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Full text of "Presidential campaign activities of 1972, Senate resolution 60; Watergate and related activities"

'^ PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972 

SENATE RESOLUTION 60 

3== 



HEARINGS '^ '^' 

BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

NINETY-THIED CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 



WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 
Phase I: Watergate Investigation 

WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 11, 12, 13, 16, AND 17, 1973 

Book 5 




Printed for the use of the 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 



U S. Goverr?T;'^r ■ 3 Depository 

Franklin iicrce i..a\v ov-iiier Libn 



.lorary 



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972 

SENATE RESOLUTION 60 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

NINETY-THIED CONGKESS 

FIRST SESSION 



WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 
Phase I: Watergate Investigation 

WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 11, 12. 13, 16, AND 17, 1973 

Book 5 




Printed for the use of the 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OflBco 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3 
Stock Number 5270-01956 



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES 

(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1 st Session) 



SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina, Chairman 
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vice Chairman 

HERMAN E. TALMADGE, Georgia EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr., Connectici-t 

JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico 

Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

Fred D. Thompson. Minority Counsel 

RUFUS L. Edmisten, Deputy Chief Counsel 

Arthur S. Miller, Chief Consultant 

David M. Dorsen, Assistant Chief Counsel 

Terry F. Lenzner, Assistant Chief Counsel 

James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel 

Carmine S. Bellino, Chief Investigator 

Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator 

Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel 

R. Phillip Haire, Assistant Counsel 

Marc Lackritz, Assistant Counsel 

William T. Mayton, Assistant Counsel 

Ronald D. Rotunda, Assistant Counsel 

Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel 

Howard S. Liebengood, Assistant Minority Counsel 

H. William Shure, Assistant Minority Counsel 

Robert Silverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel 

Laura Matz, Administrative Assistant 

Carolyn Andrade, Office Manager 

Joan C. Cole, Secretary to the Minority 

(n) 



CONTENTS 



HEARING DAYS Pag« 

Wednesday, July 11, 1973 1815 

Thursday,' July 12, 1973 1893 

Friday, July 13, 1973 1963 

Monday, July 16, 1973 2047 

Tuesday, July 17, 1973 2115 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

Wednesday, July 11, 1973 

Mitchell, John N., former Attorney General and campaign director of the 
Committee To Re-Elect the President, accompanied by William G. 
Hundley, Plato C. Cacheris, and Marvin Segal, counsels, testimony 
resumed 1816 

Thursday, July 12, 1973 

Mitchell, John N., testimony resumed 1894 

Moore, Richard A., special counsel to the President, accompanied by 

Herbert J. Miller, Jr., counsel 1938 

Friday, July 13, 1973 

Moore, Richard A., testimony resumed 1963 

Monday, July 16, 1973 

Moore, Richard A., testimony resumed 2049 

Butterfield, Alexander P., Administrator, Federal Aviation Administra- 
tion, former deputy assistant to the President 2073 

Kalmbach, Herbert W., former associate finance chairman for the Finance 
Committee To Re-Elect the President and personal attorney to the 
President, accompanied by James H. O'Connor, counsel 2091 

Tuesday, July 17, 1973 
Kalmbach, Herbert W., testimony resumed 2115 

INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY MEMBERS OF THE 
COMMITTEE AND COUNSELS 

Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr Mitchell: 1856-1868, 

1895. Moore: 2004, 2009-2019, 2045, 2046. Butterfield: 2073, 

2089. Kalmbach: 2091, 2156-2170, 2176, 2178, 2179. 
Baker, Hon. Howard H., Jr Mitchell: 1829-1839. 

Moore: 2019-2022. Butterfield: 2081, 2082. Kalmbach: 2151- 

2156. 

Talmadge, Hon. Herman E Moore: 2022-2029. 

Butterfield: 2082, 2083. Kalmbach: 2142-2150. 
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K Mitchell: 1815-1829, 

1893-1895. Moore: 1990-1997. Butterfield: 2084. Kalmbach: 

2127—2131 2171—2173 
Montoya, Hon. Joseph u'. . Mitchell: 1839-1856. 

Moore: 2048-2058. Butterfield: 2084-2086. Kalmbach: 2115- 

2121, 2176, 2177. 

(m) 



IV 

Gurney, Hon. Edward J Moore: 1997-2009, 

2060. Butterfield: 2083, 2084, 2089, 2090. Kalmbach: 2131-2135, 

2138-2142. 
Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr Mitchell: 1869-1892. 

Moore: 2029-2045. Butterfield: 2086-2088. Kalmbach: 2121- 

2127, 2173-2176. 
Dash, Samuel, chief counsel and staff director Mitchell: 1896-1928. 

Moore: 1992, 2066. Butterfield: 2079-2081. Kalmbach: 2091- 

2112. 
Thompson, Fred D., minority counsel Mitchell: 1928-1936. 

Moore: 1963-1990, 2066. Butterfield: 2073-2079. Kalmbach: 

2112-2114, 2177, 2178. 

Lenzner, Terry F., assistant chief counsel Moore: 1946-1962, 

1991, 2058-2073. 

EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

No. 75A — (1815) Statement of Hon. Garry Brown concerning allegations 
made by John Dean during Mr. Dean's testimony before the 

Select Committee 2181 

No. 76 — (2138) Letter from The Mayflower dated June 27 re: Mr. Kalm- 
bach not being a registered guest between June 1 and July 1, 
1972. Also a letter from the Statler-Hilton, and various other 

attachments 2209 

No. 77 — (2162) Question and answer telephone conversation between 

Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. EhrHchman, April 19, 1973 2215 



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972 
PHASE I: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION 



WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Acti\^ties, 

Washington, B.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair- 
man), presiding. 

Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, Gur- 
nev, and Weicker. 

Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred D. 
Thompson, minority counsel ; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief coun- 
sel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert "Silverstein, assistant minority counsels ; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant ; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye ; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; John Walz, 
publications clerk. 

Senator Ervin, The committee will come to order. 

On June 29, the committee received a letter* from Congressman 
Garry Brown regarding John Dean's testimonv linking \h^ House 
Banking and Currency Committee action with what he testified were 
White House coverup activities. The Congressman also said that he 
was preparing a sworn statement to submit to this committee. We have 
received that statement with attachments, and it will be marked as an 
exhibit and printed in full for the record. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 75A**.] 

Senator Fr\t:n. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mitchell, throufrhout these many davs witnesses and vou have 
testified as to hundreds of meetings: meetinfl:s held along the George 
Washington Parkwav : meetings held in hotel rooms. I believe there 
are three meetinfrs of special significance. One meeting of January 27 ; 
another of Februarv 4. and the third, March 30, all occurring prior to 
the June 17 break-in. Witnesses have testified that at tlie first of these 
meetings criminal activities were discussed, to wit : The kidnaping of 



•Printed as exhibit 69 In Book 4. 
►*See p. 2181. 

(1815) 



1816 

leaders of dissident groups and hiding them away in Mexico ; the leas- 
ing of a yacht and fitting the facility with special photographic and 
eavesdropping equipment and servicing this yacht with prostitutes to 
entice leaders of the opposition, and placing them in compromising 
positions; and the breaking and entering to photograph documents 
and engaging in the electronic surveillance, and I gather that at the 
first meeting you had, in addition to the Attorney General of the 
United States, Mr. Magruder, the deputy chairman of the Committee 
To Re-Elect the President, the counsel for the President of the United 
States, Mr. John Dean, and Mr. Liddy, the counsel to the Committee 
To Re-Elect the President, and yesterday, when asked about the price 
tag your response was "Oh, just a million dollars." 

At the close of that first meeting you testified that you told Mr. 
Liddy to "take that stuff out and burn it." At the second meeting on 
February 4, this was also in the office of the Attorney General, in addi- 
tion to the Attorney General, Mr. Magruder, INIr. Liddy, and Mr. Dean 
were in attendance, and at this time we had a scaled down plan costing 
about half a million dollars and at the close of this meeting Mr. Dean 
was quoted to have said: "We should not be discussing this in the 
Attorney General's office." 

Would I be translating your statement "take that stuff out and burn 
it," to mean get rid of this incriminating evidence ? 

TESTIMOITY OF JOHN N. MITCHELL, ACCOMPANIED BY WIL- 
LIAM G. HUNDLEY, PLATO C. CACHERIS, AND MARVIN SEGAL, 
COUNSELS— Resumed 

Mr. Mitchell. Not only that. Senator, to get rid of the incriminating 
evidence, but also to abandon any concept that any such activity would 
be part of the reelection campaign of the President. 

Senator Inouye. Did you advise the participants that they Avere 
essentially participating in conspiracy to commit a crime? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not at that time ; no sir, I did not. 

Senator Inottye. I ask this because just about that time your office, 
with much publicity and great vigor, had pursued the indictment of 
American citizens who had allegedly discussed the kidnaping of Dr. 
Kissinger. Is there any difference between the discussion of kidnap- 
ing and a discussion of these criminal activities in your office ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I think you have stopped very far short in 
connection with the activities of the indictment that you referred to. 
There were overt actions in connection with that as well as discussions. 

Senator Ixouye. Was there any overt action in this case ? There were 
three meetings — charts that cost a small fortune. 

Mr. Mitchell. Those were not the type of overt acts that were in- 
volved in connection with the indictments that you have referred to. 

Senator Inouye. 'V\'Tiy did you not, as the Attorney General of the 
United States, advise the President of these meetings ? 

Mr. Mitchell. For the very simple reason that I presumed, and 
had every reason to believe, that these matters were over and done 
with — were through — and that was the end of them. The President of 
the TTnited States has many other things to concern himself with other 
than the type of factors that were involved in these meetings and many 
other meetings. 



1817 

Senator Inotjye. Weren't you concerned when they persisted? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure I understand your question, Senator. 

Senator Inouye. You had a meeting on the 27th of January, Febru- 
ary 4, and March 30; didn't you consider that this was nothing 
frivolous ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, to my mind the matter had not been approved ; 
it was not going to be approved ; and that was the end of it. There are 
many, many things that happen in connection with political campaigns 
that you do not go and advise the President with respect to. The obli- 
gation rests upon those that are conducting a camj^aign and not the 
President to follow each and every one of the details. 

Senator Inouye. In your colloquy with Senator Talmadge you indi- 
cated that the election of the President was so important that you did 
not wish to advise the President of the Wliite House horror stories 
because he might blow the lid off, and thereby endanger the election, 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that is a reasonable summary of it. I don't 
think I used the words "blow the lid off" but that he would take very, 
very strong action that would put the- — - 

Senator Inouye. He would lower the boom on people. 

Mr. Mitchell. That, I think, was my phrase, and I am sure that 
was — would have been the case. 

Senator Inouye. Why did you not advise the President in November 
or December 1972 or January ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That, in my opinion, was: The election was over; 
there was going to be a housecleaning ; the matter would have taken 
care of itself at that particular time. 

Senator Inouye. As one who was aware of the facts, didn't you think 
that as the President's confidant it was an obligation on your part to 
advise the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are different types of obligations. Sen- 
ator, and I think in my particular case I have always looked upon it as 
my obligation being that which was in the interests of the President, 
and I did not believe or feel at that particular time that it was neces- 
sary that he be so advised that these matters come out to the detriment 
of his second term. It was my full belief that he \^ as going to take care 
of the reorientation of the White House and the matter would be taken 
care of by itself. 

Senator Inouye. I am certain, Mr. Mitchell, you have heard of the 
famous memo prepared by Mr. Buzhardt ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The one that the Senator read ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have a slight knowledge of it. [Laughter.] 

Senator Inouye. In this memo, Mr. Buzhardt suggested that, based 
upon the information made available to your successor, Mr. Klein- 
dienst, he stated in late July 1972 that : "It did not appear that any 
White House people or any high ranking committee people were in- 
volved in the preparation of planning or discussion of the break-in." 

The White House memo goes on to note that, "History fails to record 
that at that moment Dean corrected the Attorney General's erroneous 
impression by pointing out that ^litchell, Magruder, and Dean had all 
been involved in planning of operations of which Watergate was the 
obvious derivative or that Strachan had knowledge of the fruits of 
this kind of operation or that all of them were suborning perjury 
and otherwise seeking to conceal the facts." 



1818 

The memo goes on to fix Dean with the principal blame for, and I 
quote : "The political and constitutional crisis that Watergate now 
epitomizes." 

Such blame as a senior and as a man whose counsel and advice the 
President of the United States sought with much greater frequency 
and respect would seem to share in. at least equal proportion, and 
that memo goes on to say : 

It would have been embarrassing to the President if the true facts had been 
known shortly after June 17 but it is the kind of embarrassment that an im- 
mensely popular President could have easily weathered. The political problem 
had been magnified a thousandfold because the truth is coming to light so be- 
latedly because of insinuations that the White House was a party to the coverup 
and, above all, because the White House was led to say things about Watergate 
that have been since found to have been untrue. 

Do you still maintain that you served your President and your 
Nation well by the course you pursued ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I don't know whether you are adopting Mr. 
Buzhardt's premises or not. I certainly do not adopt them. Further- 
more, as I listened to your reading of that particular paragraph it 
relates solely to Watergate. ]My reasons — .my motives — liad to do with 
an entirely different subject matter and that had to do with the White 
House horror stories, not the Watergate. 

Senator Inotjye. Mr. Mitchell, if the reelection of President Nixon 
was so important that you were willing to engage in activities which 
have been well described as being irregular to insure his reelection, I 
think a question lies in many minds at this time. To what length are 
you now willing to go to deceive in an effort to avoid further implica- 
tion of the President in the activities under investigation by this 
panel? More specifically, are you willing to lie to protect the 
President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, there is one great thing about the answer 
that I can give to that question to you. I do not have to make that 
choice because, to my knowledge, the President was not knowledgeable, 
certainly about the Watergate, or certainly knowledgeable about any- 
thing that had to do with the coverup, if that is the phrase that we are 
using. So I do not have to make that choice. 

Senator Inouye. In your testimony, Mr. Mitchell, you have sug- 
gested that it would not be fair — that is the word you have used — fair 
to the President" if the facts relating to Watergate and the ^^Hiite 
House horrors had been brought to his attention and to the attention 
of the American people during the election campaign. Have you ever 
considered whether it was fair to the members of the opposition party 
or fair to the American people to conspire to keep them from the true 
facts of this matter ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I am sure that that subject matter has crossed 
my mind many, many times. But I do not believe now, I did not believe 
then, that the President should be charged with the transgressions of 
others. And it is just as simple as that. 

Senator Inouye. What was wrong with telling the people of the 
United States the facts involved as you knew them as Attorney 
General ? 

Mr. Mitchell. As Attorney General ? 

Senator Inouye. Or as the chairman of the Committee To Re-Elect 
the President ? 



1819 

Mr. Mitchell. The campaign director ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. It was a fact that, as you know — are well aware of, 
Senator, that these matters are imputed, of course, to the highest 
authority regardless of where they arise. And it was my opinion that 
he would be improperly associated with these activities. 

Senator Inouye. I am reminded that as Attorney General, like all 
public officials, you were required to take an oath of office to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States. And I am reminded by telegrams 
that I have been receiving that this is a Government of laws and not of 
men. Did you feel that the President was above the laws of the land ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The President is never above the laws of the land 
and to my knowledge, he has faithfully executed the laws of the land. 

Senator Inouye. Did you not think that in your discussion of the 
laws of the land and the upholding of the Constitution, you had an 
obligation to advise the President of these irregularities? 

Mr. Mitchell. At what time and what timeframe are you talking 
about, Senator? 

Senator Inouye. The meeting of January 27 ; the meetings of Feb- 
ruary 4 and March 30. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, March 30, 1 was not in public office. 
With respect to the prior ones, the discussions did not go to the point 
where I thought it was of a requisite nature that anybody be advised 
of them because of the actions that I took with respect to them. 

Senator Inouye. In your discussion with Mr. Dash, you said the 
following, speaking of the President, and I believe that this is rather 
important : 

Mr. Mitchell. What I am saying is that I think I know the individual, I know 
his reaction to things, and I have a very strong feeling that during the period of 
time in which I was in association with him and did talk to him on the telephone, 
that I just do not believe that he had that information or had that knowledge. 
Otherwise, I think the type of conversations we had would have brought it out. 

Mr. Dash. Generally, is it fair to say that much of your opinion that you 
express is based on your faith in the President and your knowledge of the man, 
rather than any specific statement the President made to you or that you made 
to the President? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I subscribe to the first two. I do have faith in the Presi- 
dent and I do think I have knowledge of the man and I do think there are enough 
discussions in that area, in the general area, to the point where I think the general 
subject matter would have come out if the President had had knowledge. 

This is A^erv important, because based upon your knowledge of the 
President, and as a judge of men and men's character, you are suggest- 
ing to this committee and to the people of the Ignited States that the 
President was not aware of the break-in and of the coverup that fol- 
lowed. In your position as Attorney General, like all of us in public 
office, vou are called upon to hire people or to get yourself involved in 
the process of hiring people. I note that you have hired or were 
involved in the process of hiring very important men — Jeb Magruder, 
John Dean, Frederick LaRue, Mr. Mardian, Mr. G. Gordon Liddy, 
and Major General Turner. I note that there is one thing in common 
with all of these men : Thev have all been invoh-ed in the commission 
of a crime. Would you say that you are a good judge of character, sir? 
[Laughter.] 

Mr. Mitchell. If the Senator wants to go back over that list, I will 
discuss them item by item. 



1820 

No. 1, with respect to Mr. Dean, I did not hire him ; Mr, Kleindienst 
did, as the Deputy Attorney General. I would have fully subscribed to 
his hiring him at that particular time. As Mr. Dean has testified, I 
advised him to stay in the Justice Department, not to go to the White 
House. 

With respect to Mr. Liddy, if you would take and look at his record 
and background to the date upon which his hiring was discussed with 
me by Mr. Dean, he had an impeccable record. 

With respect to General Turner, he probably had the finest record 
with respect to his activities to the date of his hiring as the chief mar- 
shal that anybody could possibly have. He had more citations, he was 
better known for his activities in connection with demonstrations and 
sabotage. We were de-politicizing the marshal's service. Here was a 
man with an impeccable Army record. 

Have I missed somebody ? 

Senator Inotjye. Mr. Magruder. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Magruder, of course, was recommended from the 
White House and perfectly acceptable to me at that particular time. 

So that if you look at the background of these individuals to the 
time that they came into the picture so far as I was concerned, they 
all had impeccable reords. 

Senator Inouye. And you did not at any time note any flaw in them ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was not aware of any, of course. 

Senator Inouye. Throughout your testimony, you have responded to 
questions by using the word "hindsight," that by "hindsight" you may 
have done otherwise. 

What advice would you give to your successor so that he will not 
repeat some of the errors you have made, which you admit by 
hindsight ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, needless to say. Senator, I haven't really given 
a great deal of thought as to that particular subject matter, but there 
is one item that keeps coming to the fore all of the time, and I presume 
you are talking about a political campaign. There is one thought that 
keeps coming to the fore all the time in my mind and it particularly re- 
lates to what happened in the campaign for the reelection of the Presi- 
dent. The campaign is a most unique operation. It builds up in a very 
short time to a crescendo and then, of course, it is terminated, and the 
organization and its activities are abolished. I would think that the 
one thing that has stuck in my mind very clearly, is that instead of 
having one individual as a campaign director, that can't keep his hands 
on the pulse of everything that is going on, that there ought to be much 
clearer lines of authority and responsibility so that it is compart- 
mentalized to the point where you can keep your hands on things and 
that you can have somebody in charge of a j^articular segment of it and 
that those people do have a greater responsibility instead of bucking 
everything up to the top, whether it be by option memos or what- 
ever it is. Because you are dealing with people ; you are dealing in a 
highly charged, emotional area. And to me, that is one thing that I can 
think of right off the bat that should be done in connection with po- 
litical campaigns. 

Senator Ixotjye. As the former chief law officer of the United States, 
would you care to recommend to this committee any legislation to 
prevent the recurrence of some of the irregularities that occurred in 
the 1972 Presidential election ? 



1821 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I would be delighted to do that, but I would 
like to give it more thought and a little bit more study. I have noticed 
that one of the committees of the Senate is already hacking away at 
the election law in areas that deserve consideration, which were one 
of the problems, problem areas that we had to consider. I think this is 
something that needs a great deal of thought and can't be expressed 
at a time like this, when other matters are on the table. But I would 
be delighted to provide you with my thoughts on the subject matter. 

Senator Inouye. As director of the campaign on March 1 — I believe 
that is the date you assumed the position ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, it was not. The date that I formally assumed 
the responsibilities as campaign director was April 9. 

Senator Inouye. April 9. On that date were you concerned about 
the nomination of Eichard Nixon ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think you always have to have a concern. Senator, 
regardless of the fact that you have an incumbency. You still had two 
opponents ; one on the — shall we say on the spectrum of the left, and 
one on the spectrum of the right. You have a long way to go between 
them and the nomination, and I think you always have to have a 
concern. 

Senator Inouye. My final question, sir, and that is the general ques- 
tion of executive privilege. As a former Attorney General of the United 
States, could you advise this committee as to your thoughts on executive 
privilege ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, my position has been, and I must admit in some 
of the appearances before the Judiciary Committee that the chairman 
and I have not always agreed, that the President has very wide range 
of powers in this particular field. I believe there is also testimony in 
this record coming from Mr. Dean to the effect that I was out in front 
recommending that the President not invoke it in connection with the 
hearings that this committee has undertaken. I felt the President was 
being ill served by the thought that he would invoke executive priv- 
ilege with respect to this committee, even though he might have the 
constitutional power to do so. 

Senator Inouye. To be more specific, it has been reported in the 
press that Mr. Ehrlichman, when asked a question : "Did you notify 
the President as to the Watergate break-in?" his response was "execu- 
tive privilege." Do you think that executive privilege goes that far? 

Mr. Mitchell. If I understand you that Mr. Ehrlichman was asked 
a question about the subject matter ? 

Senator Inouye. As to whether he advised the President of the 
United States as to the Watergate break-in and his response was, "I 
do not wish to discuss this matter because of executive privilege." 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, in my understanding of executive privilege 
it is not Mr. Ehrlichman that can invoke it. It is— the President is the 
only one who can invoke the area of executive privilege. 

Senator Inouye. As the chief law officer of the United States do you 
see a distinction between the activities of the President of the United 
States and a person running for reelection to the Presidency of the 
United States? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it depends on the area, of course, in which we 
are 

Senator Inouye. Let us assume we have papers. Presidential papers, 
papers involving the Presidency of the United States and papers 



1822 

involving efforts to reelect this person. Should all of these papers be 
bunched into one category of Presidential papers ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, "it depends ent:!ely on the nature of the con- 
tents of the papers, and if they are the President's papers, and I have 
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on my opinion with 
respect to this, the President has absolute power of executive privilege ; 
that is power extended to that area. 

Now, if we are talking about papers that do not involve the Presi- 
dent — they are collateral to him or staff papers— that is an entirely 
different subject matter. 

Senator Inouye. What if these papers recommend or suggest the 
commission of crimes ? 

Mr. Mitchell. What papers are we talking about. Senator ? 

Senator Inouye. Papers that are now in the White House. 

Mr. Mitchell. Papers that went to the President ? 

Senator Inouye. Memos that were prepared by staff members 
addressed to the President of the United States. 

Mr. Mitchell. That recommended commissions of crimes ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would doubt that such papers would exist ; but if 
they are talking about staff papers, I think it is an entirely different 
matter with respect to — what we are talking about is Presidential 
executive privilege. 

Senator Inouye. Would you consider the involvement of the CIA in 
domestic affairs as being within the laws of the United States ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is a very, very broad question. Senator, 
that cannot 

Senator Inouye. I am certain you are awar^ of the so-called Dean 
papers ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There are so many Dean papers that I think we ought 
to be a little more specific. 

Senator Inouye. These are the memorandums describing the forma- 
tion of an extra legal intelligence organization in which you were 
involved. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, are you talking about what we discussed yester- 
day as the Huston papers ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Not the Dean papers as such. 

Senator Inouye. We would call them Dean papers because he col- 
lected all of these papers. 

Mr. Mitchell. I just want to be sure we are talking about the same 
documents. 

Senator Inouye. The Huston papers ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, there has been a necessity in this country 
from the time that the FBI and the CIA were created, in my opinion, 
that there be liaison and coordination among those agencies as well as 
others in this Government. It does not necessarily imply that the CIA 
have an operative action or an operative base within the United 
States— which is prohibited by statute— but if we are to get the 
benefit out of the intelligence thiat the CIA has, and the FBI has, and 
the DIA has, and all the rest of the agencies, we just have to have com- 
munication among those agencies and, as I said yesterday, even more 
important, an evaluation of the intelligence that they do provide 



1823 

because there has been too long a practice in this country for one of 
these agencies to have information about intelligence matters that get 
into the file in the operative agencies that can carry out a mission to 
prohibit some of these things just do not have that information, and 
I think a good example, without knowing the facts, is the recent as- 
sassination of the member of the Israeli Embassy here in the District 
of Columbia. Now, obviously, the greatest amount of intelligence that 
could possibly come with respect to that matter would be the CIA, 
and if the CIA were knowledgeable with respect to the individuals 
that might perpetrate such a crime they certainly have to pass it on 
to the FBI and the Washington police in order that proper action 
can be taken. 

I use this as a hypothetical case without any specific knowledge. 

Senator Inouye. But did not the Huston papers describe something 
else besides coordination ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes ; very much so. 

Senator Inotjye. Did they not describe the activities of the DIA and 
CIA in surveilling citizens, dissident groups, Black Panthei'S, the 
"Weathermen ? We are not talking about foreign enemies. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, as I testified yesterday, I did not 
study the Huston plan. It was discussed with me. and I saw some of 
the notes from my recollection where Director Hoover objected to it. 
To the extent that it involved the items that you are talking about, in 
my opinion, is one of the reasons that it was tuiTied down and not 
implemented. But I am saying that, and we started this discussion on 
the basis of CIA and its activities within the country, it has no opera- 
tional activities and should not have, that is not what it was created 
for, but there is no rhyme or reason in the world why the intelligence 
that they have should not be passed on and imparted to the law 
enforcement or investigative agencies in this country that do have 
operational responsibilities. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Mitchell, getting back to the Presidential 
papers, if this committee should decide to issue a subpena to get these 
papers, what do you think should be the response of the White House? 

Mr, Mitchell. Well, I am afraid you are going to have to ask Mr. 
Buzhardt that ; he seems to be making most of the decisions over there. 
I have no opinion on the subject matter. 

Senator Inotiye. As a former chief law officer, what are your 
thoughts, sir ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sorry, Senator. Was that question which you 
put to me as a former chief? It would depend entirely on the nature of 
the papers, as we discussed before. If they are matters of Presidential 
communications I think there is an absolute privilege. If they get into 
collateral areas where the President is not involved, I think that is an 
entirely different subject matter. 

Senator Inouye. Once again to the Huston papers, you have indi- 
cated that your knowledge is limited to a discussion of it but according 
to testimony you had approved it. Did you approve the Huston plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, that is absolutely incorrect. If I may recount 
what I think the record shows, and certainly what is my recollection, 
is that with respect to the Huston papers there were conferences held 
under the aegis of, I presume, Mr. Huston from the "White House, 
among the heads of the intelligence-gathering agencies, the CIA, the 



1824 

FBI, and the DIA, which resulted in a memorandum that provided 
for activities with respect to domestic subversives, of course, as well 
as national security, and involved such things as surreptitious entry 
of places, mail covers, et cetera. I was not part of that committee. 1 
had no knowledge of it until it was brought to my attention by the 
Director of the FBI. It was then that the matter was discussed with 
me and it was then or shortly thereafter that the concept was 
terminated. 

Senator Inouye. Were you aware that the President of the United 
States approved the Huston plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I testified yesterday I was not. 

Senator Inouye. Is it not strange that the Attorney General, as a 
participant in the discussions, that you were not aware of this ? 
_ Mr. Mitchell. As a participant in the discussions ? I was not a par- 
ticipant in the discussions with respect to the plan. I was a participant 
in discussions when Mr. Hoover and, I believe, Mr. DeLoach came to 
rne with their concerns about the matter. I was not a participant in the 
discussions that led to the formulation of the plan. 

Senator Inouye. But you advised the President of the United States 
as to your misgivings and reservations ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is my very strong recollection that I advised Mr. 
Haldeman and the President after it was brought to my attention by 
Mr. DeLoach and Mr, Hoover. 
_ Senator Inouye. What is your relationship with Mr. Kalmbach, 
sir ? Do you know him well ? 

Mr. Mitcheli,. Well, I can't say I know him well. I have known Mr. 
Kalmbach since 1968 and have seen him infrequently over that period 
of time. I knew him, of course, in connection with the 1968 campaign. 
Our contacts between 1968 and 1970 or 1971 have been very infrequent ; 
probably more social than anything else. And, of course, I knew him 
during the 1971-72 campaign, Avhen he was a fundraiser. 

Senator Inouye. Did you have any relationship with him during 
the month of June, more specifically, 18, 19, and 20, of 1972? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I had a very, very close relationship with Mr. 
Kalmbach during that particular period of time, because it was during 
that particular period when I was talking to him daily or perhaps 
twice a day, because he was kind enough — he along with his wife and 
the secretaries in his office — to be of great assistance to my wife, who 
was then out in Newport, and I am sure you know the rest of the story. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. IMitchell, I believe in response to a press in- 
quiry relating to Mr. McCord, your answer was something to the effect 
that Mr. McCord has a private business and he had several clients and 
your committee was one of the clients. Isn't it true that you were per- 
sonally acquainted with Mr. McCord ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, you are asking two questions. The 
press statement that you are talking about was the press statement 
that I put out when we first found out about the break-in. the burglar- 
ization of the Democratic National Committee, where Mr. McCord was 
involved. Ever>i:hing in it was actually true. 

I had one meeting on April 5 with Mr. ^McCord — is the only time 
that I have ever met with the gentleman and talked to him. And that 
meeting was for the purpose of briefing me as I was coming into my 
law office, which was in the same building as the Committee To Re- 



1825 

Elect the President, briefing me on the security measures that were 
being established and to be established in connection with that facility 
in 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue. That is the only meeting that I have 
ever had with Mr. McCord in my life. 

The other times that I have seen Mr. McCord were casual passages, 
when he was in the lobby of 1701, and I think at one time, he was in 
the hallway of the apartment where we live. That is the extent of my 
contacts with Mr. McCord. 

Senator Inotjye. Was Mr. McCord in charge of providing security 
for your personal apartment ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; I don't believe that it could be classified as such, 
I learned at a later date that Mr. McCord did an electronic sweep of 
the apartment, in what timeframe I do not know. But there was no- 
body providing security for the apartment as such. 

Senator Inouye. Was he in charge of the security of your person and 
the person of your wife ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not personally. Mr. McCord, with the assistance and 
help of other individuals, provided people that traveled with my wife 
and myself when we traveled as security personnel. Mr. McCord, to 
my knowledge, never traveled with my wife, and I know he never 
traveled with me. 

Senator Inouye. It has been testified that Mr. McCord occasionally 
picked up your daughter at school and brought her back to the Water- 
gate apartment. 

Mr. Mitchell. This could conceivably have happened, and I don't 
know the facts, for a very, very limited period of time, because when 
we left the Justice Department, I immediately made arrangements to 
have off-duty marshals take care of the transportation of my daughter 
and I have, of course, the statement and bills to show it. So that if this 
were the case, if Mr. McCord did this, it was for a period of 1 or 2 or 
whatever davs there were in this interim period before these off-duty 
marshals picked up the task and carried it out. 

Senator Inouye. Mv final question, sir, and this goes back to mv first 
question : Why did you not advise the President of these irregularities 
after the election ? t believe your response was that you were confident 
that the White House would take care of it. 

Mr, Mitchell, I was quite confident that the White House would 
take care of the problem, or at least the individuals there, to the point 
that it would not happen again, that the change of personnel, which 
was announced, the reduction of the staff, the people that were moving 
out of the White House that had been participants in these activities, 
that there was no ^-eason, in mv opinion, to cast a pall over the second 
term of the Presidency with respect to these matters. 

Senator Inouye, Weren't you concerned when some of the major 
participants were not beinj? tossed out ? 

Mr. Mttchet.l, Yes, sir, I was. 

Senator Inouye. Whv didn't vou tell the President then? 

Mr. Mitchell. I felt that the maiority of them had been removed 
and I wouM have t>>on«T'ht that the lessons had been learned. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Magruder was not removed, Mr. Dean was not 
removed. 

Mr, Mitchell. Mr. Ma^-ruder was not placed into the White House, 
Mr, Dean, in my opinion, was not the perpetrator of the "White House 



1826 

horrors. To my knowledge, I don't believe Mr. Dean had any hand 
in it whatsoever. 

Senator Inouye. Was he not a participant ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dean ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. In the White House horrors that we have talked 
about ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. To my knowledge he was not. 

Senator Inouye. Was he a participant in the coverup of the 
Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe Mr. Dean was very knowledgeable of the 
subject matter and participated to the extent that he has testified to. 

Senator Inouye. Didn't you think that you had an obligation to 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, if I can add an addendum to that, Mr. Dean 
was at that time looking for other employment and was, hopefully, 
going to be able to get out of the White House. 

Senator Inouye. If Mr. Dean was not the perpetrator, who was the 
perpetrator of the White House horror stories ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I believe that the best answers to your question 
will be those who testify to it and the ones that have testified to it. I 
read in the newspaper of the affidavits that have been filed in connec- 
tion with the Ellsberg case and the discussions with respect to the 
Diem papers, the statements that the individuals have made with 
respect to the Dita Beard matter, et cetera. I think that my knowledge 
is that of one who has received it from some of those that were 
involved. But I can't give you the chapter and verse as to who were 
the total number of individuals that were involved in each of these 
activities. 

Senator Inouye. When did you first learn of the White House 
horrors ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, as I testified yesterday, the first story that I 
got with respect to them was the debriefing of the briefing that Mr. 
Liddy gave to Mr. Mardian and Mr. LaRue and, subsequent to that 
time, Mr. Dean imparted a great deal of the knowledge in other areas 
to me that Mr. Liddy had not provided Mardian or LaRue. 

Senator Inouye. Did the President know of the White House horrors 
at that time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In my opinion, no. If he had, in my opinion, I think 
he would have taken some pretty strong action. 

Senator Inouye. Why did you not tell the President? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that is the same question that we have an- 
swered three times this morning. Senator. We are now talking about 
the end of June; we are talking about the election; we are talking 
about the campaign. 

Senator Inouye. We are not talking about Watergate ; we are talk- 
ing about the other horror stories. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is exactly correct. Those are the ones that I am 
talking about, which to me were a great deal more damaging to the 
election than Watergate. Watergate was already out. Watergate was 
the issue. It was the subject of a suit by the Democratic National Com- 
mittee. It was constantly in the newspapers. The White House horror 
stories were not out. They were not under discussion. And these were 



1827 

the things that would have more impact upon the election, in my opin- 
ion, than the Watergate matter. ^ 

Senator Inouye. Did you think it was the obligation on the part 
of the President's two closest aides to have advised the President of 
these horrors — Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am afraid I am going to have to let them talk 
for themselves. Senator. I don't want to judge what another man 
should or should not have done. 

Senator Inouye. In your discussions with Mr. Haldeman or Mr. 
Ehrlichman, did they ever tell you that they advised the President of 
these horrors? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir ; they did not. 

Senator Inouye. Did they ever advise you that the President was 
informed as to the break-in and the coverup that followed? 

Mr. Mitchell. That the President was advised of the break-in? 
Obviously, he was advised of the break-in. Everybody was that read 
the newspapers. 

Now, the second part about it, with respect to the coverup ? No, they 
have never advised me that he was informed of that part of the subject. 

Senator Inouye. Was the President concerned about the fact that 
checks issued by your committee had found their way into the hands 
of those who had broken into the Watergate office of the Democratic 
National Committee? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would presume that he would be ; but I have never 
discussed the subject matter with him, so I can't give you a firsthand, 
personal report on it. 

Senator Inouye. If these things had been out in the press, didn't you 
think it was your obligation to fill the President in with the details ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, which things are we talking about ? 

Senator Inouye. The Watergate. You just said that the press had 
covered it adequately. 

Mr. Mitchell. I did not believe, and to this day, I believe that I was 
right in not involving the President in any of these subject matters, 
because obviously, he would have had to take, as T have testified before, 
very strong action, which would have been to the great detriment of the 
campaign that was being run on his behalf. 

Senator Inouye. And, in your mind, the campaign was of the utmost 
importance, the election outcome ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The reelection of the President, this particular Presi- 
dent, was uppermost in my mind without question. 

Senator Inouye. And it is your feeling that everything should be 
done to protect this present administration from further damage ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't get the thrust of your question. Senator. Are 
vou talking as of now, as of this date ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that the current time in the affairs of men 
are to the point where these stories are now out, they should be fully 
explored. I think those who are involved should be fully identified, 
and I think that the appropriate action should be taken because as of 
this particular time there is no rhvme or reason why the circumstances 
should trv to revert back to what they were prior to the election or even 
prior to the time that the stories came forth in whatever manner they 
came forth. I think, however, that great care should be taken to ascer- 

96-296 O— 73— bk. 5 2 



1828 

tain who was involved and how they were involved instead of just 
lumping it into a catch phrase of Watergate or coverup or things like 
that. I think it is time that the individual activities be properly par- 
celed out. 

'Senator Inouye. You have said on several occasions that if the Presi- 
dent had been notified he would ha\'e lowered the boom and would have 
taken drastic steps, and you have also suggested that you know the man 
very well. What would the President have done if you had notified him 
of the Watergate and the coverup ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure that he would have — here again, Senator, 
you are talking about Watergate ? 

Senator Inouye. The coverup. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is that what you are talking about ? 

Senator Inouye. And the coverup. 

Mr. Mitchell. We have to get, I think, more specific in order to 
discuss these matters in the proper context. Are we talking about what 
we have now discussed for the last 2 days, the Wliite House horror 
stories. Are we talking about the Watergate break-in or we talking 
about 

Senator Inouye. Let's say the whole package. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would say that the President would have brought 
in the appropriate governmental officials from the investigative side 
and from those who were the prosecutors and laid it all out to them 
and said "Here it is, take it in the proper process of law." 

Senator Inouye. He would have brought the FBI in ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the investigative agency that acts on behalf of 
the Federal Government ; yes, sir. And, of course, the important thing 
is to get the facts and make sure of your facts before you go to the 
prosecutorial aspect of any activity. 

Senator Inouye. What would the President have done if he found 
out that his choice for the directorship had destroyed evidence ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am sure he would have done what he has 
done since and that is made sure he was replaced very rapidly by some- 
body who was not so involved. 

Senator Inouye. Would he have fired Mr. Magruder? Would he 
have fired Mr. Dean? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would feel quite certain that would be the case. 

Senator Inouye. And yet these men were not fired after the election. 

Mr. Mitchell. They were not fired because the President was not 
aware of any of the activities that they were involved in. After all, 
with respect to Mr, Dean, the President was unaware of his activities 
at that time after the election, in my opinion; and second, as far as 
Mr. Magruder is concerned, that was such a lower echelon that I am 
sure that the President was not particularly involved in his continu- 
ance on the Inaugural Committee or whatever governmental job he 
went to. 

Senator Inouye. With all the headlines and all of the lead articles, 
the front page articles, appearing in the Post, the Times, and other 
national newspapers, isn't it strange that the President was never 
concerned to call in the investigatory arm of the Federal GoA'ernment 
to investiffate the alleged irregularities being carried out bv members 
of his staff? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator 



1829 

Senator Inouye. In these articles names were named. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, the investigative arm of the Federal Gov- 
ernment, as I think you described it, the FBI, had been investigating 
this case from June 1972, and I am sure their investigation has con- 
tinued all the way through. 

Senator Inouye. Do you think they did a good job ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not privy to what they did or didn't do. I have 
heard statements made with respect to the number of investigations, 
the man-hours, and so forth. I don't know what they did or didn't do. 

Senator Inouye. You have indicated that Mr. Magruder was low 
on the totem pole, from the lower echelon, the fact that he was deputy 
director of the campaign and had authority to spend unlimited funds ; 
didn't that make him very important ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, we are changing courses here now. He was 
talking about his governmental position the last time. With respect 
to his activities in the campaign obviously he was quite important. 

Senator Inouye. This is absolutely my last question. [Laughter.] 

I believe that all of us would maintain that we are men of honesty, 
men of truth, and men of integrity. You have indicated that you have 
great faith in the President and that his administration is of utmost 
importance, to what extent would you go to protect the good name of 
the President? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I think I answered that same question in 
another form previously. Fortunately, I don't have to make that deter- 
mination. I think the good name of the President is going to be pro- 
tected by the facts and by the President himself and that I won't have 
to be a party to any circumstances that relate to that. 

Senator Inouye. And it is your testimony that those who have pre- 
ceded you, suggesting that the President had prior knowledge or in- 
volved in these activities are totally false ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is my testimony, as I answered similar questions 
yesterday on a number of occasions, that I have no reason personally 
to believe through anything that I have ever heard or said or seen done 
that the President had prior knowledge with respect to these matters, 
and I have a very strong feeling from my discussions with the Presi- 
dent over the period of time, and this is a feeling, obviously it has to 
be, that I don't know what he knows or what others may have told him, 
but I have a very strong feeling that he does not, or did not, I should 
say, have prior knowledge with respect to the matter of the break-in 
or what has become generally referred to as the coverup. 

Senator Inouye. This is your feeling, sir ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is my feeling. I would point out that so far as I, 
my personal dealing with the President during this period of time, 
my discussions with him, there is nothing that has ever occurred which 
would give me any such indication. 

Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, sir. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mitchell, your testimonv has been significant in manv respects. 
It has given us new insight into important new material. It has also 
created apparent conflicts with the testimonv of other witnesses. I refer 
particularly, of course, to the testimony of Mr. Magruder ; in some in- 



1830 

stances to the testimony of Mr. Dean ; in some minor respects to the 
testimony of Mr. Stans, and others. And I know that the function of 
the law of evidence or testimony taken in a situation is to try to recon- 
cile apparent conflicts, if that is possible, before concluding that any 
witnesses have sworn falsely, let alone trying to establish where the 
truth lies, if reconciliation is impossible. 

I intend to proceed on the assumption that T have proceeded with 
every other witness, that what you have sworn to is the truth until the 
contrary is made to appear, if it is made to appear, and on the basis 
and the assumption that what you have told us is the truth I would 
like to put certain questions that I believe are material and relevant 
to this inquiry, and important. 

Would you tell me, Mr. Mitchell, what is your perception of the in- 
stitution of the Presidency ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Is that part of the purpose of this committee, to ascer- 
tain from me the perception of the Presidency ? 

Senator Baker. I think it is, Mr. Mitchell, because I think your 
perception, or the perception of anyone who worked with and for the 
President, of the institution itself has some bearing on the decision- 
making processes that are undertaken. I think it has some bearing, for 
instance, on the question of why you did not tell the President of these 
facts, and I know you have indicated that you have answered those 
questions a number of times before, but I would like to approach it 
from another standpoint, that is: TVhat is your perception of the 
Presidency and, modified still further, what is your perception of your 
responsibility to the Presidency, both as the Attorney General of the 
United States, as a friend of the President, and as a private citizen — 
what is your perception of the obligations of the Presidency and your 
obligations to it? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, I could, of course, go on for hours as 
to the perception that I have of the Presidencv and what it stands for 
but I think our Constitution and statutes outline that very clearly as 
the Chief Executive Officer of this country. I think that perhaps what 
you would like to get to is my thought of my responsibility to the 
Presidency. 

Senator Baker. That is right. 

I would like to know your perception of the Presidency. I am rather 
fully aware of the constitutional description of the office, the separa- 
tion of powers, of the derivative doctrines of executive privilege, of 
the stated constitutional requirement of the President, the obligations 
of the Presidency, and the statutory mandates that are given to that 
occupant from time to time. But what I am interested in is your per- 
ception of that institution. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of the Presidency? 

Senator Baker. Of the institution. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Mitchell. Of the Presidency. 

Senator Baker. Of the institution of the Presidency. Let me give 
you a few examples to see if it will help any. [Laughter.] Is the 
President 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I could go on for days on perception of the 
Presidency. 

Senator Baker. I am forebeannff and willing, as a matter of fact, 
and we may have to do it that way but it is important — it is important 



1831 

enough at least from my standpoint, to have insight not only into your 
perception of the institution and your relationship to it but also your 
insight into what may have been the President's perception of that 
office. 

Now, let me give you an example or so. Is the Presidency so shrouded 
in mystique, is there such an aura of magnificence about the Presi- 
dency, is there such an awesome responsibility for a multitude of 
problems and undertakings of this Nation that the Presidency in some 
instances must be spared the detail, must be spared the difficulty of 
situations which in more ordinary circumstances might be considered 
by some at least to be frank, open, declarations of criminal offense ? 
Is the Presidency to be protected in that way ? Is the splendor of the 
isolation so great that the President must be protected and if so, in 
what cases? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, we can talk to the specifics of this partic- 
ular case, the Presidency, in my concept of it and the way I have 
watched it function is that obviously the President cannot deal with 
all of the mundane problems that go on from day to day. He has to 
deal with the greater problems in the area. 

Now, to get to the point where I come in, and that is it is my opinion 
and my concern with respect to this particular Presidency, that he 
should not have been involved in connection with these matters that 
bore directly upon his election, and he should have been protected from 
the knowledge of them. 

Senator Baker. Why? 

Mr. Mitchell. In the interest of his reelection. 

Senator Baker. Why is that not a Presidential grade decision ? Why, 
of all decisions that might be made by the man, the candidate for Presi- 
dent of the United States, why should he not be permitted to make that 
decision ? What is it that arrogates that authority to someone else other 
than the President, to take a material step that will significantly affect 
not only his election prospects and chances but his Presidency, if he is 
reelected ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Because of the consequences that would obviously 
flow from it. 

Senator Baker. Why should he not make that decision ? 

Mr. Mitchell. If he were to make the decision there would be no 
alternative. He would have a choice of being involved in what you all 
referred to as a coverup or he would be involved in the disclosures 
which would affect his reelection. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Mitchell, does that not imply distrust of the 
decisionmaking ability of the man who occupied the office at the time — 
that you spare him the responsibility to make such a fantastically 
important decision? 

Mr. Mitchell. Quite the contrary, and I do not refer to it as a fan- 
tastically important decision. Of course, in retrospect, it has been, and 
perhaps the best thing maybe would have been to do that. But it is 
not a question of distrust of the President, it is a question of recogni- 
tion that if he were advised of the situation, that he would take these 
actions which would be deleterious to his campaign. 

Senator Baker. Then, what is your perception of the Presidency 
that leads you to believe that he ought to be spared the difficulty of 
making a monumental decision ? 



1832 

Mr. Mitchell. The very simple point, Senator, that it was an elec- 
tion year in which, if the facts were known to the President, that his 
course would have been obvious and it would have impeded his po- 
tential for reelection. Now, I am not saying today any more than I said 
yesterday that this was the right decision. I am telling you the basis 
upon which the decision was made. 

Senator Baker. I understand that. I have a full appreciation of the 
explanation you have given for why you made the decision. But I am 
trying to probe into your perception of the Presidency, your relation- 
ship to it, your knowledge of the man, that led you to make a decision 
for him. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think I have put that very simply in the last few 
sentences that I have stated. 

Senator Baker. I do not think I quite understand, at least 

Mr. Mitchell. Let me review it again. Knowing the current Presi- 
dent, knowing his respect for the Presidency, that there would be no 
options, no decisionmaking on his part. He would have unloaded, as I 
think I said yesterday, on all of the White House horror stories and 
this, in my opinion, would have impeded and had a direct effect, an 
adverse effect, on his reelection. 

Senator Baker. Is there any other important decision that you can 
think of that the President ought to be spared from making ? Give me 
another example of another situation where the Attorney General of 
the United States, or the chairman of the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President, or administrative staff or anyone else, should decide in order 
to spare him the lack of options, as you have described it — what else 
besides that would come to mind ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In what category ? 

Senator Baker. In any category. 

Mr. Mitchell. One that he should be spared or one that he should 
be advised of ? 

Senator Baker. No ; one that he should be spared. For the moment, 
I am going to pursue your theorem that this matter would have limited 
the President's options if you had told him about it. ^ 

Mr. Mitchell. It would have eliminated his options, not limited 
them. 

Senator Baker. Tell me another one that would be similar, another 
one that you would not tell the President about ; another consequential 
decision that you would not tell the President about to avoid eliminat- 
ing his options. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think as your hearings go on, you will find out 
about other ones, in connection with the staging of demonstrations up 
here in the Capitol and some of the other activities that were under- 
taken by some of the people who were involved in this campaign, that 
obviously he would have to condemn if they were known to him. 

Senator Baker. Is not what you are telling us, Mr. Mitchell, that in 
certain cases, in order to preserve a range of political options, that the 
President should be denied access to the information on which to make 
a legal and valid judgment as to the propriety of those actions? And if 
you say "Yes" to that, is it not true that that theorem has a significant 
diminishing effect on the powers of the Presidency as described in the 
Constitution ? 



1833 

Do you not, in fact, by that, arrogate unto yourself a Presidential 
decision ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I think the answer is "Yes" in all of those 
particular areas, because obviously, the basis of information has to be 
with the President before he can make his judgments on the subject 
matter. 

Senator Baker. What is the constitutional basis for arrogating unto 
yourself or anyone else a constitutional level — I mean, a Presidential- 
level decision ? 

Mr. Mitchell, I have not found one in the Constitution, Senator. 

Senator Baker. Then, what authority is there ? 

Mr. Mitchell. What authority — there is a matter of judgment you 
make in connection with these areas. 

Senator Baker. There are many judgments; some of them legal, 
some of them illegal. 

Mr. Mitchell. Some of them in hindsight are quite improper, 
obviously. 

Senator Baker. How do we protect against the necessity of viewing 
the world in hindsight ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In doing what to the world ? 

Senator Baker. In looking at the world in hindsight. How do we 
go about the business of legislating against such occurrences in the 
future ? How do we go about making sure that Presidential-level deci- 
sions, decisions of tremendous importance, are in fact made by the 
President and not by someone else ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, this happens every day in this Capital, 
where the President does not have information about a particular 
subject matter. 

Senator Baker. Surely it does not happen every day with respect to 
an illegal entry into the Democratic National Committee or efforts by 
principal White House staff, allegedly, to cover up those activities, or 
suborning perjury or conspiracy. Surely those do not happen every 
day. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, but there are many, many circumstances that 
probably have a greater effect on this country that happen every day 
within the departments that the President is not aware of so that he 
does not have the facility to make the decisions that are 

Senator Baker. Then, your answer to me implies — and I am not 
prepared to agree with it — but it implies a defect in the institution of 
the Presidency ; that is, the institution itself is not capable of dealing 
\yith first-magnitude questions. And I really am not prepared to be- 
lieve that. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not prepared to believe it or agree with it, either. 
I am telling you that the Presidency is perfectly capable of dealing 
with them if he has the information. 

Senator Baker. If someone else takes on themselves the decisionmak- 
ing authority on important issues and spares him ; is that what you 
say? 

Mr. Mitchell. This is frequently done, as you know. Not in the 
particular circumstances that you have just described, but it is done 
from day to day throughout the Government and always has been. 



1834 

Senator Baker. Let us talk about the man for the moment. The 
President of the United States is a man that you have spoken to for a 
long time and known intimately and that I have known for a long 
time, less intimately but for a long time. What is there in your percep- 
tion of the man that would contribute or did contribute to your deci- 
sion not to tell him about this ? I am not speaking now^ of the institution 
but rather of the man. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have described that circumstance and answered 
that question, Senator, a number of times here in the last 2 days, and 
'I will answer it again the same way. I know the man very well, just as 
you do, and as I say, he would have lowered the boom on the whole 
category of the IVhite House horrors and that this would have then, 
of course, spread across the whole White House and, of course, the 
derivative effect would have been upon the President and would have 
affected his election. 

Senator Baker. I am rather inclined to think you are right. I think 
he would have done that. 

Mr. Mitchell, I believe that 

Senator Baker. But I rather think that your hindsight is remark- 
able ; that you at that time, when you yourself, according to your testi- 
mony, were completely free from an}^ involvement in the so-called 
White House horrors, in the break-in incident on June 17, 1972, and 
certainly free of any allegations in connection with the coverup, the 
payoff, and the like. At that point in time, in mid-June 1972, you made 
a decision not to tell the President because you were afraid he would 
fire those involved. Even if you do not think of it from any circum- 
stance except how it affected you, did that not 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, 1 am quite well aware of that. I am well 
aware of that. But it is not just a question of firing something — some- 
body. It is a question of the unraveling of some of these activities that 
existed over there. 

Senator Baker. How could you promote the unraveling, how could 
you promote the ventilation of these circumstances, the exposure to 
light of justice of these matters by not telling him ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Tliat is a contradiction. Senator. 

Senator Baker. No ; it isn't. 

Mr. Mitchell. You couldn't promote them \\ithout telling him, 
because once you have told him, you and I have agreed that he would 
take the action that would unravel them. 

Senator Baker. Then you start from the premise that it was better 
not to unravel them and I start from the premise that it would have 
been better to unravel them. Now, is that the basis, is that the percep- 
tion that led you to decide not to tell the President the facts ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Exactly. At that period of time, that was a decision 
that was made. In hindsight, it might have been entirely correct. But 
it was a decision that was made. 

'Senator Baker. It was — aren't you dead sure in your mind that that 
was a mistake, not telling the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I am not certain that that is the case, because 
we were talking about the weeks of June in 1972, where I still believe 
that the most important thing to this country was the reelection of 
Richard Nixon. And I was not about to countenance anything that 
would stand in the way of that reelection. 



1835 

Senator Baker. Anything at all ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well. [Laughter.] We can get to some points where 
I am sure that 

Senator Baker. Wliere ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure if it had to involve treason and other high 
crimes and misdemeanors that were directly related to the office, that 
there would be a very definite breaking point. 

Senator Baker. Wouldn't it have been infinitely better, and aren't 
you certain of this, Mr. Mitchell — in hindsight — wouldn't it have been 
infinitely better to line up everybody on the south lawn of the White 
House and have the President find out on June 17, 1972, what in the 
world happened ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, are you talking about what, Senator ? 

Senator Baker. I am talking about the break-in of the Democratic 
National Conunittee headquarters at the Watergate complex at 2 in 
the morning of June 17, 1972. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was not the concern. Senator, and I hope I have 
made it clear to this committee that it was not the break-in at the 
Watergate that was the concern. What we are referring to is the White 
House horror stories. 

Senator Baker. Are you talking about the Huston papers ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No; I am talking about the Ellsberg matter, the 
Diem papers, the Dita Beard matter, the stories of surreptitious and 
unauthorized wiretapping, the bombing of the Brookings Institute, et 
cetera. 

Senator Baker. We must move forward to June 22, when you re- 
ceived your briefing from those involved on what happened at the 
Watergate. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

Senator Baker. At that moment, in retrospect, aren't you certain 
now that the country would have been better served and the President 
would have been better served by calling to account every single per- 
son in the administration who even allegedly had anything to do with 
it and to express to the President personally what happened ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, you are talking about not only the W^atergate 
but these other activities that we have just gotten through with? 

Mr. Baker. I am speaking of everything that occurred from Jan- 
uary 20, 1969, to June 22, 1972. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, if I could have been assured at that time 
that the President would have been reelected, I would agree with you 
wholeheartedly. 

Senator Baker. You understand, I am sure, what an enormous 
premium, then, you put on success? I suppose all politicians put a 
great premium on success. But do you care to weigh that any further 
and tell me that the concealment from the President of facts such as 
you have described as the Watergate horrors, the break-in 

Mr. Mitchell. No, the "White House. 

Senator Baker. The White House horrors and the break-in to the 
Watergate on June 17, that all of those thinors were inferior in im- 
portance to the ultimate reelection of the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I had no doubt about it at that time and I have no 
doubt about it now. 



1836 

Senator Baker. What would the President have to have done be- 
fore his reelection was not as important as the event ? Or what would 
someone have had to have done other than the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, I am sure you are well aware that 
the President was not knowledgeable of the — or involved in that and 
this would have been a derivative rubofE on many of something that 
was, would have been absolutely unfair and unjustified. 

Senator Baker. Isn't it unfair that he is now undergoing the hos- 
tility and the suspicion of the Nation in this respect with the allega- 
tions of coverup, with the lingering suspicion about what he knew? 
Isn't that greatly, isn't that far more unfair ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is a statement that I am not prepared to ac- 
cept, Senator. I do not believe the Nation feels that way and I do not 
believe that anybody has come to the point where they have one shred 
of evidence that he was knowledgeable of the break-in or the coverup. 

Senator Baker. I think you and I are talking about two different 
things. 

Mr. Mitchell. Obviously, because we generally get along fine. 

Senator Baker. Well, we still do get along fine and I am delighted 
that I have this opportunity to probe into the great mentality of a 
great man. 

And I think one thing that I might say in that respect that may shed 
some light on that situation is a remark you made in Gatlinburg, Tenn., 
when you spoke to the Tennessee Bar Association at my request ; you 
graciously accepted that invitation. I introduced you at the reception 
to some of my friends who are attorneys in Tennessee. I said, 
Mr. Mitchell, as you know, was once President Nixon's law partner. 
And our distinguished witness said, no, Mr. Nixon was my law partner. 

Now, Mr. Mitchell, I have no quarrel with you. I welcome this 
opportunity to find out where the threshold is, where the crossover 
point is on the importance of an event versus the responsibility to tell 
the President. 

Now, what I spoke of a moment ago was not evidence of the Presi- 
dent's involvement. I have imposed on myself a discipline that I will 
not comment on the importance, the relevance, or the competence of 
the testimony of any witness until all of the testimony is taken. And 
I am not going to do that with respect to the President, either. But 
what I am talking about is suspicion. What I asked you is whether or 
not the decision to expose all of this to tlie President for a Presidential 
decision, would not it have been infinitely better than to undergo the 
suspicion, the blemish, the uncertainty in the minds of the American 
people that does exist — not proof; I think the American people are 
remarkably forebearing in this respect — but the suspicion. Would not 
it have been infinitely better to do that in June of 1972 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In the Monday morning quarterback field in what 
has developed into the circumstances that exist today, I don't doubt 
for a moment that you are probably absolutely correct, and I believe so. 

Senator Baker. Of course, the responsibility of this committee is 
not to fix blame. 

Mr. Mitchell. That's right. 

Senator Baker. We have no defendants. We are not trying to estab- 
lish the guilt or innocence of anyone. We are trying to prevent this in 
the future by legislative relief. So that statement by you is most help- 



1837 

ful. That is, in hindsight, you are certain, are 3'ou not, that it would 
have Deen better to permit a i^resiaent to make a Presidential grade 
decision in J une ot i\)i'2i 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't think there is any question about that based 
upon what has developed out of this. Senator, and how it has devel- 
oped to the point we are today is another question that has to be 
examined. 

Senator Baker. Entirely different, separate and aside. It has to do 
with guilt and innocence, it has to do with circumstances, it has to do 
with involvement or noninvolvement. But for our purposes, as a sen- 
atorial committee, our future is to find the ways to avoid this in the 
future — our responsibility is to find ways to avoid this in the future 
and that is why I keep pressing for your hindsight, whether or not 
you are convinced, and i am happy you are convinced. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there is no question about the developments 
that have taken place since the weeks of June of 1972 to July of 1973. 
I don't think there is any question about it at all, that it might even 
have been better. Senator, as you say, take them out on the White 
House lawn; it would have been simpler to have shot them all and 
that would have been less of a problem than has developed in the 
meantime. 

Senator Baker. It might have been. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I agree. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Mitchell, on another subject — and I thank you 
for your replies in that respect, for fear it would appear that I am 
advocating the commission of a felony. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I am delighted that you at least joined in 
the delightful thought regardless of whether or not you countenanced 
it. 

Senator Baker. I thank you for that. 

On another matter, this committee has the hope of providing to 
the Senate of the United States and to the people of the United States 
what I have referred to as a definitive statement on Watergate ; that is, 
we aspire to have every fact and detail and every circumstance that 
is humanly possible to develop, and to bring order and coherence to 
it and to write a report that will stand as an important document in 
the political history of the Nation. That is not meant to sound vain. 
That is obviously the challenge that the Senate placed before us when 
they created this committee. 

One of the things that we are delighted for is that, I gather partly 
on account of your advice, and other circumstances, we are not now 
confronted with the inability to gain the testimony of present or 
past White House officials and Cabinet officers. The doctrine of execu- 
tive privilege has not been invoked. It very possibly could have been 
invoked, but we have greatly enlarged the access of this committee 
to important information because the doctrines of executive privilege 
and attorney-client privilege have not been invoked. 

We have another problem, however, and that is to know something 
of the President's perception of the unique facts and circumstances 
that only he, or only he and one or two others, may know about and in 
that respect, as you know, we have a letter from the President to the 
committee indicating that he will not appear before the committee and 
I think he has the constitutional authority not to appear before the 



1838 

committee. But I was taken by a statement you made yesterday morn- 
ing on page 3268 of the record when Mr. Dash asked you : 

Actually when did the President make the decision to ask you to direct this 
campaign in the 1972 campaign ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not know as I can answer that question, Mr. Dash. I think 
the President would have to answer it. 

Now, if I could invite your attention to two or three matters I 
would like to ask you to advise us on how we can have access to that 
information, without doing violence to the fundamental doctrines of 
separation of powers, of executive privilege, of the institution of the 
Presidency or anything else. I refer to the conversation in September 
that Mr. Dean spoke of in which he, the President, and Mr. Haldeman 
were present and from which Mr. Dean inferred, and he veiy candidly 
says he is not certain, but he inferred, that the President knew of the 
coverup. 

Now we know, we can have Mr. Haldeman's testimony, as we shall, 
but what comment can you give me on how we can complete the record 
in that respect, how we might gain access, as a distinguished lawyer 
and a former Attorney General, and a confidant of the President, how 
can we gain access to the full content of that conversation and the per- 
ception of all the people involved. 

