, in ■fcis9 Mr. Hoover's younger days, used to
conduct such operations with great success and with
no exposure. The information secured was invaluable.
Surreptitious entry of facilities occupied by jiubversive
elements can turn up information about identities,
methods of operation, and other invaluable investigative
information which is not otherwise obtainable. This
technique would be particularly helpful if used against
the Weathermen and Black Panthers.
E. Development cf Campus Sources (pp. 34-36)
Recommendation:
Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded
coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related
groups.
ALSO, CIA coverage of American students (and others)^(*^lV .flj,
traveling or living abroad should be increased. a^^''
-T-OTa CTT r-T> VT r,K ^^ ^
1322
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Rationale:
The FBI does not currently recruit any campus sources
among individuals below 21 years of age. This dramatically
reduces tlie pool from which sources inay be drawn. Mr. Hoover
is afraid of a young student surfacing in the press as an FBI
source, altliough the reaction in the past to such events has
been minimal. After all, everyone assumes the FBI has
such sources.
The campus is the battle-ground of the revolutionary
protest movement. It is impossible to gatlier effective
intelligence about the movement unless we have campus
sources. The risk of exposure is minimal, and where
exposure occurs the adverse publicity is moderate and
short-lived. It is a price we must be willing to pay for
effective coverage of the campus scene. The intelligence
comn-iunity, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, feels
strongly tliat it is imperative the we increase the number
of campus sources this fall in order to forestall widesp'^ead
violence.
CIA claims there are no existing restraintc on its coverage
of over-seas activities of US nationals. However, this
coverage has been grossly inadequate since 1965 and an
explicit directive to increase coverage is required.
F. Use of Military Undercover Agents (pp. 37-39)
Rccominendation:
Present restrictions should be retained.
Rationale:
yhe intelligence community is agreed that the risks
of lifting these restraints arc greater than the value
of any possible intelligence which could be acquired
by doing so.
TCP SECi
sf/shi
1323
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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
BUDGET AND MANPOWER RESTRICTIONS
(pp. 40-41)
Recommendation ;
Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to
projected manpower needs and other costs in the event
the various investigative restraints herein are lifted.
Rationale:
In the event that the above recommendations are concurred
in, it will be necessary to modify existing budgets to provide
tlie money and manpower necessary for their implementation.
The intelligence community has been badly hit in the budget
squeeze (I suspect the foreign intelligence operations are in
tlic same shape) and it may fcs. will be necessary to make
some modifications. The projected figures should be
reasonable, but will be subject to individual review if this
reconimcndation is accepted.
MEASURES TO IMPROVE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
(pp. 42-43)
Recommendation :
A perrrianent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should
be appointed to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence,
prepare periodic doinestic intelligence estimates, and catty
out the otlier objectives specified in the report.
Rationale:
The need for increased coordination, joint estimates, and
responsiveness to the White Hqusc is obvious to the
intelligence community. There are a number of operational
problcins wliich need to be \\orked out since Mr. Hoover is
fearful of any mechanism which might jeopardize his autonomy.
CIA wo'.ild prefer an ad hoc conimittce to see how the system
works, but other members believe that this wovild inerely delay
the establishment of effective coordination and joint operations.
The value of lifting intelligence collection restraints is
proportional to tlie availability of joint operations and evaluation,
and the establisluncnt of this inter-agency group is considered
imperative. y//5/73
TOP SECRET -03r'
1324
Exhibit No. 36
July 14, 1970
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HUSTON
SUBJECT: Domcctic Intellic?ence Review
The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the review
have been approved by the Procident.
He doc3 not, however, v/anL to follow the procedure you outlined
on page 4 of your meinorandum regarding implonentation. He
v/ould prefer that tlie thing 3in"!ply be put into motion on the
basis of tJiis approval.
The formal official memorandum should, of course, bo prepared
and that should be the device by which to carry it out.
I realize this is contrary to your feeling as to tlie best v/ay to get
this done. If you feel very strongly that this procedure v/on't work
you had better let me knov/ and we'll take another stab at it. ■
Otherwise let's go ahead.
