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PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 27, 28, 29, AND JULY 10, 1973
Book 4
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
i^raniilin fierce U^>^ ^^u.er Lib,rary
D359B
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 27, 28, 29, AND JULY 10, 1973
Book 4
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-296 O WASHINGTON : 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price !?3.00
Stocli Number 5270-01964
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session)
*
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina, Chairman
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vice Chairman
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, Georgia EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr., Connecticut
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico
Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Frkd D. Thompson, Afinoriiy Counsel
RxJFUS L. Edmisten, Deputy Chief Counsel
Arthur S. Miller, Chief Consultant
David M. Dorsen, Assistant Chief Counsel
Terry F. Lenzner, Assistant Chief Counsel
James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel
Carmine S. Bellino, Chief Investigator
Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator
Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel
R. Phillip Haire, Assistant Counsel
Marc 1, ACKnnz, Assistant Counsel
WiLLUM T. Mayton, Assistant Counsel
Ronald D. UoTVtiDA, Assistant Counsel
Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel
Howard S. Iaebengood, AssistaiU Minority Counsel
H. Wiluam Shvre, Assistant Minority Counsel
Robert Silverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel
Laura Matz, Administrative Assistant
Carolyn Andrade, OfficeManager
Joan C. Cole, Secretary to theMinority
(n)
CONTENTS
HEARING DAYS
Page
Wednesday, June 27, 1973 1347
Thursday,' June 28, 1973 1431
Friday, June 29, 1973 1507
Tuesdaj^, July 10, 1973 1601
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Wednesday, June 27, 1973
Dean, John W., Ill, former counsel to the President, accompanied by
Charles N. Shaffer and Robert C. McCandless, counsels, testimonj'^
resumed 1348
Shaffer, Charles N., Esq., statement of 1574
Thursday, June 28, 1973
Dean, John W., Ill, testimonj- resumed 1431
Friday, June 29, 1973
Dean, John W., Ill, testimonj^ resumed 1508
Tuesday, July 10, 1973
Mitchell, John N., former Attorney General and campaign director of the
Committee To Re-Elect the President, accompanied by William G.
Hundlej^, Plato C. Cacheris, and Marvin Segal, counsels 1601
INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE AND COUNSELS
Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr Dean: 1388,
1389, 1429, 1430, 1452-1465, 1531, 1532, 1536, 1537, 1569, 1596,
1599, 1600.
Baker, Hon. Ho^vard H., Jr Dean : 1465-1488,
1491-1495, 1537-1557, 1563, 1569, 1597, 1598.
Talmadge, Hon. Herman E Dean: 1488-1490, Mitchell: 1653-1667.
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K Dean: 1412-1429, 1431-1451, 1526-1535, 1557-1562.
Montoya, Hon. Joseph M Dean: 1508-1511.
Gurney, Hon. Edward J Dean: 1351-1387,
1389-1408, 1511-1523. Mitchell: 1667-1681.
Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr Dean: 1495-1504.
Dash, Samuel, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Dean: 1349, 1350,
1386, 1387, 1408-1411, 1564-1580. Mitchell: 1602-1636.
Thompson, Fred D., minority counsel Dean: 1580-1597. Mitchell: 1636-1652.
EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
No. 44 — (1349) Papers from a file entitled "Opponents List" and "Political
Enemies Project." First document is briefing paper pre-
pared for Mr. Haldeman for a meeting with the head of
IRS. This is followed by "IRS Talking Paper." 1682
No. 45 — (1349) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re:
Tax discrepancies in income tax return of Harold J.
Gibbons, vice president of the Teamsters Union 1686
No. 46 — (1349) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re: In-
formation received from an informer concerning Jack
Anderson 1687
Note. — Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the
record.
(Ill)
IV
Page
No. 47 — (1349) Memorandum for John Dean from Jack Caulfield. Subject:
Opposition Activity 1688
No. 48 — (1350) Memorandum prepared by John Dean for members of the
White House staff. Subject: DeaUng with our Political
Enemies 1689
No. 49 — (1350) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re:
Names given top priority on enemies list 1692
No. 50 — (1350) Memorandum for Larry Higby from John Dean concerning
names for enemies list 1697
No. 51 — (1350) Section of a news summary from Higby to Dean, indicating
that DNC treasurer Robert Strauss should be on the list. 1699
No. 52 — (1350) Additions to enemies list sent to John Dean from Gordon
Strachan 1700
No. 53 — (1350) Memorandum for John Dean from Gordon Strachan.
Subject: Political Enemies. (Re: Chet Huntley.) 1701
No. 54 — (1350) Memorandum to John Dean from Gordon Strachan with
attached news summary indicating that J. Irwin Miller
might be considered for enemies list 1703
No. 55 — (1350) Memorandum from a member of Charles Colson's staff re:
People who attended a rally for a "dump Nixon"
program 1705
No. 56 — (1350) List of Mc Govern campaign staff with asterisks beside key
names that were to be included in the opponents project. 1707
Nos. 57 and 58 — (1388) Marked for identification only and are not for
publication.
No. 59 — (1393) Bank statement on account of John Welsey [sic] Dean, IIL 1712
No. 60 — (1409) Additional document updating the enemies list, entitled
"Politicos Continued" 1713
No. 61 — (1409) Memorandum from member of Charles Colson's staff. Sub-
ject : Opponents Lists 1725
No. 62 — (1409) Memorandum re: Updating of opponents list 1728
No. 63 — (1410) Document entitled "Corporate Executives Committee for
Peace, Trip to Washington— June 25, 1970." This
document also is an update of the enemies list 1730
No. 64 — (1410) List of Democratic contributors of $25,000 or more in 1968
campaigns (from New York Times Story, June 20, 1971) _ 1733
No. 65 — (1410) Memorandum re: List of Muskie contributors to be added
to opponents list 1734
No. 66 — (1412) Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the
President, to Senator Inouye re: Questions and a mem-
orandum previously furnished the committee in ques-
tioning Mr. Dean 1754
No. 67 — (1412) Memo and questions pertaining to exhibit No. 66 1755
No. 68 — (1525) Memorandum of Law, Admissibility of Hearsay State-
ments of a Co-conspirator. Submitted by Samuel Dash,
chief counsel and staff director, Senate Select Com-
mittee on Presidential Campaign Activities 1783
No. 69 — (1557) Letter from Congressman Garry Brown to Senator Ervin
re: Certain statements made bv Mr. Dean 1791
No. 70 — (1563) Letter from Senator Strom Thurmond to Senators Baker
and Gurney and Mr. Fred Thompson re: Mr. Harry
Dent declining to do research against Senator Ervin__ 1793
No. 70A — (1569) Detailed notes of Fred D. Thompson, minority counsel,
of telephone conversation with J. Fred Buzhardt,
special counsel to the President re: Conversation
between the President and Mr. Dean 1794
No. 71 — (1573) Letter to Mr. Garnett D. Inscoe, Suburban Trust Co.,
from Shaffer, McKeever & Fitzpatrick with enclosures. 1801
No. 72— (1595) Request for transportation dated October 11, 1972 1808
No. 73— (1595) Request for transportation dated October 19, 1972 1809
No. 74 — (1655) Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb S.
Magruder, dated December 3, 1971 1810
No. 75 — (1656) Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb S.
Magruder, dated January 14, 1972. Subject: Telephone
Plan for the Florida Primary, with attachment 1811
Note.— Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
PHASE I: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION
WEDNESDAY, JUN:^ 27, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington^ B.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :05 a.m., in room
318, Eiissell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and "Weicker.
Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director : Fred D.
Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief
counsel: Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel ; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator W^eicker; John Walz,
publications clerk.
Senator Eratn. We have two very peculiar questions which have
been addressed to the committee, apparently by ]\Ir. J. Fred Buzhardt,
special counsel to the President. The first question addressed to the
committee by Mr. Buzhardt is this :
"Did you and your counsel develop a strategy for obtaining immu-
nitv from prosecution? What were the elements of that strategy?"
On behalf of the committee, I would reply to Mr. Buzhardt that the
only strategy we developed was to pursue the course outlined by the
act of Congress codified as sections 6002 and 6005 of title 18 of the
United States Code.
The second question to the committee is: "Didn't your strategy in-
clude deliberate leaks of information to the media on what you had
told investigators?" Maybe this is addressed to Mr. Dean, I do not
know. [Laughter.] It is probably addressed to Mr. Dean.
(1347)
1348
Mr. Dean, I will ask you these questions — ^well, maybe I had just
better let us proceed in orderly fashion. I am sorry I misconstrued the
question.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I had not seen these before this
moment. I notice there is a cover letter dated June 27, 1973, which I
have seen now for the first time. It says, "Pursuant to the rules of the
committee, there are enclosed herewith questions which we believe
would be appropriate to have asked of Mr. Dean."
I will say ag^ain I have only seen these just now, but from that
cover letter it would appear to me that these are questions submitted
to be propounded to the witness and not to the committee. I wonder if
the chairman might agree with me in view of the cover letter which
has been handed me by counsel.
Senator Ervin. The only thing which misled me was the fact we had
two series of questions. One of them was numbered 1 and 2, and the
second series of questions also are numbered 1 and 2. So I drew the
inference from this that the first question and the second question were
addressed to the committee. But perhaps I have misconstrued that.
Senator Baker. I think I would agree with my chairman, who has
implied that it would be inappropriate for anyone to address questions
to the committee, and if that is in fact the fair intendment of the
letter, then I do disagree with it and I would suggest that they be dis-
regarded. If, in fact, they are questions submitted under rule 25 of the
Standing Rules of the Committee to be propounded to the witness, it
would seem to me we have a different situation.
Senator Ervin. I might state these were just handed to me about
1 second before I read them, and I drew the inference since the ques-
tions were separated as they were, some of them were addressed to the
committee rather than the witness. But perhaps I am mistaken in that,
but I would say that the only strategy this committee lias followed to
secure immunity for any witness has been to pursue the law strictly.
Senator Baker. I think the chairman is entirely correct, and I think
the committee has tracked the provisions of the statute carefully. On
one occasion, at least, Mr. Chairman, I recall that we retracked our steps
for fear there might be a technical deficiency in our method of opera-
tion. The votes have been unanimous in each case, even though the
statute only requires a two-thirds vote in order to request immunity.
So I agree with my chairman that the only strategy this committee
has followed is to track the provisions of the available statute law in
order to gain the most information we can in order to present it to the
Senate.
Mr. Dean". INIr. Chairman
Senator Ervin. Now, yesterday the witness was asked to produce
some exhibits, and I just wanted to ask him if he had provided them.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN DEAN III, FOKMER COUNSEL TO THE PRESI-
DENT, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARLES N. SHAFFER AND ROBERT C.
McCANDLESS, COUNSELS— Resumed
Mr. Dean. Mr. Chairman, the only thin<? I wanted to say, the only
involvement I had in what you are referring to is I did participate
a number of years ago first in the development of that statute and,
second, its drafting and its relationship with the Senate in its adop-
1349
tion, but I did take at that time, in representing the Department of
Justice, a far different position that the Attorney General should have
the ability to nullify any request of any committee to grant immunity
to any witness, which is far different from the one Congress accepted
ultimately.
Mr. Dash. Xow, Mr. Dean, did you bring with you this morning the
exhibits that you indicated you had and the committee requested you
to bring?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Could you just submit them and perhaps identify them as
you submit them to the committee ?
Mr. Deax. These are from a file that is entitled "Opponents List and
Political Enemies Project." The first document in the file, and these
are not in any chronological order, is a briefing paper that was pre-
pared for Mr. Haldeman for a meeting with the head of Internal
Eevenue Service. The goal of the briefing paper which was based on
material that was provided to me by Mr. Caulfield who, in turn, got
information from friends of his within the Internal Revenue Service,
was to make the IRS politically responsive to the White House, and
I think that the document is self-explanatory. It is not marked other
than the heading which says "To Accomplish Make IRS Politically
Responsive."
I will mark these as I
Mr. Dash. Well, you can mark them following your last exhibit
number.
Mr. Deax. For the sake of the record, right now I will call it exhibit
A.
FThe document referred to was marked exhibit No. 44.^]
Mr. Deax. The next ex'hibit, which I will call B, is a memorandum
from Charles Colson to me, dated June 12, 1972, regarding tax discrep-
ancies in the income tax return of Mr. Harold J. Gibbons, vice presi-
dent of the Teamsters Union, in which Colson indicates that he is an
all-out enemy, a McGovernite and an anti-Nixon person, and he
believes that there should be an audit started at once, and if there is an
informer's fee, he would like to know because he believes there is a
good cause in which that informer's fee can be dtmated to. [Laughter.]
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 45.^]
Mr. Dean. The next document is a memorandum from Charles Col-
son, dated November 17, 1972, regarding the fact that he has received
information from an informal, some information regarding Mr. Jack
Anderson referring to the fact that Mr. Anderson was found in a room
with certain wiretap in private — wiretap equipment in connection with
the Dodd investigation.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 46.^]
Mr. Dean. The next memorandum is a document from Mr. Caulfield
to me, dated August 12, 1971, in which Mr. Caulfield briefly indicates
that he has talked with Mr. Nofziger to come up with a candidate to
assist in the enemy's project.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 47."]
Mr. Dean. The next is a copy of a memorandum of August 16, 1971,
that was prepared for Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and others at
the White House by myself, which addresses itself to the general prob-
1 See. p. 1682.
= See p. 1686.
3 See p. 1687.
^ See p. 1688.
1350
lem of dealing with political enemies and a strategy which would
involve a number of members of the ^Vllite House staff in various
phases of that project to deal with political enemies.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 48.^]
Mr. Dean. The next is a document dated September 9, 1971. It is
from Charles Colson to John Dean, in which Mr. Colson has checked
in blue those that he would give top priority on the enemies' list, and
an attached series of lists that were prepared by Mr. Colson's office of
what were deemed opponents or political enemies.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 49.']
Mr. Dean. The next is a memorandum dated September 14, 1971,
which is a memorandum from myself to Larry Higby which attached
the names that he had requested in connection with the political ene-
mies' project and a limiting of that list to some 20 names. These were
names which were based on the suggestion of INIr. Colson.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 50.^]
Mr. Dean. The next is a section of the news summary, of what date
I don't know. It is from Mr. Higby to me, indicating that DNC Treas-
urer Robert Strauss should be on the list.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 51.*]
Mr. Dean. The next is a document dated September 17 from Gordon
Strachan to me indicating that the attached list should be included in
the political enemies' project. And there is attached a list.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 52.^]
Mr. Dean. The next is a memorandum from Gordon Strachan dated
October 26, 1971, to me, indicating that Mr. Nofziger sent the attached
information on Chet Huntley to Mr. Haldeman and that since I have
the action on the political enemies project I should make a determina-
tion of what should happen and advise Mr. Nofziger of what should
happen.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 53.^]
Mr. Dean. The next is a memo from Gordon Strachan of November
5, 1971, subject J. Irwin Miller which indicates that he fits into the
enemies project.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 54.'^]
Mr. Dean. The next is a memorandum from a member of Mr. Col-
son's staff that is part of one of many memorandums that came in, this
one is dated June 28, where there was a continual updating of the
opponents list.
[The document referred to was marked exhibt No. .55.^1
Mr. Dean. And the last document is one relating to the McGovern
campaign staff with asterisks beside certain key names that were to be
included in the opponents project also.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. .56.®]
Mr. Dean. And that is the sum and substance of the request that I
have available that Mr. Weicker asked me for vesterdav.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, can we have those? Thev will be marked, and
we will make copies of them for members of the committee and cir-
culate them to members of the committee.
Senator Ervix. Let the reporter mark them with the appropriate
numbers.
1 Spe p. IfiSfi. «Spp p. 1701.
3Spe p. 1602. -Rep p. 1703i.
3Spp p. 1697. "See p. 1705.
■« Spe p. 16fl9. f Spe p. 1707.
5 See p. 1700.
1351
I would just like to say I am sorry I misconstrued Mr. Buzhardt's
questions; they were just handed to me before I looked at them, and
they were separate from the other questions.
The other questions were clearly directed to the witness and not to
the committee.
The Chair now recognizes the Senator from Florida, Mr. Gurney.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dean. Good morning. Senator.
Senator Gurney. We have had a great deal of testimony, 245 pages
of your statement as well as the testimony yesterday, and I must say
it is hard to know where to begin in all this.
I will go over some of the ground that has already been covered, in
an effort perhaps to clarify and amplify as far as I am concerned. I
will ask probing questions, and I am sure you recognize why this is
important.
There have been serious charges in the testimony leveled against
many people, including the President of the United States. Some of
these charges, uncorroborated. Certainly the duty of this committee
is to seek out the truth, to gather all the evidence we can from every
witness, and especially from you who probably will be the most im-
portant witness in these whole hearings..
As a matter of fact, I think the committee would be very derelict
if it didn't get all the evidence it could.
I think probably the best place to start always is at the beginning.
Would you say that it is fair to say that Gordon Liddy's plan of
bugging and electronic espionage really started out the whole Water-
gate affa-ir ?
Mr. Dean. Would I say it started off the whole Watergate affair?
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. Dean. Well, as I testified I think that the — ^there was an atmos-
phere that might have been several precursors source to that plan.
The plan was an accident of fate where they culminated into Mr.
Liddy's specific proposal that was presented in the Attorney General's
office in the two meetings which occurred in late January and early
February.
Senator Gurney. But as far as the Watergate break-in itself is con-
cerned, it really stemmed from Mr. Liddy's plan of bugging and elec-
tronic espionage, did it not ?
Mr. Dean. The specific plan to enter the Watergate would have
begun with the plan that Mr. Liddy developed, yes.
Senator Gurney. Now, who recommended Mr. Liddy to the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President ?
Mr. Dean. I passed on a recommendation that I had received from
Mr. Krogh to Mr. Mitchell and he in turn endorsed that recommenda-
tion and sent him over to the Re-Election Committee.
Senator Gurney. In other words, you recommended Mr. Liddy to
the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. Did you interview Mr. Liddy after Krogh rec-
ommended him to you?
Mr. Dean. Xot to my recollection, no. I was present when he was
interviewed by Mr. Mitchell and again when he was interviewed by
Mr. Magruder.
1352
Senator Gtjrney. Did you ask any questions about his qualifications
at that time or did Mr. Liddy just simply answer questions?
Mr. Dean. I asked Mr, Krogh about his qualifications at that time
when he first mentioned him to me. And they asked questions during
those interviews, yes.
Senator Gtjrney. Did you ever ask him what he had been doing for
Mr. Krogh?
Mr. Dean. No, I did not.
Senator Gtjrney. Or Mr. Hunt ?
Mr. Dean. No, I did not.
Senator Gurney. Would that not be important in finding out his
qualifications, his previous employment ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I was told, for example, when I met him — when
I talked to Mr. Krogh about him, I can recall Mr. Krogh very specifi-
cally telling me that he had written some of the best legal memoran-
dums that he had run across in a long time. He explained that Gordon
had taken some rather complex subjects and analyzed them in a very
precise way. One of these memoranda had gone in to the President and
the President had complimented Mr. Liddy through Mr. Krogh on the
quality of the document that he had prepared.
Senator Gtjrney. Was it understood that part of his duties would
be in charge of security or things like that ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gtjrney. Well, did you ask any questions of him as to what
he had been doing in the area of security ?
Mr. Dean. I was told that he had an FBI, Treasury Department, law
enforcement background. There was not a great focus on that at that
time. I knew Mr. Krogh had worked in the past before I came to the
White House and partially after I was still at the White House with
the demonstrator problem. Mr. Krogh was very knowledgeable in the
area and when he told me that he thought Mr. Liddy had these quali-
fications, I thought that Mr. Krogh 's judgment was good and in fact,
it was partially Mr. Krogh's working with me from my position at
the Department of Justice that resulted in my coming into the White
House.
Senator Gtjrney. You never did go into what he had been doing
with Krogh and Hunt ?
Mr. Dean. No, I did not.
Senator Gtjrney. The January 27 meeting occurred and as I recall,
you testified that the original plan — and I do not know what the word
was that you used to describe it, but
Mr. Dean. I think I called it a mission impossible plan.
Senator Gtjrney. I think that is probably a good description.
Did you ever talk to Mr. Mitchell or INIr." Magruder after this hor-
rendous plan, about whether Liddy really was competent to stay on
and work for the Committee To Re-El ect the President ?
Mr. Dean. As I recall, the only conversation I had was a very brief
convei-sation. Mr. Liddy was taking the charts ofl' the easel and they
were preparing to leave tlie office when I paused in front of Mr.
Mitchell's desk and he told me that this was certainly out of the ques-
tion. I do not think anyone knew that a plan of that dimension was
going to be presented at that time.
1353
Senator GimxEY. Well, did it worry yon that this man came up with
kidnaping, prostitution, mugging, and all the rest of it?
Mr. Deax. Yes, sir, it did.
Senator Gupxey. But you never really discussed it with Mitchell
and Magruder as to his capability, Liddy's capability of staying on at
the job?
Mr. Deax. Well, sir, you would have had to have been there to
believe it and I might say that it was so far out that there was no hope
in my mind that anyone was ever going to approve any plan like this.
So I just assumed that it was going to die a natural death.
Senator Gtjrxey. Now we come to the second meeting that occurred
on February 4. My recollection is that you came in a little later this
day.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gtjrxey. My recollection also is that you testified that you
were again disturbed. Verv disturbed at what he was proposing. Is
that true?
Mr. Deax. That is correct and I was injecting myself into the meet-
ing in an effort to terminate the meeting, which I did.
Senator Gurxey. Well, did you have any discussion after the meet-
ing with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Maf^ruder about his continuing?
Mr. Deax. I had a direct discussion with Mr, Liddy at that time.
I might add. after the first meeting, I had told Mr. Liddy he s'hould
destroy the charts. After the second meeting, as we were leaving the
office, I told him that I would not discuss this with him any further. I
indicated to him that it still was not what was necessary, and it was a
rather brief discussion. I must say I felt very sorry for Gordon Liddy
during much of this because of the fact that he had received no guid-
ance from anybody that I could tell — certainly none from me — as to
what was expected of him. It is not my nature to be hard on somebody.
Rather, I was trying to tell him that I felt this was not what was
contemplated.
Senator Gurxey. My reaction was that you testified that you told
him that he was never to discuss this thing again with you, is that
correct ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Gurxey. You told him that if any plan was approved like
this that you did not want to know about it.
Mr, Deax. That is correct.
'Senator Gurxey. At this particular time, Mr. Dean, were you not
the counsel for the President ? Was that not your job ?
Mr. Deax. That was my title and that was my job.
Senator Gurxey. You were not counsel for Mr. Mitchell and Mr.
Magruder, were you ?
Mr. Deax. No, I was not.
Senator Gurxey. Wliy did you not go back to the President and
tell him about this hair-raising scheme ?
Mr. Deax. Well, I did go back, but I did not have access to the Presi-
dent, as I think I explained. I went to Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Gurxey. Did you try to gain access to the President?
Mr. Deax. Senator, I did not try. I had never been in to the Presi-
dent or called by the President before. My reporting channel was
1354
through Mr. Haldeman and I went back and told what I thought was
the proper reporting channel. I told him what I had seen, told him my
reaction to it, told him that I thought it was unwise, unnecessary, and
Mr. Haldeman agreed with me.
Senator Gurnet, Did you ever discuss after this meeting with Mr.
Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, whether this plan was going to be im-
plemented or whatever happened to it ?
Mr. Dean. I never heard about the plan again until, as I have testi-
fied, Mr. Liddy came into my office some time in February or March —
I do not know the precise date — and told me that he could not get his
plan approved. I reminded him that I was not going to talk with him
about it, and he said that he understood and he did not talk about it.
And we went on to whatever our business was that day on some other
election matter.
Senator Gurney. When was this ?
Mr. Dean. I believe it was February, some time in Feibruary or
March. I am not sure of the date.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever report that to the President ?
Mr. Dean. No, I didn't, sir.
Senator Gurney. Let's go now to the break-in at Watergate. But
before we do, let's go back and clear up some testimony of yesterday.
I have never been entirely clear on this law firm incident. I came in in
the middle of Senator Talmadge's questioning yesterday. Could you go
over that? What exactly happened? You were representing a law
firm in connection with some television application — is that it?
Mr. Dean. No sir, I read into the record yesterday a letter I don't
know if the Senator has had a chance to see the letter.
Senator Gurney. I haven't had a chance to see it.
Mr. Dean. I might read it to you.
Senator Gurney. No, I don't think you need to read it if you just
summarize quickly what happened.
Mr. Dean. All right. I was in a communications law firm and doing
very little communications work. I had some connection witli summar-
i7,in<T findings of fact and things of that nature that were before the
FCC, but I could not term myself a communications lawyer in any
respect. I had been at the firm a very short while. I was not happy at
the firm and was contemplating leaving the firm.
One of the men who was at the firm was 7iot a lawyer but an in-house
representative of the senior partners in the firm, who had television
interests around the country as a result of their processing applica-
tions. This man came to me and began to discuss, he said, John, you are
leaving, are you interested in investing any money in a television
station ?
I said, yes, I might be, let's explore it.
We had some preliminary discussions about it with the lawyers who
he had selected to represent his application, a man by the name of Earl
Stanley, who is a senior member of the communications bar, and I
think a very well respected member of the bar. At that time, I raised
with him, was there any conflict for me to become involved in that
while I was still at the firm. He indicated to me so long as T was out of
the firm by the time the application Avas actually filed, which would
have taken mechanically months to prepare and Mr. Stanley and
Mr. Fellows, the man I was referring to in the firm, were going to
1355
prepare the application. I had some — I had accumuhated some papers
on the matter in my desk and apparently, one night, one of the partners
was lookino- for some other unrelated matters and came across this.
Senator Gurney. Were these papers in connection with your
venture ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, they were.
Senatoi" Gurney. Not the law firm
Mr. Deax. No.
There were standard forms that were used on virtually every appli-
cation for filling out various forms of the application and I was pre-
paring my own, my rights, and Mr. Fellows and some of these aspects
of it. I also had some papers on — there is an outfit that does incorpora-
tions— FCP, I believe is the name of it^ — where you just pay the fee
and they do all the incorporating work. It is nothing you do yourself.
I think there were some papers related to that in there. When these
were discovered, I was called into the office the next morning when I
came in. I remember there was a very serious snowstorm that night
and I was late coming in. When I came in, I was asked to come into one
of the senior partners' office.
He asked me to explain what I was doing. I had learned, I had seen
that my desk had been rifled the night before and I was quite annoyed
by it, so I decided I would say nothing. I said, I have nothing to say
aix)ut this.
There then ensued — he said, well, if you are not going to tell me any-
thing about this, you are fired.
I said, I am not fired, because I have already resigned.
He said, you can't resign, because I have already fired you. So that
was the session.
Later, one of the other associates said, John, you had better go back
and talk this over with him. I did. I thought tlie matter was resolved.
The next I heard about it was when the civil service did an examina-
tion, and there was a comment in that examination that I had been
dismissed for unethical conduct.
At that time, I asked one of the lawyers that had been at the law
firm if he would look into it, because I said I am prepared to take this
to the Ethics Committee, if necessary.
He looked into it, the person who had made the comment that it
was an unethical charge retracted the comment, and the matter was
left at that.
Senator Gurney. "When did the matter occur in the civil service
files? Was that in connection witli your employment at the House
Judiciary Committee?
Mr. Dean. No, it was after I left the House Judiciary Committee.
As the Senator knows, the House does not run civil service examina-
tions on staff.
Senator Gurney. Was it in connection with your employment at the
Justice Department?
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; it was not. While I was with the House Judiciary
Committee, I developed legislation that created the National Com-
mission on Reform of Criminal Laws.
^ Senator Gurney. I am talking now about the civil service informa-
tion.
Mr. Dean. I am explaining. Senator.
1356
I was asked to go on the staff as the Associate Director of that Com-
mission. It was at that time, when I was joining that staff, that this
matter arose.
Senator Gurney. And regardless of the ethics involved, and I do
understand your contention and the letter you read was that it was not
an ethical matter.
Mr. Dean. It was not unethical to me ; no, sir.
Senator Gurney. But as far as your termination of employment
with the law firm, I do understand that you were discharged ; is that
right?
Mr. Dean. I would say it was a rather heated discharge as a matter
of my unwillingness to discuss the matter with the person who was a
senior partner in the organization.
Senator Gurney. Now, to get back to the break-in at the Watergate,
as I recall your testimony, there really wasn't anything in Watergate
or much of anything in the activities surrounding the Committee To
Re-Elect the President from that February 4 meeting until the Water-
gate break-in. And I understand you got back from the Philippine
Islands on the 18th and then returned here to Washington and went
in your office on the 18th.
Is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Gurney. Then, as I recall, you said that you had received
phone calls that day and talked to a number of people — Caulfield,
Magruder, Ehrlichman, Strachan, Colson, Sloan, and you later called
Liddy and Kleindienst.
Why all these calls if you weren't that closely associated with what
they were doing over there in the political field ?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I would say that my office was one that,
one, I did have some dealings with the reelection committee, I did
know all the parties involved. My office normally was asked to investi-
gate or look into any problem that came up of tliat nature. "\^nien any
wrongdoing was charged — an administration office, for example, when
the grain deal came up — and I think as the Senator will recall, during
the ITT matter, my office had some peripheral involvement in that.
And I believe we had some dealings with your office on that matter.
Senator Gurney. Not my office. I think we met in Senator Hruska's
office, the Republican members of the committee; isn't that correct,
with you?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I recall one time that Mr. Fieldinor and
I came up to your office on the matter and Mr. Fielding provided some
material for your staff. It was that type of thing that would come to
my office for assistance and aid.
Senator Gurney. What does that have to do with the Watergate ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I was explaining the tvpe of thing that would come
to my office and my office was a firefighting office and would get into
various
Senator Gurney. Did you do other firefighting before June 18 ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. At the committee to reelect?
Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge, no. That was the only fire I recall
over there, and it was the biggest one.
'Senator Gurney. Now, then, you mentioned in your testimony yes-
terday in response to Mr. Dash that you inherited the coverup.
1357
Would you tell how j-ou inherited the coverup ?
Mr. Deax, I didn't hear the Senator. Inherited ?
Senator Gurxey. You said yesterday in response to questioning
from Mr. Dash, you said that j^ou inherited the coverup of Watergate.
Mr. Deax. I had heard or inherited ?
Senator Gurxey. I understand inherited.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
When I came back to the office on the 18th and talked to
Mr. Strachan, I realized that the coverup was already in effect, in
being, and I realized that when Mr. Strachan told me of the documents
that he had destroyed and Mr. Haldeman's instruction, that there cer-
tainly wasn't going to be a revelation of the AVhite House involvement
in the matter. I didn't at that point in time know the potentials of the
White House involvement.
Senator Gurxey. Was not one of the first meetings of the coverup
held in John Mitchell's apartment on the 19th of June ?
Mr. Dean. Senator, I would say that the day of, to my knowledge,
the day of the 19th at the T^Tiite House was a very busy day. That
the calls I received from Mr. Ehrlichman, from Mr. Colson, the meet-
ings I had with Mr. Ehrlichman and then again later with Mr. Colson
about the safe were long before I went to the meeting at Mr. Mitchell's
apartment, which I do not recall was on the 19th or 20th. I do recall a
meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, but I do not recall specifically which
day it was. I recall arriving late at the meeting, and I cannot recall
with any specificity any of the discussions at the meeting.
Senator Gurney. Well, what you are saying is then that these several
phone calls you had with all of these people really had to do with at
least the beginnings of the coverup, is that right?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. Well, you were in on it from the beginning, were
you not?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. You really did not inherit anything. You were in
on the sort of hatching of it, were you not ?
Mr, Dean. Senator, I might explain that what often happened in my
relationship with my superiors at the White House, and I think I
alluded to this yesterday, is that others would set the policy, for ex-
ample, with the CalUy case or the Lithuanian defector, how to deal
with it, what was to be done.
Senator Gurney. Who set the policy on the coverup ?
Mr. Dean. I would say the policy was just — I do not think it was a
policy set. There was just no alternative at that point in time.
Senator Gurx^ey. It sort of grew like Topsy, and you were a part
of it, is that not right ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurx^ey. Now, since this thing started out with such a flurry
and a spate of phone calls and meetings between everybody, did you
advise the President of what was going on ?
Mr. Deax'. Senator, the first time I ever talked to the President was
on September 15. There was one occasion that I recall before Septem-
ber 15, which was in late August, to the best of my recollection, and
that certainly was not an occasion to talk to the President about any-
thing because his former law partners were in the office, Mrs. Nixon
was in the office, there were several notaries or one notary there, some
1358
other members of the staif and it had to do with the siting of the
President's testamentary papers and it was — just was not a very
appropriate occasion to even give a whisper to the President that I
would like to talk to him. So I must say that any time between June 19
and September 15 I had no conversations with the President, and nor
did I approach the President at any time other than through reporting
to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman about what I was doing.
Senator Gukney. Well, of course, you must have realized that this
coverup business, at least after it had gone on for a little while, was
pretty serious, did you not ?
Mr. Dean. I did not like it from the outset. I do not think anj^ody
liked it.
Senator Gtjrney. Do you not think as the President's attorney, you
should have tried to go to him and warn him about what was being
done?
Mr. Dean. I probably should have but I was assuming everything I
reported to Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman was also being reported to
the President.
Senator Gurney. Let us go and discuss for a moment the FBI
reports of the investigation. Did you first go to Mr. Kleindienst for
these reports ? Now, I am talking about the 302 form, you know, FBI
interviews with witnesses.
Mr. Dean. Right. I do not recall whether it was Mr. Kleindienst or
Mr. Petersen that I first discussed this with. I was being asked to get
the reports, I had talked with
Senator Gtjrney. Who asked you to get the reports ?
Mr. Dean. Initially, the request came from Mr. Mitchell, and I
believe that was as a result of Mr. Mardian's desire to see the reports.
Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman thought it was a good idea that I
see the reports, and I had — at what point in time I actually raised this
with either Petersen or Kleindienst, my recollection is I did talk to Mr.
Petersen about it at some time and he suggested I go directly to Mr.
Gray, and I cannot really with specificity tell you at what point in time
I went to Gray, but I do recall discussing it with Mr. Gray.
Senator Gurney. Let us get back to Mr. Kleindienst though, because
this is extremely important, I think. The Attorney General is head of
the Justice Department and, of course, the FBI is under the Justice
Department. Are you sure you cannot recall whether you ever talked
to him about getting these 302 forms ?
INIr. Dean. It is very possible, as I said, Senator, it is very possible
I did. I have
Senator Gurney. Well, you have recalled in minute detail in 245
pages of the testimony of almost everything.
Mr. Dean. I understand that. I have tried to the best of my recol-
lection to recall everything. I do not recall specifically whether I talked
to Mr. Kleindienst about this subject. The major item
Senator Gutjney. Well, do you recall if you talked to Mr. Petersen?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I just stated T did recall I did talk to INIr. Petersen.
Senator Gurney. 'Wliat did you recall of that conversation ?
Mr. Dean. I recall he sucirested that T go directlv to INfr. Gray.
Senator Gurney. Did either Mr. Petersen or Mr. Kleindienst or
anybody, according to your recollection, tell you that you could not
get these FBI reports, that the President himself would have to get
1359
them and Mr. Klcindienst or Mr. Petersen would have to ^ive them to
the President ?
INIr. Dean. I do not necessarily recall that it was stated as you have
stated it. I was told that the best way to deal with this situation is go
directly to Mr. Gray. Mr. Gray initially said to nie, "Why do you not
read them in my office?" I said that would be a rather cumbersome
arrangement.
Senator Gurnet. Then, you have no recollection that the Attorney
General or Mr. Petersen told you that you could not have them unless
you got them through the President ?
Mr. Dean. Well
Senator Gurnet. Is that correct?
INIr. Dean. I have read this in the paper. Senator, that this was-
Senator Gurnet. Well, so have I, and that is why I am asking you.
Mr. Dean. I do not recall it, frankly.
Senator Gurnet. Well, then let's go to Mr. Gray and your conversa-
tions with him about the 302 forms. Wliat were they ? What were the
conversations?
Mr. Dean. The conversation with Mr. Gray, well, I think as we ini-
tially discussed it, Mv. Gray told me that he thought that I could read
them in his office, I told him I thought that was awkward, and when
we discussed it, he wanted some assurance that this information was
being reported to the President. As I recall, I gave him such an assur-
ance that it was being reported to the President.
Senator Gurnet. Can you recall that conversation more specifically
because Mr. Gray testified at quite some length before the Judiciary
Committee on this in response to many questions. "^^Hiat is your recol-
lection of it ?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I have, in preparing all my testimony, I
have done this, I have not sought to go through in detail all of the
press accounts, I have not sought to go through in detail all of the
Gray hearings, for example. I have not sought to sit and watch these
hearings.
Senator Gurnet. I understand that, and all I want is your
impression.
Mr. Dean. Yes. My impression
Senator Gurnet. That is all.
Mr. Dean [continuing]. Is what I am giving, and the receipt or non-
receipt of the FBI interviews was not a very big thing for me, and that
is why it doesn't strike very clearly in my mind.
Senator Gurnet. Well, it was a pretty big thing for Mr. Gray.
Mr. Dean. I appreciate that.
Senator Gurnet. Pretty nearly shot him out of the saddle as far as
being the head of the FBI is concerned.
Mr. Dean. Well, I appreciate that. Senator, and to the best of my
recollection, Mr. Gray said to me that, after I gave him assurance it
was going to be reported, that he would work something out. Now, I
don't recall when I first received the initial reports. I only recall that
it was after a summary report was prepared on the 21st of July, as I
recall the date, and I showed that report to the people at the White
House and the people at the reelection committee, that the pressure
began that I let others read the raw FBI reports.
-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 2
1360
Senator Gurney. Let me get back again now to the conversation
with JNIr. Gray. Wasn't he pretty specific with you that the only reason
he would turn these things over to you is because the President of the
United States requested them through you ?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, in my dealings with Mr, Gray, from the
very outset he was very anxious to be of any assistance he could. For
example, when I first met with him and he told me he was
traveling
'Senator Gurney. Could we get to my question now.
Mr, Dean. Certainly, I just want ito explain the circumstance of a
conversation so you can understand it in full and can fully appreciate
it.
WTien he told me, for example, he was traveling around the country
a lot and I should deal with Mark Felt, that to me evidenced that Mr.
Gray wanted to be of assistance ; if he wasn't there, I should talk to
others. The same tenor was in the conversation that he would have to
check, and he wanted assurances these were going to the President, this
information would go to the President. I am sure he knew very well
that the President didn't want to sit down and read a stack of raw FBI
materials.
Senator Gurney. Then it is your understanding that it was Mr.
Gray's understanding that the reason why you were there getting those
302 forms is because the President had requested you to; is that
correct ?
Mr. Dean. I don't believe that is necessarily mv understanding that
he, as I recall wanted to know, you know was this information going
back to the President, and I assured him it was.
Senator Gurney, Well, did it? Did you ever report to the President
what was in those 302 forms ?
Mr. Dean. There was never anything in those FBI reports that I
read, worth reportinc; even to Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever show a single one of the 82, 302 files
to the President ?
Mr. Dean. No, not to my recollection ; no, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did vou ever report a single information that was
in those files to the President ?
Mr. Dean. Not to my recollection, no. I may have reported the gen-
eral tenor of the investigation which was, I might say, very vigorous.
Senator Gurney. You reported that to the President?
Mr. Dean. No, I would report that to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehr-
lichman and as my channel of reporting.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever get a call from Mr. Grav about this
newspaper storv about one of the reports being shown to Mr. Segretti ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, T did.
Senator Gurney. Would you report that to the committee?
Mr. Dean. Well, T recall that when that storv broke, Mr. Grav called
me and asked me if that Avere true, and T said absolutelv not, that the
FBI reports have never left my office and I have never showed an FBI
report to Mr. Secrretti which, in fact, is true. I never showed an FBI
report to Mr. Segretti.
Senator Gurney. Woll, did you gather from this conversation that
Mr. Gray was pretty disturbed about the fact that the report might be
shoAvn not onlv to Segretti but anybody else ?
1361
Mr. Dean. I didn't have the impression that lie was upset by it. I
don't know how often Mr. Gray and I talked but we talked frequently.
We had worked tooether at the Department of Justiee, and while it
was reported that he called me with some oi^tra^e, Mr. Gray and I
generally didn't have that type of conversation. He said something to
the effect that "It that true, you know, I can't believe you would do
that," and I said "No, it is not true and I never showed Segretti any
FBI reports."
Senator Gurnet. Of course you worked at the Department of Justice
for sometime, and I suppose you have some familiarity with the pro-
cedures down there. Isn't it a most unusual thing for a 302 report to
be let out of the FBI office to anyone ?
]Mr. Deax. Well, I know this: that the "Wliite House receives on a
regular basis and my office was the recipient on a regular basis, of
countless FBI information. Now this deals with everything from back-
ground investigation.
Senator Gurnet. I am talking about the 302 forms that are filed
with raw data.
INIr. Dean. Yes.
Senator Gurnet. Not reports.
Mr. Dean. I don't. recall ever receiving 302's at the "White House
other than on this incident. I really was never terribly aware of what
the poMcy was. I didn't work with the criminal cases in the Department
of »Justice while I was there so I don't know if there were other oc-
casions when 302's were sent anywhere or not. I can't answer the ques-
tion.
Senator Gurnet. But I understood vou to say your understanding
with Gray on these 302 files would be that you would guard them very
closely.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet. "V^Hio did you show them to ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I testified, after the report on the 21st came to
my office, ISIr. IMardian was anxious to see them, Mr. Mitchell thought
that was a good idea and also that Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Parkinson
also came to see them. They came to my office. I recall them scanning
them. They decided there really wasn't much in there that interested
them. The thing that sticks in my mind most is tliat Mardian was, who
was apparently very familiar with 302 and FBI investigations from
being the head of the Internal Security Division said that, vou know,
"Gray is just going hog wild here," because of the tone and the tenor
of the interoffice from one field office or from headquarters to field
offices, that the tone of the cables that were being sent out of head-
quarters.
Senator Gurnet. Mardian, O'Brien, Parkinson weren't even in the
^Y]\\te House then ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet. "Wlio were thev working for ?
Mr. Dean. The reelection committee.
Senator Gurnet. Do vou think Mr. Gray had any idea that people
like that outside of the T\niite House were looking at these files?
Mr. Dean. I am surp he had none because I didn't tell him.
Senator Gurnet. Did anybody else look at the files ?
1362
Mr. Dean. The only other occasion I recall anybody else looking at
the files is when Mr. Dick Moore who was Special Counsel to the Presi-
dent was instructed by Mr. Ehrlichman to prepare himself to deal with
the leaking stories on the Segretti related matters and at that time
Mr. Moore was given those documents to look at, and worked with
those documents as they related to Segretti, Kalmbach, and Chapin,
and INIr. Strachan.
Senator Gtjkney. Didn't Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan look at them,
too?
Mr. Dean. No, sir, they did not. I never showed them to any witness.
In fact I was requested, and I told the people wlio had been inter-
viewed that I didn't think it was something I could show them, and I
would generally just talk in general about it. I do recall when they
were reinterviewed by the FBI the FBI themselves showed them their
original 302's.
Senator Gurnet. Don't you think it was a serious breach of faith
to show these 302 files to other people, a breach of faith to Mr. Gray?
Mr. Dean. Yes. I think it can be interpreted that way.
Senator Gitrney. Let's go to the matter of the Hunt material that
was turned over to Mr. Gray.
ISTow, as I understand it some material was turned over to the FBI
but certain materials were held out ; is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gukney. What were they ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I tried in my statement to catalog wliat I can recall
that I saw amongst those documents. This was a combined effort to
extract this material by Mr. Fielding and myself. Sometimes when
Mr. Fielding was going through it he would make reference to some-
thing and at one point in time I decided we ought to extract all of
these documents and put them in one place, and Mr. Fielding did that
for me and put them in envelopes and they were subsequently stored in
my safe until the time they were turned over to Mr. Gray.
So, I cannot
Senator Gtjrney. I thought you testified that you carried some of
these around in the trunk of your car?
Mr. Dean. No, sir, that was not, those were not documents. That was
the briefcase that was found in Mr. Hunt's safe. That was a rather
large, oh, like so.
Senator Gtirney. Wasn't that the material that was turned over to
Gray?
Mr. Dean. No, sir, it was not.
Senator Gtjrney. "V^Hiat was turned over to Gray ?
Mr. Dean. Two envelopes containing sensitive political documents.
Senator Gurney. And what — that was turned over at a meeting in
Mr. Ehrlichman's office, is that right?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. And you were present and Mr. Gray was present.
Mr. Dean. That is correct. You will recall I had been instnicted to
"deep-six" and shred documents. I had to come up in my own mind with
a persuasive argument for Mr. Ehrlichman as to why not to "deep-six"
and destroy documents. I decided the best way to persuade him was to
tell him that there was a chance that the men who had drilled the safe
had seen it, that the Secret Service agent who was present at the time
1363
of the drillinrr had seen it that Mr. Fiekliiio- and Mr. Kehrli had been
there and had seen it and, of course, Mr. Fielding had gone through all
of the documents and for all those people to be quizzed by the FBI
would result in an awful lot of lying.
Senator Gurney. Was it your suggestion to turn these papers over
to Mr. Gray ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it was because I told Mr.
Senator Gukney. Why did you suggest this ?
Mr. Dean. I told Mr.Ehrlichman that if I were ever asked I wanted
to be able to testify that I turned everything over to the FBI and sub-
sequently when that came up and they were getting more specific with
that I told
Senator Gttkney. Wliat was the conversation in the office at the time
the documents were turned over to Mr. Gray ?
Mr. Dean. Well, it was a very brief conversation and, as I say, my
encounter during that was very short. I had preceded Mr. Gray, as I
recall the sequence, to Mv. Ehrlichman's office. Mr. Ehrlichman in-
formed me he was going to meet with him and said, "Bring the docu-
ments over."
I brought the documents over and laid them on a coffee table in Mr.
Ehrlichman's office.
Senator Gurney. Didn't you and Ehrlichman agree to set up the
meeting ?
Mr. Dean. I have the impression Mr. Ehrlichman was going to
meet with INIr. Gray on something else. That it w-as not specifically
on this subject.
Senator Gurney. I thought you said you suggested to Mr. Ehrlich-
man that you have a meeting with Gray to turn the documents over
to him.
Mr. Dean. I suggested we turn them directly over to Mr. Gray, and
]\Ir. Ehrlichman, and after I turned the rest of the material over and
I was still holding this I thought we ought to get the remainder over,
called — that happened on a Thursday or Friday, over the weekend. I
said — there is a delay here — and called Ehrlichman on Monday and he
said, 'T am meeting with Mr. Gray this evening, why don't you bring
the documents over then," something of that nature.
Senator Gurney. Now then, what transpired when they were turned
over?
Mr. Dean. As I said, I took the documents and had a very brief dis-
cussion with Ehrlichman. I laid them on the coffee table in Ehrlich-
man's office. INIr. Gray was called up from the reception area, came in
and Mr. Ehrlichman made the initial — initially raised the matter, and
said something to the effect that these are materials from Mr. Hunt's
safe, I believe Dean has turned over other material to the Bureau
directly.
Senator Gurney. Did you have any discussion with Mr. Ehrlichman
when you brought the documents in and laid them on the coffee table?
Mr. Dean. I am sure there was.
Senator Gurney. "Wliat was
Mr. Dean. About this w^as the way I could very easily handle the
situation if I was ever asked, if Mr. Gray had been useful and seen
them.
1364
Senator Gurney. Did you discuss with Mr, Ehrlichman what you
mi^ht be g:oin^ to tell Mr. Gray ?
Mr. Dean. 1 was ^oing to tell him that I did not think these related
to the Watergate incident, which I did not.
Senator Gurney. No, I am talking about the papers. The purpose of
the meeting was to turn some very sensitive documents over to
Mr. Gray.
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Senator Gtjrney. So you could get rid of them and Mr. Ehrlichman
could get rid of them.
Now, prior to his coming into the office, I understand that you went
in and took the papers in and laid them down. My question is, did you
have any discussion with Mr. Ehrlichman at that time to what you
were going to tell Mr. Gray when you turned the papers over — or when
he turned them over ?
Mr. Dean. It was pretty well understood what the meeting was for.
so it was not necessary to have any extended discussion other than the
fact that the documents were very politically sensitive, that as I recall,
I called them political dynamite when I raised them with Gray, that
he should take custody of them, and that that would be the way to
handle it as far as the "V^Hiite House was concerned. I do not recall any
discussion of telling Mr. Gray to destroy the documents.
'Senator Gttrney. You and Mr. Ehrlichman must have had, cer-
tainly, some feeling that Mr. Gray was not going to take this back to
the FBI and put it in the files somewhere.
Mr. Dean. Well, he was told that they should never be leaked or be
made public, something to that effect, yes.
Senator Gtjrney. Well, did you discuss something to that effect
before he came in the office ?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, if we did. I have certainly no recollection
of it at this time. As I recall the transaction, it was brief, I came over
immediately preceding the meeting. Gray was called up, there was this
brief conversation. Grav was virtually en route up. He came in. This
was explained to him. He at that point in time, as I recall, placed the
documents in a small sort of briefcase — not really a briefcase, but one
of these thin legal briefcases that he i:)laced the documents in, and
seemed quite willing to take them. He did not have a lot of hesitancy
and he seemed to miderstand that indeed, this was an appropriate pro-
cedure, although an unusual one.
Senator Gurney. And what was precisely the thing that was said
to Mr. Gray about the documents ?
Mr. Dean. Was said to him? Well, I can recall that Ehrlichman
told him that they were from Mr. Hunt's safe and that they were very
politically sensitive. I then explained to him that we had turned the
rest of the material over to the agents. Plowever, these were political
dynamite and if they ever leaked, it would just be a very serious
problem for the President during the reelection year.
Senator Gtitrney. Was there not something about the light of day in
that conversation ?
Mr. Dean. That is possible. I do not recall it now, what particular
language I used. I think I conveyed to the committee the — if I used
that particular term at that time, that does not necessarily strike me
as one of my normal phrases.
1365
Senator Gurney. Well, to the best of your recollection, what did you
say to Mr. Gray ?
Mr. Dean, As I say, to the best of my recollection, I cannot recall
the precise words, but other than the fact that the material had come
from Hunt's safe, to the best of my knowledge, it did not relate to the
Watergate ; if it leaked, that these documents were political dynamite,
that if the}' leaked or became public, it would cause great embarrass-
ment and great problems.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever call Mr. Gray about these documents
after that meeting?
]Mr. Dean. I cannot recall calling him. I recall, as I testified, I be-
lieve yesterday, I had discussed this with counsel, that I had a con-
versation at some time with Mr. Gray in his office, in which he told
me that he had taken the documents to Connecticut. He said he was
either going to read them or had read them. I just cannot recall which
it was that he said, because it was a passing conversation.
Senator Gurney. You do not recall two conversations with Mr.
Gray, either meeting with him in his office or he in your office or over
the phone, asking him what he had done with the documents?
Mr. Dean. The first time — well, as I say, this one occasion, as I
recall, was in his office when he indicated to me that he had taken them
to Connecticut.
Senator Gurney. That was the result of your question asking him
what he had done with them ; is that right ?
Mr. Dean. No ; as I recall, he volunteered that, that he had taken
them to Connecticut.
Senator Gurney. Well, what were you discussing at that meeting
with him ? "Wliat was the purpose of the meeting ?
Mr. Dean. I do not recall. It could have been on the leak problems
that we were having.
Senator Gurney. But you do recall in the meeting that he said, I
have taken the documents to Connecticut ?
Mr. Dean. If you gave me a specific date on what meeting you might
be referring to
Senator Gurney. I do not really know myself. I am trying to find
out.
]Mr. Dean. As I say, five dates, I can generally jout them in the
sequence of what I was doing at a given time or what a given concern
was. I do recall a meeting in Gray's office that this came up, he told
me that he had taken tliem to Connecticut, I am not clear whether he
said he had read them or was going to read them or anything of this
nature.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever ask him again on any occasion what
he had done with the documents?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did. After I liad disclosed this matter to Mr. Peter-
sen, I recall that I was at luncheon at the Justice Department. This
was probably in early January. At that time, INIr. Gray came up to
me and sort of took me by the arm and said, John, you have got to
hang tight on not disclosing these documents. And I said nothing
to liim.
I said, I understand, and tliat was — but at the time, I had been
questioned by the prosecutors. I felt I had to tell ]Mr. Petersen because
if I was going to go forward, that very fact was going to come out.
1366
Senator Gurney. But you never asked him on any other occasion
what he did with the documents ; is that right ?
Mr, Dean. Not to my recollection; no. In fact, I was quite sur-
prised at that same time that he had destroyed the documents.
Senator Gurney. Why did that surprise you?
Mr. Dean. Well, I thought it was totally unnecessary, a rather
unwise move.
Senator Gurney. I thought that was the whole subject of the con-
versation in Ehrlichman's office when you turned over the documents
to him?
ISIr. Dean. To the contrary. He was told that they should just never
be leaked or made public. That to me, is far different from telling a
man to destroy documents. There are a host of things, I am sure, in
everybody's files that, if they were leaked, you know, if you told a
staff man not to leak this, that is one thing. If you told him to destroy
it, that is quite another situation.
Senator Gurney. Hoping that they might never see the light of day
again might be interpreted as wanting them to be destroyed, might
it not have?
jSIr. Dean. Not necessarily. I am sure there are a lot of things in the
Bureau that probably should never see the light of day, but to destroy
them is something else. I see a great distinction. Senator, in the two.
Senator Gurney. Let us go to the August press conference, where
the President referred to the Dean report. My understanding is that
you indicated great surprise at this so-called Dean report, because, as
I understand it, you felt that you had not been conducting an investi-
gation of Watergate ; is that right ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. When I say great surprise, any time the
President of the United States mentions your name, it is a great
surprise.
I will give you another example. When the President, shortly after
the Supreme Court handed down the death penalty decision, I liad a
call from Mr. Buchanan, wlio was preparing the President. The Presi-
dent went on television and said, I have just talked to my counsel
about this decision and here is his opinion on it.
Now, I was obviously quite surprised to hear my name on television
when I had given advice to the President interpreting this decision,
when, in fact I had never talked to him about it. That is a great sur-
prise to me when that sort of thing happens.
Senator Gueney. If we can get back to the investigation of Water-
gate, though, that is what I am trying to find out about here. "What
were you doing all tliis time when you had 82 of tliese form 802's, you
were sitting in with witnesses from the White House in their FBI
interviews, you had many calls to people about it, you talked to Mr.
Gray about it several times, you, as I understand it, were reporting
to Haldeman and Ehrlichman? You do not call it an investigation.
What do you term it ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I call it participation in a coverup. I was getting
my orders from my superiors and doing what I thought was expected
of me at that time and following those orders out.
Senator- Gurney. Well, do you not think that it might have been
interpreted by some people as a rather thorougli investigation on your
part?
1367
Mr. Dean. I doubt if they could consider it thorough. If I were
going to conduct an investigation, I would use an^^thing from a poly-
.<>:ra]Dh to a — every investigative means I could conceive of. I was not
investigating ;Mr. Haldeman, certainly. I never pressed Mr. Strachan
on his involvement. I certainly was not investigating the White House.
The onl}' person I was not^
Senator Gurnet. There is no reason why you should be investigating
Mr. Haldeman or ]Mr. Ehrlichman, because the}^ were included in the
coverup with you, were they not ?
Mr. Dean. That is what I am saying, there was no investigation.
You asked me why I am surprised about the investigation. There was
no investigation.
Senator Gurnet. My question was, don't you think that somebody
else might have thought that you were investigating from the activity
that I have just described to you ?
Mr. Dean. I do not know who would conceive of that.
Senator Gurnet. Well, I can tell you that all of the members of
the Judiciary Committee, during the Gray hearings, were under the
impression that you were conducting a rather large investigation of
the White House.
Mr. Dean. Well, let me just use the same analogy. I am sure a lot
of people thought when the President recited what the substance of
the death penalty was that I had probably just talked to him and given
him the substance.
Senator Gurnet. Do you not think that the President might have
concluded that you were conducting an investigation, particularly if
INIr. Haldeman or ]Mr. Ehrlichman, one or the other, were reporting to
him what was going on, as you have testified to many times in this
Mr. Dean. I have also testified I have no idea how this ended up
in the briefing book. I had no conversations with the President during
this period of time. I have no idea what the President thought was
happening. I have testified to the fact that Mr. Haldeman frequently
made notes when I was reporting to him. I had meetings in some of
the most unusual places that I cannot recall the substance of the meet-
ings, but I would be called to California, I would meet up at the New-
porter with ]Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, off on the patio. They
would want to know what was happening.
I recall one time when Air Force One landed, they called me to come
out to Andrews and I met in the — the President had already de-
parted. I met in the cabin of Air Force One, the President's cabin.
They asked me for a report at that time. As soon as the press plane
came in, they said, we have got to get out of here, we cannot all be seen
together.
Senator Gurnet. Let me ask you this in connection with this so-
called investigation by Mr. Dean of Watergate. You indicated great
surprise and as I gather, rather consternation about the fact that you
were said bv the President to have conducted an investigation. Is
that not right ?
Mr. Dean. I said great surprise. I do not believe I would reveal to
others at that time the fact that I was distressed about it.
Senator Gurnet. Did you ever protest to Mr. Haldeman that you
did not appreciate the way the President was bandying your name
around in this investigation ?
1368
Mr. Dean. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Gueney. Did you ever protest to Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I did not.
Senator Gurnet. Did you ever protest to the President ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; but others, I did.
Senator Gtjrney. Whom did you protest to ?
Mr. Dean. I talked to Mr. Mitchell about it, I talked to Mr. Moore
about it, I talked to my associate, Mr. Fielding. I said, tliis bothers me,
that I am being put out on front on this. I think if I would have
protested to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, it would have been to no avail.
Senator Gurney. Let's turn to the CIA involvement with Water-
gate. I understand that you suggested the possibility to Haldeman?
Is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I think that what happened, from what I under-
stand, is that the first time I talked to them about the CIA, they had
already met with the CIA. They told me, or Mr. Ehrlichman told me,
really none of the specifics of his meetings with the CIA the preceding
day other than the fact that he and Mr. Haldeman had met with the
CIA, met with Director Helms and General Walters. I told him that it
had come up in a meeting with Mr. Mitchell that we should explore
the possibility of the CIA providing some assistance.
Senator Gurney. Well, I guess I worded my question poorly.
Mitchell brought it up to you and then you brought it up to Haldeman
and Ehrlichman, is that right?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, yes.
Senator Gurney. You knew perfectlv well that the CIA had abso-
lutely nothing to do with Watergate, didn't you ?
Mr. Dean. Well, sir, I knew this. The only thing I did know and
this is one of the questions that I asked General Walters, were any
of these men operatives that could in any way embarrass the CIA?
This had come up — I don't understand that whole world and how it
exists even today. But apparently, there is some arrangement where
the operative is taken care of if some day he does get in trouble. This
was discussed in this conversation, that some of these people might
well be operatives that he would be taken care of and the CIA might
have a legitimate interest in protecting them.
Senator Gurney. You mean you thought at this time that those
seven people who were caught in the Watergate were not in the employ
of the Committee To Re-Elect the President ?
Mr. Dean. Oh, it was quite clear.
Senator Gurney. Or that they might have been working for the
FBI?
Mr. Dean. No, sir; I am talking about in years past.
Senator Gurney. All I said was that you knew that the CIA had
nothing to do with Watergate. That was mv question.
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir ; I was well aware of that.
Senator Gurney. Then whv did vou try to involve the CIA in this ?
Mr. Dean. What I was beginning to explain is what had come up
was there was a suggestion that these men could have been past oper-
atives. There is a lot more known about these men today than was
known at that time.
This was looked at as a potential way to deal with the situation
that they were going to meet. They were asking for support
1369
Senator Gtjrxey. This was a good coverup.
Mr. Deax. Absolutely.
Senator Gurxey. That is all I am trying to find out, that you tried
to inA'olve the CIA
jNIr. Deax. I am trying to explain.
Senator Gtrxey [continuing]. Knowing that they had nothing to
do with it, in order to trj^ to cover up.
Mr. Deax. Well, I knev7 that, after he had made it clear to the best
of his knowledge that they did not have a problem, it was sort of a
hope that this would be a solution. It was not a solution. I continued
to pursue it with them, asking if in fact, there was anything they
could do.
Senator Gurxey. All of this is really in preparation for my next
question. Did you ever advise the President of the United States that
somebody was trying to involve the CIA in this coverup proposition ?
Mr. Deax. No, sir; Mr. Ehrlichman was quite aware I was meeting,
because he had instructed me to meet. That was my reporting channel.
Senator Gurxey. Now let's turn to Mr. Kalmbach if we can and the
beginning of the silence operation, the pajdng off of the people in
Watergate. Could you tell us briefly how this came up? I know we
have discussed it before, but could you summarize exactly what
went on?
Mr. Deax. As I have explained, I would carry a message, for exam-
ple, when Mr. Haldeman and INIr. Ehrlichman agreed that to involve
the CIA would be a very bad idea. I took this infonnation back to the
reelection committee. They then said, well, we have to do something.
As I have testified, the discussion was, well, we need Herb Kalmbach.
Well, they knew that there was nothing they could say that could
get ]Mr. Kalmbach going. They knew there was nothing I could say
that would get Mr. Kalmbach going. So I was asked to go back to Mr.
Haldeman and ^Nlr. Ehrlichman to see if they would agree to this
procedure, which they did. Then 'I conveyed the message to Mr.
Kalmbach.
Senator Gurxey. Now what happened?
Mr. Deax. Mr. Kalmbach flew back East and I told Mr. Kalmbach
why he had come back East.
Senator Gurxey. 'What day was this?
Mr. Deax. I believe it was on the 29th.
Senator Gurxey. Where did you meet?
Mr. Deax. We met dn the Mayflower Hotel, in the coffee shop
initially, but the coffee shop is too busy and we could find no privacy,
so we went to his room.
Senator Gurxey. "\'\Tiat did you discuss ?
Mr. Deax. I told him — I was very open with Mr, Kalmbach about
the situation. I knew he didn't want to get involved, but I told him
what I knew. I told him that I had learned that files had been destroyed
that were apparently quite incriminating for Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Gurxey. Now, now, let's proceed carefully here.
]Mr. Deax. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurxey. Are you sure you told him that ?
Mr. Deax. Well, I told him — what I told him is that I had conveyed
to him
Senator Gurxey. Why would he be interested in that ?
1370
Mr. Dean. I will tell you why he would be interested in that.
Senator Gurney. Wliy would you be interested in telling him?
Mr. Dean. I would be interested in telling him because at that point
in time, I was very concerned that this thing might lead directly to
the President of the United States and that was the seriousness of
his being involved.
Senator Gurney. Well, what did you tell him that you needed him
for, to raise money for what? That is why he came there, isn't that
right?
Mr. Dean, That is correct.
Senator Gurney. What did you tell him that you needed him for ?
Mr. Dean. To pay for the silence of these individuals.
Senator Gurney. Are you sure you told him that ?
Mr. Dean. Well, if there was any doubt in his mind, I would be
surprised.
Senator Gurney, Well, I thought that the money went for a number
of things, like the payment of bail money, the payment of attorneys'
fees, the payment of support for the defendants and their families.
Weren't those some of the reasons the money was being raised?
Mr. Dean. I can recall
Senator Gurney. You told him nothing about that?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, if you will let me answer the question,
please.
I can recall that when Mr. Ehrlichman was asking me about some
of my testimony, he said, well, I always assumed this was for humani-
tarian purposes,
I said, now, you know we talked about specifics, I played some tapes
and tlie like. To pay the support, the bail, and the like of these indi-
viduals who had been found in the Democratic National Committee,
who could begin unraveling the whole matter — I think. Senator, know-
ing the good lawyer you are, you would understand very well that
this was for silence, Air, Kalmbach had no difficulty understanding
that this was for silence.
Senator Gurney. I am not sure I would at all. I think that would be
a very human thing to do if you employed some people who had got
caught and who had no resources, I would think it would be a fairly
logical thing, that you might raise some money for these expenditures,
jNIr, Dean, Well, Senator, I am saying that I was quite sure that
Mr. Kalmbach understood after our meeting that the purpose of his
mission was. He told me that he wanted to use INIr, Ulasewicz for the
deliveries. If we were going to make such payments openly, why not
put it on the campaign expenditures?
Senator Gurney. Well, as I understand your testimony now, you
did discuss this business of raising the money for bail, for support,
for attorneys' fees.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney, And you did not discuss specifically that this
money was being raised to pay for silence.
Is that correct?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I can't recall specifically what I said,
but I felt quite confident that INIr, Kalmbach understood. Given the
whole ])rocedure that was being set up and the use of INIr, Ulasewicz,
that this was not for humanitarian purposes, we might say.
1371
Senator Gurney. Who suggested the use of INfr. Ulasewicz?
]Mr. Deax. ]\Ir. Kahnbach raised that himself. He said he was the
only man he would trust.
Senator Gurney. What did you say and plan or what was the under-
standing about the instructions that were going to be given to Mr.
Kalmbach from time to time?
Mr. Dean. I told him that INIitchell had suggested that he get his
detailed instructions from ]\Ir. LaRue, who had all the facts and
details. I did not have them.
Senator Guexey. You mentioned a meeting in your office. I don't
recall the date now, but Mr. LaRue came there for the purpose, I
think, of turning over some money.
Is that correct?
Mr. Deax. No, it wasn't to turn over money ; it was to explain to
INIr. Kalmbach the nature of the deliveries. He had a large sheet of
])aper — when I say hirge, it was probably a folded 8 by 10. Mr. Kalm-
bach took notes and put into his own code on a very small piece of
paper the information that Mr. LaRue had and put this in his wallet.
Senator Gtjrney. Did you set up that meeting ?
Mr. Deax. As I recall, Mr. Kalmbach had asked me if LaRue and
he could meet in m}' office, and I said fine.
Senator Gurxey. You don't recall that you set up the meeting
Mr. Deax". I don't recall the mechanics of the meeting. Mr. LaRue
had a "\Aniite House pass. He had been on the ^^Hiite House staif before.
I didn't really know him when he was at the White House and didn't
know he had a pass until he was able to come into my office without
being cleared. Mr. Kalmbach also had a pass, so it was very easy for
them to come to my office and meet.
Senator Gurxey. Were there any other people present ?
Mr. Deax. No, sir.
Senator Gurxey. Just the three of you ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Gurxey. My understanding of your previous testimony is
that at the meeting, you didn't pay any attention to it at all and they
just talked among themselves
Mr. Deax^. Well, I wouldn't say — I wasn't totally unaware of what
they were talking about. I can't recall specifically the dollar amounts.
I did take some telephone calls and return some, because Mr. Kalm-
bach was being very careful in deciding how he was going to decipher
down this larger list into a smaller list that he could use himself.
Senator Gurx'ey. Let's turn now to the September 15 meeting with
the President and Mr. Haldeman and yourself. That of course is a
very important meeting, because I understand from your testimony
that it was at that meeting that you felt that the President knew all
about Watergate, is that right ?
Mr. Deax', Well, I will say this, when I came in, the indictments had
been announced, he acted as if it was a very cordial circumstance. The
President asked me to sit down and told me that Bob had told him
what I had been doing and he expressed appreciation for it. He, you
know, indicated that he was— I could tell, you know you can tell, when
you are talking with the President when he understands or not. I
learned that even more later when I had more dealings with him
when I knew something would come up that he knew nothing about
and I would have to go into greater detail.
1372
Senator Gubney. Did you discuss the criminal cases that were com-
ing on for trial ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, we did or it was the criminal case at that point. It
was the entire seven were being moved forward as a trial.
Senator Gttrney. Did you discuss the civil suits that were filed by
the Democrats?
Mr, Dean. Yes, we did.
Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss the Common Cause suit that had
been filed by Common Cause?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss the Patman hearings that were
imminent ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, we did.
Senator Gurnet. Any idea how long these discussions took ?
Mr. Dean. I would say that the entire meeting lasted 30 minutes or
some, 40 minutes.
Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss any aspects of the Watergate at
that meeting with the President. For example, did you tell him any-
thing about what Haldeman knew or what Ehrlichman knew?
Mr. Dean. Well, given the fact that he told me I had done a good
job I assumed he had been very pleased with what had been going on.
The fact that the indictments, he was pleased that the indictments had
stopped at Liddy because the only oblier link into the White House,
as we had discussed earlier in sessions with Ehrlichman and Halde-
man, was Magruder.
Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss what Magruder knew about
Watergate and what involvement he had ?
Mr. Dean. No. I didn't. I did not get into any — I did not give him a
report at that point in time.
Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss the coverup money that was being
raised and paid?
Mr. Dean. No, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss Strachan bringing wiretap infor-
mation in to Haldeman?
]\Tr. Dean. No, I did not.
Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss Haldeman instructing Strachan
to destroy all of these materials?
INIr. Dean. No, I did not.
Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss the CIA coverup idea?
Mr. Dean. I did not.
Senator Gurnet. Did you talk about coaching Magruder on his
perjured testimony in August?
Mr. Dean. No, I did not.
Senator Gurnet. Well now how can you say that the President
knew all about these things from a simple observation by him that
"Bob tells me you are doing a good job."
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I assume you know how your staff oper-
ates. I assume members of your staff understand how you operate,
how reporting requirements proceed. I v/as aware of the fact that Mr.
Haldeman had often made notes, INIr. Haldeman has a good mernory.
Mr. Haldeman does not leave details aside. This was the hottest issue
that was going in the campaign. I can't believe that the fact that we
Avere going to contain this matter would totally escape the President's
1373
attention and it was to me a confirmation and a compliment to me
that I had done this.
Senator Gurxey. Don't you think the President might have been
complimenting you on the, I will use the word, investigation even if
you don't desire that word, of the involvement of the people in the
White House, the FBI interviews, all of that business, don't you think
he might have been discussing that?
jSIr. Deax. I would think he would say something to the effect that
"AVell, your investigation has been very accurate" rather than "Bob's
been telling me everything you have been doing and you have been
doing a good job."
Senator Gurxey. Did he say that "Bob has been telling me every-
thing you have been doing."
Mr. Deax. He said "Bob has been reporting to me," something of
this nature.
Senator Gurxey. I thought you said that he said that "Bob has
been telling me what a good joId you have been doing."
]Mr. DEA^^ AVell, we are quibbling over words but I remember
Senator Gurxey. We are not quibbling over words. We are talking
about something very important, whether the President of the United
States knew on September 15 about the Watergate and the coverup.
]Mr. Deax'. I am totally aware.
Senator Gurxey. This protects his Presidency and the Government
of the United States.
Mr. Deax. I am quite aware of that and I have told you I am trying
to recall. My mind is not a tape recorder. It does recall impressions of
conversations very well, and the impression I had was that he had told,
he told me that. Bob had reported to him what I had been doing. That
was the imjiression that very clearly came out.
Senator Gurxey. In other words, your whole thesis on saying that
the President of the United States knew about Watergate on Septem-
ber 15 is purelv an impression, there isn't a single shred of evidence
that came out of this meeting.
Mr. Deax^. Senator, I don't have
Senator Gurx^ey. That he knew anything about.
Mr. Deax". Senator, I don't have a thesis. I am reporting the facts
as I am able to recall them to this committee.
Senator Gurx^ey. Let's turn to Segretti. I understand you talked
to him in June and advised him about his pending interview with the
FBI, is that correct?
Mr. Deax^. I had a call from Mr. Strachan who asked me if I would
meet with Mr. Segretti.
Senator Gurx^ey. I presume that you learned at that time his par-
ticipation in the dirty tricks department.
Mr. Deax. He was not fully explicit at that time and that is why
it was not until November that I went out and had a full interview
with him to find out the dimensions of the involvement of Mr. Chapin
and Mr. Strachan, a copv of that tape, of that interview. I turned over
to the committee and that was the first time I really knew of the full
dimensions of his involvement.
Senator Gurxey. But did you know he was up to dirty tricks in
June?
Mr. Deax-. Yes ; I did.
1374
Senator Gukney. Did you tell that to the President of the United
States?
Mr. Dean. I think I have explained my reporting times to the Presi-
dent, and this I might also add that the
Senator Gtjrney. In other words, you did not tell it to the President
of the United States ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir. The coverup on Segretti was sort of a mini
coverup as opposed to the rather large and extensive coverup that was
going on with the other matters.
Senator Gurney. The purpose of the meeting with Mr. Segretti was
to advise him to withhold information from the FBI about Strachan,
Chapin, and Kalmbach, isn't that right?
Mr. Dean. Unless pressed.
Senator Gurney. Now then let's go to October, going along there
in chronological fashion, and the money that was turned over to you,
the $15,200 ; now why were you put in charge of that money ?
Mr. Dean. I can't answer that question. I know that Mr. Strachan
and Mr. Howard brought it to me on the week of June 19, I think it
was the 20th or 21st they brought it to me.
Senator Gtjrney. Who brought it to you ?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Strachan, Gordon Strachan and Mr. Richard
Howard.
Senator Gurney. What were their instructions ?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Strachan told me that these are funds that had not
been expended, they were in Mr. Howard's custody and asked me to
take custody of the money and I told him I would. I told Strachan I
would tell him what, you know I would remain accountable for the
money.
Senator Gurney. Now then, I understand that you withdrew $4,850
from it.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. And that you placed in it, what was it, a packet
of money ?
Mr. Dean. When I took it out. I took out, I was seeking to take out
about $5,000. I thought that would cover my expenses. I might pvit
this in context : When my prospective bride came back I was working
around the clock on this, I had been given a couple of assignments. I
was supposed to get the minister or I was looking for a judge to do
that, and also to get some wedding music because the wedding was
going to be held in a home. Come Thursdav I hadn't even gotten a
chance to take care of these matters. I had made some preliminary
calls and had to get another member of my staff to go out and find
somebody to perform the ceremony on Friday, and I sent my secretary
to go out and find wedding music. I didn't exactly sit down and plan
this thing out and realized I would not have money to pay for the
honeymoon and expenses to occur and this was a very easy thing for
me to do and reach in and take out what I thought I would need at
that time.
Senator Gurney. Well, mv quf^slion was, "Was the money in a
packet or envelope, the whole $15,200 ?"
Mr. Dean. It was in two envelopes. I had replaced it. I had put them
both into one envelope, and put them in my safe.
1375
Senator Gurnet. Then you put your check for $4,850 in this
envelope ?
Mr. Dean. After I counted out what I thouglit was going to be
roughly $5,000 and it came up to $4,850. I put a check, wrote a check
out and put it in, wrote it to cash.
Senator Gurney. How were you going to spend the $4,850?
Mr. Dean. Well, to the best of my recollection.
Senator Gurxey. "Will you just generally tell us.
]Mr. Dean. Yes.
To the best of my recollection I had made reservations for an accom-
modation in Florida tluit was going to run roughly $100 a day. I had
hoped to spend about 2 weeks down there. I also had food expenses, I
was going to have people come in and do the serving, and travel
expenses, and I assumed that just $5,000 would cover it.
Senator Gurney. It seems like a lot of money for a honeymoon.
[Laughter.]
I am really trying to find out a just rough idea of how you were
going to use all that money?
Mr. Dean. Well, sir, as I say I also was having my yard done that
day and I thought I might have to pay having dirt delivered, my
patio had been repaired, I had a whole host of other expenses I thought
I was going to be hit with that night when I walked in.
Senator Gurney. You can't give a better explanation of how you
were going to spend $4,850?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I was told that the backyard was going
to cost about $500. I thought about $2,000 for the honeymoon and I
didn't know what it was going to cost to have people that would do
the serving and the like so I just took what I thought would be a safe
amount to cover all my expenses.
Senator Gurney. I recall in your testimony that you said that you
had neglected or forgotten to get some money out of an account in
New York, and that is why that you took the $4,850, is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. I from time to time would call my broker
when I felt I needed money and just ask him to send me money.
Senator Gurney. This was a brokerage account?
^Ir. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. Where is it or where w^as it?
Mr. Dean. Shearson & Hamill in Xew York City.
Senator Gurney, What was the broker's name handling it?
>Mr. Dean. Mr. Arnold Katz.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever call him for $4,850 to replace this?
Mr. Dean. Xot until early this year. I mean not early this year, it
was in March or April of this year.
Senator Gurney. Xow then, of course, 3'ou really never went on the
honeymoon, did you, except for a short time?
]Mr. Dean. I made several attempts but did not make it.
Senator Gurney. Well, what did you do with the $4,850?
]Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, at one point in time, well, I began using
it for personal expenses.
Senator Gurney. Did you use all of it for personal expenses?
Mr. Dean. Well, I did pay for some travel, I did pay for some
expenses in Florida out of it. I have not sat down and tried to re-
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 3
1376
construct every expenditure. It might be possible for me to do. I don't
know in dealing with cash but I bought everything from groceries and
just used it personally.
Senator Gtirney. I wonder if you would try to do that for the com-
mittee, reconstruct how you spent it.
Mr. Dean. Certainly.
Senator Gurney. Why didn't you replace it shortly after this time ?
]Mr. Dean. Well, at one point I did put in, ])ack in what I had into
the account, and in November when I was trying again to get a honey-
moon in I took it back out again.
Senator Gurnet. How much ?
Mr. Dean. Senator, I have no idea. I commingled it with other
money of mine and put back in and taken back out.
Senator Gurney. Do you recall how much you put back in?
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I do not.
Senator Gurney. You don't recall how much you took back out?
Mr. Dean. I do not at this point. I could — as I say I will try to rp-
construct that for the committee.
Senator Gurney. Did you do it at any other time ?
Mr. Dean. No.
Senator Gurney. Put in and take out ?
Mr. Dean. Not to my recollection, no.
Senator Gurney. Only the one time following the original?
Do you know this is a crime, Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Dean. I am not aware what crime it is, no.
Senator Gurney. Isn't it embezzlement ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I had very clearly made, there was no intention
on my part never to account for the full amount. I had understood
later that by the time I had taken it out it was moneys that had come
over from the 1968' primaries, and I knew at some point in time there
were many people aware of the fact that I had custodv of the money,
that I was to account for $15,200 and I was perfectly willing, able
and capable of accounting for that full amount.
Senator Gurney. Did anybody know you had ever taken the money
out?
Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge, no.
Senator Gurney. Did you tell anybody?
Mr. Dean. No ; I did not.
Senator Gurney. When did you tell somebody about handling this
money ?
Mr. Dean. When I went to the Government, when I first beofan talk-
ing to the prosecutors I explained it to them. I told my lawyer about
it also when I retained counsel.
Senator Gurney. When was that and who?
Mr. Dean. I retained Mr. Shaffer on ^larch 30 and I don't recall
exactly when we got around to that. We spent most of the time getting
out mv explanation of the facts and then we started getting down
into details and at that point in time I told him I had this money
and I thought we ouflfht to handle that also.
Senator Gurney. Was the check still in there at that time?
Mr. Dean. Yes; it was.
Senator Gurney. In other words, you never told anvbody about
this or really did anvthing about it until April when, of course, the
whole Watergate thing was blowing?
1377
]\Ir. Dean. Well, Senator, I will tell yoii, I thought at one time I
ouoflit to stick cash back in there and I said that is the dishonest thing
to do in this regard, I have to come forward and explain that I did
make personal use of this money.
Senator Gtjrney. AVhere is the money now?
Mr. Shaffer. Excuse me. I would like to say as counsel for Mr. Dean,
that based upon the facts that have been discussed with Mr. Dean, if
they are true, ]\Ir. Gurney says that is embezzlement. I disagree with
him, and I think there are enough lawyers in the room to know what
embezzlement is, and I do not plan to take the time now unless the
Chair expressly asks me to make that definition. However, I think it
is unfair to the record to have the situation in a demurrer posture
and to conclude that on the facts that are recited by Mr. Dean, if true,
that that is embezzlement.
Senator Gurney. Well, we might rephrase the question this way.
[Laughter.]
Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Dean, that this might have, that you
might have been committing some sort of an offense or crime?
]\Ir. Dean. No ; it did not because I felt I was always prepared to
account for the money.
Senator Gtjrney. Let us go into the business of attorney's fees.
AVell, first of all, was not your lawyer originally Mr. Hogan?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. And then you changed from INIr. Hogan to whom ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I began discussing with Mr. Hogan who is a very
able lawver. who has had some criminal experience, on March 25, who
he would suggest is a very fine criminal lawyer. We talked about, I
told him that I wanted to have a very fine criminal lawyer to go over
a lot of these things to get some independent counsel on. Mr. Hogan,
who is also from, has a suburban practice, told me about Mr. Shaffer.
I had known Mr. Shaffer from some years ago, we had had a casual
acquaintance, wliere we had met, I do not know how many years ago,
three or four, I guess it has been, and I liked him when I met him.
I knew he had been a prosecutor, and enjoyed a good reputation in that
regard. I also called on the 28th and 29th several other friends to ask
them who they might suggest as a very capable criminal lawyer that
could assess this situation for me. I wanted them to look at my prob-
lem and everybody else's problem and that had never been done based
on the facts that I knew. So Mr. Hogan was my initial lawyer, then
Mr. Hogan dropped out of the case because he had a conflict of interest
because he had represented Mr. Colson at one stage and he realized
that when my conversations went on it might get on into Mr. Colson,
so he withdrew and about that same time Mr. INIcCandless was retained.
Senator Gtjrney. Is Mr. Shaffer chief counsel or Mr. McCandless?
Mr. Dean. I think they are cocounsel and Mr. Shaffer and Mr. Mc-
Candless work together very closely.
Senator Gurney. Have you paid them a retainer ?
Mr. Dean. They have sent me a bill I have not paid.
Senator Gurney. Did you handle any other cash during the cam-
paig-n other tlian the $15,200 tliat you testified to ?
Mr. Dean. Did I personally handle it ? No, sir, I did not.
Senator Gurney. Have you received any payments from anybody
this year or last year other than the income which you received from
your employment or the brokerage accounts ?
1378
Mr. Dean. I have had reimbursements from the Government and
I had a reimbursement from the Re -Elect ion Committee for an expen-
diture for the convention but those were the only reimbursements.
Senator Gurnet. Turning now to
Mr. Dean. You said also my brokerage firm, I guess it was this
year that I made a substantial profit on a home I owned. I had bought
a house at, in the neighborhood that Senator Weicker has recently
moved into, I might add, where I was one of the first persons in the
neighborhood, and they were almost giving the houses away at that
point in time. I bought the house, encouraging a lot of my friends to
buy houses also, and we were able to negotiate by bringing the number
of people in simultaneously, a rather good purchase price. Within
11, 12 months I had made a $15,000 profit on one home and was able
to buy another home and pay for the furniture in the second house.
Senator Gurnet. Is it my understanding that the committee is being
furnished a full financial statement by the witness?
Mr. Dash. We will so receive one.
Mr. Dean. I have not been asked for one. I would be perfectly
willing. My records are in the White House, my own records are down
there with everything else and I might add that I would be perfectly
welcome for any audit or any examination that I understand ]\Ir.
Bellino, who is with the staff, and would welcome his full and thor-
ough analysis of all my financial holdings or dealings and the like.
Senator Gurnet. I would like to request that, Mr. Chairman. I do
not want to ask the witness questions here on that but I would like a
full statement for the committee.
Senator ER^^:N. The witness says he will be glad to furnish it so
I request him to do so. I do not know whether he has to get access to
the records at the White House or not.
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, they will give me access down there and
I think they might let me take 'my own personal things out there, I
assume that is going to occur.
Senator Gurnet. Now, if we can go to November, Mr. Dean, as I
recall, in the testimony there was discussion some time around Novem-
ber about a written report that was to be written by you on Watergate?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet. Who requested that report?
Mr. Dean. That was INIr. Haldeman who first raised it with me.
Senator Gurnet. Did you ever write this report?
INIr. Dean. Yes, sir, and I have submitted that as a document to
the committee.
Senator Gurnet. Did you — if we have it I can look at it there —
but did you ever tell the President about this report or give him a
copy of it?
INIr. Dean. No, sir, I used my normal reporting channels. I under-
stand that it went from Mr. Haldeman to ^Ir. Ehrlichman, who made
some editorial changes on it which are reflected, I believe I submitted
the original to the committee, the editorial changes are INIr. Ehrlich-
man's. Then, it went to ]Mr. Ziegler and there was a meeting on
September 13 in which it was decided that report would not be issued.
Senator Gi^rnet. Turnhig to the offer of clemency to Mr. McCord,
as I understand it, you made the arrangements for that through ]Mr.
Caulfield?
1379
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gukxey. And he, in turn, communicated with Mr. McCord,
I guess, througli Uhisewicz one time and then himself; is that correct?
Mr. Deax. That is my undei-standing.
Senator Gurxey. And my understanding also is that the offer of
clemency Avas made to Mr. McCord, I think, in terms like this : That
it comes from the highest authority in the White House ; is that sub-
stantially correct ?
]Mr. Deax. That is correct ; yes.
Senator Gurxey. Did you ever advise the President of the United
States about that?
Mr. Deax. Xo, sir. As I had explained in my testimony, I vras pro-
ceeding on a conversation I had with Mr. Ehrlichman after Mr. Ehr-
lichman indicated and Mr. Colson also had indicated that they had
talked directly with the President about the matter, something which
was later confirmed by the President himself in conversations with
him.
Senator Gurxey. Did you ever have a meeting with Mr. Magruder,
let me see on this, in January or December, in which there was a dis-
cussion about the planning of the "Watergate ? Do you remember any-
thing about that ?
Mr. Deax". I recall Mr. Magruder coming to my office one time, and
this is — I saw part of Mr. Magruder's testimony on this before this
committee. It is one if I have seen 3 hours total I would be surprised,
but I did see part of Mr. Magruder, I caught one section of the ques-
tioning of him, I believe it was during the questioning of him, in which
he made a reference to this.
I think what he is referring to
Senator Gurxey. What did he refer to ?
Mr. Deax. He was referring to the fact that my memory had gotten
suddenly foggy. I have never, as I testified l)efore this committee,
understood what happened between, with any clarity, between Feb-
ruary 4 and June 17, and I was — we were talking about that.
I think he also was referring to the meeting on — he may have been
mixing the meetings and referring to the fact that on ]\Iarch 28, when
I came back from Camp David, that I was playing very dumb, I was
playing very reluctant — and I was. I did not want to engage in a dis-
cussion of my recollection of those meetings, because we had gone over
that before and I had made my decision by that time as to what I was
going to do and I did not want to get into a debate on it.
I believe he also referred to the fact that I taped that conversation.
That is not correct.
Senator Gurxey. Let me refer to his testimony when he was here
before the committee. He said : "Well, I think the one occasion that did
crop up when I asked for an appointment with Mr. Haldeman."
I said : ""\^nien was this ?"
He said : ''That was probably in January, probably in early Janu-
ary, December" — that would have been January of this year or De-
cember of last year — it was before that meeting with Haldeman, so
it must have been in December. It was when he indicated to me that
he did not know how the Watergate had ever been planned, some-
thing to that effect.
1380
And I said, John, do you not remember, something to that effect ? And I became
concerned, of course, over that type of conversation, because obviously, that
would be at a time that could be an indication that somebody was being set up,
in effect.
That was his testimony.
He also testified some place else.
Now, do you recall whether you had any conversation with him ?
Mr. Dean. My discussions witli JNIr. Magruder while he was at the
inaugural committee, were basically around what he was going to do.
The one conversation I recall very clearly did not relate to this at all.
It was the conversation that occurred in the hall when I was trying
to dissuade him from going to California to run for office. He said
that he was going to go out and test the waters, because he thought
that he had met so many people during the campaign, he could get
good financial backing and now was the time to move.
I thought, without telling him, that he was going to have some seri-
ous problems down the road and he would be putting a lot of people
who had gone out to back him in jeopardy, and tried to persuade him
not to do it.
He was adamant. I later called Haldeman, who agreed also that it
was a very unwise idea for Jeb to go out and pursue office. He told me
he was going to call Mr. Finch and speak to him about it to try to
dissuade Jeb from doing it. And he was also going to call Kalmbach,
who was one of the persons INIagruder was going to meet with.
Then, when I met with Jeb, we had a number of discussions to the
effect, he said, I have told Higby my problem. They are going to help
me. They also know the problem and I want to get a good job. That
was the tenor. It was a job-oriented discussion and I cannot recall a
specific conversation where I told him that.
I do recall i]i February — excuse me, in INIarch — when I was at Camp
David, and this is in one of the exhibits I have submitted, when he
wanted me to have a very fresh recollection of the meetings that had
occurred in February, or January and February of the preceding year.
At that point in time, I was trying — I said to him — I thought I had
gotten a bum rap for being accused of having prior knowledge of this
matter and Magruder agreed. And I have submitted a tape — that is a
conversation I did record, with a dictaphone held to the receiver, I
happened to have the suggestion from ilr. Haldeman that I do that
while I was at Camp David, and I thought it was a pretty good idea,
so vou will find that exhibit is one of the ones I submitted.
Senator Gtjrnet. Of course, what he was saying is that you and he
were discussing, I guess, the Watergate and what led ui> to it and that
his impression was that you were forgetting, I guess, about the meet-
ings in Mitchell's office and the discussion of the electronic bugging
and Liddy's plan and all that sort of thing. Do you recall that at all?
Mr. Dean. I only recall that I have always told Magruder that I
was never clear on what happened between February and June 17.
I have repeated that to him on a number of occasions, because I have
not — in fact, some of Mr. Magruder's testimony was a revelation to me.
Senator Gtjrney. Let us go to the meeting now of March 21 in the
"Wliite House, which is a very imjiortant meeting, of course, with vou
and the President. That, as T understand it, is when you gave him
a pretty complete rundown of the story about the Watergate, is that
correct ?
1381
Mr. Dean. Tliat is correct. I think I have stated in my intentions
that what I had seen occurring — I had had earlier conversations. The
President had been rather nonchaLant in dealing with the $1 million
issue. AVe had discussed on the 13th the fact that he had discussed clem-
ency with Colson and Ehrlichman. I really felt that the President did
not understand the full implications of some of these activities and I
did not know if he knew the full involvement of everybody, and I
thought that I should report it.
I also would like to add one other thing. On a number of occasions,
I asked Mr. Ehrlichman, particularly after the first of the year, if the
President were being kept fully informed still, because he did the same
amount of note taking and the trial was over and things had sort of
slowed down as far as the chaos that sometimes was occurring at the
White House. Ehrlichman assured me that the President was being
kept regularly posted.
Senator Gurnet. On this meeting of the 21st, did you explain to the
President in full all you knew about Watergate ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I would not say it was every detail, because as you
know, it has taken me 6 hours to read a statement to this committee,
which is highlights of the full story. I think I gave
Senator Gurnet. Could you summarize briefly for us the points you
touched upon?
Mr. Dean. I think I have in my testimony summarized those points.
If you want me to go through them again, I will, I have taken great
care in trying to do that in my testimony.
Senator Gurnet. Did you tell him anything about your involvement
in Watergate?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, I did. And I had on previous occasions. I had
tried back as early as the second meeting, I believe, to tell him that I
felt that I was involved in an obstruction of justice, particularly after
he had told me that I should report to him and made the comment to
me that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were principals. That stuck in my
mind so very clearly that I thought maybe he did not understand
everything that I was doing. When I raised this with him, I gave him
a few of the facts and he began to debate with me about the fact that
he did not think I had any legal problem based on what I was telling
him and I said I did. He did not want to get into it at that time. I
do not know what was intervened, but we did not have an extended
discussion.
I believe that also came up at a meeting when Dick Moore was
present.
Senator Gurnet. Did you talk to him about the coverup money
and your involvement in that ?
Mr. Dean. In February ?
Senator Gurnet. No, no, March 21.
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did.
Senator Gurnet. You told him all about that?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet. What about the discussion
Mr. Dean. I told him particularly — what had really happened —
let me put this in sequence.
One of the things that to me was one of the real outrages, that
bothered me tremendously, was when Mr. Hunt made his final de-
1382
mand on the White House. He sent, he apparently had a meeting with
Mr. Colson's lawyer, Mr. Shapiro, and he had also had a meeting, a
direct meeting with Mr. Paul O'Brien. Mr. O'Brien — I believe that
meeting occuned on the 19th. On the 20th or on the — let us see, what
was the weekend before ? He had had the meeting on the Friday and
O'Brien came to me
Senator Ervin. I am going to have to ask the group holding the con-
ference over here to step outside for the conference. It is disturbing
the orderly procedure of the hearing.
Mr. Dean. As I was saying, Mr. Hunt met with Mr. O'Brien on a
Friday and reported to me on the preceding ]\Ionday. That report
was that Hunt was demanding $72,000 for living expenses and $50,000
for attorney's fees and the message was sent directly to me. I asked
Mr. O'Brien, why are they sending it to me?
He said, I happened to ask jSIr. Hunt the same question. He said,
you just send this message to Dean. He said, you tell him that if that
money is not forthcoming quickly, because sentencing is going to
occur this week and it is going to take me time to make arrangements,
that I will have a lot of seamy things to say about the things I have
done for John Ehrlichman and I will have to start reconsidering my
options.
Now, that was what prompted me to raise this again with Dick
^Nloore when I had had a meeting with Moore. I told ^Nloore that I
was, you know, this thing — we had talked for many, many months
about trying to end this. I thought this to me was just another indi-
cation of direct blackmail of the White House.
Senator Gurney. Well, again, if we can confine ourselves to the
meeting of INIarch 21 with the President — ^that is really what I am
getting at.
Mr. Dean. Sir, I am saying that came up in the meeting with the
President.
Senator Gurney. And you told him all about that ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did.
Senator Gurney. And you told him about the raising of the coverup
money, Kalmbach, all that activity?
'Sir. Dean. I went over that rather quickly. What I did was I painted
a very broad picture of what I thought was happening and asked him
if there were any questions he wanted to ask about that, I would fill
in any details.
Senator Gurney. Did you talk to him about the Magruder affair,
helping to prepare his testimony for the grand jury?
Mr. Dean. I didn't get into any great detail. I alluded to the fact
that I had assisted ]Magruder in preparing him to go before the grand
jury, in his second appearance before the grand jury, yes, I did.
Senator Gurney. Did you talk to the President or report to him
about the executive clemency offer to Caulfield?
:Mr. Dean. No, I didn't — to Caulfield? You mean through Caulfield
toMcCord?
Senator Gurney. Yes. Yes.
^h\ Dean. To the best of my knowledge, that did not come up and
we didn't get into that.
Senator Gurney. Did Haldeman come in later at that meeting?
Mr. Dean. The President called Mr. Haldeman to come in.
1383
Senator Gurnet. And did yon go over the whole thing pretty much
again while ]Mr. Haldeman was there ?
Mr. Dean. Xo, sir ; I did not.
Senator Gurxey. What transpired while Haldeman was there?
Mr. Dean. A decision was made that Mr. Mitchell should come down
the next day and there was a brief discussion about that. From that,
we went to a meeting in Haldeman and Ehrlichman's office.
Senator Gurney. That was the only thing that was discussed?
Mr. Dean. That was the sum and substance of Mr. Haldeman's
appearance in the President's office. We were alone virtually the entire
time and it was at the very end of the meeting that lie came in.
Senator Gtirney. Do you remember how long he was there?
Mr. Dean. I don't. I Would not say more than 5 minutes or so, to
the best of my recollection.
Senator Gurney. Did you have a later meeting with the President
and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Dean. On what day, sir?
Senator Gurnet. That day.
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet. What was discussed at that meeting ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I went from the President's office to a sub-
sequent meeting with Ehrlichman and Haldeman and the discussions
began to focus on Mitchell coming down and having Mitchell step
forward and if AFitchell stepped forward and would account for this
thing, then maybe the problems that had followed for the White House
after the break-in would be forgotten. And we went to a meeting in the
President's office that afternoon to rediscuss that. A number of ideas
came up.
Senator Gurnet. Now, who was at that meeting?
Mr. Dean. Well, initially, Mr. Ziegler was in there, as I recall, and
as we sat down and assembled, Ziegler left. It was from there that the
meeting really got down to a discussion between Ehrlichman, Halde-
man, myself, and the President.
Now, during that meeting, I recall a number of ideas were being
suggested and the like. At that point, it was the first time I had ever
mentioned in front of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and the President the
fact that I thought they were all indictable — not including the Presi-
dent. I said that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean could be indicted.
For that reason, I disagreed with whatever they were talking about.
The President on a number of occasions turned to me and said. Do you
agree ? I said, Xo sir, I do not.
After doing this a number of occasions, I finally said I think that
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean are indictable and got a very, I
might say a chilling look from Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator Gurnet. Was immunity discussed by anybody ?
Mr. Dean. On a number of occasions, I discussed the concept of im-
munity with ^Ir. INIoore as a device
Senator Gurnet. Xo, I mean on this occasion.
Mr. Dean. In the meeting ?
Senator Gurnet. March 21, the meeting in the afternoon.
Mr. Dean. Not to my recollection, other than the fact that I had
once conceived, you know, that the way to get the truth out would be
to have everybody have some sort of immunity, because everyone in-
1384
volved would have a criminal implication and I thought at that point
that the most important thing for the American people was to get the
truth out. And as I say, Moore and I had discussed a number of con-
cepts as to how to do this in the past and we had never really found a
solution.
Senator Gurnet. Was there any tentative decision by those present —
that is, you and Haldeman and Ehrlichman — to go to the grand jury
and tell the whole Watergate story ?
Mr. Dean. No sir, there was not. To the contrary, I had kept raising
the fact that as a result of the Gray hearings, it was going to be a
matter of time before I was called before the grand jury. It just
presented a real dilemma to me because I was going to lav out the
facts just as I knew them. And there was a lot of discussion about
executive privilege applying before the grand jury and things of this
nature.
Senator Gttrney. Then there was no discussion, as I understand it
from your testimony, about going to the grand jury, ever, and telling
the whole thing as possibly this immunity business
Mr. Dean. There could have been some discussion about my immu-
nity concept. I don't recall that everybody said, let's walk down to the
grand jury and tell the story, no, sir. To the contrary, I think it was
quite evident in the meeting the next day, where the real concern was
this committee and that continued to come up again and again.
Senator Gurney. My question really was, there was no discussion
about going to the grand jury, is that right ?
Mr. Dean. Well, other than, as I sav, in the context that I had raised
the fact that I thought I would be called before the grand jury at some
point in time.
Senator Gurnet. Well, I mean about you going voluntarily and the
others, too.
Mr. Dean. No, sir, not to mv recollection. I don't believe I ever
heard Mr. Ehrlichman and Haldeman volunteer to go before the grand
Senator Gurnet. Was there also a discussion at this meeting and
later at the one on the 22d that all of you misfht put this down on paper
as to what you viewed as your role in the Watergate ? You and Halde-
man and Elirlichman ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. The first time I heard about writing a report
again occurred when I arrived at Camp David on the afternoon of the
23d. The telephone was ringing as I walked into the cabin my wife
and I were staying in. The operator told me it was the President on the
phone. It was not the President. It was Mr. Haldeman on the phone
and he said, while you are up there, why don't you sit down and write
a report on this thing.
I asked him, was it going to be for internal or external use and he
said, that hasn't been decided yet. We had already gone through what
I called really an effort to put out a fairy tale on this thing that had
been turned down on December 13. I wondered if we were going to go
through this exercise again, because if we were going to do it again, I
wanted to know how to proceed.
Senator Gurnet. Then it was after that that the President asked
you to go to Camp David ?
1385
Mr. Deax. Well, the President called me on the 23d. In the meeting
on the 22d — I might mention this : As early as February, when I had a
meeting with the President, he asked me had I ever spent any time up
at Camp David I I said no, I hadn't, I had been up there to a meeting
once right after the election, a very brief meeting with Ehrlichman
and Haldeman. He said, you and your wife ought to go up there on
some weekend, it is an excellent place to go. He mentioned that on a
number of occasions and I told my wife, I said, the President has been
very gracious in saying that you should go to Camp David and men-
tioned it to her.
Senator Gurxey. At any rate, you did go to Camp David, sort of
understanding that you were going to write a rejDort about Watergate,
is that riiiht ?
Mr. Deax. No, sir. When the President talked to me on the 23d, I
had talked to O'Brien that morning about the fact that in court,
]Mr. McCord's letter had been read by Judge Sirica. O'Brien reported
from somebody who had told him at the courthouse.
I called Ehrlichman, and Ehrlichman said he had a copy of the let-
ter and read me a copy of the letter and asked me what my assessment
of it was. Based on my conversation with O'Brien, I told him that it
seemed at best that all McCord has is hearsay.
It was then much later. It was, oh, in the afternoon, I guess, 1 or 2
o'clock or so. I was still surrounded by the press at home because of the
Gray statement the preceding day; they wanted me to make a com-
ment on it, and I didn't want to do that. I received a call from the
President.
There are some details of that conversation of a personal nature to
the President that, the first family, that I don't want to put in because
they are not relevant. But I recall the conversation very clearly, be-
cause there were some complications because Mrs. Nixon and Tricia
were up there at the same time.
The President said, '"Well, go on ahead. You need the break, you
have been under a lot of pressure," and the like. He never at any time
asked me to write a report, and it wasn't until after I had arrived at
Camp David that I received a call from Haldeman asking me to write
the report up.
If I was going to go up and write a report, I would have gone to
my — there was oeneral discussion also of preparing a Segretti report,
as I recall. If I had gone to Camp David specifically to write a report,
I would have jxone to my office first and collected an awful lot of mate-
rialthat I didn't take with me, which I subsequently had to call back
for in order to write a report.
Senator Gurxey. It was shortly after this, though, that then you
engaged counsel, is that co7-rect ?
Mr. Deax. On the evening — I believe it was Sunday evening, I re-
ceived word that the Los Angeles Times was going to publish a story
that I had had prior knoAvledire of the fact that there was going to be
a break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters on
June 17.
Now, I knew I hadn't had prior knowledge of that. In fact, I don't
think anvbodv other than those involved had prior knowledjre of the
fact that there was going to be a break-in. I thought it was libelous.
I called ~\\v. Hogan, told him, explained in generalities the facts.
1386
and he put the papers on notice that there was a libel suit in this
matter.
At that time, I also told him that I wanted to talk to him further
about this, and we had further conversations while I was up there
about the general situation. So the counsel was retained at that time.
Senator Gurney. What date was that ?
Mr. Dean. That was on the 25th, as I recall.
Senator Gurxey. And that was JNIr, McCandless, and Mr. — ■ —
Mr. Dean. No, that was Mr. Hogan.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Hogan?
]\Ir. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. When did you employ Mr. McCandless and Mr.
Shaffer?
]Mr. Dean. INIr. Shaffer was employed on the 30th.
Senator Gurney. Of March?
Mr. Dean. Of March.
Senator Gurney. And ]Mr. McCandless ?
Mr. Dean. I don't know precisely. It was after Mr. Hogan with-
drew. It was sometime in April, mid or late April, to the best of my
recollection.
Senator Gurney. Then my understanding of the testimony is that
on April 2, your attorneys or Mr. Shaffer went to see the Federal
prosecutors, is that correct?
]Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. What was the purpose of that?
Mr. Dean. To tell them that I was prepared and ready to come
forward.
Senator Gurney. And when did you go and talk to them?
]Mr. Dean. Well, I believe that INIr. Shaffer and Mr. Hogan had a
number of meetings where they outlined the scope of my testimony.
I had spent several hours with both of them outlining my involvement
with myself and the involvement of others. I had deferred from getting
into any Presidential areas.
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I have a request up there.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
INIr. Dean, just before we recess, there has been a little confusion
in the exhibits that you have submitted, and we want to make sure
we have them properly identified. There is a list which is entitled
"Opponent Priority Activity." That is captioned so that we know who
pre]iared that list. There happens also to be a document which is on
White House stationery which is for eyes only, dated June 24, 1971,
memorandum for John Dean, Gerry Warren, De Van Shumway, sub-
ject, opponents list, and the statement is "Attached is the list of oppo-
nents which we have compiled. I thought it would be useful to you
from time to time," and it is signed, George T. Bell.
Is this the list that goes with that memo?
]Mr. Dean. ISIr. Dash, I would like a look at those first if I could
before I
Mr. Dash. Do you have them?
Ml-. Dean. I don't know which one you are referring to.
Mr. Dash. Would someone give this list and give this memoran-
dum— do you have the memorandum of June 24, 1971, also? Memo-
randum for John Dean, Gerry Warren, Van Shumway.
1387
Mr. Dean. Is there a list that accompanies the June 25 one, also,
that you have attached ?
Mr. Dash. June 25 ?
Mr. Dean. It would either have to be from the
Mr. Dash. Xo, there is no list attached to the June 25 one.
Mr. Dean. All right. It would either be the June 24 or June 25 that
would be attached there.
Mr. Dash. No, the June 25 says, "Please add the attached list of
Muskie contributors."
That list I have just given you is not a list of Muskie contributors.
Mr. Dean. This would go with the list on June 24, to the best of
my knowledge.
Mr. Dash. And that is your understanding in submitting that to
the committee, that to the best of your knowledge, that list is covered
by the memorandum of June 24, 1971 ?
Mr. Dean. I know the source of this would be from Mr. Colson's
office, this list, yes.
Mr. Dash. Who is Mr. George T. Bell ?
Mr. Dean. He was a member of Mr. Colson's staff at the time.
Mr. Dash. And it is your understanding that the list was prepared
in Mr. Colson's office ?
Mr. Dean. These lists were prepared by Mr. Bell and Miss Gordon,
and kept continuously updated. This does not represent the totality
of the list. This represents what I have in my possession.
Mr. Dash. For our record now, that list did come from Mr, Bell and
is related to the June 24 memorandum ?
Mr. Dean. That is my understanding. This is my best recollection
from the way I extracted the documents from my records.
Mr. Dash. The list does not have any identification on it. That is why
1 am asking you tliat question.
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
["Wliereupon, at 12 :25 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
2 p.m., the same day.]
Afternoon Session, Wednesday, June 27, 1973
Senator Era^n. The committee will come to order. Senator Gurney,
you may resume your examination.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, ]Mr. Chairman.
Mr, Dean. Senator Gurney, I wonder before we proceed, counsel
has a couple of exhibits that were in my folder this morning that we
did not get to. to insert and thei'e was a request made by the committee
yesterday and at this time he would like to insert tliem into the record.
Senator Gurney. Yes, pursuant to request.
Mr, McCandless. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman and Senator Gurney.
I think it was Senator Weicker who requested yesterday the Sullivan
memorandum, I have that. There is another memorandum here marked
confidential we would like to turn over to the committee without de-
scription, unless the chairman or counsel would like Mr. Dean to read
it. but at this time we would like to turn these over.
I also understand that there may be some confusion about some part
of a list that has been left out of the opposition list. All we can say is
1388
that last night, as we were looking for the files to respond to this com-
mittee's request, that list was hastily assembled. We hope that it
came here all intact. We had no other reason to think otherwise. If we
could have a Xerox copy back of the list, we would tlien be able to
ascertain whether everything was in it or not.
Senator Ervin. There are two documents I wish that Mr. Dean
would search his files and see if he has copies of them. One is what is
called a decision memorandum which bears the letterhead: White
House, Washington, July 15, 1970; and the other
Mr. McCandless. Would you repeat that ?
Senator Ervin. Decision memorandum, the AVhite House, Washing-
ton, July 15, 1970, and the subject is "Domestic Intelligence."
And the other is organization and organizations of the interagency
group on domestic intelligence and internal security, lAG. These were
two documents that were printed in the Xew York Times and the
Washington Post, but were not in the documents that Mr. Dean turned
over to Judge Sirica and Judge Sirica turned over to the committee.
Mr. Dean, Senator, to the best of my knowledge, I do not have those
documents, but I will check and I probably will have to go to my "\'VTiite
House files to ascertain if they are located in those files.
Mr. McCandless. If the committee can give any help to INIr. Dean
in respect to Senator Gurney's request on the financial records that are
still in the EOB or as to the rest of Mr. Dean's files, it would be help-
ful, because he does have some problem in getting in there and copying
those.
Senator Ervin. Yes. You might let INIr. Dean identify the so-called
Sullivan memorandum, and then we will mark it.
Mr. Dean. It is a memorandum, there are several memorandums
with the envelopes in which I received them. They are typed by Mr.
Sullivan, as Mr. Sullivan told me he had typed them. One is a memo-
randum re President Johnson, "Politics and tlie FBI." The other one
is headed top secret with preface, and then the first line is he indi-
cates he will make a general statement relative to the FBI and politics
in various administrations. And then on subsequent pages he sets those
circumstances out.
There is also a note to me from INIr. Sullivan in which he indicates
the contents are self-explanatory, and asks me to take recognition and
tolerance to his own poor typing.
Then, there is another lettei- I received from him classified secret,
re Watergate, and in which he indicates in light of the recent hearings
it could be that specific probing of the Watergate affair may turn out
to be more troublesome than anticipated and indicates he would be
willing to testify on behalf of the administration and draw a clear
contrast between tliis administration and past administvntions with
reference to information that he had in his possession and knowledjje.
Senator Ervin. Those will be rpcoived and marked for identification
but will not be admitted into evidence at this time because I am not
sure that this committee has jurisdiction to investigate the matters to
which that was related. You might let them be marked.
[The documents referred to were mai-ked exhibits Nos. 57 and 58 for
identification only and ai-e not for pulilication.]
Senator Ervin. Let's see the confidential document.
]\Tr. McCandless. It is coming right up.
1389
Mr. Dean. Counsel has also advised me that the one sheet is not
complete. There were other lists when we Avent throuoh last nioht, and
the only thing 1 can say is it must have gotten back into another file,
and we will reexamine it and find it.
Senator Ervix. This confidential document is a thing that is a
memorandmn for H. R. Haldeman, Charles W. Colson, "Eyes Only."
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Ervix. Wliat does this "Eyes Only" mean on the docu-
ment? [Laughter.]
]Mr. Deax. That is one of the classifications that was used around
the White House to mean that it was for the eyes of the recipient only.
Senator Ervix. And he was not to copy it, is that what it means?
^Ir. Deax. Well, often you will Iniow there are carbon copies or
blind carbon copy indications on it. The use of this classification
developed when we started reducing the rather overabundant use of
what really were security classifications, national security classifica-
tions that related to matters that were not national security.
Senator ER^^x. I will also have these marked for identification
because it is not clear yet that they relate to matters that the committee
is authorized to investigate.
Mr. Deax. I say they came in response to Senator Weicker's ques-
tion of yesterday.
Senator ER\ax. Have them marked for identification and not as
exhibits here. Thank you.
Mr. ^McCax'^dless. Just one more request. I have been handed a
3-page list of opponents priority, and there are 20 names on it, the
documents that were turned over this morning and marked by Mr.
Dean in several places contain more than just these 3 pages.
]Mr. Dash. That has already been received. That is what I was
asking ^Ir. Dean to identify in connection with the June 24 memo-
randum signed by ]Mr. Bell. But all that was received from you this
morning was that particular memorandum of a list of names. It is the
only names we received.
Senator Erat^x. I am going to request the staff to make requests of
tlie White House for copies of the document, decision memorandum
of the White House July 15, 1970, and the '\\'liite House document
organization and organizations of the interagency group on domestic
intelligence and internal security. And also for the document entitled
"Domestic Intelliirence Review" which was a part of the memoran-
dum for H. R. Haldeman from Tom Charles Huston. I believe you
called the name Huston ?
]Mr. Deax. Yes, I believe that is the way he i^ronounces his name,
Senator.
Senator Er\t[x\ Senator Gurney, you may proceed.
Senator GrRxi:T. Thank you, ]Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I will try to be as brief as possible and close up my
testimony.
Senator Ervix. So far as the chairman is concerned I think you are
rendered a real service to the committee and flic country and I don't
want you to feel rushed at all.
Senator Gurxey. T appreciate the courtesy of the chairman and the
members of the committee.
1390
I just wanted to clear up one little point on the coverup money
which I didn't touch on this morning.
When you had your meeting with Mr. Kalmbach on June 29 did you
ask him for a certain sum of money that you would need to have him
raise ?
Mr. Dean. At that time I didn't know how much was to be raised
and I believe I discussed with him the fact that he would get this
information from Mr. LaRue.
Senator Gurney. Where did you have this conversation ? Is that in
the coffee shop or up in his hotel room ?
Mr. Deax. Well, the bulk of the conversation took place in his room
and not in the coffee shop. We only talked for maybe 5 minutes in the
coffee shop.
Senator Gurney. And then you adjourned up to his room in the
Mayflower Hotel ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. But you don't recall that any figure was men-
tioned at that time ?
Mr. Dean. No, Senator, I don't.
Senator Gurney. Let us go to the $350,000 fund that came into
the White House. ]\fy recollection is that Mr. Strachan picked up that
amount of money from over at the Committee To Re-Elect the Presi-
dent. When did that occur ?
INIr. Dean. Wlien did INIr. Strachan pick it up ?
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. Dean. To the best of my knowledge, and I was told this after
the fact, in more detail, was prior to April 7. The first time I was
aware of the fact that he was receiving money before April 7 is when
Mr. Strachan came to me and asked me if I could suggest the name of
somebody outside of the Government that would have a, or could
open a safety deposit box. I told him I could not, and did not know the
amount of the money at that time.
Senator Gurney. Now, as I understand there was some monev used
out of the $350,000.
Do you recall what that fisjure was ?
]\fr. Dean. Yes, I do. It was — I am trying to recall when I first
learned it, it was sometime, oh, within 2 or 3 or 4 weeks after the June
17 incident that I was told that $22,000 had been expended out of that
amomit. And that there had been that mucli taken out of apparently
the safety deposit box and that money, in turn, was to be used for
advertisements or somethinP!" of this nature.
Senator Gurney. Well, that really
Mr. Dean. I have not finished. I was looking to see if the chairman
wanted me to proceed.
Senator Ervin. There is a vote on now and we will have to take
a short recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gt^fney. Do vou know what it aetuallv was used for?
Mr. Dean. The $22,000 ?
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. Dean. I know that the $15,000—1 learnod later that the $15,200
that was returned to me was a part of tlie $2-?.000 that had not been
that was returned to me was a part of tlie $22,000 that had not been
expended and I was told that the ]xart that had been expended had
been used for political ads.
1391
Senator Gurxey. So I guess $6,800, then
Mr. Dean. $6,800
Senator Gurney [continuing]. Then would have been used?
Mr. Deax. Yes, correct.
Senator Gurxey. Now, did you have a conversation with Mr. Stans
about restoring the $22,000 to this fund and making it whole again ?
jMr. Deax. Yes, I did.
Senator Gtjrxey. When did you have that conversation?
JSIr, Deax. Well, there were a number of conversations on this,
Senator, that commenced late July, August, September, because there
was a desire to get the entire 350 back out to the White House. Simul-
taneous witli these conversations, there was also a desire to accumulate
any cash that could be found to pay for the support and silence of
the individuals who had been involved in the Watergate. I can recall
on several occasions discussing this with Mr. Stans and Mr. Parkin-
son on how to deal with the $350,000. One of the problems was where
would it go that it wouldn^t be reported and if it were re^^orted before
the election, it would appear to be a secret slush fund at the AVhite
House.
Senator Gurxey. Well, did you discuss it after the election with
Mr. Stans?
]\Ir. Deax. Yes, I did. In fact, after the election, at one point, Mr.
Stans advised me that he had the money to replenish the $350,000
fund and called me and told me. I tried to reach Mr. Strachan, was
unable to reach Mr. Strachan. Mr. Stans, for a reason I do not recall
now, told me there was some immediacy in the money being picked up.
I in turn called ]Mr. Fielding and asked Mr. Fielding if he would go
and pick up a package from INIr. Stans and give it to Mr. Strachan
as soon as he could locate Mr. Strachan.
Senator Gurxey. When was that?
Mr. Deax. That was in — I believe it was November 28.
Senator Gurxey. Well, now Mr. Dean, why did you ask Mr. Stans
for $22,000 at this time, when you were holding $15,200 of this money
in trust? ^Yhy didn't you simply ask him for $6,800 to make that
$22,000 ?
Mr. Deax. Well, Senator, as I have indicated, from the very outset,
there was a request for all the available cash. I was quite aware of the
fact that I was holding cash. I had also made a decision that the cash
that I was holding I didn't want to be used to pay for the support, for
the silence of these individuals, and I was not going to become in-
volved in that with actual casli that I was passing for that purpose.
Senator Gurxey. But you were requesting $22,000 from Mr, Stans
just for that purpose, were you not ?
Mr. Deax. No, I was not. It was to make the fund whole and there
was resistance at that point from the White House
Senator Gurxey. If you were requesting it just to make the fund
whole, why would you be so miwilling to part with the $15,000 that
you had ?
Mr. Deax. Because as I say, tliero was pressure from the White
House and within days after Mr. Stans returned or sent over the
$22,000, the demands reached such a crescendo that in fact I was asked
to go to Mr. Haldeman and (j:ot authorization to use the entire $350,-
000. And I was very much aware of being in the middle of the dual
conversation, on the one hand to make the funds whole and simultane-
96-296 O - 73 - pt.4 - 4
1392
ously, with making money available to pay the defendants. I had no
idea how if was going to turn out.
Senator Gurnet. Well, I must say I am puzzled. I do not quite
follow the reasoning. First you say that you did not use the $15,200
which came from the $22,000, to return it and make it whole again
because you thought that money might be used for silence money. But
then, when I asked you when you requested it from Mr. Stans, you
had no compunctions about that. You said, "Well, that was not going
to be used for that." Now, which is which ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I was not discussing with Mr. Stans the
fact that there was pressure being placed on the T^Hiite House to pay
money. Tliat was coming to me from other cliannels. I was always
hopeful that we would find some remedy, that that $350,000 would
not be used to pay for the support of those individuals. There was
certainly no certainty that that would or would not happen. I had
discussed it with ISfr. Hardeman, tlie fact that they were asking for
the money. Mr. Haldeman agreed that we ought to make the money
whole. I told him that there were demands and there were requests
upon it. So I kept the $15,200 totallv out of the conversations.
Senator Gitrney. But the $15,200 had come out of the $22,000, had
it not?
INIr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gutrney. I should think the logical thing to have done
would be to return that and also to have added $6,800 from Mr. Stans
and mnde it whole.
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, from where I was sitting, that seemed
like a great risk that that money was going to go to pay the defendants.
Senator Gtjrney .Was it not a greater risk for you to have it and be
short the $4,850 which it was short ?
Mr. Dean. I was quite prepared to make that money whole at any
point in time.
Senator Gtjrney. When you put the check in the envelope that con-
tained the $15,200, your check, I understand, of $4,850^
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gtjrney. What account was that drawn on ?
Mr. Dean. It was drawn on my personal checking account.
Senator Gtjrney. Was there enough money in the checking account
to cover it ?
Mr. Dean. No, there was not at that time, but on previous occasions,
I had overdrawn my account and it had been covered. Within 24 hours,
I was able to get the money in the bank and cover it.
Senator Gtjrney. I have here a copy of a bank statement that came
in at noon time from the National Savings & Trust Co., showing an
account to John Wesley Dean III. Is that the account that you drew
the check on ?
Mr. Dean. I assume, because that is the only checlcing account I
have at that bank.
Mr. TiTOMPSON. I might point out. Senator Gurney and Mr. Chair-
man, this is pursuant to a subpena signed bv tlie chairman on tlie 22d
of this month. We received certain records — they were being com-
piled, they were furnished to us over the noon recess, I have here the
document that Senator Gurney is making reference to, which is a bank
statement dated October 26, 1972, on the National Savings & Trust
1393
Co., Washington, D.C. So I have here two copies for you and counsel.
I submit it at this time.
Senator Gurney, I wonder if 3^ou would look at the bank statement
and tell the committee how much money you had in the checking ac-
acount at that time, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Deax. At which time, Senator ?
Senator Gurney. October 12.
Mr. Dean. The balance indicates about $1,600.
Senator Gurney. $1,625.12, is that not correct?
INIr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. Yet, you put in your file where you were keeping
the money in trust a check for $4,850.
]Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. Just a couple of other questions about the use of
the money. You mentioned that you had this work done in the patio
I think that was about $500 worth of work, is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. That is approximately what I recall, yes.
Senator Gurney. Why did you not pay that by check ? That would
be the normal procedure ?
Mr. Dean. I ultimately did.
Senator Gurney. I thought you said you paid it out of cash out of
this account?
Mr. Dean. Xo, I told you 1 was anticipating what my needs would
be at that time, but I did not use it for that purpose ultimately. As I
said, I made personal expenditures out of the money for everything
from groceries to other incidentals.
Senator Gurney. "Why did you not pay those things by check?
Mr. Dean, Because I had the cash in my possession and I was using
it for that purpose. Senator.
Senator Gurney. But cash out of this trust fund.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. I am curious about the wedding trip. Do you use
credit cards ?
Mr, Dean. Sometimes, sometimes not.
Senator Gurney. You do have credit cards ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I do.
Senator Gurney. Did it ever occur to you to use these on your honey-
moon instead of this cash ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as my wife well knows, I try to use my credit cards
as infrequently as possiWe, because I don't like to live on credit.