How can we do that ? It is not significant, I hope, that at that point 
the lights went out. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Mitchell. Apparently, Mr. Vice Chairman, the chairman's 
Nicodemus has come around and wants somebody to whisper some- 
thing in his ear. 

Senator Baker. I remember when I was a teenager that my father 
used to come in and turn down the thermostat to run off my friends. 
[Laughter.] 

So maybe someone has turned out the lights to stop that answer. But 
would you try to proceed, please, sir ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure, Mr. Vice Chairman, you are as well aware 
as I am as to the difficulty of recollection of what happens at meetings 
regardless of their importance or significance, which have happened 
for months and sometimes years back. I would believe and hope that 
after your hearings are over that I think the President will respond to 
the salient points of the hearings of this committee, and I am sure that 
that meeting will probably be one of them. 

Now, I am not advising the President on the subject matter, I am 
not discussing it with him but I would have a very strong feeling, 
knowing the President as I do, that he will respond to that subject. 

Senator Baker. Do you think he should ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that he will. 

Senator Baker. That is not quite what I asked you ; do you think 
that he should ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that he will. Senator. I am not making 

Senator Baker. I am not sure it would help to ask again so I won't. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, three strikes and you are out. 

Senator Baker. No, I am not out, I am tired. But if I were to ask 
you one other question in that respect, if I were to say that I know of 
no way that this committee could or should try to compel the Presi- 
dent to appear and give testimony, I think the most fundamental tenet 
of the doctrine of separation of powers probably prohibits that, but 



1839 

if I assume that to be true, and I believe it to be true, and if I still con- 
tinue to have the desire to complete this record, this definitive state- 
ment on Watergate, with the President's perception and knowledge, 
particularly of specific events, such as I have alluded to, I finally 
come to the conclusion that a statement by the President, while wel- 
come, would not be complete, and I have been groping for some way to 
try to circumnavigate the rocks and shoals of separations of powers, 
separation of powers, and executive privilege. 

My staff brought to my attention a precedent established in 1919 
when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked President Wood- 
row Wilson to appear in connection with ratification of the Treaty of 
Versailles and President Wilson, as I recall, did not even decline to 
appear. Rather instead he invited the Foreign Relations Committee 
to the "White House and they went, and they had a conversation with 
President Wilson in rather good detail. That was made a part of the 
official record of that committee and published as a committee docu- 
ment. 

Now, that, in 1919, at least, appeared to solve the executive privilege- 
separation of powers problem for President Wilson, and for the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. 

Can you or would you care to comment on that as a possible alter- 
native or suggest any other alternative for gaining this information 
and preserving the precedents that the President has referred to ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, I hope that you all are invited down 
to the Wliite House, hopefully under the circumstances that you 
desire. 

Senator Baker. With safe conduct? 

Mr. Mitchell. With safe conduct. [Laughter.] 

I understand you do have your protective forces up here that can 
get you in and out all right — ^I do hope that somewhere along the line 
that you will be there under the appropriate circumstances but it 
would be brash on my part to make a suggestion as to how the Presi- 
dent should handle this question of separation of powers. 

Senator Baker. Well, it is no more brash for you to say it, probably 
less brash than it is for me to sav it but I genuinely do value your 
advice in that respect and I would like to have any suggestion you have. 
But do any other thoughts or ideas come to mind on how we can gain 
access to this information and perception of the President and still try 
to avoid an institutional confrontation between the Congress and the 
President on these doctrines ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Senator. There is one that very much comes to 
my mind that you and the chairman go down and discuss it with him, 
and I am sure that vou may find some mutual grounds upon which 
to resolve this problem. 

Senator Baker. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervix. Senator Montoya. 

Senator Moxtoya. Mr. Mitchell, vou have had a long, lasting friend- 
ship with the President ; have you not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it is not long and I hope it is lasting. 

Senator Montoya. I believe you stated that you met the President 
the first time in 1966. Is that about correct ? 



1840 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I had met the President before that but it was 
in the area of 1966 when I got to see more of him and spent more time 
with him. 

Senator Montoya. And at that time you had your own law firm and 
he was associated with another law firm in New York ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. And what kind of association did you start out 
with him in New York while he was a member of one law firm and 
you were a member of another ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it basically had to do with legal matters where 
the two firms were mutually involved and which led to social occa- 
sions and lunches and discussions and things of that matter. 

Senator Montoya. How often would you say you socialized with 
him between the time that you first knew him as a partner in this law 
firm and the time that the two law firms merged and you became closer 
to each other ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The question is socializing? 

'Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, I would say it was relatively infrequent. 

Senator Montoya. But did you get to know him on a very personal 
basis ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, I believe that the best answer I can 
give you in connection with that is as I got to know him as an individ- 
ual, we had wide-ranging discussions of many subject matters. And. of 
course, as our fi-rms were merged and we practiced law together, the 
knowledge of the individual and our contacts, of course, increased. 

Senator Montoya. When were your firms merged ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Officially as of Januaiy 1, 1967, if I recall correctly. 

Senator Montoya. And did your contacts with the then private 
citizen Nixon continue and on a more frequent basis ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, our offices adjoined each 
other so that we saw each other quite frequently and spent more time 
together. 

Senator Montoya. Did you and your families socialize with each 
other frequently ? 

Mr. Mitchell. From time to time ; yes. I would not say frequently, 
but from time to time. 

Senator Montoya. And then subsequent to the merger of the firms, I 
believe you became his campaign manager in 1968 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Subsequent to the merger of the firms? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

What was your association with the President during that cam- 
paign ? Did you see him frequently, did you visit with him frequently, 
did you accompany him in the campaign ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I saw him when he was in New York. He, 
of course, was out on the campaign trail. I did not accompany him 
very often. I did infrequently but basically I stayed behind and ran 
the store. 

Senator Montoya. How would you characterize your association 
with the President at that time and in the subsonuent years? Would 
you sav that von were a very close friend of his, that you were a so- 
cial friend of his, that vou had been a business partner in a most 
satisfactory manner with him, and that later you became his confi- 



1841 

dant and counselor as Attorney General of the United States. Would 
you say that all these characterizations are correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would put it on the basis that we got along pretty 
well; yes, sir. 

Senator Montgya. Yes. 

Now, let us go into Mr. Dean a little bit. Now, Mr. Dean was very 
complimentary of you in his testimony, and gave you great credit for 
starting him out in the Department of Justice oi- at least developing 
with him a father-son relationship. Now what do you think of 
Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, John Dean had been a very, very 
competent lawyer working in the Office of the Attorney General — 
Deputy Attorney General in the Justice Department in dealing with 
congressional relationships, there is no question about it. When he 
went to the AVhite House, of course, my relationship with him was on 
an entirely diiferent basis and it got to be less frequent. I think that 
Mr. 'Dean is a perfectly competent lawyer. 

Senator Moxtoya. Was he working under you when he worked in 
congressional relations at the Department of Justice ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, since I was the Attorney General, theoretically 
everybody worked under me. 

Senator Montgya. I mean, directly under you. 

Mr. Mitchell. Not directly under me, he was working directly 
under, the organizational chart the Deputy Attorney General. 

Senator Montoya. And what kind of service did he render in that 
capacity ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dean, as the legislative liaison representa- 
tive of the Justice Department carried on just the same functions that 
we are talking about, that he was a liaison with the Congress in connec- 
tion with our legislation and our congressional hearings and all of 
these other matters. Mr. Dean took on one other function that was, as 
he testified, and that is my recollection, it was delegated to him by 
Mr. Kleindienst, and that was to negotiate with the demonstrators 
concerning the permits in the Washington area here. 

Senator INIgntoya. And during the time that he performed services 
for the Department of Justice would you say that Mr. Dean followed 
ordei-s very strictly or very obediently, and carried them out as his 
superiors would want him to carry them out ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course. Senator, he was working directly 
under the Deputy but, to my knowledge, that I have not heard of any 
occasion when he did not carry out orders. I cannot be more specific 
than that. 

Senator Montgya. Then, he went over to the White House, and, of 
course, you observed him as he worked out of the White House and 
worked as liaison when the White House and the CRP, the Committee 
To Re-Elect the President, you observed him for many months, did 
you not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. I would not say that he was the liaison be- 
tween the ^\Tiite House and the committee but he started out per- 
forming substantial legal functions in connection with the origin and 
initiation of the committee, and certainly I saw Mr. Dean from time 
to time during that time and, of course, I saw more of him as we got 
into the civil litigation and other problems after June 17. 



1842 

Senator Montoya. Well, would you say that he was the type of a 
man that would act similarly at the White House as he did in the De- 
partment of Justice, carrying out orders as he was given those orders ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would presume that if he had done so at the 
Department of Justice that he would continue to do so in his capacity 
at the White House. 

Senator Montoya. Now, going to the creation of or going back to 
the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, there has 
been testimony adduced here, Mr. Mitchell, by several witnesses that 
the reports of the Internal Security Division were made available to 
the Committee To Re-Elect the President. Are you aware that those 
reports were made available ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was aware. Senator, that there was intelligence 
being made available to the Committee To Re-Elect the President, 
the Republican National Committee, and I had always assumed the 
Democrats and my knowledge of the subject matter is limited to the 
area in which the decision was considered and made with respect as 
to whether the convention should be held in San Diego or transferred 
to Miami and it seems to me we were getting intelligence from all over 
the Government with respect to the potential importance of the demon- 
strators and the potential for riots and physical violence in a particular 
area. 

Senator Montoya. What about other intelligence reports on, say, 
individuals, be they potential threats at the convention or not or out- 
side of that sphere ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall. Senator, and I doubt that they ex- 
isted, that there was ever an intelligence report that came out of Gov- 
ernment that had to do with any individual as far as politics or his 
political position is concerned, at least, I was not aware of any. 

Senator Montoya. Did you give any specific instructions that these 
reports should be made available to the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, are you talking about reports out of some partp 
of the Internal Security Division of Justice ? 

Senator Montoya. Right. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. I, of course, had left the Justice Department 
by the 1st of March, and so, to my knowledge there was not even dis- 
cussion of such activitv until after that. 

Senator Montoya. Well, in other words, the reports were made avail- 
able to the Committee To Re-Elect the President in the limited fashion 
that you have indicated after you left the Department of Justice ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is mv understanding of it; ves. 

Senator INIontoya. Did vou ever find out who the source of authority 
was for this transmission of reports ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir ; I never made such inouirv and, as I have said 
before, I presume that it related entirolv to the potential for violence, 
and that it was probablv jroing to both parties. I do recall that, and 
I think it happened when I was at the Department of Justice, that the 
law enforcement assistance administration, for instance, had nrovided 
assistance to the police establishment in ^fiami for both the Democrats 
and the Republicans in connection with the holdinfr ^f their conven- 
tion and I am sure thev had mav meetings on the subiect matter. 

Senator Montoya. Did vou ever authorize the transmission or even 
inspection of FBI repoi-ts in the Department of Justice? 



1843 

Mr. Mitchell, Authorize their transmission and inspection by 
whom, sir? 

Senator Montoya. The transmission of FBI reports to the CRP or 
the inspection of FBI reports at the Department of Justice. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Do you know of anyone who did ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir ; I do not. 

Senator Montoya. Do you know whether or not these reports were 
received at the Committee To Re-Elect the President? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no knowledge of any such procedure. 

Senator Montoya. This has been testified to that effect heretofore. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, are we to make perfectly clear we are talk- 
ing about FBI reports ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes, 

Mr. Mitchell, Well, then, my answers that I have given you stand. 
I was not aAvare that anybody testified that FBI reports were being 
received by the Committee To Ee-Elect the President. 

Senator Montoya. Now, let us go back to the meetings that you had 
at the Department of Justice with respect to the Liddy plan on 
January 27. To put the matter in proper focus, it is my understanding 
that you met Mr, Liddy on or about November 1971 when Mr. Dean 
brought him to you and introduced him to you, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir ; November 24. 

Senator Montoya. Then, subsequent to this, and to wit, on January 
27, you, Mr. Liddv, Mr. Magruder, and Mr, Dean met in your Depart- 
ment of Justice office, where the original Liddy intelligence operation 
unfolded in charts ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Now, how long did you siiend at this meeting? 

Mr. Mitchell, The meeting, according to the recollection that I 
have, which comes mainly from my log, was 1 hour or less and there 
were other — there was another subject matter discussed, which, of 
course, was the upcoming election law. 

Senator Montoya. Now, what was specifically discussed? Will you 
plea.se relate the dialog that occurred there in the discussion of the 
Liddy intelligence-gathering plan? 

Mr, Mitchell, Well, Senator, I could not possibly relate a dialog 
that took place that long ago. But I can tell you that the format of it 
was that Mr, Liddy unfolded his program and everybody just sat with 
their mouths open while he discussed it and then it was terminated and 
that was the basis of it. There was not any dialog with respect to the 
discussion of it other than to shut it off and tell him to go bum it. 

Senator Montoya, Then, was there any discussion or statement 
made — was there any discussion there or any statement made to the 
effect that he should go back and scale the plan down 

Mr. Mitchell, No. 

Senator Montoya [continuing] . Because the $1 million budget that 
it encompassed was excessive ? 

Mr. Mitchell, No ; Senator, the discussion, as I recall it, was to the 
effect that that is not what the individuals that were participating in 
that meeting — certainly, Mr, Dean and myself— had in mind, "WHiat 
we had in mind was going back to information-gathering and taking 
care of secnritv against demonstrators rather than the contents of that 
particular proposal. 

96-296 O — 73^ — bk. 5 3 



1844 

Senator Montoya. All right. What kind of information-gathering 
did you have in mind ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The gathering of all types of information that would 
be available to the campaign, beneficial to it, that would be done, of 
course, within appropriate means. That is the way it has always been 
done in political campaigns. 

Senator Montoya. Did this include getting information from the 
other side if you could get it ? 

Mr. MrrcHELL. There is no question about it. 

Senator Montoya. Now, let us go to the February 4 meeting. The 
same subjects came back to your office. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the same individuals came back ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Liddy, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Magruder came 
back. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And what transpired then with respect to the 
so-called Liddy plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, with respect to the so-called Liddy plan, and 
this was a much shorter meeting — I think of some 20 minutes at the 
most — with the so-called Liddy plan, when it was discussed, it was 
turned off again because it had the same concept of electronic surveil- 
lance and the other facets that were involved. 

Senator Montoya. Now, tell us how he explained that plan at that 
meeting. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am not sure that my recollection is that good. 
Senator. The basis of it was that they would have the capacity for 
electronic surveillance with respect to whatever targets were to be used 
in connection with the subject matter. 

Senator Montoya. Was it a reduced plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It was — oh, yes ; very much so. He had cutoff all of 
the horror aspects of it and it had been reduced down basically to the 
electronic surveillance. 

Senator Montoya. So by this time, you knew Mr. Liddy very well as 
to what he could do. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I knew Mr. Liddy as to what he was proposing 
that might be done. I could not say that I would know Mr. Liddy very 
well upon these three meetings. 

Senator Montoya. Well, did he not impress you in unveiling this 
plan twice, scaling it down, did he not impress you as a man who really 
knew how to gather intelligence ? 

Mr. Mitchell. He impressed me as an individual who had some 
ideas about iSfathering intelligence that did not fit in with mine. 

Senator Montoya. It is my understandins: that at the second unveil- 
ing on February 4 that Mr. Magruder, Mr. Dean, and you all dis- 
approved his plan. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, it most assuredly is. 

Senator Montoya. And there is testimony in the record to that effect 
on the part of Mr. Dean and the part of INIr. Ma.qruder, there was no 
question about the plans on both occasions being disapproved and they 
agreeing with you, ISIr. Mitchell. 



1845 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Senator Montoya, Now, then, you went to Key Biscayne on your 
vacation after you had left the Department of Justice. And while you 
were there on March 30, you had a meeting at the home where you 
were staying and present "at that meeting in Key Biscayne was Mr. 
LaRue and Mr. Mag: .<der. That is correct, is it not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, for the particular meeting you are talking 
about, Mr. Harry Flemming was down on the previous day also, at a 
meeting we had down there. 

Senator Moxtoya. And during the course of that meeting, Mr. 
Magruder had brought in, as your deputy at the CRP, some decision 
papers which required your approval or your passing on them. That is 
correct, isn't it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, let me put it this way, Senator. At that time, 
I had not oiRcially been associated with the Committee To Re-Elect 
the President. Undoubtedly, he had position papers that he wanted to 
discuss with me, and as I understand it, as I recall, there were quite a 
few of them. 

Senator Moxtoya. Well, as I understand it from his testimony, he 
brought about 20 different papers that required decision by you. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would not deny that there were 20 papers about 
different subject matters because I was being brought up to speed 
about what was happening on the campaign. And as I say, with respect 
to whether or not they were decisions by me or whether discussions or 
consultation or approval, I was not officially at the committee at that 
time. But I am sure the papers were brought for the purpose of dis- 
cussing them with me and getting my reaction to them. 

Senator Montoya, And you did have some meetings with respect to 
policy at the committee with Mr. Magruder and Mr. LaRue ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Now, one of these papers was a sheet 8i/^ by 10 
dealing with the third version of the Liddy plan and scaled down to 
$250,000. Is that correct? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is substantially correct. Senator, that is correct. 

Senator Montoya. And what was your decision with respect to this ? 

Now, before I ask that question — strike that question. 

I understand from testimony heretofore adduced that there were 
three copies of this particular plan. One was retained by Mr. Magruder 
and the other two copies were used in the deliberations at Key Bis- 
cayne. Would you say that is correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection of it. I recall there being one 
copy there. Senator. 

Senator Montoya. Did you make any notations on any of these 
papers ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall whether I made any notations on any 
of the particular papers. I can assure you that T made no notations on 
what you are referring to as the third Liddy plan. 

Senator Montoya. Now, did you approve the Liddy plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. At Key Biscayne ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have never approved a Liddy plan as we are dis- 
cussing it at any time, and certainly I didn't approve it at Key Bis- 
cayne, 



1846 

Senator Montoya. Did you approve any budgetary request of 
$250,000? 

Mr. Mitchell. No sir, that was part and parcel of the same item 
that was presented at that particular time and there was no approval 
of any part of that subject matter at that time. 

Senator Montoya. Is your recollection very definite on that, or are 
you saying this because you do not remember exactly what transpired ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I have a very, very strong recollection of it. 
Senator. To think that the same concept would come back again the 
third time, after the decisions and the way the decisions were made 
in connection with the first two, there is no question in my mind that 
my recollection on this subject matter is very strong. 

Senator Montoya. Then according to testimony adduced here ; Mr. 
Magruder was supposed to have called INIr. Reisner in Washington 
asking Mr. Reisner to call Mr. Liddy that the plan had been approved 
and to have Liddy call Mr. Magruder back. Are you aware of any of 
those conversations ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No sir, I am not, except insofar as they have been 
testified to before this committee. 

Senator Montoya. Well, you do agree that there is testimony on 
the part of Mr. Reisner and Mr. Magruder that that occurred, those 
conversations occurred ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am aware of the testimony that was given with 
respect to it. 

Senator Montoya. And are you also aware that Mr. Liddy in turn 
informed Mr. McCord that the plan had been approved on or about 
that time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not that familiar with Mr. — I presume it came 
out of Mr. McCord's testimony and I am not that familiar with it. 

Senator Montoya. Well, the reason I mention this background, Mr. 
Mitchell, is because here we have three individuals who have offered 
testimony here — namely, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Reisner, and Mr. Mc- 
Cord — confirming that the plan had been approved. This is contra to 
what you are stating before this committee and that is why I asked 
you whether your recollection might have been a little hazy about this 
approval. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I have no trouble whatsoever with respect to 
this subject matter, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. So in effect, you are saying that they are wrong 
and you are right. 

Mr. Mitchell. What I am sayins: is that I did not approve that 
plan on March 80, if that was the date, at that meeting at Key Bis- 
cayne or at any other subsequent time. 

Senator Montoya. All ri^ht. Let us so now to the implementation 
of that plan. When you now became the director of the CRP, during 
your incumbencv as director, vou had periodic meetinfrs with respect 
to the budo"et, at which meetinq-s vou had the finance committee, you 
had Mr. Masfruder, you had Mr. LaRue. and vourself approvin.fr the 
expenditures for the conduct of the particular campaign. That is cor- 
rect, isn't it ? 

Mr. MiTrTTELL. Yes, Senator, but the bud^-et committee also, of 
course, had Mr. Stans and Mr. Slonn and Mr. Nunn on it and Mr. 
Malek eventually became part of that budget group. 



1847 

Senator Mctntoya. I believe Mr. Stans testified that lie would go in 
there as the chairman of the finance committee and attend these budget 
heanngs, but actually, that the policy for expenditures was set out by 
your division and your direction. Was that about right ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the meetings really revolved around, in the last 
analysis, how much money Mr. Stans could raise and then we would 
make determinations as to liow much would be sp)ent in what partic- 
ular area. But, of course, Mr. Stans also had his input, would object to 
the fact that I didn't need x dollars for television and direct mail 
would overlap it, et cetera, et cetera. But the actual purposes for which 
the moneys were expended within the general categories were con- 
tained, of course, in the budget. 

Senator Montoya. And who prepared that budget ? Was that pre- 
pared under your direction, was it approved before it was submitted 
or discussed before the finance committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, the budget evolved out of the budget committee 
meetings. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 

Now, I believe your testimony has been that you did not approve 
any specific disbursement with respect to any cash that was given to 
Mr. Liddy in the implementation of the so-called Liddy surveillance 
or intelligence-gathering plan ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, and I think that is also Mr. Stans' 
testimony relating to the same conversation. 

Senator Montoya. Yes, Mr. Stans so testified that he did not dis- 
cuss any specific figures. That is correct. 

Now, isn't it odd, Mr. Mitchell, that $250,000 went out of that treas- 
ury and you do not know what went — ^what it went for when the 
word around there was between Mr. Magruder, between Mr. Stans 
and Mr. Sloan that this cash was being disbursed to Mr. Liddy ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, I don't know what the $250,000 figure 
comes from or where it comes from, but I believe there was an expendi- 
ture by Mr. Liddy before I arrived on the scene, as testified to by 
Mr. Stans, of some $125,000. And as I recall, Mr. Sloan's testimony 
with respect to the total that was turned over to Liddy was $199,000. 
So we are talking about a difference between $125,000 and $199,000. 

Senator Montoya. Then when you arrived on the scene, you were 
told about this figure of $125,000. Were you also told what that figure 
and that expenditure represented ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was not told of the $125,000, Senator. As a matter 
of fact, as I testified yesterday, when the post- Watergate investigation 
came along, it was very, very difficult to get the inf oiTnation out of the 
individuals involved and we had the colloquy between Sloan and 
Magruder, Magruder saying it was $50,000 tliat liad been given to 
Liddy and Sloan saying, no, it was much, much more. We had to 
finally resolve the question by getting Mr. Stans. So if I couldn't get 
the information post-Watergate without getting it from Mr. Stans, 
I sure in hell didn't get it voluntarily when I came aboard in April. 

Senator Montoya. Well, what did you mean when you stated that 
you were aware of the $125,000 figure having already been expended ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was aware that Mr. — in what context are you 
putting this ? 



1848 

Senator Montoya. With respect to the disbursements to Mr. Liddy. 

Mr. Mitchell. I was aware of the fact that there was an informa- 
tion-fathering, intelligence-gathering; activity that Mr. Liddy was 
carrying on. The $125,000, the first time I ever saw it, was when Mr. 
Stans testified here before this committee. 

Senator Montoya. Well, give me the specifics of the intelligence 
gathering that Mr. Liddy was gathering at that time when you were 
so informed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. At the time that I was informed ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would have to start back, Sena/tor, to the time 
when Dean brought Liddy over to the office on November 24 to talk 
about the position where he was going to get intelligence. This would 
be part of his activity, to get information relating to which might be 
useful in the campaign. There has been testimony here, and I vividly 
recall the fact that Liddy went to San Diego and did a survey of the 
then gathering storm with respect to the elements that were going to 
congregate in San Diego to oppose the holding of a peaceful conven- 
tion. There was the Democratic National Committee kickback story 
that was investigated by Liddy at a later date, a number of such items, 
none of which were of great consequence to me except possibly the San 
Diego convention site problem. 

Senator Montoya. Were you aware that Mr. Hunt was working with 
him? 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; I had never heard that Mr. Hunt was working 
with him until after the I7th of Jime. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Sloan has indicated here, and so has Mr. 
Magruder, that you knew and had given authority for the disbursement 
of this money to Mr. Liddy, and their testimony is in — is contra to 
what you have stated here today. There we have another instance of 
two witnesses who have testified here who indicate contrary to what 
you have testified to here today. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I am not cognizant of what Mr. Sloan has 
testified to in this hearing. 

Senator Montoya. I am just bringing this into proper focus, I am 
not trying to dispute the rectitude of what you are saying. I am just 
bringing this into proper focus for the record. 

Now, then, we go into the June 17 date when you were in California. 
I believe on that date quite a few of you engaged in some kind of 
political activity in California, and you were staying at the Beverley 
Hills Hotel, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe it was the Beverley Hills Hotel. There was, 
there were a group of us out there and I think we were all staying at 
the same hotel. 

Senator Montoya. And on the morning you were advised as to what 
had happened here in Washington. 

Mr. Mitchell. It was, I believe it was morning or noontime out 
there. Senator, yes. 

Senator Montoya. And you immediately convoked a conference, 
after having breakfast, at which you met with the different individ- 
uals to trv to prepare a reaction report, to the so-called bugging at the 
Watergate or break-in at the Watergate ? 



1849 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, it was not at breakfast, and it was at 
a place other than the hotel we were staying at. I believe they call it 
the Airport Marina or something to that effect, where the political 
activities were taking place. I was to have a press conference after two 
or three meetings and a luncheon, and so forth, and convocations, as 
you call them, were held for the purpose of trying to tell me what 
had happened and to what response I could possibly have at a press 
conference in connection with the facts as they then existed. 

Senator Montoya. Who did you receive the information from pre- 
liminary to making the press statement there in Los Angeles ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would believe by that time that Mr. Mardian 
and Mr. Magruder would have talked to people back in Washington. 
I am not certain if there was anybody else, whether Mr. LaRue did or 
not, but I would believe that Mr. Mardian and Mr. Magruder would 
have talked to them and possibly also Mr. Clifford Miller, I am not 
certain. 

Senator Montoya. ^Vlio did they call here in Washington, and why 
did they call at the time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not certain that I can answer either part of 
that question. Senator. They obviously were calling back to get in- 
formation and, of course, as it has since been testified, they called the 
public information office of the Committee for the Re-Election of the 
President and, I gather, other people. 

Senator Montoya. I believe this is the statement you made in Los 
Angeles and I will quote from it : 

"In a statement issued in Los Angeles" — ^this is from the Washing- 
ton Post, June 19 and I quote : 

In a statement issued in Los Angeles, Mitcliell said "McCord and the other 
four men arrested in Democratic headquarters Saturday were not operating 
either in our behalf or with our consent in the alleged bugging attempt." 

And this is a continuation of the quotation : 

Referring to the alleged attempt to bug the opposition's headquarters, Mitchell 
said "There is no place in our campaign or in the electoral process for this type of 
activity and we will not permit it nor condone it." 

Now, is that an accurate statement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is a very accurate statement, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. Now, what did you do in order not to condone it? 

Mr. Mitchell. What did I do in order not to condone it? 

Senator Montoya. Did you try after you got back to Washington 
to find out who the individuals that might be responsible for this were ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I did. Senator. As I discussed yesterday, we 
took and discussed it on the way back on the plane, Mr. Mardian, Mr. 
LaRue — Mr. Mardian was put in charge of the investigation, and we 
brought lawyers into the picture as soon as it became evident that we 
were going to have a civil litigation, and asked them also to investigate 
it and to interrogate the parties involved. 

Senator Montoya. Well, did you bring lawyers into the picture to 
represent those who were involved or to try to extract information, 
sufficient information, from them, so that you could be able to pin 
culpability on those who were responsible ? 

Mr. Mitchell. They were brought in for both purposes. 



1850 

Senator Montoya. And what culpability did you uncover as a result 
of this legal representation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, obviously, we uncovered the culpability of 
Mr. Liddy, at least, so far as his refusal to talk to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, and from then on the question got to be quite hazy 
as to where the culpability ran from there. 

Senator Montoya. All right ; what did you do after you determined 
the culpability of Mr. Liddy? Did you talk to any prosecuting at- 
torney or any law officer and inform him of Mr. Liddy's complicity 
in this affair? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not believe, Senator, that — I am sure I did not, 
I did not know what the people who were conducting the investiga- 
tion did. 

Senator Montoya. Then, on September 2, 1972, from the Washing- 
ton Post, and I quote the Washington Post as follows : 

Mitchell, following his 20-minute appearance in the oflBce of Edward Bennett 
Williams, the Democrats' attorney, told reporters outside that he was in no way 
involved in the Watergate incident. Although the questioning under oath did not 
get to the point of the Watergate break-in said the former Attorney General, "I 
can swear now that I had no advance knowledge." 

That is still your testimony, is it not, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir ; that is my testimony. 

Senator Montoya. Then on September 6, 1972, the Washington Post 
story is as follows : 

"Mitchell told reporters yesterday that the Watergate incident was 
a ridiculous caper, that the news media had blown it all out of 
proportion." 

Do you still agree with that statement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator Montoya. Do you think that the Watergate incident was a 
ridiculous caper? 

Mr. Mitchell. I want to make sure that w^e are talking about the 
same thing, and I am talking about the break-in and entering into the 
Democratic National Committee. I think it was perfectly ridiculous 
that it was done, it served no purpose, it was in nobody's interest, and, 
of course, it should never have happened, and it shouldn't be condoned 
under any circumstances. 

Senator Montoya. Well, do you believe, that the news media has 
blown this affair all out of proportion ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, I do. In connection with the single act of the 
break-in and entering, I still believe it has been blown out of 
proportion. 

When you get to the total story that has now become known as 
Watergate — that is referred to as Watergate — I think that is an en- 
tirely different subject matter than the subject matter that I was 
talking about in September of 1972. 

Senator Montoya. Well, aren't those just ramifications from the 
trunk of that tree ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I think it goes far beyond tliat. Senator. 

Senator Montoya. Now, on April 21, 1973, another story in the 
Washington Post, and I c(uote, "The former Attorney General, wlio 
also served as campaign director for Nixon, reportedly told the grand 
jury that he knew that Magruder would not have moved ahead inde- 



1851 

pendently with plans for the bugging unless he had received permis- 
sion from higher authority." 

Would you still say that ? ■, • ^ 

Mr. Mitchell. I didn't say it then in those terms, Senator ; I think 
my comment on that particular occasion was that I didn't know who 
might have been the final authority with respect to it and there was 
conjecture as to whether or not Mr. Magruder would have moved 
ahead on his own. t n i 

Senator Montoya. Well, knowing Mr. Magruder as you did, and 
having heard what the Washington Post attributed to you, what is 
your testimony today ? 

Mr. Mitchell. With respect to what. Senator ? 

Senator Montoya. Would you say that Mr. Magruder, as I have 
stated, in quoting you, would you say that Magruder would not have 
moved ahead independently with plans for the bugging unless he had 
received permission from higher authority ? 

:Mr. IkliTCHELL. My testimony today is the same as it was yesterday. 
To this day I do not know as to who was the final authority or who 
in concert moved this program into its activity. 

Senator Montoya. No, but with respect to Mr. Magruder, do you 
stick by that statement that he was the kind of a man that would not 
move except with permission from some higher authority ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Now you are talking about something the Washing- 
ton Post said ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. ^Mitchell. And I think yesterday I found out that I shouldn't 
always rely on the Washington Post through Senator Talmadge's 
questioning. 

Senator Montoya. Would you 

Mr. Mitchell. With respect to that story which you just read, I say 
that it was m.y recollection that I did not specifically make that state- 
ment. It was made in the context of T did not know where the final 
push or shove or approval came from. 

Now, with respect to your specific question on Mr. Magruder, I do 
not know whether he in concert or with others may have moved ahead 
on it. I would feel that Mr. Magruder would not have done so unless 
there was compulsion coming from some other area. 

Senator Montoya. Do you have any speculation as to where that 
compulsion might have come from ? 

Mr. Mitchell. T tried to answer that question yesterday. Senator, 
and T believe that the record that has been made by Mr. Magruder and 
certainly Mr. Dean's testimony has better insight on it than T have at 
this time. 

Senator Montoya. Well, then, would you say that Mr. Dean's testi- 
monv is correct in the assumptions that he made with respect to this 
particular subject? 

Mr. Mttcttet.l. Now. whose testimony ? 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Dean's. 

INfr. Mitchell. Well. Mr. Dean, as I recall his testimony, covered 
a great manv areas of hearsay about what people had told him with 
resDect to this subject m fitter. 

Senator Monto^'A. Then after Watergate vou appeared at vour 
apartment on June 19, and you had a meeting there with some of the 



1852 

people. Now, present at tliat meeting were Mr, Mardian, Mr. LaRue, 
Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, and yourself. You recall that meeting, do 
you not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir; oh, I do. 

Senator Montoya. And did you request at that meeting of Mr. Dean 
to check and see if the White House embarrassment could be 
prevented ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. To the best of my recollection that was not 
discussed at that meeting. As a matter of fact, as of that time frame 
of the 19th of June I was unfamiliar with the White House horror 
stories. 

Senator Montoya. Did you at this particular meeting discuss any- 
thing with respect to the Gemstone file ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection there was no discus- 
sion of that subject matter whatsoever. 

'Senator Montoya. Are you saying that to the best — are you saying 
this, in light of your recollection and not as a positive statement? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am saying, Senator, that there was no dis- 
cussion of the Gemstone file because I hadn't heard of it at that partic- 
ular time. There was no discussion of wiretap logs or matters of those 
subjects that took place certainly not in my presence there. 

Senator Montoya. Well, did you discuss any i:>articular file at that 
meeting? 

Mr. Mitchell. To my recollection we did not discuss anything 
except to get a briefing from the people who were in Washington, 
Mardian, LaRue, and Mitchell, just having come back from the west 
coast, as to what the current circumstances were and as to how it 
would be handled with respect to the responses that were actually 
required to the charges that the Democrats were making out of their 
committee. 

Senator Montoya. Now, am I correct in saying that before Mr. Dean 
got there and these other people that they had already talked to 
Mr. Liddy about the particular involvement of the ORP ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think the record will show that Mr. Dean had 
talked to Mr. Liddy on that day, the 19th, and I think his testimony 
will also show that he did not discuss any of his activities or any of 
his meetings on the 19th at that meeting at the apartment that night. 

Senator Montoya. Now, on June 22 you had another meeting, is 
that correct, not at your apartment but somewhere else ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure I had quite a number of meetings on 
June 22, Senator, I will take and check my log here and we will get 
to the one that you are talking about. 

Senator Montoya. Well, there is a question here, and it arose from 
your testimony yesterday that you were not sure whether the subse- 
q^uent meeting was on the 21st or 22d, and I am referring to that par- 
ticular meeting. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well now, which meeting of the 22d are you talking 
about, Senator? 

Senator Montoya. Did you have a meeting at the Wiite House on 
the22d? 

Mr. Mitchell. I had a meeting at the White House every morning 
at 8 :15 a.m. 



1853 

Senator Moxtoya. Did you discuss anything relating to the Water- 
gate incident with any individuals at the White House ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection the type of meeting 
that was held at 8 :15 a.m. every morning, there was certainly no dis- 
cussion of any of the details of the Watergate matter. It was a staff 
meeting that was held every morning at the AVhite House under these 
circumstances where you had all of the top staif people from Dr. 
Kissinger all the way through to the congressional liaison people. 

Senator Montota. And did you, during your subsequent visits to 
the White House, engage in any conversations with Mr. Ehrlichman 
or Mr. Haldeman about the course of the investigation as it was being 
conducted by the lawyers for the CEP and others with respect to 
Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, I am sure that somewhere, sometime along the 
way, that these discussions were held. I can't pinpoint any particular 
meeting. We were more heavily engaged in the matters of the cam- 
paign than we were discussing the particular aspects of the Water- 
gate investigation. 

Senator Montoya. Did you discuss the testimony before the grand 
jury on the part of Mr. Magruder or the testimony that might, that 
was going to be presented by Mr. Dean with anyone at the White 
House ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The testimony that was going to be presented by 
Mr. Dean ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes; before the prosecutors and the testimony 
that was going to be presented by Mr. Magruder before the grand 
jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No; to the best of my recollection. Senator, those 
discussions were not held with anybody at the White House. They 
were held with ]\f r. Dean and the lawyers and other people at the com- 
mittee and not the "V^Hiite House. 

Senator Montoya. Can you tell this committee whether or not Mr. 
Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman knew anything about the so-called 
activities trying to cover up the White House involvement with respect 
to the Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the White House involvement in what respect. 
Senator? White House involvement in connection with the Water- 
gate? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchetj.. Well, I do not know as there has been anv testimony 
to the effect that the people in the White House were involved in the 
Watergate. 

Senator Montoya. Well, with respect to the coverup ? 

Mr. Mitchet,l. Well, eventuallv along the road, there was discussion 
in connection with the fact that there was no volunteering or coming 
forward and that there was a desiarn not to have the stories cominsf out 
that had to do with the "White House horror activities. There is no 
question about that. 

Senator Montoya. Now, let us go into what you stated a few 
moments ago, that you were clearly motivated bv a sincere desire to 
see the President reelected and that is whv you failed to tell him all 
you knew about Watergate at that time. Now, that is a correct state- 
ment, is it not ? 



1854 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, if you will add to the Watergate the other 
activities that we have been talking about. 

Senator Montoya. Well, I believe yd stated on cross-examination 
a few minutes ago by Mr. Inouye, Senator Inouye, that your sole con- 
cern was that the White House horrors should not be disclosed and 
that is why you did not tell the President about this situation. Is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Moxtoya. Now, did it ever occur to you that you could sep- 
arate Watergate from the White House horrors ? 

Senator ER^^[N. Senator, I assume that you are not going to be 
through with your interrogation right soon and I believe we have a 
vote. So, we will take a recess until 2 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, at 12 :30 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 2 p.m., this same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Wednesday, July 11, 1973 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

■Senator Montoya. Are you ready, Mr. Chairman ? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Mitchell, just briefly, I think it has been es- 
tablished here that you reviewed the Liddy plan three different times, 
two in Washington, when you were at the Department of Justice and 
once at Key Biscayne. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would differ with the word "review," Senator. I 
would put it on the basis that it was presented to me. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 

Mr. Mitchell. One occasion, of course, was less detailed than the 
other and, of course, on the third occasion practically no discussion of 
it. 

Senator Montoya. Then, later on when, after June 17, it was di- 
vulged that some people at the CRP might have been iuA'olved in the 
break-in, you made a statement saying that the CRP was in no way 
involved "and I had no advance knowledge." 

Now, did you mean to say that you had no specific knowledge or did 
you mean to say that you were not aware of the Liddy plan at that 
time? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, Senator, that was entirely related to the event of 
the break-in of the Democratic National Committee. 

Senator Montoya. All right. Now, after the June 17 affair, you had 
several meetings with the President and you indicated that you did not 
want to divulge to the President what you had ascertained now for the 
reason that you did not want to impair his chances of reelection. Now, 
after the election, did you think about this, and did you think of the 
advisability of advising the President after the election because no 
longer was your motivation in order at the time? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. As I have previously testified, I did con- 
sider and in retrospect probably should have gone ahead with it at that 
particular time. 

Senator Montoya. Why did you not do it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not certain that I can give you rationalization 
for it other than the fact that there was, of course, the fond hope that 



1855 

there would be changes in the White House personnel, and that the in- 
dividuals certainly were not going to pursue the type of activities that 
they had in the past, and that the President would not be burdened 
with the knowledge that these things had taken place in his White 
House. 

Senator Montoya. On October 5, 1972, the President made this 
statement, made it to the American people, and I quote from the Presi- 
dential documents: 

I wanted every lead carried out to the end because I wanted to be sure that no 
member of the White House staff and no man or woman in a position of major 
responsibility in the Committee for the Re-Election had anything to do with this 
kind of reprehensible activity. 

I presume you read that statement, I presume you were aware of it. 
Did not this trigger in your mind the possibility that you might have 
reversed your determination not to tell the President before the 
election ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you say that was October 5 ? 

Senator Montoya. October 5, 1972. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that, of course was before the election and I 
do not recall any particular thought that I had on the subject matter 
at that time, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. Well, you were fully aware that the President 
was making public statements indicating that he was trying to get to 
the bottom of all this, were you not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir ; I was aware of that. And I am sure he was 
using the p>roper departments of Government to do so. 

Senator Montoya. And in spite of this you did not come forward 
and tell him what you knew about Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. Senator. 

Senator Montoya. And your concern being that you did not want 
to trigger off any action that might impair the President's reelection, 
and that is why you did not advise him before the election, did it not 
occur to you that your desire to insulate the President against dis- 
closure by you of the exact details of Watergate was not exclusive be- 
cause there were others close to the President who might have done the 
same thing? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure there were others who were close to the 
President that might have had the same thoughts and the same oppor- 
tunities. I do not know what their subjective thoughts were. 

Senator Montoya. What I am suggesting is that the possibility 
existed at that time that if you did not tell the President, that Mr. 
Ehrlichman, Mr. Hakleman, or Mr. Dean might do this, did you insure 
against that thing happening ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. We had no discussions along the lines t^at 
you are inferring with respect to the subject matter. 

Senator Montoya. Well, if your interest was so profound in trying 
to trigger off any Presidential action that might endanger his chances 
of reelection, why did you not go to people close to the President to 
make sure that they would not tell the President about the details 
involving Watergate? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that they are capable of making their deci- 
sions on their own. I obviously made mine and I presume that they 
made theirs independently. 



1856 

Senator Montoya. We have a situation here before the committee 
and I will close with this, Mr. Mitchell, we have a situation of whether 
or not the Liddy plan was approved. Was any part of the plan 
approved by you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, none whatsoever. 

Senator Montoya. Did you disapprove of the Liddy plan at Key 
Biscayne ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator Montoya. Completely, did you disapprove it all three 
times ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. All right. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Mitchell, on yesterday when Senator Talmadge 
asked you concerning your political activities in respect to the Com- 
mittee To Ke-Elect the President while you were still serving as Attor- 
ney General you pointed out that it was not illegal for you to do that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, that is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Now, I think we might meditate just a minute on what St. Paul said. 
He said "All things are lawful unto me but some things are not 
expedient." 

Don't you think it is rather inexpedient for the chief law enforce- 
men officer of the United States to be engaging in, directly or indirectly 
in, managing political activities ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do, Senator. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. I was in hopes that that was what you were 
going to do because when you appeared before the Judiciary Com- 
mittee on your nomination back on January 14, 1969, you and I had 
this little colloquy. 

Mr. Mitchell. I remember it very well, Senator. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Senator Eevin. Mr. Mitchell, until comparatively recent years it has been 
customary for Presidents to appoint the Postmaster General his chief political 
adviser and agitator. Unfortunately, during recent years this role has been largely 
taken away from the Postmaster General and given to and exercised by the 
Attorney General. To my mind there is something incompatible with marrying 
the function of the chief political adviser and chief agitator with that of prose- 
cutor of crimes against the Government. 

Now, I would just like to know whether you think that the primary function 
and objective of the Attorney General should be giving political advice or doing 
political agitating before congressional committees or enforcing Federal law and 
acting as an adviser to the President in his Cabinet in legal matters rather than 
political. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I would hope that my activities in a political nature and 
of a political nature have ended with the campaign. 

I might say that this was my first entry into a political campaign, and I trust 
it will be my last. From the termination of the campaign and henceforward my 
duties and functions will be related to the Justice Department, and as the legal 
and not the political adviser of the President. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you, sir. I commend your answer. 

Senator Er\^n. I am very sorry that you didn't carry out the purpose 
you announced on that occasion. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, that would have been my fondest 
wish. Unfortunately, it is very, very difficult to turn down a request 
by the President of the United States. 



1857 

Senator Ervin. Now, don't you think that what we have been in- 
vestigating here indicates the desirability of the Congress giving seri- 
ous consideration to divorcing the Department of Justice from political 
matters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would perhaps even go further and suggest that 
you divorce all of the departments from political matters. I think it 
would be a very constructive move. 

Senator Ervin. Now here we had a criminal prosecution in which 
the prosecutors held office at the pleasure of the President, and the 
tracks from the burglary in the Watergate led directly into the Com- 
mittee To Ee-Elect the President, and it turns out that the lawyers 
who are defending the seven men indicted in the criminal action were 
paid, either directly or indirectly, by the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President or Presidential aides in the White House, and that is a con- 
dition which is not calculated to accomplish justice, in my opinion. Of 
course you were out of the Department of Justice at that time. 

Now, twice while you were still Attorney General of the United 
States and the chief law enforcement officer of the United States, and 
the chief legal adviser to the President of the United States, meetings 
were held in your office in the Department of Justice in which such 
matters were discussed as proposals to bug the opposition political 
i:>arty and to burglarize the headquarters of the opposition party and 
to employ prostitutes to induce members of the opposition party to 
disclose secrets, weren't they ? 

Mr. Mitchell. They were so discussed and, of course, disapproved. 

Senator Ervin. But the burglary and the bugging was discussed in 
the second ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. Then on the third occasion ; namely on the 30th of 
March, Mr. Magruder, who was your deputy director of the committee, 
visited Key Biscayne where you were and discussed these matters, at 
least the bugging and the break-in, a third time with you, didn't he ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I wouldn't use the term "discussed." They were 
presented 

Senator Ervin. They were presented to you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And you say you declined to approve them ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That was my testimony. 

Senator Ervin. And you declined to do that on three occasions? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Can you explain to me why it was, after you declined 
on the first occasion, that you had a second discussion on the matter and 
after you declined on the second occasion, that you had a third discus- 
sion of the matter or presentation of the matter ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I cannot for the life of me understand as to why this 
matter was constantly brought back, except for the point that some- 
body obviously was very interested in the subject matter. 

Senator Ervin. Wouldn't the evidence justify the inference that you 
did not communicate your disapproval in such an emphatic enough 
manner to prevent the bugging and the break-in ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I think the testimony of Mr. Dean and my testi- 
mony of yesterday and today is quite to' the contrary. In fact, this 



1858 

was not the type of concept that was envisioned. It was quite different. 

Senator Ervin. Well, Mr. Dean was not the man that was in charge 
of your committee when you were absent, was he ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I am not saying that. I am making reference to 
the fact as to the manner in which these items were disapproved. 

Senator Ervin. And the man who was in charge of your committee 
when you were absent was Mr. Magruder, wasn't he ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. And didn't you find out shortly after the ITth day 
of June that Magruder had financed the burglaries ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, that was in the week following the break-in. 

Senator Ervin. In other words, it appeared very shortly that five 
burglars had been caught in the Watergate and that one of them was 
Mr. McCord, an employee of your committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell, That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And it also appeared that four of the burglars at 
that very time had in their pockets money which came from your 
committee. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was eventually established, yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Very shortly thereafter, wasn't it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe the week following the break-in. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, sir. 

I am informed there is a vote on, so we will have to go and vote. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. Now, very shortly after you found out about the 
things I inquired of you, you also found that Liddy, who had been 
general counsel to the Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President, 
and another employee of your committee, E. Howard Hunt, had been 
arrested for complicity in the break-in. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, may I point out that to the best of my knowl- 
edge, Mr. Hunt was never an employee of either one of the committees. 
Mr. McCord 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Hunt was employed in the T\^ite House, was he 
not? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have learned that since ; yes. 

Senator Ervin. Well, you found out sometime in the summer, did 
you not, that Mr. Hunt had been sent over to the committee by Mr. 
Colson? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And you found out about the same time that Mr. 
Hunt had been implicated in the burglary of the office of the psychia- 
trist of El Isberg ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And you found out, therefore, that Hunt, a burglar, 
had been retained on the White House payroll from September 1971 
until the break-in. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I was not aware of the periods, but I did learn 
that he had been a consultant to the White House. 

Senator Ervin. And then, after you came back from California, you 
talked to Mr. Robert Mardian, and Mr. Fred LaRue, and Mr. Dean, 
and Mr. Magruder about these matters. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 



1859 

Senator Ervin. And from your conversation with these men, you 
realized that Magruder liad participated in the break-in and that he 
and Dean were engaged in what has been called the coverup? 

Mr. Mitchell. If I can answer just slightly different, Mr. Chair- 
man, we did learn that Magruder had obviously been providing the 
funds that were used in connection with the activities of the group 
that did break in. 

Senator Er\^n. And did you not find out that Dean and Magruder 
were trying to conceal these events ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this came quite a bit later down the pike but 
we did obviously learn that this was the case. 

Senator Ervin. About how long afterward ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would believe that it would probably have been the 
middle of July or some time thereafter. 

Senator Erven. And you also found that money which had been 
contributed for the reelection of President Nixon had found its way 
into the bank account of Barker, one of the burglars at the Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir; that came forward quite early. 

Senator Ervin. And then, first, you talked to LaRue and Mardian 
and they both knew about these events. You could tell that from the 
conversations they had with you, did you not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. They told me, repeated what Mr. Liddy had told 
them ; yes, sir. 

Senator ER^^[N. And that was that he had participated, had insti- 
gated this burglary at the instance of Magruder? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the basis of their representation to me as to 
what Liddy had said. 

Senator Ervin. Yes ; and from that, your conversation with Robert 
Mardian and Fred LaRue, you leaiTied that thev had been apprised of 
that fact? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Ervix. You also were informed by Magruder that he, 
Magruder, was prepared to commit perjury when it went before the 
grand jury in August rather than to reveal what lie knew about these 
matters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That was correct, sir. 

Senator Erven. Now, did you agree that that was the proper course 
of action to take? 

Mr. Mitchell, It was a very expedient one, Senator. At that time 
in the campaign, so close to the election, we certainly were not volun- 
teering any information. 

Senator Ervin. Well, did you advise Mr. Magruder that perjury 
was a felony and he ought not to commit perjury when he proposed to 
you that he commit perjury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure Mr. Magruder was well aware of it. 

Senator Erven. Yes. Well, did Mr. Mardian and Mr. LaRue ever 
talk to you about the Magruder proposal to commit perjury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. They were present on an occasion or more in which 
Mr. Magruder stated what he was going to testify to. 

Senator Ervin. Did you ever have any convei-sation with Mr, Halde- 
man about these matters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not until much later on. Senator. 



96-296 O— 73— bk. 5- 



1860 

Senator Er\t:n. How much later on ? 

Mr. Mitchell. This year. 

Senator ER^^N. You mean you never had any conversation with 
Mr. Haldeman until 1973 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. About the subject matter that you are referring to 
with respect to 

Senator Er\^n. Well, what about Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I had no such conversations with Mr, Ehrlichman. 

Senator Er\tn. Did you have any information at the time of these 
other White House horrors, as you call them, about Mr. Ehrlichman 
trying to enlist the aid of the CIA to suppress investigation of the 
Mexican checks by the FBI ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I did not learn of that until a more recent date 
here, when it had been made public. 

Senator Ervin. You knew about all these other things, however, be- 
fore the indictments were returned in September against the seven 
original defendants? 

Mr. Mitchell. When you say all of the other things, you mean the 
items that we have just discussed here? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator Ervin. And you were aware of the fact that sometime about 
early September or late August that the President made a statement to 
the American people to the effect that nobody presently employed in 
the White House had anything to do with any of these matters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. As I recall the statement. Senator, and I am not sure 
that I can recall it specifically, I believe the statement was to the effect 
that there was nobody in the White House that was involved in the 
breaking and entering of the Watergate. 

Senator Ervin. Then the President's statement, as you construed it, 
didn't indicate that the President was saying that nobody in the Wliite 
House knew anything about the coverup ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I believe the statement referred to involve- 
ment. I could be wrong, because I don't remember the contents of it, but 
I believe that was the case. 

Senator Ervin. Well, I think you stated that Mr. Strachan was liai- 
son between Haldeman in the Wliite House and the Committee To Re- 
Elect the President? 

Mr. Mitchell, I think you can broaden that. Senator, to the fact that 
he was liaison between the A¥hite House and the Committee To Re- 
Elect the President. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. And did you not learn that he had been advised 
by Mr. Dean and Mr. Magruder as to what was going on in the Com- 
mittee To Re-Elect the President at these times ? 

Mr. Mitchell, Well, Mr. Strachan was constantly being advised as 
to what was going on in connection with the matters at the Committee 
To Re-Elect the President. In fact, he attended meetings from time to 
time of the committee. 

Senator Ervin. And he attended for the purpose of advising the peo- 
ple at the Wliite House as to what the committee was doing, didn't he ? 

Mr. Mitchell, I presume that was his purpose. 

Senator Ervin, That was his sole function, was it not ? 



1861 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know what he did at the White House, but it 
was the sole function of his relationship with the committee. 

Senator Ervin. Now, as I understand your testimony, you talked to 
the President twice about "Watergate, the first time in June 1972, and 
the second time on March 22, 1973. 

Mr. Mitchell. When we talked about Watergate, Senator, those 
were two occasions upon which they were discussed. I also testified 
yesterday that in some of the political meetings that were had, the 
general subject matter was discussed as to how the President should 
approach it with respect to a type of Warren Commission or special 
prosecutors and other such items. These were in large groups. 

Senator Ervin. Well, you had a conversation with the President 
about Watergate in June 1972, didn't you ? I believe it was June 20. 

Mr. Mitchell. The 20th of June, a short telephone conversation, that 
is correct. 

Senator Ervin. And you apologized to the President for Watergate? 

Mr. Mitchell. I apologized to the President for not keeping track of 
the personnel in the committee to the extent that the Watergate matter 
could have happened. 

Now, this is the 20th of June before I had learned of a lot of other 
circumstances. 

Senator Ervin. Well, you had learned enough by the 20th of June to 
feel that the Committee To Re-Elect the President, or at least some 
officials of it, were implicated in the Watergate break-in, didn't you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. With respect to McCord, yes, and this is the basis for 
my apology. 

Senator Ervin. Well, didn't the President ask you what you meant 
by vour apologizing? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think I made it quite clear to him that I hadn't ex- 
ercised sufficient control over the activities of all of the people in the 
committee. 

Senator Ervin. Didn't the President ask you then what you knew 
about Watergate and why you were apologizing? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think I told him what I know about Watergate at 
that particular time, which was very, very little. 

Senator Ervin. Well, he could have learned about McCord by read- 
ing the newspaper, couldn't he ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Obviously. That is where I learned about it. 

Senator Ervin. And every day the newspapers and the other media 
of communication, from that time on until the present, were carrying 
new revelations about Watergate, weren't they ? 

Mr. Mitchell. From time to time, that was a correct statement; 
yes, sir. 

Senator Er\t:n. Now, when did you learn that Colson had allegedly 
sought to persuade Caulfield to bomb the Brookings Institute ? 

Mr. MiTCHELi>. Oh, it was sometime during one of the conversations 
that I had had with Mr. Dean along the way. 

Senator Ervin. ^Yhen did you first learn about the operations of 
Segretti ? 

Mr. Mitchell. "WHien I read about them in the newspapers. 

Senator ER^^N. ^Hien was that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Sometime in the fall of 1972. 



1862 

Senator Ervin. You hadn't learned about that until September? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I had not heard of Mr. Segretti. 

Senator Ervin. When did Secretary Stans tell you that he had fur- 
nished $75,000 to assist in paying the counsel fees for the counsel for 
the seven Watergate defendants ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The same time he told it to this committee. I saw it 
on television, that was my first knowledge of it. 

Senator Ervin. You had no knowledge of that before ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Well, did Mr. Dean come to New York and talk to 
you about the demands of some of the defendants for money ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; he did later in the year. I believe the occasion 
had to be in November or perhaps even later than that. 

Senator Ervin. Didn't you hear anything about the fact that these 
defendants were demanding money for counsel fees and for suj^port 
during the summer of 1972? 

Mr. Mitchell. I did not, as I have testified here yesterday, Mr. 
Chairman, the Mardian-Liddy discussions — Mardian-LaRue discus- 
sions with Liddy, the matter that was mentioned as to whether or not 
the committee could provide money for the bail for the individrals 
and that was turned over by the committee. Apparently the activities 
of raising money for support and counsel fees continued on and it 
wasn't later until sometime in the late summer or fall that I heard 
about the activities. 

Senator Ervin. You did hear about — you were given to understand 
that either the committee or Mr. Kalmbach were furnishing the money 
to pay counsel fees and support to the f amxilies of the seven Watergate 
people ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, I heard that as I say later on after the time 
frame. 

Senator Ervin. And later you were informed that there was some 
doubt as to whether McCord would stand fast in silence, weren't you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was so advised, yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. And you were asked to see what you could do 
about that, weren't you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. About what, Senator ? 

Senator Ervin. To see what McCord was going to do. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not quite sure, Mr. Chairman, that I get the 
thrust of your question. 

Senator Ervin. Well, who told you about the fear that McCord might 
not remain silent ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe it was Mr. Dean. 

Senator Ervin. Wlien was that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Sometime after the first of the year. I would believe. 

Senator Ervin. Now, you mentioned the fact that there had been 
some talk from somebody that came to you to the effect that Hunt said 
he would not take a promise of immunity from anybody except Colson. 
AVhen was that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That was sometime directly after the first of the year 
also, I believe preceding the trial. Mv. Dean related that conversation 
and it had to do with the fact that Mr. Hunt's interest in Executive 
clemency would only be accepted from Mr. Colson. 



1863 

Senator Ervin. Now, as I recall, you testified after you had moved 
to New York that you came down to Washington and was here on 
March 22 and had attended a meeting where the President and Dean 
and perhaps Ehrlichman and Haldeman were present. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Senator Ervin. And you discussed this committee ? 

Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And the President was adhering at that time to the 
notion that he could invoke executive privilege and keep any of his 
present or former White House aides from testifying before the com- 
mittee. Isn't that so ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that the fact that that impression had been 
put out from the White House was one of the reasons for the meeting. 
Obviously, of course, the President could waive it any time he wanted 
to and that was one of the subject matters that was discussed at the 
meeting of March 22. 

Senator Ervin. Didn't you advise him not to invoke any such claim 
of executive privilege ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I had told the President, and I presume it was by 
way of advice, if he thought it was appropriate to accept it, and this 
is, of course, in the time frame of the Gray hearings, where this subject 
matter became very lively, in which I suggested that I thought that 
his only problem, his only public problem, with respect to these mat- 
ters was the fact that he was indicating that he would invoke executive 
privilege with respect to the staif and the White House and I thought 
this was something he should not do because it was putting him in a 
very poor light. 

Senator Ervin. Don't you agree with me that any person, whether 
it is the President or a Senator or a hod carrier or anybody else, who 
gives the impression to the public that he is withholdmg information 
within his power is putting himself in a bad light ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Did we start off with the Senators and then 

Senator Ervin. I came 

Mr. Mitchell. Hod carriers ? 

Senator Ervin. I started up with the President and came down by 
gradations. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Chairman, if we will leave out the Presi- 
dent, I will certainly agree with you wholeheartedly. I think the Presi- 
dent has a separate question with respect to the separation of powere. 

Senator ER\aN. I was discussing psychology. From a psychological 
standpoint, don't you think that the President who withholds inforaia- 
tion or papers about a matter that is being investigated runs the risk 
of having many Americans draw an inference that the reason he with- 
holds them is Ijecause he realizes they would be unfavorable to him? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think they may but I am sure that there is not 
always that simple question or other factors involved that have to be 
weighed and you have, frequently you have, two risks that have to be 
weighed and certainly it is the case in this area. 

Senator Ervin. Do you accept the concept that executive privilege 
entitles the President to deny a court or a congressional committee the 
testimony of his former or present aides about everything? 

Mr. Mitchell. It depends entirely upon the area, Mr. Chairman. 



1864 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr, Mitchell. And, of course, if they are conversations or direct 
communications with the President and particularly with respect to 
certain subject matters, I think that he has that power. 

Senator Er\t:n. Well, let me state my concept of executive privilege 
and see if we agree or disagree. I think a President is entitled to have 
kept secret confidential communications had between him and an aide 
or that he had among his aides which were had for the purposes of 
assisting the President to perform in a lawful manner one of his con- 
stitutional or legal duties. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I agree with that concept. 

Senator ER^^N. Yes. And I think also that is the full scope and effect 
of executive privilege. Since there is nothing in the Constitution re- 
quiring the President to run for reelection, I don't think that executive 
privilege covers any political activities whatsoever. They are not official 
and have no relation to his office. Do you take the position that the 
President is entitled to keep political secrets from the Congress or 
political activities under executive privilege ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not under the outline that you have provided. 

Senator Ervin. I also take the position that executive privilege does 
not entitle a President to have kept secret information concerning 
criminal activities of his aides or anybody else because there is noth- 
ing in the Constitution that authorizes or makes it the official duty of 
a President to have anything to do with criminal activities. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would agree. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. So, I cannot see if any aide has any information 
about criminal activities or if any papers in the White House that 
constitute reports from — to any White House official about criminal 
activities, that they are privileged in any way whatsoever. 

Mr. Mitchell, t would have to qualify that with respect to certain 
areas that might involve national security, and if we will leave that 
out I will agree with you. 

Senator ER^^[x. Well, national security is defined in the Executive 
order as comprising only two fields : First is national defense and the 
other is our relations with foreign countries. T don't think there is 
anything else that falls in the field of national security, according to 
the definition in the Executive order which was signed by President 
Nixon, and I think that is also clear that the acts of Congress make it 
very clear what national defense is. 

Mr. Mitchell. I quite agree with you. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I made the exception and you have very properly, I 
think, defined it. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, well, I thank you. I am going to read vou some- 
thing that — vou managed President Nixon's campaign in 1968 as well 
as in 1972, didn't you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I managed it for a while in 1972 and for most 
of the time in 1968. 