H. R. HALDEMAN
TOP SECRET
1325
Exhibit No. 37
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 5, X970
TOP SECRET
HANDl^E VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: TOM CHARLES HUSTON
SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
In anticipation of your meeting with Mr. Hoover and the
Attorney General, I would like to pass on these thoughts:
1. More than the FBI is involved in this operation. NSA,
DIA, CIA, and the military services all have a great stake and a
great interest. All of these agencies supported the options
selected by the President. For your private inforination, so did
all the members of Mr. Hoover's staff who worked on the report
(he'd fire them if he knew this. )
1326
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
-2-
3i We are not getting the type of hard intelligence v/c need
at the White House. We will not get it until greater effort is made
through coiTii-nunity-wide coordination to dig out the information
by using all the resources potentially available. It is, of course,
a matter of balancing the obvious risks against the desired
rosvilts. I thought we balanced these risks rather objectively
in the report, and Hoover is escalating the risks in order to
cloak his dctennination to continue to do business as usual.
4. At some point, Hoover has to be told who is President.
He has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental
to oui' domestic intellig-ence operations. In the past two v/eek$,
he has terminated all FBI liaison with NSA, DIA, the military
services. Secret Service -- everyone except the White House. He
terminated liaison with CIA in May. This is bound to have a
crippling effect upon the entire comniunity and is contrary to
his public assurance to. the President at the meeting that there
>was close and effective coordination an,d cooperation within the
intelligence community. It is important to remember that the
entire intelligence commvuiity knows that the President made a
positive decision to go ahead arid Hoover has now succeeded in
forcing a review. If he gets his way it is going to look like he
is more powerful than the President. He had his say in the
footnotes and RN decided against him. That should close the
matter and I can't understand why the AG is a party to reopening it.
All of us are going to look damn silly in the eyes of Helnis, Gayler,
Bennett, and the military chiefs if Hoover can unilaterally reverse
a Presidential decision based on a report that many people worked
their asses off to prepare and which, on its merits, was a first-
rate, objective job.
5. The biggest risk we could take, in iT»y opinion, is to continue
to regard the violence on the cainpus and in the cities as .^ temporary
phenomenon which will siiTiply go away as soon as the Scranton
Commission files its report. The "one statement that Rennic Davis
made at HEW which I thought made sense was that the Attorney
TOP SECRET
1327
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•3-
Gcncral was kidding hiinsclf when ho said the campuses would be
quiet this fall. Davis predicted that at least 30 would be closed
d6wn in September. I don't like to make predictions, but I am
not at all convinced, on the basis of the intelligence I have seen,
that we are anyway near over the hump on this problem, and I
, am convinced that the potential for even greater violence is
present, and we have a positive obligation to take every step
within our power to prevent it,
6. Hoover can be expected to raise the following points
in your meeting:
(a) *'Our present efforts are adequate." The answer
is bullshit I, This is particularly true with regard to FBI campus
coverage,
(b) "The risks are too great; these folks are going to
get the President into trouble and RN had better listen to mc."
The answer is that we have considered the risks, we believe they
are acceptable and justified under the circumstances. We are
willing to weigh each exceptionally sensitive operation on its
merits, but the Director of the FBI is paid to take risks where
the security of the country is at stake. Nothing we propose to
do has not been done in the past -- and in the past it was always
done successfully.
(c) "I don't have the personnel to do the job the
President wants done." The answer is (1) he has the people and/or
(Z) he can get them.
(d) "I don't object to NSA conducting surreptitious entry
if they want. to. " The answer is that NSA doesn't have the people,
can't get them, has no authority to get them, and shouldn't have
to get them. It is an FBI job.
TOP SECRET
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• 4-
(c) "If we do IhcEC things the 'jackels of the press' and the
ACLU will find out; wc can't avoid leaks." Answer: We can avoid
leaks by using trained, trusted agents and restricting knowledge of
sensitive operations on a strict need to know basis. We do this
on. other sensitive operations every day.
