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Full text of "Presidential campaign activities of 1972, Senate resolution 60; Watergate and related activities"

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D >5t5 A 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972 

SENATE RESOLUTION 60 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 



WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 
Phase I: Watergate Investigation 

WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 27, 28, 29, AND JULY 10, 1973 

Book 4 




Printed for the use of the 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 



i^raniilin fierce U^>^ ^^u.er Lib,rary 
D359B 




PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972 

SENATE RESOLUTION 60 



HEARINGS 



BEFORE THE 



SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES 



OF THE 



UNITED STATES SENATE 

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 



WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 
Phase I: Watergate Investigation 

WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 27, 28, 29, AND JULY 10, 1973 

Book 4 




Printed for the use of the 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
96-296 O WASHINGTON : 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price !?3.00 

Stocli Number 5270-01964 



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES 

(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session) 

* 



SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina, Chairman 
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, Georgia EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr., Connecticut 

JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico 

Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

Frkd D. Thompson, Afinoriiy Counsel 

RxJFUS L. Edmisten, Deputy Chief Counsel 

Arthur S. Miller, Chief Consultant 

David M. Dorsen, Assistant Chief Counsel 

Terry F. Lenzner, Assistant Chief Counsel 

James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel 

Carmine S. Bellino, Chief Investigator 

Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator 

Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel 

R. Phillip Haire, Assistant Counsel 

Marc 1, ACKnnz, Assistant Counsel 

WiLLUM T. Mayton, Assistant Counsel 

Ronald D. UoTVtiDA, Assistant Counsel 

Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel 

Howard S. Iaebengood, AssistaiU Minority Counsel 

H. Wiluam Shvre, Assistant Minority Counsel 

Robert Silverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel 

Laura Matz, Administrative Assistant 

Carolyn Andrade, OfficeManager 

Joan C. Cole, Secretary to theMinority 

(n) 



CONTENTS 



HEARING DAYS 

Page 

Wednesday, June 27, 1973 1347 

Thursday,' June 28, 1973 1431 

Friday, June 29, 1973 1507 

Tuesdaj^, July 10, 1973 1601 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

Wednesday, June 27, 1973 

Dean, John W., Ill, former counsel to the President, accompanied by 
Charles N. Shaffer and Robert C. McCandless, counsels, testimonj'^ 

resumed 1348 

Shaffer, Charles N., Esq., statement of 1574 

Thursday, June 28, 1973 

Dean, John W., Ill, testimonj- resumed 1431 

Friday, June 29, 1973 

Dean, John W., Ill, testimonj^ resumed 1508 

Tuesday, July 10, 1973 

Mitchell, John N., former Attorney General and campaign director of the 
Committee To Re-Elect the President, accompanied by William G. 
Hundlej^, Plato C. Cacheris, and Marvin Segal, counsels 1601 

INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY MEMBERS OF THE 
COMMITTEE AND COUNSELS 

Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr Dean: 1388, 

1389, 1429, 1430, 1452-1465, 1531, 1532, 1536, 1537, 1569, 1596, 
1599, 1600. 

Baker, Hon. Ho^vard H., Jr Dean : 1465-1488, 

1491-1495, 1537-1557, 1563, 1569, 1597, 1598. 

Talmadge, Hon. Herman E Dean: 1488-1490, Mitchell: 1653-1667. 

Inouye, Hon. Daniel K Dean: 1412-1429, 1431-1451, 1526-1535, 1557-1562. 

Montoya, Hon. Joseph M Dean: 1508-1511. 

Gurney, Hon. Edward J Dean: 1351-1387, 

1389-1408, 1511-1523. Mitchell: 1667-1681. 

Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr Dean: 1495-1504. 

Dash, Samuel, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Dean: 1349, 1350, 

1386, 1387, 1408-1411, 1564-1580. Mitchell: 1602-1636. 
Thompson, Fred D., minority counsel Dean: 1580-1597. Mitchell: 1636-1652. 

EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

No. 44 — (1349) Papers from a file entitled "Opponents List" and "Political 
Enemies Project." First document is briefing paper pre- 
pared for Mr. Haldeman for a meeting with the head of 
IRS. This is followed by "IRS Talking Paper." 1682 

No. 45 — (1349) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re: 
Tax discrepancies in income tax return of Harold J. 
Gibbons, vice president of the Teamsters Union 1686 

No. 46 — (1349) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re: In- 
formation received from an informer concerning Jack 
Anderson 1687 



Note. — Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the 
record. 

(Ill) 



IV 

Page 
No. 47 — (1349) Memorandum for John Dean from Jack Caulfield. Subject: 

Opposition Activity 1688 

No. 48 — (1350) Memorandum prepared by John Dean for members of the 
White House staff. Subject: DeaUng with our Political 

Enemies 1689 

No. 49 — (1350) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re: 

Names given top priority on enemies list 1692 

No. 50 — (1350) Memorandum for Larry Higby from John Dean concerning 

names for enemies list 1697 

No. 51 — (1350) Section of a news summary from Higby to Dean, indicating 

that DNC treasurer Robert Strauss should be on the list. 1699 
No. 52 — (1350) Additions to enemies list sent to John Dean from Gordon 

Strachan 1700 

No. 53 — (1350) Memorandum for John Dean from Gordon Strachan. 

Subject: Political Enemies. (Re: Chet Huntley.) 1701 

No. 54 — (1350) Memorandum to John Dean from Gordon Strachan with 
attached news summary indicating that J. Irwin Miller 

might be considered for enemies list 1703 

No. 55 — (1350) Memorandum from a member of Charles Colson's staff re: 
People who attended a rally for a "dump Nixon" 

program 1705 

No. 56 — (1350) List of Mc Govern campaign staff with asterisks beside key 

names that were to be included in the opponents project. 1707 
Nos. 57 and 58 — (1388) Marked for identification only and are not for 

publication. 
No. 59 — (1393) Bank statement on account of John Welsey [sic] Dean, IIL 1712 
No. 60 — (1409) Additional document updating the enemies list, entitled 

"Politicos Continued" 1713 

No. 61 — (1409) Memorandum from member of Charles Colson's staff. Sub- 
ject : Opponents Lists 1725 

No. 62 — (1409) Memorandum re: Updating of opponents list 1728 

No. 63 — (1410) Document entitled "Corporate Executives Committee for 
Peace, Trip to Washington— June 25, 1970." This 

document also is an update of the enemies list 1730 

No. 64 — (1410) List of Democratic contributors of $25,000 or more in 1968 

campaigns (from New York Times Story, June 20, 1971) _ 1733 
No. 65 — (1410) Memorandum re: List of Muskie contributors to be added 

to opponents list 1734 

No. 66 — (1412) Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the 
President, to Senator Inouye re: Questions and a mem- 
orandum previously furnished the committee in ques- 
tioning Mr. Dean 1754 

No. 67 — (1412) Memo and questions pertaining to exhibit No. 66 1755 

No. 68 — (1525) Memorandum of Law, Admissibility of Hearsay State- 
ments of a Co-conspirator. Submitted by Samuel Dash, 
chief counsel and staff director, Senate Select Com- 
mittee on Presidential Campaign Activities 1783 

No. 69 — (1557) Letter from Congressman Garry Brown to Senator Ervin 

re: Certain statements made bv Mr. Dean 1791 

No. 70 — (1563) Letter from Senator Strom Thurmond to Senators Baker 

and Gurney and Mr. Fred Thompson re: Mr. Harry 

Dent declining to do research against Senator Ervin__ 1793 

No. 70A — (1569) Detailed notes of Fred D. Thompson, minority counsel, 

of telephone conversation with J. Fred Buzhardt, 

special counsel to the President re: Conversation 

between the President and Mr. Dean 1794 

No. 71 — (1573) Letter to Mr. Garnett D. Inscoe, Suburban Trust Co., 

from Shaffer, McKeever & Fitzpatrick with enclosures. 1801 

No. 72— (1595) Request for transportation dated October 11, 1972 1808 

No. 73— (1595) Request for transportation dated October 19, 1972 1809 

No. 74 — (1655) Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb S. 

Magruder, dated December 3, 1971 1810 

No. 75 — (1656) Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb S. 
Magruder, dated January 14, 1972. Subject: Telephone 
Plan for the Florida Primary, with attachment 1811 

Note.— Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record. 



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972 
PHASE I: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION 



WEDNESDAY, JUN:^ 27, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washington^ B.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 
318, Eiissell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Ervin, Jr. (chair- 
man), presiding. 

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and "Weicker. 

Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director : Fred D. 
Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief 
counsel: Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel ; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator W^eicker; John Walz, 
publications clerk. 

Senator Eratn. We have two very peculiar questions which have 
been addressed to the committee, apparently by ]\Ir. J. Fred Buzhardt, 
special counsel to the President. The first question addressed to the 
committee by Mr. Buzhardt is this : 

"Did you and your counsel develop a strategy for obtaining immu- 
nitv from prosecution? What were the elements of that strategy?" 

On behalf of the committee, I would reply to Mr. Buzhardt that the 
only strategy we developed was to pursue the course outlined by the 
act of Congress codified as sections 6002 and 6005 of title 18 of the 
United States Code. 

The second question to the committee is: "Didn't your strategy in- 
clude deliberate leaks of information to the media on what you had 
told investigators?" Maybe this is addressed to Mr. Dean, I do not 
know. [Laughter.] It is probably addressed to Mr. Dean. 



(1347) 



1348 

Mr. Dean, I will ask you these questions — ^well, maybe I had just 
better let us proceed in orderly fashion. I am sorry I misconstrued the 
question. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I had not seen these before this 
moment. I notice there is a cover letter dated June 27, 1973, which I 
have seen now for the first time. It says, "Pursuant to the rules of the 
committee, there are enclosed herewith questions which we believe 
would be appropriate to have asked of Mr. Dean." 

I will say ag^ain I have only seen these just now, but from that 
cover letter it would appear to me that these are questions submitted 
to be propounded to the witness and not to the committee. I wonder if 
the chairman might agree with me in view of the cover letter which 
has been handed me by counsel. 

Senator Ervin. The only thing which misled me was the fact we had 
two series of questions. One of them was numbered 1 and 2, and the 
second series of questions also are numbered 1 and 2. So I drew the 
inference from this that the first question and the second question were 
addressed to the committee. But perhaps I have misconstrued that. 

Senator Baker. I think I would agree with my chairman, who has 
implied that it would be inappropriate for anyone to address questions 
to the committee, and if that is in fact the fair intendment of the 
letter, then I do disagree with it and I would suggest that they be dis- 
regarded. If, in fact, they are questions submitted under rule 25 of the 
Standing Rules of the Committee to be propounded to the witness, it 
would seem to me we have a different situation. 

Senator Ervin. I might state these were just handed to me about 
1 second before I read them, and I drew the inference since the ques- 
tions were separated as they were, some of them were addressed to the 
committee rather than the witness. But perhaps I am mistaken in that, 
but I would say that the only strategy this committee lias followed to 
secure immunity for any witness has been to pursue the law strictly. 

Senator Baker. I think the chairman is entirely correct, and I think 
the committee has tracked the provisions of the statute carefully. On 
one occasion, at least, Mr. Chairman, I recall that we retracked our steps 
for fear there might be a technical deficiency in our method of opera- 
tion. The votes have been unanimous in each case, even though the 
statute only requires a two-thirds vote in order to request immunity. 
So I agree with my chairman that the only strategy this committee 
has followed is to track the provisions of the available statute law in 
order to gain the most information we can in order to present it to the 
Senate. 

Mr. Dean". INIr. Chairman 

Senator Ervin. Now, yesterday the witness was asked to produce 
some exhibits, and I just wanted to ask him if he had provided them. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN DEAN III, FOKMER COUNSEL TO THE PRESI- 
DENT, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARLES N. SHAFFER AND ROBERT C. 
McCANDLESS, COUNSELS— Resumed 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Chairman, the only thin<? I wanted to say, the only 
involvement I had in what you are referring to is I did participate 
a number of years ago first in the development of that statute and, 
second, its drafting and its relationship with the Senate in its adop- 



1349 

tion, but I did take at that time, in representing the Department of 
Justice, a far different position that the Attorney General should have 
the ability to nullify any request of any committee to grant immunity 
to any witness, which is far different from the one Congress accepted 
ultimately. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, Mr. Dean, did you bring with you this morning the 
exhibits that you indicated you had and the committee requested you 
to bring? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Could you just submit them and perhaps identify them as 
you submit them to the committee ? 

Mr. Deax. These are from a file that is entitled "Opponents List and 
Political Enemies Project." The first document in the file, and these 
are not in any chronological order, is a briefing paper that was pre- 
pared for Mr. Haldeman for a meeting with the head of Internal 
Eevenue Service. The goal of the briefing paper which was based on 
material that was provided to me by Mr. Caulfield who, in turn, got 
information from friends of his within the Internal Revenue Service, 
was to make the IRS politically responsive to the White House, and 
I think that the document is self-explanatory. It is not marked other 
than the heading which says "To Accomplish Make IRS Politically 
Responsive." 

I will mark these as I 

Mr. Dash. Well, you can mark them following your last exhibit 
number. 

Mr. Deax. For the sake of the record, right now I will call it exhibit 
A. 

FThe document referred to was marked exhibit No. 44.^] 

Mr. Deax. The next ex'hibit, which I will call B, is a memorandum 
from Charles Colson to me, dated June 12, 1972, regarding tax discrep- 
ancies in the income tax return of Mr. Harold J. Gibbons, vice presi- 
dent of the Teamsters Union, in which Colson indicates that he is an 
all-out enemy, a McGovernite and an anti-Nixon person, and he 
believes that there should be an audit started at once, and if there is an 
informer's fee, he would like to know because he believes there is a 
good cause in which that informer's fee can be dtmated to. [Laughter.] 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 45.^] 

Mr. Dean. The next document is a memorandum from Charles Col- 
son, dated November 17, 1972, regarding the fact that he has received 
information from an informal, some information regarding Mr. Jack 
Anderson referring to the fact that Mr. Anderson was found in a room 
with certain wiretap in private — wiretap equipment in connection with 
the Dodd investigation. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 46.^] 

Mr. Dean. The next memorandum is a document from Mr. Caulfield 
to me, dated August 12, 1971, in which Mr. Caulfield briefly indicates 
that he has talked with Mr. Nofziger to come up with a candidate to 
assist in the enemy's project. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 47."] 

Mr. Dean. The next is a copy of a memorandum of August 16, 1971, 
that was prepared for Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and others at 
the White House by myself, which addresses itself to the general prob- 

1 See. p. 1682. 
= See p. 1686. 
3 See p. 1687. 
^ See p. 1688. 



1350 

lem of dealing with political enemies and a strategy which would 
involve a number of members of the ^Vllite House staff in various 
phases of that project to deal with political enemies. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 48.^] 
Mr. Dean. The next is a document dated September 9, 1971. It is 
from Charles Colson to John Dean, in which Mr. Colson has checked 
in blue those that he would give top priority on the enemies' list, and 
an attached series of lists that were prepared by Mr. Colson's office of 
what were deemed opponents or political enemies. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 49.'] 
Mr. Dean. The next is a memorandum dated September 14, 1971, 
which is a memorandum from myself to Larry Higby which attached 
the names that he had requested in connection with the political ene- 
mies' project and a limiting of that list to some 20 names. These were 
names which were based on the suggestion of INIr. Colson. 
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 50.^] 
Mr. Dean. The next is a section of the news summary, of what date 
I don't know. It is from Mr. Higby to me, indicating that DNC Treas- 
urer Robert Strauss should be on the list. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 51.*] 
Mr. Dean. The next is a document dated September 17 from Gordon 
Strachan to me indicating that the attached list should be included in 
the political enemies' project. And there is attached a list. 
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 52.^] 
Mr. Dean. The next is a memorandum from Gordon Strachan dated 
October 26, 1971, to me, indicating that Mr. Nofziger sent the attached 
information on Chet Huntley to Mr. Haldeman and that since I have 
the action on the political enemies project I should make a determina- 
tion of what should happen and advise Mr. Nofziger of what should 
happen. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 53.^] 
Mr. Dean. The next is a memo from Gordon Strachan of November 
5, 1971, subject J. Irwin Miller which indicates that he fits into the 
enemies project. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 54.'^] 
Mr. Dean. The next is a memorandum from a member of Mr. Col- 
son's staff that is part of one of many memorandums that came in, this 
one is dated June 28, where there was a continual updating of the 
opponents list. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibt No. .55.^1 
Mr. Dean. And the last document is one relating to the McGovern 
campaign staff with asterisks beside certain key names that were to be 
included in the opponents project also. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. .56.®] 
Mr. Dean. And that is the sum and substance of the request that I 
have available that Mr. Weicker asked me for vesterdav. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, can we have those? Thev will be marked, and 
we will make copies of them for members of the committee and cir- 
culate them to members of the committee. 

Senator Ervix. Let the reporter mark them with the appropriate 
numbers. 



1 Spe p. IfiSfi. «Spp p. 1701. 

3Spe p. 1602. -Rep p. 1703i. 

3Spp p. 1697. "See p. 1705. 

■« Spe p. 16fl9. f Spe p. 1707. 
5 See p. 1700. 



1351 

I would just like to say I am sorry I misconstrued Mr. Buzhardt's 
questions; they were just handed to me before I looked at them, and 
they were separate from the other questions. 

The other questions were clearly directed to the witness and not to 
the committee. 

The Chair now recognizes the Senator from Florida, Mr. Gurney. 

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dean. Good morning. Senator. 

Senator Gurney. We have had a great deal of testimony, 245 pages 
of your statement as well as the testimony yesterday, and I must say 
it is hard to know where to begin in all this. 

I will go over some of the ground that has already been covered, in 
an effort perhaps to clarify and amplify as far as I am concerned. I 
will ask probing questions, and I am sure you recognize why this is 
important. 

There have been serious charges in the testimony leveled against 
many people, including the President of the United States. Some of 
these charges, uncorroborated. Certainly the duty of this committee 
is to seek out the truth, to gather all the evidence we can from every 
witness, and especially from you who probably will be the most im- 
portant witness in these whole hearings.. 

As a matter of fact, I think the committee would be very derelict 
if it didn't get all the evidence it could. 

I think probably the best place to start always is at the beginning. 

Would you say that it is fair to say that Gordon Liddy's plan of 
bugging and electronic espionage really started out the whole Water- 
gate affa-ir ? 

Mr. Dean. Would I say it started off the whole Watergate affair? 

Senator Gurney. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I testified I think that the — ^there was an atmos- 
phere that might have been several precursors source to that plan. 
The plan was an accident of fate where they culminated into Mr. 
Liddy's specific proposal that was presented in the Attorney General's 
office in the two meetings which occurred in late January and early 
February. 

Senator Gurney. But as far as the Watergate break-in itself is con- 
cerned, it really stemmed from Mr. Liddy's plan of bugging and elec- 
tronic espionage, did it not ? 

Mr. Dean. The specific plan to enter the Watergate would have 
begun with the plan that Mr. Liddy developed, yes. 

Senator Gurney. Now, who recommended Mr. Liddy to the Com- 
mittee To Re-Elect the President ? 

Mr. Dean. I passed on a recommendation that I had received from 
Mr. Krogh to Mr. Mitchell and he in turn endorsed that recommenda- 
tion and sent him over to the Re-Election Committee. 

Senator Gurney. In other words, you recommended Mr. Liddy to 
the Committee To Re-Elect the President? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. Did you interview Mr. Liddy after Krogh rec- 
ommended him to you? 

Mr. Dean. Xot to my recollection, no. I was present when he was 
interviewed by Mr. Mitchell and again when he was interviewed by 
Mr. Magruder. 



1352 

Senator Gtjrney. Did you ask any questions about his qualifications 
at that time or did Mr. Liddy just simply answer questions? 

Mr. Dean. I asked Mr, Krogh about his qualifications at that time 
when he first mentioned him to me. And they asked questions during 
those interviews, yes. 

Senator Gtjrney. Did you ever ask him what he had been doing for 
Mr. Krogh? 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not. 

Senator Gtjrney. Or Mr. Hunt ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not. 

Senator Gurney. Would that not be important in finding out his 
qualifications, his previous employment ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I was told, for example, when I met him — when 
I talked to Mr. Krogh about him, I can recall Mr. Krogh very specifi- 
cally telling me that he had written some of the best legal memoran- 
dums that he had run across in a long time. He explained that Gordon 
had taken some rather complex subjects and analyzed them in a very 
precise way. One of these memoranda had gone in to the President and 
the President had complimented Mr. Liddy through Mr. Krogh on the 
quality of the document that he had prepared. 

Senator Gtjrney. Was it understood that part of his duties would 
be in charge of security or things like that ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gtjrney. Well, did you ask any questions of him as to what 
he had been doing in the area of security ? 

Mr. Dean. I was told that he had an FBI, Treasury Department, law 
enforcement background. There was not a great focus on that at that 
time. I knew Mr. Krogh had worked in the past before I came to the 
White House and partially after I was still at the White House with 
the demonstrator problem. Mr. Krogh was very knowledgeable in the 
area and when he told me that he thought Mr. Liddy had these quali- 
fications, I thought that Mr. Krogh 's judgment was good and in fact, 
it was partially Mr. Krogh's working with me from my position at 
the Department of Justice that resulted in my coming into the White 
House. 

Senator Gtjrney. You never did go into what he had been doing 
with Krogh and Hunt ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not. 

Senator Gtjrney. The January 27 meeting occurred and as I recall, 
you testified that the original plan — and I do not know what the word 
was that you used to describe it, but 

Mr. Dean. I think I called it a mission impossible plan. 

Senator Gtjrney. I think that is probably a good description. 

Did you ever talk to Mr. Mitchell or INIr." Magruder after this hor- 
rendous plan, about whether Liddy really was competent to stay on 
and work for the Committee To Re-El ect the President ? 

Mr. Dean. As I recall, the only conversation I had was a very brief 
convei-sation. Mr. Liddy was taking the charts ofl' the easel and they 
were preparing to leave tlie office when I paused in front of Mr. 
Mitchell's desk and he told me that this was certainly out of the ques- 
tion. I do not think anyone knew that a plan of that dimension was 
going to be presented at that time. 



1353 

Senator GimxEY. Well, did it worry yon that this man came up with 
kidnaping, prostitution, mugging, and all the rest of it? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, sir, it did. 

Senator Gupxey. But you never really discussed it with Mitchell 
and Magruder as to his capability, Liddy's capability of staying on at 
the job? 

Mr. Deax. Well, sir, you would have had to have been there to 
believe it and I might say that it was so far out that there was no hope 
in my mind that anyone was ever going to approve any plan like this. 
So I just assumed that it was going to die a natural death. 

Senator Gtjrxey. Now we come to the second meeting that occurred 
on February 4. My recollection is that you came in a little later this 
day. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gtjrxey. My recollection also is that you testified that you 
were again disturbed. Verv disturbed at what he was proposing. Is 
that true? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct and I was injecting myself into the meet- 
ing in an effort to terminate the meeting, which I did. 

Senator Gurxey. Well, did you have any discussion after the meet- 
ing with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Maf^ruder about his continuing? 

Mr. Deax. I had a direct discussion with Mr, Liddy at that time. 

I might add. after the first meeting, I had told Mr. Liddy he s'hould 
destroy the charts. After the second meeting, as we were leaving the 
office, I told him that I would not discuss this with him any further. I 
indicated to him that it still was not what was necessary, and it was a 
rather brief discussion. I must say I felt very sorry for Gordon Liddy 
during much of this because of the fact that he had received no guid- 
ance from anybody that I could tell — certainly none from me — as to 
what was expected of him. It is not my nature to be hard on somebody. 
Rather, I was trying to tell him that I felt this was not what was 
contemplated. 

Senator Gurxey. My reaction was that you testified that you told 
him that he was never to discuss this thing again with you, is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Gurxey. You told him that if any plan was approved like 
this that you did not want to know about it. 

Mr, Deax. That is correct. 

'Senator Gurxey. At this particular time, Mr. Dean, were you not 
the counsel for the President ? Was that not your job ? 

Mr. Deax. That was my title and that was my job. 

Senator Gurxey. You were not counsel for Mr. Mitchell and Mr. 
Magruder, were you ? 

Mr. Deax. No, I was not. 

Senator Gurxey. Wliy did you not go back to the President and 
tell him about this hair-raising scheme ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I did go back, but I did not have access to the Presi- 
dent, as I think I explained. I went to Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Gurxey. Did you try to gain access to the President? 

Mr. Deax. Senator, I did not try. I had never been in to the Presi- 
dent or called by the President before. My reporting channel was 



1354 

through Mr. Haldeman and I went back and told what I thought was 
the proper reporting channel. I told him what I had seen, told him my 
reaction to it, told him that I thought it was unwise, unnecessary, and 
Mr. Haldeman agreed with me. 

Senator Gurnet, Did you ever discuss after this meeting with Mr. 
Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, whether this plan was going to be im- 
plemented or whatever happened to it ? 

Mr. Dean. I never heard about the plan again until, as I have testi- 
fied, Mr. Liddy came into my office some time in February or March — 
I do not know the precise date — and told me that he could not get his 
plan approved. I reminded him that I was not going to talk with him 
about it, and he said that he understood and he did not talk about it. 
And we went on to whatever our business was that day on some other 
election matter. 

Senator Gurney. When was this ? 

Mr. Dean. I believe it was February, some time in Feibruary or 
March. I am not sure of the date. 

Senator Gurney. Did you ever report that to the President ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I didn't, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Let's go now to the break-in at Watergate. But 
before we do, let's go back and clear up some testimony of yesterday. 
I have never been entirely clear on this law firm incident. I came in in 
the middle of Senator Talmadge's questioning yesterday. Could you go 
over that? What exactly happened? You were representing a law 
firm in connection with some television application — is that it? 

Mr. Dean. No sir, I read into the record yesterday a letter I don't 
know if the Senator has had a chance to see the letter. 

Senator Gurney. I haven't had a chance to see it. 

Mr. Dean. I might read it to you. 

Senator Gurney. No, I don't think you need to read it if you just 
summarize quickly what happened. 

Mr. Dean. All right. I was in a communications law firm and doing 
very little communications work. I had some connection witli summar- 
i7,in<T findings of fact and things of that nature that were before the 
FCC, but I could not term myself a communications lawyer in any 
respect. I had been at the firm a very short while. I was not happy at 
the firm and was contemplating leaving the firm. 

One of the men who was at the firm was 7iot a lawyer but an in-house 
representative of the senior partners in the firm, who had television 
interests around the country as a result of their processing applica- 
tions. This man came to me and began to discuss, he said, John, you are 
leaving, are you interested in investing any money in a television 
station ? 

I said, yes, I might be, let's explore it. 

We had some preliminary discussions about it with the lawyers who 
he had selected to represent his application, a man by the name of Earl 
Stanley, who is a senior member of the communications bar, and I 
think a very well respected member of the bar. At that time, I raised 
with him, was there any conflict for me to become involved in that 
while I was still at the firm. He indicated to me so long as T was out of 
the firm by the time the application Avas actually filed, which would 
have taken mechanically months to prepare and Mr. Stanley and 
Mr. Fellows, the man I was referring to in the firm, were going to 



1355 

prepare the application. I had some — I had accumuhated some papers 
on the matter in my desk and apparently, one night, one of the partners 
was lookino- for some other unrelated matters and came across this. 

Senator Gurney. Were these papers in connection with your 
venture ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, they were. 

Senatoi" Gurney. Not the law firm 

Mr. Deax. No. 

There were standard forms that were used on virtually every appli- 
cation for filling out various forms of the application and I was pre- 
paring my own, my rights, and Mr. Fellows and some of these aspects 
of it. I also had some papers on — there is an outfit that does incorpora- 
tions — FCP, I believe is the name of it^ — where you just pay the fee 
and they do all the incorporating work. It is nothing you do yourself. 
I think there were some papers related to that in there. When these 
were discovered, I was called into the office the next morning when I 
came in. I remember there was a very serious snowstorm that night 
and I was late coming in. When I came in, I was asked to come into one 
of the senior partners' office. 

He asked me to explain what I was doing. I had learned, I had seen 
that my desk had been rifled the night before and I was quite annoyed 
by it, so I decided I would say nothing. I said, I have nothing to say 
aix)ut this. 

There then ensued — he said, well, if you are not going to tell me any- 
thing about this, you are fired. 

I said, I am not fired, because I have already resigned. 

He said, you can't resign, because I have already fired you. So that 
was the session. 

Later, one of the other associates said, John, you had better go back 
and talk this over with him. I did. I thought tlie matter was resolved. 
The next I heard about it was when the civil service did an examina- 
tion, and there was a comment in that examination that I had been 
dismissed for unethical conduct. 

At that time, I asked one of the lawyers that had been at the law 
firm if he would look into it, because I said I am prepared to take this 
to the Ethics Committee, if necessary. 

He looked into it, the person who had made the comment that it 
was an unethical charge retracted the comment, and the matter was 
left at that. 

Senator Gurney. "When did the matter occur in the civil service 
files? Was that in connection witli your employment at the House 
Judiciary Committee? 

Mr. Dean. No, it was after I left the House Judiciary Committee. 
As the Senator knows, the House does not run civil service examina- 
tions on staff. 

Senator Gurney. Was it in connection with your employment at the 
Justice Department? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; it was not. While I was with the House Judiciary 
Committee, I developed legislation that created the National Com- 
mission on Reform of Criminal Laws. 
^ Senator Gurney. I am talking now about the civil service informa- 
tion. 

Mr. Dean. I am explaining. Senator. 



1356 

I was asked to go on the staff as the Associate Director of that Com- 
mission. It was at that time, when I was joining that staff, that this 
matter arose. 

Senator Gurney. And regardless of the ethics involved, and I do 
understand your contention and the letter you read was that it was not 
an ethical matter. 

Mr. Dean. It was not unethical to me ; no, sir. 

Senator Gurney. But as far as your termination of employment 
with the law firm, I do understand that you were discharged ; is that 
right? 

Mr. Dean. I would say it was a rather heated discharge as a matter 
of my unwillingness to discuss the matter with the person who was a 
senior partner in the organization. 

Senator Gurney. Now, to get back to the break-in at the Watergate, 
as I recall your testimony, there really wasn't anything in Watergate 
or much of anything in the activities surrounding the Committee To 
Re-Elect the President from that February 4 meeting until the Water- 
gate break-in. And I understand you got back from the Philippine 
Islands on the 18th and then returned here to Washington and went 
in your office on the 18th. 

Is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Gurney. Then, as I recall, you said that you had received 
phone calls that day and talked to a number of people — Caulfield, 
Magruder, Ehrlichman, Strachan, Colson, Sloan, and you later called 
Liddy and Kleindienst. 

Why all these calls if you weren't that closely associated with what 
they were doing over there in the political field ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I would say that my office was one that, 
one, I did have some dealings with the reelection committee, I did 
know all the parties involved. My office normally was asked to investi- 
gate or look into any problem that came up of tliat nature. "\^nien any 
wrongdoing was charged — an administration office, for example, when 
the grain deal came up — and I think as the Senator will recall, during 
the ITT matter, my office had some peripheral involvement in that. 
And I believe we had some dealings with your office on that matter. 

Senator Gurney. Not my office. I think we met in Senator Hruska's 
office, the Republican members of the committee; isn't that correct, 
with you? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I recall one time that Mr. Fieldinor and 
I came up to your office on the matter and Mr. Fielding provided some 
material for your staff. It was that type of thing that would come to 
my office for assistance and aid. 

Senator Gurney. What does that have to do with the Watergate ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I was explaining the tvpe of thing that would come 
to my office and my office was a firefighting office and would get into 
various 

Senator Gurney. Did you do other firefighting before June 18 ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. At the committee to reelect? 

Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge, no. That was the only fire I recall 
over there, and it was the biggest one. 

'Senator Gurney. Now, then, you mentioned in your testimony yes- 
terday in response to Mr. Dash that you inherited the coverup. 



1357 

Would you tell how j-ou inherited the coverup ? 
Mr. Deax, I didn't hear the Senator. Inherited ? 
Senator Gurxey. You said yesterday in response to questioning 
from Mr. Dash, you said that j^ou inherited the coverup of Watergate. 
Mr. Deax. I had heard or inherited ? 
Senator Gurxey. I understand inherited. 
Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

When I came back to the office on the 18th and talked to 
Mr. Strachan, I realized that the coverup was already in effect, in 
being, and I realized that when Mr. Strachan told me of the documents 
that he had destroyed and Mr. Haldeman's instruction, that there cer- 
tainly wasn't going to be a revelation of the AVhite House involvement 
in the matter. I didn't at that point in time know the potentials of the 
White House involvement. 

Senator Gurxey. Was not one of the first meetings of the coverup 
held in John Mitchell's apartment on the 19th of June ? 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I would say that the day of, to my knowledge, 
the day of the 19th at the T^Tiite House was a very busy day. That 
the calls I received from Mr. Ehrlichman, from Mr. Colson, the meet- 
ings I had with Mr. Ehrlichman and then again later with Mr. Colson 
about the safe were long before I went to the meeting at Mr. Mitchell's 
apartment, which I do not recall was on the 19th or 20th. I do recall a 
meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, but I do not recall specifically which 
day it was. I recall arriving late at the meeting, and I cannot recall 
with any specificity any of the discussions at the meeting. 

Senator Gurney. Well, what you are saying is then that these several 
phone calls you had with all of these people really had to do with at 
least the beginnings of the coverup, is that right? 
Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. Well, you were in on it from the beginning, were 
you not? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. You really did not inherit anything. You were in 
on the sort of hatching of it, were you not ? 

Mr, Dean. Senator, I might explain that what often happened in my 
relationship with my superiors at the White House, and I think I 
alluded to this yesterday, is that others would set the policy, for ex- 
ample, with the CalUy case or the Lithuanian defector, how to deal 
with it, what was to be done. 

Senator Gurney. Who set the policy on the coverup ? 
Mr. Dean. I would say the policy was just — I do not think it was a 
policy set. There was just no alternative at that point in time. 

Senator Gurx^ey. It sort of grew like Topsy, and you were a part 
of it, is that not right ? 
Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurx^ey. Now, since this thing started out with such a flurry 
and a spate of phone calls and meetings between everybody, did you 
advise the President of what was going on ? 

Mr. Deax'. Senator, the first time I ever talked to the President was 
on September 15. There was one occasion that I recall before Septem- 
ber 15, which was in late August, to the best of my recollection, and 
that certainly was not an occasion to talk to the President about any- 
thing because his former law partners were in the office, Mrs. Nixon 
was in the office, there were several notaries or one notary there, some 



1358 

other members of the staif and it had to do with the siting of the 
President's testamentary papers and it was — just was not a very 
appropriate occasion to even give a whisper to the President that I 
would like to talk to him. So I must say that any time between June 19 
and September 15 I had no conversations with the President, and nor 
did I approach the President at any time other than through reporting 
to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman about what I was doing. 

Senator Gukney. Well, of course, you must have realized that this 
coverup business, at least after it had gone on for a little while, was 
pretty serious, did you not ? 

Mr. Dean. I did not like it from the outset. I do not think anj^ody 
liked it. 

Senator Gtjrney. Do you not think as the President's attorney, you 
should have tried to go to him and warn him about what was being 
done? 

Mr. Dean. I probably should have but I was assuming everything I 
reported to Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman was also being reported to 
the President. 

Senator Gurney. Let us go and discuss for a moment the FBI 
reports of the investigation. Did you first go to Mr. Kleindienst for 
these reports ? Now, I am talking about the 302 form, you know, FBI 
interviews with witnesses. 

Mr. Dean. Right. I do not recall whether it was Mr. Kleindienst or 
Mr. Petersen that I first discussed this with. I was being asked to get 
the reports, I had talked with 

Senator Gtjrney. Who asked you to get the reports ? 

Mr. Dean. Initially, the request came from Mr. Mitchell, and I 
believe that was as a result of Mr. Mardian's desire to see the reports. 
Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman thought it was a good idea that I 
see the reports, and I had — at what point in time I actually raised this 
with either Petersen or Kleindienst, my recollection is I did talk to Mr. 
Petersen about it at some time and he suggested I go directly to Mr. 
Gray, and I cannot really with specificity tell you at what point in time 
I went to Gray, but I do recall discussing it with Mr. Gray. 

Senator Gurney. Let us get back to Mr. Kleindienst though, because 
this is extremely important, I think. The Attorney General is head of 
the Justice Department and, of course, the FBI is under the Justice 
Department. Are you sure you cannot recall whether you ever talked 
to him about getting these 302 forms ? 

INIr. Dean. It is very possible, as I said, Senator, it is very possible 
I did. I have 

Senator Gurney. Well, you have recalled in minute detail in 245 
pages of the testimony of almost everything. 

Mr. Dean. I understand that. I have tried to the best of my recol- 
lection to recall everything. I do not recall specifically whether I talked 
to Mr. Kleindienst about this subject. The major item 

Senator Gutjney. Well, do you recall if you talked to Mr. Petersen? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I just stated T did recall I did talk to INIr. Petersen. 

Senator Gurney. 'Wliat did you recall of that conversation ? 

Mr. Dean. I recall he sucirested that T go directlv to INfr. Gray. 

Senator Gurney. Did either Mr. Petersen or Mr. Kleindienst or 
anybody, according to your recollection, tell you that you could not 
get these FBI reports, that the President himself would have to get 



1359 

them and Mr. Klcindienst or Mr. Petersen would have to ^ive them to 
the President ? 

INIr. Dean. I do not necessarily recall that it was stated as you have 
stated it. I was told that the best way to deal with this situation is go 
directly to Mr. Gray. Mr. Gray initially said to nie, "Why do you not 
read them in my office?" I said that would be a rather cumbersome 
arrangement. 

Senator Gurnet. Then, you have no recollection that the Attorney 
General or Mr. Petersen told you that you could not have them unless 
you got them through the President ? 

Mr. Dean. Well 

Senator Gurnet. Is that correct? 

INIr. Dean. I have read this in the paper. Senator, that this was- 



Senator Gurnet. Well, so have I, and that is why I am asking you. 

Mr. Dean. I do not recall it, frankly. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, then let's go to Mr. Gray and your conversa- 
tions with him about the 302 forms. Wliat were they ? What were the 
conversations? 

Mr. Dean. The conversation with Mr. Gray, well, I think as we ini- 
tially discussed it, Mv. Gray told me that he thought that I could read 
them in his office, I told him I thought that was awkward, and when 
we discussed it, he wanted some assurance that this information was 
being reported to the President. As I recall, I gave him such an assur- 
ance that it was being reported to the President. 

Senator Gurnet. Can you recall that conversation more specifically 
because Mr. Gray testified at quite some length before the Judiciary 
Committee on this in response to many questions. "^^Hiat is your recol- 
lection of it ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I have, in preparing all my testimony, I 
have done this, I have not sought to go through in detail all of the 
press accounts, I have not sought to go through in detail all of the 
Gray hearings, for example. I have not sought to sit and watch these 
hearings. 

Senator Gurnet. I understand that, and all I want is your 
impression. 

Mr. Dean. Yes. My impression 

Senator Gurnet. That is all. 

Mr. Dean [continuing]. Is what I am giving, and the receipt or non- 
receipt of the FBI interviews was not a very big thing for me, and that 
is why it doesn't strike very clearly in my mind. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, it was a pretty big thing for Mr. Gray. 

Mr. Dean. I appreciate that. 

Senator Gurnet. Pretty nearly shot him out of the saddle as far as 
being the head of the FBI is concerned. 

Mr. Dean. Well, I appreciate that. Senator, and to the best of my 
recollection, Mr. Gray said to me that, after I gave him assurance it 
was going to be reported, that he would work something out. Now, I 
don't recall when I first received the initial reports. I only recall that 
it was after a summary report was prepared on the 21st of July, as I 
recall the date, and I showed that report to the people at the White 
House and the people at the reelection committee, that the pressure 
began that I let others read the raw FBI reports. 



-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 2 



1360 

Senator Gurney. Let me get back again now to the conversation 
with JNIr. Gray. Wasn't he pretty specific with you that the only reason 
he would turn these things over to you is because the President of the 
United States requested them through you ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, in my dealings with Mr, Gray, from the 
very outset he was very anxious to be of any assistance he could. For 
example, when I first met with him and he told me he was 
traveling 

'Senator Gurney. Could we get to my question now. 

Mr, Dean. Certainly, I just want ito explain the circumstance of a 
conversation so you can understand it in full and can fully appreciate 
it. 

WTien he told me, for example, he was traveling around the country 
a lot and I should deal with Mark Felt, that to me evidenced that Mr. 
Gray wanted to be of assistance ; if he wasn't there, I should talk to 
others. The same tenor was in the conversation that he would have to 
check, and he wanted assurances these were going to the President, this 
information would go to the President. I am sure he knew very well 
that the President didn't want to sit down and read a stack of raw FBI 
materials. 

Senator Gurney. Then it is your understanding that it was Mr. 
Gray's understanding that the reason why you were there getting those 
302 forms is because the President had requested you to; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Dean. I don't believe that is necessarily mv understanding that 
he, as I recall wanted to know, you know was this information going 
back to the President, and I assured him it was. 

Senator Gurney, Well, did it? Did you ever report to the President 
what was in those 302 forms ? 

Mr. Dean. There was never anything in those FBI reports that I 
read, worth reportinc; even to Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Senator Gurney. Did you ever show a single one of the 82, 302 files 
to the President ? 

Mr. Dean. No, not to my recollection ; no, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Did vou ever report a single information that was 
in those files to the President ? 

Mr. Dean. Not to my recollection, no. I may have reported the gen- 
eral tenor of the investigation which was, I might say, very vigorous. 

Senator Gurney. You reported that to the President? 

Mr. Dean. No, I would report that to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehr- 
lichman and as my channel of reporting. 

Senator Gurney. Did you ever get a call from Mr. Grav about this 
newspaper storv about one of the reports being shown to Mr. Segretti ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, T did. 

Senator Gurney. Would you report that to the committee? 

Mr. Dean. Well, T recall that when that storv broke, Mr. Grav called 
me and asked me if that Avere true, and T said absolutelv not, that the 
FBI reports have never left my office and I have never showed an FBI 
report to Mr. Secrretti which, in fact, is true. I never showed an FBI 
report to Mr. Segretti. 

Senator Gurney. Woll, did you gather from this conversation that 
Mr. Gray was pretty disturbed about the fact that the report might be 
shoAvn not onlv to Segretti but anybody else ? 



1361 

Mr. Dean. I didn't have the impression that lie was upset by it. I 
don't know how often Mr. Gray and I talked but we talked frequently. 
We had worked tooether at the Department of Justiee, and while it 
was reported that he called me with some oi^tra^e, Mr. Gray and I 
generally didn't have that type of conversation. He said something to 
the effect that "It that true, you know, I can't believe you would do 
that," and I said "No, it is not true and I never showed Segretti any 
FBI reports." 

Senator Gurnet. Of course you worked at the Department of Justice 
for sometime, and I suppose you have some familiarity with the pro- 
cedures down there. Isn't it a most unusual thing for a 302 report to 
be let out of the FBI office to anyone ? 

]Mr. Deax. Well, I know this: that the "Wliite House receives on a 
regular basis and my office was the recipient on a regular basis, of 
countless FBI information. Now this deals with everything from back- 
ground investigation. 

Senator Gurnet. I am talking about the 302 forms that are filed 
with raw data. 

INIr. Dean. Yes. 

Senator Gurnet. Not reports. 

Mr. Dean. I don't. recall ever receiving 302's at the "White House 
other than on this incident. I really was never terribly aware of what 
the poMcy was. I didn't work with the criminal cases in the Department 
of »Justice while I was there so I don't know if there were other oc- 
casions when 302's were sent anywhere or not. I can't answer the ques- 
tion. 

Senator Gurnet. But I understood vou to say your understanding 
with Gray on these 302 files would be that you would guard them very 
closely. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. "V^Hio did you show them to ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I testified, after the report on the 21st came to 
my office, ISIr. IMardian was anxious to see them, Mr. Mitchell thought 
that was a good idea and also that Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Parkinson 
also came to see them. They came to my office. I recall them scanning 
them. They decided there really wasn't much in there that interested 
them. The thing that sticks in my mind most is tliat Mardian was, who 
was apparently very familiar with 302 and FBI investigations from 
being the head of the Internal Security Division said that, vou know, 
"Gray is just going hog wild here," because of the tone and the tenor 
of the interoffice from one field office or from headquarters to field 
offices, that the tone of the cables that were being sent out of head- 
quarters. 

Senator Gurnet. Mardian, O'Brien, Parkinson weren't even in the 
^Y]\\te House then ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. "Wlio were thev working for ? 

Mr. Dean. The reelection committee. 

Senator Gurnet. Do vou think Mr. Gray had any idea that people 
like that outside of the T\niite House were looking at these files? 

Mr. Dean. I am surp he had none because I didn't tell him. 

Senator Gurnet. Did anybody else look at the files ? 



1362 

Mr. Dean. The only other occasion I recall anybody else looking at 
the files is when Mr. Dick Moore who was Special Counsel to the Presi- 
dent was instructed by Mr. Ehrlichman to prepare himself to deal with 
the leaking stories on the Segretti related matters and at that time 
Mr. Moore was given those documents to look at, and worked with 
those documents as they related to Segretti, Kalmbach, and Chapin, 
and INIr. Strachan. 

Senator Gtjkney. Didn't Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan look at them, 
too? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, they did not. I never showed them to any witness. 
In fact I was requested, and I told the people wlio had been inter- 
viewed that I didn't think it was something I could show them, and I 
would generally just talk in general about it. I do recall when they 
were reinterviewed by the FBI the FBI themselves showed them their 
original 302's. 

Senator Gurnet. Don't you think it was a serious breach of faith 
to show these 302 files to other people, a breach of faith to Mr. Gray? 

Mr. Dean. Yes. I think it can be interpreted that way. 

Senator Gitrney. Let's go to the matter of the Hunt material that 
was turned over to Mr. Gray. 

ISTow, as I understand it some material was turned over to the FBI 
but certain materials were held out ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gukney. What were they ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I tried in my statement to catalog wliat I can recall 
that I saw amongst those documents. This was a combined effort to 
extract this material by Mr. Fielding and myself. Sometimes when 
Mr. Fielding was going through it he would make reference to some- 
thing and at one point in time I decided we ought to extract all of 
these documents and put them in one place, and Mr. Fielding did that 
for me and put them in envelopes and they were subsequently stored in 
my safe until the time they were turned over to Mr. Gray. 

So, I cannot 

Senator Gtjrney. I thought you testified that you carried some of 
these around in the trunk of your car? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, that was not, those were not documents. That was 
the briefcase that was found in Mr. Hunt's safe. That was a rather 
large, oh, like so. 

Senator Gtirney. Wasn't that the material that was turned over to 
Gray? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, it was not. 

Senator Gtjrney. "V^Hiat was turned over to Gray ? 

Mr. Dean. Two envelopes containing sensitive political documents. 

Senator Gurney. And what — that was turned over at a meeting in 
Mr. Ehrlichman's office, is that right? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. And you were present and Mr. Gray was present. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. You will recall I had been instnicted to 
"deep-six" and shred documents. I had to come up in my own mind with 
a persuasive argument for Mr. Ehrlichman as to why not to "deep-six" 
and destroy documents. I decided the best way to persuade him was to 
tell him that there was a chance that the men who had drilled the safe 
had seen it, that the Secret Service agent who was present at the time 



1363 

of the drillinrr had seen it that Mr. Fiekliiio- and Mr. Kehrli had been 
there and had seen it and, of course, Mr. Fielding had gone through all 
of the documents and for all those people to be quizzed by the FBI 
would result in an awful lot of lying. 

Senator Gurney. Was it your suggestion to turn these papers over 
to Mr. Gray ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it was because I told Mr. 

Senator Gukney. Why did you suggest this ? 

Mr. Dean. I told Mr.Ehrlichman that if I were ever asked I wanted 
to be able to testify that I turned everything over to the FBI and sub- 
sequently when that came up and they were getting more specific with 
that I told 

Senator Gttkney. Wliat was the conversation in the office at the time 
the documents were turned over to Mr. Gray ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, it was a very brief conversation and, as I say, my 
encounter during that was very short. I had preceded Mr. Gray, as I 
recall the sequence, to Mv. Ehrlichman's office. Mr. Ehrlichman in- 
formed me he was going to meet with him and said, "Bring the docu- 
ments over." 

I brought the documents over and laid them on a coffee table in Mr. 
Ehrlichman's office. 

Senator Gurney. Didn't you and Ehrlichman agree to set up the 
meeting ? 

Mr. Dean. I have the impression Mr. Ehrlichman was going to 
meet with INIr. Gray on something else. That it w-as not specifically 
on this subject. 

Senator Gurney. I thought you said you suggested to Mr. Ehrlich- 
man that you have a meeting with Gray to turn the documents over 
to him. 

Mr. Dean. I suggested we turn them directly over to Mr. Gray, and 
]\Ir. Ehrlichman, and after I turned the rest of the material over and 
I was still holding this I thought we ought to get the remainder over, 
called — that happened on a Thursday or Friday, over the weekend. I 
said — there is a delay here — and called Ehrlichman on Monday and he 
said, 'T am meeting with Mr. Gray this evening, why don't you bring 
the documents over then," something of that nature. 

Senator Gurney. Now then, what transpired when they were turned 
over? 

Mr. Dean. As I said, I took the documents and had a very brief dis- 
cussion with Ehrlichman. I laid them on the coffee table in Ehrlich- 
man's office. INIr. Gray was called up from the reception area, came in 
and Mr. Ehrlichman made the initial — initially raised the matter, and 
said something to the effect that these are materials from Mr. Hunt's 
safe, I believe Dean has turned over other material to the Bureau 
directly. 

Senator Gurney. Did you have any discussion with Mr. Ehrlichman 
when you brought the documents in and laid them on the coffee table? 

Mr. Dean. I am sure there was. 

Senator Gurney. "Wliat was 

Mr. Dean. About this w^as the way I could very easily handle the 
situation if I was ever asked, if Mr. Gray had been useful and seen 
them. 



1364 

Senator Gurney. Did you discuss with Mr, Ehrlichman what you 
mi^ht be g:oin^ to tell Mr. Gray ? 

Mr. Dean. 1 was ^oing to tell him that I did not think these related 
to the Watergate incident, which I did not. 

Senator Gurney. No, I am talking about the papers. The purpose of 
the meeting was to turn some very sensitive documents over to 
Mr. Gray. 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Senator Gtjrney. So you could get rid of them and Mr. Ehrlichman 
could get rid of them. 

Now, prior to his coming into the office, I understand that you went 
in and took the papers in and laid them down. My question is, did you 
have any discussion with Mr. Ehrlichman at that time to what you 
were going to tell Mr. Gray when you turned the papers over — or when 
he turned them over ? 

Mr. Dean. It was pretty well understood what the meeting was for. 
so it was not necessary to have any extended discussion other than the 
fact that the documents were very politically sensitive, that as I recall, 
I called them political dynamite when I raised them with Gray, that 
he should take custody of them, and that that would be the way to 
handle it as far as the "V^Hiite House was concerned. I do not recall any 
discussion of telling Mr. Gray to destroy the documents. 

'Senator Gttrney. You and Mr. Ehrlichman must have had, cer- 
tainly, some feeling that Mr. Gray was not going to take this back to 
the FBI and put it in the files somewhere. 

Mr. Dean. Well, he was told that they should never be leaked or be 
made public, something to that effect, yes. 

Senator Gtjrney. Well, did you discuss something to that effect 
before he came in the office ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, if we did. I have certainly no recollection 
of it at this time. As I recall the transaction, it was brief, I came over 
immediately preceding the meeting. Gray was called up, there was this 
brief conversation. Grav was virtually en route up. He came in. This 
was explained to him. He at that point in time, as I recall, placed the 
documents in a small sort of briefcase — not really a briefcase, but one 
of these thin legal briefcases that he i:)laced the documents in, and 
seemed quite willing to take them. He did not have a lot of hesitancy 
and he seemed to miderstand that indeed, this was an appropriate pro- 
cedure, although an unusual one. 

Senator Gurney. And what was precisely the thing that was said 
to Mr. Gray about the documents ? 

Mr. Dean. Was said to him? Well, I can recall that Ehrlichman 
told him that they were from Mr. Hunt's safe and that they were very 
politically sensitive. I then explained to him that we had turned the 
rest of the material over to the agents. Plowever, these were political 
dynamite and if they ever leaked, it would just be a very serious 
problem for the President during the reelection year. 

Senator Gtitrney. Was there not something about the light of day in 
that conversation ? 

Mr. Dean. That is possible. I do not recall it now, what particular 
language I used. I think I conveyed to the committee the — if I used 
that particular term at that time, that does not necessarily strike me 
as one of my normal phrases. 



1365 

Senator Gurney. Well, to the best of your recollection, what did you 
say to Mr. Gray ? 

Mr. Dean, As I say, to the best of my recollection, I cannot recall 
the precise words, but other than the fact that the material had come 
from Hunt's safe, to the best of my knowledge, it did not relate to the 
Watergate ; if it leaked, that these documents were political dynamite, 
that if the}' leaked or became public, it would cause great embarrass- 
ment and great problems. 

Senator Gurney. Did you ever call Mr. Gray about these documents 
after that meeting? 

]Mr. Dean. I cannot recall calling him. I recall, as I testified, I be- 
lieve yesterday, I had discussed this with counsel, that I had a con- 
versation at some time with Mr. Gray in his office, in which he told 
me that he had taken the documents to Connecticut. He said he was 
either going to read them or had read them. I just cannot recall which 
it was that he said, because it was a passing conversation. 

Senator Gurney. You do not recall two conversations with Mr. 
Gray, either meeting with him in his office or he in your office or over 
the phone, asking him what he had done with the documents? 

Mr. Dean. The first time — well, as I say, this one occasion, as I 
recall, was in his office when he indicated to me that he had taken them 
to Connecticut. 

Senator Gurney. That was the result of your question asking him 
what he had done with them ; is that right ? 

Mr. Dean. No ; as I recall, he volunteered that, that he had taken 
them to Connecticut. 

Senator Gurney. Well, what were you discussing at that meeting 
with him ? "Wliat was the purpose of the meeting ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not recall. It could have been on the leak problems 
that we were having. 

Senator Gurney. But you do recall in the meeting that he said, I 
have taken the documents to Connecticut ? 

Mr. Dean. If you gave me a specific date on what meeting you might 
be referring to 

Senator Gurney. I do not really know myself. I am trying to find 
out. 

]Mr. Dean. As I say, five dates, I can generally jout them in the 
sequence of what I was doing at a given time or what a given concern 
was. I do recall a meeting in Gray's office that this came up, he told 
me that he had taken tliem to Connecticut, I am not clear whether he 
said he had read them or was going to read them or anything of this 
nature. 

Senator Gurney. Did you ever ask him again on any occasion what 
he had done with the documents? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did. After I liad disclosed this matter to Mr. Peter- 
sen, I recall that I was at luncheon at the Justice Department. This 
was probably in early January. At that time, INIr. Gray came up to 
me and sort of took me by the arm and said, John, you have got to 
hang tight on not disclosing these documents. And I said nothing 
to liim. 

I said, I understand, and tliat was — but at the time, I had been 
questioned by the prosecutors. I felt I had to tell ]Mr. Petersen because 
if I was going to go forward, that very fact was going to come out. 



1366 

Senator Gurney. But you never asked him on any other occasion 
what he did with the documents ; is that right ? 

Mr, Dean. Not to my recollection; no. In fact, I was quite sur- 
prised at that same time that he had destroyed the documents. 

Senator Gurney. Why did that surprise you? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I thought it was totally unnecessary, a rather 
unwise move. 

Senator Gurney. I thought that was the whole subject of the con- 
versation in Ehrlichman's office when you turned over the documents 
to him? 

ISIr. Dean. To the contrary. He was told that they should just never 
be leaked or made public. That to me, is far different from telling a 
man to destroy documents. There are a host of things, I am sure, in 
everybody's files that, if they were leaked, you know, if you told a 
staff man not to leak this, that is one thing. If you told him to destroy 
it, that is quite another situation. 

Senator Gurney. Hoping that they might never see the light of day 
again might be interpreted as wanting them to be destroyed, might 
it not have? 

jSIr. Dean. Not necessarily. I am sure there are a lot of things in the 
Bureau that probably should never see the light of day, but to destroy 
them is something else. I see a great distinction. Senator, in the two. 

Senator Gurney. Let us go to the August press conference, where 
the President referred to the Dean report. My understanding is that 
you indicated great surprise at this so-called Dean report, because, as 
I understand it, you felt that you had not been conducting an investi- 
gation of Watergate ; is that right ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. When I say great surprise, any time the 
President of the United States mentions your name, it is a great 
surprise. 

I will give you another example. When the President, shortly after 
the Supreme Court handed down the death penalty decision, I liad a 
call from Mr. Buchanan, wlio was preparing the President. The Presi- 
dent went on television and said, I have just talked to my counsel 
about this decision and here is his opinion on it. 

Now, I was obviously quite surprised to hear my name on television 
when I had given advice to the President interpreting this decision, 
when, in fact I had never talked to him about it. That is a great sur- 
prise to me when that sort of thing happens. 

Senator Gueney. If we can get back to the investigation of Water- 
gate, though, that is what I am trying to find out about here. "What 
were you doing all tliis time when you had 82 of tliese form 802's, you 
were sitting in with witnesses from the White House in their FBI 
interviews, you had many calls to people about it, you talked to Mr. 
Gray about it several times, you, as I understand it, were reporting 
to Haldeman and Ehrlichman? You do not call it an investigation. 
What do you term it ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I call it participation in a coverup. I was getting 
my orders from my superiors and doing what I thought was expected 
of me at that time and following those orders out. 

Senator- Gurney. Well, do you not think that it might have been 
interpreted by some people as a rather thorougli investigation on your 
part? 



1367 

Mr. Dean. I doubt if they could consider it thorough. If I were 
going to conduct an investigation, I would use an^^thing from a poly- 
.<>:ra]Dh to a — every investigative means I could conceive of. I was not 
investigating ;Mr. Haldeman, certainly. I never pressed Mr. Strachan 
on his involvement. I certainly was not investigating the White House. 
The onl}' person I was not^ 

Senator Gurnet. There is no reason why you should be investigating 
Mr. Haldeman or ]Mr. Ehrlichman, because the}^ were included in the 
coverup with you, were they not ? 

Mr. Dean. That is what I am saying, there was no investigation. 
You asked me why I am surprised about the investigation. There was 
no investigation. 

Senator Gurnet. My question was, don't you think that somebody 
else might have thought that you were investigating from the activity 
that I have just described to you ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not know who would conceive of that. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, I can tell you that all of the members of 
the Judiciary Committee, during the Gray hearings, were under the 
impression that you were conducting a rather large investigation of 
the White House. 

Mr. Dean. Well, let me just use the same analogy. I am sure a lot 
of people thought when the President recited what the substance of 
the death penalty was that I had probably just talked to him and given 
him the substance. 

Senator Gurnet. Do you not think that the President might have 
concluded that you were conducting an investigation, particularly if 
INIr. Haldeman or ]Mr. Ehrlichman, one or the other, were reporting to 
him what was going on, as you have testified to many times in this 

Mr. Dean. I have also testified I have no idea how this ended up 
in the briefing book. I had no conversations with the President during 
this period of time. I have no idea what the President thought was 
happening. I have testified to the fact that Mr. Haldeman frequently 
made notes when I was reporting to him. I had meetings in some of 
the most unusual places that I cannot recall the substance of the meet- 
ings, but I would be called to California, I would meet up at the New- 
porter with ]Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, off on the patio. They 
would want to know what was happening. 

I recall one time when Air Force One landed, they called me to come 
out to Andrews and I met in the — the President had already de- 
parted. I met in the cabin of Air Force One, the President's cabin. 
They asked me for a report at that time. As soon as the press plane 
came in, they said, we have got to get out of here, we cannot all be seen 
together. 

Senator Gurnet. Let me ask you this in connection with this so- 
called investigation by Mr. Dean of Watergate. You indicated great 
surprise and as I gather, rather consternation about the fact that you 
were said bv the President to have conducted an investigation. Is 
that not right ? 

Mr. Dean. I said great surprise. I do not believe I would reveal to 
others at that time the fact that I was distressed about it. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you ever protest to Mr. Haldeman that you 
did not appreciate the way the President was bandying your name 
around in this investigation ? 



1368 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Gueney. Did you ever protest to Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you ever protest to the President ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; but others, I did. 

Senator Gtjrney. Whom did you protest to ? 

Mr. Dean. I talked to Mr. Mitchell about it, I talked to Mr. Moore 
about it, I talked to my associate, Mr. Fielding. I said, tliis bothers me, 
that I am being put out on front on this. I think if I would have 
protested to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, it would have been to no avail. 

Senator Gurney. Let's turn to the CIA involvement with Water- 
gate. I understand that you suggested the possibility to Haldeman? 
Is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I think that what happened, from what I under- 
stand, is that the first time I talked to them about the CIA, they had 
already met with the CIA. They told me, or Mr. Ehrlichman told me, 
really none of the specifics of his meetings with the CIA the preceding 
day other than the fact that he and Mr. Haldeman had met with the 
CIA, met with Director Helms and General Walters. I told him that it 
had come up in a meeting with Mr. Mitchell that we should explore 
the possibility of the CIA providing some assistance. 

Senator Gurney. Well, I guess I worded my question poorly. 
Mitchell brought it up to you and then you brought it up to Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman, is that right? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, yes. 

Senator Gurney. You knew perfectlv well that the CIA had abso- 
lutely nothing to do with Watergate, didn't you ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, sir, I knew this. The only thing I did know and 
this is one of the questions that I asked General Walters, were any 
of these men operatives that could in any way embarrass the CIA? 
This had come up — I don't understand that whole world and how it 
exists even today. But apparently, there is some arrangement where 
the operative is taken care of if some day he does get in trouble. This 
was discussed in this conversation, that some of these people might 
well be operatives that he would be taken care of and the CIA might 
have a legitimate interest in protecting them. 

Senator Gurney. You mean you thought at this time that those 
seven people who were caught in the Watergate were not in the employ 
of the Committee To Re-Elect the President ? 

Mr. Dean. Oh, it was quite clear. 

Senator Gurney. Or that they might have been working for the 
FBI? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir; I am talking about in years past. 

Senator Gurney. All I said was that you knew that the CIA had 
nothing to do with Watergate. That was mv question. 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir ; I was well aware of that. 

Senator Gurney. Then whv did vou try to involve the CIA in this ? 

Mr. Dean. What I was beginning to explain is what had come up 
was there was a suggestion that these men could have been past oper- 
atives. There is a lot more known about these men today than was 
known at that time. 

This was looked at as a potential way to deal with the situation 
that they were going to meet. They were asking for support 



1369 

Senator Gtjrxey. This was a good coverup. 

Mr. Deax. Absolutely. 

Senator Gurxey. That is all I am trying to find out, that you tried 
to inA'olve the CIA 

jNIr. Deax. I am trying to explain. 

Senator Gtrxey [continuing]. Knowing that they had nothing to 
do with it, in order to trj^ to cover up. 

Mr. Deax. Well, I knev7 that, after he had made it clear to the best 
of his knowledge that they did not have a problem, it was sort of a 
hope that this would be a solution. It was not a solution. I continued 
to pursue it with them, asking if in fact, there was anything they 
could do. 

Senator Gurxey. All of this is really in preparation for my next 
question. Did you ever advise the President of the United States that 
somebody was trying to involve the CIA in this coverup proposition ? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir; Mr. Ehrlichman was quite aware I was meeting, 
because he had instructed me to meet. That was my reporting channel. 

Senator Gurxey. Now let's turn to Mr. Kalmbach if we can and the 
beginning of the silence operation, the pajdng off of the people in 
Watergate. Could you tell us briefly how this came up? I know we 
have discussed it before, but could you summarize exactly what 
went on? 

Mr. Deax. As I have explained, I would carry a message, for exam- 
ple, when Mr. Haldeman and INIr. Ehrlichman agreed that to involve 
the CIA would be a very bad idea. I took this infonnation back to the 
reelection committee. They then said, well, we have to do something. 
As I have testified, the discussion was, well, we need Herb Kalmbach. 

Well, they knew that there was nothing they could say that could 
get ]Mr. Kalmbach going. They knew there was nothing I could say 
that would get Mr. Kalmbach going. So I was asked to go back to Mr. 
Haldeman and ^Nlr. Ehrlichman to see if they would agree to this 
procedure, which they did. Then 'I conveyed the message to Mr. 
Kalmbach. 

Senator Gurxey. Now what happened? 

Mr. Deax. Mr. Kalmbach flew back East and I told Mr. Kalmbach 
why he had come back East. 

Senator Gurxey. 'What day was this? 

Mr. Deax. I believe it was on the 29th. 

Senator Gurxey. Where did you meet? 

Mr. Deax. We met dn the Mayflower Hotel, in the coffee shop 
initially, but the coffee shop is too busy and we could find no privacy, 
so we went to his room. 

Senator Gurxey. "\'\Tiat did you discuss ? 

Mr. Deax. I told him — I was very open with Mr, Kalmbach about 
the situation. I knew he didn't want to get involved, but I told him 
what I knew. I told him that I had learned that files had been destroyed 
that were apparently quite incriminating for Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Gurxey. Now, now, let's proceed carefully here. 

]Mr. Deax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurxey. Are you sure you told him that ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I told him — what I told him is that I had conveyed 
to him 

Senator Gurxey. Why would he be interested in that ? 



1370 

Mr. Dean. I will tell you why he would be interested in that. 

Senator Gurney. Wliy would you be interested in telling him? 

Mr. Dean. I would be interested in telling him because at that point 
in time, I was very concerned that this thing might lead directly to 
the President of the United States and that was the seriousness of 
his being involved. 

Senator Gurney. Well, what did you tell him that you needed him 
for, to raise money for what? That is why he came there, isn't that 
right? 

Mr. Dean, That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. What did you tell him that you needed him for ? 

Mr. Dean. To pay for the silence of these individuals. 

Senator Gurney. Are you sure you told him that ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, if there was any doubt in his mind, I would be 
surprised. 

Senator Gurney, Well, I thought that the money went for a number 
of things, like the payment of bail money, the payment of attorneys' 
fees, the payment of support for the defendants and their families. 

Weren't those some of the reasons the money was being raised? 

Mr. Dean. I can recall 

Senator Gurney. You told him nothing about that? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, if you will let me answer the question, 
please. 

I can recall that when Mr. Ehrlichman was asking me about some 
of my testimony, he said, well, I always assumed this was for humani- 
tarian purposes, 

I said, now, you know we talked about specifics, I played some tapes 
and tlie like. To pay the support, the bail, and the like of these indi- 
viduals who had been found in the Democratic National Committee, 
who could begin unraveling the whole matter — I think. Senator, know- 
ing the good lawyer you are, you would understand very well that 
this was for silence, Air, Kalmbach had no difficulty understanding 
that this was for silence. 

Senator Gurney. I am not sure I would at all. I think that would be 
a very human thing to do if you employed some people who had got 
caught and who had no resources, I would think it would be a fairly 
logical thing, that you might raise some money for these expenditures, 

jNIr, Dean, Well, Senator, I am saying that I was quite sure that 
Mr. Kalmbach understood after our meeting that the purpose of his 
mission was. He told me that he wanted to use INIr, Ulasewicz for the 
deliveries. If we were going to make such payments openly, why not 
put it on the campaign expenditures? 

Senator Gurney. Well, as I understand your testimony now, you 
did discuss this business of raising the money for bail, for support, 
for attorneys' fees. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney, And you did not discuss specifically that this 
money was being raised to pay for silence. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I can't recall specifically what I said, 
but I felt quite confident that INIr, Kalmbach understood. Given the 
whole ])rocedure that was being set up and the use of INIr, Ulasewicz, 
that this was not for humanitarian purposes, we might say. 



1371 

Senator Gurney. Who suggested the use of INfr. Ulasewicz? 

]Mr. Deax. ]\Ir. Kahnbach raised that himself. He said he was the 
only man he would trust. 

Senator Gurney. What did you say and plan or what was the under- 
standing about the instructions that were going to be given to Mr. 
Kalmbach from time to time? 

Mr. Dean. I told him that INIitchell had suggested that he get his 
detailed instructions from ]\Ir. LaRue, who had all the facts and 
details. I did not have them. 

Senator Guexey. You mentioned a meeting in your office. I don't 
recall the date now, but Mr. LaRue came there for the purpose, I 
think, of turning over some money. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. Deax. No, it wasn't to turn over money ; it was to explain to 
INIr. Kalmbach the nature of the deliveries. He had a large sheet of 
])aper — when I say hirge, it was probably a folded 8 by 10. Mr. Kalm- 
bach took notes and put into his own code on a very small piece of 
paper the information that Mr. LaRue had and put this in his wallet. 

Senator Gtjrney. Did you set up that meeting ? 

Mr. Deax. As I recall, Mr. Kalmbach had asked me if LaRue and 
he could meet in m}' office, and I said fine. 

Senator Gurxey. You don't recall that you set up the meeting 

Mr. Deax". I don't recall the mechanics of the meeting. Mr. LaRue 
had a "\Aniite House pass. He had been on the ^^Hiite House staif before. 
I didn't really know him when he was at the White House and didn't 
know he had a pass until he was able to come into my office without 
being cleared. Mr. Kalmbach also had a pass, so it was very easy for 
them to come to my office and meet. 

Senator Gurxey. Were there any other people present ? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir. 

Senator Gurxey. Just the three of you ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Gurxey. My understanding of your previous testimony is 
that at the meeting, you didn't pay any attention to it at all and they 
just talked among themselves 

Mr. Deax^. Well, I wouldn't say — I wasn't totally unaware of what 
they were talking about. I can't recall specifically the dollar amounts. 
I did take some telephone calls and return some, because Mr. Kalm- 
bach was being very careful in deciding how he was going to decipher 
down this larger list into a smaller list that he could use himself. 

Senator Gurx'ey. Let's turn now to the September 15 meeting with 
the President and Mr. Haldeman and yourself. That of course is a 
very important meeting, because I understand from your testimony 
that it was at that meeting that you felt that the President knew all 
about Watergate, is that right ? 

Mr. Deax', Well, I will say this, when I came in, the indictments had 
been announced, he acted as if it was a very cordial circumstance. The 
President asked me to sit down and told me that Bob had told him 
what I had been doing and he expressed appreciation for it. He, you 
know, indicated that he was— I could tell, you know you can tell, when 
you are talking with the President when he understands or not. I 
learned that even more later when I had more dealings with him 
when I knew something would come up that he knew nothing about 
and I would have to go into greater detail. 



1372 

Senator Gubney. Did you discuss the criminal cases that were com- 
ing on for trial ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, we did or it was the criminal case at that point. It 
was the entire seven were being moved forward as a trial. 

Senator Gttrney. Did you discuss the civil suits that were filed by 
the Democrats? 

Mr, Dean. Yes, we did. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss the Common Cause suit that had 
been filed by Common Cause? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss the Patman hearings that were 
imminent ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, we did. 

Senator Gurnet. Any idea how long these discussions took ? 

Mr. Dean. I would say that the entire meeting lasted 30 minutes or 
some, 40 minutes. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss any aspects of the Watergate at 
that meeting with the President. For example, did you tell him any- 
thing about what Haldeman knew or what Ehrlichman knew? 

Mr. Dean. Well, given the fact that he told me I had done a good 
job I assumed he had been very pleased with what had been going on. 
The fact that the indictments, he was pleased that the indictments had 
stopped at Liddy because the only oblier link into the White House, 
as we had discussed earlier in sessions with Ehrlichman and Halde- 
man, was Magruder. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss what Magruder knew about 
Watergate and what involvement he had ? 

Mr. Dean. No. I didn't. I did not get into any — I did not give him a 
report at that point in time. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss the coverup money that was being 
raised and paid? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss Strachan bringing wiretap infor- 
mation in to Haldeman? 

]\Tr. Dean. No, I did not. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss Haldeman instructing Strachan 
to destroy all of these materials? 

INIr. Dean. No, I did not. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you discuss the CIA coverup idea? 

Mr. Dean. I did not. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you talk about coaching Magruder on his 
perjured testimony in August? 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not. 

Senator Gurnet. Well now how can you say that the President 
knew all about these things from a simple observation by him that 
"Bob tells me you are doing a good job." 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I assume you know how your staff oper- 
ates. I assume members of your staff understand how you operate, 
how reporting requirements proceed. I v/as aware of the fact that Mr. 
Haldeman had often made notes, INIr. Haldeman has a good mernory. 
Mr. Haldeman does not leave details aside. This was the hottest issue 
that was going in the campaign. I can't believe that the fact that we 
Avere going to contain this matter would totally escape the President's 



1373 

attention and it was to me a confirmation and a compliment to me 
that I had done this. 

Senator Gurxey. Don't you think the President might have been 
complimenting you on the, I will use the word, investigation even if 
you don't desire that word, of the involvement of the people in the 
White House, the FBI interviews, all of that business, don't you think 
he might have been discussing that? 

jSIr. Deax. I would think he would say something to the effect that 
"AVell, your investigation has been very accurate" rather than "Bob's 
been telling me everything you have been doing and you have been 
doing a good job." 

Senator Gurxey. Did he say that "Bob has been telling me every- 
thing you have been doing." 

Mr. Deax. He said "Bob has been reporting to me," something of 
this nature. 

Senator Gurxey. I thought you said that he said that "Bob has 
been telling me what a good joId you have been doing." 

]Mr. DEA^^ AVell, we are quibbling over words but I remember 

Senator Gurxey. We are not quibbling over words. We are talking 
about something very important, whether the President of the United 
States knew on September 15 about the Watergate and the coverup. 

]Mr. Deax'. I am totally aware. 

Senator Gurxey. This protects his Presidency and the Government 
of the United States. 

Mr. Deax. I am quite aware of that and I have told you I am trying 
to recall. My mind is not a tape recorder. It does recall impressions of 
conversations very well, and the impression I had was that he had told, 
he told me that. Bob had reported to him what I had been doing. That 
was the imjiression that very clearly came out. 

Senator Gurxey. In other words, your whole thesis on saying that 
the President of the United States knew about Watergate on Septem- 
ber 15 is purelv an impression, there isn't a single shred of evidence 
that came out of this meeting. 

Mr. Deax^. Senator, I don't have 

Senator Gurx^ey. That he knew anything about. 

Mr. Deax". Senator, I don't have a thesis. I am reporting the facts 
as I am able to recall them to this committee. 

Senator Gurx^ey. Let's turn to Segretti. I understand you talked 
to him in June and advised him about his pending interview with the 
FBI, is that correct? 

Mr. Deax^. I had a call from Mr. Strachan who asked me if I would 
meet with Mr. Segretti. 

Senator Gurx^ey. I presume that you learned at that time his par- 
ticipation in the dirty tricks department. 

Mr. Deax. He was not fully explicit at that time and that is why 
it was not until November that I went out and had a full interview 
with him to find out the dimensions of the involvement of Mr. Chapin 
and Mr. Strachan, a copv of that tape, of that interview. I turned over 
to the committee and that was the first time I really knew of the full 
dimensions of his involvement. 

Senator Gurxey. But did you know he was up to dirty tricks in 
June? 

Mr. Deax-. Yes ; I did. 



1374 

Senator Gukney. Did you tell that to the President of the United 
States? 

Mr. Dean. I think I have explained my reporting times to the Presi- 
dent, and this I might also add that the 

Senator Gtjrney. In other words, you did not tell it to the President 
of the United States ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. The coverup on Segretti was sort of a mini 
coverup as opposed to the rather large and extensive coverup that was 
going on with the other matters. 

Senator Gurney. The purpose of the meeting with Mr. Segretti was 
to advise him to withhold information from the FBI about Strachan, 
Chapin, and Kalmbach, isn't that right? 

Mr. Dean. Unless pressed. 

Senator Gurney. Now then let's go to October, going along there 
in chronological fashion, and the money that was turned over to you, 
the $15,200 ; now why were you put in charge of that money ? 

Mr. Dean. I can't answer that question. I know that Mr. Strachan 
and Mr. Howard brought it to me on the week of June 19, I think it 
was the 20th or 21st they brought it to me. 

Senator Gtjrney. Who brought it to you ? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Strachan, Gordon Strachan and Mr. Richard 
Howard. 

Senator Gurney. What were their instructions ? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Strachan told me that these are funds that had not 
been expended, they were in Mr. Howard's custody and asked me to 
take custody of the money and I told him I would. I told Strachan I 
would tell him what, you know I would remain accountable for the 
money. 

Senator Gurney. Now then, I understand that you withdrew $4,850 
from it. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. And that you placed in it, what was it, a packet 
of money ? 

Mr. Dean. When I took it out. I took out, I was seeking to take out 
about $5,000. I thought that would cover my expenses. I might pvit 
this in context : When my prospective bride came back I was working 
around the clock on this, I had been given a couple of assignments. I 
was supposed to get the minister or I was looking for a judge to do 
that, and also to get some wedding music because the wedding was 
going to be held in a home. Come Thursdav I hadn't even gotten a 
chance to take care of these matters. I had made some preliminary 
calls and had to get another member of my staff to go out and find 
somebody to perform the ceremony on Friday, and I sent my secretary 
to go out and find wedding music. I didn't exactly sit down and plan 
this thing out and realized I would not have money to pay for the 
honeymoon and expenses to occur and this was a very easy thing for 
me to do and reach in and take out what I thought I would need at 
that time. 

Senator Gurney. Well, mv quf^slion was, "Was the money in a 
packet or envelope, the whole $15,200 ?" 

Mr. Dean. It was in two envelopes. I had replaced it. I had put them 
both into one envelope, and put them in my safe. 



1375 

Senator Gurnet. Then you put your check for $4,850 in this 
envelope ? 

Mr. Dean. After I counted out what I thouglit was going to be 
roughly $5,000 and it came up to $4,850. I put a check, wrote a check 
out and put it in, wrote it to cash. 

Senator Gurney. How were you going to spend the $4,850? 

Mr. Dean. Well, to the best of my recollection. 

Senator Gurxey. "Will you just generally tell us. 

]Mr. Dean. Yes. 

To the best of my recollection I had made reservations for an accom- 
modation in Florida tluit was going to run roughly $100 a day. I had 
hoped to spend about 2 weeks down there. I also had food expenses, I 
was going to have people come in and do the serving, and travel 
expenses, and I assumed that just $5,000 would cover it. 

Senator Gurney. It seems like a lot of money for a honeymoon. 
[Laughter.] 

I am really trying to find out a just rough idea of how you were 
going to use all that money? 

Mr. Dean. Well, sir, as I say I also was having my yard done that 
day and I thought I might have to pay having dirt delivered, my 
patio had been repaired, I had a whole host of other expenses I thought 
I was going to be hit with that night when I walked in. 

Senator Gurney. You can't give a better explanation of how you 
were going to spend $4,850? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I was told that the backyard was going 
to cost about $500. I thought about $2,000 for the honeymoon and I 
didn't know what it was going to cost to have people that would do 
the serving and the like so I just took what I thought would be a safe 
amount to cover all my expenses. 

Senator Gurney. I recall in your testimony that you said that you 
had neglected or forgotten to get some money out of an account in 
New York, and that is why that you took the $4,850, is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. I from time to time would call my broker 
when I felt I needed money and just ask him to send me money. 

Senator Gurney. This was a brokerage account? 

^Ir. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. Where is it or where w^as it? 

Mr. Dean. Shearson & Hamill in Xew York City. 

Senator Gurney, What was the broker's name handling it? 

>Mr. Dean. Mr. Arnold Katz. 

Senator Gurney. Did you ever call him for $4,850 to replace this? 

Mr. Dean. Xot until early this year. I mean not early this year, it 
was in March or April of this year. 

Senator Gurney. Xow then, of course, 3'ou really never went on the 
honeymoon, did you, except for a short time? 

]Mr. Dean. I made several attempts but did not make it. 

Senator Gurney. Well, what did you do with the $4,850? 

]Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, at one point in time, well, I began using 
it for personal expenses. 

Senator Gurney. Did you use all of it for personal expenses? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I did pay for some travel, I did pay for some 
expenses in Florida out of it. I have not sat down and tried to re- 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 3 



1376 

construct every expenditure. It might be possible for me to do. I don't 
know in dealing with cash but I bought everything from groceries and 
just used it personally. 

Senator Gtirney. I wonder if you would try to do that for the com- 
mittee, reconstruct how you spent it. 
Mr. Dean. Certainly. 

Senator Gurney. Why didn't you replace it shortly after this time ? 
]Mr. Dean. Well, at one point I did put in, ])ack in what I had into 
the account, and in November when I was trying again to get a honey- 
moon in I took it back out again. 
Senator Gurnet. How much ? 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I have no idea. I commingled it with other 
money of mine and put back in and taken back out. 

Senator Gurney. Do you recall how much you put back in? 
Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I do not. 

Senator Gurney. You don't recall how much you took back out? 
Mr. Dean. I do not at this point. I could — as I say I will try to rp- 
construct that for the committee. 
Senator Gurney. Did you do it at any other time ? 
Mr. Dean. No. 

Senator Gurney. Put in and take out ? 
Mr. Dean. Not to my recollection, no. 

Senator Gurney. Only the one time following the original? 
Do you know this is a crime, Mr. Dean ? 
Mr. Dean. I am not aware what crime it is, no. 
Senator Gurney. Isn't it embezzlement ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I had very clearly made, there was no intention 
on my part never to account for the full amount. I had understood 
later that by the time I had taken it out it was moneys that had come 
over from the 1968' primaries, and I knew at some point in time there 
were many people aware of the fact that I had custodv of the money, 
that I was to account for $15,200 and I was perfectly willing, able 
and capable of accounting for that full amount. 

Senator Gurney. Did anybody know you had ever taken the money 
out? 

Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge, no. 
Senator Gurney. Did you tell anybody? 
Mr. Dean. No ; I did not. 

Senator Gurney. When did you tell somebody about handling this 
money ? 

Mr. Dean. When I went to the Government, when I first beofan talk- 
ing to the prosecutors I explained it to them. I told my lawyer about 
it also when I retained counsel. 

Senator Gurney. When was that and who? 

Mr. Dean. I retained Mr. Shaffer on ^larch 30 and I don't recall 
exactly when we got around to that. We spent most of the time getting 
out mv explanation of the facts and then we started getting down 
into details and at that point in time I told him I had this money 
and I thought we ouflfht to handle that also. 

Senator Gurney. Was the check still in there at that time? 
Mr. Dean. Yes; it was. 

Senator Gurney. In other words, you never told anvbody about 
this or really did anvthing about it until April when, of course, the 
whole Watergate thing was blowing? 



1377 

]\Ir. Dean. Well, Senator, I will tell yoii, I thought at one time I 
ouoflit to stick cash back in there and I said that is the dishonest thing 
to do in this regard, I have to come forward and explain that I did 
make personal use of this money. 

Senator Gtjrney. AVhere is the money now? 

Mr. Shaffer. Excuse me. I would like to say as counsel for Mr. Dean, 
that based upon the facts that have been discussed with Mr. Dean, if 
they are true, ]\Ir. Gurney says that is embezzlement. I disagree with 
him, and I think there are enough lawyers in the room to know what 
embezzlement is, and I do not plan to take the time now unless the 
Chair expressly asks me to make that definition. However, I think it 
is unfair to the record to have the situation in a demurrer posture 
and to conclude that on the facts that are recited by Mr. Dean, if true, 
that that is embezzlement. 

Senator Gurney. Well, we might rephrase the question this way. 
[Laughter.] 

Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Dean, that this might have, that you 
might have been committing some sort of an offense or crime? 

]\Ir. Dean. No ; it did not because I felt I was always prepared to 
account for the money. 

Senator Gtjrney. Let us go into the business of attorney's fees. 

AVell, first of all, was not your lawyer originally Mr. Hogan? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. And then you changed from INIr. Hogan to whom ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I began discussing with Mr. Hogan who is a very 
able lawver. who has had some criminal experience, on March 25, who 
he would suggest is a very fine criminal lawyer. We talked about, I 
told him that I wanted to have a very fine criminal lawyer to go over 
a lot of these things to get some independent counsel on. Mr. Hogan, 
who is also from, has a suburban practice, told me about Mr. Shaffer. 
I had known Mr. Shaffer from some years ago, we had had a casual 
acquaintance, wliere we had met, I do not know how many years ago, 
three or four, I guess it has been, and I liked him when I met him. 
I knew he had been a prosecutor, and enjoyed a good reputation in that 
regard. I also called on the 28th and 29th several other friends to ask 
them who they might suggest as a very capable criminal lawyer that 
could assess this situation for me. I wanted them to look at my prob- 
lem and everybody else's problem and that had never been done based 
on the facts that I knew. So Mr. Hogan was my initial lawyer, then 
Mr. Hogan dropped out of the case because he had a conflict of interest 
because he had represented Mr. Colson at one stage and he realized 
that when my conversations went on it might get on into Mr. Colson, 
so he withdrew and about that same time Mr. INIcCandless was retained. 

Senator Gtjrney. Is Mr. Shaffer chief counsel or Mr. McCandless? 

Mr. Dean. I think they are cocounsel and Mr. Shaffer and Mr. Mc- 
Candless work together very closely. 

Senator Gurney. Have you paid them a retainer ? 

Mr. Dean. They have sent me a bill I have not paid. 

Senator Gurney. Did you handle any other cash during the cam- 
paig-n other tlian the $15,200 tliat you testified to ? 

Mr. Dean. Did I personally handle it ? No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Gurney. Have you received any payments from anybody 
this year or last year other than the income which you received from 
your employment or the brokerage accounts ? 



1378 

Mr. Dean. I have had reimbursements from the Government and 
I had a reimbursement from the Re -Elect ion Committee for an expen- 
diture for the convention but those were the only reimbursements. 

Senator Gurnet. Turning now to 

Mr. Dean. You said also my brokerage firm, I guess it was this 
year that I made a substantial profit on a home I owned. I had bought 
a house at, in the neighborhood that Senator Weicker has recently 
moved into, I might add, where I was one of the first persons in the 
neighborhood, and they were almost giving the houses away at that 
point in time. I bought the house, encouraging a lot of my friends to 
buy houses also, and we were able to negotiate by bringing the number 
of people in simultaneously, a rather good purchase price. Within 
11, 12 months I had made a $15,000 profit on one home and was able 
to buy another home and pay for the furniture in the second house. 

Senator Gurnet. Is it my understanding that the committee is being 
furnished a full financial statement by the witness? 

Mr. Dash. We will so receive one. 

Mr. Dean. I have not been asked for one. I would be perfectly 
willing. My records are in the White House, my own records are down 
there with everything else and I might add that I would be perfectly 
welcome for any audit or any examination that I understand ]\Ir. 
Bellino, who is with the staff, and would welcome his full and thor- 
ough analysis of all my financial holdings or dealings and the like. 

Senator Gurnet. I would like to request that, Mr. Chairman. I do 
not want to ask the witness questions here on that but I would like a 
full statement for the committee. 

Senator ER^^:N. The witness says he will be glad to furnish it so 
I request him to do so. I do not know whether he has to get access to 
the records at the White House or not. 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, they will give me access down there and 
I think they might let me take 'my own personal things out there, I 
assume that is going to occur. 

Senator Gurnet. Now, if we can go to November, Mr. Dean, as I 
recall, in the testimony there was discussion some time around Novem- 
ber about a written report that was to be written by you on Watergate? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. Who requested that report? 

Mr. Dean. That was INIr. Haldeman who first raised it with me. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you ever write this report? 

INIr. Dean. Yes, sir, and I have submitted that as a document to 
the committee. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you — if we have it I can look at it there — 
but did you ever tell the President about this report or give him a 
copy of it? 

INIr. Dean. No, sir, I used my normal reporting channels. I under- 
stand that it went from Mr. Haldeman to ^Ir. Ehrlichman, who made 
some editorial changes on it which are reflected, I believe I submitted 
the original to the committee, the editorial changes are INIr. Ehrlich- 
man's. Then, it went to ]Mr. Ziegler and there was a meeting on 
September 13 in which it was decided that report would not be issued. 

Senator Gi^rnet. Turnhig to the offer of clemency to Mr. McCord, 
as I understand it, you made the arrangements for that through ]Mr. 
Caulfield? 



1379 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gukxey. And he, in turn, communicated with Mr. McCord, 
I guess, througli Uhisewicz one time and then himself; is that correct? 

Mr. Deax. That is my undei-standing. 

Senator Gurxey. And my understanding also is that the offer of 
clemency Avas made to Mr. McCord, I think, in terms like this : That 
it comes from the highest authority in the White House ; is that sub- 
stantially correct ? 

]Mr. Deax. That is correct ; yes. 

Senator Gurxey. Did you ever advise the President of the United 
States about that? 

Mr. Deax. Xo, sir. As I had explained in my testimony, I vras pro- 
ceeding on a conversation I had with Mr. Ehrlichman after Mr. Ehr- 
lichman indicated and Mr. Colson also had indicated that they had 
talked directly with the President about the matter, something which 
was later confirmed by the President himself in conversations with 
him. 

Senator Gurxey. Did you ever have a meeting with Mr. Magruder, 
let me see on this, in January or December, in which there was a dis- 
cussion about the planning of the "Watergate ? Do you remember any- 
thing about that ? 

Mr. Deax". I recall Mr. Magruder coming to my office one time, and 
this is — I saw part of Mr. Magruder's testimony on this before this 
committee. It is one if I have seen 3 hours total I would be surprised, 
but I did see part of Mr. Magruder, I caught one section of the ques- 
tioning of him, I believe it was during the questioning of him, in which 
he made a reference to this. 

I think what he is referring to 

Senator Gurxey. What did he refer to ? 

Mr. Deax. He was referring to the fact that my memory had gotten 
suddenly foggy. I have never, as I testified l)efore this committee, 
understood what happened between, with any clarity, between Feb- 
ruary 4 and June 17, and I was — we were talking about that. 

I think he also was referring to the meeting on — he may have been 
mixing the meetings and referring to the fact that on ]\Iarch 28, when 
I came back from Camp David, that I was playing very dumb, I was 
playing very reluctant — and I was. I did not want to engage in a dis- 
cussion of my recollection of those meetings, because we had gone over 
that before and I had made my decision by that time as to what I was 
going to do and I did not want to get into a debate on it. 

I believe he also referred to the fact that I taped that conversation. 
That is not correct. 

Senator Gurxey. Let me refer to his testimony when he was here 
before the committee. He said : "Well, I think the one occasion that did 
crop up when I asked for an appointment with Mr. Haldeman." 

I said : ""\^nien was this ?" 

He said : ''That was probably in January, probably in early Janu- 
ary, December" — that would have been January of this year or De- 
cember of last year — it was before that meeting with Haldeman, so 
it must have been in December. It was when he indicated to me that 
he did not know how the Watergate had ever been planned, some- 
thing to that effect. 



1380 

And I said, John, do you not remember, something to that effect ? And I became 
concerned, of course, over that type of conversation, because obviously, that 
would be at a time that could be an indication that somebody was being set up, 
in effect. 

That was his testimony. 

He also testified some place else. 

Now, do you recall whether you had any conversation with him ? 

Mr. Dean. My discussions witli JNIr. Magruder while he was at the 
inaugural committee, were basically around what he was going to do. 
The one conversation I recall very clearly did not relate to this at all. 
It was the conversation that occurred in the hall when I was trying 
to dissuade him from going to California to run for office. He said 
that he was going to go out and test the waters, because he thought 
that he had met so many people during the campaign, he could get 
good financial backing and now was the time to move. 

I thought, without telling him, that he was going to have some seri- 
ous problems down the road and he would be putting a lot of people 
who had gone out to back him in jeopardy, and tried to persuade him 
not to do it. 

He was adamant. I later called Haldeman, who agreed also that it 
was a very unwise idea for Jeb to go out and pursue office. He told me 
he was going to call Mr. Finch and speak to him about it to try to 
dissuade Jeb from doing it. And he was also going to call Kalmbach, 
who was one of the persons INIagruder was going to meet with. 

Then, when I met with Jeb, we had a number of discussions to the 
effect, he said, I have told Higby my problem. They are going to help 
me. They also know the problem and I want to get a good job. That 
was the tenor. It was a job-oriented discussion and I cannot recall a 
specific conversation where I told him that. 

I do recall i]i February — excuse me, in INIarch — when I was at Camp 
David, and this is in one of the exhibits I have submitted, when he 
wanted me to have a very fresh recollection of the meetings that had 
occurred in February, or January and February of the preceding year. 
At that point in time, I was trying — I said to him — I thought I had 
gotten a bum rap for being accused of having prior knowledge of this 
matter and Magruder agreed. And I have submitted a tape — that is a 
conversation I did record, with a dictaphone held to the receiver, I 
happened to have the suggestion from ilr. Haldeman that I do that 
while I was at Camp David, and I thought it was a pretty good idea, 
so vou will find that exhibit is one of the ones I submitted. 

Senator Gtjrnet. Of course, what he was saying is that you and he 
were discussing, I guess, the Watergate and what led ui> to it and that 
his impression was that you were forgetting, I guess, about the meet- 
ings in Mitchell's office and the discussion of the electronic bugging 
and Liddy's plan and all that sort of thing. Do you recall that at all? 

Mr. Dean. I only recall that I have always told Magruder that I 
was never clear on what happened between February and June 17. 
I have repeated that to him on a number of occasions, because I have 
not — in fact, some of Mr. Magruder's testimony was a revelation to me. 

Senator Gtjrney. Let us go to the meeting now of March 21 in the 
"Wliite House, which is a very imjiortant meeting, of course, with vou 
and the President. That, as T understand it, is when you gave him 
a pretty complete rundown of the story about the Watergate, is that 
correct ? 



1381 

Mr. Dean. Tliat is correct. I think I have stated in my intentions 
that what I had seen occurring — I had had earlier conversations. The 
President had been rather nonchaLant in dealing with the $1 million 
issue. AVe had discussed on the 13th the fact that he had discussed clem- 
ency with Colson and Ehrlichman. I really felt that the President did 
not understand the full implications of some of these activities and I 
did not know if he knew the full involvement of everybody, and I 
thought that I should report it. 

I also would like to add one other thing. On a number of occasions, 
I asked Mr. Ehrlichman, particularly after the first of the year, if the 
President were being kept fully informed still, because he did the same 
amount of note taking and the trial was over and things had sort of 
slowed down as far as the chaos that sometimes was occurring at the 
White House. Ehrlichman assured me that the President was being 
kept regularly posted. 

Senator Gurnet. On this meeting of the 21st, did you explain to the 
President in full all you knew about Watergate ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I would not say it was every detail, because as you 
know, it has taken me 6 hours to read a statement to this committee, 
which is highlights of the full story. I think I gave 

Senator Gurnet. Could you summarize briefly for us the points you 
touched upon? 

Mr. Dean. I think I have in my testimony summarized those points. 
If you want me to go through them again, I will, I have taken great 
care in trying to do that in my testimony. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you tell him anything about your involvement 
in Watergate? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, I did. And I had on previous occasions. I had 
tried back as early as the second meeting, I believe, to tell him that I 
felt that I was involved in an obstruction of justice, particularly after 
he had told me that I should report to him and made the comment to 
me that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were principals. That stuck in my 
mind so very clearly that I thought maybe he did not understand 
everything that I was doing. When I raised this with him, I gave him 
a few of the facts and he began to debate with me about the fact that 
he did not think I had any legal problem based on what I was telling 
him and I said I did. He did not want to get into it at that time. I 
do not know what was intervened, but we did not have an extended 
discussion. 

I believe that also came up at a meeting when Dick Moore was 
present. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you talk to him about the coverup money 
and your involvement in that ? 

Mr. Dean. In February ? 

Senator Gurnet. No, no, March 21. 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did. 

Senator Gurnet. You told him all about that? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. What about the discussion 

Mr. Dean. I told him particularly — what had really happened — 
let me put this in sequence. 

One of the things that to me was one of the real outrages, that 
bothered me tremendously, was when Mr. Hunt made his final de- 



1382 

mand on the White House. He sent, he apparently had a meeting with 
Mr. Colson's lawyer, Mr. Shapiro, and he had also had a meeting, a 
direct meeting with Mr. Paul O'Brien. Mr. O'Brien — I believe that 
meeting occuned on the 19th. On the 20th or on the — let us see, what 
was the weekend before ? He had had the meeting on the Friday and 

O'Brien came to me 

Senator Ervin. I am going to have to ask the group holding the con- 
ference over here to step outside for the conference. It is disturbing 
the orderly procedure of the hearing. 

Mr. Dean. As I was saying, Mr. Hunt met with Mr. O'Brien on a 
Friday and reported to me on the preceding ]\Ionday. That report 
was that Hunt was demanding $72,000 for living expenses and $50,000 
for attorney's fees and the message was sent directly to me. I asked 
Mr. O'Brien, why are they sending it to me? 

He said, I happened to ask jSIr. Hunt the same question. He said, 
you just send this message to Dean. He said, you tell him that if that 
money is not forthcoming quickly, because sentencing is going to 
occur this week and it is going to take me time to make arrangements, 
that I will have a lot of seamy things to say about the things I have 
done for John Ehrlichman and I will have to start reconsidering my 
options. 

Now, that was what prompted me to raise this again with Dick 
^Nloore when I had had a meeting with Moore. I told ^Nloore that I 
was, you know, this thing — we had talked for many, many months 
about trying to end this. I thought this to me was just another indi- 
cation of direct blackmail of the White House. 

Senator Gurney. Well, again, if we can confine ourselves to the 
meeting of INIarch 21 with the President — ^that is really what I am 
getting at. 

Mr. Dean. Sir, I am saying that came up in the meeting with the 
President. 

Senator Gurney. And you told him all about that ? 
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did. 

Senator Gurney. And you told him about the raising of the coverup 
money, Kalmbach, all that activity? 

'Sir. Dean. I went over that rather quickly. What I did was I painted 
a very broad picture of what I thought was happening and asked him 
if there were any questions he wanted to ask about that, I would fill 
in any details. 

Senator Gurney. Did you talk to him about the Magruder affair, 
helping to prepare his testimony for the grand jury? 

Mr. Dean. I didn't get into any great detail. I alluded to the fact 
that I had assisted ]Magruder in preparing him to go before the grand 
jury, in his second appearance before the grand jury, yes, I did. 

Senator Gurney. Did you talk to the President or report to him 
about the executive clemency offer to Caulfield? 

:Mr. Dean. No, I didn't — to Caulfield? You mean through Caulfield 
toMcCord? 

Senator Gurney. Yes. Yes. 

^h\ Dean. To the best of my knowledge, that did not come up and 
we didn't get into that. 

Senator Gurney. Did Haldeman come in later at that meeting? 
Mr. Dean. The President called Mr. Haldeman to come in. 



1383 

Senator Gurnet. And did yon go over the whole thing pretty much 
again while ]Mr. Haldeman was there ? 

Mr. Dean. Xo, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Gurxey. What transpired while Haldeman was there? 

Mr. Dean. A decision was made that Mr. Mitchell should come down 
the next day and there was a brief discussion about that. From that, 
we went to a meeting in Haldeman and Ehrlichman's office. 

Senator Gurney. That was the only thing that was discussed? 

Mr. Dean. That was the sum and substance of Mr. Haldeman's 
appearance in the President's office. We were alone virtually the entire 
time and it was at the very end of the meeting that lie came in. 

Senator Gtirney. Do you remember how long he was there? 

Mr. Dean. I don't. I Would not say more than 5 minutes or so, to 
the best of my recollection. 

Senator Gurney. Did you have a later meeting with the President 
and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Dean. On what day, sir? 

Senator Gurnet. That day. 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. What was discussed at that meeting ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I went from the President's office to a sub- 
sequent meeting with Ehrlichman and Haldeman and the discussions 
began to focus on Mitchell coming down and having Mitchell step 
forward and if AFitchell stepped forward and would account for this 
thing, then maybe the problems that had followed for the White House 
after the break-in would be forgotten. And we went to a meeting in the 
President's office that afternoon to rediscuss that. A number of ideas 
came up. 

Senator Gurnet. Now, who was at that meeting? 

Mr. Dean. Well, initially, Mr. Ziegler was in there, as I recall, and 
as we sat down and assembled, Ziegler left. It was from there that the 
meeting really got down to a discussion between Ehrlichman, Halde- 
man, myself, and the President. 

Now, during that meeting, I recall a number of ideas were being 
suggested and the like. At that point, it was the first time I had ever 
mentioned in front of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and the President the 
fact that I thought they were all indictable — not including the Presi- 
dent. I said that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean could be indicted. 
For that reason, I disagreed with whatever they were talking about. 
The President on a number of occasions turned to me and said. Do you 
agree ? I said, Xo sir, I do not. 

After doing this a number of occasions, I finally said I think that 
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean are indictable and got a very, I 
might say a chilling look from Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Senator Gurnet. Was immunity discussed by anybody ? 
Mr. Dean. On a number of occasions, I discussed the concept of im- 
munity with ^Ir. INIoore as a device 

Senator Gurnet. Xo, I mean on this occasion. 
Mr. Dean. In the meeting ? 

Senator Gurnet. March 21, the meeting in the afternoon. 
Mr. Dean. Not to my recollection, other than the fact that I had 
once conceived, you know, that the way to get the truth out would be 
to have everybody have some sort of immunity, because everyone in- 



1384 

volved would have a criminal implication and I thought at that point 
that the most important thing for the American people was to get the 
truth out. And as I say, Moore and I had discussed a number of con- 
cepts as to how to do this in the past and we had never really found a 
solution. 

Senator Gurnet. Was there any tentative decision by those present — 
that is, you and Haldeman and Ehrlichman — to go to the grand jury 
and tell the whole Watergate story ? 

Mr. Dean. No sir, there was not. To the contrary, I had kept raising 
the fact that as a result of the Gray hearings, it was going to be a 
matter of time before I was called before the grand jury. It just 
presented a real dilemma to me because I was going to lav out the 
facts just as I knew them. And there was a lot of discussion about 
executive privilege applying before the grand jury and things of this 
nature. 

Senator Gttrney. Then there was no discussion, as I understand it 
from your testimony, about going to the grand jury, ever, and telling 
the whole thing as possibly this immunity business 

Mr. Dean. There could have been some discussion about my immu- 
nity concept. I don't recall that everybody said, let's walk down to the 
grand jury and tell the story, no, sir. To the contrary, I think it was 
quite evident in the meeting the next day, where the real concern was 
this committee and that continued to come up again and again. 

Senator Gurney. My question really was, there was no discussion 
about going to the grand jury, is that right ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, other than, as I sav, in the context that I had raised 
the fact that I thought I would be called before the grand jury at some 
point in time. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, I mean about you going voluntarily and the 
others, too. 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, not to mv recollection. I don't believe I ever 
heard Mr. Ehrlichman and Haldeman volunteer to go before the grand 

Senator Gurnet. Was there also a discussion at this meeting and 
later at the one on the 22d that all of you misfht put this down on paper 
as to what you viewed as your role in the Watergate ? You and Halde- 
man and Elirlichman ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. The first time I heard about writing a report 
again occurred when I arrived at Camp David on the afternoon of the 
23d. The telephone was ringing as I walked into the cabin my wife 
and I were staying in. The operator told me it was the President on the 
phone. It was not the President. It was Mr. Haldeman on the phone 
and he said, while you are up there, why don't you sit down and write 
a report on this thing. 

I asked him, was it going to be for internal or external use and he 
said, that hasn't been decided yet. We had already gone through what 
I called really an effort to put out a fairy tale on this thing that had 
been turned down on December 13. I wondered if we were going to go 
through this exercise again, because if we were going to do it again, I 
wanted to know how to proceed. 

Senator Gurnet. Then it was after that that the President asked 
you to go to Camp David ? 



1385 

Mr. Deax. Well, the President called me on the 23d. In the meeting 
on the 22d — I might mention this : As early as February, when I had a 
meeting with the President, he asked me had I ever spent any time up 
at Camp David I I said no, I hadn't, I had been up there to a meeting 
once right after the election, a very brief meeting with Ehrlichman 
and Haldeman. He said, you and your wife ought to go up there on 
some weekend, it is an excellent place to go. He mentioned that on a 
number of occasions and I told my wife, I said, the President has been 
very gracious in saying that you should go to Camp David and men- 
tioned it to her. 

Senator Gurxey. At any rate, you did go to Camp David, sort of 
understanding that you were going to write a rejDort about Watergate, 
is that riiiht ? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir. When the President talked to me on the 23d, I 
had talked to O'Brien that morning about the fact that in court, 
]Mr. McCord's letter had been read by Judge Sirica. O'Brien reported 
from somebody who had told him at the courthouse. 

I called Ehrlichman, and Ehrlichman said he had a copy of the let- 
ter and read me a copy of the letter and asked me what my assessment 
of it was. Based on my conversation with O'Brien, I told him that it 
seemed at best that all McCord has is hearsay. 

It was then much later. It was, oh, in the afternoon, I guess, 1 or 2 
o'clock or so. I was still surrounded by the press at home because of the 
Gray statement the preceding day; they wanted me to make a com- 
ment on it, and I didn't want to do that. I received a call from the 
President. 

There are some details of that conversation of a personal nature to 
the President that, the first family, that I don't want to put in because 
they are not relevant. But I recall the conversation very clearly, be- 
cause there were some complications because Mrs. Nixon and Tricia 
were up there at the same time. 

The President said, '"Well, go on ahead. You need the break, you 
have been under a lot of pressure," and the like. He never at any time 
asked me to write a report, and it wasn't until after I had arrived at 
Camp David that I received a call from Haldeman asking me to write 
the report up. 

