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Full text of "Presidential campaign activities of 1972, Senate resolution 60; Watergate and related activities"

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Phase I: Watergate Investigation 

WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973 

Book 3 

Printed for the use of the 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 

TJ. S. Gcverrjinen^- r-""-^.'-^ts Depository 
Franklin i'ierce i c-r Library 











Phase I: Watergate Investigation 


Book 3 

Printed for the use of the 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 

96-296 O WASHINGTON : 1973 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3 
Stock Number 5270-01963 


(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session) 

SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina, Chairman 
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vice Chairman 

DANIF.L K. INO UYE, Hawaii LOWELL P. WEICKE R, Jr., Connecticut 


Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

Fred D. Tnoyipaoy:, Minority Counsel 

RiTFUS L. Edmisten, Deputy Chief Ccumel 

David M. Dorsen, Assistant Chief o unsel 

Terry F. Lenzser, Assistant Chief Counsel 

James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel 

Carmine S. Bellino, Chief Investigator 

Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator 

Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel 

R. Phillip Haire, Assistant Counsel 

Marc Lackritz, Assistant Counsel 

William T. Mayton, Assistant Counsel 

Ronald D. RoTVtiUA, Assistant Counsel 

Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel 

Howard S. 'Liebe'sgood, Assistant Minority Counsel 

H. William Shvre, Assistant Minority Counsel 

Robert Silverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel 

Laura Matz, Administrati-ie Assistant 

Carolyn Andrade, Office Manager 

Joan C. Cole, Secretary to IheMinority 





Monday, June 25, 1973 911 

TuesdaV, June 26, 1973 1021 


Monday, June 25, 1973 

Dean, John W., Ill, former counsel to the President, accompanied by 

Charles N. Shaffer and Robert C. McCandless, counsels 911 

Tuesday, June 26, 1973 
Dean, John W., Ill, testimony resumed 1021 


Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr 1060-1063 

Talmadge, Hon. Herman E 1044-1054 

Montova, Hon. Joseph M 1074-1094 

Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr 1055-1059, 1063-1074 

Dash, Samuel, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 1021-1031 

Thompson, Fred D., Minority Counsel 1032-1044 


No. 32— (913) Letter of June 18, 1973, to Senator Ervin from Shaffer, 

McKeever and Fitzpatrick, law offices 1095 

No. 33— (914) Letter of June 19, 1973, to Mr. Dean from Leonard Gar- 
ment, counsel to the President 1099 

No. 34-1 — (918) Memorandum for John Dean from the President, dated 
March 12, 1973, re: College student and demonstrations 
(from Washington Post storj-) 1 100 

No. 34-2 — (919) Memorandum for H. R.' Haldeman from Jack Caulfield, 
dated February 11, 1971, re: Anderson leaks and various 
other memorandums 1101 

No. 34-3— (922) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from Gordon Stra- 

chan, re: Leaks and various other memorandums 1111 

No. 34-4 — (923) Information concerning Senator Edward M. Kennedy's 

visit to Honolulu August 17-19, 1971 1117 

Nos. 34-5 through 34-8 — (923) Submitted for identification only, not for 
pubfication, and will be retained in the files of the committee. 

No. 34-9 — (925) The proposed budget for "Operation Sandwedge" and 
various other memorandums relating to the securitj^ aspects 
of the plan 1121 

No. 34-10 — (925) Photograph of membership card for Democratic Na- 
tional Committee 1133 

No. 34-11 — (926) Information re: Congressman McCloskey's New Hamp- 
shire Campaign 1134 

No. 34-12 — (926) Memorandum to the Attorney General from John Dean. 

Subject: Operation Sandwedge 1149 

Note : Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the 



No. 34-13 — (928) Copy of agenda prepared b}^ Gordon Liddy for meeting of Page 

November 24, 1971, with Attorney General Mitchell and 

John Dean 1150 

No. 34-14 — (931) Memorandum for Larry Higby fnnn John Dean with 

attachments 1151 

No. 34-15 — (935) White House memorandum for John Dean from Charles 

Colson concerning Howard Hunt, with attachments 1157 

No. 34-16— (939) FBI interview of Charles Colson 1 160 

No. 34-17 — (943) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman 

from John Dean re: O'Brien letter concerning special 

prosecutor 1161 

No. 34-18 — (954) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re: 

Chronology of Howard Himt's activities 1169 

No. 34-19 — (957) Memorandums re: Counteractions (Watergate) by 

Kenneth Parkinson and John Dean 1173 

No. 34-20 — (959) Letter from Congressman Brown to Attorney General 

re: Banking and Currency Committee investigation into 

Watergate activities 1181 

No. 34-21 — (961) Memorandum to John Dean from Kenneth Parkinson 

re: 1972 political fihngs 1183 

No. 34-22 — (961) Banking and Currency Committee notice of meeting 

change and subpena list, with attachments 1190 

No. 34-23 — (961) Letter to Congressman Patman from Assistant Attorney 

General Henry Petersen re: Extensive public hearings into 

financial aspects of Watergate "Bugging" incident 1194 

No. 34-24 — (965) Question and answer conversation between Ziegler, 

Ehrlichman, Chapin, and Moore. Statement by Dwight 

Chapin 1200 

No. 34-25 — (967) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean 

re: Watergate and Segretti, with attachments 1210 

No. 34-26 — (968) Information on campaign spending — HRH and Dean, 

dated May 18, 1971 1226 

No. 34-27 — (968) Memorandum for Herb Kalmbach from John Dean 

re: Bill from Jack Gleason's lawyer on Common Cause law 

suit ' 123 1 

No. 34-28— (973) White House note to John Dean from Charles Colson 

"Now what the hell do I do?" with attachment 1233 

No. 34-29— (974) Handwritten note to Mr. John Caulfield re: CIA taking 

the blame 1235 

No. 34-30 — (976) Document entitled "Relevancy of Intercepted Com- 

mim ications " 1236 

No. 34-31 — (977) Message given by Saimdra Greene to Mr. Gordon 

Liddy " 1 238 

No. 34-32 — (980) Memorandum for the President from John Dean re: 

Congressional hearings regarding Watergate 1239 

No. 34-33 — (982) Memorandum from H. R. Haldeman for John Dean re: 

Appointment of minoritj' counsel to " Ervin Committee," 

with additional memos 1 240 

No. 34-34 — (988) Agenda — Matters to be discussed and resolved 1243 

No. 34-35 — (988) Potential matters for discussion with Senator Baker 

(Meeting to be totally off the record) 1245 

No. 34-36 — (989) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean, 

with attachment entitled "Talking Points for Meeting with 

the Attorney General" 1247 

No. 34-37 — (990) Memorandum for Larry Higby and John Dean from 

Jerry Jones. Subject: Options for Jeb Magruder 1249 

No. 34-38 — (991) Memorandum for the files from John Dean. Subject: 

Call from Secretary Dent re Jel) Magruder 1251 

No. 34-39— (997) Draft letter addressed "Dear Mr. Chairman" from 

John Dean with oath attached to bottom of letter 1252 

No. 34-40 — (1004) Taped conversation between Dean and Magruder with 

attached Camp David envelope 1258 

No. 34-41 — (1004) Statement of charges against White House and Com- 
mittee To Re-Elect the President officials 1261 

Note: Figures in indicate page tliat exhibit was officially made part of the 

No. 34-42 — (1005) Memorandum for the file re: Maroulis conversation Paee 
with Dean on March 29, 1973, concerning Maroulis' client, 

G. Gordon Liddy 1262 

No. 34-43 — (1006) John Dean's Camp David report with attached hand- 

WTitten notes 1263 

No. 34-44 — (1010) Summation of Segretti involvement in Watergate case. 1294 
No. 34-45 — (1011) Memorandum bv John Dean re: Meeting with John 

Mitchell, April 10, 1973 1308 

No. 34-46 — (1012) Alemorandum by John Dean of his meeting with Fred 
LaRue on April 13, 1973, re: LaRue's appearance before 

grand j ury 1311 

No. 34-47 — (1013) List of names denoting "Pre, post, and potential o/j"_ . 1312 
No. 34-48 — (1015) Message from John Dean to the President, April 15, 

1973 1313 

No. 34-49 — (1017) Two letters to the President on White House stationery, 
dated April 16, 1973. (Letter of resignation and letter re- 
questing indefinite leave of absence.) 1314 

No. 34-50— (1018) Letter from John Dean to the President, April 16, 1973. 

Request for indefinite leave of absence 1316 

No. 34-51 — (1018) Draft statement re: Grand jury's investigation into 
Watergate and leave-of-absence requests from H. R. Halde- 

man, John Ehrlichman, and John Dean 1317 

No. 35 — (1062) Document concerning operational restraints on intelligence 

collection 1319 

No. 36 — (1062) Memorandum for Mr. Huston from H. R. Haldeman re: 

Domestic intelligence review, dated July 14, 1970 1324 

No. 37 — (1062) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from Tom Huston re: 

Domestic intelligence, dated August 5, 1970 1325 

No. 38 — (1062) Memorandum from Tom Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 

dated August 7, 1970. Subject: Domestic Intelligence Review- _ 1330 
No. 39 — (1062) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from Tom Huston, 
dated August 25, 1970. Subject: Subversive Activities Control 

Board 1331 

No. 40— (1062) Memorandum dated September 10, 1970, for H. R. Halde- 
man from Tom Huston re: Future air hijaclcings and use of 

increased intelligence information 1333 

No. 41 — (1062) Note from Sol Lindenbaum to John Dean with attached 
memorandums regarding procedures to commence domestic 

intelligence operation 1 334 

No. 42— (1062) Memorandum dated September 21, 1970, to H. R. Halde- 
man from Tom Huston. Subject: IRS and Ideological Organi- 
zations, with attachments 1338 

No. 43 — (1062) Submitted for identification onlj^, not for publication, and 
wiU be retained in the files of the committee. 

Note : Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the 


MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washingto7i, D.O. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :10 a.m., in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair- 
man), presiding. 

Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and TVeicker. 

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred 
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Eufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief 
counsel : Arthur S. ]Miller, chief consultant ; Jed Johnson, consultant ; 
David ]M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
cliief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant ; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye ; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya : Ron Mc^Mahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flani- 
gan, assistant publications clerk. 

Senator ER^^N. The committee will come to order. 

Counsel will call the first witness. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. John W. Dean III. 

Senator Er^tn. Stand up and raise your right hand. Do you swear 
that the evidence that you shall give to the Senate Select Committee 
on Presidential Compaign Activities shall be the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God. 

Mr. Dean. I do, so help me God. 

Senator Er^tcn. You are accompanied by counsel, and I would ask, 
your name is John W. Dean III ? 


Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator ER^^x. I would ask counsels to identify themselves for the 
record. You may be seated. 

Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Chairman, mv name is Charles N. Shaffer from 
Rockville, Md.. and T am one of ]Mr. Dean's counsels. 



Mr. McCandless. Mr. Chairman, I am Kobert C. McCandless of 
Washington, D.C., and I too, am one of Mr. Dean's counsels. 

Senator Ervin. I would like for members of the committee, the wit- 
ness, and counsels for the witness to pay strict attention to what I shall 

Mr. Dean appears before the committee and has appeared previously 
before the staff of the committee on obedience to subpena from the 

Mr. Dean at all times has claimed that he is privileged against testi- 
fying by the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment on the 
ground that any testimony lie might give to the committee concerning 
the matters the committee is authorized to investigate might incrimi- 
nate him and, therefore, he appears involuntarily. The committee has 
unanimously in times past, requested His Honor, Judge Sirica, Chief 
Judge of the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia, to enter 
an order of immunity for the witness under the provisions of sections 
6002 and 6005 of the title 18 of the United States Code. The committee 
pursuant to those statutes, gave 10 days notice to the Attorney General 
of its application to Judge Sirica and at the instance of the Attorney 
General, Judge Sirica delayed entering an order until more than 20 
days thereafter had expired. He then entered an order of immunity 
under the statutes, and Mv. Dean has now been informed of that fact 
and has jDreviously been informed of that fact and he is now testify- 
ing under this order of immunity granted at the instance of tlie com- 
mittee. He appears here involuntarily as a witness pursuant to this 
order, and he has heretofore been ordered by the committee to answer 
the questions and he has all the testimony he has previously given 
to the committee staff and all the testimony which he may give to this 
committee is given by him on the basis of the order of immunity. Is 
that correct? 

Mr. Shaffer. That is correct, Mr, Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Now, if there is no objection on the part of any mem- 
ber of the committee, the chairman will define his statement to be tlie 
facts on behalf of the committee. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I might say just for the completion 
of the record to that effect, that it is also my understanding that in 
addition to appearing in response to subpena and after having claimed 
his constitutional privileges, after the attachments of use immunity, 
as the chairman has just indicated, that counsel for ]Mr, Dean at a 
previous executive session of this committee made certain other re- 
quests, particularly that the witness waived no rights, that he was ap- 
pearing involuntarily and pursuant to subpena, and he filed an applica- 
tion to be excused from testifying because of the fear of prejudice effect 
on the possibility of his subsequent trial and that he requested that 
coverage of the hearings be either in executive session oi- limited in 
accordance with the rules of this committee. 

I hope it is appropriate to say, Mr. Chairman, that those matters 
were taken into account by this committee as a whole in executive ses- 
sion and the requests were denied. I think that the record oufrht to 
indicate that further for Mr. Dean's, for the completion of Mr. Dean's 

Senator Ervin. I want to thank you and say I join in your view. 


Mr. Shaffer. We appreciate that, Mr. Vice Chairman, and I would 
like, out of an abundance of caution, so that there ^yould be no waiver 
for me. to again call to the attention of the committee here and now 
before the public session, the content of my letter to the chairman 
dated June 18, 1973, which I ask you to rule again on the insertions 
contained therein and that it be made a part of this public record. 

Senator Ervin. That letter will be printed in the record. 

[The letter referred to was marked exhibit No. 32.*] 

Senator Ervix. The request by members of the committee sitting 
on the left is that you and ]Mr. Dean change places because 

Mr. Shaffer. I am going to leave the chair, Mr. Chairman, and 

Senator ER\nx [continuing]. Because the reporter sort of obstructs 
their view. 

Senator Moxtoya. I would like for the reporter to move back a little 
so that I can see the witness. 

Mr. McCandless. We have one additional matter we would like 
to call to the attention of the chair. First of all, the subpena issued 
under your rules does subpena all documents, so we conclude that all 
material supplied other than his oral testimony, all exhibits and other 
documents are under the same subpena and must be and are being 
brought forward in that manner. 

Also, we bring to your attention again title 18 of the United States 
Code, section 798, disclosure of classified information, and section C 
saying, ''Nothing in this section shall prohibit the furnishing upon 
lawful demand of information to any regularly constituted committee 
of the Senate, the House of Representatives of the United States of 

We raise that, Mr. Chairman, because as you are very well aware, 
and all the membere of the committee, under a ruling by the Honorable 
John J. Sirica, this committee came into possession of certain docu- 
ments which Mr. Shaffer and I, as counsel to Mr. Dean, have not even 
seen ourselves; they are in your possession. If Mr. Dean is to be asked 
questions on those documents, he does not have a copy in his possession. 
the committee would have to furnisji such a copy to him for him to be 
able to refresh his recollection, and we just wanted to make sure that 
this section of the criminal code, and your rules, pointed out how 
they dovetail as to disclosure of secivt and classified information. 

Senator Ervix. Well, we will rule on that at the proper time. I am 
expecting, rather, questions on those documents which were furnished 
to the committee by Judge Sirica at the request of the committee, 
will not come today and we will handle that in due season. 

Mr. McCaxdless. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervix. I Avill state myself from my study of the subject, I 
think that information or material cannot be classified allegedly in 
the interest of national security unless it should not be disclosed to 
an unauthorized person because it relates to either national defense 
or to our foreign relations with other nations. I am of the opinion 
from my study that there is no authority under that statute to classify 
any matter merely because it relates to domestic intelligence or in- 
ternal security. That is a matter, though, that the committee will rule 
on later if it becomes necessary. 

♦See p. 1095. 


Mr. McCaxdless. It is also our understandin/i;, and I hope it is cor- 
rect, that any doctrines of executive privilege or attorney-clients privi- 
lege have already been taken care of by your committee. 

Mr. Dash. Yes ; I think I would add to that 

Senator Baker. I would like to laise a point in that respect and, in 
addition to the points raised by INIr. McCandless which I think is im- 
portant to raise in protection of the client's rights. It is my under- 
standing, and chief counsel, INIr. Dash, can coriect me if I am in error — 
it is my understanding last Monday there was transmitted to the wit- 
ness, with copies to the committee and its stali", a letter from Mr. 
Leonard Garment, the counsel for the White House or a counsel for 
the White Plouse, indicating that the White House would not claim 
executive privilege as to this witness' testimony nor would it claim the 
privilege of attorney-client and as I recall as Avell. tliat on matters of 
the use of documents nominally classified that they would leave to the 
discretion of the committee to decide how that should be handled. 

Mr. Dash. Tliat is correct, Senator Baker. It initially was an oral 
statement given to me by Mr. Garment, counsel for the President. He 
followed it up with a letter to Mr. Dean and a cop^' to our committee in 
which he put in writing that he was authorized by the President to do 
as you just stated. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 33.*] 

Senator Baker. And the committee in executive session on this past 
Monday, I believe by unanimous vote, I am sure by unanimous vote, 
authorized the chairman to act on behalf of the committee in the mat- 
ter of the handling of these classified documents. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator Ervix. Certainly, let the record show as to what ]Mr. ]Mc- 
Candless states that any documents, that the witness produces are pro- 
duced in obedience to a subjiena duces tecum. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, you have a statement you wish to present to the 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, Mr. Dash. But before I commence read- 
ing the rather lengthy statement I would just like to make a couple of 
comments. First of all, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Vice Chairman and 
members of the committee, I sincej-ely wish I could say it is my pleasure 
to be here today but I think you can understand wliy it is not. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, could you please take tl;e muToplione and i)ut 
it closer so we can all hear ? 

Mr. Dean. Certainly. It is a very difficult thing for me to testify 
about other people. It is far more easy for me to explain my own 
involvement in tliis matter, the fact that I was involved in obstructing 
justice, the fact that I assisted another in perjured testimony, the fact 
that I made personal use of funds that were in my custodv, it is far 
easier to talk about these things myself than to talk about what others 
did. Some of these people I will be referring to are friends, some ai'C 
men I greatly admire and respect, and paiticularly with reference to 
the President of the United States. I would like to say this. It is my 
honest belief that while the President was involved that he did not 
realize or appreciate at any time the implications of his involvement, 
and I think that when the facts come out T h(^i)e the President is 

•See p. 1099. 


Pursuant to the request of the committee I will commence with a 
general description of the atmosphere in the White House prior to 
June 1972. 

The Atmosphere at the White House, Pre-June 1972 

To one who was in the White House and became somewhat familiar 
with its interworkincTS, the Watergate matter was an inevitable out- 
growth of a climate of excessive concern over the political impact of 
demonstrators, excessive concern over leaks, an insatiable appetite for 
political intelligence, all coupled with a do-it-yourself White House 
staff, regardless of the law. However, the fact that many of the 
elements of this climate culminated with the creation of a covert 
intelligence operation as a part of the President's reelection com- 
mittee was not by conscious designs, rather an accident of fate. 

These, of coui-se, are my conclusions, but I believe they are well 
founded in fact. This committee, however, is not interested in my 
conclusions, rather it is interested in the facts as I know them. Rather 
than my characterizing the climate and attitudes, I shall — as re- 
quested — present the facts which themselves evidence the precursors of 
the Watergate incident. 

Excessi\t: Coxcerx Over Demonstrators 

It was not until I joined the \Vliite House staff in July of 1970 that 
I fully realized the strong feelings that the President and his staff 
had toward antiwar demonstrators — and demonstrators in general. 
But even before my joining the White House staff I was partially 
aware of this Presidential concern, a concern that, in turn, permeated 
much of the '\Miite House. 

During my tenure at the Justice Department, as an associate Deputy 
Attorney General, I was involved in representing the Government in 
discussions with demonstration leaders regarding the terms of demon- 
stration permits for activities in the Capital City. ^ATiile I was not 
the decisionmaker, in this capacity, I was in close proximity to the 
decisionmaking process and thus realized that the White House (prin- 
cipally Ehrlichman) often made or cleared the final decisions regard- 
ing demonstration activity. 

It was also because of my proximity to those involved with demon- 
strations at the Department of Justice that I became aware that the 
White House was continually seeking intelligence information about 
demonstration leaders and their supporters that would either dis- 
credit them personally or indicate that the demonstration was in fact 
sponsored by some foreign enemy. There were also White House re- 
quests for information regarding ties between major political figures 
(specifically Members of the U.S. Senate) who opposed the Presi- 
dent's war policies and the demonstration leaders. 

I also recall that the information regarding demonstrators — or 
rather lack of information showing connections between the demon- 
stration leaders and foreign governments or major political figiires — 
was often reported to a disbelieving and complaining White House 
staff that felt the entire system for gathering such intelligence was 
worthless. As I shall elaborate shortly, this attitude toward the intel- 


ligence-gatherino; capability of the Government reirardinp; demonstra- 
tions prevailed thronwh my tenure at the Justice Department and 
the White House, and I was hearino- complaints from tlie President 
personally as late as ]March 1'2 of this year. 

It was when' I joined the White House stafl' in July of 1970 that 
I became fully aware of the extent of concern at the "White House 
regarding demonstrations and intellip:ence information relating; to 
demonstrators. It was approximatelv 1 month after I arrived at the 
White House that I was informed about the project that had been 
going on before I arrived to restructure the Governmenfs intelligence- 
gathering capacities vis-a-vis demonstrators and domestic radicals. 
The revised domestic intelligence plan was submitted in a document 
forwarded for the President's approval. 

The committee has in its possession a copy of that document and 
certain related memorandums pursuant to the order of Judge Sirica. 
After I was told of the Presidentially approved ])lan. that called for 
bugging, burglarizing, mailcovers, and the like. I was instructed bv 
Haldeman to see what I could do to get the plan implemented. I 
thought the plan was totally uncalled for and unjustified. I talked with 
Mitchell about the plan, and he said he knew there was a great desire 
at the White House to see the plan implemented, but he agreed fully 
with FBI Director Hoover, who opposed the plan, with one excep- 
tion : INIitchell thought that an interacrency evaluation committee might 
be useful, because it was not good to have the FBI standing alone with- 
out the information of other intelligence agencies and the sharing of 
information is always good and avoids duplication. After my conver- 
sation with Mitchell. I write a memorandum requesting that the evalu- 
ation cominittee be established, and the restraints could be removed 
later. I told Mr. Haldeman that the only way to proceed was one step 
at a time, and this could be an important first step. He agreed. 

The Interagency Evaluation Committee (lEC) as it was referred 
to, was created, as I recall, in early 1971. I requested that Jack Caul- 
field, who had been assigned to mv office, to serve as tlie White House 
liaison to the lEC, and when Mr.Caulfield left the White House, ]\Ir. 
David Wilson of my staff served as liaison. I am unaware of the lEC 
ever having engaged in any illegal activities or assignments, and cer- 
tainly no such assignment was ever requested by my office. The reports 
from the lEC, or summar-ies of the reports were forwarded to ]\Ir. 
Haldeman and sometimes Ehrlichman. 

In addition to the intelligence repoi-ts from the lEC, my office also 
received regular intelligence reports regarding demonstrators and radi- 
cal groups from the FBI and on some occasions, from the CIA. A 
member of my staff would review the material to determine if it 
should be forwarded to Mv. Haldeman — that is. for bringing to the 
President's attention — or sent to another member of the staff who 
mic?ht have an interest in the contents of the report. 

The committee has in its — Air. Chaii-man, from time to time, I am 
going to skip parts of the statement in an effoit to make sure that I 
can move as quicklv as possible and get the statement completed in as 
short a time as possible. 

Senator Ervix. I believe it is important to read the whole statement 
since you thought it was important enough to write it. 

Mr. Dean. I will honor the chairman's wish. 


For example, Len Garment would be sent information regarding 
Indian uprisings, Mr. Kissinger or General Haig information regard- 
ing travels of antiwar groups to Hanoi. 

Also prior to and during a demonstration, my office would prepare 
summary reports for the President of the anticipated size of the dem- 
onstration, any information about the leaders of the demonstration, 
and during the demonstration, a description of the activities of the 
demonstrators and tlie Government's handling or anticipated handling 
of the demonstrations. 

Contrary to the policy that had existed before I came to the White 
House, I sought to keep the White House out of tactical decisions 
regarding the demonstrations. I felt that these were decisions for the 
Department of Justice and the police. I felt my job Avas to merely 
keep the White House informed as to what might happen or was 
happening. My own desires were sometimes superseded when Mr. 
Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman did not like the way a particular demon- 
stration was being handled. Sometimes they so instructed me to inform 
the Justice Department or Chief Wilson of the INIetropolitan Police 
and sometimes Mr. Ehrlichman would so inform Justice or the Chief 

As soon as a potential demonstration was in the wind, I began receiv- 
ing calls from Mr. Larry Higby, Mr. Haldeman's principal staff as- 
sistant, requesting intelligence reports. I also received frequent com- 
plaints regarding the quality of the available information, despite the 
fact that I felt the White House had the best information available to 
the Government. 

I became directly and personally aware of the President's own inter- 
est in my reports regarding demonstrations w^hen he called me during 
a demonstration of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War which 
occurred on the Mall in front of the Capitol. This was the occasion in 
May 1971 — I believe that is the date — when the Government first 
sought to enjoin the demonstration and later backed dow^n. The Presi- 
dent called me for a first-hand report during the demonstration and 
expressed his concern that I keep him abreast of what was occurring. 
Accordingly, we prepared hourly status reports and sent them to the 

I was made aware of the President's strong feelings about even the 
smallest of demonstrations during the late winter of 1971, when the 
President happened to look out the windows of the residence of the 
White House and saw a lone man with a large 10-foot sign stretched 
out in front of Lafayette Park. INIr. Higby called me to his office to tell 
me of the President's displeasure with the sign in the park and told me 
that Mr. Haldeman said the sign had to come down. When I came out 
of Mr. Higby's office, I ran into Mr. Dwight Chapin who said that he 
was going to get some "thugs" to remove that man from Lafayette 
Park. He said it would take him a few hours to get them, but they 
could do the job. 

Senator Erat^x. The audience is here by the consent of the committee, 
and I am goinsf to request the audience to refrain from giving expres- 
sion of their feelings by laughter or otherwise. I hope the audience 
will restrain themseh'es in that respect. 

Mr. Deax. I told him I didn't believe that was necessary. I then 
called the Secret Service and met Avith INIr. Louis Sims. Mr. Sims said 


that he felt that the Park Police could work it out. I went out with 
Mr. Sims, surveyed the situation, and Mr. Sims talked with the Park 
Police. Within 30 minutes the man had been convinced that he should 
move to the backside of Lafayette Park. There the sign was out of 
sight from the Wliite House. I reported back to Mr. Haldeman and 
after a personal look see, he was delighted. I told Mr, Chapin he could 
call off the troops. 

I also recall that the first time I ever traveled with the President 
was on his trip in 1971 to the Football Hall of Fame and on to Iowa 
to open a dam. After arriving at the Akron-Canton airport, I noticed 
that there was virtually no hostile demonstrator in sight of the Presi- 
dent. Later when the President arrived at the motel where he was 
spending the night in Akron, I was a few paces behind him as he 
walked into the lobby. Across the street were chanting, Vietcong flag- 
waving demonstrators. The President, after seeing the demonstrators 
told the Secret Service agent beside him, in some rather blunt syno- 
nyms, to get the demonstrators out of there. The word was passed, but 
the demonstrators couldn't be moved — much to the distress of the 
advance men who were responsible for the President's trip. 

It was after observing that incident that I talked with several in- 
dividuals in charge of advancing Presidential visits that I learned a 
major part of any Presidential trip advance operation was insuring 
that demonstrators were unseen and unheard by the President. 

In early February of 1972, I learned that any means — legal or il- 
legal — were authorized by Mr. Haldeman to deal with demonstrators 
when the President was traveling or appearing some place. I would 
like to add that when I learned of the illegal means that were being 
employed, I advised that such ta'ctics not be employed in the future 
and if demonstrations occurred — they occurred. 

I stated earlier that there was a continuing dissatisfaction with the 
available intelligence reports. The most frequent critic was INIr. Halde- 
man, but the President himself discussed this with me in early March 
of this year, as a part of the planned counteroffensive for dealing with 
the Senate Watergate investigation. The President wanted to show 
that his opponents had employed demonstrators against him during 
his reelection campaign. However, with each demonstration that the 
President was confronted with, and each incident that occurred during 
the campaign, my office had sought to determine if it had in fact been 
instigated by political opponents of the President — Senator IMcGovern, 
the Democratic Party, or whomever. We never found a scintilla of 
viable evidence indicating that these demonstrators were part of a 
master plan ; nor that they were funded by the Democratic political 
funds; nor that the}^ had any direct connection with the McGovern 
campaign. This was explained to Mr. Haldeman, but the President 
believed that the opposite was, in fact, true. I have submitted to the 
committee the text of the President's memorandum to me on the 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34—1.*] 

Mr. Dean. On Febmary 16, 1973, which was almost a month prior 
to this direct request from the President, I had, at Mr. Haldeman's 
request, received all the available intelligence on the demonstrations 
the President had been subjected to during the 1972 campaign. This 

♦See p. 1100. 


intelligence did not evidence what the President was looking for, but 
I turned it over to Mr. William Baroody, telling him the President 
wanted a speech as part of the counteroffensive to the Watergate 
inquiry. Several weeks later Baroody reported, that he too agreed that 
the information wasn't there for a speech. 

While there were other things which occurred, that evidence the 
concern about demonstrators, I believe the foregoing gives the com- 
mittee a good sampling of the degree of concern. 

Concern About Leaks 

The committee has asked me about concern over leaks. I believe that 
most anyone who worked at the Wliite House during the past 4 years 
can attest to the concern that prevailed regarding leaks — any and all 
leaks. This was a matter of frequent discussions among staff members 
and in some instances leaks were investigated by Haldeman's or Ehr- 
lichman's office. I have submitted to the committee documents evidenc- 
ing the types of investigations made. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 34-2.*] 

Mr. Dean. I began to understand the high degree of concern after 
I got to know Mr. Jack Caulfield, who had been assigned to my staff. 
I would guess that I had been at the White House almost i year, 
before Mr. Caulfield told me that he had been directed by Mr. Ehrlich- 
man to wiretap a newsman's telephone in pursuit of a leak. Mr. Caul- 
field told me that the wiretap was on for only a short period of time 
because he believed the FBI had subsequently taken over. He told me 
that he had been directed to perform the wiretap when Mr. Hoover 
was unwilling, but Mr. Ehrlichman wished to proceed. 

The wiretap was undertaken, as I recall, in late 1969 or early 1970. 
Caulfield told me that it was performed by Mr. Ulasewicz, Mr. John 
Regan, and himself. He later repeated the story to me telling me that 
it had been a rather harrowing experience when he was holding the 
ladder in a back alley of Georgetown while also trying to keep a look 
out as another member of the group was working at the top of the 
ladder. He also told me that he received what he referred to as the 
"pair numbers" from INIr. John Davies, who was then on the White 
House staff, but who had previously been employed or had an associa- 
tion with the telephone company before joining the White House staff. 

I do not know what information, if anv, they obtained, nor do I 
know anv other details other than what I have related above. I have 
no idea if the reason for tlie wiretap was related to national security 
and I believe Mr. Caulfield told me it was indeed Joseph Kraft's tele- 
phone they tapped. 

TMiile there was an always present concern about leaks, that concern 
took a quantum jump when the New York Times began publishing the 
Pentagon Papers in June 1971. After the initial lesral skirmish to 
enjoin publication of the napers had died down, the "\"\liite House con- 
cern about the problem of leaks had heightened. 

To the best of mv recollection — I have been unable to confirm this 
throujrh the TNHiite House records^it was late June or earlv Julv 
that Jack Caulfield came to me to tell me that INIr. Colson had called 
him in, at Ehrlicliman's direction, and instructed him to burglarize 

•See p. 1101. 


The Brookings Institute in an effort to determine if they had certain 
leaked documents. What prompted ]Mr. Caulfield to come to me was 
that he thought the matter was most unwise and that his instructions 
from Mr. Colson were insane. He informed me that Mr. Uhisewicz had 
"cased'' The Brookings Institute and that Mr. Uhisewicz had made a 
friendly contact with one of the security men in the buikling, but the 
security system at the Brookings building was extremely tight and it 
would be very difficult to break-in. Caulfield told me that he had so 
informed Colson, but that Colson had instructed him to jnirsue the 
matter and if necessary he should jDlant a firebomb in tlie building ana 
retrieve the documents during the commotion tliat woukl ensue. Mr. 
Caulfield said Colson's entire argument for burglarizing the lirookings 
was based on a publication he had obtained indicating that the Brook- 
ings was planning for the fall — 1971 — a study of Vietnam based on 
documents of a current nature, and a former consultant to the Xational 
Security Council worked there. 

Caulfield convinced me that Colson was intent on proceeding, by 
one means or another, so I advised Caulfield that he should do nothing 
further, that I would immediately fly to California and tell Ehrlich- 
man that this entire thing was insane. 

I flew to California on a militarv aircraft courier flight that was 
going to San Clemente. I sat with Mr. Robert ]Mardian on the flight, 
who told me he was going to see the President about a highly im- 
portant matter that he could not discuss with me — a matter which I 
will refer to later. AVlien I arrived in California I arranged to see 
Ehrlichman and told him that the burglary of Brookings was insane — 
and, to persuade him, probably impossible. He said OK and he called 
Mr. Colson to call it off, and t called Mr. Caulfield to tell him it was 
called off. 

It was not until almost 1 year or more later that I learned the reason 
for Mardian's trip to see the President. Mr. ]\[ardian later told me. in a 
social conversation, that he had gone to see the President to get in- 
structions regarding the disposition of wiretap logs that related to 
newsmen and "\"\^iite House staffers who were suspected of leaking. 
These logs had been in possession of Mr. William Sullivan, an As- 
sistant Director of the FBI, and were, per Mr. Mardian's instructions 
from the President, given to Ehrlichman. 

I had occasion to raise a question about these logs with Ehrlichman 
during the fall of 1972, and he flatly denied to me that he had tlie logs. 
I did not tell him at that time I liad been told he had them and it was 
about February 22 or 23 of this year. Time magazine notified the 
White House it was going to print a story that the "\"\niite House had 
undertaken wiretaps of newsmen and White House staff and a re- 
sponse was being asked for and I further got into the matter. 

The White House press office notified me of this inquiry. I called 
Mr. INIark Felt at the FBI to ask him first what the facts were, and 
second, how such a story cor.ld leak. Mr. Felt told me that it was true, 
that INIr. Sullivan knew all the facts and that he had no idea how it 
leaked. I then called INfr. Sullivan and requested tliat he drop by my 
office, which he did. He explained that after much haggling, that the 
wiretaps were installed, but as I i-ecall, Afr. Sullivan said they did not 
have the blessing of Director Hoovei-. Mr. Sullivan explained to me 
that all but one set of the logs had been destroved and all the internal 


FBI records relatinfj to the wiretaps except one set, had been de- 
stroyed and all the material had been delivered to Mr. INIardian, After 
Mr. Sullivan departed. I called ]Mr. ]Mitchell who told me he also had 
an inquiry from Time magazine and denied to Time magazine any 
knowledge of the matter. I did not press him further as to what he 
did know. 

I then called Mr. Ehrlichman and told him about the forthcoming 
story in Time magazine. I told him of my conversations with Felt, 
Sullivan, and Mitchell. I also told him I knew he had the logs because 
Mr. Mardian had told me. This time he admitted they were in his safe. 
I asked him how ]Mr. Ziegler should handle it. He said ^h\ Ziegler 
should flatly deny it — period. I thanked him, I called Mr. Ziegler and 
so advised him. 

Turning now to the so-called "plumbei's" unit that was created to 
deal with leaks. I first heard of the plumbers unit in late July 1971. I 
do not recall ever being actually advised in advance that such a unit was 
being created in the "White House, but I stumbled into it unknowingly 
when Mr. Egil Krogh happened to mention it to me. I was not in- 
volved in its establishment ; I only know that ]\Ir. Krogh and ]SIr. 
David Young were running it under Ehrlichman's direction. Shortly 
after Mr. Krogh told me about his unit, he told me that thev were 
operatinjz out of a supersecured location in the basement of the Execu- 
tive Office Building. He invited me down to see the unit, which I did 
and he showed me the sensor security system and scrambler phone. 

I never discussed with y[r. Krogh or Mr. Young what they were 
doing or how they were doing it. It was through Jack Caulfield that 
I learned that Mr. Gordon Liddy was working with Mr. Krogh. I 
did not know Liddy personally, although I may have met him. All I 
knew about Mr. Liddy was that Mr. Caulfield had told me and was 
to the effect that Mr. Gene Rossides of the Treasury Department and 
Liddy had a falling out, and Krogh waded into the middle of the 
dispute by hiring Liddy and bringing him into the "White House. 

I did not realize that Mr. Howard Hunt worked — most of his time 
while he was at the "White House — in the plumbers unit until after 
June 17, 1972. I had seen Hunt on many occasions in Colson's office, 
and finally asked Mr. Colson who he was. He told me that he was 
doing some consultant work for him and introduced me. That was the 
only time I ever talked with Mr. Hunt. 

I am not aware of what success the plumbers unit had in its dealing 
with leaks. I recall on one occasion after Jack Anderson printed the 
documents from a National Security Council meeting asking Bud 
Krogh if they had figured out who leaked the information to Mr. 
Anderson. He told me, yes, but that he couldn't disclose the name of 
the individual. 

As I have indicated, the June 1971 publication of the Pentagon 
Papers caused general consternation at the "White House over the leak 
problem. On June 29. 1971, the President brought the subject of leaks 
up in a Cabinet meeting as a part of a "White House orchestrated 
effort to curtail all leaks. As a part of that effort. Mr. Haldeman in- 
structed Mr. Fred ^Slalek. Mr. Larry Higby, Mv. Gordon Strachan, 
and myself to develop a followup strategy for dealing with leaks. 
Mr. Malek and I never took the project very seriously, but Strachan 
and Higbv continued to push. I have submitted to the committee 
memorandums outlining the project that finally developed. 


[The documents referred to ^vere marked exhibit No. 34—3.*] 
Mr. Dean. Mr. Malek was to take charge and Mr. Haldeman was 
to be brought in as the "Lord High Executioner" when a leak was 
uncovered. The committee will note from the documents I have sub- 
mitted, this project was to complement and not compete with the 
plumbers. To the best of my knowledge this project never uncovered 
the source of a single leak. 

I shall turn now, pursuant to the committee's request of me, from 
leaks to the matter of political intelligence, with the hope that my 
voice will hold up through this entire statement. 

Interest in Political Intelligence 

The pre-reelection "White House thrived on political gossip and 
political intelligence. I knew of the type of information they sought 
even before I joined the White House staff. During the summer of 
1969, while I was working at the Justice Department, the then Dep- 
uty Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst, called me into his office 
and told me that the White House wanted some very important in- 
formation. Mr. Kleindienst instructed me to call Mr. DeLoach, then 
Deputy Director of the FBI, and obtain from him information re- 
garding the foreign travels of Mary Jo Kopechne. I was told that 
Mr. DeLoach would be expecting a call from me and once I had the 
information in hand, I was to give it to Jack Caulfield at the "^Tiite 

This incident stuck in my mind because of the rather sensitive 
nature of the information being obtained from the FBI and the fact 
that I was made the courier of the information. 

To this day I can only speculate that I was asked to convey the 
information so that others could deny they had done so should the 
matter become known. 

It was not until I joined the "White House staff and Caulfield was 
placed on my staff that I learned that Caulfield was assigned to 
develop political intelligence on Senator Edward Kennedy. 

Mr. Caulfield told me that within some 6 hours of the accident at 
Chappaquiddick on July 18, 1969, he had a friend named Tony on 
the scene, who remained on the scene conducting a private investiga- 
tion of the matter and reporting pertinent information back to him. 
It was not until this spring that I knew or could remember Tony's full 
name — Anthony LTlasewicz. Caulfield told me that Mr. Ulasewicz posed 
as a newspaper reporter, and always asked the most embarrassing 
questions at any press gathering related to the Chappaquiddick inci- 
dent. Caulfield also informed me that his instructions were to continue 
surveillance of Senator Kennedy and that he was doinp- so on n selected 
basis. I was told by Caulfield that although he had been assigned 
to my staff that he would continue to perform various intelligence 
gathering functions assigned to him by ]\Ir. Ehrlichman or Mr. 

I recall only once becoming involved in Mr. Caulfield's activities 
relating to Senator Kennedy. That occurred in the fall of 1971 when 
I received a call from Larry Higby, who later — and I can say later 
these talks were followed up with' ]Mr. Strachan, who told me that 

•See p. 1111. 


Haldeman wanted 24:-hoiir surveillance of Senator Kennedy and regu- 
lar reports on his activities. I passed this on to Caulfield and we dis- 
cussed it. He told me that he thought that this was most unwise 
because it would require several men and also could uncover his 
activities in that Senator Kennedy was bound to realize he was under 
surveillance and given the fact that it could easily be misinterpreted 
as someone who was planning an attack on his life, and the police or 
the FBI might be called in to investigate. I agreed fully with Caul- 
field. After some initial resistance. I convinced Higby that it was a 
bad idea to have a dav-in-and-day-out surveillance and it was called 
off. Instead, Caulfield was to keep a general overview of Senator 
Kennedy's activities and pursue specific investigations of activities 
that might be of interest. 

Caulfield seldom informed me of his findings, but occasionally he 
would bring matters to my attention. For example, Caulfield was 
instructed to investigate Senator Kennedy's visit to Honolulu in 
August 1971. I have submitted to the committee a copy of his report, 
which he passed on for me to see, along with several followup memo- 
randums relating to the visit. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34—4.*] 

Mr. Deax. Political intelligence often came from unexpected sources. 
For example, during this last spring of 1972, a top man at the Secret 
Service brought me information regarding Senator McGovern. I 
asked Mr. Colson if he were interested. He was very interested and had 
the information published. 

The persons on the '\^nnte House staff who were most interested in 
political intelligence were Ehrlichman. Haldeman, and Colson. As the 
reelection campaign drew closer, I would have to say that it was prin- 
cipally Colson and sometimes Haldeman w^ho sought infonnation from 
my oiSce that had political implication to it. "\^niilc I have been unable 
to make a complete review of my office files to document the many types 
of inquiries, I do have some documents that evidence a fair sampling 
of the type of requests that were frequently made of me and how they 
were handled by my office. The documents are extremely sensitive and 
could be injurious to innocent people whose names are mentioned in 
them. Accordingly. I have submitted them for the committee's use, and 
I am prepared to answer any questions the committee may have regard- 
ing these documents. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit Xo. 34-5 for 
identification only and are not for publication.] 

Mr. Deax. In addition to the rather wide ranging types of inquiries 
evidenced by the documents I have just referred to, and in addition to 
the extensive efforts to obtain politically embarrassing information on 
Senator Kennedy, there were also frequent efforts to obtain politically 
embarrassing information on Mr. Lawrence OT^rien, the Democratic 
National Committee chairman. Senator Muskie, and Senator McGov- 
ern. While the involvement of my office in seeking such information 
was peripheral, I have submitted to the committee records and docu- 
ments which show the efforts of the White House to politically embar- 
rass those individuals. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 34-6, 34-7, 
and 34-8 for identification only and are not for publication.] 

•See p. 1117. 


Mr. Dean. Again, because of the very sensitive nature of informa- 
tion contained in these documents, and the problems that information 
might unfairly cause those individuals, I shall not discuss the docu- 
ments further, othei- than to point out to the committee that the inter- 
est in Mr. Larry O'Brien dates back, from my records, to the time I 
first joined the White House stall' in July 19TU, while the interest in 
Senators Muskie and McGovern developed as the reelection campaign 

I would now like to turn to a political intelligence and security plan 
that was designed for the campaign, but ultimately was rejected. 

Operation Sandwtidge 

While Caulfield was a member of my staff, the use of Mr. Ulasewicz 
slowly diminished, in that I had no need for such investigative work, 
and I only requested Caulfield to obtain investigative information 
when someone else on the staff requested it. While I did try to find 
assignments for Caulfield that related to the work of the counsel's 
office it was difficult in that he was not a lawyer. 

Mr. Caulfield was aware of this situation and in the spring of 1971 
he came to me and told me that he was thinking of leaving the White 
House staff and establishing an investigative/security consulting cor- 
poration. He felt that there was a need and a market for what he 
described as a "Republican intertel" — Intertel being a firm being a long 
established firm that has been in existence working in this field. He 
told me that he could have a going concern by campaign time and that 
his firm could provide investigative/security assistance to the 

We casually discussed this on several occasions. The basic and initial 
concept he had developed was an operation that could be funded by 
contracts with corporations. ISIr. Caulfiekl's firm would provide services 
for these corporations, but it would also provide free services to the 
1972 reelection campaign. I recall telling Caulfield tliat I could not help 
him in the intelligence field because I did not have any expertise in 
the area but I advised him that he should work with a lawyer in de- 
veloping the concept he had outlined to me because it was fraught with 
legal problems. For example, I told him corporations are prohibited 
under Federal law from making direct campaign contributions. 

Shortly after these conversations, Caulfield infosmed me that he had 
formed a group to develop a plan to submit to Mr, Ehrlichman, Mr. 
Haldeman, and Mr. Mitchell. The planning group intended to become 
the principal officers of the corporation once it commenced its activity. 
Caulfield and the group spent several months devolopiu:": their plans 
and in early August or September of 1971 Caulfield brought me a copy 
of a memorandum entitled Operation Sandwedge and told me he 
was seeking a meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman to discuss the matter and 
requested that T assist him in gettin>r a meetinjr with 'Mv. Mitchell. I 
do not know if Mr. Caulfield met with Mr. Ehrlichman. If he did, I 
was not present and have no knowledge of the meeting. 

I read the memorandum and found it to be a privately operated ex- 
tension of the types of things that Caulfield had boon i^orformin^r for 
Ehrlichman. T returned the memorandum to Caulfield and told him 
I would raise it with ^Mitchell. To the best of my recollection Opera- 


tion Sandwedge envisioned the creation of a corporation called Se- 
curity Consultino; Group, Inc., which was to have offices in Washing- 
ton, Chicago, and New York. It was to have an "overt" and "covert" 
capacity. The covert capacity would have operated out of New York — 
presumably under the aegis of INIr. Ulasewicz — and was to be separate 
and apart from the other operations in Washington and Chicago. The 
principal activity of the Security Consulting Group, Inc., was to pro- 
vide private security for all phases of the campaign, l3ut the New York 
"covert" operation would have the capacity to provide "bag men" to 
carr}' money and engage in electronic surveillance — if called upon to 
do so. 

Although I returned the copy of the Operation Sandwedge memo- 
randum given me by Caulfield, I did find in my records a copy of the 
proposed budget, which reflects some of the items I have just men- 
tioned. I also found a number of memorandums relating to the cam- 
paign security aspects of the plan. I have submitted these documents 
to the committee. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 34-9.*] 

Mr. Dean. I did discuss Operation Sandwedge with Mr. Mitchell. I 
recsiW that he was not interested at all. He told me that he thought 
Jack Caulfield was a fine person, but he felt the principal problems 
would relate to security and the problems that demonstrators might 
pose to the campaign. Mitchell said he wanted a lawyer to handle any 
such operation and asked me to think about candidates. I told him that 
Jack Caulfield had requested an opportunity to discuss his plan with 
him. and I told him that I told Jack I would convey the message. 
Mitchell did not wish to discuss the proposal, so T kept putting Caul- 
field off wheji he raised it with me because I liked Jack and did not 
want to hurt his feelings, so I continued to keep putting him off. 

I also recall that Ehrlichman raised Operation Sandwedge Avith 
me. I do not know if this was a result of his meeting with Caulfield or 
Caulfield sending him a copy of the memorandum. Ehrlichman told 
me that he would like to keep Tony Ulasewicz around during the cam- 
paiflfn. but he did not think much of Caulfield's pioposed gi-and plan. 
Ehrlichman told me that Mitchell knew about Tony T"^lasewicz and 
that ]Mitchell and Jack should talk about Tony's future. 

Meanwhile, Caulfield kept requesting an answcn- (m his plans. He 
had his heart set on his proposal; he had spent long hours preparing 
it and I knew he was going to be very disappointed to learn that it had 
been shot down. Every few weeks Caulfield would send an item to me 
to prompt me to take some action. I have submitted to the committee 
the tvpe of items he would send. 

TThe document referred to was marked exhibit No. .'')4-10.**] 

^Ir. Dkax. I would iust file them and do nothinsf, as T had decided 
that the best course of action to save Jack's feelings was to let the 
matter die a natural death through no action. Indeed, that happened. 

By November 1971, CaulfieVl realized that his plan was dead and 
he abandoned the idea. Realizing this, he told me he would like to work 
foi- Mr. ^Mitchell durinji the campaign as an nidc-de-cnmp. and re- 
ouested that I assist him in getting an appointment with Mitchell. 
T arranged for him to meet with ^Vfr. ^NFitchell on November 24, 1971. 

♦Sep p. 1121. 
•*See p. 1133. 


Pursuant to Mr. Caulfield's request, I was not present during 
the entire meeting, but Jack later said that Mitchell had requested 
that he do some investigative work on ^NlcCloskoy's campaign. Ap- 
parently, Caulfield convinced Mitchell that some greatly reduced ver- 
sions of Operation Sand wedge might be of value, or he was seeking 
to show Mitchell what he could do. At any rate, Caulfield continued to 
call his intelligence gathering capabilities Operation Sandwedge. I 
have submitted to the committee copies of the investigative report that 
Mr. Caulfield prepared for Mitchell on the ]McCloskey New Hamp- 
shire campaign, and I hasten to add that to the best of my knowledge, 
Caulfield employed no illegal procedures in gathering this infoi'mation, 
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No, 34—11.*] 
Mr. Dean. Pursuant to the request of Mr. Ehrlichman that Mr. 
Mitchell determine whether continued funding should be provided for 
Mr. Ulasewicz, Mitchell asked me what Ulasewicz had been doing. I 
told him that I did not know, but would have Caulfield prepare a 
summary of the activities. On January 12, 1972, I informed Mitchell 
that Caulfield had prepared such a list and suggested he meet with 
him. I will submit this to the committee. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-12.**] 
Mr. Deax. I would also note at this point that there is no list cover- 
ing that exhibit, because while I thought earlier I did have a list. I 
have searched my records that were available and I have no such list 
available. There is a possibility that such a list might be available in 
my files at the White House. 

I do not recall how this matter was resolved, but T believe some ar- 
rangement was made to compensate INIr. Ulasewicz, but to my knowl- 
edge, he was not used in any manner other than that to wliich T shall 
refer later in my statement. Mr. Caulfield and Mr. Kalmbach would 
know about the arrangements that were made. 

I shall now turn to my knowledge of how an intelligence unit was 
established at the reelection committee. 

Establishing an Intelligence- Gathering Capability at the 
Reelection Committee 

To the best of my recollection, it was the spring of 1971 that ^Ir. 
Haldeman discussed with me what my office should do during the 
forthcoming campaign year. He told me that we should take maxi- 
mum advantage of the President's incumbencv and the focus of every- 
one in the White House should be on reelecting the President. It was 
decided that the principal area of concern for mv office c^hould bo keep- 
ing the White House in compliance with the election laws and improv- 
ing our intelligence regarding demonstrators. T was also told tliat I 
should provide legal assistance in establishing the reelection committee 
and insuring that they had their own capacity to deal with the po- 
tential threats of demonstrations during the cam.paign and particu- 
larly at the convention. 

I advised Haldeman that Jack Caulfield was developing a security 
plan and that he wanted to discuss his plan with Mr. Mitchell and Mv. 
Ehrlichman. I also told him I would seek to get the Intcragonc}- Eval- 
uation Committee working on the potential for demonstrations during 

•S(^ p. 1134. 
••See p. 1149. 


the campaign and subsequently called Mr. Bernie Wells, the head of 
the lEC, to my office and told liim of the concorn of th.e White House 
for good intelligence during the coming campaign. 

During the months that followed, I devoted most of my time to regu- 
lar office functions, keeping abreast of the new campaign legislation 
and familiarizing myself with existing election laws, the Hatch Act, 
and related laws. It was not until after the proposed Operation Sand- 
wedge had been shelved and ^Nlagruder had left the White House to 
form the reelection committee, that I began receiving calls from Stra- 
chan and ]Magruder that I was expected to suggest a lawyer to head 
up the demonstration intelligence operation at the reelection com- 
mittee and to also serve as genei-al counsel. 

On several occasions Magruder told me that he would like to have 
Fred Fielding, my {>riiH'i|.;i! assistant, for this job. Fred Fielding and 
I discussed it, but rejected it for several reasons. First, Fielding was 
aware of the fact that 1 was considering leaving the White House at 
that time — I was actually interviewing for jobs outside of Govern- 
ment—and he knew that I would recommend that he succeed me as 

Second, if I stayed, I would need his assistance during the months 
ahead. I might add parenthetically, that as I look back, if I had 
accepted the job I was interviewing for at that time, I would not be 
sitting here today. 

After I informed Mr. Magruder that Mr. Fielding was not avail- 
able, he requested that I suggest someone else, because he was desper- 
ately in need of an in-house lawyer. Accordingly, I next went to Mr. 
Krogh and asked him if David Young might be available and inter- 
ested. Krogh told me that Young was very much involved in the 
declassification project and could not be spared. The reason Young 
had occurred to me is that I had spent several days traveling with him 
in mid-October 1971, interviewing prospective candidates for nomina- 
tion to the Supreme Court. I might add that during those days of 
traveling around the country together he nevei told me what the 
plumbers unit was doing or had done. But I felt that Mr. Young was 
a bright and extremely capable lawyer who would make an excellent 
general counsel, and could handle the security and demonstration prob- 
lems of the campaign. 

During my conversation with Mr. Krogh about Young, he suggested 
that Mr. Gordon Liddy might be available, in that he had just about 
completed his work. Krogh spoke very highly of Liddy's legal ability 
and said that his FBI/Treasury Department background in law 
enforcement would qualify him to handle a demonstration intelligence 
and security operation for the reelection committee. I did not know 
Mr. Lidd}" but I respected Krogh's judgment, both as to his judgment 
of other lawyers and his knowledge of law enforcement. Bud had dealt 
with the demonstration problems for the Wiite House before I joined 
the stalf. I asked Mr. Krogh to find out if Mr. Liddy was interested. 

Several days later Mr. Krogh informed me that Liddy was inter- 
ested and asked me to come to his (Krogh's) office and meet Liddy and 
describe the job. I did this. I told Liddy that the primary responsi- 
bility for the job was to serve as the lawyer for the reelection com- 
mittee, but among the responsibilities of the general counsel would be 
k<'>?ping abreast of the potential of demonstrations that might affect 
the campaign. Liddy said he was interested. Krogh said that lie would 
fii-st have to clear it with Ehrlichman. I advised them that Mr. ^Mitchell 


and Mr. Magruder would be making the decision on filling the post, 
and if Krogh got the OK from Ehrlichman, I would set up a meeting 
for Liddy to be interviewed by Mr. Mitchell. 

WhenMr. Krogh gave me the OK from Ehrlichinan, I called Mr. 
Mitchell and told him that Krogh, with Ehrlichman's approval, had 
suggested Gordon Liddy for the general counsel post and I arranged 
for Liddy to meet with Mitchell on November 24, 1971, after Mr. Caul- 
field met with Mr. Mitchell. I attended the meeting with Mitchell and 
Liddy, and I have submitted to the committee a copy of an agenda 
Mr. Liddy prepared for the interview session. 

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34—13.*] 

Mr. Dean. "While I cannot recall every detail that was discussed, I do 
recall that it was a very general job-type interview. ^Mitchell realized 
that Liddy was not familiar with the election laws and asked if I 
would assist him in any way I could in getting himself familiar with 
those laws. I agreed. There was virtually no discussion of intelligence 
plans, other than that Lidd}' would draw up some sort of plans. Most of 
the conversation centered around title and compensation. ]Mr. Mitchell 
agreed that Liddy would be titled general counsel. I do not recall 
the rate of his compensation. I also recall Liddy asking Mr. Mitchell 
when he would actually join the campaign, but Mitchell said he did 
not know. 

After this meeting, Mitchell called me to say that he wanted 
Magruder to interview Liddy because Magruder would be the man 
working most with him, I so advised Liddy and on December 8, 1971, 
INIr. M'agruder requested I bring Liddy over to his office for an inter- 
view. The interview in Magruder's office on December 8 was brief 
and nonsubstantive. Magruder told Liddy that he had a host of legal 
problems that needed attention immediately and pointed to a stack of 
papers that I assumed contained the problems that he was concerned 
about. There was a brief discussion of Liddy's responsibilities for 
demonstrations vis-a-vis the campaign and Liddy said that after he 
got acclimated to the committee's problems and needs he would draw 
up a plan. ^Lagnider requested that Liddy come to work as soon as 
possible, which I believe was the following Monday. 

After Liddy was hired at the reelection committee, I informed my 
staff — principally Mr. Fred Fielding and Mr. David Wilson — that 
they should assist Liddy in becoming familiar with the election laws. 
I made my election law files available to Liddy and believe that he 
used them and he had periodic contact with my staff and myself on 
election law matters. 

I can recall that I had several discussions with Liddy about his 
responsibilities with the reelection committee in complying with the 
election laws. He told me that he had more work than there were 
hours in the day to complete it. I urged him to get volunteer lawyers 
to assist him and suggested several names of lawyers who might assist 

I can also recall that several weeks after Liddy left the "WHiite House 
he was asked to turn in his White House pass. Liddy came to me and 
asked me to intervene on his behalf so that he might retain his pass 
and avoid the cumbersome procedures of clearance every time he 
wished to enter the White House. I thought that my office would have 

♦See p. 1150. 


a good deal of contact with Liddy, so I requested that he be permitted 
to keep his pass. This request was turned down, however, because 
they had decided to provide a fixed number of passes for the people 
at the reelection committee and ]Magruder would decide who got the 
passes, I so informed Liddy and never heard any more about the 

Liddy's Plax — ^Meetings in Mitchell's Office 

The next time I recall meeting with Mr. Liddy — I might say before 
this that I did have a brief occasion to see him in early January, I 
believe about the 9th through the 14th or 15th, when he attended a 
general conference in San Diego on the entire scope of the conven- 
tion and the security problems that were goirig to confront the com- 
mission in San Diego. 

After that, the next time I recall meeting Mr. Liddy was at a meet- 
ing in ]Mitcheirs office on January 27, 1972, Magruder called my office 
to set up the meeting and only after I called ISlagruder to ask why he 
wanted me to attend the meeting did I learn that Liddy was going 
to present his intelligence plan. I met Magruder and Liddy at Mitchell's 
office. Liddy had a series of charts or diagrams which he placed on an 
easel and the presentation by Liddy began. 

I did not fully understand everything Mr. Liddy was recommend- 
ing at the time because some of the concepts were mind-boggling and 
the charts were in code names, but I shall attempt to reconstruct the 
high points that I remember as best I can. Liddy was in effect making 
a sales pitch. He said that the operations he had developed would be 
totally removed from the campaign and carried out by professionals. 
PLans called for mugging squads, kidnaping teams, prostitutes to 
compromise the opposition, and electronic surveillance. He explained 
that the mugging squad could, for example, rough up demonstrations 
that were causing problems. The kidnaping teams could remove 
demonstration leaders and take them below the Mexican border and 
thereby diminish the ability of the demonstrators to cause problems 
at the San Diego convention. The prostitutes could be used at the 
Democratic convention to get information as well as compromise the 
persons involved. I recall Liddy saving that the girls would be high 
class and the best in the business. Wlien discussing the electronic sur- 
veillance, he said that he had consulted with one of tlie iK-st authori- 
ties in the country and his plan envisoned far more than bugging and 
tappinjr phones. He said that, under his plan, communication lietween 
ground facilities and aircraft could also be intercepted. 

I might also add that he gave an elaborate description of intercepting 
various microwaves to travel around the country through various com- 
munication facilities and T cannot explain to the committee what that 
was, because to this day, I do not understand it. 

Each maior aspect of his proposal was on a chart, with one chart 
showing the interrelationship with the others. Each operation was 
given a code name. I have no 7-ecollection of the«e code names. With 
rerrard to surveillance, and T do not recall that this was necessarily 
limited to electi'onic surveillance, he su.<T^.f>'os<"od several i:»otential tarirets. 
T cannot recall for certain if it was during this meeting or at the second 
meetinn- in earlv February that ho sup-^est^ed the potential tar.trets. The 
targets that T recall he suggested were Mr. Larrv O'Brien, the Demo- 
C7\atic headquarters, and the Fontainebleau Hotel during the Demo- 


cratic Convention. Mr. Liddy concluded his presentation by sajdng 
that the plan would cost approximately $1 million. 

I do not recall Magruder's reaction during the presentation plan 
because he was seated beside me but T do recall Mitchell's ronction to 
the "Mission Impossible" plan. He was amazed. At one point I gave 
him a look of bewilderment and he winked. Knowing Mitcliell, I did 
not think he would throw Liddy out of the office or tell him he was 
out of his mind, rather he did what I expected. Allien the presentation 
was completed, he took a few long puffs on his pipe and told Liddy 
that the plan he had developed was not quite what he had in mind and 
the cost was out of the question. He suggested to Liddy iie go back and 
revise his plan, keeping in mind that he was most interested in the 
demonstration problem. 

I remained in MitcheH's office for a brief moment after the meeting 
ended, as the charts were being taken off the easel and disassembled 
and Mitchell indicated to me that Mr. Liddv's proposal was out of the 
question. I joined Magruder and Liddv and as we left the office I told 
Liddy to destroy the charts. Mr. Liddy said that he would revise the 
plans and submit a new proposal. At that point I thought the plan 
was dead, because I doubted if INIitchell would reconsider the matter. 
I rode back to mv office with Liddy and Magruder, but there was no 
further conversation of the plan. 

The next, time I became aware of any discussions of such plans oc- 
curred, I believe, on Februarv 4, 1972. Magruder had scheduled 
another meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office on a revised intelligence plan. 
I arrived at the meeting very late and when I came in, Mr. Liddy was 
presenting a scaled down version of his earlier plan. I listened for a 
few minutes and decided I had to interject myself into the discussions. 
Mr. Mitchell, I felt, was being put on the spot. The only polite way I 
thought I could end the discussions was to inject that these discussions 
could not go on in the Office of the Attorney General of the United 
States and that the meeting should terminate immediately. 

At this point the meeting ended. I do not know to this day who kept 
pushing for these plans. Whether Liddy was pushing or whether 
Magruder was pushing or whether someone was pushing ISIagruder, I 
do not know. I do know, in hindsight, that I should have not been as 
polite as I was in merelv suggesting that Liddy destroy the charts 
after the first meeting. Rather, I should have said forget the plan 
completely. After I ended the second meeting, I told Liddy that I 
would never again discuss this matter with him. I told him that if any 
such plan were approved, I did not want to know. One thiusr was cer- 
tain in my mind, while someone wanted this operation, I did not want 
any part of it, nor would I have anv part of it. 

After this second meeting in Mitchell's office, I sought a meeting 
with Mr. Haldeman to tell him what was occurring, but it took me 
several days to get to see him. I recall that Higby got me into Halde- 
man's office when another appointment had been canceled or post- 
poned. I told Haldeman what had been presented by Liddv and told 
him that I felt it was incredible, unnecessary, and unwise. I told him 
that no one at the White House should have anythin.qf to do with this. 
I said that the reelection committee will need an ability to deal with 
demonstrations, it did not need bugging, mugging, prostitutes, and 
kidnapers. Haldeman agreed and told me I should have no further 
dealings on the matter. 


I assumed the Liddy plan was dead iii that it would never be ap- 
proved. I recall Liddy coming into my office in late February or early 
March on a matter relatino; to the election laws. He started to tell me 
that he could not get his plan approved and I reminded him that I 
would not discuss it with him. He stopped talking about it, and we 
went on with our business. 

I have thought back over the sequence of events and tried to deter- 
mine if I in any way encouraged Mr. Liddy and his intelligence plans. 
I am certain of this — I did not encourage him to develop illegal tech- 
niques, because I was unaware he was developing such plans. 

Between the meeting in ]Mitchell's office on February 4, 1972, and 
June 19, 1972, I had no knowledge of what had become of Liddy 's 
proposal. I did receive a memorandum from Magruder on INIarch 26, 
1972 that indicated that Liddy was doinn^ some investigative work for 
Magruder, but nothing that appeared illegal. Let me explain. 

During the first v^eek of iMaicli 19.2, Lanv Iligb>, Kaldeman's 
assistant, called me to request for Haldeman any information that 
Caulfield could come up with regarding the funding of the Democratic 
Convention in Miami. On March 15, 1972, I forwarded a newspaper 
article that Caulfield had discovered on the subject. Later that day 
Magruder brought to me a copy of a memorandum from Liddy to 
Mitchell regarding an investigation Liddy had conducted — using 
Howard Hunt — in Florida. I called Higby and he said that Magruder 
had already given him a copy. I told Higby that I did not see anything 
illegal by the Democrats based on the information in the memorandum. 
I made a notation on the bottom of the memorandum from Mr. Liddy, 
but I did nothing further and heard nothing further from Higby on 
the subject. I have submitted to the committee the documents I have 
just referred to. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 34-14.*] 

Mr. Deax. I shall now turn to the events following the "Watergate 
incident of June 17, 1972. and begin by telling the committee how I 
first learned of the incident. 

I will skip the first part here explaining how I ended up being out 
of the country when the decision was made in late May and returned 
on June 18, from the Far East. 

First Knowledge of Watergate Incident 

In late May of 1972 the Bureau of Xarcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs asked me to deliver a graduation address at its Training 
School in Manila, Philippines, on Saturdav, June 17, 1972. I noti- 
fied Mr. Alex Butterfield, pursuant to White House procedures 
for staff contemplating foreign travel, on June 7, and informed 
I\Ir. Butterfield that I planned to depart on June 14 and return 
on June 18 and that the trip had been cleared by the State 
Department, tlie National Security Council, and Bud Krogh (who 
had responsibility for the drug program on the "\^^lite House 
Domestic Council). ^Nlr. Butterfield also approved the trip and 
I departed for Manila on June 14. 

♦See p. 1151. 

Note. — Indented matter represents portions of Mr. Dean's prepared statement which 
were omitted or summarized in his presentation. 


I returned from this 4-day trip to the Far East on the morning of 
June 18. When I landed in San Francisco, after 20 hours of 
flying, I called my assistant, Fred Fielding, to check in and tell him 
that I was going to spend an additional day in San Francisco to get 
some sleep before I returned to Washington and, accordingly, I would 
not be in the office until Tuesday. It was at this time that I first learned 
from Mr. Fielding of the break-in at the DNC headquarters. Mr. Field- 
ing told me that he thought I should return home immediately as there 
might be a problem and that he would fill me in when I got home. I 
recall that at first I resisted, but Mr. Fielding, who was not explicit at 
that time, told me I should come back so that he could fill me in. 

Accordingly, I flew back to Washington and arrived on Sunday 
evening. I had a brief conversation with Mr. Fielding and he informed 
me that he had learned from Jack Caulfield that Mr. McCord from 
the reelection committee was among those arrested in the Democratic 
National Committee headquarters on Saturday and also that one of 
the Cubans arrested had a check that was made out by Howard Hunt 
to some country club. I recall that my immediate reaction was that 
Chuck Colson was probably involved. I was truly exhausted at this 
point so I told Mr. Fielding that I couldn't do anything at that time 
and I went to bed without doing a thing. 

On Monday morning, June 19, I arrived at my office about 9 :lo, 
my normal arrival time at the office. While reading the news accounts 
of the incident, I received a call from Jack Caulfield who repeated 
what Mr. Fielding had told me on Sunday evening. Mr. Caulfield in- 
formed me that he had received the information from Mr. Boggs of 
the Secret Service. I next received a call from Mr. Magruder and, as 
best I can recall, Magruder said something to the effect that tliis might 
create some problems and I should look into it. He also stated that 
this was all Liddy's fault and he volunteered a few harsh epithets 
regarding Liddy. I also recall Magruder mentioning something about 
how the committee was going to handle the matter publicly but I can- 
not remember specifically what he stated regarding this. I told Ma- 
gruder that I had just arrived back in the country and did not know 
any of the facts surrounding the incident, but I would look into it. 

I next received a call from Ehrlichman, who instructed me to find 
out what I could and report back to him. I advised Ehrlichman of 
my call from Magruder and told him I probably should talk to 
Liddy — he agreed. I recall that Ehrlichman told me to find out what 
Colson's involvement was in the matter and he also suggested I speak 
with Mr. Kleindienst to see what the Justice Department knew about 
it. I told him I would report back to him after I talked with Liddy. 
I next received a call from Gordon Strachan who said he wanted to 
meet with me. I informed him that I would not be able to meet with 
him until early in the afternoon. He said he would drop by my office 
after lunch. 

I next talked with Chuck Colson on the phone. I asked him what he 
knew about the incident and he vehemently protested that he knew 
nothing and had no involvement in the matter whatsoever. Colson 
advised me that Ehrlichman had spoken with him earlier regarding 
Mr. Hunt, earlier during that weekend, and Colson said that we should 
get together with Ehrlichman as soon as possible. I recall asking 
Colson if Hunt still worked for him and again he became very de- 


fensive and stated that he was merely on his paja-oll as a consultant 
because Ehrlichman had so requested. He asked me to determine if 
Hunt was still on his payroll and I said I would check. Colson also 
expressed concern over the contents of Hunt's safe. Several weeks 
later — probably 4 or 5 — I learned from Paul O'Brien, who was 
representing the reelection committee, that he had learned from ]Mr. 
Hunt's attorney, Mr. William Bittman, that Hunt and Colson spoke 
on the telephone over the weekend of June 17-18, and that Hunt had 
told Colson to get the materials out of his — Hunt's — office safe. 

Mr. Hugh Sloan called me to tell me he was worried. At that time 
I knew of no reason why Mr. Sloan should be worried so I told him 
not to worry. He told me that he would like to meet with me and I 
told him that I was trying to find out what had happened and re- 
quested we meet in a few days. I do not recall the precise date we did 

I next contacted Liddy and asked him to meet with me. He said he 
would come to my office. As he came into the office I was on my way 
out. I suggested we take a walk. It was shortly before noon and we 
walked down I7th Street toward the Corcoran Gallery'. 

I will try to reconstruct the conversation to the best of my memory. 
'\Miile I cannot recall every detail, I do indeed recall the major items 
we discussed. 

Mr. Liddy told me that the men who had been arrested in the DXC 
were his men and he expressed concern about them. I asked him why 
he had men in the DXC and he told me that ^Nlagruder had pushed 
him into doing it. He told me that he had not wanted to do it, but 
Magruder had complained about the fact that the}- were not getting 
good information from a bug the}^ had placed in the DXC sometime 
earlier. He then explained something about the steel structure of the 
Watergate Office Building that was inhibiting transmission of the bug 
and that they had gone into the building to correct this problem. He 
said that he had reported to Magruder that during the earlier entry 
of the DXC offices they had seen documents — w^iich I l)elieve he told 
me were either Government documents or classified documents — and 
Magruder had told him to make copies of those documents. 

Liddy was ver}^ apologetic for the fact that they had been caught and 
that Mr. ]McCord was involved. He told me that he had used ^Ir. 
McCord only because Magruder had cut his budget so badly. 1 asked 
him why one of the men had a check from ^Ir. Howard Hunt and he 
told me that these men were friends of Hunt and Hunt had put him 
in touch with them. I do not recall Liddv discussing any further in- 
volvement of Hunt, other than Hunt's putting him in touch with the 
Cubans. I asked him if anyone from the White House was involved 
and he told me no. 

As tlie conversation ended he again expressed his apologv and his 
concern about the men in jail. I told him I couldn't help and he said he 
understood. He also told me that he was a soldier and would never talk. 
He said if anvone w^ished to shoot him on the street, he was ready. 
As we parted I said I would be unable to discuss this with him further. 
He said he understood and I returned to mv office. 

Aft^r returning to mv office I arranged a meeting Avith Ehrlichman 
in his office for mid-after7ioon. Goi'don Strachan came to my office 
shortly after I had met with Liddy. Strachan told me that he had been 


instructed by Haldeman to go through all of Mr, Haldeman's files 
over the weekend and remove and destroy damaging materials. He 
told me that this material included such matters as memorandums from 
the reelection committee, documents relating to wiretap information 
from the DNC, notes of meetings with Haldeman, and a document 
which reflected that Haldeman had instructed Magruder to transfer 
his intelligence gathering from Senator Muskie to Senator McGovern. 
Strachan told me his files were completely clean. 

I spoke with Mr. Kleindienst and he told me that both the FBI 
and the D.C. Metropolitan Police were investigating, and he assumed 
that the FBI would take full jurisdiction of the case shortly. He also 
alluded to his encounter with Lidd}^ at Burning Tree Country Club, 
but did not explain this in full until I later met with him. I do not 
have a record of when I met with Mr. Kleindienst, but it was either 
on Monday, the 19th, or the next day. I will describe that meeting 

I met with Ehrlichman in the mid-afternoon and reported in full 
my conversation with Liddy. I also told Ehrlichman about the earlier 
meetings I had attended in Mitchell's office in late January and early 
February and my subsequent conversation with Haldeman. He told 
me he wanted to meet later with Colson and told me to attend. Ehrlich- 
man also requested that I keep him advised and find out from the 
Justice Department on what was going on. I did not mention my con- 
versation with Strachan because I assumed that Ehrlichman was aware 
of this from Haldeman himself. 

Later that afternoon I attended a second meeting in Ehrlich man's 
office with Colson. I recall Ehrlichman asking where Hunt was. I said 
I had no idea and Colson made a similar statement. At that point, be- 
fore the meeting had started, Ehrlichman instructed me to call Liddy 
to have him tell Hunt to get out of the country. I did this, Avithout 
even thinking. Shortly after I made the call, however, I realized that 
no one in the "WHiite House should give such an instruction 'owd raised 
the matter. A brief discussion ensued between Ehrlichman and myself. 
As I recall, Ehrlichman said that he was not a fugitive from justice, 
so why not. I said that I did not think it was very wise. At this point, 
Colson chimed in that he also thought it unwise and Ehrlichman 
agreed. I immediately called Liddy again to retract the request but he 
informed me that he had already passed the message and it might be 
too late to retract. 

Following this brief telephone skirmish refrardin,<r Hunt's travel 
plans, the meeting turned to Hunt's status at the 'Wliite House. I had 
learned from Fred Fielding, who I had asked to check on it, that Hunt 
had not drawn a check from his "White House consultantship since late 
March of 1072. But as far as I knew, the records indicated that Hunt 
was still a "Wliite House consultant to Colson. After discussions of this 
bv Colson, who at this point was disowning Hunt as a inomber of his 
staff, Ehrlichman called ^Nlr. Bruce Kehrli and requested that he bring 
Hunt's personnel records up to E'irlichman's office. Before Kehrli ar- 
rived, Colson raised the matter of Hunt's safe. Colson, without jretting 
specific, said it was imperative that someone sret tlie contents of Hunt's 
safe. Colson sugo"ested, and Ehrlichman concurred, that I take custody 
of the contents of the safe. 


When Kehrli arrived he was quizzed by Ehrlichman and Colson on 
Hunt's status at the "\^liite House. Colson was arouinor that Hunt 
should have been removed from the '\^niite House as of IVIarch 81, 1972. 
^Ir. Kehrli's records, however, did not so indicate. I have submitted to 
the committee memorandums that Colson forwarded to mc on June 
19, presenting his arofument. This was later resolved between Colson 
and Kehrli, pui-suant to Colson's argument. I always assumed that this 
required some alteration of the records, but I do not knoAv this for a 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. M-15*]^ 

Mr. Deax. Following this discussion, Ehrlichman asked Kehrli 
where Hunt's office was located and how the contents of his safe could 
be removed. Kehrli explained that he would have to have GSA open 
the safe. Colson said it must be done iunnediately and Ehrlichman 
instructed Kehrli to have me present when the safe was opened and 
that I should receive the contents of the safe. Kehrli said he would call 
me when he had made the arrangements and he then left Ehrlichman's 
office. Ehrlichman told me to report to him on the contents of Mr. 
Hunt's safe and the meeting ended. 

Kehrli called my office after I had departed. He talked with Fred 
Fielding and asked him to come with him to open Mr. Hunt's safe. I 
do not recall mentioning this to Fielding before I departed and I do 
not know what Kehi-li told Fielding, but Kehrli was aware from the 
earlier meeting with Ehrlichman that I was to receive the contents of 
the safe. 

After departing the office, I believe I went to ^Ir. Mitchell's apart- 
ment. I do not recall who asked me to come to Mitchell's apartment, 
and it may have been the evening of the 20th, rather than June 19. 
I recall that when I arrived, ]Mitchell, ^Nfardian, and Magruder 
were there and I gather had been discussing matters before I arrived. 
I recall listening, but can only recall discussions of how to handle the 
matter from a public relations standpoint. I have no other recollection 
of the meeting. 

It was on June 20 or 21 that Strachan and Mr. Eichard Howard 
came to my office. Strachan informed me that Haldeman had author- 
ized an expenditure by Colson of some funds, but the entire amount 
had not been expended and he was turning over the remainder to 
me to hold. I told ^Nfr. Strachan that I would hold the funds and would 
be accountable for them. I placed the cash, $15,200 in my safe. I 
informed Mr. Fielding of my office of the fact that the cash was in 
my safe and where it had come from. I felt I should inform Fielding 
because I wanted someone to know why the money was in my safe 
if anything should happen to me. 

The cash remained in my safe untouched until October 12, 1972, 
when I removed a packet of bills amounting to $4,850 and placed my 
iiersonal check for that amount with the remaining cash. I removed 
the $4,850 after I had failed to make arrangements to pay for the 
anticipated expenses of my wedding, and my honeymoon. I subse- 
quently expended the cash over a several month period of time as my 
honejinoon was cut short and the full amount I had anticipated was 
not necessary ; thus, I used part of the cash for normal daily expendi- 

•See p. 1157. 


tures. At one point after I had withdrawn the cash I returned part 
of it to the safe, and subsequently took it out again when I was later 
making another attempt, after the election, to go on a honeymoon. 

At no time when I was making personal use of part of these funds 
did I plan — or believe — that I would not have to account for the 
entire amount at some point in time. However, as I shall state later, 
there was great pressure, long before October, to use any and all 
available cash to pay for the silence of the individuals involved in the 
Watergate and I decided from the outset that I did not want the 
money I was holding to be used for that purpose. 

1 have never sought to hide the fact that I made personal use of 
this money from anyone. I informed my lawyers, 1 informed the 
Government prosecutors in April, and I informed ]Mr. Dash at the 
outset of our discussions. 

The money is presently in a trustee account which was established 
after I informed my lawyers of the fact I was holding the funds, 
and all the records relating to the creation of that account have been 
turned over to the Government and this committee as well, I believe. 

As I mentioned earlier in my statement, I met with the Attorney 
General, Richard Kleindienst, on either Monday, June 19, or Tues- 
day, June 20. I recall that before this meeting I had been asked by 
Ehrlichman to talk with Mr. Kleindienst about the scope of the in- 
vestigation, and I had already had my meetings with Liddy and 
Strachan. When I went to Kleindienst's office I found him totally dis- 
mayed and angered that such a stupid thing could occur. He then 
told me that over the previous weekend, while at the Burning Tree 
Country Club, Liddy — accompanied by ]Mr. Powell Moore — had 
sought him out. He said he was incredulous when Liddy stated that 
John ]SIitchell had instructed him (Liddv) to tell Kleindienst to get 
the men who had been arrested out of jail. He told me that Liddy was 
rattled and upset and wanted to talk about the entire matter, but 
Kleindienst told me that he cut Liddy off and told him he would not 
talk with him. 

I told Mr. Kleindienst that I did not have all the facts, but I was 
very concerned that this matter could lead directly to the President. 
I told him that I did not know if the President was involved, but I was 
concerned. I remember Kleindienst saying to me that he certainly 
hoped that the President was not involved or that I was not involved 
in any criminal activity. I told him that I had no idea that there was 
going to be a break-in at the Democratic National Committee head- 
quarters and I agreed with his continued assertion of its stupidity. 

I told Kleindienst, without giving him specifics, that I did not know 
what would happen if the investigation led into the White House, but 
that I suspected that the chances of reelecting the President would 
be severelv damaged. Kleindienst called Henry Petersen and asked 
Petersen to come to his office. "WTiile we were waiting for Petersen, 
Kleindienst told me that my superiors at the White House never 
understood that once an investigation begins, it runs its full course. 
He said that he was always being asked to take care of this matter or 
that matter, as if by magic he could make something unpleasant go 
away. T said I was well aware of that attitude and that I had never 
been able to get through to anyone at the White House that things 
just did not work that way. 

WTien Petersen arrived at Kleindienst's office he gave a status report 
of the investigation. Kleindienst then related my concern to Petersen. 
Petersen was troubled by the case and the implications of it. Klein- 
dienst had another meeting, so Petersen and I — I believe the other 
meeting was in his office, so Petersen and I went into Mr. Kleindienst's 
back office and talked further. To the best of my recollection, we did 
not discuss specifics, rather it was a general discussion. 

I told him I had no idea where this thing might end, but I told him 
I did not think tlie White House could withstand a wide-open investi- 
gation. The sum and substance of our conversation was that I had no 
idea how far this matter might go, but I had reason — without being 
specific — to suspect the worst. The meeting ended on that note, that I 
hoped I was wrong. 

I do not recall ever reporting this meeting to Ehrlichman, because 
he had a somewhat strained relationship with Kleindienst and I 
thought he would raise havoc that I did not have an assurance from 
Kleindienst that he would take care of everything. I did report, how- 
ever, that I felt Petersen would handle this matter fairly and not pur- 
sue a wide-open inquiry^ into everything the "White House had been 
doing for 4 years. I made this statement not because of anything Peter- 
sen specifically said, as much as the impression he gave me that he 
realized the problems of a wide-open investigation of the "White House 
in an election year. 

Returning now to the contents of Mr. Hunt's safe, it was mid-morn- 
ing on Tuesday, June 20, when the GSA men brought several cartons 
to my office, which contained the contents of Hunt's safe. I had learned 
earlier that morning from Fielding that the boxes had been secured in 
Kehrli's office overnight. Fielding also reported that they had found a 
handgun in the safe, which Kehrli had disengaged, a large briefcase 
containing electronic equipment, and a number of documents, some 
of which were classified. I told Fielding I would like his assistance 
later that day in going through the material. 

During the afternoon of the 20th, Fielding and I began going 
through the cartons of Hunt's materials. I remember looking in the 
briefcase, which contained electronic equipment. I frankly do not 
know what it was it contained, but it contained loose wires, chapsticks 
for your lips with wires coming out of them and instruction sheets 
for walkie-talkies. As I recall, there were also some antennas in there. 
We then began sorting the documents. The bulk of the papers were 
classified cables from the State Department relating to the early years 
of the war in Vietnam. These were separated out from the rest of 
the papers. The other papers I assumed related to Hunt's work at the 
"V^Tiite House. Also, there were personal papers. I will attempt, to the 
best of my recollection, to describe the papers and documents that 
were found in the safe. I must point out, however, that I personally 
did not look at all the documents, rather it was a combined effort by 
Fielding and myself to determine what was in Hunt's safe. 

First, among his personal papers were copies of his submissions for 
his per diem pay as a consultant, a few travel vouchers, and an enve- 
lope containing materials of a personal nature relating to his wife. 
Among the papers that I assumed related to his work at the "\"\niite 
House were numerous memorandums to Chucl/^Colson regarding 
Hunt's assessment of the plumbers unit operation and critical of Mr. 

96-296 O - 73 


Krogh's handling of matters ; a number of materials relating to Mr. 
Daniel Ellsberg, such as news clippings and a psychological study of 
Ellsberg which apparently had been prepared by someone who had 
never actually met or talked with Mr. Ellsberg ; a bogus cable — that is, 
other cables spliced together into one cable regarding the involvement 
of persons in the Kennedy administration in the fall of the Diem 
regime in Vietnam ; a memorandum regarding some discussion about 
the bogl^s cable with Colson and Mr. William Lambert; some materials 
relating to an investigation Hunt had conducted for Colson at Chap- 
paquidick, some materials relating to the Pentagon Papers and a 
paper*back book containing the published Pentagon Papers. 

Upon examining the contents of the safe, I recall that Fielding and 
I discussed our concern about the public impact some of these docu- 
ments might have if they became public, particularly in an election 
year. I requested that Fielding remove the politically sensitive docu- 
ments from the others, which he did. The classified State Department 
cables were too bulky for my own safe, so I called David Young and 
requested that he store them for me in his office, as I assumed at that 
time that they would probably be returned to the State Department. 
I told Young when he came to pick up the materials that they had 
come from Hunt's safe and he should store them — all together — until 
I told him what to do with them. Accordingly, Mr. Young took the 
State Department documents to his office. The large briefcase was 
stored in a locked closet in my office suite, and the politically sensitive 
documents and Hunt's personal papers were placed in a safe in my 
office. The remaining materials were left in the cartons on the floor in 
my office. 

I subsequently met with Ehrlichman to inform him of the contents 
of Hunt's safe. I gave him a description of the electronic equipment 
and told him about the bogus cable, the materials relating to Ellsberg 
and the other politically sensitive documents. I remember well his in- 
structions : He told me to shred the documents and "deep six" the brief- 
case. I asked him what he meant by "deep six." He leaned back in his 
chair and said : "You drive across the river on your way home at 
night — don't you?" I said, yes. He said, "Well, when you cross over 
the bridge on your way home, just toss the briefcase into the river." 

I felt very much on the spot, so I told him in a joking manner that 
T would bring the materials over to him and lie could take care of 
them because he also crossed the river on his way home at night. He 
said, no thank you, and I left his office and returned to my office. 

After leaving Erlichman's office I thought about what he had told 
me to do and was very troubled. I raised it with Fielding and he shared 
my feelings that this would be an incredible action to destroy potential 
evidence. I think Mr. Fielding appreciated my quandary — when Ehr- 
lichman said do something, he expected it to be done. I decided to think 
it over. I did take the briefcase out of my office because the closet that 
it was being stored in was used by the secretaries in the office and 1 
did not have an available safe to hold the large briefcnse. I was also 
giving serious consideration to Ehrlichman's instructions. Accordingly, 
I placed the briefcase in the trunk of my car, wliere it remained until 
I returned it to the office after I had reached a decision that T could 
not follow EhT'lichman's instructions. T will explain in a few minutes 
how I handled the material in Hunt's safe, but before doing so, I would 
like to continue with the sequence of events. 


Colson's FBI Interview 

To the best of my recollection it was on June 20 or 21, that Colson 
told me in a casual conversation in the hall outside his office about an 
incident that he thought was painfully humorous. He told me that a 
member of his staff, Mr. Douglas Hallett, had an office in the same 
suite with Mr. Hunt, and Hallett was talking with a wire service re- 
porter while Hunt was in the other office. Colson said to me something 
to the effect : "Can you believe what a story that reporter might have 
had if Hunt had come walking out of his office while Hallett was being 

Colson gave me the impression that this incident had occurred on 
June 17 or 19, but I do not recall which. However, I do recall Colson 
telling me that it had occurred, as Colson was very concerned about 
his relationship with Hunt. 

To the best of my recollection the FBI contacted me during the 
morning of June 22 and requested an interview with Colson. I so in- 
formed Colson, and an interview was arranged for that day. Colson 
said that he wanted me present when he was interviewed and also 
wanted to meet with me prior to the interview. He was insistent that 
I be present because he was concerned that the FBI report of the inter- 
view might not be accurate and he wanted someone else to attest to his 

Colson came to my office shortly before the scheduled meeting with 
the FBI. He said that he did not wish to get into unrelated matters 
and he said again that he had no information regarding the Water- 
gate. I told him I presumed that the agents would only be interested in 
his knowledge about the Watergate and his relationship with Hunt. 

The agents arrived, identified themselves, and somewhat to my sur- 
prise, gave Colson a warning of his rights, which he waived. I believe 
the committee has access to Mr. Colson's FBI interview, which was 
rather brief, Colson imparted very little information to them. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-16.*] 

Mr. Dean. I did not interject myself into the interview at any time, 
but did make some rough notes of items covered. In fact, I believe this 
was the only interview where I made any notes at all. I made these 
notes because Colson had expressed his concern before the interview 
regarding someone later being able to attest to his story. 

I have submitted to the committee the very rough notes, which have 
also been transcribed from my handwriting — the rough notes that I 
hastily jotted down during the interview, and find them very revealing 
in light of the statement that was made during the nomination hear- 
ings of Mr. Patrick Gray for the FBI directorship, and would like to 
digress for a moment regarding the comment that was made during 
those hearings that "Dean probably lied" to the FBI as to whether 
Hunt had an office in the White House. 

Dean Probably Lied 

During the interview of Mr, Colson on June 22, the agents asked 
him if Mr. Hunt had an office in the White House. Colson responded 
that he thought Mr. Hunt had an office in the EOB, but he did not 

•See p. 1160. 


know where it was located. This question came up about midway 
thronorh the interview and was not, as I recall, pursued further at that 
point by the agents, other than a question to me as to whether it would 
be possible to get the room number. I said yes. At the end of the inter- 
view and as the agents were departing, they asked me if they could 
see— not whether IMr. Hunt had — rather whether they could see Mr. 
Hunt's office right then. I told them I would have to check it out and 
get back to them. 

Those are the facts as I remember them, and Colson happened to 
stop by my office on the day that Grav said I probably lied. I asked 
Colson for this recollection of the matter and he stated that he remem- 
bered it as I had remembered it. At that time I had forgotten that I 
had made the notes during Colson's interview, which clearly reflected 
that Colson had stated during the interview that Hunt had an office in 
the "\'\niite House. A few days after Colson's interview I called the 
agents and told them I had the materials from Hunt's office and would 
get the material to them shortly. 

I learned after ]Mr. Gray made his statement during his nomination 
hearing that he based his conclusion on a report, written by the agents, 
some 7 months after the incident. "\^nien I talked with Gray about the 
matter during his nomination hearings and he informed me that he 
did not feel he could retract the statement without creating more 
problems, I told him that I did not think that the agents involved 
should be brought into the matter because I was sure that thev had 
honestly reported the matter as thev had remembered it. I had dealt 
with the agents involved on several occasions and felt that they had 
called it the way they had remembered it, so I let the matter drop and 
decided that I would just have to take the rather unpleasant heat 
and live with it. 

Mr. Chairman, this could be a point where I could summarize part 
of this statement regarding handling of the FBI interview with the 
White House and just merely state generally that they follow a very 
similar pattern. 

Senator Erm:x. That would be all right if you could indicate for the 
committee the pages on which the statements are made that you sum- 
marize so we can have those pages printed in full in the body of the 

^h\ Deax. All right, sir. I will summarize beginning at the bottom 
of paere 63 throufrh 66 and merely note to the committee that the 
liandling of the FBT interviews at the "White House followed the 
pattern that had first been established bv the interview with Mr, 
Colson. I cleared this procedure with INIr. Ehrlichman. He felt it was 
a good idea I was there. I was there when he was present or when 
he was interviewed and T think that the material is self -explanatory 
as to any questions that the committee might have regarding those 

Gexkrai. PTaxdltxg of FBT Ixtervtews at the White House 

As pi'eviously indicated the first person to be interviewed at 
the White House bv the FBI was Colson and Colson had insisted 
that I be present dui'ing his interview and requested I review 
the matter with him prior to his interview. The Colson interview 


formed the oreneral pattern that was followed with other mem- 
bers of the White House staff, that is I would discuss with the 
person before the interview what I throught the agents would 
be interested in and then discuss that person's area of knowledge. 
I had reviewed this procedure with Ehrlichman, who fully con- 
curred in the procedure. On several occasions, ]Mr. Fielding of 
my office also participated in preparing witnesses for their inter- 
views with the FBI. Contrary to some accounts that I sat in on 
some 14 to 18 interviews at the White House, the only inter- 
views I recall sitting in on were Chapin's, Miss Chenow's, Col- 
son's, Ehrlichman's, ^liss Joan Hall's, Strachan's, Timmons', 
and Young's. Also I was present when Fielding, Kehrli, and I 
had a discussion with the FBI about the handling of the materials 
in Hunt's safe. 

The only FBI interview that differed from the normal pattern 
was the interview of Miss Chenow. It was in late June that ^liss 
Chenow's fonner roommate notified David Young and I believe 
also Bud Krogh that the FBI had been to see her and requested 
to know where ^liss Chenow was. The former roommate had said 
that the agents had asked about a telephone listed in iSIiss 
Chenow's name. The roommate had informed the FBI that Miss 
Chenow was in London on vacation. David Young came to see 
Fielding and I and said that this girl could not know anything 
about the Watergate, but could cause the White House problems 
by inadvertently answering questions about the plumbers' oper- 
ation, where she had been employed, and that the telephone had 
been listed in her name in connection with the plumbers' oper- 
ation. Mr. Young was very concerned about ]Miss Chenow being 
caught off guard by an FBI agent. Accordingly, I notified Gray 
that we would make arrangements to have !Miss Chenow available 
to the agents in Wasliington within a few days. 

I discussed the problem, that Chenow could cause the "^XTiite 
House problems, with Ehrlichman and suggested that someone 
bring her back from London for the interview and explain to 
her that she should not get into Hunt's and Liddy's activities 
while at the White House. Ehrlichman fully agreed and I called 
Fielding from Ehrlichman's office and told him he should be on 
the next plane to London to get the girl. The two first-class round- 
trip tickets were paid for by the White House. There were two 
sets because ]Miss Chenow was provided transportation back to 
London. I informed Kehrli, who would not authorize such a trip 
on my word alone, that I had cleared this w^ith Ehrlichman. I 
do not know if Kehrli himself checked with Ehrlichman or 
Haldeman. I believe it was on July 2 that Fielding left for London 
and returned witli Miss Chenow the next day. He did have some 
problem because the address that had been given him was incor- 
rect. Fielding and Young briefed ^liss Chenow when she came 
back before her interview, and Fielding and I were present when 
the FBI interviewed her. 
I will now turn to my first meetings with Mr. Gray, beginning on 
page 66 regarding the investigation. 

Note. — -Indentecl matter represents portions of Mr. Dean's prepared statement which 
were omitted or summarized in his presentation. 

First Meetings With ]Mr. Gray Regarding the Ixvestigatiox 

I believe that it was on June 21 that I first met with Gray in his 
office in the late morning regarding the FBI's investigation. At that 
meeting he told me he fully realized tlie sensitive nature of the in\esti- 
gation they were pursuing and that he had placed his most trusted 
senior people in charge of the investigation. I told Gray that I had 
been asked to be kept informed about the investigation. ^Mr. Gray 
told me that he had been visiting a number of regional offices and 
would be doing so in the future. Thus, if I needed any information 
I should call ]Mr. Mark Felt in his absence. I might note at this point 
that indeed Gray was frequently absent from the city during the course 
of the investigation and this irritated Ehrlichman greatly when he 
asked me to get information from Gray and Gray was out of the city. 
On several occasions, in fact, Ehrlichman instructed me to tell Gray 
to return to the city and mind the store. I passed this message to Gray, 
but I cannot recall what prompted Ehrlichman to have me do so at 
this time. 