Senator Erat^n. Now, in his campaign in 1968 Nixon appealed to 
voters for their support in these words : 

America is in trouble today not because her people have failed but because her 
leaders have failed. Let us be^n by oommitting ourselves to the truth, to see it 
like it is, and to tell it like it is, to find the truth, to speak the truth, and to live 
the truth. 



1865 

Now, do you have any reason to think that between that time and 
1972 that President Nixon has changed his position, his fidelity to the 
truth? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no doubt whatsoever that his fidelity to the 
truth is the same as it was in 1968. 

Senator Ervin. And yet, he said that the way to save America in 
1968 was "to find the truth, to speak the truth, and to live the truth." 

And yet, when 1972 came and these White House horrors became 
known to you, you did not take the advice that President Nixon gave 
us all in 1968, did you? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not under that particular guideline, I assure you. 

Senator Er%t[n. In other words, not only was it true in your case, but 
it was true in the case of Mr. Mardian, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Magruder, 
Mr. Dean, and Mr. Ehrlichman, was it not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I cannot characterize those gentlemen and their 
activities. 

Senator Ervin. Well you know that Mr. Dean knew about the Water- 
gate affair to some extent, that Mr. Mardian knew about the Water- 
gate affair to some extent, that Mr. LaRue knew about the Watergate 
affair to some extent, and that Mr. Magruder knew about it to some 
extent and that none of them made any public statement disclosing 
what they knew. 

Mr. Mitchell. 
agree with your statement, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. Now, you have told us that you talked to the 
President on many occasions, either in person or by phone between 
June 17, 1972, and March 22, 1973. Is that not right ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There were considerable number of occasions; most 
of them, of course, were in group meetings. 

Senator Ervin. Did you at any time tell the President anything you 
knew about the White House horrors ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Ervin. Did the President at any time ask you what you 
knew about Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not after that first discussion that we had on the 
telephone, I believe it was on June 20. 

Senator Ervin. Well, if the cat hadn't any more curiosity than that 
it would still be enioying its nine lives, all of them. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I hope the President enjoys eight more of them. 

Senator ER^^N. We will take a little recess. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Mitchell, as I understand your testimony, you 
knew that Magruder was subpenaed to go before the grand jury some 
time about August ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I knew that Magruder made an appearance before 
the grand jury in August, yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And he had told you that he was prepared to commit 
perjury rather than reveal the truth ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. And am I doing you an injustice to ask you whether 
or not you preferred for Magruder to commit perjury rather than to 
reveal the truth ? 



1866 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not think any of your questions, Senator, could 
possibly be an injustice. The preference, obviously, was that the matter 
not be disclosed. 

Senator Ervin. Now, you state that you kept silent concerning the 
things you knew because you considered the reelection of President 
Nixon of such extreme importance. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Do you know anything about any plans to use the 
money that had been contributed for the reelection of President Nixon 
in 1968 or 1972 to sabotage the campaigns of the other Democratic 
candidates? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have — I do not know what your word "sabotage" 
means, Mr. Chairman. I do know that there were activities that were 
carried out that I have learned of subsequently. They are all second- 
and third-hand information. 

Senator ER\^N. Now, I want to talk to you just a little bit about the 
Presidency. I do not consider — you and I may disagree on this, but I 
do not consider the occupant of the Office of the President, as impor- 
tant as that Office is, to be a sacrosanct person, occupying a position 
above the law and above all other Americans. 

Mr. Mitchell. If you wish a response to that 

Senator Er\t;n. I would be glad to have your comment on it. 

Mr. Mitchell. My comment would be that the Presidency obviously 
has to be held in the highest regard, respect, and obviously, he is not 
above the law, nor is any other citizen. 

Senator ER^^:x. Well, why should a President be immune from sub- 
pena or from voluntarily appearing before a congressional committee 
investigating a matter of the importance of this matter ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I am out of the business of giving legal 
advice, at least for the time being, and I do not think I can comment 
on that subject. 

Senator Er\tx. Well, the only thing I have seen definitely on that 
point is the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in the Aaron Burr case 
in which he ordered a subpena duces tecum to be issued to Thomas 
Jefferson to come to the Circuit Court in Richmond and present some 
letters he had received from General Wilkinson. So far as I know, that 
case has never been overruled or disputed by any court. 

Now, I wonder if your statement ought not to be changed a little 
bit. You say that you did not want President Nixon to find out about 
the Wliite House horrors. Is it not the fact that you did not want the 
American people to find out about it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think that is one and the same, because as I 
testified before, if the President had found out about it, obviously, he 
would have pursued his responsibilities in that area very vigorously. 

Senator Ervin. And you were afraid to tell the President — well, I 
won't say afraid, but you preferred not to tell the President and didn't 
tell the President because you didn't want the President to do what you 
called lowering the boom ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is exactly correct. 

Senator Ervin. And if he had lowered the boom, the thing would 
have been exposed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't think there is any doubt about it. 

Senator Ervin. And the American people would have learned about 
it? 



1867 

Mr. Mitchell. They would have learned about it. 

Senator Ervin. And it might have affected the votes of the American 
people ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is quite conceivable — I don't expect to an extent 
that some of us might believe. I think that is a matter for debate, but 
it certainly could very well have affected the outcome. 

Senator Ervin. Well, I have a higher opinion of the American peo- 
ple than that. I think if the President had lowered the boom, if you had 
told the President and the President had lowered the boom and come 
out in the performance of his constitutional duties to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed, I think he would have made his elec- 
tion more sure than ever. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, except for one circumstance. Senator. And that 
is, of course, they impute the wrongdoings of the lowest individual in 
the Wliite House, of course, right to the top. This is where the problem 
always seems to arise. 

Senator Ervin. Now, don't you think that there is danger of people 
doing that if the President persists in his determination not to come 
before this committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure I understand your question, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

Senator Ervin. Well, the President announced about Friday — I 
think is the day — ^that he would not appear before this committee and 
that he would not allow this committee to have access to what he called 
Presidential papers, which seem to cover all of the papers in the White 
House or in the executive branch of the Government. I don't know 
exactly what he meant by that. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure I don't, either, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. But isn't it a rule of evidence that when a person 
refuses to produce evidence within his power to produce that an infer- 
ence may be drawn that the reason he does not produce it is because 
he knows it to be unfavorable to him ? 

Mr. Mitchell. This I believe is a rule of evidence in the courts of 
law. When you are dealing with the separation of powers involving the 
President, t think it has to be looked at perhaps in a different light. 

Senator Ervin. Well, isn't that a rule that applies just as much to 
the search for truth as it does in courts of law ? It is a rule of logic, it 
seems to me. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would agree with you with respect to the search for 
truth. There is no question about it. But as I say, there is another fac- 
tor involved here and that has to do with the separation of powers. 

Senator Ervin. Well, I don't believe there is anything in the Consti- 
tution that says the powers of the Presidency should be separated from 
truth. At least, I have never seen it. 

Mr. Mitchell, I would have thought that the Founding Fathers 
who wrote the Constitution might have left that out by design. 

Senator Ervin. Well, I don't think it ever occurred to them that a 
President wouldn't be willing to do just exactly like President Nixon 
said we ought to all do. and that is to seek the truth, to find the truth, 
to speak the truth, and live the truth. 

I was somewhat intrigued by the question that Senator Montoya 
asked you. 

Now, it is your explanation that you were afraid that the revelation 
of the White House horrors prior to November 6 might have some 



1868 

disastrous effect on the election. But when the seventh came, that 
danger was past and why didn't you tell the President, knowing that 
one of his chief duties under the Constitution is to take care that the 
laws be f atihfully executed, on the day after the election, or sometime 
after, about what you knew about this ? 

Mr. Mitchell. 1 would repeat what I said previously, Senator, that 
it wasn't my responsibility to do so. There were other people involved. 
They were changing the guard, so to speak, at the White House, and 
the fond hope was that the Presidency would not be hurt by the activi- 
ties of others that were carried on in the "V\niite House. 

Senator Ervin. And was it your found hope at that time that the 
truth would never overtake anybody other than the seven people in the 
original case? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was my fond hope that whatever came out 
of it would not mar the Presidency ? 

Senator Ervin. Well, it was another President named George Wash- 
ington who had an adviser named Alexander Hamilton, and Alexander 
Hamilton laid down two precepts. One was : 

But you must by all means avoid the imputation of evading an inquiry and 
protecting a favorite. 

Is it conceivable that you are trying to protect the President? Or 
was it conceivable that you were trying to protect the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Protect the Presidency, not from the fact that he was 
involved, but the fact that the derivative activities of those in the 
White House might cast a cloud upon the President. 

Senator Ervin. And Hamilton also stated : 

It was my duty to state facts to the President. 

You don't feel like it was your duty to state facts to the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Under certain circumstances, there is no question 
about that. 

Senator Ervin. Well, in respect to the Watergate horrors, you never 
felt any compulsion, either before or after election day, to advise the 
President of what you knew ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In retrospect, Mr. Chairman, after the election was 
over, I probably should have done so. I didn't, and it probably was a 
mistake. 

Senator Ervin. Well, as a matter of ethics, don't you think you 
should have advised him about these matters just as soon as you 
learned about them? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is a much more difficult question, because 
as I have said before, many times here in the last 2 days, I had the 
feeling that it would affect his reelection and I thought that that was 
paramount. 

Senator Ervin. Now, did you — you state that you neA^er told the 
President about Watergate except the matter that you mentioned on 
the 21st of June, and he never asked you anything about the Water- 
gate. You do not know what information the Pi'esident might have 
gotten about tliis matter from other sources, do you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I have no information on that, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Mitchell, I want to thank you. You have been 
extremely patient with me and you have been extremely patient with 
the committee. 



1869 

Mr. Mitchell. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. 
Senator Er\t;n. Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Mitchell, I am going to repeat a question that 
was asked of you this morning by Senator Inouye and I would like to 
have an answer to it. Senator Inouye asked you "To what lengths you 
now are willing to go to deceive in an effort to avoid further implica- 
tion of the President in the activities under investigation by this 

panel ? More specifically" 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I cannot hear you, I am sorry. 
Senator Weicker. Senator Inouye's question to you this morning, 
Mr. Mitchell, was "To what lengths are you now willing to go to 
deceive in an effort to avoid further implication of the President in the 
activities under investigation by this panel ? More specifically, are you 
willing to lie to protect the President", to which question you 
responded "Senator, there is one great thing about the answer that I 
can give to that question to you. I do not have to make that choice 
because to my knowledge, the President was not knowledgeable cer- 
tainly about the Watergate or certainly knowledgeable about anything 
that had to do with the coverup if that is the phrase that we are using, 
so I do not have to make that choice." 

Now, Mr. Mitchell, I am going to ask you the same question. I do 
not consider that an answer to Senator Inouye's question, and so I 
will repeat his question, also my question : Would you lie at the present 
time to protect the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I can — ^I should answer it the same way I did 
this morning. Senator, but I will add to it that if you are putting a 
hypothetical question to me the answer would l)e no, that I would not 
here under oath, and I am answering a hypothetical question so far as 
any knowledge is concerned. 

Senator Weicker. Now, on September 5, 1972, in the deposition in 
the case of Lawrence 0''Brien v. James McCord, when you were 
asked the following question by Edward Bennett Williams, you were 
asked "Was there any discussion at which you were present or about 
which you heard when you were campaign director concerning having 
any form of surveillance on the Democratic National Committee head- 
quarters," and your answer at that time on September 5, 1972, was : 
"No, sir, I can't imagine a less productive activity than that." 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, and I stand on the answer that I gave 
this morning that refers to the activities of the security group the 
question was asked with respect to. 

Senator Weicker. Of course, even by September 5, 1972, you had 
been informed by Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian on June 21 as to what 
had occurred, had you not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, but this question, of course, was pre the June 
17 event, as I recall the question, and of the whole line of questioning. 

Senator Weicker. The question was asked you, Mr. Mitchell, on 
September 5, 1972. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am well aware of the date of it, Senator, but I am 
talking about the context in which the question was asked. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, you felt that you answered that 
question truthfuUv? 

Mr. Mitchell. I did. 



1870 

Senator Weicker. On March 29, 1973, you made the statement in a 
CEP press release "I deeply resent the slanderous and false statements 
about me concerning the Watergate matter reported as being based on 
hearsay and leaked out of the Ervin Committee. I have previously 
denied any prior knowledge of or involvement in the Watergate affair 
and again reaffirm such denials." 

iMr. Mitchell. And I have so testified here in the last 2 days. 

Senator Weicker. And again, this was said on March 29, 1973, even 
though you have also testified before this committee of the meetings 
of January 27 and February 4 and then the meeting with INIessrs. 
Mardian and LaRue on the 2'lst of June and you still make this state- 
ment on March 29, 1973 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. And that statement does not contradict the fact as 
I have so testified here. 

Senator Weicker. Now, you have testified that on June 21, 1972, you 
were briefed by Messrs. Mardian and LaRue concerning the statement 
Liddy had given them the day before. Why did you fail to mention 
your knowledge of this information when you were interviewed by the 
staff of this committee on May 10 of this year and, in fact, you only 
gave the information to the staff on July 9 after it came to your atten- 
tion that the committee had met with Messrs. LaRue and Mardian 
and had this information in their ken. Why did you wait, in other 
words, until July 9 to indicate your knowledge of a meeting which you 
had called between yourself, Mardian and LaRue ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I did not call that meeting, and I am not 
sure it was held on the 21st or the 22d. Mardian and LaRue came in 
to brief me on the subject matter and, as I recall, my meeting with the 
staff up here, whatever date it was, I was being responsive to the ques- 
tions that they were asking me. 

Senator Weicker. Well, you were asked specifically what you knew 
of the coverup and you denied any knowledge except that you had 
heard that payments were being made to the defendants which you 
agreed to in fear of revealing Plumbers activities. 

Mr. Hundley. Excuse me. Senator, I was present with Mr. Mitchell 
on that occasion, and I remember very well it was the day that an 
action had been taken up in New York involving Mr. ^Mitchell, and the 
whole interview was very courteous, very brief and very general only 
attended by staff members, and to the very best of my recollection. 
eA^ery question that was asked was answered and answered truthfully 
and it was made very clear at that meeting that they really regretted 
the circumstances of the timing of the interview and that we would 
come back for more detailed and substantial interviews, which we did. 

Senator Weicker. All right. Let's start at the beginning here, if we 
can, in going over the testimony that has been presented by you, and 
do some probing. I must confess, Mr. Mitchell, that as I have sat here 
and listened to your testimony the only difficulty I find with it is that 
it sometimes is difficult to realize that we have sitting before the com- 
mittee not some administrative assistant to some deputy campaign 
director but we have the campaign director sitting before this com- 
mittee, and indeed we don't have some Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General sitting before the committee, we have the Attorney General of 
the United States sitting before the committee. 



1871 

Now, on the 27th of January, 1972, Gordon Liddy presented a plan 
in your office, in the office of the Attorney General of the United States, 
and that plan, complete with visual aids, included elaborate charts of 
electronic surveillance and breaking and entering and prostitution 
and kidnaping and mugging. Now you have indicated that in hindsight 
you probably should have thrown him out of the office. 

Mr. Mitchell. Out of the window. 

Senator Weicker. Maybe even out of the window, in hindsight. 

The life of every American is or to a great degree, his liberty, pro- 
tection of all of his rights, sits in the hands of the Attorney General of 
the United States, and do you mean to tell me that you sat there 
through that nleeting and, in fact, actually had the same man come 
back into your office for a second meeting without in any way alerting 
appropriate authorities, in this particular case, the President of the 
United States? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is exactly what happened, Senator. And, as I 
say, in hindsight it was a grievous error. 

Senator Weicker. Grievous error when, that you didn't notify him 
right away or you didn't notify him at all ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think both. I don't think it would have been neces- 
sary to notify the President with respect to the meetings in the Justice 
Department. I think they should have been handled differently on a 
different level. 

Senator Weicker. You mean after listening to what we would both 
agree are outlandish plans, that you were neither moved to great anger 
in your capacity as Attorney General of the United States, which 
certainly everything that he proposed runs contrary to what you are 
supposed to stand for at that moment ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was moved to considerable anger. That is the reason 
that the plans were turned down and he was told to go and burn them 
and forget about such things. 

Senator Weicker. Well, obviously you didn't make much of a point 
to the man since he was back in your office on February 4 ; isn't that 
correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. He should have understood, got the message. 

Senator Weicker. Yes, but I mean he came back into your office, he 
was back into your office on February 4 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, with an entirely different concept, not the con- 
cept, one that would be approved but an entirely different concept. 

Senator Weicker. Economy plan. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would not put it as an economy plan, I would put 
it on the basis that it was considerably changed but he still hadn't 
gotten the message as to what the interest of the committee was or 
should have been. 

Senator Weicker. Well, the fact is, forget, for 1 minute, politics, 
let's just talk about your position as Attorney General of the United 
States. I find it inconceivable, unless there seems to be at least some 
willingness to share a portion of the mentality that you didn't go 
ahead and have the fellow arrested for even suggesting this to the 
Attorney General of the United States. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I doubt if you can get people arrested for 
suggesting such things but, as I said 



1872 

Senator Weicker. For suggesting illegal acts to the Attorney Gen- 
eral of the United States, I think that is i:)robably grounds for arrest. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you really, Senator ? 

Senator Weicker. t do, I do. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would have some doubts. I don't know what part of 
title 18 would cover that but that is not the point that I am sure you 
are trying to get at. The point is that I think I made it eminently clear 
that those acts were not in accord with the concept that we had for the 
purpose of gathering information of intelligence and to secure the cam- 
paign against harmful demonstrators. That was the concept of the 
plan that was discussed, and if you recognize Mr. Dean's testimony it 
was so stated at one of those meetings that that was the the concept in 
which we were interested. 

Senator Weicker. Well now, it is true that the elements of the plan 
contained considerably more than just actions against demonstrators. 

Mr. Mitchell. There is no question but that the plans presented did, 
but it was not the intention that the activities of Mr. Liddy and the 
gathering of information intelligence and the protection of the cam- 
paign against demonstrators was the concept in which we were looking 
forward to and which we understood would be the case. 

Senator Weicker. Now, since your sensibilities as Attornev General 
were not overly offended in this matter what about your sensibilities as 
the shortly-to-be-appointed director of the President's campaign effort. 
Here is a man who is standing before you as the chief counsel of his 
reelection effort, I mean it didn't occur to you to call up the President 
and say, "I have got some pinwheel in my office here that is going to be 
the counsel to your reelection campaign and I think I ought to warn 
you — I think I ought to warn you — you have got a lot of trouble on 
your hands." 

In other words, in a political sense, it didn't occur to you to go ahead 
and warn anybody to get this fellow off the boat, if you will. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, it never occurred to me that anybody would 
carry out such activities particularly without any authorization to 
do so. 

'Senator Weicker. Did it ever occur to you that anybody would 
present such a thing, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It was pretty hard to conceive but I do not know 
why it was done or who was the author or the sponsors of it. The 
fact of the matter is that it was turned down and turned down very 
hard and terminated on that very day on which it was presented. 

Senator Weicker. Well, in any event, he still had sufficient standing 
before the Attorney General and the then-to-bc director of the cam- 
paign so that he was back in vour office on Februarv 4, with, admit- 
tedlv, a scaled-down plan. But let us p:et back to the 27th of Januarv 
1972. At 11 :15 in the morning, vou go through this presentation, which 
both of us would describe as incredible. At 2 :30 that afternoon, you 
talked to the President of the T"^nited States, and no mention is made 
at all of what had transpired in the office of the Attorney General that 
morning? 

Mr. ^fiTCTiELL. Absolutely, Senator. I do not know how often you 
get to talk to the President of the United States, but he is the one that 
normally initiates the conversation and the subject matters that are 
discussed. 



1873 

Senator Weicker. But no conversation, as incredible — I have never 
heard, and I am sure that you had never heard of such a plan in all 
your career in politics. Certainly, I have never heard of such a plan. 
So this is not just something that stands just over the line, if you will. 
This is fantasy, this is unbelievable. And this man is holding a respon- 
sible position in the Committee To Re-Elect the President. You have 
the option of talking to the President hours after this idiot is in your 
office, and you say nothing. It that right ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. Now, you stated in your testimony yesterday 
if you have the transcript there 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I do not, but we will be glad to listen to it. 

Senator Weicker. In any way that the committee can be helpful to 
you, I do not want to catch you on something. I want you to have the 
words before you. 

You stated in your testimony yesterday that Mr. Magruder was 
wrong when he said you "were focusing on the Democrats and Mr. 
O'Brien because of Mr. O'Brien's vocal activities in the ITT case." 

What I would like to do is to refresh your memory. Specifically, you 
stated — this is in relation to the February 4 meeting : 

Mr. Mitchell. It did, but there again, there are faulty recollections with what 
was discussed at that meeting, what the concept of it was. I violently disagreed 
with Mr. Magruder's testimony to the point that the Democratic National Com- 
mittee was discussed at a target for electronic surveillance for the reasons that he 
gave, number 1, with respect to the Democratic back story. We are talking now 
about the 4th of February. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, I know, Mr. O'Brien's the reason for centering in on Mr. 
O'Brien, I believe. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, and, of course, the newspaperman did not 
have his column that Magruder referred to until the 23rd of February. He said 
we were focusing on the Democrats and Mr. O'Brien, because Mr. O'Brien's 
vocal activities in connection with the ITT case, and Mr. Anderson did not 
publish his column until the 29th of February, and so that what I am point- 
ing out is that this meeting was a relatively short meeting and it was rejected 
again because of the fact that it had these factors involved. But these targets 
were not discussed. 

Do you want to stand, Mr. Mitchell, with that statement that this 
was the first knowledge that you had of the Anderson column, when 
it was published ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That I had the — ^the first knowledge that I had of 
the Anderson column ? 

Senator Weicker. That is right. In other words, the implication 
is that it was not until the Anderson colunm on February 28 that 
you became significantly concerned with Mr. O'Brien's effectiveness 
with the ITT story; in other words, 24 or 25 days after the Feb- 
ruary 4 meeting. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. O'Brien had written a letter that had re- 
ceived practically no publicity whatsoever, and it was not until the 
Anderson column about the Dita Beard memorandum was published 
on the 29th that this received any publicity or any concern. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, you had received a letter from 
Mr. O'Brien, actually back in December, December of 1971 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure whether I received it or somebody 
else did, but it had no concern as far as the tough political picture 
was involved. The concern arose after the publication of the Decem- 
ber 28 column by Mr. Anderson. 



1874 

Senator Weicker. But in fact, there was a concern with Dita Beard, 
with the ITT matter, as early as February 4. But your concern was 
not precipitated by the Anderson column, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell, i am not quite sure that 1 got your double concern, 
Senator. 

Senator Weicker. Let me be very specific. You have already indi- 
cated that you had received the letter. 

Mr. Mitchell. What I am saying is it became a matter of public 
controversy at the time that the Jack Anderson column was published 
February 29 and it was not of great moment before then. 

Senator Weicker. Well, let us examine that for a minute. On Feb- 
ruary 4, 1972, is it fair to say that the ITT matter was a potential 
concern ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not so far as I can recall or not so far as I would 
assess it under the circumstances which you have just related. 

Senator Weicker. Well, do you recall that there had been newspaper 
articles back in 1971 relative to ITT, relative to the Dita Beard memo- 
randum — not the memorandum but the subject matter of it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I recall that the ITT matter was constantly in 
the newspapers. But I am talking about the circumstances that ^rose 
which had received the great notoriety after the publication of the 
Anderson column. 

Senator Weicker. And it is true that you had received an earlier 
letter from Mr. O'Brien on the matter ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure whether I received it or whether the 
President received it or who received it. I knew that there was such a 
letter, but there was not very much attention paid to it at the partic- 
ular time and it certainly did not receive a great deal of public clamor. 

Senator Weicker. Had Mr. Anderson's office contacted you relative 
to the Dita Beard memorandum prior to its publication in the |)ress? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe, if my memory is correct, that they called 
the public information office in the Justice Department the day they 
were to publish it or the day before. 

Senator Weicker. Specifically, on February 25. 

Mr, Mitchell, It could have been that far back, but I would doubt 
it. Or at least, that is not my recollection. It could be. 

Senator Weicker, Then, on February 29, Dita Beard was spirited 
off to Denver by Mr, Gordon Liddy, is that correct? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not know what date it was. This was one of the 
matters that Mr, Mardian and Mr. LaKue told me that Mr. T^iddy had 
told them. But what the dates are, I am not aware of it and was not 
aware of it at the time. 

Senator Weicker. You were not involved with the plans to spirit 
Dita Beard off to Denver by Mr, Gordon Liddy? 

Mr. Mitchell, No ; I can assure you that that is the case. 

Senator Weicker. "W^io was in charge of that operation? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not know. You will have to ask the parties that 
were involved in it. The only information I had on it camo through 
the Mardian-Lalfue discussion vv'ith Mr. Liddy, who stated that he liad 
been involved in it. 

Senator Weicker, Now, Mr. LaRue states that on March 30, 1972, 
when Mr. Magruder presented the Liddy plan to you in Mr. LaTJue's 
presence, that rather than rejecting it, you merely told Mr. Magruder 



1875 

that it did not have to be decided at that time. Is there any way that 
you can relate to Mr. LaKue's testimony as to what occurred at that 
moment in time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; my recollection is very distinctly as to what I 
testified on yesterday, that the matter was rejected and it was rejected 
on the basis that I was tired of hearing of these things and did not want 
to hear about them again. 

Senator Weicker. All right. Now, let's move to your meeting with 
Mr. Liddy on June 15, 1972, 2 days before the break-in. Wliat time of 
day did you usually leave the office when you were Attorney General 
or campaign director ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It ranged all the way from 6 to 9. 

Senator Weicker. Well, in the first 5 months of 1972, your logs show 
no appointments after 6 p.m. Does that seem to correspond with your 
recollection ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, it — after 6 p.m. ? 

Senator Weicker. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I haven't been through them to ascertain that, 
but it was not unusual for me to work on until 7 or 8 o'clock, some- 
times 9 o'clock at night. 

Senator Weicker. Well, there is no record of it, certainly that I have 
in my possession, and the pattern of ending at 6 o'clock or before con- 
tinued into June, with one exception. On the 15th of June, you had a 
6 -AO p.m. appointment, an appointment with a man who, as it turns 
out, it would have been well not to have been seen coming to and from 
your office, G. Gordon Liddy. This after hours appointment happened 
only once in all the time, at least as to the logs we had, that you were 
Attorney General or campaign director in 1972 prior to June 17. 

Mr. INIitchell. Senator, are you aware of the purpose and contents 
of tliat meeting ? 

Senator Weicker. I am going to get — my question is simply do you 
maintain that this meeting was not arranged because you were aware 
you were meeting with a man whose association could embarrass you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is not the case at all, Senator. Do you want the 
facts as to how the meeting was structured ? 

Senator Weicker. Yes ; I would like to have the fact as to how the 
meetina; was structured and the contents 

Mr. Mitchell. It is very simple. Mr. Liddy had written a letter to 
the Washington Post, which was subsequently published, at the request 
of ISIr. Stans responding to some charges that were made by somebody 
on the staff of the General Accounting Office about the failure of the 
finance committee — the failure of tlie finance committee to comply 
with certain provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act. The letter was 
brought to Mr. Shumway, wlio Avas in charge of public infonnation 
atthe Committee for theEe-Election of the President. Mr. Shumway 
said that he did not Avant that lettei- published without my approval, 
so Mr. Shumway brought Mr. Liddy into my office. 

We looked at the letter and I gave the approval to its publication 
and that was the total sum of that meeting. And that is the only time 
that I saw or talked to Mr. Liddy from the second day of February — 
the fourth day of February. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, there is no particular significance 
in the fact that this meeting was held after hours ? I see nothing in 



1876 

the content of the meeting as to why it could not have been held at 
any other time of day. But on this particular day, this meeting was 
held after hours, totally contrary to the patterns of 

Mr. Mitchell. It is not contrary to the pattern necessarily. Senator. 
The fact that appointments aren't made after 6 o'clock, although 
I am sure that there must be some in here, the fact that appointments 
aren't made after that hour may be because people aren't available. 
But I certainly was working at the committee and also at the Justice 
Department for long times after 6 o'clock. 

Senator Weicker. Now, let's get to Mr. Dean's role in relationship 
to you. According to your logs, you did not meet with John Dean for 
more than a month before the Watergate break-in. Now, do you recall 
anything that would contradict that record ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I haven't checked my logs to that, Senator. 

Senator Weicker. On June 19, after you returned from California, 
you met with Mr. Dean and others in your apartment, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Weicker. According to your logs you then met with Mr. 
Dean on June 20 twice, June 22, June 23, June 24. June 25 is a Sunday 
and there are no logs for the 26th, 27th, and 28th. But you met again 
on the 29th and the 30th. In other words, here is a man that you 
scheduled no appointments with for a period as long as a month and 
following June 17, you met every day except for holidays and trips 
out of town. Is that substantially correct, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would believe that is the case, and I would believe 
that you would find that also, after the trips out of town and into 
the fall, there were continued and constant meetings with Mr. Dean 
dealing with the civil litigation, with many of the facets that were in- 
volved in connection with the problems that the Watergate presented. 

Senator Weicker. Well, let's stay to these meetings right after the 
17th of June, starting with June 19. Was the discussion during the 
course of these meetings Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. On June 19 ? 

Senator Weicker. June 19. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was the one at the Department. There most as- 
suredly was a discussion of Watergate, because that was the purpose 
of the meeting. We had just returned from California and we were 
being brought up to date as to what the information was on the subject 
matter and how we would handle it with respect to a response to the 
charges that the Democrats were making about it. 

Senator Weicker. All right. You met twice on June 20. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure that the same subject matters were covered. 

Senator Weicker. June 22 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, obviously, I can't tell you what was dis- 
cussed at each of these meetings, but I am sure that in connection with 
most of the meetings that I had with John Dean during this period 
of time, it dealt with the Watergate. 

Senator Weicker. Well, I imagine — well, that is fair enough, tlien. 
I just want to establish the fact that there was no relationship here, 
certainly not on a regular basis, until after the Watergate, at which 
time there was a continuing relationship between yourself and Mr. 
Dean. You liave answered my question, tliat the principal discussions 
centered around the Watergate. 



1877 

Is that right? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Now as far as Mr. LaKue is concerned, again, is 
it not true that you had close contact with him during this particular 
period of time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I had very close contact with him, because, of 
course, he was involved in the political campaign as well as assisting 
Mr. Mardian in connection with the investigation of what went on in 
relationship to Watergate. 

Senator Weicker. And Mr. Mardian ? He was the one that had been 
selected ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. So, your relationships here insofar as Watergate 
is concerned, can we say that they really center around John Dean, 
Bob Mardian, and Fred LaRue? 

Mr. Mitchell. Basically, that is the case. And, of course, at a later 
date, ■ sometime in the second week of AjDril, the lawyers that were 
retained by the committee in connection with the civil litigation. 

Senator'WEiCKER. All right, and outside of the litigation aspect of 
it, Mardian, LaRue, and Dean. Is there anybody that you would add 
to that group as being the group that you were in consultation with 
relative to Watergate? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would have to add in the counsel, because they were 
the ones that were interrogating the people in the committee. They 
were handling the civil litigation, the depositions that were about to be 
taken or were being taken in connection with it. And then, of course, 
you Avill find meetings there in which some of the people that you have 
mentioned have added to them Mr. Cliff Miller, Mr. Van Shumway, 
INIr. Powell Moore, Mr. Ricliard Moore, in which we were working on 
the responses to the charges that the Democrats were making from day 
to day in a public relations point of view. 

Senator Weicker. Now, on June 19, Mr. Magruder has testified and 
Mr. LaRue has stated that Mr. Mitchell, that you instructed Magruder 
to destroy the Gemstone files, to in fact, have a bonfire with them. 

Now, you deny this having ever occurred. Can you give me any 
reason why these two men would lie about this fact ? 

Mr, Mitchell. Well, I don't know whether they have lied about it 
or whether there was a difference of opinion. 

As you know, Mr. Dean has also testified that there was no such 
discussion at the meeting. And I would point out, as I say, again 
that as of that particular time, I didn't have any knowledge that 
there was such a thing as a Gemstone file. 

Senator Weicker. Did you suggest that any documents be de- 
stroved, not necessarily Gemstone ? 

Mr. MiTCTTELL. To tile best of my recollection 

Senator Weicker. At the June 19 meeting at your apartment did 
you suggest that any documents be destroyed, not necessarily Gem- 
stone or not necessarily documents that relate to electronic surveil- 
lance ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection when I was there 
there was no such discussion of the destruction of any documents. 
That was not the type of a meeting we were having. 



1878 

Senator Weicker. What was the type of meeting you were having? 

Mr. Mitchell. Just the one I have described earlier it had to do 
with we being brought up to date, having just gotten off an airplane 
from California being advised as to what the current circumstance 
was and what was to be the response of this committee, the Committee 
for the Re-Election of the President. 

Senator Weicker. Did you instruct at that meeting Mr. Mardian 
and Mr. LaRue to go and see Mr. Liddy the next day ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I don't, to my recollection. I would point out 
that Mr. Mardian and Mr. LaRue and I had been on an airplane for 

5 hours that day, and I am not certain whether I did anything more 
than ask Mr. Mardian or instruct Mr. Mardian to get on top of this 
matter, to see what had happened and to find out what and who, if 
anybody else in the committee, were involved in it and that is what 
he undertook. 

Senator Weicker. Well, they did interview Liddy the next day. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure whether it was the next day or the 
day after but it was in that time frame. 

Senator Weicker. All right. Then let's move to June 20 and let's 
go to your calendar. 8:15 a.m., White House meeting; 10:32 am., 
Magruder meeting, LaRue meeting, Mardian meeting. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is all the same meeting. Senator. 

Senator Weicker. Magruder, LaRue, and Mardian ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Weicker. 1 :40, Mardian meeting. 2 :05, Magruder meeting, 
Timmons meeting. 4:15, Stans meeting. 4:50, Magruder meeting, 
Daley meeting. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is Pete Daley who was the head of the media 
operation. 

Senator Weicker. Right. 5 :30, Magruder, Sedam, LaRue, Mardian. 
Now at any of these meetings with Magruder, LaRue, Mardian, or 
LaRue and Mardian or with any one of the individuals did you receive 
a report on Mr. Liddy's activities ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I tell you. Senator, that I recall having received the 
report in a meeting with LaRue and Mardian alone and that these 
meetings do not seem to fit into that circumstance. I think that prob- 
ably the later period in time, which was probably on Wednesday, the 
21st where I noticed that there is a meeting in which only LaRue and 
Mardian participated. I believe that that would probably be more 
likely the meeting in which they described to me of their conversation 
with Mr. Liddy. 

Senator Weicker. All right, and that meeting, according to your log 
probably took place somewhere between 5 :30 and 6 o'clock in the 
evening ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It says in my log it is from 3 :20 to 4 o'clock. 

Senator Weicker. On the log of Tuesday, the 20th of June 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I am talking about the 21st of June. 

Senator Weicker. I am talking about the 20th, I started off this 
questioning in relating to the 20th of June. 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, I see on, another page here there is a meeting at 

6 o'clock that involves Fred LaRue and Bob Mardian so it could have 
been either one of those days. 



1879 

Senator Weicker. Well, in this one it is on Tuesday, and at the bot- 
tom it shows on the log, your log, Magruder, Sedam, LaRue, and 
Mardian except within the large parentheses — do we have June 20 up 
there — within the large parentheses it includes all four, Magruder and 
Sedam have a small parentheses as if they had a meeting and then also 
Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian had a meeting alone. 

Mr. Mitchell. Are we still on June 20 ? 

Senator Weicker. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. It says in this log, which is a photostatic copy of the 
original "5 :30, at 5 :3d I saw Sedam and Magruder and at 6 o'clock 
LaRue and Mardian joined the above." 

So, that LaRue and Mardian came into a meeting that was already 
in existence. 

Senator Weicker. Well, now, what is missing at this point from 
your log, Mr. Mitchell, anything? 

Let's assume what you have just told me to be correct, what is miss- 
ing from your log ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I haven't the faintest idea what you are making 
reference to. 

Senator Weicker. Well, the appointments are in your log and you 
now have indicated to me at 6 o'clock you have Magruder, Sedam, 
LaRue, and Mardian with you and not in your logs but from the 
White House logs is a phone call from the President lasting from 6 
o'clock to 6 :12. 

Mr. Mitchell. That might very well be the case. 

Senator Weicker. And that phone conversation, did it relate to the 
Mardian-LaRue report ? 

Mr. Mitchell. If it was from the President it obviously did not 
relate to the report, and I say, I have a very distinct recollection of 
having had the discussion with INIardian and LaRue alone and that is 
why I believe that it probably took place on the 21st when I did meet 
with Mardian and LaRue alone and not on the 20th when there were 
two other people shown at the meeting. 

Senator Weicker. Well, it could have been there, they couldn't have 
been there, that is something vou have got to rely on your recollection. 
The wav it is set up here and I have a photostat of the log, it is pos- 
sible LaRue and INIardian were alone. That is something you have to go 
ahead and resolve. But in any event it is a fact that at 6 o'clock you 
talked to the President, that day. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is what the log shows. 

Senator Weicker. Does anything come to mind as to what the sub- 
ject matter was of that conversation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of mv recollection was the conversation 
of the 20th is as I have described it here before the committee. It was 
a relativelv short conversation and it was in this particular conversa- 
tion that I apologized to the President for not having kept letter 
control over the activities of some of the people that were at the 
Committee for the Re-Election of the President. 

Senator Weicker. And then you talked to the President from 6 to 
6 :12 which entrv is not in your log and at 6 :50 you talked to John 
Dean and at 7 :15 you talked to John Dean. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now which day are we talking about? 

Senator Weicker. The 20th, the same day, Mr. Mitchell. 



1880 

Mr. Mitchell. It so shows. If you are trying to ask me what the 
subject matters of those conversations were, I haven't the faintest 
idea that I can recall them. I talked to Mr. Dean, as the log shows, 
many, many times over the period of the next number of months. 

Senator Weicker. Let me ask you one question: In other words, 
what this series of events then that involves LaRue and Mardian, 
phone calls from the President, meeting with Dean is as you have de- 
scribed it and in nowise did you transmit any information gained from 
Mardian and LaRue to either the President or to John Dean^ 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I am certain that I did not have that in- 
formation at the time that I talked to the President on the 20th of 
June. 

Senator Weicker. How come the President's call is not on your log ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I haven't the faintest idea. 

Senator Weicker. In the meeting with Mardian and LaRue, did 
they tell you about the Memorial Day break-in at the Democratic 
National Committee? 

Mr. Mitchell. Now you are talking about the debriefing ? 

Senator Weicker. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. Of Liddy ? 

Senator Weicker. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. They did tell you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is my recollection. 

Senator Weicker. When was the debriefing of Liddy ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is what we have been trying to get at. 

Senator Weicker. Well, roughly, can you give me a 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I believe it was sometime 

•Senator Weicker. On the 20th or 21st ? 

Mr. Mitchell. On the 20th or 21st ? 

Senator Weicker. May I read to you a transcript in the case of 
Lawrence 0''Brien v. James McCord^ et al.^ dated Tuesday, September 
5, 1972 : "Did it ever come to your attention or were you given any in- 
formation that members of the security group headed by Mr. McCord 
had entered on to the premises of the Democratic National Committee 
at 2600 Virginia Avenue prior to June 17, 1972. 

"Answer. I don't have that information to this date, except to read 
of speculation in the newspapers. 

"Question. Your answer is no. 

"Answer. No. 

"Question. Now beginning on June 17, 1972, and for the period 
thereafter did you have conversations with anybody from the security 
group," et cetera that continues. 

But what you are telling me here today, Mr. Mitchell, is that you 
were notified of a prior break-in on either the 20th or the 21st of June 
and that you denied such a knowledge, such knowledge in a deposition 
taken on September 5, 1972 ? 

Mr. Mitchell, Let's go back on this, Mr. Weicker, because this is the 
same subject matter that you came up with and I am glad you read 
more of the information, I said it was my recollection, and it could be 
wrong, that I had been advised of the earlier break-in, Cei-tainly that 
Liddy was involved. The questions, as you just read relate to the secu- 
rity group of McCord and it was answered in that context. 



1881 

Senator Weicker. To me it is very clear, this is the same group 
that Mr. Liddy was involved with ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, you will have to read the rest of the transcript. 
Mr. Liddy was not part of the security group. Mr. Liddy worked for 
the finance committee, and the questions involved there had to do 
with the security group that was headed by Mr. McCord, and this is a 
civil litigation and I was not volunteering any information. 

Senator Weicker. And Mr. Liddy as a practical matter was not a 
member of this group ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Of the security group ? 

Senator Weicker. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, he was not. 

Senator Weicker. The group that was involved in the breaking and 
entering ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No — well, you will have to go to the discussion of 
what was the security group and it did not involve Mr. Liddy be- 
cause Mr. Liddy worked for the Finance Committee. 

Senator Weicker. Let's move to June 21. At 8 :15 you met with Mr. 
Haldeman ; at 8 :15 in the morning Magruder, LaKue, Mardian ? 

Mr, Mitchell. May I stop you. Senator, that 8 :15 is the regular 
staff meeting in the White House just like all the rest of them are 
listed in there. 

Senator Weicker. At 9 :50 you met with Mr. Magruder, Mr. LaBme, 
Mr. Mardian, and Mr. Malek. At 11:30 you met with Mr. LaEoa, 
2 :45 with Mr. Magruder, at 3 :20 with Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardiair; 
4 :45 Magruder, Sedam ; 6 :20, Mardian, Magruder and LaRue. 

Can you indicate as to whether anything in the discussion with Ife. 
Haldeman related to the Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator 

Senator Weicker. I know you have indicated it was a regular staff 
meeting but it still does not mean we don't talk to each other. 

Mr. Mitchell. There would have been no discussion of the Water- 
gate at that particular staff meeting that involved the upper echelo© 
of the people in the White House at that particular time and I caa 
recall no such morning meeting when any of the specifics of the de- 
tails of the Watergate matter were discussed. 

Senator Weicker. But in any event, and this is a dispute still to be 
resolved as to whether you received the information from LaRue and 
Mardian on the 20th or whether you received it on the 21st, by the 21st 
you had been given what I will call the Mardian-LaRue briefing rela- 
tive to Mr. Liddy's activities. 

Mr. Mitchell. I will not say that it was actually the 21st but I 
believe that according to this log that it is more likely on that date that 
that meeting that I have pointed out because I have a very distinct 
recollection that they were the only two people there at the time. 

Senator Weicker." You have stated that you did not tell the Presi- 
dent of Mr. Liddy's activities because of the fear that you had that 
revelation of these matters to the President would result in public 
exposure of these matters by the President and that that would be 
harmful to his reelection campaign, is that correct ? 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. Yes ; and I want to make sure that you understand 
that we were not talking about the Watergate. We were talking about 
the other matters that have been discussed here, the so-called White 
House horrors. 



1882 

Senator Weicker. I understand that, and I must confess it is one of 
the few areas probably of judgment where I would agree with you as 
to which was the more serious situation, and I think the horror stories 
probably in a political sense were probably far more serious than the 
Watergate. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, Senator, for that justification. 

Senator Weicker. However, in trying to protect the President by 
not telling him of these activities and thus preserving his status in the 
campaign, did you not feel that there was a far greater danger, relative 
to Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy and that it was not sufficient not to tell 
the President but rather that something would have to be done relative 
to Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Done to them in what respect ? 

Senator Weicker. That is what I am asking you as to whether or 
not you felt that you could — it was sufficient to protect the President 
by not telling the President or whether you felt a far greater danger 
existed with Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy running around the country- 
side in having the story that you were trying to suppress come to the 
surface ? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. Well, Mr. Hunt and Mr. 

Senator Weicker. Was there not a far greater threat that Hunt and 
Libbv would expose these activities than the President of the United 
States? 

Mr. Mitchell. That was always a possibility, but the fond hope was 
that they would, of course, not because they were involved in them. 

Senator Weicker. What did you do to prevent it ? 

Mr. ;Mitchell. What did I do to what ? 

Senator Weicker. Prevent it from happening. 

Mr. Mitchell. I did not do anything to prevent it. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, you took care of the Presidential 
situation by not telling him ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. And you took care of the Hunt and Liddy situa- 
tion by just letting it run its course ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, if you will look at the 

Senator Weicker. Because your next contact relative to Mr. Hunt 
and Mr. Liddy comes in September quite aways away before you get 
involved with them again. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, the fact of the matter is that the rationale 
is that Hunt and Liddy were involved in those other activities and 
there was every indication or belief that they were not about to go 
and incriminate themselves in those particular areas. 

Senator Weicker. So you did absolutely — even though having a 
deep concern over this matter, having been told about the "Wliite 
House horror stories and having a deep concern as to blow the whole 
campaign right out of the water even to the extent where you did not 
go ahead and tell the President of the United States, you did nothing 
relative to the two people who if they talked, could blow the whole 
campaign out of the water ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I have never talked to Mr. Liddy or Mr. 
Hunt — I never talked to Mr. Hunt in my life, I never talked to Mr. 
Liddy or any of their counsel. But obviously, as we know that there 
were other people that did have that concei-n and did start at a very 
early date payments for support and lawyers' fees. 



1883 

Senator Weicker. Were you one of those people ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I was not. As a matter of fact, I have testi- 
fied here that when the suggestion was made at the Mardian and La- 
Rue meeting after they met with Liddy, Liddy suggested to them that 
it would be helpful if the Committee for the Re-Election of the Presi- 
dent might provide bail money for the ones that -were, I presume, 
then in the jail, that I refused to go along with it and turned it down. 

Senator Weicker. Now, then, let us move to the 22d of June and 
again run through those logs, 8 :15 White House meeting, 10 o'clock 
White House meeting, 10:50 Magruder-LaRue-Mardian meeting; 
11 :15 Dean telephoned, 11 :20 Ehrlichman telephoned, 4 o'clock La- 
Rue, Mardian, and Magruder ; 5 :20 Kalmbach by telephone, and 5 :45 
LaRue, Mardian, and Magruder. 

Do you have any recollection as to what it was you discussed with 
Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr, Mitchell. I do not have any specific recollection. Of course, 
as far as Mr. Ehrlichman was concerned, I would — I dealt with him 
frequently on matters that pertained to issues in connection with the 
campaign. I believe that if my memory serves me right, that June 22 
was the day that the Democratic National Committee filed its lawsuit, 
and I am sure that they must have had to be subject matters of the 
conversations. 

Senator Weicker. Did you ask them either Ehrlichman or Dean, as 
to whether or not they knew anything about the Liddy activities which 
at this point in time you had come into knowledge about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Did I ask them what they knew ? 

Senator Weicker. Right. Did you indicate to them that you knew 
about Mr. Liddy's activities ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There was a period in here. Senator, and it must have 
been within this time frame that after I had been debriefed by LaRue 
and Mardian that I discussed the matter with John Dean and John 
Dean made aware to me the conversations that he had had with Gordon 
Liddy on the 19th of June, so there was a reafRmnation of some of the 
material. They were not exactly the same stories but there was a cross 
index of information. 

Senator Weicker. All right. Now, the phone call to Mr. Kalmbach 
at 5 :20, your recollection as to the nature of that conversation. 

Mr. Mitchell. If you will look, Senator, you will find that the next 
day and the day after that, and right through Saturday of that week, 
there were calls to Mr. Kalmbach and those calls had entirely to do 
with Mr. Kalmbach being of assistance to my wife, who was then at 
the Newporter Inn in California, having substantial difficulties with 
some of the people that were out there with her. 

Senator Weicker. But, of course, this date which I am referring to 
is not that weekend at all. I am talking about June 22. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am talking about all three of them. If you will look 
at the 22d and go right on through, you will find, I believe, there is a 
call every dav. 

Yes, sir ; there is one on the 23d, there is one on the 24th, which is 
Saturday. 

Senator Weicker. And there was no discussion at all of money with 
Mr. Kalmbach? 

Mr. Mitchell. None whatsoever. It had entirely to do with my 
personal problem. 



1884 

Senator Weicker. Now, then, moving to June 23, Friday. Were you 
aware tliat 2 days after you learned of what you called the White 
House horrors, a concerned effort by Messrs. Haldeman and Ehrlich- 
man began at the White House to encourage the CiA to get involved, 
first of all, by informing tne FBI of CiA involvement in the case, 
and thereby to hinder the mvestigation. 

Mr. Mitchell, i was not aware of the activities that were being 
carried on over in the White House, either by Haldeman, Ehrlichman, 
or subsequently, Mr. Dean. 

Senator Weicker. You had no conversations with Mr. Haldeman or 
Mr. Ehrlichman during this period of time about this particular 
subject? 

Mr. Mitchell. About this particular subject matter, 1 am quite cer- 
tain that that is my best recollection ; I am quite sure that 1 did not. 

Senator Weicker. And on that same day, June 23, Hugh Sloan, in 
an eH'ort to alert the White House of what he was learning about 
people's involvement in the break-in, was first counseled to get a lawyer 
by Mr. Ehrlichman and was told by Mr. Chapin that he, Mr. Sloan, 
needed a rest because he was distraught. And nobod}- informed you, 
the campaign manager, that somebody at the White House was in- 
volved, is that a fact ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, as you will see, I met with Mr. Sloan on 
June 24 and Mr. Sloan never even mentioned it to me at that time. He 
expressed no such concerns. In fact, all he did was undertake an argu- 
ment with Magruder in the presence of Mardian, and so forth, as to the 
amount of money that he had passed on to Mr. Lidd3^ 

And this, by the way, is the only time that I met with Mr. Sloan sub- 
sequent to June 17, and his testimony with respect to the fact that he 
was brought in to see me before he was being interviewed by the FBI, 
is not correct. That was a matter that was being handled by the 
lawyers. 

Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Mitchell, I think probably I know 
what the answer to this one is going to be, but to try to pull together 
these o or 4 days, is it fair to say that on June 21, 1972, when you 
learned of the potential revelations of the plumbers' activities, which 
revelations you knew could be devastating to the President, that you 
and others began a coverup that carried over to the White House in 
order to prevent any such revelation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the answer to that is that I certainly was not 
about to do anything that would provide for the disclosure of it. AVhat 
others were doing on their own or in concert with others is the subject 
matter that they will have to testify to. I think what Mr. Dean has 
testified to is that he tliought the coverup had started on June 19 in 
connection with certain activities that he testified to at that particular 
time. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, again, the nature of the activities 
that you discovered on the 20th or the 21st of June was in your mind 
sufficiently explosive to throw a Presidential campaign off the tracks? 

Mr. Mitchell. There is no question about it. I have testified fre- 
quently to that subject. 

Senator Weicker. And the only action which you took as one of the 
President's closest advisers and also as the head of the Committee To 
Re-Elect the President, the only affirmative action that you took was 
to say nothing to the President ? 



1885 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, obviously, I had had discussions with the other 
individuals involved here about the subject matters, and this is where 
I learned more of the liorroi- stories from John Dean. But as to an 
affirmative, overaction, there was no other action that I took during 
this period of time. 

Senator Weicker. Now, let's move through some other days here. 
At what time — let me ask that question. On what date did you leave 
as head of the Committee To Re-Elect the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I met with the President on June 29 — June — yes. On 
June 30, I had a meeting with the President to discuss the subject 
matter and the conclusion, the decision was reached, and it was an- 
nounced on July 1. 

Senator Weicker. All right. On June 20, your logs for that day 
indicate meeting with LaRue, meeting with Mardian, telephone call 
from Dean, telephone call from Haldeman, telephone call to Halde- 
man, meeting with Mardian ; 11 :45, meeting with Haldeman, the 
meeting with the President at 12:30. Then at 4:30, a White House 
meeting. 

What was the reason for you having left the campaign ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I answered that question previously and it 
had entirely to do with the conversation that I had with Mrs. Mitchell, 
sometimes on the telephone, sometimes through UPI, to the effect that 
if I didn't get out of the campaign, I wasn't going to have a wife any 
longer. And that is the reason why I left. That was quite well pub- 
licized, I believe, at the time. 

Senator Weicker. I wonder if I might have put before us the 
calendars of late June, which would indicate your schedule just prior 
to your leaving the Committee To Re-Elect the President, and the 
schedule in July after you had left the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President? Let's see June— late June, and before that, the middle of 
June. 

That is the schedule of June. 

Now, could we see July. 

With the exception of the Fourth of July, I would say it is pretty 
much the same schedule, wouldn't you, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I wouldn't think so. It was quite a different area of 
operation. If you will go back — of course, what you have done there 
is just list on all of these charts the meetings with certain people. But 
if you will go back and look and see the change of the nature of the 
meetings, the different groups that had to do with the politics of the 
campaign, these are not shown on there. All that is shown on your 
prior charts are the ones that are involved in your hearings here. 

Senator Weicker. Well, let me read out vour schedule and the 
individuals involved on that schedule of June" 29, which was the last 
day, the next to the last day that you served — and your schedule of 
July 6. On June 29, your meeting with LaRue, Mardian, Haldeman, 
Dean, LaRue, Mardian and Dean. 

On July 6, Colson, Mardian, LaRue, Magruder, Haldeman, LaRue, 
Mardian, LaRue, Dean, Magruder, LaRue, Mardian, LaRue. 

That does not indicate to me, does it, a change in pattern. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, you have just picked out two pages that 
happen to coincide. If you go back and read some of these other pages, 
you can see that I meet with all types of people from campaign 
chairmen to Senators, Governors, all the rest of them down the line. 



1886 

Senator Weicker. My point is that the burden of work as far as 
you are concerned does not change. 

Mr. Mitchell. It changes completely. Clark MacGregor came in 
and took over the running of the campaign and met with the type of 
people I am telling you about except in some specific areas that re- 
mained for me to look after in my consulting role. 

Senator Weicker. Didn't anybody discuss the fact, Mr. Mitchell, 
that the reason why you should leave as the head of the Committee 
To Ke-Elect the President was because it might be considered that 
in that capacity, you were subject to the daily confrontations with the 
press, which press might go ahead and continue to ask you questions 
relative to Watergate ? What this ever discussed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. If it was, it was not discussed with me, no. The de- 
termination. Senator, for my leaving the campaign was made entirely 
on the basis of that luncheon conversation that I had with the 
President. 

Senator Weicker. July 1, Saturday, 9 :40, you met with LaRue and 
Moore and Magruder. 12 :08, LaRue and Magruder. 12 :30, Kleindienst 
by telephone and then from 5 :13 to 5 :36, it does not appear on your 
logs, you have phone conversation with the President from San 
Clemente ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I had a phone conversation from San Clemente 
which I have described to this committee. And obviously, the phone 
call came to my apartment, since the log here shows that I left the 
office at 2 o'clock, 

Senator Weicker. And this conversation was on the evening of 
July 1, is that correct? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. Did the President call you the next day, July 2 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is also correct. 

Senator Weicker. Do you know where he called you from ? 

Mr, Mitchell. According to the information that I have received 
from the White House, he called on both occasions from San Clemente. 

Senator Weicker. What time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. What time ? 

Senator Weicker. Yes. Insofar as the call on July 2 is concerned. 

Mr. Mitchell. July 2 — the information provided from the White 
House switchboard shows that the time was 9 a.m. And I don't 
know 

Senator Weicker. My information shows 6 a.m. on Sunday morning. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, we had the discussion yesterday, I believe, as 
to the time difference, and I am not quite certain whether this is Wash- 
ington time or San Clemente time. 

Senator Weicker. On July 11, you met with Fred LaRue at 11 
o'clock in the morning. Then at 12 :48, you had a conversation with the 
President, which again does not appear on your log. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is 12 :43, it shows here, that there was a call, it is 
not in the log and I have no explanation as to why it is not. 

Senator Weicker. Do you have any idea as to the substance of that 
conversation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Wliich one are we talking about, Senator ? 

Senator Weicker. We are now talking about the conversation of 
July 11. 



1887 

Mr. Mitchell. The July 11 conversation, to the best of my recollec- 
tion, as I testified yesterday, had to do with the discussion of the 
President's determination to keep Vice President Agnew on the ticket, 
or at least to recommend him to the convention, that he be kept on the 
ticket. 

Senator Weicker. And then, after that phone call with the Presi- 
dent, you meet again with Mardian and LaRue, is that correct? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there is obviously no relationship to it; be- 
cause I was not discussing with Mardian and LaRue the President's 
desire to keep the Vice President on the ticket. 

Senator Weicker. Well, let me give you some examples of pattern 
again, so that you can possibly supply me with an explanation that I 
fail to get from the logs themselves. 

June 30, you meet with LaRue at 8 :35 a.m., Mardian at 8 :45 a.m., 
with Dean at 10 :30 a.m., with Haldeman, 11 a.m., then you talk with 
the President at 12 :55 p.m. 

July 21, you meet with LaRue at 10 a.m., with Mardian at 10 a.m., 
with Dean at 10 :15, with Parkinson at 10 :30, then with the President 
at 2 p.m. 

July 27, you meet with LaRue at 9 :35, Ehrlichman at 10, Dean on 
the telephone at 12 :50, met LaRue at 12 :55, talked with Mardian at 
1 :10, met with Magruder at 4, and talked with the President at 5 :51 
p.m. No connection, what you are telling me is that none of the matters 
that were discussed as between you, Mr, LaRue, and Mr. Mardian 
were discussed with the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am telling you that as affirmatively as I can put it. 
There is no question. 

Senator Weicker. Did you discuss them with anybody else? 

Mr. Mitchell. Discuss what. Senator ? 

Senator Weicker. Matters that you and Mardian and LaRue — 
specifically, I guess Watergate matters ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. All aspects of it. Senator, including the civil litiga- 
tion, including — and this runs on through to the General Accounting 
Office inquiry, has to do with the currency problems that were in- 
volved. It has to do, of course, as you can see from many of these 
meetings, with a response to the charges that the Democrats were 
making. 

Senator Weicker. One thing relative to the logs, then we will leave 
them. It is possible, however, as far as your logs are concerned, since 
we have established the fact that calls, meetings with the President, 
that appear on the T\niite House logs that do not appear on your logs, 
that there might very well be other meetings with other individuals 
that do not appear in your logs ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, it is always conceivable, but I doubt that 
would be the case because of the manner in which these logs were 
kept. And I am sure the staff has interviewed my secretaries and they 
would be much better able to describe that than I would. 

Senator Weicker. Well, if a Presidential phone call does not im- 
press them, I would imagine not much below that is going to go ahead 
and impress them. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think both these girls were quite accustomed to re- 
ceiving and handling phone calls from the President, and I think that 
they might have had many, many more of them before this period of 
time, as my earlier logs would show. 



1888 

Senator Weicker. But it was customary not to have them logged ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir ; it was not. As a matter of fact, my logs, as 
I testified yesterday, were started in the Justice Department and they 
were continued even beyond my knowledge after I left the Justice 
Department in the same form and shape and circumstance after I 
came to the practice of law and then subsequent to that, to the com- 
mittee. 

Senator Weicker. Now, on March 22, you have stated that you spoke 
with the President, along with Dean and Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
and that the sole subjects were executive privilege and developing a 
liaison with the Select Committee. Am I correct? And that nothnig 
else concerning Watergate was discussed. 

Mr. Mitchell. I said that those were the main topics of the meeting. 
There was also the discussion, as I said, of having somebody provide 
liaison with the committee up here. Dean was discussed and apparently 
rejected, and then Ehrlichman, and as I think the record will show, 
and I think I can bear out Mr. Dean's recollection of it, the President 
called Mr. Kleindienst on the subject matter while we were there. 

Senator Weicker. Everybody seems to be very much in tune with 
the conversations of that particular meeting. And yet, in the Presi- 
dent's remarks of April 17, 1973, he states that on March 21, "As a 
result of serious charges which came to my attention, some of which 
were publicly reported, I began intensive new inquiries into this whole 
matter." 

That is by the President's own statement : "On March 21, as a result 
of serious charges which came to my attention, some of which were 
publicly reported, I began intensive new inquiries into this whole 
matter." 

And on March 22, you and Mr. Dean, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlich- 
man, all met with the President and the subject matter of Watergate 
never comes up, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, what part of — you are talking about Watergate. 
We are talking about this committee up here whose purpose was to 
investigate Watergate, as I understand it. So obviously, the subject 
matter of Watergate came up in connection with this committee, being 
the committee to investigate Watergate. But if you are talking about 
did the meeting have any conversations that went back and reviewed 
the bidding as to who did what to whom under what circumstances, 
the answer is "No," it did not. 

Senator Weicker. But we know from the President's own statement 
that on the day before, new inquiries were made into the whole matter. 
And here he had standing before him the following day the head of 
the Committee To Re-Elect the President. Were any inquiries made at 
all of the former head of the Committee To Re-Elect the President? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; the conversations were just as I have re- 
ported them. 

Senator Weicker. So, in effect, no inquiry, even though the Presi- 
dent stated that new inquiries were being made, no inquiry was being 
made of you by this particular group of gentlemen, either the President 
or Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Dean, in that room at that 
time? 

Mr. Mitchell. There was no such discussion. Senator. 



1889 

Senator Weicker. Do you find that surprising, in light of the 
March 21 statement? 

Mr. Mitchell. I find it surprising in light of what Mr. Dean said 
about the March 21 conversation that he purportedly had with the 
President. 

Senator Weicker. I am not talking about Mr. Dean. I am talking 
about what is reported as said by the President. 

Mr. Mitchell. What is the date of that statement, Senator? 

Mr. Weicker. It is the statement of April 17, 1973, and the state- 
ment says : 

My second announcement concerns the Watergate case directly. On March 21st, 
as a result of serious charges which came to my attention, some of which were 
publicly reported, I began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter. Last 
Sunday afternoon, the Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General Petersen 
and I met at length in my EOB office to review the facts which had come to 
me in my investigation and also to review the progress of the Department of 
Justice investigation. I can report today that there have been many develop- 
ments in the case concerning which it would be improper to be more specific now 
except to say that real progress has been made in finding the truth. 

That is the President speaking relative to what he did on March 21. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, what question would you like me to answer ? 