If I was going to go up and write a report, I would have gone to 
my — there was oeneral discussion also of preparing a Segretti report, 
as I recall. If I had gone to Camp David specifically to write a report, 
I would have jxone to my office first and collected an awful lot of mate- 
rialthat I didn't take with me, which I subsequently had to call back 
for in order to write a report. 

Senator Gurxey. It was shortly after this, though, that then you 
engaged counsel, is that co7-rect ? 

Mr. Deax. On the evening — I believe it was Sunday evening, I re- 
ceived word that the Los Angeles Times was going to publish a story 
that I had had prior knoAvledire of the fact that there was going to be 
a break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters on 
June 17. 

Now, I knew I hadn't had prior knowledge of that. In fact, I don't 
think anvbodv other than those involved had prior knowledjre of the 
fact that there was going to be a break-in. I thought it was libelous. 

I called ~\\v. Hogan, told him, explained in generalities the facts. 



1386 

and he put the papers on notice that there was a libel suit in this 
matter. 

At that time, I also told him that I wanted to talk to him further 
about this, and we had further conversations while I was up there 
about the general situation. So the counsel was retained at that time. 

Senator Gurney. What date was that ? 

Mr. Dean. That was on the 25th, as I recall. 

Senator Gurxey. And that was JNIr, McCandless, and Mr. — ■ — 

Mr. Dean. No, that was Mr. Hogan. 

Senator Gurney. Mr. Hogan? 

]\Ir. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. When did you employ Mr. McCandless and Mr. 
Shaffer? 

]Mr. Dean. INIr. Shaffer was employed on the 30th. 

Senator Gurney. Of March? 

Mr. Dean. Of March. 

Senator Gurney. And ]Mr. McCandless ? 

Mr. Dean. I don't know precisely. It was after Mr. Hogan with- 
drew. It was sometime in April, mid or late April, to the best of my 
recollection. 

Senator Gurney. Then my understanding of the testimony is that 
on April 2, your attorneys or Mr. Shaffer went to see the Federal 
prosecutors, is that correct? 

]Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. What was the purpose of that? 

Mr. Dean. To tell them that I was prepared and ready to come 
forward. 

Senator Gurney. And when did you go and talk to them? 

]Mr. Dean. Well, I believe that INIr. Shaffer and Mr. Hogan had a 
number of meetings where they outlined the scope of my testimony. 
I had spent several hours with both of them outlining my involvement 
with myself and the involvement of others. I had deferred from getting 
into any Presidential areas. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I have a request up there. 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

INIr. Dean, just before we recess, there has been a little confusion 
in the exhibits that you have submitted, and we want to make sure 
we have them properly identified. There is a list which is entitled 
"Opponent Priority Activity." That is captioned so that we know who 
pre]iared that list. There happens also to be a document which is on 
White House stationery which is for eyes only, dated June 24, 1971, 
memorandum for John Dean, Gerry Warren, De Van Shumway, sub- 
ject, opponents list, and the statement is "Attached is the list of oppo- 
nents which we have compiled. I thought it would be useful to you 
from time to time," and it is signed, George T. Bell. 

Is this the list that goes with that memo? 

]Mr. Dean. ISIr. Dash, I would like a look at those first if I could 
before I 

Mr. Dash. Do you have them? 

Ml-. Dean. I don't know which one you are referring to. 

Mr. Dash. Would someone give this list and give this memoran- 
dum — do you have the memorandum of June 24, 1971, also? Memo- 
randum for John Dean, Gerry Warren, Van Shumway. 



1387 

Mr. Dean. Is there a list that accompanies the June 25 one, also, 
that you have attached ? 

Mr. Dash. June 25 ? 

Mr. Dean. It would either have to be from the 

Mr. Dash. Xo, there is no list attached to the June 25 one. 

Mr. Dean. All right. It would either be the June 24 or June 25 that 
would be attached there. 

Mr. Dash. No, the June 25 says, "Please add the attached list of 
Muskie contributors." 

That list I have just given you is not a list of Muskie contributors. 

Mr. Dean. This would go with the list on June 24, to the best of 
my knowledge. 

Mr. Dash. And that is your understanding in submitting that to 
the committee, that to the best of your knowledge, that list is covered 
by the memorandum of June 24, 1971 ? 

Mr. Dean. I know the source of this would be from Mr. Colson's 
office, this list, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Who is Mr. George T. Bell ? 

Mr. Dean. He was a member of Mr. Colson's staff at the time. 

Mr. Dash. And it is your understanding that the list was prepared 
in Mr. Colson's office ? 

Mr. Dean. These lists were prepared by Mr. Bell and Miss Gordon, 
and kept continuously updated. This does not represent the totality 
of the list. This represents what I have in my possession. 

Mr. Dash. For our record now, that list did come from Mr, Bell and 
is related to the June 24 memorandum ? 

Mr. Dean. That is my understanding. This is my best recollection 
from the way I extracted the documents from my records. 

Mr. Dash. The list does not have any identification on it. That is why 

1 am asking you tliat question. 
Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Thank you. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

["Wliereupon, at 12 :25 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 

2 p.m., the same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Wednesday, June 27, 1973 

Senator Era^n. The committee will come to order. Senator Gurney, 
you may resume your examination. 

Senator Gurney. Thank you, ]Mr. Chairman. 

Mr, Dean. Senator Gurney, I wonder before we proceed, counsel 
has a couple of exhibits that were in my folder this morning that we 
did not get to. to insert and thei'e was a request made by the committee 
yesterday and at this time he would like to insert tliem into the record. 

Senator Gurney. Yes, pursuant to request. 

Mr, McCandless. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman and Senator Gurney. 
I think it was Senator Weicker who requested yesterday the Sullivan 
memorandum, I have that. There is another memorandum here marked 
confidential we would like to turn over to the committee without de- 
scription, unless the chairman or counsel would like Mr. Dean to read 
it. but at this time we would like to turn these over. 

I also understand that there may be some confusion about some part 
of a list that has been left out of the opposition list. All we can say is 



1388 

that last night, as we were looking for the files to respond to this com- 
mittee's request, that list was hastily assembled. We hope that it 
came here all intact. We had no other reason to think otherwise. If we 
could have a Xerox copy back of the list, we would tlien be able to 
ascertain whether everything was in it or not. 

Senator Ervin. There are two documents I wish that Mr. Dean 
would search his files and see if he has copies of them. One is what is 
called a decision memorandum which bears the letterhead: White 
House, Washington, July 15, 1970; and the other 

Mr. McCandless. Would you repeat that ? 

Senator Ervin. Decision memorandum, the AVhite House, Washing- 
ton, July 15, 1970, and the subject is "Domestic Intelligence." 

And the other is organization and organizations of the interagency 
group on domestic intelligence and internal security, lAG. These were 
two documents that were printed in the Xew York Times and the 
Washington Post, but were not in the documents that Mr. Dean turned 
over to Judge Sirica and Judge Sirica turned over to the committee. 

Mr. Dean, Senator, to the best of my knowledge, I do not have those 
documents, but I will check and I probably will have to go to my "\'VTiite 
House files to ascertain if they are located in those files. 

Mr. McCandless. If the committee can give any help to INIr. Dean 
in respect to Senator Gurney's request on the financial records that are 
still in the EOB or as to the rest of Mr. Dean's files, it would be help- 
ful, because he does have some problem in getting in there and copying 
those. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. You might let INIr. Dean identify the so-called 
Sullivan memorandum, and then we will mark it. 

Mr. Dean. It is a memorandum, there are several memorandums 
with the envelopes in which I received them. They are typed by Mr. 
Sullivan, as Mr. Sullivan told me he had typed them. One is a memo- 
randum re President Johnson, "Politics and tlie FBI." The other one 
is headed top secret with preface, and then the first line is he indi- 
cates he will make a general statement relative to the FBI and politics 
in various administrations. And then on subsequent pages he sets those 
circumstances out. 

There is also a note to me from INIr. Sullivan in which he indicates 
the contents are self-explanatory, and asks me to take recognition and 
tolerance to his own poor typing. 

Then, there is another lettei- I received from him classified secret, 
re Watergate, and in which he indicates in light of the recent hearings 
it could be that specific probing of the Watergate affair may turn out 
to be more troublesome than anticipated and indicates he would be 
willing to testify on behalf of the administration and draw a clear 
contrast between tliis administration and past administvntions with 
reference to information that he had in his possession and knowledjje. 

Senator Ervin. Those will be rpcoived and marked for identification 
but will not be admitted into evidence at this time because I am not 
sure that this committee has jurisdiction to investigate the matters to 
which that was related. You might let them be marked. 

[The documents referred to were mai-ked exhibits Nos. 57 and 58 for 
identification only and ai-e not for pulilication.] 

Senator Ervin. Let's see the confidential document. 

]\Tr. McCandless. It is coming right up. 



1389 

Mr. Dean. Counsel has also advised me that the one sheet is not 
complete. There were other lists when we Avent throuoh last nioht, and 
the only thing 1 can say is it must have gotten back into another file, 
and we will reexamine it and find it. 

Senator Ervix. This confidential document is a thing that is a 
memorandmn for H. R. Haldeman, Charles W. Colson, "Eyes Only." 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Ervix. Wliat does this "Eyes Only" mean on the docu- 
ment? [Laughter.] 

]Mr. Deax. That is one of the classifications that was used around 
the White House to mean that it was for the eyes of the recipient only. 

Senator Ervix. And he was not to copy it, is that what it means? 

^Ir. Deax. Well, often you will Iniow there are carbon copies or 
blind carbon copy indications on it. The use of this classification 
developed when we started reducing the rather overabundant use of 
what really were security classifications, national security classifica- 
tions that related to matters that were not national security. 

Senator ER^^x. I will also have these marked for identification 
because it is not clear yet that they relate to matters that the committee 
is authorized to investigate. 

Mr. Deax. I say they came in response to Senator Weicker's ques- 
tion of yesterday. 

Senator ER\ax. Have them marked for identification and not as 
exhibits here. Thank you. 

Mr. ^McCax'^dless. Just one more request. I have been handed a 
3-page list of opponents priority, and there are 20 names on it, the 
documents that were turned over this morning and marked by Mr. 
Dean in several places contain more than just these 3 pages. 

]Mr. Dash. That has already been received. That is what I was 
asking ^Ir. Dean to identify in connection with the June 24 memo- 
randum signed by ]Mr. Bell. But all that was received from you this 
morning was that particular memorandum of a list of names. It is the 
only names we received. 

Senator Erat^x. I am going to request the staff to make requests of 
tlie White House for copies of the document, decision memorandum 
of the White House July 15, 1970, and the '\\'liite House document 
organization and organizations of the interagency group on domestic 
intelligence and internal security. And also for the document entitled 
"Domestic Intelliirence Review" which was a part of the memoran- 
dum for H. R. Haldeman from Tom Charles Huston. I believe you 
called the name Huston ? 

]Mr. Deax. Yes, I believe that is the way he i^ronounces his name, 
Senator. 

Senator Er\t[x\ Senator Gurney, you may proceed. 

Senator GrRxi:T. Thank you, ]Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I will try to be as brief as possible and close up my 
testimony. 

Senator Ervix. So far as the chairman is concerned I think you are 
rendered a real service to the committee and flic country and I don't 
want you to feel rushed at all. 

Senator Gurxey. T appreciate the courtesy of the chairman and the 
members of the committee. 



1390 

I just wanted to clear up one little point on the coverup money 
which I didn't touch on this morning. 

When you had your meeting with Mr. Kalmbach on June 29 did you 
ask him for a certain sum of money that you would need to have him 
raise ? 

Mr. Dean. At that time I didn't know how much was to be raised 
and I believe I discussed with him the fact that he would get this 
information from Mr. LaRue. 

Senator Gurney. Where did you have this conversation ? Is that in 
the coffee shop or up in his hotel room ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, the bulk of the conversation took place in his room 
and not in the coffee shop. We only talked for maybe 5 minutes in the 
coffee shop. 

Senator Gurney. And then you adjourned up to his room in the 
Mayflower Hotel ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. But you don't recall that any figure was men- 
tioned at that time ? 

Mr. Dean. No, Senator, I don't. 

Senator Gurney. Let us go to the $350,000 fund that came into 
the White House. ]\fy recollection is that Mr. Strachan picked up that 
amount of money from over at the Committee To Re-Elect the Presi- 
dent. When did that occur ? 

INIr. Dean. Wlien did INIr. Strachan pick it up ? 

Senator Gurney. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. To the best of my knowledge, and I was told this after 
the fact, in more detail, was prior to April 7. The first time I was 
aware of the fact that he was receiving money before April 7 is when 
Mr. Strachan came to me and asked me if I could suggest the name of 
somebody outside of the Government that would have a, or could 
open a safety deposit box. I told him I could not, and did not know the 
amount of the money at that time. 

Senator Gurney. Now, as I understand there was some monev used 
out of the $350,000. 

Do you recall what that fisjure was ? 

]\fr. Dean. Yes, I do. It was — I am trying to recall when I first 
learned it, it was sometime, oh, within 2 or 3 or 4 weeks after the June 
17 incident that I was told that $22,000 had been expended out of that 
amomit. And that there had been that mucli taken out of apparently 
the safety deposit box and that money, in turn, was to be used for 
advertisements or somethinP!" of this nature. 

Senator Gurney. Well, that really 

Mr. Dean. I have not finished. I was looking to see if the chairman 
wanted me to proceed. 

Senator Ervin. There is a vote on now and we will have to take 
a short recess. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. Senator Gurney. 

Senator Gt^fney. Do vou know what it aetuallv was used for? 

Mr. Dean. The $22,000 ? 

Senator Gurney. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. I know that the $15,000—1 learnod later that the $15,200 
that was returned to me was a part of tlie $2-?.000 that had not been 
that was returned to me was a part of tlie $22,000 that had not been 
expended and I was told that the ]xart that had been expended had 
been used for political ads. 



1391 

Senator Gurxey. So I guess $6,800, then 

Mr. Dean. $6,800 

Senator Gurney [continuing]. Then would have been used? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, correct. 

Senator Gurxey. Now, did you have a conversation with Mr. Stans 
about restoring the $22,000 to this fund and making it whole again ? 

jMr. Deax. Yes, I did. 

Senator Gtjrxey. When did you have that conversation? 

JSIr, Deax. Well, there were a number of conversations on this, 
Senator, that commenced late July, August, September, because there 
was a desire to get the entire 350 back out to the White House. Simul- 
taneous witli these conversations, there was also a desire to accumulate 
any cash that could be found to pay for the support and silence of 
the individuals who had been involved in the Watergate. I can recall 
on several occasions discussing this with Mr. Stans and Mr. Parkin- 
son on how to deal with the $350,000. One of the problems was where 
would it go that it wouldn^t be reported and if it were re^^orted before 
the election, it would appear to be a secret slush fund at the AVhite 
House. 

Senator Gurxey. Well, did you discuss it after the election with 
Mr. Stans? 

]\Ir. Deax. Yes, I did. In fact, after the election, at one point, Mr. 
Stans advised me that he had the money to replenish the $350,000 
fund and called me and told me. I tried to reach Mr. Strachan, was 
unable to reach Mr. Strachan. Mr. Stans, for a reason I do not recall 
now, told me there was some immediacy in the money being picked up. 
I in turn called ]Mr. Fielding and asked Mr. Fielding if he would go 
and pick up a package from INIr. Stans and give it to Mr. Strachan 
as soon as he could locate Mr. Strachan. 

Senator Gurxey. When was that? 

Mr. Deax. That was in — I believe it was November 28. 

Senator Gurxey. Well, now Mr. Dean, why did you ask Mr. Stans 
for $22,000 at this time, when you were holding $15,200 of this money 
in trust? ^Yhy didn't you simply ask him for $6,800 to make that 
$22,000 ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, Senator, as I have indicated, from the very outset, 
there was a request for all the available cash. I was quite aware of the 
fact that I was holding cash. I had also made a decision that the cash 
that I was holding I didn't want to be used to pay for the support, for 
the silence of these individuals, and I was not going to become in- 
volved in that with actual casli that I was passing for that purpose. 

Senator Gurxey. But you were requesting $22,000 from Mr, Stans 
just for that purpose, were you not ? 

Mr. Deax. No, I was not. It was to make the fund whole and there 
was resistance at that point from the White House 

Senator Gurxey. If you were requesting it just to make the fund 
whole, why would you be so miwilling to part with the $15,000 that 
you had ? 

Mr. Deax. Because as I say, tliero was pressure from the White 
House and within days after Mr. Stans returned or sent over the 
$22,000, the demands reached such a crescendo that in fact I was asked 
to go to Mr. Haldeman and (j:ot authorization to use the entire $350,- 
000. And I was very much aware of being in the middle of the dual 
conversation, on the one hand to make the funds whole and simultane- 

96-296 O - 73 - pt.4 - 4 



1392 

ously, with making money available to pay the defendants. I had no 
idea how if was going to turn out. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, I must say I am puzzled. I do not quite 
follow the reasoning. First you say that you did not use the $15,200 
which came from the $22,000, to return it and make it whole again 
because you thought that money might be used for silence money. But 
then, when I asked you when you requested it from Mr. Stans, you 
had no compunctions about that. You said, "Well, that was not going 
to be used for that." Now, which is which ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I was not discussing with Mr. Stans the 
fact that there was pressure being placed on the T^Hiite House to pay 
money. Tliat was coming to me from other cliannels. I was always 
hopeful that we would find some remedy, that that $350,000 would 
not be used to pay for the support of those individuals. There was 
certainly no certainty that that would or would not happen. I had 
discussed it with ISfr. Hardeman, tlie fact that they were asking for 
the money. Mr. Haldeman agreed that we ought to make the money 
whole. I told him that there were demands and there were requests 
upon it. So I kept the $15,200 totallv out of the conversations. 

Senator Gitrney. But the $15,200 had come out of the $22,000, had 
it not? 

INIr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gutrney. I should think the logical thing to have done 
would be to return that and also to have added $6,800 from Mr. Stans 
and mnde it whole. 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, from where I was sitting, that seemed 
like a great risk that that money was going to go to pay the defendants. 

Senator Gtjrney .Was it not a greater risk for you to have it and be 
short the $4,850 which it was short ? 

Mr. Dean. I was quite prepared to make that money whole at any 
point in time. 

Senator Gtjrney. When you put the check in the envelope that con- 
tained the $15,200, your check, I understand, of $4,850^ 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gtjrney. What account was that drawn on ? 

Mr. Dean. It was drawn on my personal checking account. 

Senator Gtjrney. Was there enough money in the checking account 
to cover it ? 

Mr. Dean. No, there was not at that time, but on previous occasions, 
I had overdrawn my account and it had been covered. Within 24 hours, 
I was able to get the money in the bank and cover it. 

Senator Gtjrney. I have here a copy of a bank statement that came 
in at noon time from the National Savings & Trust Co., showing an 
account to John Wesley Dean III. Is that the account that you drew 
the check on ? 

Mr. Dean. I assume, because that is the only checlcing account I 
have at that bank. 

Mr. TiTOMPSON. I might point out. Senator Gurney and Mr. Chair- 
man, this is pursuant to a subpena signed bv tlie chairman on tlie 22d 
of this month. We received certain records — they were being com- 
piled, they were furnished to us over the noon recess, I have here the 
document that Senator Gurney is making reference to, which is a bank 
statement dated October 26, 1972, on the National Savings & Trust 



1393 

Co., Washington, D.C. So I have here two copies for you and counsel. 
I submit it at this time. 

Senator Gurney, I wonder if 3^ou would look at the bank statement 
and tell the committee how much money you had in the checking ac- 
acount at that time, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Deax. At which time, Senator ? 

Senator Gurney. October 12. 

Mr. Dean. The balance indicates about $1,600. 

Senator Gurney. $1,625.12, is that not correct? 

INIr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. Yet, you put in your file where you were keeping 
the money in trust a check for $4,850. 

]Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. Just a couple of other questions about the use of 
the money. You mentioned that you had this work done in the patio 
I think that was about $500 worth of work, is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That is approximately what I recall, yes. 

Senator Gurney. Why did you not pay that by check ? That would 
be the normal procedure ? 

Mr. Dean. I ultimately did. 

Senator Gurney. I thought you said you paid it out of cash out of 
this account? 

Mr. Dean. Xo, I told you 1 was anticipating what my needs would 
be at that time, but I did not use it for that purpose ultimately. As I 
said, I made personal expenditures out of the money for everything 
from groceries to other incidentals. 

Senator Gurney. "Why did you not pay those things by check? 

Mr. Dean, Because I had the cash in my possession and I was using 
it for that purpose. Senator. 

Senator Gurney. But cash out of this trust fund. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. I am curious about the wedding trip. Do you use 
credit cards ? 

Mr, Dean. Sometimes, sometimes not. 

Senator Gurney. You do have credit cards ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I do. 

Senator Gurney. Did it ever occur to you to use these on your honey- 
moon instead of this cash ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as my wife well knows, I try to use my credit cards 
as infrequently as possiWe, because I don't like to live on credit. 

Senator Gurney. Turning to the meetings with the President, now, 
as I understand it. you engaged your counsel — I think this is where we 
left off when we adjourned this morning — on April 2 of this year. 

Oh. yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this statement of the 
National Savings & Trust Co. on John Welsey [sic] Dean III account 
a ])art of the record. 

Senator Er%t:n. The reporter will mark this as an exhibit and insert 
it in the record at this point. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 59,*] 

Senator Gurney. Would you state again now when you engaged 
your present counsel ? 

♦See p. 1712. 



1394 

Mr. Dean. I engaged Mr. Shaffer on the 30th of March. Mr. Mc- 
Candless was engaged, as I recall, sometime in mid- April, after Mr. 
Hogan had removed himself from the case. 

Senator Gtjkney. Now, at that time, I suppose you discussed with 
him your criminal liability, is that correct — your possible criminal lia- 
bility, excuse me. 

Mr. Dean. At the fii-st meeting I had with Mr. Shaffer on the 30th, 
I think we spent initially about 5 hours in which I went over the high- 
lights. He said, I would like to think about that over the weekend and 
meet with you again on Monday morning. That was on a Friday. On 
Monday morning, we met again, spent about 2 hours or more going 
over further details, in which I was giving him the highlights of 
everything that I knew^ about the entire picture. 

Senator Gurney. Did you have any discussions in this time frame 
with the President of the United States? 

Mr. Dean The President 

Senator Gurney. The time frame you are talking about? 
Mr. Dean. The President had gone to San Clements at that time. 
Senator Gurney. Actually, did you have any meeting at all with 
the President from tlie meeting on March 22 and the phone calls on 
March 23 ? I understand there were two. 
Mr. Dean. No, one. 
Senator Gurney. One only? 

]Mr. Dean. There was one call. As I said, when I arrived at Camp 
David, they said it was the President calling but it Avas ]Mr. Haldeman. 
I assume he was calling from the President's office at that time. 

Senator Gurney. Then there were no phone calls on the 23d with 
the President? 

INIr. Dean. Yes, there was. There was one phone call on the 23d. 
I don't recall the precise hour, sometime after lunch, when we dis- 
cussed my going to Camp David. 

Senator Gurney. And that was the last contact with him until April 
14, is that correct? 
Mr. Dean. I believe it was April 15, Senator. 
Senator Gurney. April 15 ? 
Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Senator Gurney. You are right. That is true. Now, why was that? 
You had been meeting with him almost daily there in March on a 
number of things, many of which had touched on the Watergate 
affair, according to your testimony. Why was there this total and you 
had sudden absence of any other contacts, meetings, or phone calls 
with the President? 

Mv. Dean. Well, I can only tell you what my impression of the 
situation is. When I met with him on the 22d in the afternoon — let's 
say it was the afternoon of the 21st^ — I had gotten rather factual and 
open in a meeting with Ehrlichman and Haldeman and the President 
that I thought they could be indicted, that I could be indicted, and 
I was disagreeing witli most everything that was being said in the 
meeting. I subsequently had a meeting the next day, on the 22d, in 
the morning, with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, ]Mitchell, and myself. There 
was furtlier discussion of — one of the first things that came out in 
the meeting was the fact when j\Ir. Ehrlichman asked Mr. ]Mitchell 
if Mr. Hunt's problems had been taken care of, referring to the fact 



1395 

that Hunt had made demands. ]Mr. Mitchell said, "I don't think that 
Hunt has any problems anj-more." 

Then there was the afternoon meeting in the President's office in 
whicli there was more discussion about how to handle this committee 
and deal with it vis-a-vis the White House and the President and the 
President's posture on executive privilege. I again had quite evidently 
shown a different posture than I had before. 

[Recess.] 

Senator ER^^x. The committee will resume. 

Senator Guexey. Mr. Dean, we were discussing the time lapse be- 
tween those meetings with the President, the last meetings on the 20th 
and 21st and 22d and your next communication with him, which was 
April 15, as I recall. 

Mr. Deax. Yes, Senator, and I believe I was explaining that it was 
after the meeting on the 22d, that afternoon, when we met again with 
Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and the President, and 
there was more discussion of dealing with this committee, some dis- 
cussion about the fact that the Executive privilege statement was too 
broad and that the President would probably have to retreat somewhat 
to a position, this is ]Mr. ^Mitchell's suggestion, and he saw this to be 
the only problem in dealing with the committee. And then, on the 23d 
the President was going to Key Biscayne, and I believe he probably 
was in Key Biscavne when he called me. I am not certain because of 
the time frame. As I said, I had been surrounded by the press and 
was at my house and I talked to Ehrlichman that morning about the 
McCord letter, and then the President called and suggested I go to 
Camp David, and I would sav that was the last time I talked with him 
until April 15 at which time I sent him a message. 

Now, why did this happen ? In my estimation, it was becoming very 
evident to certainly Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Elirlichman, and j^robably 
the President, who was present during the meeting on the afternoon 
of the 21st. that I was not playing the coverup game any more, and 
certainly when I came back from Camp David that was very evident 
to them in mv meetings with ^Ir. Haldeman, my subsequent meeting 
with ]Mr. Mitchell, and my meeting 

Senator Gtrxet. "When were thev ? 

Mr. Deax. This was on the 28th. " 

Senator Gurxey. The meeting with ^Mitchell. 

Mr. Deax. Mitchell and ]Magi'uder. Mitchell and Magruder had met 
with Haldeman. and then when Mr. Haldeman called and asked me to 
come back from Camp David and I had a brief meeting with him, 
as I said, we had for many, many, many months, we talked very openly 
about 

Senator GtmxEY. When was that ? 

Mr. Deax. This was on the 28th, 

Senator Gtjrxey. In the meantime, vou had engaged counsel on the 
25th? 

Mr. Deax. Well, no, sir- — yes. I did, I did. I engaged 

Senator Gurxey. Hogan ? 

Mr. Deax. I engaged Hogan and in regard to the story running in 
the Los Ano-eles Times — — 

Senator Gurxey. And Mr. Shaffer on the 30th. 



1396 

Mr. Dean. When I was at Camp David I really made a decision 
there was no way that I was going to continue in the coverup. 

Senator Gurney. All of these meetings on the 20th, 21st, 22d, as I 
understand it, they were the first meetings between what I would call 
perhaps the most principal people involved in Watergate, at least 
those in the White House, to where you were coming to serious dis- 
cussion about what ought to be done and all of you realized that some- 
thing certainly had to be done, and done rather fast, as I understand 
it? 

Mr. Dean. I would not characterize the meetings as to what had to 
be done. In fact, the meetings were, as I believe I described them in 
my testimony, very similar to manv, many meetings had occurred, 
or I had been in earlier where we talked about, you know, how do we 
deal with the Senate committee, the President at one point in the meet- 
ing picked up the phone and called the Attorney General and asked 
him why he had not been meeting with Senator Baker. 

Senator Gtjrney. But the March 21 meeting was a meeting that, as 
I understand it, you sought with the President to tell him, as I think 
you said, the broad outlines of the Watergate story. Is that not right? 
Mr. Dean. Well, as I said also, we had discussed the Watergate on 
previous occasions before that, we discussed it on the 18th. We talked 
about monev and clemencv. He had told me as early as my February 
meetings with him, that I was to report directly to him at that point. 
If you check some of the exhibits that I have submitted you will see 
that there are a lot of Presidential decisions being made as a result of 
the La Costa meeting, and it was at one point I decided that I had 
to tell the President what I thought the implications of this whole 
situation was. That I thought that not only was there a problem for 
some that were involved before the break-in had become known but I 
thought there were a lot that had problems as a result of the break-in, 
and that the coverup could not continue. 

Senator Gtjrney. Well, at any rate, whatever was being discussed 
at these meetings the 20th, the 21st. and the 22d, they certainly were 
very important matters affecting Watergate, is that not true ? 

Mr. Dean. They were affecting Watergate to the degree of how to 
deal with this Senate committee, yes. 

Senator Gttrney. You mean you only discussed the Senate com- 
mittee in these meetings? 

Mr. Dean. That is the thrust of virtually the entire conversations 
that occurred, particularly when Mr. Mitchell was present, the morn- 
ing he was present, on the 22d. 

Senator Gurney. What about the meeting of the 21st? You had two 
that day, one with the President when Mr. Haldeman came in later, 
and then another one with Mr. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and yourself 
and the President. Was that the subject of this committee here that 
you talked about? 

Mr. Dean. I think, as I testified, that after I had completed mv 
presentation to the President from some of the questions he asked 
and some of the statements he made I did not feel that he fully under- 
stood the problem that people at the AVliite House had for their in- 
volvement in the post situation. It was somewhat like 

Senator Gurney. So it was a much wider discussion than simply 
this committee? 



1397 

Mr. Dean. Not really, Senator, it was, it was a rambling discussion. 
It did not have a particular focus. We never got down to specifics. 
The meeting — I assume what was going to happen as a result of the 
meeting that afternoon of the 21st and a subsequent meeting I had liad 
earlier, at that meeting was that there was going to be an effort to have 
Mr. Mitchell step forward and take the heat. 

Senator Gurxey. Did you not seek the meeting of the 21st with the 
President ? 

Mr, Dean. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator GrrRNEY, "^^Hiy did you ? 

Mr. Dean. As I think I mentioned earlier to you, I had had a com- 
munication from lSh\ O'Brien that Mr. Hunt was making new and 
increased demands that were now coming directly to the White House, 
and I could see that the Wliite House was going to be increasingly 
and increasingly placed in a position of having to deal with this 
situation. 

Senator Gurxey. And is that not what precipitated your request for 
this meeting with the President so that you can tell him the whole 
broad outline of the Watergate and what it was all about ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I had discussed with Moore, Dick Moore, for many, 
many months how to end this situation, how to get the President out 
in front of it so that he would step forward and say, "This is what 
my involvement is, this is what the picture is from my standpoint." 
But there just seemed no way to do that. 

Senator Gurxey. Did you not discuss the day before, March 20, as 
I recall, witli Mr. Moore, that "Now I have got to go in and tell the 
President what this is all about, and I am going to make an appoint- 
ment with liim tomorrow." Is that not the substance of the conversa- 
tion that morning? 

Mr. Deax\ That did — yes, and Mr. Moore encouraged me to go in, 
as a matter of fact. 

Senator Gurxey. Tell him about Watergate, the whole thing? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. But as I say, Mr. Moore, it is much — it is 
parallel to the Segretti situation in this regard my conversation with 
i\Ir. Moore. Mr. Moore knew a lot but he did not know everything. For 
example, when he had recommended that the President merely issue a 
letter of censure to Mr. Chapin and keep him on at that point he had 
only the broadest understanding of Chapin and Strachan's involve- 
ment. He had not heard the tape that I had recorded with Mr. Segretti. 

Senator Gurxey. Well, perhaps we had better continue on because 
there are other members I know who want to question and I have 
got to close mine down here. 

But at any rate after these meetings of the 20th, 21st, and 22d, 
you had no communication with the President until April 14, 15? 

Mr. Deax. April 15. 

Senator Gurxey. April 15. That strikes me as very surprising. 
All of these very important matters, at least to me, about Watergate 
were being discussed in these very crucial meetings of the 20th, the 
21st. and 22d and then there is no communication with the President 
until April 15. 

Why is this so ? I don't understand. 

]Mr. Deax. Well, as I told you, when I came back from Camp David, 
the signals that I got were very clear to me. I had discussed matters 



1398 

of the coverup very openly with INIr. Haldeman in the past, and sud- 
denly we weren't discussing those things. I was sent into a meeting 
tliat I didn't want to attend Avith Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder; I 
had had conversation with, in the next day or so wnth Mv. Ehrlichman, 
and I could tell, when you deal with somebody for a long period of 
time, you can tell if there is a change of attitude, a different posture. 
They realized where I stood at that point, that I was not going to 
involve — or be involved in the coverup any further. They went to 
California. While they were in California I had seen no change in 
attitude on behalf of anybody on the White House staff or for that 
matter the President after the fact I had given him what I thought 
was the most shocking way I could present the situation to him, and 
I decided at that point that I would definitely retain counsel, I would 
assess the circumstances and I would make my decision on what to do. 

Senator Gurnet. You retained counsel April 30? 

Mr. Dean. I made calls^ — I retained counsel on April 30, had made 
calls 

Senator Gurney. When did counsel 



Mr. Dez\n. I mean not April 30, March 30, excuse me. 

Senator Gurney. March 30. 

When did your counsel go to the prosecutors. Federal prosecutors? 

Mv. Dean. I believe the first meeting they had was on the after- 
noon of April 2. 

Senator Gurney. Then there were a number of meetings after that; 
is that correct? 

]\Ir. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. And they were discussing with the Federal prose- 
cutors the subject of immunity all this time; is that correct? 

']\Ir. Dean. I wasn't present at those meetings. 

Senator Gurney. Do you know whether they were, did they tell you ? 

Mr. Dean. I believe they did discuss immunity ; yes. I don't think 
it was discussed, as immunity as such as let's find out, have discussions 
with Dean and his testimony to find out what his testimony is about, 
whether he is a witness, whether he is a defendant, they all went into 
the discussions of immunity as I recall. 

Senator Gurney. Of course, we can find that out from the 
prosecutors. 

Mr. Dean. I am sure you can, sir. 

Senator Gueney. Did you advise Mr. Haldeman when you engaged 
counsel, criminal lawyer, on March 30 ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not. They were on the west coast and counsel 
advised me to stop and try to avoid any further discussions with any- 
body who was involved in the coverup and I tried to avoid conversa- 
tions relating to the coverup as much as possible. 

Senator Gurney. And you didn't advise Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I haven't completed yet. Senator. 

And it was— the 8th of April, to the best of my recollection, that I 
was going to have a meeting directly with the prosecutors. And ar- 
rangements had been made whereby my testimony had been explained 
in some degree to the prosecutors by my attorneys and an arrange- 
ment had l3een worked out whereby I could deal directly with the 
prosecutors so they could see first hand or hear first hand and ask 
questions of me in a manner that anything that was given to them 



1399 

would not be used against me later. That meeting was scheduled for 
the 8th, as I recall, and before that meeting, I called Mr. Haldeman in 
California to tell him that I was going to meet with him. 

The reaction I got from that call made it evident to me, very clearly 
evident, that that wasn't what they wanted, because I recall that Mr. 
Haldeman told me — there is something that stuck in my mind because 
I had never heard the expression before. He said, "Well, John, once the 
toothpaste is out of the tube, it is awfully hard to get it back in." 

Senator Gurnet. I remember that. But that was what, 6 days after 
your attorneys had started to meet with the Federal prosecutors, is 
that correct? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, and I did not reveal at that time to Mr. 
Haldeman when I talked to him what T would do and in fact, I de- 
cided I would go ahead and talk to the prosecutors. 

I also would like to state that at this point 

Senator Gurnet. Now, wait a minute. Are you saying that on 
April 8, you didn't tell him, Mr. Haldeman, that you were going to 
talk to the Federal prosecutors ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct ; I did not. 

Senator Gurnet. I understood you to say that you did. 

Mr. Dean. I called him to tell him. "V\nien I got that reaction — I 
said I had a meeting scheduled with them. When I got that reaction 
from him, I didn't say whether I would or I would not. It was while 
they were flying back east that day that I received a call from Air 
Force One requesting that I appear in Mr. Ehrlichman's office when 
they arrived back in the city. I departed from a meeting with the 
prosecutors to go see ISIr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman at the White 
House. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, then, you really never advised them at any 
time tliat you were meetinc: with the prosecutors, is that correct? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. "\^nien you did see the President on April 15, 
tliough. you told him that vou had engaged counsel and that you had 
been meeting with the Federal prosecutors, is that correct? 

Mr. Dean. Well, on — I believe it was late in the evening on the 14th, 
]Mr. Shaffer had a call from the prosecutors saying that it was going 
to be necpssary to breacli tlie privacv of the conversations that were 
being held because they had been asked to report to Mr. Petersen and 
in turn to the Attorney General as to where the grand jury was going 
and what was likely to come out of it. 

I think vou should also i-emomber that T testified that I, on the 
preceding Friday or Saturday, that same day, earlier that day, had 
tried to make it verv clear to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehi^lichman 
with a list I had prepared that I was not playing any games and that 
they were very much involved and they should understand it. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, since you had made your decision to come 
clean, as we might caU it. and engage attorneys and go to the Federal 
prosecutors and tell them everything you knew about the case, why 
didn't you toll ]\Ir. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlirhman? Don't you think 
that would have been a decent thing to do, to let them know what you 
were doing? 

Mr. Dean. My answer to that is that I had watched a frank-pro- 
tecting operation commence before thev went to California. I had seen 



1400 

subsequent signs of that as well as I had seen preceding signs of it. 
Whenever I would, for example, raise testimonial points with Mr. 
Ehrlichman regarding things that might be asked me before a grand 
jury, for example when I went over the "deep six" conversation with 
him, he told me, well, he said, you don't have to testify quite that way. 
You can say you were making an inventory. And I said, well, I didn't 
make an inventory. He said, well, I am sure you will think of some- 
thing. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, was not yours really a protecting operation 
so you could get to the Federal prosecutors first with a bargain for 
immunity ? 

Mr. Dean. I would not say it was a protecting opportunity. I would 
say I had made my decision as to what I was going to do and went to 
counsel to find out how best to proceed. 

Senator Ervin. There is a vote on. I expect we had better take a 
recess to vote. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. Please come to order. 

Senator Gurney. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, before Senator Gurney begins, for the 
record, an issue came up a little while earlier. Mr. McCandless was 
questioning whether the full list of so-called enemies or the contrib- 
utors that Mr. Dean submitted has now been released. My statement 
was that it has. That was based on the fact that all we received from 
having been copied, we thoujrht that was the complete list. But I have 
just been informed that additional lists are still down in the copying 
room for more copies of the additional materials that Mr. Dean had 
submitted to us. Since they have now been received by us, we will give 
you a complete copy. It has quite a few additional names, and they 
will also be released and members of the committee will get copies. 

Mr. McCandless. Thank you very much. 

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dean, finally, before wrapping up here, I would like to pin down 
the occasions this year prior to March 21, the meeting with the Presi- 
dent, when you and he discussed the coverup of Watergate. 

Mr, Dean. You mean direct conversations ? 

Senator Gurney. That is right. It seemed to me there were one or 
two and I think they involved Executive clemency. Those are the ones 
I am talking about. 

Mr. Dean. All right. 

There was a direct conversation about my reportino: to him on 
Watergate on February 28, when he told me that I should come in and 
report to him because Haldeman and Ehrlichman were principals. It 
was, I believe, the meeting on the — may I check my list ? I want to be 
accurate on this. 

Senator Gurney. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Dean. All right. It was the meeting on the 27th that I had with 
the President when he told me to report directly to him. It was in the 
meeting on the 20th — well, also I mi.frht add at the conclusion of 
that meeting, as we were walking to the door to leave the office, he 
again complimented me on the fact that I had done a good iob during 
the campaign, that this had been the only issue that they had had. that 
they had tried to make something of it but they had been unable to 



1401 

make anything of it and he was very complimentary of my handling of 
the job/lt was not dissimilar from a compliment he had paid me 
earlier. I again repeated to him that this thing had been contained, but 
I was not sure that it could be contained indefinitely. 

He then told me we have got, you know, you have got to fight back 
on situations like this. And I can recall something I cannot express in 
writing, a gesture when he sort of put his fist into his hand and said, 
''You have just got to really keep fighting back and I have got confi- 
dence in vou that vou can do that and this thing will not get out of 
hand." 

Now, the meeting on the 28th, there was discussion about some of the 
strategy that had been developed at the La Costa meetings regarding 
dealing with the Attorney General and developing 

Senator Gurxey. Again, I am really only interested in what I call 
the criminal activities. I think really, they are the coverup. We are not 
talking about the planning and break-in, but direct conversations with 
the President on that — not strategy meetings about the committee or 
that, but only the criminal activities. 

]\Ir, Dean? Well, Senator, it's hard for me to separate something like 
this out because we have a continuing sequence that evolved continu- 
ously, virtually, from the 19th until this thing finally ended and brings 
me to the hearing room today. It dealt with every aspect of the matter 
from press relations to 

Senator Gurxey. Well, I understand, but my recollection of the 
testimony — and obviously, it isn't nearly as accurate as yours, because 
I have only heard you go through the statement once. I think I have 
gone through it once myself. But I am talking about these cases where 
you and the President directly discussed Watergate, the coverup. It 
seems to me there were either one or two that involved Executive 
clemency. Those are the ones I am talking about. 

Mr. Deax. All right. Your question is, then, when did we discuss 
clemency ? That came up at the meeting on the 13th 

Senator Gurxey. Of March ? 

IMr. Deax. Of March, and again on the loth of April, in which he 
had told me that he thought it was foolish for him to haA^e talked to 
Colson. 

Senator Gurxey. I am talking about meetings prior to INIarch 21. 

Mr. Deax. All right, fine. There was discussion on the meeting on the 
28th, when I tried to tell the President that I didn't feel 

Senator Gurxey. I am talking about prior to the 21st. 

Mr. Deax. That is prior, February 28. 

Senator Gurxey, Oh, February 28, excuse me. I thought you were 
talking about March. 

Mr. Deax. Allien I discussed with him the fact that I thought he 
ought to be aware of the fact that I had been involved in obstruction 
of justice, when I made known to him that I had been made a conduit 
for decision. He said, John, you don't have any legal problems to 
worry about, I just don't believe you have any problems at all, and it 
was left hanging at that. 

Senator Gurxey. Did you discuss any specific instances of obstruc- 
tion of justice? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I, Senator, based on conversations I had with him, 
I had worked from 



1402 

Senator Gurnet. I am talking about this meeting. 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I understand. I am answering your question. 

I can tell when I am talking with somebody if they have some con- 
ception of what I am talking about, and I certainly had the impression 
that the President had some conception of what I was talking about. 

Senator Gurney. But I am not talking about impressions. That is 
what I am trying to get away from. I am talking about specific 
instances. 

Mr. Dean. All right, I told him that I had been a conduit for a lot 
of decisions regarding support and for silence and things of this 
nature, and I felt that involved me in an obstruction of justice. The 
President didn't think it did. 

Senator Gttrney. Did you mention any of these decisions 
specifically ? 

Mr. Dean. I beg your pardon? 

Senator Gurnet. Did you mention any of these incidents 
specifically ? 

Mr. Dean. I did not get into specific instances. I rather gave him 
a general outline or picture of my conduit activities. 

Senator Gurnet. Now, go on to the other meetings where you dis- 
cussed specifically the coverup of Watergate, anything about it. 

Mr. Dean. That subject about my involvement in an obstruction 
position also came up at a meeting which I cannot date, but I recall 
that Dick Moore was present. I had mentioned this to Dick Moore 
and Dick ]\Ioore was another one who thought I had no legal prob- 
lems and Dick was at that point fairly aware of the situation from 
the fact that he had been at the La Costa meetings. 

I am now at the March 13 meeting, where the matter of executive 
clemency and the million dollars came up. That would be the next 
instance in the sequence. 

Senator Gurnet. March 13? 

jNIr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. And what happened then? 

]Mr. Dean. At March 13, there was a number of unspecified demands 
for money that had come to me through INIr. O'Brien. I had also been 
having conversations with Mr. Mitchell. 

I might mention this because it is just — I have just remembered 
this now. There was at one point in time, after Mr. Moore had been 
to visit with Mr. Mitchell in New York, following the La Costa meet- 
ing, an effort to have Mr. LaRue go out and raise money. This had 
been discussed earlier and ]Mr. LaRue had done some activities of 
this nature. Mr. Ehrlichman mentioned to me the fact that someone 
ought to go to ]Mr. Pappas, who was a long-time supporter of the 
President, and see if he would be of any assistance. Apparently, Mr. 
LaRue and Mr. Pappas had had some business dealings and as a result 
of those business dealings, INlr. LaRue was encouraged that something 
migl\t be able to be done. But he told me that Mr. Pappas might want 
to have some favorable considerations from the Government on some 
oil matters that resulted from this mutual venture they were in. I 
rejwrted this to Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman told me to just give him 
a call w^henever anything was necessary. 

So thei-e was this general problem that was existing before the 13th 
of March as to who was going to raise the support money and how it 



1403 

was froins: to ^et there. That is wliat prompted me to raise it with the 
President at the end of the meeting, because it was on my mind, and 
I told him that, you know, there were money problems, there was no 
money to pay these people and he said, "How much will it cost?" 

I said. "]\iy best estimate is a milion dollars or more." 

He asked me who the demands were coming from. I told him prin- 
cipally from 'Sh: Hunt through his attorney. At that point in time, he 
said something to the effect that, well, Mr. Hunt has already been 
given an assurance of clemency. 

He said. T talked to Mr. Ehrliclnnan about that and then Mr. Colson 
came and talked to me about it after he had been instructed not to talk 
to me about it. 

So that was the next occasion that came up. 

Senator Gi-rxey. This is ^March 13 ? 

IMr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator GrnxEv. Was that not also a preparation for a press con- 
ference, was that not the main reason for that meeting? 

:Mr. Deax. On the 13th? 

Senator Gurxet. Yes. 

]Mr. Deax. The bulk of that meeting had to do with the fact that 
it was very likely that I was going to be called to appear before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, and we had discussions at that time of 
possibly litigating over Dean as a means of not having other members 
of the ^Miite House staff having to appear before any other committee. 

Senator Gurx^et. Are you saying you discussed nothing about the 
press conference that day? 

Mr. Deax'. I do not recall a preparation. It was generally just 
shortlv before a press confei'enco that these thinsrs would come up, 
that he would ask me for questions on a press conference. 

Senator GrRX'EY. He had a press conference on the 15th of March. 
You had meetings with him on the 13th and 14th ? 

Mr. Deax. 14th ? 

Senator Gttrx'ev. 13th and 14th. 

Mr. Deax'. It is verv possible that questions came up during the press 
conference because he was following the Gray hearings verv closely 
and whether the discussion that we were having regardinir the Gray 
hearings was formulating answers in the President's mind for the 
press conference I do not know. He liad not at that point l^egun 
to studv. at least in my presence, his briefing book for the press 
conference. 

Senator Gurx^^ey. You cannot recall any discussions in either one of 
those meetings about a preparation for a press conference? All you 
recall is discussion about Watergate, is that vour answer? 

Mr. Df.ax'. Xo. sir: vour quostion was. what specific conferences did 
I have with the President on Watergate. 

Senator GrRX'EY. Xo, we are wa}^ beyond that. Then. I was asking 
did vou discuss the press conference in the March 13 and 14 meetings 
and your answer was that you could not recall. Xow, I am asking 
that — you can recall all about the Watergate on those two dates but 
you cannot recall any discussions about preparing the President for 
the press conference. 

Mr. Deax' fconferring with counsel]. Well, Senator, all I can say is 
that the thrust of that meeting was not to prepare the President for a 



1404 

press conference. There were discussions about tlie Gray hearings, 
there was discussion about the question of litigatino: executive privi- 
lege. The fact that the President gave a press conference on the 15th, 
those dates were generally flexible, and certain circumstances might 
influence the President as to whether he would or would not have a 
press conference. 

Senator Gurney. So you do not reinembor any discussion at either 
one of those meetings about the press conference ? 

Mr. Dean. On the 14th I do, yes. 

Senator Gueney. But not on the 13th ? 

Mr. Dean. Not on the 13th, no, sir. 

Senator Gui^ney. Let us go on. Are there otlier meetings that j'ou 
remember in March, prior to the 21st of March, where Watergate was 
discussed, and again I am talking about the co^'erup, the criminal 
activities ? 

Mr. Dean. Senator, again, I am not trying to include more in your 
question than I would wish to include but there was a general theory 
that had been set up at La Costa as to how to approach the entire 
Watergate coverup situation, so what might be your interpretation of 
a discussion of a Watergate matter and what had emerged out of the 
La Costa meeting, I find far different. If you will look at the agenda 
that went in to the President following the La Costa meeting, you will 
see those were the first beginnings of the coverup as it related to the 
hearings which were deemed to be as serious as a criminal investiga- 
tion by the Department of Justice. 

Senator GtJRNEY. We have got down to March 14th and we only have 
7 days to go to the Slst of March. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gtjrney. Would you please tell me in these meetings you 
had with the President between INIarch 14 and March 21, the occasions, 
the incidents, that you discussed the coverup of Watergate with him ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, again, I think what I describe in my testimony/ is 
the post La Costa and I will be happy to go through that again and 
get into what were rather specific discussions of mechanics of coverup 
from a very detailed nature whereas opposed to the general policy of 
a coverup. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, you had a meeting with him the 14th of 
March, did you not? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. I mean, the 15th. 

Mr. Dean. On the 15th after the press conference I met with him, 
yes. 

Senator Gurney. What did you discuss ? 

INIr. Dean. The President, after the press conference, called Dick 
Moore and I over to his office and I can recall very vividl}' that the 
President was very relaxed, he completed the press conference, and he 
was — his initial comment to both Moore and I was he was surprised 
that after having made a rather historic announcement about the 
opening up of liaison offices with Peking and the announcement of the 
appointment of Ambpssador Bruce to fill that post, that the first ques- 
tion that the press had asked after- he had read this announcement was 
whether or not Dean would appear before tlie Senate Judiciary Com- 
mittee in the Gray hearings. 



1405 

From there the discussion became rather rambling. It was the 
President's recollection of his handling of the Hiss case, Mr. Moore's 
recollection of how the President had handled the Hiss case, and it was 
what I would call more of a social conversation than a working con- 
versation. 

Senator Gurnet. Then, you did not discuss anything about Water- 
gate at that meeting ? 
]Mr. Dean. No, sir. 

Senator Gurney. All right. INIarch 16. You had a meeting with him 
on March 16 ? 

]Mr. Dean. On the 16th we discussed matters on how Mr. Ziegler 
should follow up on matters that had arisen during the press confer- 
ence. I recall that one of the things the President had tried to ac- 
complish 

Senator Gurnet. I am just trying to shorten it up. Did you discuss 
"Watergate with him at all ? 
Mr. Dean. Not specifically, no. 

Senator Gurnet. All rijzht. March 17. You had a meeting that day? 
Mr. Dean. March 17 ? Yes, that was St. Patrick's Day, and I recall 
the President had a green tie on [laughter] and sitting in the oval 
office. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, that is probably true. 

Mr. Dean. He was very relaxed and he had his feet up on the desk 
and was very — the thing that stuck in my mind from that particular 
conversation was that he wondered if the Senate would bite the bait 
that he had put out at his press conference on litigating over the ques- 
tion of Dean and executive privilege because he was convinced if they 
did you would never see any of the "\^niite House staff before the 
Senate. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, if he was all that relaxed, I guess you 
didn't discuss Watergate. Is that a fair thing to say? 

Mr. Dean. I think that is correct, yes. Other than as I say we were 
just following a consistent theme that had been developed at La Costa 
regarding dealing with Watergate issues, he was continuing during 
these meetings where I referred to Gray discussing the fact that he 
was very distressed that Gray was turning over FBI files that related 
to Watergate. 

Senator Gurnet. Well now, what about March 19, there was a 
meeting with him then, as a matter of fact, two meetings. Did you 
discuss Watergate on those meetings? I am not sure of whether there 
were two or not, were there one or two, do you recall? It looks like 
two on this log. 

Mr. Dean. Well, what happened on that, as I recall, I don't know 
what records you are reading from. 

Senator Gurnet. I am reading from a "WHiite House log which was 
furnished the committee. 

]Mr. Dean. All right. Now what I recall there is I came to the 
President's office and he wanted to discuss, it was a discussion of the 
media problems related to the Gray hearings, and some of the postures 
he had taken on executive privilege and as the conversation proceeded 
I realized it was a media-type area he was getting into. 

Senator Gurnet. Again if I can help shorten it, that is what it says 
here, too, that you discussed these judiciary problems. 



1406 

'^Mr. Dean. That is right. 

Senator Gurney. You did not discuss Watergate? 

jNIr. Dean. No, and the reason— I don't know, the meeting was 
interrupted when I had suggested that Dick INIoore come down and 
join the discussion, and the President indeed called for Dick Moore 
and Dick INIoore came in to the meeting. 

Senator Gurney. Now what about March 20 here, there were one, 
two — no, three phone calls at one meeting as I see it here. Do you 
recall what they were about? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I do. On the 20th — the preceding evening, on March 
19, we had discussed the matter of the fact that a number of charges 
were being made that related to my involvement in the Watergate that 
were coming out of the Senate confirmation hearings of Mr. Gray, 
and we discussed whether I was — I was very anxious to send written 
interrogatories as we had offered the committee at that time. 

Senator Gurney. But those discussions were about the 302 files, I 
think, and the Segretti letter probably. 

Mr. Dean. What happened as I recall. Senator Ervin had been on 
nationwide television the preceding Sunday, on INIeet the Press or 
Face the Nation, and had made some statements about sending the 
Sergeant at Arms down to arrest people at the White House, and 
there had also been questions that had been raised regarding the 
reason that principal interrogatories would not be sufficient because 
you could not cross-examine a written interrogatory. I think that 
everybody at the White House agreed that you can't cross-examine a 
written interrogatory. 

iSenator Gurney. I might say the chairman of our committee was 
very persuasive and effective on that he convinced everybody that you 
could not. 

Mr. Dean. Well, the White House realized he had a very convincing 
point, I will assure you. 

Senator Gurney. Well, again, if we can shorten it, except for mat- 
ters like that the Watergate coverup was not discussed; is that a fact? 

Mr. Dean. Well, now, there was an effort in those meetings to get a 
draft letter up where Dean could explain some of this. This wasn't 
what I would call baring all the facts of the Watergate and how I was 
going to answer that letter. I submitted a copy of the draft of the 
response which you have as an exhibit before the committee. 

Senator Gurney. Well, now 

Mr. Dean. Then on the 20th, of course, I had a call that evening 
from the President and we were talking further about some of the 
things we talked about during the day, and it was at the tail end of 
the conversation that I said to the President, "I would like to meet 
with you the next day to give you a report on some of the implications 
of the Watergate." 

Senator Gurney. Well, thank you, INfr. Dean ; I am sorry we took so 
long to get through there but I was trying, as I am sure you understand, 
to do a rundown of the actual discussions, direct discussions with the 
President 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Gurnev, I might sav this 



Senator Gurney [continuing]. On Watergate. 



M07 

Mr. Deax [continuing]. That just, I know that every time I entered 
the oval office I appreciated the enormity of dealing with the Presi- 
dent of the United States, at no time did I ever feel I withheld any- 
thing from the President, and I think anyone who went in there and is 
asked anv ([uestion by the President does not withhold anything, just 
as when" I am saving something about the President I realize the 
enormity of that also, and I wouldn't lightly or in any way intention- 
ally say^anything that I did not know to be the facts as I knew them in 
my mind. 

Senator Gurney. Well, in summary, let me simply state my under- 
standing of what we found out here : i understand it is your own testi- 
mony that you did not think the President had anything to do with 
the plamiing of the Watergate break-in or the break-in; is that a fact? 

Mr. Dean. I have no knowledge of that at all, sir. 

Senator Gurxey. Then. I think it is also true, at least according to 
my understanding, that during the rest of the year 1972 between June 
16 or was it the 17th, the 17th, the day of the break-in, except for a 
meeting on September 15, even you have not testified to any discus- 
sions with the President about Watergate. Isn't that correct? 

Mr. Dean. AVell, sir, at the meeting on the 15th, Senator, we got dis- 
cussing some very narrow semantic 

Senator GurnJey. I understand, but what I say, except for that meet- 
ing : isn't that correct ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Gurxey. And, of course, it is understandable here that you 
and I have different interpretations of that. Your interpretation is 
that when the President said to you, "Bob tells me you have done a 
good job." you interpret that as meaning he knew all that you had 
been doing on Watergate and I simply say that the interpretation can 
be assessed to that that he was talking about the investigation you 
were doing in connection with the FBI. 

]\Ir. Dean. I would call the Senator's attention to the other phase 
of the conversation when I told him that I didn't think that this thing 
could go on indefinitely and at some point in time it would likely 
unravel. 

Senator Gttrxey. I understand, and the records show that and the 
facts show that. 

]Mr. Dean. I am simply saying you and I have a different opinion on 
that point. 

Now, then we come to the voar 1973 and from what I have been 
able to gather in the questioning I have just finished your testimony 
is that on Fobruarv 28 vou did discuss this matter of obstruction of 
justice and then you also testified to what you did here on March 13, 
and then, of course, we come to the meeting on ]\rarch 21 when you 
told him most of what Watergate was all about. And the summary 
that I can sop from the testimonv, the President of the Ignited States 
certainly didn't know anything about all this business, to this one 
Senator, until this thing on Fpbruarv 28. according to your testimony, 
and on IMarch 13 but especially, of course, the meeting on March 21 
where vou did discuss with him at .ofreat len.ofth the Waterirate nnd he 
at a later press conference said that he learned about it on that date. 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 5 



1408 

Thank you for your patience, and, Mr. Chairman, especially I 
thank you for your patience and the rest of the members of the com- 
mittee. I am soi'ry I have taken so long, 

Mr. Dean. I thank the Senator for his questions. I think they were 
very good. 

Senator Ervin. I want to thank the Senator for his examination of 
the witness. 

We will take a recess for a vote and come back after the vote. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, prior to asking his ques- 
tions, has asked me to have cleared up by Mr. Dean some more identi- 
fication of the materials wliicli he has submitted to us which we have 
just received back from the Xerox machine. This is the second batch. 

What I would like to do, Mr. Dean, if I could give you this batch 
of questions which are in approximately the order you gave them, and 
if you could go tlirough them to the extent you can, identify the source 
of each one if you can. Some of them, for instance, are a list of names 
without any letterhead or any indication. A^Hio drew up the list of 
names ? There is no indication as to whether or not the memorandum 
was attached. Tlie wav they presently appear, tlie identification of 
each of these documents is obscure, and I think for our purposes, if we 
use them for the committee's work, it Avould be important if you 
looked at them and to the best of your recollection, tell us what each 
list is and who drew it up and who received it, to the best of your 
recollection. 

Mr. Dean. Are we working from the same stack, tlie same order I 
have? 

Mr. Dash. If vou could identify for the record from what you are 
reading, not 7-ead the entire record. 

Mr. Dean. I liave the first document from Gordon Strachan to John 
Dean, dated September 17.^ And the source of this list is Mr. Strachan 
and sent to me. I do not know where he got the list. 

The next document I have is a memorandum dated October 26 from 
Mr. Strachan to me, subject, "Political Enemies." ^ 

Mr. Dastt. Mr. Dean, is the ])rior list also supposed to be included in 
political enemies? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, it was. 

Mr, Dasit. Could you identifv it? If you already have, all ri.q-ht. But 
when you speak of the list, if it is a contrilnitors' list, identifv it as 
such; and if it is supposed to be an opponents list, an enemy's list, 
would you please characterize it? 

Mr. Dean. The list I have — the first list I was referring to lias a 
reference on the cover note that came to me : "The attached should be 
of interest to you and the political enemies project." Attached to it is a 
partial list of fat cats attending a Muskie fundraiser. 

The next document, the memorandum of October 26 from Mr, 
Strachan to me, subject "Political Enemies," indicates that Mr. Nof- 
ziger sent the attached information on Chet Huntley to Mr. Halde- 
man. "Since you have the action on the political enemies project, 
would you make your determination of what should happen, advise 
Nofziger and mention your decision to me." 

1 Previously entered into tlie record as exhibit 52. 
^ Previously entered Into the record as exhibit 53. 



1400 

Attached to that is a memorandnm from Nofzi^er to Haldeman re 
Chet Huntley. I thhik that the notations on there, which are mine, are 
self-evident. 

The next document I have is a list of the McGovern campaign staff.^ 
This list was prepared by Mr. Murray Chotiner and sent to me. Mr. 
Chotiner had some discussions with Mr. Ehrlichman about this, and 
he was to prepare a list and send it over to me pursuant to some instruc- 
tions and directions he had from Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Dash. Now, do you characterize that list as a so-called enemies 
list or a cauipaign contributors' list? 

Mr. Deax. This was to go into th.Q general enemies project, which I 
might add at tliis point generally went into the file, where it remained. 

The next document, dated November 5. 1971, is a memorandum from 
Gordon Strachan to me regarding J. Irwin Miller.^ It notes that "You 
will probably notice in this morning's news summary that J. Irwin 
Miller, who is still giving money to Democrat John Lindsay, though 
he states he will support R. N., is also a backer of Lugar. I trust that 
you will use this information as you see fit in the enemies project." 

Attached is the news summary of that day. 

The next document I have starts "Politicos continued." This is a 
document that came out of Mr. Colson's office to me. 

Mr. Dash. "What is that ? Have you identified that document? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, I have. 

Mr. Dash. Is that also an enemies document ? 

Mr. Deax'. That is correct. That was a part — this is one of the 
updates. I am sure there was a cover memorandum or probably it is in 
my files somewhere in the White House that this was related to. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 60.^] 

The next document is dated Novembei- 11. It is a memorandum from 
a member of ]\Ir. Colson's staff. The subject is "Opponents' List," and 
it has, it is directed to Marge Acker, Pat Buchanan, John Dean, Dan 
Kingsley, Larry Higby, Gordon Strachan, Van Shumway, Gerry War- 
ren, and Lucy Winchester. Connected to that is a similar list with more 
additional names, these all coming from Mr. Colson's office. And there 
is a third document, dated June 2, of the same nature. 

Mr. Dash. The same origin ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. There is a duplicate document of the same 
nature. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 61.^] 

Another one dated May 16, the same origin. As I say, this list was 
continually being updated, and the file was sevei'al inches thick. 

[The document referred to wat3 marked exhibit No. 62.^] 

The next document is a memorandum of September 14, 1971, from 
me to Mr. Higby, indicating a list of names that he had requested, as 
well as additional materials containing other names. I might as w^ell 
read the memorandum : ^ 

^ Previously entered Into the record as exhibit 56. 

= Previously entered into the record as exhibit 54. 

3 See p. 1713. 

* See p. 172.5. 

s See p. 1728. 

a Previously entered into the record as exhibit 50. 



1410 

The list I have prepared is merely suggestive; it is based on conversations I 
had with others regarding persons who have both the desire and capability of 
harming us. The list is limited to less than 20 persons, as it would be most diffi- 
cult to proceed with more at this time. I would hope we would continue to feed 
additional names into the process every few months, but we must keep this proj- 
ect within reasonable bounds. I will await the review of these names as I feel 
certain there will probably be additions and deletions from the list. Before I take 
any action, please keep the list at at least 20 or less. 

Attached is a list that was prepared based on a document that Mr. 
Colson had gone through and picked out some 20 key names. 

The next document is a page of a news summary.^ I don't know the 
date of the news summary. It has a notation on the top, "Dean/L." 

Mr. Dash. When you say news summary 

Mr. Dean. This is the daily news summary that is prepared for the 
President and distributed to various members of the White House 
staff. 

The "Dean/L" indicates that it was to me from Mr. Higby and he 
has encircled DNC Treasurer Robert Strauss, with a note, "Is he on our 
list? Or should he be?" 

Mr. Dash. Did you respond to that ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I did not. As I say, most of these merely went 
into a file in my office, where I just gathered them. 

The next document I have is a document entitled "Corporate Execu- 
tives Committee for Peace, Trip to Washington, June 25, 1970," with 
a list of names. This was another document that was sent as a part of 
one of the continuing updates. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 63.^] 

Mr. Dash. What ds the source of that document ? 

Mr. Dean. That would have been from Mr. Colson's office. The next 
document is entitled "Democratic Contributors of $25,000 or ISIore in 
the 1968 Campaigns" —from June 20, 1971, New York Times story — 
with certain names checked on the list. This is a document that came, 
again, from Mr. Colson's staff. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 64.^] 

Next is a series of documents that relate to Muskie contributors. 
Part of it is cut off on the top here in the xerography process and this 
document was forwarded to me from Mr. Colson's office also. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 65.^] 

The next document ^ begins — it is a bLank sheet of paper, which is a 
briefing paper that I was requested to prepare for Mr. Haldeman so 
that he could deal with the Secretary of the Treasury with regard to 
making the Internal Revenue Service politically responsive to the 
White House. 

This document was prepared — the top document was prepared by 
myself; the attached document was prepared by Mr. Caulfield based 
on conversations he had had with individuals in the Treasury Depart- 
ment, as well as the last document was prepared by Mr. Caulfield as a 
result of conversations he had with people in the Treasury Depart- 
ment and in the Internal Revenue Service. 

Mr. Dash. That was prepared by you with Mr. Caulfield's assistance 
to be delivered to Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 



1 Previously entered Into the record as exhibit 51. 

2 See p. 1730. 

3 See p. 1733. 
* See p. 1734. 

s Previously entered into the record as exhibit 44. 



1411 

Mr. Dash. Was it delivered to Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it was. 

The last document for identification is a memorandum dated Au- 
gust 16. 1971.^ It was a draft in my files in which I was asked to prepare 
a strategy for dealing with political enemies that involved the entire 
White House staff, and it was sent forward, to the best of my recollec- 
tion, to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman for approval, disapproval, 
or comment. 

Xow. without going to my files in the A^Hiite House, I can't tell you 
the disposition of this document. 

Mr. Dash. But can you tell us whether or not that document was in 
fact sent forward ? 

Mr. Deax. Either in this form or in some form where the names 
were typed on it. 

Mr. Dash. Thank you, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Deax. I just noticed there were two other documents attached 
to that. 

On July 16, 1971, there is another update on the opponents list, add- 
ing a name. This again is from Mr. Colson's office. 

Senator Erm;x. With Senator Inouye's indulgence, I am going to 
ask you one question about a paper that you identified in this connec- 
tion called '"Subject : Opponent Priority Activity," ^ a three-page docu- 
ment, and see if you can give me the date of the origin of that. 

Mr. Deax. Senator, I am not sure which document vou are referring 
to. 

Senator ER^^x. It is one called, "Subject : Opponent Priority Activ- 
ity," on the heading. It is three pages. You had it this morning. 

Mr. Dash. I have that, Mr. Dean. I didn't forward that to you here. 
I can forward that to you now. The one I think you identified at the 
end of the morning session — one that had a memorandum of June 24 
from Mr. Bell. 

Mr. Deax. Yes. I was forwarding that 

'Senator ER\ax. I want to find out, on page 2, the name of Sterling 
Munro, Jr., Senator Jackson's AA. Do you have anything that indi- 
cates whether Mr. Munro was added on the list of opponents ? 

Mr. Deax. No, I don't. This is one of the- — I can only assume that 
this was around June 24 when the document was prepared by a mem- 
ber of Mr. Colson's staff and forwarded to my office as a part of this 
general list. 

Senator ER^^x. That would be June 24, what year ? 

Mr. Deax. That is 1971. 

Senator Ervix. Thank you. 

Mr. Dash. Could I have the documents back, Mr. Dean ? 

Senator Er\t:x. I can't forbear observing when I consider the list of 
opponents why the Democratic vote was so light in the general election. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator ER^^x. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. I really even in my wildest dreams would not think 
of trying to improve or embellish on your story but you told it better 
the first time when you leaned over to me and you said "I think I am 

^ Previously entered into the record as exhibit 48. 
2 Attachment to exhibit 49. 



M12 

going to demand a recount," when you said "There are more enemies 
than we got votes." [Laughter.] 

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Inouye. ISIr. Chairman, the charges contained in Mr. Dean's 
testimony are extremely serious with potentially grave consequences. 
The President of the United States has been implicated, and because 
of the gravity of these charges, I believe that the witness, Mr. John 
Dean, should be subjected by this committee to the most intense inter- 
rogation to test his credibility. 

It would appear to me that a most appropriate credibility test would 
be one prepared by the White House and as you, Mr. Chairman, know, 
the White House has prepared a memorandum and a set of questions 
for use by this committee. These questions should serve as a substitute, 
admittedly not the very best, but a substitute for cross-examination of 
jNIr. Dean by the President of the United States. 

Accordingly, I believe that it would be most appropriate to use 
these questions and to use the memorandum, and I am certain that all 
of us here will agree that the President is entitled to his day in court. 
So with that in mind I wish to proceed, sir. 

I have here a letter dated June 27, 1973, from the White House, 
Washington. It reads as follows: 

Dear Senator Inouye : We have noted your public expression of your willing- 
ness to use questions and a memorandum, previously furnished to the committee 
staff, in questioning Mr. Dean. We have today forwarded more up-to-date ques- 
tions to hoth the majority counsel and minority counsel for the committee. 
However, in view of your interest in this material, we thought it would be 
appropriate to send these questions directly to you. There is also enclosed here- 
with a slightly revised draft and updated version of the memorandum previously 
furnished to the committee staff. Sincerely, J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Counsel 
to the President. 

ISIr. Chairman, I ask that this letter be made part of the record, sir. 

Senator Ervin. AVithout objection, it is so ordered. The letter will 
be marked with the appropriate exhibit number. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 66.^] 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I also request that the memo and 
the questions previously furnished to staff be made part of the record 
at this point, sir. 

Senator Ervin. I would suggest that the memo, which is sort of an 
expanded version of the White House logs, should be followed by — 
this is a memorandum of counsel explaining the position of counsel 
in substance. 

Senator Inouye. Yes. 

Senator Ervin. If there is no objection, it will be marked as an 
exhibit. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 67."] 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I will now proceed with the memo 
which was received this morning from the White House. It goes as 
follows : 

It is a matter of record that John Dean knew of and participated in the 
planning that went into the break-in at Watergate, though the extent of his 
knowledge of that specific operation or of his approval of the plan ultimately 
adopted have not yet been established. There is no reason to doubt, however, 
that John Dean was the principal actor in the Watergate cover-up, and that while 

1 See p. 1754. 

2 See p. 1755. 



141i3 

other motivations may have played a part, he had a great interest in covering 
up for himself, pre-June 17. 

Dean came to the White House from Justice from a background of working 
on problems of demonstrations and intelligence. Among those working under him 
at the White House were Tom Huston and Caulfield. Dean was involved in dis- 
cussions in 1971 about the Sandwedge plan Caulfield proposed. Ehrlichman was 
told that the original authors of the $1 million plan were Dean and Liddy. 

If I maj' I would like to pause at this point. Would you care to 
comment, sir? 

Mr. Dean. Is that in question form ? 

Senator Ixouye. This is a quotation from Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Dean. I have no recollection of advising Mr. Liddy of a $1 mil- 
lion plan. In fact to the contrary. When operation Sandwedge was 
shelved, and I think I have in my testimony explained how that died a 
natural death, that the budget for that was set at $500,000, and all 
that were involved in reviewing that document thought that was an 
excessive amount of money. 

Senator Inottte. Well, I will continue to quote : 

Whatever the fact about this, it is clear that Dean attended the meetings 
that led up to adoption of the Watergate plan. Dean introduced Mitchell (who 
had sponsored Dean for his White House position) to Liddy in November 1971. 

jNIr. Dean. Senator, may I comment right there ? 

Senator Inouye. Please do so. 

Mr. Dean. I do not believe Mr. Mitchell sponsored me, to my knowl- 
edge, to my White House position. I first heard of the White House 
interest in me when Mr. Krogh came to ime and said would I be inter- 
ested in going to the Wliite House and would John Mitchell let me 
come to the "\^liite House ? I said I did not know but I thought some- 
body else ought to take it up with Mr. Mitchell rather than myself. So 
to the contrary, I do not believe Mr. Mitchell sponsored me to the 
White House. In fact, I recall some conversations when he counseled 
me against going to the 'White House. 

Senator Inotjye. I will continue : 

Dean introduced Magmder to Liddy in December 1971 and suggested Liddy 
for the combined position of general counsel and chief of intelligence-gathering 
for CRP. He told Magruder that Mitchell had hired Liddy. Dean, Liddy, Mitchell 
and Magruder met to discuss intelligence plans of this kind on .January 27, 1972, 
and on February 4. Dean was not present at tlie final meeting on March 30 when 
the .$2.50,000 plan was approved. It is not clear whether he was not there because 
he disapproved or simply because he was not in Key Bi.scayne or because he 
wanted to try to keep his own record clean. 

Mr. Dean. I might comment there. Senator. First of all, after I 
returned from the second meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, and reported 
to Mr. Haldeman what had occurred and told him of my feelings about 
what was occurring, and that I wanted to have no part in it and told 
him I thought no one in the "\^^iite House should have any part in it. 
He agreed and told me to have no part in it and I have no knowledge 
that there was going to be a meeting in Key Biscayne and did not learn 
about that meeting until long after June 17, 1972. ' 

Senator Inouye [continues reading] : 

He is reported as having said that he did not think it was appropriate for him 
to be in on these conversation*;. "He is also reported to have said at a meeting in 
Mitchell's oflSce that we should not discuss this in front of Mitchell or in the 
Attorney General's office." 

At some point during the spring Magruder phoned Dean and asked him to talk 
to Liddy to try to calm him down. At another point. Dean knowing that a bugging 



1414 

operation was under serious consideration, called Magruder and referred to the 
importance of Liddy's intelligence activities. 

Mr. Dean. I would like to comment on that. I do not believe that is 
quite accurate, Senator. What happened is Mr. Strachan at the White 
House, called me, I believe I did receive a call from ]\Ir. Magruder tell- 
ing me that he had developed very strained relationship with Mr. 
Liddy. Like when Strachan called me because I believe he told me he 
had been talking with Mr. Liddy he said, "What should I do?" I said 
it sounds like a personality and a personnel problem and I suggested 
that he not bother Mr. Mitchell with it but rather take it to Mr. 
Mardian and let Mr. Mardian resolve any problem because they do 
need a general counsel over there. 

Senator Inoxjye [continuing] : 

This arose after an argument between Magruder and Liddy. Dean urged 
Magruder not to let personal animosity "get in the way of the project." Also in 
March 1973 Dean claimed to Haldeman that in the spring of 1972 he had told 
Haldeman that he had been to two meetings at which unacceptable and out- 
landish deals for intelligence gathering had been rejected by himself and by 
Mitchell and that he, Dean proposed not to attend any more such meetings. 
Haldeman has no personal recollection of Dean telling him about the meetings at 
the time but is "willing to accept that as a possibility." 

Post June 17. 

Mr. Dean. If I might just comment there, following June 17 and the 
break-in the first time I had a discussion with Mv. Haldeman about 
these facts I had already reported them to Mr. Ehrlichman. He re- 
membered perfectly well and very clearly the fact that I had come to 
him shortly after the second meeting. 

Senator Inouye [continues reading] : 

Whatever the facts may be on the matters that are uncertain in the spring of 
1972 about Dean's knowledge or specific approval of the break-in, it must have 
been clear to Dean as a lawyer when he heard on June 17 of Watergate that he was 
in personal difficulty. The Watergate affair was too clearly the outgrowth of the 
discussions and plans he had been in on that he might well be regarded as a 
conspirator with regard to them. He must immediately have realized that his 
patron, Mitchell, would also be involved. 

It appears that Ehrlichman called Dean on June 17 to advise him of the 
problem and to direct him to take charge of it for the White House. Even with- 
out an instruction this would have been his responsibility as counsel for the 
President, from the time of the occurrence and he was active in that role from 
the moment of his return to the city a day or two after the break-in. This is a 
statement from Mr. Ehrlichman's deposition. 

On June 19, Dean met with Liddy, Mitchell. Strachan and Magruder and 
Sloan. Dean, ]Mitchell, and Magruder also met wath LaRue and ISIardian that 
evening at Mitchell's apartment. At these meetings the coverup plan was liatched. 
This is from the Magruder testimony. A series of meetings followed throughout 
the summer. 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I just might footnote as you go along. I believe 
that the policy regarding the coverup was set long before I returned 
from the Far East over tlie weekend of the break-in and when I came 
into the office and talked to INIr. Strachan I realized that the White 
House already decided initially that it was going to start destroying 
incriminating documents and certainly was not going to step forward 
as to what its knowledge of the mattei- was at that point in time. 

Senator Ixouye. If I may ask at tliis point, when you refer to the 
White House had decided, wlio do you mean by the White House? 

Mr. Dean. I am sorry, Senator, I did not hear you. 



1416 

Senator Inouye. You have just testified that the White House had 
decided. 

]Mr. Dean. Well, I mean by that that certainly Mr. Haldeman and 
Mr. Ehrlichman, because Mr. Haldeman had given specific instruc- 
tions to Mr. Strachan to destroy the incriminating documents that 
were in his possession. 

Senator Ixouye. "At these meetings the coverup plan was hatched. 
A series of meetings followed throughout the summer. Dean and 
Mitchell were ]Magruder's principal contacts on the coverup. Dean 
was not merely one of the architects of the coverup plan. He was also 
its most active participant. ^lagruder correctly concluded that Dean 
'was involved in all aspects of this coverup,' ■' and this is from the 
Magruder testimony. 

"It was Dean who suggested to Haldeman that the FBI was con- 
cerned that it might run into a CIA operation." This is from Mr, 
Haldeman. If you wish to comment I hope you will. 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

As you recall, when I testified I had been asked by Mr. Ehrlichnian 
to stay abreast of what was happening in the Department of Justice. 
In my meeting with ]Mr. Gray, which I believe was on the 21st, Mr. 
Gray told me of the fact that they had uncovered banking transactions 
in Mr. Barker's account and were at that time looking for the Dahl- 
l)erg check and the Mexican money and, indeed, I did report this back 
as the reporting channels had been developed to my superiors. 

Senator Inouye. Were you truly concerned 

Senator Ervin. Suppose you name the superiors you reported to? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Senator Inouye. Were you truly concerned that the CIA was in fact 
involved ? 

Mr. Dean. I had no idea that the CIA was involved at that point 
in time. 

Senator Inouye. Why did you suggest that the CIA might be 
involved ? 

Mr. Dean. This, as I believe I testified, was not at this point in time 
but that was at a later date when I went over to Mr. Gray's again and 
he told me his theories of the case. I explained these to Mr. Haldeman 
and Mr. Elirlichman that one of his theories was that the CIA was 
involved. I had no idea that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were 
going to meet with Mr. Helms, and General Walters, that was unknown 
to me until I subsequently was so informed by Mr. Ehrlichman but not 
as to the substance of the meeting they had held. 

Senator Inouye. "It was Dean who suggested to General Walters 
on January 26 that CIA pay the Watergate defendants while in jail," 
and this is from the Walters memorandum for record June 28, 1972. 

Mr. Dean. I believe I have explained that, Senator, in that I re- 
ported also at one point in time to ^Ir. Mitchell and INIr. Mardian about 
the Gray theory. That theory prompted Mr. Mardian. as I recall, to 
suggest that the CIA might be of some assistance in providing us sup- 
port and he also raised the question that the CIA might have a very 
proper reason to do so because of the fact that these were former CIA 
operatives. 

Mr. Mitchell asked me to go back and explore this to Mr. Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman knowing very well that this isn't the sort of thing I 
could go to the CIA with. 



1416 

I didn't talk to Mr. Haldeman about this, rather I talked to Mr. Ehr- 
lichman about it and he told me indeed I should explore it. In fact, 
I said I didn't know anybody at the CIA. 

He told me — I told him I didn't know Mr. Helms. He told me not 
to call Helms but to call General Walters, General Walters is a friend 
of the White House, and at that time alluded to the fact that he had 
already met with General Walters. 

Senator Inotjye, Did you, in fact, discuss this matter with General 
Walters? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did and I have so testified. 

Senator Inotjye. "It was Dean purportedly acting on behalf of 
Mitchell who came to Ehrlichman several weeks after the break-in to 
obtain approval for fund raising by Kalmbach for the arrested per- 
sons," and this is from Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Dean. It is correct that Mr. ■ — after the fact that there could be 
no assistance from the CIA came out, and Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
agreed that they couldn't and I reported that back to Mr. Mitchell 
and Mr. Mardian, that the demands apparently had reached the point 
where they felt they had to do something to get some money and they 
had none themselves. I was asked again by Mr. Mitchell to go back and 
raise this with Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Mr. Mitchell told me 
that he believed that Mr. Ehrlichman particularly would have an 
interest in making sure that these men were taken care of, and it did 
not take me any persuading at all in this conversation with Mr. Halde- 
man and Ehrlichman to initiate Mr. Kalmbach, and obviously Mr. 
Kalmbach would not have acted on my instructions at all. 

Senator Inotjye. "It was Dean who reviewed the papers found in 
Hunt's safe and declared that they were 'politically sensitive' and 
should be given special treatment." 

IMr. Dean. I don't think there was any doubt about the political 
sensitivity. Mr. Ehrlichman, as you recall, on the 19th, there was a 
meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office late that evening. Mr. Colson is 
the one wlio had expressed anxiety over what might he in INIr. Hunt's 
safe. As I have also testified at a subsequent time I learned that appar- 
ently Mr. Colson and Mr. Hunt had talked about the fact that there 
were things in his safe that somebody at the "White House should take 
possession of. It was during this meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office 
on the 19th that Mr. Ehrlichman said that I should report back to 
him the contents of the safe after he had directed Mr. Kehrli to have 
the safe opened. 

Senator Inouye. What do you think Mr. Ehrlichman meant by 
"should be given special treatment"? 

INIr. Dean. Well, I don't know what INIr. Ehrlichman meant bv it. 
I know that ]\Ir. Ehrlichman, when I described the documents to him, 
realized their ])olitical sensitivity, and that they — he had originally 
told me when I reported what the documents were to shred them and 
it was subsequently he told me to "deep six" the briefcase and shred 
the documents and it was only after I had reached the conclusion in 
my own mind that I wasn't going to do tliat and I persuaded him that 
too many people had seen them, that tliat might be what he refers to 
as special treatment, they be given directly to Mr. Gray. 
Senator Ervin. We will take a recess for another vote. 
[Recess.] 



1417 

Senator EmT:x. The committee will resume. 

Senator Ixouye. If I may resume reading from the memo. 

"It was Dean who sought out successfully^ to have the others omit 
his name from the list of those who attended meetings on the Liddy 
plans." 

This is from the ]\Iagruder testimony. 

^[r. Deax. I would like to comment on that. The meeting in which 
this was discussed was called by Mr. INIitchell. I was departing a meet- 
ing in his office and he asked me if he could talk to me about these 
matters. He called ]Mr. Magruder into the same meeting. They asked 
me to review my recollection of the meetings. I told him what my recol- 
lection was and as I testified, Mr, Magruder asked me, "How do I 
handle this before the grand jury ?" 

I said, "Well, I don't know what occurred at the second meeting. 
I know there was some brief reference in the first meeting to the elec- 
tion laws and that would seem to me a way to explain my presence at 
the meetings." 

Senator Ixouye. "It was Dean who urged Hunt to leave the country 
two days after the burglary." 

yiv. i)EAx. I believe I testified to that. That occurred before the 
meeting commenced in ^Ir. Ehrlichman's office on the evening of the 
19th. when Mr. Ehrlichman asked me where Hunt was. I said I had 
no idea. Mr. Colson was present also. He asked Mr. Colson a similar 
question and got a similar response. 

At that point, ]\Ir. Ehrlichman told me to call Liddy and tell Hunt 
to get out of the country, which I did. 

After a subsequent discussion, I called back, after reraising the 
matter, thinking it was not something that the White House should 
be doing, and spoke again with Mr. Liddy and told him that my earlier 
conversation should be retracted. 

Senator Ix'ouye. Then it is your testimony that it was Mr. Ehrlich- 
man who 

Mr. Deax'. That is correct. 

Senator Ixottye [continuing] . Proposed the idea ? 

Mr. Deax'. That is correct. 

Senator Ix'Oute. "It was Dean and Mitchell who prepared Magruder 
for his perjurious grand jury testimony." 

Mr. Deax. I can't speak about Mr. Mitchell's involvement. I know 
that Mr. Magruder came to my office shortly before he was to appear 
before the grand jury. As you will recall from my testimony, there 
were a series of events that preceded that relating to the fact that I 
had recommended that Magruder be removed or resign from the re- 
election committee because I thought he was going to have problems. 

Simultaneously to that, there was a discussion developing which 
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were well aware of, that there was 
an effort to hold the case at Mr. Liddy. 

Senator Ixotjte. Did you in fact counsel Mr. Magruder to commit 
perjury? 

Mr. Deax. I did. I did in this regard : I helped him prepare a state- 
ment that I knew was false. 

Senator Ix'otiye. "It was Dean who said of a memorandum Colson 
had prepared on Auofust 29 stating the facts as he knew them, 'For 
God's sake, destroy the memo. It impeaches Magruder.' " 



1418 

Mr. Dean. I think the facts speak for themselves on that. I did not 
destroy the memorandum. In fact, I turned a copy over to this 
committee. 

I think I have also explained in my testimony why I did not turn 
it over to the prosecutors. 

Senator Inotjye. "It was Dean who suggested that Sloan take the 
fifth amendment, though Sloan was innocent." 

Mr. Dean. It is correct; I did call Mr. Sloan's attorney before he 
was to appear in Florida before an unrelated matter down there. There 
had been a number of discussions within the White House about the 
fact that Mr. Sloan was going to testify about money that had come 
to the Wliite House. He had sought meetings with a number of people 
in the White House. I was the only one who would talk with him. 
Technically, under the law, it appeared that he did have difficulties 
with some of the disbursements that had been made that occurred after 
April 7, which was the effective date of the new law. And I did call 
him and ask his attorney if he was prepared to take the fifth amend- 
ment and in doing that, suggesting that he might want to pursue that 
course. Because to me, the fifth amendment doesn't indicate innocence 
or guilt. 

Senator Inouye. "It was Dean who was the agent in some of the 
money dealings with the arrested persons." 

Mr. Dean. Would you repeat that, please. Senator? 
Senator Inouye. "It was Dean who was the agent in some of the 
money dealings with arrested persons." 

Mr. Dean. I never had any direct dealings with any of the arrested 
persons. I conveyed messages back of the pressure that was being 
placed, not only on the reelection committee but ultimately on the 
White House, particularly the one that came to my attention where a 
threat had been delivered directly to me of concern to Mr. Ehrlichman. 
I think I testified that Mr. Ehrlichman raised that immediately with 
Mr. Mitchell when Mr. Mitchell did attend a meeting in Mr. Ehrlich- 
man's presence. 

Senator Inotjye. Did you have any dealings with arrested persons? 
Mr. Dean. Direct dealings? I had a telephone conversation, the 
telephone conversations I have discussed with Mr. Liddy, the meeting 
I had with Mr. Liddy. I have never met INIr. Hunt other than the 
one occasion I referred to, when he was in Mr. Colson's outer office in 
August of 1971, which is roughly the time I recall meeting him, after 
having seen him in there on a number of occasions. I have never met 
any other individuals. 

Senator Inouye. Did you in fact discuss money with Mr. Liddy ? 
Mr. Dean. Mr, Liddy at the time I called him — this was in January, 
I believe it was January 5 of this year. He had been trying to reach 
Mr. Krogh. He had received a letter from the Senate Commerce Com- 
mittee investigators and they were seeking responses from Mr. Liddy 
regarding Mr. Krogh. Liddy called Krogh. Krogh did not take the call. 
That is one of the documents that was not submitted, which I have 
submitted to the committee, the gist of the call that was returned to 
Liddy. 

I had a report subsequentlv that INfr. Liddv was rather miffed and 
a little outraged at the fact that he couldn't get hold of who he 
thought was a good and loyal friend, INIr. Krogh. Mr. Krogh asked me 
if I would personally do something about that. 



1419 

That Saturday, I called Mr. Liddy just to tell, to convey to him the 
reasons that Mr. Krogh did not wish to speak with him, because he 
wanted to testify before the Senate Commerce Committee in con- 
nection with his confirmation hearing that he had not talked with Mr. 
Liddy. 

So, I explained this to Mr. Liddy and during the course of that con- 
versation, Mr. Liddy told me, he said he hoped that somebody would 
take care of the attorneys fees. I reported to Mr. Liddy that I would 
pass that message along. 

Senator Ixotjye. "It was Dean who told Colson not to make a tran- 
script of Colson's taped conversation with Hunt and said that he. 
Dean, would handle the matter." 

This is a report from the Federal prosecutors, reported in the New 
York Times. 

Mr. Dean. That is not correct. To the contrary, I made a transcript 
of Mr. Colson's telephone conversation on a cassette tape shortly after 
Mr. Colson brought me his IBM tape of the conversation. I took a 
copy of that and played it for Mr. Haldeman and INIr. Ehrlichman at 
Camp David on November 15. Later that afternoon, after getting in- 
structions that I should raise this with Mr. Mitchell, that he should 
take care of the problem for Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, I 
took it to Xew York with me and played it for Mr. Mitchell as well. 
I got no instruction at that point in time from Mr. Mitchell. 

Senator Ixguye. Where is the tape ? 

^Ir. Deax. It has been turned over — the committee has a copy of 
the transcript of the conversation. 

Senator Ixouye. I do not know if they have the tape or not. 

Mr. Dash. Senator Inouye, we do not have the tape. I am assuming 
the prosecutors have it. We have a transcript of the tape. 

Senator Ixouye. "Throughout all of this. Dean was perfectly sit- 
uated to mastermind and to carry out a coverup since, as counsel to 
the President and the man in charge for the White House, he had full 
access to what was happening in the investigation. He sat in on FBI 
interviews with AMiite House witnesses and received investigative 
reports. Dean and Ehrlichman met with Attorney General Kleindienst 
late in July. The Attorne,y General described the investigation and 
said that 'it did not appear that any Wliite House people or any high- 
ranking committee j^eople were involved in the preparation or plan- 
nmsr or discussion of the break-in.' " 

This is from Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Deax. Senator, if I just might add one point. I do not know 
if the committee has a copy of the cassette that I prepared based on 
Mr. Colson's tape. I do have that in my possession and will be happy 
to turn that over to the committee. 

Mr. Dash. We do not have it. 

Mr, Deax. You do not have that ? 

All right. 

On the other comment you made reofarding the Attorney General's 
public statements, I ncA^er discussed with Mr. Kleindienst the coverup 
that was going on at the White House and the investigation I am sure 
he is referring to there was his own conclusion. 

Senator Ixouye. "History fails to record that at that moment, Dean 
corrected the Attorney General's erroneous impression by pointing out 



1420 

that Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean had all been involved in planning 
of operations of which Watergate was an obvious derivative or that 
Strachan had knowledge of the fruits of this kind of operation, or 
that all of them were suborning perjury and otherwise seeking to con- 
ceal the facts." 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I would just like to make a general observation. 
This document has obviously been prepared by somebody who was not 
at the White House at the time this was all occurring. It sounds like 
they are putting it back together through newspaper accounts. 

Senator Inouye. This is from the office of your successor, sir. 

Mr, Dean. I understand. And I don't believe my successor was there 
and didn't spend the nearly 3 years in the White House that I did. 

Senator Inouye. "Dean's activity in the coverup also made him, per- 
haps unwittingly, the principal author of the political and constitu- 
tional crisis that Watergate now epitomizes. It would have been embar- 
rassing for the President if the true facts had become known shortly 
after June 17th, but it is the kind of embari'assment that an immensely 
popular President could easily have weathered. The political problem 
has been magnified one thousandfold because the truth is coming to 
light so belatedly, because of insinuations that the White House was a 
party to the coveru]^, and above all, because the White House was led 
to say things about Watergate that have since been found to have been 
untrue. These added consequences were John Dean's doing." 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I think that my testimony answers in 
great detail my dealings with INIr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and the 
President, and based on what I know, and knowing the position I held 
in the Wliite House staff, there is no way conceivable tliat I could have 
done and conceived and implemented the plan tliat they are trying to 
suggest that I did. 

Senator Inouye. "Dean was responsible within the White House for 
becoming apprised of what had happened. From June 17 on, Dean had 
periodic conversations with Ehrlichman 'about virtually every aspect 
of this case.' " This is from Mr. Ehrlichman. 

"Dean reported also to Haldeman and to Ziegler, to whom he gave 
repeated assurances that he had made an 'intensive investigation' and 
had found no White House involvement." This is from Mr. Ziegler. 

"Dean was 'the foundation of the proposition that the White House 
was not involved' " and this is from Ehrlichman, 

Spring 1973. "With the election past and public interest in Water- 
gate on the wane, Dean may have tliought that this coverup had been a 
success, although he purported to continue an ongoing investigation." 

Mr, Dean. Senator, if I might interject, I don't know how quickly 
they are jumping from winter to spring, but I would draw to the atten- 
tion of the committee and the Senator the La Costa meeting and the 
events that transpired there, which I believe are documented by mate- 
rials prepared by Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Higby. his assistant, as well 
as subsequent materials that were prepared for the President, and I 
think these speak for themselves. 

Senator Inouye. "At the same time, Dean was affecting a failing 
memory and talking to Magruder as if Dean did not recall the pre- 
Watergate planning meetings in which he had participated," This is 
from Magruder's testimony. 



1421 

Mr. Dean. We reviewed that earlier, and as I said, I did, when I was 
talking to ]Magriider, I was telling him I did not understand what had 
happened between February 4 and June 17 that resulted in that event 
occurring, that I never had hard evidence, I never knew for sure what 
the facts were, I didn't know how the plan had been approved ; I didn't 
know how much White House pressure had been put on him ; I didn't 
know for a fact if ^Mitchell had or had not approved it ; I had never 
talked with Mr. jSIitchell about it. I think that is what Mr. Magruder 
is referring to, or, as I said earlier, he may have confused later meet- 
ings when I came back from Camp David and I did indeed give him 
the impression that I could not remember what had happened, because 
I didn't want to get into any discussions about what had happened at 
that time. 

Senator iNOirrE. Were you surprised when you heard of the June 17 
break-in ? 

Mr. Dean. Was I surprised ? 

Senator Inottye. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. As I told you, my immediate reaction was, after hearing 
the facts, that it was something that Mr. Colson had been involved in. 
I was more appalled than surprised. 

Senator Inouye. Talking about the first time you heard of the break- 
in on the 17th, were you surprised ? 

Mr. Dean. As I say. I learned it through a conversation that I had 
on the telephone with my assistant on the 18th, when I called after 
landing in San Francisco, his persuading me to come back. l^Hien I 
first heard of it, I can't say I was surprised to hear it, knowing what I 
knew had occurred in the "Wliite House in the past. 

Senator Inouye. You had anticipated something like this ? 

Mr. Dean. I hadn't anticipated anything like this, no. I can't say 
I anticipated it, but I can't say I was surprised to hear of it, because 
I was aware of the fact that there had been a past effort to accomplish 
a burglary on the Brookings Institute and I had also heard of the 
Ell she rg psvchiatrist break-in by that time. 

Senator Inouye. You were not surprised because you were an author 
of the plan ? 

Mr. Dean, No, sir; that was not my immediate reaction. I didn't 
think the plan had been approved. 

Senator Inouye. "In February, however, with the Ervin committee 
beginning its work, the President was again concerned that all of the 
available facts be made known. In the middle of February 1973, Dean 
and Richard Moore met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman at San Cle- 
mente. Dean was assigned to reduce 'to written form all of the detailed 
facts as thev related both to the Committee To Re-Elect and the White 
House.' " This is from Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Dean. I received no such instruction when I was at La Costa to 
prepare anv written report and have no knowledge of ever being given 
such an instruction. 

Senator Inouye. This is also substantiated bv Mr. Moore. 

Mr. Dean. I have no knowledge of that. There was, as I say, an 
earlier effort in December to prepare such a report and I have sub- 
mitted that document to the committee. If there were discussions of 
preparing a written report, it was of the ilk of a report that was pre- 
pared in the December period, which I, for lack of a better term, call 
a fairy tale. 



1422 

Senator Inottye. "Dean was pressed continually for tliat statement, 
particularly by Haldeman, but never produced it." 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I recall, the only time I recall Mr. Halde- 
man and Mr, Ehrlichman pushing me and pressing me for a statement 
is when I was up at Camp David and not in that time frame. 

Senator Inottye. "At this point, the Gray confirmation hearings 
were imminent and the Ervin hearings were on the horizon. The Presi- 
dent, who had barely known Dean, determined that counsel to the 
President was the appropriate person with whom to work in formu- 
lating the President's position on executive privilege and similar legal 
issues in that these hearings in news conferences on March 2 and 15, 
at which they would arise, would present. Between February 27 and 
April 16, the President met with Dean and usually others, 21 or 22 
times and there were 14 telephone conversations between March 10 and 
April 22." 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I will stand on my testimony with regard to 
those last few paragraphs you have read. 

Senator Inouye. "It is probable that Dean helped induce the views 
on attorney-client privilege and on separation of powers that would 
have immunized Dean himself from having to testify under oath." 

Mr. Dean. I will comment on that to the effect that Mr. — or the 
President and I when we discussed the Dean appearance, I told him 
that if I go up there, I am going to testify. There is no way to go up. 
We had had countless occasions when the executive privilege issue had 
come up before, there was a parallel developing between the Gray 
hearings and the ITT hearings where Mr. Flanigan made an appear- 
ance before the Senate Judiciary Committee. This was quite evident. 
In my discussions with the President he made it clear to me he did 
not want Mr, Ehrlichman or Haldeman to appear and I told him the 
strongest case for executive privilege would rest on the counsel to the 
President and we did discuss that. 

Senator Inotjye, "During this period Dean was developing other 
problems. On March 10 there were press reports it was Dean who had 
recommended Liddy to the Committee to Re-Elect the President, On 
March 22, Pat Gray testified that Dean had lied to him during the 
course of the FBI investigation of Watergate, On March 23 ^McCord's 
letter to Judge Sirica was made public. The coverup was coming 
uncovered. 

"During this period the point was frequently raised by various peo- 
ple, including primarily the President, that the 'whole story of the 
Watergate should be made public' Dean's answer always was 'We 
cannot do it while the investigation is continuing,' There are conflict- 
ing versions of events and the rights of defendants might be prejudiced 
by the statement." 

And this is from Mr. Haldeman. 

Mr. Dean, I think that relates back to a conversation that I had with 
Mr, Haldeman shortly after the election and before I prepared the — 
was requested to prepare a written version of the Dean report when he 
asked me for what the facts would entail. At that time I told him that 
I thought that the grand jury would be reconvened and I thought that 
they would undoubtedly get into obstruction of justice and I tliought 
that those — that that investigation would come directly to the White 
House and that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean could be indicted, 
and he said to me, "I do not believe that is a very viable option." 



1423 

Senator Inouye. "On March 20th the President indicated that he 
still did not have all the facts." 

Mr. Dean. Wliat date was that, Senator ? 

Senator Inotjye. INIarch 20. 

Mr. Deax. The President did not state to ms, on the 20th when I 
received a call from the President I told him at that time that I would 
like to meet with him the next morning, and I would like to tell him 
what I thought the implication of the situation Avas, what had really 
prompted me at that time was the new demand from Mr. Hunt that 
indeed, this thing was getting far out of hand, that the White House 
was now being directly subject to blackmail and I did not know how 
to handle it. 

Senator Inouye. Is it your testimony that on March 20 the Presi- 
dent did in fact have all the facts? 

Mr. Dean. I did not hear you, again. Senator, I am sorry. 

Senator Inotjye. Is it your testimony that on March 20 the Presi- 
dent did not have all the facts ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not know what the President knew on March 20. 
We had had conversations before that. We had conversations that I 
was personally engaged in on September 15 of the preceding year. We 
had had conversations in early February or late February in which 
I tried to start telling him some of my own involvement. We had also 
had a discussion on March 13 about the money demands that were 
being made. At that time he discussed the fact that a million dollars 
is no problem. He repeated it several times. I can very vividly recall 
that the way he sort of rolled his chair back from his desk and leaned 
over to Mr. Haldeman and said, "A million dollars is no problem," 
and then he came back and asked "Well, who is making these demands," 
and I said they are principally coming from Mr. Hunt and he got into 
the fact that Hunt had been given clemency and his conversation about 
his annoyance that he had also talked to Colson about this in addition 
to Ehrlichman, and the money matter was left very much hanging at 
that meeting. Nothing was resolved. 

Senator Ix'^ouye. As the President's counsel, did you, in a very legal 
fashion, advise him of your meetings in February in the Attorney 
General's office? 

Mr. Deax\ My channel of reporting was through Mr. Haldeman or 
Mr. Ehrlichman. At the completion of the second meeting I sought 
out an appointment with Mr. Haldeman. I recall 

Senator Ix^guye. In the subsequent meetings with the President did 
you clearly advise him of the break-in, your involvement and the cover- 
up, and your involvement? 

Mr. Dean. I certainly did on the 21st and I had attempted to do it 
earlier in February but he was not interested in it when I raised it, 
and the conversation got cut short. I told him I thought I had an 
obstruction-of-justice problem and gave him, started to give him the 
highlights. He did not want to pursue it further. 

Senator Inotjye. "In the preceding week Dean had begun to express 
to Richard Moore concern about Dean's own involvement. Referring 
to the meetings in Mitchell's office, the plumbers operation and the Ells- 
berg break-in and the demands by Hunt possibly on March 16 for more 
money." 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 



1424 

Mr. Dean. I did discuss with Mr. Moore the fact that, but that was 
not the first time I had discussed it with Mr. Moore. Mr. ISIoore and I 
had talked about this on many occasions, that I thoug;ht that the cover- 
up as harmful, bad, it had to stop at some point. We were searching for 
answers as to how to end it. We could not find an answer, and finally, 
at one point when I was having direct access to the President I thought, 
and discussed with Moore that I can do something to end it now and 
I will go in and tell the President what this is going to mean if it 
continues. 

Senator Inoute. "After the two of them met with the President on 
March 20 Moore told Dean 'I do not think the President has any idea 
of the kind of things that you have told me about.' When Dean agreed 
that the President did not, Moore told Dean that it was his obligation 
to advise the President and lectured Dean on this subject." 

Mr. Dean. Well, Richard Moore to me is a wonderful man, and I 
often went to him for counsel. He is an older man, and I respected his 
judgment very much. 

I believe I raised these thinafs witli Mr. ISIoore, I had raised them 
before and I told him what prompted my conversation that afternoon 
with Mr. Moore were the demands from Hunt and I wanted — by this 
time he Avas aware himself of the money demands because this had 
come up at La Costa when Mr. Ehrlichman had instructed Mr. Moore 
to go to New York and get Mr. Mitchell to take care of these prob- 
lems. So for that reason I had never told Dick Moore everything I 
knew but I had given him enough knowledge so that he could see the 
breadth of the problem. 

Senator Ixouye. As tlie trusted aide and counsel to the President 
of the United States, did you not feel that it was your obligation and 
duty to as soon as possible advise him of the involvement in the Water- 
gate break-in and the ensuing coverup ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I think I have expressed before to walk 
into the President's door is not the easiest thing to do. My channels 
of reporting was through Mr. Haldeman or INIr. Ehrlichman, prin- 
cipally through Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Inouye. Didn't the enormity of the problem compel you to 
walk into the President's office ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I can only assume that everything I told Mr. Halde- 
man and Ehrlichman would be going to the President also. As I have 
testified, on some occasions Mr. Haldeman would take notes about 
things I was telling him. He would take these notes shortlv before he 
would go into meetings with the President. I can also recall occasions 
when we were meeting when a call would come from Mr. Haldeman 
to come to the President's office or once in Florida to come over to his 
residence and he would wait until I completed reporting. I assumed 
that everything I was telling Mr. Haldeman was going to the 
President. 

Senator Inotjye. "^^Hien did you begin to mistrust Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Dean. I think that the first signal T got that Mv. Haldeman had 
decided that, you might say, I was off the reservation when I came 
back from Camp David. 

Senntor Inotjye. "V^-Tiat was the date, sir ? 

Mr. Dean. That was the 28th. I think that was prompted bv my atti- 
tude in a meeting with the President on the afternoon of the 21st 



1425 

when there was more discussion of different essentially coverup tech- 
niques without getting into great detail because I' cannot recall in 
great detail, everything they were saying the President was asking me, 
do I a<iree and I was saving no, and finally, at one point in that meeting 
I said that, right in front of the President that, I felt that Dean, 
Haldeman, and Ehrlichman could be indicted for obstruction of justice 
and this has to be recognized. And I think as a result of that meeting 
they saw that I had begun to change my attitude about any further 
involvement in a coverup. 

Senator Ixouye. "On March 21 Dean gave the President a more 
complete, but still laundered version of the facts and so surprised the 
President that according to press accounts of what Dean is saying 'the 
President came out of his chair.' " 

Mv. Dean. I do not knOAV where that press account came from. The 
President did not come out of his chair. I have never seen the President 
come out of his chair other than very easily and slowly at the time 
that he got up on April 15 to walk around to the corner of the EOB 
office and then raise something with me. The President of the United 
States does not come flying out of his chair. 

Senator Ixouye. "At this meeting Dean indicated that Magruder 
was involved but that he did not know about Mitchell." 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. As I have said before this committee I 
have never had a direct conversation with John Mitchell to ask him 
what his involvement was. On the 28th when I came down from Camp 
David after there was this discussion about whether I would be willing 
to perpetuate the story that there had been one meeting in INIitchell's 
office, there had been a discussion of the election laws and that that was 
the reason for my presence and it was to introduce Mr. Liddy, at the 
end of that discussion I said to Mr. INIitchell "I have never asked you 
of your involvement and I will not ask you of your involvement but 
1 want to hypothesize what I see to be the situation," and I then gave 
them my hypothesis of the situation and, as a result of that hypothesis, 
]\rr. Mitchell said "that is not far from accurate, but we thought it 
would be two or three times removed." 