During my meeting with Gray on June 21 he also told me a man 
by the name of Mr. Bates was heading the investigation. I do not know 
Mr. Bates, and when I reported this back to Ehrlichman and he asked 
me who Bates was, I told him I did not know Bates. I can recall on 
several occasions Ehrlichman asking me if I thought that Gray knew 
what he was doing and if he had the investigation under control. I 
responded that he seemed to be relying on men in whom he had full 

To the best of my recollection, it was during this June 21 meeting 
with Gray that he informed me that the FBI had uncovered a number 
of major banking transactions that had transpired in the account of 
one of the arrested Cubans — Mr. Barker. He informed me that they 
had traced a $25,000 check to a ]Mr. Kenneth Dahlberg and four checks 
totaling $89,000 to a bank in Mexico City. 

I do not recall whether I first learned al^nut the Dahlbero; check 
from INIr. Gray or whether I learned about it in a meeting in ^Mitchell's 
office by reason of the fact that the FBI was trving to contact Mr. 
Dahlberg about the matter and Dahlberg had called ^Nlr. Stans. At 
any rate, the fact that the FBI was investigating these matters was 
of utmost concern to Mr. Stans when he learned of it. Stans was con- 
cerned about the Dahll:>er.q" check. T was informed, because it was in fact 
a contribution from Mr. Dwavne Andreas, whom I did not know, but 
I was told was a lono-time backer of Senator Hubert ITumphrev. 
Neither Stans nor Mitchell wanted ]Mr. Andreas to be embarrassed by 
disclosure of the contribution. The concern about the ^Mexican monev 
was made a little less clear to me. I was told it was a contribution from 
a group of Texans who had used an intermediarv in ^Mexico to make 
the contribution. Althoufrh I had not been told. I assumed at that time 
that thev were concerned because it sounded to me as if it mi.iht have 
been a corporate contribution and clearlv a violation of tlie law. 

Mr. Stans also exolained that he had checked with Sloan to find out 
how this monev had ended un in ^Nfr. Barker's bank account and Sloan 
reported that he had ffiven the checks to Eiddv and reonested that he 
cash them: He said he had no idea how Liddv had cashed them, but 
surmised that he had obviouslv used Bai'ker to cash tliem. I was also 


told — and I do not recall specifically who told me this — that this money 
had absolutely nothing to do with the Watergate ; it was unrelated and 
it was merely a coincidence of fact that Liddy had used Barker to 
cash the checks and Liddy had returned the money to Sloan. I was told 
that the inyestigation of this matter which appeared to be connected 
with Waterofate but wasn't, was unfounded and would merely result 
in an unnecessary embarrassment to the contributors. Accordinofly, 
Mitchell and Stans both asked me to see if there was anything the 
"\^niite House could do to preyent this unnecessary embarrassment. I, 
in turn, related these facts to both Haldeman and Ehrlichman. On 
June 22, at the request of Ehrlichman and Haldeman I went to see 
Mr. Gray at this office in the early eyening to discuss the Dahlberg and 
Mexican checks and determine how the FBI was proceeding with these 
matters. Mr. Gray told me that they were pursuing it by seeking to 
interview the persons who had drawn the checks. 

It was during my meeting with Mr. Gray on June 22 that we also 
talked about his theories of the case as it was beginning to unfold, I 
remember well that he drew a diagram for me showing his theories. At 
that time Mr. Gray had the following theories: It was a setup job by 
a double agent ; it was a CIA operation because of the number of 
former CIA people inyolyed : or it was someone in the reelection com- 
mittee who was responsible. Gray also had some other theories which 
he discussed, but I do not recall them now, but I do remember that 
those I haye mentioned were his primary theories. 

Before the meeting ended. I recall that Gray and I again had a brief 
discussion of the problems of an investigation in the Wliite House. 
Gray expressed his awareness of the Dotential i:)roblems of such an 
investigation and also told me that if I needed any information I 
should call either Mark Felt or himself. Gray also informed me that 
he was going to meet with the CIA to discuss their possible involve- 
ment and he would let me know the outcome of that meeting. 

On June 23 I reported my convei"sation with Gray of the preceding 
evening to Ehrlichman and Haldeman. We discussed the Dahlberg 
and the Mexican checks and the fact that the FBI was looking for 
answers regarding these checks. I had the impression that either Ehr- 
lichman or Haldeman might have had a conversation with someone 
else about this matter but this was mere speculation on my part at that 

Within the first days of my involvement in the coverup. a pattern 
had developed where I was carrying messages from Mitchell, Stans, 
and Mardian to Ehrlichman and Haldeman — and vice vei-sa — about 
how each quarter was handling the coverup and relevant information 
as to what was occurring. I was also reporting to them all the informa- 
tion I was receiving about the case from the Justice Department and 
the FBI. I checked with Haldeman and Ehrlichman before I did any- 
thing. One of the few sets of early documents evidencing this working 
relationship with Haldeman and Ehrlichman relates to responding to 
Larry O'Brien's letter of June 24 to the President requesting the 
appointment of a special prosecutor. I have submitted these documents 
to the committee. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 84-17.*] 

♦See p. 1161. 


Mr. Dean. Consistent with tlio reportino; pattern that had developed, 
I reported to Mitchell in a meetin<i^ also attended by Mr. Mardian and 
Fred LaRiie, Gray's theories of the case as he had related them to me. 
This meeting occurred, to the best of my recollection, on Friday after- 
noon, June 23 or Saturday morning, June 24. During this meeting 
there were wide ranging discussions of the many problems then con- 
fronting the reelection committee including such mattei's as the prob- 
lem the civil lawsuit filed by the Democratic Xational Committee 
could cause, the problem of the Dahlberg and IVIexican checks, and 
to the best of my recollection this was the first time I had heard any 
discussion (^f the need for money to take care of those who were in- 
vohed in the break-in of June 17. 

I think also, Mr. Vice Chairman, I might omit the first paragraph 
here on page 71 of my prepared statement, and proceed with regard 
to my receipt of the reports. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, it will be entirely agreeable and, as the 
chairman asked you previously if you would note that page in your 
statement where you would resume by appropriate identification. 

Mr. Dean. All right, I will leave out the first paragraph on page 71. 

Receipt o^ Reports From the FBI 

In addition to the conversations that I was having with Gray 
regarding the status of the investigation, I was continually being- 
asked by Mardian if I had seen the FBI reports on the investi- 
gation, I indicated that no, I had not. Mitchell also thought it 
might be helpful if I saw the FBI reports. As the demands in- 
creased for this information, I raised the matter with Ehrlichman 
and Halcleman and they both thought that I should indeed see the 
FBI reports. I first raised this with Peterson, who suggested I 
deal directly with Gray. 
And I will begin by summarizing and saying to the best of my 
recollection it was in early July when I called Gray to discuss the 
matter of receiving reports from the FBI. Gray indicated that he 
was going to be in his office on Saturday and that I should come to 
his office and take a look at the reports in his office. I told him that I 
thought it was unwise for me to be coming in and out of the Justice 
Department, particularly since most of the guards and people at the 
Justice Department knew me. Accordingly, we arranged to meet later 
at his apartment and he said that he would discuss the matter with 
me then. I recall we took a stroll to the side of his apai'tment building 
and sat on a bench in front of the river and talked generally about 
the case and I raised with him the matter of my receivino; some of the 
raw FBI data regarding the investigation. Grav said that he would 
haA'e to check but wanted an assurance from me that this information 
was being reported to the President and that was the principal pur- 
pose of the request. I assured him that it was being reported to the 
President. Even though I was not directly reporting to the President 
at that time, I was aware of the fact that Ehrlichman or Ilaldeman 
had daily discussions with the President, and I felt certain, because 
Haldeman often made notes of my reporting back about the informa- 

NOTE. — Indented matter represents portions of ISrr. Dean's prepared statement whieli 
were omitted or summarized in tils presentation. 


tion I was bringino; to their attention, that this information was being 
given to the President. 

I do not recall when actnally I received the first written information 
from the FBI, but I believe it was after July 21 when I received a 
summary report that had been prepared on the investigation to that 

I would also like to now summarize to the bottom of the page, and 

indicate that when 

Mr. Dash. Bottom of page 72. 

Mr. Deax. Seventy-two. correct, and indicate that after I did get 
possession of the documents, the FBI files, I found them not very 
meaningful and later Mv. ]Mardian. ]Mr. Parkinson, My. O'Brien came 
over to my office and read the reports, and ]Mardian, they all reached 
the same conclusion and I recall ]\Iardian's reaction was that the docu- 
ments indicated that the investigation was too vigorous and he was 
quite critical of Gray and asked me to call Gray to slow down but I 
never made such a call. 

It was after I showed a copy of the July 21 report to INIr. 
^Mitchell that ^Nlardian insisted that he be permitted to see the FBI 
reports. Mitchell agreed, and thought that Paul O'Brien and Ken 
Parkinson should also see them. 

I recall that when Mardian, O'Brien and Parkinson finally 
came to my office to look at the reports, they realized that they 
were not very meaningful. It was Mr. Mardian, however, who be- 
came very excited because of the scope of the investigation that 
Gray was conducting and the tone of the cables he was sending out 
of headquarters. Mardian clearly thought that Gray was being 
too vigorous in his investigation of the case and was quite critical 
of Gray's handling of the entire matter. He demanded that I tell 
Gray to slow down, but I never did so. 
Summarizing the first paragraph on page 73, 1 would also note that 
I never showed any of these reports to any persons who were inter- 
viewed bv the FBI and they were only given to INIr. Dick INIoore of the 
Wliite House staff when he was working on the Segretti matter for 
Mr. Ehrlichman and INIr. Haldeman. 

I do not recall ever finding anything in the FBI reports which 
I scanned, that was worth reporting to Ehrlichman and Halde- 
man and so I never read all of the reports that were sent to me. 
The FBI files containing the reports never left my office, nor were 
they shown to anyone in the A^Tiite House other than Dick ^Nloore 
when Mr. INIoore had been instructed to prepare a report on the 
Segretti incident by Ehrlichman. I never showed the reports to 
any of the persons who were interviewed by the FBI after theii' 

First Dealixgs With the CIA 

I will turn now to the first dealings I had with the CIA. It was dur- 
ing the meeting in Mitchell's office on June 23 or 24 that Mardian first 
raised the proposition that the CIA could take care of this entire mat- 

NOTE. — Indented matter represents portions of Mr. Dean's prepared statement which 
wero omitted or summarized in his presentation. 


ter if they wished, in that they had funds and covert procedures for 
distributing funds. I was personally unaware of the workings of the 
CIA, but Mardian and Mitchell appeared very knowledgeable. As a 
result of this conversation, which was prompted by my reporting that 
Gray thought the CIA might be involved ^Mitchell suggested I explore 
with Ehrlichman and Haldeman having the "White House contact the 
CIA for assistance. It was also argued that the individuals involved 
in the Watergate incident, as former CIA operatives, might com- 
promise the CIA in some manner, and the CIA should be interested in 

On ]Monday morning, June 26, I spoke with Ehrlichman regarding 
this suggestion. He thought it was a good idea and worth exploring. 
He told me to call the CIA and ex^^lore it with them. I told him that 
I had never dealt with anyone at the CIA and did not know Director 
Helms. He told me that I should not call Helms, rather General 
Walters. I told him I did not know General "Walters either. He then 
told me that he and Haldeman had had a little chat — as lie called it — 
with Helms and General "Walters a few days earlier about their deal- 
ings with the FBI in relationship to the investigation. He was not 
specific. He then told me that I should deal with General "Walters 
because he was a good friend of the "White House and the "White 
House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have 
some influence over the Agency. He told me that I should tell General 
"Walters that I was calling because he (Ehrlichman) had requested 
that I follow up on the earlier meeting thev had and if there were 
any problems General "Walters should call him. After my meeting 
with Ehrlichman, I telephoned General "Walters. I told him I was 
calling at Ehrlichman's request on a matter relating to his previous 
discussions with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, and would like to have 
him visit with me if possible. He seemed somewhat surprised and un- 
certain about my call, so I told him that he might like to check with Mr. 
Ehrlichman. He said he would get back to me and he later called me 
back to set up a meeting for about noon at that day. 

"When General Walters came to my office I told him again that I was 
meeting with him at Ehrlichman's request. I made some general com- 
ments about the Watergate case. It was from my discussion as a result 
of general comment with Walters that I became aware of the fact 
that Ehrlichman and Haldeman had discussed the Dahlberg and ]Mex- 
ican money. We then discussed the fact that some of the leads that 
the FBI were pursuing were, to my understanding, were unrelated 
to the Watergate but could result in persons, totally uninvolved, being 
embarrassed. I would just like to note to counsel for the record that 
some of this is different from the original pagination of my draft 
that may have been lost through the transcribing of it here. I also 
told him that I understood that the FBI had developed three possible 
theories of the case, which I explained and then asked if, in fact, any 
of the men arrested were persons that were working for the CIA. 
General Walters assured me that they were not. I then told him that 
I had been asked to explore every possible means of dealing with this 
rather embarrassing and troublesome situation, because some of the 
men involved were looking for assistance. I asked him if there was 
any possible way the CIA could be of assistance in j^iroviding support 
for tlie individuals involved. General Walters told me that while 


it could, of course, be done, he told me that he knew the Director's 
feelings about such a matter and tiie Director would only do it on a 
direct order from the President. He then went on to say that to do 
anything to compound the situation would be most unwise and that 
to involve the OIA would only compound the problem because it would 
require that the President become directly involved. 

^Miile I cannot recall in detail everything General Walters told me, 
I do recall that his argument was most sound and very persuasive. I 
told him I agreed with his position fully and I had merely been asked 
to explore the potential, which he very rightly stated was too great a 
risk. As the discussion ended I asked him that if he had any further 
ideas and told him I would appreciate the benefit of his thoughts. I 
thanked him for his coming over and his candid answers and he 

Subsequent to my meeting with General Walters, I reported back to 
Ehrlichman that Walters had informed me that any involvement by 
the CIA in this matter was impossible. I recall that when I reported 
this to Ehrlichman, he very cynically said "very interesting". He told 
me that I should talk with General Walters further and push him a 
little harder to see if the CIA couldn't help out, particularly with 
regard to the unnecessary pui^uit of investigative leads. I also recall 
Ehrlichman saying something to the effect that General Walters seems 
to have forgotten how he got where he is today. 

I would like to skip the paragraph on page 77 I'egarding the call 
from Gray, and turn to the last paragraph on 77. 

I received a phone call from Gray on June 27 in which 
he expressed both concern and confusion about his determining if 
the CIA was or was not concerned about the FBI investigation. I 
was also confused by Gray's call and do not recall at this time 
what, if an>i:hing, I did after I received it. However, I do recall 
that Ehrlichman had mentioned to me that he wanted Gray to 
deal with General Walters rather than Director Helms. Appar- 
ently this was the cause of the confusion on Gray's behalf. 
On the morning of June 28 I arranged again to meet with General 
Walters. I was first embarrassed about requesting the meeting because 
he had been most explicit and convincing to me at the first meeting, I 
told him that I requested the meeting at Ehrlichman's behest to further 
discuss the problems of the Dahlberg and Mexican checks. I told him 
what I knew about the matters and that, to the best of my knowledge, 
they were not related to the Watergate incident. I then asked him if he 
had any suggestions. He expressed sympathy over the situation, but 
said there was nothing his agency could do. He again explained rea- 
sons similar to his earlier comments regarding CIA involvement and I 
expressed my understanding. I then asked him if he had any ideas at 
all and he said that it might be possible to explain the matter as an 
anti-Castro activity. We had some general discussion of this, but 
nothing concrete emerged from the discussion. Before Walters 
departed I assured him that I agreed that it would be most unwise to 
involve the CIA, and I thanked him — almost apologetically — for 
coming by again. At no time did I push him as I had been instructed. 
At the conclusion of this meeting I was totally convinced, as I had 

Note. — -Indented matter represents portions of Mr. Dean's prepared statement which 
wero omitted or summarized in his presentation. 


been earlier, that the CIA could not and would not be brought in to 
solve the problems confronting the White House and reelection com- 
mittee as a result of the Watergate incident. 

I subsequently informed Ehrlichman and Haldeman that unless the 
President directly ordered the CIA to provide support for those 
involved that the CIA was not going to get involved. I told them I 
agreed with Walters that this would be a terrible mistake and they 
both told me they agreed. 

Transmitting the Materials in Mr. Hunt's Safe to the FBI 

I would now like to explain the transmitting of the materials in 
Hunt's safe to the FBI. As I noted earlier, shortly after the FBI inter- 
view on June 22 of Colson, and my later instructions from Ehrlichman 
to "Deep Six'' the briefcase and shred documents, I had informed the 
FBI that I would forward the material found in Hunt's office. After 
weighing the implications of Ehrlichman's instructions to destroy the 
items I decided that I would not engage in any such activity mvself or 
be pushed into it. Accordingly, I asked David Young to return the 
State Department cable to my office. I had already returned the brief- 
case from my car trunk to my office. 

I received several calls from the FBI requesting the material, but 
I had not yet figured out how to tell Ehrlichman I was not going to 
destroy the material. I knew I had to develop a good argument to give 
Ehrlicliman as to why the materials should not be destroyed. On 
June 25 or 26 I went to Ehrlichman to explain that I thought the 
men who drilled the safe had probably seen the briefcase, that the 
Secret Service agent who was present had probably seen some of the 
material ; that Mr. Kehrli and Fielding had seen it — and what would 
happen when all those people were later asked by the FBI about the 
contents of the safe. Then, I said I felt we must turn over the material 
to the FBI. With regard to the sensitive documents. I suggested that 
thev be given directly to Gray, I told Ehrlichman that, if ever asked 
under oath, I had to be able to testify that to the best of my knowledge, 
everything found in the safe had been turned over to the FBI. 

The FBI agents came to my office, I believe on June 26 or 27. 
I gave them one box, which had been packed and told them that 
as soon as the other material was packed I would get it to them. When 
I got tied up in a meeting, I phoned Fielding and asked him to pack 
up the remainder of the materials, which I believe was the State De- 
partment cables and the briefcase. He did so and turned over the re- 
mainder of the materials, with the exception of the two envelopes 
which contained the politically sensitive materials I described earlier. 
I spoke with Ehrlichman on the 28th and informed him the material 
had been sent to the FBI with the exception of the politicall}^ sensitive 
documents. He told me he was meeting later that day with Gray and 
I should bring them over at that time. 

I went to Ehrlichman's office just before ^Nfr. Gray arrived. I placed 
the envelopes on the coffee table in his office. When Gray arrived, 
Ehrlichman told him that we had some material for him that had 
come from Hunt's safe. Ehrlichman described it as politioallv sensi- 
tive, but not related to the Watergate. I told Gray that Fieldins?- and 
I had gone through Hunt's documents and had turned over all the 
materials to the agents except the documents in these two envelopes. 


I said we did not believe they related to the Watergate in any way, 
but should they leak out they would be political dynamite in an election 
year. I believe at that point Gl-ay placed the two envelopes in his brief- 
case. At no time while I was present with Gray and Ehrlichman was 
he instructed by myself or Ehrlichman to destroy the documents. 
Rather, he was merely told that they must never be leaked or made 
public. I departed and returned to my office. 

The next time the fact of giving these documents to Gray came up 
was shortly before the criminal Watergate trial in January of this year. 
Fielding. Kehrli, and I were being interviewed by the prosecutors 
regarding the handling of the materials in Hunt's safe to establish 
the evidentiary chain. At one point in the interview, I asked Henry 
Petersen, who' was present with Mr. Earl Silbert, if I could speak 
with him privately. At that time I felt I had to tell Petersen that 
not all the materials from Hunt's safe had gone directly to the agents, 
rather that two envelopes of material, the contents of which I could 
not itemize any better then than I can now, had been given directly 
to Gray. I told Petersen that if I were to testify I would have to reveal 
this fact. Mr. Petersen suggested that the interview be terminated, 
which it was, and that they would get back to me and we could com- 
plete it on another day. I was not called again and it was not because, 
I think, of my knowledge, but because of other intervening events and 
a motion that Mr. Bittman had filed not being pursued—but Fielding 
and Kehrli testified as to the evidentiary chain at the trial. 

I recall that shortly after this meeting in Petersen's office, where I 
disclosed these facts to Petersen, I talked with Gray at a Department 
of Justice hmcheon. After the luncheon he came up to me and told me 
that I must "hang tight" on not disclosing his receipt of the docu- 
ments. He also informed me that he had destroyed the documents. I 
told Ehrlichman about this shortly after Gray told me he had de- 
stroyed the documents, and when Ehrlichman called me just before the 
President selected Gray as his nominee for Director of the FBI, 
Ehrlichman asked me if I had any problems with Gray and I reminded 
him of the destruction of the documents. He indicated that this was 
not a problem. 

It was after I commenced my informal interviews with the Water- 
gate prosecutoi-s in early April of this year that this subiect arose 
again. I repeated my story, as I have to this committee. They later 
informed me that Gray denied having ever received such documents. 
This was the first issue of fact that arose in my discussions with the 
prosecutors, so my attorney requested that I take a polygraph test, 
which I did. Subsequently, as is now public knowledge, and not to 
my surprise because I believe that Gray is both an honorable and 
truthful man, he has admitted that he had received and destroyed 
the documents. 

Mr. Kai3ibach and Silence Money 

I would now like to turn back again to the end of June 1972. 
After my meetinp-s with General Walters and subsequent meeting with 
Haldeman and Ehrliclmian, I informed ]Mr. Mitchell that there could 
be no CIA assistance. To the best of my recollection, this occurred on 
the afternoon of June 28, in a meetinq- in Mr. Mitchell's office, and I 
believe that Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian were also present. There was 


a discussion of the need for support money in exchanfre for the silence 
for the men in jail and if the CIA could not do it they would have to 
find money somewhere else. Mr. LaRue indicated that ]Mr. Stans had 
only a small amount of cash. I believe he said $70,000 or $80,000, but 
more would be needed. After some discussion which I cannot recall 
with any specificity at this time, Mitchell asked me to get the approval 
of Haldeman and Ehrlichman to use ]\Ir. Herbert Kalmbach to raise 
the necessary money. Before I departed the meeting I remembered that 
Mr. Mitchell, in an aside for my ears only, told me that the White 
House, in particular Ehrlichman, should be very interested and anx- 
ious to accommodate the needs of these men. He was referring to ac- 
tivities that they had conducted in the past that related to the White 
House, such as the Ellsberg break-in. 

I conveyed this request to Haldeman and Ehrlichman and they told 
me to proceed to contact ]\Ir. Kalmbach. I called ^Nlr. Kalmbach on 
June 28, and told him that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell had 
requested that he come back to Washington as quickly as possible. He 
told me he would take the next flight. 

I met Mr. Kalmbach at the ]Mayflower Hotel on June 29. We first 
met in the coffee shop, but could not find sufficient privacy to talk, 
so we went to his room. I had always been very open in my deal- 
ings with Mr. Kalmbach, and I knew that he had stated, after h^ 
completed his fundraising activities prior to April 7, 1972. that he 
did not wish to engage in any further fundraising activities, so I tolrl 
him everything I knew about the case at that time, including my con- 
cern that it might involve the President himself, but I did not know 
that for a fact. I also told him that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and 
Mitchell felt it was very important that he raise the money. I told him 
that per Mitchell's instructions he should contact Fred LaRue as to 
the amoTUits needed and the timing. I knew that Kalmbach was not 
happy with this assignment, and he said he was undertaking it only 
because ^Mitchell, Haldeman. and Ehrlichman had so requested. I do 
not know if Mr. Kalmbach discussed this with any of these persons, 
but given the nature of the request, I did not expect him to take it on 
my word alone. I had never before given instructions to Kalmbach to 
raise any money or never passed on any similar instructions to him. 

Subsequent to our meeting, Kalmbach informed me he was depart- 
ing to raise the money, but he wanted Tony Ulasewicz to handle any 
deliveries because ]Mr. Ulasewicz was the only man he would trust. He 
said that he did not have his telephone number and requested that I 
call Jack Caulfield and request that Mr. Ulasewicz call him in Cali- 
fornia. I called Caulfield and made the request, but I did not tell 
Caulfield the reason Kalmbach wanted to have Mr. ITasewicz call him. 

Within a week or so, Kalmbach returned to Washington and re- 
quested that I meet him in Lafayette Park, which I did. He said that 
I could report to Haldeman and Ehrlichman that he had raised the 
money and, in fact, he said he had it in his briefcase with him, to the 
best of my recollection, he told me he was en route to meet ^Iv. T^lase- 
wicz, but wanted me to know tlie iob was done. Followin"- that meeting 
and several days later, as I recall, he called me and said that he had 
asked Fred LaKue to come to my offline to give him the details of who 
was to get how much. I recall that such a meeting did occur in mv office, 
but I was on and off the telephone while LaRue and Kalmbach were 
going over the figures and T have absolutely no recollection of the 


details of their discussion. I know that LaRue had the figures on a 
sheet of paper and Kahnbach wrote them down in his own code on a 
small piece of paper Avhich he placed in his wallet. I have no further 
knowledge of how or when or to whom delivery was made. ^Ir. Kalm- 
bach merely told me later that it had been done and I passed this on to 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, before you do, it is the wish of the 
chairman — he had to go to the floor of the Senate to attend other 
business — ^that we continue until about 12 :30 and then recess for lunch, 
if that is agreeable to you. I think you might have time to just finish 
this sequence and then recess for lunch. 

Mr. Dash. There is a break on page 97. 

Senator Baker. We will see how far the witness can go until 

Mr. Deax. The witness only has the first part of his statement. 

Senator Baker. I understand there is another part of about 150 
pages or thereabouts. We are anxious for you to go as far as you can, 
so you have been reading for 21^ hours, almost, so another 10 minutes, 
I think, and then we will break for lunch. 

Mr. Deax. Fine. 

Discussion of Mitchell and Magruder Remaining at the 
Reelection Committee 

I would like to return once again to the period of June 21 through 
June -30 in the matter of Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder remaining 
at the reelection committee. As I had indicated, I had frequent dis- 
cussions with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, in which I would report 
back to them on information they had requested or report informa- 
tion I had received. It was sometime during the last 10 days of 
June that I recall a meeting in Haldeman's office in which they 
asked me for my recommendation regarding removing Mitchell and 
^fagruder from the reelection committee. This discussion preceded my 
contacting Kalmbach. At that time I repeated mv knowledge of the 
meetings which had occurred in Mitchell's office in January and Febru- 
ary when Liddy was presenting his proposal. I told them I did not 
know for a fact that Mitchell had ever approved Liddy's plans, but 
Magruder had recently inferred to me that ^Mitchell was aware of the 
operation. I told them I had never discussed it with ^litchell himself 
and the only observation I could make was that the Watergate matter 
appeared to be consuming most of Mitchell's time, which might dis- 
tract him from the camjoaign. 

Witli regard to Magruder, I repeated what Liddy had told me re- 
garding ^lagruder's pushing him into doing the break-in at the Demo- 
cratic Xational Committee. I also said that I thought there was a 
real chance he could be indicted, although INIitchell and Magruder 
thought that the matter might be stopped at Liddv. Accordinglv, I 
told them I did not think I could make a recommendation regarding 
^litchell, but I did recommend that ^lagruder be removed in a grace- 
ful manner that would not unduly jeopardize him. They thanked 
me, and told me they would take my recommendations under advise- 
ment. The next time I heard an}i:hing about this subject was when it 
was publicly announced that Mr. ^Mitchell was resigning. I was some- 
what startled that ^Magruder was remaining. It was clear that 
]Magruder was the only link back to the White House, and Magruder 


might not stand up if indicted. I recall Haldeman asking me if I 
thought ]Magruder would stand up if indicted and I said no. I have 
always assumed it was a Presidential decision to keep ]Magruder on 
at the reelection committee. Following the decision, Ehrlichman and 
Haldeman indicated a greatly increased interest in Magruder's prob- 
lems. They were aware of the strategy to stop the involvement at 
Liddy, because I reported to them on the story that Magruder would 
tell, that is, that he did not know what Liddy was doing. They fre- 
quently asked me how ]\Iagruder was doing in relationship to the 
FBI and grand jury investigation. I also had calls from ^Ir. Larry ^ 
Higby as to ^Magruder's status. 

I do not know when I first learned of Magruder's proposed testi- 
mony, but I did not know that it had ali'eady been fornnilated when I 
first heard it. I informed Haldeman and Ehrlichman of the story. "We 
discussed it and no one was sure it would hold up. This discussion did 
occur before Mitchell resigned. We, of course, knew that it was a fab- 
ricated story. Wlien I later learned that ]\Ir. Porter would corroborate 
Mr. Magruder's testimony, I informed Haldeman and Ehrlichman of 
that. I had never heard Mr. Magruder's story in full detail until just 
before his grand jury appearance, in mid-August 1972. when he asked 
me if I would be a devil's advocate and question him before he went 
before the grand jury. Magruder came to my office, as I recall, the day 
before his second grand jury appearance. He told me he had made the 
decision himself as to how he was going to handle his testimony and 
wanted me to ask him any and all questions I could think of. I spent 
about an hour or more questioning him. Shortlj^ after I had this ses- 
sion with ^Magruder, Higby called me to tell me that ]\Lagruder had 
been to see him, to let Haldeman know he was ready. 

Following Magruder's appearance before the grand jury I receii'ed 
a call from Higby requesting information for Haldeman as to how 
Magruder had done before the grand jury. I subsequently called ]Mr. 
Petersen, who said he would find out and call me back. Petersen called 
back and said he had made it through by the skin of his teeth. I called 
Haldeman and so informed him, and subsequently informed ^Mitchell 
and Magruder. I recall that Haldeman was very pleased, because this, 
of course, meant that the investigation would not <xo beyond Liddy. 

In early September Paul O'Brien came to my office and informed me 
that there was an outstanding subpena for ^Magruder's diarv. O'Brien 
said that Magruder's diary reflected the meetings in ^MitchelTs office 
in January and February with Liddy, Magruder, Dean, and ^Mitchell. 
O'Brien also informed me that there had been discussion of destroying 
or altering the diary, but he did not think much of that. I agreed that 
to alter it would be impossible because it would be discovered by the 
FBI laboratory. 

I remember talking with Magruder and asking him why ho kept a 
diary^ — being somewhat facetious. I told Magruder that he should talk 
with Mr. Mitchell about this, because he was probably going to have 
to turn the diary over. 

Long before the matter of Magruder's diary had arisen, I had talked 
with Mitchell about the meetings in January and February in his 
office. I told him that should it ever be necessary, I would tostifv that 
I knew that he had not approved anything at these meetings. It was 
after the matter of Magruder's diary being subponaed and ^fagruder 
again being recalled to the grand jury that Mitchell requested that I 


meet with him and Magruder to discuss how Magruder should handle 
this matter before the grand jury. During the meeting at which this 
was discussed, I told IMitdiell and IMagruder that I had no idea what 
they had discussed before I arrived late at the second meeting in 
February. I said I recalled there was some reference to the election 
laws at the first meeting and IMagruder could explain my presence with 
Liddy at the meetings by reason of the fact of the election laws dis- 
cussion. Magruder liked this idea and said that was how he would 
handle it. I later learned that Magruder testified that one of the meet- 
inns had been canceled, and the meeting that occurred was to introduce 
Liddy to Mitchell and had dealt with election law problems. I assume 
that these refinements to the story were added by ]Magruder because 
they were not discussed at my meeting with ]SIitchell and ]Magnider. 

Senator Baker. INIr. Dean, that would seem to be a convenient break- 
ing place. I notice that on the next page, 91, you have appearances of 
White House personnel before the grand jury, so if you have no ob- 
jection to it, the meeting will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

["Wliereupon, at 12 :30 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 2 p.m., this same day.] 

Afterxoox Sessiox, ]Moxday, Juxe 25, 1973 

Senator Ervix. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Dean, I realize that when you have to do so much reading that 
sometimes it gets pretty hard on your voice and any time that you 
feel like you need a little break to sort of relieve your voice, let us 
know and we will certainly grant it to you. 

Mr. Deax. I appreciate that very much, Mr. Chairman. 

If the Chairman is ready I will proceed. 

When we stopped for lunch I was just commencing on page 91. 

Appearaxces of White House Persoxxel Before the Graxd 


]Mr. Deax. I shall now turn from the matter of Magruder's ap- 
pearances before the grand jury, to the appearance of the members of 
the Wiite House staff before the grand jury. 

The handling of the appearances of the White House staff before 
the grand jury was very similar to the procedure that had been fol- 
lowed with regard to their interviews by the FBI. By that I mean 
either Mr. Fielding or myself would discuss with the individual before 
he went to the grand jury the likely questions he would be aslvcd, the 
unrelated areas that we didn't feel it was necessary for the individual 
to net into. 

"\Mien Colson learned that he was going to be called before the grand 
jury, he was outraged. He felt that the press had been rather hostile 
toward him because of his association with Mr. Hunt and his appear- 
ance in the courthouse before the grand jury would be most detri- 
mental. He was very insistent that something be done about the situa- 
tion and asked me to see if I could do anything to help him. I called 
Henry Petersen and discussed this with him and asked him if there 
was anything that could be done. Petersen told me he would explore 
it. Petersen called l)ack and said he appreciated the problem of the 
"VMiite House staff' people coming down to the courthouse to appear 

96-296 O - 73 


before the grand jury and he had worked out an arrangement whereby 
they could come to the Department of Justice, be interviewed by the 
prosecutors with counsel present, and then the prosecutor would take 
a sworn statement without counsel present as if it were a secret grand 
jury room and later the prosecutors would read the statement to the 
grand jury. This procedure was followed, as I recall, for Mr. Colson, 
Mr. Krogh, Mr. Young, Mr. Chapin, and Mr. Strachan. 

When Secretary Stans learned that he was being called before the 
grand jury, he expressed a similar outrage and requested a procedure 
like that which had been given to the members of the White House 
staff. I discussed this again with Petersen, but he said he didn't feel it 
would be possible to follow a similar procedure. Mr. Stans' outrage 
continued and finally he raised it directly with Mr. Ehrlichman. Ehr- 
lichman asked me why I couldn't do anything with Petersen about this 
and I told him that Petersen had done the best he could but that there 
was nothing he could do about it because the grand jury wanted Stans 
to appear. Ehrlichman would not accept my explanation and called 
Petersen and was very harsh in telling Petersen that he should honor 
the White House request that Stans not be forced to appear at the court 
house to go before the grand jury. I was present when Ehrlichman 
called Petersen and felt that he was wrong in doing so. I felt that 
Petersen had been more than accommodating and that if he could have 
done it, he would, but obviously the grand jury wanted to see these 
people and Petereen was not happy with the procedures that had been 
followed with the others. It had merely been an accommodation. 
Accordingly, I called Mr. Petersen and apologized for the call that he 
had received from Ehrlichman. 

The only significant matter that I can recall in connection with any 
of the grand jury appearances was in connection with Colson's grand 
jury appearance also. After Colson returned from his grand jury 
interview he sent me a memorandum, a copy of which I have submitted 
to the committee — ^which he suggested I might wish to send on to the 
prosecutors. I had been present during Colson's interview with the 
prosecutors before his sworn statement was taken and I did not find 
anything of significance in the memorandum that he had failed to 
cover during his interview. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-18.*] 

Mr. Deax. I had also received information from Magnider that he 
had been pressured by Colson and members of Colson's staff into 
authorizing the adoption of Liddy's plans on several occasions and 
this information was not reflected in the memorandum that (\)lson liad 
prepared. I felt that the memorandum was rather self-serving to ]\Ir. 
Colson and I was not convinced that it was totally factual. 

The memorandum also came to my attention almost a week after 
Colson had sent it to me because, immediately following his appear- 
ance before the grand jury at the end of August. I had gone to San 
Clemente. I advised Colson that I did not know if everything in his 
memorandum was consistent with Magruder's testimony, and I 
thought we ought to leave well enough alone. He agreed. Accordingly, 
I filed the document rather than forward it to Mr. Silbert. 

•See p. 1160. 


The So-Called Deax Ix\'estigation 

It was while I was in San Clemente, at the end of August, that the 
President announced at a press conference the so-called "Dean Re- 
port'' which cleared everybody presently employed at the AMiite House 
or in the administration 'from'^any complicity in the Watergate matter. 
This statement was made on August 29. 1972. 

I would like to recall to the committee what the ^Y}iite House had 
publicly said about this incident prior to the xVugust 29 statement of 
the President. 

On June 19, Ziegler reported that there was no inquiry being made 
by the ■\\nnte House into the matter. On June 20 Ziegler stated that 
the case is something that the President will not get into at all despite 
the fact that Mr. Hunt had been publicly linked to the White House. 

On June 21, Ziegler stated that Colson had assured him that he was 
not involved, and the White House repeated the statement that the 
President would not get involved. On June 23, the President stated 
that, as Ziegler had said, the ^Yl\ite House has had no involvement 
whatever in this particular incident. 

On July 3, when the President was in California, he ruled out a 
special prosecutor and said that the FBI and other authorities will 
pursue the investigation thoroughly and completely. And, Ziegler fur- 
ther reported on that date that the President would not be getting 
special reports on this politically sensitive case since that would be 

Suddenly came the August 29 statement citing the Dean investiga- 
tion. I had no advance knowledge that the President was going to 
indicate that I had investigated the matter and found no complicity 
on the part of anybody at the Wliite House or anyone presently em- 
ployed in the administration. I first learned of the matter when I 
heard it on a television news broadcast that evening after I had de- 
parted from the compound at San Clemente. I was going to walk up 
to the residence and listen to the press conference that day because I 
had never been to a press conference on the west coast, but, at the 
last minute. I returned to my room and later turned on the television 
and heard the statement. 

Had I been consulted in advance by the President, I would have 
strongly opposed the issuing of such a statement for several reasons 
which i would have told the President. First, I was aware that Gorclon 
Strachan had close, daily, liaison with Mr. ]Magruder and had carried 
information relating to wiretapped conversations into the "\^niite House 
and later destroyed incriminating documents at Haldoman's direction. 

Second, I had never been able to determine whether Haldeman had 
advance knowledge or not, and in fact, had never asked him because 
I didn't feel I could. 

Third. I had always suspected, but never been able to completely 
substantiate my suspicion, that Colson was far more knowledgeable 
than he protested. 

I was very aware of Mr. Colson's efforts to disassociate himself with 
Hunt and of Colson's continual production of documents that would 
disassociate himself with Hunt. Colson protested too much. 


Finally, I -was aware of the two meetings that I had attended and 
had reported these to both Haldeman and Ehrlichman, I reported to 
Haldeman, as I mentioned earlier, shortly after the meetings had oc- 
curred when I told him I thought the idea was bad and incredible and 
told him that I would have no connection or relationship with the 
matter. I had reported this to Ehrlicliman in June 1972, shortly after 
the incident. I never understood how the Liddy plan had been ap- 
proved and Magruder had indicated to me that there had been White 
House pressure to get the plan moving. 

Accordingly, I would have been the last to say unequivocally, as 
the President so stated, that no one presently employed at the White 
House had any advance knowledge of the matter. I did believe, how- 
ever, that nobody at the White House knew that there was going to 
be a break-in of the Democratic National Committee on June 17 
because I don't believe that anyone other than those directly involved 
knew that that was going to happen, on that day. I don't know if the 
President's statement was meant to be a very literal play on carefully 
chosen words or whether he intended to give it the broad-brush inter- 
pretation that it later received. However, I would have certainly coun- 
seled the President against issuing the statement. And, I was very 
unhappy to have my name associated with the statement without being 
consulted whatsoever, and put out in front on the issue. 

The issuing of the so-called "Dean Report" was the first time I began 
to think about the fact that I might be being set up in case the whole 
thing came crumbling down at a later time. I subsequently discussed 
this with other individuals — ^^Ir. Moore, Mr. Fielding, and Mr. 
]Mitchell — and they assured me, but not unanimously, that I need not 
worry because they did not believe that anyone at the White House 
would do that to me. 

The Presidentially Directed CoT7NTEROFrEXSi\^ to the 
Democratic Civil Suits 

In early September, as the FBI and the Department of Justice 
investigations began winding down the concern of the White House 
and the reelection committee shifted to the very active investigation 
that was being pursued by the Democratic National Committee 
throug'h its discoverv proceedings in its civil lawsuit against the re- 
election committee. The Democrats were making daily headlines with 
their lawsuit. 

Senator Er\tx. I would suggest your voice has dropped and I sug- 
gest you talk more directly into the microphone. 

]Mr. Dean. I will move closer then. I have several hours and I 
thought I ought to ease it back a little bit. 

On or about September 9 or 10, I received a Presidential request 
from both Plaldeman and Colson. The President felt that the best 
defense to the actions being pursued by the Democrats, and the charges 
and implications that were stemming from the lawsuits being filed by 
the Democrats, was our own counteroffensive with our own series of 
lawsuits against the Democrats. I recall that Colson called me repeat- 
edly and finally reported that he had just come from the President's 
Office and that the President wanted action on this as quickly as 
humanly possible. I informed Mr. Colson that I was working on it 


but. that I wasn't going to suggest filing any lawsuit or taking any 
action that was not well founded. 

I had talked with ^litchell. Ken Parkinson, and Paul O'Brien about 
the matter and ^Nlr. Parkinson informed me that he was working on 
several potential counteractions. I requested that he submit a memo- 
randum to me as soon as possible because there was great interest at 
the White House in a counterattack, including the interest by the 
President. On September 11, 1972, Mr. Parkinson submitted his 
memorandum to me and after the memorandum, I redrafted his docu- 
ments for submission to Haldeman. I have submitted to the committee 
copies of both Mr. Parkinson's memorandum and the memorandum 
I submitted to Haldeman. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 34r-19.*] 

Mr. Deax. You will note that my memorandum of September 12, 
1972, to Mr. Haldeman has a "P" with a checkmark in the upper 
right-hand corner, which indicates that the document was forwarded 
directly to, or reviewed by, the President. I later learned that the 
President was pleased and wanted a full followup on the items in the 
memorandum. The markings on the memo are Mr. Haldeman's 

It was also about this time, later July — early September, that I 
learned during a meeting in Mitchell's office that Mr. Rhoemer Mc- 
Phee was having private discussions with Judge Richey regarding 
the civil suit filed by the Democrats. I believe this fact was known to 
Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, Paul O'Brien, and Ken Parkinson — and 
later again by McPhee — that Judge Richey was going to be helpful 
whenever he could. I subsequently talked with Mr. McPhee about 
this, as late as March 2 of this year, when he told me he was going to 
visit the judge in the judge's rose garden over the weekend to discuss 
an aspect of the case. 

Meeting "With the President — September 15, 1972 

On September 15 the Justice Department announced the handing 
down of the seven indictments by the Federal grand jury investigat- 
ing the Watergate. Late that afternoon I received a call requesting 
me to come to the President's Oval Office. When I arrived at the Oval 
Office I found Haldeman and the President. The President asked me 
to sit down. Both men appeared to be in very good spirits and my 
reception was very warm and cordial. The President then told me 
that Bob — referring to Haldeman- — had kept him posted on my han- 
dling of the Watergate case. The President told me I had done a good 
job and he appreciated how difficult a task it had been and the Presi- 
dent was pleased that the case had stopped with Liddy. I responded 
that I could not take credit because others had done much more diffi- 
cult things than I had done. As the President discussed the present 
status of the situation I told him that all that I had been able to do 
was to contain the case and assist in keeping it out of the AMiite Plouse. 
I also told him that there was a long way to go before this matter 
would end and that I certainly could make no assurances that the day 
would not come when this matter would start to unravel. 

•See p. 1173. 


Early in our conversation the President said to me that former 
FBI Director Hoover had told him shortly after he had assumed office 
in 1969 that his campaign had been bugged in 1968. The President 
said that at some point we should get the facts out on this and use 
this to counter the problems that we were encountering. 

The President asked me when the criminal case would come to trial 
and would it start before the election. I told the President that I did 
not know. I said that the Justice Department had held off as long as 
possible the return of the indictments, but much would depend on 
which judge got the case. The President said that he certainly hoped 
that the case would not come to trial before the election. 

The President then asked me about the civil cases that had been 
filed by the Democratic National Committee and the common cause 
case and about the counter suits that we had filed. I told him that the 
lawyers at the reelection committee were handling these cases and that 
they did not see the common cause suit as any real problem before the 
election because they thought they could keep it tied up in discoverj^ 
proceedings. I then told the President that the lawyers at the reelec- 
tion committee were very hopeful of slowing down the civil suit filed 
by the Democratic National Committee because they had been making 
ex parte contacts with the judge handling the case and the judge was 
very understanding and trying to accommodate their problems. The 
President was pleased to hear this and responded to the effect that, 
"Well, that's helpful." I also recall explaining to the President about 
the suits that the reelection committee lawyers had filed against the 
Democrats as part of their counteroffensive. 

There was a brief discussion about the potential hearings before the 
Patman committee. The President asked me what we were doing to 
deal with the hearings and I reported that Dick Cook, who liad once 
worked on Patman's committee staff, was working on the problem. 
The President indicated that Bill Timmons should stay on top of the 
hearings, that we did not need the hearings before the election. 

The conversation then moved to the press coverage of the Watergate 
incident and how the press was really trying to make this into a major 
campaign issue. At one point in this conversation I recall the President 
telling me to keej^ a good list of the press people giving us trouble, 
because we will make life difficult for them after the election. The 
conversation then turned to the use of the Internal Revenue Service 
to attack our enemies. I recall tel]in<T the President that we had not 
made much use of this because the "White House did not have the clout 
to have it done, that the Internal Revenue SerAace was a rather demo- 
cratically oriented bureaucracy and it would be very dangerous to try 
any such activities. The President seemed somewhat annoved and said 
that the Democratic administrations had used this tool well and after 
the election we would get people in these agencies who would be re- 
sponsive to the "\^Tiite House requirements. 

The conversation then turned to the President's postelection plans 
to replace people Avho were not on our team in all the agencies. It was 
at this point that Haldeman, I remember, started taking notes and he 
also told the President that he had been developing information on 
which people should stay and which should go after the election. I 
recall that several days after my meeting with the President, I was 
talking to Dan Kingsley, who was in charge of developing tlie list for 


Haldeman as to people who should be removed after the election. I 
told Kinfrsley that this matter had come up during my couA-ersation 
with the President and he said he had wondered what had put new life 
into his project as he had received several calls from Higby about the 
status of his pi'oject within the last few days. The meeting ended with 
a conversation with the President about a book I was reading. 

I left the meeting with the impression that the President was well 
aware of what had been going on regarding the success of keeping the 
White House out of the Watergate scandal and I also had expressed to 
him my concern that I was not confident that the coverup could 
maintained indefinitely. 

Blockixg the Patmax Committee Hearings 

I would next like to turn to the '\"\niite House efforts to block the 
Patman committee hearings. As early as mid-August 1972. the AAliite 
House learned through the congressional relations staff that an inves- 
tigation was being conducted by the staff of the House Banking and 
Currency Committee, under the direction of Chairman Patman, into 
many aspects of the Watergate incident. The focus of the investigation 
at the outset was the funding of the Watergate incident, and other 
possible illegal funding that may have involved banking violations. 
The ^Yhite House concern was twofold : First, the hearings would 
have resulted in more adverse preelection publicity regarding the 
Watergate, and second, they just might stumble into something that 
would start unraveling the coverup. 

The initial dealings with the Patman committee and the reelection 
committee were handled by Mr. Stans and Mr. Parkinson. However, 
as the Patman committee proceeded, Stans called for assistance from 
the White House. I was aware of the fact that the Patman investi- 
gatoi^s had had numerous conversations with Parkinson and the inves- 
tigators themselves came to the Eepublican National Convention to 
interview Stans on August 25, 1972. Upon Mr. Stans' return from the 
Republican Convention he met with the investigative staff' of the Pat- 
man committee, which I believe occurred on August 30. He was 
accompanied at both these interviews by Mr. Parkinson. 

At some point in time during these investigations Mr. Parkinson 
was put in touch with Congressman Garry BroAvn, who was a member 
of the Banking and Currency Committee. To the best of my recollec- 
tion, this may have resulted from discussions between members of the 
"\Miite House congressional relations staff with the Re):)ublican mem- 
bei-s of the Banking and Currency Committee to determine who would 
be most helpful on the committee, and Brown indicated his willing- 
ness to assist. 

On September 8, Congressman Brown sent a letter to the Attorney 
General regarding the forthcoming appearance of Secretary Stans and 
others before the Patman committee. I have submitted to the com- 
mittee a copy of this letter, whicli was, in fact, drafted by Mr. Parkin- 
son for Congressman Brown. 

[The letter was marked exhibit Xo. 34-20.*] 

Mr. Deax. It is my recollection that .Secretary Stans was scheduled 
to appear before the Patman committee for formal testimony on Sep- 

*See p. IISI. 


tember 14. Prior to Parkinson's drafting the letter for Congressman 
Brown, I had been asked to discuss the matter with Henry Petersen, 
which I did. I told Petersen of the problem and asked him for his feel- 
ing about Stans and others appearing before the Patman committee 
and what effect that might have on either the grand jury or the indicted 
individuals once the indictments were handed down. I recall that 
Petersen had very strong feelings that it could be very detrimental to 
the Government's ability to prosecute successfully the Watergate case, 
but he said he would have to give some thought to responding to Con- 
gressman Brown's letter. I had several additional discussions with 
Petersen and later with the Attorney General, when Petersen indicated 
he did not think he could respond before the scheduled appearance of 
Stans on September 14. 

The Justice Department did not feel that it could write such a letter 
for one individual regarding the Patman hearings and was very reluc- 
tant to do so. I also had conversations with Mitchell about this and 
reported the matter to Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Tlie Justice De- 
partment felt that for them to write such a letter would look like a 
direct effort to block the hearings and I frankly had to agree. There- 
fore, no response was sent prior to the scheduled September 14 
appearance of Stans and Mr. Parkinson himself informed the com- 
mittee that Stans would not appear because he felt it would be detri- 
mental to the then pending civil and criminal investigations. 

It was after my September 15 meeting with the President where 
this matter had been briefly and generally discussed and, as the subse- 
quent activities on the Patman committee became more intense that 
the White House became more involved in dealing with the Patman 
committee. On September 25, Chairman Patman announced that he 
would hold a vote on October 3 regarding the issuing of subpenas to 
witnesses. With this announcement the White House congressional 
relations staff began talking with members of the committee as well 
as the Republican leadership of the House. 

I recall several conversations with ]\Ir. Timmons and Dick Cook 
regarding this matter as well as conversations with Haldeman. Tim- 
mons and Cook informed me that there v>^as a daily change in the list 
of potential witnesses and the list was ever growing and beginning 
to reach into the AAHiite House itself. In discussing it with Haldeman 
I asked him how he thought the Patman hearings might be turned off. 
He suggested that I might talk with Secretary Connally about the 
matter because Connally would know Patman as well as anybody. I 
called Secretary Connally and told him the reason I was calling. He 
said that the only thing he could think of. the only soft spot that Pat- 
man might have, was that he had received large contributions from a 
"Washington lobbyist and had heard rumors that some of these contri- 
butions may not have been reported. 

I discussed this matter with Bill Timmons and we concluded that 
several Republicans would probably have a similar problem so the 
matter was dropped. At this time I cannot recall the name of the 
lobbvist whom Secretary Connallv said had made the contributions to 
Mr. Patman. Timmons and I had also discussed that probably some 
of the members of the Banking and Currency Committee would have 
themselves potential campaign act violations and that it probably 
would be worthwhile to check out their reporting to the Clerk of the 
House. I told Timmons I would look into it. 


On September 26 I received a report I had requested from Parkin- 
son after he had one of his associates check the reports of the members 
of the committee with the Clerk of tlie House. After I received the 
document from Parkinson, a copy of which I have submitted to the 
committee, I decided it would be a cheap shot to get into anything of 
this nature. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34—21.^] 
Mr. Deax. Accordingly, I never reviewed the document that Park- 
inson submitted and I have not reviewed it to this day. 

While the White House had received through its congressional re- 
lations stall' informal reports as to who was likely to be subpenaed, 
(^liairman Patman made public his list on October 2, 1972. The indi- 
viduals for whom subpenas were to be requested was extensive and in- 
cluded several people who had varying degrees of knowledge regard- 
ing the Watergate and related matters. This list, for example, included 
Alfred Baldwin, Jack Caulfield, persons from the finance commit- 
tee, Sallv Harmonv, Fred LaRue, Clark ]MacGregor, Mr. ']Magruder, 
Mr. :Mardian, :\Ir. Mitchell, Rob Odle, Bart Porter, Hugh Sloan, Stans, 
Timmons. and myself. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the 
entire list. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-22.^] 
Mr. Deax. As the names on the list had continued to evolve, it be- 
came increasingly apparent that the ^Vliite House did not want the 
hearings to be held. For example, Bill Timmons took a much greater 
interest in the project when he realized early on that his name was 
among those who would be called. I say this not because Timmons had 
any reason not to appear because I know of no illegal or improper 
activity on Timmons' part, rather he had been Avorking to prevent the 
hearings from occurring in the first instance through his conversations 
with the Republican leaders and members of the committee. This he 
knew would put him in an awkward position. 

I began receiving increasing pressure from Mitchell, Stans, Parkin- 
son and others to get the Justice Department to respond to the Sep- 
tember 8 letter of Congressman Brown as a vehicle that Congressman 
Brown could use in persuading other Republicans not to vote in favor 
of the subpenas. Congressman Brown felt that with this document in 
hand he could gi^'e the Republicans and others something to hang their 
vote on. I had continued my conversations with Henrv Petersen and 
after the indictments had been returned he said that indeed he did feel 
that the Justice Department should issue such a letter because of the 
potential implications of the breadth of the Patman hearings. The let- 
ter was sent on October 2, 1972. I have submitted to the committee a 
copy of Congressman Brown's letter ^ and Assistant Attorney General 
Petersen's response. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 3-1-23.*] 
]Mr. Deax. A number of people worked on ofetting the votes necessary 
to block the Patman committee hearings. Mr. Timmons discussed the 
matter with the House Republican leaders who agreed to be of assist- 
ance by making it a matter for the leadership consideration, which 
resulted in direction from the leadership to the members of the com- 

iSee p. 11 S3 
2 See p. 1190 

^ Confrressman Brown's letter appears as exhibit 34—20. 
*See p. 1194. 


mittee to vote against the hearings. I was informed that Congressman 
Brown had been working with several membei-s on the Democratic side 
of the Patman committee to assist in voting against the hearings or as 
an alternative not to appear for the hearings. Timmons informed me 
that he was also in direct contact with one of the leaders of the south- 
ern delegation who was being quite helpful in persuading the south- 
erners on the committee not to vote for the subpenas or in the alterna- 
tive not to appear at the meeting on October 3. Also INIitchell reported 
to me that he had been working with some people in New York to get 
the New Yorkers on the committee to vote against the hearings. He 
told me, and I cannot recall now which members of the New York 
delegation he referred to, that he had assurances that they would 
either not show up or would vote against tlie hearings. I in turn passed 
this information on to Timmons, but I did not tell him the source of 
my information. On October 3 the vote was held and the subpenas 
were defeated by a vote of 20 to 15 and another sigh of relief was 
made at the Wliite House that we had leaped one more hurdle in the 
continuing coverup. 

On October 4, however, Chairman Patman requested a GAO in- 
vestigation and I was asked by Stans what this would mean. I told 
him that this would be primarily between himself and the GAO but 
that since GAO had no subpena power to compel testimony, the scope 
of their investigation would have limits. He said he felt that he could 
work with Elmer Staats, who was an old and good friend, and not let 
this matter get out of hand with the GAO. On October 10, Chairman 
Patman decided to proceed without subpena power, and sent letters 
to MacGregor, Stans, Mitchell, and mvself. Evervbody who received 
such a letter declined to appear and Patman held his hearings with 
empty witness chairs and, as I recall the press accounts, "lectured" 
the missing witnesses. 

The Segretti Matter 

I would now like to turn to the so-called Segretti matter. I have 
been informed by committee counsel that the subject of alleged po- 
litical sabotage will be taken up in subsequent hearings. However, I 
have been asked to exolain in full the ):)attern of coverup which 
evolved in connection with the AVatergate and related matters and my 
explanation would be less than complete in presenting my knowledge 
of the subject if I were to omit the so-called Segretti matter. AAHiile the 
Segretti matter was not directlv related to the Watergate, the covenip 
of the facts surrounding Mr. Segretti's activities was consistent with 
other i)arts of the general White House coverup which followed the 
Watergate incident. I will not go into extensive detail at this time, 
rather I will give the highlights of the pattern that was followed 
regarding the dealings of the White House with Mr. Segretti. 

I first heard of ]Mr. Segretti when Gordon Strachan called me in 
late June and told me that the FBI had called a friend of his by the 
name of Donald Segretti, and requested to interview him in connection 
with the break-in at the Democratic National Committee. Strachan 
asked if I would meet with Segretti. I told him that I would and 
Strachan arranged a meeting at the ]Mayflower Hotel where Segretti 
was staying. Strachan gave me a very general description of INIr. Se- 


<rretti-s activities and said that he was a "dirty tricks" type operator 
wlio was beino- paid by ^Ir. Kabiibach. He told me that he would 
rather have Se^rretti himself tell me what he had been doino; because 
lie, in fact, was not aware of all of Se^rretti's activities. He also in- 
formed me that ^Mr. Chapin had been involved in hirincr Seo:retti. I 
met with ]Mr. Se^retti in the lobby of the ]Mayflower Hotel at which 
time he erave me a very broad description of his activities and said that 
lie had had contact with a man by the name of Ed Warren, who, by 
haviii£r seen subsequent pictures in the paper, he assumed was Howard 
Hunt. I told Seofretti to come to my office the next day and we would 
discuss the matter further. 

When Sejrretti came to my office the next mornins;, he told me of 
his relationship with Mr. Hunt and that he had only had incidental 
dealiiifrs with him and recalled meetinc: with him twice in Florida and 
several subsequent telephone calls. Seofretti told me that Hunt had 
"scared him" and that he had reallv decided early-on to deal with him 
as little as possible. Seirretti then described how he had been hired and 
the fact that he had met with Kalmbach to arran^re his compensation. 
He said he wanted to know whether he should mention the fact that 
Strachan and Chapin had recruited him and Kalmbach was paying 
him when he was interviewed by the FBI. 

I told Seoretti that he should answer any and all questions asked 
about Hunt and his relationship with Hunt but that he should with- 
hold the names of Strachan. Chapin. and Kalmbach. unless the FBI 
felt it was absolutelv necessary to have the names. Seo-retti departed 
and returned to California. 

Several davs after Segretti's FBI interview, he called me and told 
me that he thoup:ht his interview had <rone very well. He said he told 
the FBI everything he Imew about Mr. Hunt and the fact that he had 
no knowledge of the Watergate incident and that the agents had not 
pressed him in a manner that required him to reveal the names of 
Strachan. Chapin. and Kalmbach. I thanked him for informing me of 
the results of his interview and did not hear again from him until 
much later. 

The next time I heard from Segretti was in August, during the 
Republican National Convention in Miami. I received a call from 
yir. Chapin who indicated that Segretti was very concerned about the 
fact that he was being called before a Federal grand jury in Washing- 
ton to investigate the Watergate. 

Chapin told me that Segretti was looking for guidance as to his 
appearance before the grand jury and that he was concerned again 
that he might have to reveal the names of Strachan. Chapin. and 
Kalmbach. I informed Chapin that it would be impossible for me to 
go to Washington to see Segretti. but if he wished to come to Florida 
prior to his scheduled gi'and jury appearance. I would be happy to 
meet with him. 

After my conversation with Chapin, I called Mr. Petersen at the 
Department of Justice and explained the problem that was confront- 
ing Segretti. I told Petersen that to the best of mv knowledge Segretti 
had no involvement in the Watergate incident but he had had deal- 
ings with Hunt in connection with some campaign activities he had 
been performing for the A^Hiite House. 


I also informed Petersen that he was being paid by the President's 
personal attorney, Mr. Kalmbach, and that he had been recruited by 
Chapin and Strachan. I said that these facts, if revealed, would obvi- 
ously be quite embarrassing and could cause political problems during 
the waning weeks of the election. Mr. Petersen said that he understood 
the problem and would determine what he could do. I subsequently 
talked to Petersen again and he told me that he did not believe it 
would be necessary for the prosecutors to get into these areas when 
Mr. Segretti appeared before the grand jury. 

Segretti came to Florida a day or so before his appearance before 
the grand jury. To the best of my recollection it was on a Saturday 
during the week I was in Miami preparing for the convention. I had 
a very brief meeting with Segretti, not longer than 30 minutes, as I 
recall in which we reviewed his potential problem. I told him that I 
did not believe that the Government was particularly interested in 
pursuing the names of Strachan, Chapin, and Kalmbach in connection 
with his activities and I doubted if he would be asked any questions 
about these areas. I told him, however, if he were asked the questions, 
that he should answer any question and every question truthfullv, and 
if we were asked the names of who had hired him and who had paid 
him that he should give the names. I told him if pressed, he should lay 
out the whole ball of wax. 

I later learned from Segretti that the names had come out during 
the grand jury appearance and I had a discussion later with Petersen 
also on the subject in which he told me that Mr. Silbert had tried to 
avoid getting into this area and in fact did not ask him tlie question 
which resulted in his giving the names, rather that a grand juror liad 
asked the question despite the fact that the prosecutors had tried to 
gloss over it. 

As a result of Segretti's appearance before the grand jury, FBI 
inter\dews were scheduled for Chapin, Strachan, and Kalmbach. I had 
by this time learned the full story, that in fact Haldeman, in a meeting 
with Kalmbach, had approved Segretti's activities and authorized 
Kalmbach to make the payments to Segretti. In discussing this wit;li 
Chapin and Strachan before their appearances or their FBI inter- 
views, I should say, they both had great concern about revealing Halde- 
man's involvement. In fact, I recall that Strachan came into my office, 
when Dick Moore was present, and said that he would, if necessary, 
perjure himself to prevent involving Haldeman in this matter. I told 
Strachan that that was certainly not necessary in my estimation, but 
lie was indeed, most loyal to Haldeman for taking that position. Dick 
Moore made a similar comment. 

When the agents came to interview Chapin and Strachan, they con- 
tained themselves in their questioning and, to the best of my knowledge 
all the answers that Chapin and Strachan provided were truthful, al- 
though I must say that, pursuant to discussions I had had witli them 
before their interview, they did not volunteer any information that 
was not asked for. 

When I was in California in late August, I was asked by ]\[r. Ehr- 
lichman to meet with Kalmbach and prepare him for his FBI inter- 
view resrarding the Segretti matter. 

Mr. Kalmbach was very concerned that the interview could lead 
into other areas, and had discussed this problem with Ehrlichman. 


Accordingly, I helped Kalmbach prepare for his FBI interview, and 
he later informed nie it had gone well, that they had not asked 
questions unrelated to the Segretti matter, and he volunteered nothing. 

On October 10, 1972, an article based on leaked FBI information 
rej^orted the Segretti story for the first time publicly. Following the 
October 10 story there commenced a series of stories involving Chapin, 
Strachan, Kalmbach, and, later, Haldeman. These stories created a new 
frenzy in the White House press office as to how to deal with the stories. 

On Friday, the 13th, I had left Washington to go to Florida to spend 
several weeks on a honeymoon, but was abruptly called back to Wash- 
ington on Sunday, October 15, because of the cascading leaked stories 
regarding Segretti. When I returned, I went to the White House where 
a meeting was in session in the Roosevelt room. In attendance at the 
meeting were Ehrlichman, Ziegler, Buchanan, Moore, and Chapin. The 
l)urpose of the meeting was to prepare Ziegler for his press briefings on 
the Segretti-related stories. For a reason that I cannot explain, a sec- 
retary to ]Mr. Chapin was present and taking notes during parts of 
the discussions and hypothetical questioning and answering of ]SIr. 
Ziegler. I believe this is one of the rare occasions where the preparation 
of a Ziegler briefing was actually recorded and I have submitted to the 
committee a copy of the notes recording parts of that session. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34—24.*] 

Mr. Dean. I might also add that this session was not unlike many 
other sessions that had preceded it and that were to follow it in prepar- 
ing Ziegler to meet with the AAHiite House press corps. It would, how- 
over, take me another 200 pages to give that story. After Segretti 
became the subject of intense inquiry by the press, Ehrlichman sug- 
gested that I advise Segretti to go incognito and hide from the press 
and avoid further stories that might result from j^ress interviews of 
him. I so advised Segretti and he came to Washington in late October, 
because he was very distressed alwut the fact that a number of people 
were issuing what he considered to be inaccurate and false stories 
regarding his activities. 

"\"\lien Segretti arrived in Washington, he was met by "Sir. Fielding 
and myself to discuss whether he should issue a press statement him- 
self at that time. This subject was also discussed in a meeting at 
Mr. Chapin's office attended by Ziegler. Ehrlichman. Chapin, and my- 
self, and later by Fielding after he had received a draft copy of 
Segretti's proposed press statement. It was decided that it would be 
unwise for Segretti to issue the statement, so he commenced his travels 
around the United States once again to avoid the press. Mr. Segretti 
would periodically call me to tell me that he was in some small town 
and had not seen a newspaper or television for several days and was 
curious to know what they were saying about him. I would give him 
a summary report as to the ])ress co\'erage. 

Following the election, I was asked by Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
to meet wnth Segretti to determine the extent of the involvement that 
Chapin and Stiachan had had with him. Segretti at this time was in 
Palm Springs, Calif., where he had been spending the last week before 
the election in the desert. I arranged to meet with him on November 10 
in Palm Springs, and had planned to spend a week myself relaxing 
after the election in Palm Springs. On November 10 I met with 

♦See p. 1200. 


Segretti and, pursuant to an arrangement between Segretti and my- 
self, I agreed to tape the interview with him, with the understanding 
that I felt it was privileged under the doctrine of executive privilege 
and that it would never be released. I have submitted the tape of that 
conversation between Segretti and myself to the committee pursuant 
to a subpena issued for the material. 

My visit to Palm Springs was abruptly interrupted when I received 
a call on November 11 from Mr. Todcl Hullin, Ehrlichman's assistant, 
requesting that I come to Florida where Ehrliclmian and Haldeman 
were accompanying the President, to report on my interview with 

Accordingly, I flew to Florida immediately and met with Halde- 
man and Ehrlichman on November 12 and played the taped interview 
I had had with Segretti for them. I recall that while I was discussing 
this matter with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, the President requested 
that Haldeman come over to see him. I was surprised on this occasion, 
as I had been on other occasions when a similar situation had occurred, 
that Haldeman sent a message back to the President that he was meet- 
ing with me and would be over shortly to report. I was surprised that 
my reporting on Segretti would take precedence over Haldeman's 
responding to an immediate request of the President. 

On November 15, 1972, 1 arranged to meet with Mr. Haldeman and 
Mr. Ehrlichman at Camp David on another subject, which I will dis- 
cuss later. During the first part of the meeting, however, the subject 
of Chapin's remaining at the White House came up, and I learned 
that the President had made a decision, based on the information that 
had been imparted to Haldeman and Ehrlichman in Florida, that ]Mr. 
Chapin would have to leave the White House staff. Before going to 
Camp David, I was aware of this subject being under discussion and 
Mr. Moore and I had talked about it. Moore felt that the President 
should merely issue a letter of censure to Chapin and let it go at that, 
but Moore was unaware of the contents of the tape and had never 
heard it. Pursuant to requests of ]\Ioore, however. I did raise his sug- 
gestion with Ehrlichman and Haldeman. Haldeman said that he was 
i:>ei-sonally too close to Chapin to make a judgment on such a thing and 
that if it was going to be done, it was going to be reraised with the 
President it would have to be done so by Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman 
said that he did not think that it was possible to reraise the matter and 
subsequently Chapin resigned from the White House staff. 

Discussions of a Written Dean Report 

As the press accounts of Segretti's activities lingered on after the 
election as well as the continuing Watergate stories, there was serious 
discussion about putting out the facts. In late Novembei', I recall a 
conversation with Haldeman in his office. We talked about the facts and 
he asked my opinion about what would happen if we put them out. I 
told him that I thought that the then pending trial would be put back 
into a grand jury and it was very likely that Mitchell, Magruder, 
Strachan, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Dean could be indicted. He 
asked me to elaborate. I said I had no idea nor did I have full knowl- 
edge of what happened before June 17 but I did know that there is a 
good possibility that any reconvened grand jury could get into ques- 
tions of obstruction of justice which would lead right to us. 


Haldeman said that tlie President wished, now that the election was 
over, to get rid of the AVatergate and related matters by laying them 
open but based on what I had just told him he said it doesn't seem to 
be a very viable option. I told him that I was ready at any time to ac- 
count for myself and that I thought we should continue to examine 
that option so that the President is not damaged. He then asked me to 
attempt to write a report that could be made public : A report that 
would be a written version of the so-called Dean investigation that the 
President had announced on August 29 and include a new report on 
the Segretti matter. I told Haldeman that I thouglit that this could 
only create additional new problems because it would be just like a 
peek into the tent without letting anyone in and it would be very diffi- 
cult to write, but I would do my best. 

I did not tell Haldeman that I was also opposed to writing a report 
under my name which I felt would come back to haunt me some day. 
Accordingly, to follow his instructions I decided that I would draft a 
series of carefully worded interrogatories or affidavits for each indi- 
vidual whose name had come up in the press regarding political 
sabotage and espionage activities. Then based on the affidavits I would 
write a summary report and attach the affidavits. I thought that I 
would merely waltz over the Watergate matter by referring to the fact 
that other governmental investigations, the FBI, and grand jury, had 
cleared anyone in the "\Miite House from involvement. 

After drafting the document I reluctantly submitted it to Halde- 
man on December 5. I have submitted a copy of this document to the 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 84-25.*] 

Mr. Deax. Haldeman in turn gave it to Ehrlichman, who made the 
editorial changes that appear on the draft. Ehrlichma]i then gave it to 
Ziegler. On December 13, a meeting was scheduled in Haldeman's office 
to discuss the matter but was subsequently moved to Ziegler's office. 
Present at the meeting were Haldeman, ]Moore, Ziegler, and myself. 
Ehrlichman had shown up for the earlier meeting in Haldeman's office 
but when it was moved to Ziegler's office, he never returned to the meet- 
ing, to the best of my recollection. Xothing was resolved at the meeting 
and it was a consensus of the group that the AAHiite House should con- 
tinue, in Dick Moore's words, to ''hunker dov/n" — do notliing — on the 
general theory that no one would be arrested for what they didn't say. 

The Haxdlixg of Demands tor White House Moxey 

Turning now to the handling of demands for White House money, 
I have previously discussed Mr. Kalmbach's raising the money for 
the first pressures for support money for silence. These pressures were 
continuous and following the election there were increasing pressures 
from Hunt for money for himself and the other indicted defendants 
as a means of assuring their silence. While this pressure had begun 
well before the election, it steadily grew after the election until the 
demands were being made directly to the AMiite House for financial 
assistance. Before getting into the details of these pressures and how 
they were handled, I believe it might be helpful to explain the situa- 
tion at the White House regarding the handling and availability of 

♦See p. 1210. 


In early 1971, 1 was asked by Haldeman to assist in establishing the 
reelection committee in that they had no lawyer of their own. My activ- 
ities resulted in my learning that there were large sums of cash that 
had been left over from the 1968 Nixon primaries and some funds had 
been left from the 1970 congressional fundraising efforts. These 
moneys, which were referred to as surplus moneys, were held by Kalm- 
bach and controlled by Haldeman and Ehrlichman. I have submitted 
to the committee a memorandum prepared by Strachan of a meeting 
that was attended by Haldeman, Strachan, and myself on May 18, 1971, 
which reflects the tight controls Haldeman exercised over the surplus 
moneys held by Kalmbach. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-26.*] 

jklr. Dean. I have also submitted to the committee documents evi- 
dencing that it Avas necessary to have Haldeman's approval, based on a 
full explanation of the reasons, for even the smallest disbursement by 
Kalmbach of the surplus money. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhi])it Xo. 34—27.**] 

Mr. Dean. In this instance, I am referring to an expenditure of $813. 

It was sometime prior to April 7, 1972, that I learned that cash 
was being sent to the White House. I was not told the amount, but I 
was asked by Strachan if I could suggest someone outside of the Gov- 
ernment who might be willing to hold a large amount of cash in a 
safety deposit box. I told him I would have to think about it but later 
told liim I couldn't think of anyone. 

It was in late June or early July 1972, that I learned that $350,000 
of the surplus money had been delivered to the White House prior to 
April 7, 1972. I was informed that the money came from the 1968 
primaries and that the delivery was made before April 7 to insure 
that it not become a part of the 1972 campaign funds. 

The $350,000 fund, as I have indicated, was held by Strachan but 
I do not know where he held it. It was shortly before Mr. Sloan was 
being called to testify in July that discussions commenced on how to 
make the $350,000 fund whole and get it out of the 'White House. 
There was no easy answer, because there was no place to send it out 
without reporting requirements. The concern was that Mr. Sloan 
would testify that he was aware of the disbursal of the $350,000 to the 
White House. This, in turn, would have created two problems: The 
"White House would have been accused of having a secret slush fvmd if 
this became public, and second, a $6,800 expenditure out of a $22,000 
authorization which had been made presented a potential campaign 
act violation for Haldeman, Colson, and Howard. I had numerous 
discussions about how to handle this problem with Mr. Stans and Mr. 
Parkinson but there was no easy answer. 

I also discussed this matter with Mr. Haldeman, telling him that 
there was no easy answer. Finally, after the election, Stans indicated 
he had cash available and it was decided that Stans should provide 
$22,000 to Strachan to make the funds whole and then they could 
be removed from the White House and, if necessary, reported. This 
plan was approved by Haldeman and Stans was so informed. On the 
morning of November 28, Stans called to request that Strachan come 
to his office to receive money that he had available. I do not know the 

*Seft p. 1226. 
♦*See p. 1231. 


source of the money or whether it was campaign money or any of the 
details about the $22,000 that Stans had made available. I could not 
locate Strachan and Stans indicated that it should be picked up imme- 
diately but I cannot recall at this time the reason he called for the 
immediacy. Accordingly, I asked Mr. Fielding to pick up a package 
from Stans and give it to Strachan as soon as he could. 

I informed Stans that Fielding would be over to pick up the pack- 
age but he would not know what he was picking up and when I later 
learned that Stans had informed Fielding I was somewhat annoyed 
because I felt it was unfair to Fielding. The money was then given 
by Fielding to Strachan but no final decision had been made regard- 
ing how to dispose of the $350,000. 

Having explained the status of the cash at the "White House, I must 
now return to the pressure that was being placed on the White House 
for the use of these funds which I have just described for payments 
to the seven indicted individuals. This pressure began long before 
election day in that Paul O^Brien was receiving messages from Wil- 
liam Bittman, Hunt's lawyer, that Hunt and others expected to have 
more support money and attorney's fees in exchange for continued 
silence. The initial payments by Kalmbach had not been sufficient. 
O'Brien reported this frequently to oSIitchell, Mardian, LaRue, and 
mvself. I, in turn, was reporting to Haldeman and Ehrlichman. 

There were discussions in late July, August, and September of using 
these funds at the "Wliite House for these payments. I informed Halde- 
man of these discussions, but they were still in the discussion stage and 
no action was taken. 

After the election, the pressure was greatly increased when Colson 
received a call from Mr. Hunt, which Colson recorded. Colson brought 
the recorded call to me and I, in turn, transcribed it onto a cassette 
tape. I have been informed by the committee counsel that the com- 
mittee has in its possession a transcript of the conversation between 
Colson and Hunt in which Hunt makes demands for money. On No- 
vember 15, I arranged a meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman so 
that they could hear the tape of the conversation Colson had had with 
Hunt and also to infoi-m them of the increased and now threatening 
demands that were being transmitted through Hunt's lawyer to Mr. 
O'Brien and in turn on to the White House. 

Haldeman and Ehrlichman were at Camp David at that time devel- 
oping the plans for the reorganization of the executive branch for the 
second term of the Nixon administration. I departed on the morning 
of November 15 for Camo David with Mr. Walter Minnick, who was 
going to Camp David to discuss the reorganization plans with Ehrlich- 
man. Mr. Minnick had been doing virtuallv all of the legal work at 
that time for Ehrlichman on the reorganization plan and was a member 
of Ehrlichman's staff. In fact, I was somewhat surprised that the coun- 
sel's office had not been more involved, or involved at all, prior to that 
time in the reorffanization plans. After arriving at Camp David. 
Ehrlichman. Haldeman, and I went into the President's office in Laurel 
Lodge, which wac emntv. I have referred earlier to the fact that in this 
meeting the matter of Dwight Chapin's remaining at the "Wliite House 
was discussed. 

It was after that discussion that I told them of the telephone con- 
versation between Hunt and Colson and played the tape for them and 

96-296 O - 73 


also told them of the increasing demands being made for money. I told 
them I was going to New York that afternoon because Mitchell had 
requested that I come visit him regarding the demands being made and 
told them I would also play the tape for him. My instructions from 
this meeting were to tell Mitchell to take care of all these problems. 

iWhen we came out of this private meeting, Ehrlichman told Mr. 
^Nlinnick, who had been waiting to meet with him, that we had been 
talking about reorganization matters. This position was taken because 
Minnick was at Camp David for that j^urpose and it would seem to be 
a very logical thing that I might be discussing with Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman. In fact, in our private meeting there was no discussion 
of the reorganization at all. 

After a brief discussion about reorganization matters, I departed 
Camp David and returned to Washington and then flew to Xew York 
with Mr. Stans. Stans had told me some days earlier that he was going 
to meet with Mr. Mitchell to discuss a number of matters about wind- 
ing down the reelection committee and asked me to join him. 

Senator Ervix. There is a vote. I will stay here and proceed with 
the committee and ask them to hold the vote until I can get over and 
somebody can come back and take over so I can get over and vote. 

Mr. Dean. Thank you. 

Stans had arranged for the meeting with ^Mitchell to take place at 
the Metropolitan Club in New York City, because Stans was anxious 
to return to Washington as soon as the meeting was over and did not 
want to go down to Wall Street and get tied up in traffic. .Vfter the 
first part of the meeting where Stans and ^litchell discussed their 
problems, Stans departed and I played the tape for ]\Iitchell. I recall 
that he had only one reaction to the tape and it was to the effect tliat it 
was certainly a self-serving tape for Colson and he wondered what the 
hell Hunt was talking about with regard to ]Mitcheirs having perjured 
himself. I informed Mitchell that Ehrlichman and Haldeman had 
heard the tape and requested that he do what he could to solve the 
problem. I received no instruction or really any indication at all at that 
time from Mitchell regarding the matters that Hunt liad raised in his 
conversation with Colson. 

To the best of my recollection, it M^as the first week of December 
that Mitchell called me and said that we would have to use some of the 
$350,000 fund to take care of the demands that Avere being made by 
Hunt and the others for money. He indicated that the money that was 
taken out would be returned in order that the fund could be made 
whole again. He asked me to get Haldeman's approval. 

Prior to Mitchell's call, I had been informed by Col son's secretary 
that iSIrs. Hunt had called her at home on a number of occasions to 
discuss this problem with her in order that she might pass it on to 
Colson and get something done about the problem. Colson had sent 
his secretary. Miss Joan Hall, to me with these messa,o-es indicating 
that he did not want to talk to her about it but that she should pass 
the message on to me. I told INIiss Hall not to talk to Mrs. Hunt and, 
if necessary, <i:Qt an unlisted phone number. 

After the phone call from IMitchell, T called Haldeman and described 
the situation in full to him and that T had told ^Mitchell that T was 
very i-eluctant to see "\^liite House money used but tliat he indicated 
that it would be returned as soon as thev could raise some additional 


money. I told Haldeman that I did not think this was a good idea to 
further involve the White House in raising money for these men but 
I frankly had no ans^yer. Haldeman said he did not like it either, but 
since we had the assurance that the money would be returned, I should 
inform Strachan that he could make the delivery of the money to the 
committee. Following my conversation with Haldeman 1 called 
Strachan and told him he should speak with LaRue and make a deliv- 
ery to LaRue pui"suant to LaRue's instruction. I also informed 
Strachan that he should anticipate the fact that we would get this 
money back in the near future. I do not recall how much money was 
delivered by Strachan but I believe it was either $40,000 or $70,000. 

This delivery did not satisfy the demands and they continued to 
be relayed by Mr. Bittman to Mr. O'Brien, who, in turn, would relay 
them to Mr. ^Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, and myself, I, in turn, would tell 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman of the demands. I can recall LaRue and 
O'Brien coming to my office to discuss these demnndr and T told 
them that there could be no further use of the White House money 
and. in fact, to the contrary, Haldeman was expecting that that money 
which had been provided earlier was to be returned in full. 

To the best of my recollection, it was some time shortly before the 
trial when the demands reached the crescendo point once again. 
O'Brien and LaRue came to my office and told me of the seriousness 
of the problem. Subsequentl5\ Mitchell called me and told me that 
once again I should ask Haldeman to make available the necessary 
funds. I called Haldeman and told him of Mitchell's request and the 
situation and told him that I thought it was time to get the entire 
money out of the ^Miite House rather than continue as we were with, 
every few weeks, further bites being taken out of the apple. After 
we discussed the matter Haldeman said, send the entire damn bundle 
to them but make sure that we get a receipt for $350,000. After receiv- 
ing my instructions from Haldeman I called Strachan and told him 
that he was to deliver the remainder of the money to LaRue but that 
he was to make certain that he got a receipt for $350,000. Strachan 
later told me that LaRue had refused to give him a receipt. 

With each of these deliveries I am only aware of the fact that 
money was delivered to LaRue by Strachan. I have no knowledge of 
how LaRue in turn delivered it to those who were making demands 
upon the committee, nor do I know how much, in fact, was paid. 

Hunt's Status After the Death of His Wife 

After ]\Irs. Hunt was tragically killed on December 8, 1972, Paul 
O'Brien informed me that he had learned from William Bittman that 
Plunt was in A'ery bad shape. He had become extremely depressed 
and grieved over the death of his wife. 

I also recall that the funeral of Mrs. Hunt created a serious dilemma 
for Colson. who had known the Hunts' personally and was very fond 
of them both, but was A'ery concerned about in any way publicly 
identifying himself with ]Mr. Hunt. Accordingly, he came to ask 
me if he should attend ^Irs. Hunt's funeral and I told him that I 
thought he ought to do whatever he felt in his heart — that certainly 
attending her funeral could not in any way be deemed to show he 
was in any way involved with Plunt in the Watergate. Colson ini- 


tially told me he was ^oino: to attend the funeral but subsequently 
decided to send his secretary with a letter to Hunt expressing deep 
sympathy over the situation. 

It was also after the death of ^Irs. PTunt that I learned from O'Brien 
that Hunt's lawyer did not think that ]Mr. Hunt was capable of stand- 
ing trial in his then psychological situation, and that he had been 
examined by a psychiatrist who had reached that conclusion, Mr, 
O'Brien had discussed this matter with ^Mitchell because ]Mr. ^litchell 
and I had a conversation in whicli he told me that Bittman thought 
that the Government might be of some assistance in resolving Hunt's 
problems temporarily by finding a sympathetic psychiatrist to exam- 
ine Hunt who would concur in the findings of the psychiatrist who 
had already examined and found him not fit to stand trial, Mitchell 
asked me to discuss this with Petersen and I said I would. I had a 
brief conversation with Petersen about this and he said that if there 
was anything that could be done it would, but he did not think that 
anvthing could be done regarding this matter. 

After the government psychiatrist determined that Hunt was 
capable of standing trial, I had a report back from O'Brien that Hunt 
was outraged that no one at the White Hous'^ was doing anvthing 
to take care of him and, in fact, he thought that the White House and 
his friends had turned against him. He was not asking to have anybody 
fix his case, but he was merelv asking for someone to give him time 
to recover from the tragedy of his wife's death, 

I can recall telling Colson about this when I reported to him gen- 
erally that Hunt was in rather bad shape and was thinking about 
pleading guiltv rather than going through the rigors of a trial in his 
present situation. I also told Colson that I had been informed that 
Hunt wanted to talk with him, but since Hunt knew that would put 
Colson in an awkward position, that he wanted Colson to talk to his 

I shall now turn to the matter of Executive clemency for Mr, Hunt 
and others. 

ExECTrn\'E Clemexcy for Mr. Huxt and Others 

I was out of my office from roughly December 22 until the morning 
of January 3. 

Senator Er\^x. Would you like to take a little recess now? 

ISIr. Dean. I think my throat would enjoy that very much, ]Mr. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will take a short recess to go and vote. 

r Recess.] 

Senator Baker [presiding]. Mr. Dean, if you are ready to resume, 
the chairman asked me to reopen the hearings and proceed while he 
returns from the rollcall vote which has just boon concluded on the 
Senate floor, if you would like to take a fut'ther and more lentrthy 
break we will be ha})py to do that but if you are ready to proceed we 
will proceed. 

Mr. Dean. I am ready to proceed. I would just as soon get the state- 
ment over. 

Senator Baker. Go right ahead. 


Mr. Dean. As I was commenting before the break, on page 135 
in dealing with the subject of Executive clemency for Mr. Hunt and 
others, I was out of my office from roughly December 22 until the 
morning of January 3. The latter part of this time I was in California 
with other membei'^ of the White House staff and their families on a 
short vacation. I received a call on the morning of January 2 while 
awaiting takeoff from California in the President's new Air Force One. 
The call was from Paul O'Brien, who told me that there were some 
serious problems and I should speak with him as soon as I returned to 
Washington. He told me that Mr. Hunt was off the reservation. I was 
traveling with Haldeman and told him about the call. 

TAHien I arrived in Washington that evening, I called O'Brien and he 
told me that Hunt was quite upset and wished to plead guilty but 
before he did so he wanted some assurances from the White House that 
he would receive Executive clemency. O'Brien told me that Hunt 
would only take the assurances from Colson and that Bittman had 
been trying to reach Colson. I told O'Brien that I doubted if Colson 
would be willing to give any such assurance because he was staying at 
more than arm's length from Hunt. I told O'Brien that I would have 
to talk with him about it in the morning. 

On the morning of January 3, I received another call from Mr. 
O'Brien saying that the matter had to be resolved immediately because 
he had talked to Bittman, and they had been trying to get hold of 
Colson without any success. Colson called me to tell me that Bittman 
was trying to reach him and asked me if I had seen the letter that Hunt 
had sent him. I have submitted a copy of the letter to the committee. 

[The letter was marked exhibit Xo. 34-28.*] 

Mr. Deax. I told Colson that I had not seen the letter. I had just 
returned to my office, and while we were talking I found in my mail a 
memorandum from Colson with a letter attached from Hunt in which 
he was desperately pleading to have Colson meet with his attorney, 
Mr. Bittman. I told Colson that I was aware of the fact that Bittman 
wanted to discuss the matter of Executive clemency for Hunt and that 
Hunt would only take assurances from him — Colson. As I recall. Col- 
son said that he did not w^ant to meet with Mr. Bittman but he would 
do whatever I suggested. I told him I would get back in touch with 

I next met with Ehrlichman and told him about the situation and 
he thought that Colson should meet with Bittman. I do not believe Col- 
son was present when I first discussed this with Ehrlichman. I in- 
formed Colson that Ehrlichman thought he should meet with Bittman. 

In trying to reconstruct as best as I recall what occurred, there was 
a meeting in Ehrlichman's office on January 3, after jNIr. Colson had 
had a convereation with Bittman about Hunt's potential for Executive 
clemency. I recall that when Colson came to the meeting with Ehrlich- 
man he was extremely shaken, which was unlike Colson. He was not 
specific in his ar,Q-uments to Ehrlichman but he said that he felt it was 
imperative that Hunt be given some assurances of Executive clemency. 

The meeting in Ehrlichman's office did not last long and Ehrlich- 
man said that he would have to speak with the President. Ehrlichman 
told Colson that he should not talk with the President about this. On 

♦See p. 1233. 


January 4, I learned from Ehrlichman that lie had given Colson an 
affirmative regarding clemency for Hunt and that Colson had talked 
with Bittman again about the matter. There was another meeting on 
this subject on January 5, in Ehrlichman's office, in wliich Colson 
explained exactly what he had told Bittman regarding clemency. He 
said that he had told Bittman that he could not give a specific com- 
mitment but he gave him a general assurance. He also said that lie 
told him that clemency generally came up around Christmas and that 
a year was a long time. It was as this meeting was ending that I said 
to Ehrlichman that this will obviously affect all of tlie others involved 
as the word will spread, and can I assume that the same commitment 
extends to all ? He said that no one could be given a specific commit- 
ment but obviously, if Hunt was going to get an assurance for clemency 
the others could understand that it applied to all. 

After the meeting in Ehrlichman's office, Colson told me that al- 
though Ehrlichman had told him that he (Colson) should not discuss 
this matter with the President, that lie, in fact, thought it was so 
important that he had taken it up with the President himself. I also 
learned shortly thereafter, as a result of a telephone call from O'Brien, 
that Bittman had informed O'Brien that Hunt was satisfied with 
Colson 's assurances. 

As I shall state later, the President himself raised this subject on 
two occasions with me, and told me that he had discussed the matter 
of Executive clemency for Hunt with both Ehrlichman and Colson. 
The President raised this with me on March 13, 1973, and April 15, 

Catjlfield's Dealings With McCord — January 1973 

While I was in California during the late December /early January, 
as I referred to a moment ago, 1973, 1 received a call from ]Mr. Field- 
ing who told me that Jack Caulfield had received a letter from ISIcCord. 
Fielding was not explicit regarding the contents of the letter, and said 
that he had taken down the letter and that I could read it when I 
returned in the next day or so to the office. I have submitted a copy 
of the letter transcribed by Fielding to the committee. 

[The letter was marked exhibit Xo. 34-29.*] 

Mr. Deax. Within 2 or 3 days of mv return to the office — that is 
between January 3 and 5, ]\fr. Caulfield came to my office with the 
original letter. I do not know what I did with the original, but I believe 
I gave it to Paul O'Brien. I know that O'Brien and I discussed the 
matter, because he told me that ]McCord was not cooperating with his 
lawver — ^Mr. Alch. O'Brien also told me that Bittman had planned 
a CIA defense to the case, but McCord, who initially had been willing 
to go along, later refused. 

O'Brien subsequentlv talked with Mitchell about the matter, because 
Mitchell called me and informed me that he had discussed the matter 
with O'Brien, and Mitchell asked me to request that Jack Caulfield 
talk with McCord to find out what he was going to do. I told ^Mitchell 
I would ask Caulfield to speak with iVIcCord. Wien I later tried to 
reach Caulfield he had gone to California for a drug conference. I later 
informed Mitchell that Caulfield was out of town. 

♦See p. 1235. 


It was on January 10 that I received calls from both O'Brien and 
Mitchell indicating that since Hunt had been given assurance of clem- 
ency and that those assurances were being passed by Hunt to the others, 
that Caulfield should give the same assurances to McCord, who was 
becoming an increasing problem and again I was told that McCord's 
lawyer was having problems with him. Both O'Brien and Mitchell 
felt that McCord might be responsive to an assurance from Caulfield, 
because Hunt, Bittman, and his lawyer, Alch, had lost rapport with 
him. I told ^litchell I would do so. 

Based on the earlier conversation I had with Ehrlichman on Jan- 
uary 5 that the clemency assurance that had been given to Hunt would 
also apply to the others, and Colson's description of how he hod given 
Bittman a general assurance, without being specific as to the commit- 
ment, I called Caulfield later that day to request that he get in touch 
with McCord. Caulfield told me that it would be very difficult, because 
he was going to be in California for several more days. Caulfield in- 
dicated that it would be easier for Mr. Ulasewicz rather than himself 
to talk with McCord. because he was tied up with a lot of people at 
the drug conference. I said fine, and then gave him the clemency mes- 
sage similar to the message that Colson had transmitted to Hunt via 
Bittman. Caulfield wrote down the gist of the message, he repeated his 
notes back, and I said that was fine, and told him I thought that Mc- 
Cord would be expecting to hear from him as soon as possible. Caul- 
field said he would have the message delivered right away. 

On January 11, I received a call from O'Brien, who asked me if the 
message had been delivered bv Caulfield. I told him that it had. O'Brien 
told me that ^McCord wanted to speak with Caulfield rersonally and 
asked me when Caulfield could meet with McCord. T told him I would 
try to arrange it. O'Brien told me he was goins: to be out of town, but 
I could reach him if there were any problems. He told me he was keep- 
ing Mitchell )50sted and requested I keep him posted. O'Brien said 
that we need a firsthand renort. a firsthand readhig on McCord from 
someone he will talk with, because he is not talking openly with his 
lawyer about what he plans to do. I told O'Brien I would call him 
(O'Brien) as soon as I learned anvthing. 

I called Caulfield on January 11 and told him that McCord wanted 
to meet with him and asked him if he would do so and take McCord's 
pulse as to what he nlannod to do. He told me ho would meet McCord 
as soon as he returned to Washin.o'ton. 

On Friday, June 12, INIitchell called me for a report. I told him I 
thought I would hear from Caulfield after he talked to McCord. Caul- 
field called me at home Friday night to inform me that he had met 
with INfcCord and sufircrested we meet at my office in the morning so he 
could give me a report, that was a Saturday morning. T said fine, and 
on Saturday morning we met and he p-ave me a repoi't. The sum and 
substance of the report was McCord had not decided what he was 
.ofoing to do, but that he wanted his freedom. Caulfield reported that 
IVrcCord was very annoyed at Magruder. He had seen a picture of 
Ma^ruder in the paper which had peeked his annDvnnco. He also told 
Caulfield that lie had a plan that would enable him to get his case 
dismissed, but his lawver had not helped him with the matter and the 
Government had lied to him. He explained that he had made calls to 
pertain foreijrn embassies, and that these calls had been recorded, but 
the Government would not admit it. 


During this meeting with Caulfield I received a call from either 
John Mitchell or Paul O'Brien requesting a report en the meeting. I 
told the caller that I was getting a report from Caulfield and would 
call back. Caulfield told me that McCord was very adamaiit about his 
plans to gain his freedom through the phone calls that he had made to 
the foreign embassies. I told Caulfield I really did not understand why 
IMcCord thought he could get his case dismissed by reason of the wire- 
taps, but I would give the matter some thought. Caulfield told me that 
it was his assessment that McCord would only respond to a direct 
request from the President. 

I told Caulfield that he couldn't make such a statement because I 
had no such request from the President, but suggested he meet again 
with McCord and keep him happy bv telling him we were checking 
out the matter of his conversations M^ith the Embassies. 

Later that afternoon, Caulfield reported again to me that McCord 
was only interested in his theory about the calls to the Embassies. I 
told Caulfield to keep in touch with McCord. but I couldn't promise 
anything about his calling the Embassies. I told Caulfield to have 
McCord give him a memo on whv he thought that his calls to the 
Embassies would result in dismissal of his case. I called O'Brien and 
told him what had transpired. On Monday morning I reported to 
Mitchell what Caulfield had reported. 

Tt was sometime during this period that a result of my reports of 
Caulfield meetings with McCord, that O'Brien, JNIitchell and INIr. Alch 
discussed having F. Lee Bailey, Alch's partner, meet with McCord and 
inform him that he would personally handle his case on appeal. 
Mitchell was to talk with Mr. Bailev about this. I do not know what 
happened regarding this proposed plan. 