Senator Weicker. My question to you is, "Do you find it surprising 
when you appear on the scene on March 22 and sweeping new investi- 
gations are oeing made that nobody goes ahead and raises the Water- 
gate insofar as any participation of those in the room?" Do you find 
this rather surprising? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not. 

Senator Weicker. Considering the new attitudes toward question- 
ing for the truth announced or started on the 21st of March? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would presume that the President, under normal 
processes, would be having others look into the matter and not the 
President himself. I am sure he has a lot more important things to 
do than to conduct an investigation of his own of that type. 

Senator Weicker. Or do you think it is possible, in other words, it 
doesn't surprise you that nobody — it doesn't surprise you that nobody 
discussed Watergate. I am talking about now — I am not talking about 
the committee, I understand all about those discussions that go on 
about the committee, I am specifically talking about the involvement of 
persons in that room, it is not surprising to you it was never discussed 
in light of this statement of the President. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, it does not surprise me. 

Senator Weicker. That new affirmative action was being taken just 
the day before ? 

Mr. IMitchell. No, it was not the purpose of the meeting and I can 
understand why it might not have been discussed. As I say it may have 
been very well someone else who was conducting the investigation. 

Senator Weicker. Do you think one of the reasons it was not, no 
reason to be discussed, with anybody in the room was because nobody 
was gaining that knowledge because they already had that knowledge ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I had not thought of it in those concepts but I 
don't believe it was the case. "When you meet with the President, you 
meet with the President for a specific purpose and the purpose was, the 
purposes were, as I have stated them here. 



1890 

Senator Weicker. Well, now, the President already knew at that 
point in time or suspected, let's put it that way, suspected, that you 
were involved. Dean had told him this. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now 

Senator Weicker. And you don't find it surprising that he doesn't 
turn to you and say, "John, for heaven's sake, will you please tell me 
what your involvement in this matter is ?" 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, are you taking that from John Dean's testi- 
mony, is that where you are getting that ? 

Senator Weicker. I am taking this from the White House logs, Mr. 
Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. The White House logs of what ? What does the White 

House logs 

Senator Weicker. Of the meeting with John Dean, between John 
Dean and the President. 

Mr. Mitchell. What does it say about Mitchell. I am not privy 
to those logs. 

Senator Weicker. Dean gave the President his theory of what had 
happened. He still said no prior June 17 White House knowledge, 
Magruder probably knew, Ehrlichman probably knew, Haldeman had 
possibly seen the fruits of the wiretaps from Strachan, et cetera. Your 
name came up in the conversation it had been bandied about. 

Mr. Mitchell. This is still a Dean allegation. Well, Senator 

Senator Weicker. This is the White House vei-sion, Mr. Mitchell, of 
the meeting with John Dean. 

Mr. Mitchell. I understand that but it is still John Dean who is 
being the one who is being quoted. 

Senator Weicker. Well, why — do you find it unusual that the Presi- 
dent didn't ask you on March 22 to comment upon Mr. Dean's con- 
versations with him as they related to you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I didn't find it at all unusual because of the basis 

Senator Weicker. You don't find it unusual, you didn't know any- 
thing, you don't find it unusual now ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't find it at all unusual because the basis of the 
meeting and the purposes of the meeting was a different one or different 
ones, as I have stated. 

Senator Weicker. Is this your definition, by the way, this kind of 
testimony, of, what is the expression of, "Stonewalling it." 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know that term. Is that a Yankee term from 
Connecticut? [Laughter.] 

'Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask one more 
question. I really do have another series but I won't take the time of 
the committee now, but there is one question that I would like to get 
into. Now you have referred repeatedly to the WTiite House horrors, 
specifically one of the horrors I believe is the break-in into the office 
of doctor — Ellsberg's psychiatrist? 
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. That is one of the horrors. And on or about June 
21 is when you found out about this ? 
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. Senator. 

Senator Weicker. You were no longer Attorney General at this 
time? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 



1891 

Senator Weicker. But you are an attorney. Is that correct? 
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. And you are an officer of the court ? 
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. Did you bring this matter to the attention of any 
law enforcement officials ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Weicker. Did you notify any officials in the Justice Depart- 
ment about the break-in ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I notified nobody about the break-in. 
Senator Weicker. Did you notify Judge Byrne, the judge presiding 
in Ellsberg's prosecution, that you knew about a break-in of the office 
of his psychiatrist ? 
Mr. Mitchell. I notified nobody about the break-in. 
Senator Weicker. In other words, as an officer of the court, and as 
a former Attorney General of the United States, you were content to 
remain silent even though you knew that silence might possibly con- 
vict American citizen via means of illegally — or illegal conduct? 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I am sure that you are aware of the fact 
that that break-in produced nothing whatsoever, and under no circum- 
stances could there have possibly been any fruits of the break-in that 
could affect the trial one way or the other. 

Senator Weicker. Is it not really a question of what they found, is 
it, Mr. Mitchell? 

Mr. Mitchell. In answer to your question it is. Your question was 
whether or not American citizens could have been convicted because 
of this act, and I am saying that, as I understood the story as it was 
related to me, there was no material obtained or used ; since it hadn't 
been obtained it couldn't have been used. 

Senator Weicker. You didn't know that at the time he committed 
the act? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know the time they committed the act. I had 
heard it when I was advised of the nature of the break-in. 

Senator Weicker. What I am saying to you is that you had no way 
of knowing at the time that if you remained silent this man might not 
have been convicted through information that you knew had been 
illegally obtained? 

Mr. Mitchell. What I am saying is that as these stories dribbled 
out and were embellished upon, it became known to me that their entry 
was unsuccessful in obtaining any information out of the doctor's 
office. 

Senator Weicker. Is there anything in this country, aside from the 
President of the United States, that puts you into awe, Mr. Mitchell ? 
Mr. Mitchell. To put me where ? 
Senator Weicker. That puts you in awe ? 
Mr. Mitchell. There are very, very many things. 
Senator Weicker. Do the courts put you in awe ? 
Mr. Mitchell. Very much so. 

Senator Weicker. Does your oath as attorney, does that put you 
into awe? 

Mr. Mitchell. Very much so. 

Senator Weicker. Do you feel as an officer of the court you did the 
right thing? 



QR_'>QR O 73- 



1892 

Mr. Mitchell. In connection with the Ellsberg matter? 

Senator Weicker. When you did not notify the prosecution or you 
did not notify rather Judge Byrne of the information that you had in 
your possession? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think in retrospect, it probably would have been 
the right thing to do. 

Senator Weicker, I have no further questions at this time. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is a great trial being conducted up here, isn't it ? 

Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock 
tomorrow. 

[Whereupon, at 4 :50 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 
10 a.m., Thursday, July 12, 1973.] 



THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in 
room 318, Kussell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. 
(chairman), presiding. 

Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, Gur- 
ney, and Weicker. 

Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred D. 
Thompson, minority counsel ; Ruf us L. Edmisten, deputy chief coun- 
sel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels ; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel ; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker ; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker ; Michael Flani- 
gan, assistant publications clerk. 

Senator Er\t:n. The committee will come to order. 

In view of the fact that there has been some discussion in the news 
media about the executive meeting of the Select Committee this morn- 
ing, I want to announce on behalf of the committee that the commit- 
tee did not complete its deliberations and will resume them at 1 o'clock 
today. 

I believe Senator Talmadge is next in order if he has some addi- 
tional questions. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of expediting 
the hearings I will pass at this time. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney will be the next questioner. 

Senator Gurnet. For the same reason I will pass, too, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mitchell, I have just one question and the question relates to 
"lowering the boom." I believe on March 21, the President had a meet- 
ing with John Weslev Dean III, at which time Mr. Dean has testified 
that he notified the President as to his involvement in all of the ir- 
regular activities. 

On the following day we have testimony to indicate that the Presi- 
dent met with high officials, staff members of the White House, includ- 
ing Mr. Dean. Now, according to what you have said, we would expect 
the President to have lowered the boom on John Wesley Dean III. But 

(1893) 



1894 

on the 22d of March, instead of lowering the boom, testimony indicates 
that the President designated Mr. Dean to serve as his liaison with 
this committee. Is this your concept of lowering the boom? 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN N. MITCHELL— Resumed 

Mr. Mitchell. No, Senator, it most assuredly is not. I believe that 
the facts were that there was a discussion of Mr. Dean being the liaison 
with the committee to get certain areas straightened out. What actually 
the President was doing in other areas to '"lower the boom," I am not 
quite sure but as we all know, things started to happen from thence 
forward in the area where I do believe that steps were taken to the 
point where you could call it lowering the boom. 

Senator Inouye. For the record, could you tell us where the Presi- 
dent has really lowered the boom ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think he has done so by his appointment of a 
special prosecutor, removing the people from the White House who 
were involved in the activities that were covered. 

Senator Inouye. Was not the appointment of the special prosecutor 
brought about because of intensive pressure initiated by the Congress 
of the United States? Does not the record indicate that the White 
House and the President resisted this ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It was the President's determination ; he was the one 
who made that determination. What were the causes of it, I think we 
can all have different opinions upon but it was his action that did 
provide for the special prosecutor. 

Senator Inouye. And in the case of so-called removals of staff mem- 
bers, the record seems to indicate that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlich- 
man submitted letters of resignation and the President most reluc- 
tantly accepted this and said publicly that these were the two finest 
men he has ever known. Is this lowering the boom, sir? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, but it shows the streak in the President of 
warmth and kindness that most people have not attributed to him 
before, I think could be considered in that light. 

Senator Inouye, I believe your lowering the boom statement is an 
important one and that is why I am pursuing this. You have indicated 
that you did not advise the President of the United States as to your 
knowledge of the facts involved in the matter before us, because you 
were concerned that the President would lower the boom and thereby 
lift the lid off the scandal. I am trying to find out where the President 
has, since learning of these activities, lowered the boom. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is my opinion. Senator, that particularly during 
the month of April and the succeeding intervening period of time, he 
has done exactly what he should have done in lowering the boom by 
removing the people from the White House and by providing for the 
special prosecutor within our system of Government that is what the 
Chief Executive should do. 

Senator Inouye. With the exception of Mr. Dean, when he advised 
the President that he is going to do some talking here, he, I presume, 
was removed, but was anvone else removed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were. 

Senator Inouye. They were not removed, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. They were not removed from the '\\niite House? 



1895 

Senator Inouye. If you read the public statement, they submitted 
their resignations and the President most reluctantly accepted this, and 
in so accepting the resignations praised them to the highest. 

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, I have an entirely different interpretation 
of that. [Laughter.] 

Senator Inouye. Besides Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, did 
anyone else suffer from the lowering of this boom ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I believe that Mr. Magruder was removed from 
his job, Mr. Krogh was. I don't know whether other people that don't 
come to mind at the moment but those who had been participants 
through the information of the President were removed and the boom 
was lowered and the judicial process is going on under an independent 
special prosecutor. 

Senator Inouye. This may be a matter of disagreement, but I have 
done whatever research I could do last evening to find evidence of 
the lowering of this boom, and I regret very much, sir, that I just 
could not see much evidence of this boom being lowered on any alleged 
participant in this tragedy. 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that the matters that I have discussed, and 
we have discussed and I have recounted here this morning is a lowering 
of the boom in the area of the prerogatives of the Executive. 

Senator Inouye. And do you believe that with this soft lowering of 
the boom the lid Avould have blown off? 

Mr. Mitchell. It has, and I don't think it was necessarily soft. 

Senator Inouye. But the lid wasn't blown off by the so-called re- 
moval of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. The lid was blown off, I 
believe, by two men in the Washington Post. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it depends on what areas you are talking about. 
Senator. If you go back to our White House horror stories, I think 
they came out from other sources and at other times. 

Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, Mr. Mitchell. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Baker, 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have no further ques- 
tions at this time. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya. 

Senator Montoya. I have no questions. 

Senator Ervin. I have just one or two questions. 

Don't you consider that one of the primary functions of the Presi- 
dent under the Constitution is to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. He is so charged. Senator, yes. 

Senator Ervin. And aren't you convinced or rather you have testi- 
fied that if you had acquainted the President at the time you acquired 
knowledge of those matters with what you call the White House 
horrors the President would have undertaken to see that the laws 
relating to those matters were faithfully executed. 

Mr. Mitchell. I feel quite certain that would have been the case. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

So, isn't it an inescapable conclusion that you exalted the political 
fortunes of the President before the President's responsibility to 
perform his constitutional duties to see that the laws are faithfully 
executed ? 

Mr. INIitchell. I think that is a reasonable interpretation of the sub- 
ject matter and, of course, in reflection it is a very serious one. 



1896 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Magruder appeared before the grand 
jury for his second appearance on August 18, 1972. 

Noiv, your logs, if you have them, show that you saw Mr. Magruder 
on August 17, the day before, at 2 :15, and that on August 18, the day 
he appeared, you spoke to Mr. Kleindienst at 4 o'clock on the telephone 
and you saw Mr. Magruder at 4 :10, 10 minutes afterwards, on that 
day. 

Can you tell us whether or not the discussion with Mr. Kleindienst 
at 4 o'clock and the 10 minute later meeting with Mr. Magruder after 
he testified had to do with his testimony at the grand jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I have talked to Mr. Kleindienst quit« a 
number of times during this period and we have never discussed the 
Watergate m^atter in any form or shape or circumstance. 

To answer your question specifically with respect to that date and 
that conversation, no, we did not discuss Mr. Magruder or his 
testimony. 

Mr. Dash. Your meeting with Mr. Magruder both on the 17th and 
the 18th at 4 :10, was that for the purpose of discussing his testimony 
before the grand jury? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't have that recollection, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Do you have any recollection of what the discussion was 
about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. As you know from my logs, I met constantly 
with Mr. Magruder about campaign matters and other things, includ- 
ing the Watergate and the public relations aspect of it. And as I testi- 
fied earlier, there were meetings in which Mr. Magruder outlined to 
a group of us the nature of his testimony that he was going to give. 

Mr. Dash. It is specifically because of this that I asked you the 
question, because on a number of occasions, you said, especially during 
meetings with Mr. Magruder, Mr. Dean, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mardian, 
that you did at least have presented to you what Mr. Magruder was 
going to testify before the grand jury. 

Now, on the day he actually testified, you met with him ; on the day 
before he testified, you met with him. Would it not be consistent with 
your earlier discussions that you would have discussed what his testi- 
mony was or was going to be when he finally testified ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think, Mr. Dash, those conversations took place 
much earlier than the date in August that you have made reference to. 
If you will look at the logs, you will see, as I say, I met with Mr. Ma- 
gruder almost daily during the whole period of time on many subject 
matters. 

Mr. Dash. But all the way up to this period of time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Pardon ? 

Mr. Dash. All the way up to this period of time ? 

Mr. IMiTCHELT,. And tJiereafter. 

Mr. Dash. Yes; but I would now draw your attention specifically 
to the day — did you know, by the way, when Mr. Magruder was going 
to appear before the grand jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection whether I did or did not. 
I presume T would have been advised, yes. 

Mr, Dash, And at the time, whether it was the 17th or 18th, and 
when you knew that he was going to testify, wouldn't tliat be an 
appropriate time for you to discuss what he was going to testify before 
the grand jury ? You certainly were interested ? 



1897 

Mr. Mitchell. As I said, Mr. Dash, I believe those conversations 
took place much earlier than that. 

Mr. Dash. I know, but you testified before the committee that you 
certainly wanted him to testify in such a way that the lid would not 
come off. You now knew he was going to be testifying. So whatever 
date you can recall at this time he was going to testify before the 
grand jury, would you not have discussed the grand jury testimony 
with him? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I believe the sequence of events goes back 
to the time when Mr. iSIagruder and Mr. Porter went to Mr. Parkin- 
son's office and put together their proposed testimony, which at that 
time they felt was going to be submitted to the grand jury in deposi- 
tion form. I think that was the middle of July. It was in that time 
frame and during or shortly thereafter that the recitation of Mr. Ma- 
gruder's testimony, of the nature of his testimony, was given. I have no 
recollection of having sat down with Mr, Magruder the day before, the 
second day before he went to the grand jury and going over it with 
him. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you learn what he testified to when he went 
to the grand jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I assume that he had testified to what he had told 
us he was going to testify to. 

Mr. Dash. Did you just assume ? Didn't anybodj^ tell you what he 
testified ? Didn't you in fact learn that he did testify as he did, what 
he had been agreeing to testify to ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe, INIr. Dash, if my memory serves me right, 
that he was debriefed by one of the lawyers who advised me as to 
what he testified to. 

Mr. Dash. So in fact, you did learn? 

Mr. Mitchell. I did learn. 

Mr. Dash. Now, he again testified before the grand jury on Septem- 
ber 13 and at that time, it dealt with his diaries and the meeting that 
he had with you. Now, you saw Mr. Magruder, according to your log, 
Mr. Magruder and ]Mr. Dean, at 12 o'clock on that day. Did you have 
any discussions with him about his grand jury testimony on September 
13? 

Mr. Mitchell. On September 13 ? 

Mr. Dash. September 13 is when he appeared for his third and final 
time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I testified, I believe, on Monday to the fact that 
Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, and I rather briefly discussed the recollec- 
tion of the meetings that had taken place in the Justice Department. 

Mr. Dash. And what did Mr. Magruder, to your knowledge, tell 
you that his recollection or his testimony was going to be ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, if I can recall it as best I can, No. 1, that he 
thought that one of the meetings had been canceled ; No. 2, that there 
were discussions of the election laws, which, of course, they both testi- 
fied there were. I think those were the essential parts of it. 

Mr. Dash. What was your response to that ? Did you respond to his 
recollection of what his testimony was going to be ? 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. I have no recollection of that, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you disagree with him ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I didn't disagree with it, no, I did not. 



1898 

Mr. Dash. Did you learn after that testimony on September 13 what 
his testimony was ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe probably in the same way, in connection 
with the debriefing. 

Mr. Dash. Because your logs show on September 14 you met with 
Mr. Dean and Mr. Magruder at 2 :30 in the afternoon. Do you think 
at this point in time that you would have discussed that at that time? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is quite conceivable. As I say, customarily, the 
information would come to us from the lawyers by way of debriefing 
rather than talking to the individuals involved. 

Mr. Dash. Actually, on the very following day of that testimony 
by Mr. Magruder on September 14, you had^a meeting with Mr. 
Ehrlichman at 9 :50 in the morning. In that meeting, did you discuss 
Mr. Magruder's testimony? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure that we would not, Mr. Dash. I have 
not discussed Mr. Magruder's testimony with either Mr. Ehrlichman 
or anybody else in the White House except John Dean. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you testified yesterday that many of your meet- 
ings — I think it was in response to you being asked about the various 
meetings you had with Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mardian, Mr. Dean, Mr. 
Magruder — you testified that many of your meetings during July, 
August, and September of 1972 had to do with the Democrats civil 
suit and the strategy for counterattack or how to defend against that. 
Did you also, during that time, play any role in preventing the Pat- 
man committee investigation from getting off the ground ? 

Mr. Mitchell. We had many, many discussions on the subject 
matter, Mr, Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you make any recommendations as to how to 
deal with the Patman committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the only way to deal with the Patman com- 
mittee as it evolved, was to make a determination as to whether or not 
there were enough votes to eliminate the subpena. 

Mr. Dash. And how did you resolve that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think it was resolved mainly by people in 
the White House liaison and other individuals talking to members of 
the committee or subcommittee, whichever it was, of the Patman 
committee. 

Mr. Dash. It turned out there were not enough votes to 

Mr. Mitchell. It turned out there were not enough votes, and of 
course there was, as I think has been put into evidence here through 
one of Mr. Dean's exhibits, a letter from the Justice Department on 
which they preferred not to have such hearings held pending the 
criminal case that was 

Mr. Dash. Did you at any time during this discussion make any 
recommendation that such a letter be sent from the Justice Depart- 
ment to anybody ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. Having left the Justice Department I cer- 
tainly could not control what their activities might have been. 

Mr. Dash. That was not my question, Mr. Mitchell. During your 
meetings in which this discussion came up, as you said, a number of 
times, was your suggestion at any time that somebody, Dr. Dean or 
somebody else, arrange that such a letter be sent from the Justice 
Department ? 



1899 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, excuse me. I misunderstood your question. 

Most assuredly, we discussed quite widely the impact a letter from 
the Justice Department in such a situation would have on the com- 
mittee and its membership. 

Mr. Dash. I am puzzled, about your distinction between your ef- 
forts you said you were going to make, some sort of coverup of the 
White House horrors that you have described and the Watergate 
break-in and the defense against the civil suits themselves. You seem to 
draw a distinction about the activities that took you away from some 
of this discussion of the White House horrors or other activities be- 
cause of your being involved in the discussion of the civil suits. Now, 
actually, was not the strategy against the civil suits the same kind 
of coverup activity ? Would it not be true that full disclosure in the 
Democratic National Committee suit could result in unraveling all 
the things that you wanted to be not unraveled ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, if I understand your question, Mr. Dash, it 
was our strategy to limit the progress of the civil suits as much as 
possible, certainly before the election. We knew that they would come 
afterwards, and of course, the civil suits, of course, related to the 
criminal trial which was subsequently, I believe, determined by the 
judge handling it. And there was a strategy to keep the civil suits 
from proceeding, yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And then one of the policies behind that strategy was 
the similar policy you had on the other matters of keeping the lid on 
from having these things come out. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this, of course, included the Common Cause 
suit and whatever other suit, the Nader suit I guess it had to do with. 

Mr. Dash. Right, and these discussions concerning what the strategy 
should be concerning the civil suit deals with what kind of testimony 
should be given at the depositions. 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; I think — not in the meetings that I had. They 
were handled by the lawyers with the individuals who were to testify. 

Mr. Dash. Now, around that same time, and I am now speaking 
still around the late June period, and perhaps early July, did you at 
any time after June 17, suggest that the CIA might be — or suggest 
not to the CIA but to Mr. Dean or to anybody else in any of those 
meetings — that the CIA might be a good source of coverup moneys 
for lawyers' fees? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I did not and, of course, I think Mr. Dean 
testified, and I do not know whether his testimony is accurate or not, 
he started out placing that in my lips and wound up with it with Mr. 
Mardian. Now this may be a perfectly honest mistake on his part. 
There were discussions, of course, as I testified, I think on the first day 
here, about, the question was the CIA involved. The newspapers were 
filled Avith it, the individuals that were involved had worked for the 
CIA, there were a number of such matters but the concept of the 
CIA's supporting or providing funds in connection with this activity 
was not discussed in my presence, to my best recollection. 

Mr. Dash. Now, your log 

Mr. Mitchell. Excuse me, Mr. Dash, if I might add to that because 
I think \ye discussed it on Monday, the meeting in which Mr. Dean 
places this conversation having come from the CIA meeting that had 
never took place and, of course, I was not in the city, so I could not 
have heard of his discussions about CIA support. 



1900 

Mr. Dash. But it is your testimony that on no other day when you 
were present in these meetings with Mr. LaKue, Mr. Mardian, Mr. 
Dean, Mr. Magruder, or any other persons who were meeting with you 
regularly did a discussion take place on your part or on any other's 
part that the CIA might be a good source for funds ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not the CIA for the source of support, money for 
bail or defending or whatever it is. There were discussions or questions 
really, about what was the involvement of the CIA. 

Mr. Dash. Now, your log shows from June 17 all the way to August 
29 certainly and thereafter, but certainly to August 29, you had almost 
daily meetings with John Dean and sometimes twice or three times 
a day, and you knew, I think, from your testimony before this com- 
mittee, what Mr. Dean was doing during this time, that he was serving 
as a liaison between you and ]Mr. Haldeman or Ehrlichman, White 
House people, and that he was not making any investigation of the 
Watergate case for the President. Yet, on August 29, the President did 
make an announcement that Mr. Dean had made an investigation to 
give him a report. What was your reaction to that announcement know- 
ing, by having been meeting with Mr. Dean almost on a daily basis 
during that whole period of time that he was doing nothing? 

Mr. Mitchell, Well, Mr. Dash, I think your question provides an 
assumption that I am not willing to accept. It is perfectly conceivable 
in my mind so far as the involvement of personnel in the White House 
were concerned, that Mr. Dean was making such an investigation as to 
the involvement of people in the Wliite House, and I think that was 
the context of the statement of August, whatever date it was. 

Mr. Dash. Well, as a matter of fact, didn't Mr. Dean discuss with 
you what he was doing? You said he met with you regularly, he was 
at your meetings, and if he were making such an investigation, would 
you not know about it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think Mr. Dean was making an investigation with 
respect to the involvement or potential involvement of individuals in 
the White House in the knowledge of the Watergate break-in or 
participation. 

Mr. Dash. His testimony was that rather than make an investigation 
he was engaging in a coverup. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't doubt that for a moment, and I have 
so stated here, that there was that aspect of it. Now, the coverup is 
an entirely different thing, and the statement made bv the President 
with respect to the involvement of individuals in the Watergate affair 
and prior to the June 17 or at the June 17 activities, and I think that 
was the thrust of the statement. 

Mr. Dash. Well, you know from what Mr. Dean I think has testified 
or mav have indicated to you is that on June 19 that Mr. Strachan 
had admitted to him that he had destroyed certain intelligence papers. 
Did Mr. Dean tell you about that? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, he did eventually. 

Mr. Dash. Eventually. When did he tell you this ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not quite certain. 

Mr. Dash. Was it before August 29 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I can't say that for sure, Mr. Dash, but he did some- 
where along the way. 



1901 

Mr. Dash. Well, if he had, you would have been somewhat surprised 
that Mr. Dean had said nobody in the White House 

Mr. Mitchell. I think I would have been quite surprised if that had 
come out. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Dean tell you personally that he made a report 
to the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, Mr. Dean did not so tell me. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever ask him after the President's statement 
came out whether he made such a report ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I discussed — I am not sure that I put it quite in 
the form of that type of a question. We did have discussions of it, and 
he told me that he, of course, had been discussing the matters with 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman, but that he had not specifically made a 
direct report to the President. That whatever information he was pro- 
viding was going through Haldeman and Ehrlichmaan, one or the 
other, I forget which. 

Mr. Dash. From that testimony or from the information you got 
from Mr. Dean that he was reporting to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehr- 
lichman, was it your impression that the President was being misled 
by that group just as you were misleading the President after your 
knowledge from June 21 to June 22 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would believe that would certainly be what — the 
impression that I would have, because Mr. Dean was not talking di- 
rectly to the President. 

Mr. Dash. And under that assumption and the President then mak- 
ing that kind of a report, you still did not feel it was necessary at 
least to correct the President, because now he made a public statement 
to the people of the United States which you knew was perhaps in- 
correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. He made the statement, as I recall, having to do with 
the involvement of the people in the White House with respect to the 
prior knowledge or participation in the break-in of the Democratic 
National Committee, and that statement I think was factually true 
at the time that he made that statement so far as the information that 
he had, and I think possibly so far as the information I had, because 
I believe the Strachan matter arose at a much later date. 

Mr. Dash, But your testimony now is you think that Mr. Dean 
told you about the Strachan matter after the President's report. 

Mr. Mitchell. That would be my recollection, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Throughout your testimony, Mr. Mitchell, you also ap- 
pear to distinguish the so-called Wliite House horror stories, which 
I want to get back to briefly, but the so-called White House horror 
stories from the Watergate break-in. 

Now, you were willing to state that you participated in a coverup 
of the former, the White House horror stories but you sort of dis- 
tinguish that role or participation on your part in the Watergate 
break-in. Is this, Mr. Mitchell, an effort to develop a legal defense or 
is it a real distinction so far as you are concerned. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, this is what I made as a decision back 
in June. It has nothing to do with legal defenses one way or the other. 

Mr. Dash. Well, then, if vou considered the break-in of Ellsberg's 
psychiatrist's office to be a White House horror story, why did you 



1902 

not consider the break-in of the opposite party, the Democratic Na- 
tional Committee headquarters at the Watergate a AVhite House hor- 
ror story ? 

Mr, Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dash, that had become quite widely known 
publicly and there were people in jail, that were leading to an indict- 
ment, there was a grand jury investigation in connection with it. 

Mr. Dash. But the break-in perhaps had become widely known but 
not all the people who were involved, and wasn't that an essential 
problem ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe that that would necessarily be the 
case, because it had come out into the open, it was public knowledge 
that was being discussed widely, but with the other stories they had 
not come out and were not being discussed, were not known, and, of 
course, as I mentioned earlier it was directly in the White House. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, but if, in fact, it had become known that Mr. Ma- 
gruder, the deputy campaign director of the President's reelection 
committee, or Mr. Strachan, Mr. Haldeman's assistant, or perhaps 
Mr. Haldeman himself, had been involved, wouldn't that really be part 
of the AVhite House horror story ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is entirely a matter of degree. Certainly the ac- 
tivities that we have described as the \Vhite House horror stories and 
the periods over which they were undertaken is quite different and 
were not known, is quite different from the fact that you now have or 
did have then on the record and in the media the fact that there had 
been a break-in at the Democratic National Committee that was par- 
ticipated in by some of the people from the Finance Committee To 
Re-Elect the President and the Committee To Re-Elect the President. 
To me it is an entirely different circumstance. 

Mr. Dash. Now, j\Ir. Mitchell, in your testimony through all of these 
meetings of June, late June, July, and August with Mr. Magruder, 
Mr. Mardian, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Dean, although you indicate that there 
was quite a bit of discussion concerning the testimony that Mr. Ma- 
gruder might make and strategies that were taking place, that you 
appeared to be constantly taking a passive role. 

Are we to assume that you are a passive man in this operation, 
Mr. Mitchell? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I think that would be very nice if you 
would do just that but I want to also point out to you that all of these 
meetings you are talking about, this did not all have to do with Water- 
gate. They had to do with other things with the campaign. 

Mr. Dash. I know they had but they quite frequently had to do 
with Watergate? 

Mr. Mitchell. They did quite frequently. 

Mr. Dash. And wasn't your opinion quite frequently a deciding 
factor in so many of these things, certainly sought after in these 
decisions ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There is no doubt that I undertook many of the dis- 
cussions in connection with the matters that were brought up at those 
meetings. 

Mr. Dash. Did you give any specific directions during these 
meetings ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it would depend upon what the subject matter 
was. 



1908 

Mr. Dash. Well, could you give us any examples on subject matter 
that you might have given directions ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would have to go back and refresh my recollection 
on some of the subject matters that were discussed, the specifics of 
them, in order to arrive at that particular point. 

Mr. Dash. Well, would it be fair to say, then, that frequently you 
were an active participant, not just sitting in the room and listening? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was a participant in the discussions, no question 
about it. 

Mr. Dash. And also in the decisionmaking process ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sure that there was a consensus would come out 
of the discussions in the room and I would be a part of that consensus. 

Mr. Dash. Now, have you drawn a distinction in your meetings with 
Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman concerning the strategy or concern of 
the revelation of the so-called White House horrors as apart from the 
Watergate break-in ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not understand your question, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Well, I think your testimony is that you did meet with 
Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman and discuss with them, you said from 
time to time, in July, you did discuss with Mr. Haldeman and Ehr- 
lichman the problems involved in the Ellsberg break-in matter and all 
the other matters you have categorized as White House horrors. 

Mr. Mitchell. Excuse me, Mr. Dash, I do not believe that I said 
that I discussed them with Ehrlichman and Haldeman in July. 

Mr, Dash. Well, the record would show it, but I think you did say 
that you did discuss that later, and I think you said in July. 

Mr. Mitchell. Later on. I do not recall that I said they were dis- 
cussed as early as that. I think much later on down the road we dis- 
cussed them. 

Mr. Dash. The distinction I think you said in the record is the 
Watergate break-in, you said you did not discuss that with them 
until 1973, but as to the White House horror activities, you did speak 
to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman in 1972. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And in those discussions, were those discussions con- 
cerned with the strategy to keep the lid on ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There was no question about the fact that we dis- 
cussed the problems that would arise if the parties that had been in- 
volved in those activities in the Wliite House were to come forward 
with all of the conversations and all of the discussions and all of the 
information that they had relating to them. 

Mr. Dash. And specifically in this particular context, the parties 
that you were most concerned with, I take it, were the two defendants 
under indictment, Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy. 

Mr. Mitchell. They were the participants ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And there was no doubt in your mind in those discussions 
that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were taking an active role 
themselves in attempting to keep the lid on ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would say that they had a very active con- 
cern, just like I did. 

Mr, Dash, I did not hear your answer. 

Mr, Mitchell, They had a very active concern, just like I did. 

Mr. Dash. And that active concern was implemented, I think. 



1904 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, in what way they participated in the imple- 
mentation of it, I have heard more of it from tlie testimony up here 
than I knew at the particular time. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean was reporting back to you, was he not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dean, as 1 mentioned before, was reporting back 
to me certain things, but Mr. Dean, and I think quite appropriately, 
was not telling me everything that was happening in his conversations 
between he and the people in the White House. 

Mr. Dash. Why was there reticence on the part of Mr. Dean when, as 
a matter of fact, you were really all together in a common purpose, to 
protect the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I believe that Mr. Dean, being a lawyer, would 
discuss the matters on a need-to-know basis and not go through all of 
the dialogs that he might have with parties in the White House, that 
he would consider it probably in an attorney -client relationship. 

Mr. Dash. As an attorney-client with Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would think so. He was the White House coun- 
sel 

Mr. Dash. Counsel to the President. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, he was counsel to the President, but of course, 
he did legal work and gave legal advice to other people in the "V^^lite 
House outside of the President. 

Mr. Dash. But you knew what his actual role was ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In what respect ? 

Mr. Dash. I think Mr. Dean has so testified that he did very little 
work as so-called counsel to the President ; White House counsel does 
not carry with it that much of the prerequisites. Basically, Mr. Dean 
had a kind of low-level job at the White House, did he not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that was his characterization of it. The fact of 
the matter is that my experience has been that the office of counsel over 
in the White House does a tremendous amount of legal work just in 
reviewing the documents that come through there that have to be acted 
upon by the President or other people in the White House. Wiether 
you call that a low-level job or not, it is the chief legal officer in the 
White House establishment. 

Mr. Dash. I think his testimony was that his principal activity was 
putting out fires, and I guess this was one of the biggest fires that had 
to be put out at the White House, was it not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would hope there are none other that are any larger. 

Mr. Dash. Who else was it that you mentioned was involved other 
than Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt at tlie Wliite House that you were con- 
cerned about in these discussions that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlich- 
man might also have been concerned about ? 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. At that time, Mr. Dash, in my recollection, it was 
Liddy and it was Hunt. These other gentlemen who have appeared on 
the scene through newspaper accounts and testimony, they were not 
discussed at that particular time. 

Mr. Dash. Now, at a later time, did you ever discuss Mr. Krogh's or 
Mr. Ehrlichman-s involvement in the Ellsberg matter? 

Mr. Mitchell, I learned about that involvement later. 

Mr. Dash. When did you learn about that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Out of the newspaper or the media or in connection 
with affidavits that were filed in the Ellsberg case. The Plumbers be- 
came knowledgeable to me shortly after the Watergate. 



1905 

Mr. Dash. Shortly after the Watergate, they became knowledgeable 
to you through Mr. Mardian's debriefing of Mr. Liddy ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, and also through Mr. Dean. But the 
specific activities of Mr. Krogh and others in connection with him 
were not known to me until later on, as I say, from the public media. 

Mr. Dash, You didn't know from Mr. Dean that among the so-called 
supervising Plumbers was Mr. Krogh ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I knew that he was one of the supervisors, yes. What 
his involvements were in particular activities, I did not learn. 

Mr. Dash. Well, if in fact, the Plumbers did engage in what you 
called White House horrors and Mr. Krogh was in a supervisory role, 
would you not have been concerned as to what Mr. Krogh would have 
done, whether you learned about it or not? 

Mr. Mitchell. No question about it. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever ask Mr. Krogh or Mr. Haldeman or Ehr- 
lichman anything about that ? Did you ever probe that ? 

I mean you were concerned, Mr. Mitchell, and I think the question 
came out yesterday from Senator Weicker, that you were very much 
concerned at keeping the President from knowing about some of these 
matters because you were afraid that if he did know, this might take 
the lid off and it might hurt the reelection, and you did answer Senator 
Weicker's question that you didn't do very much to keep the people 
who could blow the lid off from doing so. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I made the response to Senator Weicker to the 
effect that I believed fully it was in their interests as participants in 
it that they would follow that course without any necessity of any 
urgency. 

Now, getting back to the question that you asked me and why I 
paused, Mr. Dash, I don't believe that I can recall discussing the sub- 
ject matter with Mr. Krogh. In fact, I am not sure I have seen Mr. 
Krogh since June 17. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever discuss the matter with Mr. Ehrlichman, 
for whom Mr. Krogh worked ? 

Mr. Mitchell. We discussed the matter, yes. Ehrlichman and Halde- 
man and I have discussed the matter from time to time. 

Mr. Dash. Can you recall any of the specifics of that discussion ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, it had to do — the contents that I recall of the 
discussions had to do with respect to the facts of what had happened 
and not who were the participants or how it was originated or moti- 
vated, 

^Ir. Dash. What, if anything, did Mr. Ehrlichman say, to your best 
recollection, about the facts ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection other than what I have just 
outlined, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. And the facts again were being discussed and the concern 
that you all had in seeing to it that these matters did not become 
public knowledge. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was the basis upon which I was discussing them, 
yes. 

Mr. Dash. Now, it seems clear from your logs here that you were 
heavily involved in tlie civil cases, since you show a number of meet- 
ings with Mr. Parkinson and Mr. O'Brieii, and phone calls and meet- 
ings were also had during this time with Mr. Parkinson, I take it about 



1906 

the criminal case, because Mr. Parkinson and Mr. O'Brien, it has been 
testified, represented a number of the employees for the Committee To 
Re-Elect the President before the grand jury or in their testimony or 
statements before the FBI. So all these meetings that also include 
Parkinson and O'Brien was a combination of both the civil suits and 
the criminal investigaton ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, and of course, Common Cause and the General 
Accounting Office matter, and the whole gamut of them. 

Mr. Dash. Now, a new name begins to appear in your logs, Mr. 
Mitchell, on August 7, 1972. Would you look at your August 7, 1972 ? 
You met with a Mr. McPhee. You had a meeting with him along at 
3 :40 p.m. Who was Mr. McPhee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. McPhee is a lawyer here in the District of Co- 
lumbia who was introduced to me by Mr. Maurice Stans. Apparently, 
Mr. McPhee has advised Mr. Stans on certain matters over a number 
of years. He was — I don't believe he was ever retained by Mr. Stans, 
I am not sure. At Mr. Stans' request, he discussed with this group 
and with me a number of the problems that Mr. Stans was having in 
connection with the function aspects of the campaign and the litigation 
that related to it. 

Mr. Dash. And the litigation. Was this the Common Cause suit? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it not only was the Common Cause, but the fact 
of the civil litigation went very heartily into the question, of course, 
as to where these checks came from and why they were in the bank in 
Miami and how they happened to be from Mexico, et cetera, et cetera. 

Mr. Dash. That would have been the Democratic National Com- 
mittee suit? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. I think the chart shows that McPhee began to appear 
more readily in the meetings. I think he meets with you, Mardian, and 
O'Brien at 2 :40 p.m. on August 17. Then there is an interesting series 
of calls on August 28, 1972. 

There is a call with Mr. IVIcPhee — I will turn to my calendar where 
I can read it better — at 10 o'clock in the morning. You had a telephone 
call with Mr. McPhee. 

Mr. Hundley. What date is this, Mr. Dash ? 

Mr. Dash. On August 28, 1972. 

Mr. Hundley. We don't have that in our diary. 

Mr. Dash. Your telephone logs showed that there was 

Mr. Mitchell. This is in the log. 

Mr. Dash. Do you have the log ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mr. Hundley. Go ahead. 

Mr. Mitchell. "VATiatever it shows. 

Mr. Dash. Then does your log show a telephone call at 11 :30 with 
Mr. Kleindienst? 

Mr. Hundley. No, it shows a Bill Simon called 

Mr. Dash. I have a copy of your log showing August 28, 1972, and 
it shows that at 10 o'clock,' ;Mr. ^IcPhee called Mr. ^litchell and talked. 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. Maybe you have a different date there? 

Mr. Dash. I have Monday, August 28, 1972. 

Mr. Hundley. No, it is Tuesday, August 28. 

Right, it is Monday, August 28, that is right. 



1907 

Mr. Dash. Do you have it now ? 

Mr. Mitchell. We have a date now that corresponds. 

Mr. Dash. I think you have the same date. I think it is Monday, 
August 28, right? 

Mr. Mitchell. Eight. 

Mr. Dash. Now that they are all the same date, Monday, August 28, 
there was a telephone call with Mr. McPhee at 10 o'clock ; a telephone 
call at 11 :30 with Mr. Kleindienst; a telephone call with Mr. Dean at 
11:40; a telephone call with Mr. Haldeman at 12; a telephone call at 
12 :45 with Mr. Mardian ; a telephone call with Mr. Ehiiichman at 
1 :10. Then let me see — Haldeman was at 12 :45, excuse me — Mr. Ehr- 
lichman at 2 :30. Then you had a meeting with Mr. Stans, Mr. McPhee, 
and ]\Ir. Parkinson at 4 o'clock. 

Is there any relationship to that series of telephone calls during 
the day and a meeting at 4 o'clock ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would think there was none whatsoever, Mr. Dash. 
I would believe that in this time frame of August 28 was the time when 
Mr. Gardner had made his demands upon the committee with respect 
to the disclosure of the contributions which resulted in the later date 
of the filing of the Common Cause suit. I don't know whether there has 
been placed in the record the letter that ]Mr. Gardner wrote to the 
committee or to ^Nlr. Stans or whoever it was written to. But it was in 
this time frame and I would believe that the discussions between Stans, 
McPhee, and myself and Mr. Parkinson would relate to that particular 
subject matter, or certainly to the civil litigation. 

Mr. Dash. You said Mr. Stans had brought Mr. McPhee in in order 
to consult with him. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. What actual role was he playing at the meeting ; was he 
retained counsel ; was he representing any party to the suit ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To my knowledge, he was not retained a fee but Mr. 
Stans had great faith in him and frequently had him sit in in some of 
the discussions. 

Mr. Dash. Was he volunteering his time then ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would believe that he would be doing that as far 
as I know, but as I say, there was quite a relationship with Mr. McPhee 
and Mr. Stans that had gone back over quite a period of time. 

Mr. Dash. Well now, in September your meetings with Mr. McPhee 
continue — on August 1, you, Parkinson, and ]\Ir. McPhee. 

Mr. Mitchell. August 1 ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes, August 1, 1972. Excuse me, I mean August, not 
September. 

Mr. Hundley. We do not have McPhee August 1. 

Mr. Dash. August 17 is where you meet with Mr. McPhee, Mr. 
Mardian and Mr. O'Brien and again on August 28 you meet actually 
with Mr. McPhee twice, once — he telephoned, you have a telephone 
call with Mr. McPhee at 1 o'clock and you meet at 4 o'clock with Mr. 
Stans, Mr. McPhee, and Mr. Parkinson. And then again, there are 
additional meetings with Mr. McPhee going on September 1 and other 
meetings. 

Now, these generally with Mr. Parkinson, Mr. O'Brien and yourself 
or others, there are a total of nine meetings that at least our reference 
to your logs show with reference to Mr. McPhee. During that period 



96-296 O— 73— bk. 



1908 

of time the civil suits were underway and the depositions had begun, 
had they not 'i 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, they had, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And were Caere not plans discussed, as I think you have 
already mdicatea, and strategies to pernaps nave tne civil suits puo olf 
until after the election i 

Mr. Mitchell. Ihat was certainly our desire and, I believe, that the 
court records can speak for tnemseives m comieccion with it. 

Mr. iJAsH. All rignt. X\ow, was lioemer Mcl^liee playing any active 
role in the civil litigation especially tlie eli'ort to get a postponement i 

Mr. Mitchell, in one otner tiian sitting in on tne discussions tnat 1 
am aware of. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you are aware, I think, of Mr. Dean's testimony that 
he said that he learned at a meeting m your olhce — one of tiiese meet- 
ings which he attended when Mr. ivicPnee was there and otliers — that 
Mr. Koemer Mci^liee was having private discussions with Judge 
Richey, who was the Federal judge in the Democratic National Com- 
mittee suit, and that both Mr. ir'arkinson and Mr. McPliee nad told 
him personally that Judge Kichey would be helpful. Now, was Mr. 
McPhee serving in any helpful role with regard to Judge iiicney in 
your discussions ? 

Mr. Mitchell. None that I know other than the fact that Roemer 
McJPhee apparently knew Judge Richey and contributed to the intel- 
ligence as to how he thought that J udge Richey might handle the case 
and what his attitude might be with respect to dinerent motions and 
matters of that just like you would discuss any other judge who might 
be handling a case. 

Mr. Dash. How would Roemer McPhee be a special adviser or of 
special significance in his presence at these meetings with regard to 
how Judge Richey might act ? 

Mr. Mitchell. 1 do not think there was anything special about it. 
It was the fact he attended the meetings and knowing Judge Richey 
apparently for a long time and expressed opinions as to what he 
thought his activities might be in the case. 

Mr. Dash. Everybody knew then that Mr. McPhee actually did 
know Judge Richey and was a very good friend of Judge Richey's ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes, there was no question about that. 

Mr. Dash. Was that not actually the major reason why Mr. McPhee 
was attending those meetings, was to give you this kind of opinion 
as to what to expect from Judge Richey ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; Mr. Dash. He was attending those meetings, I 
think, primarily at the request of Mr. Stans. He had been brought in 
by Mr. Stans originally, and I think he was sitting in and helping on 
behalf of Mr. Stans' interest. 

Mr. Dash. Well, now, you testified before the committee, I think, to 
several of the Senators' questions, that you would have engaged in 
practically anything to keep the lid on so as to assure the President's 

election. Would it really have been 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not think we should allow that one to stand. 
Mr. Dash [continuing] . I think 

Mr. Mitchell. Would engage in practically anything, no. 
Mr. Dash [continuing]. I think you limited it to high crimes and 
misdemeanors involving the President in office. I guess that is directed 



1909 

to the language of impeachment in the Constitution, perhaps, but I 
take it that you would also exclude murder, although you have in- 
dicated you would like to have seen some oi the people shot in the 
Wliite House. 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; I did not say that I would like to see them shot. 
I said it miglit have been a good idea if it had happened at a particular 
time. [Laugnter.] 

Mr. Dash. Well, would it actually have offended your concept of 
having to do everything necessary to protect the President in his re- 
election bid to see to it that you did get favorable consideration in the 
civil suit from J udge Kichey 'i 

Mr. Mitchell. 1 do not think that the thought ever occurred to me, 
Mr. Dash, until you just put the question and I cannot answer other 
than 

Mr. Dash. The thought never occurred to you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It never occurred to me that there would ever be any 
improper approach to a judge because in my opinion, that is the quick- 
est way to gee tlie opposite results. 

Mr. Dash. Well, in some cases is that not true ? You are not saying 
that there never have been successful approaches to judges, are you, 
Mr. Mitchell? 

Mr. Mitchell. I understand that some of the cases, case books in 
criminal laws are tilled with such activities, but it would have been 
my opinion that it would have been absolutely nonproductive. 

Mr. Dash. Well, Mr. Dean never reported to you about the state- 
ments that he says Mr. McPhee made to him or Mr. Parkinson made 
to him 'i 

Mr. Mitchell. In the context 

Mr. Dash. In the context that Mr. McPhee was having private 
con versations 

Mr. Mitchell. Somebody, as I think you put it, was fixing the 
judge. 

Mr. Dash. Well, I think Mr. Dean preferred to use the words "had 
influence with the judge". 

Mr. Mitchell. Weil, I have not knowledge from anybody that 
there was ever any influence exerted upon Judge Kichey in connection 
with the civil litigation that he handled, and that included, of course, 
not only the original case but the other two cases that were filed. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever at any time while you were Attorney Gen- 
eral, send any representative to the Supreme Court on a wiretapping 
case? 

Mr. Mitchell. No; I have read that story in the newspaper and 
it is absolutely incredible. I do not know how it possibly could have 
gotten started. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Therefore, your sort of standard that you 
would use to do anything to keep the lid on so far as the exposing 
of the Wliite House horrors is it that you say as a matter of strategy 
would be bad but as a matter of what in fact it was effective, you 
would have done it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No; I am not saying that, Mr. Dash, because the 
question did not come up, the decision was not made, did not have to 
be made, and I would have great reluctance to have approached a 



1910 

judge to the point where on these ex parte activities, is the way you 
are putting them, to compromise the judicial system. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, I am sure, and I would agree with you, you 
would have had great reluctance but on balance, and you put it on 
balance here, if it meant the reelection of the President of the United 
States, President Nixon, would that reluctance have been overcome? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is a hypothetical question that I can't answer 
at the time 

Mr, Dash. Was it hypothetical in light of Mr. Dean's testimony that 
Mr. McPhee was in fact so being used ? 

Mr, Mitchell. It is hypothetical to the point that I do not agree 
with Mr. Dean's testimony &■) far as I know about the discussions that 
had to do with the litigation that was before Judge Richey. 

Mr. Dash. Well, is it that you know that this didn't occur or that 
so far as in your presence that discussion didn't occur ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, obviously I have no assurance that it didn't 
occur but I do have my own knowledge of what took place in my 
presence with respect to the numerous discussions we had about that 
litigation, and the estimates as to what Judge Richey might do in 
connection with it. 

Mr. Dash. But you could not completely disagree with Mr. Dean if 
Mr. Dean says that Mr. Parkinson and Mr. McPhee told him person- 
ally that this was going on and you weren't present ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was not present, of course, obviously. 

Mr. Dash. You are not saying any of these persons told you other- 
wise? 

Mr. Mitchell. Otherwise than what? 

Mr. Dash. Since, some of this has become public, have any of these 
persons, Mr. McPhee or anybody spoken to you or have you spoken 
to them about Mr. Dean's testimony ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have been advised that Mr. Parkinson, I don't 
recall that I have read it myself but Mr. Parkinson has denied this 
publicly in the newspapers. 

Mr. Dash. But I asked the question whether you personally talked 
to Mr. Parkinson or ]\Ir. INIcPhee about this ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I have not. 

Mr. Dash. Would you clarify how you heard about Colson's dis- 
cussion of Executive clemency with Hunt. I think so far the testimony 
seems to be that you overheard it, and I am not sure the record is clear 
as to how you overheard it, who was present, who was telling you this ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think my testimony and my recollection is that it 
was either John Dean or Mr. O'Brien, and that it probably was John 
Dean because he was more closely related to it, and the recollection I 
have is that Mr. Hunt, in connection with his discussions, whether they 
were going through his counsel, Mr. Bittman directly to ]Mr, Colson 
or directly to Mr. Colson, but anyway to Colson, the bottom line that 
I recall in connection with it was that ]\Ir. Hunt wanted assurances 
from Mr. Colson with respect to Executive clemency. 

Mr. Dash. Did you hear, whether it be from Mr. Dean or Mr. 
O'Brien, that Mr. Hunt got some assurances from Mr. Colson? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that my recollection is that there were as- 
surances that Mr. Hunt would have Executive clemency. 



1911 

Mr. Dash. Now, you know, Mr. Mitchell that the only person who 
could grant Executive clemency is the President of the United States. 
Now when you heard that, did you inquire of anybody whether or 
not the President of the United States had authorized such assurances 
to be made ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am well aware of, Mr. Dash, that the President 
is the only one that can exercise the power. It was not in that context, 
it was in the context that Mr. Colson would exercise his best efforts 
to obtain the Executive clemency. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know whether he ever did so exercise his best 
efforts with the President ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no idea, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever hear whether or not he did ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Only through the discussions of Mr. Dean in his 
statement, that is the only knowledge I have. 

Mr. Dash. That is the first time you heard about it in Mr. Dean's 
statement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the first time I heard of the subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, when was the last time you had a com- 
munication from the President or someone on behalf of the President 
of the United States? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the last meeting I had with the President 

Mr. Dash. I am not restricting that question, Mr. Mitchell, to a 
meeting. 

Mr. Mitchell. I understand. But it was in two parts, as I recall. 

Mr, Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was on the 22d of March was the last time that I 
met with the President. I have not talked to him on the telephone. 
Will you not rephrase but phrase the second part of the question. 

Mr. Dash. The second part of anyone on behalf of the President. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't think I have had anybody on behalf 
of the President but I don't want to exclude the fact that we have mu- 
tual friends who have had dinner together and I have had calls of 
condolences with respect to certain matters that happened in New 
York by people who are very close to the President. 

Mr. Dash. How recently, Mr. ^Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I guess, let's see, when was that, that was 
sometime in May, wasn't it, well sometime in May with respect to the 
calls relating to condolences, and I have had dinner within the past 10 
days, I would guess, with mutual friends. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, were these former employees or membere of the 
White House staff or friends of the President? 

Mr. JSIitchell. Both. 

Mr. Dash. Both. 

Now, could you tell us who they were ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, Mr. Eobert Abplanalp, and Rosemary Woods 
was another one that telephoned me. 

Mr. Dash. Who did you have dinner with ? 

Mr. ]\Iitchell. Mr. Robert Abplanalp. 

Mr. Dash. Have you ever been promised any Executive clemency 
or have ever asked for it or any help with regard to your present 
pending matters? 



1912 

Mr. Mitchell. I hope, Mr. Dash, that with respect to matters in 
New York the question is absolutely not, and with respect to circum- 
stances down here I trust that it is not necessary. 

Mr. Dash. You have expressed a hope it is not necessary, but you 
haven't answered the question. 

Mr. Mitchell. The answer is absolutely no. 

Mr. Dash. Senator Ervin asked you yesterday whether the Presi- 
dent ever asked you anything about your knowledge of the Watergate 
break-in or the so-called White House stories and you said no, the 
President hadn't asked. 

Senator Weicker asked you whether on March 22, 1973, when you 
met with the President the day after Mr. Dean reported to the Presi- 
dent, that you might have been involved, whether the President asked 
you about it, and you said no, and you didn't think that was peculiar 
that the President didn't ask you. 

Weren't you surprised that despite your own decision to keep con- 
cealed from the President what you knew that he never once asked 
you what your opinion or views were on the Watergate matter or any- 
thing else that was so daily in the newspapers and daily involved in 
the grand jury investigations and before this committee? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, you must remember that I testified that 
the Watergate matter was discussed at great length. 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. But in much different context to what you are talking 
about. 

Mr. Dash. I know that but I am asking you now not in that context 
but in a much broader context as to who might have been involved, 
whether you were involved, after the President learned that in fact, 
there was a possibility that you were. 

Mr. Mitchell. And your question is ? 

Mr. Dash. The question is. Is your statement still that the President 
never asked you that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. My statement is exactly that. 

Mr. Dash. And you still are not surprised that he didn't ask you 
that? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not particularly surprised about it at all, no. 

Mr. Dash. If he had asked you what your knowledge was, especially 
before the election, would you have told the President? 

Mr. IVIiTCHELL. I would have laid out the chapter and verse on every- 
thing that I knew about it. 

Mr. Dash. Now, certainly in 1973 you had a considerable number of 
telephone calls between INIarch 13 and March 31 from your home to the 
White House about, I think, about 88 calls. 

Mr. Mitchell. Are you talking about my home ? 

Mr. Dash. Home phone, telephone calls from your home and office. 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. And the office. 

Mr. Dash. To the White House ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. There is a particular series of calls that are very interest- 
ing and perhaps you can help us understand what they were about. On 
March 31, 1973 there were 14 calls on the period, on that day. There is 
a call at 12 :31 a.m., 12 :3.5 a.m., and 12 :47 a.m., and then* there is a 
break, and there is a call at 1 :09 p.m., that evening, 8 :27 p.m., 9 :01 p.m.. 



1913 

10 :05 p.m., 10 :41 p.m., 10 :48 p.m., 11 p.m., 11 :07 p.m., 11 rlT p.m., 
11 :39 p.m., 11 :56 p.ni It appears just from the calls that there was 
somebody at least sitting at a telephone calling a number to tlie White 
House. Were these calls that you made, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. We have another party in the family that 
does more telephone calling and during those hours than I do. 
[Laughter.] 

Mr. Dash. Is it your testimony that you made none of these calls to 
the White House on the 31st ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I can't say that I didn't make any of them but cer- 
tainly not in that range, and let me say, Mr. Dash, that frequently 
calls to the White House are not necessarily to talk to people in the 
White House but to get through the wonderful operation they have 
over there the telephone numbers of people that are available to them. 

Mr. Dash. Well, one of the significant thing perhaps of the number 
of calls and I say perhaps, and 1 am asking for your assistance, is that 
these occurred March 31, is that if you look at what was occurring at 
that time was that, certainly by March 31, the sentencing procedure 
before Judge Sirica had already occurred, Mr. McCord had come for- 
ward and given a letter to Judge Sirica, then come forward to this 
committee and it had become public knowledge that Mr. INlcCord was 
accusing Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder and yourself as having been involved 
in the bugging operations of the Watergate. 

Were these calls on March 31—14 calls to the different people at the 
White House — to discuss this implication of you by Mr. McCord ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Certainly not at that hour, those hours. 

^Ir. Dash. These were not late hours. A call at 1 :09 p.m., is in the 
afternoon, 8 :27 p.m. is the early evening, all early evening calls, 10 :05 
p.m., 10 :41 p.m., the latest call is 11 :56 p.m., that is not very late. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, they were not my calls, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. And when you say they were not your calls, you are not 
saying none of them were ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not saying none of them were, but there was no 
period of time 

Mr. Dash. Did you make any telephone calls to the White House 
or any White House person after the McCord revelations came out 
which named you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I am sure that mattei^ were discussed with Mr. 
Dean. I am certain of it. 

Mr. Dash. Just Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall discussing them with anybody else 

until a much later date, and you tied your question to what you referred 

to as the McCord revelations. I believe that Mr. Dean was the only 

one in the White House that I discussed the McCord letter — I presume 

, that is what you are talking about, the letter to Judge Sirica. 

Mr. Dash. Well, Mr. McCord came forward, actually, to this com- 
mittee in executive session, and issued some statements which did name 

.you. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, would it have gotten out of executive session 
to the public 

Mr. Dash. Yes, it did, it was in the public press. 

Mr. Mitchell. If it did, then I am sure it was discussed with Mr. 
Dean at the White House and I do not recall discussing 



1914 

Mr. Dash. Could you tell us what the nature of your discussions 
with Mr. Dean was? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have had so many discussions with Mr. Dean on 
the matter, I cannot isolate that one. 

Mr. Dash. Could you search your mind ? I think it is the first time 
in the public press your name became identified with the break-in. 

Mr. Mitchell. It would have been discussed, I am sure, in the con- 
text of what was said in the letter to Judge Sirica or with respect to 
what came out of your executive session as to what the facts, or allega- 
tions, I probably should say, were contained in the particular items. 

Mr. Dash. Actually, following up at least that McCord episode, 
were your meetings with Mr. Magruder on March 27, where he was 
beginning to be concerned about the unraveling of the operations, so 
far as he was concerned, your meeting with Mr. Magruder and ^Ir. 
Haldeman on March 28 and your later meeting with Mr. Dean, Mr. 
Magruder, and yourself, on a discussion of what Mr. Magruder was 
going to do at the grand jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. So this was coming to a head at this point, was it not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was coming to the point where conversations 
increased as the information came forth from this committee or Mr. 
McCord or whoever it came forward from. 

Mr. Dash. And at that time, were you not in active discussion with 
Mr. Dean and Mr. Magruder as to how the grand jury testimony was 
to be carried out ? 

Mr. Mitchell. We had that meeting that I have already testified to, 
Mr. Dash. That is the one meeting we had on the subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. And was that the meeting where Mr. Dean had indicated, 
at least, that you were going to hold fast to your position that there 
was no discussion of electronic surveillance or intelligence at that 
meeting ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have never heard that. If you are referring to the 
memorandum that Mr. Dean wrote after the April 10 meeting, I do not 
believe that that is contained in there. With respect to the meeting that 
was held with Dean and Magruder, obviously not. There was no sucli 
concept discussed that there would not be revelation of the fact if 
there had been discussions with the Justice Department on electronic 
surveillance. 

Mr. Dash. Well, Mr. Magruder had made the decision as to what he 
was going to do. If you all three stood together, he could continue to 
testify as he had. He had testified to the grand jury in August, he 
testified at the trial about those meetings. In fact, he said there was one 
meeting that had been canceled and all he discussed was the election 
laws. If all three of you had agreed to that, he could have gone back 
to the grand jury and stuck to that. "^Vliat he was concerned about, his 
testimony is, was that the two of you, you and Mr. Dean, were not 
going to stay with him and it was unraveling as to him, that he had 
committed perjury and he would go back 

Mr. Mitchell. That was not the discussion between Dean and ^lit- 
chell and Magruder on March 28; the fact that there had been two 
meetings that were shown in the logs and that the question was whether 
or not Magruder had perjured himself by the basis upon which he had 
presented his testimony to the grand jury on this subject. 



1915 

Mr. Dash. What did you conclude, at least as to that? 

Mr. Mitchell. As I testified here yesterday and the day before, I 
told him that I would not know whether he had or had not, it would 
be dependent on what he told the grand jury. 

Mr. Dash. Did he tell you what he told the grand jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. He told me in generalities with respect to it but when 
it got down to the question of what questions he had been asked, he 
could not recall that. 

Mr. Dash. You have already indicated that you had been debriefed 
by the lawyers as to what Mr. Magruder told the grand jury after- 
wards back in August. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is absolutely correct. 

Mr. Dash. So you know what he testified to at the grand jury. 

Mr. Mitchell. I did not know what the questions were. I knew what 
he had testified to. 

Mr. Dash. Now, in early April 1973, Mr. Ehrlichman is supposed 
to have been assigned by the President to make new investigations on 
who was involved in the Watergate break-in and he interviewed a 
number of persons, including Mr. Magruder, Mr. Strachan and 
others. Did he ask you anything about your knowledge about the 
Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, he did not. The meet- 
ing that I presume you are referring to was on Saturday, April 14. 