Senator Ixotjye. If you did not know about Mitchell why did you 
advise the President that Mr. ]\Iitchell could be indicted? 

Mr. Deax. Because based on the information Mr. Magruder had 
given me, which was inferential and my general assumption of the 
fact. I was aware of the fact that he had received the information from 
the electronic surveillance. 

Senator Ixottye. Did you so advise the President ? 

Mr. Deax. Did I so advise the President? I do not recall that I got 
into a detailed discussion. I was jriving the President what I would 
say was a general overview and letting him come back and ask any 
specific questions he might wish to ask. 

Senator Ixouye. Do you not feel it was important enough to advise 
the President of the I"^nited States that his former Attorney General 
Avas involved and implicated? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I told him I thought he could be indicted but I 
told him I did not have the facts for certainty myself that he was 
indictable. 

Senator Ixouye. I thouo:ht vou had just testified that Mr. Magruder, 
Mitchell, and Dean were indictable? 



1426 

Mr. Dean. No, no. You are talking about the meeting that occurred 
on the 21st? 

Senator Inouye. The 21st of March, sir. 

Mr. Dean. That was in the afternoon after I had earlier met with 
the President and I said that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean were 
indictable for obstruction of justice. 

'Senator Inouye. "He mentioned the Ellsberg break-in and possibly 
a second-story job at the Brookings Institute. He told about the attempt 
by Hunt to blackmail Ehrlichman over the Ellsberg break-in. He sug- 
gested that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean might all have some 
problem about the financial transactions with the defendants but that 
he thought they were more technical and political than legal." 

Mr. Dean. I do recall saying that I thought that some of the obstruc- 
tion problems were technical. I said some of them are more serious than 
others. As far as discussion of the Ellsberg burglary, Senator, I don't 
recall raising that at that point in time with the President as the rea- 
son for Mr. Hunt's threat. In fact I was — when I raised it with Mr. 
Ehrlichman as to what these seamy things were, Mr. Ehrlichman said, 
"Well, you know I just have no idea what he could be talking about." 

And subsequently on the 28tli or 29th wlien I talked to Mr. Krogh 
I was very curious myself to find out wliat it was. and that is when I 
asked Mr. Krogh if, in fact, Mr. Ehrlichman had authorized the bur- 
glary of the doctor's office and he had told me that he didn't think 
Mr. Ehrlichman knew in advance. 

Senator Inouye. Didn't you believe that the offer of money for 
silence was a criminal offense ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did. 

Senator Inouye. Why did you say that these problems were more 
technical and political than legal ? 

Mr. Dean. That isn't the way I believe I cast it. ^^Hien I said they 
were indictable I meant despite the degree of technicality as an indict- 
ment, I can't say I was a criminal lawyer but I did recognize an 
obstruction of justice. 

Senator Inouye. "He gave no hint, however, of his orchestration of 
perjured testimony by Magruder and others. Ehrlichman suggested 
that everyone be made to appear before the grand jury and waive 
executive privilege." 

Mr. Dean. I have no recollection of that at all. To the contrary, when 
we met subsequently I kept shaking my head and saying, "No," Ehr- 
lichman, Dean and Haldeman are indictable and the tone of the con- 
versation was not going to come forward but rather to continue the 
coverup and I think the subsequent meetings on the 22d with Mr. 
Mitchell, if the President indeed had received the message I was trying 
to give certainly wouldn't have engaged in the conversation with Mr. 
Mitchell that afternoon which would leisurely discuss the status of 
this committee and the like. 

Certainly nothing of any significance occurred at all after that 21st 
meeting. 

Senator Inouye. "Dean thought this would be a good idea but only 
if the persons who appeared before the grand jury were given 
immunity." 

Mr. Dean. I don't recall that at all. I do recall general discussions 
that I thought that one of the best ways to get the truth out would be 
if people could receive immunity because I knew a lot of people would 



1427 

be unwilline: to talk or that their stories \YOiild be less than forthcom- 
ing if they felt they were going to incriminate themselves. 

Senator Ixouye. Should it be I do not recall oi- it did not happen? 

Mr. Deax. The reference to the discussion of innn unity ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes. 

It is very important. I note throughout your testimony your power 
of recollection is immense but oftentimes you have testified that you 
cannot recall. 

Mr. Dean. I am sorry, with regard to this 

Senator Inouye, Is there a possibility that it did happen ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, it is. I do not recall specifically, Senator. 

Senator Inouye. '"At another meeting that day Ehrlichman strongly 
opposed immunity." 

Mr. Dean. I never heard that. 

Senator Inotjye. This did not happen ? 

Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Inouye. "On March 23 Dean was sent to Camp David in 
order to complete the long-promised report. Dean was at Camp David 
for 6 days but came down on the night of the 28th and delivered 
nothing." 

Mr, Dean. That is correct, I delivered nothing because I had, as I 
have testified, had earlier conversations about my testimony. Every 
time I revealed the slightest inch of my knowledge, recollections began 
to change, characterizations began to change. I was asked to handle 
testimony in difi'erent ways. When I came down from Camp David 
there was no doubt in my mind that I wasn't going to play the coverup 
game and I wasn't going to give them any further information with 
which they could play the coverup game. 

Senator Inouye. Were you in fact, Mr. Dean, preparing your own 
testimony ? 

Mr. Dean. I was going through and recalling everything I could 
remember about the incidents. I had been asked to do that, and if the 
President had called and asked me for that report — — 

Senator Inouye. Did you spend the 6 days preparing testimony for 
your own use ? 

Mr. Dean. Let me complete, Senator. If the President called me and 
asked me for that report, I would have sent it to the President of the 
United States. There is no doubt about that. That isn't who was call- 
ing and asking me for it. It was Mr. Ehrlichman who was calling me 
from California, he wanted any part I had of it, and based on the 
earlier conversations I had had I wasn't about to give it to Mr. Ehrlich- 
man. So I can't say I was preparing my own testimony because I wasn't 
preparing my own testimony. I was trying to reconstruct, as I had been 
asked to do, what I remembered as to what had occurred. 

Senator Inouye. You have testified on several occasions that you 
were concerned with the enormity of the problem. If it was so, why did 
3'ou not on your own present to the President your written report ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I thought I had very clearly made the point to the 
President on the 21st. "V^Hiat I saw occurring after the 21st indicated 
to me that there was a certain degree of protection going on by Mr. 
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. I was never sure that if I had sent the 
report the President would ever see it for one thing. 

Senator Inouye. As the President's counsel, and you were seeing the 
President quite often during those days, could you not have personally 
handed the report to him ? 



1428 

Mr. Dean. The President was in California, Senator, at the time. 
He left shortly after I came down and I had this little round of activi- 
ties with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, and 
they were off to California. 

Senator iNotnrE. "The failure of Dean's muse while he was on the 
mountain is understandable since by this time it would have been 
impossible to write a believable report that would not have been self- 
indicting. "WHiile he was at Camp David, Dean told Ehrlichman's 
assistant that he was not getting the statement done but was planning 
his own defense." And this is from Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Dean. That is not true, Senator. 

Senator Inouye, "Haldeman talked with him several times and felt 
that 'Dean was not having much progress in writing his report but 
it became clear that he was worrying more about himself.' " This is 
from Haldeman. 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say when I came down from Camp David, I 
don't think it was a question of worrying about myself as what I was 
witnessing was Mr. Haldeman and then subsequently Mr. Ehrlichman 
becoming very concerned about themselves. 

Senator Inouye. "On the 25th the President suggested it be an- 
nounced that Dean would appear before the grand jury." 

Mr. Dean. On what date ? 

Senator Inouye. On March 25. 

Mr. Dean. On INIarch 25 I was at Camp David. The President was 
in Florida. That was a Sunday, as I recall, and I recall no convei^sation 
with the President. I have no knowledge of that at all. That is a new 
one to me. 

Senator Inouye. "On the 26th Dean agreed but said he would do so 
only if given immunity." 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, I had no conversations with anybody. They were 
in Florida at that time. The discussion that morning, if vou will recall, 
was that the President came out with a statement that he warmly en- 
dorsed me, he expressed new confidence or renewed confidence in me, 
that he had allegedly spoken directly with me, and had no concern at 
all about my prior knowledge of this matter and I do not recall any 
statement about going before the grand jury being issued when he was 
giving me this very warm embrace. 

Senator Inouye. "On March 30, the President relieved Dean of any 
further responsibility for the Watergate investigation. He called Ehr- 
lichman in, told him that it was evident to the President that 'Dean 
was in the thing up to his eyebrows', and assigned Ehrlichman to look 
into Watergate." 

This is from Mr. Ehrlichman. 

"The President indicated to Ehrlichman that his conversations with 
Dean throughout the preceding month had given him 'a growing 
awareness of Dean's personal involvement in this.' Relieved of his 
Watergate duties by the President and aware that" 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I might just note at this point and call it to the 
attention of the record, that Mr. Ehrlichman also resigned from the 
White House on the same day that my resignation was requested, and 
Mr. Haldeman as well. 

Senator Inouye. "Relieved of his Watergate duties by the President 
and aware that his own complicity had become obvious. Dean decided 
to strike out on his own to hunt for immunity for the long list of 



1429 

wrongs he had committed. According to the President, it was April 2 
when he first established contact with the prosecutors and attempted 
to bargain for immunity, ^^^lile he carried on these negotiations, 
Ehrlichman completed his report and advised the President on 
April 14 that Mitchell, Magnider, and Dean were all involved." 

INIr. Dean. I would like to comment on that. As I have testified, Mr. 
Ehrlichman told me after he had returned from San Clemente back 
to Washington, I met with him on the afternoon, late afternoon of 
the 8th and had periodic meetings with him during the week of the 
8th to the 14th. It was on the 14th that he told me that he had talked 
with Kleindienst and that the grand jury was doing nothing. He was 
particularly asking me when I was likely to appear before the grand 
jury. I was already, per the instructions of my own counsel, limiting 
conversations with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman about testi- 
monial areas. But it was that day that I drew up the list which I 
wanted to get the message very clear to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehr- 
lichman that they had very serious problems. It was on the, as a result 
of that list that the Attorney General suddenly received a call, because 
I informed him that my counsel had been in direct communication 
with the prosecutors and the prosecutors had indicated that indeed, 
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were potential targets of the 
grand jury. At 1 o'clock that night, I realized that they had gotten 
the Attorney General late at night to get a briefing from the prose- 
cutors, and that is when things really started moving. That is when 
the activities began to occur. 

Senator Ixouye. "On the 16th, Dean was asked by the President to 
resign, but refused to do so. On the 30th, he was dismissed. His in- 
creasingly shrill efforts since that date to save himself by striking 
out recklessly at others are too familiar and too painful to require 
mention." 

This ends the memorandum. 

Mr. Deax. I would only add to that. Senator, that I think that if 
anyone has been on the receiving end of adverse publicity, it has been 
this witness and not any of the other witnesses and I have not dealt 
in personalities, nor will I deal in personalities at any time during 
these hearings. 

Senator Ixouye. Mr. Chairman, that ends the memorandum. I have 
several questions which were submitted by the office of the counsel for 
the President, with a closing statement. Knowing the lateness of the 
time, may I request that I be permitted to continue the interrogation 
tomorrow, sir? 

Senator EmT:]sr. Yes. I think the Chair should state, however, for 
the information of all concerned, that the article which you have been 
reading to the witness and the witness has been testifying about is an 
article which the committee has received from Mr. Fred Buzhardt, 
counsel to the President. 

Mr. Dean. I understand. 

Senator Ervix. And not the testimony of a witness. 

Senator ]Moxtoya. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask 

Mr. Deax. Excuse me. May, before we leave Senator Inouye, may I 
just add one point? One thing missing in that description of the 
sequence of events is the fact that I, on the 15th, was asked by INIr. 
Ehrlichman to come in — — 

Mr. Dash. What month ? 



1430 

Mr. Dean. April of this year, the 15th of April of this year, was 
asked to come in and see him. I did not want to visit with him. That is 
when I sent a message to the President requesting I meet with him. 
I did meet with him that night, on April 15, and that meeting is 
described, of course, fully in my testimony. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Chairman, in view of the observations made 
in the memorandum submitted by the White House with the list of 
questions, and in view of the fact that the authorship of the memo- 
random is attributed to a IMr. Fred Buzhardt, I would like to request 
the committee that the chairman, in behalf of the committee, issue a 
subpena to Mr. Buzhardt so that he can inform the committee as to the 
source of observations which led him to some of the conclusions in the 
memorandum. 

Senator Ervin. My understanding is that Mr. Buzhardt is the coun- 
sel and I don't believe he claims to have any personal knowledge of 
any of these matters. 

In a great many instances, he cited depositions or statements of 
others. The Chair will take that under advisement and rule on it later. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, before we conclude, would it be in 
order for me to ask, in view of the rather extended testimony that 
Mr. Dean has now given us and now the certainty that his testimony 
will continue until tomorrow, what plans the chairman might have 
for the remaining schedule for the committee this week and thereafter? 

Senator Ervin. "Well, it is apparent that we will not finish with the 
witness until sometime tomorrow at the most optimistic period. The 
next witness who has been tentatively scheduled for hearing was 
former Attorney General John Mitchell, and I do not believe that we 
could finish with Mr. Mitchell within the time allotted for meetings 
this week. I think it would be unjust to the committee and the public 
and to Mr. Mitchell to have his testimony split between this week and 
the next session by the 10-day period. I have talked to most of the 
members of the committee and they feel that under these circumstances, 
we ought to complete the testimony of Mr. Dean and then recess until 
after the week of July 4. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I entirely agree with that. 

Senator Ervtn. In deference to the request made by Senator Mon- 
toya, I would like to ask the staff to address a request to INIr. Buzhardt 
as to whether he is able to testify from his personal knowledge to any 
of the matters set forth in the statement. If he says he can, that he has 
personal knowledge of the matters, then we can subpena him. If he 
says he has not, then we can discuss it. 

Senator Baker. In order to make sure I understand the schedule 
outlined — by the way, I do entirely concur with it and I cannot speak 
for the members of the committee, but I understand they are in agree- 
ment with that, but it is my understanding that we will finish with 
the testimony of Mr. Dean on tomorrow or Friday, as the case may be. 
But if we do conclude with Mr. Dean's testimony tomorrow, the com- 
mittee will stand in recess at the close of business tomorrow instead 
of Friday, until we reconvene again on Tuesday, July 10. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock 
in the morning. 

[Whereupon, at 5 :50 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 
10 a.m., Thursday, June 28, 1973.] 



THURSDAY, JUNE 28, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign AcTI^^TIEs, 

W ashington^ D.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair- 
man), presiding. 

Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and Weicker. 

Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred D. 
Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief 
counsel: Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Eiler Ravjiholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flani- 
gan, assistant j^ublications clerk. 

Senator Ervin. You may proceed. 

Senator Inotjye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, before proceeding I would like to advise the com- 
mittee that we have had a bit of confusion here. Statements attributed 
to the press office of the A^liite House indicated last evening that the 
memo which I presented to the committee might not have been an 
official document of the White House. However, about 15 minutes ago 
I had a personal chat with Mr. Fred Buzhardt, I believe, is that the 
way 3'ou pronounce his name ? 

Mr. Dean. Buzhardt. 

Senator Inotjye. Buzhardt, and he indicated to me that these ques- 
tions were in fact prepared by his office, and he was desirous that I 
would use them in my interrogation of you, sir. 

Mr. Dean, before proceeding may I ask one question. We have been 
advised that these questions have appeared in the New York Times, 
have you seen those questions ? 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN W. DEAN III— Resumed 

Mr. Dean. No, I have not. 

Senator Inouye. With that Mr. Chairman, I wish to now proceed 
with the questions which were prepared by the Office of the Special 
Counsel to the President of the United States, J. Fred Buzhardt. 

(1431) 



1432 

Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Inouye, I would like to advise the committee that 
I have seen the New York Times this mornino;, that I didn't see the 
questions. I looked at some photo<rraphs in the Times, and that I 
haven't discussed the contents of the Times with my client and I would 
like to make that statement in behalf of Mr. McCandless, and if you 
would like to put us under oath we are both willing to be sworn. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that is necessary, sir. 

Senator Ervin. You know, my experience ai'ound Washino;ton is 
that if several people get hold of a document, that the thing will more 
than likely appear in the morning paper — if not be telecast that night. 
[Laughter.] 

I think that the protection of information ar-ound Washington is 
about as much as the protection which a sieve affords to the passage of 
water. You may proceed. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dean, you quote the President as saying on February 27 that 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman were principals in the Watergate matter 
and that therefore you could be more objective. 

What did you understand by this ? 

Mr. Dean. Frankly, Senator, I never understood what the President 
was saying when he said that they were principals. Before he said that 
he told me that the involvement of their time in dealing wnth Water- 
gate matters was taking them away from their other duties and then 
he also added to me that they were principals in this matter and, there- 
fore, that he thought I could be very objective in it, and that was what 
subsequently prompted me the next day later to make sure he under- 
stood that I felt I was also a principal. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean, did you have any evidence then or now 
that Mr. Ehrlichman had prior knowledge of the break-in ? 

Mr. Dean. That he had prior knowledge ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not or I do not now. 

Senator Inouye. The second question: Mr. Dean, if the President 
was referring to the post -June 17 events were you not equally a "prin- 
cipal" as you claim to have indicated to the President on Sep- 
tember 15? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I just mentioned in answering the last question 
when the President raised this it stuck in my mind, and I returned the 
next day and after thinking about what he had said, and told him that 
I also felt I was a principal and that he should understand that. 

And then began to explain to him why I felt I was involved in 
obstruction of justice and he assured — he said, "You don't have any 
legal problem in this matter," and the discussion was terminated. 

Senator Inouye. Your 245-page statement is remarkable for the 
detail with which it recounts events and conversations occurring over 
a period of many months. It is particularly remarkable in view of the 
fact that you indicated that it Avas prepared without benefit of note or 
daily diary. 

Would you describe what documents were available to you in addi- 
tion to those which have been identified as exhibits. 

Mr. Dean. What I did in preparing this statement, I had kept a 
newspaper clipping file from roughly June 17 up until about the time 
these hearings started when I stopped doing any clipping with any 



1433 

regularity. It was by going: through every single newspaper article 
outlining what had happened and then placing myself in what I had 
done in a given sequence of time, I was aware of all of the principal 
activities I had been involved in, the dealings I had had witli others in 
rehationship to these activities. Many times things were in response to 
press activities or press stories that would result in further activities. 
I had a good memory of most of the highlights of things that had oc- 
curred, and it was through this process, and being extremely careful 
in my recollection, particularly of the meetings with the President. 

Before I did leave the White'House while I was initially, well, I was 
ultimately denied access to the logs ; I called the man who was in charge 
of keeping the logs and asked him if he could give me a list of all my 
meetings with the President. He did so on an informal basis before 
he realized that — when I sent a formal memorandum asking for more 
information and a formal confirmation, then they denied me that in- 
formation when I sent the formal memorandum. 

Senator iNOtrrE. Are you suggesting that your testimony was pri- 
marily based upon press accounts? 

Mr. Dean. No sir, I am saying that I used the press accounts as one 
of the means to trigger my recollection of what had occurred during 
given periods of time. 

Senator Inoute. Am I to gather from this that you had great faith 
in the reporting in the press ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I am saying what was happening is that this sequen- 
tially, many times White House activities related to a response to a 
given press activity. I did not have the benefit, in fact tlie statement 
might even be more detailed. Senator, if I had had the benefit of all 
the Ziegler briefings where some of these questions came up A^ery 
specifically in press briefings as to given events at that time but I 
didn't have the iDenefit of those. 

Senator Ixottye. In addition to your press clipping, the logs, what 
other sources did you use in the process of reconstruction ? 

Mr, Dean. Well, Senator, I think I have a good memory. I think 
that anyone who recalls my student years knew that I was very fast 
at recalling information, retaining information. I was the type of 
student who didn't have to work very hard in school because I do have 
a memory that I think is good. 

Senator Inotjye. Have you always had 

Mr. Dean. I might also add this : That I did have an opportunity to 
go through my daily chrono files which was another part of the process, 
plus while I was at Camp David I had sent for some files in prepara- 
tion of the report I was writing up there so I did have some docu- 
mentary materials many of which have been submitted to the com- 
mittee, some of the exhibits that the committee has and from these I 
was very easy able to put in time sequence various specifics. 

Senator IxorvE. The next question, have you always had a facility 
for recalling the details of conversations which took place many 
months ago? 

Mr. Dean. I didn't hear you, Senator. 

Senator Inoute. Have you always had a facility for recalling the 
details of conversations which took place many months ago? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I would like to start with the President of the 
United States. It was not a regular activity for me to go in and visit 



M34 

with the President. For most Americans it is not a regular activity 
to go in and visit with the President. For most of the members of the 
White House staff it is not a daily activity. When you meet with the 
President of the United States, it is a very momentous occasion, and 
you tend to remember what the President of the United States says 
when you have a conversation with him. 

With regard to others, some of the things, for example, the "deep 
six" conversation and shredding of documents was so vivid in my 
memory because of the circumstance that had occurred that it was very 
indelibly put in my mind. Going back even while I was at the Justice 
Department seeking the information on Mary Jo Kopechne, that is 
the sort of thing that would stick in a person's mind because of the 
nature of the sensitivity of the information being sought. So I would 
say I have an ability to recall not specific words necessarily but cer- 
tainly the tenor of a conversation and the gist of a conversation. 

I would like to give another example, I remember I referred at one 
point in one of the meetings I had with the President after he had, 
after Mr. Gray had, made the statement about, that he had jolly well 
proceeded with the investigation at the White House despite the fact 
that Mr. Dean had been sitting in on the investigations. I remember 
vividly when the President mimicked Mr. Gray in saying this and 
saying it was absurd. That sort of thing is very easy to remember and 
it sticks very clearly in one's mind. 

Senator Inouye. Then why is it, Mr. Dean, that you were not able 
to recall precisely the account of the meeting of September 15, very 
likely the most important meeting in the year 1972 ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I think I have recalled that meeting. 

'Senator Inouye. If I recall, in your colloquy with Senator Gurney, 
your response was "I had an impression.'- 

Mr. Dean. Well, we were talldng about the one line out of the first 
part of the meeting. I would recall to the Senator that after I had had 
the conversation, after I was — I sat down, and the President told me 
that "Bob had said that you had done a good job," and then I turned 
on the fact of — I said that I could not take responsibility for this alone 
myself, I remember a sequence of events in the conversation ending up 
with something when we were discussing a book I was reading and I 
remember very vividly the book I was reading at the time we discussed 
it. 

Senator Inouye. Is it your testimony that you cannot recall pre- 
cisely what the President said to you ? 

Mr. Dean. You mean, can I repeat the very words he used ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. I cannot repeat the very words he used, no, sir. As I 
explained to Senator Gurney, my mind is not a tape recorder, but it 
certainly receives the message that is being given. 

Senator Inouye. Did yovi take any notes of this meeting? 

Mr. Dean. Of the September 15 meeting? 

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; and I did not take notes of other meetings for a 
very specific reason, I recall at one time Mr. Moore saying to me, John, 
you are having a lot of meetings with the President; you ought to be 
recording these. Some of the things that were being discussed in these 
meetings I did not want to make records of. Senator. 



M35 

Senator Inouye. "\^niy, sir? 

jNIr. Deax. I thought they were very incriminating to the President 
of the United States. 

Senator Ixouye. Mr. Chairman, this is not part of the questioning, 
but could you advise this committee what sort of information you 
received ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I have recalled most of it in my testimony regard- 
ing the conversation on clemency for Mr. Hunt, the million dollar 
conversation, when the President told me that it would be no problem 
to raise $1 million on the 13th. I did not think documents like this 
should be around the White House, because the White House had a 
similar problem as far as information getting out. 

Senator Ixouye. Did you discuss this September 15 meeting with 
an^'one at that time or at any time since ? 

Mr. Deax. I believe when I came out of the meeting, I told Mr. 
Fielding of my office that I had spent about 30 or 40 minutes with the 
President and Mv. Fielding did not have full knowledge of my activi- 
ties at this time. But I told him that fact that the meeting had oc- 
curred and that the President seemed very pleased with the job that 
I had been doing thus far. I think Mr. Fielding probably had a general 
awareness about the specifics of the fact that I was involved in assisting 
with the coverup. 

Senator Ixouye. You have indicated in your testimony that you 
were certain after the September 15 meeting that the President was 
fully aware of the coverup, did you not ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ixouye. And you further testified that you believed that 
you had on your spurs in handling the coverup by February 27, when 
you were told by the President that you would report to him directly. 
Is that not correct ? 

ISIr. Deax'. I do not believe I used the word "my spurs." I think that 
was another characterization, I said I thought I had earned my stripes. 

Senator Ix^ouye. If that was the case, why did you feel it necessary 
on February 27 to tell the President that you had been participating 
in a coverup and, therefore, might be chargeable with obstruction of 
justice? 

Mr. Deax. Because on the preceding day, he had indicated to me 
that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were principals and I was 
wrestling with what he meant by that. I wanted him to know that I 
felt also that I was a principal. So I wanted him to be able to assess 
whether I could be objective in reporting directly to him on the matter. 

Senator Ixouye. If the President was aware on September 15 of the 
coverup, was he not aware that you were implicated also ? 

Mr. Deax. I would think so, but I did not understand his remark 
at the time. 

Senator Ix'^ouye. Then, why was it necessary on February 27 to ad- 
A'ise him that you were guilty of obstruction of justice ? 

Mr. Deax. Because as I said. Senator, when he mentioned the fact 
that ]Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman were principals, I did not 
understand what he meant. I wanted to make it clear to him that I felt 
I also had legal problems and I had been involved in obstruction of 
justice. Any time I was in the oval office, I did not want to withhold 
anything from the President at any time and felt that any informa- 



1436 

tion that he was seeking or came out as a result of the conversation, 
that I should give it to him. 

Senator Inouye. If you were not clear as to whether the President 
clearly imderstood, are you suggesting that on September 15 he did 
not clearly understand what was happening? 

Mr. Dean. I have testified that one of the reasons I sought the meet- 
ing of the 21st is because I did not think the President fully under- 
stood the implications of the coverup, the fact that people had been 
involved in obstruction of justice and I wanted to make it very clear 
to him that this was my interpretation of the situation. At that time, 
I did have access to the President. When he did call me the night be- 
fore, I did raise it and felt that I should go in and tell him the implica- 
tions of this entire matter. 

Senator Inouye. If you felt that the President of the United States 
did not fully understand the implications on February 27, how did you 
expect the President to understand the implications on September 15 
of the prior year ? 

Mr. Dean. When I went in on the 15th of the prior year, as I say, 
this was sort of a congratulations, good job, John, Bob's told me what 
you have been doing. At the time, we went on to discuss other aspects 
of the efforts to prevent the entire matter from coming out before the 
election. We talked about when the civil suit would proceed, we talked 
about when the criminal suit would be tried. The discussion at that 
time was very — the President was asking most of the questions and I 
was giving very short answers. 

I might also'add that I was very unused to going into the President's 
office. I was extremely nervous when I was before him. This was the 
first time I had ever really had a sort of one-to-one session with him. 
The other meetings I have been in, there have been many other mem- 
bers of the staff. I have not done most of the talking; rather, I was 
the man who was in there taking notes or taking other people into the 
meetings. So I would answer his questions and listen and do the best 
I could to report. 

Senator Inouye. Did you and your counsel dcA-elop a strategy for 
obtaining immunity from prosecution? And what were the elements 
of that strategy ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I recall the chairman starting to raise that question 
yesterday. First of all, I do not know what is meant by a strateg}^ for 
immmiity. What happened is my counsel went down and began dis- 
cussing, first of all, how the prosecutors could hear my testimony to 
make their own determination as prosecutors as to what they wanted 
to do with me — whether I was to be a witness, whether I was to be a 
defendant, and the like. I went to counsel because I had made my de- 
termination that I was going to go to the prosecutors and tell them 
what I knew about the case. But there is an old saying that all lawyers 
know that the lawyer who represents himself is a fool. I did not feel 
that I could be objective about my situation. I sought out a man whose 
judgment I would respect in regard to the criminal law and he said, 
John, if I am going to represent you, you liave to take my counsel ; 
otherwise, you do not need a lawyer if you just want to walk down 
there. 

I said, well, I think I will take counsel. I am a lawyer myself and I 
think to follow counsel is a eood idea. 



1437 

Senator Ixouye. I wish to follow this question with my own ques- 
tion, if I may. 

Mv. Shaffer. Excuse me, Senator. 

I didn't want to register a timely objection to your last question, 
since it bears so heavily on the issue of credibility. However, for future 
proceedings, I would like to note for the record that when we came 
before you gentlemen, you took away our fifth amendment right by 
virtue of the use of immunity which was conferred by Judge Sirica 
at your request. You have not taken away our sixth amendment right 
and we have not surrendered it for future proceedings. 

Senator Ixoute. This is understood, sir. 

Mr. Shaffer. Thank you. 

Senator Ixouye. I'll return to the ■\^Tiite House questions. 

Didn't your strategy include deliberate leaks of information to the 
media on what you had told investigators and what you might be 
prepared to testify about in the future ? 

Mr. Dean. Senator, in any testimonial areas, I dealt directly with 
the appropriate investigative forum. I conceived of no strategy to leak 
my testimony or anything of that nature. In fact, any comments I 
have had with the press, I believe, were a matter of public record and 
I think that most of the press know that I have refused on countless 
occasions to give what I consider testimonial areas. 

Senator Ixouye. How were these contacts with the media handled? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I did have a number of inquiries that came, not 
directly to me, because I made myself as inaccessible to the press as 
possible. As I believe the Senator is aware, there were a number of 
attacks about my character. They have been ongoing and continuous. 
My counsel would call and ask me questions about these and I would 
giA'e them what my assessment of the given attack was. 

Senator Ix^^ouye. AAHio represented you and what individual mem- 
bers of the press were contacted ? 

Mr. Deax. I can't answer that, Senator, because I don't know. As I 
say, I am aware of the contacts I had with the press, but there were 
stacks of calls that came in, apparently, to my attorney's offices and I 
don't know — I don't believe there was an understanding of my i-eturn- 
ing those calls. 

Senator Ix'^ouye. Mr. Dean, were any of the stories or quotes attrib- 
uted to you or sources close to you inaccurate ? 

Mr, Deax', Yes, they were. 

Senator Ixouye. If so, what, if any, steps did you take to correct 
these stories? 

Mr. Deax. "Well, as I said, I am in a delicate position. If I come out 
into testimonial areas, I can be accused of trying to generate publicity. 
I already as a result of my appearance up here h.ave serious legal prob- 
lems as a result of the publicity generated by this. I have not read the 
press with regularity at all since these hearings have commenced. 

I did see a Newsweek piece, for example, when they said that they 
attributed to me some story about a Panamanian assassination. Xow, 
I have no more idea what they are talking about, just none at all. 

Senator Ixouye. The next question. Mr. Dean, is rather lengthy. 

Mr. Dean, one point of distinction you drew in your testimony puz- 
zles me. You have testified that you had received and placed in your 
safe the sum of $15,200 which vou never turned over to anyone because 



1438 

you didn't want funds you had physically handled to be used for pay- 
ments to the Watergate defendants. You also testified that you called 
Mr. Stans and asked him for $22,000 to make the $350,000 fund whole 
and that you had your deputy, Mr. Fielding, go to Mr. Stans' office, 
pick up the money, and later deliver it directly to Mr. Strachan, know- 
ing that $22,000 would probably be used for pa\ments to the Water- 
gate defendants. 

Now, do you mean to imply that you think there is some moral basis 
for the distinction, or were you just being cautious to protect yourself 
technically from committing the criminal offense of obstructing justice 
at the expense of implicating your deputy ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, if you will recall my testimony on that when I 
spoke with Mr. Stans, I told him Mr. Fielding would be over to pick 
up the package. I also informed Mr, Stans that Mr. Fielding would 
not know what he was picking up. 

I was quite surprised and I must say annoyed when Mr. Fielding 
came back and told me that he had realized that he had received cash. 
I did not have any desire to involve INIr, Fielding in this, because he had 
not been involved in it before that. I assumed when he was makyig the 
trip that he would be no more than an innocent agent in the matter and 
he would be unknowing as to what he was doing. 

I still think to this day he didn't know what the full purpose of that 
money was and I told him at the time, I said, "Well, don't worry about 
it. It is nothing for you to be concerned about." 

Senator Inotjye. Mr. Dean, you have testified as to your close work- 
ing relationship to your deputy, Mr. Fielding. It was he who you 
sent to pick up the $22,000 from Mr. Stans, he who helped you to sort 
the documents from Mr. Hunt's safe and he who sent to England to 
retrieve Mr. Young's secretary. 

Did Mr. Fielding know that you were involved in a conspiracy to 
obstruct justice, perjure testimony, and pay defendants for their 
silence ? 

Mr. Dean. I have no idea what Mr. Fielding knew. I didn't discuss 
these things with him. When he, to the best of my knowledge, his 
involvement merely was dealing with, going through the material in 
Mr. Hunt's safe with me and then dealing with Miss Chenow and going 
to England to get her and brief her. He also assisted in briefing Mr. 
Krogh and he also accompanied me when Mr. Ehrlichman requested 
that he join me in preparing himself for his interview before the FBI 
because it related to matters with the plumbers unit. 

]\Ir. Fielding had become familiar with some of the problems of the 
Plumbers unit as a result of dealing with Miss Chenow and he had 
also talked to David Younjr, who was in the Plumbers unit. 

So, he was more knowledgeable than I was. That is my knowledge 
of Mr. Fielding's knowledge. 

Senator Inotjye. Mr. Dean, if your deputv, Mr. Fielding, who 
worked so closely with you and who carried out some of vour missions 
connected with the conspiracy, had absolutely no knowledge of the 
covorup conspiracy, how do you so blithelv assume that others on the 
White House staff, and even the President, did know of your 
conspiracy ? 

Mr. Dean. Did know of my conspiracy ? 

Senator Inotjye. Yes, sir. 



1439 

Mr. Dean. Well, I wouldn't classify it as my conspiracy. I would 
say that I was involved with others in a coverup operation. I recall 
on countless occasions, INIr. Fieldino- complaining to me that I was leav- 
ing him out, I wasn't explaining to him what I was doing. We had had 
a very close working relationship. I think today, Mr. Fielding is very 
happV that I did not tell him what I was doing or involve him any 
more than the degree he was involved in the entire matter. In fact, 
he has subsequently thanked me for not involving him. 

Senator Inoute. The question was, if I may repeat it again, if your 
deputy, ]Mr. Fielding, who worked so closely with you and who carried 
out some of your missions connected with the conspiracy, had abso- 
lutely no knowledge of the coverup conspiracy, how do you so blithely 
assume that others on the White House staff and even the President 
did know of the conspiracy ? 

]Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I don't know how many other people 
on the White House staff knew of the conspiracy to — not my con- 
spiracy but the general coverup conspiracy. I certainly know that I 
was getting instructions from Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman and 
I know of my conversation with the President. I know that there were 
other people on the staff who were quite aware of the fact that the 
White House was not baring its soul on this matter. There were, as 
I said, parallel coverup situations with regard to Mr. Segretti, where 
people who were not involved in other aspects become involved in that. 

There was the Patman hearing, where it was quite evident that the 
White House did not want to have the Patman hearings. There were 
a series of various phases to the coverup and various people in the 
White House knew. 

Senator Inoitye. Mr. Dean, beginning in late May and early June 
there were a series of newspaper stories reporting what you had told 
^•arious investigators which quoted sources close to you as to what he 
had said. A number of these news reports, for example, the page 1 
story in the Washington Post of June 3, alleged that you began your 
jirivate meetings with the President either early in the year or as 
in the case of this particular story beginning on January 1. 

According to your testimony your first private meeting with the 
President in 1973 was not until February 27. Did you or did you not 
tell investigators and/or friends that you began meeting with the 
President, either the first of the year or beginning January 1, and 
were these stories an attempt to exaggerate the length of time which 
you had l^een dealing directly with the President and by implication 
imparting to him knowledge of the AVatergate? 

Air. Dean, Senator, where the source of that story came from I do 
not have any idea. It certainly was not from me. I always, in dealing 
with any of the investigators from either this committee or from the 
prosecutor's office, told them exactly what I knew. I do not know of 
any exaggeration at any time, any place regarding my knowledge of 
tliis matter. So I cannot — it is obviously a loaded question and I do 
not know how to answer it other than to say what 1 just said. 

Senator Ixou^t:. Is it your testimony that the first private meeting 
you had with the President of the United States in the year 1973 was 
on February 27? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 7 



1440 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean, the number of source stories containing 
allegations against the President attributed directly or indirectly to 
you over the last 4 or 5 weeks 

jMr. Dean. Excuse me, Senator, I do recall — was that, did you say, 
private meetings? In other words, after the inauguration there was 
a church service meeting as I recall, where I had a brief encounter 
with the President where he actually stopped me in the reception line 
as a result of an incident that had occurred during the inauguration. 
It may be relevant. I had not planned to discuss this but if the com- 
mittee wishes me to show my recollection of dealings with the Presi- 
dent this may be very well relevant. When going to the — right after 
the inauguration or during the inauguration apparently there was a 
demonstrator who ran through the police lines and toward the Presi- 
dent's car. That night the head of the Secret Service detail protecting 
the President called me and told me that the President was quite 
angry and anxious to do something about this man charging at the 
President's car. The man had made it about 5 feet from the curb 
before he had been knocked down by Secret Service agents. 

I do not think anybody in the whole world who was watching the 
inauguration on television saw it, I certainly did not. Mr. Taylor, 
when he called me, said "What do I do?" The President wants some- 
thing done. 

"Well, you just tell the President you reported it to me and I will 
check into it," which I did. 

The next Sunday morning when I was going through the reception 
line the President pulled me aside and said to me, "I want something 
done about that man, that fellow that charged the car." I had looked 
into the case. The best this man could be charged with was a collat- 
eral offense for breaking police lines. There was no assassination at- 
tempt, there was no evidence of anything like that. He was merely 
trying to make a point, as many demonstrators do, by being arrested 
in a public forum to make his protest. 

I had occasion to request the Secret Service to make a full investi- 
gation of the matter. They said they, after examining the man, had 
released him. 

I also talked to Mr. Petersen at the Justice Department and ISIr. 
Silbert at the Justice Department and they told me there is no case 
hei-e. Thev had talked to the Secret Service. 

Meanwhile, I was receiving fiTrther reports from Mr. Haldeman 
saying, "What are you going to do with the man? We want a case 
made against him." That is one where I just quietly let it go away 
because there was no case. 

Senator Ixouye. INIr. Dean, the number of source stories containing 
allegations against the President attributed directly or indirectly to 
you over the last 4 or 5 weeks have been most numerous. Do you deny 
that these stories were planted in a calculated attempt to influence 
Federal prosecutors to believe you had such important testimony that 
they should give you transactional immunity from the crimes which 
you have committed in return for vour testimony against others? 

Mr. Deax. I gave my testimonv directly to the prosecutors. T planted 
no stories at all to do that and the prosecutors certainly would not 
make anv decision based on what thev are reading in the newspaper. 



1441 

They would want to hear it directly from me and I was dealing 
directly with the prosecutor. And likewise with Mr. Dash when he 
began to interview me to find out what the scope of my knowledge was, 
to make a decision for this committee as to whether they wished to 
grant me immunity. 

Senator Ixouye. Mr. Dean, the ^lay 14, 1973, edition of Newsweek 
carried a long article about you and your prospective testimony. In 
this article you are quoted a number of times and instances. The quotes 
in that article were word by word identical to the testimony you have 
given this week. Indeed, for the most part this Newsweek article was 
a very accurate preview summary of the lengthy statement which you 
detailed before this committee. 

There are, however, several very noticeable differences. One differ- 
ence is an omission from the testimony you gave here. You told this 
committee that when the President discussed the matter of your 
investigation of Watergate you did not tell him you made no such 
investigation. 

The Newsweek article, however, reports that in your meeting with 
the President of March 21, and I quote "Dean also bore down hard, 
he said, on the fact that there had never been any study clearing White 
House staffers. Mr. Nixon replied that he had had verbal reports of 
Dean's work but the counsel insisted 'nobody asked me for reports, 
Mr. President,' he said." 

**He said, T did not go around asking people questions in their 
offices. There was no report.' " 

"At this point sources quoted Dean as saying 'The President came 
out of his chair into a half crouch of astonishment and shock.' " 

If the Newsweek account is correct, Mr. Dean, the President's reac- 
tion was most inconsistent with that to which you have testified before 
this committee. 

Did you or did you not tell the President that you had never con- 
ducted "an investigation, and have you made the statement previously 
that "The President came out of his chair into a half crouch of aston- 
ishment and shock" ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I have testified here already that I have never seen 
the President come out of his chair — [laughter] — in that manner. I 
recall the interview that you are talking about, and the ground rules 
for that interview my wife was present with me, and she will recall 
that well, Mr. McCandless was with me and the rules were set that I 
would enter into no, what I considered testimonial areas at all of a 
substantive nature regarding my direct dealings with the President. 
I was asked if I had prepared an investigation or done an investigation 
into that I merely just said, no. 

As I say, the interview that was given, and that story do not meet 
with what I told the reporter because I said anything I say I want 
it for attriliution, I am not giving you anything on background or the 
like and I will not enter into testimonial areas and it was very clearly 
understood that I would not. I would recall to the Senator again that 
at this time I was coming under increasing character assassination 
attacks. People said, "John, you just cannot sit down and take that, 
you have got to come out and say at least a few words that you are 
li^-ing and breathing and a real human being," and that is the reason 
I held that interview. 



1442 

Senator Inotjye. INIr. Dean, if I recall correctly, you testified to 
this committee that it was not your idea for Magruder's diary to be 
altered nor were you aware before ISLr. INIagruder testified before the 
grand jury last September that Mr. JNIagruder would testify that the 
first meeting appearing in his diary had been canceled, and the second 
meeting had been to discuss election laws. 

On both of these points, your testimony is in direct conflict with the 
sworn testimony of Mr. jSIagruder. 

Are we to believe that Mr. Magruder lied as to these details con- 
cerning you and, if that is your position, what could be Mr. jNIagruder's 
motive for lying about the details of the manner in which Mr. 
Magruder's perjury was conceived? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, I will stand on my testimony and not 
on the conclusions drawn in the question that has been propounded 
by you at the request of the White House. 

Senator Inouye. INIr. Dean, Mr. ]\Iagruder also testified that Mr. 
Liddy told him that you among others had indicated to him that he 
would have $1 million for his plans, which he had been working on 
before he even came to the committee. You testified, on the other hand, 
that you were surprised when Mr. Liddy briefed his million dollar 
intelligence plan to Mr. Mitchell in your presence. To what motive do 
you attribute Mr. Liddy "s report to INIr. Magruder that you knew about 
his extensive plans before you saw them in Mr. MitchelFs office. 

iNIr. Dean. Well, if the Senator will check the exhibits, there is one 
of the exhibits in there where I had an interview or a discussion with 
Mr. Mitchell. At that time Mr. ]Mitchell reported to me that Magruder 
had made this statement to him. My response at that time to Mr. 
Mitchell was that I had no recollection at all of ever making such a 
statement to ]\'Ir. Liddy, and I can't conceive of the statement being 
made for this reason : I was quite aware of the fact that a far different 
plan. Operation Sandwedge, that had a half-million dollar budget 
suggestion, had been deemed to be far more than necessary for any- 
thing to deal with even the security problems that were going to con- 
front the campaign. 

Senator Ixotjye. Mr. Dean, just prior to taking Mr. Liddy to meet 
Mr. ']\ragruder in early December 1971, did you and Mr. Liddy not 
have a meeting with Mr. Egil Krogh and did you not at that time 
tell Mr, Liddy he would have $1 million for intelligence gathering at 
the committee? 

Mr. Dean. I don't recall — I recall a meeting with Mr. Krogh and 
INIr. Liddy when I described the job, and I don't recall specifying a 
dollar amount as to what the intelligence for dealing with demon- 
strators would be. I have no recollection of that, Senator, no sir. 

Senator Inouye. This is my question : Is it a matter of recollection 
or did it actually happen? 

Mr. Dean. AVell, as 

Senator Inouye. I am very much impressed by your power of 
recollection. 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, I remember very well the meeting with 
Mr. Krogh. The meeting was at the time I was describing the job 
to Mr. Liddy. The thrust of the description of the job was the fact 
that he would be the general coimsel of the reelection committee. I said 
one of the responsibilities he would have would be for dealing with the 



1443 

potential problems of demonstratoi-s. I don't recall at that time any 
extensive discussion at all as to, you know, how this plan would operate, 
what it would involve, what would be the substance of it because 1 
never did, in fact discuss this with Mr. Liddy at all. 

Senator Inouye. Did you discuss any sums of money i 

Mr. Dean. I may have told him at that time whatever he feels is 
necessary will probably be allotted to him after he presents his plan 
but he didn't really have a plan in mind himself at that time. 

Senator Inouye. Wouldn't a sum of $1 million be significant enough 
for you to remember ? 

Mr. Dean. That is — I have no recollection of $1 million, as I have 
repeated earlier. In fact, to the contrary that seems like an extremely 
high amount. 

Senator Ixouye. I will now return to the White House questions. 

Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder testified that in March 1972 ^Mr. Liddy had 
threatened to kill Mr. Magruder and that ]Mr. INIagruder made a deci- 
sion to terminate ]Mr. Liddy *s employment. [Laughter.] 

In this connection ]Mr. ^Nlagruder testified that he received a call from 
you encouraging him not to become j^ersonally concerned about Mr. 
Liddy and not to let personal animosity get in the way of Mr. Liddy's 
project. 

Did you in March intercede with Mr, Magruder on Mr. Liddy's 
behalf and, if so, since you have said you assumed Mr. Liddy's intelli- 
gence project died after your meeting in February, what was the proj- 
ect of Mr. Liddy that you urged Mr. Magruder to give priority over 
his personal animosities? 

^Ir. Dean. I did not intercede for Mr. Liddy, in answer to that 
question, and I think I have described yesterday, I believe it was 
yesterday, yes, that what happened is I was aware of the fact of a 
strained relationship between Liddy and Magruder. 

Mr. Strachan at one point called me and told me that there were 
serious difficulties betwen Liddy and ^Magruder and Liddy — IMagruder 
wanted to fire Liddy. I said, well, that is a personnel problem for the 
reelection committee. They need a lawyer over there, that I suggested 
Mr. Mardian deal with the problem because I didn't think it was 
something worth taking to Mr. Mitchell. 

Senator Ixouye. Mr. Dean. ]\[r. Magruder testified under oath that 
prior to his August 16 grand jury appearance at a meeting in your 
office you told him that if the worst happened "everything would be 
taken care of, even Executive clemency." 

Did you make such a promise of Executive clemency to Mr. Ma- 
gruder as he testified and. if so. did you have authority from anyone 
else to make such an offer or was it on your own initiative. 

Mr. Dean. You sav the date was August 16 ? 

Senator Inotjye. Yes, sir. 

^Ir. Deax. AVell, I can recall on numerous occasions that Mr. 
]Magruder was very worried, he was very shakv at some stages. As I 
alluded earlier, or discussed earlier, the fact that the strategy that 
had been developed, that ]Mr. Haldeman. ]\Ir. Ehrlichman were quite 
aware of was that stop the case with Liddy. That is why apparently 
they made the decision to keep Mr. ]Magruder on at the reelection 
committee, contrary to mv recommendation that he be removed. There 
were a number of occasions that they asked me how was he doing 



1444 

and the like, and I would say, you know, he is either calm today or 
upset today or the like. 

I do recall his having a conversation with me : 

What happens if this whole thing comes tumbling down, will I get Executive 
clemency and will my family be taken care of? 

And in a manner of not serious import or serious discussion I said 
something to the effect, "I am sure you will." 

But I wouldn't call that what I would consider a firm offer of 
Executive clemency and it was not in that context at all. He didn't 
specifically ask "Will I get Executive clemency" — he was just saying 
he wanted assurances. 

Senator Inouye. Then your testimony, your answer to the question, 
did you have authority from anyone else to make much an offer is, no. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Inouye. And was it on your own initiative, the answer 
is yes? 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean, did I understand you to testify earlier 
that you had led Mr. Caulfield to believe you were assisting him in 
obtaining approval and funding for what he called Operation Sand- 
wedge but that in fact you let Operation Sandwedge die a natural 
death ? 

Mr. Dean. I wasn't encouraging ]Mr. Caulfield. Mr. Caulfield was 
anxious for my assistance. I told him that I would talk to Mr. ]Mitchell 
about it, which I did. Mr. Mitchell virtually rejected it out of hand. 
In an effort to save a man's feelings who had spent a great deal of 
time, he had involved a number of other good friends of his own who 
had major positions and had taken time off to work on the project, 
rather than come back and bluntly say, "You have been shot out of 
the water" and it had been disapproved, I realized that through a 
period of time he would realize the j^lan was going nowhere and it 
did die a natural death. 

Senator Inouye. I call your attention to exhibit No. 34-12,* which is 
a memorandum for the Attorney General from John Dean, dated 
January 12, 1972, and I call your attention to the first sentence of the 
second paragraph, which says: 

Oi)eration Sandwedge will be in need of refunding at the end of this month, 
so the time is quite appropriate for such a review. 

Mr. Dean, if you let Operation Sandwedge die a natural death, why 
did you state to Mr. ]\Iitchell that it would be in need of refunding at 
the end of January? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I testified to this committee, after the Novem- 
ber 24 meeting that Mr. Caulfield had had with Mr. Mitchell, he con- 
tinued to do various investigative assignments. He was doing an 
investigative assignment with Mr. McCloskey ; Mr. ]\Iitchell was inter- 
ested in that. He continued to call what had formerly been just his 
relationship with Mr. X'lasewicz Operation Sandwedge. 

Mr. Ehrlichman had raised witli mo the fact that he thought Mr. 
Ulasewicz could be of assistance, he would like to keep him around, 
and that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Caulfield should decide what Mr. 



♦See Book 3, p. 1149. 



1445 

Ulasewicz's future should be. This is the result of the label that 
Mitchell understood all of Caulficld's operations and I think he had a 
misimpression that, dating back to somewhere in 1969, I think Mr. 
Mitchell assumed that everything had been called Operation Sand- 
wedge. At least in my conversations with him, that is the way he 
referred to it. So rather than go into a lengthy explanation when I was 
communicating with him on this matter, I merely called it Operation 
Sandwedge. 

Senator Inottye. Mr. Dean, you have depicted all others in the White 
House as excessively preoccupied with political intelligence, use of 
covert methods and security, and yourself as a restraining influence on 
these preoccupations. Yet, your background of responsibilities at the 
Justice Department seems to suggest that your experience in these very 
types of activities might have contributed to your being invited to join 
the White House stall'. What, precisely, were your duties in connection 
with demonstrations while you were at the Justice Department? 

Mr. Deax. Well, I would like to address myself to the first part of 
the question before I answer the second part of the question regardijif"' 
being a restraining influence. 

I do believe I was a restraining influence at the White House to many 
wild and crazy schemes. I have testified to some of them ; some of them 
I have not testified to. Many of the memorandums that came into my 
office became a joke, in fact, some of the things that were being sug- 
gested. I think if you talk to some of the other members of my staff 
or if 3'our investigators would like to talk to them, they would tell you 
some of the things that we would automatically just file — just like the 
political enemies project. Many of these just went right into the file and 
never anvthino- further: until extreme pressure was put on me to do 
something, did I ever do anything. So I do feel I had some restraining 
influence. I did not have a disposition or a like for this type of activity. 

Xow, let me go to my responsibilities for the Department of Justice. 
And I will speak specifically with the area of demonstrators. When the 
demonstration situation was first developing, it was quite obvious that 
somebody was going to have to talk to the demonstration leaders. I 
can recall — would you like to proceed. Senator ? 

Senator Inottye. Proceed. 

Mr. Deax. I can recall that the first time that I had any knowledge 
of being involved in this was when I was on my way, doing my normal 
congressional relations work, coming up here to Congress on some proj- 
ect. I had a call just as I was leaving the Department, down at the gate 
of the 10th Street entrance. I was on my way out and they said, the 
Deputy Attorney General wants to see you right away, would you go 
up to his office ? 

I went into his office and here was a large gathering in his confer- 
ence room, many members of the military, representatives of all the 
different depaitments and agencies, the Metropolitan Police, and the 
like. At tliat time, the Deputy Attorney General said, John, you are 
going to be the negotiator for the Government with the demonstrators 
to determine who will have permits and what the parameters of those 
l^ermits will be. 

At that time, when I started discussing permits with demonstration 
leaders, I was offered FBI information on all the demonstration 
leaders that I was negotiating with. I said, I do not want to have that 



1446 

information, I want to deal as one man looking in another man's eye 
and know that man for the reaction I get from him just dealing across 
the table; I do not want to know what he has been doing all his life 
or the like. I said, that is for others to judge rather than me. I just 
merely want to tell you the results of my negotiations. 

So I was not involved in intelligence from the outset. Now, as I 
testified, I did become aware from time to time of requests from the 
White House because of my proximity to the decisionmaking processes 
for various intelligence that would relate to political figures in their 
associations with the demonstrations and also, I was hearing com- 
plaints that the White House staff was unhappy about the quality 
of this intelligence. But my role was merely a conduit from the demon- 
stration leaders back to a major committee that would make decisions 
and talk about what I would report. In fact, I would often put myself, 
in that I could be most effective in this capacity, in the role of advocat- 
ing the position of the demonstrators. Because many times, I thought 
they had a good point. 

For example, one I thought that the Grovemment was taking a 
terrible beating on was in the November moratorium on this big issue 
of Pennsylvania Avenue versus no Pennsylvania Avenue. I thought 
that the demonstrators got $1 million worth of publicity or $2 million 
worth of publicity out of the Government's posture on refusing to 
give Pennsylvania Avenue. Instead, they insisted that they go down 
Constitution Avenue. I did not see that it made all that much differ- 
ence in the long and short of it. 

Senator Ixouye. Immediately after you were appointed counsel 
to the President, did you not take over the responsibilities of Mr. Tom 
Huston in connection with intelligence activities? 

Mr. Dean. I think that you would have to know Tom Huston and 
my relationship with Tom Huston to know that there was no way 
I would take over anything regarding Mr. Tom Huston. He is a very 
brilliant, independent man. He would not, I did not even know what 
he was doing half the time. In fact, it was some months after he had 
joined my staff that I learned he had some sort of scrambler phone 
locked in a safe beside -him and he made a lot of calls. 

]Mr. Huston did an awful lot of things that I have no idea what 
he was doing in the intelligence field. The only thing I know is that 
at that point, he was the liaison for receipt of FBI information re- 
garding radical groups and he would be the distributor throughout 
the White House and he put me on a distribution list. Most of this 
material was not even to me, worth reading because I was not par- 
ticularly interested, unless it was a very current demonstration. 

So I inherited Mr. Huston. Mr. Huston and I worked with a friendly 
relationship. As I say, he is a very independent man and he and I think 
a little differently and handle memorandums a little differently. 

1 recall one rather interesting occasion when he prepared a rather 
strong and blunt memorandum for my signature to the Attorney Gen- 
eral, on a very minor request for something. The memorandum was in 
my mail stack. I read it quickly and didn't think much about it; I was 
signing the mail. Two days later, I had a call from INIr. Kleindienst 
and he said, in short, who in the hell do you think you are writing a 
memorandum like that to the Attorney General of the I'^^nited States? 
Now that you are up at the White House, you think you are high and 
mighty. 



11447 

So I pulled the memorandum back out and realized that it is not the 
kind of memorandum I would send to Mr. Kleindienst. I apologized 
for the memorandum, because it was a rather strong and harsh memo- 
randum for me to send to anybody. 

Senator Ixouye. You did testify, did you not, Mr. Dean, that po- 
litical intelligence was routed to you in the AVhite House? 

Mr. Deax. Political intelligence i I had requests for political activi- 
ties to embarrass people. I think I have turned over in exhibits 3-i-5, 
3^6, 34-7, and 34-8* a fair sampling of the sort of things. If the com- 
mittee would like to go through those at some point, I Avould like to 
explain that most of those ended up in my file with no action. 

I did refer to one yesterday with regard to commencing a tax audit 
on Mr. Gibbons. I did not start that tax audit. 

Senator Ixouye. Mr. Dean, I believe that you were the author of the 
memorandum to the Attorney General which led to the establishment 
of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. Did you hold the first meet- 
ing of that committee in your office ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, I believe that is correct. 

Senator Ixouye. Were you not the one on the White House staff who 
levied requirements on and received reports from the Intelligence 
Evaluation Committee? 

^Ir. Deax. That is correct — well, I didn't — I asked them to suggest 
areas they would like to go into. This would get into a couple of areas 
that they wanted to get into that directly relate to national security 
under the rulings of the Chair, so we will have to defer from those. But 
they would often suggest areas that they would like to be into and I 
would have to check them with others on the White House staff, par- 
ticularly the foreign areas, which I didn't think was appropriate for 
this group, but they had domestic implications. I went to Mr. Haig 
and he in turn checked with ]Mr. Kissinger and he would decide there 
was nothing to be done in this area. We would receive regular calendars 
from them of events. I would have a man on my staff, initially Mr. 
Caulfield and subsequently Mr. David Wilson, who would decide if 
there was a demonstration coming, based on these regular calendars 
they would send to us, was this a demonstration that we would need 
intelligence on. And I would in turn either summarize or send a direct 
report to Mr. Haldeman or any other member of the staff that the 
lEC report would relate to. 

Senator Ixouye. In interagency meetings to plan for handling dem- 
onstrations, were you not the "Wliite House reoresentative ? 

]\fr. Deax. From the time I went to the '\^niite House, I was, yes, 
with some exceptions. There were some types of demonstrations that I 
did not go to the Justice Department on or I went with others, because 
they were of a particular nature that I had no expertise in the problem 
area. I am thinking particularly of the Wounded Knee situation. I did 
go over to the meeting on how to deal with Wounded Knee, but I 
reallv was not personally aware of the Indians' grievance problems, so 
Mr. Garment took over and dealt with that. 

Allien there was a demonstration to occur in Washington like the 
Mav Day demonstrations, I did participate with the Attorney General 
in those in finding out what the Government was going to do, because 

♦The rioonments referred to were marked for Identification only in Book 3 and were not 
for publication. 



1448 

I was asked and expected to report in my summaries that the Presi- 
dent had a great interest in as to what was going to be the Govern- 
ment's response in dealing with such situations. 

Mr. Ehrlichman frequently maintained a continuing interest in this. 
In fact, I can recall another member of the stati' saying that as far as 
demonstration goes, Mr. Ehrlichman is like a Dalmatian at the fire ; 
he just can't stay aw^ay from them. He liked to knoAv what was 
happening. 

Senator Ixouye. In the St. Louis Post Dispatch of May 14, 1973, 
there is a report that you attempted to recruit a Department of Inte- 
rior employee, Mr. Kenneth Tapman, for undercover work at the Dem- 
ocratic Convention. Did you attempt to recruit Mr. Tapman or any 
others for undercover work and what prior experience did you have in 
recruiting foi* undercover work ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I can't recall recruiting anybody for undercover 
work other than I did have a discussion with Mr. Tapman. but I have 
to put this in context. 

Mr. Tapman had been with the Department of the Interior for a 
number of years. He and I had worked very closely with the demon- 
strators. He w^as with me during most of the negotiations we had on 
the major demonstrations. 

Mr. Tapman wears his hair far longer than I do; he developed an 
excellent rapport with many of these people. He also had rapport with 
the police officials, the Metropolitan Police and the like, when I was 
having no relationships at this point in time as we went down toward 
the planning for the convention with what the reelection committee 
was going to do, but I knew that there was going to be a need for the 
Wliite House to be well informed. I suggested that Mr. Tapman might 
like to do this, because I would be able to have a set of eyes and ears 
down there of somebody who I thought could assess the circumstances. 
Somebody who is unfamiliar with a demonstration, and a lot of people 
overreacted to demonstrations, would see that, you know, a group was 
coming down the street and because one tear gas canister was thrown, 
they would react that a hydrogen bomb had been thrown. 

Mr. Tapman was a type who had been probably through more tear 
gas than anybody other than Chief Wilson himself. 

I thought Mr. Tapman would serve as an excellent source of infor- 
mation for me and I told him that I wanted him, asked him if he was 
interested in going down there. I said, you can't be on the White 
House payroll to do this, quite obviously. 

Senator Inouye. Then your answer to this question, did you attempt 
to recruit Mr. Tapman 

]Mr. Deax. Is yes. 

Senator Inotjye [continuing]. Is j'es. 

Mr. Deax. This was foi- hoih conventions, incidentally, I might add. 

First of all, to go down and get an understanding of what type of 
demonstrations were occurring at the Democratic Convention, what 
were the logistic problems. I wasn't really familiar with ]Miami because 
I hadn't been to the 196S convention and I didn't know the logistical 
problems that were confronting us. so I suggested he go, for example, 
to both and see how the police handled it and see what the problems 
were going to be and the like. 



1449 

Senator Inotjye. This is another very lengthy question : Mr. Dean, 
you have testified concerning 3'our conversations on three different 
occasions with General Vernon Walters, the Deputy Director of the 
CIA, beginning on the 26th of June. General Walters prepared a 
memorandum for the record of each of these conversations with you. 

In General Walters' memorandum record for 3^our meeting with 
him on June 26, 3'ou are reported to have asked General Walters 
whether there was not some way that the Central Intelligence Agency 
could pay bail for the Watergate defendants and if the men went to 
prisoii, could CIA find some way to pay their salaries while they were 
in jail out of covert action funds. 

In your testimony, you made no mention of asking General Walters 
whether the CIA could pay the Watergate defendants' bail or salaries 
while they were in prison. Was this an intended omission on your 
part in the interest of saving them or do you deny that you made 
these specific requests of General Walters? 

]\Ir. Deax. I recall I did make those requests and as I say, the 
omission was not intentional. I have never really read in full General 
Walters' depositions. So the answer is that in fact, I recall that, that 
was discussed. 

Senator Inouye. And it was not intentional? The omission was 
not intentional? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir. In fact, I recall that they were in the paper and 
I decided I didn't want to read them and then tailor what I had to 
say around what Mr. Walters had to say. 

Senator Ixouye. ^Ir. Dean, I believe you testified that on March 26, 
while you were at Camp David, you called INIr. Maroulis, the attorney 
for Mr. Liddy, and asked for a statement by Mr. Liddy that you had 
no prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct, and I have so testified. 

Senator Ixoute. Xow, you also testified, did you not, that it was on 
March 28 that Mr. Haldeman called you to meet with Mr. oMitchell 
and ]\rr. ]\Iagruder and that it was at that time you became convinced 
you would have to look out for yourself. 

Isn't that correct ? 

]\rr. Deax. That isn't my interpretation. I had decided while I was 
at* Camp David, in fact before I went to Camp David, that I didn't 
have to watch out for myself, but I saw what others were doing and 
I realized that I ought to — ^well, as I say, I retained counsel up there 
initially and told him because of the Los Angeles Times story, I re- 
tained him. 

At that point in time, I told him I would like to talk to him when 
I got back and suggested to him that he begin to think about a criminal 
lawyer. 

Senator Ixouye. If on March 26, after you, according to your testi- 
mony, had admitted to making payments to Watergate defendants to 
obstruct justice, offering clemency to defendants to obstruct justice and 
suborning perjury, you were still actively trying to build vour defense 
against having jorior knowledge of the break-in on March 26, doesn't 
this demonstrate that throughout this affair, your motivation was to 
protect vourself against the criminal charge of authorizing and direct- 
ing the Watergate break-in ? 



1450 

Mr. Dean. The reason I sought the statement from Mr. Liddy is you 
will recall I testified that on the 25th, I learned there was going to be 
a story ])ublished in the Los Angeles Times that I had prior knowl- 
edge. I felt that was libelous. I was trying to build what I thought 
would be a good defense or a good case if I decided I wanted to bring 
a libel action. In fact, I had mentioned that in my conversation with 
Mr. Maroulis also. 

Senator Inotjte. Mr. Dean, you stated that Mr. Maroulis called you 
back on the 29th of March and told you he could not get you the 
statement you wanted from Mr. Liddy. 

Did you record either of these telephone conversations you had with 
Mr. Maroulis? 

Mr. Dean. Yes. The first telephone conversation was recorded. It 
is almost inaudible and I don't know if it is because of the form I 
recorded it in. I would be happy to turn it over to the committee and 
if the committee can get off the tape what is on there, fine. I have been 
unable to. 

Senator Ixouye. Mr. Chairman, that was the last question from the 
White House. However, the White House has also submitted a short 
statement, I presume this is the closing statement, sir. 

Mr. Dean. Do I have the opportunity to comment on the closing 
statement as well as the opening statement ? 

Senator Inoxjye. If you wish to, sir, 

Mr. Dean. Thank you. 

Senator Inotjye. "A central credibility question is what prompted 
Dean's tactics in ]March and April of 1973, The desire to have the truth 
or the effort to achieve " 

Senator Ervin. Senator, so the record will be correct, is that a state- 
ment which White House counsel has prepared ? 

Senator Inouye. This is a statement prepared by Mr, J, Fred 
Buzhardt. 

Senator Ervin, Yes. 

'Senator Inouye, Special counsel to the President, 

Senator Ervin. And it is a statement of his contentions about evi- 
dence and not evidence as such. 

Mr, Dean. May I ask a question? Does this represent the White 
House view or ']Mr. Buzhardt's view? 

Senator Inouye. This was delivered to me yesterday under cover 
letter signed by INIr, J. Fred Buzhardt. 

A central credibility question is : What prompted Dean's tactics in March 
and April 1973 — ^the desire to have the triith told or the effort to achieve 
immunity from prosecution? The following sequence of events is important: 

Dean's admitted personal connection with the offer of clemency to McCord 
in January (Dean to Caulfield to McCord via Ulaseuicz) (p. 141). 

Dean's admitted personal connection with Hunt's demand for more money 
on March 19 (Hunt to O'Brien to Dean) (p. 197). 

Dean's meeting with the President on March 21-22. On any version of this 
meeting it was an effort to get the President to take action on what was becom- 
ing a personal problem for Dean. (p. 195). 

McCord's letter to Judge Sirica on March 23. 

Mr. Dean, May T just comment there? 
Senator Inouye. Please do, sir, 

]Mr. Dean. I, in the 21st meeting, had hoped that that would be 
the truth punctuation point that indeed, the coverup. It was after 



1451 

that, that morning meeting when I saw that it was not going to end 
that the period had not been placed in the story that my whole think- 
ing began to change and I began to think of how can I now proceed 
while others are miwilling to proceed, particularly Mr. Haldeman 
and ^Ir. Ehrlichman, and at that jDoint in time I certainly wanted 
to try to still get the President out in front of this entire matter. 
Senator Ixguye [reading] : 

McCord's letter to Judge Sirica on March 23. This was the crucial break in 
the cover-uii. Dean learned via a call from O'Brien (p. 205). On March 25 press 
comments directly linked Dean with knowledge of the Watergate break4n (p. 
203). He called Liddy's attorney, Maroulis, on March 27 to get a statement that 
he did not have prior knowledge of break-in (p. 211). Maroulis called back on 
March 29 with word that he couldn't give him a statement (p. 212). This state- 
ment might have been taped. On March 28 and March 29 he solicited names of 
criminal counsel (p. 220). On March 30, he decided to retain Mr. Shaffer (p. 220). 

Time had run out ; the cover-up had come apart ; Dean was centrally involved. 
He sent his lawyers to the U.S. Attorney on Monday, April 2, and commenced 
his negotiations for immunity. 

Mr. Chairman, this ends the statement. 

Senator Ervix. Thank j'ou. 

Senator Ixouye. Mr. Chairman, I have questions of my own but 
these questions have taken up an hour and 15 minutes so, if I may, I 
would like to have the opportunity at some later time to interrogate. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, all the members of the committee will be 
accorded a second opportunity. 

Senator Ixouye. I thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Dean. 

Senator Erm:x. Do 3'ou want to respond to the statement which has 
just been read to you? 

Mr. Deax. I believe I have commented through the questions and 
answers to most of those matters. The fact, I would just make this 
point. I would recall the fact that the question of clemency for Mr. 
^IcCord was a result of the fact that the issue of clemency had come 
up directly with the President. That was not something that I initiated. 
It was something that came in, Mr, Colson went to Mr. Ehrlichman, 
Mr. Ehrlichman, in turn went to the President, Mr. Colson also went 
to the President. I received word that the fact that clemency had been 
offered to one, similar assurances should be given or could be given to 
all, so that is clearly in the record on the clemency matter. 

The 21st meeting I have explained repeatedly what my hope in 
accomplishing with that meeting was, and my disappointment when 
I had thought I did have access to the President, I thought what I call 
my cancer on the Presidency speech did not result in immediate surgery 
but rather continued coverup. 

The 23d letter of Mr. McCord I was asked by Mr, Ehrlichman what 
my assessment of it was based on the earlier conversation I had had 
with Mr. O'Brien, at best it was hearsav that he had if any wanted 
to perpetuate the coverup at that point through further perjury, I am 
sure they could have because he had no hard evidence. This was 
revealed in a conversation which I have submitted to the committee 
and a conversation I had with Mr. Magruder who was not concerned 
about this, that the fact that McCord could prove nothing, he could 
say a lot but he could prove nothing. 



1452 

Let me see here. I will recall the reason again that I was seeking to 
get the comment from Mr. Liddy was in a sense twofold. First of all, 
the President had done a tremendous embrace of me that next morning 
when the story was printed. He had said that based on conversations 
he had had with me, which in fact he had not had, but rather I had had 
conversations with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ziegler, both, and informed 
them I was prepared to file a libel suit, and I believe the White House 
has also admitted the fact that that phone call never took place be- 
tween the President and myself on that day. But in an effort to develop 
what would be necessary for a libel suit, not that I was planning to file 
one at that point, but just in preparing for it I thought the strongest 
statement I could have would be a statement from Mr. Liddy and that 
was the reason I approached Mr. Maroulis to see if he could do it. 

The reason that Mr. Maroulis could not get the statement was because 
he was concerned about his client's fifth amendment rights. So those 
are the only points I would make on that closing statement that was 
offered by the White House. 

Senator Ervin. I want to thank Senator Inouye for putting these 
questions at the request of the White House counsel, and also for call- 
ing the attention of the witness to the contentions of the White House 
counsel. 

Mr. Dean, you have been testifying for about an hour and a half 
and I imagine you would not be very adverse to having a very brief 
recess at this time. 

Mr. Dean. I would appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for 
your thoughtfulness. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Under our usual routine, it would be the time for Senator Baker 
to interrogate the witness. However, he has kindly agreed to allow 
me to do so on account of certain obligations I have. 

Mr. Dean, there are one or two exhibits I want to ask you about 
and one of them is exhibit No. 34-5* which is a Shearson and Hamill 
Co. statement. Do you have a copy of that there ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not, no sir. 

Senator Er^t:n. Can someone supply him with a copy there. 

And another is our exhibit No. 35 of what I call the Dean papers, 
that is the papers that were turned over to this committee at the order 
of Judge Sirica. Do you have a copy of that? 

Mr. Dean. I do not. 

Senator Er\^n. And another is our exhibit No. 36 of the Dean 
papers, a memorandum for Mr. Huston from Mr, Haldeman. I would 
like for you to have a copy of those three documents before I begin. 

INIr. Dean. I have some of the documents that were turned over to 
me yesterday for identification relating to Judge Sirica. J don't know 
what you are referring to with regard to the Shearson and Hamill 
statement. 

Senator Erwn. "When did you transfer from the Justice Department 
to the White House? 

Mr. Dean. July of 1970. 

Senator Ervin. And when did ]Mr. Tom Huston transfer from the 
Justice Department to the Wliite House? 

♦Exhibit No. 34-5 was entered for Identification only In Book 3 and was not for 
publication. 



1453 

Mr. Deax. I don't believe he was at the Justice Department, to the 
best of my knowledge. 

Senator'ER^^x. Was he at the White House when you arrived there? 

Mr. Dean. Yes; he was there. 

Senator ER^^^^ Do you know anything about a meeting having been 
held in the office of the President on or about June 5, 1970, at which 
the President and Mr. Huston and others discussed laying plans for 
gathering domestic intelligence? 

Mr. Deax. I have hearsay knowledge of that, Mr. Chairman, that 
such a meeting did occur. Present at the meeting, Mr. Huston, various 
representatives of the intelligence agencies, the President at that point 
in time stated to those present that Mr. Huston would be in charge of 
the project for the White House. 

Senator Ervix. Now, you were informed in substance that the Presi- 
dent assigned to Tom Charles Huston, White House staff, responsi- 
bility for domestic intelligence and internal security affairs? 

Mr. Deax". That is correct. 

Senator ER\r[N. Now, as a result of this meeting there was a review 
by the heads of the CIA, FBI, NSA, and DIA of the techniques used 
by these information or intelligence-gathering organizations to gather 
intelligence, both domestic and foreign, was there not? 

^Ir. Deax. That was my general understanding on hearsay again. 

Senator Ervix. Yes. And that review is embodied in one of the pa- 
pers that you identified yesterday which I call No. 1 of the Dean 
papers that was not introduced in evidence ? 

5lr. Deax. I don't identify them as the Dean papers. They happened 
to fall in my possession. I was not the author, of course, but I did turn 
them over to the court. 

Senator Er\t:x. Now, I will ask you to look at the exhibit entitled 
"Recommendations, Top Secret, Handle VIA COMINT Channels 
Only, Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection," that you have 
there. 

Mr. Deax. Is this your No. 2? [Committee exhibit No. 35.*] 

Senator ER^'TX^ Yes ; that is what I call No. 2. 

Mr. Deax*. The top does not sav recommendations on it to me. It 
just has "Top Secret Handle VIA COMINT Channels Only Opera- 
tional Restraints on Intelligence Collection" and then (a) is missing 
and ''b) the document begins. 

Senator ER^^x■. Yes. In other words, parts of it were deleted that 
referred to 

Mr. Deax. I understand. 

Senator Ervix^ [continuing]. That had any reference to foreign in- 
telligence matters. 

Does that not constitute a recommendation from Tom Charles Hus- 
ton concerning domestic intelligence, the part you have there? 

Mr. Deax". What I understand this document, as I recall, when I 
received it it appeared to me to be a summation of a rather lengthy 
document, a 43-page document that was being forwarded either to Mr. 
Haldeman or to the President for their review. 

Senator ER\ax. Yes. Does not that document, in short, make these 
recommendations as to the manner or rather the technique that should 
be followed, in Mr. Huston's view, in gathering domestic intelligence 
and ma^-fers af^ef^tino- internal security? 

Mr. Deax. Yes ; it does. 



•Exhibit 35 was published In Book 3. 



1454 

Senator Ervin. In other words, it says, it recommends the first 
technique is surreptitious entry. 

Mr. Dean. On mine, which is No. (b) [exhibit No. 35], the first 
recommendation is electronic surveillance and penetrations and says, 
"Recommend present procedure should be changed to permit intensi- 
fication of coverage of individuals and groups in the United States 
who pose major threats to national security." 

Senator Erven. In other words, what I asked was the first recom- 
mendation was techniques for removing limitations on electronic sur- 
veillance and penetration. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. Then the next, the second recommendation was for 
the use of the mail coverage. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. The third recommendation was a recommendation of 
a technique designated as surreptitious entry. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. Now does not the exhibit show that surreptitious 
entry, the third technique as described by Mr. Huston in that docu- 
ment as follows : "Use of this technique is clearly illegal. It amounts 
to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrass- 
ment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can 
produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other 
fashion." 

Mr. Dean. That isn't on the document I have before me but I do 
recall something to that effect in the larger report that we are referring 
to, yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

The fourth technique was development of campus sources of infor- 
mation concerning violence-prone student groups or campus groups, 
wasn't it? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. And the fifth technique recommended by this state- 
ment is the use of undercover military agents? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Er\^n. Yes. 

Now, I will ask you that all of these recommendations were that 
restrictions of use techniques be removed, was it not? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. As I recall the larger document that 
many of these recommendations had footnotes that had been placed 
on there by Hoover as to every one of them. 

Senator Er\t:n. Now, did not the original document, of which there 
is an excerpt with deletions, point out in several occasions that Mr. 
Hoover, the Director of the FBI, was wholly opposed to the use of 
any of these techniques for domestic surveillance ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, it did. 

Senator Ervin. And I will ask you if the Americans who were 
to be the subject of these information or intelligence-gathering activi- 
ties were designated by such terms as subversive elements without 
further definition? 

INIr. Dean. It was very broad, that is correct. 

Senator Er\in. And second, selected targets of internal security 
interests. 



1455 

Mr. Deax. Yes, sir, again that was a very broad description. 

Senator Erm;x. There is no definition anywhere in the ( >cument 
as to what those two things mean? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, sir. There was a prefatory soction of 
the document explaining somewhat the dimensions of the problem as 
it was i)erceived at that time. But again there was not even a lot of 
specificity in that, as I recall but it has been several — quite a time since 
I ha\^ read that document. 

Senator Ervix. Now, was there anything in the document that told 
who was going to do the selecting? These selected targets of internal 
security interests ? 

Mr. Deax. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Erxix. And that was left up, by the document, to the imagi- 
nation or interpretation of anybody engaged in the intelligence work ? 

]Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervix. Now there was another 

]Mr. Deax. I believe that one of the reasons for developing this was 
to get intelligence that was more responsive to the requirements of the 
White House. There had been, as I think I have testified, there were 
continued complaints about the intelligence, and I think that is why 
the "White House took charge of the project. 

Senator Ervix. The White House was dissatisfied with the work be- 
ing done b}' the FBI, CIA, NSA, and the other intelligence gathering 
agencies. It wanted to assume some degree of supervision over those 
agencies, didn't it ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Erm:x. And I will ask you, as a lawyer, if you do not think 
that surreptitious entry or burglary and the electronic surveillance and 
penetration constitute a violation of the fourth amendment? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator Erm:x. The fourth amendment provides that : 

Theright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. And no warrant 
shall issue other than upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be served and the personal things to be 
seized. 

Hasn't it always been a violation of the fourth amendment under 
the decisions of the court to resort to burglary for the purpose of get- 
ting information? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, sir, it has been. 

Senator Ervix. And hasn't the Supreme Court recently held by 
unanimous opinion that the use of electronic surveillance and penetra- 
tion to obtain information concerning persons allegedly guilty of 
domestic sub^•ersive activities is also a violation of the fourth amend- 
ment ? 

jNIr. Deax. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator ER^^x. Now, I call your attention to what I designate as 
exhibit No. 36* and ask if you will read this document to the committee. 

Mr. Deax^. This is a memorandi:m for Mr. Huston, subject, domestic 
intelligence review : 

Its recommendations — 



♦Exhibit 36 was published In Book 3. 



6-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 



1456 

I might add here it is from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Huston — 

The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the review have been 
approved hy the President. He does not, however, want to follow the procedure 
you have outlined on page 4 of your memorandum regarding implementation. He 
would prefer that the thing simply be put into motion on the basis of this ap- 
proval. The formal official memorandum should, of course, be prepared and should 
be the device by which to carry it out. 

I realize this is contrary to your feeling as to the best way to get this done. I 
feel very strongly that this procedure won't work and you had better let me know 
and we will take another stab at it. Otherwise let's go ahead. 

Senator Ervin. Now, that letter can only be construed as a statement 
on the part of Mr. H. R. Haldeman to Mr. Tom Charles Huston, the 
aide in charge of domestic intelligence, to the effect that the President 
of the United States had approved his recommendations about remov- 
ing the limitations on electronic surveillance and penetration, sur- 
reptitious entry or burglary, the use of mail coverage, and of sources 
of information on the campuses and the military undercover agents 
for the purposes of gathering information upon the objectives of that. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Er\t[n. Now, when did Mr. Huston leave the AVhite House? 

Mr. Dean. I do not recall specifically the date. It seems to me he 
was on my staff 6 or 8 months at the most, as I recall. He had been 
talking about leaving for some time and returning to private practice. 
This had been one of his pet projects. He had apparently gotten into 
a serious dispute with ]\Ir. Hoover over it and he felt that his effective- 
ness at getting this accomplished had been diminished as a result of 
the fact that his plan was not being implemented and was flounder- 
ing. I can recall him coming to me and asking me if I could do 
anything. I told him I could not. 

Senator Ervin. Now, do you not know that this plan was approved 
for use by the President without the prior knowledge of l\Ir. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not know that for a fact, no, sir. "When I talked 
to j\Ir. Mitchell about it, it had reached the stage that they wanted 
to do something. Mv. Mitchell and I talked about it and we decided 
that the best thing to do was to create the lEC and that would pos- 
sibly satisfv everybody's request to do something. 

Senator ER^^N. Now, the lEC, in effect, was a proposal to set up 
a group representing or representatives from the FBI, CIA, NSA, 
DIA, and the counterintelligence units of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force to furnish information about the activities of all of these agen- 
cies to the Wliite House? 

Mr. Dean. I believe that is correct, but I believe that at that time 
also, the military — I am not sure they were involved because they had 
already made a decision that they were not going to do any domestic 
intelligence work. 

Senator Ervin. Now, as a lawyer, vou are aware of the fact that the 
section 408(d) (3) of title 50 of the United States Code pro^^des that 
the CIA "shall have no police, subpena, law enforcement powers, or 
internal security functions" 

Mr. Dean. Domestically. 

Senator ER\^N. Yes; internal security functions. 

INIr. Dean. Yes; I was entirely aware of that. I was not specifically 
aware of the statute. 



1457 

Senator Era^x. Yet, despite the fact that the statute forbade the 
CIA exercising any internal security functions, here was a consoli- 
dation, in a sense, of activities or at least a coordination of activities 
of the CIA in the domestic intelligence field, was there not? 

]Mr. Deax. Mr. Chairman, I believe what the CIA did in this instance 
was to share their own intelligence from a foreign nation that would 
have a domestic implication. They were a part, because of their exper- 
tise in analysis and evaluation of intelligence to 

Senator Er\^x. And notwithstanding the fact that the statute gave 
them no internal security functions, they were called upon to evalu- 
ate domestic intelligence-gathering by other agencies? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. Now, I am not familiar specifically with 
how the evaluation group operated at all as to the mechanics of that. 
But they were a part of the group, yes, sir. 

Senator Erm:x. As a lawyer, do you know of any statute which gives 
the White House the power to set up interagency units of this kind ? 

Mr. Deax. I do not know of any statute, no, sir. 

Senator Er\t[x. Xow, the memo from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Huston 
is dated the 14th day of July and states that the President has approved 
the recommendations made by Mr. Huston, does it not? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator ER^^x. The President made a statement on May 20, 1 believe, 
to the effect that he rescinded this approval after 5 days. Do you recall 
that ? 

Mr. Deax. It was late July when I came on and I do not recall 
whether it was rescinded or not. 

Senator ER^^x. Xow, on yesterday, Senator Weicker interrogated 
you about one of the documents that you turned over to Judge Sirica 
and Judge Sirica turned over to this committee, one dated September 
18, 1970, which consisted of a memorandum from you to the Attorney 
General 

;Mr. Deax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Er%t:x [continuing] . In which you recommended the setting 
up of this interagency evaluation unit. 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. I might add that when Mr. Mitchell and 
I talked about that, we decided that with Mr. Haldeman and others 
being aware of this, we thought this might satisfy the needs and the 
requests at the time to do something. 

I also recall that the liaison between the FBI and other intelligence 
agencies had really broken down. I believe Mr. Hoover had withdrawn 
all of his liaison relationships with everyone except the Wliite House 
and ]\fr. Mitchell hoped that this might be a vehicle to start getting 
the FBI dealing with the agencies, because there are, of course, quite 
proper and natural reasons to have liaison amongst the intelligence 
community. 

Senator ER^^:x. Anyway, do you know of anv written document 
which tends to show that the President disapproved of or rescinded 
these plans which Mr. Haldeman said he had approved on the 14th 
of July? 

Mr. Deax^. No, sir : I have never seen such a document. 

'Senator Er\^x. Xow, after Mr. Huston left the White House, you 
had some responsibility in this field, did you not? 



1458 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator ER^^N. Did you ever receive any instruction from anybody 
to the effect that the President had rescinded these plans recommended 
by Mr. Huston ? 

Mr. Dean. No. To the contrary, as this document indicates, on Sep- 
tember 18', I was asked to see what I could do to get the first step started 
on the document. This was reflective of that effort. 

Senator Ervin. Now, virtually all of these papers were marked "Top 
Secret," were they not? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervix. I do not know whether you are familiar with Execu- 
tive Order No. 11652 dated March 8, 1972, which was published in 
37 Fedei'al Register, page 5208. Section 1 of that shows that the only 
thing that can be classified on the basis of national security is informa- 
tion or material whicli requires protection agaiust unauthorized dis- 
closure in the interest of national defense or foi'eign relations to the 
United States. 

Mr. Dean. I am aware of that. That was the result of the extreme 
over-classification of documents in the Government. If somebody 
wanted to get somel)ody's attention, T think, often they would put "Top 
Secret" on a memorandum and send it forward under that procedure 
with a big red stamji on it or something marked on it. 

Senator Ervin. Now, just for the sake of the record, the United 
States Code, title 18, in sections 793, 794, 795, 796, 797 clearly reveals 
what defense information is. The only statute I can find on the subject 
of classified information generally is that embodied in 18 USC 798, 
and there is nothing in any of these statutes that gives anybody any 
authority to classify information that relates to domestic intelligence 
or internal security. 

Mr. Dean. I believe there are some statutes back in title 50 with 
regard to the Atomic Energy Act that apply to this, but I am just 
thinking off the to]:) — — 

Senator Ervtn. The Atomic Energy Act is designed to guard secrets 
relating to atomic energy. 

Mr. Dean. That is right. As I say 

Senator Ervin. And has no relation to demonstrations or persons 
who attempt to petition the Government for regress of grievances in 
compliance with the first amendment. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. Senator. 

Senator Ervin. Isn't it true to say that among some of the officials 
in the Committee To Re-Elect the "President and the '\^niite House, 
there was a great complement of fear during 1970 and 1971 ? 

Mr. Dean. I would say there was a great concern about demon- 
strators. I think demonstrators were viewed as a political problem. 

You used the word "fear." That connotes to me physical concern 
about them. As one who has walked with many demonstrators, to go 
out and get the pulls of the crowd, they are certainly not a fearsome 
group. There were some militants who were bent on, you know, 
destroying office buildings and breaking windows and thinos of that 
nature, the looters and the trashers and the groups like tliat. But I 
would not say — I would say there was a concern. 

Senator Ervin. Well, there are two kinds of fear. There is physical 
fear and intellectual fear. Don't you think there was an intellectual 
fear prevalent at that time among some people in the committee and 



1459 

some people in the T^^iite House about Americans who undertook to 
exercise their first amendment riglit to petition for regress of 
grievances ? 

Mr. Deax. I think that is correct when you put it in tlie political 
context. 

Senator Ervix. "Well, all of this was in the political context; was it 
not? 

Mv. Deax. Yes, it was. 

Senator Ervix. Xow, was not there a feeling there among some White 
House officials such as iNIr, Colson, and perhaps among some in the 
Committee To Re-Elect the President, that every person who was not 
backing their efforts to reelect the President or who dissented from 
tiie programs of the President was an enemy ? 

Air. Deax. I think that many people who were most vocal and could 
command some audience in their dissent were considered opponents or 
enemies, yes. 

Senator Ervix'. And that was applied to a great list of people, in- 
cluding some of the most distinguished commentators of the news 
media on the national scene ; was it not ? 
]Mr. Deax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Er\t:x. Xot only that, yesterday a document was put in 
evidence and identified by you, as I recall, as coming from Air. Colson's 
office, entitled "'Opponent Priority Activity." On i)age 3 of that docu- 
ment it has this, among the opponent priority activity. No. 14,''' Samuel 
M. Lambert, L-a-m-b-e-r-t, president. National Education Association, 
"Has taken us on vis-a-vis Federal aid to parochial schools, a 1972 
issue." 

Didn't those in the White House interested in President Nixon's re- 
election and then the reelection committee classify among their ene- 
mies people who dissented from President Nixon's programs? 

Mr. Deax. As I say, those who were able to command audience were 
singled out. 

Senator Erv^x'^. Here is a man listed among the opponents or the 
enemies whose only offense is that he believed in the first amendment 
and shared Thomas Jefferson's conviction as expressed in the Virginia 
statute for religious freedom that to compel a man to make contribu- 
tions of money for the dissemination of religious opinions he dis- 
believes is sinful and tyrannical. Isn't that true ? 

Mr. Deax. I cannot disagree with the chairman at all. 
Senator Er\t;x". So we have here plans to violate the fourth amend- 
ment, which were approved by the President according to Mr. Halde- 
man ; we have people being branded enemies whose mere offense is that 
they believed in enforcing the first amendment as proclaimed b}' the 
Su]:)reme Court of the United States just about a week ago. 
Mr. Deax'. That is correct. 
Senator Ervix". Yes. 

I was very much intrififued by Afr. Buzhardt's document and I would 
like to invite your attention to page 8, the statement he makes on there. 
Mr. McCax'dtess. Air. Chairman, he does not have the Buzhardt 
document, so-called. 

Senator Ervix^. I can read this very short statement : 
"In Februarv. however, with the Ervin committee beginning its 
work, the President was concerned that all the available facts be made 
known." 

♦See p. 16&6. 



1460 

And also a statement on page 10 to the effect that "during this 
period, the point was frequently raised by various people, including 
primarily the President, that the whole story of the Watergate should 
be made public." 

Do you know any action that the President took subsequent to the 
establishment of this committee and prior to the time this committee 
started to function which showed his concern that all the available 
facts with respect to the Watergate be made known? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Chairman, I must testify to the contrary, that I 
think some of the documents that I have submitted regarding Mr. 
Haldeman's specific instructions to me on dealing with what was 
called the Watergate tactics and then the subsequent La Costa meet- 
ing, which occurred on June 11 and 12, the subsequent meetings where 
there were efforts to woo members of this committee, the discussions 
of executive privilege to prevent the testimony of people from the 
White House, could well be concluded to evidence quite the contrary 
intention. 

Senator Ervtn. Now, you have testified about a September 15 meet- 
ing with the President. When was that meeting held with respect 
to the time that the bills of indictment were handed down in the 
original criminal action? 

']\Ir. Dean. As I recall the meeting, it was in the late afternoon. 
I believe the President was just about to leave to go somewhere and 
in fact, the helicopter might have even landed during the very end 
of the meeting. I don't know where at this point in time he was going. 
I remember we continued to chat on. We had gotten into the subject 
of the book I was reading at that time, w^hich was Inside Australia. 
We were discussing Australians while we were waiting. 

The indictments had been handed down or announced far earlier 
in the day and had been running on the wires all day. 

Senator ER^^N. Now isn't it true that a short time after the break- 
in, the news media carried information to the effect that five burglars 
had been caught in the Democratic National Headquarters in the 
Watergate, and that four of the burglars had money in their pockets 
which came from the Committee To Re-Elect the President? 

Mr. Dean. I don't believe that was reported immediately, but shortly 
thereafter, it was; yes. 

Senator ER^^N. And notwithstanding that fact, was it not revealed 
shortly thereafter that this money had been paid to Mr. Liddy by 
]Mr. Sloan at the instigation of ]Mr. jNIagruder and with the consent of 
Mr. Stans and Mv. Mitchell? 

Mr. Dean. I believe that is correct. 

Senator Er\t:n. Yes. 

Do you not agree with me that these facts indicated that there were 
footsteps which went from the Watergate right into the Committee 
To Re-Elect the President? 

Mr. Dean. There is no doubt about that. 

Senator Ervin. Yet nobody in the committee except ^Mr. Liddy 
and INIr. Hunt were indicted. . « 

Mv. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. And had it not been that Mr. Magruder had resorted, 
to your knowledge, in his testimonv before the grand jury to perjury 
to keep the grand jury from implicating him and others — ; — 



1461 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. And so this meeting in which the President said that 
Bob Plaldeman had tokl him about your activities was held in the 
office of the President right after it had been announced that the in- 
dictments had stopped with Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt and Mr. McCord ? 

Mr. Deax, That is correct, and there had been discussion within the 
White House of this very strategy of stopping them at, or stopping the 
case at Mr. Liddy and there was an awareness of the fact that Mr. ^la- 
gruder was going to have to perjure himself to have that accomplished. 

Senator Krvix. Do you know of any action that the President took 
at any time between the 17th day of June until the establislunent of 
this committee and until February that is mentioned here by Mr. Buz- 
hardt, to have the facts concerning this matter discovered ? 

Mr. Deax. I do know that after the election there was discussion 
with Mr. Haldeman in his office in which Mr. Haldeman said that tlie 
President would like to lay out some of the facts and we discussed 
what the implications of those facts would be, and when I said that 
I felt that — well. I did not know e\erything that had hapjKMied in 
advance, I did know what had happened since June 17, and I thought 
that as a result of those activities that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and 
Dean and I might have mentioned some other at that time also, could 
be indicted, Mr. Haldeman's res|)onse, which I can remember very 
clearly because it stuck in my mind, he said, '"That does not seem like 
a very viable option, does it ?" 

Senator ER\^x. Xow, the truth is that during this period of time that 
the FBI was giving you, that is, Mr. Gray was permitting you to 
receive some FBI reports. 

Mr. Deax\ What occurred, as I recall, there were two deliveries 
where I returned the first group of files that I had received back in his 
attache case to him, and then picked up another bunch of documents 
subsequently, and then returned those later, and it has only been 
through i)ress accounts that I learned that I received some 82 out of 
the 160 total documents. 

Senator Ervix. Xow, at whose instance did you contact the CIA; 
that is, General Walters ? 

Mr. Deax'. After discussing this wnth ]\Ir. Ehrlichman, he thought 
that I should explore the possil^le use of the CIA with regard to assist- 
ing in supporting in dealing with the individuals who had been in- 
volved in the incident. 

Senator Ervix. So, an effoi't was made to involve the CTA. Also 
the FBI, Mr. Gray, destroyed some documents w^hich came from Mr. 
Hunt's safe, did he not? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervix. And also, it was suggested by those in charge of 
things, who were concerned about these so-called enemies, that the 
processes of the Internal Revenue Service should be perverted and 
prostituted in order to harrass people who were enemies as viewed 
by the A^^lite House and the Committee To Re-Elect the President? 

]\rr. Deax. That is correct. I might add also in addition to the har- 
rassment through tax audits there were a number of memorandums I 
received from iNIr. Colson regarding the tax-exemption status of groups 
that did have tax exemptions that were opposed to Presidential policy. 
Xow, my files would contain those, I do not have them in my possession. 



1462 

A review of my files would indicate that 99 out of a 100 times when 
one of these would come down it would go right in the file and go no 
further. 

Senator Ervin. Now, returning to Mr. Buzhardt's assertion that the 
President was desirous, beginning in September, to have all of the facts 
revealed after the establishment of this committee, will you tell us 
again what meetings were had in the White House with respect to this 
committee, and who was present ? 

Mr. Dean. With dealing with this committee ? 

Senator Er\t:n. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. With respect to the President or the leading up to that 
as well? 

Senator Ervin. Well, I am particularly interested in the President, 
since Mr. Buzhardt says he was anxious that all facts be revealed. 

Mr. Dean. Well, it was when the President was in San Clemente, 
and I arrived on the — left on the 9th, was out there on the 10th and llth 
for meetings, I recall that— of February of this year, I recall that Mr. 
Haldeman departed the meeting once or twice and he finall}- told the 
President what we were meeting on while we were out there. 

We left there and went to, down to La Costa where the meetings 
proceeded and there we had the remainder of the 2 days of discussions 
about how to deal with this committee. During the course of the meet- 
ings at one point in time, as I had mentioned earlier, there was an 
assessment made by Mr. Ehrlichman, there had been disappointment 
that they had not been able to influence the selection of the committee, 
there had been disappointment that they had not been able to amend 
successfully your resolution to put a bipartisan — you know, have equal 
representation between Republicans and Democrats; that the floor 
amendments that had been offered had been defeated. They — some of 
these are evidenced in the memorandum from Mr. Haldeman that is in 
the exhibit I submitted. 

Senator Ervin. To make the testimony about that short, was that 
one of the times you said that the consensus was there should be an 
effort to show, to claim open cooperation with the committee but an 
effort to impede it from discovering the truth ? 

INIr. Dean. I would call the chairman's attention to the exhibit re- 
garding the meeting with the Attorney General where there was great 
concern that this committee might uncover additional criminal ac- 
tivity. There was also a very strained relationship at that point in 
time between the Attorney General and INIr. Haldeman and INIr. Ehr- 
lichman. I was asked to prepare an agenda for the President to woo 
the President or have the President woo the Attorney General back 
into the family. The President was aware of the problem, and there 
is also spelled out somewhat in the agenda that was submitted to him, 
I believe, on February 22. 

Senator Ervin. Now, returning to the President's desire about the 
truth, you spoke of some meeting that the President attended in which, 
after a press conference, he wondered if the committee was going to 
swallow the bait he had put out in the press conference about a court 
decision? 

Mr. Dean. That was on St. Patrick's Da v. 

Senator Er%^n. That was — St. Patrick's Dav is the ITtli. T believe. 
Now, before that, the President had a press conference, did he not, on 



1463 

March 12, 1973, which was approximately a montli after Mr. Biizhardt 
said in his statement that the President was anxious that the facts be 
revealed, and I will ask you if at this press conference he did not say, 
and I quote from Presidential documents : ''A member or former mem- 
ber of the President's personal staif normally shall follow the well- 
established precedent and decline a request for formal appearance 
before a committee of the Cong-rcss." 

Are 3'ou familiar with that press conference? 

Mr. Deax. 1 recall hearing that at the press conference, yes. 

Senator Erm;x. "At the same time it will continue to be my policy 
to provide all these and relevant information through informal con- 
tacts between my present staff and connnittees of the Congress in ways 
which preserve intact the constitutional separation of the branches." 
I believe that was the thing that provoked my statement that I was 
not going to let anyl)ody come down to see me, travel by night like 
Xicodemus and whisper in my ear something that he was not willing 
for all of the American people to hear. [Laughter.] 

Xow, at the press conference on March 15, 1973, this question was 
asked : "Mr. President, does your offer to cooperate with the Ervin 
committee include the possibility that you would allow your aides to 
testify before his committee. And if it does not, would you be willing 
to comply with a court order if Ervin went to court to get one that 
required some testimony from White House aides. 

"The President : In answer to your first part of the question, the 
statement that I made yesterday answered that completely — not yes- 
terday', the 12th I think it was — my statement on executive privilege. 
Members of the White House staff will not appear before a committee 
of Congress in any formal session." 

Then skipping "We will furnish information under the proper cir- 
cumstances. We will consider each matter on a case-by-case basis. 

"With regard to the second point that is not before us, let us say, 
however, that if the Senate feels at this time that this matter of sepa- 
ration of powers were, as I said, this administration has been more 
forthcoming than any Democratic administration I know of. If the 
Senate feels that they want a test case, we would welcome it. Perhaps 
this is the time to have the highest court of this land make a definitive 
decision with regard to this matter. I am not suggesting that we are 
asking for it, but I would suggest that if the Members of the Senate 
in their wisdom decide that they want to test this matter in court we 
will, of course, present our side of the case and we think that the 
Supreme Court will uphold, as it always usually has, the great con- 
stitutional principle of separation of j^owers rather than to uphold 
the Senate." 

Xow was that the bait that the President mentioned in the meeting 
on the St. Patrick's Day? 

]\Ir. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Em^x'. And the President discussed again on St. Patrick's 
Day he was not willing for any of his aides, past or present, to appear 
before the committee and give testimony in person. 

Mr. Deax. Well, we had discussed that before he made that state- 
ment. ]Mr. Chairman, that he certainly did not want ]Mr. Haldeman 
and Mr. Ehrlichman coming up here before the committee nor did 
he want me appearing before this committee. 



1464 

Senator Ervix. And this was on the 15th and the 17th day of 
jNIarch, about a month after Mr. Buzhardt says that the President 
was anxious for all the facts to be revealed. 

Do you know how facts can be revealed except by people who know 
something about those facts? [Laughter.] 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, I do not. I think that the theory that was 
developing was that to take the very hard line initially and back down 
to written interrogatories. But that would be the bottom line. I believe 
that was as far as the President was willing to go because he felt that 
written statements could be handled and quite obviously it is much 
easier to prepare a written brief of a situation than it is to submit 
yourself to cross-examination. 

Senator Er\in. And a written statement can be written to conceal 
as well as to reveal facts, can't it? 

Mr. Dean, That is absolutely correct and I think 

Senator Ervin. I believe you discussed at that time the assertion 
that I made I was not willing to accept written statements because 
you cannot cross-examine a written statement. 

Mr, Dean. Yes ; and I had discussion with the President about that 
very statement. 

Senator Ervin. Just one other matter. Article II of the Constitu- 
tion says, in defining the power of the President, section 3 of article 
II, "He" — that is the President — "shall take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed." 

Do you know anything that the President did or said at any time 
between June 17 and the present moment to perform his duty to see 
that the laws are faithfully executed in respect to what is called the 
Watergate affair? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Chairman, I have given the facts as I know them 
and I don't — I would rather be excused from drawing my own con- 
clusions on that at this point in time. 

Senator Ervin. Now, you have been asked several questions about 
your credibility. I will ask you as a lawyer if the experience of the 
English-speaking race, both in its legislative bodies and in its courts, 
has not demonstrated that the only reliable way in which the credi- 
bility of a witness can be tested is for that witness to be interrogated 
upon oath and have his credibility determined not only by what he 
says but by his conduct and demeanor while he is saving it and also 
by whether his testimony is corroborated or not corroborated by other 
witnesses ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. Is there any way whatsoever to test the credibility 
of anybody when the credibility has to be judged merely upon the basis 
of a written statement ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you very much. 

The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

[Thereupon, at 12 :25 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
2 p.m., the same day.] 



1465 

Afterxoox Session, Thursday, June 28, 1973 

Senator Ervin. I handed you an exhibit (34-5) from your stock- 
brokers. 

Mr. De.vn. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. I wish you would give me the date of that exhibit 
and wliat it shows. 

Mr. Dean. The document is from Shearson and Hamill, and Co. The 
date appears to be the month of October. 

Senator Ervin. What year ? 

^Ir. Dean. Of 1972. And it indicates various transactions that oc- 
curred at that time, and indicates that the balance brought forward in 
the credit line at that point in time was $26,000, $26,167 and it has the 
new net balance at $26,229, I believe it is 99, it is hard to read from 
the copy I have here. 

Senator Ervin. So it shows that at that time, you had assets to have 
replaced the $4,850 that you borrowed from the funds that had been 
delivered to you ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you. 

Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. ]\Ir. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Senator Ervin. First. I want to thank you for swapping places with 
me so I can fulfill an engagement later. Thank you very much. 

Senator Baker. ]Mr. Chairman, there is no way on earth I can swap 
places with you. But I thank you for that and I am happy to relin- 
quish my place in the sequence of questioning so that you could com- 
plete your very, very thorough and very, very important line of ques- 
tioning this morning. 

I was about to say, ]\Ir. Dean, that you have been a very patient 
witness, and very thorough. You presented us with a great mass of in- 
formation, almost 250 pages in your written statement of voluminous 
testimony in response to the interrogation of members of this commit- 
tee, and we are very grateful. 

Some of the specific allegations that you make in your testimony 
are at least prima facie extraordinarily important. The net sum of 
your testimony is fairly mind-bogglinii. It is not my purpose in these 
questions that are about to follow to do what would ordinarily be the 
expected function of a committee member, to try to test your testi 
mony. I think that you have been subjected to a rather rigid examina- 
tion by my colleagues on the committee thus far and, of course, your 
testimony and its credibility, its importance and relevance, will fall 
into place not only in terms of its own significance but in terms of its 
relationship to the testimony of other witnesses. 

You are a lawyer, ^fr. Dean, and I need not go into a long pre- 
amble about what I am about to do. But so that you understand what 
I am tryinqr to do. I will give you some brief explanation in advance. 

As T said just a moment ago, it is not my purpose now to try to test 
your testimony. It is not my purpose to try to impeach your testimony, 
to corroborate your testimony, to elaborate or extend particular aspects 
of it, but rather to try to structure your testimony so that we have a 
coherent presentation against which we can measure the testimony of 
other witnesses heretofore given, and the testimony of other witnesses 
later to appear and, of course, against whatever other information the 



14)66 

committee can gather from circumstantial evidence, from whatever 
source. 

It occurs to me that at this point, the central question, and in no way 
in derrogation of the importance of the great volume of material and 
the implications that flow from it, but the central question at this point 
is simply put. What did the President know and when did he know it ? 

In trying to structure your testimony I would ask that you give at- 
tention to three categories of information : That information that you 
can impart to the committee that you know of your own personal 
knowledge ; that type of information that we lawyers refer to as cir- 
cumstantial evidence, which would include evidence given based on 
your opinion or on inferences you draw from circumstances in the 
situation ; and, third, that type of evidence that ordinarily would not 
be admitted in a court of law but is admitted here for whatever 
purpose it may serve, that is hearsay evidence or evidence about which 
you have only secondhand information. 