(f) "If I have to do these things, the Attorney General
will have to approve them in writing. " This is up to the AG, but
I would tell Hoover that he h?s been instructed to do them by
the President and he is to do them on that authority. He needn't
look for a scape goat. He has his authority from the President
and he doesn't need a written memo from the AG. To maintain
security, wc should avoid written communications in this area,
(g) "We don't need an Inter-Agency ComiTiittcc on
Intelligence Operations because (1) we're doing fine right now --
good coordination, etc. -- and (2) there are other existing group*
which can handle this assignment. " The answer is that we are
doing lousy right now and there aren't other groups which can
do the job wc have in rnind because: (1) they don't meet; (2) they
don't have the people on them we want or have some people we
don't want; (3) they don't have the author ity to do what we want
done; (4) ultimately this new operation will replace them; and
(5) 'they aren't linked to the White House staff.
There are doubtless another dozen or so specious arguments
that Hoover \vill raise, but they will be of similar qviality. I hope
that you will be able to convince the AG of the iinportance and
necessity of getting Hoover to go along. Wc have worked for
nearly a year to reach lliis point; otlicrs have worl^cd far longer
and had abandoned hope. I believe we are talking about the future
of this country, for surely domestic violence and disorder
tlirc.iten the very fabric of our society. Intelligence is not the
cure, but it can provide the diagnosis that makes a cure possible.
Moro importantly, it can provide us with tho means to prevent the
TOP SECRET
1329
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
deterioration of the situation. Perhaps lowered voices and peace
in VietnajTi will defuse the tense situation we face, but I wouldn't
^ant to rely on it exclusively.
There is this final point. For eighteen months we have
watched people in this governnnent ignore the President's orders,
take actions to embarrass him, promote thennsclves at his
expense, and generally make his job more difficult. It makes
me fighting mad, and what Hoover is doing here is putting
himself above the President. If he thought the Attorney General's
advice should be solicited, he should have done so before the
report was sent to the President. After all. Hoover was chaiiman
of tlie committee and ho could have asked the AG for his comments.
Bv»t no, he didn't do so for it never occurred to him that the
President would not agree with his footnoted objections. He
thought all he had to do was put in a footnote and the jriattcr was
settled. He had absolutely no interest in the views of NSA,
CIA, DIA, and the military services, _ and obviously he has
little interest in our views, or apparently even in the decisions
of the President. I don't see how we can tolerate this, but
being a fatalist, if not a realist, I am prepared to accept the
fact .that we may have to do so.
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
TOP SIj^CRTST
MEMORANDUM
CONFIDENTIAL
1330
Exhibit No. 38
THE WHITE MOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 7, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Mr. Hoover has departed for the West Coast where he plans to vacation
for three weeks. If you wait until his return to clear up the prohlems
surrourtding our Domestic Intelligence operations, we will be into the new
school year without any preparation.
The situation in Portland is beginning to look very tense — the American
Legion Convention could become the first battleground for a new wave of youthful
violence. Coming just as the school year begins, it could serve as a catalyst
for widespread campus disorders.
I recommend that you meet with the Attorney General and secure his support
for the President's decisions, that the Director be informed that the decisions
will stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to implement them
at once.
[oWs
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
I
CONFIDENTIAL
1331
ExmsiT No. 39
MEMORA^fDUM
THE Vv'IIITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 25, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT: SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD
On Monday, August 24, the Senate approved the budget for the SACB
by a vote of 44 to 28. The principal objection -- as might be expected --
was that the Board has nothing to do to justify the $400, 000 a year
budgeted. Among those supporting Senator Proxmire in this argument
were John Williams, Peter Dominick, and Len Jordan -- conservatives
all.
In defending the appropriatioii. Senator McClellan for the majority
and Senator Hruska for the minority argued that the Administration intends
to make effective use of the Board. Senator McClellan was quite specific
in his opinion that the current internal security threat requires prompt
and effective action from the Administration.
The appropriations measure should come down for the President's
signature later this week. I believe that we should now proceed to fill
the two vacancies on the Board and give serious consideration to the
Executive Order expanding the powers of the Board.
I have recommended to Harry Flemming that we reappoint John Mahan
as Chairman and Otto Otepka as member of the Board. Mahan is under
the patronage of Mike Mansfield whose support is crucial. Moreover, he
is a competent enough fsllov/ -who is a team player and will cooperate with
us completely. Otepka's reappointment strikes me as imperative.