On Januarv 19 or 20, Mr. Caulfield brought me copies of McCord's 
memo regarding his intercepted conversations to the embassies. I have 
submitted these documents to the committee. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-30.*] 

Mr. Dean. I never did anvthing with these documents, other than 
inform Mitchell I had received them and I showed them to Mr, 
O'Brien in my office. I do not recall e^•er talking with anyone at the 
Department of Justice, regardinof McCord's pro]:)osal. At this time I 
concluded that McCord was going to do what he thought best for 

Handling Liddy's Call to Krogh — January 1973 

On January 4, Gordon Liddv called Mr. Krogh. Krogh's secretary 
received the call and Liddy said that he had received a letter from an 
investigator for the Senate Commerce Committee about his relation- 
ship with Krogh. The letter was part of an investigation being con- 
ducted by the committee staff in connection witli Krosh's nomination 
hearings for the Under Secretary of Transportation post. Liddy 
wished to speak to Krogh, but the call was not put through to Krogh. 

Krogh came to my office and asked what he should do. He said he 
wanted to be able to testify at his confirmation hearing that he had not 
spoken with Liddy since long before the "Watei-o-ate incident. I told 
Krogh that his secretary should return the call. We then worked out a 

♦See p. 1236. 


response which Kro^h wrote down for liis secretary and she returned 
the calL I have submitted to the committee the document jtrepared In' 
Mr. Krogh's secretary after the call was returned to Mr. Liddy — and 
I miffht note that was not in the exhibits when I assembled them last 
ni^ht but I do know where it is, on the table at home. 

Senator Bakek. I take it you will supply that document later in your 
testimony ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, Senator ; I will. 

Senator Baker. Thank you very much. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-31.*] 

Mr. Deax. On Friday afternoon, January 5, I received a report 
from O'Brien that Liddy had been rather miffed and annoyed that 
Kix)gh had been unwilling to s]:)cak with him. I reported this to Krogh, 
who asked if I would personally see what I could do, because Krogh 
felt sorry for Liddy but just couldn't talk with him. I agreed I would 
do something and on Saturday, January 6, T called Liddy from my 
house at his home. It was a brief call in which I told him the reason 
Krogh had not called and told him that Krogh had great sympathy 
for his plight. Liddy said he understood. The only thing T can recall 
Liddy saying to me was that he hoped that there would be some money 
forthcoming for his lawyer. I said I would pass that message along. 
I also expressed sympathy over his situation and the call ended. I 
later reported to Krogh that Liddy understood why he did not speak 
with him personally and Krogh appreciated it. 

Retrievixg CIA Material From the Department or Justice 

Now I am going to turn to the receiving, the retrieving CIA mate- 
rials from the Department of Justice in connection with the 

As a result of a conversation I had with Ehrlichman, I was asked 
to attempt to have the CIA retrieve from the Department of Justice 
information relating to Hunt's dealings with the CIA. To understand 
Ehrlicliman's request, I must provide some background. During the 
course of the Watergate investigations, the prosecutors had requested 
material from the CIA and, because of the fact that this material 
related to the "White House, the CIA had informed the White House 
of the request. The first incident when this came up was regarding 
the fact of who had made the initial request to the OIA to assist Hunt. 
General Cushman had been the Deputy Director of the CIA at the 
time the matter occurred, and when he was asked, he reported that 
he had been requested from John Ehrlichman. When Ehrlichman was 
informed of this, I believe by General Cushman, he denied the fact 
that he had ever made such a request, and told Cushman that he had 
never been asked for such assistance. 

Subsequently, General Cushman prepared a memorandum that indi- 
cated that the request had come from either Ehrlichman, Colson, or 
myself. Ehrlichman forwarded a copy of this document to me and 
asked if I would get this matter taken care of. I told him I thought 
it was somewhat strange that my name was on the memorandum from 
Cushman in that I had never spoken with Cushman in my life. 

*See p. 1238. 


He then asked me if I did not think it wonld be better that Cushman 
mentioned no one since he conld not remember who it was. I remember 
suspecting at the time, as I do today, that Ehrlichman had had my 
name inserted in the memorandum as a means of g-ettinfj me to make 
sure that Cushman would have no names in the memorandum at all. 
I remember calling General Cushman and telling him that I had 
received from Ehrlichman a copy of his memorandum and that I was 
somewhat surprised to find my name in it because this was the first 
time I had ever spoken with him. He agreed that we had never talked 
and I said that Ehrlichman had suggested to me that, if he could not 
remember w^ho it was, he, Cushman. ])robal)ly should not mention 

A short time later, another memorandum on this subject of who 
had asked for Hunt to have the assistance of the CIA come forward 
from General Cushman and this time no names were mentioned at 
all. It was after this episode in getting the Cushman statement cor- 
rected that I had an occasion to discuss this with Colson. Colson told 
me that he had been present when Ehrlichman had made the call to 

The other CIA material relating to Hunt's dealings with the CIA 
emanated from a series of questions that had been asked by the Water- 
gate prosecutors. I recall a discussion with CIA Director Helms and 
one of his deputies in Ehrlichman's office when they went over the 
type of material that they would be providing to the Department of 

I subsequently had occasion, while at the Department of Justice, 
to talk with Henry Petersen about the CIA material and he showed 
me a copy of the inforaiation the CIA had provided him, and he told 
me Mr. Gray had the same material. I remember that the document 
had attached to it a number of photographs which had come from a 
camera — again my text has gotten confused — had come from a camera, 
the camera which had been returned by Hunt to the CIA. It is a 
camera that had been borrowed by Hunt from the CIA. The pictures, 
which had been processed by the CIA, included a picture of Liddy 
standing in front of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. 

I informed Ehrlichman about this and that is the reason that he 
subsequently requested that I seek to retrieve the documents before the 
Senate investigators srot a copy of the material. 

I discussed this with Petersen, but he said that thev had received 
a letter in early Januarv of this year from Senator INIansfield re^rarding 
the maintenance of all records relating to the case and that the only 
thin.of that he could do would be to extract the document and leave 
a card to the effect that the document had been returned to CIA. 

I reported this to Ehrlichman and he told me that he thought that 
the CIA ought to get all of the material back and that no card should 
be left in the file and that national security grounds should be used to 
withhold release of the information. 

On February 9, 1973, 1 sjwke with Director Schlesinger of the CIA 
and asked him if it would be possible to retrieve the material that had 
been sent to the Department of Justice in connection witli the Water- 
gate investigation. I told him that I liad discussed this with the 
Department of Justice and they indicated that they would merely leave 


a card in their files indicating that the material had been returned 
to the CIA. 

I subsequently had a visit from General Walters in late February 
at which time he told me that the CIA was opposed to retrieving the 
material and leaving a card indicating that they had so retrieved it 
because they also had been requested by the Senate not to destroy any 
material relating to the case. I told Walters that I did not suggest that 
the material be destroyed; rather I thought that national security 
grounds might justify withholding release of the information to Senate 
investigators. He said it simply could not be done and I dropped the 

As I will explain later in a meeting with Mr. Krogh, the fact that 
this material was in the possession of the Department of Justice meant 
to me that it was inevitable that the burglary of Ellsberg's psychia- 
trist's office would be discovered. I felt that any investigator worth his 
salt would certainly be able to look at the pictures in the files at the 
Department of Justice and immediately determine the location and 
from there discover the fact that there had been a burglary of the 
office that was in the picture. 

I would now like to turn to the "Wliite House plans for dealing with 
this committee. 

White House Plav for Pftjpetuatixg the Coverttp Throtjghotjt 
THE Senate Watergate In\t:stigation 

Even before the Watergate criminal trial in January of this year, 
there had been press reports and rumors that the Senate planned 
independent hearings on the Watergate and related matters. The Wliite 
House Congressional Relations Staff reported that the subject of Wa- 
tergate hearings was being discussed in the Senate Democratic Policy 
Committee, but thev did not know the substance of those discussions. 
I was aware of the interest of Ehrlichman and Haldeman in the pros- 
pects of such hearings because they had discussed it with me. and 
Bill Timmons told me they had discussed it with him. 

On December 13, 1972, Timmons informed me that Senator Jackson 
was coming to the White House for a meeting with the President. 
Timmons said that Senator Jackson was a member of the Senate 
Democratic Policy Committee and had an excellent rapport with the 
President. Timmons asked me what I thought about having the Presi- 
dent inquire of Senator Jackson regarding the potential of a Senate 
inquiry into the Watergate. I responded that I thought it was a good 
idea, but would have to check. Timmojis said the meeting with Senator 
Jackson was going to be without staff present, and asked me to draft 
a memorandum to the President raising the issue. I told him I would 
check with Haldeman. 

I prepared a memorandum for the President and went to Halde- 
man's office, but he was not there. He was in the President's office with 
Mre. Ann Armstrong, who was discussing with the President joining 
the "Wliite House staff. A meeting had been scheduled in Mr. Halde- 
man's office at which Ehrlichman, !Moore, Ziegler, and I were to attend. 
Wien Ehrlichman came to Haldeman's office for the meeting I raised 
the matter of the President's asking Senator Jackson about the hear- 
ings because I did not have authority to send memorandums directly 


to the President. Ehrlichman thought it was a good idea, so I walked 
the memorandum down to Alex Butterfield to take to the President 
before the meeting. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-32.*] 

Mr. Dean. When Haldeman returned to his office with Mrs. Arm- 
strong, Ehrlichman, and I were in his office, waiting. But he asked us 
to leave and proceed with the meeting in Ziegler's office where Moore 
and Ziegler were waiting. 

I have referred earlier to the substance of this meeting of Decem- 
ber 13 in discussing the proposed written Dean report. Ehrlichman 
returned to his office and Haldeman later came to the meeting and 
told me that he had blocked the memorandum regarding the Water- 
gate inquiry from going to the President. He, in fact, had the original 
memorandum with him and had drawn a line through it. I told him 
that Timmons had suggested it and that Ehrlichman had also ap- 
proved it. He said he had not known that, and made a notation on the 
memorandum to the President and immediately sent it back to Butter- 
field to give to the President. I learned that day from Timmons, who 
later met with Senator Jackson, that the Senator did not know what 
the Senate Democratic Policy Committee was going to do about the 
Watergate. I do not know if the President discussed this subject with 
Senator Jackson. 

Timmons continued to report to Haldeman and me that there were 
rumblings on the Hill that the Senate was going to proceed with hear- 
ings. Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administrative Practices 
and Procedures had been conducting an investigation for several 
months, but it was uncertain as to whether they would proceed. 

It was learned in late December — early January that Senator Mans- 
field was pushing hard for Watergate hearings, but there was a debate 
as to who should handle the hearings. 

It was learned in late December — early January that Senator Mans- 
field had sent letters to Senator Eastland and Senator Ervin regard- 
ing the holding of hearings. Before that letter became public, however, 
both Wally Johnson and Fred LaRue had informed me tliat they had 
talked with Senator Eastland. The White House wanted Senator East- 
land to hold such hearings because they feJt that Senator Eastland 
would be friendly and that the White House had more friends on the 
Judiciary Committee than on Senator Ervin's Government Operations 

I was told that the White House congressional relations staff was 
doing what it could to get the hearings before Senator Eastland's 
committee. On January 11 of this year, the Senate Democrats formally 
voted that Senator Ervin would head the inquiry into the Watergate 
incident and related matters, and I must add. nnich to the displeasure 
of the White House. 

On February 5, 1973, the chairman introduced his resolution to 
create this committee. An advance copy of that resolution was for- 
warded to me by Timmons and I was subsoqucMitly requested to attend 
a luncheon meeting with Ehrlichman, Timmons, and Johnson to dis- 
cuss the resolution. Ehrlichman was tied up in another meeting and 
never attended. I was asked what I thought about the resolution and 

♦See p. 1239. 


did I have any suggested amendments that the Republicans might 
offer. I had not had an opportunity to study the resolution closely so 
I reread it and ottered a few suggestions off' the top of my liead : that 
it be broadened to cover other elections than the 1972 Presidential 
campaign; that the minority membei*s have adequate staff; that it be 
bipartisan with equal representation of the Republicans and Demo- 
crats, and that the minority members have the i)ower to call for an 
executive session when they believed it necessary. 

Wally Johnson indicated that he could get someone at the Depart- 
ment of Justice to draft amendments and that he and Timmons would 
peddle them to friendly Republicans. 

I later had discussions with Haldeman and Ehrlichman about the 
Senate hearings and they felt that it was time to develop a strategy 
for dealing with the Senate situation. I received what I interpreted as 
mild criticism that I wasn't getting the White House prepared for the 
forthcoming hearings and it was recognized that we were fast moving 
into an uncontrollable, if not hostile, forum. We had made it through 
the trial without any problems, but the Senate hearings were a new 
and possibly larger problem. Accordingly, I suggested that there be a 
meeting called where these mattei-s could be ciiscussed. I also suggested 
that we might call on Mr. Bryce Harlow. Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and 
Mitchell all agreed that Mr. Harlow's counsel would be most helpful. 
Accordingly, I had my secretary schedule a meeting in Ehrlichman's 
office on February 6, 1973. I recall that it was at some hardship that 
Mr. Harlow attended, in that he was scheduled to fly to Arizona that 
day, but I explained to him that my superiors were anxious to focus 
on the problem and wanted his advice. 

Prior to this meeting, but after my meeting with the President in 
September when he had mentioned to me that Mr. Hoover had told 
him that he (the President) had been bugged during his 1968 cam- 
paign, the thought of getting this information out had been discussed. 
I can recall discussing it with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, and in turn, 
discussing it with Mitchell. Haldeman, and Ehrlichman wanted 
Mitchell to get the information from Mr. DeLoach. I so informed 
Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell informed me that he was trying to get the facts 
regarding the bugging from DeLoach, whom he believed would have 
known if it had, in fact, happened. Mitchell had talked to DeLoach 
prior to the February 6 meeting and had received some information, 
but not much. 

The meeting assembled in Ehrlichman's office. INIitchell was late in 
arriving because of a delayed flight from New York City. Those pres- 
ent were Ehrlichman, Haldeman, finally Mitchell, Harlow, Moore, and 
myself. "When Mitchell arrived, he reported that there had been some 
surveillance by the Johnson administration, but DeLoach was unaware 
of a buge:ing of wiretap. I remember that I told Harlow that I thought 
he had been recorded when he was traveling with the Vice President 
in 1968. I based this on a conversation I had had with Mitchell earlier. 
The surveillance that DeLoach reported to Mitchell was related to 
Mrs. Anna Chennault and a foreiirn embassy. Also the telephone toll 
records from the Vice Presidential candidate Agnew's airplane when 
he had stop))ed in Albequernue, N. Mex., had been checked by the FBI. 

The meeting then turned to a general discussion of the proposed 
amendments and Timmons was called from the congressional leader- 


ship meeting that was then in session in the Cabinet room. Timmons 
reported that the Senate was going to begin debate on Senator Ervin's 
resohition that afternoon. Timmons was instructed to rec[uest Senator 
Hugh Scott to come to his office after the leadership meeting and I was 
instructed to go to Mr. Timmons' office to explain the amendments to 
the resolution to Senator Scott. I was also told that I should tell the 
Senator — Senator Scott — to raise the 1968 bugging incident as a reason 
to expand the scope of the resolution wdth reference to prior Presi- 
dential elections. I left to brief Senator Scott with the feeling that the 
meeting had accomplished nothing. I went to Timmons' office, had a 
brief meeting with Senator Scott, and, as I was returning to my office, 
I ran into Dick ^loore who told me that he felt that the meeting had 
been useless. I agreed. 

On February 7, Timmons informed me that the White House amend- 
ments had been virtually rejected out of hand and the resolution 
adopted 77-0, Timmons told me he had discussed with Haldeman the 
possibilities of susfgesting names for the Republican side of the Select 
Committee with Senator Scott, and Scott seemed receptive. On Febru- 
ary 8, the members of this committee were named and I recall Timmons 
telling me that Haldeman had "chewed him out," but Timmons told 
me Scott had never given him a chance to make any recommendation. 

On February 9, I had planned to go to Florida for a week or 10 
days. The President had departed for San Clemente, and it appeared 
that everyone could relax for a while. In midafternoon, however, my 
plans were changed when I received a call from Ehrlichman in San 
Clemente telling me that he wanted IVIr. Moore and me to come to 
California that night so that he could discuss in full detail the prob- 
lems of how to deal with the forthcoming Senate hearings. Ehrlich- 
man indicated that he and Haldeman were going to have some avail- 
able time over the weekend, so we should come immediately. I contacted 
Mr. Moore, who was about to take a train trip to southern Virginia 
with his young son and wife. ISIoore said that since he was packed he 
would merely fly west instead of training south. INIv wife and I and 
the Moores all flew to San Diego on the evening of February 9. 

The La Costa Meetixgs 

Evervone was staving at the La Costa Resort Hotel, south of San 
Clemente. The meetings with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Moore and 
myself ran for 2 days, and I would estimate they involved between 12 
to 14 hours of discussion. The meetings began on Saturday morning, 
February 10. at San Clemente, but the discussion did not begin to take 
any focus until Saturdav afternoon and Sunday, when we met in 
Haldeman's villa at La Costa. Based on notes T took during the meet- 
ing I will attempt to reconstruct what transpired. I should also point 
out that before I departed San Clemente to I'eturn to La Costa T was 
given several memorandums, which I have submitted to the committee, 
which directly relate to what occurred at La Costa. 
[The documents were marked exhibit No. 3-1—3.3.*] 
Mr. Deax. I did not look at these memorandums until several davs 
after the meeting and was rather surprised that Haldeman would state 
in writing specific instructions to me regarding his thoughts on pei'- 

*See p. 1240. 


petuating the Waterffate tactics or the coverup by a coiinteroffensive 
against the forthcoming Senate hearings. "What had happened by this 
point in time was that the coverup had become a way of life at the 
White House, and having made it to this point, those involved were 
becoming careless and more open about it. Also, the Senate was differ- 
ent than the courts, grand jury, FBI, and the like that had been dealt 
with earlier. 

Before turning to the substance of the La Costa meetings. I would 
like to note that Mr, Moore and I had talked on many occasions about 
the Watergate aft'air and the damage it was doin.g. Mr. Moore is the 
only person — other than Mr. O'Brien on a few occasions— to whom I 
ever expressed my deep concern about the matter, particularly the 
coverup. AMiile Moore did not know all the facts he knew a great deal 
and was becoming increasingly aware of the dimensions of the prob- 
lems. I talked to Moore far differently than anyone else. I talked to 
him about how we could end this matter once and for all. I expressed 
my concern to him often about how to end the matter before it ruined 
the second term of the President, I was concerned that it was not going 
to simply go away, and I had learned that the press was becoming 
aware of other illegal activities at the "\"\niite House, I never discussed 
these other matters with ]\Ioore, but I told him the coverup was bigger 
than the "Watergate incident per se. The more that we talked about it 
the less we could find a solution — so the coverup proceeded. 

As I have indicated, the purpose of what I call the La Costa meet- 
ings, was how to deal with this committee's investigation of the Water- 
gate. The Watergate trial was over and that problem appeared to be 
over. The next major problem was the Senate hearings. It was realized 
that it was going to take an all-out effort by the White House to deal 
with the Senate inquiry, because of the scope of the resolution, the 
composition of the committee, the investigative powers of the com- 
mittee, and the general feeling that the Senate was a hostile world for 
the White House, Haldeman and Ehrlichman were disappointed that 
the efforts to influence the Senate resolution creating the Select Com- 
mittee had failed, as well as the White House efforts to recommend 
members to the Select Committee. Thus, the focus of the discussion was 
how to deal with the committee henceforth. 

It was during the morning meeting in Ehrlichman's office at San 
Clemente that there was a discussion of the members of this com- 
mittee. Ehrlichman said that the "White House could not look for any 
help from the Democrats. I recall that when we were discussing the 
Democratic members of this committee, and I read from the Con- 
gressional Directory the data on Senator Inouye, Ehrlichman said that 
his name is pronounced "Ain't-no-way" and then said, indeed, there 
ain't-no-way he's going to give us anything but problems. [Laughter.] 

The Republican members of this committee were also discussed in 
that morning meeting. It was Ehrlichman who was doing most of the 
assessing, but occasionally Haldeman would add a comment. Senator 
Weicker was an independent who could give the "\^^lite House prob- 
lems. Senator Gurney would help the White House and would not have 
to be told to do so. I recall that Ehrlichman said that Senator Gurney 
needs the "^^Hiite House because former Congressman Cramer may 
take him on in his next primary. Senator Gurney was considered a 
sure friend and protector of the President's interest. Senator Baker 

was an unknown, and neither Haldeman nor Ehrlichman knew which 
way he might go. [Laughter.] 

Senator Ervin. The audience will please refrain from demonstrating 
in respect to the testimony. 

Mr. Dean. I might add that in a subsequent discussion I had with 
the President he also reached a similar conclusion regarding the Re- 
publicans. He thought that Senator Baker might help, but he was not 
sure. He was confident, however, that Senator Gurney would protect 
the "V\Tiite House and would do so out of political instinct and not have 
to be persuaded to do so. 

The long and short of this morning discussion was that the White 
House had one friend— Senator Gurney — and the possibility of wooing 
and winning another. 

Later, after the meeting had reconvened at La Costa, the discussion 
turned to a general approach about how to deal with the Select Com- 
mittee. Ehrlichman suggested that it should be publicly analogized 
to the ITT hearings — that is, the hearings were a waste of time to the 
Senate, they were very partisan, and ultimately repudiated by the 
Senate when Kleindienst was confirmed. After a general discussion, 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman concluded that the theory for dealing 
with this committee should be as follows : The White House will take 
a public posture of full cooperation, but privately will attempt to 
restrain the investigation and make it as difficult as possible to get 
information and witnesses. A behind-the-scenes media effort would be 
made to make the Senate inquiry appear very partisan. The ultimate 
goal would be to discredit the hearings and reduce their impact by 
attempting to show that the Democrats have engaged in the same type 
of activities. 

During the meeting on Saturday afternoon (February 11), Ehr- 
lichman instructed me to call Wally Johnson and tell Johnson that he 
was to go visit with Senator Baker during the then congressional 
recess to find out how Senator Baker planned to operate — that is, 
was he going to be friend or foe — and to ask Senator Baker how the 
Wliite House could aid him, particularly regarding the selection of 
the minority counsel. Prior to making the call, I asked Ehrlichman if 
I should arrange to give Johnson some kind of briefing before he went 
to see Senator Baker, so that he would know fact from fiction wlien 
talking with the Senator about the Watergate. Ehrlichman said that 
was not necessary. I called Mr. Johnson while the discussions pro- 
ceeded and passed the message to him. He said he would proceed 

At one point in the meeting, Ehrlichman raised the question of 
whether or not the Select Committee was going to be able to obtain 
the grand jury minutes and other investigative records from the FBI 
and the U.S. Attorney's Office. I said I did not know and tlien a dis- 
cussion of possible legal options ensued. No one really knew what the 
law might be regarding this matter, but Ehrlichman stated that the 
Attorney General will have to be told that the Justice Department 
should resist turning over such records, and that I should get word 
back to the attorneys for the defendants that they should fight the 
release of these investigative records to the Senate on the grounds that 
it would have an adverse impact on their appeals. 


When discussing how to handle the press coverage of the Senate 
hearings, Haldeman suggested that Pat Buchanan be used as a watch- 
dog of the press. Mr. Buclianan could prepare speeches on the biased 
press coverage. He could write op-ed articles and actually attend the 
hearings and be a White House spokesman to take the pressure off 
Ziegler's daily briefings. It was decided by Haldeman and Elirlich- 
man that Mr. Baroody's White House attack group — a group of media- 
oriented White House aides who meet virtually every morning to 
determine how to counter adverse news or push White House pro- 
grams — should not be involved. 

There was also discussion during the La Costa meeting of the role 
the reelection committee would play during the Senate hearings. It 
was decided that the reelection committee should have a new titular 
head. Several names were suggested and rejected and the matter was 
left unresolved. However, it was decided that the reelection committee 
should beef up its legal and public relations staffs. Paul O'Brien and 
Ken Parkinson should be given any additional legal staff they wished, 
as they would be responsible for handling witnesses from the com- 
mittee" who would be called to the Hill to testify. Mr. Van Shumway, 
who had been handling press relations for the reelection committee, 
would be asked to remain on and provided with any additional staff 
he needed. ^Ir. ]Moore would have general oversight of ^Slr. Shumway's 

At one point, Haldeman suggested that the reelection committee 
hire private investigators to dig out information about the Demo- 
cratic campaigns. I raised the wisdom of this because I thought it 
was more political surveillance. The matter was left unresolved. 

There was lengthy discussion of the importance of the minority 
counsel. Mr. Moore related back to some episodes during the McCarthy 
hearings. Both Ehrlichman and Haldeman felt very strongly about 
having a man, as minority counsel, who would work with the White 
House. A number of suggestions were made and discussed. Ehrlich- 
man thought that Mr. Fred Buzhardt would be an excellent choice. 
I was asked to come up with some names for consideration as soon 
as possible and report back. 

It was toward the end of the meeting on Sunday afternoon, Febru- 
ary 11, that Ehrlichman raised the bottom line question : Avould the 
seven Watergate defendants remain silent through the Senate hear- 
ings? I say this was a bottom line question because the entire strategy 
was based on this continued silence. I reported that I could not answer 
the question because I did not know. I said that I understood that 
they were still demanding more money, but as we had discussed pre- 
viously, there was no more money available. I told both Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman that I had carried their messages to Mitchell, that 
this is something that they would have to take care of — I think the 
transcript is confused, this ^vas something he should take care of, he, 
Mitchell, but that thev were aware of Mitchell's feelings that this was 
something that the White House should be concerned about. I said as 
far as I was concerned, that they would have to take this up with 
]\ritchell in tliat ^Mitchell felt it was a matter for the White House. 

At this point, Ehrlichman told INIr. Moore — who was hearing all 
this for the first time— that he, Mooi'e, should go to Mitchell and 

96-296 O - 73 - 6 


simply lay it out that it was Mitchell's responsibility to raise the nec- 
essary funds for these men. It had been decided at the outset of the 
first day of the meetings that Moore would go to New York and report 
to Mitchell on what had been resolved regarding dealing with the 
Senate hearings, and now Ehrlichman was telling Moore that an im- 
portant element of his visit with Mitchell would be for him to get 
Mitchell to raise the necessary future funds for the seven Watergate 

The meeting concluded on this item and Moore and I departed to- 
gether. I told him as we walked back to our rooms that I was very 
distressed that this had come up in his presence, but that he now had 
a very real idea of the dimensions of the situation. I told him I did 
not think that he should get involved in carrying such a message to 
Mitchell. Mr. Moore was concerned, but felt that he had an obliga- 
tion to do what Ehrlichman and Haldeman expected of him, but he 
did not understand why they thought that he could change MitchelFs 
mind. Shortly after Moore and I departed, I went to Los Angeles to 
join my wife at her mother's home and we left for Florida the next 
morning, February 12, 1973. 

Following Up on the La Costa Meetings 

Wliile in Florida, I received calls from Higby, Moore, Johnson, and 
others following up on the matters that had been set in motion at the 
La Costa meeting. 

On February 13, I received a call from Johnson, who informed me 
that he had talked with Senator Baker by telephone. He told me that 
he had informed Senator Baker tliat he would serve as the White 
House liaison to the Select Committee. 

Johnson reported that Senator Baker had told him that a personal 
visit was not necessary, that they could talk when he returned to 
Washington from Tennessee. Johnson said that he had discussed the 
minority counsel position with Senator Baker, and the Senator said 
he did not want any official input from the ^^Hiite House and had 
already given some thought to the qualifications he was seeking in his 
minority counsel. 

Johnson reported that the Senator had 50 names already under 
consideration and planned to make his selection in the next few days. 
Johnson told me that he didn't think Senator Baker had ruled out the 
White House's making some suggestions, but we would have to move 

Mr. Johnson also reported that Senator Baker had told him that the 
White House should be concerned about the President's posture vis-a- 
vis the Senate inquiry. 

Finally, he reported that Senator Baker had indicated that he and 
the chairman would be getting together after the recess and would 
discuss staffing and procedural matters at that time. I passed this 
report to Haldeman via Mr. Higby. 

On February 14, Paul O'Brien came to visit me in Florida. He 
arrived in the evening and we went out to dinner. Nothing of sub- 
stance was discussed that evening other than some hand wrinffing over 
the p-eneral situation. O'Brien came to Florida to get a report from mo 
on what had occurred at the La Costa meetinc;. He told mo that 


]\Iitchell wanted him. O'Brien, to get my version of tlie meeting, as 
well as the report he was getting from Mr. ISIoore. 

On February 15, after a late breakfast, O'Brien and I took about a 
2 hour walk down the beach, at which time I told him what had 
occurred at La Costa. I told him that Moore had been dispatched to 
New York by Haldeman and Ehrlichman to tell Mitchell it was his 
responsibility to raise the future money for the convicted defendants. 
O'Brien's reaction — as he was well aware of Mitchell's feeling that 
this was Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's problem and not his — was that 
Mitchell would probably go through the roof. 

After returning from our walk we talked about the fact that I had 
been requested to suggest names for the minority counsel. It was during 
this conversation that I thought of Mr. Martin Hoffman, whom I knew 
to be a very capable lawyer then serving as general counsel of the 
Atomic Energy" Commission, and a person who had worked on the Hill. 

I called Mr. Hoffman and asked if he was interested. He said he 
was. but he did not know if Senator Baker would be because they had 
had a difference of opinion over a matter at the AEC. He said, how- 
ever, he had done some work for Senator Baker in the past and liked 
him very much. 

I then called Ehrlichman and he agreed that Mr. Hoffman would be 
a good choice. Xext I called Haldeman and he said OK if Ehrlichman 
said OK. during my conversation with Haldeman he told me he had 
learned that the chief counsel's job had been offered to Mr. Ken Keat- 
ing and Mr. Keating had sent a feeler to the White House as to whether 
he should be interested. Haldeman asked me to think about it. 

After talking with Ehrlichman and Haldeman about ]SIr. Hoffman, 
I called Timmons and Johnson and asked them to float ]\Ir. Hoffman's 
name to Senator Baker. Mr. Timmons called me back later and said it 
wouldn't float because the Senator had indicated he had had some 
problem with ^Slr. Hoffman and Chairman Schlesingcr over an AEC 
matter. He liked Mr. Hoffman but said he was still miffed at him. 

Later that day I called Mr. Moore, but learned he had gone to Xew 
York to see INIitchell. I had talked with Moore earlier that week, but 
had forgotten he was going to Xew York on the 15th. 

Paul O'Brien called Mitchell in the inidafteinoon to report our 
conversation. I was in and out of the room while he was on the tele- 
phone talking to ^Sritchell as I didn't feel it was my business to listen 
to his conversation. I talked briefly with ]\ritchel] at the end^ of the 
conversation he had with O'Brien. He talked about the possibility of 
Mr. Keating as chief counsel. INIr. Mitchell seemed intrigued by the 
idea, but doubted if Mr. Keating would accept. After T hung up, 
O'Brien reported that Mr. ]\Ioore had brought up the money raising 
matter, but Mitchell just didn't discuss it at nnv length with ^Nfoore. 
O'Brien departed Florida late that afternoon and my wife and I got 
away from the telephone for the next 3 da vs. 

I returned to the office on Monday. February 10. and spoke with 
Haldeman on either the 19th or 20th. He requested that T draw up an 
agenda for a meeting with the President reirarding matters which the 
President should reflect on as a result of the La Costa meeting and 
subsequent matters which had come up. Mr. Haldeman and T went over 
the high points of what should be raised, indudino- items that had not 
come up at La Costa, such as Magruder's desire to return to the 'V\niite 


House staff and sending Mr. Stans to the Senate for a confirmable post 

as a tactic to counter the Watergate hearings. 

I prepared the agenda. I thought that I was going to attend the 

meeting with the President, but Haldeman called for the agenda, and 

not me. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the agenda. 
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. P)4-34.*] 
Mr. Dean. You will see that the agenda deals witli five items to be 

discussed and resolved with the President : 

1. Senator Baker's requested meeting with the President; 

2. Submitting Secretary Stans' name for a confirmable position ; 

3. ^YhRt to do with Mr. Magruder ; 

4. Using Mr. Buchanan during the Senate hearings; and 

5. Getting the Attorney General back in touch ^\-ith the White House. 
Subsequent to Haldeman's meeting with the President, he informed 

that : The President would meet with Senator Baker; T should discuss 
with Mr. Stans his interest in a confirmable position ; Magruder could 
not return to the "N^Hiite House staff; Buchanan could not be used at 
the Senate hearings; and the President would meet with the Attorney 

I have not explained at this point the details of this rather signifi- 
cant document, but I believe the document is rather self-explanatory 
of the continuing coverup and I will, of course, answer anv questions 
about it. I was not present when the President and Haldeman dis- 
cussed these matters, but I had discussed them with Haldeman before 
he went to see the President and he informed me of the President's 
decisions after the meeting; thus, I assume that the agenda I had 
prepared was the basis of their discussions. 

On February 20, or 21, Mr. Timmons told me he had arranged for 
the President to have an off-the- record, private meeting with Senator 
Baker. As vou will note from the agenda I referred to just a moment 
ago, Mr. Timmons had reported that the Senator had told Timmons 
he wanted guidance and Timmons' interpretation was that the Senator 
wished to help the T^^ite House. Haldeman told me to prepare a 
briefing paper for the President and bring it directly to him rather 
than routing it throusrh normal channels. I have submitted to the 
committee a copy of the agenda T prepared for the President's meet- 
ing with Senator Baker. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-3.5.**] 

Mr. Deax. After the President met with Senator Baker I was 
informed bv ETaldeman that the Senator had anpeared to be verv inter- 
ested in beinof cooperative and the President had the impression that 
he might be helpful. This, of coui'se, was the White House hope, but 
nothing that was reported from the meeting made this anything more 
than a hope. 

Also, Senator Baker told the President that he wanted his contact 
point to be Mr. Kleindienst, rather than someone on the White House 
staff. Haldeman told me that Senator Baker had urged the President 
to waive executive privilege and send members of the White House 
staff to the hearinirs as quickly as possible, but the President 
had told Senator Baker that he was going to hold the line at 
written interrogatories. 

*See p. 1243. 
♦♦See p. 1245. 


Finally. I wa.j told that both the President and Senator Baker had 
discussed that there should be an effort to get the hearings over as 
quickl}' as possible. 

This report of the meeting which Haldeman gave me was later con- 
firmed in discussions I had with the President myself in early March 
of this year. 

On February 22, Mr. Haldeman requested that I prepare a briefing 
paper for the President's meeting that day with Attorney General 
Kleindienst. Throughout the "Watergate investigation Haldeman and 
particularly Ehrlichman, had complained about Mr. Kleindienst's 
passive role in the investigation and prosecution. Haldeman and Ehr- 
lichman were both aware of the strained relationship between Klein- 
dienst and the "White House. I knew that Ehrlichman was riding hard 
on the Justice Department in an effort to undermine Mr. Kleindienst. 
I also knew from conversations with Kleindienst that he had little 
affection for ^Nlr. Ehrlichman. 

The Senate "Watergate hearings presented the real possibility of the 
Justice Department having to make fnrther criminal investigations 
that would lead back to the "\"Miite House. Accordingly, the President 
was the only one who could bring Mr. Kleindienst back in the family 
to protect tiie "White House and this meeting was designed to do just 
that. As a result of Senator Baker's request that Kleindienst be his 
contact point, the President had a perfect vehicle to solicit Klein- 
dienst's assistance during the hearings and, if anything should develop 
during the hearings, to not let all hell break loose in a subsequent 

I have submitted to the committee a copy of the briefing paper I was 
requested to prepare. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-36.*] 

Ml-. Deax. I know that this document went to the President because 
just before the meeting was to occur, I realized that the President 
might not understand the reference to the fact that Kleindienst was 
considering one particularly attractive offer from a law firm that he 
was likely to accept. I called Haldeman to explain this, but Haldeman 
said the paper had gone in and the President would understand that 
this was a reference to Governor Connally's law firm because Governor 
Connallv had discussed it with the President. 

The President subsequently discussed this meeting with me in early 
March, He told me that he would continue to call Mr. Kleindienst from 
time to time, but I should also make certain that Kleindienst was work- 
ing closely with Senator Baker in preparation for the Select Committee 

As I mentioned earlier, I had also been informed that the President 
had made a decision that INIagruder could not return to the White 
House. ^Slagruder had been working at the inaugural committee and 
even before the inauguration he told me that he had called Mr. Higby 
requesting a meeting with Haldeman to discuss his future. After the 
inauguration, ]\Iagruder told me that he had to decide what he was 
going to do. Prior to that meeting I had informed Haldeman that Mr. 
O'Brien liad had some discussions with Magruder and that Magruder 
had indicated that Haldeman and Colson were very much involved 
in the planning and approval of the Liddy operation. 

•See p. 1247. 


After Magruder met with Haldeman in late January 1973, I had 
occasion to see him in the hall of the EOB. He told me that he had 
talked vrirh Haldeman and Mitchell about running for office in Cali- 
fornia and was planning a trip to California to test the water. He said 
now was the time, because he felt he could get good financial backing. 
I felt Magruder was in for some serious problems bftth before the 
grand jury and the Senate hearings, but without saying this to him, I 
tried to dissuade him from running for office until this entire matter 
had been resolved. 

Shortly after this conversation with Magruder I phoned Haldeman 
and told him that I thought INIagruder was making a mistake in going 
to California in pursuit of an elected office. 

Haldeman agreed and said he was going to call Bob Finch and 
suggest that when Magruder met with him. Finch, tliat he l)e dis- 
suaded. He asked me to call Kalmbach and make a similar suggestion, 
which I did, and Kalmbach said he would do it. 

After Magruder returned from California he had decided that he 
wanted to stay in Washington. He was pushing hard to return to the 
White House staff, and work on the Bicentennial program. No one had 
the heart to tell INIagruder that the President had said that he could 
not return to the Wliite House staff. It was during this period of time, 
which I believe was mid-February, Magruder had a conversation with 
Mr. O'Brien, in which he told O'Brien that he had received his final 
authorization for Liddy's activities from Gordon Strachan and that 
Strachan had reported that Haldeman had cleared the matter with 
the President. I reported this to Haldeman, who expressed concern 
over Magruder's statement. After I reported this information, the 
"White House efforts to find a job for ]Magruder became intense. Halde- 
man assigned Mr. Higby to the task. Higby called me to discuss the 
general type of job that I thought would satisfy Magrudor and tlien 
Higby instructed Mr. Jerry Jones, the head of the White House per- 
sonnel operation, to find an available, high level, nonconfirmable posi- 
tion for Magruder. 

During the time when Mr. Jones was reviewing all the potential 
jobs for Magruder, I recall that Magruder dropped by my office and 
told me he had discussed his potential problems in full with both 
Higby and Haldeman. He asked me for my assistance and support 
in finding him a job. I assured Magruder I would help. He also indi- 
cated that Mitchell was trying to help get the job matter resolved. 

On February 28, Mr. Jones submitted a memorandum to Higby 
and myself, a copy of which I have submitted to the committee. 
fThe document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34—37.*] 

Mr. Dean. After Haldeman reviewed the memorandum, a mooting 
was scheduled for Magruder to meet with Plaldeman and T Avas asked 
to attend. 

This meeting occurred during the first week of INIarch and ^Nfagruder 
explained to Haldeman at the meeting that he did not want to leave 
Washington. Haldeman told Magruder that his working at the Bicen- 
tennial was not realistic, but to consider the position at the Depart- 
ment of Commerce as an Assistant to the Secretary for Policy 
Development. ^Magruder said he was interested but wanted som.o assur- 

♦See p. 1249. 


ance from Haldeman that if he made it throiic^h the Senate hearings, 
as he had the grand jury and trial, that he conld have a better job later. 

ITaldcman said that he could not make a firm promise, but that 
he would do all ho personally could do to assist. This was good enough 
for ]\Iagruder. Haldeman said that Mr. Jones would be told to pro- 
ceed with Secretary Dent to get the position at the Commerce Depart- 
ment finalized. 

On ^Nlarch 5, I received a call from Secretary Dent regarding his 
hiring ]\Iagruder. I did not want to tell Secretary Dent that ']Magru ' i' 
was totallv free from future problems so I was evasi^-e with 'li:., 
hinted that Magruder might have some problems. Because I regretted 
misleading him. I prepared a memorandum for my files — something 
I seldom do — ^^because I felt ^lagruder was, in fact, going to have 
jn-oblems. In fact, I thought everyone was going to have problems. 
I have submitted a copy of this memorandum reflecting this con- 
\ersation with Secretary Dent to the committee. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-38.*] 

Mr. Deax. I would now like to turn to the meetings I had with the 
President in February and March of this year. 

I have described to the committee several matters that followed the 
La Costa meeting Avhich directly involved Presidential decisionmaking 
and Presidential involvement. I would now like to turn to my direct 
dealings with the President which began in late February of 1973 
wnth regard to the Watergate and related matters. I feel I can best 
set forth what transpired at these meetings by discussing what 
occurred at each meeting. 

Meeting or February 27 

This was the first meeting I had had with the President since my 
September 15, 1972, meeting which related to the Watergate. It was 
at this meeting that the President directed that I report directly to 
him regarding all Watergate matters. He told me that this matter 
was taking too much time from Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's normal 
duties and he also told me that they were principals in the matter, 
and I. therefore, could be more objective than they. The President 
then told me of his meetings with Senator Baker and the Attorney 
General. He told me that Senator Baker had requested that the Attor- 
ney General be his contact point and that I should keep in contact 
with the Attorney General to make sure that the Attorney General 
and Senator Baker were working together. He asked me to follow 
up immediately to determine if the Attorney General and Baker had 
met. I informed him that I had earlier discussed this with the Attorney 
General and the Attorney General was planning to meet with Senatoi 
Bakei and Senator Ervin to discuss turning over FBI data regarding 
the Watergate investigation. 

A brief discussion followed in wdiich the President recounted, what 
had already been reported to me by Haldeman, that he had told 
Senator Baker that he would not permit Wiite House staff to api^ear 
before the Select Committee, rather he would only permit the taking 
of written interrogatories. He asked me if I agreed with this and I said 
that written interrogatories were something that could be handled 

•See p. 1251. 


whereas appearances might create serious problems. He told me he 
would never let Haldeman and Ehrlichman go to the Hill. He also 
told me that Senator Gurney would be very friendly to the White 
House and that it would not be necessary to contact him because the 
President said Senator Gurney would know what to do on his own. 
On the way out of his office he told me I had done an excellent job 
of dealing with this matter during the campaign; that it had been 
the only issue that McGovern had had and the Democrats had tried 
to make something out of it but to no avail. I told him as we were 
walking togetlier out of the office that I had only managed to contain 
the matter dviring the campaign, but I was not sure it could be con- 
tained indefinitely. He then told me that we would have had to fight 
back and he was confident that I could do the job. 

Meeting of February 28 

I had received word before I arrived at my office that the President 
wanted to see me. He asked me if I had talked to the Attorney General 
regarding Senator Baker. 

I told him that the Attorney General was seeking to meet with both 
Senator Ervin and Senator Baker, but that a meeting date had not yet 
been firmed up. I told him that I knew it was the Attorney General's 
wish to turn over the FBI investigation and the President said that 
he did not think we should, but asked me what I thought of the idea. 
I told him that I did not think that tliere Avas much damaging in- 
formation in the FBI investigation, although there could be some 
bad public relations from it. He told me to think about this matter. 
He also said that he had read in the morning paper about the Vesco 
case and asked me what part, if any, his brother Ed had had in the 
matter. I told him what I knew of his brother's involvement, which 
was that he was an innocent agent in the contribution transaction. 
We then discussed the leak to Time magazine of the fact that the White 
House had placed wiretaps on newsmen and "WHiite House staff people. 
The President asked me if I knew how this had leaked. I told him that 
I did not; that I knew several people were aware of it. but I did not 
know any who had leaked it. He asked me who knew about it. I told 
him that Mr, Sullivan liad told me that he thought that Director 
Hoover had told somebody about it shortly after it happened because 
Hoover was against it and that Sullivan said that he had heard that 
this information had gone to Governor Rockefeller and in turn had 
come back from Governor Rockefeller to Dr. Kissinger. We then 
talked about the executive privilege statement and the President ex- 
pressed his desire to get the statement out well in advance of the 
Watergate hearings so that it did not appear to be in response to the 
Watergate hearings. We also discussed Mr. Mollenhoff's interest in 
the Fit/frernld case, and he asked me to look into the matter for 
Mr. Mollenhoff. 

Before departinqr his office, he ajrain raised the matter that T should 
report directlv to him and not throu^rh Haldeman and Ehrlichman. 
I told him that T thought he should know that I was also involved in 
the post- June 17 activities regarding Watergate. I brieflv described to 
him why T thought I had legal problems, in that I had been a conduit 
for many of the decisions that were made and, therefore, could be 


involved in an obstruction of justice. He would not accept my analysis 
and did not want me to get into it in any detail other than what I had 
just related. He reassured me not to worry, that I had no legal prob- 
lems. I raised this on another occasion with the President, when Dick 
^Nloore was present. 

Meeting of March 1 

The first meeting on this date and the afternoon meeting which 
occurred on ]\Iarch 1, related to preparing the President for his forth- 
coming press conference. The President asked me a number of ques- 
tions about the Gray nomination hearings and facts that had come 
out during these hearings. In particular, I can recall him stating that 
there should be no problem with the fact that I had received the FBI 
reports. He said that I was conducting an investigation for him and 
that it would be perfectly proper for the counsel to the President to 
have looked at these reports. I did not tell the President that I had 
not conducted an investigation for him because I assumed he was well 
aware of this fact and that the so-called Dean investigation was a 
public relations matter, and that frequently the President made refer- 
ence in press conferences to things that never had, in fact occurred. 

I was also aware that often in answering Watergate questions, that 
he had made reference to my report and I did not feel that I could 
tell the President that he could not use my name. There had been con- 
siderable adverse publicity stemming from the Gray hearings and the 
fact that Gray was turning over FBI information to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, which caused the President to tell me at this 
morning meeting that Gray must be "pulled up short." He told me 
that he had talked with the Attorney General to tell him to read the 
chapter in his book "Six Crises,'' dealing with the Hiss case regarding 
the lack of cooperation which Truman and the FBI had given to his 
investigation. He also told me the FBI Watergate materials should 
not be turned over by Gray. I informed him that I had had a meeting 
several days prior with IMr. Sullivan who had been at the FBI for 
many years and Sullivan had alluded to the fact that the FBI had been 
used for political purposes by past administrations. I cited a few 
examples that ]Mr. Sullivan had given me. The President told me to 
get this information from Sullivan. The President told me that he 
Avas readino; a book at that time called "The 13 Mistakes of Kennedv." 
and he told me that I should read the chapter regarding Kennedy's 
use of the FBI. He also told me that I should gather any material I 
could o-ather regarding the uses and abuses of the FBI bv past admin- 
istrations so that we could show that we had not abused the FBI for 
political purposes. 

The President told me that he was convinced that he had been wire- 
tapped in 1968 and the fact that DeLoach had not been forthcoming 
indicated to the President that DeLoach was probably lying. He told 
me that I should call Don Kendall, DeLoach's employer, and tell him 
that DeLoach liad better start telling the truth because "the bovs are 
coming out of the woodwork." He said this plov may smoke DeLoach 
out. I might respond that I never did call ]Mr. Kendall. He also asked 
me who else might know about the bugging of his 196S campaign and 
I sugsrested that ^Nlr. Tolson, Hoover's former assistant, might have 
some knowledge of it. He told me that he probably ought to call Mr. 


Tolson and wish him happy birthday or good health and possibly get 
some information from him when lie was talking to him. The dis- 
cussion then turned back to the Hiss case and I reminded the Presi- 
dent of the strong statement he had made in 1950 regarding Truman's 
refusal to provide his committee with information, and that speech 
might be raised at his press conference. He asked me to go get a copj 
of that speech. 1 returned to his office shortly with a copy of the speech, 
and he asked me to discuss with him how it could be differentiated 
from the present situation. 

During the March 1 afternoon meeting the President also asked 
me some questions about executive privilege and the timing on the 
release of the executive privilege statement which he had discussed 
in his press conference on January 31. I told him that the statement, 
as far as I was concerned, was ready for release and merely would 
require the signoff of a handful of other people. I told him I thought 
it could be out within a week. 

It was during the days after this series of March 1 meetings with 
the President that the name Dean began coming increasingly to the 
forefront in the Gray confirmation hearings, and the rumblings were 
that there was going to be a situation where Dean could be called 
to the committee to testify and a number of Senators were anxious to 
use me as a vehicle to test executive privilege. On ]March 4 or 5, I 
had a conversation with Ehrlichman in which I might add occurred 
in the hall of the West Building, in which I told him that I thought 
it would be very difficult to maintain a court test of executive privilege 
over me, when in fact I had only met with the President infrequently 
and had had very few conversations with him that would be protected. 
It was following this conversation with Ehrlichman that I began 
meeting and talking with the President, at his request, with ever 
increasing frequency. The Presidential meeting of March 6. 

Senator Erm:n [presiding]. A vote has been called on a 10-minute 
basis. I expect the committee had better go and come back. We will 
finish this statement this afternoon. 


Senator Er\^x. The committee will resume. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, you can proceed. Senator Weicker is here 
making a quorum, as required by our rules. 

INIr. Dean. Thank you. 

Meeting of March 6 

This meeting was brief and a general discussion of the status of 
the Gray hearings and the President reminded me again that I should 
report directly to him and not involve Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
with Watergate-related matters. 

Meeting of INIarch 7 

The President was very unhappy with Gray's performance before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee. In my meeting with him on this date 
he made a reference to the fact that Grav's comment regarding my sit- 
ting in on tlie investigations by the FBI was absurd. He felt it was 
perfectly proper that I was present at those interviews and said that 
Gray's attitude that he "jolly well" went forward because he had no 


alternative was absurd. I also discussed with the President the fact 
that Ziegler was considering endorsing the ACLU letter to the Judi- 
ciary Committee regarding the turning over of FBI materials. The 
President thought that that was a good idea. At the end of the meeting 
the President instructed me to tell the Attorney General to cut off 
Gray from turning over any further Watergate reports to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. lie said this just had to cease. 

Meeting of March 8 

I had a very brief meeting with the President on this date during 
which he asked me if something had been done to stop Gray from turn- 
ing over FBI materials to the Senate Judiciary Committee. I told him 
I thought that the matter had been taken care of by the Attorney 

Phone Con^-ersation of March 10 

The phone conversation of March 10. The President called me to tell 
me that he felt we should get the executi\e privilege statement out 
immediately: that this should be done before I was called before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the Gray hearings so 
that it would not appear that the statement on executive privilege was 
in response to the action by the Senate committee. 

Meeting of March 13 

This was a rather lengthy meeting, the bulk of which was taken up 
by a discussion about the Gray hearings and the fact that the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had voted to invite me to appear in connection 
with Gray's nomination. It was at this time we discussed the potential 
of litigating the matter of executive privilege and thereljy preventing 
anybody from going before any Senate committee until that matter was 
resolved. The President liked the idea very much, particularly when 
I mentioned to him that it might be possible that he could also claim 
attorney/client privilege on me so that the strongest potential case on 
executive privilege would probably rest on the counsel to the President. 
I told him that obviously, this area would have to be researched. He 
told me that he did not want Haldeman and Ehrlichman to go before 
the Ervin hearings and that if we were litigating the matter on Dean, 
that no one would have to appear. Toward the end of the conversation, 
we got into a discussion of Watergate matters specifically. I told the 
President about the fact that there were money demands being made 
by the seven convicted defendants, and that the sentencing of these 
individuals was not far off. It was during this conversation that Plalde- 
man came into the office. After this brief interruption by Haldeman's 
coming in. but while he was still there. I told the President about the 
fact that there was no money to pay these individuals to meet their 
demands. He asked me how much it would cost. I told him that I could 
only make an estimate that it might be as high as $1 million or 
more. He told me that that was no problem, and he also looked over at 
Haldeman aiid repeated the same statement. He then asked me who 
was demanding this money and I told him it was principally coming 
from Hunt through his attorney. The President then referred to the 
fact that Hunt had been ])romised Executive clemency. He said that he 


liad discussed this matter with Ehrlichman and contrary to instruc- 
tions that Ehrlichman had given Colson not to talk to the President 
about it, that Colson had also discussed it with him later. He expressed 
some annoyance at the fact that Colson had also discussed this matter 
with him. 

The conversation then turned back to a question from the President 
regarding the money that was being paid to the defendants. He asked 
me how this was done. I told him I didn't know much about it other 
than the fact that the money was laundered so it could not be ti-aced 
and then there were secret deliveries. I told him I was learning about 
things I had never known before, but the next time I would certainly 
be more knowledgeable. This comment got a laugh out of Haldeman. 
The meeting ended on this note and there Avas no further discussion 
of the matter and it was left hanging just as T have described it. 

Meetings or March 14 

The meetings which occurred on this day principally involved pre- 
paring the President for a forthcoming press conference. I recall talk- 
ing about executive privilege and making Dean a test case in the courts 
on executive privilege. The President said that he would like very 
much to do this and if the opportunity came up in the press conference, 
he would probably so respond. T also recall that during the meetings 
which occurred on this day, that the President was going to try to 
find an answer that would get Ziegler off the hoolv of the frequent 
questions asked him regarding the Watergate. He said that he was 
going to say that he would take no further questions on the Watergate 
until the completion of the Ervin hearings and that Ziegler in turn 
could repeat the same statement and avoid future interrogation by the 
press on the subject. 

Meeting of March 15 

It was late in the afternoon after the President's press conference 
that he asked Dick Moore and I to come ovei- to visit with him. He was 
in a vei-y relaxed mood and entered into a general discussion about the 
press confei'ence. The President was amazed and distressed that the 
press had paid so little attention to the fact that he had made an 
historic announcement about Ambassador Bruce opening up the liaison 
office in Peking. He said he was amazed when the first question follow- 
ing that announcement was regarding whether or not Dean would 
appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the 
Gray hearings. The conversation then rambled into a. discussion of 
the JEfisfi case, and ]Nfr. Moore discussed his memory of the President's 
handling of the case. 

Meeting of March 16 

This meeting was a discussion with Ziegler on how to follow up on a 
number of matters that had arisen in the press conference of the 
preceding day. 

Meeting of March 17 

This Avas St. Patrick's Day and the President was in a very good 
mood and \ery I'claxed and avo engaged in a rambling conversation 
Avith only some l)rief reference to the Gray hearings and the problems 
that were then confronting the White House regarding the President's 


statements on executive privilefre and liis willingness to go to court on 
the matter. He opined that he did not think that the Senate would be 
dumb enough to go for the bait he had given them but he was hopeful 
that they might. 

Meeting of March 19 

As I best recall this meeting, it was a rather rambling discussion 
regarding media problems in connection with the Gray hearings. As 
the discussion proceeded, I suggested that ]Mr, Moore might like to 
engage in this convei^ation with us. There was some discussion of 
Senator Ervin's appearance the preceding Sunday on ''Face the Na- 
tion," and whether or not it would be appropriate for me to respond to 
some of the points that were being made regarding my requested ap- 
pearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee. I told the President 
that I would work with Dick INIoore in preparing a draft response. 

Meetings of March '20 

The President had called me earlier that morning to tell me that I 
should work up a draft letter of response as a result of the discussions 
that we had had the preceding evening with ]\roore. I told him I was 
drafting a letter and he told me as soon as I had the letter prepared 
that I should arrange to meet with him. Shortly after lunch, I took over 
a draft copy of the letter which I had developed with Mr. Moore and 
I have submitted a copy of that draft letter to the committee. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-39.*] 

Mr, Deax. Tlie President read the draft and we discussed it. There 
was no resolution of the prol:)lem. He told me to talk with Ziegler. I 
told him that if T did this as a sworn statement, that I was going to 
obviousl}' redraft it very carefully before I signed any affidavit on the 

It was during the afternoon of March 20 that I talked again with 
Dick ^loore about the entire coverup. I told Moore that there were 
new and more threatening demands for support money. I told him 
that Hunt had sent a message to me — through Paul O'Brien — that he 
wanted $72,000 for living expenses and $50,000 for attorney's fees and 
if he did not receive it that week, he would reconsider his options and 
have a lot to say about the seamy things he had done for Ehrlichman 
while at the '^^Hiite House. I told Moore that I had about reached the 
end of the line, and was now in a position to deal with the President 
to end the coverup. I did not discuss witli ]Moore the fact that I had 
discussed money and clemency with the President eai'lier. but I told 
him that I really didn't think the President understood all of the facts 
involved in the "Watergate and particularly the implications of those 
facts. I told him that the matter was continually compounding itself 
and I felt that I had to lay the facts out for the President as w-ell as 
the implication of those facts. INIoore encouraged me to do so. 

Phone Conversation of IMarch 20 

TVhen the President called and we had a rather rambling discussion, 
I told him at the conclusion of the conversation that evening that I 
wanted to talk with him as soon as possible about the Watergate matter 

•See p. 1252. 


because I did not think that he fully realized all the facts and the 
implication of those facts for people at the White House as well as 
himself. He said that I should meet with him the next morning about 
10 o'clock. 

Before going in to tell the President some of these things, I de- 
cided I should call Haldeman because I knew that his name would 
come up in the matter. I called Haldeman and told him what I was 
going to do and Haldeman agreed that I should proceed to so inform 
the President of the situation. 

Meeting of March 21 

As I have indicated, my purpose in requesting this meeting par- 
ticularly with the President was that I felt it necessary that I give 
him a full report of all the facts that I knew and explain to him what 
I believed to be the implication of those facts. It was my particular con- 
cern with the fact that the President did not seem to understand the 
implications of what was going on. For example, when I had earlier 
told him that I thought I was involved in an obstruction of justice 
situation he had argued with me to the contrary after I had explained 
it to him. Also, when the matter of money demands had come up pre- 
viously he had very nonchalantly told me that that was no problem 
and I did not know if he realized that he himself could be getting in- 
volved in an obstruction of justice by having promised clemency to 
Hunt. What I had hoped to do in this conversation was to have the 
President tell me that we had to end the matter — now. Accordingly, 
I gave considerable thought to how I would present this situation to 
the President and try to make as dramatic a presentation as I could 
to tell him how serious I thought the situation was that the coverup 

I began by telling the President that there was a cancer growing on 
the Presidency and that if the cancer was not removed that the Presi- 
dent himself would be killed by it. I also told him that it was important 
that this cancer be removed immediately because it was growing more 
deadly every day. I then gave him what I told him would be a broad 
overview of the situation and I would come back and fill in the details 
and answer any questions he might have about the matter. 

I proceeded to tell him how the matter had commenced in late Janu- 
ary and early Februarv but that I did not know how the plans had 
finally been approved. I told him I had informed Haldeman what was 
occurring, and Haldeman told me I should have nothing to do with it. 
I told him that I had learned that there had been pressure from Colson 
on Magnider but I did not huve all the facts as to the degree of pres- 
sure. I told him I did not know if Mitchell had approved the plans but 
I had been told that Mitchell had been a recipient of the wiretap in- 
formation and that Haldeman had also received some information 
through Strachan. 

I then proceeded to tell him some of the highlights that had occurred 
during the coverup. I told him that Kalmbach had been used to raise 
funds to pay these seven individuals for their silence at the instructions 
of Ehrlichman. Haldeman, and Mitchell and I had been the conveyor 
of this instruction to Kalmbach. I told him that after the decision 
had been made that Magruder was to remain at the reelection com- 


mittee. I had assisted Magruder in preparing his false story for pres- 
entation to the grand jury. 1 told liim that cash that liad been at the 
White House had been f unneled back to the reelection committee for 
the purpose of paying the seven individuals to remain silent. 

I then proceeded to tell him that perjury had been committed, and 
for this coverup to continue it would require more perjury and more 
money. I told him that the demands of the convicted individuals were 
continually increasing and that with sentencing imminent, the demands 
had become specific. 

I told him that on Monday the 19th, I had received a message from 
one of the reelection committee lawyers who had spoken directly with 
Hunt and tliat Hunt had sent a message to me demanding money. I 
then explained to him the message that Hunt had told Paul O'Brien 
the preceding Friday to be passed on to me. I told the President I'd 
asked O'Brien why to Dean, and O'Brien had asked Hunt the same 
question. But Hunt had merely said you just pass this message on to 
Dean. The message was that Hunt wanted $72,000 for livuig expenses 
and $50,000 for attorney's fees and if he did not get the money and get 
it quickly that he would have a lot of seamy things to say about what 
he had done for John Ehrlichman while he was at the White House. 
If he did not receive the money, he would have to reconsider his 

I informed the President that I had passed this message on to both 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman asked me if I had discussed 
the matter with Mitchell. I had told Ehrlichman that I had not done 
so and Ehrlichman asked me to do so. I told the President I had called 
Mitchell pursuant to Ehrlichman's request but 1 had no idea of what 
was happening with regard to the request. 

I then told the President that this was just typical of the type of 
blackmail that the Wliite House would continue to be subjected to and 
that I didn't know how to deal with it. I also told the President that I 
thought that I would as a result of my name coming out during the 
Gray hearings be called before the grand jury and that if I was called 
to testify before the grand jury or the Senate committee I would have 
to tell the facts the way I know them. I said I did not know if execu- 
tive privilege would be applicable to any appearance I might have 
before the grand jury. I concluded by saying thot it is going to take 
continued perjury and continued support of these individuals to per- 
petuate the coveruj^ and that I did not believe it was possible to 
continue it; rather I thought it was time for surgery on the cancer 
itself and that all those involved must stand up and account for them- 
selves and that the President himself get out in front of this matter. 

I told the President that I did not believe that all of the seven de- 
fendants would maintain their silence forever, in fact, I thought that 
one or more would very likely break rank. 

After I finished, I realized that I had not really made the President 
understand because after he asked a few questions, he suggested that 
it would be an excellent idea if I gave some sort of briefing to the 
Cabinet and that he was very impressed with my knowledge of the 
circumstances but he did not seem particularly concerned with their 

It was after my presentation to the President and during our subse- 
quent conversation the President called Haldeman into the office and 


the President suggested that we have a meeting with Mitchell, Halde- 
man, and Ehrlichman to discuss how to deal with this situation. What 
emerged from that discussion after Haldeman came into the office was 
that John Mitchell should account for himself for the pve-June 17 
activities and the President did not seem concerned about the activities 
which had occurred after June 17. 

After I departed the President's office I subsequently went to a meet- 
ing w-ith Haldeman and Ehrlichman to disc-uss the matter further. The 
sum and substance of that discussion was that the way to handle this 
now was for Mitchell to step forward and if ]MitchoH were to step 
forward we might not be confronted with the activities of those in- 
volved in the "White House in the coverup. 

Accordingly, Haldeman, as I recall, called Mitchell and asked him 
to come down the next da}' for a meeting with tlie President on the 
Watergate matter. 

In the late afternoon of ]March 21. Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
and I had a second meeting with the President. Before entering this 
meeting I had a brief discussion in the President's outer office of the 
Executive Office Building suite with Haldeman in which 1 told him 
that we had two options: 

One is that this thing goes all the wav and deals with both the pre- 
activities and the postactivities, or the second alternative; if the 
coverup was to proceed we would have to draw the wagons in a circle 
around the A\niite House and that the "V^liite House protect itself. 
I told Haldeman that it had been the White House's assistance to the 
reelection committee that had gotten us into much of this problem and 
now the only hope would be to protect ourselves from further 

The meeting with the President that afternoon with Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and myself was a tremendous disappointment to me 
because it was quite clear that the coverup as far as the White House 
was concerned was going to continue. I recall that while Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and I were sitting at a small table in front of the Presi- 
dent in his Executive Office Building office that I for the first time 
said in front of the President that I thought that Haldeman, Ehrlich- 
man, and Dean were all indictable for obstruction of justice and that 
was the reason I disagreed with all that was being discussed at that 
point in time. 

I could tell that both Haldeman, and particularly Ehrlichman, were 
very unhappy with my comments. I had let them very clearly know 
that I was not going to participate in the matter any further and that 
I thought it was time that everybody start thinking about telling 
the truth. 

I again repeated to them I did not think it was possible to per- 
petuate the coverup and the important thing now was to get the 
President out in front. 

Meeting or 'Makch 22 

The arrangements had been made to have a meeting after lunch 
with the President with Ehrlichman, Haldeman. ^Nfitchell. and myself. 
Mr. Mitchell came to Washington that morning for a meeting in 
Haldeman's office in which Ehrlichman, 'INlitchell, Haldeman. and 


myself were present. 1 recall that one of the first things that Ehrlich- 
man asked of Mitchell was whether Hunt's mone}- problem had been 
taken care of. ^Mitchell said that he didn't think it was a problem any 
further. There then followed a general discussion of the status of 
the Senate hearings, and the discussion never got down to specifics. 

It had been my impression that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were 
going to try to get Mitchell to come forward and explain his involve- 
ment in the matter. This did not occur. ]\Iitchell said that he thought 
everything was going along very well with the exception of the posture 
of the President on executive privilege. He said that he felt that the 
President was going to have to back down somewhat or it would appear 
he was preventing information from coming out of the Wliite House. 

I recall that Ehrlichman left the meeting before it had terminated 
because he was going to meet Secretary Shultz, who was coming in 
from out of the country. I was also called out of the meeting about 
noontime when a message was sent to me by Ziegler that it was impor- 
tant he see me immediately. This had to do with the statement that 
was running on the wires that Gray had said that I had probably lied 
and Ziegler wanted to know how to handle it. Accordingly, I departed 
the meeting and went into a meeting with Ziegler and Moore to dis- 
cuss Grav's comment. I returned to Haldeman's office where ^Mitchell 
and Haldeman and I had lunch. 

During lunch there was some continued conversation about the gen- 
eral problems. ]\Ir. Mitchell raised the fact that F. Lee Bailey, who 
had been very helpful in dealing with McCord, had a problem that he 
would like to bring up. He said that Mr. Bailey had a client who had 
an enormous amount of gold in his possession and would like to make 
an arrangement with the Government whereby the gold could be turned 
over to the Government without the individual being prosecuted for 
holding the gold. Mitchell was addressing his request for assistance to 
Haldeman but Haldeman was nonresponsive and the matter was 

I again departed Mr. Haldeman's office to have further dealings 
with Moore and Ziegler and Haldeman told me that there would be a 
meeting in the President's EOB office about 1 :30 and that I should 
come directly from Ziegler's office when I got my problem worked out 
regarding Gray's statement. I arrived about 1 :30 in the President's 
Office but the President was not ready to hold the meeting yet. 

The meeting with the President, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, INlitchell, 
and me was again a general discussion of the Senate Watergate hear- 
ings situation and, did not accomplish anjiihing. Rather it was a fur- 
ther indication that there would be no effort to stop the coverup from 
continuing. I recall that Mitchell told the President that he felt that 
the only problem that he now had was the fact that he was taking a 
public beating on his posture on executive privilege ; that the statement 
on executive privilege was too broad and that probably something 
should be done to change his posture on the matter. 

Mitchell was not suggesting that members of the White House go 
to the Hill to testify, rather that some more cooperative position be 
developed to avoid the adverse publicity. It was at this time that the 
President said that Kleindienst was supposed to be working these 
things out with Senator Baker and he apparently had not been doing 
so. The President said that Timmons had told him that a member of 

96-296 O - 73 


Senator Baker's staff was very desirous of a meeting to get guidance. 
It was at this point that the President called the Attorney General 
and told him that he should get up to meet with Senator Baker as 
soon as possible and get some of these problems regarding executive 
privilege and the turning of documents over resolved with the com- 
mittee immediately. After the conversation with the Attorney General, 
there was a continued discussion of how to deal with the Ervin com- 
mittee. I asked the President to excuse me from the meeting for a 
moment because I was working with Ziegler on a response to a state- 
ment that Gray had made. The President asked me what that was 
about and I then explained to him about Gray's statement. I told him 
what Gray had said and I also told him what the facts were. He ex- 
cused me to use the telephone in his office and said that I should get 
that resolved as quickly as possible. 

Wlien I returned to the conversation with the President, Mitchell, 
Haldeman, and Ehrlichman, they were still talking about dealing with 
the Ervin committee. The President told me that the White House 
should start directly dealing with the committee and that I should go 
up and commence discussions with Senator Ervin as to the parameters 
of executive privilege. 

I told the President that I did not think this would be wise because 
I was very much the party in issue with regard to the Judiciary Com- 
mittee hearings and that it would be unwise for me to go to the Hill 
and negotiate my own situation. The President agreed and Ehrlich- 
man said that he would commence discussions. 

The meeting was almost exclusively on the subject of how the White 
House should posture itself vis-a-vis the Ervin committee hearings. 
There was absolutel}^ no indication of any changed attitude and it was 
like one of many, many meetings I had been in before, in which the 
talk was of strategies for dealing with the hearings rather than any 
effort to get the truth out as to what had happened both before June 
17 and after June 17. 

Following this meeting with the President, it was apparent to me 
that I had failed in turning the President around on this subject, Imt 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman began taking over with regard to deal- 
ing with a new problem, which had become John Dean, as they were 
aware of the fact that I was very unhappy about the situation. 

Trip to Camp David 

On Friday mornino:, March 23, my house was surrounded by camera 
crews as a result of Gray's statement the day before, that I had 
"probably lied." xVccordinglv, I decided to wait until the camera crews 
departed before going to the office. It was midmorniiKr when Paul 
O'Brien called to tell me about Judge Sirica's reading ^NfcCoiTrs letter 
in open court. O'Brien gave me the high points of the letter as thev 
had been reported to him by someone from the courthouse. He also 
told me that McCord had onlv hearsay knowledge. I then called 
Ehrlichman to tell him about it. He said he had a copy of the letter and 
read it to me. I asked him how he received a copy so quickly. 

He responded : "It just came floatin.o- into my office." He asked me 
what I thought al>out it and I told liim I was not surprised at all 
and repeated to him what O'Brien had told me that ^VfcCord ])robablv 
had onlv hearsav knowledge. He asked me if I was in mv office and 


I informed him that I was a prisoner of the press and would be in 

After my conversation with Ehrlichman, the President called. Re- 
ferring to our meeting on JMarch 21 and McCord's letter, he said: 
"Well, John, you were right in your prediction."' He then suggested 
I go up to Camp David and analyze the situation. He did not instruct 
me to write a report, rather he said to go to Camp David, "take your 
wife, and get some relaxation.*- He then alluded to the fact that I had 
been under 

Senator Erm:x. I will have to depart because I have less than 5 
minutes to get over there. This is good training for running in the 


Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, we are not trying to hurr}- along but I 
stayed on the floor of the Senate until this rollcall began because in 
the last short rollcall vote Senator Weicker and I missed the vote and 
one or two others did, and so we are going to interchange in the interest 
of time. If j-ou do not mind you might continue now. 

Mr. Deax. Thank you, Senator. 

He then alluded to the fact that I had been under some rather intense 
pressure lately, but he had been through this all his life and you 
cannot let it get to you. He said that he was able to do his best thinking 
at Camp David, and I should get some rest and then assess where we 
are and where we go from here and report back to him. I told him 
I would go. 

'Sly wife and I arrived at Camp David in the midafternoon. As we 
entered the cabin in which we were staying, the phone was ringing. 
The operator said it was the President calling but Haldeman came on 
the phone. Haldeman said that while I was there I should spend some 
time writing a report on everything I know f.bout the Watergate. I 
said I would do so. I asked him if it was for internal use or public use. 
He said that would be decided later. 

I spent the rest of the day and the next day thinking about this 
entire matter. I reached the conclusion, based on earlier conversations 
I had with Ehrlichman, that he would never admit to his involvement 
in the coverup. I did not knoAv about Haldeman, but I assumed that 
he would not because he would believe it a higher duty to protect the 
President. The more I thought about it the more I realized that I 
should step forward because there was no way the situation was going 
to get better — rather, it could only get worse, ^fy most difficult prob- 
lem was how I could end this mess without mortally wounding the 
President. I had no answer, because T felt once T came forward the 
matter would be for the American people to decide, and not for me to 
decide. T finally concluded that I would have to tlnnk of some way for 
the President to get out in front of the matter, despite what happened 
to evervbodv else. 

I called INIr. Moore and talked with him about it. We talked about 
a Presidential speech, where thp President would really lay the facts 
out : we talked about immunity for eveiyone involved : we talked about 
a special Warren-type commission that would put the fncts out: we 
talked about some half measures that miafht satisfy the public interest : 
but we both renlized that nothing less than the truth would sell. As T 
mentioned earlier, Moore and I had talked about some of these con- 


cepts on previous occasions, but we still did not have an answer that 
would bring the full truth out because of the criminal implications 
of the behavior of those involved. 

On Saturday, I began reconstructing all I knew and began writing 
a rei^ort. I spent Saturday afternoon and evening, Sundaj', and Mon- 
da}' reconstructing and writing. On Monday I asked my secretary to 
come to Camp David, bring certain documents that I had requested, 
and commence typing. I did not realize how difficult it would be to 
reconstruct my knowledge from memory. I had not kept a diary or 
even a calendar of all my activities, thus, I have been reconstructing 
my knowledge of this matter since March 23 to this day. 

On Sunday e\ening, March 25, 1 was informed that the Los Angeles 
Times and the AVashington Post were going to print a story that Ma- 
gruder and I had prior knowledge of the June IT bugging of the Demo- 
cratic National Committee. I considered the story libelous then, as I do 
today. Upon learning that the story was going to be printed, I contacted 
an attorney, Mr. Tom Hogan, who was familiar with libel law. We dis- 
cussed the matter. He then decided to put the newspapers on notice to 
preserve a libel suit in the event they printed the story. I also told Mr. 
Hogan that when I returned from Camp David that I wanted to talk 
with him about this entire matter and asked him to think about some- 
one who was a good criminal lawyer because I was planning to take 
certain steps in the near future. I might add that it was my thinking 
at that time that I would explain all the facts to a knowledgeable 
criminal lawyer to determine the potential problems of everyone in- 
volved — from the President on down^ — to get independent advice on 
what I should do. 

On Monday morning, Marcli 26, I had a conversation witli Halde- 
man about the story in the Los Angeles Times. I told him I was pre- 
pared to file a libel suit and had retained a lawyer to put the newspapers 
on notice. I told him that he knew that I had not known of the June 17 
"Watergate ]n*eak-in in advance, that my knowledge of tlie entire mat- 
ter ended with the second meeting in Mitchell's office. I told Haldeman 
that Magruder knew that I had no prior knowledge, but I did not 
know if he would admit it publicly. Haldeman concurred in the fact 
that I had no prior knowledge and suggested I call Magruder and tape 
his conversation. 

I did call Magruder and by using a dictaphone held to the receiver, 
I recorded the call. I have submitted a transcript of this conversation 
to the committee ; the long and short of this conversation was that 
Magruder acknowledged that the newspaper accounts were a "bum 
rap" for me because I had not had prior knowledge of the break-in. 

[The transcript was marked exhibit No. 34—10.*] 

^Ir. Dean. My secretary arrived at Camp David on ]Monday after- 
noon and began typing the report. On ^Monday night, I had given addi- 
tional thought to how the President might get out in front of this 
matter and how we could get everyone involved to speak the truth. I 
called Moore, who is fairly conservative in his solutions to problems, 
and told him of my idea, which I said was so far out that I thought it 
might solve the awful pi-oblem. I have submitted to the committee a 
co))y of my notes outlining my concept. 

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-41.**] 

*Spo p. 125R. 
**See p. 1261. 


Mr. Deax. In brief, the President would create an independent 
panel — tliat would be investitrator, prosecutor, and judfre and jury for 
everyone involved. It would have the power to remove officials from 
office, levy fines, and impose criminal sanctions. It was designed to give 
every man a fair and full hearing, and proceed in a manner where 
people would not be tried publicly. 

Finally, after all the facts were in, the panel would render its judg- 
ments on the individuals involved and report to the public. I might 
note that if the special prosecutor and this committee were merged, 
made independent, and proceeded in camera, it would be very close to 
the concept I liad proposed back on March 26. 

Moore liked the idea and suggested I call Haldeman, which I did. 
He was intrigued, but not overwhelmed. It was becoming increasingly 
clear that no one inxolved was willing to stand up and account for 

After I had read in the newspaper on Tuesday, March 27, that the 
President had called me on Monday morning, March 26 — which he had 
not — and expressed great confidence in me and the fact that I liad not 
had prior knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Com- 
mittee. I decided to attempt to contact Mr. Liddy, who was the one 
man who could document the fact that we never had talked about his 
plans following the February -i meeting in Mitchell's office. I called 
Paul O'Brien and asked him how I could get in contact with Mr. 
Maroulis, Mr. Liddy's attorney. O'Brien gave me Maroulis' phone 
number, but told me I could not reach him until late in the afternoon. 

I called Mr. ]Maroulis about 5 :30 and asked him if I might get some 
sort of sworn statement from Liddy regarding my lack of prior 
knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Committee. I 
told him of the two meetings in IMitchelFs office, and that ]Mr. Liddy 
and I never talked about his plans after the second meeting. To this 
day. I am convinced that if and when Mr. Liddj^ ever talks, he will tell 
the truth as he knows it. I was hopeful that he would give me some 
sort of an affidavit attesting to the facts, but his lawyer was concerned 
about his fifth amendment problems. 

Mr. INIaroulis called me back on iNIarch 29 after I had returned from 
Camp David, after he had talked with ]Mr. Liddy. I requested O'Brien 
to make a memorandum of the call, as he was with Mr. Maroulis when 
he made the call. I have submitted to the committee a copy of this docu- 
ment in which IMaroulis advised me his client could not make such a 
statement because it might result in a waiver of his fifth amendment 
privileges, that to give such a statement could be detrimental to others, 
but Liddy did wish to convey that his reasons for not providing such a 
statement was not because he disagreed with the facts, but because of 
the advice of counsel. 

[The document was marked exhibit Xo, 34-42.*] 

]Mr. Deax. It was the day before I received this call, ]March 28, that 
Haldeman had called me at Camp David and requested that I return to 
Washington. He told me that he was meeting with jNIitchell and 
Magruder and that thej^ wished to meet with me. I told Haldeman that 
I really did not wish to meet with Mitchell and INIagruder, but he was 
insistent that I return and meet with them. I returned from Camp 
David about 3 :30 and went directly to Haldeman's office. He told me 

*See p. 1262. 


that Mitchell and ISIagruder were waiting in another office for me. I 
asked him why they wanted to talk to me and he said that they wanted 
to talk to me about my knowledge of the meetings in Mitchell's office. 
I told Haldeman that they were both aware of the situation and I was 
not going to lie if asked about those meetings. Haldeman said that he 
did not want to get into it, but I should go in and work it out with 
Mitchell and Magruder. 

Before discussing the meetings with Mitchell and IMagruder, I feel 
I should comment on my reaction to the discussion I had just had with 
Mr. Haldeman. Knowing how freely and openly he had discussed 
matters in the past, I could tell that he was back-peddling fast. That 
he was now in the process of uninvolving himself, but keeping others 
involved. This was a clear sign to me that Mr. Haldeman was not 
going to come forward and help end this problem, rather, he was begin- 
ning to protect his flanks. It was my reaction to this meeting witli Mr. 
Haldeman and his evident changed attitude, and my earlier dealings 
with Ehrlichman where he had told me how I should handle various 
areas of my testimony should I be called before the grand jury, that 
made me decide not to turn over to them the report I had written at 
Camp David. T have submitted to the committee a copy of the Camp 
David report, part of which was typed by my secretary at Camp David 
and the remainder in longhand, which I had not put in final narrative 
form before I was called back to Washington. 

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-43.*] 

Meeting With Mr. INIitchell and Mr. Magruder 

]Mr. Dean. After departing ]\Ir. Haldeman's office, I went to meet 
with Mitchell and ^Magruder. After an exchange of pleasantries, they 
told me they wished to talk to me about how I would handle any testi- 
monial appearances regarding the January 27 and February 4 meetings 
which had occurred in Mitchell's office. I told them that we had been 
through this before and they knew well my understanding of the facts 
as they had occurred at that time. ]\ritchell indicated that if I so testi- 
fied, it could cause problems. ]\Iagruder then raised the fact that I had 
previously agreed, in an earlier meeting, that I would follow the testi- 
monial approach they had taken before the grand jury. 

I told them I recalled the meeting. INIagruder then said that it had 
been I who had suggested that the meetings be treated as dealing 
exclusively with the election law and that explained my presence. At 
this point in time, I decided I did not wish to get into a debate regard- 
ing that meeting. They both repeated to me that if I testified other 
than- they had it would only cause problems. I said I understood that. 
I told them that there was no certainty that I would be called before 
the grand jury or the Senate committee and that if I were called, I 
might invoke executive privilege, so the question of my testimony 
was still moot. I did not want to discuss the subject further so I tried 
to move them off of it. They were obviously both disappointed that I 
was being reluctant in agreeing to continue to perpetuate their earlier 

The only other matter of any substance that came up during that 
meeting was when I made the point that I had never asked Mitchell 

•See p. 1263. 


about his involvement in the matter and I had no intention of asking 
him at that time. I said to this day I do not fully understand how 
tlie Liddv plan got into operation and can only speculate based on 
the tidbits of information I know. I then offered my hypothesis of 
what had happened, that is, that at some point after the second meet- 
ing in ^litchell's office there had been pressure put on to get the plan 
approved and that it had been approved without anyone really under- 
standing its full import. ]Mitchell said somethino; to the effect that 
my theory was not far from wrong, only they thought it would be 
three or four times removed from the committee. The meeting termi- 
nated shortly thereafter. It was not a lengthy meeting and as far as 
Magruder and Mitchell were concerned, it was certainly less than 
satisfactory for them. 

IMarch INIeeting With IMr. Egil Krogh 

On either ]March 28 or 29. IMr. Krogh came to my office because he 
happened to be in the Executive Office Building. He said he had come 
to express sympathy for me as a result of the adverse publicity I had 
received during the Gray hearings. He then began telling me that he 
had not himself had a good day since his own confirmation hearings 
and that he had been haunted bv his experiences at the "^^Hiite House. 

I told Krogh that I thought that there was a very likely possibility 
that the Senate "Watergate committee could stumble into the Ellsberg 
burglary. I told him that there were documents in the possession of 
the Justice Department which had been provided by the CIA in con- 
nection with the "Watergate investigation which contained pictures 
of Liddv standing in front of 3Ir. Ellsberg's doctor's office in 

I told him that I had learned from the CIA that these pictures had 
been left in a camera returned bv Hunt to the CIA and the CIA had 
developed the pictures. I said I did not believe that the Justice Depart- 
ment knew what the pictures were all about but that any investigator 
worth his salt would probably track down the incident as a result of 
the pictures. 

I told him that Ehrlichman had requested that I retrieve the docu- 
ments from the Justice Department and get them back to the CIA 
where they might be withheld from the committee investigators but 
the CIA had been unwilling to do so. 

Krogh was very distressed to hear this news but said that maybe it 
was for the best in that he had personally been haunted b}' this inci- 
dent for so Ions: that he would like to get it out in the open. "We then 
entered into a discussion about the incident and I asked him if he had 
received his authorization to proceed with the burglary from Ehrlich- 
man, knowing well that Krogh would not undertake such a mission 

Krogh responded that no: he did not believe that Ehrlichman had 
been aware of the incident until shortly after it had occurred; rather, 
he had received his orders right out of the "oval office." I was so sur- 
prised to hear this that I said, "You must be kidding." And he repeated 
again that he had recei^'ed his instructions out of the oval office. 

Mr. Krogh also indicated to me that he thought he might have per- 
jured himself during his confirmation hearings and he was very both- 


ered by that. He said he thought he had been asked some questions 
about the Cubans that he probably could have ans^Yered but was afraid 
to open up the whole area of the plumbers' operation so he did not 
properly answer the question. 

He had never really studied his transcript to determine if he had or 
had not perjured himself but he was concerned about it. I told him 
that there might be a possible solution to his problem if there was some 
way we could get him immunized on a national security basis and get 
the matter out in the open on that basis, or some sort of procedure that 
would remedy his plight. I said I did not have anything specific in 
mind but it is something that we might talk to Henry Petersen about 
sometime in the future. 

Shortly after Krogh left my office, I had a call from Ehrlichman 
who told me that Krogh had been in to see him about the matters we 
had just been talking about. He said that he was convinced that Krogh 
had not perjured himself, but he requested that I call Petersen to 
explore how we might deal with Krogh's situation. I told Ehrlichman 
that I did not think it was an appropriate time to call right now, but 
that maybe we could in the near future, before the Senate committee 
came across the documents at the Justice Department that would 
unravel this entire matter. I never called Petersen on this matter. 

Meeting With the Prosecutors 

Following my meeting with Mitchell and Magruder on March 28, 
I realized that I was under pressure from both \a ithin the White House 
and without to either not testify or falsely testify. I had earlier dis- 
cussed with Ehrlichman that if I was called upon to testify that I 
would probably be asked questions about the Dean investigation, my 
dealings with the FBI, the handling of the material in Hunt's safe, 
and the like. 

I recall testing Ehrlichman's reaction to my testimony and I got 
the result that I expected. He had asked me for an example of a prob- 
lem area. I then told him that I would probably have to explain the 
delay of turning materials over to the FBI from Hunt's office. I said 
that the reason I had delayed was because of his instructions that I 
"deep-six" and shred the evidence. Ehrlichman told me that he didn't 
think that I would have to explain the delay that way, rather that I 
could say that I was making an inventory. I told him that I had not 
made an inventory and he said, "Well, I'm sure you'll think of 

I have mentioned that I had received what I considered an indica- 
tion from Haldeman when I had met with him preceding the Magruder 
and Mitchell meeting on the 28th that he was protecting himself. 

I also realized that w^hen Ehrlichman had called me after my con- 
versation with Mr. Krogh, that he was trying to tell me that what 
Krogh had earlier told me might not be correct and I felt that he was 
somewhat unhappy that Krogh had given me the information he had. 

By March 29, Ehrlichman and Haldeman fully realized that I was 
not playing ball and, in fact, could present a serious prol)lem to them. 
It was also evident to me that they were doing everything they could 
to protect themselves against my knowledge. 


I had been in continuous contact since March 25 with my attorney, 
Tom Hogan, regarding whom lie felt was the best availalDle man in 
the criminal law field that I might discuss this entire matter with. 
We had talked on several occasions about Charles Shaffer, whom I 
had met several years ago and regarded highly as a criminal lawyer. 

On March 28' and 29. however, I made several other calls to friends 
to ask them for suggested names of knowledgeable criminal lawyers, 
but decided on March 30 that I would retain Mr. Shaffer if he were 
available. Mr. Hogan informed me that he was and we arranged to 
meet with him. 

The President, along with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, were going 
to be in California for a week or more in connection with the Presi- 
dent's meeting with President Tliieu of South Vietnam and I felt that 
this would give me an opportunity to decide how best I could come 
forward and end this matter. I had decided that I was going to inform 
the prosecutors of what the case was all about but before I. did so 
I felt that I should consult with counsel to determine the scope of 
my own problems. 

On ]March 30. shortly after lunch, I met with Mr. Hogan and Mr. 
Shaffer. I spent 5 hours telling them everything that I could remember 
and telling them that I was unwilling to continue in the coverup. 
Mr. Shaffer advised me to avoid further conversations regarding this 
subject and said that he would like to talk with me again on Monday 
morning prior to his seeing the prosecutors. 

Accordingly, we met again on Monday morning, April 2, and dis- 
cussed the matter for several hours more. That afternoon, my attorneys 
went to the Govei-nment prosecutors and told them that I was willing 
to come forward with everything I knew about the case. 

From the outset 1 was confronted with the problems of executive 
privilege, attorney-client privilege, and national security. Thus, it 
was agreed until these problems were resolved that I would exclude 
matters involving the President from these conversations. I was also 
uncertain of many of the dates and details of the facts that I had 
general knowledge of so I began reconstructing a chronology of events. 
As each session progressed. I was able to provide more information, 
more leads, and more explanations of the interrelationships within 
the White House and the relationships of persons who were involved. 

During the period of April 2 until April 15, the meetings I had 
with the prosecutors were initially focusing on the activities which 
had led ud to the June 17 break-in at the Democratic National Com- 
mittee and all the knowledge I had regarding the events before June 
IT. but as our discussions evolved and I began telling them more and 
more of the coverup. their interest began to focus more and more in 
that area. 

As I beo-an explaining what T knew, it was evident that the prose- 
cutors had no conception of how extensive the coverup was so I tried 
to provide them with all the details that I could remember. Also, as 
tlie conversations regarding the coveru]:) began to get into more and 
more specifics, we moved into areas that came closer and closer to the 
President, but prior to April 15 I did not discuss any of the areas of 
Presidential involvement. 


Events Leading up to the President's Statement of April 17 

During the time I was having conferences with the Government 
prosecutors, I was avoiding conversations with Mitchell, Ehrlicliman, 
and Haldeman as much as I could. However, on several occasions I 
did talk with Ehrlicliman while he was in California. At one point 
he called me and asked if I had completed my report that I had been 
working on at Camp David. I told him it was still incomplete. He 
said that I should send him whatever I had completed. I told him 
that a section dealing with Segretti's activities, which had been pre- 
pared by Dick Moore, but which I had not reviewed myself, was com- 
plete as far as I was concerned and I would send it on to him. He said 
I should send it to California immediately on the DX machine. He 
said that Haldeman was interested in getting these facts out now 
because the timing might be good. 1 sent the report that had been 
written by Mr. Moore, a copy of which I have submitted to the 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 3 1 11 .*] 

Mr. Dean. I also had a conversation with Mitchell about Paul 
O'Brien going out to visit with Haldeman in California. Mitchell told 
me that he wanted O'Brien to go out and visit with Haldeman and that 
he had worked out the meeting. 1 felt like telling ^Mitchell that I 
thought that when I learned the meeting had been switched from 
Haldeman to Ehrlicliman, that O'Brien was being set up, that Ehrlicli- 
man would probe him on everything he knew about 5litcliell, Dean, 
and anyone else involved. I did not know if this in fact occurred, but 
knowing that Ehrlicliman and Haldeman were very busy protecting 
their flanks, I would have to believe that it did occur. I have never 
talked with O'Brien about what did occur during his meeting with 

Ehrlichman also asked me if I knew when I would be called before 
the grand jury. I told him I did not, but that my lawyers were dis- 
cussing the matter with the prosecutors. I did not tell him that I had 
already met with the prosecutors but he told me that he wanted to 
know when I was going to be called because he wanted to talk with 
me before I appeared. 

I believe that the President returned from California on Sunday, 
April 8. I was scheduled to meet with the prosecutors that afternoon. 
My attorneys had been discussing my testimony with the prosecutors 
and they had worked out an arrangement whereby I could give the 
prosecutors my knowledge directly and what I told them would not 
later be used against me if they should prosecute me. I felt that I 
should tell Haldeman that I was going to meet with the prosecutors 
personally so I called him in California on the morning of April 8 
before they departed for Washington. I made the call from Mr. Shaf- 
fer's office and when I told him this he said that I should not meet 
with the prosecutors because, as he said, "Once the toothpaste is out 
of the tube, it's going to be very hard to get it back in." After this 
comment, I did not tell Haldeman whether I would or would not meet 
with them and in fact the meeting w^ent forward. During the meeting 
and while the President was flying east, I received a call from Air 

•See p. 1294. 


Force One from Hig*by, who asked me to be in Wisdom's (Ehrlich- 
man's code name) office at a certain time for a meeting. I believe the 
meeting was set for 4 or 5 o'clock. 

I departed from the meeting with the prosecutors to go into the 
White House. I went to Ehrlichman's office. There I found Ehrlich- 
man and Haldeman who had just arrived from Andrews Air Force 
Base and we chatted for a brief moment about their trip. I raised the 
fact that I had read in the paper that morning that Colson had taken 
a lie detector test. I said that I hope everyone is willing to take such 
a lie detector test because it will proba]:)ly be necessary now that Colson 
has taken a test. They asked me if I had met yet with the prosecutors 
or knew when I would be called before the grand jury. I avoided a 
direct answer to the question by saying that my lawyers were still 
having discussions with the prosecutors about my appearance before 
the grand jury. I was then asked some questions about testimonial 
areas but I gave them evasive answers. Even these evasive answers, 
which raised matters which related to them, brought forth responses 
that they did not remember it quite as I did. 

During the week of April 9 to April 14, I had several conversations 
with Ehrlichman and Haldeman but I tried to avoid them as much 
as possible. I recall some discussions however regarding getting 
IMitchell to step forward. The theory that had been discussed before 
they went to California was becoming the policy — "If Mitchell takes 
the rap the public will have a high level person and be satisfied and 
the matter will finally end." I felt during each encounter I had with 
them that I was veiw much a problem for them but they did not want 
me to know that they felt so. However, after having been involved 
with them for months on end in this matter, it was very easy for me 
to recognize a clianged attitude, and on occasion they were almost 
patronizing in dealing with me. 

On Monday. April 9, Mitchell called me and told me he was coming 
to Washington and wanted to meet with me. I informed Ehrlichman 
and Haldeman of ^Mitchell's request and they both wanted me to meet 
with him. I also discussed this with counsel and there was some discus- 
sion with the Government about the meeting. The prosecutors were 
interested in mv taping the conversation but I told them I tliought it 
was most unfair to do. to JMitchell, and that I would not go in and set 
him up. 

After discussing this further with my attorney, and rejecting the 
suq:i>estion that I record the conversation, I agreed to meet with 
Mitchell but I had been instructed by counsel to prepare a memoran- 
dum of the meeting as soon as the meeting was over. I agreed to do 
this and I have submitted a copy of that memorandum to the 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-45.*] 

Mr. Dean. The sum and substance of the meeting was that if and 
when I were called to testify I would testify fully and honestly. Mit- 
chell said that lie understood and did not suggest tliat I do otherwise. 
He did, howevei-, believe that mv testimony would be verv harmful to 
the President and said that he felt that I should not testify if at all 
possible. I reported my meeting with ]Mitchell to Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman later. 

♦See p. 1308. 


There were other discussions that week in which Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman talked about pinning this entire matter on MitchelL I 
listened with some interest because I did not feel that they would suc- 
ceed at this and I felt that also they would have to bo thinkino; about 
liow to handle the coverup activities and felt that I would undoubt- 
edly be the target for them to pin everything with regard to the 
coverup on. As Haldeman and Ehrlichman began to discuss more 
about getting Mitchell to take the blame for authorizing this plan in 
the first instance, I began to increase my conversations with the prose- 
cutors about the coverup. The more I told the prosecutors about the 
coverup the more interested they became iii it. At this time, Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman were still unaware of my direct dealings with the 

On Friday, April 13, Fred LaRue came to my office to see me. Before 
he arrived in my office I again contacted my attorney to advise him 
that LaRue wanted to see me and I asked wliat I should do. He again 
said he thouglit I ought to meet with LaRue, not to get into testi- 
monial areas, but to make a memorandum of the meeting, I have sub- 
mitted a copy of that memorandum to the committee. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-46.*] 

Mr. Dean. When LaRue and I met, LaRue told me that lie thought 
he was going to be called before the grand jury shortly and he wanted 
to know what I was going to do if I was called. I told him I was going 
to tell the truth. I told him I did not believe we should talk about 
testimony because we could be asked that very question in and of 
itself before the grand jury. LaRue said, "Let me just ask one ques- 
tion." He asked me if I had made anv decisions on the money and I 
told him that I had not but I had merely passed messages along and 
returned messages. He said that he had assumed that to be the case 
and asked me how I was going to handle the persons above me who 
were involved. I told him again that I was going to withhold nothing 
from the grand jury and if asked I would respond. 

oSIr. LaRue also said that he needed some legal advice and I sug- 
gested that rather than getting it from me that he ought to get inde- 
)3endent counsel. I liked Fred LaRue very much and felt very sorry 
for him realizing that this probably would be the last conversation 
we would have for some time and that he was in the middle of this 
matter not necessarily by his own choice but by the circumstances he 
found himself in at the time. 