Senator Gurney. Turning to the meetings with the President, now,
as I understand it. you engaged your counsel — I think this is where we
left off when we adjourned this morning — on April 2 of this year.
Oh. yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this statement of the
National Savings & Trust Co. on John Welsey [sic] Dean III account
a ])art of the record.
Senator Er%t:n. The reporter will mark this as an exhibit and insert
it in the record at this point.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 59,*]
Senator Gurney. Would you state again now when you engaged
your present counsel ?
♦See p. 1712.
1394
Mr. Dean. I engaged Mr. Shaffer on the 30th of March. Mr. Mc-
Candless was engaged, as I recall, sometime in mid- April, after Mr.
Hogan had removed himself from the case.
Senator Gtjkney. Now, at that time, I suppose you discussed with
him your criminal liability, is that correct — your possible criminal lia-
bility, excuse me.
Mr. Dean. At the fii-st meeting I had with Mr. Shaffer on the 30th,
I think we spent initially about 5 hours in which I went over the high-
lights. He said, I would like to think about that over the weekend and
meet with you again on Monday morning. That was on a Friday. On
Monday morning, we met again, spent about 2 hours or more going
over further details, in which I was giving him the highlights of
everything that I knew^ about the entire picture.
Senator Gurney. Did you have any discussions in this time frame
with the President of the United States?
Mr. Dean The President
Senator Gurney. The time frame you are talking about?
Mr. Dean. The President had gone to San Clements at that time.
Senator Gurney. Actually, did you have any meeting at all with
the President from tlie meeting on March 22 and the phone calls on
March 23 ? I understand there were two.
Mr. Dean. No, one.
Senator Gurney. One only?
]Mr. Dean. There was one call. As I said, when I arrived at Camp
David, they said it was the President calling but it Avas ]Mr. Haldeman.
I assume he was calling from the President's office at that time.
Senator Gurney. Then there were no phone calls on the 23d with
the President?
INIr. Dean. Yes, there was. There was one phone call on the 23d.
I don't recall the precise hour, sometime after lunch, when we dis-
cussed my going to Camp David.
Senator Gurney. And that was the last contact with him until April
14, is that correct?
Mr. Dean. I believe it was April 15, Senator.
Senator Gurney. April 15 ?
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Senator Gurney. You are right. That is true. Now, why was that?
You had been meeting with him almost daily there in March on a
number of things, many of which had touched on the Watergate
affair, according to your testimony. Why was there this total and you
had sudden absence of any other contacts, meetings, or phone calls
with the President?
Mv. Dean. Well, I can only tell you what my impression of the
situation is. When I met with him on the 22d in the afternoon — let's
say it was the afternoon of the 21st^ — I had gotten rather factual and
open in a meeting with Ehrlichman and Haldeman and the President
that I thought they could be indicted, that I could be indicted, and
I was disagreeing witli most everything that was being said in the
meeting. I subsequently had a meeting the next day, on the 22d, in
the morning, with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, ]Mitchell, and myself. There
was furtlier discussion of — one of the first things that came out in
the meeting was the fact when j\Ir. Ehrlichman asked Mr. ]Mitchell
if Mr. Hunt's problems had been taken care of, referring to the fact
1395
that Hunt had made demands. ]Mr. Mitchell said, "I don't think that
Hunt has any problems anj-more."
Then there was the afternoon meeting in the President's office in
whicli there was more discussion about how to handle this committee
and deal with it vis-a-vis the White House and the President and the
President's posture on executive privilege. I again had quite evidently
shown a different posture than I had before.
[Recess.]
Senator ER^^x. The committee will resume.
Senator Guexey. Mr. Dean, we were discussing the time lapse be-
tween those meetings with the President, the last meetings on the 20th
and 21st and 22d and your next communication with him, which was
April 15, as I recall.
Mr. Deax. Yes, Senator, and I believe I was explaining that it was
after the meeting on the 22d, that afternoon, when we met again with
Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and the President, and
there was more discussion of dealing with this committee, some dis-
cussion about the fact that the Executive privilege statement was too
broad and that the President would probably have to retreat somewhat
to a position, this is ]Mr. ^Mitchell's suggestion, and he saw this to be
the only problem in dealing with the committee. And then, on the 23d
the President was going to Key Biscayne, and I believe he probably
was in Key Biscavne when he called me. I am not certain because of
the time frame. As I said, I had been surrounded by the press and
was at my house and I talked to Ehrlichman that morning about the
McCord letter, and then the President called and suggested I go to
Camp David, and I would sav that was the last time I talked with him
until April 15 at which time I sent him a message.
Now, why did this happen ? In my estimation, it was becoming very
evident to certainly Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Elirlichman, and j^robably
the President, who was present during the meeting on the afternoon
of the 21st. that I was not playing the coverup game any more, and
certainly when I came back from Camp David that was very evident
to them in mv meetings with ^Ir. Haldeman, my subsequent meeting
with ]Mr. Mitchell, and my meeting
Senator Gtrxet. "When were thev ?
Mr. Deax. This was on the 28th. "
Senator Gurxey. The meeting with ^Mitchell.
Mr. Deax. Mitchell and ]Magi'uder. Mitchell and Magruder had met
with Haldeman. and then when Mr. Haldeman called and asked me to
come back from Camp David and I had a brief meeting with him,
as I said, we had for many, many, many months, we talked very openly
about
Senator GtmxEY. When was that ?
Mr. Deax. This was on the 28th,
Senator Gtjrxey. In the meantime, vou had engaged counsel on the
25th?
Mr. Deax. Well, no, sir- — yes. I did, I did. I engaged
Senator Gurxey. Hogan ?
Mr. Deax. I engaged Hogan and in regard to the story running in
the Los Ano-eles Times — —
Senator Gurxey. And Mr. Shaffer on the 30th.
1396
Mr. Dean. When I was at Camp David I really made a decision
there was no way that I was going to continue in the coverup.
Senator Gurney. All of these meetings on the 20th, 21st, 22d, as I
understand it, they were the first meetings between what I would call
perhaps the most principal people involved in Watergate, at least
those in the White House, to where you were coming to serious dis-
cussion about what ought to be done and all of you realized that some-
thing certainly had to be done, and done rather fast, as I understand
it?
Mr. Dean. I would not characterize the meetings as to what had to
be done. In fact, the meetings were, as I believe I described them in
my testimony, very similar to manv, many meetings had occurred,
or I had been in earlier where we talked about, you know, how do we
deal with the Senate committee, the President at one point in the meet-
ing picked up the phone and called the Attorney General and asked
him why he had not been meeting with Senator Baker.
Senator Gtjrney. But the March 21 meeting was a meeting that, as
I understand it, you sought with the President to tell him, as I think
you said, the broad outlines of the Watergate story. Is that not right?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I said also, we had discussed the Watergate on
previous occasions before that, we discussed it on the 18th. We talked
about monev and clemencv. He had told me as early as my February
meetings with him, that I was to report directly to him at that point.
If you check some of the exhibits that I have submitted you will see
that there are a lot of Presidential decisions being made as a result of
the La Costa meeting, and it was at one point I decided that I had
to tell the President what I thought the implications of this whole
situation was. That I thought that not only was there a problem for
some that were involved before the break-in had become known but I
thought there were a lot that had problems as a result of the break-in,
and that the coverup could not continue.
Senator Gtjrney. Well, at any rate, whatever was being discussed
at these meetings the 20th, the 21st. and the 22d, they certainly were
very important matters affecting Watergate, is that not true ?
Mr. Dean. They were affecting Watergate to the degree of how to
deal with this Senate committee, yes.
Senator Gttrney. You mean you only discussed the Senate com-
mittee in these meetings?
Mr. Dean. That is the thrust of virtually the entire conversations
that occurred, particularly when Mr. Mitchell was present, the morn-
ing he was present, on the 22d.
Senator Gurney. What about the meeting of the 21st? You had two
that day, one with the President when Mr. Haldeman came in later,
and then another one with Mr. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and yourself
and the President. Was that the subject of this committee here that
you talked about?
Mr. Dean. I think, as I testified, that after I had completed mv
presentation to the President from some of the questions he asked
and some of the statements he made I did not feel that he fully under-
stood the problem that people at the AVliite House had for their in-
volvement in the post situation. It was somewhat like
Senator Gurney. So it was a much wider discussion than simply
this committee?
1397
Mr. Dean. Not really, Senator, it was, it was a rambling discussion.
It did not have a particular focus. We never got down to specifics.
The meeting — I assume what was going to happen as a result of the
meeting that afternoon of the 21st and a subsequent meeting I had liad
earlier, at that meeting was that there was going to be an effort to have
Mr. Mitchell step forward and take the heat.
Senator Gurxey. Did you not seek the meeting of the 21st with the
President ?
Mr, Dean. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator GrrRNEY, "^^Hiy did you ?
Mr. Dean. As I think I mentioned earlier to you, I had had a com-
munication from lSh\ O'Brien that Mr. Hunt was making new and
increased demands that were now coming directly to the White House,
and I could see that the Wliite House was going to be increasingly
and increasingly placed in a position of having to deal with this
situation.
Senator Gurxey. And is that not what precipitated your request for
this meeting with the President so that you can tell him the whole
broad outline of the Watergate and what it was all about ?
Mr. Deax. Well, I had discussed with Moore, Dick Moore, for many,
many months how to end this situation, how to get the President out
in front of it so that he would step forward and say, "This is what
my involvement is, this is what the picture is from my standpoint."
But there just seemed no way to do that.
Senator Gurxey. Did you not discuss the day before, March 20, as
I recall, witli Mr. Moore, that "Now I have got to go in and tell the
President what this is all about, and I am going to make an appoint-
ment with liim tomorrow." Is that not the substance of the conversa-
tion that morning?
Mr. Deax\ That did — yes, and Mr. Moore encouraged me to go in,
as a matter of fact.
Senator Gurxey. Tell him about Watergate, the whole thing?
Mr. Deax. That is correct. But as I say, Mr. Moore, it is much — it is
parallel to the Segretti situation in this regard my conversation with
i\Ir. Moore. Mr. Moore knew a lot but he did not know everything. For
example, when he had recommended that the President merely issue a
letter of censure to Mr. Chapin and keep him on at that point he had
only the broadest understanding of Chapin and Strachan's involve-
ment. He had not heard the tape that I had recorded with Mr. Segretti.
Senator Gurxey. Well, perhaps we had better continue on because
there are other members I know who want to question and I have
got to close mine down here.
But at any rate after these meetings of the 20th, 21st, and 22d,
you had no communication with the President until April 14, 15?
Mr. Deax. April 15.
Senator Gurxey. April 15. That strikes me as very surprising.
All of these very important matters, at least to me, about Watergate
were being discussed in these very crucial meetings of the 20th, the
21st. and 22d and then there is no communication with the President
until April 15.
Why is this so ? I don't understand.
]Mr. Deax. Well, as I told you, when I came back from Camp David,
the signals that I got were very clear to me. I had discussed matters
1398
of the coverup very openly with INIr. Haldeman in the past, and sud-
denly we weren't discussing those things. I was sent into a meeting
tliat I didn't want to attend Avith Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder; I
had had conversation with, in the next day or so wnth Mv. Ehrlichman,
and I could tell, when you deal with somebody for a long period of
time, you can tell if there is a change of attitude, a different posture.
They realized where I stood at that point, that I was not going to
involve — or be involved in the coverup any further. They went to
California. While they were in California I had seen no change in
attitude on behalf of anybody on the White House staff or for that
matter the President after the fact I had given him what I thought
was the most shocking way I could present the situation to him, and
I decided at that point that I would definitely retain counsel, I would
assess the circumstances and I would make my decision on what to do.
Senator Gurnet. You retained counsel April 30?
Mr. Dean. I made calls^ — I retained counsel on April 30, had made
calls
Senator Gurney. When did counsel
Mr. Dez\n. I mean not April 30, March 30, excuse me.
Senator Gurney. March 30.
When did your counsel go to the prosecutors. Federal prosecutors?
Mv. Dean. I believe the first meeting they had was on the after-
noon of April 2.
Senator Gurney. Then there were a number of meetings after that;
is that correct?
]\Ir. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. And they were discussing with the Federal prose-
cutors the subject of immunity all this time; is that correct?
']\Ir. Dean. I wasn't present at those meetings.
Senator Gurney. Do you know whether they were, did they tell you ?
Mr. Dean. I believe they did discuss immunity ; yes. I don't think
it was discussed, as immunity as such as let's find out, have discussions
with Dean and his testimony to find out what his testimony is about,
whether he is a witness, whether he is a defendant, they all went into
the discussions of immunity as I recall.
Senator Gurney. Of course, we can find that out from the
prosecutors.
Mr. Dean. I am sure you can, sir.
Senator Gueney. Did you advise Mr. Haldeman when you engaged
counsel, criminal lawyer, on March 30 ?
Mr. Dean. No, I did not. They were on the west coast and counsel
advised me to stop and try to avoid any further discussions with any-
body who was involved in the coverup and I tried to avoid conversa-
tions relating to the coverup as much as possible.
Senator Gurney. And you didn't advise Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Dean. No, I haven't completed yet. Senator.
And it was— the 8th of April, to the best of my recollection, that I
was going to have a meeting directly with the prosecutors. And ar-
rangements had been made whereby my testimony had been explained
in some degree to the prosecutors by my attorneys and an arrange-
ment had l3een worked out whereby I could deal directly with the
prosecutors so they could see first hand or hear first hand and ask
questions of me in a manner that anything that was given to them
1399
would not be used against me later. That meeting was scheduled for
the 8th, as I recall, and before that meeting, I called Mr. Haldeman in
California to tell him that I was going to meet with him.
The reaction I got from that call made it evident to me, very clearly
evident, that that wasn't what they wanted, because I recall that Mr.
Haldeman told me — there is something that stuck in my mind because
I had never heard the expression before. He said, "Well, John, once the
toothpaste is out of the tube, it is awfully hard to get it back in."
Senator Gurnet. I remember that. But that was what, 6 days after
your attorneys had started to meet with the Federal prosecutors, is
that correct?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, and I did not reveal at that time to Mr.
Haldeman when I talked to him what T would do and in fact, I de-
cided I would go ahead and talk to the prosecutors.
I also would like to state that at this point
Senator Gurnet. Now, wait a minute. Are you saying that on
April 8, you didn't tell him, Mr. Haldeman, that you were going to
talk to the Federal prosecutors ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct ; I did not.
Senator Gurnet. I understood you to say that you did.
Mr. Dean. I called him to tell him. "V\nien I got that reaction — I
said I had a meeting scheduled with them. When I got that reaction
from him, I didn't say whether I would or I would not. It was while
they were flying back east that day that I received a call from Air
Force One requesting that I appear in Mr. Ehrlichman's office when
they arrived back in the city. I departed from a meeting with the
prosecutors to go see ISIr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman at the White
House.
Senator Gurnet. Well, then, you really never advised them at any
time tliat you were meetinc: with the prosecutors, is that correct?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, sir.
Senator Gurnet. "\^nien you did see the President on April 15,
tliough. you told him that vou had engaged counsel and that you had
been meeting with the Federal prosecutors, is that correct?
Mr. Dean. Well, on — I believe it was late in the evening on the 14th,
]Mr. Shaffer had a call from the prosecutors saying that it was going
to be necpssary to breacli tlie privacv of the conversations that were
being held because they had been asked to report to Mr. Petersen and
in turn to the Attorney General as to where the grand jury was going
and what was likely to come out of it.
I think vou should also i-emomber that T testified that I, on the
preceding Friday or Saturday, that same day, earlier that day, had
tried to make it verv clear to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehi^lichman
with a list I had prepared that I was not playing any games and that
they were very much involved and they should understand it.
Senator Gurnet. Well, since you had made your decision to come
clean, as we might caU it. and engage attorneys and go to the Federal
prosecutors and tell them everything you knew about the case, why
didn't you toll ]\Ir. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlirhman? Don't you think
that would have been a decent thing to do, to let them know what you
were doing?
Mr. Dean. My answer to that is that I had watched a frank-pro-
tecting operation commence before thev went to California. I had seen
1400
subsequent signs of that as well as I had seen preceding signs of it.
Whenever I would, for example, raise testimonial points with Mr.
Ehrlichman regarding things that might be asked me before a grand
jury, for example when I went over the "deep six" conversation with
him, he told me, well, he said, you don't have to testify quite that way.
You can say you were making an inventory. And I said, well, I didn't
make an inventory. He said, well, I am sure you will think of some-
thing.
Senator Gurnet. Well, was not yours really a protecting operation
so you could get to the Federal prosecutors first with a bargain for
immunity ?
Mr. Dean. I would not say it was a protecting opportunity. I would
say I had made my decision as to what I was going to do and went to
counsel to find out how best to proceed.
Senator Ervin. There is a vote on. I expect we had better take a
recess to vote.
[Recess.]
Senator Ervin. Please come to order.
Senator Gurney.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, before Senator Gurney begins, for the
record, an issue came up a little while earlier. Mr. McCandless was
questioning whether the full list of so-called enemies or the contrib-
utors that Mr. Dean submitted has now been released. My statement
was that it has. That was based on the fact that all we received from
having been copied, we thoujrht that was the complete list. But I have
just been informed that additional lists are still down in the copying
room for more copies of the additional materials that Mr. Dean had
submitted to us. Since they have now been received by us, we will give
you a complete copy. It has quite a few additional names, and they
will also be released and members of the committee will get copies.
Mr. McCandless. Thank you very much.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dean, finally, before wrapping up here, I would like to pin down
the occasions this year prior to March 21, the meeting with the Presi-
dent, when you and he discussed the coverup of Watergate.
Mr, Dean. You mean direct conversations ?
Senator Gurney. That is right. It seemed to me there were one or
two and I think they involved Executive clemency. Those are the ones
I am talking about.
Mr. Dean. All right.
There was a direct conversation about my reportino: to him on
Watergate on February 28, when he told me that I should come in and
report to him because Haldeman and Ehrlichman were principals. It
was, I believe, the meeting on the — may I check my list ? I want to be
accurate on this.
Senator Gurney. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Dean. All right. It was the meeting on the 27th that I had with
the President when he told me to report directly to him. It was in the
meeting on the 20th — well, also I mi.frht add at the conclusion of
that meeting, as we were walking to the door to leave the office, he
again complimented me on the fact that I had done a good iob during
the campaign, that this had been the only issue that they had had. that
they had tried to make something of it but they had been unable to
1401
make anything of it and he was very complimentary of my handling of
the job/lt was not dissimilar from a compliment he had paid me
earlier. I again repeated to him that this thing had been contained, but
I was not sure that it could be contained indefinitely.
He then told me we have got, you know, you have got to fight back
on situations like this. And I can recall something I cannot express in
writing, a gesture when he sort of put his fist into his hand and said,
''You have just got to really keep fighting back and I have got confi-
dence in vou that vou can do that and this thing will not get out of
hand."
Now, the meeting on the 28th, there was discussion about some of the
strategy that had been developed at the La Costa meetings regarding
dealing with the Attorney General and developing
Senator Gurxey. Again, I am really only interested in what I call
the criminal activities. I think really, they are the coverup. We are not
talking about the planning and break-in, but direct conversations with
the President on that — not strategy meetings about the committee or
that, but only the criminal activities.
]\Ir, Dean? Well, Senator, it's hard for me to separate something like
this out because we have a continuing sequence that evolved continu-
ously, virtually, from the 19th until this thing finally ended and brings
me to the hearing room today. It dealt with every aspect of the matter
from press relations to
Senator Gurxey. Well, I understand, but my recollection of the
testimony — and obviously, it isn't nearly as accurate as yours, because
I have only heard you go through the statement once. I think I have
gone through it once myself. But I am talking about these cases where
you and the President directly discussed Watergate, the coverup. It
seems to me there were either one or two that involved Executive
clemency. Those are the ones I am talking about.
Mr. Deax. All right. Your question is, then, when did we discuss
clemency ? That came up at the meeting on the 13th
Senator Gurxey. Of March ?
IMr. Deax. Of March, and again on the loth of April, in which he
had told me that he thought it was foolish for him to haA^e talked to
Colson.
Senator Gurxey. I am talking about meetings prior to INIarch 21.
Mr. Deax. All right, fine. There was discussion on the meeting on the
28th, when I tried to tell the President that I didn't feel
Senator Gurxey. I am talking about prior to the 21st.
Mr. Deax. That is prior, February 28.
Senator Gurxey, Oh, February 28, excuse me. I thought you were
talking about March.
Mr. Deax. Allien I discussed with him the fact that I thought he
ought to be aware of the fact that I had been involved in obstruction
of justice, when I made known to him that I had been made a conduit
for decision. He said, John, you don't have any legal problems to
worry about, I just don't believe you have any problems at all, and it
was left hanging at that.
Senator Gurxey. Did you discuss any specific instances of obstruc-
tion of justice?
Mr. Deax. Well, I, Senator, based on conversations I had with him,
I had worked from
1402
Senator Gurnet. I am talking about this meeting.
Mr. Dean. Yes, I understand. I am answering your question.
I can tell when I am talking with somebody if they have some con-
ception of what I am talking about, and I certainly had the impression
that the President had some conception of what I was talking about.
Senator Gurney. But I am not talking about impressions. That is
what I am trying to get away from. I am talking about specific
instances.
Mr. Dean. All right, I told him that I had been a conduit for a lot
of decisions regarding support and for silence and things of this
nature, and I felt that involved me in an obstruction of justice. The
President didn't think it did.
Senator Gttrney. Did you mention any of these decisions
specifically ?
Mr. Dean. I beg your pardon?
Senator Gurnet. Did you mention any of these incidents
specifically ?
Mr. Dean. I did not get into specific instances. I rather gave him
a general outline or picture of my conduit activities.
Senator Gurnet. Now, go on to the other meetings where you dis-
cussed specifically the coverup of Watergate, anything about it.
Mr. Dean. That subject about my involvement in an obstruction
position also came up at a meeting which I cannot date, but I recall
that Dick Moore was present. I had mentioned this to Dick Moore
and Dick ]\Ioore was another one who thought I had no legal prob-
lems and Dick was at that point fairly aware of the situation from
the fact that he had been at the La Costa meetings.
I am now at the March 13 meeting, where the matter of executive
clemency and the million dollars came up. That would be the next
instance in the sequence.
Senator Gurnet. March 13?
jNIr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet. And what happened then?
]Mr. Dean. At March 13, there was a number of unspecified demands
for money that had come to me through INIr. O'Brien. I had also been
having conversations with Mr. Mitchell.
I might mention this because it is just — I have just remembered
this now. There was at one point in time, after Mr. Moore had been
to visit with Mr. Mitchell in New York, following the La Costa meet-
ing, an effort to have Mr. LaRue go out and raise money. This had
been discussed earlier and ]Mr. LaRue had done some activities of
this nature. Mr. Ehrlichman mentioned to me the fact that someone
ought to go to ]Mr. Pappas, who was a long-time supporter of the
President, and see if he would be of any assistance. Apparently, Mr.
LaRue and Mr. Pappas had had some business dealings and as a result
of those business dealings, INlr. LaRue was encouraged that something
migl\t be able to be done. But he told me that Mr. Pappas might want
to have some favorable considerations from the Government on some
oil matters that resulted from this mutual venture they were in. I
rejwrted this to Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman told me to just give him
a call w^henever anything was necessary.
So thei-e was this general problem that was existing before the 13th
of March as to who was going to raise the support money and how it
1403
was froins: to ^et there. That is wliat prompted me to raise it with the
President at the end of the meeting, because it was on my mind, and
I told him that, you know, there were money problems, there was no
money to pay these people and he said, "How much will it cost?"
I said. "]\iy best estimate is a milion dollars or more."
He asked me who the demands were coming from. I told him prin-
cipally from 'Sh: Hunt through his attorney. At that point in time, he
said something to the effect that, well, Mr. Hunt has already been
given an assurance of clemency.
He said. T talked to Mr. Ehrliclnnan about that and then Mr. Colson
came and talked to me about it after he had been instructed not to talk
to me about it.
So that was the next occasion that came up.
Senator Gi-rxey. This is ^March 13 ?
IMr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator GrnxEv. Was that not also a preparation for a press con-
ference, was that not the main reason for that meeting?
:Mr. Deax. On the 13th?
Senator Gurxet. Yes.
]Mr. Deax. The bulk of that meeting had to do with the fact that
it was very likely that I was going to be called to appear before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, and we had discussions at that time of
possibly litigating over Dean as a means of not having other members
of the ^Miite House staff having to appear before any other committee.
Senator Gurx^et. Are you saying you discussed nothing about the
press conference that day?
Mr. Deax'. I do not recall a preparation. It was generally just
shortlv before a press confei'enco that these thinsrs would come up,
that he would ask me for questions on a press conference.
Senator GrRX'EY. He had a press conference on the 15th of March.
You had meetings with him on the 13th and 14th ?
Mr. Deax. 14th ?
Senator Gttrx'ev. 13th and 14th.
Mr. Deax'. It is verv possible that questions came up during the press
conference because he was following the Gray hearings verv closely
and whether the discussion that we were having regardinir the Gray
hearings was formulating answers in the President's mind for the
press conference I do not know. He liad not at that point l^egun
to studv. at least in my presence, his briefing book for the press
conference.
Senator Gurx^^ey. You cannot recall any discussions in either one of
those meetings about a preparation for a press conference? All you
recall is discussion about Watergate, is that vour answer?
Mr. Df.ax'. Xo. sir: vour quostion was. what specific conferences did
I have with the President on Watergate.
Senator GrRX'EY. Xo, we are wa}^ beyond that. Then. I was asking
did vou discuss the press conference in the March 13 and 14 meetings
and your answer was that you could not recall. Xow, I am asking
that — you can recall all about the Watergate on those two dates but
you cannot recall any discussions about preparing the President for
the press conference.
Mr. Deax' fconferring with counsel]. Well, Senator, all I can say is
that the thrust of that meeting was not to prepare the President for a
1404
press conference. There were discussions about tlie Gray hearings,
there was discussion about the question of litigatino: executive privi-
lege. The fact that the President gave a press conference on the 15th,
those dates were generally flexible, and certain circumstances might
influence the President as to whether he would or would not have a
press conference.
Senator Gurney. So you do not reinembor any discussion at either
one of those meetings about the press conference ?
Mr. Dean. On the 14th I do, yes.
Senator Gueney. But not on the 13th ?
Mr. Dean. Not on the 13th, no, sir.
Senator Gui^ney. Let us go on. Are there otlier meetings that j'ou
remember in March, prior to the 21st of March, where Watergate was
discussed, and again I am talking about the co^'erup, the criminal
activities ?
Mr. Dean. Senator, again, I am not trying to include more in your
question than I would wish to include but there was a general theory
that had been set up at La Costa as to how to approach the entire
Watergate coverup situation, so what might be your interpretation of
a discussion of a Watergate matter and what had emerged out of the
La Costa meeting, I find far different. If you will look at the agenda
that went in to the President following the La Costa meeting, you will
see those were the first beginnings of the coverup as it related to the
hearings which were deemed to be as serious as a criminal investiga-
tion by the Department of Justice.
Senator GtJRNEY. We have got down to March 14th and we only have
7 days to go to the Slst of March.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gtjrney. Would you please tell me in these meetings you
had with the President between INIarch 14 and March 21, the occasions,
the incidents, that you discussed the coverup of Watergate with him ?
Mr. Dean. Well, again, I think what I describe in my testimony/ is
the post La Costa and I will be happy to go through that again and
get into what were rather specific discussions of mechanics of coverup
from a very detailed nature whereas opposed to the general policy of
a coverup.
Senator Gurnet. Well, you had a meeting with him the 14th of
March, did you not?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. I mean, the 15th.
Mr. Dean. On the 15th after the press conference I met with him,
yes.
Senator Gurney. What did you discuss ?
INIr. Dean. The President, after the press conference, called Dick
Moore and I over to his office and I can recall very vividl}' that the
President was very relaxed, he completed the press conference, and he
was — his initial comment to both Moore and I was he was surprised
that after having made a rather historic announcement about the
opening up of liaison offices with Peking and the announcement of the
appointment of Ambpssador Bruce to fill that post, that the first ques-
tion that the press had asked after- he had read this announcement was
whether or not Dean would appear before tlie Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee in the Gray hearings.
1405
From there the discussion became rather rambling. It was the
President's recollection of his handling of the Hiss case, Mr. Moore's
recollection of how the President had handled the Hiss case, and it was
what I would call more of a social conversation than a working con-
versation.
Senator Gurnet. Then, you did not discuss anything about Water-
gate at that meeting ?
]Mr. Dean. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. All right. INIarch 16. You had a meeting with him
on March 16 ?
]Mr. Dean. On the 16th we discussed matters on how Mr. Ziegler
should follow up on matters that had arisen during the press confer-
ence. I recall that one of the things the President had tried to ac-
complish
Senator Gurnet. I am just trying to shorten it up. Did you discuss
"Watergate with him at all ?
Mr. Dean. Not specifically, no.
Senator Gurnet. All rijzht. March 17. You had a meeting that day?
Mr. Dean. March 17 ? Yes, that was St. Patrick's Day, and I recall
the President had a green tie on [laughter] and sitting in the oval
office.
Senator Gurnet. Well, that is probably true.
Mr. Dean. He was very relaxed and he had his feet up on the desk
and was very — the thing that stuck in my mind from that particular
conversation was that he wondered if the Senate would bite the bait
that he had put out at his press conference on litigating over the ques-
tion of Dean and executive privilege because he was convinced if they
did you would never see any of the "\^niite House staff before the
Senate.
Senator Gurnet. Well, if he was all that relaxed, I guess you
didn't discuss Watergate. Is that a fair thing to say?
Mr. Dean. I think that is correct, yes. Other than as I say we were
just following a consistent theme that had been developed at La Costa
regarding dealing with Watergate issues, he was continuing during
these meetings where I referred to Gray discussing the fact that he
was very distressed that Gray was turning over FBI files that related
to Watergate.
Senator Gurnet. Well now, what about March 19, there was a
meeting with him then, as a matter of fact, two meetings. Did you
discuss Watergate on those meetings? I am not sure of whether there
were two or not, were there one or two, do you recall? It looks like
two on this log.
Mr. Dean. Well, what happened on that, as I recall, I don't know
what records you are reading from.
Senator Gurnet. I am reading from a "WHiite House log which was
furnished the committee.
]Mr. Dean. All right. Now what I recall there is I came to the
President's office and he wanted to discuss, it was a discussion of the
media problems related to the Gray hearings, and some of the postures
he had taken on executive privilege and as the conversation proceeded
I realized it was a media-type area he was getting into.
Senator Gurnet. Again if I can help shorten it, that is what it says
here, too, that you discussed these judiciary problems.
1406
'^Mr. Dean. That is right.
Senator Gurney. You did not discuss Watergate?
jNIr. Dean. No, and the reason— I don't know, the meeting was
interrupted when I had suggested that Dick INIoore come down and
join the discussion, and the President indeed called for Dick Moore
and Dick INIoore came in to the meeting.
Senator Gurney. Now what about March 20 here, there were one,
two — no, three phone calls at one meeting as I see it here. Do you
recall what they were about?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I do. On the 20th — the preceding evening, on March
19, we had discussed the matter of the fact that a number of charges
were being made that related to my involvement in the Watergate that
were coming out of the Senate confirmation hearings of Mr. Gray,
and we discussed whether I was — I was very anxious to send written
interrogatories as we had offered the committee at that time.
Senator Gurney. But those discussions were about the 302 files, I
think, and the Segretti letter probably.
Mr. Dean. What happened as I recall. Senator Ervin had been on
nationwide television the preceding Sunday, on INIeet the Press or
Face the Nation, and had made some statements about sending the
Sergeant at Arms down to arrest people at the White House, and
there had also been questions that had been raised regarding the
reason that principal interrogatories would not be sufficient because
you could not cross-examine a written interrogatory. I think that
everybody at the White House agreed that you can't cross-examine a
written interrogatory.
iSenator Gurney. I might say the chairman of our committee was
very persuasive and effective on that he convinced everybody that you
could not.
Mr. Dean. Well, the White House realized he had a very convincing
point, I will assure you.
Senator Gurney. Well, again, if we can shorten it, except for mat-
ters like that the Watergate coverup was not discussed; is that a fact?
Mr. Dean. Well, now, there was an effort in those meetings to get a
draft letter up where Dean could explain some of this. This wasn't
what I would call baring all the facts of the Watergate and how I was
going to answer that letter. I submitted a copy of the draft of the
response which you have as an exhibit before the committee.
Senator Gurney. Well, now
Mr. Dean. Then on the 20th, of course, I had a call that evening
from the President and we were talking further about some of the
things we talked about during the day, and it was at the tail end of
the conversation that I said to the President, "I would like to meet
with you the next day to give you a report on some of the implications
of the Watergate."
Senator Gurney. Well, thank you, INfr. Dean ; I am sorry we took so
long to get through there but I was trying, as I am sure you understand,
to do a rundown of the actual discussions, direct discussions with the
President
Mr. Dean. Mr. Gurnev, I might sav this
Senator Gurney [continuing]. On Watergate.
M07
Mr. Deax [continuing]. That just, I know that every time I entered
the oval office I appreciated the enormity of dealing with the Presi-
dent of the United States, at no time did I ever feel I withheld any-
thing from the President, and I think anyone who went in there and is
asked anv ([uestion by the President does not withhold anything, just
as when" I am saving something about the President I realize the
enormity of that also, and I wouldn't lightly or in any way intention-
ally say^anything that I did not know to be the facts as I knew them in
my mind.
Senator Gurney. Well, in summary, let me simply state my under-
standing of what we found out here : i understand it is your own testi-
mony that you did not think the President had anything to do with
the plamiing of the Watergate break-in or the break-in; is that a fact?
Mr. Dean. I have no knowledge of that at all, sir.
Senator Gurxey. Then. I think it is also true, at least according to
my understanding, that during the rest of the year 1972 between June
16 or was it the 17th, the 17th, the day of the break-in, except for a
meeting on September 15, even you have not testified to any discus-
sions with the President about Watergate. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Dean. AVell, sir, at the meeting on the 15th, Senator, we got dis-
cussing some very narrow semantic
Senator GurnJey. I understand, but what I say, except for that meet-
ing : isn't that correct ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Gurxey. And, of course, it is understandable here that you
and I have different interpretations of that. Your interpretation is
that when the President said to you, "Bob tells me you have done a
good job." you interpret that as meaning he knew all that you had
been doing on Watergate and I simply say that the interpretation can
be assessed to that that he was talking about the investigation you
were doing in connection with the FBI.
]\Ir. Dean. I would call the Senator's attention to the other phase
of the conversation when I told him that I didn't think that this thing
could go on indefinitely and at some point in time it would likely
unravel.
Senator Gttrxey. I understand, and the records show that and the
facts show that.
]Mr. Dean. I am simply saying you and I have a different opinion on
that point.
Now, then we come to the voar 1973 and from what I have been
able to gather in the questioning I have just finished your testimony
is that on Fobruarv 28 vou did discuss this matter of obstruction of
justice and then you also testified to what you did here on March 13,
and then, of course, we come to the meeting on ]\rarch 21 when you
told him most of what Watergate was all about. And the summary
that I can sop from the testimonv, the President of the Ignited States
certainly didn't know anything about all this business, to this one
Senator, until this thing on Fpbruarv 28. according to your testimony,
and on IMarch 13 but especially, of course, the meeting on March 21
where vou did discuss with him at .ofreat len.ofth the Waterirate nnd he
at a later press conference said that he learned about it on that date.
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 5
1408
Thank you for your patience, and, Mr. Chairman, especially I
thank you for your patience and the rest of the members of the com-
mittee. I am soi'ry I have taken so long,
Mr. Dean. I thank the Senator for his questions. I think they were
very good.
Senator Ervin. I want to thank the Senator for his examination of
the witness.
We will take a recess for a vote and come back after the vote.
[Recess.]
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, prior to asking his ques-
tions, has asked me to have cleared up by Mr. Dean some more identi-
fication of the materials wliicli he has submitted to us which we have
just received back from the Xerox machine. This is the second batch.
What I would like to do, Mr. Dean, if I could give you this batch
of questions which are in approximately the order you gave them, and
if you could go tlirough them to the extent you can, identify the source
of each one if you can. Some of them, for instance, are a list of names
without any letterhead or any indication. A^Hio drew up the list of
names ? There is no indication as to whether or not the memorandum
was attached. Tlie wav they presently appear, tlie identification of
each of these documents is obscure, and I think for our purposes, if we
use them for the committee's work, it Avould be important if you
looked at them and to the best of your recollection, tell us what each
list is and who drew it up and who received it, to the best of your
recollection.
Mr. Dean. Are we working from the same stack, tlie same order I
have?
Mr. Dash. If vou could identify for the record from what you are
reading, not 7-ead the entire record.
Mr. Dean. I liave the first document from Gordon Strachan to John
Dean, dated September 17.^ And the source of this list is Mr. Strachan
and sent to me. I do not know where he got the list.
The next document I have is a memorandum dated October 26 from
Mr. Strachan to me, subject, "Political Enemies." ^
Mr. Dastt. Mr. Dean, is the ])rior list also supposed to be included in
political enemies?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, it was.
Mr, Dasit. Could you identifv it? If you already have, all ri.q-ht. But
when you speak of the list, if it is a contrilnitors' list, identifv it as
such; and if it is supposed to be an opponents list, an enemy's list,
would you please characterize it?
Mr. Dean. The list I have — the first list I was referring to lias a
reference on the cover note that came to me : "The attached should be
of interest to you and the political enemies project." Attached to it is a
partial list of fat cats attending a Muskie fundraiser.
The next document, the memorandum of October 26 from Mr,
Strachan to me, subject "Political Enemies," indicates that Mr. Nof-
ziger sent the attached information on Chet Huntley to Mr. Halde-
man. "Since you have the action on the political enemies project,
would you make your determination of what should happen, advise
Nofziger and mention your decision to me."
1 Previously entered into tlie record as exhibit 52.
^ Previously entered Into the record as exhibit 53.
1400
Attached to that is a memorandnm from Nofzi^er to Haldeman re
Chet Huntley. I thhik that the notations on there, which are mine, are
self-evident.
The next document I have is a list of the McGovern campaign staff.^
This list was prepared by Mr. Murray Chotiner and sent to me. Mr.
Chotiner had some discussions with Mr. Ehrlichman about this, and
he was to prepare a list and send it over to me pursuant to some instruc-
tions and directions he had from Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you characterize that list as a so-called enemies
list or a cauipaign contributors' list?
Mr. Deax. This was to go into th.Q general enemies project, which I
might add at tliis point generally went into the file, where it remained.
The next document, dated November 5. 1971, is a memorandum from
Gordon Strachan to me regarding J. Irwin Miller.^ It notes that "You
will probably notice in this morning's news summary that J. Irwin
Miller, who is still giving money to Democrat John Lindsay, though
he states he will support R. N., is also a backer of Lugar. I trust that
you will use this information as you see fit in the enemies project."
Attached is the news summary of that day.
The next document I have starts "Politicos continued." This is a
document that came out of Mr. Colson's office to me.
Mr. Dash. "What is that ? Have you identified that document?
Mr. Deax. Yes, I have.
Mr. Dash. Is that also an enemies document ?
Mr. Deax'. That is correct. That was a part — this is one of the
updates. I am sure there was a cover memorandum or probably it is in
my files somewhere in the White House that this was related to.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 60.^]
The next document is dated Novembei- 11. It is a memorandum from
a member of ]\Ir. Colson's staff. The subject is "Opponents' List," and
it has, it is directed to Marge Acker, Pat Buchanan, John Dean, Dan
Kingsley, Larry Higby, Gordon Strachan, Van Shumway, Gerry War-
ren, and Lucy Winchester. Connected to that is a similar list with more
additional names, these all coming from Mr. Colson's office. And there
is a third document, dated June 2, of the same nature.
Mr. Dash. The same origin ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct. There is a duplicate document of the same
nature.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 61.^]
Another one dated May 16, the same origin. As I say, this list was
continually being updated, and the file was sevei'al inches thick.
[The document referred to wat3 marked exhibit No. 62.^]
The next document is a memorandum of September 14, 1971, from
me to Mr. Higby, indicating a list of names that he had requested, as
well as additional materials containing other names. I might as w^ell
read the memorandum : ^
^ Previously entered Into the record as exhibit 56.
= Previously entered into the record as exhibit 54.
3 See p. 1713.
* See p. 172.5.
s See p. 1728.
a Previously entered into the record as exhibit 50.
1410
The list I have prepared is merely suggestive; it is based on conversations I
had with others regarding persons who have both the desire and capability of
harming us. The list is limited to less than 20 persons, as it would be most diffi-
cult to proceed with more at this time. I would hope we would continue to feed
additional names into the process every few months, but we must keep this proj-
ect within reasonable bounds. I will await the review of these names as I feel
certain there will probably be additions and deletions from the list. Before I take
any action, please keep the list at at least 20 or less.
Attached is a list that was prepared based on a document that Mr.
Colson had gone through and picked out some 20 key names.
The next document is a page of a news summary.^ I don't know the
date of the news summary. It has a notation on the top, "Dean/L."
Mr. Dash. When you say news summary
Mr. Dean. This is the daily news summary that is prepared for the
President and distributed to various members of the White House
staff.
The "Dean/L" indicates that it was to me from Mr. Higby and he
has encircled DNC Treasurer Robert Strauss, with a note, "Is he on our
list? Or should he be?"
Mr. Dash. Did you respond to that ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I did not. As I say, most of these merely went
into a file in my office, where I just gathered them.
The next document I have is a document entitled "Corporate Execu-
tives Committee for Peace, Trip to Washington, June 25, 1970," with
a list of names. This was another document that was sent as a part of
one of the continuing updates.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 63.^]
Mr. Dash. What ds the source of that document ?
Mr. Dean. That would have been from Mr. Colson's office. The next
document is entitled "Democratic Contributors of $25,000 or ISIore in
the 1968 Campaigns" —from June 20, 1971, New York Times story —
with certain names checked on the list. This is a document that came,
again, from Mr. Colson's staff.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 64.^]
Next is a series of documents that relate to Muskie contributors.
Part of it is cut off on the top here in the xerography process and this
document was forwarded to me from Mr. Colson's office also.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 65.^]
The next document ^ begins — it is a bLank sheet of paper, which is a
briefing paper that I was requested to prepare for Mr. Haldeman so
that he could deal with the Secretary of the Treasury with regard to
making the Internal Revenue Service politically responsive to the
White House.
This document was prepared — the top document was prepared by
myself; the attached document was prepared by Mr. Caulfield based
on conversations he had had with individuals in the Treasury Depart-
ment, as well as the last document was prepared by Mr. Caulfield as a
result of conversations he had with people in the Treasury Depart-
ment and in the Internal Revenue Service.
Mr. Dash. That was prepared by you with Mr. Caulfield's assistance
to be delivered to Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
1 Previously entered Into the record as exhibit 51.
2 See p. 1730.
3 See p. 1733.
* See p. 1734.
s Previously entered into the record as exhibit 44.
1411
Mr. Dash. Was it delivered to Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it was.
The last document for identification is a memorandum dated Au-
gust 16. 1971.^ It was a draft in my files in which I was asked to prepare
a strategy for dealing with political enemies that involved the entire
White House staff, and it was sent forward, to the best of my recollec-
tion, to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman for approval, disapproval,
or comment.
Xow. without going to my files in the A^Hiite House, I can't tell you
the disposition of this document.
Mr. Dash. But can you tell us whether or not that document was in
fact sent forward ?
Mr. Deax. Either in this form or in some form where the names
were typed on it.
Mr. Dash. Thank you, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Deax. I just noticed there were two other documents attached
to that.
On July 16, 1971, there is another update on the opponents list, add-
ing a name. This again is from Mr. Colson's office.
Senator Erm;x. With Senator Inouye's indulgence, I am going to
ask you one question about a paper that you identified in this connec-
tion called '"Subject : Opponent Priority Activity," ^ a three-page docu-
ment, and see if you can give me the date of the origin of that.
Mr. Deax. Senator, I am not sure which document vou are referring
to.
Senator ER^^x. It is one called, "Subject : Opponent Priority Activ-
ity," on the heading. It is three pages. You had it this morning.
Mr. Dash. I have that, Mr. Dean. I didn't forward that to you here.
I can forward that to you now. The one I think you identified at the
end of the morning session — one that had a memorandum of June 24
from Mr. Bell.
Mr. Deax. Yes. I was forwarding that
'Senator ER\ax. I want to find out, on page 2, the name of Sterling
Munro, Jr., Senator Jackson's AA. Do you have anything that indi-
cates whether Mr. Munro was added on the list of opponents ?
Mr. Deax. No, I don't. This is one of the- — I can only assume that
this was around June 24 when the document was prepared by a mem-
ber of Mr. Colson's staff and forwarded to my office as a part of this
general list.
Senator ER^^x. That would be June 24, what year ?
Mr. Deax. That is 1971.
Senator Ervix. Thank you.
Mr. Dash. Could I have the documents back, Mr. Dean ?
Senator Er\t:x. I can't forbear observing when I consider the list of
opponents why the Democratic vote was so light in the general election.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman.
Senator ER^^x. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. I really even in my wildest dreams would not think
of trying to improve or embellish on your story but you told it better
the first time when you leaned over to me and you said "I think I am
^ Previously entered into the record as exhibit 48.
2 Attachment to exhibit 49.
M12
going to demand a recount," when you said "There are more enemies
than we got votes." [Laughter.]
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. ISIr. Chairman, the charges contained in Mr. Dean's
testimony are extremely serious with potentially grave consequences.
The President of the United States has been implicated, and because
of the gravity of these charges, I believe that the witness, Mr. John
Dean, should be subjected by this committee to the most intense inter-
rogation to test his credibility.
It would appear to me that a most appropriate credibility test would
be one prepared by the White House and as you, Mr. Chairman, know,
the White House has prepared a memorandum and a set of questions
for use by this committee. These questions should serve as a substitute,
admittedly not the very best, but a substitute for cross-examination of
jNIr. Dean by the President of the United States.
Accordingly, I believe that it would be most appropriate to use
these questions and to use the memorandum, and I am certain that all
of us here will agree that the President is entitled to his day in court.
So with that in mind I wish to proceed, sir.
I have here a letter dated June 27, 1973, from the White House,
Washington. It reads as follows:
Dear Senator Inouye : We have noted your public expression of your willing-
ness to use questions and a memorandum, previously furnished to the committee
staff, in questioning Mr. Dean. We have today forwarded more up-to-date ques-
tions to hoth the majority counsel and minority counsel for the committee.
However, in view of your interest in this material, we thought it would be
appropriate to send these questions directly to you. There is also enclosed here-
with a slightly revised draft and updated version of the memorandum previously
furnished to the committee staff. Sincerely, J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Counsel
to the President.
ISIr. Chairman, I ask that this letter be made part of the record, sir.
Senator Ervin. AVithout objection, it is so ordered. The letter will
be marked with the appropriate exhibit number.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 66.^]
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I also request that the memo and
the questions previously furnished to staff be made part of the record
at this point, sir.
Senator Ervin. I would suggest that the memo, which is sort of an
expanded version of the White House logs, should be followed by —
this is a memorandum of counsel explaining the position of counsel
in substance.
Senator Inouye. Yes.
Senator Ervin. If there is no objection, it will be marked as an
exhibit.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 67."]
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I will now proceed with the memo
which was received this morning from the White House. It goes as
follows :
It is a matter of record that John Dean knew of and participated in the
planning that went into the break-in at Watergate, though the extent of his
knowledge of that specific operation or of his approval of the plan ultimately
adopted have not yet been established. There is no reason to doubt, however,
that John Dean was the principal actor in the Watergate cover-up, and that while
1 See p. 1754.
2 See p. 1755.
141i3
other motivations may have played a part, he had a great interest in covering
up for himself, pre-June 17.
Dean came to the White House from Justice from a background of working
on problems of demonstrations and intelligence. Among those working under him
at the White House were Tom Huston and Caulfield. Dean was involved in dis-
cussions in 1971 about the Sandwedge plan Caulfield proposed. Ehrlichman was
told that the original authors of the $1 million plan were Dean and Liddy.
If I maj' I would like to pause at this point. Would you care to
comment, sir?
Mr. Dean. Is that in question form ?
Senator Ixouye. This is a quotation from Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dean. I have no recollection of advising Mr. Liddy of a $1 mil-
lion plan. In fact to the contrary. When operation Sandwedge was
shelved, and I think I have in my testimony explained how that died a
natural death, that the budget for that was set at $500,000, and all
that were involved in reviewing that document thought that was an
excessive amount of money.
Senator Inottte. Well, I will continue to quote :
Whatever the fact about this, it is clear that Dean attended the meetings
that led up to adoption of the Watergate plan. Dean introduced Mitchell (who
had sponsored Dean for his White House position) to Liddy in November 1971.
jNIr. Dean. Senator, may I comment right there ?
Senator Inouye. Please do so.
Mr. Dean. I do not believe Mr. Mitchell sponsored me, to my knowl-
edge, to my White House position. I first heard of the White House
interest in me when Mr. Krogh came to ime and said would I be inter-
ested in going to the Wliite House and would John Mitchell let me
come to the "\^liite House ? I said I did not know but I thought some-
body else ought to take it up with Mr. Mitchell rather than myself. So
to the contrary, I do not believe Mr. Mitchell sponsored me to the
White House. In fact, I recall some conversations when he counseled
me against going to the 'White House.
Senator Inotjye. I will continue :
Dean introduced Magmder to Liddy in December 1971 and suggested Liddy
for the combined position of general counsel and chief of intelligence-gathering
for CRP. He told Magruder that Mitchell had hired Liddy. Dean, Liddy, Mitchell
and Magruder met to discuss intelligence plans of this kind on .January 27, 1972,
and on February 4. Dean was not present at tlie final meeting on March 30 when
the .$2.50,000 plan was approved. It is not clear whether he was not there because
he disapproved or simply because he was not in Key Bi.scayne or because he
wanted to try to keep his own record clean.
Mr. Dean. I might comment there. Senator. First of all, after I
returned from the second meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, and reported
to Mr. Haldeman what had occurred and told him of my feelings about
what was occurring, and that I wanted to have no part in it and told
him I thought no one in the "\^^iite House should have any part in it.
He agreed and told me to have no part in it and I have no knowledge
that there was going to be a meeting in Key Biscayne and did not learn
about that meeting until long after June 17, 1972. '
Senator Inouye [continues reading] :
He is reported as having said that he did not think it was appropriate for him
to be in on these conversation*;. "He is also reported to have said at a meeting in
Mitchell's oflSce that we should not discuss this in front of Mitchell or in the
Attorney General's office."
At some point during the spring Magruder phoned Dean and asked him to talk
to Liddy to try to calm him down. At another point. Dean knowing that a bugging
1414
operation was under serious consideration, called Magruder and referred to the
importance of Liddy's intelligence activities.
Mr. Dean. I would like to comment on that. I do not believe that is
quite accurate, Senator. What happened is Mr. Strachan at the White
House, called me, I believe I did receive a call from ]\Ir. Magruder tell-
ing me that he had developed very strained relationship with Mr.
Liddy. Like when Strachan called me because I believe he told me he
had been talking with Mr. Liddy he said, "What should I do?" I said
it sounds like a personality and a personnel problem and I suggested
that he not bother Mr. Mitchell with it but rather take it to Mr.
Mardian and let Mr. Mardian resolve any problem because they do
need a general counsel over there.
Senator Inoxjye [continuing] :
This arose after an argument between Magruder and Liddy. Dean urged
Magruder not to let personal animosity "get in the way of the project." Also in
March 1973 Dean claimed to Haldeman that in the spring of 1972 he had told
Haldeman that he had been to two meetings at which unacceptable and out-
landish deals for intelligence gathering had been rejected by himself and by
Mitchell and that he, Dean proposed not to attend any more such meetings.
Haldeman has no personal recollection of Dean telling him about the meetings at
the time but is "willing to accept that as a possibility."
Post June 17.
Mr. Dean. If I might just comment there, following June 17 and the
break-in the first time I had a discussion with Mv. Haldeman about
these facts I had already reported them to Mr. Ehrlichman. He re-
membered perfectly well and very clearly the fact that I had come to
him shortly after the second meeting.
Senator Inouye [continues reading] :
Whatever the facts may be on the matters that are uncertain in the spring of
1972 about Dean's knowledge or specific approval of the break-in, it must have
been clear to Dean as a lawyer when he heard on June 17 of Watergate that he was
in personal difficulty. The Watergate affair was too clearly the outgrowth of the
discussions and plans he had been in on that he might well be regarded as a
conspirator with regard to them. He must immediately have realized that his
patron, Mitchell, would also be involved.
It appears that Ehrlichman called Dean on June 17 to advise him of the
problem and to direct him to take charge of it for the White House. Even with-
out an instruction this would have been his responsibility as counsel for the
President, from the time of the occurrence and he was active in that role from
the moment of his return to the city a day or two after the break-in. This is a
statement from Mr. Ehrlichman's deposition.
On June 19, Dean met with Liddy, Mitchell. Strachan and Magruder and
Sloan. Dean, ]Mitchell, and Magruder also met wath LaRue and ISIardian that
evening at Mitchell's apartment. At these meetings the coverup plan was liatched.
This is from the Magruder testimony. A series of meetings followed throughout
the summer.
Mr. Dean. Senator, I just might footnote as you go along. I believe
that the policy regarding the coverup was set long before I returned
from the Far East over tlie weekend of the break-in and when I came
into the office and talked to INIr. Strachan I realized that the White
House already decided initially that it was going to start destroying
incriminating documents and certainly was not going to step forward
as to what its knowledge of the mattei- was at that point in time.
Senator Ixouye. If I may ask at tliis point, when you refer to the
White House had decided, wlio do you mean by the White House?
Mr. Dean. I am sorry, Senator, I did not hear you.
1416
Senator Inouye. You have just testified that the White House had
decided.
]Mr. Dean. Well, I mean by that that certainly Mr. Haldeman and
Mr. Ehrlichman, because Mr. Haldeman had given specific instruc-
tions to Mr. Strachan to destroy the incriminating documents that
were in his possession.
Senator Ixouye. "At these meetings the coverup plan was hatched.
A series of meetings followed throughout the summer. Dean and
Mitchell were ]Magruder's principal contacts on the coverup. Dean
was not merely one of the architects of the coverup plan. He was also
its most active participant. ^lagruder correctly concluded that Dean
'was involved in all aspects of this coverup,' ■' and this is from the
Magruder testimony.
"It was Dean who suggested to Haldeman that the FBI was con-
cerned that it might run into a CIA operation." This is from Mr,
Haldeman. If you wish to comment I hope you will.
Mr. Dean. Yes.
As you recall, when I testified I had been asked by Mr. Ehrlichnian
to stay abreast of what was happening in the Department of Justice.
In my meeting with ]Mr. Gray, which I believe was on the 21st, Mr.
Gray told me of the fact that they had uncovered banking transactions
in Mr. Barker's account and were at that time looking for the Dahl-
l)erg check and the Mexican money and, indeed, I did report this back
as the reporting channels had been developed to my superiors.
Senator Inouye. Were you truly concerned
Senator Ervin. Suppose you name the superiors you reported to?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator Inouye. Were you truly concerned that the CIA was in fact
involved ?
Mr. Dean. I had no idea that the CIA was involved at that point
in time.
Senator Inouye. Why did you suggest that the CIA might be
involved ?
Mr. Dean. This, as I believe I testified, was not at this point in time
but that was at a later date when I went over to Mr. Gray's again and
he told me his theories of the case. I explained these to Mr. Haldeman
and Mr. Elirlichman that one of his theories was that the CIA was
involved. I had no idea that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were
going to meet with Mr. Helms, and General Walters, that was unknown
to me until I subsequently was so informed by Mr. Ehrlichman but not
as to the substance of the meeting they had held.
Senator Inouye. "It was Dean who suggested to General Walters
on January 26 that CIA pay the Watergate defendants while in jail,"
and this is from the Walters memorandum for record June 28, 1972.
Mr. Dean. I believe I have explained that, Senator, in that I re-
ported also at one point in time to ^Ir. Mitchell and INIr. Mardian about
the Gray theory. That theory prompted Mr. Mardian. as I recall, to
suggest that the CIA might be of some assistance in providing us sup-
port and he also raised the question that the CIA might have a very
proper reason to do so because of the fact that these were former CIA
operatives.
Mr. Mitchell asked me to go back and explore this to Mr. Haldeman
and Ehrlichman knowing very well that this isn't the sort of thing I
could go to the CIA with.
1416
I didn't talk to Mr. Haldeman about this, rather I talked to Mr. Ehr-
lichman about it and he told me indeed I should explore it. In fact,
I said I didn't know anybody at the CIA.
He told me — I told him I didn't know Mr. Helms. He told me not
to call Helms but to call General Walters, General Walters is a friend
of the White House, and at that time alluded to the fact that he had
already met with General Walters.
Senator Inotjye, Did you, in fact, discuss this matter with General
Walters?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did and I have so testified.
Senator Inotjye. "It was Dean purportedly acting on behalf of
Mitchell who came to Ehrlichman several weeks after the break-in to
obtain approval for fund raising by Kalmbach for the arrested per-
sons," and this is from Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dean. It is correct that Mr. ■ — after the fact that there could be
no assistance from the CIA came out, and Haldeman and Ehrlichman
agreed that they couldn't and I reported that back to Mr. Mitchell
and Mr. Mardian, that the demands apparently had reached the point
where they felt they had to do something to get some money and they
had none themselves. I was asked again by Mr. Mitchell to go back and
raise this with Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Mr. Mitchell told me
that he believed that Mr. Ehrlichman particularly would have an
interest in making sure that these men were taken care of, and it did
not take me any persuading at all in this conversation with Mr. Halde-
man and Ehrlichman to initiate Mr. Kalmbach, and obviously Mr.
Kalmbach would not have acted on my instructions at all.
Senator Inotjye. "It was Dean who reviewed the papers found in
Hunt's safe and declared that they were 'politically sensitive' and
should be given special treatment."
IMr. Dean. I don't think there was any doubt about the political
sensitivity. Mr. Ehrlichman, as you recall, on the 19th, there was a
meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office late that evening. Mr. Colson is
the one wlio had expressed anxiety over what might he in INIr. Hunt's
safe. As I have also testified at a subsequent time I learned that appar-
ently Mr. Colson and Mr. Hunt had talked about the fact that there
were things in his safe that somebody at the "White House should take
possession of. It was during this meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office
on the 19th that Mr. Ehrlichman said that I should report back to
him the contents of the safe after he had directed Mr. Kehrli to have
the safe opened.
Senator Inouye. What do you think Mr. Ehrlichman meant by
"should be given special treatment"?
INIr. Dean. Well, I don't know what INIr. Ehrlichman meant bv it.
I know that ]\Ir. Ehrlichman, when I described the documents to him,
realized their ])olitical sensitivity, and that they — he had originally
told me when I reported what the documents were to shred them and
it was subsequently he told me to "deep six" the briefcase and shred
the documents and it was only after I had reached the conclusion in
my own mind that I wasn't going to do tliat and I persuaded him that
too many people had seen them, that tliat might be what he refers to
as special treatment, they be given directly to Mr. Gray.
Senator Ervin. We will take a recess for another vote.
[Recess.]
1417
Senator EmT:x. The committee will resume.
Senator Ixouye. If I may resume reading from the memo.
"It was Dean who sought out successfully^ to have the others omit
his name from the list of those who attended meetings on the Liddy
plans."
This is from the ]\Iagruder testimony.
^[r. Deax. I would like to comment on that. The meeting in which
this was discussed was called by Mr. INIitchell. I was departing a meet-
ing in his office and he asked me if he could talk to me about these
matters. He called ]Mr. Magruder into the same meeting. They asked
me to review my recollection of the meetings. I told him what my recol-
lection was and as I testified, Mr, Magruder asked me, "How do I
handle this before the grand jury ?"
I said, "Well, I don't know what occurred at the second meeting.
I know there was some brief reference in the first meeting to the elec-
tion laws and that would seem to me a way to explain my presence at
the meetings."
Senator Ixouye. "It was Dean who urged Hunt to leave the country
two days after the burglary."
yiv. i)EAx. I believe I testified to that. That occurred before the
meeting commenced in ^Ir. Ehrlichman's office on the evening of the
19th. when Mr. Ehrlichman asked me where Hunt was. I said I had
no idea. Mr. Colson was present also. He asked Mr. Colson a similar
question and got a similar response.
At that point, ]\Ir. Ehrlichman told me to call Liddy and tell Hunt
to get out of the country, which I did.
After a subsequent discussion, I called back, after reraising the
matter, thinking it was not something that the White House should
be doing, and spoke again with Mr. Liddy and told him that my earlier
conversation should be retracted.
Senator Ix'ouye. Then it is your testimony that it was Mr. Ehrlich-
man who
Mr. Deax'. That is correct.
Senator Ixottye [continuing] . Proposed the idea ?
Mr. Deax'. That is correct.
Senator Ix'Oute. "It was Dean and Mitchell who prepared Magruder
for his perjurious grand jury testimony."
Mr. Deax. I can't speak about Mr. Mitchell's involvement. I know
that Mr. Magruder came to my office shortly before he was to appear
before the grand jury. As you will recall from my testimony, there
were a series of events that preceded that relating to the fact that I
had recommended that Magruder be removed or resign from the re-
election committee because I thought he was going to have problems.
Simultaneously to that, there was a discussion developing which
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were well aware of, that there was
an effort to hold the case at Mr. Liddy.
Senator Ixotjte. Did you in fact counsel Mr. Magruder to commit
perjury?
Mr. Deax. I did. I did in this regard : I helped him prepare a state-
ment that I knew was false.
Senator Ix'otiye. "It was Dean who said of a memorandum Colson
had prepared on Auofust 29 stating the facts as he knew them, 'For
God's sake, destroy the memo. It impeaches Magruder.' "
1418
Mr. Dean. I think the facts speak for themselves on that. I did not
destroy the memorandum. In fact, I turned a copy over to this
committee.
I think I have also explained in my testimony why I did not turn
it over to the prosecutors.
Senator Inotjye. "It was Dean who suggested that Sloan take the
fifth amendment, though Sloan was innocent."
Mr. Dean. It is correct; I did call Mr. Sloan's attorney before he
was to appear in Florida before an unrelated matter down there. There
had been a number of discussions within the White House about the
fact that Mr. Sloan was going to testify about money that had come
to the Wliite House. He had sought meetings with a number of people
in the White House. I was the only one who would talk with him.
Technically, under the law, it appeared that he did have difficulties
with some of the disbursements that had been made that occurred after
April 7, which was the effective date of the new law. And I did call
him and ask his attorney if he was prepared to take the fifth amend-
ment and in doing that, suggesting that he might want to pursue that
course. Because to me, the fifth amendment doesn't indicate innocence
or guilt.
Senator Inouye. "It was Dean who was the agent in some of the
money dealings with the arrested persons."
Mr. Dean. Would you repeat that, please. Senator?
Senator Inouye. "It was Dean who was the agent in some of the
money dealings with arrested persons."
Mr. Dean. I never had any direct dealings with any of the arrested
persons. I conveyed messages back of the pressure that was being
placed, not only on the reelection committee but ultimately on the
White House, particularly the one that came to my attention where a
threat had been delivered directly to me of concern to Mr. Ehrlichman.
I think I testified that Mr. Ehrlichman raised that immediately with
Mr. Mitchell when Mr. Mitchell did attend a meeting in Mr. Ehrlich-
man's presence.
Senator Inotjye. Did you have any dealings with arrested persons?
Mr. Dean. Direct dealings? I had a telephone conversation, the
telephone conversations I have discussed with Mr. Liddy, the meeting
I had with Mr. Liddy. I have never met INIr. Hunt other than the
one occasion I referred to, when he was in Mr. Colson's outer office in
August of 1971, which is roughly the time I recall meeting him, after
having seen him in there on a number of occasions. I have never met
any other individuals.
Senator Inouye. Did you in fact discuss money with Mr. Liddy ?
Mr. Dean. Mr, Liddy at the time I called him — this was in January,
I believe it was January 5 of this year. He had been trying to reach
Mr. Krogh. He had received a letter from the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee investigators and they were seeking responses from Mr. Liddy
regarding Mr. Krogh. Liddy called Krogh. Krogh did not take the call.
That is one of the documents that was not submitted, which I have
submitted to the committee, the gist of the call that was returned to
Liddy.
I had a report subsequentlv that INfr. Liddv was rather miffed and
a little outraged at the fact that he couldn't get hold of who he
thought was a good and loyal friend, INIr. Krogh. Mr. Krogh asked me
if I would personally do something about that.
1419
That Saturday, I called Mr. Liddy just to tell, to convey to him the
reasons that Mr. Krogh did not wish to speak with him, because he
wanted to testify before the Senate Commerce Committee in con-
nection with his confirmation hearing that he had not talked with Mr.
Liddy.
So, I explained this to Mr. Liddy and during the course of that con-
versation, Mr. Liddy told me, he said he hoped that somebody would
take care of the attorneys fees. I reported to Mr. Liddy that I would
pass that message along.
Senator Ixotjye. "It was Dean who told Colson not to make a tran-
script of Colson's taped conversation with Hunt and said that he.
Dean, would handle the matter."
This is a report from the Federal prosecutors, reported in the New
York Times.
Mr. Dean. That is not correct. To the contrary, I made a transcript
of Mr. Colson's telephone conversation on a cassette tape shortly after
Mr. Colson brought me his IBM tape of the conversation. I took a
copy of that and played it for Mr. Haldeman and INIr. Ehrlichman at
Camp David on November 15. Later that afternoon, after getting in-
structions that I should raise this with Mr. Mitchell, that he should
take care of the problem for Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, I
took it to Xew York with me and played it for Mr. Mitchell as well.
I got no instruction at that point in time from Mr. Mitchell.
Senator Ixguye. Where is the tape ?
^Ir. Deax. It has been turned over — the committee has a copy of
the transcript of the conversation.
Senator Ixouye. I do not know if they have the tape or not.
Mr. Dash. Senator Inouye, we do not have the tape. I am assuming
the prosecutors have it. We have a transcript of the tape.
Senator Ixouye. "Throughout all of this. Dean was perfectly sit-
uated to mastermind and to carry out a coverup since, as counsel to
the President and the man in charge for the White House, he had full
access to what was happening in the investigation. He sat in on FBI
interviews with AMiite House witnesses and received investigative
reports. Dean and Ehrlichman met with Attorney General Kleindienst
late in July. The Attorne,y General described the investigation and
said that 'it did not appear that any Wliite House people or any high-
ranking committee j^eople were involved in the preparation or plan-
nmsr or discussion of the break-in.' "
This is from Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Deax. Senator, if I just might add one point. I do not know
if the committee has a copy of the cassette that I prepared based on
Mr. Colson's tape. I do have that in my possession and will be happy
to turn that over to the committee.
Mr. Dash. We do not have it.
Mr, Deax. You do not have that ?
All right.
On the other comment you made reofarding the Attorney General's
public statements, I ncA^er discussed with Mr. Kleindienst the coverup
that was going on at the White House and the investigation I am sure
he is referring to there was his own conclusion.
Senator Ixouye. "History fails to record that at that moment, Dean
corrected the Attorney General's erroneous impression by pointing out
1420
that Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean had all been involved in planning
of operations of which Watergate was an obvious derivative or that
Strachan had knowledge of the fruits of this kind of operation, or
that all of them were suborning perjury and otherwise seeking to con-
ceal the facts."
Mr. Dean. Senator, I would just like to make a general observation.
This document has obviously been prepared by somebody who was not
at the White House at the time this was all occurring. It sounds like
they are putting it back together through newspaper accounts.
Senator Inouye. This is from the office of your successor, sir.
Mr, Dean. I understand. And I don't believe my successor was there
and didn't spend the nearly 3 years in the White House that I did.
Senator Inouye. "Dean's activity in the coverup also made him, per-
haps unwittingly, the principal author of the political and constitu-
tional crisis that Watergate now epitomizes. It would have been embar-
rassing for the President if the true facts had become known shortly
after June 17th, but it is the kind of embari'assment that an immensely
popular President could easily have weathered. The political problem
has been magnified one thousandfold because the truth is coming to
light so belatedly, because of insinuations that the White House was a
party to the coveru]^, and above all, because the White House was led
to say things about Watergate that have since been found to have been
untrue. These added consequences were John Dean's doing."
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I think that my testimony answers in
great detail my dealings with INIr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and the
President, and based on what I know, and knowing the position I held
in the Wliite House staff, there is no way conceivable tliat I could have
done and conceived and implemented the plan tliat they are trying to
suggest that I did.
Senator Inouye. "Dean was responsible within the White House for
becoming apprised of what had happened. From June 17 on, Dean had
periodic conversations with Ehrlichman 'about virtually every aspect
of this case.' " This is from Mr. Ehrlichman.
"Dean reported also to Haldeman and to Ziegler, to whom he gave
repeated assurances that he had made an 'intensive investigation' and
had found no White House involvement." This is from Mr. Ziegler.
"Dean was 'the foundation of the proposition that the White House
was not involved' " and this is from Ehrlichman,
Spring 1973. "With the election past and public interest in Water-
gate on the wane, Dean may have tliought that this coverup had been a
success, although he purported to continue an ongoing investigation."
Mr, Dean. Senator, if I might interject, I don't know how quickly
they are jumping from winter to spring, but I would draw to the atten-
tion of the committee and the Senator the La Costa meeting and the
events that transpired there, which I believe are documented by mate-
rials prepared by Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Higby. his assistant, as well
as subsequent materials that were prepared for the President, and I
think these speak for themselves.
Senator Inouye. "At the same time, Dean was affecting a failing
memory and talking to Magruder as if Dean did not recall the pre-
Watergate planning meetings in which he had participated," This is
from Magruder's testimony.
1421
Mr. Dean. We reviewed that earlier, and as I said, I did, when I was
talking to ]Magriider, I was telling him I did not understand what had
happened between February 4 and June 17 that resulted in that event
occurring, that I never had hard evidence, I never knew for sure what
the facts were, I didn't know how the plan had been approved ; I didn't
know how much White House pressure had been put on him ; I didn't
know for a fact if ^Mitchell had or had not approved it ; I had never
talked with Mr. jSIitchell about it. I think that is what Mr. Magruder
is referring to, or, as I said earlier, he may have confused later meet-
ings when I came back from Camp David and I did indeed give him
the impression that I could not remember what had happened, because
I didn't want to get into any discussions about what had happened at
that time.
Senator iNOirrE. Were you surprised when you heard of the June 17
break-in ?
Mr. Dean. Was I surprised ?
Senator Inottye. Yes.
Mr. Dean. As I told you, my immediate reaction was, after hearing
the facts, that it was something that Mr. Colson had been involved in.
I was more appalled than surprised.
Senator Inouye. Talking about the first time you heard of the break-
in on the 17th, were you surprised ?
Mr. Dean. As I say. I learned it through a conversation that I had
on the telephone with my assistant on the 18th, when I called after
landing in San Francisco, his persuading me to come back. l^Hien I
first heard of it, I can't say I was surprised to hear it, knowing what I
knew had occurred in the "Wliite House in the past.
Senator Inouye. You had anticipated something like this ?
Mr. Dean. I hadn't anticipated anything like this, no. I can't say
I anticipated it, but I can't say I was surprised to hear of it, because
I was aware of the fact that there had been a past effort to accomplish
a burglary on the Brookings Institute and I had also heard of the
Ell she rg psvchiatrist break-in by that time.
Senator Inouye. You were not surprised because you were an author
of the plan ?
Mr. Dean, No, sir; that was not my immediate reaction. I didn't
think the plan had been approved.
Senator Inouye. "In February, however, with the Ervin committee
beginning its work, the President was again concerned that all of the
available facts be made known. In the middle of February 1973, Dean
and Richard Moore met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman at San Cle-
mente. Dean was assigned to reduce 'to written form all of the detailed
facts as thev related both to the Committee To Re-Elect and the White
House.' " This is from Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dean. I received no such instruction when I was at La Costa to
prepare anv written report and have no knowledge of ever being given
such an instruction.
Senator Inouye. This is also substantiated bv Mr. Moore.
Mr. Dean. I have no knowledge of that. There was, as I say, an
earlier effort in December to prepare such a report and I have sub-
mitted that document to the committee. If there were discussions of
preparing a written report, it was of the ilk of a report that was pre-
pared in the December period, which I, for lack of a better term, call
a fairy tale.
1422
Senator Inottye. "Dean was pressed continually for tliat statement,
particularly by Haldeman, but never produced it."
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I recall, the only time I recall Mr. Halde-
man and Mr, Ehrlichman pushing me and pressing me for a statement
is when I was up at Camp David and not in that time frame.
Senator Inottye. "At this point, the Gray confirmation hearings
were imminent and the Ervin hearings were on the horizon. The Presi-
dent, who had barely known Dean, determined that counsel to the
President was the appropriate person with whom to work in formu-
lating the President's position on executive privilege and similar legal
issues in that these hearings in news conferences on March 2 and 15,
at which they would arise, would present. Between February 27 and
April 16, the President met with Dean and usually others, 21 or 22
times and there were 14 telephone conversations between March 10 and
April 22."
Mr. Dean. Senator, I will stand on my testimony with regard to
those last few paragraphs you have read.
Senator Inouye. "It is probable that Dean helped induce the views
on attorney-client privilege and on separation of powers that would
have immunized Dean himself from having to testify under oath."
Mr. Dean. I will comment on that to the effect that Mr. — or the
President and I when we discussed the Dean appearance, I told him
that if I go up there, I am going to testify. There is no way to go up.
We had had countless occasions when the executive privilege issue had
come up before, there was a parallel developing between the Gray
hearings and the ITT hearings where Mr. Flanigan made an appear-
ance before the Senate Judiciary Committee. This was quite evident.
In my discussions with the President he made it clear to me he did
not want Mr, Ehrlichman or Haldeman to appear and I told him the
strongest case for executive privilege would rest on the counsel to the
President and we did discuss that.
Senator Inotjye, "During this period Dean was developing other
problems. On March 10 there were press reports it was Dean who had
recommended Liddy to the Committee to Re-Elect the President, On
March 22, Pat Gray testified that Dean had lied to him during the
course of the FBI investigation of Watergate, On March 23 ^McCord's
letter to Judge Sirica was made public. The coverup was coming
uncovered.
"During this period the point was frequently raised by various peo-
ple, including primarily the President, that the 'whole story of the
Watergate should be made public' Dean's answer always was 'We
cannot do it while the investigation is continuing,' There are conflict-
ing versions of events and the rights of defendants might be prejudiced
by the statement."
And this is from Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Dean, I think that relates back to a conversation that I had with
Mr, Haldeman shortly after the election and before I prepared the —
was requested to prepare a written version of the Dean report when he
asked me for what the facts would entail. At that time I told him that
I thought that the grand jury would be reconvened and I thought that
they would undoubtedly get into obstruction of justice and I tliought
that those — that that investigation would come directly to the White
House and that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean could be indicted,
and he said to me, "I do not believe that is a very viable option."
1423
Senator Inouye. "On March 20th the President indicated that he
still did not have all the facts."
Mr. Dean. Wliat date was that, Senator ?
Senator Inotjye. INIarch 20.
Mr. Deax. The President did not state to ms, on the 20th when I
received a call from the President I told him at that time that I would
like to meet with him the next morning, and I would like to tell him
what I thought the implication of the situation Avas, what had really
prompted me at that time was the new demand from Mr. Hunt that
indeed, this thing was getting far out of hand, that the White House
was now being directly subject to blackmail and I did not know how
to handle it.
Senator Inouye. Is it your testimony that on March 20 the Presi-
dent did in fact have all the facts?
Mr. Dean. I did not hear you, again. Senator, I am sorry.
Senator Inotjye. Is it your testimony that on March 20 the Presi-
dent did not have all the facts ?
Mr. Dean. I do not know what the President knew on March 20.
We had had conversations before that. We had conversations that I
was personally engaged in on September 15 of the preceding year. We
had had conversations in early February or late February in which
I tried to start telling him some of my own involvement. We had also
had a discussion on March 13 about the money demands that were
being made. At that time he discussed the fact that a million dollars
is no problem. He repeated it several times. I can very vividly recall
that the way he sort of rolled his chair back from his desk and leaned
over to Mr. Haldeman and said, "A million dollars is no problem,"
and then he came back and asked "Well, who is making these demands,"
and I said they are principally coming from Mr. Hunt and he got into
the fact that Hunt had been given clemency and his conversation about
his annoyance that he had also talked to Colson about this in addition
to Ehrlichman, and the money matter was left very much hanging at
that meeting. Nothing was resolved.
Senator Ix'^ouye. As the President's counsel, did you, in a very legal
fashion, advise him of your meetings in February in the Attorney
General's office?
Mr. Deax\ My channel of reporting was through Mr. Haldeman or
Mr. Ehrlichman. At the completion of the second meeting I sought
out an appointment with Mr. Haldeman. I recall
Senator Ix^guye. In the subsequent meetings with the President did
you clearly advise him of the break-in, your involvement and the cover-
up, and your involvement?
Mr. Dean. I certainly did on the 21st and I had attempted to do it
earlier in February but he was not interested in it when I raised it,
and the conversation got cut short. I told him I thought I had an
obstruction-of-justice problem and gave him, started to give him the
highlights. He did not want to pursue it further.
Senator Inotjye. "In the preceding week Dean had begun to express
to Richard Moore concern about Dean's own involvement. Referring
to the meetings in Mitchell's office, the plumbers operation and the Ells-
berg break-in and the demands by Hunt possibly on March 16 for more
money."
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4
1424
Mr. Dean. I did discuss with Mr. Moore the fact that, but that was
not the first time I had discussed it with Mr. Moore. Mr. ISIoore and I
had talked about this on many occasions, that I thoug;ht that the cover-
up as harmful, bad, it had to stop at some point. We were searching for
answers as to how to end it. We could not find an answer, and finally,
at one point when I was having direct access to the President I thought,
and discussed with Moore that I can do something to end it now and
I will go in and tell the President what this is going to mean if it
continues.
Senator Inoute. "After the two of them met with the President on
March 20 Moore told Dean 'I do not think the President has any idea
of the kind of things that you have told me about.' When Dean agreed
that the President did not, Moore told Dean that it was his obligation
to advise the President and lectured Dean on this subject."
Mr. Dean. Well, Richard Moore to me is a wonderful man, and I
often went to him for counsel. He is an older man, and I respected his
judgment very much.
I believe I raised these thinafs witli Mr. ISIoore, I had raised them
before and I told him what prompted my conversation that afternoon
with Mr. Moore were the demands from Hunt and I wanted — by this
time he Avas aware himself of the money demands because this had
come up at La Costa when Mr. Ehrlichman had instructed Mr. Moore
to go to New York and get Mr. Mitchell to take care of these prob-
lems. So for that reason I had never told Dick Moore everything I
knew but I had given him enough knowledge so that he could see the
breadth of the problem.
Senator Ixouye. As tlie trusted aide and counsel to the President
of the United States, did you not feel that it was your obligation and
duty to as soon as possible advise him of the involvement in the Water-
gate break-in and the ensuing coverup ?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I think I have expressed before to walk
into the President's door is not the easiest thing to do. My channels
of reporting was through Mr. Haldeman or INIr. Ehrlichman, prin-
cipally through Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Inouye. Didn't the enormity of the problem compel you to
walk into the President's office ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I can only assume that everything I told Mr. Halde-
man and Ehrlichman would be going to the President also. As I have
testified, on some occasions Mr. Haldeman would take notes about
things I was telling him. He would take these notes shortlv before he
would go into meetings with the President. I can also recall occasions
when we were meeting when a call would come from Mr. Haldeman
to come to the President's office or once in Florida to come over to his
residence and he would wait until I completed reporting. I assumed
that everything I was telling Mr. Haldeman was going to the
President.
Senator Inotjye. "^^Hien did you begin to mistrust Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Dean. I think that the first signal T got that Mv. Haldeman had
decided that, you might say, I was off the reservation when I came
back from Camp David.
Senntor Inotjye. "V^-Tiat was the date, sir ?
Mr. Dean. That was the 28th. I think that was prompted bv my atti-
tude in a meeting with the President on the afternoon of the 21st
1425
when there was more discussion of different essentially coverup tech-
niques without getting into great detail because I' cannot recall in
great detail, everything they were saying the President was asking me,
do I a<iree and I was saving no, and finally, at one point in that meeting
I said that, right in front of the President that, I felt that Dean,
Haldeman, and Ehrlichman could be indicted for obstruction of justice
and this has to be recognized. And I think as a result of that meeting
they saw that I had begun to change my attitude about any further
involvement in a coverup.
Senator Ixouye. "On March 21 Dean gave the President a more
complete, but still laundered version of the facts and so surprised the
President that according to press accounts of what Dean is saying 'the
President came out of his chair.' "
Mv. Dean. I do not knOAV where that press account came from. The
President did not come out of his chair. I have never seen the President
come out of his chair other than very easily and slowly at the time
that he got up on April 15 to walk around to the corner of the EOB
office and then raise something with me. The President of the United
States does not come flying out of his chair.
Senator Ixouye. "At this meeting Dean indicated that Magruder
was involved but that he did not know about Mitchell."
Mr. Deax. That is correct. As I have said before this committee I
have never had a direct conversation with John Mitchell to ask him
what his involvement was. On the 28th when I came down from Camp
David after there was this discussion about whether I would be willing
to perpetuate the story that there had been one meeting in INIitchell's
office, there had been a discussion of the election laws and that that was
the reason for my presence and it was to introduce Mr. Liddy, at the
end of that discussion I said to Mr. INIitchell "I have never asked you
of your involvement and I will not ask you of your involvement but
1 want to hypothesize what I see to be the situation," and I then gave
them my hypothesis of the situation and, as a result of that hypothesis,
]\rr. Mitchell said "that is not far from accurate, but we thought it
would be two or three times removed."
Senator Ixotjye. If you did not know about Mitchell why did you
advise the President that Mr. ]\Iitchell could be indicted?
Mr. Deax. Because based on the information Mr. Magruder had
given me, which was inferential and my general assumption of the
fact. I was aware of the fact that he had received the information from
the electronic surveillance.
Senator Ixottye. Did you so advise the President ?
Mr. Deax. Did I so advise the President? I do not recall that I got
into a detailed discussion. I was jriving the President what I would
say was a general overview and letting him come back and ask any
specific questions he might wish to ask.
Senator Ixouye. Do you not feel it was important enough to advise
the President of the I"^nited States that his former Attorney General
Avas involved and implicated?
Mr. Deax. Well, I told him I thought he could be indicted but I
told him I did not have the facts for certainty myself that he was
indictable.
Senator Ixouye. I thouo:ht vou had just testified that Mr. Magruder,
Mitchell, and Dean were indictable?
1426
Mr. Dean. No, no. You are talking about the meeting that occurred
on the 21st?
Senator Inouye. The 21st of March, sir.
Mr. Dean. That was in the afternoon after I had earlier met with
the President and I said that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean were
indictable for obstruction of justice.
'Senator Inouye. "He mentioned the Ellsberg break-in and possibly
a second-story job at the Brookings Institute. He told about the attempt
by Hunt to blackmail Ehrlichman over the Ellsberg break-in. He sug-
gested that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean might all have some
problem about the financial transactions with the defendants but that
he thought they were more technical and political than legal."
Mr. Dean. I do recall saying that I thought that some of the obstruc-
tion problems were technical. I said some of them are more serious than
others. As far as discussion of the Ellsberg burglary, Senator, I don't
recall raising that at that point in time with the President as the rea-
son for Mr. Hunt's threat. In fact I was — when I raised it with Mr.
Ehrlichman as to what these seamy things were, Mr. Ehrlichman said,
"Well, you know I just have no idea what he could be talking about."
And subsequently on the 28tli or 29th wlien I talked to Mr. Krogh
I was very curious myself to find out wliat it was. and that is when I
asked Mr. Krogh if, in fact, Mr. Ehrlichman had authorized the bur-
glary of the doctor's office and he had told me that he didn't think
Mr. Ehrlichman knew in advance.
Senator Inouye. Didn't you believe that the offer of money for
silence was a criminal offense ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did.
Senator Inouye. Why did you say that these problems were more
technical and political than legal ?
Mr. Dean. That isn't the way I believe I cast it. ^^Hien I said they
were indictable I meant despite the degree of technicality as an indict-
ment, I can't say I was a criminal lawyer but I did recognize an
obstruction of justice.
Senator Inouye. "He gave no hint, however, of his orchestration of
perjured testimony by Magruder and others. Ehrlichman suggested
that everyone be made to appear before the grand jury and waive
executive privilege."
Mr. Dean. I have no recollection of that at all. To the contrary, when
we met subsequently I kept shaking my head and saying, "No," Ehr-
lichman, Dean and Haldeman are indictable and the tone of the con-
versation was not going to come forward but rather to continue the
coverup and I think the subsequent meetings on the 22d with Mr.
Mitchell, if the President indeed had received the message I was trying
to give certainly wouldn't have engaged in the conversation with Mr.
Mitchell that afternoon which would leisurely discuss the status of
this committee and the like.
Certainly nothing of any significance occurred at all after that 21st
meeting.
Senator Inouye. "Dean thought this would be a good idea but only
if the persons who appeared before the grand jury were given
immunity."
Mr. Dean. I don't recall that at all. I do recall general discussions
that I thought that one of the best ways to get the truth out would be
if people could receive immunity because I knew a lot of people would
1427
be unwilline: to talk or that their stories \YOiild be less than forthcom-
ing if they felt they were going to incriminate themselves.
Senator Ixouye. Should it be I do not recall oi- it did not happen?
Mr. Deax. The reference to the discussion of innn unity ?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
It is very important. I note throughout your testimony your power
of recollection is immense but oftentimes you have testified that you
cannot recall.
Mr. Dean. I am sorry, with regard to this
Senator Inouye, Is there a possibility that it did happen ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, it is. I do not recall specifically, Senator.
Senator Inouye. '"At another meeting that day Ehrlichman strongly
opposed immunity."
Mr. Dean. I never heard that.
Senator Inotjye. This did not happen ?
Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Inouye. "On March 23 Dean was sent to Camp David in
order to complete the long-promised report. Dean was at Camp David
for 6 days but came down on the night of the 28th and delivered
nothing."
Mr, Dean. That is correct, I delivered nothing because I had, as I
have testified, had earlier conversations about my testimony. Every
time I revealed the slightest inch of my knowledge, recollections began
to change, characterizations began to change. I was asked to handle
testimony in difi'erent ways. When I came down from Camp David
there was no doubt in my mind that I wasn't going to play the coverup
game and I wasn't going to give them any further information with
which they could play the coverup game.
Senator Inouye. Were you in fact, Mr. Dean, preparing your own
testimony ?
Mr. Dean. I was going through and recalling everything I could
remember about the incidents. I had been asked to do that, and if the
President had called and asked me for that report — —
Senator Inouye. Did you spend the 6 days preparing testimony for
your own use ?
Mr. Dean. Let me complete, Senator. If the President called me and
asked me for that report, I would have sent it to the President of the
United States. There is no doubt about that. That isn't who was call-
ing and asking me for it. It was Mr. Ehrlichman who was calling me
from California, he wanted any part I had of it, and based on the
earlier conversations I had had I wasn't about to give it to Mr. Ehrlich-
man. So I can't say I was preparing my own testimony because I wasn't
preparing my own testimony. I was trying to reconstruct, as I had been
asked to do, what I remembered as to what had occurred.
Senator Inouye. You have testified on several occasions that you
were concerned with the enormity of the problem. If it was so, why did
3'ou not on your own present to the President your written report ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I thought I had very clearly made the point to the
President on the 21st. "V^Hiat I saw occurring after the 21st indicated
to me that there was a certain degree of protection going on by Mr.
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. I was never sure that if I had sent the
report the President would ever see it for one thing.
Senator Inouye. As the President's counsel, and you were seeing the
President quite often during those days, could you not have personally
handed the report to him ?
1428
Mr. Dean. The President was in California, Senator, at the time.
He left shortly after I came down and I had this little round of activi-
ties with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, and
they were off to California.
Senator iNotnrE. "The failure of Dean's muse while he was on the
mountain is understandable since by this time it would have been
impossible to write a believable report that would not have been self-
indicting. "WHiile he was at Camp David, Dean told Ehrlichman's
assistant that he was not getting the statement done but was planning
his own defense." And this is from Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dean. That is not true, Senator.
Senator Inouye, "Haldeman talked with him several times and felt
that 'Dean was not having much progress in writing his report but
it became clear that he was worrying more about himself.' " This is
from Haldeman.
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say when I came down from Camp David, I
don't think it was a question of worrying about myself as what I was
witnessing was Mr. Haldeman and then subsequently Mr. Ehrlichman
becoming very concerned about themselves.
Senator Inouye. "On the 25th the President suggested it be an-
nounced that Dean would appear before the grand jury."
Mr. Dean. On what date ?
Senator Inouye. On March 25.
Mr. Dean. On INIarch 25 I was at Camp David. The President was
in Florida. That was a Sunday, as I recall, and I recall no convei^sation
with the President. I have no knowledge of that at all. That is a new
one to me.
Senator Inouye. "On the 26th Dean agreed but said he would do so
only if given immunity."
Mr. Dean. No, sir, I had no conversations with anybody. They were
in Florida at that time. The discussion that morning, if vou will recall,
was that the President came out with a statement that he warmly en-
dorsed me, he expressed new confidence or renewed confidence in me,
that he had allegedly spoken directly with me, and had no concern at
all about my prior knowledge of this matter and I do not recall any
statement about going before the grand jury being issued when he was
giving me this very warm embrace.
Senator Inouye. "On March 30, the President relieved Dean of any
further responsibility for the Watergate investigation. He called Ehr-
lichman in, told him that it was evident to the President that 'Dean
was in the thing up to his eyebrows', and assigned Ehrlichman to look
into Watergate."
This is from Mr. Ehrlichman.
"The President indicated to Ehrlichman that his conversations with
Dean throughout the preceding month had given him 'a growing
awareness of Dean's personal involvement in this.' Relieved of his
Watergate duties by the President and aware that"
Mr. Dean. Senator, I might just note at this point and call it to the
attention of the record, that Mr. Ehrlichman also resigned from the
White House on the same day that my resignation was requested, and
Mr. Haldeman as well.
Senator Inouye. "Relieved of his Watergate duties by the President
and aware that his own complicity had become obvious. Dean decided
to strike out on his own to hunt for immunity for the long list of
1429
wrongs he had committed. According to the President, it was April 2
when he first established contact with the prosecutors and attempted
to bargain for immunity, ^^^lile he carried on these negotiations,
Ehrlichman completed his report and advised the President on
April 14 that Mitchell, Magnider, and Dean were all involved."
INIr. Dean. I would like to comment on that. As I have testified, Mr.
Ehrlichman told me after he had returned from San Clemente back
to Washington, I met with him on the afternoon, late afternoon of
the 8th and had periodic meetings with him during the week of the
8th to the 14th. It was on the 14th that he told me that he had talked
with Kleindienst and that the grand jury was doing nothing. He was
particularly asking me when I was likely to appear before the grand
jury. I was already, per the instructions of my own counsel, limiting
conversations with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman about testi-
monial areas. But it was that day that I drew up the list which I
wanted to get the message very clear to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehr-
lichman that they had very serious problems. It was on the, as a result
of that list that the Attorney General suddenly received a call, because
I informed him that my counsel had been in direct communication
with the prosecutors and the prosecutors had indicated that indeed,
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were potential targets of the
grand jury. At 1 o'clock that night, I realized that they had gotten
the Attorney General late at night to get a briefing from the prose-
cutors, and that is when things really started moving. That is when
the activities began to occur.
Senator Ixouye. "On the 16th, Dean was asked by the President to
resign, but refused to do so. On the 30th, he was dismissed. His in-
creasingly shrill efforts since that date to save himself by striking
out recklessly at others are too familiar and too painful to require
mention."
This ends the memorandum.
Mr. Deax. I would only add to that. Senator, that I think that if
anyone has been on the receiving end of adverse publicity, it has been
this witness and not any of the other witnesses and I have not dealt
in personalities, nor will I deal in personalities at any time during
these hearings.
Senator Ixouye. Mr. Chairman, that ends the memorandum. I have
several questions which were submitted by the office of the counsel for
the President, with a closing statement. Knowing the lateness of the
time, may I request that I be permitted to continue the interrogation
tomorrow, sir?
Senator EmT:]sr. Yes. I think the Chair should state, however, for
the information of all concerned, that the article which you have been
reading to the witness and the witness has been testifying about is an
article which the committee has received from Mr. Fred Buzhardt,
counsel to the President.
Mr. Dean. I understand.
Senator Ervix. And not the testimony of a witness.
Senator ]Moxtoya. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask
Mr. Deax. Excuse me. May, before we leave Senator Inouye, may I
just add one point? One thing missing in that description of the
sequence of events is the fact that I, on the 15th, was asked by INIr.
Ehrlichman to come in — —
Mr. Dash. What month ?
1430
Mr. Dean. April of this year, the 15th of April of this year, was
asked to come in and see him. I did not want to visit with him. That is
when I sent a message to the President requesting I meet with him.
I did meet with him that night, on April 15, and that meeting is
described, of course, fully in my testimony.
Senator Montoya. Mr. Chairman, in view of the observations made
in the memorandum submitted by the White House with the list of
questions, and in view of the fact that the authorship of the memo-
random is attributed to a IMr. Fred Buzhardt, I would like to request
the committee that the chairman, in behalf of the committee, issue a
subpena to Mr. Buzhardt so that he can inform the committee as to the
source of observations which led him to some of the conclusions in the
memorandum.
Senator Ervin. My understanding is that Mr. Buzhardt is the coun-
sel and I don't believe he claims to have any personal knowledge of
any of these matters.
In a great many instances, he cited depositions or statements of
others. The Chair will take that under advisement and rule on it later.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, before we conclude, would it be in
order for me to ask, in view of the rather extended testimony that
Mr. Dean has now given us and now the certainty that his testimony
will continue until tomorrow, what plans the chairman might have
for the remaining schedule for the committee this week and thereafter?
Senator Ervin. "Well, it is apparent that we will not finish with the
witness until sometime tomorrow at the most optimistic period. The
next witness who has been tentatively scheduled for hearing was
former Attorney General John Mitchell, and I do not believe that we
could finish with Mr. Mitchell within the time allotted for meetings
this week. I think it would be unjust to the committee and the public
and to Mr. Mitchell to have his testimony split between this week and
the next session by the 10-day period. I have talked to most of the
members of the committee and they feel that under these circumstances,
we ought to complete the testimony of Mr. Dean and then recess until
after the week of July 4.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I entirely agree with that.
Senator Ervtn. In deference to the request made by Senator Mon-
toya, I would like to ask the staff to address a request to INIr. Buzhardt
as to whether he is able to testify from his personal knowledge to any
of the matters set forth in the statement. If he says he can, that he has
personal knowledge of the matters, then we can subpena him. If he
says he has not, then we can discuss it.
Senator Baker. In order to make sure I understand the schedule
outlined — by the way, I do entirely concur with it and I cannot speak
for the members of the committee, but I understand they are in agree-
ment with that, but it is my understanding that we will finish with
the testimony of Mr. Dean on tomorrow or Friday, as the case may be.
But if we do conclude with Mr. Dean's testimony tomorrow, the com-
mittee will stand in recess at the close of business tomorrow instead
of Friday, until we reconvene again on Tuesday, July 10.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Senator Baker. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock
in the morning.
[Whereupon, at 5 :50 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at
10 a.m., Thursday, June 28, 1973.]
THURSDAY, JUNE 28, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign AcTI^^TIEs,
W ashington^ D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :05 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and Weicker.
Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred D.
Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief
counsel: Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant; Eiler Ravjiholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert
Baca, office of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flani-
gan, assistant j^ublications clerk.
Senator Ervin. You may proceed.
Senator Inotjye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, before proceeding I would like to advise the com-
mittee that we have had a bit of confusion here. Statements attributed
to the press office of the A^liite House indicated last evening that the
memo which I presented to the committee might not have been an
official document of the White House. However, about 15 minutes ago
I had a personal chat with Mr. Fred Buzhardt, I believe, is that the
way 3'ou pronounce his name ?
Mr. Dean. Buzhardt.
Senator Inotjye. Buzhardt, and he indicated to me that these ques-
tions were in fact prepared by his office, and he was desirous that I
would use them in my interrogation of you, sir.
Mr. Dean, before proceeding may I ask one question. We have been
advised that these questions have appeared in the New York Times,
have you seen those questions ?
TESTIMONY OF JOHN W. DEAN III— Resumed
Mr. Dean. No, I have not.
Senator Inouye. With that Mr. Chairman, I wish to now proceed
with the questions which were prepared by the Office of the Special
Counsel to the President of the United States, J. Fred Buzhardt.
(1431)
1432
Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Inouye, I would like to advise the committee that
I have seen the New York Times this mornino;, that I didn't see the
questions. I looked at some photo<rraphs in the Times, and that I
haven't discussed the contents of the Times with my client and I would
like to make that statement in behalf of Mr. McCandless, and if you
would like to put us under oath we are both willing to be sworn.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that is necessary, sir.
Senator Ervin. You know, my experience ai'ound Washino;ton is
that if several people get hold of a document, that the thing will more
than likely appear in the morning paper — if not be telecast that night.
[Laughter.]
I think that the protection of information ar-ound Washington is
about as much as the protection which a sieve affords to the passage of
water. You may proceed.
Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dean, you quote the President as saying on February 27 that
Haldeman and Ehrlichman were principals in the Watergate matter
and that therefore you could be more objective.
What did you understand by this ?
Mr. Dean. Frankly, Senator, I never understood what the President
was saying when he said that they were principals. Before he said that
he told me that the involvement of their time in dealing wnth Water-
gate matters was taking them away from their other duties and then
he also added to me that they were principals in this matter and, there-
fore, that he thought I could be very objective in it, and that was what
subsequently prompted me the next day later to make sure he under-
stood that I felt I was also a principal.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean, did you have any evidence then or now
that Mr. Ehrlichman had prior knowledge of the break-in ?
Mr. Dean. That he had prior knowledge ?
Senator Inouye. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dean. No, I did not or I do not now.
Senator Inouye. The second question: Mr. Dean, if the President
was referring to the post -June 17 events were you not equally a "prin-
cipal" as you claim to have indicated to the President on Sep-
tember 15?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I just mentioned in answering the last question
when the President raised this it stuck in my mind, and I returned the
next day and after thinking about what he had said, and told him that
I also felt I was a principal and that he should understand that.
And then began to explain to him why I felt I was involved in
obstruction of justice and he assured — he said, "You don't have any
legal problem in this matter," and the discussion was terminated.
Senator Inouye. Your 245-page statement is remarkable for the
detail with which it recounts events and conversations occurring over
a period of many months. It is particularly remarkable in view of the
fact that you indicated that it Avas prepared without benefit of note or
daily diary.
Would you describe what documents were available to you in addi-
tion to those which have been identified as exhibits.
Mr. Dean. What I did in preparing this statement, I had kept a
newspaper clipping file from roughly June 17 up until about the time
these hearings started when I stopped doing any clipping with any
1433
regularity. It was by going: through every single newspaper article
outlining what had happened and then placing myself in what I had
done in a given sequence of time, I was aware of all of the principal
activities I had been involved in, the dealings I had had witli others in
rehationship to these activities. Many times things were in response to
press activities or press stories that would result in further activities.
I had a good memory of most of the highlights of things that had oc-
curred, and it was through this process, and being extremely careful
in my recollection, particularly of the meetings with the President.
Before I did leave the White'House while I was initially, well, I was
ultimately denied access to the logs ; I called the man who was in charge
of keeping the logs and asked him if he could give me a list of all my
meetings with the President. He did so on an informal basis before
he realized that — when I sent a formal memorandum asking for more
information and a formal confirmation, then they denied me that in-
formation when I sent the formal memorandum.
Senator iNOtrrE. Are you suggesting that your testimony was pri-
marily based upon press accounts?
Mr. Dean. No sir, I am saying that I used the press accounts as one
of the means to trigger my recollection of what had occurred during
given periods of time.
Senator Inoute. Am I to gather from this that you had great faith
in the reporting in the press ?
Mr. Dean. No, I am saying what was happening is that this sequen-
tially, many times White House activities related to a response to a
given press activity. I did not have the benefit, in fact tlie statement
might even be more detailed. Senator, if I had had the benefit of all
the Ziegler briefings where some of these questions came up A^ery
specifically in press briefings as to given events at that time but I
didn't have the iDenefit of those.
Senator Ixottye. In addition to your press clipping, the logs, what
other sources did you use in the process of reconstruction ?
Mr, Dean. Well, Senator, I think I have a good memory. I think
that anyone who recalls my student years knew that I was very fast
at recalling information, retaining information. I was the type of
student who didn't have to work very hard in school because I do have
a memory that I think is good.
Senator Inotjye. Have you always had
Mr. Dean. I might also add this : That I did have an opportunity to
go through my daily chrono files which was another part of the process,
plus while I was at Camp David I had sent for some files in prepara-
tion of the report I was writing up there so I did have some docu-
mentary materials many of which have been submitted to the com-
mittee, some of the exhibits that the committee has and from these I
was very easy able to put in time sequence various specifics.
Senator IxorvE. The next question, have you always had a facility
for recalling the details of conversations which took place many
months ago?
Mr. Dean. I didn't hear you, Senator.
Senator Inoute. Have you always had a facility for recalling the
details of conversations which took place many months ago?
Mr. Dean. Well, I would like to start with the President of the
United States. It was not a regular activity for me to go in and visit
M34
with the President. For most Americans it is not a regular activity
to go in and visit with the President. For most of the members of the
White House staff it is not a daily activity. When you meet with the
President of the United States, it is a very momentous occasion, and
you tend to remember what the President of the United States says
when you have a conversation with him.
With regard to others, some of the things, for example, the "deep
six" conversation and shredding of documents was so vivid in my
memory because of the circumstance that had occurred that it was very
indelibly put in my mind. Going back even while I was at the Justice
Department seeking the information on Mary Jo Kopechne, that is
the sort of thing that would stick in a person's mind because of the
nature of the sensitivity of the information being sought. So I would
say I have an ability to recall not specific words necessarily but cer-
tainly the tenor of a conversation and the gist of a conversation.
I would like to give another example, I remember I referred at one
point in one of the meetings I had with the President after he had,
after Mr. Gray had, made the statement about, that he had jolly well
proceeded with the investigation at the White House despite the fact
that Mr. Dean had been sitting in on the investigations. I remember
vividly when the President mimicked Mr. Gray in saying this and
saying it was absurd. That sort of thing is very easy to remember and
it sticks very clearly in one's mind.
Senator Inouye. Then why is it, Mr. Dean, that you were not able
to recall precisely the account of the meeting of September 15, very
likely the most important meeting in the year 1972 ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I think I have recalled that meeting.
'Senator Inouye. If I recall, in your colloquy with Senator Gurney,
your response was "I had an impression.'-
Mr. Dean. Well, we were talldng about the one line out of the first
part of the meeting. I would recall to the Senator that after I had had
the conversation, after I was — I sat down, and the President told me
that "Bob had said that you had done a good job," and then I turned
on the fact of — I said that I could not take responsibility for this alone
myself, I remember a sequence of events in the conversation ending up
with something when we were discussing a book I was reading and I
remember very vividly the book I was reading at the time we discussed
it.
Senator Inouye. Is it your testimony that you cannot recall pre-
cisely what the President said to you ?
Mr. Dean. You mean, can I repeat the very words he used ?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
Mr. Dean. I cannot repeat the very words he used, no, sir. As I
explained to Senator Gurney, my mind is not a tape recorder, but it
certainly receives the message that is being given.
Senator Inouye. Did yovi take any notes of this meeting?
Mr. Dean. Of the September 15 meeting?
Senator Inouye. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; and I did not take notes of other meetings for a
very specific reason, I recall at one time Mr. Moore saying to me, John,
you are having a lot of meetings with the President; you ought to be
recording these. Some of the things that were being discussed in these
meetings I did not want to make records of. Senator.
M35
Senator Inouye. "\^niy, sir?
jNIr. Deax. I thought they were very incriminating to the President
of the United States.
Senator Ixouye. Mr. Chairman, this is not part of the questioning,
but could you advise this committee what sort of information you
received ?
Mr. Deax. Well, I have recalled most of it in my testimony regard-
ing the conversation on clemency for Mr. Hunt, the million dollar
conversation, when the President told me that it would be no problem
to raise $1 million on the 13th. I did not think documents like this
should be around the White House, because the White House had a
similar problem as far as information getting out.
Senator Ixouye. Did you discuss this September 15 meeting with
an^'one at that time or at any time since ?
Mr. Deax. I believe when I came out of the meeting, I told Mr.
Fielding of my office that I had spent about 30 or 40 minutes with the
President and Mv. Fielding did not have full knowledge of my activi-
ties at this time. But I told him that fact that the meeting had oc-
curred and that the President seemed very pleased with the job that
I had been doing thus far. I think Mr. Fielding probably had a general
awareness about the specifics of the fact that I was involved in assisting
with the coverup.
Senator Ixouye. You have indicated in your testimony that you
were certain after the September 15 meeting that the President was
fully aware of the coverup, did you not ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, sir.
Senator Ixouye. And you further testified that you believed that
you had on your spurs in handling the coverup by February 27, when
you were told by the President that you would report to him directly.
Is that not correct ?
ISIr. Deax'. I do not believe I used the word "my spurs." I think that
was another characterization, I said I thought I had earned my stripes.
Senator Ix^ouye. If that was the case, why did you feel it necessary
on February 27 to tell the President that you had been participating
in a coverup and, therefore, might be chargeable with obstruction of
justice?
Mr. Deax. Because on the preceding day, he had indicated to me
that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were principals and I was
wrestling with what he meant by that. I wanted him to know that I
felt also that I was a principal. So I wanted him to be able to assess
whether I could be objective in reporting directly to him on the matter.
Senator Ixouye. If the President was aware on September 15 of the
coverup, was he not aware that you were implicated also ?
Mr. Deax. I would think so, but I did not understand his remark
at the time.
Senator Ix'^ouye. Then, why was it necessary on February 27 to ad-
A'ise him that you were guilty of obstruction of justice ?
Mr. Deax. Because as I said. Senator, when he mentioned the fact
that ]Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman were principals, I did not
understand what he meant. I wanted to make it clear to him that I felt
I also had legal problems and I had been involved in obstruction of
justice. Any time I was in the oval office, I did not want to withhold
anything from the President at any time and felt that any informa-
1436
tion that he was seeking or came out as a result of the conversation,
that I should give it to him.
Senator Inouye. If you were not clear as to whether the President
clearly imderstood, are you suggesting that on September 15 he did
not clearly understand what was happening?
Mr. Dean. I have testified that one of the reasons I sought the meet-
ing of the 21st is because I did not think the President fully under-
stood the implications of the coverup, the fact that people had been
involved in obstruction of justice and I wanted to make it very clear
to him that this was my interpretation of the situation. At that time,
I did have access to the President. When he did call me the night be-
fore, I did raise it and felt that I should go in and tell him the implica-
tions of this entire matter.
Senator Inouye. If you felt that the President of the United States
did not fully understand the implications on February 27, how did you
expect the President to understand the implications on September 15
of the prior year ?
Mr. Dean. When I went in on the 15th of the prior year, as I say,
this was sort of a congratulations, good job, John, Bob's told me what
you have been doing. At the time, we went on to discuss other aspects
of the efforts to prevent the entire matter from coming out before the
election. We talked about when the civil suit would proceed, we talked
about when the criminal suit would be tried. The discussion at that
time was very — the President was asking most of the questions and I
was giving very short answers.
I might also'add that I was very unused to going into the President's
office. I was extremely nervous when I was before him. This was the
first time I had ever really had a sort of one-to-one session with him.
The other meetings I have been in, there have been many other mem-
bers of the staff. I have not done most of the talking; rather, I was
the man who was in there taking notes or taking other people into the
meetings. So I would answer his questions and listen and do the best
I could to report.
Senator Inouye. Did you and your counsel dcA-elop a strategy for
obtaining immunity from prosecution? And what were the elements
of that strategy ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I recall the chairman starting to raise that question
yesterday. First of all, I do not know what is meant by a strateg}^ for
immmiity. What happened is my counsel went down and began dis-
cussing, first of all, how the prosecutors could hear my testimony to
make their own determination as prosecutors as to what they wanted
to do with me — whether I was to be a witness, whether I was to be a
defendant, and the like. I went to counsel because I had made my de-
termination that I was going to go to the prosecutors and tell them
what I knew about the case. But there is an old saying that all lawyers
know that the lawyer who represents himself is a fool. I did not feel
that I could be objective about my situation. I sought out a man whose
judgment I would respect in regard to the criminal law and he said,
John, if I am going to represent you, you liave to take my counsel ;
otherwise, you do not need a lawyer if you just want to walk down
there.
I said, well, I think I will take counsel. I am a lawyer myself and I
think to follow counsel is a eood idea.
1437
Senator Ixouye. I wish to follow this question with my own ques-
tion, if I may.
Mv. Shaffer. Excuse me, Senator.
I didn't want to register a timely objection to your last question,
since it bears so heavily on the issue of credibility. However, for future
proceedings, I would like to note for the record that when we came
before you gentlemen, you took away our fifth amendment right by
virtue of the use of immunity which was conferred by Judge Sirica
at your request. You have not taken away our sixth amendment right
and we have not surrendered it for future proceedings.
Senator Ixoute. This is understood, sir.
Mr. Shaffer. Thank you.
Senator Ixouye. I'll return to the ■\^Tiite House questions.
Didn't your strategy include deliberate leaks of information to the
media on what you had told investigators and what you might be
prepared to testify about in the future ?
Mr. Dean. Senator, in any testimonial areas, I dealt directly with
the appropriate investigative forum. I conceived of no strategy to leak
my testimony or anything of that nature. In fact, any comments I
have had with the press, I believe, were a matter of public record and
I think that most of the press know that I have refused on countless
occasions to give what I consider testimonial areas.
Senator Ixouye. How were these contacts with the media handled?
Mr. Deax. Well, I did have a number of inquiries that came, not
directly to me, because I made myself as inaccessible to the press as
possible. As I believe the Senator is aware, there were a number of
attacks about my character. They have been ongoing and continuous.
My counsel would call and ask me questions about these and I would
giA'e them what my assessment of the given attack was.
Senator Ix^^ouye. AAHio represented you and what individual mem-
bers of the press were contacted ?
Mr. Deax. I can't answer that, Senator, because I don't know. As I
say, I am aware of the contacts I had with the press, but there were
stacks of calls that came in, apparently, to my attorney's offices and I
don't know — I don't believe there was an understanding of my i-eturn-
ing those calls.
Senator Ix'^ouye. Mr. Dean, were any of the stories or quotes attrib-
uted to you or sources close to you inaccurate ?
Mr, Deax', Yes, they were.
Senator Ixouye. If so, what, if any, steps did you take to correct
these stories?
Mr. Deax. "Well, as I said, I am in a delicate position. If I come out
into testimonial areas, I can be accused of trying to generate publicity.
I already as a result of my appearance up here h.ave serious legal prob-
lems as a result of the publicity generated by this. I have not read the
press with regularity at all since these hearings have commenced.
I did see a Newsweek piece, for example, when they said that they
attributed to me some story about a Panamanian assassination. Xow,
I have no more idea what they are talking about, just none at all.
Senator Ixouye. The next question. Mr. Dean, is rather lengthy.
Mr. Dean, one point of distinction you drew in your testimony puz-
zles me. You have testified that you had received and placed in your
safe the sum of $15,200 which vou never turned over to anyone because
1438
you didn't want funds you had physically handled to be used for pay-
ments to the Watergate defendants. You also testified that you called
Mr. Stans and asked him for $22,000 to make the $350,000 fund whole
and that you had your deputy, Mr. Fielding, go to Mr. Stans' office,
pick up the money, and later deliver it directly to Mr. Strachan, know-
ing that $22,000 would probably be used for pa\ments to the Water-
gate defendants.
Now, do you mean to imply that you think there is some moral basis
for the distinction, or were you just being cautious to protect yourself
technically from committing the criminal offense of obstructing justice
at the expense of implicating your deputy ?
Mr. Dean. Well, if you will recall my testimony on that when I
spoke with Mr. Stans, I told him Mr. Fielding would be over to pick
up the package. I also informed Mr, Stans that Mr. Fielding would
not know what he was picking up.
I was quite surprised and I must say annoyed when Mr. Fielding
came back and told me that he had realized that he had received cash.
I did not have any desire to involve INIr, Fielding in this, because he had
not been involved in it before that. I assumed when he was makyig the
trip that he would be no more than an innocent agent in the matter and
he would be unknowing as to what he was doing.
I still think to this day he didn't know what the full purpose of that
money was and I told him at the time, I said, "Well, don't worry about
it. It is nothing for you to be concerned about."
Senator Inotjye. Mr. Dean, you have testified as to your close work-
ing relationship to your deputy, Mr. Fielding. It was he who you
sent to pick up the $22,000 from Mr. Stans, he who helped you to sort
the documents from Mr. Hunt's safe and he who sent to England to
retrieve Mr. Young's secretary.
Did Mr. Fielding know that you were involved in a conspiracy to
obstruct justice, perjure testimony, and pay defendants for their
silence ?
Mr. Dean. I have no idea what Mr. Fielding knew. I didn't discuss
these things with him. When he, to the best of my knowledge, his
involvement merely was dealing with, going through the material in
Mr. Hunt's safe with me and then dealing with Miss Chenow and going
to England to get her and brief her. He also assisted in briefing Mr.
Krogh and he also accompanied me when Mr. Ehrlichman requested
that he join me in preparing himself for his interview before the FBI
because it related to matters with the plumbers unit.
]\Ir. Fielding had become familiar with some of the problems of the
Plumbers unit as a result of dealing with Miss Chenow and he had
also talked to David Younjr, who was in the Plumbers unit.
So, he was more knowledgeable than I was. That is my knowledge
of Mr. Fielding's knowledge.
Senator Inotjye. Mr. Dean, if your deputv, Mr. Fielding, who
worked so closely with you and who carried out some of vour missions
connected with the conspiracy, had absolutely no knowledge of the
covorup conspiracy, how do you so blithelv assume that others on the
White House staff, and even the President, did know of your
conspiracy ?
Mr. Dean. Did know of my conspiracy ?
Senator Inotjye. Yes, sir.
1439
Mr. Dean. Well, I wouldn't classify it as my conspiracy. I would
say that I was involved with others in a coverup operation. I recall
on countless occasions, INIr. Fieldino- complaining to me that I was leav-
ing him out, I wasn't explaining to him what I was doing. We had had
a very close working relationship. I think today, Mr. Fielding is very
happV that I did not tell him what I was doing or involve him any
more than the degree he was involved in the entire matter. In fact,
he has subsequently thanked me for not involving him.
Senator Inoute. The question was, if I may repeat it again, if your
deputy, ]Mr. Fielding, who worked so closely with you and who carried
out some of your missions connected with the conspiracy, had abso-
lutely no knowledge of the coverup conspiracy, how do you so blithely
assume that others on the White House staff and even the President
did know of the conspiracy ?
]Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I don't know how many other people
on the White House staff knew of the conspiracy to — not my con-
spiracy but the general coverup conspiracy. I certainly know that I
was getting instructions from Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman and
I know of my conversation with the President. I know that there were
other people on the staff who were quite aware of the fact that the
White House was not baring its soul on this matter. There were, as
I said, parallel coverup situations with regard to Mr. Segretti, where
people who were not involved in other aspects become involved in that.
There was the Patman hearing, where it was quite evident that the
White House did not want to have the Patman hearings. There were
a series of various phases to the coverup and various people in the
White House knew.
Senator Inoitye. Mr. Dean, beginning in late May and early June
there were a series of newspaper stories reporting what you had told
^•arious investigators which quoted sources close to you as to what he
had said. A number of these news reports, for example, the page 1
story in the Washington Post of June 3, alleged that you began your
jirivate meetings with the President either early in the year or as
in the case of this particular story beginning on January 1.
According to your testimony your first private meeting with the
President in 1973 was not until February 27. Did you or did you not
tell investigators and/or friends that you began meeting with the
President, either the first of the year or beginning January 1, and
were these stories an attempt to exaggerate the length of time which
you had l^een dealing directly with the President and by implication
imparting to him knowledge of the AVatergate?
Air. Dean, Senator, where the source of that story came from I do
not have any idea. It certainly was not from me. I always, in dealing
with any of the investigators from either this committee or from the
prosecutor's office, told them exactly what I knew. I do not know of
any exaggeration at any time, any place regarding my knowledge of
tliis matter. So I cannot — it is obviously a loaded question and I do
not know how to answer it other than to say what 1 just said.
Senator Ixou^t:. Is it your testimony that the first private meeting
you had with the President of the United States in the year 1973 was
on February 27?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 7
1440
Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean, the number of source stories containing
allegations against the President attributed directly or indirectly to
you over the last 4 or 5 weeks
jMr. Dean. Excuse me, Senator, I do recall — was that, did you say,
private meetings? In other words, after the inauguration there was
a church service meeting as I recall, where I had a brief encounter
with the President where he actually stopped me in the reception line
as a result of an incident that had occurred during the inauguration.
It may be relevant. I had not planned to discuss this but if the com-
mittee wishes me to show my recollection of dealings with the Presi-
dent this may be very well relevant. When going to the — right after
the inauguration or during the inauguration apparently there was a
demonstrator who ran through the police lines and toward the Presi-
dent's car. That night the head of the Secret Service detail protecting
the President called me and told me that the President was quite
angry and anxious to do something about this man charging at the
President's car. The man had made it about 5 feet from the curb
before he had been knocked down by Secret Service agents.
I do not think anybody in the whole world who was watching the
inauguration on television saw it, I certainly did not. Mr. Taylor,
when he called me, said "What do I do?" The President wants some-
thing done.
"Well, you just tell the President you reported it to me and I will
check into it," which I did.
The next Sunday morning when I was going through the reception
line the President pulled me aside and said to me, "I want something
done about that man, that fellow that charged the car." I had looked
into the case. The best this man could be charged with was a collat-
eral offense for breaking police lines. There was no assassination at-
tempt, there was no evidence of anything like that. He was merely
trying to make a point, as many demonstrators do, by being arrested
in a public forum to make his protest.
I had occasion to request the Secret Service to make a full investi-
gation of the matter. They said they, after examining the man, had
released him.
I also talked to Mr. Petersen at the Justice Department and ISIr.
Silbert at the Justice Department and they told me there is no case
hei-e. Thev had talked to the Secret Service.
Meanwhile, I was receiving fiTrther reports from Mr. Haldeman
saying, "What are you going to do with the man? We want a case
made against him." That is one where I just quietly let it go away
because there was no case.
Senator Ixouye. INIr. Dean, the number of source stories containing
allegations against the President attributed directly or indirectly to
you over the last 4 or 5 weeks have been most numerous. Do you deny
that these stories were planted in a calculated attempt to influence
Federal prosecutors to believe you had such important testimony that
they should give you transactional immunity from the crimes which
you have committed in return for vour testimony against others?
Mr. Deax. I gave my testimonv directly to the prosecutors. T planted
no stories at all to do that and the prosecutors certainly would not
make anv decision based on what thev are reading in the newspaper.
1441
They would want to hear it directly from me and I was dealing
directly with the prosecutor. And likewise with Mr. Dash when he
began to interview me to find out what the scope of my knowledge was,
to make a decision for this committee as to whether they wished to
grant me immunity.
Senator Ixouye. Mr. Dean, the ^lay 14, 1973, edition of Newsweek
carried a long article about you and your prospective testimony. In
this article you are quoted a number of times and instances. The quotes
in that article were word by word identical to the testimony you have
given this week. Indeed, for the most part this Newsweek article was
a very accurate preview summary of the lengthy statement which you
detailed before this committee.
There are, however, several very noticeable differences. One differ-
ence is an omission from the testimony you gave here. You told this
committee that when the President discussed the matter of your
investigation of Watergate you did not tell him you made no such
investigation.
The Newsweek article, however, reports that in your meeting with
the President of March 21, and I quote "Dean also bore down hard,
he said, on the fact that there had never been any study clearing White
House staffers. Mr. Nixon replied that he had had verbal reports of
Dean's work but the counsel insisted 'nobody asked me for reports,
Mr. President,' he said."
**He said, T did not go around asking people questions in their
offices. There was no report.' "
"At this point sources quoted Dean as saying 'The President came
out of his chair into a half crouch of astonishment and shock.' "
If the Newsweek account is correct, Mr. Dean, the President's reac-
tion was most inconsistent with that to which you have testified before
this committee.
Did you or did you not tell the President that you had never con-
ducted "an investigation, and have you made the statement previously
that "The President came out of his chair into a half crouch of aston-
ishment and shock" ?
Mr. Deax. Well, I have testified here already that I have never seen
the President come out of his chair — [laughter] — in that manner. I
recall the interview that you are talking about, and the ground rules
for that interview my wife was present with me, and she will recall
that well, Mr. McCandless was with me and the rules were set that I
would enter into no, what I considered testimonial areas at all of a
substantive nature regarding my direct dealings with the President.