I would hope, though, that in this tliird category, that is in terms of 
hearsay evidence or secondhand information, we would try, you and I, 
to limit the scope of that to situations whicli may be further venti- 
lated by the testimony of other witnesses on the roster of witnesses to 
appear before this committee because if we range too far, there is no 
wa}^ that we can compare and assess und evaluate the importance of 
that testimony. But I want it and I would like to divide the informa- 
tion then as we go along into three parts, that is. direct evidence, cir- 
cumstantial evidence, and hearsay or si condhand information. 

I am in no way criticizing your testimony, I think you really have 
been a very remarkable witness. 

Mr. Deax. Mr. Vice Chairman, I might say this, in preparing my 
testimony I made a very conscious effort to not write a brief against 
any man but merely to state facts sequentially as close as I could. By 
sequentially some things it was necessary to follow forward to explain 
a given sequence of events to bring the matter into a time sequence but 
I did not by design try to write a brief or a document that focused in 
on any individual or any set of circumstances surrounding any indi- 
vidual. Rather, laid them out in the totality of their context. 

Senator Baker. I understand that, Mr. Dean, and I really do hope 
you understand that what I am saying to you is not a criticism of you 
nor any implication of criticism. Rather instead you have presented 
us with a sequential presentation, and I am trying to convert it into 
an organized presentation, according to categories and to the quality 
and scope of the information that you possess. So please believe me, I 
am not trying to attack your to 'imoiiy but rather to organize it for 
our own committee purpose. 

Now, there is one other thing I would like to say and it may or may 
not be possible to do this, and again I am not being critical of you as a 
witness. As I said just a moment ago T think you have been a very 
remarkable witness. When I used to practice law, I used to call on the 
trial judge from time to time to instruct the witness to fiist answer the 
question and then to explain it. So I ho])e I can keep my questions brief 
and I hope you miglit preface youi- answers with a yes or no. if that is 
possible, and then whatever explanation you wish. 

Mr. Dean. Certainly. 



1467 

Senator Baker. It is not meant to be an entrapment, nor a "do you 
still beat your wife"' question, answer yes or no. But it is meant to try 
to advance the cause of factfinding. 

Under the heading of what did the President know and when did he 
know it falls into several subdi\isions. The first one is the break-in at 
the Democratic National Committee headquarters of the Watergate 
complex on the morning of June 17, 1972. 

Do you know what the President knew of that in advance? 

Mr. Deax. I do not. 

Senator Baker. Do you have any information that he did know of it ? 

]Mr. Deax. I only know^ that I learned upon my return to the office 
that events had occurred that indicated that calls had come from Key 
Biscayne to Washington to Mr. Strachan to destroy incriminating 
documents in the possession of Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Baker. The question is, I hope, not impossibly narrow but 
your testimony touches many people. It touches INIr. Ehrlichman, Mr. 
Haldeman, Mr. Colson, INIr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, and many others. But 
1 am trying to focus on the President. 

Mr. Deax. I understand. 

Senator Baker. What did the President know and when did he 
know it i 

Is it possible for you, based on direct knowledge or circumstantial 
information, and you have given us an indication of circumstances, or 
even hearsay, to tell us whether or not you can shed any further light 
on w^hether the President knew or, in the parlance of tort law% should 
have known of the break-in at the Watergate complex on June 17 ? 

]Mr. Deax. You mean, could he have prior knowledge of it? 

Senator Baker. Yes. 

j\Ir. Deax. I cannot testify of any firsthand knowledge of that. I 
can only testify as to the fact that an^^thing that came to ]Mr. Halde- 
man's attention of any importance was generally passed to the Presi- 
dent by Mr. Haldeman, and if Mr. Haldeman had advance knowledge 
or had received advance indications it would be my assumption that 
that had been passed along but I do not know that for a fact. 

Senator Baker. So that w^ould fall into category 2 of my organi- 
zation. 

Mr. Deax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. That is an inference that von do draw from the 
arrangements of the organization of the "\Yliite House and your knowl- 
edge of the relationships, the relationship of Mr. Haldeman and the 
President. 

]\Ir. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. But it does not fall in category 1 or 3 which is to 
say direct knowledge or hearsay information from other parties. 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. The coverup is the second heading and, of course, 
the coverup embraces and involves so many things and so many people 
over such a span of time that it is difficult really to place it in a single 
catefTory but I would like to try. 

What did the President know and when did he know it about the 
coverup. You have already testified about this, Mr. Dean, and I under- 
stand, I believe, the burden of your testimony, the thrust of your testi- 
mony, but for the sake of clarity, and understanding and organization 



1468 

of this record, tell me briefly : based on your personal knowledge, based 
on circumstantial evidence or based even on hearsay, what the Presi- 
dent knew and when he first knew it. 

Mr. Dean. I would have to start back from personal knowledge and 
that would be when I had a meeting on September 15 when we dis- 
cussed what was very clear to me in terms of coverup. We discussed 
in terms of delaying lawsuits, compliments to me on my effortt^ to that 
point. Discussed timing and trials, because we didn't want them to 
occur before the election. That was direct conversation that I testified 
to. 

Now, going back from September 15, back to the June 17 time, I 
believe I have testified to countless occasions in which I have — I re- 
ported information to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, made 
recommendations to them regarding Mr. Magruder, I was aware of 
the fact that often Mr. Haldeman took notes, I know that Mr. Halde- 
man met daily with the President, I was quite aware of the fact that 
this was one of the most important and virtually the only issue that 
was really developing at all, and given the normal reporting channels 
I worked through it was my assumption, without questioning, that this 
was going in to the President. 

Now, at what point in time this was that Mr. Haldeman discussed 
this with the President, I have no idea. 

Senator Baker. If I understand you correctly, you say that based 
on inference drawn from your knowledge of the "VATiite House orga- 
nization and relationships, you surmised that the President knew of 
the situation from June 17 until September 15 in some degree, but that 
you have no personal knowledge of that. 

Mr. Dean. Well, I am sure of this, that there were press releases 
put out within a short time after the incident. Tliere must have been 
discussion in Florida, while they were still in Florida, about how to 
handle this. Some of the early press releases, as I i-ecall, indicated im- 
mediately before I had even talked to anybody or done anything that 
this was something that didn't involve the "WHiito House in any way. 

Senator Baker. But once again, simply searching for an organiza- 
tional format, these conclusions or inferences on your part are based 
on your knowledge of the White House organization and not on direct 
information of any personal kind 

]Mr. Dean. That is right, pending on almost 3 years at the "^^Hiite 
House. 

Senator Baker. '\^niich is an important circumstance and I am not 
trying to discredit that. I am simply trying to isolate and define the 
quality of the testimony. 

Mr. Dean. I imderstand. 

Senator Baker. T don't mean to say that the quality of its desira- 
bility, but the nuality of a technical sense; was it direct information, 
circumstantial information, was it an inference or a conclusion based 
on a valid set of circumstances, that is, a situation at the "\^niite House, 
or it is a pure, plain, guess. So you have been very helpful in that 
respect. 

Let me try to restate it, then. From the very first moments after 
the break-in on June 17, 1972, and based on a number of factors, 
including the fact that press releases issued from, I believe you said 
Key Biscayne 



1469 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. Based on your knowledge and understanding of 
the White House organization and the relationship between Mr. 
Haldcnian and the President, you draw an inference that the President 
knew something between June 17 and September 15. 

Mr, Deax. Well, I also am aware of the fact that there were a flurry 
of telephone calls between Mr. Ehrlichman and ]Mr. Haldeman as to 
some of the things I was telling Mr. Ehrlichman in Washington after 
I did come back on the 19th, and he was calling Mr. Haldeman in 
Florida, who was still in Florida at that time. 

Senator Baker. In any of this — and I am not trying on construct 
an edifice that will end up defending the President. I have stated 
before it is not my purpose to defend or prosecute the President or 
any witness, but only for the purpose of establishing the quality and 
the scope of the testimony. In any event, your personal feelings that 
the President knew something between June 17 and September 15 
is based on category 2 ; that is, circumstantial evidence and inferences 
based on your knowledge and relationships in the organization. 

']Mr. Deax. Given the events that had occurred over the weekend 
while I was not there and the events that occurred on Monday, and 
before I met with the Attorney General on either late INIonday or 
Tuesday, whenever I had my first meeting with him, I was deeply 
concerned initially that this went right to the President or certainly 
to other persons above myself on the White House staff. 

Senator Baker. I understand your concern, and I think it w^as an 
understandable concern. But what I am struggling to establish is 
whether that concern was based on something other than what you 
have just testified to. 

Mr. Deax. As I have testified, you know, I had not talked to the 
President at this point in time and did not talk to him until Septem- 
ber 15. So all of the knowledge I have between June 17 or June 19, 
actually, when I came back, and September 15 was through the fact 
of the things I was reporting to Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Ehrlichman, my 
awareness of the fact that they were meeting with the President, the 
fact that Mr. Haldeman often took notes. That is the basis of my 
knowledge at that point in time. 

Senator Baker. Did anything occur that we would put in category 
3 — that is, hearsay information or documentary evidence not fii'sthand, 
that would shed any further light on the state of the President's knowl- 
edge during the period June 17 to September 15, 1 972 ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes. I have submitted a document to the committee in 
which the President was very anxious to have counteractions against 
the suits that were becoming a problem, the lawsuits filed by the Dem- 
ocrats. It was a very active investigation being pursued through dis- 
covery procedures. These Avere the only headlines that were being 
made, because as the investigation by the Department of Justice and 
the FBI was winding down, this was the new phase. This prompted 
me to receive direct requests, Presidential requests, through Mr. Halde- 
man and Mr. Colson, which resulted in the memorandum I sent back 
in to the President. 

Ultimately it went to the President, and I was told to follow up on 
that memorandum. That is one of the exhibits that has been submitted 
to the committee. 



1470 

Senator Baker. Can you recall offhand or can your counsel help you 
tell us what that exhibit number is or what that exhibit might be ? 

Mr. Dean. I can find it very quickly for you here. That is exhibit 
No. 34-19. 

Senator Baker. Do you have that exhibit before you, Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I do. The first part of the exhibit is a preliminary 
memorandum that was prepared by Mr. Parkinson at my request. I 
asked him to send it when I had the request made of me. Following 
conversations I had had with Mr. Parkinson, I modified his memo- 
randum and sent the memorandum of September 12 in to the Presi- 
dent, or in to Mr. Haldeman. You will note a "P" up in the right-hand 
corner, which was checked, which indicates — it is my undei-standing of 
the White House procedures that it was sent either directly to the 
President or reviewed directly by Mr. Haldeman with the President, 
that they went over it. 

Senator Baker. To make sure we have the same exhibit before us, 
I have exhibit No. 34-19*, the first page of which is entitled "Counter 
Actions," dated September 11, '1972. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. You will have to go to the back part of 
that. 

Senator Baker. Consisting of four pages signed by Kenneth Wells 
Parkinson, then a letter on "V^^iite House stationery dated September 
12, 1972, the first line of Avhich reads, "Administratively confidential 
for Haldeman from Ken,'' consisting of four pages. 

Are we reading from the same script ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. All right. 

Now, this is additional information bearing on the President's 
knowledge of the coverup from June 17 to September 15, 1972. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. All right, sir. It consists of some 8 or 10 pages. We 
can read it if you like. It would be much easier, I expect, if you would 
simply point out those sections relative to the President's knowledge. 

Mr. Dean. This memorandum going in to the President — I received 
instructions back that all of the actions in here were something that 
should be followed up on and that was done. 

Senator Baker. So you are referring now to the second half of the 
exhibit, which is the White House memorandum ? 

INIr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. And the allegations made fall under the headings 
in the memo of "Complaint for malicious abuse of process." What is 
that? 

Mr. Dean. This is one of several counteractions. This was an action 
to be filed by the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and 
the finance committee against Mr. O'Brien. 

Senator Baker. Alleging that they were violating the rights and 
privileges of discovery in civil suits for an ulterior purpose. 

Mr. Dean. That their basic action was unfounded in its 

Senator Baker. Was that suit ever filed, Mr. Dean ? 

INIr. Dean. Yes, it was. 

Senator Baker. What Avas the disposition of it ? 

Mr. Dean. It is still in litiiration. 



•Exhibit 34-19 was published in Book 3. 



1471 

Senator Baker. And the second heading — incidentally, I don't mean 
to cut you off. 

Mr. Dean. As a part of that, you will note there is a note on page 2 : 

Depositions are presently being taken of members of the DNC by defense 
counsel in the O'Brien suit. These are wide ranging and will cover everything 
from Larry O'Brien's sources of income while Chairman of the DNC to certain 
sexual activities of employees of the DNC. They should cause considerable prob- 
lems for those being deposed. 

I would like to add something, that shortly 

Mr. Baker. Did you file that suit? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, I did not file that suit. 

Senator Baker. Who did? 

Mr. Dean. The reelection committee. 

Senator Baker. Were those allegations made? 

Mr. Dean. No, they were not. That was a part of the deposition 

Senator Baker. Of the discovery 

Mr. Dean [continuing]. The discovery area. 

Senator Baker. Were those areas covered in discovery after the 
fighting of the suit? 

]Mr. Dean. I have no knowledge of whether they were or not. 

Senator Baker. I am sorry, go ahead, sir. 

Mr. Dean. This has recalled to me something that I — I earlier indi- 
cated that there had been a longstanding interest in Mr. O'Brien. 
Some of the documents that I have submitted in exhibits 34-6, 34-7, 
or 34-8* — I do not recall which one off the toj) — deals directly with 
Mr. O'Brien. 

I recall that the line that is drawn beside that note is Mr. Halde- 
man's marking. 

Senator Baker. This is on page 2 of the second half of the exhibit? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. Some time before this, he had told me 
in a discussion, a rather casual discussion when we were talking about 
who was likely to be Mr. ]McGovem's, Senator McGovern's campaign 
manager, and there was speculation that it was going to be Mr. 
O'Brien, I recall Mr. Haldeman telling me that he certainly hoped 
it would be, because we have got some really good information on 
him. I believe he was referring to tax information at that time. 

Senator Baker. Referring to what, sir? 

Mr. Dean. Tax information. 

Senator Baker. And this was Mr. Haldeman who said this? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. Do you remember when he said that? 

]Mr. Dean. It was some time after Mr. McGovern had been nomi- 
nated and before he had made his final selection for his campaign 
manager. 

Senator Baker. 'Which would have been, then, probably, in the 
early fall of 1972. As I recall, it was September before Mr. O'Brien 
was designated as campaign chairman. That is not important. It was 
in that time. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. Now, let us see, the second heading — before I get 
to the second heading, on page 11 of the second part of the exhibit, 
did I understand you to say that the penciled or pened capital "P" 

•These exhibits were for identification only and were not published. 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 



1472 

apparently with the checkmark through it is a White House desig- 
nation that the document was seen or known of by the President? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. Do you know this of your own knowledge ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I do. 

Senator Baker. The second half of that memorandum is entitled 
"Complaint for Libel, Stans Versus O'Brien." What did that mean? 

Mr. Dean. Well, that was an action being filed, a counteroffensive, 
again as part of the counteractions that were being requested as a result 
of its occurrence, that before an amended complaint had been filed 
with the district court, that the amended complaint, which charged 
Mr. Stans had funded the Watergate incident with the $114,000 checks 
for Mr. Barker was alleged in the complaint of the amended com- 
plaintr— the amended complaint was distributed to the press before it 
was filed, so it had no privilege. I do not know if it was ultimately 
filed or not, but based on that, the reelection committee lawyers 
thought they had a very good libel action for using the processes in 
that manner. 

Senator Baker. Was that suit, in fact, filed ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it was. 

Senator Baker. Do you know who filed it ? 

Mr. Dean. The reelection committee lawyers filed it on Mr. Stans' 
behalf. 

Senator Baker. Do you know what the present status of that litiga- 
tion is? 

Mr. Dean. That is still in litigation. All of these cases have been 
consolidated in, I believe in Judge Richey's court. 

Senator Baker. Here in the District ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, here in the District. 

Senator Baker. I think we take really a great deal more time than we 
ought to if we try to go through each item, but let me try to refocus 
now on this exhibit for the purposes of this moment. 

What in this exhibit sheds any further light or implies any fu.rther 
information about the scope and extent, if any, of the President's 
knowledge of the coverup post-June 17, 1972. I understand, before 
you answer, that so far you have suggested that the President, seeing 
and approving this memorandum which deals with a series of civil 
suits and certain other actions to be taken, implies that there was at 
least to be a counteraction and a backfire, if you please, but in what 
respect does this give us further insight into the President's knowledge 
of a coverup of the Watergate break-in ? 

Mr. Dean. Well. I am not sure I understand the Senator's definition 
of coverup. As I think I have laid out in my testimony, the coverup 
was something that liad a broad range. Anvthing tliat miglit cause any 
problem at all in relationship to the Watergate came within the 
coverup. 

Senator Baker. I understand. That is not really a very good way to 
put it. Let me narrow it even further. What in this document gives us 
any further insight or information about the President's knowledge, 
if any, post-June 17, 1972, about the apparent efforts to conceal the con- 
nection with and responsibility for tlie unlawful entrv into the Demo- 
cratic National Headquarters at the Watergate complex on the morn- 
ing of June 17, 1972 ? 



1473 

Mr. Deax. Well, I can only surmise what I was told when asked for 
the docunient, and, as I say, 1 had a request from two people for the 
document in the President's behalf that the best defense is an offense, 
and this was an offensive effort. 

Senator Baker. All right. Is it fair to say, and I really am not trying 
to put words in your mouth, but rather to digest this information for 
my own purposes, that the documentary evidence that we have been 
re/ferring to now, exhibit 3-1-19, indicates some knowledge by the 
President of an effort to establish countermeasures in terms of the 
total impact of Watergate ; that is, countersuits, allegations for misuse 
of the discovery process, and other things of that sort? 

Mr. Deax. Well, he did not — these were conceived, these were not 
actions that he conceived. He asked that counteractions be taken. The 
request came to me, I in turn passed it on to the lawyers who were 
closest to it because some of the suggestions were just, you know, start 
filing suits, and I had advised Mr. Colson that I would not suggest 
filing any suit that was not well founded rather than rushing into 
court with some action that was not an action that would tie things up. 
This was particularly true of some of the statements of some of the 
individuals whose names were being speculated, that they file for libel. 
Xow, libel results in both countersuits and counterdiscovery. Some of 
these people obviously could not withstand discovery. So that was why 
the suits, I thought, had to be well founded and had to be suits that 
counterdiscovery would not be a problem. 

Senator Baker. So, if I understand what you are saying now, while 
these documents do not bear on the isolated issue of the President's 
knowledge of the Watergate and what I call the coverup of the Water- 
gate post-June 17, they do shed some light on at least the willingness 
to commence counteractions to avoid further prying into the situation 
at tlie White House ; is that a fair statement ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, that is, Senator. 

Senator Baker. What other documentary evidence gives us an}^ in- 
sight or information about the state of the President's knowledge of 
Watergate and the date on which he acquired it? 

~Sh'. Deax. We are talking now about pre-September 15? 

Senator Baker. Yes, we are still working our way up from June 17 
to September 15. 

]\Ir. Deax. That is the only documentary evidence I have that, to my 
knowledge, is that document right there. As I say, there were not a lot 
of documents floating around on this subject. 

Senator Baker. There are a whole lot. 

Mr. Deax. Well, there were some but not 

Senator Baker. OK. 

Is there any other circumstantial evidence? You have alluded to the 
organization and relationships at the ^^Hiite House : is there any other 
circumstance that would give us any further insight or is there any 
category 3 information, that is, is there anything anyone has told you 
that would shed further light on what the President knew and when 
he knew it in this time frame from June 17 to September 15 ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes. as I say, on a number of occasions when I was in 
meetings with Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichmau, sometimes together, 
I can recall that the President would call for Mr. Haldeman, and 
Mr. Haldeman would send a message back to tell the President that he 



1474 

was meeting with Dean, getting a report, and he would see him after 
that. This was always rather startling to me that my report was more 
important than Mr. Haldeman going right into the President's office. 

Senator Baker. So the unusual nature of that arrangement and cir- 
cumstance led you to believe that there was some knowledge of the sub- 
ject matters attendant to the Watergate affair by the President? 

Mr. Dean. That and another circumstance that I might add is that 
this, the coverup, consumed a great amount of time of Mr. Haldeman 
and Mr. Ehrlichman. They were spending a great deal of time in dis- 
cussion with me, discussions amongst themselves, and this was prob- 
ably the major thing that was occurring at this point in time. 

Senator Baker. Is there anything else now, because I want to move 
on to the September 15 meeting, in either of the three categories of 
testimony, of evidence, direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, infer- 
ences and hearsay? Is there anything else that you can think of at the 
moment and if you think of something later we will certainly add it 
but, is there anything you can think of at the moment that will give us 
further insight into what the President knew and when he knew it in 
this time frame, September — until September 15 ? 

Mr. Dean. I think I have expressed the highlights of that. 

Senator Baker. I think we are getting better at this thing now. I am 
trying to organize the structure of it. Let us take the September 15 
meeting and let us analyze it rather very closely, if you will, Mr. Dean, 
and I understand this is necessarily redundant and that it has been 
covered at rather great length, but would you bear witli me long 
enough to describe it in as much detail as you can conjure up the meet- 
ing of September 15 at present ? 

Mr. Dean. I am sorry. Senator, I was reading some notes here and 
I did not — did you want me to repeat to you 

Senator Baker. "VN'liat I want to do now, we have had a general 
overview of the situation 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Senator Baker. I am going to try now to focus entirely on the meet- 
ing of September 15. 

Mr. Dean. Right. 

Senator Baker. And I have an ambition to focus sharply on it in 
order to disclose as much information as possible about the September 
15 meeting. What I want to do is to test, once again, not the credibility 
of your testimony, but the quality of the evidence, that is, is it direct 
evidence? 

Mr. Dean. I understand. 

Senator Baker. Hearsay evidence or any circumstantial evidence 
related to the September 15 meeting, so take a little time with it, if 
you will. 

Mr. Dean. All right. 

During the morning of the loth the indictments had been handed 
down. I think there was a general sigh of relief at the White House. 
I had no idea that I was going to be called to the President's office. 
Mr. Haldeman was quite aware of the fact that T had spent a great 
deal of time ; he had spent a great deal of time, that Mr. Ehrlichman 
had spent a great deal of time, on this matter. In the late afternoon I 
received a call requesting I come to the President's office. 

Senator Baker. Do you know who made the call ? 



1475 

Mr. Dean. The call came to my secretary, as I recall, and she said, 
"You have been asked to come to the oval office" so I do not recall who 
made the call but it was one of the secretaries who conveyed those types 
of messages. 

Senator Baker. All right, go ahead, sir. 

Mr. Dean. When I entered the office I can recall that — you have been 
in the office, you know the way there are two chairs at the side of the 
President's desk. 

Senator Baker. You are speaking of the oval office ? 

Mr. Deax. Of the oval office. As you face the President on the left- 
hand chair Mr. Haldeman was sitting and they had obviously been 
immersed in a conversation and the President asked me to come in and 
I stood there for a moment. 

He said, ''Sit down" and I sat on a chair on the other side. 

Senator Baker. You sat in the right-hand chair ? 

Mr. Dean. I sat on the right-hand chair. 

Senator Baker. That is the one he usually says no to, but go ahead. 

Mr. Dean. I was unaware of that. [Laughter.] 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dean. As I tried to describe in my statement, the reception was 
very warm and very cordial. There w^as some preliminary pleasantries, 
and then the next thing that I recall the President very clearly saying 
to me is that he had been told by Mr. Haldeman that he had been kept 
posted or made aware of my handling of the various aspects of the 
^Yatergate case and the fact that the case, you know, the indictments 
had now been handed down, no one in the White House had been 
indicted, they had stopped at Liddy. 

Senator Baker. Stop, stop, stop just for one second. Let's examine 
those particular words just for a second. 

That no one in the White House had been indicted. Is that as near 
to the exact language — I don't know so I am not laying a trap for you, 
I just want to know. 

]Mr. Dean. Yes, there was a reference to the fact the indictments had 
been handed down and it was quite obvious that no one in the Wliite 
House had been indicted on the indictments that had been handed 
down. 

Senator Baker. Did he say that, though ? 

Mr. Dean. Did he say that no one in the White House had been 
handed down ? I can't recall it. I can recall a reference to the fact that 
the indictments were now handed down and he was aware of that and 
the status of the indictments and expressed what to me was a pleasure 
to the fact that it had stopped at Mr. Liddy. 

Senator Baker. Tell me what he said. 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, he told me I had done a good job 

Senator Baker. No, let's talk about the pleasure. He expressed 
pleasure the indictments had stopped at Mr. Liddy. 

Can you just for the purposes of our information tell me the language 
that he used ? 

Mr. Dean. Senator, let me make it very clear the pleasure that it had 
stopped there is an inference of mine based on, as I told Senator 
Gurney yesterday, the impression I had as a result of the, of his, com- 
plimenting me. 



147i6 

Senator Baker. Can you give us any information, can you give us 
any further insight into what the President said ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I can recall he told me that he appreciated how 
difficult a job it had been for me. 

Senator Baker. Is that close to the exact language ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, that is close to the exact language. That stuck very 
clearly in my mind because I recall my response to that was that I 
didn't feel that I could take credit. I thought that others had done 
much more difficult things and by that I was referring to the fact that 
Mr. Magruder had perjured himself. [Laughter.] There was not an 
extended discussion from there as to any more of my involvement. I 
had been complimented. I told him I couldn't take the credit, and then 
we moved into a discussion of the status of the case. 

Senator Baker. Stop, before you get to the status, and let's lay that 
aside just for a second because I do want to hear about that, too, but 
this really, and I don't mean to be melodramatic, but this is really a 
terribly important moment in history. As you know, this meeting was 
in the afternoon in the oval office in Washington on September 15, 
1972, and you were there, the President was there, and Mr. Haldeman. 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman was there. 

Senator Baker. What was the President's denjeanor, what was his 
attitude, what was the expression on his face, the quality of his voice ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, when I walked in it was very warm, very 
cordial. They were smiling, they were happy, they were relaxed. The 
President, I think I said earlier this morning, was about to go some- 
where and I think that actually was delaying his departure to have 
this conversation with me. The fact that I had not been in to see the 
President other than on a rather mechanical activity before that deal- 
ing with his testamentary papers, indicated so clearly that Haldeman 
had thought that the President should compliment me for my handling 
of this matter, and that that was one of the reasons I probably had 
been called over, and the President had done it at Mr. Haldeman's 
request. 

Senator Baker. All right. 

Now, tell us about, as you started to say before I interrupted you, 
the status of the case. 

Mr. Dean. All right. 

He was interested in knowing if it was likely — well, let me, before 
I go on to that, let me say something else that I recall. "Wlien we talked 
about the fact that the indictments had been handed down, at some 
point, and after the compliment I told him at that point that we had 
managed, you know, that the matter had been contained, it had not 
come into the "Wliite House, I didn't say that, I said it had been 
contained. 

Senator Baker. Did you say anything beyond that it had been con- 
tained ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not. I used that, I recall very clearly using that 
expression that it had been contained. 

Senator Baker. That is an important word, it has been contained. 

Mr. Dean. That is right. 

Senator Baker. What was the President's or Mr. Haldeman's re- 
action to that word because that is a rather significant word, I think. 

Mr. Dean. Well, I have got to say this, I wasn't studying the Presi- 
dent's face or Mr. Haldeman's face at this time. I had not ever had a 



1477 

one on one with the President before and must confess 'I was a little 
nervous in there. They were trying to make me as relaxed as possible, 
and make it as cordial as possible, but I was quite naturally nervous. 
There was a man who is the most important man in the Western World, 
and here I am having a conversation with him for the first time one on 
one, so I Avas not studying his reactions and it wasn't until I started 
meeting with him more frequently later that the tenor of our conversa- 
tions changed and 

Senator Baker. You see what I am driving at I am sure, Mr. Dean. 
If someone had said that the investigation has been contained it might 
evoke a question, tliat might ci'eate a startled look on one's face, it 
might be taken for granted, and that might be important to shed light. 

Mr. Deax. That is right. 

Senator Baker. On the state of the knowledge with the person with 
whom you were having the conversation. 

Mr. "Deax. Everyone seemed to understand what I was talking 
about. It didn't evoke any questions and I was going on to say that I 
didn't think it could be contained indefinitely. I said that this is, you 
know, there are a lot of hurdles that have to be leaped down the road 
before it will definitely remain contained and I was trying to tell the 
President at that time that I was not sure the coverup even then would 
last indefinitely. 

Senator Baker. This, once again, is a terribly important area of 
inquiry, so let me interrupt you again and take you over it one more 
time. You told the President, I don't think it can continue to be 
contained ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. Are those close to your exact words ? 

Mr. Deax. That is very close to my words, because I told him it had 
been contained to that point and I was not sure that it would be con- 
tained indefinitely. 

Senator Baker. \Yhat was his reaction to this ? 

Mr. Dean. As I say, I don't recall any particular reaction. 

Senator Baker. AVas there any statement by him or by Mr. Halde- 
man at that point on this statement ? 

Mr. Deax'. No, not to mv recollection. 

Senator Baker. All rignt, go ahead. 

Mr. Deax'. It was then we turned to the status of the litigation. 

The criminal case, as I recall the sequence of the conversation, and 
he wanted to know when this matter was likely to come to trial. I told 
him very much would depend upon which judge the case was assigned 
to. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead. 

Mr. Dean. At that point, it had not been assigned to any judge at 
all. 

Another point that came out, as I testified earlier in my conversa- 
tion, was the fact that he alluded, told me for the first time that I had 
ever heard this, that shortly after he had assumed office, Mr. Hoover 
had been ov^er to visit with him. He told me that Mr. Hoover had 
informed him that his 1968 campaign had been bugged and the Presi- 
dent said, this is something that we may be able to use ourselves at 
some point down the road to explain the fact that we have been subject 
to the same type of activity. 

Senator Baker. Did you look into that ? 



1:478 

Mr. Dean. Not until many, many months later. 

Senator Baker, You have already testified to that conversation. 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead. I am sorry, Mr. Dean. Tell me anything 
else you can at all, no matter hovs^ minute, about the meeting of 
September 15. 

Mr. Dean. The next matter I recall is the fact that we did get into 
a discussion about the civil cases. 

Senator Baker. I am sorry, Mr. Dean. Thank you very much. 

INIr. Dean. The next thing that I recall occurred was a discussion 
that ensued about the civil cases. He asked me some questions about 
the civil cases and it was in the course of this conversation that I 
told him what I knew at that point in time about the status of the 
civil cases, where they were, and I knew because I was fairly familiar 
at that time with the precise status of the cases. 

It was also as a result of this conversation that we got into a dis- 
cussion, or I told him that I had learned from the lawyers at the re- 
election committee that they had been making or they had somebody 
who was making an ex parte contact with the judge who had juris- 
diction over the principal suit of the greatest concern, which was the 
suit by Mr. O'Brien, Larry O'Brien and the DNC. 

Senator Baker. Is this, once again, close to the exact language 
you used? 

ISIr. Dean. Yes, that was — I did not know who it was that was mak- 
ing the contacts at that time for certain, so I just told him that the 
lawyers at the reelection committee are making ex parte contacts 
or have made ex parte contacts and are hoping to get some favorable 
rulings. 

Senator Baker. Did the President make any remark at that point, 
or did Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Dean. I recall the President said something to the effect, well, 
that is helpful. 

Senator Baker. Is that close to his exact language? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

■Senator Baker. Is there anything else? 

Mr. Dean. We talked about the Common Causo suit as well and I 
told him that I didn't think it was any problem. This was a suit that 
was trying to bring or identify the donors or the contributors of some 
$10 million of unidentified campaign moneys that had not been re- 
ported prior to April 7. The suit, I told him, I didn't think would be 
a problem because the lawyers at the rooloctioii committee felt that 
they could tie this one up in discovery for quite a while. 

Senator Baker. What did the President say to that? 

Mr. Dean. I don't recall any specific comment to that. I think as 
we were going through some of these descriptions, I was just report- 
ing as best I could and I don't recall him giving me what his reaction 
was at that point. 

Senator Baker. You understand why I am asking you these 
questions ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I do. 

Senator Baker. All right. Now, I don't mean to shorten your 
description of the September 15 meeting, but for the sake of moving 
on, were there other important matters discussed at that time? 



1479 

Mr. Dean. Well, yes, the matter of the Patman hearing did come 
up, because the President was aware of that, I assume, from his news 
sunnnaries or the newspapers, that there was likely to be congressional 
inquiry on the House side. He asked me who was handling that. I told 
him that Kicluird Cook, a member of the congressional relations stall', 
who had worked with the Patman committee at one point in time, 
was doing the principal work on it. He then told me that Mr. Timmons 
should be spending his time and get on top of it, something of that — 
that would be very close to the language he used. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, excuse me. I see we have a vote signal 
from the Senate. The committee will stand in recess until we return. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Baker. The committee will come to order. 

The chairman was necessarily called away for the rest of the after- 
noon. For the information of the committee, I might indicate that 
he requested that we run as long as practical, and that we continue 
with present rotation arrangements, so as soon as I can conclude my 
queries I will yield then to Senator Montoya and after that to Senator 
Weicker. 

Mr. Dean, do you have any objection if we try to go, say, until a 
few minutes before 6 tonight ? 

Mr. Dean. I will hold up as long as I can. Senator. 

Senator Baker. If you need a break or would like to break in the 
course of things, if you would let me know I would be happy to do that. 

Mr. Dean, have w^e finished with the delineation of the September 15 
meeting ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I do not believe we have. 

Senator Baker. We were discussing the fact that we were talking 
about how to deal with the Patman committee because this was another 
threat, a dual threat, I might add. First was the fact that it would 
mean adverse publicity as a result of the hearings and, second, there 
was always the potential they might stumble into something there. 
Were those words used ? 

Mr. Dean. I believe, when we talked about adverse publicity and 
there is no telling where this thing may go. 

Senator Baker. Do you remember who said that ? 

Mr. Dean. I said that. 

Senator Baker, Do you remember what the President's reaction 
was? 

Mr. Dean. Well, he asked me who was covering the hearings and 
I told him that Dick Cook was covering the hearings. 

Senator Baker. Covering, meaning what person on the White House 
staff had responsibility for that ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, that is correct. Because I explained to him that Mr. 
Cook had formerly worked for the House Banking and Currency Com- 
mittee, and at that point he said that Mr. Timmons should get on top 
of those hearings. 

We then, the conversation turned to the press coverage that had been 
following the Watergate incident, and during this discussion he told 
me that I should keep a good list of people who were giving us trouble 
in the press because we would give them trouble after the election. 

Senator Baker. This was stated by the President ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 



1480 

Senator Baker. What else was said by him or by Mr. Haldeman or 
by you in that context ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, this evolved into a, immediately into a conversa- 
tion about the Internal Revenue Service and using the Internal Reve- 
nue Service to audit returns of people. 

I had — again, we were on, you know, I knew the wavelength we had 
had been talking about, because I had had similar requests in the past 
to audit returns of people, and I told the President that the Internal 
Revenue Service had been 

Senator Baker. Wait, wait, wait. You knew the wavelength because 
you knew from your previous use of the Internal Revenue Service ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, I had requests from Mr. Haldeman in the 
past that certain individuals have audits commenced on them. 

Senator Baker. What did you do with that ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I can — the one time I recall getting one I did not 
know exactly what I was going to do with it because I was always 
reluctant to call Mr. Walters at that time, who was the head of the 
Internal Revenue Service, so I went to INIr. Caulfield, who had friends 
in the Internal Revenue Service and he said, "I think I know a way 
this can be done." 

Apparently there is some system where the appropriate anonymous 
letter comes into a regional office and if it is — those who know how to 
do this can write the right letter and sufficient information will prompt 
an audit on that individual. 

Senator Baker. Is that known as the informer statute ? 

Mr. Dean. No ; I do not believe it is an informer statute. It is just 
something that will be of sufficient attention to that regional office, 
that branch of the, audit branch of that regional office, that will insti- 
tute an audit. 

I went on to tell the President that we did not seem to have the clout 
at the White House to get this done. I had talked to Walters about it in 
the past, and told him that T had had instructions from Mr. Haldeman 
on one occasion, and he said that, he brought to my attention the mak- 
ing of the IRS political, and said that. 

You will recall what happened back in 1948 with Truman and that administra- 
tion and the cleaning house and the changing of the Internal Revenue Service. 

And these were all new facts to me, and what he was telling me was 
"Don't call me with this sort of thing." 

Senator Baker. Tell me, if you do not mind, what you did. Did you 
in fact set up an audit ? Your counsel is trying to reach you and I think 
he may have something to say. 

Mr. Dean Fconferring with counsel]. He just said, which was quite 
accurate, I do not mind telling you any fact that is true. FLaughter."! 

Senator Baker. I would say that was a very lawyer-like piece of 
advice. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Dean. So in this instance there was, the one I was referring to 
in the past, there was an audit commenced. Now I, for example, read 
a memorandum into the record this morning per request of some mate- 
rial requested bv the committee that had to do with an audit of Mr. 
Gibbons of the Teamsters Union. I merely put that in my file, and that 
is where it has remained to this day. 



1481 

Senator Baker. To shorten this, and I do not mean to shorten it if 
you care to go on with it, did you in fact initiate IRS inquiries or 
audits as a result of suggestions from the White House stafi' or the 
President ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, the President at this time, to keep in the focus you 
want to keep in, told me to keep a good list, so that these could be— 
you know, we would take care of these people after the election, and 
we went into — I told him that IRS was a democratically oriented 
bureaucracy and to do something like that was a virtual impossibility. 
And then the conversation moved to the fact that he was going to make 
some dramatic changes in all of the agencies and, at this point in time, 
I can remember Mr. Haldeman opened up his pad and started making 
notes as to what the President was describing as to his post-election 
intentions. As a result of the President giving liis thoughts on what he 
wanted to do post-election with all of the agencies and as far as chang- 
ing personnel. Mr. Haldeman also injected into the conversation at 
that time that he had already commenced a project to determine which 
people in which agencies were responsive and were not responsive to 
the IVliite House. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, in deference to my colleagues and the 
requirements of time, let me try to refocus now : Is there anything else 
about the September 15 meeting that would shed light on the Presi- 
dent's knowledge, and the scope and depth of his knowledge, if any, of 
the "Watergate break-in on June 17 or the coverup activities, so-called, 
thereafter and prior to September 15 ? 

Mr. Deax. I think I described pretty well in full of the on, 40 min- 
ute meeting, however long it was. As I say at the end of the meeting 
it turned to rather unrelated chatter about a book I was reading. 

Senator Baker. All right. 

It seems to me then that the extent to which the September 15 meet- 
ing would give us some guidance in our inquiry as to what the Presi- 
dent knew and when he knew it, that you depend on a combination of 
things. You depend on your experience at the Wliite House as a staffer, 
with the interrelationships of staff and the Presidential staff; the 
remarks which did not relate directly to Watergate, that is the break-in 
at Watergate or to the concealment of the involvements and responsi- 
bilities for it. But based on the general tenor of the conversation, you 
gained the impression, I believe you said, to paraphrase your testi- 
mony, that the President knew that there was an on-going counter- 
effort, at least, and when you couple that with your knowledge of the 
relationships and circumstances, that you concluded then in your own 
mind that he knew something, and I don't believe you have testified 
quite exactly what, about the events involved ? 

^Ir. Deax. Well, I might say one thing that did come specifically 
out of the conversation was that we had leaped the hurdle of the 
Justice Department investigation and the indictments were down. 
Now the looming problem were the Patman committee hearings, and 
the President gave very clear instructions to Mr. Timmons he should 
get on top of those so they did not get out of hand because that was 
the next problem. 

It was also very clear that I was to follow up with the civil litiga- 
tion and see anything I could do to make sure that this didn't get 
out of hand. 



1482 

Senator Baker. But in an effort to summarize it and, believe me, I 
am not trying to distort the meaning of your testimony by summary, 
but, in effect, you drew inferences from the totality of this conversation 
and the circumstances and relationships as you knew it, you drew 
inferences from that that led you to believe that on September 15 
the President knew something about at least the efforts to counter 
the Watergate and possibly, in fact, about Watergate itself. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. But there is no direct statement about Watergate, 
CRP involvement, the President's knowledge of it, or the coverup — 
there is no category 1 information about that? 

Mr. Dean. Other than as I have recited and I have chosen not to 
place interpretations on these. Senator. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Dean. 

I think that that information is very useful, then. You understand, 
Mr. Dean, that in the course of things, we are going to explain fur- 
ther the content of that meeting and the perceptions that the other 
parties had of that meeting. 

Mr. Dean. I understand. 

Senator Baker. As you know, Mr. Haldeman will be a witness 
before this committee. The only other person present was the Presi- 
dent. I am not prepared to say at this point how we may be able to 
gain access to the President's knowledge and perception of that meet- 
ing. But in a three-way meeting, I think it is important to this com- 
mittee that we have all the information we can get. So the information 
you have just given me in rather good detail will now be structured 
alongside with the rest of the record to test against the testimony of 
Mr. Haldeman and hopefully against statements by the President, 
in whatever manner that can be arranged. 

Now, what is the time of your next meeting with the President? 

Mr. Dean. On this subject? 

Senator Baker. Yes, sir. 

jNIr. Dean. There were certain events that led up to my next meet- 
ing and they were the events which occurred at La Costa, in which I, 
or following La Costa, in which I was requested by Mr. Haldeman 
when I returned from Florida — ^^I had gone from California to Florida 
and had spent a week or so, just about a week, in Florida and when 
I returned on the 19th or 20th, Mr. Haldeman asked me to prepare 
an agenda. I think that that agenda is a rather important document 
along the line of questioning you are asking. 

Senator Baker. I would like to go into that. 

Before von do, let me reiterate, the focus of my inquiry is on what 
did the President know 

Mr. Dean. As I say, this acrenda went directly to the President. 

Senator Baker feontinuing]. And when did he know it. 

]\Tr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. So as you go into vour testimonv and as you refer 
to the scA^'eral documents that I lx>lieve vou have before vou, trv to 
keen in mind that I am not at this moment talking about other matters 
and details. I am not talking about Ellsberg at this point, or the enemy 
list. I am talking about what the President knew. So tell me what 



1483 

additional information you can give me in that respect, preferably 
in terms of your meetings with the President or conversations with 
him, and then in terms of what secondary or circumstantial evidence 
you have. 

]Mr. Deax. My next meeting with the President was on the 27th 
of February of this year. Now, to explain this meeting, I believe it 
is necessary to explain this agenda, because I believe that is in part 
the reason I commenced having meetings with the President. A number 
of decisions had been made at La Costa, a number of areas had come 
up after that. As I said, on the 19th or 20th, I was asked to prepare 
an agenda. The matters that were on that agenda related to a meeting 
between yourself and the President, the concept of sending former 
Secretary Stans up for confirmation, and this was a concept that had 
been discussed with Mr. Haldeman 

Senator Baker. Are you referring to an exhibit now, Mr. Dean? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I am. It is No. 34-34. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir. 

]Mr. Dean. Sending Secretary Stans up for confirmation. The con- 
firmation hearings were thought of as a means of defusing the 
Watergate hearings and getting as much out of the public as possible 
and lessening the impact of these hearings. I was given — per my discus- 
sion with Mr. Haldeman, I would have the assignment to go talk to 
Mr. Stans and see if he was interested upon his return from being 
out of the country. 

The next item on the agenda was what to do with Mr. Magruder, 
which was on the inquiry for Presidential decision. These were all 
matters that were going in for Presidential decision. 

Senator Baker. Who asked you to prepare it? 

^Ir. Dean, ]Mr. Haldeman. It was tjased on a conversation Mr. 
Haldeman and I had had. Some of the points had come up at La Costa, 
some had not. For example, I believe you had had a conversation 
subsequent to the time we came from La Costa and the arrangements 
were worked out in that time frame. 

Senator Baker. Just so the record is clear on that point, were you 
advised of the conversation I had with Mr. Timmons? 

Mr. Deax. ]Mr. Timmons did adA'ise me of the fact that you wanted 
to talk to the President, you wanted to seek some guidance, I believe 
in the areas of executive privilege, what was going to occur. Mr. Tim- 
mons had the interpretation that you wanted to be helpful to the 
White House and the question, one of the questions was whether you 
would object to staff being present or not when you met. Timmons 
did not feel that you would object and the interpretation at the Wliite 
House was that this would be an excellent chance to find out what your 
plans were and to, hopefully, set up a channel of communications to 
work with you. 

Senator Baker. Just a little bit to follow on, partly for self-serving 
purposes and partly to clarify the record at this point, after the meet- 
ing was held with the President in February, did you receive some 
information about what the conversation was about ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes; I did. 

Senator Baker. Would you relate that ? 



1484 

Mr. Dean. Do you want me to take that out of order right now ? 

Senator Baker. If you don't mind. 

Mr. Dean. Certainly. 

The President reported to me — first of all, Mr. Haldeman reported 
to me, and subsequently the President reported to me, that you had 
urged the President to send members of the White House staff up to 
this committee as quickly as he could get them up here and waive 
executive privilege. The President told you that he was going to hold 
the line at written interrogatories. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, would you proceed, then, with your se- 
quence as I have it ? 

Before you do, I see we have another roll call vote. If the commit- 
tee is agreeable, we will recess at this point until we can return from it. 

[Eecess.] 

Senator Baker. The committee will come to order. 

It is my information from the floor of the Senate that there will be 
a series of other votes tonight. The Senate will be in session probably 
until 9 or 10 o'clock. That is for the edification of my colleagues. 

At the time we ended, Mr. Dean, I believe you were about to tell 
us about the February meeting. 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir ; Senator, you asked me to give you what led up 
to a given set of meetings and we had turned to the immediate agenda, 
but I think we ought to be complete and full in answering the way 
you requested I answer. I will give you the intervening sequences that 
occurred just in highlight again, directly relating to what occurred 
in the February meetings. It was the intervening event of the payment 
of silence money and then the lack of that money and a serious prob- 
lem, with differences between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman about who would raise that money. 

There was also the intervening event of clemency being assured to 
Mr. Hunt, in which Mr. Ehrlichman informed me that — I was present 
when he told Mr. Colson and myself that he was going in to see the 
President about it. He subsequently informed me he talked to the 
President. Mr. Colson had informed me he talked to the President 
about it and subsequently, there was another meeting in Mr. Ehrlich- 
man's office when it was described how the assurance was given to Mr. 
Hunt's lawyer, Mr. Bittman. 

Senator Baker. Before vou go on with that, Mr. Dean, so you have 
some preview of the subject matter I am going to cover, it would 
appear now that I probably may not finish my questions in this first 
round, but just so you know I do not intend to skij) those things, I have 
on my list the break-in, the coverup, the so-called enemies list, execu- 
tive privilege. Executive clemency, domestic intelligence. Internal Rev- 
enue Service, Judge Richey, and a number of other things. Each of 
those I consider to be a subject I want to explore more fully. But for 
the sake of time 

Mr. Dean. All I am doing is highlighting, as I just did right then, 
what was leading up to the February meetings. 

Senator Baker. All right, sir, but for the sake of time, I would like 
to focus at this moment on what the President knew and when he 
knew it. Let us start first with dii-ect information that you have, 

Mr. Dean. All right. I am going to give you a document tliat went 



1485 

directly to the President and I think that the fastest way for me to 
handle' that is just to read the document. We have already covered the 
first part of it. 

Senator Baker. What document ? 

Mr. Deax. This is exhibit Xo. S-i-S-i. The first part was what we just 
discussed, ''Baker meeting with President. 

"'Baker I'equested secret meeting re Watergate hearings. 

"Baker told Timmons he wants guidance, but to maintain his purity 
in the Senate he doesn't want anyone to know of meeting with the 
President. 

"Timmons believes that Baker wants to help. 

"Timmons does not feel Baker would object if there was staff present 
during meeting, so long as fact of meeting never gets out. 

"Meeting would be excellent chance to find out what Baker plans to 
do and set up channel to work with him." 

This was based on a conversation, as I believe we discussed in execu- 
tive session, of Mr. Timmons' perception of the conversation he had 
with you. 

" ( 2 ) Sending Stans up for confirmation : 

"We don't know if Stans wants to do this, but we do know he wants 
to be rehabilitated and isn't afraid to tell his story publicly. 

"Confirmation hearings would help defuse Watergate hearings, and 
the more of this we get to the public, the less impact the Watergate 
hearings per se will have. 

"This should be resolved quickly, because it will only be helpful if 
it occurs prior to Watergate hearings. (Stans has requested to see 
Dean on February 28 — upon his return from Jamaica.) 

"(3) WTiat to do with Magruder: 

"Jeb wants to return to "\\niite House (Bicentennial project). 

"May be vulnerable (Sloan) until Senate hearings are completed. 

"Jeb personally is prepared to withstand confirmation hearings. 

" (4) Use of Buchanan as observer/spokesman to keep press coverage 
honest : 

"Watergate press coverage to date has been dishonest and libelous. 
Pat could call them to task. 

"The hearings are going to be partisan. Pat could make certain that 
the public understands this. 

"Teddy Kennedy is a moving force behind the hearings — this can 
and should be documented. Pat could do this well. 

"TPie public does not perceive Buchanan as being that close to the 
President. The basic question is whether the White House is going to 
sit quietly and take the unwarranted abuse that is bound to come from 
hearings. We can't run a secret counter PR effort so why not do it 
openly and respectfully — ^Pat can do that ? 

"Buchanan's role will eliminate much of the heat that Ziegler will 
otherwise receive and Ziegler could even have Pat brief from time to 
time. 

" ( 5 ) Getting the A.G. back on the reservation : 

"A.G. is merely biding his time until he returns to private sector 

"A.G. is extremely loyal to the President and if asked to take ar 
active concern in these hearings (and their fallout) would do so- 
otherwise, he will probably do what is best for his own self-interest 



1486 

"A.G. should be asked to remain in office at least 1 full year from 
this date (i.e., until hearings have passed) because hearings may well 
result in request for additional action by DOJ. A.G. can get Henry 
Petersen — who has the greatest loyalty for the A.G. — ^to handle sensi- 
tive problems with ease. We can't afford bitterness in the DOJ nor can 
we risk a new A.G. being able to grapple with some of the potential 
problems." 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, this was dictated by you ? 

Mr. Dean. This was as the result of a meeting I had with Mr. Halde- 
man discussing the agenda. These were matters that had come up in — 
some of them had come up in La Costa. I was asked to boil them down 
into a paper to go in to discuss with the President. 

■Senator Bakjer. All right. When was this paper prepared ? 

Mr. Dean. This was prepared the 19th or 20th of February of this 
year. 

Senator Baker, All of these things, or at least some of them, never 
occurred that are dealt with in here. 

Mr. Dean. I got a response from each of the points on here. As 1 will 
subsequently tell you, there was a subsequent agenda prepared for the 
meeting between yourself and the President. 

Senator Baker. Which one is this ? 

Mr. Dean. That would be exhibit No. 34-35. Mr. Stans — I was asked 
to talk to him to see if he was interested in being sent up for a con- 
firmable post and to explore to see if there was any post that he was 
interested in. He and I discussed it and he didn't have any particular 
post in mind and didn't particularly want to do it after he gave it some 
consideration. 

There was a Presidential decision that Mr. Magruder could not re- 
turn to the White House staff. 

There was also a decision by the President that Mr, Buchanan could 
not be used as an observer spokesman because the President, I was told, 
felt that Mr. Buchanan was too close to him, had been with him too 
long, relating back to even pre-1968. 

Finally, there was a meeting and there is a subsequent agenda I 
have in the exhibits for the meeting with the Attorney General, 

Now, as I say, these all led up to what later occurred in my discus- 
sions on the 27th and 28th with the President, 

Let me turn to the next exhibit. This was again requested by Mr, 
Haldeman, He said, "Prepare it, do not send it through normal chan- 
nels," because it was to be a totally off the record meeting, between 30 
and 45 minutes. Originally there was to be staff, Mr, Dean, or alterna- 
tives. It was decided there would be no staff present, so that was crossed 
out on the record. 

General description is : Potential Matters for Discussion with Sena- 
tor Baker. 

General : 

Take Baker's pulse and find out how much he wants to help — keep 
this from becoming a political circus. 

Baker can be assured that no one in the "^Vliite House had any 
knowledge that there was going to be a break-in and bugging of the 
DNC. 



1487 

If Baker appears to be truly desirous of cooperating — and the fact 
he is seeking guidance may so indicate — he might be told that there 
are matters unrelated to the bugging incident per se (e.g., Segretti, 
Kalmbach) that could be embarrassing and tarnish good people whose 
motives were the highest. Surely he can appreciate that things which 
occur at the White House have a degree of sensitivity that occur no 
where else in Government. 

1968 Bugging : 

Tell Baker that J. Edgar Hoover personally informed the Presi- 
dent shortly after taking office that his campaign had been bugged. 
Presently seeking to obtain documentation and evidence of the 1968 
incidents. 

Appearances of Wliite House Staff Members Before Senate Com- 
mittee: 

Statement coming out shortly on the matter of executive privilege. 
[Draft attached.] 

I recall that when I first sent this document in to the President, the 
draft was not attached. He was in his Executive Office Building — ^^I 
don't know if that is where you met with him or not, but I had a call — 
a frantic call — to get a copy of that draft down to him. 

Senator Baker. On executive privilege? 

Mr. Dean. On executive privilege. 

Senator Baker. Do you know why ? 

Mr. Deax. I don't know why. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead. 

Mr. Dean. I assumed maybe you were meeting with him or it was 
imminent you were going to be in a meeting with him. 

Cannot state at this time if such witnesses will be provided to com- 
mittee. Must wait to determine how the issue develops. 

A possible resolution of the problem may be that when the com- 
mittee believes a White House staff member is essential as a witness, 
we can compromise and agree upon sworn written interrogatories, 
that should be instead of interrogation. 

General Guidance : 

Seek to get hearings over as quickly as possible because they really 
are a potential witch hunt. The President can note that hearings of 
this type damage all Government officials and the institutions of Gov- 
ernment. The public wants to believe the worst about all politicians 
and hearings of this type are going to damage all elected officials. 

Committee procedures should protect the rights of minority mem- 
bers to information, calling its own witnesses, notice of meetings, et 
cetera. 

Minority counsel should be tough, aware of the way things operate 
in Washington, and able to handle a fellow like Sam Dash who has 
been selected as majority counsel. Dash is a partisan. 

Communication with White House : 

Wally Johnson should be initial contact point, but if Baker feels he 
wants to raise something that he chooses not to discuss with Wally, 
then arrangements can be made to meet with Dean. (Note: Frankly, 
the naming of Dean as the man who deals with the President on such 
matters preserves our posture on executive privilege should 'Dean be 
called as a witness.) 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 10 



1488 

Note at the bottom: Have just learned that Baker has publicly 
announced the appointment of Fred Thompson as chief minority coun- 
sel. Timmons has recommended George Webster as our candidate. 

Senator Baker. Just out of curiosity, Mr. Dean, since this agenda 
was prepared at some length first, did you dictate it ? 

Mr. Dean. I did, and again, this is based on the meeting that 
occurred at La Costa and the discussions I had with Mr. Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman. 

Senator Baker. Can you enlighten us; How much of this agenda 
was covered at such meeting? 

Mr. Dean. I only know what came out, was reported to me by the 
President and Mr. Haldeman that the thrust of the meeting really 
was your calling upon the President to 

Senator Baker. To waive executive privilege ? 

Mr. Dean [continuing]. To waive executive privilege is correct. 
And I also — the President told me that you agreed that the hearings 
should be over as soon as possible. If they lingered, it would be 
damaging. 

Senator Baker. It also is your information that there was not a sug- 
gestion as to minority counsel which had been announced on the 
same day. 

Mr. Dean. Had been announced, that is correct. 

Senator Baker. All right, go ahead, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dean. The next significant document leading up to my meetings 
that some of these things were discussed on the 27th and 28th was a 
request again by Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Baker. Do you have an exhibit number ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. This is exhibit No. 34-36. And I have a cover 
note on this. I hand-carried the other agenda over to Mr. Haldeman, 
whereas this one there was a little more time. He had asked me not 
to send it through normal channels, so there is a cover note on "Memo- 
randum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean. I did not use the pre- 
scribed format because I understand you do not want this to pass into 
channels." 

Talking Point for Meeting With the Attorney General 

Senator Baker. I think we just talked out, Mr. Dean. I think that 
is another rollcall vote. Would the committee like to try to alternate, 
we are on 10-minute voting cycles, I do not think we can 

Senator Talmadge. If the chairman desires, I have one or two very 
brief questions. I think I can complete them in about 5 minutes while 
you go vote, and when you return I will go vote. 

Senator Baker. Does that suit you, Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Dean. Whatever pleases the Chair. 

Senator Baker. Thank you. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Dean, you have been in the chair now for 
4 days and I know how weary you must be, and I will be extremely 
brief. There are one or two things T would like some clarification on. 
You have testified repeatedly that even though you were counsel^ to 
the President, you had no direct access to the President except going 
through Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman ; is that correct ? 



1489 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. In fact, Senator, I think the documents 
I have just referred to were talking about direct meetings with the 
President I am asked to prepare an agenda showing the very pattern 
that exists in and of itself where I sent everything I did through 
either Ehrlichman or Haldeman for anything of this nature. 

Senator Talmadge. Do you know who was responsible for that or- 
ganizational setup ? 

]Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman had basically told me who I would report 
to. jNIr. Ehrlichman had been the former counsel, and when I got into 
legal areas that were of interest to him, I also supplied legal assistance 
through my office to the domestic counsel on occasion. 

Senator Talmadge. Then. INIr. Haldeman informed you of that orga- 
nizational setup, is that a correct answer ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct, sir. It was just — it was not a matter of 
being informed, it just existed when you arrived. WHien I started there 
I was alone. I finally persuaded them to let me get one assistant. Slowly 
as the workload of my office increased, I got two or three more. I had 
inherited a couple of people when I came on. Mr. Huston was there but 
he never really worked directly for me. He was taking his assignments 
from Mr. Haldeman or doing speechwriting for Mr. Price and Mr. 
Caulfield when I first came was still doing assignments for Mr. 
Ehrlichman. 

Senator Talmadge. "V'^Hien were you told that you had no direct access 
to the President but must go through 'Sir. Haldeman and ]Mr. 
Ehrlichman? 

Mr. Deax. Well, Senator, I had had dealings with the White House 
before I even joined the staff and I had a pretty good feel for the 
operation in the White House from working on developing various 
legislative programs that went over to the T^Hiite House, and in talking 
to people over there I had gotten to know a number of people before 
I even went to the staff, and that is just the way it was. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you ever try to obtain direct access to the 
President without going through Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Deax. There is no way that would be possible, Senator. If, for 
example, you were to pick up the telephone and call the President, 
the call would be transferred immediately by the operator to Mr. 
Haldeman or some other member of the staff. But generally if, say, an- 
other staff member called, the call would generally go to Mr. Haldeman 
to clear the call. He would want to know why you wanted to call and 
what the subject matter was, so you were in a sense reporting to Mr. 
Haldeman. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you ever see anyone try to go into the Office 
of the President without going through Mr. Haldeman and Mr. 
Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Deax. I think I made reference in, early in, my testimony I 
believe there is a reporter in this room, Mr. Mollenhoff . who used to be 
on the '\'\niite House staff and I noted on occasion in looking back over 
some old records that he had a special counsel title and worked in some 
areas where he was. in a sense, what I might call also firefighting to 
put out problems of conflicts and dealing in areas like that and I saw 
a number of memorandums that he had sent to the President which 
never got there, and they had been returned by Mr. Haldeman. 



1490 

Senator Talmadge. You never saw him try to walk in the President's 
Office? 

Mr. Dean. No, I did not. There are a lot of Secret Service agents 
around the President's Office, I might add, also. 

Senator Talmadge. One other thing I would like some clarification 
on. On Monday I asked you a question and it appears on page 2465, 
line 23 of the record. "Did you think it was part of an effort to make 
you the fall guy in the plan ?" And your answer begins immediately, of 
course, after the question but then, beginning on line 8 of page 2466 
you stated something that I would like more clarification on. 

"I had seen situations like this occur wiiere people who had not 
actually done something take the blame for it to avoid embarrassing 
others higher up and I felt it was a real possibility." 

Now, were you referring to the situation at the White House ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, I was. 

Senator Talmadge. Could you give us an illustration of some 
instances of that type where 

Mr. Dean. I can give you instances that I think are public knowl- 
edge of — I think I have already alluded to one because another mem- 
ber of this panel had another followup question of this nature. The 
one I have already referred to was the fact that Mr. Malik was — took 
the blame, so to speak, for instigating an investigation of Mr. Daniel 
Schorr. Another interesting situation — there was during the 1970 cam- 
paign a rather 

Senator Talmadge. Who was he taking the blame for ? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr, Haldeman. All right. Go ahead. 

Mr. Dean. Or the President. 

Senator Talmadge. All right. Proceed. 

Mr. Dean. Another instance that occurs to me is when during the 
1970 congressional campaign there were a number of rather rough, you 
might call, of questionable political ethical standard ads run that got 
the name of the Shipley ad because Mr. Shipley had signed the ads. 
The ultimate blame came to rest at the White House and it came to rest 
on Chuck Colson. 

Senator Talmadge. You are saying then \n your testimony, as I 
understand it, it was common practice in the A^Hiite House when some- 
thing went wrong for subordinates to take the blame for their supe- 
riors, is that your testimony ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it is, Senator. 

Senator Talmadge. Thank 3'ou very much, Mr. Dean. I must rush to 
the Senate floor and the committee will stand in recess until the vice 
chairman or some other member returns. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Dean. Fine. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Baker. The committee will come to order. I understand that 
Senator Talmadge left to avoid missing this last rollcall vote with 
possibly a question left unanswered. I was not here so I can't say but 
is there anything further you wish to add, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dean. He was asking me about people wlio had taken the blame 
for their superiors at the White House from some examples and I had 
cited two examples. 



1491 

Mr. Dash. Yes, but you had not completed. I think Senator Tal- 
madge, as he was leaving, I think the last words said was the person 
taking the blame was Chuck Colson and the foUowup question would 
have been, who was he taking the blame for ? 

Mr. Deax. He was taking the blame for Mr. Haldeman who had 
authorized the ads. There is one other example that gets into an area 
I believe j^ou indicated you were going to question me on, and that is 
based on information that I have directly from Mr. Krogh, that it 
appears to me that based on a conversation I had with ]Mr. Krogh 
that he is taking the blame for something. 

Senator Baker. Do you know who ? 

Mr. Deax. I believe the President of the United States. 

Senator Baker. Maybe you ought to elaborate on that a little. 
[Laughter.] 

Ur. Dean. Well, it was on either the 28th or 29th of March that Mr. 
Krogh came to my office, he stopped by to express his sympathy for 
the adverse publicity I had received as a result of the Gray hearings 
and asked me how I was holding up and I said, "Fine, it is not very 
pleasant but my hands are tied and I can't speak." He said, he then 
began a discussion about how he had been haunted ever since he left 
the White House about his own experiences there, and then we got into 
a discussion of the fact that there was evidence within the files of the 
Department of Justice indicating leads that might let the investi- 
gators from this committee discover the fact of the Ellsberg burglary 
and we began discussing it. I asked him then if that had been au- 
thorized by ^Ir. Ehrlichman, and he told me — knowing Mv. Krogh 
pretty well and knowing Mr. Krogh had a similar level as myself and 
didn't, would not start something of that dimension without clearing 
it with someone, and he told me, no, that to his knowledge, Mr. Ehrlich- 
man had not learned about it until after the fact and told me that his 
orders had come directly from the Oval Office, and I was somewhat 
surprised and so surprised I said, "You have got to be kidding," and 
he repeated again no. he said, they came from the Oval Office. 

Senator Baker. This was ]Mr. Krogh speaking ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, sir. And subsequently, of course, he has under a 
sworn statement said that he was totally responsible for the matter. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, it is now a little after 4 :30 and in defer- 
ence to my colleagues, I am not going to try to finish with the list of 
questions and topics that I thought I outlined to you earlier. What 
I would like to do for about 10 minutes, almost 15 minutes, say, to 4 :45 
is to go once again to the narrow focus of what the President knew and 
when he knew it, relative to Watergate. So would you please move then 
to the next situation. 

Mr. Deax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. That would shed any light on that. 

Mr. Deax. And that would be a document which was forwarded 
to the President that I was just referring to, as we ended our con- 
versation, and it is exhibit Xo. 34-36,* for talking points for a meeting 
with the Attorney General. This was a request that I prepare this by 
Mr. Haldeman and send it not through normal channels for a meeting 
but rather directly to him because of the sensitivity of the documents. 

♦Exhibit 34-36 was printed In Book 3. 



1492 

Background, Kleindienst is biding his time until he returns to private law 
practice. He has discussed joining several law firms and has a particularly at- 
tractive offer from one that lie would probably like to accept. Kleindienst is less 
than enthusiastic about helping to solve some of the tough problems relating to 
the forthcoming Watergate hearings. He does not want to get himself involved 
in any controversy at this time. The morale of the Department of Justice is low 
because they are extremely loyal to Kleindienst but they think the White House 
is trying to force him out. Kleindienst is extremely loyal to the President and 
will do anything asked of him by the President. 

Kleindienst should be asked to remain in office at least one full year from this 
date, that is until after the Watergate hearings have passed because the hearings 
may well result in a request for additional action by the Department of Justice. 
We can't afford bitterness at the Justice Department nor can we risk a new At- 
torney General being able to handle some of the potential problems. Kleindienst 
should be asked to follow the hearings closely and keep us apprised of any 
potential problems from a Department of Justice standpoint. Kleindienst should 
be given a feeling that he is an important member of the team and not merely 
because of these hearings is he being asked to stay on. 

Senator Baker. Of course, Mr. Kleindienst did not stay on ; is that 
right ? 

Mr. Dean. His resignation was accepted, I believe, on April 30. 

Senator Baker. Just out of curiosity, is it your personal knowledge 
that Mr. Kleindienst's resignation was not requested but rather was 
tendered by Mr. Kleindienst. 

Mr. Dean. That is my understanding. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir. 

Mr. Dean. The first meeting that I had after these series of docu- 
ments were exchanged and I got, I was told of the results of the meet- 
ings in the first instance by ]\Ir. Haldeman, and subsequently by the 
President himself when I met with him, that meeting was on February 
27 and it was at this meeting that the President asked me to report 
directly to him on all Watergate matters. There had been a great ex- 
change of this type of memorandums back and forth into the Presi- 
dent's office and out. He indicated to me at that time that this was 
consuming a great deal of time of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, 
and that at that time he also indicated to me that they were principals 
and he felt that I could be more objective in this matter. 

We had, I think, a lengthy discussion about that this morning with 
one of the members of the panel. As I indicated, it was at this meeting 
that the President also repeated what had earlier been reported to me 
by Mr, Haldeman, about your meeting with the President, in which 
you had told the President that you suggested he waive executive 
privilege. He had told you that he was going to hold the line at written 
interrogatories, and he asked me that time what did I think about that, 
and I said I certainly thought that written interrogatories could be 
handled. He also discussed the fact that he didn't want Mr. Halde- 
man and Ehrlichman to appear on the Hill. 

Senator Baker. Incidentally, INIr. Dean, at that point, as we know, 
you are here without a claim of executive privilege, Mr. Haldeman, 
]Mr. Dean — I mean Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman are under 
subpena and it is our understanding that they will appear without a 
claim of executive privilege. 

Can you identify the point at which this position at the White House 
was reversed and that those privileges indeed were waived? 

Mr. Dean. I believe it was probably in late April, I don't know for 
certain, maybe it was May, maybe it was June, the position was evolv- 



1^3 

ing as I recall, as to the statements on executive privilege continued 
to change after, that certainly was after the April 30 resignation of 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman and my departure from the White House 
staff. 

Senator Baker. Do you know who recommended the changed posi- 
tion? 

Mr. Deax. I do not. I was not privy to the conversations at that 
point in time. 

Senator Baker. But in any event, there is no claim now of executive 
privilege or of attorney-client privilege as far as you are concerned? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. And as far as the other witnesses are concerned? 

Mv. Deax. That is correct. 

[Conferring with counsel.] 

Mr. Dean. Counsel has just reminded me of something that at one 
point in time we were going down to appear at a special Saturday ses- 
sion before the grand jury and the Friday night before when we went 
to advise it with the prosecutors there was a sheet that had been 
handed out by the White House on executive privilege and at that point 
in April, sometime in April, the latter half of the month, executive 
privilege was still being claimed particularly vis-a-vis the grand jury 
as well. 

Senator Baker. There was a speech by the President, I believe on 
May 2-2 on this subject, but that is really not important to this query 
so we will mo\e on from there. I am anxious, in the moments we have 
remaining, for vou to tell me about the first-hand information that you 
have, or what I call category 1, of direct knowledge of what the Presi- 
dent knew which you also knew. 

Mr. Deax. That is right. 

It was on the meeting of the 27th that the President urged me to, he 
reported the fact that you had asked that your contact, not be anybody 
at the White House but somebody, very specifically the Attorney Gen- 
eral, Mr. Kleindienst, and I was asked by the President then to make 
sure that Kleindienst had in fact met with you. T had met witli Klein- 
dienst the preceding day, as I recall, in a general discussion and he had 
indicated to me he wanted to turn over the FBI materials, I don't think 
he was aware at that point in time, well, he couldn't have been aware — 
yes. he may have been aware at that point in time of the fact that you 
were to be the contact point for the hearings and he had not yet sched- 
uled a meeting with you, I don't know what conversations he had had 
with you but he had said that he hadn't worked out a firm date to have 
these hearings, that he was hoping to meet with both you and the 
chairman. 

Senator Baker. Do you know, in fact, when he did meet with us? 

Mr. Deax-^. Xo ; I do not. 

Senator Baker. But you do know that it was with Senator Ervin 
and me? 

Mr. Dean. That was my understanding, yes. That was hi-; desire. 
Apparently, you indicated you wanted to meet with both, yo ; tlioiight 
it would be most effective if the meeting was with both you and the 
chairman. That is what INIr. Kleindienst reported to me. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, Mr. Dean. 



1494 

Mr. Dean. As I have also testified, there was some discussion of 
the composition of the committee. He felt that at that point in time, 
he hoped that the White House could receive some assistance from you. 
That is why he was hoping, urging me to have the Attorney General 
work closely with you. We discussed Senator Gurney. Senator Gurney, 
as the President said, no one has to get in touch with him, he will do 
what is right. He felt very comfortable that that was our best friend 
on the committee. 

Senator Baker. Incidentally, one other thing. I noticed in one of the 
memos, one of the exhibits, that mention was made of Attorney Gen- 
eral Kleindienst and of you as a possible communication point for 
committee affairs. 

Mr. Dean. It was Wally Johnson or myself, I believe. 

Senator Baker. Would you confirm that you and I have never 
discussed that? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, I would. 

Senator Baker. Thank you. 

Go ahead, sir. 

Mr. Dean, I might add that coming forward in the meeting at one 
point in the meeting on March 22, when Mr. Mitchell was with the 
President, there was a call as a result of a staff inquiry from a member 
of your staff that said that it is still seeking guidance and this report 
had come to the President from Mr. Timmons. During the middle of 
the meeting, the President picked up the phone and tried to, or called 
the Attorney General and said, you know, get on up there and meet 
with Senator Baker and work these problems out. 

At that meeting also, he told me, he said, John, you should start 
having direct dealings with Senator Ervin and Senator Baker on the 
parameters of executive privilege. This was right in the middle of the 
Gray hearings and I told the President, I said I think that would be 
very unwise, Mr. President, because I am the point in controversy in 
the Gray hearings and I would be up there negotiating my own posi- 
tion, so to speak. 

Senator Baker. I remember, too, at that time, that the chairman was 
talking about arresting people at the White House gate. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. And the President was talking about having a law- 
suit. 

Mr. Dean. I also remember having a discussion with the Attorney 
General about this area and he told me, he said, we have more marshals 
than they have sergeants at arms and if we run out of marshals, your 
boss has got the Army. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dean. Now, there is something that occurred that was very 
similar to the September 15 meeting after we had these discussions. 
On my way out of the office, he again repeated to me that I had done 
an excellent job of dealing with the matter during the campaign, with 
the Watergate problem. He said that it had been the only issue that 
the McGovern people had had, that the Democrats had tried to make 
a big issue out of it. I told him that I had only managed to contain the 
matter during the campaign, and again, feeling; that I did not know 
how long the coverup could go on, that this thing could go on indefi- 
nitely. 



1495 

Senator Baker. Did you use the word "coverup" ? 

Mr. Dean. I used tlie word "contain." He said to me — I said, I am 
not sure it can be contained indefinitely. 

He then, I can recall this very vividly. He said, John, he said, I have 
o;ot a lot of confidence in you. He said, you know, we have to keep just 
frohtino; back and fightino; back, and I am sure you can do it and I 
want you to report directly to me on all your problems and not bother 
Bob and John, referring- to Haldeman and Ehrlichman. 

Senator Baker. Did you feel at the time that the President had con- 
fidence in vou ? 

Mr. Deax. Did I feel ? As I think I testified earlier, I thought that 
I had earned my stripes by that time, so to speak. Somebody else classi- 
fied it, I think Senator ]\iontoya, as I had gotten my spurs, and I felt 
that he did ; yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, it is now 4 :45. 1 have covered much terri- 
tory and I have much more that I have already mentioned to you that 
I would like to cover, but at this point, I would like to yield. 

Senator Talmadge has not returned. I understand that he has finished 
his interrogation for this round and the next one would be Senator 
Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

IVIr. Dean, just a couple of preliminary questions before I get into 
the main thrust of questioning. And this asks for an opinion, ad- 
mittedly so, but I would still like to hear it. 

On April 30. 1973, the President announced your resignation along 
with Messrs. Kleindienst, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman. And the Presi- 
dent had some very warm things to say about Mr. Haldeman and Mr. 
Ehrlichman, not very much to say about you and only a very little to 
say about Mr. Kleindienst. Would you care to opine as to why this 
particular treatment? 

Mr. Deax. I do not want to ofTer an opinion: I will just say this, 
that given the fact that I was not playing ball, I was not surprised. 
And I might also add this, that I thought it was somewhat unfair to 
put ^Ir. Kleindienst's name amongst the others that were leaving the 
White House staff at that time. I had a definite reaction to that. I 
thought that was unfair to Mr. Kleindienst, who had, as I understood 
it, proffered his own resignation and then suddenly was lumped with 
others who there had been a good deal of press speculation about being 
involved in the Watergate. 

Senator Weicker. Did you have any information that Mr. Klein- 
dienst had indeed offered his resignation prior to this time ? 

Mr. Deax". Xo, I didn't. I read subsequently that he had proferred it. 

Senator Weicker. The committee has received evidence that a 
courier for Senator Muskie's campaign microfilmed documents which 
were typed by Sally Duncan. Bart Porter's secretary, and delivered by 
her to Gordon Strachan at the "WHiite House. This was in earlier testi- 
mony before tliis committee. Now, what do you know about the source 
of the list of Muskie contributors, which list you provided to the com- 
mittee vesterday? 

Mr. Deax. The only thing I know about that list is it was sent to me 
from Mr. Colson's office. 

Senator Weicker. I see. 



1496 

Now, Mr. Dean, the line of questioning which I am going to follow 
is going to include you to some extent, it is going to include me to some 
extent. But one of the jobs that I think we have is to preserve the op- 
portunity for every individual to be heard and heard fairly when they 
come before this committee, whether it is you or any other witness, and 
to probe fairly, as has been the case by the members of this committee. 
Obviously, the seriousness of the matter before us also makes it impera- 
tive that the committee itself and each member of the committee have 
credibility and be believed. 

Now, our job, in other words, as 1 look upon it here, is to get the 
facts, not to get the President, and to have the United States or Amer- 
icans feel exactly what it is that happened to their political system and, 
in fact, what happened to their Constitution. 

With that in mind, I now intend to review some of your testimony 
and to also review some of the things that have happened. Certainly, 
I and the committee, the American people, have seen things that have 
been illegal. We have seen things that have been unconstitutional, and 
we have seen — and here those things which I can only categorize as 
gross. 

But to get to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, I first want to 
find out what your comments would be to the memorandum that was 
read to you by Senator Inouye. Except this time, what I am going to do 
is I am going to point out to you and to the American people the 
dijfference between the first memorandum that was sent to the commit- 
tee and the second memorandum that was sent to Senator Inouye. 

The first memorandum sent from Mr. Fred Buzhardt at the White 
House made the following statement : 

His try fails to record tliat at that moment, Dean corrected the Attorney 
General's erroneous impression by pointing out that, however, innocently, 
Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean had all been involved in planning of operations 
of which Watergate was an obvious derivative or that Strachan had knowledge 
of the fruits of this kind of operation or that all of them were suborning perjury 
and otherwise seeking to conceal the facts. 

Now, let me show you the key difference between the first and the 
second versions. The first version here, "His try fails to record that 
at that moment. Dean corrected the Attorney General's erroneous im- 
pression by pointing out that, however innocently, ISIitchell, Ma- 
gruder, and Dean" — the memorandum which was read to you by 
Senator Inouye, which was the second memorandum to come from the 
White House, read as follows : 

"His try fails to record that at the moment Dean corrected the At- 
torney General's erroneous impression by pointing out that Mitchell, 
Magruder, and Dean" — in other words, omitting, "however inno- 
cently." 

Now, to get to further aspects of the memorandum, the first memo- 
randum stated : 

It is probably because of executive privilege it is not possible even to specu- 
late on the extent to which Dean helped induce the views on attorney-client 
privilege. 

The second version of the memorandum read "It is probably that 
Dean helped induce the views on attorney-client privilege." 



1497 

Then again, in the first version of the memorandum given to this 
committee by :Mr. Buzhardt and the White House, the statement was 
made in the first edition : 

The President indicated to Ehrlichman that his conversations with Dean 
througliout the preceding month had given him "a growing awareness of Dean's 
personal involvement and that his sending him to Camp David apparently was 
a device to smoke him out." 

The second version that came from the White House reads as fol- 
lows: "The President indicated to Ehrlichman that his conversations 
with Dean throughout the preceding month had given him a growing 
awareness of Dean's personal involvement in this." 

Then lastly — if you will be patient here for a minute — the first ver- 
sion: ''Dean 'was not merely one of the architects of the coverup plan. 
He was also perhaps its most active participant." 

The second version from the White House : "Dean was not merely 
one of the architects of the coverup plan. He was also its most active 
participant." 

I think it is important to point out, Mr. Chairman, to the committee 
the very substantial discrepancies in the two memorandums sent to this 
committee. But probably the greatest disservice performed by the 
'\Miite House in this instance comes on the following fact. Before I 
make my statement in regard to the entire memorandum, I would like 
to read a quote from a speech given by the Vice President of the United 
States not long ago. where he goes ahead and blasts this committee, in 
which speech he states : 

There is no question whatever that some men, despite their innocence, will he 
ruined by all of this, even though I am sure that the Senate intended nothing of 
this kind when it commissioned this investigation. 

I think, Mr. Chairman, that the American people should know that 
the author of the '\Miite House memorandum read by Senator Inouye 
yesterday makes statements of facts concerning John Mitchell which, 
in effect, assume that he took part in a conspiracy to break and enter, 
that he took part in obstructing justice and suborning perjury, and all 
this without an admission or conviction of John Mitchell. And this, 
]\rr. Chairman, done in the document sent by the "VMiite House to this 
committee. I don't believe that in anything that the committee has 
done to date we have overstepped our bounds to this extent and I think 
it important to note, not only in the case of Mr. Dean, who sits before 
us, but also in the case of ]Mr. Mitchell, who is to come before us, 

Xow% ]\rr. Dean, I didn't mean to jump ahead of you. 

Have you any comment to make relative to this memorandum, and if 
so, I don't mean to cut you off on it. 

Mr. Deax. When the memorandum was being read yesterday, as you 
will recall. Senator, I commented point by point as they went through 
it. I will certainly stand on the comments I made yesterday and I cer- 
tainly stand on my testimony. I refuse to engage in descriptions of 
motives of others, myself. 

Senator AVeicker. Xow, Mr. Chairman, as I have indicated, there 
have been acts that have been illegal, unconstitutional, and those that 
fall in the general category of gross. And I would like to go ahead and 
repeat now exactlv what acts which have been testified to, have actu- 
ally been proven or admitted in the illegal area, acts committed by 



14i98 

various members of the executive branch of government — conspiracy 
to obstruct justice, conspiracy to intercept wire or oral communica- 
tions, subornation of perjury, conspiracy to obstruct a criminal inves- 
tigation, conspiracy to destroy evidence, conspiracy to file false sworn 
statements, conspiracy to commit breaking and entering, conspiracy to 
commit burglary, misprision of a felony, filing of false sworn state- 
ments, perjury, breaking and entering, burglary, interception of wire 
and oral communications, obstruction of criminal investigation, 
attempted interference with administration of the internal revenue 
laws, and attempted unauthorized use of internal revenue information. 
These are illegal matters proven or admitted that have been accom- 
plished by the executive branch of this Government. 

As to those matters that are unconstitutional : Attempts to infringe 
upon people's first amendment rights of free speech, and the press, the 
enemy list which we have seen, first amendment rights to peaceable 
assembly, fourth amendment rights to be secure in our houses and 
papers and effects, and fourth amendment rights, denial of rights to 
fair trial, right to due process of law. That is what we have heard 
which has been done in the way of unconstitutional acts by the execu- 
tive branch of the Government, 

Now, when you get into the area of the gross, I think it very impor- 
tant that we have more than just an exhibit before us, the exhibits that 
were part of the enemy papers submitted by Mr, Dean to this com- 
mittee yesterday, and I would like to go ahead and read just very short 
portions from some of those memorandums. 

This, I would say, falls into the area of gross : Memorandum for 
John Dean from Charles Colson : 

I received a well-informed tip that there are income tax discrepancies involv- 
ing the returns of Harold J. Gibbons, the vice president of the Teamsters Union 
in St. Louis. This has come to me on very, very good authority. 

Gibbons, you should know, is an all out enemy, a McGovernite, ardently anti- 
Nixon. He is one of the three labor leaders who w-ere recently invited to Hanoi. 

Please see if this can be started on at once and if there is an informer's fee, 
let me know. There is a good cause at which it can be donated. 

Let me read from your memorandum, Mr. Dean, and I imagine this 
couldn't have been one of your i:)roudest moments in life. If I am not 
mistaken, the subject dealing with our political enemies was a memo- 
randum written by you to Mr. Haldeman, is that correct ? 

Mr. Deax. I will have to confess, I had to do some research to pre- 
pare that, because it was a new field for me. 

Senator Weicker. Well, I think we have got to get it all out on the 
table here, and that means everybody. And I am going to read two 
paragraphs which I find to be absolutely amazing having been written 
in the White House of the United States. "After reviewing this matter 
with a number of persons possessed of expertise in the field" — the sub- 
ject of this is "Dealing with our political enemies" — "I have concluded 
that we do not need an elaborate mechanism or game plan, rather we 
need a good project coordinator and full support for the project. In 
brief, the system would work as follows :" 

The project coordinator should then determine — and this is one of the ways the 
system operates — what source of dealings these individuals have with the Federal 
Government — talking about our political enemies now — and how we can best 
screw them (for example, grant availability. Federal contracts, litigation, pros- 
ecution, et cetera). 



1499 

Xow, to move along; to that portion of the Internal Revenue Service 
memo — this is how you use the Internal Revenue Service against your 
political enemies— just one sentence : 

Walters must be made to know that discrete political actions and investiga- 
tions on behalf of the administration are a firm requirement and responsibility 
on his part. 

In the same memorandum, "We have been unable to obtain informa- 
tion in the possession of IRS regarding our political enemies." 

And then lastly, in one of the lists which we received, as I under- 
stand it. are the '"'Opponent Priority Activity" — Mr. Dean, does that 
come from Mr. Colsons' office to ]Mr. Bell ? 

]Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. All right. The language at first is very' prosaic. 
"Having studied the attached material and evaluated the recommenda- 
tions for the discussed action, I believe you will find my list worth- 
while for go status — " the space age come to dirty politics. "It is in 
priority order." 

Now I want everybody to listen to some of the comments that are 
made alongside the names: "It is time to give the message"; "they 
should be hit hard starting with" this particular individual ; "A scan- 
dal would be most helpful here" : "we should give him a try. Positive 
results would stick a pin in Jackson's white hat"; "coming on fast. 
Emerging as a leading black anti-Xixon spokesman. Has known weak- 
ness for white females." 

These are the exhibits, these are the exhibits that were turned in 
yesterday. They form a part of the record of activity, along with those 
matters unconstitutional and illegal. 

Xow, we get to the point as to whether or not these attitudes still 
prevail or whether, in fact, they still continue. INIr. Dean, I am now 
referring to your statement on page 163. 

Ehrlichman and Haldeman concluded that the theory for dealing with this 
committee should be as follows : The White House will take a public posture of 
full cooperation, but privately will attempt to restrain the investigation and make 
it as difficult as possible to get information and witnesses. A behind-the-scenes 
media effort would be made to make the Senate inquiry appear very partisan. 
The ultimate goal would be to discredit the hearing and reduce their impact by 
attempting to show that the Democrats have engaged in the same type of ac- 
tivities. 

"Would you like to expand on that statement at all at this time? I 
plan to go through a chronology of events, even as they affect me and 
you. But, is there anything in the way of a general statement that 
you would like to make at this time ? 

]Mr. Deax. I think I indicated this to counsel yesterday, that at this 
particular La Costa meeting, I made several which I have not turned 
over as an exhibit but will be turned over as an exhibit and this ma- 
terial is documented in that form. 

Senator Weicker. "Well, now, Mr. Dean, I am going to go through 
a chronology of events because the thing that worries me, I suppose, 
more than anything else about these hearings is that people say these 
things happened in 1970, they happened in 1971, they happened in 
1972 but it is 1978, and these are matters that were back then, they 
involve people that existed back then, and so it is now my intention 
to go through a chronology of something that affects this committee. 



1500 

Already having tried to establish somewhat as to what was being done 
to the credibility of this particular witness, we have your statement on 
the La Costa meeting, which is February 10 to 11 of 1973. 

Around March 26 or March 27, 1 indicated by press statements that 
I thought the Watergate conspiracy went beyond those seven persons 
engaged in the actual break-in. This was done in a statement to the 
press outside my office and also in an interview with UPI. That was 
on the 26th and 27th of March. 

Now I intend, Mr. Chairman, to read a taped telephone conversa- 
tion between Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Kleindienst on the 28th of 
March, taped by Mr. Ehrlichman, and in the possession of the com- 
mittee. 

Mr. Dash. Senator Weicker, we might identify it as having been 
submitted under subpena by Mr. Ehrlichman to this committee. 

Senator Weicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Dash, [Reading.] 

Ehrlichman. The President wanted me to cover with you. Are you on an 
outside line? 

Kleindienst. I'm at my parents' house. 

Ehrlichman. Oh, fine, OK, so it's a direct line? Number one, he wanted me to 
ask you those two things that I did yesterday about the grand jury and about 
Baker. He had me call Pat Gray and have Pat contact Lowell Weicker to ask 
Weicker about this second story that he put out yesterday to the effect that he 
had information about White House involvement. And Weicker told Gray that 
be was talking there about political sabotage and not about the Watergate. 

Kleindienst. About the Segretti case? 

Ehrlichman. Yeah, and that he was quite vague with Pat as to what he had. 

Kleindienst. I called him also, you know, after I talked to the President on 
Monday. 

Ehrlichman. Well, the President's feeling is that it wouldn't be too bad for 
you in your press conferences in the next couple of days to take a swing at that 
[putting in my own parentheses, that is me. Now I get back on the record] and 
just say we contacted the Senator because we continue to exercise diligence in 
this thing and we're determined to track down every lead and it turns out he 
doesn't have anything. 

Kleindienst. I would really at this delicate point question the advisability of 
provoking, you know, a confrontation with Weicker. He is essentially with us, 
he and Baker get along good. 

Ehrlichman. Is he? 

Kleindienst. [and as soon as I make this statement I intend to interrupt with 
my own comment] Baker has had a long talk with him and told him to shut up 
and said that he would — 

Senator Weicker. Now, this is serious business, it is not a time for 
wisecracks, it is a time for everybody to be telling the truth and to be 
telling it hard, and I don't think there is any question — Howard, at 
times you and I don't agree but Howai^d Baker has never in any man- 
ner, shape or form, directly or indirectly ever told Senator Weicker to 
shut up, and I am going to put that one right out on the record. I think 
that 

Senator B.\ker. It is indeed a serious moment l>ut I cannot overlook 
the presumptiousness of a man who is five feet seven telling a six-foot- 
sixer to shut up. [Laughter.] 

Senator Weicker. Thank you. 

"And I talked with him" — ^^I will just start over again. 

Baker has had a long talk with him. 

We are now back, this is Kleindienst speaking, talking : 

I talked with him on Sunday after he said he didn't have anything but he's 
kind of an excitable kid and we just might not want to alienate liim and I think 



1501 

that if he finds himself in a direct word battle with the White House and me and 
loses face about it I think in the long run we might need that guy's vote. 

Ehrlichman. I see. You don't think that this is evidence of alienation to the 
point of no return, then. 

Kleindienst. No. You mean by Lowell? 

Ehrlichm,\x. Yeah. 

Kleixdienst. No, I don't. He's pretty disenchanted with the whole concept of 
it. * * * Connecticut politician 

Ehrlichmax. Well, use your own judgment on it, Richard. 

Kleixdiexst [continuing]. On TV I guess seven or eight times this Sunday 
when I finished my testimony before my Appropriations Committee all three net- 
works I referred to the letter that I sent to Sirica and I am also emphasized and 
repeatedly said (a) the President wants this investigated, let the chips fall where 
they will'but secondly, that if anybody has any information we not only want it, 
we "expect to get it so we can investigate it and if necessary, indict other people 
and that anybody who withholds information like that is obstructing justice. But 
I did not refer to Weicker and my judgment right now is not to do so. 

Ehrlichman. OK, OK. 

Kleixdiexst. If he gets to that point, the hell with him. 

Ehrlichmax. Well, our uneducated and uninformed impression was that he 
was trying to develop an attack line here on the White House or the President. 

Kleixdiexst. If that * * * if we would conclude that that is what he's up to 
that he is completely alienated then I say we've got to take him on. 

Ehrlichmax. Well, keep track of that and you'll be talking to Baker and you 
get a feel of it. 

And the phone conversation g:oes on — this is in the possession of the 
committee, if any of the committee members desires a full reading of 
it, I will be glad to do that but I am definitely opening this along the 
line of our committee and the other members of the committee and I do 
not think the other members of the committee 

Senator Baker. The document is in the files, and I understand was 
transcribed by committee staff. 

Mr. Dash. Actually, this was given to the committee by Mr. Ehrlich- 
man's counsel, Mr. Wilson, under subpena, the actual tape we under- 
stand, is in the possession of the prosecutors. 

Senator Baker. Thank you. 

Senator Weicker. Xow, Mr. Dean, I will pick up the time sequence 
here in a minute, but in and around this period of time, do you know of 
any other efforts to interfere with other members of the committee ? 

Mr. Deax. Senator, I do not. At that time, I was up at Camp David 
at this point in time, and I was unaware of what was happening and 
I had developed somewhat of a strained relationship with the — with 
Mr. Ehrlichman and ]SIr. Haldeman already by this time as a result 
of some of the things that had occurred on the 21st and 22d. And I 
believe the President was in Florida. 

Some time before this, however, in discussing this committee, I recall 
hearing, and I cannot recall specifically who raised it, that a number of 
members of this committee, the Kepublican members, may have re- 
ceived campaign contributions during the 1970 election from the "\\Tiite 
House and some of that money might not have been reported and that 
should be examined. The records of that, of those contributions, are 
locked in a safe in my former office : thev were deposited there by Mr. 
Colson. I have never read them. Tn fact, thev were put in there with 
instructions that nobodv on mv staff was to look at them, including 
mvself, and the thought was it was to go through those and find out 
what was in there. I am not aware specifically of any of the details of 



1502 

any of the contributions that were made to Republicans or Democrats 
or anyone specifically. I know this was discussed though, at one point 
in time. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, this was one of the matters that 
was discussed to look into as a means of 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I believe it was. 

Senator Weicker. Of pressuring the committee ? 

Mr. Dean. Specifically, it was in reference to you and trying in some 
way to embarrass you. 

Senator Weicker. I understand that and we are going to get to that. 

I will have to pick up the next step on my own hook. Around April 
10 1 was informed by an individual who is well aware of these contribu- 
tions during the 1970 campaign that he had been approached by the 
White House and had been requested to indicate to them that some- 
thing illegal or something wrong attached themselves to the contribu- 
tions made to my campaign. His answer to the White House, and his 
answer to press peojDle who had been sent by the White House, was 
that there wasn't anything illegal and there wasn't anything wrong. 
But I was notified of this fact on April 10. 

Now, Mr. Dean, I came to our meeting of May 3 when I, along with 
members of my staff and your counsel, met with you. Would you de- 
scribe to the committee that incident which took place during the inter- 
view at which point in time you asked to leave the room with me? 

Mr. Dean. The meeting was arranged by counsel and counsel thought 
since it was becoming imminent I was going to appear up here and you 
wanted very much to talk with me that I should indeed cooperate and 
talk with you. I told them at that time that I didn't want to get into 
any depth of testimonial areas but I was happy to discuss sort of the 
outer parameters of some of my areas of knowledge because of your 
membership on the committee. 

Before we commenced that discussion at some point in time I 
thought I ought to inform you of the fact that I had just raised a 
minute ago, that I was aware of the fact that there was an effort to 
embarrass you, and I didn't want to get into that discussion in front 
of your staff or anyone else, I thought it had come to me, I didn't know 
the substance of it and I thought as one person to another I ought to 
just tell you what I knew about that and bring it to your attention. 

Senator Weicker. What was my response to you ? 

Mr. Dean, That thev were barking up the wrong tree. 

Senator Weicker. Would you say that 30 seconds, a minute would 

be 

^ Mr. Dean. I would say at the most. We turned around and went 
right back into the room. 

Senator Weicker. All right. 

We next move to an incident that occurred within the last several 
days whereby a reporter in Washington, D.O., was informed by Mr. 
Charles Colson that he was involved in the living of monevs to my 
campaign and that he had reason to believe that the monev was not 
properly handled, and quite franklv I was being a disloyal Republican 
and the time had come to swing around. 



1503 

When pinned to substantiate this request, there was absolutely no 
substantiation by :Mr. Colson. But that was enough to finally go ahead 
and get me a little mad, and so a couple of days ago I indicated oyer 
NBC television prior to these hearings that eitorts were still being 
made to pressure this committee, and indeed yesterday I received a 
call from the White House from Mr. Len Garment, and he was most 
concerned about my statement, wanted to know what the facts were, 

I indicated to him the Colson story which I have just read here. I did 
not indicate to him our meeting, I did not indicate to him the attempt 
of the White House to communicate with another individual who, for 
the time being, I shall leave nameless. 

I then told Mr. Garment that Mr. Colson was his problem, he wasn't 
my problem. And the time had come either to step forward and make 
a specific charge or to go ahead and disavow these attempts to snare 
a member of the committee. 

But I don't think that is enough, and so this morning I communi- 
cated with Mr. Archibald Cox, the special prosecutor. I think I have 
had sufficient personal experience both in reading the pay telephone 
conversation and with this nebulous threat as to campaign funds so 
that, in my opinion, there is the possible violation of yet another law. 
And after all the violation of laws is the business of the prosecutor and 
not this committee and, therefore, I have communicated all the facts 
that I have discussed here with you with the prosecutor, and I have 
asked him to look into the possible violation of section 1505 which is 
the obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and com- 
mittees, and the last part of the section says, "Whoever corruptly or 
by threat of force or by any threatening letter, communication, influ- 
ences, obstructs or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct or im- 
pede the due and proper administration of the law under which such 
proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the 
United States or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry 
under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House 
or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Con- 
gress shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 
5 years or both." 

Now, I know, Mr. Dean, that I have been making you sit through 
an event that you onlv had a small ])art in but I think it is important. 

Mr. Deax. If I might just add. Senator, there may be a parallel 
story but I don't pretend — but I would not like to get into it right 
now — as far as efforts to attack my own character in some of the 
individuals that I have become aware that have been involved in that 
also. 

Senator Weicker. Let me ask you this : Have there been any attempts 
to influence you in 3'our testimony regarding your testimony before 
this committee? 

Mr. Dean. There has been every effort in the world to make me look 
in the worst possible light, to try to intimidate me through tliat proc- 
ess, to try to make it as difficult as possible for me to testify. That has 
occurred. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Let's put it this way : whether it is you in that 
witness chair or whether it is me in this committee chair or anv other 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - H 



1504 

man in back of this table or any other witness who is going to come 
before this committee, there are going to be no more tnreats, no in- 
timidation, no innuendo, no working through the press to go ahead 
and destroy the credibility of individuals, if the executive branch of 
Government wants to meet tlie standards that the American people 
set for it in their mind then the time has come to stop reacting and stop 
playing this type of a game, and either disavow it completely or make 
the very specific charges that apparently are being leaked out either 
against the committee members, or against the witnesses appearing be- 
fore this committee. 

Now I am going to conclude this way, Mr. Chairman, and then I am 
done, and I have tried to, as I say, accomplish one role that I think 
needed accomplishing in these hearings: among the rumors that are 
floated around, and this isn't hearsay, are on three different occasions 
plants to the effect that I am such a disloyal Republican and I am 
going to switch to the Democratic Party. 

Now, I am going to tell you, in your memorandum, Mr. Dean, you 
went ahead and had me described, whether it was you or Mr. Halde- 
man or whoever was there, as an independent who would give the 
White House trouble. But I say before you and I say before the Ameri- 
can people and this committee that I am here as a Republican and, 
quite frankly, I think that I express the feelings of the 42 other Re- 
publican Senators that I work with, and the Republicans of the State 
of Connecticut and, in fact, the Republican Party, far better than these 
illegal, unconstitutional, and gross acts which have been committed 
over the past several months by various individuals. 

Let me make it clear because I have got to have my partisan mo- 
ment, Republicans do not cover up ; Republicans do not go ahead and 
threaten; Republicans do not go ahead and commit illegal acts; and 
God knows Republicans don't view their fellow Americans as enemies 
to be harassed but rather, I can assure you, that this Republican, and 
those that I serve with, look upon every American as human beings 
to be loved and wanted. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
[Applause.] 

Senator Baker. Senator Weicker, thank you very much. 

I think that it might be in order at this time to remark that I had 
the opportunity to discuss this matter with you this morning before 
the committee hearings began and, at that time, you and I discussed 
the possibility that if there were, in fact, indications that anyone had 
tried to create an atmosphere or to produce a malicious impact on any 
witness or any member of this committee, that undor the statute law 
and according to the precepts of fairplay, that would be a legitimate 
inquiry for the staff of this committee and for the other law enforce- 
ment agencies of the country. 

So may I call on you, and any other member of this committee and, 
in the absence of the chairman but I am sure that I speak his senti- 
ments as well, to say that as, if, and when we develop information of 
past occurrences that ought to be investigated, and certainly of future 
ones, relating to any person, relating to any witness, relating to any 
member of this committee that that will promptly be investisrated by 
the staff of this committee surely within the scope and jurisdiction of 
our effort. 



1505 

With that, it is 5 :30 and I would ask the sentiment of m}' colleagues 
on whether we should continue at this time or adjourn until 10 in the 
morning. 

If there is no objection, then the committee will stand in recess until 
10 tomorrow morning. 

[Whereuj)on at 5 :30 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 
a.m., Friday, June 29, 1973.] 



FRIDAY, JUNE 39, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :05 a.m., in 
room 318, Eussell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. 
(chairman), presiding. 

Present : Senatoi^ Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and AVeicker. 

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred 
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief 
counsel; Arthur S. ^Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David ^l. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels ; R. Phillip Haire, ]Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to 
Senator Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Ray 
St. Armand, assistant publications clerk. 

Senator Er\t[n. The committee will come to order. 

I would like to thank Senator Baker for presiding during my tem- 
porary absence yesterday afternoon and also, in addition to saying my 
thanks to him, I would like to state that I have never had the privilege 
of performing a public service with a more courageous and independ- 
ent man than my vice chairman. 

I would also like to make this statement : The committee has dis- 
cussed the question of holding hearings next week but the staff has 
been so pressed in preparing testimony and talking to witnesses that 
we decided we would make more progress by taking next week off and 
leaving the staff here to work. I would like to praise the staff because 
in connection with preparation of the transcripts of Mr. Dean's testi- 
mony some 12 or 14 members of the staff who had worked all day 
Saturday and all day Sunday, also stayed up Sunday night in order to 
enable the committee to go ahead with the hearing on Monday, and I 
have never known a more diligent and more dedicated staff on any 
committee than this committee has the honor of having. 

Thank you. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, might I respond just for a moment? 
I thank you most deeply and humbly for your remarks. I say not just 
in a spirit of reciprocation but with absolute sincerity that, and I have 

(1507) 



1508 

said it before and I would like to say it again, I have never in my life 
worked with a man who has been more cooperative, who has been more 
sensitive and understanding to the importance of this occasion and 
who has tried hard to make a bipartisan etlort of these hearings which 
I think they have been. It has been a great privilege for me to learn 
from you and to go forward in this unpleasantness. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you. 

Senator Montoya. 

Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dean, I presume while you were counsel at the White House 
that you had many discussions and probably provided input to some 
legal opinions with respect to the separation of powers vis-a-vis the 
possibility that the President might be subpenaed before any con- 
gressional committee. 

TESTIMONY OP JOHN W. DEAN III— Eesumed 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, I do not. 

Senator Montoya. Did anyone else ? 

Mr. Dean. Not while I was present at the White House do I recall 
that subject being researched by my office, certainly. 

Senator Montoya. Did you have any discussions pursuant to this ? 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I might respond in this regard, that much of the 
doctrine of executive privilege, and there were several statements 
issued on the policy of executive privilege, stemmed from the separa- 
tion of powers concept, and it was the President who told me that 
rather than refer to the matter as executive privilege that Mr. Ziegler 
should start referring to it as separation of powers. 

Now, when we were looking into the problems of executive privilege, 
of course, there were collateral reviews but not as far as the President 
vis-a-vis an appearance per se was ever researched as opposed to staff 
appearances. 

Senator Montoya. I noticed from reading the President's press 
statements that he used the separation of powers and Mr. Ziegler, in his 
press statements, used tliat term and also the term executive privilege. 

Now, was there any legal opinion with respect to the ground that 
the two facets or two phrases covered ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, I think you will find that about in mid- 
March the phrase "executive privilege" was not being used as much and 
they began using the phrase publicly "separation of powers." As I say, 
this resulted in some discussions in preparing the President for press 
conferences that occurred in mid-March, and the President said that 
he did not want to use the phrase "executive privilege." Ratlier he 
wanted to use the phrase "separation of powers" and instructed Mr. 
Ziegler to do likewise. 

How often Mr. Ziegler has subsequently used the phrase "executive 
privilege" I do not know. I have not studied the transcript. 

Senator Montoya, Are vou aware that anybody might have advised 
the President as to whether or not he was subject to a subpena of a 
congressional committee ? 

Mr. Dean. I have no firsthand knowledge of that. Senator. 



1509 

Senator Moxtoya. Xow, referring to the President's news conference 
on August 29, 1972, and I will quote from that conference, a reporter 
asked this question : 

Mr. President, would not it be a good idea for a special prosecutor, even from 
your standpoint, to be appointed to investigate tlie contribution situation and also 
the Watergate case? 

Answer : 

The President. With regard to who is investigating it now, I think it would 
be — it would be well to know that the FBI is conducting a full field investigation. 
The Department of Justice, of course, is in charge of the prosecution and present- 
ing the matter to the Grand Jury. The Senate Banking and Currency committee — 

I presume he meant the House — 

is conducting an investigation. The General Accounting OflBce, an independent 
agency, is conducting an investigation of those aspects which involve the cam- 
paign spending law. Now with all these investigations that are being conducted, 
I don't believe that adding another Special Prosecutor would serve any useful 
purpose. 

Now, Tou stated before that there was a move at the White House 
to try to stop the House Banking and Currency investigation, and you 
presented testimony as to what went on in the White House in the 
l3ackground. 

Now, was this going on under auspices of anyone close to the 
President ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, of course, on September 15 I had had a discussion 
with the President about this. He had asked me about the Banking 
and Currency Committee investigation. He had asked me who was 
handling it for the lYhite House. I had reported that ]Mr. Richard Cook 
was the man who had formerly worked with the Banking and Cur- 
rency Committee as a member of the minority staff, was very familiar 
with the members of the committee, and at the conclusion of my report 
I recall him saving that he wanted Mr. Timmons to get on top of the 
matter and be directly involved in it also. 

Senator Moxtoya. And that was about the time that he was making 
this statement to the press? 

ISIr. Deax. Well, that preceded — that is correct. Of course, it was 
September 15 that that arose in his office directly and we are talking 
about a press conference in August, and during the following weeks, of 
course, there was an ever-increasing effort of the T\Tiite House to deal 
with the Patman committee hearings as I have so testified. 

Senator Moxtoya. When did the President tell you this? Was it 
before August 29 when he made the statement at the press conference 
or after ? 

Mr. Deax. It was after, September 15. 

Senator Moxtoya. It was approximately 17 days later. 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Moxtoya. 17 or 13 days. 

In the same, and as he went along, the President said as follows : 

The other point that I should make is that these investigations, the investiga- 
tion by the GAO, the investigation by the FBI, by the Department of Justice have 
at my direction hqd the total cooperation of the — not only the "WTiite House but 
also of all agencies of the government. 