The strategy that was now developing was a partial uncovering of 
the coverup: that is, to get ]\Iitchell to step forward. On Friday, 
April 13, I went to Ehrlichman's office where Ehrlichman and Halde- 
man were present and discussing a meeting that they had just had 
with Colson and his attorney, INfr. Shapiro. 

They informed me that Colson had developed a plan to deal with 
the matter and that was that ^Mitchell should be smoked out. Ehrlich- 
man said that Colson had concluded that obviously '^Mitchell had 
signed off on this matter and he should take responsibility for it to 
end this thing. Ehrlichman also said that Colson had some other ideas 
including the fact that the Gray hearings had been very damaging 
to me publicly and I should certainly not take any position out in 

♦See p. 1311. 


front dealing with the Ervin committee hearings because of this. I 
miglit add that Ehrlichman and Haldeman were most cynical about 
Colson's suggestions and said to me that he was really scrambling to 
protect himself. 

After discussing the Colson plan they told me that Mitchell would 
bo coming down to talk about this entire matter. There was some dis- 
cussion as to how to smoke ISlitchell out. By the week's end it had 
been decided that the President would meet with ^Mitchell and ask 
liim about his knowledge and hopefully the President would be able 
to get ^Mitchell to come forward. I told them I doubted very seriously 
if ^litchell would say anything to anyone about this matter. While 
these discussions were going on, the President called Ehrlichman 
and they had a brief discussion about the matter. I also recall that at 
one point in the conversation Ehrlichman said that "He's right here," 
referring to me. 

On Saturday, April 14, I requested my attorney, Mr. Shaffer, to 
come to my office. I told him that ]Mitchell was coming down to meet 
with the President and that there was going to be an effort to smoke 
him out. I asked him if he had any ideas as Ehrlichman and Halde- 
man had asked me if I had any ideas. Mr. Shaffer gave me a former 
prosecutor's answer that what Mitchell needs is a good cross- 

I told him I did not think that that was possible by the President 
because the President was not the cross-examining type. He also made 
a couple of other suggestions which would have resulted in the Presi- 
dent having to appear before the grand jury if he got any admissions 
from i\Ir. Mitchell. I passed these suggestions along subsequently to 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman but the}^ were not viable suggestions. 

Mr. Shaffer and I then sat down and began reviewing all the facts 
that I had related to him. I told him I wanted his opinion based on 
conversations with the prosecutors and his own knowledge of the 
criminal law as to who had problems and who could be indicted and 
who were the targets of the grand jury. ]Mr. Shaffer and I discussed 
this for awhile and then I prepared a list of who was likely to be 
indicted as the investigation proceeded. 

I had guests for lunch and it was after lunch that I met with Dick 
Moore. I had the list in front of me and I thought that I would see 
what INIoore's reaction to it was because I was planning to take it to 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman later. I showed the list to Dick INIoore and 
told him it had been prepared based on conversations with my attorney 
and his knowledge of the involvement of various persons. 

I told him that I felt that everybody on this list was a potential 
subject of an indictment. When I showed Moore the list ho was quite 
upset. He said that if indeed that occurred it would be a tremendous 
tragedy to the country. He was shaken by the list and the seriousness 
with which I discussed it with him, but I was very serious in my desire 
to stop the coverup with Ehrlichman and Haldeman so I was appre- 
ciative for Moore's reaction. I have submitted a copy of the document 
I prepared to the committee. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-47.*] 

Mr. Deax. Later that afternoon I wont to Ehrlichman's office where 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman were discussing Mitchell's visit. I learned 

•See p. 1312. 


that Mitchell had met briefly with Ehrlichman but not with the Presi- 
dent. Ehrlichman said that Mitchell was not talkino- which certainly 
did not surprise mo. And I certainly was not surprised that he would 
not talk with Ehrlichman eitlier. I then pulled the list I had prepared 
out of my pocket and told them tliat I had discussed everyone's prob- 
lem with my lawyers and my lawyers had had conversations with the 
prosecutors as well and I thought that the following persons would be 
indicted. I then read them the list. I told them that my attorney had 
learned from his discussions with the prosecutors that not only was 
Dean the target of the grand ]ury but Ehrlichman and Haldeman 
were also very much targets of the grand jury, Ehrlichman said that 
he had just talked with Kleindienst a few days earlier about the grand 
jury and that he had no such report from Kleindienst. I said that my 
lawyer appears to know more than the Attorney General does because 
I believe he is probably more informed in that he had had direct con- 
versations with the prosecutors. I did not tell them at that point that 
I had had private meetings with the prosecutors or that I had told 
the prosecutors of the extent of involvement of Haldeman and Ehr- 
lichman. When this meeting ended I was quite confident that I had 
gotten the message through to Ehrlichman and Haldeman that they 
had a serious problem themselves and I had put them on final notice 
that I was not playing the coverup game any longer. 

It was late that night that I realized that indeed, my message had 
gotten through. About 1 o'clock on Saturday niglit or Sunday morn- 
ing, I received a call from Mr. Shaffer. He said that the prosecutors 
had called him and that they were going to have to ))reach the agree- 
ment they had made regarding keeping all of my conversations with 
them private. The prosecutors had reported to Mr. Shaffer that the 
Attorney General had called Mr. Petersen and them and wanted a full 
report on everything that was going on before the grand jury and 
where the grand jury was headed. The meeting with tlie Attorney 
General was to occur about 2 a.m., at the Attorney General's home. 
The prosecutors also reported that the reason thev felt they had to 
breach the agreement was because the Attorney General was being 
summoned to the President's office the next morning to discuss the 
entire matter. I told Mr. Shaffer that I had hoped to tell the Presi- 
dent personally that I had gonp to the prosecutors several weeks ago 
but that I had understood why this was occurring and obviously there 
was nothing we could do about it. I told Shaffer that we certainly 
have gotten the message through to Ehrlichman and PTaldeman that 
thev have problems and that the co\orup mav begin to uni-avel at last. 

On Sunday, April 15, I went to Mr. Shaffer's office for an all-day 
meeting. I learned durinsr the day that Ehrlichman had been trying 
to reach me during the better part of the dav but I decided not to 
return his cpH. When T returned home abont 7:30, the White House 
operator called me again and said that Ehrlichman had been trying to 
reach me. T then returned his call. Ho told me that ho was <roinfr back 
to the office to do some work that ni.o'ht and would bo in about S p.m. 
and would like to meet with mo very much. T told him I would luoet 
with him. 

I was quite aware of the reason that Ehrlichman wanted to meet 
with me because I was sure that ho had learned from the President 
what was going on as a result of the President's mootinG: with Klein- 


dienst and Petersen and the fact that I had been to the prosecutors 
had obviously come out. As I have noted earlier, I had not at any time 
discussed Presidential involvement with the prosecutors so the dis- 
cussions that Petersen and Kleindienst had with the President obvi- 
ously focused on the involvement of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, 
Mitchell, Magruder, Strachan, and others that I had discussed. After 
Ehrlichman's call, I called ]\Ir. Shaffer and we discussed the wisdom 
of the meetino-s. I told him I did not want to meet with Ehrlichman 
and he aorreed. Subsequently, I tried to reach Ehrlichman to turn the 
moetiuir off but I learned that he was already en route to the office. 

I called Mr. Shaffer back and told him that I thought I ought to 
meet with the President and I should call Rosemary Woods and have 
her give a message to the President. He said that he saw no problem 
with my talking with the President to tell him why I had gone to 
the prosecutors. I attempted to reach Rosemary Woods but she was out 
of the city. I then wrote out a message for the President and phoned 
Mr. Higby and requested that Higby relate the matter to Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and on to the President. I have submitted a copy to the 
committee of the message I sent to the President at 8:15 Sunday, 
April 15. 

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-48.*] 

Mr. Deax. In short, I told the President that I hoped he did not in- 
terpret my going to the prosecutors as an act of disloyalty, that I did 
not wish "to speak with Ehrlichman at this time, that I would meet 
with him if he wished to discuss the matter with me, and that I 
thought that he should get his legal advice from Henry Petersen. 
Witliin 45 minutes of sending this message I had a call from the 
"Wliite House operator informing me that the President wished to 
meet with me at 9 o'clock. 

It was shortly after 9 when I arrived at the President's EOB office. 
As I was driving into the White House I wondered to myself if the 
meeting was a set-up. By a set-up I mean, was the President going to 
try to smoke out of me what Ehrlichman and Haldeman obviously had 
been trying to do and had not been able to do, would not be able to get 
out of me because they knew very well that I would not play any games 
with the President. I decided I could not worry about that and I had a 
duty to explain to the President why I was doing what I had done. 

Meeting With the President — April 15 

The President was very cordial when we met. I was somewhat 
shaken when I went in to meet him because I knew I had taken it upon 
myself to end the coverup and what I had started was going to cause 
serious problems for the President. I shall attempt to recall the high- 
lights of the conversation that transpired on the meeting which oc- 
curred about 9 o'clock on April 15. 

I told the President that I had gone to the prosecutors. And, that I 
did not believe that this was an act of disloyalty but, rather in the end 
it would be an act of loyalty. I told him I felt this matter had to end. 
I informed the President that I told the prosecutors of my own in- 
volvement and the involvement of others. At one point in the conver- 
sation I recall the President asking me about Haldeman's knowledge 

♦See p. 1313. 


of the Liddy plans. He asked me if I had told him earlier about the 
fact that I had met with Ilaldeman after the second mootino; in Mitch- 
ell's office and told Haldeman what was <2:oin;2: on and my reaction 
to what was going on. I told the President that I had reported this 
fact to him earlier. The President then made some reference to Henry 
Petersen asking about why Haldeman had not turned it off at that 
point and told me to testify that I had told Haldeman about the meet- 
ing in Mitchell's office. The President almost from the outset began 
asking me a number of leading questions, which was somewhat unlike 
his normal conversational relationships I had had with him, which 
made me think that the conversation was being taped and that a record 
was being made to protect himself. Although I became aware of this 
because of the nature of the conversation, I decided that I did not know 
it for a fact and that I had to believe that the President would not tape 
such a conversation. 

Some question came up, by the President, as to whether I had im- 
munity. As best as I can recall, I told him my lawyers had discussed 
this with the prosecutors but certainly I had no deal with the Govern- 
ment. He told me that he did not want to do anything to hurt my 
negotiations witli the Government. I do not recall his comment on his 
comment regarding that. I also recall that the conversation turned to 
the matter of L/iddy not talking. He said something about Liddy was 
waiting for a signal and I told him that possibly he was waiting for a 
signal from the President. 

I discussed with him the fact that maybe if Liddy's lawyer met 
with him that Liddy would begin to open up because I said that I 
thought that that would be very helpful if Liddy did talk. It was 
during this part of the conversation that the President picked up the 
telephone and called Henry Petersen and pretended with Petersen 
that I was not in the room but that the matter of Liddy's coming for- 
ward and talking had arisen during our conversation. The President 
relayed to Petersen that if Liddy's lawyer wanted to see him to get 
a signal that the President was willing to do this. 

The President also asked me about Petersen and I told him if any- 
one could give him good advice Henry Petersen could. The President 
also asked me if I remembered what day it was in March that I had 
reported to him on some of the details of the Watergate matter. He 
said that he thought it was the 21st but was not certain. I said that 
I could not recall for certain without checking. 

At another point in the convei'sation the matter of the degree of 
discussions that I had had with the prosecutors came up and I in- 
formed the President that I had had no discussions with the prose- 
cutors relating to conversations I had had witli him or in anything 
in the area of national security. The Pi-esident told me that I could 
not talk about national security areas and that I should not talk about 
conversations I had had with him because they were privileged 

Toward the end of the conversation the President recalled the fact 
that at one point we had discussed the difficulty in raising money and 
that he had said that $1 million was nothing to raise to pay to main- 
tain the silence of the defendants. He said that he had, of course, only 
been joking when he made that comment. As the conversation went 
on, and it is impossible for me to recall anything other than the high 


points of it, I 'became more convinced that the President was seeking 
to elicit testimony from me and put his i:)crspective on the record and 
get me to agree to it. 

The most interesting thing tliat happened during the conversation 
was, very near the end. he got up out of his chair, went behind his 
chair to the corner of the Executive Office Building office and in a 
nearly inaudible tone said to me he was probably foolish to have dis- 
cussed Hunt's clemency with Colson. I do not recall that I responded. 
The conversation ended shortly thereafter. 

As I was on my way out of the office after exchanging parting 
pleasantries, I told the President that I hoped that my going to the 
prosecutors and telling the truth would not result in the impeach- 
ment of the President. He jokingly said, "I certainly hope so also," 
and he said that it would be handled properly. 

^Ieetixg "With the President — April 16 

I received word on ^Monday morning, April 16, that the President 
had requested I come to the oval office. I arrived at his office about 
9 i-tS. and rather than going to the reception entrance normally used by 
other members of the staff and mvself, I went into ]Mr. Steve Bull's 
office. ^Ir. Bull is the one who had informed me that the President 
wanted to see me, so I went to his office. 

Mr. Bull told me I would have to wait a few minutes because the 
President was in another meeting. A few minutes later Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman emerged laughing from the President's office and when 
they saw me in Mr. Bull's office their faces dropped. I said hello, they 
put on a serious — they said hello, put on a serious look and departed. 
I went into the President's office. 

The President told me that he had been thinking about this entire 
matter and thought it might be a good idea if he had in his drawer a 
letter from me requesting that he accej^t my resignation or in the alter- 
native an indefinite leave of absence. He said that he had prepared two 
letters for my signature and he would not do anything with them at 
this time but thought it would be good if he had them. He then passed 
me a manila file folder with two letters in them. The President said 
that he had prepared the letters himself and that no one would knoAv 
I had signed them. I read the letters and was amazed at what I was 
being asked to sign. I have submitted to the committee copies of the 
letters, but since they are very brief, I will read them. 

[The letters were marked exhibit No. 34—49.*] 

Mr. Deax. The first letter, dated April 16, 1973, read : 

Dear Mr. President, in view of ray increasing involvement in the Watergate 
matter, my impending appearance before the grand jury and the probability of 
its action, I request an immediate and indefinite leave of absence from my posi- 
tion on your staff. 

The second letter, which was even more incriminating, read : 

Dear Mr. President, as a result of my involvement in the Watergate matter, 
which we discussed last night and today, I tender you my resignation, effective 
at once. 

*See p. 1314. 

96-296 O - 73 - 8 


After reading the letters, I looked the President squarely in the eyes 
and told him that I could not sign the letters. He was annoyed with 
me, and somewhat at a loss for words. He said that maybe I would like 
to draft my own letter. I told him that the letters tliat ho liad asked me 
to sign were virtual confessions of anything regarding the Watergate. 
I also asked him if Ehrlichman and Haldeman had signed letters of 
resignation. I recall that he was somewhat surprised at my asking this 
and he said no, they had not but they had given him a verbal assur- 
ance to the same effect. 

He then elaborated that Haldeman and Ehrlichman had said that 
if they were called before the grand jury they would seek an indefinite 
leave of absence. They had given him their verbal assurances. I tlien 
told the President that he had my verbal assurance to the same effect. 
It was a tense conversation, but I was not going to sign the letters 
under any circumstances. 

As I sat there talking with the President, I had very much on my 
mind the laughter in Ehrlichman's and Haldeman's voices when thev 
walked out of the office before they realized that I was waiting outside 
to see the President. To break the impasse the President said that lie 
would like me to draft my own letter and report back to him later. He 
said that he was working on a statement regarding the Watergate and 
the recent developments that had come to his attention as a result of 
his meetings with Kleindienst and Petersen and would appreciate my 
thoughts. He said that he would also like a suggested draft letter for 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman or maybe a form lettei- that e^•eryone could 
sign. I told him I would draft a letter and would report back to him. 

The President called me to come to his EOB office about 4 that 
afternoon. He asked me if I had drafted a letter. I said that I had as 
well as I had prepared some thoughts for his statement. He asked to 
see the letter, a copy of which I have submitted to the committee — 
but again shall read it because it is very brief : 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-50.*] 

Dear Mr. President : 

You have informed me tliat Bob Haldeman and .John Elirlicliman liave verbally 
tendered their requests to be given an immediate and indefinite leave of absence 
from your staff. By this letter I also wish to confirm my request that I be given 
such a leave of absence from your staff. 

Mr. Dean, After the President read the letter, he handed it back to 
me and said it wasn't what he wanted. [Laughter,] 

Senator Ervix. The audience will please refrain from laughter. 

Mr. Dean. I then told him that I would not resign unless Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman resigned. I told him that I was not walling to be the 
White House scapegoat for the Watergate. He said that lie understood 
my position and he wasn't asking me to be a scapegoat. I then gave him 
my recommendations of the draft statement. Before lie read the draft 
statement he said that he had checked his records and it lias been on 
March 21 that I had met with him and given him the report on the 
problems of the Watergate and its coverup. I have submitted to the 
committee a copy of the draft statement I prepared for tlie President. 

[The document referred to Avas marked exhibit No. 34-51.**] 

Mr. Deax. The gist of the statement was twofold : First the Presi- 
dent had learned of new facts in tlie case over the weekend and as a 

*Rpe p. 1316. 
**See p. 1317. 


result of this information coming to his staff and had directed Henry 
Petersen to take cliarge and leave no stone unturned: secondly, that he 
had accepted requests from Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean to be 
placed on leave of absence. The President said virtually nothing about 
the statement and after reading it told me to talk with Len Garment, 
who he said was also preparing a draft statement. 

After departing from the President's office, I called ]Mr. Garment 
and told him that the President had requested I give him my input on 
the draft he was developing. jNlr. Garment said he would come by my 
office, which he did. I gave him a copy of the draft statement, and he 
told me that he and I were thinking along similar lines, that is. that 
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean had to resign. I told him I was ready 
and willing but only if Haldeman and Ehrlichman resigned as well. 

Call From the President — April 17 

The next time I heard anything about the draft statement was on 
April 17, when the President called and informed me that he had 
decided not to request any resignations until after the grand jury took 
action and that he would issue a statement very shortly. That statement 
of April 17 is a matter of public record. I would only like to point 
out one or two items about the statement. The President said that on 
March 21, as a result of serious charges which came to his attention, 
some of which were publicly reported, he began an intense new in- 
quiry into this whole matter. I would merely refer the committee's 
attention back to my earlier testimony as to what the President did 
after my report to him on ISIarch 21 as to the White House's deep 
invohement in tlie coverup. In short, the President commenced no 
investigation at all. Rather, the President, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman 
commenced to protect themselves against the unraveling of the 

Secondly, I would also like to raise the paragraph that had been 
put in the statement that no one in a position of major importance in 
the administration should be given immunity from prosecution. "While 
this statement went virtually unnoticed in the public, it was very evi- 
dent to me what the President was saying: Dean will not be a witness 
against anyone so the Government might as well stop dealing with him. 

The Deax Scapegoat Statement axd Requested Resigxation 

On Monday night, April 16, I had learned that the President had 
informed the Government that he allegedly had taped a conversation 
in which I had told him I was seeking immunity from the Government 
in exchange for testimony on Haldeman and Ehrlichman. I have no 
recollection of ever telling the President that I was so negotiating with 
the Government and the President told me very specifically tliat he 
did not want to do anvthing to interfere with any negotiations I was 
haviufr with the Government. 

"Wlien I learned this from my attorney I suggested that he request 
that the Government call for the tape aiid listen to the tape because I 
told him it must be a reference to the meeting I had with the President 
on April 15 and if that conversation were taped the Government would 
have a prettv ffood idea of the dimensions of the case they were dealing 
with. I was referring to the fact that the President had mentioned 


the million dollar conversation and the fact that he had talked to 
Colson about clemency for Hunt. I do not in fact know if such a tape 
exists but if it does exist and has not been tampered with and is a com- 
plete transcript of the entire conversation that took place in the Presi- 
dent's office, I think that this committee should have that tape because 
I believe that it would corroborate many of the things that this com- 
mittee has asked me to testify about. 

When the President issued his statement on April 17 in which he 
was quite obviously trying to affect any discussions I ^yas ha^dng with 
the Government regarding my testimony by inserting the phrase 
therein regarding "no immunity" and combined with the fact that he 
had requested that I sign a virtual confession on Monday of that week, 
I decided that indeed I w^as being set up and that it was time that I 
let the word out that I would not be a scapegoat. Accordingly, on April 
19, 1 issued a statement to that effect. 

After my statement of April 19, I had virtually no contact with the 
members of the ^^Hiite House, staff. I did have occasion to speak with 
Mr. Garment however. I recall asking him who had placed the ''no 
immunity" paragraph in the President's statement. Garment said while 
he did not know for certain, he believed that Ehrlichman had placed it 
in the draft because it had not been there in the earlier drafts, but was 
in the draft that emerged from Ehrlichman's consideration when 
Ehrlichman went over the final statement with the President. 

On April 22, Easter Sunday, the President called me to wish me a 
Happy Easter. It was what they refer to at the A^Hiite House as a 
"stroking" call. 

On April 30, while out of the city, I had a call from my secretary in 
which she informed me that the wire services were carrying a story 
that my resignation had been requested and accepted and that Halde- 
man and Ehrlichman were also resigning. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my rather lengthy statement. I apolo- 
gize again for its length, but I have sought to comply with the com- 
mittee's request to provide the committee with a broad overview of my 
knowledge of this matter. 

Senator Ervin. Without objection on the part of any member of the 
committee, the chairman at this time will admit into evidence all of 
the exhibits identified by the witness in the course of his testimonv 
except exhibits Nos. 34-5, 34-6, 34-7, and 34-8 whose admissibility will 
be considered later by the committee. 

The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow 

[Whereupon, at 6 :05 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 
a.m., Tuesday, June 26, 1973.] 

TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1973 

U.S. Sexate, 
Select Committee ox 
Presidextial Campaigx Actim:ties, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10.05 a.m., in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair- 
man), presiding. 

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and Weicker. 

Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred D. 
Thompson, minority counsel ; Rufus Ij. Edmisten, deputy chief coun- 
sel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David yi. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boycc, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya; Ron Mc]\Iahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker ; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker ; Ray St. Armand, 
assistant publications clerk. 

Senator Er^tcx. The committee will come to order. 

The committee counsel will question the witness. 

Mr. Dasti. Mr. Dean, you stated, did you nor, that well before the 
so-called Liddy plan spelled out in meetings on January 27 and Feb- 
ruary 4. 1972, that there was an atmosphere in the White House con- 
ducive to the bugging and break-in of the Democratic Xational Com- 
mittee headquarters. Is that true ? 


Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Let me very briefly summarize the key plans and activ- 
ities which you state in your statement created such an atmosphere. 
The first I understand was an overall intelligence plan developed by 
the time you had already arrived at the White House in July of 1970 
by "\Aniito House leadership or including White House lead'ershii^ to 
deal with internal security and domestic dissent which included such 
activities as illegal break-in and wiretapping and these are the papers 
which I understand you submitted to Judge Sirica and which this 
committee has received from Judge Silica ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct, and I believe that was indicative of a 
concern that existed regarding that particular area of problem. 



Mr. Dash. Then there was the so-called plumbers operation set up 
in the White House in 1971 under Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Krogh 
utilizing Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to investigate leaks such as the 
Pentagon paper leaks, which utilized such tactics as break-ins, photo- 
graphing and bugging, and then there was Operation Sandwedge rec- 
ommended by Mr. Caulfield but never finally approved which had 
covert features to it such as the use of bagmen and wiretapping. 

Now, generally, is that the context in which you described the 
atmosphere that was conducive to such activity as break-ins and wire- 
tapping in the "WHiite House ? 

Mr. Dean. I think, Mr. Dash, you have capsulized some of the high 
points of the concerns I expressed yesterday. 

Mr. Dash. I am attempting just to capsulize and not go over j^our 
lengthy statement. 

Mr. Dean. I understand. 

Mr. Dash. Therefore, in addition to your testimonj^ about the Presi- 
deiit and the Wiiite House staff members' obsession over demonstrators 
and leaks, is this then a brief and fair summary in a nutshell of the 
kind of practices the President to some extent and White House offi- 
cials such as Haldeman and Ehrlichman, had approved or considered 
to crush internal dissent or obtain political intelligence ? 

Mr. Deax. I think that this is indicative, INIr. Dash, of the fact that 
the 'N'Vniite House often took it upon itself to obtain information or 
resolve a problem when it felt that an agency of the Government was 
incapable or unsatisfactory in dealing with the problem, that the '\Vliite 
House itself felt that they were quite capable of handling the problem 
and thereupon would handle the problem. 

Mr. Dash. Well, therefore, ]\Ir. Dean, when Liddy. Hunt, ]McCord, 
and their crew broke into the Watergate in ]May and June of 1972. this 
really was not an extraordinary action from the standpoint of the 
White House which had approved or engaged in similar missions for 
a period of at least 2 years prior to the Watergate, was it? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I believe I described in my statement yesterday, 
the preceding things that had occurred in a sense were precui'sors but 
I think that the fact that the break-in occurred was not as a result of a 
conscious design as much as an accident of a culmination of many of 
these elements. 

Mr. Dash. I understand that. But recognizing that some of these 
earlier plans had the approval of such things as break-ins and wire- 
tapping and things of that covert activity, the break-in at the Demo- 
cratic National Committee headquarters was not extraordinary in con- 
text of those plans, would that not be true ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Therefore, on the basis of your own statement, would 
it be fair to sa}^ that the true concern of those who approved such 
tactics in the past, such as INIr. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, as you have 
stated, would not be that there was a break-in but that the Committee 
for the Re-Election of the President burglars had been caught at it? 

Mr. Dean. You say the concern was 

]Mr. Dash. The concern really was that they had been caught rather 
than that they had broken in. 

iSIr. Dean. I think that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Let us examine, INIr. Dean, your denial of your own 
complicity in the Watergate itself in ]May and June of 1972. 


Is it not true that althougli you expressed amazement at the mind 
bofrg'ling, as you described it, Liddy plan remembered in a show-and- 
tell meeting- in the Attorney General's office on January 27, 1972, 
you, along with ]Mr. ]Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, did encourage Liddy 
to scale down this plan and budget, and you didn't tell him to stop 
the activity ? 

]\Ir. Deax. That is correct, and I might add that with hindsight, 
as I think I indicated in my statement yesterday, I probably should 
have been much more forceful in trying to stop the plan at that point 
when I, in fact, myself realized it was something that should not 

Mr. Dash. "Well, ^Ir. Dean, after the scaled down Liddy plan was 
presented in Mitchell's office in February 4, 1972, which omitted the 
activity of nuigging, kidnaping, or prostitution, but included primar- 
ily electronic surveillance or break-ins, you say you disassociated your- 
self from it. As the White House representative you did not, in fact, tell 
Liddy to stop it ; did you ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. And although you say that you told Haldeman that the 
White House should not be involved with the plan, you did not rec- 
ommend that Haldeman put a stop to it, which you knew he could 
have done if he wanted to ? 

]Mr. Deax. Well, again I must rely on hindsight. Given the circum- 
stances that were existing at the time, I felt that someone wanted this, 
I knew I didn't want it. I knew I had put those on notice involved 
that I was going to have no part in it. I had similarly and with regard 
to operation Sanclwedge, let it die a natural death. I assumed the same 
thing was going to happen. Quite obviously it did not happen. 

^Ir. Dash. But so far as Liddy was concerned, ^Ir. Dean, your 
actions were consistent, were they not, with his getting the impression 
that you were merely establishing deniability for the Attorney Gen- 
eral and the White House should the plans go forward, is that not 

^Ir. Deax. I don't know if Mr. Liddy had that impression or not. 

]Mr. Dash. Would it be consistent with his having that impression? 

Mr. Deax'. He could have well have had that impression, yes. 

'Sir. Dash. Xow. during January and June of 1972, did you, in fact, 
know that Sir. Magruder, who has testified before this committee, was 
giving Gordon Strachan full reports of the Liddy plan, including 
the break-in and the fruits of the break- in ? 

Mr. Deax. Xo. I did not. I was just — while you were asking that 
question. I was thinking about your last question still, and I recall 
something that Mr. Krogh had told me when I first discussed with him 
Mr. Liddy going over to the reelection committee. He told me that 
Gordon Liddy is a man who needs guidance. Gordon Liddy didn't get 
any guidance that I can see while he was there from anyone that I 
know, and that could explain partially the reason that he was sent 
over to prepare one thing and something else evolved unbeknownst to 
those who had sent him over. 

Mr. Dash. But you didn't give him any guidance yourself ? 

Mr. Deax. Xo. I did not. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, going back to my next question, I think you have 
answered the question that you did not know that between the period 


of January to June 1972 that Mr. ]Ma<2:nKler. according to liis own 
testimony here, was giving reports to Mr. Gordon Straclian of the 
Liddy plan and, in fact, the break-in and the fi'uits of the break-in. 

Now, in fact, after the June 17 break-in and more specifically on 
June 19, I think your statement indicates that you were told by Mr. 
Strachan that he destroyed, at the direction of ]Mr. ITaldeman, certain 
intelligence reports that came from the CRP. is that not true? 

Mr. Dean-. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash, So at that time, you did hayo some knowledge of Mr. 
Strachan's knowledge? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Could you tell the committee' exactly what Mr. Strachan's 
role in the White House was and his activities and responsibilities. 

Mr. Deax. Mr. Strachan was placed on ]Mr. Haldeman's staff to 
serve as the liaison individual from tlie White Plouse to the reelec- 
tion committee, and to deal with other members of the White House 
staff who were working on problems relating directly to the political 
faces of the reelection problem. I was aware of the fact that he was 
having frec{uent contact with Mr. Magruder regarding the reelection 
committee, that he had received copies of documents that any of us 
would send regarding election law problems or othei- peojole who send 
to the reelection committee so that he was aware of everythino- that 
was going out of the White House as well as coming into tlie White 
PIousc from the reelection committee. 

Mr. Dash. How close was his relationship wilh ]Mr. Haldeman. and 
what were his responsibilities to Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I assume that from the time he went on, it was a 
regular reporting relationship. ]Mr. Haldeman is an excellent manager 
of people. I recall that one document I submitted to you yesterday of a 
meeting that occurred in May of 1971 evidences that when there was 
a meeting that occurred in Mr. Haldeman's office, Mr. Strachan obvi- 
ously took rather complete notes of the meeting and sent me a copy of 
the meeting, I was unaware of the fact that he was even taking notes 
at the meeting. 

Mr. Dash. Well, if Strachan did in fact receive reports from Ma- 
gruder in the Liddy operation, do you have an opinion as to whether 
he Avould have forwarded these reports to Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Deax. I would only have an opinion, ]\Ir. Dash. 

Mr. Dash, What is that opinion ? 

Mr. Deax. ]My opinion is that he would report everything he knew 
in some form to Mr. Haldeman. 

Mr. Dash. And did you know what Mr. Haldeman's relationships 
and duties were with the President during the period January to June 

]Mr. Deax. Well, I think that everybody who worked at the White 
House was generally aware of the fact that Mr. ITaldeman was the 
virtual link between a number of, a large number of the White House 
staff and the President as to what would go in to the President, and he 
would take and summarize and boil down and report to the President 
regularly all information that was pertinent and important that should 
come to the President's attention. 

Mr. Dash. What was the relationship in the matter of time that Mr. 
Haldeman had with the President — was it a daily relatio ship or 
weekl y ? What was his contact ? 


Mr. Deax. I would say that Mr, Haldeman spent more time with the 
President than any other member of the White House staff. 

Mr. Dash. Therefore, do you have an opinion as to whether Mr. 
Haldeman would have reported the information he received from 
Strachan about the DNC break-in plan and the break-in itself to the 
President- — an opinion based on your knowledge of his relationship 
with the President ? 
]Mr. Dean. I believe he probably would have reported it. 
]Mr. Dash. I want to ask you some questions, Mr. Dean, about your 
handling of cash given to you by Mr. Richard Howard, in the amount 
of $15,200, which you have included in your statement. To your knowl- 
edge, this money came from the $350,000 sent to the White House 
before April 7, subject to ]Mr. Sloan's statement? Is that true? 

Mr. Deax. That is true. I did not know it at the time it was given to 
me. but I later learned that was the source of the money. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, to your knowledge, the $22,000 has been taken from 
this amount to pay for advertising, but only $6,800 was in fact used, 
leaving a balance of $15,200 ? 
]Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. How did it come about that you were given this $15,200 
in cash ? 

'Mr. Deax. The week after or during the week immediately following 
the break-in. ]Mr. Strachan and Mr. Howard came to my office and said 
that they had some cash and that they asked me to be the custodian for 
the cash. They were not terribly explicit at that time. I told Mr. 
Strachan I would keep the cash and be accountable for the cash. 

]Mr. Dash. Do you know why he gave it to you rather than put it 
back in the original pot of $350,000 ? 
Mr. Deax. I do not. 

Mr. Dash. What did you do with the money ? 
Mr. Deax. I put it in my safe. 

Mr. Dash. I think you have already told us in your statement thai 
you took the $4,380 from the money for your wedding, honeymoon, 
and personal expenses, leavino; an lOU and your personal check in 
the safe. Did vou ever repay this amount ? 

^Ir. Deax. I did not repay it until I opened a trustee account, when 
a subsequent check was neirotiated to make the funds whole at that 
time. That was in April of this year. 

Mr. Dash. Now, there came a time, did there not, INIr. Dean, when 
the $350,000 uuder Haldeman's control was needed for payoff money, 
and you sufifgested that before any of it was sent back to the committee 
or Mr. LaRue. that it be made whole again with regard to the $22,000 
that liad been taken out of it ? 

]\Ir. Deax. That is correct. Those discussions be.qfan as early as late 
July and August of 1972, about making the fund whole. 

]Mr. Dash. Was it your suggestion, ]Mr. Dean, or one that you 
approved of. that ]Mr. Stans of the Finance Committee for the Re- 
Election of the President should provide this $22,000 from the com- 
mittee funds to send that over to the White House to make that 
$350,000 whole? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Since you had in your safe $15,200 from the original pot, 
why did you not return it and request of CNIr. Stans only the amount 
requested for the advertising, which was only $6,800? 


Mr. Deax. Well, you would have to s;o back into the time sequence 
again. There was a request for any and all available cash, far before 
they started speaking of the $350,000 cash fund, when ]Mr. Kalmbacli 
was collecting the cash. Mr. Stans had some money that was used. They 
were looking anywhere they could look to find any available cash. 
It was at this point, I knew that I had the $15,200 in my safe and 
I decided at that time that I was not going to let that money be used 
for that purpose, because I did not want to become further involved 
in that particular aspect of the coverup. 

Mr. Dash. And you made that decision despite the fact that you had 
been a key figure in getting ]Mr. Kalmbach involved in the original 
payoff ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Now, in your statement, you have described a number of 
meetings and activities occurring: immediatclv after the arrest of the 
CRP burglars in the Democratic National Committee headquarters 
in the Watergate on June 17, 1972, and continuing for several months 
thereafter, involving such persons as INIr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, 
Mr. Colson, Mr. Mardian, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, jNIr. ISIagruder, 
yourself, and others. 

Isn't it your testimony that this flurry of activity represented a 
massive coverup operation to prevent the prosecutors, the FBI, and 
the public from learning of the involvement of high "\^niite House or 
CRP officials, either in the Watergate break-in or embarrassing earlier 
illegal activities of a similar nature such as the Ellsberg break-in? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. And did not this coverup require a number of strategies 
such as perjury and subordination of periury of ]\Iagruder, Porter, 
and others, and the undermining of the judicial process and pavoffs to 
indicted defendants to maintain their silence, thereby limiting the 
FBI inquiry so they would not stumble on other illegal intelligence 
activities of the "\^^ite House ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. And is it not true that you played a role in all of these 
coverup activities? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Did you do these things on your own initiative. Mv. Dean, 
or at the direction of anybody else ? 

Mr. Dean. I would have to say that to describe it, I inherited a 
situation. The coverup was in operation when I returned to my office 
on Monday, the ninth, and it just became the instant way of life at 
that point in time and I participated in that and engaged in these 
activities along with the others. 

I was taking instructions 

Mr. Dash. From whom were you taking instructions? 

Mr. Dean. I was taking instructions from Mr. Hakleman and Mr. 
Ehrlichman, I was taking instructions and suggestions from Mr. ]Mit- 
chell and Mr. Mardian. 

I was a conveyor of messages back and forth between each group 
and at times. I was makins: surrffestions myself. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, I don't think the record is clear from the state- 
ment. You held an impressive title. Counsel to the President, and I 
understand had quite a big office. But could you tell us just what in 


fact was your relationship with Mr. Haldeman and INIr. Ehrlichman 
in your position with the "White House ? 

Mr. Dean. "Well, I learned before I went to the "White House that 
the title was probably the best part of the job. My reporting relation- 
ship was directly to %h\ Haldeman, but because ^Ir. Ehrlichman had 
formerly been the Counsel, he maintained a very active intei-est in 
manv of the things of the Counsel's office. 

So that most of the work of the Counsel's office was really related to 
technical legal problems, making sure that the t's were crossed — or that 
the i's were dotted and the t's were crossed on certain documents, to 
examine questions on timing, on pocket vetoes, to work with the De- 
partment of Justice in making sure that they were preparing even 
legal positions on issues that were of importance to the White House. 
I had a number of dealings with the persons who were working on the 
Nixon foundation and did some personal work on the President's San 
Clemento properties and other personal things like that for the Presi- 
dent, where I was the conduit to the law firm that was handling this 
for the President. 

I would not say that it was a policymaking position, by any means. 

Mr. Dash. And to a large extent, you were, in fact, reporting to 
either Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

INIr. Dash, Xow, given such a massive coverup which you have in- 
cluded in your statement and that was under way the 

Mr. Deax. T might add one thing. There was one role that the office 
had also that is what I described as a firefighting role. For example, 
after the Lithuanian defector situation came up, Ehrlichman and 
Haldeman, and I assume the President, Avould set the policy and after 
they had finished with their interest in the matter, I was the man 
who had the, sort of the cleanup on the details. This happened also, 
for example, with the C alley case. After the initial flurry, the decision 
had all bepn made, some of the decisions I didn't fully agree with, but 
I had my — you know, I sent memorandums in. Decisions were made 
and I was the guy who had to answer 100,000 letters that came in. So 
T would add that footnote. 

Mr. Dash. All right, taking that into the context, as I was begin- 
ning to state, such a massive coverup operation that was underway 
with the approval and with the direction at times of Mr. Haldeman, 
Mr. Ehrlichman. and Mr. Mitchell, do vou have an opinion — and I am 
asking you at this point for just an opinion — as to whether the Presi- 
dent would have been informed of this coverup operation from its 

Mr. Deax. Mr. Dash. I think it is unfair to ask me opinions. T can 
surmise from the way T know the "Wliite House operated. I will say 
this, that in my statement, I indicated that I had reached a conclusion 
in my own mind when I went to the Attornev Greneral. for example, 
that this thing might well go right to the President. I would say that 
that evidence is an opinion, that I was concerned that it did, knowing 
how the "White House operated, knowing how the reporting informa- 
tion went up to the President. 

Mr. Dash. "Well, the question was put to vou iust on the basis of 
vour knowledge, your intimate knowledge. I take it. of how the '\^niite 
House operated and what Mr. Haldeman's relationship to the Presi- 
dent was as you have already testified. 


But actually, according to your own statement, in fact, you learned 
firsthand, did j^ou not, that the President did know about the coverup 
when you met with him on September 15, 1972, the day the indict- 
ments came down cutting off the involvement of Liddy. Is that so ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. When the President told you on September 15, as you 
say in your statement, that Bob Haldeman had kept him posted on 
your handling of the Watergate case, and complimented you on the 
good job you had done and expressed his appreciation on the difficulty 
of j'^our tasks, did you have any doubt in your mind what the President 
was talking about ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not. 

Mr. Dash. Indeed, Mr. Haldeman not only knew about how you had 
handled the Watergate case but, in effect, he had directed the opera- 
tion, did he not, which included payoffs to defendants, perjury, and 
limiting the FBI investigation ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not believe by September 15 that the $350,000 pay- 
ment had been involved but the Kalmbach payment had been involved 
so I would say, yes, that he had as well as being aware of the perjur3^ 

Mr. Dash. Actually, the payoffs began fairly early. 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Not the final ones. 

Mr. Dean. That ds right. 

Mr. Dash. Now, if the President had been kept posted by Mr. Halde- 
man as to how you were handling the Watergate case he would have 
known of these illegal acts and, according to your statement, did, in 
fact, congratulate you for your successful performance of these acts, 
would that not be true from your point of view ? 

Mr. Dean. I think that is true. 

Mr. Dash. Now, even further, Mr. Dean, you say in your statement 
that you told the President on that occasion, September 15, with re- 
gard to the civil suit filed by the Democratic National Committee, that 
the lawyers for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President had 
been making ex parte contact with the Federal judge handling the case 
and the judge was understanding and trying to be accommodating. 
Now, putting it bluntly, ISlr. Dean, were you not telling the President 
that you understood that the CRP had a ''fix" in with the judge? 

INIr. Dean. I do not think, INIr. Dash, I would use the word "fix." I 
think I was indicating to the President that the lawyers had some in- 
fluence on the handling of the case and that thev could slow down the 
case so that it would not be an embarrassment before the election. When 
I think of the word "fix" I think that means the outcome of the case is 
going to be influenced. I do not know that that was the fact because I 
do not know the specifics and I do not believe that to be the case. 
Rather, it was a process whereby they might get some favorable rulings 
out of the judge to slow it down before the election. 

Mr. Dash. You would soften the word to "influence" rather than 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I would. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Now, accordins; to your statement, did the Presi- 
dent not sav to vou. on beiner apprised of this special influence with the 
judge. "Well, that is helpful"? 

Mr. Dean. He said somethino; to that effect ; yes, that is correct. 


yh\ Dash. Therefore, Mr. Dean, whatever doubts you may have had 
prior to September 15 about the President's involvement in the cover- 
up, did you have any doubts yourself about this after September 15 ? 

Mr. Deax. Xo, I did not. 

Mr. Dash. Is it not true, Mr. Dean, that based on the statement you 
have (jiven this commitee, that not only did the President express his 
approval to you on September 15 of your coverup activities leading 
to An indictment of no one higher than Liddy but after September 15 
the President took an active part in the coverup? Or let me briefly 
summarize, and very briefly, your statements concerning this and please 
tell me if this is an accurate summary of what you have stated in your 
long statement. One, after telling the President on September 15 that 
you could not assure that the coverup would not unravel, it, in fact, did 
begin to unravel in January 1973, when Hunt pressed for a promise 
of Executive clemency : and that you learned from ]\Ir. Ehrlichman in 
January and from the President himself on March 13, 1973, that the 
President, when apprised of Hunt's pressure, authorized giving Hunt 
assurances concerning Executive clemenc}'. Despite your explicit state- 
ment in your meeting with the President on February 28, 1973, of your 
culpability for obstruction of justice, the President, according to your 
statement, reassured you that you had no legal problems. 

In your meeting with the President on March 13. when you apprised 
the President of increasing payoff demands from Mr. Hunt, which you 
estimated would cost as much as $1 million, the President, according 
to your statement, responded that that amount of money would be no 
problem, and inquired as to how such payment could be made leading 
to a discussion by you in the presence of the President, of laundering 
money and secret drops. And despite your lengthy explanation to the 
President when you met with him on March 21 concerning the crimi- 
nal involvement of various White House and CRP officials including 
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Colson. yourself, Mr. Magruder. 
and the increased demands for payoff money requiring more coverup 
activity on the part of the A^Hiite House, the President took no affirma- 
tive action to end the coverup. And that, indeed, the President made, 
according to your statement, specific plans to deal with this Select 
Committee of the Senate to prevent it from being effective, and sought 
to further the coverup by attempting to have Mr. Mitchell acknowl- 
edge his guilt in approving the Liddy plan v-'ith the hope that this 
would satisfy the various investigating bodies; and, finally, when you 
would not continue to participate in the coverup. according to your 
statement, but retained counsel and went to the U.S. attorney's office 
and began to tell what you knew about the Watergate case, the Presi- 
dent sought to protect Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, who had 
been clearly implicated by you and asked that you submit to him a 
letter of resignation. Is that a fair summarization or brief in terms of 
your long statement, of your meeting you had with the President and 
the information you had with him ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, it is. 

Mr. Dash. "\Miy is it you waited until April 15 before j'ou told the 
prosecutors of your knowledge of the President's involvement. 

Mr. Deax. I didn't tell them on — it was after April 15 that I did. 
Preceding that time my lawyer and I had first of all had discussions 
about matters of executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, and 


national security matters. We saw there were legal problems, although 
we had resolved in our own mind these were not problems as far as 
preventing the necessary disclosures of the contents of some of these 
conversations. However, I must be very candid, I was hopeful that the 
President himself would step forward and tell of his involvement in 
some of these things. 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Dean, you opened your statement when you 
began to testify before this committee yesterday by purporting to 
soften the blow concerning the President by stating that you do not 
believe the President realized the full implications of his involvement. 
Now, if you have told the truth before this committee about what the 
President said to you on September 15 and what you said to him, and 
as to the subsequent meetings you had with the President, can you 
honestly believe that the President, as a lawyer, and a sophisticated 
man in politics, was not aware of the full implications of the co\erup 
activities ? 

Mr. Dean. ]\Ir. Dash, I think my opening remarks were more directed 
at the human side of the situation than the legal side of the situation, 
that he had — he didn't realize the implications as far as what this 
would mean to people he had worked with for a number of years, people 
he was very fond of and I was not necessarily referring to the full 
legal implications of some of his activities. 

Mr. Dash. Well, do you have a belief as to whether or not he did 
have knowledge of the implications, the legal implications of this 
coverup activity ? 

Mr. Dean. I cannot put myself in the President's mind. 

Mr. Dash. Based on the facts you have given this committee ? 

Mr. Dean. Based on the facts I have given this committee, I would 
think the President would certainly have some appreciation of the legal 
problems involved ; yes, indeed. 

Mr. Dash. Is this the first time, Mr. Dean, you have told your story 
about your involvement and the involvement of others, including the 
President, under oath ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Including, of course, the executive session at which you 
appeared before this committee ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Now it is obvious to you, is it not, that your principal 
assertions which constitute accusations against the President of the 
United States, of involvement in the coverup of the Watergate case 
are based almost solely on your own account of either private meetings 
with the President or meetings with Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
where they were present ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. I would add the fact that I was aware of 
the fact that often when I was in a meeting with Mr. Haldeman and 
Mv. Ehrlichman that IVIr. Haldeman was taking notes and often those 
notes — immediately following the meeting those notes were taken with 
Mr. Haldeman directly into the Presidents' office but, of course, I was 
not present at the time of some of those discussions. 

Mr. Dash. Do you have any copies of those notes ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I do not. 

Mr. Dash. Are you aware of any other records of the content of 
these meetings which are the focus of your statement ? 


'Sh'. Deax. One of the meetings I had in !March, early March of this 
year I did compare notes and some of the notes were taken because I 
had a number of instructions from the President and based on those I 
did make notes. I am also aware — not aware, but I was told by the Gov- 
ernment prosecutors that the President had taped a conversation be- 
tween himself and me, and that as a result of that there apparently 
may be a tape in existence and I believe that would be the April 15 
meetino- that would record that conversation. 

Mr. Dash. The notes you referred to, have they been submitted to 
this committee? 

Mr. Deax. I don't believe they have but they are available. They 
are in my testimony, of course, the substance of the notes but they 
certainly are available for the committee. 

]\Ir. Dash. Would you submit them as an exhibit to this committee? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, I would be happj'^ to. 

^Ir. Dash. Are written or reported records of such conversations 
with the President regfularly made at such meetings? 

Mr. Deax. Xot to my knowledge. 

Mr. Dash. Officially or regularly ? 

Mr. Deax. Xo. I would say this: That often after a Presidential 
meeting when there is a staff member present, not necessarily staff 
meetings but when outsiders come in and there is a staff member pres- 
ent a summary is made of the meeting but, of course, these are not, they 
were not the types of meetings where summaries would be made. 

]\Ir. Dash. INIr. Dean, you have made serious charges before the 

Do you have any special motive in making these charges such as a 
hope for immunity before the prosecutors ? 

You have already received immunit}- before this committee which 
is only use immunity and does not prevent your being prosecuted for 
any crimes that the prosecutors have evidence against you. 

Do you have any motive in making these charges against the Presi- 
dent based on tlie fact that this may lead to giving you immunity from 
the prosecutors? 

]Mr. Deax. Mr. Dash, I have been asked to give testimony. That 
testimony happens to involve the President of the T'nited States. I 
don't plan to use. I have no motive in giving that testimony to try to 
obtain immunity from the prosecutors ; no, sir. 

Mr. Dash. I guess you are full^y aware, ]Mr. Dean, of the gravity of 
the charges you have made under oath against the highest official of 
our land, the President of the United States. 

Mr. Deax. Yes, I am. 

]Mr. Dash. And being so aware, do a^ou still stand on vour statement ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, I do. 

jSIr. Dash. ISTr. Chairman. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Deax. I might add this, Mr. Dash, I realize it is almost an im- 
possible task, if it is one man against the other that I am up against 
and it is not a very pleasant situation but T can only speak what I 
know to be the facts and that is what I am providing this committee. 

Senator Ervix. 'Mr. Dean, do vou wisli to take a break? 

Mr. Deax. T am here at the will of the committee and whatever the 
Chair would like. 


Senator EmTCN, We will proceed then. 

]Mr. Thompson, 

Mr. Thompson. Thank you, INIr. Chairman. 

Mr, Dean, you have, of course, made some serious accusations witli 
regard to coverup of criminal activities, and wo have heard other testi- 
mony about the coverup of certain criminal actiA'itios and. of course, 
the responsibility for prosecuting those criminal activities did lie with 
the Department of Justice. 

I would like to ask you a few questions based upon some of your 
testimony yesterday concerning your contacts with ^h\ Petersen. If 
I remember correctly, it was on the 19th or 20th of June that you first 
had contact with IMr. Petersen about the "Watergate break-in. 

Mr, Deax. The first time I had contact with ^h\ Petersen is when 
the Attorney General called Mr. Petersen to his office and tliat was 
either on the 19th or the 20th. 

Mr, Thompson. Do I recall your testimony correctly that you told 
him that you did not believe the Wiite House could stand a wide-open 
investigation ? 

Mr. Dean. I told him, we discussed the implications of a wide-open 
investigation and how embarrassing that could be in an election year, 
that is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, did he indicate to you in anv way that he 
would carry out anything less than a wide-open investigation of this 
matter ? 

Mr. Dean. As I testified yesterday, I don't recall ■Nlr. Petersen say- 
ing an}i;hing specific, I left the meeting with an impression that ]\rr. 
Petersen would be fair in an investigation of the White House and that 
that interpretation of fairness would mean that we wouldn"t haA'e an 
investigation of evervthing that occurred in tlie White House for 4- 

Mr. Thompson. That was your interpretation of the use of the 
phrase, "wide-open investigation" ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. I would tliink a wide-op-^n investio"ation would 
mean a complete, thorough investio-ation of charges tliat were going 
around at that time and specificallv, all of the ramifications of the 
break-in of the D:N'C. 

Do I understand your testimony to be that you were only concerned 
that he not s:o back into the prior 4 years to lirinq- np unrelated 
matters that had nothing to do with this pai^ticular incident? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Thompson, I am trving to recall a meeting of. of 
couree, over a year ago and the highlights of my recollection at that 
point are that we discussed what this would mean if this investigation 
led all the way to the President. 

Mr. Thompson. Pardon me. Did vou discuss the possibilitv of Presi- 
dential involvement with him? I thouirht you said yesterdav that you 
had that in your own mind, but you did not discuss it with him at that 

Mr. Dean. I believe T discussed them with Kleindienst and Klein- 
dienst conveyed my concern to Mr. Petersen and it is verv j^ossible 
that it was reraised again when Mr. Petersen and I departed from 
Mr. Kleindienst's office. 

I do recall the note that the meetings ended on, that I hoped that 
my fears suspecting the woret were not true. 


Mr. Thompson. Did you have the impression when you talked to 
Mr. Kleindienst and Mr. Petei-sen that Mr. Ehrlichman was depend- 
ing on you to take care of the situation or to get them to take care of 
the situation so that the "Wliite House would not be hurt ? 

Mr. Deax. At this point, I was merely a messenger. I was conveyor 
of information back and forth and I was being sent to different assign- 
ments to find out information at this point in time. "When I talked to 
Ehrlichman and he asked me to find out what the Justice Department 
was doing, he wanted to find out how extensive their investigation was. 

As time evolved, there was frequent criticism of the scope of the 
investigation by Mr. Ehrlichman. 

There was, very clearly, the concern at the White House that the 
investigation would come right back into the White House. 

Mr. Thompsox. You testified that you told Mr. Petersen that you 
had in fact delivered certain documents to Patrick Gray, that you did 
not discuss with Mr. Silbert or anyone else your delivery of those docu- 
ments to him and no one else knew about it, presumably, except Mr. 

Do you know what he did after that, whether or not he made any 
inquiry of Mr. Gray, for example, as to whether or not this in fact 
was true ? 

Mr. Dean. I have heard after the fact in my discussions with the 
prosecutors this spring about the matter that apparently, Mr. Petersen 
went to Mr. Gray and immediately raised it with Mr. Gray, and at 
that point in time, Mr. Gray denied to Mr. Petersen that he had ever 
received such documents. 

So I assume that happened very shortly after I had reported it to 
Mr. Petersen and as I testified yesterday also, shortly after I had 
reported it, Mr. Gray came to me at a luncheon at the Department of 
Justice and said, "Hang tight, John, with regard to that matter." 

Mr. Thompson. You mentioned a telephone call from Mr. Ehrlich- 
man to Mr. Petersen about Stans having to go down and testify before 
the grand jui'j', something to the effect that Silbert was acting like a 
local prosecutor and Mr. Stans should not be treated this way, and so 
forth, and used rather abrasive terms to Mr. Petersen. 

Do you know what Mr. Petersen's response to Mr. Ehrlichman was 
during that conversation ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not know, but I can only speculate that Mr. Petersen 
isn't the type of man who is easily pushed around. And I don't know 
what the sum and substance of it was. I subsequently called Mr. Peter- 
sen myself, after I had departed Mr. Ehrlichman's office, and apolo- 
gized for the call. Petersen didn't seem particularly upset by the fact 
that he had received the call. 

"\Anien I talked to him, he was annoyed at Ehrlichman. but I might 
also add that Mr. Ehrlichman had been sort of riding hard on the 
Department of Justice for some time and there was a certain degree of 
animosity between Ehrlichman and the Department. 

Mr. Thompson. The reason I am making these inquiries is that his 
name was mentioned and I think it was rather unclear, at least to me, 
anyway. As I understand your statement now, just based upon your 
knowledge, you know of no impropriety on Mr. Petersen's part in 
conducting his part of the investigation ? 

96-296 O - 73 


Mr. Dean. I know of no impropriety. I think he tried to be very 
fair with the White House in dealing with the White House and the 
fact that we had an investigation going on in a political year, that it 
could result in embarrassment on countless occasions. The entire ar- 
rangement to have the Wliite House staff, for example, appear at the 
Department of Justice rather than go to the courthouse was merely 
designed to save the fact of the embarrassment that would arise po- 
litically of members of the AVliite House staff appearing at the court- 
house, all the cameras and pictures and speculation that are likely to 
run from that. That was aborted by simulating the grand jur}' situa- 
tion in Mr. Petersen's conference room. 

Mr. Thompson. You mentioned also Mr. Ziegler, and of course, we 
all know the statements that he continuously made during this matter. 
Who was supplying Mr. Ziegler his information ? 

Mr. Dean. I would say that basically, I supplied a large amount of it. 
I think that Mr. Ziegler would check many times with Mr. Ehrlichman, 
sometimes with Mr. Haldeman, and often with the President himself, 
he would check out a given statement. At times, I was called — I say 
often — not on a daily basis, by any means, but with some frequency. 
That was how Ziegler could sort of wade through a story without be- 
ing factual- — being factual, but without actually going out and lying 
on a given matter, how he could hedge and bob and weave. I think 
that the exhibit that I submitted is very typical of the type of ap- 
proach that he would take. He would take, you know, an offensive ap- 
proach rather than to really admit a given set of facts. Because he 
could not, you know, I would tell him he could not admit the facts. 

Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Ziegler know the truth ? 

Mr. Dean. No, he did not. In fact, that was a very difficult situation. 
Mr. Ziegler, on countless occasions, asked me to brief him. I on several 
occasions asked Mr. Ehrlichman if I could brief Ziegler. I was given 
very specific instructions that I was not to brief Ziegler. In fact, this 
briefing of other people occurred on a number of occasions. It occurred 
in connection with Mr. Johnson visiting, Wallv Johnson. It occurred 
with Clark MacGregor before he went to, actually, while he was at the 
Republican National Convention. 

He was very desirous of knowing the facts. Pie was having intense 
press inquiries at that point in time. One time, he called me to his room 
and he said, I have to have the facts. 

Well, I called Ehrlichman and said — I had known INIr. MacGregor 
for a number of vears, going back to mv time on the House Judiciary 
Committee, and I felt very awkward. I said, I will liave to check this 
out with Mr. Ehrlichman. I called Mr. Ehrlichman and he told me I 
could not brief MacGregor. 

'So as MacGregor didn't have the facts when he would make public 
statements, Ziegler didn't have the facts. Ziegler was quite annoyed, 
but I told him that I could not give him the facts. 

Mr. Thompson. Would it be fair to say, then, that on occasion, on 
numerous occasions, you misinformed ]Mr. Ziegler with regard to tlie 
true facts of the matter? 

Mr. Dean. I would not say misinformed him as much as to tell him 
how to take the offensive so that he could save a given situation. I can 
think of one occasion where we talked about the secret fund that was 
at the Wliite House and he said, how do I handle that ? I said, well that 


is a matter of interpretation. It is a secret to some people, but since 
we know of it. it obviously is not a secret, so you don't need to say it is 
a secret fund. So that is the way that was handled. 

On, for example, the leaking to Time magazine of the story regard- 
ing surveillance of the White House staff and newsmen, that did pre- 
sent a real quandary to me, so I called Ehrlichman for guidance. I was 
aware what happened. I asked Ehrlichman for guidance on how to 
handle it. He said, just flat out deny it. Xow, that was a flat out lie. 

Mr. Thompsox. All right. Did you tell Ziegler on occasion that there 
was no White House involvement ? 

Mr. Deax. That there was no "Wliite House involvement ? I told Mr. 
Ziegler that there was nobody that I knew of who was involved or had 
prior knowledge of the June 17 break-in. I alwajs dealt in very close 
literal words that continually got broader brush. 

]Mr. Thompsox. What was it that you said here yesterday about Mr. 
Strachan having told you that Haldeman ordered him to destroy docu- 
ments ? I believe one of the conclusions you drew in your statement was 
that Hadelman in fact must have known about the situation or he 
would not have told Strachan to do what he told him to do. 

Mr. Deax. I did not notice — I did not know Haldeman's involve- 
ment for a fact, I do not know it today. 

Mr. Thompsox. Do you know anything 

;Mr. Deax. I have been asked for an opinion this morning. 

Mr. Thompsox. You do not know any more today about that matter, 
I assume, then you knew when you told Mr. Ziegler what you told him 
about White House involvement ? 

INIr. Deax. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompsox. Mr. Dean, let me ask you a few questions about your 
actions after the Watergate incident and by asking questions about 
your own personal involvement. I hope I am not appearing to be 
badgering you in any way, but I am sure you understand that your 
actions and motivations are very relevant ? 

Mr. Deax. In fact, if I were still at the White House, I would prob- 
ably be feeding you the questions to ask the person who is sitting here. 

Mr. Thompsox. If I were here as I am, I would have responded as I 
have responded, that I do not need questions to be fed to me from any- 

After the break-in, I believe that 3'ou had a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's 
apartment with Mr. INIitchell, Mr. Mardian, Mr, Magruder, on the 
19th, after you returned to Washington ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Deax. As I testified, to the best of my recollection, that was 
either on the 19th or the 20th. I arrived at the meeting, the meeting was 
already in session. I do not have any recollection of that meeting other 
than the fact that there was discussion while I was there of the public 
relations handling of the matter. That was at the end. It was certainly 
at the end of a day that it occurred, either on the 19th or the 20th and I 
do not have a clear recollection of which day that was. 

Mr. Thompsox. You did not discuss the facts as to what had actually 
hanpened and who was res]X)nsible ? 

Mr. Deax. Not at that time that I recall. 

^Ir. Thompsox. Had you previously that day met with Mr. Liddy? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, I had. 


Mr, Thompson. And he told you, I believe, that Magruder had 
pushed him? 

Mr. Deax. I sat and listened at that meeting more than talking at 
that meeting and I do not recall that I reported that at that particular 

Mr. Thompson. I did not ask you if you had reported it, I just 
asked if you had tliat understanding? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Thompson. And in your listening to Mr. Mitchell and ]Mr. 
]\Iagruder, of course, you realized that there were three of the same 
four individuals that sat in on two meetings at which these matters 
were discussed — wiretapping and that sort of thing. Was that not a 
sort of strange feeling that you must have had there on that occasion ? 
Did not your mind go back to those previous meetings? Did you not 
wonder whether or not in fact Mr. Liddy had bv-^cn given tlie go-ahoad ? 

Mr. Dean. That had already occurred to me when I met with 
Mr. Liddy I realized what had happened. Before I met with Liddy, 
I talked with ^lagruder. ]Magruder had told me this was all Liddy's 
fault. It was very clear to me then that Liddy had proceeded, either 
with or without authorization. It was after I talked with Liddy that 
I was very clear in my understanding that Liddy had been given 
authorization to proceed. 

Mr. Thompson. You never talked to Mr, IMitchell about it? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Wliat had been your professional relationship with 
Mr. Mitchell while you were at the Justice Department ? 

Mr. Dean. I had a very — I would have to say it was sort of a father- 
son relationship in many ways. Mr. Mitchell was very friendly to me. 
He gave me some of the best assignments, I thought, in the Depart- 
ment of Justice, He counseled me before I went to the White House 
that I should not go to the "Wliite House, He said I ought to stay at 
the Department of Justice, I liked Mr, IMitchell very much, 

Mr, Thompson, Were you concerned about his personal involvement 
after you heard about the break-in ? 

Mr, Dean, I indeed was but, as I say, Mr. Mitchell to this day there 
has been only one indication and that was on a meeting on INIarch 28 
that he has given me any indication that he had any involvement in 
this thing at all and that was when I hypothesized to him what I 
thought had happened and he said something to the effect "Well, yes, 
it was something like that but we thought it was going to be two or 
three times removed from the committee." 

Mr. Thompson. Wlien you turned over the documents from Hunt's 
safe to Mr. Gray, I believe you stated that you did not tell him to 
destroy them but that they were politically sensitive, 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. I think I described them as political dynamite. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever tell him to destroy those documents? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. On any subsequent occasion, did you not call ]Mr. 
Gray and ask him whether or not he had in fact destroyed those 
documents ? 


Mr. Dean. No, Mr. Gray and I discussed the documents at one of 
the meetings in his office in, I think, early July or sometime of that 
nature, in which he told me that he had taken the documents to Con- 
necticut and he had them there, and either indicated to me that he 
was planning to read them or had read them. I am very unclear on 
that. At that time he had mentioned nothing about destruction of the 
documents, and it was not until after I had my meeting in January, 
early January, with ]Mr. Petersen, and subsequently met with Mr. 
Gray that he told me he had destroyed the documents. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he say when he had destroyed them ? 

Mr. Dean. No, he did not. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know when he destroyed them ? 

Mr. Dean. No. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever call him and ask him if he had read 
the documents ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not. 

Mr. Thompson. What was the purpose of vour discussions with 
Mr. Walters of the CIA ? 

INIr. Dean. Which discussions are you referring to ? 

Mr. Thompson. I am talking about the June 26, June 27 — were there 
two or three ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, to the best of my recollection there was a meeting 
as a result of a meeting that had occurred in INIitchell's office in which 
the decision had been made that there was some need for some sort 
of support, and there was a discussion in Mitchell's office about 
the fact that the CIA would have the facilities to do this and the 
fact that these were CIA people and the CIA should have an interest 
in doing tliis sort of thing. It was from there I went to discuss this 
with Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Ehrlichman told me he thought it was a 
good idea that I explore this and that he told me I should talk to 
General Walters. I told him at that time I didn't know the people at 
the CIA, I didn't know Helms, I didn't know Walters. He told me 
"Well, you tell Walters to call me if you have any problems." So the 
purpose of that meeting was for me to explore if there was any pos- 
sibility that the CIA could be of assistance in dealing with these 

Mr. Thompson. Was it not the purpose of that meeting to get the 
CIA to help you in the coverup ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it was. 

Mr. Thompson. Didn't you state to INIr. Walters that in fact wit- 
nesses were wobbling and could cause problems ? 

IVFr. Dean. I think I used somethino; of that nature. 

Mr. Tpiompson. Didn't vou ask him whether or not the CIA could 
possiblv be used to raise bail for some of these defendants ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe you also delivered a message to Mr. Hunt 
through Mr. Liddv to tell him to get out of the country, is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. I think, as I recounted that yesterdav. that there was a 
meeting in Ehrlichman's office on the evening of the 19th. 

Earlier I had met with him. he told me to attend this meeting and 
Mr. Colson was present. Before the meeting really got underway 
Mr. Ehrlichman asked where is Hunt and I said I have no idea. Mr. 
Colson made a similar response, that he had no idea. Ehrlichman then 


told me to call Liddy and tell Hunt to get out of the country. I made 
the call. Subsequently I began to think about the call I had made and 
I reraised the wisdom of making such a call. We had a brief discus- 
sion about the call. Ehrlichman — ^or Colson agreed that it was a rather 
unwise call. Later Ehrlichman concurred. I tlien went immediately 
back to the phone — ^I would say all this transpired witliin a 30-minute 
time span — I went back to the telephone, re-called Liddy who was still 
employed at the reelection committee, and told him to retract the 
earlier request that I had made for Hunt to leave the country. 

I had — he told me something to the effect that he didn't know if that 
was possible, that the message had already been sent, and I to this day 
don't know whether the message was retracted or what happened to 
Mr. Hunt. 

Mr. Thompson. So, to summarize your answer, the answer is yes, 
you did make the call and subsequent to that you had second thoughts 
about it and tried to retract it ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Would that be correct? I believe on the 29th you 
talked to Mr. Kalmbach about raising money for the coverup. You 
said at that time you told him substantially everything that you knew. 
I believe that you helped Mr. Magruder in preparing himself for testi- 
mony before the grand jury in August. I assume you knew he was 
going to perjure himself in that grand jury testimony. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Would you tell us how you obtained the FBI 302's? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I said in my statement yesterday, I am not 
terribly clear on when I did actually first receive them. I had some 
preliminary discussions with "Sir. Petersen about it and ]Mr. Petersen 
suggested I deal directly with Gray on the matter. I had some dis- 
cussions with Gray about it. Initially, as I recall the sequence, there 
was a summary prepared or, I might add this, Mr. Gray offered to 
me to come over to his office and read the reports. I might have even 
looked at some of the reports initially in his office but it was after I 
received the July 21 summary of the FBI investigation to date and 
showed that to Mitchell and Mardian that they said that they thought 
that I should permit ]Mardian, and ]\Iitchell said O'Brien and Parkin- 
son as well, the right to look at these investigative reports and discuss 
this with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, they thought it was a wise idea 
to follow what the FBI were doing. 

Mr. Thompson. That is a different area, Mr. Dean. 

If you want to elaborate on that a little later, fine, but I want to 

Mr. Dean. I don't know the precise date I started receiving reports. 

Mr. Thompson. Are you definitely stating you said to INIr. Peter- 
sen, "You deal directly with Pat Gray on this matter" ? 

!Mr, Dean. That is my best recollection. 

Mr. Thompson. Did not in fact ]Mr. Kleindienst tell you that the 
only way he would make FBI 302's available was that he would deliver 
them directly to the President himself if the President asked for 
them; that he wouldn't give them to you? 

Mr. Dean. That is possible but I don't recall that. I had a very 
happy relationship with INIr. Kleindienst. The way you have stated 
it is certainly not the way Mr. Kleindienst stated it to me. 


j\Ir. Thompson. You said it is possible. Would that not be 

i\Ir. Deax. He might have said, you know, "If you want those at 
the White House they ought to go to the President." I don't recall any 
such conversation, frankly. 

]Mr. Thompson. Did you ever tell Mr. Kleindienst that you were 
reporting on your investigation directly to the President? 

Mr. Dean. Did I report that to Kleindienst? 

Mr. Thompson. That you told Mr. Kleindienst that you were re- 
porting to the President. 

Mr. Dean. Xot until I began reporting to the President did I ever 
tell the Attorney General that the President had instructed him to do 
a given thing or ask that he do something. 

Mr. Thompson. I am not talking about what the President was tell- 
ing him to do. I am asking whether or not in June or July of 1972 you 
told ]Mr. Kleindienst, at that time, that you were reporting directly to 
vhe President. 

Mr. Dean. I believe I told that to Mr. Gray, not Mr. Kleindienst. 

Mr. Thompson. But you did not tell that to Mr. Kleindienst when 
you were attempting to get FBI material ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever call Mr. Sloan in October of 1972 or 
thereafter or his attorney and talk to him about the possibilities of his 
claiming his fifth amendment privileges ? 

]\Ir. Dean. Yes, I did. I tried to reach Mr. Sloan. I had had a call 
from, as I recall, Mr. Parkinson, there had been considerable discus- 
sion about Mr. Sloan at the White House and at the reelection com- 
mittee. In fact, Mr. Sloan at that time seemed to be looking for a 
confessional of any source he could find, and reporting everything he 
knew. Ehrlichman knew this, for example, before Sloan sought him 

Other people at the White House knew this. I think that is one of the 
reasons that Ehrlichman did not want to talk with Mr. Sloan. Mr. 
Sloan came to see me on a number of occasions because I would talk 
Avith him and I reassured him on a number of occasions I didn't think 
that the fact he was treasurer would necessarily result in him haying to 
face criminal charges as a result of some of the misappropriations of 
funds that had occurred there. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever tell him or his attorney ? 

Mr. Dean. I am .o-ettinj? to that. I am trying to give you the 
preface of why I said that. Mr. Sloan was headed for Florida to 
testify in the trial, was going on down there with regard to Mr. 
Barker at the request of, receiving this information from Parkinson, 
he was going, tried to reach Mr. Sloan at his attorney's office, and 
Sloan not being there, as I recall, I asked Mr. Stoner or Triest ( ? ) , I 
think it was. Miss Stoner, Stoner and Sloan had already left and 
Triest was there, was he prepared to have his client take the fifth 
amendment because he certainlv would be a hero in the eyes of people 
around the White House if he did. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, ]\Ir. Dean, let me move now, if I may, to 
why you have talked about vour involvement in the coverup, why you 
participated in the coverup. In any way was it because of the fear that 
you had about your own personal involvement up until that time? 
When you heard about the break-in at the DNC what w^ent through 


your mind ? Did you have fear concerning your own personal involve- 
ment in the matter up until that time ? 

Mr. Dean. When I first heard of the break-in on Sunday the 18th, I 
frankly thought that it involved Mr. Colson, as I believe I testified. 
It was on Monday I learned 

Mr. Thompson. Why ? 

Mr. Dean. A^^iy ? Well, I was aware of the fact that Mr. Colson had 
suggested burglaries in the past, specifically the Brookings Institute, 
and the name Hunt I immediately associated with Colson. 

Mr. Thompson. Wlien did you learn about the name Hunt ? 

Mr. Dean. I think I first met Mr. Hunt in August. 

Mr. Thompson. I am sorry, when did you find out that INIr. Hunt 
was involved in some way in the break-in ? 

Mr. Dean. On Sunday, I did not know about the break-in, I knew 
about the fact there was a Cuban who had a check written out to INIr. 
Hunt to some country club in his possession when he was arrested. 

Mr. Thompson. You learned this in your telephone call from Cali- 
fornia or did you learn this after you returned to Washington ? 

Mr. Dean. I learned this after I returned on Sunday night, the 18th. 

Mr. Thompson. So I assume your immediate reaction — you returned 
to Washington and learned about the Hunt matter ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, and my reaction that Colson was involved. 

Mr. Thompson. Go ahead in regard to yourself. 

Mr. Dean. Yes. Then, on the 19th when I talked to Magruder and 
learned that he had indicated it was Liddy's fault and after talking 
to Liddy, I was not personally concerned about myself because I knew 
very well that I had not authorized any such thing, that I had not 
known about anything from Februar}^ until that time. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me explore that point with you, not necessarily 
from the standpoint of whether or not you did in fact have any cul- 
pability at that time, but what it might appear to be. After all, you 
had introduced Liddy to Mitchell, had you not ? I believe you had in 
fact recommended, or sent, anyway, ]Mr. Liddy over to the Committee 
To Re-Elect. You explained how this came about — starting from the 
standpoint of somebody investigating the matter from outside — ^that 
you sent Mr. Liddy to the Committee To Re-Elect. You did attend the 
March meeting when these matters were discussed ; you did attend the 
February 4 meeting when these matters were discussed. Very possibly 
when somebody talked about these meetings, very possibly it could get 
out that a conspiracy of some kind was in the making. You know the 
law of conspiracy, generally; if a person involves himself in a con- 
spiracy and one of his coconspirators subsequently commits an overt 
act, he very well may be held responsible for what one of his cocon- 
spirators does. You are a lawyer. I am sure you realize that. 

Liddy did come to you after those meetings in February and ISIarch 
to solicit your help in getting this plan approved and you said vou 
turned him off at that time. Strachan and Magruder did call you when 
they were having trouble with Liddy to get you to help them on one 
of their problems with Liddy. Evidently. Strachan or Magruder or 
Liddy himself felt that you had some involvement. 

Mr. Dean. Maybe we can come back at some other time and I will 
explain that to you. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, I am finished. I am talking about all of 
these things. Did you not, at one point, say to yourself, it looks like 


I am possibly involved in this thing or very much involved in this 
thing, therefore, I am going to participate in a coverup ? 

Mr. Dean. When I learned, for example, talking to Mr. Strachan, 
that he had been instructed to destroy records, that was my greatest 
concern at that time. If it had been merely John Dean, we would have 
had far fewer pix>blems, because I would have been willing to step 
forward as I did with Ehrlichman. I told him exactly what my in- 
volvement was when I was first asked by him what it was. Tlie stakes 
were too high regarding any pei'sonal feelings that I had regarding 
myself. I had no criminal problem. If they wanted to fire me on the 
basis of the involvement I had, fine. If we could reelect the President, 
fine. Jolin Dean certainly would not stand in the way of that. People 
were removed from the White House for far less. 

Mr. Thompsox. "\^^lat you are saying is that you had no concern 
for your own welfare, but you just wanted to stay on to help out others ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I found myself helping out others with- 
out — I was in the process before I began thinking about the process. 

Mr. Thompson. Why did you not tell the Federal prosecutors when 
you first made contact with them ? I believe it was April 2 of this year 
when your attorney first made contact with the Federal prosecutors. 
I am still not quite sure in my own mind why you did not, evidently, 
relate to them the nature of the President's involvement or the f a'^t that 
the President was involved to some extent. 

Mr. Dean. Well, of course, it was not my presence at the meetings, 
so I am not aware of what was discussed. ]NIy lawyer and I did discuss 
it. We were aware of the fact that there were attorney-client privilege 
problems, there was executive privilege, there were national security 
matters and I frankly was hopeful that at some point, when the Presi- 
dent returned, I would have a chance to go in and tell the President, 
this is the way I saw it ; this is what I have done, and ask him, based 
on that, expect him to come forward and explain his involvement the 
way I thought he would. 

Mr. Thompson. T^Hien were you terminated at the T^Hiite House, Mr. 

Mr. Dean. My resignation was requested and accepted on April 30. 

Mr. Thompson. Without your involvement ? 

Mr. Dean. Without my involvement. 

Mr. Thompson. So you had from April 2 to April 30 in which to do 
what vou are talking about, meet the President and try to get him to 
step forward. 

Mr. Dean. Let me eet this straight. I am talking about the period 
from April 2 to April 15, there were no discussions with the President, 
From April 15 on, I beo-an inferentiallv, because it was impossible to 
explain things, explaininsr the highlights of some of the things that 
involved the President without .<Tetting terribly specific with him, but 
giving him very broad ideas of some of the areas that were involved. 

AFr. Tttomp>*on. If vou were interested in his cominjr forward, why 
did vou not tell him that you were talkinsf to the prosecutors or that 
vou had made snmp contact with the prosecutors ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, T met with him on the 21st. I met with him again 
on the 22d, called again on the 23d- T had given him what I thought 
was the most dramatic wav I could tell him what the situation was. 
Xothing happened as a result of that. 


He then went to California. When he came back from California, 
I noted that there was — Avell actually, when I came back from Camp 
David on the 28th before they went to California — he had been in 
Florida in the interim ; there was a very changed attitude about me at 
that point in time. I was getting signals from Hakleman in my meet- 
ings with him. He directed me to come down, really, from Camp David. 
He said, vou just cannot hole up up there. 

I said I do not want to talk to Mitchell. 

He said, I think you have to come down and talk to Mitchell. 

It was very clear to me Mr. Haldeman wanted me to come down 
and talk to ^Mitchell and Magruder. I saw a very different Bob Halde- 
man than I had dealt with over the last year. That was clear to me 
that there was a new concern and I had become a concern. It was for 
that reason that I did not turn over the report I had written at Camp 
David. The whole atmosphere changed after — really, after I had gone 
to Camp David. Probably the greatest change occurred in the meet- 
ing on the afternoon of the 21st or the 22d, when Ehrlichman, Halde- 
man, and I met with the President, and I said in front of the President 
for the first time ever that I thought I had kept this agreement, every- 
thing was being said, because I said Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Dean 
are all indictable. 

INIr. Thompsox. Let us consider what your motivations would be 
at that time. You mentioned first of all, the attorney-client privilege, 
in which, of course, I assume vou are talking about conversations that 
you would have had with the President. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. But there was an abundance of evidence that you 
could have given which would not have involved attorney-client priv- 
ilege, based on what you told us. 

Mr. Dean. As I say, we were researching it at the time and we con- 
cluded that there was no attorney-client privilege. 

Mr. Thompson. I am talkino: about what Ehrlichman told you. 
According to your testimony, Ehrlichman told you that the President 
had approved Executive clemencv for Hunt to try to keep his mouth 
shut. You talked about Colson telling you that the President approved 
Executive clemency for Hunt to keep him quiet. 

You have testified that Krogh told you that he got his instructions 
for the Ellsberg psychiatrist's break-in from the oval office. None of 
those things involved communications with the President. It could not 
have possibly involved the attorney-client privilege, could it? 

Mr. Dean. They could not involve the attorney-client privilege, no. 
Some of them involved conversations I had had directly with the 
President, yes. Some of them did not. 

As I say, there was also the executive privilege question, there were 
national security questions. We had resolved that in fact, these did 
not apply. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you tell the prosecutors about the Ellsberg 
break-in ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Thompson. So you had resolved that question ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not tell them the totality of it. "\^niat I said was 
that thev had evidence in their files that thev should reexamine, because 
it indicated a break-in. I did this because there is case law my lawyer 


told me about. He said, John, you are committing another crime if you 
do not tell and you have to reveal this to them and they are on that 
case. He said, there is an ongoing: prosecution. You must give tliem 
enough so that they can look at their files and make the determination. 

Mr. Thompson, Mr. Dean, is it your testimony that you -were not in 
effect bargaining for immunity or seeking immunity ? 

Mr. Deax. My lawyers were very heavily discussing immunity 
with tlie prosecutors at that time. 

Mr. Thompson. And you failed at the U.S. attorney's office in that 
attempt, did you not? 

Of course, I might add that that is a very proper thing for attorneys 
to pursue. The fact is they were. 

Mr. Dean. That is right. What happened is my lawyers worked out 
what they called a Dhase I with the 

Mr. Thompson. Phase I ? 

IMr. Dean. Phase I, in which I would- 

]Mr. Thompson. You did not have any better luck than the other 
phase I. 

Mr. Dean. I would discuss with the prosecutors everything I could 
remember, everything I could tell them and the evidence could not be 
used against me so they could assess what they wanted to do with that. 
That was the design of phase I, which I did. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. And then contact was made with Mr. 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Dash made contact with us. 

Mr. Thompson. "Well, either way you want to put it, you discussed 
the matter with Mr. Dash, who very properly, of course, was seeking 
any information he could get and talked with you about these matters. 

Then, for the first time, as far as I know — you correct me if I am 
wrong — after that, some time after that, the stories started appearing 
quoting sources close to you to the effect that you had met with Nixon 
more than 40 times to discuss the coveru}), that Nixon had substantial 
knowledge about what the White House people were doing and all 
those things. 

Now, I do not want to leave an unfair implication if I am wrong 
about this, but the obvious question is whether or not you went to the 
prosecutors, gave them what you thought might be enough to get im- 
munity; having failed there, came to this committee and offered a 
little more in order to get immunity for this committee. Was that or 
was that not your strategy ? 

Mr. Dean. I believe that is not correct. 

Mr. Thompson. In what points does that thesis break down? 

Mr. Dean. Phase I had effectively gone into abeyance. 

Mr. Thompson. Were we considered phase II ? 

Mr. Dean. No, no, I am talking about the off the record discussions 
with the prosecutors had gone into abeyance by the time Mr. Dash con- 
tacted us, because we were giving them so much information so fast 
and the thing was tumbling so quickly that they were in pursuit of it 
and it became more and more difficult for me. 

There also was the increasing demand for a special pi-osecutor. The 
prosecutors didn't know their own status. 

Meanwhile, ISIr. Dash asked to discuss it with my attorney and 
he said, you are going to be called, you are going to be called soon and 
I want to know what it is all about. So he was given the story. 


Mr. Thompson. Of course, you did get immunit}^ from this com- 
mittee, use immunity. 

One last question, Mr. Dean. The reason I ask this, of course, is that 
your statement is replete with references about your desire to uncover 
the coverup and your desire to tell the truth in all these matters. 
Before you were forced out of the White House — as you stated, you 
started making contact with the prosecutors on April 2 of this year; 
you had substantial difficulty with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman 
concerning their desire to get Mitchell to take the rap and get them off 
the hook. Why didn't you resign, call a press conference, and tell the 
entire truth about the matter if you wanted it to come out, substan- 
tially before you 

Mr. Dean. When I was at Camp David — I went up on the 23d. On 
the 25th, I talked to a lawyer and I told him I wanted to take some 
steps. He cautioned me, saying, for gosh sakes, don't do anything until 
you do talk to a lawyer. 

So it was when I came back from Camp David on the 28th that I 
again began calling to obtain a criminal lawyer. He told me — he said, 
John, he said, I know you want to get the truth out. and that was the 
first thing we told the prosecutors. He said, you don't have to run in a 
machinegun to do it. You have a Constitution, you can protect your 
rights, you can go forward, and if I am going to represent you, I am 
going to represent you the best way I know as a member of the bar 
and I will give you the best counsel I can. I have tried to follow his 
counsel and simultaneously get the truth out. 

Mr. Thosipsox. Fine. Just one small matter. I don't w\ant to leave 
any inferences from the story I quoted a minute ago concerning your 
meeting with Mr. Dash. I don't know the source and this is not the 
proper time to find out the source. The only thing I am sure of is that 
it was not Mr. Dash. I just want to put that on the record. 

I have no further questions. 

Senator Erwn. Senator Talmadge. 

Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dean, you realize, of course, that you have made very strong 
charges against the President of the United States that involves him 
in criminal offenses, do you not ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator Talmadge. What makes you think that your credibility is 
greater than that of the President, who denies what you have said? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I have been asked to come up here and tell 
the truth. I have told it exactly the way I know it. I don't say that I — 
you are asking me a public relations question, really, in a sense, why I 
Avould have greater credibility than the President of the United States ? 
I am telling you what I know. I am telling you just as I know it. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, you are testifying, I believe, under use 
immunity that this committee has granted to you. 

]Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. You would not be here testifying today had we 
not granted that use immunitv, would you ? 

Mr. Dean. I would probably be before the prosecutors downtown. 

Senator Tal^nfadge. Xow, you refused to testify before the grand 
jury, I believe, did you not ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 


Senator Talmadge. You pled the fifth amendment there ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. You have been bargaining with them for im- 
munity which has not yet been granted. Is that an accurate statement ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, there have been various reports in the 
press ; I know nothing whatever about their credence. Did you see an 
article in one of the Washington papers that you were kicked out of a 
law firm here for violation of the canon of ethics ? 

Mr. Deax. I did, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. "Would you like to comment on that ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, I would. To explain that is that I learned about that 
sometime after it had occurred. That was when I had left — I had been 
on the Hill working with the House Judiciary Committee. I had gone 
to a newly formed commission that was working on a revision of the 
Federal criminal laws and the Civil Service ran a normal civil service- 
type examination. As a result of that, they went to a former employer, 
tiie employer indicated he had dismissed me for unethical reasons. The 
Deputy Director of the Commission brought this to my attention and 
said, is this true ? 

I said, I am flabbergasted to see this. I called a friend who had been 
in the firm at the time, who is another lawyer. I asked him if he would 
go to the person who had made the charge and see if he could find out 
what in the world this is all about. I explained to him the entire set of 
facts and circumstances that had occurred. As a result of this man go- 
ing to see the former partner who had dismissed me, the statement was 
retracted in my civil service record. 

Also, I should note, one of the reasons that I was prepared to go to 
the ethics committee at that point in time is because I was operating 
on the advice of counsel when I was involved in this investment, while 
I was still at this law firm, and I believe we had really a question of 
personalities rather than a question of ethics involved. 

I would be happy to submit to the committee for its record the letter 
of counsel that I was operating on at the time this incident occurred, 
that I had sought legal advice as to whether this was proper or im- 
proper because I did not want to engage in it if it was improper. 

Senator Talmadge. If you will submit that for the record, we will 
appreciate it. I judge from your statement that that was an unfair and 
unfounded attack on your professional ethics. 

Senator Er^ttx. I would suggest that he read it. 

]\f r. Deax'. "Would you like me to read the letter ? 

This is a letter to the man who investigated the matter. It is from 
^Ir. Earl Stanley of the firm of Dow, Lohnes & Albertson : 

Dear Mr. TAPTirn : This will confirm and supplement my recent conversations 
with yon concerning events preceding and to some degree surrounding the resig- 
nation in early February 1966. of Mr. .John Dean from the law firm of "Welch & 
Morgan. Washington, D.C. 

As you know. Mr. Boyd Fellows approached me in October of 1965 about the 
possibility of representing an anplicant for a construction permit for a new tele- 
vision broadcast station in St. Louis. Mo. At that time. Mr. Fellows was. in es- 
sence considering various law firms in Washington as communications counsel 
for a groun which he was putting together to apnly for a St. Louis Television 
authorization. I had known Mr. Fellows for some time before he approached me 
and as a result of our initial contact, I told him I would be pleased to represent 


his group and to assist them in any way that I could in the filing and prosecution 
of their application at the Federal Communications Commission. 

At that time, Mr. Fellows' plans appeared to be very much in the preliminary 
stages. No corporation had been organized, specific program plans had not been 
formulated, and few if any of the other necessary investigations and work pre- 
liminary to the preparation of the application had been completed. 

At our initial conference, Mr. Fellows pointed out that he was then employed 
as a television management expert at Welch & Morgan and that his name had 
appeared in other applications for television authorizations which have been filed 
by that firm, including one in St. Louis, Mo. It was my understanding that the 
firm of Welch & Morgan would probably eventually own approximately 30 per- 
cent of that St. Louis television operation, consistent with the pattern followed 
by the firm in connection with other television authorizations. I told Mr. Fellows 
that insofar as he was concerned, there was no problem of ethics involved since 
he was not a practicing attorney. My recollection is that Mr. Fellows had already 
made known his plans and proposals to one or more partners of Welch & Morgan. 
I did advise Mr. Fellows that when, if and shortly before the application for his 
group was filed, due to Commission requirements he would have to sever con- 
nections with the other St. Louis television group. 

At our conference in October, Mr. Fellows also discussed with me the possi- 
bility of Mr. John Dean becoming a part of the group. Mr. Dean was then a 
recent associate at Welch & Morgan, but according to my recollection was con- 
templating the possibility of a change in positions. I was told that Mr. Dean's 
participation in the group was to be largely that of an investor, that he did not 
desire, plan or feel qualified to advise the applicant corporation in any way as 
to the preparation of its application, and that I would be relied upon for such 
advice and guidance. I advised Mr. Fellows that, in my opinion, it would not be 
unethical or improper in any respect for Mr. Dean to become a part of the group 
recognizing that if and when the application was filed at the Commission, he 
should plan to resign from Welch »& Morgan because of that firm's interest in 
another St. Louis group. 

The subject of Mr. Dean's participation in the St. Louis group was also men- 
tioned at a luncheon meeting which I had with Mr. Fellows and Mr. Dean in 
November of 1965 at Costin's Restaurant in Washington, D.C. My recollection 
of the details is quite vague but I am certain that I told Mr. Dean the same 
thing that I had earlier told Mr. Fellows. 

I might say in conclusion that I have always regarded Mr. John Dean as an 
extremely honorable, conscientious, careful and able man. His honesty and his 
integrity, in my opinion, are both 'beyond question. His care and his conduct in 
connection with his participation in the application for a television authorization 
in St. Louis demonstrated these very qualifications. 

As to what occurred between Mr. Dean and Mr. Welch of Welch & Morgan 
at the tme Mr. Dean resigned in February of 1966. I have no personal knowledge. 
I do know that at the time application of Mr. Fellows' group, Greater St. Louis 
Television, Inc., was filed in March. 1966, Mr. Dean was no longer an associate 
with Welch & Morgan. 

The above is according to my best recollection and knowledge. If you have 
any questions or need some further details, please let me know. 

With kindest regards, Cordially yours. 

Senator Talmadoe. I believe yon testified that you met with the 
President in ]March of this year and informed him fnllv about vour 
participation and the participation of others in the coverup of the 
Watero:ate incident and, at that time, as I recall, vou told the President 
that both you, ^Nlr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Haldeman were indictable, 
is that correct? 

]Mr. Deax. That was in an afternoon meetintr when I met with him 
which I believe was on the afternoon of the 21st. 

Senator Talmadge. Was anyone there besides vou and the President ? 

■Mr. Deax. Initially Mr. Zieo:ler was in — at the meetino; in the morn- 
ing it was only the President and I initially. At the end of the con- 
versation he called Mr. Haldeman in to request that Mr. Haldeman 
get ahold of Mr. Mitchell, to get Mr. ^Mitchell down there for a meeting 


the next day. In the afternoon, Mr. Ziegler was in the office for a 
very short period of time and then left as the meeting commenced 
with Ehrlichman, Haldeman, the President, and myself. So there was 
no other pereon than those involved. 

Senator Talmadge. What was the President's reaction when you 
told him about the complicity of the individuals in the White House? 

]\rr. Dean. Well, I felt he had not gotten the message that I was 
trying to convey through to the President, and I think that the subse- 
quent meeting that afternoon and the meeting the next day with the 
President indicated to me that there was more concern about this 
committee and its hearings than doing anything affirmative about 
wliat I told the President. In fact the strategy was then developing 
that John Mitchell should step forward and if he did that there would 
be lack of concern and interest in the postactivity as opposed to the 
preactivity and hopefully they would all go away. 

Senator Talmadge. What did the President say when you told him 
about these individuals? 

]Mr. Deax. About which individuals, Senator? 

Senator Talmadge. Of you and Ehrlichman and Haldeman all being 
subject to indictment. 

]Mr. Deax. I don't recall the President's reaction as much as I re- 
call ]\Ir. Ehrlichman's reaction when he expressed displeasure. There 
was a general discussion, and I was just amazed at the discussion going 
on and I just kept shaking mv head because the President would say 
to me "Do you agree with this?" And I would say "No, I don't," and 
finallv I said "the reason I don't agree with this is because I think 
that Mr. Haldeman, INIr. Ehrlichman, and I are indictable for obstruc- 
tion of justice." 

Senator Talmadge. Did the President seem surprised when you gave 
him this information ? 

Mr, Deax. No sir, he did not. 

Senator Talmadge. I believe at the same time he discussed with you 
that he should not have talked with Mr. Colson about Executive clem- 
ency, did he not ? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir, that was a meeting— that occurred on two times. 
On March 13 when he had asked me where the pressure was coming 
from for the money he told me about the fact that Colson had come to 
see him despite Ehrlichman's instructions that he not do so, and he 
expressed annoyance at f^at occasion. 

Then, on April 15 of this year at the very end of the conversation 
I remember very vividly the President getting up out of his chair, 
walking behind the chair to the corner and in a very, very audible — 
almost inaudible tone, turned to me and said, "I was probably foolish 
to talk to Colson about clemency for Hunt, wasn't I ?" 

That was his statement. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, to turn to another matter. Do you have 
any idea why it was you that INIr. Ehrlichman asked to check into the 
brenk-ip affair immp^^atelv after the Watergate entrance ? 

Mr. Deax. I would only assume because I had become the White 
House firefighter at that time and I was given assignments of this 
nature whether it was the, as I say. the Lithuanian defector or any 
conflict of interest problem that came up, I investigated a lot of those. 


I dealt with all of the Presidential appointees before they were ap- 
pointed to clear them for conflict problems or any problem that came 
up, any improprieties that had come to our attention was sent to my 
office so we could investigate them and find out if they could be em- 
barrassing to the President so it was very natural, of course, for it to 
come to me. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you really believe Mr. Liddy when he told 
you that no one in the TVliite House was involved ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, given the nature of my statement in reflecting back 
at that time he did not even mention to me Hunt's involvement, and 
how much Mr. Liddy would know about White House involvement in 
this I do not know. I think that he would only have probably hearsay 
knowledge from Mr. Magruder in his dealings with Mr. Magruder as 
to who in the ^\^iite House would or would not be involved. I do not 
know what dealings he had with the "\'\niite House other than the deal- 
ings he had with me. 

Senator Talmadge. Let us see if I have the sequence on the imme- 
diate aftermath of the break-in correct now. 

Immediately upon your return to Washington after the break-in in 
June, you saw Mr. Liddy, whom you knew had provided massive 
intelligence plans to Mr. Mitchell, is that correct ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, sir, I will give you the sequence. As I arrived back 
on Sunday night, the 18th, I was informed hy my assistant that 
McCord had been arrested, one of the individuals arrested and that one 
of the Cubans had a check from INIr. Hunt. The next morning I had a 
conversation with INIr. Caulfield, who repeated the same thing to me. I 
then had a call from Mr. Ehrlichman or I had a call from Mr. 
Magruder who told me that this whole thing is Liddy's fault and I 
should look into it. I then had a call from Mr. Ehrlichman who. I 
reported to him that this was, had been, told me and he said "I think 
you ought to meet with Liddy." I then met with Mr. Liddy about noon 
and he gave me his report. It was in that afternoon that Mr, Strachan 
came into my office and told me that he had been instructed by ]Mr. 
Haldeman to destroy documents. 

Senator Talmadge. You Imew, of course, that Mr. Liddy had pre- 
sented massive intelligence plans to Mr. Mitchell, I believe you were 
there on two occasions ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, I was. 

Senator Talmadge. Then vou testified that Mr. Strachan told 

Mr. Deax. Senator, I might correct that they were massive on the 
first occasion and a very tailored-down version on the second and, I 
must say I was very late in attending the second meeting and the meet- 
ing was shortened after I arrived. 

Senator Talmadge. Each meeting was scaled down further ? 

Mr. Deax. That is right. 