I was asked if I had prepared an investigation or done an investigation
into that I merely just said, no.
As I say, the interview that was given, and that story do not meet
with what I told the reporter because I said anything I say I want
it for attriliution, I am not giving you anything on background or the
like and I will not enter into testimonial areas and it was very clearly
understood that I would not. I would recall to the Senator again that
at this time I was coming under increasing character assassination
attacks. People said, "John, you just cannot sit down and take that,
you have got to come out and say at least a few words that you are
li^-ing and breathing and a real human being," and that is the reason
I held that interview.
1442
Senator Inotjye. INIr. Dean, if I recall correctly, you testified to
this committee that it was not your idea for Magruder's diary to be
altered nor were you aware before ISLr. INIagruder testified before the
grand jury last September that Mr. JNIagruder would testify that the
first meeting appearing in his diary had been canceled, and the second
meeting had been to discuss election laws.
On both of these points, your testimony is in direct conflict with the
sworn testimony of Mr. jSIagruder.
Are we to believe that Mr. Magruder lied as to these details con-
cerning you and, if that is your position, what could be Mr. jNIagruder's
motive for lying about the details of the manner in which Mr.
Magruder's perjury was conceived?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I will stand on my testimony and not
on the conclusions drawn in the question that has been propounded
by you at the request of the White House.
Senator Inouye. INIr. Dean, Mr. ]\Iagruder also testified that Mr.
Liddy told him that you among others had indicated to him that he
would have $1 million for his plans, which he had been working on
before he even came to the committee. You testified, on the other hand,
that you were surprised when Mr. Liddy briefed his million dollar
intelligence plan to Mr. Mitchell in your presence. To what motive do
you attribute Mr. Liddy "s report to INIr. Magruder that you knew about
his extensive plans before you saw them in Mr. MitchelFs office.
iNIr. Dean. Well, if the Senator will check the exhibits, there is one
of the exhibits in there where I had an interview or a discussion with
Mr. Mitchell. At that time Mr. ]Mitchell reported to me that Magruder
had made this statement to him. My response at that time to Mr.
Mitchell was that I had no recollection at all of ever making such a
statement to ]\'Ir. Liddy, and I can't conceive of the statement being
made for this reason : I was quite aware of the fact that a far different
plan. Operation Sandwedge, that had a half-million dollar budget
suggestion, had been deemed to be far more than necessary for any-
thing to deal with even the security problems that were going to con-
front the campaign.
Senator Ixotjye. Mr. Dean, just prior to taking Mr. Liddy to meet
Mr. ']\ragruder in early December 1971, did you and Mr. Liddy not
have a meeting with Mr. Egil Krogh and did you not at that time
tell Mr, Liddy he would have $1 million for intelligence gathering at
the committee?
Mr. Dean. I don't recall — I recall a meeting with Mr. Krogh and
INIr. Liddy when I described the job, and I don't recall specifying a
dollar amount as to what the intelligence for dealing with demon-
strators would be. I have no recollection of that, Senator, no sir.
Senator Inouye. This is my question : Is it a matter of recollection
or did it actually happen?
Mr. Dean. AVell, as
Senator Inouye. I am very much impressed by your power of
recollection.
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I remember very well the meeting with
Mr. Krogh. The meeting was at the time I was describing the job
to Mr. Liddy. The thrust of the description of the job was the fact
that he would be the general coimsel of the reelection committee. I said
one of the responsibilities he would have would be for dealing with the
1443
potential problems of demonstratoi-s. I don't recall at that time any
extensive discussion at all as to, you know, how this plan would operate,
what it would involve, what would be the substance of it because 1
never did, in fact discuss this with Mr. Liddy at all.
Senator Inouye. Did you discuss any sums of money i
Mr. Dean. I may have told him at that time whatever he feels is
necessary will probably be allotted to him after he presents his plan
but he didn't really have a plan in mind himself at that time.
Senator Inouye. Wouldn't a sum of $1 million be significant enough
for you to remember ?
Mr. Dean. That is — I have no recollection of $1 million, as I have
repeated earlier. In fact, to the contrary that seems like an extremely
high amount.
Senator Ixouye. I will now return to the White House questions.
Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder testified that in March 1972 ^Mr. Liddy had
threatened to kill Mr. Magruder and that ]Mr. INIagruder made a deci-
sion to terminate ]Mr. Liddy *s employment. [Laughter.]
In this connection ]Mr. ^Nlagruder testified that he received a call from
you encouraging him not to become j^ersonally concerned about Mr.
Liddy and not to let personal animosity get in the way of Mr. Liddy's
project.
Did you in March intercede with Mr, Magruder on Mr. Liddy's
behalf and, if so, since you have said you assumed Mr. Liddy's intelli-
gence project died after your meeting in February, what was the proj-
ect of Mr. Liddy that you urged Mr. Magruder to give priority over
his personal animosities?
^Ir. Dean. I did not intercede for Mr. Liddy, in answer to that
question, and I think I have described yesterday, I believe it was
yesterday, yes, that what happened is I was aware of the fact of a
strained relationship between Liddy and Magruder.
Mr. Strachan at one point called me and told me that there were
serious difficulties betwen Liddy and ^Magruder and Liddy — IMagruder
wanted to fire Liddy. I said, well, that is a personnel problem for the
reelection committee. They need a lawyer over there, that I suggested
Mr. Mardian deal with the problem because I didn't think it was
something worth taking to Mr. Mitchell.
Senator Ixouye. Mr. Dean. ]\[r. Magruder testified under oath that
prior to his August 16 grand jury appearance at a meeting in your
office you told him that if the worst happened "everything would be
taken care of, even Executive clemency."
Did you make such a promise of Executive clemency to Mr. Ma-
gruder as he testified and. if so. did you have authority from anyone
else to make such an offer or was it on your own initiative.
Mr. Dean. You sav the date was August 16 ?
Senator Inotjye. Yes, sir.
^Ir. Deax. AVell, I can recall on numerous occasions that Mr.
]Magruder was very worried, he was very shakv at some stages. As I
alluded earlier, or discussed earlier, the fact that the strategy that
had been developed, that ]Mr. Haldeman. ]\Ir. Ehrlichman were quite
aware of was that stop the case with Liddy. That is why apparently
they made the decision to keep Mr. ]Magruder on at the reelection
committee, contrary to mv recommendation that he be removed. There
were a number of occasions that they asked me how was he doing
1444
and the like, and I would say, you know, he is either calm today or
upset today or the like.
I do recall his having a conversation with me :
What happens if this whole thing comes tumbling down, will I get Executive
clemency and will my family be taken care of?
And in a manner of not serious import or serious discussion I said
something to the effect, "I am sure you will."
But I wouldn't call that what I would consider a firm offer of
Executive clemency and it was not in that context at all. He didn't
specifically ask "Will I get Executive clemency" — he was just saying
he wanted assurances.
Senator Inouye. Then your testimony, your answer to the question,
did you have authority from anyone else to make much an offer is, no.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. And was it on your own initiative, the answer
is yes?
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean, did I understand you to testify earlier
that you had led Mr. Caulfield to believe you were assisting him in
obtaining approval and funding for what he called Operation Sand-
wedge but that in fact you let Operation Sandwedge die a natural
death ?
Mr. Dean. I wasn't encouraging ]Mr. Caulfield. Mr. Caulfield was
anxious for my assistance. I told him that I would talk to Mr. ]Mitchell
about it, which I did. Mr. Mitchell virtually rejected it out of hand.
In an effort to save a man's feelings who had spent a great deal of
time, he had involved a number of other good friends of his own who
had major positions and had taken time off to work on the project,
rather than come back and bluntly say, "You have been shot out of
the water" and it had been disapproved, I realized that through a
period of time he would realize the j^lan was going nowhere and it
did die a natural death.
Senator Inouye. I call your attention to exhibit No. 34-12,* which is
a memorandum for the Attorney General from John Dean, dated
January 12, 1972, and I call your attention to the first sentence of the
second paragraph, which says:
Oi)eration Sandwedge will be in need of refunding at the end of this month,
so the time is quite appropriate for such a review.
Mr. Dean, if you let Operation Sandwedge die a natural death, why
did you state to Mr. ]\Iitchell that it would be in need of refunding at
the end of January?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I testified to this committee, after the Novem-
ber 24 meeting that Mr. Caulfield had had with Mr. Mitchell, he con-
tinued to do various investigative assignments. He was doing an
investigative assignment with Mr. McCloskey ; Mr. ]\Iitchell was inter-
ested in that. He continued to call what had formerly been just his
relationship with Mr. X'lasewicz Operation Sandwedge.
Mr. Ehrlichman had raised witli mo the fact that he thought Mr.
Ulasewicz could be of assistance, he would like to keep him around,
and that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Caulfield should decide what Mr.
♦See Book 3, p. 1149.
1445
Ulasewicz's future should be. This is the result of the label that
Mitchell understood all of Caulficld's operations and I think he had a
misimpression that, dating back to somewhere in 1969, I think Mr.
Mitchell assumed that everything had been called Operation Sand-
wedge. At least in my conversations with him, that is the way he
referred to it. So rather than go into a lengthy explanation when I was
communicating with him on this matter, I merely called it Operation
Sandwedge.
Senator Inottye. Mr. Dean, you have depicted all others in the White
House as excessively preoccupied with political intelligence, use of
covert methods and security, and yourself as a restraining influence on
these preoccupations. Yet, your background of responsibilities at the
Justice Department seems to suggest that your experience in these very
types of activities might have contributed to your being invited to join
the White House stall'. What, precisely, were your duties in connection
with demonstrations while you were at the Justice Department?
Mr. Deax. Well, I would like to address myself to the first part of
the question before I answer the second part of the question regardijif"'
being a restraining influence.
I do believe I was a restraining influence at the White House to many
wild and crazy schemes. I have testified to some of them ; some of them
I have not testified to. Many of the memorandums that came into my
office became a joke, in fact, some of the things that were being sug-
gested. I think if you talk to some of the other members of my staff
or if 3'our investigators would like to talk to them, they would tell you
some of the things that we would automatically just file — just like the
political enemies project. Many of these just went right into the file and
never anvthino- further: until extreme pressure was put on me to do
something, did I ever do anything. So I do feel I had some restraining
influence. I did not have a disposition or a like for this type of activity.
Xow, let me go to my responsibilities for the Department of Justice.
And I will speak specifically with the area of demonstrators. When the
demonstration situation was first developing, it was quite obvious that
somebody was going to have to talk to the demonstration leaders. I
can recall — would you like to proceed. Senator ?
Senator Inottye. Proceed.
Mr. Deax. I can recall that the first time that I had any knowledge
of being involved in this was when I was on my way, doing my normal
congressional relations work, coming up here to Congress on some proj-
ect. I had a call just as I was leaving the Department, down at the gate
of the 10th Street entrance. I was on my way out and they said, the
Deputy Attorney General wants to see you right away, would you go
up to his office ?
I went into his office and here was a large gathering in his confer-
ence room, many members of the military, representatives of all the
different depaitments and agencies, the Metropolitan Police, and the
like. At tliat time, the Deputy Attorney General said, John, you are
going to be the negotiator for the Government with the demonstrators
to determine who will have permits and what the parameters of those
l^ermits will be.
At that time, when I started discussing permits with demonstration
leaders, I was offered FBI information on all the demonstration
leaders that I was negotiating with. I said, I do not want to have that
1446
information, I want to deal as one man looking in another man's eye
and know that man for the reaction I get from him just dealing across
the table; I do not want to know what he has been doing all his life
or the like. I said, that is for others to judge rather than me. I just
merely want to tell you the results of my negotiations.
So I was not involved in intelligence from the outset. Now, as I
testified, I did become aware from time to time of requests from the
White House because of my proximity to the decisionmaking processes
for various intelligence that would relate to political figures in their
associations with the demonstrations and also, I was hearing com-
plaints that the White House staff was unhappy about the quality
of this intelligence. But my role was merely a conduit from the demon-
stration leaders back to a major committee that would make decisions
and talk about what I would report. In fact, I would often put myself,
in that I could be most effective in this capacity, in the role of advocat-
ing the position of the demonstrators. Because many times, I thought
they had a good point.
For example, one I thought that the Grovemment was taking a
terrible beating on was in the November moratorium on this big issue
of Pennsylvania Avenue versus no Pennsylvania Avenue. I thought
that the demonstrators got $1 million worth of publicity or $2 million
worth of publicity out of the Government's posture on refusing to
give Pennsylvania Avenue. Instead, they insisted that they go down
Constitution Avenue. I did not see that it made all that much differ-
ence in the long and short of it.
Senator Ixouye. Immediately after you were appointed counsel
to the President, did you not take over the responsibilities of Mr. Tom
Huston in connection with intelligence activities?
Mr. Dean. I think that you would have to know Tom Huston and
my relationship with Tom Huston to know that there was no way
I would take over anything regarding Mr. Tom Huston. He is a very
brilliant, independent man. He would not, I did not even know what
he was doing half the time. In fact, it was some months after he had
joined my staff that I learned he had some sort of scrambler phone
locked in a safe beside -him and he made a lot of calls.
]Mr. Huston did an awful lot of things that I have no idea what
he was doing in the intelligence field. The only thing I know is that
at that point, he was the liaison for receipt of FBI information re-
garding radical groups and he would be the distributor throughout
the White House and he put me on a distribution list. Most of this
material was not even to me, worth reading because I was not par-
ticularly interested, unless it was a very current demonstration.
So I inherited Mr. Huston. Mr. Huston and I worked with a friendly
relationship. As I say, he is a very independent man and he and I think
a little differently and handle memorandums a little differently.
1 recall one rather interesting occasion when he prepared a rather
strong and blunt memorandum for my signature to the Attorney Gen-
eral, on a very minor request for something. The memorandum was in
my mail stack. I read it quickly and didn't think much about it; I was
signing the mail. Two days later, I had a call from INIr. Kleindienst
and he said, in short, who in the hell do you think you are writing a
memorandum like that to the Attorney General of the I'^^nited States?
Now that you are up at the White House, you think you are high and
mighty.
11447
So I pulled the memorandum back out and realized that it is not the
kind of memorandum I would send to Mr. Kleindienst. I apologized
for the memorandum, because it was a rather strong and harsh memo-
randum for me to send to anybody.
Senator Ixouye. You did testify, did you not, Mr. Dean, that po-
litical intelligence was routed to you in the AVhite House?
Mr. Deax. Political intelligence i I had requests for political activi-
ties to embarrass people. I think I have turned over in exhibits 3-i-5,
3^6, 34-7, and 34-8* a fair sampling of the sort of things. If the com-
mittee would like to go through those at some point, I Avould like to
explain that most of those ended up in my file with no action.
I did refer to one yesterday with regard to commencing a tax audit
on Mr. Gibbons. I did not start that tax audit.
Senator Ixouye. Mr. Dean, I believe that you were the author of the
memorandum to the Attorney General which led to the establishment
of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. Did you hold the first meet-
ing of that committee in your office ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, I believe that is correct.
Senator Ixouye. Were you not the one on the White House staff who
levied requirements on and received reports from the Intelligence
Evaluation Committee?
^Ir. Deax. That is correct — well, I didn't — I asked them to suggest
areas they would like to go into. This would get into a couple of areas
that they wanted to get into that directly relate to national security
under the rulings of the Chair, so we will have to defer from those. But
they would often suggest areas that they would like to be into and I
would have to check them with others on the White House staff, par-
ticularly the foreign areas, which I didn't think was appropriate for
this group, but they had domestic implications. I went to Mr. Haig
and he in turn checked with ]Mr. Kissinger and he would decide there
was nothing to be done in this area. We would receive regular calendars
from them of events. I would have a man on my staff, initially Mr.
Caulfield and subsequently Mr. David Wilson, who would decide if
there was a demonstration coming, based on these regular calendars
they would send to us, was this a demonstration that we would need
intelligence on. And I would in turn either summarize or send a direct
report to Mr. Haldeman or any other member of the staff that the
lEC report would relate to.
Senator Ixouye. In interagency meetings to plan for handling dem-
onstrations, were you not the "Wliite House reoresentative ?
]\fr. Deax. From the time I went to the '\^niite House, I was, yes,
with some exceptions. There were some types of demonstrations that I
did not go to the Justice Department on or I went with others, because
they were of a particular nature that I had no expertise in the problem
area. I am thinking particularly of the Wounded Knee situation. I did
go over to the meeting on how to deal with Wounded Knee, but I
reallv was not personally aware of the Indians' grievance problems, so
Mr. Garment took over and dealt with that.
Allien there was a demonstration to occur in Washington like the
Mav Day demonstrations, I did participate with the Attorney General
in those in finding out what the Government was going to do, because
♦The rioonments referred to were marked for Identification only in Book 3 and were not
for publication.
1448
I was asked and expected to report in my summaries that the Presi-
dent had a great interest in as to what was going to be the Govern-
ment's response in dealing with such situations.
Mr. Ehrlichman frequently maintained a continuing interest in this.
In fact, I can recall another member of the stati' saying that as far as
demonstration goes, Mr. Ehrlichman is like a Dalmatian at the fire ;
he just can't stay aw^ay from them. He liked to knoAv what was
happening.
Senator Ixouye. In the St. Louis Post Dispatch of May 14, 1973,
there is a report that you attempted to recruit a Department of Inte-
rior employee, Mr. Kenneth Tapman, for undercover work at the Dem-
ocratic Convention. Did you attempt to recruit Mr. Tapman or any
others for undercover work and what prior experience did you have in
recruiting foi* undercover work ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I can't recall recruiting anybody for undercover
work other than I did have a discussion with Mr. Tapman. but I have
to put this in context.
Mr. Tapman had been with the Department of the Interior for a
number of years. He and I had worked very closely with the demon-
strators. He w^as with me during most of the negotiations we had on
the major demonstrations.
Mr. Tapman wears his hair far longer than I do; he developed an
excellent rapport with many of these people. He also had rapport with
the police officials, the Metropolitan Police and the like, when I was
having no relationships at this point in time as we went down toward
the planning for the convention with what the reelection committee
was going to do, but I knew that there was going to be a need for the
Wliite House to be well informed. I suggested that Mr. Tapman might
like to do this, because I would be able to have a set of eyes and ears
down there of somebody who I thought could assess the circumstances.
Somebody who is unfamiliar with a demonstration, and a lot of people
overreacted to demonstrations, would see that, you know, a group was
coming down the street and because one tear gas canister was thrown,
they would react that a hydrogen bomb had been thrown.
Mr. Tapman was a type who had been probably through more tear
gas than anybody other than Chief Wilson himself.
I thought Mr. Tapman would serve as an excellent source of infor-
mation for me and I told him that I wanted him, asked him if he was
interested in going down there. I said, you can't be on the White
House payroll to do this, quite obviously.
Senator Inouye. Then your answer to this question, did you attempt
to recruit Mr. Tapman
]Mr. Deax. Is yes.
Senator Inotjye [continuing]. Is j'es.
Mr. Deax. This was foi- hoih conventions, incidentally, I might add.
First of all, to go down and get an understanding of what type of
demonstrations were occurring at the Democratic Convention, what
were the logistic problems. I wasn't really familiar with ]Miami because
I hadn't been to the 196S convention and I didn't know the logistical
problems that were confronting us. so I suggested he go, for example,
to both and see how the police handled it and see what the problems
were going to be and the like.
1449
Senator Inotjye. This is another very lengthy question : Mr. Dean,
you have testified concerning 3'our conversations on three different
occasions with General Vernon Walters, the Deputy Director of the
CIA, beginning on the 26th of June. General Walters prepared a
memorandum for the record of each of these conversations with you.
In General Walters' memorandum record for 3^our meeting with
him on June 26, 3'ou are reported to have asked General Walters
whether there was not some way that the Central Intelligence Agency
could pay bail for the Watergate defendants and if the men went to
prisoii, could CIA find some way to pay their salaries while they were
in jail out of covert action funds.
In your testimony, you made no mention of asking General Walters
whether the CIA could pay the Watergate defendants' bail or salaries
while they were in prison. Was this an intended omission on your
part in the interest of saving them or do you deny that you made
these specific requests of General Walters?
]\Ir. Deax. I recall I did make those requests and as I say, the
omission was not intentional. I have never really read in full General
Walters' depositions. So the answer is that in fact, I recall that, that
was discussed.
Senator Inouye. And it was not intentional? The omission was
not intentional?
Mr. Deax. No, sir. In fact, I recall that they were in the paper and
I decided I didn't want to read them and then tailor what I had to
say around what Mr. Walters had to say.
Senator Ixouye. ^Ir. Dean, I believe you testified that on March 26,
while you were at Camp David, you called INIr. Maroulis, the attorney
for Mr. Liddy, and asked for a statement by Mr. Liddy that you had
no prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in.
Is that correct?
Mr. Deax. That is correct, and I have so testified.
Senator Ixoute. Xow, you also testified, did you not, that it was on
March 28 that Mr. Haldeman called you to meet with Mr. oMitchell
and ]\rr. ]\Iagruder and that it was at that time you became convinced
you would have to look out for yourself.
Isn't that correct ?
]\rr. Deax. That isn't my interpretation. I had decided while I was
at* Camp David, in fact before I went to Camp David, that I didn't
have to watch out for myself, but I saw what others were doing and
I realized that I ought to — ^well, as I say, I retained counsel up there
initially and told him because of the Los Angeles Times story, I re-
tained him.
At that point in time, I told him I would like to talk to him when
I got back and suggested to him that he begin to think about a criminal
lawyer.
Senator Ixouye. If on March 26, after you, according to your testi-
mony, had admitted to making payments to Watergate defendants to
obstruct justice, offering clemency to defendants to obstruct justice and
suborning perjury, you were still actively trying to build vour defense
against having jorior knowledge of the break-in on March 26, doesn't
this demonstrate that throughout this affair, your motivation was to
protect vourself against the criminal charge of authorizing and direct-
ing the Watergate break-in ?
1450
Mr. Dean. The reason I sought the statement from Mr. Liddy is you
will recall I testified that on the 25th, I learned there was going to be
a story ])ublished in the Los Angeles Times that I had prior knowl-
edge. I felt that was libelous. I was trying to build what I thought
would be a good defense or a good case if I decided I wanted to bring
a libel action. In fact, I had mentioned that in my conversation with
Mr. Maroulis also.
Senator Inotjte. Mr. Dean, you stated that Mr. Maroulis called you
back on the 29th of March and told you he could not get you the
statement you wanted from Mr. Liddy.
Did you record either of these telephone conversations you had with
Mr. Maroulis?
Mr. Dean. Yes. The first telephone conversation was recorded. It
is almost inaudible and I don't know if it is because of the form I
recorded it in. I would be happy to turn it over to the committee and
if the committee can get off the tape what is on there, fine. I have been
unable to.
Senator Ixouye. Mr. Chairman, that was the last question from the
White House. However, the White House has also submitted a short
statement, I presume this is the closing statement, sir.
Mr. Dean. Do I have the opportunity to comment on the closing
statement as well as the opening statement ?
Senator Inoxjye. If you wish to, sir,
Mr. Dean. Thank you.
Senator Inotjye. "A central credibility question is what prompted
Dean's tactics in ]March and April of 1973, The desire to have the truth
or the effort to achieve "
Senator Ervin. Senator, so the record will be correct, is that a state-
ment which White House counsel has prepared ?
Senator Inouye. This is a statement prepared by Mr, J, Fred
Buzhardt.
Senator Ervin, Yes.
'Senator Inouye, Special counsel to the President,
Senator Ervin. And it is a statement of his contentions about evi-
dence and not evidence as such.
Mr, Dean. May I ask a question? Does this represent the White
House view or ']Mr. Buzhardt's view?
Senator Inouye. This was delivered to me yesterday under cover
letter signed by INIr, J. Fred Buzhardt.
A central credibility question is : What prompted Dean's tactics in March
and April 1973 — ^the desire to have the triith told or the effort to achieve
immunity from prosecution? The following sequence of events is important:
Dean's admitted personal connection with the offer of clemency to McCord
in January (Dean to Caulfield to McCord via Ulaseuicz) (p. 141).
Dean's admitted personal connection with Hunt's demand for more money
on March 19 (Hunt to O'Brien to Dean) (p. 197).
Dean's meeting with the President on March 21-22. On any version of this
meeting it was an effort to get the President to take action on what was becom-
ing a personal problem for Dean. (p. 195).
McCord's letter to Judge Sirica on March 23.
Mr. Dean, May T just comment there?
Senator Inouye. Please do, sir,
]Mr. Dean. I, in the 21st meeting, had hoped that that would be
the truth punctuation point that indeed, the coverup. It was after
1451
that, that morning meeting when I saw that it was not going to end
that the period had not been placed in the story that my whole think-
ing began to change and I began to think of how can I now proceed
while others are miwilling to proceed, particularly Mr. Haldeman
and ^Ir. Ehrlichman, and at that jDoint in time I certainly wanted
to try to still get the President out in front of this entire matter.
Senator Ixguye [reading] :
McCord's letter to Judge Sirica on March 23. This was the crucial break in
the cover-uii. Dean learned via a call from O'Brien (p. 205). On March 25 press
comments directly linked Dean with knowledge of the Watergate break4n (p.
203). He called Liddy's attorney, Maroulis, on March 27 to get a statement that
he did not have prior knowledge of break-in (p. 211). Maroulis called back on
March 29 with word that he couldn't give him a statement (p. 212). This state-
ment might have been taped. On March 28 and March 29 he solicited names of
criminal counsel (p. 220). On March 30, he decided to retain Mr. Shaffer (p. 220).
Time had run out ; the cover-up had come apart ; Dean was centrally involved.
He sent his lawyers to the U.S. Attorney on Monday, April 2, and commenced
his negotiations for immunity.
Mr. Chairman, this ends the statement.
Senator Ervix. Thank j'ou.
Senator Ixouye. Mr. Chairman, I have questions of my own but
these questions have taken up an hour and 15 minutes so, if I may, I
would like to have the opportunity at some later time to interrogate.
Senator Ervin. Yes, all the members of the committee will be
accorded a second opportunity.
Senator Ixouye. I thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Dean.
Senator Erm:x. Do 3'ou want to respond to the statement which has
just been read to you?
Mr. Deax. I believe I have commented through the questions and
answers to most of those matters. The fact, I would just make this
point. I would recall the fact that the question of clemency for Mr.
^IcCord was a result of the fact that the issue of clemency had come
up directly with the President. That was not something that I initiated.
It was something that came in, Mr, Colson went to Mr. Ehrlichman,
Mr. Ehrlichman, in turn went to the President, Mr. Colson also went
to the President. I received word that the fact that clemency had been
offered to one, similar assurances should be given or could be given to
all, so that is clearly in the record on the clemency matter.
The 21st meeting I have explained repeatedly what my hope in
accomplishing with that meeting was, and my disappointment when
I had thought I did have access to the President, I thought what I call
my cancer on the Presidency speech did not result in immediate surgery
but rather continued coverup.
The 23d letter of Mr. McCord I was asked by Mr, Ehrlichman what
my assessment of it was based on the earlier conversation I had had
with Mr. O'Brien, at best it was hearsav that he had if any wanted
to perpetuate the coverup at that point through further perjury, I am
sure they could have because he had no hard evidence. This was
revealed in a conversation which I have submitted to the committee
and a conversation I had with Mr. Magruder who was not concerned
about this, that the fact that McCord could prove nothing, he could
say a lot but he could prove nothing.
1452
Let me see here. I will recall the reason again that I was seeking to
get the comment from Mr. Liddy was in a sense twofold. First of all,
the President had done a tremendous embrace of me that next morning
when the story was printed. He had said that based on conversations
he had had with me, which in fact he had not had, but rather I had had
conversations with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ziegler, both, and informed
them I was prepared to file a libel suit, and I believe the White House
has also admitted the fact that that phone call never took place be-
tween the President and myself on that day. But in an effort to develop
what would be necessary for a libel suit, not that I was planning to file
one at that point, but just in preparing for it I thought the strongest
statement I could have would be a statement from Mr. Liddy and that
was the reason I approached Mr. Maroulis to see if he could do it.
The reason that Mr. Maroulis could not get the statement was because
he was concerned about his client's fifth amendment rights. So those
are the only points I would make on that closing statement that was
offered by the White House.
Senator Ervin. I want to thank Senator Inouye for putting these
questions at the request of the White House counsel, and also for call-
ing the attention of the witness to the contentions of the White House
counsel.
Mr. Dean, you have been testifying for about an hour and a half
and I imagine you would not be very adverse to having a very brief
recess at this time.
Mr. Dean. I would appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
your thoughtfulness.
[Recess.]
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Under our usual routine, it would be the time for Senator Baker
to interrogate the witness. However, he has kindly agreed to allow
me to do so on account of certain obligations I have.
Mr. Dean, there are one or two exhibits I want to ask you about
and one of them is exhibit No. 34-5* which is a Shearson and Hamill
Co. statement. Do you have a copy of that there ?
Mr. Dean. I do not, no sir.
Senator Er^t:n. Can someone supply him with a copy there.
And another is our exhibit No. 35 of what I call the Dean papers,
that is the papers that were turned over to this committee at the order
of Judge Sirica. Do you have a copy of that?
Mr. Dean. I do not.
Senator Er\^n. And another is our exhibit No. 36 of the Dean
papers, a memorandum for Mr. Huston from Mr, Haldeman. I would
like for you to have a copy of those three documents before I begin.
INIr. Dean. I have some of the documents that were turned over to
me yesterday for identification relating to Judge Sirica. J don't know
what you are referring to with regard to the Shearson and Hamill
statement.
Senator Erwn. "When did you transfer from the Justice Department
to the White House?
Mr. Dean. July of 1970.
Senator Ervin. And when did ]Mr. Tom Huston transfer from the
Justice Department to the Wliite House?
♦Exhibit No. 34-5 was entered for Identification only In Book 3 and was not for
publication.
1453
Mr. Deax. I don't believe he was at the Justice Department, to the
best of my knowledge.
Senator'ER^^x. Was he at the White House when you arrived there?
Mr. Dean. Yes; he was there.
Senator ER^^^^ Do you know anything about a meeting having been
held in the office of the President on or about June 5, 1970, at which
the President and Mr. Huston and others discussed laying plans for
gathering domestic intelligence?
Mr. Deax. I have hearsay knowledge of that, Mr. Chairman, that
such a meeting did occur. Present at the meeting, Mr. Huston, various
representatives of the intelligence agencies, the President at that point
in time stated to those present that Mr. Huston would be in charge of
the project for the White House.
Senator Ervix. Now, you were informed in substance that the Presi-
dent assigned to Tom Charles Huston, White House staff, responsi-
bility for domestic intelligence and internal security affairs?
Mr. Deax". That is correct.
Senator ER\r[N. Now, as a result of this meeting there was a review
by the heads of the CIA, FBI, NSA, and DIA of the techniques used
by these information or intelligence-gathering organizations to gather
intelligence, both domestic and foreign, was there not?
^Ir. Deax. That was my general understanding on hearsay again.
Senator Ervix. Yes. And that review is embodied in one of the pa-
pers that you identified yesterday which I call No. 1 of the Dean
papers that was not introduced in evidence ?
5lr. Deax. I don't identify them as the Dean papers. They happened
to fall in my possession. I was not the author, of course, but I did turn
them over to the court.
Senator Er\t:x. Now, I will ask you to look at the exhibit entitled
"Recommendations, Top Secret, Handle VIA COMINT Channels
Only, Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection," that you have
there.
Mr. Deax. Is this your No. 2? [Committee exhibit No. 35.*]
Senator ER^'TX^ Yes ; that is what I call No. 2.
Mr. Deax*. The top does not sav recommendations on it to me. It
just has "Top Secret Handle VIA COMINT Channels Only Opera-
tional Restraints on Intelligence Collection" and then (a) is missing
and ''b) the document begins.
Senator ER^^x■. Yes. In other words, parts of it were deleted that
referred to
Mr. Deax. I understand.
Senator Ervix^ [continuing]. That had any reference to foreign in-
telligence matters.
Does that not constitute a recommendation from Tom Charles Hus-
ton concerning domestic intelligence, the part you have there?
Mr. Deax". What I understand this document, as I recall, when I
received it it appeared to me to be a summation of a rather lengthy
document, a 43-page document that was being forwarded either to Mr.
Haldeman or to the President for their review.
Senator ER\ax. Yes. Does not that document, in short, make these
recommendations as to the manner or rather the technique that should
be followed, in Mr. Huston's view, in gathering domestic intelligence
and ma^-fers af^ef^tino- internal security?
Mr. Deax. Yes ; it does.
•Exhibit 35 was published In Book 3.
1454
Senator Ervin. In other words, it says, it recommends the first
technique is surreptitious entry.
Mr. Dean. On mine, which is No. (b) [exhibit No. 35], the first
recommendation is electronic surveillance and penetrations and says,
"Recommend present procedure should be changed to permit intensi-
fication of coverage of individuals and groups in the United States
who pose major threats to national security."
Senator Erven. In other words, what I asked was the first recom-
mendation was techniques for removing limitations on electronic sur-
veillance and penetration.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. Then the next, the second recommendation was for
the use of the mail coverage.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. The third recommendation was a recommendation of
a technique designated as surreptitious entry.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. Now does not the exhibit show that surreptitious
entry, the third technique as described by Mr. Huston in that docu-
ment as follows : "Use of this technique is clearly illegal. It amounts
to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrass-
ment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can
produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other
fashion."
Mr. Dean. That isn't on the document I have before me but I do
recall something to that effect in the larger report that we are referring
to, yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
The fourth technique was development of campus sources of infor-
mation concerning violence-prone student groups or campus groups,
wasn't it?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. And the fifth technique recommended by this state-
ment is the use of undercover military agents?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Er\^n. Yes.
Now, I will ask you that all of these recommendations were that
restrictions of use techniques be removed, was it not?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. As I recall the larger document that
many of these recommendations had footnotes that had been placed
on there by Hoover as to every one of them.
Senator Er\t:n. Now, did not the original document, of which there
is an excerpt with deletions, point out in several occasions that Mr.
Hoover, the Director of the FBI, was wholly opposed to the use of
any of these techniques for domestic surveillance ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, it did.
Senator Ervin. And I will ask you if the Americans who were
to be the subject of these information or intelligence-gathering activi-
ties were designated by such terms as subversive elements without
further definition?
INIr. Dean. It was very broad, that is correct.
Senator Er\in. And second, selected targets of internal security
interests.
1455
Mr. Deax. Yes, sir, again that was a very broad description.
Senator Erm;x. There is no definition anywhere in the ( >cument
as to what those two things mean?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, sir. There was a prefatory soction of
the document explaining somewhat the dimensions of the problem as
it was i)erceived at that time. But again there was not even a lot of
specificity in that, as I recall but it has been several — quite a time since
I ha\^ read that document.
Senator Ervix. Now, was there anything in the document that told
who was going to do the selecting? These selected targets of internal
security interests ?
Mr. Deax. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Erxix. And that was left up, by the document, to the imagi-
nation or interpretation of anybody engaged in the intelligence work ?
]Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervix. Now there was another
]Mr. Deax. I believe that one of the reasons for developing this was
to get intelligence that was more responsive to the requirements of the
White House. There had been, as I think I have testified, there were
continued complaints about the intelligence, and I think that is why
the "White House took charge of the project.
Senator Ervix. The White House was dissatisfied with the work be-
ing done b}' the FBI, CIA, NSA, and the other intelligence gathering
agencies. It wanted to assume some degree of supervision over those
agencies, didn't it ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Erm:x. And I will ask you, as a lawyer, if you do not think
that surreptitious entry or burglary and the electronic surveillance and
penetration constitute a violation of the fourth amendment?
Mr. Deax. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Erm:x. The fourth amendment provides that :
Theright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. And no warrant
shall issue other than upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be served and the personal things to be
seized.
Hasn't it always been a violation of the fourth amendment under
the decisions of the court to resort to burglary for the purpose of get-
ting information?
Mr. Deax. Yes, sir, it has been.
Senator Ervix. And hasn't the Supreme Court recently held by
unanimous opinion that the use of electronic surveillance and penetra-
tion to obtain information concerning persons allegedly guilty of
domestic sub^•ersive activities is also a violation of the fourth amend-
ment ?
jNIr. Deax. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator ER^^x. Now, I call your attention to what I designate as
exhibit No. 36* and ask if you will read this document to the committee.
Mr. Deax^. This is a memorandi:m for Mr. Huston, subject, domestic
intelligence review :
Its recommendations —
♦Exhibit 36 was published In Book 3.
6-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 -
1456
I might add here it is from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Huston —
The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the review have been
approved hy the President. He does not, however, want to follow the procedure
you have outlined on page 4 of your memorandum regarding implementation. He
would prefer that the thing simply be put into motion on the basis of this ap-
proval. The formal official memorandum should, of course, be prepared and should
be the device by which to carry it out.
I realize this is contrary to your feeling as to the best way to get this done. I
feel very strongly that this procedure won't work and you had better let me know
and we will take another stab at it. Otherwise let's go ahead.
Senator Ervin. Now, that letter can only be construed as a statement
on the part of Mr. H. R. Haldeman to Mr. Tom Charles Huston, the
aide in charge of domestic intelligence, to the effect that the President
of the United States had approved his recommendations about remov-
ing the limitations on electronic surveillance and penetration, sur-
reptitious entry or burglary, the use of mail coverage, and of sources
of information on the campuses and the military undercover agents
for the purposes of gathering information upon the objectives of that.
Mr. Dean. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Er\t[n. Now, when did Mr. Huston leave the AVhite House?
Mr. Dean. I do not recall specifically the date. It seems to me he
was on my staff 6 or 8 months at the most, as I recall. He had been
talking about leaving for some time and returning to private practice.
This had been one of his pet projects. He had apparently gotten into
a serious dispute with ]\Ir. Hoover over it and he felt that his effective-
ness at getting this accomplished had been diminished as a result of
the fact that his plan was not being implemented and was flounder-
ing. I can recall him coming to me and asking me if I could do
anything. I told him I could not.
Senator Ervin. Now, do you not know that this plan was approved
for use by the President without the prior knowledge of l\Ir. Mitchell ?
Mr. Dean. I do not know that for a fact, no, sir. "When I talked
to j\Ir. Mitchell about it, it had reached the stage that they wanted
to do something. Mv. Mitchell and I talked about it and we decided
that the best thing to do was to create the lEC and that would pos-
sibly satisfv everybody's request to do something.
Senator ER^^N. Now, the lEC, in effect, was a proposal to set up
a group representing or representatives from the FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, and the counterintelligence units of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force to furnish information about the activities of all of these agen-
cies to the Wliite House?
Mr. Dean. I believe that is correct, but I believe that at that time
also, the military — I am not sure they were involved because they had
already made a decision that they were not going to do any domestic
intelligence work.
Senator Ervin. Now, as a lawyer, vou are aware of the fact that the
section 408(d) (3) of title 50 of the United States Code pro^^des that
the CIA "shall have no police, subpena, law enforcement powers, or
internal security functions"
Mr. Dean. Domestically.
Senator ER\^N. Yes; internal security functions.
INIr. Dean. Yes; I was entirely aware of that. I was not specifically
aware of the statute.
1457
Senator Era^x. Yet, despite the fact that the statute forbade the
CIA exercising any internal security functions, here was a consoli-
dation, in a sense, of activities or at least a coordination of activities
of the CIA in the domestic intelligence field, was there not?
]Mr. Deax. Mr. Chairman, I believe what the CIA did in this instance
was to share their own intelligence from a foreign nation that would
have a domestic implication. They were a part, because of their exper-
tise in analysis and evaluation of intelligence to
Senator Er\^x. And notwithstanding the fact that the statute gave
them no internal security functions, they were called upon to evalu-
ate domestic intelligence-gathering by other agencies?
Mr. Deax. That is correct. Now, I am not familiar specifically with
how the evaluation group operated at all as to the mechanics of that.
But they were a part of the group, yes, sir.
Senator Erm:x. As a lawyer, do you know of any statute which gives
the White House the power to set up interagency units of this kind ?
Mr. Deax. I do not know of any statute, no, sir.
Senator Er\t[x. Xow, the memo from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Huston
is dated the 14th day of July and states that the President has approved
the recommendations made by Mr. Huston, does it not?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator ER^^x. The President made a statement on May 20, 1 believe,
to the effect that he rescinded this approval after 5 days. Do you recall
that ?
Mr. Deax. It was late July when I came on and I do not recall
whether it was rescinded or not.
Senator ER^^x. Xow, on yesterday, Senator Weicker interrogated
you about one of the documents that you turned over to Judge Sirica
and Judge Sirica turned over to this committee, one dated September
18, 1970, which consisted of a memorandum from you to the Attorney
General
;Mr. Deax. Yes, sir.
Senator Er%t:x [continuing] . In which you recommended the setting
up of this interagency evaluation unit.
Mr. Deax. That is correct. I might add that when Mr. Mitchell and
I talked about that, we decided that with Mr. Haldeman and others
being aware of this, we thought this might satisfy the needs and the
requests at the time to do something.
I also recall that the liaison between the FBI and other intelligence
agencies had really broken down. I believe Mr. Hoover had withdrawn
all of his liaison relationships with everyone except the Wliite House
and ]\fr. Mitchell hoped that this might be a vehicle to start getting
the FBI dealing with the agencies, because there are, of course, quite
proper and natural reasons to have liaison amongst the intelligence
community.
Senator ER^^:x. Anyway, do you know of anv written document
which tends to show that the President disapproved of or rescinded
these plans which Mr. Haldeman said he had approved on the 14th
of July?
Mr. Deax^. No, sir : I have never seen such a document.
'Senator Er\^x. Xow, after Mr. Huston left the White House, you
had some responsibility in this field, did you not?
1458
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator ER^^N. Did you ever receive any instruction from anybody
to the effect that the President had rescinded these plans recommended
by Mr. Huston ?
Mr. Dean. No. To the contrary, as this document indicates, on Sep-
tember 18', I was asked to see what I could do to get the first step started
on the document. This was reflective of that effort.
Senator Ervin. Now, virtually all of these papers were marked "Top
Secret," were they not?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervix. I do not know whether you are familiar with Execu-
tive Order No. 11652 dated March 8, 1972, which was published in
37 Fedei'al Register, page 5208. Section 1 of that shows that the only
thing that can be classified on the basis of national security is informa-
tion or material whicli requires protection agaiust unauthorized dis-
closure in the interest of national defense or foi'eign relations to the
United States.
Mr. Dean. I am aware of that. That was the result of the extreme
over-classification of documents in the Government. If somebody
wanted to get somel)ody's attention, T think, often they would put "Top
Secret" on a memorandum and send it forward under that procedure
with a big red stamji on it or something marked on it.
Senator Ervin. Now, just for the sake of the record, the United
States Code, title 18, in sections 793, 794, 795, 796, 797 clearly reveals
what defense information is. The only statute I can find on the subject
of classified information generally is that embodied in 18 USC 798,
and there is nothing in any of these statutes that gives anybody any
authority to classify information that relates to domestic intelligence
or internal security.
Mr. Dean. I believe there are some statutes back in title 50 with
regard to the Atomic Energy Act that apply to this, but I am just
thinking off the to]:) — —
Senator Ervtn. The Atomic Energy Act is designed to guard secrets
relating to atomic energy.
Mr. Dean. That is right. As I say
Senator Ervin. And has no relation to demonstrations or persons
who attempt to petition the Government for regress of grievances in
compliance with the first amendment.
Mr. Dean. That is correct. Senator.
Senator Ervin. Isn't it true to say that among some of the officials
in the Committee To Re-Elect the "President and the '\^niite House,
there was a great complement of fear during 1970 and 1971 ?
Mr. Dean. I would say there was a great concern about demon-
strators. I think demonstrators were viewed as a political problem.
You used the word "fear." That connotes to me physical concern
about them. As one who has walked with many demonstrators, to go
out and get the pulls of the crowd, they are certainly not a fearsome
group. There were some militants who were bent on, you know,
destroying office buildings and breaking windows and thinos of that
nature, the looters and the trashers and the groups like tliat. But I
would not say — I would say there was a concern.
Senator Ervin. Well, there are two kinds of fear. There is physical
fear and intellectual fear. Don't you think there was an intellectual
fear prevalent at that time among some people in the committee and
1459
some people in the T^^iite House about Americans who undertook to
exercise their first amendment riglit to petition for regress of
grievances ?
Mr. Deax. I think that is correct when you put it in tlie political
context.
Senator Ervix. "Well, all of this was in the political context; was it
not?
Mv. Deax. Yes, it was.
Senator Ervix. Xow, was not there a feeling there among some White
House officials such as iNIr, Colson, and perhaps among some in the
Committee To Re-Elect the President, that every person who was not
backing their efforts to reelect the President or who dissented from
tiie programs of the President was an enemy ?
Air. Deax. I think that many people who were most vocal and could
command some audience in their dissent were considered opponents or
enemies, yes.
Senator Ervix'. And that was applied to a great list of people, in-
cluding some of the most distinguished commentators of the news
media on the national scene ; was it not ?
]Mr. Deax. Yes, sir.
Senator Er\t:x. Xot only that, yesterday a document was put in
evidence and identified by you, as I recall, as coming from Air. Colson's
office, entitled "'Opponent Priority Activity." On i)age 3 of that docu-
ment it has this, among the opponent priority activity. No. 14,''' Samuel
M. Lambert, L-a-m-b-e-r-t, president. National Education Association,
"Has taken us on vis-a-vis Federal aid to parochial schools, a 1972
issue."
Didn't those in the White House interested in President Nixon's re-
election and then the reelection committee classify among their ene-
mies people who dissented from President Nixon's programs?
Mr. Deax. As I say, those who were able to command audience were
singled out.
Senator Erv^x'^. Here is a man listed among the opponents or the
enemies whose only offense is that he believed in the first amendment
and shared Thomas Jefferson's conviction as expressed in the Virginia
statute for religious freedom that to compel a man to make contribu-
tions of money for the dissemination of religious opinions he dis-
believes is sinful and tyrannical. Isn't that true ?
Mr. Deax. I cannot disagree with the chairman at all.
Senator Er\t;x". So we have here plans to violate the fourth amend-
ment, which were approved by the President according to Mr. Halde-
man ; we have people being branded enemies whose mere offense is that
they believed in enforcing the first amendment as proclaimed b}' the
Su]:)reme Court of the United States just about a week ago.
Mr. Deax'. That is correct.
Senator Ervix". Yes.
I was very much intrififued by Afr. Buzhardt's document and I would
like to invite your attention to page 8, the statement he makes on there.
Mr. McCax'dtess. Air. Chairman, he does not have the Buzhardt
document, so-called.
Senator Ervix^. I can read this very short statement :
"In Februarv. however, with the Ervin committee beginning its
work, the President was concerned that all the available facts be made
known."
♦See p. 16&6.
1460
And also a statement on page 10 to the effect that "during this
period, the point was frequently raised by various people, including
primarily the President, that the whole story of the Watergate should
be made public."
Do you know any action that the President took subsequent to the
establishment of this committee and prior to the time this committee
started to function which showed his concern that all the available
facts with respect to the Watergate be made known?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Chairman, I must testify to the contrary, that I
think some of the documents that I have submitted regarding Mr.
Haldeman's specific instructions to me on dealing with what was
called the Watergate tactics and then the subsequent La Costa meet-
ing, which occurred on June 11 and 12, the subsequent meetings where
there were efforts to woo members of this committee, the discussions
of executive privilege to prevent the testimony of people from the
White House, could well be concluded to evidence quite the contrary
intention.
Senator Ervtn. Now, you have testified about a September 15 meet-
ing with the President. When was that meeting held with respect
to the time that the bills of indictment were handed down in the
original criminal action?
']\Ir. Dean. As I recall the meeting, it was in the late afternoon.
I believe the President was just about to leave to go somewhere and
in fact, the helicopter might have even landed during the very end
of the meeting. I don't know where at this point in time he was going.
I remember we continued to chat on. We had gotten into the subject
of the book I was reading at that time, w^hich was Inside Australia.
We were discussing Australians while we were waiting.
The indictments had been handed down or announced far earlier
in the day and had been running on the wires all day.
Senator ER^^N. Now isn't it true that a short time after the break-
in, the news media carried information to the effect that five burglars
had been caught in the Democratic National Headquarters in the
Watergate, and that four of the burglars had money in their pockets
which came from the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Dean. I don't believe that was reported immediately, but shortly
thereafter, it was; yes.
Senator ER^^N. And notwithstanding that fact, was it not revealed
shortly thereafter that this money had been paid to Mr. Liddy by
]Mr. Sloan at the instigation of ]Mr. jNIagruder and with the consent of
Mr. Stans and Mv. Mitchell?
Mr. Dean. I believe that is correct.
Senator Er\t:n. Yes.
Do you not agree with me that these facts indicated that there were
footsteps which went from the Watergate right into the Committee
To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Dean. There is no doubt about that.
Senator Ervin. Yet nobody in the committee except ^Mr. Liddy
and INIr. Hunt were indicted. . «
Mv. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. And had it not been that Mr. Magruder had resorted,
to your knowledge, in his testimonv before the grand jury to perjury
to keep the grand jury from implicating him and others — ; —
1461
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. And so this meeting in which the President said that
Bob Plaldeman had tokl him about your activities was held in the
office of the President right after it had been announced that the in-
dictments had stopped with Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt and Mr. McCord ?
Mr. Deax, That is correct, and there had been discussion within the
White House of this very strategy of stopping them at, or stopping the
case at Mr. Liddy and there was an awareness of the fact that Mr. ^la-
gruder was going to have to perjure himself to have that accomplished.
Senator Krvix. Do you know of any action that the President took
at any time between the 17th day of June until the establislunent of
this committee and until February that is mentioned here by Mr. Buz-
hardt, to have the facts concerning this matter discovered ?
Mr. Deax. I do know that after the election there was discussion
with Mr. Haldeman in his office in which Mr. Haldeman said that tlie
President would like to lay out some of the facts and we discussed
what the implications of those facts would be, and when I said that
I felt that — well. I did not know e\erything that had hapjKMied in
advance, I did know what had happened since June 17, and I thought
that as a result of those activities that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and
Dean and I might have mentioned some other at that time also, could
be indicted, Mr. Haldeman's res|)onse, which I can remember very
clearly because it stuck in my mind, he said, '"That does not seem like
a very viable option, does it ?"
Senator ER\^x. Xow, the truth is that during this period of time that
the FBI was giving you, that is, Mr. Gray was permitting you to
receive some FBI reports.
Mr. Deax\ What occurred, as I recall, there were two deliveries
where I returned the first group of files that I had received back in his
attache case to him, and then picked up another bunch of documents
subsequently, and then returned those later, and it has only been
through i)ress accounts that I learned that I received some 82 out of
the 160 total documents.
Senator Ervix. Xow, at whose instance did you contact the CIA;
that is, General Walters ?
Mr. Deax'. After discussing this wnth ]\Ir. Ehrlichman, he thought
that I should explore the possil^le use of the CIA with regard to assist-
ing in supporting in dealing with the individuals who had been in-
volved in the incident.
Senator Ervix. So, an effoi't was made to involve the CTA. Also
the FBI, Mr. Gray, destroyed some documents w^hich came from Mr.
Hunt's safe, did he not?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervix. And also, it was suggested by those in charge of
things, who were concerned about these so-called enemies, that the
processes of the Internal Revenue Service should be perverted and
prostituted in order to harrass people who were enemies as viewed
by the A^^lite House and the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
]\rr. Deax. That is correct. I might add also in addition to the har-
rassment through tax audits there were a number of memorandums I
received from iNIr. Colson regarding the tax-exemption status of groups
that did have tax exemptions that were opposed to Presidential policy.
Xow, my files would contain those, I do not have them in my possession.
1462
A review of my files would indicate that 99 out of a 100 times when
one of these would come down it would go right in the file and go no
further.
Senator Ervin. Now, returning to Mr. Buzhardt's assertion that the
President was desirous, beginning in September, to have all of the facts
revealed after the establishment of this committee, will you tell us
again what meetings were had in the White House with respect to this
committee, and who was present ?
Mr. Dean. With dealing with this committee ?
Senator Er\t:n. Yes.
Mr. Dean. With respect to the President or the leading up to that
as well?
Senator Ervin. Well, I am particularly interested in the President,
since Mr. Buzhardt says he was anxious that all facts be revealed.
Mr. Dean. Well, it was when the President was in San Clemente,
and I arrived on the — left on the 9th, was out there on the 10th and llth
for meetings, I recall that— of February of this year, I recall that Mr.
Haldeman departed the meeting once or twice and he finall}- told the
President what we were meeting on while we were out there.
We left there and went to, down to La Costa where the meetings
proceeded and there we had the remainder of the 2 days of discussions
about how to deal with this committee. During the course of the meet-
ings at one point in time, as I had mentioned earlier, there was an
assessment made by Mr. Ehrlichman, there had been disappointment
that they had not been able to influence the selection of the committee,
there had been disappointment that they had not been able to amend
successfully your resolution to put a bipartisan — you know, have equal
representation between Republicans and Democrats; that the floor
amendments that had been offered had been defeated. They — some of
these are evidenced in the memorandum from Mr. Haldeman that is in
the exhibit I submitted.
Senator Ervin. To make the testimony about that short, was that
one of the times you said that the consensus was there should be an
effort to show, to claim open cooperation with the committee but an
effort to impede it from discovering the truth ?
INIr. Dean. I would call the chairman's attention to the exhibit re-
garding the meeting with the Attorney General where there was great
concern that this committee might uncover additional criminal ac-
tivity. There was also a very strained relationship at that point in
time between the Attorney General and INIr. Haldeman and INIr. Ehr-
lichman. I was asked to prepare an agenda for the President to woo
the President or have the President woo the Attorney General back
into the family. The President was aware of the problem, and there
is also spelled out somewhat in the agenda that was submitted to him,
I believe, on February 22.
Senator Ervin. Now, returning to the President's desire about the
truth, you spoke of some meeting that the President attended in which,
after a press conference, he wondered if the committee was going to
swallow the bait he had put out in the press conference about a court
decision?
Mr. Dean. That was on St. Patrick's Da v.
Senator Er%^n. That was — St. Patrick's Dav is the ITtli. T believe.
Now, before that, the President had a press conference, did he not, on
1463
March 12, 1973, which was approximately a montli after Mr. Biizhardt
said in his statement that the President was anxious that the facts be
revealed, and I will ask you if at this press conference he did not say,
and I quote from Presidential documents : ''A member or former mem-
ber of the President's personal staif normally shall follow the well-
established precedent and decline a request for formal appearance
before a committee of the Cong-rcss."
Are 3'ou familiar with that press conference?
Mr. Deax. 1 recall hearing that at the press conference, yes.
Senator Erm;x. "At the same time it will continue to be my policy
to provide all these and relevant information through informal con-
tacts between my present staff and connnittees of the Congress in ways
which preserve intact the constitutional separation of the branches."
I believe that was the thing that provoked my statement that I was
not going to let anyl)ody come down to see me, travel by night like
Xicodemus and whisper in my ear something that he was not willing
for all of the American people to hear. [Laughter.]
Xow, at the press conference on March 15, 1973, this question was
asked : "Mr. President, does your offer to cooperate with the Ervin
committee include the possibility that you would allow your aides to
testify before his committee. And if it does not, would you be willing
to comply with a court order if Ervin went to court to get one that
required some testimony from White House aides.
"The President : In answer to your first part of the question, the
statement that I made yesterday answered that completely — not yes-
terday', the 12th I think it was — my statement on executive privilege.
Members of the White House staff will not appear before a committee
of Congress in any formal session."
Then skipping "We will furnish information under the proper cir-
cumstances. We will consider each matter on a case-by-case basis.
"With regard to the second point that is not before us, let us say,
however, that if the Senate feels at this time that this matter of sepa-
ration of powers were, as I said, this administration has been more
forthcoming than any Democratic administration I know of. If the
Senate feels that they want a test case, we would welcome it. Perhaps
this is the time to have the highest court of this land make a definitive
decision with regard to this matter. I am not suggesting that we are
asking for it, but I would suggest that if the Members of the Senate
in their wisdom decide that they want to test this matter in court we
will, of course, present our side of the case and we think that the
Supreme Court will uphold, as it always usually has, the great con-
stitutional principle of separation of j^owers rather than to uphold
the Senate."
Xow was that the bait that the President mentioned in the meeting
on the St. Patrick's Day?
]\Ir. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Em^x'. And the President discussed again on St. Patrick's
Day he was not willing for any of his aides, past or present, to appear
before the committee and give testimony in person.
Mr. Deax. Well, we had discussed that before he made that state-
ment. ]Mr. Chairman, that he certainly did not want ]Mr. Haldeman
and Mr. Ehrlichman coming up here before the committee nor did
he want me appearing before this committee.
1464
Senator Ervix. And this was on the 15th and the 17th day of
jNIarch, about a month after Mr. Buzhardt says that the President
was anxious for all the facts to be revealed.
Do you know how facts can be revealed except by people who know
something about those facts? [Laughter.]
Mr. Dean. No, sir, I do not. I think that the theory that was
developing was that to take the very hard line initially and back down
to written interrogatories. But that would be the bottom line. I believe
that was as far as the President was willing to go because he felt that
written statements could be handled and quite obviously it is much
easier to prepare a written brief of a situation than it is to submit
yourself to cross-examination.
Senator Er\in. And a written statement can be written to conceal
as well as to reveal facts, can't it?
Mr. Dean, That is absolutely correct and I think
Senator Ervin. I believe you discussed at that time the assertion
that I made I was not willing to accept written statements because
you cannot cross-examine a written statement.
Mr, Dean. Yes ; and I had discussion with the President about that
very statement.
Senator Ervin. Just one other matter. Article II of the Constitu-
tion says, in defining the power of the President, section 3 of article
II, "He" — that is the President — "shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed."
Do you know anything that the President did or said at any time
between June 17 and the present moment to perform his duty to see
that the laws are faithfully executed in respect to what is called the
Watergate affair?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Chairman, I have given the facts as I know them
and I don't — I would rather be excused from drawing my own con-
clusions on that at this point in time.
Senator Ervin. Now, you have been asked several questions about
your credibility. I will ask you as a lawyer if the experience of the
English-speaking race, both in its legislative bodies and in its courts,
has not demonstrated that the only reliable way in which the credi-
bility of a witness can be tested is for that witness to be interrogated
upon oath and have his credibility determined not only by what he
says but by his conduct and demeanor while he is saving it and also
by whether his testimony is corroborated or not corroborated by other
witnesses ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. Is there any way whatsoever to test the credibility
of anybody when the credibility has to be judged merely upon the basis
of a written statement ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. Thank you very much.
The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
[Thereupon, at 12 :25 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
2 p.m., the same day.]
1465
Afterxoox Session, Thursday, June 28, 1973
Senator Ervin. I handed you an exhibit (34-5) from your stock-
brokers.
Mr. De.vn. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. I wish you would give me the date of that exhibit
and wliat it shows.
Mr. Dean. The document is from Shearson and Hamill, and Co. The
date appears to be the month of October.
Senator Ervin. What year ?
^Ir. Dean. Of 1972. And it indicates various transactions that oc-
curred at that time, and indicates that the balance brought forward in
the credit line at that point in time was $26,000, $26,167 and it has the
new net balance at $26,229, I believe it is 99, it is hard to read from
the copy I have here.
Senator Ervin. So it shows that at that time, you had assets to have
replaced the $4,850 that you borrowed from the funds that had been
delivered to you ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Thank you.
Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. ]\Ir. Chairman, thank you very much.
Senator Ervin. First. I want to thank you for swapping places with
me so I can fulfill an engagement later. Thank you very much.
Senator Baker. ]Mr. Chairman, there is no way on earth I can swap
places with you. But I thank you for that and I am happy to relin-
quish my place in the sequence of questioning so that you could com-
plete your very, very thorough and very, very important line of ques-
tioning this morning.
I was about to say, ]\Ir. Dean, that you have been a very patient
witness, and very thorough. You presented us with a great mass of in-
formation, almost 250 pages in your written statement of voluminous
testimony in response to the interrogation of members of this commit-
tee, and we are very grateful.
Some of the specific allegations that you make in your testimony
are at least prima facie extraordinarily important. The net sum of
your testimony is fairly mind-bogglinii. It is not my purpose in these
questions that are about to follow to do what would ordinarily be the
expected function of a committee member, to try to test your testi
mony. I think that you have been subjected to a rather rigid examina-
tion by my colleagues on the committee thus far and, of course, your
testimony and its credibility, its importance and relevance, will fall
into place not only in terms of its own significance but in terms of its
relationship to the testimony of other witnesses.
You are a lawyer, ^fr. Dean, and I need not go into a long pre-
amble about what I am about to do. But so that you understand what
I am tryinqr to do. I will give you some brief explanation in advance.
As T said just a moment ago, it is not my purpose now to try to test
your testimony. It is not my purpose to try to impeach your testimony,
to corroborate your testimony, to elaborate or extend particular aspects
of it, but rather to try to structure your testimony so that we have a
coherent presentation against which we can measure the testimony of
other witnesses heretofore given, and the testimony of other witnesses
later to appear and, of course, against whatever other information the
14)66
committee can gather from circumstantial evidence, from whatever
source.
It occurs to me that at this point, the central question, and in no way
in derrogation of the importance of the great volume of material and
the implications that flow from it, but the central question at this point
is simply put. What did the President know and when did he know it ?
In trying to structure your testimony I would ask that you give at-
tention to three categories of information : That information that you
can impart to the committee that you know of your own personal
knowledge ; that type of information that we lawyers refer to as cir-
cumstantial evidence, which would include evidence given based on
your opinion or on inferences you draw from circumstances in the
situation ; and, third, that type of evidence that ordinarily would not
be admitted in a court of law but is admitted here for whatever
purpose it may serve, that is hearsay evidence or evidence about which
you have only secondhand information.
I would hope, though, that in this tliird category, that is in terms of
hearsay evidence or secondhand information, we would try, you and I,
to limit the scope of that to situations whicli may be further venti-
lated by the testimony of other witnesses on the roster of witnesses to
appear before this committee because if we range too far, there is no
wa}^ that we can compare and assess und evaluate the importance of
that testimony. But I want it and I would like to divide the informa-
tion then as we go along into three parts, that is. direct evidence, cir-
cumstantial evidence, and hearsay or si condhand information.
I am in no way criticizing your testimony, I think you really have
been a very remarkable witness.
Mr. Deax. Mr. Vice Chairman, I might say this, in preparing my
testimony I made a very conscious effort to not write a brief against
any man but merely to state facts sequentially as close as I could. By
sequentially some things it was necessary to follow forward to explain
a given sequence of events to bring the matter into a time sequence but
I did not by design try to write a brief or a document that focused in
on any individual or any set of circumstances surrounding any indi-
vidual. Rather, laid them out in the totality of their context.
Senator Baker. I understand that, Mr. Dean, and I really do hope
you understand that what I am saying to you is not a criticism of you
nor any implication of criticism. Rather instead you have presented
us with a sequential presentation, and I am trying to convert it into
an organized presentation, according to categories and to the quality
and scope of the information that you possess. So please believe me, I
am not trying to attack your to 'imoiiy but rather to organize it for
our own committee purpose.
Now, there is one other thing I would like to say and it may or may
not be possible to do this, and again I am not being critical of you as a
witness. As I said just a moment ago T think you have been a very
remarkable witness. When I used to practice law, I used to call on the
trial judge from time to time to instruct the witness to fiist answer the
question and then to explain it. So I ho])e I can keep my questions brief
and I hope you miglit preface youi- answers with a yes or no. if that is
possible, and then whatever explanation you wish.
Mr. Dean. Certainly.
1467
Senator Baker. It is not meant to be an entrapment, nor a "do you
still beat your wife"' question, answer yes or no. But it is meant to try
to advance the cause of factfinding.
Under the heading of what did the President know and when did he
know it falls into several subdi\isions. The first one is the break-in at
the Democratic National Committee headquarters of the Watergate
complex on the morning of June 17, 1972.
Do you know what the President knew of that in advance?
Mr. Deax. I do not.
Senator Baker. Do you have any information that he did know of it ?
]Mr. Deax. I only know^ that I learned upon my return to the office
that events had occurred that indicated that calls had come from Key
Biscayne to Washington to Mr. Strachan to destroy incriminating
documents in the possession of Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Baker. The question is, I hope, not impossibly narrow but
your testimony touches many people. It touches INIr. Ehrlichman, Mr.
Haldeman, Mr. Colson, INIr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, and many others. But
1 am trying to focus on the President.
Mr. Deax. I understand.
Senator Baker. What did the President know and when did he
know it i
Is it possible for you, based on direct knowledge or circumstantial
information, and you have given us an indication of circumstances, or
even hearsay, to tell us whether or not you can shed any further light
on w^hether the President knew or, in the parlance of tort law% should
have known of the break-in at the Watergate complex on June 17 ?
]Mr. Deax. You mean, could he have prior knowledge of it?
Senator Baker. Yes.
j\Ir. Deax. I cannot testify of any firsthand knowledge of that. I
can only testify as to the fact that an^^thing that came to ]Mr. Halde-
man's attention of any importance was generally passed to the Presi-
dent by Mr. Haldeman, and if Mr. Haldeman had advance knowledge
or had received advance indications it would be my assumption that
that had been passed along but I do not know that for a fact.
Senator Baker. So that w^ould fall into category 2 of my organi-
zation.
Mr. Deax. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. That is an inference that von do draw from the
arrangements of the organization of the "\Yliite House and your knowl-
edge of the relationships, the relationship of Mr. Haldeman and the
President.
]\Ir. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Baker. But it does not fall in category 1 or 3 which is to
say direct knowledge or hearsay information from other parties.
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Baker. The coverup is the second heading and, of course,
the coverup embraces and involves so many things and so many people
over such a span of time that it is difficult really to place it in a single
catefTory but I would like to try.
What did the President know and when did he know it about the
coverup. You have already testified about this, Mr. Dean, and I under-
stand, I believe, the burden of your testimony, the thrust of your testi-
mony, but for the sake of clarity, and understanding and organization
1468
of this record, tell me briefly : based on your personal knowledge, based
on circumstantial evidence or based even on hearsay, what the Presi-
dent knew and when he first knew it.
Mr. Dean. I would have to start back from personal knowledge and
that would be when I had a meeting on September 15 when we dis-
cussed what was very clear to me in terms of coverup. We discussed
in terms of delaying lawsuits, compliments to me on my effortt^ to that
point. Discussed timing and trials, because we didn't want them to
occur before the election. That was direct conversation that I testified
to.
Now, going back from September 15, back to the June 17 time, I
believe I have testified to countless occasions in which I have — I re-
ported information to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, made
recommendations to them regarding Mr. Magruder, I was aware of
the fact that often Mr. Haldeman took notes, I know that Mr. Halde-
man met daily with the President, I was quite aware of the fact that
this was one of the most important and virtually the only issue that
was really developing at all, and given the normal reporting channels
I worked through it was my assumption, without questioning, that this
was going in to the President.
Now, at what point in time this was that Mr. Haldeman discussed
this with the President, I have no idea.
Senator Baker. If I understand you correctly, you say that based
on inference drawn from your knowledge of the "VATiite House orga-
nization and relationships, you surmised that the President knew of
the situation from June 17 until September 15 in some degree, but that
you have no personal knowledge of that.
Mr. Dean. Well, I am sure of this, that there were press releases
put out within a short time after the incident. Tliere must have been
discussion in Florida, while they were still in Florida, about how to
handle this. Some of the early press releases, as I i-ecall, indicated im-
mediately before I had even talked to anybody or done anything that
this was something that didn't involve the "WHiito House in any way.
Senator Baker. But once again, simply searching for an organiza-
tional format, these conclusions or inferences on your part are based
on your knowledge of the White House organization and not on direct
information of any personal kind
]Mr. Dean. That is right, pending on almost 3 years at the "^^Hiite
House.
Senator Baker. '\^niich is an important circumstance and I am not
trying to discredit that. I am simply trying to isolate and define the
quality of the testimony.
Mr. Dean. I imderstand.
Senator Baker. T don't mean to say that the quality of its desira-
bility, but the nuality of a technical sense; was it direct information,
circumstantial information, was it an inference or a conclusion based
on a valid set of circumstances, that is, a situation at the "\^niite House,
or it is a pure, plain, guess. So you have been very helpful in that
respect.
Let me try to restate it, then. From the very first moments after
the break-in on June 17, 1972, and based on a number of factors,
including the fact that press releases issued from, I believe you said
Key Biscayne
1469
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Based on your knowledge and understanding of
the White House organization and the relationship between Mr.
Haldcnian and the President, you draw an inference that the President
knew something between June 17 and September 15.
Mr, Deax. Well, I also am aware of the fact that there were a flurry
of telephone calls between Mr. Ehrlichman and ]Mr. Haldeman as to
some of the things I was telling Mr. Ehrlichman in Washington after
I did come back on the 19th, and he was calling Mr. Haldeman in
Florida, who was still in Florida at that time.
Senator Baker. In any of this — and I am not trying on construct
an edifice that will end up defending the President. I have stated
before it is not my purpose to defend or prosecute the President or
any witness, but only for the purpose of establishing the quality and
the scope of the testimony. In any event, your personal feelings that
the President knew something between June 17 and September 15
is based on category 2 ; that is, circumstantial evidence and inferences
based on your knowledge and relationships in the organization.
']Mr. Deax. Given the events that had occurred over the weekend
while I was not there and the events that occurred on Monday, and
before I met with the Attorney General on either late INIonday or
Tuesday, whenever I had my first meeting with him, I was deeply
concerned initially that this went right to the President or certainly
to other persons above myself on the White House staff.
Senator Baker. I understand your concern, and I think it w^as an
understandable concern. But what I am struggling to establish is
whether that concern was based on something other than what you
have just testified to.
Mr. Deax. As I have testified, you know, I had not talked to the
President at this point in time and did not talk to him until Septem-
ber 15. So all of the knowledge I have between June 17 or June 19,
actually, when I came back, and September 15 was through the fact
of the things I was reporting to Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Ehrlichman, my
awareness of the fact that they were meeting with the President, the
fact that Mr. Haldeman often took notes. That is the basis of my
knowledge at that point in time.
Senator Baker. Did anything occur that we would put in category
3 — that is, hearsay information or documentary evidence not fii'sthand,
that would shed any further light on the state of the President's knowl-
edge during the period June 17 to September 15, 1 972 ?
Mr. Deax. Yes. I have submitted a document to the committee in
which the President was very anxious to have counteractions against
the suits that were becoming a problem, the lawsuits filed by the Dem-
ocrats. It was a very active investigation being pursued through dis-
covery procedures. These Avere the only headlines that were being
made, because as the investigation by the Department of Justice and
the FBI was winding down, this was the new phase. This prompted
me to receive direct requests, Presidential requests, through Mr. Halde-
man and Mr. Colson, which resulted in the memorandum I sent back
in to the President.
Ultimately it went to the President, and I was told to follow up on
that memorandum. That is one of the exhibits that has been submitted
to the committee.
1470
Senator Baker. Can you recall offhand or can your counsel help you
tell us what that exhibit number is or what that exhibit might be ?
Mr. Dean. I can find it very quickly for you here. That is exhibit
No. 34-19.
Senator Baker. Do you have that exhibit before you, Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I do. The first part of the exhibit is a preliminary
memorandum that was prepared by Mr. Parkinson at my request. I
asked him to send it when I had the request made of me. Following
conversations I had had with Mr. Parkinson, I modified his memo-
randum and sent the memorandum of September 12 in to the Presi-
dent, or in to Mr. Haldeman. You will note a "P" up in the right-hand
corner, which was checked, which indicates — it is my undei-standing of
the White House procedures that it was sent either directly to the
President or reviewed directly by Mr. Haldeman with the President,
that they went over it.
Senator Baker. To make sure we have the same exhibit before us,
I have exhibit No. 34-19*, the first page of which is entitled "Counter
Actions," dated September 11, '1972.
Mr. Dean. That is correct. You will have to go to the back part of
that.
Senator Baker. Consisting of four pages signed by Kenneth Wells
Parkinson, then a letter on "V^^iite House stationery dated September
12, 1972, the first line of Avhich reads, "Administratively confidential
for Haldeman from Ken,'' consisting of four pages.
Are we reading from the same script ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. All right.
Now, this is additional information bearing on the President's
knowledge of the coverup from June 17 to September 15, 1972.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. All right, sir. It consists of some 8 or 10 pages. We
can read it if you like. It would be much easier, I expect, if you would
simply point out those sections relative to the President's knowledge.
Mr. Dean. This memorandum going in to the President — I received
instructions back that all of the actions in here were something that
should be followed up on and that was done.
Senator Baker. So you are referring now to the second half of the
exhibit, which is the White House memorandum ?
INIr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. And the allegations made fall under the headings
in the memo of "Complaint for malicious abuse of process." What is
that?
Mr. Dean. This is one of several counteractions. This was an action
to be filed by the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and
the finance committee against Mr. O'Brien.
Senator Baker. Alleging that they were violating the rights and
privileges of discovery in civil suits for an ulterior purpose.
Mr. Dean. That their basic action was unfounded in its
Senator Baker. Was that suit ever filed, Mr. Dean ?
INIr. Dean. Yes, it was.
Senator Baker. What Avas the disposition of it ?
Mr. Dean. It is still in litiiration.
•Exhibit 34-19 was published in Book 3.
1471
Senator Baker. And the second heading — incidentally, I don't mean
to cut you off.
Mr. Dean. As a part of that, you will note there is a note on page 2 :
Depositions are presently being taken of members of the DNC by defense
counsel in the O'Brien suit. These are wide ranging and will cover everything
from Larry O'Brien's sources of income while Chairman of the DNC to certain
sexual activities of employees of the DNC. They should cause considerable prob-
lems for those being deposed.
I would like to add something, that shortly
Mr. Baker. Did you file that suit?
Mr. Dean. No, sir, I did not file that suit.
Senator Baker. Who did?
Mr. Dean. The reelection committee.
Senator Baker. Were those allegations made?
Mr. Dean. No, they were not. That was a part of the deposition
Senator Baker. Of the discovery
Mr. Dean [continuing]. The discovery area.
Senator Baker. Were those areas covered in discovery after the
fighting of the suit?
]Mr. Dean. I have no knowledge of whether they were or not.
Senator Baker. I am sorry, go ahead, sir.
Mr. Dean. This has recalled to me something that I — I earlier indi-
cated that there had been a longstanding interest in Mr. O'Brien.
Some of the documents that I have submitted in exhibits 34-6, 34-7,
or 34-8* — I do not recall which one off the toj) — deals directly with
Mr. O'Brien.
I recall that the line that is drawn beside that note is Mr. Halde-
man's marking.
Senator Baker. This is on page 2 of the second half of the exhibit?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. Some time before this, he had told me
in a discussion, a rather casual discussion when we were talking about
who was likely to be Mr. ]McGovem's, Senator McGovern's campaign
manager, and there was speculation that it was going to be Mr.
O'Brien, I recall Mr. Haldeman telling me that he certainly hoped
it would be, because we have got some really good information on
him. I believe he was referring to tax information at that time.
Senator Baker. Referring to what, sir?
Mr. Dean. Tax information.
Senator Baker. And this was Mr. Haldeman who said this?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Do you remember when he said that?
]Mr. Dean. It was some time after Mr. McGovern had been nomi-
nated and before he had made his final selection for his campaign
manager.
Senator Baker. 'Which would have been, then, probably, in the
early fall of 1972. As I recall, it was September before Mr. O'Brien
was designated as campaign chairman. That is not important. It was
in that time.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Now, let us see, the second heading — before I get
to the second heading, on page 11 of the second part of the exhibit,
did I understand you to say that the penciled or pened capital "P"
•These exhibits were for identification only and were not published.
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4
1472
apparently with the checkmark through it is a White House desig-
nation that the document was seen or known of by the President?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Do you know this of your own knowledge ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I do.
Senator Baker. The second half of that memorandum is entitled
"Complaint for Libel, Stans Versus O'Brien." What did that mean?
Mr. Dean. Well, that was an action being filed, a counteroffensive,
again as part of the counteractions that were being requested as a result
of its occurrence, that before an amended complaint had been filed
with the district court, that the amended complaint, which charged
Mr. Stans had funded the Watergate incident with the $114,000 checks
for Mr. Barker was alleged in the complaint of the amended com-
plaintr— the amended complaint was distributed to the press before it
was filed, so it had no privilege. I do not know if it was ultimately
filed or not, but based on that, the reelection committee lawyers
thought they had a very good libel action for using the processes in
that manner.
Senator Baker. Was that suit, in fact, filed ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it was.
Senator Baker. Do you know who filed it ?
Mr. Dean. The reelection committee lawyers filed it on Mr. Stans'
behalf.
Senator Baker. Do you know what the present status of that litiga-
tion is?
Mr. Dean. That is still in litigation. All of these cases have been
consolidated in, I believe in Judge Richey's court.
Senator Baker. Here in the District ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, here in the District.
Senator Baker. I think we take really a great deal more time than we
ought to if we try to go through each item, but let me try to refocus
now on this exhibit for the purposes of this moment.
What in this exhibit sheds any further light or implies any fu.rther
information about the scope and extent, if any, of the President's
knowledge of the coverup post-June 17, 1972. I understand, before
you answer, that so far you have suggested that the President, seeing
and approving this memorandum which deals with a series of civil
suits and certain other actions to be taken, implies that there was at
least to be a counteraction and a backfire, if you please, but in what
respect does this give us further insight into the President's knowledge
of a coverup of the Watergate break-in ?
Mr. Dean. Well. I am not sure I understand the Senator's definition
of coverup. As I think I have laid out in my testimony, the coverup
was something that liad a broad range. Anvthing tliat miglit cause any
problem at all in relationship to the Watergate came within the
coverup.
Senator Baker. I understand. That is not really a very good way to
put it. Let me narrow it even further. What in this document gives us
any further insight or information about the President's knowledge,
if any, post-June 17, 1972, about the apparent efforts to conceal the con-
nection with and responsibility for tlie unlawful entrv into the Demo-
cratic National Headquarters at the Watergate complex on the morn-
ing of June 17, 1972 ?
1473
Mr. Deax. Well, I can only surmise what I was told when asked for
the docunient, and, as I say, 1 had a request from two people for the
document in the President's behalf that the best defense is an offense,
and this was an offensive effort.
Senator Baker. All right. Is it fair to say, and I really am not trying
to put words in your mouth, but rather to digest this information for
my own purposes, that the documentary evidence that we have been
re/ferring to now, exhibit 3-1-19, indicates some knowledge by the
President of an effort to establish countermeasures in terms of the
total impact of Watergate ; that is, countersuits, allegations for misuse
of the discovery process, and other things of that sort?
Mr. Deax. Well, he did not — these were conceived, these were not
actions that he conceived. He asked that counteractions be taken. The
request came to me, I in turn passed it on to the lawyers who were
closest to it because some of the suggestions were just, you know, start
filing suits, and I had advised Mr. Colson that I would not suggest
filing any suit that was not well founded rather than rushing into
court with some action that was not an action that would tie things up.
This was particularly true of some of the statements of some of the
individuals whose names were being speculated, that they file for libel.
Xow, libel results in both countersuits and counterdiscovery. Some of
these people obviously could not withstand discovery. So that was why
the suits, I thought, had to be well founded and had to be suits that
counterdiscovery would not be a problem.
Senator Baker. So, if I understand what you are saying now, while
these documents do not bear on the isolated issue of the President's
knowledge of the Watergate and what I call the coverup of the Water-
gate post-June 17, they do shed some light on at least the willingness
to commence counteractions to avoid further prying into the situation
at tlie White House ; is that a fair statement ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, that is, Senator.
Senator Baker. What other documentary evidence gives us an}^ in-
sight or information about the state of the President's knowledge of
Watergate and the date on which he acquired it?
~Sh'. Deax. We are talking now about pre-September 15?
Senator Baker. Yes, we are still working our way up from June 17
to September 15.
]\Ir. Deax. That is the only documentary evidence I have that, to my
knowledge, is that document right there. As I say, there were not a lot
of documents floating around on this subject.
Senator Baker. There are a whole lot.
Mr. Deax. Well, there were some but not
Senator Baker. OK.
Is there any other circumstantial evidence? You have alluded to the
organization and relationships at the ^^Hiite House : is there any other
circumstance that would give us any further insight or is there any
category 3 information, that is, is there anything anyone has told you
that would shed further light on what the President knew and when
he knew it in this time frame from June 17 to September 15 ?
Mr. Deax. Yes. as I say, on a number of occasions when I was in
meetings with Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichmau, sometimes together,
I can recall that the President would call for Mr. Haldeman, and
Mr. Haldeman would send a message back to tell the President that he
1474
was meeting with Dean, getting a report, and he would see him after
that. This was always rather startling to me that my report was more
important than Mr. Haldeman going right into the President's office.
Senator Baker. So the unusual nature of that arrangement and cir-
cumstance led you to believe that there was some knowledge of the sub-
ject matters attendant to the Watergate affair by the President?
Mr. Dean. That and another circumstance that I might add is that
this, the coverup, consumed a great amount of time of Mr. Haldeman
and Mr. Ehrlichman. They were spending a great deal of time in dis-
cussion with me, discussions amongst themselves, and this was prob-
ably the major thing that was occurring at this point in time.
Senator Baker. Is there anything else now, because I want to move
on to the September 15 meeting, in either of the three categories of
testimony, of evidence, direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, infer-
ences and hearsay? Is there anything else that you can think of at the
moment and if you think of something later we will certainly add it
but, is there anything you can think of at the moment that will give us
further insight into what the President knew and when he knew it in
this time frame, September — until September 15 ?
Mr. Dean. I think I have expressed the highlights of that.
Senator Baker. I think we are getting better at this thing now. I am
trying to organize the structure of it. Let us take the September 15
meeting and let us analyze it rather very closely, if you will, Mr. Dean,
and I understand this is necessarily redundant and that it has been
covered at rather great length, but would you bear witli me long
enough to describe it in as much detail as you can conjure up the meet-
ing of September 15 at present ?
Mr. Dean. I am sorry. Senator, I was reading some notes here and
I did not — did you want me to repeat to you
Senator Baker. "VN'liat I want to do now, we have had a general
overview of the situation
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Senator Baker. I am going to try now to focus entirely on the meet-
ing of September 15.
Mr. Dean. Right.
Senator Baker. And I have an ambition to focus sharply on it in
order to disclose as much information as possible about the September
15 meeting. What I want to do is to test, once again, not the credibility
of your testimony, but the quality of the evidence, that is, is it direct
evidence?
Mr. Dean. I understand.
Senator Baker. Hearsay evidence or any circumstantial evidence
related to the September 15 meeting, so take a little time with it, if
you will.
Mr. Dean. All right.
During the morning of the loth the indictments had been handed
down. I think there was a general sigh of relief at the White House.
I had no idea that I was going to be called to the President's office.
Mr. Haldeman was quite aware of the fact that T had spent a great
deal of time ; he had spent a great deal of time, that Mr. Ehrlichman
had spent a great deal of time, on this matter. In the late afternoon I
received a call requesting I come to the President's office.
Senator Baker. Do you know who made the call ?
1475
Mr. Dean. The call came to my secretary, as I recall, and she said,
"You have been asked to come to the oval office" so I do not recall who
made the call but it was one of the secretaries who conveyed those types
of messages.
Senator Baker. All right, go ahead, sir.
Mr. Dean. When I entered the office I can recall that — you have been
in the office, you know the way there are two chairs at the side of the
President's desk.
Senator Baker. You are speaking of the oval office ?
Mr. Deax. Of the oval office. As you face the President on the left-
hand chair Mr. Haldeman was sitting and they had obviously been
immersed in a conversation and the President asked me to come in and
I stood there for a moment.
He said, ''Sit down" and I sat on a chair on the other side.
Senator Baker. You sat in the right-hand chair ?
Mr. Dean. I sat on the right-hand chair.
Senator Baker. That is the one he usually says no to, but go ahead.
Mr. Dean. I was unaware of that. [Laughter.]
Senator Baker. Go ahead, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dean. As I tried to describe in my statement, the reception was
very warm and very cordial. There w^as some preliminary pleasantries,
and then the next thing that I recall the President very clearly saying
to me is that he had been told by Mr. Haldeman that he had been kept
posted or made aware of my handling of the various aspects of the
^Yatergate case and the fact that the case, you know, the indictments
had now been handed down, no one in the White House had been
indicted, they had stopped at Liddy.
Senator Baker. Stop, stop, stop just for one second. Let's examine
those particular words just for a second.
That no one in the White House had been indicted. Is that as near
to the exact language — I don't know so I am not laying a trap for you,
I just want to know.
]Mr. Dean. Yes, there was a reference to the fact the indictments had
been handed down and it was quite obvious that no one in the Wliite
House had been indicted on the indictments that had been handed
down.
Senator Baker. Did he say that, though ?
Mr. Dean. Did he say that no one in the White House had been
handed down ? I can't recall it. I can recall a reference to the fact that
the indictments were now handed down and he was aware of that and
the status of the indictments and expressed what to me was a pleasure
to the fact that it had stopped at Mr. Liddy.
Senator Baker. Tell me what he said.
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, he told me I had done a good job
Senator Baker. No, let's talk about the pleasure. He expressed
pleasure the indictments had stopped at Mr. Liddy.
Can you just for the purposes of our information tell me the language
that he used ?
Mr. Dean. Senator, let me make it very clear the pleasure that it had
stopped there is an inference of mine based on, as I told Senator
Gurney yesterday, the impression I had as a result of the, of his, com-
plimenting me.
147i6
Senator Baker. Can you give us any information, can you give us
any further insight into what the President said ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I can recall he told me that he appreciated how
difficult a job it had been for me.
Senator Baker. Is that close to the exact language ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, that is close to the exact language. That stuck very
clearly in my mind because I recall my response to that was that I
didn't feel that I could take credit. I thought that others had done
much more difficult things and by that I was referring to the fact that
Mr. Magruder had perjured himself. [Laughter.] There was not an
extended discussion from there as to any more of my involvement. I
had been complimented. I told him I couldn't take the credit, and then
we moved into a discussion of the status of the case.
Senator Baker. Stop, before you get to the status, and let's lay that
aside just for a second because I do want to hear about that, too, but
this really, and I don't mean to be melodramatic, but this is really a
terribly important moment in history. As you know, this meeting was
in the afternoon in the oval office in Washington on September 15,
1972, and you were there, the President was there, and Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman was there.
Senator Baker. What was the President's denjeanor, what was his
attitude, what was the expression on his face, the quality of his voice ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, when I walked in it was very warm, very
cordial. They were smiling, they were happy, they were relaxed. The
President, I think I said earlier this morning, was about to go some-
where and I think that actually was delaying his departure to have
this conversation with me. The fact that I had not been in to see the
President other than on a rather mechanical activity before that deal-
ing with his testamentary papers, indicated so clearly that Haldeman
had thought that the President should compliment me for my handling
of this matter, and that that was one of the reasons I probably had
been called over, and the President had done it at Mr. Haldeman's
request.
Senator Baker. All right.
Now, tell us about, as you started to say before I interrupted you,
the status of the case.
Mr. Dean. All right.
He was interested in knowing if it was likely — well, let me, before
I go on to that, let me say something else that I recall. "Wlien we talked
about the fact that the indictments had been handed down, at some
point, and after the compliment I told him at that point that we had
managed, you know, that the matter had been contained, it had not
come into the "Wliite House, I didn't say that, I said it had been
contained.
Senator Baker. Did you say anything beyond that it had been con-
tained ?
Mr. Dean. No, I did not. I used that, I recall very clearly using that
expression that it had been contained.
Senator Baker. That is an important word, it has been contained.
Mr. Dean. That is right.
Senator Baker. What was the President's or Mr. Haldeman's re-
action to that word because that is a rather significant word, I think.
Mr. Dean. Well, I have got to say this, I wasn't studying the Presi-
dent's face or Mr. Haldeman's face at this time. I had not ever had a
1477
one on one with the President before and must confess 'I was a little
nervous in there. They were trying to make me as relaxed as possible,
and make it as cordial as possible, but I was quite naturally nervous.
There was a man who is the most important man in the Western World,
and here I am having a conversation with him for the first time one on
one, so I Avas not studying his reactions and it wasn't until I started
meeting with him more frequently later that the tenor of our conversa-
tions changed and
Senator Baker. You see what I am driving at I am sure, Mr. Dean.
If someone had said that the investigation has been contained it might
evoke a question, tliat might ci'eate a startled look on one's face, it
might be taken for granted, and that might be important to shed light.
Mr. Deax. That is right.
Senator Baker. On the state of the knowledge with the person with
whom you were having the conversation.
Mr. "Deax. Everyone seemed to understand what I was talking
about. It didn't evoke any questions and I was going on to say that I
didn't think it could be contained indefinitely. I said that this is, you
know, there are a lot of hurdles that have to be leaped down the road
before it will definitely remain contained and I was trying to tell the
President at that time that I was not sure the coverup even then would
last indefinitely.
Senator Baker. This, once again, is a terribly important area of
inquiry, so let me interrupt you again and take you over it one more
time. You told the President, I don't think it can continue to be
contained ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Are those close to your exact words ?
Mr. Deax. That is very close to my words, because I told him it had
been contained to that point and I was not sure that it would be con-
tained indefinitely.
Senator Baker. \Yhat was his reaction to this ?
Mr. Dean. As I say, I don't recall any particular reaction.
Senator Baker. AVas there any statement by him or by Mr. Halde-
man at that point on this statement ?
Mr. Deax'. No, not to mv recollection.
Senator Baker. All rignt, go ahead.
Mr. Deax'. It was then we turned to the status of the litigation.
The criminal case, as I recall the sequence of the conversation, and
he wanted to know when this matter was likely to come to trial. I told
him very much would depend upon which judge the case was assigned
to.
Senator Baker. Go ahead.
Mr. Dean. At that point, it had not been assigned to any judge at
all.
Another point that came out, as I testified earlier in my conversa-
tion, was the fact that he alluded, told me for the first time that I had
ever heard this, that shortly after he had assumed office, Mr. Hoover
had been ov^er to visit with him. He told me that Mr. Hoover had
informed him that his 1968 campaign had been bugged and the Presi-
dent said, this is something that we may be able to use ourselves at
some point down the road to explain the fact that we have been subject
to the same type of activity.
Senator Baker. Did you look into that ?
1:478
Mr. Dean. Not until many, many months later.
Senator Baker, You have already testified to that conversation.
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did.
Senator Baker. Go ahead. I am sorry, Mr. Dean. Tell me anything
else you can at all, no matter hovs^ minute, about the meeting of
September 15.
Mr. Dean. The next matter I recall is the fact that we did get into
a discussion about the civil cases.
Senator Baker. I am sorry, Mr. Dean. Thank you very much.
INIr. Dean. The next thing that I recall occurred was a discussion
that ensued about the civil cases. He asked me some questions about
the civil cases and it was in the course of this conversation that I
told him what I knew at that point in time about the status of the
civil cases, where they were, and I knew because I was fairly familiar
at that time with the precise status of the cases.
It was also as a result of this conversation that we got into a dis-
cussion, or I told him that I had learned from the lawyers at the re-
election committee that they had been making or they had somebody
who was making an ex parte contact with the judge who had juris-
diction over the principal suit of the greatest concern, which was the
suit by Mr. O'Brien, Larry O'Brien and the DNC.
Senator Baker. Is this, once again, close to the exact language
you used?
ISIr. Dean. Yes, that was — I did not know who it was that was mak-
ing the contacts at that time for certain, so I just told him that the
lawyers at the reelection committee are making ex parte contacts
or have made ex parte contacts and are hoping to get some favorable
rulings.
Senator Baker. Did the President make any remark at that point,
or did Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Dean. I recall the President said something to the effect, well,
that is helpful.
Senator Baker. Is that close to his exact language?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
■Senator Baker. Is there anything else?
Mr. Dean. We talked about the Common Causo suit as well and I
told him that I didn't think it was any problem. This was a suit that
was trying to bring or identify the donors or the contributors of some
$10 million of unidentified campaign moneys that had not been re-
ported prior to April 7. The suit, I told him, I didn't think would be
a problem because the lawyers at the rooloctioii committee felt that
they could tie this one up in discovery for quite a while.
Senator Baker. What did the President say to that?
Mr. Dean. I don't recall any specific comment to that. I think as
we were going through some of these descriptions, I was just report-
ing as best I could and I don't recall him giving me what his reaction
was at that point.
Senator Baker. You understand why I am asking you these
questions ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I do.
Senator Baker. All right. Now, I don't mean to shorten your
description of the September 15 meeting, but for the sake of moving
on, were there other important matters discussed at that time?
1479
Mr. Dean. Well, yes, the matter of the Patman hearing did come
up, because the President was aware of that, I assume, from his news
sunnnaries or the newspapers, that there was likely to be congressional
inquiry on the House side. He asked me who was handling that. I told
him that Kicluird Cook, a member of the congressional relations stall',
who had worked with the Patman committee at one point in time,
was doing the principal work on it. He then told me that Mr. Timmons
should be spending his time and get on top of it, something of that —
that would be very close to the language he used.
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, excuse me. I see we have a vote signal
from the Senate. The committee will stand in recess until we return.
[Recess.]
Senator Baker. The committee will come to order.
The chairman was necessarily called away for the rest of the after-
noon. For the information of the committee, I might indicate that
he requested that we run as long as practical, and that we continue
with present rotation arrangements, so as soon as I can conclude my
queries I will yield then to Senator Montoya and after that to Senator
Weicker.
Mr. Dean, do you have any objection if we try to go, say, until a
few minutes before 6 tonight ?
Mr. Dean. I will hold up as long as I can. Senator.
Senator Baker. If you need a break or would like to break in the
course of things, if you would let me know I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Dean, have w^e finished with the delineation of the September 15
meeting ?
Mr. Dean. No, I do not believe we have.
Senator Baker. We were discussing the fact that we were talking
about how to deal with the Patman committee because this was another
threat, a dual threat, I might add. First was the fact that it would
mean adverse publicity as a result of the hearings and, second, there
was always the potential they might stumble into something there.
Were those words used ?
Mr. Dean. I believe, when we talked about adverse publicity and
there is no telling where this thing may go.
Senator Baker. Do you remember who said that ?
Mr. Dean. I said that.
Senator Baker, Do you remember what the President's reaction
was?
Mr. Dean. Well, he asked me who was covering the hearings and
I told him that Dick Cook was covering the hearings.
Senator Baker. Covering, meaning what person on the White House
staff had responsibility for that ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, that is correct. Because I explained to him that Mr.
Cook had formerly worked for the House Banking and Currency Com-
mittee, and at that point he said that Mr. Timmons should get on top
of those hearings.
We then, the conversation turned to the press coverage that had been
following the Watergate incident, and during this discussion he told
me that I should keep a good list of people who were giving us trouble
in the press because we would give them trouble after the election.
Senator Baker. This was stated by the President ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
1480
Senator Baker. What else was said by him or by Mr. Haldeman or
by you in that context ?
Mr. Dean. Well, this evolved into a, immediately into a conversa-
tion about the Internal Revenue Service and using the Internal Reve-
nue Service to audit returns of people.
I had — again, we were on, you know, I knew the wavelength we had
had been talking about, because I had had similar requests in the past
to audit returns of people, and I told the President that the Internal
Revenue Service had been
Senator Baker. Wait, wait, wait. You knew the wavelength because
you knew from your previous use of the Internal Revenue Service ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, I had requests from Mr. Haldeman in the
past that certain individuals have audits commenced on them.
Senator Baker. What did you do with that ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I can — the one time I recall getting one I did not
know exactly what I was going to do with it because I was always
reluctant to call Mr. Walters at that time, who was the head of the
Internal Revenue Service, so I went to INIr. Caulfield, who had friends
in the Internal Revenue Service and he said, "I think I know a way
this can be done."
Apparently there is some system where the appropriate anonymous
letter comes into a regional office and if it is — those who know how to
do this can write the right letter and sufficient information will prompt
an audit on that individual.
Senator Baker. Is that known as the informer statute ?
Mr. Dean. No ; I do not believe it is an informer statute. It is just
something that will be of sufficient attention to that regional office,
that branch of the, audit branch of that regional office, that will insti-
tute an audit.
I went on to tell the President that we did not seem to have the clout
at the White House to get this done. I had talked to Walters about it in
the past, and told him that T had had instructions from Mr. Haldeman
on one occasion, and he said that, he brought to my attention the mak-
ing of the IRS political, and said that.
You will recall what happened back in 1948 with Truman and that administra-
tion and the cleaning house and the changing of the Internal Revenue Service.
And these were all new facts to me, and what he was telling me was
"Don't call me with this sort of thing."
Senator Baker. Tell me, if you do not mind, what you did. Did you
in fact set up an audit ? Your counsel is trying to reach you and I think
he may have something to say.
Mr. Dean Fconferring with counsel]. He just said, which was quite
accurate, I do not mind telling you any fact that is true. FLaughter."!
Senator Baker. I would say that was a very lawyer-like piece of
advice. [Laughter.]
Mr. Dean. So in this instance there was, the one I was referring to
in the past, there was an audit commenced. Now I, for example, read
a memorandum into the record this morning per request of some mate-
rial requested bv the committee that had to do with an audit of Mr.
Gibbons of the Teamsters Union. I merely put that in my file, and that
is where it has remained to this day.
1481
Senator Baker. To shorten this, and I do not mean to shorten it if
you care to go on with it, did you in fact initiate IRS inquiries or
audits as a result of suggestions from the White House stafi' or the
President ?
Mr. Deax. Well, the President at this time, to keep in the focus you
want to keep in, told me to keep a good list, so that these could be—
you know, we would take care of these people after the election, and
we went into — I told him that IRS was a democratically oriented
bureaucracy and to do something like that was a virtual impossibility.
And then the conversation moved to the fact that he was going to make
some dramatic changes in all of the agencies and, at this point in time,
I can remember Mr. Haldeman opened up his pad and started making
notes as to what the President was describing as to his post-election
intentions. As a result of the President giving liis thoughts on what he
wanted to do post-election with all of the agencies and as far as chang-
ing personnel. Mr. Haldeman also injected into the conversation at
that time that he had already commenced a project to determine which
people in which agencies were responsive and were not responsive to
the IVliite House.
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, in deference to my colleagues and the
requirements of time, let me try to refocus now : Is there anything else
about the September 15 meeting that would shed light on the Presi-
dent's knowledge, and the scope and depth of his knowledge, if any, of
the "Watergate break-in on June 17 or the coverup activities, so-called,
thereafter and prior to September 15 ?
Mr. Deax. I think I described pretty well in full of the on, 40 min-
ute meeting, however long it was. As I say at the end of the meeting
it turned to rather unrelated chatter about a book I was reading.
Senator Baker. All right.
It seems to me then that the extent to which the September 15 meet-
ing would give us some guidance in our inquiry as to what the Presi-
dent knew and when he knew it, that you depend on a combination of
things. You depend on your experience at the Wliite House as a staffer,
with the interrelationships of staff and the Presidential staff; the
remarks which did not relate directly to Watergate, that is the break-in
at Watergate or to the concealment of the involvements and responsi-
bilities for it. But based on the general tenor of the conversation, you
gained the impression, I believe you said, to paraphrase your testi-
mony, that the President knew that there was an on-going counter-
effort, at least, and when you couple that with your knowledge of the
relationships and circumstances, that you concluded then in your own
mind that he knew something, and I don't believe you have testified
quite exactly what, about the events involved ?
^Ir. Deax. Well, I might say one thing that did come specifically
out of the conversation was that we had leaped the hurdle of the
Justice Department investigation and the indictments were down.
Now the looming problem were the Patman committee hearings, and
the President gave very clear instructions to Mr. Timmons he should
get on top of those so they did not get out of hand because that was
the next problem.
It was also very clear that I was to follow up with the civil litiga-
tion and see anything I could do to make sure that this didn't get
out of hand.
1482
Senator Baker. But in an effort to summarize it and, believe me, I
am not trying to distort the meaning of your testimony by summary,
but, in effect, you drew inferences from the totality of this conversation
and the circumstances and relationships as you knew it, you drew
inferences from that that led you to believe that on September 15
the President knew something about at least the efforts to counter
the Watergate and possibly, in fact, about Watergate itself.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. But there is no direct statement about Watergate,
CRP involvement, the President's knowledge of it, or the coverup —
there is no category 1 information about that?
Mr. Dean. Other than as I have recited and I have chosen not to
place interpretations on these. Senator.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Dean.
I think that that information is very useful, then. You understand,
Mr. Dean, that in the course of things, we are going to explain fur-
ther the content of that meeting and the perceptions that the other
parties had of that meeting.
Mr. Dean. I understand.
Senator Baker. As you know, Mr. Haldeman will be a witness
before this committee. The only other person present was the Presi-
dent. I am not prepared to say at this point how we may be able to
gain access to the President's knowledge and perception of that meet-
ing. But in a three-way meeting, I think it is important to this com-
mittee that we have all the information we can get. So the information
you have just given me in rather good detail will now be structured
alongside with the rest of the record to test against the testimony of
Mr. Haldeman and hopefully against statements by the President,
in whatever manner that can be arranged.
Now, what is the time of your next meeting with the President?
Mr. Dean. On this subject?
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
jNIr. Dean. There were certain events that led up to my next meet-
ing and they were the events which occurred at La Costa, in which I,
or following La Costa, in which I was requested by Mr. Haldeman
when I returned from Florida — ^^I had gone from California to Florida
and had spent a week or so, just about a week, in Florida and when
I returned on the 19th or 20th, Mr. Haldeman asked me to prepare
an agenda. I think that that agenda is a rather important document
along the line of questioning you are asking.
Senator Baker. I would like to go into that.
Before von do, let me reiterate, the focus of my inquiry is on what
did the President know
Mr. Dean. As I say, this acrenda went directly to the President.
Senator Baker feontinuing]. And when did he know it.
]\Tr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. So as you go into vour testimonv and as you refer
to the scA^'eral documents that I lx>lieve vou have before vou, trv to
keen in mind that I am not at this moment talking about other matters
and details. I am not talking about Ellsberg at this point, or the enemy
list. I am talking about what the President knew. So tell me what
1483
additional information you can give me in that respect, preferably
in terms of your meetings with the President or conversations with
him, and then in terms of what secondary or circumstantial evidence
you have.
]Mr. Deax. My next meeting with the President was on the 27th
of February of this year. Now, to explain this meeting, I believe it
is necessary to explain this agenda, because I believe that is in part
the reason I commenced having meetings with the President. A number
of decisions had been made at La Costa, a number of areas had come
up after that. As I said, on the 19th or 20th, I was asked to prepare
an agenda. The matters that were on that agenda related to a meeting
between yourself and the President, the concept of sending former
Secretary Stans up for confirmation, and this was a concept that had
been discussed with Mr. Haldeman
Senator Baker. Are you referring to an exhibit now, Mr. Dean?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I am. It is No. 34-34.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir.
]Mr. Dean. Sending Secretary Stans up for confirmation. The con-
firmation hearings were thought of as a means of defusing the
Watergate hearings and getting as much out of the public as possible
and lessening the impact of these hearings. I was given — per my discus-
sion with Mr. Haldeman, I would have the assignment to go talk to
Mr. Stans and see if he was interested upon his return from being
out of the country.
The next item on the agenda was what to do with Mr. Magruder,
which was on the inquiry for Presidential decision. These were all
matters that were going in for Presidential decision.
Senator Baker. Who asked you to prepare it?
^Ir. Dean, ]Mr. Haldeman. It was tjased on a conversation Mr.
Haldeman and I had had. Some of the points had come up at La Costa,
some had not. For example, I believe you had had a conversation
subsequent to the time we came from La Costa and the arrangements
were worked out in that time frame.
Senator Baker. Just so the record is clear on that point, were you
advised of the conversation I had with Mr. Timmons?
Mr. Deax. ]Mr. Timmons did adA'ise me of the fact that you wanted
to talk to the President, you wanted to seek some guidance, I believe
in the areas of executive privilege, what was going to occur. Mr. Tim-
mons had the interpretation that you wanted to be helpful to the
White House and the question, one of the questions was whether you
would object to staff being present or not when you met. Timmons
did not feel that you would object and the interpretation at the Wliite
House was that this would be an excellent chance to find out what your
plans were and to, hopefully, set up a channel of communications to
work with you.
Senator Baker. Just a little bit to follow on, partly for self-serving
purposes and partly to clarify the record at this point, after the meet-
ing was held with the President in February, did you receive some
information about what the conversation was about ?
Mr. Deax. Yes; I did.
Senator Baker. Would you relate that ?
1484
Mr. Dean. Do you want me to take that out of order right now ?
Senator Baker. If you don't mind.
Mr. Dean. Certainly.
The President reported to me — first of all, Mr. Haldeman reported
to me, and subsequently the President reported to me, that you had
urged the President to send members of the White House staff up to
this committee as quickly as he could get them up here and waive
executive privilege. The President told you that he was going to hold
the line at written interrogatories.
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, would you proceed, then, with your se-
quence as I have it ?
Before you do, I see we have another roll call vote. If the commit-
tee is agreeable, we will recess at this point until we can return from it.
[Eecess.]
Senator Baker. The committee will come to order.
It is my information from the floor of the Senate that there will be
a series of other votes tonight. The Senate will be in session probably
until 9 or 10 o'clock. That is for the edification of my colleagues.
At the time we ended, Mr. Dean, I believe you were about to tell
us about the February meeting.
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir ; Senator, you asked me to give you what led up
to a given set of meetings and we had turned to the immediate agenda,
but I think we ought to be complete and full in answering the way
you requested I answer. I will give you the intervening sequences that
occurred just in highlight again, directly relating to what occurred
in the February meetings. It was the intervening event of the payment
of silence money and then the lack of that money and a serious prob-
lem, with differences between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman and
Ehrlichman about who would raise that money.
There was also the intervening event of clemency being assured to
Mr. Hunt, in which Mr. Ehrlichman informed me that — I was present
when he told Mr. Colson and myself that he was going in to see the
President about it. He subsequently informed me he talked to the
President. Mr. Colson had informed me he talked to the President
about it and subsequently, there was another meeting in Mr. Ehrlich-
man's office when it was described how the assurance was given to Mr.
Hunt's lawyer, Mr. Bittman.
Senator Baker. Before vou go on with that, Mr. Dean, so you have
some preview of the subject matter I am going to cover, it would
appear now that I probably may not finish my questions in this first
round, but just so you know I do not intend to skij) those things, I have
on my list the break-in, the coverup, the so-called enemies list, execu-
tive privilege. Executive clemency, domestic intelligence. Internal Rev-
enue Service, Judge Richey, and a number of other things. Each of
those I consider to be a subject I want to explore more fully. But for
the sake of time
Mr. Dean. All I am doing is highlighting, as I just did right then,
what was leading up to the February meetings.
Senator Baker. All right, sir, but for the sake of time, I would like
to focus at this moment on what the President knew and when he
knew it. Let us start first with dii-ect information that you have,
Mr. Dean. All right. I am going to give you a document tliat went
1485
directly to the President and I think that the fastest way for me to
handle' that is just to read the document. We have already covered the
first part of it.
Senator Baker. What document ?
Mr. Deax. This is exhibit Xo. S-i-S-i. The first part was what we just
discussed, ''Baker meeting with President.
"'Baker I'equested secret meeting re Watergate hearings.
"Baker told Timmons he wants guidance, but to maintain his purity
in the Senate he doesn't want anyone to know of meeting with the
President.
"Timmons believes that Baker wants to help.
"Timmons does not feel Baker would object if there was staff present
during meeting, so long as fact of meeting never gets out.
"Meeting would be excellent chance to find out what Baker plans to
do and set up channel to work with him."
This was based on a conversation, as I believe we discussed in execu-
tive session, of Mr. Timmons' perception of the conversation he had
with you.
" ( 2 ) Sending Stans up for confirmation :
"We don't know if Stans wants to do this, but we do know he wants
to be rehabilitated and isn't afraid to tell his story publicly.
"Confirmation hearings would help defuse Watergate hearings, and
the more of this we get to the public, the less impact the Watergate
hearings per se will have.
"This should be resolved quickly, because it will only be helpful if
it occurs prior to Watergate hearings. (Stans has requested to see
Dean on February 28 — upon his return from Jamaica.)
"(3) WTiat to do with Magruder:
"Jeb wants to return to "\\niite House (Bicentennial project).
"May be vulnerable (Sloan) until Senate hearings are completed.
"Jeb personally is prepared to withstand confirmation hearings.
" (4) Use of Buchanan as observer/spokesman to keep press coverage
honest :
"Watergate press coverage to date has been dishonest and libelous.
Pat could call them to task.
"The hearings are going to be partisan. Pat could make certain that
the public understands this.
"Teddy Kennedy is a moving force behind the hearings — this can
and should be documented. Pat could do this well.
"TPie public does not perceive Buchanan as being that close to the
President. The basic question is whether the White House is going to
sit quietly and take the unwarranted abuse that is bound to come from
hearings. We can't run a secret counter PR effort so why not do it
openly and respectfully — ^Pat can do that ?
"Buchanan's role will eliminate much of the heat that Ziegler will
otherwise receive and Ziegler could even have Pat brief from time to
time.
" ( 5 ) Getting the A.G. back on the reservation :
"A.G. is merely biding his time until he returns to private sector
"A.G. is extremely loyal to the President and if asked to take ar
active concern in these hearings (and their fallout) would do so-
otherwise, he will probably do what is best for his own self-interest
1486
"A.G. should be asked to remain in office at least 1 full year from
this date (i.e., until hearings have passed) because hearings may well
result in request for additional action by DOJ. A.G. can get Henry
Petersen — who has the greatest loyalty for the A.G. — ^to handle sensi-
tive problems with ease. We can't afford bitterness in the DOJ nor can
we risk a new A.G. being able to grapple with some of the potential
problems."
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, this was dictated by you ?
Mr. Dean. This was as the result of a meeting I had with Mr. Halde-
man discussing the agenda. These were matters that had come up in —
some of them had come up in La Costa. I was asked to boil them down
into a paper to go in to discuss with the President.
■Senator Bakjer. All right. When was this paper prepared ?
Mr. Dean. This was prepared the 19th or 20th of February of this
year.
Senator Baker, All of these things, or at least some of them, never
occurred that are dealt with in here.
Mr. Dean. I got a response from each of the points on here. As 1 will
subsequently tell you, there was a subsequent agenda prepared for the
meeting between yourself and the President.
Senator Baker. Which one is this ?
Mr. Dean. That would be exhibit No. 34-35. Mr. Stans — I was asked
to talk to him to see if he was interested in being sent up for a con-
firmable post and to explore to see if there was any post that he was
interested in. He and I discussed it and he didn't have any particular
post in mind and didn't particularly want to do it after he gave it some
consideration.
There was a Presidential decision that Mr. Magruder could not re-
turn to the White House staff.
There was also a decision by the President that Mr, Buchanan could
not be used as an observer spokesman because the President, I was told,
felt that Mr. Buchanan was too close to him, had been with him too
long, relating back to even pre-1968.
Finally, there was a meeting and there is a subsequent agenda I
have in the exhibits for the meeting with the Attorney General,
Now, as I say, these all led up to what later occurred in my discus-
sions on the 27th and 28th with the President,
Let me turn to the next exhibit. This was again requested by Mr,
Haldeman, He said, "Prepare it, do not send it through normal chan-
nels," because it was to be a totally off the record meeting, between 30
and 45 minutes. Originally there was to be staff, Mr, Dean, or alterna-
tives. It was decided there would be no staff present, so that was crossed
out on the record.
General description is : Potential Matters for Discussion with Sena-
tor Baker.
General :
Take Baker's pulse and find out how much he wants to help — keep
this from becoming a political circus.
Baker can be assured that no one in the "^Vliite House had any
knowledge that there was going to be a break-in and bugging of the
DNC.
1487
If Baker appears to be truly desirous of cooperating — and the fact
he is seeking guidance may so indicate — he might be told that there
are matters unrelated to the bugging incident per se (e.g., Segretti,
Kalmbach) that could be embarrassing and tarnish good people whose
motives were the highest. Surely he can appreciate that things which
occur at the White House have a degree of sensitivity that occur no
where else in Government.
1968 Bugging :
Tell Baker that J. Edgar Hoover personally informed the Presi-
dent shortly after taking office that his campaign had been bugged.
Presently seeking to obtain documentation and evidence of the 1968
incidents.
Appearances of Wliite House Staff Members Before Senate Com-
mittee:
Statement coming out shortly on the matter of executive privilege.
[Draft attached.]
I recall that when I first sent this document in to the President, the
draft was not attached. He was in his Executive Office Building — ^^I
don't know if that is where you met with him or not, but I had a call —
a frantic call — to get a copy of that draft down to him.
Senator Baker. On executive privilege?
Mr. Dean. On executive privilege.
Senator Baker. Do you know why ?
Mr. Deax. I don't know why.
Senator Baker. Go ahead.
Mr. Dean. I assumed maybe you were meeting with him or it was
imminent you were going to be in a meeting with him.
Cannot state at this time if such witnesses will be provided to com-
mittee. Must wait to determine how the issue develops.
A possible resolution of the problem may be that when the com-
mittee believes a White House staff member is essential as a witness,
we can compromise and agree upon sworn written interrogatories,
that should be instead of interrogation.
General Guidance :
Seek to get hearings over as quickly as possible because they really
are a potential witch hunt. The President can note that hearings of
this type damage all Government officials and the institutions of Gov-
ernment. The public wants to believe the worst about all politicians
and hearings of this type are going to damage all elected officials.
Committee procedures should protect the rights of minority mem-
bers to information, calling its own witnesses, notice of meetings, et
cetera.
Minority counsel should be tough, aware of the way things operate
in Washington, and able to handle a fellow like Sam Dash who has
been selected as majority counsel. Dash is a partisan.
Communication with White House :
Wally Johnson should be initial contact point, but if Baker feels he
wants to raise something that he chooses not to discuss with Wally,
then arrangements can be made to meet with Dean. (Note: Frankly,
the naming of Dean as the man who deals with the President on such
matters preserves our posture on executive privilege should 'Dean be
called as a witness.)
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 10
1488
Note at the bottom: Have just learned that Baker has publicly
announced the appointment of Fred Thompson as chief minority coun-
sel. Timmons has recommended George Webster as our candidate.
Senator Baker. Just out of curiosity, Mr. Dean, since this agenda
was prepared at some length first, did you dictate it ?
Mr. Dean. I did, and again, this is based on the meeting that
occurred at La Costa and the discussions I had with Mr. Haldeman
and Ehrlichman.
Senator Baker. Can you enlighten us; How much of this agenda
was covered at such meeting?
Mr. Dean. I only know what came out, was reported to me by the
President and Mr. Haldeman that the thrust of the meeting really
was your calling upon the President to
Senator Baker. To waive executive privilege ?
Mr. Dean [continuing]. To waive executive privilege is correct.
And I also — the President told me that you agreed that the hearings
should be over as soon as possible. If they lingered, it would be
damaging.
Senator Baker. It also is your information that there was not a sug-
gestion as to minority counsel which had been announced on the
same day.
Mr. Dean. Had been announced, that is correct.
Senator Baker. All right, go ahead, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dean. The next significant document leading up to my meetings
that some of these things were discussed on the 27th and 28th was a
request again by Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Baker. Do you have an exhibit number ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. This is exhibit No. 34-36. And I have a cover
note on this. I hand-carried the other agenda over to Mr. Haldeman,
whereas this one there was a little more time. He had asked me not
to send it through normal channels, so there is a cover note on "Memo-
randum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean. I did not use the pre-
scribed format because I understand you do not want this to pass into
channels."
Talking Point for Meeting With the Attorney General
Senator Baker. I think we just talked out, Mr. Dean. I think that
is another rollcall vote. Would the committee like to try to alternate,
we are on 10-minute voting cycles, I do not think we can
Senator Talmadge. If the chairman desires, I have one or two very
brief questions. I think I can complete them in about 5 minutes while
you go vote, and when you return I will go vote.
Senator Baker. Does that suit you, Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Dean. Whatever pleases the Chair.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Dean, you have been in the chair now for
4 days and I know how weary you must be, and I will be extremely
brief. There are one or two things T would like some clarification on.
You have testified repeatedly that even though you were counsel^ to
the President, you had no direct access to the President except going
through Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman ; is that correct ?
1489
Mr. Deax. That is correct. In fact, Senator, I think the documents
I have just referred to were talking about direct meetings with the
President I am asked to prepare an agenda showing the very pattern
that exists in and of itself where I sent everything I did through
either Ehrlichman or Haldeman for anything of this nature.
Senator Talmadge. Do you know who was responsible for that or-
ganizational setup ?
]Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman had basically told me who I would report
to. jNIr. Ehrlichman had been the former counsel, and when I got into
legal areas that were of interest to him, I also supplied legal assistance
through my office to the domestic counsel on occasion.
Senator Talmadge. Then. INIr. Haldeman informed you of that orga-
nizational setup, is that a correct answer ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct, sir. It was just — it was not a matter of
being informed, it just existed when you arrived. WHien I started there
I was alone. I finally persuaded them to let me get one assistant. Slowly
as the workload of my office increased, I got two or three more. I had
inherited a couple of people when I came on. Mr. Huston was there but
he never really worked directly for me. He was taking his assignments
from Mr. Haldeman or doing speechwriting for Mr. Price and Mr.
Caulfield when I first came was still doing assignments for Mr.
Ehrlichman.
Senator Talmadge. "V'^Hien were you told that you had no direct access
to the President but must go through 'Sir. Haldeman and ]Mr.
Ehrlichman?
Mr. Deax. Well, Senator, I had had dealings with the White House
before I even joined the staff and I had a pretty good feel for the
operation in the White House from working on developing various
legislative programs that went over to the T^Hiite House, and in talking
to people over there I had gotten to know a number of people before
I even went to the staff, and that is just the way it was.
Senator Talmadge. Did you ever try to obtain direct access to the
President without going through Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Deax. There is no way that would be possible, Senator. If, for
example, you were to pick up the telephone and call the President,
the call would be transferred immediately by the operator to Mr.
Haldeman or some other member of the staff. But generally if, say, an-
other staff member called, the call would generally go to Mr. Haldeman
to clear the call. He would want to know why you wanted to call and
what the subject matter was, so you were in a sense reporting to Mr.
Haldeman.
Senator Talmadge. Did you ever see anyone try to go into the Office
of the President without going through Mr. Haldeman and Mr.
Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Deax. I think I made reference in, early in, my testimony I
believe there is a reporter in this room, Mr. Mollenhoff . who used to be
on the '\'\niite House staff and I noted on occasion in looking back over
some old records that he had a special counsel title and worked in some
areas where he was. in a sense, what I might call also firefighting to
put out problems of conflicts and dealing in areas like that and I saw
a number of memorandums that he had sent to the President which
never got there, and they had been returned by Mr. Haldeman.
1490
Senator Talmadge. You never saw him try to walk in the President's
Office?
Mr. Dean. No, I did not. There are a lot of Secret Service agents
around the President's Office, I might add, also.
Senator Talmadge. One other thing I would like some clarification
on. On Monday I asked you a question and it appears on page 2465,
line 23 of the record. "Did you think it was part of an effort to make
you the fall guy in the plan ?" And your answer begins immediately, of
course, after the question but then, beginning on line 8 of page 2466
you stated something that I would like more clarification on.
"I had seen situations like this occur wiiere people who had not
actually done something take the blame for it to avoid embarrassing
others higher up and I felt it was a real possibility."
Now, were you referring to the situation at the White House ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, I was.
Senator Talmadge. Could you give us an illustration of some
instances of that type where
Mr. Dean. I can give you instances that I think are public knowl-
edge of — I think I have already alluded to one because another mem-
ber of this panel had another followup question of this nature. The
one I have already referred to was the fact that Mr. Malik was — took
the blame, so to speak, for instigating an investigation of Mr. Daniel
Schorr. Another interesting situation — there was during the 1970 cam-
paign a rather
Senator Talmadge. Who was he taking the blame for ?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Talmadge. Mr, Haldeman. All right. Go ahead.
Mr. Dean. Or the President.
Senator Talmadge. All right. Proceed.
Mr. Dean. Another instance that occurs to me is when during the
1970 congressional campaign there were a number of rather rough, you
might call, of questionable political ethical standard ads run that got
the name of the Shipley ad because Mr. Shipley had signed the ads.
The ultimate blame came to rest at the White House and it came to rest
on Chuck Colson.
Senator Talmadge. You are saying then \n your testimony, as I
understand it, it was common practice in the A^Hiite House when some-
thing went wrong for subordinates to take the blame for their supe-
riors, is that your testimony ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it is, Senator.
Senator Talmadge. Thank 3'ou very much, Mr. Dean. I must rush to
the Senate floor and the committee will stand in recess until the vice
chairman or some other member returns.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Dean. Fine.
[Recess.]
Senator Baker. The committee will come to order. I understand that
Senator Talmadge left to avoid missing this last rollcall vote with
possibly a question left unanswered. I was not here so I can't say but
is there anything further you wish to add, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dean. He was asking me about people wlio had taken the blame
for their superiors at the White House from some examples and I had
cited two examples.