1510 

I want you to pay special attention to this. This is quoting the 
President still. 

In addition to that, within our staff under my direction Counsel to the Presi- 
dent, Mr. Dean, lias conducted a complete investigation of all leads which might 
involve any present members of the White House staff or anybody in the Govern- 
ment. I can say categorically that his investigation indicates that no one in 
the White House staff, no one in this Administration presently employed was 
involved in this bizarre incident. 

Now, I ask you this question : With respect to any project that you 
handled directly for the President where a report was required 
wouldn't you assume that if this is true that you would have been 
required to file a report ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And also if, assuming that this was true, wouldn't 
that report be available at the White House ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Montoya, And so assuming the correctness of the Presi- 
dent's statement then it necessarily follows that if you made a complete 
investigation at his behest, and for him, that the President should 
produce that Dean report ? 

Mr. Dean. I already believe that the White House has indicated 
there was no Dean investigation. I think that is one of the inoperative 
statements, [Laughter.] 

Senator Montoya. But it is still your testimony that you were not 
requested by the President to make a report to him or to conduct this 
investigation. 

Mr. Dean. Not at that time, Senator ; that is correct. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 

I want to go into this a little further the matter of the San Clemente 
conferences. 

Now, did you discuss specifically with Mr. Haldeman, with Ehrlich- 
man and others who might have been attending their matters directly 
dealing with the so-called coverup ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, we did. 

Senator Montoya. Now, will you as succinctly as possible, as briefly 
as possible, relate for the record now just exactly what those discus- 
sions were with respect to the coverup ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, we had a lengthy discussion ranging over 2 days, 
and I have estimated between 12, 14—10, 12, 14 hours — I do not know 
how many hours totally were spent in a discussion, that basically were 
focusing on how to deal with this committee. At the end of that dis- 
cussion, on the last day of the discussion, on Sunday afternoon, what 
I described as the bottom line question came up, because evervthing 
depended upon the continued silence of the seven individuals who had 
either been convicted or had pleaded guilty. Would they remain silent 
during the duration of these hearings? I was asked that question, 

I said, I cannot answer that question, because I do not know. All I 
know is that they are still making money demands. 

Preceding that, there had been a ffood bit of discussion between IMr. 
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and back and forth to Mr. Mitchell as 
to wlio was going to raise the necessary money. I reported to them that 
there was nothing I could do, this was out of my hands, that Mr, 



1511 

Mitchell had felt it was not his responsibility to raise this money and 
he was not interested in doing- it. Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman 
said that they thought it was his. 

Finally, they asked Mr. Richard Moore, who was also attending the 
meeting, to go to ]Mr. Mitchell and lay it on the line that it was Mr. 
Mitcholl's responsibility. 

Now, I assume they did that because Mr. Moore had spent time at 
the Department of Justice working very closely with Mr. Mitchell 
and knew Mr. iSIitchell. He was an older man and they felt probably 
sending Mr. Moore as a direct emissary from them, rather than my- 
self when I had failed to accomplish what they thought was necessary, 
might solve the problem. 

i later learned that Mr. Moore indeed did go to New York and did 
raise this with Mr. Mitchell, but Mr, Mitchell virtually ignored the 
matter when it was raised by Mr. Moore. 

Senator Moxtoya. Were these particular conferences at San Cle- 
mente designed to just discuss the matter of Watergate ? 

Mr, Deax. They were designed to discuss how to deal with this 
committee so that the coverup would not unravel up here before this 
committee. 

Senator Moxtoya. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Senator EE^^x. Senator Gurney ? 

Senator Gtjrxey, Thank you, Mr, Chairman. 

Just a few questions, ]Mr. Dean. I would like to go back to the Kalm- 
bach meeting again, when you and he first discussed this coverup 
money. 

Mr. Dean. On the 29th, Senator? 

Senator Gurxey. June 29. 

Mr. Deax. Yes. 

Senator Gurxey. You are absolutely certain about that date? It 
could not have occurred in July, could it have ? 

Mr. Deax. The first meeting I had with him was when I flew in — 
he took the last flight, I believe, out of Los Angeles. We met the next 
morning. The records — he very seldom stayed at the Mayflower Hotel 
and he was staying at the Mayflower Hotel and I would assume that if 
the committee investigators would check the records of the Mayflower 
Hotel, they could confirm that date. That is the best of my recollection, 
that it was the 29th. 

Senator Gtjrxey. This was the June 29 date ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes. 

Senator Gurxey. Was there anyone else at the meeting ? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir. there was not. 

Senator Gurxey, And my recollection is that you had a short meet- 
ing in the coffee shop, is that right ? 

Mr. Deax. I was to meet him in the coffee shop and I recall we sat 
down in the booth and it did not appear very private in the booth, so 
we decided to go to his room to discuss the matter. 
Senator Gurxey. And that was there in the Mayflower Hotel ? 
Mr, Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Gurxey, Well, the committee has subpenaed the records of 
the hotel, I have a letter here from the Mayflower, and also one from 



1512 

the Statler Hilton. I would like a committee staffer to give these copies 
to the witness. 

Now, as you will see today, the letter is from the Mayflower Hotel, 
dated June 27, 1973, addressed to Senator Gurney, Select Committee 
on Presidential Activities, U.S. Senate OiSce Building, Washington, 
D.C. 

Dear Senator Gumey, in reply to your request of June 27, 1973, to the best 
of our knowledge, the records do not reflect a Mr. Herbert B. Kalmbach as being 
a registered guest during the period of June 1, 1972, through July 1, 1972. Very 
truly yours, Ray Sylvester, Senior Assistant Manager. 

Then the other letter from the Statler Hilton, again addressed to 
me. This also has the subpena of the committee plus photostatic copies 
of the hotel records. The hotel record photostatic copy is not very good 
here, so I think we are going to have to go by the letter itself. At any 
rate, here is what it says : 

Attached, please find photostatic copies of a previous subpena served on the 
Washington Statler Hilton, registration card and folio B 86403, for Mr. Herbert 
W. Kalmbach who was registered in our hotel from June 29-30, 1972. 

Original folio and registration card were received in compliance with the 
previous subpena by Angelo J. Lano, S.A.F.B.I., telephone number 324-2685. 

We are unable to locate any further records on Mr. Kalmbach. 

Sincerely, William J. Utnik, General Manager. 

Now, as I recall, you have testified three times very positively that 
you met with Mr. Kalmbach in the coffee shop of the Mayflower 
Hotel. 

Mr. Dean. Absolutely. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. And then retired to his room in the Mayflower. 
How do you account for these records here ? 

Mr. Dean. The only thing I can suggest is that Mr. Kalmbach may 
have been registered under another. Let me elaborate on that. 

Mr. Kalmbach often discussed matters in a code name. For example, 
after our discussion, he began referring to Mr. Hunt as "the writer." 
He began referring to Mr. Haldeman as "the brush." He began re- 
ferring to Mr. Mitchell as "the pipe." These would be the nature of our 
discussions and this might explain the fact that he decided not to use 
his own name in registering in the hotel. 

I think the person that could answer that best is Mr. Kalmbach, 
because I have a very clear recollection of walking into the coffee shop, 
meeting in the coffee shop, going to his room. It was a small room. He 
had not really had a chance to get a good night's sleep because he had 
been flying all night. To maintain further privacy, I recall him also 
turning on the television next to the adjoining door and we sat on the 
other side of the room and had the conversation in which I relayed to 
him everything I knew at that point in time. So I think ^Ir. Kalmbach 
will have to answer that question as to why his name does not appear 
on the register. 

Senator Gtjeney. Well, it also occurred to me that that could be 
the case, that he was using an assumed name, but then when we ran 
into this other record at the Statler-Hilton Hotel, it just does not make 
sense. If he was coming into the city under an assumed name so that 
no one would know he was here and no later record could be found, why 
in the world would he register under his own name at a nearby hotel, 



1513 

the Washington Hilton, and then engage another room over in the 
Mayflower to meet Trith you? It just does not add up. 

Mr. Deax. I see what you are saying. I have testified the Mayflower 
and I am never sure which is the ISIayflower and which is the Statler- 
Hihon, The hotel I recall is the one that is on 16th Street up from the 
White House. I know I walked up from the office to his room. 

Senator Gtjrney. How long have you lived in Washington? 

Mr. Dean. I have been here about 10 years. 

Senator Gurney. And you don't know the difference between the 
Washington-Hilton and the Mayflower Hotel ? 

]Mr. Deax. I continually get them confused, I must confess. 

Senator Gueney. Well, I must say I am reminded of your colloquy 
with the chairman yesterday, Mr. Dean, when you said what an excel- 
lent memory you had right from schooldays right on down; that is 
why you were able to reconstruct 

Mr. Deax. That is right, my memory is good, but I confuse some 
names often. I don't pretend to have a perfect memory. I think I have 
a good memory, Senator. 

Senator Gurxey. But you can't remember really now, after testi- 
fying three times very positively, whether it was the Statler-Hilton 
or the Mayflower ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, Senator, the point in substance here is the fact that 
the meeting did occur. We met in the coffee shop. We went from the 
coffee shop to his room. AVe had an extended discussion of the matter, 
and that is very clear in my recollection, the substance of the event. 

Senator Gurxey. And one of the reasons I am curious about this, 
really, it is less an attempt to try to confuse you than it is an attempt to 
try to pin you down. You haven't tried to conceal the meeting, and 
Mr. Kalmbach, of course, knows all about it, too. 

]Mr. Deax". That is correct. 

Senator Gttrxey. And he is going to testify before this committee, 
there is no question about that. But I can't understand the confusion in 
where it took place, because it is an extremely important meeting, 
obviously. This is where the coverup, as far as the financial part of it, 
first started. 

Are you sure the meeting didn't occur somewhere else ? 

Mr. Deax'. I can recall very clearly meeting Mr. Kalmbach in the 
coffee shop. The coffee shop was crowded, it was busy. We could not 
find a booth that was quiet. We went from the coffee shop to his room 
and as I say, I recall very clearly him turning the television on. be- 
cause there was a door, an adjoining door next to the room. Then we 
proceeded to have our conversation. It was a rather lengthy con- 
versation. 

Senator Gtrxey. Well, could that particular meeting you speak of 
at the ISIayflower have occurred some other time ? Could it have been 
a later meeting or an earlier meeting ? 

Mr. Deax'. No, sir. To the best of my recollection, this was the first 
time we ever talked about this matter and these were the circumstances 
under which we talked about it, when he flew in from California. He 
had taken a late flight, he was tired, and we met in the coffee shop, 
went to his room, as I have repeated, then had the discussion. 



1514 

Senator Gurnet. Let me just try to refresh your recollection. Could 
this meeting have taken place out in front of the Hay-Adams Hotel ? 

Mr. Dean. In front of the Hay-Adams Hotel ? 

Senator Gurnet. That is right, that you walked over from your 
office and he walked over from his hotel and met out in front of the 
Hay- Adams and discussed it there ? 

Mr. Dean. I have testified to a subsequent occasion when we met, 
after he had the money in his possession, as he told me, and I believe 
he told me he was going to meet with Mr. Ulasewicz at that time. That 
was in Lafayette Park. I can recall very clearly being in Lafayette 
Park, because we stood and we each put our foot up on the bench and 
we were looking back over at the White House and talking. He had 
his attache case with him. I had walked out of my office and this was 
some time after this initial meeting. 

Senator Gurnet. That couldn't have been the initial meeting, at 
least according to your recollection ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, I guess we will just have to wait for Mr. 
Kalmbach and find out what he remembers. 

Let's go back a little bit to the credit cards again. You know, we 
had a discussion on that and the use of the $4,850, 1 asked you why you 
couldn't use credit cards. 

Mr. Dean. And I responded I preferred not to use credit cards. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, now, the committee staff has brought to my 
attention here a list of some of the checks drawn on your account. I 
wonder if the staff would furnish the witness with a copy of these 
checks. 

Mr. Dean. I can barely read the copy I have here, particularly the 
first one. Senator. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, I can't read the first one, either, but I really 
don't think that is important. The second one down, which is legible 
on my sheet here — is it on yours ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it is. 

Senator Gurnet. That is a check as I see dated September 21, 1972. 
This was very close, of course, to the October taking of the $4,850. 
Here is a check made out to the American Express Co. for $908.47. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. Signed John W. Dean. Is this a check drawn on 
your account ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it is. 

Senator Gurnet. Is this in payment of credit card bills ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it is. 

Senator Gurnet. Then we go down a little further on November 3. 
There is another check drawn to Bankamericard for $250.51. Is this 
also your check ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. Is this also for credit card bills ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it is. 

Senator Gurnet. Then going further down, there is another fur- 
ther check dated November 22, 1972, Bankamericard, $106.50. 

Is this your check ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it is. 



1515 

Senator Gurnet. Did that go for credit card payments ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it did. 

Senator Gurnet. Then dropping further down, another in March 
to the American Express Co. for $531.45. 

Is this your check ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Guknet. And another in April, American Express Co., 
$4:59.17. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. Xow, I don't know whether there are others or not, 
because we don't have all of the financial records. 

Mr. Dean. I am sure there are, Senator. 

Senator Gurnet. Do 3'ou have any recollection what those were for? 

Mr. Dean. Off the top, I do not. As I have told the committee, I am 
perfectly willing to turn over all of my financial records to the com- 
mittee where these can be fully analyzed. I believe in my own records 
will be found the stubs that indicate that each expenditure is for a 
given credit card payment. I know that because of the result of some 
foreign travel, when I did use my credit cards, when traveling abroad, 
some of the foreign travel particularly takes as much as 6 months to 
a year, which surprised me, to catch up to make a payment. 

Senator Gurnet. I see. 

Do you have an air travel credit card ? 

Mr. Dean. Xo, I do not. 

Senator Gurnet. You would pay for your air travel either off 
American Express or Bankamericard ? 

]Mr. Dean. That is correct, or by cash. 

Senator Gurnet. Let me ask the chief counsel of the committee, 
have we subpenaed the financial records ? 

Mr. Dash. We have subpenaed all the records of Mr. Dean and we 
also have one of our chief investigators, Mr. Carmine Bellino, who will 
be going over those records with Mr. Dean. 

]Mr. Dean. I might go back over one point. The name of the coffee 
shop at the Statler Hilton is the Mayflower. [Applause.] 

Senator Erm:n. The audience will please refrain from applause or 
demonstrating their reaction to any testimony. 

Senator Gurnet. Is that what your attorney just told you ? 

^Ir. Dean. Yes, he did. 

Senator Gurnet. His memory apparently 

Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Chairman, that was Mr. McCandless. I would 
like to ofive him credit for that. TLaughter.] 

Senator Gurnet. Let me ask you. ]\Ir. Dean, what does that mean 
now, what is your testimonv so that we can get it on the record here? 

Mr. Dean. '\^'Tiat I would like to say is I have a very clear recol- 
lection of meeting with Mr. Kalmbach in the coffee shop before our 
meeting in his room. I think Mr. Kalmbach can resolve, if it is im- 
portant to the Senator, the particular location of that meeting. To 
me there was the substance of the meeting that was the important 
tliin<T and I think I have relaved to the committee the full substance 
of the meeting and what occurred as a result of the meeting. 

Senator Gurnet. Xow, what is your testimony as to what hotel ? 

Mr. Dean. To the best of my recollection, it was the Mayflower but 
I am perfectly — if I am incorrect I will stand corrected. 



1516 

Senator Gubney. Now, to get back to the payments for the credit 
cards here, of course, all I wanted to point out is that you did fre- 
quently use your credit cards. Is that not correct ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did use them but as I say, I prefer not to live on 
credit. Wlien I made the reference to that I have other credit cards as 
when my records will reveal when they are turned over to the com- 
mittee, when my full checking account is revealed it will note that most 
of my expenditures are paid for by check. There is nothing more shat- 
tering to me than to see a check come through like this September 27 
check for 900-and-some dollars because I can never remember that 
I am expecting such an amount and I live basically on my salary and 
do not like to reach into brokerage accounts and capital to make 
expenditures. So as I say, I think this is fully revealed to the com- 
mittee when my financial materials are gone through in great detail 
and the committee, df that is their desire, are welcome to have those 
records. 

Senator Gtjrney. But it is not your testimony that you use credit 
cards only for expenses in connection with your job. You do use credit 
cards also for personal expenses, is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, for example. Senator, when I was at the Repub- 
lican Convention, and often traveling on behalf of the Government, I 
knew I would be reimbursed for some of those expenses. Rather than 
to go to some elaborate procedure when you are checking out of a 
hotel, I stayed at the Doral Hotel, I had a bill there for several days, 
the easiest way to check out is to use a credit card, particularly when 
you know you are going to be reimbursed because it is a Government- 
related expenditure or a job-related expenditure and the like, and I 
think that that will be reflected when Mr. Bellino goes through my 
financial records that that was often the case with some of these 
expenditures. 

Senator Gurney. Well, I have no doubt it is. I am sure that will be 
true but my question was do you not use credit cards for personal 
expenses, too ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes ; I do. 

Senator Gtjrney. That is all I was asking. 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Senator Gtjrney. Another point that I am interested in here is this 
meeting of March 21 with the President which, of course, was an ex- 
tremely important meeting. I was going over that yesterday, and there 
was one part of that that I must say totally confused me. I just did 
not understand it. 

Summarizing briefly, you mentioned, of course, that you talked to the 
President about perjury being committed, you talked about the cover- 
up, if it was going to continue it would require more iierjury and more 
money because of the demands that were being made upon, by these 
convicted people, and you said it was time for the surgery on the cancer 
itself and all those involved to stand up and account for themselves. 
In other words, a rather complete briefing to the President on the whole 
Watergate affair. I just touched some of the highlights there. 

But then, you also made this statement : 

After I finished T realized that I had not really made the President understand 
because he asked me a few questions, after he asked me a few questions he sug- 



1517 

gested it would be an excellent idea if I gave some sort of briefing to the Cabinet 
and that he was very impressed with my knowledge of the circumstances but he 
did not seem particularly concerned about their implications. 

Well, I must say I overlooked that, I think, totally when the testi- 
mony was first given, and I must say it does not seem to make any 
sense to me at all. 

If the President was now fully knowledgeable about this whole 
coverup business, and a part of it, as I think you have indicated before 
the committee here, why in the world would he want the Cabinet 
briefed ? 

Mr. Deax. Well, as I — when the matter came up, the conversation 
had tapered down and we were into a light question and answer session 
about some of the areas that I had gone into, and I must say that I had 
a similar reaction, and I said to the President- 
Mr. President, I do not think this is the sort of thing that I could give a briefing 
on even a tailored-down briefing on. 

But he felt it might be important that I explained some of the param- 
eters of the problem and the like. It was not a lengthy matter. I felt 
at some time during my presentation that he was very sort of im- 
pressed with the way I was giving the presentation. I tried to, I was 
trying to, really give one of the most dramatic speeches I had ever 
given in my life. 

Senator Gurxey. Well, it still is totally 

Mr. Deax. I might add I never did give a briefing to the Cabinet 
and that was dropped immediately in the conversation. I added that 
because it stuck in my mind that as one of the points that I really 
did not feel that I had made the full implications of this thing 
clear but that is the sort of thing that as you noted in the testimony, it 
was noted very clearly in my mind when the suggestion came up. 

Senator Grr.xEY. Well, that occurs to me too. that maybe the Presi- 
dent did not imderstand for some reason. I cannot imagine a President 
of the United States, knowing that his two chief aides, Mr. Haldeman, 
Mr. Ehrlichman. yourself, and Mr. Colson, LaRue, Mardian, 
Magruder, Mitchell, all these people being involved in this criminal 
activity or possibly involved in this criminal activity, I do not want to 
accuse them of crimes over this national television here, but these sup- 
posedly were all involved in this and then there was coverup money 
with his personal attorney Mr. Kalmbach and all of these things went 
on. and if he knew that, as I understand your thesis is how in the world 
would he have suggested anybody who had total knowledge of this 
like you. suggested them to go to the Cabinet and tell them about it ? 

Mr. Deax. May I respond in several parts you have stated that I 
have a thesis. I have no thesis, I have no wish other than to report by 
this committee the facts as I know them. 

Second, this was a part, of a dialog that followed. I do not think 
the President had any intention of sending me in to report in full as 
I had just reported to him. I made it, the comment, in my testimony 
because it stuck in my mind as evidence of the fact that the President 
did not really still realize the implications of what I was talking about 
and it recalled to me the similar and earlier occasions when I tried to 
raise with him my own involvement in this matter and explain the 
obstruction of justice involvement and he did not seem to want to hear 



1518 

it or get into it or anything of that nature. So that is why it is in the 
testimony because it is the sort of thing. Senator, as you, when you 
re-read the testimony, it pops right off that page and it stuck right in 
my mind the same way. 

Senator Gurney. Well, it did, and I must say it rather startled me, 
I really did not understand why I did not hear it the first time, and 
that same thing occurred to me that maybe even on ^Slarch 21 he was 
not totally aware of all of these things that you testified to here these 
last 5 days otherwise I cannot understand why he would have sug- 
gested that you go to the Cabinet with it. 

Well, let us get on here. Late in March or early April you did decide 
that you had had enough of this business and that you wanted out of it. 

Mr. Dean. Senator, you said early April. 

Senator Gtjrney. Late in March or early April. 

Mr. Dean. Excuse me, I did not hear that. 

Senator Gtjrney. You decided that you had had enough of this 
coverup, and you wanted to get out of it, and go on your own course, 
and as I would put it maybe come clean, is that a fair way of saying it ? 

Mr. Dean. Senator, what I wanted to do I was trying to work inter- 
nally within the Wliite House. I was very anxious to get the President 
out in front on this issue. I had conversations from Camp David with 
Mr. Moore, exploring further ideas. We had explored this on countless 
occasions, on how to end it, how to get the President out in front of it, 
have the President taking the action to end it, decisive action to end it. 
By the time I went to Camp David I realized that I had not accom- 
plished what I was trying to do internally and began to think about 
that I might have to be the one to stand up and take my own steps. 

Senator Gueney. And taking your own steps, of course, would be 
revealing and telling the whole story, is that not what you mean ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gueney. Well, now, you went before the grand jury last 
week, did you not ? 

Mr. Dean. That ds correct. 

Senator Gtjrney. Did you tell them the whole story ? 

Mr. Dean. I decided to exercise my constitutional rights at that 
point in time. 

Senator Gutiney. What do you mean by that ? 

Mr. Dean. I invoked the fifth amendment. 

Senator Gtjrney. You did not tell them anything, did you ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. Shaffer. I hate to interrupt. Senator 

Senator Gtjrney. I might point out to the chairman, because I do 
think that we ought to have the rules understood, that the witness' 
counsel may defend his constitutional rights but the attorney cannot 
testify here or make statements on his own behalf or even on behalf 
of his client, as I understand the rules the committee is operating 
under, is that correct ? 

Senator Erwn. I don't know what the counsel wants to say. 

Mr. Shaffer. I would sav it in a wav that is a proffer. I would like 
to defend my client's constitutional rights and by so doing I would 
like to call to the attention of the chair the fact that in 1959 our 
Supreme Court decided the case of United States v. Gi'nienwald and 



1519 

in that case the Supreme Court said that it is not proper cross- 
examination and it is not inconsistent for a witness on one occasion 
to take his fifth amendment right and on another occasion testify, and 
as a result of that decision, the case had to be retried in the Southern 
District of Xew York and the man who made the mistake went to the 
Federal bench and the man who retried the case lost it and went into 
private practice. 

Senator Er\t[n. I might state to the counsel that just about all of the 
testimony that has been presented here before this committee, whether 
by this witness or any other witness, a good bit of it would never be 
admissible in a court of law. I think counsel ought to understand 
that too. 

Mr. Shaffer. I might add, Senator, it would be admissible before 
the grand jury. 

Senator Ervix. The rule of law, as I understand it, where you have 
evidence tending to show two or more people conspired either to do an 
unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an unlawful method, by unlawful 
means, then any action or statement made by one of the parties to the 
conspiracy in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy is admis- 
sible in evidence. In my judgment as a lawyer, while we have some 
hearsay and we have had some questions asked that were not admis- 
sible in a court of law, I think the great bulk of the testimony that has 
been produced here would be admissible in a court of law. 

Mr. Shaffer. I might also add, Mr. Chairman 

Senator Ervix. I will give any member of the committee or anybody 
else the right to disagree with my legal opinion but that is my legal 
opinion. 

Senator Gurxey. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address myself 
precisely to the point we are talking about. Under the rules of proce- 
dure for the Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, rule 20 
says — 

The sole and exclusive prerogative of the counsel shall be to advise such witness 
when he is testifying of his legal rights and his constitutional rights. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I think- 



Senator Gurxey. No question has been posed that I know of to the 
witness at this moment that interferes with his constitutional rights. 
I simply asked him if he had gone before the grand jury, he said he had 
and he said he had taken the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Deax. Also while I was there, I tried to convey to the grand jury 
that I wished I could tell them the storv because everything that I have 
told this committee would be admissible before the grand jury and the 
grand jurv was verv anxious to hear it. 

I would also recall to the Senator that I had had extensive discus- 
sions with the prosecutors about the timing of mv appearance before 
the grand jurv. The prosecutors themselves were in the middle of the 
situation of whether there was going to be a special prosecutor or no 
special prosecutor, and no regulation of that was mentioned and I think 
you will find in an affidavit attached to a motion filed in the court re- 
garding mv appearance before the grand jurv some of the facts that 
relate to that, and the fact that I was being brought before the grand 
jury, the reasons I was being brought before the grand jury and reflect- 



96-296 O - 73 - pt.4 - 12 



1520 

ing the decision based on the advice of counsel as to why I did at that 
point in time invoke the fifth amendment because of some unusual cases 
in this jurisdiction, the leading case being the Ellis case which I had 
referred to the Senator to read as to what happened when one waives 
ones rights in this jurisdiction being a unique jurisdiction and being a 
lawyer as you are, I am sure you would understand looking at that 
entire picture the reason that I feel it was necessary to do that. 

Senator Gurney. I don't know of course what the Ellis case provides. 

Senator Ervin". I want to say since the rules of the committee have 
been invoked, I would like to call the attention of the committee to rule 
16 which says : 

"Any objection raised by a witness or his counsel to procedures or to the 
admissibility of testimony and evidence, shall be ruled upon by the chairman 
or presiding member and such ruling shall be the ruling of the committee unless 
a disagreement thereon is expressed by a majority of the committee present. In 
the case of a tie, the ruling of the Chair will prevail. 

I interpret that as the right to give counsel and the right to object to 
the admissibility of testimony. 

Senator Gtjrney. I do so too. So why doesn't the counsel state his 
objection. 

Mr. Shaffer. I did, Mr. Chairman, and my suggestion is, simply 
stated, it is improper to raise the question that on a previous occasion 
he raised the fifth amendment. 

Senator Ervin. I would state it a little differently. The Supreme 
Court has held that if a witness can be impeached by testimony that 
on the previous occasion he pleaded the fifth amendment, then the 
value of the fifth amendment to the witness would be virtually 
destroyed. 

Mr. Shaffer. I adopt that statement. 

Senator Gtjrney. I am not exactly sure whether I asked him that 
question or not. I asked him if he had been before the grand jury and 
told his story and I think his reply was no that he took the fifth 
amendment is my recollection of the answer. 

Mr. Dean. It was, the only answer I could give to your question, 
Mr. Chairman, is why my counsel came to his feet. 

Senator Gurney. Well, suppose we go on to what is happening here 
now. That is, I think, very interesting. Here, of course, we have had 
testimony for 5 days, this is the fifth day. It started with a statement 
of 245 pages, and indeed you have endeavored to tell the committee 
everything, of course, that you knew about the case and the com- 
mittee certainly is very grateful for that. But you are testifying here 
under immunity, are you not ? 

Mr. Dean. I have been compelled to appear here to testify. The com- 
mittee had made a decision I understand by a unanimous vote to grant 
me immunity. I don't come before this committee without substantial 
consequences on my future legal rights even though I am under 
immunity. 

Senator Gurney. But none of what has transpired here as far as 
your testimony is concerned can be used against you in a further 
criminal proceeding. Isn't that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. If it is impossible — or if it is possible 
to take the lead problem out of an individual's testimony. 



1521 

Senator Gurnet. Now, just in summary, Mr. Dean, I wonder if we 
can go over the salient points of the 5 days. Again as I understand 
it, to your own knowledge you have no knowledge that President 
Nixon was ever involved in the planning or the break-in at Watergate ; 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. I have no direct knowledge of that, that is correct. 

Senator Gurney. Then, in the year lD72 the only meeting you ever 
had with the President on Watergate was on September 15, is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, and I believe we have been over that in detail. 

Senator Gurnet. We have been over that in detail, and I don't 
think it would serve any purpose to go over it again. 

In 1973 the two occasions that you did discuss Watergate with him 
prior to ISIarch 21, was that meeting on February 27, is that correct? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I, in answering Senator Baker's questions yes- 
terday I don't know if you were present. Senator, we were going 
through all of the circumstantial situations leading up to the meetings 
that occurred in February and March, and the fact that there was a 
developing strategy that had occurred in California at the La Costa 
meetings and on the tail end of those and consistent with those I had 
a number of meetings with the President where subjects related to that 
particular California policy-setting meeting were being continually 
discussed. 

Senator Gurnet. I understand that, but I mean the direct involve- 
ment of the possible criminal activities of Watergate, February 27 
was the first meeting, was it not, when, as you testified, the question 
of obstruction of justice came up, isn't that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. And you stated that you might be implicated in 
some way in that, and the President said no, he didn't think so. Isn't 
that the substance of that ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. Then, on March 18 you also 

Mr. Dean. That was, I believe, on tlie 28th that came up. Senator. 

Senator Gurnet. Twenty-eighth, all right. 

Then one other meeting on March 13 you had another conversation 
with him that involved this Executive clemency business, isn't that 
correct ? 

Mr. Dean. On INIarch 13 we discussed both clemency and the fact 
that this was no money. The way the clemency discussion came up as 
you will recall is that at the end of another conversation I raised with 
him the fact that there were demands being made for money, for con- 
tinued money, there was no money around to pay it. He asked me how, 
you know, how much it was going to cost. I gave him my best estimate, 
which I said was $1 million or more. He, in turn, said to me, "Well, 
$1 million is certainly no problem to raise," and turned to Mr. Halde- 
man and made a similar comment and then he came back after, just 
a briof discussion on that, and I remember very clearly the way he 
pushed his chair away from his desk as he was looking back at Mr. 
Haldeman to get, you know, the same message through to Mr. Halde- 
man, you know, that $1 million is no problem. 



1522 

Then he came back up, he rolled his chair back up toward the desk 
and said to me who is making the principal demands for this money at 
that point in time. 

I said they were coming principally from Mr. Hunt through his 
attorney, and he turned to the discussion of the fact that he had talked 
with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Colson about clemency for Mr. Hunt 
and he expressed annoyance at the fact that Mr. Colson had come to 
him contrary to an instruction that the President was aware of that 
Colson wasn't to raise this with him. 

Senator Gurney. So there were discussions 

Mr. Dean. Then we went on to discuss the delivery, you know, how 
this money was delivered and I told him that it was laundered and told 
him I was learning about things that I had never known about before, 
and I recall very vividly how^ Mr. Haldeman thought this was very 
funny and started laughing. 

Senator Gurney. So there were really two main discussions on 
Watergate, the money, the coverup money that you have just discussed 
and also the Executive clemency, and Mr. Haldeman w^as present dur- 
ing these discussions ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Senator, not to take anything away from your 
interpretation but a lot of the discussion that occurred regarding the 
press conferences, the positions we were going to take on executive 
privilege, and the like, had direct implications on unraveling the 
Watergate. 

Senator Gurney. Well, I understand that. Indeed, I do, but I am 
talking about the criminal activities. Certainly press conferences, 
Executive clemency do not involve any criminal activity. I am just 
trying to pinpoint the criminal parts of it, and then, of course, there 
was the meeting on March 21. 

Mr. Dean. I might add that in, as I told you in one point in time 
when I went to discuss this with counsel, who is an experienced prose- 
cutor, he said that oftentimes intervening events show intention and 
purpose. That is why I have tried to report everything I know to the 
committee as fully as I know. 

Senator Gurney. I understand that, and I as a committee member 
am extremely glad you did, because I do think it sheds a lot of light 
and it will help the deliberations of the committee when other wit- 
nesses come before it. I am not in any way deprecating the importance 
of all of the events that surrounded these transactions in Watergate, 
but I am trying to pinpoint the criminal parts of it. 

And that really is the sum and substance of your direct knowledge, 
direct conversations with the President on the criminal activity ? 

Mr. Dean. On the INIarch 13 meeting. 

Senator Gurney. Well, I also said the March 21. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. We have gone over the March 21 meeting. 

Senator Gurney. Yes ; we don't need to go over it again. I am just 
pinpointing that time and that date. 

Mr. Dean. Then we jumped where the next in a series of meetings 
was in the April 15 period. 

Senator Gurney. Well, I realize that, but I am really not interested 
in that, I am not trying to cut you off here, but of course, the President 
himself later said that March 21 was the time when he first really 



1523 

realized the full implications. So I was just bringing us down to that 
date. 

Mr. Dean. I would recall how that came up, that the President se- 
lected that date, was as the result of a discussion that had occurred 
on March 15 — April 15, when he was searching his mind. I was being 
lead through a series of rather leading questions by the President and 
at one point in the convereation, he said to me, do you recall what day 
it was that you gave me the report on some of the implications of the 
Watergate case? Then before I even got an answer out that I didn't 
remember the exact date in March, he said, I believe it was the 21st. 

I said, I will have to check. 

It was the next day that, when I was in his office again that after- 
noon, talking about a press statement that he was going to put out, 
he said, I have gotten the confirmation now and I believe it was the 
21st. And he referred to it at that time as my cancer on the Presidency 
statement. That is the way I led that off and that is the way I had 
referred to it and that is the way he referred to it. 

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Dean. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye, if you will yield for just a moment, 
Mr. Dash said he wanted to make a statement concerning his under- 
standing of the rule of evidence. 

Mr. Dash. I think the question has come up from time to time and 
has been mentioned either by witnesses or by members of the commit- 
tee as to admissibility of certain hearsay evidence. A memorandum of 
law has been submitted to all members of the committee. The leading 
case of the Supreme Court is Krulewitch v. United States and that 
case has been the position of the committee and the counsel working 
on the committee that even hearsay testimony, and most of the hear- 
say testimony admitted falls within this rule, is an exception to the 
hearsay rule. 

The Supreme Court has ruled time and time again that where there 
is a conspiracy and there are overt acts — and I think at this stage of 
our hearings, there has been sufficient testimony which would go to a 
jury in a criminal case indicating that a conspiracy has occurred and 
that there have been overt acts — that therefore, the statements of a co- 
conspirator in the furtherance and in the course of the conspiracy, 
although hearsay, is an exception to the hearsay rule and is admitted 
in every court in this country. 

Therefore, even Mr. IMcCord's testimony, which was initially hear- 
say, following up on the evidence of other witnesses which established 
the conspiracy and overt acts, that the Supreme Court has ruled in 
Krulewitch and other cases that that testimony is admissible and goes 
to a jury and is used against the defendants that may be charged as 
conspirators as any other testimony and is an exception to the hearsay 
rule. 

Therefore. T think it should be made very clear and a memo has been 
ffiven to everv member of the committee that the hearsay evidence that 
has been admittpd before this committo would be admissible in any 
court of law in this couhtrv under the KriOewitch decision, excepting 
conspiracy and co-conspirator's statements from the hearsay rule. 



1524 

Senator Gurnet. What the chief counsel is saying, then, is that 
some people may be indicted on conspiracy, is that it, in addition to 
obstruction of justice and other things ? 

Mr. Dash. Oh, quite certainly. Senator. The evidence before this 
committee, and I understand the evidence being considered by the 
prosecutors, includes the doctrine of conspiracy with two or more 
persons engaged in the commission of a crime that is a conspiracy. I 
understand that even Mr. LaRue, who just recently pleaded guilty, 
and this was made public knowledge, pleaded guilty to a conspiracy 
count rather than any other count, and that conspiracy is a major 
crime in this inquiry and in the inquiry made by a special prosecutor. 

Senator Gurnet. Did you say Mr. LaRue pleaded guilty to con- 
spiracy ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Senator Gurnet. I thought it was obstruction of justice? 

Mr. Dash. No; conspiracy to obstruct justice, Senator. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I say a word on this subject ? 

Senator Ervin. Sure. 

Senator Baker. I do not mean to be facetious and I do not mean this 
to be critical of Mr. Dash, who is a fine lawyer, and Senator Gumey, 
who is a fine lawyer and a fine Senator, but this committee is too far 
gone to start worrying about hearsay and we are too deep into the 
business of finding the facts to try to second-guess what a court will 
admit or will not admit. I have spent a lifetime being surprised on 
what a court would admit or would not admit, depending on my point 
of view. I think it was Oliver Wendell Holmes who said lawyers spend 
their professional careers shoveling smoke and I have no desire to 
shovel smoke. 

So I really recommend, Mr. Chairman, and once again, this is not a 
criticism of the committee or counsel, I recommend that we not think 
of ourselves as a court or a jury or a judge, and that we try to follow 
the facts wherever they lead us with the full foreknowledge that what 
we do will have little, if any, effect on how the rules of evidence are 
applied if there is in fact litigation, either civil or criminal, based on 
these same facts. 

So I think that rules of this committee are important and the rule 
against hearsay and its exceptions--and the hearsay rule is virtually 
emasculated by the hundreds of exceptions to it — but I think the rules 
themselves are far less important than us getting along with the busi- 
ness at hand. So I very much hope that we do not fall into the business 
of extensive objections, the argument of objections, and the arguments 
about rules of law that may apply. If we get too far out of bounds, I 
think we ought to qualify the quality of the evidence so that we can 
take that into account. But I do not think, and I hope we do not start 
admitting and excluding evidence. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

Senator ER\^N, I would just like to make the observation that Felix 
Frankfurter wrote a very interesting article at the time about the Tea- 
pot Dome and he laid great stress on the wisdom of the fact that con- 
gressional committees should not be bound by technical rules of evi- 
dence, I do think, however, that it was well for Mr, Dash to make his 
statement, because I have read several articles by commentators who 



1525 

are not lawyers and who were criticizing the committee on the ground 
that it had received hearsay testimony. I am not concerned much about 
criticism, because I have been criticized very much over the j-ears and 
I am sort of immune to it, but I think it is well for the general i^ublic 
to know that under the rules governing the admissibility of declara- 
tions of co-conspirators, the great bulk of the hearsay testimony that 
has been received in this case would have been admissible in a court of 
law for an indictment charging a conspiracy to obstruct justice. 

I think the observations of my friend from Tennessee are correct, 
that we are not judges and we are not juries. We are members of a 
legislati^•e body seeking to determine whether or not the facts before 
us indicate that new leo;islation may be necessary. 

Senator Baker. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that by explaining my 
point of view, I have fallen into the trap that the chairman just warned 
me against. He and I had a brief conversation a moment ago, and I am 
sure he will not think it a breach of confidence to repeat it. He said, 
Howard, he said, do not try to explain ; your friends do not require it 
and your enemies will not believe it. 

Senator Er\t[x. I agree with you. I was not trying to explain, I was 
just trying to enlighten some of our commentators. 

I would like to put in the record a legal memorandum which sustains 
the points made by Mr. Dash. 

[The memorandum by Mr. Dash was marked exhibit No. 68.*] 

Mr. Thompson. IMr. Chairman, on that point, I do not want to be- 
labor the matter. If I am in error, I want to be corrected for my mis- 
information, but I think what Mr. Dash has said is completely correct. 
I think there might be one additional consideration. It goes to the point 
of admissibility under any circumstance about what this witness 
thought another man was thinking at any particular time, his mind 
as to what some other individual was thinking or his impressions of 
thoughts, and I think that is a completely different matter. With that 
statement, I would like to subscribe to everything j^ou and the co- 
chairman and Mr. Dash have said. 

Senator Ervix. I agree with you on that. 

Mr. Deax. I just want to 

Senator Ervix. I am from near Watauga County in North Carolina, 
the county where Rufus Edmisten comes from. This man had been 
in court over in Boone, the county seat. He came back that night and 
was in the country store and he mentioned the fact that he had been 
over to the court in Boone, and somebody asked him what was going 
on there. 

Well, he said, there was the judge sitting up there; there was the 
jury sitting over in the jury box, and there were the lawyers. He said, 
some of the lawyers were objecting and others were excepting and the 
costs were piling up. 

Senator Baker. You know. Mr. Chairman, if this is storytelling 
time, my distinguished chairman is going to have to suffer for ha^dng 
set the example for me. But in the course of all of our testimony, to the 
extent that we have conflicts in it, I am reminded of an old lawyer in 
Scott County. Tenn., named Ha^nivood Pemberton, who was employed 
to defend a man. 

•See p. 1783. 



1526 

He said, I have just shot a man, Haywood, will you defend me? 

He said, of course I will defend you. Did you kill him ? 

He said, no, I have just wounded him. 

He said, that is all right, but just remember, he will be an awful hard 
witness against you. 

Senator Ervin. I believe the witness wants to make some observa- 
tions. Then we will go to Senator Inouye. 

Mr. Dean. I just wanted to say, Mr. Chairman, that as you know, 
I am here under compulsion of the committee and I have tried to with- 
hold nothing from the committee at any time and I did not want these 
conversations to reflect that there has been any hesitancy on this wit- 
ness to answer any question put to him and to answer it fully and 
honestly. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye ? 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I regret I have no Hawaiian stories 
to tell. [Applause.] 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, in order to avoid confusion, I wish 
to advise the Chair that the questions I am about to ask Mr, Dean were 
not prepared by the Office of the Counsel of the President. 

Mr. Dean, I will refer to testimony received yesterday. To the fol- 
lowing statement, you made your response. This is the statement : 

Mr. Dean, you have depicted all others in the White House as excessively pre- 
occupied with political intelligence, use of overt methods of security, and your- 
self as a restraining influence on these pre-occupaticns. 

And, Mr. Dean, this was your response : 

I do believe I was a restraining influence at the White House to many wild 
and crazy schemes. I have testified to some of them. Some of them I have not 
testified to. Many of the memorandums that came into my office became a joke ; 
in fact, some of the things that were being suggested. I think if you talked to 
some of the other members of my staff or if your investigators would like to talk 
to them, they would tell you some of two things that we would automatically 
file, just like the political enemies project. Many of these just went right into 
the file and never anything further until extreme pressure was put on me to do 
something did I ever do anything. So I do feel I had some restraining influence. 
I did not have a disposition or like for this type of activity. 

Mr. Dean, I would like now to refer to a memo dated August 16, 
1971, and you have testified that this was prepared for Mr. Haldeman, 
Mr. Ehrlichman, and others at the White House. It is dated August 16, 
1971. It is classified "Confidential." Subject : "Dealing With Our Po- 
litical Enemies." I would like to read part of this : 

This memorandum addresses the matter of how we can maximize the fact of 
our incumbency in dealing with persons known to be active in their opposition 
to our Administration. Stated a bit more bluntly — how we can use the available 
federal machinery to screw our political enemies. 

After reviewing this matter with a number of persons possessed of expertise 
in the field, I have concluded that we do not need an elaborate mechanism or 
game plan, rather we need a good project coordinator and full support for the 
project. In brief, the system would work as follows : 

Key members of the staff (e.g., Colson, Dent. Flanigan, Buchanan) should be 
requested to inform us as to who they feel we should be giving a hard time. 

The project coordinator should then determine what sorts of dealings these 
individuals have with the federal government and how we can best screw them 
(e.g., grants availability, fedei'al contracts, litigation, prosecution, etc.). 

The project coordinator then should have access to and the full support of the 
top oflBcials of the agency or department in proceeding to deal with the individual. 



1527 

This is a very important memorandum. Is this your idea of restrain- 
ing influence? 

Mr. Deax. As I said. Senator, in the memorandum, first of all, as I 
answered that question yesterday, it took a good bit of push before I 
would prepare even a document like that. I had request after request 
after request to prepare this. I didn't know a thing about how to 
handle something like this, so I went and talked to other people about 
it. I think that is indicated in the memorandum itself. 

I also made it very clear in the memorandum that this is something 
that I personally was not going to get involved in. Whoever that project 
coordinator was going to be, it was not going to be John Dean, be- 
cause I just didn't want to get involved in doing the sort of things they 
wanted. 

As I say, when the thing didn't float, they kept sending their po- 
litical enemies suggestions back to me. I never did a thing to get a 
project coordinator. There was some rather loose talk about indi- 
viduals who might handle this ; I can't even recall their names now. 
I made no effort to find somebody to head this up and while there was 
a conception on behalf of some who kept sending these things in for 
my political enemies project, there was no political enemies project 
operating out of my office. 

So I thought that while the memo had gone out and, you know, 
satisfied my superiors that something was being done, in fact, it was 
not being done. So I felt there was a restraint. 

Senator Ixouye. It is your testimony, then, that this memo described 
an activity which, in the minds of your supporters, was considered 
important. 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Ixouye. It was not a wild or crazy scheme ? 

Mr. Deax. To me it was a wild and crazy scheme, because I felt I 
just didn't operate that way. 

Senator Ixouye. Was it considered wild or crazy scheme for Mr. 
Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir. 

Senator Ixouye, In your testimony, you have submitted several 
exhibits with lists of names — politicos, Members of Congress, mem- 
bers of the media, and members of the entertainment field, et cetera, 
et cetera, taking this memo together with that list 

Mr, Deax, I might add also. Senator, before we go forward, I didn't 
believe that list is complete in and of itself. It ju.=t happens to be a part 
that I received and had access to before my files were shut down. There 
mav well be additional names and additional information available on 
that. 

Senator Ixouye, Mr, Dean, I believe one list would have been 
enough, 

Mr, Deax. Indeed it would. 

Senator Ixouye. And on one of your exhibits, you had a copy of a 
memo which suggested that certain things can be done, such as calling 
the Internal Revenue Service. 

Xow, in addition to that, you testified that in one of your meetings 
with President Nixon, you quoted the President as saying, "We will 
take care of them after the election," Avhen the President referred to 
enemy newsmen. 



1528 

'Is that correct, sir ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Inouye. How was this memo implemented ? Could you give 
us examples, concrete examples ? 

Mr. Dean. The memo itself was never implemented. I never did have 
a political enemies project that was in any way operational. 

Senator Inouye. However, we do have evidence here that, for exam- 
ple, a TV commentator with CBS was, in fact, audited by the Internal 
Revenue Service just for the purpose of harassment, isn't that correct? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I know Mr. Schorr had an FBI investigation. 

Senator Inouye. Oh, it was an FBI ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it was. I know there were other instances. These did 
not come from me. 

Another instance, many times, members of the staff who were oper- 
ating in the political area would want to see a tax return. My office was 
supposed to be the office to have the facility to receive from Internal 
Revenue tax returns. I never called at any time I can ever remember 
while I was there to the Director of the Internal Revenue Service 
requesting he send over a tax return on any individual to my office. 

Senator Inouye. Have you ever seen tax returns ? 

Mr. Dean. Have I other than my own ? 

Senator Inouye. Other than your own. 

Mr. Dean. Only in connection with clearing individuals who volun- 
tarily submitted them in relationship to a nomination for a Presiden- 
tial appointment. 

Senator Inouye. In your memo, you speak of granting availability. 
Federal contracts, et cetera. I refer you to exhibit No. 53.* It is a memo 
for you from Gordon Strachan and it relates to Mr. Chet Huntley. 
It says here, "John Whitaker has ordered the Department of Agri- 
culture to quit dragging its heels on Big Sky." 

Was this a j^olitical favor ? 

Mr. Dean. Wliat is the number of the exhibit. Senator ? 

Senator Inouye. I believe it is 53, sir. 

Mr. Dean. I recall the exhibit you are referring to, but it is not 53 
in my sequence here. I believe that might be in 4, 5, 6, or 7. 

Well, anyway, I can answer the question. I recall there is a notation 
on it. 

There was at one point in time an effort, because of a comment — a 
rather hostile comment that Mr. Huntley had made regarding the 
President — there was an effort that I initially was unaware of to make 
it as difficult as possible for him to get his Big Sky project moving. 
Apparently, he needed assistance from tlie Department of the Inteiior. 
I would receive i^eriodic calls asking me what is happening on that, 
and the like. I would, in turn, call John Whitaker, who is the person 
on the Domestic Council staff' who had dealings with the Department 
of Interior. 

At one point in time, apparently, there was a change in heart on 
Chet Huntley and there was a turnaround, and Interior was given the 
signal that they should sign off on whatever it was he needed to get 
his Big Sky project accomplished. 

Now, I would have to review the document that you are referring 
to, and that may well answer your question. 

♦See p. 1701. 



1529 

Senator Inotjte. I believe this line of questioning is very important, 
because your exhibits have listed, I would say, a couple of hundred 
names of very distinguished Americans, most of them, and other 
exhibits have suggested that extra-legal activities had been carried out 
in connection with these names. 

Xow, there are Members of the Senate and Members of tlie House 
whose names have appeared, but to date, you have been able to tell us 
of the possibility of a man from CBS, and Chet Huntley. 

Are there any other concrete examples? I am asking you this be- 
cause Mr. Colson has gone on the air suggesting that the lists you sub- 
mitted were a social list, that this was a list used by the White House 
so that they would not invite the names listed there for the White 
House dinners. 

Mr. Dean. I think you will note in there at some point — first of all, 
that ]Mr. Colson, there is a memorandum to him in one of the exhibits 
where he was to cull out the 20 worst enemies and submit them. This 
was again because I was receiving through Mr. Higby and Mr. 
Strachan a direct request from ]Mr. Haldeman that he wanted to nail 
this down as to the 20, or the minimum number that we could do some- 
thing with. 

So, we went through this big thing of taking all the lists Mr. Colson 
had. and Mr. Colson went through and checked off through his lists 
what he thought were his candidates. He was the only one that I knew 
that dealt in these areas. I certainly — none of these people were my 
enemies. In fact, most of these names were unfamiliar to me. 

As a result of that, I sent a memorandum to Mr. Higby indicating, 
here are the lists, don't let it go over 20, and this was sent to ]\Ir. Higby 
for Mr. Haldeman's final review. It was sent back to me and went back 
in the file again. 

Senator Ixouye. Did you know if anything ever happened to these 
20 on the top — hit parade ? 

Mr. Dean. I cannot answer that, because I think it was realized that 
my office had less than enthusiasm for dealing with things like this. 

Senator Ixouye. Are you suggesting that this listing of names was 
just an exercise? 

]Mr. Deax. As far as I was concerned, it was an exercise that I had 
no intention to implement ; that is correct. Senator. 

Senator Ixouye. Are you aware of any person or any agency or any 
official using these lists to do harm or injury or to assist? 

Mr. Deax. They were principally used by Mr. Colson and Mr. Halde- 
man and I don't know what they did with them. I know on one oc- 
casion, I had a call regarding the fact that some of the President's 
friends — and these are in exhibits and I just think it would be in- 
appropriate right now to mention the individuals' names — were having 
tax problems, and I was to look into those. I had Mr. Caul field, who 
had — who was the person on my staff, who was the only one I knew — 
who had a relationship with the Internal Revenue Service — because I 
could onlv deal with the Director. 

I did deal with one of his assistants from time to time on sensitive 
cases, where thev were just brought to our attention if somebodv in 
the administration was having a normal audit, just to alert the "White 
House to the fact that such an audit was occurring. 



1530 

At any rate, as I was saying, I was told that I was to do something 
about these audits that were being performed on two friends of the 
President's. They felt they that they were being harassed and the like. 

There is a third instance there this occurred also. Now, on the — 
finally, when I got around to checking on it, Mr. Caulfield sent me some 
information which I think is evidenced in the exhibit and a note went 
to Mr. Higby. Mr. Higby sent it in to Mr. Haldcman, and Mr. Halde- 
man wrote a note on the bottom, "This has already been taken care of." 
So obviously, things were happening that I had no idea on. 

Now, I would again like to defer from using names in this instance, 
but there was a request of an audit that was commencing on somebody 
who was close to the President and several people got involved in this. 
They said, John, you have got to do something about this, because the 
President is just going to hit the roof when he finds out about it. 

Well, I went to the Justice Department because it had already gone 
from Internal Revenue to the Criminal Division of the Justice Depart- 
ment. I spoke with Mr. Erickson about it. He said, this man is just up 
to his teeth in the problem. 

I reported back to the people who were asking me. I said, just do not 
touch this, there is just no way; this man is in trouble and he has 
got to be told he is in trouble. 

So that was the way 1 handled these situations, and I thought that 
was the proper way the counsel's office should handle them. 

Senator Inouye. Do you know from your own personal knowledge, 
Mr. Dean, if any Member of the U.S. Congress was ever subjected to 
an Internal Revenue Service audit or surveillance by the FBI ? 

Mr. Dean. The only — I do not know from my own knowledge of any 
audits being commenced on any Member of the U.S. Congress. I do 
know that there was extensive surveillance on Senator Kennedy, which 
I have testified to. 

Senator Inouye. Was this for political purposes ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir, it was. 

Senator Inouye. Wlio else ? 

Mr. Dean. Senator Kennedy was the principal one. I would say the 
greatest amount of surveillance was conducted on Senator Kennedy, 
and subsequently, politically embarrassing information was sought 
on 

Senator Inouye. Was the FBI aware that this surveillance was for 
political purposes? 

Mr. Dean. The FBI did not perform this. This was performed 
directly by the White House. Now, whether any information was 
requested from the FBI, I do not know on this. 

Senator Inouye. Are you aware of any member of the press being 
subjected to a special audit or surveillance by the FBI ? 

Mr. Dean. I am aware of one member of the press being subjected 
to an audit, and this was an audit that was initiated as a result of an 
adverse story he had written regarding a friend of the President. 

Senator Inouye. Who is this person ? 

Mr. Dean. I would have to check my records on this, which are un- 
available to me still, as I have said. I do recall it was a reporter from 
Newsday, who had worked on a story on Mr. Rebozo. 



1531 

Senator Ixouye. Thank you. "Wlio do you think could assist this com- 
mittee in testifying as to whether these lists were ever used for pur- 
poses described in your memo ? 

JNIr. Dean. Well, I would say that the man who is most knowledge- 
able is the man who has described them as socialists, so I do not know 
if you will find out what was done there. 

Also, it is possible that Mr. Caulfield may be able to provide some 
assistance to the committee in this regard, and I feel Mr. Caulfield 
would be very honest and forthcoming with the committee. 

Senator Inouye. Then, your testimony is that with the exception of 
this columnist and this television commentator and Mr. Chet Huntley 
and Senator Kennedy, you are not aware of how these lists were ever 
used ? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir. I am also aware, and I would have to again be 
able to look through my files on this, there were a number of requests 
from various members of the White House staff to see if tax exemp- 
tions and alteration of the tax status could be removed from various 
charitable foundations and the like, that were producing material that 
was felt hostile to the administration or their leaders were taking posi- 
tions that were hostile to the administration, and on occasions I checked 
this out, and their activities were deemed to be perfectly proper within 
the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and nothing was done on 
these. 

Senator Inouye. These files are presently available in the White 
House ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I believe they would be in my files in the White 
House. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, may I request that these files be 
made available, sir ? 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Dash will communicate 

Mr. Dean. I will have to at some point, there have been a number of 
requests for material, that I would hope that the committee would put 
the White House on notice or they may well not be there when I get 
there. 

Senator Ervin. In this connection, you have testified the other day 
that when you went to the White House to see some of your files that 
you were required to write them out, as I understand, in longhand, 
and somebody would not allow you to make copies like Xerox? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. Presently, I am not allowed to Xerox 
any copies of anything, and I would hope, particularly with the request 
of Senator Gurney for my financial records, that I not have to sit and 
copy all my own financial records. 

Senator Ervin. I believe you also stated you had to stand up and 
copy it ? 

Mr. Dean. I was able to sit in a chair and write on a safe that was 
several feet above the chair. 

Senator Ervin. Did you make a request of anybody for the oppor- 
tunity to have these copied on a Xerox ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did and mv counsel did, and I wrote a letter to 
the President requesting it, and I was denied. 

Senator Ervin. Do you have a copy of the letter to the President? 

Mr. Dean. My counsel can supply the letter that was written ; yes, 
sir. 



1532 

Senator Ervin. Wlio originally denied you the right to copy them ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, when I was — my resignation was requested on the 
30th, I recalled a call from my secretary who said "What do I do? 
They are in here putting bands around all your safes and all your 
material." And I said, "Just let them band it all." And subsequently, 
they transferred it all down to the basement of the Executive Office 
Building. 

Senator Ervin. Did you talk to any individuals up there about hav- 
ing the right of access to them and the right to have your files copied 
by Xerox or otherwise ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. I had my counsel send a letter, and I sat down 
and talked with Mr. Buzhardt, and Mr. Buzhardt just said, "I am 
sorry, I cannot do anything for you about it." 

Senator Ervin. Is he not the White House counsel now? 

Mr. Dean. He is a special counsel on the Watergate. 

Senator Ervin. Special counsel on Watergate, and Mr. Buzhardt 
refused to allow you, or at least, he declined your request ? 

Mr. Dean. To permit me to copy ; yes, sir. In fact, they were permit- 
ting me earlier to make some copies. My chronofiles which I would like 
to have just for future use, and my secretary was stopped from making 
any copies. 

Senator Ervin. Unless there is some objection from some member 
of the committee, I will direct the staff of the committee to communi- 
cate with the White House and ask the White House to give Mr. Dean 
access to his files and also the privilege of copying them by Xerox or 
other means. 

Mr. Dean. I tliink that a number of the questions that Senator Mon- 
toya asked about executive privilege could also be answered if I had 
access to some of my files on executive privilege. I might add also that 
my office files were not only contained in my own personal files, but 
they are contained in other members of my staff who I do not believe 
their files have been bound, and I would hope to have the opportunity 
to check things that I knew they were working on for me that relate 
to many of these items. 

Senator Ervin. And without objection on the part of the committee, 
I would request your counsel to supply the committee a copy of the 
letter to the President asking for access to these files. 

Mr. Shaffer. We will do that, IVIr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you very much. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean, you have just indicated that one of our 
colleagues, the senior Senator from Massachusetts, was placed under 
surveillance. Was this electronic ? 

Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge. It was initially 

Senator Inouye. Any break-ins, burglaries ? 

Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Inottye. Were members of his staff also subjected to this? 

Mr. Dean. I do not know. I think there was some effort to make con- 
tact or do some examination of some of the women who were also pres- 
ent during tho Chappaquiddick incident, and there mav have been 
some investigations made of them also. I do not have all the details on 
this, and I am afraid that others, Mr. Caulfield and IVIr. TTlasewicz, can 
tell you most about that. I do not know if Mr. Hunt is going to appear. 



1533 

but apparently he did an investigation for Mr, Colson of Mr. Ken- 
nedy, Senator Kennedy, also. 

Senator Ixouye. CJn i^'ebruary 10 and 11, important meetings were 
held in La Costa i 

Mr. Deax. February 10 and 11, correct. 

Senator Ixouye. February 10 and 11, which have extra significance 
to this committee because from your testimony, I recall that on top of 
tlie agenda was the discussion of the makeup of this panel. 

Mr. Deax. lliat is correct. 1 believe the Senator recalls my comment 
on that. 

Senator Ixouye. Did the meetings go beyond just the discussion of 
the background of panel members; did it go into how to influence, how 
to intimidate, threaten ? 

Mr. Deax'. Not at that point, sir, and I do not recall that. It was 
more just an assessment of Avho. I think the AYhite House was looking 
for friends on the committee then, you know, so they might find out 
what the committee was going to do, was the initial concern. 

Senator Ixouye. I refer to an article which appeared in the Char- 
lotte Observer, dated May 17, 1973, and it reads as follows: "High 
officials in the Xorth Carolina Republican Party confirmed Wednesday 
that H. E. (Bob) Halcleman, at the time President Nixon's chief of 
staff, made two attempts to get local party officials to 'dig up something 
to discredit Ervin and blast him with it.' According to the sources, 
Haldeman placed two phone calls to former White House aide Harry 
Dent and asked Dent to relay the suggestion to State Republican 
Chairman Frank Rouse." 

Who is Harry Dent? 

]Mr. Dean. Mr. Dent is a former special counsel to the President. His 
principal area of activity was in the political area with regard to 
Southern States. I believe he is from the chairman's State. He has 
departed from the White House staff and is in the private practice of 
law. He was on the White House staff' for a number of years. I believe 
he Avas in the 1969 campaign, and he operates his law practice in both 
North Carolina and Washington, D.C. 

Senator Ixouye. Was this type of activity part of the job descrip- 
tion? 

Mr. Deax. Part of his job description? I believe the activity that is 
referred to occurred after ]Mr. Dent had departed from the White 
House staff. 

Senator Ixouyt:. Are you aware if this activity did, in fact, occur? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir. I have no firsthand knowledge of that, the only 
recollection I have of any effort to get any information on the chair- 
man came to me when I had, after returning from Florida — from the 
La Costa meetings I went, as I recall, on the 12th to Florida and spent 
a week down there. When I returned back, I wanted to reconfirm with 
Mr. Baroody the attack group which is a group of media-oriented 
people who had formerly operated under Mr. Colson would no longer— 
would stay out of the Water<xate area, that they would not have this 
on their morning agenda, and it was also in connection with this meet- 
inc: that the President was asking that a speech be prepared to counter- 
offensive the general thrust of these hearings by laying out the number 
of demonstrations he had been subject to and the fact these had been 
paid for by Democrats and the like. 



1534 

I can recall Mr. Baroody and I also discussing other areas of counter- 
offensive and the like. It was that time that he told me, either that night 
or the next night, that he was meeting with some people from North 
Carolina and they thought they may have some interesting informa- 
tion on the Senator. 

Senator Inouye. Were any other members of this committee sub- 
jected to special treatment? One member has suggested that he has 
been subjected to special treatment. Were other members subjected to 
special treatment? 

Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge. I was not involved in that par- 
ticular activity ; no sir. 

Senator Inouye. Did you ever discuss special treatment? 

]Mr. Dean. It very well could have come up at La Costa as to 

Senator Inouye. I am testing your power of recollection. 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. It happened just recently ; what can you recall, sir ? 

Mr. Dean. With regard to other members of the committee? 

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir; because I can't imagine meeting for 12 
hours and just deciding that Senator so and so is an attorney, he prac- 
ticed for 10 years, he was born in 1934. 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; that was a very brief part of the meeting in the 
early morning on the first day in which there was a great disappoint- 
ment at the fact that the White House had not had more influence on 
deciding who would be a member of the committee from the Re- 
publican side certainly, and I would hope, and I would assume if they 
could have had any influence on the totality of the appointment of the 
committee, they would have been very happy but they had at least 
hoped to have an influence on the appointment and selection of the mi- 
nority members. I think that is very clearly reflected in this document 
that I have submitted to the committee from Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Inouye. Did you discuss the possibility of digging up dirt 
on anyone of the members here ? 

Mr. Dean. We hadn't gotten around to that at that point, Senator. 
I said we had not gotten to that point yet. 

Senator Inouye. When did you get to that point, sir ? 

Mr. Dean. I am trying to recall specifically, I think it was just to 
familiarize — when I was reading from the Congressional Directory, a 
number of the members of the committee were men I did not know, I 
had prior dealings with the chairman, I had had prior dealings with 
Senator Gumey, I had had prior dealings with Senator Weicker. They 
were the only members of the committee I knew, Mr. Timmons had 
given his assessment to Mr. Haldeman and this was just a general 
session at this point as to the composition of the committee, the general 
philosophy and makeup of the committee. 

Senator Inouye, You just stated that at a later time you came to the 
digging up dirt. When did you get to the digging up dirt stage? 

Mr. Dean. That must have been, I can only recall an allusion to the 
fact that this would be. you know, looking into at some point in time 
but it reallv was not the focus of any discussion I can recall. 

Senator Inoitye. "V^Hio suggested this, sir? 

Mr, Dean, The only comment I can recall making myself is, and I 
had made a similar comment with regard to the Patman committee 



1535 

hearing, and you will recall that I requested, after a discussion with 
Mr. Haldeman, that we check the financial or the campaign filing 
requirements of the members of the Patman committee. I did receive 
a document, I have submitted that document. To this day I have not 
read that document and I can't tell you what it says, I didn't have any 
interest in that. I had also been suggesting, I had had a suggestion, for 
Mr. Plaldeman to call Governor Connallv, to ask him about ^Nlr. Pat- 
man and he said, "I think ]Mr, Patman might have one soft spot," but 
he also indicated some Eepublicans might have similar soft spots, and 
when Mr. Timmons and I discussed this we realized this might create 
more problems than it would solve. 

Now, coming back to this committee, I can recall a comment when 
this discussion came up that it would be very difficult for some mem- 
bers, possibly some of the members of this committee, to throw stones 
when they were living in a glass house, and that is the comment I 
recall making. 

Senator Inotjye. Returning to the President's statement which you 
quoted, '"That we will take care of them after the election," did the 
President ever tell you what he meant by that ? 

Mr. Deax. To me, the way the conversation was evolving, and it 
moved right from there to the Internal Revenue Service, and there 
ma}' have preceded that — because I am taking such care in any refer- 
ence that I make to any conversations I recall with the President— to 
something about the Internal Revenue Service that led into the fact 
that I should keep a good list and then he went on to talk, I do recall 
him very clearly telling me to make a good list of those who are giving 
us problems, that we will take care of them after the election. We will 
make life less than pleasant for them, and it moved, the conversation 
moved, directly from there to a discussion of the Internal Revenue 
Service, and I told him how, I was really telling him the fact that I 
could not call Mr. Walters and tell "Sir. Walters to get an audit started. 

And the President was rather annoyed at this and I told him the 
reason why when he asked me and I said, well, because the bureaucracy 
of the Internal Revenue Service is primarily Democratic and some- 
thing like this cannot be done. 

Senator Ixoute. Did you ever call Mr. Walters to attempt to pro- 
vide special treatment for anyone ? 

Mr. Dean. To provide special treatment ? 

Senator Inottye. Yes or to 

Mr. Deax. No. I called him and asked him a number of questions on 
occasions on tax cases, yes, but I don't recall ever asking him for 
special treatment and, to the contrary, Mr. Walters is the type of man 
that he and I discussed on a number of occasions the extreme danger 
of the White House doing anything that would politicize the Internal 
Revenue Sernce and he felt very strongly about that and the like. 

Now, I got criticisms 

Senator Ixotte. Mr. Walters was not the man to see, who was your 
contact man in the Internal Revenue Service ? 

Mr. Deax. Mr. Taulfipld liad a contact man and he will have to tell 
you who that is because I do not know. 

Senator Ixottye. I thank you very much, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Deax. Thank you. Senator. 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 13 



1536 

Senator Ervin. I sort of regret that anything was brought out about 
the alleged attempt, the request, of Bob Haldeman about me, but I am 
glad it happened because President Nixon's campaign manager in 
1968 and again in 1972 Charles R. Jonas, Jr., made this statement, 
and I cannot refrain from reading it because I am very grateful to 
him for it. He said, "Charles R. Jonas, Jr., who headed Nixon's re- 
election campaign in North Carolina, and has recently said he might 
run for Ervin's Senate seat, said he had not been contacted by anyone 
to discredit Ervin. 'That would be an impossible task and almost 
foolish to attempt,' Jonas said when reached by phone. 'I think that 
Senator Ervin is one of the handful of people in the Senate whom it 
would be impossible to discredit. I think that is why he was chosen. 
He has a record of impeccable honesty and integrity. If I had to de- 
pend on any one person in the Senate to proceed fairly and in a way 
that would protect the innocent, it would be Senator Ervin.' " 

I am deeply grateful for that compliment. [Applause.] 

And furthermore [laughter] when I was asked about this I said 
it did not disturb me at all and I deeply regretted to say that all 
the indiscretions I had committed were barred by the statute of limita- 
tions and lapse of time. [Laughter.] And that I had lost my capacity 
to commit further indiscretions. [Applause and laughter.] 

Senator Inouye. You are not that old. 

Senator Er\t:n. This article states that Secretary Butz went down 
to North Carolina and made some uncomplimentary remarks about me 
in connection with this investigation, saying I should call it off, as if it 
is my investigation rather than the Senate's. And I was called and 
asked if I had any comments on Secretary Butz' statement and I said, 
"only one, and that was if the Secretary would come down before the 
committee and testify on his oath and on his personal knowledge that 
the Watergate affair had never happened, I would be the happiest man 
in the United States." 

The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

[Wliereupon, at 11 :55 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 2 p.m., this same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Friday, June 29, 1973 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Dean, was George Wallace of Alabama, on the list of enemies? 

Mr. Dean. Senator, I never really have gone through the list of 
enemies so I cannot name that. The only thing I know about Mr. Wal- 
lace in that relationship at all is that, the fact that, I understand that 
during Mr. Wallace's — Governor Wallace's — last gubernatorial cam- 
paign, that a substantial amount of money was provided by Mr. Kalm- 
bach, somewhere between $200,000 and $400,000, to Mr. Wallace's 
opponent. 

Senator Ervin. That was provided in the last Governor's race in 
Alabama ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. Between $200,000 and $400,000 ? 

Mr. Dean. 200. 

Senator Ervin. 200,000. 



1637 

Mr. Dean. And $400,000, yes. I do not know the precise figure. 
Senator Ervix. Yes, I have no further questions. Senator Baker. 
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 
Do I understand that you know that of your own knowledge, Mr. 
Dean? 

Mr. Dean. Tliat was told me by Mr. Kalmbach, who apparently 
made the arrangements. 

Senator Baker. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Dean, this is your fifth day on the stand, and it is, I hope, the 
last session for this committee and for you and, therefore, I intend 
to abbreviate my questions, although following the same technique I 
did yesterday. Let me tell you in advance the two questions I want 
to ask which will require multiple answers, and try to suggest a format 
for the purposes of abbreviation. Obviously, if you have an elabora- 
tion that you wish to make on any of these points you are free to do 
so. But if you could answer them first and then elaborate, it would 
help us along. 

My primary thesis is still what did the President know, and when 
did he know it ? 

Oh, yes, I asked you to respond and you did respond, in terms of 
the quality of your knowledge, that is to say, whether it was direct 
first-hand information, whether it was circumstantial or whether it 
was second-hand or hearsay information. 
Mr. Dean. And I also believe I added documentary. 
Senator Baker. Documentary evidence, that is correct. What I 
would like to do today is to limit that inquiry to the remaining meet- 
ings that we did not cover and to direct information only. This is not to 
imply that I am not interested in the other but I hope to contain this to 
about 20 minutes, and if you could tell me in seratim what you know 
first-hand of your own knowledge of the President's knowledge, and 
the date of tliat knowledge, beginning where we left off yesterday in 
February and working your way through the ending of j'our employ- 
ment at the White House. I would be grateful. 

Xow, the second question I am going to put to you after we finish 
that is one that really is, I am afraid, cumbersome and awkward. But 
you are a lawyer and I am a lawyer and we both understand the neces- 
sity for this. Rather than me asking you detailed and probing questions 
on particular areas of conflict in 3'our testimony and those of other 
witnesses who have testified or witnesses we may have hereafter about 
which you have personal knowledge, would you identify for me im- 
portant elements of controversy that you know or suspect to exist. This 
is once again for the sake of organizing your rather voluminous testi- 
mony so that we have some idea of how to test it against the testimony 
of other witnesses. If you think either of those questions unfair I will 
try to revise them. If you are agreeable to trying to proceed in that 
manner I would appreciate it if you began first with your first-hand 
knowledge of Presidential involvement in February where we con- 
cluded our interrogation yesterday. 

Mr. Dean. I believe that we stopped yesterday with the meeting on 
the 28th at which time I was told, I mentioned to you the fact that I 
had told the President that I also thought he ought to know of my 
involvement in the matter, and then I will have to move along. 



1538 

Now, again, it is hard for me to separate in a sense what is defined 
as involvement because there was an evolving pattern that came out of 
the La Costa meetings when I began having my direct dealings with 
the President, and many of these things related directly to that. 

Senator Baker. But even though the pattern of activity 

Mr. Dean. I understand. 

Senator Baker [continuing]. And the circumstances involved are 
important for the purpose of this abbreviated interrogation, would 
you please tell me what you told the President, the President told you, 
was said by the President in your presence or was said by you to the 
President. I guess that third one is unnecessary, but would you please 
do that, limiting it only to direct first-hand information for the pur- 
pose of this interrogation ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I think we ought to go to the next, as I say, the 
testimony 

Senator Baker. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dean [continuing]. Speaks for itself on a number of these mat- 
ters I just referred to and we ought to move then to the meeting on 
March 13 at which the, toward the conclusion of that meeting. 

Senator Baker. All right, would you stop just a moment, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, there is a vote in progress and I 
would like very much to finish this line of inquiry, and I would hope 
that the Chair would permit me to continue and, if the rest of the 
committee will go vote, I will continue with this interrogation. 

Senator Ervin. Fine. 

Mr. Dean. During the conclusion of the meeting on the 13th, the 
question of money and how to pay this support silence money came 
up, and I explained to the Presidents — ^I was telling the President of 
the problem. 

Senator Baker. Where were you? 

Mr. Dean. I was in the President's office. 

Senator Baker. In the oval office? 

Mr. Dean. In the oval office. 

Senator Baker. Who else was present? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman was present. 

'Senator Baker. Anyone else? 

Mr. Dean. That is 'all. 

Senator Baker. All right, go ahead, sir. 

Mr. Dean. I was telling the President — I don't believe Mr. Halde- 
man was present during the entire meeting to the best of my recollec- 
tion but he came into the meeting at some point, at the point he came 
in it was on an unrelated matter, the meeting was interrupted to re- 
solve his particular problem and he stayed in while I was finishing 
my discussion of this because it had come up shortly before he came 
in, and he sat and listened for just a moment while we were talking 
and then he took care of his business with the President and then 
stayed because it was quite obviously toward the end of my meeting 
with the President. 

Senator Baker. It might be useful to know how the meeting was 
arranged at your request, at the President's request, or through Mr. 
Haldeman, or how? 



1530 

Mr. Dean. The meeting was arranged per the request of the 
President. 

Senator Baker. All right. Would you continue please. 

jNIr. Dean. As I have testified the question of — I got into the dis- 
cussion of the fact because I had had countless cross pressures and 
the like as to who was going to raise this money that was being 
demanded, and ]Mr. Haldeman and ]Mr. Ehrlichman were unwilling 
to do it, Mr. Mitchell was unwilling to do it. 

Senator Baker. Are these the things you were saying to the Presi- 
dent '^ 

]Mr. Dean. I will get to that. I am prefacing what the circumstance 
was that resulted this coming up with the meeting with the President. 

Senator Baker. I don't mean to hamper you, but would it be possible 
to tell me of the conversation first and then to explain the background ? 

Mr. Dean. All right. I told the President at some point that, toward 
the end of the conversation of the meeting, that the individuals who 
had either been convicted or pleaded guilty were continuing to make 
their den:iands on the White House and that it would be some time in the 
not too distant future that these individuals would be up for sentenc- 
ing, and the demands were at this point again growing toward a 
crescendo point. 

The President asked me, "Well, how much are they demanding and 
how much is it going to cost?" And I said, "Well, to the best of my 
estimation it will cost a million dollars or more to continue the pay- 
ments.*' At that point, the President, I can recall this very vividly, 
leaned back in his chair and he sort of slid his chair back from the desk 
and he said to me that a million dollars was no problem at all. In fact, 
I have a very clear visual picture even of the President, of the fact 
that he had his hands somewhat in a position like this when he repeated 
it, when he looked over at Mr. Haldeman and said, "A million dollars 
is no problem to raise." 

Senator Baker. I take it from that that Mr. Haldeman was present 
during this portion of the conversation ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, he was. Yes, he was. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir. 

]Mr. Dean. It was then he asked me who was putting the pressure 
on for this, and I said it was principally coming tlirough his attorney 
and at that point the President raised the fact that Mr. Hunt, or he 
had had discussions with Mr. Haldeman — I mean with Mr. Ehrlich- 
man and Mr. Colson regarding clemency for Mr. Hunt. 

Senator Baker. I am sorry, my mind wandered. 

At that time he, the President, said that he had had conversations? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. And he also went on to tell me that, with 
some expressions of annoyance that, Mr. Colson had been told not to 
raise this with him, and he also said that Colson had raised it with him 
though, contrary to an instruction that he had received from Mr. 
Ehrlichman. 

Senator Baker. Was Mr. Haldeman present during this portion of 
the conversation ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, he was. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir. 



1540 

Mr. Dean. From there, he then asked me, he said, "How is this 
money handled?" and I said, "Well, I don't know all the details but 
I know there is a laundering process so the money cannot be traced to 
any source." 

And I explained what I knew about the laundering process, and I 
said, "I am learning about things I never knew about and the next 
time I will know better how to handle these matters," and I do re- 
member very vividly at this point Mr. Haldeman commenced with a 
rather good belly laugh. He thought this was quite funny, and that 
was that, the meeting really ended on that note. There was no fur- 
ther discussion on that point. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, sir. 

Would you move on to the next occasion. 

■Let me, while you are looking 

INIr. Dean. I just don't want to miss any of the points I have in 
here. I am very clear in my mind on the principal ones but I want 
to make sure there is no minor point that I miss also. 

Senator Baker. All right. I fully understand that. 1 am asking you 
to hurry through this, and you should fully understand, Mr. Dean, 
if there are other points in your testimony that bear directly on this 
question, the fact that you don't identify them now does not mean 
that you do not stand on your statement as previously made. I am 
simply trying to organize it for the committee's purposes. 

Mr. Dean. I understand. 

Senator Baker. While you are looking let me ask you this : It seems 
Mr. Haldeman was present during that meeting most of the time. Was 
there any significant conversation between you and the President 
before Mr. Haldeman came in? 

Mr. Dean. As I say, this conversation had commenced before Mr. 
Haldeman came in. It was interrupted and I went back — Mr. Halde- 
man sat down while I was telling the President about this and then 
stayed on during the remainder of the conversation. 

Senator Baker. Do you remember at what point he came in, what 
point in your conversation? 

Mr. Dean. I don't think I had gone much fiirther than telling the 
President that there were problems in raising money. 

Senator Baker. So it is fair to say, I assume, that Mr. Haldeman 
was there for virtually all of the conversation? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I think that is correct. 

Senator Baker. All right, sir, proceed if you will. 

Mr. Dean. At least, you know, 90 percent of the conversation, I 
would say. 

Senator Baker. Thank you. 

']Mr. Dean. The next occasion that I raised the matter with the 
President myself was when he called me on the evening of the 20th, 
I had gone home, I was at home, as I recall, it must have been about, 
I don't know, 7 :30, 7 :15, sometime in that period of time, he called 
me and I went down to my living room to take the call. 

Senator Baker. This was on March 20 ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. March 20. We were having a rather 
rambling conversation. I at this point, because of events that had 
proceeded over the last couple of days, told the President I would like 



1341 

to meet with him the next morning to discuss the implications of the 
Watergate case that I thought I ought to bring to his attention as they 
affected the White House stall' and himself. And he said, well, why 
don't you try to meet with me about 10 o'clock the next morning. Then 
we'll go to the meeting at 10 o'clock. That was on the 21st. 

As I told you, after the conversation with the President, and on the 
evening, the preceding evening, and the next morning I thought, both 
on my way to work in the morning and when I entered the office in the 
morning, how I could most dramatically present the situation which I 
thought had to end that very day— it could not proceed another hour 
as far as I was concerned — in a way that would be very meaningful 
to the President and based on my thought and my — some discussion 
I had had with Mr. Moore the preceding day, I decided I would tell 
the President that there was a cancer growing on the Presidency and 
something had to be done about the cancer oecause it was growing 
daily and if there were not immediate surgery, it was going to kill the 
President himself. 

So I started with lines to that ejffect. 

Senator Baker. Where did you meet with the President ? 

Mr. Deax. This was in the Oval Office. 

Senator Baker. And who was present ? 

Mr. Deax. Xo one other than the President and myself. 

Senator Baker. And it was at 10 o'clock in the morning. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, approximately 10 o'clock, as best I can 
recall. 

Senator Baker. Would you proceed with as much exactitude as you 
can. 

Mr. Deax. I then told the President that what I would like to do is 
give him a broad overview and let him come back and ask any questions 
he might like to ask. I wanted to explain to him how the continued 
support would be necessary, how continued perjury would be necessary 
to perpetuate the coverup. 

Senator Baker. Did you use those terms ? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, I did use those terms. 

Senator Baker. All right, sir, go ahead. 

Mr. Deax. That was my definition to him of how the cancer was 
growing; in other words, that more people would have to perjure 
themselves 

Senator Baker. Did you say these things as an advocate — that is, 
that other support and perjury should continue — or as examples as to 
why it should not continue ? 

Mr. Deax. As to why it should not continue. 

Senator Baker. Did you make this clear to the President ? 

Mr. Deax. Absolutely. 

Senator Baker. In what terms? 

Mr. Deax. As I say, I tried to make it as dramatic as the fact that 
this type of cancer was going to kill him and kill the Presidency if 
this tvpe of thing was not stopped by surgery and ending that type of 
activity. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir. Before you do, what was the Presi- 
dent's reaction to that ? 



1542 

Mr. Dean. The President, if I recall — and I was not looking for 
reactions at that point as much as trying to be as forceful and dramatic 
in my presentation — it is like asking me what was my reaction to the 
answer to any member of this panel to a particular question. In my 
now sitting here and answering these questions, I really haven't 
watched for the reactions of the Senators and the like. I think you can 
understand that circumstance. 

■Senator Baker. I understand. It is fair to say, then, that you do not 
recall the reaction ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not recall the reaction, no. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, if you would. 

Mr. Dean. I then proceeded to give the President the broad overview 
of what I knew of the entire situation — where it started. 

^Senator Baker. You might take us through that, if you will. Tell 
us as close as you can what you told him. 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I recall, I told him about the meetings that had 
occurred in Mr. Mitchell's office ; that the fact that I had come back 
from Mr. Mitchell's office 

Senator Baker. Is this the first time you told him of the meetings 
in Mitchell's office ? 

Mr. Dean. It is. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir. 

Mr. Dean. That I had come back to Mr. Haldeman and told him of 
the circumstances of those meetings, what had been presented. 

Senator Baker. Just for clarity, these were the meetings at which 
the plan for bugging and 

Mr. Dean. Mugging 

Senator Baker [continuing]. And illegal entry were discussed in 
Attorney General John Mitchell's office ? 

Mr. Dean. That is right. There were two meetings, the second meet- 
ing at which I don't know the full extent of the discussion there, but 
I know that, you know, what I did here was 

Senator Baker. All ri.crht, but you began telling the President of 
those meetings, and would you continue from that point? 

Mr. Dean. When I was telling him the broad overview, I did not 
get into an awful lot of specifics, because I told him, I said any point 
that you want to either question me or if we can come back and have, 
I will answer any of your questions subsequently. Then I told him 
of the fact that I had reported this to Mr. Haldeman, that I had been 
distressed by the situation myself, had told Mr. Haldeman what I had 
seen and advised Mr. Haldeman that I didn't think anybody in the 
White House should have any involvement at all in this, and that I 
told him I was not going to have any involvement in it, and INIr. Halde- 
man had agreed that I should not have any involvement in it. 

Senator Baker. Did you tell the President when that conversation 
with Mr. Haldeman took place? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I did. I told him it occurred shortly after the meet- 
ing in Mr. Mitchell's office, after the second meeting in February. 

Senator Baker. All right, sir; go ahead. 

Mr. Dean. I also recall that I told him I did not know how the 
plans had been finally approved; I didn't know what precisely had 
happened as to the final decision to sign off on some phase of the plan. 



1543 

Senator Baker. Did you say that on your own initiative, or did he 
put a question to you to that effect? 

Mr. Dean. No, at the outset, I was doing most of the talking and 
giving liim my general presentation of this matter. I can't recall when 
I basically presented it to him. As to interruptions by him, it was 
toward the end that he began asking me questions that are now not 
very clear to me as to the questions he did ask. 

Senator Baker. If you would, Mr. Dean, work your way through 
the convei^ation and then particularly try to recall what the President 
may have asked you. 

Mr. Dean. I told the President that I had learned that there had 
been pressure from Mr. Colson's office on j\Ir. INIagruder, that I was 
aware of that degree of pressure from the White House, but I didn't 
have all the details on that at even that time. 

In fact, I might want to add this in testimony at this point, because 
as I recall, I may have mentioned this to the President; I am not 
certain. I recall one occasion, on walking from the White House 
Executive Office Building to the Re-Election Committee to one of the 
meetings in Mr. jSIitchell's office, I met Mr. Magruder as I was walking 
over there. He was returning to the Re-Election Committee. We were 
standing at the stop light at the comer of 17th and Pennsylvania 
Avenue across the street from the Executive Office Building. At that 
very moment^ — and I recall very vividly Mr. INIagruder telling me that 
because of the pressure from JNIr. Colson — ^they were afraid that Mr. 
Col son would take this operation over, and they were concerned about 
his taking it over. That had been one of Magruder's expressions of 
concern as to why the matter had gone forward. 

Senator Baker. Do I understand you to say 

Mr. Dean, I don't recall getting into that detail with the President, 
but I don't believe I had testified to that before and I wanted to put 
that into the record. 

Senator Baker. Is it your impression that you did tell the President 
something or all of this? 

Mr. Dean. I told him of the pressure from Mr. Colson's office on 
Mr. ]\Iagruder, because I was aware of this conversation. 

Senator Baker. All right: go ahead, Mr. Dean. 

]Mr. Dean. I told him I didn't know if INIitchell had approved the 
plan, that I had never asked Mr. Mitchell directly whether he had, 
but I was aware from my conversations with Mr. Magruder that 
Mitchell had been the recipient of wiretap information and that Mr. 
Haldeman had also received, through Mr. Strachan, some of the infor- 
mation from the Democratic National Committee. 

That generally covered what I told him of my knowledge of the 
pre-June 17 situation, and then I again went into rather broad gen- 
eralities as to what had occurred after June 17. I told him, I raised 
the principal points that I thought were of concern, that the indi- 
viduals that had been involved had been paid for their silence, and 
in fact, this had involved Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and myself 
and ]Mr. ^Mitchell in giving instructions to Mr. Kalmbach. I had men- 
tioned this, I might add, the fact that I had been a conduit for this 
type of information, at an earlier meeting with the President back in 



1544 

February, and he had disagreed with me as to the fact that I had had 
any legal problems from being a conduit. 

We did not get into any great detail on that matter and he didn't 
seem to want to get into detail on that point when I raised that. 

Senator Baker. Is that the essence, now, of this meeting? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, it is not. 

Senator Baker. Incidentally, I have forgotten the date. Tell me the 
date in March. Is this March 21 ? 

Mr. Dean. The morning of March 21, that is correct. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir. 

Mr. Dean. I mentioned to him the fact that I had, after the decision 
had been made that Mr. Magruder remain at the Re-Election Commit- 
tee, that I had assisted Magruder in preparing his testimony for the 
grand jury, which was perjured testimony. 

Senator Baker. Did you use that term ? 

Mr. Dean. I don't think I used the term "perjured." I think I used 
"false testimony." 

Senator Baker. But at any rate, it was a description of your prep- 
aration of Mr. Magruder for his appearance before the grand jury ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir. 

Mr. Dean. I also mentioned to him the fact that as a result of the 
lack of money that was available that finally, there had been cash at 
the Wliite House that had been used to pay for these individuals 
silence. I was referring then to the 350 and I did not give him the 
details at that point in time. 

Senator Baker. This is the $350,000 fund that was at the White 
House 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, in cash. 

Now, at any one of those points, which were the principal points 
that were in my mind at that point there may have been varying de- 
grees of elaboration on, but I cannot give the degree of elaboration at 
this point, but I can recall clearly the principal points I raised with 
him. 

Senator Baker. The record should show that you are testifying to, 
at my request, a general outline of the conversation and this is not 
meant to omit other detail or statements that have been included in 
your previous testimony. 

I would like to reach the point when you are ready when you can 
tell us in whatever detail you can what the President said to you or 
what questions he asked. You indicated, I believe, that toward the end, 
the President did ask some questions 

Mr. Dean. Yes ; he did. 

Senator Baker. You do not have a perfect memory of that, but 
would you 

Mr. Dean. The questions were running along a tenor— there were not 
many — that indicated that the President still did not realize the impli- 
cations of this matter and the one that really stuck in my mind is when 
he suggested to me that maybe some sort of presentation or briefing 
ought t-o be provided to the Cabinet. And I believe he also suggested the 
leadership, that this be explained to. 



1545 

Senator Baker. You mean to the congressional leadership ? 

Mr. Deais^. Congressional leadership. 

Senator Baker. I understand that there is a meeting with the con- 
gressional leadership, usually on Tuesday morning. Is this what the 
President apparently indicated ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not know what particular day he was referring to 
and I cannot recall which day of the week the 21st was. I have not 
checked my calendar on that. 

Senator Baker. Go ahead, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dean. It was after — another point that came up in the conver- 
sation, because we talked about this subsequently on the 23d when he 
called me. I told him that I did not think all of the individuals in- 
volved would remain silent. I had very much in mind the matter of 
Mr. McCord. 

Now, I would like to put something else that has just occurred to me 
that I do not believe has come out m the question and answer with 
regard to Mr. McCord. Shortly before the sentencing, I had a call 
from Mr. Mitchell and he suggested that Mr. Caulfield get back in 
touch again with Mr. ]McCord. I called Mr. Caulfield and talked to 
him about it and he said, well, I think I had better talk to you. 

I said, well, fine. 

He said, I want to come to your office and see you. 

And he came into my office and he told me — he came in with a small 
diary that he had found in his car, and he said that he had, described 
one of the meetings that he had had with Mr. INIcCord, that he had 
driven into the country with Mr. McCord and had a discussion with 
him. Just shortly before this meeting in January — no; it was much 
later than January. Excuse me, it was in March that he was cleaning 
his car out and found this small diary, and apparently, it was Mr. 
]McCord's diary. In it was noted each meeting that he had had with 
Mr. Caulfield and others and all the subsequent events that he had 
done. It was a daily diary and was up to the day that ]\Ir. Caulfield 
had met with him. 

Now, Mr. Caulfield handed it to me and I handed it back to Mr. 
Caulfield, and he said, I do not want this, and he tore it up and put 
it in his pocket. 

It was based on that that I told Mr. Mitchell that I did not think 
that it was very wise that Mr. Caulfield and Mr. McCord meet further, 
because it was quite obvious to me, as it was to Mr. Caulfield, that 
Mr. McCord was keeping a very accurate diary of all of his activities. 

Senator Baker. Let us go back to your conversation with the Pres- 
ident. We are on March 21 still. Can you recall any 

Mr. Dean. I was explaining that. But even before this, you know, 
before the sentencing, I was quite confident that McCord was the 
most likely individual who would not remain silent and I did not — 
without specifying who it was, I told the President that I did not 
think it was possible that all of these individuals would remain silent 
forever. 

Senator Baker. But Mr. McCord and the incident that you have 
just related are what you had in mind when you made that statement 
to the President ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 



1546 

Senator Baker, Go ahead, if you will. 

Mr. Dean, I also — and without repeating, unless you want me to 
repeat it in full again, because I have repeated it several times now, 
is the matter about the fact of Mr. Hunt's demand that came directly 
to me through Mr. O'Brien, came up in the conversation. 

Senator Baker. Is this a conversation with the President ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker, On March 21 ? 

Mr, Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. Is it fully noted in your testimony ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it is, and 

Senator Baker. Is the language used in your testimony, prepared 
statement, exact enough for us to assume that that is precisely what 
you said and the President said, to the best of your recollection ? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Vice Chairman, I have exercised the greatest degree 
of care, particularly with my conversations with the President in my 
written statement. I have tried to not overstate anything and pursuant 
to the committee's desire to have the facts, to not understate anything. 

Senator Baker. All right now. How many — just so I know whether 
to ask you to do it again or not — how many more meetings are there 
that you need to describe ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, there are several meetings. There is a meeting on 
the afternoon of the 21st. There is a meeting on the afternoon of the 
22d, and there is a meeting when some of these things were repeated, 
on April 15. 

Senator Baker. All right, we have three more meetings to discuss ; 
is that right? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. I think for the sake of time I will accept your 
written statement in that respect. Would you move on then to the after- 
noon of March 21 ? 

Mr. Dean. This was a meeting that was attended by Mr. Haldeman, 
Mr. Ehrlichman, and myself. When the meeting first commenced 

Senator Baker. In the Oval Office? 

Mr. Dean. No, this was in the Executive Office, When the meeting 
first commenced, Mr. Ziegler was in the President's office, as I recall, 
and as the meeting settled down, Mr. Ziegler departed the meeting 
very — shortly thereafter, I have no recollection of how long he was in 
there but I would not say, oh, 4, 5, 10 minutes at the most was he there 
but there was no conversation because he was still conversing with the 
President about some press matter at that point in time. 

Senator Baker. Anyway, for the purposes of your narrative now 
can we assume that Mr, Ziegler was not privy to any of the Watergate 
conversation ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. All right, sir. Go ahead. 

Mr. Dean. And that meeting is the meeting in which there were 
discussions about having Mr. Mitchell come down and there were some 
discussions about this committee and there were some discussions about 
the fact that I was goine: to go to the grand jury, as I recall, but I was 
very — I have a very difficult time recalling that meeting for this 
reason : I was very upset at what had occurred that morning, had not 



1547 

accomplished the goal that I wanted to accomplish and so the most 

important thing 

Senator Baker. If you will- 



]Mr. Deax [continuing] . If I might finish — that occurred during that 
meeting is that the President would, as was an often practice with the 
President, would go around to each individual to ask them for their 
judgment on a given point, and every time he got to me I would say 
"Xo, I disagree," and finally, it got around to "T\Tiy do you disagree," 
and for the first time, I said in front of the President and in front of 
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, I said, "I think that Mr. Halde- 
man, Mr. Ehrlichman, and myself are indictable." 

Senator Baker. You anticipated my question. I was about to say if 
you would please state the important feature of that conversation. Is 
there any other significant and important part of the afternoon con- 
versation other than that ? 

]Mr. Deax. That is, sir, the most significant thing because I can recall 
^Ir. Ehrlichman was rather unhappy, as I said, when I said that. 

Senator Baker. What did Mr. Ehrlichman say or how did he express 
his unhappiness ? 

]Mr. Deax. Well, it was kind of, you know, a look and, you know, 
kind of a pained expression, and he did not reach across the table and 
swing at me or anything of that nature, but it was quite evident that 
when one man looks at another man you can tell whether 

Senator Baker. In addition to that nonverbal communication did 
]Mr. Ehrlichman say anything to you at that point that might be 
significant to this record? 

]Mr. Deax. I think it is — my recollection of his particular response 
is not that good because I just have a very clear impression that he 
was unhappy. I know that subsequently to that, and I do not want to 
confuse subsequent events with events that occurred during the course 
of that meeting, that ]Mr. Ehrlichman got into a little discussion with 
me about obstruction of justice laws and I told him that he ought to 
pull his code down because I had had a rather interesting engage- 
ment, encounter with ]Mr. Ehrlichman the very first time I had met 
him back in 1970 when he was becoming counsel to the President. I 
met him in Senator Hruska's office, as a matter of fact, and he said, 
"Well, I have just been down to my new office where I am going to 
be counsel and they do not have any law books down there and the first 
thing I am going to do is put some law books down there." 

Well, when I went to ]\Ir. Ehrlichman's office when he was counsel 
he did not have any law books in his office either, and he said, "Would 
you bring me a copy of that section of the code," as I did have the law 
books in my office and I thought, I told him he ought to look up 
section 1503 of title 18 of the United States Code and particularly 
read the annotations thereunder. 

Senator Baker. All right, sir. What did Mr. Haldeman say, if any- 
thing, when you indicated to the President that you disagreed because 
you thought Ehrlichman. Haldeman, and Dean were indictable? AMiat 
reaction did you have from INIr. Haldeman, particularly what did 
he say? 

']Mr. Deax. I had discussed this with Mr. Haldeman on earlier 
occasions. I do not recall a reaction at that meeting that afternoon 



1548 

because I had already talked to him about this in a meeting he and 
I had had shortly after the election and before the version of the Dean 
report which was put in writing and has been submitted to this com- 
mittee as an exhibit. 

Senator Baker, But more to the point and just for the moment, 
did Mr. Haldeman say anything to you at that juncture? 

Mr. Dean. I cannot recall him saying anything at that point, no. 

Senator Baker. Did the President say anything at that point? 

Mr. Dean. No, this is toward the end of the meeting, and 1 am sure 
the discussion was that Dean is wrong, because there was no change. 
There was discussion about the fact that Mr. Mitchell, that was part 
of the discussion at that meeting, that Mr. Mitchell should come down 
the next morning. In fact, when Mr. — during the morning meeting, 
at the conclusion of the meeting the President called for Mr. Halde- 
man to come into the office and what he told, what the President told 
Mr. Haldeman was, is, that "John Mitchell should come down and 
you all should have a meeting with him." 

Senator Baker. We are back to the morning meeting ? 

Mr. Dean. We are back to the morning meeting but that is because 
I am not going into every detail and jumping back and forth to try to 
explain it to you. 

Senator Baker. All right, sir, go ahead. 

Mr. Dean. The next meeting with the President, and I am leaving 
out the intervening meetings with Haldeman and Ehrlichman at this 
point, the next meeting with the President occurred on the afternoon 
of the 22d. 

Senator Baker. Before you go to that, Mr. Dean, did the President 
say anything that you can recall, or let me put it in two parts, did the 
President say anything when you said Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and 
Dean might be indictable and if he did say something if you can recall, 
what did he say ? 

Mr. Dean. I cannot recall what the President said. I thought I had 
dropped a bomb which I obviously had in front of the President, and 
certainly the explosion was still going over in my ears and I was not 
listening, I was looking at Mr. 

Senator Baker. But you have no recollection that the President did 
or did not speak. 

Mr. Dean. No. As I recall, the meeting ended on the note that — 

Let us have Mr. Mitchell come down and you all have a little discussion with 
Mr. Mitchell about these problems the next morning. 

Senator Baker. Wlio suggested that ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not know. I am trying to be very careful. 

Senator Baker. All right, would you move on to March 22 ? 

Mr. Dean. To the meeting with the President that afternoon ? 

Senator Baker. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dean, The meeting with the President on March 22 was like 
many, many meetings that I had attended, in which there was a gen- 
eral discussion of this committee, questions of executive privilege at 
one Doint in that meeting, the President picked up the telephone and 
called the Attorney General because he had a report from ]\Ir, Tim- 
mons that apparently Mr. Kleindienst was not dealing with you on 



1549 

working out problems with this committee, and Mr. Mitchell referred 
to the fact that the President had had no problems excepting the fact 
that there is probably an over — he has overstated the executive priv- 
ilege position and he is taking a beating on that and there should be 
some retraction or pulling back to a point on that. 

Senator Baker. This was John Mitchell's advice ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Bakek. Go ahead, sir. 

]\Ir. Deax. At one point during the discussions I asked the President 
to excuse myself because I was working on a statement with Mr. Ziegler 
regarding the Gray conmient that I had probabl}' lied. I went from — 
you are familiar with the President s Executive Office, we were sitting 
on the sofa in the office and Mr. Haldeman was sitting in a chair 
or Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman were on the sofa and the President 
was on a chair as you were facing us on the right and Mr. ]\litchell in 
a chair on the left and I pulled up a chair at the other end of the table 
between the President and Mr. Mitchell and I asked to excuse myself 
to go handle this matter. The President asked me what it was about. I 
explained to him what it was about, he said "Go over to the corner and 
use the phone by the table," which I did and went over and had a quiet 
conversation with Mr. Ziegler for 10 minutes or so on the telephone, 
and then I rejoined the meeting and the discussion was still focusing 
around this committee, and the executive privilege question. 

At that point, the President turned to me and said "John, I think 
that you ought to go up and discuss with Senator Ervin the parameters 
of executive privilege'' and I said to the President, "I thought that 
would be very unwise because I am the point at issue in the Gray 
hearings and I am there negotiating my own position." He agreed, 
and Mr. Ehrlichman said that he would come up and visit with Senator 
Ervin on discussing executive privilege vis-a-vis appearances of White 
House staff. 

The meeting was very much of this tenor. There was nothing dra- 
matic that happened, and again this was somewhat to my surprise. 

The meeting concluded, Haldeman and Ehrlichman departed the 
office, Mr. Mitchell stayed and had a social conversation with the Presi- 
dent, they were talking about 

Senator Baker. Were you there at the time ? 

Mr. Deax. I was in and out for this reason, here is a point that I 
had really forgotten about that occurred in front of ]Mr. Mitchell. The 
President said in front of ]Mr. Mitchell that "John has been doing an 
excellent job on this whole problem," and it was just a compliment he 
paid me in front of Mr. Mitchell. I was trying to make an arrangement 
for Mr. Mitchell to meet with Paul O'Brien who had been wanting to 
meet with him and as vou know outside the President's suite there, 
there is an empty office that he makes available for guests. I was talking 
to the receptionist as to Mr. Mitchell's availability of that. I went even 
to that office myself. I called my secretary to tell her to make arrange- 
ments for Mr. O'Brien to come over to meet with Mr. IVIitchell in that 
office. I meanwhile went back in the President's office and told the 
President and ]\Ir. ^Mitchell that that office had been set up and that my 
secretary was trying to arrange the meeting so that Mr. O'Brien and 
Mr. ]Mitchell could meet and, as I recall, I departed then for Mr. 



1550 

Ziegler's office again to see what had happened with the White House 
response on Mr. Gray's statement regarding myself. 

Senator Baker. All right. Does that conclude the important aspects 
of the March 22 meeting ? 

Mr. Dean. I think that does; yes. 

Senator Baker. And once again with the caveat that whatever else 
you have said in your prepared statement will be incorporated for the 
purposes of our colloquy here. 

Do we move then to April 16 ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. All right. Would you go ahead, please. 

Mr. Dean. Well, I might add, now, I had a conversation with the 
President on March 23. 

Senator Baker. All right. Would you tell us about that ? 

Mr. Dean. The President suggested, as he had on previous occa- 
sions, and in fact my wife and I had talked about it, he had said, 
"John, have you ever been up to Camp David," and I said "Well, 
only once on a very brief visit" which had been on November 15. 

Senator Baker. Where was this conversation ? 

Mr. Dean. These were in the Oval Office and they would come 
up at the end of a meeting or something in which he had suggested 
I go to Camp David to enjoy Camp David. 

Senator Baker. What time during the day of March 23 ? 

Mr. Dean. Did I receive the call ? 

Senator Baker. I am not quite sure I understand. 

Mr. Dean. All right. 

Senator Baker. There was a meeting with the President. 

Mr. Dean. I was referring to the fact that, I know there has been 
some — I have read in the press that, you know, the President was 
continually trying to send me to Camp David. Well, the invitations 
I was getting to go to Camp David were not to go for any personal 
reasons other than to go up and enjoy Camp David and relax as dur- 
ing the Gray hearings as my name was coming more to the forefront 
and the President was telling me, "Don't bother to read the news- 
paper, I have been through this sort of thing before," and he told me 
that on countless occasions to ignore the newspapers and not let this 
get to me. And I had relayed this to my wife and told her that the 
President had been very gracious in saying that we should go to Camp 
David and enjoy the facilities up there. 

Senator Baker. Was there a meeting on March 23 ? 

Mr. Dean. No ; there was a telephone call that came in, it must have 
been after lunch time, some time, I don't recall precisely when, what 
hour, but we arrived there at about 3:30 or so, so I would say that 
the call probably came in, given the fact that it is about over a 2-hour 
ride, about 1, 1 :30 or so, and I would assume the President was calling, 
by then he had left for Florida. 

The President said to me, he said, the most interestinrr thins I 
remember that is relevant to your inquiry now is, he said, "Well, John, 
your prediction is correct." That was in reference to the fnct on the 21st 
I told him T thought one of the defendants would — would not remain, 
not all the defendants would remain silent and here in fact this had 
occurred when Mr. McCord had submitted his letter to the court 
on the 23d. 



1551 

Senator Baker. Let's examine that just a moment, Mr. Dean. 

Did the President say that you were proved correct because McCord 
has said so and so or is this an inference you draw from the circum- 
stances ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, he was quite aware of the fact that McCord had, 
in the conversation that came up he was aware of the fact that Mc- 
Cord's letter had been read in court that morning. 

Senator Baker. Tell me what he said, please ? 

Mr. Dean. He just acknowledged the fact that he was aware of Mr. 
McCord having submitted a letter to the court. 

Senator Baker. Can you recall the language ? 

Mr. Dean. No ; I cannot. 

Senator Baker. But it was your — it is your recollection that the 
President conveyed to you the information that he knew of the Mc- 
Cord letter to the court ^ 

Mr. Dean. Yes, and then he told me, he said, "Well, John, your 
prediction was right." 

Senator Baker. All right, sir, go ahead. 

Mr. Dean. That did stick in my mind very clearly. 

It was after that we entered into a discussion about going to Camp 
David. He suggested I go up and relax. 

Senator Baker. I thought you were at Camp David. 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I was at my home. 

Senator Baker. I am sorry. Go ahead, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. Dean. I had been surrounded by the press that morning as a 
result of the preceding day's comment by Mr. Gray. I have not made 
myself carefully available to the press during any time in this matter 
and my house has been, I might say, staked out almost 24 hours a day 
by the press. 