Senator Talmadge. Intelligence plan. Then, Mr. Strachan told you 
that Mr. Haldeman ordered him to go through Mr. Haldeman's files 
and destroy materials which included documents relating to wiretap 
information from the Democratic National Committee, is that correct ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. Then vou told Mr. Ehrlichman about the meet- 
ings with Liddy and Mitchell and about your subsequent conversations 
with Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Ehrlichman's reaction in a meeting 


which Mr. Colson attended, was to tell you to get Liddy to have hmi 
tell Hunt to get out of the country, is that correct ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, you are tying two meetings together, Senator. I 
might straighten that out for you. The meeting I reported to Ehrlich- 
man was in midafternoon and Mr. Colson was not present. I was 
reporting ni}^ meeting with Liddy at that point. I did not discuss 
with him the facts that Strachan had brought to my attention because 
I assume he was aware from his conversations with ]\Ir. Haldeman 
that that in fact had occurred. 

He told me to come back to a meeting later that evening with Colson. 
He said he was aware of the fact that Colson wanted to meet with him 
and I should be present at that meeting. 

Senator Talmadge. Then shortly thereafter Mr. Ehrlichman told 
you to throw the contents of Hunt's safe in the river, is that correct? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. Well, he told me I should throw the brief- 
case in the river and he told me to shred the documents. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, after all of those facts occurred, were avail- 
able to you, why did you not, as counsel to the President, go to him at 
that time and tell him what was happening ? 

Mr. Deax. Senator, I did not have access to the President. I never 
was presumptuous enough to try to pound on the door and get in 
because I knew that just did not work that way. I know of efforts of 
other "\'\^iite House staff to get in, I have seen, for example, one of the 
reporters sitting in this room, Mr. Mallenhoff, memorandums he tried 
to send in to the President and they are just blocked when you try to 
send information in. 

Senator Talmadge. You mean you were counsel to the President of 
the United States, and you could not get access to him if you wanted 
to, is that your testimony ? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir ; I thought it would be presumptuous of me to try, 
because I felt, I was told my reporting channel was Mr. Haldeman and 
^Ir. Ehrlichman and I was reporting everything I knew to them. 

Senator Talmadge. It seems like to me after finding evidence of a 
conspiracy of this magnitude it was incumbent upon you as counsel 
to the President, to make every possible effort to see that he got that 
information at that time. 

Mr. Deax". Senator, I was participating in the coverup at that time. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, another question. When you met with At- 
torney General Kleindienst on the 19th and 20th of June, I believe, 
there you told him you had no idea there would be a break-in at the 
Democratic National Committee headquarters. Did you tell him about 
the meetings of January 27 and February 4, 1972, with Mr. Liddy and 
Mr. Magruder and Mitchell during, when buggings were considered ? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Talmadge. Why did you not tell him at that time? 

Mr. Deax. Because I knew that would put him in a position that he 
would have to pursue his investigation that way. and Mr. Kleindienst 
had told me when we talked generally, in very broad generalities about 
the thing that he said he would never sit in the Attorney General's 
office and prosecute Mr. ^Mitchell and I did not want to put this on 
Mr. Kleindienst at this point in time. 

96-296 O - 73 - 10 


Senator Talmadge. In other words, you were still participating in 
the coverup. 

Mr. Dean. Well, this meeting had occurred on the 19th or 20th. 

Senator Talmadge. Yes. 

Were you chosen to tell Mr. Kalmbach, ]Mr. ]\Iitchell, Ehrlichman 
and Haldeman wanted him to raise money to pay for tlie silence of 
the Watergate defendants ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I became the courier of good and bad news be- 
tween the committee concerning what each quarter was doing concern- 
ing the coverup. I think that occurred for this reason : One, Mr. 
Mitchell had known me and trusted me with this type of information 
and, Haldeman and Ehrlichman knew and trusted me. There was a — 
particularly after — this reporting requirement or requirements, this re- 
porting scheme, developed very early on. Ehrlichman and Mitchell, 
I would have to say, had a rather strained relationship and this made 
it convenient to avoid some of those strains, and there was also a long- 
standing competition between Mr. Mitchell and certain persons in 
the White House so that this made it convenient, they didn't want to 
deal with one another so I was the convenient vehicle to deal with. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you think it was part of an effort to make 
you the fall guy in the plan ? 

Mr. Dean. I didn't raise the fall guy — it made it very easy for them 
to protect themselves to say that this was all Dean if anything ever 
went wrong. I was aware of that but I didn't begin to think about 
that until the August 29 statement and at that time I began discussing 
it with other people because I was right square in the middle of the 
coverup, and now my name was being put out in front of the whole 
thing as clearing everybody of complicity and I say this may be a 
natural, I had seen it happen before. I had seen situations like this 
occur where people who had not actually done something take the 
blame for it to avoid embarrassing others higher up and I felt it was a 
real possibility. 

Senator Talmadge. Why have you always assumed it was a Presi- 
dential decision to keep Mr. Magruder on at the Committee To Re- 
Elect the President ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I assumed that for two reasons: First of all, it 
was very clear by the time Mr. Magruder or these discussions came up 
the strategy was developing that the matter could stop at ]Mr. Liddy, 
that they could hold it there, then there could be no links in the White 
House through Mr. Magruder and nobody at the top of the Re-Election 
Committee would be damaged. 

Mr. Magruder was the deputy director, he was involved. I reported 
the fact he was involved. Mr. Mitchell, who I didn't know was 
involved or not, they were asking me whether I thought he should 
leave or stay in the campaign. I cannot conceive of a discussion of these 
factors not coming up in a conversation with the President about 
what was happening over at his reelection committee. 

Now, it is presumptions or it is a presumption on my part but 
given the, you know, this is the number one and two men at the re- 
election committee. 

•Senator Talmadge. You testified that you always suspected that 
Mr. Colson was far more knowledgeable than he protested. 
What led you to that conclusion? 


Mr. Deax. Well, the fact that Mr. Magruder had told mc of numbers 
of — ^^the fact that the stalf had contacted him regarding implementing 
the jilan. The fact that ]Mr. Hunt had a very close relationship with 
Mr. Colson, that the memos that I found in Hunt's safe indicated that 
Hunt had a practice of reporting regularly to ]Mr. Colson on things 
that occurred, and I found it very hard to believe that 'Mv. Hunt and 
Mr. Liddy would walk into Mr. Colson's office and tell him that they 
didn't have some security plan or something like that and then per- 
suade Colson on a call like that or on a statement like that to call 
Mr. ]SIagruder to have his staff subsequently follow up with additional 
calls and tell them to get that plan going. 

Senator Talmadge. You testified that you had to report to the Presi- 
dent through Mr. Haldeman or through Mr. Ehrlichman. Were you 
closer to the President on the Watergate than in any other area? 
^Ir. Dean. Do you mean when I did begin rej^orting to him? 
Senator Talmadge. Yes. 
]\Ir. Deax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Can you account for that? 
]\rr. Deax. Well. I can only tell you what the President told me. 
He told me that this matter was taking up too much attention of 
]Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman which, indeed it was very consuming 
for everybody that was involved in it. Xo one could leave the store 
very long for fear that something would go astray so it was some- 
thing that everyone had to stay on top of. That the trial was over, we 
were moving into the Senate phase, had a grand plan that had been 
hiid out over a weekend of some 12 and 14 hour meetings. The Presi- 
dent, I assume, thought that now that the plans had been laid the 
policies had been made, "have ]Mr. Dean rep)ort to me and I will deal 
with him directly on the matter." 

Senator Talmadge. Did Mr. Haldeman have direct access to the 
President ? 

Mr. Deax. Indeed he did, sir. 
Senator Talmadge. ]\Ir. Ehrlichman ? 
Mr. Deax. Yes, he did. 
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Colson ? 
Mr. Deax. Yes, he did. 
Senator Talmadge. Mr. :Mitchell ? 

Mr. Deax. I don't believe that Mr. Mitchell had any dealin^rs with 
the President, to my knowledge other than one or two social visits in 
Florida with him from the time he left the campaign until the meeting 
that occurred on June 22. I know they had sort of a good chat about 
what everyone had been doing at that time, very social chat at the end 
of the meeting. I was asked by the President to make arrangements 
so Mr. ISIitchell could use his outer office in the Executive Office Build- 
ing and while I was doing that they were having a chat about what was 
happening among some of the partners. I know also that the President 
stopped in his old law firm at one time but I think these were strictly 
social dealings. 

Senator Talmadge. That was :March 22, I believe rather than 
June 22? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, excuse me, March 22. 

Senator Talmadge. :Mr. Kalmbach had immediate access to the 
President ? 


Mr. Dean. No sir. 

Senator Talmadge. He did not. 

Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge. I think the President periodically 
called Mr. Kalmbach when he had some specific item he wanted to take 
up regarding the residence in California. I was often the conveyor of 
information to Mr. Kalmbach for the President and these requests had 
come to me from Haldeman or Ehrlichman. They dealt with the per- 
sonal side of the President's business. 1 think that — I don't know of 
other than social gatherings, White House dinners or the like, where 
Mr. Kalmbach might have been present. I know his partner, Mr. 
DeMarco, and I would always take the tax return in to be signed and 
those would be rather mechanical sessions so I can't say that Mr. 
Kalmbach had access to the President, no. 

Senator Talmadge. What was Mr. Mitchell's relationship to the 
President, the same — was it the same over the entire period that you 
were at the White House ? 

Mr. Dean. I don't really know. I know that Mr. Mitchell and the 
President had frequent contact. I can recall while I was at the Depart- 
ment of Justice and I would be in the Attorney General's office and the 
President would call him. I know Mr. Mitchell would have no hesita- 
tion to pick up the phone and call the President. I know that Mr. 
Mitchell attended a number of meetings with the President, private 
meetings, on a regular basis while he was still Attorney General. I was 
also told they had a number of evening meetings and some planning 
for the campaign as they moved toward a campaign and I often 
thought back to a comment that I was told when I was first interviewed 
at the Pierre Hotel to come to the Department of Justice that Klein- 
dienst told me that this Attorney General will probably be as close to 
this President as Robert Kennedy was to President Kennedy. 

Senator Talmadge. And throughout your statement you indicated 
that you met with or were ordered to work with either Mr. Haldeman 
or Mr. Ehrlichman. What was the relationship between you and these 
advisers ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I would report to them or get assignments from 

Senator Talmadge. What was their relationship between themselves ? 

Mr. Dean. I think that Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman have a 
relationship that goes back a number of years from college days. They 
were good friends. They were very close, they worked very well to- 
gether. I think that, of course, that Mr. Ehrlichman dealt more with 
substantive matters whereas Mr. Haldeman dealt with procedural 
matters at the White House. I think Mr. Haldeman from time to time 
would make substantive suggestions but he would restrain himself 
because of the mere mechanics of keeping an operation of the dimen- 
sions of a Presidency going. 

Senator Talmadge. Did they keep each other informed as to what 
they were doinsr ? 

Mr. Dean. I would assume they did, yes. I would say, you know, on 
selected areas. I would not say that Mr. Ehrlichman would tell every- 
thing to Mr. Haldeman he was planning on in a given area of domestic 
policy. He would go directly to the President on that. 

Senator Talmadge. Do you have a copy of your exhibit No. 34-28* 
before you? 

*See p. 1233. 


Mr. Deax. I do not have the exhibit. 

Senator Tai.madoe. I will ask the staff to plense hand you one. It is 
an interestino; document and I Avould like to have your comment on it. 
Do YOU have it now ? 

You will note that it is on White House stationery dated January 2, 
1973, very brief and to the point : 

To : John Dean. 
From : Charles Colson. 
Now what the hell do I do? 

Tell US the sifrnificance of that. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Deax. Attached to that, there was a very small memorandum or 
note u)) in the corner. Attached to the letter is the second part of the 
exhibit. It is a letter from Howard Hunt to Mr. Colson. This came to 
me while I was — ^to my attention, while I was. on a telephone conver-. 
sation with Mr. Colson and having just returned from California. I had 
had a conversation with ]Mr. O'Brien in the evenino; of the 2d of Jan- 
uary concerninof Mr. Plunt's status and his desire to plead ouiltv and 
to <ret assurances for Executive clemency. I had a call from ]\Ir. O'Brien 
the next morning on the same subject. I had a call from Mr. Colson 
who told me Mr. Bittman was trying to reach him. He asked me if I 
had seen this letter and I said I had not, and while we were talking, I 
dug the letter out of my mail. 

As a result of this letter and our conversation he asked me, he was 
indicating that he didn't — he still wanted to keep at ann's length from 
Mr. Hunt. He had throughout the mattei' tried to keep at arm's length 
to Mr. Hunt. I told him I would have to talk to ]Mr. Ehrlichman before 
I could make anv suggestion. I went to Ehrlichman, told him the situ- 
ation and ]Mr. Ehrlichman told ]\Ir. Colson he thought he ought to 
meet with ]Mr. Bittman and subsequently they did meet. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, will you look at exhibit Xo. 34— IT* that 
you inserted in your testimony yesterday. It is also an interesting docu- 
ment. As I recall your testimony as you i:)resented that yesterday, it is 
a list of all of the people that you thouglit had violated the law and 
what the laws may be that they violated, is that coi'rect ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. Let us start with the top of the list, now. That 
is in vour own liandwritinc;, is it not ? 

ISIr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. This is a copy thereof ? 

]Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. What is the significance of the letters in the top 
lefthand part of that sheet? 

Mr. Deax. The list is broken down into two parts. Senator. One says 
"pre" and the other is "x)Ost." 

Senator Talmadge. By "pre," you mean prior to the Watergate 
break-in ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. The planning and discussion of those events? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator TAi,:\rADGE- And vou list in that category Mr. jMitchell, Mr. 
!Magruder, and ^Ir. Strachan, is that correct ? 

*See p. 1312. 


Mr. Dean. That is correct. , 

Senator Talmadge. Now, you have a star by Mr. Mitchell's name and 
no star by Mr, Magruder. 

Mr. Dean. Maybe if I explain the whole list, it would save some 
questions for you. 

Senator Talmadge. Surely. 

Mr. Dean. I have listed for pre : Mitcliell, Magruder, Strachan ; post : 
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, LaRue, Mardian, O'Brien, Parkinson, 
Colson, Bittman, Kalmbach, Tony — I have by that the word "source." 
I will explain that in a minute ; Stans. 

Now, beside several of the names, after I did the list — just my first 
reaction was there certainly are an awful lot of lawyers involved here. 
So I put a little asterisk beside each lawyer, which was Mitchell, 
Strachan, Ehrlichman, Dean, Mardian, O'Brien, Parkinson, Colson, 
Bittman, and Kalmbach. 

Then I put, as we were discussing the development of the list, the 
evidence that I knew sort of firsthand or had reason to believe that 
others had firsthand evidence of, that I thought that a very strong 
case might be made against. The ones that I was not as sure about 
were those I put a questionmark on. This was just something I was 
working out in my own mind in a discussion I had with my lawyer 
as a result of discussions he had also had with some of the prosecutors. 

Senator Talmadge. Any significance to the star? That they are all 

Mr. Dean. No, that was just a reaction myself, the fact that how in 
God's name could so many lawyers get involved in something like this ? 

Senator Talmadge. What do the checkmarks indicate on the left- 
hand side of the paper ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not know. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, you have presences there and some other 
things there. I presume — what is that language on the right? 

Mr. Dean. That is because I had had earlier discussions with Ehr- 
lichman and Haldeman about this and they asked me, what is the 
obstruction of justice? So I dug out the obstruction of justice statutes, 
which were sections 371, which I believe is the conspiracv statute, and 
1503, and put the sanctions beside them — 5 years and $10,000, 5 years 
and $5,000 for potential obstruction of justice. 

When I took this list to Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman, Mr. 
Ehrlichman said, well, I may have to take — he said, I do not think 
this sounds like an obstruction of justice. 

I said, well, you may want to look at the statute. I said, particularly 
read the annotations of the statute, because I think you will find some 
case law which indicates that obstruction of justice is as broad as the 
imagination of man to obstruct justice. 

Senator Talmadge. So your significance, then, was that those gentle- 
men had violated those statutes and were guilty of those particular 
offenses which carried either a 5-year sentence and $10,000 and 5 years 
and $5,000, is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. Senator. 

Senator Talmadge. Thank you, ]\Ir. Dean. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, at 12 :05 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 2 p.m., this same day.] 


Afterxoox Session, TtTiSDAY, June '26, 1973 

Senator Ervix. The committee will come to order. 

Senator "Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dean, I would like to completely change gears from the testi- 
mony wliich you gave this morning and go back to the beginning of 
the statement you made yesterday in order to put this in its proper 
context because it is so completely different from what was discussed 
this morning and yesterday. I am going to read the early portions ^ 
your statement in order to set the framework for the questions I am 
going to ask. 

This is quoting from your statement of yesterday. 

It was when I joined the White House staff in July of 1970 that I became fully 
aware of the extent of concern at the White House regarding demonstrations 
and intelligence information relating to demonstrators. It was approximately 
one month after I arrived at the White House that I was informed ahout the 
project that had been going on before I arrived to restructure the Government's 
intelligence gathering capacities vis-a-vis demonstrators and domestic radicals. 
The revised domestic intelligence plan was submitted in a document for the 

The committee has in its possession a copy of that document and certain 
related memoranda pursuant to the order of Judge Sirica. 

I want to inform the chairman and members of the committee so 
there is no apprehension here, I do not intend to go into the memo- 
randum of 1970. I understand that there are matters contained therein 
which the chairman is handling at the present time so it is not my 
intent to go into that document. 

After I was told of the Presidentially-approved plan, that called for bugging, 
burglarizing, mail covers, and the like. I was instructed by Haldeman to see 
what I could do to get the plan implemented. I thought the plan was totally 
uncalled for and unjustified. I talked with Mitchell about the plan, and he said 
he knew there was a great desire at the White House to see the plan imple- 
mented, but he agreed fully with FBI Director Hoover, who opposed the plan, 
with one exception. He thought that an interagency evaluation committee might 
be useful, because it was not good to have the FBI standing alone without the 
information of other intelligence agencies and the sharing of information is 
always good and voids duplication. After my conversation with ^litchell, I wrote 
a memorandum requesting that the evaluation committee be established, and 
the restraints could be removed later. I told Haldeman that the only way to 
proceed was one step at a time, and this could be an important first step. 
He agreed. 

The Interagency Evaluation Committee (lEC) was created, as I recall, in early 
1971. I refiuested Jack Caulfield, who had been assigned to my oflice, to serve as 
the White House liaison to the lEC, and when Mr. Caulfield left the White House, 
Mr. David Wilson of my staff served as liaison. I am unaware of the lEC ever 
having engaged in any illegal activities or assignments, and certainly no such 
assignment was ever requested by my office. The reports from the lEC, or sum- 
maries of the reports were forwarded to Haldeman and sometimes Ehrlichman. 

In addition to the intelligence reports from the lEC, my ofiice also received 
regular intelligence reports regarding demonstrators and radical groups from the 
FBI and on some occasions, from the CIA. A member of my staff would review 
the material to determine if it should be forwarded to Mr. Haldeman — that is, 
for Ivrin.ging to the President's attention — or sent to another member of the staff 
who might have an interest in the contents of the report. 

And then you give several examples relative to Mr. Garment and to 
Mv. Kissinger. 

Xow, on the bottom of page 13, you refer to another incident that 


It was not until almost a year or more later that I learned the reason for 
Mardian's trip to see the President. Mr. Mardian later told me in a social con- 
versation, that he had gone to see the President to get instructions regarding the 
disposition of wiretap logs that related to newsmen and White House staffers 
who were suspected of leaking. These logs had been in possession of Mr. William 
Sullivan, an Assistant Director of the FBI, and were, per Mr. Mardian's instruc- 
tions from the President, given to Ehrlichman. 

I had occasion to raise a question about these logs with Ehrlichman during the 
fall of 1972, and he flatly denied to me that he had the logs. I did not tell him at 
that time I had been told by Mardian that he had the logs. About February 22nd 
or 23rd of this year. Time Magazine notified the White House it was going to print 
a story that the White House had undertaken wiretaps of newsmen and White 
House staff and requested a response. 

The White House Press OflBce notified me of this inquiry. I called Mr. Mark 
Felt at the FBI to ask him first, what the facts were, and secondly, how such 
a story could leak. Mr. Felt told me that it was true, that Mr. Sullivan knew all 
the facts and that he had no idea how it leaked. I then called Mr. Sullivan and 
requested that he drop by my ofiice, which he did. He explained that after much 
haggling, that the wiretaps were installed, but as I recall, Mr. Sullivan said they 
did not have the blessing of Director Hoover. Mr. Sullivan explained to me that 
all but one set of the logs had been destroyed and all the internal FBI records 
relating to the wiretaps except one set, had been destroyed and all the material 
had been delivered to Mr. Mardian. After Mr. Sullivan departed, I called Mr- 
Mitchell who told me he also had an inquiry from Time Magazine and denied to 
Time Magazine any knowledge of the matter. I did not press him further as to 
what he did know. 

I then called Mr. Ehrlichman and told him about the forthcoming story in 
Time Magazine. I told him of my conversations with Felt, Sullivan and Mitchell. 
I also told him I knew he had the logs because Mr. Mardian had told me. Tliis 
time he admitted they were in his safe. I asked him how Mr. Ziegler should 
handle it. He said Mr. Ziegler should flatly deny it — period. I thanked him, called 
Mr. Ziegler and so advised him. 

Now, Mr. Dean, this sets the general framework as to the areas of 
my inquiry this afternoon. 

The first question that arises is that, during the course of questioning 
by this committee, Mr. McCord stated that ho went to the Internal 
Security Division and obtained from a Mr. John Martin and Mr. Joel 
Lisker information which he brought back to the Committee To Re- 
Elect the President and disseminated among the various members of 
the Committee To Re-Elect. 

My first question to you is based upon the visit which he made shortly 
after Mr. McCord's testimonj^ to the Internal Security Division and in 
talks which he had with Mr. Martin, and Mr. Kevin Moroney, and it 
relates to the fact of whether or not you know who authorized the re- 
lease of this information by Messrs. Martin and Lisker at the Internal 
Security Division. 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I have only a general awareness of this area, 
and to the best of my recollection, and I don't know, I don't recall who 
told me this, but there was an arrangement that was worked out by ]Mr. 
Mardian before he departed the Department of Justice to join the 
reelection committee. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, the arrangement of releasing in- 
formation from the Internal Security Division to McCord was autlior- 
ized by Mardian. This never came to your attention as being authorized 
by anybody in the "^^^lite House ? 

Mr. Deax. I don't recall that it did. My office did have dealings, as I 
have said, with the Internal Security Division. I don't recall specifi- 
cally this subject cominsi; up. I recall subsequent conversations in which 
Mr. INIardian told me that he had made an arrangement of some sort 
after it was initially arrived at. 


Senator Weicker. But, of course, at this moment Mr. Mardian is 
over at the Connnittee To Re-Elect the President and Mr. Olson is at 
the head of the Internal Security Division? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. Did your office have an}^ dealings with Mr. Olson ? 

]Mr. Deax. No — well, I had dealings with him but they were on 
departmental matters where the practice had evolved that when the 
department was going- to release in a major case electronically obtained 
evidence under a court order the}" would notify the White House of 
this procedure. 

Senator Weicker. Could you amplify on that ? I am not so sure I 

]Mr. Deax. Well, when a major case was going on, and a defendant 
would call for whether or not there was any electronic surveillance of 
his conversations at any time and the Government made a decision to 
release this information if it was a very political or sensitive case, this 
matter would be brought to the attention of the White House and ]Mr. 
Olson would generally inform me that he was going to do this. 

Senator Weicker. Then can you give me some specific examples of 
cases that involved that kind of release of information ? 

^Ir. Deax. Well, I am trying to think; it was some of the more 
celebrated cases in connection with antiwar demonstrators and I can- 
not recall with an}' specificity and having not had an opportunity lo go 
back to my files it is rather difficult to remember this off the top. 

Senator Weicker. Is it a fact, Mr, Dean, that Mr. Olson and Kevin 
]Moroney came to your office, at least on one occasion, maybe there are 
others, to give you information relevant to the law on foreign 
contributions ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, they did. I recall a conversation with them both 
about it ; I don't recall whether it was in my office or telephonic in 
which I raised the subject. I had always assumed that foreign contri- 
butions were prohibited under the law. I had been asked by Mr. Stans 
at one point, who had received a memorandum from Mr. Liddy when 
he was serving as counsel to the finance committee, indicating that 
this was a proper contribution to receive. I had occasion to talk to 
Mr. Olson and Mr. ]\Ioroney about this and. they had reached another 
conclusion. They felt it was not from their reading of the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act. that unless the individual was an agent in 
fact and not a principal that such a contribution was not violative of 
the Federal Law. 

Senator Weicker. VThy would you seek such information from the 
Internal Security Division of the Justice Department ? 

Mr. Deax. Because they had jurisdiction over that area of the law. 

Senator Weicker. What were your contacts with the Internal Secu- 
rity Division ? 

Do you feel any information that was supplied to your office from 
the Internal Security Division might have had some sort of political 
impact ? 

Mr. Deax. Well. I think some of the reports that the lEC prepared 
had political implications to them but those did not go outside of the 
^Miite House. 

Xow, I would have to review those reports and I have not done that 
either regardinof demonstrations and the like. I did, as I mentioned in 


my testimony, after I had talked to Mr. Haldeman about what my 
oflice should be doing regarding the forthcoming election I called Mr. 
Wells who was then the head of the lEC or Mr. Caulfield brought 
him over and told him that the White House was very anxious to 
have the best intelligence possible regarding the potentials of demon- 
strations during the forthcoming campaign. 

Senator Weicker. And so you maintained a liaison with the lEC ? 

Mr. Dean. I would say that of all my contacts with the Justice 
Department my most infrequent contacts were with the Internal Secu- 
rity Division. 

Senator Weicker. All right, now, I have in my hand a position 
report on the Internal Security Division, as of April 15, 1972. It is the 
same report which already has been brought to the attention of the 
committee, which I submitted to Mr. McCord to identify those in- 
dividuals with which he had contacts, specifically, Mr. Martin and 
Mr. Lisker. 

In this position report dated April 15, 1972, under the Office of 
Analysis and Planning, there are listed Bernard Wells, Executive 
Director of the IDIU, and two assistants, James McGrath and Joyce 
Webb. Again, in the interviews which I had at the Internal Security 
Division, after Mr. McCord's testimony, it was explained to me quite 
openly that in fact, this office of Analysis and Planning and this posi- 
tion of Director of the IDIU were a cover for the lEC. This report 
is dated April of 1972. I will be glad to have you take a look at it. 
Does this in any way relate to recommendations you had made at an 
earlier date ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, now, the IDIU was a unit that was in existence 
at one point in time in the Justice Department. 

Senator Weicker. Right. 

Mr. Dean. It was basically a newspaper clipping operation to follow 
what the demonstrators were doing, and as I understand, they sub- 
scribed to the magazines and publications of the Xew Left to try to 
just analyze from those publications what they were doing, as well as 
anything else they could pick up. 

When the decision was made to establish the lEC, the IDIU unit 
was virtually defunct at that time and as I recall, there was discussion 
about the fact that the IDIU did exist and that it could very easily 
be the explanation for the lEC, which was not due to be a publicly 
known intelligence evaluation group. This was the decision, to put the 
IDIU cover over the lEC. 

Now, as I recall, the initial person that was placed in charge of 
the lEC was INIr. Doherty, who had been with the Internal Security 
Division for quite sometime but was planning on retiring at some 
point. There were also suggestions that others — somebody else might 
come in and head this unit up. 

Senator Weicker. Well, I appreciate your answer and vou have an- 
swered my question. If we can just track this in logical time sequence, 
that is all. 

So it is true that the concept of the lEC does sit there covered by the 
office of Analysis and Planning, the position of IDIU, is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 


Senator Weicker. "Was this the subject of a letter which you wrote 
John Mitchell? 

Mr. Dean. I believe in the documents that I turned over to the court 
initially, there was a memorandum in there that was based on a con- 
versation that ]\Iitchell and I had had as to how to establish this very 
small segment of a rather large and dramatic plan. Xow, whether that 
was in that document or not, I cannot recall. I have not reviewed those 
documents virtually since the time they were written. So you are ask- 
ing me to recall something that is about 3 years old and I am not 
terribly fresh in my recollection on it. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, when I show you a position report 
that is dated April 15 of 1972, which has in the position report a unit 
whicli both of us have identified as the lEC, under the cover of the 
IDIU, this was the recommendation made back in the summer of 1970. 
Is that correct ? 

]\Ir. Deax. I think that is an accurate statement to the best of my 

Senator Weicker. I am not talking about illegal activities 

Mr. Deax. No ; I know exactly what you are talking about. 

Senator Weicker. Nothing else, just setting up of the unit as recom- 
mended in the summer of 1970, it does still exist in the office of Analy- 
sis and Planning section, IDIU ; is that correct? 

]Mr. Deax. To the best of my recollection, it is, Senator, but as I say, 
I would have to check documents in my own office to remember the 
accuracy of that and that is generally the way I recall it occurring, yes. 

Senator Weicker. The first step, then, was taken in setting up the 

Mr. Deax. Was that the first step ? 

Senator Weicker. Yes, right. 

Mr. Deax. I think the step, the first step, was the decision to take a 
verv small part of the plan, the only part of the plan that was not 
illegal, and begin with that. And then there was a series of correspond- 
ence, and I believe I liad some meetings with Mr. Mitchell about this 
in his office and we discussed some of these concepts. 

Senator Weicker. Do you have any idea when those meetings took 

]Mr. Deax. Well, they would have occurred about the time that my 
initial memorandum went over, either preceding it and so that followed 
it. There was still resistance at this point in time on the part of the 
FBI as to its participation in the unit and it was as a result of this 
resistance by the FBI that ]Mr. Haldeman told me to talk to Mr. 
^Mitchell about it and ]Mr. Haldeman also said, as I recall, that he was 
willing to come over and talk to ]Mr. ^Mitchell himself about it if I 
had any problem. 

Senator Weicker. ]Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Ervix. Do you wish to use one of these documents? 

Senator Weicker. I would very specifically like to use the docu- 
ment, ]Mr. Chairman, which is the letter sent by Mr. Dean to Mr. 

]Mr. ]\IcCaxdless. ]Mr. Chairman, is that one of the national security 
documents ? 


Senator Ervin. Yes. I might state for the record that yesterday, 
Senator Baker and myself, by authority of the unanimous vote of the 
committee, sent the following letter to the White House : 

June 25, 1973. 
The President, 
The White House, 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: A former White House employee, John W. Dean III, 
delivered to his honor. Judge John J. Sirica, Chief Judge of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia, certain documents. Judge Sirica subsequently 
ordered copies of these documents delivered to the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities. These documents may be briefly described 
as follows : 

1. A docimient which is entitled "Special Report Interagency Committee Intel- 
ligence," which constitutes a review of the systems by which foreign and domestic 
intelligence is collected 'by the FBI, CIA, DIA, and NSA. Tliis document is 43 
pages long, and is signed by the then heads of the four intelligence gathering 

2. A document entitled "Recommendations" which relates to operational re- 
straints on intelligence collection. This document was apparently prepared in 
June 1970, tout does not bear the day of the month on which it was finalized. 

3. A memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Tom Charles Huston dated July 
14, 1970. 

4. A memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman dated August 
5, 1970, which relates to domestic intelligence. 

5. A memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman dated August 
7, 1970, which is entitled "Domestic Intelligence Review." 

6. A memorandum from John Dean to the Attorney General relating to the 
Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit dated September 18, 1970, which bears 
the notation that it was returned to John W. Dean by the Attorney General's 
Office on March 3, 1972. 

All of these documents are marked "Top Secret," except the memorandum from 
Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman dated August 7, 1970, which is marked 

The committee agrees that the first numbered document relates in substantial 
part to foreign intelligence, and ought not to be disclosed. It believes, however, 
that all of the portions of the other documents which relate to domestic intelli- 
gence or internal security should be released at the hearings, and for this reason, 
the committee has unanimously authorized and directed us as chairman and vice 
chairman to ask you forthwith to declassify them. 

In addition, the committee has authorized and directed us to request that you 
declassify two additional documents which have been printed in the New York 
Times and the Washington Post, insofar as they relate to domestic intelligence 
and internal security. These additional documents are as follows : 

1. A decision memorandum dated July 15, 1970, bearing the title "Decision 
Memorandum, The White House, Washington." 

2. A document entitled "Organization and Operations of the Interagency Group 
on Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security." 

The committee desires to interrogate witnesses concerning these documents, 
and for this reason, respectfully requests that you forthwith declassify them. 
Sincerely yours, 

Sam J. Ervin, Jr., 

Howard H. Baker, Jr., 

Vice Chairman. 

Senator Er\t[x. This morning, I received the following letter. 

The White House, 
Washington, June 26. 1973. 
Dear Senator Ervin : In a telephone discussion this morning with Mr. Rufus 
Edmisten of your staff. Fred Buzhardt and I stated that the Senatf Select Com- 
mittee should use its discretion with respect to the utilization of the documents 
referred to in your letter to the President dated June 25. 1973. It is our under- 
standing that the agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence 


areas have provided extensive advice to tlie Senate on these documents. In this 
connection, Mr. Edmisten stated that the Committee intended to utilize only those 
portions relating to domestic intelligence activities, and would not make public 
any material referring to any foreign intelligence activities or capabilities. 

5lr. Edmisten asked that I confirm this conversation to you in writing during 
the luncheon recess, which I am pleased to do. 

Senator ER^^x. Novr, as I understand it, Senator Weicker, you wish 
to interrogate the witness about one of these documents and I would 
suggest that in order to have the thing in consecutive order, that we 
ask the witness if he can identify all of the copies of the documents 
referred to in this letter. 

Mr. Dean. I think, ]Mr. Chairman, that Senator Weicker is referring 
to the memorandum that I wrote to the Attorney General. 

Senator Ervix. Yes. Before you do, I would like to give you copies 
of these papers. 

]Mr. Deax. I would like to see them to refresh my recollection of 
the documents. 

Senator Ervix. We might give you copies of two other documents 
which are not chissified. One is a memo to II. E. Ilaldeman from Tom 
Charles Huston, dated August 25, 1970, referring to SACB appropria- 
tions, and a memo to H. K. Haldeman from Torii Charles Huston dated 
September 10, 1970, neither of which is classified. 

Mr. Shaffer. May we have permission to look at them, Senator ? We 
have never seen them before. 

Senator Er\t:x. Yes. 

In other words, preliminary to Senator Weicker continuing his 
examination. I want you to identify all the documents and order them 
admitted into the record. The question then that will be asked of INIr. 
Dean is whether or not he can identify these documents as having been 
copies of documents which he delivered to Judge Sirica and which 
Judge Sirica ordered delivered to this committee. 

Mr. Shaffer. Senator, just out of an abundance of caution, I would 
like to advise the chairman that, although his lawyers participated in 
the delivery of the documents to Judge Sirica, it was done by Mr. 
Dean placing the documents in a safe deposit box and the keys then 
being delivered to the court and the docimients never came into our 
possession, nor did we see them. 

Senator Baker. ]\Ir. Chairman, do I understand Mr. Shaffer to say 
that in an abundance of caution, he wishes to indicate that he and ]Mr. 
McCandless ha^e not previously received possession of these docu- 
ments ? 

Mr. Shaffer. That is right. 

Senator Baker. I think it would be a]:)propriate, Mr. Chairman, if 
you concur to state that on behalf of the committee, we think it is 
desirable and essential for counsel to be able to confer now with Mr. 
Dean on these documents on our authority. 

Senator Ervix. I agree with you absolutely. 

The committee will take a recess or stand at ease until the attorneys 
and Mr. Dean can confer about these documents. 


Senator Ervix. Everyone take your seats, please. 

Can you identify those documents, as being true copies, with certain 
deletions of matters relatino- to foreign intelligence, as being copies of 
the documents you delivered to Judge Sirica ? 


Mr. Dean. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Xos. 35 thru 42.*] 

Senator Ervin. There is one other document. I am groing to ask INIr. 
George INIurphy, Deputy Director of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, who has had custody of these documents since they were 
delivered by Judge Sirica's order to this committee, to show you an- 
other document which is not inchided among those copies, and ask if 
you can identify that document handed you by Mr. Murphy as being 
one of the documents you delivered to Judge Sirica. 

Mr. Dean. This is a copy of the original. 

Senator Er\t[n. A copy. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator EnAaN. Yes. Does it have some identification mark? 

Mr. Dean. Yes. It is a Special Report Interagency Committee on 
Intelligence Ad Hoc dated June 1970 with the chairman indicated 
J. Edgar Hoover, with a classification on it. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 43 for identifica- 
tion only and is not for publication.] 

Senator ER^^N. You can return that to Mr. Murphy now. 

Mr. Dean. It has top secret comment classification on it. 

Senator Er\^n. I want to take this occasion to thank Mr. Murphy, 
the Deputy Director of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, for 
acting as custodian of these documents since they were delivered to us 
by Judge Sirica and for the great help which he has given to the coni- 
niittee in respect to the contents of the documents and respect to their 
sensitive nature. We cannot thank you too much, Mr. Murphy. I am 
going to ask you to retain jurisdiction of the originals of these docu- 
ments and also we have no copy of that first document there. 

Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Er\^n. The committee is anxious to avoid disclosing any 
matters which affect national security, which are matters defined as 
matters relating to national defense or relating to our relations with 
other nations and for this reason we will not make this first document 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word in that respect ? 

Senator ER^^N. Yes. 

Senator Baker. I, too, would like to join in commending Mr. Mur- 
phy who, in addition to being Deputy Director of the Joint Atomic 
Energy Committee staff, is the security officer of the Atomic Energy 

I am a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and while 
we are going along with bread and butter, I would like to thank Con- 
gressman Mel Price, who is Chairman, for consenting to the additional 
burden on the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to assure 
the storage of these documents was done in accordance with the 
requirements of the law. 

Senator Er\t[n. One other question and then I will turn you back to 
Senator Weicker. How^ did you get possession of these documents, 
including the one that Mr. Murphy retained custody of ? 

Mr. Dean. The docvmients w^ere originally in the possession of Mr. 
Tom Huston, who had been assigned, I believe, directly by the Presi- 
dent to work on this project. Wlien I came on the White House staff 

*See pp. 1319-1338. 


Mr. Huston was placed on my staff and was on my staff for some time. 
I had a general awareness of the fact that he was working on this proj- 
ect but none of the specifics. At the time Mr. Huston was departing 
the start' he turned over the documents to me that I had possession of. 
Some of the documents that are contained, and I maintained in the file, 
I had never seen before the time he turned tliem oa cr to me. The only — 
I had seen the basic documents shortly after I joined the White House 
start' when Mr. Haldeman told me that Mr. Huston had been working 
to get the plan implemented, but there were some difliculties in imple- 
mentation. That is basically how I came in contact with the matter. 

Senator Ervix. Have you had the physical custody of these papers 
since that time? 

]Mr. Deax. Well. I had them until I took them and placed them in a 
safety deposit box under an instruction of Senator ]\Iansfield that any- 
thing that might have any bearing on this entire matter should be 

Senator Emax. Senator Weicker, you may resume your examina- 
tion. I thought it was wise to bring all of the documents in evidence 
that we think ought to be put there. 

Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Now. j\Ir. Dean, would you be good enough then to read to the com- 
mittee the memorandum from you to ]Mi-. Mitchell which, I believe — 
now, I have got to rely on my memory of several months' time since 
I liave seen these things, dated in September 1970 ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Deax. September 18, 1970. 

Senator Weicker. September 18. 

Mr. Deax [reading]. 

^lemorandiim For the Attorney General : 

Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, September 17, 1970, I suggest the fol- 
lowing procedures to commence our domestic intelligence oi>eration as quickly as 

1. Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit. A key to the entire operation will 
be the creation of an interagency intelligence unit for both operational and evalua- 
tion purposes. Obviously, the selection of persons to this unit will be of vital 
importance to the success of the mission. As we discussed, the selection of the 
personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step for several reasons. First, 
effective coordination of the different agencies must be developed at an early stage 
through the establishment of the unit. Second. Hoover has indicated a strong 
opposition to the creation of such a unit and. to bring the FBI fully on board, 
this seems an appropriate first step to guarantee their proper and full participa- 
tion in the program. Tliird, the unit can serve to make appropriate recommenda- 
tions for the type of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the 
various agencies. In regard to this third point, I believe we agreed that it would 
be inapnronriate to have anv blanket removal of restrictions: rather, the most 
appropriate procedure would be to decide on the tyjie of intelligence we need, 
based on an assessment of tlie recommendations of this unit, and then to proceed 
to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence. 

To proceed to create the interRgency intelligence unit, jiarticularly the evalu- 
ation srroup or committee. I recommend that we request the names of four nomi- 
nees from each of the intelligence agencies involved. "Wliile the precise composi- 
tion of the unit may vary as we giin exnerience, I think that two members 
should be anpointed initinlly from each agency in addition to your personal 
representative who should also be involved in the proceedinss. Because of the 
interagency a^nects of this reouest. it would ])robably be best if the request came 
from the White House. If you asree. I will make such a request of the acenc.v 
heads: however, I feel that it is essential th.Tt yon work this out with Hoover 
before I have any den lines with him directly. 

2. Housing. We di'^cussed the approprinte hou.c'ns: of this o))er!)tion and, upon 
reflection, I believe that rather than a White House staffer looking for suitable 


space, that a professional intelligence person should be assigned the task of locat- 
ing such space. Accordingly, I would suggest that a request be made that Mr. 
Hoover assign an agent to this task. In connection with the bousing problem, I 
think serious consideration must be given to the appropriate Justice Department 
cover for the domestic intelligence operation. We discussed yesterday using IDIU 
as a cover and as I indicated I believe that that is a mosit appropriate cover. I 
believe that it is generally felt that IDIU is already a far more extensive intelli- 
gence operation than has been mentioned publicly, and that the IDIU operation 
cover would eliminate the problem of discovering a new intelligence operation in 
the Department of Justice. However, I have reservations about the i^ersonnel in 
IDIU and its present operation activities and would suggest that they either be 
given a minor function within tlie new intelligence operation or that the staff be 
completely removed. I have had only incidental dealings with the personnel, other 
than Jim Devine, and cannot speak to their discretion and loyalty for .such an 
operation. I do not believe that Jim Devine is capable of any major position 
vplthin the new intelligence operation. However, I do believe that he could help 
perpetuate the cover and he has evidenced a loyalty to you, the Deputy and 
other key people in the Department of Justice, despite his strong links with the 
prior Administration. I would defer to your judgment, of course, on any recom- 
mendation regarding Jim Devine's continued presence in such an intelligence 

3. Assistant to Attorney General. We also discussed the need for you to have 
a right hand man to assist in running this operation. It would seem that what 
is needed is a man with administrative skills, a sensitivity to the implications of 
the current radical and subversive movements within the United States, and 
preferably, some background in intelligence work. To maintain the cover, I would 
think it appropriate for the man to have a law degree in that he will be a part 
of the Department of Justice. You suggested the possibility of using a prosecutor 
who had had experience with cases of this type. Accordingly, I have spoken 
with Harlington Wood to ask him to submit the names of five Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys who have had experience in dealing with demonstrations or riot type 
cases and who are mature individuals that might be appropriately given a sensi- 
tive assignment in the Department of Justice. I did not discuss the matter in any 
further detail with Wood other than to request the submission of some nominees. 
I w^ould also like to suggest that we request names from the various intelligence 
agencies involved for personnel that might be appropriately involved in this 
activity or w'ho might serve as your assistant. 

In summary, I recommend the following immediate action : 

(1) You meet with Hoover, explain what must be done, and request his 
nominees for the interagency unit. 

(2) You request that Hoover assign an agent to the task of locating 
appropriate housing for the operations. 

(3) I request that other involved intelligence agencies submit nominees 
for the interagency unit. 

(4)1 request from the agencies names of appropriate personnel for assign- 
ment to the operation. 
Finally, I would suggest that you call weekly meetings to monitor the problems 
as they emerge and to make certain that we are moving this program into imple- 
mentation as quickly as possible. 

It was signed, and had a note at the bottom. 

Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that if you would like him to join you 
in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy to do so. 

Senator Weicker. Thank yon, Mr, Dean. 

Now, this, in other words, refers to that portion of yonr statement 
yesterday where von sav : "I wrote a memorandnm reqiiestinpf that the 
Evahiation Committee be established and that the strings conld be 
removed hater. I tokl Haldeman that the only way to proceed would 
be one step at a time and this would be an important first step and he 

jNIr. De.vx. That is correct. 

I miffht footnote that with the remark that T was quite aware of a 
.ofreat interest in the matter,, and after some discussions with Mr. 
Huston, who still had a hope that the entire plan would be adopted, 


I had reached the conchision that there was no way the whole plan 
was going to be adopted and that the only thing that was essential 
was the lEC and that this wonld satisfy everybody that we were at 
least doing something to solve the problem and this was a first step 
that seemed to solve or to resolve that pressure with everybody. 

Senator Weicker. So. after this memorandum was written, you pro- 
ceeded to set up the lEC insofar as the structure, the placing of it, in 
the Internal Security Division, is that correct? 

Mr. Deax. I think what happened is, and I am not terribly familiar 
witli the mechanics of how this actually did occur, I believe that Mr. 
Mitchell did have a coTivei^ation with ]Mr. Hoover and reached some 
agreement as to their participation. I don't know how the decision 
was made to place it in the Internal Security unit, but I did learn 
about it at some point because they told me they had space that they 
had set aside in the Internal Security unit's office, which was separate 
and apart from the Department of Justice, the main Department of 

And I had learned that Mr. Doherty would be sort of the man that 
would be heading the operation initially. 

Senator AVeicker. INIay I ask you this question in relation to Mr. 

Was there any discussion at this time about this unit's first head 
being ]\Ir. Earl Sharp? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, there was. 

]\Ir. Ehrlichman was aware of this as well and Judge Sharp, who 
was a friend of Mr. Ehrlichman's, apparently had been — as I recall, 
he was an elective judge and he either hadn't been reelected or some- 
thing of that nature, an appointment had run out, and he was not 
currently sitting on the bench anywhere, and ^Ir. Ehrlichman thought 
this would be an excellent thing for him to do and invited him to 
come to Washington. 

We had a number of meetings on it and the more he looked at it, 
the less he decided he wanted to get involved in it. 

Senator Weicker. So that the first head was Mr. John Doherty? 

Mr. Deax. I believe that is correct. 

Senator Weicker. Did you hold anv discussions in 3'our office with 
Mr. Sharp or Mr. Doherty'relative to the lEC ? 

Mr. Deax. I am sure probably with both individuals, yes. 

Senator Weicker. And what other persons would have been present 
at those meetings ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I can't recall anybody else being present when I 
talked to Judofe Sharp. 1 know that — I do recall tha*" when he decided 
that he wasn't interested, because, one, he felt he didn't know much 
about this field, that he would have a whole education to become ac- 
quainted with it — I think he spent a couple of weeks looking into the 
matter, I think he learned that it was going to be some sort of, going 
to be a secret operation that he would be running in the Department 
of Justice and he wanted to be able to explain iust what he was doing 
with people back home and he didn't want to have to say, I can't tell 
3'ou what I am doing in Washington. 

We had a number of discussions about other assignments for him 
and he did some very valuable legal work for my office in connection 
with some trade matters that had come to my office for resolution. 

96-296 0-73-11 


Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Dean, then Mr. Doherty was the first 
head and he was succeeded by whom ? 

Mr. Dean. I believe by Mr. Wells. 

Senator Weicker. By Mr. Bernard Wells ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. All right. 

So from the time of your memorandum at the time of your talk 
with Haldeman as to the setting up of the mechanics of the operation, 
administering of details of the operation, does it come as any surprise 
to you, that listed under the Office of Analysis and Planning in the 
Internal Security Division of the Justice Department as of April 15, 
1972, is a listing of Bernard Wells, Executive Director, IDII"'. with 
Mr. James McGrath and Joyce Webb listed under that ? 

Is this basically, then, the plan that is suggested in your memoran- 
dum to John Mitchell ? 

The ink marks and the scribblings are mine and my staff's. 

Mr. Dean. I can't glean an awful lot from this chart. 

Senator Weicker. There is no mention of lEC there, is there ? 

Mr. Dean. No, there is not, and the documents that all came to me 
were clearly marked "lEC" on them when they came over. 

Senator Weicker. And they came over from ^Ir. Wells ? 

Mr. Dean. They came over from Mr. Wells. 

Senator Weicker. Would you read to the committee what Mr. Wells 
is listed as in that document ? 

Mr. Dean. Executive Director, IDIU. 

Senator Weicker. You have also stated that to the best of your 
knowledge, no illegal activities were conducted by the lEC ? I would 
like to get into the matter of your contacts. Let me ask you one ques- 
tion before you go on to your contacts with the Internal Security 

Statements have been made tliat there was a rescission by the Presi- 
dent of the 1970 plan. "WHiy all this business ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, at one point — I do not know about the 
rescission. That is something that I do not know. I knew tliat tliei'e 
was a squabble going on between principally Mr. Huston, representing 
the White House, and the FBI. Mr. Huston talked to me on a number 
of occasions about the matter. I knew that Mr. Mitchell, when I talked 
with him about it, both telephonically and when I met with him, was 
opposed to the grand plan that is in that manual, and I think what 
Mitchell and I decided was the best course was to do the minimum 
amount possible that might satisfv people that something was being 
done. And that was to create the lEC. 

Senator Weicker. Now, it is possible, then, that one of two things 
might have happened. Either there could have been a rescission by the 
President, the word of which rescission you never received. That is a 
possibility, is it not ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I note that their memorandum in here tliat follow 
the date of the memorandum I sent and memorandum I had not seen, 
and I recall that ]Mr. Huston was still trying to do something about 
this, even after I sent that memorandum. 

Senator Weicker. Yes, but let me 

Mr. Dean. So to answer your question, it is very i'>ossil)le that I 
would not have been aware of, in fact, I was not aware at all of a 


Senator Weickek. It is also possible there was no rescission. 

Mr. Dean. And I was not aware in full of an approval. I had a 
general awareness that, you know, I was told to see what you can do to 
get this plan implemented. 

Senator AVeicker. But insofar as your firsthand knowledge, and that 
is all I am interested in 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. You did implement the first step of the plan ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. Xow, could you tell this committee in your own 
words of any other contacts that you had with the Internal Security 
Division insofar as information that could have a political value? Did 
you have any contacts with the Internal Security Division yourself? 

Mr. Deax. As I mentioned in my statement, there was a continual 
request for information regarding demonstrations and particularly 
information that would embarrass individuals in connection with their 
relationship with demonstrators or demonstration leaders. The princi- 
pal liaison 

Senator "Weicker. Outside of the area of demonstrations, did any 
information come to you from the Internal Security Division which 
could have a political value ? 

'Sir. Deax. I am sure it could have, but without looking at my files, 
it is impossible for me to remember what might be. 

Senator "Weicker. Did vou have any direct contact with Division 5 
of the FBI? 

Mr. Deax. Division 5 of the FBI ? 

Senator "Weicker. That is Mr. Sullivan's division. 

Mr. Deax. I knew Ylr. Sullivan, but I do not recall haying any con- 
tact with him when he was at the Internal Security Division. 

Senator "Weicker. All right ; with the CIA ? 

Mr. Deax. No. 

Senator Weicker. With the Metropolitan Police ? 

Mr. Deax. I talked to them — in connection with demonstrations, I 
had a number of conversations with the ^Metropolitan Police. In fact, 
I had on my telephone, I had a number of private lines that would go 
directly to "command posts that were concerned with demonstrations. 
There was one that went to the Defense Department, there was one 
that went to the Justice Department, to what I should call the old 
IDTU Unit, which did become operational at demonstration time. I 
had contact, a telephone line to the Mavor's command post, and one to 
the Secret Service command post. So during demonstrations, I did 
receive information from all those places. 

Senator Weicker. To ffet over this particular area of inquiry, and I 
do not want to prolonq- it. insofar as Division 5, the CIA, the Metro- 
politan Police, military intelligence 

Mr. Deax. I am not aware of where the intelligence 

Senator Weicker. Did vou receive any information from these en- 
tities which was of a political nature — and I do not consider informa- 
tion on demonstrations to be of a political nature : it is somethinor that 
could be applied to all sides — but that could be useful politically? 

Mr. Deax. Senator, I wouVl like to be able to tell vou that I can 
vocalk but T cannot recall and what the answer mi^-ht be to resolve the 
question is that the committee mi^ht want to go throuQ-h my files and 
see what is in there and that would answer the question. Because I have 


not destroyed any documents and anything I received would be there. 
My files, of course, are still locked up in the basement of the White 

Senator Weicker. All right. Let us move on to your comment on 
page 14, where you refer to your conversation with Mr. ]\Iardian. 

It was not until almost a year or more later that I learned the reason for Mar- 
dian's trip to see the President. Mr. Mardian later told me, in a social conversa- 
tion, that he had gone to .see the President to get instructions regarding the 
disposition of wiretap logs that related to newsmen and White House staffers 
who were suspected of leaking. 

Now, can you expand on the conversation which you had with 
Robert Mardian at that time ? 

Mr. Dean. To the best of my recollection, the conversation was a 
very, very minor part of a very rambling conversation when I recalled 
the fact that we had gone to San Clemente together and had gone to 
visit a friend of his in San Clemente and spent some time together. I 
was out there for one purpose — that was to turn off a burglary of the 
Brookings Institution. He told me that he could not tell me what he 
was out there for. I recall he went down to San Clemente at the same 
time I did and I waited for him to have his meeting. He did not tell 
me after the meetings what had occurred. Then it was in recounting 
the fact that our visit with this friend of his out in California, when I 
finally asked him, I said. Avell, what in the world were you doing out in 
California ? He said, Avell, there were some wiretaps and I had gotten 
the logs from Sullivan and I had to get instructions on what to do with 
them and I was told to give them to Ehrlichman. 

It was a very fleeting conversation, but it stuck in my memory. 

Senator Weicker. All right. You then say, you have in your state- 
ment, since I had occasion to raise a question about these logs with 
Ehrlichman during the fall of 1972, what was that occasion ? 

Mr. Dean. I tried to recall that as I was preparing my statement 
and something did occur in which I asked Ehrlichman directly about 
the loirs and I cannot recall specificallv what it was. Again it wasn't 
something that was of the moment of the Time magazine inquiry but 
it was a reference to something about newsmen. There had been on 
the rumor mill at the White House for some time this fact that the 
White House had instructed a surveillance of White House staff mem- 
bers and newsmen in dealing with leaks and I asked Ehrlichman about 
it. I said "Do you have the logs?'' and he said "Xo." And I let it drop 
at that. 

Senator Weicker. Even though at that moment in time 

Mr. Dean. I knew he had the logs. 

Senator Weicker. You were under the impression from a talk with 
Mr. Mardian that he did have the logs. You had the logs? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. I beg you pardon, he had the logs ? 

Mr. Dean, Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Then comes February 22 or 23 of this year, and 
to vour testimonv I gather vou were placed in position of 
trying to find out about the leaks with the FBI relative to a potential 
Time magazine story? 

Mr. Dean. That is rieht. 

Senator Weicker. So you interviewed Mr. Sullivan ? 


'Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. Would you describe to the committee the nature 
of that interview ? 

Mr. Deax. After I learned of the inquiry, I called Mr. Mark Sul- 
livan or Mr. Mark Felt and asked him, first of all, if in fact it were 
true because I had never had a confirmation from anyone; I thought 
I ought to get a direct confirmation. He told me "Do you really want 
to know V' and I said "Yes, I think I should know," and he told me that, 
'•Yes, it had occurred,'" and said that "Bill Sullivan has all the facts on 
this. He was involved in it and he knows all those facts." I then asked 
Felt if he knew how it had leaked and he said he didnt have any idea. 
I then called Sullivan and told him that, I asked him if he would 
come to my office, and he did come to my office, and I said that I had 
this inquiry from the press office i^garding this and I had some in- 
formation that in fact it had happened, and I wondered what the facts 
were, and Mr. Sullivan then recounted the fact that he had been in- 
volved in this and told me that he had at one point gotten the most 
trusted people in the "Washington field office to undertake the function. 
That subsequently he had, when Director Hoover was trying to get 
copies of the logs that he had either before that time or contemporane- 
ously with this time, he had told the Washington field office people 
to destroy all of the other logs so it ended up there was one set of logs 
and related memorandums that were in the custody of Sullivan, and 
there was some removal of these persons' instructions and I don't have 
all these details because Sullivan didn't give them to me, and give them 
to Mardian, and INIardian had possession of them appar-^ntly at the time 
he went to the west coast to get instructions as to what he was to do 
with them. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Dean, let me be very clear here so we try to 
put this story together. You were informed earlier in 1972 by Mr. 
Mardian that he has in his possession the logs of the Kissinger taps, 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct, No, not that he has them, that he had 
turned them over. 

Senator AVeicker. He had received them and he had turned them 
over to Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. And then in 1973 in an interview with Mr. Sulli- 
van, Mr. Sullivan indicated to you that the taps were accomplished 
by the Washington field office of the FBI. That they had a set of the 
logs and the taps, he had a set of the logs and taps or the logs and the 
summaries, I beg your pardon, the logs and summaries. 

Mr. Deax. Yes, that Sullivan had them in. No, Sullivan told me that 
he had turned them over to Mardian. 

Xow one or the other, at the time that the Time magazine inquiry 
came in there was also an effort, to determine how this had leaked and 
that was very much a part of the conversation I had with Sullivan as 
to how this could leak, and I recall discussing with Sullivan also who 
else knew about this, and he told me that he thought that Hoover had 
told and he mentioned the name of the person and I cannot recall it at 
this time, and this person, in turn, had mentioned that he understood 
to Governor Rockefeller and Governor Eockefeller in turn told Dr. 
Kissinger. Also in dealing with Mr. Felt I had asked him if he had 


any idea how it had leaked because there was concern as to what the 
source of the story was as well as the leak. 

Senator Weicker. Did Mr. Sullivan indicate to you that summaries 
of the logs had gone to several persons in the White House j 

Mr. Dean. When I was dealing with Sulli\an, he didn't seem to 
know the final disposition of the logs and we didn't discuss whether the 
logs had gone over to the White House at that time, during the time 
that they were, the wiretaps were being taken. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Dean, I am not talking about the final dis- 
position of the logs and summaries but rather where the summaries of 
the logs went at the time that they were being done. 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, Sullivan did not tell me where they had gone, to 
the best — ^I have no recollection of that and I think I would have 
remembered it. 

Senator Weicker. I mean be very careful on this point. He indicated 
to you, No. 1, according to the testimony that you set down to the best 
of your recollection that Mr. Hoover disapproved of these particular 
set of taps, is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That is the impression I had. I liad been told sometime 
before after Mr. Mardian left the Department of Justice and went 
to the reelection committee that sometliing had to be done for Bill 
Sullivan. Now he always worked on the assumption that I knew that 
Sullivan had done some very important thing for the White House. 
I was never clear on exactly what it was that Mr. Sullivan had done 
that the White House owed him some favor for. But I can recall on 
repeated occasions this coming up and also it came up with respect to 
a man by the name of Mr. Brennan and who was with the FBI. I was 
somewhat on the periphery of this and was never quite clear and tlie 
best I can do now I am just trying to put together the tidbits of knowl- 
edge that I did have. 

Senator Weicker. Well, you interviewed ISIr. Sullivan yourself as to 
his involvement in the Kissinger tap situation ? 

]\Ir. Dean. Yes, I did. 

Senator Weicker. And I just want to make sure what it is that — — 

Mr, Dean. I think if you were to talk to Mr. Sullivan he would call 
I was most interested in how it had leaked because ]Mr. Felt had told 
me in fact it had happened. I was, of course, aware of the taps occur- 
ring because of the information that ]Mardian had given me and I do 
not recall exactly when Mardian had told me this but I was merely 
collecting a wliole series of tidbids of information as mucli information 
at the Wliite House that did come to me was through tidbits, ]My im- 
mediate focus at the time I was dealing with Sullivan was how in the 
world we were going to deal with the story that was in Time magazine 
and after I collected the information I was able to collect as to who 
did know I called Ehrlichman and told him the facts and he said 
"Deny it." 

Senator Weicker. Did he tell you who prepared the summaries of 
the logs ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; he did not. 

Senator Weicker. ]Mr. Chairman. T tliink one point that I would like 
to make clear here is that I have had a rather lengthy discussion witli 
^Ir. Sullivan on the subject matter which is being discussed here now. I 
know that it would not be fair for me to state what the substance of 


that conversation was, I would much prefer to have it with INIr. Sulli- 
van and I would hope when we are throug:h with this particular wit- 
ness we will give Mr. Sullivan the opportunity to explain his particular 
ix)le in this matter. 

In your talk with Mr. Sullivan, or in j^our contacts with him, was he 
ever requested to prepare a memorandum relative to FBI involvement 
with other Presidents insofar as the political aspects were concerned? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, he was. As I mentioned that in my statement, when 
I had mentioned to the President the fact that I had met with INIr. 
Sullivan and he had alluded to other activities by the FBI over the 
preceding jGurs the President was very interested and asked me to 
obtain the information from Mr. Sullivan, and on several times I 
asked ISIr. Sullivan if he could put this into documentary form, and 
he said he could. He himself typed out a memorandum that contained 
his best recollection of some of the political uses that have been made 
of the FBI by preceding administrations. That was originally one of 
my submissions to the committee and it is a classified document by 
Mr. Sullivan himself. He told me it was going to have to be declassified 
before it could be turned over but by the reference to it in my state- 
ment I meant to call it to tlie attention of the committee and the com- 
mittee is certainly welcome to have that document. 

Senator Wetcker. All right. Is there any other use that you made 
or the Wliite House made of the FBI on matters that come to your 
recollection now? 

Mr. Deax. I can recall again, after the fact, getting involved in a 
situation that involved an FBI investigation that was made of Mr. 
Daniel Schorr, and when I learned about that after the fact I was 
told that what had happened is that Mr. Higby, who was Mr. Halde- 
man's assistant, had received a request from Mr. Haldeman when he 
was traveling with the President, to direct the FBI to do an investi- 
sration of ]Mr. Schorr. Mr. Hoover proceeded with the investigation 
but, to the dismav of the ^^^lite House, he did a sort of a full field 
wide-onen investigation, and this became verv apparent. So this put 
tlio White House in a rather scrambling position to explain what had 
hapnened. The long and short of the explanation was that Mr. Malik, 
who at the time knew nothing about this said that Mr. Schorr was 
]>eing considered for a post and that this was a part of a preliminary 
investigation in consideration of Mr. Schorr for a Presidential 
appointment in, I believe, the environmental field. 

Senator "Wetcker. All right. Anv other instances that you recollect 
as to the use of the FBI by the A^Hiite House along these lines? 

Let me give you a broad range, mark these down so you do not have 
to remember them, this type of situation that either involved the FBI 
or the Internal Revenue Service, CIA, ^Military Intelligence, Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms, Secret Service. 

Mr. Deax. Let me start from the bottom of the list back. I do recall, 
and I mentioned in mv statement a rather broad reference to the fact 
that intelligence came from surprising sources sometimes. At one point 
one of the top officials at the Secret Service brought me a small intel- 
ligence printout regardino- Senator ]McGovern and just left it with 
me and said "I thought that this might be of interest to you." 


It had to do with Mr. — with Senator McGovern attending a fund- 
raising function, I believe in Philadelphia, and apparently there were 
some references in the intelligence statement to the fact that either 
Communist, former Communist supporters were going to attend the 
fund raiser. 

I took the document to Mr. Colson and I said, "Are you interested 
in this? I assume it was given to me not to bury in my files," but I 
said, "I do not think you can reveal the source of the information." 

He said, "I am very interested in it." He took it and later told me 
he had made arrangements to have it published. 

Now, with regard to the ATF, Mr. Caulfield was at ATF after he 
left the White House and going by way of the reelection committee, 
and from time to time I would send over tidbits of information regard- 
ing individuals. Some of this might be reflected in my files because I 
cannot recall ever doing anything with this information other than 
filing it. 

The CIA, I do not recall myself receiving anything that we might 
call politically embarrassing information from the CIA about any in- 
dividual. The memoranda I received from the CIA were straight 
classified documents regarding activities of some antiwar demon- 
strators or people traveling to Hanoi and things of this nature. Also, 
foreign funding of domestic radical groups and things of this nature 
which I would forward generally to Dr. Kissinger or General Haig. 

With regard to the FBI, I mentioned that — IRS, I think that you 
will find in either exhibit 34—5 or possibly maybe 34-6 reference to some 
use of the Internal Eevenue Service and requesting information or 
dealing with situations in regard to the Internal Revenue Service. 

I am also aware of the fact that after an article was published on 
Mr. Rebozo I got instructions that one of the authors of that article 
should have some problems. I did not know how to deal directly with 
the situation. I discussed it with Mr. Caulfield. I was reluctant to call 
Mr. Walters, who was the head of the Internal Revenue Service and 
suggest that he do anything about this. Mr. Caulfield apparently had 
friends in Internal Revenue Service and I believe he told me he was 
able to accomplish an audit on the individual. What the consequence 
of the audit was I do not know. 

Senator Weicker. "Who is the individual ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not recall for certain. It was one of the, I think it 
was one of the Newsday persons who worked on a rather extensive 
article on INIr. Rebozo. 

Senator Weicker. All right. 

Are there any other instances of which you have firsthand knowl- 
edge in this 

Mr. Dean. As I say, if I were to spend a week or so in my files, I 
could probably on chapter and verse everything that had come to my 
office in this regard. 

But I am trying to come off the top and tell you what I can recall off 
the top. 

Senator Weicker. I would hope, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Chairman, that 
Mr. Dean would do just tliat and refresh his recollections as to whether 
there is anything further that he has been unable to come forth with 
at this time. 


Mr. Dean. The "White House has made an arrangement whereby I 
can go to my files, but I nuist say it is a ratlier awkward arrangement. 
There are some five file cabinets that are all safes and there is no desk 
in the room to work and I must work under the supervision of a Secret 
Service agent and there is no place to sit down with any comfort in 
writing, so it is a little difficult to get in there and do anything. 

Hopefully, if I were to do that, we can make arrangements so 1 can 
get in and spend the time that would be necessary to go through the 

The other thing is, of course, I have to do this all by handwriting, 
because I am not allowed to make any copies of anything in my files. 

Senator Weicker. I see. 

Just briefly— and this will end my questioning, and I apologize to 
the committee for taking so much time, but it is a subject that I confess 
I don't have every last bit of information on. It is a difficult thing to 
piece together, but I think it is a very important part of the story. I 
think it has become clear this afternoon that another step has been 
taken, another step further along the road from testimony that Mr. 
McCord gave, whereupon he was receiving information from the In- 
ternal Security Division; another step wherein, at least insofar as the 
structure of the plan of 1970, which included bugging, breaking in, 
burglary and the like, and the mechanics and the administration was 
concerned, that the first step was taken ; and also, that even though 
that particular unit did not invoH'e itself in any illegal activities, cer- 
tainly the security arms of the U.S. Government were in various in- 
stances which you have cited utilized for purposes not intended. 

Would that be a fair summation of what we are talking about? 

IMr. Dean. I am not njiite sure of the end of vour summation there. 
I wonder if you could repeat. You said that security arms were used — — 

Senator Weicker. That is correct. Even though the lEC itself did 
not engage in any illeiral activities, do you consider the m.atters that 
you have spoken of, whether it be an FBI investigation of an individ- 
ual or an I"RS audit, to be legal and proper activities by those security 

Mr. Dean. As I say, I don't know of the lEC itself preparing 
I'tolitical material. 

Senator Weicker. I understand. 

]Mr. Dean. I do. of course, kriow and as I have submitted in docu- 
ments, other agencies were involved in seekinjr politically embarrassing 
information on individuals who were tliought to be the enemies of the 
"\^^lite House. 

I might also add that in mv possession is a rather, verv much down 
the line to what you are talking about, is a memorandum that was 
requested by me to prepare a means to attack the enemies of the "^^Hiite 

There was also maintained what was called an enemies list, which 
was rather extensire and continually being updated. 

Senator Weicker. I am not going to ask who was on it. I am afraid 
vou mi.frht answer. 

I wonder, are these documents in the possession of the committee? 


Mr, Dean. No, but I would be happy to submit them to the com- 
mittee. They didn't fit within the request that I had with counsel as to 
the documents he wished to have produced, but if the committee does 
wish them, I will be happy to submit them.* 

Mr. Dash. My. Chairman, I think the committee would like very 
much to have a copy of that memorandum. 

Mr. Dean. All rif^ht, sir. 

Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, ]Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Senator ]Montoya. 

Senator jNIoxtoya. Thaiik you, Mr. Chairman. 

j\Ir. Dean, you mentioned in yesterday's testimony about the brief- 
ings that were being given to ]Mr. Ziegler prior to his making public 
statements with respect to this situation involving the break-in at the 

Now, will you please give me a little more information as to the 
intensity or the extent of these briefings ? 

INIr. Dean. I think that the intensity would depend upon the subject 
matter at a given point in time. The one I have pointed out was the 
October 10 situation when the Segretti story began breaking. I was 
not always present when Mr. Ziegler was being prepared but was often 
asked questions by him on how to handle a question or the like. 

"When stories started leaking in various areas, at that point in time. 
I was particularly asked what we may expect next. At one point in 
time, I recall when Mr. Baldwin's testimony was printed in the Los 
Angeles Times, I read the FBI interview of Mr. Baldwin to see if in 
fact, everything that he had told the Times had yet been printed. We 
talked about that. 

Often Mr. Moore was present when I was with ]Mr. Ziegler and 
i:)reparing him for his morning briefing. Often, he would clieck with 
Mr. Haldeman if the story related directly to him or particularly with 
Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Senator Montoya. INIr. Dean, I am referring specifically to the brief- 
ing that Mr. Ziegler received with respect to the responses which he 
made about White House involvement in the Watergate affair. 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I believe I cataloged many of those in my 

Now, some of those occurred before Mr. Ziegler and I had even 
talked about the matter. 

Senator Montoya. Wlio would ordinarily brief him? Would it be 
Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman, or who would approve his state- 

Mr. Dean. It would be Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, or the 

Senator Montoya. I notice that the President also made some state- 
ments. Wlio briefed the President prior to his making these statements 
with respect to inquiries about the Watergate and the White House 
involvement ? 

Mr. Dean. "What would happen or what occurs before Presidential 
press conferences, a briefing book is prepared and a number of people 
contribute to tliat briefing book as to anticipated questions. The people 
who are familiar with the press and anticipated questions that tlie 

*Thp flocnments rofprred to y:erc lator submitted in hearing of June 27 and will appear 
in Book 4 as exhibits Nos. 44 thru 56. 


press might ask will send around to various members of the staff 
suggested questions and ask for their suggested answers. These often 
go to several people. Oftentimes, the "Watergate questions would come 
to me. Oftentimes, they would come to Dick Moore as well and each 
person, in fact. Dick Moore and I would often sit down and work 
them out together and then take them to ISIr. Buchanan, who was 
compiling this briefing book. 

Senator Moxtoya. Would you say that you participated in most of 
the briefings where the President made positive statements about the 
"Watergate affair? 

^fr. Deax. I would say I either contributed to the briefing book or 
later, when I began meeting with the President in ]\Iarch, had direct 
conversations with him when he asked me about a reaction to a par- 
ticular question. 

Senator Moxtoya. Now, let's go into the statements made by the 
President — ^I have copies here. On August 29, 1972, the President made 
this statement: 

In addition to that, within our own staff, under my direction, counsel to the 
President, Mr. Dean, has conducted a complete investigation of all leads which 
might involve any present members of the White House staff or anybody in the 
government. I can say categorically that his investigation indicates that no one 
in the White House staff, no one in this administration presently employed, was 
involved in this very bizarre incident. 

Xow, did you participate in that? 

]Mr. Deax. Xo. sir, not at all. I was totally unaware of it and do 
not know who did prepare that for the President. 

Senator ]Moxtoya. "\Yas the President telling the truth when he 
made that statement ? 

]Mr. Deax. "Well, as I said in my statement yesterday, I would have 
counseled the President against the statement and I cited the reasons 
why I would have counseled the President against the statement be- 
cause of the knowledge I had as to the fact that documents had been 
destroyed that were incriminating to ]Mr. Haldeman; the fact that I 
had suspicions about other people's involvement. 

As I said yesterdav also, if that were to be a literal statement as 
to somebody being involved in the very particular incident which 
occurred on June 17. which, the wav it reads, does not indicate that, 
but if it originally was designed to do that, that would have been a 
true statement. 

Otherwise, I think it was a little broad. 

Senator ]Moxtoya. Now, on October 5, 1972, the President made this 

Senator Er\tx. "We have a vote. "We will recess. 


Senator Emix. Senator, you may proceed with the interrogation. 

Senator Moxtoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dean, now I ask vou about the press conference of October 5, 
1972. held by the President, and I quote from his press conference as 

Incidentally, I conducted the investigation of the Hiss case. I know that is 
a very unpopular subject to raise in some quarters, but I conducted it. It was 
successful. The FBI did a magnificent job, but that investigation involving the 
security of this eountrv was basically a Sunday school exercise compared to the 


amount of effort that was put into this — meaning the Watergate — I agreed with 
the amount of effort that was put into it. I wanted every lead carried out to the 
end, because I wanted to be sure that no member of the White House staff and 
no man or woman in a position of management responsibility in the Committee 
for Re-Electiou had anything to do with this kind of reprehensible activity. 

Now, would you say that the President was correct in making those 
statements at that time? 

Mr. Dean. I can say this, Senator. I certainly did not brief him or 
prepare anything for the briefing book that would have led him to 
make that statement. And I can also say once the indictments were 
handed down, it became the^ — what I would have to call the PE tech- 
nique of the White House to say tliat, well, everybody in tlie White 
House is clean and this was repeated by Mr. Ziegler and in tniii, used 
by the President. 

Senator Montoya. Well, would you agree with his ajipraisal that his 
job in the Hiss case was a Sunday school exercise com[)ared with this 

Mr. Deax. Well, I am not that familiar with his effort. It is true 
that the FBI investigation was extensive, but it obviously was not 

Senator Montoya. Now, on March 17, 1973, the President made 
another statement : 

I will simply say with regard to the Watergate case what I have said pre- 
viously, that the investigation by Mr. Dean, the White House counsel, in which, 
incidentally, he had access to the FBI records on this particular matter, because 
I directed him to conduct this investigation, indicates tliat no one in the White 
House staff at the time he conducted the investigation — that was .July and 
August — ^was involved or had knowledge of the Watergate matter. 

Now, is that a correct statement ? 

Mr. Dean. As I testified yesterday, that came up, I believe, in my 
meeting preceding his press conference. He said that — that was 
March 17, the date on that ? 

Senator Montoya. March 2, 1973. 

Mr. Dean. March 2, correct. 

On March 1, w^hen I met with him, he was verv annoyed at the fact 
that Gray was making comments about Dean sitting in on the FBI 
investigation and things of this nature were coming up. It was his 
assessment that there was nothing wrong with this. He told me that. 
These were thoughts that he, himself, had raised and as I testified yes- 
terday, I do not feel or I did not feel at the time that he was raising 
this that I could tell him that he could not use my name further for the 
so-called Dean report. I was quite aware of the fact that he nnist be 
aware of the fact that I had not conducted such an investigation for 
him because he had never received a report from me on it. 

Senator Montoya. All right. Now, on April 17. 1973, the President 
said this : "I condemn any attempts to cover up in this case, no matter 
who is involved." 

Do you believe he was telling the truth on that date ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Will you state why ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, because by that time, he knev,- the full implications 
of the case and Mr. Haldeman and Mv. Ehrlichman were certainly 
still on the staff at that point in time and there was considerable 
resistance to their departure from the staff. I had told the President 


that I would not leave the staff unless they resigned. Yet, it was not 
until the 30th that those resignations occurred. 

Senator Montoya. Xow, on April 30 he made this statement : 

We must maintain tlie integrity of tlie White House and that integrity must 
be real, not transparent. There can be no whitewash at the White House. 

Is that a correct statement ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I would like to make this comment regarding the 
April 30 speech. As I testified yesterday, after I issued my statement 
that I would not be a scapegoat I had virtually no contact with mem- 
bers of the staff. However, I did have occasion to talk to Len Garment 
and when the President went off to Camp David to prepare his major 
address, which is the one you are referring to. I told Mr. Garment, I 
said, "I have no way to get this message through to the President at 
this point in time. However, I would ask you one thing, Len." I said, 
"Would you please tell the President in your own words that he not 
give a cosmetic speech," and I asked him to do what he could to get the 
President to lay out the facts as the President could have laid them out 
at that time. 

Senator Montoya. Do you know whether he followed through on 
that ? 

Mr. Dean. He did not follow through on that. 

Senator Montoya. Now, on May 22, 1973, the President made this 
statement : 

With regard to the specific allegations that have been made I can and do 
state categorically. 

1. 1 had no prior knowledge of the Watergate operation. 

2. I took no part in nor was I aware of any subsequent efforts that may have 
been made to cover up Watergate. 

3. At no time did I authorize any offer of Executive clemency for the Water- 
gate defendants nor did I know of any such offer. 

4. I did not know until the time of my own investigation of any effort to provide 
the Watergate defendants with funds. 

5. At no time did I attempt or did I authorize others to attempt to implicate 
the CIA in the Watergate matter. 

6. It was not until the time of my own investigation that I learned of the 
break-in in the ofiice of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and I specifically authorized 
the furnishing of this information to Judge Byrne. 

7. I neither authorized nor encouraged subordinates to engage in illegal or 
improper campaign tactics. 

Now, will vou respond as to the correctness of this particular state- 
ment bv the President ? 

'Sir. Dean. In its totality or point by point ? 

Senator INIontoya. Point by point, if you can or you might start 
out by respondinis: to it in totality. 

]\Ir. Dean. Well, in totality, I think there are less than accurate 
statements in the statement. Let me take it point by point. 

I do not know, I have no firsthand knowledge if the President had 
prior knowVdge of the Watergate operation. Avith regard to point 1. 

I believe the President was aware of an effort to cover up the 
Watergate, point 2. 

Senator ]\Iontoya. Will you state the particulars? 

Mr. Dean. As far as T know, the first time I had firsthand knowledge 
that he was aware of this was on September 15 when I met with him 
shortly after the indictments. 

Senator IMontoya. That was on September 15, 1972 ? 


Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Moxtoya. What specific knowledge did lie have at that time, 
what knowledge was imparted to him ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I have testified earlier, I was aware of the fact 
that Mr. Haldeman frequently took notes when I was reporting to 
him and would immediately leave from my reporting session to go to 
the President's office with these notes. There were occasions when, 
before this date, when I would meet with him when there would be a 
call from the President and ]Mr. Haldeman would indicate that "INIr. 
Dean is giving a report on information he has,'' and would delay until 
that report was completed. So I assumed most of what I was reporting 
was being reported to the President, 

When he talked to me on the ISth^ — it is very eas}^ to tell, if you are 
talking on the same wavelength with a man, and there was certainly no 
doubt in my mind that we were talking on the same wavelength about 
the fact that it had been successful in keeping it out of tlie "\"\niite House 
because of the fact that it had been held, the indictments had been held 
at the Liddy level and gone no higher. 

And certainly, this statement was issued on ^Slay 22, 1973, and on 
March 21 I certainly told the President everything I knew at that 
point in time. And also I would indicate that some of the conversa- 
tions I had with him in February again indicated to me that he under- 
stood what was happening. He had complimented me again on the 
first meeting on the 27th on my handling of the matter during the 
campaign, and I cannot imagine him complimenting me if he did not 
understand what ho was complimenting me on. 

vSenator ^NIoxtoya. Well, as a matter of fact, on February 17, or 
27, 1973, the President directed that you report to him regarding all 
Watergate matters, did he not? 

]Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator ]Moxtoya. Who did he give those instructions to? 

Mr. Deax. He gave them directly to me. 

Senator ]Moxtoya. Did you relay them to ]\Ir. Haldeman and Mr. 

'^Ir. Deax. No; he told me I should not deal with Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman. PTe told me that the Watergate matter was consuming 
too much of their time and taking them away from their normal duties 
and tliat henceforth I should report to him. I should submit this, 
because this in the light of the fact that he had been involved in a 
number of Presidential decisions which were reflective of some of 
the agenda which I had submitted to the committee, and he saw very 
clearly there was going to require a lot more of their time. 

Senator ^NIoxtoya. Why would the President be so concerned about 
Mr. Haldeman and ]Mr. Ehrlichman spending so much time away 
from their normal duties on Watergate if his people were not involved 
and he had no knowledge of any involvement on the part of his people 
or anyone in the White House? 

yiv. Deax. Well, sir, I happen to believe that he did have knowledge. 

Senator ]Moxtoya. Would you say that because he had this knowl- 
edge he was expressing concern about the time expended by Mr. 
Ehrlichman and ^Nlr. Haldeman on this affair? 

^h\ Deax. T would think that by that time I had earned my stripes, 
so to speak, as capable of handling the coverup on my own, and that 


I no lonofer needed to have the daily reporting with Ehrlichman and 
Haldcman as to what I should do and how I should handle things 
and that was the reason for the request that I report directly to him 
and got guidance from him. 

Senator Moxtoya. In other words, it was your feeling as we say 
in the West that you had earned your spurs ? 

^Ir. Dean. Yes, sir. [Laughter.] 

Senator Montoya. Xow, on September 15 

^Ir. Deax. Do you want me to complete the points on the speech? 

Senator ]Moxtoya. Yes, if you will; I am sorry. 

Mr. Deax'. On point Xo. 4, he indicated his own investigation 
started on the 21st. I had a conversation with the President on the 
13th myself in which he mentioned the fact that he had talked to 
Colson and Ehrlichman regarding clemency for ]\Ir. Hunt, and also 
prior to that I was aware of the fact that Mr, Colson told me in Jan- 
uary, January -1 or 5, that he had talked to the President. Ehrlichman 
told me he had talked to the President and that message was, in turn, 
relayed to Mr. Bittman and then rela^'ed to Mr. Hunt. 

Subsequent to that on April 15 the President again repeated the 
fact that he had talked to ^Mr. Colson about clemency for Mr. Hunt. 
So I don't think that is quite an accurate statement. 

Senator ^Mox'toya. Well, as a matter of fact, you did relay some 
information to, was it Caulfield so that he could in turn relay such 
information to Mr. McCord about clemency ? 

Mr. Deax". That is correct. 

Senator Moxtoya. And when was this ? 

^Ir. Deax'. That was in roughly, January 10, as I recall the date was. 

Senator Moxtoya. Did you not tell Mr. Caulfield at that time that 
this promise of immunity was coming from somebody at a very high 
level at the "White House ? 

Mr. Deax'. Yes. I did. But Mr. Caulfield, when we talked about it 
specifically, and it was not at that time, after he told me that he 
thought the only thing that would turn !Mr. IMcCord around was a 
direct request from the President, and I told him that he could not do 
that because T had no such request from the President, although I did 
have the general assurance that clemency would be since it would be 
given to ]Mr. Hunt it should also apply to others. 

Senator ]\Ioxtoya. What motivated you to tell Mr. Caulfield that he, 
in turn, tell Mr. McCord that the promise of immunity was coming 
from the A'ory top at the White House ? 

Mr. Deax'. Because of ]Mr. Caulfield's concern that it would take 
a statement of that nature to persuade Mr. McCord as to the authen- 
ticity and sincerity of the offer of clemency. 

Senator Mox'toya. What authority did you have or what background 
did vou muster in justification for making this statement to Mr. 

Mr. Deax. On the 5th, as I recall it was, of January, after Mr. Colson 
had talked to 'Sir. Bittman he called a meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's 
office and reported how he had handled the offer of clemency, the 
assurances of clemencv to ^Nlr. Hunt. At that meeting I said to Mr. 
Ehrlichman, T said "'The word will jzet out to the others that this offer 
has been made and can I assume that this also applies to the others." 
And he said ''Yes, of course vou can." It was from that, and then when 


Mr. Mitchell asked me to make sure that jNIr. McCord had the same 
assurances, that I took my action. 

Senator Montoya. Did Mr. Mitchell indicate to you that he had 
assurances from the White House at the time ? 

Mr. Dean. No, but he was quite aware of the fact that the assurances 
had been given from the President as a result of conversations that he 
had had with me and with Mr. O'Brien who was aware of the pro- 
cedure that had occurred. 

Senator Moxtoya. How did Mr. O'Brien know about these assur- 
ances ; who had communicated these assurances to him ? 

Mr. Dean. I informed him of the procedure that had gone on and 
he was aware of the fact that Colson had given assurances to Mr. Bitt- 
man who, in turn, had given them to Mr. Hunt, 

Senator Montoya. And did Mr. Colson communicate these assur- 
ances also, or the content of these assurances, to Mr. Mitchell so that he 
could, in turn, endorse what j^ou were doing ? 

Mr. Dean. I don't believe Mr. Colson talked to Mr. Mitchell at all 
about it, no, sir. 

Senator Montoya. In other words, Mr. Mitchell knew because he 
had heard from you that these assurances had been given, is that it? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Now, on point No. 5, I don't laiow what happened in the first meet- 
ing that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman had with Director Helms 
and General Walters. I was not given a specific report of wliat occurred 
at that meeting, so I cannot testify with any firsthand knowledge on 
that and I only know what, in scanning the newspapers, some of the 
things I have subsequently learned about that. So I have no firsthand 
knowledge on that. 

Senator Montoya. You didn't work on the arrangements to try to 
get the CIA to come into the picture and modify the impact ? 

Mr. Dean. This was subsequent to the meeting that Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman had with the CIA when I first met with them, and I was 
doing this per Mr. Ehrlichman's instructions that lie thought it was a 
very good thing that I explore with the CIA if they would provide 
some assistance. 

Now, on point No. 7 — excuse me, on point No. 6, 1 made some refer- 
ences, as I recall, to this with the President in a meeting in ]\Iarch, 
that my only knowledge of Presidential knowledge in there is hearsay 
and that is what Mr. Krogh told me in a meeting in my office on either 
March 28 or 29 of this year, in which we were talking about the fact 
that this matter might come out. I told him about the documents that 
I had been unable to retrieve from the Department of Justice, and I 
had asked him — knowing ]Mr. Krogh, I didn't believe he would do 
anything like this without higher authorization — whether iMr. 
Ehrlichman had authorized it. He told me no, he hadn't, that his 
instructions had come right out of the oval office. I was startled by 
the comment and I said to him, you have got to be kidding. And he 
repeated the same comment to me again. 

So I don't know about the — I say I only have hearsay knowledge 
on that matter as to whether that is the correct or incorrect statement. 

Senator Montoya. What about point No. 7 ? 

Point No. 7 is as follows : "I neither authorized nor encouraged sub- 
ordinates to engage in any illegal or improper campaign tactics." 


Mr. Deax. I have no firsthand knowledge about that at all. I only 
know what I testified about with regard to Mr. Segretti, the fact that 
it was authorized by Mr. Haldeman and in turn funded by Mr. 

Senator Moxtoya. Let us go into Mr. Ziegler's press statements. 
On June '20. 19 r2, he made this statement which appeared in the Wash- 
ington Post. He told reporters in Florida, who were with the President, 
that he would not comment on a "third-rate burglar}' attempt." 

Xow. would you agree with me that that was not a third-rate bur- 
glary attempt? 

]\Ir. Deax. I would agree it was not a third-rate burglary attempt 
and I have no idea what the source of this story was. 

Senator Moxtoya. How would you characterize the Watergate 
burglary ? 

Mr. Deax. That is probably the most difficult question that has been 
asked yet. 

I guess I would have to say that it was probably the opening act of 
one of America's great tragedies. 

Senator ]\1oxtoya. Well, you answered it very well. 

Xow, on October 17, 1972, Mr. Ziegler's statement appeared in the 
Xew York Times. He told reporters as follows: 

It goes without saying that this administration does not condone sabotage or 
espionage or the surveillance of individuals or source stories that make broad, 
sweeping charges about the character of individuals. 

He also said— 

I am not going to comment on stories based on hearsay or where innuendo 
or character assassination is involved. I am not going to dignify that with a 

Now, would you say that the administration was engaged in tech- 
niques such as were condemned in this statement by Mr. Ziegler at the 
time and during the campaign of 1972 ? 

Mr. Deax. I would say that these things did occur. I would also say, 
as I believe I mentioned in an earlier question with Mr. Thompson, 
that the degree of Mr. Ziegler's briefing varied. At times, he was told 
enough that he could handle the story. 

I also believe I testified that I thou.^ht it would probably take me 
another 200 pages of testimony to explain all those briefings. I have 
not had an opportunity to go back through all of Ziegler's briefings to 
determine, for example. I could spot very easily which briefing I helped 
him on and which I didn't. But I haven't done that. Senator. 

Senator !Mox'tota. Then do I understand you to say that there are 
briefing papers for every press conference by yir. Zief?ler and for every 
press conference by the President available at the "Wliite House? 

Mr. Deax. Yes. sir. Every time Mr. Ziegler gives a briefing, it is 
recorded by a court-reporter-type situation and that is kept in record 
form and those are distributed to various members of the White 
House staff. But again, I have not had access to get back to these. 

Senator Moxtoya. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you and coun- 
sel to subpena these briefings, the briefing papers, so that they will 
become available to this committee. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, Senator Montoya. we are in the process of getting 

96-296 O - 73 - 12 


Senator Montoya. And did you also state that the President received 
news summaries periodically with respect to commentaries about him 
in the news media or other media ? 

jNIr. Deax. The President received a daily news summary that was 
composed of basically the wire service stories from the preceding eve- 
ning. I do not know what time the cutoff was, generally about 12 or 
1 o'clock at night, and then it was produced so it would be on his desk 
in the morning, summarizing all the preceding day's news. 

Senator Montoya. Are these also filed in the archives of the White 
House ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, they are. I might make a comment with regard to 

The news summaries were really a source of a lot of action by White 
House staff. When the President read the news summaries, he would 
make notations on the news summaries, and in turn, those would be 
transcribed into action memorandums for various members of the staff 
to follow up on. Reading the news summary would prompt the Presi- 
dent to take certain actions. These are, of course, kept in the possession 
of the White House. 

Senator Montoya. I would like to make a similar request with re- 
spect to these news summaries, Mr. Chairman. 

Now, going back to >\Ir. Ziegler, on October 16, 1972, a statement 
appeared in the New York Times on October 17. The statement reads 
as follows : "The opposition has been making charges which have not 
been substantiated." Would you say that this is correct? 

Mr. Dean. I think that probably at that time, they had not been 
substantiated, no, so it probably is correct. 

Senator ]Montoya. On October 25, 1972, another statement by Mr. 
Ziegler appeared in the Washington Post, where he termed the reports, 
the Post reports, "a blatant effort at character assassination that I 
do not think has been witnessed in the political process in some time." 

Mr. Dean. What was the date on that, please. Senator? 

Senator INIontgya. October 25, 1972. 

Senator Ervin. AVe will have to go and vote. 

Mr. Dean. Fine. 


Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Montoya. Before the recess I was reading you a quotation 
from a press statement delivered by Mr. Ziegler which appeared in 
the Post. He stated : "A blatant effort at character assassination that 
I do not think has been witnessed in the political process for some time" 
had occurred. 

What comment do you have to say about that ? "\ATiat do you think 
about that? 

Mr. Dean. Senator, it is hard for me to — what was the date on that 
again ? 

Senator INIontoya. That was October 25, 1972. 

Mr. Dean. It is hard for me to relate to specifically which story he 
was referring to. About the time, as I recall, the Segretti stories Avere 
evolving, it had started on October 10. Finally, it i-eached the point 
of directly tying in Mr. Haldeman on source stories, and I can only 
assume that this is the 


Senator ^Ioxtoya. The reaction to it ? 

Mr. Deax. The reaction to that story, 3^es. 

Senator Moxtoya. On April 18, 1973, in the Washington Post, this 
statement appeared: "Mr. Ziegler met with reporters and said that all 
previous White House statements about the bugging were inoperative. 
Ziegler emphasized the President's statement today is the operative 

Xow, can you tell us what motivated Mr. Ziegler to make this state- 
ment, what transpired prior to the making of this statement at the 
T\niite House, if .you know ? 

Mr. Deax. I believe what transpired as you compare that statement 
to the chronology of my testimony, you will see that that was the week- 
end that the Attorney General and ^Ir. Petersen reported to the Presi- 
dent the direction that the grand jury was headed in and the fact that 
I had been to the prosecutors had been revealed and the fact that I had 
told the prosecutors the involvement of others in this matter, includ- 
ing those at tlie White House. It was as a result of that and the Presi- 
dent's statement of the iTth when he went out to explain and further 
elaborate on the President's statement that he made the inoperative 

Senator ]Moxtoya. Then let us get back to Mr. ]\Iitchell with whom 
you felt a father-son relationship, and perhaps justifiably so; what 
were the reasons for your going to Mr. Mitchell's office at the time 
that Mr. Liddy first presented his plan, and then subsequentlv on 
February 4, when there was a scaling down of the initial plan ? A^Hio 
sent you there and what was your mission ? 

Mr. Deax. Well. I was called — it was a meeting called by Mr. 
Magruder. My secretary informed me of the fact that the meeting 
had been scheduled. I did not know the substance of the meeting so I 
called ]\rr. Magruder to ask him what the substance of the meeting 
was going to be, and he told me that Mr. Liddy was going to present 
his intelligence plan at that point. 

Senator Moxtoya. Did you have any instructions from Mr. Ehrlich- 
man or ^Nlr. Haldeman to attend those meetings ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, very early in the preceding yeai it had been my role 
to make sure that the reelection committee had a capacity to deal 
with demonstrators. '\^nien I had first talked to ^fr. Lidd^- about his 
job. I had explained that one of the responsibilities of his job would be 
to deal with demonstrators in the security system and particularly 
with regard to the convention. '\'^'lien he was interviewed by 
]\Ir. ^Mitchell on Xovember 24, I think you will find in the exhibits a 
copy of the agenda that Mr. Liddv prepared regarding his job. Therein 
you will find a one-line in a rather limited ao-enda that would have 
something to do with intelligence. That was discussed at that meeting 
that he would prepare an intelligence plan for dealing with demon- 
strators. Subsequentlv. when he met. when ]Mr. Liddy met. with Mr. 
Magruder on December 8. he also said that he would develop appro- 
priate plans for dealing with demonstrators. So it was quite logical, 
and I assumed that Magruder felt given the fact that one of my "\Miite 
House responsil)ilities was to deal with demonstrators and deal with 
demonstration intelligence, that T would be interested in seeing what 
Mr. Liddy's plan was, so I in turn v^-as invited. 


Senator Montoya. Would you say that your presence there was a 
followup of interest emanating first from tlie initial memorandum that 
you sent Mr. Mitchell about the interagency group ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, I would not say there was any relationship 
between that memorandum and the Liddy meeting at all. 

Senator Montoya. Now, at that initial meeting I understand from 
your testimony, Mr. Liddy discussed possible tai'gets and mentioned 
the DNC, the Democratic National Committee headquarters, the Fon- 
tainebleau Hotel, and Mr. O'Brien. 

Now, in what context were these three targets mentioned ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, I cannot recall for certain whether tar- 
gets were discussed at the first meeting or the second meeting. I am not 
able to separate the meetings as to that discussion. I know that I 
arrived very late at the second meeting, and I was only there a very 
brief while before I injected myself into the meeting 

Senator Montoya. I do not think that is relevant because the dates 
are too close. 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. But in what context when you heard it, were 
these targets discussed ? 

Mr. Dean. For political intelligence. 

Senator Montoya. And was a possible break-in into the Democratic 
headquarters discussed at that time ? 

Mr. Dean. Not a break-in. Just that these would be targets for polit- 
ical intelligence. 