1491
Mr. Dash. Yes, but you had not completed. I think Senator Tal-
madge, as he was leaving, I think the last words said was the person
taking the blame was Chuck Colson and the foUowup question would
have been, who was he taking the blame for ?
Mr. Deax. He was taking the blame for Mr. Haldeman who had
authorized the ads. There is one other example that gets into an area
I believe j^ou indicated you were going to question me on, and that is
based on information that I have directly from Mr. Krogh, that it
appears to me that based on a conversation I had with ]Mr. Krogh
that he is taking the blame for something.
Senator Baker. Do you know who ?
Mr. Deax. I believe the President of the United States.
Senator Baker. Maybe you ought to elaborate on that a little.
[Laughter.]
Ur. Dean. Well, it was on either the 28th or 29th of March that Mr.
Krogh came to my office, he stopped by to express his sympathy for
the adverse publicity I had received as a result of the Gray hearings
and asked me how I was holding up and I said, "Fine, it is not very
pleasant but my hands are tied and I can't speak." He said, he then
began a discussion about how he had been haunted ever since he left
the White House about his own experiences there, and then we got into
a discussion of the fact that there was evidence within the files of the
Department of Justice indicating leads that might let the investi-
gators from this committee discover the fact of the Ellsberg burglary
and we began discussing it. I asked him then if that had been au-
thorized by ^Ir. Ehrlichman, and he told me — knowing Mv. Krogh
pretty well and knowing Mr. Krogh had a similar level as myself and
didn't, would not start something of that dimension without clearing
it with someone, and he told me, no, that to his knowledge, Mr. Ehrlich-
man had not learned about it until after the fact and told me that his
orders had come directly from the Oval Office, and I was somewhat
surprised and so surprised I said, "You have got to be kidding," and
he repeated again no. he said, they came from the Oval Office.
Senator Baker. This was ]Mr. Krogh speaking ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, sir. And subsequently, of course, he has under a
sworn statement said that he was totally responsible for the matter.
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, it is now a little after 4 :30 and in defer-
ence to my colleagues, I am not going to try to finish with the list of
questions and topics that I thought I outlined to you earlier. What
I would like to do for about 10 minutes, almost 15 minutes, say, to 4 :45
is to go once again to the narrow focus of what the President knew and
when he knew it, relative to Watergate. So would you please move then
to the next situation.
Mr. Deax. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. That would shed any light on that.
Mr. Deax. And that would be a document which was forwarded
to the President that I was just referring to, as we ended our con-
versation, and it is exhibit Xo. 34-36,* for talking points for a meeting
with the Attorney General. This was a request that I prepare this by
Mr. Haldeman and send it not through normal channels for a meeting
but rather directly to him because of the sensitivity of the documents.
♦Exhibit 34-36 was printed In Book 3.
1492
Background, Kleindienst is biding his time until he returns to private law
practice. He has discussed joining several law firms and has a particularly at-
tractive offer from one that lie would probably like to accept. Kleindienst is less
than enthusiastic about helping to solve some of the tough problems relating to
the forthcoming Watergate hearings. He does not want to get himself involved
in any controversy at this time. The morale of the Department of Justice is low
because they are extremely loyal to Kleindienst but they think the White House
is trying to force him out. Kleindienst is extremely loyal to the President and
will do anything asked of him by the President.
Kleindienst should be asked to remain in office at least one full year from this
date, that is until after the Watergate hearings have passed because the hearings
may well result in a request for additional action by the Department of Justice.
We can't afford bitterness at the Justice Department nor can we risk a new At-
torney General being able to handle some of the potential problems. Kleindienst
should be asked to follow the hearings closely and keep us apprised of any
potential problems from a Department of Justice standpoint. Kleindienst should
be given a feeling that he is an important member of the team and not merely
because of these hearings is he being asked to stay on.
Senator Baker. Of course, Mr. Kleindienst did not stay on ; is that
right ?
Mr. Dean. His resignation was accepted, I believe, on April 30.
Senator Baker. Just out of curiosity, is it your personal knowledge
that Mr. Kleindienst's resignation was not requested but rather was
tendered by Mr. Kleindienst.
Mr. Dean. That is my understanding.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Dean. The first meeting that I had after these series of docu-
ments were exchanged and I got, I was told of the results of the meet-
ings in the first instance by ]\Ir. Haldeman, and subsequently by the
President himself when I met with him, that meeting was on February
27 and it was at this meeting that the President asked me to report
directly to him on all Watergate matters. There had been a great ex-
change of this type of memorandums back and forth into the Presi-
dent's office and out. He indicated to me at that time that this was
consuming a great deal of time of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman,
and that at that time he also indicated to me that they were principals
and he felt that I could be more objective in this matter.
We had, I think, a lengthy discussion about that this morning with
one of the members of the panel. As I indicated, it was at this meeting
that the President also repeated what had earlier been reported to me
by Mr, Haldeman, about your meeting with the President, in which
you had told the President that you suggested he waive executive
privilege. He had told you that he was going to hold the line at written
interrogatories, and he asked me that time what did I think about that,
and I said I certainly thought that written interrogatories could be
handled. He also discussed the fact that he didn't want Mr. Halde-
man and Ehrlichman to appear on the Hill.
Senator Baker. Incidentally, INIr. Dean, at that point, as we know,
you are here without a claim of executive privilege, Mr. Haldeman,
]Mr. Dean — I mean Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman are under
subpena and it is our understanding that they will appear without a
claim of executive privilege.
Can you identify the point at which this position at the White House
was reversed and that those privileges indeed were waived?
Mr. Dean. I believe it was probably in late April, I don't know for
certain, maybe it was May, maybe it was June, the position was evolv-
1^3
ing as I recall, as to the statements on executive privilege continued
to change after, that certainly was after the April 30 resignation of
Haldeman and Ehrlichman and my departure from the White House
staff.
Senator Baker. Do you know who recommended the changed posi-
tion?
Mr. Deax. I do not. I was not privy to the conversations at that
point in time.
Senator Baker. But in any event, there is no claim now of executive
privilege or of attorney-client privilege as far as you are concerned?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Baker. And as far as the other witnesses are concerned?
Mv. Deax. That is correct.
[Conferring with counsel.]
Mr. Dean. Counsel has just reminded me of something that at one
point in time we were going down to appear at a special Saturday ses-
sion before the grand jury and the Friday night before when we went
to advise it with the prosecutors there was a sheet that had been
handed out by the White House on executive privilege and at that point
in April, sometime in April, the latter half of the month, executive
privilege was still being claimed particularly vis-a-vis the grand jury
as well.
Senator Baker. There was a speech by the President, I believe on
May 2-2 on this subject, but that is really not important to this query
so we will mo\e on from there. I am anxious, in the moments we have
remaining, for vou to tell me about the first-hand information that you
have, or what I call category 1, of direct knowledge of what the Presi-
dent knew which you also knew.
Mr. Deax. That is right.
It was on the meeting of the 27th that the President urged me to, he
reported the fact that you had asked that your contact, not be anybody
at the White House but somebody, very specifically the Attorney Gen-
eral, Mr. Kleindienst, and I was asked by the President then to make
sure that Kleindienst had in fact met with you. T had met witli Klein-
dienst the preceding day, as I recall, in a general discussion and he had
indicated to me he wanted to turn over the FBI materials, I don't think
he was aware at that point in time, well, he couldn't have been aware —
yes. he may have been aware at that point in time of the fact that you
were to be the contact point for the hearings and he had not yet sched-
uled a meeting with you, I don't know what conversations he had had
with you but he had said that he hadn't worked out a firm date to have
these hearings, that he was hoping to meet with both you and the
chairman.
Senator Baker. Do you know, in fact, when he did meet with us?
Mr. Deax-^. Xo ; I do not.
Senator Baker. But you do know that it was with Senator Ervin
and me?
Mr. Dean. That was my understanding, yes. That was hi-; desire.
Apparently, you indicated you wanted to meet with both, yo ; tlioiight
it would be most effective if the meeting was with both you and the
chairman. That is what INIr. Kleindienst reported to me.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, Mr. Dean.
1494
Mr. Dean. As I have also testified, there was some discussion of
the composition of the committee. He felt that at that point in time,
he hoped that the White House could receive some assistance from you.
That is why he was hoping, urging me to have the Attorney General
work closely with you. We discussed Senator Gurney. Senator Gurney,
as the President said, no one has to get in touch with him, he will do
what is right. He felt very comfortable that that was our best friend
on the committee.
Senator Baker. Incidentally, one other thing. I noticed in one of the
memos, one of the exhibits, that mention was made of Attorney Gen-
eral Kleindienst and of you as a possible communication point for
committee affairs.
Mr. Dean. It was Wally Johnson or myself, I believe.
Senator Baker. Would you confirm that you and I have never
discussed that?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, I would.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Dean, I might add that coming forward in the meeting at one
point in the meeting on March 22, when Mr. Mitchell was with the
President, there was a call as a result of a staff inquiry from a member
of your staff that said that it is still seeking guidance and this report
had come to the President from Mr. Timmons. During the middle of
the meeting, the President picked up the phone and tried to, or called
the Attorney General and said, you know, get on up there and meet
with Senator Baker and work these problems out.
At that meeting also, he told me, he said, John, you should start
having direct dealings with Senator Ervin and Senator Baker on the
parameters of executive privilege. This was right in the middle of the
Gray hearings and I told the President, I said I think that would be
very unwise, Mr. President, because I am the point in controversy in
the Gray hearings and I would be up there negotiating my own posi-
tion, so to speak.
Senator Baker. I remember, too, at that time, that the chairman was
talking about arresting people at the White House gate.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. And the President was talking about having a law-
suit.
Mr. Dean. I also remember having a discussion with the Attorney
General about this area and he told me, he said, we have more marshals
than they have sergeants at arms and if we run out of marshals, your
boss has got the Army.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dean. Now, there is something that occurred that was very
similar to the September 15 meeting after we had these discussions.
On my way out of the office, he again repeated to me that I had done
an excellent job of dealing with the matter during the campaign, with
the Watergate problem. He said that it had been the only issue that
the McGovern people had had, that the Democrats had tried to make
a big issue out of it. I told him that I had only managed to contain the
matter during the campaign, and again, feeling; that I did not know
how long the coverup could go on, that this thing could go on indefi-
nitely.
1495
Senator Baker. Did you use the word "coverup" ?
Mr. Dean. I used tlie word "contain." He said to me — I said, I am
not sure it can be contained indefinitely.
He then, I can recall this very vividly. He said, John, he said, I have
o;ot a lot of confidence in you. He said, you know, we have to keep just
frohtino; back and fightino; back, and I am sure you can do it and I
want you to report directly to me on all your problems and not bother
Bob and John, referring- to Haldeman and Ehrlichman.
Senator Baker. Did you feel at the time that the President had con-
fidence in vou ?
Mr. Deax. Did I feel ? As I think I testified earlier, I thought that
I had earned my stripes by that time, so to speak. Somebody else classi-
fied it, I think Senator ]\iontoya, as I had gotten my spurs, and I felt
that he did ; yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, it is now 4 :45. 1 have covered much terri-
tory and I have much more that I have already mentioned to you that
I would like to cover, but at this point, I would like to yield.
Senator Talmadge has not returned. I understand that he has finished
his interrogation for this round and the next one would be Senator
Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
IVIr. Dean, just a couple of preliminary questions before I get into
the main thrust of questioning. And this asks for an opinion, ad-
mittedly so, but I would still like to hear it.
On April 30. 1973, the President announced your resignation along
with Messrs. Kleindienst, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman. And the Presi-
dent had some very warm things to say about Mr. Haldeman and Mr.
Ehrlichman, not very much to say about you and only a very little to
say about Mr. Kleindienst. Would you care to opine as to why this
particular treatment?
Mr. Deax. I do not want to ofTer an opinion: I will just say this,
that given the fact that I was not playing ball, I was not surprised.
And I might also add this, that I thought it was somewhat unfair to
put ^Ir. Kleindienst's name amongst the others that were leaving the
White House staff at that time. I had a definite reaction to that. I
thought that was unfair to Mr. Kleindienst, who had, as I understood
it, proffered his own resignation and then suddenly was lumped with
others who there had been a good deal of press speculation about being
involved in the Watergate.
Senator Weicker. Did you have any information that Mr. Klein-
dienst had indeed offered his resignation prior to this time ?
Mr. Deax". Xo, I didn't. I read subsequently that he had proferred it.
Senator Weicker. The committee has received evidence that a
courier for Senator Muskie's campaign microfilmed documents which
were typed by Sally Duncan. Bart Porter's secretary, and delivered by
her to Gordon Strachan at the "WHiite House. This was in earlier testi-
mony before tliis committee. Now, what do you know about the source
of the list of Muskie contributors, which list you provided to the com-
mittee vesterday?
Mr. Deax. The only thing I know about that list is it was sent to me
from Mr. Colson's office.
Senator Weicker. I see.
1496
Now, Mr. Dean, the line of questioning which I am going to follow
is going to include you to some extent, it is going to include me to some
extent. But one of the jobs that I think we have is to preserve the op-
portunity for every individual to be heard and heard fairly when they
come before this committee, whether it is you or any other witness, and
to probe fairly, as has been the case by the members of this committee.
Obviously, the seriousness of the matter before us also makes it impera-
tive that the committee itself and each member of the committee have
credibility and be believed.
Now, our job, in other words, as 1 look upon it here, is to get the
facts, not to get the President, and to have the United States or Amer-
icans feel exactly what it is that happened to their political system and,
in fact, what happened to their Constitution.
With that in mind, I now intend to review some of your testimony
and to also review some of the things that have happened. Certainly,
I and the committee, the American people, have seen things that have
been illegal. We have seen things that have been unconstitutional, and
we have seen — and here those things which I can only categorize as
gross.
But to get to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, I first want to
find out what your comments would be to the memorandum that was
read to you by Senator Inouye. Except this time, what I am going to do
is I am going to point out to you and to the American people the
dijfference between the first memorandum that was sent to the commit-
tee and the second memorandum that was sent to Senator Inouye.
The first memorandum sent from Mr. Fred Buzhardt at the White
House made the following statement :
His try fails to record tliat at that moment, Dean corrected the Attorney
General's erroneous impression by pointing out that, however, innocently,
Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean had all been involved in planning of operations
of which Watergate was an obvious derivative or that Strachan had knowledge
of the fruits of this kind of operation or that all of them were suborning perjury
and otherwise seeking to conceal the facts.
Now, let me show you the key difference between the first and the
second versions. The first version here, "His try fails to record that
at that moment. Dean corrected the Attorney General's erroneous im-
pression by pointing out that, however innocently, ISIitchell, Ma-
gruder, and Dean" — the memorandum which was read to you by
Senator Inouye, which was the second memorandum to come from the
White House, read as follows :
"His try fails to record that at the moment Dean corrected the At-
torney General's erroneous impression by pointing out that Mitchell,
Magruder, and Dean" — in other words, omitting, "however inno-
cently."
Now, to get to further aspects of the memorandum, the first memo-
randum stated :
It is probably because of executive privilege it is not possible even to specu-
late on the extent to which Dean helped induce the views on attorney-client
privilege.
The second version of the memorandum read "It is probably that
Dean helped induce the views on attorney-client privilege."
1497
Then again, in the first version of the memorandum given to this
committee by :Mr. Buzhardt and the White House, the statement was
made in the first edition :
The President indicated to Ehrlichman that his conversations with Dean
througliout the preceding month had given him "a growing awareness of Dean's
personal involvement and that his sending him to Camp David apparently was
a device to smoke him out."
The second version that came from the White House reads as fol-
lows: "The President indicated to Ehrlichman that his conversations
with Dean throughout the preceding month had given him a growing
awareness of Dean's personal involvement in this."
Then lastly — if you will be patient here for a minute — the first ver-
sion: ''Dean 'was not merely one of the architects of the coverup plan.
He was also perhaps its most active participant."
The second version from the White House : "Dean was not merely
one of the architects of the coverup plan. He was also its most active
participant."
I think it is important to point out, Mr. Chairman, to the committee
the very substantial discrepancies in the two memorandums sent to this
committee. But probably the greatest disservice performed by the
'\Miite House in this instance comes on the following fact. Before I
make my statement in regard to the entire memorandum, I would like
to read a quote from a speech given by the Vice President of the United
States not long ago. where he goes ahead and blasts this committee, in
which speech he states :
There is no question whatever that some men, despite their innocence, will he
ruined by all of this, even though I am sure that the Senate intended nothing of
this kind when it commissioned this investigation.
I think, Mr. Chairman, that the American people should know that
the author of the '\Miite House memorandum read by Senator Inouye
yesterday makes statements of facts concerning John Mitchell which,
in effect, assume that he took part in a conspiracy to break and enter,
that he took part in obstructing justice and suborning perjury, and all
this without an admission or conviction of John Mitchell. And this,
]\rr. Chairman, done in the document sent by the "VMiite House to this
committee. I don't believe that in anything that the committee has
done to date we have overstepped our bounds to this extent and I think
it important to note, not only in the case of Mr. Dean, who sits before
us, but also in the case of ]Mr. Mitchell, who is to come before us,
Xow% ]\rr. Dean, I didn't mean to jump ahead of you.
Have you any comment to make relative to this memorandum, and if
so, I don't mean to cut you off on it.
Mr. Deax. When the memorandum was being read yesterday, as you
will recall. Senator, I commented point by point as they went through
it. I will certainly stand on the comments I made yesterday and I cer-
tainly stand on my testimony. I refuse to engage in descriptions of
motives of others, myself.
Senator AVeicker. Xow, Mr. Chairman, as I have indicated, there
have been acts that have been illegal, unconstitutional, and those that
fall in the general category of gross. And I would like to go ahead and
repeat now exactlv what acts which have been testified to, have actu-
ally been proven or admitted in the illegal area, acts committed by
14i98
various members of the executive branch of government — conspiracy
to obstruct justice, conspiracy to intercept wire or oral communica-
tions, subornation of perjury, conspiracy to obstruct a criminal inves-
tigation, conspiracy to destroy evidence, conspiracy to file false sworn
statements, conspiracy to commit breaking and entering, conspiracy to
commit burglary, misprision of a felony, filing of false sworn state-
ments, perjury, breaking and entering, burglary, interception of wire
and oral communications, obstruction of criminal investigation,
attempted interference with administration of the internal revenue
laws, and attempted unauthorized use of internal revenue information.
These are illegal matters proven or admitted that have been accom-
plished by the executive branch of this Government.
As to those matters that are unconstitutional : Attempts to infringe
upon people's first amendment rights of free speech, and the press, the
enemy list which we have seen, first amendment rights to peaceable
assembly, fourth amendment rights to be secure in our houses and
papers and effects, and fourth amendment rights, denial of rights to
fair trial, right to due process of law. That is what we have heard
which has been done in the way of unconstitutional acts by the execu-
tive branch of the Government,
Now, when you get into the area of the gross, I think it very impor-
tant that we have more than just an exhibit before us, the exhibits that
were part of the enemy papers submitted by Mr, Dean to this com-
mittee yesterday, and I would like to go ahead and read just very short
portions from some of those memorandums.
This, I would say, falls into the area of gross : Memorandum for
John Dean from Charles Colson :
I received a well-informed tip that there are income tax discrepancies involv-
ing the returns of Harold J. Gibbons, the vice president of the Teamsters Union
in St. Louis. This has come to me on very, very good authority.
Gibbons, you should know, is an all out enemy, a McGovernite, ardently anti-
Nixon. He is one of the three labor leaders who w-ere recently invited to Hanoi.
Please see if this can be started on at once and if there is an informer's fee,
let me know. There is a good cause at which it can be donated.
Let me read from your memorandum, Mr. Dean, and I imagine this
couldn't have been one of your i:)roudest moments in life. If I am not
mistaken, the subject dealing with our political enemies was a memo-
randum written by you to Mr. Haldeman, is that correct ?
Mr. Deax. I will have to confess, I had to do some research to pre-
pare that, because it was a new field for me.
Senator Weicker. Well, I think we have got to get it all out on the
table here, and that means everybody. And I am going to read two
paragraphs which I find to be absolutely amazing having been written
in the White House of the United States. "After reviewing this matter
with a number of persons possessed of expertise in the field" — the sub-
ject of this is "Dealing with our political enemies" — "I have concluded
that we do not need an elaborate mechanism or game plan, rather we
need a good project coordinator and full support for the project. In
brief, the system would work as follows :"
The project coordinator should then determine — and this is one of the ways the
system operates — what source of dealings these individuals have with the Federal
Government — talking about our political enemies now — and how we can best
screw them (for example, grant availability. Federal contracts, litigation, pros-
ecution, et cetera).
1499
Xow, to move along; to that portion of the Internal Revenue Service
memo — this is how you use the Internal Revenue Service against your
political enemies— just one sentence :
Walters must be made to know that discrete political actions and investiga-
tions on behalf of the administration are a firm requirement and responsibility
on his part.
In the same memorandum, "We have been unable to obtain informa-
tion in the possession of IRS regarding our political enemies."
And then lastly, in one of the lists which we received, as I under-
stand it. are the '"'Opponent Priority Activity" — Mr. Dean, does that
come from Mr. Colsons' office to ]Mr. Bell ?
]Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. All right. The language at first is very' prosaic.
"Having studied the attached material and evaluated the recommenda-
tions for the discussed action, I believe you will find my list worth-
while for go status — " the space age come to dirty politics. "It is in
priority order."
Now I want everybody to listen to some of the comments that are
made alongside the names: "It is time to give the message"; "they
should be hit hard starting with" this particular individual ; "A scan-
dal would be most helpful here" : "we should give him a try. Positive
results would stick a pin in Jackson's white hat"; "coming on fast.
Emerging as a leading black anti-Xixon spokesman. Has known weak-
ness for white females."
These are the exhibits, these are the exhibits that were turned in
yesterday. They form a part of the record of activity, along with those
matters unconstitutional and illegal.
Xow, we get to the point as to whether or not these attitudes still
prevail or whether, in fact, they still continue. INIr. Dean, I am now
referring to your statement on page 163.
Ehrlichman and Haldeman concluded that the theory for dealing with this
committee should be as follows : The White House will take a public posture of
full cooperation, but privately will attempt to restrain the investigation and make
it as difficult as possible to get information and witnesses. A behind-the-scenes
media effort would be made to make the Senate inquiry appear very partisan.
The ultimate goal would be to discredit the hearing and reduce their impact by
attempting to show that the Democrats have engaged in the same type of ac-
tivities.
"Would you like to expand on that statement at all at this time? I
plan to go through a chronology of events, even as they affect me and
you. But, is there anything in the way of a general statement that
you would like to make at this time ?
]Mr. Deax. I think I indicated this to counsel yesterday, that at this
particular La Costa meeting, I made several which I have not turned
over as an exhibit but will be turned over as an exhibit and this ma-
terial is documented in that form.
Senator Weicker. "Well, now, Mr. Dean, I am going to go through
a chronology of events because the thing that worries me, I suppose,
more than anything else about these hearings is that people say these
things happened in 1970, they happened in 1971, they happened in
1972 but it is 1978, and these are matters that were back then, they
involve people that existed back then, and so it is now my intention
to go through a chronology of something that affects this committee.
1500
Already having tried to establish somewhat as to what was being done
to the credibility of this particular witness, we have your statement on
the La Costa meeting, which is February 10 to 11 of 1973.
Around March 26 or March 27, 1 indicated by press statements that
I thought the Watergate conspiracy went beyond those seven persons
engaged in the actual break-in. This was done in a statement to the
press outside my office and also in an interview with UPI. That was
on the 26th and 27th of March.
Now I intend, Mr. Chairman, to read a taped telephone conversa-
tion between Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Kleindienst on the 28th of
March, taped by Mr. Ehrlichman, and in the possession of the com-
mittee.
Mr. Dash. Senator Weicker, we might identify it as having been
submitted under subpena by Mr. Ehrlichman to this committee.
Senator Weicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Dash, [Reading.]
Ehrlichman. The President wanted me to cover with you. Are you on an
outside line?
Kleindienst. I'm at my parents' house.
Ehrlichman. Oh, fine, OK, so it's a direct line? Number one, he wanted me to
ask you those two things that I did yesterday about the grand jury and about
Baker. He had me call Pat Gray and have Pat contact Lowell Weicker to ask
Weicker about this second story that he put out yesterday to the effect that he
had information about White House involvement. And Weicker told Gray that
be was talking there about political sabotage and not about the Watergate.
Kleindienst. About the Segretti case?
Ehrlichman. Yeah, and that he was quite vague with Pat as to what he had.
Kleindienst. I called him also, you know, after I talked to the President on
Monday.
Ehrlichman. Well, the President's feeling is that it wouldn't be too bad for
you in your press conferences in the next couple of days to take a swing at that
[putting in my own parentheses, that is me. Now I get back on the record] and
just say we contacted the Senator because we continue to exercise diligence in
this thing and we're determined to track down every lead and it turns out he
doesn't have anything.
Kleindienst. I would really at this delicate point question the advisability of
provoking, you know, a confrontation with Weicker. He is essentially with us,
he and Baker get along good.
Ehrlichman. Is he?
Kleindienst. [and as soon as I make this statement I intend to interrupt with
my own comment] Baker has had a long talk with him and told him to shut up
and said that he would —
Senator Weicker. Now, this is serious business, it is not a time for
wisecracks, it is a time for everybody to be telling the truth and to be
telling it hard, and I don't think there is any question — Howard, at
times you and I don't agree but Howai^d Baker has never in any man-
ner, shape or form, directly or indirectly ever told Senator Weicker to
shut up, and I am going to put that one right out on the record. I think
that
Senator B.\ker. It is indeed a serious moment l>ut I cannot overlook
the presumptiousness of a man who is five feet seven telling a six-foot-
sixer to shut up. [Laughter.]
Senator Weicker. Thank you.
"And I talked with him" — ^^I will just start over again.
Baker has had a long talk with him.
We are now back, this is Kleindienst speaking, talking :
I talked with him on Sunday after he said he didn't have anything but he's
kind of an excitable kid and we just might not want to alienate liim and I think
1501
that if he finds himself in a direct word battle with the White House and me and
loses face about it I think in the long run we might need that guy's vote.
Ehrlichman. I see. You don't think that this is evidence of alienation to the
point of no return, then.
Kleindienst. No. You mean by Lowell?
Ehrlichm,\x. Yeah.
Kleixdienst. No, I don't. He's pretty disenchanted with the whole concept of
it. * * * Connecticut politician
Ehrlichmax. Well, use your own judgment on it, Richard.
Kleixdiexst [continuing]. On TV I guess seven or eight times this Sunday
when I finished my testimony before my Appropriations Committee all three net-
works I referred to the letter that I sent to Sirica and I am also emphasized and
repeatedly said (a) the President wants this investigated, let the chips fall where
they will'but secondly, that if anybody has any information we not only want it,
we "expect to get it so we can investigate it and if necessary, indict other people
and that anybody who withholds information like that is obstructing justice. But
I did not refer to Weicker and my judgment right now is not to do so.
Ehrlichman. OK, OK.
Kleixdiexst. If he gets to that point, the hell with him.
Ehrlichmax. Well, our uneducated and uninformed impression was that he
was trying to develop an attack line here on the White House or the President.
Kleixdiexst. If that * * * if we would conclude that that is what he's up to
that he is completely alienated then I say we've got to take him on.
Ehrlichmax. Well, keep track of that and you'll be talking to Baker and you
get a feel of it.
And the phone conversation g:oes on — this is in the possession of the
committee, if any of the committee members desires a full reading of
it, I will be glad to do that but I am definitely opening this along the
line of our committee and the other members of the committee and I do
not think the other members of the committee
Senator Baker. The document is in the files, and I understand was
transcribed by committee staff.
Mr. Dash. Actually, this was given to the committee by Mr. Ehrlich-
man's counsel, Mr. Wilson, under subpena, the actual tape we under-
stand, is in the possession of the prosecutors.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Senator Weicker. Xow, Mr. Dean, I will pick up the time sequence
here in a minute, but in and around this period of time, do you know of
any other efforts to interfere with other members of the committee ?
Mr. Deax. Senator, I do not. At that time, I was up at Camp David
at this point in time, and I was unaware of what was happening and
I had developed somewhat of a strained relationship with the — with
Mr. Ehrlichman and ]SIr. Haldeman already by this time as a result
of some of the things that had occurred on the 21st and 22d. And I
believe the President was in Florida.
Some time before this, however, in discussing this committee, I recall
hearing, and I cannot recall specifically who raised it, that a number of
members of this committee, the Kepublican members, may have re-
ceived campaign contributions during the 1970 election from the "\\Tiite
House and some of that money might not have been reported and that
should be examined. The records of that, of those contributions, are
locked in a safe in my former office : thev were deposited there by Mr.
Colson. I have never read them. Tn fact, thev were put in there with
instructions that nobodv on mv staff was to look at them, including
mvself, and the thought was it was to go through those and find out
what was in there. I am not aware specifically of any of the details of
1502
any of the contributions that were made to Republicans or Democrats
or anyone specifically. I know this was discussed though, at one point
in time.
Senator Weicker. In other words, this was one of the matters that
was discussed to look into as a means of
Mr. Dean. Senator, I believe it was.
Senator Weicker. Of pressuring the committee ?
Mr. Dean. Specifically, it was in reference to you and trying in some
way to embarrass you.
Senator Weicker. I understand that and we are going to get to that.
I will have to pick up the next step on my own hook. Around April
10 1 was informed by an individual who is well aware of these contribu-
tions during the 1970 campaign that he had been approached by the
White House and had been requested to indicate to them that some-
thing illegal or something wrong attached themselves to the contribu-
tions made to my campaign. His answer to the White House, and his
answer to press peojDle who had been sent by the White House, was
that there wasn't anything illegal and there wasn't anything wrong.
But I was notified of this fact on April 10.
Now, Mr. Dean, I came to our meeting of May 3 when I, along with
members of my staff and your counsel, met with you. Would you de-
scribe to the committee that incident which took place during the inter-
view at which point in time you asked to leave the room with me?
Mr. Dean. The meeting was arranged by counsel and counsel thought
since it was becoming imminent I was going to appear up here and you
wanted very much to talk with me that I should indeed cooperate and
talk with you. I told them at that time that I didn't want to get into
any depth of testimonial areas but I was happy to discuss sort of the
outer parameters of some of my areas of knowledge because of your
membership on the committee.
Before we commenced that discussion at some point in time I
thought I ought to inform you of the fact that I had just raised a
minute ago, that I was aware of the fact that there was an effort to
embarrass you, and I didn't want to get into that discussion in front
of your staff or anyone else, I thought it had come to me, I didn't know
the substance of it and I thought as one person to another I ought to
just tell you what I knew about that and bring it to your attention.
Senator Weicker. What was my response to you ?
Mr. Dean, That thev were barking up the wrong tree.
Senator Weicker. Would you say that 30 seconds, a minute would
be
^ Mr. Dean. I would say at the most. We turned around and went
right back into the room.
Senator Weicker. All right.
We next move to an incident that occurred within the last several
days whereby a reporter in Washington, D.O., was informed by Mr.
Charles Colson that he was involved in the living of monevs to my
campaign and that he had reason to believe that the monev was not
properly handled, and quite franklv I was being a disloyal Republican
and the time had come to swing around.
1503
When pinned to substantiate this request, there was absolutely no
substantiation by :Mr. Colson. But that was enough to finally go ahead
and get me a little mad, and so a couple of days ago I indicated oyer
NBC television prior to these hearings that eitorts were still being
made to pressure this committee, and indeed yesterday I received a
call from the White House from Mr. Len Garment, and he was most
concerned about my statement, wanted to know what the facts were,
I indicated to him the Colson story which I have just read here. I did
not indicate to him our meeting, I did not indicate to him the attempt
of the White House to communicate with another individual who, for
the time being, I shall leave nameless.
I then told Mr. Garment that Mr. Colson was his problem, he wasn't
my problem. And the time had come either to step forward and make
a specific charge or to go ahead and disavow these attempts to snare
a member of the committee.
But I don't think that is enough, and so this morning I communi-
cated with Mr. Archibald Cox, the special prosecutor. I think I have
had sufficient personal experience both in reading the pay telephone
conversation and with this nebulous threat as to campaign funds so
that, in my opinion, there is the possible violation of yet another law.
And after all the violation of laws is the business of the prosecutor and
not this committee and, therefore, I have communicated all the facts
that I have discussed here with you with the prosecutor, and I have
asked him to look into the possible violation of section 1505 which is
the obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and com-
mittees, and the last part of the section says, "Whoever corruptly or
by threat of force or by any threatening letter, communication, influ-
ences, obstructs or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct or im-
pede the due and proper administration of the law under which such
proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the
United States or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry
under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House
or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Con-
gress shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
5 years or both."
Now, I know, Mr. Dean, that I have been making you sit through
an event that you onlv had a small ])art in but I think it is important.
Mr. Deax. If I might just add. Senator, there may be a parallel
story but I don't pretend — but I would not like to get into it right
now — as far as efforts to attack my own character in some of the
individuals that I have become aware that have been involved in that
also.
Senator Weicker. Let me ask you this : Have there been any attempts
to influence you in 3'our testimony regarding your testimony before
this committee?
Mr. Dean. There has been every effort in the world to make me look
in the worst possible light, to try to intimidate me through tliat proc-
ess, to try to make it as difficult as possible for me to testify. That has
occurred. Yes.
Senator Weicker. Let's put it this way : whether it is you in that
witness chair or whether it is me in this committee chair or anv other
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - H
1504
man in back of this table or any other witness who is going to come
before this committee, there are going to be no more tnreats, no in-
timidation, no innuendo, no working through the press to go ahead
and destroy the credibility of individuals, if the executive branch of
Government wants to meet tlie standards that the American people
set for it in their mind then the time has come to stop reacting and stop
playing this type of a game, and either disavow it completely or make
the very specific charges that apparently are being leaked out either
against the committee members, or against the witnesses appearing be-
fore this committee.
Now I am going to conclude this way, Mr. Chairman, and then I am
done, and I have tried to, as I say, accomplish one role that I think
needed accomplishing in these hearings: among the rumors that are
floated around, and this isn't hearsay, are on three different occasions
plants to the effect that I am such a disloyal Republican and I am
going to switch to the Democratic Party.
Now, I am going to tell you, in your memorandum, Mr. Dean, you
went ahead and had me described, whether it was you or Mr. Halde-
man or whoever was there, as an independent who would give the
White House trouble. But I say before you and I say before the Ameri-
can people and this committee that I am here as a Republican and,
quite frankly, I think that I express the feelings of the 42 other Re-
publican Senators that I work with, and the Republicans of the State
of Connecticut and, in fact, the Republican Party, far better than these
illegal, unconstitutional, and gross acts which have been committed
over the past several months by various individuals.
Let me make it clear because I have got to have my partisan mo-
ment, Republicans do not cover up ; Republicans do not go ahead and
threaten; Republicans do not go ahead and commit illegal acts; and
God knows Republicans don't view their fellow Americans as enemies
to be harassed but rather, I can assure you, that this Republican, and
those that I serve with, look upon every American as human beings
to be loved and wanted. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Applause.]
Senator Baker. Senator Weicker, thank you very much.
I think that it might be in order at this time to remark that I had
the opportunity to discuss this matter with you this morning before
the committee hearings began and, at that time, you and I discussed
the possibility that if there were, in fact, indications that anyone had
tried to create an atmosphere or to produce a malicious impact on any
witness or any member of this committee, that undor the statute law
and according to the precepts of fairplay, that would be a legitimate
inquiry for the staff of this committee and for the other law enforce-
ment agencies of the country.
So may I call on you, and any other member of this committee and,
in the absence of the chairman but I am sure that I speak his senti-
ments as well, to say that as, if, and when we develop information of
past occurrences that ought to be investigated, and certainly of future
ones, relating to any person, relating to any witness, relating to any
member of this committee that that will promptly be investisrated by
the staff of this committee surely within the scope and jurisdiction of
our effort.
1505
With that, it is 5 :30 and I would ask the sentiment of m}' colleagues
on whether we should continue at this time or adjourn until 10 in the
morning.
If there is no objection, then the committee will stand in recess until
10 tomorrow morning.
[Whereuj)on at 5 :30 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 10
a.m., Friday, June 29, 1973.]
FRIDAY, JUNE 39, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington, D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :05 a.m., in
room 318, Eussell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
(chairman), presiding.
Present : Senatoi^ Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and AVeicker.
Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief
counsel; Arthur S. ^Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
David ^l. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels ; R. Phillip Haire, ]Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to
Senator Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Ray
St. Armand, assistant publications clerk.
Senator Er\t[n. The committee will come to order.
I would like to thank Senator Baker for presiding during my tem-
porary absence yesterday afternoon and also, in addition to saying my
thanks to him, I would like to state that I have never had the privilege
of performing a public service with a more courageous and independ-
ent man than my vice chairman.
I would also like to make this statement : The committee has dis-
cussed the question of holding hearings next week but the staff has
been so pressed in preparing testimony and talking to witnesses that
we decided we would make more progress by taking next week off and
leaving the staff here to work. I would like to praise the staff because
in connection with preparation of the transcripts of Mr. Dean's testi-
mony some 12 or 14 members of the staff who had worked all day
Saturday and all day Sunday, also stayed up Sunday night in order to
enable the committee to go ahead with the hearing on Monday, and I
have never known a more diligent and more dedicated staff on any
committee than this committee has the honor of having.
Thank you.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, might I respond just for a moment?
I thank you most deeply and humbly for your remarks. I say not just
in a spirit of reciprocation but with absolute sincerity that, and I have
(1507)
1508
said it before and I would like to say it again, I have never in my life
worked with a man who has been more cooperative, who has been more
sensitive and understanding to the importance of this occasion and
who has tried hard to make a bipartisan etlort of these hearings which
I think they have been. It has been a great privilege for me to learn
from you and to go forward in this unpleasantness.
Senator Ervin. Thank you.
Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dean, I presume while you were counsel at the White House
that you had many discussions and probably provided input to some
legal opinions with respect to the separation of powers vis-a-vis the
possibility that the President might be subpenaed before any con-
gressional committee.
TESTIMONY OP JOHN W. DEAN III— Eesumed
Mr. Dean. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Montoya. Did anyone else ?
Mr. Dean. Not while I was present at the White House do I recall
that subject being researched by my office, certainly.
Senator Montoya. Did you have any discussions pursuant to this ?
Mr. Dean. Senator, I might respond in this regard, that much of the
doctrine of executive privilege, and there were several statements
issued on the policy of executive privilege, stemmed from the separa-
tion of powers concept, and it was the President who told me that
rather than refer to the matter as executive privilege that Mr. Ziegler
should start referring to it as separation of powers.
Now, when we were looking into the problems of executive privilege,
of course, there were collateral reviews but not as far as the President
vis-a-vis an appearance per se was ever researched as opposed to staff
appearances.
Senator Montoya. I noticed from reading the President's press
statements that he used the separation of powers and Mr. Ziegler, in his
press statements, used tliat term and also the term executive privilege.
Now, was there any legal opinion with respect to the ground that
the two facets or two phrases covered ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, I think you will find that about in mid-
March the phrase "executive privilege" was not being used as much and
they began using the phrase publicly "separation of powers." As I say,
this resulted in some discussions in preparing the President for press
conferences that occurred in mid-March, and the President said that
he did not want to use the phrase "executive privilege." Ratlier he
wanted to use the phrase "separation of powers" and instructed Mr.
Ziegler to do likewise.
How often Mr. Ziegler has subsequently used the phrase "executive
privilege" I do not know. I have not studied the transcript.
Senator Montoya, Are vou aware that anybody might have advised
the President as to whether or not he was subject to a subpena of a
congressional committee ?
Mr. Dean. I have no firsthand knowledge of that. Senator.
1509
Senator Moxtoya. Xow, referring to the President's news conference
on August 29, 1972, and I will quote from that conference, a reporter
asked this question :
Mr. President, would not it be a good idea for a special prosecutor, even from
your standpoint, to be appointed to investigate tlie contribution situation and also
the Watergate case?
Answer :
The President. With regard to who is investigating it now, I think it would
be — it would be well to know that the FBI is conducting a full field investigation.
The Department of Justice, of course, is in charge of the prosecution and present-
ing the matter to the Grand Jury. The Senate Banking and Currency committee —
I presume he meant the House —
is conducting an investigation. The General Accounting OflBce, an independent
agency, is conducting an investigation of those aspects which involve the cam-
paign spending law. Now with all these investigations that are being conducted,
I don't believe that adding another Special Prosecutor would serve any useful
purpose.
Now, Tou stated before that there was a move at the White House
to try to stop the House Banking and Currency investigation, and you
presented testimony as to what went on in the White House in the
l3ackground.
Now, was this going on under auspices of anyone close to the
President ?
Mr. Deax. Well, of course, on September 15 I had had a discussion
with the President about this. He had asked me about the Banking
and Currency Committee investigation. He had asked me who was
handling it for the lYhite House. I had reported that ]Mr. Richard Cook
was the man who had formerly worked with the Banking and Cur-
rency Committee as a member of the minority staff, was very familiar
with the members of the committee, and at the conclusion of my report
I recall him saving that he wanted Mr. Timmons to get on top of the
matter and be directly involved in it also.
Senator Moxtoya. And that was about the time that he was making
this statement to the press?
ISIr. Deax. Well, that preceded — that is correct. Of course, it was
September 15 that that arose in his office directly and we are talking
about a press conference in August, and during the following weeks, of
course, there was an ever-increasing effort of the T\Tiite House to deal
with the Patman committee hearings as I have so testified.
Senator Moxtoya. When did the President tell you this? Was it
before August 29 when he made the statement at the press conference
or after ?
Mr. Deax. It was after, September 15.
Senator Moxtoya. It was approximately 17 days later.
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Moxtoya. 17 or 13 days.
In the same, and as he went along, the President said as follows :
The other point that I should make is that these investigations, the investiga-
tion by the GAO, the investigation by the FBI, by the Department of Justice have
at my direction hqd the total cooperation of the — not only the "WTiite House but
also of all agencies of the government.
1510
I want you to pay special attention to this. This is quoting the
President still.
In addition to that, within our staff under my direction Counsel to the Presi-
dent, Mr. Dean, lias conducted a complete investigation of all leads which might
involve any present members of the White House staff or anybody in the Govern-
ment. I can say categorically that his investigation indicates that no one in
the White House staff, no one in this Administration presently employed was
involved in this bizarre incident.
Now, I ask you this question : With respect to any project that you
handled directly for the President where a report was required
wouldn't you assume that if this is true that you would have been
required to file a report ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And also if, assuming that this was true, wouldn't
that report be available at the White House ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Montoya, And so assuming the correctness of the Presi-
dent's statement then it necessarily follows that if you made a complete
investigation at his behest, and for him, that the President should
produce that Dean report ?
Mr. Dean. I already believe that the White House has indicated
there was no Dean investigation. I think that is one of the inoperative
statements, [Laughter.]
Senator Montoya. But it is still your testimony that you were not
requested by the President to make a report to him or to conduct this
investigation.
Mr. Dean. Not at that time, Senator ; that is correct.
Senator Montoya. All right.
I want to go into this a little further the matter of the San Clemente
conferences.
Now, did you discuss specifically with Mr. Haldeman, with Ehrlich-
man and others who might have been attending their matters directly
dealing with the so-called coverup ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, we did.
Senator Montoya. Now, will you as succinctly as possible, as briefly
as possible, relate for the record now just exactly what those discus-
sions were with respect to the coverup ?
Mr. Dean. Well, we had a lengthy discussion ranging over 2 days,
and I have estimated between 12, 14—10, 12, 14 hours — I do not know
how many hours totally were spent in a discussion, that basically were
focusing on how to deal with this committee. At the end of that dis-
cussion, on the last day of the discussion, on Sunday afternoon, what
I described as the bottom line question came up, because evervthing
depended upon the continued silence of the seven individuals who had
either been convicted or had pleaded guilty. Would they remain silent
during the duration of these hearings? I was asked that question,
I said, I cannot answer that question, because I do not know. All I
know is that they are still making money demands.
Preceding that, there had been a ffood bit of discussion between IMr.
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and back and forth to Mr. Mitchell as
to wlio was going to raise the necessary money. I reported to them that
there was nothing I could do, this was out of my hands, that Mr,
1511
Mitchell had felt it was not his responsibility to raise this money and
he was not interested in doing- it. Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman
said that they thought it was his.
Finally, they asked Mr. Richard Moore, who was also attending the
meeting, to go to ]Mr. Mitchell and lay it on the line that it was Mr.
Mitcholl's responsibility.
Now, I assume they did that because Mr. Moore had spent time at
the Department of Justice working very closely with Mr. Mitchell
and knew Mr. iSIitchell. He was an older man and they felt probably
sending Mr. Moore as a direct emissary from them, rather than my-
self when I had failed to accomplish what they thought was necessary,
might solve the problem.
i later learned that Mr. Moore indeed did go to New York and did
raise this with Mr. Mitchell, but Mr, Mitchell virtually ignored the
matter when it was raised by Mr. Moore.
Senator Moxtoya. Were these particular conferences at San Cle-
mente designed to just discuss the matter of Watergate ?
Mr, Deax. They were designed to discuss how to deal with this
committee so that the coverup would not unravel up here before this
committee.
Senator Moxtoya. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Senator EE^^x. Senator Gurney ?
Senator Gtjrxey, Thank you, Mr, Chairman.
Just a few questions, ]Mr. Dean. I would like to go back to the Kalm-
bach meeting again, when you and he first discussed this coverup
money.
Mr. Dean. On the 29th, Senator?
Senator Gurxey. June 29.
Mr. Deax. Yes.
Senator Gurxey. You are absolutely certain about that date? It
could not have occurred in July, could it have ?
Mr. Deax. The first meeting I had with him was when I flew in —
he took the last flight, I believe, out of Los Angeles. We met the next
morning. The records — he very seldom stayed at the Mayflower Hotel
and he was staying at the Mayflower Hotel and I would assume that if
the committee investigators would check the records of the Mayflower
Hotel, they could confirm that date. That is the best of my recollection,
that it was the 29th.
Senator Gtjrxey. This was the June 29 date ?
Mr. Deax. Yes.
Senator Gurxey. Was there anyone else at the meeting ?
Mr. Deax. No, sir. there was not.
Senator Gurxey, And my recollection is that you had a short meet-
ing in the coffee shop, is that right ?
Mr. Deax. I was to meet him in the coffee shop and I recall we sat
down in the booth and it did not appear very private in the booth, so
we decided to go to his room to discuss the matter.
Senator Gurxey. And that was there in the Mayflower Hotel ?
Mr, Deax. That is correct.
Senator Gurxey, Well, the committee has subpenaed the records of
the hotel, I have a letter here from the Mayflower, and also one from
1512
the Statler Hilton. I would like a committee staffer to give these copies
to the witness.
Now, as you will see today, the letter is from the Mayflower Hotel,
dated June 27, 1973, addressed to Senator Gurney, Select Committee
on Presidential Activities, U.S. Senate OiSce Building, Washington,
D.C.
Dear Senator Gumey, in reply to your request of June 27, 1973, to the best
of our knowledge, the records do not reflect a Mr. Herbert B. Kalmbach as being
a registered guest during the period of June 1, 1972, through July 1, 1972. Very
truly yours, Ray Sylvester, Senior Assistant Manager.
Then the other letter from the Statler Hilton, again addressed to
me. This also has the subpena of the committee plus photostatic copies
of the hotel records. The hotel record photostatic copy is not very good
here, so I think we are going to have to go by the letter itself. At any
rate, here is what it says :
Attached, please find photostatic copies of a previous subpena served on the
Washington Statler Hilton, registration card and folio B 86403, for Mr. Herbert
W. Kalmbach who was registered in our hotel from June 29-30, 1972.
Original folio and registration card were received in compliance with the
previous subpena by Angelo J. Lano, S.A.F.B.I., telephone number 324-2685.
We are unable to locate any further records on Mr. Kalmbach.
Sincerely, William J. Utnik, General Manager.
Now, as I recall, you have testified three times very positively that
you met with Mr. Kalmbach in the coffee shop of the Mayflower
Hotel.
Mr. Dean. Absolutely. That is correct.
Senator Gurney. And then retired to his room in the Mayflower.
How do you account for these records here ?
Mr. Dean. The only thing I can suggest is that Mr. Kalmbach may
have been registered under another. Let me elaborate on that.
Mr. Kalmbach often discussed matters in a code name. For example,
after our discussion, he began referring to Mr. Hunt as "the writer."
He began referring to Mr. Haldeman as "the brush." He began re-
ferring to Mr. Mitchell as "the pipe." These would be the nature of our
discussions and this might explain the fact that he decided not to use
his own name in registering in the hotel.
I think the person that could answer that best is Mr. Kalmbach,
because I have a very clear recollection of walking into the coffee shop,
meeting in the coffee shop, going to his room. It was a small room. He
had not really had a chance to get a good night's sleep because he had
been flying all night. To maintain further privacy, I recall him also
turning on the television next to the adjoining door and we sat on the
other side of the room and had the conversation in which I relayed to
him everything I knew at that point in time. So I think ^Ir. Kalmbach
will have to answer that question as to why his name does not appear
on the register.
Senator Gtjeney. Well, it also occurred to me that that could be
the case, that he was using an assumed name, but then when we ran
into this other record at the Statler-Hilton Hotel, it just does not make
sense. If he was coming into the city under an assumed name so that
no one would know he was here and no later record could be found, why
in the world would he register under his own name at a nearby hotel,
1513
the Washington Hilton, and then engage another room over in the
Mayflower to meet Trith you? It just does not add up.
Mr. Deax. I see what you are saying. I have testified the Mayflower
and I am never sure which is the ISIayflower and which is the Statler-
Hihon, The hotel I recall is the one that is on 16th Street up from the
White House. I know I walked up from the office to his room.
Senator Gtjrney. How long have you lived in Washington?
Mr. Dean. I have been here about 10 years.
Senator Gurney. And you don't know the difference between the
Washington-Hilton and the Mayflower Hotel ?
]Mr. Deax. I continually get them confused, I must confess.
Senator Gueney. Well, I must say I am reminded of your colloquy
with the chairman yesterday, Mr. Dean, when you said what an excel-
lent memory you had right from schooldays right on down; that is
why you were able to reconstruct
Mr. Deax. That is right, my memory is good, but I confuse some
names often. I don't pretend to have a perfect memory. I think I have
a good memory, Senator.
Senator Gurxey. But you can't remember really now, after testi-
fying three times very positively, whether it was the Statler-Hilton
or the Mayflower ?
Mr. Deax. Well, Senator, the point in substance here is the fact that
the meeting did occur. We met in the coffee shop. We went from the
coffee shop to his room. AVe had an extended discussion of the matter,
and that is very clear in my recollection, the substance of the event.
Senator Gurxey. And one of the reasons I am curious about this,
really, it is less an attempt to try to confuse you than it is an attempt to
try to pin you down. You haven't tried to conceal the meeting, and
Mr. Kalmbach, of course, knows all about it, too.
]Mr. Deax". That is correct.
Senator Gttrxey. And he is going to testify before this committee,
there is no question about that. But I can't understand the confusion in
where it took place, because it is an extremely important meeting,
obviously. This is where the coverup, as far as the financial part of it,
first started.
Are you sure the meeting didn't occur somewhere else ?
Mr. Deax'. I can recall very clearly meeting Mr. Kalmbach in the
coffee shop. The coffee shop was crowded, it was busy. We could not
find a booth that was quiet. We went from the coffee shop to his room
and as I say, I recall very clearly him turning the television on. be-
cause there was a door, an adjoining door next to the room. Then we
proceeded to have our conversation. It was a rather lengthy con-
versation.
Senator Gtrxey. Well, could that particular meeting you speak of
at the ISIayflower have occurred some other time ? Could it have been
a later meeting or an earlier meeting ?
Mr. Deax'. No, sir. To the best of my recollection, this was the first
time we ever talked about this matter and these were the circumstances
under which we talked about it, when he flew in from California. He
had taken a late flight, he was tired, and we met in the coffee shop,
went to his room, as I have repeated, then had the discussion.
1514
Senator Gurnet. Let me just try to refresh your recollection. Could
this meeting have taken place out in front of the Hay-Adams Hotel ?
Mr. Dean. In front of the Hay-Adams Hotel ?
Senator Gurnet. That is right, that you walked over from your
office and he walked over from his hotel and met out in front of the
Hay- Adams and discussed it there ?
Mr. Dean. I have testified to a subsequent occasion when we met,
after he had the money in his possession, as he told me, and I believe
he told me he was going to meet with Mr. Ulasewicz at that time. That
was in Lafayette Park. I can recall very clearly being in Lafayette
Park, because we stood and we each put our foot up on the bench and
we were looking back over at the White House and talking. He had
his attache case with him. I had walked out of my office and this was
some time after this initial meeting.
Senator Gurnet. That couldn't have been the initial meeting, at
least according to your recollection ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Well, I guess we will just have to wait for Mr.
Kalmbach and find out what he remembers.
Let's go back a little bit to the credit cards again. You know, we
had a discussion on that and the use of the $4,850, 1 asked you why you
couldn't use credit cards.
Mr. Dean. And I responded I preferred not to use credit cards.
Senator Gurnet. Well, now, the committee staff has brought to my
attention here a list of some of the checks drawn on your account. I
wonder if the staff would furnish the witness with a copy of these
checks.
Mr. Dean. I can barely read the copy I have here, particularly the
first one. Senator.
Senator Gurnet. Well, I can't read the first one, either, but I really
don't think that is important. The second one down, which is legible
on my sheet here — is it on yours ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it is.
Senator Gurnet. That is a check as I see dated September 21, 1972.
This was very close, of course, to the October taking of the $4,850.
Here is a check made out to the American Express Co. for $908.47.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet. Signed John W. Dean. Is this a check drawn on
your account ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it is.
Senator Gurnet. Is this in payment of credit card bills ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it is.
Senator Gurnet. Then we go down a little further on November 3.
There is another check drawn to Bankamericard for $250.51. Is this
also your check ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet. Is this also for credit card bills ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it is.
Senator Gurnet. Then going further down, there is another fur-
ther check dated November 22, 1972, Bankamericard, $106.50.
Is this your check ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it is.
1515
Senator Gurnet. Did that go for credit card payments ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it did.
Senator Gurnet. Then dropping further down, another in March
to the American Express Co. for $531.45.
Is this your check ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Guknet. And another in April, American Express Co.,
$4:59.17.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet. Xow, I don't know whether there are others or not,
because we don't have all of the financial records.
Mr. Dean. I am sure there are, Senator.
Senator Gurnet. Do 3'ou have any recollection what those were for?
Mr. Dean. Off the top, I do not. As I have told the committee, I am
perfectly willing to turn over all of my financial records to the com-
mittee where these can be fully analyzed. I believe in my own records
will be found the stubs that indicate that each expenditure is for a
given credit card payment. I know that because of the result of some
foreign travel, when I did use my credit cards, when traveling abroad,
some of the foreign travel particularly takes as much as 6 months to
a year, which surprised me, to catch up to make a payment.
Senator Gurnet. I see.
Do you have an air travel credit card ?
Mr. Dean. Xo, I do not.
Senator Gurnet. You would pay for your air travel either off
American Express or Bankamericard ?
]Mr. Dean. That is correct, or by cash.
Senator Gurnet. Let me ask the chief counsel of the committee,
have we subpenaed the financial records ?
Mr. Dash. We have subpenaed all the records of Mr. Dean and we
also have one of our chief investigators, Mr. Carmine Bellino, who will
be going over those records with Mr. Dean.
]Mr. Dean. I might go back over one point. The name of the coffee
shop at the Statler Hilton is the Mayflower. [Applause.]
Senator Erm:n. The audience will please refrain from applause or
demonstrating their reaction to any testimony.
Senator Gurnet. Is that what your attorney just told you ?
^Ir. Dean. Yes, he did.
Senator Gurnet. His memory apparently
Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Chairman, that was Mr. McCandless. I would
like to ofive him credit for that. TLaughter.]
Senator Gurnet. Let me ask you. ]\Ir. Dean, what does that mean
now, what is your testimonv so that we can get it on the record here?
Mr. Dean. '\^'Tiat I would like to say is I have a very clear recol-
lection of meeting with Mr. Kalmbach in the coffee shop before our
meeting in his room. I think Mr. Kalmbach can resolve, if it is im-
portant to the Senator, the particular location of that meeting. To
me there was the substance of the meeting that was the important
tliin<T and I think I have relaved to the committee the full substance
of the meeting and what occurred as a result of the meeting.
Senator Gurnet. Xow, what is your testimony as to what hotel ?
Mr. Dean. To the best of my recollection, it was the Mayflower but
I am perfectly — if I am incorrect I will stand corrected.
1516
Senator Gubney. Now, to get back to the payments for the credit
cards here, of course, all I wanted to point out is that you did fre-
quently use your credit cards. Is that not correct ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did use them but as I say, I prefer not to live on
credit. Wlien I made the reference to that I have other credit cards as
when my records will reveal when they are turned over to the com-
mittee, when my full checking account is revealed it will note that most
of my expenditures are paid for by check. There is nothing more shat-
tering to me than to see a check come through like this September 27
check for 900-and-some dollars because I can never remember that
I am expecting such an amount and I live basically on my salary and
do not like to reach into brokerage accounts and capital to make
expenditures. So as I say, I think this is fully revealed to the com-
mittee when my financial materials are gone through in great detail
and the committee, df that is their desire, are welcome to have those
records.
Senator Gtjrney. But it is not your testimony that you use credit
cards only for expenses in connection with your job. You do use credit
cards also for personal expenses, is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. Well, for example. Senator, when I was at the Repub-
lican Convention, and often traveling on behalf of the Government, I
knew I would be reimbursed for some of those expenses. Rather than
to go to some elaborate procedure when you are checking out of a
hotel, I stayed at the Doral Hotel, I had a bill there for several days,
the easiest way to check out is to use a credit card, particularly when
you know you are going to be reimbursed because it is a Government-
related expenditure or a job-related expenditure and the like, and I
think that that will be reflected when Mr. Bellino goes through my
financial records that that was often the case with some of these
expenditures.
Senator Gurney. Well, I have no doubt it is. I am sure that will be
true but my question was do you not use credit cards for personal
expenses, too ?
Mr. Dean. Yes ; I do.
Senator Gtjrney. That is all I was asking.
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Senator Gtjrney. Another point that I am interested in here is this
meeting of March 21 with the President which, of course, was an ex-
tremely important meeting. I was going over that yesterday, and there
was one part of that that I must say totally confused me. I just did
not understand it.
Summarizing briefly, you mentioned, of course, that you talked to the
President about perjury being committed, you talked about the cover-
up, if it was going to continue it would require more iierjury and more
money because of the demands that were being made upon, by these
convicted people, and you said it was time for the surgery on the cancer
itself and all those involved to stand up and account for themselves.
In other words, a rather complete briefing to the President on the whole
Watergate affair. I just touched some of the highlights there.
But then, you also made this statement :
After I finished T realized that I had not really made the President understand
because he asked me a few questions, after he asked me a few questions he sug-
1517
gested it would be an excellent idea if I gave some sort of briefing to the Cabinet
and that he was very impressed with my knowledge of the circumstances but he
did not seem particularly concerned about their implications.
Well, I must say I overlooked that, I think, totally when the testi-
mony was first given, and I must say it does not seem to make any
sense to me at all.
If the President was now fully knowledgeable about this whole
coverup business, and a part of it, as I think you have indicated before
the committee here, why in the world would he want the Cabinet
briefed ?
Mr. Deax. Well, as I — when the matter came up, the conversation
had tapered down and we were into a light question and answer session
about some of the areas that I had gone into, and I must say that I had
a similar reaction, and I said to the President-
Mr. President, I do not think this is the sort of thing that I could give a briefing
on even a tailored-down briefing on.
But he felt it might be important that I explained some of the param-
eters of the problem and the like. It was not a lengthy matter. I felt
at some time during my presentation that he was very sort of im-
pressed with the way I was giving the presentation. I tried to, I was
trying to, really give one of the most dramatic speeches I had ever
given in my life.
Senator Gurxey. Well, it still is totally
Mr. Deax. I might add I never did give a briefing to the Cabinet
and that was dropped immediately in the conversation. I added that
because it stuck in my mind that as one of the points that I really
did not feel that I had made the full implications of this thing
clear but that is the sort of thing that as you noted in the testimony, it
was noted very clearly in my mind when the suggestion came up.
Senator Grr.xEY. Well, that occurs to me too. that maybe the Presi-
dent did not imderstand for some reason. I cannot imagine a President
of the United States, knowing that his two chief aides, Mr. Haldeman,
Mr. Ehrlichman. yourself, and Mr. Colson, LaRue, Mardian,
Magruder, Mitchell, all these people being involved in this criminal
activity or possibly involved in this criminal activity, I do not want to
accuse them of crimes over this national television here, but these sup-
posedly were all involved in this and then there was coverup money
with his personal attorney Mr. Kalmbach and all of these things went
on. and if he knew that, as I understand your thesis is how in the world
would he have suggested anybody who had total knowledge of this
like you. suggested them to go to the Cabinet and tell them about it ?
Mr. Deax. May I respond in several parts you have stated that I
have a thesis. I have no thesis, I have no wish other than to report by
this committee the facts as I know them.
Second, this was a part, of a dialog that followed. I do not think
the President had any intention of sending me in to report in full as
I had just reported to him. I made it, the comment, in my testimony
because it stuck in my mind as evidence of the fact that the President
did not really still realize the implications of what I was talking about
and it recalled to me the similar and earlier occasions when I tried to
raise with him my own involvement in this matter and explain the
obstruction of justice involvement and he did not seem to want to hear
1518
it or get into it or anything of that nature. So that is why it is in the
testimony because it is the sort of thing. Senator, as you, when you
re-read the testimony, it pops right off that page and it stuck right in
my mind the same way.
Senator Gurney. Well, it did, and I must say it rather startled me,
I really did not understand why I did not hear it the first time, and
that same thing occurred to me that maybe even on ^Slarch 21 he was
not totally aware of all of these things that you testified to here these
last 5 days otherwise I cannot understand why he would have sug-
gested that you go to the Cabinet with it.
Well, let us get on here. Late in March or early April you did decide
that you had had enough of this business and that you wanted out of it.
Mr. Dean. Senator, you said early April.
Senator Gtjrney. Late in March or early April.
Mr. Dean. Excuse me, I did not hear that.
Senator Gtjrney. You decided that you had had enough of this
coverup, and you wanted to get out of it, and go on your own course,
and as I would put it maybe come clean, is that a fair way of saying it ?
Mr. Dean. Senator, what I wanted to do I was trying to work inter-
nally within the Wliite House. I was very anxious to get the President
out in front on this issue. I had conversations from Camp David with
Mr. Moore, exploring further ideas. We had explored this on countless
occasions, on how to end it, how to get the President out in front of it,
have the President taking the action to end it, decisive action to end it.
By the time I went to Camp David I realized that I had not accom-
plished what I was trying to do internally and began to think about
that I might have to be the one to stand up and take my own steps.
Senator Gueney. And taking your own steps, of course, would be
revealing and telling the whole story, is that not what you mean ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gueney. Well, now, you went before the grand jury last
week, did you not ?
Mr. Dean. That ds correct.
Senator Gtjrney. Did you tell them the whole story ?
Mr. Dean. I decided to exercise my constitutional rights at that
point in time.
Senator Gutiney. What do you mean by that ?
Mr. Dean. I invoked the fifth amendment.
Senator Gtjrney. You did not tell them anything, did you ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I did not.
Mr. Shaffer. I hate to interrupt. Senator
Senator Gtjrney. I might point out to the chairman, because I do
think that we ought to have the rules understood, that the witness'
counsel may defend his constitutional rights but the attorney cannot
testify here or make statements on his own behalf or even on behalf
of his client, as I understand the rules the committee is operating
under, is that correct ?
Senator Erwn. I don't know what the counsel wants to say.
Mr. Shaffer. I would sav it in a wav that is a proffer. I would like
to defend my client's constitutional rights and by so doing I would
like to call to the attention of the chair the fact that in 1959 our
Supreme Court decided the case of United States v. Gi'nienwald and
1519
in that case the Supreme Court said that it is not proper cross-
examination and it is not inconsistent for a witness on one occasion
to take his fifth amendment right and on another occasion testify, and
as a result of that decision, the case had to be retried in the Southern
District of Xew York and the man who made the mistake went to the
Federal bench and the man who retried the case lost it and went into
private practice.
Senator Er\t[n. I might state to the counsel that just about all of the
testimony that has been presented here before this committee, whether
by this witness or any other witness, a good bit of it would never be
admissible in a court of law. I think counsel ought to understand
that too.
Mr. Shaffer. I might add, Senator, it would be admissible before
the grand jury.
Senator Ervix. The rule of law, as I understand it, where you have
evidence tending to show two or more people conspired either to do an
unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an unlawful method, by unlawful
means, then any action or statement made by one of the parties to the
conspiracy in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy is admis-
sible in evidence. In my judgment as a lawyer, while we have some
hearsay and we have had some questions asked that were not admis-
sible in a court of law, I think the great bulk of the testimony that has
been produced here would be admissible in a court of law.
Mr. Shaffer. I might also add, Mr. Chairman
Senator Ervix. I will give any member of the committee or anybody
else the right to disagree with my legal opinion but that is my legal
opinion.
Senator Gurxey. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address myself
precisely to the point we are talking about. Under the rules of proce-
dure for the Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, rule 20
says —
The sole and exclusive prerogative of the counsel shall be to advise such witness
when he is testifying of his legal rights and his constitutional rights.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I think-
Senator Gurxey. No question has been posed that I know of to the
witness at this moment that interferes with his constitutional rights.
I simply asked him if he had gone before the grand jury, he said he had
and he said he had taken the fifth amendment.
Mr. Deax. Also while I was there, I tried to convey to the grand jury
that I wished I could tell them the storv because everything that I have
told this committee would be admissible before the grand jury and the
grand jurv was verv anxious to hear it.
I would also recall to the Senator that I had had extensive discus-
sions with the prosecutors about the timing of mv appearance before
the grand jurv. The prosecutors themselves were in the middle of the
situation of whether there was going to be a special prosecutor or no
special prosecutor, and no regulation of that was mentioned and I think
you will find in an affidavit attached to a motion filed in the court re-
garding mv appearance before the grand jurv some of the facts that
relate to that, and the fact that I was being brought before the grand
jury, the reasons I was being brought before the grand jury and reflect-
96-296 O - 73 - pt.4 - 12
1520
ing the decision based on the advice of counsel as to why I did at that
point in time invoke the fifth amendment because of some unusual cases
in this jurisdiction, the leading case being the Ellis case which I had
referred to the Senator to read as to what happened when one waives
ones rights in this jurisdiction being a unique jurisdiction and being a
lawyer as you are, I am sure you would understand looking at that
entire picture the reason that I feel it was necessary to do that.
Senator Gurney. I don't know of course what the Ellis case provides.
Senator Ervin". I want to say since the rules of the committee have
been invoked, I would like to call the attention of the committee to rule
16 which says :
"Any objection raised by a witness or his counsel to procedures or to the
admissibility of testimony and evidence, shall be ruled upon by the chairman
or presiding member and such ruling shall be the ruling of the committee unless
a disagreement thereon is expressed by a majority of the committee present. In
the case of a tie, the ruling of the Chair will prevail.
I interpret that as the right to give counsel and the right to object to
the admissibility of testimony.
Senator Gtjrney. I do so too. So why doesn't the counsel state his
objection.
Mr. Shaffer. I did, Mr. Chairman, and my suggestion is, simply
stated, it is improper to raise the question that on a previous occasion
he raised the fifth amendment.
Senator Ervin. I would state it a little differently. The Supreme
Court has held that if a witness can be impeached by testimony that
on the previous occasion he pleaded the fifth amendment, then the
value of the fifth amendment to the witness would be virtually
destroyed.
Mr. Shaffer. I adopt that statement.
Senator Gtjrney. I am not exactly sure whether I asked him that
question or not. I asked him if he had been before the grand jury and
told his story and I think his reply was no that he took the fifth
amendment is my recollection of the answer.
Mr. Dean. It was, the only answer I could give to your question,
Mr. Chairman, is why my counsel came to his feet.
Senator Gurney. Well, suppose we go on to what is happening here
now. That is, I think, very interesting. Here, of course, we have had
testimony for 5 days, this is the fifth day. It started with a statement
of 245 pages, and indeed you have endeavored to tell the committee
everything, of course, that you knew about the case and the com-
mittee certainly is very grateful for that. But you are testifying here
under immunity, are you not ?
Mr. Dean. I have been compelled to appear here to testify. The com-
mittee had made a decision I understand by a unanimous vote to grant
me immunity. I don't come before this committee without substantial
consequences on my future legal rights even though I am under
immunity.
Senator Gurney. But none of what has transpired here as far as
your testimony is concerned can be used against you in a further
criminal proceeding. Isn't that correct ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. If it is impossible — or if it is possible
to take the lead problem out of an individual's testimony.
1521
Senator Gurnet. Now, just in summary, Mr. Dean, I wonder if we
can go over the salient points of the 5 days. Again as I understand
it, to your own knowledge you have no knowledge that President
Nixon was ever involved in the planning or the break-in at Watergate ;
is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. I have no direct knowledge of that, that is correct.
Senator Gurney. Then, in the year lD72 the only meeting you ever
had with the President on Watergate was on September 15, is that
correct ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, and I believe we have been over that in detail.
Senator Gurnet. We have been over that in detail, and I don't
think it would serve any purpose to go over it again.
In 1973 the two occasions that you did discuss Watergate with him
prior to ISIarch 21, was that meeting on February 27, is that correct?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I, in answering Senator Baker's questions yes-
terday I don't know if you were present. Senator, we were going
through all of the circumstantial situations leading up to the meetings
that occurred in February and March, and the fact that there was a
developing strategy that had occurred in California at the La Costa
meetings and on the tail end of those and consistent with those I had
a number of meetings with the President where subjects related to that
particular California policy-setting meeting were being continually
discussed.
Senator Gurnet. I understand that, but I mean the direct involve-
ment of the possible criminal activities of Watergate, February 27
was the first meeting, was it not, when, as you testified, the question
of obstruction of justice came up, isn't that correct ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet. And you stated that you might be implicated in
some way in that, and the President said no, he didn't think so. Isn't
that the substance of that ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet. Then, on March 18 you also
Mr. Dean. That was, I believe, on tlie 28th that came up. Senator.
Senator Gurnet. Twenty-eighth, all right.
Then one other meeting on March 13 you had another conversation
with him that involved this Executive clemency business, isn't that
correct ?
Mr. Dean. On INIarch 13 we discussed both clemency and the fact
that this was no money. The way the clemency discussion came up as
you will recall is that at the end of another conversation I raised with
him the fact that there were demands being made for money, for con-
tinued money, there was no money around to pay it. He asked me how,
you know, how much it was going to cost. I gave him my best estimate,
which I said was $1 million or more. He, in turn, said to me, "Well,
$1 million is certainly no problem to raise," and turned to Mr. Halde-
man and made a similar comment and then he came back after, just
a briof discussion on that, and I remember very clearly the way he
pushed his chair away from his desk as he was looking back at Mr.
Haldeman to get, you know, the same message through to Mr. Halde-
man, you know, that $1 million is no problem.
1522
Then he came back up, he rolled his chair back up toward the desk
and said to me who is making the principal demands for this money at
that point in time.
I said they were coming principally from Mr. Hunt through his
attorney, and he turned to the discussion of the fact that he had talked
with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Colson about clemency for Mr. Hunt
and he expressed annoyance at the fact that Mr. Colson had come to
him contrary to an instruction that the President was aware of that
Colson wasn't to raise this with him.
Senator Gurney. So there were discussions
Mr. Dean. Then we went on to discuss the delivery, you know, how
this money was delivered and I told him that it was laundered and told
him I was learning about things that I had never known about before,
and I recall very vividly how^ Mr. Haldeman thought this was very
funny and started laughing.
Senator Gurney. So there were really two main discussions on
Watergate, the money, the coverup money that you have just discussed
and also the Executive clemency, and Mr. Haldeman w^as present dur-
ing these discussions ?
Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, not to take anything away from your
interpretation but a lot of the discussion that occurred regarding the
press conferences, the positions we were going to take on executive
privilege, and the like, had direct implications on unraveling the
Watergate.
Senator Gurney. Well, I understand that. Indeed, I do, but I am
talking about the criminal activities. Certainly press conferences,
Executive clemency do not involve any criminal activity. I am just
trying to pinpoint the criminal parts of it, and then, of course, there
was the meeting on March 21.
Mr. Dean. I might add that in, as I told you in one point in time
when I went to discuss this with counsel, who is an experienced prose-
cutor, he said that oftentimes intervening events show intention and
purpose. That is why I have tried to report everything I know to the
committee as fully as I know.
Senator Gurney. I understand that, and I as a committee member
am extremely glad you did, because I do think it sheds a lot of light
and it will help the deliberations of the committee when other wit-
nesses come before it. I am not in any way deprecating the importance
of all of the events that surrounded these transactions in Watergate,
but I am trying to pinpoint the criminal parts of it.
And that really is the sum and substance of your direct knowledge,
direct conversations with the President on the criminal activity ?
Mr. Dean. On the INIarch 13 meeting.
Senator Gurney. Well, I also said the March 21.
Mr. Dean. That is correct. We have gone over the March 21 meeting.
Senator Gurney. Yes ; we don't need to go over it again. I am just
pinpointing that time and that date.
Mr. Dean. Then we jumped where the next in a series of meetings
was in the April 15 period.
Senator Gurney. Well, I realize that, but I am really not interested
in that, I am not trying to cut you off here, but of course, the President
himself later said that March 21 was the time when he first really
1523
realized the full implications. So I was just bringing us down to that
date.
Mr. Dean. I would recall how that came up, that the President se-
lected that date, was as the result of a discussion that had occurred
on March 15 — April 15, when he was searching his mind. I was being
lead through a series of rather leading questions by the President and
at one point in the convereation, he said to me, do you recall what day
it was that you gave me the report on some of the implications of the
Watergate case? Then before I even got an answer out that I didn't
remember the exact date in March, he said, I believe it was the 21st.
I said, I will have to check.
It was the next day that, when I was in his office again that after-
noon, talking about a press statement that he was going to put out,
he said, I have gotten the confirmation now and I believe it was the
21st. And he referred to it at that time as my cancer on the Presidency
statement. That is the way I led that off and that is the way I had
referred to it and that is the way he referred to it.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Dean.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye, if you will yield for just a moment,
Mr. Dash said he wanted to make a statement concerning his under-
standing of the rule of evidence.
Mr. Dash. I think the question has come up from time to time and
has been mentioned either by witnesses or by members of the commit-
tee as to admissibility of certain hearsay evidence. A memorandum of
law has been submitted to all members of the committee. The leading
case of the Supreme Court is Krulewitch v. United States and that
case has been the position of the committee and the counsel working
on the committee that even hearsay testimony, and most of the hear-
say testimony admitted falls within this rule, is an exception to the
hearsay rule.
The Supreme Court has ruled time and time again that where there
is a conspiracy and there are overt acts — and I think at this stage of
our hearings, there has been sufficient testimony which would go to a
jury in a criminal case indicating that a conspiracy has occurred and
that there have been overt acts — that therefore, the statements of a co-
conspirator in the furtherance and in the course of the conspiracy,
although hearsay, is an exception to the hearsay rule and is admitted
in every court in this country.
Therefore, even Mr. IMcCord's testimony, which was initially hear-
say, following up on the evidence of other witnesses which established
the conspiracy and overt acts, that the Supreme Court has ruled in
Krulewitch and other cases that that testimony is admissible and goes
to a jury and is used against the defendants that may be charged as
conspirators as any other testimony and is an exception to the hearsay
rule.
Therefore. T think it should be made very clear and a memo has been
ffiven to everv member of the committee that the hearsay evidence that
has been admittpd before this committo would be admissible in any
court of law in this couhtrv under the KriOewitch decision, excepting
conspiracy and co-conspirator's statements from the hearsay rule.
1524
Senator Gurnet. What the chief counsel is saying, then, is that
some people may be indicted on conspiracy, is that it, in addition to
obstruction of justice and other things ?
Mr. Dash. Oh, quite certainly. Senator. The evidence before this
committee, and I understand the evidence being considered by the
prosecutors, includes the doctrine of conspiracy with two or more
persons engaged in the commission of a crime that is a conspiracy. I
understand that even Mr. LaRue, who just recently pleaded guilty,
and this was made public knowledge, pleaded guilty to a conspiracy
count rather than any other count, and that conspiracy is a major
crime in this inquiry and in the inquiry made by a special prosecutor.
Senator Gurnet. Did you say Mr. LaRue pleaded guilty to con-
spiracy ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Senator Gurnet. I thought it was obstruction of justice?
Mr. Dash. No; conspiracy to obstruct justice, Senator.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I say a word on this subject ?
Senator Ervin. Sure.
Senator Baker. I do not mean to be facetious and I do not mean this
to be critical of Mr. Dash, who is a fine lawyer, and Senator Gumey,
who is a fine lawyer and a fine Senator, but this committee is too far
gone to start worrying about hearsay and we are too deep into the
business of finding the facts to try to second-guess what a court will
admit or will not admit. I have spent a lifetime being surprised on
what a court would admit or would not admit, depending on my point
of view. I think it was Oliver Wendell Holmes who said lawyers spend
their professional careers shoveling smoke and I have no desire to
shovel smoke.
So I really recommend, Mr. Chairman, and once again, this is not a
criticism of the committee or counsel, I recommend that we not think
of ourselves as a court or a jury or a judge, and that we try to follow
the facts wherever they lead us with the full foreknowledge that what
we do will have little, if any, effect on how the rules of evidence are
applied if there is in fact litigation, either civil or criminal, based on
these same facts.
So I think that rules of this committee are important and the rule
against hearsay and its exceptions--and the hearsay rule is virtually
emasculated by the hundreds of exceptions to it — but I think the rules
themselves are far less important than us getting along with the busi-
ness at hand. So I very much hope that we do not fall into the business
of extensive objections, the argument of objections, and the arguments
about rules of law that may apply. If we get too far out of bounds, I
think we ought to qualify the quality of the evidence so that we can
take that into account. But I do not think, and I hope we do not start
admitting and excluding evidence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Senator ER\^N, I would just like to make the observation that Felix
Frankfurter wrote a very interesting article at the time about the Tea-
pot Dome and he laid great stress on the wisdom of the fact that con-
gressional committees should not be bound by technical rules of evi-
dence, I do think, however, that it was well for Mr, Dash to make his
statement, because I have read several articles by commentators who
1525
are not lawyers and who were criticizing the committee on the ground
that it had received hearsay testimony. I am not concerned much about
criticism, because I have been criticized very much over the j-ears and
I am sort of immune to it, but I think it is well for the general i^ublic
to know that under the rules governing the admissibility of declara-
tions of co-conspirators, the great bulk of the hearsay testimony that
has been received in this case would have been admissible in a court of
law for an indictment charging a conspiracy to obstruct justice.
I think the observations of my friend from Tennessee are correct,
that we are not judges and we are not juries. We are members of a
legislati^•e body seeking to determine whether or not the facts before
us indicate that new leo;islation may be necessary.
Senator Baker. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that by explaining my
point of view, I have fallen into the trap that the chairman just warned
me against. He and I had a brief conversation a moment ago, and I am
sure he will not think it a breach of confidence to repeat it. He said,
Howard, he said, do not try to explain ; your friends do not require it
and your enemies will not believe it.
Senator Er\t[x. I agree with you. I was not trying to explain, I was
just trying to enlighten some of our commentators.
I would like to put in the record a legal memorandum which sustains
the points made by Mr. Dash.
[The memorandum by Mr. Dash was marked exhibit No. 68.*]
Mr. Thompson. IMr. Chairman, on that point, I do not want to be-
labor the matter. If I am in error, I want to be corrected for my mis-
information, but I think what Mr. Dash has said is completely correct.
I think there might be one additional consideration. It goes to the point
of admissibility under any circumstance about what this witness
thought another man was thinking at any particular time, his mind
as to what some other individual was thinking or his impressions of
thoughts, and I think that is a completely different matter. With that
statement, I would like to subscribe to everything j^ou and the co-
chairman and Mr. Dash have said.
Senator Ervix. I agree with you on that.
Mr. Deax. I just want to
Senator Ervix. I am from near Watauga County in North Carolina,
the county where Rufus Edmisten comes from. This man had been
in court over in Boone, the county seat. He came back that night and
was in the country store and he mentioned the fact that he had been
over to the court in Boone, and somebody asked him what was going
on there.
Well, he said, there was the judge sitting up there; there was the
jury sitting over in the jury box, and there were the lawyers. He said,
some of the lawyers were objecting and others were excepting and the
costs were piling up.
Senator Baker. You know. Mr. Chairman, if this is storytelling
time, my distinguished chairman is going to have to suffer for ha^dng
set the example for me. But in the course of all of our testimony, to the
extent that we have conflicts in it, I am reminded of an old lawyer in
Scott County. Tenn., named Ha^nivood Pemberton, who was employed
to defend a man.
•See p. 1783.
1526
He said, I have just shot a man, Haywood, will you defend me?
He said, of course I will defend you. Did you kill him ?
He said, no, I have just wounded him.
He said, that is all right, but just remember, he will be an awful hard
witness against you.
Senator Ervin. I believe the witness wants to make some observa-
tions. Then we will go to Senator Inouye.
Mr. Dean. I just wanted to say, Mr. Chairman, that as you know,
I am here under compulsion of the committee and I have tried to with-
hold nothing from the committee at any time and I did not want these
conversations to reflect that there has been any hesitancy on this wit-
ness to answer any question put to him and to answer it fully and
honestly.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye ?
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I regret I have no Hawaiian stories
to tell. [Applause.]
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, in order to avoid confusion, I wish
to advise the Chair that the questions I am about to ask Mr, Dean were
not prepared by the Office of the Counsel of the President.
Mr. Dean, I will refer to testimony received yesterday. To the fol-
lowing statement, you made your response. This is the statement :
Mr. Dean, you have depicted all others in the White House as excessively pre-
occupied with political intelligence, use of overt methods of security, and your-
self as a restraining influence on these pre-occupaticns.
And, Mr. Dean, this was your response :
I do believe I was a restraining influence at the White House to many wild
and crazy schemes. I have testified to some of them. Some of them I have not
testified to. Many of the memorandums that came into my office became a joke ;
in fact, some of the things that were being suggested. I think if you talked to
some of the other members of my staff or if your investigators would like to talk
to them, they would tell you some of two things that we would automatically
file, just like the political enemies project. Many of these just went right into
the file and never anything further until extreme pressure was put on me to do
something did I ever do anything. So I do feel I had some restraining influence.
I did not have a disposition or like for this type of activity.
Mr. Dean, I would like now to refer to a memo dated August 16,
1971, and you have testified that this was prepared for Mr. Haldeman,
Mr. Ehrlichman, and others at the White House. It is dated August 16,
1971. It is classified "Confidential." Subject : "Dealing With Our Po-
litical Enemies." I would like to read part of this :
This memorandum addresses the matter of how we can maximize the fact of
our incumbency in dealing with persons known to be active in their opposition
to our Administration. Stated a bit more bluntly — how we can use the available
federal machinery to screw our political enemies.
After reviewing this matter with a number of persons possessed of expertise
in the field, I have concluded that we do not need an elaborate mechanism or
game plan, rather we need a good project coordinator and full support for the
project. In brief, the system would work as follows :
Key members of the staff (e.g., Colson, Dent. Flanigan, Buchanan) should be
requested to inform us as to who they feel we should be giving a hard time.
The project coordinator should then determine what sorts of dealings these
individuals have with the federal government and how we can best screw them
(e.g., grants availability, fedei'al contracts, litigation, prosecution, etc.).
The project coordinator then should have access to and the full support of the
top oflBcials of the agency or department in proceeding to deal with the individual.
1527
This is a very important memorandum. Is this your idea of restrain-
ing influence?
Mr. Deax. As I said. Senator, in the memorandum, first of all, as I
answered that question yesterday, it took a good bit of push before I
would prepare even a document like that. I had request after request
after request to prepare this. I didn't know a thing about how to
handle something like this, so I went and talked to other people about
it. I think that is indicated in the memorandum itself.
I also made it very clear in the memorandum that this is something
that I personally was not going to get involved in. Whoever that project
coordinator was going to be, it was not going to be John Dean, be-
cause I just didn't want to get involved in doing the sort of things they
wanted.
As I say, when the thing didn't float, they kept sending their po-
litical enemies suggestions back to me. I never did a thing to get a
project coordinator. There was some rather loose talk about indi-
viduals who might handle this ; I can't even recall their names now.
I made no effort to find somebody to head this up and while there was
a conception on behalf of some who kept sending these things in for
my political enemies project, there was no political enemies project
operating out of my office.
So I thought that while the memo had gone out and, you know,
satisfied my superiors that something was being done, in fact, it was
not being done. So I felt there was a restraint.
Senator Ixouye. It is your testimony, then, that this memo described
an activity which, in the minds of your supporters, was considered
important.
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Ixouye. It was not a wild or crazy scheme ?
Mr. Deax. To me it was a wild and crazy scheme, because I felt I
just didn't operate that way.
Senator Ixouye. Was it considered wild or crazy scheme for Mr.
Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Deax. No, sir.
Senator Ixouye, In your testimony, you have submitted several
exhibits with lists of names — politicos, Members of Congress, mem-
bers of the media, and members of the entertainment field, et cetera,
et cetera, taking this memo together with that list
Mr, Deax, I might add also. Senator, before we go forward, I didn't
believe that list is complete in and of itself. It ju.=t happens to be a part
that I received and had access to before my files were shut down. There
mav well be additional names and additional information available on
that.
Senator Ixouye, Mr, Dean, I believe one list would have been
enough,
Mr, Deax. Indeed it would.
Senator Ixouye. And on one of your exhibits, you had a copy of a
memo which suggested that certain things can be done, such as calling
the Internal Revenue Service.
Xow, in addition to that, you testified that in one of your meetings
with President Nixon, you quoted the President as saying, "We will
take care of them after the election," Avhen the President referred to
enemy newsmen.
1528
'Is that correct, sir ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. How was this memo implemented ? Could you give
us examples, concrete examples ?
Mr. Dean. The memo itself was never implemented. I never did have
a political enemies project that was in any way operational.
Senator Inouye. However, we do have evidence here that, for exam-
ple, a TV commentator with CBS was, in fact, audited by the Internal
Revenue Service just for the purpose of harassment, isn't that correct?
Mr. Dean. Well, I know Mr. Schorr had an FBI investigation.
Senator Inouye. Oh, it was an FBI ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it was. I know there were other instances. These did
not come from me.
Another instance, many times, members of the staff who were oper-
ating in the political area would want to see a tax return. My office was
supposed to be the office to have the facility to receive from Internal
Revenue tax returns. I never called at any time I can ever remember
while I was there to the Director of the Internal Revenue Service
requesting he send over a tax return on any individual to my office.
Senator Inouye. Have you ever seen tax returns ?
Mr. Dean. Have I other than my own ?
Senator Inouye. Other than your own.
Mr. Dean. Only in connection with clearing individuals who volun-
tarily submitted them in relationship to a nomination for a Presiden-
tial appointment.
Senator Inouye. In your memo, you speak of granting availability.
Federal contracts, et cetera. I refer you to exhibit No. 53.* It is a memo
for you from Gordon Strachan and it relates to Mr. Chet Huntley.
It says here, "John Whitaker has ordered the Department of Agri-
culture to quit dragging its heels on Big Sky."
Was this a j^olitical favor ?
Mr. Dean. Wliat is the number of the exhibit. Senator ?
Senator Inouye. I believe it is 53, sir.
Mr. Dean. I recall the exhibit you are referring to, but it is not 53
in my sequence here. I believe that might be in 4, 5, 6, or 7.
Well, anyway, I can answer the question. I recall there is a notation
on it.
There was at one point in time an effort, because of a comment — a
rather hostile comment that Mr. Huntley had made regarding the
President — there was an effort that I initially was unaware of to make
it as difficult as possible for him to get his Big Sky project moving.
Apparently, he needed assistance from tlie Department of the Inteiior.
I would receive i^eriodic calls asking me what is happening on that,
and the like. I would, in turn, call John Whitaker, who is the person
on the Domestic Council staff' who had dealings with the Department
of Interior.
At one point in time, apparently, there was a change in heart on
Chet Huntley and there was a turnaround, and Interior was given the
signal that they should sign off on whatever it was he needed to get
his Big Sky project accomplished.
Now, I would have to review the document that you are referring
to, and that may well answer your question.
♦See p. 1701.
1529
Senator Inotjte. I believe this line of questioning is very important,
because your exhibits have listed, I would say, a couple of hundred
names of very distinguished Americans, most of them, and other
exhibits have suggested that extra-legal activities had been carried out
in connection with these names.
Xow, there are Members of the Senate and Members of tlie House
whose names have appeared, but to date, you have been able to tell us
of the possibility of a man from CBS, and Chet Huntley.
Are there any other concrete examples? I am asking you this be-
cause Mr. Colson has gone on the air suggesting that the lists you sub-
mitted were a social list, that this was a list used by the White House
so that they would not invite the names listed there for the White
House dinners.
Mr. Dean. I think you will note in there at some point — first of all,
that ]Mr. Colson, there is a memorandum to him in one of the exhibits
where he was to cull out the 20 worst enemies and submit them. This
was again because I was receiving through Mr. Higby and Mr.
Strachan a direct request from ]Mr. Haldeman that he wanted to nail
this down as to the 20, or the minimum number that we could do some-
thing with.
So, we went through this big thing of taking all the lists Mr. Colson
had. and Mr. Colson went through and checked off through his lists
what he thought were his candidates. He was the only one that I knew
that dealt in these areas. I certainly — none of these people were my
enemies. In fact, most of these names were unfamiliar to me.
As a result of that, I sent a memorandum to Mr. Higby indicating,
here are the lists, don't let it go over 20, and this was sent to ]\Ir. Higby
for Mr. Haldeman's final review. It was sent back to me and went back
in the file again.
Senator Ixouye. Did you know if anything ever happened to these
20 on the top — hit parade ?
Mr. Dean. I cannot answer that, because I think it was realized that
my office had less than enthusiasm for dealing with things like this.
Senator Ixouye. Are you suggesting that this listing of names was
just an exercise?
]Mr. Deax. As far as I was concerned, it was an exercise that I had
no intention to implement ; that is correct. Senator.
Senator Ixouye. Are you aware of any person or any agency or any
official using these lists to do harm or injury or to assist?
Mr. Deax. They were principally used by Mr. Colson and Mr. Halde-
man and I don't know what they did with them. I know on one oc-
casion, I had a call regarding the fact that some of the President's
friends — and these are in exhibits and I just think it would be in-
appropriate right now to mention the individuals' names — were having
tax problems, and I was to look into those. I had Mr. Caul field, who
had — who was the person on my staff, who was the only one I knew —
who had a relationship with the Internal Revenue Service — because I
could onlv deal with the Director.
I did deal with one of his assistants from time to time on sensitive
cases, where thev were just brought to our attention if somebodv in
the administration was having a normal audit, just to alert the "White
House to the fact that such an audit was occurring.
1530
At any rate, as I was saying, I was told that I was to do something
about these audits that were being performed on two friends of the
President's. They felt they that they were being harassed and the like.
There is a third instance there this occurred also. Now, on the —
finally, when I got around to checking on it, Mr. Caulfield sent me some
information which I think is evidenced in the exhibit and a note went
to Mr. Higby. Mr. Higby sent it in to Mr. Haldcman, and Mr. Halde-
man wrote a note on the bottom, "This has already been taken care of."
So obviously, things were happening that I had no idea on.
Now, I would again like to defer from using names in this instance,
but there was a request of an audit that was commencing on somebody
who was close to the President and several people got involved in this.
They said, John, you have got to do something about this, because the
President is just going to hit the roof when he finds out about it.
Well, I went to the Justice Department because it had already gone
from Internal Revenue to the Criminal Division of the Justice Depart-
ment. I spoke with Mr. Erickson about it. He said, this man is just up
to his teeth in the problem.
I reported back to the people who were asking me. I said, just do not
touch this, there is just no way; this man is in trouble and he has
got to be told he is in trouble.
So that was the way 1 handled these situations, and I thought that
was the proper way the counsel's office should handle them.
Senator Inouye. Do you know from your own personal knowledge,
Mr. Dean, if any Member of the U.S. Congress was ever subjected to
an Internal Revenue Service audit or surveillance by the FBI ?
Mr. Dean. The only — I do not know from my own knowledge of any
audits being commenced on any Member of the U.S. Congress. I do
know that there was extensive surveillance on Senator Kennedy, which
I have testified to.
Senator Inouye. Was this for political purposes ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, it was.
Senator Inouye. Wlio else ?
Mr. Dean. Senator Kennedy was the principal one. I would say the
greatest amount of surveillance was conducted on Senator Kennedy,
and subsequently, politically embarrassing information was sought
on
Senator Inouye. Was the FBI aware that this surveillance was for
political purposes?
Mr. Dean. The FBI did not perform this. This was performed
directly by the White House. Now, whether any information was
requested from the FBI, I do not know on this.
Senator Inouye. Are you aware of any member of the press being
subjected to a special audit or surveillance by the FBI ?
Mr. Dean. I am aware of one member of the press being subjected
to an audit, and this was an audit that was initiated as a result of an
adverse story he had written regarding a friend of the President.
Senator Inouye. Who is this person ?
Mr. Dean. I would have to check my records on this, which are un-
available to me still, as I have said. I do recall it was a reporter from
Newsday, who had worked on a story on Mr. Rebozo.
1531
Senator Ixouye. Thank you. "Wlio do you think could assist this com-
mittee in testifying as to whether these lists were ever used for pur-
poses described in your memo ?
JNIr. Dean. Well, I would say that the man who is most knowledge-
able is the man who has described them as socialists, so I do not know
if you will find out what was done there.
Also, it is possible that Mr. Caulfield may be able to provide some
assistance to the committee in this regard, and I feel Mr. Caulfield
would be very honest and forthcoming with the committee.
Senator Inouye. Then, your testimony is that with the exception of
this columnist and this television commentator and Mr. Chet Huntley
and Senator Kennedy, you are not aware of how these lists were ever
used ?
Mr. Deax. No, sir. I am also aware, and I would have to again be
able to look through my files on this, there were a number of requests
from various members of the White House staff to see if tax exemp-
tions and alteration of the tax status could be removed from various
charitable foundations and the like, that were producing material that
was felt hostile to the administration or their leaders were taking posi-
tions that were hostile to the administration, and on occasions I checked
this out, and their activities were deemed to be perfectly proper within
the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and nothing was done on
these.
Senator Inouye. These files are presently available in the White
House ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I believe they would be in my files in the White
House.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, may I request that these files be
made available, sir ?
Senator Ervin. Mr. Dash will communicate
Mr. Dean. I will have to at some point, there have been a number of
requests for material, that I would hope that the committee would put
the White House on notice or they may well not be there when I get
there.
Senator Ervin. In this connection, you have testified the other day
that when you went to the White House to see some of your files that
you were required to write them out, as I understand, in longhand,
and somebody would not allow you to make copies like Xerox?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. Presently, I am not allowed to Xerox
any copies of anything, and I would hope, particularly with the request
of Senator Gurney for my financial records, that I not have to sit and
copy all my own financial records.
Senator Ervin. I believe you also stated you had to stand up and
copy it ?
Mr. Dean. I was able to sit in a chair and write on a safe that was
several feet above the chair.
Senator Ervin. Did you make a request of anybody for the oppor-
tunity to have these copied on a Xerox ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did and mv counsel did, and I wrote a letter to
the President requesting it, and I was denied.
Senator Ervin. Do you have a copy of the letter to the President?
Mr. Dean. My counsel can supply the letter that was written ; yes,
sir.
1532
Senator Ervin. Wlio originally denied you the right to copy them ?
Mr. Dean. Well, when I was — my resignation was requested on the
30th, I recalled a call from my secretary who said "What do I do?
They are in here putting bands around all your safes and all your
material." And I said, "Just let them band it all." And subsequently,
they transferred it all down to the basement of the Executive Office
Building.
Senator Ervin. Did you talk to any individuals up there about hav-
ing the right of access to them and the right to have your files copied
by Xerox or otherwise ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. I had my counsel send a letter, and I sat down
and talked with Mr. Buzhardt, and Mr. Buzhardt just said, "I am
sorry, I cannot do anything for you about it."
Senator Ervin. Is he not the White House counsel now?
Mr. Dean. He is a special counsel on the Watergate.
Senator Ervin. Special counsel on Watergate, and Mr. Buzhardt
refused to allow you, or at least, he declined your request ?
Mr. Dean. To permit me to copy ; yes, sir. In fact, they were permit-
ting me earlier to make some copies. My chronofiles which I would like
to have just for future use, and my secretary was stopped from making
any copies.
Senator Ervin. Unless there is some objection from some member
of the committee, I will direct the staff of the committee to communi-
cate with the White House and ask the White House to give Mr. Dean
access to his files and also the privilege of copying them by Xerox or
other means.
Mr. Dean. I tliink that a number of the questions that Senator Mon-
toya asked about executive privilege could also be answered if I had
access to some of my files on executive privilege. I might add also that
my office files were not only contained in my own personal files, but
they are contained in other members of my staff who I do not believe
their files have been bound, and I would hope to have the opportunity
to check things that I knew they were working on for me that relate
to many of these items.
Senator Ervin. And without objection on the part of the committee,
I would request your counsel to supply the committee a copy of the
letter to the President asking for access to these files.
Mr. Shaffer. We will do that, IVIr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean, you have just indicated that one of our
colleagues, the senior Senator from Massachusetts, was placed under
surveillance. Was this electronic ?
Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge. It was initially
Senator Inouye. Any break-ins, burglaries ?
Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Inottye. Were members of his staff also subjected to this?
Mr. Dean. I do not know. I think there was some effort to make con-
tact or do some examination of some of the women who were also pres-
ent during tho Chappaquiddick incident, and there mav have been
some investigations made of them also. I do not have all the details on
this, and I am afraid that others, Mr. Caulfield and IVIr. TTlasewicz, can
tell you most about that. I do not know if Mr. Hunt is going to appear.
1533
but apparently he did an investigation for Mr, Colson of Mr. Ken-
nedy, Senator Kennedy, also.
Senator Ixouye. CJn i^'ebruary 10 and 11, important meetings were
held in La Costa i
Mr. Deax. February 10 and 11, correct.
Senator Ixouye. February 10 and 11, which have extra significance
to this committee because from your testimony, I recall that on top of
tlie agenda was the discussion of the makeup of this panel.
Mr. Deax. lliat is correct. 1 believe the Senator recalls my comment
on that.
Senator Ixouye. Did the meetings go beyond just the discussion of
the background of panel members; did it go into how to influence, how
to intimidate, threaten ?
Mr. Deax'. Not at that point, sir, and I do not recall that. It was
more just an assessment of Avho. I think the AYhite House was looking
for friends on the committee then, you know, so they might find out
what the committee was going to do, was the initial concern.
Senator Ixouye. I refer to an article which appeared in the Char-
lotte Observer, dated May 17, 1973, and it reads as follows: "High
officials in the Xorth Carolina Republican Party confirmed Wednesday
that H. E. (Bob) Halcleman, at the time President Nixon's chief of
staff, made two attempts to get local party officials to 'dig up something
to discredit Ervin and blast him with it.' According to the sources,
Haldeman placed two phone calls to former White House aide Harry
Dent and asked Dent to relay the suggestion to State Republican
Chairman Frank Rouse."
Who is Harry Dent?
]Mr. Dean. Mr. Dent is a former special counsel to the President. His
principal area of activity was in the political area with regard to
Southern States. I believe he is from the chairman's State. He has
departed from the White House staff and is in the private practice of
law. He was on the White House staff' for a number of years. I believe
he Avas in the 1969 campaign, and he operates his law practice in both
North Carolina and Washington, D.C.
Senator Ixouye. Was this type of activity part of the job descrip-
tion?
Mr. Deax. Part of his job description? I believe the activity that is
referred to occurred after ]Mr. Dent had departed from the White
House staff.
Senator Ixouyt:. Are you aware if this activity did, in fact, occur?
Mr. Deax. No, sir. I have no firsthand knowledge of that, the only
recollection I have of any effort to get any information on the chair-
man came to me when I had, after returning from Florida — from the
La Costa meetings I went, as I recall, on the 12th to Florida and spent
a week down there. When I returned back, I wanted to reconfirm with
Mr. Baroody the attack group which is a group of media-oriented
people who had formerly operated under Mr. Colson would no longer—
would stay out of the Water<xate area, that they would not have this
on their morning agenda, and it was also in connection with this meet-
inc: that the President was asking that a speech be prepared to counter-
offensive the general thrust of these hearings by laying out the number
of demonstrations he had been subject to and the fact these had been
paid for by Democrats and the like.
1534
I can recall Mr. Baroody and I also discussing other areas of counter-
offensive and the like. It was that time that he told me, either that night
or the next night, that he was meeting with some people from North
Carolina and they thought they may have some interesting informa-
tion on the Senator.
Senator Inouye. Were any other members of this committee sub-
jected to special treatment? One member has suggested that he has
been subjected to special treatment. Were other members subjected to
special treatment?
Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge. I was not involved in that par-
ticular activity ; no sir.
Senator Inouye. Did you ever discuss special treatment?
]Mr. Dean. It very well could have come up at La Costa as to
Senator Inouye. I am testing your power of recollection.
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. It happened just recently ; what can you recall, sir ?
Mr. Dean. With regard to other members of the committee?
Senator Inouye. Yes, sir; because I can't imagine meeting for 12
hours and just deciding that Senator so and so is an attorney, he prac-
ticed for 10 years, he was born in 1934.
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; that was a very brief part of the meeting in the
early morning on the first day in which there was a great disappoint-
ment at the fact that the White House had not had more influence on
deciding who would be a member of the committee from the Re-
publican side certainly, and I would hope, and I would assume if they
could have had any influence on the totality of the appointment of the
committee, they would have been very happy but they had at least
hoped to have an influence on the appointment and selection of the mi-
nority members. I think that is very clearly reflected in this document
that I have submitted to the committee from Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Inouye. Did you discuss the possibility of digging up dirt
on anyone of the members here ?
Mr. Dean. We hadn't gotten around to that at that point, Senator.
I said we had not gotten to that point yet.
Senator Inouye. When did you get to that point, sir ?
Mr. Dean. I am trying to recall specifically, I think it was just to
familiarize — when I was reading from the Congressional Directory, a
number of the members of the committee were men I did not know, I
had prior dealings with the chairman, I had had prior dealings with
Senator Gumey, I had had prior dealings with Senator Weicker. They
were the only members of the committee I knew, Mr. Timmons had
given his assessment to Mr. Haldeman and this was just a general
session at this point as to the composition of the committee, the general
philosophy and makeup of the committee.
Senator Inouye, You just stated that at a later time you came to the
digging up dirt. When did you get to the digging up dirt stage?
Mr. Dean. That must have been, I can only recall an allusion to the
fact that this would be. you know, looking into at some point in time
but it reallv was not the focus of any discussion I can recall.
Senator Inoitye. "V^Hio suggested this, sir?
Mr, Dean, The only comment I can recall making myself is, and I
had made a similar comment with regard to the Patman committee
1535
hearing, and you will recall that I requested, after a discussion with
Mr. Haldeman, that we check the financial or the campaign filing
requirements of the members of the Patman committee. I did receive
a document, I have submitted that document. To this day I have not
read that document and I can't tell you what it says, I didn't have any
interest in that. I had also been suggesting, I had had a suggestion, for
Mr. Plaldeman to call Governor Connallv, to ask him about ^Nlr. Pat-
man and he said, "I think ]Mr, Patman might have one soft spot," but
he also indicated some Eepublicans might have similar soft spots, and
when Mr. Timmons and I discussed this we realized this might create
more problems than it would solve.
Now, coming back to this committee, I can recall a comment when
this discussion came up that it would be very difficult for some mem-
bers, possibly some of the members of this committee, to throw stones
when they were living in a glass house, and that is the comment I
recall making.
Senator Inotjye. Returning to the President's statement which you
quoted, '"That we will take care of them after the election," did the
President ever tell you what he meant by that ?
Mr. Deax. To me, the way the conversation was evolving, and it
moved right from there to the Internal Revenue Service, and there
ma}' have preceded that — because I am taking such care in any refer-
ence that I make to any conversations I recall with the President— to
something about the Internal Revenue Service that led into the fact
that I should keep a good list and then he went on to talk, I do recall
him very clearly telling me to make a good list of those who are giving
us problems, that we will take care of them after the election. We will
make life less than pleasant for them, and it moved, the conversation
moved, directly from there to a discussion of the Internal Revenue
Service, and I told him how, I was really telling him the fact that I
could not call Mr. Walters and tell "Sir. Walters to get an audit started.
And the President was rather annoyed at this and I told him the
reason why when he asked me and I said, well, because the bureaucracy
of the Internal Revenue Service is primarily Democratic and some-
thing like this cannot be done.
Senator Ixoute. Did you ever call Mr. Walters to attempt to pro-
vide special treatment for anyone ?
Mr. Dean. To provide special treatment ?
Senator Inottye. Yes or to
Mr. Deax. No. I called him and asked him a number of questions on
occasions on tax cases, yes, but I don't recall ever asking him for
special treatment and, to the contrary, Mr. Walters is the type of man
that he and I discussed on a number of occasions the extreme danger
of the White House doing anything that would politicize the Internal
Revenue Sernce and he felt very strongly about that and the like.
Now, I got criticisms
Senator Ixotte. Mr. Walters was not the man to see, who was your
contact man in the Internal Revenue Service ?
Mr. Deax. Mr. Taulfipld liad a contact man and he will have to tell
you who that is because I do not know.
Senator Ixottye. I thank you very much, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Deax. Thank you. Senator.
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 13
1536
Senator Ervin. I sort of regret that anything was brought out about
the alleged attempt, the request, of Bob Haldeman about me, but I am
glad it happened because President Nixon's campaign manager in
1968 and again in 1972 Charles R. Jonas, Jr., made this statement,
and I cannot refrain from reading it because I am very grateful to
him for it. He said, "Charles R. Jonas, Jr., who headed Nixon's re-
election campaign in North Carolina, and has recently said he might
run for Ervin's Senate seat, said he had not been contacted by anyone
to discredit Ervin. 'That would be an impossible task and almost
foolish to attempt,' Jonas said when reached by phone. 'I think that
Senator Ervin is one of the handful of people in the Senate whom it
would be impossible to discredit. I think that is why he was chosen.
He has a record of impeccable honesty and integrity. If I had to de-
pend on any one person in the Senate to proceed fairly and in a way
that would protect the innocent, it would be Senator Ervin.' "
I am deeply grateful for that compliment. [Applause.]
And furthermore [laughter] when I was asked about this I said
it did not disturb me at all and I deeply regretted to say that all
the indiscretions I had committed were barred by the statute of limita-
tions and lapse of time. [Laughter.] And that I had lost my capacity
to commit further indiscretions. [Applause and laughter.]
Senator Inouye. You are not that old.
Senator Er\t:n. This article states that Secretary Butz went down
to North Carolina and made some uncomplimentary remarks about me
in connection with this investigation, saying I should call it off, as if it
is my investigation rather than the Senate's. And I was called and
asked if I had any comments on Secretary Butz' statement and I said,
"only one, and that was if the Secretary would come down before the
committee and testify on his oath and on his personal knowledge that
the Watergate affair had never happened, I would be the happiest man
in the United States."
The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
[Wliereupon, at 11 :55 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., this same day.]
Afternoon Session, Friday, June 29, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Dean, was George Wallace of Alabama, on the list of enemies?
Mr. Dean. Senator, I never really have gone through the list of
enemies so I cannot name that. The only thing I know about Mr. Wal-
lace in that relationship at all is that, the fact that, I understand that
during Mr. Wallace's — Governor Wallace's — last gubernatorial cam-
paign, that a substantial amount of money was provided by Mr. Kalm-
bach, somewhere between $200,000 and $400,000, to Mr. Wallace's
opponent.
Senator Ervin. That was provided in the last Governor's race in
Alabama ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. Yes. Between $200,000 and $400,000 ?
Mr. Dean. 200.
Senator Ervin. 200,000.
1637
Mr. Dean. And $400,000, yes. I do not know the precise figure.
Senator Ervix. Yes, I have no further questions. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Do I understand that you know that of your own knowledge, Mr.
Dean?
Mr. Dean. Tliat was told me by Mr. Kalmbach, who apparently
made the arrangements.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dean, this is your fifth day on the stand, and it is, I hope, the
last session for this committee and for you and, therefore, I intend
to abbreviate my questions, although following the same technique I
did yesterday. Let me tell you in advance the two questions I want
to ask which will require multiple answers, and try to suggest a format
for the purposes of abbreviation. Obviously, if you have an elabora-
tion that you wish to make on any of these points you are free to do
so. But if you could answer them first and then elaborate, it would
help us along.
My primary thesis is still what did the President know, and when
did he know it ?
Oh, yes, I asked you to respond and you did respond, in terms of
the quality of your knowledge, that is to say, whether it was direct
first-hand information, whether it was circumstantial or whether it
was second-hand or hearsay information.
Mr. Dean. And I also believe I added documentary.
Senator Baker. Documentary evidence, that is correct. What I
would like to do today is to limit that inquiry to the remaining meet-
ings that we did not cover and to direct information only. This is not to
imply that I am not interested in the other but I hope to contain this to
about 20 minutes, and if you could tell me in seratim what you know
first-hand of your own knowledge of the President's knowledge, and
the date of tliat knowledge, beginning where we left off yesterday in
February and working your way through the ending of j'our employ-
ment at the White House. I would be grateful.
Xow, the second question I am going to put to you after we finish
that is one that really is, I am afraid, cumbersome and awkward. But
you are a lawyer and I am a lawyer and we both understand the neces-
sity for this. Rather than me asking you detailed and probing questions
on particular areas of conflict in 3'our testimony and those of other
witnesses who have testified or witnesses we may have hereafter about
which you have personal knowledge, would you identify for me im-
portant elements of controversy that you know or suspect to exist. This
is once again for the sake of organizing your rather voluminous testi-
mony so that we have some idea of how to test it against the testimony
of other witnesses. If you think either of those questions unfair I will
try to revise them. If you are agreeable to trying to proceed in that
manner I would appreciate it if you began first with your first-hand
knowledge of Presidential involvement in February where we con-
cluded our interrogation yesterday.
Mr. Dean. I believe that we stopped yesterday with the meeting on
the 28th at which time I was told, I mentioned to you the fact that I
had told the President that I also thought he ought to know of my
involvement in the matter, and then I will have to move along.
1538
Now, again, it is hard for me to separate in a sense what is defined
as involvement because there was an evolving pattern that came out of
the La Costa meetings when I began having my direct dealings with
the President, and many of these things related directly to that.
Senator Baker. But even though the pattern of activity
Mr. Dean. I understand.
Senator Baker [continuing]. And the circumstances involved are
important for the purpose of this abbreviated interrogation, would
you please tell me what you told the President, the President told you,
was said by the President in your presence or was said by you to the
President. I guess that third one is unnecessary, but would you please
do that, limiting it only to direct first-hand information for the pur-
pose of this interrogation ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I think we ought to go to the next, as I say, the
testimony
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dean [continuing]. Speaks for itself on a number of these mat-
ters I just referred to and we ought to move then to the meeting on
March 13 at which the, toward the conclusion of that meeting.
Senator Baker. All right, would you stop just a moment, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, there is a vote in progress and I
would like very much to finish this line of inquiry, and I would hope
that the Chair would permit me to continue and, if the rest of the
committee will go vote, I will continue with this interrogation.
Senator Ervin. Fine.
Mr. Dean. During the conclusion of the meeting on the 13th, the
question of money and how to pay this support silence money came
up, and I explained to the Presidents — ^I was telling the President of
the problem.
Senator Baker. Where were you?
Mr. Dean. I was in the President's office.
Senator Baker. In the oval office?
Mr. Dean. In the oval office.
Senator Baker. Who else was present?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman was present.
'Senator Baker. Anyone else?
Mr. Dean. That is 'all.
Senator Baker. All right, go ahead, sir.
Mr. Dean. I was telling the President — I don't believe Mr. Halde-
man was present during the entire meeting to the best of my recollec-
tion but he came into the meeting at some point, at the point he came
in it was on an unrelated matter, the meeting was interrupted to re-
solve his particular problem and he stayed in while I was finishing
my discussion of this because it had come up shortly before he came
in, and he sat and listened for just a moment while we were talking
and then he took care of his business with the President and then
stayed because it was quite obviously toward the end of my meeting
with the President.
Senator Baker. It might be useful to know how the meeting was
arranged at your request, at the President's request, or through Mr.
Haldeman, or how?
1530
Mr. Dean. The meeting was arranged per the request of the
President.
Senator Baker. All right. Would you continue please.
jNIr. Dean. As I have testified the question of — I got into the dis-
cussion of the fact because I had had countless cross pressures and
the like as to who was going to raise this money that was being
demanded, and ]Mr. Haldeman and ]Mr. Ehrlichman were unwilling
to do it, Mr. Mitchell was unwilling to do it.
Senator Baker. Are these the things you were saying to the Presi-
dent '^
]Mr. Dean. I will get to that. I am prefacing what the circumstance
was that resulted this coming up with the meeting with the President.
Senator Baker. I don't mean to hamper you, but would it be possible
to tell me of the conversation first and then to explain the background ?
Mr. Dean. All right. I told the President at some point that, toward
the end of the conversation of the meeting, that the individuals who
had either been convicted or pleaded guilty were continuing to make
their den:iands on the White House and that it would be some time in the
not too distant future that these individuals would be up for sentenc-
ing, and the demands were at this point again growing toward a
crescendo point.
The President asked me, "Well, how much are they demanding and
how much is it going to cost?" And I said, "Well, to the best of my
estimation it will cost a million dollars or more to continue the pay-
ments.*' At that point, the President, I can recall this very vividly,
leaned back in his chair and he sort of slid his chair back from the desk
and he said to me that a million dollars was no problem at all. In fact,
I have a very clear visual picture even of the President, of the fact
that he had his hands somewhat in a position like this when he repeated
it, when he looked over at Mr. Haldeman and said, "A million dollars
is no problem to raise."
Senator Baker. I take it from that that Mr. Haldeman was present
during this portion of the conversation ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, he was. Yes, he was.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir.
]Mr. Dean. It was then he asked me who was putting the pressure
on for this, and I said it was principally coming tlirough his attorney
and at that point the President raised the fact that Mr. Hunt, or he
had had discussions with Mr. Haldeman — I mean with Mr. Ehrlich-
man and Mr. Colson regarding clemency for Mr. Hunt.
Senator Baker. I am sorry, my mind wandered.
At that time he, the President, said that he had had conversations?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. And he also went on to tell me that, with
some expressions of annoyance that, Mr. Colson had been told not to
raise this with him, and he also said that Colson had raised it with him
though, contrary to an instruction that he had received from Mr.
Ehrlichman.
Senator Baker. Was Mr. Haldeman present during this portion of
the conversation ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, he was.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir.
1540
Mr. Dean. From there, he then asked me, he said, "How is this
money handled?" and I said, "Well, I don't know all the details but
I know there is a laundering process so the money cannot be traced to
any source."
And I explained what I knew about the laundering process, and I
said, "I am learning about things I never knew about and the next
time I will know better how to handle these matters," and I do re-
member very vividly at this point Mr. Haldeman commenced with a
rather good belly laugh. He thought this was quite funny, and that
was that, the meeting really ended on that note. There was no fur-
ther discussion on that point.
Senator Baker. Thank you, sir.
Would you move on to the next occasion.
■Let me, while you are looking
INIr. Dean. I just don't want to miss any of the points I have in
here. I am very clear in my mind on the principal ones but I want
to make sure there is no minor point that I miss also.
Senator Baker. All right. I fully understand that. 1 am asking you
to hurry through this, and you should fully understand, Mr. Dean,
if there are other points in your testimony that bear directly on this
question, the fact that you don't identify them now does not mean
that you do not stand on your statement as previously made. I am
simply trying to organize it for the committee's purposes.
Mr. Dean. I understand.
Senator Baker. While you are looking let me ask you this : It seems
Mr. Haldeman was present during that meeting most of the time. Was
there any significant conversation between you and the President
before Mr. Haldeman came in?
Mr. Dean. As I say, this conversation had commenced before Mr.
Haldeman came in. It was interrupted and I went back — Mr. Halde-
man sat down while I was telling the President about this and then
stayed on during the remainder of the conversation.
Senator Baker. Do you remember at what point he came in, what
point in your conversation?
Mr. Dean. I don't think I had gone much fiirther than telling the
President that there were problems in raising money.
Senator Baker. So it is fair to say, I assume, that Mr. Haldeman
was there for virtually all of the conversation?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I think that is correct.
Senator Baker. All right, sir, proceed if you will.
Mr. Dean. At least, you know, 90 percent of the conversation, I
would say.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
']Mr. Dean. The next occasion that I raised the matter with the
President myself was when he called me on the evening of the 20th,
I had gone home, I was at home, as I recall, it must have been about,
I don't know, 7 :30, 7 :15, sometime in that period of time, he called
me and I went down to my living room to take the call.
Senator Baker. This was on March 20 ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. March 20. We were having a rather
rambling conversation. I at this point, because of events that had
proceeded over the last couple of days, told the President I would like
1341
to meet with him the next morning to discuss the implications of the
Watergate case that I thought I ought to bring to his attention as they
affected the White House stall' and himself. And he said, well, why
don't you try to meet with me about 10 o'clock the next morning. Then
we'll go to the meeting at 10 o'clock. That was on the 21st.
As I told you, after the conversation with the President, and on the
evening, the preceding evening, and the next morning I thought, both
on my way to work in the morning and when I entered the office in the
morning, how I could most dramatically present the situation which I
thought had to end that very day— it could not proceed another hour
as far as I was concerned — in a way that would be very meaningful
to the President and based on my thought and my — some discussion
I had had with Mr. Moore the preceding day, I decided I would tell
the President that there was a cancer growing on the Presidency and
something had to be done about the cancer oecause it was growing
daily and if there were not immediate surgery, it was going to kill the
President himself.
So I started with lines to that ejffect.
Senator Baker. Where did you meet with the President ?
Mr. Deax. This was in the Oval Office.
Senator Baker. And who was present ?
Mr. Deax. Xo one other than the President and myself.
Senator Baker. And it was at 10 o'clock in the morning.
Mr. Dean. That is correct, approximately 10 o'clock, as best I can
recall.
Senator Baker. Would you proceed with as much exactitude as you
can.
Mr. Deax. I then told the President that what I would like to do is
give him a broad overview and let him come back and ask any questions
he might like to ask. I wanted to explain to him how the continued
support would be necessary, how continued perjury would be necessary
to perpetuate the coverup.
Senator Baker. Did you use those terms ?
Mr. Deax. Yes, I did use those terms.
Senator Baker. All right, sir, go ahead.
Mr. Deax. That was my definition to him of how the cancer was
growing; in other words, that more people would have to perjure
themselves
Senator Baker. Did you say these things as an advocate — that is,
that other support and perjury should continue — or as examples as to
why it should not continue ?
Mr. Deax. As to why it should not continue.
Senator Baker. Did you make this clear to the President ?
Mr. Deax. Absolutely.
Senator Baker. In what terms?
Mr. Deax. As I say, I tried to make it as dramatic as the fact that
this type of cancer was going to kill him and kill the Presidency if
this tvpe of thing was not stopped by surgery and ending that type of
activity.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir. Before you do, what was the Presi-
dent's reaction to that ?
1542
Mr. Dean. The President, if I recall — and I was not looking for
reactions at that point as much as trying to be as forceful and dramatic
in my presentation — it is like asking me what was my reaction to the
answer to any member of this panel to a particular question. In my
now sitting here and answering these questions, I really haven't
watched for the reactions of the Senators and the like. I think you can
understand that circumstance.
■Senator Baker. I understand. It is fair to say, then, that you do not
recall the reaction ?
Mr. Dean. I do not recall the reaction, no.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, if you would.
Mr. Dean. I then proceeded to give the President the broad overview
of what I knew of the entire situation — where it started.
^Senator Baker. You might take us through that, if you will. Tell
us as close as you can what you told him.
Mr. Dean. Well, as I recall, I told him about the meetings that had
occurred in Mr. Mitchell's office ; that the fact that I had come back
from Mr. Mitchell's office
Senator Baker. Is this the first time you told him of the meetings
in Mitchell's office ?
Mr. Dean. It is.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Dean. That I had come back to Mr. Haldeman and told him of
the circumstances of those meetings, what had been presented.
Senator Baker. Just for clarity, these were the meetings at which
the plan for bugging and
Mr. Dean. Mugging
Senator Baker [continuing]. And illegal entry were discussed in
Attorney General John Mitchell's office ?
Mr. Dean. That is right. There were two meetings, the second meet-
ing at which I don't know the full extent of the discussion there, but
I know that, you know, what I did here was
Senator Baker. All ri.crht, but you began telling the President of
those meetings, and would you continue from that point?