Mr. Dash. Well, this is a separate — meeting with whom? 

Mr. Mitchell. Ehrlichman. Isn't that who you are talking about? 

Mr. Dash. No, I am not asking you now. I know you did meet with 
Ehrlichman at that time. 

Did he ever, when he was supposedly making a new investigation 
for the President, on what happened, did he ever ask you, John 
Mitchell, what your involvement might have been ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know that he had come to the conclusion, based, 
I take it, on Magruder's statement, that you had approved the bugging 
operation and were involved ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That he had come to the conclusion ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes, he has so reported. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, he told me about Magruder's allegations when 
we met that Saturday. 

Mr. Dash. Did he ask you about whether you 

Mr. Mitchell. No, he did not. 

Mr. Dash. Wliy would he tell you that and not ask you about it? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know. You will have to ask Mr. Ehrlichman. 
I don't know 

Mr, Dash. What did you say to him ? When he told you about Ma- 
gruder's allegation, did you say Magruder is a damn liar or its a 
palpable lie? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think something along those lines, Mr. Dash, and 
that is the basis on which the conversation was ended. 

You will recall that this is the one where we didn't sit near the 
coffee table, but we were over at the desk. 

Mr. Dash. Therefore, if there is a recording of that conversation, 
your denial would be on that recording ? 



1916 

Mr. Mitchell. What I said at that conversation would be on the 
recording. 1 understand it is not a very good recording, but it would 
be there anyway. 

Mr. Dash. I think you can hope, at least, it is good enough to include 
your denial? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would hope so. 

Senator Baker. Did you talk to the coffee table or did you talk to 
the desk ? Which one was it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Vice Chairman, I don't know where that little 
device is, but I wouldn't be surprised if there were a number of them 
around there. Or had been, I should say. 

Mr. Dash. I am sorry. I didn't want to interrupt your discussion 
with the Vice Chairman. 

Were you aware that on April 15, 1973, Mr. Petersen and Mr. Klein- 
dienst met with the President and informed him that a number of 
people might be involved and that you were so included? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was not aware of that, of course, until I read it in 
the press. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did the President then at that time ask you about 
your involvement? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have not talked to the President, as I have pre- 
viously testified, since March 22. 

Mr. Dash. I think you have constantly indicated your close friend- 
ship to the President and your loyalty to the President. I take it, it is 
reciprocated. Would not the President have called you if he had this 
information and asked you, John, is this true ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, first of all, I have not expressed my closeness 
to the President. That has been an assumption that has been used down 
here. 

Second, with respect to the question, I believe that he was having it 
investigated bv the pro]:)er peo'^le under the i^roner circumstances and 
it was not a function of the President of the United States to carry 
out such an investigation. 

Mr. Dash. No, I don't believe it was, but as a personal matter, you 
have indicated that his references to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlicli- 
man showed his warmth and sympathetic character as a personal mat- 
ter. Just a matter of human personality and the relationship you liad 
with him as Attorney General and campaign manager, would you not 
expect the President to call you and say, John, what about this ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't think that would necessarily be appropriate 
under the circumstances. 

Mr. Dash. He would not want to ask from your lips alone your 
viewpoints? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know what his motives would be one way or 
the other. I have found that, at least decided on April 14 that after 
having learned of some of the occurrences that had taken place, I made 
a determination not to meet with him and not to talk to him further 
about the subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. Now, when did you testify before the grand jury in the 
new grand jury investigation, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. April 13 or April 14. 

Mr. Dash. Is your testimony here the same testimony you gave 
before the previous grand jury ? 



1917 

Mr. Mitchell. The testimony here is much more extensive. 

Mr. Dash. Well, on the subject matters that are consistent with the 
subject. 

Mr. Mitchell. Exactly the same as they are here. 

Mr. Dash. Did you testify before the first Watergate grand jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I did, sometime in September, the day before 
the indictments came down. 

Mr. Dash. Was your testimony then the same as the testimony in 
April of this year ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, it was different, because their questions were 
different. 

Mr. Dash. Were you asked specifically whether or not you were 
involved in the meetings of January and February — January 27 and 
February 4 — on a discussion of electronic interruptions? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I don't believe, Mr. Dash — I don't recall the 
specifics of it. It was a very brief appearance. It was done almost on 
the basis of an apology, but the grand jury wants you up here, and I 
don't recall the specifics of the questions. But nobody to my recollec- 
tion asked me was there a discussion of electronic surveillance at the 
meetings of January and February. 

Mr. Hundley. Excuse me. I think I have an obligation to note for 
the record that the last six or seven questions are under compulsion. 
I have asked — Mr. Mitchell has related certain matters that he has 
given before the Federal grand jury that is investigating this matter. 

Mr. Dash. Of course, I think Mr. Hundley well knows that even 
under rule 6(e) of the Federal rules, nothing prevents a witness who 
testified before a grand jury to tell a committee of this kind or any- 
body else what he testified to. 

Mr. Hundley. As Mr. Baker stated at the beginning of this hear- 
ing, Mr. Dash, Mr. Mitchell was not waiving any rights by appearing 
here and he was here under compulsion. I just note that for the record. 

Mr. Dash. I understand that. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, just so that this part of the record 
is complete, counsel properly states the claim of the reservation and 
the understanding of the committee, as I tried to express it at the 
beginning, as to reservation of rights. 

On the rule referred to by IMr. Dash, it is my impression that a wit- 
ness is perfectly free to testify on the subject matter that he discussed 
before the grand jury but not to tell of the proceedings before the 
grand jury. 

Mr. Hundley. Well, I think we did get into that and that is why I 
noted my objection for the record. 

Senator Baker. For my part, I have no desire to bring the witness 
into that situation that he specifically disclaimed that intent. 

Mr. Dash. My questions aren't aimed at getting into the proceedings 
of the o-rand jury. 

Mr, HuNDi-EY. I just made a note for the record. 

Mr. Dash. I just want one final question on the first Watergate 
grand jury inquir3^ Would it be right to say, Mr. Mitchell, from your 
testimony that you were given some deference for your appearance? 

IMr. Mitchell. Deference ? 



1918 

Mr. Dash. You say it was a sort of apology that they called you. 
Would you say that you were given some special deference as a former 
Attorney General for being called before the grand jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I thought they were very polite, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Going back to the March 30 meeting in Key Biscayne 
with Mr. Magruder, are you certain, that while Mr. LaRue was in the 
room, you didn't leave the decision on the Liddy plan open ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe, Mr. Dash, that my reaction to that 
resubmission could be considered an open question. In my mind, it was 
a determination that it was not approved and showed extreme distaste 
for the fact that it had been brought again to me in any form, shape, or 
circumstance. 

Mr. Dash. Now, when Mr. LaRue was down there, what role was he 
playing? Was not it there that he was to allow you to have privacy 
and answer the telephones somewhere ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, Mr. LaRue, of course, has been a friend of mine 
for quite some time. He also, of course, was working with me in the 
campaign or had been working in the campaign and was going to con- 
tinue to work in the campaign as one of my assistants. The house that 
we had down there is a very long house with two segments to it. It is 
almost two houses that are put together. Mr. LaRue came down and 
stayed with us and the meeting that we had was in the part of the house 
where ]\Ir. LaRue was staying and as I described it, it is a Florida 
room. 

Mr. Dash. During that meeting, was it not true that Mr. LaRue was 
actually on and off the telephone for part of that meeting? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall that, Mr. Dash. The telephones were 
right in the room where we were meeting and how many times he was 
on or off the telephone, I have no recollection. 

Mr. Dash. Now, when Mr. Mardian debriefed you as to his conversa- 
tion with Mr. Liddy on June 21 and June 22, did he not tell you that 
Liddy told him that you had approved the budget of the bugging op- 
eration and that his operations had been approved by the White House 
and carried out with the assistance of the CIA ? Was that not in the 
debriefing discussion ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That question was answered, Mr. Dash, and my 
recollection is to the effect that he did — that is, Mardian did tell me 
that Liddy said that the White House had, using that term as they had, 
had approved it. In my recollection with respect to the approval of 
the budget, I do not have that. 

Mr. Dash. Well, now, on that debriefing, I just want to go into it 
just briefly again, because there were some loose ends. There are a 
number of things which you call White House horrors, and I think 
the record should be clear as to what are categorized as such, which 
Liddy told Mardian or LaRue and which they told you and they 
included, to be specific, the Ellsberg break-in, I think, was the first one. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did Liddy indicate to Mr. Mardian, as Mardian told 
you, who was involved in that break-in ? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the extent that he referred to himself and Hunt, 
T am certain of it. Going beyond that, I have no direct knowledge. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mardian tell you whether Liddy said who had 
authorized that break-in ? 



1919 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not believe that that was discussed at that par- 
ticular time, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did he indicate that that was part of a plumbers 
operation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Either at that time or shortly thereafter, yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know from Mr. Mardian from what Liddy had 
told him, who else was in it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you repeat that ? 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Liddy tell Mr. Mardian and Mardian you, who 
else knew about this other than the i)articipants ? 

Mr. Mitchell. As of that particular time ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not recall. 

Mr. Dash. Did you learn later ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I learned later. 

Mr. Dash. Who else did you learn ? 

Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. I, of course, have had discussions with John Dean 
about these subject matters and learned more to the effect as to what 
the plumbers were and how they were operating in the "Wliite House. 

Mr. Dash. And who were the plumbers ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, they were, of course, Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy 
were the operators and they were apparently working under the di- 
rection of Mr. Krogh and David Young. 

Mr. Dash. And ]\Ir. Krogh worked under the supervision of 
Mr. Ehrlichman, did he not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Krogh, according to my knowledge or 
information of the White House organization, was assigned to the 
then Domestic Council, of which Mr. Ehrlichman was the head. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you tell anybody, other than meeting the Presi- 
dent now, about the information you got from Mr. Mardian? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. LaRue was there at the particular time 
Mr. Mardian debriefed me, and, of course, it was discussed with John 
Dean on numerous occasions when these further stories came out from 
Mr. Dean as to the activities that had been carried on. 

Mr. Dash. And I think you testified that you always talked about it 
to Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, at a later time. 

Mr. Dash. Xow the spiriting out of Dita Beard from the town was 
one of the other A\niite House horrors. Was it your information that 
Mr. Liddy said she had been kidnapped ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No — well 

Mr. Dash. What did you mean by spiriting her out of town ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this is now again the Mardian story ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes, I know. 

Mr. Mitchell. His story to me. 
' Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I did not take it in the context of the fact she was 
kidnapped. It was the fact that they got her whatever way, with or 
without her consent, but I presume with her consent, got her out of New 
York, I believe it was, not Washington, but New York, and got her out 
to Denver. 

Mr. Dash. And did Mr. Mardian tell you that Mr. Liddy had ex- 
plained who had authorized that operation ? 



1920 

Mr. Mitchell. Not to my recollection. 

Mr. Dash. Who else knew about it, from Mr. Liddy to Mr. Mardian \ 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I don't believe that was so, ]Mr. Dash. There was 
a — rather an outline of the activities that had been carried out rather 
than who were the parties that had authorized the activities. 

Mr. Dash. All right. 

The Diem cables, were these the so-called fake cables which pur- 
portedly link President Kennedy to the murder of Diem ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Who told you about them ? Did that come from the Liddy 
discussion or from Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Mitchell. As being fake cables ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. That came from John Dean. 

Mr. Dash. Are these the so-called cables that were taken from Mr. 
Hunt's safe ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe them to be the same, yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And were you aware or did you learn that these false 
cables were ultimately given to Mr. Gray ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I did not. 

Mr. Dash. Had you any prior discussions with anybody about those 
cables ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I had. 

Mr. Dash. Who were they ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I didn't realize that they were the same cables at 
the time. Mr. William Lambert came to me at some time in the early 
part of 1972 and said he had been having discussions with Mr. Colson 
over at the White House concerning these cables and that he thought 
it was a great story, a problem 

Senator Ervix. I'm sorry, I hate to interrupt you but there is a vote 
on in the Senate and the committee will have to take a recess tem- 
porarily. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervix. The committee will have to resume a meeting at 1 
o'clock and for that reason, I think it will be the expedient thing to 
recess at this time until 2 o'clock or as near thereafter as the committee 
can finish its meeting. 

[Whereupon, at 11 :55 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 
p.m., the same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Thursday, July 12, 1973 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. The counsel will 
resume examination of the witness. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, did INIr. Richard Moore sometime in Feb- 
ruary come to see you in New York for the purpose of asking you to 
participate to try to raise some funds for the legal defense of the 
defendants ? 

Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Richard ISIoore came to New York on Febru- 
ary 15 and, as I recall, we had lunch to discuss a number of items con- 
cerning the forthcoming hearings of this committee, and I believe, if 
my memory serves me right, that it was a casual reference to the 
thought that some people thought that I might be interested in that 



1921 

subject matter and, as I recall, I had a very strong resentment of the 
concept and that was disposed of in one or two sentences. 

Mr. Dash. Now the subject matter, again of casual reference, was 
seeking whether you would be interested in raising funds for the legal 
defense of the defendants ? 

Mr. 3iIiTCHELL. That is correct. But that was not the prime basis of 
the discussion. 

Mr. Dash. I understand. 

Mr. Mitchell. Or the one upon which we dwelled. 

Mr. Dash. That was raised though and what was your reaction to it? 

Mr. Mitchell. My reaction was that I was without interest in the 
subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. Now, I think in a question asked by Senator Inouye to 
you about whether or not, after information did come out concerning 
the Watergate and the President became aware at least of certain in- 
volvements, I think a line of questions were put to you about whether 
or not you considered what the President did was lowering the boom, 
using your language, and I think you indicated it was kind of a soft 
lowering of the boom. Was it not true that Mr. Caulfield, who did 
leave, who went to work for the Treasury, and Mr. Krogh, who also 
left the White House, became Under Secretary for the Department of 
Transportation, Mr. INIagruder went to the Commerce Department, and 
]Mr. Strachan became General Counsel of the USIA? They may not 
all be there now" but that is how they left the White House and where 
they went — was that your understanding of the proper way to handle 
people who may have been involved in the Watergate case ? 

Mr. Mitchell. ]Mr. Dash, I am not familiar with the job that these 
gentlemen have held, particularly with respect to the time frame, but I 
would believe, according to any recollection, that they w^ere placed in 
those positions before the period of the subject matter that Senator 
Inouye was talking about and they subsequently of course have been 
removed from those jobs. 

Mr. Dash. But they certainly were placed in those positions during 
a time when there was quite a bit of a cloud that hung over all of 
these people including Mr, Magruder and Mr. Krogh and Mr. Caul- 
field and jVIr. Strachan. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I can't tell you — it seems to me they were in an 
earlier time period and time frame with respect to my knowing 
when they were, Mr. Magruder's case might have been an exception. 

Mr. Dash. It was really because Mr. Magruder was coming to see 
you asking for help and later Mr. Haldeman, you testified you tried 
to help him as much as you could, that was March 27 ? 

Mr. IVIiTCiiELL. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Haldeman, I take it, offered the same kind of 
assistance ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't know what kind of assistance you are 
talking about, just the general fact. 

Mr. Dash. Job opportunity. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the job opportunities at that time, Mr. 
Magruder was already working over at the Commerce Department. 

Mr. Dash. You have told Senator Talmadge, and I don't want to 
restate it too dramatically but I think you did make a dramatic 
statement in terms of what you thought was necessary to assure the 



1922 

reelection of President Nixon. I think you did state kind of dramati- 
cally to Senator Baker that you would pretty much not want to allow 
anything to stand in the way of reelection and 1 know you, of course, 
drew certain exceptions to that. Would you have included, and I am 
now talking about the time prior to the election, per j ury as an activity 
that would stand in your way in getting the President reelected^ 

Mr. Mitchell. Are you talking about somebody else's part ? 

Mr. Dash. Or your own part? 

Mr. Mitchell. 1 would think that that would be a subject matter, 
Mr. Dash, that I would have to give very long and very hard thought 
to. 

Mr. Dash. All right, now, you have told us repeatedly during your 
testimony on Tuesday, Wednesday, and today that Mr. Mardian 
told you of his conversation with Mr. Liddy and I think the date on 
which he debriefed you was according to your testimony, around 
June 21 or 22, and that it was that debriefing that gave you all the 
information of Liddy's operation, which included the so-called White 
House horrors and break-in. 

Now, have you ever denied at any time that Mr. Mardian told 
you about his conversation with Mr. Liddy ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection of having done so, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Did you give a deposition on September 5 in the Civil 
Case No. 1233 brought by the Democratic National Committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir; I did. 

Mr. Dash. Let me read you, Mr. Mitchell, and I can send it to you 
if you wish to look at it yourself or counsel wishes to look at it from 
page 45 of that deposition. Question put to you, "Did you know whether 
or not Mr. LaRue had a discussion with Mr. Gordon Liddy about Mr. 
Liddy's involvement in the Watergate episode?"' Answer by you, "I 
don't really know. I believe that according to my best recollection it 
was that Liddy — I mean LaRue and Mardian, one or the other or 
maybe both, talked to Liddy when Liddy decided he was not going to 
cooperate with the FBI. I am not sure which one of them. It was 
either one or the other, it may have been both of them." 

Question put to you, "You were not present at this conversation?" 
And by you. "No, I have not seen Mr. Liddy since the middle of June, 
I have not seen Mr. Liddy or talked to him." 

Question put to you, "Did either Mr. Mardian or Mr. LaRue report 
to you on their conversation with Liddy ?" Your answer, "No ; only to 
the extent that his services had been terminated in whatever way it 
was." 

Now that was your testimony as of September 5, 1972, in the 
deposition. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. Mr. Dash, that relates to the basis of the termination 
of Mr. Liddy. 

Mr. Dash. No ; the question put to you was, "Did either Mr. Mardian 
or Mr. LaRue report to you on their conversation with Liddy?" 

Mr. Mitchell. If you go back to the basis of it it had to do with the 
subject matter of the termination of Mr. Liddy. 

Mr. Dash. Let me ask you again the question that was put to you, 
and I will re-read it and you may look at this on page 45, "Did you 
know whether or not Mr. LaRue had a discussion with Mr. Gordon 
Liddy about Mr. Liddy's involvement in the Watergate episode ?" 



1923 

And then you said, "I don't really know" — but your answer was that 
Mr. JMardian and Mr, LaRue did and the question was, "Did either Mr. 
Mardian or Mr. LaRue report to you on the conversation with Mr. 
Liddy,'' and your answer was, "No," and it was your limitation "only 
to the extent his service had been terminated in whatever way it was." 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the answer speaks to the termination of the 
services. My response with respect to the other subject matter was 
equivocal because of my recollection at the particular time. 

Mr. Dash. Well, it certainly w^as equivocal because you have testified 
3 days here that the important part of that conversation that Mr. 
Mardian was talking to you about was the White House horrors and 
the Watergate break-in and since this w^as September 5, 1972, before 
the election, didn't you answer "No" in that case as part of your 
willingness to keep the lid on so that if you had answered "Yes" and 
had to tell that conversation, you would have been opening the lid? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I have spent many, many hours recon- 
structing the events in connection with what happened during this 
period of time, in preparation for the testimony of this committee, 
and that is one of the reasons why I have more specific knowledge or 
better recollect with what had gone on than at that particular time in 
September. 

Mr. Dash. This was September 5 ? 

Mr. ]MiTCHELL. September 5. 

Mr. Dash. Which was closer to the June meeting ? 

Mr. ]\IiTcnELL. Was closer to the particular time when there were 
two subject matters contained in that discussion there, one of which 
had to do, of course, with his termination and the other had to do with 
the other subject matter. 

[Conferring with counsel.] 

Mr. Dash. Well, your answer, "No," that Mr. Mardian did not tell 
you anything about his conversation with Liddy with regard to 
Liddy 's involvement in the Watergate episode, is actually quite con- 
trary to your testimony under oath before this committee. 

Mr. ^Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I w^ould point out that there are two sub- 
ject matters there, and is no relation to the termination aspect of it, 
and the other answer is as I say. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, I don't want to argue with you but you put 
the limitation on. The question put to you was dealing with the ques- 
tioning of Mr. Liddy concerning his involvement in the Watergate 
episode and you said that Mr. ^Mardian did not tell you about that con- 
versation and all you said was except about his termination. 

Now, all I am asking you is whether or not that answer "No," that 
Mr. ]Mardian did not tell you about the conversation with Liddy con- 
cerning his Watergate involvement is directly contrary to the testi- 
mony you have given here. 

Mr. Mitchell. I still disagree with the interpretation that you have 
put on it, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Now, it seems to me that 

Mr. ]\Iitchell. Let me also point out that in addition to the hours 
that have been put in reconstructing these events of course there have 
been other matters presented to us that relate to the subject matters 
which have refreshed my recollection, including testimony before 
this committee. 



9&-296 O — 73— bk. 



1924 

Mr. Dash. Well, is your testimony at the time you said, "No" there 
that you actually had no recollection that Mardian had told you about 
the White House horrors, that Liddy had told them. Could you have 
forgotten that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No; that is not the subject matter of that question. 

Mr. Dash. That is the subject matter of the question. 

Mr. Mitchell. The White House horrors ? 

Mr. Dash. Liddy 's involvement in the Watergate episode. 

Mr. Mitchell. Those are not the White House horrors, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you also forget about Liddy's involvement in 
the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters? 

Mr. Mitchell. I go back and stand on the statement, the answer 
that I gave you, I think there are two subject matters there and there 
are two answers. 

Mr. Dash. This statement was made under oath, was it not, Mr. 
Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It was made under oath, that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you have testified several times to the commit- 
tee as to the circumstances under which Mr. Liddy was hired as 
counsel to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, involv- 
ing Mr. Dean's introduction, your interview with him on November 24, 
and your hiring of Mr. Liddy, is that not correct ? 

Mr, Mitchell. Well, I think my testimony and my recollection as to 
how it happened is after Mr. Dean had brought ]\Ir. Liddy over to meet 
with me on November 24, 1971, and discussed the areas in which he 
would be working, we met, this is Liddy, Dean and myself, we discus- 
sed it, and then, as I understand it, the suggestion was tliat since Mr. 
Magruder was then overrunning the committee that ]Mr. Liddy be nut 
in touch with Mr. Dean — Mr. Magruder by Mr. Dean and that th*> 
hiring of him took place over there. 

Mr. Dash. But you were aware of the circumstances under which he 
was hired. 

Mr. Mitchell. I was aware of the circumstances, Mr. Dean having 
brought Mr. Liddy over to meet with me, and I having said that it 
looked to me like he could be perfectly competent. 

Mr. Dash. And you approved his being hired ? 

Mr. MiTCHFJLL. As counsel for that committee ? 

Mr. Dash. Right, and Mr. Magruder hired him on your approval, 
is that not true ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would presume that that had followed. 

Mr. Dash. Now, have you ever denied to anybody that you were 
aware of these circumstances of Mr. Liddy 's employment with the 
committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There was one occasion in which my recollection 
failed with respect to who actually hired Mr. Liddy. It is still my 
opinion that Mr. Magruder hired Liddy, and not John ]Mitchell. 

]\Ir. Dash. AVithout the question of who actually hired him and the 
circumstances under which he became employed, which would in- 
clude at least your interviewing of liim and your having some role, 
have you ever denied knowing any of those circumstances? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Under the same testimony of INIr. INIitchell on September 



1925 

5, 1972, the question was put to you on page 18 of the transcript: 
"Mr. Mitchell, do you have any information as to the circumstances 
under which Mr. Liddy was hired?" with reference to the Commit- 
tee for the Re-Election of the President. 

The answer : "No sir, I do not." 

Question. "Have you ever made inquiry to find out how it came that 
he was hired?" 

"Have I made inquiry ?" 

Question : "Yes." 

Answer. "No, I have not." 

Now, that testimony was under oath. Could you have been actually 
able to answer no to that question ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Very easily, because I was not aware of how Mr. 
Magruder ultimately hired Mr. Liddy. 

Mr. Dash. Well, the question was not really that, was it, Mr. 
Mitchell? 

Mr. iVIiTCHELL. In the context as you have read it and as I under- 
stood it at that particular time, the answer is "Yes." 

Mr. Dash. You A^'ere asked, do you have any information as to the 
circumstances under which ]Mr. Liddy was hired? Would not the 
truthful answer to that be, I may have not hired him myself, it may 
have been Magruder, but I interviewed him when Mv. Dean brought 
him over. I approved. Maybe I didn't hire him, Mr. ]\Iagruder did. 
Would not that have been a more factual answer than no, I have no 
information? 

Mr. Mitchell. It gets to a point of degree, Mr. Dash, and the ques- 
tion was as to the hiring and the hiring was done by Mr. Magruder 
in the following month and I have no knowledge of those aspects of 
Mr. Magruder hiring him. 

Mr. Dash. Did you remember at that time the interview of Mr. Dean 
when you were asked that question ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I had no recollection of the interview at that 
time. 

Mr. Dash. And you had no recollection of your approving Mr. 
Liddy at that time? 

Mr. Mitchell. You are using the word "approving." It was not to 
that extent. It was the basis of the conversation that yes, I think he 
would be perfectly all right for counsel for the committee and the ulti- 
mate decision was to be made by Magruder. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, vou know an agenda was prepared for that 
interview and vou know that if vou didn't approve Mr. Liddy, Mr. 
Magruder would never have hired him. You know that. 

Mr. Mitchell. That could have been the case, or it might have been 
otherwise, because Mr. Magruder might have gotten approval. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have any information 

Mr. Mitchell. I might have had information on that meeting. That 
was my recollection. 

Mr. Dash. Isn't it so, ISIr. Mitchell, that you answered "No" in this 
context, because at that time on September 5 Mr. Liddy had been 
identified as being involved and that you did not want to have any 
relationship with Mr. Liddy's involvement or hiring by the 
committee ? 



1926 

Mr. Mitchell. I think that would have been the magnitude or con- 
sequence. Obviously, Mr. Liddy was known to me, attended meetings 
in the Justice Department on different subject matters including the 
drug abuse law enforcements and so forth, that would not have been 
of that magnitude. 

Mr. Dash. In any event, your statement that you had no informa- 
tion whatsoever as to any of the circumstances on September 5 is quite 
different than your testimony before this committee, is that not so? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that to be true, and I believe the rechecking 
of the records, and the committee being kind enough to furnish me a 
copy of the agenda that Mr. Dean provided, and further reflection so 
it has brought the subject matter very much into focus. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you testified you asked Mr. Mardian to make an 
investigation for you as to the Watergate break-in. Did those instruc- 
tions include cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? 

Mr. Mitchell. The matter involved, I do not recall coming back on 
the plane from California, whether that was specifically discussed or 
not, but there was a policy within the committee that tliev should co- 
operate with the FBI and, of course, that was the basis for the dis- 
charging of Mr. Liddy when he did not cooperate. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you ever give instructions that there should 
be cooperation with the FBI to Mr. Mardian? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I don't recall the specific words. I would 
presume that it would be 

Mr. Dash. Did you consider 

Mr. Mitchell [continuing]. Implicit in his actions. 

Mr. Dash. Did you include yourself in Taat requirement to cooperate 
with the FBI? 

Mr. Mitchell. I would certainly believe so. 

Mr. Dash. Isn't it a fact, that you were interviewed by Special 
Agents Mahan and Lill on July 5, 1972 ? Do you recall that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I recall there was an interview, Mr. Dash. I don't 
recall the date. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall being interviewed as to what knowledge 
you had of the Democratic National Committee break-in and inform- 
ing the agents that the only knowledge you had was what you read 
in the newspapers? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, by July 5, and that is prettv close 
to June 21 or 22, you have been given information by ]\ir. Mardian 
on what Mr. Liddy told him about that break-in. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, at that particular time, I was not sure 
whether that information was correct or otherwise. 

Mr. Dash. "Whether it was correct or not, the FBI was making an 
investi.<xation and would not you want to give whatever leads or in- 
formation they wanted, having l>een the former Attorney General 
and knowing how the FBI investigates, so they could check that out? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, at that particular time, we weren't vol- 
unteering any information for the reason that I have discussed here. 

Mr. Dash. Right. So that in other words, your answer to the FBI 
was part of the decision that you made, a strong decision for the rea- 
sons you have given, to see to it that none of these things got out. 

Mr. MiTCHEr>L. It was the decision of those that were involved to 
not volunteer any information under any circumstances. 



1927 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall being interviewed again on October 5, 1972, 
by Special Agent Lano? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe that I was, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. This was a telephone call interview. Do you recall the 
FBI calling you on the telephone ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe, Mr. Dash, that that was a telephone call 
concerning whether or not the FBI should intervieAv my wife. That is 
my recollection. 

Mr. Dash. Well, FBI records indicate that you were asked again 
about whether you had any information about the Watergate break-in 
and you deny that you did. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, that is not the case. I think you will find 
that it relates to my wife and not to myself. 

Mr. Dash. Well, it is true that the telephone conversation did relate 
to your wife, but at least the FBI records show that a question was 
put directly to you also as to any information and that their records 
show that your answer was that you had no knowledge of your own. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then, their records are absolutely wrong, because 
the subject matter was limited to the question about whether or not 
they should interview my wife or not. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell, you enjoy the distinction, and you have 
made it from time to time, that it was your purpose to not volunteer 
anything. Is there a distinction between your not volunteering any- 
thing and lying? 

If you do not volunteer an answer to a direct question, you might say 
you do not volunteer anything, but actually, you are lying. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think we would have to find out what the specifics 
are, what the particular occasion and 

Mr. Dash. We will have to go back to the July 5 question of the 
FBI as to whetlier or not you have any information on the DNC break- 
in and your answer, only what you read in the newspapers. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think the newspaper accounts were a lot more pro- 
ductive than what I had heard from ISIardian or LaRue 

Mr. Dash. Or Dean? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Dean was not discussing or had no knowledge 
of the Watergate break-in, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Dean had no knowledge of it at all ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not that he had imparted to me at that particular 
time. I think we have establislied that it was much later doAvn the road 
that he imparted to me the knowledge that he had obtained. 

Mr. Dash. Well, the information received from Mardian about 
Liddy is that Magruder pushed him into it. Now, nobody in the news- 
papers had ever mentioned that IVIagruder had anything to do with it, 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not talking about it being in the newspapers. It 
was still an open question whether it had happened or had not hap- 
pened. We still had Magruder telling us to the contrary and advising 
the lawyers to the contrary. 

Mr. Dash. In any event, it seems to me that there are two instances 
that I have been unable to quote to you from the record — you may 
differ — where your testimony on December 5 on the civil deposition 
was diametrically opposed to your testimony before this committee. 
Wiat I have to say to you on that, is that since you may have given 
false testimony under oath on prior occasions, is there really any rea- 
son for this committee to believe your testimony now, especially to 



1928 

the issue of whether you did or did not give final approval at the Key 
Biscayne meeting to the Liddy plan, whether or not you had any 
knowledge about the President's knowledge of the coverup or par- 
ticipation in the coverup, or whether you took any active part in the 
payoffs or coverup, the Watergate case or any other part of the White 
House horrors ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I disagree, of course, with your inter- 
pretation of the matters that you have just read. As far as the deter- 
minations of this committee, I think they can judge their testimony — 
my testimony — and make their own conclusions after my appearance 
here for 4 days, 3i/^ days, whatever it is. 

Mr. Dash. I think that is true, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. And anything else I would say would be self-serving. 

Mr. Dash. I think that is true, and actually, if one were to take 
your testimony to the various parts, which would include what you 
have had to say about the Key Biscayne meeting and what you have 
had to say about the raising of funds to pay off the defendants and 
some other parts, that in order to believe your testimony, you would 
have to disbelieve Mr. Magruder, Mr. Sloan, Mr. McCord, Mr. Reisner, 
Mr. Stans, and in some respects, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Mitchell. I disagree vehemently on the list of the people that 
you have talked about. I would suggest that you wait until the rest of 
the witnesses that you are going to have appear and they will be 
testifying on these same subject matters and Senator Weicker yester- 
day pointed out something imbeknownst to me about j\Ir. LaRue's 
statement as to Avhat transpired at the March 30 meeting down in 
Key Biscayne. 

Mr. Dash. You didn't have any recollection that Mr. LaRue in fact 
had that recollection of that meeting, did you? 

Mr. Mitchell. I didn't have any recollection that he had that 
recollection ? 

Mr. Dash. Your testimony is that Mr. LaRue would have agreed 
or agree with your testimony that when Mr. Magruder presented the 
proposal to you in Key Biscayne that you just dismissed it out of 
hand at that point. And I think Senator Weicker said to you that 
Mr. LaRue's testimony would probably be the fact that you stated it 
didn't have to be decided at that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. This, Mr. Dash, is an affirmation of the fact that it 
wasn't approved at Key Biscayne. I say it wasn't approved subse- 
quently and it is certainly temporary to ^lagruder's testimony that it 
was approved in Key Biscayne on March 30. 

]Mr. Dash. Not approved in Key Biscayne in that room at that min- 
ute. I don't know whether you may have taken either walks with 
Mr. Magruder or whether you spoke to Mv. jMagruder outside of 
Mr. LaRue's presence. But I think we will have Mr. LaRue's testi- 
mony. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mitchell, I have a few more questions. They 
may not be as good as Mr. Dash's, but they will be a lot slower, I 
guarantee you. 

Let me ask you concerning Charles Colson, what was your under- 
standing of Mr. Colson's campaign duties and obligations, specifically 
during the months of July and August? 



1929 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am sure they were many and varied. The 
basic contact that I had with him in the Committee for the Re-Elec- 
tion of the President had had to do with the connection of the estab- 
lislmient of the Democrats for Nixon. I am sure there were many other 
things that he was doing, but that is one in which I had more contact 
with him than anything else. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you about your log again, Mr. Mitchell. 
Do you have your log there before you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me refer you to some telephone calls that you 
had with Mr. Colson during July and August. I refer to a call to Mr. 
Colson on July G, 1972, 10 :05, I believe. 

Do you recall the substance of that telephone conversation? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't, Mr. Thompson. As you know, there is a 
substantial number of calls in here back and forth between Mr. 
Colson and myself, and there is no way that I can identify the subject 
matter 

Mr. Thompson. So I will probably be a little more general in some 
of these other references. But that one was followed by a meeting 
with Mardian and LaRue, the call being made at 10 :05 and the meet- 
ing with Mardian and LaRue, I believe, at 10 :10. 

Mr. Mitchell. I can see that there would be no connection between 
the two whatsoever. 

Mr. Thompson. There would be no connection between the two ? 

Mr. Mitchell. My belief would be that that would be the case. 

Mr. Thompson. On July 7, you have another call with Mr. Colson 
after having had a meeting with Mr. LaRue that morning. 

Mr. Mitchell. There still would be no connection between any 
conversations or meeting I had with Colson and LaRue or Mardian. 
There would be in connection with some of the meetings in here with 
Secretary Connally and Clark MacGregor and Governor Rockefeller, 
and, I think Magruder sat in on some of them also. 

Mr. Thompson. I am sure you remember Mr. Magruder's testimony 
that when he received this call from Mr. Colson in March of 1972, 
Mr. LaRue was present in the room. 

Do you recall that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, I do. I do not recall the time frame involved, 
but I do recall the testimony to the effect that LaRue was either in 
the room or in the immediate vicinity of Magruder receiving the call. 

Mr. Thompson. Did LaRue ever tell you anything about that con- 
versation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; he did. 

Mr. Thompson. What did he tell you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, sometime along — I would have to believe it 
would be in the year 1973, he told me of having been in Magruder's 
office or having been told by Magruder after Magruder had received 
the call from Colson that Mr. Colson had called Magruder, told him 
that Hunt and Liddy were in the office of Mr. Colson and that Mr. 
Colson was urging Magruder to listen to Hunt and Liddy and get on 
with the Liddy program. I can't be any more specific than that. 

Mr. Tpiompson. Did he state that Mr. Magruder was any more spe- 
cific than that as to what the Liddy program was at that time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not quite sure who you are talking about. I am 
talking about a conversation that Mr. LaRue had with me. 



1930 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. Did Mr. LaRue tell you, from what he got 
from Magruder, that either Magruder or LaRue had an understand- 
ing as to what that program was at that time? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe we discussed it in those terms. I think 
what we were both assuming in retrospect, going back over the time, 
that was one of the programs tiiat Liddy had proposed to Magruder. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, now, we know also that LaRue was pres- 
ent at Key Biscayne. 

Mr. ]MiTCHELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. In the same month that he heard part of this con- 
versation, was on one end of this conversation, later on in the month 
he was at Key Biscayne when Liddy again presented this plan to you. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Thompson, let me again point out that I think 
Mr. LaRue, at least in his discussions with me on this subject matter, 
thought that this teleplione call had come after the meeting in Key 
Biscayne, not before. This is my recollection of what he told me. 

Mr. Thompson. Then why did he discuss with you at all this con- 
versation that he had overheard when he was in the room, if he didn't 
think it had any significance with what was openly described as the 
Liddy project as we know it now ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't know his 

Mr. Thompson. What was the nature of that conversation? "WHiat 
significance did LaRue place on it, even in retrospect? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am not sure what significance that he placed 
on it. It was when we were reviewing some of the things that had hap- 
pened over the period of time and it might have arisen in connection 
with the statements that Mr. McCord made after the appearance be- 
fore Judge Sirica. I am not quite certain of the date, but in going back 
over the chronology of these events, he advised me of his knowledge 
of the telephone call from Colson. 

Mr. Thompson. Did Liddy have any other project? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Licldy, of course, as I always understood it, 
had an area of intelligence and information-gathering that existed with 
respect to the committee from the time he came aboard, which is shown 
in the prospectus that I was discussing with Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Thompson. That wouldn't faM within the scope of Mr. Colson's 
campaign interest, would it, according to the way you described his 
function a moment ago. What interest would he have in seeing that 
the Liddy program was carried out if he was referring to that 
program ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was talking, Mr. Thompson, to my contacts with 
Mr. Colson concerning the campaign issues. Obviously, he had other 
functions in connection with the campaign. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know any other functions ? Could you be a 
little bit more specific ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I am sure that Mr. Colson was very much inter- 
ested in the issues of the campaign, because he was present at many of 
the meetings that I attended where the issues involved in the campaign 
were discussed. I believe that Mr. Colson was connected with or related 
to or knowledgeable of the so-called attack group that met and de- 
cided positions with respect to the candidate and the opposition. I am 
sure he had many other duties. I am not fully aware of all of them. 

Mr. Thompson. None of the things you mentioned, of course had 
anything to do with intelligence-gathering or anything of that nature, 
do they ? 



1931 

Mr. Mitchell. Not as such, no, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, even assuming that LaRue made this state- 
ment that this telephone conversation came after Key Biscayne, and 
even assuming that it did, you say it was 1973, sometime in 1973 be- 
fore LaRue told you about the circumstance. 

Mr. Mitchell. This is my recollection, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me refer you to August 8 again in your journal. 
My notations indicate that you had a meeting with LaRue at 9 :31 that 
morning and received a telephone call from Mr. Colson at 10 :30 the 
same morning. 

Would there be any connection there ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe that there is anything that I can re- 
call where there was any relationship between Mr. LaRue and Mr. 
Colson and myself throughout this whole period. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, let me run through the list here briefly and 
maybe we can be more general if you have no specific recollection with 
regard to any specific telephone conversation. 

I mentioned the July call to Mr. Colson followed by a meeting with 
Mardian and LaRue. July 7, you called Mr. Colson after meeting with 
LaRue. 

July 21, you had a telephone conversation with Mr. Colson. July 26, 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, I was perfectly contented to accept Mr. 
Haldeman. 

July 28, you had a telephone conversation with Mr. Colson between 
meetings with LaRue and Magruder. 

August 4, you had a call with Mr. Colson. 

August 8, you had a telephone call from Mr. Colson after meeting 
with LaRue. 

August 29, you received a call from Colson. 

September 8, you talked to Colson after talking with Parkinson. 

Do you have any specific recollection of the substance of any of those 
telephone conversations with Mr. Colson ? 

Mr. Mitchell. As I have stated, Mr. Thompson, there were two 
areas, or actually, three areas, in which Mr. Colson and I were dis- 
cussing matters at that ])articular time. The first one, which spent more 
time than anything else, had to do with the establishment of the 
Democrats for Nixon. 

Mr. Thompson. Were you still that actively engaged in the cam- 
paign ? You had resigned ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was putting out fires in connection with this subject 
matter. 

Mr. Thompson. Of course, we know that was the biggest fire you had 
at that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, but we also had smaller fires in connection with 
the establishment of the Democrats for Nixon and the personnel 
involved. 

Mr. Thompson. Democrats for Nixon, what else? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think I have testified or told this committee that 
my responsibilities as a consultant continued in dealing with some 
of the i^eople who were involved out of the Committee for the Re- 
Election, but in the election, reelection of the President, such as Gover- 
nor Reagan, Governor Rockefeller, Governor Cahill and people like 
that. The problem that developed was ap]:)arently there was a great 
disagreement as to which Democrats should head up these organiza- 



1932 

tions in the different States. Mr. Colson was going one way at the time 
and Secretary Connally was going another way and at times the 
organizations, the regular i^olitical organizations, in the States wanted 
to make sure they did not go that way, and frequently I w^as brought 
in to help clarify the situation. 

Mr. Thompson. Are there any other areas ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The second area, of course, that was involved with 
the establishment of the labor groups that were supporting the Presi- 
dent, and Mr. Colson and I had conversations on that subject matter, 
and the third one, of course, which involved the issues that were being 
discussed at the particular time in relationship to the campaign. 

Mr. Thompson. When Dean told you what he did tell you about the 
so-called White House horrors, I believe you said he mentioned the 
Diem cables ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. His words were the Diem cables, did he mention 
Mr. Colson in reference to that matter ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Thompson. When he mentioned the Dita Beard situation did 
he mention Mr. Colson in reference to that matter? 

Mr. Mitchell, I am not quite that certain. I believe that to be true 
but I am not quite that certain. 

Mr. Thompson. You believe that to be true. You believe he men- 
tioned him with regard to that and he mentioned him, you believe, with 
regard to the Diem cables, and you had this knowledge and you had 
some 13 or 14 telephone conversations within a period of 2 months, 
did you ever discuss any of these matters with him, ask him if what 
Dean had said about those matters was true ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir, to the best of my recollection, I did not. 

Mr. Thompson. What did Dean say exactly about Mr. Colson with 
regard to those matters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. With regard to what, Mr. Thompson ? 

Mr. Thompson. Those two matters, the Diem cable situation and the 
Dita Beard or the ITT situation. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, as I say, these matters were discussed from 
time to time, and you would receive or at least I would receive the 
stark statement that such and such had happened and from time to 
time, you would learn additional items about it, particularly as to 
what was the nature of the cables, how they had been tampered with 
and who were the players who were involved in connection with them. 

Mr. Thompson. I know you do not want to 

Mr. Mitchell. Pardon ? 

Mr. Thompson. I know you do not want to repeat serious allegations 
as matters of hearsay. We will have an opportunity to talk to Mr. 
Colson about them. We already have had the opportunity to talk to 
Mr. Dean but I am just asking you. considering matters that serious 
when you had the situation on your hands, the whole Watergate situa- 
tion, does it not seem a little bit strange, at least in retrospect, that you 
never mentioned those matters to IMr. Colson to find out whether or 
not there was any truth to them ? 

Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. No, sir, I was perfectly contented to accept ]\Ir. 
Dean's statements on the subject matter. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, I think it requires knowing just exactly what 
Dean did say then. What did he say with regard to Colson's part? 



1933 

Mr, Mitchell. Well, let me go back in history a little bit and pick 
up a question that Mr. Dash was about to ask me before the lunch 
break. I had heard about the Diem cables and Mr. Colson's involvement 
from a third party. Of course, I did not know all of the details at that 
particular time but I did know that Mr. Colson was aware of the Diem 
cables and had talked to Mr. Lambert, Mr. William Lambert about 
the Diem cables so that what Mr. Dean told me about it at a subsequent 
date fitted right into what I had previously heard about them. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he tell you the same thing or did he tell you 
anything different about his involvement? What did he supposedly 
do with the cables, according to Dean ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Are you talking about Mr. Colson doing anything 
with the cables ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, what Mr. Colson was trying to do with the 
cables was to get Mr. Lambert to use them in a story. 

Mr. Thompson. What about the splicing of cables together? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that was part of the information that came 
out at a later period of time. 

Mr. Thompson. Did Dean refer to that particular aspect of it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, he did. At what particular period of time I 
cannot pinpoint. 

Mr. Thompson. Does it not seem even stranger, assuming that the 
telephone conversations with Mr. LaRue, when he was present in the 
room, occurred after the March 30 meeting you had with Magruder, 
that he would wait all this time from March of 1972 to sometime in 
1973, and obviously was meeting with him continually also, to talk to 
you about the significance of these matters. I believe you have already 
stated, I get the impression anyway and correct me if I am wrong, that 
Mr. LaRue was, besides a political acquaintance, a personal friend ; you 
had him down at Key Biscayne with you. Can you shed any light on 
why he would withhold a significant matter like this from you when 
this was one of your responsibilities ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Thompson, I am sure he was not withholding 
anything from me. I am telling you that to the best of my recollection, 
the first time I heard tliis story from Mr. LaRue was in the year 1973 
after some of these allegations were made, whether it was McCord's 
material or w^hatever it was. 

Mr. Thompson. When we were asking about who might have been 
pushing Magruder, you referred to some of Magruder's testimony 
about the call he received from Colson as a possibility. Would it be 
fair to say then that during the period of at least July and August of 
1972 that you had no suspicion wliatsoever that Mr. Colson might have 
been the one who pushed Magruder ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, as I have testified before, I have not to this 
day know who might have been or might not have been pushing Mr. 
Magruder. 

Mr. Thompson. Would the answer to my question be yes, then ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, to what question, sir ? 

Mr. Thompson. I said would it be accurate to say that you had no 
suspicion whatsoever during at least July and August of 1972 that 
Mr. Colson might have been the one who was pushing Mr. Magruder to 
do the things that he ultimately did ; that you had no suspicion of him 



1934 

during that period of time ? I mean, you were talking with him on a 
continuous basis about campaign matters to start with. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would believe I could answer that ]Mr. Thompson 
by saying that if I had any suspicion of it I w^ould certainly have 
pursued it, yes. 

Mr. Thompson. All ri^ht, sir. 

So any reference to Mr. Colson then, from what I can gather at this 
particular time, simply goes back to what Magruder's testimony was 
concerning who might have been pushing him. "Would that he an 
accurate statement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it also goes to the point where I believe I have 
just recentlv testified here within the last number of minutes of the 
fact that Mr. LaRue mentioned the subject matter to me in this year. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mitchell, on the night of June 17, 1972, did you 
have a conversation with Pat Gray ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you see him at any time during that day or 
night? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. "VVlien was the first time you saw Pat Gray after 
June 17, 1972? 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not believe I have seen him since June 17. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you to relate briefly tons 

Mr. Mitchell. Bv the way, Mr. Thompson, you asked about June 17. 
All of these specs stories in the newspapers put it the following day 
on the 18th, which was the Sunday, not the I7th. And my answer is no 
to that question, too. 

Mr. Thompson. I was interested in the 17th only. Let me ask you to 
refer back to Februarv 15 of this vear. As I understand it. Mr. 
Richard Moore came to you and visited you and had a conversation 
with you in New York, is that correct ? 

Mr, Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Could you relate to us briefly the substance of that 
conversation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The subject, creneral subject matter other tha^i the 
one that Mr. Dash has touched upon here, had to do with the Ervin 
committee, this comTnU-tpe, the Select Committee, its activities, as how 
to some extent the Whit^ House was goinq- to respond and how the 
Committee for the Re-Election of the President and their personnel 
were to be handled. I think he carried with him a sugcrestion that it 
would be nice if I would movp back to Washington and help with 
the personnel who were, from the Committee for the Re-Election of 
the President, who were going to appear before this committee. I 
thanked him verv much and declined the sugjrestion. We sfot into the 
question of whether or not I would be interested in helpino; to raise 
support monev. I did not thank him for that but I declined anvway. 
We discussed a number of other areas with respect to the committee 
and its proposed staff and, as I recall, the question again of executive 
privilege which was always being discussed, general approach to the 
subject. 

Mr. Thotsipson. T>et me ask you to recall as specifically as you can 
exactly Avhat he said to you concerning money. 



1935 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't know as I can remember the specific 
phrase but there is one thought that sticks in my mind which may or 
may not be the exact words but it was something to the effect, "You 
would not be interested in helping raise money in connection with 
these activities, would you?" It was more of a question than it was a 
plea, and my answer to that was negative. 

Mr. Thompson. What activities ? 

Mr. jSIitchell. The activities, the payment for the support and the 
legal fees of the people that were involved in the Watergate. 

Mr. Thompson, Did he specifically mention support for the people 
involved in the Watergate ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this was the general tenor of the subject mat- 
ter, yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you have any talk about 

Mr. Mitchell. Or at least I under-stood Avhen he talked about rais- 
ing funds that this is what they were talking about. 

Mr. Thompson. That is the way you received it from your end of 
the conversation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you also discuss the Committee to Re-Elect, how 
the Committee to Re-Elect was going to function from then on? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I covered that generally in my answer. It was 
discussed to the point that there would be people coming up here to 
testify, that if they would be needing counsel, counsel would be need- 
ing tlie backup of the documentation which was in the committee. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you also discuss additional staffing? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think the additional staffing was discussed in con- 
nection with the other aspects of tlie litigation but there was the dis- 
cu-sion that the lawyers, and I am talking about Mr. Parkinson and 
Mr. O'Brien, who had been doing legal work for the committee would 
be examining this area of the subject matter of the people from the 
committee who were coming up here to testify, and it was conceivable 
that they would need additional assistance. 

Mr. Thompson. Additional lawyers would be employed by the 
committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think, Mr. Thompson, it went both to the poten- 
tial of additional lawyers as well as clerical or staff help to take care 
of providing for the documentation that might be required in con- 
nection with it. 

Mr. Thompson. Were there any other matters which you discussed 
there that would possibly require money or any additional money, 
where money considerations might be involved in any way ? 

Mr. ^Mitchell. I don't 

Mr. Thompson. In other words, what you have mentioned so far 
did it involve that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall, Mr. Thompson because it seems to me 
that one thing that the Committee for the Re-Election of the President 
has or at least the finance committee has had plenty of money. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, sir. 

Are you firm in your own mind that Mr. Moore, from what he said 
to you, in the words that he used, referred specifically to support 
money for defendants or in retrospect would you say that is the way 
that you took it ? 



1936 

Mr. MiTCHELX,. That is the way I took it. Because, as I say, to the 
best of my recollection it was a very brief, almost an aside "Would 
you be interested in raising any more money" and the answer was 
negative, and 

Mr. Thompson. Raising any more money ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think I had better drop the "more" since I 
hadn't raised any up to that time. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Thompson. You had not raised any money up until that time? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Was the talk of the money the major focus of the 
conversation or did it receive equal consideration in your conversation 
or was it a minor part of the conversation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. A very minor. As I mentioned before, I described it 
as almost an aside and I think that is a proper terminology for the 
way in which it was put. 

Mr. Thompson. Just one more question or small line of questions, 
Mr. Mitchell, and I think this should be asked. If my memory serves 
me correctlv, newspaper reports were that on one occasion fairly re- 
cently, I believe in a telephone conversation you had with a columnist, 
you indicated that you were not going to be the fall guy in this thing. 
Was that an accurate report ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It most assuredly was not. T think vou are quoting 
the other side, of the distaff side of the Mitchell family, not me. 

Mr. Thompson. You didn't take the telephone and verify that fact 
then? 

Mr. Mitchell. I did not what ? 

Mr. Thompson. You did not take the telephone yourself after that 
comment was made ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I took the telephone to try to terminate the conver- 
sation, not to perpetrate it. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell, have you requested immunity for your appearance 
here today ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. 

Mr. Thompson. And of course, have received none, is that correct? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. 

Senator Ervin. Any further questions from any member of the com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. Mitchell, on behalf of the committee I wish to thank you for 
the extreme patience which you have manifested in what was neces- 
sarily a very trying ordeal. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, if I might respond just briefly, I 
certainly want to, and I am sure my counsel do likewise, thank the 
committee and certainly the staff for the many courtesies that have 
been extended to us which have made the coming and going in the in- 
termissions, and so forth much, much easier than they might have been 
otherwise, and we are quite appreciative of it. We appreciate it. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Hundley. Thank you very much. 

Senator Ervin. On behalf of the committee I wish to make certain 
announcements. 



1937 

On July 6 President Nixon wrote to the chairman of the committee 
a letter responding to the request which the committee had made of 
the White House for certain documents. The letter has been widely- 
publicized in the press and will not be either read or paraphrased by 
me now for that reason. 

On this morning at 9 o'clock the committee had the first meeting 
it has held since the letter was written and received. On that occasion 
the vice chairman of the committee, Senator Baker, who always mani- 
fests nuich wisdom, moved that the chairman send a committee to the 
White House by way of reply to the letter of July 6. After discussion 
among the members of the' committee, the committee unanimously 
authorized the chairman to send the following letter to the President : 

JxjLY 12, 1973. 
The President, 
The White House, 
Washington, D.G. 

Dear Mr. President : I acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 6, addressed 
to me with a copy to Senator Baker. 

The Committee feels that your position as stated in the letter, measured 
against the Committee's responsibility to ascertain the facts related to the mat- 
tors set out in Senate Resolution 60, present the very grave possibility of a funda- 
mental constitutional confrontation between the Congress and the Presidency. 
We wish to avoid that, if possible. Consequently, we request an opportunity for 
representatives of this Committee and its staff to meet with you and your staff 
to try to find ways to avoid such a confrontation. 

We stand ready to discuss the matter with you at your convenience. We would 
point out that the hearings are ongoing and that time is of the essence. We trust 
that this may be done very promptly. 
Very truly yours, 

Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Chairman. 

I would like to add that the letter was largely dictated by Senator 
Baker with suggestions from the other members of the committee. 
It was forwarded to the President by special messenger in a sealed 
envelope marked for the eyes of the President only. [Laughter.] 

The letter was accompanied by this letter : 

July 12, 1973. 
The President, 
The White House, 
Washington, B.C. 

Dear Mr. President : This letter is a product of deliberations of the Committee 
this morning, authorizing the Chairman to direct a letter to the President. It 
is the intention of the Chairman to try to reach the President by telephone at 
mid-day today. 

Very truly yours, 

Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Chairman. 

The chairman did contact the President by telephone and was as- 
sured by the President that after certain pressing matters are handled 
-by him on which deadlines are necessarily imposed, he will meet with 
the chairman to discuss this question. 

The committee adopted the following resolution at a special meeting 
today held at 1 o'clock. 

Resolt^ed by the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities: 
First, that the Committee is of the unanimous opinion that the Committee 
is entitled to have access to every document in the possession of the White House 
for any Department or Agency of the Executive Branch of the Federal Govern- 
ment which is relevant to prove or disprove any of the matters the Committee 
is authorized by Senate Resolution 60 to investigate. 



1938 

Second, that the Committee is anxious to avoid any confrontation with the 
White House in respect to this matter, and for this reason authorizes the Chair- 
man to meet with the President to ascertain whether there is any reasonable 
possibility of working out any reconciliation between the position of the Com- 
mittee in this resp-eet and that announced by the President in his letter to the 
Chairman bearing date July 6, 1973 which will enable the Committee to gain 
access to the documents necessary to enable it to make the inquiry which it is 
authorized by Senate Resolution 60 to make. 

The chairman expects to avail himself of the promised opportunity 
to confer -with the President in this matter in the hope that we might 
work out some reconciliation of these two divergent positions and thus 
avoid any possibility of a confrontation between the committee as a 
representative of the legislative branch of the Government, and the 
AVhite House. 

Does any member of the committee wish to add anything to what the 
chairman has said ? 

If not, counsel will call the next witness. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Richard Moore. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Moore, will you stand up, please. 

Do you swear that the testimony that you shall give to the Senate 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Moore. I do. 

Senator Ervin. Be seated, please, sir. Will you please state your 
name and address in full for the record. 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD A. MOORE, ACCOMPANIED BY HERBERT J. 
MILLER, JR., COUNSEL 

Mr. Moore. My name is Richard A. Moore, Mr. Chairman. My 
address is 4917 Rockwood Parkway, "Washington, D.C. 

Senator Ervin. I note that you are accompanied by counsel. I will 
ask counsel to identify himself by giving his name and address for the 
record. 

Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, for the record my name is Herbert J. 
Miller, Jr., 1320-19th Street, Washington, D.C. I am here representing 
Mr. Richard Moore. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Moore, I also observe that you have a prepared 
statement, and I assume that you would like to read your statement 
before you are interrogated. 

Mr. MooRE. I would, sir, and thank you for the privilege. 

Senator Ervin. You may proceed to do so. 

Mr. MooRE. My name is Richard A. Moore. I am special counsel to 
the President, a position to which I was appointed on April 26, 1971. 
But today, I speak today only for myself. 

For the 10 years following my graduation from Yale University 
Law School in 1939, 1 practiced law in Xew York, with 4 years out for 
Army service. After the war I migrated to California, where I was 
a lawyer and later an executive in the television industry. To save the 
committee's time, I will not recite biographical details at this point, 
but refer you to the resume attached to tliis statement. 

Senator Ervin. We might let the record show that tlie resume will 
be printed in full after the reading of Mr. Moore's statement. 



1930 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, also, if Mr. Moore would not mind, 
you might pull the microphone a little bit further. We are experienc- 
ing some difficulty in hearing you. 

Mr. MooRE. Thank you, sir. 

Is that better? 

In California, I became a friend and supporter 

Senator Ervin. I would like to request that we have order in the 
audience and that anyone in the audience who wishes to converse, 
would please retire so that their conversation will not disturb the 
capacity of the committee to hear the witness. 

Mr. Moore. In California, I became a friend and supporter of 
Eichard Nixon, and advised on the television aspects of his 1962 cam- 
paign. In 1968 I accompanied him on his campaign tours. I was then 
invited to join the administration. 

For a year beginning in April 1970, I served as a special assistant 
to Attorney General Mitchell. I assist-ed him primarily in the prep- 
aration of speeches, statements, and position papers on current public 
issues within the Department's responsibilities. In April 1971 I was 
appointed a special counsel to the President. My principal role has 
been to assist the President and his staff in communicating their posi- 
tions in the most convincing manner to the general public. Since con- 
vincing communications depend on having a convincing position to 
communicate, my job necessarily involves me in the substance of par- 
ticular issues in the public eye. But I do not have a line responsibility 
either on the communications or on the substantive side. I serve pri- 
marily as an extra hand, if you will — as a source of white-haired advice 
and some experience, perhaps — whenever the President or the younger 
men with line responsibility seek my help. 

I shall be glad, of course, to answer any questions concerning any 
aspect of these hearings, but I believe that the most significant testi- 
mony I can give to this committee relates to a limited time frame — that 
is basically the period from February 6, 1973, the day Senator Ervin 
introduced his resolution creating this Select Committee, to March 21, 
1973. ]\Iarch 21 is tlie date when President Nixon, as he later announced 
to the Nation, learned of "serious charges" which caused him to begin 
"intensive new inquiries into this whole matter." This was the day 
when jNIr. Dean, at my urging, went into the President's office and, as 
he has testified, told the President "everything." 

Much of my testimony will involve my recollections about conversa- 
tions with the President and John Dean. The good faith recollections 
of one party to a conversation often differ from those of the other. The 
chairman himself addressed to this point early in these proceedings 
when he recalled Sir Edward Coke's advice that "one scratch of a pen" 
is often better than the memories of a multitude of witnesses. Even the 
•written word can be misunderstood — you may remember, Mr. Chair- 
man, Elihu Root's insistence that in good legal drafting "the words 
you use must not only be consistent with what you mean ; they must be 
inconsistent with any other meaning." The Chair reminded us — tran- 
script p. 802 — that when two men communicate with each other by 
word of mouth, there is a "two-fold hazard in that communication." 
First, the man who spoke might not have expressed himself clearly and 
may not have said exactly what was in his mind. 



O — 73 — bk. 5- 



1940 

Second, even if he did express himself clearly, the man who heard 
may have put a different interpretation on the words than did the man 
who spoke them. The chairman's reminder is wise and sound and I 
would recommend, if I may, with all respect, Mr. Chairman, that that 
sound principle should be known as "Ervin's law." 

In December — and there is a typo here; it should be 1972 — and 
January 1973, I was primarily involved with inaugural matters and 
can recall no direct meetings or consultations with regard to the 
Watergate or related matters until February 6. On that day I attended 
a meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office to discuss our legislative position 
with respect to the proposed resolution creating this select committee. 
Except for the discussion at this meeting, I knew of no other planning 
or preparation that had been going on with regard to these hearings. 
Within the White House, I was a critic of this lack of preparation. 

This may explain why I was called to the meetings in California 
on February 10 and 11. I had been home with intestinal flu for 2 days 
and had been planning to take the weekend off and had reservations 
for my wife and family at the Greenbrier for the long weekend of 
February 9 to 12, But late on the afternoon of February 9, Mr. Dean 
called me at home to say that we were both asked by Mr. Ehrlichman 
to meet with Mr. Haldeman and himself in San Clemente on February 
10 to discuss the forthcoming Senate hearings. I, therefore, took my 
family and baggage to the Far West instead of South. 

Mr. Dean and I met on Saturday, February 10, 1973, at San 
Clemente with Messrs. Haldeman and Ehrlichman in Mr. Ehrlich- 
man's office from 10 :30 or 11 in the morning until 3 or 4 in the after- 
noon. On Sunday, we went to Mr. Haldeman's cottage at La Costa. 

All four of us were present for the majority of the time. One or 
more of us would leave the group on occasion to make a telephone 
call or to perform some other function. Summarizing these meetings 
is difficult because they involved about 8 hours of conversation, with 
none of the participants adhering to any strict agenda. In addition, the 
many things that were said during these sessions were heard by any- 
where from two to four people — depending on who was absent at the 
moment — each person with a different background or degree of knowl- 
edge or point of view. It was a situation, if you will, where Ervin's 
law applied to the fourth power. With that prelude, let me now give 
you my best recollection of what transpired while I was present. 