Senator Baker. Was this the time when a newspaper or television 
reporter tried to interview you through the mail slot? 

Mr, Dean. No; that was rather recently when I refused to open 
the door and she kept pounding on the door and so I finally opened up 
the mail slot and, to correct the record on that, I was not on all fours, 
I was merely on my, bending down [laughter]. Just to keep accuracy 
in the media [laughter] . 

Senator Baker. And just for the sake of chivalry, we will not say 
who that was. 

All right, Mr. Dean, go ahead, please. 

Mr. Dean. We entered into a discussion about going to Camp David, 
and I told him yes, that sounded good, because I told him that I was 
surrounded by the press and he again repeated what he had repeated 
to me earlier, that I had been under a lot of press coverage as a result 
of this. But the important thing that you are interested in, he told me 
not to ffo to Camp David to write a report. Rather, he told me to go up, 
relax for a couple of davs, take my wife. He told me he does his best 
thinking at Camp David and that what I should do is go up and assess 
the entire situation and figure out where we go from here. 

I told him I would do that. I told him I would go up and think 
over the entire matter. 

Senator Baker. This was on March 23 ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 14 



1552 

Now, when I arrived at Camp David on March 23, we had some 
incidental conversation about that as a result of the fact that some other 
of the First Family was up there. But I do not think that is relevant 
at all. I do not even think it is relevant to my testimony this morning. 

When I arrived at Camp David, the phone was ringing in the cabin 
that my wife and I were staying in and the operator came on and said, 
it is the President calling. I waited and the President did not come on. 
Rather, Mr. Haldeman came on the phone. Mr. Haldeman said — we 
had a little further conversation, brief conversation about McCord's 
letter because I had not spoken with him during the day on the McCord 
letter. I had talked to Mr. Ehrlichman earlier that day about the 
McCord letter. 

I recall Mr. Haldeman saying that he had understood that McCord 
basically had hearsay and I said, that was my understanding. So I 
assumed from that that Mr. Haldeman had obviously talked to some- 
body also about the matter. 

Then he said, while you are up there, why don't you write up a report 
on this matter ? And t asked him was it for internal or external use ? 
And he said that would be decided later. 

So I was very much in a quandry as to how to write what he wanted 
to write. But I had also, by the time I got to Camp David, had well 
evidenced to everybody I was dealing with that I was thinking far 
differently about the continued coverup than I think others were. 

Senator Baker. This was a conversation with Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Baker. All right. Would you proceed to the next conver- 
sation with the President ? 

Mr. Dean. That will take us to April 15. 

Now, this meeting was indirectly at my request. On Saturday, the 
14th, I had presented a list to Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman 
and told them that I thought, based on the conversations that my 
counsel had had with the prosecutors, and my counsel's assessment 
of the entire facts of the circumstances, that they were also targets 
of the grand jury, along with myself. They expressed concern about 
this, and indicated that this was contrary to what Mr. Kliendienst 
had told them just a short time preceding that regarding what the 
grand jury was doing and which way it was going. 

Well, now, of couree, my conversations with the prosecutors were 
off the record at this point in time. So obviously, the Attorney General 
would not know it. 

So after Mr. Ehrlichman — this resulted in the Attorney General 
meeting with the President on Sunday and I believe Mr. Petersen 
might have been there — I do not know for a fact — and I had a call 
from Mr. Ehrlichman also on Sunday, but I was wiih my counsel 
and we were in another meeting. I did not answer the call until about 
7 :30 that night. Mr. Ehrlichman said he happened to be going back 
to his office and wouldn't I drive along in and have a chat with him 
about some things he wanted to chat with me. It was quite evident to 
me that what had happened is that after the President had met with 
the Attorney General and Mr. Petersen, that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. 
Ehrlichman had gotten — been informed of this — and he wanted to 
talk to me about why I had been to the prosecutors. I did not want to 
talk to Mr. Ehrlichman. 



1553 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, I am sorry ; it is 3 o'clock and I am going 
to run out of time, and I am going to miss another vote, but would 
you tell me of your conversation with the President on the 15th ? 

Mr. Deax. All right, I will go into that. I was a little rattled by the 
fact that I had not been to the President to tell him that I had been to 
the prosecutors when I went in. To be rather specific, he realized I was 
rattled and I had had enough rapport with him by this time that I 
was comfortable in dealing with him. I had thought on the way in, I 
wonder if I am being set up by the President. Xow, this was an awful 
thought to run through my own mind, because I knew that Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman knew that anything the President asked me, I would 
answer and I would answer truthfulT3^ You just do not lie to the Presi- 
dent of the United States. 

Senator Baker. Move on to the conversation. 

]Mr. Deax. Right. Well, I am telling you that — all right, the 
conversation. 

So the President offered me a cup of coffee. 

Senator Baker. First of all, where was the meeting? 

Mr. Deax, This was in the Executive Office Building. 

Senator Baker. All right, in the President's office there ? 

Mr. Deax'. In the President's office, correct. 

Senator Baker. Who was present ? 

Mr. Deax". The only persons that were present were myself other 
than when ]Mr. Sanchez came in with some Coca-Cola for me and went 
back out. 

Senator Baker. All right, sir, go ahead, 

Mr. Deax. I told the President that I had been to the prosecutors. 
I told him I did not believe this was an act of disloyalty, I felt I had 
to go and do it. I said I thought in the end that it would be considered 
an act of loyalty and I felt that when I made my decision to go, that 
was the way I felt, 

I told him that in my discussion with the prosecutors, I had discussed 
my own involvement and the involvement of others. 

I told him that I had not discussed any conversations I had with him 
with the prosecutors, and I had not had any dealings with the prose- 
cutors vis-a-vis myself and the President. 

At one point in the conversation, I recall the President asking me 
about whether I had reported to him on the fact that Mr. Haldeman 
had been told by me after the second meeting with Mr. Mitchell on 
February -i, 1972, about what occurred in that meeting. 

I said, yes, I had. 

Then the President raised the fact that this had come up in a dis- 
cussion he had had with Henry Petersen, and Petersen had raised 
with him why had not Haldeman done something to stop it. 

Then the President went on to tell me, he said, well, now, John, you 
testify to that when asked. Now, I want you to testify to that when 
asked, that you told Mr. Haldeman. 

At one point in the conversation — and I am just rambling through 
the high points and not going through every detail here — at one point 
in the conversation, we talked about the fact that Liddy was remaining 
silent. The President at this point — I told him that I thought that Mr. 
Liddy was looking for some sort of signal. He told me that he had got 



1554 

from Petersen, I believe, the President had the impression that Liddy 
was looking for a signal. 

I said, yes, that is my understanding, also, that Mr. Liddy is looking 
for some sort of signal. I said, what might be the signal is that you are 
to meet with Liddy's attorney. 

At this point, he picked up the telephone and called Mr. Petersen. 

Senator Baker. "He" being the President ? 

Mr. Deax. "He" being the President. Once he got Mr. Petersen on 
the telephone, the President winked at me and said, like I was not in 
the office, began his conversation with Mr. Petersen about the fact that 
he was willing to talk to Liddy's lawyer if necessary to give Mr. Liddy 
the signal to talk. 

Mr. Petersen — I didn't hear the other end of the conversation, but 
he talked about some other things to Mr. Petersen. I don't know what 
they were. 

Senator Baker. "What else? We are speaking of April 15. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

I recall also the President asking me about Henry Petersen and my 
assessment of Henry Petersen, and I assume this was prompted by the 
message that I had sent to the President earlier regarding Mr. Peter- 
sen when I sent a message through to him that I didn't want to talk 
to Ehrlichman. I told him I thought that Mr. Petersen was a man who 
was one of the most able criminal lawyers in the business, that he could 
give the President a good assessment of the entire circumstance. I told 
him that he ought to take his own personal counsel from Mr. Petersen. 

Now, I didn't feel like telling the President that he had problems, 
but I thought that I was giving the President a very clear signal that 
he might want to talk to Mr. Petersen about his own situation. 

I told him that I didn't think that Mr. Petersen would want to do 
anything to see the Presidency harmed and that Mr. Petersen was a 
very, very well respected man at the Department of Justice who plays 
it right down the middle and he will give you the best advice in the 
world. And that is my assessment of Mr. Petersen. 

Senator Baker. "\VTiat else happened? What else was said by the 
President or by you ? 

Mr. Dean. The President at that time expressed appreciation for 
my evaluation of Mr. Petersen. 

I recall, and this is not in my testimony because it is now falling 
on something that I remembered at the end of the Petersen conver- 
sation, there was also some discussion about my feelings about ap- 
pointing a special prosecutor. He said something to the effect that, "I 
don't think we need a special prosecutor at this time, do you?" 

I said, "I think that Sir. Petersen is an honorable, capable man to 
handle the job." 

Senator Baker. Was there anything else ? 

Mr. Deax. At some point in the conversation, and I believe this 
was toward the earlier part of the conversation, the question came 
up as to whether I had immunity from the Government as a result 
of my dealings with the prosecutors. I told the President that my law- 
yers had discussed this with the Government, but I assured him — 
and this is very clear in my mind, because it later came back to sur- 
prise me when I read a subsequent statement of the President — I told 



1555 

the President that I had no deal, I can assure you, with the Govern- 
ment at all. 

The President at that point said, and I remember this very clearly, 
he said, ''Jolin, I will do nothing, I assure you, to interfere in any way 
with your negotiations with the Government." And that would be 
fairly close to the words I believe he used. 

I think I mentioned earlier also — I don't know if just in this se- 
quence of going through this particular meeting — that the President 
asked me if I remembered the date at which I had given him the re- 
port on the implications of the Watergate, and I said that, before 
I got my answer out, he said, ''I think that was on March 21. Do you 
recall if that is correct or not?" 

And I said I had to check my own records to find out what date that 
was. 

Senator Baker. Now, let me examine that a little more. The Presi- 
dent asked you what ? 

Mr. Dean. He asked me if I remembered what day it was in March 
that I had given him my report on the implications of the Water- 
gate — some words to that effect again. Before I got my answer out, 
he said, 'T believe it was on the 21st." 

I said to him that I would have to check my records or check the 
records to determine exactly what day that was. 

And I might add that that came up again on Monday afternoon, 
when he told me he had checked and determined that indeed, that it 
was the 21st. 

Senator Baker. Was it the 21st ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it was the 21st. 

Senator Baker. A^Tiat else, sir ? 

Mr. Dean. We had some discussion about the fact that I had dis- 
cussed no national security matters with the prosecutors, or he instruc- 
ted me that I could not deal with national security matters or any 
matters with regard to executive privilege. I assured him that I had 
not at that point had any such conversations with the prosecutors. 

It was toward the end of the conversation that he raised on his own 
and asked me if I remembered when he had mentioned the fact that 
it would not be any problem to pay $1 million and I said, "Yes, I recall 
that conversation." He said, "Well, of course, I was joking, I was only 
joking when I said that." 

Then shortly after that, I recall that he got up from his chair and 
walked behind his chair to the corner of the office. I don't know if it is 
the chair he normallv sits in when he is in the Executive Office Build- 
ing, but he has one favorite chair over beside his desk. He got up and 
went around the chair and in back of the chair and in a barely audible 
tone to me. but I could hear what he was saying, he said, "I was foolish 
to talk with Colson about Executive clemency for Hunt, was I not?" 

I don't recall making any statement or response to that. It was sort 
of a declarative statement and I said nothing. 

Senator Baker. What else? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I sav, shortly after he got out of his chair, I don't 
recall him getting back in his chair and we began exchanging some 
pleasantries as I was leaving the office. 



1556 

As I was leaving the office, he said to me, "say hello to your pretty 
wife" and some things of this nature, which I came home and conveyed 
to her, because she always liked to hear those things. 

Then also, as I was standing by the door, I remember I had the door 
open and I turned to the President, who was standing not 10 feet away 
from me, and told the President that I certainly hoped that the fact 
that I was going to come forward and tell the truth did not result in 
impeachment of the President. And I told him that I hoped the thing 
would be handled right, and he assured me that it would be handled 
right. 

And the meeting ended on that note. 

Senator Baker. Is that the last meeting or conversation you had 
with the President ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir; I met with him the next Monday morning, in 
which he called me and asked me to come in the office. I received a call 
while I was, before I really left to come in. 

Senator Baner. Hold it just 1 minute. The next meeting would 
have been April what ? 

Mr. Dean. April 16. 

Senator Baker. And is that the last meeting ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir — well, there were two meetings on the 16th, one 
call on the ITth, and then a call on Easter morning. 

Senator Baker. It is 3 :15 and I promised to take 20 minutes and 
I have taken an hour. I am sorry for that and I haven't the slightest 
intention of proceeding even to my second question, which was to ask 
your assistance in identifying the probable areas of conflict between 
your testimony and that of other witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this time and I am willing to yield 
at this point. 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Vice Chairman, I might just comment briefly on 
your second question. 

I am quite aware of the fact that in some circumstances, it is going 
to be my word against one man's word, it is going to be my word 
against two men, it is going to be my word against three men, and 
probably in some cases, it is going to be my word against four men. 
But I am prepared to stand on my word and the truth and the knowl- 
edge and the facts I have. I know the truth is my ally in this and I 
think ultimately, the truth is aroinsr to come out. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, I might sav that the reason I had in- 
tended to formulate that question was anticipation of conflict and the 
very point that you make. The alternative wav to handle that, of 
course, would be to have rebuttal or surrebuttal from you after we re- 
ceive the other testimony, that is, if there is conflict, the committee may 
wish to recall vou to testifv further or it may not. But since time is 
moving on, I think it is better to wait and make that judgment later 
and I assume that you, like every other witness, would be willing to 
return if that seems indicated. 

Mr. Dean. I stand at the subpena of the committee at this point in 
time and if the committee desires me back, I will return. 

Senator Baker. Thank you very much. 

Senator Er\t:n. I found in the record the exhibit to which I asked 
you the question whether George Wallace of Alabama was listed 



1557 

among the enemies. I find that on the page about 12 black Congress- 
men— Congress woman Shirley Chisholm and 11 Congressmen are 
named. And then there is miscellaneous politicos: John V. Lindsay, 
mayor of New York City, Eugene McCarthy, former U.S. Senator, and 
George Wallace, Governor of Alabama. 

Xow, before I get silenced, I have been furnished by the Library of 
Congress through the agency of Senator Inouye a Xerox copy of an 
extract from the Xew York Tribune of February 14, 1862, which has 
an item of historical value. It is entitled "The Premature Publication 
of the President's Message." 

President Lincoln today voluntarily appeared before the House Judiciary 
Committee and gave testimony in the matter of the premature publication in the 
Herald of a portion of his last annual message. Chevalier AVikof was then brought 
before the committee and answered the question which he refused to answer 
yesterday, stating, as is rumored, that the stolen paragraph was furnished to the 
Herald by Watt, the President's gardner, who was reported as disloyal by the 
Potter Committee, and whose nomination to a Lieutenancy the Senate so de- 
cidedly refused to confirm, but who is still to be seen in the White House, and is 
said to be an applicant for a foreign appointment. The public can learn from 
this case in what sewers it is the taste of the Herald to fish for state secrets. 

The Chevalier is still in close confinement at the Capitol, in quarters at which 
his fastidious tastes revolt. An iron bedstead was purchased for him today. His 
most frequent visitor is said to be General Sickles. The first papers taken by 
the officers out of the pocketbook of the "j^pecial representative of the Xew York 
Herald," now in Fort McHenry, was a pass admitting Dr. Ives at all hours to 
the War Department, signed "George B. McClellan." 

That is an item concerning the manner in which President Lincoln 
volunteered to appear and testify before the House Committee. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I might say in that respect, al- 
though my precedent is not nearly as old as your precedent, that I 
believe in 1919. in junction with the efforts to ratify the Treaty of 
Versailles, rather than a President appearing before a committee of 
the Congress, in fact. President Wilson invited the Foreign Relations 
Committee to meet with him. 

So as we say in Tennessee, there are lots of ways to skin a cat and 
I wouldn't presume to say how we go about it. But I do hope that 
there is some way to supply additional information on these crucial 
and inaportant points. 

Mr. Chairman, might I say one other thing on an unrelated matter? 

Congressman Garry Brown has written a letter to this committee 
that refers directly to certain statements made by Mr. Dean. Congress- 
man Brown has also indicated to me that he wishes to file a sworn 
statement in compliance with the rules of the committee and I would 
ask, if there is no objection, that the letter be included in the record, 
and the statement that Congressman Brown may later submit be 
included in the record at the appropriate place. 

Mr. Ervix. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 69.*] 

Senator Ervix. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Ixouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dean, I have a few questions I would like to follow up on. 

•See p. 1791. 



1558 

In your colloquy with Senator Baker on the meeting of April 14, at 
which time, you have testified that you had a discussion with the 
President 

Mr. Dean. April 15, Senator ? 

Senator Inouye. April 15 ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Senator Inouye. On the matter of immunity ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Inouye. You have indicated that the President told you 
that he will make no effort to interfere in your negotiations with the 
Government. 

Mr, Dean. He made that very clear to me, Senator. And I might 
say that that was one of the things that led me to issue the statement 
that I did regarding my unwillingness to be a scapegoat in this matter. 

Senator Inouye. Do you think at that time the President was aware 
that you had evidence that might incriminate him ? 

Mr. Dean. I am sure he was aware of the conversations we have had 
and as I have indicated to the committee, because of the nature of the 
conversation, because of subsequent events, I had reason to believe 
that that conversation was being taped. The subsequent events that 
gave me further confirmation of that were the fact that the prose- 
cutors indicated the President had indicated to Mr, Petersen that he 
had taped my conversation or allegedly taped my conversation and 
that I had said that I had immunity in exchange for the testimony 
of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Senator Inouye. This is my final question relating to the matter 
of friends and enemies. First, may I touch upon the matter of friends. 
You indicated earlier that the White House was looking into a tax 
matter involving a very, involving a person very close to the Presi- 
dent, and I believe you indicated that he was guilty up to his teeth. 

Mr, Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Inouye. Was this matter at that moment in the hands of 
the Criminal Investigation Division ? 

Mr. Dean. When it was first brought to my attention it was still 
at the Internal Revenue Service. I was asked to see what I could 
do about it. I called and spoke with Mr. Walters on this case and 
told him what the concern was. I then — he told me at that point in 
time, he said — well, let me back up just a moment. The individual in- 
volved had said that he thoufrht he was being harassed bv the agents 
of the Internal Revenue Service. I raised this with Mr. Walters and he 
said, he assured me, that could not be the case after he looked into it. 
He said there is a very strong case against this individal, and that 
ultimately it is going to be transferred to the Tax Division at the De- 
partment of Justice for further analysis. 

I merely asked to be kept advised of the status of the case because 
I felt the President may want to know because this was an individual 
the President saw with great regularity, and I got questions on it with 
considerable regularity. 

Senator Inouye. Did the President personally express interest in 
this? 

Mr. Dean. It gets more and more painful to bring these names out 
as it was painful to bring the President's name out. It is painful to 



1559 

bring out other people. It was Rosemary Woods who kept asking me 
the status of the case because this individual was seeing the President 
a good deal. 

Senator Inouye. What is the status of the case? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I say, it was ultimately referred over to the 
Civil Division, or the Tax Division of the Department of Justice. 
I asked to be advised on the various status of the case. I told Miss 
Woods at one point that she should just stay as far away from this 
case as possible. She was seeing the individual, having encounters with 
the individual Avho was the subject of the tax case, and he would 
protest his innocence to her. He is a fine man, and she was quite con- 
vinced of his innocence and could not believe that he was not being 
harassed by agents that were trying to get somebody who was close 
to the President. The individual was using the President's name a 
great deal, he was traveling with the President to China and Russia 
and other places, and the like. As a result of this, I merely asked that 
I be kept advised of the status of the case. Wlien it was at the Justice 
Department, the Justice Department assessed it. I had a conversation 
with Mr. Ralph Erickson, he said "There is nothing we can do with 
this. There is one thing more we can do," and he said "there are some 
weaknesses in the investigation and we may send it back to the Internal 
Revenue Service for one last look to see if this fellow, it really is a 
solid case." 

They did do that and it came back "Absolutely solid case." I said, 
"Don't touch it, send it right on through," and that is what they did 
and the case is proceeding forward. 

Senator Inouye. Has he been indicted ? 

Mr. Dean. I do not know if he has been indicted yet, but I know 
that there is no, to my knowledge, there is nothing which has been 
done to impede the case. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Erickson was fired, was he not? 

Mr. Dean. Was he fired ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. I do not think that is quite accurate, no. 

Senator Inouye. Would you wish to tell us who this important 
individual is? 

Mr. Dean. It might affect his tax case. 

Senator Inouye. Then, please do not tell us [laughter]. 

I would like to now discuss a case involving an enemy. Mr. Dean, I 
am certainly aware that these hearings unfortunately have perma- 
nently damaged the reputations of good and decent people. Further- 
more, reputations have been destroyed in past months, in past years by 
activities allegedly related to activities in the White House. 

In your statement you mentioned that on February 28, 1973, you 
were asked to look into a case of Mr. A. Ernest Fitzgerald by Mr. 
Clark Mollenhoff. Do you recall that? 

Mr. Dean. Yes ; I do. 

Senator Inouye. This gentleman is the one, the fellow who worked 
in the Air Force, Department of the Air Force ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Inouye. And he is the person who was requested by a duly 
authorized Senate committee to testify on the C-5xA. ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 



1560 

Senator Inouye. I believe it is very importajit to Mr. Fitzgerald to 
learn whether he was released or fired because of reduction in force 
in the Air Force, as the Air Force claims, or whether he was fired 
either by the Air Force or under orders of the White House or the 
President, because he told the truth about the $2 billion cost overrun 
of the C-5A. If we can clear the reputation of one man I think this 
committee would have done well today. So, may I aska few questions ? 

Mr. Dean. Senator 

Senator Inouye. Was the President of the United States concerned 
about the Fitzgerald case ? 

Mr. Dean. May I preface my answer with this : I believe it was on 
January 31 of this year that Mr. Mollenhoff raised this at a press con- 
ference. The President was caught totally off guard by the answer 
and what you might say is he sort of was winging it on how to respond 
to Mr. Mollenhoff's question. There was a lot of misinformation that 
got into the record. The President apparently confused two or three 
other cases he was aware of, he had remembered the name Fitzgerald 
and as a result of that Mr. Ziegler had a conversation with the Presi- 
dent, after having other conversations with Mr. Mollenhoff , Mr. Ziegler 
says the President wants you to get into this. I subsequently had that 
instruction directly from the President also. 

I had a man on my staff handle this. I was not directly handling it 
and, as I told Mr. Mollenhoff when he and I had several telephone 
conversations, that, I said, "Clark, this is one I am going to have to 
study but I have not gotten into right yet." I still have not had a 
chance to get into it and I think, based on my testimony, you can see 
what I was doing, why I was not able to get into the Fitzgerald case 
so I am not terribly familiar with the substance of the Fitzgerald case. 
So it will be very difficult for me to answer those questions, and I had 
full intention of looking into the matter but before I got to it I was 
relieved from my duties at the White House. 

Senator Inouye. Did the President ever tell you why he was inter- 
ested in the Fitzgerald case ? 

Mr. Dean. No ; he merely said, he merely said that he did not want 
Mr. Mollenhoff to keep reraising it at every press conference so would 
I work with him. 

Senator Inouye. Do you know if Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman 
were interested ? 

Mr. Dean. There is a rather extensive file in the Wliite House on 
Mr. Fitzgerald that was retrieved at one point by a member of my 
staff who was bringing the material in so I could at least read it all. 
There were the hearings and a book that Mr. Fitzgerald had written 
and then there was correspondence and the like. I never got the oppor- 
tunity to read those materials to make an assessment. Based on my 
conversations with Mr. Wilson of my staff I thought Mr. Mollenhoff 
frankly had a very good point and I thought it was something that 
should be looked into, and I thought there might have been errors that 
should be corrected. 

Senator Inouye. You have indicated that this case was assigned to 
someone on your staff. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Inouye. "WTio is this person ? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. David Wilson. 



1561 

Senator In-ouye. Is he still in the office of the White House counsel ? 

Mr. Dean. No, he has now gone, I believe to the Cost of Living 
Council. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Dean. His departure is totally unrelated to the Watergate. He 
went over there because he was looking for another job, he had 
grown in the job he was in, there was a general staff reduction at the 
White House, I was also to tailor some of my staff, and it was an excel- 
lent opportunity for him. He is a very bright, capable young lawyer 
and he is still there and I am sure he may still have some familiarity or 
if he were to reexamine the records he might be able to be of some 
assistance to the Senate, Senator, on this matter. 

Senator iNOirrE. Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Fitzgerald's reputation has 
been unjustly injured, and if this committee can in any way assist 
Mr. Fitzgerald in regaining his reputation 

Senator Ervix. Senator, I do not believe this matter falls within the 
jurisdiction of this committee under the resolution. I think it is alien 
to what we are authorized to investigate. 

Senator Inotiye. I brought this up because we were discussing all 
day the matter of friends and enemies and I presume this man was on 
the enemy list. 

Senator Er\t:n. I do not know, but we I do not believe are author- 
ized to investigate Mr. Fitzgerald's case here. 

Senator Ixotjte. I thought it might be well to invite Mr. Wilson to 
help clear Mr. Fitzgerald. Otherwise, once again, thank you very much. 

]Mr. Deax. I would merely offer this to the Senator. I think that if 
Mr. Mollenhoff reraises it at one or two more press conferences it may 
be given attention again. [Laughter] . 

Senator Ixoute. Thank you very much, sir. 

Senator Ervix. Senator Gurney, do you have any further questions? 

Senator Gttrxey. Just one, Mr. ChaiiTaan, to clarify the record. In 
the morning session, Mr. Dean, in Mr. Inouye's, Senator Inouye's 
questioning on pressure being brought to bear on any of the members 
of the committee, you did mention that you had had prior dealings 
with the chairman, with Senator Gurney, and with Senator Weicker. 

Now, this came up in a context of pressure being brought to bear on 
members of the committee and also 

Mr. Deax. Xo, sir; as my recollection of the question was when we 
were assessing members of the committee who I was familiar with on 
the committee, and the only people that I knew by reputation or any 
personal dealings on the committee were you from your years in the 
House, Senator Weicker from my knowledge of him in the House, 
and that was about the extent of my knowledge. 

Senator Ixouye. Well, I realize that but it did come up in context, 
this questioning about pressure on the committee of digging up dirt 
and I thought we ought to clarify what the prior dealings were. None 
of these prior dealings with the chairman. Senator Ervin, or myself, 
or Senator Weicker had anything to do with Watergate ; did it ? 

Mr. Deax. No, sir. 

Senator Ixotjye. My recollection of my own personal contacts with 
you is only one, although yours are two. One occurred in Senator 
Hruska's office during the Kleindienst confirmation hearings when you 



1562 

got with the Republican Senators, and I was among those, on the 
Judiciary Committee, and discussed the pending request to have Peter 
Flanigan, a Wliite House counsel, I guess his job is to testify before 
the committee in response to a request by our chairman, Senator Ervin 
on the committee. That was one of the occasions, and I recall that we 
suggested with our advice that the White House had better send him 
up, this was a matter of executive privilege, otherwise he would not be 
confirmed. 

Is that your recollection of our meeting ? 

Mr. Dean. That, I have a vague recollection of because I was not 
the principal actor in that. The meeting I recall was during the same 
set of hearings when you were going to appear on either Face the 
Nation or Meet the Press or one of the national television shows and 
I was instructed to provide you with briefing material for you and 
your staff to go over in preparation for that appearance. 

Senator Inouye. There was a discussion ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I brought Mr. Fielding up with me and we 
had a very cordial, brief meeting. Mr. Fielding, I understand, had 
some subsequent meetings with you and your staff, and prepared you 
for that briefing session on national television. 

Senator Inouye. That was the discussion with Senator Tunney, as I 
recall it on the whole matter of executive privilege that came up dur- 
ing the Kleindienst hearings ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. I think that is correct. It definitely had to do with the 
Kleindienst hearings, yes. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you. 

Senator Ervin. Senator, I would like to state that my impression 
of this matter that referred to the allegation Mr. Haldeman had called 
down to North Carolina should be reference to the time I was fighting 
the impoundment of funds and had no reference whatever to this com- 
mittee. I was very sorry it was brought out here. I never attributed 
any importance to it, and it didn't bother me at all, and my under- 
standing is that it had no relation whatsoever to my service on the 
Senate Select Committee but was, Mr. Haldeman was, kind of dis- 
tressed because I was taking a very strong stand in respect to the Presi- 
dent's power under the Constitution to impound funds. 

I think that is what it was. If he did anything, I think that this is 
what provoked him, and not my service on this committee and I just 
think in fairness to everybody that I would state that. 

Senator Weicker, Mr. Chairman, I just have one further question 
along the lines of the precedents cited by the chairman and the vice 
chairman, and that appears in Carl Sandburg's book on Abraham 
Lincoln, "The War Years," where he writes : 

Yet the talk of a Southern woman spy in the White House arrived at the point 
where Senate members of the committee on the conduct of the war had set 
a secret morning session for attention to tlie reports tliat Mrs. Lincoln was a 
Disloyalist, so the story goes, though vaguely authenticated. 

One member of the committee told of what happened. "We had just been called 
to order by the chairman when the officer stationed at the committee room door 
came in with a half-frightened expression on his face. Before he had opportunity 
to make explanation we understood the reason for his excitement, and were 
ourselves almost overwhelmed with astonishment for at the foot of the com- 
mittee table stood solitary, his hat in his hands, his form towering, Abraham 



1563 

Lincoln stood. Had he come by some incantation thus of a sudden appearing be- 
fore us unannounced we could not have been more astounded. There was almost 
unhuman sadness in the eyes, and above all an indescribable sense of his com- 
plete isolation which the committee felt had to do with fundamental senses of 
the apparition. No one spoke, for no one knew what to say. The President had 
not been asked to come before the committee nor was it susi^ected that he had 
information that we were to investig'ate reports which, if true, fa.stened treason 
upon his family in the White House. At last the mourning corpus spoke slowly 
with control, although a depth of ^^orrow in the voice : 

"I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, appear of my own voli- 
tion before this committee of the Senate, to say that I, of my own knowledge, 
know that it is untrue that any of my family hold treasonable communication 
with the enemy." 

Having attested this he went away as silent and solitary as he had come. We 
sat for some moments speechless and, by tacit agreement, no word being spoken, 
the committee dropped all consideration of the rumors that the wife of the 
President was betraying the Union, we were so greatly affected that the com- 
mittee adjourned for the day. 

Senator Er\t:x. Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, on another subject, having already 
cited my precedent for the day and not wanting to oneupmanship my 
colleagues, I have something entirely different. I have before me a 
letter from Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and if there 
is no objection, I would like to include it in the record and read it 
briefly. 

It is dated June 29, 1973, from Senator Thurmond. 

Earlier testimony in today's hearing carried the impre-ssion that a friend of 
mine, Mr. Harry Dent of South Carolina, might have done something improper. 
I would greatly appreciate it if one of you gentlemen would set the record .straight 
before today's hearings are completed. The testimony that I refer to came about 
during questions asked by Senator Inouye regarding attempts made by Republi- 
cans to "find dirt" on Senator Ervin. Mr. Dean said that Harry Dent had been 
contacted, but no one stated that Mr. Dent declined. 

I suggest that this be brought out by questioning Dean directly or by obtaining 
permission to in.sert any of a number of news stories which appeared in the press 
which indicated that Mr. Dent had declined to do any of that type research 
against Senator Ervin. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 

Senator Ervix. If I may add to that, the newsman who wrote the 
article informed me that he had contacted Mr. Dent and Mr. Dent 
had assured him that he had had nothing whatever to do with that 
matter. 

Let the reporter mark the letter with the appropriate exhibit 
number. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 70.*] 

Senator Baker. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Deax. Mr. Chairman, I believe I also answered no question that 
indicated any wrongdoing or misdoing on Mr. Dent's behalf. I was 
merely asked what his role was, what he was doing now and I think 
I misspoke myself when I said he was practicing law in North Carolina 
when I meant South Carolina is the only mistake. 

Senator ER^^x. If I might state further on that thing, I have stated 
what Charles R. Jonas, Jr., had stated, and I want to add that I ap- 
preciate that very much. I had known his grandfather, Charles A. 
Jonas, who was Congressman from my district elected in 1928, and a 
very fine gentleman and also his father represented a North Carolina 
district which included in part my county for many years and he 

•See p. 1793. 



1564 

rendered very distinguished service to North Carolina and the Nation 
as a Congressman for a period of 20-odd years. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Mr, Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, first, I think the record ought to be corrected 
from yesterday's testimony. I think there is an error in the record and 
would ask your assistance in correcting it. This has to do with your 
reference to Mr. Fielding's knowledge and we received a letter from 
Mr. Ronald B. Wertheim, counsel for Mr. Fielding. 

The record as it presently reads on page 282i of yesterday's tran- 
script has you testifying : 

I think Mr. Fielding probably had a general awareness about the specifics of 
the fact that I was involved in assisting with the eoverup. 

The recollection of Mr. Wertheim, who heard your testimony, was 
that you in fact said : 

I think Mr. Fielding probably had a general awareness without any specifics 
of the fact I was involved in assisting the eoverup. 

IVhich is correct ? 

Mr. Dean. I think the latter is correct as I recall the statement. 

Mr. Dash. We will see that the record is corrected to reflect that. 

Now, Mr. Dean, I know we have gone through all of these hearings 
or meetings with the President and I am going to try to be very brief. 
There is one particular meeting that I do want to go back to because I 
think it is a very crucial one and I just want to liit the highlights with 
you, and this is the meeting of September 15, 1972, that you had with 
the President. I think it is significant. One is, as you testified frankly, 
was the first meeting you had with the President on a 1-to-l basis 
which was your language, and, two, it was the day, September 15, when 
the indictments came down of the first Watergate ti-ial which cut off 
the involvement at Liddy and you were called in to have a meeting 
with the President. 

Now, I think what I want to just clear up is what was a realistic 
version of the meeting and perhaps an unrealistic version that may 
have come up in questioning concerning that meeting. 

As I understand, that what you testified to was that when you came 
in, and leaving out other areas but getting to the specifics, that the 
President told you that Bob Haldeman had kept him posted on how 
you would handle the Watergate case. You were asked a question as 
to whether or not the President had, in fact, told you about his knowl- 
edge of the Watergate case or had indicated any knowledge on his 
part of any of the eoverup. I think the first question I would like to 
ask is would you have expected, in any relationship with the Presi- 
dent, for the President to have asked you to come in and said that "Bob 
Haldeman had told me about your covering up of the Watergate case, 
your assisting Jeb Magruder in committing perjury" or things of that 
kind? 

Mr. Dean. It wasn't the nature of that type of conversation so I 
would not have expected that type of further followup questioning; 
no, sir. 

Mr. Dash. All right. But when the President told you that Bob 
Haldeman had told or kept him posted, on how you had handled the 



1565 

Watergate case, he also indicated from your testimony that he ap- 
preciated how difficult a task it was. You were asked did you tell the 
President what you in fact had done, that you had assisted Magruder 
in committing perjury, that you had assisted in the coverup, that you 
had limited the FBI investigation or actually gotten CIA involve- 
ment. Would it have been realistic in that circumstance if the Presi- 
dent said that Bob Haldeman had kept him posted and was con- 
gratulating you on how you had handled your job, for you to say, 
"That is right, Mr. President, you know what you are telling me is and 
what I want you to know is that I had gotten Mr. Magruder to commit 
perjury before the grand jury and that I had him limit the FBI 
investigation, et cetera." Would that be a realistic response of yours 
in such a meeting ? 

Mr. Dean. I don't believe it would be, no. 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, when the President told you that 
Bob Haldeman had kept him posted on how you handled the Water- 
gate case, you knew very well how you had handled the Watergate 
case, did you not ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. And in fact, it did involve having Mr. Magruder perjure 
himself before the committee and other types of things such as payoffs 
and limiting FBI investigation? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. And you knew that Bob Haldeman knew that ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. From your knowledge of Mr. Haldeman's relationship 
with the President, and you have said that when you were in that 
Oval Office, you never lied to the President. From your knowledge 
of Mr. Haldeman's relationship to the President, would it be your 
opinion that Mr. Haldeman would lie to the President ? 

Mr. Dean. It would be to the contrary. I do not think Mr. Haldeman 
would lie to the President. I do not know of anybody who would 
walk into the Oval Office and lie to the President. 

Mr. Dash. So if Mr. Haldeman had kept the President posted on 
exactly how you had handled the Watergate case, he would have told 
the President exactly how you had handled the Watergate case, 
including the coverup ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. You told the President, according to your own state- 
ment, at that time that you had only been able to contain the case 
and you could not insure that someday it would not become unraveled ; 
is that not correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Did the President ask you what you meant by that ? 

Mr. Dean. No, he did not. 

Mr. Dash. Now, also at that time, you discussed the civil case. Is 
that not the time you told the President that the lawyers for the 
Committee To Re-Elect the President had developed an ex parte 
relationship to influence the judge? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. And the President, according to your statement, at that 
time said, that would be helpful ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 



1566 

Mr. Dash. And during the course of that meeting on September 15, 
you got into the Patman committee hearings. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, also. 

Mr. Dash. Now, on the Patman committee hearings, what was the 
concern about those hearings ? 

Mr. Dean. The concern was twofold. One, it would cause further 
embarrassment to the White House prior to the election by more 
headlines about the Watergate. Second, it could result in the Patman 
investigators stumbling into something that might start unraveling 
the coverup. 

Mr. Dash. Do you have a copy of exhibit No. 34-22, which you have 
submitted to the committee ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Dash. Now, that exhibit has attached to it a letter or memoran- 
dum under the letterhead of the U.S. House of Representatives, Com- 
mittee of Banking and Currency, and it is from Chairman Wright 
Patman. There is attached a list of individuals that were subpenaed 
before the Patman committee. 

Now, was there anything significant in that list of individuals who 
were going to be subpenaed before the Patman committee? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, there was. 

I might add, Mr. Dash, that the list that was submitted or made 
public on this date had formerly, the bulk of the list was already in the 
possession of the White House and the congressional relations staff 
before this was actually made up. 

Mr. Dash. Your name appears on that list on page 2 ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. And Mr. LaRue's name ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. And a number of the witnesses who have already appeared 
here and been questioned by the grand jury — McCord, Robert Mardian, 
John Mitchell, Robert Odle, Herbert Porter, Hugh Sloan, Maurice 
Stans. 

Now, if all those witnesses had been called by the Patman committee 
at the time those hearings were going to be held and had answered 
according to the subpena, what in fact was the concern of the White 
House ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, if those hearings had been held, there is a good 
chance these hearings would not be held today, because I think that 
would have unraveled the coverup. 

Mr. Dash. "WTiat was the instruction that you received with regard 
to that on that day from the President ? 

Mr. Dean. On the 15th? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. After reporting to him who was handling that, he told me 
to — this was really something that was said to both Mr. Haldeman 
and myself — that Mr. Timmons should get on top of this matter. 

Mr. Dash. Now, I think you have already testified exactly what did 
occur, and as a matter of fact, those hearings never went forward. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Now, after all those events, after the President having 
told you how Bob Haldeman had kept him posted on your handling 



1567 

of the Watergate case and that he appreciated how difficult a job that 
was and your own statement to the President that you had only con- 
tained it and that some day it might unravel, and your own statement 
to the President that in a civil case, an ex parte relationship had been 
established to influence the judge, and then the discussion on the Pat- 
man case — frankly and honestly, ]Mr. Dean, when you left the Presi- 
dent on September 15, did you just have an impression as to his knowl- 
edge of the coverup, or did you have a conviction concerning that? 

Mr. Deax. ;Mr. Dash, thei-e was no doubt in my mind that the Presi- 
dent was aware of it and I would have to, to use your language, say 
I had a conviction, or I was convinced. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, Mr. Dean, I do not want to go through the other 
meetings, because they have been thoroughly gone through. But at the 
March 13 meeting, which again was a significant meeting, March 13, 
1973, you have testified to the discussion about the possible require- 
ment of $1 million and the President's response to that and the dis- 
cussion of Executive clemency. 

Now, the committee does have in its possession some confirmation 
from the '^^Hiite House that at least the subject matter of the million 
dollar discussion did occur, as well as the discussion of Executive clem- 
ency. I think we know now that Mv. Fred Buzhardt contacted the com- 
mittee by phone call and that minority counsel, Mr. Thompson, re- 
duced his notes in the form of a memorandum. Those notes have been 
reviewed in my office by Mr. Buzhardt and Mr. Garment and with 
some minor exceptions, which do not relate to this particular reference 
that I am going to read to you, Mr. Buzhardt and ]Mr. Garment have 
informed me in my office that they were not verbatim or detailed, but 
a roughly accurate memorandum of the conversation. These were 
submitted to us for use by this committee for the purpose of question- 
ing you at this time. I would like to identify that I am using them for 
that purpose at this time. 

Xow, according to the memorandum that Mr. Thompson prepared 
based on that call, this meeting when the discussion, according to the 
"\'\niite House, on the million dollars and Executive clemency took place 
was March 21 rather than ]March 13. 

Mr. Deax. That is not correct. That is not my recollection. In fact, 
I am very clear on the fact that it occurred on the 13th, because the 
meeting on the 21st was a totally different range of topics than the way 
this rather casually came up on the 13th. 

Mr. Dasii. Regardless of the date, because I am sure there will be 
disagreement on the date — vou have already testified the date this 
discussion came up — I think it is important, however, that I read to 
you the reconstruction of this meeting from the point of view of the 
"WHiite House at that meeting and what was said. This is from Mr. 
Thompson's notes which, as I have indicated, was his putting down 
what he recalled from the telephone call from Fred Buzhardt, special 
counsel to the President : 

Mr. Dean stated that Hunt was trying to blackmail Ehrlichman about Hunt's 
prior plumber activities unless he was paid what ultimately might amount to 
$1 million. The President said how could it possibly be paid. "What makes you 
think he would be satisfied with that?", stated it was blackmail, that it was 
wrong, that it would not work, that the truth could come out anyway. Dean had 
said that a Cuban group could possibly be used to transfer the payments. Dean 
said Colson had talked to Hunt about executive clemency. 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 15 



1568 

Now, is that to your recollection, a correct statement of how that 
conversation took place, or is your statement the correct 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; my recollection is there was no discussion of the — 
it appears to me what they have done is take what I did raise on the 
S-lst regarding Mr. Hunt's direct threat of a blackmail nature to John 
Ehrlichman and confused it with an earlier meeting which occurred 
on March 13, when the $1 million conversation came up, and put the 
two together some way. 

Mr. Dash. Now, do you recall the President ever telling you that it 
was wrong to pay this $1 million ? 

Mr. Dean. To the contrary. He said it would be no problem to raise 
the $1 million. 

Mr. Dash. Now, also, the next item in this memorandum states that 
the President spoke to — I think that was — 

Mr. Dean spoke to Haldeman's return of the $350,000. He said that Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman possibly had no legal guilt with regard to the money matters. 

Did you make such a statement ? 

Mr. JDean. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Let me go back again : 

Mr. Dean said nothing of his role with regard to the coverup money. He said 
nothing about his discussions with Magruder helping him prepare for the grand 
jury. He said nothing of his instructions to Caulfield to offer executive clemency. 

Was that true, on the 21st ? 

Mr. Dean. I think the contrary is true and I will rely on my state- 
ment, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Now, there is another reference or that meeting on the 
21st which we have from this oral communication from the White 
House. It says "Dean said Colson had talked to Mr. Hunt about execu- 
tive clemency." 

Is that the way you had put it to the President ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. As I recall, this initially came up on — the 13th 
was the first time it came up and the second time it came up was on the 
15th. I believe I have testified several times to the way that did occur 
and I respectfully disagree with that interpretation. 

Mr. Dash. Well, but, as stated, if in fact Mr. Dean had said that 
Colson had talked to Hunt about Executive clemency, and there is 
nothing further in this memorandum, if the President had not author- 
ized Executive clemency, would you have expected the President to 
have raised a question about that and called upon you or somebody 
who had authority to have Mr. Colson retract that ? 

Mr. Dean. Only the President can promise Executive clemency 
and Mr. Colson was quite aware of that. I think that the facts are that, 
in fact, Mr. Colson had talked to the President, who in turn had — then 
Colson talked to Mr. Bittman, who in turn talked to Mr. Hunt. 

Mr. Dash. Well, I just want the record to show that in this submis- 
sion by the White House to the committee, the reference to the Execu- 
tive clemency merely shows that Mr. Dean said Colson had talked to 
Hunt about Executive clemency. There was no reference to any re- 
action of the President, whether he had said that he had not authorized 
that and whether in fact, he indicated that whoever had done that, 
especially Mr. Colson, with Mr. Hunt, that that was to be retracted. 



1569 

The submission does not have that in it in a reconstruction of the 
so-called White House call. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to just have this introduced as part of 
the record, which I have already identified as a memorandum based 
on a call. 

Senator Ee\t[x. Without objection, it will be so identified and made 
a part of the record. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 70A.*] 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman. I think that is appropriate to make 
that a part of the record, but I think its character ought to be under- 
stood. This does not, as I understand it, represent a definitive "A^Tiite 
House position," but rather are the transcribed notes of a telephone 
conversation between Mr. Buzhardt, an attorney of the "\Aniite House, 
and Mr. Thompson, which were turned over to Mr. Dash and reviewed 
subsequently by Mr. Garment and Mr. Buzhardt. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, and I just want to give their statement as to what 
they intended to do and that was their reconstruction, having talked 
to persons who had knowledge of what had occurred in these meetings 
between the President and Mr. Dean. It was basically a reconstruction 
given to us for the purpose of use in qviestioning Mr. Dean. 

Senator Baker. I think that, Mr. Chairman, as I said a moment 
ago, is appropriate for that purpose at this time. But I caution against, 
if I may, taking that as a statement of a l^Tiite House position or a 
Presidential statement at this time, and I would rather keep the record 
open on that and see if we can't do a little bit about it. 

Mr. Dash. I accept that, Senator, and I only submit it as you limit it. 

Senator Er^t:n. I will make the same statement about it that I made 
at the time Mr. Dean was cross-examined about the statement which 
had come, at least infrequently, from Mr. Buzhardt. This is not evi- 
dence, it is a statement of Mr. Buzhardt's position or supposed position 
as counsel. 

[The document referred to was previously entered as exhibit Xo. 66 
in hearing of June 27 ; see p. 1412.] 

Senator Ervin. Yesterday, Senator Montoya suggested that the 
committee issue a subpena for Mr. Buzhardt and I suggested at that 
time that instead of so doing, we should have inquiry made of Mr. 
Buzhardt if he claimed to have any personal knowledge of the matters 
mentioned in his so-called Buzhardt statement. I am informed that 
Mr. Buzhardt says he has no personal knowledge of those matters. 

Mr, Dash. I informed the chairman that I had such a call with 
Mr. Buzhardt and as to personal knowledge, he referred to both his 
reconstruction and to the statement that this is something he prepared 
as counsel, having discussed it with others, or used other information 
in preparing it. 

Now, with regard to your involving Mr. Kalmbach in the raising 
of funds and in the so-called payoffs to maintain silence of the defend- 
ants, I think j'ou were, yesterday, by Senator Gurney in his very 
thorough cross-examination, examined as to whether or not Mr. Kalm- 
bach really understood from your discussions with him just what he 
was doing when he was being asked to raise money for the payoffs. 
You had indicated that you clearly understood that he did under- 
stand, because you had fully informed him as to the circumstances. 

The question clearly was raised whether or not Mr. Kalmbach could 

•See p. 1794. 



1570 

have gotten the impression that this was for humanitarian purposes, 
sort of to raise a defense fund. 

Now, first, Mr. Dean, I think you testified that you told Mr. Kalm- 
back just prior to asking him to undertake this assignment what the 
circumstances were. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Could you just briefly, very briefly, tell us, what did you 
tell Mr. Kalmbach? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I told him everything that I knew about the case 
at that time. I told him that I was very concerned that this could lead 
right to the President. I didn't have any hard facts. I hoped that I was 
incorrect. I explained to him in full the seriousness of the matter. I 
relayed to him the fact that some records had been destroyed. I told 
him virtually everything I knew at that time and I think there was no 
doubt in his mind about the sensitivity of the situation. 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, Mr. Dean, is there anything wrong, 
for instance, if somebody working for you — and after all, Liddy and 
McCord did work for the Committee To Re-Elect the President — is 
there anything wrong if anybody works for you and gets in trouble, 
about your picking up expenses — defense funds and things like that. 
Defense funds have been raised. 

'If that was the attitude of the "Wliite House and if that was the atti- 
tude of the Committee To Re-Elect the President for Mr. Liddy, Mr. 
McCord, whoever else they involved, would they not at least have tried 
to dig up a collection from all those working for the White House and 
the committee, to raise a defense fund? Isn't that the way you raise 
defense funds for defendants ? 

Mr. Dean. I am not familiar with raising defense funds, but you 
don't use covert means to raise humanitarian funds. 

Mr. Dash. Do you use moneys that have been given to a committee 
to reelect a President of the United States ? 

Mr. Dean. In covert fashion ? 

Mr. Dash. In raising a defense fund for those who may have been 
cauirht in a covert act, do you use campaign funds 

Mr. Dean. No, you don't. 

Mr. Dash. Is that a proper use of funds given in a campaign for re- 
election of a President ? 

Mr. Dean. No, it is not. 

Mr. Dash. You spoke of your knowledge of clandestine payments. 
Can you tell us of your knowledge of the clandestine nature of the 
way in which these payments were made ? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Kalmbach asked me if I would have Mr. Ulasewicz 
call him when he returned to California. He said he didn't have his 
phone number at that time and would like to have him reach him as 
soon as he got back. In a few subsequent conversations I had with IMr. 
Kalmbach, he had developed what he called code names for various 
individuals. I think I referred to these earlier. He called Mr. Hunt 
the Writer. He called Mr. Haldeman the Brush. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know what ho called Mrs. Hunt ? 

Mr. Dean. The writer's wife, I think, maybe. Something, I don't 
know. 

Mr. Dash. Like who is buried in Grant's Tomb. 



1571 

Mr. Dean. I don't really know. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know, by the way, whether Mr. Ulasewicz had 
a code name? Did you know that he was called Mr. Rivers in the 
conversation with ^Ir. Kalmbach and Mr. Ulasewicz ? 

Mr. Dean. I think I did hear that subsequently from Mr. Kalmbach, 
that he had referred to him as Mr. Rivers. 

Mr. Dash. Now, again, if one were to, on the basis of decency, 
humanitarianism, whatever way you want to call it, raise a defense 
fund, would one go about clandestinely using code names of that kind 
to secretly make these payoffs ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. I think we will have Mr. Kalmbach here to testify as to 
that in much more detail. 

Now, did Mr. Kalmbach tell you about any of the instructions that 
he had as the man who was to make these payoffs ? 

Mr. Dean. He told me when I met him in Lafayette Park that he 
was going to meet Mr. Ulasewicz at that point in time and that he was 
going to have the money laundered. That is the only thing I know 
about that. He never did tell me exactly how money was laundered. I 
asked him and he said, I don't know. I don't know if he goes to the 
race track and exchanges it there or if he's got friends in New York 
that exchange it; I was never exactly clear on how money was 
laundered. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Kalmbach ever tell you that he had had any 
discussion with Mr. Ehrlichman concerning this role? 

Mr. Dean. The only time I had heard of any discussion was when — 
well, Mr. Kalmbach had numerous discussions with Mr. Ehrlichman 
that I was aware of. Mr. Kalmbach, when he would come into town, 
would have a list that he would keep in his pocket that he would check 
off each item with each individual he wanted to talk with. He is a very 
thorough man. He never told me what he was going over with Mr. 
Ehrlichman on his list. The only time I had heard about his discussing 
this at all with Mr. Ehrlichman was after April — or, let's see, March 
29 or 30, when they were in California for President Thieu's visit. He 
said to me he had met with Mr. Ehrlichman that week to discuss the 
fact that he was concerned that when he appeared before this com- 
mittee, he didn't want to ever have the name of the contributor come 
out, the person who had raised this money, and he had had some dis- 
cussion with him. 

What other discussions — I know he had met with Mr. Ehrlichman 
on countless occasions. 

Mr. Dash. Did ISTr. Kalmbach ever tell you to your knowledge that 
Mr. Ehrlichman had indicated that the President had approved these 
payments ? 

Mr. Dean. Did Mr. Kalmbach tell me ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. No, he did not. 

Mr. Dash. Did you learn in any other way ? 

Mr. Dean. No. not that I recall. 

Mr. Dash. In your exhibit No. 84-47, Mr. Dean, you list Mr. Stans. 
I think you pretty well identified a number of the others and I think 
it may be interesting to the committee, Mr. Stans having testified be- 



1572 

fore the committee, why you listed his name. This was a list, to recall 
it for you, that you put certain markings by those who were lawyers. 
This was a list of those you thought had problems as far as criminal 
charges. Why was Mr. Stans put on your list ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, this was based on — first of all, you will note on the 
list I have question marks beside certain people. On some of those 
people, I knew what I knew, I knew what evidence I had in my mind of 
their own involvement. I didn't know about Stans, I didn't know how 
involved he had or had not been. For that reason, I put a question 
mark beside his name because I hadn't had any direct dealings with 
him that would indicate it, but there were certain circumstantial situa- 
tions and I was not sure. So that is why the question marks on some of 
these. 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Dean, just going back very briefly to the testi- 
mony concerning the $15,200 which had been given to you by Mr. 
Strachan, Mr. Howard and Mr. Strachan, that you put in your safe. 
And the fact that you had taken from that an amount of about 
$4,800 

Mr. Dean. $4,850. 

Mr. Dash. $4,850 for your own personal use ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. I think this has not been brought out in the testimony 
and I would like to ask you this question. 

Can you tell the committee when was the first time you told anybody 
about your removing $4,850 ? 

Mr. Dean. When I first went to my lawyer, sometime shortly after 
I had gotten through an explanation of all the facts that I knew, I got 
into this particular problem and raised that with him. 

Mr. Dash. Therefore, he was the first one in the world, so to speak, 
who first learned about your doing that ? 

Mr. Dean, That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. If you had wanted to conceal that — if you were interested 
in, using the term that has been used here, embezzle, if you had wanted 
to conceal your use of that money, could you not just as well, before 
telling your lawyer about that, have replaced that money and told 
your lawyer that you had $15,200 in the safe ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, I could have. 

Mr. Dash. T^Hiy, then, did you tell your lawyer about it? 

Mr. Dean. Because I thought that would be an untruthful thing to 
do and I thought I would tell him the facts the way they were. Mr. 
Dash, I might also add that I asked my lawyer to go to the Govern- 
ment with this information right away, so they knew that. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, I think it is important that we discuss that and 
the fact that vour lawver and you opened up a trustee account and 
deposited the full $15,200, which was the balance left in the safe of the 
cash plus your own personal check of $4,850, which you replaced the 
original check with, so that vou made it whole. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to give some photostatic copies we have 
of that transaction to Mr. Dean if he could identifv them for us. 

Mr. Dean. You want me to identifv these for the record? 

Mr. Dash. Would vou, for the record ? 

Mr. Dean. This document, dated April 24, is a letter from Mr. 
Shaffer. 



1573 

Another document is a check dated April 12, 1973, written out to 
INIr. Hogan and Mr. Shaffer, trustees, for $4,850, and signed by myself. 

There is a receipt written out by Mr. Shaffer of that amount — no, 
it is for the full amount, I take that back. I can't even read the writing 
here. It indicates the full amount. 

There is a cashier's check written out for $10,350. 

Mr. Dash. What does that cashier's check represent? 

Mr. Dean. It is drawn on the Suburban Trust Co. It represents the 
cash that was deposited at that account. 

There are signature cards that were prepared with Mr. Hogan 
being stricken and Mr. McKeever being replaced on that as a trustee 
as a result of Mr. Hogan having to withdraw from the case for other 
reasons. 

Then there are additional signature cards. 

It looks like on the next document, there is a repeat of the earlier 
document for the Suburban Trust check. The numbers are the same at 
the top, so we have already identified that check. 

Then there is a subsequently issued check when Mr. Hogan withdrew 
from the case and it was necessary to put Mr, McKeever on a new check 
so that a new check drawn by me to the order of Mr. Shaffer and Mr. 
McKeever for $4,850. 

The next appears to be endorsements on the back of these checks; 
and a signature card. 

Mr. Dash. Will you read the letter for the committee, please ? 

Mr. Dean. [Reads :] 

Dear Garnett : Enclosed you will find : (1) client's check dated April 20, 1973, 
numbered 1647 payable to the order of myself and Mr. McKeever as Trustees in 
the amount of $4,850.00 which we have suitably endorsed to the Bank; (2) the 
Bank's Treasurer's check dated April 19, 1973, in the amount of $10,350.00 cover- 
ing the cash I delivered to you for safekeeping on Friday, April 13, 1973, pending 
the opening of an account; and (3) the two signature cards signed by Mr. Dean, 
myself and my partner, McKeever. 

As you know, when we first discussed opening the account I contemplated that 
Thomas Hogan, Esquire, would be cotrustee with myself inasmuch as he then 
also represented Mr. Dean. However, subsequent developments (conflict of inter- 
est) have required Mr. Hogan to withdraw from tlie representation and, accord- 
ingly, my partner, McKeever, is acting as cotrustee. 

Tliis change also required Mr. Dean to substitute his enclosed check numbered 
1647 for his check numbered 1643 originally payable to Mr. Hogan and myself as 
Trustees. I have had Mr. Dean void the latter check by tearing his signature 
therefrom and it remains in our files. 

Should you be inquired of by competent authorities as to the opening of this 
account, please tell them all you know, including whatever I have told you. 

Thank you for your cooperation in the matter. 
Sincerely, 

Shaffer, McKeever & Fitzpatrick. 

Mr. Dash. Who is it addressed to ? 

Mr. Dean. Garnett Inscoe, Suburban Trust Co., 255 North Wash- 
ington St., Rockville, Md., April 4, 1973. 

Mr, Dash, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that identified and 
introduced into the record. 

Senator Ervin. That will be done. The reporter will number it ap- 
propriately as an exhibit and receive it into the record as such. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 71,*] 

•See p. 1801. 



1574 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, I don't know whether 

Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Chairman, there is one statement I could make 
with respect to one of those documents that would clarify what I think 
would be confusing. I would be glad to do it under oath or off oath, 
and if any member of your committee objects to me making a state- 
ment and you rule that I can't, I won't, but I would like to. It relates 
to the Suburban Trust treasurer's check. May I make the statement ? 

Senator Ervin. Is there any objection from any member of the 
committee ? 

f No response.] 

Senator Ervin. Suppose you stand up and I will administer the 
oath. 

Do you swear that the evidence you shall give the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth, 
the wliole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Shaffer. I do. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES N. SHAETER, ESQ., COUNSEL TO 
JOHN DEAN III 

Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Chairman, after my client had given me the cash 
and a current check made payable to me and Hogan, and after I had 
gone to the Government with the currency so that they could look 
at the — Xerox it, do whatever they wanted with it, I got to the bank. 
I was carrying it around about a day. I was a little uncomfortable. I 
got to the Ibank about 2:05 on a Friday, and it was in April. It was, 
I believe, in early April. The records will show; the receipt there 
will date it. And I knocked on Mr. Inscoe's window and he came 
around to the door and he opened it up, because he knows me. My 
law office is right near the bank. I have a very small account there, 
and he treats me as a good customer, nevertheless. 

I said, Garnett, I have got all this cash, and I don't want to have 
it over the weekend ; will you take it ? 

So he said, yes, he would take it and he would give me a receipt. 

Then on Monday and Tuesday, we were having trouble with Mr. 
Hogan and his conflict-of-interest problem, and we never got the 
signature cards back, and finally, Garnett said, "Look, I can't hold this 
cash around here forever. I am going to give you a treasurer check 
at the bank so I can then pass the currency through the account." That 
is how this treasurer's check came into being. 

Thank you. If anybody wants to cross-examine me, I will be glad 
to answer questions. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Shaffer, no, I don't want to cross-examine 
you, but I can't resist the temptation to let the record note that you 
claim and continue to stand on and have not waived the attorney- 
client privilege. 

Mr. Shaffer. Thank you. I appreciate the comment 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, on page 202 of your statement, vou state down 
toward the bottom, "Mr. Mitchell raised the fact that F. Lee Bailey, 
who had been verv helpfnl in dealing with McCord" had a problem — 
what are the details, or what to youi- knowledge was meant by Mr. F. 
Lee Bailev, wlio had been helpful in dealing with McCord, from Mr. 
Mitchell's point? 



1575 

["Testimony of John W. Dean III, continued.] 

Mr. Dean. Well, I believe I testified to this fact earlier, Mr. Dash. 
There was one point when ]Mr. Alch apparently was not havinp; full 
rapport with his client, Mr. McCord, that an arrangement or discus- 
sion was to be had. I testified, I belieA^e I didn't know that in fact that 
had occurred, in which Mr. Mitchell was going to call Mr. Bailey. 
INIr. Bailey was going to fly in or call or visit with Mr. McCord and 
promised Mr. McCord that he would represent his case on April and 
at that time to the highest court in the land, if necessary. That was 
what the reference is to. 

Mr. Dash. Now, I don't know whether you fully replied to Senator 
Montoya's question when he asked the question that concerned the 
President's news conference of August 29, 1972, and the question had 
been put to the President : 

Mr. President, wouldn't it be a good idea for a special prosecutor, even from 
your standpoint, to be appointed to investigate the contribution situation and also 
the Watergate case? 

The President: 

With regard to who is investigating it now, I think it would be well to notice 
that the FBI is conducting a full field investigation. The Department of Justice, 
of course, is in charge of the prosecution and presenting the matter to the grand 
jury. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee is conducting an investigation. 

Now, can you identify who the President meant, for Senator Mon- 
toya, when he was referring to the Senate Banking and Currency 
Committee also conducting an investigation? 

Mr. Deax. That was a known fact that the Patman committee 
was 



Mr. Dash. That was the Patman committee? 

Mr. Deax. Yes ; correct. 

Mr. Dash. And here the President was responding that the Patman 
committee was making an investigation ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. But, in fact, when the President was making that state- 
ment, was the "WHiite House strategy to halt the Patman committee 
investigation ? 

Mr. Deax. It was to try to impede that investigation. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, in your statement, page 101, you state that the 
lawyers at the reelection committee were hopeful of slowing down 
the Democratic National Committee suit, as a result of ex parte con- 
tacts with the judge. "V\niat was the extent and source of your informa- 
tion on the subject? 

Mr. Deax. I first learned of this in a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office 
in which I was told that there were some arrangements had been made 
to have somebody, at that time I did not know who, talk with Judge 
Richey about the problems the case presented for the reelection com- 
mittee and potentially for the "White House, without getting into 
specifics with the judge. I later learned and was present when Mr. 
ISIcFee had a direct discussion with Mr. Michell about this subject, and 
the fact that he was going to go visit with the judge, and then as late 
as March 2 of this year, Mr. McFee came to my office^not to my office, 
he came to have lunch with me at the "^^Hiite House and told me that 
A'Cry weekend he was going to go take up a matter which he said 
Kenny, referring to Ken Parkinson, had said was an aspect of the case 



1576 

that he was concerned about, so there were several people, I think, who 
were aware of this. I think Mr. LaRue was aware of it ; I think Mr. 
Mitchell was aware of it. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have personal knowledge of that other than what 
you had been told ? 

Mr. Dean. Only what I was told directly by Mr. McFee, that he, 
in fact, was going to visit the judge. I was not present at any meetings 
with the judge ; no, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know that at a hearing on September 21, 1972, 
before Judge Charles R. Richey, the judge to whom the case was as- 
signed, that counsel for the plaintiffs, the Democratic National Com- 
mittee, agreed as a practical matter that the case could not be tried 
before the election ? Did you know that ? 

Mr. Dean. I did not follow the civil cases at all to speak of, other 
than just general awareness ; I was probably aware of that at the time, 
but I do not know — I know there were countless meetings with Judge 
Richey with all counsel present. In fact, virtually every meeting he 
had directly relating to the case he would call all counsel and all inter- 
ested parties. The meetings I am referring to did not involve all 
counsel. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know at the same hearing that the judge ruled 
that depositions should cease to be taken for the time being on the 
ground that the taking of depositions might jeopardize the pending 
criminal case ? 

Mr. Dean. I was aware of the fact that about that time that the 
depositions had been cut off temporarily anyway. 

Mr. Dash. Are you personally familiar with any of the other rulings 
of Judge Richey that were made during the pendency of the Demo- 
cratic National Committee case that occurred prior to the election ? 
Mr. Dean. No, I am not. 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, you have no other knowledge, really, 
of that matter other than what Mr. Parkinson or other lawyers told 
you about that ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you indicated that on April 15, meeting with the 
President, the President in bringing up the question of the million- 
dollar discussion, told you that he was joking. When he first mentioned 
that to you, Mr. Dean^ did he indicate in any way that he was joking, 
or did you understand him to be joking ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, I did not understand him to be joking. He re- 
peated it twice, and indicated that there would be no problem to raise 
$1 million. He looked over at Mr. Haldeman and raised the same 
matter, and was very confident that $1 million was nothing to raise 
at all. I'V^en he reraised it on the 15th, when he said he was just 
joking, I would have to characterize his characterization as being a 
rather nervous laughter kind of , "I was just joking." 

Mr. Dash. I think you testified, and you may have given us informa- 
tion on this, that you" believe that April 15 meeting with the President 
was taped and that you were being asked leading questions. Have you 
ever asked the White House if you were taped, or any official of the 
White House? 



1577 

Mr. Dean. I raised it with my lawyer, and I do not know whether he 
raised this with the prosecutors or not, but after I was told that I had 
been taped 

Mr. Dash. '\Mio told you, Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Deax. ]My lawyer, Mr. Shaffer, told me, that he had received 
word from the prosecutors that I had been taped, and I thought there 
was only one occasion when that could have occurred that I was aware 
of where I had a direct conversation with the President, because all 
the circumstances seem to indicate that, and that was on this April 15 
meeting. Now, I do not know for a fact whether he was or was not 
taped, but suggested that the Government might want to listen to that 
tape because if they listened to that tape, they would have some idea of 
the dimensions of what was involved. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, I just want to refer to exhibit No. 34-15 and 
this is the exhibit that has first a memorandum from Mr. Charles 
Colson to you, reference Howard Hunt. The memorandum itself also 
includes a short memorandum from "W. Richard Howard who, I under- 
stand, was Mr. Colson's assistant ; am I not correct ? Mr. Howard was 
Mr. Colson's assistant, was he not ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, yes. I have your exhibit now. 

Mr. Dash. All right. On that March 30 memorandum from Mr. 
Howard on the second paragraph the opening line is "Howard," mean- 
ing Howard Hunt, "has been very effective for us." Have you an 
understanding what he meant bv that ? It is a memorandum for Bruce 
Kehrli. 

Mr. Deax. No, I do not. I am not fully familiar other than what 
some of the things that I recall and I have recalled to this committee 
that I saw in the files of Mr. Hunt's that related to Mr. Colson, that 
in fact, he had a close relationship with Mr. Colson. 

Mr. Dash. What was your understanding of the "us" in that, "How- 
ard Hunt has been very effective for us." 

Mr. Deax. Tliat would be a reference to Mr. Colson and Mr. Howard 
and Mr. Colson's general office. 

Mr. Dash. Would you look at exhibit No. 34-37? This exhibit dated 
February 28, 1973, which has the heading "Administratively Confi- 
dential," is for Larr^^ Higby and John Dean and is from Jerry Jones. 
A^Hio is Jerry Jones ? 

Mr. Deax. He is the head of the personnel office, and I might add 
that while this was addressed to me it took me several days to get this 
memorandum. It did not come directly to me, and I finally got the 
copy I had after having to make several calls to get the copy so that 
the memorandum really was not directly to me and I think I did not 
get an original, rather I got a Xerox. 

Mr. Dash. Now the subject matter says what "Options for Jeb 
Magruder." 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. '\^niat was it all about ? "\^^ly was this memorandum writ- 
ten and what do they mean by ojitions for Jeb Magruder? 

Mr. Deax. Well, it was shortly before this time that Mr. Magruder 
had been making some statements to Mr. O'Brien which I had in turn 
relayed to Mr. Haldeman. These statements were to the effect that Mr. 
Haldeman — that he was aware of Mr. Haldeman's involvement in cer- 



1578 

tain aspects of the pre-April or pre- June 17 aspects of the Watergate, 
and he was indicating to Mr. O'Brien that, in fact, it was his under- 
standing that the President might have had knowledge of this. 

When I reported this back to Mr. Haldeman, the interest in finding 
Mr. Magruder a job increased about tenfold, and this is the product of 
that. 

Mr. Dash. Then it would fair to characterize this memorandum as a 
memorandum to show what could be done for Jeb Magruder to help 
him out in that case ? 

Mr. Dean. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, let me read to you the opening part 
of that memorandum which indicates that perhaps some pressure might 
have to be brought to get him a job. "Listed below are nine possible 
options for Jeb. Some will break more china to secure than others. 
Where there are problems I have so noted them." What is your inter- 
pretation of "some will break more china than others?" 

Mr. Dean. I do not know exactly. That could mean one of many 
things, that given, the given head of an agency might have had a var- 
ious level of tolerance for the White House continuing to place people 
in their agencies. It could mean that people would w^ant to know about 
Magruder's awareness which I do not know if Mr. Jones had any 
awareness that Mr. Magruder had problems, but whether Mr. Higby 
had related that to them or not, I certainly did not so it is very hard 
for me to interpret exactly what that phrase means and I think only 
Mr. Jones can testify what he meant by that. 

Mr. Dash. I think it is fair for the record of this committee to 
clarify here. Is it your testimony that Mr. Jerry Jones, who had been 
asked to prepare this memorandum and seek out these options, did 
not himself, of your knowledge, know what Mr. Magruder's problems 
were or know anything about the Watergate coverup ? 

Mr. Dean. Not to my knowledge. In fact, when I was talking about 
this with Higby before Mr. Jones prepared this, one of the jobs I had 
heard of after talking with Jeb that he might be interested in was 
the job that ends up as No. 1, which was the assistant to the Secre- 
tary or Deputy Undersecretary of Commerce for Policy Development. 
And apparently, Mr. Higbv relaved that on to Mr. Jones, No, I do not 
know when I first heard of that job but I did, when Magruder came by 
I mentioned I heard of that job and he expressed immediate interest 
in it. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, you testified you were asked by Mr. Mac- 
Greffor to tell him the true facts and that you testified that you checked 
with Mr. Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman said no that you should not 
tell Mr. MacGregor the true facts. Do you recall what Mr. Mac- 
Gregor's reaction was when you refused to tell him the true facts 
or how did you handle that ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, what I did was I gave him the most evasive song 
and dance I could to weave him through the problems he was goin.Qr 
to have down there, and I recall that as soon as Mr. MacGrearor would 
have a press conference that peo]ile at tlie Wiite House who hit the 
ceiling because he would say something that would create more prob- 
lems than it would solve, and I felt very sorrv for Mr. MacGregor 
because he did not know what he should say and what he should not 



1579 

say and he had been given a lot of assurances that were assurances he 
should not have been given, and I think, I am sure I am not the only 
one he asked for assurances, I am sure he asked othere for assurances 
and was given them, that there was notliing to be concerned about. 

Mr. Dash. You have also testified, Mr. Dean, that after the Presi- 
dent's August 29 speech, and that is the speech of the so-called Dean 
report of no White House involvement, that you discussed with Mr. 
Moore and others the possibility of your becoming a fall guy. 

Now, how could you meaningfully discuss it with Mr. Moore without 
Mr. INIoore having the facts ? Did Mr. Moore have the facts at that time ? 

Mr. Deax. Xot at that time. I — it was long after that that I began — 
I do not recall exactly when, when I first started discussing this, as I 
recall, I was discussing it with Mr. Fielding, and I thought that if this 
statement crumbles, I crumble with it. I am a man who is out in front 
saying that everybody is clean, and this is something I did not exactly 
want, and that is why I began to talk to people about : Am I being put 
out in front? I can recall discussing it with Mr. Mitchell at one time, 
and he assured me, he told me, his answer was, "If you ever see any 
sign of that please tell me because I will speak directly with the 
President." 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Dean, you testified, of course, quite at length 
this week, firet a full day of statement and then all these days of 
examination, cross-examination. But I think in the course of your 
testimony you have made it fairly clear that you have had experience 
both in the legislative branch and the executive branch and very full 
experience in this unfortunate occurrence which was the coverup of the 
"Watergate and perhaps some complicity in the Watergate itself. 

Now, a major reason for this committee sitting and hearing all these 
facts certainl}' is not that of a prosecutor but of a committee of the 
Senate in order to come forward with legislative recommendations and, 
especially in this case, recommendations to prevent this kind of thing 
from ever happening again in this country. 

You were a major and key figure in so many intimate parts of this 
massive coverup and activity which became the Watergate scandal and 
coverup. 

Can you give this committee any reconunendation either now in 
brief, and later in writing to the committee, which can assist this 
committee in formulating its recommendation to the Congress so that 
this kind of thing can never happen again in oui" country? 

Mr. Dean. INIr. Dash, I am quite aware of the fact that the purpose 
of this committee is legislative, and you are looking for answers to 
problems and that the man who has been right in the middle of those 
problems, and right in the middle of the White House for quite a while 
and has seen the way things have operated down in the executive 
branch. I have given this considerable thought, and with the permis- 
sion of the chairman and the committee what I would like to do at 
some point, because I have made some rather Jengthy notes as I have 
thought about this, over the last several months, as to potential legisla- 
tive steps that might be taken by this committee under consideration, 
that I feel might provide some answers to preventing this sort of thing 
from occurring again and I would like to submit that at a subsequent 
date to the committee rather than go on to what would be a rather 
extensive discussion of legislative remedies. 



1580 

Mr. Dash. Thank you, Mr. Dean. I have no further questions, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I might add since the document which I dictated 
subsequent to my conversation with Mr. Buzhai dt has been made part 
of the record that it was submitted to me with the understanding that 
it would be made available for committee use. There was no discussion 
as to exactly how that document or the subsequent document that I 
might prepare would be used, although there was certainly no limita- 
tion in any manner as to how it might be used. I maght also add there 
was no discussion as to the source of the information which Mr. Buz- 
hardt was imparting to me but that it was one lawyer's position to 
another lawyer. 

Mr. Dean, you have testified and referring to your statement on page 
144, that you had a meeting with Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. 
Alch. Mr. Alch has testified. 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Alch, I never met with Mr. Alch, I am sorry, I am 
trying to get to that page. 

Mr. Thompson. I am sorry, you are right, it was a report of the 
meeting. I will relate the portion I am referring to, "Sometime during 
this period that as a result of my repoit of Caulfield meeting with 
McCord that O'Brien, Mitchell, and Alch discussed having F. Lee 
Bailey meet with McCord, et cetera." I assume then that discussion 
was not in your presence either ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know Mr. Alch's relationship with either 
Mr. O'Brien or Mr. Mitchell at that time ? 

Mr. Dean. No, I do not. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know why he was present at that partic- 
ular meeting at that time ? 

Mr. Dean. It is my understanding that Mr. O'Brien — I am not sure 
Mr. Mitchell was present. I have not seen the paragraph you are re- 
ferring to. 

Mr. Thompson. The first full paragraph. 

Mr. Dean. On page 145 of my testimony ? 

Mr. Thompson. 144. That O'Brien, Mitchell, and Mr. Alch dis- 
cussed havinfr F. Lee Bailev, I assume that as a discussion, one discus- 
sion with all these gentlemen present ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, this is what I am referring to here, if you read 
it, is that there was sometime during this period that as a result of 
mv reports of Caulfield's meetings with INIcCord, that O'Brien, 
Mitchell and Alch discussed. That does not indicate a meeting, and 
I am not aware of any meeting. 

Mr. Thompson. I see. 

Mr. Dean. It is intei'communication among these individuals that 
I am referring to, and I was not directly privy to any of these but I 
had a j^eneral understanding that Mr. O'Brien had request contacts 
with Mr. Alch, and he, in turn, would report back to Mr. Mitchell. I 
am not aware of any contact between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Alch. 

Mr. Thompson. I see. So vou assume that vour information was 
from Mr. O'Brien and that he had gotten his information directly 
from Mr. Alch ? 



1581 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. That is your assumption. 

Let me ask you this: About this $350,000 of which you received 
$15,200, did I understand you to say that you understood that part 
of this money came from the 1970 congressional campaign? 

Mr. Dean.*^ ]\Iy understanding was that the money came from the 
1968 primaries. 

Mr. Thompson. 1968 primaries ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know what particular route that money 
traveled in order to get from those primary campaigns to the Com- 
mittee To Re-Elect? 

Mr. Dean. To the best of my recollection what I was told is that it 
went to New York during 1968, was kept in safety deposit boxes in 
New York, it subsequently came from safety deposit boxes in New 
York to safety deposit boxes in Washington. 

Mr. Thompson. In whose custody was it in in New York? 

Mr. Dean. I believe it was in Mr. Kalmbach's custody in New York 
but I don't have the actual facts as to who had the actual safety 
deposit boxes. 

Mr. Thompson. Would it not be appropriate for that money to have 
gone to the cono:ressional campaign committee ? 

Mr. Dean. The 1968 primary money ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Thompson, I was not making any decisions in 1968 
about that money. 

Mr. Thompson. I am not holding you accountable. This is strictly 
a collateral matter, it is a matter that vou wound up with money in 
your safe or perhaps a part of it, or the Committee To Re-Elect wound 
up with money that they were using, according to some of the testi- 
monv we have had, in paying these defendants. 

]Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

]Mr. Thompson. I was wondering for my own information where 
that money should have gone after the 1968 primaries were over; in 
whose custody it was. 

Mr. Dean. Well, I gather what the intention was after the 1968 
primaries and the 1968 general election that there was, I recall a figure 
of $1.9 million being left. Now, I am sure your committee investigators 
are trying to reconstruct the totality of this cash, and I don't know 
what hapnend to all that monev. I know Mr. Kalmbach told me what 
happened to some of it, and some of it was spent for polling that I 
mentioned earlier todav, that some of it was spent for payment to 
Mr. Wallace's opponent's campaign, and the remainder of it was still 
surplus monev. Now there was other surplus monev that came in from 
the 1970 campaign, congressional campaign effort that apparently was 
kept separate also is mv understanding but, you know, I am not inti- 
mately familiar with these details at all. 

Mr. Thompson. "WHiere did you get your information concerning 
the monev going to Mr. Wallace's opponent? 

Mr. Dean. From Mr. Kalmbach. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Kalmbach told you that? 

INIr. Dean. That is correct. 



1582 

Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate he had personal dealings in that 
matter ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, he did. 

Mr. Thompson. What did he say exactly about that? 

Mr. Dean. He indicated to me that he had made a disbursement 
of the surplus money to a — he didn't give me the mechanics of it, to 
that purpose. 

Mr. Thompson. Who was Mr. Wallace's opponent at that time? 

Mr. Dean. I think it was ]\Ir. Brewer, as I recall. 

Mr. Thompson. Governor Brewer. And he said what, excuse me. 

Mr. Dean. That money had gone to that campaign from these funds. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate whether there were any intermedi- 
aries in that particular transaction ? 

Mr. Dean. This discussion was, I guess it was, in late February 
of this year, in which he was recounting to me generally what had 
happened to the money he had had in his custody because he was trying 
to reconstruct in his own mind. Apparently he had no records at this 
point in time, and he was trying to reconstruct the areas that he could 
recall as to how the disbursements of the money that had come from 
New York had traveled. And this is all, I just recall this point sticking 
in my mind as one of the things he said. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate that money had gone to any other 
Democratic candidates ? 

Mr. Dean. I am not sure that Mr. Brewer was a Democratic candi- 
date, was he? 

Mr. Thompson. Well, he was. 

Mr. Dean. Was he a Democratic candidate? 

Mr. Thompson. He was Grovernor of Alabama. 

Mr. Dean. Well, I am not familiar with what — I know there was 
an extensive fundraising effort in the 1970 congressional campaign 
and the records of those fundraising efforts and the disbursements as 
well came up in another conversation with another interrogation by 
the committee. Those records, to the best of my knowledge are still 
in a safe in Mr. Fielding's custody. They have never been reviewed 
or read by anybody in my office. They were placed in that safe with 
those instructions no one was to read them. We were given these records 
by Mr. Colson, and I, as I recall, ]\Ir. Colson had collected the records 
from Mr. Gleason, who was also involved in this activity at this time. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Dean, let me leave that and ask you a few 
questions concerning the $4,850 which you took from the safe. As I 
understand it, the reason you took that money instead of using your 
personal funds was that time in effect had run out on you and you had 
failed to go to the New York accounts you had, would that be your 
stock accounts? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. I had not only forgotten to take care 
of money matters, I had forgotten to get a — it wasn't I had forgotten, 
I had gotten too consumed to get wedding music, I had forgotten to 
get a minister or a judge to handle the proceedings, and it was a 
general bit of panic there in the final hours, I might say. 

Mr. Thompson. The chairman presented to you a statement from 
the Shearson and Hamill Co. of your stock account, I believe yester- 



1583 

day, do you happen to have a copy of that with you ? I have two extra 
copies here if that would expedite mattei-s any. 

Mr. Dean. No, I don't have a copy, I am sorry. 

Mr. Thompson. This is a matter of confusion to me, I believe you 
indicated yesterday that you had a $26,167 credit. 

Is that not — the copy is not clear. 

Mr. Dean. May I say something about these documents? I had a 
standard practice of not opening these, in fact originally they were 
not even sent to me, they were sent to my ex- wife's house where they 
remained and I would collect them in bulk, unopened and take them to 
my secretary and she would just file them. This is a margin account we 
are talking about, and I have not a lot of expertise in the market. The 
arrangements I had with my broker is that he had a total discretion in 
all handling of all trading. I would sign at the outset of all, I think 
periodically he would send me a sheet to sign that he would have total 
discretion for all trades. I have never been able to fully interpret these 
sheets so that is why I hope somebody else can look at them to do the 
interpretation when I turn all this information over to the committee. 

Mr. Thompson. AYould it be accurate to say that is a debit instead of 
a credit ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I don't — I think what it indicates to me is that — it 
is a credit, I am sure there were at least $26,000, in fact I am sure there 
is more than $26,000 in the account. 

Mr. Thompson. Could it possibly be that that was a debit but the 
value of your stock at that time was such that if you sold your stock 
you would have a $20-something thousand credit ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I think that if you were to — when your investi- 
gators do an entire audit of this entire matter which is of interest to 
you, that they will find that there were ample funds, including more 
than $26,000. I think this indicates merely one transaction that had 
occurred in this period of time. 

Mr. Thompson. So you had ample funds there to take care of the 
honej'moon expenses ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe you stated that you placed some of the 
money back at one time and then you took some money out again 
later? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

]Mr. Thompson. Again you did not go to your stock account although 
you had, as you say $20,000 either in stock value or readily available 
cash whichever that might be. 

Was this again because you had forgotten to do that or why didn't 
you go to the stock account on that occasion ? 

Mr. Dean. It was merely a matter of convenience. I had already 
made some use of the funds, and I merely decided to make more use of 
them. 

[Conferring with counsel.] 

Mr. Thompson. You received $15,200 in what, June of 1972? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

^Ir. Thompson. And then you took $4,850 on October 11 of 1972. 

The remaining what, $10,350, did you ever use any of this money for 
any other purposes ? 



-296 O - 73 - pt. 



1584 

'Mr. Dean. The other cash that was in there? 

JSIr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. As I said when I — at one time I recall I put some money- 
back in, and I could have very well at that time commingled other 
money that I had. I sometimes did carry cash with me, and I have told 
the committee I will do my best to go through my entire records and 
reconstruct this, with the committee investigators. 

Mr. Thompson. Did I understand your testimony in response to 
Senator Gurney's questions that you took some money out, you don't 
really know how much, you put some back in and you don't really 
know how much? 

Mr. Dean. I have not sat down and tried to figure this out, no. 

Mr. Thompson. So you don't really know how much. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. How did you know that you owed the fund $4,850 ? 

Mr. Dean. Because I had a check in there for that amount and I sat 
down and recounted it, and double checked that before I turned the 
money over to my lawyer as well. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you still have that check incidentally ? 

Mr. Dean. Which check? 

Mr. Thompson. The $4,850 check placed in the safe. 

Mr. Dean. No ; I do not. When my lawyer and I discussed this he 
told me that we will have to negotiate a new check, an updated check 
because the old check would not pass with the old date. He said issue 
me a new check and tear up the old one and get it over to me, which 
I did. 

Mr. Thompson. You tore up the check that you placed in the safe ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you not consider this as possible evidence of 
your good intentions which you have relayed to us here? 

Mr. Dean. Well, Mr. Thompson, if I was trying to be deceitful I 
could have very easily written another check to put in but I am not 
trying to be deceitful, I tore up the first check and I didn't try to 
pretend there was 

Mr. Thompson. Well, I am sure you had a problem — the reason you 
didn't place the money back, and in telling your attorney, was that you 
wanted to be completely truthful, but what you had done was realize 
it might be questionable ; based on that statement would it not have 
been logical for you to have kept that check and say, yes, this is a 
check I placed in the safe at the very beginning? 

Mr. Dean. If you want to place something sinister on this you can't 
because it was a very sort of incidental activity. Mr. Shaffer and I 
didn't really talk at length about it. He wanted to get the information 
to the prosecutors, he said, "I will also need a new check." 

Mr. Thompson. An incidental activity at this time when you went 
to your attorney and explained the situation and, as you have said 
in your o\vn testimony, you wanted to make sure the truth was out 
about this matter; you might be questioned about it and you wanted 
to be truthful about it; you consider this an incidental matter at this 
time, the only evidence possibly that you had besides your own testi- 
mony that you had indeed placed your personal check in there ? 



1585 

Mr. Deax. I didn't feel it a major matter at that moment I was 
prepared to reveal it and in fact develop it to the prosecutor. 

Mr. Tho3Ipsox. You didn't feel it was necessary to have any docu- 
mentary evidence to support or bolster your testimony on this par- 
ticular point then? 

Mr. Deax. Xo; I was perfectly willing to say everything I knew 
about the matter. 

Mr. Thompsox. What about a check stub? 

Mr. Deax. I would surmise there is no check stub because I kept, 
the way my checkbook is composed there are no stubs to the checks, 
you slide new checks into the book and run the other, the stub section 
in another area of the book, and I would keep in my desk drawer a 
nonsequential numbered checks far down the line and when I wrote 
the che<;k for cash I took one out of my desk drawer because my secre- 
tary would keep the sequential checks in her desk, and at the time I 
don't recall her being in the office when I needed a check and I just 
wrote one out of my desk drawer. 

Mr. Thompsox. Are you saying you did not stub this check at all ? 
You did not make a stub? 

Mr. Deax. No; I did not make a stub. 

Mr. Thompsox. I believe you previously testified that you stood 
ready to make ^ood this check at any time. Was it not necessary in 
keeping a record of your account, did you consider this an obligation 
which you had covered, so to speak? 

Of course, you did not have enough money in your account to 
cover it. You have already testified that you only had $1,600 in your 
account at that time. 

Mr. Deax. In my banking account. I certainly felt I had enough 
money to cover it through my brokerage account. 

]\Ir. Thompsox. You had 20 something thousand dollars in your 
brokerage account? 

Mr. Deax. I had over $20,000 in my brokerage account at that time. 

Mr. Thompsox. All right. And you took the money out on 
October 12, 1972? 

]Mr. Deax. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Th03Ipsox And you placed the check in the trustee account 
when ? 

Mr. Deax. I do not recall the exact date the trustee account was 
set up, because as I say 

Mr. Thompsox. In April? 

Mr. Deax. Yes, in April. 

Mr. Thompsox. From October 1972 to April 1973, you had this 
money in your stock account, and you never did take any money out 
of the stock account and place it in the bank to cover this check ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompsox. When did you tear up this check ? 

Mr. Deax. Shortly after my attorney told me he wanted me to issue 
a newer check. And he said in a manner that was without, to my 
knowledge, any sinister thought at all, that, merely issue me a new 
check and tear up the old check and bring the old one over here 

Mr. Thompsox. I am not talking about sinister now. Of course, you 
have a right to do what you want to do with your own checks. There 
is nothing sinister about 



1586 

Mr. Dean. We had talked about this, Mr. Thompson, after the fact. 
I wish I had had the check. 

Mr. Thompson. I certainly do, too. 

Mr. Dean. If I were not perfectly candid with this committee, it 
would not be very difficult to manufacture another check. 

Mr. Thompson. I assume you would not do that, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dean. I would not do that, no, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. I do not think we will even discuss possible further 
perjury or any activity of that nature. 

Mr. Shaffer. I object to the word "further," Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Thompson. That objection, if the Chair will allow me to com- 
ment on it, is well taken. 

But it was your intent and what was in your mind at the time, that 
puzzles me, Mr. Dean. Under ordinary circumstances, I would say 
that a man of your dealings, dealing in stock — if I might finish — with 
personal affairs involving great sums of money, that even in ordinary 
circumstances, it would be highly unusual for anyone to tear up a 
check, for any reason. Maybe not. But it would seem that way to me. 
But under these circumstances, when you knew in your own mind that 
there might be some question about it, to the extent that you went 
through these gyrations to set up this trustee account, when you real- 
ized there might be some question, that you would destroy the only 
documentary evidence that might substantiate that testimony. 

Mr. Dean. Well, let me repeat something that I think should be very 
clear on the record. I at no time thouffht there was any way in the world 
that I would not have to account in full for that money. Too many peo- 
ple were aware of it. Mr. Howard was aware that it had come to me. 
Mr. Strachan was aware that it had come to me. I had told Mr. Field- 
ing that I had it in my possession. I assume that they had possibly told 
other people about it, the fact that the money had ended up in my safe. 
The first occasion that it came to my mind, the point where I thought 
it ought to be revealed to the Government, was after I went to my 
attorney. I revealed it as it was. We discussed back at that time that 
after we made the moves to open up the trustee accounts that really, 
through inadvertence rather than serious thought, I had destroyed 
the first check based on an accounting that my attorney had made. He 
said, tear up the first check and issue me a new check ; it will be negoti- 
able. Now, that is the way the facts are. 

Mr. Thompson. Had you already started preparing your statement 
that you were going to use here today ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir : I was not preparing the statement then. I was 
trying to go over at that time just my chronology of my knowledge as 
to the sequence of events. I was having meetings with the prosecutors — 
some of this was just by, you know, trying to give them the facts as I 
knew them. 

Mr. Thompson. Maybe I got the wronsr implication or impression a 
minute ago in response to a question of Mr. Dash. The impression I 
got was that you were stating, in effect, that you never would have 
had to return that money, but you came forward and did it anyway 
because nobody would have known about it, something to that effect. 
Now you state that, correctly, Mr. Howard knew about it, Mr. Strachan 
knew about it, you assumed that they had told others about it. So 



1587 

Mr. Dean. What I am saying is not that no one would have ever 
known I had taken out the money. I could have put the cash back in. 
That was not my intention. When I, in fact, knew that I had handled 
that money, I felt I ought to state I had handled that money. I raised 
it with my lawyer, told him what I had done, and that is the way 
it occurred. 

Mr. Thompsox. At the time you went to your lawyer, you were, of 
course, shall we say, estranged from the White House ? I believe you 
said you got a different impression when you got back from Camp 
David. You said you were not going to play the coverup game any 
longer and you got a different impression from Mr. Haldeman as to 
his relationship with you and what he thought about you, that sort 
of thing. Did it ever occur to you that they might have access to your 
safe or that they might be talking to Mr. Howard, they might be talk- 
ing to Mr. Strachan, and they could go to the safe at any time? 

Mr. Deax. At that point, they were on their way to California. 
There was no problem with that happening. 

Mr. Thompson. So there were other people in the "VVliite House 
you still assumed were friends at that time ? 

Mr. Dean. There was only one person who had a combination to 
that safe and it would have been an extraordinary act if they had 
come in at that point when they were still dealing with me and trying 
to solicit my testimony, as to what it was going to be, for suddenly 
one night my safe to disappear. So I do not think that that is a fair 
assumption. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you about this entire fund. I think this 
merits some questioning with regard to the remaining money that 
was there; $10,350 that you said was not used. So you took $4,850 
because you did not want it to be used in coverup activities or used 
to perpetuate the coverup. 

Let us place this in context with your own situation at that time. 
Is it not true that on October 11, Mr. Hunt had filed a motion to sup- 
press in the criminal case in which he was involved at that time, alleg- 
ing in an affidavit as part of its motion that certain documents or cer- 
tain materials had not been turned over to the authorities when his 
safe was cleaned out ? 

Mr. Dean, I do not recall the date when he had filed that motion, 
whether it was October 11. I recall there was a motion filed to that 
effect. 

In fact, I recall that we received a letter at the Wliite House, that it 
was a draft letter by Mr. Bittman to Mr. Colson that I received from 
Mr. O'Brien indicating the fact that such a motion might be filed and 
in that letter, the question was raised as to where given items that were 
in the safe were located. This immediatelv raised to me the problem of 
the fact that materials had not gone directly to the FBI, but rather 
had gone directly to Mr. Gray. So I was aware of the fact that that 
motion was in the works and was goins; to be filed. 

Mr. Thompson. And the basis of that motion was, at least one of the 
points, as I understand, in the affidavit was that certain materials had 
not been turned over from his safe, had been withheld, and something 
had hnnrtened to them, is that not correct? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 



1588 

Mr. Thompson. All ri^ht, and you were one of the ones involved — 
I believe you said Mr. Ehrlichman told you to see that the safe was 
cleaned out. You were the one who, I believe, held a suitcase for a while, 
carried it around in the trunk of your car ? 

Mr. Dean, That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. You were the one who turned over documents to 
Mr. Gray ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. In order that they would not be leaked, I believe you 
said. 

Did you not consider when this motion was filed, when this affidavit 
was filed, that there was some amount of pressure on you, that you 
might be called in a hearing in the criminal case in order to explain 
what might have happened to those documents ? 

Mr. Df^4n. Indeed, I was quite aware when the motion was filed and 
I was called down to visit with the prosecutors, with the fact that I was 
going to be called to testify. That is what compelled me to go and tell 
Mr. Petersen that in fact, the documents had not all been turned over 
directly to the agents. 

Mr. Thompson. So you were concerned about that at that time ? 

Mr. Dean. I was concerned about what ? 

Mr. Thompson. The fact that this motion had been filed and you 
knew that you had been actually the one who had, in effect, diverted 
some of those materials. 

Mr. Dean. Let us understand this. I had been asked to deep six and 
shred documents. 

Mr. Thompson. You testified as to that. 

Mr. Dean. I did not want to deep six and shred documents. As far 
as I was concerned, I had been prepared to testify when my name 
became known that in Mr. Gray's testimony my name was going to 
come out. 

Mr. Thompson. You had been prepared to testify that you had given 
him certain documents and that they were extremely sensitive and I 
believe you said you did not tell him that they should never see the 
light of day. 

Mr. Dean. That is not what I remember. I believe I testified yester- 
day that I said they were not to be made public. 

Mr. Thompson. Were you prepared to testify that you carried the 
suitcase around in your car for a few days to decide whether or not you 
would deep six it ? 

Mr. Dean. If I had been called, that would have come out. 

Mr. Thompson, Were you interested in testifying truthfully and 
wanting to do that or in trying to prevent yourself from being placed 
in a situation where you would have to do that — you did not want to 
go down there ? 

Mr. Dean. Mr. Thompson, you cannot believe the amount of pressure 
that came on me after the Gray hearings by people not wanting me to 
testify. It became inevitable that I might have to testify. 

Mr. Thompson. I am talking about the specific point. I am talking 
about whether or not, on the day before you took this money out — 
and, of course, the records speak for themselves — I believe it was 
October 11 of that year — that the day before you took the money out, 



1589 

this motion ^as filed and in your mental condition at the moment, 
whether it was a matter of great concern to you ? 

Mr. Dean. I would not testify it was a matter of great concern ; 
no, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Would you carry a suitcase around with documents 
in it 

Mr. Dean. That was a long way off and let me tell you the inter- 
vening events. After the letter came to my attention before the motion 
was filed, I had conversations with ISIr. O'Brien about this. I told 
him that if the motion were filed by Mr. Bittman that a lot of problems 
might be created for the White House. 

Sir. Thompson. When was this conversation ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, it was well in advance of the filing of the motion. 

]Mr. Thompson. Was it well after October — before the motion 
was filed ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, it was. 

]Mr. Thompson. And what was the substance of the conversation? 

Mr. Dean, I told him that it would create real problems for the 
"WHiite House if it was. I didn't get explicit with him. 

Mr. Thompson. And possibly problems for you, would it not? It 
would be at least embarrassing, would it not, that you were trying 
to decide whether or not to deep six those materials ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, it was not, you know, embarrassment to me in the 
sense that it might have embarrassed others more seriously and it 
would have unraveled the coverup, if that is what you are saying; 
yes. 

Mr. Thompson. You were only concerned not to embarrass others 
and not yourself ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir ; I am saying I was concerned that it might start 
unraveling the coverup. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever give Mr. LaKue any money for him 
to distribute to defendants? 

Mr. Dean. Directly ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Was any money ever passed in your ofRce when Mr. 
LaRue and ]Mr. Kalmbach were present to give to defendants in order 
to keep them silent ? 

]Mr. Dean. That is possible. I don't recall. It could have happened 
when ]\Ir. LaRue and Mr. Kalmbach met for Mr. LaRue to get his 
instructions regarding or Mr. Kalmbach got the instructions from 
Mr. LaRue as to the disposition of the money. 

Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Kalmbach ever come in and in effect, make 
an accounting of the money he had received and the money he had 
disbursed when he had some notes in his hand? Do you recall that, 
in vour office ? 

Mr. Dean. I recall that he told me that he had destroved the copy 
of the distribution, but he said that he had taken care of it and there 
may have been some sort of accounting. T don't recall it precisely. 
It was not somethinjT we talked about with great frequency. 

^Ir. Thompson. Did you ever burn notes Mr. Kalmbach had had 
concerning his distribution ? 



1590 

Mr. Dean. Oh, yes; I did. Mr. Kalmbach gave me a small slip of 
paper. He was burning it and I gave him my ash tray and it was 
placed in my ash tray on my desk and burned up, one of these little 
notepads I think I testified lo in my earlier testimony, where he had 
transcribed larger notes into smaller notes and it was burned up in an 
ash tray in my office. I do recall that ; yes. 

Mr. Thompson. When did that occur ? 

Mr. Dean. Sometime after the delivery, I gather, had been made. 

Mr. Thompson. Was anyone else present besides you and Mr. 
Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Dean. No ; there was not. 

Mr. Thompson. As to whether or not you in fact told Mr. Kalm- 
bach that you wanted Ulasewicz to be the one to distribute this money ? 

Mr. Dean. I did not tell Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Kalmbach requested 
Mr. Ulasewicz' number from me because he told me he was the only one 
he would trust to do the job. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you know who Ulasewicz was? 

Mr. Dean. Indeed I did. I knew that from the time that Mr. Caul- 
field had been put on my staff ; shortly thereafter, I learned that he had 
done countless assignments for Mr, Caulfield and Mr. Caulfield had 
regailed me at times with Mr. Ulasewicz ability. 

Mr. Thompson. Getting back to the money in a different light, 
and I hope my pursuit is not being completely irrelevant. I am con- 
cerned with that fund and the possibility of whether or not there 
might have been distributions of that fund other than the one you have 
related to us. As I understand your statement, the reason you took the 
$4,850 primarily was to cover the expenses that you would incur on 
your honeymoon. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Dean. That was the original purpose, but as I have, I think, told 
the committee, I later used it for personal expenditures. 

Mr. Thompson. But that was the original purpose? 

Mr. Dean. That was the original purpose ; that is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. And you were questioned, I believe, as to why it 
would take that much money for a honeymoon. I believe your statement 
is that you planned to spend several weeks on your honeymoon. 

Mr. Dean. I had hoped to spend about 10 days to 2 weeks in Florida 
if I could get it. I didn't know if I could get it. 

Mr. Thompson. 10 days to 2 weeks? 

Mr. Dean. I didn't know how long I was going to stay. I was going 
to fight off the office as long as I could. I hadn't had a break in some 
time. 

Mr. Thompson. You testified on more than one occasion that you 
were very careful in making your statement, that you went over your 
statement in detail. Now the 10 days, this is the first time I have heard 
of the 10 days. 

Mr. Dean. No, sir; if you will check the transcript, that also came 
out in the questioning at one point. 

Mr. Thompson. That you have testified ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. If I am in error, I will apologize. I am going back 
to your prepared transcript, your prepared statement, where you say 
on page 116: 



1591 

On Friday, the 13th, I had left Washington to go to Florida to spend several 
weeks on a honeymoon. I was abruptly called back on the 15th, after 2 days. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. I assume it was your intention when you left here to 
spend several weeks 

Mr. Deax. That was my 

Mr. Thompson. If possible ? 

]Mr. Dean. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. ^Yhsit were your campaign duties, Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Dean. I don't know what you mean by campaign duties. 

]Mr. Thompson. You were counselor to the President, and I believe 
you mentioned in the past, that Mr. Haldeman in effect related what 
your duties would be during the campaign. I assumed you would have 
a slightly different role, perhaps, during a campaign than you would 
in a nonpolitical year? 

]Mr. Dean. That is right. I certainly was not involved in any political 
aspects. I would say the basic thing, a number of filings required by 
the President required research of the State laws to define and de- 
scribe exactly what the President himself would have to sign as a 
candidate for the Office of President of the United States. These could 
not be handled by the reelection committee. They would require a 
notarized Presidential signature. The President was traveling around 
the country from time to time, we would have to send them with a 
military aide. We would have to be not only aware of what the 50 
States required, we would have to be aware of when they required it. 
That was probably the most consuming of the campaign activities. 

I would say that my largest campaign activity was the coverup of 
the Watergate. 

]Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you if this would be correct and I am 
reading from page 28 of the transcript of our executive session. 

My principal area of concern would be that the White House itself would stay 
in full compliance with election laws. And I can say from that point on, we 
didn't miss one thing regarding the election laws themselves, which was a rather 
voluminous and time-consuming task because as the candidate, the President 
had a lot of filings that required his signature itself and were handled in the 
White House. 

Mr. Dean. I think that is saying in another way what I have just 
said. 

Mr. Thompson. You left on October what. 13th ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, several weeks would have had you returning 
after the election 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Would not that have presented a little problem 
for you, considering there was a required filing on the 15th, 6 days next 
preceding the election ? 

]\Ir. Dean. At that time, we had a routine system set up for filing. 
Mr. Wilson had devised a calendar with all the check dates. There was 
not a daily filing period. I can't recall any particular filing period in 
that time, there may have been. I don't have the calendar in front of 
me. These would be" forwarded by that time routinely to the President 
for signature. He was used to them by that time. He would sign them. 



1592 

they would come back notarized and he would forward them back to 
the appropriate State requiring it. 

In fact, I would say the weeks preceding the election were some of 
the slowest weeks during my time at the White House. 

Mr. Thompson. Was it slow in terms of campaign contributions 
that were coming in ? 

Mr. Dean. We didn't receive campaign contributions at the White 
House. 

Mr. Thompson. Were you ever called upon to interpret the propriety 
of accepting such campaign contributions, foreign contributions, any- 
thing of that nature ? 
Mr. Dean. Yes; that periodically, came up, yes, indeed. 

Mr. Thompson. But you were going to go on a honeymoon, from 
which you would not return, if you had your preference, until after 
the election ? 

Mr. Dean. Let me explain when I went to Florida, what the situa- 
tion is in Florida. There are two villas that are set aside for White 
House staff. I had to retain that privately rather than take it at 
Government expense, obviously, being on a honeymoon. That runs 
$100 a day. 

I also did that because when I am in Florida, you have the entire 
signal telephone system. As I think my wife can attest, while I was at 
the White House, there was virtually no time that I was out of contact 
with the remainder of the staff at any time. And as you well know, 
you can conduct business by telephone and get staff doing things as 
easily as you being present in the office, and that is how, often, you 
operate in the office. 

I also had a very trusted deputv who could handle things in my 
absence and if he had a judgment he wanted my attention drawn to, 
I certainly was available for him to call and reflect on that judgment. 

Mr. Thompson. So then you were planning to be gone for several 
weeks ? 

Mr. Dean. I had hoped to. That had been our intention ; yes. 

Mr. Thompson. That was your intention. Did you know anyone 
when you were working at the White House, have contact with any- 
one whose first name is Jane ? 

Mr. Dean. Did I know anybody at the White House by the name of 
Jane? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. Dean. I know several 

Mr. Thompson. Start closest to you, if you would. 

Mr. Dean. Yes ; I have a secretary by the name of Jane Thomas. 

Mr. Thompson. That is the name, I think, that I am interested in. 
If I am not, we will go back to it. 

Do you have a travel office or did you have a travel office at the 
White House that sometimes made accommodations for you for the 
trips that you would take ? 

Mr. Dean. Yes; I generally had my secretary make travel accom- 
modations through the travel office. 

Mr. Thompson. Do vou recall whether or not you had Jane Thomas 
make travel accommodations for this particular honeymoon trip? 

Mr. De \N. I do not have the foggiest recollection. 



1593 

Mr. Thompson. There is a document here, Mr. Dean, that I would 
like to present to you for your examination. It is entitled "Request for 
Transportation." If I might read it as it is being presented to you. 
Dated October 11, "Contact, Jane. Traveler, Mr. and Mrs. John Dean. 
Extension 241, from D.C. to Miami, two seats. Carrier, Eastern Air- 
lines, Flight 185. Date. October 14.'- 

You went down, I assume you returned. "National Airlines, Flight 
102, October 18. Payment, American Express. Fare, $336." The word 
"tickets" is stamped across it. 