Mr. Dean. When I was telling him the broad overview, I did not
get into an awful lot of specifics, because I told him, I said any point
that you want to either question me or if we can come back and have,
I will answer any of your questions subsequently. Then I told him
of the fact that I had reported this to Mr. Haldeman, that I had been
distressed by the situation myself, had told Mr. Haldeman what I had
seen and advised Mr. Haldeman that I didn't think anybody in the
White House should have any involvement at all in this, and that I
told him I was not going to have any involvement in it, and INIr. Halde-
man had agreed that I should not have any involvement in it.
Senator Baker. Did you tell the President when that conversation
with Mr. Haldeman took place?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did. I told him it occurred shortly after the meet-
ing in Mr. Mitchell's office, after the second meeting in February.
Senator Baker. All right, sir; go ahead.
Mr. Dean. I also recall that I told him I did not know how the
plans had been finally approved; I didn't know what precisely had
happened as to the final decision to sign off on some phase of the plan.
1543
Senator Baker. Did you say that on your own initiative, or did he
put a question to you to that effect?
Mr. Dean. No, at the outset, I was doing most of the talking and
giving liim my general presentation of this matter. I can't recall when
I basically presented it to him. As to interruptions by him, it was
toward the end that he began asking me questions that are now not
very clear to me as to the questions he did ask.
Senator Baker. If you would, Mr. Dean, work your way through
the convei^ation and then particularly try to recall what the President
may have asked you.
Mr. Dean. I told the President that I had learned that there had
been pressure from Mr. Colson's office on j\Ir. INIagruder, that I was
aware of that degree of pressure from the White House, but I didn't
have all the details on that at even that time.
In fact, I might want to add this in testimony at this point, because
as I recall, I may have mentioned this to the President; I am not
certain. I recall one occasion, on walking from the White House
Executive Office Building to the Re-Election Committee to one of the
meetings in Mr. jSIitchell's office, I met Mr. Magruder as I was walking
over there. He was returning to the Re-Election Committee. We were
standing at the stop light at the comer of 17th and Pennsylvania
Avenue across the street from the Executive Office Building. At that
very moment^ — and I recall very vividly Mr. INIagruder telling me that
because of the pressure from JNIr. Colson — ^they were afraid that Mr.
Col son would take this operation over, and they were concerned about
his taking it over. That had been one of Magruder's expressions of
concern as to why the matter had gone forward.
Senator Baker. Do I understand you to say
Mr. Dean, I don't recall getting into that detail with the President,
but I don't believe I had testified to that before and I wanted to put
that into the record.
Senator Baker. Is it your impression that you did tell the President
something or all of this?
Mr. Dean. I told him of the pressure from Mr. Colson's office on
Mr. ]\Iagruder, because I was aware of this conversation.
Senator Baker. All right: go ahead, Mr. Dean.
]Mr. Dean. I told him I didn't know if INIitchell had approved the
plan, that I had never asked Mr. Mitchell directly whether he had,
but I was aware from my conversations with Mr. Magruder that
Mitchell had been the recipient of wiretap information and that Mr.
Haldeman had also received, through Mr. Strachan, some of the infor-
mation from the Democratic National Committee.
That generally covered what I told him of my knowledge of the
pre-June 17 situation, and then I again went into rather broad gen-
eralities as to what had occurred after June 17. I told him, I raised
the principal points that I thought were of concern, that the indi-
viduals that had been involved had been paid for their silence, and
in fact, this had involved Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and myself
and ]Mr. ^Mitchell in giving instructions to Mr. Kalmbach. I had men-
tioned this, I might add, the fact that I had been a conduit for this
type of information, at an earlier meeting with the President back in
1544
February, and he had disagreed with me as to the fact that I had had
any legal problems from being a conduit.
We did not get into any great detail on that matter and he didn't
seem to want to get into detail on that point when I raised that.
Senator Baker. Is that the essence, now, of this meeting?
Mr. Dean. No, sir, it is not.
Senator Baker. Incidentally, I have forgotten the date. Tell me the
date in March. Is this March 21 ?
Mr. Dean. The morning of March 21, that is correct.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Dean. I mentioned to him the fact that I had, after the decision
had been made that Mr. Magruder remain at the Re-Election Commit-
tee, that I had assisted Magruder in preparing his testimony for the
grand jury, which was perjured testimony.
Senator Baker. Did you use that term ?
Mr. Dean. I don't think I used the term "perjured." I think I used
"false testimony."
Senator Baker. But at any rate, it was a description of your prep-
aration of Mr. Magruder for his appearance before the grand jury ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Dean. I also mentioned to him the fact that as a result of the
lack of money that was available that finally, there had been cash at
the Wliite House that had been used to pay for these individuals
silence. I was referring then to the 350 and I did not give him the
details at that point in time.
Senator Baker. This is the $350,000 fund that was at the White
House
Mr. Dean. That is correct, in cash.
Now, at any one of those points, which were the principal points
that were in my mind at that point there may have been varying de-
grees of elaboration on, but I cannot give the degree of elaboration at
this point, but I can recall clearly the principal points I raised with
him.
Senator Baker. The record should show that you are testifying to,
at my request, a general outline of the conversation and this is not
meant to omit other detail or statements that have been included in
your previous testimony.
I would like to reach the point when you are ready when you can
tell us in whatever detail you can what the President said to you or
what questions he asked. You indicated, I believe, that toward the end,
the President did ask some questions
Mr. Dean. Yes ; he did.
Senator Baker. You do not have a perfect memory of that, but
would you
Mr. Dean. The questions were running along a tenor— there were not
many — that indicated that the President still did not realize the impli-
cations of this matter and the one that really stuck in my mind is when
he suggested to me that maybe some sort of presentation or briefing
ought t-o be provided to the Cabinet. And I believe he also suggested the
leadership, that this be explained to.
1545
Senator Baker. You mean to the congressional leadership ?
Mr. Deais^. Congressional leadership.
Senator Baker. I understand that there is a meeting with the con-
gressional leadership, usually on Tuesday morning. Is this what the
President apparently indicated ?
Mr. Dean. I do not know what particular day he was referring to
and I cannot recall which day of the week the 21st was. I have not
checked my calendar on that.
Senator Baker. Go ahead, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dean. It was after — another point that came up in the conver-
sation, because we talked about this subsequently on the 23d when he
called me. I told him that I did not think all of the individuals in-
volved would remain silent. I had very much in mind the matter of
Mr. McCord.
Now, I would like to put something else that has just occurred to me
that I do not believe has come out m the question and answer with
regard to Mr. McCord. Shortly before the sentencing, I had a call
from Mr. Mitchell and he suggested that Mr. Caulfield get back in
touch again with Mr. ]McCord. I called Mr. Caulfield and talked to
him about it and he said, well, I think I had better talk to you.
I said, well, fine.
He said, I want to come to your office and see you.
And he came into my office and he told me — he came in with a small
diary that he had found in his car, and he said that he had, described
one of the meetings that he had had with Mr. INIcCord, that he had
driven into the country with Mr. McCord and had a discussion with
him. Just shortly before this meeting in January — no; it was much
later than January. Excuse me, it was in March that he was cleaning
his car out and found this small diary, and apparently, it was Mr.
]McCord's diary. In it was noted each meeting that he had had with
Mr. Caulfield and others and all the subsequent events that he had
done. It was a daily diary and was up to the day that ]\Ir. Caulfield
had met with him.
Now, Mr. Caulfield handed it to me and I handed it back to Mr.
Caulfield, and he said, I do not want this, and he tore it up and put
it in his pocket.
It was based on that that I told Mr. Mitchell that I did not think
that it was very wise that Mr. Caulfield and Mr. McCord meet further,
because it was quite obvious to me, as it was to Mr. Caulfield, that
Mr. McCord was keeping a very accurate diary of all of his activities.
Senator Baker. Let us go back to your conversation with the Pres-
ident. We are on March 21 still. Can you recall any
Mr. Dean. I was explaining that. But even before this, you know,
before the sentencing, I was quite confident that McCord was the
most likely individual who would not remain silent and I did not —
without specifying who it was, I told the President that I did not
think it was possible that all of these individuals would remain silent
forever.
Senator Baker. But Mr. McCord and the incident that you have
just related are what you had in mind when you made that statement
to the President ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
1546
Senator Baker, Go ahead, if you will.
Mr. Dean, I also — and without repeating, unless you want me to
repeat it in full again, because I have repeated it several times now,
is the matter about the fact of Mr. Hunt's demand that came directly
to me through Mr. O'Brien, came up in the conversation.
Senator Baker. Is this a conversation with the President ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker, On March 21 ?
Mr, Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. Is it fully noted in your testimony ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it is, and
Senator Baker. Is the language used in your testimony, prepared
statement, exact enough for us to assume that that is precisely what
you said and the President said, to the best of your recollection ?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Vice Chairman, I have exercised the greatest degree
of care, particularly with my conversations with the President in my
written statement. I have tried to not overstate anything and pursuant
to the committee's desire to have the facts, to not understate anything.
Senator Baker. All right now. How many — just so I know whether
to ask you to do it again or not — how many more meetings are there
that you need to describe ?
Mr. Dean. Well, there are several meetings. There is a meeting on
the afternoon of the 21st. There is a meeting on the afternoon of the
22d, and there is a meeting when some of these things were repeated,
on April 15.
Senator Baker. All right, we have three more meetings to discuss ;
is that right?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. I think for the sake of time I will accept your
written statement in that respect. Would you move on then to the after-
noon of March 21 ?
Mr. Dean. This was a meeting that was attended by Mr. Haldeman,
Mr. Ehrlichman, and myself. When the meeting first commenced
Senator Baker. In the Oval Office?
Mr. Dean. No, this was in the Executive Office, When the meeting
first commenced, Mr. Ziegler was in the President's office, as I recall,
and as the meeting settled down, Mr. Ziegler departed the meeting
very — shortly thereafter, I have no recollection of how long he was in
there but I would not say, oh, 4, 5, 10 minutes at the most was he there
but there was no conversation because he was still conversing with the
President about some press matter at that point in time.
Senator Baker. Anyway, for the purposes of your narrative now
can we assume that Mr, Ziegler was not privy to any of the Watergate
conversation ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. All right, sir. Go ahead.
Mr. Dean. And that meeting is the meeting in which there were
discussions about having Mr. Mitchell come down and there were some
discussions about this committee and there were some discussions about
the fact that I was goine: to go to the grand jury, as I recall, but I was
very — I have a very difficult time recalling that meeting for this
reason : I was very upset at what had occurred that morning, had not
1547
accomplished the goal that I wanted to accomplish and so the most
important thing
Senator Baker. If you will-
]Mr. Deax [continuing] . If I might finish — that occurred during that
meeting is that the President would, as was an often practice with the
President, would go around to each individual to ask them for their
judgment on a given point, and every time he got to me I would say
"Xo, I disagree," and finally, it got around to "T\Tiy do you disagree,"
and for the first time, I said in front of the President and in front of
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, I said, "I think that Mr. Halde-
man, Mr. Ehrlichman, and myself are indictable."
Senator Baker. You anticipated my question. I was about to say if
you would please state the important feature of that conversation. Is
there any other significant and important part of the afternoon con-
versation other than that ?
]Mr. Deax. That is, sir, the most significant thing because I can recall
^Ir. Ehrlichman was rather unhappy, as I said, when I said that.
Senator Baker. What did Mr. Ehrlichman say or how did he express
his unhappiness ?
]Mr. Deax. Well, it was kind of, you know, a look and, you know,
kind of a pained expression, and he did not reach across the table and
swing at me or anything of that nature, but it was quite evident that
when one man looks at another man you can tell whether
Senator Baker. In addition to that nonverbal communication did
]Mr. Ehrlichman say anything to you at that point that might be
significant to this record?
]Mr. Deax. I think it is — my recollection of his particular response
is not that good because I just have a very clear impression that he
was unhappy. I know that subsequently to that, and I do not want to
confuse subsequent events with events that occurred during the course
of that meeting, that ]Mr. Ehrlichman got into a little discussion with
me about obstruction of justice laws and I told him that he ought to
pull his code down because I had had a rather interesting engage-
ment, encounter with ]Mr. Ehrlichman the very first time I had met
him back in 1970 when he was becoming counsel to the President. I
met him in Senator Hruska's office, as a matter of fact, and he said,
"Well, I have just been down to my new office where I am going to
be counsel and they do not have any law books down there and the first
thing I am going to do is put some law books down there."
Well, when I went to ]\Ir. Ehrlichman's office when he was counsel
he did not have any law books in his office either, and he said, "Would
you bring me a copy of that section of the code," as I did have the law
books in my office and I thought, I told him he ought to look up
section 1503 of title 18 of the United States Code and particularly
read the annotations thereunder.
Senator Baker. All right, sir. What did Mr. Haldeman say, if any-
thing, when you indicated to the President that you disagreed because
you thought Ehrlichman. Haldeman, and Dean were indictable? AMiat
reaction did you have from INIr. Haldeman, particularly what did
he say?
']Mr. Deax. I had discussed this with Mr. Haldeman on earlier
occasions. I do not recall a reaction at that meeting that afternoon
1548
because I had already talked to him about this in a meeting he and
I had had shortly after the election and before the version of the Dean
report which was put in writing and has been submitted to this com-
mittee as an exhibit.
Senator Baker, But more to the point and just for the moment,
did Mr. Haldeman say anything to you at that juncture?
Mr. Dean. I cannot recall him saying anything at that point, no.
Senator Baker. Did the President say anything at that point?
Mr. Dean. No, this is toward the end of the meeting, and 1 am sure
the discussion was that Dean is wrong, because there was no change.
There was discussion about the fact that Mr. Mitchell, that was part
of the discussion at that meeting, that Mr. Mitchell should come down
the next morning. In fact, when Mr. — during the morning meeting,
at the conclusion of the meeting the President called for Mr. Halde-
man to come into the office and what he told, what the President told
Mr. Haldeman was, is, that "John Mitchell should come down and
you all should have a meeting with him."
Senator Baker. We are back to the morning meeting ?
Mr. Dean. We are back to the morning meeting but that is because
I am not going into every detail and jumping back and forth to try to
explain it to you.
Senator Baker. All right, sir, go ahead.
Mr. Dean. The next meeting with the President, and I am leaving
out the intervening meetings with Haldeman and Ehrlichman at this
point, the next meeting with the President occurred on the afternoon
of the 22d.
Senator Baker. Before you go to that, Mr. Dean, did the President
say anything that you can recall, or let me put it in two parts, did the
President say anything when you said Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and
Dean might be indictable and if he did say something if you can recall,
what did he say ?
Mr. Dean. I cannot recall what the President said. I thought I had
dropped a bomb which I obviously had in front of the President, and
certainly the explosion was still going over in my ears and I was not
listening, I was looking at Mr.
Senator Baker. But you have no recollection that the President did
or did not speak.
Mr. Dean. No. As I recall, the meeting ended on the note that —
Let us have Mr. Mitchell come down and you all have a little discussion with
Mr. Mitchell about these problems the next morning.
Senator Baker. Wlio suggested that ?
Mr. Dean. I do not know. I am trying to be very careful.
Senator Baker. All right, would you move on to March 22 ?
Mr. Dean. To the meeting with the President that afternoon ?
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dean, The meeting with the President on March 22 was like
many, many meetings that I had attended, in which there was a gen-
eral discussion of this committee, questions of executive privilege at
one Doint in that meeting, the President picked up the telephone and
called the Attorney General because he had a report from ]\Ir, Tim-
mons that apparently Mr. Kleindienst was not dealing with you on
1549
working out problems with this committee, and Mr. Mitchell referred
to the fact that the President had had no problems excepting the fact
that there is probably an over — he has overstated the executive priv-
ilege position and he is taking a beating on that and there should be
some retraction or pulling back to a point on that.
Senator Baker. This was John Mitchell's advice ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Bakek. Go ahead, sir.
]\Ir. Deax. At one point during the discussions I asked the President
to excuse myself because I was working on a statement with Mr. Ziegler
regarding the Gray conmient that I had probabl}' lied. I went from —
you are familiar with the President s Executive Office, we were sitting
on the sofa in the office and Mr. Haldeman was sitting in a chair
or Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman were on the sofa and the President
was on a chair as you were facing us on the right and Mr. ]\litchell in
a chair on the left and I pulled up a chair at the other end of the table
between the President and Mr. Mitchell and I asked to excuse myself
to go handle this matter. The President asked me what it was about. I
explained to him what it was about, he said "Go over to the corner and
use the phone by the table," which I did and went over and had a quiet
conversation with Mr. Ziegler for 10 minutes or so on the telephone,
and then I rejoined the meeting and the discussion was still focusing
around this committee, and the executive privilege question.
At that point, the President turned to me and said "John, I think
that you ought to go up and discuss with Senator Ervin the parameters
of executive privilege'' and I said to the President, "I thought that
would be very unwise because I am the point at issue in the Gray
hearings and I am there negotiating my own position." He agreed,
and Mr. Ehrlichman said that he would come up and visit with Senator
Ervin on discussing executive privilege vis-a-vis appearances of White
House staff.
The meeting was very much of this tenor. There was nothing dra-
matic that happened, and again this was somewhat to my surprise.
The meeting concluded, Haldeman and Ehrlichman departed the
office, Mr. Mitchell stayed and had a social conversation with the Presi-
dent, they were talking about
Senator Baker. Were you there at the time ?
Mr. Deax. I was in and out for this reason, here is a point that I
had really forgotten about that occurred in front of ]Mr. Mitchell. The
President said in front of ]Mr. Mitchell that "John has been doing an
excellent job on this whole problem," and it was just a compliment he
paid me in front of Mr. Mitchell. I was trying to make an arrangement
for Mr. Mitchell to meet with Paul O'Brien who had been wanting to
meet with him and as vou know outside the President's suite there,
there is an empty office that he makes available for guests. I was talking
to the receptionist as to Mr. Mitchell's availability of that. I went even
to that office myself. I called my secretary to tell her to make arrange-
ments for Mr. O'Brien to come over to meet with Mr. IVIitchell in that
office. I meanwhile went back in the President's office and told the
President and ]\Ir. ^Mitchell that that office had been set up and that my
secretary was trying to arrange the meeting so that Mr. O'Brien and
Mr. ]Mitchell could meet and, as I recall, I departed then for Mr.
1550
Ziegler's office again to see what had happened with the White House
response on Mr. Gray's statement regarding myself.
Senator Baker. All right. Does that conclude the important aspects
of the March 22 meeting ?
Mr. Dean. I think that does; yes.
Senator Baker. And once again with the caveat that whatever else
you have said in your prepared statement will be incorporated for the
purposes of our colloquy here.
Do we move then to April 16 ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. All right. Would you go ahead, please.
Mr. Dean. Well, I might add, now, I had a conversation with the
President on March 23.
Senator Baker. All right. Would you tell us about that ?
Mr. Dean. The President suggested, as he had on previous occa-
sions, and in fact my wife and I had talked about it, he had said,
"John, have you ever been up to Camp David," and I said "Well,
only once on a very brief visit" which had been on November 15.
Senator Baker. Where was this conversation ?
Mr. Dean. These were in the Oval Office and they would come
up at the end of a meeting or something in which he had suggested
I go to Camp David to enjoy Camp David.
Senator Baker. What time during the day of March 23 ?
Mr. Dean. Did I receive the call ?
Senator Baker. I am not quite sure I understand.
Mr. Dean. All right.
Senator Baker. There was a meeting with the President.
Mr. Dean. I was referring to the fact that, I know there has been
some — I have read in the press that, you know, the President was
continually trying to send me to Camp David. Well, the invitations
I was getting to go to Camp David were not to go for any personal
reasons other than to go up and enjoy Camp David and relax as dur-
ing the Gray hearings as my name was coming more to the forefront
and the President was telling me, "Don't bother to read the news-
paper, I have been through this sort of thing before," and he told me
that on countless occasions to ignore the newspapers and not let this
get to me. And I had relayed this to my wife and told her that the
President had been very gracious in saying that we should go to Camp
David and enjoy the facilities up there.
Senator Baker. Was there a meeting on March 23 ?
Mr. Dean. No ; there was a telephone call that came in, it must have
been after lunch time, some time, I don't recall precisely when, what
hour, but we arrived there at about 3:30 or so, so I would say that
the call probably came in, given the fact that it is about over a 2-hour
ride, about 1, 1 :30 or so, and I would assume the President was calling,
by then he had left for Florida.
The President said to me, he said, the most interestinrr thins I
remember that is relevant to your inquiry now is, he said, "Well, John,
your prediction is correct." That was in reference to the fnct on the 21st
I told him T thought one of the defendants would — would not remain,
not all the defendants would remain silent and here in fact this had
occurred when Mr. McCord had submitted his letter to the court
on the 23d.
1551
Senator Baker. Let's examine that just a moment, Mr. Dean.
Did the President say that you were proved correct because McCord
has said so and so or is this an inference you draw from the circum-
stances ?
Mr. Dean. Well, he was quite aware of the fact that McCord had,
in the conversation that came up he was aware of the fact that Mc-
Cord's letter had been read in court that morning.
Senator Baker. Tell me what he said, please ?
Mr. Dean. He just acknowledged the fact that he was aware of Mr.
McCord having submitted a letter to the court.
Senator Baker. Can you recall the language ?
Mr. Dean. No ; I cannot.
Senator Baker. But it was your — it is your recollection that the
President conveyed to you the information that he knew of the Mc-
Cord letter to the court ^
Mr. Dean. Yes, and then he told me, he said, "Well, John, your
prediction was right."
Senator Baker. All right, sir, go ahead.
Mr. Dean. That did stick in my mind very clearly.
It was after that we entered into a discussion about going to Camp
David. He suggested I go up and relax.
Senator Baker. I thought you were at Camp David.
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I was at my home.
Senator Baker. I am sorry. Go ahead, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Dean. I had been surrounded by the press that morning as a
result of the preceding day's comment by Mr. Gray. I have not made
myself carefully available to the press during any time in this matter
and my house has been, I might say, staked out almost 24 hours a day
by the press.
Senator Baker. Was this the time when a newspaper or television
reporter tried to interview you through the mail slot?
Mr, Dean. No; that was rather recently when I refused to open
the door and she kept pounding on the door and so I finally opened up
the mail slot and, to correct the record on that, I was not on all fours,
I was merely on my, bending down [laughter]. Just to keep accuracy
in the media [laughter] .
Senator Baker. And just for the sake of chivalry, we will not say
who that was.
All right, Mr. Dean, go ahead, please.
Mr. Dean. We entered into a discussion about going to Camp David,
and I told him yes, that sounded good, because I told him that I was
surrounded by the press and he again repeated what he had repeated
to me earlier, that I had been under a lot of press coverage as a result
of this. But the important thing that you are interested in, he told me
not to ffo to Camp David to write a report. Rather, he told me to go up,
relax for a couple of davs, take my wife. He told me he does his best
thinking at Camp David and that what I should do is go up and assess
the entire situation and figure out where we go from here.
I told him I would do that. I told him I would go up and think
over the entire matter.
Senator Baker. This was on March 23 ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 14
1552
Now, when I arrived at Camp David on March 23, we had some
incidental conversation about that as a result of the fact that some other
of the First Family was up there. But I do not think that is relevant
at all. I do not even think it is relevant to my testimony this morning.
When I arrived at Camp David, the phone was ringing in the cabin
that my wife and I were staying in and the operator came on and said,
it is the President calling. I waited and the President did not come on.
Rather, Mr. Haldeman came on the phone. Mr. Haldeman said — we
had a little further conversation, brief conversation about McCord's
letter because I had not spoken with him during the day on the McCord
letter. I had talked to Mr. Ehrlichman earlier that day about the
McCord letter.
I recall Mr. Haldeman saying that he had understood that McCord
basically had hearsay and I said, that was my understanding. So I
assumed from that that Mr. Haldeman had obviously talked to some-
body also about the matter.
Then he said, while you are up there, why don't you write up a report
on this matter ? And t asked him was it for internal or external use ?
And he said that would be decided later.
So I was very much in a quandry as to how to write what he wanted
to write. But I had also, by the time I got to Camp David, had well
evidenced to everybody I was dealing with that I was thinking far
differently about the continued coverup than I think others were.
Senator Baker. This was a conversation with Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Baker. All right. Would you proceed to the next conver-
sation with the President ?
Mr. Dean. That will take us to April 15.
Now, this meeting was indirectly at my request. On Saturday, the
14th, I had presented a list to Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman
and told them that I thought, based on the conversations that my
counsel had had with the prosecutors, and my counsel's assessment
of the entire facts of the circumstances, that they were also targets
of the grand jury, along with myself. They expressed concern about
this, and indicated that this was contrary to what Mr. Kliendienst
had told them just a short time preceding that regarding what the
grand jury was doing and which way it was going.
Well, now, of couree, my conversations with the prosecutors were
off the record at this point in time. So obviously, the Attorney General
would not know it.
So after Mr. Ehrlichman — this resulted in the Attorney General
meeting with the President on Sunday and I believe Mr. Petersen
might have been there — I do not know for a fact — and I had a call
from Mr. Ehrlichman also on Sunday, but I was wiih my counsel
and we were in another meeting. I did not answer the call until about
7 :30 that night. Mr. Ehrlichman said he happened to be going back
to his office and wouldn't I drive along in and have a chat with him
about some things he wanted to chat with me. It was quite evident to
me that what had happened is that after the President had met with
the Attorney General and Mr. Petersen, that Mr. Haldeman and Mr.
Ehrlichman had gotten — been informed of this — and he wanted to
talk to me about why I had been to the prosecutors. I did not want to
talk to Mr. Ehrlichman.
1553
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, I am sorry ; it is 3 o'clock and I am going
to run out of time, and I am going to miss another vote, but would
you tell me of your conversation with the President on the 15th ?
Mr. Deax. All right, I will go into that. I was a little rattled by the
fact that I had not been to the President to tell him that I had been to
the prosecutors when I went in. To be rather specific, he realized I was
rattled and I had had enough rapport with him by this time that I
was comfortable in dealing with him. I had thought on the way in, I
wonder if I am being set up by the President. Xow, this was an awful
thought to run through my own mind, because I knew that Haldeman
and Ehrlichman knew that anything the President asked me, I would
answer and I would answer truthfulT3^ You just do not lie to the Presi-
dent of the United States.
Senator Baker. Move on to the conversation.
]Mr. Deax. Right. Well, I am telling you that — all right, the
conversation.
So the President offered me a cup of coffee.
Senator Baker. First of all, where was the meeting?
Mr. Deax, This was in the Executive Office Building.
Senator Baker. All right, in the President's office there ?
Mr. Deax'. In the President's office, correct.
Senator Baker. Who was present ?
Mr. Deax". The only persons that were present were myself other
than when ]Mr. Sanchez came in with some Coca-Cola for me and went
back out.
Senator Baker. All right, sir, go ahead,
Mr. Deax. I told the President that I had been to the prosecutors.
I told him I did not believe this was an act of disloyalty, I felt I had
to go and do it. I said I thought in the end that it would be considered
an act of loyalty and I felt that when I made my decision to go, that
was the way I felt,
I told him that in my discussion with the prosecutors, I had discussed
my own involvement and the involvement of others.
I told him that I had not discussed any conversations I had with him
with the prosecutors, and I had not had any dealings with the prose-
cutors vis-a-vis myself and the President.
At one point in the conversation, I recall the President asking me
about whether I had reported to him on the fact that Mr. Haldeman
had been told by me after the second meeting with Mr. Mitchell on
February -i, 1972, about what occurred in that meeting.
I said, yes, I had.
Then the President raised the fact that this had come up in a dis-
cussion he had had with Henry Petersen, and Petersen had raised
with him why had not Haldeman done something to stop it.
Then the President went on to tell me, he said, well, now, John, you
testify to that when asked. Now, I want you to testify to that when
asked, that you told Mr. Haldeman.
At one point in the conversation — and I am just rambling through
the high points and not going through every detail here — at one point
in the conversation, we talked about the fact that Liddy was remaining
silent. The President at this point — I told him that I thought that Mr.
Liddy was looking for some sort of signal. He told me that he had got
1554
from Petersen, I believe, the President had the impression that Liddy
was looking for a signal.
I said, yes, that is my understanding, also, that Mr. Liddy is looking
for some sort of signal. I said, what might be the signal is that you are
to meet with Liddy's attorney.
At this point, he picked up the telephone and called Mr. Petersen.
Senator Baker. "He" being the President ?
Mr. Deax. "He" being the President. Once he got Mr. Petersen on
the telephone, the President winked at me and said, like I was not in
the office, began his conversation with Mr. Petersen about the fact that
he was willing to talk to Liddy's lawyer if necessary to give Mr. Liddy
the signal to talk.
Mr. Petersen — I didn't hear the other end of the conversation, but
he talked about some other things to Mr. Petersen. I don't know what
they were.
Senator Baker. "What else? We are speaking of April 15.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
I recall also the President asking me about Henry Petersen and my
assessment of Henry Petersen, and I assume this was prompted by the
message that I had sent to the President earlier regarding Mr. Peter-
sen when I sent a message through to him that I didn't want to talk
to Ehrlichman. I told him I thought that Mr. Petersen was a man who
was one of the most able criminal lawyers in the business, that he could
give the President a good assessment of the entire circumstance. I told
him that he ought to take his own personal counsel from Mr. Petersen.
Now, I didn't feel like telling the President that he had problems,
but I thought that I was giving the President a very clear signal that
he might want to talk to Mr. Petersen about his own situation.
I told him that I didn't think that Mr. Petersen would want to do
anything to see the Presidency harmed and that Mr. Petersen was a
very, very well respected man at the Department of Justice who plays
it right down the middle and he will give you the best advice in the
world. And that is my assessment of Mr. Petersen.
Senator Baker. "\VTiat else happened? What else was said by the
President or by you ?
Mr. Dean. The President at that time expressed appreciation for
my evaluation of Mr. Petersen.
I recall, and this is not in my testimony because it is now falling
on something that I remembered at the end of the Petersen conver-
sation, there was also some discussion about my feelings about ap-
pointing a special prosecutor. He said something to the effect that, "I
don't think we need a special prosecutor at this time, do you?"
I said, "I think that Sir. Petersen is an honorable, capable man to
handle the job."
Senator Baker. Was there anything else ?
Mr. Deax. At some point in the conversation, and I believe this
was toward the earlier part of the conversation, the question came
up as to whether I had immunity from the Government as a result
of my dealings with the prosecutors. I told the President that my law-
yers had discussed this with the Government, but I assured him —
and this is very clear in my mind, because it later came back to sur-
prise me when I read a subsequent statement of the President — I told
1555
the President that I had no deal, I can assure you, with the Govern-
ment at all.
The President at that point said, and I remember this very clearly,
he said, ''Jolin, I will do nothing, I assure you, to interfere in any way
with your negotiations with the Government." And that would be
fairly close to the words I believe he used.
I think I mentioned earlier also — I don't know if just in this se-
quence of going through this particular meeting — that the President
asked me if I remembered the date at which I had given him the re-
port on the implications of the Watergate, and I said that, before
I got my answer out, he said, ''I think that was on March 21. Do you
recall if that is correct or not?"
And I said I had to check my own records to find out what date that
was.
Senator Baker. Now, let me examine that a little more. The Presi-
dent asked you what ?
Mr. Dean. He asked me if I remembered what day it was in March
that I had given him my report on the implications of the Water-
gate— some words to that effect again. Before I got my answer out,
he said, 'T believe it was on the 21st."
I said to him that I would have to check my records or check the
records to determine exactly what day that was.
And I might add that that came up again on Monday afternoon,
when he told me he had checked and determined that indeed, that it
was the 21st.
Senator Baker. Was it the 21st ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it was the 21st.
Senator Baker. A^Tiat else, sir ?
Mr. Dean. We had some discussion about the fact that I had dis-
cussed no national security matters with the prosecutors, or he instruc-
ted me that I could not deal with national security matters or any
matters with regard to executive privilege. I assured him that I had
not at that point had any such conversations with the prosecutors.
It was toward the end of the conversation that he raised on his own
and asked me if I remembered when he had mentioned the fact that
it would not be any problem to pay $1 million and I said, "Yes, I recall
that conversation." He said, "Well, of course, I was joking, I was only
joking when I said that."
Then shortly after that, I recall that he got up from his chair and
walked behind his chair to the corner of the office. I don't know if it is
the chair he normallv sits in when he is in the Executive Office Build-
ing, but he has one favorite chair over beside his desk. He got up and
went around the chair and in back of the chair and in a barely audible
tone to me. but I could hear what he was saying, he said, "I was foolish
to talk with Colson about Executive clemency for Hunt, was I not?"
I don't recall making any statement or response to that. It was sort
of a declarative statement and I said nothing.
Senator Baker. What else?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I sav, shortly after he got out of his chair, I don't
recall him getting back in his chair and we began exchanging some
pleasantries as I was leaving the office.
1556
As I was leaving the office, he said to me, "say hello to your pretty
wife" and some things of this nature, which I came home and conveyed
to her, because she always liked to hear those things.
Then also, as I was standing by the door, I remember I had the door
open and I turned to the President, who was standing not 10 feet away
from me, and told the President that I certainly hoped that the fact
that I was going to come forward and tell the truth did not result in
impeachment of the President. And I told him that I hoped the thing
would be handled right, and he assured me that it would be handled
right.
And the meeting ended on that note.
Senator Baker. Is that the last meeting or conversation you had
with the President ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir; I met with him the next Monday morning, in
which he called me and asked me to come in the office. I received a call
while I was, before I really left to come in.
Senator Baner. Hold it just 1 minute. The next meeting would
have been April what ?
Mr. Dean. April 16.
Senator Baker. And is that the last meeting ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir — well, there were two meetings on the 16th, one
call on the ITth, and then a call on Easter morning.
Senator Baker. It is 3 :15 and I promised to take 20 minutes and
I have taken an hour. I am sorry for that and I haven't the slightest
intention of proceeding even to my second question, which was to ask
your assistance in identifying the probable areas of conflict between
your testimony and that of other witnesses.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this time and I am willing to yield
at this point.
Mr. Dean. Mr. Vice Chairman, I might just comment briefly on
your second question.
I am quite aware of the fact that in some circumstances, it is going
to be my word against one man's word, it is going to be my word
against two men, it is going to be my word against three men, and
probably in some cases, it is going to be my word against four men.
But I am prepared to stand on my word and the truth and the knowl-
edge and the facts I have. I know the truth is my ally in this and I
think ultimately, the truth is aroinsr to come out.
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, I might sav that the reason I had in-
tended to formulate that question was anticipation of conflict and the
very point that you make. The alternative wav to handle that, of
course, would be to have rebuttal or surrebuttal from you after we re-
ceive the other testimony, that is, if there is conflict, the committee may
wish to recall vou to testifv further or it may not. But since time is
moving on, I think it is better to wait and make that judgment later
and I assume that you, like every other witness, would be willing to
return if that seems indicated.
Mr. Dean. I stand at the subpena of the committee at this point in
time and if the committee desires me back, I will return.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much.
Senator Er\t:n. I found in the record the exhibit to which I asked
you the question whether George Wallace of Alabama was listed
1557
among the enemies. I find that on the page about 12 black Congress-
men—Congress woman Shirley Chisholm and 11 Congressmen are
named. And then there is miscellaneous politicos: John V. Lindsay,
mayor of New York City, Eugene McCarthy, former U.S. Senator, and
George Wallace, Governor of Alabama.
Xow, before I get silenced, I have been furnished by the Library of
Congress through the agency of Senator Inouye a Xerox copy of an
extract from the Xew York Tribune of February 14, 1862, which has
an item of historical value. It is entitled "The Premature Publication
of the President's Message."
President Lincoln today voluntarily appeared before the House Judiciary
Committee and gave testimony in the matter of the premature publication in the
Herald of a portion of his last annual message. Chevalier AVikof was then brought
before the committee and answered the question which he refused to answer
yesterday, stating, as is rumored, that the stolen paragraph was furnished to the
Herald by Watt, the President's gardner, who was reported as disloyal by the
Potter Committee, and whose nomination to a Lieutenancy the Senate so de-
cidedly refused to confirm, but who is still to be seen in the White House, and is
said to be an applicant for a foreign appointment. The public can learn from
this case in what sewers it is the taste of the Herald to fish for state secrets.
The Chevalier is still in close confinement at the Capitol, in quarters at which
his fastidious tastes revolt. An iron bedstead was purchased for him today. His
most frequent visitor is said to be General Sickles. The first papers taken by
the officers out of the pocketbook of the "j^pecial representative of the Xew York
Herald," now in Fort McHenry, was a pass admitting Dr. Ives at all hours to
the War Department, signed "George B. McClellan."
That is an item concerning the manner in which President Lincoln
volunteered to appear and testify before the House Committee.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I might say in that respect, al-
though my precedent is not nearly as old as your precedent, that I
believe in 1919. in junction with the efforts to ratify the Treaty of
Versailles, rather than a President appearing before a committee of
the Congress, in fact. President Wilson invited the Foreign Relations
Committee to meet with him.
So as we say in Tennessee, there are lots of ways to skin a cat and
I wouldn't presume to say how we go about it. But I do hope that
there is some way to supply additional information on these crucial
and inaportant points.
Mr. Chairman, might I say one other thing on an unrelated matter?
Congressman Garry Brown has written a letter to this committee
that refers directly to certain statements made by Mr. Dean. Congress-
man Brown has also indicated to me that he wishes to file a sworn
statement in compliance with the rules of the committee and I would
ask, if there is no objection, that the letter be included in the record,
and the statement that Congressman Brown may later submit be
included in the record at the appropriate place.
Mr. Ervix. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 69.*]
Senator Ervix. Senator Inouye.
Senator Ixouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dean, I have a few questions I would like to follow up on.
•See p. 1791.
1558
In your colloquy with Senator Baker on the meeting of April 14, at
which time, you have testified that you had a discussion with the
President
Mr. Dean. April 15, Senator ?
Senator Inouye. April 15 ?
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Senator Inouye. On the matter of immunity ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. You have indicated that the President told you
that he will make no effort to interfere in your negotiations with the
Government.
Mr, Dean. He made that very clear to me, Senator. And I might
say that that was one of the things that led me to issue the statement
that I did regarding my unwillingness to be a scapegoat in this matter.
Senator Inouye. Do you think at that time the President was aware
that you had evidence that might incriminate him ?
Mr. Dean. I am sure he was aware of the conversations we have had
and as I have indicated to the committee, because of the nature of the
conversation, because of subsequent events, I had reason to believe
that that conversation was being taped. The subsequent events that
gave me further confirmation of that were the fact that the prose-
cutors indicated the President had indicated to Mr, Petersen that he
had taped my conversation or allegedly taped my conversation and
that I had said that I had immunity in exchange for the testimony
of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator Inouye. This is my final question relating to the matter
of friends and enemies. First, may I touch upon the matter of friends.
You indicated earlier that the White House was looking into a tax
matter involving a very, involving a person very close to the Presi-
dent, and I believe you indicated that he was guilty up to his teeth.
Mr, Dean. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. Was this matter at that moment in the hands of
the Criminal Investigation Division ?
Mr. Dean. When it was first brought to my attention it was still
at the Internal Revenue Service. I was asked to see what I could
do about it. I called and spoke with Mr. Walters on this case and
told him what the concern was. I then — he told me at that point in
time, he said — well, let me back up just a moment. The individual in-
volved had said that he thoufrht he was being harassed bv the agents
of the Internal Revenue Service. I raised this with Mr. Walters and he
said, he assured me, that could not be the case after he looked into it.
He said there is a very strong case against this individal, and that
ultimately it is going to be transferred to the Tax Division at the De-
partment of Justice for further analysis.
I merely asked to be kept advised of the status of the case because
I felt the President may want to know because this was an individual
the President saw with great regularity, and I got questions on it with
considerable regularity.
Senator Inouye. Did the President personally express interest in
this?
Mr. Dean. It gets more and more painful to bring these names out
as it was painful to bring the President's name out. It is painful to
1559
bring out other people. It was Rosemary Woods who kept asking me
the status of the case because this individual was seeing the President
a good deal.
Senator Inouye. What is the status of the case?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, it was ultimately referred over to the
Civil Division, or the Tax Division of the Department of Justice.
I asked to be advised on the various status of the case. I told Miss
Woods at one point that she should just stay as far away from this
case as possible. She was seeing the individual, having encounters with
the individual Avho was the subject of the tax case, and he would
protest his innocence to her. He is a fine man, and she was quite con-
vinced of his innocence and could not believe that he was not being
harassed by agents that were trying to get somebody who was close
to the President. The individual was using the President's name a
great deal, he was traveling with the President to China and Russia
and other places, and the like. As a result of this, I merely asked that
I be kept advised of the status of the case. Wlien it was at the Justice
Department, the Justice Department assessed it. I had a conversation
with Mr. Ralph Erickson, he said "There is nothing we can do with
this. There is one thing more we can do," and he said "there are some
weaknesses in the investigation and we may send it back to the Internal
Revenue Service for one last look to see if this fellow, it really is a
solid case."
They did do that and it came back "Absolutely solid case." I said,
"Don't touch it, send it right on through," and that is what they did
and the case is proceeding forward.
Senator Inouye. Has he been indicted ?
Mr. Dean. I do not know if he has been indicted yet, but I know
that there is no, to my knowledge, there is nothing which has been
done to impede the case.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Erickson was fired, was he not?
Mr. Dean. Was he fired ?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
Mr. Dean. I do not think that is quite accurate, no.
Senator Inouye. Would you wish to tell us who this important
individual is?
Mr. Dean. It might affect his tax case.
Senator Inouye. Then, please do not tell us [laughter].
I would like to now discuss a case involving an enemy. Mr. Dean, I
am certainly aware that these hearings unfortunately have perma-
nently damaged the reputations of good and decent people. Further-
more, reputations have been destroyed in past months, in past years by
activities allegedly related to activities in the White House.
In your statement you mentioned that on February 28, 1973, you
were asked to look into a case of Mr. A. Ernest Fitzgerald by Mr.
Clark Mollenhoff. Do you recall that?
Mr. Dean. Yes ; I do.
Senator Inouye. This gentleman is the one, the fellow who worked
in the Air Force, Department of the Air Force ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. And he is the person who was requested by a duly
authorized Senate committee to testify on the C-5xA. ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
1560
Senator Inouye. I believe it is very importajit to Mr. Fitzgerald to
learn whether he was released or fired because of reduction in force
in the Air Force, as the Air Force claims, or whether he was fired
either by the Air Force or under orders of the White House or the
President, because he told the truth about the $2 billion cost overrun
of the C-5A. If we can clear the reputation of one man I think this
committee would have done well today. So, may I aska few questions ?
Mr. Dean. Senator
Senator Inouye. Was the President of the United States concerned
about the Fitzgerald case ?
Mr. Dean. May I preface my answer with this : I believe it was on
January 31 of this year that Mr. Mollenhoff raised this at a press con-
ference. The President was caught totally off guard by the answer
and what you might say is he sort of was winging it on how to respond
to Mr. Mollenhoff's question. There was a lot of misinformation that
got into the record. The President apparently confused two or three
other cases he was aware of, he had remembered the name Fitzgerald
and as a result of that Mr. Ziegler had a conversation with the Presi-
dent, after having other conversations with Mr. Mollenhoff , Mr. Ziegler
says the President wants you to get into this. I subsequently had that
instruction directly from the President also.
I had a man on my staff handle this. I was not directly handling it
and, as I told Mr. Mollenhoff when he and I had several telephone
conversations, that, I said, "Clark, this is one I am going to have to
study but I have not gotten into right yet." I still have not had a
chance to get into it and I think, based on my testimony, you can see
what I was doing, why I was not able to get into the Fitzgerald case
so I am not terribly familiar with the substance of the Fitzgerald case.
So it will be very difficult for me to answer those questions, and I had
full intention of looking into the matter but before I got to it I was
relieved from my duties at the White House.
Senator Inouye. Did the President ever tell you why he was inter-
ested in the Fitzgerald case ?
Mr. Dean. No ; he merely said, he merely said that he did not want
Mr. Mollenhoff to keep reraising it at every press conference so would
I work with him.
Senator Inouye. Do you know if Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman
were interested ?
Mr. Dean. There is a rather extensive file in the Wliite House on
Mr. Fitzgerald that was retrieved at one point by a member of my
staff who was bringing the material in so I could at least read it all.
There were the hearings and a book that Mr. Fitzgerald had written
and then there was correspondence and the like. I never got the oppor-
tunity to read those materials to make an assessment. Based on my
conversations with Mr. Wilson of my staff I thought Mr. Mollenhoff
frankly had a very good point and I thought it was something that
should be looked into, and I thought there might have been errors that
should be corrected.
Senator Inouye. You have indicated that this case was assigned to
someone on your staff.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. "WTio is this person ?
Mr. Dean. Mr. David Wilson.
1561
Senator In-ouye. Is he still in the office of the White House counsel ?
Mr. Dean. No, he has now gone, I believe to the Cost of Living
Council.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman
Mr. Dean. His departure is totally unrelated to the Watergate. He
went over there because he was looking for another job, he had
grown in the job he was in, there was a general staff reduction at the
White House, I was also to tailor some of my staff, and it was an excel-
lent opportunity for him. He is a very bright, capable young lawyer
and he is still there and I am sure he may still have some familiarity or
if he were to reexamine the records he might be able to be of some
assistance to the Senate, Senator, on this matter.
Senator iNOirrE. Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Fitzgerald's reputation has
been unjustly injured, and if this committee can in any way assist
Mr. Fitzgerald in regaining his reputation
Senator Ervix. Senator, I do not believe this matter falls within the
jurisdiction of this committee under the resolution. I think it is alien
to what we are authorized to investigate.
Senator Inotiye. I brought this up because we were discussing all
day the matter of friends and enemies and I presume this man was on
the enemy list.
Senator Er\t:n. I do not know, but we I do not believe are author-
ized to investigate Mr. Fitzgerald's case here.
Senator Ixotjte. I thought it might be well to invite Mr. Wilson to
help clear Mr. Fitzgerald. Otherwise, once again, thank you very much.
]Mr. Deax. I would merely offer this to the Senator. I think that if
Mr. Mollenhoff reraises it at one or two more press conferences it may
be given attention again. [Laughter] .
Senator Ixoute. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Ervix. Senator Gurney, do you have any further questions?
Senator Gttrxey. Just one, Mr. ChaiiTaan, to clarify the record. In
the morning session, Mr. Dean, in Mr. Inouye's, Senator Inouye's
questioning on pressure being brought to bear on any of the members
of the committee, you did mention that you had had prior dealings
with the chairman, with Senator Gurney, and with Senator Weicker.
Now, this came up in a context of pressure being brought to bear on
members of the committee and also
Mr. Deax. Xo, sir; as my recollection of the question was when we
were assessing members of the committee who I was familiar with on
the committee, and the only people that I knew by reputation or any
personal dealings on the committee were you from your years in the
House, Senator Weicker from my knowledge of him in the House,
and that was about the extent of my knowledge.
Senator Ixouye. Well, I realize that but it did come up in context,
this questioning about pressure on the committee of digging up dirt
and I thought we ought to clarify what the prior dealings were. None
of these prior dealings with the chairman. Senator Ervin, or myself,
or Senator Weicker had anything to do with Watergate ; did it ?
Mr. Deax. No, sir.
Senator Ixotjye. My recollection of my own personal contacts with
you is only one, although yours are two. One occurred in Senator
Hruska's office during the Kleindienst confirmation hearings when you
1562
got with the Republican Senators, and I was among those, on the
Judiciary Committee, and discussed the pending request to have Peter
Flanigan, a Wliite House counsel, I guess his job is to testify before
the committee in response to a request by our chairman, Senator Ervin
on the committee. That was one of the occasions, and I recall that we
suggested with our advice that the White House had better send him
up, this was a matter of executive privilege, otherwise he would not be
confirmed.
Is that your recollection of our meeting ?
Mr. Dean. That, I have a vague recollection of because I was not
the principal actor in that. The meeting I recall was during the same
set of hearings when you were going to appear on either Face the
Nation or Meet the Press or one of the national television shows and
I was instructed to provide you with briefing material for you and
your staff to go over in preparation for that appearance.
Senator Inouye. There was a discussion ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I brought Mr. Fielding up with me and we
had a very cordial, brief meeting. Mr. Fielding, I understand, had
some subsequent meetings with you and your staff, and prepared you
for that briefing session on national television.
Senator Inouye. That was the discussion with Senator Tunney, as I
recall it on the whole matter of executive privilege that came up dur-
ing the Kleindienst hearings ; is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. I think that is correct. It definitely had to do with the
Kleindienst hearings, yes.
Senator Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. Senator, I would like to state that my impression
of this matter that referred to the allegation Mr. Haldeman had called
down to North Carolina should be reference to the time I was fighting
the impoundment of funds and had no reference whatever to this com-
mittee. I was very sorry it was brought out here. I never attributed
any importance to it, and it didn't bother me at all, and my under-
standing is that it had no relation whatsoever to my service on the
Senate Select Committee but was, Mr. Haldeman was, kind of dis-
tressed because I was taking a very strong stand in respect to the Presi-
dent's power under the Constitution to impound funds.
I think that is what it was. If he did anything, I think that this is
what provoked him, and not my service on this committee and I just
think in fairness to everybody that I would state that.
Senator Weicker, Mr. Chairman, I just have one further question
along the lines of the precedents cited by the chairman and the vice
chairman, and that appears in Carl Sandburg's book on Abraham
Lincoln, "The War Years," where he writes :
Yet the talk of a Southern woman spy in the White House arrived at the point
where Senate members of the committee on the conduct of the war had set
a secret morning session for attention to tlie reports tliat Mrs. Lincoln was a
Disloyalist, so the story goes, though vaguely authenticated.
One member of the committee told of what happened. "We had just been called
to order by the chairman when the officer stationed at the committee room door
came in with a half-frightened expression on his face. Before he had opportunity
to make explanation we understood the reason for his excitement, and were
ourselves almost overwhelmed with astonishment for at the foot of the com-
mittee table stood solitary, his hat in his hands, his form towering, Abraham
1563
Lincoln stood. Had he come by some incantation thus of a sudden appearing be-
fore us unannounced we could not have been more astounded. There was almost
unhuman sadness in the eyes, and above all an indescribable sense of his com-
plete isolation which the committee felt had to do with fundamental senses of
the apparition. No one spoke, for no one knew what to say. The President had
not been asked to come before the committee nor was it susi^ected that he had
information that we were to investig'ate reports which, if true, fa.stened treason
upon his family in the White House. At last the mourning corpus spoke slowly
with control, although a depth of ^^orrow in the voice :
"I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, appear of my own voli-
tion before this committee of the Senate, to say that I, of my own knowledge,
know that it is untrue that any of my family hold treasonable communication
with the enemy."
Having attested this he went away as silent and solitary as he had come. We
sat for some moments speechless and, by tacit agreement, no word being spoken,
the committee dropped all consideration of the rumors that the wife of the
President was betraying the Union, we were so greatly affected that the com-
mittee adjourned for the day.
Senator Er\t:x. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, on another subject, having already
cited my precedent for the day and not wanting to oneupmanship my
colleagues, I have something entirely different. I have before me a
letter from Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and if there
is no objection, I would like to include it in the record and read it
briefly.
It is dated June 29, 1973, from Senator Thurmond.
Earlier testimony in today's hearing carried the impre-ssion that a friend of
mine, Mr. Harry Dent of South Carolina, might have done something improper.
I would greatly appreciate it if one of you gentlemen would set the record .straight
before today's hearings are completed. The testimony that I refer to came about
during questions asked by Senator Inouye regarding attempts made by Republi-
cans to "find dirt" on Senator Ervin. Mr. Dean said that Harry Dent had been
contacted, but no one stated that Mr. Dent declined.
I suggest that this be brought out by questioning Dean directly or by obtaining
permission to in.sert any of a number of news stories which appeared in the press
which indicated that Mr. Dent had declined to do any of that type research
against Senator Ervin. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Senator Ervix. If I may add to that, the newsman who wrote the
article informed me that he had contacted Mr. Dent and Mr. Dent
had assured him that he had had nothing whatever to do with that
matter.
Let the reporter mark the letter with the appropriate exhibit
number.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 70.*]
Senator Baker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deax. Mr. Chairman, I believe I also answered no question that
indicated any wrongdoing or misdoing on Mr. Dent's behalf. I was
merely asked what his role was, what he was doing now and I think
I misspoke myself when I said he was practicing law in North Carolina
when I meant South Carolina is the only mistake.
Senator ER^^x. If I might state further on that thing, I have stated
what Charles R. Jonas, Jr., had stated, and I want to add that I ap-
preciate that very much. I had known his grandfather, Charles A.
Jonas, who was Congressman from my district elected in 1928, and a
very fine gentleman and also his father represented a North Carolina
district which included in part my county for many years and he
•See p. 1793.
1564
rendered very distinguished service to North Carolina and the Nation
as a Congressman for a period of 20-odd years.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Mr, Dash.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, first, I think the record ought to be corrected
from yesterday's testimony. I think there is an error in the record and
would ask your assistance in correcting it. This has to do with your
reference to Mr. Fielding's knowledge and we received a letter from
Mr. Ronald B. Wertheim, counsel for Mr. Fielding.
The record as it presently reads on page 282i of yesterday's tran-
script has you testifying :
I think Mr. Fielding probably had a general awareness about the specifics of
the fact that I was involved in assisting with the eoverup.
The recollection of Mr. Wertheim, who heard your testimony, was
that you in fact said :
I think Mr. Fielding probably had a general awareness without any specifics
of the fact I was involved in assisting the eoverup.
IVhich is correct ?
Mr. Dean. I think the latter is correct as I recall the statement.
Mr. Dash. We will see that the record is corrected to reflect that.
Now, Mr. Dean, I know we have gone through all of these hearings
or meetings with the President and I am going to try to be very brief.
There is one particular meeting that I do want to go back to because I
think it is a very crucial one and I just want to liit the highlights with
you, and this is the meeting of September 15, 1972, that you had with
the President. I think it is significant. One is, as you testified frankly,
was the first meeting you had with the President on a 1-to-l basis
which was your language, and, two, it was the day, September 15, when
the indictments came down of the first Watergate ti-ial which cut off
the involvement at Liddy and you were called in to have a meeting
with the President.
Now, I think what I want to just clear up is what was a realistic
version of the meeting and perhaps an unrealistic version that may
have come up in questioning concerning that meeting.
As I understand, that what you testified to was that when you came
in, and leaving out other areas but getting to the specifics, that the
President told you that Bob Haldeman had kept him posted on how
you would handle the Watergate case. You were asked a question as
to whether or not the President had, in fact, told you about his knowl-
edge of the Watergate case or had indicated any knowledge on his
part of any of the eoverup. I think the first question I would like to
ask is would you have expected, in any relationship with the Presi-
dent, for the President to have asked you to come in and said that "Bob
Haldeman had told me about your covering up of the Watergate case,
your assisting Jeb Magruder in committing perjury" or things of that
kind?
Mr. Dean. It wasn't the nature of that type of conversation so I
would not have expected that type of further followup questioning;
no, sir.
Mr. Dash. All right. But when the President told you that Bob
Haldeman had told or kept him posted, on how you had handled the
1565
Watergate case, he also indicated from your testimony that he ap-
preciated how difficult a task it was. You were asked did you tell the
President what you in fact had done, that you had assisted Magruder
in committing perjury, that you had assisted in the coverup, that you
had limited the FBI investigation or actually gotten CIA involve-
ment. Would it have been realistic in that circumstance if the Presi-
dent said that Bob Haldeman had kept him posted and was con-
gratulating you on how you had handled your job, for you to say,
"That is right, Mr. President, you know what you are telling me is and
what I want you to know is that I had gotten Mr. Magruder to commit
perjury before the grand jury and that I had him limit the FBI
investigation, et cetera." Would that be a realistic response of yours
in such a meeting ?
Mr. Dean. I don't believe it would be, no.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, when the President told you that
Bob Haldeman had kept him posted on how you handled the Water-
gate case, you knew very well how you had handled the Watergate
case, did you not ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And in fact, it did involve having Mr. Magruder perjure
himself before the committee and other types of things such as payoffs
and limiting FBI investigation?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And you knew that Bob Haldeman knew that ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. From your knowledge of Mr. Haldeman's relationship
with the President, and you have said that when you were in that
Oval Office, you never lied to the President. From your knowledge
of Mr. Haldeman's relationship to the President, would it be your
opinion that Mr. Haldeman would lie to the President ?
Mr. Dean. It would be to the contrary. I do not think Mr. Haldeman
would lie to the President. I do not know of anybody who would
walk into the Oval Office and lie to the President.
Mr. Dash. So if Mr. Haldeman had kept the President posted on
exactly how you had handled the Watergate case, he would have told
the President exactly how you had handled the Watergate case,
including the coverup ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. You told the President, according to your own state-
ment, at that time that you had only been able to contain the case
and you could not insure that someday it would not become unraveled ;
is that not correct ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Did the President ask you what you meant by that ?
Mr. Dean. No, he did not.
Mr. Dash. Now, also at that time, you discussed the civil case. Is
that not the time you told the President that the lawyers for the
Committee To Re-Elect the President had developed an ex parte
relationship to influence the judge?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And the President, according to your statement, at that
time said, that would be helpful ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
1566
Mr. Dash. And during the course of that meeting on September 15,
you got into the Patman committee hearings.
Mr. Dean. That is correct, also.
Mr. Dash. Now, on the Patman committee hearings, what was the
concern about those hearings ?
Mr. Dean. The concern was twofold. One, it would cause further
embarrassment to the White House prior to the election by more
headlines about the Watergate. Second, it could result in the Patman
investigators stumbling into something that might start unraveling
the coverup.
Mr. Dash. Do you have a copy of exhibit No. 34-22, which you have
submitted to the committee ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I do.
Mr. Dash. Now, that exhibit has attached to it a letter or memoran-
dum under the letterhead of the U.S. House of Representatives, Com-
mittee of Banking and Currency, and it is from Chairman Wright
Patman. There is attached a list of individuals that were subpenaed
before the Patman committee.
Now, was there anything significant in that list of individuals who
were going to be subpenaed before the Patman committee?
Mr. Dean. Yes, there was.
I might add, Mr. Dash, that the list that was submitted or made
public on this date had formerly, the bulk of the list was already in the
possession of the White House and the congressional relations staff
before this was actually made up.
Mr. Dash. Your name appears on that list on page 2 ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And Mr. LaRue's name ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And a number of the witnesses who have already appeared
here and been questioned by the grand jury — McCord, Robert Mardian,
John Mitchell, Robert Odle, Herbert Porter, Hugh Sloan, Maurice
Stans.
Now, if all those witnesses had been called by the Patman committee
at the time those hearings were going to be held and had answered
according to the subpena, what in fact was the concern of the White
House ?
Mr. Dean. Well, if those hearings had been held, there is a good
chance these hearings would not be held today, because I think that
would have unraveled the coverup.
Mr. Dash. "WTiat was the instruction that you received with regard
to that on that day from the President ?
Mr. Dean. On the 15th?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Dean. After reporting to him who was handling that, he told me
to — this was really something that was said to both Mr. Haldeman
and myself — that Mr. Timmons should get on top of this matter.
Mr. Dash. Now, I think you have already testified exactly what did
occur, and as a matter of fact, those hearings never went forward.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, after all those events, after the President having
told you how Bob Haldeman had kept him posted on your handling
1567
of the Watergate case and that he appreciated how difficult a job that
was and your own statement to the President that you had only con-
tained it and that some day it might unravel, and your own statement
to the President that in a civil case, an ex parte relationship had been
established to influence the judge, and then the discussion on the Pat-
man case — frankly and honestly, ]Mr. Dean, when you left the Presi-
dent on September 15, did you just have an impression as to his knowl-
edge of the coverup, or did you have a conviction concerning that?
Mr. Deax. ;Mr. Dash, thei-e was no doubt in my mind that the Presi-
dent was aware of it and I would have to, to use your language, say
I had a conviction, or I was convinced.
Mr. Dash. Xow, Mr. Dean, I do not want to go through the other
meetings, because they have been thoroughly gone through. But at the
March 13 meeting, which again was a significant meeting, March 13,
1973, you have testified to the discussion about the possible require-
ment of $1 million and the President's response to that and the dis-
cussion of Executive clemency.
Now, the committee does have in its possession some confirmation
from the '^^Hiite House that at least the subject matter of the million
dollar discussion did occur, as well as the discussion of Executive clem-
ency. I think we know now that Mv. Fred Buzhardt contacted the com-
mittee by phone call and that minority counsel, Mr. Thompson, re-
duced his notes in the form of a memorandum. Those notes have been
reviewed in my office by Mr. Buzhardt and Mr. Garment and with
some minor exceptions, which do not relate to this particular reference
that I am going to read to you, Mr. Buzhardt and ]Mr. Garment have
informed me in my office that they were not verbatim or detailed, but
a roughly accurate memorandum of the conversation. These were
submitted to us for use by this committee for the purpose of question-
ing you at this time. I would like to identify that I am using them for
that purpose at this time.
Xow, according to the memorandum that Mr. Thompson prepared
based on that call, this meeting when the discussion, according to the
"\'\niite House, on the million dollars and Executive clemency took place
was March 21 rather than ]March 13.
Mr. Deax. That is not correct. That is not my recollection. In fact,
I am very clear on the fact that it occurred on the 13th, because the
meeting on the 21st was a totally different range of topics than the way
this rather casually came up on the 13th.
Mr. Dasii. Regardless of the date, because I am sure there will be
disagreement on the date — vou have already testified the date this
discussion came up — I think it is important, however, that I read to
you the reconstruction of this meeting from the point of view of the
"WHiite House at that meeting and what was said. This is from Mr.
Thompson's notes which, as I have indicated, was his putting down
what he recalled from the telephone call from Fred Buzhardt, special
counsel to the President :
Mr. Dean stated that Hunt was trying to blackmail Ehrlichman about Hunt's
prior plumber activities unless he was paid what ultimately might amount to
$1 million. The President said how could it possibly be paid. "What makes you
think he would be satisfied with that?", stated it was blackmail, that it was
wrong, that it would not work, that the truth could come out anyway. Dean had
said that a Cuban group could possibly be used to transfer the payments. Dean
said Colson had talked to Hunt about executive clemency.
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 15
1568
Now, is that to your recollection, a correct statement of how that
conversation took place, or is your statement the correct
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; my recollection is there was no discussion of the —
it appears to me what they have done is take what I did raise on the
S-lst regarding Mr. Hunt's direct threat of a blackmail nature to John
Ehrlichman and confused it with an earlier meeting which occurred
on March 13, when the $1 million conversation came up, and put the
two together some way.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you recall the President ever telling you that it
was wrong to pay this $1 million ?
Mr. Dean. To the contrary. He said it would be no problem to raise
the $1 million.
Mr. Dash. Now, also, the next item in this memorandum states that
the President spoke to — I think that was —
Mr. Dean spoke to Haldeman's return of the $350,000. He said that Haldeman
and Ehrlichman possibly had no legal guilt with regard to the money matters.
Did you make such a statement ?
Mr. JDean. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Let me go back again :
Mr. Dean said nothing of his role with regard to the coverup money. He said
nothing about his discussions with Magruder helping him prepare for the grand
jury. He said nothing of his instructions to Caulfield to offer executive clemency.
Was that true, on the 21st ?
Mr. Dean. I think the contrary is true and I will rely on my state-
ment, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Now, there is another reference or that meeting on the
21st which we have from this oral communication from the White
House. It says "Dean said Colson had talked to Mr. Hunt about execu-
tive clemency."
Is that the way you had put it to the President ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir. As I recall, this initially came up on — the 13th
was the first time it came up and the second time it came up was on the
15th. I believe I have testified several times to the way that did occur
and I respectfully disagree with that interpretation.
Mr. Dash. Well, but, as stated, if in fact Mr. Dean had said that
Colson had talked to Hunt about Executive clemency, and there is
nothing further in this memorandum, if the President had not author-
ized Executive clemency, would you have expected the President to
have raised a question about that and called upon you or somebody
who had authority to have Mr. Colson retract that ?
Mr. Dean. Only the President can promise Executive clemency
and Mr. Colson was quite aware of that. I think that the facts are that,
in fact, Mr. Colson had talked to the President, who in turn had — then
Colson talked to Mr. Bittman, who in turn talked to Mr. Hunt.
Mr. Dash. Well, I just want the record to show that in this submis-
sion by the White House to the committee, the reference to the Execu-
tive clemency merely shows that Mr. Dean said Colson had talked to
Hunt about Executive clemency. There was no reference to any re-
action of the President, whether he had said that he had not authorized
that and whether in fact, he indicated that whoever had done that,
especially Mr. Colson, with Mr. Hunt, that that was to be retracted.
1569
The submission does not have that in it in a reconstruction of the
so-called White House call.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to just have this introduced as part of
the record, which I have already identified as a memorandum based
on a call.
Senator Ee\t[x. Without objection, it will be so identified and made
a part of the record.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 70A.*]
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman. I think that is appropriate to make
that a part of the record, but I think its character ought to be under-
stood. This does not, as I understand it, represent a definitive "A^Tiite
House position," but rather are the transcribed notes of a telephone
conversation between Mr. Buzhardt, an attorney of the "\Aniite House,
and Mr. Thompson, which were turned over to Mr. Dash and reviewed
subsequently by Mr. Garment and Mr. Buzhardt.
Mr. Dash. Yes, and I just want to give their statement as to what
they intended to do and that was their reconstruction, having talked
to persons who had knowledge of what had occurred in these meetings
between the President and Mr. Dean. It was basically a reconstruction
given to us for the purpose of use in qviestioning Mr. Dean.
Senator Baker. I think that, Mr. Chairman, as I said a moment
ago, is appropriate for that purpose at this time. But I caution against,
if I may, taking that as a statement of a l^Tiite House position or a
Presidential statement at this time, and I would rather keep the record
open on that and see if we can't do a little bit about it.
Mr. Dash. I accept that, Senator, and I only submit it as you limit it.
Senator Er^t:n. I will make the same statement about it that I made
at the time Mr. Dean was cross-examined about the statement which
had come, at least infrequently, from Mr. Buzhardt. This is not evi-
dence, it is a statement of Mr. Buzhardt's position or supposed position
as counsel.
[The document referred to was previously entered as exhibit Xo. 66
in hearing of June 27 ; see p. 1412.]
Senator Ervin. Yesterday, Senator Montoya suggested that the
committee issue a subpena for Mr. Buzhardt and I suggested at that
time that instead of so doing, we should have inquiry made of Mr.
Buzhardt if he claimed to have any personal knowledge of the matters
mentioned in his so-called Buzhardt statement. I am informed that
Mr. Buzhardt says he has no personal knowledge of those matters.
Mr, Dash. I informed the chairman that I had such a call with
Mr. Buzhardt and as to personal knowledge, he referred to both his
reconstruction and to the statement that this is something he prepared
as counsel, having discussed it with others, or used other information
in preparing it.
Now, with regard to your involving Mr. Kalmbach in the raising
of funds and in the so-called payoffs to maintain silence of the defend-
ants, I think j'ou were, yesterday, by Senator Gurney in his very
thorough cross-examination, examined as to whether or not Mr. Kalm-
bach really understood from your discussions with him just what he
was doing when he was being asked to raise money for the payoffs.
You had indicated that you clearly understood that he did under-
stand, because you had fully informed him as to the circumstances.
The question clearly was raised whether or not Mr. Kalmbach could
•See p. 1794.
1570
have gotten the impression that this was for humanitarian purposes,
sort of to raise a defense fund.
Now, first, Mr. Dean, I think you testified that you told Mr. Kalm-
back just prior to asking him to undertake this assignment what the
circumstances were.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Could you just briefly, very briefly, tell us, what did you
tell Mr. Kalmbach?
Mr. Dean. Well, I told him everything that I knew about the case
at that time. I told him that I was very concerned that this could lead
right to the President. I didn't have any hard facts. I hoped that I was
incorrect. I explained to him in full the seriousness of the matter. I
relayed to him the fact that some records had been destroyed. I told
him virtually everything I knew at that time and I think there was no
doubt in his mind about the sensitivity of the situation.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, Mr. Dean, is there anything wrong,
for instance, if somebody working for you — and after all, Liddy and
McCord did work for the Committee To Re-Elect the President — is
there anything wrong if anybody works for you and gets in trouble,
about your picking up expenses — defense funds and things like that.
Defense funds have been raised.
'If that was the attitude of the "Wliite House and if that was the atti-
tude of the Committee To Re-Elect the President for Mr. Liddy, Mr.
McCord, whoever else they involved, would they not at least have tried
to dig up a collection from all those working for the White House and
the committee, to raise a defense fund? Isn't that the way you raise
defense funds for defendants ?
Mr. Dean. I am not familiar with raising defense funds, but you
don't use covert means to raise humanitarian funds.
Mr. Dash. Do you use moneys that have been given to a committee
to reelect a President of the United States ?
Mr. Dean. In covert fashion ?
Mr. Dash. In raising a defense fund for those who may have been
cauirht in a covert act, do you use campaign funds
Mr. Dean. No, you don't.
Mr. Dash. Is that a proper use of funds given in a campaign for re-
election of a President ?
Mr. Dean. No, it is not.
Mr. Dash. You spoke of your knowledge of clandestine payments.
Can you tell us of your knowledge of the clandestine nature of the
way in which these payments were made ?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Kalmbach asked me if I would have Mr. Ulasewicz
call him when he returned to California. He said he didn't have his
phone number at that time and would like to have him reach him as
soon as he got back. In a few subsequent conversations I had with IMr.
Kalmbach, he had developed what he called code names for various
individuals. I think I referred to these earlier. He called Mr. Hunt
the Writer. He called Mr. Haldeman the Brush.
Mr. Dash. Do you know what ho called Mrs. Hunt ?
Mr. Dean. The writer's wife, I think, maybe. Something, I don't
know.
Mr. Dash. Like who is buried in Grant's Tomb.
1571
Mr. Dean. I don't really know.
Mr. Dash. Do you know, by the way, whether Mr. Ulasewicz had
a code name? Did you know that he was called Mr. Rivers in the
conversation with ^Ir. Kalmbach and Mr. Ulasewicz ?
Mr. Dean. I think I did hear that subsequently from Mr. Kalmbach,
that he had referred to him as Mr. Rivers.
Mr. Dash. Now, again, if one were to, on the basis of decency,
humanitarianism, whatever way you want to call it, raise a defense
fund, would one go about clandestinely using code names of that kind
to secretly make these payoffs ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. I think we will have Mr. Kalmbach here to testify as to
that in much more detail.
Now, did Mr. Kalmbach tell you about any of the instructions that
he had as the man who was to make these payoffs ?
Mr. Dean. He told me when I met him in Lafayette Park that he
was going to meet Mr. Ulasewicz at that point in time and that he was
going to have the money laundered. That is the only thing I know
about that. He never did tell me exactly how money was laundered. I
asked him and he said, I don't know. I don't know if he goes to the
race track and exchanges it there or if he's got friends in New York
that exchange it; I was never exactly clear on how money was
laundered.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Kalmbach ever tell you that he had had any
discussion with Mr. Ehrlichman concerning this role?
Mr. Dean. The only time I had heard of any discussion was when —
well, Mr. Kalmbach had numerous discussions with Mr. Ehrlichman
that I was aware of. Mr. Kalmbach, when he would come into town,
would have a list that he would keep in his pocket that he would check
off each item with each individual he wanted to talk with. He is a very
thorough man. He never told me what he was going over with Mr.
Ehrlichman on his list. The only time I had heard about his discussing
this at all with Mr. Ehrlichman was after April — or, let's see, March
29 or 30, when they were in California for President Thieu's visit. He
said to me he had met with Mr. Ehrlichman that week to discuss the
fact that he was concerned that when he appeared before this com-
mittee, he didn't want to ever have the name of the contributor come
out, the person who had raised this money, and he had had some dis-
cussion with him.
What other discussions — I know he had met with Mr. Ehrlichman
on countless occasions.
Mr. Dash. Did ISTr. Kalmbach ever tell you to your knowledge that
Mr. Ehrlichman had indicated that the President had approved these
payments ?
Mr. Dean. Did Mr. Kalmbach tell me ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Dean. No, he did not.
Mr. Dash. Did you learn in any other way ?
Mr. Dean. No. not that I recall.
Mr. Dash. In your exhibit No. 84-47, Mr. Dean, you list Mr. Stans.
I think you pretty well identified a number of the others and I think
it may be interesting to the committee, Mr. Stans having testified be-
1572
fore the committee, why you listed his name. This was a list, to recall
it for you, that you put certain markings by those who were lawyers.
This was a list of those you thought had problems as far as criminal
charges. Why was Mr. Stans put on your list ?
Mr. Dean. Well, this was based on — first of all, you will note on the
list I have question marks beside certain people. On some of those
people, I knew what I knew, I knew what evidence I had in my mind of
their own involvement. I didn't know about Stans, I didn't know how
involved he had or had not been. For that reason, I put a question
mark beside his name because I hadn't had any direct dealings with
him that would indicate it, but there were certain circumstantial situa-
tions and I was not sure. So that is why the question marks on some of
these.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Dean, just going back very briefly to the testi-
mony concerning the $15,200 which had been given to you by Mr.
Strachan, Mr. Howard and Mr. Strachan, that you put in your safe.
And the fact that you had taken from that an amount of about
$4,800
Mr. Dean. $4,850.
Mr. Dash. $4,850 for your own personal use ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. I think this has not been brought out in the testimony
and I would like to ask you this question.
Can you tell the committee when was the first time you told anybody
about your removing $4,850 ?
Mr. Dean. When I first went to my lawyer, sometime shortly after
I had gotten through an explanation of all the facts that I knew, I got
into this particular problem and raised that with him.
Mr. Dash. Therefore, he was the first one in the world, so to speak,
who first learned about your doing that ?
Mr. Dean, That is correct.
Mr. Dash. If you had wanted to conceal that — if you were interested
in, using the term that has been used here, embezzle, if you had wanted
to conceal your use of that money, could you not just as well, before
telling your lawyer about that, have replaced that money and told
your lawyer that you had $15,200 in the safe ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I could have.
Mr. Dash. T^Hiy, then, did you tell your lawyer about it?
Mr. Dean. Because I thought that would be an untruthful thing to
do and I thought I would tell him the facts the way they were. Mr.
Dash, I might also add that I asked my lawyer to go to the Govern-
ment with this information right away, so they knew that.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, I think it is important that we discuss that and
the fact that vour lawver and you opened up a trustee account and
deposited the full $15,200, which was the balance left in the safe of the
cash plus your own personal check of $4,850, which you replaced the
original check with, so that vou made it whole.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to give some photostatic copies we have
of that transaction to Mr. Dean if he could identifv them for us.
Mr. Dean. You want me to identifv these for the record?
Mr. Dash. Would vou, for the record ?
Mr. Dean. This document, dated April 24, is a letter from Mr.
Shaffer.
1573
Another document is a check dated April 12, 1973, written out to
INIr. Hogan and Mr. Shaffer, trustees, for $4,850, and signed by myself.
There is a receipt written out by Mr. Shaffer of that amount — no,
it is for the full amount, I take that back. I can't even read the writing
here. It indicates the full amount.
There is a cashier's check written out for $10,350.
Mr. Dash. What does that cashier's check represent?
Mr. Dean. It is drawn on the Suburban Trust Co. It represents the
cash that was deposited at that account.
There are signature cards that were prepared with Mr. Hogan
being stricken and Mr. McKeever being replaced on that as a trustee
as a result of Mr. Hogan having to withdraw from the case for other
reasons.
Then there are additional signature cards.
It looks like on the next document, there is a repeat of the earlier
document for the Suburban Trust check. The numbers are the same at
the top, so we have already identified that check.
Then there is a subsequently issued check when Mr. Hogan withdrew
from the case and it was necessary to put Mr, McKeever on a new check
so that a new check drawn by me to the order of Mr. Shaffer and Mr.
McKeever for $4,850.
The next appears to be endorsements on the back of these checks;
and a signature card.
Mr. Dash. Will you read the letter for the committee, please ?
Mr. Dean. [Reads :]
Dear Garnett : Enclosed you will find : (1) client's check dated April 20, 1973,
numbered 1647 payable to the order of myself and Mr. McKeever as Trustees in
the amount of $4,850.00 which we have suitably endorsed to the Bank; (2) the
Bank's Treasurer's check dated April 19, 1973, in the amount of $10,350.00 cover-
ing the cash I delivered to you for safekeeping on Friday, April 13, 1973, pending
the opening of an account; and (3) the two signature cards signed by Mr. Dean,
myself and my partner, McKeever.
As you know, when we first discussed opening the account I contemplated that
Thomas Hogan, Esquire, would be cotrustee with myself inasmuch as he then
also represented Mr. Dean. However, subsequent developments (conflict of inter-
est) have required Mr. Hogan to withdraw from tlie representation and, accord-
ingly, my partner, McKeever, is acting as cotrustee.
Tliis change also required Mr. Dean to substitute his enclosed check numbered
1647 for his check numbered 1643 originally payable to Mr. Hogan and myself as
Trustees. I have had Mr. Dean void the latter check by tearing his signature
therefrom and it remains in our files.
Should you be inquired of by competent authorities as to the opening of this
account, please tell them all you know, including whatever I have told you.
Thank you for your cooperation in the matter.
Sincerely,
Shaffer, McKeever & Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Dash. Who is it addressed to ?
Mr. Dean. Garnett Inscoe, Suburban Trust Co., 255 North Wash-
ington St., Rockville, Md., April 4, 1973.
Mr, Dash, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that identified and
introduced into the record.
Senator Ervin. That will be done. The reporter will number it ap-
propriately as an exhibit and receive it into the record as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 71,*]
•See p. 1801.
1574
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, I don't know whether
Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Chairman, there is one statement I could make
with respect to one of those documents that would clarify what I think
would be confusing. I would be glad to do it under oath or off oath,
and if any member of your committee objects to me making a state-
ment and you rule that I can't, I won't, but I would like to. It relates
to the Suburban Trust treasurer's check. May I make the statement ?
Senator Ervin. Is there any objection from any member of the
committee ?
f No response.]
Senator Ervin. Suppose you stand up and I will administer the
oath.
Do you swear that the evidence you shall give the Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth,
the wliole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Shaffer. I do.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES N. SHAETER, ESQ., COUNSEL TO
JOHN DEAN III
Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Chairman, after my client had given me the cash
and a current check made payable to me and Hogan, and after I had
gone to the Government with the currency so that they could look
at the — Xerox it, do whatever they wanted with it, I got to the bank.
I was carrying it around about a day. I was a little uncomfortable. I
got to the Ibank about 2:05 on a Friday, and it was in April. It was,
I believe, in early April. The records will show; the receipt there
will date it. And I knocked on Mr. Inscoe's window and he came
around to the door and he opened it up, because he knows me. My
law office is right near the bank. I have a very small account there,
and he treats me as a good customer, nevertheless.
I said, Garnett, I have got all this cash, and I don't want to have
it over the weekend ; will you take it ?
So he said, yes, he would take it and he would give me a receipt.
Then on Monday and Tuesday, we were having trouble with Mr.
Hogan and his conflict-of-interest problem, and we never got the
signature cards back, and finally, Garnett said, "Look, I can't hold this
cash around here forever. I am going to give you a treasurer check
at the bank so I can then pass the currency through the account." That
is how this treasurer's check came into being.
Thank you. If anybody wants to cross-examine me, I will be glad
to answer questions.
Senator Baker. Mr. Shaffer, no, I don't want to cross-examine
you, but I can't resist the temptation to let the record note that you
claim and continue to stand on and have not waived the attorney-
client privilege.
Mr. Shaffer. Thank you. I appreciate the comment
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, on page 202 of your statement, vou state down
toward the bottom, "Mr. Mitchell raised the fact that F. Lee Bailey,
who had been verv helpfnl in dealing with McCord" had a problem —
what are the details, or what to youi- knowledge was meant by Mr. F.
Lee Bailev, wlio had been helpful in dealing with McCord, from Mr.
Mitchell's point?
1575
["Testimony of John W. Dean III, continued.]
Mr. Dean. Well, I believe I testified to this fact earlier, Mr. Dash.
There was one point when ]Mr. Alch apparently was not havinp; full
rapport with his client, Mr. McCord, that an arrangement or discus-
sion was to be had. I testified, I belieA^e I didn't know that in fact that
had occurred, in which Mr. Mitchell was going to call Mr. Bailey.
INIr. Bailey was going to fly in or call or visit with Mr. McCord and
promised Mr. McCord that he would represent his case on April and
at that time to the highest court in the land, if necessary. That was
what the reference is to.
Mr. Dash. Now, I don't know whether you fully replied to Senator
Montoya's question when he asked the question that concerned the
President's news conference of August 29, 1972, and the question had
been put to the President :
Mr. President, wouldn't it be a good idea for a special prosecutor, even from
your standpoint, to be appointed to investigate the contribution situation and also
the Watergate case?
The President:
With regard to who is investigating it now, I think it would be well to notice
that the FBI is conducting a full field investigation. The Department of Justice,
of course, is in charge of the prosecution and presenting the matter to the grand
jury. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee is conducting an investigation.
Now, can you identify who the President meant, for Senator Mon-
toya, when he was referring to the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee also conducting an investigation?
Mr. Deax. That was a known fact that the Patman committee
was
Mr. Dash. That was the Patman committee?
Mr. Deax. Yes ; correct.
Mr. Dash. And here the President was responding that the Patman
committee was making an investigation ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. But, in fact, when the President was making that state-
ment, was the "WHiite House strategy to halt the Patman committee
investigation ?
Mr. Deax. It was to try to impede that investigation.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, in your statement, page 101, you state that the
lawyers at the reelection committee were hopeful of slowing down
the Democratic National Committee suit, as a result of ex parte con-
tacts with the judge. "V\niat was the extent and source of your informa-
tion on the subject?
Mr. Deax. I first learned of this in a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office
in which I was told that there were some arrangements had been made
to have somebody, at that time I did not know who, talk with Judge
Richey about the problems the case presented for the reelection com-
mittee and potentially for the "White House, without getting into
specifics with the judge. I later learned and was present when Mr.
ISIcFee had a direct discussion with Mr. Michell about this subject, and
the fact that he was going to go visit with the judge, and then as late
as March 2 of this year, Mr. McFee came to my office^not to my office,
he came to have lunch with me at the "^^Hiite House and told me that
A'Cry weekend he was going to go take up a matter which he said
Kenny, referring to Ken Parkinson, had said was an aspect of the case
1576
that he was concerned about, so there were several people, I think, who
were aware of this. I think Mr. LaRue was aware of it ; I think Mr.
Mitchell was aware of it.
Mr. Dash. Did you have personal knowledge of that other than what
you had been told ?
Mr. Dean. Only what I was told directly by Mr. McFee, that he,
in fact, was going to visit the judge. I was not present at any meetings
with the judge ; no, sir.
Mr. Dash. Do you know that at a hearing on September 21, 1972,
before Judge Charles R. Richey, the judge to whom the case was as-
signed, that counsel for the plaintiffs, the Democratic National Com-
mittee, agreed as a practical matter that the case could not be tried
before the election ? Did you know that ?
Mr. Dean. I did not follow the civil cases at all to speak of, other
than just general awareness ; I was probably aware of that at the time,
but I do not know — I know there were countless meetings with Judge
Richey with all counsel present. In fact, virtually every meeting he
had directly relating to the case he would call all counsel and all inter-
ested parties. The meetings I am referring to did not involve all
counsel.
Mr. Dash. Do you know at the same hearing that the judge ruled
that depositions should cease to be taken for the time being on the
ground that the taking of depositions might jeopardize the pending
criminal case ?
Mr. Dean. I was aware of the fact that about that time that the
depositions had been cut off temporarily anyway.
Mr. Dash. Are you personally familiar with any of the other rulings
of Judge Richey that were made during the pendency of the Demo-
cratic National Committee case that occurred prior to the election ?
Mr. Dean. No, I am not.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, you have no other knowledge, really,
of that matter other than what Mr. Parkinson or other lawyers told
you about that ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, you indicated that on April 15, meeting with the
President, the President in bringing up the question of the million-
dollar discussion, told you that he was joking. When he first mentioned
that to you, Mr. Dean^ did he indicate in any way that he was joking,
or did you understand him to be joking ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir, I did not understand him to be joking. He re-
peated it twice, and indicated that there would be no problem to raise
$1 million. He looked over at Mr. Haldeman and raised the same
matter, and was very confident that $1 million was nothing to raise
at all. I'V^en he reraised it on the 15th, when he said he was just
joking, I would have to characterize his characterization as being a
rather nervous laughter kind of , "I was just joking."
Mr. Dash. I think you testified, and you may have given us informa-
tion on this, that you" believe that April 15 meeting with the President
was taped and that you were being asked leading questions. Have you
ever asked the White House if you were taped, or any official of the
White House?
1577
Mr. Dean. I raised it with my lawyer, and I do not know whether he
raised this with the prosecutors or not, but after I was told that I had
been taped
Mr. Dash. '\Mio told you, Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Deax. ]My lawyer, Mr. Shaffer, told me, that he had received
word from the prosecutors that I had been taped, and I thought there
was only one occasion when that could have occurred that I was aware
of where I had a direct conversation with the President, because all
the circumstances seem to indicate that, and that was on this April 15
meeting. Now, I do not know for a fact whether he was or was not
taped, but suggested that the Government might want to listen to that
tape because if they listened to that tape, they would have some idea of
the dimensions of what was involved.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, I just want to refer to exhibit No. 34-15 and
this is the exhibit that has first a memorandum from Mr. Charles
Colson to you, reference Howard Hunt. The memorandum itself also
includes a short memorandum from "W. Richard Howard who, I under-
stand, was Mr. Colson's assistant ; am I not correct ? Mr. Howard was
Mr. Colson's assistant, was he not ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, yes. I have your exhibit now.
Mr. Dash. All right. On that March 30 memorandum from Mr.
Howard on the second paragraph the opening line is "Howard," mean-
ing Howard Hunt, "has been very effective for us." Have you an
understanding what he meant bv that ? It is a memorandum for Bruce
Kehrli.
Mr. Deax. No, I do not. I am not fully familiar other than what
some of the things that I recall and I have recalled to this committee
that I saw in the files of Mr. Hunt's that related to Mr. Colson, that
in fact, he had a close relationship with Mr. Colson.
Mr. Dash. What was your understanding of the "us" in that, "How-
ard Hunt has been very effective for us."
Mr. Deax. Tliat would be a reference to Mr. Colson and Mr. Howard
and Mr. Colson's general office.
Mr. Dash. Would you look at exhibit No. 34-37? This exhibit dated
February 28, 1973, which has the heading "Administratively Confi-
dential," is for Larr^^ Higby and John Dean and is from Jerry Jones.
A^Hio is Jerry Jones ?
Mr. Deax. He is the head of the personnel office, and I might add
that while this was addressed to me it took me several days to get this
memorandum. It did not come directly to me, and I finally got the
copy I had after having to make several calls to get the copy so that
the memorandum really was not directly to me and I think I did not
get an original, rather I got a Xerox.
Mr. Dash. Now the subject matter says what "Options for Jeb
Magruder."
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. '\^niat was it all about ? "\^^ly was this memorandum writ-
ten and what do they mean by ojitions for Jeb Magruder?
Mr. Deax. Well, it was shortly before this time that Mr. Magruder
had been making some statements to Mr. O'Brien which I had in turn
relayed to Mr. Haldeman. These statements were to the effect that Mr.
Haldeman — that he was aware of Mr. Haldeman's involvement in cer-
1578
tain aspects of the pre-April or pre- June 17 aspects of the Watergate,
and he was indicating to Mr. O'Brien that, in fact, it was his under-
standing that the President might have had knowledge of this.
When I reported this back to Mr. Haldeman, the interest in finding
Mr. Magruder a job increased about tenfold, and this is the product of
that.
Mr. Dash. Then it would fair to characterize this memorandum as a
memorandum to show what could be done for Jeb Magruder to help
him out in that case ?
Mr. Dean. That is right.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, let me read to you the opening part
of that memorandum which indicates that perhaps some pressure might
have to be brought to get him a job. "Listed below are nine possible
options for Jeb. Some will break more china to secure than others.
Where there are problems I have so noted them." What is your inter-
pretation of "some will break more china than others?"
Mr. Dean. I do not know exactly. That could mean one of many
things, that given, the given head of an agency might have had a var-
ious level of tolerance for the White House continuing to place people
in their agencies. It could mean that people would w^ant to know about
Magruder's awareness which I do not know if Mr. Jones had any
awareness that Mr. Magruder had problems, but whether Mr. Higby
had related that to them or not, I certainly did not so it is very hard
for me to interpret exactly what that phrase means and I think only
Mr. Jones can testify what he meant by that.
Mr. Dash. I think it is fair for the record of this committee to
clarify here. Is it your testimony that Mr. Jerry Jones, who had been
asked to prepare this memorandum and seek out these options, did
not himself, of your knowledge, know what Mr. Magruder's problems
were or know anything about the Watergate coverup ?
Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge. In fact, when I was talking about
this with Higby before Mr. Jones prepared this, one of the jobs I had
heard of after talking with Jeb that he might be interested in was
the job that ends up as No. 1, which was the assistant to the Secre-
tary or Deputy Undersecretary of Commerce for Policy Development.
And apparently, Mr. Higbv relaved that on to Mr. Jones, No, I do not
know when I first heard of that job but I did, when Magruder came by
I mentioned I heard of that job and he expressed immediate interest
in it.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, you testified you were asked by Mr. Mac-
Greffor to tell him the true facts and that you testified that you checked
with Mr. Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman said no that you should not
tell Mr. MacGregor the true facts. Do you recall what Mr. Mac-
Gregor's reaction was when you refused to tell him the true facts
or how did you handle that ?
Mr. Dean. Well, what I did was I gave him the most evasive song
and dance I could to weave him through the problems he was goin.Qr
to have down there, and I recall that as soon as Mr. MacGrearor would
have a press conference that peo]ile at tlie Wiite House who hit the
ceiling because he would say something that would create more prob-
lems than it would solve, and I felt very sorrv for Mr. MacGregor
because he did not know what he should say and what he should not
1579
say and he had been given a lot of assurances that were assurances he
should not have been given, and I think, I am sure I am not the only
one he asked for assurances, I am sure he asked othere for assurances
and was given them, that there was notliing to be concerned about.
Mr. Dash. You have also testified, Mr. Dean, that after the Presi-
dent's August 29 speech, and that is the speech of the so-called Dean
report of no White House involvement, that you discussed with Mr.
Moore and others the possibility of your becoming a fall guy.
Now, how could you meaningfully discuss it with Mr. Moore without
Mr. INIoore having the facts ? Did Mr. Moore have the facts at that time ?
Mr. Deax. Xot at that time. I — it was long after that that I began —
I do not recall exactly when, when I first started discussing this, as I
recall, I was discussing it with Mr. Fielding, and I thought that if this
statement crumbles, I crumble with it. I am a man who is out in front
saying that everybody is clean, and this is something I did not exactly
want, and that is why I began to talk to people about : Am I being put
out in front? I can recall discussing it with Mr. Mitchell at one time,
and he assured me, he told me, his answer was, "If you ever see any
sign of that please tell me because I will speak directly with the
President."
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Dean, you testified, of course, quite at length
this week, firet a full day of statement and then all these days of
examination, cross-examination. But I think in the course of your
testimony you have made it fairly clear that you have had experience
both in the legislative branch and the executive branch and very full
experience in this unfortunate occurrence which was the coverup of the
"Watergate and perhaps some complicity in the Watergate itself.
Now, a major reason for this committee sitting and hearing all these
facts certainl}' is not that of a prosecutor but of a committee of the
Senate in order to come forward with legislative recommendations and,
especially in this case, recommendations to prevent this kind of thing
from ever happening again in this country.
You were a major and key figure in so many intimate parts of this
massive coverup and activity which became the Watergate scandal and
coverup.
Can you give this committee any reconunendation either now in
brief, and later in writing to the committee, which can assist this
committee in formulating its recommendation to the Congress so that
this kind of thing can never happen again in oui" country?
Mr. Dean. INIr. Dash, I am quite aware of the fact that the purpose
of this committee is legislative, and you are looking for answers to
problems and that the man who has been right in the middle of those
problems, and right in the middle of the White House for quite a while
and has seen the way things have operated down in the executive
branch. I have given this considerable thought, and with the permis-
sion of the chairman and the committee what I would like to do at
some point, because I have made some rather Jengthy notes as I have
thought about this, over the last several months, as to potential legisla-
tive steps that might be taken by this committee under consideration,
that I feel might provide some answers to preventing this sort of thing
from occurring again and I would like to submit that at a subsequent
date to the committee rather than go on to what would be a rather
extensive discussion of legislative remedies.
1580
Mr. Dash. Thank you, Mr. Dean. I have no further questions, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I might add since the document which I dictated
subsequent to my conversation with Mr. Buzhai dt has been made part
of the record that it was submitted to me with the understanding that
it would be made available for committee use. There was no discussion
as to exactly how that document or the subsequent document that I
might prepare would be used, although there was certainly no limita-
tion in any manner as to how it might be used. I maght also add there
was no discussion as to the source of the information which Mr. Buz-
hardt was imparting to me but that it was one lawyer's position to
another lawyer.
Mr. Dean, you have testified and referring to your statement on page
144, that you had a meeting with Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Mitchell, and Mr.
Alch. Mr. Alch has testified.
Mr. Dean. Mr. Alch, I never met with Mr. Alch, I am sorry, I am
trying to get to that page.
Mr. Thompson. I am sorry, you are right, it was a report of the
meeting. I will relate the portion I am referring to, "Sometime during
this period that as a result of my repoit of Caulfield meeting with
McCord that O'Brien, Mitchell, and Alch discussed having F. Lee
Bailey meet with McCord, et cetera." I assume then that discussion
was not in your presence either ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know Mr. Alch's relationship with either
Mr. O'Brien or Mr. Mitchell at that time ?
Mr. Dean. No, I do not.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know why he was present at that partic-
ular meeting at that time ?
Mr. Dean. It is my understanding that Mr. O'Brien — I am not sure
Mr. Mitchell was present. I have not seen the paragraph you are re-
ferring to.
Mr. Thompson. The first full paragraph.
Mr. Dean. On page 145 of my testimony ?
Mr. Thompson. 144. That O'Brien, Mitchell, and Mr. Alch dis-
cussed havinfr F. Lee Bailev, I assume that as a discussion, one discus-
sion with all these gentlemen present ?
Mr. Dean. Well, this is what I am referring to here, if you read
it, is that there was sometime during this period that as a result of
mv reports of Caulfield's meetings with INIcCord, that O'Brien,
Mitchell and Alch discussed. That does not indicate a meeting, and
I am not aware of any meeting.
Mr. Thompson. I see.
Mr. Dean. It is intei'communication among these individuals that
I am referring to, and I was not directly privy to any of these but I
had a j^eneral understanding that Mr. O'Brien had request contacts
with Mr. Alch, and he, in turn, would report back to Mr. Mitchell. I
am not aware of any contact between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Alch.
Mr. Thompson. I see. So vou assume that vour information was
from Mr. O'Brien and that he had gotten his information directly
from Mr. Alch ?
1581
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. That is your assumption.
Let me ask you this: About this $350,000 of which you received
$15,200, did I understand you to say that you understood that part
of this money came from the 1970 congressional campaign?
Mr. Dean.*^ ]\Iy understanding was that the money came from the
1968 primaries.
Mr. Thompson. 1968 primaries ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know what particular route that money
traveled in order to get from those primary campaigns to the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect?
Mr. Dean. To the best of my recollection what I was told is that it
went to New York during 1968, was kept in safety deposit boxes in
New York, it subsequently came from safety deposit boxes in New
York to safety deposit boxes in Washington.
Mr. Thompson. In whose custody was it in in New York?
Mr. Dean. I believe it was in Mr. Kalmbach's custody in New York
but I don't have the actual facts as to who had the actual safety
deposit boxes.
Mr. Thompson. Would it not be appropriate for that money to have
gone to the cono:ressional campaign committee ?
Mr. Dean. The 1968 primary money ?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Dean. Mr. Thompson, I was not making any decisions in 1968
about that money.
Mr. Thompson. I am not holding you accountable. This is strictly
a collateral matter, it is a matter that vou wound up with money in
your safe or perhaps a part of it, or the Committee To Re-Elect wound
up with money that they were using, according to some of the testi-
monv we have had, in paying these defendants.
]Mr. Dean. That is correct.
]Mr. Thompson. I was wondering for my own information where
that money should have gone after the 1968 primaries were over; in
whose custody it was.
Mr. Dean. Well, I gather what the intention was after the 1968
primaries and the 1968 general election that there was, I recall a figure
of $1.9 million being left. Now, I am sure your committee investigators
are trying to reconstruct the totality of this cash, and I don't know
what hapnend to all that monev. I know Mr. Kalmbach told me what
happened to some of it, and some of it was spent for polling that I
mentioned earlier todav, that some of it was spent for payment to
Mr. Wallace's opponent's campaign, and the remainder of it was still
surplus monev. Now there was other surplus monev that came in from
the 1970 campaign, congressional campaign effort that apparently was
kept separate also is mv understanding but, you know, I am not inti-
mately familiar with these details at all.
Mr. Thompson. "WHiere did you get your information concerning
the monev going to Mr. Wallace's opponent?
Mr. Dean. From Mr. Kalmbach.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Kalmbach told you that?
INIr. Dean. That is correct.
1582
Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate he had personal dealings in that
matter ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, he did.
Mr. Thompson. What did he say exactly about that?
Mr. Dean. He indicated to me that he had made a disbursement
of the surplus money to a — he didn't give me the mechanics of it, to
that purpose.
Mr. Thompson. Who was Mr. Wallace's opponent at that time?
Mr. Dean. I think it was ]\Ir. Brewer, as I recall.
Mr. Thompson. Governor Brewer. And he said what, excuse me.
Mr. Dean. That money had gone to that campaign from these funds.
Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate whether there were any intermedi-
aries in that particular transaction ?
Mr. Dean. This discussion was, I guess it was, in late February
of this year, in which he was recounting to me generally what had
happened to the money he had had in his custody because he was trying
to reconstruct in his own mind. Apparently he had no records at this
point in time, and he was trying to reconstruct the areas that he could
recall as to how the disbursements of the money that had come from
New York had traveled. And this is all, I just recall this point sticking
in my mind as one of the things he said.
Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate that money had gone to any other
Democratic candidates ?
Mr. Dean. I am not sure that Mr. Brewer was a Democratic candi-
date, was he?
Mr. Thompson. Well, he was.
Mr. Dean. Was he a Democratic candidate?
Mr. Thompson. He was Grovernor of Alabama.
Mr. Dean. Well, I am not familiar with what — I know there was
an extensive fundraising effort in the 1970 congressional campaign
and the records of those fundraising efforts and the disbursements as
well came up in another conversation with another interrogation by
the committee. Those records, to the best of my knowledge are still
in a safe in Mr. Fielding's custody. They have never been reviewed
or read by anybody in my office. They were placed in that safe with
those instructions no one was to read them. We were given these records
by Mr. Colson, and I, as I recall, ]\Ir. Colson had collected the records
from Mr. Gleason, who was also involved in this activity at this time.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Dean, let me leave that and ask you a few
questions concerning the $4,850 which you took from the safe. As I
understand it, the reason you took that money instead of using your
personal funds was that time in effect had run out on you and you had
failed to go to the New York accounts you had, would that be your
stock accounts?
Mr. Dean. That is correct. I had not only forgotten to take care
of money matters, I had forgotten to get a — it wasn't I had forgotten,
I had gotten too consumed to get wedding music, I had forgotten to
get a minister or a judge to handle the proceedings, and it was a
general bit of panic there in the final hours, I might say.
Mr. Thompson. The chairman presented to you a statement from
the Shearson and Hamill Co. of your stock account, I believe yester-
1583
day, do you happen to have a copy of that with you ? I have two extra
copies here if that would expedite mattei-s any.
Mr. Dean. No, I don't have a copy, I am sorry.
Mr. Thompson. This is a matter of confusion to me, I believe you
indicated yesterday that you had a $26,167 credit.
Is that not — the copy is not clear.
Mr. Dean. May I say something about these documents? I had a
standard practice of not opening these, in fact originally they were
not even sent to me, they were sent to my ex- wife's house where they
remained and I would collect them in bulk, unopened and take them to
my secretary and she would just file them. This is a margin account we
are talking about, and I have not a lot of expertise in the market. The
arrangements I had with my broker is that he had a total discretion in
all handling of all trading. I would sign at the outset of all, I think
periodically he would send me a sheet to sign that he would have total
discretion for all trades. I have never been able to fully interpret these
sheets so that is why I hope somebody else can look at them to do the
interpretation when I turn all this information over to the committee.
Mr. Thompson. AYould it be accurate to say that is a debit instead of
a credit ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I don't — I think what it indicates to me is that — it
is a credit, I am sure there were at least $26,000, in fact I am sure there
is more than $26,000 in the account.
Mr. Thompson. Could it possibly be that that was a debit but the
value of your stock at that time was such that if you sold your stock
you would have a $20-something thousand credit ?
Mr. Dean. Well, I think that if you were to — when your investi-
gators do an entire audit of this entire matter which is of interest to
you, that they will find that there were ample funds, including more
than $26,000. I think this indicates merely one transaction that had
occurred in this period of time.
Mr. Thompson. So you had ample funds there to take care of the
honej'moon expenses ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. I believe you stated that you placed some of the
money back at one time and then you took some money out again
later?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
]Mr. Thompson. Again you did not go to your stock account although
you had, as you say $20,000 either in stock value or readily available
cash whichever that might be.
Was this again because you had forgotten to do that or why didn't
you go to the stock account on that occasion ?
Mr. Dean. It was merely a matter of convenience. I had already
made some use of the funds, and I merely decided to make more use of
them.
[Conferring with counsel.]
Mr. Thompson. You received $15,200 in what, June of 1972?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
^Ir. Thompson. And then you took $4,850 on October 11 of 1972.
The remaining what, $10,350, did you ever use any of this money for
any other purposes ?
-296 O - 73 - pt.
1584
'Mr. Dean. The other cash that was in there?
JSIr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Dean. As I said when I — at one time I recall I put some money-
back in, and I could have very well at that time commingled other
money that I had. I sometimes did carry cash with me, and I have told
the committee I will do my best to go through my entire records and
reconstruct this, with the committee investigators.
Mr. Thompson. Did I understand your testimony in response to
Senator Gurney's questions that you took some money out, you don't
really know how much, you put some back in and you don't really
know how much?
Mr. Dean. I have not sat down and tried to figure this out, no.
Mr. Thompson. So you don't really know how much.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. How did you know that you owed the fund $4,850 ?
Mr. Dean. Because I had a check in there for that amount and I sat
down and recounted it, and double checked that before I turned the
money over to my lawyer as well.
Mr. Thompson. Do you still have that check incidentally ?
Mr. Dean. Which check?
Mr. Thompson. The $4,850 check placed in the safe.
Mr. Dean. No ; I do not. When my lawyer and I discussed this he
told me that we will have to negotiate a new check, an updated check
because the old check would not pass with the old date. He said issue
me a new check and tear up the old one and get it over to me, which
I did.
Mr. Thompson. You tore up the check that you placed in the safe ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Did you not consider this as possible evidence of
your good intentions which you have relayed to us here?
Mr. Dean. Well, Mr. Thompson, if I was trying to be deceitful I
could have very easily written another check to put in but I am not
trying to be deceitful, I tore up the first check and I didn't try to
pretend there was
Mr. Thompson. Well, I am sure you had a problem — the reason you
didn't place the money back, and in telling your attorney, was that you
wanted to be completely truthful, but what you had done was realize
it might be questionable ; based on that statement would it not have
been logical for you to have kept that check and say, yes, this is a
check I placed in the safe at the very beginning?
Mr. Dean. If you want to place something sinister on this you can't
because it was a very sort of incidental activity. Mr. Shaffer and I
didn't really talk at length about it. He wanted to get the information
to the prosecutors, he said, "I will also need a new check."
Mr. Thompson. An incidental activity at this time when you went
to your attorney and explained the situation and, as you have said
in your o\vn testimony, you wanted to make sure the truth was out
about this matter; you might be questioned about it and you wanted
to be truthful about it; you consider this an incidental matter at this
time, the only evidence possibly that you had besides your own testi-
mony that you had indeed placed your personal check in there ?
1585
Mr. Deax. I didn't feel it a major matter at that moment I was
prepared to reveal it and in fact develop it to the prosecutor.
Mr. Tho3Ipsox. You didn't feel it was necessary to have any docu-
mentary evidence to support or bolster your testimony on this par-
ticular point then?
Mr. Deax. Xo; I was perfectly willing to say everything I knew
about the matter.
Mr. Thompsox. What about a check stub?
Mr. Deax. I would surmise there is no check stub because I kept,
the way my checkbook is composed there are no stubs to the checks,
you slide new checks into the book and run the other, the stub section
in another area of the book, and I would keep in my desk drawer a
nonsequential numbered checks far down the line and when I wrote
the che<;k for cash I took one out of my desk drawer because my secre-
tary would keep the sequential checks in her desk, and at the time I
don't recall her being in the office when I needed a check and I just
wrote one out of my desk drawer.
Mr. Thompsox. Are you saying you did not stub this check at all ?
You did not make a stub?
Mr. Deax. No; I did not make a stub.
Mr. Thompsox. I believe you previously testified that you stood
ready to make ^ood this check at any time. Was it not necessary in
keeping a record of your account, did you consider this an obligation
which you had covered, so to speak?
Of course, you did not have enough money in your account to
cover it. You have already testified that you only had $1,600 in your
account at that time.
Mr. Deax. In my banking account. I certainly felt I had enough
money to cover it through my brokerage account.
]\Ir. Thompsox. You had 20 something thousand dollars in your
brokerage account?
Mr. Deax. I had over $20,000 in my brokerage account at that time.
Mr. Thompsox. All right. And you took the money out on
October 12, 1972?
]Mr. Deax. Yes, sir.
Mr. Th03Ipsox And you placed the check in the trustee account
when ?
Mr. Deax. I do not recall the exact date the trustee account was
set up, because as I say
Mr. Thompsox. In April?
Mr. Deax. Yes, in April.
Mr. Thompsox. From October 1972 to April 1973, you had this
money in your stock account, and you never did take any money out
of the stock account and place it in the bank to cover this check ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Mr. Thompsox. When did you tear up this check ?
Mr. Deax. Shortly after my attorney told me he wanted me to issue
a newer check. And he said in a manner that was without, to my
knowledge, any sinister thought at all, that, merely issue me a new
check and tear up the old check and bring the old one over here
Mr. Thompsox. I am not talking about sinister now. Of course, you
have a right to do what you want to do with your own checks. There
is nothing sinister about
1586
Mr. Dean. We had talked about this, Mr. Thompson, after the fact.
I wish I had had the check.
Mr. Thompson. I certainly do, too.
Mr. Dean. If I were not perfectly candid with this committee, it
would not be very difficult to manufacture another check.
Mr. Thompson. I assume you would not do that, Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dean. I would not do that, no, sir.
Mr. Thompson. I do not think we will even discuss possible further
perjury or any activity of that nature.
Mr. Shaffer. I object to the word "further," Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thompson. That objection, if the Chair will allow me to com-
ment on it, is well taken.
But it was your intent and what was in your mind at the time, that
puzzles me, Mr. Dean. Under ordinary circumstances, I would say
that a man of your dealings, dealing in stock — if I might finish — with
personal affairs involving great sums of money, that even in ordinary
circumstances, it would be highly unusual for anyone to tear up a
check, for any reason. Maybe not. But it would seem that way to me.
But under these circumstances, when you knew in your own mind that
there might be some question about it, to the extent that you went
through these gyrations to set up this trustee account, when you real-
ized there might be some question, that you would destroy the only
documentary evidence that might substantiate that testimony.
Mr. Dean. Well, let me repeat something that I think should be very
clear on the record. I at no time thouffht there was any way in the world
that I would not have to account in full for that money. Too many peo-
ple were aware of it. Mr. Howard was aware that it had come to me.
Mr. Strachan was aware that it had come to me. I had told Mr. Field-
ing that I had it in my possession. I assume that they had possibly told
other people about it, the fact that the money had ended up in my safe.
The first occasion that it came to my mind, the point where I thought
it ought to be revealed to the Government, was after I went to my
attorney. I revealed it as it was. We discussed back at that time that
after we made the moves to open up the trustee accounts that really,
through inadvertence rather than serious thought, I had destroyed
the first check based on an accounting that my attorney had made. He
said, tear up the first check and issue me a new check ; it will be negoti-
able. Now, that is the way the facts are.
Mr. Thompson. Had you already started preparing your statement
that you were going to use here today ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir : I was not preparing the statement then. I was
trying to go over at that time just my chronology of my knowledge as
to the sequence of events. I was having meetings with the prosecutors —
some of this was just by, you know, trying to give them the facts as I
knew them.
Mr. Thompson. Maybe I got the wronsr implication or impression a
minute ago in response to a question of Mr. Dash. The impression I
got was that you were stating, in effect, that you never would have
had to return that money, but you came forward and did it anyway
because nobody would have known about it, something to that effect.
Now you state that, correctly, Mr. Howard knew about it, Mr. Strachan
knew about it, you assumed that they had told others about it. So
1587
Mr. Dean. What I am saying is not that no one would have ever
known I had taken out the money. I could have put the cash back in.
That was not my intention. When I, in fact, knew that I had handled
that money, I felt I ought to state I had handled that money. I raised
it with my lawyer, told him what I had done, and that is the way
it occurred.
Mr. Thompsox. At the time you went to your lawyer, you were, of
course, shall we say, estranged from the White House ? I believe you
said you got a different impression when you got back from Camp
David. You said you were not going to play the coverup game any
longer and you got a different impression from Mr. Haldeman as to
his relationship with you and what he thought about you, that sort
of thing. Did it ever occur to you that they might have access to your
safe or that they might be talking to Mr. Howard, they might be talk-
ing to Mr. Strachan, and they could go to the safe at any time?
Mr. Deax. At that point, they were on their way to California.
There was no problem with that happening.
Mr. Thompson. So there were other people in the "VVliite House
you still assumed were friends at that time ?
Mr. Dean. There was only one person who had a combination to
that safe and it would have been an extraordinary act if they had
come in at that point when they were still dealing with me and trying
to solicit my testimony, as to what it was going to be, for suddenly
one night my safe to disappear. So I do not think that that is a fair
assumption.
Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you about this entire fund. I think this
merits some questioning with regard to the remaining money that
was there; $10,350 that you said was not used. So you took $4,850
because you did not want it to be used in coverup activities or used
to perpetuate the coverup.
Let us place this in context with your own situation at that time.
Is it not true that on October 11, Mr. Hunt had filed a motion to sup-
press in the criminal case in which he was involved at that time, alleg-
ing in an affidavit as part of its motion that certain documents or cer-
tain materials had not been turned over to the authorities when his
safe was cleaned out ?
Mr. Dean, I do not recall the date when he had filed that motion,
whether it was October 11. I recall there was a motion filed to that
effect.
In fact, I recall that we received a letter at the Wliite House, that it
was a draft letter by Mr. Bittman to Mr. Colson that I received from
Mr. O'Brien indicating the fact that such a motion might be filed and
in that letter, the question was raised as to where given items that were
in the safe were located. This immediatelv raised to me the problem of
the fact that materials had not gone directly to the FBI, but rather
had gone directly to Mr. Gray. So I was aware of the fact that that
motion was in the works and was goins; to be filed.
Mr. Thompson. And the basis of that motion was, at least one of the
points, as I understand, in the affidavit was that certain materials had
not been turned over from his safe, had been withheld, and something
had hnnrtened to them, is that not correct?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
1588
Mr. Thompson. All ri^ht, and you were one of the ones involved —
I believe you said Mr. Ehrlichman told you to see that the safe was
cleaned out. You were the one who, I believe, held a suitcase for a while,
carried it around in the trunk of your car ?
Mr. Dean, That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. You were the one who turned over documents to
Mr. Gray ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. In order that they would not be leaked, I believe you
said.
Did you not consider when this motion was filed, when this affidavit
was filed, that there was some amount of pressure on you, that you
might be called in a hearing in the criminal case in order to explain
what might have happened to those documents ?
Mr. Df^4n. Indeed, I was quite aware when the motion was filed and
I was called down to visit with the prosecutors, with the fact that I was
going to be called to testify. That is what compelled me to go and tell
Mr. Petersen that in fact, the documents had not all been turned over
directly to the agents.
Mr. Thompson. So you were concerned about that at that time ?
Mr. Dean. I was concerned about what ?
Mr. Thompson. The fact that this motion had been filed and you
knew that you had been actually the one who had, in effect, diverted
some of those materials.
Mr. Dean. Let us understand this. I had been asked to deep six and
shred documents.
Mr. Thompson. You testified as to that.
Mr. Dean. I did not want to deep six and shred documents. As far
as I was concerned, I had been prepared to testify when my name
became known that in Mr. Gray's testimony my name was going to
come out.
Mr. Thompson. You had been prepared to testify that you had given
him certain documents and that they were extremely sensitive and I
believe you said you did not tell him that they should never see the
light of day.
Mr. Dean. That is not what I remember. I believe I testified yester-
day that I said they were not to be made public.
Mr. Thompson. Were you prepared to testify that you carried the
suitcase around in your car for a few days to decide whether or not you
would deep six it ?
Mr. Dean. If I had been called, that would have come out.
Mr. Thompson, Were you interested in testifying truthfully and
wanting to do that or in trying to prevent yourself from being placed
in a situation where you would have to do that — you did not want to
go down there ?
Mr. Dean. Mr. Thompson, you cannot believe the amount of pressure
that came on me after the Gray hearings by people not wanting me to
testify. It became inevitable that I might have to testify.
Mr. Thompson. I am talking about the specific point. I am talking
about whether or not, on the day before you took this money out —
and, of course, the records speak for themselves — I believe it was
October 11 of that year — that the day before you took the money out,
1589
this motion ^as filed and in your mental condition at the moment,
whether it was a matter of great concern to you ?
Mr. Dean. I would not testify it was a matter of great concern ;
no, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Would you carry a suitcase around with documents
in it
Mr. Dean. That was a long way off and let me tell you the inter-
vening events. After the letter came to my attention before the motion
was filed, I had conversations with ISIr. O'Brien about this. I told
him that if the motion were filed by Mr. Bittman that a lot of problems
might be created for the White House.
Sir. Thompson. When was this conversation ?
Mr. Dean. Well, it was well in advance of the filing of the motion.
]Mr. Thompson. Was it well after October — before the motion
was filed ?
Mr. Dean. Yes, it was.
]Mr. Thompson. And what was the substance of the conversation?
Mr. Dean, I told him that it would create real problems for the
"WHiite House if it was. I didn't get explicit with him.
Mr. Thompson. And possibly problems for you, would it not? It
would be at least embarrassing, would it not, that you were trying
to decide whether or not to deep six those materials ?
Mr. Dean. Well, it was not, you know, embarrassment to me in the
sense that it might have embarrassed others more seriously and it
would have unraveled the coverup, if that is what you are saying;
yes.
Mr. Thompson. You were only concerned not to embarrass others
and not yourself ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I am saying I was concerned that it might start
unraveling the coverup.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever give Mr. LaKue any money for him
to distribute to defendants?
Mr. Dean. Directly ?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dean. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Was any money ever passed in your ofRce when Mr.
LaRue and ]Mr. Kalmbach were present to give to defendants in order
to keep them silent ?
]Mr. Dean. That is possible. I don't recall. It could have happened
when ]\Ir. LaRue and Mr. Kalmbach met for Mr. LaRue to get his
instructions regarding or Mr. Kalmbach got the instructions from
Mr. LaRue as to the disposition of the money.
Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Kalmbach ever come in and in effect, make
an accounting of the money he had received and the money he had
disbursed when he had some notes in his hand? Do you recall that,
in vour office ?
Mr. Dean. I recall that he told me that he had destroved the copy
of the distribution, but he said that he had taken care of it and there
may have been some sort of accounting. T don't recall it precisely.
It was not somethinjT we talked about with great frequency.
^Ir. Thompson. Did you ever burn notes Mr. Kalmbach had had
concerning his distribution ?
1590
Mr. Dean. Oh, yes; I did. Mr. Kalmbach gave me a small slip of
paper. He was burning it and I gave him my ash tray and it was
placed in my ash tray on my desk and burned up, one of these little
notepads I think I testified lo in my earlier testimony, where he had
transcribed larger notes into smaller notes and it was burned up in an
ash tray in my office. I do recall that ; yes.
Mr. Thompson. When did that occur ?
Mr. Dean. Sometime after the delivery, I gather, had been made.
Mr. Thompson. Was anyone else present besides you and Mr.
Kalmbach ?
Mr. Dean. No ; there was not.
Mr. Thompson. As to whether or not you in fact told Mr. Kalm-
bach that you wanted Ulasewicz to be the one to distribute this money ?
Mr. Dean. I did not tell Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Kalmbach requested
Mr. Ulasewicz' number from me because he told me he was the only one
he would trust to do the job.
Mr. Thompson. Did you know who Ulasewicz was?
Mr. Dean. Indeed I did. I knew that from the time that Mr. Caul-
field had been put on my staff ; shortly thereafter, I learned that he had
done countless assignments for Mr, Caulfield and Mr. Caulfield had
regailed me at times with Mr. Ulasewicz ability.
Mr. Thompson. Getting back to the money in a different light,
and I hope my pursuit is not being completely irrelevant. I am con-
cerned with that fund and the possibility of whether or not there
might have been distributions of that fund other than the one you have
related to us. As I understand your statement, the reason you took the
$4,850 primarily was to cover the expenses that you would incur on
your honeymoon. Is that correct ?
Mr. Dean. That was the original purpose, but as I have, I think, told
the committee, I later used it for personal expenditures.
Mr. Thompson. But that was the original purpose?
Mr. Dean. That was the original purpose ; that is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And you were questioned, I believe, as to why it
would take that much money for a honeymoon. I believe your statement
is that you planned to spend several weeks on your honeymoon.
Mr. Dean. I had hoped to spend about 10 days to 2 weeks in Florida
if I could get it. I didn't know if I could get it.
Mr. Thompson. 10 days to 2 weeks?
Mr. Dean. I didn't know how long I was going to stay. I was going
to fight off the office as long as I could. I hadn't had a break in some
time.
Mr. Thompson. You testified on more than one occasion that you
were very careful in making your statement, that you went over your
statement in detail. Now the 10 days, this is the first time I have heard
of the 10 days.
Mr. Dean. No, sir; if you will check the transcript, that also came
out in the questioning at one point.
Mr. Thompson. That you have testified ?
Mr. Dean. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. If I am in error, I will apologize. I am going back
to your prepared transcript, your prepared statement, where you say
on page 116:
1591
On Friday, the 13th, I had left Washington to go to Florida to spend several
weeks on a honeymoon. I was abruptly called back on the 15th, after 2 days.
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. I assume it was your intention when you left here to
spend several weeks
Mr. Deax. That was my
Mr. Thompson. If possible ?
]Mr. Dean. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. ^Yhsit were your campaign duties, Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Dean. I don't know what you mean by campaign duties.
]Mr. Thompson. You were counselor to the President, and I believe
you mentioned in the past, that Mr. Haldeman in effect related what
your duties would be during the campaign. I assumed you would have
a slightly different role, perhaps, during a campaign than you would
in a nonpolitical year?
]Mr. Dean. That is right. I certainly was not involved in any political
aspects. I would say the basic thing, a number of filings required by
the President required research of the State laws to define and de-
scribe exactly what the President himself would have to sign as a
candidate for the Office of President of the United States. These could
not be handled by the reelection committee. They would require a
notarized Presidential signature. The President was traveling around
the country from time to time, we would have to send them with a
military aide. We would have to be not only aware of what the 50
States required, we would have to be aware of when they required it.
That was probably the most consuming of the campaign activities.
I would say that my largest campaign activity was the coverup of
the Watergate.
]Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you if this would be correct and I am
reading from page 28 of the transcript of our executive session.
My principal area of concern would be that the White House itself would stay
in full compliance with election laws. And I can say from that point on, we
didn't miss one thing regarding the election laws themselves, which was a rather
voluminous and time-consuming task because as the candidate, the President
had a lot of filings that required his signature itself and were handled in the
White House.
Mr. Dean. I think that is saying in another way what I have just
said.
Mr. Thompson. You left on October what. 13th ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Well, several weeks would have had you returning
after the election
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Would not that have presented a little problem
for you, considering there was a required filing on the 15th, 6 days next
preceding the election ?
]\Ir. Dean. At that time, we had a routine system set up for filing.
Mr. Wilson had devised a calendar with all the check dates. There was
not a daily filing period. I can't recall any particular filing period in
that time, there may have been. I don't have the calendar in front of
me. These would be" forwarded by that time routinely to the President
for signature. He was used to them by that time. He would sign them.
1592
they would come back notarized and he would forward them back to
the appropriate State requiring it.
In fact, I would say the weeks preceding the election were some of
the slowest weeks during my time at the White House.