Senator Montoya. Well, would you not assume that that would 
involve a break-in, or pilfering of documents ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, I think that is true. I was aware of the fact that 
frequently a campaign technique was used to put friendly people to 
one cause in the campaign headquarters of another. It was not all 
spelled out at that point in time other than the fact these would be tar- 
gets for political intelligence. 

Senator Montoya. Well, would you not say that this was coming 
very close to a discussion of what later became known as Watergate? 

Mr. Dean, I would, yes. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 

Now, you indicated that Mr. Mitchell and the President met fre- 
quently to discuss campaign plans. Where did they meet? 

Mr. Dean. I only have that on hearsay. Senator. It was just one of 
those things it was rumored that Mr. ISIitchell and the President and 
Mr. Haldeman and sometimes Mr. Connally and the like, would get 
together in the evening and discuss general tactics. 

Senator Montoya. I think everybody in the country- knows that they 

Mr. Dean. I know it. I have no specific knowledge ; I never attended 
any of the meetings. 

Senator IMontoya. I thought you knew about it. 

Mr. Dean. That is right. 

'Senator Montoya. Now. do you know whether or not the President 
met with the Mitchells at their home ? 

Mr. Dean. I have no idea, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. Do you know whether or not Mrs. Mitchell was 
ever present at any of these meetings, be thev at the ^Mitchell's home, 
at the White House, or Key Biscayne or San Clemente ? 


Mr. Deax. I believe she did accompaii}- the Attorney General, but 
I could not tell you with any specificity that she attended any meetings 
with the President when the Attorney General was having these 
discussions with the President. 

Senator ]\Ioxtoya. I am very concerned, Mr. Dean, about the truth 
that might come out of these hearings and whether or not your credi- 
bility will be sustained by the American people or whether or not the 
President's will be sustained or tarnished, and that is why I am asking 
you these specific questions about the reliability of press statements by 
the President, by 5lr. Ziegler, and by statements that you have made 
in your testimony of yesterday. Xow- • 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I just might add that I have one ally only, and 
that is the truth as I know it and I can speak it, and I realize the 
implications when I talk about the President that my one ally is the 

Senator IMoxtoya. Now, I have read press comments, and I have 
become fully cognizant of dift'erent efforts which have been made to 
discredit your testimony before this committee in recent days, one of 
which was the release of information dealing with your obtaining 
$4,800 from the cash fund. The other was the leaking out by sources 
unknown of an allegation tliat you had applied in concert with others 
for a television license while 3'ou were working for a law firm. Now, 
this has been rebutted this morning, and I will not go into the au- 
thenticity of this. But did it ever occur to you that you had gone 
through a complete checkup before you were employed by the De- 
partment of Justice and before you were em.ployed by the "NAHiite House, 
and that this information necessarily had to turn up in your folder or 
dossier collected by the FBI. and that you had to either explain it or 
the dossier explained whatever allegation was made with respect to the 
TY license per se ? 

Mr. Deax. I am well aware of that, because when I was first inter- 
viewed bv Mr. Haldeman, he had a copy of mv FBI report from the 
Justice Department. I gathered from his review of the FBI report 
that this material was in the FBI report. He asked me for some com- 
ments on it. I told him about the fact that I thought it involved more 
personalities than anythiiig else, that I had been prepared to take it 
to an ethics committee at the time, that I had had a lawyer friend who 
had been at the firm at the time to check it out. that I had been operat- 
ing on the advice of a verv senior and distinguished member of the 
communications bar. and that I thouq-ht it was really a matter of per- 
sonalities more than facts and that I had not pursued the matter be- 
cause it had been retracted later and I was satisfied with that. So this 
was reviewed and this obviously was investigated by the FBI before I 
went to the Justice Depai'tment originally, and then subsequently to the 
"\'\^iite House. 

Senator !Moxtoya. So apparentlv this was picked out of context and 
released by someone. Do vou have any conjecture about that? 

Mr. Deax. I dicln't understand vour question. Senator. 

Senator INIoxtoya. So apparently, the allegation that you had ap- 
plied for a TV license in coniunction with otTiers while you were em- 
ploved in a law firm that Avas handlino- almost a similar application, 
apparentlv. this allegation was apparently picked out of context from 
vour file bv someone. 


Mr. Dean. That is correct. I understand that it was leaked by some- 
one to a member of the press and in turn reported. 

Senator Montoya. Wlio do you think leaked it? What is your 
opinion ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, that would be highly speculative. At that point in 
time, I don't know. I have heard of subsequent efforts to discredit me 
and a rather concerted attack to discredit me. 

Senator Montoya. Have you felt that they were serious efforts? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I am quite aware of the fact that there are a num- 
ber of investigators who have been privately retained to visit friends, 
visit stores I deal with. It has run the gamut — places where I bank, 
every conceivable inch of my life has been gone over, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. Now, tell me more about it. I mean not your life, 
but about the efforts made by the "\^%ite House. 

Mr. Dean. Well, I have learned this from people who have said, 
who have called and tried to get verification on stories and the like. 
I can tell you the absurdity of some of the stories. 

For example, I borrowed a friend's car, a friend of my wife's one 
of her girl friends, and I drove that car for several days. My wife 
went off to Florida with some friends of hers for a couple of days. 
The next thing that was on the rumor mill was that I had left my 
wife and was living with some beautiful foreign woman. That went 
around for awhile. It was not printed, but it has been gossiped. 

I have been charged with being afraid — I have been charged with 
being afraid to go to jail for reasons of homosexuality. That was 
attributed directly to one of my lawyers. Now, the story is absurd, but 
again it is a typical character assassination technique. 

There have been efforts to say that I received $100,000 of missing 
campaign money. There is no truth to that whatsoever and there is no 
conceivable way they will ever substantiate a story like that. 

Every neighlDor has been probed. As I say, some of this has been 
press inquiry and quite legitimate press inquiry. Other of it has been 
by privately hired investigators. 

Senator Montoya. Now, how long did you know ]Mr. Lidd}^ before 
he was hired by the Committee To Re-Elect the President ? 

Mr. Dean. I didn't know Mr. Liddy until I had — I may have met 
him once while I was at the Department of Justice at a rather large 
meeting, when I was in the Deputy Attorney's office. There was a 
program called "Operation Intercept," which I was not directly in- 
volved in. 

It was a drug program and I understand that ]Mr. Liddy was in- 
volved in that. 

l^Hien I did meet him once at the White House, he referred to the 
fact that I had met him earlier. I don't recall that. 

The first time I ever talked to INIr. Liddy was in, let's see, I guess 
it was late October, when I began talking to Kroph about whether he 
was interested or not in the p-eneral counsel position at the reelection 
committee. I was unaware of his activities with the plumbers unit, I 
had only known that he had been in a dispute with his emplover at the 
Treasurv Department, Mr. Rossides, and there had been quite a fiery 
exchange between the White House and the Treasurv Department and 
the like for the White House intervei-iinjx in this dispute and hiring 
Mr. Liddy and bringino- him to the Wliite House. This I got from ]Mr. 
Caulfield, who had friends in the Treasury Department. 


Senator Montoya. AMien was the first time that you knew about 
Mr. Liddy and ]\Ir. Hunt working together ? 

Mr. Deax. I don't believe I really realized that until after the break- 
in. It just didn't occur to me, the fact that they were both in the 
plumbers unit. I was unaware of the fact, for example, that Mr. Hunt 
spent most of his time as a consultant for the White House working 
for the plumbers. 

Xow, I ma}" have been told, but it didn't occur to me. 

I learned, I believe it was in April or May of 1972, 1 had heard the 
rumor about the break-in at the Ellsberg psychiatrist's offVe iuk.. 
had heard that Hunt and Liddy had been involved in this. So it was 
much after the fact of their actual working together that I learned 
of the fact that they had worked together. 

Senator ]\Ioxtoya. Had you seen them around the White House 
talking together, on or about March or February of 1972 ? 

Mr. Deax. Xo. sir ; I cannot say I did. 

Senator ]Moxtoya. Xow. when you were having discussions with 
]Mr. Liddy at the CRP, did he ever tell you about his activities other 
than being chief counsel for the CRP ? 

Mr. Deax'. Well, if I recall our initial dealings after he went over 
there, my responsibility with him was to get him very aware of the 
election laws. He had not had any experience in this area. I informed 
my staff that they should cooperate with him and assist him. I made 
my files available. We had a new election law to deal with, to interpret, 
to understand. Regulations were being issued by the GAO, and we had 
a munber of discussions on those. 

I also encouraged him, because he frequently told me that there was 
more work than one man could handle, to get himself some volunteer 
lawyers and I suggested some names of lawyers who I thought might 
be of assistance to him. 

Senator ]Moxtoya. Well. I am not speaking of his duties as chief 
counsel. Were you aware that he was performing other duties? 

Mr. Deax'. I think the only time I was aware — I was unaware of his 
developing his plan; no. sir. That has been always one of the great 
mysteries to me, what happened from the time he went over there — I 
giiess it must have been December 10, because as I recall, it was 1 or 2 
days after Mr. Magruder had interviewed him that he went to work — 
what happened between December 10 and January 27 and my concep- 
tion of what his responsibilities were and possiblv his own or others 
conception dramatically changed. There was nothing in my conversa- 
tions with him that indicated anything other than the fact that he was 
going to have a plan for dealing with demonstrators and convention 

Senator Mox'toya. Well, weren't you kind of curious as to what had 
happened to the scaled down plan which involved the expenditure of 
$250,000 and which was discussed by Mr. ]\Iitchell. Mr. Magruder, 
yourself, and Mr. Liddy ? 

Mr. Deax. You mean between the meeting on the 27th and the 
fourth ? 

Senator Mox'toya. February 4. 

Mr. Deax-. February 4. Well, after the meeting on the 27th, I was 
frankly very surprised, given the precedent that had been followed 
before with Operation Sandwedge, that Mr. Mitchell even reconsid- 
ered the matter. I think that he expected, when the meeting was 
reconvened, that there was going to be something totally different than 


it was. It was when I came in that meeting late and it was the same 
type of discussion going on that I interjected myself and terminated 
the meeting. 

Senator Montoya. "When were you first aware that the scaled down 
plan had been approved by Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr, Dean. As I think I testified, I have never asked Mr. Mitchell 
directly whether he approved the plan or not. Mr. Magruder 

Senator Montoya. Well, were you aware 

Mr. Dean. Yes, after June 19, when I was having- conversations with 
Mr. Magruder, he indicated to me that Mr. ]\Iitchell had authorized 
the plan, that he indicated also that the "W^iite House was recipient of 
the information, and he indicated at that time that there had been 
pressure from tlie TVHiite House to get the plan moving. But it was 
never very clear as to exactly what had happened. 

Senator Montoya. Well, did you have any conversations with jNIr. 
Strachan, who was the emissary or liaison between the CRP and ^Ir. 
Haldeman or Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, that raises a point that came up in the questioning 
that Mr. Thompson was going into this morning. At one point, Mr. 
Strachan called me and told me that Mr. Magruder and ^Ir. Liddy 
had had a serious falling out. I believe Mr. Magruder raised the fact 
with me that he just could not work with Liddy. Strachan got in the 
middle of it and called me and he said, what should I do ? 

I said, I have no idea, but I would suggest now that Bob Mardian 
is over there, that if there are personality problems and personnel 
problems, that Mr. Mardian handle it. That was my recommendation 
to Mr. Strachan and it was only later that I heard that he had been 
moved from the reelection committee to the finance committee. 

Senator Montoya. Had you become aware since the break-in that 
Mr. Magruder was transmitting memorandum through Mr. Strachan 
to Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Dean. Not to Mr. Ehrlichman. I was aware from a conversation 
I had with Mr. Strachan on the 19th that he had destroyed documents 
that indicated that he was transmitting this information back to the 
I'VTiite House. 

Senator Montoya. And why would Mr. Haldeman destroy these 
documents if he was not aware, and still professes unawareness, of 
anyone at the White House being involved in the Watergate affair 
prior to June 17 ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I think I have said before. Senator, publicly, it 
is inch by inch that the truth is coming out. 

Senator Montoya. Would you say that in view of the correlation 
of events, in view of Mr. Strachan's missions between the CRP and 
Mr. Haldeman, in view of the admission by Mr. Jeb INIagruder that ho 
was sending this memorandum to Mr. Haldeman as well as to Mr. 
Ehrlichman about all these things, that Mr. Haldeman as well as Mr. 
Ehrlichman were fully aware of what Mr. Liddy's role was with re- 
spect to collecting intelligence, and with respect to the possible plan of 
breaking into the DNC, the McGrovern headquarters or the O'Brien 
suite at ISIiami during the Democratic convention ? 

Mr, Dean. You have drawn, that is, a rather broad conclusion. But 
I would say this : That I think that anything that was transmitted 
to Mr. Strachan, Mr. Strachan was a very good, thorough, capable 
man. Anything of an}^ import that came to his attention he would 


regularly report to Mr. Haldeman, and I can only assume that material 
that came to Mr, Strachan was reported on to 5lr. Haldeman. 

Senator jNIoxtoya. Well, I can only assume from your testimony 
and what has been adduced before this committee heretofor by other 
witnesses that ^Ir. Haldeman and ]Mr. Ehrlichman were very precise 
in the missions that they undertook and in exacting performance by 
those to whom they made assignments of missions. Would not you 
say that that is a correct statement ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir ; I would. 

Senator Moxtoya. And in view of that, is it your supposition that 
there was no way that ^Ir. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman could plead 
ignorance of any part of the involvement on the part of the CEP, 
Mr. Liddy, or any other personnel connected with the CEP in the 
planning before the Watergate incident on the burglary at the 
Watergate ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I would have to separate out for a moment Mr. 
Haldeman from Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Strachan reported directly to 
Mr. Haldeman. He did not report to Mr. Ehrlichman. Anything that 
Mr. Ehrlicliman would know about this would have to have come 
from conversations with Mr. Haldeman. So I would only, I can only, 
say that under the reporting arrangement that information that did 
come from Mr. Strachan, knowing Strachan as being very thorough, 
particularly in information I rej^orted to him always seemed to get to 
Mr. Haldeman, that any major information that came to him was 
reported. But I can only say that if ]Mr. Haldeman and ]Mr. Ehrlich- 
man had conversations about it, Mr. Ehrlichman would know about 

'Senator ]Moxtoya. They were verv^ close, weren't they ? 

Mr. Deax. They were good friends ; yes, sir. 

Senator ]\Iox*tota. Would you say they conversed very warmly, very 
frankly with each other ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, sir. 

Senator ^Moxtoya. Then, did you call Mr. Caulfield in January of 
1972 when you authorized him to deliver a message to ]McCord, and 
did you ask him at the time to say to McCord, and I quote "A year is a 
long time. Your wife and family will be taken care of. You will be 
rehabilitated with employment when this is over." Did you say that? 

Mr. Deax'. Yes, I did. That was the result of a conversation in 
which I — he was on the west coast and I was in my office, I called him 
and transcribed the gist of what I was sayinir. read it back to me later. 
that is virtually what it was, that I said to him. and I told him "Fine," 
and that is what he should report. 

Senator ^Moxtoya. Xow wlien you discussed the coverup with respect 
to Watorofate, at San Clemente, did these meetings take place at the 
home of the President ? 

Mr. Deax'. Xo, sir. San Clemente is a general term for a situation 
where the President's residence is located at one place, and then right 
adioinino: that there is a compound of office space. 

Senator ^Ioxtota. T mean the compound ? 

Afr. Deax. All ridit. 

The first meetinfr took place', the morning meetinsf on the 10th, 
benfan in ]\[r. Ehrlichman's office This was what T described as we 
were assessincr the various members of this committee. It was from 


there we went to lunch. We had lunch at the staff mess and we talked 
on. We then adjourned because nothing- was happening. It w^as a very 
loose and fleeting meeting. With generalities and there were interrup- 
tions because Mr. Haldeman had calls and Mr. Ehrlichman had calls. 
It wasn't until we went back down south to La Costa and met later in 
]Mr. Haldeman's, and I think it was being shared by Mr. Ehrlichman, 
a large villa, a suite with rooms on each side, we met in the living room 
area and there we discussed for many hours the situation and we met 
there again the next day, and discussed this matter for many days or 
hours. , 

Senator Montoya. Give me the dates of those meetings. 

Mr. Dean. They were on the 10th and the 11th of February. 

Senator Montoya. And give me substantially the conversations that 
took place with respect to the coverup, and the individuals to whom 
you might ascribe these conversations. 

Mr. Dean. Well, the thrust of the conversations were after some 
general discussion there evolved theories on how to deal with this 
committee, in other words, that there would be a public posture of 
cooperation and privately we would make it as difficult as possible 
to set investigative materials and witnesses. 

There would be an effort to discredit the committee bv painting it 
very partisan through a behind-the-scenes media effort. That there was 
also discussion of how to make sure that there were raised also the 
problems that the Democratic Party might have been engaged in but 
at that point there was nothinfr specific to raise. We were hopincr to 
find things. In fact at one point in the conversation it was suirgested we 
hire private investi.o-ators, Mr. Haldeman su<rgested this I raised the 
fact this is more political surveillance and that is the last thing in the 
world we need. 

Then, I think I tried to recount most of this in mv testimony and I 
will be happv to do it all ac:ain for vou if you would like me to. 

Senator Montoya. Do vou know whether or not since the Watergate 
entry, do vou know whether or not the CRP, the A^liite House, or any- 
one else under the auspices of the CRP was hired to conduct a gather- 
ing of more intelligence or invasions of, or to engage in the invasions 
of the ri,q:ht of privacy of individuals ? 

Mr. Dean. I onlv know of the fact that that has been done with 
regard to me and I don't believe it has been done bv those entities. It 
mififht be indirectly but I have no firsthand knowledge of that. 

Senator INIontoya. Do you know whether or not there were any 
other buggings other than the ones that you have mentioned or any 
eavesdropping through electronic devices ? 

Mr. Dean. Xo, sir, I think I have mentioned those that I am aware 

Senator Montoya. In what respects did vou discuss the possible 
blocking or impeding of the Senate investigation at the "\^niite House 
at any time ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, as a result of the La Costa meetings there 
were set in motion a host of followup activities. I think some of the 
agenda that you see in my submissions for meetings indicate the thrust 
of things that were developing at the La Costa meeting. I think in 
particular some of those agenda are self-explanatory as to the tactics 
and the thoughts as to how to deal with the situation. 


Senator ]Moxtoya. When you informed Lidcl}- to get Hunt out of 
the country who had instructed you to do this ? 

Mr. Deax. This was 

Senator Moxtoya. And what conversation actually took place prior 
to your informincr Mr. Liddy to get Hunt out of the country ? 

Mr. Deax. This occurred on Monday the 19th of June in 1972. It was 
a late afternoon meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office with Mr. Colson. 
The first question before the meeting got down to any substance was 
raised by Mr. Ehrlichman as to where Mr. Hunt was. He asked me 
and I said I had no idea. He asked ISIr. Colson and Mr. Colson made a 
similar comment. 

I was then asked by ]\Ir. Ehrlichman to call Mr. Liddy and tell 
Mr. Liddy to tell ]Mr. Hunt to get out of the country. I did that. It was 
a short time thereafter that I began to think about the wisdom of hay- 
ing made that call and re-raised it. There was a brief discussion 
between Ehrlichman and myself, and finally Mv. Colson entered the 
discussion and he said he also thought it was a very unwise idea. Ehr- 
lichman concurred. This all took place within about, oh, 15, 20 minute 
span and I was asked to call Mr. Liddy back and retract the instruc- 
tion. I did that. Liddy said to me he didn't know if it was possible 
because the message had already been passed and I have no further 
knowledge of whether, in fact, Hunt did leave the countr}- or not as a 
result of that. 

Senator Moxtoya. AVhen was the first real meeting to organize the 
coverup and who was present at that first meeting ? 

ISIr. Deax'. I think that the coverup is somewhat similar to the plan- 
ning of this whole thino-. that just sort of happened. I knoAv that when 
I came back from out of the country there had already been significant 
events which had occurred. The coverup was already- — it had begun 
and was. in fact, in place and was going. 

Senator Moxtoya. "^Aliat information did you have with respect to 
the involvement of any officials in the '\\niite House on that initial 
staflre of the coverup ? 

]\Ir. Deax'. "Well, it was on Monday the 19th that I was gaining in- 
formation. I think the first very revealinir information was that ]Mr. 
Strachan had destroyed files at Mr. Haldeman's suggestion. I also— 
that morning I had had a call from Ehrlichman who asked me to find 
out what yir. Col son's involvement was in this matter. 

Senator ^Foxtoya. Did you advise tlie President or ^Slr. Haldeman 
or ]\Ir. Ehrlichman about the authority that might exist under law 
for the covert activity that was to ensue as a result of the organiza- 
tion of the plumbers ? 

^Ir. Deax'. I wasn't involved in the establishment of the plumbers 
and it was somewhat by accident that T was talkinfr about Bud Krogh 
who T had known well and was partially responsible for my coming to 
the '\Miite House, as a matter of fact, when I realized that a plumbers 
unit or whatever the proper name was for it was being established. 

At that time he told me that they had an operation that was seekincr 
to determine major leaks. He invited me down to see the unit. He said. 
"We have a new sensor security system, and you might be interested 
in seeing it-" so T went dowii and looked at it. and saw their scrambler 
phone and that was about the extent of it. 


Senator Montoya. IVho devised the shelter of executive privilege 
as part of the coverup ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, the — I wouldn't say there was a conscious decision 
at any point in time to use executive privilege as a part of the coverup. 
It was always in existence with regard to White House staff because 
no one, the President's policy was he didn't want the staff coming up. 
It began to take a very severe focus during the — first of all, during the 
Patman hearings that if push had gotten to shove in those hearings 
that privilege would have been declared on Timmons and myself. 

Senatoi Montoya. You mean to tell me that you and Mr. Haldeman 
and Mr. Ehrlichman didn't discuss the use of executive privilege? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir ; I was getting to that. 

Senator Montoya. As a coverup ? 

Mr. Dean. That was the first time it had occurred when there was 
some discussion of it that was with regard to the Patman hearings in 
late September or early October. That was the only congressional 
problem that arose. It was during the Gray hearings when my name 
moved to the information front that we began discussing using or 
litigating with Dean the issue of executive privilege, possibly being 
the strongest, and these were the discussions I had with the President 
whereas if we were litigating the matter with Mr. Dean there would 
be no other witnesses from the White House who would have to appear 
because he would have the perfect reason that this matter is under 

Senator Ervin. We will take a 5 minute recess to vote. 


Senator Erm^n. The committee will resume. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Dean, I only have three or four questions to 
ask of you. I want to clear this matter up with respect to Mr. ISIitchell. 
On pages 225 and 226 of your statement, you mention that there was 
a move afoot at the White House to try to get Mr. Mitchell to accept 
the blame for the entire affair. Now, can you tell me who the prime 
mover of this attempt was at the Wiite House ? 

Mr. Dean. It is very difficult for me to say who the prime mover 
was. At the time this first was discussed, it was after I had reported 
to the President on the 21st what I thought were the implications of 
this entire matter and subsequently, I had a meeting with Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman and then another meeting with the President. It was 
early discussion — I recall one p:irticular incident that occurred out- 
side of the President's Office before he went into a meeting in ■which I 
said that there are two options. One is everything pre and post is going 
to have to be laid out or, second, the "N^Hiite House is going to have 
to surround itself with wagons and start protecting itself. It was in 
subsequent discussions with the President when it was evolving that 
I was argiiing that both pre and post had to be disclosed, but there 
was evolving the thought at that point in time that if we merely deal 
with the pre situation, that the post might go awa3^ I did not believe 
that and it was i-eally Avhen the Presidential ]:)arty came back from 
California that early discussions of this concept had evolved into a firm 

So I also mentioned that there was a meeting on the 22d where 
Mr. Mitchell came down. I assumed at that time that Mr. Ehrlichman 
and Mr. Haldeman were going to do something to try to bring Mr. 


Mitchell forward on this issue because of the earlier discussions that 
had been held. To the contrary, the discussion realh revolved around — 
first of all, Mr. Ehrlichman asked, has the Hunt problem been taken 
care of, the demands that he was making, and Mr. Mitchell reported 
that that did not seem to be any problem. 

There were general discussions again about the status of the White 
House vis-a-vis this committee on executive privilege. I went to a meet- 
ing that afternoon with the President and it was a repeat of the same 
thing that had occurred on several previous occasions. 

So I really cannot say that that policy evolved until after they 
returned from California. 

I recall on the 13th 

Senator ]\Ioxtoya. Did you not indicate that there had been some 
discussion in California about making Mr. Mitchell the fall gny'i 

Mr. Deax. Well, I do not know that. I was not in California. I am 
aware of another situation where Mr. Colson and Mr. Shapiro came 
to meet with Mr. Ehrlichman and ]:»ossibly ]Mr. Haldeman — I was not 
]n-esent, but I did hear them both discussing it on the afto-noon of the 
13th — in which Mr. Colson had laid out the theory that Mr. Mitchell 
should be smoked out and this might resolve the w^hole problem. 

Senator ^Ioxtoya. Did you hear any discussions by Mr. Haldeman 
or Mr. Ehrlichman with respect to the same thing ? 

Mr. Dean. I guess I did. In fact, during that conversation, Mr. Ehr- 
lichman was on the telephone with the President at one point in time, 
I recall, and it was — it had been planned that Mr. Mitchell would come 
down that Saturday, Saturday, the 14th. 

Senator ]\Ioxtoya. Who arranged for Mr. ]\Iitchell to come down ? 

Mr. Deax. I believe that Mr. Haldeman called him. I am not sure of 
that, though. 

Senator Mox'toya. Xow, in view of your strong feelings for Mr. 
^litchell. why did you not apprise him of this move by the White 
House ? 

Mr. Deax'. I had already gone to the prosecutors by this time and 
was in discussions with the prosecutors and I was trying to avoid any 
situation that would further involve me, but yet, I was not revealing 
to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman that, in fact, I was having dis- 
cussions with the Government about the entire situation. It occurred 
to me at one time, when I learned that Mr. O'Brien was going to Cali- 
fornia to meet with Mr. Ehrlichman at a suggestion of Mr. Mitchell 
that he do so. that this could well be a setup situation. But I did not 
apprise him of it because I. myself, was dealing with the Government 
and I had stopped the coverup, as far as I was concerned. I was no 
longer involved in it. 

Senator Moxtoya. Xow, were you aware all throughout your deal- 
ings with respect to this affair of the implications that you might be 
chargeable with violation of the law for obstructing justice? 

Mr. Deax'. Yes, I was. I do not know when I first began to think 
about it. but I did certainly think about it from time to time, and I 
can recall discussing it directly after the election with Mr. Haldeman. 
We had a discussion about a written Dean report. He asked me what 
would happen if all the facts were laid out. I told him what would 
happen, and I said that I thought that ultimately, a reconvened grand 


jury, which would occur if the facts were laid out, would end up in 
potential indictments of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean. 

Senator Montoya. Well, let me ask you this question. How do you 
expect us to resolve the truth in this matter when you state one story 
and you have testified here and made yourself subject to cross-examina- 
tion and the President states another story and he does not appear 
before this committee? I am not implying that he should. Now, how 
do you expect us to resolve this ? Can you give us any information as 
to how we might resolve it ? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Chairman, I think this. I strongly believe that the 
truth always emerges. I do not know if it will be during these hearings ; 
I do not know if it will be as the result of the further activities of the 
special prosecutor. I do not know if it will be through the processes of 
history. But the triith will out someday. 

As far as any issue of fact, and I am not suggesting this with the 
President, of any individual where I have a difference of opinion or 
different statement of the fact with that individual — this has occurred 
once, in my early meetings with the prosecutors — I am quite willing to 
submit myself to a polygraph test on any issue of fact with any 
individual who says that what I am saying is less than truthful. 

Senator Montoya. Wliat really made you change and start coming 
up and coming out with the truth of this matter as you have related 
it ? What motivated you ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I think that it was after the first of the yearthat 
I had serious reservations as to whether the coverup could continue. 
T must say that from June 19 on, I have not had a very pleasant day 
in my life. This has been a haunting situation for me. 

As early as September, when I began talking with my now wife 
about getting married, I told her that somewhere down the road, it is 
going to be a very rough situation, because at that time — I did not 
explain it to her, because I just realized that something like this could 
not go on indefinitely. At one point, I reached the end of the line and 
just decided that I could not continue it. I just did not have the con- 
stitution internally to proceed with what was going on. So I decided 
to start swimming the other way. 

Senator Montoya. Do you have peace of mind now about what you 
have done ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. In disclosing everything that you knew, do you 
have a peace of mind and a clear conscience ? 

]Mr. Dean. I am not here as a sinner seeking a confessional, but I 
have been asked to be here to tell the truth, and I had always planned 
at anv time before anv forum when asked to tell the truth. 

Senator Montoya. A^Hiat I am trying to ask vou, do you feel better 
now that vou have told evervthing rather than hidinsr it ? 

Mr. Dean. Indeed T do, sir. It is a verv difficult thing to hide, and, 
as I explained to the President, it would take perjury upon perjury, 
upon perjury, if it were to be perpetuated. I was not capable of doing 
that, and I knew that mv dav of beinqf called was not far off. 

Senator Montoya. That is all. Thank you, sir. 

Sonntoi- Ervin. Tlie committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock 

[Whereupon, at 5 :40 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
10 a.m.. Wednesday. June 27, 1973.] 



Exhibit No. 32 

Shaffer, McKeever and Fitzpatrick 

342 HuNOERPOBD Court 
RocKViLLE, Maryland 20850 


(30I) 7e2-ieoo 

CT or COLUM91A orrict 




June 18, 1973 ..T.m.PAT,..c« 

The Honorable Sam J. Ervln, Jr. 


Senate Select Committee on Presidential 

Campaign Activities 
1418 New Senate Office Building 
Washington, D. C. 20510 

Dear Senator Ervin: 

In the strongest terms possible we wish to register an objec- 
tion In behalf of our client, John W. Dean, III, who is scheduled to appear' 
before your Committee in Executive Session preparatory to a public appearance 
before your Committee covered by national television and other news mediaf 
As the transcript of the proceedings will reflect, we immediately raised thlff^ 
objection on Friday, June 15, 1973, when our client first appeared before The 
Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr., the Vice Chairman of your Committee, artd 
the staff. 

As lawyers for Mr. Dean charged with the guardianship of hfs 
legal welfare, and as officers of the Court, we respectfully call your attention 
to the fact that the Executive Branch is conducting a Grand Jury inquiry and as 
late as May 22, 1973, in an unusual but nonetheless official communication 
the United States Attorney and his Assistants in charge of the inqiiiry advised 
our client that they intended to seek his indictment and would not drop charges 
against him but would permit a guilty plea to a one count indictment charglngf 
a conspiracy to obstruct Justice. Although the offer has not been accepted,' Mf. 
Dean remains a jjrospective defendant against whom the prosecutors seek a <' 
Grand Jury indictment. 

Accordingly, at this juncture we are very much concerned about: 
(1) our client giving any testimony at this time (notwithstanding the "use" im- 
munity your Committee has accorded him) because of his status as a prospective 


targeted defendant, and (2) the effect nationwide television and other publi- 
city accorded to your hearings during our client' s testimony will have upon 
the basic rights of our client to a speedy, fair and impartial trial. 

As you well know, assuming but not conceding the prosecutors 
will be in a position to overcome their obvious problem about leads furnished 
them by our client, your nationally televised Committee hearing, at least dur- 
ing our client's appearance, will afford the public a wide-spread preview of 
the prosecution's case against our client without any of the safeguards that 
would attend a criminal trial. 

Our concerns are not novel but are well-founded and are shared 
In many quarters of the legal community including the Special Prosecutor, The 
Honorable Archibald Cox, who, according to press reports, first tried to dissuade 
you and your Committee from further proceeding publicly. We know when he fail- 
ed in that endeavor the Special Prosecutor, in an effort to curb some public as- 
pects of the'Committee hearings, sought an Order from The Honorable John J. 
Sirica, Chief Judge of the United States District Court, to condition the confer- 
ral of "use" immunity to our client upon the absence of television and/or national 
media coverage which the Chief Judge refused to do. 

Understanding that Mr. Cox's legal maneuver was a novel one, 
was contrary to the terms of the Congressional "Use" Immunity Statute, Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 5005, flew in the face of the Constitutional doctrine 
of Separation of Powers and relying upon the early learned maxim " Quad vanum 
et inutile est , lex non requirit " Co. Litt. 319, we abided the inevitable Court 
ruling and now timely address our request in the forum having the pov/er to grant 

The facts will show we have never been a volunteer before this 
Committee or any other public testimonial forum. Your records will show that _^^ 
on May 9^ 1973, we were subpoenaed to appear, to testify and to produce "on^^'^'^ 
May lOth'Jwiich date has been adjourned) documentary evidence about the mat- 
ters you ^ave under inquiry. Were it not for your subpoena our client would not 
appear in a public forum but would have continued his cooperation with the pro- 
secutors in secret as outlined in an affidavit of his counsel dated June 11, 1973, 
and recently filed in support of a motion to quash his Grand Jury subpoena (a copy 
of which Is attached hereto). 


since one branch of the Government has stated its intention 
to prosecute and another branch has stated and demonstrated Its intention to 
publicly legislate, our client - on the one hand being the prospective defend- 
ant and on the other hand the compelled witness - is caught in the middle. 

Since Constitutional rights are involved, we ask you and your 
Committee to recognize what the Coui-t noted in Delaney v. United States, 199 
F.2d 107, 110, 112-113 (1st Cir. 1952): 

"One cannot assume that the average Juror is so „-.y'- 

endowed with a sense of detachment, so clear in ' n;-* j 

his introspective perception of his own mental 
processes that he may confidently exclude even 
the unconscious influence of his preconceptions 
as to probable guilt, endangered by a pervasive 
pre-trial publicity. This is particularly true in 
, the determination^ of issues involving the credibility 
of witnesses , "v 
(Emphasis added). 

Being compelled to testify before your Committee our client must 
tell the truth. That truth is not limited to the actions of others but includes his 
own as well. Publicity about our client's involvement will completely vitiate 
the safeguard of your "Use" Immunity Statute which on its face is designed to 
Insure that our client will not be convicted out of his own mouth but rather upon 
evidence from others. How can anyone assure that a Jury drawn from a commun- 
ity saturated with news media coverage of our client's testimony, will ever be 
in a position to give him a fair trial? 

Accordingly, we earnestly and respectfully request in the altem- 
aEtlve (1) you excuse our client from any testimony at this time, and/Or (2) should 
he be required to give testimony, he give it only in Executive Session under the 
strictiffes of Rule 27 of your Rules of Procedure and that such testimony not be 
made public until after the Govenunent concludes its iTosecution of him, and/or 
0} if OOF client is requirol to testify in public, the sessions not be televised 
or recGcded by movie film for subsequent presentatlcm on television. 

We trust you will not intaTsret the postlon we take as obstruc- 
tive <d the announce alois of your Committee's work but will realize the 

96-296 O - 73 - 13 


clrcumstauces in which our client now finds himself requires the action 
we take. 




1819 H Street, N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20006 
Of Counsel 



Exhibit No. 33 


June 19* 1973 

Dear Mr. Oeant 

I am authorised by the President to inform you that the 
President will not invoke executive privilege, and you are 
released from any attorney- client privilege with regard to 
testimony you may give concerning the Watergate break-in, [ 
efforts to cover it up, or any other matters relevant to the 
inquiry of the Senate Select Committee. 

Insofar as you may have information that is related to national . 
8 purity, it is for your counsel to advise you what lawfully may 
be disclosed. The President is not authorizing any release 
of legally protected national security nnaterial. _^^^ 

1 advised the Senate Select Committee of this yesterday, and 

I am writing you so that you may have direct inforxnatlpn aboul l^- 

this. . '' - ^l: 



Leonard Garment 
Counsel to the President 

Mr. John W. Dean UI ' 

100 Quay Street 
Alexandria, Virginia 22314 

cc: Mr. Samuel Dash, Seziate Select Committee 
Mr. Fred Thompson, Senate Select Committee 

Exhibit No. 34-1 

March 12, 1973 — [Note: This is one where you will make only one copy for my 
file and deliver the other copy to him — it is private] 



I noted the story in the Post this morning (3/11/73) with regard to some col- 
lege student who had been hired to get some information with regard to demon- 
strations which might be useful in keeping those activities from developing into 
violence or have other unpleasant consequences. It is difiicult for me to under- 
stand why we have not done an adequate job of getting the facts out chapter and, on the mas.sive activities of McGovern and the so-called peace groups in 
funding demonstrations against me, members of the family and others during 
the campaign. As you are aware, there were virtually no demonstrations whatever 
on our part against their meetings. This I had ordered at the beginning of the 
year. On the other hand, I cannot recall a meeting in which I participated where 
there were not demonstrations, including the non-political type meetings like 
the one at the Statue of Liberty. 

There was hard evidence of the McGovern people supporting and inciting the 
violent demonstrations in San Francisco which resulted in several thou.sand 
dollars in property damage. There was also hard evidence of the McGovern head- 
quarters inciting the demonstration in L.A. the following day. And it would be 
hard for me to believe that the fire bombing of our Phoenix headquarters, with a of $100,000.00 was done by one of our own people. It would seem to me that 
the facts on such activities should be accumulated and that somebody — perhaps 
Goldwater is the only man who has the guts to do it — should blast the McGovem- 
ites for their vicious activities. Needles.s to .say, it would be helpful if Hruska or 
someone on the Ervin committee on our side could see that at a time they are 
investigating our campaign activities they are also investigating the charges 
that have been made against their actions. I have rai.sed this ix)int to no avail 
on previous occasions. Perhaps you now can follow through and .see that some- 
thing is done. Give me a report at your convenience. 



Exhibit No, 34-2 


the white house 


February 11, I97I 






During his recent appearance on the Dick Cavctt Shov;, Jack Anderson made 
the follovTing coniraents: 

"I have access to intelligence digests because people . * 
show them to us . " . . ' 

" - - some of the President's private memos, some of the 
'transcripts of confidential ir\iimt«p." 

"Tv70 thirds of the State of the Union Message tv.'O or three 
days before it vras delivered." 

"I can assure you that if the President knew vho was leaking 
these memos, he would be fired tomorrow. " 

>Iriter has analyzed the Anderson columns for the three month period pre- "■". 
ceeding the State of the Union leak, as well as discreetly conferring with - 
selected V.'hite House staff members. Resultingly, the foDJLowing observations 
are offered : /f 

a) Anderson does, indeed, have access to intelligence digests, andW., 
proves it on a daily basis. It also appears his reference to private , ' 
Pi-esidential memoranda is valid, but most likely when such material leaves; 
the V/hite House and is circulated on an agency level. On more than one 
occasion, examination of a Presidential quote in context indicates strongly . 
that the leak came not from within the V/hite House, but from the agency 
concerned with the subject matter. . , '- ^,\ 

B) Anderson's comment regarding "some of the transcripts of confidential' 
"Binutes" possibly refers to verbatuia quotes of comments made at V/hite House:? ;; 
leadership meetings. ■■■'>' ; . ' 

Tv70 of the V/hite House st?.ff members intervievfcd independently expressed the -p 

view that Senator Hueh Scott or a m.embcr of Scott's staff are suspect. If.' •"••)! 

you were not aware of thif; possibili^ and wish the names of the staff mcnbera, 

■tbey will be furnished to lariy Higby upon request. ■ ..\ :>: 


Memorandum for H. R. Haldernan .RE: Anderson. 

From: J. J. Caulfleld 

Page tvra • " i ' ■ , 

Examination of the Anderson colvunns of Januai-y_ 21^ 22 and 23, all of vhich 
are concerned vith the reorgani^'.ation of the federal government, apparently 
refers to his State of the Union comiuent indicated above. ■ , '. ' 

In this connection, it lias been determined that all of the above information ' 
contained in those three articles appeared in one black bound, working 
looseleaf booklet, Furtlier, thatt./elve late copies of such booklet vera ; 
prepared and foruardcd to the Office of Management and Budget from the 
Domestic Council under strict secairlty conditions in advance of the Anderson 
leak. ;. : 

An e>:araination of the subject document, along with a studied reviev; of the 
subject A.nderson columns indicates tliat the book was made available ,.,,' '.- ;.' 
to Anderson, most likely in its entirety, , ' .- r 

Domestic Council members intervievred make a valid case for the leak to be <<■•'* 
pinned on Oi-IB, Human Resources Section, I, personally, vrish to reserve ■.' ' ■ '!■ 
judgment until luore evidence is at hand. It has been brought to my atte,ntion ;; 
that Geortit: Sljulo/^ iias buwn appx'iscu uf tiitise suspicions, and has taken the _'5^ 
position that a "smoking out" type investigation would be inadvisable.. ,,. '";5 

Eesul tangly, I do not feel it proper to proceed with this aspect of the inq^uiry^ ; 
unless or until you so advise. . " ' '.;,' 

Having looked at this matter with all its serious implications for the future, ,.,.; 
I feel it advisable to imiiediately suggest that all of the section chiefs on ■<^.' 
the V/hite House staff be briefed by your office v/ith a view tovrards a miniraization 
of leaked material and comment. I also suggest that an overt firing of a person i-. 
directly connected with a leak would go a long v.'ay towards making the ability .■.'.,,. 
of the Andersons of the vrarld to gain VJhite House information both difficult ' 
and hazardous. .\.i{ 

•Please advise. f 



June 1, 1971 




I discussed the attached memo from 
Bob Brown informally with Bob Haynes of FB^. 
He advised that a type of investigation 
Mr. Brown is asking for v/ould be almost /^ 

iiixpos £)iuie. 

I believe this is out of my area of '• 
responsibility and therefore would like your 



May 28, 1971 


// y 

FROM: ROBERT J. BROWN ^.<;/^ i/ 

SUBJECT; FBI Check on News Leak 

I would appreciate it if you would have the FBI .v-> 
make a rundown on who is letting out information 
of the sort enclosed with this memo. This is a ' 
matter of great concern to me and I would like a* 
report on it. 



cc: Mr, John Ehrlichman 


■ NoAoAoBoBo NEWS 

Naiional Assccfelion To Advance Black Business 

P.O. BOX 12978 
YORK, N.Y. 10019 




John Ehrlichman, Special Assistant to the President/ has another 

running battle going on. It will be well worth watching to ccc -» 

Whether or not he wins this one as he did at Treasury on the 
appointment, of an IRS director. 

Ehrlichman backs Jay Leanse, a close friend of his, who has never " 
had any experience in minority enterprise. Even when he wrote 
Ehrlichman a personal letter/ he indicated that his ihterests were \ 
in HEW or KVD. He has become/ by virtue of Ehrlichman's endorse- 
ment/ an instant expert on minority enterprise. 

Secretary Stans is holding up the appointment waiting for the White 
House Aide to give him the go ahead to appoint a minority to the 
directorship of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise. 



(Date Illegible) 

Mr. John D. Elirlichman 
The White House 
Washington, D.C, 

Dear John: 

For most of the twenty years since U.C.L.A. I've been in 
general and sales management of paint and chemical manufac- 
turing businesses in which I've had equity. In I965 and 
through 1967 I was associated with W. Ross Campbell Company, 
a prominent Los Angeles Realty and Mortgage brokerage firm. 

I was a vice president and director of the Los Angeles 
Junior Chamber of Commerce and have been an active parti- 
cipant in various Jewish and community organizations. 

My field is marketing and management, I am highly oriented 
toward "people and organizations." My interests generally 
are in HEW or HUD but I'm open to suggestion and willing to 

Joyce is in a masters program in the Graduate School of 
Public Health at U.C.L.A. John, our oldest son, is I8 and 
completing his senior year at a boarding school near Los 
Angeles. Tom, 15, is a jimior and Steve, 12, a 7th grader. 

John, I'm a registered Republican, I'm available and would 
welcome enthusiastically the opportunity to work for you 


s/s Jay 

Jay I. Leanse 

29^0 Cavendish Drive 

Los Angeles, California 90064 




July 1. 1971 






Mr, Robert Brov.-n*B InvDr.tlr^atlon Reduest 


I would appreciate your rsviowing tl^e attached material and advising '': 
Bob Brown as to v/hlch (if any) af^ency or organiaatioa conducts 
invcDtigationo of the tj-pe ixo Id requesting, A '. 


cc: .yl^lr. John \7- Dnan. lU 



W A S H I N G T O N 

July 12, 1971 






Bob Brown's Investigative Request 

1. Inquiry has ascertained tlie following: 

a) The Post Office box number on the 
attached letterhead is non-existent. 

b) Credit Bureau and telephone company 
checks reveal no information as to the 
existence of an organization known as 
the National Association to Advance ; " 
Black Business. • ' 

2. The above developments suggest a clumsy covert : 
. atteinpt to embarrass whomever. Bob Brown has 

• . been so advised. Further, he has agreed that any 

future leads regarding this matter will be forwarded 
to my office. , , 





July 1, 1971 






Mr. Robert Brown's Investigation Request ' 

I would appreciate your reviewing the attached material and advising ■• 
Bob Brown as to which (if any) agency or organization conducts •. 

investigations of the type he is requesting. 


cc; ^.^r John W Dean Ttt 




September 2U, I97I 


A feniale Nixon campaign vorker presently working at 
H.U.D. 's northeast regional office has expressed 
concern to an intermediary party about the relation- 
ship of the subject and the General Counsel in the 
northeast region. Assertedly, the General Counsel 
has been providing the subject inside information 
on H.U.D. contracts and operations in that area. 
Further, it is asserted that the subject has acquired 
significant sums of money resulting from this re- 


Exhibit No. 34-3 




Dean, Malek, and I met to develop a strategy for handling leaks. 

It would be helpful to realize that there arc five distinct types of leaks; 
only some of these are detcrrable. The types include: a) the August 
SALT leak promptijig the lie detector tests at State. The individual 
consciously violated the lav,' to protect his own view of the 
national interest- -non-deterrable ; b) the September SALT (accidental 
war agreement) leak: too many individuals (all of Congress and our 
NATO allies) knew and so the information is not controllable-- 
non-deterrablc; c) the self-serving leak wiiich strengthens the individual's 
policy position by acquiring public support before the final decision is 
made -- deterrable; d) the ego-stroke leak where the individual either 
wants to sec his name ir. print or to be k^iown as one v.-ith inliuencc -- 
deterrable; and e) the careless leak resulting from either a slow 
individual with information and a foot reporter or too much liquor -- 

The "self-serving leak" for policy position advantage has been partially 
deterred as a result of the Ju:ie 29 Cabinet meeting. 

Following the June 29 meeting ih your office. Dean, Malek, Allin and 
Ihavc reviewed eleven cases for possible Haldcman action as "lord high 
executioner" to slop leaks, Malek and Dean arc of the opinion that none of 
the eleven cases would have been appropriate for Haldcman action. The 
subject should be raised again in a future Cabinet meeting and in the 
8:00 a.m. and 8:15 a.m. meetings. 

The conscious violator of the law leak should be handled as the August 
SALT leak-is now -- firm FBI investigation and full criminal penalties. 
Any dctcrence is fortuitous. 

Tlie last two, the ego- stroke and tlic careless leak, can be deterred by: 

a) Careful placomcnl of a Buchanan drafted story to the effect 
that as a result of the SALT leaks a White House investigative 
unit of Dud Kro!jh, Jolin Di-an, and Fred Malek lias been csla- 
bHshod to monitor leaks. The thrust of the story v.'ould be the , 



positive Roscoe Drummond theme that good government requires 
this type systenn to assure loyal burcacrats; 

b) Periodic soundings in the bureacracy aimed at detecting the level 
of concern about leaks and to indicate White House interest in the 

subject. These could be conducted by Dent's departmental 

c) Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and I'Cissinger should meet with their 
respective staffs to emphasize the following points: 

1. The political year is upon us; 

2. The media will be watching for and pushing wedges in 
any cracks; 

3. This has been an excellent year in terms of policy decision^*- 
These positions should be consolidated by not permitting 
leaks to vinderinine our unified approach to the re-eloction 

of the President; 

4. The ineeting should not be similar to the 1970 Campaign 
meeting with the notorious leaks (Safire, Timmons, Dent, 
Finch, Magruder, KJein, Colson), which had a very 
negative effect. 


September 27, 1971 



SUBJECT: Leak Situation 

Gordon reports that you, Higby and Dean met to review the leaJc 
situation and procedures for handling them« Based on the report 
of the meeting, it is my understanding that you will take personal 
charge of this project, 

John Ehrlichman has the feeling that there has been an increase 

in the number of leaks lately. Please discuss this with him as 

the first step in a high priority program of pinning down the sources 

of leaks and cutting them off. 

Bi-weekly reports on what action you've taken and the results will 
be expected with the first one due on Monday, October 11. 

cc: Mr. Dean 


Mr. Strachan 


-296 O - 73 - 14 


CC ' -al^^Vi, A^.4ft-^ 

^_. -„_ . « ^*L li 





September 29, 1971 





The purpose of this memo is to brief you on my plan for dealing with the 
problem of leaks. 


Since the President's forceful direction on this problem, there have been a 
minimum of major improper disclosures requiring your attention. However, 
the number of minor, hard to track down, infractions has continued, hi fact, 
a CIA study predicts that at the present rate, we will have 4 times the num», *• 
ber of improper disclosures of national security information this year as 
wc had ir. 197"0. Thic ctudy i= attached -xt Tab A, and John Ehrlichman tellP 
me it is the basis for his recent comments to you on this subject. 


Responsibility for dealing with this problem has been centralized with me. 
However, it will be necessary to have separate approaches for national secu- 
rity leaks and domestic leaks. 

National Security. As you know. Bud Krogh and David Young, under 
Ehrlichman's direction, are already conducting a confiprehensive investigation 
of national security leaks. They plan to continue this, and any efforts on my 
part to actually investigate wovild be redundant. Rather, my role will be to 
keep infornned of their efforts, to crack down hard on any violators who are 
uncovered, and to report to you on any cases needing your intervention. 
Their problenn to date is identifying the violators, but I feel they are on the 
right track. 

Donrtcstic. This covers all leaks not involving national security, some 
of which could involve State or DOD. There are, of course, a large number 
of minor infractions in this area, and I do not believe we at the White House 


should try to locate the origins except in the most obvious cases. Rather, I 
plan to remain continually alert to leaks, forcefully call them to the attention 
of Department Heads, insist on actions, and follow through to ensure actions 
are taken. Where nnultiple sources are involved, we would coordinate the 
follow througli from here. When a violator is identified, I would ensure a 
hard crackdown. 

Specific steps I plan to take in approaching this problem are as follows: 

1. The memo at Tab B has been sent to Cap Weinberger 
and Ken Cole, reiterating my request for their assistance 
in spotting improper disclosures. I will follow up with them 
as needed to gain their cooperation. 

2. Mort Allin will continue to scan newspapers and the news 
summaries and call my attention to observed leaks, 

3. On each legitimate leak spotted, I will follow up force- 
fully with the Departn-icnt Head, insisting on a thorough 
investigation to identify the source. Most of these will not 
bring results but at the least will increase consciousness 
and attention to tliis matter. This should have an important 
preventive maintenance effect. 

4. We will work through our politically loyal personnel con- 
tacts in each Department to spot leaks, identify culprits, 
and raise the general degree of attention to this problem. 
This will be sonnewhat duplicative of 3 above, but will give 
us another avenue to help get results. 

5. I expect the need for your involvement to be minimal, 
but I will prepare an action memo and talking paper for all 
cases requiring your attention. 

6. At the end of each nnonth, I will submit a progress 
report to you, outlining the cases considered, actions taken, 
and results. I believe this would be more effective than the 
bi-weekly reports suggested in your 9/27 memo. 

A major part of my thrust is to increase awareness of and attention to the 
problem on the part of top-line officials. They must be held responsible for 
leaks in their units and sliould be required to take forceful preventive as well 
as curative measures. To ensure the top line officials give added attention 


to this, however, we need additional Presidential direction. I recommend 
that the President raise this in an early Cabinet Meeting. He could cover it 
quickly as a follow on to the session of several months ago, ask for an 
aggressive action plan in each Department to- deal with tliis problem, and 
designate me as the follow up person to counsdfl on the plans and work with 
them as needed on implementation. If you approve of this concept, I will 
prepare a tallcing paper and coordinate with Alex on scheduling. 



The combination of the ahpve should have some impact. However, the greatest 
impact \vill be achievpd'oy finding and making an example of violators. 

Please let me know whether you have any general comments or would like 
some modificfi'tion in this plan of attack. 

Attti c ''.Snent £ 


Exhibit No. 34-4 


Indicated below arc the results of an on the scone check of the 
moveraentG of E:;1C during his ."iop-off visit to Honolulu enroute 
from India; 

Ei'DC arrived in Honolulu alone aboard Pan American Flif\ht ;?2 from 
India via Tokyo (he didn't G-t off filane jn Tokyo) at 11:00 AI^I 
August I'l'th. A ru::nin£i press :intervie\/ took place with Kennedy 
obviously reluctant to ma!:e any statement. His only corcment was 
V7ith regard to the President's econoinic moves which he character- 
ized as "sound, but late". He departed the airport quickly with 
two friends identified as follows: 

a) John V7. Goeraans 

Resides in V.'aialua City^ close to Honolulu 
Fonner HIK classmate and Aide to botli Jack and 
Robert Kennedy 

B) John Carl V/arnecke 

Friend of Kennedy family 
Designer of JFK gra^^ewight 

Ostensibly, B'JC's visit wos for the purpose of evaluating the 

creation of a National Park at t>ie site of a black coral reef 

island off the Honolulu coast. The reef bears an identifiable likeness 

to the profile of the late JTK. It was determined that a local 

Democratic Councilman, Joseph E. Eulgo (Maui Island) is handling 

the project on behalf of E-IFC. 

H^IK made no public appearances during his stay in Honolulu. Inquiry 
ascertained that he occupied the private estate of one J. Otani, 
located at Diamond Head Road, Honolulu. Otani is initially described 
as a wealthy Japanese industrialist (attempts will be made to identify 
him further) . 

Discreet inquiry determined that Kennedy used the estate solely for 
sleeping purposes, took only his breakfast meal at t>iat location 
and quietly visited friends at other locations on the island. 

It is knovm that he played tennis on August l8 at the estate of one 
Lloyd Martin identified as a wealthy Honolulu contractor. Partners 
in the tennis match were Mrs. .Warnecke, Mrs. Martin, Lloyd I-lartin and 



An extensive survey of liotels, discreet cocktail loun;v;on and 
other liideavjays vas conducted v;ith a vicv/ tovards determining 
a covert K-K visit. The results vore n egative . 

Additional co,nipanion3 of B'HC at the estates mentioned vere: 

Stan llimcns 

A friend of V'arnecke's 'and 

V/alttr Taf^av^a, 

A friend of Jiartin's 

It A7as also determined that durJnfi his island stay E-3C worked 
on a speech vhich A:as civen 8/26/7I at the National Press Club 
in Washlnfiton on tl)e subject of Pakistan. 

As previously reported, rcaterial relating to this matter vas 
forwarded to Lyn Nofziger for use in the Monday publication. A 
review of the 8/30/7I issue indicates some of the material \ra.s 
in fact used in the EK- Pakistani article. 

In conclusion, it is believed that EK activity dCillng his stay 
in Honolulu was adequately covered. Ko evidence was developed 
to indicate that his conduct v."as improper. 

}Iyahnispoft sources indicate KUC will remain in that area until 

reconvenes. A discreet, inquiry at llyannis is programned by our 
source during this period. 



WA S H 1 N G T O N 

October ll+, I97I 






Dick Allen has passed information to HRH indicating 
Kennedy people have engineered a regional Toyota 
franchise in New England. 

Ify memo of August indicating Et-K visited with an 
as!serte^ J^'^^nese ipdus'^'rialist C J« O'^-ani - *T^t 
further identified) during a two day layover enroute 
from India nov7 suggests a follow-up on J. Otani. 
Such inquiry is underv/ay. 




October 20, I97I 




Inquiry to date has determined the' following 

Otani is a multi-millionaire Democrat with extensive real 
estate and business holdings in Hawaii. He is President 
and General Manager of the Otani Company which is a 
successful wholesale seafood enterprise. 

Sources advise that Otani significantly controls local politics 
in Honolulu to the extent that he is referred to as the "Mayor 
Maker" . 

.He is a frequent visitor to Honolulu's Customs area, particularly 
vhen important Japanese visit the island . 

U.S. Customs sources contacted in this regard were unaware of 
any relationship between Otani and Toyota. Since there apparently 
exists a friendly relationship betv/een Otani and Customs officials 
in that area, further inquiry through this source is deemed 

Other means of inquiry designed to prove or disprove the 
allegation are currently being explored. 

cc: JR. Allen 


EXHTOIT No. 34-9 


SAMRIES President 3^,000 

Vice-Ii-eGident 36,000 

Adjnin. Asst. 20,000 

Secretary 15,000 
Klectronics - 

Security Expert 25^000 


$132, 000 

Kental 10, 000 

Furn.iGhinGS 5, 000 

Eciuip-ient ' 5,000 

Utilities (telephone, etc.):L2,000 

Security Devices 2,000 
Accounto.nt - Legal 

Fees 10, OOP 

$ ^^000 


(Clcints - opcratJ.Yes - 



Security Expert 50,000 

$ 226, 000 







$36, 000 


$ 50, 000 


Rental, equip:nent, etc. 5^000 


10, 000 


(informants, Special Projects) 

10, OOP 

$ 75,000 


imi YORIC 






25', 000 


$ B&, 000 


(To include aeals, 
lodgirig, airfare, 
car rental) 





$ ^^i+Tooo 


InforiPantc Turfd - 
Spe c i a,l Fi-o j C:c ts 

Headquarters, il.Y.C. 
(Apartnent, false 
identities, r.ail drops, 

telepb-one , etc . ) 

l'kxuj.p:r.snt - 'Jlectrcnic - 

Su i-ve i 1 Ian c o_) 

Telephone Credit cards 







$210, 000 

$100, 000 Open ended 




September 17, I97I 


The attached memorandum represents an analysis of the 
overall security requirements for Campaign '72 at the 
Republican National Committee, I7OI Pennsylvania Avenue 
and at San Diego. 

Consistent with the Sandwedge memo, it expands upon the 
overt involvment of the Security Consulting Group*, Inc. 
in a manner that would be credible, readily accepted 
and, most importantly, badly needed. 

Since the plans for the Nixon Campaign traveling 
staff are presently unknown, no analysis was made in 

vill have to be taken to ensure the integrity of that 
operation. There is time for that, however. 


iiiTRor/j';T ron 

The bro?.d iMnr.e oT jcjUlical activity acsoclatcd with 
a Presidential rar.dotes tliat a conti-ollinc cecurity 
entity he rslcb?. i^licO. and pro^ to effectively minir,iize, in 
practical fobhion, the l;azarQ3 for oo.TiproniiEe by oppoaition 
forces e.'.)d tliereby crii;urc the si.ooth function of Republican Party 
busiucsc during; 1972. 

It is Uic puj-poHC of t'.la paper to cauf^e fjOcus to be brought 
upon thor.e ;jrcas rc;qiiirin;3 cucl; security capability. In addition, 
indication irj ^ivcn as to ho-.r tlie Security Consulting Group of 
Vashinf.ton, Inc., the proposed risrr.s f cs" the coniT.ercial security 
entity, ■i.'ill be able to function in this regard A.-hether it be fro.-n 
an oi.>3rational or ovei-vJei; standpoint, as follovrs: 

a) fepublicn n ration a l Cc~: :: itxce 

Immediately cftcr C.'/cpaifn 'oB, Bob authorized the 
author of this papr;r to institute and overviev; a security pro^rjun 
at the Republican national Co— -littce. This prograju has been onr;oin3 
for tuo years and a continual overviev: has been structured. Attached {l.-JD 
"A") is an account of the security procedures presently in place at 
the Coi'!!:ee. 

They ere found to be generally satisfactory vrith the exception of 
a requi t to tig hten up the P inkc'rton effort to include an analysis 
of llie quality of tlicir personnel and institute a^ polycraph 
examination of each c^nrd v/orI;inc; at tlic Coirjnittce. 

For health rensonr, John Itaf;nn vill not be able to continue to 
pcrfoi-in In tliis area during the coming monthr;. Jaiiics Mc Cord, 


a hichly qualified ^'cpjblicun career Eccurlty professional, 
(tab "IJ") vill be retained r.s e consultatii; to the Security 
Consulting Croup nnc: vill perfoiin operational overview' duties 
at the Cov,".dtteo vwl clscvrhcrc, as indicated, on a scheduled basis 
under the directior. of the orcani'/ation. 

1701 ro!irfiylvr.n Ja /■vcnv.e 

The Security Con-j-jllliiii Group, Inc. -i/ill initiate (l»c Cord) and 
Bupervisc a con-.prohc:;Givc r.ecu^'ity system tt the above location. 
Tlie procedr.res ei-.lohliL;hed &.t the R.IT.C. (TAE "A") vill be tailored 
to conforn to thr- cxp^.ndinr; roquireii;ento of I7OI Pennsylvania. 

In addition, the follo-./ing arc-as of security concern vill be 
addressed, evaluai-cd and proi;r::r--!ii3d : 

A) the reyuironont that a sclioduled ELDJTROillC COUHTEHIKaSUPJCS 
SYSTH-I be cctablich'-:d to include: 

1) Office t«.'lepho:ie net\:orl: 

2) Conference roo.v.s 

3) ResiOcnce phones of key political staff in 

KOTE: Tlie syster.i established vill be adaptable to the Ilixon 

staff and G.O.P. needs at Can Dicco. 

B) Tlie ability to recruit a tvo wan bodyguard protective detail 
for the Attorney General throuchout Cajapaisn *^2 is at hand. 
Because the A.G. may have personal preferences in this area, no 
cteps vill be taken, until ndviccd. 

C) Computer Security - An inspection capability to ensure the 
intccrity of the Republican computer cystemu used in Cwiipulen '^2. 


D) Poll Cccurily 

A security cop-^'ility clC3:iGntd to ennurc the ccnfidentiallty 
of key polls inntlUit'Jcl by lyOJ. operatives vill be pro^ramned . 

F) Undoubtedly, additional cccuri-ly requirements ctoraiinfj 
from the 1701 ororrition vill Leco.ns evident as the cainpaicn 
prosresses. Tlie f;l>ove described f;tructure ■t/ill pernit a 
professional ic^p^uje to the:;e needs . 

R dpublJccn H a tirp :' ' Cci :'.ventio.i ■ 

The vast private i.e:.urity need.': c? the Ilixon teai-i and I'epublican 

Party at San Die^o can be ber.t i;::plen3ntcd in the follovin^ ranner: 

a) ni?:on r^t pff Ile ndo'j r.rtc- vs at t he Sheraton h ote l, liarbor Tsl ind 
The Security Consulting Crc^'.p, Inc. ■J'ill be cliar^ed vith total 

ad hoe Eccurity-reccpiionict entity i.'.lll be cstablifihed utilizins 

off duty reserve deputy sheriff .'j fro.-n the San Dieco Sheriff's office 

and Ilixon fcLiale volunteers. The Sheriff of San Diego County, Joan I>jffy, 

(Nixon ?.ei:i:blican) has acrecd to provide such personnel, escured that 

they -vill be younc, bright and capable and, ji.-portantly, that they 

all vill be Republicans. It vas agreed that a reasonable vage vould 

be paid tliose performing in this regard fro.n Nixon Staff funds. 

The nboYC procedure is strongly recoiLucndcd to ensure that the 
Nixon Staff team vill have qvialified and loyal security personnel 
under proper controls at the iuportant Sheraton Hotel (see belovf)-. 


Includorl in the re: i-oi-'.nibJ] lilc.-'; of the Cccurltj Coiir;uItir.[- Croup 

at th2 holcl vjj.ll bj the .ti;r;ti tution of u sophicticDtcd photo-ID 

Bystor.i ar.'.l e?.ov:'.tor cjcaraufc process clc-jicncd to minimize the 

hazard o<' dict'i''j, urr.'arrautcd accccc to senGitivc v/ork areas 

and the like. 

B) Cprvcno'cn r'::-';-it yj C-;n Dicr ro , 

The n.lI.C. h?.3 ;;clc;ctcd Cdy Fich of Vir.consjn to be the Gereeant 

at AriDs lor the CoMveation. In that position he v;ill have cecurity 

and iinhcr rcrporinilbii j tier, uitbin the Convention Hall and at the 

COP lle^dqx'.arter:: ai -..lie Ro.val Inn a-j; the V.'iiurf during the Convention 


Dick Ilsr/.'an has cSr.ri the cutlior to have the Security Consulting 
Croup act in an tc'vicory cap:_city in this regard and lidtiate a 
cojaiTChciiijivc cost r.urvey of ths secuTity requirecents for the 
COP llckdr.ucrtczjj orA Convention Hull. Further, Heri'ian hiS ashed 
that qualiificd profcruionuls be recruited to assist Fish in this 
regard. Tliis vemicjit hris been aj^reed to and such survey vill be 
conducted by the-; r.ubjcct orcanization and i;ubnittcd to the ArrRn5eT2nts 
Coonsittec for revjcv at the earDiest possible tinse. 

It io noted that various private detective agencies aJ*c already 
atter.iptins to use l^cpublicnn jx)litical influence to obtain vliat vlll 
be a prestigious nnl lucrative contract at San Weco. Iv'hile the Cecurity 
Consulting Group v/jll ensure that all interested parties get 
consideration, the ability to jicrform should be considered the 


prine factor in ii\.'ardin3 tho contract and rcco:rL'ucndations ^;ill 

be r-r.dc acrordiiiGly. At-loched (TAB "C") in a recent article 

in the V.'a3hi.n.::konicn I!<;ar'.inG clearly indicatinc the- poor quality 

of private iiccurJ.ty perijcniiel in VJu^fihinrton. Generally speaVtint;, the 

BQiiie pattern applies •natioM\ndc . (It is this factor that stronGly 

Buccests the use of reserve deputy Sheriffs at the Nixon Staff 

headciuarters as indicated above). 

lit eddition to the Sports Arena and G.O.P. hof-dquarters 

hotel, early cir^n-s ind-Jcato the posnilility of a security need 

at other ]ocatioi:3. For exuiiple, the Nixon staff is conteisplr.tinc 

the hoursin^r of a lar^e croup of 18 year olds at a local San Die~o 

collcn<^ for rally purposes. AduitionalDy, the Arranc:cn-;tntD 

CoiniRittee is loohinf^ at the possible u£^c of a pier near the Royal 

Inn at the \nnrf as a Ci.O.P. A:orkinj4 area. 

When these and other like them decisions are nade, the Security 
Consultin3 Group can effectively program the security requirements 
after it Is deterniincd vhetlier operational activity or advisory 
cervices are needed. 

96-296 O - 73 - 15 


I\c-v..w-i.^ August 26, 1971 


FROM: .BARRY MOUiu/ua -j 

;;tai.\ [/-v / 


Over the past' sc'veral r.onths 
nurnsrous r.sasurc-s heive been tc".!;cn to up^'.^ado seciiri'cy for the bor.e.'it 
of the Rc-pLibncen ilacicnc;! Cc:7.niittee. K;ny of thase steps, v.'aile nc: 
readily visible to zi'.e e.'::ployee in his or her day-to-day operacio.i, •..ill 
help with overall security needs and precautions as we ready for the '72 

nevertheless, some of these pre- 
cautions still require the wholehearted cooperation of everyone in the 
building. Therefore, please read these instructions carefully and re- 
tain them for future reference. 


GU;"^D S£sVrC£ 

John Ragan, former F. B. I. agent 
and security officer for the '68 cair.pairn, is retained by t'ac National 
Committee and the Citizens Coa.:nittee to oversee security measures. Mr. 
Ragan's office is on the 1st floor in Mr. Underwood's section. His tele- 
phone extension is 6517. 

Between 5 p. m. and 9 a. m. on 
weekdays and all day Saturday and Sunday, the Pinkerton Agency is re- 
tained for guard service. They are a bonded service and are required 
to fully adhere to certain specific regulations. Therefore, your cooper- 
ation is requested in dealing with tho:,i. The guards will have hone 
numbers of all crr.ployoes but are instructed not to give them out except 
to another employee. In case of an crr.crgcncy he has been instructed to 
call certain key employees for additional instructions. 


All full -tine employees should 
have identification cards with then at all times. All other individuals 
should be listed at the reception desk and should be prepared to produce 


a driver's license or other suitable identification v/honc-vcr requsstsd 
by tiic or gjcrd. People arriving bovcre 8:30 a. v.. or 
leaving after 6:C0 p. n. arc- rec;uircd to sign the register at tha 

reception desk. 


.Visitors are to be logged in 
and out at the reception desic at all 

When individual offices are 
expecting visitors, please notify the reception desk v/hcnever possi- 
ble. The receptionist will r.uke certain ti:at they are well received 
in the Lobby until sucn ti.T.e as they are rciCy tc be received. 

Effe c tive Senterriber 1s t, all 
visitors will be escorted to their appoiivc.ueni: cy iVie secretary or 
designated er.iplcyee of the office being visited. This is a startoard 
security procedure which will be enforced. 

Unfortunately, in the past 
there has been loss of valuables and poclcetbccks, v.aich is possii^ly 
attributed to lack of control over outsiders. Let r.e remind you, 
therefore, that all fe.v.ale e::ployees should keep their pocketbocks cut 
of sight in a cra'.,er or ceoinet. iven should not leave .jackets con- 
taining v/allets unattended in the open. 


^' HELI VERIES - A receiving 
clerk's station has been installed at the back cccr vnzn access ceing 
only through the supply office. In addition, TV nonitors are also 
located in this office so as to give daytire coverage to the garac;e and 
parking lot. All rr.erchant deliveries are zo be rou:ed ihrouon this area 
and deliverytr.en will no longer have free access to the building. 

B. GARAG E - The c;arago door 
will be closed at all tinges and opened only for e.vcry or exit by a ve- 
hicle. The interior ranp and tiie exterior apron are new constantly 
monitored by closed circuit television car.eras. These monitors will be ■ 
controlled at night by the guard at the reception desk and during the 
day solely by the receiving clerk. 

For exit and entry in the 
garage, a doorbell has been installed on either sice of the garage door. 
The bell will ring at the r.onitoring stations and the door will be open- 
ed by remote control. 

C. Orncrs - Keys have been 
issued to the Chairman's, Co-Chainnen's and Divu.K.ii Heads' offices, and 
each s cction i s rospon'. ihl o for sectiri t v v.' i v t . i n t h .-^ i r ov.t; a re a . .' I r . R a r a n 
and otners mil periodically ii.ake sccui-jty c.ioc:^s i,o as to naintain co.urol 
over the syr.tcn; The r.'.aintenance people will KOT have keys to private 
Offices, and therefore, wastebaskets, ashtrays and other items for cleaning 


should be loft CL'tsici cha privute office in t'r,2 cvoninr, ualc-ss 
other arranccrr.snts ere ir.zd^. 

V. fiA\"DLlf:G A:n'D ST0.?A 3E cf 

All confidential r'.iiarizil is to 
be locked v^i u;-,Gn2vcr an area is not attc.-^.dod. IccaViyj alj_ desks and 
cabinets should be Icclxd. If t.Vis is not possible, each ccpartcent 
head sho-jld designate certain cabinets for s«;o;'aye of specific types of 
material. .\'o sensitive material should be left en top of desks over- 
night. A SLifficienc nu.T.eer cf Icckec file cabinets are available to 
handle everyone's needs. 

. .A shredding nachino is located 
in the Mail Roor:i on 3-2 for disposal cf confidential r.aterial. .The 
dispatch officer v;ill pick up such cz the end of eacn day for 
shredding, or each office can personally take such r.^aterial to E-2. 
All offices will be supplied with wastebsskots and bags for this 

VI, em:rge::cie$ 


Everyone should be aware of the 
location of the fire extinguisher closesi: to his desk and also of the 
location of tne rrre alam switcn. ine fire aiann systeni nowever, is 
for building notification cnly end dees not autor,iatically alerc the 
fire departr.ent. Such notification r.ust be rr.ade cnrourli our switch- 
board operator, by calling the fire cepartr.-.ent (iiO 2-1515) or by use of t^ 
fire alara box located at 1st and "D" S'creet, S. E. 

Fire drills will be held periodical- 
'ly and in the event of evacuation: 

1) Use either staircase but do NOT 
use the elevators. 

2) Leave the building by either 
the front or back door and proceed to a point at least 300 feet fror.i the 

Listed below are emergency num- 
bers for your infonnation: 

POLICE 626-2375 


. JOHN RAGA^L .....EXT. 6517 or (516) 798-4S81 

PINKERTO:i 2/14-3500 

cc: John Ragan . 

Pinkcrton Guards 



Exhibit No. 34-10 

The Democratic Party is proud 

to present you with your 

Membership Card. . . . 

Participating Mombcrsiiip 

2600 Viroinia Avenue. N.W. 
Washington. D.C. 20037 





V»i ':_.••■;. ■-. 

H'ofAinC.on. D.C. 

Thit cerlificM ihct 


i;S:.SOCii.-i2JZ :'.. t.' 

ti/ the 


This card ocknov.'ledges v;ith our sincere thanks your Membership Contribution. You will find 
. space on the back to rccorc) the names o( your Congressional representatives. 

Here's another v/av vcu c-m cor 

jtyour rany. . 

Your Participating Membership is most appreciated. You 
can help even more by sending us the names of others 
that you think would also v:ant to support our efforts. 

City .. 

Stale Zip 

City .. 

City .. 

City .. 

Exhibit No. 34-11 

SUBJECT: McCloskcy's Now Hampshire Cnmp;<i(Tn 

1. As dircclcd, an investigative team conducted r. series of 
discreet inquiries and oljservationc in New Hampshire with a 
view towards an evaluation of Paul N. (Pete) McOoskey's 
N. H. organization and plans to cliallcnj^c tlic President in 
th(i March 1972 New Hampshire presidential preference 
primary. This activity took place dliring the period 11/18-11/21. 
.The results are as follows: 


Volunteers - The >.'IcCloskcy volunteer headciuarters is 
located at 101 Norlli Main Street, Concord, New Hampshire, 
Telephone ii 683-224-1966, It is a one room storefront operation 
typical of a small towai election headquarters. 

There is a marked lack of activity at the headquarters, siaiied 
primarily oy youths in their middle to late twenties. In addition, 
there appears to be little interest expressed by the local Concord 
citizens witli the current operation. 

Pretext press intervicv/s conducted at the location determined th.c 
identities and assignments of the present volunteer personnel: 

Michael Brev/cr Campaign Manager for 

28 years of age New Hai-npshire (Receives salary) 

Field Rciciiardt New England Coordinator 

23 years of age McCloskcy Volunteers 

Resides in Waterville, Maine, (Receives Salary) 

graduate of Colby College, Maine 

Former Chairman of Maine College 

Republicans . . ' " • • • 


Eric Schnapper 
26 years of age 

Charles Brcrcton 
29 years of age 
Previous invol v'cmcnt as 
organizer in Peace Movements 

Nancy Payne 
24 years of age 

John Mudge 
22 years of age 
Resides Lyme, N. H. 
Grandfather founder of 
Mudge, Rose law firm 

Christopher Finch (no relation) 
24 ycarS" of age 

Aide to Campaign Manager 

Youtli Organization-Voter 
Registration Coordinator for 
McCloiikcy Volunteers 
(Receives Salary) 

Office Manager 

Regional Coordinator 
McClosl;cy Volunteers 
(See attachment) 

Regional Coordinator 
McClosl;cy Volunteers 
Cair>T>:'i"n Workev 

Kathy Gonzalez 
Woodside, Calif. 
(McCloskey's hoine district) 

CaiTipaign Worker 

Youthful enthusiasm was expressed by all of tlic above during the 
course of pretext press interviews. The main focus of this liead- 
quarters is to supply logistical and contact support for a campus 
registration effort scheduled to become full blov/n in January. 
It was dcterinined, hov/ever, that the organization's efforts to 
date have been discouraging. Encouraging support has only 
been achieved on four campuses to date. Deep concern v/as 
expressed over the expected organizational thrusts of Muskie, 
McGovern and Jackson in tliat tlicir respective constituencies 
arc closely aligned plnlosopliically willi McCloskey and rcsultingly 
threaten their campus voter registration efforts. 

.the presence of 
Close questioning of the above staff reveals jnoncy problcnis. 
All financing is controlled froin the Washington headquarters. 
Within the last wecli 'mailing of campaign literature from the 
volunteer hcadciuarlcis was c\irtailcd because of a shortage of 
funds. Negligible amounts arc coming direct to the volunteer 


The voUinlccjG arc placing their hojics upon an accelerated 
appearance schedule hy McCloskcy to begin alter Congress ' 
adjourns for tlie holiday recess. 

In any event, it is clear that McCloskey docs not have a 
" McCarthy Youth Movenic-nt " going in New Ilampsliire at this 
time. Worliing ayainst that potential is the lack of the war as 
an issue and the expected heavy thrusts of the Democratic 
candida:tcs after the first of the year. Unless an incident 
or event occurs whicli can project NlcCloskey ir»to the headlines 
and capture the ima.gination of the yoimg, it is doubtful ihzii 
he crfn gear the existing organivialional' volunteer framework 
(and that's all it is) to a successful effort. 


Inquiry has dctcrinincd lliat tlic below identified Concord 
businessmen arc actively supporting McCloskey' s New 
Hampshire canipaign: 

Malcohn White - Mayor of Concord 

CcticorJ iic-w.spj'.pciG report tliat While openly pledged 
support for McCloskey on August 9, 1971 during a ceremony 
opening the Volunteers for McCloskey headquarters. 

J. Richard Jackman 

Described as a prominent Concord Republican. Retired 
President of Ruinford Press Inc. , Chairman of N. H. delegation 
to '64 Republican N'ational Convention; '64 Cliairman of Draft 
Lodge Committee. Past international President of Adminis- 
trative Management Association and Printing Industries of 
America; President of Concord Hospital; Member of City 
Council, Chairinan of Housing Authority; Director of Concord 
National Bank. 

Jackman' s announced support of McCloslcey in October 
caused significant enthusiasm aniongst McCloskey' s supporters 
in New Hampshire. 


Paul O. Bofinger 

East Concord Conservationist. Forrester for Society for 
the Protection of N. H. Forests. (Conservation is a sensitive 
issue in New Ilainpshire). 

Robert H. Reno 

State Chairman for McClosUey's campaign in primary. 
Lawyer in Concord law firin of Orr and Kcno, 95 N. Main Street, 

Reno has had no significant previous political experience. 

An examination of the 12 member lav/ firm indicates both 
the Mayor and Charles F. Leahy, Administrative Assistant to 
Governor Peterson are listed as practicing attorneys. 

Reno's present focus is concentrated on obtaining 1,000 
signatures of registered voters (500 from each congressional 
district) for submittal to the Secretary of State along with a 
$500 filing fee for each district. The filing deadline is January 6, 
1972. l^ocal key political reporters were contacted in this regard 
and they expressed tlic opinion that McCloskey's oj^eralion could 
produce the required nuniber of signatures, but that they may have 

It might v/ell be desirable for Nixon political loyalists in 
New Hampsliire to take a close look at the progress of this effort 
and if trouble in gaining tlie required amount of signat\ires becomes 
evident, consideration could be given to apply pressure to have 
the lav/ firm (where pressure opportunities exist) drop its support. 
Conceivably, this tack could cause the entire operation to fold 


Clearly McCloskey is having serious nnoney problcir\s as 
mentioned above. His inain sources to date have been identified 
as coming fron^ Now York and California. Norton Simon, who 
Tran unsuccessfully against George Nhirjjhy in the California 
Senate primary of 1970 is a jnajor contributor. 


It is reported Norton in mid-July provided $50, 000 
in 6ccd money for a nationwide effort. 

Anotlicr major California contributor is Albert R. Schrcck, 
Director of the San Franci.'jco Art Institute. 

On the Kast Coast McClo.sI;cy has sought and accepted 
what is described as "N. Y. Peace Money. " A New York City 
party in the S]5ring of 1971 raised $11, 000 whicli was used to 
finance a trip to Southeast Asia. Sonie of those attending the 
party were: 

Stewart Mott - Left wing phila.nthropist 
Howard Stecn - ]J)jeyfus Fund 
Sam Rubin - Invci^tor 

It was determined tliat former Kennedy staffer, Charles Daly, 
was instrumental in this particular effort. Daly accomjianied 
McClosk(!y on the trip. 

IVlcCloskcy has accepted nvimerous paid speaking cngagejncnts 
before a grou):) known as the Business Executives Move for Vietnam 
Peace (BEM). Attaclicd is a description of the organization. 

In an effort to sustain the New Hampshire effort, McCloskey 
in October closed down his West Coast campaign Iieadquarters 
and now operates only out of Concord and Wasiiington. Resultingly, 
it is believed that v.!iilc money is short, he will have enough to 
continue the N. II. priniary battle. 

NOTE: A small newspaper piece in October stated that 
former Kennedy TV produce)-, Charles Guggenheim, had agreed 
to work for McClosl;ey. This sliould be watched, Guggcnhciin 
is a pre. . 


McCloskey has assertedly finished his book for Random House. 
The book directs itself to lii? campaign tlicmes as follows: 


1) Peace in Viclnam 

2) Truth in Government 

3) Independence of the Judiciary 

4) Maintenance of the Kepublican tradition 

in Civil Rights 

All signs indicate that with the war winding down McCloskcy 
is focusing on Trulli in Government as his main issue. This 
thrust v/ill be priinarily directed to the youth campus vote. 

McCloskey is vulnerable, however. In an Evanston, 
Illinois, speech he came out strong in favor of tlie draft. lie • 
is also on recoid as supporting free abortions in a California 
speech. Assertcdly, position caused him Catholic vote 
problems in his district. 

Much lias been said in the New Hampshire media about the 
White House feud with Governor Petersen. The Governor is 
apparently annoyed over the preferred W. H. treatment given 
William I..oeb of the Manclicstcr Leade r and the key campaign 
spot given to Lane Dwinell. 

Wide coverage v/as given to the appearance of the Governor 
and N. H. state official Stuart Lamprey at the opening of McCloskcy' s 

A mending of the fences in this regard might v/ell diffuse 
any adult protest vote which, might be present and leave McCloskey 
solely with the highly competitive youth vote. 

NOTE: While there was a close July liaison between 
McCloskey and Alard Lowenstcin, little has been heard of this 
relationship since. Because of Lowenstcin' s success in '68 with 
the McCarthy forces, an alert should go up if he surfaces with 


A) McCloskey has only a volunteer youth frajncwork presently 
in New Hampshire. TJie effort has not caught fire. 


B) The higlily oigani-/.cd and funded Dcmoci-atic cainpaigns 
arc expected to liurt McClor.kcy's cffoits. 

C) Funding will be a continual debilitating problem. 

t>) Truth in Government will be his main issue. McCloskcy 
is vulnerable if an attacl; is desirable. 

E) Republican infighting is helping McCloskey's efforts. 

NOTE: Future action by the investigative team 
to be discussed privately. 


BusiNFSS prAixuTiVT-s MOVE TOW VTi:T?rA?' PEACE (ni::.!) 

BEM is rcf:istorcd \7itli tho Conf^i'cc?; of tho United 
States as r. Roivistcrca Politic;:! IjObby. It is self -docarihcd 
fts a national ori;;inizatioa which bolicvos the v/ar in Vietnam 
is contrary to t)ic interests of the United States and that 
business c-xccutivcs nhould provide realir:-.tJc loadoifjhip in 
foreign affairs. As of April, 1071, hcadciuartcrs of tliis 
orcanization was located at 901 1,'orth llov/ard Street, Ealtir.'.ore, 

Members of tJie By:*.' Executive Corr.initteo are 
Henry E. Niles, Chairi.ian, Haltiiaore Life Iv.siu-anco Covoi^any, 
Baltii.iorc, Maryland; VriTlian ¥. Ti^cher, Jr., President, 
Fischer Macliine Cof.ipany, Diiladel j.hia , Peni:?3ylvania; Jo:-;eph E. , 
McDov.-ell, Chairnrai, Servoi-alion Cory.oratioi-. , Nvv/ Yor!: , liov/ York; 
and Erv.'in Abnor L'alh, President, Sail:, V.'ard £-. \i'alk, Inc., 
Chicaco, Illinois. 

Information f\irnjihcd this Bureau indicates tliat 
members pay rcfiular duos of ^100 per year, patron ir.cinbcrs 
pay $1,000 per year, and a life tiien-.bership is $5,000. 

'BEM held a rally in Chicago, Illinois, on 10-1-71, 
■Purpose of tlie ra]ly to focus attention tJiat the Vietnani 
war continues, that people are b3i:-:t: hilled and to lu-mor 
outstanding: peace advocates. About 2,000 persons voi'o in 
attendance and fornor U. S. "Attorney Gonor.'il IlaMsey Clai^l; 
was Master of Ceren^.onies. Anionr; tl\o-re receiving the Yiyi'. 
American peace A\.nrds were Daniel Ellsboi-f;, Joan Daez, 
Wayne :.!orse, Ra'..':scy Clark, Ralph Abcrnr.thy, L'on.jarjin Spock 
and Senator Fulbriclit. Darinjj t)ie rally Joan IJacz rer.ioved 
tv/o American flap.s froii: their stands and placed them on the 
floor. Some of the audience protested. Tlie flar,s v.ere later 
restored to their stands by Clark and Conci'cssman Paul 
McCloskcy, Jr, 


December I, 1971 



Attached is uornc additional informp.tion which 
Jack h'-is collected re McClo::!:ry' ti operation, 

I Jiavc tlto pat cod a copy cvlcn^ to Jcb Magrudci'» 

bcc: Gordon Strachan 


ON IIOVEIIBKl^ 29, 1971 

1. Investigative coverage v/as civen this McCloskey appearance 
vith the follo'./inc results: 

McCloskey 's appearance lasted approximately one hour 
during vhich he cave a prepared 20 minute speech follo'./ed by a 
question and e.ncver period. His main thenie focused upon the 
threat of concentrated ^/"ealth to the electoral process; the 
abuses involved in cainpaign contributions and his personal 
support for the ta::payer dollar checl: off proposal presently 
before Congress . 

McCloshey's appearance at Dartnouth resulted frcn: an 
Invitatici"! offered by the university's 5tud'='nt or^a^i-^^tion. The 
850 seat auditorium vas filled to capacity. 

It is pointed out that similar invitations have been 
extended to other presidential candidates. In this context the 
turnout can be considered pro forma. 

McCloskey appealed to the students to join his 
Kew Ilampshire volunteer organization. Membership applications 
vere distributed to all attendees. It vas discreetly determined 
that a total of 10 volunteers signed up. 

Vhile McCloskey v/as r/armly applauded at the conclusion 
of his remarks, he proved vulnerable in the question and ans\;er 
period vhcn asked to Justify his support of the Draft. The 
reaction to his explanation of support \;as decidedly poor. 


He vas also cloGely qucGtioned by pro-Israel students 
on his lack of support for Israeli arras from the U.S. A^iain, a 
poor reaction to his response vas ascertained. 

He adnittcd under questioning that he has received heavy 
financial support fro.-n Norton Siiaon of California. 

It can be concluded that his Dartmouth appearance, vhile 
sympathetic in nature, failed to evidence any nushrooaing support 
araongst ca;npus youth. i 

NOTE: A follov/-up visit to McCloskey's concord, II. H. volunteer 
headquarters, fails to indicate any change in the lethargic activity/ 
observed tvra weeks a^o. There is still no evidence of increased 
funding or volunteer personnel. 

It was also determined that a strategy session is presently 
ongoing in V.'ashington, D.C. The topics of discussion assertedly an 
a) Uom to counter the heavy I'uskie, McGovern, Yorty II. H. 

B) How to counter the apparent loss of Governor Peterson 
support. (This is vie\/ed as discouraging and suspectt 
as coming from Vfhite House pressures) 
■ Other steps, previously discussed, designed to develop inter: 
intelligence are ongoing. 



headquartj;r3, 32S PE;ni:T^LVAriiA ayihue, 

DECEI-ffiER 11-12, 1971 

A Sandwedce engineered penetration of He Closkey's volunteer 
headquarters in U'aGhincton, D.C. took place durins the v/eekend 
of December 11-12, 1971 with the following results: 

The operative arrived at the headquarters on Saturday morning 
and was v;ell received. There was a marked lack of activity 
during the entire day, with a total volunteer participation 
of only four persons . The operative v/as advised that there 
was little need for volunteer work at the Vfeshington headquarters, 
but a dire need for volunteers to work at the Concord, N. H. 
Headquarters. He was advised to call and speak with Nancy or 
Bruce at 603-22U-I966. 

The vorkers appeared to emphasize that the office is in dire 
need of money at the present. One of the volunteers indicated 
that his father had donaLed ^^2,500 recently (because the workers 
identified themselves only by first name, the operative did not 
attempt to pursue the identity of the contributor). 

Operative indicated a willingness to work for Mc Closkey in 
New York City. He was told that there were no Mc Closkey 
volunteer offices in Hew York City at this time and that the 
prime and only drives now ongoing with respect to campuses is 
Vithin the New Hampshire area. 

Operative determined that the 32^ "C" Street headquarters, from 
vhich the main V/'asliington campaign principals operate, was closed 
this weekend and the "C" Street staff was believed to be in 
Wisconsin dealing with political matters. 

Operative had lengthy conversations with the four volunteers 
and it was determined that although there v/as enthusiasm, the 
reports coming back from N. H. indicated that things v;ere not 
going well there. Lack of money and adult apathy appeared to be 
the main causes of the discouraging report. The volunteers were 
banking heavily upon Mc Closkey's increased schedule in N. H. 
beginning next week. 

Throughout the entire day on Saturday there were no visitors to 
the office and no incoming phone calls. The workers busied 
themselves stuffing envelopes with leaflets. The operative assisted 
in this effort. He engaged in the same activity on Sunday morning 
and departed without incident. 

In view of the foregoing, it v.'ould appear that best future use cf this 
activity should be focused in N.H., csp'jcially d'aring Christnus recess 
vhen nllopcdly the He Closkey effort will increase. Arrangements 
have been m.ude accordingly and va-ittcn results will follow. 

96-296 0-73 

The White House 


Date 12/7/Tl 

TO: JOM'W. DliMl, III 


Approval /SI ana ture 
, ComTi3nts/Recor;.T.2ndations 

For Your Tnforp?.t"»on 



The A.G, should see these. They are 
very consistent with my report. 

[Tues., Nov. 30, 1971] 

(By Robert S. Allen) 

Washington — Rep. Pete McCloskey is dropping some curious hints for an 
avowedly dedicated anti-Nixon crusader. 

The militant California maverick Republican is intimating that if his ram- 
bunctious "dump Nixon" campaign is a dud, he may pull a Mayor Lindsay and 
bolt to the Democrats. 

Unquestionably another potent motivating factor is the likelihood McCloskey 
may be redistricted out of Congress. 

With California due to get five more House seats, for a total of 43, McCloskey's 
11th District is very apt to be extensively modified — to his disadvantage. In 
each of his three elections, he won largely as a result of Democratic backing — 
which would be lost to him in a projected geographic reshufiling. 

So McCloskey apparently is hedging his political gambols ! 

The strident Californian's "dump Nixon" electioneering in New Hampshire's 
first-in-the-nation March 7 presidential primary has gotten nowhere. His anti- 
Vietnam haranguing has won him some cheers from dovish students but the 
general public is giving no evidence of being impressed. 

As one veteran local observer remarked, "So far, McCloskey is running like a 
dry creek. I'm beginning to wonder whether he'll stick it out until March." 

That's a good question. 

In recent weeks, McCloskey had to sharply prune his campaign staff and 
expenditures due to lack of funds. The flow of contributions he had counted on 
hasn't materialized — and there are no indications his finances will improve. 

Undoubtedly, a key reason is that his one and only issue, Vietnam, is steadily 
fading out of the picture. 

McCloskey is finding himself in the unhappy position of being a loud and 
clangorous crusader with a vanishing cause. And in politics, that never pays off — 
either in votes or campaign funds. 




WotiLD Go IN Debt to Finish Campaign 

(By Carl Greenberg, Times Political Writer) 

Rep. Paul N. (Pete) McCloskey Jr. (Calif.) said here Monday his campaign 
for the Republican presidential nomination is about $45,000 in debt. 

But, said the congressman who wants to unseat Presidi^nt Nixon and has 
entered New Hampshire's March 7 primary, "I'll go in debt to finish out this 
campaign if I have to." 

McCloskey's disclosure was made at a press conference before he and former 
New York Democratic representative AUard K. Lowenstein, national chairman 
of Americans for Democratic Action, addressed 1,000 guests at a Beverly Hilton 
luncheon of Women For, a volunteer nonpartisan organization. 

McCloskey said he has no commitment from Los Angeles industrialist Norton 
Simon to continue aiding him financially. 

He said Simon had contributed to an ad in the New York Times that cost 
$7,800 and that the ad had "approximately paid for itself," but that other 
newspaper ads so far have not. 

The ads followed a speech by Vice President Agnew in which he said that 
McCloskey was running so short of funds that he had been forced to sell his 
painting of "Benedict Arnold crossing the Delaware" — a crack McCloskey con- 
strued as charging him with being a traitor. 

The Administration's handling of the undeclared war between India and 
Pakistan was criticized by McCloskey, who cited a statement last Friday by an 
unidentified State Dei>artment official saying India was largely to blame. 

McCloskey said that the people of East Pakistan have been "systematically 

Although he had previously commended Mr. Nixon for his planned trips to 
China and Russia, McCloskey said people are skeptical about the Peking trip, 
which he contended has diverted attention from the fact the Vietnam war has 
not been ended. 

McCloskey also charged that Congress has abdicated its role in making political 
decisions and that its members are concerned primarily with getting elected. 

Lowenstein, who led the "Dump Johnson" movement in 1968 and is trying to 
do the same to Mr. Nixon, said that "We have an obligation and debt to help 
this extraordinarily courageous man," referring to McCloskey. 


Exhibit No. 34-12 

January 12, 1972 






Operation iSantiv/odec 

As a result of our recent conversation, I asked Jack 
Caulfield to a Guininary of liis activitlcB so 
that you could review them. Ilov/evcr, because of the 
sensitivity of this information, I v/ould like to suggest 
that you briefly meet v/ith Jack and go over this 

Operation Sand\ved<To v/ill be in need of refundinr: at 
th'^ end of thic month f.o the time is quite appropriate 
for sucli a review. If you any questions that I 
can be of assistance in ansv/erinjj, please give me a 


Exhibit No. 34-13 

meeting between attorney genj^iial mitchell, john 
dean, and golldon liddy, wednesday, november 24, 1971, 

AT 10:00 A. M. 

Suggested Items For Discussion 

I. Chain Of Cominand 

A. Organization ' 

B. Who will eventually head up cariipaign? 

C. Wlio performed proposed Liddy function in 1968? 

II. Scope Of Responsibility 

A. Finance 

(1) Federal (Corrvipt Practices Act) 

(2) State and local reporting requirements 

(3) Creation and dissolution of working committees 

(4) Creation and dissolution of funnel committees 

B. Primary election questions (qualification, filing and withdrawal) 

C. Intelligence , , ; 

D. Advertisiiig contracts 

E. Radio and TV contracts ■ ■';' 

F. Transi^ortation leases '' 

G. Real estate leases 

H. Legal questions relating to convention (credentials) 
I. Insurance 

III. S upport 

A. Staff 

B. Local volunteer lawyers 

C. Lawyers for Nixon . ' 

IV. Future Role Of Comniittee To Re-elect President Nixon 

V. What Is Present Posture On Publicizing Activities Of the Committee 

VI. Title And Compensation . 

Gordon Liddy 


Exhibit No. 34-14 

March 15, 1972 



While v/c arc ntill purcuin^ this matter, the attaclicd 
newspaper article is an accurate account of all the visible 
funding of the Democrat Convention. 