At the outset Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman — and parentheti- 
cally, I sometimes find it hard to recall which was which — asked Mr. 
Dean and me what we had been doing to prepare for the hearings. 
The answer was nothing. The focus of these hearings, they said, would 
be the activities of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, and it 
would be the committee that would have the primary responsibility 
for the defense. Had we had any discussions or, as they put it, any 
input, from John Mitchell ? The answer was "No." Either Mr. Halde- 
man or Ehrlichman then said that in that case, Dick Moore ought to 
sit down with John Mitchell as soon as he could and fill him in on the 
things that we discuss here and get Mr. Mitchell actively interested — 
he is the only one who could give real leadership to the people at the 
committee. 

Either HaMeman or Ehrlichman then sugcrested that Mr. Dean 
be the Wliite House coordinator for the hearing, and that I hold 



1941 

myself available to advise him. I siio^gested that the White House have 
a writer-spokesman who could issue statements or go on television, if 
necessary, to reply quickly to testimony or commentary that was 
wrong or slanted. Mr. Dean, I believe, suggested that Pat Buchanan 
be this spokesman. 

The meeting then ^nrned to a discussion of our relationship with 
the minority members of the committee. It was pointed out that in 
an ordinary hearing there is an open relationship between the White 
House and the committee leadership of the same party, and the White 
House has a perfectly proper role in presenting its views to the mem- 
bers affiliated with its party on the particular committee. No one in 
the group had any firm view as to what was appropriate here, but 
the general feeling was that since this was in effect an investiga- 
tion of the administration, the normal relationship might not apply 
and we probably should maintain an arm's-length approach even 
to the Republican members. In any event, it was agreed that Wally 
Johnson, then of the White House Congressional Relations Staff, 
would be made available for whatever liaison with the committee 
might be appropriate. 

Early in the discussions, Mr. Ehrlichman made it clear that the 
President wanted our position in the hearings to be one of full co- 
operation, subject only to the doctrine of separation of powers. It 
was agreed it would be important to work out a statement on execu- 
tive privilege (the President had recently promised the press he would 
do this) , that would enable us to cooperate and supply the informa- 
tion that the committee wanted. It is my recollection that at this time 
the question whether Presidential advisers would be permitted to 
appear was still unresolved, although the consensus was that appear- 
ances should be permitted where the subject matter did not relate 
to their official duties for the President. 

Parenthetically, some of the matters that were discussed here clearly 
would not relate to official duties. 

There was, as I have said, no prepared sequence to our discussions, 
and I cannot recall all the other subjects we discussed. I do recall a 
discussion about putting out a White House statement in advance of 
the hearings setting forth all the known facts about the Watergate 
episode. It was also agreed that more manpower would be needed by 
the Committee To Re-Elect the President — possibly in the form of 
young lawyers and researchers to review each day's testimony and 
prepare rebuttals. This was among the items I agreed to discuss with 
Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Dean, of course, has testified about a discussion of money. His 
recollection differs from mine, and again illustrates the principle which 
I liave called Ervin's law. The brief mention of money made at this 
meeting may have had a very different significance to a person with 
Mr. Dean's knowledge of the circumstances than it had to a person with 
my lack of knowledge. My recollection on that subject is as follows: 
The subject came up, I believe, on the second day at the hotel. In the 
context of a discussion of the litigation in which the committee was 
then involved, John Dean, in a sort of by-the-way reference, said he 
had been told by the lawyers— and I think that was the way he put 
it, but I cannot be precise about his language — that they may be 
needing some more money, and did we have any ideas ? Someone said, 



1942 

isn't that something that John Mitchell might handle with his rich 
New York friends. It was suggested that since I would be meeting 
with Mr. Mitchell I should mention this when I saw him and I said 
I would. 

As I look back now^, of course, with the knowledge I subsequently 
began acquiring in the latter part of March, Mr. Dean's reference to 
a need for money might well have stimulated some further inquiries 
on my part at La Costa. But I did not have that knowledge on February 
11 — at that point I knew nothing about any prior payments to any 
defendants or their counsel — and no one else at the meeting went 
into any details, at least in my presence. Moreover, I had served for 
a year as special assistant to Mr. Mitchell at the Department of Justice, 
and I know him well. I was certain that he wasn't about to be pro- 
gramed into becoming a fundraiser by Mr. Haldeman and ^Nlr. 
Ehrlichman, and I anticipated that Mitchell's answer would be no, as 
it turned out to be. 

We discussed several other matters and the meeting ended, as I 
recall, with Ehrlichman asking me about my draft of the statement 
on executive privilege. He indicated that he would like a revised report 
to be prepared and cleared for review by the President on the flight 
east, the next day. At sometime during or just after the Sunday meet- 
ing, I called my secretary in Washington and dictated some changes in 
the statement to be cleared among those in Washington who were work- 
ing on the draft. 

Mr. Dean has testified that w^e left the meeting together and that he 
had a conversation with me at which time he cautioned me against 
conveying this fund raising request when I saw Mr. Mitchell. I have 
absolutely no recollection of any such conversation and I am convinced 
it never took place. 

I returned to my office in Washington on February 13, and tele- 
phoned Mr. Mitchell to inquire whether he had any immediate plans 
to be in Washington. He said he did not, and I said I needed 2 or 3 
hours with him to tell him about the meetings in California. He sug- 
gested that I come to New York and we could take as much time as 
we needed. On February 15, I took a morning shuttle to New York, 
went to Mr. Mitchell's office, visited briefly before lunch, and after 
lunch we had a discussion about the California meetings and the up- 
coming hearings. 

Knowing Mr. Mitchell as I do, I felt there were several points 
where he would resist being "programed" by the "Wliite House staff, 
as I mentioned earlier, and I elected to get those out of the way at the 
start. At the beginning of our discussion I said something like this : 
"Well, you will be glad to know that the group in San Clemente 
thinks you should be taking a more active interest in the Ervin hear- 
ings." 1 had a somewhat blunt reply, such as, thank you, and as you 
know, I am indeed interested and, I may be a star witness. I told 
him it was suggested that it would be most helpful if he could spend 
part of each week in his law firm's Washington office. He made a 
chilly reply that he would come to Washington whenever he felt it 
necessary. Then I said something to the effect that I didn't know what 
it was all about but that it had been suggested that the committee 
lawyers might be needing more money and that liis Wliite House 
friends had nominated him for the honor of being a fundraiser. I 
don't remember his exact words, but I believe he said something like 
"Tell them to get lost." 



1943 

Thereafter I began my report of the meetings. We had a wide- 
ranging discussion and a pleasant visit that lasted most of the after- 
noon. I left his office at about 4 or 5 o'clock and took the shuttle home. 
From mid-February to early March, I was not asked to participate 
in any followup to the La Costa-San Clemente discussions about pre- 
paring for these hearings, except for my continuing participation 
in the preparation of the statement on executive privilege. By the 
beginning of March, the Gray nomination hearings had become a 
major preoccupation for me and for Mr. Dean. During those hearings, 
Mr. Dean's role in the Watergate investigation became a subject of 
headline news almost daily. The Judiciary Committee's invitation to 
Mr. Dean to testify before it brought the question of executive privi- 
lege into critical focus and I should insert there that so also, cer- 
tainly did the President's statement, you had on March 12. 

A Presidential press conference was scheduled for March 15, and 
Mr. Dean and I prepared for the President's briefing book" a list 
of more than 20 possible questions on the subject. Although it was 
not the President's usual practice to hold face-to-face briefing sessions 
before a press conference, he chose to do so on this occasion. And so 
began a series of meetings about which Mr. Dean has testified and 
which marked the first occasion I had to discuss with the President 
any subject related to Watergate. 

The first meeting on March 14 was in progress when I was called 
to the President's office in the EOB. Messrs. Ziegler and Dean were 
already there. We went over the questions and answers with con- 
siderable discussion on each. The meeting recessed temporarily while 
the President kept another appointment and had lunch. It reconvened 
after lunch for several hours. 

Mr. Chairman, at no time during this meeting, or during the suc- 
ceeding meetings on March 15, 19, and 20, 1973— all of which were 
attended only by the President, Mr. Dean, and myself — did anyone 
say anything in my presence which related to or suggested the exist- 
ence of any coverup, or any knowledge or involvement by anyone in 
the White House, then or now, in the Watergate affair. 

Late on the afternoon of INIarch 15, after the President concluded 
his press conference, "Sir. Dean and I were called to the Oval Office. 
We had a relaxed and informal session in which we discussed the 
press conference and the President's view of the doctrine of separation 
of powers. 

The topic to which the President devoted most attention and em- 
phasis was the se])aration of powers. He made the point that the 
term "executive privilege" doesn't properly express the principle. He 
asked Mr. Dean and me to advise others who were dealing with the 
subject to use the term "separation of powers." He emphasized several 
times that the President has the constitutional responsibility to pre- 
serve the separation of powers, a responsibility he cannot disregard. 
The President made the point that he cannot command any Member 
of Congress to come to see him at the White House, but they usually 
come when invited, just as our people go up to the Hill when invited. 
He said our Cabinet people seem to be up there testifying voluntarily 
practically every day. But the point is, he said, that one branch can- 
not, as a matter'of right, command the other to appear; that, he said, 
would destroy the separation of powers. 



1944 

On March 19, 1 was called to meet with the President and Mr. Dean 
in the President's Executive Office Building office. The President 
reiterated his desire to get out a general statement in advance of the 
hearings. He asked us to be thinking about ways that this could be 
done. This would include or could include issuing a full statement 
or "White Paper" ; he was also interested in our thoughts about ways 
to present our story to the Senate in terms of possible depositions, 
affidavits, or possible conferences or meetings which would give the 
Senate all the information it wished but which would not cut across 
the separation of powers. He asked Dean and me to consider ways to 
do this. 

Now, late on March 19, 1973, or possibly on March 20 — ^before we 
met later that day with the President — Mr. Dean told me that Howard 
Hunt was demanding that a large sum of money be given to him before 
his sentencing on March 23, and that he wanted the money by Wednes- 
day, the 21st. If the payment were not made. Dean said, Hunt had 
threatened to say things that would be very serious for the White 
House. I replied that this was pure blackmail, and that Dean should 
turn it off and have nothing to do with it. I could not imagine, I said, 
that anything that Hunt could say would be as bad as entering into 
a blackmail arrangement. I don't recall Mr. Dean's exact words, but 
he expressed agreement. 

This revelation was the culmination of several other guarded com- 
ments Mr. Dean had made to me in the immediately preceding days. 
He had said that he had been present at two meetings attended by 
Messrs. Mitchell, Magruder, and Liddy before the bugging arrests, 
during which Liddy had proposed wild schemes that had been turned 
down — specifically espionage, electronics surveillance, and even kid- 
napping. He said that the Watergate location had not been mentioned, 
and that he had "turned off the wild schemes." I believed then and be- 
lieve today that Mr. Dean had no advance knowledge of the Watergate 
bugging and break-in. In addition, he said that if he ever had to testify 
before the grand jury, his testimony would conflict with Mr. Ma- 
gruder's, and that he had heard that if Magruder faced a perjury 
charge lie would take others with him. 

Mr. Dean had also mentioned to me in these davs in March that 
earlier activities of Messrs. Hunt and Liddy — not directly related to 
Watergate — could be seriously embarrassing to the administration if 
they ever came to lifjht. He had also implied to me that he knew of 
payments being made to the defendants for litigation expenses, and 
Hunt's explicit blackmail demand raised serious questions in my mind 
as to the purpose of these payments. 

This brings me to the afternoon of March 20, when Mr. Dean and I 
met with the President in the Oval Office. The meeting lasted about 
half an hour. The President again stated his hope that we could put 
out a full statement in advance of the hearings, and again he expressed 
his desire that we be forthcoming, as he put it. He made some compari- 
sons as to our attitude and the attitude of previous administrations, 
and he wanted us to make sure that we were the most forthcoming of 
all. 

As I sat throuqfh the meeting of March 20 with the President and 
Mr. Dean in the Oval Office, I came to the conclusion in my own mind 
that the President could not be aware of the things that Dean was 
worried about or had been hintine: at to me, let alone Howard Hunt's 



1945 

blackmail demand. Indeed, as the President talked about getting the 
Avhole stoiy out — as he had done repeatedly in the recent meetings — 
it seemed crystal clear to me that he knew of nothing that was incon- 
sistent with the previously stated conclusion that the White House was 
uninvolved in the Watergate affair, before or after the event. 

As we closed the door of the Oval Office and turned into the hall, 
I decided to raise the issue directly with Mr. Dean. I said that I had 
the feeling that the President had no knowledge of the things that 
were worrying Dean. I asked Dean w^hether he had ever told the Presi- 
dent about them. Dean replied that he had not, and I asked whether 
anyone else had. Dean said he didn't think so. I said, and I use quota- 
tion marks to indicate the substance, and I think these are almost my 
precise words— I said, "Then the President isn't being served, he is 
reaching a point wliere he is going to have to make critical decisions 
and he simply has to know ail the facts. I think you should go in and 
tell him what you know, you will feel better, it will be right for him. 
and it will be good for the country." 

I do not recall whether Dean told me he would take action or not, 
but I certainly had the impression that he was receptive. In any 
event, the question was resolved that very evening when I received 
a call at home sometime after dinner and it w^as Mr. Dean, who said 
that the President had just phoned him and that he had decided that 
this was the moment to speak up. He said tliat he told the President 
that things had been going on that the President should know about 
and it was important that Dean see him alone and tell him. Dean said 
that the President readily agreed and told Dean to come in the follow- 
ing morning. I congratulated Mr. Dean and wished him well. 

The next day, March 21, Mr. Dean told me that he had indeed 
met with the President at 10 o'clock and had talked with him for 2 
hours and had in his words, "Let it all out." I said, "Did you tell 
him about the Howard Hunt business r' Dean replied that he had told 
the President eveiTthing. I asked him if the President had been sur- 
prised and he said yes. I say he said yes in terms of his response; 
whether yes is the exact words, but it was an affirmative statement. 

Following this critical meeting on March 21, I had several subse- 
quent meetings and telephone conversations with Mr. Dean alone, as 
well as several meetings with the President which Mr. Dean did not 
attend. I do not dispute Mr. Dean's account of the meetings between 
us as to any substantive point, and I have no direct knowledge of what 
transpired" in Mr. Dean's subsequent meetings with the President. But 
nothing said in my meetings or convei-sations with Mr. Dean or my 
meetings with the President suggests in any way that before March 
21 the President had known — or that Mr. Dean believed he had 
known — of any involvement of 'lAHiite House persomiel in the bugging 
or the coverup. Indeed, Mr. Dean's own account that he and I agreed 
on the importance of persuading the President to make a prompt dis- 
closure of all that the President had just learned is hardly com- 
patible with a belief on Mr. Dean's part that the President himself 
had known the critical facts all along. In one of my talks with the 
President, the President said he had kept asking himself whether there 
had been any sign or clue which sliould have led him to discover the 
true facts earlier. I told him that I wished that I had been more 
skeptical and inquisitive so that I could have served the Presidency 
better. 



1946 

I have given you the most complete account I can as to my knowl- 
edge of the events being examined by this committee. It is my deep 
conviction — as one who has known the President over the years and 
has had many private conversations with him — ^that the critical facts 
about the Watergate did not reach the President until the events tliat 
began when John Dean met with him on March 21, 1973. 

That completes my opening statement, Mr. Chairman. 

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Moore follows:] 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH— RICHARD ANTHONY MOORE 
Special Counsel to the President of the United States 

Bom— January 23, 1914, Albany, New York, son of the late John D, and 
Julia Leader Moore. 

Educated — Public schools of New York City, Phillips Academy, Andover, 
Massachusetts ; Yale University, AB 1936; LLB, 1939 

1939h1942— Practice of law in New York. Left to enlist in United States 
Army, World War II, Served Private to Captain ; Legion of Merit. 

1946-1951 — Assistant General Counsel, American Broadcasting Compatny and 
later head of West Coast Operations. 

1951-1962— President, Times Mirror Broadcasting Company (KTTV) sub- 
sidiary of Times Mirror Company; Director (1956-1962) of parent company. 

1962-1970 — Engaged as principal in own communications enterprises in 
Southern California, including cable television. 

1970-1971 — Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States. 

1971 to date — Si>ecial Counsel to the President of the United States. 

Present and Past Community and Business Activity 

Director, California Portland Cement Company. 

Director (five terms), Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. 

Vice-Chairman and Director, National Cable Television Association. 

Director, Los Angeles Community Chest. 

Trustee, Richard M. Nixon Foundation. 

Director. Hollywood Bowl. 

Member. Yale University Council ; Yale De^'elopment Board ; President's 
Council of Loyola University (Los Angeles) ; Mayor's Committee on Human 
Rights. 

Panel Member, President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals. 

Pounder and Chairman, Television Bureafu of Advertising. 

President, Television Broadcasters of Soutliern California. 

Member, California Club; Metropolitan Club. Yale Clubs of New York and 
Southern California: Friendly Sons of St. Patrick (President, 1966); Delta 
Kappa Epsilon ; Skull and Bones ; Chicago Club ; Cypress Point Club. 

Married — 1948, Jane Swift: Children: Richard A. Jr.. Matthew, Joseph, Kate. 
Samuel. 

Residence — 757 Hillcrest Avenue, Pasadena, California and 4917 Rockwood 
Parkway, NW., Washington, D.C. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Terry Lenzner, assistant counsel, 
will ask questions for the majority. 

Mr. Lexzner. ]\Ir. Moore, I want to go back briefly to some dates 
prior to your testimony from your statement. 

First, I would like to ask you wliether you had a meetinof on Feb- 
ruary 10, 1972, with Mr. Kleindienst and Mr. Mitchell at Mr. Mitchell's 
office at the Committee To Re-Elect the President. Do you recall that 
meeting ? 

Mr. Moore. I don't recall. 

Mr. Lenzner. You don't recall meeting with Mr. Mitcliell or Mr. 
Kleindienst? 

Mr. MooRE. I don't recall any such meeting. It could well have 
happened. 



1947 

Mr. Lenzner. Approximately 12 :30 in the midday. 

Mr. Moore. That is 1972 ? 1972 ? 

Mr. Lenzxer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Moore. In Mr. Mitchell's office ? 

Mr. Lenzner. At 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, at the committee to 
reelect officers. 

Do you have any recollection of that? 

Mr. Moore. No, I don't. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you have a recollection of a meeting; on March 14, 
1972, at 8 :30 in the morning, also attended by Mr. Kleindienst and 
Mr. Mitchell? 

Mr, Moore. At what, I am sorry. 

Mr. Lenzner. That date was February 14, 1972. 

Mr. Moore. It would help if I knew when Mr. Kleindienst's nomina- 
tion was presented or when the issue arose 

Mr. Lenzner. Let me help you. Do you recall when Mr. Lackritz 
and I interviewed you on June 7 in Mr. INIiller's office ? 

Do you recall our discussing this with you in Mr. Miller's office on 
June 7? 

Mr. Moore. These two meetings ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes. 

Mr. Moore. I don't recall this conversation. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, the results of our notes indicate that you said 
those meetings were related to Mr. Kleindienst's confirmation hearings. 

Mr. Moore. They could well have. That is why I asked about the 
dates. 

Mr. Lenzner. Does that refresh your recollection as to what those 
meetings v>'ere about ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you recall the meetings now ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I don't have an independent recollection of the 
meeting, but if that is in the time frame of the Judiciary Committee 
hearings on Mr. Kleindienst's nomination, that is most likely what 
they were about. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you recall a meeting with Mr. Kleindienst, Mr. 
Mitchell, and Mr. Mardian on March 10, 1972, beginning at approxi- 
mately 10 :30 a.m., in the morning ? 

Mr. MooRE. Not independently but — no, sir. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you recall telling us on June 7 that you did recall 
that meeting and it referred to the upcoming Kleindienst confirmation 
hearings ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I don't recall saying it that firmly. Obviously, 
that is what could have been, and 

Mr. Lenzner. On June 7. when Mr. Lackritz and I interviewed 
-you, do you recall telling us that you did remember that meeting 
and it referred to the Kleindienst confirmation hearings? 

Mr. Moore. I don't think we are quite on the same frequency when 
you say remember the hearings. I remember that during the hearing 
or the pendency of the Kleindienst nomination, I met frequently with 
'Mr. Mitchell, sometimes Mr. Kleindienst, and others — Mr. Mardian, 
who was the Assistant Attorney General then — to discuss the hearing 
and the steps which should be taken to help support the confirmation 
of the nomination of Mr. Kleindienst. But I don't know the day or 



1948 

that I was at a meeting on March 10, 1972. I could check them, of 
course. But that is what these meetings would have been about. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well. Mr. Moore, let me ask you this : Those hearings 
involved the issue of ITT, is that correct ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Lenzner. And did you have any involvement in the question 
of ITT as it affected Mr. Kleindienst's confirmation ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, I was a White House liaison or adviser, helping 
the Department to support and present the case in favor of the con- 
firmation of the nomination of Mr. Kleindienst. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you have some specific duties in assisting in 
that effort? 

Mr. Moore. I was a Johnny One-Note who kept saying we should 
talk about the biggest victory in divestiture of the antitrust laws we 
had ever had instead of talking about all these details that kept coming 
out in the hall every day. I was advised of the main issue, yes, I 
remember vividly. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you have any recollection of receiving information 
concerning a White House investigation relating to the ITT matter? 

Mr. Moore. Eeceiving 

Mr. Lenzner. Information or receiving confirmation or receiving 
memorandum reflecting a White House investigation involving the 
ITT issue? 

Mr. MooRE. A White House memorandum ? 

Mr. Lenzner. A White House memorandum, or information con- 
cerning the White House involvement in the investigation ? 

Are you refreshing your recollection, sir, from a document your 
attorney has handed you ? 

Mr. Miller. Yes. As you know, we did not review this particular 
area before Mr. Moore came in to testify today because of shortness 
of time. I was merely letting him see a copy of the interview report 
to put into the frame of context the interviews that did occur in my 
office, possibly a month ago. 

Mr. Lenzner. Who prepared that for you, Mr. Miller ? 

Mr. Miller. I assume the committee did. 

Mr. Lenzner. Mr. Miller, could you tell us how you got a copy 
of that? 

Mr. Miller. Yes, it was handed to me in your presence in my office 
about quarter to 7 last night. 

Mr. Lenzner. That was prepared, I believe, by Mr. Parker of the 
White House, is that correct ? 

Mr. Miller. I don't believe so. It was handed to me 

Mr. Lenzner. By Mr. Thompson ? 

Mr. Miller. By Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Lenzner. Mr. Thompson, I believe that was a document pre- 
pared by Mr. Parker of the White House, who was present at that 
interview. 

Mr. Miller. I have my own notes. I don't have 

Mr. Thompson. What is the date of that ? 

Mr. Miller. June 8. 

Mr. Thompson. That is a document that was sent over by Mr. Doug 
Parker, who was also present at the interview. 

Mr. Lenzner. The interview of June 7. 



1949 

Mr. Thompson. That is right. 

That interview was not attended by anybody of the minority staff. 
Mr. Parker was over there. He submitted that to me. I submitted it to 
you and to Mr. Miller. 

Mr. Lenzner. Fine. 

Does that refresh your recollection of what White House investiga- 
tion was conducted involving the ITT matter ? 

Mr. MooBE. If I may read it, Mr. Lenzner. 

Mr. Lenzner. Surely. 

Mr. Moore. I am having trouble finding it in the memorandum. 

Mr. Lenzner. Let me first ask, Mr. Moore, you have no independent 
recollection now of a White House investigation involving ITT, is 
that correct ? I will then ask you a question which I hope will refresh 
your recollection. 

Mr. Moore. Well, it is so general, you mentioned a White House 
memorandum. 

Mr. Lenzner. No, no, I am speaking of any information you ob- 
tained involving a White House investigation with regard to ITT. Let 
me ask you this. Did you meet with Mr. Colson during that period 
of time ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you have discussions with Mr. Colson involving 
the ITT matter? 

Mr. MooRE. Was this — I am not being difficult but I just cannot 
recall, was this the investigation where a young man tried to prove 
that Mr. Jack Anderson's secretary was a friend of Miss Dita Beard, 
is th at the investigation ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. Moore. Yes, I do remember that. But this 

Mr. Lenzner. Was that an individual who was an employee of the 
Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice named John 
Martin ? 

Mr. MooRiE. It could have been, I do not remember his name. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you attend a meeting at which he was present 
when he was asked to conduct that investigation ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. Who else was present? 

Mr. Moore. I cannot recall exactly. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, do you recall telling us on June 7 that it was 
a meeting in Mr. Rohatyn's office when Mr. Colson, Mr. Mardian, Mr. 
Wally Johnson and yourself and Mr. John Martin came in and was 
requested to interview people about a relationship between Dita Beard 
and Jack Anderson's secretary? 

Mr. MooRE. That is correct. 
- Mr. Lenzner. You recall that? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, as my counsel says, I have been concentrating on 
other matters and this has been — yes, that sounds like it. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you recall telling Mr. Lackritz and myself that 
on June 7 in Mr. Miller's office. You do so 

Mr. Moore. I do not recall it independently but I will not quarrel 
with your report of it. 

Mr. Lenzner. OK. You will accept my version? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, no problem. 



1950 

Mr. Lenzner. But you do not now remember telling us? 

Mr. Moore. I do now. I remember this discussion, Mr. Lenzner, 
but I did not remember what five names I mentioned but I accept 
that — that is fine. 

Mr. Lenzner. OK. Do you recall whether you ever saw the results 
of that investigation in writing or heard them orally? 

Mr. Moore. I recall hearing a result, whether it was oral or writ- 
ing, I do not know. 

Mr. Lenzner. You do not recall whether it was in writing or who 
gave you the information orally, sir ? 

Mr. MooRE. No; I do not. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you recall, if it was orally, who was the person 
who spoke to you? 

Mr. Moore. No; I do not recall. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, do you recall that you received information 
as to how the Dita Beard memorandum was furnished to Mr. Colson 
as part of your participation in preparation for the ITT hearings? 

Mr. Moore. I think I might have said, but I do not remember, 
you know, the conversation, that I learned it in the newspapers, that 
the memorandum went from the FBI to Justice to the White House, 
someone in the White House, I should say, and then was given an 
independent examination by a commercial firm specializing in identi- 
fying typewriters, something like that ; I do not recall. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you have any information on that besides what 
you read in the newspaper, information received directly from either 
White House or Government employees? 

Mr. Moore. I simply do not remember. 

Mr. Lenzner. All right, Mr. Moore. If you do not recall that, let 
me ask you this. On March 21, 1972, you had a meeting with Mr. 
Mitchell, Mr. Mardian, Mr. Jack Caulfield, and Mr. Dean at 2 o'clock. 
Do you recall that meeting? 

Mr. MooRE. I recall your mentioning it but I do not recall the 
meeting, I do not recall the purpose or substance of the meeting. May 
I have the date again ? 

Mr. Lenzner. March 21, sir. 

Mr. MooRE. Of what year ? 

Mr. Lenzner, 1972. That was a meeting in Mr. MitchelFs office. 

Mr. Moore, t remember saying to you that I did not recall Mr. 
Caulfield being in the meeting but, being at any meeting with Mr. 
Caulfield is what I said, I think. I remember he had at that time, 
for a short period had, a little office adjoining Mr. Mitchell and I 
remember him perhaps coming in the room once or twice Avhen, to 
deliver a piece of paper but he was not at the meeting. He could have 
been but I do not recall. 

Mr. Lenzner. On June 7 you told us you were going to try to 
remember what was discussed on that date. Have you had an oppor- 
tunity to refresh your recollection and do you recall now what the 
substance of the meeting was ? 

Mr. MooRE. I have not, sorry. I did not follow through on that. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, you had a meeting with the President on June 80, 
1972, which, of course, was shortly after the break-in at the Democratic 
National Committee. You recall the subject discussed with President 
Nixon on June 30, 1972? Do you recall, first of all, meeting the Presi- 
dent on June 30, 1972 ? 



1951 

Mr. Moore. There is nothing about that date that helps me out. 
Maybe I can look at the log. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, I think we gave your counsel yesterday a copy 
of the logs sent over by the White House which does reflect, I believe, 
a meeting on June 30. 

Mr. Miller. I just handed the log to him, Mr. Lenzner. 

Mr. Lenzner. Does that document, which was furnished to us by 
the White House, refresh your recollection or is it conceivable that 
you did not meet with the President on that day ? 

Mr. Moore. I have always found these logs liable. The log notes 
that from 4 :22 p.m. to 4 :29 p.m., the President met with Mr. Moore. 
More than a year ago, I noticed that, you know, in your office earlier 
today and I could not recall what it was, whether it was some cere- 
monial matter or whether — I just do not know. I am sure I can find a 
way to refresh my recollection on that. 

Mr. Lenzner. I believe, I am not going to quarrel with you. 

Mr. MooRE. I would say this, though, the fact it happened the same 
month as the Watergate affair suggests nothing to me that refreshes 
my recollection. 

Mr. Lenzner. All right. Well, I believe that the log indicates on 
June 22 and June 27 that you met with the President and it involved 
"broadcast executives,'' so I take it that the June 30 meeting was just 
between you and the President. 

Mr. Moore. Yes : that is what the log reflects. 

Mr. Lenzner. But do you recall whether you discussed the events 
of June 17 and the Watergate break-in with the President on that 
day? 

Mr. MooRE. I am certain 

Mr. Lenzner. I am sorry, Mr. Moore, I did not hear your answer. 

Mr. MooRE. Just a moment now. pardon me, the date comes back, of 
course, this was the day that Mr. John Mitchell had met with the Presi- 
dent and thev had reached a conclusion that Mr. Mitchell was going 
to resign as chairman of the — or campaign director for reasons which 
you well know, Mr. Mitchell had made this ultimatum, and the Presi- 
dent called me in to ask me a little bit as to how the announcement 
should be made and Ave spoke briefly about that. I was there 7 minutes. 
Should the President make it, should Mr. Mitchell make it, that kind 
of thing. 

Mr. Lenzner. You said in your prepared statement, Mr. Moore, that 
your principal role was to assist the President in communicating the 
positions in the most convincing manner to the general public. Now, it 
was clear on Jmie 30, was it not, when Mr. Mitchell resigned from the 
campaign, the press might implv that it was related directly or indi- 
rectly to the events of June 17. Was that discussed? 
- Mr. MooRE. It really was not. 

Mr. Lenzner. Were you working on that issue for the President at 
that time? 

Mr. Moore. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. Were you concerned about that as an issue and how 
the Wliite House and the President were going to communicate, in 
your language, the positions in a convincing manner? 

Mr. MooRE. No. 



1952 

Mr. Lenzner. You met on August 8 with Mr. Mitchell at 11 a.m. in 
the morning and at 11 :20 in the morning, August 8, 1972. Do you recall 
what the subject of that meeting was since Mr. Mitchell had left the 
campaign at that time ? 

Mr. Moore. August 8, 1972? 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Moore. And what was the other date ? 

Mr. Lenzner. The same date and you met again at 11 :20. It indicates 
two meetings on that date. I am referring to Mr. Mitchell's diary, logs 
which he has testified were kept by his secretaries. 

Mr. MooRE. Well, no, I cannot. 

Mr. Lenzner. You have no recollection of that? You were on Air 
Force One, apparently on August 24, 1972, with the President. The 
White House log indicates a trip 9 :55 to 11 :20 to O'Hare Airport in 
Illinois, and 1 :10 flying on Air Force One to 2 :10 to Selfridge Air 
Force Base, Mich., and at 3 :35 to 5 :55 flight to San Diego, Calif., all on 
August 24. Did you discuss anything with the President on that oc- 
casion ? Did you talk with the President in Air Force One ? 

Mr. MooRE. I am trying to recall. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. You did not see him to talk to him at all on that day, 
is that what you are saying ? 

Mr. Moore. I did not talk to him at all. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, on September 8, 1972, you met with Mr. Mitchell, 
Mr. O'Brien, Mr. LaEue, Mr. Miller, I take it that is Cliff Miller, Mr. 
Dean, Mr. Mardian, and Mr. Powell Moore at 1 p.m. Do you recall 
what the subject of that discussion was ? 

Mr. Moore. August ? 

Mr. Miller. What was the date again ? 

Mr. Lenzner. I am sorry, September 8, 1972. 

Mr. Moore. I had better write these down because by the time the 
question finishes, I cannot remember the date. This date is September 8. 

Mr. Lenzner. You have no recollection of that meeting I take it ? 

Mr. MooRE. I have not answered the question. 

Mr. Lenzner. I am asking it. 

Mr. Moore. September — those present, particularly Cliff Miller and 
did you say Powell Moore was present also ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Moore. That undoubtedly was, that was the first, certainly one 
of a series of meetings over a period of 2 or 3 weeks in the middle of 
September in this campaign year of 1972, when, as I described, Mr. 
Stans and the finance committee to reelect, were getting a particularly 
strong series of barrage of criticisms every day on issues that were 
coming up quite regularly, the checks, the lawsuits, that report that 
came out of the staff of the Patman Committee, the question of why 
not disclose funds, pre-April 7 funds voluntarily, that kind of thing, 
and Mr. Stans, who is, neither he nor his finance committee had any 
informational or press office, and they felt they were not getting 
enough attention or help from the Committee for the Re-Election of 
the President, so it was decided, I think, or which John Mitchell and 
Mr. Stans requested asked me if I would join a little ad hoc committee 
to act as public relations advisers to Mr. Stans and the finance com- 
mittee on these issues which, of course, affected both committees. This 
was the campaign, an attack on our fund-raising practice was an 



1953 

attack on the other committee so I attended quite a number, I would 
say 6, 8, or 10 meetings over a particular period. Tlie public relations 
committee was Cliff Miller who was a professional in that field, Powell 
Moore who has a very fine record in that field in Government and my- 
self. That would have been it. 

Mr. Lenzner. And your recollection now is that the meetings, those 
meetings were concerning the subject matter that you just described, 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. Lenzxer. Now, on September 13, 1972, you met at 2 p.m., with 
Mr. Stans, Mr. Parkinson and Mr. O'Brien, Mr. LaRue, Mr. McPhee, 
Mr. Mardian, Mr. Miller, and Mr. Mitchell. Was there any discussions 
on that day about Mr. McPhee's relationships with Judge Richey, to 
your recollection ? 

Mr. MooRE. I recollect none and I doubt that there were any. 

Mr. Lexzxer. I am sorry I can't hear you. 

Mr. Moore. I recollect none. 

Mr. Lexzner. Is it possible that there were that you don't recall 
right now ? 

Mr. MooRE. I doubt that very much. 

Mr. Lexzxer. Had you heard that subject discussed at any time ? 

Mr. MooRE. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, that was 2 days before the indictment on Sep- 
tember 15, 1972. Was the impending indictment discussed in that 
meeting ? 

Mr. Moore. No. I don't know that we — well, no. 

Mr. Lexzxer. I think it is fair to say, and I want to know if you 
agree with this, when we did discuss some of these meetings that are 
reflected in Mr. Mitchell's diary on June 17 of this year you had a 
similar problem remembering what the subject matter of those discus- 
sions were, is that an accurate statement when we initially went over 
these meetings ? 

Mr. MooRE. Which meetings are you referring to ? 

Mr. Lexzxer. Well, the meetings I just asked you about. 

Mr. Moore. Well, I responded to quite a few. And I take it that the 
ones, the series, I mentioned there were a series of meetings, for 
example, dealing with Mr. Kleindienst's nomination and during this 
period I met with Mr. Kleindienst and Mr. Mitchell and others, that, 
of course, we were dealing with the subject of his nomination and con- 
firmation. I have outlined these series of problems that the finance 
committee and ffiven the dates and the makeup of the subcommittee, 
and I have told you that those meetings deal with those subjects. I 
think we could probably find a headline or a statement that came out 
everv day there was one of those meetings. 

• Mr. Lexzxer. By the way, were you also assisting in the prepara- 
tion of the Committee To Re-Elect the President press releases and 
statements in response to the news that was coming out of the 
newspapers ? 

Mr. Moore. Rarelv. 

Mr. Lexzxer. Were you consulted on the denials that were being 
issued by Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Magruder reflecting their 
noninvolvement with the break-in on June 17 ? 

Mr. Moore. No. 



1954 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, in your statement of today, you say that you 
were primarily involved with inaugural matters in December 1972 and 
January 1973, and can recall no direct meeting or consultations with 
regard to the Watergate or related matters until February 6. I take it 
that is February 6 of this year, is that my understanding ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, vrould you include as a related matter the in- 
formation that became public on the issue of the White House rela- 
tionship to Donald Segretti ? 

Mr. MooRE. Mr. Lenzner, if I could find the page. 

Mr. Lenzner. It is pace 4, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. Moore. You will note I corrected the years. I have made two 
other corrections which, in reading it, I failed to include in my 
reading. My reading copy has the words "in latter December," I meant 
to read that. 

Mr. Lenzner. In latter December. 

Mr. MooRE. In latter December, and then on the second line it says 
"recalled no particular meetings or consultations." 

Mr. Lenzner. With regard to Watergate or related matters ? 

Mr. Moore. Right. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you consider the Segretti matter a related 
matter ? 

Mr. Moore. Actually not. Although — at that time for the purpose of 
this meeting I am certainly willing to acknowledge that this hearing 
which is known as the Watergate hearing or the Ervin hearing em- 
braces matters that would involve the Segretti matter. But I was not 
being cute about words. I did recall in early December we did have 
discussions about Segretti and that is why I caught that error but 
failed to read it and if I may I would like to correct the record. 

Mr. Lenzner. Fine, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. MooRE. To the effect that I have written in my statement. 

Mr. Lenzner. Let me ask you this. Before December 1972 were you 
not deeply involved in the Segretti matter on behalf of the White 
House? 

Mr. MooRE. What I was involved in was a response to a news report 
that connected Dwi.q-ht Chapin to Mr. Secrretti in terms and in a 
frame of reference which we thought at the time were inaccurate. That 
was not, I would sav, being deeply involved in the Segretti matter. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, I did not mean vou personallv were involved 
in his activities, but were you involved in the White House's response 
to the information that was coming out about his activities ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. L*ENZNER. And in fact, were you not requested to conduct an 
investigation of the White House involvement and prepare a state- 
ment on that subject ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. And to that end, did you interview a variety of em- 
ployees of the White House ? 

Mr. MooRE. I interviewed two employees. 

Mr. Lenzner. And who was that ? 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan. 

Mr. Lenzner. Who asked you, by the way, to conduct that investi- 
gation or prepare that report ? 



1955 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you recall when he asked you to do that ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, I recall that I think on the weekend — it was the 
St. Patrick's Day weekend, I think — February 16, [he said February, 
he meant March] — late in the day, he called me and said he had just 
left the President, who still was insisting that everything that any- 
body knew should be gotten out and would I take a crack at an outline 
or a preliminary report on the Wliite House connection with 
Mr. Segretti so that we could see what it looked like. I think that that 
was probably dated March 22, if I am not mistaken. 

Mr. Lenzner. Of 1973. But did you not have discussions in October 
of 1972 concerning Segretti ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. \V1io were those discussions with ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, the first discussions were with Mr. Ehrlichman, 
Haldeman, Ziegler, and I think Chapin, and myself. 

Mr. Lenzner. How about Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. MooRE. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, on June 7, and I do not want to quarrel with 
your memory, Mr. Moore, but on June 7, you told Mr. Lackritz and 
myself that the meeting was attended by John Ehrlichman, Ziegler, 
Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean and yourself; you issued a brief statement 
and you did not recall specifically that Mr. Chapin attended the meet- 
ing. But later in the interview you said he probably was there since he 
had the most information. 

Does that refresh your recollection ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, it does. I think Chapin probably was there. I was 
wrong about Dean. It turns out he was getting married at that moment, 
but he was not there. 

Mr. Lenzner. Mr. Dean was not there ? 

Mr. MooRE. No. He was invited but he was being married. 

Mr. Lenzner. I take it you have had your memory refreshed by 
Mr. Dean's appearance before this committee? Is that how you know 
that now? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, when he talked about his honeymoon, I suddenly 
remembered that was the weekend when this Washington Post story 
was about to break. 

Mr. Lenzner. After that, did you receive information from 
Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan involving their relationships with 
Mr. Segretti? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. And did you incorporate some of that information 
into what is now exhibit 34-44 that has been submitted to this com- 
mittee by Mr. Dean? Is that your memorandum? 

Mr. MooRE. This was a draft that I prepared as a starting point for 
a report that Mr. Dean might make, or it could be — it was in response 
to the request I just told you about from Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now. let me ask you this. Did you ever discuss the 
events of June 17 with the President prior to the time that you had 
learned of Mr. Dean's knowledge concerning those in March of 1973? 

Mr. MooRE. The — no. 

I had better have that question read back. 



1956 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, did you ever discuss with President Nixon the 
event of June 17 prior to, say, January 1 of 1973 ? 

Mr. Moore. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, turning to the La Costa meeting in February of 
1973, do you recall whether Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman — first 
of all, did you take any notes at that meeting ? 

Mr. Moore. No, I did not. 

Mr. Lenzner. Was that memorandum ever written up by anybody 
on that meeting reflecting the agenda or the items discussed ? 

Mr. MooRE. The only memorandums that I am aware of were those 
Mr. Dean presented, none of which I ever saw before until he showed 
them on television. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did either Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman take . 
notes, or did they tape that conversation to your knowledge? 

Mr. Moore. I do not know either. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman furnish any 
facts of their own when you were discussing the Watergate matter and 
how they would respond to the Ervin committee ? 

Mr. Moore. Facts ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Facts of their own personal knowledge concerning 
the breaking and entering on June 17 ? 

Mr. Moore. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you recall whether there was any discussion of 
the Watergate criminal case at the La Costa meeting ? 

Mr. MooRE. I do not. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you recall whether there was any discussion of the 
Democratic National Committee civil suit at that meeting? 

Mr. MooRE. I have to answer it this way. I do not recall the suits by 
names. It is possible. I do not recall specifically. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, did you recall any discussion of the suit brought 
by Common Cause out at that meeting ? 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Lenzner, Mr. Dean was talking about the cases and 
I do not have a firm recollection, but that Common Cause suit was — if 
this was mentioned, I do not have a firm recollection of it, sir. 

Mr. Lenzner. You say the Common Cause suit was mentioned? 

Mr. Moore. I do not have a firm recollection of it. 

Mr. Lenzner. May I recall we asked you this question. ]Mr. Thomp- 
son and INIr. Moore — Mr. Thompson may not recall, but Mr. Moore 
was there at 1 o'clock today in Mr. Thompson's office. I asked you if 
there was any discussion in La Costa of the Democratic National Com- 
mittee lawsuit or the Common Cause lawsuit, and your answer was 
not to your recollection. You say now there may have been ? 

Mr. ^looRE. I will let the answer stand, whatever it was. 

Mr. Lenzner. I am sorry, sir. What I am asking you now is, do you 
recall at approximately 1 o'clock today saying there was no discussion 
of the Common Cause suit or the Democratic National Committee suit 
or for that matter, the Watergate criminal trial ? 

Mr. Moore. I think we have a question of your speaking to me and 
my listening and not understanding each other. The suits were dis- 
cussed. I think I said this afternoon I found it difficult to specify which 
suit had been identified in that conversation by name. I think I was 
asked in that frame of reference about the pending lawsuits. There was 
a general discussion of the, or report, really, of various lawsuits and it 



1957 

was not part of my field of interest, and I do not — I think you said this 
afternoon that it sounds like you were not paying too much attention 
and you were right. 

Mr. Lenzner. So you were not paying much attention to that 
discussion ? 

Mr. Moore. That is right. 

Mr. Lenzxer. Do you recall who first suggested that you ask Mr. 
Mitchell to raise funds? 

Mr. Moore. Again, I think, to talk about today, I think either 
Ehrlichman or Haldeman. 

Mr. Lenzner. I think today when I asked you that at 1 o'clock, you 
said, can I see my statement ? 

Mr. MooRB. No, I didn't. 

Mr. Lenzner. You didn't ask to see your statement at that point ? 

Mr. Moore. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. You don't remember asking Mr, Miller, your lawyer 
there 

Mr. Moore. I won't argue about whether I asked to see my statement 
or not. 

I believe that Mr. Miller showed it to me and you objected. I didn't 
ask for it. 

Mr. Lenzner. No ; I asked you if you had any recollection before 
you looked at your statement of whether you remembered who sug- 
gested getting Mr. Mitchell to raise the funds. At that point, you said 
you didn't recall whether it was Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Moore. That is right. As I said, that is not an infrequent situa- 
tion to be placed in, because trying to remember which it was is often 
a problem. 

Mr. Lenzner. I understand. 

Now, at page 7 of your statement, you made it clear that Mr. Ehrlich- 
man made it clear that the President wanted the White House position 
to be one of full cooperation subject only to the doctrine of separation 
of powers. Did you ever talk to the President to have him indicate to 
you that he wanted Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Dean to 
come up before. Senator Ervin's committee and testify ? 

Mr. MooRE. This is up until the present date ? 

Mr. Lenzner. At any time. 

Mr. Moore. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you ever become aware of the fact that 

Mr. MooRE. Could I have that question read back ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you ever hear from President Nixon that he 
wanted Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Dean to come up to 
Senator Ervin's committee and testify before his committee ? 

Mr. Moore. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you ever become aware of whether that was in 
fact the President's position ? Or did it become the President's posi- 
tion at any time, to your knowledge — before, I might say, Mr. Ehrlich- 
m.an, ]Mr. "Haldeman, and Mr. Dean left the AVhite House? 

Mr. ]\Ioore. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, have you had an opportunity to review the log 
that was submitted of Mr. Dean's meetings and calls with the Presi- 
dent that was prepared by the White House ? 

Mr. Moore. I have not reviewed it ? 



1958 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, let me read you from the entry of March 17, 
which says, in part : 

The President wanted Haldeman — 

This allegedly reflects a meeting between the President and Mr. 
Dean. 

The President wanted Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean to talk to the 
committee and Dean resisted. 

Now, to your knowledge, is that an accurate statement from conver- 
sations you have had with the President ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, that conversation was not in my presence. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, I am asking you now 

Mr. Moore. I can't say whether it is accurate or not. 

Mr. Lenzner. You can't say further whether he did or did not want 
at any time those three individuals to come up before Senator Ervin's 
committee ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, again, are you speaking of a formal appearance as 
a witness or to appear before the committee informally and answer 
any questions 

Mr. Lenzner. The logs does not make a distinction on that, Mr. 
Moore, but I think it might indicate testimony before this committee, 
which was the subject of the question of executive privilege; was it 
not? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I was not in the discussion or the negotiations 
with the committee, but it was my understanding, from perhaps the 
press or general, that the President wanted his people to cooperate 
in every way they could except under a command appearance, as I dis- 
cussed in my testimony. So that could have been included an appear- 
ance other than a formal appearance before a hearing. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, you also said in your statement that you have 
no recollection of the conversation which Mr. Dean testified about 
concerning the time when you left the meeting with him, which he al- 
leges you left out at La Costa ? 

Mr. MooRE. That is right. 

Mr. Lenzner. Are you absolutely sure, beyond any doubt, now, that 
you did not leave that meeting with Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Moore. No ; I am not sure that I did or I didn't. 

Mr. Lenzner. Are you absolutely sure beyond any doubt that you 
did not have that conversation with Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. MooRE. A. I don't think I had any conversation ; B. I certainly 
didn't have the conversation he described. 

If we walked out together, and I don't know if we did, and he said, 
it has stopped raining, maybe we had a conversation. We did not have 
the conversation he described. 

Mr. Lenzner. As you said yourself, Mr. Moore, you did not realize 
the significance of the request to Mr. Mitchell to raise funds. 

Mr. Moore. That is right. 

Mr. Lenzner. So is it possible that you also did not recognize the 
significance of what Mr. Dean was trying to say to you after that 
meeting ? 

Mr. Moore. Ke said, if he said anything, if there was a conversation, 
and if there was, I certainly did not get anything remotely resembling 
the meaning that seems to be conveyed in the words he used in his 



1959 

testimony. If it happened, which I don't think, the conversation, as I 
say, did not take place. But if there were remarks passed as we left, 
there is no resemblance to that. 

Mr. Lenznee. And there is no question in your mind that that con- 
versation didn't take place. Is that correct ? 

Mr. MooRE. Absolutely. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, I think you stated on page 13, that at no time 
during meetings of March 14, 15, 19, and 20 with the President, 
Mr. Dean, and yourself, did anybody say anything involving Water- 
gate involvement or coverup. You watched Mr. Dean's testimony, 
did you not ? 

Mr. ISIooRE. Not all of it. 

Mr. Lenzner. Are you aware of that fact that Mr. Dean did not 
testify that any discussions were held at those meetings concern- 
ing the matters that you have outlined here? This does not, in any 
way, conflict in any shape or form with what Mr. Dean testified to. 

'Are you aware of that ? 

Mr. Moore. I don't think I am aware of that. I think he twice testi- 
fied that he said some of these things at a meeting with the President at 
which I was present. 

Mr. Lenzner. Not on any dates of March 14, 15, 19 or 20? 

Mr. Moore. No, that is true. He said twice, I believe, that he said 
it in the presence of the President and me. But one of the times, he 
said, I can't place the date, with good reason. He can't place the date 
because it didn't happen. 

Mr. Lenzner. I am not going to review the testimony of each of 
those occasions. Mr. Dean's testimony will stand for itself. 

By the way, you are aware now, are you not, that they discussed, 
]Mr. Dean and President Nixon discussed possible involvement of a 
variety of individuals on ]March 13 in the President's office ? 

Are you aw^are of that ? 

Mr. MooRE. You mean am I aware of Dean testifying to that ? 

Mr. Lenzner. No, I am asking you if you are aware of the fact that 
the White House itself has admitted that there was a discussion be- 
tween Mr. Dean and the President about whether Mr. Mitchell and 
Mr. Colson knew of Watergate. Mr. Strachan was involved in the 
discussion, and there was a question whether Colson or Haldeman 
knew Segretti. 

Are you aware of that discussion as admitted by the White House ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, when you say the discussion, am I aware of that 
report ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Moore. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. You are not ? 

Mr. Moore. No, I am not. 

Was that published in the New York Times? I try to read the New 
York Times. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, the papers have been publishing a lot of things. 
I can't keep up with them myself, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, you also testified, Mr. Moore, that Mr. Dean told 
you that Howard Hunt was, I think in your words, trying to black- 
mail people for money. Now, did you ask Mr. Dean on that occasion 



1960 

what was behind that? Did you try to get details of what that in- 
volved ? 

Mr. Moore. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. This is the first time you had heard about blackmail, 
was it not, by Mr. Hunt ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. Had you heard previous to that meeting that Mr. 
Hunt, Mr. Liddy, or Mr. Dean had been involved in earlier activities 
that could be seriously embarrassing to the administration? 

Mr. Moore, Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. When was that for the first time ? 

Mr. Moore. I can't quite place it. It was in this growing or accelerat- 
ing period in mid-March, as Mr. Dean was coming under more and 
more daily pressure, where he talked to me a bit more than he had 
been doing. At one point, he said what I testified to about these 
activities. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, what activities was he talking about ? 

Mr. MooRE. I don't know. 

Mr. Lenzner. You never asked him what specific activities might 
be embarrassing to the administration ? 

Mr. MooRE. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. When did you first learn of the break-in of Dr. Ells- 
berg's psychiatrist ? 

Mr. Moore. I can't give you that date. I don't know the exact date. 

Mr. Lenzner. Was it sometime in March of 1973 ? 

Mr. Moore. No. It would have been later than that. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, you don't have any recollection of when that 
date was? That was rather significant information, was it not? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. There is an awful lot of significant information 
coming out in these days, and as to fixing the date — I can do a little 
checking on that and see if I can find anything that would remind 
me of the date. 

Mr. Lenzner, Did Mr. Dean tell you who was involved in that 
break-in whenever you heard about it ? 

Mr. MooRE. I don't recall that he did. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, at one point, he did, didn't he ? Didn't you once 
review with him a list of people who might be indicted who were 
employed at the White House. 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. "When was that? 

Mr. Moore. I believe it was either April 13 or April 14, 1973. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did he indicate to you that Mr. Ehrlichman might be 
indicted ? 

Mr, MooRE. Yes. 

Mr, Lenzner, And did he indicate why ? 

Mr, Moore, He said he might have trouble over that $350,000, 

Mr, Lenzner, That was Mr. Haldeman, Mr, Moore ? 

Mr, Moore, You said Mr. Haldeman, 

Mr. Lenzner. No, Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Moore, I asked, as I recited to you earlier today, when I saw the 
list, I pointed to Ehrlichman and I said, what has he got to do with 
Watergate ? You know, what is this ? 

He said, his problem may be with Ellsberg, 



1961 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, did he say anything else ? 

Mr. Moore. I think I told you that 1 cannot recall whether at that 
time, having now learned about the break-in and having heard about 
it, whether Ellsberg was synonymous with the break-in or whether 
I would now attach that to it. I have been puzzled about it and I will 
acknowledge that I don't recall whether — Mr. Dean was often cryptic 
and I don't remember that he said anything more than Ehrlichman's 
trouble may be Ellsberg. 

Mr. Lexzner. The trial of thait case was on that time. Did you ask 
him what Ehrlichman's relationship to Ellsberg was? He surely was 
not on trial with him. What was the relationship ? 

Mr. Moore. I do not know. As I say, it is possible that he mentioned 
it but I cannot pin that down and this would have been April 14. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, did you ask him any questions on that subject 
of Ehrlichman's relationship to Ellsberg? 

Mr. MooRE. No, no, I was — no. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you tell anybody about that matter ? Did you tell 
the President about it, the possibility of Mr. Ehrlichman's involve- 
ment with Ellsberg, which was rather vague in your mind? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you tell the President ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. A^Hien did you tell the President ? 

Mr. MooRE. On August 19 — pardon, April 19. 

Mr. Lenzner. About 5 days after you learned of it, is that correct ? 

Mr. Moore. I think it was that soon, yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. What did you tell tlie President and who else was 
present ? 

Mr. MooRE. I was the only one with the President, and it was 2 days 
after his April 17 statement and we had a discussion about it, we had 
a conversation and that is what it was. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, do you recall what specifically you said about 
Mr. Ehrlichman's involvement with the Ellsberg case? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. Well, you say specifically. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, to the best of your recollection, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. MooRE. I am trying to recall and I want to be careful about the 
circumstances. I told him tliat Mr. Dean had shown me this list, and I 
recalled the names from memory, I did not cover them all, I mentioned 
the names that I remembered, and I simply said that I did not under- 
stand it or I did not understand how realistic it was. In discussing the 
names I said Dean had told me that apparently in his opinion, Mr. 
Ehrlichman's problem might be involved with the Ellsberg case. 
Whether by then I knew about the Ellsberg break-in, I do not know. I 
do not think I said break-in. I think I said Ellsberg or the Ellsberg 
case. 

Mr. Lenzner. "What was the President's reaction to that ? Wliat did 
he say to you at that time ? 

Mr. Moore. He said that, of course, investigation of Ellsberg had 
had to be done because Mr. Hoover could not be counted on doing it 
because Mr. Hoover was a close friend of Mr. Ellsberg's father — 
father-in-law. 

Mr. Lenzner. Father-in-law, yes, sir. Go ahead, what else did he 
say? 



1962 

Mr. Moore- That is all he said. 

Mr. Lenzjter. Well, what relationship did that have with Mr. Ehr- 
lichman's involvement with Mr. Ellsberg? Did he tell you that Mr. 
Ehrlichmsin had an investigation conducted by this so-called Plumb- 
ers group because Mr. Hoover could not be relied upon himself? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I am not — I was not a student of the Ellsberg case 
and I do not remember the dates or the procedures. The question was 
that, the point was that, the White House had set up a security opera- 
tion to investigate Mr. Ellsberg's activities in leaking top-secret docu- 
ments and j>ossibly giving them to a foreign embassy of the other 
great superpower, and that the President said in view of the fact that 
Mr. Hoover would not undertake this investigation, the White House 
undertook it, and he did not — I think that was about all he said. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did he say that he knew that there had been a break- 
in of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist ? 

Mr. MooRE. No, he did not. 

Mr. Lenzner. Was it your impression that he did know? 

Mr. MooRE. I have long since learned not to try to draw impres- 
sions from the President in that fashion. I did not say anything about 
it. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, are you aware of the fact that during Mr. 
Richardson's confirmation hearings on May 22, in response to a ques- 
tion from Senator Byrd, Mr. Ricliardson said the President and he 
had spoken on Sunday, April 25, and the President told him he had 
found out about the break-in on April 25. Were you aware of that 
testimony ? 

Mr. Moore. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. I have no more questions at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock 
tomorrow. 

[Wliereupon at 4:55 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 
10 a.m., Friday, July 13, 1973.] 



FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washington^ D.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in 
room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. 
(chairman) , presiding. 

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and Weicker. 

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred 
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief 
counsel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Teri-y F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels ; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; John Walz, 
publications clerk. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Moore, you have restricted your prepared state- 
ment to the events betw^een the resolution introduced by the chairman 
of this committee for this committee on February 6, 1972, until 
March 21 of this year, and w^hile you have been special counsel to the 
President since April 1971 and I am sure you have had many conver- 
sations, many meetings that may want to be explored during your 
testimony, I plan to stick pretty much to the confines of your state- 
ment and the matters contained therein. 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD A. MOORE— Resumed 

Mr. Moore. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. First of all, I would like to ask you about the San 
Clemente meeting at La Costa. As I understand, you went to this 
"meeting pursuant to a request by Mr. Dean, is that correct ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir, relaying a request apparently from Mr. Ehr- 
lichman. 

Mr. Thompson. And you went to San Clemente and arrived there on 
what date ? 

Mr. Moore. Around midnight of February 9, Friday night. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you have a meeting the next day ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

(1963) 



1964 

Mr. Thompson. Who attended that meeting ? 

Mr. IMooRE. Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean and myself. 

Mr. Thompson. I know you set this out in your statement but I 
want to explore your memory a little bit with regard to that. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Give us, first of all, the tenor of the discussions: 
what was the general subject matter; what was your understanding 
of what you were going to talk about and what did you in fact talk 
about ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, the general subject matter was the time hn' 
surely come to start preparing and planning and, if you will, braii 
storming the question of how we were going to approach and cooperatt 
with and prepare for the forthcoming hearings of the Select Com 
mittee which then were, we thought, more imminent than they turned 
out to be. I remember they were postponed but at that time apparently 
little had been done and it was time to sit down and talk as you would 
to prepare for any important case hearing and that was the purpose. 

Mr. Thompson. Why were you included in this meeting? 

Mr. Moore, This is a kind of assignment where, what we had here 
was — first of all, I had been in, consulted in, other hearings, I — my 
role is as an adviser on issues exactly like this. For instance, the whole 
issue of television, should we object, if you will, to this hearing being 
carried on television? Of course, we did not. The whole matter of pre- 
paring so that we could be equipped so that when things were said 
by witnesses or by commentators that we would be staffed up and be 
available to do the research and be ready to reply the same day so 
in the evening when those millions of Americans watch the news shows 
they could hear our side of the story. That is something we felt — I 
went on at length about this — I felt that we had failed to do in the 
hearings on the nomination of Mr. Kleindienst. This is the kind of 
thing where I think that they would expect me to contribute, and that 
was my area, purely, if you will, public relations, communications, 
that aspect of it. 

Mr. Thompson. Besides the media aspect, did you have any discus- 
sion with regard to the problems that, as you considered them, this 
committee was creating for you. for the Committee To Re-Elect, and 
these sorts of things; was the Committee To Re-Elect discussed? Of 
course, I assume you had nothing to do with the committee. 

Mr. Moore. Yes, the Committee To Re-Elect was discussed. There 
was a question in our mind, for instance as to how partisan this hear- 
ing might turn out to be. We felt that it might be, we felt, some of us, 
that the previous one. the so-called ITT hearing, had taken on at least 
on the part of some members of that distinguished committee, had a 
certain partisan flavor and certainly partisanship by some of the 
witnesses and some of the commentators, which we didn't know. We 
felt if it were going to take that turn we should be prepared to call 
the attention of the partisan approach to the American public. 

I think I can say from my standpoint those concerns were ill- 
founded and T don't know anybody who. that I know who, feels differ- 
ently about it but that was should we. for instance, at that point — -and 
this was discussed, emphasize the fart thnt our nnipTidment. which had 
suggested that as in the case or the Senate Ethics Committee, the 
membership be ecjual on this committee since you are really getting 



1965 

into ethics of campaign. Should we make something of that ? Nothing 
was made as you know, all these things were discussed, very little 
decided. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you discuss the relationship which the White 
House should have to the committee ? 

Mr. Moore, Yes, sir; in a fairly brief way because none of us had 
a real feel for that. In some situations with a bill or perhaps a nomina- 
tion of an officer, I think that there is quite an open and direct contact 
between the congressional staff of the White House and the minority, 
bringing to them facts and points which we would like to have repre- 
sented in the discussions, and we felt somehow we had better wait 
and see in this because there was, there was no question that Water- 
gate was not a subject of which the Democrats are going to be investi- 
gating about. This was going to be an investigation on tne Kepublican 
side and we felt that since we were, in effect, the object of the investi- 
gation, we perhaps maintain an arm's length arrangement until we 
could see whether it was appropriate and whether we were invited 
to have the kind of customary relationship and all that was done was 
that if, as I remember, was that if there were to be any liaison young 
Mr. Wally Johnson on the congressional staff would be available, and 
I heard the testimony that he called Senator Baker to get some guid- 
ance on this, and I never did know what came of that nor did I ever 
know that he called him until I heard it here. 

Mr. Thompson. Prior to this meeting on Februaiy 10 — I believe 
you met for 2 days ? 

Mr. MooRE. Two days. 