Mr. Thompson. Was it slow in terms of campaign contributions
that were coming in ?
Mr. Dean. We didn't receive campaign contributions at the White
House.
Mr. Thompson. Were you ever called upon to interpret the propriety
of accepting such campaign contributions, foreign contributions, any-
thing of that nature ?
Mr. Dean. Yes; that periodically, came up, yes, indeed.
Mr. Thompson. But you were going to go on a honeymoon, from
which you would not return, if you had your preference, until after
the election ?
Mr. Dean. Let me explain when I went to Florida, what the situa-
tion is in Florida. There are two villas that are set aside for White
House staff. I had to retain that privately rather than take it at
Government expense, obviously, being on a honeymoon. That runs
$100 a day.
I also did that because when I am in Florida, you have the entire
signal telephone system. As I think my wife can attest, while I was at
the White House, there was virtually no time that I was out of contact
with the remainder of the staff at any time. And as you well know,
you can conduct business by telephone and get staff doing things as
easily as you being present in the office, and that is how, often, you
operate in the office.
I also had a very trusted deputv who could handle things in my
absence and if he had a judgment he wanted my attention drawn to,
I certainly was available for him to call and reflect on that judgment.
Mr. Thompson. So then you were planning to be gone for several
weeks ?
Mr. Dean. I had hoped to. That had been our intention ; yes.
Mr. Thompson. That was your intention. Did you know anyone
when you were working at the White House, have contact with any-
one whose first name is Jane ?
Mr. Dean. Did I know anybody at the White House by the name of
Jane?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Dean. I know several
Mr. Thompson. Start closest to you, if you would.
Mr. Dean. Yes ; I have a secretary by the name of Jane Thomas.
Mr. Thompson. That is the name, I think, that I am interested in.
If I am not, we will go back to it.
Do you have a travel office or did you have a travel office at the
White House that sometimes made accommodations for you for the
trips that you would take ?
Mr. Dean. Yes; I generally had my secretary make travel accom-
modations through the travel office.
Mr. Thompson. Do vou recall whether or not you had Jane Thomas
make travel accommodations for this particular honeymoon trip?
Mr. De \N. I do not have the foggiest recollection.
1593
Mr. Thompson. There is a document here, Mr. Dean, that I would
like to present to you for your examination. It is entitled "Request for
Transportation." If I might read it as it is being presented to you.
Dated October 11, "Contact, Jane. Traveler, Mr. and Mrs. John Dean.
Extension 241, from D.C. to Miami, two seats. Carrier, Eastern Air-
lines, Flight 185. Date. October 14.'-
You went down, I assume you returned. "National Airlines, Flight
102, October 18. Payment, American Express. Fare, $336." The word
"tickets" is stamped across it.
First of all, is this a form that is used by the travel office?
Mr. Dean. I have no idea. I have never seen the form before and
I have no idea if in fact that was paid for by American Express. I
think that is something that will have to be checked as the auditors go
back through my records.
Mr. Thompson. I agree with you.
If there is any question about it, obviously, the person in charge of
these documents, the person in custody of these documents will be
brought down here and placed under oath to explain these documents
in full. It is my understanding that since your testimony was begun
pursuant to committee request, this document has been furnished by
the travel office. It does indicate to me that the request was made on
October 11, 1972, by someone named Jane for a flight leaving on the
14th to return on the 18th, a trip of 4 days.
Do you have any further comment on it, Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, it was my intention to go down there and
spend 2 weeks.
Mr. Thompson. Two weeks or several weeks ?
Mr. Dean. Several weeks.
I very frequently, and you can check my other travel records, when
I went j^laces, I took the immediate turnaround ticket for the hold
purpose and often stayed beyond that date. A bird in the hand, in
traveling back and forth through main routes, is something I always
felt was wise to do. I think if you will check my records in the travel
office, you will find I did that on other occasions.
]\Ir. Thompson. So you are stating that this document could be cor-
rect and you could have requested your secretary to make accommoda-
tions for you to return on the 18th after 4 days ?
Mr. Dean. It is my recollection I did not pay for that by American
Express, as a matter of fact. Often, when my secretary would go down
and set something like this up, a subsequent phone call would change
an arrangement, or something like tliat. I think you can check that also.
Mr. Thompson. I thought you just testified you did not know whether
or not your secretary had made a request for this particular honeymoon
trip or not.
Mr. Dean. I am saying that the name "Jane" here would indicate to
me that she had.
Mr. Thompson. You just said that you did not recall Avhether or not
this was paid for by American Express.
Mr. Dean. That is the reason I say that. I recall that there was not
time to pay for it by American Express and I had to go to the airport
and pick the tickets up at the "will call," so I had the tickets in hand.
The White House could not process the tickets fast enough. I think if
1594
you will check the records, you will find out that is what happened.
Mr. Thompson. The White House could not process the tickets fast
enough ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Would that indicate that you did make a request
throug'h the travel office of the White House ?
Mr. Dean. As I say, I generally made all the requests through the
travel office — through my secretary, I mean. I asked her to arrange
them. There were occasions when she went directly to outside lines and
made my travel requests as well.
Mr. Thompson. Did you subsequently get to Miami to spend a few
more days on your honeymoon ?
Mr. Dean. As I recall, we made several trips to Miami to try to
have a honeymoon and were called back.
Mr. Thompson. Did you leave for Miami on October 20, if you
recall ?
Mr. Dean. That is very possible. As I told you when we started
this line of questioning, I have not sat down and tried to reconstruct
this. I am perfectly willing to reconstruct it for the committee and
turn it all over to the committee for the committee's use. I just have
not entered this area of reconstruction and I am sure
Mr. Thompson. You will not test your memory on these particular
points, is that what you are saying?
Mr. Dean. I think I would like to have the opportunity to check
my own calendar, particularly my wife, who does keep a calendar
of these types of events. It would be very helpful in reconstructing
this for the committee.
Mr. Thompson. I have a document here that I would like to present
to you, which is a similar document indicating a request, the contact
being Mr. Dean this time, dated October 19, 1972, for flight to Miami
on October 20, to return October 23. There are several markings down
here. Evidently, there was some confusion as to the airlines. That is
the only thing I can tell.
Mr. Dean. No; this probably indicates, as I recall — it is 10-18 — ■
that they could not find a flight, they tried to get a flight, they could
not find a flight and they had me on the wait list. T see there is a wait
list indication down here — W.L. I assume, is wait list. The only thing
I can assume is that this is some sort of form that the travel office uses
which I have never seen before, so I cannot explain it.
Mr. Thompson. But you do remember the occasion, you do remem-
ber the trip ?
Mr. Dean. On the 19th?
Mr. Thompson. You would have been leaving on the 20th, I believe,
Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dean. On the 20th — that is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And returned on the 23d ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Were you called back
Mr. Dean. Do I recall that? As I say, I recall several eiforts to
get to Florida but not with success.
Mr. Thompson. What I asked you, and I think you misunderstood
me, was were you called back on the 23d ?
1595
Mr. Deax. Yes ; I have testified that after I got to Florida, I was
virtually on the phone the whole time and suddenly was called back, to
come back on Sunday. I went to this meeting in the Roosevelt room
which I have described in my testimony and turned around again as
soon as I thought I could get oif to Florida again and tried to get to
Florida again. This must be the trip that evidences that. I would as-
sume that indicates that trip.
]\Ir. Thompsox. All right. ]Mr. Dean, my point again is as to the
significance of the points I have been going over. I know they might
seem rather minute in comparison with Presidential involvement, but
I think when you state in your statement that you planned several
weeks and if one wanted to put a theory afloat that possibly you were
trying to seek to justify your taking this money out for some reason
other than you have given us today, that is, an extended honeymoon
trip, that this would be very relevant.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to either have these marked for identi-
fication or made part of the record. I would suggest and hope that we
would get the proper people in charge of the custody of these docu-
ments to come down here and verify them for us.
Mr. Deax. As I indicated to the committee, I am perfectly willing
to provide all my materials, all my records, and this can be gone over in
the greatest detail the committee wishes,
]Mr. Thompsox. That will be done, Mr. Dean. Thank you.
Senator Ervix. Let the documents be appropriately numbered by
the reporter.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 72 and 73.*]
Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request of the
Chair, and I think ]\Ir. Thompson ouglit to be aware of something that
I do not think he is aware of. That is that in the committee's files,
there is a Xerox copy of all the currency that Mr. Dean transmitted
to me and that I transmitted to the bank before that currency cleared.
That was made in my office by me to my secretary, who is in this room,
and I still consider myself under oath, and turned over to this com-
mittee voluntarily and not pursuant to a subpena. So by looking at
the serial numbers on that currency, you can establish whether or not
more than $4,850 was taken out and some other currency put back.
Because my recollection of that currency is the serial numbers, while
from the first bill to the last are not in sequential order, there are a
series of sequential numbers that meant something to the prosecutors.
With reluctance, I also would like to say that when Mr. Dean first
spoke to me about the cash and his check, the cash and the check were
not then open to view. I have never seen this missing check, we never
discussed destruction of the missing check with the committee before.
On the next day, when I had decided what we were going to do with
the check and the documents, I said, I will need a currently dated
check — he had told me the one was old — and the currency, which he
provided me at another location. I am sorry as an officer of the court,
and also analogously as an officer of this committee, that we do not
have here today for you that check and I assure each and every one
of you under oath that there was no intention on my part or Mr.
Dean's to destroy that document and keep it from you.
Thank you.
•See pp. 1808 and 1809.
1596
Mr. Thompson, We might just put one question
Mr. Dash. I think it should go on the record that it is true that we
did receive the photostatic copies of currency and Mr. Thompson does
know about it, because I have shown him tliat file.
Mr. Shaffer. I am sorry. I did not know whether he knew about
it or not.
Mr. Thompson. I received some of these documents belatedly and
much later than Mr. Dash, quite frankly.
Mr. Shaffer. I have no problem with it.
Senator Ervin. If I could ask a question or so here, I might shorten
some of this.
Mr. Dean, did anybody Imow that you had taken out the $4,850 out
of this money except yourself ?
Mr. Dean. No, sir, they did not.
Senator Ervin. If you had wanted to deceive anybody about it,
what would have prevented you from getting $4,850 and replacing it ?
Mr. Dean. Nothing.
Senator Ervin. And the first man that knew that you had used the
$4,850 was your lawyer ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, and I told him that I wanted to reveal
that fact to the Government also.
Senator Ervin. And your lawyer advised you to issue a new check.
Did he give as a reason the fact that banks sometimes refuse to cash
checks unless they are presented within a reasonable time after they
are dated ?
Mr. Dean. That is precisely the reason he gave me.
Mr. Shaffer. I object to that. The reason I gave him was that he
told me the check was made to cash and it had to be made to me and
Hogan as Trustees.
Mr. Dean. You said also that it had to be a current check.
Mr. Shaffer. Well, all right. You remember that.
Senator Ervin. If you had haxl tlie desire to deceive anybody, all
you would have had to do was get the $4,850 in cash and taken and
added the money to the balance that you had in the safe.
Mr. Dean. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. But the first man you told that you had used the
money was Mr. Shaffer ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. Instead of concealing the transaction by restoring
the cash, you gave him a check paid to him and he deposited it in a
trust account ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Ervtn. Together with the other money ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct.
Senator Er\^n, Making the amount of money the total amount that
was originally delivered to you ?
Mr, Dean, That is correct, I was quite aware of the fact that obvi-
ously, this is a great personal embarrassment and a rather unwise move,
but I didn't want to hide the facts from this committee on what I had
done.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Dean, if I might ask you one more qiiestion
with regard to the checking account on which you drew this check;
you drew the check on April 12, would that be correct?
1597
Mr. Deax. I believe there were two checks. I don't have those records
in front of me now.
Mr. TriOMPSOX. I have here in your bank account an indication that
April 12 was the first day for some time, evidently, that you had enough
money in your checking account for this check to clear ?
Mr. Deax. "When I realized it, I called him and had my broker send
down the amount of money necessary to cover the check.
Mr. Thompsox. You were not advised by anyone that it would either
be wise or the thing to do with regard to the destruction of your check,
is that coi'rect ?
You did that of your own volition ?
Mr. Deax. As I say, I told
Mr. Thompsox. I am sorry, Mr. Dean, you can explain in as great
detail as you would like.
]Mr. Deax. No, no one told me it would be wise or
Mr. Thompsox. All right.
That is all.
Senator Ervix. Any other questions of any members of this com-
mittee ?
[No response.]
Senator Ervix. Mr. Dean, the committ-ee has a rule that a witness
can make a closing statement. We will afford you that opportunity
just as we afforded it to other witnesses.
Senator Baker. Let me do this first, Mr. Chairman. It might be that
Mr. Dean would want to comment on it before he makes his closing
statement.
Senator Ervix. OK, fine.
Senator Baker. I indicated earlier in the hearings that Congressman
Garry Brown had written a letter to the committee and was preparing
to submit a sworn statement. I did not at that time have in hand the
letter from Congressman Brown. It had been inadvertently misplaced.
I now have a copy and if there is no objection, Mr. Chairman, I'll
read it.
Also, if there is no objection, we will receive the statement under
oath of ]Mr. Brown as to the letter.
Dear Mr. Chairman :
Late yesterday afternoon upon learning of the statement given to your com-
mittee by John W. Dean, III in which he implicated me and members of the
Banking and Currency Committee in what he has alleged was a "coverup'' of
the Watergate matter and other improper conduct, I immediately dictated a
letter to you demanding that I be given an opportunity to appear before your
committee and respond to, deny, and rebut Mr. Dean's allegations.
I might depart from the letter to say that the chairman and I have
indicated to Mr. Brown that we would be happy to have this letter as
part of the record, his statement as part of the record. If he still wished
to testify, of course, we would provide him that opportunity.
j\Ir. Deax. Mr. Vice Chairman, I wonder if I might comment on
something ? I think that in my testimony, I have explained that often,
what was happening at the White House was one motive. The person
on the other end wasn't always aware of that motive and I don't mean
to impute to other people, the fact that one person had one desire, the
same motive to the other person, who was doing a normal, what they
thought was a helpful thing to the White House in a general election
1598 •
year and not understanding the implications of all the facts and
circumstances.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Dean.
I am aware of that situation, and what I would really like to do is
read this letter now so that before you conclude your testimony and
make your closing statement, if you choose to do that you would have
an opportunity to comment on that as well.
To continue with the letter, the second paragraph :
Before I had an opportunity to get the letter off to you, I was pleased to be
contacted by a member of your committee's majority staff who indicated an in-
terest in talking with me relative to the allegations set forth and involving me in
Dean's statement. I met with your Mr. Dorsen and Mr. Parr and believe that this
conference was mutually beneficial. I thank you for providing me with this op-
portunity to at least apprise your committee staff of my position relative to
Dean's charges.
Although I think I have satisfied your Committee staff members that Dean
had no factual justification to link the House Banking and Currency Committee
action with what he has testified were White House coverup activities, his
irresponsible or false statements with respect thereto have caused me and other
members of the Banking and Currency Committee grave harm. Without equivoca-
tion, I can state it was not known to me nor to any other member of the Com-
mittee, to my knowledge, that our opposition to the granting of subpoena power
to Chairman Patman was in any way, nor could be claimed to be in any way, a
part of the coverup about which Mr. Dean is testifying.
I, personally, vehemently deny the truth of Mr. Dean's statement that my
letter of September 8, 1972 to the Attorney General was 'in fact, drafted by Park-
inson for Congressman Brown.' This is an untrue statement, the letter having
been dictated by me and having contained my work product.
Although I am preparing a chronological statement of my whole participation
in the successful effort to deny Chairman Patman subpoena power in October of
last year, the mere filing of such a statement with your Committee and even the
giving of the same to the media will not counteract and repudiate the publicity
given to INIr. Dean's testimony.
I, therefore, respectfully request and insist that I be given an opportunity
to appear before your Committee and respond to the allegations made by Mr.
Dean. The granting of this request, Mr. Cliairman, is the least your Committee
should do, it seems to me, to attempt to correct the unwarranted and unjustified
damage that has been done. Your prompt and favorable response to this request
will be greatly appreciated.
Signed Gaery Brown, Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I reiterate this letter has been accepted for the record
and is being read now for the record at the request of Congressman
Brown.
Mr. Dean. Yes, and I might just say
Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, I wanted to read it now in an abundance
of fairness both to Congressman Brown and to you, so you can make
any further comment.
i^ow, on the question, on the request that Mr. Brown makes, as I
stated earlier, the chairman and I have discussed this matter and clearly
if Mr. Brown wants to testify as a Member of Congress he is entitled to
do that but by the same token, we understand that he is submitting a
sworn statement* as an addendum to this letter and I would proi:)Ose,
Mr. Chairman, that we take under advisement the matter of whether
any further testimony should be received or not.
Mr. Dean. I might just add on, ^yith regard to Mr. Brown, Congress-
man Brown's letter, this is in the area of hearsav, of course, that I had
heard tliat the letter by Mr. Parkinson was, Mr. Parkinson assisted
Mr. Brown in preparing the letter for the Attorney General.
*Not received at time of publication.
1599
Mr. Chairman, just to close, and I will be very brief, I have sought
to provide this committee
Senator Ervix. One question on this.
INIr. Deax. Certainly.
Senator Ervix. You stated that there was an attempt at the "N^Hiite
House and the Committee To Re-Elect the President, to prevent the
Patman committee from investigating that ?
Mr. Dean. That is correct, ]\Ir. Chairman.
Senator Ervix. And the Patman committee did, at least a majority
of them did refuse to investigate it ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Ervix. So regardless of motives, it had the same effect as
what the White House and the committee were trying to do ?
Mr. Deax. That is correct.
Senator Ervix. But of course a Congressman has got a perfect right
to vote his own convictions. That is his function.
]\Ir. Deax. I have sought to provide this information with all the
facts and information that I know regarding this matter, to answer
all of the questions that have been asked of me, and to hide nothing
of my own involvement in this matter, and provide the truth as I
know it.
This has been most difficult for me because I have had to speak
against the President of the United States, some of my friends, and
some of my former colleagues. I attempted to end this coverup initially
from working within the White House, and when that didn't work, I
took it upon myself to work from without, and I earnestly pray that
this committee reaches the truth in this entire matter and reaches it as
quickly as possible because I think there is a terrible cloud over this
Government that must be removed so that we can have effective gov-
ernment and I thank the committee for the many courtesies that they
have provided me in assisting me to get to and from the hearing room
and providing me available space during the breaks and the recesses
and thoughtfulness of the staff in that regard.
Senator Ervix. Without expressing any opinion about your testi-
mony or the way of your testimony, I do think that you do deserve the
thanks of the committee for the extreme patience which you have
exhibited. It has been quite a trial, a trying time to you and also on
the committee because I think this is our fifth day on your testimony,
and it is a very long time. Are there any other comments ?
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would only associate myself with
your remarks and express, I believe, the appreciation of the committee
for Mr. Dean's patience and rather prolonged testimony. It's obviously
not an easy task to testify on matters of this importance and delicacy,
and I think ]Vfr. Dean has provided us with a great deal of information
and will — which will serve as a basis for the ongoing inquiry of this
committee and we thank him for it.
Senator Er\tx. It might be at some later stage of the investigation
the committee may want to recall you.
Mr. Deax. I understand, Mr. Chairman.
Senator ERnx. I understand you will be willing to return on proper
notice under the same subpena.
Mr. McCaxdt.ess. Mr. Chairman, a matter of procedure that per-
haps you could give us some help with. In the last 2 or 3 hours
-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 17
1600
we have had many requests from the media who have been so patient
and who have been sitting through this, to have an interview with
Mr. and Mrs. Dean as they leave here. You understand, of course, that
we cannot provide those interviews for some legal reasons, and for
the basic reason, 5 days, that they are exhausted. We ask their leave
and their understanding and yours that we are going to leave the
building immediately after this.
Senator Erven. I would think, since Mr. Dean has testified under
an order of immunity, and testified involuntarily, I would think that
his counsel would be wise to give him the same advice that I used
to give my clients and that is to keep his mouth shut. [Laughter.]
The committee will stand in adjournment until Tuesday, July 10,
at 10 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 5 :45 p.m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene at
10 a.m., Tuesday, July 10, 1973.]
TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington^ D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate OflEice Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., chair-
man.
Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, Gur-
ney. and Weicker.
Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief
counsel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
Davdd ]M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T, Mayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert
Baca, office of Senator ]\Iontoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; John Walz,
publications clerk.
Senator Baker [presiding]. The committee will come to order. Be-
cause of the death in the family of the chairman he has not yet
returned to Washington and we expect the chairman to be back momen-
tarily but I have been requested by his office to open the hearings and
to commence the proceedings.
The first witness today is Mr. John Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell, if you
will stand up I will administer the oath. Mr. Mitchell do you swear
that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr, Mitchell. I do, so help me God.
Senator Baker. Be seated.
Mr. Mitchell, do you have any preliminary statement that you care to
make at this point ?
TESTIMONY OF JOHN N. MITCHELL, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM G.
HUNDLEY, PLATO C. CACHERIS, AND MARVIN SEGAL, COUNSELS
Mr. Mitchell. I think counsel has a brief statement he would like
to make, Mr, Vice Chairman.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Mr, Hundley, Mr, Vice Chairman, my name is Mr, Hundley, I
would like the record to reflect that by letter of June 18, 1973, and
(1601)
1602
again by letter of July 0, 1973. I formally requested this committee
to withdraw its subpena compelling Mr. Mitchell to testify for the
reasons stated therein, and that the committee has rejected his petition.
I would like the committee to express on the record that it would ad-
judge Mr. Mitchell in contempt if he did refuse to testify so that we
can protect our legal position.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much. The letter to which you refer
was duly received by the committee, and at an executive session on
June 26, 1973, the request was denied. As a result, Mr. Mitchell is
here before the committee pursuant to a lawful subpena of the com-
mittee compelling him to appear and testify. The record should indi-
cate that we took account of his request, that we denied the request,
that he is not here volmitarily, that he is here by subpena, that in
the view of the committee he has not waived any rights which may
inure to him by reason of his testimony and by reason of his appearance
before this committee.
Mr. Hundley. Thank you very much, INIr. Vice Chairman. Since it
is our position that our appearance is not voluntary but strictly due
to compulsion, I have advised ]Mr. Mitchell not to make any voluntary
opening statement just in order to help preserve our legal position
and it is not done in any sense of disrespect to this committee.
Senator Baker. We understand and we appreciate it. If there is
no opening statement by counsel or by the witness, in the ordinary
course of events, the questioning would begin then by majority and
chief counsel, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. I do not know if the record shows. Senator Baker when
asked if there was any statement and Mr. Mitchell responded through
his counsel, if the counsel has identified himself for the record.
Mr. Hundley. Yes: INIr. William G. Hundley.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, for the record, will you state your full
name and address?
Mr. Mitchell. John N. :\Iitchell, 1030 Fifth Avenue, New York
City.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, when did you first join President Nixon's
administration and what office did you hold ?
Mr. IMiTCHELL. I held the office of Attorney General from January
1969 until March 1, 1972.
Mr. Dash. Prior to the time of your assmning the office of Attorney
General of the TTnited States, did you know ]\Ir. Nixon and would
you please give the committee some brief information as to how you
came in contact with him and what relationship you had with him?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I had a casual acquaintanceship with the
President prior to the time that he came to New York in 1963, I
believe it was, to practice law. Our associations increased and at the
end of the year 1966 oiu- law firms merged and we practiced law
together until we both retired from the firm.
Mr. Dash. Did you take any active political role with the President
during his 1968 campaign ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, T am sure that is a matter of some debate but
I was known as the campaign director in the 1968 campaign.
Mr. Dash. During the time when you were Attorney General and
1603
sometime in 1970, Mr. Mitchell, were you aware of concern in the
White House and, perhaps, in your own office, the Department of
Justice, that the existinc; intelligence pro^rrams against internal dis-
sent or demonstrations throiiohout the country were lacking and that
fliere was need for some new programs?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think. ]Mr. Dash. T would put that on the
basis that there was lack of adequate intelligence. That probably
more importanth' so there was failure of coordination among the
intelligence-gathering agencies to the point where problems were
existing in the country, that there was a general feeling that we did
not have, the Government did not have, adequate intelligence to antici-
pate the activities that were being carried out at that particular time.
Mr. Dash. After the Safe Streets Act of 1968, Mr. Mitchell, you did
receive as Attorney General some j)owers involving electronic sur-
veillance, did you not ?
Mr. INIiTCHFXL. Yes. sir. that is correct.
Mr. Dash. Was it your position, publicly taken, that, with regard to
internal dissent, you had the power to authorize electronic surveillance
without court approval ?
Mr. ]\IiTciiELL. Well, when you say internal dissent, that is not a
sufficiently descriptive term. In addition to that, as you know, the Safe
Streets Act did not change measurably the activities that had been
carried out in connection with electronic surveillance in prior admin-
istrations.
]\Ir. Dash. "WTiat term would you use, "internal security" as a better
word?
^Ir. ^Mitchell. Internal security would, I think, be a better general
term to describe it.
Mr. Dash. Right. And it was your position, was it not, that you
did have the authoritv under the act, whether it was prior practice or
not, to authorize electronic surveillance without first having to go to a
court for approval ?
Mr. INIiTCHELL. I would believe, Mr. Dash, a better way to put it was
that we continued the practice that was then in effect concerning the
use of electronic surveillance in connection with internal security.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware, Mr. Mitchell, of the so-called Huston
plan, which we have received as part of the testimony of this com-
mittee, for an interagency intelligence program which would improve
somewhat the intelligence gathering in this country ?
Mr. INIttchell. Well, there was a matter of time in connection with it.
I was not aware of the fact that the heads of the various agencies were
meetinof on the subject matter. It came to mv attention, was brought to
my attention by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
To the best of my recollection I met with Mr. DeLoach and I met with
Mr. Hoover. We discussed the so-called Huston plan which is the term
that you have been using. The document that we discussed very briefly,
I didn't get into many of the details of it, it was more an oral dis-
cussion of it, at that stage had ]\Ir. Hoover's dissent to the provisions
of it. I was of the opinion. I needed very little convincing by Mr. De-
Loach and Mr. Hoover that this was not the proper approach to the
problems that existed at the time, and I joined Mr. Hoover in opposing
its implementation.
1604
Mr. Dash. Were you aware, Mr. Mitchell, that the plan did provide
for removing certain restrictions against illegal break-ins and elec-
tronic surveillance ?
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes, these items were discussed in conversations
that I had with Mr. DeLoach and Mr. Hoover.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall when you first became aware of the plan ?
Mr. Mitchell. I can't put the date on it. I shouldn't try because I
don't recall.
Mr. Dash. Did you have the plan ever in your possession or did
you peruse the plan ?
Mr. Mitchell. I had, as I recall, the plan in my possession during
the period that the Director of^ — the Associate Director of the FBI was
discussing it with me. As I am sure you are aware, Mr. Dash, this mat-
ter was handled and considered aside and apart from the Attorney
General. It was considered in the committee that involved the heads
of the intelligence gathering community.
Mr. Dash. Well, did you know who in the White House were back-
ing the plan ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, I can't say who was backing it and who was op-
posed to it but obviously Mr. Huston was apparently backing it be-
cause he was the author of part of it. The other people in the White
House that I communicated with, at the stage in the process in which I
communicated, were understanding of the position that the Director
and I were supporting and the matter was disposed of.
Mr. Dash. Well, were you aware of the so-called Haldeman-Hus-
ton memos relating to this plan ?
Mr. Mitchell. No. sir; I do not recall seeing any Wliite House
correspondence on the subject.
Mr. Dash. Did you know when the plan had at one time been ap-
proved by the President ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I did not know that until these hearings
were held.
Mr. Dash. Why did you oppose the plan, Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. MiTCHELi.. I opposed the plan for the very simple reason that
in the case of domestic problems tliat I was very much opposed to the
thought of surreptitious entry ^ the mail covers, and all of the other
aspects of it that were involved at the particular time.
Mr. Dash. To w^hom did you express this disapproval other than
]Mr. Hoover or INIr. De'Loach?
Mr. JNIiTCHELL. ]My recollection is that I talked to both Mr. Halde-
man and the President about the subject matter.
Mr. Dash. And do you recall when that was ?
]Mr. Mitchell. No, but it was, of course, in the limited timeframe
in which this activity took place.
Mr. Dash. Did vou know their reaction to your opposition at that
time ?
Mr. Mitchell. My recollection is that they, both of them were ap-
preciative of my views on the subject matter and reconsidered it and
that was the end of it.
Mr. Dash. Now, during 1971
Mr. Mitchell. I say — excuse me, Mr. Dash — w^hen I say reconsider
it I don't know how far they had gone into the consideration of it be-
1605
cause as of that particular time to my understanding the plan had
not been implemented.
Mr. Dash. Well, did you ever receive an}- formal notice that the
plan had not been approved or had been discontinued or been termi-
nated ?
Mr. Mitchell. Not to my recollection, I was just told verbally that
it was nil.
Mr. Dash. Or whether it had been approved?
Mr. ^Mitchell. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. During 1971, were you aware of an intelligence operation
that had been set up in the White House under ^Nlr. Ehrlichman and
Mr. Krogh which has become known as the Plumbers operation?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.
]Mr. Dash. Was there a time that you did become aware of that
operation ?
]Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Dash. When was that ?
Mr. :\liTCHELL. After June 17, 1972.
Mr. Dash. Now also, Mr. Mitchell, in 1971 were you aware of the
so-called Sandwedge plan proposed by ]Mr. Caulfield for political
intelligence operations ?
]Mr. ^Mitchell. I was aware of the concept that Mr. Caulfield was
proposing and, of course, I opposed that and it never came to fruition.
]NIr. Dash, Did you ever have a copy of the so-called Sandwedge
proposal or plan in your possession ?
]\lr. ^Mitchell. To the best of my knovv'ledge — my knowledge of it
came in discussions with John Dean.
]Mr. Dash. Were you aware that that plan also included a so-called
covert operation and the use of bugging or electronic surveillance ?
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. No ; I have seen that in one of Mr. Dean's exhibits
but that Avas not the understanding that I had of the so-called Sand-
wedge proposal.
]\Ir. Dash. Did you know that the budget included actual funds to
purchase electronic surveillance equipment ?
Mr, Mitchell. No, sir; I had never got that far with the subject
matter.
]Mr. Dash. Now, in any event, after the recommendation of Mr.
Caulfield for the so-called Sandwedge plan, did you ask Mr. Caulfield
for any operation or any particular assignment ?
]Mr. ]\liTCHELL. There has been shown to me by this committee a
memorandum that had to do with an investigation that apparently
was made under ]\Ir. Caulfiold's aegis having to do with the so-called
McCloskey campaign up in New Hampshire. I do not know who hired
him or who paid him. I have seen the memorandum.
Aside from that, I would go to the point that Mr. Caulfield, who
I saw on the 24th day of November 1971, wherein Mr. Dean brought
him over to discuss the concept of his working for me in the campaign
if and when I joined the campaign, Mr. Caulfield did come to work for
the committee as what was purported to be an aide-de-camp at some
time in March and within 2 weeks or so, he was gone, had left the
committee.
1606
Mr. Dash. Do you recall any other assignment that you personally
gave to Mr. Caulfield ?
Mr. Mitchell, No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware of some of Mr. Ulasewicz's work, either
for people in the White House or for Mr. Dean or for anybody else?
Mr. ]MiTCHELL. No, sir; not until much later on when I, and I am
talking about these committees, I knew that there were individuals over
there that were working with Mr. Caulfield, but I did not know Mr.
Ulasewicz.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Mitchell, what role did you play in the setting
up of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the basic role, I believe, was the discussion
with the President to the point that he still had to get nominated in
his second term and there was a committee needed to undertake that
function and that there should be one established. Also, with respect
to the people who originally organized the committee, we discussed
those, and of course, the personnel that originally came to the Com-
mittee for the Re-Election of the President were also discussed.
Mr. Dash. A number of other people were White House staff peo-
ple, were they not?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think, Mr. Dash, you have to go — ^yes. Yes, I
want to make sure that we understand what period we are talking
about. We are talking about the period when Mr. Harry Flemming
was organizing the activities.
Mr. Dash. And did Mr. Magruder go over at that time ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, as I understand, Mr. Magruder came to the
committee quite a number of months later, sometime in the spring of
1971 is my recollection.
Mr. Dash. Did you have any say in Magruder's appointment ?
Mr. Mitchell. It was recommended by Mr. Haldeman and was con-
curred in by me, yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, there has been testimony by a number of witnesses,
Mr. Mitchell, that during this whole period, the 1971 period and also
the early period of 1972, while you still held the office of Attorney
General, that you played a role — in fact, an active role — in the affairs
of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. Is that not true ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I played a role. I do not know how you
characterize the word "active." The basic point was that I had been
asked by the President to keep my eye on their activities over there
to make sure they did not get out of line, and they would bring
personnel over to me to review them and to see if they were qualified
for the jobs, and they would discuss with me different projects that
they were proposing to undertake, studies in connection with the
media and direct mail. They discussed with me their proposed pri-
mary activities that they were preparing for in some of the early
primaries.
]Mr. Dash. Well, initially, certainly, you had to authorize the expend-
iture of any funds that were paid out at this
Mr. Mitcptell, Well, if you put it in that term, what they did was,
and this again is to keep the lid on, that they did not run wild with
individuals, they would have a montlily budget of personnel, basi-
cally, since they had not gotten to the programmatic stage. They
would ask me to look at it and approve it, yes.
1607
Mr. Dash. And did there come a time when you authorized Mr.
Magruder to be the authority ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think that — I do not know that I asked him
or authorized him. I think that evolved over the fact that he was there
and he had gotten involved with the finance committee people who
were raising the money and he took over the authorizations of that
!Mr. Dash. Is your testimony that he took it over without any action
on your part?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall, Mr. Dash, but certainly there was
great assent on my part, because it got it out of my hair.
Mr. Dash. I think there was quite a bit of testimony that we re-
ceived that Mr. ]Magruder was constantly sending over for approval
and that your secretary was bothered quite a bit by these requests and
you asked Mr. Magruder to actually take over the authorization him-
self, because he was going to be running the thing.
Mr. Mitchell. It could very well be, because he was running it,
and I do not recall the complaints from my secretary.
Mr. Dash. Also, do you recall that a number — you said a number
of projects had been sent over to you — that you had received a number
of memorandums for approval, where you would mark an X or some-
thing on the memorandums ?
Mr. Mitchell. Either that or they would be brought in to me and
approval indicated orally and been taken back.
Mr. Dash. Do you know how much time this activity took ? Was it
a daily occurrence between you and Mr. Magruder and other people
at the Committee To Re-Elect the President ?
Mr. iSIiTciiELL. I do not know if we can put it on a daily occurrence.
Undoubtedly, as it approached the time of my leaving of the Justice
Department, it became more frequent and there were a substantial
number of such conferences.
Mr. Dash. Actually, when did the President make the decision to
ask you to direct this campaign in the 1972 campaign ?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not know as I can answer that question, Mr.
Dash. I think the President would have to ansAver it.
Mr. Dash. Well, when did you know that you were goins: to actually
leave the Attorney General's office and take over this position ?
Mr. Mitchell. 'Well, I was doing substantial feet dragging on the
subject matter, because it was not particularly my desire and I am
sure it was probably sometime around the first of the year, in 1972.
Mr. Dash. Now, T think you have indicated that Mr. Haldeman also
played a role in both the creation of the Committee To Re-Elect the
President and the selection of personnel. What was the relationship
between vou and Mr. Haldeman in the operation of the committee?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was one of liaison, I would think, at the
highest level, in which he, of course, would be representing the Presi-
dent and the interest of the President in connection with the campaign,
and that most major decisions were discussed with Mr. Haldeman
and/or the President, and I say very major decisions.
Mr. Dash. And did you have fairly frequent conversations or meet-
ings with Mr. Haldeman on this subject ?
Mr. Mitchell. I would think that the meetings were not that fre-
quent. Undoubtedly, we had numerous telephone conversations about
various subject matters.
1608
Mr. Dash. Were you aware that reports of major events, at least,
that were being sent to you concerning the activities of the committee
were also being sent to Mr, Haldeman ?
Mr. Mitchell. I would presume that the major ones would be be-
cause of the fact that we would discuss them. He would have to have
such reports in order to be able to discviss them with me.
Mr. Dash. Do you know what liaison relationship was established
at the White House with Mr. Haldeman and the committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, there was a direct liaison between
Mr. Haldeman and myself. As the campaign developed, as we got
more into an active stage, Mr. Strachan was the liaison between the
committee and Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Dash. To your knowledge, was Gordon Strachan Mr. Halde-
man's assistant ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't know what his title was, but he did work
under Mr. Haldeman, and I know his function because various con-
versations were had on the subject matter.
Mr. Dash. To your knowledge, if he had reports from the com-
mittee that had to go to the White House, was it his responsibility to
deliver it to Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't know what his responsibility was, but I as-
sume that is the basis upon which the reports went to the Wliite House,
so they would be disseminated to the appropriate person or persons.
Mr. Dash. Now, in the fall of 1971, Mr. Mitchell, when Mr. Caulfield's
Sandwedge plan was not accepted, were you aware of a continuing con-
cern on the part of Mr. Haldeman and the White House or Mr. Ma-
gruder's part for an intelligence capacity for the Committee To Re-
Elect the President to deal with the problems of demonstrations and
the possible violence during the campaign ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; that first came up, of course, in that, or at least,
occurred in my recollection, it first came up in that November 24
meeting, when Dean brought Liddy over into my office to discuss the
general counsel for the Committee To Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Dash. Was that one of the reasons that INIr. Liddy was being
introduced to you, to take over fact and intelligence gathering?
Mr. Mitchell. No ; I don't believe that is one of the reasons he was
introduced to me. They were looking for a general counsel. What I am
pointing out to you is that in one of the exhibits that ]VTr. Dean has
provided you with, in what you might call a prospectus dealing with
Mr. Liddy's job, there is a one-line short sentence in which it refers to
intelligence gathering.
Mr. Dash. Was that discussed at all during that meeting with you?
Mr. Mitchell. No. The meeting was a very, very short one and the
contents of the prospectus was not discussed.
Mr. Dash. Did you imderstand that a portion of Mr. Liddy's time
would be spent in intelligence gathering for the committee?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe T focused on it at the time, but later
on I came to understand that Mr. Liddy was expending his time or
portions of his time in gathering information of this sort.
ISIr. Dash. I think you said INIr. Dean brought ]\Ir. Liddy over.
Mr. Mitcheix. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Was that the first time vou had met Mr. Liddy ?
ieo9
Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, that is the first time
I ever met him,
Mr. Dash. "Were you aware of INIr. Liddy's background — profes-
sional background ?
]\Ir. Mitchell. I was aware because it was described at the time, but
I think I had probably heard beforehand that he had previously been
an assistant prosecutor in the State of New York, that he had run for
Congress, that he had been with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and had been working in the Treasury and at that particular time,
was in the ^^liite House.
]\Ir. Dash. Xow, were you aware of his duties at the Wliite House?
Mr. Mitchell. I become aware of his duties in the Wliite House
when, I believe it was on the 8th day of December, Mr. Egil Krogh
brought him over to my office in connection with a meeting that had
to do with the Dale program — that is the drug abuse law enforcement
program — of which there were many such meetings going on around
the office, around the administration, around the Government.
Mr. Dash. Well, did you know that Mr. Liddy also worked for Mr.
Krogh as one of the Plumbers?
jMr. Mitchell. No ; I had not been advised of those activities as of
that time.
Mr. Dash. Xow, after Mr. Liddy was hired and became counsel to
the committee, there came a time when there was a meeting in your
office, on January 27, 1972, at the Department of Justice, attended by
Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Liddy, and of course, yourself.
Can you tell us how this meeting came about, who set it up, and why
it was in your office ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I can't tell you how it came about other than
in the normal process of events. Most of the meetings in my office were
put on the calendar through individuals who would call up and ask
for meetings and my secretary would make notes of that and then
somewhere along prior to the time of the request, she would check with
me concerning whether I was agreeable to it and it would be put on
the permanent calendar for that particular day.
]\Ir. Dash. Would she tell you as to what the purpose of the meeting
would be in determining whether you were agreeable or not?
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. Normally, this would be the case.
Mr. Dash. Do you know what purpose was stated for the meeting
of January 27, 1972?
Mr. Mitchell. I cannot recall that, Mr. Dash. The meeting, of
course, as we are well aware now, had two functions. One of them was
to discuss the proposed intelligence plan and the other one had to do
with the discussion of the election and what, what part of it that she
mifi-ht have discussed with me, I am not aware.
Mr. Dash. Well, prior to that
Mr. MrrcHELL. What part of it that she might have discussed with
me I am not aware.
Mr. Dash. Is it your testimony now that you don't recall having
any knowledge that you were going to have an intelligence plan
discussed prior to that meeting of January ?
Mr. Mitchell. I just don't recall.
1610
Mr. Dash. Now the committee has heard, Mr. Mitchell, consider-
able testimony about this particular meeting, at least from the other
side of your desk. Now, what is your recollection of what Mr. Liddy
presented to you as the Attorney General and also to some extent
an adviser to the Committee To Ee-Elect the President ?
Mr. Mitchell. I didn't hear the last part of your question.
Mr- Dash. I said what, to your best recollection, was the intelligence
plan that Mr. Liddy presented to you as Attorney General or in your
role as adviser to the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Mitchell. I think it can be best described as a complete horror
story that involved a mish-masli of code names and lines of author-
ity, electronic surveillance, the ability to intercept aircraft communi-
cations, the call girl bit and all the rest of it.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall the use of charts in the show and tell
operation ?
Mr. Mitchell. I recall the use of charts because this is where the
lines were all crossing with the authority, et cetera, et cetera.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall any of the code names that were used,
Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. Mitchell. No, I can't, Mr. Dash. The matter was of such
striking content and concept that it was just beyond the pale.
Mr. Dash. "When Liddy completed his presentation, what was your
reaction ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think it was very simple. As I recall, I
told him to go burn the charts and that this was not what we were
interested in. Wliat we were interested in was a matter of informa-
tion gathering and protection against the demonstrators.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, if this was the kind of plan that you have
described and, as has been described this way by other witnesses
before this committee, and since you were the Attorney General
of the United States, why didn't you throw Mr. Liddy out of your
office?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think, Mr. Dash, in hindsight I not only
should have thrown him out of the office, I should have thrown him
out of the window. [Laughter.]
Mr. Dash. Well, since you did neither^[laughter] why didn't you
at least recommend that Mr. Liddy be fired from his responsible posi-
tion at the committee since obviously he was presenting to you an ir-
responsible program ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, in hindsight I probably should have done that,
too. About the belief I had at the time in turning the matter over we
would get back to the purpose that was originally intended, and that he
was qualified to pursue that particular segment that we had been talk-
ing about.
Mr. Dash. Well, it's been testified that although you didn't take an
affirmative action, you did not approve the plan that was presented
by any means. But Mr. Liddy at least went away from your office with
the idea that he could come back with a scaled down version of a plan
for intelligence gathering that would have a lower price tag. By the
way, what was the price tag ? Do you recall the pnce tag ?
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, just a million dollars.
1611
Mr. Dash. Now. just carrying on from what my previous observa-
tion was as to what Mr. Liddy may have come away from the meeting,
obviously ]\Ir. Maerruder and Mr. Liddy did not get the impression
that you completely disapproved of the program because they did set
up only 8 days later a meeting in your office on Februaiy 4 with the
same participants in which they presented a half million dollar pro-
gram I understand which included electronic surveillance.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dash, I would disagree with the testimony
to which you refer insofar as Mr. Magruder or Mr. Liddy either one
of them was invited back under the basis of the same concept with re-
spect to the presentation of a plan, and I think Mr. Dean, if I recall
his testimony, agrees a little bit more with what my recollection was
and it was to the point of this was not what we were interested in.
"What we were interested in was the gathering of information and the
securitv and protection against the demonstrations.
Mr. Dash. But nevertheless Mr. Magruder and Mr. Liddy did come
back and Mr. Dean attended that meeting with you, on February 4,
and did present a scaled down version which included electronic sur-
veillance and break-ins, did it not ?
Mr. Mitchell. It did that but there again there are faulty recol-
lections with what was discussed at that meeting, what the concept of
it was. I violently disagree with Mr. Magruder's testimony to the point
that the Democratic National Committee was discussed as a target for
electronic surveillance for the reasons that he gave, number one with
respect to the Democratic back story. We are talking now about the 4th
of Februarv\
Mr. Dash. Yes, I know, the reason for centering in on Mr. O'Brien,
I believe
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, and, of course, the newspaperman
did not have his column that Magruder referred to until the 23d of
February. He said we were focusing on the Democrats and Mr. O'Brien
because Mr. O'Brien's vocal activities in connection with the ITT case,
and Mr. Anderson did not publish his column until the 29th of Febru-
ary, and so that what I am pointing out is that this meeting was a
relatively short meeting and it was rejected again because of the fact
that it had these factors involved. But these targets were not discussed.
Mr. Dash. Were any targets discussed, Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, there were none.
Mr. Dash. Do you also disagree with Mr. Magruder's testimony that
you actually volunteered a particular target which was Hank Green-
spoon's office in Las Vegas for the purpose of obtaining some docu-
ments that might involve a political candidate ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, you gave me a great opportunity to correct
the record on this. You know, Mr. INIagruder said that it could have
been Mitchell or Dean and then when you pickied up the questioning
you said Mitchell, so we are now correcting that record. To the best of
my recollection, there was no such discussion of any
Mr. Dash. However, your recollection is there was no discussion
of it?
iNIr. Mitchell. No discussion whatsoever.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall Mr. Dean's reaction at that meeting ?
1612
Mr. Mitchell. I recall both of our reactions to it. Althouo;h it has
been given, Mr. Dean's reaction has been given a different connotation
and, of course, it depends on who is tellino; the story and under what
circumstances to who looks like the White Knight and who looks like
the Black Knight, of course.
The fact of the matter is that Dean, just like myself, was again
aghast that we would have this type of presentation. John Dean, as I
recall, not only was aghast at the fact that the program had come back
again w^ith electronic surveillance, perhaps a necessary entry in con-
nection with it, I am not sure that entries were always discussed with
electronic surveillance because they are not necessarily synonymous,
but Mr. Dean was quite strong to the point that these things could not
be discussed in the Attorney General's office, I have a clear recollection
of that and that was one of the bases upon which the meeting was
broken up.
Mr. Dash. And broke up on that basis, I believe.
Mr. Mitchell. And broke up, along with my observations.
Mr. Dash. What specifically did you say ?
Mr. Mitchell. I cannot tell you specifically any more than I can
tell you specifically what Mr. Dean said but my observation was to
the point that this was not going to be accepted. It was entirely out of
the concepi of what we needed and what we needed was again an
information-gathering operation along with, of course, the program
to get information on and to be able to have security against the dem-
onstrators that Ave knew were coming.
As you recall, Mr. Dash, at this particular time they had already
started to form in substantial numbers in San Diego in connection
with the proposed convention, even though that convention was not
to happen until August of that year.
Mr. Dash. Well, since this reappearance, and presentation of the
so-called Liddy plan to you which included these obviously objection-
able portions to you as you testified, and since you did not take any
violent action at the preceding meeting, did you take any action
against Mr. Liddy as a result of his coming back again on February 4
and re-presenting it ?
Mr. Mitchell. Other than to cut off the proposals ; no.
Mr. Dash. AVliy not? Here is a man talking to you as Attorney
General about illegal wiretapping and perhaps break-ins. Why, if
you did not have him ordered arrested for trying to conspire to do
things like this, why didn't you have him fired ?
Mr. Mitchell. In hindsight I would think that would have been a
very viable thing to do. And probably should have been done. Liddy
was still an employee of the campaign and I presumed that he would
go back to the duties that he was performing without engaging in
such activities.
Mr. Dash. Well, you had to be aware at least at that time, Mr.
Mitchell, that Liddy could become a very embarrassing employee of
the campaign.
Mr. Mitchell. Not necessarily, unless he violated directions mider
which he was operating to that point there was no such, there was no
such evidence that he was violating.
1613
Mr. Dash. He did not indicate any responsibility to yon at least,
in the presentation of the two plans that he gave you on January 27
and February 4, did he ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure I understand your question, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Certainly, from your point of view, he did not exercise
or did not demonstrate any responsibility ?
]Mr. ^Mitchell. He did not exercise any responsiveness to my desires
in the matter, if that is your question ; no.
]\Ir. Dasil Did you report to anybody the January 27 meeting or the
February 4 meeting ?
Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, no ; Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Did you ever take it up with ]\Ir. Haldeman or anybody
in the White House ?
Mr. ^Mitchell, No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware that Mr. Liddy left the February 4 meet-
ing believing that his plan was not objectionable in itself but only that
the price tag was too high and that he reported that to Mr. McCord and
Mr. Hunt ?
Mr. Mitchell. I cannot conceive of anybody leaving that meeting
with such an understanding.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware, by the way, that Mr. McCord and Mr.
Hunt were involved in the planning operation ?
Mr. Mitchell. Li no way. I have never met Mr. Hunt. I do not know
Mr. Hunt and, of course. Mr. ]\IcCord was the security officer of the
Committee To Re-Elect the President and one of the last people I would
have believed would have been involved in such activitv.
Mr. Dash. Now. after the February 4 meeting, did you receive any
urging or pressures from anybody in the White House with i-egard to
approving the Liddy plan ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Well, now, once again, Mr. Mitchell, and for a third time,
on March 80, 1972, and this time in Key Biscayne, Mr. Magruder him-
self, not yiv. Liddy, presented a decision paper on the so-called Liddy
wiretapping political intelligence ])lan scaled down now to a price tag
of $250,000.""
Do you recall the meeting with Mr. Magruder and yourself down at
Key Biscayne on March 30 ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I do. Mr. Dash.
I was on a vacation and it gave an o]:)portunity to catch up on some
of the things that were happening in the Committee To Re-Elect the
President that I was to be associated with shortly. There were 2 days
of meetings, Mr. Harry Flemming was down there for a day with his
side of the campaign activities that had to do more with the political
organizations and States and Mr. Magruder was down there in con-
nection with the operational program, programmatic side of the
campaign.
Mr. Dash. I understand — I am sorry, continue.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. LaRue had come down with us and was living
in the house with us and he sat in on all of these meetings that we had
while we were down there.
Mr. Dash. Now, I understand Mr. Magruder came down not only
with this so-called Liddy plan proposal but he had a number of other
items on the agenda.
1614
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; he had a substantial number of items on the
agenda because I had been otherwise en^a^ed and had for weeks. I had
not had an opportunity to meet with these people. I was about to
become officially associated with the campaign and he came down with
a big stack of documents that were to be considered immediately.
Mr. Dash. "Would it be fair to say, Mr. Mitchell, that the so-called
quarter million dollar Liddy plan for wiretapping and break-in was
actually diiferent in degree and kind than any other agenda item that
he was presenting to you ?
Mr. Mitchell. ]Mr. Dash, you can I'cst assured of this. There were
no other such plans in the documents that were submitted.
Mr. Dash. I^Hiat would have given ]\Ir. ]Magruder the idea that you
would even consider this proposal again if you had indeed, as you
stated, rejected it so categorically twice before ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would have presumed that you would ask
Mr. Magruder that question when he was here, ]Mr. Dash, but in hind-
sight I presume there were other people interested in the implementa-
tion of some type of activity in this area. Because I believe that Mr.
Magruder was very clearly aware of the position that I had taken in
connection with it.
Mr. Dash. So that it is at least your present feeling that he was
acting under some pressure for somebody to represent this plan to you ?
Mr. Mitchell. This has been continued to be ni}^ feeling but I have
no basis for knowing that.
Mr. Dash. Do you know wdio might have been involved?
Mr. Mitchell. No, I do not.
Mr. Dash. Has anybody ever told you other than any testimony
which has appeared before this committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, the only information I have had has been the
testimony that has been before this committee, and, of course, that is
pretty wide ranging, you can almost take j^our pick of quite a number
of such influences.
Mr. Dash. Now, what is your recollection of what decision you made
in Key Biscayne on the so-called Lidd}- plan ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was very simple. This, again, "We don't
need this, I am tired of hearing it, out, let's not discuss it any further."
This sort of a concept.
Mr. Dash. It was as clear as that?
Mr. IMiTCHELL. In my opinion, it was just as clear as that.
I believe I recall, Mr. Dash, that this was part of a long agenda that
for some unknown reason, they kept this to the last, or the next to the
last. l'\niether somebody thought they were going to sneak it through
or whether there would be less resistance or wdiat, I don't know. But
this is my recollection.
Mr. Dash. Well, then, could ]Mr. ]\Iagruder have been in any way
mistaken as to what your position was ?
Mr. ]MiTCHELL. I would hope not.
Mr. Dash. Then how do vou explain, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Magruder's
sw^orn testimony that you, however reluctantly, approved the quarter
million dollar Liddv plan at Key Biscavne?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I can't explain anybody's testimony up
here except my own.
1615
Mr. Dasti. Well, indeed, if you had not approved the plan
Mr. Mitchell. I really shook him up, didn't 1 1
Mr. Dash. "Well, I will try another question.
You had not approved the plan, but these thin^-s occurred accord-
ino- to the testimony of a number of witnesses. Why would ]Mr. INIa^jru-
der call Mr. Reisner to have Liddy call him in Key Biscay ne and then
as soon as ]Mr. ]Ma2:ruder returned to Washin2:ton, he told Mr. Reisner
to tell Liddy that his ])lan had been approved and he told Sloan that
you had authorized Liddy to draw a total of a quarter of a million
dollars.
Now, Mr. Sloan, ]Mr. Reisner. and ]Mr. Ma^ruder have so testified
that this occurred just after the March 20 meeting.
Mr. Mitchell. I can't describe or prescribe the activities of other
people, ]Mr. Dash, assuming that that long statement of yours is cor-
rect. I can't describe the
]\[r. Dash. Well, perhaps you may not be able to describe the activi-
ties, but was Mr. ]\lagruder capable of leaving a meeting in Key
Biscayne with you on ]March 3fJ, in Avhich you rejected for a third
time the Liddy plan, and completely on his own, lied to Mr. Reisner,
Liddy, and Sloan about your approval of the quarter million dollar
plan ?
Mr. ^Mitchell. Is he capable of it ?
I wasn't privy to the conversation, but if it happened
Mr. Dash. Well, we have this testimony under oath before this
committee, by all three witnesses.
Mr, Mitchell. Well, with respect to all three people that were
involved, if there is a problem there, it is a problem of misunder-
standing or a contravention of my orders.
Mr. Dash. I think you testified that he couldn't possibly misunder-
stand ■
]Mr. ]MiTCHELL. This would certainly have been my recollection
upon the basis of the conversation that was involved. Of course, for-
tunately, there was a third party there and I am sure that he will have
some opinion on the subject matter one way or the other.
Mr. Dash. Who is that?
Mr. ^Mitchell. Mr. LaRue, who was in this meeting with us through-
out the activity.
Mr. Dash. Do you know what his testimony is on that subject?
^Ir. ^Iitchell. No, I don't know what his testimony wnll be, Mr.
Dash, but ]Mr. LaRue was there, and we have talked about it, ob-
viously, since that event occurred over the months that have inter-
vened since the Watergate event of June 17, and I am quite sure that,
for instance, he told Mr. Parkinson and Mr. O'Brien that there was
no such approval at this particular time.
Mr. Dash. Well, did you ever have any meeting with ]Mr. ^lagruder
down at Key Biscayne at which Mr. LaRue was not there ?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't see how there could have been. Mr. LaRue was
staying in the House with us, we were meeting in what they call the
Florida room in the particular house. The meetings went on for quite
a number of hours and we went through these documents and to the
best of my recollection, ]Mr. LaRue was there.
j\Ir. Dash. Do vou recall what JNIr. LaRue said there?
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 18
1616
Mr. MiTCHELX,. Well, I don't think Mr, LaRue was very enthusiastic
about this project and I think he concurred in the fact that it should
not be approved.
Mr. Dash. Now, if Mr. Magnider didn't come away with the idea
that you had approved it and nevertheless, very shortly after he re-
turned, set it in motion by approving the payment to Mr. Liddy of
funds to carry out this plan, do you have any idea who above you could
have given him authority to do this ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dash, I don't know whether it would be
above me, but there could very well have been pressures that came from
collateral areas in which they decided that this was the thing to do. I
can't speculate on who they might be. I am sure that thei-© could be
such pressures.
Mr. Dash. Generally, though, from your knowledge of Mr.
Magruder and the working of Mr. Magruder, would Mr. Magruder
on his own undertake to carry out this plan ?
Mr. Mitchell. You are asking for an opinion again.
Mr. Dash. An opinion, yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I think it is a matter of degree, Mr. Dash. I think
you will find when you get into your additional investigations that
there were a lot of activities in the so-called dirty tricks department
and so forth that were carried on without my knowledge by the gentle-
men who were at the committee. So, it is a matter of degree.
Mr. Dash. Well, a matter of degree. But here, although Mr. Magru-
der had a continuing authority to approve expenditures, if Mr. Magru-
der actually knew that you had barred or rejected a particular pro-
gram, would you expect Mr. Magruder to approve the payment of a
quarter of a million dollars to Mr. Liddy for that program ?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe that Mr. Magruder paid a quarter of a
million dollars to Liddy.
Mr. Dash. Well, approved
Mr. Mitchell. What he had done was continue what he liad been
doing before, made payments along the way to Liddy for Liddy's in-
telligence-gathering activities.
Mr. Dash. Well, that is not according to Mr. Magruder"s testimony.
According to Mr. INIagruder's testimony, he had given this money not
for general intelligence activity, but the so-called Liddy plan.
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, you are talking about the later date ?
Mr. Dash. Yes. Would you expect, taking as a matter of degree, that
Mr. Magruder may have acted on his own ? Having your rejection to a
particular program, would you have expected Mr. Magruder to have
approved the expenditures of large sums of money ?
Mr. Mitchell. I certainly would not have expected it, Mr. Dash, no.
Mr. Dash. Now, shortly, and I think again this is a restatement of
what occurred, shortly after the March oO meeting in Key Biscayne,
Liddy in April did ask for an initial payment from Mr. Sloan on a
quarter million dollar budget. Mr. Sloan lias so testified that Liddy
asked that the initial payment be $83,000. Were you aware of that re-
quest of Mr. Liddy's ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am not aware of the request, Mr. Dash, witli respect
to the dollar amount, and I am sure that the committee recalls the
dialogue from Sloan to Stans to Mitchell to Stans to Sloan with respect
1617
to it in which amounts were not discussed. It was a question of did
Mao;ruder have continuino^ authorization to authorize expenditures,
and of course, the answer was yes.
Mr. Dasti. Well, it is more in direct disagreement with Mr. Sloan's
testimony or Mr. Stans' testimony, but according to Mr. Sloan's testi-
mony, he was quite concerned about the sizable amount, $83,000, and
went to Mr. Stans to see if Mr. Magruder had such authority and then
Mr. Stans went to you. According to the testimony of Mr. Stans, on
^Nlay 16, for the record — just paraphrasing it — ]Mr. Stans, although not
meaning a particular amount, asked whether, if any amount that Mr.
IVIagruder wanted to give Mr. Liddy would be all right, and that you
had said yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I said that Magruder had continuing authority to
authorize expenditures of money. Up until that time, I guess he had
expended $3 or $31/9 million.
Mr. Dash. But did you recall that in this particular case, Mr. Stans
was asking you about Liddy ?
Mr. ISIiTCHELL. I don't have that recollection on the issue of Ma-
gruder's continuing authority, but I would not challenge or dispute
Mr. Stans' statement on the subject.
Mr. Dash. Well, that was his testimonv. Now, you had just had a
meeting with Mr. Magruder on March 30, in which Mr. Magruder was
asking you to approve a quarter million dollar plan that would au-
thorize giving Liddy this kind of money. Your statement now, then,
is that you did tell Mr. Stans that Mr. Magruder could pay Mr. Liddy
any sum of money that Mr. Magruder wanted to pay him.
Mr. Mitchell. Don't put it in the context of any sum of money.
It was a fact that existed, Mr. Dash, in connection with Liddv had
been in the intelligence and information gathering field. I think Mr.
Stans has testified up here that to that time, he had been authorized
$125,000 and it is again in the context of the fact that Magruder had
continuing authority to authorize moneys and Mr. Stans said, with
respect to Liddy, I can take it on the same basis to authorize money
in connection with the ongoing programs that Liddy had l)een carrying
out.
Mr. Dash. That would be true, Mr. Mitchell, in the abstract.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, this is the abstract, Mr. Dash, because there
were no sums involved and none discussed, and this has been the
testimony.
Mr. Dash. Well, Mr. Stans felt it necessary to come back to you
and this was shortly after you were aware that Mr. Liddy was seeking
to get approval of a plan for a quarter of a million dollars.
^Ir. Mitchei L. Xo, we had had no discussion whatsoever with respect
to approval of a Liddy plan of a quarter of a million dollars, and
Mr. Stans has testified that he never heard about it. And I am so
testifying that I never heard about it in connection with the discussion
of whether or not the authorization from Magruder to Liddy had
anything to do with a quarter of a million dollar plan.
Mr. Dash. But shortly after the March 30 meeting, you were being
asked by Mr. Stans if Mr. Magruder could pay sizable amounts to Mr.
Liddy?'
iei8
Mr. Mitchell. No, there weren't any sizable amounts. We didn't
talk about numbers, we didn't talk about sizable amounts at all. What
we talked about was did Magnider have continuing authorization,
Stans said, to provide money to Liddy. I say continuing authorization
and it is still the fact that it is continuing authorization to Liddy. We
are not talking about a quarter of a million dollars, we are not talking
about sizable amounts, we are talking about what was conceived to
be an ongoing program that had already expended $125,000.
Mr. Dash. Just one last question on this, Mr. Mitchell. Then why
was it necessary for Mr. Stans to come to you if it was not a sizable
amount involved?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Stans has already testified that he didn't know
the amount involved and didn't discuss it with me.
Mr. Dash. I think Mr. Stans' testimony is that he asked you if any
amounts were to be paid by Mr. Liddy, would that be all right?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall on that basis, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Let me just read to you, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Stans' testi-
mony on page 1644.
"I said" — meaning Mr. Stans — "you mean, John, that if Magruder
tells Sloan to pny these amounts to Gordon Liddy that he should do
so ? And he said, that is right."
Mr. Mitchell. Would you go back and pick it up so I can hear the
prior testimony ?
Mr. Dash. Let me just go back.
"I will quote the conversation with John Mitchell as best as I can
paraphrase it. It is not precise. But I saw John Mitchell a relatively
short time after and said, Sloan tells me that Gordon Liddy wants
a substantial amomit of money. What is it all about?
"And John Mitchell's reply was, I do not know. We will have to ask
Magruder, because Magruder is in charge of the campaign and he
directs the spending."
Mr. Stans said, "I said, do you mean, John, that if Magruder tells
Sloan to pay these amounts or any amounts to Gordon Liddy, that he
should do so? And he said, that is right."
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would respectfully disagree with Mr. Stans
on the fact of substantial amounts or that the discussions had to do
with respect to the authorization by Magruder in the continuity of
the way he had been acting. This was as I was coming aboard in
connection with the campaign.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Mitchell, were you aware that on or about
May 27, 1972, there was in fact a break-in of the Democratic National
Committee headquarters at the Watergate ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. And did you know of the code name, "Gemstone" or any
of the wiretap proofs that came from the break-in ?
Mr. Mitchell. Not until a great deal later down the road, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. When you say that, how far down the road ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am not quite certain. I believe it would be sub-
stantially down the road.
Mr. Dash. Before June 17 or after June 17 ?
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, much after June 17.
1619
Mr. Dash. Were you aware that Mr. Magruder kept a so-called
Mitchell Gemstone file as well as a Haldeman Gemstone file, prior to
June 17?
Mr. Mitchell. I have heard testimony here, Mr. Dash, that I be-
lieve it was Mr. Reisner, that they kept a Mitchell file, in which docu-
ments would be placed for Mr. Magruder to come up and discuss them
with me.
Mr. Dash. Yes, I believe Mr. Magruder has also testified about that.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, about a file that would have documents, memo-
randums, et cetera, et cetera. I am not aware of anybody testifying
to the fact that there was a special Mitchell gemstone file.
]\Ir. Dash. Well, the INIitchell file did include, on that testimony,
you will recall, that it included gemstone.
Mr. ^Mitchell. I recall Keisner stating that he had put the docu-
ments in there, yes.
Mr. Dash. But do you recall Mr. Magruder testifying that he had
taken these documents and showed them to you ?
]\Ir. ^Mitchell. I recall it very vividly because it happens to be a
palpable, damnable lie.
Mr. Dash. What is the lie, Mr. :Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, let me lay out the scenario for you, because
my answer will come in the scenario. I paid particular attention to
this because of the fact that INIr. Magruder said that at his regular
8 :80 morning meeting, sometime within a week or a week and a half
from the time of the initial break-in, that he brought certain docu-
ments to my office at the regular 8:80 meeting to display them to me
and that I was dissatisfied with them and that I called Gordon
Liddy up to my office and raised holy hell with him about the fact that
thev were not the tvpe of information that was wanted.
Now, let me go back and pick up the facts with respect to the meet-
ing. First of all, I had an 8 :15 meeting every day ever at the White
House in connection with activities that were governmental, but I
sat in on.
Second, if you have my logs, that are very, very accurate and cor-
rect, you will note that there was no meeting in any morning during
thnt period when yir. ^Magruder and I were alone during that meeting.
Third, I have never seen or talked to Mr. Liddy from the 4th day
of February 1972 until the 15th day of June 1972, either in person or
on the telephone.
Fourth, I would like to point out that ]Mr. Dean's testimony is that
when he first debriefed ^Nfr. Liddy on the 19th of June, Mr. Liddy
told Mr. Dean that ^lagruder was the one that had pushed him con-
cerning the second entrv on the 17th of June and I cannot conceive
of anybodv, if they had Mitchell as a scapegoat, whv thev would get
down to ]Magruder and use him as the one that had pushed him.
So I am using that dialogue to point out the reasons why this
meetinsf could not and did not take place.
Mr. Dash. Just taking that dialogue, vou were aware that there
was no love lost between jNIr. Liddy and Mr. Magruder and he might
well have wanted to, since we are speculating, put the blame on
Mr. IVIagruder.
1620
Mr. Mitchell. As I am stiating, Mr. Dash, I never saw Mr. Liddy
from the 4th of February until the 15th of June and I cannot tell you
whether there was love lost or not. I think there is testimony that if
they had a controversy, it should be kept away from me and settled
at lower echelons.
Mr. Dash. Well, if Mr. Liddy did not see you, did Mr. Magruder
show you the Gemstone file, as he indicated he did?
Mr. Mitchell. No; he did not and I just got through denying that
fact that he did and I am pointing out the reasons why he did not be-
cause of the circumstances and time in which he is talking about the
meetings that are referred to in those logs.
Mr. Dash. You do not recall then, any statement by IVIr. Liddy to
you indicating that the O'Brien microphone was not working and he
would have to fix it ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, the only statement that I have had with
Mr. Liddy and the only conversation from the 4th of February until
this very day was one single meeting that shows in my log on June 15,
1972, where Mr. Liddy was brought into my office by Mr. Van Shum-
way, the Public Information Officer, to discuss with me a letter that
Mr. Liddy had written on Mr. Stans' request to the Washington Post
having to do with some charges that had been made by the General
Accounting Office dealing with the Corrupt Practices Act and Mr.
Shumway did not want that letter to go to the Post without my ap-
])roval. I looked at the letter and gave it the approval and that was the
end of it. That was the only conversation I had with Mr. Liddy so it
could not possiblv be as you were inferring.
Mr. Dash. Without seeking at all to challenge, Mr. Mitchell, your
testimony, would it not be true since you referred to the log or what
may or may not appear in the log if a name does appear in the log it
is perhaps likely that such a person did meet with you during that
time but does it actually mean if a name does not appear that such a
person never entered your office ?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe that to be absolutely true, Mr. Dash. If
you go back and look at that log you will find that the aide that I had
sitting in the next office to me when he came into see me that was logged.
When my daughter called on the telephone or when my wife called on
the telephone — ^by the way, my wife called a lot more often than my
daughter [laughter] but regardless of who it was that called and who
came into the office that was logged in that particular circumstance.
Mr. Dash. Well, even though you may not have followed all the
testimony, Mr. Mitchell, are you aware that some time earlier at the
beginning of these hearings that Mr. McOord in his early testimony
before this committee gave some corroborating evidence, although
hearsay as it was, to the effect that Liddy told him that the reason they
had to go into the DNC on June 17 was because you, Mr. Mitchell,
were unhappy about the false or the ineffective working opercOition of
the O'Brien bug.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, that fits right in with Mr. McCord's testi-
mony as the only reason he did anything of this was because he thought
he had the approval of the Attorney General of the TTnited States
and the counselor to the President, that iust fits right in with it. But
the fact of the matter is that I never saw or talked to Mr. Liddy from
the 4th of February until the 15th of June.
1621
Mr. Dash. All right, now, ]\Ir. Mitchell, where and when did you
first learn of the break-in of the Democratic National Committee head-
quarters that took place on June 17, 1972 ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I was in California for the weekend on an
extensive round of activities and, to the best of my recollection,
Mr. Dash, it was on Saturday morning. I am not sure who the individ-
ual was who told me. AVe were, I was, moving with Governor Reagan
from a hotel to a place where there was a series of political meetings, to
the best of my recollection, when I arrived there I was advised of it.
There was coi'isiderable concern about the matter because I was holding
a press conference out there, and we did not know what the circum-
stances were. I believe that by that time that they had — Mr. McCord,
his name had surfaced or Mrs. McCord had called somebody at the
committee about it, and obviously, there was an involvement in the
Committee To Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Dash. What, if anything, did you do, while still in California ?
Mr. Mitchell. While in California ? I did a number of things. First
of all, I continued to carry out the schedule that I liad there which was
quite extensive for 2 days. I asked the people, particularly Mr. Mardian
who was there, to get as much information about it as he could. I put
out a statement to the effect that, I do not know whether it went out
there or after we came back, to tlie effect that we did not understand
this, tliat Mr. McCord was one of our employees, he also had a separate
consulting firm, that it was basically an attempt to carry on the exten-
sive schedule that I had which, of course, is in the book that you are
well aware about and, at the same time, trying to get information as
to what had happened back in the District of Columbia.
]\Ir. Dash. At that time, out in California, did it ever cross your
mind when you read about this that perhaps the Liddy plan had been
put in operation ?
]\lr. ]\liTCHELL. Well, that had crossed my mind but the players
were different and, of course, there was a lot of discussion about CIA
and because of the Cuban Americans who were involved in it. It
wasn't until actually later on that it struck home to me that this could
have been the same operation that had a genesis back in the earlier
conversation.
Mr. Dash. Well then, after you returned from California, and I
understand that was on June 19, 1972.
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. Yes, sir, it was.
Mr. Dash. When and how were you briefed as to what actually
happened in this matter ?
Mr, Mitchell. Well, how was I briefed as to what actually hap-
pened ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is such a broad statement that I could
tell you for the next 6 months I was being briefed on it.
Mr. Dash. I mean, let's take the
Mr. Mitchell. Excuse me, Mr, Dash, you are asking the questions.
Mr. Dash. That is all right. I think you were about ready to give
me a shorter answer than a longer answer,
Mr, Mitchell, Well, I was giving you a shorter answer to the fact
that the first so-called briefing on what had hai:)pened, and you used
the word "actually" which I will have to omit from that for the time
1622
being because I have never quite got to the bottom of it, Avas after ISIr.
Mardian and Mr. LaRiie had met with Mr, Liddy and Mr. Liddy
provided them with quite an extensive story on Mr. Liddy's activities.
Mr, Dash. Will you tell us briefly what that extensive story
included ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it included the fact that he was involved with
other individuals in the Watergate activity, that he had also made
surveillance of McGovern headquarters, I believe it was, and that he
had previously, as part of what has since become known as the
Plumbers group, acted extensively in certain areas while he was at
the White House in connection with the Ellsberg matter, in the Dita
Beard matter and a few of the other little gems.
Mr, Dash, "WHien you say the Ellsberg matter what specifically are
you referring to ?
Mr, Mitchell, Well, I am referring to, well, it certainly wasn't the
prosecution,
Mr, Dash, No.
Mr. Mitchell. Obviously it had to do with the surreptitious entry
of the doctor's office in California.
Mr. Dash. And when you refer to the Dita Beard matter what spe-
cifically did you learn through Mr. LaRiie and Mr. ]Mardian?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, if mv recollection is correct he was assisting
in spiriting her out of wherever they spirited her out of, either New
York or Washington.
Mr. Dash. Was there a meeting in your apartment on the evening
that you arrived in Washington on June 19, attended by Mr. LaRue,
Mr. Mardian, Mr. Dean. Mr. Magruder
Mr, Mitchell. Magruder and mvself. that is correct.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall the purpose of that meeting, the discus-
sion that took place there ?
Mr. Mitchell. I recall that we had been traveling all day and, of
course, we had very little information about what the current status
was of the entry of the Democratic National Committee, and we met
at the apartment to discuss it. They were, of course, clamoring for a
response from the committee because of Mr. McCord's involvement,
et cetera, and we had quite a general discussion of the subject matter.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall anv discussion of the so-called either Gem-
stone files or wiretapping files that you had in your possession?
Mr. Mitchell. No ; I had not heard of the Gemstone files as of that
meeting and, as of that date. I had not heard that anybody there at
that particular meeting knew of the wiretapping aspects of that or
had anv connection with it.
Mr. Dash. Did either you or anybodv in your presence at that meet-
ing discuss INIr. Liddy having a good fire at his house?
Mr. Mitchell. Not in mv recollection was there any discussion of
destruction of documents at that meeting.
Mr. Dash. You are aware of the testimony of Mr. Magruder that
he did get the idea to destroy the documents and he did in fact burn
the Gemstone documents?
Mr. Mitchell. T am aware of his testimony and T think his testi-
mony was one of these general t]iin.Qfs "It was decided that" or some-
thing to that effect but, to my recollection, there was no such discus-
sion of it.
1623
Mr. Dash. Now, diirincr the period which is the latter part of June,
July, and perhaps August, you did become somewhat aware, not fully
aware, of the fact that Mr. Magruder had been very nuich involved
in the so-called Liddy bugging operation of the Democratic National
Committee headquarters, and also of the Liddy-Hunt operations as
you have indicated for the plumbers activities that you have described
earlier.
Were you not also aware, Mr. Mitchell, of the wiretapping of certain
journalists and stall' members of Mr. Kissinger after the so-called leaks
of the SALT talks?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, which question do you want me to answer ?
JNIr. Dash. I think, the first
]\Ir. ]MiTtiiELL. We are going from July 1972 back to some place in
1969 and I am not quite sure how you want me to approach it.
]Mr. Dash. Well, you did become aware during June and July of
Mr. ]Magruder's involvement in the break-in of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee headquarters?
Mr. ^Mitchell. We had people such as ]Mr. Liddy and so forth say
yes, that Magruder was involved, Magruder was saying no at one time
and maybe yes the other time, and so forth, but we were aware of the
fact that certainly ]\Ir. ]Magruder had provided the money if nothing
else and that during the latter part of June and the early part of July
seemed to be what all the focus was as to how much money Mr. Ma-
gruder had provided to ]Mr. Liddy.
]Mr, Dash. Well, there came a time when you were aware that Ma-
gruder himself had admitted to certain persons, whether INIr. Mardian
or INIr. Parkinson, that he had been involved but was going to give a
false story about what he had done.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't want to get Mr. Parkinson in there and
I don't know about Mr. Mardian because Mr. Magruder told them two
or three different stories, and Mr. Parkinson, and Mr. O'Brien ob-
viously went ahead on the story that they thought was to be the facts.
As I understand the sequence of events when this thrashing around
was involved, occurred, involving everybody from the President of the
Ignited States and the chairman of this committee and everybody on
down the line as anybody they could think of to name, ^Nlr. Parkinson.
Senator Ervix [presiding]. Just a minute, did they accuse this
chairman?
Mr. ^Mitchell. No, sir, this committee, I was going to use some other
committee, I think we had better use some other committee.
[Laughter.]
The fact of the matter is that to the best of my recollection that
Mr. Parkinson got jNIr. Magruder and Mr. Porter down to his office
and ]:)ut them in a room and said now "I want you to write down
what your statement is on this subject matter liecause it probably is
going to be used as a deposition before the grand jury or certainly
for submission to the Justice Department," so I want to make sure
that Mr. O'Brien — that ]Mr. Parkinson is not involved in this. It got
to the point where I had a very, very strong suspicion as to what the
involvement was, yes.
Mr. Dash. Witli that you also had the suspicion, if that is the word
you want to use. that AIi\ ]\Lagrudei'*s story which he was writing
down and which he was going to give in a deposition to the grand jury
was not a true story.
1624
Mr. Mitchell. Well, this came out later. I didn't know what he
was writing down July 15 or whatever it was, it came later.
Mr. Dash. There came a time when it did become a fact.
Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
Mr. Dash. When was that ?
Mr. Mitchell. I would say it was sometime before he went to the
grand jury, sometime. I don't want to duck your ques'don on these
wiretaps that happened back in 1969.
Mr. Dash. I will come back to that in a second. But you did become
aware by the time he testified on the grand jury that Mr. Magruder
was, in fact, testifying to a false story.
Mr. Mitchell. 1 became aware or had a belief that it was a false
story.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, there were a number of meetings
that you had with Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, Mr. LaRue, and Mr. Mar-
dian, and at least in way part of the discussion that took place at that
time, was Mr. Magruder's testimony before the grand jury ?
Mr. Mitchell. I would think there would have been more than one
meeting on the subject matter, yes.
Mr. Dash. I think the calendar would show there were quite a num-
ber of meetings in which you met
Mr. Mitchell. There were a lot of meetings, with a lot of matters
being discussed at that time.
Mr. Dash. Also was it true that Mr. Dean began to serve as sort of a
liaison between this group that you were meeting with and Mr. Halde-
man and Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dean was serving as a liaison between the
Committee To Re-Elect the President and the White House and I am
sure that would have meant Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dash. And then, to the best of your recollection and knowledge,
were you aware that Mr. !Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were being
kept informed on the question of the strategy to conceal Mr. Ma-
gruder's actual
Mr. MrrciiELL. I had no specific knowledge of that.
Mr. Dash. Did you ever discuss that with Mr. Ehrlichman or
Haldeman?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir ; I never did. You are talking about the Ma-
gruder testimony ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection I have never discussed
it with them.
Mr. Dash. You don't recall that at all ?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall that, no. I can only say that Mr. Dean
was the conduit, Avas the party who acted between the two committees
and came back and forth and discussed things with us so that
whether
Mr. Dash. Did you have any communication with Mr. Haldeman
or Mr. Ehrlichman yourself durinii: this ]ieriod of time?
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, I am sure I had numerous communications but
I probably had to do with the running of the campaign, with other
such matters rather than what Mr. ISIagruder might be testifvina: to.
Mr. Dash. Did it have anythinq: to do with the so-called White
House horror stories or the scandals you learned about from Mr.
1625
Mardian and 'Sir. LaRiie based on Mr. Liddy's statement, to back
them lip ?
Mr. Mitchell. You are talking about this time, you are talking
before Magruder
Mr. Dash. Before Magruder's testimony before the grand jury.
Mr. Mitchell. Before Magruder's testimony before the grand jury.
I would believe that during that period of time there were some dis-
cussions of the so-called White House stories, yes.
Mr. Dash. Was there
Mr. Mitchell. Horrors, I mean not stories.
Mr. Dash. Was there a concern expressed by you to Mr. Halde-
man or Mr. Ehrlichman concerning whether stories Avould be revealed
during this campaign ?
Mr. ^IiTCHELL. I think that we all had an innate fear that during the
campaign that they might be revealed. I recall discussing it specifically
in that area but I am sure we must have had a mutual concern about
the subject matter.
Mr. Dash. Well, did you yourself form a personal position as to
what should be done about revealing this material ?
Mr. Mitchell. I formed the opinion and a position that I did not
believe that it was fair to the President to have these stories come out
during his political campaign,
Mr. Dash. Were you aware that there was a program actually
going on so as to actually prevent these stories from coming out?
]Mr. ^Mitchell. Now, which program are you talking about, Mr.
Dash, so I can be sure to answer your question properly?
Mr. Dash. Well, a program on the part of yourself, Mr. Dean, Mr.
Haldeman. Mr. Ehrlichman, and perhaps Mr. LaEue and Mr. Mar-
dian to see to it that the information that got to the prosecutor or to
the grand jury or to the civil suits did not in any way include this
information concerning the so-called White House horrors, as you
described them ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dash, that is a very broad question and
covers a lot of areas. I may answer it, perhaps, by saying that we
sure in hell were not volunteering anything. In addition to that, we
were involved in a A'ery difficult series of civil litigation, as you know,
that involved discovery and all the rest of it. So we were not volun-
teering anything.
Mr. Dash. But you say you did come to know that, prior to Mr.
Magruder's testimony, that he was going to testify falsely?
Mr. Mitchell. I think I can put it on the basis that I had a pretty
strong feeling that his testimony was not going to be entirelv accurate.
Mr, Dash. Right, and this discussion, T think you have already tes-
tified, M-as part of the discussion of some of the meetings with Messrs.
LaRue, Mardian, Dean, and Magruder.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Would it be correct
Mr. ]\IiTciiELL, I think the best way to put it is that Mr, Magruder
would seek an audience to review his stor>' that he was going to tell,
rather than somebody was trying to induce him to do so, I think Mr.
Magruder has testified that nobody coerced him to do this, that he made
up the story, that he did it of his own free will. So it was more of a basis
1626
of Mr. Magruder recounting to these assembled groups what he was
going to testify to.
Mr. Dash. But would it be fair to say, Mr, Mitchell, that it was in
the interest of the group to have the story that did go into the grand
jury and the ultimate indictments that did come out cut off at Liddy ?
And Mr. Magruder, who was in such a high position in the committee,
would not be involved in that type of thing ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I think you are jumping from one conclu-
sion to another without tlie bridge. What we were really concerned
about were the l^Hiite House horror stories. Now, if the cutoff that you
speak of helped in that direction, perhaps that was probably the case.
In other words, Watergate did not have the great significance that the
White House horror stories that have since occurred had.
Mr. Dash. Would you say that whatever coverup was taking place
to this point, concealment and not volunteering information, had to do
with actually preventing the so-called White House horror stories
rather than Watergate break-in ?
Mr. Mitchell. This was certainly my belief and rationale and I
would believe the people in the White House, certainly some of them,
might well be involved and certainly would have similar interests.
Mr. Dash. Well, did Mr. Dean, in carrying back the messages from
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, indicate that he had in fact in-
formed them of the actions that had been taken — the strategies per-
formed by your group ?
Mr. Mitchell. I cannot say that he did or did not. I would have to
believe that Mr. Dean was reporting to those gentlemen over there.
Mr. Dean, as a proper lawyer, proper counsel, was very, very limited
in his discussions of what he did or said with people in the White
House and that is the way, of course, he should have acted.
Mr. Dash. I think you testified that you at least discussed withJNIr.
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman the problems involved in the Liddy
operations, the Ellsberg, and other situations?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, and that was somewhere down the line, prob-
ably much later than the time frame of which you are talking about in
relationship to Mr. Magnider's appearance before the grand jui-y.
Mr. Dash. All right, now, let us look very briefly to the so-called
wiretapping of the journalists and Mr. Kissinger's staff as a result of
the SALT talk leaks. Were you aware of the leaking and those
wiretaps?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I find it hard to give you a specific answer
other than the fact that, yes, I was. To what extent, I do not know.
This happened in 1968 and they were national security wiretaps. They
should have a full record of everything that was handled in the De-
partment of Justice, because every security tap, whether it be a strict
national security dealing with foreigners or whether it is the type that
the court, has since frow^ned upon, is filed in the Department of Justice.
Mr. Dash. But this would require your authority as Attorney Gen-
eral, would it not?
Mr. Mitchell. I would believe that the FBI would probably not op-
erate without it. I am not sure of that, but I believe that that would
be the case.
1Q27
Now, let me go on to ])oint out two other thino;s. No. 1, I do not
recall tliere being that many people involved. I remember some mem-
bers of the National Security Council that they thought were very
much suspect.
The second point I would like to point out, which gives me memory
problems, is that in the newspapers, counsel said that some of these
were on for a year and a half or 2 years, or something to that extent.
Well, we have' a rule that I put in the Department that where they
had these national security taps, they had to be reviewed every 90
days. So there again, I would have had a memory jog along the way
if this be the case.
So what I am saying is that I think your best evidence is over in the
Department of Justice and not my recollection.
Mr. Dasji. Well, would the President's recollection be of assistance,
Mr. ^Mitchell ? Are you aware of the President's statement of May 22 ?
Mr. INIiTCHELL. I am aware of that reference in the statement of
May 22. 1 do not know where the information came from. It may quite
conceivably be correct. I brought the matter up through correspond-
ence with Mr. Ruckelshaus and I thought I got very fuzzy answers
back. But as I say, the evidence is in the Department of Justice and
you ought to have access to it.
Mr. Dash. But you do recall that in that statement of the President,
the President did say that these areas did have the approval and were
selected, along with others, by the Attorney General of the United
States, who was you at the time ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I have seen a lot of statements that come
out that — I am not referring to the President, but in which people who
dig out the information frequently get their facts wrong.
Mr. Dash. This is a very important statement bv the President on
May 22.
Mr. ^Mitchell. I thought Mr. Buzhardt's statement was quite im-
portant as far as I was concerned, too, but I think we found out what
the distinction was there.
Mr. Dash. You are not suggesting Mr. Buzhardt prepared the May
22 testimony?
]Mr. Mitchell. I am not suggesting anything.
Mr. Dash. Did you believe, ]S[r. INIitchell — and I use the tenn belief
at this point — have any belief as to whether the President was awai-e of
the events either prior to or after the break-in of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee headquarters? When I say events, I mean the actual
bugging or the coverup which took place thereafter?
Mr. ^IiTCiiELL. I am not aware of it and I have evei^y reason to be-
lieve, because of my discussions and encounters with him up through
the 22d of ^Nlarch, I have very strong opinions that he was not.
Mr. Dash. How do you arrive at that conclusion ? Was it by particu-
lar conversations with the President that he talked to you about this
subject, or did you talk to him about this subject?
Mr. Mitchell. No, it is primarily — I do not want to say no to
exclude it, and I will explain the natures of the conversations, if you
so desire. As a matter of fact, you may go through that list and I will
get a chance to do them one by one. AAHiat I am saying is that I think
1628
I know the individual, I know his reactions to things, and I have a
very strong feeling that during the period of time in which I was in
association with him and did talk to him on the telephone, that I just
do not believe that he had that information or had that knowledge;
otherwise, I think the type of conversations we had would have
brought it out.
Mr. Dash. Generally, is it fair to say that much of your opinion that
you express is based on your faith in the President and your knowl-
edge of the man, rather than any specific statement the President made
to you or that you made to the President ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I subscribe to the first two. I do have faith in
the President and I do think I have knowledge of the man and I do
think there were enough discussions in the area, in the general area, to
the point where I think the general subject matter would have come
out if the President had had knowledge.
Mr. Dash. Well, now, Mr. Mitchell, you did become aware, as you
have indicated, somewhere around June 21 or 22, when you were
briefed or debriefed by Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian about the so-
called — as you described it, the White House horrors of the Liddy
operation and the break-in. Did you, yourself, as the President's ad-
viser and counselor, tell the President what you knew or what you
learned ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I did not.
Mr. Dash. Why didn't you ?
Mr. Mitchell. Because I did not believe that it was appropriate for
him to have that type of knowledge, because I knew the actions that
he would take and it would be most detrimental to his political
campaign.
Mr. Dash. Could it have been actually helpful or healthy, do you
think?
Mr. Mitchell. That was not my opinion at the particular time. He
was not involved ; it wasn't a question of deceiving the public as far
as Richard Nixon was concerned, and it was the other people that were
involved in connection with these activities, both in the "\\niite House
horrors and the Watergate. I believed at that particular time, and
maybe in retrospect, I was wrong, but it occurred to me that the best
thing to do was just to keep the lid on through the election.
Mr. Dash. Then it is your testimony that you in fact did not say
anything to the President at that time
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I did not.
Mr. Dash. So whether the President had any knowledge of it, it
certainly couldn't have come from, his lack of knowledge or knowledge,
from any statement that you made to him ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Now, were you aware of the fact that actually prior to
Magruder's testimony, Mr. Dean rehearsed Mr. Magruder for his testi-
mony before the grand jury ?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall that, Mr. Dash, if you are talking
about the testimony that took place on the
INIr. Dash. In August.
Mr. Mitchell. In August, the second appearance.
Mr. Dash. The second appearance.
1629
Mr. IMiTCHELL. I am not aware of that.
Mr. Dash. Then prior to Mao:ruder's third appearance, which dealt
with the diaries and the meetings in your office, were you aware or do
you recall the meetino; between you, Magruder, and Dean, in which a
discussion was had concerning how to handle that testimony and how
he was to testify in some of those meetings?
^h\ ]MiTCiiELL. Well, it wasn't a question so much of how to handle
the testimony; it was a question of what the recollection was. That,
as I recall, Magruder's testimony had to do with the destruction of
diaries that were already in the possession of the grand jury. But I
think ]Mr. Dean's testimoiiy is a lot closer to the recollection that I have
of the meeting. It was a question of what was the purpose of it, who
was there, and what could be said about it to limit the impact of the
whole
]Mr. Dash. And did Mr. INIagruder indicate that he was not going to
testify concerning any intelligence plans, but would testify that he
was tiiere to discuss the election laws.
;Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. Well, the election laws w^ere discussed and I think
the result was that he would limit it to the election laws.
Mr. Dash. And you were aware, then, in December that he would
testify not completely, if not falsely, concerning the meetings on Jan-
uary 27 and Februar}^ 4 ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is generally correct. As I say again, this
is something that Dean and I were listening to, as to his story as to
how he was going to present it.
Mr. Dash. Well, wasn't it the result of your effort or program to
keep the lid on? You were interested in the grand jury not getting the
full story. Isn't that true ?
]Mr. Mitchell. Maybe we can get the record straight so you won't
have to ask me after each of these questions : Yes. we wanted to keep
the lid on. We were not volunteering anything.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, would it not be fair to sav, Mr.
Mitchell, that the most consuming issue that occupied you and some
of those you were meeting with at this time was exactly the question
of keeping the lid on during the
]Mr. Mitchell. Xo. I wouldn't say that was correct. ]Mr. Dash. There
were many other political activities that took place and. of course, we
probably spent more time in connection with the civil litigation than
we did in connection with this particular aspect of it.
Mr. Dash. Well, did you become aware at this time — in July or
August — that payments were being made to defendants and support
for the family ?
Mr. Mitchell. I became aware in the fall sometime, and I can't tell
you when it was. Probably it was a time in which one individual
stopped making the payments and the other individual took it up,
whatever time reference that was.
Mr. Dash. And did you know that Mr. Kalmbach had been involved
in that at all ?
Mr. Mitchell. I had learned that, yes.
Mr. Dash. Did you also learn that in September, he had decided not
to be involved any more and that INIr. LaRue took up the responsibility
of landing the funds, making payoffs ?
1630
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, when did you leave your position as the director
of the campaign ?
Mr. Mitchell. On the 1st of July 1972.
Mr. Dash. And when you left, you were aware, were you not, that
Mr. Magruder was staying on as deputy director of the campaign.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, he stayed on as Mr. MacGregor's deputy.
Mr. Dash. And were you not aware when you were leaving that Mr.
Magruder at least faced some serious problem of being indicted on the
break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquartere as of
July 1 ?
Mr. Mitchell. As of July 1 ? I think that was a potential, yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, you did meet with the President on June 30, 1972,
just before you left. As I understand, you had lunch with the Presi-
dent.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did you think it your duty to tell the President at that
lunch before you left that the man who was playing such a key role in
his campaign, Magruder, had such a problem that he might be indicted
for the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I think you and I have gone over to the
point where we have established that the White House horror stories
had come out in connection with the problem at that particular time
and there wasn't the question of lifting of the tent slightly in order
to get with respect to one individual or another ; it was a keeping the lid
on and no information volunteered.
Mr. Dash. Even if the lid had been kept on the so-called White House
horrors, wouldn't it be very embarrassing to the President of the
United States in his effort to be reelected if his deputy campaign di-
rector was indicted in the break-in of the Democratic National Com-
mittee headquarters ?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't think as far as the Watergate was concerned,
there was a hell of a lot of difference between the deputy campaign
director and the counsel for the finance committee and the security
officer. Quite frankly, as far as the Watergate was concerned, that was
already a public issue. It was the parties that were involved.
Mr. Dash. There came a time, did there not, Mr. Mitchell, that the
pressures for money by the defendants or by Mr. Hunt increased ?
Would you tell us what you know about that ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am not sure, Mr. Dash, that I can tell you very
much about them other than the fact that somewhere along in the fall,
Mr. Hunt had a telephone conversation with Mr. Colson, which. I
think, covered the subject matter and then later on, as I recall, Mr.
Dean has got in the record a letter from Mr. Hunt to Mr. Colson. which
I think is quite suggestive of the fact that he was beinof abandoned.
Then T heard later on, in March of this year, there were oral com-
munications from either Hunt or his attorney relatin.fr to requests for
legal fees and so forth, which were oommnnioated to the White House.
Mr. Dash. How did vou hear about the March request?
Mr. Mttchelt,. The March request ? T think I probably heard about
it throuq-h Mr. DaRue, if mv memorv serves me right.
Mr. Dash. Do you know how much money was actually being re-
quested at that time ?
1631
Mr. Mitchell. I can't really tell you about the moneys across this
period of time. It seems to me that the March request had some amount
in the area of $75,000 which Mr. LaRue described to me, that was being
requested by counsel for their legal fees in connection with the rep-
resentation of Mr. Hunt.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. DaRue ask you Avhat your opinion was or whether
he should pay that amount of money to Mr. Hunt or his counsel ?
Mr. MiTciiELL. Mr. LaRue, to the best of my recollection, put it in
this context : I have got this request, I have talked to John Dean over
at the White House, they are not in the money business any more,
what would you do if you were in my shoes and knowing that he made
prior payments? I said, if I were you. I would continue and I would
make the payment.
Mr. Dash. And in that advice to Mr. LaRue, I take it, was the con-
sideration that unless that payment was made, Mr. Hunt might in fact
uncover the so-called "White House horror stories.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I don't know how you can move from the
fact that Mr. LaRue told me that it was for legal fees to the point
where we are uncovering the A^-liite House horror stories. It may be
there. I don't know.
Mr. Dash. Didn't that enter your mind, the pressure from Mr. Hunt,
the fact that you indicated there were requests and former pressures
for money, to the
Mr. Mitchell. I don't think, Mr. Dash, that in March of 1973, those
things were entering my mind, because I think as you are well aware
from other testimony, I had refused to even consider raising money for
these purposes a long time before that.
Mr. Dash. But you are aware that there was a sum of money avail-
able for that at the White House, were you not ?
Mr. Mitchell. I was aware that there had been one at one time, but
T didn't know how far Liddy had gotten into that particular fund.
Mr. Dash. Since the $3.50,000 had come over from the Committee
for the Re-Election of the President to the "V^Hiite House
Mr. Mitchell. That is the only fund I was aware of, yes.
Mr. Dash. Why, Mr. Mitchell, did you refuse around that time to
raise any money for the payment of these fees?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, not only around that time, but all other times.
I have never raised any money for anything and I was not about to
start for that particular purpose.
Mr. Dash. Did you ever make any suggestions that the money that
should be used for that purpose was the $350,000?
Mr. Mitchell. No, to the best of my recollection, I had a conversa-
tion with Mr. LaRue, I am sure at his instance, not mine, in which he
pointed out tliat the funds, whatever source they were, that he had for
the support of and the payment of lawyers' fees of these individuals,
had run out. did I know whether there was any other money? And I
suggested that maybe you ought to call over to the White House and see
if the $350,000 that had been sitting over there since April was avail-
able for the purpose. I understand that he did so.
Mr. Dash. Do vou recall attending a meeting in January with Mr.
Kalmbach and Mr. Dean in which you asked Mr. Kalmbach to help
raise money for these legal fees and support of families ? That occurred
in January 1973.
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 19
1632
Mr. Mitchell. In January 1973. Since our conversation of yester-
day, Mr. Dash, I have continued to rack my brain and I have no rec-
ollection of that. I know that there was a meeting on that day, Jan-
uary 19, a foundation meeting over here in Blair House, in which both
Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. Dean were there. But I liave no recollection
of any meeting beyond that.
Mr. Dash. Xow, did you become also aware of Mr. McCord's de-
mands and were you in touch with Mr. Dean concerning Mr. Caul-
field's approach to Mr. McCord ?
Mr. Mitchell. Somewhere through the middle of it, because I was
in Florida for sometime, I think the 20th of December through the
8th or 9th of January, while a lot of this was occurring
Mr. Dash. What role did you play ? What did you learn ?
Mr. Mitchell. I learned that Mr. Dean had Mr. Caulfield contact-
ing Mr. McCord and talking to Mr. McCord.
Mr. Dash. About what ? Do you know about what ?
Mr. Mitchell. About what Mr. McCord's attitude was concerning
the predicament that he was in and what he was going to do.
Mr. Dash. At that time, did you hear that Mr. Caulfield had been
authorized to promise some form of Executive clemency to Mr.
McCord?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe so. I think the only conversations that
I had heard about Executive clemency had to do with Mr. Colson and
Mr. Hunt.
Mr. Dash. Well, what was that, to the best of your recollection?
Mr. Mitchell, To the best of my recollection, it was that somewhere
along the line, and I gather that that would be in 1973, early 1973, there
were discussions of whether or not Mr. Hunt — well, I gather he had
approached Colson, or through his lawyer had approached Colson
on the subject matter. The essence of it was that Mr. Colson's word
was the only word that Mr. Hunt would take with respect to Executive
clemency, whatever that meant. That is the subject and substance of
my overhearing of discussions on Executive clemency.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Mitchell, you became aware, apparently, that
after the election and after the questions concerning the funds that
were being used bv Mr. Hunt and Mr. McCord's concern, that what-
ever you discussed as keeping the lid on might become uncovered.
Did that, sometime around December or January, occur to you?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it always occurred to me, the possibilitv that
the so-called lid would become uncovered. Of course, I always hoped
that it didn't, for the very simple reason that there was no necessity
of scaring the President, who was not involved, through his White
House activities or the activities in the White House.
Mr. Dash. But the real possibility of it becoming unco A^e red, now
that the election was over, could not affect his election.
Mr. Mitchell. No, it \vould not affect his election but it would af-
fect his Presidency, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. But you were aware, and I think from your own state-
ment that the President was unaware, and you had personal knowl-
edge or knowledge of information you had received from others of
certain activities, that if they did become known publiclv, could either
injure or destroy the President's second administration. After the
election, did it occur to you to tell the President then?
1633
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am sure it occurred to me and probably on
hindsight I probably should have. I do not think there is any doubt
about it.
Mr. Dash. Did you not think it was the President's prerogative to
know what to do about these matters ?
Mr. ^Mitchell. The decision had to be made, and it is a tough one,
whether or not he is not involved in it but he does not know about
them, will this go away. I knew they were going to change the person-
nel in the White House and hopefully they would be gone and he would
not have to deal with it and he could go on to his second term, the
second Presidency, without this problem.
Mr. Dash. But you were taking a major risk, were you not, Mr.
Mitchell?
Mr. Mitchell. I think you are taking a major risk any time you
have to deal with the White House horrors under any circumstances.
Mr. Dash. Xow. you spoke to the President quite frequently on the
telephone, you met with him, your logs indicate, so you did have plenty
of opportunities, and on no occasion, I think it is your testimony, did
you speak to the President about these matters ?
Mr. Mitchell. Now, which matters are we talking about ?
Mr. Dash. Again, the White House
Mr. Mitchell. About disclosing these matters.
Mr. Dash. Disclosing the matters, the White House horrors, the
break-in.
Mr. Mitchell. I did not^ — well, let us not pass this over to the point
where — on the 20th of June when I talked to him I apologized to him
for not knowing what the hell had happened and I should have kept a
stronger hand on what the people in the committee were doing, et
cetera. And then, further on down the road in these political meetings
that are shown on the logs, there were discussions about appointing a
commission of the type of the Warren commission to investigate this
matter, and special prosecutors and things like that. I do not want to
leave the impression that it was never touched under any circum-
stances.
Mr. Dash. I am not talking about when you talked about Water-
gate as such. I am talking about the so-called coverup, the White House
horrors and what your own knowledge, based on information given
you, as to who was involved in the break-in of the DNC.
Mr. ]VIitchell. I answered that I did not talk to him about it.
Mr. Dash. I know, but on the 20th
Mr. Mitchell. I also answered in hindsight it probably would have
been a better idea if I had.
Mr. Dash. Now, also on March 27 did Mr. Magruder come to see you
in New York ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, he did.
Mr. Dash. And do you recall that he testified that he came because
he began to be aware or concerned that things might unravel and,
therefore, wanted assurances from you that he be taken care of. Do you
recall that ?
IMr. Mitchell. I recall very well, Mr. Dash, because of the fact that
there was, based in the McCord letter to Judge Sirica, and Mr. Ma-
gruder wanted to talk to me about the potentials of his being brought
back before the grand jury on a perjury count.
1634
Mr. Dash. Did you promise him at that time, as he testified, that
to the best of your ability, though you no longer were in office, you
would help him to either get Executive clemency, support, or rehabil-
itation, any of the things we have been asking about ?
Mr. Mitchell. Let us take Executive clemency. No, I have never
promised that to anybody. Obviously, there is no basis upon which I
could.
With respect to, you were talking about support and so forth, what I
told Jeb Magruder was that I thought he was a very outstanding young
man and I liked and I worked with and to the extent that I could help
him in any conceivable way, I would be delighted to do so.
And this was exactly the same conversation that we had the next day
down at Haldeman's office.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Magruder then ask for that meeting with Mr.
Haldeman ?
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes.
Mr. Dash. Did he feel he needed that assurance from somebody still
in the White House ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
Mr. Dash. And met with Mr. Haldeman on the 28th of March?
Mr. Mitchell. 28th of March, that is correct.
Mr. Dash. What kind of assurances were being sought by Mr. Ma-
gruder there and what was being given to him ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Magruder was again concerned — well, he did
not express it too directly — that he thought he might become the fall
guy. It seems to me that everybody around this town involved in this
all thought thev were going to become a fall guy.
Mr. Dash. Did you, Mr.^ Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. Did I ? Xo. Contrary to the story that I have read I
did not believe that to be the case. I am quite anxiously waiting to see
if there is some possibility of that other than some misguided counsel
who wrote a piece of paper from which cross-examination was to be
made.
Mr. Dash. Getting back to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Magruder's meet-
ing with you on March 28
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, it was the same general discussion, "I may have
problems with my perjury, I don't liave any money, am I going to be
deserted, are you people still going to be friends, will I be able to get
counsel," and this tvpe of conversation.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Haldeman make any kind of promises to Mr.
Magruder at that time, in your presence?
Mr. Mitchell. None other than the fact to help him as a friend and
I think Mr. Haldeman has testified to that.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you ever have a meeting with Mr. Magruder
and Mr. Dean after that meeting with Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes sir.
Mr. Dash. What was that meeting about ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, this was held at Magruder's request because
he again was concerned about this perjury question that he might
have, and the meeting was a quick runthroup-h again of the recollec-
tion of the individuals as to what was discussed prior to Mr.
Magruder's third appearance before the grand jury back in September.
1635
^Ir. Dash. Did you agree at that time, Mr. Mitchell, that you would
hold the line, at least, if you were called, to limit the meeting to a
discussion of the election laws ?
Mr. ^liTCHELL. Xo, that was not the basis, to hold it to the election
laws, Mr. Dash. The basis of it was for the recollection of what had
happened and how it would have affected Mr. Magruder in perjury.
You see, if you go back ^Slagruder had said there only had been one
meeting when there actually had been two, and so fortli. It wasn't a
question of holding the line on anything. It was a question of the recol-
lection of what actually did happen vis-a-vis what ^Magruder ap-
parently had testified to.
^Ir. Dash. He was obviously concerned as to what your positio?^
was going to be if you were called before the grand jury. Did you make
any assurances to ^Ir. Magruder at that time ?
^Ir. Mitchell. Any assurances as to what ?
Mr. Dash. How would you testify before the grand jury if you were
called as to the meetings ?
]Mr. Mitchell. I made no assurances as to how I was going to testify.
Obviously I was going to testify as to what happened.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Dean make any assurances ?
Mr. ^Mitchell. ]Mr. Dean had a very hazy recollection of what had
happened. Obviously, as I think Mr. Dean testified, he didn't want to
discuss the matter. He had already, of course, gone to counsel and was
looking after ]Mr. Dean's problems.
]\Ir. Dash. Did you learn during April that Mr. Magruder and Mr.
Dean had gone to see the prosecutors ?
Mr. Mitchell. I learned about Mr. Magruder, I didn't learn about
Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dash. And were you personally aware of Mr. Dean's meetings
with the President in March and April that he testified to before
this committee?
Mr. Mitchell. Only the meeting of March 22 at which, of course,
I was present.
Mr. Dash. What I am talking about are the meetings of Septem-
ber 15, 1972, the meeting of February 28.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Mr. Dash, you are talking about 1972.
Mr. Dash. The meetings of September 15, 1972, with the President,
February 28, 1973, March 13, 1973, and March 21. Are you aware
of those meetings?
]Mr. ^Mitchell. Let me put it this way. The only meeting that I
was aware of, of Mr. Dean and the President, was the one I attended
on March 22.
Mr. Dash. At that meeting was there any discussion by the Presi-
dent, by you or by Mr. Dean, concerning the Watergate, either
coverup or who may be involved in an indictment or anything like
that on the 22d?
Mr. Mitchell. None whatsoever. The total discussion had to do
with the "Wliite House's response to this committee, and I think it
was prompted, or at least that was my understanding at the time, it
was prompted by the fact that the President was getting a pretty
good knocking around in the press on the question of executive
privilege. I believe it arose with respect to the Gray hearings but it
certainly was to be applicable to this committee's hearings.
1636
Mr. Dash. Well, just a couple of more questions, Mr. Mitchell : I
think you have testified already, and quite frequently, that you did not
personally inform the President of any of these so-called White House
horrors or the efforts to keep the lid on and the Plumbers activities,
is that correct ?
Mr. Dash. Are you personally aware of anybody else having any
conversation with the President concerning these activities ?
Mr. Mitchell. Not in my presence. I am not aware of anybody
ever having reported to me that they have had.
Mr. Dash. Likewise it is your testimony that the President did not
discuss these events or the coverup with you or, to your knowledge,
with anyone else?
Mr. Mitchell. If I understand your question
Mr. Dash. To your knowledge.
Mr. Mitchell [continuing]. He has not discussed them with me; to
my knowledge, the answer is that is correct.
Mr. Dash. To your knowledge.
Therefore then, Mr. Mitchell, I am briefing your testimony at this
time before the committee. Is it not fair to say or is it not true that,
according to your testimony, you are not in a position to state to this
committee of your own knowledge whether the President in fact knew
or did not know of the break-in or the bugging of the AVatergate or
the coverup efforts that took place after June 17, 1972 ?
Mr. jNIitchell. The only thing that I can state to my own knowledge,
Mr. Dash, is that so far as I know he does not know of either of those
circumstances.
INIr. Dash. But that statement is not made on any information the
President told you or you told the President or anybody told you
about what the President knows ?
Mr. Mitchell. Would you repeat that again ?
Mr. Dash. I say that statement you have just made is not based on
anything the President told you specifically, anything you told the
President, anything anybody told you that he had told the President?
Mr. Mitchell. I understand the thrust of vour question. That is cor-
rect. It is based solely on my association with the President and not
conversations on the affirmative side of the subject matter.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions.
Senator Ervix. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., the same day.]
Afternoon Session, Tuesday, July 10, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. Mr. Thompson
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mitchell, vou have testified concerning the so-
called 1970 plan or the Huston plan or the Huston project, and then
in answering questions from Mr. Dash vou went into Vnlkin.o- f»bout
what is knoAvn as the Plumbers project in the "\Aniite House. Would
you say that the Plumbers in the White House, as yon now know
them to be, was a logical extension of this 1970 plan which was evi-
dently rescinded ?
1637
Mr. Mitchell. I would not say so, ]Mr. Thompson, because of the
time frame intervening and also the consideration of the Interagency
Evaluation Commission — Committee — in the meantime. I think that
was somewhat of a self-starter later on caused by events and if I would
have to guess, without knowing, it was ))robably generated about the
time of the Pentagon Papers. Now, these are opinions I am giving
to you. I have no knowledge on it.
Mr. TiiOMPsox. You mentioned a field for need of coordination be-
tween the intelligence-gathering agencies, is that correct ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Thompsox. Was this just in the White House or was this also
in the intelligence community ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was in parts of the intelligence community
and it certainly was in the Justice Department. We, as I think I men-
tioned this morning, found that we were receiving intelligence from
quarters where we might not have expected it in connection wnth an-
ticipation of violent acts in connection with demonstration and at
other times just pure violent acts. I mentioned the Alcoholic Tax and
Firearms Bureau which had, I thought, quite a very competent intel-
ligence capacity certainly, in connection Avith some of the problems
that we had in the Justice Department. I know that Mr. Hoover and
Mr. Helms had broken off their liaison that they had established in
connection with the CIA and the FBI. There was great interest in
finding a veliicle to reestal)lish that in a meaningful way, and so that
basically the implementation of the Interagency Evaluation Commis-
sion was to take personnel from the different intelligence-gathering
areas, put them into one room where they could sort out and exchange
ideas and, of course, evaluate what intelligence they had. One of the
problems that I found in Govermnent was that there was very fre-
quently a great deal of collection of intelligence but the evaluation and
dissemination lacked a great deal.
Mr. Thompsox. Then, was this need for better coordination because
of problems that the agencies themselves were having internally or
was it because of external considerations, or both ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think I can best answer that to point out
that there were many events that happened in this country, including
the bombing of the Capitol and other such events that, if we had had
appropriate intelligence in advance, we might have been able to pro-
hibit it. I know that in connection with many of the large demonstra-
tions that we had in Washington, while 99 percent of those people
who came, came for peaceful protest and to petition their Government,
that there was always that lunatic fringe that was bound to and deter-
mined to thrash the place and cause damage, and if we had had better
intelligence in some of these areas, and I am not excluding them to
those but in other areas, but jierhaps a great deal of that could have
been prevented. That was the basis upon which the Interagency Eval-
uation Committee was considered in concept and put into place.
Mr. Tho:mpsox. I^t me leave that for a moment and invite your
attention to the November 24, 1971, meeting which I believe you had
with Mr. Liddy and Mr. Dean when Mr. Dean brought Mr. Liddy to
your office.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
1638
Mr. Thompsox. And I believe introduced him to you. I believe your
response to questioning this morning was to the effect that at that
time you were not aware that Mr. Liddy was to be involved in intelli-
gence activities as such but that later on you understood that he
would be.
Mr. Mitchell. No; I don't think that is quite true, Mr. Thompson.
What I referred to was the Liddy prosjiectus about his job description
at that time, which was one of the Dean exhibits, had a one-line refer-
ence to it in connection with gathering of information of intelligence
or whatever it might be.
Mr. Thompson. Just the one line. Do you recall any discussion
about that?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't. As a matter of fact, it is one sentence, not
one line.
Mr. Thompson. Do you have that before you ?
Mr. Mitchell. This is exhibit 11* of the Dean exhibits. I don't know
what committee exhibit it might be.
Mr. Thompson. And you don't remember any discussion about that
at. the time?
Mr. ^Mitchell. No, sir; the meeting didn't last long enough.
Mr. Thompson. Did there come a time between that time and the
meeting on Januaiy 27 when you became aware, or had a greater un-
derstanding as to what his role would be in the intelligence field ?
Mr. ^Mitchell. Well, I might say tliat sometime during early De-
cember, before Liddy was hired by the Committee To Re-Elect the
President, IVIr. Krogh brought Liddy over, and I may have been—
along with other ))eople to discuss the Drug Abuse Law Enforcements
in which he had been working and which was my knowledge of Mr.
Liddy 's activities in the "\"\niite House. I do not recall any meetings,
and I am sure they didn't take place, in. wliicli Liddv's intelligence ac-
tivities were discussed. It could very well ])e that Mr. Magruder, Mr.
Dean who I undei-stand did have meetings during that period Avith Mr.
Liddy may have made reference to the fact that he was gathering
intelligence.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Krogh brought him to your office, you say. in
December, you think, of that year ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. sir; I can give you the exact date if you wish.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall right offhand whether it was before or
after he went to the Committee To Re-Elect?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I believe it would have to }>e before he went to
the Committee To Re-Elect because he was working on this DALE
program, the drug program.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Mr. Mitchell. It is December 9, 1971. And there had been, of course,
a series of meetings all over the Government, including the White
House, the Justice Department, HEW, and other places preliminaiy
to setting up the Drug Abuse Law Enforcement program.
Mr. Thompson. I believe you testified that you did not know at the
time of your meeting on November 24 wliat Mr. Liddv had done at the
White House, any involvement he had with the Plumbers group in
the Wliite House or anvthinc: of this sort ; is that correct ?
•See exhibit No. 34-13, p. 1150. Book 3.
1639
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. It Avas 6 months later before I
learned of the so-called Plumbers activities.
Mr. TiioMPSox. "Were you even aware that he worked at the AVTiite
House at that time ?
Mr. ^Mitchell. Yes, because he was brought over with Mr. Krog;!!
Mr. Thompsox. I am talkinjcr about November 24 ?
Mr. ^Mitchell. Yes. I was aware he was at the White House be-
cause it was so represented at that meetino;.
]Mr, Thompsox. Whose office did you understand that he was work-
ina" in ?
Mr. Mitchell. He was workino; under Mr. Kros^h's aegis in connec-
tion with the druo; proo'ram over there.
]\Ir. Thompsox. All riofht. Did you know of any other activities
that ^Ir. Kroo;h had at that time?
Mr. ^NIiTCiiEL. Yes; he was very much involved in the Wliite House
relationship with the District of Columbia here. In fact, he was their
prime contact. But as far as his activities in the area which has since
been developed and become common knowledo:e, I had no such ideas.
Mr. Thompson. I see.
A^Hien you met with Liddy and Krogh in December did you inquire
of Mr. Krogh then or did yon have any discussion as to the nature of
Liddy's work at the White House involving any of the Plumbers?
Mr. Mitchell. None whatsoever. We discussed entirely the DALE
program, to the best of my recollection.
Mr. Thompsox. That seems like ^Nlr. Krogh knew what he was doing
and it seems like you were being ]-)laced in a potentially embarrassing
position by even allowing Mv. Liddy to be presented to you, consider-
ing the nature of his prior activities.
Did not anyone who knew Mr. Liddy's prior activities mention the
fact to you that you were about to take a man in an important position
of the campaign who had engaged in some of these
Mr. Mitchell. None whatsoever. As a matter of fact, Mr. Liddy
was quite actively involved in the establishment of this DALE pro-
gram which, as you probably know, relates to law enforcement through
tlie use of the courts, grand juries, and so forth and, as I understood that
at the time, that was one of the reasons that Liddy was brought into
the Krogh operation and the Ambrose operation and helped setting
that up was because he had been a former assistant prosecutor who
did have knowledge with respect to the functioning of grand juries.
Mr. Thompson. I believe you made the decision there on Novem-
ber 24 that if it was all right with Magruder that it was all right with
you for
Mr. Mitchell. I think that is the general tenor in which it was
represented.
Mr. Thompsox. Whose representations were you relying on, you
didn't know the man before, you just met him : Mr. Dean's ?
Mr. Mitchell. I was relying on the representations that Avere made
to me with respect to the background of the individual involved.
Mr. Thompsox. Who made those representations ?
Mr. ^Mitchell. I am sure they were made by Mr. Dean and by Mr.
Liddy with respect to what his background was then.
1640
Mr. Thompson. Neither of them mentioned anything having to do
with his previous Plumbers activities.
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I can assure you of that.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Mr. Mitchell, you mentioned in your testimony this morning, or im-
plied, I believe would be a fair way to state it, that perhaps someone
prevailed upon Mr. ]Magruder to supersede your orders. I believe you
have made public statements that you would like to know who sent Mr.
Magruder back again and again with this thing that you didn't want
to come about. I know you don't like to engage in speculation with re-
gard to other people but these are things that you volunteered. I was
wondering if you could enlighten us a little bit more based upon your
prior experience in your relationship with the people in the White
House, and things that have occurred since the break-in as to this being
a case — of course, Mr. Magruder was a young man, an individual who
was a team player e^ddently — can you shed any light on who it might
have been who was doing this ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Thompson, this would be purely an opin-
ion and would involve people's reputations. I think if you go back
to the testimony of Mr. Dean relating conversations that he had both
with Mr. Magruder and otherwise I think that that probably is a
better answer to the question than my hypothecation or guesstimate
at this particular time.
Mr. Thompson. What part of Mr. Dean's testimony are you re-
ferring to ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are quite a number of areas and I cannot
give vou the page numbers, but they have in tw^o areas. No. 1, what Mr.
Magruder told Mr. Dean personally and what Mr. O'Brien told Mr.
Dean that Magruder had told him. And then, of course, thei'e are the
statements that Magruder himself made about the telephone calls
from Mr. Colson, Mr. Howard, et cetera. I think that those areas of
testimony would probably be a great, a better source of information
than my conjecture.
Mr. Thompson. I think I see what you mean and I do not want to
try to draw names out that you do not want to present, but you have
just presented one name. Would it be your opinion, if you care to give
us your opinion, as to whether or not it might have come from more
than one source ?
Mr. Mitchell. It is always conceivable.
Mr. Thompson. Do you have any reason to believe that it was either
one source or more than one source ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, I have no ability to weigh the potentials for the
sources of concern in this area.
Mr. Thompson. Knowing Mr. Magruder, what kind of pressure
would he have responded to to take an action which, of course, would
have been a serious matter; to supersede the orders of his superior?
Would anyone in the White House, for example, do you think, with
any kind of authority, have so impressed him that he would have
superseded your orders and acceded to their wishes ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am sure it could not have been anybody in the
White House. It must have been somebody in the White House with
which he had a working relationship which he thought perhaps was in
1641
the interest of the campaign or somebody who had what you might
refer to as superior authority.
Mr. TnoMPSOx. A working relationship during the campaign or
prior to the campaign ?
Mr. Mitchell. No; I would put this very much on the basis of a
working relationship during the campaign that goes to some of the
testimony here of the people who have evidenced an interest in this
intelligence-gathering field.
INIr. Thompson. Of course, there were many people in the White
House involved in the campaign, were there not ?
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. What is your question, were there many people?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr, IVIiTCHELL. I believe that the record shows there were quite a few.
Mr. Thompson. Maybe too many people, would you think ?
Mr. Mitchell. At times, that was my opinion.
Mr. Thompson. You were discussing some of Mr. Reisner's testi-
mony this morning with Mr. Dash, with regard to the Gemstone docu-
ments. I have here, verbatim, Mr. Reisner's testimony. I would like to
ask you a couple of questions after I read that. I believe Mr. Reisner
was talking about Mr. INIagruder handing him certain documents.
"I was handed the documents and I was asked to put them in Mr.
Mitchell's files. The nature of that is that things that Mr. Magruder
might have wished to take up with Mr. Mitchell were put in the file
marked 'Mr. Mitchell's file' and that does not indicate any more than
that."
Were vou aware that Mr. Magruder was keeping a file marked "Mr.
Mitchell's file.''?
]\rr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Thompson, I think I can best explain that
as that during my busy schedule, when Mr. Magruder could get in to
see me, as special assistant, where he was the clearing house for memo-
randums from other people, that he would have more than one item
normally, to discuss. They would be in the folder. Frequently, we
would sit and discuss them and he would take them back. Others, if
they were long position papers on matters, he would leave them with
me to read. If that is a Mitchell file, that is the jacket in which he
brought the materials into the office.
Mr. Thompson. Did he ever leave such a file with you for any period
of time ?
Mr. Mitchell. Not as a file. He would leave from time to time posi-
tion papers, certainly.
Mr. Thompson. So as far as you are concerned, your remembrance
is that the Mitchell file was not in fact your file, but his file which
he was using to bring documents to you ?
Mr. Mitchell. The only thing that I can identify it as is a folder
in which he brought up these memorandums to the office.
Mr. Thompson. "Wliat color was it, if you recall?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall, sir.
Mr. Thompson. You never saw any Gemstone documents that you
remember?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. In retrospect, would there be any materials that
were a product of electronic surveillance without your knowing that
they were?
1642
Mr. Mitchell. No; I would believe that electronic surveillance,
after my experience in the Justice Department — I do not know in what
forms they are; I have not seen them to this date. But after my ex-
perience in the Justice Department, I think I would have a pretty
good idea of what the source of it might have been, unless it was
totally disguised.