Wc are still pursuing any "invisible" funding and I v/ill 
report ■forlhv.'ith. 

I am not cnc.ou varied at this point that we are going to find 
anytniri^ evxue:icUig in:ipropricn7 -- bciieve it or noci 




• March 15, 1972 



SU B J ECT : Democratic National Convention Finance Investigation 

Below is a summary of the results to date of the investigation, 
vhich began March 12, 1972. 

Howard Hunt reported on March 13, 1972: 

The following individuals are members of the Tourist Development 
Authority and in addition to donating funds themselves to the 
DKC they have served as conduits for other funds. 

1) Jesse Weiss - owner of Joe's Stone Crabs Restaurant 

2) Bob Olin - Seville Hntpl 

3) H. Bant - Seville Hotel 

A) Jack Gordon (Chairman of the Authority) ' 

5)' Hans Marcuse - Algiers Hotel 

6) Herbert Rolbin - Carillion Hotel 

7) William Leonard (not further identified) 

8) Ben Grcnold {o\n\er of a number of drug stores) 

Information indicates that the exposition areas will be located 
in two places: the Fontainebleau Hotel and Convention Hall. The 
Mancraft Agency, a national organization specializing in such 
expositions, is the agent for booking space. However, all space 
bookings must go through, and have the approval of, James Teague, 
an employee of the Democratic National Committee, whose business 
telephone number for Miami is 305-538-5375. 

. Mancraft has an agent, one Barry Block, at the Fontainebleau, but 
he can do nothing without Teague 's approval. 

Hunt advised further that the Spanish language (Cuban) radio in 
Miami is carrying a news item to the effect that the Republicans 
are "looking around town" to "get something on the Democrats," 
in connection with the convention. 


Honorable John N. 
March 15, 1972 
Page 2 


A pretext attempt was made to book exposition space in the 
Fontainebleau. The reply was that all Fontainebleau space 
has been booked and that the only space rcnaining is in 
Convention Hall. 

On March 14, 1972, T-1 described as an experienced political 
correspondent for major news media in the ^liami are?, but who 
has not reported previously and whose reliability is, therefore, 
untested, advised as follows: 

The GFC (Florida-Askew) raised one million dollars. He advised 
further that the Democratic National Committee is receiving a 
25 per cent kickback from the funds raised through the exposition 
to be held at the Fontainebleau Hotel and Convention Hall during 
the Democratic National Convention to be held in Miami Beach 
in July, 1972. 

A transcription of the tape-recorded interview of T-1 is attached 
at Tab A. 


Investigation at Miami and Miami Beach continues. 






Q. The question was on the Governor's Finance Conimittee. 

A. That was strictly raised by Askew and Bob Morgan, who is the old Democrat fund 
raiser here in Dade County - he's a CPA - and Dave Walters, who is the old other 
bag man here in Dade County. They put the arm on- a bunch of industries and ' ' \ 
businesses in Florida, and they work with the Committee of One Hundred out of 
Palm Beach, and they cane in with - what I'm reliably told - the Governor's Finance 
Committee came up with a million dollars. One million. 

Q. Were there any names of specific persons? 

A. They never had to make any announcement - it's not mandatory that you have to 
announce, but I do know that they got Associated Industries of Florida, for 
example, gave, as I recall the figure, $10,000 - that's a lobbying organization 
In Tallahassee. All of the big industries in Florida: the St. Joe Paper 
Company; the Lehigh Portland Cement; the Florida East Coast and Seaboard 
Airline railroads; and the airlines and the tourist operated attractions and 
so forth_. The money all wound up in a common kitty at the end, which was the 
Governor's Finance Committee. 

Q. Did the Tourist Developm.ent Authority go into that same kitty? . . ..' 

A. Their money went in v;ith the other half million of goods and services promised. 
They may have to come up with - they committed themselves - TDA committed 
themselves - either for 50 or 100, I forget which it was. Let me think here. 
One hundred thousand. But it was based on them - I'm trying to think how to ,, 
explain this - They come in v;ith services, that's their big thing. They're 
going to man and staff a 24-hour day press central office, around the clock 
swlLchboaru, -lor Lhe uieuia thdL are here for tut: coverage of L'uc convention. 
And that, of course, will cost them some money - to have it staffed; but they'll 
. use their own people. So they'll write that off as part of their $100,000 

commitment. They will also wheedle ten or twelve free rental cars - Hertz or 
• Avis - through Frank ; connections, like, you know, if you let us 

have ten cars for the convention, why the next convention that comes down here 
we'll try to suggest they use your rental cars. So they'll provide X number 
of cars and pro-rate that out as part of their $100,000 commitment. 

Typewriters - they'll rent X number of typewriters and put them over in the 
offices in the press rooms, and they'll charge that off to their $100,000 
commitment. That's the way theirs" works, and then they'll come up with cash, 
as a. part of it. But they'll try to get away with as much In the way of 
services as they can by charging the convention at the full rate. The type- 
writers are a good example: They can make a deal with the typewriter rental 
company here in Dade County to get 200 typewriters for one week for a rental 
figure, we'll say of $20,000 for these 200 electric typewriters. That's 
the retail going rate. They'll charge the Convention Finance Office the full 
amount. But then they'll chisel the typewriter company and say, "VJhy don't you 
give us a discount on it," and they'll get it for $5,000 less and that would be 
money they kick back. 

Q. On the TDA, do you remember who the principal person was on that? 


A. At the time they made the cormitment the main guy that was the sparkplug of It 
was Jack Gordon. I don't think he is on the TDA any more, because he quit when 
they had the big hassle, but this commitment was made months and months ago, 
not just recently. They were fighting for this convention back a year ago. 
So they made the offer way last summer, last fall, almost a year ago. And 
Gordon was the key guy, because he knew all of the Democrat National Committee 
guys. He knew Larry O'Brien and he knew Humphrey, who was the titular head 
of the party, and he knew Humphrey's Finance Chairman and, he was the key 


Q. This rental space that they have over there' at the Fontaineblcau? 

A. The Fontainebleau estimates an income of between $80,000 and $100,000 and the 
Democrat National Committee gets back 25% of whatever they bring in. 

Q. They have a 25% kickback? ■ " 

A. Right. 

Q. Have you heard anything about anybody named Teague being involved in this? 

A. The name sounds familiar, but I can't place it. 

Q. When we checked previously on getting space here, now they have kind of an 

agency, this is the guy that they referred us to, and I 'thought maybe you had 

A. Wliat was that" for? 

Q. Getting space for the expositrion at the Fontainebleau for some company that we 
asked. About a v;eek ago a friend of mine had a call to try and reserve some 
space over there and they told him it was sold out, and referred hin to tliis 
man Teague. And he said that probably at Convention Hall they could find some 

A. As I say, the name sounds familiar, but I can't place who he is. I can't believe 
the Fontaineblcau is sold out, are they They're also pretty good at whip- 
sawing and yo-yoing a guy around here, too. Like, "Gee, Mr. Smith, we can't 
give you any space at the Fontainebleau but we got a little space here at 
Convention Hall - here in the middle of the boondocks." "Well that's so far from 
everything" — "well let us look around." Then all of a sudden a day later, 
"Hey, just got a cancellation, but let me tell you - he had already paid in 
advance so you'll have to pick that up plus this other fee here, and the 
insurance and so on." This is an old game. 

Q. I heard that there was a list of 35 persons in the Governor's that 

were going to be taken care of. 

A. Of course they are going to take care of people. 

Q. But there was a definite ],ist of 35 people .in that Governor's Committee that had 
given a' certain amount. 




According to Andy Shea, Assistant to the Democratic 
National Committee Treasurer Robert Strauss, the following 
is their account of the means for raising $950,000 
for the Democratic National Convention in Miajni: 

Miami Beach Tourist Development Authority $250,000 

Fund raising committee organized by 

Governor Askev/ $100,000 

Miami Beach Hotels $100,000 

Goods and Services (Construction, shuttle 

busses, off duty police and general 

security) * $500,000 

* The City of Miami will provide $250,000 of 

the above figure. Individual cities in . 

.Dade and Brov/ard Counties and zhe Daae 
County government will provide the additional 
$250,000 in goods and services. 



ExraBiT No. 34-15 



June 19, 1972 





Howard Hunt 

Dick Howard just discovered the attached in his chron file; this 
is a copy and Bruce Kehrli is looking for the original. I think 
it can be flatly and clearly said that his services here terminated 
on March 31, 1972. There is also attached a report of a conver- 
sation which Joan Hall had with Howard Hunt approximately 6 or 
8 weeks ago. 


March 30, 1972 


We would like to accommodate Howard Ewnt on 
the attached and would like to do it right away 
and then totally drop him as a consultant so that 
1701 can pick him up and use him. 

Howard has been very effective for us, but his 
most logical place now is consulting 1701. The 
attached could be a major problem and we would 
like to do everything we can to accomplish this 
and help him in this way. Please let me know. 

W. Richard Howard 






June 19, 1972 



SUBJECT: Discussion \vith Howard Hunt 


For the record, approximately 6 or 8 weeks ago in a casual 
conversation, I asked Howard Htjnt why he had not turned in 
any time sheets. He replied, "That is being taken care of 
elsewhere. " I did not inquire any further and the subject was 
dropped. (Note: I had initialed his time sheets each month 
and was merely curious why I had not received one. ) 



Exhibit No. 34-16 

# how did hunt come to staff? 

cc as a consultant. i knew him. pentagon papers needed someone 
to review. knew that he was capable. 

# how did you know him? 
cc social 

# associated wtth cia? 












Exhibit No. 34-17 
the white house 


June 26, 1972 





SUBJECT: O'Brien Letter Re 

Special Prosecutor 

Attached at Tab A is the Larry O'Brien letter. Attached 
at Tab B is a draft response from the Attorney General. 
At Tab C js a White House response from me. 

I would recommend that Kleindienst respond as quickly 
as possible. Colson concurs. ^* C>*-^0~ Ci>&} Ci^t'C' ♦ 

Ag r e e 7 


-296 O - 73 - n 



NAT lONAL C( AIMI f rCL 2>M ) Virr.ini,^ Avt-nvc, NW . W.i^hinrjon, D. C. 20037 (202) 333-fS750 .' 

LAW.iNCi F. O-B.iEH • 

June 24, 1972 - ■ 

Dear Mr. Pretidsni: 

Last week a group of men wcs appreliendcd after breaking into ihe notionc. hccdc; ' I'.ers 
of ihc Demo ntic Part/. I am sure you will agree that Ineir oction constituted art infiinga- 
menf of the F' ;t Amor.drr.ciit rig!., of polliical asiociction of '".ions of American citizens. 
The pr. mpt and fair invejtir'alion cf tlii; matter is of the era concern to all Americans, 

regar. jss of political c.ffii 'aricrj. 

During the past week there ' ve been numerous reports in the press which arc profoundly 
disturbing. Of pcriiculcr cc::cern arc those report: which indicate t reialionship cr the 
action of these men last week to official orgn-s of the PLpublican .irty, members of the 
While House staff and security agencies of ih. United Z :tes Government. 

Mr, James W. /vAcCorJ, Jr., one of the men who was o rested at gunpoint by the police, 
was closely ossocicle'l Vi'Ith The Comr.iitloc for the ue-cleciion of ihe President and wiih 
the Rep-jbl icon N'ritlonal Ccmmittee. Mr. McCord was the Security Coordinator for The 
Committee for the Re-slsction of ihe President and the P>epubllcc:i Nclicnal Committee. 
Mr. M'_Cord and the m n oppr' hended with him at the time of the ar"e5t had walkie-tallcle 
radios whicli wrre cjilici: .' lo operali on chani:.::!s granted by the F- Jer^il Coir.municctic-rts 
Commisslpi. exclusively for the use of ihe Republica.'i Natio'iol Committee. 

The events that hove been revc:!c-d to date, particularly in the context of a presidential 
campaign, make this cose one of vital importance. I am sure you share my concern that 
the inves;' rion of this matter and its eventual prosecution be conducted In a manner that , 
will credit ..;e' Interrliy of ihe American j 'Iclal process. Of equal importance is the need 
to assure that all Americans can be confident that this Investigation Is conducted promptly 
and with complete ohjectlvlty and fairness to all concerned. At stake here are Amsrica's 
most cherished constitutional rights — rights of free speech and free association. 

I Accordingly, I respectfully request that you direct the Attorney General to appoint a. ' ■ ' ' 
Special Prosecutor of unimpeachable integrity and national repufatIon,a"d provide him 
with whatever resoiirces he requests to investigate the facts surrounding this violation of 
First Amendment rights end to pro:ecute those respcnsible to the full extent of the law. 


Lawrence F, O'Brien 

Tlio President 
The White House 



Dear Mr. O'Brien: , 

This will acknowledge receipt and thank you for your letter of 
June 24, 1972 to the President, which has been forwarded to me 
for response. ■, , 

You may be assured that the recent incident involving the 
breaking and entry of the headquarters office of the Democratic 
National Committee is being fully and thoroughly investigated 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that this Department 
will prosecute violators of the Federal law to the fullest extent. 


Richard G. Kleindienst 

' B 



Dear Mr. O'Brien: 

Thfe President has asked me to respond to your letter of 

June 24, 1972, requesting that he direct the Attorney General 

to appoint a special prosecutor in connection with the recent. 

breaking and entry of the headquarters office of the Democratic 

National Committee. The President is confident that this ..,,.. 

matter is being fully investigated by the FBI and that the ;Xj-^' 

Department of Justice will prosecute all violators of the f^;^-? 

federal law in a manner consistent with the high integrity ''■'■^.' 

and traditions of that Department and the American judicial 



John W. Dean, III 
Counsel to the President 





June 26, 1972 






SUBJECT: O'Brien Letter Re 

Special Prosecutor 

Attached at Tab A is the Larry O'Brien letter. Attached 
at '-'ab is a draft responre froni the Attorney General. 
At Tab C is a White House response froin ine. 

I would recoinniend that Klci; He \Gt respond as quickly 
as possible. Colson concurs. 





9 eo 




NATIONAL COiN'.'vUirEi: 2(M> V iifjini.y ,\ ,;, v(: NV <V.»)i »i/ ;!on, DC. 20037 (202) 3ii -f>750 

L»W.[HCI F. O , .N 

Jun 24, 1972 , , TAB 

Dear Mr. A 

Last week a group of men was cpprehendsd offer breaking Into the noticncl headqucri'is 
of the Democraflc Pcrty. I am sure you will agree thai ihelr action constituted an infringe- 
ment of flie Firit right of political association of inillions of Amc 'can citizens. 
The prompt and fair Investig ion of ihis matter Is of ihe gravest concarn to all AmsriccMs, 
. regardless of political cffilicfion. 

During the past week there have been numerous reports in the pr- vhl'-h are pr 'oundly 
disturbing. Of particular concer:: e ihose reports which Indicaicj a relationship of the 
action of these men las! week to ofricial organs of the Repubi' an Party, members of the 
While House r-tcFf and sccuriiy agencies of the United States Governmcnl 

Mr, James W. McCord, Jr., one of ihc rr n who wos arretted at gunpoint by the police, 
was closely associarod with The CommilSee for ihe Re-olecticn of the Prsjideat and v/lth 
the Republican National Ccnmiil % Mr, McCord v.'cs the Security Coordinate Tor The ' 
- Commi''"ce for the Re-clec;I.. . cf . ;e President and the Republicon National Ccmmiiiee : 
Mr, t\' "ord and ihe men apprc-lic Jed \A'th him :t the time of the arre5' had v.-al'-ie-tclrcie ■ 
radios which ■ 2re aulhorized to cpsrafa on chatiiiels grar,led by iha Fer'eral Communico;' is 
Comuhsicn cxclusiveiy for the uso of the Ropubilcon Not' Corr.rnlti 3. ■ "' 

The events that have Irien revealed to daiti, porticulorly in the confe;;t of a p; i'dential 
campaign, molce this case or.e of vitol Impcrtcncc-. I am sure you share my concern that 
the investigation of this maiter and its eventual prosecution be conducted in a manner that 
will credit the integrily of the American judicial process. Of equal importance is the need 
to assure that all Ame. icons can be confident that this investigation is conducted promptly , 
and with complete objectiviiy end fairness to all concerned. At stake here are America's 
most cherished constitutional rights — rights of free speech and free association. 

1 Accordingly, I respeclfully request that you direct th e Attorney Gencro! to ap point a i 

Speciol Pro'ocutQr of unimiieccl^cbie intoprily and naticnol repuiation,and provide him ' ]'.';■ 
with wliatever re: . -es he rcqussts to investigate the facts surrounding this violation of '■ '■ 
First Amendment rig'iis and to prosecute those rerponsiblo to the full extent of the law. , ;', 

Sincerely, • ..,-■' 

' ■' ■ 7 • ' 

Lawrence F. O'Brien 

The President 
The White House 



Dear Mr. O'Brien: 

This will acknowledge receipt and thank you for your letter o£ 
June 24, 1972 to the President, which has been forwarded to me, 
for response. 

You may be assured that the recent incident involving the 
breaking and entry of the headqxiarters office of the Democratic 
National Comin'^tee is bein^- fully and thoroughly investigated 
by the Fedcr-J Bureau of Investigation, and that this Department 

will prosec\'.te violators of the Federal law to the fullest extent. T ^ 

if:' ■■;;■■' 


Richard G. Kleindienst 



Dear.Mr. O'Brien: 

The President has asked me to respond to your lettei- of *.*;*f,'!) 
June 24, 1972, requesling that he direct the Attorney General" 
to appoint a special prosecutor in connection vAth the feceiii ■(■*. 
breaking and entry of the headquarters office of the DemoC/t;4f?i^'i 
National Coniniittee, The President is confid it that: this.' 
matter is being fully investigated by the FBI and that the i 
Department of Justice will prosecute all violators of the 
federal law in a manner consistent with the high integrity ;,,,., 
and traditions of that Department and the American judicial 


John W. Dean, III • 
Counsel to the President 



Exhibit No. 34-18 




August 29, 1972 



Over the past two days I have been trying to reconstruct the chronology 
of Howard Hunt's activities liere as accurately as I can recall thcni. 
Oui" records are simply not that complete. I had the feeling that I was 
wandering somewhat on dates during;; tlie interview at Justice yester- 
day; but frankly I had not tried to put all the dates in sequence in 
preparation. I cannot find new records here that are any more 
helpful other thaia one memo which I dictated immediately after the 
Watergate episode broke in the press. I am attaching' a copy. If 
"you think it would be helpful you can send it along to Mr. Silbert. 

I should have reviewed the attached nnemo before appearing yesterday 
hiif T hart foranffpn T had it, T wrote the nttached. by the way. in order 
to have my best recollection in the files in the event the history of 
this ever arose at a later time. At the tiine I remember straining 
very hard to try to remember the specifics of any meetings; I cannot 
be sure that my memory is all that precise. 

In any event there is no substantial variance between this and what I 
testified to except this is more specific. As I Say, if you think it would 
be helpful, it should be passed on to Mr. Silbert. 

Also, as I went through some of the records las^t night I found the 
attached file copies of 4 inemos which had been submitted by my office 
involving Howard Hunt's travel expenses. You may recall yesterday 
that Silbert asked me about authorized travel. I authorized two trips -•• 
one to Massachusetts and one to Denver. The attached, however, 
refers to other trips which were not authorized by me although obvi- 
ously the expenses were submitted through me. I do not ever recall 
signing any of these and the one expense request as to whicli there is 
a xerox original attached contains a "CWC" as initialed by Joan Hall. 
I assume that Joan handled all of these in the same way that she handled 
the vouchers for time spent as a consultant. If I did sign any of these, 
1 do not recall or I certainly did not focus on them at the time. In any 
event, they are attached for whatever v.ilue they have. 


June 20, 1972 


SUBJECT: Howard Hunt 

The last time that I recall meeting with Howard Hvmt was mid- 
March. According to my office records, the date was March 15. 
At that time I was \mder the impression that Eunt had left the 
White House and was working at the Committee for the Re-election 
of the President. 

I may have seen Hunt once or even possibly twice subsequent to 
that time. These were (or this was), however, a chance encounter. 
I do recall seeing him outside of my office during a day this Spring; 
I recall inquiring about his health since he had told me in March he 
had bleeding ulcers. During the brief conversation in the corridor, 
nothing was discussed or any of Hunt's work or his areas of responsi- 
bility. As I recall, he merely told me that he had been very busy 
and that after getting some rest, his health had been restored. 

I also talked to him on the telephone the night Governor Wallace was 
shot simply to ask him for his reactions on what he thought might 
have been the cause of the attempted assassination. (Hunt was known 
of something of an expert of psychological warfare and motivations 
when in the CIA.) 

The only other communication I can recall subsequent to March 15 
was a memo I sent to Howard in connection with what I thought his 
duties were at 1701, i.e., security at the Republican Convention. 
Steve Bull told me he had a friend in Miami who had been stationed 
in the White House but was now in the Miami office of the Secret ServiC' 
who wanted to be of help to whoever was handling security for the 
convention. I merely sent Hunt a note suggesting that he get in touch 
with Bull's friend. 



'o the best of my recollection. Hunt came to me during the month 
f January and said he had no work to do here and no one was giving 
im any assignments and that this was the only campaign year he 
ould ever probably have a chance to participate in, that he cared 
nly about one thing, the re-election of the President, and that he 
anted to be of help in any way he could, for pay or not for pay, I 
old him I had nothing in my office, but that I thought once the Com- 
ittee was organized and Mitchell was in charge, there would be work 
or him to do at the Committee. I told him that I would be sure the 
ommittee was aware of his desire to help. I did nothing further. 

few weeks later Hunt dropped by my office with Gordon Liddy, from 
he Committee. I believe this was in February, possibly early in the 
onth, although my office records do not show the visit. Hunt said 
e was in the building and Just wanted to talk briefly. Both he and Liddy 
aid that they had some elaborate proposals prepared for security 
ctivitles for the Committee, but they had been unable to get approval 
rom the Attorney General. I explained that Mitchell would soon be 
t the Committee and that they should be persistent and see him because 
5 was the only one who could authorize work they woiild be doing. I 
ave a vague recollection that Liddy said, "We (referring to Hunt ajid 
Lmself ) are now over at the Committee working and we are anxious 
3 get started but can't find anyone who can make a decision or give 
3 the green light" or words to that effect. While Liddy and Hunt were 
1 my office, I called Jeb Magruder and urged them to resolve what- 
/er it was that Hunt and Liddy wanted to do and to be sure he had an 
pportunity to listen to their plans. At one point. Hunt said he wanted 
3 fill me in and I said it wasn't necessary because it was of no 
Dncern to me, but that I wovild be glad to urge that their proposals, 
latever they were, be considered. There was no discussion that I 
an recall of what it was that they were planning to do other than the 
act that I have the distinct in^jression that it involved security at 
le convention and/or gathering intelligence during the Democratic 
ational Convention, 

1 March, Hunt sent me a memo explaining that when he retired from 
le CIA he had failed to designate survivor benefits for his wife and 
1 view of the fact that he had had severe ulcer attacks, he wondered 
f this coiild be changed in view of his present government service. I 
Did him to take the matter up with Dick Howard, which he did. Dick's 
smo to Kehrli, copy attached, was the result. I assume Dick Howard 
Lscovered at this time that Hxint was still on the rolls even though not 
Drking for us. 



i had assumed throughout Hunt's tenure in the White House that he 
was charged to someone else's budget. I signed the original request 
for him to be a consultant because everyone else was in California at 
the time it was decided to bring him in. Shortly after he came on 
board J however, he was assigned to David Yo\mg and Bud Krogh and 
I didn't consider at any time after that that Hunt was under my super- 
vision or responsibility. 

From time to time after Hunt had come on board, he did talk to me, 
normally to express his frustrations in being unable to get things 
through the David Young operation. Of course, on occasion also we 
talked socially and about politics, something Howard and I had done 
from time to time over the years. 

Charles W, Colson 

A TRUE copy 


Exhibit No. 34-19 

couimiE ACTioris 9/11/72 

1, Complaint for Malicious Abuse of Process by Committee for the 
Be-Election of the President end Finance Committee to Re-Elect the 
President against Lav;rence O'Brien, 

Based upon unfounded civil action brought against Committee 
for the Re-Election of the President by O'Brien. The only nexus betv/een 
the V/atergate incident of June lyth and the CRP being the fact that James 
W. McCord was at the time an employee of the CRP. O'Brien continues to 
issue statements and is quoted in the press as saying that the suit was 
not brought for damages but to for partisan political purposes 
and to pre-occupy the Republicans during the campaign. ',>.-■ ** 

Common Law of the District of Columbia supports such a suit. 
Constant use of subpoenas for records and witnesses .who are employees 
of the CRP and the Finance Committee corfititute malicious abuse. 

A. Deposition schedule v;ould normally begin 20 days after service of 
complaint or earlier if advanced by the Covtrt on proper motion, Depositions 
would be noted for: 

(1) Lawrence O'Brien 

(2) Frank Mankiewicz 

(3) Gary Kart 

(U) Members of the Democratic National Committee as of ui;.. 
June 20, 1972 (date original suit brought) 

(5) Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Democratic National 
Committee, as of June 20, 1972. 


DepoEitions to run daily until all facts with respect to the 
information upon which the suit was brought in June has been discovered. 

B. Motions to Produce Minutes of meetings of DNC or its Executive 
Committee to expose authority, if any, to b^ing action on June 20, 
2. Complaint for Libel*. Stans v. O'Drien. 

Complaint based upon false, malicious and libellous statements leaked to 
the press by O'Brien through his counsel. Substantially the same allegations 
as contained in the Amended Complaint, but before the Amended Complaint 
had been filed in the United States District Court. Leaks occurred in the 
early morning hours of September 11, 1972 while Amended Complaint was not 
presented for filing \intll the afternoon of that day. 

Libel based upon statement that Stans funded the Watergate 
incident of June 17th v;ith $im,000 in checks transmitted to Barker.* 
The facts were well known to O'Brien as they had been the subject of the 
GAO RejKDrt and Stans' response thereto' i — both published. 

Deposition and discovery schedule v;ould essentially be the 
same as in Complaint for Malicious Abuse of Process. .. .-< 

The statement made concerning Stans is libelous per se ; 
imputation of a crime. However, under Kev/ York Times v. Sullivan , 
376 U.S. 25^ {'^9^) and cases following, Stans would, because he is in 
a public position and is essentially a public figure, be required to 
plead and prove actual malice, ill will, hatred on the part of O'Brien. 
"That is, O'Brien may publish with impunity false and libelous statements 
regarding Stans unlegs Stans can prove actual malice. 


Actual malice may also be CEtablished upon a showing.of :V' 
gross negligence. . ,• , . i ^^ ''. 

The facts knovm to us do not support a claim of actual malice. 
On the contrary, the dialogue bctv;een Gtang and Andreas would indicate 
that indeed O'Brien harbored no actual malice toward Stans. Furthermore, ' ' ,* 
O'Brien might contend that the leak was his counsel's doing and not his. 

A libel suit by Stans against O'Brien or others is not recommended, 
Senator Barry Goldwater prevailed against Ginsberg because the latter was 
demonstrably guilty of actual malice — the preparation by Ginsberg, of . 
false statements and doctored statements of psychiatrists allegingvthat 
Goldwater was a Nazi, homosexual and insane. .. . i. , j'. 

3. The cause of action of malicious abuse of process set forth in, Section 1 . 
may also l)e made in the way of a counterclaim in the event the Amended 
Complaint is permitted to be filed by Richey, J. , , ; 

k. Cause of action against O'Brien for violation of the First Amendment . ' 
rights of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and the 
various Finance Committees. Freedom of Speech, the right to associate - 
for political purposes and to advocate political positions in support of 
a Presidential candidate have been impaired by the actions and statements _v- 
of O'Brien and the DNC. We have made this contention from the outset in 

A, Motion to Dismiss the Complaint brought against the CRP; , . ;, '.} 

B. Proposed Motion for Protective Order 'in the nature of an injunttion 
to stop all further discovery in the civil case. 


This cause of action v;ould support a separate and distinct 
civil action against O'Brien, et. al., by the CRP.and the finance com- • 
mittees — or a counterclaim in the event Judge Rlchey permits the Amended 
Complaint to be filed, *■ .! > 

5. Senator Dole does not have a cause of action as Chairman of the '■f, 
Republican national Committee and the members thereof, as O'Brien's ' • 
statements and action.? have not been directed at the RNC or Dole but at , ; .^ 
the rather separate and distinct CRP,,the finance committees, their member^ •, 
and personnel. : ^ . 

6. Ko cause of action exists at this time against Common Cause or John ,' 
Gardner for simply bringing their lawsuit against the finance committees. :. 
If the case is dismissed and evidence developed that John Gardner harbo];;ed ''< 
ill will or hatred toward individual defendants, a cause of action for ,"' 
malicious abuse of process v/ould lie, - ' '' '■'•% 

7. A Complaint to the Fair Campaign Practices Committee (ujicertain about :; 
the proper name) with respect to the statements and actions of O'Brien, et^ - 
al, would provide no relief to those injured but may be of some political 

/ Kc'nneth Iv'ells i'arkinson 





September 12^ 1972 




SUBJECT: Counter Actions CWatergate) 

Set forth below are potential counter actions that are either about to be 
filed or under serious consideration. While the list is not exhaustive, 
it contains several potentials that could place us on the offensive; We 
are working to develop other Nvell founded actions. 

Connplaint for Malicious Abuse of Process 

This action will be filed by the Committee for the Re- Election of the ' 
President apd the Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President agarin'st 
Lawrence O'Brien. The filing of this action was announced yesterday 
by Clark MacGregor and it will be filed after the Amended Complaint 
in the O'Brien civil case is filed. 

This action is based upon the unfounded civil action brought against the'' 
Committee for the Re- Election of the President by O'Brien. O'Brien 
and Edward Bennett Williams continue to issue statements and are ■■" 

quoted in the press as saying that the suit was not brought for damages 
but to expose for partisan political purposes and to pre-occupy the 
Republicans during the campaign. Under the common law oi the *-' 

District of Columbia, the constant use of subpoenas for records and 
witnesses who are employees of the CRP and the Finance Committee ''' 
for the purpose of exposure and harassment constitute malicious abuse? ■• 
of process. ■', 

The depositions would normally begin 20 days after service of the 
complaint or earlier if advanced by the court on proper motion. Deposi- 
tions would be noted for: 

-- Lawrence O'Brien 
-- Frank Mankiewicz 

96-296 O - 73 - 18 


-- Gary Hart 

-- Members of the Democratic National Committee as of . -r' 

June 20, 1972 (date original suit brought) i ,. , 

-- Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Democratic National 

Committee, as of June 20, 1972. 

Depositions will run daily until all facts "with respect to the information 
upon which the suit was brought in June hae been discovered. 

Also, motions to produce minutes of meetings of DNC or its Executive 
Committee to determine authority, if any, to bring the civil action of 
Jxaae 20 will be filed. 

NOTE : Depositions are presently being taken of members of the DNC 
by the defense counsel in the O'Brien suit. These are wide ranging 
and will cover everything from Larry O'Brien's sources of income' 
while Chairman of the DNC to certain sexual activities of employees 
of the DNC. They should cause considerable problenns for those 
being deposed. 

Complaint for Libel: Stans v. O'Brien 

A complaint based upon the false, malicious and libelous statenaeiits v .V , 
leaked to the press by O'Brien through his counsel is under consideration. 
This action would attack substantially the same allegations as contained 
in the Aijiended Complaint, but made before the Amended Connplaint 
had been filed in the United States District Court. Leaks of these 
allegations occurred in the early morning hours of September 11, 1972. 
while the Amended Complaint was not presented for filing until the 
afternoon of that day. A libel action cannot be based on the Amended 
Complaint per se as it is privileged. ► 

The libel is based upon the statement that Stans funded the Watergate 
incident of June 17th with $114, 000 in checks transmitted to Barker. 
The fact that this is false was well known to O'Brien, as Stans had 
made sworn statements to the contrary in the GAO report as well as 
his deposition in the civil case. 

The deposition and discovery schedule would essentially be the same 
as in the Complaint for Malicious Abuse of Process. .;, ■; 


The statement made concerning Stans is libelous per se; imputation 
of a crime. However, under New York Times v. Sullivan and cases 
following, Stans would, because he is in a public position and is 
essentially a public figure, be required to plead and prove actual 
malice, ill will or hatred on the part of O'Brien. That is, O'Brien 
may publish with impunity false and libelous statements regarding 
Stans unless Stans can prove actual malice'. 

Actual malice may also be established upon a showing of gross neg- 
ligence, which appears more likely in the instant situation. 

The facts known to us do not support a claiin of actual malice. On 
the contrary, dialogue between Stans and Andreas would indicate 
that indeed O'Brien harbored no actual malice toward Stans. Further- 
more, O'Brien might contend that the leak was his counsel's doing 
and not his. However, the filing of the action would have obvious 
media advantages. 

Counterclaim: Abuse of Process 

The cause of action of malicious abuse of process set forth above 

may also be made in the way of a counterclaim in the event the Aanended 

Complaint is perinitted to be filed by Judge Richey. 

First Afnendment Action 

A cause of action against O'Brien for violation of the First Amendment 
rights of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and the 
various Finance Committees is under consideration. Freedom of 
Speech, the right to associate for political purposes and to advocate 
political positions in support of a Presidential candidate have been 
impaired by the actions and statements of O'Brien and the DNC. This 
contention has been made from the outset in our: 

-- Motion to Dismiss the Complaint brought against the CRP; , 
-- Proposed Motion for Protective Order in the nature of an 

injunction to stop all further discovery in the civil case.*' " ". " 

This cause of action would support a separate and distinct civil action 
against O'Brien, et al. , by the CRP and" the finance committees -- or 
a counter claim in the event Judge Richey permits the Amended Com- 
plaint to be filed. 



Action by Senator Dole 

Senator Dole does not appear to have standing for a cause of action 
as Chairman of the Republican National Committee, as O'Brien's 
statements and actions have not been directed at the RNC or Dole 
but at the rather separate and distinct CRP, the finance committee8>- 
their nfiembers and personnel. 

Action Against Common Cause 

Ko cause of action exists at this time against Common Cause or 
John Gardner for simply bringing their lawsuit against the finance 
committees. If the case is dismissed and evidence developed that |;'', 
John Gardner harbored ill will or hatred toward individual defendants, 
a cause of action for malicious abuse of process would lie. 

!t tl jThis is not to say, however, that public pressure should not be placed" 
'f ifj^ Ion Common Cause to institute a suit against the known violation of 
rthe campaign law by the McGovern organization. 

Complaint to Fair Campaign Practices Committee 

XX coiVapxaiiit to the X- air \_»c*rjripc*igTi jPi'iiCfciccc %^GrT*mi^vCC*. rccpcCto 
to the statements and actions of O'Brien, et al. , and their misuse of* 
the courts 4:0 harass the Re- Election Comnnittee would provide no 
relief to those injured but could be of some political value. Most ' . •' 
people do not know what this Committee does and would interpret the, 
action as founded upon a real grievance. 

Action to Enjoin McGovem Finance Committee 

For several weeks Ave have been quietly collecting information re-, 
garding a blatantly illegal action by McGovern to operate his fund 
raising activities through a District of Columbia corporation. We 
have been waiting for the September 10th GAO report to be filed by 
this corporation/committee to determine if they have in fact been / 
so operating. Today's Washington Post confirms that indeed McGovern 
is using a corporation contrary to the federal criminal prohibition. 

I have assigned a Task Force to do nothing but work on every possible 
action we can charge against this activity and develop a means whereby 
Someone can go into court as soon as possible and enjoin this blatant 
violation of the laws. ' We may have struck gold in that we may have 
our first chance to really hit them where they are already hurting ■ 
the most (i. e. , fund raising). 


ExraBIT No. 34-20 

Congress! of tfje ?Hnitcb states! 

J^oMt of i^epresentatibetf 

Room 2-1-36 Fcdzr* 
74 North WA-iM.i 

maebinstott.m.€. 20515 Tc^-o..:<.,e,. 

September 8, 197: 

The Honorable Richard G. Kleindienst 
Attorney General of the United States 
Departr.ent of Justice 
Washington, D. C. 20530 

Dear Mr. Attorney General: 

It no doubt has coiae to your attention that the Banking and Currency Conmittee 
of the House of Representatives, upon which I serve, has, through its 
and activities of staff members, become interested and involved in the inves- 
tigation of the so-called Watergate bugging incident. 

Although many of us on the Coir.;nittee may question the wisdom of still a 
further investigation of this matter under the auspices of our Con-unittee, it 
would appear that some of the financial transactions tangential to the incident' 
may come within the purview of our Comaiittee's jurisdiction and, therefore, the 
Chairman of the Committee may be justified in the interest he has expressed. 
However, the plans of the Chairman for pursuit cf this investigation have raised 
a serious question in my mind. 

The notice members have received from the Chairman indicates that the full 
Couimittee will meet at 10:00 A.M., Thursday morning, September 14 to hear 
testimony from The Honorable Maurice Stans, Chairman of the Finance Committee 
of the Committee to Re-Elect the President, as well as the testimony of Phillip 
S. Hughes, Director of the Office of Federal Elections, General Accounting Office, 
concerning their Icnowlodge of the "financial aspects of the Watergate burglary." 
I am sure the testimony of these gentlemen would add significantly to the 
Committee's knowledge of the incident; however,' I am well aware of the restric- 
tions which have been placed on or are applicable to the testimony of Mr. Scans 
regarding this matter and feel that in the interest of all concerned your advice 
with respect to the propriety of Mr. Staas testifying before our Committee in 
either Executive or Open Session should be sought. 

Specifically, I would appreciate as prompt as possible answers to the following 

1) Would it be inappropriate or improper for Mr. Stans to testify 
before our Banking and Currancy Committee with respect to his 
knowledge of the financial aspects of the Watergate incident in 
view of the embargo which has been placed by Judge Richcy on his 
testimony by deposition which has been taken in the civil suit 
arising out of the Watergate incident? 


2) Would it be inappropriate or improper for Mr. Stans to testify 
before our Corunittee with respect to this matter in view of the 
pending action of the Grand Jury in returning criininal indictnients 
arising out of the Watergate incident? 

3) Would it be inappropriate or improper for Mr. Stans to testify 
before our Conunittee with respect to this «.atter because of the 
impact publicizing of such testimony might have on the ultimate 
trial of any or all of those indicted as a result of the Grand 
Jury action, especially insofar as such publicity might be used 

as a basis for a claim that the accused, or any of them, may have 
been prejudiced thereby? 

I realize that your office is not technically' involved in the civil action. 
However, your opinion with respect to the substance and significance of Judge 
Richey's Order placing an embargo upon the testimony of Mr. Stans in that 
action would be most helpful. 

With respect to question "2" above, it has also occurred to me that the 
absolutely secret nature of the Grand Jury deliberations makes it impossible 
for any of us to know whether or noc Mr. Stans might be called upon to testify 
before our Committee with resnccc to matters which he may have been called upon 
to testify about before the Grand Jury, if he so testified, and that his tes- 
timony before the full Committee would be violative of the secrecy mandates 
of the Grand Jury proceedings. 

Inasmuch as I know not what position Mr. Stans will take with respect to the 
Chairman's request that he appear to testify before our Committee on Thursday, 
I ask these questions only for the purpose of being better informed should a 
confrontation arise and should I be called upon as a member of the Committee 
to support or oppose v;hatever position is taken by Mr. Stans on the Chairman's 
request for his appearance. I hasten to add that although this inquiry relates 
only to Mr. Stans' testimony, it is equally relevant to whomever else, similarly 
situated, the Chairman might feel prompted to call as a witness should this 
investigation be expanded upon. 

In view of the significance of the questions X have asked and the limited 
time involved, I urgently request that my questions receive your immediate 
attention and response. 

With best regards. 




Exhibit No. 34-2i 

to: mr. joiin dean - . • 


Attached are memoranda prepared by this office on September 13, 
1972 in connection with the political filings of political committees 
registered under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 on behalf 
of members of the House Committee on Banking and Currency. Sheets 1 
and 2 list in the lefthand margin the names of the members of the 
Committee, and in the righthand margin reports filed, by committees on 
.^their behalf. Sheets 3 and A show the names of the members of the 
Committee, in the lefthand m.argin and the names of political committees 
acting on their behalf in the righthand margin. Sheets 5 and 6 show 
the numbers of the political committees in the lefthand margin and 
key into Sheets 3 and 4, and across the page the filings for each of 
these committees are shown. 











St. Germain 


Minish . 






















Reports Filed i 
5th day report 
September 10 report 
September 10 report 
September 10 report ' ij^jV-t 
5th day report S June 10th report 
5th day report S^ept. 10th report 
Sth*day report § Sept. 10th report 
5th day report 
Sept. 10th report 
15th day report 5 June 10th report 
15th day report 5 June 10th report 
5th day report G 15th day report 
Sept. 10th report 6 June 10 report 

June 10th report 

15th day report 5 5th day report 

Not listed 

"other report" 6 June 10th report 

June 10th report 

June 10th report 

5th day report 5 15th day report 

June 10th report 5 5th day report 

Sept. 10th report 

5th day report 

5th day report 5 June 10th report 

June 10th report 

15th day report ^ 5th day report 

15th day report 5 Sept. 10th report 

June 10th report 

5th day report G ISth day report 

September 10th report 


Congressman Reports Filed j , 

Crane September 10th report fi Ju^e' 

10th report 

Rousselot September 10th report fi June 

10th report ',< ' 

McKinney Sth day report Q June 10th report 

Lent June lOtfi report .ff ISth day report 

Archer June 10th report 5 15th day report 

Frenzel ' Sth day report ■■ .. 











Bra SCO 





Election Conmittee (s) ",- 

^5 Democratic County Executive Committee ; 
(2) Machinists Non-Partisan Political League • 
??) Reuss for Congress Committee 

f Ashley for Congress Committee i ,'' 
Ashley Re-election Committoe 

(t) Engineers Political 5 Education Committee 
pN The Moorhead Campaign Committee 

(^ Engineers Political 6 Education Committee 
g) American Federation of Teachers Committee 

on Political Education 
(^ Drive, New Jersey Teamsters 
Ao Citizens for Minish 
^^Joe. Minish Dinner Committee 
./^Joseph J. Minish Campaign Fund 

(Jl) Congressman tlanna Committee 

($5) South Carolina Political Action Committee 
Qy Tom Gettys Ke-election Committee 

(^ Annunzio for People Committee 

/^ Rees for Congress Committee ■"* ' 

© Friends of Torn Bevili 

(^ Alabama Medical Action Commit'tee 

r^j Chenango Cty. Democratic Committee 
(-"/^^ Delaware Cty. Democratic Committee 
y^^ Independent Citizens Committee for the 
^-^ 32nd District 

^y Citizens Committee for Re-election of 
.'.'■ Congressman Brasco 

i^rM Bill Chappell Dinner Committee 

@ Committee for a Better New York 

(^ New Yorkers for Re-election of Ed Koch 

M^ Cotter for Congress Committee 

^^ Active Ballot Club 

^) P.J. Mitchell Campaign for Congress Committee 

(^ D.C, Committee for Re-election of W.B. 

(2^ Citizens for Re-election of William 

^^ Citizens ComnLztee for Widnall 

(?r9 Johnson to Congress 

nj? Trumball Cty. r.cpublican Central Committee 
-^ Lake Cty. Republican Executive Organization 
^..,; Lake Cty. Fedcr-ation of Women's Clubs 
^_;v' Bill Stanton fcr Congress Committee 
/•O! Geauga Cty. Republican Finance Committee 


Election Committce (s) 

The 250 Club 

The Ben Blackburn Campaign Fund 

Blackburn for Congress Committee 


!p) Garry Brown for Congress 




Regular Republicans Committee of 

Delaware Cty. 
L.G. Williams for Congress Committee 

Wylie for Coryjress Committee 

OCA Political Action Committee 

Madison Cty. Republican Central Committee 

Franklin Cty. Republican Executive Committee 

Womans Republican Club of Wellesley 

Crane for Congress Committee 

Committee to Re-elect Congressman John 

Victory '72 Committee 

McKinney for Congress Committee 
Mc^inney for Crngress Action Committee 
McKinney Victory Dinner Committee 
Independents and Democrats for McKinney 
Fairfielders for McKinney 
Volunteers for McKinney 
Students for McKinney 
Committee to Re-elect Stew McKinney 

Lent for Congress Committee 
Nassau Cty, Republicans Committee 

Archer for Congress Committee 

Frenzel Volunteers Committee 
















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'oii^^ £yvv/V 






















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V,ntCHT P 
W:li iaM I 


Exhibit No. 34-22 


NiNCT v-SecoND CoNcnrss 




October 2, 1972 



I'D: All Members of )Iouse Conmittee on Banking and Currency 

FROM: Wright Patman, Cliairman 

SUBJECT: Notice of Heeting Change and Subpoena List 

October 3 

10:30 a.m. 

2128 KHOB 

Attached for your information is a list of 
individuals and institutions for v.'liom subpoenas 
will be requested at the irccting of the full 
Co~jiiittcc tomorrow. 

The meeting has been rescheduled for 10:30 a.m., 
Room 2128 Rayburn iluildin;;, rather than at 
10:00 a.m., as previously indicated in the 
notice of September 25, 1972. 




Robert Allen -- President of Gulf Resources and Chemical Corporation 
of Hou-ston, Texas, and Texas cliairman of the campaign committee, who 
is involved in the Mexican transfer. 

American Telephone and Telegraph Company and all Federal and State 
licensed telephone coivipanies, including: 
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company 
Southv;esLern Boll Telephone Company of Houston, Texas 
Southern Bell TclepliC'iie Company of Miami, Florida 

D^jayne Andreas -- One of the applicants on a successful national bank 
charter and a contributor of $25,000 to the Nixon campaign, 

Alfred Baldwin -- A former employee of the Coinnittee to Re-Elect the 
President and reportedly transcribed conversations overlieard at the 
Democratic tCational Conriiittco, 

Paul Barrick -- Present treasurer of the Conmittee to Re-Elect the 

Records relating to the Mexican transfer of campaign funds in the 
possession of appropriate Federal Reserve Banks and the Internal 
Revenue Service. 

John Caulfield -- A former employee of the Committee to Re-Elect the 
President and one who has knowledge of those wiio had access to the 
secret campaign commitcee funds in the possession of Hugh Sloan and 
Maurice Stans. 

Arden Chambers -- An employee of the Committee to Re-Elect the President 
and presently secretary Co Maurice Stans. 

Maury Chotincr -- Reportedly an investigator for the President of the 
involvement, of the Cominittee to Re-Elect tlie President in the Watergate 

Chase Manhattan Bank -- One of the institutions involved in the payment 
of the checks drawn on the Banco Ir-.ternacioaal of Mexico City, 

Contini-ntal Illinois Dank and Trust Company of Chicai;o -- One of the 
institutions involved in the payinent of the checks drawu on the Banco 
Intcrnacional of Mexico City. 


Kenneth II. Dahlbcrg -- The midwest chairman of fundraising for the 
Committee to Uc-L'lcct the President and one who was involved in the 
Andreas contribution. 

John Dean -- An employee of the Wiite House and one who has reportedly 
investigated the involvement of the Committee to Re-l^lcct the President 
in the Watergate case. 

Edward Failar -- An employee of the Committee to Re-Elcct the President 
and one who has knowledge of v;hether the campaign cornmittee attempted 
surveillance of political activities. 

Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President and other committees related 

Financial institutions whicli have in the past or in. the, present maintained 
accounts for the Finance Committee to Re-Elcct the President or related 
committees, including: 

National Savings and Trust Company of Washington 

First National Bank of Washington 

Riggs v\'ational Bank 

American Security and Trust Company 

First City National Bank of Houston -- It is believed this bank was 
involved in the transfer of the Mexican funds. 

First National Bank Building, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.U. , 

Washington, D.C. •- tlie building in which the Finance Coircnittee is 

First National City Bank of New York -- One of the institutions involved 
in the payment of the checks 'drawn on the Banco Internacional of Mexico 

Harry Fleming -- An employee of the Conmiittee to Re-Elect the. President an 
who it is believed has knowledge of the operating procedures of the 
campaign cor.rjittce. 

Sally Harmony -- An employee of the Finance Conaittee to Re-Elect the 
President and former secretary to G. Gordon Liddy. 

Gulf Resources and Chemical Corporation and all its subsidiaries. 

Frederick l.a Rue -- An cinployeo of the Corrnitteo to Re-Elcct the 
President. He reportedly had access to the Committee safes and 
is said to have participated in destruction of Co::imittec documents. 

Clark MacGregor -- Campaign director of the Committee to Re-Elect the 


Jcb Stuart Maeruder -- An employee of the Committee to Rc-Eloct the 
President vho reportedly was involved in' the withdrawal of $300,000 
from the ca-.paign committee's secret fund cannarked for sensitive 
political projects. 

Robert C. Mardian -- An ewployee of the Committee to Re-Elect the President 
wlio reportedly lias made an investigation of the involvement of the campaign 
committees in the Watergate case. ' . ■ 

John N, Mitchell -- Former Attorney General and former campaign chairman 
for the Ccrrriittee to PvC-Elect tlie President. 

Robert Odlc -- Personnel director of the Committee to, Re-Elect the 
President ar.d reportedly involved in the destruction of Committee 

Herbert L. Porter -- Scheduling director at the Committee to Re-Elect 
the President and one who has knowledge concerning the use of the 
secret funds. 

Ectore Reynaldo -- An official at the Republic National Bank of Miami 
who handled the conversion of $114,000 in checks to cash for Bernard 

Republic National Rank of Miami -- The bank in which Bernard Barker 
maintainid an account which was used to cash $114,000 in checks 
belonging to tlic campaign coinmittee. _ . 

Hugh W, Sloan -- Former treasurer of the Finance Conmittoe to Re-Elect 
the President and a long-time associate of Maurice Stans. 

Maurice H. Stans -- Chairman of the Finance cu;.imItLee to R>. -Elect the 

The Bank of .\merlcn -- One of the institutions involved In the payment 
of the ch«.cks drawn on the Banco Tntornacional of Mexico City. 

Will'iam TL.r^ons -- An employee of the White IIouso who reportedly received 
memos containing material from eveasdropping efforts directed at the 
Democratic '.'ational Committee. 

Tlic Watergate Hotel, 2690 Virginia Avenue, N.W. , Washington, D.C. 

Watergate Office Building, 600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. , Washington, D.C. 

Watergate Ease Apartments, 2500 Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 

Watergate South Apartments, 700 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. , VJashington, D.C. 

Watergate West Apartments, 2700 Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 

96-296 O - 73 - 19 


EXHTOIT No. 34-23 

Honorable Itright: Pateaa 


Cornnittaa on Bcnld.nr5 and Currency 

House of ?u;pre3C;ucai:iva3 

yashin^Ccn, D, C, 

Dear Mr* ChajLrsiaa: 

Cotit^rassaria G^irry Brc-.-ti lias i n fo jr:::o<i ua by letter o£ 
Septsdhar 26 that the- (CcrrrjLctGQ oa BcixLiiii;^ and Currcijcy ox 
the Houce of Representative;! is ccxinidcjrxns; er'tcnoive pmbiii 
hearin-^s iato finmcial aspects of tho so--caiied Watergsce 
"bulging'* inciuoac, Mr, Brc.m'a letter and recent ne'-^3- 
paper reports oi tha Cor-.iiittC'e's plans iudic;r-ta thai:: ths . 
Corrrilttaa i^ay hciir a nuirjbai" of parscriS 'uho ar-s lilcoly to 
be called as uitiiessca for the Govenrr?nt or for tha d^xan- 
danta in tha psndin^^ crimlaai prcsccutiou ox sevan perscaa 
indlctad in ccroioction vita the Watorgata incidcTit. 

\vhile It is of course iniportazit that tha public be 
fully infor:r-ad concerning the suajoct cantar invoivad i:a 
ths Co::r:3ittaa'3 haarin.^3, tha Depari::z.'.n£ of Justice feols 
obliijad to craw to ths attancicri of tha Ccr:::nitt5a socua 
law eaforcemenc and civil libarriea* corisidaraticna that 
raay bear on ths dasirability or propriety of such hearings 
being held shortly boxora che criraiiriai trial at vhich soma 
of thase persons ara lilcely to ba called as uitnasses. 
The pvialic intar33t in a prczipt and Gucccoafui prosecutioa 
cay ba irnperiled by \;idely publicized hearings ha id at this 
ticia. And tha basic ri;ihts of ths defendants to c Gpc-ady, 
fair and icioartiai trial n:ay be jeopard i:2:ed by prejudicial 
publicity or tha dalay en^andarad by it. 


In a reriarkably similar situation sorp.e 20 years ago, 
the conviction of a fomor public official for corruption 
V7as vacated by the United States Court of Appaalo for tha 
First Circuit because of the pretrial publicity engendered 
by a congressional investigation botJ7Gen the time of 
indie tir.ent and the tima of trial. The official, a 
Collector of Internal Revenue, was reir.oved frcra office and 
indicted on various charges of corruption in office. Prior 
to the trial, the liouse VJays and Meaiis Cocraittea conducted 
an investigation and public hearing of the official's con- 
duct, over the protest of both his counsel and the Depart- 
ment of Justice. The Government exprecsed its concern to 
the Con^ai ttae with respect to what the court subsoa\iently 
found to be the case: "the coiiniittee hearing afforded 
the public a previevj of the prosecution's case against 
Delaney with.out, hc'raver, the safeguards that would attend 
a crininal trial." Sclanev v. United States^ 199 F.2d 107, 
110 (C.A. Ij 1552). 11-13 dcfend;;ni:-s objecticn to tho 
hearing V7aa^ of course, the adverse publicity which the 
court also fovind had prejudiced the fairness of tha trial. 

In Delaney tho court Gnph^.sized that the prejudicial 
publicity haa been generated by the Goverriitent, rather 
than by indeoendent Dress inquiry. It held that tha fact 
that the hearing vras not conducted hy tha sar:2 branch of 
Government responsible for the prosecution did not diminish 
the ham to che defendant. "l^'^'J^^ perceive no difference 
bet^'Teen prejudicial publicity instigated by the United 
States through its e-.^ecutive arm and prejudicial publicity 
instigated by tho United States thrcuch itr, Icsi.'slativa 
arm." 139 F.2d at 114. ^Tnile the court did not question 
tho authority of Ccn~ra39 to proceed XTith the hearing 
while the indictr:snt ';7as pending;, it held that tha consti- 
tutional rights of the defendant were nevertheless entitled 
to protection either by a change of venue or a delay in the 
trial sufficient to offset the adverse publicity," 

* Supreme Court decisions subsequent to the Delaney case 
reinforce the Si:;th iVirendinenc right of a crininai defendant 
to a speedy trial and 3u;55est that a lengthy continuance 
roay prevent a subsequent orosecucion, at least where the 
defendant requests an early trial. See Dickey v. Florida , 
393 U.S. 30 (1970); laoofer v. Morth Carolina , 336 U.S. 
933 (1967). 


"We think that the United States is put to 
a choice in this matter: If the United States, 
through its legislative department, acting 
conscientiously pursuant to its conception of the 
public interest, chooses to hold a public hearing 
inevitably resulting in such damaging publicity 
prejudicial to a pending indictment, then the 
United States must accept the consequence that 
the judicial department, charged with the duty 
of assuring the defendant a fair trial before an 
impartial jury, may find it necessary to postpone 
the trial until by lapse of time the danger of 
prejudice may reasonably be thought to have been 
substantially removed," Id., at ll4. 

Other courts, in discussing Delaney , have suggested 
that the congressional committee should not have conducted 
the public hearings prior to the defendant's trial. The 
Second Circuit, in United States v. Flynn , 2l6 F.2d 354, 
375 (C.A. 2, 195^)i, ~cert . denied , 34« U.S, 909, suggested 
that the hearings should either have been postponed until 
after Delaney 's trial or held in private. Similarly, in 
Silverthorne v. United States , 400 F.2d 627, 633 (C,A. 9, 
T^S^ the court commented: %niile the reversal in Delaney 
was necessitated because of the fact of prejudicial 
publicity, this result is inextricably boimd up in the 
rationale that such publicity was caused by the action of 
the United States Government at a time when restraint 
would have been the more prudent course of action." 

This emphasis on governmental involvement in the 
generation of adverse publicity has been repeated by the 
Supreme Court. In Rideau v. Louisiana , 373 U.S. 723 
(1963), the Court found a violation of due process in 
the trial of a defendant in the same parish where tele- 
vision publicity of his interrogation by the sheriff was 

"Under our Constitution's guarantee of due process, 
a person accused of committing a crime is vouch- 
safed basic minimal rights. Among these are the 
right to counsel, the right to plead not guilty. 



and the right to be tried in a courtroon presided 
over by a judge. Yet in this case the people 
of Calcasieu Pariijh sav and lieard^ not once but 
three times, a 'trial' of Ridcau in a Jail, pre- 
sided over by a sheriff, where there vzaa no 
la^^yer to advise ilidaau of his rinhc to stand 
inut6." 373 U.S. at 726-27 (footnotes omitted). 

The courts, largely because of a proper concern for 
freedora of the press, have been reluctant to regulate 
press coverage of sensational trials. At tha sania time, 
the courts have tha responsibility to preserve tha right 
of criminal defancumts to an ii::n3artial trial. Perharjs 
tha cost ezitcnsiva judicial discucsicn of the baL-incajag 
of these intaresta in recent yearn x:as tha decisica In 
SheoT^ard v. Han^^c^ll, 334 U.S. 333 (1966). There the 
Court again vacacea a criminal conviction because or 
excessive publicity, not only prior to but curing tha 
trial. V-"hile taare v;era a variety of factors involved 
in that case, tha Court eriphasized the special obliga- 
tion of insuring that govamnent officials, in that case 
the prosecutor, police officers, and the coroner, not 
contribute to the production of adverse publicity. 334 
U.S. at 359. 

The United States District Court here in the 
District of Colurribia has recognized its responsibility 
in this regard by adopting a special rule to guard 
against adverse publicity prior to criirdnal trials. 
Rule 100 of the Court's rules strictly enjoins court 
personnel and pirosecutors not to discloca niattex preju- 
dicial to the defendant and furtlier authorizes the judge 
in a V7idely publici::ed or sensational case to issue a 
special order governing extrajudicial statscents by 
parties and vitnesses. It was this rule that Judge Rlchey 
invo'.ced in a pending civil action, also emanating fro:n the 
Watergate incident, in order to protect the rights of the 
criminal defendants. 

This Departnient is seriously concerned that public 
hearin;;3 on matters related to the '.'atergatc case at this 


tims may not only JGOpardize the prosecution of the case 
but also seriously prejudice the rights of the defendants. 
It is distinctly possible that rvitters ^;hich adversely 
reflect on the defendants, and which would not be admiss- ' 
ible at the criciinai trial, will become known to the public 
and to potential jurors as a result of the proposed con- 
gressional investigation. This wa3 the result of the 
advance publicity in the Sheonard case and was one of tha 
principal reasons for tha reversal of the conviction. 

This matter of prejudice through adverse pretrial 
publicity has been a natter of grave concern to all lawyers 
in the United States. It was for this reason that tha 
American Bar Asfjociatj.on coirmissicned a study of the prob— 
lenj as part of its fonrailation of niniiiram standards for 
the administration of criminal justice. In the report on 
Fair Trial and Free Press the Con:mittee on Mininuia 
Standards observed: 

"Freedoia of speech and of the press are 
fundamental liberties guaranteed by the United 
States. CouDtitution. They zealously 
prcser^/ed, but at the same time must be exer-^ 
cised v;ith an awareness of the potential impact 
of public statements on other ftmdamental rights, 
including tha right of a person accused of 
crime, and of his accusers, to a fair trial by 
an impartial jury. 

-A-:">V -.V ^ xt is important both to the community 
and to tha criminal process that the public be 
informed of tha coirmission of crime, that corrup- 
tion and misconduct, including the improper 
failure to arraign or to prosecute, be exposed 
V7hanever thay are found, and that those accused 
of crima be apprahanded. If, hov/ever, public 
statem.ents and reporting with respect to these 
mattars assume cha truth cf what zizy be only 
a belief or a suspicion, thay may destroy the 
reputation of ona who is innocent and may 
seriously endanger the right to a fair trial in 
tha event that fornial charges are filed. 

-;c --v -.V Vr [d] uring tha period prior to trial, 
public statam.ancs originating from officials. 


attorneys, or the neva media that assirne the 
guilt o£ the pcrncn char,^sd, that include 
inaccurate or inadniisaible information, or 
that serve to inflama the ccr^xojniL'y, may "n 
undemiiiQ the judicial proc&oa by raalclng 
ttnobtairuibla s j^ry satisfying tha requisite 
standard of impartiality." pp.. 16-17, 

CoLszaittaes of Cono:ress have been careful in the past 
to give proper regard to ia^7 GnzorceL.-;imc and civil liber- 
ties' concerns in psrforsin^ thair investigative functions. 
The Bepartr.rnit of Juatice is iiighly concerned that a wall 
publicized congressional investigation at this ti^a.i will 
jeopardize the rights of criminal defendants and endanger 
the prospects of a prcnpt and success:cul prosec-ution. For 
these rea„~on3 the Deoartiri^ent, as it did in the Del.•?n:^^?^ 
case, aslcs chat the Ccnmittae ^ive serious consideration 
to these concerns before hoidin'^ hearinc^s on chis niatter 
V7bich x/ill undouotediy cczi:2 co trial in the very near 


Henry S. Petersen 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criniinal Division 


Exhibit No. 34-24 

ZIEGLER: Dwight Chapin has already made it clear that the story 

was fundamentally inaccurate and one based on hearsay. 
Now there have been a number of stories which have 
appeared over the last f(/w days -- and over the last 
few months -- that you gentlemen have asked me about. 
All of these stories have been based on hearsay or 
on sources which have not been identified. These 
stories have resulted in substantial confusion. All 
of them seem to be lumped together as the Watergate 
affair. The Watergate affair is one that has been 
thoroughly investigated and seven men have been 
indicted. It has been one of the most extensive 
investigations in history. • . . 

The other stories that have run don't relate to the 
Watergate where criminal action is involved. ', , 

But still we see such stories as espionage, sabotage, 
spying, surveillance -- all being charged to activities ' 
of the Re-election Campaign. But none of the charges 
are based upon anything more than hearsay or • ■ • 
unidentified sources. 


Now I can tell you I have nothing more to say or add 
on this subject beyond what Dwight Chapin said in his 
statement - but I will tell you this. At no time has 
anyone in the White House or this Administration condoned 
such activities as spying on individuals, surveillance 
of individuals , or sabotaging campaigns in an illegial 
way. The President has said before and I will repeat 
it again. He does not condone this type of activity. 

Now three weeks before the election there is a flurry 
of sensationalism. I ani not going to inject the White 
House into these stories. I am not going to assume 
the resiDonsibility from this podium and from the 
W^hite House Press Rooin to answer every unfounded 
story based on hearsay or unidentified sources. . , . 
every story based on-some sensational charge during 
this period. ... 
E?IRLICHMAN We are going to see all kinds of Presidential friends, 
Presidential staff, Presidential relatives, dogs, etc. 
pictures on the front pages of the local newspapers 


to counteract the fact that McGovern is two to one 
behind. I am not going to try t o cope with these 
unfounded stories. ■ ' 

CHAPIN I am not going to dignify desperation politics. 

QUESTION Ron, that was a self-righteous, self-serving statement. 

Simply, is the answer yes or no? Did Dwight Chapin, 
the President's Appointments Secretary - a man who 
meets with the President regularly - hire Segretti 
and Instruct him to engage in sabotage? 

ZIEGLER Gentlemen, I have nothing to add to what Mr. Chapin ^^ 

has already said on this and that is that the story is 
fundamentally inaccurate and based on hearsay. 

QUESTION But Ron, why don't you just ask Dwight or why 

doesn't the President just ask him. Did he or did 
he not hire Segretti? 

ZIEGLER GentleiTien, I have nothing to add to what Chapin has 

already said on the subject. 

QUESTION Are you telling us that you won't say wlicther or not the 

President condones activities such as sabotage, espionage, 


ZIEGLER If you would listen to what I said, you will note that I 

stated that the President in no way condones this type 
of activity and no one in the White House under any 
circumstances direcl'cd, encouraged, or suggested that 
people at any level in the campaign involve themselves 
in survelliance of individuals, spying on individuals, 
stealing documents or any illegal or repulsive steps 
such as have been charged in the source 
sensational stories that have been published. 

QUESTION Is it trvie that Segretti was a close, personal friend 

of Chapin' s? , ,., ' 

ZIEGLER Mr. Chapin covered that in the statemient. ^ 

QUESTION When was the last time that Chapin saw Segretti? 

ANSWER I don't know. 

QUESTION Why don't you ask him? 

ANSWER Gentlemen, I told you I have nothing to add. 

EHRLICHMAN We just don't take as seriously as you do these 

campaign pranks. Some of you for your own purposes 
have blown these into something that is not there. 

ZIEGLER I don't think we can take on the press. 


EHRLICHMAN Dwight Chapin is terribly offended at the treatment he 
got over the weekend. I approached him to the 
possibility of coming out here. He said he would 
never again speak to any member of the press and he 
would lilie your apologies. . . 

MOORE This refers to a statement of policy and it is clear 

that it is the right one. What is the right of anyone to 
expect an answer from this podium on a story which 
is based on sources you will not reveal. Good citizens 
are being filiifixMi;x vilified based on irresponsible, 
unidentified stories and stories whicli draw broad- 
sweeping conclusions. You have this right under the 

First Admendment make charges on hearsay 

evidence. . . Today you had a four-column picture in which 
Dwight Chapin was named as a contact in sabotage. The 
person who said it was not named. To take this 
xdmitEd adniittcdly unsupported, non-knowledge 
Hmik and assert it as knowledge to the point where 

you may do so, but it does not give you a right 

to expect an answer from the President's Press Secretary 


or from the President of the United States. When and if 
anyone comes in here with evidence of wrongdoing- 
you will receive an answer. Until that occurs, we will 
go on to the next question or next subject. 
Jim Mitchell -- fund. He denied it. 
. Bill Timmons -- he denied it. 
Clawson and the letter - he denied it. 
In none of these cases was the source for the 
story revealed, but these men for the rest of their 
lives will have to live with these charges for which 
they have no recourse. 
QUESTION If you feel so strongly about this, then why don't you 

just deny it? 

These are the rules. Mr. Chapin has asked- me to 
make a voluntary statement. As a man who has 
worked in campaigns for X number of years and 
have seen many pranks and hoaxes, it occured to me we 
should have our own Dick Tuck in this campaign. Gordon 
Strachan recalled that our old friend, Don Segretti, 


was coming out of the 7\rmy in September. We called 
him and he expressed interest in the assignment- 

of being a counter-agent 

on that basis I said to him that perhaps I could get 
an okay for you to be supported and take off on your 
own on activities as long as lliey are legal. 
I referred him to Mr. Kalmbacli who did supply 
funds wliich would allow him to act on his own for a 
few months. . I did this on my own without any 
•knowledge or encouragement or authority. 
I have read nothing to the contrary that Segretti has 
done anything illegal or inconsistent witli traditional 
stories in politics -- and the most I heard was a post 
card or clipping from the newspaper. 
I have noted that nothing has been said that anything 
was illegal or of any consequence. 
Then you might read a statement from the President 

of the United States Dwight Chapin is one of 

the most able and most respected men on my iaff. 
In my opinion, he made a mistake in encouraging 



prarics. However, this has occurred in my campaigns 
in the past and had no effect there. I am sure these 
pranks have had no effects here. 
EHRLICHMAN Two exceptions =-- the government and the White 

House. Chapin is the Wh i te House and the separation 

you bridge the separation when you get 

the President in it. 

Who paid hiin and how was he paid? 

On Mr, Chapin' s recommendation that he was going to 

further the cause of the campaign, Mr. Kalmbach 

paid him. 

If we are doing something about them, there are a host 

of charges liere and we are looking into them and we are 

going to have a response for you. 

We malce investigations and we check the evidence. 

It is being looked into We are looking into it. 

We don't have the answers. 

Does the President have any reaction? 

Yes, he is absolutely revolted and distressed that the 

word sabotage is connected by picture and name 

of a man whom he considers based on an 

unsubstantiated story. 






Let's get to the question of precisely what the allegation is. With 

regard to the Watergate, it was quite evidently a crime -- a serious 

crime -- With regard to the other allegations they range from 

allegations of political high-jinks, pranks and hoaxes, all the way 

to more serious matters such as spying and surveillance on individuals. 

The President is under no obligation to comment upon these charges 

for the reason (e) They are unsubstantiated; (b) they are unsupported, 

and (c) in our judgment, both the timing, character, and the placement 

of these stories is political in character. The purpose is to focus 

attention' froixi the central issues of the campaign. The President 

is under no obligation nor should he get into discussion or comment 

on these tactics. 


I have already made my comment that (a) Dwight Chapin did direct 

the hiring of Segretti, that (b) once Segretti was hired, the day to day 

activities were not Chapin's responsibility. 


The President does not comment on allegations of campaign tactics. 

i. e. irrilitants at the rally in Californiar. 




As the Washington Post reporter has described it, the 
story is based entirely on hearsay and is fundamentally 
inaccurate." , 

For example, I do not know, have never met, seen, or 
talked to E. Howard Hunt. I have known Donald Segretti 
since college days but I did not meet with him in Florida 
as the story suggests and I certainly have never discussed 
with him any phase of the grand jury proceedings in the 
Watergate case. 

Beyond that I don't propose to have any further comment. 


7^ /Jyr 

96-296 O - 73 - 20 


Exhibit No. 34-25 



December 5, 1972 




SUBJECT: Report Re Watergate and Segretti 

After having reworked innumerable draft reports, I have developed the 
following approach for releasing the report: 

Attachment A : A draft statement for Ziegler to read to the press, 

Attachmeiit B : Drafts of sworn depositions of White House staff - 
who have been alleged by the media as having been involved. Ziegler 
would also release these at the time he briefed on the subject. 

NOTE: Included. at this time are: 

Dwight Chapin • ' 

• * Gordon Strachan 

If this approach is agreed upon, the following should also be 

H. R. Haldeman 
Ken Clawson 

The above approach is suggested as a means of getting the information 
out in a form that is both credible and not unnecessarily harmful to the 
individuals involved. It avoids the questions of how Dean reached his 
conclusions and also puts congressional investigators on notice that this 
is all they can ever expect. Also, the depositions are unimpeachable 
and put the matter into a proper perspective. 

While, as you know, I am not sure that we need a report at this tinr^e, 
if such a report should be issued this approach would do the job. Dick 
Moore has worked with me on this matter and agrees. 


Attachment A 



As you are aware, following the so-called Watergate 
incident the President directed John Dean, Counsel to the President, 
to conduct a complete investigation of the matter to determine 
whether any present niember of the White House staff or anybody 
employed in the government was involved in that bizarre affair. 
On August 29, 1972 the President announced Mr. Dean's findings 
that no one pi^ee-en-feiy employed in the White House or in the 
Administration was involved in the incident. 

Since that time, in the waning weeks of the campaign, 

there were additional charges made of Adininistration officials 

being involved in alleged acts of political espionage and sabotage. 

As a result, the President directed Mr. Dean to conduct an additional 
• A 

investigation into these charges. 

Mr. Dean has reported the findings of this additional 
investigation to the President. 

This investigation resulted in the following findings: 
-- After investigation of all charges which might involve 
any persons l^-'ff3^h,£\J^ employed in the White House or in the 
Administration, as well as consultations wdth the FBI and with the 
chief prosecutor handling the criminal action, it can be reaffirmed 
there was no involvenient by any such people in the incident which 
occurred at the Watergate on June 17, 1972. 


-- No one in the Administration was in any way involved 
in the incident in New Hampshire involving the so-called "Canuck" 
letter, and more specifically, the charge alleging the source of 
that letter to be Mr. Ken Clawson of the White House staff is 
untrue and totally without foundation. Nor, it should be noted, 
was any information developed which shed any light on the origin 
of the letter. 

-- There is no substance whatever to the charge that any 
person in the Administration "directed some 50 secret agents in 
sabotage activities;" to the contrary, no one in the Administration 
directed any such activities. 

--In late summer of 1971, Mr. Gordon Strachan and 

Mr. Dwight Chapin, both White House staff members, encouraged 

Donald "Tick" Segretti, an old college friend who was finishing his 

active duty military service, to become a political prankster. The 

idea to enlist such a prankster was Mr. Chapin' s. Based upon his 

experience in five political campaigns, he had become aware that 

certain individuals such as the celebj=^+ed Dick Tuck conducted 

pranks designed to harass and disrupt Republican campaigning and to 

embarrass the President. V;lj'ecr©fAy@, J*e^ took it upon himself to 


initiate similar activity against opponents of the Republican Party, 
and when he and Mr. Strachan heard that Tick Segretti, who they knew 
to be a practiced practical joker, was seeking employment 
they decided to approach him. 


Once Segretti was approached and b'^ enlisted neither 

Strachan or Chapin or anyone in the White House directed or controlled 


any of Segretti's activities. Rather, by the very nature of this task 

he received directions from ite oiie-ai^S was to operate on his own 
/V A J 

initiative and use his ingenuity to perform political pranks. 

Mr. Segretti received no government funds, but instead was 
paid from available political funds. Paynient was made by a 
Republican fvind raiser to whom Segretti was referred by Chapin. 

* - - There is no basis whatever to the allegations that 
H. R. ^Haldeman had access to any secret campaign slush fund, O^ 
directed political sabotage activities, tVor was interviewed by the 
FBI regarding these alleged activites and the Watergate incidenti3_A \<-t. 
These charges are all totally without substance. Mr. Haldeman 
at soine point in time was advised by Mr. Strachan that a political 
prankster was operating in the primarie s on behalf of the Republicans, 
but he was told that tliis individual was working on his" own initiative 
and he had no knowledge of any specific activities of that individual, 
nor did he even knov/ his name. 

-- There was no evidence uncovered in this investigation 
which in any way links Mr. Segretti with the Watergate incident 

or the alleged activities of those charged with a crime in 
connection with the incident and, indeed, Mr. Dean is 
satisfied that there was in fact no such connection. 


Attachment B 



It has been alleged in the media, that you told the FBI that 
you hired Donald Segretti "to disrupt the Democratic [primary] 
campaigns. Is that allegation true? 

Answer: ' 

To the best of my recollection I told the FBI that I had en- 
couraged Don to become active as a political prankster in the 
Democratic primaries. Let me be more specific: 

Having been closely involved in five political campaigns, I 
had become acutely aware of being subjected to the wide variety 

of intelligence and harassment tactics which are used against candi- 

C ^^' 
dates by their opponents. For example, the most c elebr ated YlcrS^ ^<^5~w- 

exponant of these tactics was Richard Tuck who has been widely 

publicized over the years fo:i; his success in infiltrating the Republican 

camp, obtaining information about their plans and engaging in so-called 

political pranks to disrupt or harass their operations. In fact, I 

understand that the reports filed by the McGovern Campaign Committee 

reveal that Tuck was on their payroll as recently as this spring. 

I had also been keenly aware, through direct experience and 

observation, of the extent to ■which organized activities of demonstrators 

can disturb, and in some instances disrupt, a political campaign. 


And, I have come to understand how important it is to know in 
advance when disruptive tactics of this kind are going to be used 
against us. 

In the summer of 1971, knowing that the primary campaigns 
would soon be underway, I concluded that it would be wise if our 
side could have a "Dick Tuck" of our own who could fill the dual role 
of obtaining information about political pranks which might be directed 
against us, and also engage in corresponding activity against the 

I was aware that an old college friend, Donald Segretti, 
would shortly be completing his army service. He and I had been 
active in campus politics at U. S. C. and I thought he would be an 
excellent choice for the role I have described because on campus he 
had been energetic and imaginative and, indeed, a prankster. I 
■ comniunicated with him atid arranged to meet with him in Washington. 

When Don came to Washington my wife and I, joined by 
Gordon Strachan and his wife, had him to dinner at our hon"ie. While 
the evening was basically a social reunion, as Gordon had also been 
a college ma-te, we did discuss in generalities the pranks that we 
have been exposed to in previous campaigns. We asked Don if he 
would be interested in being such a prankster, but nothing was 
resolved that evening. 

' Sometime after our meeting in Washington Segretti 
telephoned from California and said he would like to be our Dick 
Tuck as we discussed. 



It has been alleged in the press that you told the FBI that 
Segretti was paid for his activities by Herbert Kalmbach. Did you 
make these arrangements? 


Yes, I made these arrangements. It is really unfortiinate, 
however, that Herb Kalmbach' s name has been brought into this over- 
publicized matter. Herb has absolutely no involvement in or knowledge 
of what Segretti was doing. Let me explain, to the best of my recollec- 
tion, exactly how these arrangements were made. 

After Segretti expressed interest in becoming a political 
prankster, I told him to get in touch with Herb Kalmbach, who w^ould 
make arrangements for his reimbursement for time and expenses. 
To date, I have no specific or first hand knowledge of how much 
.Don was paid other than that he would receive a salary of approxi- ... 
mately $16,000 plus expenses. 

I called Kalmbach and told him that I had requested that a 
person by the name of Segretti get in touch with him and asked 
Kalmbach if he could make arrangements to pay him a salary plus 
expenses. I informed Kalnnbach that Segretti ■would be engaged in 
—political activity, but v/e never discussed what Segretti ■would be doing, 
Kalmbach stated that he would make such arrangements and we have 
never discussed the matter since that time. 



How often did you have contact with Segretti? 


Although I never directed any of his activities, I did suggest 
to Segretti that he come to Portland, Oregon, in September, 1971 
where tlie President would be attending a meeting at the Benson Hotel. 
It was known that hostile demonstrators would be present, and indeed 
they were, and I thought it would be educational for Segretti to observe 
the kind of activities which were being directed against the President, 
and which we would expect to encounter in the political campaign. I met 
with Segretti once during this visit, and I was the only member of the 
white House staff to do so. 

It was shortly after this that I was assigned to lead the advance 
trips to the Peoples Republic of China, and to accompany the President 
on the trip itself. Thus, in the late fall of 1971, and all of January 
and February, 1972, I was totally immersed in the preparations for 
the China trip, including two advance trips, and in the Presidential trip 
itself, February 17-28. 

Upon my return from China, I was given the same assignment 
with respect to the forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union which in- 
volved an advance trip to Austria, Poland, Russia, the Ukrain and 
Iran, followed by the Presidential trip itself in late May. 


During the periods of time I was working on the Presidential 
trips, I recall Segretti would sometimes call, but I often was unable 
to speak with him because of the press of business. However, I am 
sure I did speak with him on the phone, and can only guess that during 
the period of September 1971 to June 1972 I may have spoken with him 



Were you aware of what Segretti was doing? 


To this day my knowledge of Don's specific activities is 
extremely limited. I am certainly not aware of Don engaging in 
any unlawful or even sinister type activity and I believe I know 
him well enough to say that he, in fact, would not be party to any 
such activities. 

When Don contacted me by phone or sent me a news 
clipping, it would relate to some hiimorous hoax. I iTiight add 
that I never had the impression that anything he was doing was 
very significant. 



Did you ever direct any political sabotage or espionage 
activities through Segretti or anyone else? 

Answer: *. 

When I first met with Don, I explained that he would be on his 
own and he would have to make his own judgements regarding his 
activities. I further explained that the only purpose that a prankster 
could have in the Democratic primaries would be to cause an 
impression of general party confusion and general ineptness. 

I also suggested that Segretti travel to ti^^key primary states 
and become familiar With the political activities of the Democratic 
candidates. 1 also suggested that he might obtain information about 
the schedules of our opponents and any activities directed against us. 
I am as certain as any person can be that there was never any 
discussion between us of "sabotage, " "espionage, " "surveillance 
of candidates or their families, " "compilation of dossiers, " or any 
activities which would be unlawful. In fact, I know that Don would 
never participate in any such activities. 



Did you ever discuss Segretti's activities with the President? 


No. I have never discussed this subject with the President 
at any time. 

Q uestion: 

Did you ever discuss Segretti's activities with H. R. Haldeman? 

No. I cannot remember ever having discussed Segretti 
r this matter in general with Haldeman. 




Will you state what your association with Donald Segretti 
has been? 


I have knowTi Don Segretti, whonn we used to call by the 
nickname "Tick, " since we were both students and fraternity 
brothers at U. S. C. I had seen or been in touch with "Tick" from 
time to time since graduation from college, and sometime in mid- 
1971 he got in touch with me to say that he was soon to be discharged 
from active service in the army and that he would be inter-ested in 
finding a job in the political area, I told him if I heard of anything 
I would -let him know. 

I remember later mentioning Segretti' s interest to Ehvight 
Chapin, who was also a college friend of Tick's and mine, and later 
we discussed the possibility that Tick might well be a good choice 
to work for the Republican Party as a political prankster. The idea 
would be for him to do the kind of things for the Republicans that 
people like Dick Tuck had done to our side in past campaigns and 
would undoubtedly be doing again. We both agreed that Segretti would 
be an excellent choice, and Chapin got in touch with Tick and the 
three of us later met for dinner in Washington where we discussed 
some of the kinds of stunts that would be involved. I recall that 


Segretti expressed interest, but I understand that it was not until 
some days or weeks later that he got in touch with Chapin and told 
him that we would like to take on the activity we had discussed. 
Thereafter, Chapin told me that he arfanged for Segretti to meet 
Mr. Kalmbach in California who would make arrangements for 
Segretti to be hired and compensated. I understand tint Mr. 
Kalmbach was the custodian of funds available for the primary 



How often were you in contact with Segretti? 


I saw or heard from Segretti perhaps four or five tinnes 
in 1971 and 1972, but I never had any knowledge as to what actual 
activities he might have been engaged in. The last time I heard 
from Segretti was in June of 1972 when he phoned me, and we met 
for lunch at the Mayflower Hotel. On that occasion, Segretti told 
me that he had been contacted by the FBI, and they wanted to 
interview him. I told him that I had no idea why they were calling 
him, (Ed. Note: This answer to be completed after further review 
of JWD investigation material. ) 



Did you direct any of his activities? 




Did you ever discuss Segretti's activities with Mr. Haldeman? 


(Ed. Note: This answer to be completed after further review 
of JWD investigation material. ) '' 


When was the last time you had contact with Segretti? 


To the best of my recollection, he last called me in 
June or July to tell me that the FBI want'ed to interview him. 
He wanted to know if I knew why and I told him I had no idea. 


96-296 O - 73 - 21 

Exhibit No. 34-26 


1. The pending issue is the mechanics of reporting or not reporting 
for the 1701 activities. If 1701 is considered a "re-nomination 
Committee" it can be treated as a non-reporting activity. None 
of the Democratic candidates are currently reporting according 
to Dean. It is Dean's view that the legal question may have 
changed after the formation of the Committee was announced 
because of the choice of the word "re-election". 

2. Dean and H agree that the expenditure should be kept low so that 
if the decision to report is made the facts don't look to bad. 
Large expenditures, and the activities with the milk money, would 
remain non-reporting. 

3. The Attorney General concurred with the advice to do a mass mailing 
to 1000 to 2000 people from a list held by Lee Nunn. The letter 
would be signed by Frank Dale. Milbank has been approached and 

is not opposed. 

4. Dean reported that Nunn is requesting use of the "500,000 White 
House List". If the list is not to be used now, could it be used 

H - "I don't think that we can." 

Dean - "What about interspersing the lists?" 

H - "Ever been done before? Under LBJ?" 


__ 1227 

Dean - "VVill check and discover." 

H - "Sort of interesting to get a run on the list and clean it up now." 

Dean - "VVhat was the criteria for setting up the list?" 

H - "It is merely a list of people' who indicated support for the 
President. " 

Dean - "There will be a 7-day turn around for any mailing." 

'There will also be some telephone solicitation to establish a 
'operating' activity." 

H - "The Committee will be collecting funds in its own name." 

Dean - "The pledge money that Kalmbach is seeking is to be brought 
in under the theory 'get as much as possible as soon as possible'. 

H - "Nunn is also pushing separate from Kalmbach and getting it in fast. 

"Strachan should push Kalmbach and Sloan to move on their money now ." 

H - "Kalmbach'spledges for 10 - can't they be put ' to work?" 

Dean - "Maybe we should make arrangements for polling research, etc., 
and make payment now." 

H - "Opposed to paying people in advance of work delivered: What about 
the possibility of creating a polling consultant - we give the money 
to him now and as our agent he holds the cash until the poll people 
actually deliver: presumably, he would pay income tax on the interest, 
but the interest could be his fee. We will have to do some checking 
on that. " 


H - "We should begin moving at once because when the law is passed 

it will be effective immediately (of course, 10 days for the President 

to s . " 

Dean - "Much campaign money has lost earning power money anyhow." 

Dean - "To review the guidelines for Sloan: 1. He can not assure 
contributors that there will be no gift tax liability; 2. The 
reporting and disclosure requirements from the law are also open 
and so Sloan can give very little assurance to the contributors that 
he can comfort." 

H - "What about the possibility of getting the money in nov/ with 
the understanding that we would reimburse them for the gift tax: 
argue reduce the amount by the amount of the gift tax." 

Dean - "Ottinger family paid three quarters of one million dollars 
in gift tax. " 

Dean - "Sloan creating committees with 200 chairmen and bank supplies 
the treasurer. " 

Dean - "We will have to look into the question of agreement to reimburse 
on the gift tax point as well as the question of the possibility of 
putting, some of the 10 in pledges in municipal bonds to prevent federal 
tax liability." 

Dean - "Evans, Nunn and Sloan have raised the surplus funds question." 


H - "Forget this) " 

"No, the surplus funds are not to go into 1701 - there is no need 
for cash in the 1701." 

Dean - "What about the milk money? Our current thinking is to keep 
it totally separate and not even use the same bank." 

H - "Agree" 

Dean - "What should the milk money be used for?" 

H - "The Citizens Committee can submit a budget at the appropriate 
time and in the meantime, the money can sit in the bank." 

Dean - "Salaries at the Citizens Committee are currently being paid' 
through a Kalfnbach Trustee Account, so it is surplus money."' 

H. - Fleming should not have access to the Kalmbach surplus money nor 
the 70 surplus money. 

H - Strachan is to discover the source of the original 35 given to 
fleming and cover with Kalmbach that he is not to move any OjJ che 
surplus money without express approval from H and no such approval 
has been given. 

Dean pointed out that the expenses of the Citizens Committee ^;ould 
be approximately 35-40 thousand per month. 

Dean - Why can't the current mailing be a cover for the other availab."L; 
money? Since presumably the amount received from the mailina V7ill noi 
be sufficient to cover the .operating expenses. 


H - VThy can't the milk money be funneled into comniittees aiui liitu 
1701 to pay operating expenses? 

Dean, it is my understanding that the White House is to be coTnpletoly 
hands off the milk money. , 

H - Agree ' 

H - The milk money can pay for the 1701 activities up to the campaign. 

Dean summarized the remaining open questions: 

1. Whether to be a reporting or non-reporting committee. 
H - Why report? 

2. No surplus money is to be extended ever. 

3. The direct mailing is a go and expenditures should con.^ out 
of what is raised. 

4. The milk money is to pay for operating expenses. 

H - The operating people need not know the source of the money: The 
operating people should merely submit a budget and budget revisions 
for expenditures which they incur. They need not know the mec.i'i.nism 
for covering the expenditures. 

H - Any tap of Kalmbach or reserve funds must be cleared by II. 


Exhibit No. 34-27 

July 21, 1971 




Attached is a bill from Gloaoon's laNvyer repreccnting him 
ixi tlic Common Cauoe la.\v suit. I have requceted that 
Gordon Strachan clear thio with Haldeman, although it is 
a miiior expenditure, and that you reiniburse Gleaeon 
for tho expenditure. I would suggest that you deal directly 
with Gleason on this matter and <^ct in touch with mo 
regarding tl?.ldeinan'£3 reaction, if I have not already 
informed you of his approval. 

Plcace give me a call if you have any qucctions. 

cc: Gordon Strachan 




2021 L STREET, N. W. 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036 

Mr. Jack A. Gleason . , July 1, 1971 

The Washington Consulting Group 
3524 K Street, N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20007 

Legal Services, June, 1971: 
Telephone and personal conferences, 
correspondence and research; nego- 
tiation, preparation and filing of 
stipulation suspending effectiveness 
of subpoena . . 

Out-of-Pocket Disbursements . . . 
(Photocopies-$31. 70; Cabs-$2. 00) 


Exhibit No. 34-28 



TO: John Dean 

FROM: Charles Colson 

Now what the hell do I do? 



December 32, 1972 

By Hand 

Hon. Charles W, Colson 

Special Counsel to the President ' 

The VJliite House 

Washington, D. C, 

Dear Chuck: 

The children and myself were touched by your letters, 
and vv-e deeply appreciate your sympathy, I am unable to i-'cconcile 
myself to Dorothy's death, much less accept it. 

For years I was aware that I depended upon Dorothy, 
but only now do I realize hoi\? profound that dependence V7as. 

Her death, of course, changes my personal equation 
entirely, and I believe tliat my paramount duty now and in the 
future is to my children, particularly to my 9--year-old t;c!n who 
was unusually dependent upon his moLher, particularly since last 
June ' s- tumult began. 

I had understood you to say that you would be vjilling 
to see my attorney. Bill Bittman, at any time. After my v.'ifo's 
death I asked him to see you, but his efforts v.'ere unavailing. 
And though I believe I vinderstand the del.icacy of your overt 
position, I nevertheless feel myself even more isolated than 
before. My wife's death, the inunlnent trial, my present mental 
depression, and my inability to get any relief fi'om my pre.-, ^nt 
situation, all contribute to a sense of abandonment ]jy fri.'.Js 
on Vv'hom 1 had in good faith relied. I can't tell you hovj ;ii;;ooc- 
tant it is, under the circiuiistances, for Bill Bitbnan to have the 
opportxmity to meet with you, and I trust that you will do me 
that favor. 

There is a limit to the endurance of any man trapped 
in a hostile situation and mine was reached on December 8th. I 
do believe in God - not neccssai^lly a Just God but in the gover- 
nance of a Divine Being, His Will, however, is often enacted 
through human hands, and human adversaries ai^e arraigned against 

Sincerely, and in friendship. 


Exhibit No. 34-29 

'Post riAfl-v-i^ti 2-c>c.viU((_u£- i^>:i. l)e=e 7_8 TX- Pl^ 
^2^^'b . bec^. 2-^,-7 2- -^ 

. f^&uT VdO W-Ar'b TO IclMou) , 

.^A-(t) . /&^ c^aS Pter, u3(x(^&ee. ^t 1)c>:^s mot e(^'L.o/oc5 

.^O-ULH Te-<i& (M TH£ FoiZ&Sr Uijc_i_ FALL. 

i^ A-T TH<^ P/^e^iP6. rOoLx)^ 

c30ST P4SS Ti4C. rt€S^A-Gfe TH-AT if T>+6-V uJ/^U^T tT T^ 

I'm 5o,e^v{ Tt^A-T VOO U)tL(_ Gi<^T »-Ju/2.T iM_ TH6 


Exhibit No. 34-30 

"X . Relevancy of Intercepted CommunicQtiona 

1. My cell to the Chilean Ecibaooy on Oct 10 1972 vas relevant in thni 
the I.' tcrgato esse was diECucsed. 

2. Justice Douglas en July 29 1972 in a hearing on tho application for 
stay in the Ellcl^erg Case, caid: 

" \7a (tha Supreca Court) held in Aldarman v. U.S. , 394 U.S. 165, 182 

(1968) tliQt tlia icaue of relevancy should not be resolved in car.iera, 
but in an r.dvercary proceeding. Aldernan \jould be greatly undercut 
if tha issue of relevancy could ba resolved in caccora, end if ths 
triS.1 court ruled or,ainGt the defendants on tl;s cv2rits and tlicn 
detcrtaincd that tliey had no " standin:_;''to cor.^piain," 

(Pet for V;rit of Cert, to U S Court of A?p. #72-307 US Sup CC) 

jl ^!and3ted Disclosuro of Imoenniscably Intercepted 

• -__ crrTrTeri-aLrc'ris "" '"~ 

The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 provides in tho pertinent pari; (84 
Stat 935, 18 USC 3504) 

" Litigation concerning sources of evidence. 

(a) In any trial , hearing, or other proceeding, in or before any 

court, frand jury, departnant, officer, agency, regulatory- body 
'or other authority of tlie United Ltatea - 

(1) upon a claia by a party aggrieved that evidence is insdmissible 

becnucs it is tha nrtciary product of an unlav;ful act or because it v.-as 
obtained by tha e.xnioitation of nn unlawful act, the opponent of 
the claira sl'.all affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged 

unltluful act; 

(b) As used in this section " unlavjful act " means any act tha ul^s of ct.'j 
electronic, uachanical, or other device (as defined in section 251C(5) 
of this title) in violation of the Constitution or lauo of tha 
United fjtates or any regulation or standard promulgated pursuant 

In the Ellsberg Case, on Jan 24 1972 the defense during pre-trial proceedings 
moved for discovery of electronic surveillance information with resi^ect to 
the petitiioners , ttieir attoruays and legal consultants. They had no reason 
to believe that such inforniaticn \;ould necessarily be used as evidence 
against them, but rade tl'.e notion under the provision od the Org Crir.e Control 
Act of 1970. The g.ovt \ja3 forced to disclose such icnarmissably intercepted 
conversations, to v;it, ti;o piioue calls intercepted of the defense ctcovaoy, 
one of wuich was to t!ie Ciiilcan L;;:iba53y in l.'ashington DC. 

( p 3 Ellsberg Writo of Cert 72-307 U S Supreme Court) 


In the Cblnlbua Crine Control Dill of 1963, and the Organized Crlrjs Coat.iol 
Bill of 1970, Congress n-rfl".t od di scloniiro , on motion from a defense r.ttornoy, 
of ALL lI-2?2rjlISSAi;LY linz.XELriLn CC:;;'x:?^ATIC::S - not just those relevriV.r. to 
a case, or intended to be introduced into evidence. The Senate report o.\ 
the O.anibuo Crina Control Eill of 1963 sets forth clearly that Congrccsional 
intent, end the fact that It was Incorporated into law as a protection for 
the defendant. 

The imperolssably Intercepted converEationa of McCord's included: 

1. A loag-dlstance call from Chile to llcCord'c office phone in the Spring of 1972. 

2. Local calls frora liiCord'o office phone in the Spring of 1972 to the 

Ciillean Military attache's residence and office phona in the sp l.'achtngtoa orca. 

3. Calls by McCord from his residence phona to the folloulng Embassies: 

Septetnber 21, 1972 to the Israeli Embassy 8:35 am from 762-8720 
October 10, 1972 to the Cliilean Embassy 4:50 pm froa 762-8720 
A. Agencies involved: FBI, HSA, and CIA 


Jack Caulfield 
Fairfax, Virginia 


Exhibit No. 34-31 

Message given ;by Saundra Greene to 

Mr-. Gordon Liddy - January ^, 197Z 

5«15 P.M. 

Hello Gordon - (Mr. Liddy) 

I've talked with Bud and he really regrels he can't 
talked to you at this time because of the confirmation 
hearings coming up. But he hopes you would not talk to 
Mr. Sutcliffe in light of the impending case. Bud believes 
that Sutclife does not expect a return call from you. 