There is some question whether we should appoint a Republican as
Board chairman. Normally, I would think so, but I believe the unique
circumstances we face with this Board suggest otherwise. Otepka is too
controversial to be chairman, Paul O'Neal is too impetuous, and John
Patterson is too old. We can work well with Mahan and I see no reason
for replacing him as chairman. The fact that he is a Democrat and close
to Mansfield is a plus in my opinion.
1332
As soon as a decision is made on these nominations, I plan to mieet
with John Ashbrook and Dick Ichord to discuss some of the legislative
proposals pending before the House Internal Security Committee which
pertain to the activities of the Board. Once we get a feel for what these
people believe we should do, we will be in a position to re-evaluate the
alternatives open to us. The point, however, which we need to keep in
mind is that we cannot afford to let the Board sit idle or content itself
with investigating old line Communist fronts which are largely irrelevant
to our current problem.
After the bombing at Madison, I suspect that the public is fully-
prepared to accept the concept that the Federal Government ought to
take an active interest in the activities of violent-action organizations,
as we propose in. the Executive Order.
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
1333
Exhibit No. 40
memorandum
the white house
WASUINOTON
September 10, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
I understand that in the course of Peter Flanigan's meeting on steps
to minimize the risk of future air hijackings the question of increased
use of intelligence information arose and that the Bureau is to submit
recommendations in this regard.
It strikes me that this exercise will amount to nothing more than a
retracing of the steps we took in June to no avail. This is but one more
example of the crying need for inter-community coordination on a
systematic and formal basis. In this area, for example, there are
resources yet untapped, i. e. , Customs, the military services, etc. ,
which will remain untapped so long as Mr. Hoover runs a one-man
show.
I don't know the extent of Peter's experience in intelligence matters,
but he should be aware that paper plans don't always translate into
effective action.
I might add that we haven't seen anything yet. If this incident in the
Mideast poses problems, wait until some of our home-grown fedayeen
decide to emulate their peers.
T^T-
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
96-296 O - 73 - 28
1334
OFFICE OF
The Aticrney G£ii£RAL
Exhibit No. 41
March 3, 1972
To: John W. Dean, III
The attached memorandum
turned up in our housecleaning
operation and is being returned to
you for whatever disposition you
wish to make of it.
y
Sol Lindenbaum
1335
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTO N
Septeaiber 18, 1970
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, September IT, 1970, I
suggest the following procedures to commence our domestic
intelligence operation as quickly as possible.
1. Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit . A key to the
entire operation will be the creation of a interagency intelligence
^ unit for both operational and evaluation purposes. Obviously,
t the selection of persons to this unit will be of vital importance
to the success of the mission. As ve discussed, the selection
of the personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step
for several reasons. First, effective coordination of the
different agencies must be developed at an e'arly stage through the
establishment of the unit. Second, Hoover has indicated a strong ■
opposition to the creation of such a unit and, to bring the FBI
fully on board, this seems an appropriate first step to guarantee
their proper and full participation in the program. Third, the
unit can serve to make appropriate recommendations for the type
of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various
agencies. In regard to this third point, I believe ve agreed
that it vould be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of
restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure vould be
to decide on the type of intelligence ve need, based on an
assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then to
proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such
intelligence .
To proceed to create the interagency intelligence unit,
parti cularl;/' the evaluation group or committee, I recommend that
ve request the names of four nominees from each of the intelligence
agencies involved. V/hile the precise composition of the unit
may vary as ve gain experience, I think thatxtvo members should
be appointed initially from each agency in addition to your
personal representative vho should also be involved^n the
proceedings. Because of the interagency aspects of this request,
it vould probably be best if the request came from the White^ -
House. If you agree, I vill make such a request of the agency ■
1336
heads; however, I feel that it is essential that you work this
out with Hoover before I have any .dealings with hira directly.