Mr. Thompson. February 10 and February 11. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe the February 11 meeting was at Mr. 
Haldeman's cottage, is that correct? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you recall what matters you discussed on the 
10th and what matters you discussed on the 11th or was there general 
overlap ? Was there an agenda ? 

Mr. MooRE. No, there was no agenda. This meeting apparently was 
decided upon late Friday, as I was told by Mr. Dean on the phone, I 
think. That Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman found they would 
have some free time over the weekend and would it be possible to get 
a night plane and be there in the moniing so we could take advantage 
of this. It was a loose meeting with no agenda and a wide ranking; 
I think a brain-storming discussion would be the best description. I 
can separate some of the convei-sations by day but not all. The dis- 
cussions of the role of the Committee came in very early. In fact, there 
were among one of the first things because the point was made that the 
•vehicle that could respond and — to whatever issues, charges, or criti- 
cisms came up that needed a response — should be the committee who 
were, in effect, the primary target of the investigation. That is why 
that happened early. I do recall quite vividly, but — that late at the 
end, I think, of the second day, the question of executive privilege came 
up for a final review, and I'^think I had a separate session with Mr. 
Ehrlichman on that where he was going to be flying back with the 
President the next day, and he wanted to get the latest rewrite and, in 
fact, I telephoned back Sunday evening to dictate some corrections 



1966 

which were then cleared with the people who worked on the draft 
and sent back to Mr. Ehrlichman the next morning, so that I can 
place. 

But that money discussion we referred to, I just simply seem to recall 
that that took place sometime in the middle of the second day. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. 

Tell us what you remember about the discussions for the need to 
raise money. 

Mr. Moore. The question came up, as I recall, when Mr. Dean was 
discussing the things over the committee involving the lawsuits and 
how they were going. Now, there were several lawsuits, there was the 
Common Cause suit, there was the O'Brien suit, original suit against 
the committee, there was the amendment to that that added additional 
defendants. That suit also included not only the committee itself but, 
I guess all the Watergate defendants and also officers of the committee. 

There was a countersuit for abuse of process filed by the committee 
and, I think, by some individuals, although I am not certain of that. 

Mr. Thompson. Were all these suits discussed by them or did you 
just know 

Mr. Moore. No, as I think I said to ISIr. Lenzner, I know the name 
of the suits. We were discussing the suits. At what point a name of a 
suit was attached — it was a general discussion that they were going 
forward. I think, on reflection, that there was some talk or suggestion 
of the Common Cause suit, and I, yesterday, was uncertain whether 
it was mentioned by name. It must have been, because there was 
some discussion of settlement about it. 

In any event, this was a discussion which, in which Mr. Dean was 
relaying information he had gotten from the committee — I assumed, 
and I expect he probably said^ from Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Parkinson. 
Somewhere in that discuss'on, he said, by the way, they — or the 
lawyers — and I cannot think of the precise words; I rarely try to 
say the precise words, because I happen to believe most people cannot 
remember them except in exceptional circumstances— tell me there is 
going to be a need for some more money. And either Mr. Ehrlichman 
or Mr. Haldeman said, oh, did we have any ideas about it; is that not 
something that John Mitchell ought to handle ? 

Mr. Thompson. Wlio said that ? 

Mr. MooRE. I do not remember ; either Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Halde- 
man. It may have been one of those cases where one joined in the 
comment with an affirmative. That was quickly, yes, that is a good 
idea, and it is a remark that — I think this was by Ehrlichman— it 
sounds like him — ^a facetious remark like, John Mitchell has rich 
friends up in New York, why does he not worry about this, or some- 
thing to that effect. 

That was the total effect and, Dick, you are going to be talking 
to him, this will be coming up, maybe you can talk to him or get into it. 
Mr. Thompson. You mentioned 2 da}^s. At what point in those 
discussions did this arise? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I think it would have been in the middle of the 
afternoon session. 

Mr. Thompson. ^^Tiich afternoon session? 
Mr. Moore. Pardon me, on Sunday. 
Mr. Thompson, The second day? 



1967 

Mr. Moore. Which would have been February 11, the second day, 
at La Costa. 

By the way, to save confusion, Mr. Dean did testify that the second 
half of the Saturday meeting took place at La Costa. T am certain 
he is wrong about that. The first day's meeting took place entirely at 
San Clemente, so the La Costa meeting was purely a Sunday meeting, 
the San Clemente meeting was purel}^ a Saturday meeting. And it was, 
and I must say if this matter was important — this money matter — 
which I have been invited in just in time to switch from going to the 
railroad station, to the airport the night before, Mr. Dean testified, 
having no previous knowledge of these things, it strikes me that if 
this matter were important, it probably would have come up sooner 
and not kind of as a by-the-way throw-in in an afternoon discussion 
of a fairly unrelated matter, those lawsuits. That is the way I remem- 
ber it. 

Mr. Thompson. In retrospect, do you still feel like it was a by-the- 
way throw-in — an unimportant matter? 
Mr. MooRE. No. 

Mr. Thompson. Are you saying that is the way you took it at the 
time ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. What I took it as at the time primarily, sir, was 
one of those little things that I liave seen before of passing the buck 
with a request for money. First of all, in my experience, nobody enjoys 
raising money. You have to have a finance chairman. That is always 
true. 

I know this thing of John Mitchell, who generally is independent, 
and particularly independent of these two gentlemen in many things, 
that he would not relish the thought that or respond affirmatively to 
the idea that they would like to have him raise money. It was not a 
matter of for what or for whom or why, and no background on that. 
It was, I am not going to get into any argument as to whether John 
Mitchell should raise money, because I know he will not. 

I said, I will tell him, and I told him as I described yesterday, and 
I got a snort and a, tell them to get lost, which is exactly as I have 
related it and that was as I thought. 

Mr. Thompson. Before these meetings of February 10 or Feb- 
ruary 11, did you have any knowledge concerning who was responsible 
for the Watergate break-in, whether it was connected with either the 
White House or the Committee To Ee-Elect, except Mr. Liddy or 
Mr.McCord? 

Mr. Moore. Except 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Liddy and Mr. McCord. 
Mr. MooRE. Liddy and McCord. 

Mr. Thompson, at that point and for quite a period, for some days 
'thereafter — certainly at that point — I believed implicitly and totally 
in the President's statement of August 29 that no one in the White 
House at that time had any knowledge or participation in the Water- 
gate. I believe that that was enlarged at one or more points to include 
any person in the administration. Nor did I have any knowledge of 
anyone in the committee. To me, that, I believed implicitly that that 
wf»s fin nnauthorizd adventure by people who happened to have some 
$100 bills in their availability and an adventurous spirit and enjoyed 



1968 

playing James Bond. That was what I thought it was at that very 
moment. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. What about after the date of the break-in ? 
Did you have any knowledge concerning efforts to do what has been 
referred to as engage in coverup, or obstruct justice or suborn perjury, 
or any of those matters ? 

Mr. Moore. After the date of the break-in ? 
Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. MooRE. No, sir. It was up to and close to the date of March 19, 
1973, where I remember the suspicions that Mr. Dean had intimated. 
He had said this, you know, in this room, that as you put it, Moor(> 
knew some things but not other things. I believe that whatever his 
knowledge was, he did not wish to involve me with knowledge that 
would be inappropriate, I think as he did for his young assistant. I 
think that he did this. I appreciated tliat in retrospect. But he would 
make guarded comments because in my judgment, he began to get 
worried that things were going on and he was afraid that he might be 
involved. '\^nien I put that together with the — if I said Liddy, I meant 
Howard Hunt — ^the Hunt demand, that confirmed my intimation that 
something was with, in the nature of, payoff was possible. But again, 
at that time and durina: the period in March when my suspicions got 
firmed up, or became firmer, I was not thinking of the White House, 
I was thinking of people at the committee or related to the committee 
who might have conducted this coverup ])lan if there were one. And 
it was very late in the game when, as I indicated, I heard of the 
existence. Dean told me of the existence of the $350,000, 1 think around 
the end of the first week in April, when he was — he was, of course, I 
think, getting deeply concerned about this thing. 

Mr. Thompson. Was that in connection with Mr, Haldeman's 
$350,000, that conversation that you had with him in April? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, I 

Mr. Thompson. Let me get back to that. Let's follow it a little bit 
more in chronological fashion. You are at the meeting. You meet Feb- 
ruary 10, you meet February 11, and you agree to go see Mr. Mitchell. 
Mr. MooRE. All right. 

Mr. Thompson. Now, what were the things you are supposed to take 
up ^^ith Mr. Mitchell when you see him ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, a general review of the discussion, but with par- 
ticular reference to his role. His role was — let me digress to say you 
mentioned the tone of the meetings. There was a little needle at the 
beginning of those meetings that neither Mr. Dean nor I had done 
anything, that of all things, we had not even been in touch with John 
Mitchell, who obviously was at the committee and would plav a lead 
role. So I was assigned to go up and sfet him active because, since the 
committee would be important. Mr. Mitchell would be particular-ly im- 
portant, because at that point, the committee was something of a shell 
and his leadership would be needed. So let's say I was supposed to go 
up and give him a kind of pep talk. 

Second, I was supposed to discuss with him the substance of all the 
things that might have to be done by the committee — enlarging the 
press operation so we could respond, as I said, daily, by the hour if 
necessary. This meant research : it meant clerical help. It meant one or 
more assistants for the press officer. It meant, we hoped, some extra 



1960 

young lawyers who could be reviewing the transcripts and going back 
to the previous transcripts and doing the preparation that is needed 
in any one of these great hearings. On a great trial, there is an 
enormous amount of work that had to be equipped for. So we discussed 
that with them. 

We discussed the question of whether we would have a voice in the 
choice of the minority counsel. We talked at length as to— we didn't 
know you then, Mr. Thompson, and that discussion could have been 
unnecessary. 

Mr. Thompson. You are the same as a whole lot of people, Mr. 
Moore, so don't feel badly. 

Is that the sum and substance of it ? 

Mr. MooRE. A general preview. 

Yes, the meeting went on. We talked before lunch. Although we 
didn't get into these, we talked generally before lunch, a social lunch, 
then I would say 3 hours in his office, perhaps 4, with about 45 minutes 
out for 

Mr. Thompson. At what time in your conversation with Mr. Mitchell 
did the money matter come up ? 

Mr. MooRE. It came up when we got back to his office. We sat down 
after lunch and I said, now, about the meetings. I said, first, there are 
two or three messages from your friends that I will deliver and I think 
I know your answer. I think I went through that yesterday, that they 
thought" he could come down here part of the time, that they thought 
he ought to get actively interested, that from what they know, he 
might be one of the most actively interested persons in this proceeding. 

Mr. Thompson. It turned out to be true, didn't it ? 

Mr. MooRE. It did. He said something like, I don't need my friends 
in San Clemente to tell me that this is an important hearing and I 
ought to get interested — that sort of thing. A friendly tone. 

I mentioned that tliere had been a discussion that more money 
might be needed and I said, I don't know what this is about, but it 
is suggested that you miglit like to become a fundraiser, or you are 
nominated for the honor of raising the funds, if you will. And I got, 
as I say, a quick ansAver to that. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever discuss raising money with him at any 
time after that ? 

Mr. MooRE. Never. Or before. 

Mr. Thompson. Let's move on to March. 

I believe you stated that during the first part of March, Mr. Dean 
first told you aliout other involvement with regard to the break-in. 
He mentioned Mr. Liddy, of course. He also mentioned meetings that 
he had attended with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder. 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 
. Mr. Tjiompson. Would you tell us about when this conversation or 
these conversations occurred and as nearly as you can recollect, just 
exactly what those conversations were ? 

Mr. Moore. I think that tlie first such conversation took place — I 
will take March 1 as a rough date. It could even have been, in connec- 
tion with that conversation, be a little earlier, where at one point 
in the conversation, it came up in connection with a discussion about, 
somethino; about Liddy's name came up, or something — he said this, 
I remember, at one point. This thing, I don't knovv^ what else might 
have been on at this point. It may have been that Watergate, because 



1970 

he said, I attended two meetings and I am sorry I did. He told me, he 
said, at the first meeting, we went to Mr. Mitchell's office and there 
was Liddy and there was Magruder and I, and with a tone of some kind 
of astonishment, he said, there he was with big charts, put them out. 
with the craziest, wildest schemes you ever saw. He said they were 
razzle-dazzle charts with code names. He said— I think he might ha\ c 
used a woi-d or two tliat I shouldn't use on the air. He said, holy so-and- 
so, the charts had plans for surveillance, electronic surveillance, even 
kidnaping. 

And I, you Imow, I reacted with disbelief. I said kidnaping? I 
think I said, what the hell are you talking about ? 

He said, well, this guy, this guy Liddy, had a plan where the leaders, 
if the leaders of the demonstrators in San Diego got too tough, we 
would snatch them, they would be equipped to snatch them and take 
them to Mexico, and at this point we would assume the demonstrations 
would fail because the leaders had disappeared. 

I said, you know, I think, you know, you have got to be kidding. That 
was my reaction. 

He said, well, I just couldn't believe it; I said, get those charts out 
of here, destroy them, you shouldn't even be discussing such things 
in the presence of the Attornev General, let alone carrying them out 
or ev^en considering them. He said, I turned that off. 

He said, but I went to another meeting and he said, now, this one 
troubles me because I got there late and I don't know what was said 
or who will say what was said when I wasn't there, he said, because 
now he still had a chart that was, all this rough stuff was out, but 
electronic surveillance was still in. 

And I said, well, now, you mean in general. 

He said, yes, it was a budgetary thing. 

And I said, well, was there any — I must preface this by saying that 
he did say he was concerned about being at this meeting lest that in- 
volve him. 

I said, well, was there anything in the chart about the Democratic 
Committee or Watergate, using either or both phrases ? 

He said, no, there were not specifics, just a principle. 

And then, he said, I thought I turned it oif. 

I did not know and he did not tell me that he later went to Mr. 
Haldeman, as he so testified, and said he would have nothing to do 
with anvthing like this. 

But those were his two discussions of the meetings. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you say that he told you that he was concerned 
for himself because of his presence in those meetings? 

Mr. MooRE. At a later time, as he told me that he was concerned 
about his participation in those meetings because the grand jury was 
back in session or was about to be and he said "I am probably going to 
have to testify," and he said, "I am going to tell the truth about those 
meetings," and he said or intimated that Mr. Magruder had not re- 
vealed that aspect of the meetings when he had testified either at the 
trial or at the grand jury, I do not think he specified, but Mr. Ma- 
gruder M-as on i-ecord under oath, and he said "I am going to raise 
hell with Magruder when I tell the truth." And later either in the same 
conversation or within a short time thereafter he said "One of the 
things that concerns me is that I keep hearing or I have heard that 



1971 

Magruder if he gets in trouble, if he goes down, he is determined to 
take other people with him." And he said "I can easily see how he 
would involve me as having been there and having approved these 
proceedings." 

Mr. Thompson. All right, when did this conversation take place ? 

Mr. :Moore. This was an acceleration of Mr. Dean's problems started 
with the Gray hearings, let us say March 15, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. What was going on during that period of time? 
Look at it from Mr. Dean's standpoint. You mentioned the Gray hear- 
ing. What was Mr. Dean confronted with at that period of time ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, he was confronted with a lot of comment about the 
ubiquitous Mr. Dean who ahvays seemed to turn up. He had sat in 
investigations, FBI interviews of White House personnel. He had bad 
access to FBI records. Another, as I indicated, he got access to the 
FBI reports without clearing with the Attorney General, without his 
knowledge or approval. There was a suggestion that he had either 
withheld some of the contents of the Hunt safe or had unduly delayed 
delivery of the contents of the Hunt Safe. There was, of course, a 
suggestion, and that was March, well, it was around March 22, that 
I believe it Avas Senator Byrd who said in the Gray confirmation hear- 
ings "Don't you think that Mr. Dean lied when he said to the FBI, 
when he said, he would have to check to see if Hunt had had an oiRce? 
Mr. Gray said he would have to draw that conclusion. Mr. Dean had a 
very different version of that. All these things w^ere piling up to the 
point — and then he w^as also invited by the Judiciary Committee to 
appear, and he had become the central figure in what I think is one of 
the great debates of the season or the year, the debate of executive 
privilege, where the intimation was that, and we were hearing mostly 
from the press and commentators that Gray will be held hostage for 
Dean. No Dean, no Gray. So he had emerged as a person with a great 
deal of problems. 

At the same time, Mr. Jack Anderson, or a little later in this series, 
dug up a file which I later felt was a bad rap but which said that he 
had been discharged from his first legal employment for unethical 
conduct. Since I am on television and there are millions looking in, 
that was softened, that was retracted, but at the same time when a 
charge like that is made the retraction seldom catches up and this was 
a very rough rap for him. So he had all these things going. 

Mr. Thompson. How did he react to all these, could you tell on a 
day-to-day basis ? 

Mr. MooRE. I will say this, he kept his cool, but he was concerned and 
disturbed. 

Now later at Camp David when all this had piled down he said to 
me on the nhoue one night "I am trying to write a report up here and 
I can't do it." He said "I am just walking around in the woods trying 
to collect my thoughts," and — but he was and he testified correctly 
as far as I am concerned, what I knew about trving to find ways that 
this matter could be brought out with the President taking the initia- 
tive which all of us were saying, and I know the President was eager 
for it and we were discussing all kinds of methods, you know, the War- 
ren Commission 

Mr. Thompson. Executive privilege was a big issue along about that 
time, I believe. 



96-296 O — 73 — bk. 5- 



1972 

Mr. Moore. Yes, and he was at the center of it. 

Mr. Thompson. About how many conversations 

Mr. Moore. I am sorry. 

Mr. Thompson. About how many conversations would you say you 
had concerning these meetings in Mr. Mitchell's office with Mr. Dean ? 
I mean, was this — where were your offices located ? 

Mr. Moore. Both on the first floor of the Executive Office Building 
but a full right angle away, sort of. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you see each other daily ? 

Mr. Moore, During this March season, probably so. Before that 
hardly at all. 

Mr. Thompson. Would he go into your office, would you go into 
his office ? 

Mr. Moore. I would usually go to his office, sometimes he would 
drop by mine, and then often during these daily bulletins from the 
Gray hearings we might both go over to Mr. Ziegler's office to talk 
about what the facts were and what response we might make sucli 
as on that lie story. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. 

Did he at any time tell you about what is known now as the Plumb- 
ers activities, Mr. Hunt, Mr. Liddy at the Wliite House ? 

Mr. Moore. He made one remark, let us say — no, tw^o remarks. One 
again in this March period, and the conversations were sort of a con- 
tinued story like a soap opera going from one to another. He said at 
one point "You know, it is not the Watergate's embarrassing but, 
you know, and I think he referred, I am not sure he used the word 
"Plumbers." I think he might have used the words "Hunt and 
Liddy"— "there are things about them if they get out are going to be 
embarrassing or seriously embarrassing." 

Mr. Thompson. When did this conversation take place ? 

Mr. Moore. That one, I can only say, let us say, between the 7th 
of March and the 19th of March. 

Mr. Thompson. When Mr. Dean was telling you these things, of 
course they concerned you ; you learned about Mr. Mitchell, I am sure, 
for the first time in reference to the horror stories generally or some 
things that could be seriously embarrassing, as he stated; did you 
consider going to the President yourself at that time ? 

Mr. Moore. I was considering it seriously, Mr. Tliompson but what 
I had essentially was gossip. What I had was guarded, certainly noth- 
ing evidentiary. The procedures were going forward, the grand jury 
had been reopened. I felt that Avhatever it was, and this is when almost 
daily one of us was discussing the possibility of getting the story out. 
As I mentioned to you, Mr. Ehrlichman, as I said yesterday, phoned 
me on March 16, I think it was, to say that the President wanted a 
full statement of all these things, and I thought this thing Avas coming 
to a head but I did not feel I had anything except hearsay and gossip 
and rumor but I sure was beginning to worry. But also I must say 
that when he spoke of the Hunt and Liddy, I did not know that that 
would involve the "Wliite House. That could have been something else 
they had done, I didn't know what it was, and he made it a point never 
to go over the evening and tell me anything. He never told me, as I 
recall, of an actual criminal situation or act. He talked about embar- 
rassment and problems. 



1973 

Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you about the meetings that you and 
Mr. Dean had with the President, and I will stait with March 14. 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Would you tell us what you discussed at that meet- 
ing, the purpose of the meeting; what was discussed and what was 
resolved, if anything? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. As of this year? 

Mr. Moore. The purpose of the meeting was to go over with the 
President the possible questions that might be asked in the next day's, 
the next morning's press conference on the general subject of executive 
privilege and these hearings, the Gray hearings were still also going 
on, and in that sense the Watergate. Now, Dean and I — the way that 
worked was Mr. Buchanan, who usually coordinates the President's 
briefing book, had sent us a list of at least 20 questions that could be 
asked, more were handed, and for 2 or 3 days before that we divided 
them up, we suggested answers or gave background answers so that 
the President could consider them, and they were then edited by Mr. 
Buchanan and put in the briefing book. 

The President now wished to discuss those answers with us. 

Mr. Thompson. Had the President made a statement on executive 
privilege by tliat time ? 

Mr, Moore. Yes ; he had made that on March 12 and this meeting 
took place on March 14 and it was a very hot issue at that moment 
obviously. 

Mr. Thompson. What about March 15 ? 

Mr. Moore. March 15 was a very pleasant and relaxed meeting at 
the end of the day in the Oval Office where the President kind of 
wanted to chat about the press conference. 

Mr. Thompson. The press conference had been earlier that day? 

Mr. MooRE. Earlier that day and he wanted to know how^ we thought 
it went, and Mr. Dean correctly testified that the President said, "You 
know, the very first thing that I said, I made an announcement that 
I thought was quite historic, first representative to the People's Re- 
public of China, and I was nominating a most important man as our 
first representative, David E. K. Bruce. I made the announcement 
and what do you think the first question was ? Dean's testimony at the 
hearings and it shows where their minds are." And then we talked a 
little bit about the press conference and then he got into this discussion 
where he had been thinking more and more where we had been using 
the wrong, the more narrow phrase that what was involved here was 
the sejiaration of powers and the President's responsibilities to pre- 
serve that separation, and I think I told you how he w^ent through, 
how we invite each other, that Congressmen will come here by invi- 
' tation, that we go there but neither of us can command the other, and 
that is the way it has to be and we went into that. 

And then he got talking about how he wanted us to be outgoing and 
he recalled the days when he was a Congressman, when he could not 
get a report, an FBI report, not raw files but an FBI report, in the 
Hiss matter, and he said, "But we are going to tell this committee, 
give them anything that they Avant in terms of information. Now we 
may do it," he said. "That is where you fellows come in," he said, "It 



1974 

should be depositions or private meetings and this kind of thing." Wo 
got back into that, and that was that meeting. 

Mr. Thompson. Wliat about the meeting on the 19th ? 

Mr. MooRE. The meeting of the 19tli was again a comment, he said 
that — I think that, whether we came in together or whether Dean 
was already there I am not sure. It may be — but in any event he 
turned to me and said, "John is going to have to sort of take the lead 
in these matters of executive privilege and the hearings and I asked 
you to join the meeting because I know you have been working with 
him." 

And he said, "I want you to go about how to get our story out," and 
that kind of thing. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, were the hearings the primary topic of dis- 
cussion at that time, these hearings ? 

Mr. MooRE. Were they on 

Mr. Thompson. Were they the primary topic of discussion ? 

Mr. MooRE. I would say along with the principle of executive priv- 
ilege, yes. There was a discussion that the distinguished chairman had 
been on "Face the Nation" the day before, and Senator Byrd had made 
a talk or inserted in the record a list of questions about Mr. Dean's 
constant presence, as they called it in all these things, and I think the 
President suggested, "You know he shouldn't wait to be asked, maybe 
he should respond," and in fact Dean did draft a letter which I don't 
know was ever sent, sort of voluntarily responding to some of these 
things. 

Mr. Thompson. Is this something that Dean himself suggested or 
the President suggested that Dean do ? 

Mr. MooRE. I think I suggested it. 

Mr Thompson You think you suggested that Dean do this? 

Mr Moore. Yes. No, I think I suggested — for example, we were 
talking about getting our story out voluntarily rather than having it 
drawn out of us which the President 

Mr. Thompson. You are talking about, a sort of white paper or 
letter or what ? 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Thompson, in tliis period of March where I had 
live personal meetings with the Pre'^^ident, in every single one of those 
meetings, I think, he emphasized, "Wliy don't we get the story out 
ourselves." 

At the meetings in San Clemente and La Costa Mr. Ehrlichman 
had made that point, and I believe he indicated that he was echoing 
the President's desire. 

On March 16, Mr. Ehrlichman again rela^^ed that desire to me. So 
that this white paper, depositions, forthcoming was the word the 
President kept using, be forthcoming, was also — and, of coui-se, that 
is one of the reasons I was convinced that the President had no perma- 
nent idea of what we knew is going on or he would not be pressing to 
get it out. 

Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Dean have any suggestion as to what 
mifirht be done with rejrard to the hearings or anything else? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I know for one thing that Mr. Dean as recently, 
I believe, as March 15 concurred. T believe, in a draft of the executive 
privilege statement Avhich concluded with the recommendation that 
White House assistants and aides to the President would normally 



1975 

not appear but if the subject matter was extraneous to their duties as 
Presidential aides or advisers that the executive privilege would be 
waived. 

Later that did not end up in his statement. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me see if I understand it. You are saying that 
as late as March 15, 1973, Dean was concurring in the President's 
statement of March 12 that White House personnel would not appear 
but the information would be furnished otherwise. 

Mr. MooRE. Pardon me, I got my month wrong, pardon me, Feb- 
ruary 15. 

Mr. Thompson. February 15? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, the La Costa and San Clemente meetings and thank 
you for that correction. 

The draft that went back the next day had that recommendation in 
it that we have this waiver for matters extraneous to the normal Presi- 
dential duties. That draft kept going through a lot of circulation and 
revision and as late as February 15 I recall seeing a memo from 
Mr. Dean which still did have that provision in it. So, he was stiU 
voting for at least in that draft, in that statement, a policy of coopera- 
tion and appearance in matters not related to the official duties 
involving their relationship with the President. 

So, it is a long answer to your question as to what his attitude was. 
Later, in the post-March 21 period he and I on the phone or in person 
talked many times about the variety of ways by which the President 
could see to it that whatever the White House story was would be 
forthcoming. 

I think I perhaps referred to this, and we talked about everything 
from his own Presidential commission, from the appointment of a 
distinguished nonpolitical lawyer to come in with full power to inter- 
rogate everybody in the White House under penaltv of immediate 
dismissal, to get a 30-day — or report as to this kind of thing or three- 
man panel, a residential appointment of a Warren Commission, I re- 
member reviewing the book of the Warren Commission to see what the 
mandate and the privileges and the procedures there were and it 
seemed to me they fitted. All these things were being talked about not 
only with Dean but with me and others. 

Mr. Thompson. In the March 19 meeting did Dean ever mention the 
use of the FBI ? 

Mr. MooRE. In the March 19 meeting ? 

Mr. Thompson. Pardon me if I am wrong. 

Mr. MooRE. There is a reference to the FBI but I am not sure that 
that was the date. Could you give me a clue as to what it was ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. Correct me if I am wrong. I believe in a staff 
interview, you mentioned something to the effect that he suggested 
■ that the members of this committee perhaps be asked if they would 
submit to 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, you pick it up from there. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, that was in the March 20 meeting. 

Mr. Thompson. The March 20 meeting ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. We had been asked for ideas where we could take 
the initiative, and in that meeting at one point, Mr. Dean said to the 
President, you know, one way is for us to take the initiative. He said. 



1976 

I have worked on the Hill. He said, I do not know, I know of few 
political campaigns where someone, with or without tiie knowledge of 
the candidate, has not gotten involved in sometlnng that was improper, 
at least, if not illegal. He said, i think it migiit be a good idea if some- 
one responsible would invite or suggest that tlie committee that was 
about to investigate campaign practices voluntarily ohered to submit 
each of his most recent benatorial campaigns to a full held investiga- 
tion by the FBI. 

Mr. i'HOMPSON. He suggested this to the President in your presence ( 

Mr. Moore. He did. i es. 

Mr. 1 HOMPSON. What was the President's reaction ? 

Mr. Moore. First, he gave him what I regarded as a puzzled look. 
Ana he saia, what would tiiat do i Why that i And 1 thinii he used the 
words "1 don t understand." 

Dean then said, well, sir, people who live in glass houses shouldn't 
throw stones, ilien lie repeatea tiiat lie had been here on the Hill and 
he knew politics and Knew campaigning. 

And the President sat there shaking his head. Then the President 
said, well, let us tiiink about that. 

1 took tiiat as a complete dismissal of the suggestion, and of course, 
nothing was done about it, it was never heard of again. 

Senator Ervin. There is a vote on in the Senate, so the committee 
will have to stand in temporary recess for tiie committee to go and vote. 

[Kecess.] 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Counsel will resume the interrogation of the witness. 

Mr. Thompson, ihank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Moore, we were discussing the various meetings you attended 
with the President and Mr. Dean. We got to March ly. ^ ou were tell- 
ing us about a j)roposal Mr. Dean had concerning possibly asking 
members of this committee to submit their campaigns to FBI inves- 
tigation. Was there any discussion about comparing the use of the FBI 
by this administration with other administrations ''i 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Tell us who brought that subject up and what was 
said? 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Dean said that he had, it had come to his attention 
that at least one preceding administration, perhaps two, that this 
previous President or Presidents had used or attempted to use the FBI 
for personal or j)olitical purposes in ways that the President, in ways 
that were quite inappropriate and whereas the President, President 
Nixon, had made it a policy personally to avoid that kind of thing, 
particularly through his friendship with Mr. Hoover, that this would 
make a good contrast, because Dean had been, in effect, accused of 
using the FBI by getting reports or sitting in on interviews, and that 
that information would be quite harsh. And the President simply re- 
acted by saying, well, if you develop anything, let me know. And 
nothing came of that. 

Mr. Thompson. Was this on March 20, also ? 

Mr. Moore. That was on the 20th. 

Mr. Thompson. Was anything else discussed at that meeting of 
March 20 of any importance, any substance ? 

Mr. MooRE. No; I think my summary yesterday would cover it, any- 
thing talked about. 



1977 

Mr. Thompson. During these meetings on March 14, 15, 19, and 20, 
during this period of time, did you have this information from Mr. 
Dean concerning the meetings in Mitchell's office and the things that 
he told you about ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. And you were there, in the President's presence? 

Mr. MooRE. Right. 

Mr. Thompson. Along with Mr. Dean. You did not tell the Presi- 
dent, did you ? 

Mr. MooRE. No, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Have you related your reason for that? Would 
you like to expound on that a little bit further ? What went through 
your mind as you kept attending these meetings, knowing what you 
knew and in your mind, the President not knowing ? 

Mr. MooRE. What I knew up till the meeting of the 20th, which is 
the one I described as the moment when I thought somebody had to 
tell him, was that it was essentially rumor, gossip. I did not have 
one shred of evidence, had nothing at that point that involved the 
White House, that the suggestion that arose in my mind was from 
his discussions of the meetings in Mr. Mitchell's office was, at most, 
that that meant somebody else in the committee might have been in- 
volved. There was nothing to tie any of this activity to the White 
House and these things had now been reopened, I believe. Judge 
Sirica had already — and I did not like to have any — one does not 
like to go to the President and say, I think something is wrong, partic- 
ularly wrong across the street at campaign headquarters. But I will 
say this. I was growing increasingly concerned and I was wonder- 
ing what my role would be and I did not want to trigger the course. 

Mr. Thompson. During this period of time, did you really wonder 
in your own mind as to whether or not the President did know these 
things ? 

Mr. MooRE. I suppose I did. I am trying to recall my state of mind. 
I had not thought of his — I will put it this way. I knew in my heart, 
if you will, I was totally convinced that the President knew, believed 
that no one in the White House had been involved, as he had said 
and was, and still, I know, believed right up till he learned differently, 
I guess March 21. 

But until I heard of the Howard Hunt matter, I did not connect 
it in my mind with — the point about the Hunt matter was that Mr. 
Hunt was demanding money or the White House would be embar- 
rassed. That was something of a difference of degree, a quantum and 
quality difference, in the kind of guarded things which Dean had been 
suggesting. And that resolved the doubts. 

And let me say right here in front of anybody who is watching, 
•I certainly Avish that the minute I began to get suspicious, I had 
gone to the President. One does not go to him lightly, one does not 
go to him and say, I think something may be wrong. Maybe there are 
times when one should. I came to that conclusion, and all I know is 
that before the phone rang on the night of March 20, Mr. Dean's 
happy and committed call that the President had called him and was 
going to see him in the morning, I think maybe I would have gone in 
the next day. 

I am not reciting this to take credit, because Mr. Dean felt that 
he wanted to go and I encouraged him. And I accept that as his ver- 



1978 

sion totally of the conversation. This goes back to our discussion of 
yesterday, you hear things differently. It was on his mind. He prob- 
ably believes he said to me, I think I ought to go see the President, 
and that I, you know, said, by all means, that I gave him that speech. 

It does not matter. He did go and it was done. 

Mr. Thompson. I think it may matter and I want your recollection 
on that a little bit later. 

Mr. Moore. Mine is clear. 

Mr. Thompson. Let's talk about that just a minute. Yesterday you 
were asked several questions about the meetings, some of them in the 
early part of 1972, on Mr. Kleindienst, about his confirmation hear- 
ings, and the dates of some later meetings and more significant meet- 
ings. And you could not remember many of those things. You had 
trouble with those things. What makes you think your mind is so clear 
on this ? 

Mr. MooRE. First of all, I want to say I have had telegrams and 
phone calls from people who say that, God, for someone who does not 
remember where he was on the night of August 1-3, I have been 
astonished by this wonderful reaction. When people are a little too 
precise in their memories of dates — for example, I was cast a cold 
question, what did I talk to the President about on June 30, 1972, a 
year and a month or 2 — or more ago. June 30 was a date on a bare page 
that had no point of reference. I was a little slow. Then it came into my 
mind that July 1 was tlie day John Mitchell resigned as campaign 
director. That was the day that the President called me over to talk 
about that. I didn't pin that to a date. 

Mr. Thompson. How long have you been preparing for your testi- 
mony here? How long have you known that you were going to be 
here? 

Mr. Moore. May T ask counsel ? He got the request. 

Mr. Miller says he received a call at 6 :15 Monday night and there 
were quite a few interruptions between then and now. 

Mr. Thompson. Monday night of this week ? 

Mr. Moore. Pardon me. I had better set the date. What's the date 
of Monday ? We want to be firm about dates in tliis liearing. 

Mr. INIiLLER. Counsel was saying he cannot recall what date Monday 
is. 

Mr. Thompson. In preparing for your testimony, did you limit your 
preparation to what you put in your statement ? 

Mr. Moore. In Avhat time for preparation I had. I tried to con- 
centrate on what I regarded as the central issue and the significant 
testimony I could give. I had forgotten that a young man tried to 
investigate whether Dita Beard knew Jack Anderson's secretarv a 
year and half ago, and when that so-called investigation of the ITT. 
as it was put, came up, apparently, I had been able to recall it at June 7 
when I think it was explained what it was about. But at this hearing, 
to suddenly be asked out of the blue about that kind of thing, I was 
Pot readv for it, I hadn't prepared for it. And also, frankly, I didn't 
think it was very relevant until I was told it was going to be the 
decisioTi 

ISIr. Thompson. It may not be over, INIr. Moore. 

]\Ir. Moore. It mav not be, and I know I have been told I would not 
have been asked if it didn't have a purpose. I think Mr. Lenzner — I 



1979 

have spent 4 hours or 5 hours with a different group the day before 
when I should have been preparing. I didn't get 

Mr. Thompson. What different group were you with ? 

Mr. Moore. I went over to see Mr. Cox's group at this invitation. 

Mr. Thompson. Did they ask you for an interview also ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. What time did you spend with them ? 

Mr. Moore. I spent 5 hours with no lunch. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. 

Let's get back to March 20. Was this meeting in the official office? 

Mr. Moore. The official office. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you leave with Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. MooRE. I did. 

Mr. Thompson. What happened when you left the official office with 
Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. ]MooRE. Well, we closed the door and as we turned into the 
hall — I said very little at that meeting and I had been listening. I 
remember that I pointed, and I said, "John, I don't think the Presi- 
dent has any inkling of the things that you have been talking about, 
worrying about. Have you told him anj-thing?" 

And he said, no, he hadn't. 

I said, "Do you know whether anybody else has ?" 

He said, "I don't think so." 

And that is when I— and lie has testified that I was sort of a fatherly 
adviser. He and I worked with mutual respect on these things. And I 
said, "John, you should tell him. He is entitled to know. He is not being 
served. It will be good for you if you are concerned about your own 
role here. It will be good for him." And I think I said it will be good 
for the country. 

And I think that without any question, as I said yesterday, he was 
receptive to that. He might have made that move on his own. If I gave 
him a little needed encouragement, I am happy, but that isn't impor- 
tant. The important thing is that he did go, he did ask the President 
that very evening, and the President immediately said, by all means, 
come in tomorrow morning. 

Mr. Thompson. But you made this statement to him and you say 
while he didn't indicate or while he didn't make any definite response 
one way or the other, in your mind, he was receptive to that idea 
sometime ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Thompson. You mentioned this business about adviser and this 
sort of thing. We will get into specifically what Mr. Dean has testified 
about that conversation and who brought the subject up and who 
agreed with whom, but to backtrack just a little bit, did Mr. Dean ever 
"come to you with any kind of problems that might have been brought 
on of a personal nature or anything like that? "Wliat was your 
relationship? 

Mr. Moore. First, my relationship was basically professional and 
official, but he did — for example, he called me, after he had been called 
a liar, after everything else, he called me in the afternoon and said, can 
you come down here, there is a new low blow. 

Mr. Thompson. A new low blow ? 



1980 

Mr. Moore. Yes, and I said the world is full of surprises and 
I will come right in, and he told me about this news by Jack Andereon. 

Mr. Thompson. Was that the Anderson column ? 

Mr. Moore. It was an Anderson column which dug into a file and 
said that he had been discharged as a young lawyer for unethical 
conduct. I could tell obviously how important this was to him having 
remembered changing my trip to come from the south of California, 
my wife arrived in a long dress about now, we were going to Kennedy 
Center, and I had to say "Here is a taxi, go on home, we simply have 
a problem." 

We sat talking all evening about it as to the merits of it. He man- 
aged to collect papers on the thing, I called at night a radio lawyer 
friend of mine to see if he could help on this sort of thing. Then that 
went on to further discussions the next day, and we did, we did 
manage to defuse it. It turned out, as I said, the charge had been 
softened, or actually withdrawn. It was 

Mr. Thompson. I understand he had found out that the story was 
going to be printed very shortly. 

Mr. Moore. Yes, someone, I think he had been called by a represent- 
ative of Mr. Anderson saying "We are going to print the following, 
do you have any comment," and at that stage in his life that clearly 
was a very, personally a very, serious thing and he did come to me 
and I think I was helpful because the papers did print the softening 
of it and they printed that veiy fine letter that a lawyer had written 
on his behalf at the time saying his conduct was not unethical. 

Mr. Thompson. He probably did not consider it very soft when 
he finally read it. 

Mr. Moore. I agree, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you, again going back to March 20, 
you say you told him this and he seemed receptive ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you go home ? 

Mr. Moore. Did I go home ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. What I am asking you, you mentioned a phone 
call, did you receive a phone call that day ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, a telephone call at home. I think it was around 
8 o'clock or after dinner or at that hour and the phone rang and 
it was Mr. Dean calling and again being careful about using quotation 
marks but it is my recollection that this is an accurate summary, he 
said, "Guess what just happened," and I said, "Well, no, tell me." 
He said "I just had a call from the President" and he said "I decided 
that this is the moment to take the plunge or bite the bullet," not those 
phrases necessarily but to step forward, whatever it was, and he said 
"So I said to him, 'Mr. President, things have been ffoing on that 
I am sure you do not know about, and I think it is terribly important 
that you do and I would like to come in and see you alone and tell 
you about it,' " and he said the President said "of course" or "by 
all means" and did not say "Call my secretary for an appointment" 
or "I will look at my calendar," he said "Come in tomorrow morning," 
and Mr. Dean did go in the next morning. 

I made some remarks about "Hallelujah, John, that is great; con- 
gratulations." 



1981 

Mr. Thompson. Why did he call you to tell you this ? 

Mr. Moore. Because I think that we had shared this discussion just 
a few hours ago after we came out of the Oval Office, it was obviously 
deeply on his mind. It is entirely possible he had been looking for a 
little opportunity — now, you will note that it was the President who 
called him. Here was a chance now, w^e talked about it that afternoon, 
and I gave him what, a stiff fight talk, a fatherly talk, if you will, and 
friendly, assuring him that he would feel better when he had done it, 
and that is why he called me because I do not like to characterize con- 
versations but he w^as, if not excited, he was up on that call. He said 
"Guess what just happened?" He was pleased and the event meant 
something to him. 

Mr. Thompson. He said he was going to see the President the next 
day. 

Mr. MooRE. That is right. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he go see the President? 

Mr. MooRE. He told me he did. 

Mr. Thompson. That was on March 21 ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you talk to him after he said he called the 
President ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, and I saw him, I cannot place that conversation, 
whether it was his office or mine or it could have been that I ran into 
him, this was a short conversation, in the hall but I said "Well, John," 
you know, "did you see him ?" And he said "I sure did for 2 hours, I had 
2 hours with him." And I said "Well, did you tell him everything" and 
he said, I think his phrase was, I cannot remember, "I let it all out," 
and I said "Did you tell him about that Hunt matter," because that was 
the one I thought was the serious thing and he said "I told him every- 
thing," and then, I said I think in one of the interviews perhaps to Mr. 
Lenzner or to you, Mr. Thompson, I want to be very careful about this 
because I asked him was the President surprised, and that he replied he 
was or he sure was or perhaps he volunteered, but in any event, that 
there was a final touch to that conversation which, where he either con- 
curred or volunteered that the President had been surprised by the 
things he told him. 

Mr. Thompson. You came away from that conversation feeling like 
Dean had indicated to you that the President was surprised when he 
told him on the 21st? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Thompson. Backing up just a moment, you mentioned that Hunt 
situation, had he told you shortly before that meeting that he had with 
the President that Hunt had made increasing blackmail demands? I 
am not sure we went over that on the 19th or the 20th. 
• Mr. MooRE. He told me he had made — now, the word "blackmail" 
was mine. He said "I have just learned" 

Mr. Thompson. Dean said this? 

Mr, Moore. Dean said to me, and I place this as very late in the 
day Monday, the 19th, and I say that because we met with the Presi- 
dent on the afternoon of Monday the 19th, and I am certain I did not 
know about it at that time, but I could not be sure, but I do not think 
so, and I think there also has been, perhaps Mr. Dean testified he heard 
about it on the 20th but so I 

Mr. Thompson. Just stick to the date. 



1982 

Mr. Moore. All right, either late the 19th as I testified or early on 
the 20th so it was quite fresh in my mind when we met with the Presi- 
dent, in the early afternoon of the 20th. 

Mr. Thompson. What did he tell you about what Hunt was doing 
then? 

Mr. Moore. He didn't. He just said that if he didn't get this money 
by Wednesday, the 21st, he started out by saying and he wants it be- 
fore, he wants it deposited or put into his account or something before 
he gets sentenced, in fact he wants it by Wednesday, that would have 
been Wednesday the 21st because the sentencing was on March 23, 
and 

Mr. Thompson. Is this new Hunt situation the thing that finally 
caused you to tell Dean what you told him ? 

Mr. MooRE. It was the first penetrating, illegal, clear situation 
because, first of all, a demand, and the money amount that he men- 
tioned was enormous, I don't remember the numbers, I have heard 
since that it was in excess of $100,000, and that it had been communi- 
cated to Dean, he didn't tell me who communicated it to him nor did 
he tell me what the nature of it was. 

Now^, I had a pattern with Mr. Dean, as I said, who was very, who 
always had been very restrained in giving me any details and that 
he was doing that for my benefit and I appreciated it. But I had a 
habit of not probing because I got nowhere, I got turned off. In this 
case I didn't have to probe, I already was aware that something was 
going on, and I had thought of it in terms of possibly committing peo- 
ple or outside people, still didn't believe it had reached the White 
House, that here was a case where this was coming, this blackmail 
effort, was being aimed at the "\^Tiite House and the information, what- 
ever it was, was going to presumably involve the White House and 
I said no matter what he says it can't be worse than getting into a 
blackmail. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, did you ever talk to the President your- 
self about these matters? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. When? 

Mr. Moore. I had a conversation with the President about that on 
April 19. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. 

Mr. Moore. By the way, I had five meetings with the President and 
I have got the dates in mind, you know, in this period so this was 
April 19. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. 

Mr. Moore. Five, and with Dean and this one is a later one, April 19. 

Mr. Thompson. Tell us about the conversation you had with the 
President on April 19. 

Mr. Moore. Well, when I came in to see him, he had issued his 
April 17 statement that serious new charges had come to his atten- 
tion, and so on. So when I came in I said, and he had said that they 
came to him March 21, I said "Well, that was" — I paid him a com- 
pliment about the statement in terms of what the reactions I had 
heard and I said "I note that March 21 date. I, John Dean, must 
have been the source of those charges," and he said something to the 
effect "Oh, did you Imow about that" and I said "Yes." I said "After 



1983 

we met with you the day before John and I talked about it," and 
I said "I urged him to go in and tell you," and he said, "In fact he 
told me you called him that very night." He said "Yes, I did," and 
I said "Now the thing that got me committed was that blackmail 
business with Hunt, did he tell you about that?" He said "Yes, yes, he 
mentioned that, that is what lie said," and he said "Imagine," and 
again no quotation marks please, I have to give you my recollection, 
and he said, I think, "Imagine" or "just think of that," he said "I told 
him it was not only wrong but stupid. That you can't do that. First 
of all the demands never stop" and he said "Dean said this could 
go on," and the words "to a million dollars." The President said : "That 
isn't the point. Money is not the point. You could raise money, money 
is not the point, it's wrong, we could not, shouldn't consider it and 
it's stupid because the truth comes out anyway." 

Now I don't know, he didn't^ — that was his comment to me. 

Mr. Thompson. These will be further explored. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. But to go on as succinctly as we can, lets explore 
the other meetings briefly that you had with the President after 
that. 

Mr. Moore. I had a brief meeting with him the next day, April 20. 
And then I had another meeting with him 

Mr. Thompson. "Wliat did you talk about on April 20 ? 

Mr. MooRE. On April 20 I sought this meeting, and I 

Mr. Thompson. You sought this meeting? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. The only meeting which you sought is the one we 
are talking about with the President? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Go ahead. 

Mr. Moore. And he was leaving for Key Biscayne at 12:15, 1 think, 
and I sought it by going to Mr. Ziegler's office because I knew Ron 
was going to go in to see the President and I said, "Would you ask 
if he could give me 5 minutes before he goes to Florida," and Ron 
came back and said, "Stand by. He would like to see you." 

And I went in and I said, "Mr. President, I have been thinking 
about the whole thing." 

Mr. Thompson. Was this in the Oval Office ? 

Mr. Moore. Oval Office standing by the door and the helicopter at 
one point the whirling started. 

Mr. Thompson. Was he getting ready to go? 

Mr. Moore. He was standing up just the two of us. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know whether or not you were logged in ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir, I believe I was 

• Mr. Thompson. All right. Go ahead. 

Mr. Moore. And he said, "Dick, I understand you wanted to see 
me." 

I said, "Yes, sir. You are going down for that Easter weekend and 
it is a good time to contemplate," and I think I made a reference about, 
"Mayl3e this is the sort of a resurrection of the whole thing we are 
talking about." 

At least I frave him a little, just that comment. Then I said, "The 
reason I wanted to see you, sir, is I have been thinking about this whole 



1984 

thing. You now have facts," and I said, "You know and I know and 
I am convinced tlie country will accept that you did not know^ about 
the coverup." 

I said, "But you do now," and I said, "If you don't take action and 
get the facts quickly then it will be — you will be accused of a coverup, 
and that, sir, will come into this Oval Office and affect you. Now, you 
are involved," and I said, "And my other message I wanted to see you, 
I just hope that as you assess the facts you will get the benefit of 
outside counsel because everybody in this building has his own rela- 
tionships, his own bias, and perhaps his own involvement and when 
you are assessing the legal and factual issues please get someone, wiser 
head from outside," and that was it. 

He thanked me, and went out and got in the chopper. 

Mr. Thompson. What did the President say to you ? 

Mr. MooRE. He said, "I understand. I understand and thank you." 

Now, the sequel is that I went to see Mr. Ziegler because he had a 
couple of minutes and I said, "Eon, if you get the question," because 
he was extremely interested in getting the truth out, he was going in 
all the way and helj^ing the President to move, wherever the chips may 
fall, and I guess it is all right for me to now say that indeed Mr. 
Ziegler took this matter up on the airplane with the President and a 
prominent lawyer did visit Mr. — the President down at Key Biscayne. 

Mr. Thompson. About what ? 

Mr. MooRE. I don't know w^hat came of it. All I know is that the 
suggestion that he — it was a short time after that, that the April 30 
speech resulted, and all I know is that outside, that outside counsel 
did talk to him. All I know is he went to Key Biscayne. I don't know, 
I know no more than that. 

Mr. Thompson. "VYhy did you think he needed outside counsel ? 

Mr. Moore. For the simple reason that any fact that he asked of 
anyone — or any legal opinion — who worked in the White House was 
either too close himself in some way or had preopinions or would be 
in the position possibly of having to comment adversely about other 
people, and it is very difficult, human nature — to talk about your 
friends and coworkers. If there were people in the White House who 
had been involved in matters that were improper or illegal, I felt that 
the President should (a) not be his own lawyer because at that point — 
I should emphasize he was going at this critical time on an Easter 
weekend with no staff except Mr. Ziegler, and of course his physician, 
who travels always, and that was about the size of it and I just felt 
that during this long weekend, as he contemplated and examined 
whatever it was he learned, and I did not know other than what Mr. 
Dean knew and I told him, that he was entitled not to be his own lawyef 
and he was entitled not to rely on people who might have either a per- 
sonal bias or a preconception. Eight. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. This consideration was April 20, 1973. 
The President made his speech April 30 announcing the resignations 
of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and the fact that Mr. Dean had also left. 

Mr. Moore. Eight. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you see the President after April 20 ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. I saw him on May 8. 

Mr. Thompson. May 8 ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 



1985 

Mr. Thompson. Wliat was discussed at this meeting ? 

Mr. Moore. That was a rambling discussion. The best way, if I may- 
make a little prolix, if I can get started at the beginning. He had called 
me, sent for me the weekend of April 30, the Camp David weekend. I 
was on my way to my son's wedding in May. I got a message ; do not 
turn around, the President said, enjoy the wedding. 

So when I saw him, he wanted to know about the wedding and we 
got talking about my family, which was fine. 

He had just come for a weekend after biting a pretty good bullet in 
that April 30 situation. He looked fine. He had been in the sun and he 
looked to me much more relaxed than when I had seen him in these 
previous meetings I saw him in. I talked to him a little bit about that, 
in a sense that, I used the words, you look like your hand's back on the 
tiller and you are getting back into serious things and so forth, that 
sort of thing. 

I had not seen him since the April 30 speech and I talked about 
that, He always kind of liked to ask me about what some of our mu- 
tual friends in California thought. I relayed some of those reactions 
to him, not all favorable, by the way. I will not go into detail what 
the comments were about, but this is what we were talking about. 

Then, I talked about — oh, I reported what I had heard myself, 
about the nomination or appointment of General Haig as the at least 
Acting Chief of Staff, and of course, it was all favorable, and I felt 
that that helped give a new lift., that things were getting back on the 
track. He talked then a little bit about the future again, that he 
thought that. — but he said, do I think that this knowledge matter — he 
said, you told me, and he said — very early, he said, now, by the way, 
I remember your comment about the coverup of the coverup and I take 
it you think we are going in the right direction ? 

And I said, I certainly do. 

And he said at that point — let me just recall — he said, well, now, I 
am only wondering now, or I wonder now, about — and he had said this 
once before, but he said it with greater conviction, he said, I have 
racked my brain, I have searched my mind. Were there any clues I 
should have seen that should have tipped me off? He said, maybe 
there were. He said, I know how it is when you have a lot on your 
mind, and I did, but he said, I still wonder. And he said, what do you 
think? 

I said, Mr. President, I did not have that much on my mind and I 
did not see any clues. If that is all that is worrying you, you can get 
back to business as far as your role is concerned, and I think that was 
that. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, Mr. Moore. Let me go over a couple 
more things with you. I have already taken up more time than I 
-should, but I do want to pursue this matter as long as we are on this 
general subject matter. 

The conversation, of course, you had with Mr. Dean and what 
happened around March 21, of course, is important, and as to what 
the President knew from September 15, 1972, is important. I would 
like to compare some of the testimony that Mr. Dean has given us with 
some of the statements you have made to see if you can resolve some 
of these matters for us. 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 



1986 

Mr. Thompson. First, he said, at the La Costa meeting, "Ehrlioh- 
man raised tlie bottom line question, would the seven Watergate 
defendants remain silent through the hearings^" 

Do you recall that being discussed^ 

Mr. Moore. JS o ; and it you read tliat carefully, he did not say that 
was discussed. He said, what I call the bottom line question. He 
was talking about his own impression, his subjective evaluation. 

The question, he said, was raised. 1 do not know what he said, but 
I want to clear up that he did not say it was said. 

Mr. Thomfson. You made the statement that you said he had 
made to you atter leaving one of these meetings. 1 would like to 
read what he said about that. I would like to have your recollection. 

He said "The meeting concluded on this item and Moore and I 
departed together. I tola him as we walked back to our rooms that I 
was very distressed that this matter had come up in his presence, but 
now he had a very real idea of the dimensions of the situation. I told 
him I did not think he should get involved m carrying such a message 
to Mitchell. Mr. Moore was concerned, but felt that he had an obli- 
gation to do what Ehrlicliman and Haldeman expected of him, but 
he did not understand why they thought that he could change Mitch- 
ell's mind. Shortly after Moore and 1 departed, I went to Los Angeles 
to join my wife,"' et cetera. 

Did that conversation take place? 

Mr. MooRE. No, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Could you remember that conversation? 

Mr. Moore. If I had remembered it — well, hrst of all, if it took 
place, and he said what he described, I would have taken his advice. 
I would have gotten around to — a lot of things might have been 
learned a lot sooner. 

Again, this goes, sir, to the question, I am not here, you know, 
to impugn anybody's truthfulness. At a later point, at one point, he 
made a remark to me, very late. It might have been as late as the 
13th or 1-ith, when I was talking about how did people get drawn 
into this thing? He said, you know, you came awfully close to getting 
drawn in m that trip to New York. 

Now, whetlier he thinks he said it then, and I do not 

Mr. Thompson. Well, then 

Mr. Moore. You asked me to explain, and I camiot explain it except 
that A, I do not remember it happened ; if it did, at my age and at 
this stage of the game, whatever record, I would have made further 
inquiries and I would not have gotten 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Moore, if you could keep your answers as 
brief as possible, accurate and as brief as possible, because of the 
time consideration. 

He testified on page 195 of his statement, that after the convei-sation 
that 3-ou had — fii-st of all, let us discuss this convei^ation. He said: 
"It was during the afternoon of March 20 that I talked again with 
Dick Moore about this entire coverup matter. I told Moore that there 
were new and more threatening demands for support money. I told 
him that Hunt had sent a message to me — then Paul O'Brien — that he 
wanted $72,000 for living expenses and $50,000 for attorneys' fees and 
if he did did not receive it that week, he would reconsider his options 
and have a lot to say about the things he had done for Ehrlichman 



1987 

while at the ■\^nnte House. I told Moore that I had about reached the 
end of the line, and was now in a real position to deal with the Presi- 
dent to end the coverup. I did not discuss with Moore the fact that I 
had discussed money and clemency with the President earlier, but I told 
him that I really did not think the President understood all of the 
facts involved in the WaterjDfate and particularly the implication of 
those facts. I told him that the matter was continually compounding 
itself and I felt that I had to lay out the facts for the President as well 
as the implications of those facts. Moore encouraged me to do so." 

Now, that is all !Mr. Dean talking and Mr. Moore responding. You 
have already addressed yourself to that conversation. Do you have any- 
thing else to add, Mr. Moore ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, only this, that whether he had already reached 
the end of the line and was ready to go in as a matter within his own 
mind and I would not dispute it, because all I Imow is after the conver- 
sation that I recited, he did do it. ^Nlaybe he would have done it if I 
had not given that advice. 

Mr. Thompsox. All right, let me 

Mr. ]\IooRE. You asked me. and I cannot comment on that. I can say 
flatly, though, that he did not say to me anything other than that ]Mr. 
Hunt was going to say some things that would be very rough on or 
embarrassing to the "\^niite House. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, let me move to another point. 

Mr. ]MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Thompsox. After the convereation you had, "AVlien the Presi- 
dent called me" — the President's telephone conversation the night of 
^larch 20 — ^and "We had a rather rambling discussion, I told him at 
the conclusion of the conversation that I wanted to talk to him." And 
he said meet him the next morning. 

"Before going into these things, I decided I should call Haldeman 
because I know his name would come up in this matter. I told Halde- 
man what I was going to do and Haldeman said I should proceed in 
such a situation." 

Do vou remember any call that was made to Haldeman that night ? 

Mr. MooRE. Xo, I do not know of that. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, tell us briefly what you know about what 
Dean was doing at Camp David when he went up there March 23. I 
believe you had a tplenhone conversation while he was there. "V\niat was 
his frame of mind ? Wliat did he say to vou ? 

^Ir. IVIooRE. Well, I had several conversations with him. One that 
I remember was. you asked about his frame of mind. He said. I just 
cannot collect my thoughts up here. He said, this thing has gotten to 
a point where all I am doinar is walking around in the woods and try- 
ing to think things throusfh and get my own mind straightened out 
on this whole thing. And he said. I cannot get a pen to a paper. I am 
■ supposed to write. I haA'e been asked to write a report. I remember 
that about his frame of mind. 

What day of the visit that was and how long it lasted, I do not 
know. 

The second, I think it was from Camp David when he called me 
with one more idea of how the Presidencv could take the leadership 
in getting it all out without, as I say, waiting for these hearings and 
the completion of them in terms of essential facts. It eflPectively was 



96-296 O — 73 — bk. 



1988 

some kind of a Presidential arrangement for what would be com- 
parable to a civil arbitration, that everybody who had been named 
would agree to give testimony in kind of an arbitration proceeding and 
abide by the — it was more involved than that. I said at least it is 
original, it sounds — that was the conversation. 

Mr. Thompson. All rignt, any other points, any other topics of 
conversation ? 

Mr. MooRE. He called me on Sunday night, which would have been 
Marcli 25, and he said, ''Here s another one,'' or something like that, 
I can't remember. There is a story coming out of the Los Angeles 
Times that 1 knew in advance about, and approved — either knew 
and/or approved — in advance the Watergate break-in and bugging, 
he said, now, that is plain libelous. And he said, as I understand the 
libel law, it s important to get a quick demand for a retraction, and 
he said, 1 would like to get it in the same edition that I am putting 
them on notice. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, he has testified about that conversation. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Any other topic of conversation ? 

Let me explore that a little bit further. 

Mr. MooRE. No, i am trying to think now about other conversations 
while he was at Camp David. 

Mr. Thompson, i am sui'e that can be explored later. Let me ask 
you about two more points, if I may. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Dean testified that he showed you a list of 
people that he thought were probably indictable, people who may be 
indicted, 1 believe, on April 14, going back. Could you tell us as best 
you can remember who the people were he felt would be indicted ; in 
other words, who was on the list and why he thought that any of those 
individuals would be indicted ? 

Mr. Moore. You said would I tell you who was on the list ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. Moore. I was wondering if I could see the list. 

1 can pick them as I remember them. 

Mr. Thompson. No, sir. 

Mr. Moore. I don't really know — first of all, he didn't — let me start. 

Mr. Thompson. Who do you know who was on the list ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, sir, the list had questionmarks and asterisks on it. 
I would like to work from that, because I would not like to put a 
questionmark fellow with an asterisk fellow. 

Mr. Thompson. We can't give you that. We want to know what you 
remember about it. 

Mr. Moore. It's part of the record. It's an exhibit. Oh, excuse me. 
You want my best recollection ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. Moore. I thought you wanted to analyze the list. I am sorry. 

Mr. Thompson. Not at this point. That might be done later. 

Mr. Moore. All right. 

Mr. Thompson. Who was on the list ? 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Thompson. Who else ? 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Thompson. Who else ? 



1989 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Strachan. 

Mr. Thompson. Who else ? 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Haldeman. 

Mr. Thompson. Who else ? 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Thompson. Who else ? 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Colson, but I think with a question mark. 

Mr. Thompson. Anyone else ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, Mr. Stans. 

Mr. Thompson. Anyone else ? 

Mr. Moore. Mr. O'Brien. 

Mr. Thompson. Anyone else ? 

Mr. Moore. And I think — Mr. Parkinson. I think they both had 
question mai'ks. And there were some others. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, just working with that 

Mr. Moore. Eight. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ask him why he thought Haldeman might 
be indicted i 

Mr. Moore. Yes — pardon me. What I asked him was — yes, how do 
you figure Haldeman? You know, what's that? And I did ask him 
that. 

Mr. Thompson. What did he say ? 

Mr. Moore. He said, I think he may have some trouble with that 
$350,000 which was over here, and I think also, it's a question of how 
much Strachan told him or gave him in terms of the Watergate. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he say that he knew what Strachan told him or 
Dean knew what Strachan had told him ? 

Mr. Moore. Once again, in his closing days, he said to me that he 
was not that, that Strachan may have been aware of him getting in- 
formation derived from the Watergate, but whether he gave it to 
Haldeman or not, Mr. Dean didn't say. 

Mr. Thompson. Any other matters? The $350,000 and what 
Strachan might have given him? 

Mr. Moore. That is right. 