Mr. Thompson. So Mr. Magruder was in effect pushing Liddy and
he did come into ])ossession of these documents and he was either doing
it, I suppose, for his own benefit or somebody else's benefit. I mean that
seems to be patent on its face, doesn't it?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was probably that whoever was doing it,
it was in the misguided concept that it was in the interests of the cam-
paign. But as I have observed before, I couldn't conceive of what
would be in the Democratic National Committee on the 30th of May
or the I7th of June that would be in the interest of the process of the
campaign of the reelection of the President at that particular time.
It just doesn't make any sense to me.
Mr. Thompson. At the time that the break-in occurred, what was
your professional political judgment as to how the President stood
with regard to his chances for reelectir>n?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, we go back to the middle of June and, of course,
he had improved substantially from his previous lows vis-a-vis the
then front runner, Senator Muskie. That looked like he was on the
ascendency.
Mr. Thompson. Had not some polls indicated that, at one time or
another, Mr. Muskie was ahead of Mr. Nixon ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; but I believe, if my recollection is correct, that
this was somewhat earlier than in June.
Mr. Thompson. You didn't consider him in trouble at that time?
Mr. Mitchell. When you are running a campaign, you consider
anybody who is likely to get the nomination against your candidate,
you may have a substantial amount of trouble with them, particularly
when you look at the basis of the registration of Democrats vis-a-vis
Republicans and I am sure all of you gentlemen are aware of that
factor.
Mr. Thompson. The extent of the problems you might visualize
might have something to do with the measures you might take to
confront it, would it not ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure I understand the thrust of that
question.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I would think that if you thought you had the
nomination or the election locked up, that you would sit back and take
no chances whatsoever, any person running a campaign, if you could
avoid them. On the other hand, if you considered yourself in trouble,
you might take risks that you would not otherwise take. I am not even
saying necessarily illegal risks.
Mr. Mitchell. They are both hypothetical questions as of June 17
with respect to the first one. I don't believe that anybody thought the
election was locked up, certainly with respect to tlie time element of
June 17, with the potentials of the people that might become the Demo-
cratic candidate at the convention that was taking place in July. There
were a great deal of uncertainties as to who the candidate might be
1643
and as to what the circumstances might be vis-a-vis the incumbent who
was seeking reelection.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mitchell, let me ask you about another point.
Here is an excerpt from the civil deposition which you gave in the
Democratic Party suit against the Committee To Re-Elect the Presi-
dent and I think I am quoting you verbatim in your testimony, when
you were asked this question : "Was there ever any discussion at which
you were present or about which you heard when you were campaign
director concerning having any form of surveillance of the Democratic
National Committee headquarters?"
Your answer was : "No, sir, I can't imagine a less productive activity
than that."
Is that a correct
Mr. Mitchell. I think the total context, as I remember it, Mr.
Thompson, had to do with the discussion of Mr. McCord and the
security group. The answer was given in that context.
Mr. Thompson. But this particular question, "Was there ever any
discussion at which you were present" — and of course, I assume just
from reading this question that that would involve any discussion with
anyone. Are you saying that it is not your understanding of it ?
Mr. Mitchell. My recollection of the testimony that I gave had to
do with the so-called security group in the Committee To Re-Elect the
President which discussed Mr. McCord and the security group. And
the answer was in response to that, to my recollection.
Mr. Thompson. Of course, as it reads, as I have read it, of course,
it is not an accurate response ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, I say as you read it, but I think if you will look
at the total context of the questioning, it referred to the security group
that involved Mr. McCord which was the subject of the conversation.
]Mr. Thompson. Were you not asked any other broader questions
about any knowledge you might have had of any surveillance
activities ?
Mr. Mitchell. I was asked broader questions with respect to did
I ever receive documents that I could identify as coming from elec-
tronic surveillance and broad questions like that.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall any broader questions concerning
conversations that you had ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Thompson. Is it just a case of not having asked you the right
question ?
Mr. Mitchell. I think that that is the case.
Mr. Thompson. Let me refer to June 19 or 20, I am not quite
sure when it was, Mr. Mitchell. As I understand it, Mardian and La-
Rue debriefed Liddy and found out what he knew about the break-
in, his involvement, and the involvement of others. And at that time,
he related to them some of the White House horror stories, I believe
you characterized them as, the plumbers activities and so forth. I will
go back to that in a minute, but as I understand your testimony this
morning, the knowledge you got from that debriefing was really the
reason why you, in effect, stood by while Mr. Magruder was pre-
paring a story which, according to what you knew from Liddy, was
going to be a false story, to present to the grand jury.
1644
Mr. Mitchell. Along, Mr. Thompson, with some of the other stor-
ies that Mr. Dean brought forward to him, the Diem papers and the
suspected extracurricular wiretapping, and a few of the others.
Mr. Thompson. OK. That caused you to take that position with
regard to Magruder. And also, I assume that those factors were the
reasons why you, in effect, acquiesced, anyway, in the payments to
the families of support money and lawyers' fees and that sort of
thing, which I am sure you realize could have been pretty embarrass-
ing, to say the least, if not illegal, at that time. Would that be cor-
rect as far as your motivations are concerned ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is a correct summary of my motivation and ra-
tionale for the actions that I did take.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall the date on which Mr. Mardian and
Mr. LaRue related this conversation of Liddy's to you ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, he certainly didn't debrief them on the 19th,
I am sure of that, because they were in transit. Whether it was the 20th
or 21st, I am not certain.
Mr. Thompson. Did they talk to you the same day they talked to
him?
Mr. Mitchell. My recollection is they talked to me the next day, but
I am not certain about that, either. But in any event, it was in the
time frame of the 21st or 22d, to the best of my recollection.
Mr. Thompson. Can you recall in a little more detail what they said
that Liddy had related to them ? You have already mentioned the fact
that Liddy said that Magruder had pushed him in the break-in at the
Ellsberg psychiatrist's office, I believe, and the Dita Beard situation.
What did Liddy supposedly say with regard to the Dita Beard sit-
uation? What did he supposedly know about White House involve-
ment?
Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, and, of course, I have
heard these horror stories in different versions from different people
over the period of the years, the fact that he was either the one or
assisted in spiriting her out of town, I believe was the discussion at
that particular time.
Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate, according to them, that the budget
for the electronic surveillance operation which led to the break-in of
the DNC had been approved by the Wliite House ?
Mr. Mitchell. You are testing my memory pretty hard. I am in-
clined to think that he did say that, but this is a — not that he said it,
but that Mardian or LaRue reported to me that he had said it. But you
are testing my memory pretty hard on a substance of which I have
heard dozens and dozens of repetitions of it.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever verify any of these facts with the
President ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I never discussed them with the President.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever verify any of them wtih Mr. Halde-
man?
Mr. Mitchell. I never discussed those specific factors with Mr.
Haldeman until a later date. It was at that time that Mr. Dean was
acting as a liaison between the White House and the committee with
respect to these matters.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever talk directly with Ehrlichman about
these matters ?
1645
Mr. Mitchell. Not in that time frame. I am sure they were discussed
substantially later dates.
Mr. Thompson. In 1973 ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, yes, possibly before the end of 1972, certainly
in 1973.
Mr. Thompson. At this time did you know of Hunt's involvement ?
Did Liddy tell them about Hunt's involvement ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I believe he did. In fact, I am sure he did.
Mr. Thompson. So, in effect, what you are saying is that you were
basing your later activities concerning Magruder's testimony and
concerning the payments and these sorts of things as embarrassment
upon the hearsay information of this man that presented these out-
landish and wild-eyed proposals in your office. It would seem like you
would want some verification from him.
Mr. Mitchell. Let us back up, Mr. Thompson, a little bit. You are
jumping from the 21st or 22d of June all the way to knowledge that I
obtained in the fall and I keep reminding you that Mr. Dean was also
aware of these factors and was discussing them with me and with other
people. AYe are talking about the Wliite House problems now, is that
what you are having reference to ?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. So it was not just what Mr. Liddy had told Mr.
Mardian and Mr. LaRue on the 20th, 21st, and 22d of June. There
were further affirmations of the facts that came out of the White
House from Mr. Dean.
Mr. Thompson. Such as what, concerning these matters that we have
been discussing '?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, as I said a minute ago one of the things that I
did not believe that Mr. Liddy had any reference to in the Mardian-
LaEue Diem briefing was the papers and how they had been handled.
Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Dean verify this to you?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dean so stated, he did not show me the spliced
cables but he told me about the circumstances.
Mr. Thompson. But as early as June the money started flowing,
the payments started flowing and, of course
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, you are assuming, Mr. Thompson, I was
aware of it.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I will ask you when you first became aware
of
Mr. Mitchell. As I said this morning, it was much later than that
and I believe it was at the time that Mr. Kalmbach ceased in connec-
tion with his activities.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall the date that you became aware of
any money being paid to any of the defendants or families or attor-
neys?
Mr. Mitchell. No, I do not recall the date but it was well after the
matter was in progress and in operation.
Let me perhaps help you a little bit on that, Mr. Thompson, or help
myself maybe, is a better way to put it. [Laughter.] There is testimony
by Mr. Dean that there was a meeting.
Mr. Thompson. June 23 or 24, 1 believe.
Mr. Mitchell. On June 28.
Mr. Thompson. And 28th.
1646
Mr. Mitchell. June 28. You see, Mr. Dean had testified that they had
been playing games with the CIA up to the 28th. Then, Mr. Dean
testified that there was a meeting in my office with INIardian, LaRue,
and Mitchell and I do not know who all else including Mr. Dean in
the afternoon of the 28th in which it was decided, naturally Mitchell
was always deciding these things, according to Dean, that the "White
House, somebody in the White House, John Ehrlichman should call
Kalmbach and ask him to fly back from California that night of the
28th, which led to their meetings on the 29th. The only problem with all
of that was that I was in New York and could not have been at such
a meeting, and I was not aware of it.
Mr. Thompson. I believe your logs reflect that, Mr. Mitchell. I
think that
Mr. Mitchell. I would hope so because I have been so stating for
quite some time.
Mr. Thompson. It reflects that, according to your logs, vou were in
New York on the 28th.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. And that you arrived in the District of Columbia
at 5 :30.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. There is no indication of any meeting after 5 :30.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And I assume there was none.
Mr. Mitchell. The passenger that I had with me coming back from
New York was not about to allow me to go to any more meetings on
that particular day. [Laughter.]
Mr. Thompson. I am not going to pursue that any further.
Getting back to your knowledge of the money, perhaps my question
should have been, "When was the first time that you heard of the need
for the payment of money," and I ask it because of this : Dean testi-
fied that the first time he heard any discussions of the need for money
to take care of those who were involved in the break-in was in a meet-
ing which occurred on either June 23. Saturday, or June 24 attended
by Dean, Mardian, LaRue, and yourself.
Mr. Mitchell. That is quite possible because as T recall the con-
versation of Mr. Liddy that he had with Mr. Mardian and LaRue, he
was hopeful that these people that he at that time, of course, was not
in jail, not suspect, and was still working for the committee, I do not
know whether he was suspect or not, in any event, he was still work-
ing for the committee until the 28th of June, he was — he talked to
Mardian and Liddy about the hope that somebody could provide bail
for these five people who had been arrested, and the thought was that
the committee should do it and, of course, that was immediately turned
off, the committee would not do it and, of course, obviously could not
do it under the existing statutes. Now, what developed out of that
with respect to Mr. Dean's concept of it or what he heard about it,
whether he heard that story or what I do not know but that is the firet
point in time at which the subject matter was ever discussed.
Mr. Thompson. The points that concerned you were the fact that
earlv on the discussions about the money were taking place, or the
need for money, and also Mr. Magiiider's testimony. I believe he testi-
1647
fied, I think jfirst in June and then again maybe August and then again
in September before the grand jury, and the point was that during this
period of time you were having to make your decision as to how you
were going to play this thing. I miderstand that your testimony is
that you were making your decision on the basis of what you had
understood Liddy to say plus some points of corroboration from Mr.
Dean.
Mr. Mitchell. That was the basis for the White House activities,
that is absohitely correct.
Mr. Thompson. Without getting into a great deal more detail, Mr.
Mitchell, besides the Diem cables can you answer any further point
of verification that Mr. Dean gave you concerning these mattere we
mentioned, the Ellsberg psychiatrist, the Dita Beard situation, any
of those matters ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, there was the purported fire bomb-
ing of the Brookings Institution which had been discussed and so
forth, I have already
Mr. Thompson. Did Dean tell you that was seriously proposed at
one time ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I believe that I took it as a very serious proposal
because of the fact that he flew across the country in order to get it
turned off.
Mr. Thompson. For that particular reason as you understood it?
Mr. Mitchell. Pardon?
Mr. Thompson. He made this trip for that particular reason ?
]Mr. Mitchell. That is the way he so testified and I believe advised
it at that particular time because, as you recall, it was tied into the
Mardian trip to the west coast also. And also, it seems to me, that I
have a pretty clear recollection there was general discussion of, as I
say, the extracurricular wiretapping activities.
Mr. Thompson. Did you consider these matters national security
matters at the time you were considering them?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, since I didn't really know about them I could
not make an assessment about them.
Mr. Thompson. In your mind as you were seeking to justify your
position, if you were, when these things were realized by you, did you
consider them to be matters of national security no one had any right
to know, that they should be covered up in effect, or were these just
political decisions ?
Mr. ISIiTCHELL. They were obviously elements of that in connection
with some of these activities. But I think wo would have to parcel it
out in details before you could make that determination.
Mr. Thompson. Would it be accurate to say your motivations were
generally more out of political considerations at that time, in the midst
of a campaign, than matters of national security ?
]Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would think if you would put the aggregate
of the subject matters we are talking about it would have to be from
that point of view rather than from national security.
Mr. Thompson. All right. INIr. Mitchell, you have testified on several
points where you disagree with Mr. Magruder or refute his testimony.
I would like to ask you a few points which I don't believe have been
covered yet concerning Mr. Dean's testimony. Dean testified that
"Within the first few days," and I am quoting.
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 20
1648
Within the first few days of my involvement in coverup a pattern had developed
where he was carrying messages from Mitchell, Stans, Mardian to Ehrlichman
and Haldeman and vice versa about how each quarter was handling the coverup
and relevant information as to what was occurring.
Is that an accurate statement, as far as you know, was Dean doing
that?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think that Mr. Dean has lumped together a
number of things. I think Mr. Dean has testified that the coverup had
started on June 19 by the destruction of certain documents, by the
concept of getting Mr. Colson out of the country, and a few other such
things — ^Hunt, I am sorry, I am sorry there seems to be some correla-
tion there that I keep putting together [laughter] but it was Mr. Hunt
that they were talking about.
Mr. Thompson. What correlation do you put together there ?
Mr. Mitchell. The fact that Mr. Hunt worked for Mr. Colson.
With the second part about it with which there was particularly at
the time frame in which he is talking about, there is considerable
interest at that time as to, about the money that had been through
Barker's bank and the Ogarrio checks that were coming out that had
come from Mexico, et cetera, et cetera. This is the subject matter and
that particular week in which Mr. Stans and perhaps Mitchell and
others were asking the White House about.
You will also, of course, recognize that the newspapers and Liddy
himself, I believe, in the debriefing that Mardian got, referred to the
fact that they liad had CIA documents or materials, et cetera, et cetera.
So there was a very considerable interest in, was there any CIA involve-
ment. No. 1, in comiection with the break-in, No. 2 in connection with
the personnel involved and. No. 3, in connection with this gentleman
from Mexico City, Mr. Ogarrio I believe his name was, in connection
with his activities.
Mr. Thompson. You would not categorize those things as part of a
coverup, would you ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is what I say, Mr. Dean, I think, has put a
blanket over activities that are happening at that particular time and
talked about them as a coverup ; this is where I started, I thought, my
very lengthy answer. I am sorry to be so long.
Mr. Thompson. That is all right.
You have already stated that Dean's testimony about a meeting of
June 28, and I believe I am quoting him correctly, where he said :
Mitchell asked me to get the approval of Ehrlichman and Haldeman to get
Herb Kalmbach to raise the necessary money.
Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
Mr. Thompson. You stated that was false.
Mr. Mitchell. There was no such meeting, I made no such request,
ever.
Mr. Thompson. With regard to asking
Mr. Mitchell. Ask Dean to ask Haldeman to get Kalmbach, to my
recollection I have never made such a request.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever ask anyone to get Kalmbach to raise
money for these purposes ?
Mr. Mitchell. Not to my recollection. As I recall this scenario that
Mr. Kalmbach did at the request of somebody, according to Dean, it
1649
was somebody in the White House, Kalmbach to Washington on the
28th and met on the 29th with these people. He proceeded into this
operation. There came a time in the fall, I believe it was September
or October, where because of adverse publicity or whatever it was he
wanted out and that was tlie end of it, and I certainly don't believe
that I would have the audacity to ask him back into such an operation.
Mr. Thompson. Dean testified that after the President's statement
on Aug;ust 29 referring to the Dean report he began thinking that he
might be being set up in case the whole thing crumbled at a later
time. He testified he discussed this with you and others and that you
assured him that he need not worry because you didn't believe anyone
in the White House would do that to him.
Do you recall such a conversation with Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Mitchell. I recall such a conversation, Mr. Thompson, but it
seems to me it was much later than August 29.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall when ?
Mr, Mitchell. No, I don't recall the date but it was much, much
further. In fact, I think it was into 1973.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall the month? Was it into April, per-
haps, as late as April ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, it would be before that. It would be in February
or March I would believe.
Mr. Thompson. Did he state to you the basis of his fears ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, I don't believe he did. As a matter of fact, to
the best of my recollection I only had, of course, one conversation
with Mr. Dean in April, and a very limited number of them in March
so it had to be sometime in early March or February.
Mr. Thompson. Dean testified : That during the first week of Decem-
ber you called Dean and said that you would have to use some of the
$350,000 at the Wliite House to take care of the demands that were
being made by Hunt and the others for money, and that you asked
him to get Haldeman's approval for that. Is tliat a cori-ect statement?
Mr. Mitchell. No, that is absolutely untrue as far as I am con-
cerned. I had no official capacity, I have no control over the money
and there would be no reason why I should call Dean or anybody else
with respect to it and I did not so call Dean.
Mr. Thompson. Dean testified that shortly before the trial when
the demands for money were reaching the crescendo point again you
called Dean and once again asked him to ask Haldeman to make the
necessai-y funds available and that after Dean talked to Haldeman the
decision was made to send the entire $350,000.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would respond to that the same way I did
to your last question.
Mr. Thompson. Dean testified that on January 10 he received a
call from O'Brien and you indicating that since Hunt had been given
assurances of clemency and that those assurances were being passed
to Hunt and others that Caulfiekl should give the same assurances to
McCord who was becoming an increasing problem and again Dean
was told that McCord's lawyer was having problems with him. Is that
true?
Mr. Mitchell. I think that Mr. Dean, if lie will go back and check
his logs will find that I was out of town in Florida when he started
1650
the McCord dialog, and that there would be no reason in the world for
me to direct Mr. Dean to do anything vis-a-vis Caulfield or McCord
or anybody else.
Mr. Thompson. The logs indicate, I believe, you were in Key Bis-
cayne from January 1 through January 7.
Mr, Mitchell. I think it was December 20 through January 8, I
believe.
Mr. Thompson. All right, sir. Let me ask you about one more piece
of testimony, the meeting on March 22 which you had with Halde-
man, Ehrlichman, and Dean; I understand you met with them and
that afternoon you met with the President.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. I believe that Dean testified that Ehrlichman
turned to you and asked if Hunt had been taken care of, or his money
situation had been taken care of, and you assured him that he had been
taken care of, is that correct ?
Mr. Mitchell. It is absolutely false as far as I am concerned be-
cause I have never, to my knowledge, discussed any of these payments
with John Ehrlichman and any of the specifics of that nature with
respect to any individual, and I wouldn't have known on the 22d of
March whether Mr. Hunt had been taken care of or hadn't been taken
care of.
Mr. Thompson. Do you think Mr. Dean could be mistaken about
these various points ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, I think Mr. Dean may have, in putting together
— how long was his statement? You know, it is awfully hard to rec-
ollect on what day what was discussed.
Mr. Thompson. He did not seem to have any trouble at the time.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you said it, not I.
Mr. Thompson. Are you saying that perhaps Mr. Dean's memory
might not have been quite that good ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it certainly cannot be with respect to the spe-
cifics of the March 22 meeting. I am sure of that.
Mr. Thompson. Or with these other points about — well, is that a
matter of memory as to whether or not you called him and asked
that the $350,000 be sent over, or as to whether or not you requested
that Kalmbach be used to make deliveries of moneys to families? Is
that a matter of memory ?
Mr. Mitchell. I think it is a matter of confusion of people. I think
as you look at this total picture, you ^et two aegises, one over in 1701
and one over in— what is the White House? 1800 Pennsylvania
Avenue ?
Mr. Thompson. I am sure you know better than I, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. And Mr. Thompson, this fellow, you know he was
just carrying messages back and forth, according to his statement. He
had to have somebody over there as principals with Avhich to get to
do all of this. Unfortunately, at times, he has picked out some of these
principals that just were not on the scene at the particular time, as I
have indicated about the meeting of the 28th.
Mr. T'hompson. Do you know of any other indications of this ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I can go back through the testimony and I am
sure provide you with some, if that is your desire.
1651
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall that as you remember his statement or
have you read his statement ? Have you read his statement ? I assume
that you have — —
Mr. Mitchell. I have read his statement, yes.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall whether or not there are other points,
without specifically naming one, if you cannot ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, there are. I am not sure I could pinpoint them
today, but I can provide you with material, if it is something
Mr. Thompson. If you return tomorrow — as I expect you will — if
tonight you could go through his statement
Mr. Mitchell. You mean I am going to be invited back tomorrow ?
Mr. Thompson. Most cordially.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
]\Ir. Thompson. And refresh your memory on those points. Some
of the Senators might want to ask some questions.
Mr. Mitchell. I will attempt to do so, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you about one more meeting, the meet-
ing you had with, not with Mr. Dean, but ]\Ir. Ehrlichman on April 13
at the A^Hiite House.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I believe the meeting was on April 14, if I am not
mistaken. It was a Saturday.
INIr. Thompson. What was discussed at that meeting ?
Mr. Mitchell. Very little other than the fact that I had known that
Mr. Magruder had tried to be the first one into the prosecutor's office
and that he had already been there, and that ]\Ir. Ehrlichman had
learned that and had talked to Mr. Magruder and Mr. Ehrlichman
advised me as to what Mr. Magruder was saying. I said, thank you
very much and he said, would you not like to see the President? And I
said under the circumstances of what is unfolding here, I think it
would be inappropriate for me to see the President. So we left it at
that.
Mr. Thompson. Was this, in effect, telling you that from Ehrlich-
man's standpoint, anyway, from what was going on, that you could
anticipate problems?
Mr. ^Mitchell. That I could ?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I do not think it is so much that way as he was re-
counting to me what Magruder had said, which, of course, did involve
me.
Now, as to IMr. Ehrlichman's motive, I am not trying to guesstimate
that.
]\Ir. Thompson. We have some evidence before the committee of a
taped conversation between Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Kleindienst.
T wonder if you have any reason to believe that this or any other
conversation that you might have had with Mr. Ehrlichman was
taped ?
Mr. Mitchell. In reflection, I would think that this conversation
probably was taped.
Mr. Thompson. Why ?
1652
IVIr. Mitchell. For the reason that most of the time that I met in
John Ehrlichman's office, why, we sat on a sofa around a coffee table
and so forth.
Mr. Thompson. This is the one we heard about in the Pat Gray
testimony about the documents ?
Mr, Mitchell. Yes; I believe that is the same coffee table and
set of chairs. But at this particular time, he invited me over to
sit in the chair at his desk and fidgeted around a little bit. So it
occurred to me that a switch in the pattern of operation might very
well have had something to do with as to where the microphone was.
Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you one more question, Mr. Mitchell.
Obviously, the only verification, I suppose, direct verification of the
fact that you were not the one who pushed Liddy, or to the contrary,
the only one who could definitely testify that you did push Liddy,
would be Liddy himself. And, of course, he has not favored us with his
testimony so far.
I notice here a call in your logs on April 17 with a Mr. Peter
Maroulis.
Mr. Mitchell. Maroulis, yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. I believe he is Mr. Liddy's attorney ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Could you tell us the nature of that conversation ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, that was a return of a call to Mr. Maroulis,
who had made a call to me, and Mr. Maroulis, within a day or two,
came to see me. He was looking for guidance. Wliat had apparently
occurred, according to Mr. Maroulis, and I have not checked this out
with the parties to know whether it is true or not, but the President
had made his statement by that time, whichever one it was, in which
he asked everybody to come forward and disclose what they knew
about this matter. I guess that might have been — well, whatever date
it was, the President or somebody on his behalf had asked, I believe,
Henry Petersen to go to Mr. Liddy's local counsel here in the Dis-
trict— Mr. Kennelly, and Mr. Kennelly carried the message from Peter-
sen to Kennelly to Mr. Maroulis about the fact that the President
wanted everybody to come forward.
Well, Mr. Maroulis had spent a lot of time — ^he is a personal friend
of Mr. Liddy. It was his opinion that Mr. Liddy had a valid case on
appeal because of the errore made by the court and other matters that
were involved, and he wondered if I could give him any guidance
as to what the President meant by that particular phrase, which appar-
ently had been quoted verbatim from Petersen to Kennelly to
Maroulis.
I told him that I could not add anything to it, that I had not talked to
the President about it ; I knew what the President's wishes were, but
he as a lawyer was going to have to make his own decision as to what
his client's interests were.
Mr. Thompson. Is that the last conversation you had with him con-
cerning Liddy's position ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is the only conversation I have ever had with
the gentleman.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. I have no further
questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
1653
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Mitchell, in your testimony, you have re-
peatedly referred to "White House horrors." What do you mean by
that phrase ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, as we have discussed them here, Senator, they
certainly involved the break-in of Dr. Ellsberg's doctor, I think we had
better put it instead of the other phrase that is used ; the Dita Beard
matter, both with respect to, apparently, the removal of her from the
scene as well as visits or attempted A'isits. We are talking about the
Diem cables; we are talking about the alleged extracurricular activities
in the bugging area, the bombing, i)urported bombing of the Brookings
Institute, and a lot of miscellaneous matters with respect to Chappa-
quiddick and this, that, and the next thing. Those are the areas of
which I am talking.
Senator Talmadge. Who was the author of the White House horrors ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I do not know as I can answer for all of those.
Senator. I think that the affidavits that have been filed in some of the
courts and the stories that have come out in the press probably give you
a better picture of that than I can vividly.
Senator Talmadge. Did you play an active supervisory role in the
campaign before you resigned as AttoiTiey General ?
Mr. Mitchell. An active supervisory role ?
Senator Talmadge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What I did was succumb to the President's request
to keep an eye on what was going on over there and I had frequent
meetings with individuals dealing with matters of policy; also with
individuals who would bring other individuals over to introduce them
to me and discuss their talents and their qualities with respect to
filling certain jobs in that particular area. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Talmadge. You would consider, then, that you did play an
active supervisory role before you resigned as Attorney General?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the word "supervisory'' gets me, Senator. I am
not quite sure of that.
Senator Talmadge. An active role before you resigned.
Mr. Mitchell. If you would change "supervisory" to "consulting",
I think I Avould be much happier.
Senator Talmadge. Did it get beyond the consulting capacity ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it might have been in areas where I let them
know my opinion quite forcefully and strongly, but I think that would
still fit under the role of consultant.
Senator Talmadge. Didn't you testify to the contrary before the
Judiciary Committee on March 14, 1972 ?
Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I am glad you asked me that. I was waiting
for somebody to. May I read the dialog ?
Senator Talmadge. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I was hoping that would come up.
Senator Talmadge. I am glad to accommodate you, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. Because this subject matter has been
bandied about and I think quite unfairly. This is a question by Sen-
ator Kennedy:
Senator Kennedy. Do you remember what party responsibilities you had prior
to March 1?
Mitchell. Party responsibilities?
Kennedy. Yes. Republican Party.
Mitchell. I do not have and did not have any responsibilities. I have no party
responsibilities now, Senator.
1654
Now, it seems to me that this committee has spent about 6 weeks
trying to make a distinction between the different parties and the
Committee for the Re-Election of the President, and I look upon it
the same way.
Senator Talmadge. Let's read a little further, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. This is the only quote I have. Do you have some-
thing more on that?
Senator Talmadge. Yes. Let me read it for you. [Laughter.]
Next question :
Senator Kennedy. No re-election campaign responsibilities?
Mr. Mitchell. Not as yet. I hope to. I am going to make the application to
the chairman of the committee if I ever get through with these hearings.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Mitchell. I can't believe that the Washington Post could be
so mistaken.
Senator Talmadge. May I send it to you for the refreshment of
your memory, sir?
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to see it.
Senator Talmadge. I will ask a member of the staff to show Mr.
Mitchell page 633 of the hearings of Mr. Richard G. Kleindienst,
resumed, on March 14, 1972.
Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I still think that relates, that phrase that
you read that isn't in the Washington Post, relates back to the same
subject matter.
Senator Talmadge. You testified a moment ago in response to a
question that I asked you that you did have campaign responsibilities
prior to the time you resigned as Attorney General. And yet, on
March 14. before the Judiciary Committee, I quote again : "Senator
Kennedy. No re-election campaign responsibilities?" That is a
question. "Mr. Mitchell. Not as yet."
Isn't that negative?
Mr. Mitchell. That is negative. It relates back to the Republican
Party, Senator, in the way I read the context and this one was so
intended.
Senator Talmadge. "No reelection campaign responsibilities?" I ask
you who was running ? Mr. Nixon ? And is he a Republican ?
Mr. Mitchell. I think the answer to both those questions is "Yes."
Senator Talmadge. I would concur with that. I still don't get the
thrust of your testimony when you testified a moment ago that you
had none, that you did have election responsibilities and yet before the
Judiciary Committee of the LT.S. Senate on March 14, 1972, you testi-
fied exactly the opposite.
Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I go back to the statement that I made
before, that this refers to the Republican Party and this is the reason
that I raised the question and responded to it and it was my intention
to do so in that context.
Senator Talmadge. Was not President Nixon running on the Repub-
lican ticket ? He didn't change parties, did he ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, Senator. I stand on the answer that I have given
you. But the question that I asked of Senator Kennedy was with re-
spect to the party and he referred to the Republican Party, and that
is the context in which I took it.
1655
Senator Talmadge. Now, there is some stationery from the Commit-
tee for the Re-Election of the President, memorandum to the Attorney
General, marked "confidential," December 3, 1971. There is a lot of
language here. "We recommend that the Committee for the Re-
Election of the President assume all "WTiite House support activities."
It is signed by Jeb S. Magruder and there are three blanks there : One
"approve," one "disapprove," the third, "comment." And by "ap-
prove" there is an X. Is that your X mark ?
Mr. Mitchell. I haven't the faintest idea. I don't remember the
memorandum but maybe if I looked at it, I could tell. Generally I
write my name rather'^than write an X, but I may be able to identify
my X.
Senator Talmadge. We all admit, Mr. Mitchell, that you are entirely
legible and that you write eminently well.
Mr. Mitchell. Senator, that looks like a good enough X to possibly
be mine. I am not familiar with it and I don't recall the memorandum.
Senator Talmadge. You do not deny it ?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not deny that that could be my X.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, I ask that that be marked as an
exhibit and be inserted in the record at this point.
Senator Ervin. Without objection, it is so ordered. The reporter
will mark it as an exhibit for the record.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 74.*]
Senator Talmadge. I also ask that the colloquy I have read between
Senator Kennedy and the then Attorney General, John Mitchell, dated
March 14, 1972, before the Judiciary Committee be made part of the
record.
And as further evidence, Mr. Chairman, I desire to send to Mr.
Mitchell a number of documents here wherein he was exercising his
responsibility as director of the campaign, one dated June 22, 1971,
one dated January 14, 1972, all marked "confidential," memorandum
to the Attorney General, one involving the Republican National Com-
mittee budget, the other a telephone plan for the Florida primary.
I send them also to Mr. Mitchell for identification and I ask that
they be identified, appropriately numbered, and inserted in the rec-
ord at this point.
Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I have no recollection of the firet one re-
lating to the Republican National Committee budget. I have a vague
recollection of this one in January, having to do with the telephone
plan for the Florida primary, and I am quite sure that the writing at
the bottom here in connection with the comment which says, "Hold
for November pending standing in the polls" — "Hold for now," I
guess it is, not November — "Pending standing in polls" is not my
writing. But
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that
those documents be appropriately marked and inserted in the record
at this point.
Senator Ervin. I believe the one he stated he had no recollection
about will have to be identified by some other witnesses.
♦See p. 1810.
1656
Senator Talmadge. Then the ones he identified
Senator Ervin. The ones he identified will be appropriately marked
as an exhibit and placed in the record as snch.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 75.*]
Mr. Hundley. I think I should state with reference to the second
document that Mr. Mitchell had seen it and that he indicated that the
handwriting on it, on the bottom was not his and I would note there
is no X on the "Approved" or "Not Approved."
Senator Talmadge. I am not indicating that it was Mr. Mitchell's
mark there. But it does corroborate that he was actively involved in
the campaign. That was admitted by Mr. Mitchell, I might say.
Mr. Hundley. That is a matter of dispute.
Mr. Mitchell. That is a matter of dispute and I would like the
chairman's indulgence for a moment to point out that there is no il-
legality about any Presidential appointee engaging in the carrying out
of political functions.
Senator Talmadge. I am not arguing that, Mr. Mitchell. You testi-
fied under oath in response to a question of mine a moment ago that at
the request of the White House you were actively involved in the cam-
paign. If I can read the English language correctly, on March 14 of
last year, you testified to the opposite before the Judicially Committee.
One or the other of your statements is in error. I am inserting them in
the record only so the public can draw their own conclusions as to
which was in error.
Mr. Mitchell. I dispute your statement with respect to the discus-
sion before the Judiciary Committee and I would like to go back to my
statement and stand on that answer.
Senator Talmadge. That is part of the record and that is the reason,
Mr. Mitchell, that I inserted both of them in the record so the American
people can draw their own conclusion as to which is correct. I am not
arguing with your testimony, but if I can read the English language
in two different places, they are the opposite of each other. You state
that they aren't. If I understand English, and I learned it in a small
country school, in Telfair County
Mr. Mitchell. So did I, Senator, a very small one.
Senator Talmadge. We both studied the same English, I assume.
Mr. Mitchell. That is why I am surprised you don't agree with my
interpretation.
Senator Talmadge. Let's get on to another matter.
Senator Ervin. Could I ask for his interpretation so I can under-
stand it ?
It is your position that working for a Republican candidate for
President gave you no responsibilities in respect to the Republican
Party?
Mr, Mitchell. That is it entirely, Mr. Chairman. That is the ques-
tion that I asked of Senator Kennedy.
Senator Ervin. Thank you.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Stans testified before the committee, Mr.
Mitchell, he stated his sole responsibility as chairman of the finance
committee was to raise the money and he testified that it was your re-
sponsibility, as I recall, as chairman to determine the expenditures
thereof.
*See p. 1811.
1657
Now, we had some more than a million dollars in cash that was not
accounted for during the expenditure. Thus, as I understand it, Mr.
Mitchell, Mr. Stans has implicated you as being responsible for these
cash disbursements.
Would you comment on that ?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe that ; that Senator, in all deference
to you, is the testimony of Mr. Stans in any form, shape, or circum-
stances about that. By the time that I became active, and I am saying
active as distinguished from consulting, in the campaign, we were
working on budgets, which Mr. Stans and his people on the finance
committee were part and parcel of, just as I was on the political side,
and we were working under the budget. Mr. Stans was part of that.
Senator Talmadge. Let's see if we can clarify it. It was Mr. Stans'
responsibility to raise the money, as I understand it.
Is that an accurate statement ?
Mr. Mitchell. No question about that.
Senator Talmadge. AVhose responsibility was it to disburse it 2
Mr. Mitchell. It was the responsibility — to disbui*se it?
Senator Talmadge. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was actually disbursed by the finance com-
mittee, but I am sure that is not the thrust of your question. Your
question is who authorized the programs for which the money was
spent. I think that is the question ?
Senator Talmadge. Yes, who could call up over there and say give x
number of dollars or write a check for such and such an amount ? AYlio
had the authority to do that? Was it you or Mr. Stans? That is what
I am trying to get at.
Mr. Mitchell. It depended on the period of time involved, Mr. Tal-
madge. Before their budgets were put together, it was done in the way
you said, that we authorize this program and so-and-so can get so
much money.
Senator Talmadge. When did you take over as chairman of the
committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. I didn't become chairman. I became campaign direc-
tor, Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. What date was that ?
Mr. Mitchell. It was announced on the 9th of April. But I had
been working, as my time would allow, plus a vacation, from the 21st
of November through the 3d or 4th of April in ti-ying to put together
the budgets under which these, moneys would be expended.
Senator Talmadge. Thereafter then was it your responsibility to au-
thorize disbursements ?
Mr. Mitchell. In connection with the budget, yes.
Senator Talmadge. And so
Mr. Mitchell. That is up until the 1st of July.
Senator Talmadge. When you resigned and that was solely your re-
sponsibility during that period ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, as you have heard from the discussion here this
morning when Mr. Stans consulted me about it, because of the many
other things that I was doing, including putting together the political
organizations in the 50 States, I told Mr. Stans that Mr. Magruder
had continuing authorization which, of course, is part of Mr. Stans'
testimony, to authorize expenditures of money.
1658
Senator Talmadge. Then the expenditures that were paid out by
Mr, Sloan, as I recall, various lawyers' fees, and bail fees, and living
expenses, were authorized by you, is that a correct statement ?
Mr. Mitchell. To my knowledge, Mr. Sloan never made such pay-
ments.
Senator Talmadge. Who did ?
Mr. Mitchell. To my knowledge there was never any money paid
out of the committee for that purpose.
Senator Talmadge. There was some
Mr. Mitchell. If I can go back to my testimony a few minutes
ago
Senator Talmadge. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell [continuing]. Wlien this matter was first brought up
it was turned down and turned down cold. The money that was used,
if it was bail money and I am not sure of that, but attorneys' fees and
support, were not cojnmittec moneys.
Senator Talmadge. Where did that money come from ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I believe Mr. Stans testified, and I am no ex-
pert on this subject matter because I don't know all of the answers to
it, I believe Mr. Stans testified that at Mr. Kalmbach's request, and this
is the first public knowledge that I have as to how this got started, that
on the 29th of June Mr. Stans turned over moneys that were not part
of the campaign moneys to Mr. Kalmbach in the amount of $75,000.
Senator Talmadge. I believe he testified that he checked with you on
that and you authorized it, is that correct ?
Mr. Mitchell. Who did this?
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Stans, as I recall.
Mr. Mitchell. No, he did not. No, sir, I beg your pardon.
Senator Talmadge. Who authorized that disbursement?
Mr. Mitchell. That was not a disbursement of campaign funds.
This was moneys that Mr. Stans testified that he had outside of the
campaign, and that he turned them over to Mr. Kalmbach at Mr. Kalm-
bach's request, ]\Ir. Kalmbach having said this was for an important
White House mission and I am quite certain that is the testimony.
Senator Talimadge. How does a campaign get money outside the
campaign ? [Laughter.]
Mr. Mitchell. This has always been a very interesting question to
me. [Laughter.]
Because, for this very reason that the more I hear about all these
moneys eveiTbody says that they came from 1968, and here I was the
campaign manager in 1968 and only won by 600,000 votes and they had
all this money in the bank. That was a hell of a thing to do to me.
Senator Talmadge. I agree.
Mr. Mitchell. I regret it, I resent it.
Senator Talmadge. It wasn't but one campaign, was it, in 1972 ?
Mr. MiTCHEiJ.. Well , I am talking about 1968.
Senator Talmadge. Yes, you are talking about leftover campaign
money.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, this is what I understood.
Senator Talmadge. But you referred to funds outside the campaign
at the disposal of the campaign committee when there was only one
campaign and I was wondering how you collected campaign money
outside a campaign ?
1659
Mr. Mitchell. This was not collected, this was held except for one
item, and I am sure the staff is much more familiar with Mr. Stans'
record than I am but I think he testified that the $75,000 was made up
of $45,000 that he had in a safe deposit box that came from the 1968
campaifni and $30,000 that had come from some Filipinos who were
to be returned; if I am not mistaken that is the $75,000 and he did not
come to me on it.
Senator Talmadge. Tliere was a iji'eat deal of testimony that this
committee has had, as you know, about disbui-sement of funds, and we
found that over a million dollars was disbursed in cash with no checks
to support it or anythincr else. Some cash was bandied around in large
amounts, and it was amazing to me that a man as able, a certified pub-
lic accountant, as Mr. Stans would let money be handled in such a
loose, fashion. You would concur that you ought not kick around a mil-
lion dollars in cash without accountability, wouldn't you ?
Mr. Mitchell. I would subscribe to that wholeheartedly, in fact I
would go down to half a million or a quarter of a million.
Senator Talmadge. Or even $1.
Mr. Mitchell. I agree with that.
Senator Talmadge. Now, you mentioned these Dahlberg and Mexi-
can checks. Mr. Stans testified that you met with him on June 23, 1972,
regarding those checks, is that a correct statement?
Mr, ]\Iitciiell. Yes, sir. If I remember correctly, j\Ir. Stans and I
had lunch on that day and we had a further meeting which has been
totally screwed up in the testimony here on the 24th.
Senator Talmadge. Do you want to try to correct it?
Mr. Mitchell. I would be delighted because of the various versions
and it was a matter of some concern of this committee because of the
implication that ^Ir. Stans was brought into the picture of having in-
formation about the "Watergate, which is not true.
With respect to the 23d, to the best of my knowledge it does show
that Mr. Stans and I had lunch in my diary. Now the 24th, this is the
sequel of the Mardian-LaRue debriefing or interviewing of Liddy and
the information they got from JNIagruder's involvement with Liddy
in the payment of nioney and it resulted in Mardian going to talk to
]Magruder, and getting this story that it was only $40,000 at the most
that I could have given Liddy or whatever the number was $40,000 or
$50,000, and this, of course, was quite contrary to what ]Mr. Liddy had
told Mr. Mardian.
So ]Mardian came up and got my secretary to get Sloan in from his
house into the office, the 24th being a Saturday where there was this
confrontation and, by the way, I would like to interpolate here that
this is the only meeting that I ever had with Hugh Sloan at any time
after June 17 and it wasn't in connection with his going to the FBI
as he has testified to.
The meeting took place with Mardian, Magruder. stud Sloan, in
which ]\Iaarrudei- was saying, "Well, it couldn't have been more than
$40,000 or $50,000" and Sloan was saying, "It is much, much more than
that. But I won't tell vou because t am going to have to talk to INIr.
Stans."
And this is, by the way, where I will also have to put the record
straight. Sloan was a pretty low individual on that particular day and
1660
it was then tliat Mardian hit him on the back to buck him up and I
don't want to take credit for this statement that was reported by me to
be made that when the going; gets tough the tough get going. It was
Senator Muskie who had said it just a couple of days before it
happened.
Senator Talmadge. You did not make any such statement, is that
correct ?
Mr. Mitchell. I made the statement and I made it in the con-
text
Senator Talmadge. You did not quote Senator Muskie as being the
author thereof ?
Mr. Mitchell. I did indeed in connection with respect to the nature
of the tough campaign he had and the one that we were having.
Senator Talmadge. Were you saying that for Mr. Sloan's benefit
at that particular time ?
Mr. Mitchell. I was saying it for the total people there who were
in a hell of a knock-down-drag-out donnybrook over what they could
not agree on.
Now, the sequence is shown by my log that after that meeting
Mr. Sloan apparently went back to Mr. Stans, who had received the
information about the Liddy payments the day before, I believe, on
June 23, Mr. Stans called me, and Mr. Stans came up and saw me
alone. There was not any Jeb Magruder and there was not any
Mardian in the meeting that according to Magruder I asked Mardian
to step out so that I could discuss the matter. That would be the last
thing in the world I would do because Mardian was investigating the
circumstances at the time.
Senator Talmadge. Was that the first — excuse me.
Mr. Mitchell. I am going into this because Mr. Stans' credibility
with respect to his knowledge of the Watergate was quite severely
impugned apparently more severely in the executive committee meet-
ing by Magruder than it was later in public testimony.
Senator Talmadge. Was that the first time you had knowledge of
the Watergate break-in, bugging that day, that conversation?
Mr. Mitchell. On the 24th ?
Senator Talmadge. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. No, my
Senator Talmadge. That was the first time you were debriefed on
it, was it not ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, I had been debriefed. Senator, as I mentioned
a little earlier, either on the 21st or 22d.
Senator Talmadge. Did you get full details of it at that time ?
Mr. Mitchell. It was coming from Liddy who was, as I went
through with Mr. Thompson, was involving Magruder and said that
he got his approval in the White House and a lot of things that
Senator Talmadge. Did he say who authorized the approval in
the White House?
Mr. Mitchell. No, he did not. No, he did not.
Senator Talmadge. The White House was definitely interested in the
campaign, of course, was it not ?
Mr. Mitchell. The campaign what. Senator?
Senator Talmadge. The campaign for reelection.
1661
Mr. jNIitchell. Oh, there is no question about it.
Senator Talmadge. With whom in the White House did you discuss
the Watero-ate break-in ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it depends, of course, as I testified earlier
this morning in the context of it. Talking with, starting at the top,
with the President, I believe it was the telephone call that I had on the
20th of June in which — this was before the debriefings that I had had
and liad not any particular knowledge of it. discussed it to the point
where I thought it was ridiculous and thought I had been very re-
miss as being the campaign director and not ever being able to keep a
rein on the individuals that were working for the campaign, at that
time I had in my mind, of course, the fact that Mr. McCord was the
only one who was involved in the particular incident.
Senator Talmadge. Let me see if I can identify that telephone
call, that was on the 20th of June, according to the logs that the
committee has, that took place by telephone between the 6 p.m., and
6 :12 p.m., is that correct?
Mr. Mitchell. That is the one, sir.
Senator Talmadge. What did you tell the President about the
Watergate break-in at that time ? Did you tell him employees of the
Committee To Re-Elect the President were involved in it?
Mr. Mitchell. I assume the President knew that because it had been
in the newspapers by then, to my recollection but what I really recall
about the convei'sation was more.
Senator Talmadge. Did you tell him Magruder was involved ?
Mr. Mitchell. I did not know Magruder was involved in it at that
time.
Senator Talmadge. Who did you tell him was involved ?
Mr. Mitchell. The only ones I knew were involved at that time
were the five that were accosted on the premises.
Senator Talmadge. When did you talk with Mr. Haldeman about
the break-in ?
Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection of it but it was some time
thereafter.
Senator Talmadge. Was it shortly after June 20 ?
Mr. Mitchell. I would probably believe that would be the case.
Senator Talmadge. When did you talk to Mr. Ehrlichman about it?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I talked to Mr. Ehrlichman — Mr. Ehrlichman
called me in California when I was out there and asked me, in effect, I
think there has been testimony to the effect here that somebody sug-
gested he do it. He called me out there and asked me what it was all
about and I said, "I do not know, we will find out and we will get back
to you."" That was the substance of that conversation.
Senator Talmadge. That was either the I7th, 18th, 19th, or there-
abouts ?
Mr. ^IiTCHELL. It was either Saturday or Sunday because on the
19th, which was Monday, we left rather early for the return to
Washington.
Senator Talmadge. When did you talk to Mr. Colson about it?
Mr, Mitchell. I have no idea but it would have been somewhere
much further down the line. Let me point out
Senator Talmadge. Sure.
1662
Mr. Mitchell [continuing]. Senator, that if you would have, I know
you are reading from one of these minicharts but some of the things
they do not have up there is that there is an 8:15 a.m. morning meet-
ing in the "White House.
Senator Talmadge. You should have ample opportunity to state
whatever you want to, Mr. Mitchell, if that chart is different from
your views do not hesitate to say so, we want the facts, only the facts.
Mr. Mitchell. I cannot see it from here and it does not make any
difference anyway, because I have got a directory here but what I
would point out is that during this period which I have — which I have
testified to earlier today, until I left the committee as the campaign
director, there was a meeting at 8 :15 a.m. in the White House every
morning. This was the regular staff meeting that involved legislative
liaison. Dr. Kissinger, General Haig, et cetera. So, when I say when
you ask me when did I first talk to these people about the Watergate,
of course, it was a continuing subject matter basically in the concept of
the political problems that presented because by the, I guess the, 20th
or certainly the 21st, the Democrats had threatened their lawsuit, they
filed it, I think, on the 22d and we had had a verbal press battle over
the circumstances from then on constantly day in and clay out about
the matter.
Senator Talmadge. Did you talk to Mr. Colson about the same time ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am sure that I would because he would have at-
tended those meetings.
Senator Talmadge. Did you direct Robert Mardian to telephone
Liddy on June 17 and ask him to try to persuade Mr. Kleindienst, then
the Acting Attorney General, to arrange for Mr. McCord to be re-
leased from bail as Mr. Magruder has testified ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I am sure, I assure you, that would not be the
case. There was some conversation that somebody might call up the
Acting Attorney General to find out what the hell happened but I
noticed in Mr. Magruder's testimony he said that I selected Mardian
because Mardian was a great friend of Liddy 's and if there is any-
body who were on the opposite ends of the stick it would have been
Mardian and Liddy.
Senator Talmadge. Would you say then that ]\Ir. Magruder com-
mitted perjury before this committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. I cannot characterize anything as perjury. Senator.
That does not happen to be a fact, what you have just said, and I have
just denied it and I am sure the other people who were present will
also deny it.
Senator Talmadge. You are a good lawyer, Mr. Mitchell, testifying
under oath to a lie is commonly referred to as perjury, is it not?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, yes ; but you also have to have intents, I think,
along with it under certain circumstances and I am sure that some of
these conversations have got garbled and mixed up in the intervening
year and a half or so. I would not want to characterize anybody
Senator Talmadge. "Wliat you are saying is intentions might be
good but his facts are wrong, is that correct ?
Mr. Mitchell. Could very well be that the recollection was not quite
accurate. There are many of other circumstances some of which I have
testified to and some of which I presume I will in connection with my
1663
answers relating to Mr. Magruder's testimony where I know damn
well that he has transposed events and got them mixed into other
circumstances.
Senator Talmadge. Mr, Dean has testified before this committee
that there was a meeting on March 22, 1973, where you met with him,
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, and you said that there was no
more money problems for Mr. Hunt. Did this meeting take place?
Mr. Mitchell. The meeting had taken place. Senator, I covered this
earlier this morning, and it is to this effect, the meeting took place
prior to a meeting with the President. It was on March 22, those par-
ticipating were Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, and myself. Dean's
testimony is to the effect that Ehrlichman asked me if Hunt had been
paid or if his problems had been taken care of. and I am reported by
Dean to have answered, yes, something. To the contrary, I deny that it
ever existed as far as I am concerned, because I would not laiow whether
Hunt's problems have been taken care of or not.
Senator Talmadge. Then, you are telling this committee Mr, Dean
was in error when he made this statement ?
Mr. Mitchell. This may be another one of these cases where on
Senator Talmadge. Intentions were good and his facts were wrong ?
Mr, Mitchell. Well, he probably got the parties mixed up. I do not
recall ever having talked to John Ehrlichman about payment of money
to anybody in connection with the Watergate case.
Senator Talmadge. I believe you stated you later met with the
President that day ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, we did.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Dean said — he testified — you talked with the
President about dealing with the Ervin committee at that point, is
that correct ?
Mr. Mitchell, Excuse me, this is a side joke that we have, he is
afraid I am going to pronounce the chairman's name wrong as I have
from time to time.
The word "dealing" is a pretty broad term. Actually, the subject
matters were a number that did have to do with the committee and it
was also, of course, the basis, the subject matters were the basis for
discussion that took place previously that morning among Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, Dean, and myself in the meeting that we just got out of.
The real problem that was discussed at that particular time was
the problem the President was having in connection with executive
privilege and that was the real focal point of it and, of course, that
was right in the middle of the Gray hearings where the concentration
was on the executive privilege matter.
The other aspects of it were as to who was to be the liaison in con-
nection with the Wiite House working with this committee up here,
and I believe that Mr. Dean is correct in his testimony that during
that meeting the President called Mr. Kleindienst to ask him if he
had met with the chairman and the vice chairman of the committee
on the subject matter to start discussing these matters of executive
privilege and the other relationships in that area.
Senator Talmadge, Did you convince the President at that time
that he ought to waive executive privilege ?
Mr. Mitchell. I urged it.
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 21
1664
Senator Talmadge. Why was he so insistent on what he called
executive privilege, Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, I can't always — I can't say always,
I can't read the President's mind but I would believe that whatever
the President does in this area he does it in connection with the Presi-
dency and not in connection with some individual problem that he
may have at a particular time.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Dean testified that on March 28, 1973, he
met with you and Mr. Magruder and that you indicated to Mr. Dean
that his testimony could cause problems. Did that meeting take place ?
Mr. Mitchell. There was a meeting on March 28, but I believe that
the phrase that you have quoted has come out of a memorandum that
Dean has submitted to this committee dealing with a meeting that
we had on April 10. Now, I may be mistaken in connection with that
but the meeting I had with Dean on March 28 there was Magruder
present at the meeting and really what the discussion there was the
recollection of the meeting in the Justice Department, the one where
the statement was made that there was a possibility of Dean testifying
before the grand jury could provide problems for the President I
believe was at the April 10 statement.
Senator Talmadge. Did you make a statement that his testimony
could cause problems for the President ?
Mr. Mitchell. I would believe that I would have put it in that
frame because this would provide the entire unraveling of all of the
Plumbers activities and all of the White House horrors.
Senator Talmadge. AVliat did 3- ou mean by that statement ?
Mr. Mitchell. Just what I said now.
Senator Talmadge. That you wanted it kept concealed ?
Mr. Mitchell. I was not anxious to volunteer any information with
respect to the White House horrors or the Plumbers operations that
would hurt this President.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Dean also testified before the committee
that he gave you a hypothesis, that the plan to break in the Water-
gate had been approved without anyone fully understanding its im-
port, he stated that you said his theory was not far wrong, only that
it would be three or four times removed from the committee. Did you
make that statment and, if so, what did you mean by it ?
Mr. Mitchell. I testified this morning that there was no such state-
ment made. This has been over the past years in discussions of this and
theorization as to who was involved and how we were doing but it
certainly wasn't made at that meeting of March 28 because Magruder,
Dean, and I were at the meeting and I left to go into the office to say
goodby to Haldeman to go back to New York so if he had said it, he
would have said it in front of Dean and Magruder, and I am sure
Magruder would have remembered it but, to my knowledge, to the
best of my recollection, no such statement was ever made.
Senator Talmadge. You resigned as campaign director, I believe,
July 4, 1972?
Mr. Mitchell. July 1, sir.
Senator Talmadge.' July 1, 1972. Why did you resign, Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, I thought this was probably the most
publicized resignation that ever took place in this country.
1665
Senator Talmadge. I haven't heard you say it. I have heard others
say it.
Mr. MiTCHFXL. I had some long-range teleplione and publicized
threats that if I didn't get out of politics, I was going to lose my
marriage.
Senator Talmadge. What you are saying then, I don't want to get
into that aspect of it, what you are saying then
Mr. Mitchell. Everybody else has. Senator. You might just as
well.
Senator Talmadge. It had nothing whatever to do with the Water-
gate matter?
Mr. Mitchell. None whatsoever.
Senator Talmadge. The sequence of events there, as they unravelled
were so similar in dates that I wondered if that had anything to do
with it?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, I can't conceive the President would
have anything to do with the Watergate and we would have
continued to have all of these meetings both social and campaign meet-
ings and all the rest of it if it had anything to do with the Water-
gate
Senator Talmadge. You discussed your resignation-
Mr. Mitchell [continuing] . It didn't. What we discussed with the
President, we had lunch on Friday, the announcement was made on
Saturday — we had lunch on Friday, and we discussed who the succes-
sor was going to be. The President asked me to, urged me to stay on, I
said I could not under the circumstances, it would be impossible for me
to function properly, and I don't want to characterize his attitude but,
it seemed to me, he reluctantly consented to the fact that I was going
to leave, and we discussed a successor and implemented this rather
rapidly. If you are aware of my logs that I had been spending the
better part of the previous week trying to smooth this situation over to
the point where that I could stay as husband and wife regardless of
whether I resigned or not, so eventually it was so worked out.
Senator Talmadge. It's been observed in the press, in Mr. Dean's
testimony, that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman tried to smoke
3^ou out and get you to take the blame for this whole affair, that you
were shaken by the circumstances and now isolated from the President.
Would you like to comment on that ?
Mr. Mitchell. Now where does this come from ?
Senator Talmadge. Dean, among others, and various
Mr. Mitchell. This is not a direct quote from Dean. You are also
reading Evans and Novak and a few othere.
Senator Talmadge. Newspaper comment.
Mr. Mitchell. And a few other throw-ins of hypothetical
Senator Talmadge. Perhaps one of the contributing factors to it is
the last time you visited the White House you didn't even see the Pres-
ident as I understand it.
Mr. Mitchell. That was my exact determination that I should not
under the circumstances.
Senator Talmadge. That is what I understood you to say.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, that is what I did say.
Senator Talmadge. So you have not been isolated from the
President ?
1666
Mr. Mitchell. I have — well let me answer your question first:
There has been running through Mr. Dean's testimony on a number
of occasions the reference that, you know, "Mitchell come forward
and take the blame for all of this and this will solve all of the prob-
lems," and of course I have been meeting with these people from time
to time during this period. But the only one I have ever heard that
story from is Dean. Neither Haldeman or Ehrlichman or either Colson
or Shapiro have come to me with that story so the only one I have
ever heard from is Dean.
Senator Talmadge. One thing I can't understand, Mr. Mitchell.
As I understand it, you have been probably closer associated with the
President than probably any man. You were his law partner, prob-
ably his most trusted confidant and adviser. You had immediate
access to the White House at any time, to the President's office, in-
cluding a direct line.
Is that a fair statement ?
Mr. Mitchell. It is extremely complimentary.
Senator Talmadge. It is meant to be complimentary.
Mr. Mitchell I think it is made a little higher than it might be.
Senator Talmadge. Now, you have been in public office in positions
of high responsibility in Government. I have had that privilege also
as Governor of my State and now for I614 years in the U.S. Senate.
To my mind, the first requirement of a subordinate and adviser and
confidant in any capacity is absolute and implicit trust. If they see
anything going wrong involving their superior that needs immediate
corrective action, they report it instantly. When you found out all
these crimes and conspiracies and coverups were being committed, why
on Earth didn't you walk into the President's office and tell him the
truth?
Mr. Mitchell. It wasn't a question of telling him the truth. It was
a question of not involving him at all so that he could go on through
his campaign without being involved in tliis type of activity, and I am
talking about the White House horror particularly. As I have testi-
fied this morning, I was sure that, knowing Richard Nixon, the
President, as I do, he would just lower the boom on all of this matter
and it would come back to hurt, him and it would affect him in his
reelection. And that is the basis upon which I made the decision. And
apparently, others concuiTed with it.
Now, I am not speaking for them. It may very well be that I was
wrong, that it was a bad matter of judgment.
Senator Talmadge. Am I to understand from your response that you
placed the expediency of the next election above your responsibilities
as an intimate to advise the President of the peril that surrounded him ?
Here was the deputy campaign director involved, here were his two
closest associates in his office involved, all around him were people
involved in crime, perjury, accessory after the fact, and you delib-
erately refused to tell him that.
Would you state that the expediency of the election was more impor-
tant than that ?
INIr. Mitchell. Senator, I think you have put it exactly correct. In
my mind, the reelection of Richard Nixon, compared with what was
available on the other side, was so much more important that I put it
in just that context.
1667
Senator Talmadge, Do you think anything short of a trial for
treason would have prevented his election?
Mr. Mitchell. I beg your pardon, Senator?
Senator Talmadge. Do you think anything short of a trial for
treason would have prevented his election?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, it depends on what area we are talking about.
Mr. Thompson and I went through that, and of course, depending upon
what time and what area it was in.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. I have no further
questions at this time.
Senator Er\t:n. Senator Gurney.
Senator GritNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator ER\^N. Mr. Mitchell, you have been sitting there for about
2 hours. Would you like to have a brief recess ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, I am doing fine, sir. I am here at the pleasure of
you gentlemen, so I would certainly be delighted to sit as long as
you do.
Senator Ervin. You may proceed.
Senator Gurnet. Mr. Mitchell, you were the President's campaign
manager in 1968 and the campaign director in 1972, and of course, his
close personal friend. I would assume that you had many discussions
with him during 1971 and early 1972 about the upcoming political
campaign in 1972, is that correct?
Mr. Mitchell. Senator, there were discussions, but probably not
really as many as you might expect. In other words, we didn't meet
daily or even weekly. Sometimes months would go by before we would
meet and discuss the subject matter.
Senator Gurney. Well, in any of those discussions, Mr. Mitchell,
with the President in this time frame, did he ever bring up the matter
of bugging and electronic surveillance or dirty tricks in the 1972 Presi-
dential campaign ?
Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Certainly not with respect to anything that had to
do with politics, Mr. Gurney — Senator, excuse me. I should have called
you Mayor as I did originally. Senator, no sir.
Senator Gurnet. l\liat about 1968 ; did that subject ever come up ?
Mr. Mitchell. It didn't come up during the campaign in 1968. It
came up directly after the election, if this is an area which you want
me to get into. It is post the election. It was the day that J. Edgar
Hoover and Mr. Helms came up to New York to the Pierre Hotel and
the President was interviewing his new personnel for his administra-
tion. There was a meeting with Mr. Hoover and I was present, because
although I was still protesting that I didn't want to become the Attor-
ney General, I think he still — ^that is, he, the President — still thought
that he wanted me to. So I was in the meeting with Mr. Hoover in
which Mr. Hoover advised the President that the land lines of his
plane and the Vice President's plane, somebody working in the cam-
paign here in Washington, and another embassy had been bugged
during the campaign.
Senator Gurnet. In 1968 ?
Mr. Mitchell. This is in 1968, in the election
Senator Gurnet. Well, the general thrust of my question, of course,
was to find out if the President had any concern about bugging, elec-
tronic surveillance, or dirty tricks in the upcoming 1972 campaign.
1668
I suppose if he had, he ought to have discu^ed it with you, the No. 1
campaign director?
Mr. Mitchell. No, Senator, I believe that the conversations went
more to the security of the buildings and the personnel than they did
electronic surveillance. Obviously, we did have and we discussed from
time to time the necessity of sweeping for a determination of whether
there was electronic surveillance of the sensitive areas within the cam-
paign headquarters. But, of course, as far as the President was con-
cerned, this was always done by the Secret Service and that was not
so much a concern on his part as far as he personally was involved, but
just to make sure that we did have good security in connection with
our campaign activities.
Senator Gtjrney. And that, I guess, is one of the reasons why Mr.
McCord was on board ; is that correct ?
Mr. Mitchell. There is no question about that, sir, and no question
about the fact that there were constant sweeps of the building at 1701
and the installation of in-house television so that they could watch
corridors and so forth.
Senator Gubney. Some of these matters I am going to touch on have
obviously been touched on before, but I will try only to bring up
things, perhaps, that were not mentioned or perhaps should be men-
tioned a little more fully.
Going to the March meeting at Key Biscayne with Magruder, was
LaRue present all the time during these discussions with Magruder ?
Mr. Mitchell. That would be my belief. Senator. I know that Mr.
Magruder's testimony is to the contrary, but I might help if I explain
the circumstances.
It is rather a large house. It was built as a one-family house and
then the fellow who owned it inherited a mother- and father-in-law
to come to live with him, so he built a second wing on it was a complete
operation down there and a large Florida room, which had two tele-
phones in the room. So I think Magruder's statement was that LaRue
was in and out of the room from time to time and so forth. Well, if
he was in and out of the room, he must have had very weak kidneys,
because there were certainly enough telephones in there to take care of
without leaving the room.
Senator Gurney. "Wliat was LaRue's job at this time with you ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, he had been — Fred LaRue had been at the
Committee for the Re-Election of the President for quite a few
months and he was what you, I presume, would call a special assistant,
although until we got the place organized over there, they never had
any titles, while I was there, until after I came aboard so that they
could be sorted out and put in the proper spots. I believe you would
call him a special assistant to me, and he was staying at the house on
Key Biscayne with us, so that he was there, not only at the meeting
that I had with Magruder, but also the one that I had the previous
day or the subsequent day, whichever it was, with Harry Flemming.
Senator Gtjrney. His mission on that occasion was to be your right-
hand man to help you out, is that the idea?
Mr. Mitchell. I would believe that to be the case, besides the fact
that he is awfully good company and delightful to have around.
1669
Senator Gurney. Do you recall whether he was present when these
electronic plans were discussed by Magruder?
Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, and I am quite sure
that I am correct that he was present and he did take part in the
discussion.
Senator Gttrney. Going to this Magruder meeting — I guess I should
say alleged meeting in view of your earlier testimony today — about
the Gemstone files. You mentioned that in the morning
Mr. Mitchell. Is the Gemstone file supposed to be the same as the
Mitchell file?
Senator Gurney. Well, the Gemstone files, of couree, involved in-
formation about the bugging — transcripts, things like that. And the
testimony, of course, previous here was that they had been put in the
Mitchell files and they had been brought to your attention by
Mr. Magruder. You testified this morning that it was supposed to have
occurred in the morning, this meeting with Magruder, in which he dis-
cussed the Gemstone files.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Magruder testified that it happened at the reg-
ular 8 :30 a.m. meeting.
Senator Gurney. That is right. And you also testified that your logs
showed that you had no meetings with Magruder when no one else was
present. That is what I wanted to nail down. Would you amplify that
again ?
Mr. Mitchell. What I am saying is during the period from what is
referred to as the first break-in, which was — and, of course, you got
mixed testimony on whether it took place on the 28th of May or the
30th of May — I do not know when it took place. Magruder said that
1 to 11/2 weeks thereafter, he came up to my office and show^ed me this
material and that I did not like it ; therefore, I called Mr. Liddy up
and I chewed Mr. Liddy out and told him to get moving. What I am
saying is that my logs do not show a meeting with Mr. Magruder dur-
ing the May period to the June 17 period in the morning that did not
have other people there for other business.
Secondly, I have testified, which happens to be the fact, that I never
saw or talked to Mr. Liddy from the 2d day of February until the 15th
day of June of 1972.
Senator Gurney. I recall that, and that leads me to the next ques-
tion, which I really am getting at which I think is the important ques-
tion. How were these logs prepared ? Who prepared them? How would
the committee know, for exam]:)le, that they are precisely accurate ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, what had happened, Senator, was that over
in the Justice Department, the secretaries that I had over there fol-
lowed the practice that was always handled in the Justice Depart-
ment— nobody got in the door without their being recorded. Nobody
made a telephone call in or out without them being recorded and it
records whether the call came in or out, whether you talked, or where
the call was placed. Much to my surprise, I found out later on, after
they came over with me to the law office in the Committee To Re-Elect
the President, they continued to do the same thing. I did not even know
they were doing it until after June 17, when we got talking about a lot
of these things and found out that they had continued to do this.
Senator Gurney. So your secretaries, after you went to the Commit-
tee To Re-Elect, were the same that you had in the Justice Depart-
1670
ment and they always followed this procedure of reporting everybody
who came in and phone calls in and out ?
Mr. Mitchell. My secretary, Miss Lee Jablonski, was the one who
continued to do that ; yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Going on to this
Mr. Mitchell. May I also add so that I will be fully responsive to
your question about this meeting, so-called, by Magruder, that I would
point out, and I think that it is very persuasive, at least from the way
I look at it, that when Dean met Liddy on June 18 — in other words,
this was the firet time that anybody had really ever talked to Liddy,
according to Mr. Dean's testimony, which is in the record — Mr. Liddy
complained to Mr. Dean that Magruder was the one that made him
go into the DNC the second time around, et cetera, et cetera. Now, if
Mitchell had called him up to the office, I am sure Liddy is not stupid
enough to try to hide behind INIagruder if he had Mitchell to hide
behind.
Senator Gurnet. Incidentally, on that point, Magruder pushing
Liddy to do this work over at the DNC, do you have any evidence
that Magruder in turn was pushed by anybody to push Liddy ?
Mr. Mitchell. No ; I do not. I tried to answer that before
Senator Gurnet. I know you touched on it.
Mr. Mitchell. Insofar as I have no personal knowledge of it. As I
say, the Dean statements and testimony is replete with who called
whom and who was afraid who was going to take over what and so
forth. And I have no personal laiowledge of it.
Senator Gurnet. Let me ask you this. Were there any instances
during the campaign, when you were the campaign director, where
Mr. Magruder went over your head, on his own, without your laiowl-
edge or without your direction ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I think you will find, and we must get the two
dates because Senator Talmadge, of course, has had me in one spot at
one period of time and I was officially campaign director for another
period of time. I think you will find that in the dirty tricks depart-
ment, I can give you one example that I cannot give you the details
of, but I know that it happened Avithout my knowledge. That was a
riot that they created up here on the steps of the Capitol that I had
no knowledge of and did not know that it was being funded. There
undoubtedly are others. I know that there were beforehand and I
presume that there were in between.
I can answer your question better after this committee gets through
with its dirty tricks investigation.
Senator Gurnet. Well, hopefully, we will find out about all those
things.
Do you know, and I think maybe I have asked this in another way,
but I do want to ask it again — do you know of any other instances
where Mr. INIagruder, or do you know of any instances where Mr.
Magruder may have been carrying out the instructions of anybody
else in connection with his duties at the committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes : I believe that you will prol)alily find that that
was the case in connection with this matter up here. I tliink that this
was directed out of the "Wliite House. I think you will find that there
are other similar activities, maybe not of the same magnitude or scope.
1671
Senator Gurney. In other words, I think there probably are in-
stances where he was directed by other people?
Mr. Mitchell. I think that perhaps "directed'* can be the word, or
it may be the point where they were working in concert on some of
these activities.
Senator Gueney. Let us go to the June 18 meeting if we may. You
talked about that. But mostly in connection with this business of
whether there was discussion on destroying the Gemstone files. I am
not interested in going over that again, but would you amplify your
explanation of what happened at that meeting?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, my recollection of the purpose for the
meeting was the fact that not only I but Mardian and LaRue, who
were pretty well up in the campaign by June 17, had been on a series
of events out in California on Saturday and Sunday and that we had
very little contact with what was going on back in Washington. We
were on the plane leaving out there at 10 :30 and getting back at some-
where around 7 :30 or 8 :00 o'clock at night. "Wliat we were concerned
of was to find out what was going on in the press, because there, as you
know, was an inordinate blast from the Democratic side, and, of course,
for the next 3 months, all we did was answer charges and counter-
charges with respect to the subject matter. So that to the best of my
recollection, the meeting was for the purpose of reviewing what had
developed in the case that we did not know about in our transit, who
had been identified in connection with it, and I do not believe that as
of June 18, there had been any other identification other than the five
that had been arrested in the Watergate ; how we were going to respond
to the Democratic charges with respect to our position, because obvi-
ously, the security officer of the Committee To Re-Elect the Pres-
ident had been arrested; and where we were going to go from here.
Coming back on the plane with Mardian and LaRue, I discussed the
concept that we needed an investigation which they should undertake
in connection with the committee, which they did undertake.
Now, there seems to be a difference of opinion as to whether or not,
by the time we had gotten back on the night of June 18, as to whether
or not the Democrats had threatened to sue and we were talking about
lawyers. To the best of my recollection, that came later, altliough in
trying to reconstiiict what happened at that, there has been some
thought that lawyers for the committee were considered at that
meeting. But to my knowledge or recollection, it came at a later date.
Senator Gukney. Dean testified before the committee that when he
got into this whole Watergate affair, and you will recall that he was
out in the Philippine Islands, I think, and returning
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Senator Gurney. That this occurred — that the coverup had already
begun. My recollection of the first important meeting that he had with
anybody was this June 19 meeting.
Mr. Mitchell No sir.
Senator Gurney. Was there any discussion of the coverup at this
meeting ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; Senator, let me go back and refresh your
recollection of Mr. Dean's testimony, and I am sure these gentlemen
here can correct me if I am wrong on the general subject matter. Mr.
1672
Dean said that by the time that he came to my apartment to the June
19 meeting, the coverup had ah-eady begn^m, be^^aiise we had — and I
am just quoting Mr. Dean- — he had met with Liddy, he had met with
Magruder, he had met with Strachan and been advised that they
had destroyed documents. He said he had met with Ehrlichman and
Colson and that they were trying to get Hunt out of the country. I
am not vouching for these as facts. I am just telling you what Dean
said that he did that day, in which he came to the conclusion that
the coverup had already started by the time he got to the meeting of
the 19th.
He also testified that he did not discuss any of those subject matters
with us at the meeting in my apartment on the 19th.
Senator GuRisrEY. Were any specific instructions given at that
meeting to anybody?
Mr. MrrcHELL. No ; because I don't think we had anything to pro-
vide specific instructions for. I think what we were really looking
at was what was the PR aspects of it, where were we going to be hit
next with another broadside, and how we were going to respond to
it. And of course, you did that from day to day as the UPI and the
AP carried the stories.
Senator Gurnet. Incidentally, why do you think Dean was there
at the meeting?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't know. In trying to reconstruct that in my
mind — because I had completely forgotten about the meeting until the
testimony — I would have believed that somebody — it was not me, but
it was probably that Bob Mardian, or it could have been Fred LaRue —
we were flying back in an aircraft that needed an interim stop, as I
recall — probably called ahead to the office and said, get so-and-so so
we can find out what is going on in connection with this.
Senator Gurnet. Turning to the coverup payments now, I think
we have already discussed this business about the supposed meeting
where you thought that somebody ought to get in touch with Kalm-
bach to raise tlie money for the coverup, and you have denied that
this took place. Is that correct?
Mr. Mitchell. I specifically deny this with respect to the so-called
meeting of June 28, in which Dean puts it in a sequence on June 28,
where the CIA thing flops and then there is a meeting with Mardian,
LaRue, Dean, and myself, and I say to Dean, you go get somebody in
the White House to call Kalmbach. I tell you that that meeting didn't
happen, because I was in New York.
Senator Gurnet. Was there any other meeting where that occurred,
or something like that occurred?
Mr. Mitchell. No; there has been a question here today as to
whether or not I had a meeting on January 19, w^hich would have
been the eve of the inauguration, with Dean and Kalmbach in which
Kalmbach was asked to re-enter the fundraising activities. I have
no recollection of that whatsoever. And as T paid before, the way
that Kalmbach excited from fundraising activities due to his no-
toriety, I would have found it very difficult for me to suggest that he
get back into it.
Senator Gurnet. Do you have any personal knowledge about the
coverup money, how it was raised, by whom, who paid it ?
1673
Mr, Mitchell. I have — well, let me see if I can answer all of your
questions. First of all, I have never met with any of the defendants,
I have never talked to any of them, I have never talked to any of their
lawyers except Maroiilis on that occasion that I have mentioned. I
have never handled any negotiations in connection with it. I have
never even seen until I have seen the exhibits here the letters that —
letter or letters — that were written by Hunt.
Starting at the beginning of it, which I understand to be the begin-
ning of it, which was the Kahnbach activity that resulted from the
telephone call to him on the 28th, where the meetings were held on the
29th at the hotel that I hope you have finally gotten straightened out —
I didn't know that that money had been passed over by Mr. Stans to
Kahnbach until I heard his testimony, or read his testimony on the
subject matter. I didn't know that.
I did know that somewhere along the way, there had been money
transferred to Fred LaRue out of. and I forget the testimony on it,
but I am sure it is here. This is the amount of money that Mr. Stans,
I think, said was turned over to LaRue by Sloan and Stans at the ad-
vice of Mardian or LaRue or something.
Senator Gurney. But you found out this later in the testimony
before this committee ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I found it out later, as these things unfolded.
Senator Gurney. Well, I am talking about, now, in June and July,
when a lot of these money-raising activities and payments took place.
You have no personal knowledge about that?
iNIr. Mitchell. I have no personal knowledge about the raising of
them or the distribution of them or who was receiving them or how
they were received.
I must go back to point out that in the Liddy-Mardian-LaRue de-
briefing, Liddy said that he thought that it was right or whatever
phrase he used that the committee help him get bail to get these peo-
ple out of jail. That was turned down flat cold out.
Senator Gurney. Let's turn to this Executive clemency thing,
which of course, is important, because the only person who can offer
that is the President. There was testimony by Dean that you had
instructed him to offer to McCord. "Wliat about that testimony ?
Mr. Mitchell. AYell, that is, in my opinion, a complete fabrication,
because the negotiations with McCord started when I was out, entirely
out of the way. I was down in Florida. And this, of course, was the
thing that was handled through Caulfield. Except it was not Mitchell.
And I think if you look at Dean's total testimony, you will get to the
same conclusion that I have come to, that the only discussion of Execu-
tive clemency that I have ever heard about was during some time in
January, where Hunt was in a psychological state in which he made
demands on either Colson directly or through Bittman or whatever
it was with respect to the subject matter, and the word got back to me
from somebody— whether it was Dean or O'Brien or whoever it was —
that the only person that Hunt would take a commitment for Execu-
tive clemency from was from Colson. That is where it ended.
Senator Gurney. I recall your testimony on that. Of course, Dean
also testified that he had discussed at one time with the President, in
the President's office, and also in a conversation he had with Colson.
1674
Dean, I am talking about, Colson said he discussed it with the Presi-
dent. Did Dean ever discuss Executive clemency with you ?
Mr. Mitchell. Only to report the conversations of the dialog that
were going on between Colson, Hunt, and Bittman, and I do not know
what or the matter was
Senator Gurney. At no other time ?
Mr. Mitchell. At no other time.
Senator Gurney. And he has never mentioned the fact that he had
discussion with the President about it ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever discuss it with the President ?
Mr. Mitchell. Executive clemency ?
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I certainly did not, Senator. We have never gotten
into areas relating to the Watergate or the coverup or would bring any
such subject matter to the floor.
Senator Gurney. Do you think it might be reasonable to assume
if the President had been discussing this with anyone that he might
have touched base with you on it ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I do not know. That is quite an assumption. Of
course, I was now practicing law in New York and did not see him
as often as I had in the past and talk to him as often but I would think
that before he got into this area it is quite conceivable that he would
because I know that in his proper analogy when it came to the point of
the problem of Executive clemency in connection with the meeting of
March 22 he asked them if he would come down and talk to them about
it, this is the best answer I can give you on the subject matter.
Senator Gurney. You mentioned just now that you, of course, had
talked to the President on a number of occasions and perhaps this is the
proper time to turn to these. The logs from the President's office show a
number of times that you did have conversations with the President.
I think the very first one has already been discussed in the exchange you
had with Senator Talmadge, that is the June 20 one and we do not have
to go over that one again.
There was a meeting on June 30 in the President's Executive Office
Building with Haldeman present. I presume that means that the
President and Haldeman and you were present. Do you recall that
meeting ?
Mr. Mitchell. I recall it very well.
Senator Gurney. What was discussed ?
Mr. Mitchell. It was a luncheon meeting at which my resignation
was discussed and finally accepted and in which we discussed a suc-
cessor.
Senator Gurney. And that was the only subject at that meeting ?
Mr. Mitchell. That was the only subject of that meeting, to my
knowledge.
Senator Gurney. On July 1, there was a phone call from the Presi-
dent from San Clemente to you in Washington. Could you give us the
substance of that phone call ?
Mr. MiTCHEiJ.. July 1 was the date upon which the announcement
was made of mv resignation, and we had agreed that certain people
would be called by certain people. For instance, I would call Governor
1675
Rockefeller, Governor Eeagan and so forth, on down the line. This
meeting, as yon know, lasted for quite a while because it was the day
of the announcement and the President spent quite a period of time, as
I recall, talking with my wife on the telephone trying to pep her up
and tell her the world had not ended.
Senator Gtjrney. Yes. that was a 23-minute talk, as I see here.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Was Watergate discussed at all ?
Mr. Mitchell. Not to my recollection. Senator, and I am quite sure
that it would not have been.
Senator Gurney. On July 11, there was a very short call here, it says
12 :48 to 12 :49.
Mr. Mitchell. 12 :43 to 49, as I understand it. Senator.
Senator Gurney. "V-SHiat is that?
Mr. Mitchell. 12 :43 to 12 :49.
Senator Gurney. This sheet says 12 :48 but I will take your advice.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, mine came from the White House
so it could quite possibly be screwed up. [Laughter.]
Senator Gurney. Touche.
Mr. Mitchell. As a matter of fact, I think the covering letter was
signed by Mr. Buzhardt.
Senator Gurney. Anyway, it says that the President called San
Clemente to Mitchell in Washington. What was that about?
Mr. Mitchell. We are talking about the July 11 conversation?
Senator Gurney. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, it was a conversation
we had concerning when the President would do something concretely
about the Vice President. You remember this was just before, as I re-
call, the Democratic National Convention that was held shortly there-
after, and the President had, I believe, according to the conversation
that I remember, pretty well come to the conclusion about two things.
No. 1, that he was being shot at from the Javitses and Perc3''s, and so
forth about the Vice President — maybe not Percy, but some of the
people in the party were shooting at him about continuing the Vice
President, and yet at the same time that it did not look like it would
be a feasible thing to announce his preference for the Vice Presidency
right on the eve of the Democratic National Committee, and this is the
conversation that I remember took place in that time frame. And it
brings to mind the fact that at the next meeting that is shown there is
shown with the Vice President, Mr. Haldeman in the President's office
where the announcement had previously, I think, been made or was
about to be made and there was quite a discussion of the part that the
President was to play in the campaign.
Senator Gurney. This is the July 27 meeting you are talking about
with Haldeman and Harlow ?
Mr. Mitchell. No ; it is the July 21 meeting.
Senator Gurney. I mean the July 21 meeting, and the Vice President
came in during that meeting, is that correct ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. But at neither of these me^ings, July 11 or
July 21, was Watergate discussed, is that correct ?
Mr. Mitchell. Absolutely, sir.
1676
Senator Gurney. Then, the next meeting is the one that I skip to,
July 27 at the navy yard with Haldeman, and Harlow, and Mac-
Gregor.
Mr. Mitchell. This, as I recall, was a dinner discussion of politics
on the Sequoia because of the reference to the navy yard and the time
frame and it was a general discussion of politics, had nothing to do
with tlie Watergate and coverup.
Senator Gurney. The next log reference is August 1, a morning
telephone call from the President to you. Do you recall the substance
of that call ?
Mr. Mitchell. No. This is one of the couple here that I have no
recollection of what the call may be. It could be in connection with the
upcoming convention, but I have no recollection of the nature of that
conversation.
Senator Giteney. And then, on August 4 through August 6, it says
that you were a guest of the President at Assateague Island. Do you
recall what occurred there or did anything occur about Watergate
there?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, there is nothing occurred on Watergate. It was
a purely social occasion. As I testified this morning, I do have a very
distinct recollection that this was the particular time and event when
Senator McGovern became a thousand percenter that Senator Eagle-
ton was not going to be with them and they were selecting a new Vice
President. During that weekend we had quite a number of discussions
about that subject matter. That was the topic of it but I do not recall
discussing anything relating to Watergate.
Senator Gueney. There were meetings on August 14 in the oval
office, Haldeman was present, part of the time or I guess all of the time
and MacGregor was present part of the time. What were those discus-
sions about ?
Mr. Mitchell. Tliey were about the campaign, the 1972 campaign,
and unrelated to the Watergate or anything else that might have to do
with it.
Senator Gurney. And on August 25 there was a call from San
Clemente from the President to you here in Washington in the morn-
ing. Do you recall what that was about ?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't know whether it was this one or the earlier
one but as I think I testified this morning, and I have a reasonably
good recollection that the President and I discussed during this pre-
Republican convention activity and probably by telephone, according
to my i-ecolleotion, the problem the Rules Committee was having down
there with respect to the representation of the various factors in the
1976 convention. As you recall there was quite 'an active ongoing ques-
tion that covered lots of areas of the party, and I believe I have a recol-
lection of talking to him on the telephone on that subject matter.
Senator Gitrney. On September 13, there was a meeting in Camp
David with the President. Besides yours, Mr. MacGregor was there,
and Mr. Connally, and Mr. Haldeman. Do you recall what the subject
of those meetings was ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, this had to do entirely with the political cam-
paign, the political campaign and the scheduling of the President.
I might say here that, which I think I mentioned this morning, at
one of these meetings, and I remember particularly that Senator Con-
1677
nally was there — not Senator Connally, Governor, Secretary Connally
was there — ^that we discussed the Watergate to the extent of the
desirability of the President appointing a commission such as the
Warren Commission, to investigate it or a Special Prosecutor, et cetera,
and I believe it was the unanimous opinion that the appropriate thing
to do was to let the normal courses of justice take its place.
Senator Gtjrney. On September 26 there was a meeting between
you and the President and it says Waldorf Astoria, I presume that was
in New York, and then also that was an afternoon meeting and there
was also an evening meeting between you and the President in New
York, Haldeman was present at that occasion, and then a dinner later
on at the Waldorf.
What about these meetings ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the sequence is that the President met at the
first meeting at 4 :30 to 4 :42 with the parties that are designated here,
including Mr. Max Fisher and myself, and then we moved from that
to a meeting with some distinguished citizens of the Jewish community
and went on to an affair in the same hotel where Nelson Rockefeller
had all of his political personnel, and came from there back to the
President's suite which shows that the President, Mr. Haldeman, and
myself were there from 6 :24 to 6 :42 and, to the best of my recollection,
all we discussed were the activities that had gone on that afternoon
and what impact they had had with what particular people and what
was going to happen that particular night where he had to make a
speech in the building in connection with the Salute to the President's
dinner.
Senator Gtirney. On October 6 there was a meeting in the Oval
Office with the President. At that meeting besides yourself there was
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, MacGregor, Dole, and Harlow. What was that
meeting all about ?
Mr. Mitchell. Entirely, to my recollection, all of these meetings that
I was attending at this particular time, because I was then residing in
New York, that I would come down and sit in on these political meet-
ings, and I am sure if Senator Dole was there that obviously had
something to do with it.
Senator Gukney. In connection with the campaign ?
Mr. Mitchell. With the campaign.
Senator Gurnet. That would be true of the meeting of October 17,
too.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes sir. And 26th.
Senator Gurnet. And 24th
Mr. Mitchell. Twenty-fourth, rather.
Senator Gurnet [continuing]. It says here.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir ; the 24th.
Senator Gltrnet. Now then, on November 6 there was a phone call
to you around 1 o'clock in the afternoon. Do you know what that was
about ?
Mr. Mitchell. November 6 was the day before the election, and I
remember the call quite well even though it was very short. The Presi-
dent and I were exchanging guesstimates as to how many States he
would carry.
Senator Gurnet. And on November 24 there was a meeting in New
York at your law office ?
1678
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Two meetings, I take it here, some people were in
one meeting and some other people were in another meeting?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. "What were these about?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the President decided that he would call, stop
in and call, and see the people that he had worked with for quite a
number of years at the law firm and, as it indicates here, at least on
the sheet that I have, that he met with the senior partners for a period
of time. He also met with the junior partners, and then he spoke to
the entire staff of the law firm, some 400 people.
Senator Gurney. And on that day did you have any discussion with
him about Watergate at all ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; the prime discussion was in the smaller
group that involved the partners of the firm, dealt entirely w4th some
of the thoughts that he then had that early about the reorganization of
the Government.
Senator Gurney. I expect probably the next one is almost self-
evident, a call on December 25, was that about Christmas?
Mr. Mitchell. No question about it ; yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. And on March 2, the last one here on the White
House logs shows a meeting in the Executive Office Building with the
President and Dean and Ehrlichman and Haldeman. March 22 I guess
it is.
Mr. Mitchell. March 22 ?
Senator Gurney. It's listed as the 2d at first and then there is an-
other 2 here. I guess that's been thoroughly discussed already.
Mr. Mitchell. It, as you refer to it, it has, had, to do with Water-
gate but it had to do with this committee and the stance of the Presi-
dent with respect to it and particularly with respect to executive privi-
lege. Counsel tells me that some time back along the way I used the
words "Executive clemency" when I should have used "executive priv-
ilege." I do know the distinction and I hope somebody can correct
the record.
Senator Git^ney. In these various meetings did the President ever
bring up to you at any time the coveiiip business that was going on in
Watergate ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. I am thoroughly convinced that the Presi-
dent was not aware of it.
Senatoi- Gurney. And I hesitate to use this word "impression" but
it certainly has been used often enough in these hearings.
Did you ever get any impression that the President had any knowl-
edge of the coverup of Watergate ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. It was quite the contrary.
Senator Gurney. One other question, Mr. Mitchell, here about the
FBI reports. There was testimony about a meeting of June 24, this
was a meeting of you and Magruder and Mardian and Dean. Dean
testifies that you suggested it would be helpful to see FBI reports.
Can you shed any light on that?
Mr. Mitchell. This was his testimony at a meeting of June 24?
Senator Gurney. Yes, that is right.
1679
Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection of the discussion of nnything
at that meeting of June 24 except this problem that we had vvith re-
spect to trvdng to iron out, this was the Saturday that I was talking
about, trying to iron out the problems we had in the discrepancies be-
tween Magruder and Sloan that substantially all the day was spent
on that subject matter other than the conversation that I had with
Mr. Stans later on.
Senator Gurney. I would like to go over just one other meeting
here.
Mr. Mitchell. Counsel, I think, makes a veiy good point, and I am
sorry that I didn't think of it, that there might not even have been
FBI reports by the 24th of June. I don't know when they started in-
terviewing people.
Senator Gurney. Well, that may well be. Of course, we can
Mr. Mitchell. Let me say in connection with that Mr. Dean also
said that I asked to see his, I guess he called it a summary and so
forth, and he showed it to me, and then he testified he never took the
documents out of his office, and I have never been in Mr. Dean's office
and I have never seen the summary from the FBI so while we are on
the FBI reports I thought I might give you at least the sequence, and
I think that Mr. Dean testified that he did not receive FBI reports
until sometime in July. Now, whether it was July 23 or 31 or some-
time but it was well on into July, so I don't see how they could have
been discussed back on the 24th of June.
Senator Gurney. Well, we certainly can check out the FBI records
on that. You may well have a point there.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. It might be a good idea to take the fingerprints off
them and find out who did see them.
Senator Gurney. Thanks for that suggestion. [Laughter.] If they
are still there.
Just one other area of inquiry : You had a rather long meeting with
Mr. Dean in your law office. This memorandum which Mr. Dean
prepared says April 10 but I don't think that is the exact date.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I believe it is. Senator; I believe it was
April 10.
Senator Gurney. Anyway that is the meeting I am talking about.
Mr. Mitchell. This is the one where Mr. Dean lays out all of his
options.
Senator Gurney. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Including to go to South America or wherever it was
he was going to go.
Senator Gurney. Well, that I think is the meeting we are talking
about. His memorandum says that he talked about the fifth amend-
ment. "I told him that would not only hurt me personally but also
hurt the President."
Did he discuss that with you ?
Mr. Mitchell. The fiftli amendment ?
Senator Gurney. Taking the fifth amendment.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, he did ; yes, he did.
Senator Gurney. Was that pretty much the discussion that you had
with him ?
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 22
1680
Mr. Mitchell. As best I can recall it. The only thing that disturbs
me about that meeting was that the prosecutors wanted him to tape it
and I wish the hell he had so we would have an accurate description
of what took place, not just his recollection.
Senator Gukney. He also said he talked about the lawyer-client
privilege. I suppose that was in matters discussed between him and
the President ?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, excuse me, Senator, for interrupting, but at
that particular time they were all subject matters being quite widely
debated in the press as well as his individual problems.
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. And, of course, by that time he had long since gone
to counsel and to the prosecutors, so that he was pretty well advised
on this, on not only his options but as to how he should, I am sure,
present them.
Senator Gurney. Well, why do you think he spent all this time talk-
ing about these things with you ? Can you give your version of what
this meeting was all about ?
Mr. Mitchell. What the version of the meeting ?
Senator Gueney. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think the memorandum outside of a few
little self-serving vignettes about it, I think currently did set forth
what the circumstances were. I was going to be in Washington, of
course, John Dean and I had discussed this matter over very, very
many, many months, and I think that he was coming to tell me, with-
out telling me he had gone to the prosecutors, et cetera, that he had
come to the end of the road and these were his options, and he was
going to have to take one of them.
Senator Gurney. Who requested the meeting ?
Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall, Senator.
Senator Gurney. He indicates that you had requested the meeting.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall liis testimony in that respect. It may
very well be that I was to be in Washington and see him and be
brought up under current developments in connection with the mat-
ter. As you know, this followed the March 22 meeting and the March
28 meeting that we had had.
Senator Gurney. The memorandum starts out here, "Mitchell had
called the day before requesting that. I meet with him in Washington.
Ehrlichman and Haldeman both told me I should meet with him to tell
him that I would be going before the grand jury. Accordingly I agi'eed
on the meeting after having been advised by counsel."
That is his version of that.
- Mr. Mitchell. Pardon ?
Senator Gurney. That is his version of it, of who called the meeting.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, as I say I have no recollection of who called
it, I am perfectly willing to accept it on that basis. There wouldn't
be anything unique about my going to Washington to see John Dean
under these circumstances even though they had progressed to this
point because obviously he had done a lot of things that I was com-
pletely unaware of until some of them even came out in tliis meeting.
Senator Gurney. Just one final question, ]\Ir. INIitcliell. When do
you think the President found out about Watergate and the coverup ?
1681
Mr. Mitchell. I haven't any idea. Senator. I haven't any idea at
all. If I had to speculate, I would speculate that he probably found
out alx)ut the coverup when he talked to the people in the Govern-
ment and got the true story out of the people in Government,
Senator Gurxey. This would be in what time frame ?
Mr, INIiTCHELL, I haven't any idea, I wasn't involved in it, I just
haven't discussed it with him or with the people in Government,
Senator Gurney. Thank you very much, Mr. Mitchell.
I have no more questions.
Senator Er\t:n. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock
tomorrow morning.
[Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Wednesday, July 11, 1973.]
1682
EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Exhibit No. 44
(A) To accomplish: Make IRS politically responsive. Democrat
Administrations have discreetly used IRS inost effectively.
We have been unable.
(B) The Problem: Lack of guts and effort. The Republican r
appointees appear afraid and unwilling to do anything with
IRS that could be politically helpful. For example:
-- We have been unable to crack down on the JJ>
multitude of tax exempt foundations that
feed left wing political causes.
, ;, • ■ \ -- We hav^ been unable to obtain information
. .! ^ in the possession of IRS regarding our
;■• political enemies.
-- We have been unable to stimulate audits of
persons wiio should be auditc(^.
-- We have been unsuccessful in placing RN
■ji' ■:.; . supporters in the IRS bureaucracy.
(C) HRH should tell the Sec. -{
Walters must be more responsive, in two key areas: ,
personnel and political actions.
First, Walters should make personnel changes to maVTe IRS
responsive to the President. Walters should- work with "Pred MaleK
irr^mediately to accomplish this goal. (NOTE: There will be an
opening for a General Coimscl of IRS in the near future -- this
should be a first test of Walters' cooperation).
Second, Walters should be told that discreet political action
and investigations are a firm requirenient and responsibility on'.
his part. John Dean should have direct access to Walters, . ,,
without Treasury clearance, for purposes of the White House. •.*
Walters should understand that when a request comes to him, _• "
it is his responsibility to accomplish it - - without the White House •
having to tell him liow to do itl
1683
I.R.S. TALKING PAPER
BACKGROUND
a) TKE BURE.\UCRACY
I.R.S. is a monstrous bureaucracy, which is dominated and
controlled by Democrats. The I.R.S. bureaucracy has been
unresponsive and insensitive to both the White House and
Treasury in many areas.
In brief, the lack of key Republican bureaucrats at high levels
precludes the initiation of policies which would be proper
and politically advantageous. Practically 'Cveiy effort to
proceed in sensitive areas is met with resistance, delay and
the threat of derogatory exposure.
B) aeministration appointees
Randolph Thrower became a total captive of the democratic
assistant commissioners. In the end, he was actively fightings ;■
both Treasury and the V/hite House. ^
Johnnie Walters has not yet exercised leadership. Unevaluated
reports a'ssert he has been either reluctant or unwilling to do
so.
Walters has appointed as his deputy, William Loeb, career democrat
from Georgia. Loeb has asserted his democratic credentials in ■
staff meetings according to reliable sources.
1684
I.R.S. Talking Paper
Page .two
Walters appears oversensitive in his concern that I.R.S.
might be labelled "political" if he moves in sensitive areas
(e.g. audits, tax exemptions).
During the Democrat Administrationsj I.R.S. was used discreetly
for political purposes, but this has been unavailable during
this Administration .
SUGGESTIONS
Walters should be told to make the changes in personnel and
policy v/hich will give the Administration semblance of
control over the hostile bui^eaucracy of I.R.S. Malek
should supply recommendations.
Walters must be made to know that discreet political actions
and. investigations on behalf of the Administration are a firm
requirement and responsibility on his part.
VJe should have direct access to Walters for action in the sensitive
areas and should not have to clear thera v:ith Treasury.
Dean should have access and assurance that Walters will get
the job done - properly.'
1685
A knowledgeable source at IRS was contacted and given a hypo-
thetical situation in which the White House made a request
for an IRS audit of a group of specific individuals having
the same occupation. This source advised that IRS procedures
would require that such request be handled by Assistant
Commissioner Donald Bacon.
It is known that Bacon is a liberal Democrat holdover who
has been continually identified with anti-Nixon intrigues
at IRS within the past two years.
The source suggested that a priority target be established
within the group with preference given to one residing in
the New York area. He further stated such target could dis-
creetly be made subject to IRS audit without the clear hazard
for a leak traceable to the Wliite House as postured above.
1686
Exhibit No. 45
the white house
WAS H I NGTON
E^tS
mv^
EYES ONLY June 12. 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSOnJ,^
I have received a well informed tip that there are income
tax discrepancies involving the returns of Harold J. Gibbons;
a Vice President of the Teamsters Union in St. Loujs. , This
has come to me on very, very good authority. ■. ;,.■,■■: •'■
Gibbons, you shovild know, is an all out enerpny, a McGovernite,
ardently anti-Nixon. He is one of the 3 labor leaders who
w^ere recently invited to Hanoi. ,
Please see if this one can be started on at once and if there
is an informer's fee, let me know. There is a good- cause
at which it can be donated.
1687
ExmBiT No. 46
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTO N
November 17, 1972
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
JOHN DEAN
CHARLES COLSO
^
I have received from an informer some interesting information
on Jack Anderson, including a report that Jack Anderson was
found in a room with wiretap equipment and a private investigator
in connection with the Dodd investigation. Anderson, according
to my source, had the wiretap equipment supplied to him by a
Washington, D. C. man.
According to the same source, Anderson and Drew Pearson
were paid $100, 000 in 1958 by Batista to write favorable articles
about the former Cuban dictator. In 1961 Anderson wrote several
very favorable articles on Fidel Castro. Fredo de La Campo,
Batista's Under Secretary of State, sent Anderson a telegram
saying "I hope you were paid well, as well for the Castro articles
as you were for the Batista articles". My source has a copy of
the telegram.
You know my personal feelings about Jack Anderson. After
his incredibly sloppy and malicious reporting on Eagleton, his
credibility has diininished. It now appears as if we have the
opportunity to destroy it. Do you agree that we should pursue
this actively ?
EYES ONLY
1688
EXfflBIT No. 47
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTON
August 12, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR JOM W. DEAN,
FROM: .. ; JACK CAULFIELD
SUBJECT: . OPPOSITION ACTIV'
Consistent with your recommendation, I have verbally asked
Lyn Nofzigerto come up with a candidate to assist in this
project.
1689
Exhibit No. 48
August 16» 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEH^ORANDUM
SVBlCCTt Dealing ^srith our PoUticRl Enemiea
This znetnoroodiun Addresses the matter of how wo coo ma^imti^^o ' V
the fact of our iQcumbency in dealing with parsoBG laxoNii^^a to ho
active in their opposition to our Admialctiatiout Stated a hii
tooi'0 biuBtly -- how wo can use the available federal tnachiuG)?7 . ,^>
to screw our political enemies.
After revlovrlng this matter with a number of pereona poascucod
cf ezpertiao in the field* I have concluded that wp do not &eed aa •
elaborate mechonlem or game plan» rather we need a good project '
coordinator and full support for the project. In brief, tho cystcxn
would work as follows t
•«> Key- members of the stall (e»g. , Colson, Dent Flanl3aa«
Buchanan) should be requested to inform us as to who
they feel we should be giving a hard time.
• * The project coordinator should then determino what
florts of dealings these individuals have with tbo
iedaral government and how we can best screw thesi
*• (e»E»» grant availability, federal contracts, Utigatloa^^ ^
prosecution, etc).
•- The project coordinator then should have accesa to
and the full support of the top officials of the agency .
or department in proceeding to deal with the lodividual*
1690
X have learn&d that there have been man/ efforts in the ps^sl to
take 8uch acWojao, but thay have ultlinat>ily failed --in moot
CaSo3 •• bocauoa of lack of support at the top^ Of all tlio^a
I havo 41acviBa6d thle matter with, Lyu Nofiigoi* uppoavu th«
moot kaov/ledj];Ciabl^ and most iiat^rcotyd. il Lya had ouppiivt
ho would eajoy undortakia^ thio activity aa tho project coordlsaator.
You aro aware of sonio of Lya'o ouccesoeo in tho field, but ho
{qq\q that ho can only employ limited edoxia because thoro io
a lack of support.
y^p a aesrt stop* I would recommend that we develop a Bra,aU
list of laamoQ •- not more than ton -- ae our targota for
coacontratiocu Requoet that Lya "do a Job" on them and If
ho fiade ho io getting cut off by a departmci\t or aconcy, that
ho inform us and wa evaluate what io noceocary to proceod.
X ^eol it io important that wa keep our targcta-^liiviited for
covai'al reaconsi (1) a low violbility of the project ia impopa«
tlvoj (2) ift will be easier to accoiYipUo^ eomethliig real il vro
don*6 over'es^pand our efXortaj and (3) we can learn more about
how to operata auch en activity if we start email and build.
Approve ____________
Dleopprove _
Comment
1691
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 16, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: Marge Acker
Pat Buchanan
ohn Dean
Dan Kingsley
Gordon Strachen
Van Shumway
Jerry Warren
Lucy Winchester
Larry Higby
SUBJECT: OPPONENTS LIST
Please remove Raymond Cues from your copy of the Opponents List.
He appears on the page entitled, " Dennocrat Contributors of $25, 000
or More in 1968 Campaigns". \
^
Joanne L, Gordon
1692
ExraBiT No. 49
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTO N
EYES ONLY
September 9, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
Wi[Z^"
I have checked in blue those to whom I would give top
priority. You might want to check someone else al-
though I think you will find this is a pretty good list.
Right on!
1693
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 24, 1971
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
yfoHN DEAN
JERRY WARREN
VAN SHUMWAY
SUBJECT:
OPPONENTS LIST
Attacked is the list of opponents which we have compiled.
I thought it would be useful to you from time to time.
George TA Bell
1694
SUBJECT: OPPONENT PRIORITY ACTIVITY
Havinf; stuv-iled tht rttachocl. rrt-.terial and evaluated the
recoininendations Toi' tlia di3cussed action, I believe you
vriLll find my lirt i;orthv.'hile for go ctatus. It is In
priority order.
1. PICKlTi, AIvKOLD M. . y
United Artiylo Corporation 1/
929 7th Avenue
New York. II. Y.
Top Muskle fundraiser. Success here could be both
debilitating and veiy embarras.oing to the Muskie nachine.
If effort lool;s proir,iGir.(3, both Ruth and David Picl.er should
be procraimned and tlien a folloAr-throuch with United Artists.
2. BARKAN, ALEX./\KDER E.
National Director of AFL-CIO's Committee on Political
Education
V/ashincton, D.C.
Without a .doubt the most po-./erful political force
progra.Tji.ed- against us in 19t'S. (■■lO million dollars, 'k6 million
votes, 115 million pamphlets, 17o,000 voi'kers - all programmed
by Barkan'3 C.O.P. E. - Co cayr. Tcdd;/ VTliitc in The I'aliing of
the President '68). V/e can expect the cam.e effort tliis time.
3. CUTIIf^AI^, ED
Managing Editor L. A. Times
Guthman, former Kenned^v aide, vas q highly sophisticated
hatchetman against us in '68. It is obvious he is the prime
mover behind the current Key Biscayne effort. It is time to
give him the mescage.
h. D.VME, MAXWELL
Doyle, Dane and Bernbach
New York
The top Democratic advertising firm - They destroyed
Goldvater in '6U. They sliould be hit hard starting with Dane.
5. CHARLES DYSON
Dyson-lCissner Corporation
New York
Dyson and Larry O'Brien were close business associates
after '68. Dyson has huge business holdings and is presently
deeply involved in the Businessmen's Educational Fund which
banTcrolls a national radio netv;ork of 5 minute programs - Anti-
Nixon in chai'acter.
/
1/
V
1/
1695
6. sThm, }io\i/vJ) 1/
Dreyl'us Corpomtion ^
New Yorl;
Heaviect coniributor to Mc Carthy in '68. If Mc Carthy
goes, will do tl^s car'.e in ''(2. If not, Lindsay or He Govern
will receive tlio funds.
7. LOV/E!IGTEli:, /J.LMID
Long Island, Nev York
Guidin^i force behind the 18 year old "dump Nixon"
vote drive.
10.
No coniments iiecessary
s. STEnr.Bv'G immo, jr.
Senator Jackson's AA
711 Lamberton Drive, Silver Spring, Md.
Ve should £;ive horn a try. Positive results vould stick
a pin in Jackson's vhite hat.
11. FELD, BERIJARD T.
President . ■
Council for a Livable V/orld
Heavy far left funding. They vill program an "all court
press" against us in '72.
12. DAVIDOFF, SIDIIEY
Nev.York City
Lindsay's top personal aide.
A first class S.O.B., wlieeler-dealcr and suspected bagman.
Positive results would really shake the Lindsay camp and
Lindsay's plans to capture youth vote. Davidoff jn chai'ge.
13. COIIYERS, JOHN
Congressman, Detroit
Coming on fast. Emerging as a leading black antl-Nlxon
spokesman, lias knovm weakness for white females.
v/
8. IIALPERIN, MOR-TOn
Leading executive at Cor.'mo'i Cause -v
A scandal vnuld be most helpful here.
9- WOODCOCK, IJiDnAPJ)
UAv; 1/
Det^'oit, Michigan '
1/
-*'
o - 73 - pt. 4 - 23
1696
li|. LAivlBERT, S.^UUEL M.
President
National Education Association
Has taken us on vis a vis' federal aid to parochial
schools - a ''(2 issue.
15. MOTT, STE",-JART RAl'rt.ING3
Mott Associates
New York
Nothing but big money for radic-lib candidates
16. DELEUMS, RONALD
Congressn-,ari, California
Had extensive i^K-Tunney support in his election bid.
Success might help in California next year.
17. SCHORR, DMIEL
Columbia Broadcasting System
Washington
A real media enemy.
18. S. HARRISON DOGOLE
2011 Walnut Street
Philadelphia^ Pa.
President of Globe Security Systems - Fourth largest private
detective agency in U. S. Heavy Huiaphrey contributor. Could
program his agency against us.
19. PAUL NEl'JMAN
California
■Radic-,Lib causes. Heavy Mc Carthy involvment '68. Used
effectively in nationwide T.V. commercials. '72 involvnent
cert^,in.
20. MC GRORY, MARY
2710 'Macomb Street, Vfeshington
. Columnist
Daily hate Nixon articles.
1697
EXfflBIT No. 50
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH INGTOi{M
September 14, 1971
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HIGBY
FROM: JOHN DEAN
Attached is the list of names you requested, as well as
additional materials containing othei: names.
The list I have prepared is merely suggestive; it is based
on conversations I have had with others regarding persons
who have both the desire and capability of harining us.
The list is limited to less than twenty persons, as it would
be most difficult to proceed with more at this time. I
.: ...would hope that we would continue to feed additional names
;? into the process every few months, but we must keep this .
l project within reasonable bounds.
I will await the review^ of these names -- as I feel certain
I. •■" there will probably be additions and deletions from the
list --before I take any action. Please keep the list at
twenty. or less.
1698
Eugene Carson Blake
Leonard Bernstein
Arnold Picker
Ed Guthman
Maxwell Dane
Charles Dyson
Howard Stein
AUard Lowenstein
Morton Halperin
Leonard Woodcock
Dan Schorr
Mary McGrory
Lloyd Cutler
Thomas Watson
Tom Wicker
CUrk Clifford
(per request)
(per request)
(United Artists Cor|j, - Top
Muskie fund raiser)
(Managing Editor, L. A. Times)
(Doyle, Dane &c Bernbach)
- s,
(Associate of Larry O'Brien
bankrolls anti-RN radio programs)
(Dreyfus Corp. - Big Demo cojitributQjr
(Pushing the Dump RN move with
young people)
(Top Executive - Common Cause)
(UAW)
(CBS) ■ ■ • .
(Principal force behind Common Cause
law suit against RNC, DNC, et al)
(Muskie backer - IBM)
(N. Y. TIMES)
1699
Exhibit No. 51
27
with the other Dems growing'.' It was ''bitter and
procative, " in RFK's style, not JFK's. Wannidlo; 3;-ys
the RN-EMK appearances at the POW relatives'
conclave may liave been the first "Nixoii-K^nuc*-i;
debate" of '7?.. RN was received much bei.cj--. .. .
Gerry Wills in Life and a New Republic rfc-.ijyyc^- Oa\
the Na%'asky book on RFK both reflect disillusion •■
over the ex-AG's civil liberties record, c-.3oecii,ally; ; '
as it relates to wire taps. And we learn RjJ'K did
much buddy-buddy work with the FBI in order . , . ,
to get power of his own. The book, saya the Nov/ ' ■ '■''■_
Republic , "pulls up short of saying that RFK drove
us far down the road to repression. "
National Observer's James Perry finds the chancer.-
for "the OklaTioma Ilay Bailer"lesB than they \/arc: £cv
the early Populists whom Fred Harris seeks to
einulate largely thru gimniickry and in a fashion
more reminiscent of RFK's "New Politics" effort to .
build a constituency to elect him rather than reaLly -;
develop a meaningful 3rd party coalition. . .'. Newsrve el;
reports the big Calif. Dem prinoary may not be • . ,. .:
so big after all if top Dems. there are succesoful in": ^ j
setting up a "unity" slate with Tunney as favorite son. ';
DNC Treasurer Robert Strauss is
tTtroug piubbUiL' to rufi ;^gainl;t Sen
MISCELLANY
pposedly under ,v
Tower and he .-^ . '''.
confirmed he is giving it serious thought. Larry O'BrUm"
however expressed confidence he wasn't going ^o lofLC
Strauss. . . . McCloskey compiled a perfect voting ' :
record last year on issues "central to the tradition Of
the GOP" according to Ripon. Coughlin, Gude and ■
Riegle also scored 100. Highest on the Senate list .
were Goodell (96), Case (92), Hatfield (91) and
Ribicoff (91). Rep. John McMillan was the only MC .
to receive a zero.
Earlier reports that the prayer amendment roiight ■
sail thru Congress may have been incorrect, reports
US News , as some MCs are concerned about the ,
bill's "vagueness" and "constitutional problenna, 'J ► •,•
According to National Observer, there's a new ^ausc-
1700
Exhibit No. 52
The White House
WASHINGTON
Date:
iln.
TO
FROM:
I GORDON STRACHAN
Partial list of "fat cats" attending Muskie weekend in Kennebunkport,
Maine, Sept. 11-12, 1971:
Edward Atkins
Bert Berinsky
Paul Brountas
Bill Brown
Joe Chapman
Sherrill Corwan
Norman Cousins
Gal Dal ton
Sen. Tom Eagleton, Mo.
Joe Filner
Harold Grant
Sen. Mike Gravel, Alaska
Stan Goldstein
Bill Goldberg
Jim Goodbody
Dr. Sanford Greenberg
John Guzey
Malcolm Hecht
Alex Hixon
Ralph Hoagland
Harold Jacobs
John Levi neon
Sen. Gale McGee, Wyoming
Bob Nelson
Arnold Picker
Ralph Pcmerance
Mike Rea
Eliot Robinson
Joe Si nay
Claude Spink
Bob Squier
Al Steinberg.
Martin Stone
Bunny Solomon
Peter Taroff
Dave Tillinghast
Lawrence Tisch
Jack Valenti
'Stanley Wasie
Mort Zuckerman
1701
Exhibit No. 53
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
October 26, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT :
JOHN DEAN
GORDON STRACHAN
Political Enemies
Lyn Nofziger sent the attached information on Chet Huntley
to Bob Haldeman. Since you have the action on the political
enemies project would you make a determination of what should
happen, advise Nofziger, and mention your decision to me?
Thank you.
1702
Co:
m-
;:aea
October 19, 1971
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM LYN NOFZIGER (^ \''{^
RE: Chet Huntlev
1. The State Cr.almia.-i of Montana tells rr.e Huntley claims to
be a Republican and will support and work for whatever
Republican runs agains": Senator Metcalf next yoar.
2. John Whita'cer has ordered the Department of Agriculture to
quit dragging its heels on "Big Sky", probably without any
knowledge of the above or of my own project,
I believe we should (check one):
1. Give Mr. Huntley all the help v/e can with the clear under-
standing that he reciprocate with help to us in Montana.
2. Continue along the course we have been following since
Mr. Huntley's intemperate remarks.
3. Same as #2 until we see how Mr. Huntley performs.
EYES ON
>■• I'
5* V> . >/ \
'/'
r
1703
Exhibit No. 54
the white house
WASH I NGTON
Administratively Confidential
November 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT :
JOHN DEAN
GORDON STRACHAN
J. Irwin Miller
You probably noticed in this morning's news summary
that J. Irwin Miller, "who is still giving money to
Democrat John Lindsay though he states he will support
RN and is also a backer of Lugar,". I trust you will
use this information as you see fit in the "enemies"
project.
^
1704
w'litMi lie lihi-i.'u.'lf s\igr;i>.stotl foi- tlie FccU^ral bench a
man "p.itcnMy noquaililud. " All the Dems aren't
anivscd liy EA/lK's OHcalnt cd arlivity, concludes Lasky ;,•
a; ])( qiioles one; who said: "I wouldn't want to bny a „ .}
\if.-cd i-.ii r from RN, l)nl: jf I did buy one, I sure as hell 'M
woiildn'l v/anl EKjI^ to drive it. " ;.
Ni vv'_Yor]c_noles tltnt I^indsay has been a rcjgular visitot**
to Indiana and t o ^^I^^h^^^^^J^jj^^jjjIij^j^j^stillgiWng
money to nr-m TVT. f}.r. ],o ^<-,^,to?; he wll] .snnnort. RN^ ■■.
p^n^\ is a)-:q n l-,;.rV.>v ,.f T ,,,v-,,^^ This may explain why* '^
J\'f.. r-f' sed lO canip.;hn for Lugar's Dem opponent »'
Vrat cil opj' \vjt]i fact (hal tht.; Dem candidate was ruiming
an ant) -b\i5;ing Cc-rnpaif.n. . . . New York's covei* sto'ry'^,
j;-; ahvnii: 32 ycoi- o]d i'd ilamJlton who came to 'NYC ^i
J"io;ii T(^' •.; 13 viioi'ill;?; ,-.;.^o and may be running'it by '' ^
Jai-.. 'V'3. Tlio s'-i>naij-) J*; Ihat JVI^ will begin his - .•'^.
c rmpa'p?,, Anrt.dJo wJU rcsij-.n to naanage JVL and f 3 •
llaiii'M' on (I'Mc^^ct oii^ otor) -vill become Acting' Maycir..
T lav)>.',i!')n ca'ilf h j.m-(. 1 f a 'i'c rjncdy liberal .'ind lie is^'.. "f"
rfj.;ardi-d r, s ".ibo-it ihe nrriarfcst man I've ever met!' '^
b^ T;i",T, MclNiionara, N.;];^oi' flo;;l:efener and Frank r
Maj-k i ( v> I cr.. Tv'.Yv Yor]; r;av3 ho is a virtuoao.- ■; " ■
Of;C'." Kiicluud Rappor-ort writes in Wathhigton MontljAT 'i
(h;>{ DvS polJtictal history can be seen as marked hy _;<v
"ciitical c-leclion;;" (thclc.st in '3Z) and '72 may woll''
be Hie n:->:t (^nc. As in ilu' other epochal elections, s'.
1h(-re is widespread dif sal i :■'. faction with tl»e rpajor phrtft"
ai.d a su'lir.t antja] drop Jn x^olei- turno\:l. Rappeport sCiV>1j^;
tlio iM;:reasii\;;ly ]a:roi- nuinbtvr of young, educated vvhU'^j^
joinj"; Don and Iho young, bhic-colTar v/bitcs; turning ■ "f'G
1o iUf CjOT-'. The inc-reatiod c^ducational level anaong :'■ .\t^*?
tlie. your.;; j.'ives 1 lu' D* rns a much larger "educat«?d.'p,>^^I
llu^n ihe GOP (ncr poffcf-'t'd and correspondingly the
v.-orkjng-clas s yontli are a declining proportion of tho;
v.iiite popvil.if ion. "ff Djc economy --• [the only major''
ii sue on wl^.ich 'he grc)Vip^ agree] has substaxitially ;
recovered, ilie sliape of Ihe new alignmi-nt should be-
conie c'\ eai . "
1705
Exhibit No. 55
Till". WHITE HOrSE
VVASHINOTON
EyesOni'jj,
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
MARGE ACKER
TRUDY BROWN
PAJ BUCHANAN
*<rf5HN DEAN
LARRY HIGBY
DAN KINGSLEY
GORDON STRACHEN
JERRY WARREN
LUCY WINCHESTER
JOANNE GORDON
OPPONENTS LIST
^
The following people participated in the June 23, 24, 1972 rally-
establishing the National Labor for Peace Organization which includes
a "dump Nixon" program. Please add them to your Opponents List.
Ron Borges
IBT, Local 688
Joseph Belsky
President
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N.
2800 N. Sheridan Rd.
Chicago,. Illinois 60657
America
Harry Bridge's
President
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
150 Golden Cate Ave
San Francisco, California 94102
Cesar Chavez
President, Farmworkers
PC Box 130
Delano, California 93215
Gerald R. Coleman
General Secretary, Internatioml Union of Hatters, Cap and Milliner^' Workers
245 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10016
1706
Opponents List: June 28, 1972
Murray Finley
Unopposed candidate for President
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America ' .
15 Union Square
New York City 10003 '
Albert J. Fitzgerald
President
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America ( IndepenQent union)
11 East 51st Street
New York City 10022
Fred Fulford
President, jr^ited Furniture Workers of America
7Q0 Broadway , 4th Floor
New York City 10003
Cleveland Robinson
Secretary. Treasurer
Distributive Workers of American, National Council of
13 Astor Place
New York City 10003
Leon Sverdlove
President and Secy Treas
International Jewelry Workers Union
8 W. 40th St. Suite 907
New York City 10018
Kenneth J. Brown
President, Lithographers and Photoengrava era International Union
1900 L Street N.W.
Washington; D.C. 20036
Leonard Woodcock
President, United Auto Workers
8000 East Jefferson St.
Detroit, Michigan 48214
Jerry Wurf ■ ^ .
President, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
1155 15th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
1707
Exhibit No. 56
McGOVERN CAMPAIGN STAFF
Abzug, Rep. Bella
Armstrong, Robert
Brown, Willie L.
Caddell, Patrick
Caplin, Mortimer
Chayes, Dr. Abram
i Clifford, Clark
Cohen, Dick
Cunningham, George
Daniels, Harley
Davis, Lon
DeWind, Adrian
t Dougherty, Richard
Duffey. Rev. Joe
tt Dutton, Frederick G.
Farenthold, Frances (Sissy)
Co-chairwoman, McGovern-Shriver
Women's National Advisory Committee
Texas Land Commissioner who is
expected to have large role in
McGovern Texas campaign
California McGovern Co-chairman
McGovern 's private pollster
Economic Speech Advisor
Former he.ad of IRS ,.
Foreign Policy
Professor, Harvard University
Vice Chairman - Policy Panel
for National Security
Former Secretary of Defense
Jewish Affairs Section
Deputy Campaign Manager
McGovern State Coordinator
Youth
Economic Speech Advisor
N. Y. Tax Attorney
Press Secretary
Citizens for McGovern-Shriver
Senior Advisor
Co-chairwoman - National Citizens
for McGovern-Shriver
Texas State Legislator - former
candidate for state governor
* Starred names are repeated on last page
McGovern Campaign Staff
Page - 2 -
1708
♦ Gavin. Lt. Gen. James M.
(Retired)
Guggenheim, Charles
Vice Chairman - Policy Panel
for National Security
McGovern Media man - produces ,
McGovern films
Ha Is ted, Tom
'^ Hart, Gary
Disarmament and related matters
Campaign Director and
Western Coordinator
Heller, Walter O
Economic Speech Advisor
Former Chairman of Council of
Economic Advisors
Himmelman, Harold
^ Holvun, John D.