2. Housing. Vfe discussed the appropriate housing of
this operation and, upon reflection, I believe that rather
than a White House staffer looking for suitable space , that
a professional intelligence person should be assigned the task
of locating such space. Accordingly, I would suggest that
a request be made that Mr. Hoover assign an agent to this
task. In connection with the housing problem, I think serious
consideration must be given to the appropriate Justice Depart-
meat cover for the domestic intelligence operation. We
discussed yesterday using IDIU as a cover and as I indicated
I believe that that is a most appropriate cover. I believe
that it is generally felt that IDIU is already a far more ex-
tensive intelligence operation than has' been mentioned publicly,
and that the IDIU operation cover would eliminate the problem
of discovering a new intelligence operation in the Department
of Justice. However, I have reservations about the personnel
in IDIU and its present operation activities and would suggest
that they either be given a minor function within the new
intelligence operation or that the staff be completely removed.
I have had only Incidental dealings with the personnel, other
than Jim Devine, and cannot speak to their discretion and
loyalty for such an operation. I do not believe that Jim
Devine is capable of any major position within the new
intelligence operation. However, I do believe that he could
help perpetuate the cover and he has evidenced a loyalty to ypu,
the Deputy and other key people in the Department of Justice,
despite his strong links with the prior Administration. I
would defer to your judgement., of course, on any recommendation
regarding Jim Devine' s continued presence in such an intelligence
operation.
3. Assistant to Attorney General . We also discussed the
need for you to have a right hand man to assist in running this
operation. It would seem that what is needed is a man with
administrative skills, a sensitivity to the implications of the
current radical and subversive movements within the United
States, and preferably, some background in intelligence work.
•To maintain the cover, I would think it appropriate for the man
to have a law degree in that he will be a part of the Department
of Justice. You suggested the possibility of using a prosecutor
who had had experience with cases of this type. Accordingly, I
have spoken with Harlington Wood to ask him to submit the names
of five Assistant U. S. Attorneys who have had experience in
dealing with demonstrations or riot type cases and who are
mature individuals that might be appropriately given a sensitive
TOP SECRET
1337
assignment in the Department of Justice. I did not discuss the
matter in any further detail with Wood other than to request the
submission of some nominees. I would also like to suggest that
ve request names from the various intelligence agencies involved
for personnel that might he appropriately involved in this activity
or vho might serve as your assistant.
In summary, I recommend the follovring immediate action:
(1) You meet with Hoover, explain what must he done, and
request his nominees for the interagency unit.
(2) You request that Hoover assign an agent to the task
of locating appropriate housing for the operations. •
(3) I request that other involved intelligence agencies
submit nominees for the interagency unit.
(U) I request from the agencies names of appropriate
personnel for assignment to the operation.
Finally, I would suggest that you call weekly meetings to
monitor- the problems as they emerge and to make certain that we
are moving this program into implementation as quickly as possible
N.B. Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that if you would like
him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy
to do so.
TOP SECRET
1338
EXHTOIT No. 42
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINOTON
1>
September 21, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT: IRS & Ideological Organizations
I am. attaching a copy of a report from the IRS on the activities of its
"Special Service Group" which is supposed to monitor the activities of
ideological organizations [e.g., Jerry R^ibin Fund, Black Panthers, etc. ]
and take appropriate action when violations of IRS regulations turn up.
You will note that the report is long on words and short on substance.
Nearly 18 months ago, the President indicated a desire for IRS to move
against leftist organizations taking advantage of tax shelters. I have been
pressing IRS since that time to no avail.
What we cannot do in a courtroom via criminal prosecutions to curtail
the activities of some of these groups, IRS could do by administrative action.
Moreover, valuable intelligence-type information could be turned up by IRS
as a result of their field audits.
-T^
TOM CHARLES HUSTON'
Attachment
1339
Co:aI-^ you r;lvo c. prcjii^occ rcpovt on r!ia r-.cl.ivltlca o£ t'lc
Complir.ncc; Divisions ia review ir.^ ?!;<', o;>ar^.iicr.n of icIcoloi'.Lcal
clncc Jiilv I, 1.96';, wii5in \7o ni'ijt exp-oftss^ oai' lACcrcsi; lathla
Tfianl; you.
TOM CHAitLl^S iIUSTOI^J
1340
s::rpi 0^3/0
MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Tom Charles Huston
The IvThite House
FROM: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
In response to your memorandum dated August 14,
1970, wo have prepared the attached status report
on the Special Service Group. I would stress that >
knowledge of the existence and operations of this
Group should be carefully limited.