First of all, is this a form that is used by the travel office? 

Mr. Dean. I have no idea. I have never seen the form before and 
I have no idea if in fact that was paid for by American Express. I 
think that is something that will have to be checked as the auditors go 
back through my records. 

Mr. Thompson. I agree with you. 

If there is any question about it, obviously, the person in charge of 
these documents, the person in custody of these documents will be 
brought down here and placed under oath to explain these documents 
in full. It is my understanding that since your testimony was begun 
pursuant to committee request, this document has been furnished by 
the travel office. It does indicate to me that the request was made on 
October 11, 1972, by someone named Jane for a flight leaving on the 
14th to return on the 18th, a trip of 4 days. 

Do you have any further comment on it, Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, it was my intention to go down there and 
spend 2 weeks. 

Mr. Thompson. Two weeks or several weeks ? 

Mr. Dean. Several weeks. 

I very frequently, and you can check my other travel records, when 
I went j^laces, I took the immediate turnaround ticket for the hold 
purpose and often stayed beyond that date. A bird in the hand, in 
traveling back and forth through main routes, is something I always 
felt was wise to do. I think if you will check my records in the travel 
office, you will find I did that on other occasions. 

]\Ir. Thompson. So you are stating that this document could be cor- 
rect and you could have requested your secretary to make accommoda- 
tions for you to return on the 18th after 4 days ? 

Mr. Dean. It is my recollection I did not pay for that by American 
Express, as a matter of fact. Often, when my secretary would go down 
and set something like this up, a subsequent phone call would change 
an arrangement, or something like tliat. I think you can check that also. 

Mr. Thompson. I thought you just testified you did not know whether 
or not your secretary had made a request for this particular honeymoon 
trip or not. 

Mr. Dean. I am saying that the name "Jane" here would indicate to 
me that she had. 

Mr. Thompson. You just said that you did not recall Avhether or not 
this was paid for by American Express. 

Mr. Dean. That is the reason I say that. I recall that there was not 
time to pay for it by American Express and I had to go to the airport 
and pick the tickets up at the "will call," so I had the tickets in hand. 
The White House could not process the tickets fast enough. I think if 



1594 

you will check the records, you will find out that is what happened. 

Mr. Thompson. The White House could not process the tickets fast 
enough ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Would that indicate that you did make a request 
throug'h the travel office of the White House ? 

Mr. Dean. As I say, I generally made all the requests through the 
travel office — through my secretary, I mean. I asked her to arrange 
them. There were occasions when she went directly to outside lines and 
made my travel requests as well. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you subsequently get to Miami to spend a few 
more days on your honeymoon ? 

Mr. Dean. As I recall, we made several trips to Miami to try to 
have a honeymoon and were called back. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you leave for Miami on October 20, if you 
recall ? 

Mr. Dean. That is very possible. As I told you when we started 
this line of questioning, I have not sat down and tried to reconstruct 
this. I am perfectly willing to reconstruct it for the committee and 
turn it all over to the committee for the committee's use. I just have 
not entered this area of reconstruction and I am sure 

Mr. Thompson. You will not test your memory on these particular 
points, is that what you are saying? 

Mr. Dean. I think I would like to have the opportunity to check 
my own calendar, particularly my wife, who does keep a calendar 
of these types of events. It would be very helpful in reconstructing 
this for the committee. 

Mr. Thompson. I have a document here that I would like to present 
to you, which is a similar document indicating a request, the contact 
being Mr. Dean this time, dated October 19, 1972, for flight to Miami 
on October 20, to return October 23. There are several markings down 
here. Evidently, there was some confusion as to the airlines. That is 
the only thing I can tell. 

Mr. Dean. No; this probably indicates, as I recall — it is 10-18 — ■ 
that they could not find a flight, they tried to get a flight, they could 
not find a flight and they had me on the wait list. T see there is a wait 
list indication down here — W.L. I assume, is wait list. The only thing 
I can assume is that this is some sort of form that the travel office uses 
which I have never seen before, so I cannot explain it. 

Mr. Thompson. But you do remember the occasion, you do remem- 
ber the trip ? 

Mr. Dean. On the 19th? 

Mr. Thompson. You would have been leaving on the 20th, I believe, 
Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dean. On the 20th — that is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. And returned on the 23d ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Were you called back 

Mr. Dean. Do I recall that? As I say, I recall several eiforts to 
get to Florida but not with success. 

Mr. Thompson. What I asked you, and I think you misunderstood 
me, was were you called back on the 23d ? 



1595 

Mr. Deax. Yes ; I have testified that after I got to Florida, I was 
virtually on the phone the whole time and suddenly was called back, to 
come back on Sunday. I went to this meeting in the Roosevelt room 
which I have described in my testimony and turned around again as 
soon as I thought I could get oif to Florida again and tried to get to 
Florida again. This must be the trip that evidences that. I would as- 
sume that indicates that trip. 

]\Ir. Thompsox. All right. ]Mr. Dean, my point again is as to the 
significance of the points I have been going over. I know they might 
seem rather minute in comparison with Presidential involvement, but 
I think when you state in your statement that you planned several 
weeks and if one wanted to put a theory afloat that possibly you were 
trying to seek to justify your taking this money out for some reason 
other than you have given us today, that is, an extended honeymoon 
trip, that this would be very relevant. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to either have these marked for identi- 
fication or made part of the record. I would suggest and hope that we 
would get the proper people in charge of the custody of these docu- 
ments to come down here and verify them for us. 

Mr. Deax. As I indicated to the committee, I am perfectly willing 
to provide all my materials, all my records, and this can be gone over in 
the greatest detail the committee wishes, 

]Mr. Thompsox. That will be done, Mr. Dean. Thank you. 

Senator Ervix. Let the documents be appropriately numbered by 
the reporter. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 72 and 73.*] 

Mr. Shaffer. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request of the 
Chair, and I think ]\Ir. Thompson ouglit to be aware of something that 
I do not think he is aware of. That is that in the committee's files, 
there is a Xerox copy of all the currency that Mr. Dean transmitted 
to me and that I transmitted to the bank before that currency cleared. 
That was made in my office by me to my secretary, who is in this room, 
and I still consider myself under oath, and turned over to this com- 
mittee voluntarily and not pursuant to a subpena. So by looking at 
the serial numbers on that currency, you can establish whether or not 
more than $4,850 was taken out and some other currency put back. 
Because my recollection of that currency is the serial numbers, while 
from the first bill to the last are not in sequential order, there are a 
series of sequential numbers that meant something to the prosecutors. 

With reluctance, I also would like to say that when Mr. Dean first 
spoke to me about the cash and his check, the cash and the check were 
not then open to view. I have never seen this missing check, we never 
discussed destruction of the missing check with the committee before. 
On the next day, when I had decided what we were going to do with 
the check and the documents, I said, I will need a currently dated 
check — he had told me the one was old — and the currency, which he 
provided me at another location. I am sorry as an officer of the court, 
and also analogously as an officer of this committee, that we do not 
have here today for you that check and I assure each and every one 
of you under oath that there was no intention on my part or Mr. 
Dean's to destroy that document and keep it from you. 

Thank you. 

•See pp. 1808 and 1809. 



1596 

Mr. Thompson, We might just put one question 

Mr. Dash. I think it should go on the record that it is true that we 
did receive the photostatic copies of currency and Mr. Thompson does 
know about it, because I have shown him tliat file. 

Mr. Shaffer. I am sorry. I did not know whether he knew about 
it or not. 

Mr. Thompson. I received some of these documents belatedly and 
much later than Mr. Dash, quite frankly. 

Mr. Shaffer. I have no problem with it. 

Senator Ervin. If I could ask a question or so here, I might shorten 
some of this. 

Mr. Dean, did anybody Imow that you had taken out the $4,850 out 
of this money except yourself ? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir, they did not. 

Senator Ervin. If you had wanted to deceive anybody about it, 
what would have prevented you from getting $4,850 and replacing it ? 

Mr. Dean. Nothing. 

Senator Ervin. And the first man that knew that you had used the 
$4,850 was your lawyer ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, and I told him that I wanted to reveal 
that fact to the Government also. 

Senator Ervin. And your lawyer advised you to issue a new check. 
Did he give as a reason the fact that banks sometimes refuse to cash 
checks unless they are presented within a reasonable time after they 
are dated ? 

Mr. Dean. That is precisely the reason he gave me. 

Mr. Shaffer. I object to that. The reason I gave him was that he 
told me the check was made to cash and it had to be made to me and 
Hogan as Trustees. 

Mr. Dean. You said also that it had to be a current check. 

Mr. Shaffer. Well, all right. You remember that. 

Senator Ervin. If you had haxl tlie desire to deceive anybody, all 
you would have had to do was get the $4,850 in cash and taken and 
added the money to the balance that you had in the safe. 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. But the first man you told that you had used the 
money was Mr. Shaffer ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. Instead of concealing the transaction by restoring 
the cash, you gave him a check paid to him and he deposited it in a 
trust account ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Ervtn. Together with the other money ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Er\^n, Making the amount of money the total amount that 
was originally delivered to you ? 

Mr, Dean, That is correct, I was quite aware of the fact that obvi- 
ously, this is a great personal embarrassment and a rather unwise move, 
but I didn't want to hide the facts from this committee on what I had 
done. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Dean, if I might ask you one more qiiestion 
with regard to the checking account on which you drew this check; 
you drew the check on April 12, would that be correct? 



1597 

Mr. Deax. I believe there were two checks. I don't have those records 
in front of me now. 

Mr. TriOMPSOX. I have here in your bank account an indication that 
April 12 was the first day for some time, evidently, that you had enough 
money in your checking account for this check to clear ? 

Mr. Deax. "When I realized it, I called him and had my broker send 
down the amount of money necessary to cover the check. 

Mr. Thompsox. You were not advised by anyone that it would either 
be wise or the thing to do with regard to the destruction of your check, 
is that coi'rect ? 

You did that of your own volition ? 

Mr. Deax. As I say, I told 

Mr. Thompsox. I am sorry, Mr. Dean, you can explain in as great 
detail as you would like. 

]Mr. Deax. No, no one told me it would be wise or 

Mr. Thompsox. All right. 

That is all. 

Senator Ervix. Any other questions of any members of this com- 
mittee ? 

[No response.] 

Senator Ervix. Mr. Dean, the committ-ee has a rule that a witness 
can make a closing statement. We will afford you that opportunity 
just as we afforded it to other witnesses. 

Senator Baker. Let me do this first, Mr. Chairman. It might be that 
Mr. Dean would want to comment on it before he makes his closing 
statement. 

Senator Ervix. OK, fine. 

Senator Baker. I indicated earlier in the hearings that Congressman 
Garry Brown had written a letter to the committee and was preparing 
to submit a sworn statement. I did not at that time have in hand the 
letter from Congressman Brown. It had been inadvertently misplaced. 
I now have a copy and if there is no objection, Mr. Chairman, I'll 
read it. 

Also, if there is no objection, we will receive the statement under 
oath of ]Mr. Brown as to the letter. 

Dear Mr. Chairman : 

Late yesterday afternoon upon learning of the statement given to your com- 
mittee by John W. Dean, III in which he implicated me and members of the 
Banking and Currency Committee in what he has alleged was a "coverup'' of 
the Watergate matter and other improper conduct, I immediately dictated a 
letter to you demanding that I be given an opportunity to appear before your 
committee and respond to, deny, and rebut Mr. Dean's allegations. 

I might depart from the letter to say that the chairman and I have 
indicated to Mr. Brown that we would be happy to have this letter as 
part of the record, his statement as part of the record. If he still wished 
to testify, of course, we would provide him that opportunity. 

j\Ir. Deax. Mr. Vice Chairman, I wonder if I might comment on 
something ? I think that in my testimony, I have explained that often, 
what was happening at the White House was one motive. The person 
on the other end wasn't always aware of that motive and I don't mean 
to impute to other people, the fact that one person had one desire, the 
same motive to the other person, who was doing a normal, what they 
thought was a helpful thing to the White House in a general election 



1598 • 

year and not understanding the implications of all the facts and 
circumstances. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Dean. 

I am aware of that situation, and what I would really like to do is 
read this letter now so that before you conclude your testimony and 
make your closing statement, if you choose to do that you would have 
an opportunity to comment on that as well. 

To continue with the letter, the second paragraph : 

Before I had an opportunity to get the letter off to you, I was pleased to be 
contacted by a member of your committee's majority staff who indicated an in- 
terest in talking with me relative to the allegations set forth and involving me in 
Dean's statement. I met with your Mr. Dorsen and Mr. Parr and believe that this 
conference was mutually beneficial. I thank you for providing me with this op- 
portunity to at least apprise your committee staff of my position relative to 
Dean's charges. 

Although I think I have satisfied your Committee staff members that Dean 
had no factual justification to link the House Banking and Currency Committee 
action with what he has testified were White House coverup activities, his 
irresponsible or false statements with respect thereto have caused me and other 
members of the Banking and Currency Committee grave harm. Without equivoca- 
tion, I can state it was not known to me nor to any other member of the Com- 
mittee, to my knowledge, that our opposition to the granting of subpoena power 
to Chairman Patman was in any way, nor could be claimed to be in any way, a 
part of the coverup about which Mr. Dean is testifying. 

I, personally, vehemently deny the truth of Mr. Dean's statement that my 
letter of September 8, 1972 to the Attorney General was 'in fact, drafted by Park- 
inson for Congressman Brown.' This is an untrue statement, the letter having 
been dictated by me and having contained my work product. 

Although I am preparing a chronological statement of my whole participation 
in the successful effort to deny Chairman Patman subpoena power in October of 
last year, the mere filing of such a statement with your Committee and even the 
giving of the same to the media will not counteract and repudiate the publicity 
given to INIr. Dean's testimony. 

I, therefore, respectfully request and insist that I be given an opportunity 
to appear before your Committee and respond to the allegations made by Mr. 
Dean. The granting of this request, Mr. Cliairman, is the least your Committee 
should do, it seems to me, to attempt to correct the unwarranted and unjustified 
damage that has been done. Your prompt and favorable response to this request 
will be greatly appreciated. 

Signed Gaery Brown, Congress. 

Mr. Chairman, I reiterate this letter has been accepted for the record 
and is being read now for the record at the request of Congressman 
Brown. 

Mr. Dean. Yes, and I might just say 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, I wanted to read it now in an abundance 
of fairness both to Congressman Brown and to you, so you can make 
any further comment. 

i^ow, on the question, on the request that Mr. Brown makes, as I 
stated earlier, the chairman and I have discussed this matter and clearly 
if Mr. Brown wants to testify as a Member of Congress he is entitled to 
do that but by the same token, we understand that he is submitting a 
sworn statement* as an addendum to this letter and I would proi:)Ose, 
Mr. Chairman, that we take under advisement the matter of whether 
any further testimony should be received or not. 

Mr. Dean. I might just add on, ^yith regard to Mr. Brown, Congress- 
man Brown's letter, this is in the area of hearsav, of course, that I had 
heard tliat the letter by Mr. Parkinson was, Mr. Parkinson assisted 
Mr. Brown in preparing the letter for the Attorney General. 

*Not received at time of publication. 



1599 

Mr. Chairman, just to close, and I will be very brief, I have sought 
to provide this committee 

Senator Ervix. One question on this. 

INIr. Deax. Certainly. 

Senator Ervix. You stated that there was an attempt at the "N^Hiite 
House and the Committee To Re-Elect the President, to prevent the 
Patman committee from investigating that ? 

Mr. Dean. That is correct, ]\Ir. Chairman. 

Senator Ervix. And the Patman committee did, at least a majority 
of them did refuse to investigate it ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Ervix. So regardless of motives, it had the same effect as 
what the White House and the committee were trying to do ? 

Mr. Deax. That is correct. 

Senator Ervix. But of course a Congressman has got a perfect right 
to vote his own convictions. That is his function. 

]\Ir. Deax. I have sought to provide this information with all the 
facts and information that I know regarding this matter, to answer 
all of the questions that have been asked of me, and to hide nothing 
of my own involvement in this matter, and provide the truth as I 
know it. 

This has been most difficult for me because I have had to speak 
against the President of the United States, some of my friends, and 
some of my former colleagues. I attempted to end this coverup initially 
from working within the White House, and when that didn't work, I 
took it upon myself to work from without, and I earnestly pray that 
this committee reaches the truth in this entire matter and reaches it as 
quickly as possible because I think there is a terrible cloud over this 
Government that must be removed so that we can have effective gov- 
ernment and I thank the committee for the many courtesies that they 
have provided me in assisting me to get to and from the hearing room 
and providing me available space during the breaks and the recesses 
and thoughtfulness of the staff in that regard. 

Senator Ervix. Without expressing any opinion about your testi- 
mony or the way of your testimony, I do think that you do deserve the 
thanks of the committee for the extreme patience which you have 
exhibited. It has been quite a trial, a trying time to you and also on 
the committee because I think this is our fifth day on your testimony, 
and it is a very long time. Are there any other comments ? 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would only associate myself with 
your remarks and express, I believe, the appreciation of the committee 
for Mr. Dean's patience and rather prolonged testimony. It's obviously 
not an easy task to testify on matters of this importance and delicacy, 
and I think ]Vfr. Dean has provided us with a great deal of information 
and will — which will serve as a basis for the ongoing inquiry of this 
committee and we thank him for it. 

Senator Er\tx. It might be at some later stage of the investigation 
the committee may want to recall you. 

Mr. Deax. I understand, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator ERnx. I understand you will be willing to return on proper 
notice under the same subpena. 

Mr. McCaxdt.ess. Mr. Chairman, a matter of procedure that per- 
haps you could give us some help with. In the last 2 or 3 hours 



-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 17 



1600 

we have had many requests from the media who have been so patient 
and who have been sitting through this, to have an interview with 
Mr. and Mrs. Dean as they leave here. You understand, of course, that 
we cannot provide those interviews for some legal reasons, and for 
the basic reason, 5 days, that they are exhausted. We ask their leave 
and their understanding and yours that we are going to leave the 
building immediately after this. 

Senator Erven. I would think, since Mr. Dean has testified under 
an order of immunity, and testified involuntarily, I would think that 
his counsel would be wise to give him the same advice that I used 
to give my clients and that is to keep his mouth shut. [Laughter.] 

The committee will stand in adjournment until Tuesday, July 10, 
at 10 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, at 5 :45 p.m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 
10 a.m., Tuesday, July 10, 1973.] 



TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washington^ D.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 
318, Russell Senate OflEice Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., chair- 
man. 

Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, Gur- 
ney. and Weicker. 

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred 
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief 
counsel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
Davdd ]M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T, Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator ]\Iontoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; John Walz, 
publications clerk. 

Senator Baker [presiding]. The committee will come to order. Be- 
cause of the death in the family of the chairman he has not yet 
returned to Washington and we expect the chairman to be back momen- 
tarily but I have been requested by his office to open the hearings and 
to commence the proceedings. 

The first witness today is Mr. John Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell, if you 
will stand up I will administer the oath. Mr. Mitchell do you swear 
that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr, Mitchell. I do, so help me God. 

Senator Baker. Be seated. 

Mr. Mitchell, do you have any preliminary statement that you care to 
make at this point ? 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN N. MITCHELL, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM G. 
HUNDLEY, PLATO C. CACHERIS, AND MARVIN SEGAL, COUNSELS 

Mr. Mitchell. I think counsel has a brief statement he would like 
to make, Mr, Vice Chairman. 

Senator Baker. Thank you. 

Mr, Hundley, Mr, Vice Chairman, my name is Mr, Hundley, I 
would like the record to reflect that by letter of June 18, 1973, and 

(1601) 



1602 

again by letter of July 0, 1973. I formally requested this committee 
to withdraw its subpena compelling Mr. Mitchell to testify for the 
reasons stated therein, and that the committee has rejected his petition. 
I would like the committee to express on the record that it would ad- 
judge Mr. Mitchell in contempt if he did refuse to testify so that we 
can protect our legal position. 

Senator Baker. Thank you very much. The letter to which you refer 
was duly received by the committee, and at an executive session on 
June 26, 1973, the request was denied. As a result, Mr. Mitchell is 
here before the committee pursuant to a lawful subpena of the com- 
mittee compelling him to appear and testify. The record should indi- 
cate that we took account of his request, that we denied the request, 
that he is not here volmitarily, that he is here by subpena, that in 
the view of the committee he has not waived any rights which may 
inure to him by reason of his testimony and by reason of his appearance 
before this committee. 

Mr. Hundley. Thank you very much, INIr. Vice Chairman. Since it 
is our position that our appearance is not voluntary but strictly due 
to compulsion, I have advised ]Mr. Mitchell not to make any voluntary 
opening statement just in order to help preserve our legal position 
and it is not done in any sense of disrespect to this committee. 

Senator Baker. We understand and we appreciate it. If there is 
no opening statement by counsel or by the witness, in the ordinary 
course of events, the questioning would begin then by majority and 
chief counsel, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. I do not know if the record shows. Senator Baker when 
asked if there was any statement and Mr. Mitchell responded through 
his counsel, if the counsel has identified himself for the record. 

Mr. Hundley. Yes: INIr. William G. Hundley. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, for the record, will you state your full 
name and address? 

Mr. Mitchell. John N. :\Iitchell, 1030 Fifth Avenue, New York 
City. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, when did you first join President Nixon's 
administration and what office did you hold ? 

Mr. IMiTCHELL. I held the office of Attorney General from January 
1969 until March 1, 1972. 

Mr. Dash. Prior to the time of your assmning the office of Attorney 
General of the TTnited States, did you know ]\Ir. Nixon and would 
you please give the committee some brief information as to how you 
came in contact with him and what relationship you had with him? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I had a casual acquaintanceship with the 
President prior to the time that he came to New York in 1963, I 
believe it was, to practice law. Our associations increased and at the 
end of the year 1966 oiu- law firms merged and we practiced law 
together until we both retired from the firm. 

Mr. Dash. Did you take any active political role with the President 
during his 1968 campaign ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, T am sure that is a matter of some debate but 
I was known as the campaign director in the 1968 campaign. 

Mr. Dash. During the time when you were Attorney General and 



1603 

sometime in 1970, Mr. Mitchell, were you aware of concern in the 
White House and, perhaps, in your own office, the Department of 
Justice, that the existinc; intelligence pro^rrams against internal dis- 
sent or demonstrations throiiohout the country were lacking and that 
fliere was need for some new programs? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think. ]Mr. Dash. T would put that on the 
basis that there was lack of adequate intelligence. That probably 
more importanth' so there was failure of coordination among the 
intelligence-gathering agencies to the point where problems were 
existing in the country, that there was a general feeling that we did 
not have, the Government did not have, adequate intelligence to antici- 
pate the activities that were being carried out at that particular time. 

Mr. Dash. After the Safe Streets Act of 1968, Mr. Mitchell, you did 
receive as Attorney General some j)owers involving electronic sur- 
veillance, did you not ? 

Mr. INIiTCHFXL. Yes. sir. that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Was it your position, publicly taken, that, with regard to 
internal dissent, you had the power to authorize electronic surveillance 
without court approval ? 

Mr. ]\IiTciiELL. Well, when you say internal dissent, that is not a 
sufficiently descriptive term. In addition to that, as you know, the Safe 
Streets Act did not change measurably the activities that had been 
carried out in connection with electronic surveillance in prior admin- 
istrations. 

]\Ir. Dash. "WTiat term would you use, "internal security" as a better 
word? 

^Ir. ^Mitchell. Internal security would, I think, be a better general 
term to describe it. 

Mr. Dash. Right. And it was your position, was it not, that you 
did have the authoritv under the act, whether it was prior practice or 
not, to authorize electronic surveillance without first having to go to a 
court for approval ? 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. I would believe, Mr. Dash, a better way to put it was 
that we continued the practice that was then in effect concerning the 
use of electronic surveillance in connection with internal security. 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware, Mr. Mitchell, of the so-called Huston 
plan, which we have received as part of the testimony of this com- 
mittee, for an interagency intelligence program which would improve 
somewhat the intelligence gathering in this country ? 

Mr. INIttchell. Well, there was a matter of time in connection with it. 
I was not aware of the fact that the heads of the various agencies were 
meetinof on the subject matter. It came to mv attention, was brought to 
my attention by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
To the best of my recollection I met with Mr. DeLoach and I met with 
Mr. Hoover. We discussed the so-called Huston plan which is the term 
that you have been using. The document that we discussed very briefly, 
I didn't get into many of the details of it, it was more an oral dis- 
cussion of it, at that stage had ]\Ir. Hoover's dissent to the provisions 
of it. I was of the opinion. I needed very little convincing by Mr. De- 
Loach and Mr. Hoover that this was not the proper approach to the 
problems that existed at the time, and I joined Mr. Hoover in opposing 
its implementation. 



1604 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware, Mr. Mitchell, that the plan did provide 
for removing certain restrictions against illegal break-ins and elec- 
tronic surveillance ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes, these items were discussed in conversations 
that I had with Mr. DeLoach and Mr. Hoover. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall when you first became aware of the plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I can't put the date on it. I shouldn't try because I 
don't recall. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have the plan ever in your possession or did 
you peruse the plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I had, as I recall, the plan in my possession during 
the period that the Director of^ — the Associate Director of the FBI was 
discussing it with me. As I am sure you are aware, Mr. Dash, this mat- 
ter was handled and considered aside and apart from the Attorney 
General. It was considered in the committee that involved the heads 
of the intelligence gathering community. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you know who in the White House were back- 
ing the plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I can't say who was backing it and who was op- 
posed to it but obviously Mr. Huston was apparently backing it be- 
cause he was the author of part of it. The other people in the White 
House that I communicated with, at the stage in the process in which I 
communicated, were understanding of the position that the Director 
and I were supporting and the matter was disposed of. 

Mr. Dash. Well, were you aware of the so-called Haldeman-Hus- 
ton memos relating to this plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. sir; I do not recall seeing any Wliite House 
correspondence on the subject. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know when the plan had at one time been ap- 
proved by the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I did not know that until these hearings 
were held. 

Mr. Dash. Why did you oppose the plan, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. MiTCHELi.. I opposed the plan for the very simple reason that 
in the case of domestic problems tliat I was very much opposed to the 
thought of surreptitious entry ^ the mail covers, and all of the other 
aspects of it that were involved at the particular time. 

Mr. Dash. To w^hom did you express this disapproval other than 
]Mr. Hoover or INIr. De'Loach? 

Mr. JNIiTCHELL. ]My recollection is that I talked to both Mr. Halde- 
man and the President about the subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. And do you recall when that was ? 

]Mr. Mitchell. No, but it was, of course, in the limited timeframe 
in which this activity took place. 

Mr. Dash. Did vou know their reaction to your opposition at that 
time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. My recollection is that they, both of them were ap- 
preciative of my views on the subject matter and reconsidered it and 
that was the end of it. 

Mr. Dash. Now, during 1971 

Mr. Mitchell. I say — excuse me, Mr. Dash — w^hen I say reconsider 
it I don't know how far they had gone into the consideration of it be- 



1605 

cause as of that particular time to my understanding the plan had 
not been implemented. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you ever receive an}- formal notice that the 
plan had not been approved or had been discontinued or been termi- 
nated ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not to my recollection, I was just told verbally that 
it was nil. 

Mr. Dash. Or whether it had been approved? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. During 1971, were you aware of an intelligence operation 
that had been set up in the White House under ^Nlr. Ehrlichman and 
Mr. Krogh which has become known as the Plumbers operation? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

]Mr. Dash. Was there a time that you did become aware of that 
operation ? 

]Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. Dash. When was that ? 

Mr. :\liTCHELL. After June 17, 1972. 

Mr. Dash. Now also, Mr. Mitchell, in 1971 were you aware of the 
so-called Sandwedge plan proposed by ]Mr. Caulfield for political 
intelligence operations ? 

]Mr. ^Mitchell. I was aware of the concept that Mr. Caulfield was 
proposing and, of course, I opposed that and it never came to fruition. 

]NIr. Dash, Did you ever have a copy of the so-called Sandwedge 
proposal or plan in your possession ? 

]\lr. ^Mitchell. To the best of my knovv'ledge — my knowledge of it 
came in discussions with John Dean. 

]Mr. Dash. Were you aware that that plan also included a so-called 
covert operation and the use of bugging or electronic surveillance ? 

Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. No ; I have seen that in one of Mr. Dean's exhibits 
but that Avas not the understanding that I had of the so-called Sand- 
wedge proposal. 

]\Ir. Dash. Did you know that the budget included actual funds to 
purchase electronic surveillance equipment ? 

Mr, Mitchell. No, sir; I had never got that far with the subject 
matter. 

]Mr. Dash. Now, in any event, after the recommendation of Mr. 
Caulfield for the so-called Sandwedge plan, did you ask Mr. Caulfield 
for any operation or any particular assignment ? 

]Mr. ]\liTCHELL. There has been shown to me by this committee a 
memorandum that had to do with an investigation that apparently 
was made under ]\Ir. Caulfiold's aegis having to do with the so-called 
McCloskey campaign up in New Hampshire. I do not know who hired 
him or who paid him. I have seen the memorandum. 

Aside from that, I would go to the point that Mr. Caulfield, who 
I saw on the 24th day of November 1971, wherein Mr. Dean brought 
him over to discuss the concept of his working for me in the campaign 
if and when I joined the campaign, Mr. Caulfield did come to work for 
the committee as what was purported to be an aide-de-camp at some 
time in March and within 2 weeks or so, he was gone, had left the 
committee. 



1606 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall any other assignment that you personally 
gave to Mr. Caulfield ? 

Mr. Mitchell, No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware of some of Mr. Ulasewicz's work, either 
for people in the White House or for Mr. Dean or for anybody else? 

Mr. ]MiTCHELL. No, sir; not until much later on when I, and I am 
talking about these committees, I knew that there were individuals over 
there that were working with Mr. Caulfield, but I did not know Mr. 
Ulasewicz. 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Mitchell, what role did you play in the setting 
up of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the basic role, I believe, was the discussion 
with the President to the point that he still had to get nominated in 
his second term and there was a committee needed to undertake that 
function and that there should be one established. Also, with respect 
to the people who originally organized the committee, we discussed 
those, and of course, the personnel that originally came to the Com- 
mittee for the Re-Election of the President were also discussed. 

Mr. Dash. A number of other people were White House staff peo- 
ple, were they not? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think, Mr. Dash, you have to go — ^yes. Yes, I 
want to make sure that we understand what period we are talking 
about. We are talking about the period when Mr. Harry Flemming 
was organizing the activities. 

Mr. Dash. And did Mr. Magruder go over at that time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, as I understand, Mr. Magruder came to the 
committee quite a number of months later, sometime in the spring of 
1971 is my recollection. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have any say in Magruder's appointment ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It was recommended by Mr. Haldeman and was con- 
curred in by me, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Now, there has been testimony by a number of witnesses, 
Mr. Mitchell, that during this whole period, the 1971 period and also 
the early period of 1972, while you still held the office of Attorney 
General, that you played a role — in fact, an active role — in the affairs 
of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. Is that not true ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I played a role. I do not know how you 
characterize the word "active." The basic point was that I had been 
asked by the President to keep my eye on their activities over there 
to make sure they did not get out of line, and they would bring 
personnel over to me to review them and to see if they were qualified 
for the jobs, and they would discuss with me different projects that 
they were proposing to undertake, studies in connection with the 
media and direct mail. They discussed with me their proposed pri- 
mary activities that they were preparing for in some of the early 
primaries. 

]Mr. Dash. Well, initially, certainly, you had to authorize the expend- 
iture of any funds that were paid out at this 

Mr. Mitcptell, Well, if you put it in that term, what they did was, 
and this again is to keep the lid on, that they did not run wild with 
individuals, they would have a montlily budget of personnel, basi- 
cally, since they had not gotten to the programmatic stage. They 
would ask me to look at it and approve it, yes. 



1607 

Mr. Dash. And did there come a time when you authorized Mr. 
Magruder to be the authority ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think that — I do not know that I asked him 
or authorized him. I think that evolved over the fact that he was there 
and he had gotten involved with the finance committee people who 
were raising the money and he took over the authorizations of that 

!Mr. Dash. Is your testimony that he took it over without any action 
on your part? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall, Mr. Dash, but certainly there was 
great assent on my part, because it got it out of my hair. 

Mr. Dash. I think there was quite a bit of testimony that we re- 
ceived that Mr. ]Magruder was constantly sending over for approval 
and that your secretary was bothered quite a bit by these requests and 
you asked Mr. Magruder to actually take over the authorization him- 
self, because he was going to be running the thing. 

Mr. Mitchell. It could very well be, because he was running it, 
and I do not recall the complaints from my secretary. 

Mr. Dash. Also, do you recall that a number — you said a number 
of projects had been sent over to you — that you had received a number 
of memorandums for approval, where you would mark an X or some- 
thing on the memorandums ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Either that or they would be brought in to me and 
approval indicated orally and been taken back. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know how much time this activity took ? Was it 
a daily occurrence between you and Mr. Magruder and other people 
at the Committee To Re-Elect the President ? 

Mr. iSIiTciiELL. I do not know if we can put it on a daily occurrence. 
Undoubtedly, as it approached the time of my leaving of the Justice 
Department, it became more frequent and there were a substantial 
number of such conferences. 

Mr. Dash. Actually, when did the President make the decision to 
ask you to direct this campaign in the 1972 campaign ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not know as I can answer that question, Mr. 
Dash. I think the President would have to ansAver it. 

Mr. Dash. Well, when did you know that you were goins: to actually 
leave the Attorney General's office and take over this position ? 

Mr. Mitchell. 'Well, I was doing substantial feet dragging on the 
subject matter, because it was not particularly my desire and I am 
sure it was probably sometime around the first of the year, in 1972. 

Mr. Dash. Now, T think you have indicated that Mr. Haldeman also 
played a role in both the creation of the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President and the selection of personnel. What was the relationship 
between vou and Mr. Haldeman in the operation of the committee? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was one of liaison, I would think, at the 
highest level, in which he, of course, would be representing the Presi- 
dent and the interest of the President in connection with the campaign, 
and that most major decisions were discussed with Mr. Haldeman 
and/or the President, and I say very major decisions. 

Mr. Dash. And did you have fairly frequent conversations or meet- 
ings with Mr. Haldeman on this subject ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would think that the meetings were not that fre- 
quent. Undoubtedly, we had numerous telephone conversations about 
various subject matters. 



1608 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware that reports of major events, at least, 
that were being sent to you concerning the activities of the committee 
were also being sent to Mr, Haldeman ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would presume that the major ones would be be- 
cause of the fact that we would discuss them. He would have to have 
such reports in order to be able to discviss them with me. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know what liaison relationship was established 
at the White House with Mr. Haldeman and the committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, there was a direct liaison between 
Mr. Haldeman and myself. As the campaign developed, as we got 
more into an active stage, Mr. Strachan was the liaison between the 
committee and Mr. Haldeman. 

Mr. Dash. To your knowledge, was Gordon Strachan Mr. Halde- 
man's assistant ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't know what his title was, but he did work 
under Mr. Haldeman, and I know his function because various con- 
versations were had on the subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. To your knowledge, if he had reports from the com- 
mittee that had to go to the White House, was it his responsibility to 
deliver it to Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know what his responsibility was, but I as- 
sume that is the basis upon which the reports went to the Wliite House, 
so they would be disseminated to the appropriate person or persons. 

Mr. Dash. Now, in the fall of 1971, Mr. Mitchell, when Mr. Caulfield's 
Sandwedge plan was not accepted, were you aware of a continuing con- 
cern on the part of Mr. Haldeman and the White House or Mr. Ma- 
gruder's part for an intelligence capacity for the Committee To Re- 
Elect the President to deal with the problems of demonstrations and 
the possible violence during the campaign ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; that first came up, of course, in that, or at least, 
occurred in my recollection, it first came up in that November 24 
meeting, when Dean brought Liddy over into my office to discuss the 
general counsel for the Committee To Re-Elect the President. 

Mr. Dash. Was that one of the reasons that INIr. Liddy was being 
introduced to you, to take over fact and intelligence gathering? 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; I don't believe that is one of the reasons he was 
introduced to me. They were looking for a general counsel. What I am 
pointing out to you is that in one of the exhibits that ]VTr. Dean has 
provided you with, in what you might call a prospectus dealing with 
Mr. Liddy's job, there is a one-line short sentence in which it refers to 
intelligence gathering. 

Mr. Dash. Was that discussed at all during that meeting with you? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. The meeting was a very, very short one and the 
contents of the prospectus was not discussed. 

Mr. Dash. Did you imderstand that a portion of Mr. Liddy's time 
would be spent in intelligence gathering for the committee? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe T focused on it at the time, but later 
on I came to understand that Mr. Liddy was expending his time or 
portions of his time in gathering information of this sort. 

ISIr. Dash. I think you said INIr. Dean brought ]\Ir. Liddy over. 

Mr. Mitcheix. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Was that the first time vou had met Mr. Liddy ? 



ieo9 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, that is the first time 
I ever met him, 

Mr. Dash. "Were you aware of INIr. Liddy's background — profes- 
sional background ? 

]\Ir. Mitchell. I was aware because it was described at the time, but 
I think I had probably heard beforehand that he had previously been 
an assistant prosecutor in the State of New York, that he had run for 
Congress, that he had been with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and had been working in the Treasury and at that particular time, 
was in the ^^liite House. 

]\Ir. Dash. Xow, were you aware of his duties at the Wliite House? 

Mr. Mitchell. I become aware of his duties in the Wliite House 
when, I believe it was on the 8th day of December, Mr. Egil Krogh 
brought him over to my office in connection with a meeting that had 
to do with the Dale program — that is the drug abuse law enforcement 
program — of which there were many such meetings going on around 
the office, around the administration, around the Government. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you know that Mr. Liddy also worked for Mr. 
Krogh as one of the Plumbers? 

jMr. Mitchell. No ; I had not been advised of those activities as of 
that time. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, after Mr. Liddy was hired and became counsel to 
the committee, there came a time when there was a meeting in your 
office, on January 27, 1972, at the Department of Justice, attended by 
Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Liddy, and of course, yourself. 

Can you tell us how this meeting came about, who set it up, and why 
it was in your office ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I can't tell you how it came about other than 
in the normal process of events. Most of the meetings in my office were 
put on the calendar through individuals who would call up and ask 
for meetings and my secretary would make notes of that and then 
somewhere along prior to the time of the request, she would check with 
me concerning whether I was agreeable to it and it would be put on 
the permanent calendar for that particular day. 

]\Ir. Dash. Would she tell you as to what the purpose of the meeting 
would be in determining whether you were agreeable or not? 

Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. Normally, this would be the case. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know what purpose was stated for the meeting 
of January 27, 1972? 

Mr. Mitchell. I cannot recall that, Mr. Dash. The meeting, of 
course, as we are well aware now, had two functions. One of them was 
to discuss the proposed intelligence plan and the other one had to do 
with the discussion of the election and what, what part of it that she 
mifi-ht have discussed with me, I am not aware. 

Mr. Dash. Well, prior to that 

Mr. MrrcHELL. What part of it that she might have discussed with 
me I am not aware. 

Mr. Dash. Is it your testimony now that you don't recall having 
any knowledge that you were going to have an intelligence plan 
discussed prior to that meeting of January ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I just don't recall. 



1610 

Mr. Dash. Now the committee has heard, Mr. Mitchell, consider- 
able testimony about this particular meeting, at least from the other 
side of your desk. Now, what is your recollection of what Mr. Liddy 
presented to you as the Attorney General and also to some extent 
an adviser to the Committee To Ee-Elect the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I didn't hear the last part of your question. 

Mr- Dash. I said what, to your best recollection, was the intelligence 
plan that Mr. Liddy presented to you as Attorney General or in your 
role as adviser to the Committee To Re-Elect the President? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think it can be best described as a complete horror 
story that involved a mish-masli of code names and lines of author- 
ity, electronic surveillance, the ability to intercept aircraft communi- 
cations, the call girl bit and all the rest of it. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall the use of charts in the show and tell 
operation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I recall the use of charts because this is where the 
lines were all crossing with the authority, et cetera, et cetera. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall any of the code names that were used, 
Mr. Mitchell? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I can't, Mr. Dash. The matter was of such 
striking content and concept that it was just beyond the pale. 

Mr. Dash. "When Liddy completed his presentation, what was your 
reaction ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think it was very simple. As I recall, I 
told him to go burn the charts and that this was not what we were 
interested in. Wliat we were interested in was a matter of informa- 
tion gathering and protection against the demonstrators. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, if this was the kind of plan that you have 
described and, as has been described this way by other witnesses 
before this committee, and since you were the Attorney General 
of the United States, why didn't you throw Mr. Liddy out of your 
office? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think, Mr. Dash, in hindsight I not only 
should have thrown him out of the office, I should have thrown him 
out of the window. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Dash. Well, since you did neither^[laughter] why didn't you 
at least recommend that Mr. Liddy be fired from his responsible posi- 
tion at the committee since obviously he was presenting to you an ir- 
responsible program ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, in hindsight I probably should have done that, 
too. About the belief I had at the time in turning the matter over we 
would get back to the purpose that was originally intended, and that he 
was qualified to pursue that particular segment that we had been talk- 
ing about. 

Mr. Dash. Well, it's been testified that although you didn't take an 
affirmative action, you did not approve the plan that was presented 
by any means. But Mr. Liddy at least went away from your office with 
the idea that he could come back with a scaled down version of a plan 
for intelligence gathering that would have a lower price tag. By the 
way, what was the price tag ? Do you recall the pnce tag ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, just a million dollars. 



1611 

Mr. Dash. Now. just carrying on from what my previous observa- 
tion was as to what Mr. Liddy may have come away from the meeting, 
obviously ]\Ir. Maerruder and Mr. Liddy did not get the impression 
that you completely disapproved of the program because they did set 
up only 8 days later a meeting in your office on Februaiy 4 with the 
same participants in which they presented a half million dollar pro- 
gram I understand which included electronic surveillance. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dash, I would disagree with the testimony 
to which you refer insofar as Mr. Magruder or Mr. Liddy either one 
of them was invited back under the basis of the same concept with re- 
spect to the presentation of a plan, and I think Mr. Dean, if I recall 
his testimony, agrees a little bit more with what my recollection was 
and it was to the point of this was not what we were interested in. 
"What we were interested in was the gathering of information and the 
securitv and protection against the demonstrations. 

Mr. Dash. But nevertheless Mr. Magruder and Mr. Liddy did come 
back and Mr. Dean attended that meeting with you, on February 4, 
and did present a scaled down version which included electronic sur- 
veillance and break-ins, did it not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It did that but there again there are faulty recol- 
lections with what was discussed at that meeting, what the concept of 
it was. I violently disagree with Mr. Magruder's testimony to the point 
that the Democratic National Committee was discussed as a target for 
electronic surveillance for the reasons that he gave, number one with 
respect to the Democratic back story. We are talking now about the 4th 
of Februarv\ 

Mr. Dash. Yes, I know, the reason for centering in on Mr. O'Brien, 
I believe 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, and, of course, the newspaperman 
did not have his column that Magruder referred to until the 23d of 
February. He said we were focusing on the Democrats and Mr. O'Brien 
because Mr. O'Brien's vocal activities in connection with the ITT case, 
and Mr. Anderson did not publish his column until the 29th of Febru- 
ary, and so that what I am pointing out is that this meeting was a 
relatively short meeting and it was rejected again because of the fact 
that it had these factors involved. But these targets were not discussed. 

Mr. Dash. Were any targets discussed, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, there were none. 

Mr. Dash. Do you also disagree with Mr. Magruder's testimony that 
you actually volunteered a particular target which was Hank Green- 
spoon's office in Las Vegas for the purpose of obtaining some docu- 
ments that might involve a political candidate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, you gave me a great opportunity to correct 
the record on this. You know, Mr. INIagruder said that it could have 
been Mitchell or Dean and then when you pickied up the questioning 
you said Mitchell, so we are now correcting that record. To the best of 
my recollection, there was no such discussion of any 

Mr. Dash. However, your recollection is there was no discussion 
of it? 

iNIr. Mitchell. No discussion whatsoever. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall Mr. Dean's reaction at that meeting ? 



1612 

Mr. Mitchell. I recall both of our reactions to it. Althouo;h it has 
been given, Mr. Dean's reaction has been given a different connotation 
and, of course, it depends on who is tellino; the story and under what 
circumstances to who looks like the White Knight and who looks like 
the Black Knight, of course. 

The fact of the matter is that Dean, just like myself, was again 
aghast that we would have this type of presentation. John Dean, as I 
recall, not only was aghast at the fact that the program had come back 
again w^ith electronic surveillance, perhaps a necessary entry in con- 
nection with it, I am not sure that entries were always discussed with 
electronic surveillance because they are not necessarily synonymous, 
but Mr. Dean was quite strong to the point that these things could not 
be discussed in the Attorney General's office, I have a clear recollection 
of that and that was one of the bases upon which the meeting was 
broken up. 

Mr. Dash. And broke up on that basis, I believe. 

Mr. Mitchell. And broke up, along with my observations. 

Mr. Dash. What specifically did you say ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I cannot tell you specifically any more than I can 
tell you specifically what Mr. Dean said but my observation was to 
the point that this was not going to be accepted. It was entirely out of 
the concepi of what we needed and what we needed was again an 
information-gathering operation along with, of course, the program 
to get information on and to be able to have security against the dem- 
onstrators that Ave knew were coming. 

As you recall, Mr. Dash, at this particular time they had already 
started to form in substantial numbers in San Diego in connection 
with the proposed convention, even though that convention was not 
to happen until August of that year. 

Mr. Dash. Well, since this reappearance, and presentation of the 
so-called Liddy plan to you which included these obviously objection- 
able portions to you as you testified, and since you did not take any 
violent action at the preceding meeting, did you take any action 
against Mr. Liddy as a result of his coming back again on February 4 
and re-presenting it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Other than to cut off the proposals ; no. 

Mr. Dash. AVliy not? Here is a man talking to you as Attorney 
General about illegal wiretapping and perhaps break-ins. Why, if 
you did not have him ordered arrested for trying to conspire to do 
things like this, why didn't you have him fired ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In hindsight I would think that would have been a 
very viable thing to do. And probably should have been done. Liddy 
was still an employee of the campaign and I presumed that he would 
go back to the duties that he was performing without engaging in 
such activities. 

Mr. Dash. Well, you had to be aware at least at that time, Mr. 
Mitchell, that Liddy could become a very embarrassing employee of 
the campaign. 

Mr. Mitchell. Not necessarily, unless he violated directions mider 
which he was operating to that point there was no such, there was no 
such evidence that he was violating. 



1613 

Mr. Dash. He did not indicate any responsibility to yon at least, 
in the presentation of the two plans that he gave you on January 27 
and February 4, did he ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure I understand your question, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Certainly, from your point of view, he did not exercise 
or did not demonstrate any responsibility ? 

]Mr. ^Mitchell. He did not exercise any responsiveness to my desires 
in the matter, if that is your question ; no. 

]\Ir. Dasil Did you report to anybody the January 27 meeting or the 
February 4 meeting ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, no ; Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever take it up with ]\Ir. Haldeman or anybody 
in the White House ? 

Mr. ^Mitchell, No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware that Mr. Liddy left the February 4 meet- 
ing believing that his plan was not objectionable in itself but only that 
the price tag was too high and that he reported that to Mr. McCord and 
Mr. Hunt ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I cannot conceive of anybody leaving that meeting 
with such an understanding. 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware, by the way, that Mr. McCord and Mr. 
Hunt were involved in the planning operation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Li no way. I have never met Mr. Hunt. I do not know 
Mr. Hunt and, of course. Mr. ]\IcCord was the security officer of the 
Committee To Re-Elect the President and one of the last people I would 
have believed would have been involved in such activitv. 

Mr. Dash. Now. after the February 4 meeting, did you receive any 
urging or pressures from anybody in the White House with i-egard to 
approving the Liddy plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Well, now, once again, Mr. Mitchell, and for a third time, 
on March 80, 1972, and this time in Key Biscayne, Mr. Magruder him- 
self, not yiv. Liddy, presented a decision paper on the so-called Liddy 
wiretapping political intelligence ])lan scaled down now to a price tag 
of $250,000."" 

Do you recall the meeting with Mr. Magruder and yourself down at 
Key Biscayne on March 30 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I do. Mr. Dash. 

I was on a vacation and it gave an o]:)portunity to catch up on some 
of the things that were happening in the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President that I was to be associated with shortly. There were 2 days 
of meetings, Mr. Harry Flemming was down there for a day with his 
side of the campaign activities that had to do more with the political 
organizations and States and Mr. Magruder was down there in con- 
nection with the operational program, programmatic side of the 
campaign. 

Mr. Dash. I understand — I am sorry, continue. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. LaRue had come down with us and was living 
in the house with us and he sat in on all of these meetings that we had 
while we were down there. 

Mr. Dash. Now, I understand Mr. Magruder came down not only 
with this so-called Liddy plan proposal but he had a number of other 
items on the agenda. 



1614 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; he had a substantial number of items on the 
agenda because I had been otherwise en^a^ed and had for weeks. I had 
not had an opportunity to meet with these people. I was about to 
become officially associated with the campaign and he came down with 
a big stack of documents that were to be considered immediately. 

Mr. Dash. "Would it be fair to say, Mr. Mitchell, that the so-called 
quarter million dollar Liddy plan for wiretapping and break-in was 
actually diiferent in degree and kind than any other agenda item that 
he was presenting to you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. ]Mr. Dash, you can I'cst assured of this. There were 
no other such plans in the documents that were submitted. 

Mr. Dash. I^Hiat would have given ]\Ir. ]Magruder the idea that you 
would even consider this proposal again if you had indeed, as you 
stated, rejected it so categorically twice before ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would have presumed that you would ask 
Mr. Magruder that question when he was here, ]Mr. Dash, but in hind- 
sight I presume there were other people interested in the implementa- 
tion of some type of activity in this area. Because I believe that Mr. 
Magruder was very clearly aware of the position that I had taken in 
connection with it. 

Mr. Dash. So that it is at least your present feeling that he was 
acting under some pressure for somebody to represent this plan to you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. This has been continued to be ni}^ feeling but I have 
no basis for knowing that. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know wdio might have been involved? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I do not. 

Mr. Dash. Has anybody ever told you other than any testimony 
which has appeared before this committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, the only information I have had has been the 
testimony that has been before this committee, and, of course, that is 
pretty wide ranging, you can almost take j^our pick of quite a number 
of such influences. 

Mr. Dash. Now, what is your recollection of what decision you made 
in Key Biscayne on the so-called Lidd}- plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was very simple. This, again, "We don't 
need this, I am tired of hearing it, out, let's not discuss it any further." 

This sort of a concept. 

Mr. Dash. It was as clear as that? 

Mr. IMiTCHELL. In my opinion, it was just as clear as that. 

I believe I recall, Mr. Dash, that this was part of a long agenda that 
for some unknown reason, they kept this to the last, or the next to the 
last. l'\niether somebody thought they were going to sneak it through 
or whether there would be less resistance or wdiat, I don't know. But 
this is my recollection. 

Mr. Dash. Well, then, could ]Mr. ]\Iagruder have been in any way 
mistaken as to what your position was ? 

Mr. ]MiTCHELL. I would hope not. 

Mr. Dash. Then how do vou explain, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Magruder's 
sw^orn testimony that you, however reluctantly, approved the quarter 
million dollar Liddv plan at Key Biscavne? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I can't explain anybody's testimony up 
here except my own. 



1615 

Mr. Dasti. Well, indeed, if you had not approved the plan 

Mr. Mitchell. I really shook him up, didn't 1 1 

Mr. Dash. "Well, I will try another question. 

You had not approved the plan, but these thin^-s occurred accord- 
ino- to the testimony of a number of witnesses. Why would ]Mr. INIa^jru- 
der call Mr. Reisner to have Liddy call him in Key Biscay ne and then 
as soon as ]Mr. ]Ma2:ruder returned to Washin2:ton, he told Mr. Reisner 
to tell Liddy that his ])lan had been approved and he told Sloan that 
you had authorized Liddy to draw a total of a quarter of a million 
dollars. 

Now, Mr. Sloan, ]Mr. Reisner. and ]Mr. Ma^ruder have so testified 
that this occurred just after the March 20 meeting. 

Mr. Mitchell. I can't describe or prescribe the activities of other 
people, ]Mr. Dash, assuming that that long statement of yours is cor- 
rect. I can't describe the 

]\[r. Dash. Well, perhaps you may not be able to describe the activi- 
ties, but was Mr. ]\lagruder capable of leaving a meeting in Key 
Biscayne with you on ]March 3fJ, in Avhich you rejected for a third 
time the Liddy plan, and completely on his own, lied to Mr. Reisner, 
Liddy, and Sloan about your approval of the quarter million dollar 
plan ? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. Is he capable of it ? 

I wasn't privy to the conversation, but if it happened 

Mr. Dash. Well, we have this testimony under oath before this 
committee, by all three witnesses. 

Mr, Mitchell. Well, with respect to all three people that were 
involved, if there is a problem there, it is a problem of misunder- 
standing or a contravention of my orders. 

Mr. Dash. I think you testified that he couldn't possibly misunder- 
stand ■ 

]Mr. ]MiTCHELL. This would certainly have been my recollection 
upon the basis of the conversation that was involved. Of course, for- 
tunately, there was a third party there and I am sure that he will have 
some opinion on the subject matter one way or the other. 

Mr. Dash. Who is that? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. Mr. LaRue, who was in this meeting with us through- 
out the activity. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know what his testimony is on that subject? 

^Ir. ^Iitchell. No, I don't know what his testimony wnll be, Mr. 
Dash, but ]Mr. LaRue was there, and we have talked about it, ob- 
viously, since that event occurred over the months that have inter- 
vened since the Watergate event of June 17, and I am quite sure that, 
for instance, he told Mr. Parkinson and Mr. O'Brien that there was 
no such approval at this particular time. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you ever have any meeting with ]Mr. ^lagruder 
down at Key Biscayne at which Mr. LaRue was not there ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't see how there could have been. Mr. LaRue was 
staying in the House with us, we were meeting in what they call the 
Florida room in the particular house. The meetings went on for quite 
a number of hours and we went through these documents and to the 
best of my recollection, ]Mr. LaRue was there. 

j\Ir. Dash. Do vou recall what JNIr. LaRue said there? 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 18 



1616 

Mr. MiTCHELX,. Well, I don't think Mr, LaRue was very enthusiastic 
about this project and I think he concurred in the fact that it should 
not be approved. 

Mr. Dash. Now, if Mr. Magnider didn't come away with the idea 
that you had approved it and nevertheless, very shortly after he re- 
turned, set it in motion by approving the payment to Mr. Liddy of 
funds to carry out this plan, do you have any idea who above you could 
have given him authority to do this ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dash, I don't know whether it would be 
above me, but there could very well have been pressures that came from 
collateral areas in which they decided that this was the thing to do. I 
can't speculate on who they might be. I am sure that thei-© could be 
such pressures. 

Mr. Dash. Generally, though, from your knowledge of Mr. 
Magruder and the working of Mr. Magruder, would Mr. Magruder 
on his own undertake to carry out this plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. You are asking for an opinion again. 

Mr. Dash. An opinion, yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think it is a matter of degree, Mr. Dash. I think 
you will find when you get into your additional investigations that 
there were a lot of activities in the so-called dirty tricks department 
and so forth that were carried on without my knowledge by the gentle- 
men who were at the committee. So, it is a matter of degree. 

Mr. Dash. Well, a matter of degree. But here, although Mr. Magru- 
der had a continuing authority to approve expenditures, if Mr. Magru- 
der actually knew that you had barred or rejected a particular pro- 
gram, would you expect Mr. Magruder to approve the payment of a 
quarter of a million dollars to Mr. Liddy for that program ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe that Mr. Magruder paid a quarter of a 
million dollars to Liddy. 

Mr. Dash. Well, approved 

Mr. Mitchell. What he had done was continue what he liad been 
doing before, made payments along the way to Liddy for Liddy's in- 
telligence-gathering activities. 

Mr. Dash. Well, that is not according to Mr. Magruder"s testimony. 
According to Mr. INIagruder's testimony, he had given this money not 
for general intelligence activity, but the so-called Liddy plan. 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, you are talking about the later date ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. Would you expect, taking as a matter of degree, that 
Mr. Magruder may have acted on his own ? Having your rejection to a 
particular program, would you have expected Mr. Magruder to have 
approved the expenditures of large sums of money ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I certainly would not have expected it, Mr. Dash, no. 

Mr. Dash. Now, shortly, and I think again this is a restatement of 
what occurred, shortly after the March oO meeting in Key Biscayne, 
Liddy in April did ask for an initial payment from Mr. Sloan on a 
quarter million dollar budget. Mr. Sloan lias so testified that Liddy 
asked that the initial payment be $83,000. Were you aware of that re- 
quest of Mr. Liddy's ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not aware of the request, Mr. Dash, witli respect 
to the dollar amount, and I am sure that the committee recalls the 
dialogue from Sloan to Stans to Mitchell to Stans to Sloan with respect 



1617 

to it in which amounts were not discussed. It was a question of did 
Mao;ruder have continuino^ authorization to authorize expenditures, 
and of course, the answer was yes. 

Mr. Dasti. Well, it is more in direct disagreement with Mr. Sloan's 
testimony or Mr. Stans' testimony, but according to Mr. Sloan's testi- 
mony, he was quite concerned about the sizable amount, $83,000, and 
went to Mr. Stans to see if Mr. Magruder had such authority and then 
Mr. Stans went to you. According to the testimony of Mr. Stans, on 
^Nlay 16, for the record — just paraphrasing it — ]Mr. Stans, although not 
meaning a particular amount, asked whether, if any amount that Mr. 
IVIagruder wanted to give Mr. Liddy would be all right, and that you 
had said yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I said that Magruder had continuing authority to 
authorize expenditures of money. Up until that time, I guess he had 
expended $3 or $31/9 million. 

Mr. Dash. But did you recall that in this particular case, Mr. Stans 
was asking you about Liddy ? 

Mr. ISIiTCHELL. I don't have that recollection on the issue of Ma- 
gruder's continuing authority, but I would not challenge or dispute 
Mr. Stans' statement on the subject. 

Mr. Dash. Well, that was his testimonv. Now, you had just had a 
meeting with Mr. Magruder on March 30, in which Mr. Magruder was 
asking you to approve a quarter million dollar plan that would au- 
thorize giving Liddy this kind of money. Your statement now, then, 
is that you did tell Mr. Stans that Mr. Magruder could pay Mr. Liddy 
any sum of money that Mr. Magruder wanted to pay him. 

Mr. Mitchell. Don't put it in the context of any sum of money. 
It was a fact that existed, Mr. Dash, in connection with Liddv had 
been in the intelligence and information gathering field. I think Mr. 
Stans has testified up here that to that time, he had been authorized 
$125,000 and it is again in the context of the fact that Magruder had 
continuing authority to authorize moneys and Mr. Stans said, with 
respect to Liddy, I can take it on the same basis to authorize money 
in connection with the ongoing programs that Liddy had l)een carrying 
out. 

Mr. Dash. That would be true, Mr. Mitchell, in the abstract. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this is the abstract, Mr. Dash, because there 
were no sums involved and none discussed, and this has been the 
testimony. 

Mr. Dash. Well, Mr. Stans felt it necessary to come back to you 
and this was shortly after you were aware that Mr. Liddy was seeking 
to get approval of a plan for a quarter of a million dollars. 

^Ir. Mitchei L. Xo, we had had no discussion whatsoever with respect 
to approval of a Liddy plan of a quarter of a million dollars, and 
Mr. Stans has testified that he never heard about it. And I am so 
testifying that I never heard about it in connection with the discussion 
of whether or not the authorization from Magruder to Liddy had 
anything to do with a quarter of a million dollar plan. 

Mr. Dash. But shortly after the March 30 meeting, you were being 
asked by Mr. Stans if Mr. Magruder could pay sizable amounts to Mr. 
Liddy?' 



iei8 

Mr. Mitchell. No, there weren't any sizable amounts. We didn't 
talk about numbers, we didn't talk about sizable amounts at all. What 
we talked about was did Magnider have continuing authorization, 
Stans said, to provide money to Liddy. I say continuing authorization 
and it is still the fact that it is continuing authorization to Liddy. We 
are not talking about a quarter of a million dollars, we are not talking 
about sizable amounts, we are talking about what was conceived to 
be an ongoing program that had already expended $125,000. 

Mr. Dash. Just one last question on this, Mr. Mitchell. Then why 
was it necessary for Mr. Stans to come to you if it was not a sizable 
amount involved? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Stans has already testified that he didn't know 
the amount involved and didn't discuss it with me. 

Mr. Dash. I think Mr. Stans' testimony is that he asked you if any 
amounts were to be paid by Mr. Liddy, would that be all right? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall on that basis, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Let me just read to you, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Stans' testi- 
mony on page 1644. 

"I said" — meaning Mr. Stans — "you mean, John, that if Magruder 
tells Sloan to pny these amounts to Gordon Liddy that he should do 
so ? And he said, that is right." 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you go back and pick it up so I can hear the 
prior testimony ? 

Mr. Dash. Let me just go back. 

"I will quote the conversation with John Mitchell as best as I can 
paraphrase it. It is not precise. But I saw John Mitchell a relatively 
short time after and said, Sloan tells me that Gordon Liddy wants 
a substantial amomit of money. What is it all about? 

"And John Mitchell's reply was, I do not know. We will have to ask 
Magruder, because Magruder is in charge of the campaign and he 
directs the spending." 

Mr. Stans said, "I said, do you mean, John, that if Magruder tells 
Sloan to pay these amounts or any amounts to Gordon Liddy, that he 
should do so? And he said, that is right." 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would respectfully disagree with Mr. Stans 
on the fact of substantial amounts or that the discussions had to do 
with respect to the authorization by Magruder in the continuity of 
the way he had been acting. This was as I was coming aboard in 
connection with the campaign. 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Mitchell, were you aware that on or about 
May 27, 1972, there was in fact a break-in of the Democratic National 
Committee headquarters at the Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And did you know of the code name, "Gemstone" or any 
of the wiretap proofs that came from the break-in ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not until a great deal later down the road, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. When you say that, how far down the road ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not quite certain. I believe it would be sub- 
stantially down the road. 

Mr. Dash. Before June 17 or after June 17 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, much after June 17. 



1619 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware that Mr. Magruder kept a so-called 
Mitchell Gemstone file as well as a Haldeman Gemstone file, prior to 
June 17? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have heard testimony here, Mr. Dash, that I be- 
lieve it was Mr. Reisner, that they kept a Mitchell file, in which docu- 
ments would be placed for Mr. Magruder to come up and discuss them 
with me. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, I believe Mr. Magruder has also testified about that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, about a file that would have documents, memo- 
randums, et cetera, et cetera. I am not aware of anybody testifying 
to the fact that there was a special Mitchell gemstone file. 

]\Ir. Dash. Well, the INIitchell file did include, on that testimony, 
you will recall, that it included gemstone. 

Mr. ^Mitchell. I recall Keisner stating that he had put the docu- 
ments in there, yes. 

Mr. Dash. But do you recall Mr. Magruder testifying that he had 
taken these documents and showed them to you ? 

]\Ir. ^Mitchell. I recall it very vividly because it happens to be a 
palpable, damnable lie. 

Mr. Dash. What is the lie, Mr. :Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, let me lay out the scenario for you, because 
my answer will come in the scenario. I paid particular attention to 
this because of the fact that INIr. Magruder said that at his regular 
8 :80 morning meeting, sometime within a week or a week and a half 
from the time of the initial break-in, that he brought certain docu- 
ments to my office at the regular 8:80 meeting to display them to me 
and that I was dissatisfied with them and that I called Gordon 
Liddy up to my office and raised holy hell with him about the fact that 
thev were not the tvpe of information that was wanted. 

Now, let me go back and pick up the facts with respect to the meet- 
ing. First of all, I had an 8 :15 meeting every day ever at the White 
House in connection with activities that were governmental, but I 
sat in on. 

Second, if you have my logs, that are very, very accurate and cor- 
rect, you will note that there was no meeting in any morning during 
thnt period when yir. ^Magruder and I were alone during that meeting. 

Third, I have never seen or talked to Mr. Liddy from the 4th day 
of February 1972 until the 15th day of June 1972, either in person or 
on the telephone. 

Fourth, I would like to point out that ]Mr. Dean's testimony is that 
when he first debriefed ^Nfr. Liddy on the 19th of June, Mr. Liddy 
told Mr. Dean that ^lagruder was the one that had pushed him con- 
cerning the second entrv on the 17th of June and I cannot conceive 
of anybodv, if they had Mitchell as a scapegoat, whv thev would get 
down to ]Magruder and use him as the one that had pushed him. 

So I am using that dialogue to point out the reasons why this 
meetinsf could not and did not take place. 

Mr. Dash. Just taking that dialogue, vou were aware that there 
was no love lost between jNIr. Liddy and Mr. Magruder and he might 
well have wanted to, since we are speculating, put the blame on 
Mr. IVIagruder. 



1620 

Mr. Mitchell. As I am stiating, Mr. Dash, I never saw Mr. Liddy 
from the 4th of February until the 15th of June and I cannot tell you 
whether there was love lost or not. I think there is testimony that if 
they had a controversy, it should be kept away from me and settled 
at lower echelons. 

Mr. Dash. Well, if Mr. Liddy did not see you, did Mr. Magruder 
show you the Gemstone file, as he indicated he did? 

Mr. Mitchell. No; he did not and I just got through denying that 
fact that he did and I am pointing out the reasons why he did not be- 
cause of the circumstances and time in which he is talking about the 
meetings that are referred to in those logs. 

Mr. Dash. You do not recall then, any statement by IVIr. Liddy to 
you indicating that the O'Brien microphone was not working and he 
would have to fix it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, the only statement that I have had with 
Mr. Liddy and the only conversation from the 4th of February until 
this very day was one single meeting that shows in my log on June 15, 
1972, where Mr. Liddy was brought into my office by Mr. Van Shum- 
way, the Public Information Officer, to discuss with me a letter that 
Mr. Liddy had written on Mr. Stans' request to the Washington Post 
having to do with some charges that had been made by the General 
Accounting Office dealing with the Corrupt Practices Act and Mr. 
Shumway did not want that letter to go to the Post without my ap- 
])roval. I looked at the letter and gave it the approval and that was the 
end of it. That was the only conversation I had with Mr. Liddy so it 
could not possiblv be as you were inferring. 

Mr. Dash. Without seeking at all to challenge, Mr. Mitchell, your 
testimony, would it not be true since you referred to the log or what 
may or may not appear in the log if a name does appear in the log it 
is perhaps likely that such a person did meet with you during that 
time but does it actually mean if a name does not appear that such a 
person never entered your office ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that to be absolutely true, Mr. Dash. If 
you go back and look at that log you will find that the aide that I had 
sitting in the next office to me when he came into see me that was logged. 
When my daughter called on the telephone or when my wife called on 
the telephone — ^by the way, my wife called a lot more often than my 
daughter [laughter] but regardless of who it was that called and who 
came into the office that was logged in that particular circumstance. 

Mr. Dash. Well, even though you may not have followed all the 
testimony, Mr. Mitchell, are you aware that some time earlier at the 
beginning of these hearings that Mr. McOord in his early testimony 
before this committee gave some corroborating evidence, although 
hearsay as it was, to the effect that Liddy told him that the reason they 
had to go into the DNC on June 17 was because you, Mr. Mitchell, 
were unhappy about the false or the ineffective working opercOition of 
the O'Brien bug. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, that fits right in with Mr. McCord's testi- 
mony as the only reason he did anything of this was because he thought 
he had the approval of the Attorney General of the TTnited States 
and the counselor to the President, that iust fits right in with it. But 
the fact of the matter is that I never saw or talked to Mr. Liddy from 
the 4th of February until the 15th of June. 



1621 

Mr. Dash. All right, now, ]\Ir. Mitchell, where and when did you 
first learn of the break-in of the Democratic National Committee head- 
quarters that took place on June 17, 1972 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I was in California for the weekend on an 
extensive round of activities and, to the best of my recollection, 
Mr. Dash, it was on Saturday morning. I am not sure who the individ- 
ual was who told me. AVe were, I was, moving with Governor Reagan 
from a hotel to a place where there was a series of political meetings, to 
the best of my recollection, when I arrived there I was advised of it. 
There was coi'isiderable concern about the matter because I was holding 
a press conference out there, and we did not know what the circum- 
stances were. I believe that by that time that they had — Mr. McCord, 
his name had surfaced or Mrs. McCord had called somebody at the 
committee about it, and obviously, there was an involvement in the 
Committee To Re-Elect the President. 

Mr. Dash. What, if anything, did you do, while still in California ? 
Mr. Mitchell. While in California ? I did a number of things. First 
of all, I continued to carry out the schedule that I liad there which was 
quite extensive for 2 days. I asked the people, particularly Mr. Mardian 
who was there, to get as much information about it as he could. I put 
out a statement to the effect that, I do not know whether it went out 
there or after we came back, to tlie effect that we did not understand 
this, tliat Mr. McCord was one of our employees, he also had a separate 
consulting firm, that it was basically an attempt to carry on the exten- 
sive schedule that I had which, of course, is in the book that you are 
well aware about and, at the same time, trying to get information as 
to what had happened back in the District of Columbia. 

]\Ir. Dash. At that time, out in California, did it ever cross your 
mind when you read about this that perhaps the Liddy plan had been 
put in operation ? 

]\lr. ]\liTCHELL. Well, that had crossed my mind but the players 
were different and, of course, there was a lot of discussion about CIA 
and because of the Cuban Americans who were involved in it. It 
wasn't until actually later on that it struck home to me that this could 
have been the same operation that had a genesis back in the earlier 
conversation. 

Mr. Dash. Well then, after you returned from California, and I 
understand that was on June 19, 1972. 

Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. Yes, sir, it was. 

Mr. Dash. When and how were you briefed as to what actually 
happened in this matter ? 

Mr, Mitchell. Well, how was I briefed as to what actually hap- 
pened ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is such a broad statement that I could 
tell you for the next 6 months I was being briefed on it. 

Mr. Dash. I mean, let's take the 

Mr. Mitchell. Excuse me, Mr, Dash, you are asking the questions. 

Mr. Dash. That is all right. I think you were about ready to give 
me a shorter answer than a longer answer, 

Mr, Mitchell, Well, I was giving you a shorter answer to the fact 
that the first so-called briefing on what had hai:)pened, and you used 
the word "actually" which I will have to omit from that for the time 



1622 

being because I have never quite got to the bottom of it, Avas after ISIr. 
Mardian and Mr. LaRiie had met with Mr, Liddy and Mr. Liddy 
provided them with quite an extensive story on Mr. Liddy's activities. 

Mr, Dash. Will you tell us briefly what that extensive story 
included ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it included the fact that he was involved with 
other individuals in the Watergate activity, that he had also made 
surveillance of McGovern headquarters, I believe it was, and that he 
had previously, as part of what has since become known as the 
Plumbers group, acted extensively in certain areas while he was at 
the White House in connection with the Ellsberg matter, in the Dita 
Beard matter and a few of the other little gems. 

Mr, Dash, "WHien you say the Ellsberg matter what specifically are 
you referring to ? 

Mr, Mitchell, Well, I am referring to, well, it certainly wasn't the 
prosecution, 

Mr, Dash, No. 

Mr. Mitchell. Obviously it had to do with the surreptitious entry 
of the doctor's office in California. 

Mr. Dash. And when you refer to the Dita Beard matter what spe- 
cifically did you learn through Mr. LaRiie and Mr. ]Mardian? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, if mv recollection is correct he was assisting 
in spiriting her out of wherever they spirited her out of, either New 
York or Washington. 

Mr. Dash. Was there a meeting in your apartment on the evening 
that you arrived in Washington on June 19, attended by Mr. LaRue, 
Mr. Mardian, Mr. Dean. Mr. Magruder 

Mr, Mitchell. Magruder and mvself. that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall the purpose of that meeting, the discus- 
sion that took place there ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I recall that we had been traveling all day and, of 
course, we had very little information about what the current status 
was of the entry of the Democratic National Committee, and we met 
at the apartment to discuss it. They were, of course, clamoring for a 
response from the committee because of Mr. McCord's involvement, 
et cetera, and we had quite a general discussion of the subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall anv discussion of the so-called either Gem- 
stone files or wiretapping files that you had in your possession? 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; I had not heard of the Gemstone files as of that 
meeting and, as of that date. I had not heard that anybody there at 
that particular meeting knew of the wiretapping aspects of that or 
had anv connection with it. 

Mr. Dash. Did either you or anybodv in your presence at that meet- 
ing discuss INIr. Liddy having a good fire at his house? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not in mv recollection was there any discussion of 
destruction of documents at that meeting. 

Mr. Dash. You are aware of the testimony of Mr. Magruder that 
he did get the idea to destroy the documents and he did in fact burn 
the Gemstone documents? 

Mr. Mitchell. T am aware of his testimony and T think his testi- 
mony was one of these general t]iin.Qfs "It was decided that" or some- 
thing to that effect but, to my recollection, there was no such discus- 
sion of it. 



1623 

Mr. Dash. Now, diirincr the period which is the latter part of June, 
July, and perhaps August, you did become somewhat aware, not fully 
aware, of the fact that Mr. Magruder had been very nuich involved 
in the so-called Liddy bugging operation of the Democratic National 
Committee headquarters, and also of the Liddy-Hunt operations as 
you have indicated for the plumbers activities that you have described 
earlier. 

Were you not also aware, Mr. Mitchell, of the wiretapping of certain 
journalists and stall' members of Mr. Kissinger after the so-called leaks 
of the SALT talks? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, which question do you want me to answer ? 

JNIr. Dash. I think, the first 

]\Ir. ]MiTtiiELL. We are going from July 1972 back to some place in 
1969 and I am not quite sure how you want me to approach it. 

]Mr. Dash. Well, you did become aware during June and July of 
Mr. ]Magruder's involvement in the break-in of the Democratic Na- 
tional Committee headquarters? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. We had people such as ]Mr. Liddy and so forth say 
yes, that Magruder was involved, Magruder was saying no at one time 
and maybe yes the other time, and so forth, but we were aware of the 
fact that certainly ]\Ir. ]Magruder had provided the money if nothing 
else and that during the latter part of June and the early part of July 
seemed to be what all the focus was as to how much money Mr. Ma- 
gruder had provided to ]Mr. Liddy. 

]Mr, Dash. Well, there came a time when you were aware that Ma- 
gruder himself had admitted to certain persons, whether INIr. Mardian 
or INIr. Parkinson, that he had been involved but was going to give a 
false story about what he had done. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't want to get Mr. Parkinson in there and 
I don't know about Mr. Mardian because Mr. Magruder told them two 
or three different stories, and Mr. Parkinson, and Mr. O'Brien ob- 
viously went ahead on the story that they thought was to be the facts. 

As I understand the sequence of events when this thrashing around 
was involved, occurred, involving everybody from the President of the 
Ignited States and the chairman of this committee and everybody on 
down the line as anybody they could think of to name, ^Nlr. Parkinson. 

Senator Ervix [presiding]. Just a minute, did they accuse this 
chairman? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. No, sir, this committee, I was going to use some other 
committee, I think we had better use some other committee. 
[Laughter.] 

The fact of the matter is that to the best of my recollection that 
Mr. Parkinson got jNIr. Magruder and Mr. Porter down to his office 
and ]:)ut them in a room and said now "I want you to write down 
what your statement is on this subject matter liecause it probably is 
going to be used as a deposition before the grand jury or certainly 
for submission to the Justice Department," so I want to make sure 
that Mr. O'Brien — that ]Mr. Parkinson is not involved in this. It got 
to the point where I had a very, very strong suspicion as to what the 
involvement was, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Witli that you also had the suspicion, if that is the word 
you want to use. that AIi\ ]\Lagrudei'*s story which he was writing 
down and which he was going to give in a deposition to the grand jury 
was not a true story. 



1624 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this came out later. I didn't know what he 
was writing down July 15 or whatever it was, it came later. 

Mr. Dash. There came a time when it did become a fact. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. When was that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would say it was sometime before he went to the 
grand jury, sometime. I don't want to duck your ques'don on these 
wiretaps that happened back in 1969. 

Mr. Dash. I will come back to that in a second. But you did become 
aware by the time he testified on the grand jury that Mr. Magruder 
was, in fact, testifying to a false story. 

Mr. Mitchell. 1 became aware or had a belief that it was a false 
story. 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, there were a number of meetings 
that you had with Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, Mr. LaRue, and Mr. Mar- 
dian, and at least in way part of the discussion that took place at that 
time, was Mr. Magruder's testimony before the grand jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would think there would have been more than one 
meeting on the subject matter, yes. 

Mr. Dash. I think the calendar would show there were quite a num- 
ber of meetings in which you met 

Mr. Mitchell. There were a lot of meetings, with a lot of matters 
being discussed at that time. 

Mr. Dash. Also was it true that Mr. Dean began to serve as sort of a 
liaison between this group that you were meeting with and Mr. Halde- 
man and Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dean was serving as a liaison between the 
Committee To Re-Elect the President and the White House and I am 
sure that would have meant Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Dash. And then, to the best of your recollection and knowledge, 
were you aware that Mr. !Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were being 
kept informed on the question of the strategy to conceal Mr. Ma- 
gruder's actual 

Mr. MrrciiELL. I had no specific knowledge of that. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever discuss that with Mr. Ehrlichman or 
Haldeman? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir ; I never did. You are talking about the Ma- 
gruder testimony ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection I have never discussed 
it with them. 

Mr. Dash. You don't recall that at all ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall that, no. I can only say that Mr. Dean 
was the conduit, Avas the party who acted between the two committees 
and came back and forth and discussed things with us so that 
whether 

Mr. Dash. Did you have any communication with Mr. Haldeman 
or Mr. Ehrlichman yourself durinii: this ]ieriod of time? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, I am sure I had numerous communications but 
I probably had to do with the running of the campaign, with other 
such matters rather than what Mr. ISIagruder might be testifvina: to. 

Mr. Dash. Did it have anythinq: to do with the so-called White 
House horror stories or the scandals you learned about from Mr. 



1625 

Mardian and 'Sir. LaRiie based on Mr. Liddy's statement, to back 
them lip ? 

Mr. Mitchell. You are talking about this time, you are talking 
before Magruder 

Mr. Dash. Before Magruder's testimony before the grand jury. 

Mr. Mitchell. Before Magruder's testimony before the grand jury. 
I would believe that during that period of time there were some dis- 
cussions of the so-called White House stories, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Was there 

Mr. Mitchell. Horrors, I mean not stories. 

Mr. Dash. Was there a concern expressed by you to Mr. Halde- 
man or Mr. Ehrlichman concerning whether stories Avould be revealed 
during this campaign ? 

Mr. ^IiTCHELL. I think that we all had an innate fear that during the 
campaign that they might be revealed. I recall discussing it specifically 
in that area but I am sure we must have had a mutual concern about 
the subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you yourself form a personal position as to 
what should be done about revealing this material ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I formed the opinion and a position that I did not 
believe that it was fair to the President to have these stories come out 
during his political campaign, 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware that there was a program actually 
going on so as to actually prevent these stories from coming out? 

]Mr. ^Mitchell. Now, which program are you talking about, Mr. 
Dash, so I can be sure to answer your question properly? 

Mr. Dash. Well, a program on the part of yourself, Mr. Dean, Mr. 
Haldeman. Mr. Ehrlichman, and perhaps Mr. LaEue and Mr. Mar- 
dian to see to it that the information that got to the prosecutor or to 
the grand jury or to the civil suits did not in any way include this 
information concerning the so-called White House horrors, as you 
described them ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dash, that is a very broad question and 
covers a lot of areas. I may answer it, perhaps, by saying that we 
sure in hell were not volunteering anything. In addition to that, we 
were involved in a A'ery difficult series of civil litigation, as you know, 
that involved discovery and all the rest of it. So we were not volun- 
teering anything. 

Mr. Dash. But you say you did come to know that, prior to Mr. 
Magruder's testimony, that he was going to testify falsely? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think I can put it on the basis that I had a pretty 
strong feeling that his testimony was not going to be entirelv accurate. 

Mr, Dash. Right, and this discussion, T think you have already tes- 
tified, M-as part of the discussion of some of the meetings with Messrs. 
LaRue, Mardian, Dean, and Magruder. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Would it be correct 

Mr. ]\IiTciiELL, I think the best way to put it is that Mr, Magruder 
would seek an audience to review his stor>' that he was going to tell, 
rather than somebody was trying to induce him to do so, I think Mr. 
Magruder has testified that nobody coerced him to do this, that he made 
up the story, that he did it of his own free will. So it was more of a basis 



1626 

of Mr. Magruder recounting to these assembled groups what he was 
going to testify to. 

Mr. Dash. But would it be fair to say, Mr, Mitchell, that it was in 
the interest of the group to have the story that did go into the grand 
jury and the ultimate indictments that did come out cut off at Liddy ? 
And Mr. Magruder, who was in such a high position in the committee, 
would not be involved in that type of thing ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I think you are jumping from one conclu- 
sion to another without tlie bridge. What we were really concerned 
about were the l^Hiite House horror stories. Now, if the cutoff that you 
speak of helped in that direction, perhaps that was probably the case. 
In other words, Watergate did not have the great significance that the 
White House horror stories that have since occurred had. 

Mr. Dash. Would you say that whatever coverup was taking place 
to this point, concealment and not volunteering information, had to do 
with actually preventing the so-called White House horror stories 
rather than Watergate break-in ? 

Mr. Mitchell. This was certainly my belief and rationale and I 
would believe the people in the White House, certainly some of them, 
might well be involved and certainly would have similar interests. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did Mr. Dean, in carrying back the messages from 
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, indicate that he had in fact in- 
formed them of the actions that had been taken — the strategies per- 
formed by your group ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I cannot say that he did or did not. I would have to 
believe that Mr. Dean was reporting to those gentlemen over there. 
Mr. Dean, as a proper lawyer, proper counsel, was very, very limited 
in his discussions of what he did or said with people in the White 
House and that is the way, of course, he should have acted. 

Mr. Dash. I think you testified that you at least discussed withJNIr. 
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman the problems involved in the Liddy 
operations, the Ellsberg, and other situations? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, and that was somewhere down the line, prob- 
ably much later than the time frame of which you are talking about in 
relationship to Mr. Magnider's appearance before the grand jui-y. 

Mr. Dash. All right, now, let us look very briefly to the so-called 
wiretapping of the journalists and Mr. Kissinger's staff as a result of 
the SALT talk leaks. Were you aware of the leaking and those 
wiretaps? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I find it hard to give you a specific answer 
other than the fact that, yes, I was. To what extent, I do not know. 
This happened in 1968 and they were national security wiretaps. They 
should have a full record of everything that was handled in the De- 
partment of Justice, because every security tap, whether it be a strict 
national security dealing with foreigners or whether it is the type that 
the court, has since frow^ned upon, is filed in the Department of Justice. 

Mr. Dash. But this would require your authority as Attorney Gen- 
eral, would it not? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would believe that the FBI would probably not op- 
erate without it. I am not sure of that, but I believe that that would 
be the case. 



1Q27 

Now, let me go on to ])oint out two other thino;s. No. 1, I do not 
recall tliere being that many people involved. I remember some mem- 
bers of the National Security Council that they thought were very 
much suspect. 

The second point I would like to point out, which gives me memory 
problems, is that in the newspapers, counsel said that some of these 
were on for a year and a half or 2 years, or something to that extent. 
Well, we have' a rule that I put in the Department that where they 
had these national security taps, they had to be reviewed every 90 
days. So there again, I would have had a memory jog along the way 
if this be the case. 

So what I am saying is that I think your best evidence is over in the 
Department of Justice and not my recollection. 

Mr. Dasji. Well, would the President's recollection be of assistance, 
Mr. ^Mitchell ? Are you aware of the President's statement of May 22 ? 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. I am aware of that reference in the statement of 
May 22. 1 do not know where the information came from. It may quite 
conceivably be correct. I brought the matter up through correspond- 
ence with Mr. Ruckelshaus and I thought I got very fuzzy answers 
back. But as I say, the evidence is in the Department of Justice and 
you ought to have access to it. 

Mr. Dash. But you do recall that in that statement of the President, 
the President did say that these areas did have the approval and were 
selected, along with others, by the Attorney General of the United 
States, who was you at the time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I have seen a lot of statements that come 
out that — I am not referring to the President, but in which people who 
dig out the information frequently get their facts wrong. 

Mr. Dash. This is a very important statement bv the President on 
May 22. 

Mr. ^Mitchell. I thought Mr. Buzhardt's statement was quite im- 
portant as far as I was concerned, too, but I think we found out what 
the distinction was there. 

Mr. Dash. You are not suggesting Mr. Buzhardt prepared the May 
22 testimony? 

]Mr. Mitchell. I am not suggesting anything. 

Mr. Dash. Did you believe, ]S[r. INIitchell — and I use the tenn belief 
at this point — have any belief as to whether the President was awai-e of 
the events either prior to or after the break-in of the Democratic Na- 
tional Committee headquarters? When I say events, I mean the actual 
bugging or the coverup which took place thereafter? 

Mr. ^IiTCiiELL. I am not aware of it and I have evei^y reason to be- 
lieve, because of my discussions and encounters with him up through 
the 22d of ^Nlarch, I have very strong opinions that he was not. 

Mr. Dash. How do you arrive at that conclusion ? Was it by particu- 
lar conversations with the President that he talked to you about this 
subject, or did you talk to him about this subject? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, it is primarily — I do not want to say no to 
exclude it, and I will explain the natures of the conversations, if you 
so desire. As a matter of fact, you may go through that list and I will 
get a chance to do them one by one. AAHiat I am saying is that I think 



1628 

I know the individual, I know his reactions to things, and I have a 
very strong feeling that during the period of time in which I was in 
association with him and did talk to him on the telephone, that I just 
do not believe that he had that information or had that knowledge; 
otherwise, I think the type of conversations we had would have 
brought it out. 

Mr. Dash. Generally, is it fair to say that much of your opinion that 
you express is based on your faith in the President and your knowl- 
edge of the man, rather than any specific statement the President made 
to you or that you made to the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I subscribe to the first two. I do have faith in 
the President and I do think I have knowledge of the man and I do 
think there were enough discussions in the area, in the general area, to 
the point where I think the general subject matter would have come 
out if the President had had knowledge. 

Mr. Dash. Well, now, Mr. Mitchell, you did become aware, as you 
have indicated, somewhere around June 21 or 22, when you were 
briefed or debriefed by Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian about the so- 
called — as you described it, the White House horrors of the Liddy 
operation and the break-in. Did you, yourself, as the President's ad- 
viser and counselor, tell the President what you knew or what you 
learned ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I did not. 

Mr. Dash. Why didn't you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Because I did not believe that it was appropriate for 
him to have that type of knowledge, because I knew the actions that 
he would take and it would be most detrimental to his political 
campaign. 

Mr. Dash. Could it have been actually helpful or healthy, do you 
think? 

Mr. Mitchell. That was not my opinion at the particular time. He 
was not involved ; it wasn't a question of deceiving the public as far 
as Richard Nixon was concerned, and it was the other people that were 
involved in connection with these activities, both in the "\\niite House 
horrors and the Watergate. I believed at that particular time, and 
maybe in retrospect, I was wrong, but it occurred to me that the best 
thing to do was just to keep the lid on through the election. 

Mr. Dash. Then it is your testimony that you in fact did not say 
anything to the President at that time 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I did not. 

Mr. Dash. So whether the President had any knowledge of it, it 
certainly couldn't have come from, his lack of knowledge or knowledge, 
from any statement that you made to him ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Now, were you aware of the fact that actually prior to 
Magruder's testimony, Mr. Dean rehearsed Mr. Magruder for his testi- 
mony before the grand jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall that, Mr. Dash, if you are talking 
about the testimony that took place on the 

INIr. Dash. In August. 

Mr. Mitchell. In August, the second appearance. 

Mr. Dash. The second appearance. 



1629 

Mr. IMiTCHELL. I am not aware of that. 

Mr. Dash. Then prior to Mao:ruder's third appearance, which dealt 
with the diaries and the meetings in your office, were you aware or do 
you recall the meetino; between you, Magruder, and Dean, in which a 
discussion was had concerning how to handle that testimony and how 
he was to testify in some of those meetings? 

^h\ ]MiTCiiELL. Well, it wasn't a question so much of how to handle 
the testimony; it was a question of what the recollection was. That, 
as I recall, Magruder's testimony had to do with the destruction of 
diaries that were already in the possession of the grand jury. But I 
think ]Mr. Dean's testimoiiy is a lot closer to the recollection that I have 
of the meeting. It was a question of what was the purpose of it, who 
was there, and what could be said about it to limit the impact of the 
whole 

]Mr. Dash. And did Mr. INIagruder indicate that he was not going to 
testify concerning any intelligence plans, but would testify that he 
was tiiere to discuss the election laws. 

;Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. Well, the election laws w^ere discussed and I think 
the result was that he would limit it to the election laws. 

Mr. Dash. And you were aware, then, in December that he would 
testify not completely, if not falsely, concerning the meetings on Jan- 
uary 27 and Februar}^ 4 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is generally correct. As I say again, this 
is something that Dean and I were listening to, as to his story as to 
how he was going to present it. 

Mr. Dash. Well, wasn't it the result of your effort or program to 
keep the lid on? You were interested in the grand jury not getting the 
full story. Isn't that true ? 

]Mr. Mitchell. Maybe we can get the record straight so you won't 
have to ask me after each of these questions : Yes. we wanted to keep 
the lid on. We were not volunteering anything. 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, would it not be fair to sav, Mr. 
Mitchell, that the most consuming issue that occupied you and some 
of those you were meeting with at this time was exactly the question 
of keeping the lid on during the 

]Mr. Mitchell. Xo. I wouldn't say that was correct. ]Mr. Dash. There 
were many other political activities that took place and. of course, we 
probably spent more time in connection with the civil litigation than 
we did in connection with this particular aspect of it. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you become aware at this time — in July or 
August — that payments were being made to defendants and support 
for the family ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I became aware in the fall sometime, and I can't tell 
you when it was. Probably it was a time in which one individual 
stopped making the payments and the other individual took it up, 
whatever time reference that was. 

Mr. Dash. And did you know that Mr. Kalmbach had been involved 
in that at all ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I had learned that, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did you also learn that in September, he had decided not 
to be involved any more and that INIr. LaRue took up the responsibility 
of landing the funds, making payoffs ? 



1630 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Now, when did you leave your position as the director 
of the campaign ? 

Mr. Mitchell. On the 1st of July 1972. 

Mr. Dash. And when you left, you were aware, were you not, that 
Mr. Magruder was staying on as deputy director of the campaign. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, he stayed on as Mr. MacGregor's deputy. 

Mr. Dash. And were you not aware when you were leaving that Mr. 
Magruder at least faced some serious problem of being indicted on the 
break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquartere as of 
July 1 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. As of July 1 ? I think that was a potential, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you did meet with the President on June 30, 1972, 
just before you left. As I understand, you had lunch with the Presi- 
dent. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did you think it your duty to tell the President at that 
lunch before you left that the man who was playing such a key role in 
his campaign, Magruder, had such a problem that he might be indicted 
for the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I think you and I have gone over to the 
point where we have established that the White House horror stories 
had come out in connection with the problem at that particular time 
and there wasn't the question of lifting of the tent slightly in order 
to get with respect to one individual or another ; it was a keeping the lid 
on and no information volunteered. 

Mr. Dash. Even if the lid had been kept on the so-called White House 
horrors, wouldn't it be very embarrassing to the President of the 
United States in his effort to be reelected if his deputy campaign di- 
rector was indicted in the break-in of the Democratic National Com- 
mittee headquarters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't think as far as the Watergate was concerned, 
there was a hell of a lot of difference between the deputy campaign 
director and the counsel for the finance committee and the security 
officer. Quite frankly, as far as the Watergate was concerned, that was 
already a public issue. It was the parties that were involved. 

Mr. Dash. There came a time, did there not, Mr. Mitchell, that the 
pressures for money by the defendants or by Mr. Hunt increased ? 

Would you tell us what you know about that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am not sure, Mr. Dash, that I can tell you very 
much about them other than the fact that somewhere along in the fall, 
Mr. Hunt had a telephone conversation with Mr. Colson, which. I 
think, covered the subject matter and then later on, as I recall, Mr. 
Dean has got in the record a letter from Mr. Hunt to Mr. Colson. which 
I think is quite suggestive of the fact that he was beinof abandoned. 

Then T heard later on, in March of this year, there were oral com- 
munications from either Hunt or his attorney relatin.fr to requests for 
legal fees and so forth, which were oommnnioated to the White House. 

Mr. Dash. How did vou hear about the March request? 

Mr. Mttchelt,. The March request ? T think I probably heard about 
it throuq-h Mr. DaRue, if mv memorv serves me right. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know how much money was actually being re- 
quested at that time ? 



1631 

Mr. Mitchell. I can't really tell you about the moneys across this 
period of time. It seems to me that the March request had some amount 
in the area of $75,000 which Mr. LaRue described to me, that was being 
requested by counsel for their legal fees in connection with the rep- 
resentation of Mr. Hunt. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. DaRue ask you Avhat your opinion was or whether 
he should pay that amount of money to Mr. Hunt or his counsel ? 

Mr. MiTciiELL. Mr. LaRue, to the best of my recollection, put it in 
this context : I have got this request, I have talked to John Dean over 
at the White House, they are not in the money business any more, 
what would you do if you were in my shoes and knowing that he made 
prior payments? I said, if I were you. I would continue and I would 
make the payment. 

Mr. Dash. And in that advice to Mr. LaRue, I take it, was the con- 
sideration that unless that payment was made, Mr. Hunt might in fact 
uncover the so-called "White House horror stories. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I don't know how you can move from the 
fact that Mr. LaRue told me that it was for legal fees to the point 
where we are uncovering the A^-liite House horror stories. It may be 
there. I don't know. 

Mr. Dash. Didn't that enter your mind, the pressure from Mr. Hunt, 
the fact that you indicated there were requests and former pressures 
for money, to the 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't think, Mr. Dash, that in March of 1973, those 
things were entering my mind, because I think as you are well aware 
from other testimony, I had refused to even consider raising money for 
these purposes a long time before that. 

Mr. Dash. But you are aware that there was a sum of money avail- 
able for that at the White House, were you not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was aware that there had been one at one time, but 
T didn't know how far Liddy had gotten into that particular fund. 

Mr. Dash. Since the $3.50,000 had come over from the Committee 
for the Re-Election of the President to the "V^Hiite House 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the only fund I was aware of, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Why, Mr. Mitchell, did you refuse around that time to 
raise any money for the payment of these fees? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, not only around that time, but all other times. 
I have never raised any money for anything and I was not about to 
start for that particular purpose. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever make any suggestions that the money that 
should be used for that purpose was the $350,000? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, to the best of my recollection, I had a conversa- 
tion with Mr. LaRue, I am sure at his instance, not mine, in which he 
pointed out tliat the funds, whatever source they were, that he had for 
the support of and the payment of lawyers' fees of these individuals, 
had run out. did I know whether there was any other money? And I 
suggested that maybe you ought to call over to the White House and see 
if the $350,000 that had been sitting over there since April was avail- 
able for the purpose. I understand that he did so. 

Mr. Dash. Do vou recall attending a meeting in January with Mr. 
Kalmbach and Mr. Dean in which you asked Mr. Kalmbach to help 
raise money for these legal fees and support of families ? That occurred 
in January 1973. 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 19 



1632 

Mr. Mitchell. In January 1973. Since our conversation of yester- 
day, Mr. Dash, I have continued to rack my brain and I have no rec- 
ollection of that. I know that there was a meeting on that day, Jan- 
uary 19, a foundation meeting over here in Blair House, in which both 
Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. Dean were there. But I liave no recollection 
of any meeting beyond that. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, did you become also aware of Mr. McCord's de- 
mands and were you in touch with Mr. Dean concerning Mr. Caul- 
field's approach to Mr. McCord ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Somewhere through the middle of it, because I was 
in Florida for sometime, I think the 20th of December through the 
8th or 9th of January, while a lot of this was occurring 

Mr. Dash. What role did you play ? What did you learn ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I learned that Mr. Dean had Mr. Caulfield contact- 
ing Mr. McCord and talking to Mr. McCord. 

Mr. Dash. About what ? Do you know about what ? 

Mr. Mitchell. About what Mr. McCord's attitude was concerning 
the predicament that he was in and what he was going to do. 

Mr. Dash. At that time, did you hear that Mr. Caulfield had been 
authorized to promise some form of Executive clemency to Mr. 
McCord? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe so. I think the only conversations that 
I had heard about Executive clemency had to do with Mr. Colson and 
Mr. Hunt. 

Mr. Dash. Well, what was that, to the best of your recollection? 

Mr. Mitchell, To the best of my recollection, it was that somewhere 
along the line, and I gather that that would be in 1973, early 1973, there 
were discussions of whether or not Mr. Hunt — well, I gather he had 
approached Colson, or through his lawyer had approached Colson 
on the subject matter. The essence of it was that Mr. Colson's word 
was the only word that Mr. Hunt would take with respect to Executive 
clemency, whatever that meant. That is the subject and substance of 
my overhearing of discussions on Executive clemency. 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Mitchell, you became aware, apparently, that 
after the election and after the questions concerning the funds that 
were being used bv Mr. Hunt and Mr. McCord's concern, that what- 
ever you discussed as keeping the lid on might become uncovered. 
Did that, sometime around December or January, occur to you? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it always occurred to me, the possibilitv that 
the so-called lid would become uncovered. Of course, I always hoped 
that it didn't, for the very simple reason that there was no necessity 
of scaring the President, who was not involved, through his White 
House activities or the activities in the White House. 

Mr. Dash. But the real possibility of it becoming unco A^e red, now 
that the election was over, could not affect his election. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, it \vould not affect his election but it would af- 
fect his Presidency, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. But you were aware, and I think from your own state- 
ment that the President was unaware, and you had personal knowl- 
edge or knowledge of information you had received from others of 
certain activities, that if they did become known publiclv, could either 
injure or destroy the President's second administration. After the 
election, did it occur to you to tell the President then? 



1633 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am sure it occurred to me and probably on 
hindsight I probably should have. I do not think there is any doubt 
about it. 

Mr. Dash. Did you not think it was the President's prerogative to 
know what to do about these matters ? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. The decision had to be made, and it is a tough one, 
whether or not he is not involved in it but he does not know about 
them, will this go away. I knew they were going to change the person- 
nel in the White House and hopefully they would be gone and he would 
not have to deal with it and he could go on to his second term, the 
second Presidency, without this problem. 

Mr. Dash. But you were taking a major risk, were you not, Mr. 
Mitchell? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think you are taking a major risk any time you 
have to deal with the White House horrors under any circumstances. 

Mr. Dash. Xow. you spoke to the President quite frequently on the 
telephone, you met with him, your logs indicate, so you did have plenty 
of opportunities, and on no occasion, I think it is your testimony, did 
you speak to the President about these matters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, which matters are we talking about ? 

Mr. Dash. Again, the White House 

Mr. Mitchell. About disclosing these matters. 

Mr. Dash. Disclosing the matters, the White House horrors, the 
break-in. 

Mr. Mitchell. I did not^ — well, let us not pass this over to the point 
where — on the 20th of June when I talked to him I apologized to him 
for not knowing what the hell had happened and I should have kept a 
stronger hand on what the people in the committee were doing, et 
cetera. And then, further on down the road in these political meetings 
that are shown on the logs, there were discussions about appointing a 
commission of the type of the Warren commission to investigate this 
matter, and special prosecutors and things like that. I do not want to 
leave the impression that it was never touched under any circum- 
stances. 

Mr. Dash. I am not talking about when you talked about Water- 
gate as such. I am talking about the so-called coverup, the White House 
horrors and what your own knowledge, based on information given 
you, as to who was involved in the break-in of the DNC. 

Mr. ]VIitchell. I answered that I did not talk to him about it. 

Mr. Dash. I know, but on the 20th 

Mr. Mitchell. I also answered in hindsight it probably would have 
been a better idea if I had. 

Mr. Dash. Now, also on March 27 did Mr. Magruder come to see you 
in New York ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, he did. 

Mr. Dash. And do you recall that he testified that he came because 
he began to be aware or concerned that things might unravel and, 
therefore, wanted assurances from you that he be taken care of. Do you 
recall that ? 

IMr. Mitchell. I recall very well, Mr. Dash, because of the fact that 
there was, based in the McCord letter to Judge Sirica, and Mr. Ma- 
gruder wanted to talk to me about the potentials of his being brought 
back before the grand jury on a perjury count. 



1634 

Mr. Dash. Did you promise him at that time, as he testified, that 
to the best of your ability, though you no longer were in office, you 
would help him to either get Executive clemency, support, or rehabil- 
itation, any of the things we have been asking about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Let us take Executive clemency. No, I have never 
promised that to anybody. Obviously, there is no basis upon which I 
could. 

With respect to, you were talking about support and so forth, what I 
told Jeb Magruder was that I thought he was a very outstanding young 
man and I liked and I worked with and to the extent that I could help 
him in any conceivable way, I would be delighted to do so. 

And this was exactly the same conversation that we had the next day 
down at Haldeman's office. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Magruder then ask for that meeting with Mr. 
Haldeman ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did he feel he needed that assurance from somebody still 
in the White House ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. And met with Mr. Haldeman on the 28th of March? 

Mr. Mitchell. 28th of March, that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. What kind of assurances were being sought by Mr. Ma- 
gruder there and what was being given to him ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Magruder was again concerned — well, he did 
not express it too directly — that he thought he might become the fall 
guy. It seems to me that everybody around this town involved in this 
all thought thev were going to become a fall guy. 

Mr. Dash. Did you, Mr.^ Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Did I ? Xo. Contrary to the story that I have read I 
did not believe that to be the case. I am quite anxiously waiting to see 
if there is some possibility of that other than some misguided counsel 
who wrote a piece of paper from which cross-examination was to be 
made. 

Mr. Dash. Getting back to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Magruder's meet- 
ing with you on March 28 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, it was the same general discussion, "I may have 
problems with my perjury, I don't liave any money, am I going to be 
deserted, are you people still going to be friends, will I be able to get 
counsel," and this tvpe of conversation. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Haldeman make any kind of promises to Mr. 
Magruder at that time, in your presence? 

Mr. Mitchell. None other than the fact to help him as a friend and 
I think Mr. Haldeman has testified to that. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you ever have a meeting with Mr. Magruder 
and Mr. Dean after that meeting with Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes sir. 

Mr. Dash. What was that meeting about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this was held at Magruder's request because 
he again was concerned about this perjury question that he might 
have, and the meeting was a quick runthroup-h again of the recollec- 
tion of the individuals as to what was discussed prior to Mr. 
Magruder's third appearance before the grand jury back in September. 



1635 

^Ir. Dash. Did you agree at that time, Mr. Mitchell, that you would 
hold the line, at least, if you were called, to limit the meeting to a 
discussion of the election laws ? 

Mr. ^liTCHELL. Xo, that was not the basis, to hold it to the election 
laws, Mr. Dash. The basis of it was for the recollection of what had 
happened and how it would have affected Mr. Magruder in perjury. 
You see, if you go back ^Slagruder had said there only had been one 
meeting when there actually had been two, and so fortli. It wasn't a 
question of holding the line on anything. It was a question of the recol- 
lection of what actually did happen vis-a-vis what ^Magruder ap- 
parently had testified to. 

^Ir. Dash. He was obviously concerned as to what your positio?^ 
was going to be if you were called before the grand jury. Did you make 
any assurances to ^Ir. Magruder at that time ? 

^Ir. Mitchell. Any assurances as to what ? 

Mr. Dash. How would you testify before the grand jury if you were 
called as to the meetings ? 

]Mr. Mitchell. I made no assurances as to how I was going to testify. 
Obviously I was going to testify as to what happened. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Dean make any assurances ? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. ]Mr. Dean had a very hazy recollection of what had 
happened. Obviously, as I think Mr. Dean testified, he didn't want to 
discuss the matter. He had already, of course, gone to counsel and was 
looking after ]Mr. Dean's problems. 

]\Ir. Dash. Did you learn during April that Mr. Magruder and Mr. 
Dean had gone to see the prosecutors ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I learned about Mr. Magruder, I didn't learn about 
Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dash. And were you personally aware of Mr. Dean's meetings 
with the President in March and April that he testified to before 
this committee? 

Mr. Mitchell. Only the meeting of March 22 at which, of course, 
I was present. 

Mr. Dash. What I am talking about are the meetings of Septem- 
ber 15, 1972, the meeting of February 28. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Mr. Dash, you are talking about 1972. 

Mr. Dash. The meetings of September 15, 1972, with the President, 
February 28, 1973, March 13, 1973, and March 21. Are you aware 
of those meetings? 

]Mr. ^Mitchell. Let me put it this way. The only meeting that I 
was aware of, of Mr. Dean and the President, was the one I attended 
on March 22. 

Mr. Dash. At that meeting was there any discussion by the Presi- 
dent, by you or by Mr. Dean, concerning the Watergate, either 
coverup or who may be involved in an indictment or anything like 
that on the 22d? 

Mr. Mitchell. None whatsoever. The total discussion had to do 
with the "Wliite House's response to this committee, and I think it 
was prompted, or at least that was my understanding at the time, it 
was prompted by the fact that the President was getting a pretty 
good knocking around in the press on the question of executive 
privilege. I believe it arose with respect to the Gray hearings but it 
certainly was to be applicable to this committee's hearings. 