Campaign Aide for Northeast
Research Assistant and Speech
Writer
James, William S,
Co-chairman - Maryland Citizens
for McGovern-Shriver
Jones, Kirby •
Kimelman, Henry
Deputy Press Secretary
Finance Chairman - campaign
funds and contributions
Kuh, Edwin
Economic Speech Advisor
Professor, MIT
jH^ LaRocque, Rear Adm, Gene
(Retired)
Levett, Michael
Vice Chairman - Policy Panel
for National Security
Maryland McGovern Campaign
Coordinator
Lobell, Martin
Energy
Formerly Sen Proxmire's Legis-
lative Assistant
MacLaine, Shirley
Co-chairwoman - McGovern-Shriver
Women's National Advisory Com-
mittee
McGovern Campaign Staff
Page - 3 -
1709
Mankiewicz, Frank
Martindell, Anne
McPherson, Mike
Meyers, Henry
O'Brien, Lawrence
Okun, Arthur M.
Patterson, Basil
Pechman, Joseph A.
Pokorny, Gene
tk Proxmire, Senator William
Rapp, Stan
Rubin, Miles
Salinger, Pierre
Schultze, Charles L.
Scoville, Herbert Jr.
Rational Political Director
Deputy Campaign Director
Chairwoman to New Jersey Con-
vention Delegation
Shriver Travelling Staff
Former Aide to Rep. William
Clay (D-Mo.)
Scientific Affairs and Environment
Campaign Chairman
•> '.. . .
Economic Speech Advisor
Former Chairman of Council of
Economic Advisors
Co-chairman, Dem. National Committee
Economic Speech Advisor
Economist, Brookings Institution
Domestic Issues
Vice Chairman - Policy Panel
for National Security) ^
Ads for McGovern
Rapp & Collins, New York, Adver-
tising firm
Fund Raiser
Los Angeles Industrialist
Campaign Aide
Vice Chairman - Policy Panel
for National Security
Former Director, Bureau of the
Budget
Vice Chairman - Policy Panel
for National Security
Former CIA Deputy Director
McGovern Campaign Staff
Page - 4 -
1710
4* Smith, Floyd
Stearnes, Rick
Surrey, Stanley S.
Sylvester. Edward S., Jr
Tobin, James
Van Dyck, Ted
it Warnke, Paul C.
Weil, Gordon
Westwood, Jean
W6xler, Anne
White, Cissy
Willens, Haro]d
^ York, Herbert F.
Vice Chairman - Policy Panel
for National Security
President - Intl. Assn. of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Campaign strategy
Economic Speech Advisor
Professor, Harvard University
Director - Black Steering Com-
mittee for McGovern
Fbrmer AsBt. Secretary of HEW
Economic Speech Advisor
Professor, Yale University
Handling of substantive issues
Co-chairman - Policy Panel for
National Security
Substantive Issues
Legislative Assistant to McGovern
Co-chairwoman, Democratic
National Committee
Executive Director - Voter
Registration
Former Democratic Party Co-
chairperson
Press Aide
California Democratic Finance
Chairman
Co-chairman - Policy Panel for
National Security
Former Defense Dept Director
of Research and Engineering
1711
Page 5
McGovern Top Campaign Aides
Frank Mankiewicz
Richard (Dick) Dougherty
Gary Hart
National Political Director '
Press Secretary
Campaign Director
Frederick (Fried) G. Dutton Senior Advisor
John D. Holum Research Assistant and Speech Writer
POLICY PANEL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Co-chairmen;
Paul C. Warnke
Herbert F. York
Vice Chairmen;
Clark Clifford
Lt. Gen. James Gavin
Rear Adm. Gene LaRocque
Sen. William Proxmire
Charles L. Schultze
Herbert Scoville, Jr.
Floyd Smith
National Security Planning
Military Manpower Needs • \
General Purpose Forces '.■'
Military Procurement and Efficiency '
Domestic Aspects of Military Spending
Nuclear Weapons Policy
Conversion of Defense Production
to Peacetime Uses ""
B-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 24
1712
71t Bo»k WWi
Exhibit No. 59
J^L^llft \?J>.lQ£lllA _._
^
Naiuhml Savings ^x** I^rust Company
VASUINCTOM, D. C aOOOS
'^ jOMw wrtsFv nfAN,li>^
too 004V STRfFT
AlFvANnMlA vIPATNl* 2?31a
^^c,^:
Cfiftt, IH67
Mai
OATE
CHECKS AND OTHIR DEBITS
K(S
om%iit
AAUfiCE
09/2fi
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1.9?3,OI
[>V/2»
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90'' .47
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in. 60
1»«9|,4S
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66.10
56,9?
tfif53,42
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57,81
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497,05
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6.63
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to/n
98,70
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1713
Exhibit No. 60
POLITICOS CONTINUED:
12 BLACK CONGRESSMEN
Shirley Chisholm
William Clay-
George Collins
John Conyers
Ronald Dellums
Charles Diggs
Augustus Hawkins
Ralph Metcalf
Robert N. C. Nix r
Parr en Mitchell
Charles Rangel
Louis Stokes
MISCELLANEOUS POLITICOS
John V. Lindsay, Mayor, New York City
Eugene McCarthy,* Former U.S. Senator
George Wallace, Governor, Alabama
1714
SENATORS
>» Birch Bayh
^ J. W. Fulbright
:> Fred R. Harris
-^Harold Hughes
Edward M. Kennedy-
George McGovern
Walter Mondale
Edmund Muskie
Gaylord Nelson
William Proxmire
POLITIC OS
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
Bella Abzug
William R. Anderson
John Bradeinas
^'Father Robert F. Drinan
" Robert Kastenmeier
Wright Patman
1715
ORGANIZATIONS
>> Black Panthers, Hughie Newton
■'•^ Brookings, Institution, Lesley Gelb Ct^C'-'M-
Business Executives Move for VN Peace-Henry Niles, Nat. Chmn, Vincent McGee, ^
Committee for an Effective Congress, Russell D. Hemenway // Exec. Director
> Common Cause.^^hn Gardner, Morton Halperin, Charles Goodell, Walter Hickel
^ COPE, Alexander E. Barkan
P Council for a Livable World, Bernard T. Eeld, President; Prof. Physics, MIT
■^ Farmers Union, NFO
>> Institute of Policy Study, Richard Barnet, Marcus Raskin
National Economic Council, Inc.
"^ National Education Association, Sam M. Lambert, President
> National Student Association, Charles Palmer, President
^National Welfare Rights Organization, George Wiley
^ Potomac Associates, ft^PSfETd Watts
> SANE, Sanford Gottlief
;» Southern Christian Leadership, Ralph Abernathy
Third National Convocation on The Challenge of Building Peace, Robert V. Roosa, Chmn
3'OS\'^fcbSr»^e^ ? ^dnJCC-ko'xal TOr\c4
1716
MEDIA CONTINUED:
:p The New York Times
■^ Washington Post
St, Louis Post Dispatch
Jules Duscha, Washingtonian
Robert Maning, Editor Atlantic
■* John Osborne, New Republic
"> Richard Rovere, New Yorker
> Robert'Sherrill, Nation
^Paul Samuelson, Newsweek
ulian Goodman, Chief Executive Officer, NBC
John Macy, Jr. , Pres. , Public Broadcasting Cooporation; former Civil Service Comm,
Marvin Kalb, CBS
>^aniel Scholfr, CBS
Lem Tucker, NBC
^> Sander Vanocur, NBC
1717
MEDIA CONTINUED:
^ Joseph Kraft, syndicated columnist. Publishers Hall
James Laird, Philadelphia Inquirer
Max Lerner, syndicated colurmist, New York Post; author, lecturer, professor-BrandeiE
Stanley Levey, Scripps Howard
;^ Flora Lewis, syndicated columnist on economics
^ Stuart Loory, Los Angeles Times
^P'Mary McGrory, syndicated columnist on New Left ^^^^
•'■^ Frank Mankiewicz, syndicated columnist, Los Angeles Times
James Millstone, St. Louis Post Dispatch
Martin Nolan, Boston Globe
Thomas O'Neill, Baltimore Sun
» John Pierson, Wall Street Journal
William Prochnau, Seattle Times
•-> James Reston, New York Times
^Carl Rowan, syndicated columnist, Publishers Hall
.>>> Warren Unna, Washington Post, NET
Harriet Van Home, columnist. New York Post
Milton Viorst, reporter, author, writer
> James Wechsler, New York Post
'J'^Vrom Wicker, New York Times
'* Gary Wills, syndicated columnist, ' author of "Nixon-Agonistes'
1718
• ■ ^' Mr:DiA ,,,.-,.
Jack Ai;cJerGon, columnifit, "W.-\shinf,toii Mc-rry-co-Uound" ': ' ••' v
Jim Bishop, author, columnist, King Fo.itvircs Syndicate ' :>■ • ':' "•*>
5?7, ThomaB Draden, coluinnict. Loo Angeles Times Syndicate ■ ,
■\-."D. J.R. Di-uchner, Los Angeleo Times Syndicate . v '-■ .'
• Marquio Childs, chief Washington correspondent, St. Louts Post Diopatch. ■, ! , ,
'■■ ':■ '■ - ■■ ■ ■ ■ . '■■■ ' •'A^i's'=.^'.'.^-." '■',•
• James Derthin, White House correspondent, St. Louis Poet Dispatch . • '• • '. w'- .'■ ■'
■'. ' ' ' " . " - ;■; • . '.-.i ■i':^■'^\^\.^''^ li''. ,\ •'"'.
Jameo Doylc, .Washington Star i.',' 'V^' ''••i *?•',-;
'• ■■ '. '■, . ■.■■.■■ '■■■■•. ' .■■',. .^•L'V'''t . i'-' ^ '•"'■''- ' :;' ^■•
\;? Richard Dudman, St. Louis Post Dispatch ' . ' ; '''''''.\,- i ' -''ry-'-'i',-:-'- .^ ■ '•
■ .Williarn Eaton, Chicago Daily News .. ' .►,.1;, ' - '"'^ .;'■, ' • " f'.'i
■ PsOwland Evans, Jr. ,. syndicated columnist, Publishers Hall •.-'-:■'••.-/!'■ \-'\
fj'rr.'l Fricdm.-inn; Knight Newspapers, syndicated columnist ••"■,' v. '. ■,*'■■•'■■'■.■;'
*> Clr-yton Fritclicyf eyndicated columnist; Washington correspondent, Harpers ^ ;.. - .•'■
•Gv.ovjjo Fr.-zie.r, Bor.ton Globe • ■ ■ ';.- ,■..••.;;•,■ '.; 'v )v^ ^•' ? ' ■
. Pet.; llamill, Nevy York Post • '■';.. '' -^ '■',. '"-'^J,^-' :{-::. .
^ Michael Harrington, autlior and journalist; Mcinbcr, Executive Comni. Socialist Party
; Syt'ney Harris, columnist; drama critic and writer of'Strictly Personal", syhdicatod /
•v,. ..■; ,: ■' ;.•, ■;. Publisbcrs Hall ^ 1 •. ' ^ ■.',': .".~r.:.';,' \; ';^'
• Robtrt Healy, Boston Globe . '" ; T'*". ' n"-.' .\; ': >](•'. •;■
"William Hines, Jr., journalist; science and education, Chicago Timoe •;.' ',-';.""•■■') '•-•
■•■ ' . : - ' ■ ■ ' ' . ^ ■;"!•--'■ *VV^^■%■■'.■^■■.•
Stanley Karnow, foreign correspondent, Washington Post . . _ ■••■!' '.'<..*''■•,•■ 1 ■■ .' .
'■".",■ ' • ' ... '> :. .' -i-.*. '■'■.'■ I- ■'';"...;:'.'"'■*'''■' .'i'
•Ted Knap, cyndicated columnist. New York Daily News ■:•■>-.•■.■'.•■>/..•'.' '. .• •■'.■ :!
. Erwin Knoll, Progressive •, ' ....>•,!;-, w'; V■r^'. ,■■• '
'Morion Kondracke; Chicago Sun Times '.'.,.. ' 'v .■■••■■-.:.■•'■'■' ••,;
1719
LABOR
Karl Feller, Pres. Internat. Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink
■''^ and Distillery Workers, Cincinnati
^^arold J. Gibbons, International Vice Pres., Teamsters '"
A'^F. Grospiron, Pres. , Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, Denver
Matthew Guinan, Pres. , Transport Workers Union of America, New York City
^^aul Jennings, Pres. Internat. Union of Electrical, Radio f; Machine Workers, D.C.
iferman D. Kenin, Vice Pres., AFL-CIO, D.C.
Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO ( but we must deal with him)
J^rederick O'Neal, Pres. , Actors and Artists of America, New York City
^William Pollock, Pres. , Textile Workers Union of America, New York City
Jacob Potofsky, General Pres. , Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, New York
^T_.eonard Woodcock, President, United Auto Workers, Detroit
jk^erry Wurf, Internat. President, American Federal, State, County and Municipal
Employees, Washington, D.C.
-2" . io fiU j. CUi/o ,'>/'f-^ ,
1720
CELEBRITIES
Carol Channing, actress
Bill Cosby,actor
^ane Fonda, actress
Steve McQueen, actor
Joe Namath, New York Giants; businessman; actor
^ ^rPaul Newman, actor
%Cregory Peck, actor
Tony Randall, actor
Barb ra Streisand, actress
1721
BUSINESS ADDITIONS
Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace and New National Priorities Cont;
Morton Sweig, President, National Cleaning Contractors
Alan V. Tishman, Exec. VP , Tishman Realty & Construction Co. , Inc.
Ira D. Wallach, President, Gottesman & Co. , Inc.
George Weissman, President, Philip Morris Corp.
Ralph Weller, President, Otis Elevator Company
1722
£)ut>iMt:t>b ADDITIONS
Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace and New National Priorities:
Charles B. Beneson, President, Beneson Realty Co.
Nelson Bengston, President, Bengston & Co.
Holmes Brown, Vice President, Public Relations, Continental Can Co.
Benjamin Buttenweiser, Limited Partner, Kuhn, Loeb & Co.
Lawrence G. Chait, Chairman, Lawrence G. Chait & Co. , Inc
Ernest R. Chanes, President, Consolidated Water Conditioning Co.
Maxwell Dane, Chairman, Exec. Committee, Doyle, Dane St Bernbach, Inc.
Charles H. Dyson, Chairman, The Dyson-Kissner Corp. t(P"
Norman Eisner, President, Lincoln Graphic Arts
Charles B. Finch, Vice President, Alleghany Power System Inc.
Frank Heineman, "President, Men's Wear International
George Hillman, President, Ellery Products Manufacturing Co.
Bertram Lichtenstein, President, Delton Ltd.
William Manealoff, President, Concord Steel Corp.
Gerald McKee, President, McKee, Berger, Mansueto
Paul Milstein, President, Circle Industries Corp.
> ^^tewart R. Mott, Stewart R. Mott, Associates
Lawrence S. Phillips, President, Phillips -Van Heusen Corp.
David Rose, Chairman, Rose Associates
Jalian Roth, Senior Partner, Emery Roth & Sons
William Ruder, President, Ruder & Finn, Inc.
Si Scharer, President, Scharer Associates, Inc.
Alfred P. Slaner, President, Kayser-Roth Corp.
Roger Sonnabend, Chairman , Sonesta Internatiorial Hotels
1723
BUSINESS
Clifford Alexander, Jr., Member, Equal Opportunity Comm; LBJ's Spec. Assistant
Hugh Calkins, Cleveland lawyer, nnember. Harvard Corporation
y ^Ramsey Clark, partner, Weiss, Goldberg, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; former
Attorney General
^jloyd Cutler, lawyer, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D. C,
/^ Henry L. Kimelman, chief fund raiser for McGovern; Pres., Overview Group
Raymond Lapin, former Pres., FNMA; corporation executive
Hans F. Loeser, Chairman, Boston Lawyers' Vietnam Committee
'^ Robert McNamara, President, World Bank; former Secretary of Defense
(plans' Morgenthau, former U.S. Attorney in New York City
Victor Palmieri, lawyer, business consultant, real estate exec, Los Angeles
Arnold Picker, Muskie's chief fund raiser; Chmn. Exec Comm., United Artists
Robert S. Pirie, Harold Hughes' chief fund raiser; Boston lawyer
Joseph Rosenfield, Harold Hughes' money man; retired Des Moines lawyer
^ Henry Rowen, Pres., Rand Corp; former Asst. Director of Budget (LBJ) Ij:
"^ R. Sargent Shriver, Jr., fornner US Ambassador to France; lawyer, Strasser,
Spiegelberg, Fried, Frank k Kennpelman, Washington, D.C.
^ Theodore Sorensen, lawyer, Weiss, Goldberg, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York
Ray Stark, Broadway producer
Howard Stein, President and Director, Dreyfus Corporation
^^ilton Semer, Chairman, Muskie Election Committee; lawyer, Semer and Jacobsen
George H. Talbol, Pres., Charlotte Liberty Mutual Insurance Co* headed anti VN ad
Arthur Taylor, Vice President, International Paper Company
Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association
^ Paul Warnke, Muskie financial supporter, former Asst. Secy, of Defense
^^Thomas J. Watson, Jr. , Muskie financial supporter; Chmn, IBM
1724
ACADEMICS
Michael Ellis De Bakey, Chmn. , Dept. Surgery, Baylor University; Surgeon-in-chief
Ben Taub General Hospital, Texas
Derek Curtis Bok, Dean, Harvard Law School
> Kingman Brewster, Jr. , President Yale University
> McGeorge Bundy, President, Ford Foundation
> Avram Noam Chomsky, Professor of Modern Languages, MIT
■> Daniel Ellsberg, Professor, MIT
George Drennen Fischer, Member, Executive Committee, National Education Assn.
^ yj. Kenneth Galbraith, Professor of Economics, Harvard
Patricia Harris, educator, lawyer, former US Ambassador; Chmn Welfare Committee
Urban League
V Walter Heller, Regents Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota
Edwin Land, Professor of Physics, MIT
Herbert Ley, Jr., former FDA Commissioner; Professor of Epidemiology, Harvard
Matthew Stanley Meselson, Professor of Biology, Harvard
Lloyd N. Morrisett, Professor and Associate Dir. , Education Program, U. of Calif.
Joseph Rhodes, Jr., Fellow, Harvard; Member, Scranton Comm. on Campus Unrest
Bayard Rustin, civil rights activits; Dir. , A. Philip Randolph Institute, New York
David Selden, President, American Federation of Teachers
^ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. , Professor of Humanities, City University of New York
^ Jeremy Stone, Director, Federation of American Scientists
>l^erome Wiesner, President, MIT
Samuel (^\oo^d>^ar 'i^s (AgL-cJ riurr^i^T dsso
MEMORANDUM
1725
Exhibit No. 61
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 11, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR;
MARGE ACKER
PAT BUCHANAN
JOHN DEAN^
LARRY HIGBY
DAN KINGSLEY
GORDON STRACHEN
VAN SHUMWA.Y
JERRY WARREN
LUC Y.WINCHESTER
SUBJECT;
OPPONENTS LISTS
Please add the attached to your copy of the Opponents List.
J^
Joanne Gordon
1726
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= -^ d £ ;2 .2 §
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Ssi&g" OBtK CtBU SiJ^OjS- '^j; C_ -;^i^J?Xc< lip: 5/i B<S>"3=E, A/. fci^,0^-C J
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la. ii S.'^.mAei/.C^a.-'^ i/ i.i- LtZ ir / Ztl iy -^X<i.
1727
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASIIINCI ON
June 2, 1972
co^^f^le:;
. i iH.
MEMORANDUM FOR;
IVLARGE ACKER
TRUDY BROWN
PAT BUCHANAN
OHN DEAN
LARRY HIGBY
DAN KINGSLEY
GORDON STRACHEN
JERRY WARREN
LUCY WINCHESTER
FROM:
JOANNE GORDO
N^
The following people who are involved with the National Committee
for the Impeachment of the President should be added to your Opponents
List:
Ernest Gruening ( Former Senator, Alaska)
Randolph Phillips, Attorney prose, consultant to attorneys { 1944-72)
Richard L. Bobrick, Attorney
Dr. Elizabeth A. Most,
Alfred Hassler, Fellowship of Reconciliation, N^^ck, N. Y.
Ron Young, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Washington, D. C.
Richard A. Faljc, Milbank Professor of International Law, Princeton,
Vern Countryman, Professor of Law, Harvard University
Fagan Dickson, Austin, Texas
William Stringfellow, Block Island, R.I.
Nancy Wood, . Princeton, N. J.
N,J.
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 25
MEMORANDUM
1728
Exhibit No. 62
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 16, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MARGE ACKER
TRUDY BROWN w
PAT BUCHANAN ;
t.^DHN DEAN
LARRY HIGBY
DAN KINGS LEY '
GORDON STRACHEN
JERRY WARREN
LUCY WINCHESTER
FROM:
JOANNE GORDON
^
The attached liet of sponsors of the "Salute to Victor Reuther"
should be added to your copy of the "Opponents List".
1729
Sponsors
ffPartial Listing)
Ur. tmd Mn. t. Wnttf Adtmt
Mr. Alttrt E. Albtrioni
Mr. »U Mru Robtrl £. AiHmt
Vim tnd Dick Baxl"uo»
Mr. tKd Mn Dunri 5 BtdtU
Hjmam and Baicha BooibiixUr
Tht HonoratlM JatM Bradrmas
Jim »»d Oika Bnwn
Th* HonorabU B^njamim V. Cohtn
Cvk tnd Darict Colun
Maijotit and Oicor Cektii
Mr. tad Mru WaUact M Colum
Jttk ci%d Lu Vtml Comtnr
Mr. NHtOK H. Cnukthank
Mr. »jtd Mn. WUIiom Dodds
Mr. mud Mn. TU/er4 £■ Dudle,
Ml Umicf Cickkom
Mr. Mu f M«
Mr. tKd Un. Htan) C. tltUhtr
n» HonorabU and Mn. Donald M Frmnr
Or. and Mrx frank F. Furjitnbtrt Sr.
Mr. KobtTt W. Cilmbrt
Mr. *nd Mrx. Joitpk Claut
Mr. Jatntt A- HamUmn
TkrUonorabUnndMrr. W AotrwUHorrimaa
Mr. nnd Mn. Kobtrt O. Htrnt
n* Honorubta Pidip A. Han
Mr. and Mn. Jama H. Htlltr
Mr. and Mrx Will^m Hi
taunationat Aiixtciation of Fir9 (itbun^
Mr. and Mn. 'fftwman JiJlff
Mr. Fdmaid Kttltr
Mr. and Mrj. Loom H Ktjnarimt
Artkmr and Atica Kiwitbrtm
Mr. and Mrx Runt Lansoa
Mr. and Mrx Piaim Uuiari
Mr. and Mrx Laonard Itutr
Mr. and Mrx tamo I Loab
Mr. and Mrx Datid H. Martin
Kditk and Frank McCidlock
Tk* HonombU Cnrf* McCofaru
Ml Mriina Marrouri
Mr. £ T. Micharl
Miu UUan MmU
Mr. and Mrx Amiau Man
n« HonorabU Edmund S. Musi
Hr. WJUa
■'■'•', The Greater Washington Chapter
Americans For Democratic Action
Invites You
' J To Ai tend
'A Salute To Victor Reuther*
Retiring Director, International Affairs Department, UAW
Former Chairman. Greater Washington Chapter, ADA
Saturday, February 26, 1972
Park Room. Sheraton-Park Hotel
Washington, D.C.
f,--A-
Tro>
BtUur and Olirtr Piunon
Mr. atd Mrx Jottph L Rmik. Sr.
Mr. and Mrx Herman Rwbhan
Morrii and Ctrlrvdr Bifr
Mr. and Mrx Bdmond F. Rornar ■
iorm and Htnrr Sanu*tta\an
Mr. and Mrx Ceorta Scharmar
Mr. and Mrx Laon 5Au/;
Mx and Mrs. Pkdip Sum
Mix Otkar Siomror
U/i.W.-RtgiOMB
Mr: and Mrx Paid A. Watntr
Mr. and Mrx Jottfh WaUk
Mr. and Mrx Tkomai W Wilson. Jr.
Tka HonorabU WiUard W. Wiru
Mr. Laonard Woodcock
Mr Jnrj Wmrf
TKtItna and Aba Zwardlinf
A eomptti* listing of
Sponsors wiV appear
in tt.t dinner jounuti
K
Welcome:
David H. Martin
Toastmasier: *
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
Atlard K. Lowenstan
Clarence Mitchell
Leonard Woodcock
Reception 6:30 P.M.
Dinner 7:30 P.M.
Contribution S 1 5.00 per person
Thtrt will b* no fund tolicil ' w ttl th» dinner
I'
1730
Exhibit No. 63
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES COMMITTEE FOR PEACE
TRIP TO WASHINGTON — JUNE 2^. 1970
Donald B. Armstrong
Senior Vice President
Associate Director
J. Walter Thompson
Norma Bodine
Creative Director
Hicks & Greist
Alan D. Bogorad
President
Alan D. Bogorad Co.
Joseph Brouillard
Vice President
J. Walter Thompson
Allan I. Brown
V. P. - Marketing
Plaza Group, Inc.
Sanford Buchsbaum
Vice President
Revlon
Richard Clarke
President
Richard Clarke Assoc.
Beatrice Coleman
President
Maidenform, Inc.
James L. Conklin
President
Conklin-Stein
Betty Cott
Senior Vice President
Ruder & Finn, Inc.
Kay Daly
Vice President
Revlon
Robert David
President
David, Oksner &
Mitchneck, Inc.
Adrian W. DeWind
Attorney
Paul, Weiss, Goldberg,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
Benjamin De Young
Marketing Supervisor
Bristol-Myers Company
Robert Dolobawsky
President
Warren, Muller &
Dolobawsky, Inc.
George W. Feld
Director Adv. Services
Revlon
Jerry Fields
President
Jerry Fields Assoc.
Richard Finnis
President
Richard Finnis Enterprises
Betty Freedman
Creative Director
Grey Advertising
Joseph J. Freedman
V. P. - General Manager
Charles of the Ritz
Barbara Gittler
Senior Vice President
Jerry Fields Assoc.
John Glucksman
Cons. Engineer
John Glucksman Co.
Aaron Gottlieb
Vice President-Treasurer
National Transportation Co.
Lester Greenberg
Attorney
Lester Greenberg
Edwin Greenblatt
Vice President
Sullivan, Stauffer,
Colwell & Bayles, Inc.
Jeremy Gury
Deputy Chra. of the Board
Ted Bates & Co., Inc.
Alan Hahn
President
Seaward Edison Corp.
E. Patrick Healy
V. P. - Dir. Personnel
Young & Rubicam, Inc.
Henry C. Heppen
Senior Vice President
Ma ide nf orm , Inc .
Arthur M. Hettich
Editor
Family Circle Magazine
John C. Horvitz
Marketing Director
Estee Lauder-Aramis Div.
Judson H. Irish
Advertising Consultant
David J. Jacobson
President
Metro-Goldwyn Mayer
Merchandising Corporation
Marvin Kahan
Vice President
Hudson-Shatz Painting Co.
Lawrence Kane
Executive Vice President
Kane, Light, Gladney, Inc.
Mrs. Lawrence Kane
Kane, Light, Gladney, Inc.
(Copy illegible) Note: This is a true copy of the original document.
Original document was not legible enough for photographing
but will be retained in committee files.
1731
C0KPc3i\ATi^ fcXSCUTIVfcS COMMITTED FOH Pl^CE
TKlf TO VAt.HINGTQN — JUN2 ?$, I97O
Abraham Kanner
Senior V. P. -Finance
Maidenform, Inc.
Stanley Katz
President
Leber, Katz, Paccione
John Kaufman
President
Van Lithe Corp.
R. David Kimble
Vice President
Grey Advertising
James Lebenthal
Executive V. P.
Lebenthal & Co., Inc.
James LeShufy
Vice President
Consolidated Fine
Arts, Limited
William Levison, Jr.
President
Wilton Associates
David C. Levy
Dean
Parsons School of
Design
Ann Lewis
Copywriter
Grey Advertising
George McKay, Jr.
President
George McKay & Assoc.
Joseph McMahon
President
Joseph McMahon
Enterprises, Ltd.
Arnold Miller
Director New Products
Faberge, Inc.
Harold Miller
Senior V. P. -Media &
Network Programming
Sullivan, Stauffer,
Colwell & Bayles, Inc.
John Miraglia
President
JPM Associates, Inc.
Judson H. Morris
Vice President -
Group Director
Bristol-Myers Company
W. Richard Mullan
V. P.-Acct. Director
Ted Bates & Co., Inc.
Mrs. W. Richard Mullan
Lawrence J. Muller
Executive Vice President
Warren, Muller,
Dolobawsky, Inc.
Robert Nadel
Hertz & Herson
Sylvia S. Neumann
Vice President
Young & Rubicam, Inc.
Onofrio Paccione
Executive Vice President
Leber, Katz, Paccione
Arthur Pearson
Director Mkt. Planning
Bristol-Myers Company
Harry Phillips, III
President
H&R Phillips, Inc.
Robert Pliskin
Executive Vice President
The First Team, Inc.
George Poris
Vice President-Advertising
Revlon
David Rappaport
President
Damon Creations
Richard H. Restler
Partner
Capri Jewelry Co.
Arnold E. Rogers
Chairman of the Board
Rogers Engraving Co., Inc.
Leo M. Rogers
Chairman, Exec. Com.
Rogers Engraving Co., Inc.
Fay Rosen
Sales Promotion Manager
Maidenform, Inc.
Ellis Rosenthal
Senior V. P.-Manufact\iring
Maidenform, Inc.
Mike Ross
Vice President-Treasurer
C, M. Group, Inc.
Martin Rubenstein
Vice President
Werner Mgmt. ConsxLLtants
(Copy Illegible)
1732
CORPORATE KXECUTIVES COMMITTEE FOR PEACE
TRIP TO V,'A£HIMGTON — JUNE 2$. 1970
Martin Schrader
Publisher
Town & Country Magazine
Sanford Schwarz
President
Sanford Schwarz & Co.
Lawrence Wechsler
Senior Vice President
Revlon
Barrett Welch
President
Carter Products, Inc.
John J. Sheedy
Vice President -
Group Director
Bristol-Myers Company
Leonard S. Silverfine
Account Supervisor
Grey Advertising
Martin Stevens
Vice President
Revlon
Henry D. Taft
Executive Vice President
Bristol-Myers Company
William Tomson
Vice President
Sullivan, Stauffer,
Colwell & Bayles, Inc.
Derrik Van Nimwegen
Director of Special
Projects
Bristol-Myers Company
Peggy Prag Varady
Vice President
Papert, Koenig, Lois
Bert Wagner
Vice President
Sullivan, Stauffer,
Colwell & Bayles, Inc.
Annette Wilen
Asst. to the President
Herb Wilen Studio, Inc.
Herbert Wilen
President
Herb Wilen Studio, Inc.
Richard W. Weiner
Richard W. Weiner, Inc.
Paul Woolard
Executive Vice President
Revlon
Hal Davis
President
Grey & Davis
Sydney Derma n
President
Skyliner Salon Corp.
Fred Papert
President
Papert, Koenig, Lois
Gordon Webber
Vice President
Benton & Bowles, Inc.
A TRUE copy
1733
Exhibit No. 64
Defno'crat Contributors of $25,000 or More in 1968 Campaigns
( from June 20, 1971 New York Times Story)
. ^Herbert A. Allen, N. Y, , partner, Allen t Co., $57,500.
Robert S. Benjamin, N, Y, , Chairman, United Artists Corps, friend of LBJ, $33G
Daniel J. Bernstein, deceased, stockbroker, $113,062
Harold W. Bostrom, Milwaukee, retired , founder Bostrotn Corp. , $25,000.
Harry Brandt, N. Y. , motion pix theatre owner, $46,000
Chester F. Carlson, Pittsford ( deceased) inventor xerography; $32,200 ^
l^llsworth T. Carrington, N. Y. account exec. , Janney Montgomery Scott, $106, 00^
:> jlflair Clark, N. Y. , McCarthy campaign manager, Clark Thread heir, $75,000
Manfred Clynee, Palisades, NY, Dir. Biocybernctics Lab; $30, 000
^ Bernard Cornfield, Swife^. former chmn. , Investors Overseas Service, $30,000
> ^^orman Cousins, NY Editor, Saturday Review, $58,000
R. Dakin, Pres., R. IDakin Co, $26,167
Mrs. June Degnan, SF. , McCarthy Finance Committee chmn., $60,000
Robert Dowling, NY, Chmn, City Investing Co. , $102,754
John Factor,. Hollywood, Calif, "Jake the Barber" $102,500
James Faulkner, Drookline, Mass. (she's a dupont)^ $25,500.
-. U<far tin Fife, NY, President, Fife Assoc, (leathergoods) $72,000
• "-^ Robert Gimbel, NY Asst to Gen Manager, Saks, $50,250 , ,
Newton Glekel, TY Chairman, Hy Grade Food Coip; $25, 500 ' -
Arnold M. Grand, NY Dir. Continental Airlines, attorney; $25, 500
Raymond R. Guest, Dublin, Ireland, former Amb. $36, 000
Harold K. Hochschild, NY chairman Exec Committee, Amer. Metal $27,000
John J. Hooker, Jr. Naslivillc, founder Minnie Pearl Fried Chicken, $35, 000
Edgar Kaiser, Oakland, ChmnKailwr, $25,000
David L. Kreeger, DC, Chmn Exec Commt. Govt Employees Ins. Co, $25,000
Mrs. Doris Lanier, Bal Harbor, Fla. prin stockholder Wash Scientific $50,000
Mrs. AlbettLasker, NY $69,400
Larry Lawrence, San Diego, owner Coronado Hotel;Dem Party Chmn South Cal$30C
Howards. L«vin NY former Pres Levin-Townscnd Computer, $30,000
Frederic R. Mann, Phi la. , Pres Indutstrial Container Corp, $35,500
Allan Miller, Boca Raton, retired industrialist, $108,000
^^^artin Peretz, Cambrif^ge, Harvard prof; Mrs =Singer -Sarwfing heiresa; $114,400
^ Meshulam Riklia, NY, Chmn Rapid American Corp, $25,000
Samuel Rothberg, Peoria, III, Gen Magr. American DietllUng, $25,000
' ^amuel Rubin, NY retired Exec Fabcrgc, $76,000
Grant Sawyer, Las Vegas, attorney, former Gov Nebada; $25,000
Mrs. Elmer H. Settel, NY real estate, $25,100
Roger L. Stevens, DC Chmn JKK Center for Performing Arte; $30,000
Martin Stone, LA, Chmn Monogram Industries, $40,000
/Lew R. Wasserman, Beverly iiills, Pres., MCA, $54,096
/(iarold Willens, LA, Co Chmn Move for Peace, $35,000 , .- ^. r.
M^^^ORANDUM
1734
Exhibit No. 65
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 25, 1971
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MARGE ACKER
P^T BUCHANAN
KfOHN DEAN
DAN KINGSLEY
VAN SHUMWAY
JERRY WARREN
LUCY WINCHESTER
SUBJECT:
OPPONENTS LIST ADDITIONS
Please added the attached list of Muskie contributors to your
opponents list which George Bell sent to you yesterday.
^
Joanne L. Gordon
«J2>|un.^
1735
Leo Al len ^
M.S. V.'alkor, Ir.c.
35 V.'3reh..m Strc.ot 1,000.00
Boston. f.sssnchusGfts 02110
John B. B^rrc-;;.'/- ,00.00
52 Cnconscale -■^^ ^^ts 02132
West Roxbury, >*-^ssechuseT
Joseph V/. Bartleit
223 Franklin Street
Boston, f'.assachusctts 02110 100.00
Paul L. Beane
89 Comnerical V.horf
Boston, Massachusetts 02110 100.00
Kyor P. Beck
729 ^e'/en->h Avcr.ue
New York, Nov: York 10019
VUr
100.00
rxobart S. Eonjanin
United Artists Corporation >
729 Seventh Avenue
New York, Nev; YorK 10019 $1,000.00
Wmt^.-n Ser.ton
342 I'-'ocison Avenje
Suite 7C2
New Ycrk, New York 5 500.00
Berl I. Bernhard
5405 Blacki stone Road
Bethesda, r'.aryland 2,000.00
Edv.-ard J. Bernstein
J 4 Fen i more Road
Nev.' Rocr.cllc, .n:cw York 10204 250.00
Stanley Blacker
The Stanley Slacker Corp.
1290 Avenue of the A/rcricas
Now York, New York 1,000.00
Lov/rcnce E. Blanchsrd
4101 Sulgravo ROc,d • 75.00
Richmond, Virginia 25221
1736
inuskTip- Coor£irjoTow4
CI if Ion C. Cc-.rior
. 1120 Connecticut Avor.ue. il.v..
Suiie I2''.2 ^ 500.00
■ V/ashington, D.C. 20036
Mr. & 'Ars. David Cha Minor, Jr.
3117 Hawthorne Street, K.W.
V;ashin3tcn, D.C. 2C003 2, 500. CO
Preston Cnorles
Box 1219
Suffolk, ViPGinia 23434 5.00
Wi 1 1 iam H. Chisholn
100 Park Avcr.uo
hJew York, Now York 10017 100.00
Cyri I Clorr.ens
f'ark Twain Journal
Kirkwcod, ■"•'.issouri 63122 ' 3.00
Arthur G. Cq-hor:
60 East 55t;i STroet
. i\'ew York, New York 1 0022 500.00
f-'ourice M. Cohon
?l V.'codcliife Rood
Brockline ,;:-ssechL'5etts 2,500.00
'■)!' J-'.rs. r^ita R. Cohen
.f' 2737 Clayton Streot
>/ Pnlladolphia, Pennsylvania 19152 25.00
C. E. Colvin ^ 25.00
JuJie Co.'Ds
' '37 ^.txir.cjton Aver.uc
^;an5field, Ohio 44907
Paul C. Conradscn
277 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017
J 5.00
100.00
Kora Con./ay
1015 Beocon Street
Brooklino, Massachusetts $ 10.00
Thomas G. Corcora-.
1511 K Street, ^-'^i 1,000.00
Washington, D.C. 2C0C5
1737
Soymour M. Bohrer
'345 Park Avenue
Now York, New York
1,000.00
C. R. Borders
1539 Bayshoro Drive
■ Cocoa BocJCh, Florida 32921
150.00
Tin Bornsicin
Dopt. of y.ar.ageriont
School of Busir.::ssAdnir.i strati on
, University of Massschijso"; ;s
■ Abherst, t'asr.sch'jsctts 0IGC2
100.00
Richard P. Brandt
5 RittenhousG Road
Bronxville, New York
250.00
" lea Brody
Xy 100 East 42nd S+rett
i tie^york. New York I CO! 7
25.00
Goorgo M. Bunker
277 Park Avenue
Now York, New York 10017
100.00 ^
1738
>«wi»Mi^i)>f ji
8727 V.'cst Third Street ^ ,
Los. AngjJos, Culiiornia 90048 ,
1,000.00
iMrS. T. A." Cov.en
. Beayer Valley Road •
,hR I, Box 162 E
dolvfdere, Illinois 61008
25.00
■John H. Crooker^ Jr.
•Bank of tl>e Southwest Building
•Houston, Texas 77002
250.00
Ross D. Davis
3421 N. Sireet, N.W.
V Washington, O.C. 20007
,, Mi lliem A. Deleno
■-Trustee
, -Avery Assoc laTos
\, :'e00 West Tar.pa Street
^. SprJr.yf ieic, Missouri
• C.- Dbuclas Oi I Ion
Islesboro, .'-'.ciine 04040
Irene L. Diamond
101 Alpine Lane
'' Hof •fnao Estates, 1 11 i r.oi s 60 1 72
Mr^l'. Seirah Di.'.'ondstoi n
141 Lincoln Avcr.ue
Hastings-o.-i-Hudoon, \'ew York 10706
500.00
3,300.00
1,000.00
• 10.00
5.00
; . :Yony J. Oosse
r' 544 Alpine
. vjSonora, California 95370
■ Tony J. Dossi
P.O. Box 691
• Soho a, California
Anna Dov; I ir.g
',4 Cast Place .
-St. Louis, y.issouri 63K7
V/illlam Louis Dreyfus
26 Broadway
»«^... Vr,ri<. New York
^Joseph C. DLkohart
' 5\ Joyce Kihr.or Avenue
New Brohswick, Nov/ Jersey CS903
'H. Stewart Dur.n, Jr.
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue N.V/.
Washington, O.C. 20003
1.00
5.00
5.00
1,000.00
100.00
100.00
1739
3 Frorikl In Piece
Cambridge, r-'essachusetts 02139
^tO.OO
Harold J. Gibson
Farmington, Micliigan
75.00
Fred Goldberg
United Artists Corp.
792 Sovonih Avenue
N'ew York, Kc.v York 10019
$ 100.00
Atan Goldstein
Plymouth Si'.ce Cc:.:pa,-,y
r-'iddjeboro, iVassachasett:
,000.00
Stanley Goldstein
65 Harwich Road
Providence, Rhode Island
■"rs. Barbara Grants
294 Riverside Drive ^D
New York, New York 10025
Anna Gropczynski & grandchildren
(Pot I K.-jihy O'Kccfe)
3027 South 12th Street
Milwaukoo, IVi scons in 53215
5,000.00
20.00
100.00
James Graugr.ard
St. JarT^es, Louisiana 7C036
Sanford D. Grcenborg
2510 Virginia /.vcr.je N.-'-
V-'ashingica, D,C. 2C037
500.00
5,000.00
Frances \7. Grecory
V.'esthc.Tipton Col lege
University "of Richmond
Richxond, Virginia 23173
$ 50.00
Earle Gropcr
222 Ealdpate Hi I I Road
Newton Centre, y.assechusetts
3,000.00
Everett P. Grossrr.an
200 Union Street
Braintree, Massachusetts 02164
$ 200 .00
Nissie Grossman
95 Baldpato Hi I I Road
Newton Centre, Massachusetts
200.00
1740
Cesimir Fa lenc-ykov/ski
6616 Lako Shore Drive
Minr.oapol is, Minnosotc
^^''VorK, .VewYork ,0024
Johri Vi". Fi r.dlay
Route I Box 4 2- A
Afton, Virginia 22920
Mt. Vorr.on, Now Yor:. 105:32 >^^-'^^'^ ^ ,^^'^
Charles W. Fngelhard
113 Astor St root
Newark, Now Jersey 07114 1,000.00
$ 10.00
"ynan L. Feiner '°-°0
2001 HaverforC Road
Ardn^ore, Poonsylvar.ia 19003
Sumner L. Fe/dbcrq
2ayre Corporation'
rramingham v-^oc- ^
y ^''' *--s-chusotts 0170/
W. H. Ferguson Jr.
^•0. Box 6160
^~port ,fevs. Virgin,, ^3006
Mrs. Marshal I Field
136 East /9rh St.oot
;. New York, Kew York
25.00 •
'#000.00
500.00
,000.00
100.00
Kartin Fine
6365 S.V.'. 87tri Courl
Mia.-ni, Florida 33156 250.00
David Flexor
Inflight f'otion Pictures, Inc.
435 I'.adison Avenue
Now York, Kev; York 1,000.00
Henry L. Foster ^ .
P.O. Box 430 „
Wilrr.Jnnton, Mass.-chuscttB Oir.37 $1,000.00
Aaron Frosch
120 East 56th Street
New York, New York 10022 100.00
1741
C. R. Hailoy
P-0. Box 21G7
i?lch(rond. Virgin
Id
Nancy A. Heycock
304 South Jackson S+reot
Arlington, Virginia 222C''.
$ 75.00
f'aJeeS E. Ha I a by
1120 Fifth Avenue
New York, .N'ow York 350.00
Sig.Tur.d Karri son
U8 Ardrnore Avor.uo '
Ardrore, Penr.sy I vania 19003
25.00
100.00
Malcoln Hocht, Jr.
580 PIoasonT Stroot
Watcrtov.n, I'.ossecfiusctts 1000.00
•Elsie E. Hodenskog
^^' .2071 Fairfax -
;■';. Denver, Colorado 10.00
^' ''■ Andrew P. fii 1 1
14 V/orthley Street
Red Dank, i;ew Jeri^cy 07701 25.00
' ," . Florence Hippie
;-.. 33 JO Lansing Slreet
\Q.,''., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19136 25.00
John 0. Hobbs
5A Joyce Ki Irr.sr Avenue
N'ew. Brunswick, N'ew Jersey G5503 200.00
Richard H". Hoil.
c/o Box 693 • .^„ ^«
■■-Logan, Ohio 4^138 '00.00
'jarr.es S. Hostetler ^ .
3011 Albcrrarle Strce., N--- 100.00 •
•-^Washlns+on, D.C. 20003
'.■ J^rect^r, Corporate Public Af fa. rs
TRW, Inc. . V, w
'•' 1875 Connecticut Avenue N.y. 1,000.00.
":-r'. Washington. D.C. 20009
Curtis ^■• Huichins
55 Broadw..y 1,000.00
Bangor, Maine ' '""
1742
;^- Donald G. Isaacs '^'^^'^'^ (t^WTiti «34»?| C4
21100 West 7 Mile Roed ' •
Detroit, Michi<;an 3^00
International Ladies' Garrr.ent ^
V.'orkors Union 1970 Ca.Tipai en Corr.mittee
1710 Broadway
New York, Nov/ York 10019 _ 2,000.00
Invest In Peace
Barbara Avcdon, Co-Cha i rrran
407 I'iorth y.aple Drive
Beverly Hills, California 90210 500.00
Louise Judd
5504 Mol lyv.cod Boulevard
Hollywood, California 90029 3.00
Mrs. Louis Judd
5227 Sunset Boulevard . -• •
Los Angeles, California 90027
Harry Kshn
120 Grcod.vay •
Kgw York, .\ev/ York COO. 00
David. Kane
.. .^70 Rcr.Goiph Road
/. Brooklir.e, .'•'assechuscits 02145
E. Chester Kccchie
34 Crystal V.'ay r,/.-)--
Berkeley, Cai .to. nid
/
200.00
Frank E. Ka re I sen
230 Perk Avenue 250.00
New .York, N'ew York 10017
3.00
Richard R. Kervnedy
522 21st Street MM- ,q qq
V.'ashington, O.C. 20o05
Robert KIcincrrr.an
1350 I5rh Street
Fort Lee, Now Jersey 07024 25.00
Dr. John H. Kno./les
28 Fernv/ood Road
Chestnut Hill, N'.ossachiisclls 02167 2!>0.00
Arthur B. Krim
United Artists Corporation
728. Seventh Aventio
New York, i\'ev/ York 10019
Dr. LavMcncc R. Krivlt
Orchard Streer & I7;i
Kon roc , N --- v.;_Yo r k 109^0
l,000.0D
[iO.OO
1743
"9603 ^co Avo..o_ ^ ,,.,i'^'" ^ '"'"'^l '^^''^
• Victor Lar.s3
^i;l;.'Il?u>a. Pcnn.sy.vanla i9,06
Mrs. Mary Lf;:<:;.3 P„za . 1. 000.00
870 Ur.r.cd.-.' 0017
McvJ Vor'.;, N^" '
11133 Aqi^s Vista Ko./^-17 5.00
Jacques Les I ie
124 Lasky Drive
BcvcrJY Hills, California 90212 100.00
Dr. i' Mrs. Alfred Lev lies
24 Niircor Sircot
^ Albany, l.ov; Vorl; 12203 10.00
^'.at■new L .. L i f f I s ri d o r
no East 59tii Street
New York, Now York 10022 » 36.00
Sol I-'.. Liro-..i tz ■ , ■
Or.e Fcrre^jt Square South . ;■
loth Floor y,-^
V.'eshincton, D.C. 200C6 500.00 .
Ra I ph ( I . Love 11 ■ ' ^
23 Winter Street *
Sanford, .Valr.e 04073 2^.00
Philip W. Lt-jv/n
^640 Prudential Center
Boston, M£SSochv:s.3tTs 02199
Mr. & Mrs. Harris M. Lynam
Llncolnvillo Avo.vje
Belfast, :-;Dine O'ilMS
250.00
J. M. Lov/ry
306 Sv/cerbrier Drive
Rich.Tor.d, Virninia 75.00
10.00
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 26
1744
V.ashinoTon, D.C. 2uOC3 ' 500.00
■ Mark McGrath
910 V.'^st Konsingion Drive
Peoria, I I I inois 61614
Mary E. .VcLaughl in
2035 Park Road, N.V.'.
V.'ashington, D.C. 20010
Thorr.as Vrchor
7112 Lisbo;i Avenue
Detroit, y.ichigan 48209
4.00
10.00
.00
Tho.Tas L. f-'aynarci
V.'eid, Maine 042ii5
5.00
Cdv.-ard W. Medbery
277 Park Avenuo
New York, i\'c,-/ York 1 00 1 7
Mr. & l-';r3. Xervin C. .'-'.csyGT
Dep2rtr;'.-?nt d)f Zcolory
Univcrsiry of '■'c.'xr.e
Oror.o, V'sino C';';73
S 100.00
10.00
Dr. Jess P. I-'i I 1'^'"
3116 Victoria Boulevard
Hampton, Virginia 23361
50.00
J. E. Msjel ler
Trustee . , ,
Special Political Agr.cui-.ura I
Corr.r.'.unity tducaTion ■
503 Port tend Bui I ding
Louisville, iCentucky 40202
3,332.00
Neil R. Norr.an
2276 Tar.dy
Flint, I'.ichisan
7.50
David Arthur Oestreich
655 Madison Avenue
New York, \<e\^ York 10021.
500.00
1745
40 V.'ot-! h S"! rv-or ^
.-.New York, Nev; York 10013 " 200.00
• ' Mrs.. Dorothy Tc'ry Poyr.on ' ^
Shoroi'o.T - Ea'jMi.^,"id I'^iotor Hotel
Portland, !'.aino O^ilOl 100.00
Phil ip Pear, Esq.
1401 k Sirocit, >:.'■■:.
Suite 421
Washinglon. D.C. 20005 100.00
Francis J. Pettis, Jr.
31 Vesper Street
Portland, Meine C/;10I $ 5.00
Krs. r'argaret E. Philb.-ick
P.O. Box 83
Vashon, V.a':,hirigton 98070
10.00
Arnold Picixr
United ArTists
729 Scvc.-itn Avor.uo
New York, New York 4,000.00
David V. Picker
United Artiste
729 Scvenlh Avcr.uo ■
New York. Now York 10019 2^0.00
. Mrs. Ruth N. Picker
United Artists
729 Seventh Avenue
Now York, Kow York 4,000.00
S. N'. Pinsly
330 Beacon Street ^ 2,000.00
Boston, y.a.ssachusoits
Miss Virgifiio A. Pitts
• 10633 V,'oyr:.DLiT.h Sireet
Bcthesda, Xarylcnd 20014 100.00
Mrs. Josephine V,'. For'.orance
83 Orchard Street ' ,
Cos Cob, ConnecTicut $ 250.00
Paul A. Porter
1229 19th Sireet, U.jj- 500.00
Washington, D.C. 20035
Man R. Posnor . _
Chez Bailly . ^ nr^ '
63 Rue Franklin 10.00
Brusocl«-s 1040 Belgium
1746
Corl H. Forrir^icn
239 Park Srcorc B^j i I c i nn
Ekjstor,, I'osssci.usetis 02116
200.00
Mr. & ^t^s. Mcnning J. Post
"jO Trousdaio PUco
Beverly Hills, Colifornia 90210
500.00
i
1747
7~8'I5 Connect! CUT /.vor.uo. u^.'T'Sui ^'^^0^^' Oo»VvvC''
' V.'oshington, U.C. 2C0C6 '. lOO.OO
CM Ruplir.ol
10 Hon.Tiond Road f^:;r :•;•.-.• f-y
r.hnc.tnuf Hill, .•••scsc.civjsc-i-rs 02167 DOO.OO
Rayr-.ond J. Rcsonborger »'
7417 lfdddinc;tc,T riace
Bethesda, rarylcnd 2003''. 1000.00
Edward S. Rc^dsTOr.o
147 Chcslnur Hi ! I Road
Chesinut Hill, Ilsssicn-seTTs I, LOO. 00
^'ich3iei RodstoHG
10275 Col I ins Avenue
Bol Harbour, Florida * 5,000.00
. SummGr M. Redstone
■ 31 St. Jarr.es. Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02116 5,000.00
Charles Richardson
20 Blueberry Hi I 1 Road
Weston, i-'asscchur.etts
Saul Riecer
305 Eost^oorli Street
i>ev,' York, New York I00;6
100.00
10.00
Jul ie.T Rif kin
6S Nichols r\ced
CohasseT, I'.cisSc.chL, setts 1,000.00
Ronald Stuart Rclfe
380 Riverside Drive 9S no
Now York, New York 1 0025 . ^^'"^
Frankl in D." Roosevelt, Jr. 250.00
Roland S. Rose
II 175 Saffold Voy ' •
Roston, VirginiQ 22070 100.00
Rayrrond J. Ro'^.er.he-co'r
88S I7rh Street, .N'Tv.'.
W.ir.hiiiMloM, n.n. r\)03f) 1,000.00
N. Joseph Ross
Gateway East cuilding
Suite 5C0
Century City
Los Angeles, California 9C067 1,000.00
1748
r^ecJarhurst, New York 115^- ^'^^^^^^ ^sWs.
' ly^ ArbudtU Ayr%^ 50. CO
Stuart H. RussgI I
2309 First National Dank
0Klaho«-,3 City, Ok»aho,-na 73102
Rtchard K. Scales
, Detroit, Michigan
. -^ Arthur Schactr.an
1330 Beacon Srrest
^'- ' ., Boston, f-'asscchusstts 0214G
«oger Schaior
342t;adison Av.,.,,« ,
^ew York, .Vow York 10017
342 ^;^c/i;^'L,,,3 Roo. 535
3,400.00
Thoma'r^ H. Ryan
ei5 SoL-fh '.-.'ost 5th
•. Portlar,d, Crcson 9720'! " 2.50
Leonard B. Sand, Esq.
230 Perk Avenue
.New York, New York , 100.00
75.00
$1,000.00
10.00
Marshall L. Sche.Ncng-r
1600 South Joyce Stre-t
Arlrngtoa, Virginia 22203 5 ,0^00
Charles B. Schlaifer
A West 58th Street
New York, Now York ^ " 500.00
oarrle E. SchuJte
Pierre Hotel
Fffth Avenue gnd COth Street
New York, New York
200.00
Mrs. Helen D. Schwartz
2900 Devon Rood
K.uncie, Indiana"
Charles Scribncr, Jr.
791 Park Avontje
New York, New York 10021 100.00
Shoe Manufacturers Good
Government Co:;~ittee
1625 Eye Street N.V/. •
Washington, D.C. 20006 1,000.00
1749
j.:^- 601 ^'c^th Sierra Drive^- »=**\€4 $K%^acrf^^V • ^:.-:.
"^ Cover ;y Hills, C:. I i for.-, la 90210 ?,000.00 ' ' .'.'
Phil Shsnedlinc .••"
9171 V.'i Ishi re foulGvard • ' ..
Beverly Hills, Ca I i fornia 90210 2,000.00 , »'^
Daniel S. Shepiro *'',
3''.5 Park Av^r.L-e '!•'"'
New York, :,ciw York 10022 250.00 «■■;
George V<'. Siege I --<f'
4921 30th Place, N'.W. , ,^.'
Washington, D.C. 2C003 " 25.00 . :y.,^'
50.00 ^i'-
Alan Sicroty
•849 South Brocc'v/Dy
/Los. Angeles, California 90014
LawV-cnce 3; Sir,or.r. ' \j^
LBS Construction Co.-pany, Inc. • . %
350 St. lierks PU-ce '"'';^
Staten Island, Kev/ York 10301 25.00 " ■ •«. '
Robert 6. Smith ">v"
8303 Toll hoj;e Rc;:d '. .j
Annandale, -Virginia 22C03 30.00 l^'
-' Hermsft. Snyder , >
- 75 Frer.OnT Street ' mn nn "'•'
Boston, I'lasscchuoetts 150.00 , .
-. '■ ■ _ . ■, -j
Maurice SDJ^nbock ■ •
10 East 4bth Street , ^
Kew York, Now York 10016 1,000.00
■.Mrs. Rose A. Soorry
;. 9198 Corciel I Drive
-.;. Los Ango I OS, C3 11 fornia 90059 500.00
Jerry I . Speyer
655 Fifth /■.'.•onye
New Yo»-k, Nov.- York 10019 ' 300.00.
Dr. i Mrs. Mlchp.ol B. Sporn
6630 !'3ryv.'dod Ro2d
Bethosda, Maryland 20034 25.00
. Roy Stark
Raster Productions
,. 1438 North Gov.cr Street
Hollywood, California I.OOO.OQ
Clark Sutherland
3152 Silver Lake Boulevard
Silver Lake Vi I leqe
Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio 44224 . 100.00
1750
■ 225 Franklin Sireet Uk-i^r**»cc J, iuifMhsrr
Eolton, t.'.cS5oChusait3 02110 /|,00O.C3
, • L. J. Svordrup
Sverdru'p i Farce i snd Associates. Inc '
800 N'orth 12th Douleviird
St. Louis, Missouri 63101 1.000.00
Mrs. Wary F. Sv.cency
:, 1 70 1. North Kor.t ,^l 106
Arlington, Virginia 50.00
Jeffrey ff t-^, .
' ^"'Ornia 90024
Joan Tamkin
642 V.'arner Avenue
Los Angeles, Caliornia 90024
-v'*
^ Alan V. Tishran
6o5 Fifth Aver.Le
New York, >.ev York 10019
Alexander M. Vcgliar.o
23 V.'a 1 1 Street
K'p!W Ynrk K^u York
Voluntary Live Fur.d
1655 V.'est N'arket Street
Akron, Ohio 44513
? *inn OA
2,500.00
'. • Dr/« Mrs. Warren D. Tho-nas
163 City Road
'Turners Falls, Massachusetts 01376 " 100.00
r Devid Til I inchest
■ 300 East- 7A:h Street
New York, New York 1002! 1,300.00
'.. • • . ■ Tr5",296'^
1,000.00
John Ccmpton TolJey
I960 Sunset Plaza Drive ';
Los Angeles, California 90059 5.00
Wrs. Mary I'^^ar
,305 Perry S^^eet
Buffalo, New York 10.00
1,000.00
100.00
1751
oiuiivjion, U.C. 20006 / Pou^ C- 6t/^t^r^k<. iiOO.OO
Edv." in L. V.'eisI
I fctltry Pirk P!aro
i\'ev/ York, Ne.v York 1 0004
Donald B. V.'endiing
.■■' <8^h Flcor
277 Park Avenue
Kew York. Kew York 1 00 1 7
1,000.00
100.00
James H. V/hitfioId
3120 N'arion Drive
Royal Oak, MichigvT.n
50.00
Louis V.'jner
73 Frcrr.orit S-rrcet
Boston, y.assac.-ii-setTr.
500.00
■ Bronirilaw S. V.'ojiun
700 Forbas Avent'O
rittbburflh, Pcnnoylvoniu 15219
Pe-ter M. V.'olf
325 West End Street
New York, 1^!GW York 10025
10.00
25.00
GoldiG Yarchin
70 Park Street
'Brook I ine, Massachusetts
500.00
Wmtam S. Yoj.-.cr.-n
East Hebron, Nev; .H^rrpshire 03232
1,000.00
Dr. Richard W. You
1270 Quocn Err.,-na Street
Suite 106
Honolufu, Havtai i 95813
J. P. Zobro\.'ski
156 Coarcshal I Avenue
Newport, .Rhoce island 025',0
50.00
50.00
Alvin Zises
121 Cotton Str-et
Newton, Massachusetts 02153
1,000.00
1752
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL DINNER COMMITTEE
Kfs. Jack Games - .
132 California Street, N.
Camden, Arkansas
(Democrat National Committeewomcin)
Leonard Davis
555 Madison Avenue
Nev York, New York
Edvard J. De Bartols
7620 Market Street
Youngstown, Ohio
S. Harrison Dogole
2011 Walnut Street
Philadelphia. Pennsylvania
. Ttooas F. Fleming, Jr.
■ 750 S.E. Lake Drive
'. Boca Ratan, Florida
E. .H. Ore en
Woodruff nuildine
Springfield, Mi;i;iouri
Milledge A. Hart, III • .
<*675 Edmondson , • " •
Dallas, Texas
William G. Hells, Jr.
912 Whitney Building * ■
New Orleans, Louisicina
Lee C. Howley
5U3O Portage Drive
VemillioA> Ohio .
~ (Vice Pi'esident - Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.)
David L. Kreeger
•2I1OI Foxhall Poad, N.W. '
Washington, D.C.
(Vice Chairman - Government Employees Insurance Co.)
t-
Scott P. Linder
2201 Havthorne Trail
Lakeland, Florida
. 3,000
5.000 ,
.. • *'".>' -i •-
5,000 .
■■ ;■?•'-■
. 5»0p0 "
. t,ooq .
5, OOOii; :.•;>•
• -m' ,'■■> ;
■5,000,/;;.'. '^
\ 5,000 ':v
3,500 >^'
I
5.00P1
•>^ k
$.000
1753
-;jr— - DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL DINNER COMMITTEE CONT:
if 5.000
Charles W. Lockyer • ••
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
(President, Publishers, INC.)
Charles E&mett Lucey 5,000
3500 Raymond Street . • .
Chevy Chase, Maryland
. : (He is a Washington attorney)
: T.C.K. Murphy. Jr. " c 0^0
■ 200 Jefferson Avenue • . -*» "
El Dorado, Arkansas
•Arnold M. Picker • . ^ ^^^
New York " ^- • 5,000
(Uaited Artist Corporation)
Corbin J. Bobertson • ".^ . 3..Q.00
500 Jefferson Building
Houston, Texas
John I>1 Rockefeller, IV * 5.00(^
.1515 Barberry Lane
Charleston, West Virginia
■ (He is Secretary of State of West Virginia)
Dr. Pedro L. Rodriguez ' . 5»000-
953 Southern Building
Bronx, New York
Janes J. Schiller 3»®P<*'
One Erieview Plaza . .
• Cleveland, Ohio
John B. Tache*
.I7UU R Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Edward Bennett Williacs
1000 Hill Building
Washington, D.C.
U,000
Willi6jn J. Taylor ' '
1725 K Street, N.W. '. " 3,000;
Washington, D.C. '
.(Former Chairman REA Express)
Adolph J. Toigo ; . ,. ^ ^,
> 38p Kadison Avenue '» "
..New York, New York
(Chairnan - Lennen & Newell, Inc. advertising)
5,000
1754
Exhibit No. 66
the white house
WAS H I N GTO N
June 27, 1973
Dear Senator Inouye:
We have noted your public expression of your willingness to
use questions and a memorandum, previously furnished to the
Committee staff, in questioning Mr. Dean. We have today
forwarded more up-to-date questions to both the Majority
Counsel and Minority Counsel for the Committee. However,
in view of your interest in this material, we thought it would
be appropriate to send these questions directly to you. There
is also enclosed herewith a slightly revised draft and updated
version of the memorandum previously furnished to the
Committee staff.
Sincerely,
^A^ VOv.. Vv.c. .s-^,
FRED BUZHARDT
Jpecial Counsel to the President
Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20 510
Enclosures
1755
Exhibit No. 67
' It is a matter of record that John Dean knew of and participated
in the planning that went into the breakin at Watergate, though the
extent of his knowledge of that specific operation or of his approval
of the plan ultimately adopted have not yet been estlablished. ' There
is no reason to doubt, however, that John Dean was the principal actor,
in the Watergate coverup, and that while other motivations may have /
played a part, he had a great interest in covering up for himself. /
Dean came to the White House from Justice from a background of
working on problems of demonstrations and intelligence. Among those
working under him at the White House were Tom Houston and
Caulfield. Dean was involved in discussions in 1971 about the Sandwedge
r
plan Caulfield proposed. ( (Second Haldeman Interview 2)1 Ehrlichman
was told that the original authors of the $1, 000, 000 plan were Dean
and Liddy (Ehrlichman Deposition ll6).| Whatever the fact about this, -
it is clear that Dean attended the meetings that led up to adoption of
the Waterate pdan. Dean introduced Mitchell (who had sponsored
Dean for his White House position) to Liddy in November, 1971 (Id. , 120).
1756
Dean, Liddy, and Magruder met to discuss intelligence plans of this
kind on January 27, 1973, and, tog^her with Mitchell, on some later
date. Dean was not present at the final meeting on March SO when
the $250,000 plan was approved. It is not clear whether he was not
there because he disapproved or sinnply because he was not in
Key Biscayne or because he wanted to try to keep his own record clean.
He is reported as having said that he "didn't think it was appropriate
for hinn to be in on these conversations" (Id., 121.) He is also
reported to have said, at a meeting M in Mitchell's office, that "We
shouldn't discuss this in front of Mitchell or in the Attorney General's
office." (Ehrlichman Interview 20). At some point during the spring
Magruder phoned Dean and asked him to talk to Liddy to try and
clam hinn down (Ehrlichman Deposition 112). Also on March 26, 1973,
xxxx3Ai<ba4x5P»ixt±KOcrfaKk3cxHxy3diaxaiKiCL'txfcbcs Dean told Haldeman that
in the spring of 1972 he had told Haldeman that he'had been to two
meetings at which unacceptable and outlandish, ideas for intelligence
1757
gathering had been rejected by himself and by Mitchell and that he.
Dean, proposed not to attend any more such meetings. (Second
Haldeman Interview I, 12 ). (Haldeman may b3 off on this date
compare Haldcmandc Deposition L83). Haldeman has no personal
recollection of Dean telling him about the meetings at the time but
is "willing to accept that as a possibility" (Id. , adx 184; First
Haldeman Interview 8).
POST JUNE 17
Whatever the facts may be on the matters that are uncertain
in the spring of 1972 about Dean's knowledge or approval of the
breakin, it must have been clear to Dean, as a lawyer, when he
heard on June 17th pf Watergate, that he was in personal difficulty. I
The Watergate affair was so clearly the outgrowth of the disucussions and
plans he had been in on that he naight Ixoc well be regarded as a
conspirator with regard to thenn. He i^ust immediately have had reason
to realize that his patron, Mitchell, would also be involved^
1758
There is some indication that Ehrlichman called Dean on June
I7th to advise him of the problem and to direct him to take charge of
(Ehrlichman Interview 15.)
it for the White House. Even without an instruction, this would have
been his responsibility, as Counsel for the President, from the time
of the occurrence and he was active in that role from the moment of
his return to the city a day or two after the breakin (Ehrlichman
Deposition 228).
On June 19th Dean met with Liddy and learned, among other .;
things, of the Ellsberg breakin. (MsugjrxDdsecxSbeetinoaxDyxxxxxJoc
(That Dean met with Liddy and others is confirmed in Magruder
Testimony .) There was also a meeting that day by Dean
with Mitchell, Strachan, Mardian, and Magruder to discussxH
a covcrup. (Id. , ). A series of meetings, also including
LaRue, followed throughout the summer (Id., ). kfetKhK
i
1759
Dean wae not merely one of the architects of the coverup plan.
P
He was also perhaps Its most active participant.! It was Dean who
suggested to Haldeman that the FBI was concerned that it might
rpn into a CIA operation (Second Haldeman Inters
rview 6).|i It w«
Dean, purportedly acting on be^^lf of Mitchell, who came to
Ehrlichman several weeks after the the breakin to obtain approval
for fundraising by Kalnnbach for the arrested persons (Ehrlichman
T
Interview 7). I It was Dean who reviewed the papers found in Hunt's
safe ^nd declared that they were "politically sensitive" and should be
—-^^--^-^^^
prepared Magruder for his perjurious grand jury testimony ^jc
prepared a mennorandum stating the facts as he knew them, and
suggested it be sent to Silbert, it was Dean who said: "For God's
sake destroy the memo, it impeaches Magruder" '|(Fhrlichman
Interview 2). BKaKxutxKxpaaxfiootkyoexfaKKbodc jit was Dean who was the
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 27
1760
agent in some of the money dealings with the arrested persons (Second
'If
Haldeman Interview 6)1 lit was Dean who gave Caulfield instructions
Throughout all of this Dean was perfectly situated to mastermind
and to carry out a coverup since, as Counsel to tlio President an<l
the man in charge for the White htouse , he had full access to what
was happening in the investigation by the FBI. He sat in on f*BI
intorviewB with White House witnesses and received investigative
reports. Dean and Ehrlichman met with Attorney General Kleindienst
late in July.
The Attorney General described the investigation and
said that "it did not appear that any White House' people or any
high-ranking Committee people were involved in the preparation or
planning or execution of the break-in" (Ehrlichman Deposition 173).
History fails to record that at that monnent Dean corrected the
1761
Attorney General's erroneous innpression by pointing out that.
however innocently, Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean had all been
involved in planning o£ operations of which Watergate was an-obvious
derivative, or that Strachan had knwoledge of the fruits of this kind
of operation, or that all of thepi were suborning perjury and otherwise
seeking to conceal the facts.
Dean's activity in the coverup also made him, perhaps unwittingly.
the principal author of the political and constitutional crisis that
Watergate now epitonnizes. It would have been ennbarrassing to the
President if the true facts had become known shortly after June I7th,
but it is the kind of embarrassnnent that an immensely pssnecfick otppc
popular President could easily have weathered. The political problem
has been magnified 1000-fold because the truth is coming to light so
belatedly, because of insinutations that the White House was a party
to the coverup, and, above all, bei^ause the White House was led to say
things about Watergate that have since been found to have been untrue.
1762
(These added consequences were John Dean's doing.
Dean was responsible within the White House for becoming
apprised of what had happened. From June 17t^ on.Dean had
periodic conversations with Ehrlichman "about virtually every aspect
of this case" (Ehrlichman ^ssplK Deposition 142), Dean reported "
also to Haldennan (First Haldeman Interview 7; Second Haldeman
Interview 3) and to Zeigler, to him he gave repeated assurances
that he had made an "intensive kKKoadxgki investigation" and had
found nomhat White House involvement (Zeigler Interview 2). Dean
was "the foundation of the (proposition that the White House was not
involved" (Ehrlichman Interview 15),
With the election passed and public interest in Watergate on the
wane. Dean may have thought that this coverup had been a success,
although he purported to continue an ongoing investigation. In
February, however, with the Ervin Committee-beginning its work,
the President was concerned that all of the available facts be made known.
1763
In the middle of February, 1973, Dean and Richard Moore met with
.n
Ehrlichnnan and Haldeman at San Clemente. Dean was assigned
to reduce "to written form all of the detailed facts as they related
both to the Committee to Re-Zlect and the White House" (Ehrlichmaii
Deposition 152; see also Moore Interview 6). Dean was pressed
continually for that statement, particularly by Haldeman, but
never produced it (Id. , 154).
At this point the Gray confirmation hearings were imminent and
the Ervin hearings were on the horizonsJ The President, who had
barely known Dean, determined that Counsel to the President was the
appropriate person with whom to work in formulating the President's
|}xkwilsg position on executive privilege and similar legal issues that
these hearings -- and news conferences on March 2d and 15th at which
they wpuld xss arise -- would present. jBetween February 27th and
Mi^r«hi2«d the President met with De^n (and udually others) 211-
times and there were 14 telephone conversations between March 10th
1764
and Apr il 22nd. \ Because of executive privilege it is not possible
even to speculate on the extent to which Dean helped induce the views
on attorney-client privilege and on separation of powers that would
have immunized Dean himself from hak having to testify under oath.
During this period Dean was developing other paxfak problenns.] On
March 10th there were press reports that it was Dean who had
recommended Liddy to CREP. On March 22nd Pat Gray testified
that Dean had lied to him during the course of the FBI investigation of
Watergate. On March 23rd McCord's letber to£xzkx Judge Sirica
was made public. The cover up was l)eginning to come unciivnred.
During this period the point was frequently raised by various
people, including primarily the President, that the whole story of
Watcrj'.ite nliould be in.ulo pulilic../ "Dc.ui'v/i aiinwer nlwayn was we can't
do it while the investigation is continuing, there are conflicting
versions of events and the rights of defendantsmight be prejudiced
by a Btatement" (Second Haldeman Interview 4)
1765
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, ?(. MEX.
■ SAMUEL DASH
CHJEP CAUNSEl- AND STAFF DIRECTOR
rRED D. THOMPSON
MINORITY COUNSEU
^tniieh ^iaiesi Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
> S. RES. 60, 130 congress)
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
June l8, 1973
From: Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel
To: Members of the Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities
The attached papers were submitted to the
Committee by Counsel for the President to be used
by the Committee in connection with Mr. Dean's
testimony.
1766
On March 20th the President indicated that he still did not
have all the facts (Id. , 9). In the week preceding that Dean had
begun to express to Richard Moore ckmcern about Dean's own
involvement, referring to the meetings in Mitchell's office, the
plumbers' operation and the Ellsberg breakin, and the dMroind
by Hunt, possibly on March l6th, for more money (Moore Interview
16). filter the two of them met with the President on March 20th
Moore told Dean: "I dtxopc don't think the President has any idea of
the kinds of things that you've told me about. " When Dean agrrod
that the President did not, Moore told Dean that it was his obligation
to advise the President and lectured Dean on this subject (Id, , 17).
On March 21st Dean gave the President a nnore complete, but still
laundered, version of the facts, and so SKxps surprised the President
that, according to press accounts of what Dean is saying: "The
President came out of his chair. " At this nneeting Dean indicated that
Magruder was involved but that he did not know about Mitchell. He
1767
mentioned the Ellsberg broakin and possibly a second story job
(Haldeman Interview 9)
at the Brookings Institution. « He told about the Axtos<t attempt by
Hunt to blackmail Ehrlichman over the Ellsberg breakin. He
suggested that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean might all have
some problem about the financial transactions with the defendants
but that he thought they were more technical and political than legal.
Ehrlichman suggested that everyone be naade to appear before
the grand jury and waive executive privilege. Dean thought this
would be a good idea but only if the persons who appeared before
the grand jury were given immunity. At another meeting that
day Ehrlichman strongly opposed imnnunity (Second Haldeman
Interview 9-10) On March 23rd Dean was sent to Camp David in
order to complete the long promised report. Dean was at
Camp David for six days but caine down on the night of the 28th
and "delivered nothing" (Ehrlichman Deposition 154().
1768
The failure of Qkshk Dean's Muse while he was on the mountain
is understandable, since by this time it would have been impossible
to write a believable report that would not have been self-indicting.
While he was at Camp David Dean told Ehrlichman's assistant ,
that he was "not getting the statenr^ent done but was planning his oWn
defense" (Ehrlichman Interview 23). Haldeman talked with him
several times and felt that "Dean was not having much progress in
writing his report but it became clear that he was worrying more about
himself" (Second Haldeman Interview 12). On the 25th the President
suggested it be announced that Dean would appear beforS the grand jury.
On the 26th Dean agreed but said that he would do so only if given
immunity" (Ibid. ) ^ ■ ..i '^' .
On March 30th the President relieved Dean of any further
responsibility for the Watergate invesitgation. He called Ehrlichtnan
In, told him that it was eviden t to the President that "Dean was in the
thing up to his eyebrows, " and assigned Ehrlichman to look into
1769
Watergite (EhrlLchman Deposition 155). The President indicated
to Ehrlichman that his conversations with Dean throughout the
preceding month had given him "a growing awareness of Dean's
personal involvment in this and that his sendning him to Camp David
apparently was a device to smoke him out * * *" (Id, , 155-156).
Sxavil Relieved of his Watergate duties by the President and
aware that his own connplicity had become obvious. Dean decided ': ■-'■'
to strike out on kisxxDc his own to hunt for immunity for the long
list of wrongs he had comnnitted. According to the press, it was
April 2d when he first established contact with the prosecutors and
attempted to bargain for immunity. While he carried on these ■' •.
negotiations, Ehrlichnnan completed his report and advised the • V"
President on April 14th that Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean were all. ;
involved (Second Haldeman Interview 15). S%>oc&oi'lBKotRgx}acyci^W)tHxiiKy
Ckxroca:l>KkTxixixtiRnakxLHKkA«S5iKfciaxlxA>tkT)CKi»x5s£ka^^ ^
On the l6th Dean was asked by the President to resign but refused to doSo-
1770
On the 30th he was dismissed. His increasing shrill efforts since
that date to save himself by striking out recklessly at others are
too familiar and too painful to require mention.
1771
It is a matter of record that John Dean knew of and participated
in the planning that went into the breakin at Watergate, though the
extent of his knowledge of that specific operation or of his approval
of the plan ultimately adopted have not yet been established. There
is no reason to doubt, however, that John Dean was the principal actor
in the Watergate coverup, and that while other motivations may have
played a part, he had a great interest in covering up for himself.
PRE-JUNE 17
Dean came to the White House from Justice from a background
of working on problems of demonstrations and intelligence. Annong
those working under him at the White House were Tom Houston and
John Caulfield. Dean was involved in discussions in 1971 about the
Sandwedge plan Caulfield proposed (Caulfield Testimony 611-612;
r
Magruder Testimony 1880)7 Ehrlichman was told that the original x
authors of the $1, 000, 000 plan were Dean and Liddy lEhrlichman
Deposition 116). Whatever the fact about this, it is clear that Dean
attended the meetings that led up to adoption of the Watergate plan.
Dean introduced Mitchell (who had sponsored Dean for his White House
position) to Liddy on November 24, 1971 (Id., 120; Magruder Testimony
1941). / Dean introduced Magruder to Liddy in December, 1971, and
1772
suggested Liddy for the combined position of general counsel and
chief of intelligence gathering for CRP (Magruder Testimony 1878,
1939-1941). He told Magruder that Mitchell had hired Liddy (Magruder
Testimony 2034).
^■J
Dean, Liddy, Mitchell, and Magruder met to discuss intelligence
plans of this kind on January 27, 1972, land on February 4th (Magruder
Testimony 1881, 1887). Dean was not present at the final meeting on
'^
March 30 when the $250,000 plan was approved /(Magruder Testimony
1899)«/ jit is not clear whether he was not there because he disapproved
or simply because he was not in Key Biscayne or because he wanted to
try to keep his own record clean. \ He is reported as having said that
he "didn't think it was appropriate for him to be in on these conversations'
(Id., 121). He is also reported to have said, at a meeting in Mitchell's
office, that "We shouldn't discuss this in front of Mitchell or in the
Attorney General's office." (Ehrlichman Interview ZOijsee also
Magruder' s Tfestimony 2078)./ At some point during the spring Magruder
phoned Dean and asked him to talk to Liddy to try and calm him down
(Ehrlichman Deposition 112). /At another point Dean, knowing that a
bugging operation was under serious consideration, called Magruder
and referred to the importance of Liddy' s intelligence activities
(Magruder Ifestimony 2078). This arose after an argument between
1773
Magruder and Liddy; Dean urged Magruder not to let personal animosity
"get in the way of the project" (Magruder Testimony 1897). /Also in
March, 1973, Dean claimed to Haldeman that, in the spring of 1972,
he had told Haldeman that he bad been to two meetings at which unaccept-
able and outlandish ideas for intelligence gathering had been rejected by
himself and by Mitchell and that he. Dean, proposed not to attend any
more such meetings. (Second Haldeman Interview 1, 12; Haldeman
Deposition 183). Haldeman has no personal recollection of Dean telling
him about the meetings at the time but is "willing to accept that as a
possibility" (Id. , 184; First Haldeman Interview 8).
POST-JUNE 17
Whatever the facts may be on the matters that are uncertain
in the spring of 1972 about Dean's knowledge of specific approval of
the breakin, it must have been clear to Dean, as a lawyer, when he
heard on June 17th of Watergate, that he was in personal difficulty.
The Watergate affair was so clearly the outgrowth of the discussions
and plans he had been in on that he might well be regarded as a
conspirator with regard to them. He must immediately have realized
that his patron, Mitchell, would also be involved.
1774
It appears that Ehrlichman called Dean on June 17th to advise
him of the problem and to direct hina to take charge of it for tlie White
House. Even without an instruction, this would have been his responsibility,
as Counsel for the President, from the time of the occurrence and he was
active in that role from the moment of his return to the city a day or two
after the breakin (Ehrlichman Deposition 228).
On June 19th Dean met with Liddy, /Mitchell, Strachan, Magruder,
and Sloan. Dean, Mitchell and Magruder also met with LaRvie and
Mardian that evening in Mitchell's apartment. At these meetings the
coverup plan was hatched (Magruder Ttestimony 1913, 1955-1956). A
r
series of meetings followed throughout the summer (Id. , 1918). JDean
and Mitchell were Magruder' a principal contacts on the coverup (Id
/ Dean was not merely one of the architects of the coverup plan.
— -f^^^^ r
He was alsoKts most active participant. /Magruder correctly concluded
that Dean "was involved in all aspects of this coverup" (Magruder
It was Dean who suggested to Haldeman that the FBI was
concerned that it might run into a CIA operation (Second Haldeman
Interview 6). j
/ J- It was Dean who suggested to General Walters on January
26th that CIA pay the Watergate defendants while in jail (Walters
Memo for Record, 6-28-72).
. . 1919).\
£
1775
It was Dean, purportedly acting on behalf of Mitchell, who
came to Ehrlichman several weeks after the breakin to obtain approval
for fundraising by Kalmbach for the arrested persons lEhrlichman
Interview 7).
■t-
- -\ It was Dean wiio reviewed the papers found in Hunt's safe
and declared that they were "politically sensitive" and should be given
special treatnnent lid. , 6).
It was Dean who sought unsuccessfully to have the others
H tre;
omit his name from the list of those who attended nneetings on the
Liddy plans VMagruder Testimony 1924, 2082). /
£--1 It was Dean who urged Hunt to flee the country two days
after the burglaryUHall Affidavit^lS). /
p _) ^
-I- It was Dean and Mitchell who prepared Magruder for his
-1
lonyj (Magruder
-J- It was De
perjurious grand jury testimony! (Magruder Testimony 1922).
)ean who said of a memorandum Colson had prepared
on August 29th stating the facts as he knew them: "For God's sake
3'
destroy the memo, it impeaches Magruder" J(Ehrlichman Interview 2).
A-- It was Dean who suggested that Sloan take the Fifth Amendment,
though Sloan was innocent! (Sloan Testimony 1356). (
I-- It was Dean who was the agent in some of the money dealings
with the arrested persons VSecond Haldeman Interview 6).
1776
I-- It was Dean who told Colson not to make a transcript of
Col Hon' fl taped convcrBation with Hunt and naid that he, I)(>an, would
handle the matter (Report from federal prosecutors, New York Times,
6-28-72).
Throughout all of this Dean was perfectly situated to mastermind
and to carry out a coverup since, as Counsel to the President and the
man in charge for the White House, he had full access to what was
happening in the investigation. . He sat in on FBI interviews with White
House witnesses and received investigative reports. Dean and Ehrlirlunan
met with Attorney General Kleindienst late in July. The Attorney General
described the investigation and said that "it did not appear that any
White House people or any high-ranking Committee people were involved
in the preparation or planning or execution of the breakin" (Ehrlichman
r
Deposition 173).] History fails to record that at that moment Dean
corrected the Attorney General's erroneous impression by pointing
out that Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean had all been involved in planning
A
of operations of which Watergate was an obvious derivative, or that
Strachan had knowledge of the fruits of this kind of operation, or that
all of them were suborning perjury and otherwise seeking to conceal
the facts.
1777
Dean's activity in the coverup also made him, perhaps unwit-
tingly, the principal author of the political and constitutional crisis
that Watergate now epitomizes. It would have been embarrassing to
the President if the true facts had become known shortly after June ITth,
but it is the kind of embarrassment that an immensely popular President
could easily have weathered. The political problem has been magnifird
1,000-fold because the truth is coming to light so belatedly, because of
insinuations that the White House was a party to the coverup, and,
above all, because the White House was led to say things about Watergate
that have since been found to have been untrue. These added consequoncoFi
were John Dean's doing.
Dean was responsible within the White House for becoming
apprised of what had happened. From June 17th on Dean had periodic
conversations with Ehrlichman "about virtually every aspect of this
case" (Ehrlichman Deposition 14Z). Dean reported also to Haldeman
(First Haldeman Interview 7; Second Haldeman Interview 3) and to
Ziegler, to whom he gave repeated assurrances that he had made an
"intensive investigation" and had found no White House involvement
(Ziegler Interview 2). Dean was "the foundation of the proposition
that the White House was not involved" (Ehrlichman interview 15).
1778
SPRING 1973
With the election passed and public interest in Watergate on
the wane, Dean may have thought that this coverup had been a success,
although he purported to continue an ongoing investigation, w At the same
time Dean was affecting a failing memory and talking to Magruder as
if Dean did not recall the pre-Watergate planning meetings in which
he had participated (Magruder Testimony 1929). I In February, Viowever,
with the Ervin Committee beginning its work, the President was again
concerned that all of the available facts be made known. In the middle
of February, 1973, Dean and Richard Moore met with Ehrlichman and
Haldeman at San Clemente. Dean was assigned to reduce "to written form
all of the detailed facts as they related both to the Committee to Re -Elect
and the White House" (Ehrlichman Deposition 152; see also Moore
Interview 6). Dean was pressed continually for that statement, particularly
by Haldeman, but never produced it (Id. , 154).
At this point the Gray confirmation hearings were imminent
and the Ervin hearings were on the horizon. The President, who had
barely known Dean, determined that Counsel to the President was the
appropriate person with whom to work in formulating the President's
position on executive privilege and similar legal issues that these
hearings -- and news conferences on March 2nd and 15th at which
1779
they would arise -- would present. Between February 27th and
April l6th the President met with Dean (and usually others) 21 or 22
times and there were 14 telephone conversations between March lOtli
and April 22nri. lit is probable that Dean helped in^ice the views on
attorney-client privilege and cm separation of powers that would have
immunized Dean himself from having to testify under oathJ? During
this period Dean was developing other problemav^ On March 10th there
were press reports that it was Dean who had recommended Liddy to
CREP. On March 22nd Pat Gray testified that Dean had lied to him
during the course of the FBI investigation of Watergate. On March 23rd
McCord's letter to Judge Sirica was made public. The coverup coming
uncovered.
During this period the point was frequently raised by various
people, including primarily the President, that the whole story of
Watergate should be made publici "Dean's answer always was we
can't do it while the investigation is continuing, there are conflicting
versions of events and the rights of defendants might be prejudiced
by a statement" (Second Haldeman Interview 4). 1
On March 20th the President indicated that he still did not
have all the facts (Id. , 9). In the preceding week Dean had begun
to express to Richard Moore concern about Dean's own involvement.
1780
referring to the meetings in Mitchell's office, the plumbers' operation
and the Ellsberg breakin, and the demand by Hunt, possibly on March
l6th, for more money (Moore Interview l6). After the two of them met
with the President on March 20th Moore told Dean: "I don't think the
President has any idea of the kinds of things that you've told me about. "
When Dean agreed that the President did not, Moore told Dean that it
was his obligation to advise the President and lectured Dean on this
subject (Id. , 17). On March 21st Dean gave the President a more
complete, but still laundered, version of the facts, and so surprised
the President that, according to press accounts of what Dean is saying:
"The President came out of his chair. " At this meeting Dean indicated
that Magruder was involved but that he did not know about Mitchell. He
mentioned the Ellsberg breakin and possibly a second story job at the
Brookings Institution. (Second Ilaldeman Interview). He told about tlie
attempt by Hunt to blackmail Ehrlichman over the Ellsberg breakin.
He suggested that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean might all have
some problem about the financial transactions with the defendants
but that he thought they were more technical and political than legal.
/ He gave no hint, however, of his own orchestration of perjured testimony
by Magruder and othersT)
Ehrlichman suggested that everyone be made to appear before
the grand jury and waive executive privilege. Dean thought this would
1781
be a good idea but only if the persons who appeared before the grand
jury were given immunity. At another meeting that day Ehrlichman
strongly opposed immunity (Second Haldeman Interview 9-10). On
March 23rd Dean was sent to Camp David in order to complete the
long-promised report. Dean was at Camp David for six days but
came down on the night of the 28th and "delivered nothing" (Ehrlichman
Deposition 154).
The failure of Dean's Muse while he was on the mountain is
understandable, since by this time it would have been impossible to
write a believable report that would not have beei self-indicting. While
he was at Camp David, Dean told Ehrlichman's assistant that he was
"not getting the statement done but was planning his own defense"
(Ehrlichman Interview 23). Haldeman talked with him several times
and felt that "Dean was not having much progress in writing his report
but it became clear that he was worrying more about himself" (Second
Haldeman Interview 12). On the 25th the President suggested it be
announced that Dean would appear before the grand jury. On the 26th
Dean agreed but said that he would do so only if given immunity. ( ^'\)
On March 30 th the President relieved Dean of any further
responsibility for the Watergate investigation. He called Ehrlichman
in, told him that it was evident to the President that "Dean was in the
1782
thing up to his eyebrows, " and assigned Ehrlichman to look into
Watergate (Ehrlichnnan Deposition 155). The President indicated to
Ehrlichman that his conversations with Dean throughout the preceding
month had given him "a growing awareness of Dean's personal involve-
ment in this =i< * ^^^ '^^^l^^^l^b^ ^^^^^^^^^
Relieved of his Watergate duties by the President and aware that
his own complicity had become obvious. Dean decided to strike out on
his own to hunt for immunity for the long list of wrongs he had committed.
According to the press, it was April 2nd when he first established contact
with the prosecutors and attempted to bargain for immunity. While he
carried on these negotiations, Ehrlichman completed his report and
advised the President on April 14th that Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean
were all involved (Second Haldeman Interview 15). On the l6th Dean
was asked by the President to resign but refused to do so. On the
30th he was dismissed. His increasingly shrill efforts since that
date to save himself by striking out recklessly at others are too
familiar and tOi;"painful to require mention.
1783
Exhibit No. 68
r- SAM J. ERVIN. JR., N.C. CHAIRMAN
^ HOWARD M. BAKER. JR.. TENN., VICE CHAIRMAN
HERMAN E. TALMADGE. GA. EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.
DANIEL K. INOUYE. HAWAII LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
JOSEPH M. MONTOTA, N. MEX.
SAMUEL DASH
MINORITY COUNSLL
RUFUS L. COMISTEN
DEPUTY COUNSEL
'^Cnticb ^Ictic^ S^cnaic
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
S. RES. 60. 93D congress)
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Admissibility of Hearsay Statements of a Co-conspirator
While Congressional hearings are not limited to
the receipt of evidence competent at a crinninal trial, this
memorandum will summarize for the information of the Select
Committee the evidentiary rules regarding the admissibility at
a trial of out-of-court statements of a co-conspirator.
A. The Rule.
The basic rule as to the admissibility of a hearsay
statement of a co-conspirator against other co-conspirators is as
follows: If there is a conspiracy, the statements of any
co-conspirator in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy
are admissible as substantive evidence against all conspirators.
The fact of a conspiracy and its membership must be proved,
but it may be proven either by circumstantial or direct evidence,
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 28
1784
and this evidence need not be presented before the co-conspirator's
statements are heard. If the hearsay statement is presented
before proof of the conspiracy, the statement is admitted con-
ditionally, with the final determination of its admissibility
dependent upon the presentations of such proof.
To illustrate: In order to induce X to participate
in the venture or to do a particular act (which need not be criminal
in itself), A (a participant in a crime) tells _X_that B and C^ were
active with A^ in an unlawful conspiracy. The testimony by X as
to A's out-of-court statement is admissible in a federal criminal
trial, as an exception to the hearsay rule, to prove that B_and C_
as well as A were participants in the conspiracy, so long as
independent evidence of the conspiracy and participation by B and
C is introduced at any point in the proceeding.
1785
B. The Authorities.
The case law, which clearly establishes the
admissibility against other co-conspirators of a co-conspirator's
out-of-court statements, has an early beginning in the common
law. One of the more important English cases is Regina v.
O'Connell, 5 St. Tr. N. S. 1, 710-11 (1843):
When evidence is once given to the jury of a
conspiracy, against A, B, and C, whatever
is done by A, B, or C in furtherance of the
common criminal object, is evidence against
A, B and C though no direct proof be given
that A, B, or C knew of it or actually parti-
cipated in it .... If the conspiracy be
proved to have existed, or rather if evidence
is given to the jury of its existence, the acts
of one in furtherance of the common design
are the acts of all; and whatever one does in
furtherance of the common design he does as
the agent of the co-conspirators.
The modern federal cases apply the same rule.
One such case is United States v. Pugliese, 153 F. 2d 497
(2d Cir. 1945), in which Pugliese and his wife were charged with
illegally possessing distilled spirits without having the required
revenue stamps. Policemen approached the Pugliese house,
talked to Mrs. Pugliese, searched the house and the adjoining one
1786
and found the illegal liquor. Mrs. Pugliese and then Mr.
Pugliese were arrested and tried together. Mr. Pugliese was
convicted-/ and on appeal argued that it was error for the jury
to be allowed to use as substantive evidence "against Pugliese
the talk between his wife and the policeman. " Judge Learned
Hand, writing for the Court, stated that the admissibility of
the evidence
depended upon whether what she said was
a step in a venture to which both were parties.
If it was, it was admissible in any prosecu-
tion or in any civil action . , , As we said
in Van Riper v. United States, 13 F. 2d 961,
967: "When men enter into an agreement for
an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents
. for one another, and have made a 'partnership
in crime'. What one does pursuant to their
common purpose, all do, and as declarations
may be such acts, they are competent against
all. " See also United States v. Goodman, 2
Cir. 129 F. 2d 1009, 1013. The admissibility
of the wife's declarations in the case at bar
was for the judge, and the fact that the jury
later acquitted her was irrelevant. The issue
before him was altogether different from that
before them: he had only to decide whether,
if the jury chose to believe the witnesses,
Pugliese and his wife were engaged in a joint
undertaking; they had to decide whether they
believed the witnesses beyond a doubt. Nor
did it make any difference that, when the
judge ruled, the prosecution had not yet proved
*
- Mrs. Pugliese was acquitted.
1787
a common enter-prise; the order in which
the evidence goes in is never important.
Cohen v. United States, 2 Cir. 157 F. 651,
655; Hoeppel v. United States, 66 App, D.'C,
71, 85 F. 2d 237, 242; United States v.
Manton, 2 Cir., 107 F. 2d 834, 844. (Id.
at 500.)
The Pugliese case was approved and relied upon
in United States v. Annunziato, 293 F. 2d 273 (2d Cir. 1961),
which affirmed the conviction of a union business agent for re-
ceiving money from an employer in violation of the Labor Management
Relations Act. One important piece of evidence in that case was
the testimony of Richard Terker, who had succeeded his deceased
father, Harry Terker, as President of the Terry Contracting
Company, Inc. Judge Henry J,' Friendly described the challenged
evidence:
(Richard Terker) was allowed, over objection to
testify to a luncheon conversation with his father
late in June or early in July, 1957. The father
inforined the son "that he had received a call fronn
Mr. Annunziato" and "that he had been requested
by Mr. Annunziato for some money on the par-
ticular project in question, the Bridgeport Harbor
Bridge. I asked him what he intended to do, and
he had agreed to send some up to Connecticut
for him. " Cross examination developed the sum
of money mentioned was $250. (Id, at 376)
1788
The Court held that Richard Terker could tfestify as to what his
father had told hini about his conversation with Annunziato,
since Harry Terker's statement was a declaration of a con-
spirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and therefore admissible
against Annunizato.
Another important case is Allen v. United States,
4F. 2d 688 (7th Cir. 1925) in which seventy five defendants were
indicted for violation of the prohibition laws and other offenses.
The Court described a situation where "from police to mayor, from
baliff to the court, corruption was rampant, vice was protected,
bribery was common, and justice was a mockery. Id. at 691. The
challenged testimony was of a newspaper reporter who related a
conversation he had with an unidentified barmaid at one of the drinking
establishments in question. The Court ruled that her being in back
of the bar showed her to be a co-conspirator and hence "her
admission was receivable as against other conspirators, it being
m.ade while the conspiracy was in force, and otherwise pertinent. "
Id at 694.
The Allen court explained:
A conspiracy may be established by circumstantial
evidence or by deduction from facts. The conaaion
design is the essence of the crinie, and this may be
1789
made to appear when the parties steadily pursue
the saine object, whether acting separately or
together, by conitnon or different means, but
ever leading to the same unlawful result. K the
parties acted together to accomplish something
unlawful, a conspiracy is shown, even though
individual conspirators may have done acts in
furtherance of the common unlawful design apart
from and unknown to oti.ers. All of the conspirators
need not be acquainted with each other. They may
not have previously associated together. One
defendant may know but one other member of the
conspiracy. But if, knowing that others have
combined to violate the law, a party knowingly
cooperates to further the object of the conspiracy,
he becomes a parth thereto. (Id. at 691)
As can be seen from the Allen and Pugliese cases,
the amount of independent evidence needed to permit consideration
of a co-conspirator's out-of-court statement is well below that
needed to secure the conviction. See also United States v. Geaney,
417 F. 2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969) ("a fair preponderance of the
evidence independent of the hearsay utterances ").
Of course, if the conspiracy has ended or the state-
ment is not in furtherance of the conspiracy, for example, a
confession by on conspirator after his arrest, the evidence is not
admissible against his co-conspirators. In Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 443r444 (1949), the Supreme Court, by Mr.
Justice Black, stated:
1790
It is firmly established that where made in
furtherance of the objectives of a going
conspiracy, such stateinents (of one co-
conspirator against another)are adinissible as
exceptions to the hearsay rule. This pre-
requisite to admissibility, that hearsay statements
by some conspirators to be admissible against
another must be inade in furtherance of the
conspiracy charged, has been scrupulously
observed by federal courts.
The leading commentators are fully in accord with
this position. See Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 1079 (Chadbourn rev.
1972); McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 267 (1972 ed). The proposed
rules of evidence for Federal courts issued by the Supreme Court
on November 20, 1972 makes a statement of a co-conspirator
admissible on the ground that co-conspirators are each other's
agents. Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Under this approach the statements are
not even considered hearsay.
r^'^/Y,^-
■f(-
iL-
Sanauel Dash
Chief Counsel
1791
EXHIBIT No. 69
dARHY BROWN
3dOistrict, Michigan
Congress! of tfte Winittti states;
^ou&t of i^epre£(entattbesi
SSajsljington, ©.C. 20515
Telephone^ (202) 225-5011
Room 2-1-36 Federai- Cekter
74 North Washington
Battle Creek. Michigan 49017
TeuphonE: (616) 962-1551
Room 1 12 federal Building
410 W. Michigan Avenue
Kalamazoo. Michigan 49006
TELEPHONE: (616) 381-8290
(MON.-WED..FRI.)
The Honorable Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
Chairman
Select Conunittee on Presitiential
Campaign Activities
Senate Office Builciing
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
WASHr-TON.DX. 20510 3^,, ,^^^,.,_ ^^
^ JUN2 7
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310
Late yesterday afternoon upon learning of the statement given to your
Committee by John W. Dean, III in which he implicated me and members of
the Banking and Currency Committee in what he has alleged was a "cover-up"
of the Watergate matter and other improper conduct, I immediately dictated
a letter to you demanding that I be given an opportunity to appear before
your Committee and respond to, deny, and rebut Mr. Dean's allegations. ^
Before I had an opportunity to get the letter off to you, I was pleased to
be contacted by a member of your Committee's majority staff who indicated
an interest in talking with me relative to the allegations set forth and
involving me in Dean's statement. I met with your Mr. Dorsen and Mr. Parr
and believe that this conference was mutually beneficial. I thank you for
providing me with this opportunity to at least apprise your Committee staff
of my position relative to Dean's charges.
Although I think I have satisfied your Committee staff members that Dean had
no factual justification to link the House Banking and Currency Committee
action with what he has testified were White House cover-up activities, his
irresponsible or false statements with respect thereto have caused me and
other members of the Banking and Currency Committee grave harm. Without
equivocation, I can state it was not known to me nor to any other member of
the Committee, to my knowledge, that our opposition to the granting of sub-
poena power to Chairman Patman was in any way, nor could be claimed to be in
any way, a part of the cover-up about which Mr. Dean is testifying.
I, personally, vehemently deny the truth of Mr. Dean's statement that my
letter of September 8, 1972 to the Attorney General was "in fact, drafted
by Parkinson for Congressman Brown." This is an untrue statement, the letter
1792
The Honorable Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
June 26, 1973
having been dictated by me and having contained my work product.
Although I am preparing a chronological statement of my whole participation
in the successful effort to deny Chairman Patman sxibpoena power in October
of last year, the mere filing of such a statement with yoxir Committee emd
even the giving of the same to the media will not counteract and repudiate
the publicity given to Mr. Dean's testimony.
I, therefore, respectfully request and insist that I be given an opportunity
to appear before your Committee and respond to the allegations made by
Mr. Dean. The granting of this request, Mr. Chairman, is the least your
Committee should do, it seems to me, to attempt to coapect the unwarranted
and unjustified damage that has been done. Your pjc^^^t and favorable response
to this request will be greatly appreciated. ^-' /
With best regards.
GAERY BROWM
cc: Members of Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
1793
Exhibit No. 70
'TllCniteb ^ict^e!i ^erxale
committee on armed services
Washington, D.C. 20510
June 29, 1973
Senator Howard Baker
Senator Edward Gurney
Mr. Fred B. Thompson, Minority Counsel
318 Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.
Dear friends:
Earlier testimony in today's hearing carried the
impression that a friend of mine, Mr. Harry Dent
of South Carolina, might have done something
improper.
J would greatly appreciate it if one of you
gentlemen would set the record straight before
today's hearings are completed.
The testimony that I refer to came about during
questions asked by Senator Inouye, regarding
attempts made by Republicans to "find dirt" on
Senator Ervin. Mr. Dean said that Harry Dent had
been contacted, but no one stated that Mr. Dent
declined.
I suggest that this be brought out by questioning
Dean directly or by obtaining permission to insert
any of a number of news stories which appeared in
the press which indicated that Mr. Dent had declined
to' do any of that type research against Senator Ervin.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter, and
with kindest personal regards.
Very truly.
^.^tCff^'VV- ^fij^^^-rurryr^-trrJ^
Strom Thurmond
ST/mb
1794
Exhibit No. 70A
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, ET. AL.'
Plaintiffs
V,
RICHARD M, NIXOISI,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Defendant
Civil
Action
No.
AFFIDAVIT OF FRED D. THOMPSON
Fred D. Thompson, being sworn, deposes and says:
1, Early in June, 1973, the White House transmitted
to the Select Committee a memorandum (which is attached to this
affidavit) listing certain oral communications, "both face-to-face and
telephonic, between President Richard M^ Nixon and John Wesley Dean m.
This memorandum, inter alia , includes the exact times and durations of
these communications, and, in the case of face-to-face communications,
the other participants, if any, in those conversations.
1795
2. Shortly thereafter, I received a telephone call
from J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Counsel to the President. During
this telephone call, Mr. Buzhardt related to me his understanding
as to the substance of certain portions of the enumerated conversations
between the President and Mr. Dean.
3. During my discussion with Mr, Buzhardt, I
made detailed notes on the information that he gave me. Upon
conclusion of the conversation, I promptly prepared a "Memoranduni
of Substance of Dean's Calls and Meeting with the President, " a
copy of vhich is attached to this affidavit. It is my belief that this
memorandum accurately reflects the information imparted to me by
Mr. Buzhardt.
Subscribed and sv/orn to, before
me, this _£Z^ day of ^^^^^s/^c,7^ \
Notary Public, D.C.
My Commission Expires^!l^^:^4v tq.^
1796
MEMORANDUM OF SUBSTANCE OF DEAN'S CALLS
AND MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT
September 15, 1972 Dean reported on IRS investigation of Larry O'Brien.
Dean reported on Watergate indictments.
February 27, 1973 Discussed executive privilege, minority counsel
for Watergate Committee. Dean suggested White
House aides submit answers to interrogatories.
February 28, 1973 President inquired of Watergate, Dean said no White
House involvement, Stans was victim of circumstance'',
Colson was lightning rod because of his reputation.
Discussed wiretappings which had been brought up
in the Gray hearings. Sullivan, Deputy Director,
was friend of Dean and Dean suggested they make
sure that wiretaps of prior years (other Administra-
tions) be made known.
March 1, 1973 Preparation for press conference -- go over question
and answer book. Was decided the question would
come up as to why Dean was sitting in on FBI inter-
, views and that the reason was he was conducting an
investigation for the President. President asked
Dean to write a report. Dean was also critical of
. . Gray.
(March 2 press conference)
March 6, 1973 • Discussed executive privilege guidelines, decided
to cover former White House personnel as well as
present.
March 7, 1973 Again discussion executive privilege guidelines.
Dean again told the President the White House was
clear. The President inquired as to how Pat Gray
was doing. Dean informed himE.B. Williams had
dropped out of the civil case.
1797
^farch 8, 1973 President inquired as to whether Chapin had
helped Segretti. Dean said no.
March 10. 1973 ?
(March 12: Issued statement on executive privilege,
applies to present and former staffers but will pro-
vide information. )
March 13, 1973 Preparation for press conference. Went over ques-
tions and answers. President inquired as to Ken
Rietz. Dean said no illegality involved. President
^ asked if Colson or Haldeman knew Segretti. President
asked if Mitchell and Colson knew of Watergate.
Dean said there was nothing specific on Colson; that
he didn't know about Mitchell but that Strachan could
be involved. President states again that Dean should
compile a written report about the matter. Dean
said Sirica was a hanging judge, the President said
he liked hanging judges. They discussed fund raising
before April 7. Dean said that everything that had been
done was legal.
March 14, 1973 Press conference was discussed -- questions and
answers. Discussed executive privilege. Decided
they needed a Supreme Court test. Decided that
the President should discuss his Ij^R nnsition.
That afternoon the President suggested Dean should
possibly appear before the press and discussed wheth.c::
Chapin should make a statement about Segretti. The
Gray hearings and the use of FBI files were also
. ■ discussed.
March 15, 1^73 President held press conference. That afternoon
discussed that day's press conference and decided on
use of "separation of powers" instead of executive
privilege terminology.
March 16, 1973 The President reiterated his position on use of raw
FBI fules. Suggested Dean's written report be
accompanied by affidavits. Dean suggested untimely
release of written report might prejudice rights of
innocent people. Discussed poBsibility of getting
1798
Dar,:i to iatei-vi-.-v.' rlaL^.eman and
EhrliclnTi.in. Thf. President suggested Dean should
possibly go to Camp David to write his report.
March 17, 1973 President had made a note on a press survey contair ' \g
an article alleging White House involvement for folic /-
up (Dean possibly has copy of this). Dean again sug-
gested they bring out 1968 bugging and President
said Kleindienst had advised against it. Several
names were discussed as possibly subject to attack:
Colson, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Dean
himself. The President asked Dean point-blank if
_^ „ he knew about the planned break-in in advance. Dcp-\
said no, there there was no actual White House invc' •
vement regardless of appearances except possibly
Strachan. Dean told President Magruder pushed
Liddy hard but that Haldeman was not involved.
The President wanted Haldeman, Ehrlichman and
Dean to talk to the Committee and Dean resisted.
Dean told the President of the EUsberg break-in but 7*^
that it had nothing to do with Watergate.
(March 19: Ervin had been on Face the Nation and
accused Dean of liiding behind executive privilege. )
March 19, 1973 It was decided Dean would send a letter or sworn
statement to the Judiciary Committee answering
certain questions.
March 20, 1973 (Republican leadership had been in that day. )
Dean discussed Mitchell's problems with the grand
. jm'y. Vesco and the Gurney press conference.
The President and Moore agreed that the whole
investigation should be made public and that a state-
ment should be released imn^ediately after the sen-
tencing of the defendants. Dean suggested that each
member of the Ervin Committee be challenged to
invite an FBI investigation of his own Senate campaign.
The President called Dean that night and Dean said
that there was "not a scintilla of evidence" to indi-
cate White House involvement and Dean suggested
he give the President a more in-depth briefing on
what had transpired.
1799
March 21, 1973 Dean gave the President his theory of what had
happened. He still said no prior June 17 White
House knowledge, that Magruder probably knew,
that Mitchell possibly knew, that Strachan probably
knew, that Haldeman had possibly seen the fruits of
the wiretaps through Strachan, that Ehrlichman was
vulnerable because of his approval of Kalmbach's ■
fund raising efforts. Colson had made the call to
Magruder. He stated Hunt was trying to blackmail
Ehrlichman about Hunt's prior plumber activities
unless he was paid what ultimately might amount
to $1 million. The President said how could it
possibly be paid, "What makes you think he would
be satisfied with that? ", stated it was blackmail,
that it was wrong, that it would not work, that the
truth would come out anyway. Dean had said that a
Cuban group could possibly be used to transfer the
I payments. Dean said^Colson had talked_io_Hunt-
■ ■ about executive clemencyj He spoke of Haldeman's
return of the $350, 000. He said that Haldeman and
Ehrlichman possibly had no legal guilt with regard
to the money matters. Dean said nothing of his
role with regard to the cover-up money. He said
nothing about his discussions with Magruder helping
him prepare for the grand jury. He said nothing of
his instructions to Caulfield to offer executive
clemency.
This information was gone over twice, the last
time in Haldeman's presence.
Later that afternoon it was tentatively decided that
everyone would go to the grand jury, however. Dean
wanted immunity. Haldeman suggested that they
"' write the whole thing out and release it from the
White House. Ehrlichman said there should be no
executive privilege claim and that no one should a.;k
for immunity. The President told them to discuss
these matters with Mitchell.
March 22, 1973 Mitchell suggests they go before the Ervin Cominl Lloe,
that they not use executive privilege but that first
it should all be put down on paper .
96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 29
1800
March 23, 1973 The, President called Dean and told him to go to
Camp David. Later that afternoon he called Dean
at Camp David to check on his progress.
(March 30: After it became obvious Dean would
write no report, the President directed Ehrlichman
to iiiveatigate.
On Apj-il 14 Ehrlichman reported possible Mitchell,
Magruder and Dean involvement. The President
called Kleindienst, who followed up. (Up until now
the President had assumed Dean was getting much
of his information from the Justice Department.)
Kleindienst and Petersen focused in on possible
involvement of Hakleman, Ehrlichman and Strachan.
On April 15 Petersen submitted a memo on Ehrlich-
man, Haldeman and Strachan. They also found out
about Gray's destruction of documents. )
April 15, 1973 Dean along with almost everybody else was called
in that day. The President told Dean that he must
go before the grand jury without immunity.
April 16, 1973 The President asks Dean to resign. Had two
drafts prepared for Dean's signature. Dean
demanded Haldeman and Ehrlichman resign also.
(Petersen asked the President to hold off on firing
Dean until they could get him before the grand jury.
On April 17 the President released his statement
saying that no White House staffers would receive
inimunity.
On April 19 Dean said he would not be a scapegoat.
On April 21 Petersen told the President there is no
use trying to get Doan to go before the grand jury,
that he was demanding iinmunity.
On April 30 the President made his speech concernJr
Haldeman' 8 and Ehrlichman' a resignations end Dean-
firing. )
1801
Exhibit No. 71
AprU 24, 1973
Mir. Gamett D. Inscoe
Suburban Trust Company
255 N. Washington Street
RockvUle, Maryland 20850
Dear Gamett:
Enclosed you will find: (1) client's check dated April 20,
1973, numbered 1647 payable to the order of myself and Mr. McKeever as
Trustees In the amount of $4,850.00 which we have suitably endorsed to the
Bank; (2) the Bank's Treasurer's check dated April 19, 1973, in the amount of
$10,350.00 covering the cash I delivered to you for safekeeping on Friday, ;*
April 13, 1973, pending the opening of an account; and (3) the two signature ; i
cards signed by Mr. Dean, myself and my partner, McKeever.
As you know, when we first discussed opening the account I
ccntcr?.pl*ted thet Thomg? Hogan, Eequire, would be co-trustee with myself
inasmuch as He then also represented Mr. Dean. However, subsequent de-
velopments (conflict of interest) have required Mr. Hogan to withdraw from the
representation and, accordingly, my partner, McKeever, ts acting as co-trustee •
This change also required Mr. Dean to substitute his enclosed
check numbered 1647 for his check numbered 1643 originally payable to Mr.
Hogan and myself as Trustees. I have had Mr. Dean void the latter check by
tearing his signature therefrom and It remains in our files .
Should you be inquired of by competent authorities as to the
opening of this account, please tell them all you know, including whatever I
have told you.
1802
Mr. Gamett D. Inscoa
Aprtl24, 1973
Page Two
Thank you for your cooperation In the matter.
Sincerely,
SHAFFER, McKEEVER & FITZPATRICK
f CHARLES NORMAN SHAFFER
',;; mle'
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«f fands or the transaction of any business for this account. It ii atrreed that all transactioni between 70a
mnd the- gndersigrned ihall be goverocd by the contract printed on tht rcverac side of thia card and reaolutioa
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afftrteyy
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jf.'incxxx lA/^^tAfa^ WT
X3acxxx Charles N. Shaffer. Trustee
rfjfltixxx ?^y^\^' Nj^^^^^Qr, Trustee
€^^^ -.r I i^j^i , . - , /^u j/gg_ T«l. N..
R;.:*.. ALL CHECKS ARE TO BF! .qTHMFn RV .TOHM M,
ton ii.t>s.c. DEAN III AND COUNTERSIGNED BY ONE OF THE
TRri<^TPpC; Account Initial
f
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lOO QUAY STREET ::r"--~:A — - '*'■ 52 . M
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TOl SUBURBAN TRUST COMPANY:
You are authorized to recognize any ( ) of the ( ) signature* (ubfcribed below in the payment
of funds or the transaction of anjr business (or this account. It is agreed that all transactions between jron
end the undersigned shall be governed by the contract printed on the reverse side of this card and resolotion
attached hereto.
KaiXXyJohn W. Dean III
^^f^ Charles N. Shaffer, Trustee
^ji^x "^on^^c-^^T— Hog-aft-, — Trijo-too-
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Baak ii.t.r..c. DEAN III AND COUNTERSIGNED BY ONE OF THT?
'1' ^^i J^'fRh^*^ Account loittal
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TOl SUBURBAN TRUST COMPANY:
Vcu are authorized to recognize any ( ) of tbe ( ) signatures subscribed below in the payment
«f funds or the transaction of any business for this account. It is aKtced that all transactions between you
•nd the undersigned shall be governed by the contract printed on the reverse side of this card and resolution
attached hereto.
»X-K«J4X Tohn W. Dean. Ill
xxa^xxx
xx«xxx Chayles N. Shaffer, Trustee
XXXXXX
ALL CHECKS ARE TO BE SIGNED BY JOHN W
Baa R.t.r.n,. DEAN III AND COUNTERSIGNED BY ONE OF THE
TRIiqT'FFC; Account Inltlsl
ttntatUby ^ '^'^•^ i- i-'i^J o>«oid by Depo»it I OsU
TOt SUBURBAN TRUST COMPANY:
You are authorized to recognize any ( ) of the ( ) signatures subscribed below in the payment
•f funds or the transaction of any business for this account. It is acrccd that all transactions between you
and the undersigned shall be governed by the contract printed on the reverse side of this c::d zr.d rc.>o!iit;an
attached hereto.
^'r^*^'y Tohn W. Dean. Ill
Hm^TiKK
x»jcxxx
Charles N,
— r/7
Shaffer. Trustee
^?^xxx ^:i^4z>Ci. //' /-^U^^^*^^
Pa;{)rlck.C. McKeeVer, Trustee
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.... ALL CHECKS ARE TO BE SIGNED RV .TOHM W,
«.(.r...c. DEAN III AND COUNTERSIGNED BY ONE OF THE
lirtr^iite< by
TRUSTEES
1808
Exhibit No. 72
^ Ku-.vin^s2^.i^a iJ. /O^^-^^ E>:7 _c;?7^// ^..^rocs
AIJD reZURI7/GS*Al
CAraiS?. ITLIGE2 ElES SUS SP«n3, RaJTES, CT3.
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1809
Exhibit No. 73
ROOM
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UloA Mil)
^M^zW^''?MZSM£~mL::i^^
6
1810
Exhibit No. 74
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
> c 2000' December 3, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Enclosed is a memorandum relating to iNTiite House support that the
RNC is currently providing. The major question asked In this mem-
orandum is whether the RNC should continue to fund these activities
or whether the Committee for the Re-Election of the President should.
Both Hugh Sloan and I feel funding should be assumed by our Committee.
Because of the December 1 deadline, this question needs to be answered
as soon as possible.
We recommend that the Committee for the Re-Election of the President
assume all White House support activities.
Approve \/ Disapprove Comment
^
CONFIDENTIAL
1811
Exhibit No. 75
COMMITTEE FOii Tl :E KE-CLLCTION OF T! iZ PhZiSlDENT
January lA, 1972
I
COXFIDENTIAL
MEXORANDU^I FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBJECT: Telgphonc Plan for the Florjda Primary
The telephone can be used effectively in riany vjays ia a campaign.
In the New Hampshire Primary, the President has two opponents on
opposite sides of the political spectrum v;ho are able to achieve
visibility in a small state. Therefore, the telephone is being
used to canvass the voters, determine their voting intentions and
focus on those who arc undecided. In Florida, Ashbrooli's najor
problen is to become known to the voters. As long as the President
is dominant in the ninds of the voters, the objective of the •'
telephone should be to make them aware of the election and get
them to turn out .
A technique that is effective inT that—direction is the use of
recorded messages over the telephone. In Florida, the cost
appropriate type of message would be an endorsc.r.cnt of the President
by a conservative of national stature, such as Governor Pvca^an or
Senator Goldwater.
Such r.essdges have been used successfully in many local campaigns.
Although- they are not particularly effective in changing the
attitudes of the voters, they do appear to be effective in in-
creasing the turnout.
The proposed telephone operation v/ould be done the last two weeks
of the campaign, when the voters are most likely to be influenced
by media comiunications. It v7ould cover the five priority counties
which contain 60% of the state's registered Republicans: Pinellas,'
Broward, Dade, Palm Beach and Orange. If there is additional' time
available during the two-week blitz, other counties v.'ould be covered
on a priority basis, according to their Republican registration (Tab A)
1812
CONFIDF.NTIAI,
- 2 -
This program would be carried out by a profi;ai;ionnl vendor,
equipped to place such calls in high volume and exiiericnccd in
Republican political campaigns. Wc have had exploratory talks with
several who would be qualified.
The cost is expected to be no nore than ten cents per call,
including the obtaining of telephone numbers. Therefore, the total
projected cost would be:
Five priority counties:
430,000 registered Republicans
{Estimated 275,000 households)
275,000 X $.10 = $27,500
280,000 remaining Republicans- in the state
(Estimated 180,000 households)
180,000 X $.10 = 18,000
Total cost (if all Republicans are contacted) $45,500
If you agree with this concept and the approxirr.ate cost of
$45,000, we will proceed to select the r.ost qualified vendor and
!.develop a specific cost proposal for your approval,
. Recor-mendation -^
That you approve the concept of using the telephone to corr:iunicate
recorded messages to registered Republicans in Florida, subject
to your final approval of the specific cost proposal and choice of
vendor . • .
.Approve_
Disapprove_
Comment
1.:
t '!
b-. ^;^^<>^
pc.U:W-A.^N f^l^wv^ iw.-^"^ '^ P
JEB S. MAGRUDER
5'
p^/jA
CONFIDENTIAL
1813
.D.\
. ,. ■ -igeg
(Wlunc J
'. '.!;.■* RcpuMtcnn
.
; ' ' Rc£lr.tiation
•'^■^,; ■■' -Rc-.
% State
' FinelLis 121,895
19::
Broward ' ' 95,166
15Vi
DaJc' > 72.019
11%
PjlmDcach ' 50,-142
8%
'Ofaiif.- 37, 5^)0
6'/?>
6.
lircvarJ : 30.277
S'/i
7.
S.uasota •' : ' 30,146
S'/i
8.
Hlllsboroiislx; . 27.230
• 4%
9.
Volusia , /■. 22,365
4%
10.
: Duval : V-"^ 21.4S9
y/o
KL'Y cou.\r:i;s and i:i:V I'UiXiNcrs
(WIioic 'ilK- Volts Arc To Wi;i)
493.947
11. Manatee
12..1'olk
13. Lcc^ •'
14. Pasco
15. Seminole
16.; Uke
17. Escambia
18. Charlolle
19. St. Lucie.
20. Alachua'
21. Indian River
22. Collier
23. Marion
24. Leon
25. Martin ■,
26. Osceola
27. Okniooia
28. HirJilands
29.' Day
30. Monroe
; 14,673
^14.181
;13,091
10,441
7.580
553.913
7,127
6.767
5.466
4,492
4.411
582.176
4.221
4.153
3,665
3.496
3.449-'
601,160
2%
2%
2%
2%
1%
89vo
1%
1%
1%
.5%
^%
93/0
.5%
".5%
.5%
.5%
.5%
96;;^
.5%
.4%
.49^
!3%
.3%
9S'^
O
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