/ fJ
Ra^lidolph W. Tlirower
Attacliment
1341
S.uatu s Reoo rt On
Special Service Grou p
In August 1969 the Senate Conunittee on Government
Operations held open hearings on several controversial
organizations, including the Black Panther Party, Student
Na-tional Coordinating Coniraittee, Republic of New Africa,
and Students for Democratic Society. Information de-
veloped during these hearings established that various
organizations, categorized as extremists on the right or,
left, presented problems to the Internal Revenue Service
in that the organizations and individuals involved in the
organizations wore not in compliance with Internal Revenue
laws. Information developed in these hearings indicated •
that extremist organizations were receiving financial
support from various sources. Some of the individuals
. involved in the forefront of these organizations filed
tax returns reflecting very nominal income, or did not
■file at all, although they.v/ere obviously expending sub-
stantial amounts of funds.
Recognizing the responsibilities of the Internal
Revenue Service to administer taxing statutes without
regard to. the social or political objectives of indivi-
duals or organizations, a decision v/as made rto establish
1342
a method of accumulating and disseminating inf onnatiozi on
all activist groups to insure that the oi-ganizations and
the leaders of the organif'.ations are complying with
Internal Revenue laws.
In the National Office of the Internal Revenue Service,
functioning under the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance),
a special compliance group was established to receive and
analyze all available information on organizations and
individuals promoting extremist views and philosophies.
Tha identification of organizations and individuals included
in the program is without regard to the philosophy of poli-
tical posture involved; rather, it is directed to the
notoriety of the individual or organization and the proba-
bility of publicity that might result from their activities
and the likelihood that this notoriety would lead to inquiries
regarding their tax status. Another important consideration
was the degree of probability that the individuals might
be deliberately avoiding their tax responsibilities.
The staff responsible for this activity V7as first
designated as the Activist Organizations Group, but it
recently was changed to "Special Service Group" to avoid any
erroneous impression of its objectives. The function of tlie
1343
Special Service Group is to obtain, consolidate and dis-
saminate any inf orraation on. individuals or organizations
(including major financial sponsors of the individuals or
organizations) that v.'ould have tax implications under the
Internal Revenue lavzs. Liaison has been established with
all investigative and law enforcement agencies and with
Senate and House Investigating Committees. The Group also
subscribes to various underground publications as a source
of information on matters involving taxable income of
individuals, activities of organizations having or seeking
tax exempt status, and identity of individuals or exempt
organizations providing financial support. to activist groups.
In the case of "financial- support" our interest is to be
able to determine that donors do pot receive tax benefit
from the financial assistance where such benefit is not
clearly allowable by law.
As information is accum.ulated on the activities or.
financial support of particular organizations or taxable
income of individuals it is referred to the appropriate
field office of the Internal Revenue Service for enforce-
ment action. Field offices may be asked to investigate
the activities of organizations v/hich have been held, to be
1344
exempt as charitable organizations; they may be asked to
investigate the income tax liability of individuals vho
have openly expended substantial sums of money vrithout
obvious means of support or they may be asked to investi-
gate alleged violations of the firearms statutes falling
within the jurisdiction of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms Division.
It is Important to note that although various types
of information about -organizations or individuals is
obtained by the Service from cooperating agencies, only *-
that information' relating to tax status is recorded and
dissejninated to field offices. The sole objective of the-
Special Service Group is to provide a greater degree of
assurance of maximum compliance vith the Internal Revenue
laws by those involved in extremist activities and those
providing financial support to these activities.
To date the efforts of the Special Service Group has
been confined to manual compilation and consolidation of
information on approximately 1,025 organizations and 4,300
individuals. Data on 26 organizations and A3 individuals
has been referred to the field for enforcement action.
1345
While it is still too early to have completed many of the
field investigations, criminal investigations are under
way on 4 individuals- and 1 organization. Delinquent tax
returns have been obtained from 2 organization's with com-
bined tax liability of $29,559. On the basis of informa-
tion furnished by this "group" application for exempt
status has been denied to 8 organizations. It is the
view of officials of the Internal Revenue Service that
this "intelligence" activity and field enforcement is
necessary to avoid allegation that extremist organizations^
ignore taxing statutes V7ith immunity.
f
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