1636 

Mr. Dash. Well, just a couple of more questions, Mr. Mitchell : I 
think you have testified already, and quite frequently, that you did not 
personally inform the President of any of these so-called White House 
horrors or the efforts to keep the lid on and the Plumbers activities, 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Dash. Are you personally aware of anybody else having any 
conversation with the President concerning these activities ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not in my presence. I am not aware of anybody 
ever having reported to me that they have had. 

Mr. Dash. Likewise it is your testimony that the President did not 
discuss these events or the coverup with you or, to your knowledge, 
with anyone else? 

Mr. Mitchell. If I understand your question 

Mr. Dash. To your knowledge. 

Mr. Mitchell [continuing]. He has not discussed them with me; to 
my knowledge, the answer is that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. To your knowledge. 

Therefore then, Mr. Mitchell, I am briefing your testimony at this 
time before the committee. Is it not fair to say or is it not true that, 
according to your testimony, you are not in a position to state to this 
committee of your own knowledge whether the President in fact knew 
or did not know of the break-in or the bugging of the AVatergate or 
the coverup efforts that took place after June 17, 1972 ? 

Mr. jNIitchell. The only thing that I can state to my own knowledge, 
Mr. Dash, is that so far as I know he does not know of either of those 
circumstances. 

INIr. Dash. But that statement is not made on any information the 
President told you or you told the President or anybody told you 
about what the President knows ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you repeat that again ? 

Mr. Dash. I say that statement you have just made is not based on 
anything the President told you specifically, anything you told the 
President, anything anybody told you that he had told the President? 

Mr. Mitchell. I understand the thrust of vour question. That is cor- 
rect. It is based solely on my association with the President and not 
conversations on the affirmative side of the subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. I have no further questions. 

Senator Ervix. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 
at 2 p.m., the same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Tuesday, July 10, 1973 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. Mr. Thompson 
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mitchell, vou have testified concerning the so- 
called 1970 plan or the Huston plan or the Huston project, and then 
in answering questions from Mr. Dash vou went into Vnlkin.o- f»bout 
what is knoAvn as the Plumbers project in the "\Aniite House. Would 
you say that the Plumbers in the White House, as yon now know 
them to be, was a logical extension of this 1970 plan which was evi- 
dently rescinded ? 



1637 

Mr. Mitchell. I would not say so, ]Mr. Thompson, because of the 
time frame intervening and also the consideration of the Interagency 
Evaluation Commission — Committee — in the meantime. I think that 
was somewhat of a self-starter later on caused by events and if I would 
have to guess, without knowing, it was ))robably generated about the 
time of the Pentagon Papers. Now, these are opinions I am giving 
to you. I have no knowledge on it. 

Mr. TiiOMPsox. You mentioned a field for need of coordination be- 
tween the intelligence-gathering agencies, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. Thompsox. Was this just in the White House or was this also 
in the intelligence community ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was in parts of the intelligence community 
and it certainly was in the Justice Department. We, as I think I men- 
tioned this morning, found that we were receiving intelligence from 
quarters where we might not have expected it in connection wnth an- 
ticipation of violent acts in connection with demonstration and at 
other times just pure violent acts. I mentioned the Alcoholic Tax and 
Firearms Bureau which had, I thought, quite a very competent intel- 
ligence capacity certainly, in connection Avith some of the problems 
that we had in the Justice Department. I know that Mr. Hoover and 
Mr. Helms had broken off their liaison that they had established in 
connection with the CIA and the FBI. There was great interest in 
finding a veliicle to reestal)lish that in a meaningful way, and so that 
basically the implementation of the Interagency Evaluation Commis- 
sion was to take personnel from the different intelligence-gathering 
areas, put them into one room where they could sort out and exchange 
ideas and, of course, evaluate what intelligence they had. One of the 
problems that I found in Govermnent was that there was very fre- 
quently a great deal of collection of intelligence but the evaluation and 
dissemination lacked a great deal. 

Mr. Thompsox. Then, was this need for better coordination because 
of problems that the agencies themselves were having internally or 
was it because of external considerations, or both ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think I can best answer that to point out 
that there were many events that happened in this country, including 
the bombing of the Capitol and other such events that, if we had had 
appropriate intelligence in advance, we might have been able to pro- 
hibit it. I know that in connection with many of the large demonstra- 
tions that we had in Washington, while 99 percent of those people 
who came, came for peaceful protest and to petition their Government, 
that there was always that lunatic fringe that was bound to and deter- 
mined to thrash the place and cause damage, and if we had had better 
intelligence in some of these areas, and I am not excluding them to 
those but in other areas, but jierhaps a great deal of that could have 
been prevented. That was the basis upon which the Interagency Eval- 
uation Committee was considered in concept and put into place. 

Mr. Tho:mpsox. I^t me leave that for a moment and invite your 
attention to the November 24, 1971, meeting which I believe you had 
with Mr. Liddy and Mr. Dean when Mr. Dean brought Mr. Liddy to 
your office. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 



1638 

Mr. Thompsox. And I believe introduced him to you. I believe your 
response to questioning this morning was to the effect that at that 
time you were not aware that Mr. Liddy was to be involved in intelli- 
gence activities as such but that later on you understood that he 
would be. 

Mr. Mitchell. No; I don't think that is quite true, Mr. Thompson. 
What I referred to was the Liddy prosjiectus about his job description 
at that time, which was one of the Dean exhibits, had a one-line refer- 
ence to it in connection with gathering of information of intelligence 
or whatever it might be. 

Mr. Thompson. Just the one line. Do you recall any discussion 
about that? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't. As a matter of fact, it is one sentence, not 
one line. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you have that before you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. This is exhibit 11* of the Dean exhibits. I don't know 
what committee exhibit it might be. 

Mr. Thompson. And you don't remember any discussion about that 
at. the time? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. No, sir; the meeting didn't last long enough. 

Mr. Thompson. Did there come a time between that time and the 
meeting on Januaiy 27 when you became aware, or had a greater un- 
derstanding as to what his role would be in the intelligence field ? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. Well, I might say tliat sometime during early De- 
cember, before Liddy was hired by the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President, IVIr. Krogh brought Liddy over, and I may have been— 
along with other ))eople to discuss the Drug Abuse Law Enforcements 
in which he had been working and which was my knowledge of Mr. 
Liddy 's activities in the "\"\niite House. I do not recall any meetings, 
and I am sure they didn't take place, in. wliicli Liddv's intelligence ac- 
tivities were discussed. It could very well ])e that Mr. Magruder, Mr. 
Dean who I undei-stand did have meetings during that period Avith Mr. 
Liddy may have made reference to the fact that he was gathering 
intelligence. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Krogh brought him to your office, you say. in 
December, you think, of that year ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. sir; I can give you the exact date if you wish. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you recall right offhand whether it was before or 
after he went to the Committee To Re-Elect? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I believe it would have to }>e before he went to 
the Committee To Re-Elect because he was working on this DALE 
program, the drug program. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is December 9, 1971. And there had been, of course, 
a series of meetings all over the Government, including the White 
House, the Justice Department, HEW, and other places preliminaiy 
to setting up the Drug Abuse Law Enforcement program. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe you testified that you did not know at the 
time of your meeting on November 24 wliat Mr. Liddv had done at the 
White House, any involvement he had with the Plumbers group in 
the Wliite House or anvthinc: of this sort ; is that correct ? 



•See exhibit No. 34-13, p. 1150. Book 3. 



1639 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. It Avas 6 months later before I 
learned of the so-called Plumbers activities. 

Mr. TiioMPSox. "Were you even aware that he worked at the AVTiite 
House at that time ? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. Yes, because he was brought over with Mr. Krog;!! 

Mr. Thompsox. I am talkinjcr about November 24 ? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. Yes. I was aware he was at the White House be- 
cause it was so represented at that meetino;. 

]Mr, Thompsox. Whose office did you understand that he was work- 
ina" in ? 

Mr. Mitchell. He was workino; under Mr. Kros^h's aegis in connec- 
tion with the druo; proo'ram over there. 

]\Ir. Thompsox. All riofht. Did you know of any other activities 
that ^Ir. Kroo;h had at that time? 

Mr. ^NIiTCiiEL. Yes; he was very much involved in the Wliite House 
relationship with the District of Columbia here. In fact, he was their 
prime contact. But as far as his activities in the area which has since 
been developed and become common knowledo:e, I had no such ideas. 

Mr. Thompson. I see. 

A^Hien you met with Liddy and Krogh in December did you inquire 
of Mr. Krogh then or did yon have any discussion as to the nature of 
Liddy's work at the White House involving any of the Plumbers? 

Mr. Mitchell. None whatsoever. We discussed entirely the DALE 
program, to the best of my recollection. 

Mr. Thompsox. That seems like ^Nlr. Krogh knew what he was doing 
and it seems like you were being ]-)laced in a potentially embarrassing 
position by even allowing Mv. Liddy to be presented to you, consider- 
ing the nature of his prior activities. 

Did not anyone who knew Mr. Liddy's prior activities mention the 
fact to you that you were about to take a man in an important position 
of the campaign who had engaged in some of these 

Mr. Mitchell. None whatsoever. As a matter of fact, Mr. Liddy 
was quite actively involved in the establishment of this DALE pro- 
gram which, as you probably know, relates to law enforcement through 
tlie use of the courts, grand juries, and so forth and, as I understood that 
at the time, that was one of the reasons that Liddy was brought into 
the Krogh operation and the Ambrose operation and helped setting 
that up was because he had been a former assistant prosecutor who 
did have knowledge with respect to the functioning of grand juries. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe you made the decision there on Novem- 
ber 24 that if it was all right with Magruder that it was all right with 
you for 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that is the general tenor in which it was 
represented. 

Mr. Thompsox. Whose representations were you relying on, you 
didn't know the man before, you just met him : Mr. Dean's ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was relying on the representations that Avere made 
to me with respect to the background of the individual involved. 

Mr. Thompsox. Who made those representations ? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. I am sure they were made by Mr. Dean and by Mr. 
Liddy with respect to what his background was then. 



1640 

Mr. Thompson. Neither of them mentioned anything having to do 
with his previous Plumbers activities. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I can assure you of that. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell, you mentioned in your testimony this morning, or im- 
plied, I believe would be a fair way to state it, that perhaps someone 
prevailed upon Mr. ]Magruder to supersede your orders. I believe you 
have made public statements that you would like to know who sent Mr. 
Magruder back again and again with this thing that you didn't want 
to come about. I know you don't like to engage in speculation with re- 
gard to other people but these are things that you volunteered. I was 
wondering if you could enlighten us a little bit more based upon your 
prior experience in your relationship with the people in the White 
House, and things that have occurred since the break-in as to this being 
a case — of course, Mr. Magruder was a young man, an individual who 
was a team player e^ddently — can you shed any light on who it might 
have been who was doing this ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Thompson, this would be purely an opin- 
ion and would involve people's reputations. I think if you go back 
to the testimony of Mr. Dean relating conversations that he had both 
with Mr. Magruder and otherwise I think that that probably is a 
better answer to the question than my hypothecation or guesstimate 
at this particular time. 

Mr. Thompson. What part of Mr. Dean's testimony are you re- 
ferring to ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are quite a number of areas and I cannot 
give vou the page numbers, but they have in tw^o areas. No. 1, what Mr. 
Magruder told Mr. Dean personally and what Mr. O'Brien told Mr. 
Dean that Magruder had told him. And then, of course, thei'e are the 
statements that Magruder himself made about the telephone calls 
from Mr. Colson, Mr. Howard, et cetera. I think that those areas of 
testimony would probably be a great, a better source of information 
than my conjecture. 

Mr. Thompson. I think I see what you mean and I do not want to 
try to draw names out that you do not want to present, but you have 
just presented one name. Would it be your opinion, if you care to give 
us your opinion, as to whether or not it might have come from more 
than one source ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is always conceivable. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you have any reason to believe that it was either 
one source or more than one source ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I have no ability to weigh the potentials for the 
sources of concern in this area. 

Mr. Thompson. Knowing Mr. Magruder, what kind of pressure 
would he have responded to to take an action which, of course, would 
have been a serious matter; to supersede the orders of his superior? 
Would anyone in the White House, for example, do you think, with 
any kind of authority, have so impressed him that he would have 
superseded your orders and acceded to their wishes ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure it could not have been anybody in the 
White House. It must have been somebody in the White House with 
which he had a working relationship which he thought perhaps was in 



1641 

the interest of the campaign or somebody who had what you might 
refer to as superior authority. 

Mr. TnoMPSOx. A working relationship during the campaign or 
prior to the campaign ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No; I would put this very much on the basis of a 
working relationship during the campaign that goes to some of the 
testimony here of the people who have evidenced an interest in this 
intelligence-gathering field. 

INIr. Thompson. Of course, there were many people in the White 
House involved in the campaign, were there not ? 

Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. What is your question, were there many people? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr, IVIiTCHELL. I believe that the record shows there were quite a few. 

Mr. Thompson. Maybe too many people, would you think ? 

Mr. Mitchell. At times, that was my opinion. 

Mr. Thompson. You were discussing some of Mr. Reisner's testi- 
mony this morning with Mr. Dash, with regard to the Gemstone docu- 
ments. I have here, verbatim, Mr. Reisner's testimony. I would like to 
ask you a couple of questions after I read that. I believe Mr. Reisner 
was talking about Mr. INIagruder handing him certain documents. 

"I was handed the documents and I was asked to put them in Mr. 
Mitchell's files. The nature of that is that things that Mr. Magruder 
might have wished to take up with Mr. Mitchell were put in the file 
marked 'Mr. Mitchell's file' and that does not indicate any more than 
that." 

Were vou aware that Mr. Magruder was keeping a file marked "Mr. 
Mitchell's file.''? 

]\rr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Thompson, I think I can best explain that 
as that during my busy schedule, when Mr. Magruder could get in to 
see me, as special assistant, where he was the clearing house for memo- 
randums from other people, that he would have more than one item 
normally, to discuss. They would be in the folder. Frequently, we 
would sit and discuss them and he would take them back. Others, if 
they were long position papers on matters, he would leave them with 
me to read. If that is a Mitchell file, that is the jacket in which he 
brought the materials into the office. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he ever leave such a file with you for any period 
of time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not as a file. He would leave from time to time posi- 
tion papers, certainly. 

Mr. Thompson. So as far as you are concerned, your remembrance 
is that the Mitchell file was not in fact your file, but his file which 
he was using to bring documents to you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The only thing that I can identify it as is a folder 
in which he brought up these memorandums to the office. 

Mr. Thompson. "Wliat color was it, if you recall? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. You never saw any Gemstone documents that you 
remember? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. In retrospect, would there be any materials that 
were a product of electronic surveillance without your knowing that 
they were? 



1642 

Mr. Mitchell. No; I would believe that electronic surveillance, 
after my experience in the Justice Department — I do not know in what 
forms they are; I have not seen them to this date. But after my ex- 
perience in the Justice Department, I think I would have a pretty 
good idea of what the source of it might have been, unless it was 
totally disguised. 

Mr. Thompson. So Mr. Magruder was in effect pushing Liddy and 
he did come into ])ossession of these documents and he was either doing 
it, I suppose, for his own benefit or somebody else's benefit. I mean that 
seems to be patent on its face, doesn't it? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was probably that whoever was doing it, 
it was in the misguided concept that it was in the interests of the cam- 
paign. But as I have observed before, I couldn't conceive of what 
would be in the Democratic National Committee on the 30th of May 
or the I7th of June that would be in the interest of the process of the 
campaign of the reelection of the President at that particular time. 
It just doesn't make any sense to me. 

Mr. Thompson. At the time that the break-in occurred, what was 
your professional political judgment as to how the President stood 
with regard to his chances for reelectir>n? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, we go back to the middle of June and, of course, 
he had improved substantially from his previous lows vis-a-vis the 
then front runner, Senator Muskie. That looked like he was on the 
ascendency. 

Mr. Thompson. Had not some polls indicated that, at one time or 
another, Mr. Muskie was ahead of Mr. Nixon ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; but I believe, if my recollection is correct, that 
this was somewhat earlier than in June. 

Mr. Thompson. You didn't consider him in trouble at that time? 

Mr. Mitchell. When you are running a campaign, you consider 
anybody who is likely to get the nomination against your candidate, 
you may have a substantial amount of trouble with them, particularly 
when you look at the basis of the registration of Democrats vis-a-vis 
Republicans and I am sure all of you gentlemen are aware of that 
factor. 

Mr. Thompson. The extent of the problems you might visualize 
might have something to do with the measures you might take to 
confront it, would it not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure I understand the thrust of that 
question. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, I would think that if you thought you had the 
nomination or the election locked up, that you would sit back and take 
no chances whatsoever, any person running a campaign, if you could 
avoid them. On the other hand, if you considered yourself in trouble, 
you might take risks that you would not otherwise take. I am not even 
saying necessarily illegal risks. 

Mr. Mitchell. They are both hypothetical questions as of June 17 
with respect to the first one. I don't believe that anybody thought the 
election was locked up, certainly with respect to tlie time element of 
June 17, with the potentials of the people that might become the Demo- 
cratic candidate at the convention that was taking place in July. There 
were a great deal of uncertainties as to who the candidate might be 



1643 

and as to what the circumstances might be vis-a-vis the incumbent who 
was seeking reelection. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mitchell, let me ask you about another point. 
Here is an excerpt from the civil deposition which you gave in the 
Democratic Party suit against the Committee To Re-Elect the Presi- 
dent and I think I am quoting you verbatim in your testimony, when 
you were asked this question : "Was there ever any discussion at which 
you were present or about which you heard when you were campaign 
director concerning having any form of surveillance of the Democratic 
National Committee headquarters?" 

Your answer was : "No, sir, I can't imagine a less productive activity 
than that." 

Is that a correct 

Mr. Mitchell. I think the total context, as I remember it, Mr. 
Thompson, had to do with the discussion of Mr. McCord and the 
security group. The answer was given in that context. 

Mr. Thompson. But this particular question, "Was there ever any 
discussion at which you were present" — and of course, I assume just 
from reading this question that that would involve any discussion with 
anyone. Are you saying that it is not your understanding of it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. My recollection of the testimony that I gave had to 
do with the so-called security group in the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President which discussed Mr. McCord and the security group. And 
the answer was in response to that, to my recollection. 

Mr. Thompson. Of course, as it reads, as I have read it, of course, 
it is not an accurate response ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I say as you read it, but I think if you will look 
at the total context of the questioning, it referred to the security group 
that involved Mr. McCord which was the subject of the conversation. 

]Mr. Thompson. Were you not asked any other broader questions 
about any knowledge you might have had of any surveillance 
activities ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was asked broader questions with respect to did 
I ever receive documents that I could identify as coming from elec- 
tronic surveillance and broad questions like that. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you recall any broader questions concerning 
conversations that you had ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I do not. 

Mr. Thompson. Is it just a case of not having asked you the right 
question ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that that is the case. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me refer to June 19 or 20, I am not quite 
sure when it was, Mr. Mitchell. As I understand it, Mardian and La- 
Rue debriefed Liddy and found out what he knew about the break- 
in, his involvement, and the involvement of others. And at that time, 
he related to them some of the White House horror stories, I believe 
you characterized them as, the plumbers activities and so forth. I will 
go back to that in a minute, but as I understand your testimony this 
morning, the knowledge you got from that debriefing was really the 
reason why you, in effect, stood by while Mr. Magruder was pre- 
paring a story which, according to what you knew from Liddy, was 
going to be a false story, to present to the grand jury. 



1644 

Mr. Mitchell. Along, Mr. Thompson, with some of the other stor- 
ies that Mr. Dean brought forward to him, the Diem papers and the 
suspected extracurricular wiretapping, and a few of the others. 

Mr. Thompson. OK. That caused you to take that position with 
regard to Magruder. And also, I assume that those factors were the 
reasons why you, in effect, acquiesced, anyway, in the payments to 
the families of support money and lawyers' fees and that sort of 
thing, which I am sure you realize could have been pretty embarrass- 
ing, to say the least, if not illegal, at that time. Would that be cor- 
rect as far as your motivations are concerned ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is a correct summary of my motivation and ra- 
tionale for the actions that I did take. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you recall the date on which Mr. Mardian and 
Mr. LaRue related this conversation of Liddy's to you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, he certainly didn't debrief them on the 19th, 
I am sure of that, because they were in transit. Whether it was the 20th 
or 21st, I am not certain. 

Mr. Thompson. Did they talk to you the same day they talked to 
him? 

Mr. Mitchell. My recollection is they talked to me the next day, but 
I am not certain about that, either. But in any event, it was in the 
time frame of the 21st or 22d, to the best of my recollection. 

Mr. Thompson. Can you recall in a little more detail what they said 
that Liddy had related to them ? You have already mentioned the fact 
that Liddy said that Magruder had pushed him in the break-in at the 
Ellsberg psychiatrist's office, I believe, and the Dita Beard situation. 

What did Liddy supposedly say with regard to the Dita Beard sit- 
uation? What did he supposedly know about White House involve- 
ment? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, and, of course, I have 
heard these horror stories in different versions from different people 
over the period of the years, the fact that he was either the one or 
assisted in spiriting her out of town, I believe was the discussion at 
that particular time. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate, according to them, that the budget 
for the electronic surveillance operation which led to the break-in of 
the DNC had been approved by the Wliite House ? 

Mr. Mitchell. You are testing my memory pretty hard. I am in- 
clined to think that he did say that, but this is a — not that he said it, 
but that Mardian or LaRue reported to me that he had said it. But you 
are testing my memory pretty hard on a substance of which I have 
heard dozens and dozens of repetitions of it. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever verify any of these facts with the 
President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I never discussed them with the President. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever verify any of them wtih Mr. Halde- 
man? 

Mr. Mitchell. I never discussed those specific factors with Mr. 
Haldeman until a later date. It was at that time that Mr. Dean was 
acting as a liaison between the White House and the committee with 
respect to these matters. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever talk directly with Ehrlichman about 
these matters ? 



1645 

Mr. Mitchell. Not in that time frame. I am sure they were discussed 
substantially later dates. 

Mr. Thompson. In 1973 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, yes, possibly before the end of 1972, certainly 
in 1973. 

Mr. Thompson. At this time did you know of Hunt's involvement ? 
Did Liddy tell them about Hunt's involvement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I believe he did. In fact, I am sure he did. 

Mr. Thompson. So, in effect, what you are saying is that you were 
basing your later activities concerning Magruder's testimony and 
concerning the payments and these sorts of things as embarrassment 
upon the hearsay information of this man that presented these out- 
landish and wild-eyed proposals in your office. It would seem like you 
would want some verification from him. 

Mr. Mitchell. Let us back up, Mr. Thompson, a little bit. You are 
jumping from the 21st or 22d of June all the way to knowledge that I 
obtained in the fall and I keep reminding you that Mr. Dean was also 
aware of these factors and was discussing them with me and with other 
people. AYe are talking about the Wliite House problems now, is that 
what you are having reference to ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. So it was not just what Mr. Liddy had told Mr. 
Mardian and Mr. LaRue on the 20th, 21st, and 22d of June. There 
were further affirmations of the facts that came out of the White 
House from Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Thompson. Such as what, concerning these matters that we have 
been discussing '? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, as I said a minute ago one of the things that I 
did not believe that Mr. Liddy had any reference to in the Mardian- 
LaEue Diem briefing was the papers and how they had been handled. 

Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Dean verify this to you? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dean so stated, he did not show me the spliced 
cables but he told me about the circumstances. 

Mr. Thompson. But as early as June the money started flowing, 
the payments started flowing and, of course 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, you are assuming, Mr. Thompson, I was 
aware of it. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, I will ask you when you first became aware 
of 

Mr. Mitchell. As I said this morning, it was much later than that 
and I believe it was at the time that Mr. Kalmbach ceased in connec- 
tion with his activities. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you recall the date that you became aware of 
any money being paid to any of the defendants or families or attor- 
neys? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I do not recall the date but it was well after the 
matter was in progress and in operation. 

Let me perhaps help you a little bit on that, Mr. Thompson, or help 
myself maybe, is a better way to put it. [Laughter.] There is testimony 
by Mr. Dean that there was a meeting. 

Mr. Thompson. June 23 or 24, 1 believe. 

Mr. Mitchell. On June 28. 

Mr. Thompson. And 28th. 



1646 

Mr. Mitchell. June 28. You see, Mr. Dean had testified that they had 
been playing games with the CIA up to the 28th. Then, Mr. Dean 
testified that there was a meeting in my office with INIardian, LaRue, 
and Mitchell and I do not know who all else including Mr. Dean in 
the afternoon of the 28th in which it was decided, naturally Mitchell 
was always deciding these things, according to Dean, that the "White 
House, somebody in the White House, John Ehrlichman should call 
Kalmbach and ask him to fly back from California that night of the 
28th, which led to their meetings on the 29th. The only problem with all 
of that was that I was in New York and could not have been at such 
a meeting, and I was not aware of it. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe your logs reflect that, Mr. Mitchell. I 
think that 

Mr. Mitchell. I would hope so because I have been so stating for 
quite some time. 

Mr. Thompson. It reflects that, according to your logs, vou were in 
New York on the 28th. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. And that you arrived in the District of Columbia 
at 5 :30. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. There is no indication of any meeting after 5 :30. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. And I assume there was none. 

Mr. Mitchell. The passenger that I had with me coming back from 
New York was not about to allow me to go to any more meetings on 
that particular day. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Thompson. I am not going to pursue that any further. 

Getting back to your knowledge of the money, perhaps my question 
should have been, "When was the first time that you heard of the need 
for the payment of money," and I ask it because of this : Dean testi- 
fied that the first time he heard any discussions of the need for money 
to take care of those who were involved in the break-in was in a meet- 
ing which occurred on either June 23. Saturday, or June 24 attended 
by Dean, Mardian, LaRue, and yourself. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is quite possible because as T recall the con- 
versation of Mr. Liddy that he had with Mr. Mardian and LaRue, he 
was hopeful that these people that he at that time, of course, was not 
in jail, not suspect, and was still working for the committee, I do not 
know whether he was suspect or not, in any event, he was still work- 
ing for the committee until the 28th of June, he was — he talked to 
Mardian and Liddy about the hope that somebody could provide bail 
for these five people who had been arrested, and the thought was that 
the committee should do it and, of course, that was immediately turned 
off, the committee would not do it and, of course, obviously could not 
do it under the existing statutes. Now, what developed out of that 
with respect to Mr. Dean's concept of it or what he heard about it, 
whether he heard that story or what I do not know but that is the firet 
point in time at which the subject matter was ever discussed. 

Mr. Thompson. The points that concerned you were the fact that 
earlv on the discussions about the money were taking place, or the 
need for money, and also Mr. Magiiider's testimony. I believe he testi- 



1647 

fied, I think jfirst in June and then again maybe August and then again 
in September before the grand jury, and the point was that during this 
period of time you were having to make your decision as to how you 
were going to play this thing. I miderstand that your testimony is 
that you were making your decision on the basis of what you had 
understood Liddy to say plus some points of corroboration from Mr. 
Dean. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was the basis for the White House activities, 
that is absohitely correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Without getting into a great deal more detail, Mr. 
Mitchell, besides the Diem cables can you answer any further point 
of verification that Mr. Dean gave you concerning these mattere we 
mentioned, the Ellsberg psychiatrist, the Dita Beard situation, any 
of those matters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, there was the purported fire bomb- 
ing of the Brookings Institution which had been discussed and so 
forth, I have already 

Mr. Thompson. Did Dean tell you that was seriously proposed at 
one time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I believe that I took it as a very serious proposal 
because of the fact that he flew across the country in order to get it 
turned off. 

Mr. Thompson. For that particular reason as you understood it? 

Mr. Mitchell. Pardon? 

Mr. Thompson. He made this trip for that particular reason ? 

]Mr. Mitchell. That is the way he so testified and I believe advised 
it at that particular time because, as you recall, it was tied into the 
Mardian trip to the west coast also. And also, it seems to me, that I 
have a pretty clear recollection there was general discussion of, as I 
say, the extracurricular wiretapping activities. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you consider these matters national security 
matters at the time you were considering them? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, since I didn't really know about them I could 
not make an assessment about them. 

Mr. Thompson. In your mind as you were seeking to justify your 
position, if you were, when these things were realized by you, did you 
consider them to be matters of national security no one had any right 
to know, that they should be covered up in effect, or were these just 
political decisions ? 

Mr. ISIiTCHELL. They were obviously elements of that in connection 
with some of these activities. But I think wo would have to parcel it 
out in details before you could make that determination. 

Mr. Thompson. Would it be accurate to say your motivations were 
generally more out of political considerations at that time, in the midst 
of a campaign, than matters of national security ? 

]Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would think if you would put the aggregate 
of the subject matters we are talking about it would have to be from 
that point of view rather than from national security. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. INIr. Mitchell, you have testified on several 
points where you disagree with Mr. Magruder or refute his testimony. 
I would like to ask you a few points which I don't believe have been 
covered yet concerning Mr. Dean's testimony. Dean testified that 
"Within the first few days," and I am quoting. 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 20 



1648 

Within the first few days of my involvement in coverup a pattern had developed 
where he was carrying messages from Mitchell, Stans, Mardian to Ehrlichman 
and Haldeman and vice versa about how each quarter was handling the coverup 
and relevant information as to what was occurring. 

Is that an accurate statement, as far as you know, was Dean doing 
that? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think that Mr. Dean has lumped together a 
number of things. I think Mr. Dean has testified that the coverup had 
started on June 19 by the destruction of certain documents, by the 
concept of getting Mr. Colson out of the country, and a few other such 
things — ^Hunt, I am sorry, I am sorry there seems to be some correla- 
tion there that I keep putting together [laughter] but it was Mr. Hunt 
that they were talking about. 

Mr. Thompson. What correlation do you put together there ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The fact that Mr. Hunt worked for Mr. Colson. 

With the second part about it with which there was particularly at 
the time frame in which he is talking about, there is considerable 
interest at that time as to, about the money that had been through 
Barker's bank and the Ogarrio checks that were coming out that had 
come from Mexico, et cetera, et cetera. This is the subject matter and 
that particular week in which Mr. Stans and perhaps Mitchell and 
others were asking the White House about. 

You will also, of course, recognize that the newspapers and Liddy 
himself, I believe, in the debriefing that Mardian got, referred to the 
fact that they liad had CIA documents or materials, et cetera, et cetera. 
So there was a very considerable interest in, was there any CIA involve- 
ment. No. 1, in comiection with the break-in, No. 2 in connection with 
the personnel involved and. No. 3, in connection with this gentleman 
from Mexico City, Mr. Ogarrio I believe his name was, in connection 
with his activities. 

Mr. Thompson. You would not categorize those things as part of a 
coverup, would you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is what I say, Mr. Dean, I think, has put a 
blanket over activities that are happening at that particular time and 
talked about them as a coverup ; this is where I started, I thought, my 
very lengthy answer. I am sorry to be so long. 

Mr. Thompson. That is all right. 

You have already stated that Dean's testimony about a meeting of 
June 28, and I believe I am quoting him correctly, where he said : 

Mitchell asked me to get the approval of Ehrlichman and Haldeman to get 
Herb Kalmbach to raise the necessary money. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

Mr. Thompson. You stated that was false. 

Mr. Mitchell. There was no such meeting, I made no such request, 
ever. 

Mr. Thompson. With regard to asking 

Mr. Mitchell. Ask Dean to ask Haldeman to get Kalmbach, to my 
recollection I have never made such a request. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever ask anyone to get Kalmbach to raise 
money for these purposes ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not to my recollection. As I recall this scenario that 
Mr. Kalmbach did at the request of somebody, according to Dean, it 



1649 

was somebody in the White House, Kalmbach to Washington on the 
28th and met on the 29th with these people. He proceeded into this 
operation. There came a time in the fall, I believe it was September 
or October, where because of adverse publicity or whatever it was he 
wanted out and that was tlie end of it, and I certainly don't believe 
that I would have the audacity to ask him back into such an operation. 

Mr. Thompson. Dean testified that after the President's statement 
on Aug;ust 29 referring to the Dean report he began thinking that he 
might be being set up in case the whole thing crumbled at a later 
time. He testified he discussed this with you and others and that you 
assured him that he need not worry because you didn't believe anyone 
in the White House would do that to him. 

Do you recall such a conversation with Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I recall such a conversation, Mr. Thompson, but it 
seems to me it was much later than August 29. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you recall when ? 

Mr, Mitchell. No, I don't recall the date but it was much, much 
further. In fact, I think it was into 1973. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you recall the month? Was it into April, per- 
haps, as late as April ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, it would be before that. It would be in February 
or March I would believe. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he state to you the basis of his fears ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I don't believe he did. As a matter of fact, to 
the best of my recollection I only had, of course, one conversation 
with Mr. Dean in April, and a very limited number of them in March 
so it had to be sometime in early March or February. 

Mr. Thompson. Dean testified : That during the first week of Decem- 
ber you called Dean and said that you would have to use some of the 
$350,000 at the Wliite House to take care of the demands that were 
being made by Hunt and the others for money, and that you asked 
him to get Haldeman's approval for that. Is tliat a cori-ect statement? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, that is absolutely untrue as far as I am con- 
cerned. I had no official capacity, I have no control over the money 
and there would be no reason why I should call Dean or anybody else 
with respect to it and I did not so call Dean. 

Mr. Thompson. Dean testified that shortly before the trial when 
the demands for money were reaching the crescendo point again you 
called Dean and once again asked him to ask Haldeman to make the 
necessai-y funds available and that after Dean talked to Haldeman the 
decision was made to send the entire $350,000. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would respond to that the same way I did 
to your last question. 

Mr. Thompson. Dean testified that on January 10 he received a 
call from O'Brien and you indicating that since Hunt had been given 
assurances of clemency and that those assurances were being passed 
to Hunt and others that Caulfiekl should give the same assurances to 
McCord who was becoming an increasing problem and again Dean 
was told that McCord's lawyer was having problems with him. Is that 
true? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that Mr. Dean, if lie will go back and check 
his logs will find that I was out of town in Florida when he started 



1650 

the McCord dialog, and that there would be no reason in the world for 
me to direct Mr. Dean to do anything vis-a-vis Caulfield or McCord 
or anybody else. 

Mr. Thompson. The logs indicate, I believe, you were in Key Bis- 
cayne from January 1 through January 7. 

Mr, Mitchell. I think it was December 20 through January 8, I 
believe. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, sir. Let me ask you about one more piece 
of testimony, the meeting on March 22 which you had with Halde- 
man, Ehrlichman, and Dean; I understand you met with them and 
that afternoon you met with the President. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe that Dean testified that Ehrlichman 
turned to you and asked if Hunt had been taken care of, or his money 
situation had been taken care of, and you assured him that he had been 
taken care of, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is absolutely false as far as I am concerned be- 
cause I have never, to my knowledge, discussed any of these payments 
with John Ehrlichman and any of the specifics of that nature with 
respect to any individual, and I wouldn't have known on the 22d of 
March whether Mr. Hunt had been taken care of or hadn't been taken 
care of. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you think Mr. Dean could be mistaken about 
these various points ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I think Mr. Dean may have, in putting together 
— how long was his statement? You know, it is awfully hard to rec- 
ollect on what day what was discussed. 

Mr. Thompson. He did not seem to have any trouble at the time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you said it, not I. 

Mr. Thompson. Are you saying that perhaps Mr. Dean's memory 
might not have been quite that good ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it certainly cannot be with respect to the spe- 
cifics of the March 22 meeting. I am sure of that. 

Mr. Thompson. Or with these other points about — well, is that a 
matter of memory as to whether or not you called him and asked 
that the $350,000 be sent over, or as to whether or not you requested 
that Kalmbach be used to make deliveries of moneys to families? Is 
that a matter of memory ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think it is a matter of confusion of people. I think 
as you look at this total picture, you ^et two aegises, one over in 1701 
and one over in— what is the White House? 1800 Pennsylvania 
Avenue ? 

Mr. Thompson. I am sure you know better than I, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. And Mr. Thompson, this fellow, you know he was 
just carrying messages back and forth, according to his statement. He 
had to have somebody over there as principals with Avhich to get to 
do all of this. Unfortunately, at times, he has picked out some of these 
principals that just were not on the scene at the particular time, as I 
have indicated about the meeting of the 28th. 

Mr. T'hompson. Do you know of any other indications of this ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I can go back through the testimony and I am 
sure provide you with some, if that is your desire. 



1651 

Mr. Thompson. Do you recall that as you remember his statement or 
have you read his statement ? Have you read his statement ? I assume 
that you have — — 

Mr. Mitchell. I have read his statement, yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you recall whether or not there are other points, 
without specifically naming one, if you cannot ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, there are. I am not sure I could pinpoint them 
today, but I can provide you with material, if it is something 

Mr. Thompson. If you return tomorrow — as I expect you will — if 
tonight you could go through his statement 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean I am going to be invited back tomorrow ? 

Mr. Thompson. Most cordially. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. 

]\Ir. Thompson. And refresh your memory on those points. Some 
of the Senators might want to ask some questions. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will attempt to do so, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you about one more meeting, the meet- 
ing you had with, not with Mr. Dean, but ]\Ir. Ehrlichman on April 13 
at the A^Hiite House. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe the meeting was on April 14, if I am not 
mistaken. It was a Saturday. 

INIr. Thompson. What was discussed at that meeting ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Very little other than the fact that I had known that 
Mr. Magruder had tried to be the first one into the prosecutor's office 
and that he had already been there, and that ]\Ir. Ehrlichman had 
learned that and had talked to Mr. Magruder and Mr. Ehrlichman 
advised me as to what Mr. Magruder was saying. I said, thank you 
very much and he said, would you not like to see the President? And I 
said under the circumstances of what is unfolding here, I think it 
would be inappropriate for me to see the President. So we left it at 
that. 

Mr. Thompson. Was this, in effect, telling you that from Ehrlich- 
man's standpoint, anyway, from what was going on, that you could 
anticipate problems? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. That I could ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not think it is so much that way as he was re- 
counting to me what Magruder had said, which, of course, did involve 
me. 

Now, as to IMr. Ehrlichman's motive, I am not trying to guesstimate 
that. 

]\Ir. Thompson. We have some evidence before the committee of a 
taped conversation between Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Kleindienst. 
T wonder if you have any reason to believe that this or any other 
conversation that you might have had with Mr. Ehrlichman was 
taped ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In reflection, I would think that this conversation 
probably was taped. 

Mr. Thompson. Why ? 



1652 

IVIr. Mitchell. For the reason that most of the time that I met in 
John Ehrlichman's office, why, we sat on a sofa around a coffee table 
and so forth. 

Mr. Thompson. This is the one we heard about in the Pat Gray 
testimony about the documents ? 

Mr, Mitchell. Yes; I believe that is the same coffee table and 
set of chairs. But at this particular time, he invited me over to 
sit in the chair at his desk and fidgeted around a little bit. So it 
occurred to me that a switch in the pattern of operation might very 
well have had something to do with as to where the microphone was. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you one more question, Mr. Mitchell. 
Obviously, the only verification, I suppose, direct verification of the 
fact that you were not the one who pushed Liddy, or to the contrary, 
the only one who could definitely testify that you did push Liddy, 
would be Liddy himself. And, of course, he has not favored us with his 
testimony so far. 

I notice here a call in your logs on April 17 with a Mr. Peter 
Maroulis. 

Mr. Mitchell. Maroulis, yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe he is Mr. Liddy's attorney ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Could you tell us the nature of that conversation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, that was a return of a call to Mr. Maroulis, 
who had made a call to me, and Mr. Maroulis, within a day or two, 
came to see me. He was looking for guidance. Wliat had apparently 
occurred, according to Mr. Maroulis, and I have not checked this out 
with the parties to know whether it is true or not, but the President 
had made his statement by that time, whichever one it was, in which 
he asked everybody to come forward and disclose what they knew 
about this matter. I guess that might have been — well, whatever date 
it was, the President or somebody on his behalf had asked, I believe, 
Henry Petersen to go to Mr. Liddy's local counsel here in the Dis- 
trict — Mr. Kennelly, and Mr. Kennelly carried the message from Peter- 
sen to Kennelly to Mr. Maroulis about the fact that the President 
wanted everybody to come forward. 

Well, Mr. Maroulis had spent a lot of time — ^he is a personal friend 
of Mr. Liddy. It was his opinion that Mr. Liddy had a valid case on 
appeal because of the errore made by the court and other matters that 
were involved, and he wondered if I could give him any guidance 
as to what the President meant by that particular phrase, which appar- 
ently had been quoted verbatim from Petersen to Kennelly to 
Maroulis. 

I told him that I could not add anything to it, that I had not talked to 
the President about it ; I knew what the President's wishes were, but 
he as a lawyer was going to have to make his own decision as to what 
his client's interests were. 

Mr. Thompson. Is that the last conversation you had with him con- 
cerning Liddy's position ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the only conversation I have ever had with 
the gentleman. 

Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. I have no further 
questions. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge. 



1653 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Mitchell, in your testimony, you have re- 
peatedly referred to "White House horrors." What do you mean by 
that phrase ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, as we have discussed them here, Senator, they 
certainly involved the break-in of Dr. Ellsberg's doctor, I think we had 
better put it instead of the other phrase that is used ; the Dita Beard 
matter, both with respect to, apparently, the removal of her from the 
scene as well as visits or attempted A'isits. We are talking about the 
Diem cables; we are talking about the alleged extracurricular activities 
in the bugging area, the bombing, i)urported bombing of the Brookings 
Institute, and a lot of miscellaneous matters with respect to Chappa- 
quiddick and this, that, and the next thing. Those are the areas of 
which I am talking. 

Senator Talmadge. Who was the author of the White House horrors ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I do not know as I can answer for all of those. 
Senator. I think that the affidavits that have been filed in some of the 
courts and the stories that have come out in the press probably give you 
a better picture of that than I can vividly. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you play an active supervisory role in the 
campaign before you resigned as AttoiTiey General ? 

Mr. Mitchell. An active supervisory role ? 

Senator Talmadge. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What I did was succumb to the President's request 
to keep an eye on what was going on over there and I had frequent 
meetings with individuals dealing with matters of policy; also with 
individuals who would bring other individuals over to introduce them 
to me and discuss their talents and their qualities with respect to 
filling certain jobs in that particular area. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator Talmadge. You would consider, then, that you did play an 
active supervisory role before you resigned as Attorney General? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the word "supervisory'' gets me, Senator. I am 
not quite sure of that. 

Senator Talmadge. An active role before you resigned. 

Mr. Mitchell. If you would change "supervisory" to "consulting", 
I think I Avould be much happier. 

Senator Talmadge. Did it get beyond the consulting capacity ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it might have been in areas where I let them 
know my opinion quite forcefully and strongly, but I think that would 
still fit under the role of consultant. 

Senator Talmadge. Didn't you testify to the contrary before the 
Judiciary Committee on March 14, 1972 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I am glad you asked me that. I was waiting 
for somebody to. May I read the dialog ? 

Senator Talmadge. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I was hoping that would come up. 

Senator Talmadge. I am glad to accommodate you, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. Because this subject matter has been 
bandied about and I think quite unfairly. This is a question by Sen- 
ator Kennedy: 

Senator Kennedy. Do you remember what party responsibilities you had prior 
to March 1? 

Mitchell. Party responsibilities? 

Kennedy. Yes. Republican Party. 

Mitchell. I do not have and did not have any responsibilities. I have no party 
responsibilities now, Senator. 



1654 

Now, it seems to me that this committee has spent about 6 weeks 
trying to make a distinction between the different parties and the 
Committee for the Re-Election of the President, and I look upon it 
the same way. 

Senator Talmadge. Let's read a little further, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. This is the only quote I have. Do you have some- 
thing more on that? 

Senator Talmadge. Yes. Let me read it for you. [Laughter.] 

Next question : 

Senator Kennedy. No re-election campaign responsibilities? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not as yet. I hope to. I am going to make the application to 
the chairman of the committee if I ever get through with these hearings. 
[Laughter.] 

Mr. Mitchell. I can't believe that the Washington Post could be 
so mistaken. 

Senator Talmadge. May I send it to you for the refreshment of 
your memory, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to see it. 

Senator Talmadge. I will ask a member of the staff to show Mr. 
Mitchell page 633 of the hearings of Mr. Richard G. Kleindienst, 
resumed, on March 14, 1972. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I still think that relates, that phrase that 
you read that isn't in the Washington Post, relates back to the same 
subject matter. 

Senator Talmadge. You testified a moment ago in response to a 
question that I asked you that you did have campaign responsibilities 
prior to the time you resigned as Attorney General. And yet, on 
March 14. before the Judiciary Committee, I quote again : "Senator 
Kennedy. No re-election campaign responsibilities?" That is a 
question. "Mr. Mitchell. Not as yet." 

Isn't that negative? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is negative. It relates back to the Republican 
Party, Senator, in the way I read the context and this one was so 
intended. 

Senator Talmadge. "No reelection campaign responsibilities?" I ask 
you who was running ? Mr. Nixon ? And is he a Republican ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think the answer to both those questions is "Yes." 

Senator Talmadge. I would concur with that. I still don't get the 
thrust of your testimony when you testified a moment ago that you 
had none, that you did have election responsibilities and yet before the 
Judiciary Committee of the LT.S. Senate on March 14, 1972, you testi- 
fied exactly the opposite. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I go back to the statement that I made 
before, that this refers to the Republican Party and this is the reason 
that I raised the question and responded to it and it was my intention 
to do so in that context. 

Senator Talmadge. Was not President Nixon running on the Repub- 
lican ticket ? He didn't change parties, did he ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, Senator. I stand on the answer that I have given 
you. But the question that I asked of Senator Kennedy was with re- 
spect to the party and he referred to the Republican Party, and that 
is the context in which I took it. 



1655 

Senator Talmadge. Now, there is some stationery from the Commit- 
tee for the Re-Election of the President, memorandum to the Attorney 
General, marked "confidential," December 3, 1971. There is a lot of 
language here. "We recommend that the Committee for the Re- 
Election of the President assume all "WTiite House support activities." 
It is signed by Jeb S. Magruder and there are three blanks there : One 
"approve," one "disapprove," the third, "comment." And by "ap- 
prove" there is an X. Is that your X mark ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I haven't the faintest idea. I don't remember the 
memorandum but maybe if I looked at it, I could tell. Generally I 
write my name rather'^than write an X, but I may be able to identify 
my X. 

Senator Talmadge. We all admit, Mr. Mitchell, that you are entirely 
legible and that you write eminently well. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, that looks like a good enough X to possibly 
be mine. I am not familiar with it and I don't recall the memorandum. 

Senator Talmadge. You do not deny it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not deny that that could be my X. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, I ask that that be marked as an 
exhibit and be inserted in the record at this point. 

Senator Ervin. Without objection, it is so ordered. The reporter 
will mark it as an exhibit for the record. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 74.*] 

Senator Talmadge. I also ask that the colloquy I have read between 
Senator Kennedy and the then Attorney General, John Mitchell, dated 
March 14, 1972, before the Judiciary Committee be made part of the 
record. 

And as further evidence, Mr. Chairman, I desire to send to Mr. 
Mitchell a number of documents here wherein he was exercising his 
responsibility as director of the campaign, one dated June 22, 1971, 
one dated January 14, 1972, all marked "confidential," memorandum 
to the Attorney General, one involving the Republican National Com- 
mittee budget, the other a telephone plan for the Florida primary. 

I send them also to Mr. Mitchell for identification and I ask that 
they be identified, appropriately numbered, and inserted in the rec- 
ord at this point. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I have no recollection of the firet one re- 
lating to the Republican National Committee budget. I have a vague 
recollection of this one in January, having to do with the telephone 
plan for the Florida primary, and I am quite sure that the writing at 
the bottom here in connection with the comment which says, "Hold 
for November pending standing in the polls" — "Hold for now," I 
guess it is, not November — "Pending standing in polls" is not my 
writing. But 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 
those documents be appropriately marked and inserted in the record 
at this point. 

Senator Ervin. I believe the one he stated he had no recollection 
about will have to be identified by some other witnesses. 

♦See p. 1810. 



1656 

Senator Talmadge. Then the ones he identified 

Senator Ervin. The ones he identified will be appropriately marked 
as an exhibit and placed in the record as snch. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 75.*] 

Mr. Hundley. I think I should state with reference to the second 
document that Mr. Mitchell had seen it and that he indicated that the 
handwriting on it, on the bottom was not his and I would note there 
is no X on the "Approved" or "Not Approved." 

Senator Talmadge. I am not indicating that it was Mr. Mitchell's 
mark there. But it does corroborate that he was actively involved in 
the campaign. That was admitted by Mr. Mitchell, I might say. 

Mr. Hundley. That is a matter of dispute. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is a matter of dispute and I would like the 
chairman's indulgence for a moment to point out that there is no il- 
legality about any Presidential appointee engaging in the carrying out 
of political functions. 

Senator Talmadge. I am not arguing that, Mr. Mitchell. You testi- 
fied under oath in response to a question of mine a moment ago that at 
the request of the White House you were actively involved in the cam- 
paign. If I can read the English language correctly, on March 14 of 
last year, you testified to the opposite before the Judicially Committee. 
One or the other of your statements is in error. I am inserting them in 
the record only so the public can draw their own conclusions as to 
which was in error. 

Mr. Mitchell. I dispute your statement with respect to the discus- 
sion before the Judiciary Committee and I would like to go back to my 
statement and stand on that answer. 

Senator Talmadge. That is part of the record and that is the reason, 
Mr. Mitchell, that I inserted both of them in the record so the American 
people can draw their own conclusion as to which is correct. I am not 
arguing with your testimony, but if I can read the English language 
in two different places, they are the opposite of each other. You state 
that they aren't. If I understand English, and I learned it in a small 
country school, in Telfair County 

Mr. Mitchell. So did I, Senator, a very small one. 

Senator Talmadge. We both studied the same English, I assume. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is why I am surprised you don't agree with my 
interpretation. 

Senator Talmadge. Let's get on to another matter. 

Senator Ervin. Could I ask for his interpretation so I can under- 
stand it ? 

It is your position that working for a Republican candidate for 
President gave you no responsibilities in respect to the Republican 
Party? 

Mr, Mitchell. That is it entirely, Mr. Chairman. That is the ques- 
tion that I asked of Senator Kennedy. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Stans testified before the committee, Mr. 
Mitchell, he stated his sole responsibility as chairman of the finance 
committee was to raise the money and he testified that it was your re- 
sponsibility, as I recall, as chairman to determine the expenditures 
thereof. 

*See p. 1811. 



1657 

Now, we had some more than a million dollars in cash that was not 
accounted for during the expenditure. Thus, as I understand it, Mr. 
Mitchell, Mr. Stans has implicated you as being responsible for these 
cash disbursements. 

Would you comment on that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe that ; that Senator, in all deference 
to you, is the testimony of Mr. Stans in any form, shape, or circum- 
stances about that. By the time that I became active, and I am saying 
active as distinguished from consulting, in the campaign, we were 
working on budgets, which Mr. Stans and his people on the finance 
committee were part and parcel of, just as I was on the political side, 
and we were working under the budget. Mr. Stans was part of that. 

Senator Talmadge. Let's see if we can clarify it. It was Mr. Stans' 
responsibility to raise the money, as I understand it. 

Is that an accurate statement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No question about that. 

Senator Talmadge. AVhose responsibility was it to disburse it 2 

Mr. Mitchell. It was the responsibility — to disbui*se it? 

Senator Talmadge. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was actually disbursed by the finance com- 
mittee, but I am sure that is not the thrust of your question. Your 
question is who authorized the programs for which the money was 
spent. I think that is the question ? 

Senator Talmadge. Yes, who could call up over there and say give x 
number of dollars or write a check for such and such an amount ? AYlio 
had the authority to do that? Was it you or Mr. Stans? That is what 
I am trying to get at. 

Mr. Mitchell. It depended on the period of time involved, Mr. Tal- 
madge. Before their budgets were put together, it was done in the way 
you said, that we authorize this program and so-and-so can get so 
much money. 

Senator Talmadge. When did you take over as chairman of the 
committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I didn't become chairman. I became campaign direc- 
tor, Senator Talmadge. 

Senator Talmadge. What date was that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It was announced on the 9th of April. But I had 
been working, as my time would allow, plus a vacation, from the 21st 
of November through the 3d or 4th of April in ti-ying to put together 
the budgets under which these, moneys would be expended. 

Senator Talmadge. Thereafter then was it your responsibility to au- 
thorize disbursements ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In connection with the budget, yes. 

Senator Talmadge. And so 

Mr. Mitchell. That is up until the 1st of July. 

Senator Talmadge. When you resigned and that was solely your re- 
sponsibility during that period ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, as you have heard from the discussion here this 
morning when Mr. Stans consulted me about it, because of the many 
other things that I was doing, including putting together the political 
organizations in the 50 States, I told Mr. Stans that Mr. Magruder 
had continuing authorization which, of course, is part of Mr. Stans' 
testimony, to authorize expenditures of money. 



1658 

Senator Talmadge. Then the expenditures that were paid out by 
Mr, Sloan, as I recall, various lawyers' fees, and bail fees, and living 
expenses, were authorized by you, is that a correct statement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To my knowledge, Mr. Sloan never made such pay- 
ments. 

Senator Talmadge. Who did ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To my knowledge there was never any money paid 
out of the committee for that purpose. 

Senator Talmadge. There was some 

Mr. Mitchell. If I can go back to my testimony a few minutes 
ago 

Senator Talmadge. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell [continuing]. Wlien this matter was first brought up 
it was turned down and turned down cold. The money that was used, 
if it was bail money and I am not sure of that, but attorneys' fees and 
support, were not cojnmittec moneys. 

Senator Talmadge. Where did that money come from ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I believe Mr. Stans testified, and I am no ex- 
pert on this subject matter because I don't know all of the answers to 
it, I believe Mr. Stans testified that at Mr. Kalmbach's request, and this 
is the first public knowledge that I have as to how this got started, that 
on the 29th of June Mr. Stans turned over moneys that were not part 
of the campaign moneys to Mr. Kalmbach in the amount of $75,000. 

Senator Talmadge. I believe he testified that he checked with you on 
that and you authorized it, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Who did this? 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Stans, as I recall. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, he did not. No, sir, I beg your pardon. 

Senator Talmadge. Who authorized that disbursement? 

Mr. Mitchell. That was not a disbursement of campaign funds. 
This was moneys that Mr. Stans testified that he had outside of the 
campaign, and that he turned them over to Mr. Kalmbach at Mr. Kalm- 
bach's request, ]\Ir. Kalmbach having said this was for an important 
White House mission and I am quite certain that is the testimony. 

Senator Talimadge. How does a campaign get money outside the 
campaign ? [Laughter.] 

Mr. Mitchell. This has always been a very interesting question to 
me. [Laughter.] 

Because, for this very reason that the more I hear about all these 
moneys eveiTbody says that they came from 1968, and here I was the 
campaign manager in 1968 and only won by 600,000 votes and they had 
all this money in the bank. That was a hell of a thing to do to me. 

Senator Talmadge. I agree. 

Mr. Mitchell. I regret it, I resent it. 

Senator Talmadge. It wasn't but one campaign, was it, in 1972 ? 

Mr. MiTCHEiJ.. Well , I am talking about 1968. 

Senator Talmadge. Yes, you are talking about leftover campaign 
money. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, this is what I understood. 

Senator Talmadge. But you referred to funds outside the campaign 
at the disposal of the campaign committee when there was only one 
campaign and I was wondering how you collected campaign money 
outside a campaign ? 



1659 

Mr. Mitchell. This was not collected, this was held except for one 
item, and I am sure the staff is much more familiar with Mr. Stans' 
record than I am but I think he testified that the $75,000 was made up 
of $45,000 that he had in a safe deposit box that came from the 1968 
campaifni and $30,000 that had come from some Filipinos who were 
to be returned; if I am not mistaken that is the $75,000 and he did not 
come to me on it. 

Senator Talmadge. Tliere was a iji'eat deal of testimony that this 
committee has had, as you know, about disbui-sement of funds, and we 
found that over a million dollars was disbursed in cash with no checks 
to support it or anythincr else. Some cash was bandied around in large 
amounts, and it was amazing to me that a man as able, a certified pub- 
lic accountant, as Mr. Stans would let money be handled in such a 
loose, fashion. You would concur that you ought not kick around a mil- 
lion dollars in cash without accountability, wouldn't you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would subscribe to that wholeheartedly, in fact I 
would go down to half a million or a quarter of a million. 

Senator Talmadge. Or even $1. 

Mr. Mitchell. I agree with that. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, you mentioned these Dahlberg and Mexi- 
can checks. Mr. Stans testified that you met with him on June 23, 1972, 
regarding those checks, is that a correct statement? 

Mr, ]\Iitciiell. Yes, sir. If I remember correctly, j\Ir. Stans and I 
had lunch on that day and we had a further meeting which has been 
totally screwed up in the testimony here on the 24th. 

Senator Talmadge. Do you want to try to correct it? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would be delighted because of the various versions 
and it was a matter of some concern of this committee because of the 
implication that ^Ir. Stans was brought into the picture of having in- 
formation about the "Watergate, which is not true. 

With respect to the 23d, to the best of my knowledge it does show 
that Mr. Stans and I had lunch in my diary. Now the 24th, this is the 
sequel of the Mardian-LaRue debriefing or interviewing of Liddy and 
the information they got from JNIagruder's involvement with Liddy 
in the payment of nioney and it resulted in Mardian going to talk to 
]Magruder, and getting this story that it was only $40,000 at the most 
that I could have given Liddy or whatever the number was $40,000 or 
$50,000, and this, of course, was quite contrary to what ]Mr. Liddy had 
told Mr. Mardian. 

So ]Mardian came up and got my secretary to get Sloan in from his 
house into the office, the 24th being a Saturday where there was this 
confrontation and, by the way, I would like to interpolate here that 
this is the only meeting that I ever had with Hugh Sloan at any time 
after June 17 and it wasn't in connection with his going to the FBI 
as he has testified to. 

The meeting took place with Mardian, Magruder. stud Sloan, in 
which ]\Iaarrudei- was saying, "Well, it couldn't have been more than 
$40,000 or $50,000" and Sloan was saying, "It is much, much more than 
that. But I won't tell vou because t am going to have to talk to INIr. 
Stans." 

And this is, by the way, where I will also have to put the record 
straight. Sloan was a pretty low individual on that particular day and 



1660 

it was then tliat Mardian hit him on the back to buck him up and I 
don't want to take credit for this statement that was reported by me to 
be made that when the going; gets tough the tough get going. It was 
Senator Muskie who had said it just a couple of days before it 
happened. 

Senator Talmadge. You did not make any such statement, is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I made the statement and I made it in the con- 
text 

Senator Talmadge. You did not quote Senator Muskie as being the 
author thereof ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I did indeed in connection with respect to the nature 
of the tough campaign he had and the one that we were having. 

Senator Talmadge. Were you saying that for Mr. Sloan's benefit 
at that particular time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was saying it for the total people there who were 
in a hell of a knock-down-drag-out donnybrook over what they could 
not agree on. 

Now, the sequence is shown by my log that after that meeting 
Mr. Sloan apparently went back to Mr. Stans, who had received the 
information about the Liddy payments the day before, I believe, on 
June 23, Mr. Stans called me, and Mr. Stans came up and saw me 
alone. There was not any Jeb Magruder and there was not any 
Mardian in the meeting that according to Magruder I asked Mardian 
to step out so that I could discuss the matter. That would be the last 
thing in the world I would do because Mardian was investigating the 
circumstances at the time. 

Senator Talmadge. Was that the first — excuse me. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am going into this because Mr. Stans' credibility 
with respect to his knowledge of the Watergate was quite severely 
impugned apparently more severely in the executive committee meet- 
ing by Magruder than it was later in public testimony. 

Senator Talmadge. Was that the first time you had knowledge of 
the Watergate break-in, bugging that day, that conversation? 

Mr. Mitchell. On the 24th ? 

Senator Talmadge. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, my 

Senator Talmadge. That was the first time you were debriefed on 
it, was it not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I had been debriefed. Senator, as I mentioned 
a little earlier, either on the 21st or 22d. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you get full details of it at that time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It was coming from Liddy who was, as I went 
through with Mr. Thompson, was involving Magruder and said that 
he got his approval in the White House and a lot of things that 

Senator Talmadge. Did he say who authorized the approval in 
the White House? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, he did not. No, he did not. 

Senator Talmadge. The White House was definitely interested in the 
campaign, of course, was it not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The campaign what. Senator? 

Senator Talmadge. The campaign for reelection. 



1661 

Mr. jNIitchell. Oh, there is no question about it. 

Senator Talmadge. With whom in the White House did you discuss 
the Watero-ate break-in ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it depends, of course, as I testified earlier 
this morning in the context of it. Talking with, starting at the top, 
with the President, I believe it was the telephone call that I had on the 
20th of June in which — this was before the debriefings that I had had 
and liad not any particular knowledge of it. discussed it to the point 
where I thought it was ridiculous and thought I had been very re- 
miss as being the campaign director and not ever being able to keep a 
rein on the individuals that were working for the campaign, at that 
time I had in my mind, of course, the fact that Mr. McCord was the 
only one who was involved in the particular incident. 

Senator Talmadge. Let me see if I can identify that telephone 
call, that was on the 20th of June, according to the logs that the 
committee has, that took place by telephone between the 6 p.m., and 
6 :12 p.m., is that correct? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the one, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. What did you tell the President about the 
Watergate break-in at that time ? Did you tell him employees of the 
Committee To Re-Elect the President were involved in it? 

Mr. Mitchell. I assume the President knew that because it had been 
in the newspapers by then, to my recollection but what I really recall 
about the convei'sation was more. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you tell him Magruder was involved ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I did not know Magruder was involved in it at that 
time. 

Senator Talmadge. Who did you tell him was involved ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The only ones I knew were involved at that time 
were the five that were accosted on the premises. 

Senator Talmadge. When did you talk with Mr. Haldeman about 
the break-in ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection of it but it was some time 
thereafter. 

Senator Talmadge. Was it shortly after June 20 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would probably believe that would be the case. 

Senator Talmadge. When did you talk to Mr. Ehrlichman about it? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I talked to Mr. Ehrlichman — Mr. Ehrlichman 
called me in California when I was out there and asked me, in effect, I 
think there has been testimony to the effect here that somebody sug- 
gested he do it. He called me out there and asked me what it was all 
about and I said, "I do not know, we will find out and we will get back 
to you."" That was the substance of that conversation. 

Senator Talmadge. That was either the I7th, 18th, 19th, or there- 
abouts ? 

Mr. ^IiTCHELL. It was either Saturday or Sunday because on the 
19th, which was Monday, we left rather early for the return to 
Washington. 

Senator Talmadge. When did you talk to Mr. Colson about it? 

Mr, Mitchell. I have no idea but it would have been somewhere 
much further down the line. Let me point out 

Senator Talmadge. Sure. 



1662 

Mr. Mitchell [continuing]. Senator, that if you would have, I know 
you are reading from one of these minicharts but some of the things 
they do not have up there is that there is an 8:15 a.m. morning meet- 
ing in the "White House. 

Senator Talmadge. You should have ample opportunity to state 
whatever you want to, Mr. Mitchell, if that chart is different from 
your views do not hesitate to say so, we want the facts, only the facts. 

Mr. Mitchell. I cannot see it from here and it does not make any 
difference anyway, because I have got a directory here but what I 
would point out is that during this period which I have — which I have 
testified to earlier today, until I left the committee as the campaign 
director, there was a meeting at 8 :15 a.m. in the White House every 
morning. This was the regular staff meeting that involved legislative 
liaison. Dr. Kissinger, General Haig, et cetera. So, when I say when 
you ask me when did I first talk to these people about the Watergate, 
of course, it was a continuing subject matter basically in the concept of 
the political problems that presented because by the, I guess the, 20th 
or certainly the 21st, the Democrats had threatened their lawsuit, they 
filed it, I think, on the 22d and we had had a verbal press battle over 
the circumstances from then on constantly day in and clay out about 
the matter. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you talk to Mr. Colson about the same time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure that I would because he would have at- 
tended those meetings. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you direct Robert Mardian to telephone 
Liddy on June 17 and ask him to try to persuade Mr. Kleindienst, then 
the Acting Attorney General, to arrange for Mr. McCord to be re- 
leased from bail as Mr. Magruder has testified ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I am sure, I assure you, that would not be the 
case. There was some conversation that somebody might call up the 
Acting Attorney General to find out what the hell happened but I 
noticed in Mr. Magruder's testimony he said that I selected Mardian 
because Mardian was a great friend of Liddy 's and if there is any- 
body who were on the opposite ends of the stick it would have been 
Mardian and Liddy. 

Senator Talmadge. Would you say then that ]\Ir. Magruder com- 
mitted perjury before this committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I cannot characterize anything as perjury. Senator. 
That does not happen to be a fact, what you have just said, and I have 
just denied it and I am sure the other people who were present will 
also deny it. 

Senator Talmadge. You are a good lawyer, Mr. Mitchell, testifying 
under oath to a lie is commonly referred to as perjury, is it not? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, yes ; but you also have to have intents, I think, 
along with it under certain circumstances and I am sure that some of 
these conversations have got garbled and mixed up in the intervening 
year and a half or so. I would not want to characterize anybody 

Senator Talmadge. "Wliat you are saying is intentions might be 
good but his facts are wrong, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Could very well be that the recollection was not quite 
accurate. There are many of other circumstances some of which I have 
testified to and some of which I presume I will in connection with my 



1663 

answers relating to Mr. Magruder's testimony where I know damn 
well that he has transposed events and got them mixed into other 
circumstances. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr, Dean has testified before this committee 
that there was a meeting on March 22, 1973, where you met with him, 
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, and you said that there was no 
more money problems for Mr. Hunt. Did this meeting take place? 

Mr. Mitchell. The meeting had taken place. Senator, I covered this 
earlier this morning, and it is to this effect, the meeting took place 
prior to a meeting with the President. It was on March 22, those par- 
ticipating were Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, and myself. Dean's 
testimony is to the effect that Ehrlichman asked me if Hunt had been 
paid or if his problems had been taken care of. and I am reported by 
Dean to have answered, yes, something. To the contrary, I deny that it 
ever existed as far as I am concerned, because I would not laiow whether 
Hunt's problems have been taken care of or not. 

Senator Talmadge. Then, you are telling this committee Mr, Dean 
was in error when he made this statement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. This may be another one of these cases where on 

Senator Talmadge. Intentions were good and his facts were wrong ? 

Mr, Mitchell. Well, he probably got the parties mixed up. I do not 
recall ever having talked to John Ehrlichman about payment of money 
to anybody in connection with the Watergate case. 

Senator Talmadge. I believe you stated you later met with the 
President that day ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, we did. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Dean said — he testified — you talked with the 
President about dealing with the Ervin committee at that point, is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell, Excuse me, this is a side joke that we have, he is 
afraid I am going to pronounce the chairman's name wrong as I have 
from time to time. 

The word "dealing" is a pretty broad term. Actually, the subject 
matters were a number that did have to do with the committee and it 
was also, of course, the basis, the subject matters were the basis for 
discussion that took place previously that morning among Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, Dean, and myself in the meeting that we just got out of. 

The real problem that was discussed at that particular time was 
the problem the President was having in connection with executive 
privilege and that was the real focal point of it and, of course, that 
was right in the middle of the Gray hearings where the concentration 
was on the executive privilege matter. 

The other aspects of it were as to who was to be the liaison in con- 
nection with the Wiite House working with this committee up here, 
and I believe that Mr. Dean is correct in his testimony that during 
that meeting the President called Mr. Kleindienst to ask him if he 
had met with the chairman and the vice chairman of the committee 
on the subject matter to start discussing these matters of executive 
privilege and the other relationships in that area. 

Senator Talmadge, Did you convince the President at that time 
that he ought to waive executive privilege ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I urged it. 



96-296 O - 73 - pt. 4 - 21 



1664 

Senator Talmadge. Why was he so insistent on what he called 
executive privilege, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, I can't always — I can't say always, 
I can't read the President's mind but I would believe that whatever 
the President does in this area he does it in connection with the Presi- 
dency and not in connection with some individual problem that he 
may have at a particular time. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Dean testified that on March 28, 1973, he 
met with you and Mr. Magruder and that you indicated to Mr. Dean 
that his testimony could cause problems. Did that meeting take place ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There was a meeting on March 28, but I believe that 
the phrase that you have quoted has come out of a memorandum that 
Dean has submitted to this committee dealing with a meeting that 
we had on April 10. Now, I may be mistaken in connection with that 
but the meeting I had with Dean on March 28 there was Magruder 
present at the meeting and really what the discussion there was the 
recollection of the meeting in the Justice Department, the one where 
the statement was made that there was a possibility of Dean testifying 
before the grand jury could provide problems for the President I 
believe was at the April 10 statement. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you make a statement that his testimony 
could cause problems for the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would believe that I would have put it in that 
frame because this would provide the entire unraveling of all of the 
Plumbers activities and all of the White House horrors. 

Senator Talmadge. AVliat did 3- ou mean by that statement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Just what I said now. 

Senator Talmadge. That you wanted it kept concealed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was not anxious to volunteer any information with 
respect to the White House horrors or the Plumbers operations that 
would hurt this President. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Dean also testified before the committee 
that he gave you a hypothesis, that the plan to break in the Water- 
gate had been approved without anyone fully understanding its im- 
port, he stated that you said his theory was not far wrong, only that 
it would be three or four times removed from the committee. Did you 
make that statment and, if so, what did you mean by it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I testified this morning that there was no such state- 
ment made. This has been over the past years in discussions of this and 
theorization as to who was involved and how we were doing but it 
certainly wasn't made at that meeting of March 28 because Magruder, 
Dean, and I were at the meeting and I left to go into the office to say 
goodby to Haldeman to go back to New York so if he had said it, he 
would have said it in front of Dean and Magruder, and I am sure 
Magruder would have remembered it but, to my knowledge, to the 
best of my recollection, no such statement was ever made. 

Senator Talmadge. You resigned as campaign director, I believe, 
July 4, 1972? 

Mr. Mitchell. July 1, sir. 

Senator Talmadge.' July 1, 1972. Why did you resign, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, I thought this was probably the most 
publicized resignation that ever took place in this country. 



1665 

Senator Talmadge. I haven't heard you say it. I have heard others 
say it. 

Mr. MiTCHFXL. I had some long-range teleplione and publicized 
threats that if I didn't get out of politics, I was going to lose my 
marriage. 

Senator Talmadge. What you are saying then, I don't want to get 
into that aspect of it, what you are saying then 

Mr. Mitchell. Everybody else has. Senator. You might just as 
well. 

Senator Talmadge. It had nothing whatever to do with the Water- 
gate matter? 

Mr. Mitchell. None whatsoever. 

Senator Talmadge. The sequence of events there, as they unravelled 
were so similar in dates that I wondered if that had anything to do 
with it? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, I can't conceive the President would 
have anything to do with the Watergate and we would have 
continued to have all of these meetings both social and campaign meet- 
ings and all the rest of it if it had anything to do with the Water- 
gate 

Senator Talmadge. You discussed your resignation- 



Mr. Mitchell [continuing] . It didn't. What we discussed with the 
President, we had lunch on Friday, the announcement was made on 
Saturday — we had lunch on Friday, and we discussed who the succes- 
sor was going to be. The President asked me to, urged me to stay on, I 
said I could not under the circumstances, it would be impossible for me 
to function properly, and I don't want to characterize his attitude but, 
it seemed to me, he reluctantly consented to the fact that I was going 
to leave, and we discussed a successor and implemented this rather 
rapidly. If you are aware of my logs that I had been spending the 
better part of the previous week trying to smooth this situation over to 
the point where that I could stay as husband and wife regardless of 
whether I resigned or not, so eventually it was so worked out. 

Senator Talmadge. It's been observed in the press, in Mr. Dean's 
testimony, that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman tried to smoke 
3^ou out and get you to take the blame for this whole affair, that you 
were shaken by the circumstances and now isolated from the President. 
Would you like to comment on that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Now where does this come from ? 

Senator Talmadge. Dean, among others, and various 

Mr. Mitchell. This is not a direct quote from Dean. You are also 
reading Evans and Novak and a few othere. 

Senator Talmadge. Newspaper comment. 

Mr. Mitchell. And a few other throw-ins of hypothetical 

Senator Talmadge. Perhaps one of the contributing factors to it is 
the last time you visited the White House you didn't even see the Pres- 
ident as I understand it. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was my exact determination that I should not 
under the circumstances. 

Senator Talmadge. That is what I understood you to say. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, that is what I did say. 

Senator Talmadge. So you have not been isolated from the 
President ? 



1666 

Mr. Mitchell. I have — well let me answer your question first: 
There has been running through Mr. Dean's testimony on a number 
of occasions the reference that, you know, "Mitchell come forward 
and take the blame for all of this and this will solve all of the prob- 
lems," and of course I have been meeting with these people from time 
to time during this period. But the only one I have ever heard that 
story from is Dean. Neither Haldeman or Ehrlichman or either Colson 
or Shapiro have come to me with that story so the only one I have 
ever heard from is Dean. 

Senator Talmadge. One thing I can't understand, Mr. Mitchell. 
As I understand it, you have been probably closer associated with the 
President than probably any man. You were his law partner, prob- 
ably his most trusted confidant and adviser. You had immediate 
access to the White House at any time, to the President's office, in- 
cluding a direct line. 

Is that a fair statement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is extremely complimentary. 

Senator Talmadge. It is meant to be complimentary. 

Mr. Mitchell I think it is made a little higher than it might be. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, you have been in public office in positions 
of high responsibility in Government. I have had that privilege also 
as Governor of my State and now for I614 years in the U.S. Senate. 
To my mind, the first requirement of a subordinate and adviser and 
confidant in any capacity is absolute and implicit trust. If they see 
anything going wrong involving their superior that needs immediate 
corrective action, they report it instantly. When you found out all 
these crimes and conspiracies and coverups were being committed, why 
on Earth didn't you walk into the President's office and tell him the 
truth? 

Mr. Mitchell. It wasn't a question of telling him the truth. It was 
a question of not involving him at all so that he could go on through 
his campaign without being involved in tliis type of activity, and I am 
talking about the White House horror particularly. As I have testi- 
fied this morning, I was sure that, knowing Richard Nixon, the 
President, as I do, he would just lower the boom on all of this matter 
and it would come back to hurt, him and it would affect him in his 
reelection. And that is the basis upon which I made the decision. And 
apparently, others concuiTed with it. 

Now, I am not speaking for them. It may very well be that I was 
wrong, that it was a bad matter of judgment. 

Senator Talmadge. Am I to understand from your response that you 
placed the expediency of the next election above your responsibilities 
as an intimate to advise the President of the peril that surrounded him ? 
Here was the deputy campaign director involved, here were his two 
closest associates in his office involved, all around him were people 
involved in crime, perjury, accessory after the fact, and you delib- 
erately refused to tell him that. 

Would you state that the expediency of the election was more impor- 
tant than that ? 

INIr. Mitchell. Senator, I think you have put it exactly correct. In 
my mind, the reelection of Richard Nixon, compared with what was 
available on the other side, was so much more important that I put it 
in just that context. 



1667 

Senator Talmadge, Do you think anything short of a trial for 
treason would have prevented his election? 

Mr. Mitchell. I beg your pardon, Senator? 

Senator Talmadge. Do you think anything short of a trial for 
treason would have prevented his election? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it depends on what area we are talking about. 
Mr. Thompson and I went through that, and of course, depending upon 
what time and what area it was in. 

Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. I have no further 
questions at this time. 

Senator Er\t:n. Senator Gurney. 

Senator GritNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator ER\^N. Mr. Mitchell, you have been sitting there for about 
2 hours. Would you like to have a brief recess ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I am doing fine, sir. I am here at the pleasure of 
you gentlemen, so I would certainly be delighted to sit as long as 
you do. 

Senator Ervin. You may proceed. 

Senator Gurnet. Mr. Mitchell, you were the President's campaign 
manager in 1968 and the campaign director in 1972, and of course, his 
close personal friend. I would assume that you had many discussions 
with him during 1971 and early 1972 about the upcoming political 
campaign in 1972, is that correct? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, there were discussions, but probably not 
really as many as you might expect. In other words, we didn't meet 
daily or even weekly. Sometimes months would go by before we would 
meet and discuss the subject matter. 

Senator Gurney. Well, in any of those discussions, Mr. Mitchell, 
with the President in this time frame, did he ever bring up the matter 
of bugging and electronic surveillance or dirty tricks in the 1972 Presi- 
dential campaign ? 

Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Certainly not with respect to anything that had to 
do with politics, Mr. Gurney — Senator, excuse me. I should have called 
you Mayor as I did originally. Senator, no sir. 

Senator Gurnet. l\liat about 1968 ; did that subject ever come up ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It didn't come up during the campaign in 1968. It 
came up directly after the election, if this is an area which you want 
me to get into. It is post the election. It was the day that J. Edgar 
Hoover and Mr. Helms came up to New York to the Pierre Hotel and 
the President was interviewing his new personnel for his administra- 
tion. There was a meeting with Mr. Hoover and I was present, because 
although I was still protesting that I didn't want to become the Attor- 
ney General, I think he still — ^that is, he, the President — still thought 
that he wanted me to. So I was in the meeting with Mr. Hoover in 
which Mr. Hoover advised the President that the land lines of his 
plane and the Vice President's plane, somebody working in the cam- 
paign here in Washington, and another embassy had been bugged 
during the campaign. 

Senator Gurnet. In 1968 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. This is in 1968, in the election 

Senator Gurnet. Well, the general thrust of my question, of course, 
was to find out if the President had any concern about bugging, elec- 
tronic surveillance, or dirty tricks in the upcoming 1972 campaign. 



1668 

I suppose if he had, he ought to have discu^ed it with you, the No. 1 
campaign director? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, Senator, I believe that the conversations went 
more to the security of the buildings and the personnel than they did 
electronic surveillance. Obviously, we did have and we discussed from 
time to time the necessity of sweeping for a determination of whether 
there was electronic surveillance of the sensitive areas within the cam- 
paign headquarters. But, of course, as far as the President was con- 
cerned, this was always done by the Secret Service and that was not 
so much a concern on his part as far as he personally was involved, but 
just to make sure that we did have good security in connection with 
our campaign activities. 

Senator Gtjrney. And that, I guess, is one of the reasons why Mr. 
McCord was on board ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There is no question about that, sir, and no question 
about the fact that there were constant sweeps of the building at 1701 
and the installation of in-house television so that they could watch 
corridors and so forth. 

Senator Gubney. Some of these matters I am going to touch on have 
obviously been touched on before, but I will try only to bring up 
things, perhaps, that were not mentioned or perhaps should be men- 
tioned a little more fully. 

Going to the March meeting at Key Biscayne with Magruder, was 
LaRue present all the time during these discussions with Magruder ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That would be my belief. Senator. I know that Mr. 
Magruder's testimony is to the contrary, but I might help if I explain 
the circumstances. 

It is rather a large house. It was built as a one-family house and 
then the fellow who owned it inherited a mother- and father-in-law 
to come to live with him, so he built a second wing on it was a complete 
operation down there and a large Florida room, which had two tele- 
phones in the room. So I think Magruder's statement was that LaRue 
was in and out of the room from time to time and so forth. Well, if 
he was in and out of the room, he must have had very weak kidneys, 
because there were certainly enough telephones in there to take care of 
without leaving the room. 

Senator Gurney. "Wliat was LaRue's job at this time with you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, he had been — Fred LaRue had been at the 
Committee for the Re-Election of the President for quite a few 
months and he was what you, I presume, would call a special assistant, 
although until we got the place organized over there, they never had 
any titles, while I was there, until after I came aboard so that they 
could be sorted out and put in the proper spots. I believe you would 
call him a special assistant to me, and he was staying at the house on 
Key Biscayne with us, so that he was there, not only at the meeting 
that I had with Magruder, but also the one that I had the previous 
day or the subsequent day, whichever it was, with Harry Flemming. 

Senator Gtjrney. His mission on that occasion was to be your right- 
hand man to help you out, is that the idea? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would believe that to be the case, besides the fact 
that he is awfully good company and delightful to have around. 



1669 

Senator Gurney. Do you recall whether he was present when these 
electronic plans were discussed by Magruder? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, and I am quite sure 
that I am correct that he was present and he did take part in the 
discussion. 

Senator Gttrney. Going to this Magruder meeting — I guess I should 
say alleged meeting in view of your earlier testimony today — about 
the Gemstone files. You mentioned that in the morning 

Mr. Mitchell. Is the Gemstone file supposed to be the same as the 
Mitchell file? 

Senator Gurney. Well, the Gemstone files, of couree, involved in- 
formation about the bugging — transcripts, things like that. And the 
testimony, of course, previous here was that they had been put in the 
Mitchell files and they had been brought to your attention by 
Mr. Magruder. You testified this morning that it was supposed to have 
occurred in the morning, this meeting with Magruder, in which he dis- 
cussed the Gemstone files. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Magruder testified that it happened at the reg- 
ular 8 :30 a.m. meeting. 

Senator Gurney. That is right. And you also testified that your logs 
showed that you had no meetings with Magruder when no one else was 
present. That is what I wanted to nail down. Would you amplify that 
again ? 

Mr. Mitchell. What I am saying is during the period from what is 
referred to as the first break-in, which was — and, of course, you got 
mixed testimony on whether it took place on the 28th of May or the 
30th of May — I do not know when it took place. Magruder said that 
1 to 11/2 weeks thereafter, he came up to my office and show^ed me this 
material and that I did not like it ; therefore, I called Mr. Liddy up 
and I chewed Mr. Liddy out and told him to get moving. What I am 
saying is that my logs do not show a meeting with Mr. Magruder dur- 
ing the May period to the June 17 period in the morning that did not 
have other people there for other business. 

Secondly, I have testified, which happens to be the fact, that I never 
saw or talked to Mr. Liddy from the 2d day of February until the 15th 
day of June of 1972. 

Senator Gurney. I recall that, and that leads me to the next ques- 
tion, which I really am getting at which I think is the important ques- 
tion. How were these logs prepared ? Who prepared them? How would 
the committee know, for exam]:)le, that they are precisely accurate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, what had happened, Senator, was that over 
in the Justice Department, the secretaries that I had over there fol- 
lowed the practice that was always handled in the Justice Depart- 
ment — nobody got in the door without their being recorded. Nobody 
made a telephone call in or out without them being recorded and it 
records whether the call came in or out, whether you talked, or where 
the call was placed. Much to my surprise, I found out later on, after 
they came over with me to the law office in the Committee To Re-Elect 
the President, they continued to do the same thing. I did not even know 
they were doing it until after June 17, when we got talking about a lot 
of these things and found out that they had continued to do this. 

Senator Gurney. So your secretaries, after you went to the Commit- 
tee To Re-Elect, were the same that you had in the Justice Depart- 



1670 

ment and they always followed this procedure of reporting everybody 
who came in and phone calls in and out ? 

Mr. Mitchell. My secretary, Miss Lee Jablonski, was the one who 
continued to do that ; yes, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. Going on to this 

Mr. Mitchell. May I also add so that I will be fully responsive to 
your question about this meeting, so-called, by Magruder, that I would 
point out, and I think that it is very persuasive, at least from the way 
I look at it, that when Dean met Liddy on June 18 — in other words, 
this was the firet time that anybody had really ever talked to Liddy, 
according to Mr. Dean's testimony, which is in the record — Mr. Liddy 
complained to Mr. Dean that Magruder was the one that made him 
go into the DNC the second time around, et cetera, et cetera. Now, if 
Mitchell had called him up to the office, I am sure Liddy is not stupid 
enough to try to hide behind INIagruder if he had Mitchell to hide 
behind. 

Senator Gurnet. Incidentally, on that point, Magruder pushing 
Liddy to do this work over at the DNC, do you have any evidence 
that Magruder in turn was pushed by anybody to push Liddy ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; I do not. I tried to answer that before 

Senator Gurnet. I know you touched on it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Insofar as I have no personal knowledge of it. As I 
say, the Dean statements and testimony is replete with who called 
whom and who was afraid who was going to take over what and so 
forth. And I have no personal laiowledge of it. 

Senator Gurnet. Let me ask you this. Were there any instances 
during the campaign, when you were the campaign director, where 
Mr. Magruder went over your head, on his own, without your laiowl- 
edge or without your direction ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I think you will find, and we must get the two 
dates because Senator Talmadge, of course, has had me in one spot at 
one period of time and I was officially campaign director for another 
period of time. I think you will find that in the dirty tricks depart- 
ment, I can give you one example that I cannot give you the details 
of, but I know that it happened Avithout my knowledge. That was a 
riot that they created up here on the steps of the Capitol that I had 
no knowledge of and did not know that it was being funded. There 
undoubtedly are others. I know that there were beforehand and I 
presume that there were in between. 

I can answer your question better after this committee gets through 
with its dirty tricks investigation. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, hopefully, we will find out about all those 
things. 

Do you know, and I think maybe I have asked this in another way, 
but I do want to ask it again — do you know of any other instances 
where Mr. INIagruder, or do you know of any instances where Mr. 
Magruder may have been carrying out the instructions of anybody 
else in connection with his duties at the committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes : I believe that you will prol)alily find that that 
was the case in connection with this matter up here. I tliink that this 
was directed out of the "Wliite House. I think you will find that there 
are other similar activities, maybe not of the same magnitude or scope. 



1671 

Senator Gurney. In other words, I think there probably are in- 
stances where he was directed by other people? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that perhaps "directed'* can be the word, or 
it may be the point where they were working in concert on some of 
these activities. 

Senator Gueney. Let us go to the June 18 meeting if we may. You 
talked about that. But mostly in connection with this business of 
whether there was discussion on destroying the Gemstone files. I am 
not interested in going over that again, but would you amplify your 
explanation of what happened at that meeting? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, my recollection of the purpose for the 
meeting was the fact that not only I but Mardian and LaRue, who 
were pretty well up in the campaign by June 17, had been on a series 
of events out in California on Saturday and Sunday and that we had 
very little contact with what was going on back in Washington. We 
were on the plane leaving out there at 10 :30 and getting back at some- 
where around 7 :30 or 8 :00 o'clock at night. "Wliat we were concerned 
of was to find out what was going on in the press, because there, as you 
know, was an inordinate blast from the Democratic side, and, of course, 
for the next 3 months, all we did was answer charges and counter- 
charges with respect to the subject matter. So that to the best of my 
recollection, the meeting was for the purpose of reviewing what had 
developed in the case that we did not know about in our transit, who 
had been identified in connection with it, and I do not believe that as 
of June 18, there had been any other identification other than the five 
that had been arrested in the Watergate ; how we were going to respond 
to the Democratic charges with respect to our position, because obvi- 
ously, the security officer of the Committee To Re-Elect the Pres- 
ident had been arrested; and where we were going to go from here. 
Coming back on the plane with Mardian and LaRue, I discussed the 
concept that we needed an investigation which they should undertake 
in connection with the committee, which they did undertake. 

Now, there seems to be a difference of opinion as to whether or not, 
by the time we had gotten back on the night of June 18, as to whether 
or not the Democrats had threatened to sue and we were talking about 
lawyers. To the best of my recollection, that came later, altliough in 
trying to reconstiiict what happened at that, there has been some 
thought that lawyers for the committee were considered at that 
meeting. But to my knowledge or recollection, it came at a later date. 

Senator Gukney. Dean testified before the committee that when he 
got into this whole Watergate affair, and you will recall that he was 
out in the Philippine Islands, I think, and returning 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Senator Gurney. That this occurred — that the coverup had already 
begun. My recollection of the first important meeting that he had with 
anybody was this June 19 meeting. 

Mr. Mitchell No sir. 

Senator Gurney. Was there any discussion of the coverup at this 
meeting ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; Senator, let me go back and refresh your 
recollection of Mr. Dean's testimony, and I am sure these gentlemen 
here can correct me if I am wrong on the general subject matter. Mr. 



1672 

Dean said that by the time that he came to my apartment to the June 
19 meeting, the coverup had ah-eady begn^m, be^^aiise we had — and I 
am just quoting Mr. Dean- — he had met with Liddy, he had met with 
Magruder, he had met with Strachan and been advised that they 
had destroyed documents. He said he had met with Ehrlichman and 
Colson and that they were trying to get Hunt out of the country. I 
am not vouching for these as facts. I am just telling you what Dean 
said that he did that day, in which he came to the conclusion that 
the coverup had already started by the time he got to the meeting of 
the 19th. 

He also testified that he did not discuss any of those subject matters 
with us at the meeting in my apartment on the 19th. 

Senator GuRisrEY. Were any specific instructions given at that 
meeting to anybody? 

Mr. MrrcHELL. No ; because I don't think we had anything to pro- 
vide specific instructions for. I think what we were really looking 
at was what was the PR aspects of it, where were we going to be hit 
next with another broadside, and how we were going to respond to 
it. And of course, you did that from day to day as the UPI and the 
AP carried the stories. 

Senator Gurnet. Incidentally, why do you think Dean was there 
at the meeting? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know. In trying to reconstruct that in my 
mind — because I had completely forgotten about the meeting until the 
testimony — I would have believed that somebody — it was not me, but 
it was probably that Bob Mardian, or it could have been Fred LaRue — 
we were flying back in an aircraft that needed an interim stop, as I 
recall — probably called ahead to the office and said, get so-and-so so 
we can find out what is going on in connection with this. 

Senator Gurnet. Turning to the coverup payments now, I think 
we have already discussed this business about the supposed meeting 
where you thought that somebody ought to get in touch with Kalm- 
bach to raise tlie money for the coverup, and you have denied that 
this took place. Is that correct? 

Mr. Mitchell. I specifically deny this with respect to the so-called 
meeting of June 28, in which Dean puts it in a sequence on June 28, 
where the CIA thing flops and then there is a meeting with Mardian, 
LaRue, Dean, and myself, and I say to Dean, you go get somebody in 
the White House to call Kalmbach. I tell you that that meeting didn't 
happen, because I was in New York. 

Senator Gurnet. Was there any other meeting where that occurred, 
or something like that occurred? 

Mr. Mitchell. No; there has been a question here today as to 
whether or not I had a meeting on January 19, w^hich would have 
been the eve of the inauguration, with Dean and Kalmbach in which 
Kalmbach was asked to re-enter the fundraising activities. I have 
no recollection of that whatsoever. And as T paid before, the way 
that Kalmbach excited from fundraising activities due to his no- 
toriety, I would have found it very difficult for me to suggest that he 
get back into it. 

Senator Gurnet. Do you have any personal knowledge about the 
coverup money, how it was raised, by whom, who paid it ? 



1673 

Mr, Mitchell. I have — well, let me see if I can answer all of your 
questions. First of all, I have never met with any of the defendants, 
I have never talked to any of them, I have never talked to any of their 
lawyers except Maroiilis on that occasion that I have mentioned. I 
have never handled any negotiations in connection with it. I have 
never even seen until I have seen the exhibits here the letters that — 
letter or letters — that were written by Hunt. 

Starting at the beginning of it, which I understand to be the begin- 
ning of it, which was the Kahnbach activity that resulted from the 
telephone call to him on the 28th, where the meetings were held on the 
29th at the hotel that I hope you have finally gotten straightened out — 
I didn't know that that money had been passed over by Mr. Stans to 
Kahnbach until I heard his testimony, or read his testimony on the 
subject matter. I didn't know that. 

I did know that somewhere along the way, there had been money 
transferred to Fred LaRue out of. and I forget the testimony on it, 
but I am sure it is here. This is the amount of money that Mr. Stans, 
I think, said was turned over to LaRue by Sloan and Stans at the ad- 
vice of Mardian or LaRue or something. 

Senator Gurney. But you found out this later in the testimony 
before this committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I found it out later, as these things unfolded. 

Senator Gurney. Well, I am talking about, now, in June and July, 
when a lot of these money-raising activities and payments took place. 
You have no personal knowledge about that? 

iNIr. Mitchell. I have no personal knowledge about the raising of 
them or the distribution of them or who was receiving them or how 
they were received. 

I must go back to point out that in the Liddy-Mardian-LaRue de- 
briefing, Liddy said that he thought that it was right or whatever 
phrase he used that the committee help him get bail to get these peo- 
ple out of jail. That was turned down flat cold out. 

Senator Gurney. Let's turn to this Executive clemency thing, 
which of course, is important, because the only person who can offer 
that is the President. There was testimony by Dean that you had 
instructed him to offer to McCord. "Wliat about that testimony ? 

Mr. Mitchell. AYell, that is, in my opinion, a complete fabrication, 
because the negotiations with McCord started when I was out, entirely 
out of the way. I was down in Florida. And this, of course, was the 
thing that was handled through Caulfield. Except it was not Mitchell. 
And I think if you look at Dean's total testimony, you will get to the 
same conclusion that I have come to, that the only discussion of Execu- 
tive clemency that I have ever heard about was during some time in 
January, where Hunt was in a psychological state in which he made 
demands on either Colson directly or through Bittman or whatever 
it was with respect to the subject matter, and the word got back to me 
from somebody— whether it was Dean or O'Brien or whoever it was — 
that the only person that Hunt would take a commitment for Execu- 
tive clemency from was from Colson. That is where it ended. 

Senator Gurney. I recall your testimony on that. Of course, Dean 
also testified that he had discussed at one time with the President, in 
the President's office, and also in a conversation he had with Colson. 



1674 

Dean, I am talking about, Colson said he discussed it with the Presi- 
dent. Did Dean ever discuss Executive clemency with you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Only to report the conversations of the dialog that 
were going on between Colson, Hunt, and Bittman, and I do not know 
what or the matter was 

Senator Gurney. At no other time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. At no other time. 

Senator Gurney. And he has never mentioned the fact that he had 
discussion with the President about it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Did you ever discuss it with the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Executive clemency ? 

Senator Gurney. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I certainly did not, Senator. We have never gotten 
into areas relating to the Watergate or the coverup or would bring any 
such subject matter to the floor. 

Senator Gurney. Do you think it might be reasonable to assume 
if the President had been discussing this with anyone that he might 
have touched base with you on it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I do not know. That is quite an assumption. Of 
course, I was now practicing law in New York and did not see him 
as often as I had in the past and talk to him as often but I would think 
that before he got into this area it is quite conceivable that he would 
because I know that in his proper analogy when it came to the point of 
the problem of Executive clemency in connection with the meeting of 
March 22 he asked them if he would come down and talk to them about 
it, this is the best answer I can give you on the subject matter. 

Senator Gurney. You mentioned just now that you, of course, had 
talked to the President on a number of occasions and perhaps this is the 
proper time to turn to these. The logs from the President's office show a 
number of times that you did have conversations with the President. 
I think the very first one has already been discussed in the exchange you 
had with Senator Talmadge, that is the June 20 one and we do not have 
to go over that one again. 

There was a meeting on June 30 in the President's Executive Office 
Building with Haldeman present. I presume that means that the 
President and Haldeman and you were present. Do you recall that 
meeting ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I recall it very well. 

Senator Gurney. What was discussed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It was a luncheon meeting at which my resignation 
was discussed and finally accepted and in which we discussed a suc- 
cessor. 

Senator Gurney. And that was the only subject at that meeting ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That was the only subject of that meeting, to my 
knowledge. 

Senator Gurney. On July 1, there was a phone call from the Presi- 
dent from San Clemente to you in Washington. Could you give us the 
substance of that phone call ? 

Mr. MiTCHEiJ.. July 1 was the date upon which the announcement 
was made of mv resignation, and we had agreed that certain people 
would be called by certain people. For instance, I would call Governor 



1675 

Rockefeller, Governor Eeagan and so forth, on down the line. This 
meeting, as yon know, lasted for quite a while because it was the day 
of the announcement and the President spent quite a period of time, as 
I recall, talking with my wife on the telephone trying to pep her up 
and tell her the world had not ended. 

Senator Gtjrney. Yes. that was a 23-minute talk, as I see here. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Was Watergate discussed at all ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not to my recollection. Senator, and I am quite sure 
that it would not have been. 

Senator Gurney. On July 11, there was a very short call here, it says 
12 :48 to 12 :49. 

Mr. Mitchell. 12 :43 to 49, as I understand it. Senator. 

Senator Gurney. "V-SHiat is that? 

Mr. Mitchell. 12 :43 to 12 :49. 

Senator Gurney. This sheet says 12 :48 but I will take your advice. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, mine came from the White House 
so it could quite possibly be screwed up. [Laughter.] 

Senator Gurney. Touche. 

Mr. Mitchell. As a matter of fact, I think the covering letter was 
signed by Mr. Buzhardt. 

Senator Gurney. Anyway, it says that the President called San 
Clemente to Mitchell in Washington. What was that about? 

Mr. Mitchell. We are talking about the July 11 conversation? 

Senator Gurney. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, it was a conversation 
we had concerning when the President would do something concretely 
about the Vice President. You remember this was just before, as I re- 
call, the Democratic National Convention that was held shortly there- 
after, and the President had, I believe, according to the conversation 
that I remember, pretty well come to the conclusion about two things. 
No. 1, that he was being shot at from the Javitses and Perc3''s, and so 
forth about the Vice President — maybe not Percy, but some of the 
people in the party were shooting at him about continuing the Vice 
President, and yet at the same time that it did not look like it would 
be a feasible thing to announce his preference for the Vice Presidency 
right on the eve of the Democratic National Committee, and this is the 
conversation that I remember took place in that time frame. And it 
brings to mind the fact that at the next meeting that is shown there is 
shown with the Vice President, Mr. Haldeman in the President's office 
where the announcement had previously, I think, been made or was 
about to be made and there was quite a discussion of the part that the 
President was to play in the campaign. 

Senator Gurney. This is the July 27 meeting you are talking about 
with Haldeman and Harlow ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; it is the July 21 meeting. 

Senator Gurney. I mean the July 21 meeting, and the Vice President 
came in during that meeting, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. But at neither of these me^ings, July 11 or 
July 21, was Watergate discussed, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Absolutely, sir. 



1676 

Senator Gurney. Then, the next meeting is the one that I skip to, 
July 27 at the navy yard with Haldeman, and Harlow, and Mac- 
Gregor. 

Mr. Mitchell. This, as I recall, was a dinner discussion of politics 
on the Sequoia because of the reference to the navy yard and the time 
frame and it was a general discussion of politics, had nothing to do 
with tlie Watergate and coverup. 

Senator Gurney. The next log reference is August 1, a morning 
telephone call from the President to you. Do you recall the substance 
of that call ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. This is one of the couple here that I have no 
recollection of what the call may be. It could be in connection with the 
upcoming convention, but I have no recollection of the nature of that 
conversation. 

Senator Giteney. And then, on August 4 through August 6, it says 
that you were a guest of the President at Assateague Island. Do you 
recall what occurred there or did anything occur about Watergate 
there? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there is nothing occurred on Watergate. It was 
a purely social occasion. As I testified this morning, I do have a very 
distinct recollection that this was the particular time and event when 
Senator McGovern became a thousand percenter that Senator Eagle- 
ton was not going to be with them and they were selecting a new Vice 
President. During that weekend we had quite a number of discussions 
about that subject matter. That was the topic of it but I do not recall 
discussing anything relating to Watergate. 

Senator Gueney. There were meetings on August 14 in the oval 
office, Haldeman was present, part of the time or I guess all of the time 
and MacGregor was present part of the time. What were those discus- 
sions about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Tliey were about the campaign, the 1972 campaign, 
and unrelated to the Watergate or anything else that might have to do 
with it. 

Senator Gurney. And on August 25 there was a call from San 
Clemente from the President to you here in Washington in the morn- 
ing. Do you recall what that was about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know whether it was this one or the earlier 
one but as I think I testified this morning, and I have a reasonably 
good recollection that the President and I discussed during this pre- 
Republican convention activity and probably by telephone, according 
to my i-ecolleotion, the problem the Rules Committee was having down 
there with respect to the representation of the various factors in the 
1976 convention. As you recall there was quite 'an active ongoing ques- 
tion that covered lots of areas of the party, and I believe I have a recol- 
lection of talking to him on the telephone on that subject matter. 

Senator Gitrney. On September 13, there was a meeting in Camp 
David with the President. Besides yours, Mr. MacGregor was there, 
and Mr. Connally, and Mr. Haldeman. Do you recall what the subject 
of those meetings was ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, this had to do entirely with the political cam- 
paign, the political campaign and the scheduling of the President. 

I might say here that, which I think I mentioned this morning, at 
one of these meetings, and I remember particularly that Senator Con- 



1677 

nally was there — not Senator Connally, Governor, Secretary Connally 
was there — ^that we discussed the Watergate to the extent of the 
desirability of the President appointing a commission such as the 
Warren Commission, to investigate it or a Special Prosecutor, et cetera, 
and I believe it was the unanimous opinion that the appropriate thing 
to do was to let the normal courses of justice take its place. 

Senator Gtjrney. On September 26 there was a meeting between 
you and the President and it says Waldorf Astoria, I presume that was 
in New York, and then also that was an afternoon meeting and there 
was also an evening meeting between you and the President in New 
York, Haldeman was present at that occasion, and then a dinner later 
on at the Waldorf. 

What about these meetings ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the sequence is that the President met at the 
first meeting at 4 :30 to 4 :42 with the parties that are designated here, 
including Mr. Max Fisher and myself, and then we moved from that 
to a meeting with some distinguished citizens of the Jewish community 
and went on to an affair in the same hotel where Nelson Rockefeller 
had all of his political personnel, and came from there back to the 
President's suite which shows that the President, Mr. Haldeman, and 
myself were there from 6 :24 to 6 :42 and, to the best of my recollection, 
all we discussed were the activities that had gone on that afternoon 
and what impact they had had with what particular people and what 
was going to happen that particular night where he had to make a 
speech in the building in connection with the Salute to the President's 
dinner. 

Senator Gtirney. On October 6 there was a meeting in the Oval 
Office with the President. At that meeting besides yourself there was 
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, MacGregor, Dole, and Harlow. What was that 
meeting all about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Entirely, to my recollection, all of these meetings that 
I was attending at this particular time, because I was then residing in 
New York, that I would come down and sit in on these political meet- 
ings, and I am sure if Senator Dole was there that obviously had 
something to do with it. 

Senator Gukney. In connection with the campaign ? 

Mr. Mitchell. With the campaign. 

Senator Gurnet. That would be true of the meeting of October 17, 
too. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes sir. And 26th. 

Senator Gurnet. And 24th 

Mr. Mitchell. Twenty-fourth, rather. 

Senator Gurnet [continuing]. It says here. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir ; the 24th. 

Senator Gltrnet. Now then, on November 6 there was a phone call 
to you around 1 o'clock in the afternoon. Do you know what that was 
about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. November 6 was the day before the election, and I 
remember the call quite well even though it was very short. The Presi- 
dent and I were exchanging guesstimates as to how many States he 
would carry. 

Senator Gurnet. And on November 24 there was a meeting in New 
York at your law office ? 



1678 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Two meetings, I take it here, some people were in 
one meeting and some other people were in another meeting? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. "What were these about? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the President decided that he would call, stop 
in and call, and see the people that he had worked with for quite a 
number of years at the law firm and, as it indicates here, at least on 
the sheet that I have, that he met with the senior partners for a period 
of time. He also met with the junior partners, and then he spoke to 
the entire staff of the law firm, some 400 people. 

Senator Gurney. And on that day did you have any discussion with 
him about Watergate at all ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; the prime discussion was in the smaller 
group that involved the partners of the firm, dealt entirely w4th some 
of the thoughts that he then had that early about the reorganization of 
the Government. 

Senator Gurney. I expect probably the next one is almost self- 
evident, a call on December 25, was that about Christmas? 

Mr. Mitchell. No question about it ; yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. And on March 2, the last one here on the White 
House logs shows a meeting in the Executive Office Building with the 
President and Dean and Ehrlichman and Haldeman. March 22 I guess 
it is. 

Mr. Mitchell. March 22 ? 

Senator Gurney. It's listed as the 2d at first and then there is an- 
other 2 here. I guess that's been thoroughly discussed already. 

Mr. Mitchell. It, as you refer to it, it has, had, to do with Water- 
gate but it had to do with this committee and the stance of the Presi- 
dent with respect to it and particularly with respect to executive privi- 
lege. Counsel tells me that some time back along the way I used the 
words "Executive clemency" when I should have used "executive priv- 
ilege." I do know the distinction and I hope somebody can correct 
the record. 

Senator Git^ney. In these various meetings did the President ever 
bring up to you at any time the coveiiip business that was going on in 
Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. I am thoroughly convinced that the Presi- 
dent was not aware of it. 

Senatoi- Gurney. And I hesitate to use this word "impression" but 
it certainly has been used often enough in these hearings. 

Did you ever get any impression that the President had any knowl- 
edge of the coverup of Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. It was quite the contrary. 

Senator Gurney. One other question, Mr. Mitchell, here about the 
FBI reports. There was testimony about a meeting of June 24, this 
was a meeting of you and Magruder and Mardian and Dean. Dean 
testifies that you suggested it would be helpful to see FBI reports. 
Can you shed any light on that? 

Mr. Mitchell. This was his testimony at a meeting of June 24? 

Senator Gurney. Yes, that is right. 



1679 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection of the discussion of nnything 
at that meeting of June 24 except this problem that we had vvith re- 
spect to trvdng to iron out, this was the Saturday that I was talking 
about, trying to iron out the problems we had in the discrepancies be- 
tween Magruder and Sloan that substantially all the day was spent 
on that subject matter other than the conversation that I had with 
Mr. Stans later on. 

Senator Gurney. I would like to go over just one