Saudrai This should be sum total of your remarks. 
Be kind, solicitous, happy to hear his vo"ice, etc. But 
do not get in to a protracted discussion with him on any 

Saundra made call to Mr. Liddy at 5«08 P.M. After repeating 
the verbatim message above to Mr. Liddy, Mr. Liddy saidi 

"OK. Thank you very much." 
This was all Mr. Liddy said on the phone. Saundra reached 
him at 659-9010, which is the number of a law firm. Saundra 
reported that Mr. Liddy sounded subdued, but not depressed. 



Exhibit No. 34-32 

December 13, 1972 



SUBJECT: Congressional Hearings regarding Watergate - 
(Meeting with Sen. Jackson) 

Hard Information on the prospects of Congressional hearings on the 
Watergate, Segretti, etc., is virtually unavailable because the 
Democrats are not willing to talk about it. There has been some 
Information, however, indicating that the Senate Democratic 
Policy Committee has taken a position on the matter. Senator 
Jackson is a member of that Committee and may have some hard 
information on this question. 

I would like to recomment that if an opportunity arises in your 
conversation with Senator Jackson this afternoon you might ask 
him if there are going to be such hearings - and when and which 




ExmBiT No. 34-33 



February 9, 1973 



Obviously the key on the Ervin Committee is the minority staff 
and more importantly, the minority counsel. We've got to be 
sure we get a real tiger, not an old man or a soft-head, and 
although we let the connmittee membership slip out of our grasp, 
we've got to find a way to be sure we get the very best man we 
can for counsel. 

Also, you should go ahead and have Kleindienst order the FBI 
project on the 1968 bugging so as to gather the data on that and 
get. the fullest possible information. 

Also, Mitchell should probably have Kendall call DeLoach in 
and say that if this project turns up anything that DeLoach hasn't 
covered with us, he will, of course, have to fire him. 





February 10, 1973 




As I'm sure Bob's probably mentioned to you, we need to get 
a thorough itemization as quickly as possible of all the disruptions 
that occurred in the campaign. We'll need this for our Watergate 
tactics with the Ervin Committee. That is, the Democratic planned 
activities at the Century Plaza together with pictures, indications of 
violence and Communist activity and all that sort of thing - the 
violence in San Francisco - the headquarters burning in Phoenix " 
and other areas - the demonstrations at the Statue of Liberty, etc. 

96-296 O - 73 - 22 


February 10, 1973 


FRCIvI : ri.R. H/iLDEIv4/iN 

Wo ncod to cc-t cur people to vnxt out tho ctory on the foreign or 
Comniunint iTjOaoy lliat v/ao uncd in r>uppo?t of don^onotrationo 
acainijt tho Fre'ddcnt in 1972. AVc chould tio all 197^ damon- 
otrationa to IvicGovern and thus to tho Damocrato ap part of 
tho poaca n-jOvcn:i3n,tt • *, • 

The iavo.'jti^alicn chould bo brought to include tho peace iriove- 
msnt wliich Icado directly to McGovern end Toddy Kennedy, 
Tliio in a [;cod countcrcffcriaivc to be developed, la this conr.cctioa 
wo need to itomi::c c.U the dlcruptiono Duch ao tho Century Plasa, 
San Frr>,ncl-:;co, iJtaluc of Liberty, and eo on. 

You phould dcfii:itely order Gray to go ahead on Cho FBI Inv^^ctisatioa 
ajja.innt tho.oo who tr-ppcd Kiiion and Ajjnew in 1968. 

Wo need to develop tho plan on to v/hat extent the Democrato were 
responciblo £oi- ihe doxnonoti^^.tiona that Iciid to violence or dio- 
ruption » ■ 

There's alco tho qucction of whether v/o chould let cut the Fort V.'aync 
aCttry now - that v/o ran a clean camcxiign coniparcd to theirs of libel 
and Dlandcr cuch ao aijainst Rcboao, etc. 

V/c co\jld lot Evano and Novak put it out and then be aohed about It 
to make the point that v/o knew and the Precident oaid it wao not to 
bo uced any under circumctancea. In any event, vrc have to play 
a very hard j-amo on tliin wholo thinp and cot our invcDti£ationo 
golnr; afi a covmtor movo. 


Exhibit No. 34-34 


Matters to be discussed and resolved: 

(1) Baker mectinp with President: 

-- Baker requested secret meeting re Watergate hearings. 
-- Baker told Timinons he wantfe guidance, but to maintain 

his purity in the Senate he doesn't want anyone to know 

of meeting with the President. 
-- Timmons believes that Baker wants to help. 
-- Timmons does not feel Baker would object if there was 

staff present during meeting, so long as fact of meeting 

never gets out, 
-- Meeting would be excellent chance to find out what Baker 

plans to do and set up channel to work with him. 

(2) Sending Stans up for Confirmation: 

-- We don't know if Stans wants to do this, but we 'do know 
he wants to be rehabilitated and isn't afraid to tell his 
story publicly, 

-- Confirmation hearings would help defuse Watergate 
hearings, and the more of this we get to the public, 
the less impact the Watergate hearings per se will have. 

-- Tliis should be resolved quickly, because it will only be 
helpful if it occurs prior to AV^itergate hearings. (Stans 
has requested to sec Dean on Feb. 28th -- upon his return 
from Jamaica. ) 

(3) Wha-t to do v%^itii Magrudcr : 

-- Jeb wants to return to White House (Bicentennial project). 

-- May be vialnerable (Sloan) until Senate hearings are completed. 

-- Jeb personally is prepared to withstand confirmation hearings. 

(4) Use of Buclianan as Observer /Spokesman to keep press coverage 

-- Watergate press coverage to date has been dishonest and 

libelovis. Pat covild call them to task. 
-- The hearings are going to be partisan. Pat covild make 
certain that the public understands this. 


-- Teddy Kennedy is a moving force behind the hearings -- 

this can and should be documented. Pat could do this well. 

-- The public docs not percieve Buchanan as being that close 
to the President. The basic question is whether the White 
House is going to sit quietly and take the unwarranted 
abuse that is bound to come from hearings. We can't run 
a secret counter PR effort so why not do it openly and 
respectfully -- Pat can do t^at. 

'-- Buchanan's role will eliminaternuch of the heat that 

Ziegler will otherwise recieve and Ziegler could even 
have Pat brief from time to time. 

(5) Getting the A. G. back on the reservation; 

-- A. G. is merely biding his time until he returns to private 

-- A. G. is extremely loyal to the President and if asked to 
take an active concern in these hearings (and their fall out) 
would do so -- otherwise he will probably do what is best 
for his own self interest. * 

-- A. G. should be asked to remain in office at least one full «. 
year from this date (i. e. , until hearings have passed) 
because hearings may well result in request for additional 
action by DOJ. A. G. can get Henry Petersen -- who has 
the greatest loyalty for the A. G. -- to handle sensitive 
problems with ease. We can't afford bitterness in the DOJ 
nor can we risk a new A. G. being able to grappel with some 
of the potential probleins. 


Exhibit No. 34-35 

PotonlialM.iltcrs for Discussion with Son. Raker 

Meeting tn bo totally off the record 

Time: 30-45 Min. 

Staff: T>miiicuis nnd Di„Tin r 


-- Take Baker's pulse and find out how much he wants to help 
keep this from becoming a political circus. " 

Baker can be assured tliat no one in the White House had 
any kno\s'ledge tliat tliere was going to be a break in and 
bugging of the DNC. 

-- If Baker appears to be truly desirous of cooperating -- and 
the fact he is seeking guidance may so indicate -- he might 
be told that there are matters unrelated to the bugging 
incident per se (e. g, , Segretti, Kalmbach) that could be 
embarrassing and tarnish good people whose motiyes were 
the highest. Surely he can appreciate that things which 
occur at the White House have a degree of sensitivity that 
occur no where else in governnient. 

1968 Bugging 

-- Tell Baker that J. Edgar Hoover personally informed the 
President shortly after taking office that his campaign had 
been bugged. Presently seeking to obtain documentation 
and evidence of the 1968 incidents. 

Appearances of White House Staff Members before Senate Committee 

-- Statement coming out shortly on the matter of Executive privilege. 
(Draft attached) 

-- Cannot state at this time if such witnesses will be provided to 
Committee. Must wait to determine how the issue develops. 

-- A possible resolution of the problem may be that when the 

Committee believes a Wliite House staff member is essential 
as a witness, we can compromise and agree upon a sworn 
written interrogation. 


General Guiclance 

-- Seek to get hearings over as quickly as possible because 
they really are a potential witch liunt. The President can 
note that hearings of this type damage all government 
officials ajid the institutions of government. The public 
wants to believe the worst about all politicians and 
hearings of this type are going to damage all elected 

-- Committee procedures should protect the rights of 
minority members to infornnation, calling its own 
witnesses, notice of meetings, etc. 

-- Minority Counsel should be tough, aware of the way things 
operate in Washington, and able to handle a fellow like 
Sam Dash who has been selected as Majority Counsel. 
Dash is a partisan. 

Communication witli Wh.itc House 

■ - Wally Johnson should be initial contact point, but if Baker 
feels he wants to raise something that he chooses not to 
discuss with AVally, then arrangements can be made to 
meet with Dean. (NOTE: Frankly, the naming of Dean 
as the man who deals with the President on such nnatters 
preserves our posture on Executive privilege should Dean 
be called as a witness, ) 


Have just learned that Baker has publicly announced the appointment 
of Fred Tliompson as Chief Minority Counsel. Timmons has rccommend< 
George Webster as our candidate. 


EXHiBrr No. 34-36 



February 22, 1973 



I did not use the prescribed format because I understand 
that you do not want this to pass into the channels. 


Talking Points for Meeting \vith the Attorney General 

Background : 

Klcindienst is biding his time u'ntil he returns to private 

law practice. He has discussed j'oining several law firms, 
and has a particularly attractive offer from one that he 
'would probably like to accept. 

-- Kleindienst is less than enthusiastic about helping to solve 
some of the tough problems ^elated to the forthcoming 
Watergate hearings. He doesn't want to get himself 
involved in any controversy at this time. 

Themorale at the Department of Justice is low because 

theyare extremely loyal to Kleindienst, but think the 
White House is trying to force him out. 

-- Kleindienst is extremely loyal to the President and will 
do anything asked of him by the President. 

Recommendations : 

-- Kleindienst should be asked to remain in office at least 

one full year from this date (i. c. , until after the Watergate 
hearings liave passed), because the hearings may well 
result in a request for additional action by the Department 
of Justice. We can't afford bitterness at Justice nor can 
we risk a new Attorney General being able to handle some 
of the potential problenns. 

-- Kleindienst should be asked to follow the hearings closely 
and keep us apprised of any potential problems from a 
Departn-ient of Justice standpoint. 

-- Kleindicnrst should be given the feeling that he is an important 
member of the team and it is not merely becaur e of these 
hearings that he is being asked to stay on. 


Exhibit No. 34-37 

the white house 



February 28, 1973 





Options for Jeb Magruder 

Listed below arc nine possible options for Jeb. Some will break more 
china to secure than others; where there are problems, I have so noted 

1. Assistant to the Secretary, or Deputy Under Secretary 
of Commerce for Policy Developinent, PA, Level IV. Would replace 
current. Special Assistant to the Secretary of Conimerce, Schedule C, 
Level V, authorized by E„ O, 11510. Dent is interested and we are 
sending Jeb's resume over. 

2. Assistant Secretary - Coi-nptroUer of HEW, PA, 
Level V. Would require cancellation of E. O. 11251 and reissuance of 
an E. O. to make the position a PA. The position has never been 
designated in terms of its appointment authority, but is currently 
filled by Bruce Cardwell on a career basis (by fiat). Even if the 
position were made a PA, Cardwell would still have career rights 
to the job. He must be promoted elsewhere and is being considered 
for social security position. 

3. Deputy Under Secretary of HEW for Management 
Operations, PA, Level IV. Would have reporting to him the Assis- 
tant Secretaries for Administration (career, AP, Level V) and Comp- 
troller (AP, Level V). Would require E. O. and Level IV position 
from pool. Could utilize one of two HETW pool levels being cancelled; 
Counsellor to the Secretary (E.O. 11550) which is vacant, or Special 
Assistant to the Secretary for Health Policy (E.O. 11604) currently 
occupied by Roger Egeberg (D-Calif. ) who was "bumped" into that 
created position from his post of Assistant Secretary for Health and 


Scientific Affairs. This option would have to be approved by Malek 
and Weinberger and is not presently planned as an organizational 
move. An additional problem would be that Marik, who is going 
into the Administration job would probably have difficulties in being ■ 
layered with Magruder. 

4. Special Representative to, the Canal Zone Negotiations, 
Level U, PA, carrying the rank of Ambassador. Anderson feels that 
State would put up strong resistance to Magruder for this position based 
on experience required and the delicate nature of the current negoti- 
ations. We should only undertake this option if we're willing to cause 
an uproar with Rogers. 

5. Director, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, Department 
of Interior, PA, Level IV. Would require cancellation of E.O, 11262 
and a new one issued in its place. The position is currently a Schedule 
C, Level V and is vacant. 

6. Associate Director of USIA for Research and Assess- 
ment, Schedule C, Level V. Could issue an E.O. making the position 
a PA. Currently vacant. Keogh would resist placing Magruder along- 
side Strachan on the grounds of not wanting to load his office with 
"Watergate problems. " 

7. Deputy Director of SBA, Schedule C, Level IV. Could 
publish'E, O. making position PA. Currently occupied by Tony Chase 
who would be a top flight General Counsel for a large Department or 

a Federal Judge. We do not now have a General Counsel position for 
Chase although the Commerce job will probably be open within the 
next three or four months. 

8. National Director, U. S. Savings Bond Program, De- 
partment of Treasury, PA, Level IV or V. Would require E.O. and level 
from pool. The position is currently a NEA, GS-18 and is vacant. I 
doubt Jeb would take this job. . 

9. Deputy Chairman and/or Executive Director of the 
National Endownmcnt for the Humanities, PA, Level IV. Would re- 
quire E.O. and level IV or V from pool. Chairman is a Level III and 
does not have a Deputy Chairman/Top Staff Executive. In the twin 
National Endowment for the Arts the Chairman (Level III) does have 

an NEA, GS-18, Deputy Chairman who serves as the top staff executive. 
I doubt Jeb would take this ppsition. 

In summary, my top two recommendations would be the Commerce 
planning job or the Comptroller job at HEW. All the others would - 
create difficulties of one kind or another were we to place Jeb 
into them. 


Exhibit No. 34-38 


March 5, 1973 



SUBJECT: Call from Secretary Dent 
Re Jcb Magriider 

Secretary Dent called this date to inquire about hiring Jeb. 
He asked if there was any unreasonable risk in hiring Jeb. 

I responded that I thought Jeb could do an outstanding job 
for him. That Jeb had discussed several positions in 
government with the White House, but had selected the 
position at Comixierce as the one he was most interested in, 
I told him that it was possible that Jeb could get soine bad 
'publicity in coming weeks, but it should not be long lived. 

Dent said he didn't want to make this move blindly, without 
my checking. I told hini that Bob Haldeman and I had 
discussed the matter and that we tiiought Jeb could do a 
good job at Commerce. 

Exhibit No. 34-39 


Dear Mr. Chairman: 

As you l^aiow, in his statement of March 12, 1973, and 
in his press conference of March lb, 1VV3, the President has 
reiterated his policy that members of the White House staff 
will cooperate fully with Committees of the Congress, and will 
stand ready to supply relevant information requested by such 
committees, all in accordance with the President's constitutional 
responsibility to preserve the separation of powers. 

Pursuant to the President's policy, in my letter of 
March 14 I offered to provide the committee with any information 
it might seek from me relevant to the nomination of Mr. Gray 
to be Director of the F. B. I. To date, there has been no response 
to that offer. However, since individual members of your 
committee have made public statements on the floor of the 
Senate and on national television requesting that I sxipply certain 
information, the President has instructed me to respond 
voluntarily to those public requests without waiting for a formal 
action by the committee. Specifically, 1 refer to statements 
made by Senator Ervin on a national network television program 
(Face the Nation, Sunday, March 18, 1973. ) and the statements 
made by Senator Robert Byrd in the Senate (Congressional Record, 
March 14, 1973. ) 


Accordingly, I am happy to give to the committee the 
benefit of all the facts I know concerning the matters which these 
gentlemen have publicly raised. 

First , it has been suggested that the White House was 
uncooperative and sought to make the investigation difficult for 
the F. B. I, This is not true and no one has ever shov/n any 
evidence to support that allegation.. The White House sou'g'ht to 
fully and coniplctely cooperate with the F. B. I. , the U. S. 
Attorney's Office and the Grand Jury investigations of the so- 
called Watergate case. All information and witnesses were 
furnished as quickly as possible. All witnesses were told to 
answer all questions asked of them by the investigators. I knov/ 
of no effort to withhold any information requested from any 

Second, it has been suggested that the fact that I conducted 
an investigation of this matter at the direction of the President 
made it inappropriate for me to obtain F. B. I. information 
relative to their investigation. To the contrary, in an investi- 
gation of this importance it was incunnbent on me to obtain all 
available information from every appropriate investigative 
resource, and I would have been derelict indeed if I had not 
requested information from the F. B. I. 


Third, it has been alleged that I in some way influenced 
Mr. Gray's conduct of the investigation of the so-called Watergate 
case. To the contrary, Mr. Gray infornned me that he had given 
instructions to have the most complete and thorough investigation 
that the FBI could undertake. I advised Mr. Gray that the 
President wanted such an investigation and the White House was 
prepared to cooperate in any way possible. 

Fourth, Mr. Gray has been criticized for permitting 
me to be present during FBI agent interviews of persons at the 
White House. It should be understood that at no time, during 
any of the interviews, can I recall ever injecting myself into 
the interview by cutting off questions, or instructing an inter- 
viewee not to answer. I was present at these interviews because 
in virtiaally every case the person being interviewed requested 
that I be present and in no case did any object. On this question, 
I note that Mr. Gray testified that in each of the 61 interviews 
of ennployees of the Democratic National Committee one Committee 
lawyer was present at the Committee's insistence. 

Fifth, it has been alleged tliat I showed FBI interviews 
to Mr. Donald Segrctti. This is a totally false allegation. I did 
not sliow Mr, Segretti FBI materials at any time. I should add 
that the materials Mr. Gray provided me never left my custody 
and control, and therefore no one else could have shown Mr. 
Segrctti the materials I was given by Mr. Gray, 


Sixth, it has been alleged that the materials Mr. Gray- 
provided me were shown to persons at the Committee for the 
Re-Election of the President in connection with the FBI inter- 
views of Mrs. Hoback. This is also totally false and without 
foundation, Tlie fact of the matter is 'that I did not even possess 
such inforination at the time it is alleged I did. Also, I under- 
stand tliat the persons who discussed the fact of Mrs. Hoback' s 
interviews with her have publicly slated that they learned that 
Mrs, Hoback had confidential interviews with the FBI from 
colleagues of Kirs, Hoback at the Re-Election Committee. 

Seventh , it has been alleged that my relationship with 
Mr, Gordon Liddy should have made me "suspect" to the FBI 
insofar as supplying me with information. This charge appears 
to be an effort to create guilt by association. The facts, I believe, 
speak for themselves. The Committee for the Re-Election of 
the President needed a genexal counsel and could not continually 
rely on volunteer lawyers. I was asked by Mr, Magruder, 
Deputy Campaign Director, if I would give up my own deputy 
to serve as General Counsel far the Committee. When I informed 
him I needed by deputy, he requested that I assist in finding hini 
a counsel. I agreed to assist. Mr.^ Liddy was recommended to 
me as a fine lawyer and I passed this r econimcndation on to 


Mr. Magrvulcr, Once Mr. Liddy was hired, my staff and I 
provided him with background information regarding the relevant 
campaign laws that the Committee would have to comply with and 
on a few occasions my staff and I had discussions with Mr. Liddy 
on matters relating to election law compliance. I might add that 
I have recommended countless other lawyers for positions in and 
out of government and I also recommended the man who replaced 
Mr. Liddy as counsel to the Finance Committee. In short, my 
relationship to Mr. Liddy was limited to problems involving 
campaign law compliance , and I frankly cannot recall the matter 
that Mr. Magruder has testified about regarding discussion of 
Mr. Liddy's FBI backgrovmd and its possible usefulness in 
intelligence gathering at the time Mr. Magruder interviewed 
Mr. Liddy for the job of General Counsel. 

Eighth, I can state flatly that everything that was found 
in Mr. Hunt's office and safe and sent to my office was turned 
over to tlie FBI expeditiously. 

Finally , soine questions have been raised regarding 
my working relationship with Mr. Colson, who was then a member 
of the Wliite House staff.. I am somewhat at a loss to determine 
the relevancy of this question. Mr. Colson has stated under oath 



that he had no knowledge of or involvement in the so-called 
Watergate affair. I have had no special working relationship 
with Mr, Colson; rather my office's dealings with him have 
been as with other White House offices. 

Mr. Chairman, in this lctt6r I have been responsive 
to the questions which have been publicly raised by members 
of your Committee not only on the Senate Floor, but on national 
television. For those who honestly seek information, I have 
sought to give thein tlie facts as I know them. For those who 
want a political side show I suspect my candor will be ignored 
and the show will go on. Nevertheless, in accordance with the 
President's desire, and consistent with his stated policy, ibixsTisin 
yoti niay coiuit on my continued willingness to supply any relevant 
information the Coinmittce may request. 

Respectfully submitted. 

John W. Dean, III 
Counsel to the President 


The foregoing statements are true to the best of my knowledge, so 

help me Cod. 

96-296 O - 73 - 23 

Exhibit No. 34-40 

Dean : Is he in. John Dean calling. 

Magruder: Hello. 

Dean : Hi, Jeb. 

Magrudeb: Hello. 

Dean : How are you doing? 

Magruder : I'm doing fine ; how are you doing? 

Dean : Pretty well, incredible. 

Magruder: Is it? 

Dean : Just incredible. 

Magruder : Well the L.A. Times, God, we got splashed all over that one, let me 
tell you. 

Dean : Is that right? 

Magruder : I haven't seen it yet but my friend called me, said Christ you take 
up the whole front page. 

Dean: Is that right? 

Magruder : Yea, you and I, pictures, the whole works. 

Dean : I'm taking a bum rap, Jeb. 

Magruder : Well I know that. 

Dean : That's the incredible thing. 

Magruder : We've got to figure — John, I think we gotta just figure out how we 
can handle this. I don't know what we — I mean I don't know what we can do 
right now, I don't know if there is anything we can do right now. 

Dean : We'll just have to take the heat right now until the thing sorts itself out. 
I can't conceive of how McCord could have that impression. 

Magruder : Now I'll tell you what — John, can we talk here? 

Dean : Yea. 

Magruder: Okay. Here's what I figure has happened. And I'm positive of this. 
One, John, there is absolutely no substantive evidence that McCord could pos- 
sibly have in any way, shape or form that could connect anyone other than the 
seven of us. Okay. 

Dean : Yes. 

Magruder: I'm positive of that. Now I've gone right — you know I just went 
back through the process, was there anything at all that even could remotely 
imply any connection. Okay. 

Dean : Y^s. 

Magruder : So there is no evidence of what I call documentation. Now what he 
probably may have. John, is that when Liddy probably was working up numbers 
for his own benefit, and doing that kind of work, he probably used McCord to do 
that, because McCord bought all his equipment according to Silberts. 

Dean : But Liddy knows damn good and well that the last time that I. for 
example, had any conversation with him on that thing was when we walked out 
of that office and I told him I could not talk to him about it any further and he 
never — he — he never once ever raised it. 

Magruder: I'm sure he must have raised — I'm sure thought when he talked to 
his friend McCord 

Dean : He was a name dropper. 

Magruder: He's a name dropper. And I'm sure he said that well you know I 
don't really trust this idiot Magruder but Mitchell and Dean and Haldeman are 
all behind it and Gordon Strachan, I'm sure that obviously Mitchell's name will 
come up and I would take a guess if he still said "others" if you noticed, which 
is pure 

Dean : That's right, that's right. 

Magruder: So he is going to be talking probably about ^litchell and I would 
take a guess either Gordon Strachan or Colson. That would be ray guess. 

Dean : Just incredible. 

Magruder : So. one. he had no substantive evidence, I'm positive of that : tw-o, 
what he is probably referring to is simply discussions that Liddy had with him 
as they sat around drinking at the Watergate. You know — and only that. McCord 
never met with either myself or anyone else at our committee. 



Dean : Yes. 

Mageudee : Never, so there is no personal discussion lie would have of any kind. 

Dean : Well I thought maybe I was losing my mind. But I know — I know what 
I know and I know that one, I tried to turn the damn thing off. 

Mageudee: Right. 

Dean : I know that I'd told Haldeman after that meeting that it had to be 
turned off. Now what happened in the interim 1 don't have any idea, I don't want 
to know, I can only opine and speculate. 

Mageuder. I would hope so, John, of course on that meeting that I have testi- 
fied that that meeting that we've had with Liddy and Mitchell was simply on 
the general counsel's job and so on. 

Dean. I understand. 

Mageuder. I mean that's important I think, you know for Mitchell's and my 

Dean. Well I don't plan to go out and talk in any forum. 

Magruder. You know, if we ever get to the grand jury stage, I think they — 
I have testified that that meeting that you and 1 had was one meeting, not two, 
and that we had a meeting with Mitchell that just went over — since you had been 
helping me as a counsel — that we just went over the general framework of the 
job and the new law and those kind of problems, the typical cursory sort of 
post-employment meeting. That that was the extent of it. 

Dean. Well I was just trying to get straight in my own mind, you know, in 
case a guy like Liddy goes and starts giving his side of the story and 

Magruder. Well, if he did, of course what he would say is . You know 

that's one thing I would hoi>e we'd be working on and that part is Liddy. 

Dean. Yea. 

Magruder. But McCord's information would only be hearsay, it would only 
have been from Liddy. 

Dean. Okay, Jeb, well all we can do is sit tight right now. 

Mageuder. A couple of other points, John, let me ask you. Parkinson wants to 
sit down with me and is going to represent me and as far as I'm concerned that's 

Dean. I think that that's a personal decision of yours, by yourself, and that 
you know he's knowledgable and I think that's quite a good idea. 

Mageuder. AVell I mean, you know, from my standpoint, it would seem that 
somebody who is well aware of the situation and it would look funny it would 
seem to me if I changed attorneys. 

Dean. I agree, I think that's a good idea for you. 

Magruder. And he is certainly qualified. 

Dean. And I do think you ought to have counsel too. 

Magruder. What? 

Dean. I do think you ought to have a lawyer who's representing you per se. 

Mageuder. Well that would be what he would — you mean another one? 

Dean. Well I mean no — I mean like Parkinson. 

Mageudee. Right, well that's what I thought because I think for sure we're 
going to have to — I'm going to have to rely on you or whatever when we have 
to go down to the grand jury. 

Dean. I would imagine that day is coming. 

Mageudee. That's right. Of course, I think we have a hell of a case on the 
bond and who placed the bond for him and the written statement, how well it 
was done and why he waited until the last day. To me that makes it very clear. 

Dean. I don't, I'm not aware of what you are talking about. 

Mageuder. McCord. In other words, where did McCord get his bond. You 
know, he got it from a Democratic lawyer. He's got a new lawyer. He's obviously 
made a deal and a person in that position obviously is panicked facing 8 years 
or whatever he is facing. And he'll throw out names all over the place, John. 

Dean. I suspect that's true. 

Magruder. Just because he knows that's what they want to hear. If you read 
his letter, his letter is a perfect letter obviously not written by an individual 
but by a lawyer. 

Dean. I wonder if he drafted it? 

Magruder. And he's talking about fifth amendment, sixth amendments rights, 
all sorts of things that . 

Dean. Yea, okay, just hang in. 

Magruder. Yea, well that's what I planned on doing and I just wanted to 
check with you from your standpoint. But I'm positive there's no substantive 
evidence of any kind. 

Dean. Okay. 











Exhibit No. 34^-41 

Statement of charges against W/H and CREP oflScials. 

Remarks putting charges in perspective — Items which RN has been subject 
to — and things he is aware of from a life in politics. 

Rebuttal of charges from information that has been reported to him and state- 
ments made by others who have been charged. 
Polities of the present situation — 

— Press is publicly charging people on hearsay 
— Senate committee has prejudged situation 
— FBI has been falsely charged 
— DOJ is .-^aid to be less than diligent 
No man is above the law, but no man can get a fair hearing in the present 
situation. Men are being charged with crimes, when I know they have not 
committed them. 

The public is entitled to the facts, and the men who have been alleged to be 
involved are entitled to fair and just treatment. Accordingly I have today con- 
vened an independent panel that will have an unprecedented power to examine 
the charges and mete out justice. 

(1) Every individual who has been charged with involvement in con- 
nection with the Watergate affair has agreed to submit to interrogation of 
the panel — and, upon request of the panel on the individual — to submit to 
a polygraph test. 

(2) These people have also agreed to waive any right to trial by jury, 
5th Amend., etc. in that the panel is impowered to cause removal from fed. 
employment, levy fines, and if the facts warrant — impose personal sanctions. 

(3) The same offer shall be available to the 7 persons who have been 
indicted, tried & pleaded guilty in the Watergate case. If they choose to 
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the panel — and I am hopeful they 
will — they shall be treated as others. If they do not, all information they 
have provided or plan to provide, will be considered by the panel in its 
deliberation of the whole situation. 

(4) No judgments will be made by the panel until it has received all the 
facts it deems necessary and it may call upon any federal investigative 
agency for assistance in assembling such facts. 

(5) This panel shall make a full public report of its findings and the 
reasons for its actions with regard to such individual submitting to its 

Note : This printed matter Is from handwritten notes by Mr. Dean which were not 
legible enough for photography. The original copy is retained in committee files. 



Exhibit No. 34-42 

March 29, 1973 

At approximately 4:00 P.M. on Thursday, March 29,;. 
1973, Mr. Peter Maroulis spoke with Mr. John Dean over the 
telephone from this office. Mr. Maroulis stated that in ' - 
response to a request from Mr. Dean for a statement under',. 
oath from Mr. Maroulis' client, .G. Gordon Liddy, as to the 
non-involvement of Mr. John Dean in the Watergate matter, 
that he, Mr. Maroulis, had advised his client that such a 
statement would not be appropriate at this time for the 
following reasons: -\-'X:^ 

1. That if Mr. Liddy were to make such a staterrtent, 
it was conceivable that it could later be construed against 
Mr. Liddy to the extent that a selective speaking out on the 
subject waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. 

2. That to give a statement as to one specific * • 
individual only could be detrimental to other individuals 
who were not mentioned. 

3. Mr. Maroulis also stated that his client wished;. 
to convey to Mr. Dean his personal desire to be helpful in •, 
this matter and to assure him that his. decision reached '.at' - 
this time was predicated on the legal advice of his counsel. 

P.L.O'B. .V. , ;, 


Exhibit No. 34-43 
Pre June 17th 

(I) White House involvement and Knowledge of Liddy's Intelligence Operation 
at CREP. 

During the entire first four years of the administration the President had 
been subjected to mass clemonstratious relating to the war in Vietnam. I do not 
remember exactly when, but believe it was in June or July of 1971, that HRH 
asked me to make a recommendation as to how the Re-Election Committee should 
handle the problem of demonstrators. HRH raised this with me, because one of 
my White House responsibilities has been to keep informed regarding potential 
demonstrations that might affect the President. I had been involved in this area 
while at the DOJ and when I went to the White House my oflfice served as a 
liaison oflSce for metropolitan police/FBI/DOJ and SS intelligence regarding 

Haldeman and Ehrlichman have always been critical of the insuflSciency and 
weakness in the intelligence that has been provided to the White House by 
various federal agencies regarding demonstration activities. The intelligence 
always seemed to be too little and too late. While the evidence would appear 
that the demonstrations were well orchestrated and well financed, no one could 
every [sic] find hard information as to who was behind it and what motivation 
might exist other than the obvious anti-war theme. 

The demonstrations were having a dual impact on the President. First, it made 
the atmosphere of public opinion much more diflScult for the President to negoti- 
ate an honorable peace in Vietnam and secondly, when the government dealt 
firmly with the demonstrators we would be charged with oppressive tactics even 
though the demonstrators were seeking to tie the government into knots. 

There were several efforts to improve the government's ability to gather in- 
telligence regarding demonstrations, but these efforts really never accomplished 
much. For example, before I came to the White House, a study group headed 
by Tom Huston had re-examined the entire structure of the domestic intelligence 
security operation, but the plan that was ultimately developed by the study 
group was vetoed by Hoover because of the fact that it would have involved the 
FBI assuming less than a dominant position in the intelligence community. A 
compromise arrangement was worked out with Hoover to establish within the 
Department of Justice a coordinating team of all the domestic intelligence 
agencies but the product was less than satisfactory and often the newspapers 
appeared to have more information than the intelligence gatherers. 

When Haldeman would read the reports regarding demonstrations he would — 
and rightly so — express continual dissatisfaction. I assume it was because of the 
weaknesses of the government system that Haldeman urged that consideration 
be given to the campaign committee developing its own capability to deal with 
demonstrators in the forthcoming Presidential campaign. Not only did we expect 
problems for Presidential anoearances, but it w-as also felt that the demonstrators 
would seek to cause extremely serious problems for the Republican 1972 Conven- 
tion with the aim of creating a similar situation as that which occurred at the 
1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. 

It was suggested that the i)erson who head up this operation be a lawyer who 
could also serve as general counsel to the Committee and it was not anticipated 
that the intelligence operation would be a particularly consuming activity. Jeb 
Magruder indicated to me that he would like to have my Deputy Counsel, Mr. 
Fred Fielding, assume the position of General Counsel and the man to be con- 
cerned with demonstrations and security. I discussed the matter with Fielding, 
but we agreed that it would handicap my oflice's operations greatly if he were to 
leave the office during the chaos of a campaiem year. I informed Magruder that 
I could not let Fielding go, because I couldn't get along without him. Magruder 
then asked if I would recommend some other lawyer who could fill the function. 

I next discussed this with Bud Krogh because Bud is a lawyer and had had 
responsibility for demonstrations prior to my arrival at the White House. I 
suggested that David Young, who worked for Bud, might make an excellent 



man for the job, but Krogh informed me that it was not feasible because Young 
was too busy on the declassification project. Krogh did, however, suggest Gordon 
Liddy as a man who could do the job. He told me that Liddy was a fine lawyer, 
had prepared some excellent legal documents for him and that he was a fast 
study on the law, and he was quite confident that he would quickly grasp the 
campaign laws. Krogh also told me that Liddy had an FBI background and 
assumed that his background with the FBI would qualify him for dealing with 
the demonstration problems during the campaign. Krogh informed me that he 
would have to check with Ehrlichman before he signed off on his recommendation 
which he did and after that I informed Mitcheell [sic] and Magruder that I had a 

I frankly do not recall if I explained the job to Liddy or if Bud Krogh explained 
the job to Liddy. However, I do recall that I informed Liddy that one phase of 
the position would involve his tracking on domestic intelligence regarding dem- 
onstrations and the threat of demonstrators to the Republican Convention. I 
informed him that I was not an expert in intelligence and did not have any idea 
how such operations were conducted, but he assured me that he was familiar with 
intelligence gathering and would be able to handle the post. I arranged for John 
Mitchell to meet with Gordon Liddy on November 24, 1971, for a job interview. I 
attended the meeting and attached is a agenda that Liddy had prepared for the 
meeting and passed out at the meeting. As I recall the meeting, it was a normal 
job interview type meeting in which Mitchell asked Liddy about his background 
and his knowledge of the election laws. I had already informed Liddy that I 
would do everything possible to assist him in becoming familiar with the election 
laws, including the new election law, the passage of which was imminent. 

Liddy thought I could be very helpful to him in getting geared up with regard 
to the election laws, that they were complex, that they must be followed to the 
letter. I do not recall any discussion of intelligence operations at this meeting 
other than the fact that Liddy said he would put together the plan for Mr. 
Mitchell's approval. The interview also involved discussions in some detail 
regarding salary and title, which were agreed upon but I am unable to recall the 
specific salary although I do recall Mitchell agreed that Liddy .--hould be called 
the General Counsel. 

After this meeting, I recall that Magruder requested that I bring Liddy over 
for an interview with him in that Mitchell had said to him that he would have 
the final say as to whether or not Liddy was acceptable to him because he was 
the person who would have the working relationship with Liddy. I explained 
this to Liddy and Magruder asked that we come over on Friday, December 8, 
1972 (?) at which time Magruder interviewed Liddy also. Again, there was no 
discussion of Liddy's intelligence responsibilities other than Jeb's expressed 
concern regarding the demonstration threat to the Convention. Liddy indicated 
that he thought he could be helpful in getting information regarding demonstra- 
tors for Magruder and that he would draw up a plan. At that meeting Magruder 
agreed to hire Liddy and asked him to start as quickly as possible. 

The next contact that I had with Liddy was through a man in my ofiice, 
David Wilson, who I had instructed to provide Liddy with all background mate- 
rial on the election laws and to tell Liddy some of the areas that he should have 
particular concern with. 

On January — , 1972, Magruder requested that I attend a meeting in Mitchell's 
office with Gordon Liddy. At the time I went to the meeting, I had no idea of 
the subject matter to be discussed, but when we were going over to the meeting 
together, I learned that Gordon was going to present his proposal for an intel- 
ligence operation. Liddy had urejiared a series of charts to explain his plan but 
I frankly had some trouble following it as Mitchell later told me he did, because 
all of the operation*^ were in unusual code names. However, I do reciH 'ome of 
the items that were in the plan. I recall that it called for a $1 million budget, 
and included such recommended rajiacities as the ability to kidnaj) demon- 
stration leaders in an effort to throw the demonstrators into disarray, strong 
arm teams, teams to infiltrate operations with demonstrators, and the ability 
to conduct, what Liddy called the most sophisticated electronic surveillance in the 
world. The plan also set forth how convention security could be handled, and 
general security for other aspects of the campaign to deal with demonstrators. 

As the plan was unfolded I felt sorry for Liddy because he thought he was 
providing the answers for the intelligence needs, but I kiipw that .Tolin Mitchell 
would never agree to any such proposal or plan. I didn't know how Mitchell 
would turn it off, but knowing John Mitchell, I knew he would not blast Liddy 


out of the room, rather would subtly tell him that this was not what he had in 
mind. In fact, the meeting terminated with Mitchell telling Liddy that this is 
not what he had in mind, that it was a little exhorbitant, and more extensive 
than anything that would be needed. Liddy i*aid that he understood and would 
provide another plan. 

After the meeting, I talked with both Mitchell and Haldeman and Magruder 
and informed them that such a plan was disaster. I advised Jeb that he had 
better guide Liddy before the matter goes further. 

On January — , 1972, Jeb requested I attend another meeting with Mitchell and 
Liddy and himself. I had not at any time discussed this plan further with him, 
although I do recall him telling me that he was going to totally revi.>^e it. I 
arrived at this second meeting very late and Liddy was in the process of present- 
ing his revised plan. 

After sitting in the meeting for approximately 15 or so minutes and hearing 
the same sort of things starting to come out again, as have been contained in the 
earlier plan, I could see that Mitchell was very upset, but trying to maintain his 
composure. I must also say that I was frankly quite upset and decided that I had 
best interject myself into the matter in an effort to cut it off from any further 
discussion. I told Liddy and the others that the things that were being discussed 
here could not be discussed with a man who is the Attorney General of the 
United States and if there was going to be any intelligence operation, it would 
have to be taken up at another time. I felt that I got Mitchell off the .spot without 
embarrassing Liddy who agreed that this would be disciLssed sometime after 
Mitchell had come over to the Re-Election Committee. Again, I felt sorry for 
Liddy, and I felt no one had given him any guidance as to what was or was not 
expected of him, but I did not believe it was my role to get any further involved 
other than to attempt to stop what it saw developing. 

After the meeting, I informed Liddy that I could never discuss his intelligence 
operation with him further, and that he .should not look for me for any guidance 
on the matter. I informed him that our dealings would have to be limited .strictly 
to matters of election law and Liddy said he would honor that request. I never 
discussed the subject with Gordon Liddy again. 

Also, after that meeting. I informed Haldeman of what had transpired in 
Mitchell's office and the fact that I had interjected myself into the meeting in an 
effort to cut it oft'. I told Haldeman that I bad informed Liddy that I would not 
discuss this subject with him further, and that if anything like this was develop- 
ing in the White House, I had to stay totally out of it. Haldeman fully agreed 
and told me that I should not become involved in any way with the Re-Election 
Committee intelligence operation and I never did. 

I never received any intelligence from the Re-Election Committee and I cannot 
recall ever providing the government intelligence regarding demonstrations to 
the Re-Election Committee, rather, I provided all such information directly to 
Haldeman via Strachan. I have no knowledge before the incident which occurred 
on June 17th, as to what was or was not done regarding Liddy's intelligence 
gathering functions. And I never discussed this subject vnth any other person 
at the Re-E'ection Committee before June 17th. 

POST June 17th 

(1) The Dean Investigation 

I landed in San Francisco on June 18th, having been out of the country to 
give a speech on drug law enforcement. I called Fred Fielding of my office to 
check in and he informed me of the news story regarding the break in at the 
DXC headquarters. 

I arrived in Washington, D. C. late in the afternoon of June 18th and Fielding 
informed me that one of the men arrested had a letter with a check signed by 
Howard Hunt in his possession. I realized at that point that I would be asked 
to assemble all of the facts so that the White House could be fully informed as 
to what had transpired and how it might affect the President. Having been on 
an airplane for approximately 25 hours, I did nothing further than evening. 

On Monday morning, after reading all the news accounts of the incident, I 
spoke with John E. who instructed me to get the facts together and report to 
him. I called the A.G. to ask him what facts he knew and he .said that both the 
metropolitan police and the FBI were investigating. He also told me that Gordon 
Liddy and Powell Moore had tracked him down on Sunday, June 18th, at Burning 
Tree CC and Liddv had .said he must talk with him about the man who had been 
arrested at the DXC. The A.G. said he refused to talk with Liddy about the 


I then called Liddy and requested he come to my office. When he came over I 
suggested we take a walk. I asked him what he knew about the incident which 
had occurred at the DNC and he told me that this was his operation that had 
gone bad. He told me that he had been pushed into doing it, when he did not 
want to do it. He said that they had been in the DXC before and the bug they 
had placed in the DXC was not transmitting properly, so they were seeking to 
correct it. He also said that they had observed what appeared to be stolen 
classified documents in the DXC and had been instructed to make copies of them. 

I asked Liddy if anyone at the White House was involved and he told me no. 
I did not ask him who pushed him to do this, but he intimated it was Magruder. 
I did not question him further about the incident. 

Liddy also expressed concern for those who had been apprehended and I told 
him there was nothing I could do. He said he understood. He told me that he 
deeply regretted that the matter had occurred and ho planned to remain totally 
silent. As we parted I rememl)er he said you can count on me to be a soldier. 
I told him that I was trying to ascertain the seriousness of the problem — in that 
it was obviously a political bomb shell — and that I would not have any further 
contact with him. He said lie understood and we parted. 

During the days and weeks that followed 1 discussed the incident with everyone 
who I thought might have any knowledge or involvement. Set forth below are the 
findings from these conversations. 

Chuck Colson 

Because of Colson's relationship with Hunt, I thought he may have either 
knowledge or involvement in the matter, but Colson assured and reassured me 
that he had no involvement whatsoever. 

Colson told me that he was aware of the fact that Hunt was working with 
Liddy. He said that in late January — early February (V), 1972, Hunt and Liddy 
came by his ofiice late one afternoon to visit him. He said that it was a casual 
"stop-by" type visit and during the course of their conversation Hunt and Liddy 
mentioned to Colson that they had an intelligence oi>eration plan, but they could 
not get anyone at CREP to focus on it and sign off. Colson says that they em- 
plored upon him to call CREP to see if he could get some action. Colson stated 
that he called Magruder and told Magruder that he did know what Hunt and 
Liddy had for a plan, but they should not be left hanging. Someone should focus 
on it and make a decision one way or the other. 

Colson told me that the only time he requested Hunt to do anything for him 
after that was during the ITT hearings, when he requested Hunt to go to Denver 
to intervie,w Dita Beard. Colson states that he wanted to know if Beard had 
really written the famous memo and decided to sent Hunt to find out. When Hunt 
was in X^^lson's office, Colson asked him how he was going to pay for the trip. 
Hunt then telephoned someone and said he needed $1,000 and solved the problem. 
Magruder has intimated to me that Colson had more involvement than Colson 
says. Magruder says that they let Liddy and Hunt proceed with their intelligence 
operation Magnider was concerned that Colson might try to take over 
the operation himself and they did not want Colson involved. However, ^lagruder 
feels that Colson was aware of everything Hunt and Liddy did and that Colson, 
in fact, gave Hunt assignments from time to time. Magruder says that the 
Brigham Young student — Gregory — was working for Hunt to get scheduling in- 
formation for Colson. Magruder says he had no use for such information, but 
Colson did. 

Magruder also says that he received more than one call from Colson telling 
him to approve the Himt and Liddy intelligence operation, and it was Colson 
who was pushing to get something done. Colson denies this. 

Colson received a letter from Howard Hunt on . (Attach- 
ment This letter would appear to indicate that Hunt is saying that 

Colson was not involved in the incident at the DXC headquarters. 

Colson received a telephone call from Howard Hunt on Dur- 
ing the course of that conversation Hunt states that Colson had nothing to do 
with the incident at the DXC headquarters. Colson recorded the conversation. 

(Attachment , ) 

Oolson has stated under oath on two occasions that he was not involved in 
the incident. These statements were contained in depositions — one for the federal 

grand jury investigation and the other (Attachment ) in connection 

with the civil lawsuit filed by the DNC. 



I found that B had absolutely no knowledge regarding the intelligence opera- 
tiuns at the CREP. Bud Krogh had discussed with E that he was recommending 
Liddy to serve as General Counsel at the CREP and the fact that Liddy might 
also be given responsibilities for intelligence regarding demonstrations that 
would affect the campaign. However, E had, to the best of my inquiries, no 
knowledge of anything Liddy was engaged in after his departure from the 
Domestic Council staff. I also found that E had only incidental dealings with 
Liddy while he was on the Domestic Counsel staff and knew of his work in the 
area of gun control, narcotics, and that he worked for David Young and Bud 
Krogh on the problem of leaks and matters relating to national security. 

E only recalls one occasion meeting with Howard Hunt, in connection with 
an interview Hunt had conducted with a former CIA operative and relating to 
a matter of national security. E was aware of the fact that Hunt had been 
l>laced on tlie White House stnff as a consultant. Colson had recommended re- 
taining Hunt in connection with the Pentagon Papers matter and E-^aceording 
to Colson — told Colson to place him on his (Colson's) staff. 

Bud Krogh 

Krogh has testified twice under oath regarding his relationship with Liddy and 
Hunt. Once before the federal grand jury investigating the incident at the DNC 

headquarters, and once at his confirmation hearings (Attachment ). 

My independent inquiry confirmed that Krogh had absolutely no knowledge 
regarding any activities of Hunt or Liddy once they departed from the White 
House. When Krogh recommended Liddy to me as a person who would make 
an excellent General Counsel and as a person who could assist the CREP in 
keeping abreast of the problems that demonstrations might cause, the campaign, 
he told me that Liddy has an outstanding legal mind. He cited several examples 
of legal briefs Liddy had prepared and told me that he was confident that Liddy 
could quickly and thoroughly grasp the campaign laws. 


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EXfflBIT No. 34-44 

- i am sunmiarizing in this memorandum the 
results of my separate investigation of the so- 
called Segretti case, particularly as it relates 
to members of the White House staff. 

I think this report is important at this 
time because of the increasing tendency in the 
public media 

to use the term Watergate as an umbrella covering 

a variety of unrelated campaign activities including activit 

participated in by members of the Administration and 

White House staff- B'ecause the Watergate involved 

proven criminal activity, irirztriitiB the word thus 

becomes a tool for establishing guilt by 

..©s^oc.iation.. This., technlg-ue. has beati. used with 

peurticular effect in connection- with the Segretti 


The fact is, of course, that neither 
Segretti nor his activities had any connection 
with the Watergate. This is a conclusion not 
.only of the FBI , but it appears to have been the 
conclusion- of the grand jury and the United States 
Attorney. It is also the clear conclusion which I 
have reached as the result of my own investigation. 

In view of the forthcoming hearings of the 
Ervin Committee with the attendant media coverage, 
I thought it appropriate to submit this separate 
report on the Segretti matter at this time. 


The only two members of the White House Staff who 
have had any contact with Donald Segretti since your 
Administration came into office are Dwight Chapin, former 
Deputy Assistant to the President and Gordon Strachan, 
former Staff Assistant. 

Both Chapin and Strachan had been close friends of 
•Segretti when all three were undergraduates at U.S.C. 
some twelve years ago, and all three were active in campus ; 
politics as members of a "reform" group. Their more 
recent contact with Segretti stemmed from their con- 
clusion, based primarily on Chapin 's experience in 
earlier campaigns, that in 1972 your candidacy would 
be" subject to the kind of political tricks, harassment 
and intelligence activities which seem to have been a 
part of the American political process for more than 
a century. (For example, history records that Abraham 
Lincoln's nomination in 1860 might not have been brought 
about except for the circulation of thousands of bogus 
tickets to the Convention Hall in Chicago, which enabled 
the Lincoln supporters to pack the galleries and stampfede 
the Convention with cries of "We want Abe.") More recently 
the most celebrated practitioner of these political tactics 
has been Dick Tuck, whoso clandestine activities plagued 
not only your campaigns but other Republican campaigns 
since 1960. The records filed with the office of the 


Coiaptroller General pursuant to the new campaign statutes 
reveal that Mr. Tuck was officially on the payroll of the 
McGovern campaign committee for at least part of the 
primary period during 1972. However, the activities 
for which he was paid have never surfaced. 

In any event, it was Mr. Tuck who inspired 
Chapin and Strachan to contact Mr. Segretti, and the 
narrative of their connection with him is as follows: 

1. Chapin and Strachan recall that during the period 
of May or June, 1971 they had had conversations 
in which they concluded that this time around it 
would be wise and proper for the Republican 
campaign organization to have a "Dick Tuck" of 
its own. At about this time, Strachan heard 
by mail or phone from Segretti that he had 
returned from Army service in Vietnam and was 
soon to return to civilian life. Segretti 
inquired of Strachan whether there might be an 
employment opportunity, for him in the Government 


or in the forthcoming political campaign. Strachan 
discussed this matter with Chapin and both agreed 
that Segretti, whom they knew to be imaginative 
and energetic from their days in college, would 
be an ideal candidate for the role they had in 

2. Shortly thereafter, Chapin telephoned Segretti 
and suggested he meet with Chapin and Strachan 
in Washington. They did meet in Washington in 
late June or early July, 1971, and Chapin and 
Strachan discussed with Segretti the kind of role 
they had in mind. They made reference to Dick 
Tuck and cited the kind of harassment of the 
campaign activities of opposition candidates 
which Tuck has engaged in over the years. At one 
point, Strachan described the type of activity as 
"black advance", a term used in political campaigning 
to describe the planning of measures to harass the 
opposition or to detect and guard against harassment 
by the opposition. 

3. In this discussion and in at least one other sub- 
sequent discussion, Chapin and/or Strachan advised 
Segretti that once he undertook this employment 

he would travel about on his own and would make his 
own decisions as to the activities he. might engage in. 


It is my conclusion that this is the way 
Segretti did in fact operate, and neither 
Chapin or Strachan "directed" anything he may 
have undertaken or done. 

4. On this occasion, and on at least one other 
occasion, Chapin and Strachan reminded Segretti, . 

a lawyer, that he should not engage in any activity 
that could be considered illegal in any way. 

5. Segretti stated that he would think the matter 
over, and about two v/eeks later, he telephoned 
either Chapin or Strachan to say that he was 
interested in going ahead. At about this point 
in time, Strachan talked with W. and suggested 
that the Republicans would need a person v/ho 
could engage in covert activities and intelligence, 
and described the proposed role as a Republican 
Dick Tuck. Strachan stated that he and Chapin 

had a qualified candidate for the assignment, an 
old 6ollege friend who had engaged in campus 
politics with them at U.S.C. W. agreed with the 
proposal and told Strachan that he and Chapin 
should go ahead and implement it. W. was not given 
the name or identity of Segretti, never met or 
communicated with Segretti or received any reports 
from that point on. 


Strachan told Chapin that their proposal had 
received a go-ahead from W. 
6. At about this time, Herbert Kalmbach met with 
Strachan/ and Strachan advised him of the plan 
to hire a young lawyer. Strachan did not describe 
the proposed duties except to indicate there would 
be considerable travel involved. Strachan and 
Kalmbach concluded that an appropriate salary for 
a lawyer of this age and experience would be at 
a rate of $16,000 per year. 

Shortly thereafter, Chapin telephoned Kalmbach, 
who had returned to California, gave Kalmbach 
Segretti's name and phone number, and requested 
Kalmbach to work out the arrangements for compen- 
sation. Chapin did not know what those arrangements 
would be, Kalmbach did telephone Segretti who 
came to Kalmbach 's office in Newport Beach. They 
agreed on $16,000 plus expenses. 

7. Kalmbach states that he made several payments to 

Segretti, most of them in cash, that these payments 
were made during the period from September, 1971 to 
March, 1972 and the total amount representing both 


salary and expenses was between thirty and 

forty thousand dollars. Kalmbach states that 

the source of these funds was contributions 

received prior to the enactment of the election 

law which became effective April 7, 1972. Kalmbach 

has stated that he recalls meeting Segretti in 

person only twice. 

8. Shortly thereafter, Chapin was in California 

and met Segretti for lunch. Segretti asked 

how he should get started, and Chapin suggested 

of the subject 
that "to get a feel"/ he visit primary states 

and learn what he could about the political 

process and about the campaign activities of 

the primary candidates. Chapin then recited 

to Segretti the list of primary states and 

there was a general discussion of political 


Shortly thereafter, Segretti began his travels 
which continued through June of .1972. During 
that ten or eleven month period, Chapin saw him 
in person two times in Washington and once in 
Portland, Oregon. The Oregon meeting had been 
suggested by Chapin because the President was 
making a visit to Portland, and it was expected 


that there would be hostile demonstrations, and 
there were. It was Chapin's view that it would 
be helpful for Segretti to see first hand how 
advance plans are implemented and how logistic 
and crowd problems are handled. 

As to other communication with Segretti, Chapin has 
stated that he heard from him not more than every 
two or three weeks, usually a note or an envelope 
containing a clipping referring, to some humorous 
campaign incident. There was an occasional phone 
call, but more often than not, Chapin was out 
of his office or tv;oo busy to take it. 
It was in the fall of 1971 when the President 
designated Chapin to be in charge of the arrangements 
for the President's visit to the Peoples Republic 
of China, and to head the team which would make two 
advance trips there and later accompany the Presidertt. 
In order to prepare for the trips, Chapin moved 
into an office in the air raid shelter in the sub- 
basement and was relieved of other duties. His 

three trips to China took place 

and , • 

Upon the completion of the Presidential trip to 
- Pekin, the President designated Chapin to perforin 

5-296 O - 73 - 26 


the same function in connection with the 
President's trip to Moscow, Iran and Poland, with 
a stop-over in Austria. Making these plans became 
a time consuming occupation. He led an advance 

trip and accompanied 

the President May to May ^ . 

Chapin states that during most of the active 
primary season in the first half of 1972 he was 
either out of the country, or far too occupied 
to be able to direct of have meaningful communication 
with Segretti, even if he desired to do so, which 
he did not. 

11, During these same ten or eleven months, Mr. Strachan 
was almost totally out of touch with Segretti. 
During 1972, he recalls no communication at all 
until after June 17 when Segretti telephoned Strachan 
to tell him that he had had a request from the FBI 
for an interview, 

12. Following that phone call, Segretti came to 
Washington and met with Strachan and me. I advised 
Segretti to return to California, contact the FBI, 
and arrange to be interviewed by them. This was 
the first time I had ever seen Segretti, and I was 


unaware of his existence until Strachan advised 
me of his phone' call and of his desire to meet 
with me. 

In August, just before the Republican National 
Convention at Miami Beach, I received a phone 
call from Segretti who advised me that he had nov/ 
been subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury 
which was investigating the Watergate case. At 
his request, I met with him very briefly and 
advised him that he should answer all questions 
asked by the grand jury, and answer them truthfully, 
I never showed him any FBI reports or any other 
documents . 

13. FBI reports which had been furnished to me never 
were. out of my custody, so I can also state that 
none was shown to Segretti by any other member of 
the White House staff. 



1, Neither Segretti nor any of the activities 
he is alleged to have engaged in had any 
connection with the Watergate case. 

2, Neither Chapin nor Strachan engaged in any 
illegal activity. 

3. Chapin and Strachan were responsible for 
the hiring of Segretti and they arranged 
for him to receive a salary and expense 

4. Neither Chapin nor Strachan "directed" 
Segretti 's activities, and their information 
as to what his actual activities were, was 
fragmentary and infrequent. In the initial 
phase, however, they provided him guidance as 
to the kind of activity he might engage in, 
namely, the type of harassment of rival candidates 
which, for better or worse, has long been a part 
of the TVraerican political cEimpaigns and which is 
exemplified by the type of activity conducted 
against Republican candidates by persons like Dick Tu>. 


>. Chapin gave Segretti suggestions and guidance 

as to what states he should visit and specifically 
urged him to visit New Hampshire, Florida and 

>. Chapin and/or Strachan did say to Segretti that 

one objective of his activity should be to create 
such confusion among the primary candidates that 
it would be difficult for the Democratic Party 
to come back together after the Convention. 

7. In their original discussions Chapin and Strachan 
suggested to Segretti it would sometimes be ad- 
visable to recruit local assistance, either on 
volunteer or paid basis. If Segretti did recruit 
any persons to assist him, this was not reported 
by Segretti to either Chapin or Strachen. 

8. There is no evidence that the so-called Canuck 
letter about Senator Muskie was inspired directly 
or indirectly by Segretti. Contrary to the report 
in the Washington Post, Deputy Press Secretary Ken 
Clawson had no connection whatever with the letter 
and no advance knowledge of it. 


9. Kalmbach had no connection with Segretti 

or his activities other than to make the payments 
to Segretti which he described in his statements • 
to the FBI. 

10. W. gave his approval in principle to the 
proposition that the Republican side should have 
a "Dick Tuck" of its own, but he did not know 
who that person v;as to be, and had no knowledge 
of his subsequent activities. 

11. Beginning in early 1972, Segretti had contact 
with E. Howard Hunt and may have had some relation- 
ship with him in Segretti 's activities in the 
field. This contact with Hunt had nothing whatever 
to do with the fact that Hunt was separately involved 
in the burglary and wiretapping at the Watergate. 
Neither Chapin nor Strachan had any contact with 
Hunt at any time. 

12. The concern of Chapin and Strachan that hostile 
activities would be conducted against the President 
in his campaign appearances proved to be well 
founded. In every campaign stop, Mr. Nixon was 
confronted with organized hecklers, hostile or obscene 


signs, and consistent attempts to drown out 
his voice so that his audience could not hear 
him. In San Francisco, his appearance was 
greeted by organized violence which caused 
extensive damage in and around the hotel where 
the President was speaking. And, at the 
Republican Convention, the unlawful disturbances 
in the streets of Miami Beach were serious and 
highly organized. 


Exhibit No. 34-45 


Re: Meeting with John Mitchell 

Wasliington, D, C. Law Office 
Time: 1:00 - 2:20 PM • 
April 10, 1973 

Mitchell had called the day before requesting that I meet with 
him in Washington. E and II both told me I should meet with him 
to tell him that I would be going before the grand jury. Accordingly, 
I ag-reed to the meeting, after having so advised my counsel. 

The meeting began at approximately 1:00 PM and after an 
exchange of pleasantries about N. Y. vs. Washington weather, I told 
Mitchell that I thought it would be inappropriate to discuss testimony 
as it might relate to my appearance before the grand jury. 

I told him that I was aware of the fact that he hoped that I 
would not appear before tlic grand jury, but my options were limited. 

I then told hiin my potential options. 

___ Take tlic 5th Amendment. I told him I thought this wovild 
not only hurt ine personally, but that it would also hurt the President. 
I also said that the government would undoubtedly ii-ximunize me 
and force my testimony. 

-- I told him that I had fully explored the lawyer-client 
privilege and that it just would not hold water. In fact, I thought 
it would create niore problems tlian it might resolve. Also, I said 
that Sirica lias already rejected it in this case twice and would 
undoubtedly do it again should I invoke it. 

-- I told him that executive privilege could only be invoked by 
the President and he had already announced that he would not invoke 
it with regard to White House staff appearing before the grand jury. 
Mitchell suggested that I involve it myself and refuse to testify. I 
told him that such action would put me in contempt of court, and I 
preferred the basement of the Senate (with bean soup) to the D. C. 
jail. Mitchell seemed to express some hope tlvat the President might 
invoke executi\c privilege on inc alone -- to be consistent with liis 
position on me vis-a-vis the Congress. 


-- I told him llic present thinking at the White House was that 
I should testify before the grand jury. I said I appreciate that my 
testimony could cause hiin problems, and because of my personal 
feeling toward him 1 found this a dreaded situation. 

Mitchell asked mo to review once again the seqvience of meetings 
in his Department of Justice office in January and Febrilary, which I . 
did. He indicated lliat tliere may have been discussion at those meetings 
of election laws. I did not respond. 

.Mitchell also asked me what I would say about the post June 17th 
activities and I related two matters to him, i. e. , the fact that he 
requested me to arrange with E and H to use Kalmbach and his 
several requests that I liavc H authorize the use of the $350,000. 
He made no comment on this at all. 

I also expressed to Mitchell that I felt this entire matter was 
most damaging to the P and that it had to end. I told him that it was 
personally ruining iny ov/n life, and I was somewhat unhappy being 
in the middle of something I had tried to prevent from occurring in 
the first instance. I told him that I thought the truth was going to 
emerge and I personally was not concerned about the truth. I also 
told hiin that I !iad learned that Liddy had had soine limited off-the- 
record conversations v.dth the U. S. Attorney's office, but I did not 
know the substance of the conversations. 

I told Mitchell that I hope that my testimony would not start 
some sort of "pissing match" between foriner conamittee people and 
the White House -- or within the White House. I explained that I 
have always been the man in tlie middle of tliis nightinare, and that 
I meant no harm to anyone, but I had to start protecting myself. 
I told him I only know wiiat I laiow, and even to this day I don't know 
how or why the Watergate incident occurred. I reminded him that 
I have never asked he or Jcb -- flat out --to explain their involvement. 
I told liim I did not want to know even now. 

I told him that I had been selfless in my trying to assist with 
this matter during the campaign, but I now had to protect myself 
froin becoming everybody's scapegoat for things I was not responsible 
for. Mitchell agreed that I had been selfless and sliould not have to 
suffer for others. 


Mitchell indicated that he had met with Magruder earlier that 
day and Magruder was going to take the same position he had taken 
all along. Mitchell said that one of the things that Magruder had 
mentioned to him was that Liddy had told Magruder that I advised 
Liddy that he was to have a $1 million budget. I told Mitchell that 
I could not recall ever having told Liddy what his budget would be 
and If Liddy in fact said or believed that, he had a totally false 
impression or recollection. 

Mitchell also told me he planned to "stone wall" the charges 
against him, Mitchell asked me if I would advise him of my testimcrv 
after I might appear before the grand jury. I told him I did not kno".".' 
if rule 6E restricted this, but I told hina I would raise it with my 
lawyers. At this time, and for the first I think anyone has suggested 
it, I told him that he should have a lawyer and our lawyers coulH tail-: 
about such matters. I got no reaction from Mitchell on this suggestlca. 

I also at one point in the meeting told Mitchell that I could 
always take the "chicken- shit" route and disappear. I said if I 
weren't around to testify, I v/ouldn't cause anyone any problems. 
Mitchell said "tell nie where yovi are planning on going" as he might 
like to join me. I told him I wouldn't go withovit my wife, and he 
laughed at that -- (implication being that life with Martha is difficult'-. 

Mitchell during the meeting sought to impress upon me that 
my testimony might be very embarrassing to the President and for 
that reason I might reconsider any appearance at all. I told him I 
thought the people at the White House were fully aware of the 
implications of my testimony. 

The meeting ended when he received a phone call. 

I feel that he was left with the impression that I would be 
testifying, although the options of my not appearing were still 
vmder consideration -- but not much consideration. 


Exhibit No. 34-46 


Meeting with Fred LaRue 
Friday, April 13, 1973 
3:30 - 3:45 PM EOB 106 

Fred LaRue called this AM to request a meeting- with me. After 
consulting with counsel, I agreed to see him. 

LaR\ie advised me that he expected to be called before the grand 
jury and w^as aware of the fact (presumably via O'Brien) that I also 
would be called shortly. LaRue wanted to know what I was going 
to say about Kalmbach and the $350, 000.' 

I advised him that I v/as certain I would be asked by the grand jury 
who I had talked with recently about these matters and therefore 
I did not wish to discuss my testimony -- other than to say that 
I was going to answer all questions asked me to the best of my 

LaRue said he was very concerned about this whole matter and the 
affecfit w^a^ having on'the President. He said he was prepared to 
tell the grand jury what he knew, but he honestly couldn't remember • 
how he first became involved, or what all he had done. He said he 
didn't. want to cause O'Brien or Parkinson any problems. 

He asked me if I had made any decisions on money, and I^told him 
no I had not, I merely passed messages along. He said that he had 
assumed that to be the case and asked how I was going to handle that. 
I told him again that I was going to withhold nothing from the grand 
jury and if asked I would respond. 

I asked him what Mitchell was going to do and he said Mitchell told 
him he was going to fight it out. He said that he was extremely close 
to and fond of Mitchell, but a lot 'of innocent people were getting hurt 
because of Mitchell (inference to protect Mitchell). He said that 
Magruder was really in a bad way Ijecause of his loyalty to Mitchell. 

LaRue said he needed some legal advice, as to whether he had been 
involved in an obstruction of justice. I told him that he should get a 
lawyer, because I did not have any first haftd knowledge of the full 
extent of his activities, but that the federal statutes were very broad 
with regard to what could be considered obstruction. 


Exhibit No. 34-47 

%.^ ^^^,- 

la (iu^_. 

y_ ^ j_ o'/i?/^. 


^S-?/ .s-///£) 

,_.?/JF*3 5-/ if 5- 

Exhibit No. 34-48 
Message to the P 

Sun April IStli 

To Higby from H— to P 
also inform E 

(1) I hope you understand that my actions are motivated by total loyalty to 
you & the I're.sideiicy. If that is not clear now, I believe it will become clear. 

(2) E has re<iuested to meet with me tonite, but I believe it is inappropriate 
for me to meet with him at this time. 

(3) I am ready & willing to meet with you at any time to discuss the matter. 

(4) You should take your counsel from Henry Petersen who I assure you 
doesn't want the Presidency hurt. 

Note. — This Is printed from handwritten notes which were not legible enough for 
photographing. The original copy is retained in committee files. 



Exhibit No. 34-49 


April 16, 1973 

Dear Mr. President: 

As a result of my involvement in the Watergate 
matter, which we discussed last night and today, 
I tender to you my resignation effective at once. 


The President 
The White House 
Washington, D. C. 



April 16, 1973 

Dear Mr. President: 

In view of iny increasing involvement in the Watergate 
matter, my impending appearance before the grand 
jury and the probability of its action, I request an 
immediate and indefinite leave of absence from my 
position on your staff. 


The President 
The White House 
Washington, D. C. 


Exhibit No. 34-50 


April 16, 1973 

Dear Mr. President: 

You informed me that Bob Haldeman and 
John Ehrlichman have verbally tendered their 
requests to be given an imrrtediate and indefinite 
leave of absence from your staff. By this letter 
I also wish to confirm my similar request that I 
be given such a leave of absence fromi the staff. 


John W. Dean, lU 
Counsel to the President 

Honorable Richard Nixon 

The President of the United States 

The White House 

Washington, D. C. 20500 

Exhibit No. 34-51 

Draft Stateme nt 

As a result of information broguth to the attention of my 
staff in the past few days, I requested this past weekend that 
Attorney General Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General 
Petersen inform me of the grand jury's progress in its investigation 
of the facts surrounding the Watergate break-in and other matters. 
As a result of my meetings, I have taken several steps to insure . 
that all the facts are fully developed. 

(1) I have directed that Assistant Attorney General Henry 
Petersen, a man who has served in the Department of Justice 
through several Administrations, take full and personal charge of 
all aspects of the Department of Justice's role in the matter. 

(2) I have personally instructed Mr. Petersen that the 
investigation is to leave no stone unturned. 

(3) I have today received requests from Mr. H. R. Haldeman, 
Mr.- John Ehrlichman and Mr. John Dean to be placed on an 
immediate leave of absence. This action results from discussions 

I have had with these men over this past weekend (April 14, 15, 1973) 
and today (yesterday). 

In accepting their reouests I strongly caution against public 
speculation. I will not comment on this action at this time, and I 
have instructed others who are aware of my decision not to comnient 
on the matter. I do want it to be known, however, that this action 
should not -- and cannot --be construed as impugning misfeasance 
or malfeasance on any man, rather each man has requested the 

96-296 O - 73 - 27 


action as a result of the discussion I have had with him. 

(Alternate Paragraph (3)) 

I have advised all members of the White House staff who will 
be called before the grand jury that, effective immediately, they 
will be on administrative leave until such time as the grand jury 
completes its inquiry. In this connection, I have not even spared 
from this decision my closest staff advisers and included in this 
action are H. R. Haldcman, Assistant to the President, John 
Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, 
and John Dean, Counsel to the President. I want to caution that 
this action should not -- and cannot -- be construed as impugning 
wrongdoing on the part of any individual and to speculate otherwise 
is unfounded and unfair. 

I have repeatedly stated that the grand jury is the appropriate 
forunn for the development of these facts and I again want to assure 
the American people of my continued full cooperation in resolving 
this matter. There have been many unanswered questions relating 
to this matter, and I am going to inake certain that all these 
unanswered questions are fully answered. 


Exhibit No. 35 

,j. . '' TOP SECRl'^T 


B. Electronic Surveillances and Pcnctrntions. (pp. 26-Z8) 


Pr'r^sent procedures should be changed to permit 
intensification of coverage of individuals and 
groups in the United States who pose a major 
threat to the internal security. 


At tlie present time, less than 65 electronic 
penetrations arc operative. This includes 
coverage of the CPUSA and organized crime 
targcLs, with only a fevv' autliorized against 
subjects of pressi!ig internal security interest. 




Mr. Hoover's statement that the FBI would not oppose 
other agencies seeking approval for and operating 
electronic surveillances is gratutious since no other 
agencies have the capability. 

Everyone knovvledgable in the field, with the exception 
of Mr. Hoover, concurs that existing coverage is grossly 

C^ Mail Coverage (pp. . 29-31) 


Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed. 


There is no valid argument against use of legal mail 
covers except Mr. Hoover's concern that the civil 
liberties people may become upset. This risk is surely 
an acceptable one and hardly serious enough to justify 
denying ourselves a valuable and legal intelligence tool. 

Covert coverage is illegal and there arc serious risks 
involved. However, the advantages to be derived from 
its use outweigh the risks. Tliis technique is particular! 
valuable in identifying espionage agents and other contact 
of foreign intelligence services. 

D. Surreptitious Entry (pp. 32-33) 

ALSO, present restrictions sliould be modified to permit 

selective use of this technique against other urgent and 

high priority internal security targets. cil^l-Tt. 





Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it amounts 
to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result 
in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it ' 

is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the | 

type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any ,' 
other fashion. 

The FBI, in ■fcis9 Mr. Hoover's younger days, used to 
conduct such operations with great success and with 
no exposure. The information secured was invaluable. 

Surreptitious entry of facilities occupied by jiubversive 
elements can turn up information about identities, 
methods of operation, and other invaluable investigative 
information which is not otherwise obtainable. This 
technique would be particularly helpful if used against 
the Weathermen and Black Panthers. 

E. Development cf Campus Sources (pp. 34-36) 

Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded 

coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related 

ALSO, CIA coverage of American students (and others)^(*^lV .flj, 
traveling or living abroad should be increased. a^^'' 

-T-OTa CTT r-T> VT r,K ^^ ^ 




The FBI does not currently recruit any campus sources 
among individuals below 21 years of age. This dramatically 
reduces tlie pool from which sources inay be drawn. Mr. Hoover 
is afraid of a young student surfacing in the press as an FBI 
source, altliough the reaction in the past to such events has 
been minimal. After all, everyone assumes the FBI has 
such sources. 

The campus is the battle-ground of the revolutionary 
protest movement. It is impossible to gatlier effective 
intelligence about the movement unless we have campus 
sources. The risk of exposure is minimal, and where 
exposure occurs the adverse publicity is moderate and 
short-lived. It is a price we must be willing to pay for 
effective coverage of the campus scene. The intelligence 
comn-iunity, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, feels 
strongly tliat it is imperative the we increase the number 
of campus sources this fall in order to forestall widesp'^ead 

CIA claims there are no existing restraintc on its coverage 
of over-seas activities of US nationals. However, this 
coverage has been grossly inadequate since 1965 and an 
explicit directive to increase coverage is required. 

F. Use of Military Undercover Agents (pp. 37-39) 

Present restrictions should be retained. 


yhe intelligence community is agreed that the risks 
of lifting these restraints arc greater than the value 
of any possible intelligence which could be acquired 
by doing so. 





(pp. 40-41) 

Recommendation ; 

Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to 
projected manpower needs and other costs in the event 
the various investigative restraints herein are lifted. 


In the event that the above recommendations are concurred 
in, it will be necessary to modify existing budgets to provide 
tlie money and manpower necessary for their implementation. 
The intelligence community has been badly hit in the budget 
squeeze (I suspect the foreign intelligence operations are in 
tlic same shape) and it may fcs. will be necessary to make 
some modifications. The projected figures should be 
reasonable, but will be subject to individual review if this 
reconimcndation is accepted. 

(pp. 42-43) 

Recommendation : 

A perrrianent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, 
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should 
be appointed to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, 
prepare periodic doinestic intelligence estimates, and catty 
out the otlier objectives specified in the report. 


The need for increased coordination, joint estimates, and 
responsiveness to the White Hqusc is obvious to the 
intelligence community. There are a number of operational 
problcins wliich need to be \\orked out since Mr. Hoover is 
fearful of any mechanism which might jeopardize his autonomy. 
CIA wo'.ild prefer an ad hoc conimittce to see how the system 
works, but other members believe that this wovild inerely delay 
the establishment of effective coordination and joint operations. 
The value of lifting intelligence collection restraints is 
proportional to tlie availability of joint operations and evaluation, 
and the establisluncnt of this inter-agency group is considered 
imperative. y//5/73 



Exhibit No. 36 

July 14, 1970 



SUBJECT: Domcctic Intellic?ence Review 

The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the review 
have been approved by the Procident. 

He doc3 not, however, v/anL to follow the procedure you outlined 
on page 4 of your meinorandum regarding implonentation. He 
v/ould prefer that tlie thing 3in"!ply be put into motion on the 
basis of tJiis approval. 

The formal official memorandum should, of course, bo prepared 
and that should be the device by which to carry it out. 

I realize this is contrary to your feeling as to tlie best v/ay to get 
this done. If you feel very strongly that this procedure v/on't work 
you had better let me knov/ and we'll take another stab at it. ■ 
Otherwise let's go ahead. 



Exhibit No. 37 


August 5, X970 






In anticipation of your meeting with Mr. Hoover and the 
Attorney General, I would like to pass on these thoughts: 

1. More than the FBI is involved in this operation. NSA, 
DIA, CIA, and the military services all have a great stake and a 
great interest. All of these agencies supported the options 
selected by the President. For your private inforination, so did 
all the members of Mr. Hoover's staff who worked on the report 
(he'd fire them if he knew this. ) 





3i We are not getting the type of hard intelligence v/c need 
at the White House. We will not get it until greater effort is made 
through coiTii-nunity-wide coordination to dig out the information 
by using all the resources potentially available. It is, of course, 
a matter of balancing the obvious risks against the desired 
rosvilts. I thought we balanced these risks rather objectively 
in the report, and Hoover is escalating the risks in order to 
cloak his dctennination to continue to do business as usual. 

4. At some point, Hoover has to be told who is President. 
He has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental 
to oui' domestic intellig-ence operations. In the past two v/eek$, 
he has terminated all FBI liaison with NSA, DIA, the military 
services. Secret Service -- everyone except the White House. He 
terminated liaison with CIA in May. This is bound to have a 
crippling effect upon the entire comniunity and is contrary to 

his public assurance to. the President at the meeting that there 
>was close and effective coordination an,d cooperation within the 
intelligence community. It is important to remember that the 
entire intelligence commvuiity knows that the President made a 
positive decision to go ahead arid Hoover has now succeeded in 
forcing a review. If he gets his way it is going to look like he 
is more powerful than the President. He had his say in the 
footnotes and RN decided against him. That should close the 
matter and I can't understand why the AG is a party to reopening it. 
All of us are going to look damn silly in the eyes of Helnis, Gayler, 
Bennett, and the military chiefs if Hoover can unilaterally reverse 
a Presidential decision based on a report that many people worked 
their asses off to prepare and which, on its merits, was a first- 
rate, objective job. 

5. The biggest risk we could take, in iT»y opinion, is to continue 
to regard the violence on the cainpus and in the cities as .^ temporary 
phenomenon which will siiTiply go away as soon as the Scranton 
Commission files its report. The "one statement that Rennic Davis 
made at HEW which I thought made sense was that the Attorney 






Gcncral was kidding hiinsclf when ho said the campuses would be 
quiet this fall. Davis predicted that at least 30 would be closed 
d6wn in September. I don't like to make predictions, but I am 
not at all convinced, on the basis of the intelligence I have seen, 
that we are anyway near over the hump on this problem, and I 
, am convinced that the potential for even greater violence is 
present, and we have a positive obligation to take every step 
within our power to prevent it, 

6. Hoover can be expected to raise the following points 
in your meeting: 

(a) *'Our present efforts are adequate." The answer 
is bullshit I, This is particularly true with regard to FBI campus 

(b) "The risks are too great; these folks are going to 
get the President into trouble and RN had better listen to mc." 
The answer is that we have considered the risks, we believe they 
are acceptable and justified under the circumstances. We are 
willing to weigh each exceptionally sensitive operation on its 
merits, but the Director of the FBI is paid to take risks where 
the security of the country is at stake. Nothing we propose to 

do has not been done in the past -- and in the past it was always 
done successfully. 

(c) "I don't have the personnel to do the job the 
President wants done." The answer is (1) he has the people and/or 
(Z) he can get them. 

(d) "I don't object to NSA conducting surreptitious entry 
if they want. to. " The answer is that NSA doesn't have the people, 
can't get them, has no authority to get them, and shouldn't have 

to get them. It is an FBI job. 





• 4- 

(c) "If we do IhcEC things the 'jackels of the press' and the 
ACLU will find out; wc can't avoid leaks." Answer: We can avoid 
leaks by using trained, trusted agents and restricting knowledge of 
sensitive operations on a strict need to know basis. We do this 
on. other sensitive operations every day. 

(f) "If I have to do these things, the Attorney General 
will have to approve them in writing. " This is up to the AG, but 

I would tell Hoover that he h?s been instructed to do them by 
the President and he is to do them on that authority. He needn't 
look for a scape goat. He has his authority from the President 
and he doesn't need a written memo from the AG. To maintain 
security, wc should avoid written communications in this area, 

(g) "We don't need an Inter-Agency ComiTiittcc on 
Intelligence Operations because (1) we're doing fine right now -- 
good coordination, etc. -- and (2) there are other existing group* 
which can handle this assignment. " The answer is that we are 
doing lousy right now and there aren't other groups which can 

do the job wc have in rnind because: (1) they don't meet; (2) they 
don't have the people on them we want or have some people we 
don't want; (3) they don't have the author ity to do what we want 
done; (4) ultimately this new operation will replace them; and 
(5) 'they aren't linked to the White House staff. 

There are doubtless another dozen or so specious arguments 
that Hoover \vill raise, but they will be of similar qviality. I hope 
that you will be able to convince the AG of the iinportance and 
necessity of getting Hoover to go along. Wc have worked for 
nearly a year to reach lliis point; otlicrs have worl^cd far longer 
and had abandoned hope. I believe we are talking about the future 
of this country, for surely domestic violence and disorder 
tlirc.iten the very fabric of our society. Intelligence is not the 
cure, but it can provide the diagnosis that makes a cure possible. 
Moro importantly, it can provide us with tho means to prevent the 





deterioration of the situation. Perhaps lowered voices and peace 
in VietnajTi will defuse the tense situation we face, but I wouldn't 
^ant to rely on it exclusively. 

There is this final point. For eighteen months we have 
watched people in this governnnent ignore the President's orders, 
take actions to embarrass him, promote thennsclves at his 
expense, and generally make his job more difficult. It makes 
me fighting mad, and what Hoover is doing here is putting 
himself above the President. If he thought the Attorney General's 
advice should be solicited, he should have done so before the 
report was sent to the President. After all. Hoover was chaiiman 
of tlie committee and ho could have asked the AG for his comments. 
Bv»t no, he didn't do so for it never occurred to him that the 
President would not agree with his footnoted objections. He 
thought all he had to do was put in a footnote and the jriattcr was 
settled. He had absolutely no interest in the views of NSA, 
CIA, DIA, and the military services, _ and obviously he has 
little interest in our views, or apparently even in the decisions 
of the President. I don't see how we can tolerate this, but 
being a fatalist, if not a realist, I am prepared to accept the 
fact .that we may have to do so. 






Exhibit No. 38 



August 7, 1970 



Mr. Hoover has departed for the West Coast where he plans to vacation 
for three weeks. If you wait until his return to clear up the prohlems 
surrourtding our Domestic Intelligence operations, we will be into the new 
school year without any preparation. 

The situation in Portland is beginning to look very tense — the American 
Legion Convention could become the first battleground for a new wave of youthful 
violence. Coming just as the school year begins, it could serve as a catalyst 
for widespread campus disorders. 

I recommend that you meet with the Attorney General and secure his support 
for the President's decisions, that the Director be informed that the decisions 
will stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to implement them 
at once. 





ExmsiT No. 39 




August 25, 1970 



On Monday, August 24, the Senate approved the budget for the SACB 
by a vote of 44 to 28. The principal objection -- as might be expected -- 
was that the Board has nothing to do to justify the $400, 000 a year 
budgeted. Among those supporting Senator Proxmire in this argument 
were John Williams, Peter Dominick, and Len Jordan -- conservatives 

In defending the appropriatioii. Senator McClellan for the majority 
and Senator Hruska for the minority argued that the Administration intends 
to make effective use of the Board. Senator McClellan was quite specific 
in his opinion that the current internal security threat requires prompt 
and effective action from the Administration. 

The appropriations measure should come down for the President's 
signature later this week. I believe that we should now proceed to fill 
the two vacancies on the Board and give serious consideration to the 
Executive Order expanding the powers of the Board. 

I have recommended to Harry Flemming that we reappoint John Mahan 
as Chairman and Otto Otepka as member of the Board. Mahan is under 
the patronage of Mike Mansfield whose support is crucial. Moreover, he 
is a competent enough fsllov/ -who is a team player and will cooperate with 
us completely. Otepka's reappointment strikes me as imperative. 

There is some question whether we should appoint a Republican as 
Board chairman. Normally, I would think so, but I believe the unique 
circumstances we face with this Board suggest otherwise. Otepka is too 
controversial to be chairman, Paul O'Neal is too impetuous, and John 
Patterson is too old. We can work well with Mahan and I see no reason 
for replacing him as chairman. The fact that he is a Democrat and close 
to Mansfield is a plus in my opinion. 


As soon as a decision is made on these nominations, I plan to mieet 
with John Ashbrook and Dick Ichord to discuss some of the legislative 
proposals pending before the House Internal Security Committee which 
pertain to the activities of the Board. Once we get a feel for what these 
people believe we should do, we will be in a position to re-evaluate the 
alternatives open to us. The point, however, which we need to keep in 
mind is that we cannot afford to let the Board sit idle or content itself 
with investigating old line Communist fronts which are largely irrelevant 
to our current problem. 

After the bombing at Madison, I suspect that the public is fully- 
prepared to accept the concept that the Federal Government ought to 
take an active interest in the activities of violent-action organizations, 
as we propose in. the Executive Order. 



Exhibit No. 40 


the white house 


September 10, 1970 


I understand that in the course of Peter Flanigan's meeting on steps 
to minimize the risk of future air hijackings the question of increased 
use of intelligence information arose and that the Bureau is to submit 
recommendations in this regard. 

It strikes me that this exercise will amount to nothing more than a 
retracing of the steps we took in June to no avail. This is but one more 
example of the crying need for inter-community coordination on a 
systematic and formal basis. In this area, for example, there are 
resources yet untapped, i. e. , Customs, the military services, etc. , 
which will remain untapped so long as Mr. Hoover runs a one-man 

I don't know the extent of Peter's experience in intelligence matters, 
but he should be aware that paper plans don't always translate into 
effective action. 

I might add that we haven't seen anything yet. If this incident in the 
Mideast poses problems, wait until some of our home-grown fedayeen 
decide to emulate their peers. 



96-296 O - 73 - 28 



The Aticrney G£ii£RAL 

Exhibit No. 41 

March 3, 1972 

To: John W. Dean, III 

The attached memorandum 
turned up in our housecleaning 
operation and is being returned to 
you for whatever disposition you 
wish to make of it. 


Sol Lindenbaum 




Septeaiber 18, 1970 



Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, September IT, 1970, I 
suggest the following procedures to commence our domestic 
intelligence operation as quickly as possible. 

1. Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit . A key to the 
entire operation will be the creation of a interagency intelligence 
^ unit for both operational and evaluation purposes. Obviously, 
t the selection of persons to this unit will be of vital importance 
to the success of the mission. As ve discussed, the selection 
of the personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step 
for several reasons. First, effective coordination of the 
different agencies must be developed at an e'arly stage through the 
establishment of the unit. Second, Hoover has indicated a strong ■ 
opposition to the creation of such a unit and, to bring the FBI 
fully on board, this seems an appropriate first step to guarantee 
their proper and full participation in the program. Third, the 
unit can serve to make appropriate recommendations for the type 
of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various 
agencies. In regard to this third point, I believe ve agreed 
that it vould be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of 
restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure vould be 
to decide on the type of intelligence ve need, based on an 
assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then to 
proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such 
intelligence . 

To proceed to create the interagency intelligence unit, 
parti cularl;/' the evaluation group or committee, I recommend that 
ve request the names of four nominees from each of the intelligence 
agencies involved. V/hile the precise composition of the unit 
may vary as ve gain experience, I think thatxtvo members should 
be appointed initially from each agency in addition to your 
personal representative vho should also be involved^n the 
proceedings. Because of the interagency aspects of this request, 
it vould probably be best if the request came from the White^ - 
House. If you agree, I vill make such a request of the agency ■ 


heads; however, I feel that it is essential that you work this 
out with Hoover before I have any .dealings with hira directly. 

2. Housing. Vfe discussed the appropriate housing of 
this operation and, upon reflection, I believe that rather 
than a White House staffer looking for suitable space , that 

a professional intelligence person should be assigned the task 
of locating such space. Accordingly, I would suggest that 
a request be made that Mr. Hoover assign an agent to this 
task. In connection with the housing problem, I think serious 
consideration must be given to the appropriate Justice Depart- 
meat cover for the domestic intelligence operation. We 
discussed yesterday using IDIU as a cover and as I indicated 
I believe that that is a most appropriate cover. I believe 
that it is generally felt that IDIU is already a far more ex- 
tensive intelligence operation than has' been mentioned publicly, 
and that the IDIU operation cover would eliminate the problem 
of discovering a new intelligence operation in the Department 
of Justice. However, I have reservations about the personnel 
in IDIU and its present operation activities and would suggest 
that they either be given a minor function within the new 
intelligence operation or that the staff be completely removed. 
I have had only Incidental dealings with the personnel, other 
than Jim Devine, and cannot speak to their discretion and 
loyalty for such an operation. I do not believe that Jim 
Devine is capable of any major position within the new 
intelligence operation. However, I do believe that he could 
help perpetuate the cover and he has evidenced a loyalty to ypu, 
the Deputy and other key people in the Department of Justice, 
despite his strong links with the prior Administration. I 
would defer to your judgement., of course, on any recommendation 
regarding Jim Devine' s continued presence in such an intelligence 

3. Assistant to Attorney General . We also discussed the 
need for you to have a right hand man to assist in running this 
operation. It would seem that what is needed is a man with 
administrative skills, a sensitivity to the implications of the 
current radical and subversive movements within the United 
States, and preferably, some background in intelligence work. 

•To maintain the cover, I would think it appropriate for the man 
to have a law degree in that he will be a part of the Department 
of Justice. You suggested the possibility of using a prosecutor 
who had had experience with cases of this type. Accordingly, I 
have spoken with Harlington Wood to ask him to submit the names 
of five Assistant U. S. Attorneys who have had experience in 
dealing with demonstrations or riot type cases and who are 
mature individuals that might be appropriately given a sensitive 



assignment in the Department of Justice. I did not discuss the 
matter in any further detail with Wood other than to request the 
submission of some nominees. I would also like to suggest that 
ve request names from the various intelligence agencies involved 
for personnel that might he appropriately involved in this activity 
or vho might serve as your assistant. 

In summary, I recommend the follovring immediate action: 

(1) You meet with Hoover, explain what must he done, and 
request his nominees for the interagency unit. 

(2) You request that Hoover assign an agent to the task 
of locating appropriate housing for the operations. • 

(3) I request that other involved intelligence agencies 
submit nominees for the interagency unit. 

(U) I request from the agencies names of appropriate 
personnel for assignment to the operation. 

Finally, I would suggest that you call weekly meetings to 
monitor- the problems as they emerge and to make certain that we 
are moving this program into implementation as quickly as possible 

N.B. Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that if you would like 

him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy 
to do so. 







September 21, 1970 

SUBJECT: IRS & Ideological Organizations 

I am. attaching a copy of a report from the IRS on the activities of its 
"Special Service Group" which is supposed to monitor the activities of 
ideological organizations [e.g., Jerry R^ibin Fund, Black Panthers, etc. ] 
and take appropriate action when violations of IRS regulations turn up. 
You will note that the report is long on words and short on substance. 

Nearly 18 months ago, the President indicated a desire for IRS to move 
against leftist organizations taking advantage of tax shelters. I have been 
pressing IRS since that time to no avail. 

What we cannot do in a courtroom via criminal prosecutions to curtail 
the activities of some of these groups, IRS could do by administrative action. 
Moreover, valuable intelligence-type information could be turned up by IRS 
as a result of their field audits. 





Co:aI-^ you r;lvo c. prcjii^occ rcpovt on r!ia o£ t'lc 
Complir.ncc; Divisions ia review ir.^ ?!;<', o;>ar^.iicr.n of icIcoloi'.Lcal 

clncc Jiilv I, 1.96';, wii5in \7o ni'ijt exp-oftss^ oai' lACcrcsi; lathla 
Tfianl; you. 



s::rpi 0^3/0 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Tom Charles Huston 
The IvThite House 

FROM: Commissioner of Internal Revenue 

In response to your memorandum dated August 14, 
1970, wo have prepared the attached status report 
on the Special Service Group. I would stress that > 
knowledge of the existence and operations of this 
Group should be carefully limited. 

/ fJ 

Ra^lidolph W. Tlirower 



S.uatu s Reoo rt On 
Special Service Grou p 

In August 1969 the Senate Conunittee on Government 
Operations held open hearings on several controversial 
organizations, including the Black Panther Party, Student 
Na-tional Coordinating Coniraittee, Republic of New Africa, 
and Students for Democratic Society. Information de- 
veloped during these hearings established that various 
organizations, categorized as extremists on the right or, 
left, presented problems to the Internal Revenue Service 
in that the organizations and individuals involved in the 
organizations wore not in compliance with Internal Revenue 
laws. Information developed in these hearings indicated • 
that extremist organizations were receiving financial 
support from various sources. Some of the individuals 
. involved in the forefront of these organizations filed 
tax returns reflecting very nominal income, or did not 
■file at all, although they.v/ere obviously expending sub- 
stantial amounts of funds. 

Recognizing the responsibilities of the Internal 
Revenue Service to administer taxing statutes without 
regard to. the social or political objectives of indivi- 
duals or organizations, a decision v/as made rto establish 


a method of accumulating and disseminating inf onnatiozi on 
all activist groups to insure that the oi-ganizations and 
the leaders of the organif'.ations are complying with 
Internal Revenue laws. 

In the National Office of the Internal Revenue Service, 
functioning under the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance), 
a special compliance group was established to receive and 
analyze all available information on organizations and 
individuals promoting extremist views and philosophies. 
Tha identification of organizations and individuals included 
in the program is without regard to the philosophy of poli- 
tical posture involved; rather, it is directed to the 
notoriety of the individual or organization and the proba- 
bility of publicity that might result from their activities 
and the likelihood that this notoriety would lead to inquiries 
regarding their tax status. Another important consideration 
was the degree of probability that the individuals might 
be deliberately avoiding their tax responsibilities. 

The staff responsible for this activity V7as first 
designated as the Activist Organizations Group, but it 
recently was changed to "Special Service Group" to avoid any 
erroneous impression of its objectives. The function of tlie 


Special Service Group is to obtain, consolidate and dis- 
saminate any inf orraation on. individuals or organizations 
(including major financial sponsors of the individuals or 
organizations) that v.'ould have tax implications under the 
Internal Revenue lavzs. Liaison has been established with 
all investigative and law enforcement agencies and with 
Senate and House Investigating Committees. The Group also 
subscribes to various underground publications as a source 
of information on matters involving taxable income of 
individuals, activities of organizations having or seeking 
tax exempt status, and identity of individuals or exempt 
organizations providing financial support. to activist groups. 
In the case of "financial- support" our interest is to be 
able to determine that donors do pot receive tax benefit 
from the financial assistance where such benefit is not 
clearly allowable by law. 

As information is accum.ulated on the activities or. 
financial support of particular organizations or taxable 
income of individuals it is referred to the appropriate 
field office of the Internal Revenue Service for enforce- 
ment action. Field offices may be asked to investigate 
the activities of organizations v/hich have been held, to be 


exempt as charitable organizations; they may be asked to 
investigate the income tax liability of individuals vho 
have openly expended substantial sums of money vrithout 
obvious means of support or they may be asked to investi- 
gate alleged violations of the firearms statutes falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire- 
arms Division. 

It is Important to note that although various types 
of information about -organizations or individuals is 
obtained by the Service from cooperating agencies, only *- 
that information' relating to tax status is recorded and 
dissejninated to field offices. The sole objective of the- 
Special Service Group is to provide a greater degree of 
assurance of maximum compliance vith the Internal Revenue 
laws by those involved in extremist activities and those 
providing financial support to these activities. 

To date the efforts of the Special Service Group has 
been confined to manual compilation and consolidation of 
information on approximately 1,025 organizations and 4,300 
individuals. Data on 26 organizations and A3 individuals 
has been referred to the field for enforcement action. 


While it is still too early to have completed many of the 
field investigations, criminal investigations are under 
way on 4 individuals- and 1 organization. Delinquent tax 
returns have been obtained from 2 organization's with com- 
bined tax liability of $29,559. On the basis of informa- 
tion furnished by this "group" application for exempt 
status has been denied to 8 organizations. It is the 
view of officials of the Internal Revenue Service that 
this "intelligence" activity and field enforcement is 
necessary to avoid allegation that extremist organizations^ 
ignore taxing statutes V7ith immunity. 



3 9999 06313 318 3