Mr. Thompson. Any other reason ? 

Mr. Moore. No. 

Mr. Thompson. Those are the only two reasons he gave you at that 
time about what he thought 

Mr. Moore. Yes, the quick one ; that is right. 

Mr. Thompson. What about any of the rest of them? Did you ask 
about any of the rest of them specifically ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, I think I asked it this way, because it surprised 
me. I think I said, Ehrlichman? What's he got to do with Watergate? 
Or how do you figure Watergate ? 

And he said, his problem may not be so much Watergate. Words — 
quotes— I do not know. The effect was that Mr. Ehrlichman's problem 
might not be so much Watergate as the Ellsberg matter. 

Now, I have been trying to remember whether he added the break-in 
of the doctor's office. I am not certain in my mind enough to say so. 
But the thing that struck me, the only thing that I recall is that the 
differentiation between Watergate with Haldeman, and Ellsberg with 
Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ask him anything about how he compiled 
the entire list, or a more general question ? 



1990 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. What did he say ? 

Mr. Moore. He said my counsel— and I want to say this carefully be- 
cause I do not want to reflect wrongly. Let nie preface it by saying that 
I did not know at that time that he and his counsel had been talking 
to the U.S. attorney. So what he said to me was, my counsel has better 
sources at the U.S. attorney's office than anybody around here has, 
and on the basis of what he told him, what he knows, this looks like 
about the list. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, Mr. Moore. Let me ask you a final ques- 
tion. It is very important, of course, as to what the President told you 
and as to what the President told Mr. Dean, and vice versa. And we 
know about Mr. Dean's relationship with the President, how long he 
knew him, and so forth. How long have you known President Nixon ? 

Mr. MooRE. I met him in 1950, but I did not know him well until 
1962. 

Mr. Thompson. 1962? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. When did you get acquainted ? During a campaign 
situation ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. In 1962, I think I was chairman of a little media 
advisory committee that 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever travel with him ? 

Mr. MooRE. In the gubernatorial campaign, I do not — I did not 
travel with him, but I visited with him often in his headquarters or in 
his law office. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you have private conversations with him? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. You mean from 1962 to the present date ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. Now, it was actually — I got to know him best, we 
got well acquainted really in the 1962 campaign. Then while he was 
out of office, I perhaps saw more of him and on a more intimate basis. 
So that is when I knew him. 

Then, when he went to New^ York, my contacts with him were 
slight, and it was not until the summer of 1968, when I got a message 
from him; would I be willing to travel around, available for the 
campaign. 

Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Moore. I want to apologize for 
taking up this amount of time. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Moore, I am certain that you are aware that your appearance 
here as a witness, and more specifically as a witness to follow Mr. 
Mitchell's testimony, was requested by the counsel to the President, 
Mr. Leonard Garment ? 

Mr. Moore. I have no direct knowledge of that. I have heard it, I 
have read it. Mr. Garment never told me that. 

Senator Inouye. Have you discussed this testimony with Mr. 
Garment ? 

Mr. Moore. No, sir. My only discussions — let me say, I was asked 
by a reporter 

Mr. Inouye. Were you briefed on this discussion ? 



1991 

Mr. Moore. No, sir. But I would like to make a footnote on that. I 
jnet— and I think Mr. Miller was with me— to determine what the 
executive privilege and attorney-client privilege situation was, and 
we discussed that aspect. And since the question has been raised, I 
was asked by a reporter, has my testimony been reviewed in the White 
House ? The answer is no one ever sought, no one ever knew what I was 
going to say, and I was not advised by it. 

Senator Inouye. Did you ever discuss this with anyone in the White 
House ? 

Mr. MooRE. The content of my testimony ? 

Senator Inouye. Is it not strange 

Mr. Moore. Excuse me, occasionally, just to get a fact or a date that 

1 can recall. 

Senator Inouy^e. Is this not rather strange? I thought it was the 
general practice in the White House to brief people before they 
appeared before the public, such as Mr. Ziegler, and you were one of 
the briefers. No one briefed y^u before this most historical proceeding? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I am not exactly in Mr. Ziegler's role. No, sir, no 
one briefed me before this important proceeding. 

Senator Inouye. Now, your testimony is that you are not aware 
that Mr. Garment requested your appearance here? 

Mr. MooRE. I am now aware that it has been said. I had frankly 
hoped to get a little more time before appearing, when I heard — what 
was that again, Monday — Monday night. Then I was told by — 
perhaps Mr. Miller could help me out on this, because they might have 
informed him. 

Mr. Miller. Senator, perhaps I can clear this up. I was informed, 
and Mr. Lenzner can correct me on this, I was informed, I think — I 
cannot place the time, but I was informed by Mr. Lenzner that the 
White House had requested that Mr. Moore's name be on a witness 
list to appear before tliis committee. I believe that was approximately 

2 weeks ago. 

Subsequent to that, a list of prospective or possible — and possible 
witnesses appeared in the papers and I noticed that Mr. Moore's name 
was listed as a possible. That is my only knowledge of a White House 
request. 

Senator Inouye. Did you ever discuss it Monday evening ? 

Mr. Miller. Pardon me. 

Senator Inouye. Did you have a discussion with the counsel Monday 
evening ? 

Mr. Miller. Oh, yes. Mr. Lenzner talked to me on the telephone at 
approximately 6 :15 of Monday evening of this week. In that conversa- 
tion, I can't recall if he told me — I think what he told me was that 
the minority counsel had requested Mr. Moore's appearance. I don't 
recall him telling me that the 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you say majority counsel ? 

Mr. Miller. No, I said minority. 

I believe he told me Mr. Thompson had requested that Mr. Moore 
appear to testify Thursday morning. I don't recall Mr. Lenzner 
saying anything to me about the White House requesting that he 
appear at this particular time on Monday evening at 6 :15. 

Mr. Moore. Senator Inouye, I should also add for completeness that 
Mr. Parker of the Wliite House attended, did he not, the interview 



1992 

with the staff on June 7. I will also say that the first time I saw his 
report of that was when it was handed to me yesterday on that Dita 
Beard matter. So there was no — now, I should also say that before 
these proceedings, before, that I had talked with Leonard Garment 
about the facts of the situation back in early April. He was invited 
to come in as a complete new face in this matter at that time and I had 
told him of my discussions with the President as I have described them 
here as a matter of filling him in, since he at that point had become 
the primai-y coordinator. But that was not in connection with — at that 
time, I did not know I wsls going to be a witness, so it was not in con- 
nection with the testimony. But I have discussed with Mr. Garment 
in that sense some of the facts which I am now testifying to, but he 
didn't know whether I was going to testify to them or anj'thing else. 

Mr. Dash. Senator Inouye, I think I can clear this up for the record, 
because the convereation was actually between me and Mr. Garment 
and I don't know Avhether Mr. Moore knew of it. But sometime during 
the Dean testimony, when I was in contact with Mr. Garment with 
reference to getting AVhite House papers, Mr. Garment, not making an 
official request and indicating that it was not his position to tell us what 
witnesses to call and what our witness order should be, did say as one 
lawyer to another lawj^er that he felt it would be fair to have people 
testify shortly after Mr. Dean who were knowledgeable of the same 
matters that Mr. Dean had testified to and did mention Mr. Moore 
as a possible witness. And I did indicate to him that we had intended 
to call Mr, Moore anyhow and that I also felt it was a fair procedure 
to call somebody who was knowledgeable of Mr. Dean's meetings and 
testify soon after Mr. Dean had testified. That was the extent of the 
conversation between Mr. Garment and me. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. I thought the record should 
be clear, because insinuations have been made. 

Mr. Moore. I am very glad to have it clear, sir, thank you. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Moore, you are the special counselor to the 
President of the United States. You have in your words described 
yourself as a source of w^hite-haired advice and experience whenever 
the President or the younger men with line responsibility seek my help. 

You have also suggested to the committee that you are a media, press, 
and TV expert, and undoubtedly, a very important person, because at 
the San Clemente and La Costa meetings, you were invited to attend 
these meetings by two of the most important and influential men in the 
Government of the United States. Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlieli- 
man. At that point, you have testified that you liad no idea of the 
involvement of the White House or any of its staff members in the 
Watergate break-in or the aftermath. Isn't that correct, sir? 

Mr. MooRE. That is correct. 

Senator Inouye. Didn't you feel that it was rather strange, if the 
White House had not been implicated, to be discussing, among other 
things, how to get members of this committee ? 

Mr. Moore. How to get them, sir ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes. 

Mr. Moore. I am not sure 

Senator Inouye. Didn't you discuss the membership of this 
committee ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. I think I was in the room for that discussion. 



1993 

Yes, go ahead. Yes, I remember. 

Senator Inouye. Weren't you looking for weak spots in all of us? 

Mr. MooRE. I don't think so. Senator. I don't recall that. I heard 
Mr. Dean say that question came up and I don't think — I know of no 
search for weak spots. In fact, that suggestion I testified to earlier, 
you will note, never went anywhere. No, sir. 

Senator Inouye. You had been involved in the campaigns of 1962, 
1964, 1968, and 1972, now. Weren't you at least a bit curious when 
the matter of money was being discussed ? 

Mr. Moore. In the context of at least 8 hours of discussion and the 
frame of reference in which it came up and the switch of emphasis to 
let John do it, I merely thought to myself, they need money and they 
want me to ask Mitchell ; I Imow what's going to happen, I will 

Senator Inouye. This was February 9. The Committee To Ke-Elect 
the President had filed a report with the Government Accounting 
Office indicating that the committee had a surplus of $3.5 million. At 
the end of May, another report was filed indicating a surplus of $4.5 
million. Weren't you curious as to why more money had to be raised, 
even with the surplus ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, under the circumstances, I mean looking back, 
I should have been curious. I don't recall thinking about it, but here 
was a variety of lawsuits, including individual defendants. I didn't 
know, I didn't examine the question, but in the context of hindsight, 
it could easily have been a matter of financing — we had a lot of 
individual defendants here. I don't know whether the committee 
felt it was proper to use money contributed to the reelection of the 
President for personal defense funds or personal suits by members or 
employees. But I did not think about it. I did not examine that ques- 
tion, because with reflection and with hindsight — I had been called 
the night before. It w^as the first time I had been in a committee to 
start examining what would be the Watergate phase. Whatever was 
said, and I recall it was I have stated, did not raise curiosity m my 
mind. What was raised in my mind was, who is kidding who ? John 
Mitchell is not going to do this, I am not going to make an issue of it 
with him ; I will tell him. As I did tell him and as indeed, he did refuse 
it. Nothing came of it. 

You say I should have been curious. I guess I will have to acknowl- 
edge I should have been. 

Senator Inouye. As a man whose advice is sought by the President 
and other members of the staff, and one who is an expert in the media 
and the press, one who has participated in the briefing and trial runs 
of Mr. Ziegler's press conferences, I am correct to presume that you 
do follow the news accounts of the day, don't you, you read the 
papers ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. And as one who is well-versed in the business of 
news reporting, didn't you get a bit curious about these reports coming 
out from the New York Times, the Washington Post, and for that 
matter, most of the papers of the United States directly implicating 
members of the White House staff? 

Weren't you a bit curious when articles about checks directly linked 
to the Committee To Re-Elect the President were being presented ? 

Mr. Moore. I was curious about that. That is one of the matters. 



19M 

Senator Inouye. How did you expect to advise the President if you 
didn't do any research on this ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, should I start with the checks? Yes. As I think 
I testified, yes, I testified to Mr. T^nzner, I was in a series of meeting 
at that time, I mentioned the checks yesterday when Mr. Stans and 
the finance committee were bein<i severely criticized and I heard Mr. 
Stans' recital of how those checks came to him and what happened 
to him. When T heard about the first one and. as he recited it to mo. 
I said to him "I think you ouo;ht to" — T think it was Clark Mollenhoff 
who is probably here in the room — I said "I think you ought to <ret 
a good reporter to hear that story and put it out because from your 
standpoint your story is perfectly legitimate, in my opinion." And 
I think you know the story of that check, of how Mr. Dahlberg and 
so forth. I don't know what this has to do with the February 10 meet- 
ing. But, gentlemen, I did know about that and the answer is that 
I do read the newspapers, and in this case I told Mr. Stans that is 
something that belongs in the newspapers so that the people could 
hear about it and what happened. 

But what I would ask you to think about, you mentioned what 
honor it was to be invited to sit in the room with the two men at the 
pinnacle of this Government, and to think or with the thought, I was 
not prepared, Senator Inouye, obviously by frame of reference or at- 
titude certainly by knowledge or background to make an assumption 
that the two men closest to the President back in February when 
there had been no publicity about any coverup or any payments at all, 
were engaged in some illegal enterprise. 

Now, that takes quite a jump in a person's mind, and I was not pre- 
pared to accept that suspicion apparently because it didn't enter my 
mind and if it had I would have pursued it and I was there as I have 
explained on the issues of the hearing as relate to presenting our side 
in a way where it puts across in an equal fashion to the other side 
and, as I think I was talking to Mr. Lenzner in his office the other 
day about these lawsuits in this conversation that was going on. he 
said, "It sounds like you weren't paying much attention," and he is 
right, I wasn't paying much attention to the status of the lawsuits 
over at the committee, if that is where it was, and I was not concen- 
trating on the fact of anything except that once again I am in the 
position of, as I used to be 2 years earlier of communicating some- 
thing from Ehrlichman to Mitchell where Mr. Jolm Mitchell would 
sometimes answer in very short words and I just thought I will let 
that rest and get on to these other things, and we did. 

Now hindsight, yes, indeed. Senator. I wish I had thought it through 
and, of course, I began, as I testified, in my statement, this in March as 
things began to fall in place. 

Now, you know I Avent back and looked at the clippings and won- 
dered what mv state of mind was and back in February all these 
things we're all so familiar with now were not being pursued. A lot of 
things were but not this. 

Senator Inouye. In other words, you did not take seriously some 
of the charges which were being made bv responsible Americans. 

Mr. Moore. I think I would have taken anv charge seriously that 
was made by resoonsible Americans but I don't know which charges 
you arc referring to. If you will give me one 



1995 

Senator Inouye. The Presidential campaign, the Democratic can- 
didate for the Presidency on several occasions directly accused the 
White House. You were not concerned about that ? 

Mr. MooRE. Accused the White House of what? 

Senator Ixouye. Involvement in the Watergate coverup. 

Mr. Moore. Yes, I am aware. You are speaking of the White House, 
although it is a very general term, yes. I guess Mr. O'Brien or Mr. 
McGovern, I don't know, I suppose they would say there must have 
been knowledge over there. That was, if I may use an old Wendell 
Wilkie phrase, I took as campaign oratory because the President of 
the United States had said on August 29 that he was completely 
satisfied that no one in the White House was involved or had knowl- 
edge and I knew of no one in the White House who was involved or 
had knowledge, and if it has been proven, what has been proven I 
won't comment on because we have a jury of 20 million people watch- 
ing and I am not going to say what was proven, I will say then that 
I had no knowledge that would justify support of that these political 
charges you are talking about. 

Senator Ixouye. Mr. ^Nloore, as a lawyer, I am certainly aware that 
oftentimes when one is accused of improper activity the person accused 
would use as his defense similar improper activities of the accuser. 

Now, when Mr. Dean suggested that we should request that all of 
the panel members discuss their political contributions, why was that 
necessary ? Am I to interpret this to mean that there was some validity 
to the accusation? What I am trying to say is that if the White House 
was clean 

Mr. Moore. No, sir 

Senator Ixouye [continuing]. If all of you were clean why come up 
with a defense of this sort or why did you consider that ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, let me put it this way : First, we did not come up 
with that. 

Second, take the date, the date was INIarch 20. This was long after 
these discussions about the hearings, and this suggestion, so far as I 
know, and it certainly appeared that way, was being made to the Presi- 
dent for the first time so if there had been a plan, a coverup plan, coni- 
ing out of La Costa that involved undermining this committee, this 
was the first time it was coming, it was surfacing, and it didn't happen. 

Also, in fairness to Mr. Dean he didn't say that you should all be 
investigated. He said it would be good for us to take the initiative and 
for the public to know that this, the seven members of this committee 
were willing to subject themselves to the investigation, and if they 
didn't that is going to sort of, yes, he did then say that would sort of 
take, that would help the issue how about them. 

Now the important thing is that the President didn't show interest 
in it. I said nothing, I felt it was not necessary, and got one of those 
things — leave your name and address outside, and you know, that kind 
of thing, "Well, let's think it over or maybe that is something we can 
think over,'' and nothing came of it. 

And it wasn't until that point — in fairness to Mr. Dean this wasn't 
an undercover thing, he wasn't suggesting that you Senator be in- 
vestigated. He was suggesting that someone say in order that this 
hearing be totally like Caesar's wife that if the committee would agree 
to it it would be good, and he felt that it would make us good to make 
the offer. So I wanted to get that in context. 



1996 

Senator Inouye. Fine, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell, during 8 days of testimony, suggested to the committee 
that he decided not to advise the President of irregularities because 
he was afraid that if the President learned of these irregularities on 
the involvement of White House staff members he would immediately 
lower the boom. 

In fact, you used a phrase here "immediate dismissal." This was one 
of those matters discussed. And if immediate dismissal or immediate 
lowering of the boom had occurred the lid would have been lifted, the 
scandal would have been exposed and the election would have been 
endangered. 

Do you agree with this also ? 

Mr. Moore. It is a long comment. I think my answer is no. But are 
you asking me whether the election would have been endangered or the 
philosophy expressed? 

Senator Inouye. Do you agree that if the President had been advised 
he would have immediately lowered the boom on those involved ? 

Mr. MooRE. I didn't hear or read Mr. Mitchell's testimony. Are 
you talking now about the scandal being the break-in or what is the 
context ? 

Senator Inottye. The former Attorney General advised this com- 
mittee that he had decided not to advise the President. 

Mr. MooRE. Of what, sir ? 

Senator Inouye. Of the involvement of certain White House staff 
members in the aftermath of the Watergate because he knew that the 
President, upon learning of this, would immediately lower the boom, 
and if he did so the lid would be off. 

Mr. MooRE. Now what portion of that would you like me to respond 
to? 

Senator Inouye. Would the President immediately have lowered 
the boom if he had learned about the involvement ? 

Mr. MooRE. I think so and I think the events of April 30 — ^take the 
word "immediately," I don't think the President is so precipitous 
that he would act immediately, that he would act without careful 
investigation, studv of the matter. 

Senator Inouye! In April ? On March 21 he learned about the heavy 
involvement of Mr. Dean, didn't he ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. Well 

Mr. Moore. Pardon me, I don't know what he learned. Mr. Dean 
told me that he told the President everything or let it all out. 

Senator Inouye. Didn't the President make an announcement 

Mr. MooRE. I have no knowledge of what he told the President 
because I was not there. 

Senator Inouye. Didn't the President make the announcement that 
he had startling new evidence ? 

Mr. Moore. I don't know that — no, he did not. 

Senator Inouye. Did he make an announcement on or about that 
time? 

Mr Moore. He made an announcement on April 17. 

Senator Inottye. That he had learned on March 21 ? 

Mr. Moore. That is right. 



1997 

Senator Ervin. A vote is in progress. I don't know whether the 
Senator wants to proceed but there is a vote now. 

Senator Inouye. I will finish this. 

Senator Ervin. I will let you preside and I will go and vote. 

Senator Inouye. Well, the President didn't fire John Dean, did he ? 

Mr. Moore. I am sorry, in the commotion I couldn't hear that, sir. 

Senator Inouye. On March 22 didn't the President designate Mr. 
Dean to be our liaison man here ? 

Mr. Moore. To be 

Senator Inouye, Liaison with the committee. 

Mr. MooRE. Of the committee? 

Senator Inouye. The White House liaison to this committee. 

Mr. MooRE. Oh, excuse me. I don't now. That escapes me. In terms 
of working out executive privilege you mean ? 

Senator Inouye. Five and a half weeks later the President an- 
nounced that resignations of Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and 
Mr. Dean. He accepted the resignations of Haldeman and Ehrlich- 
man with reluctance, and announced to the world how great they 
were, and they were on the payroll until the end of May. 

Was this your idea of immediate dismissal and lowering the boom ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, when you say immediate, Senator Inouye, the 
President is a lawyer, he is a man of judgment and compassion, and 
I think that to have acted on the word of one man to immediately 
take action against men of the stature and the service without an op- 
portunity for study or investigation would have been totally wrong 
and he wouldn't have done it. 

Now, I should say that, in that connection, this recalls that in the 
April 19 meeting, he had made a statement on April 17, he asked me, 
"By the way, do you think I waited too long for that statement?" 

And my reply, was "From what I know certainly not, sir. You 
couldn't go plunging ahead with public announcements that would 
jeopardize people and ruin reputations." 

Bear in mind this was April 17. 

I said, "I think the country would expect you to take that much 
time. I think you are on target but I think from now on." 

That is why, because I wasn't sure, that that is again I requested 
that meeting in the Oval Office the next morning with that 3 minute 
interview I recited because I wanted to be sure he understood my 
thoughts that having studied it he certainly should have, in fairness 
to all concerned, that he now not delay because now the ball was in 
the Oval Office. 

Senator Inouye. May we pause at this moment to take a short recess 
until 2 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, at 12 :25 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 
at 2 p.m., the same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Friday, July 13, 1973 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 
Senator Gurney. 

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Moore, your testimony certainly is of very vital importance 
to these hearings, I think for a number of reasons. You are about 



1998 

the only witness who has come before us who had no involvement 
in the planning or break-in of Watergate or the coverup of Water- 
gate either until yoii came to know something aboui; it in the meetings 
that we have heard discussed here in March. 1 thi ik also you are one 
of the few witnesses who have, as 1 would put it, no axe to grind 
either. Most of the other witnesses, of course, who have appeared 
or will appear, some have been convicted, some indicted, other in- 
dictments will flow but that is not in your case. 

And then, too, you are also one of the very few people who have 
personal knowledge of Watergate in the meetings that you had with 
the President either with Mr. IJean or by yourself. So I think it would 
be fair to say that really no other witness that we are going to have 
in these hearings has testimony which is more important to offer 
the committee than you have. 

As I see it, just before every facet of what you know about Water- 
gate has been covered by the interrogation of the two counsels, and 
Senator Inouye and I do not intend to repeat all those. I would like 
to bring out though, what 1 think is important. 

In any kind of a hearing of this sort obviously the credibility of a 
witness is important and youi- credibility is of enormous importance. 

You brought out a little bit about your background but 1 think it 
would be well if we heard more about it. 

As I recall, you mentioned that you had graduated from law school 
and then you described very briefly that you practiced law in New 
York and then moved to California but let us start in New York and 
outline to the committee rather fully what your career has been. 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. I graduated from both Yale College and Yale 
Law School and took and passed the bar in 1939 in New York. I 
practiced with the firm of Breed, Abbott, and Morgan. I later took 
some months off to work on a separate matter and then came back 
and joined the firm as an associate of Cravath, then Cravath De- 
Gersdorf, Swaine, and Wood, they put the Moore in it, it is now 
Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, that is another Moore, they put that on 
after I left. [Laughter.] 

And I enlisted in 1942 as a private in the Army. 

Senator Gurney. I might say at that point that I began my legal 
career, as you did, in New York City, the year before 1938 and I am 
well familiar with those firms, and if you perhaps would not like to 
say it I would, that they are two of the finest law firms not only in 
New York City but in the United States. 

Mr. Moore. Thank you very much. Senator. I am very proud to be 
there. 

I spent just about 4 years in the Army, I went as usual, throufih 
OCS, served in the 11th Air Force and served as an intelligence offi- 
cer in Alaska, came back and worked in military intellio-ence, and 
G-2, so-called special branch, and I left the Army in mid-1946. 

I had become bv then interested, as many ix'ople cominp' out of the 
Army were in changing a career and since T was hitoros+ed in mmpiu- 
nications I became assistant general counsel to the then new Ameri- 
can Broadcasting Co., with a kind of understanding when television 
came over the horizon would be allowed to go into that area which 



1999 

was duly clone and I worked, I became their television business man- 
ager, and in 1949 I was invited to go to the west coast to inaugurate 
and prepare the west coast part of the American Broadcasting Co., in 
television. 

We loved it there in southern California ; we were invited to stay on 
and head the west coast operation, and after 2 or 3 years of that, 
one of our competitors, the Los Angeles, the Times-Mirror Co., invited 
iiie, Mr. Norman Chandler invited me, to come over and run his tele- 
vision enterprise, which I did for 12 years. 

Senator Gurney. "W^iat were your duties there ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I was president of the Times-Mirror Broadcasting 
Co., which operated the television station KTTV, which was a non- 
network, independent station which, and we also got into the distribu- 
tion of programs and production and that sort of thing. 

I also was a member of the board of directors of the parent com- 
pany, the Times-Mirror Co., where I was on one or two of the commit- 
tees'in acquisitions and in the general area, but primarily my activities 
Avere entirely in, 90 percent in broadcasting and mostly television 
broadcasting. 

Senator Gurney. When you say parent company does the Times 
stand for the Log Angeles Times ? 

Mr. ;Moore. Yes. The Times-Mirror Co., is the publisher of the Los 
Angeles Times. 

Senator Gurxey. Go on. 

Mr. Moore. After about 12 years of that it struck me I could either 
stay and make a full, lifetime career in a family company or get into 
some of the new aspects of communications, and I did that. 

I left and I joined with some others in mostly in cable television, 
and I was also retained by other broadcasters and I had several years 
of that, and we founded, or I was a founder of several cable television 
enterprises and as it happened in 1968 I had 

Senator Gurxey. In this work of founding companies, were you 
sort of a consultant as an expert in the television field, was that it? 

Mr. ISIooRE. Yes, I was both. I was consultant to the Storer Broad- 
casting Co. We were also interested and there was a great deal of 
interest then in some form of subscription or pay television which 
Avould add, broaden the choice of services available to the American 
people, and provide for minority programing, they Avould not have 
to get a high rating, as we say nowadays, in order to remain on the air 
because 25 cents or 50 cents, if there were a number of them in the 
coinbox, would support a cultural program or a special interest pro- 
gram. That never quite came about but cable television did and I had 
an interest in, I think, three or foui- systems, minority in most cases 
but one in San Diego was, I was the primary founder of that, and 
that was later acquired by the Time-Life people about 1968. I was 
active in the industry. I was vice chairman of the National Association 
of Cable Television, I have been active on the broadcast side in my 
davs there and iust about in the summer of 1968 that matter was_ con- 
summated, and just about then I srot a phone call from Mr. Bob Finch, 
who said that the then Mr. Dick Nixon, as we called him, would like to 
talk to me or inquire whether I would like to ride around on the 
airplane with him and be kind of a general helper, and I said I just 



2000 

happened to be available, and I had a very exciting 90 days. My first 
direct involvement in anything? political was the dav I stepjDed aboard 
the Tricia and we went off to Chica«?o for the first rally. 

Senator Gueney. What campaign was this ? 

Mr. MooRE. This was 1968. 

Senator Gtjrney. Go on. 

Mr. Moore. And I still had, I was — well, I was invited to come into 
the administration very much in the role I now have. I still had one 
matter pending which I had to — there was an interest in a radio appli- 
cation and I waited nntil I could dispose of that, and then I came 
back here and at that invitation but meanwhile Mr. John Mitchell had 
heard of my cominj? and he asked, he said — I sometimes think this is 
why I went to the White House — "I would like somebody around tlie 
Department my own age that I can talk to and don't have an ax to 
grind and advise me," and, if I mav say so, at that time he was having 
a pretty hard time in srettinjr with his media image, as people call it, 
and so he asked me if I could help him on that, and anything else, he 
said "I would just like one guy next to my office that I can call him 
in or he can walk in and we can talk about anything he pleased." 

So I had a verv rewarding year and busy year. 

Then when the in\ntation to come to the White House was 
renewed 

Senator Gukney. Your work with the President in 1968 and with 
Mr. Mitchell in the Justice Department in 1970 and 1971, as I under- 
stand it then was merelv or mainly advisory work on television and 
public relations, is that riffht ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, it didn't quite work that way, not television per 
se, although I was called in on — Mr. Frank Shakevspeare was the tele- 
vision director, and a fine one, and actually what the President said 
to me was he wanted a generalist, as he put it, who would be available 
to analyze any problem or, let's say. opposing statement or event that 
happened that day that would come in with suggestions as to how to 
respond. 

Senator Gurn^ey. Sort of an idea man ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. I ended up doing a lot of writing of the material for 
I think we had 90 stops on that airplane for his local rallies, speeches 
which — where we would try to update them and make them topical 
and he asked me to sort of worrj' about that. He had, of course, basic 
issues he talked about. 

Senator Gtjrney. Yes. 

Mr. MooRE. Anyhow or he might just say "Can you come in" and 
there might be others there or not or "What do you think about this 
problem coming up," this kind of thing. I was just a utility infielder, 
if vou will. 

Senator Gtjrney. What did you do with Mr. Mitchell in the Justice 
DeT>artment? 

Mr. MooRE. I was a oreneral. a general assistant and someone that he 
could bound ideas off, and also most certainlv, and prim.arilv, con- 
cerned with the, No. 1, when he should respond, when he should issue 
statements, when and what problems were and we were fretting, in 
terms of this wouVl be more in the public relations aiTa, although we 
would sit and talk about, T used to sit in on, legal mattere. too, but 
not as an official member of the legal team, but to get to be familiar 
with the problems, and it's a good combination in the Department of 



2001 

Justice when a man is both a lawyer and also charged with the 
communication. 

So I traveled with Mr. Mitchell. I met with him every day, certainly 
usually at the end of the day or in the morning, to see what problems 
there might be that day I could help him on. 

Senator Gurney. I wonder if we could go back to Los Angeles just 
a moment 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Senator Gurney [continuing]. In your private life. Could you de- 
scribe for us some of your community activities there ? You mentioned 
that you were prominent in the cable television industry. What about 
community activities? Did you have any duties or missions there? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, yes, I was active in the community. Senator Gur- 
ney, constantly. I put my whole time there. I suppose my principal 
area was I was a director of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce 
for many years ; I was a director of the Hollywood Bowl ; I was active 
and had a soit of special interest in the Arthritis and Rheumatism 
Foundation, which we used to put on, I think we put in one of the first 
telethons — way back. I am talking about 1949 or 1950 in early tele- 
vision. We developed a f undraising technique. 

One of my friends had a health problem — well, no need to go into 
that. Also, for my Irish friends that are looking in, I was a member 
of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick and a past president. 

Senator Gurney. I am not familiar with their activities, but I have 
heard of them. 

Mr. Moore. I was also on the mayor's 

Senator Gurney. Does your brother have anything to do with the 
Sons of St. Patrick? 

Mr. MooKE. He is not unknown to them. Senator. The Ambassador 
to Ireland, you are speaking about ? 

Senator Gurney. Yes. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, his grandfather and his father were members. 

Is that not true, Mr. Ambassador ? 

Yes, they were members of the Friendly Sons. 

Senator Gurney. Did you do anything in the field of human rights? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir; I was on the mayor's committee on human 
rights. It was not as active as I thought it would be, but also, we ini- 
tiated a good deal of that kind of programing in our television station, 
some of the early ones, that we like to think set patterns for some of the 
formats you see today. 

I am doing a little bragging, I suppose, but you gave me a good 
opportunity. 

Senator Gurney. Well, that is what I wanted. 

AVhat I really wanted to bring out, and this is no intent to judge 
any of the other cast of characters that has been before the committee, 
but you don't really impress me from your background as being any 
kind of a Watergate rascal. 

So, I wanted to bring that out. 

Mr. MooRE. That is a compliment. 

That is taken down in the transcript, I take it. 

Thank you for making that })art of the record, sir. 

Senator Gurney. That really was a total joke on my part. 

Mr. MooRE. I understand. 



2002 

Senator Gurney. I am not judging anybody here. It is not my job 
to do that. 

Now, do you have any other activities you would like to mention, 
or shall we move to the White House ? 

Mr. Moore. I think — I am sure I can think of a couple, but I think it 
is time to move. 

Senator G'urney. Well, thank you, Mr. Moore. 

Now, what were your duties at the White House ? Just briefly ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Quite similar to the duties and back on the airplane and back on 
the — I was, if you will, I had no line responsibilities, no statf. I had 
a secretary. I was available to get into any particular issue, program, 
project that came along where an extra hand was needed or extra 
head. I really developed kind of a clientele. I was something of an 
independent practitioner. Some of the younger men would come in 
and ask my ideas on substantive problems. I was active in the — they 
had a news planning committee that used to meet regularly. They 
would review what kind of news we would be making this week— by 
"we," I mean the administration, including the agencies and 
departments. 

I helped many of the statements and messages of the President and 
even occasionally — rarely a speech, but even including the speeches, 
the less than major speeches. I circulated them to groups for their 
suggestions and criticisms and editorial suggestions. I have been on 
that committee most of the time. 

Senator Gurney. I take it even though your title is that of special 
counsel — this is what I am trying to bring out — you are less of an 
attorney 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Or legal adviser than you were in other duties as 
you have described them ? 

Mr. Moore. That is right. You see, I stopped practicing law as such 
in 1949, I guess. But nevertheless, I find myself working as a team 
member sometimes where my legal background is either useful or the 
reason for my being there. But primarily, I would say it was more in 
the communications field. 

Senator Gutiney. Now, let me go to, just to touch upon your rela- 
tionship with Mr. Dean again. That has been gone into at great length 
here, and I don't intend to go into that again. It has been covered 
most thoroughly. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. However, in previous testimony before the com- 
mittee when Mr. Dean was here, in response to a question by Senator 
Inouye, he had this to say: "Well, Richard Moore, to me, is a wonder- 
ful man. I often went to him for counsel. He is an older man and 
I respected his judgment very much." 

Would you say that— that is Mr. Dean talking. Would you say 
that that would characterize your relationship, at least part of your 
relationship, with Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. He was, he did regard you as a friend and a con- 
fidant and, as you have mentioned here before, he did go to you at 
times when he had trouble on his mind ? Is that true ? 



2003 

Mr. MoORK. Well, he came in that one incident I mentioned. But I 
was, of course — you are always flattered to hear comments like this. 
I began to see more of John Dean, really, in the recent weeks, where 
we saw a good deal of each other and where his own life and role 
took on a very different style and situation, starting basically with 
the Gray nomination hearings. 

Senator Git^ney. By the way, you know there has been a good deal 
of speculation here surrounding this Watergate affair as to whether 
Mr. Dean ever conducted an investigation or not. Now I am talking 
about the summer of 1972 following the break-in, and of course, prior 
to the President's statement in August about the fact that Mr. Dean 
had conducted an investigation and no White House personnel were 
involved. Do you have any knowledge of what Mr. Dean was doing 
in this so-called investigation ? 

Mr. Moore. No, I don't. And of course, that went back to, presum- 
ably to post 17 June or that area 

Senator Gltrney. That is right, in that area. 

jNIr. ]Moore. When I was not seeing Mr. Dean particularly and 
would not be aware of what he was doing. 

Senator Gutrney. I would like to cover one point here of Mr. Dean's 
testimony when he was before us. I think it is extremely important. 
That was his description of a March IB meeting which he had with 
President Nixon. This is really the first time, as I see his testirnony, 
that he has any real hard evidence on discussions with the President 
about Watergate. And I would like to read from his statement, which 
describes pretty accurately, I guess, what transpired in his mind. 

Toward the end of the conversation — 

I am reading from his statement now about the meeting of March 
13. 

Toward the end of the conversation, we got into a discussion of Watergate 
matters specifically. I told the President about the fact that there were money 
demands being made by the seven convicted defendants and that the sentencing 
of these individuals was not far off. It was during this conversation that Halde- 
man came into the oflice. After this brief interruption by Haldeman's coming in, 
but while he was still there, I told the President about the fact that there was 
no money to pay these individuals to meet their demands. He asked me how 
much it would cost. I told him I could only make an estimate, that it might be as 
high as a million dollars or more. 

He told me that that was no problem, and he also looked over at Haldeman and 
repeated the same statement. He then asked we who was demanding this money 
and I told him it was principally coming from Hunt through his attorney. 

The President then referred to the fact that Hunt had been promised Executive 
clemency. He said he had discussed this matter with Ehrlichman, and contrary 
to instructions that Ehrlichman had given Colson not to talk to the President 
about it, that Colson had also discussed it with him later. He expressed some 
annoyance at the fact that Colson had also discussed this matter with him. 

There is a little more, but that is the important part. In other words, 
Mr. Dean has testified that at this meeting on March 13, this whole 
business of Hunt's demands for blackmail— that word isn't used, but 
certainly, $1 million must be that — as well as Executive clemency 
were discussed. Now, then, you, of course, had a discussion with Mr. 
Dean about Hunt's problem and blackmail and — not Executive clem- 
ency, but the blackmail thing. As I recall your testimony, you were 
startled and horrified at this when you first learned about it. 

Now, then, here's what I want to ask : Did Mr. Dean ever tell you 
when this matter came up between you and him, or, for that matter, 



9&-296 0— 73— b 



2004 

at any time later, I suppose up to INIarch 21, that he had discussed 
this matter of $1 million and Executive clemency with the President ? 

Mr. Moore. He never told me that. 

Senator Gurney. Now, don't you think that he would have told 
you about that if it actually had come up ? 

Mr. MooRE. He was telling me a great deal, Senator. 

Senator Ervin. I think we ought to allow a little freedom but I 
don't think that is quite a proper question. 

Senator Gtjrney. Well, I must sav, Mr. Chairman, that I think that 
question is less free wheeling than about a million I have heard in this 
committee room today. 

Senator Ervin. If you insist on it, I will permit it. 

Senator Gurnet. I do insist on it. 

Senator Ervin. You are asking him if he doesn't think if Mr. Dean 
had talked to the President about something, he would have told him ? 

Senator Gurney. That is exactly what I asked and would the wit- 
ness please answer ? 

Mr. MooRE. There is a 

Senator Gurney. If he desires to. 

Mr. MooRE. Well, it is a very key question and that is why I am 
hesitating, because I am giving my thought to what he might have 
done. 

Senator Gurney. You see, one of the reasons I am asking this, and 
I am sure the chairman knows this, is that a lot of Mr. Dean's testi- 
mony had to do with impressions he got 

Mr. MooRE. I understand. 

Senator Gurney [continuing]. That the President might know 
something about Watergate, what was going on in the President's 
mind. What I would like to know from your deep association with him, 
at least in tliis period of time, what you might have known what went 
on in his mind — Mr. Dean's. 

Mr. Moore. Well, I would have to say this, that inasmuch as he, 
that he might well have told me if that had happened, but that the 
fact that when I asked him on March 20 and he said no, he had never 
told the President any of these things, that might explain better why 
he didn't tell me, because at least on March 20, the indication that he 
made to me was that he hadn't told him. So, I would have to say this. 
Senator, that either John Dean felt that he shouldn't tell me on, at 
that time if that happened, in which case, he would have persisted in 
that when I asked him on March 20. 

So, I kind of go along with the notion that if that had happened, he 
mi.q-ht well have told me. 

Senator Gurney. This occurred, as I recall, either a dav or two 
before the March 21 meeting, did it not? "When he told the President 
everything ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, my conversation with him, in which he said that 
he had not told the President any of the things that were bothering 
him or that he had been hinting at, tliat conversation was on March 20. 

Now, the conversation you are referring to was March 13 ? 

Senator Gurney. Well, no, that is the one he had with the President. 

Mr. Moore. I mean the conversation where he testified that he had 
told the President these things. 



2005 

Senator Gurnet. All I am pointing out there is that your discussion 
with him about the blackmail and Mr. Hunt was very close to the 
March 21 meeting, when he told the President everything. 

Mr. Moore, Oh, yes. 

Senator Gurney. I see we have a vote here and we are going to have 
to adjourn until the vote is completed. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Gurney will resume the questioning. 

Senator Gurney. Mr. Moore, if we may just return for a moment to 
that very important business of Executive clemency which first came 
up in the meeting between Mr. Dean and the President on March 13, 
again, I simply ask the question of you, did Mr. Dean ever discuss 
this with you at any time that he and the President had talked about 
Executive clemency? 

[Mr. Moore shaking head.] 

Senator Gurney. And your answer to that is "No." 

Mr. Moore. No, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Let us turn again to the very important meeting 
that you had with Mr. Dean on April 14. That is the meeting that he 
mentioned to you the indictment list, and that is an important meeting 
because, as I recall, you paid that you were pretty shocked when he had 
this long list of people. That, of course, was well along into the period 
when Mr. Dean was making his plans about what he should do about 
his future in Watergate, the testimony, as I recall, that indicated that 
he had engaged counsel by that time, and that they too were in process 
of discussing this matter with the prosecuting attorneys, so, as I say, 
he was well along with his plans. Did he ever mention to you in this 
meeting that he intended to say at some time in the future and, of 
course, as he has said, that the President did know about Watergate 
and did know about the coverup ? 

Mr. Moore. No, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Did he ever discuss with you at any time, to your 
knowledge, about the fact that he was going to make the case that the 
President knew about the coverup ? 

ISIr. MooRE. No, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Can you give us any reason why he went ahead on 
this course? 

Mr. MooRE, Well, I would not really want to 

Senator Gurney. No, I am just asking 

Mr. Moore. I would not get into that. Senator Gurney, try to — one 
of the obvious reasons suggests itself, that he did not have any basis 
for that and he had no intention at that time of going in that direc- 
tion, and whether these thoughts came later, but I really should not 
.comment because it would really be 

Senator Gurney. That really is the question that I was going to 
put to you after the one I just put to you and that is that there was no 
indication to you from any conversations with him at any time during 
this period of time that he thought the President actually knew about 
the coverup of Watergate ; is that not correct ? 

^fr. jNIoore. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. So that at least in your mind from your conver- 
sations with Mr, Dean and also your meetings with Mr. Dean and the 



2006 

President, and tlie President himself, alone, there was nothing to indi- 
cate to you that Mr. Dean actually knew that the President was in- 
volved in or knew^ about the coverup of Watergate ? 

Mr. Moore. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. Well, I see we have got another vote here so we 
are going to have to cancel out. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Gurney. Mr. Moore, I think you mentioned in your state- 
ment or your testimony that you were also involved in the White 
House responses on the Segretti matter ; is that correct? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gltrney. I do not particularly want to go into that. I think 
we are going to look into those things later on. However, you did make 
a statement in connection with that, and I quote, "indirectly with the 
President," what did you mean by that ? 

Mr. INIooRE. I had better — are you asking me a question, sir? 

Senator Gurney. Yes ; well, I was asking 

Mr. MooRE. I am sorry, I did not mean to be 

Senator Gurney. I was looking for the precise c^uote in the state- 
ment but I recall you mentioned that you were working on White 
House responses to the Segretti matter, and you mentioned you talked 
to Chapin, and then you had a quote. 

Mr. Lenzner. Senator, that is page 3827 of the transcript where he- 
discusses 

Senator Gurney. And you used the words "indirectly with the Pres- 
ident," and that is what I was asking you about, what you meant by 
that. 

:Mr. MooRE. May I just look at that? 

Mr. ]\IiLLER. What page is that, INIr. Lenzner ? 

]Mr. Lenzner. ]Mr. 5liller, there is some reference on page 3827, 1 do 
not see reference to the President there. 

ISiv. MooRE. I have not found it. 

Senator Gurney. I think your inability to find it was that it was 
in one of the early interviews. I may find it later. Let me go on. 

Mr. Lenzner. It is in the staff interview. Senator. 

Senator Gurney. During all this — here it is in the staff interview 
here. The statement that "Moore said that he had discussed the Se- 
gretti matter indirectly with the President." 

Now, this is the staff witness summary. It is not a quote by you, it is 
simply a summary that you said that you had discussed the Segretti 
matter indirectly with the President and that is what I would like to 
ask about. Wliat does that mean ? 

Mr. Moore. It perhaps was a — it would have referred to — prob- 
ably what I was doing there was to make certain that I did not answer 
incorrectly. For instance, in the discussions of the press conference, 
those 20 questions, undoubtedly, in fact I do recall Segretti's name 
would be in there so that in any general discussion of the Watergate 
I might have in the discussion of answers might have said "Well, 
you know that goes for so and so Segretti, in the Segretti matter," 
some reference, perha]>s the word "indirectly" is not what I said or if 
I did then I did not intend it but some oblique reference that was 
really embraced within 



2007 

Senator Guhney. Talking about the briefings primarily ? 

Mr. Moore. Let me put it this way, he never had a specific discussion 
with the President about the Segretti case. 

Senator Gurney. Now, tell me, Mr. Moore, do you have any knowl- 
edge on your own of any involvement by Mr. Haldeman in the Water- 
gate coverup ? 

Mr. Moore. No, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. And do you have any knowledge of your own of 
any involvement of Mr. Ehrlichman in the Watergate coverup ? 

Mr. MooRE. No, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Do you have any knowledge on your own of any 
person in the White House other than what you have told us here about 
Mr. Dean of any involvement in the coverup of Watergate ? 

Mr. MooRE. No, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Now, just one final line of questions because, as I 
said at the outset, I think that all of the salient points have been pressed 
with you by the other members of the panel. But yesterday you started 
off with a very clear and what I thought was a forthright statement 
about the events as you knew them, surrounding the Watergate, your 
meetings with the President, and Mr. Dean and your meetings with 
Mr. Dean and your meetings with the President, and again, of course, 
this testimony is of extreme importance because, as I j^ointed out ear- 
lier, you are one of the very few witnesses probably that will appear 
before the panel who was not directly involved in the Watergate in 
one way or the other. 

Then, of course, when you completed your statement and counsel 
asked you on other matters, some collateral to Watergate, some that 
I do not think were directlv connected with it, your memory was 
rather hazy, and we both know as lawyers that that is one of the ways 
of attacking the credibility of a witness. If you remember some things 
accurately and then he does not remember other things accurately 
and I am sure you know that as well as I do, and I think a proper 
question at this time would be to ask why your memory was hazy 
on some of these other matters ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, sir, for one thing, from what I understood the 
subject matter was going to be at this session I concentrated reviewing 
the matters which were the substantial matters I talked about. 

Second, if you will recall the very first question about a White House 
report, well, I didn't know what that was ; it was a A^Hiite House report 
about the ITT investigation, and I simply couldn't recover from that, 
draw out of that memorandum I was handed any such White House 
report, about the ITT investigation, and then it did finally come back 
to me what they were really talking about was a young man who really 
tried to find out whether the secretaiy and another lady were ac- 
quainted and that was the White House report on the ITT investi- 
'gation. 

It took me a little while, perhaps starting on an assumption there 
would be more relevance to the question to get there. 

Then these bare meetings and dates, again, and bear in mind these 
dates were 1972, not 1973, I think there was a meeting with the Attor- 
ney General or Mr. Kleindienst in early 1972. 

That, it took me a moment because I met with the Attorney General 
or Mr. Kleindienst — if I am not mistaken, Mr. Mitchell was still the 



2008 

Attorney General then, and I suppose a hundred times, and to ask me 
with a bare date what was that meeting about, I said I didn't recollect. 
I think I remember finally saying now to Mr. Lenzner, "If you can 
give me the dates of hearings on the nomination of Mr. Klemdienst 
I think I can respond a little more directly and quickly," and I think 
he did, and we thereupon identified that the series of meetings all 
related to practically daily sessions about the confirmation hearings. 

The question about the — the question about June 30 — ^the meeting 
with the President, now that was again a bare date, nothing connected 
with it. It was a log with a great many dates. It had nothing to do with 
the subject matter. I had no reason to review that particular hearing, 
that particular meeting, and then I am glad to say that suddenly I 
recalled that Mr. John Mitchell had resigned as campaign director on 
the 1st of July, and this was a little personal meeting with the Pres- 
ident to discuss that situation. 

Now, I don't know, more people have told me in the last 24 hours that 
it is nice to hear that someone is willing to admit that he does not know 
exactly where he was at 12 :11 p.m. on June 30, 1972, and that was the 
source of my confusion. 

Now, I know that some of these things had been reviewed on June 7, 
the Dita Beard situation, for example, but my mind and my prepara- 
tion was on what I considered substance, plus this fact, that in the time 
available and in the day before we had this 5-hour meeting with the 
other group, an evening meeting with the staff, short but still — and 
then we were up until 3 o'clock in the morning finishing this statement. 

So, if I was a little slow to pick out these bare dates and I am sure it 
will happen again. You asked me, you know what was the meeting on 
September x about, without some frame of reference, I am not sure I 
am going to be able to say that this meeting was there. So that is my 
explanation. 

Senator Gtjrney. I am sure you are human 

Mr. Moore. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to explain 
it, sir. 

Senator Gurney [continuing]. I think you are human like we all 
are. 

I think, is it fair to say that you did come prepared to discuss those 
events that you knew about the Watergate? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. As they pertain to meetings and con^^ersations you 
had with the President, with Mr. Dean, and with the President and 
Mr. Dean, and you had not reviewed all of the other meetings that 
you may have had either this year or last year on other matters that 
seemed at least collateral and perhaps had nothing to do with what 
you thought your mission here was yesterday, is that fair to say? 

Mr. INIooRE. That is precisely the case, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Now just one final question: You have known the 
President for how long ? 

ISIr. INIooRE. I met him in 1950, and but really got to know him first 
on a first-name basis, you know, in the campaign of, gubernatorial 
campaign of 1962, got to know him better when he was out of office 
and a lawyer in Los Angeles, and then while he was in New York, 
we didn't keep in touch particularly, but in 1968 he was kind enough 
to ask me to join his campaign airplane, and of course I saAV him every 



2009 

day then. But my best acquaintance with the then Mr. Nixon was in 
1962— 1961— following the 1960 election, to 1963 before he went to 
New York. 

Senator Gtjrney. In other words, your acquaintance has been over 
a long period of years and you count yourself as a personal friend ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. I am happy to say. 

Senator Gurney. In the White House, of course, you had consider- 
able contact, especially in connection with this Watergate affair ? 

Mr. ]\IooRE. Beginning March 14. I had not had contact with him 
about it before then. 

Senator Gurney. And it's your sworn testimony, and I prefer not 
to put the words in your mouth, but what do you think the President 
knows about the Watergate break-in or the Watergate coverup. When 
you say you think he found out ? 

Mr. MooRE. I think he found out the morning of March 21, 1973. 

Senator Gurney. And that he did not know about it before then? 

Mr. Moore. That is my firm conviction. Senator. 

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Moore. Thank you, Mr, Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. ]Mr. Moore, you have testified that you believe that 
the President knew nothing about tlie critical facts relating to Water- 
gate at any time between the 17th day of June 1972 and the 21st day 
of March 1973? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. That is purely a conjecture on your part, is it not? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, he told me he did not, sir. And I have no evidence 
to the contrary. So it is a conclusion. 

Senator Ervin. Well, it is a conclusion. It is a surmise. 

Mr. MooRE. That is right. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Now, I would ask you this question. Do you not agree wdth me that 
of all the inhabitants of tliis earth, the one best qualified to testify as 
to the knowledge the President had concerning the Watergate affair 
or anything else at any time between the I7th day of June 1972 and 
the 21st day of March 1973, is President Nixon ? 

Mr. MooRE. I could agree with that. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. [Laughter.] Now^, you knew Mr. Haldeman, 
Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Chapin, Mr. Colson, Mr. Strachan, Mr. Ziegler, 
and Mr. Dean, did you not ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. They are all well educated and highly intelligent 
men, are they not ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And you knew ^Ir. Mitchell, Mr. Stans, Mr. Ma- 
gruder, Mr. Sloan, and Mr. Porter of the political committee, and they 
are all highly intelligent men and well educated men ? 
• Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Now, is it not true that President Nixon was a candi- 
date for election during the months preceding and following the Water- 
gate break-in ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. On the Republican ticket ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And the national headquarters of his opposition 
party, the Democratic Party, was in the Watergate ? 



2010 

Mr. Moore. That was the Democratic Party, yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And that the campaign for President Nixon for re- 
election on the national level was in the hands of two committees, one 
a finance committee of which Maurice Stans, former Secretary of Com- 
merce, was the head, and of w^hich Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., was the 
Treasurer ? 

Mr. MooRE. I believe that is correct, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. And the other committee, which might be called 
the political committee, was headed by former Attorney General John 
N". Mitchell, as director and Jeb Stuart as deputy director 

Mr. MooRE. IMagruder, yes, sir. 
. Senator Ervin. Jeb Stuart Magruder. 

Mr. MooRE. I do not know whether there was more than one deputy, 
but that is true, yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. The old Jeb Stuart, he is on the parade grounds of 
heaven. [Laughter.] 

Now, you found out on the morning of June 17, 1972, or shortly 
thereafter, by reading the press and watching television, that five men 
had been caught red handed in an act of burglary in the Democratic 
National headquarters? 

Mv. MooRE. Yes, I found out the morning of June 18. 

Senator Ervin. Now, I will ask you if you did not state on page 20 
of your records that "In one of my talks with the President, the Presi- 
dent kept asking himself whether there had been any sign or clue which 
should have led him to discover the true facts earlier" — that is, earlier 
than ]\rarch 21, 1973. 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. I will ask you, during the approximately 2 months 
after the burglary at the "Watergate was discovered if the news media — 
that is, the newspapers, TV and radio — did not contain many state- 
ments concerning the Watergate matter? 

Mr. ]MooRE. That the newspapers when, sir ? 

Senator Ervin. During the 2 months following the morning of June 
17,1972? 

Mr. ]MooRE. Yes, they did. 

Senator Ervin. I will ask you if this first fact did not appear in the 
news media. 

First, I ask you. can we safely assume that Mr. Haldeman, Mr. 
Ehrlichman, ]Mr. Chapin, Mr. Colson, Mr. Strachan, Mr. Ziegler, Mr. 
Dean, Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Stans, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Sloan, and Mr. 
Porter and the President, read the newspapers ? [Laughter.] 

Mr. ]\IooRE. I am not an eye witness to that, sir, but I would make 
that assumption. 

Senator Ervin. Well, you certainly do not know that ^Mr. Dean did 
anything to keep those parties from reading the newspapers and 
watching television and listening to the radio ? 

Mr. MooRE. No, sir. [Laughter.] 

Senator Ervin. The audience will please be less demonstrative. 

I will ask you if during these 2 months, one of the first facts that 
came out was that of the five burglars caught redlianded in the Water- 
gate, one of them was James W. McCord, Jr., the security officer of 
the political Committee To Re-Elect tlie President. 

Mr. MooRE. Tliat is right, sir. 



2011 

Senator Ervijst. I will ask you if the second fact that came out, or 
the critical fact, Avas not that McCord had the national Democratic 
headquarters in the Watergate bugged and had furnished the data 
obtained by the bugging to some person or persons in the campaign 
committees of President Nixon. 

Mr. Moore. That is a newspaper item ? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. Is that not what the newspapers told every- 
body in the District of Columbia who read them and everybody who 
watched TV? 

Mr. JSIooRE. In the summer of 19 

Senator ER\^N. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. I will ask you if these same news media didn't pre- 
sent this very critical fact : That somebody had presented $89,000 in 
four cashier's checks drawn on a bank in Mexico City to the campaign 
funds of President Nixon ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And in addition to that 

Mr. MooRE. Excuse me. Senator — Mr. Chairman, I am not sure 
I heard that right, that $89,000 was deposited to what account? 

Senator Ervin. Xo; I asked you if it didn't appear in the news 
media and didn't proclaim to everybody who would read or listen or 
watch 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin [continuing]. That $89,000 in four cashier's checks 
on a Mexican bank and $25,000 in what was known as the Dahlberg 
check had been furnished or contributed to Maurice Stans' Committee 
To Re-Elect the President? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. I will ask you if it was another salient fact that — 
and if it didn't appear during this period of time — that $114,000 which 
had been contributed to the Nixon campaign fund had been deposited 
in a Miami bank to the account of one of the burglars caught in the 
Watergate, Bernard L. Barker, several weeks before the burglary? 

Mi\ MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. I will ask you if the news media didn't proclaim 
this further salient fact within that 2 months' period, that after some 
days of these campaign funds reposing in the banl. account of Ber- 
nard L. Barker, that Barker drew thousands of dollars from that de- 
posit consisting of $114,000, representing these campaign funds? 

Mr. Moore. That he withdrew it, yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And didn't these news media further proclaim this 
critical fact : That a substantial part of this $114,000 of funds con- 
tributed to the campaign fund of the President was withdrawn by 
Barker in $100 bills and that the serial numbers of those bills were 
- kept by the Miami bank in obedience to the Federal law ? 

Mr. MooRE. I didn't quite hear the end of your question. I am very 
sorry, sir. 

Senator Ervin. My question is didn't the news media which I have 
referred to proclaim to everybody in the District of Columbia who was 
capable of reading and willing to read, or who watched the TV or 
listened to the radio, that when Barker withdrew the funds that had 
been contributed to Nixon's campaign fund from his bank account 



2012 

in the Miami bank, he drew a substantial part of it in $100 bills; and 
did not the Miami bank, in obedience to Federal law, keep a record of 
the serial numbers of those $100 bills? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. I am sorry, I didn't hear the last part of your 
question. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Now, didn't also during- this time period, there ap- 
pear accounts in the news media that approximately 53 of the $100 
bills bearing these serial numbers were found in the pockets and the 
rooms of Bernard L. Barker and three of the other burglars at the 
time of their arrest in the Watergate on June IT, 1972 ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. I ask you if during this same time period, these news 
media didn't contain these further statements : Instead of depositing 
such funds in banks in accordance with good business practices, 
that Secretary Stans, as director of the finance committee, kept hun- 
dreds of thousands of dollars in cash in safes in the offices of the Nixon 
campaign committees. 

jNIr. Moore. That is what I understand. 

Senator Ervin. And I will ask if the same news media didn't further 
proclaim this within that time period, that shortly prior to the bur- 
glary, Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., treasurer of the Stans committee, delivered 
various sums totaling $199,000 in cash to G. Gordon Liddy, the 
general counsel of the Stans committee ? 

INIr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And I will ask you if the same news media didn't 
also proclaim that within that same time period, that Hugh W. Sloan, 
Jr., treasurer of the Stans committee, made these cash payments to 
Liddy pursuant to the instructions of Jeb INIagruder, the deputy di- 
rector of the INIitchell committee ? 

Mv. MooRE. Do vou say did the newspapers sav that, or did he do 
that? ' ' " . , 

Senator Ervin. I said — didn't these news media — didn't the news- 
papers and the radio and the television broadcasts 

Mr. MooRE. All right ; yes, sir. 

Senator ER\aN [continuing]. Give this information to everybody 
who was willing to read, who did read and watch television or listen 
to the radio during this 2-month period ? 

Mr. JNIooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Didn't the same news media in like manner present 
statements within the same period that before making some of the 
disbursements to Liddy, Sloan expressed his misgivings to Stans in 
respect to making such large disbursements to Liddy without knowing 
what Liddy was going to do with the money ? 

Mr. ]\rooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And didn't the same news media, within the same 
period of time, state that Stans told Sloan after Sloan ex]n-essed his 
misgivings, that he, Stans, consulted Mitchell and that after such 
consultation informed Sloan that Mitchell and he, Stans, authorized 
Magruder to direct him — that is Sloan — to make these disburse- 
ments to Liddy? 

Mr. MooRE. I assume so, sir. You are reading from the summary. 
I assume all these things as 

Senator Ervin. Well, you read the newspapers ? 



2013 

Mr. Moore [continuing]. I assume so. I didn't read those exact — I 
assume they were correctly reported in the newspapers. 

Senator EIrvin. Didn't the news media also disclose that within 5 
days after the discovery of the Watergate burglary, that officers and 
employees of the campaign committees destroyed the records of 
the_receipts and disbursements of the cash sums which had been stored 
in the safes and the offices of the Nixon campaign committees? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I assume the same thing. 

Senator Ervin. Well, don't you Imow it? 

Mr. Moore. Well, you speak of officers — you know, to characterize 
those w^ords. ^VTien you say officers did — I assume, sir. 

Obviouslv, the chairman is reading. 

Senator Ervin. Well, now, you were a friend of the President, you 
were then and still are, as I understand it, special counsel to the 
President. 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator ER\^]sr. You were interested in his campaign. You were in- 
terested in his welfare, did you not keep up with what the newspapers 
were saying about the Watergate affair and what the radio was broad- 
casting and what the TV was disclosing? 

Mr. MooRE. I agree, sir, and I am just suggesting, a capsule of what 
was in perhaps several papers, I assume that is properly digested and 
I go along with it. 

Senator Ervin. I will ask you if the same news media did not pro- 
claim w^ithin the same time period that shortly after the burglary was 
discovered, G. Gordon Liddy, the chief legal adviser of the Stans com- 
mittee, and E. Howard Hunt, a White House consultant, who had an 
office in the Executive Office Building, were arrested upon the charge 
of masterminding and procuring the commission of the burglary ? 

Mr. MooRE. They certainly were arrested, I do not know about mas- 
ter — yes, sir, they were arrested. 

Senator Ervin. And charged with masterminding procuring the 
commission of the burglary, were they not? 

Mr. Moore. AYell, I do not know, I do not want to go, yes, sir. I do 
not know the kind of masterminding but 

Senator Ervin. I wnll ask you furthermore, if the news media, the 
same news media did not proclaim within the same time period that 
Gordon Strachan. and I will ask you if you do not know of your ow^n 
knowledge that Gordon Strachan was a liaison officer whose duty it 
was to keep Haldeman, the chief of staff of the President, and others 
in the "Wliite House advised as to Avhat the campaign committee under 
Mitchell and the finance committee under Stans were doing? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir, Mr. Haldeman, I do not know about others in 
the White House, yes. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Now, all of this was either know^n to you or w^as proclaimed by the 
news media within a 2-month period after the burglary, Avas it not? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir, that seems to be the time frame. 

Senator Ervin. And did it not appear, in the Washington Post on 
the 1.5th day of January that substantial sums of money had been paid 
either by the committee managing the President's campaigns or by his 
supporters to the seven men wdio had been caught in the Watergat^e? 

Mr. Moore. January 15 ? 



2014 

Senator Ervin. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Moore. Of? 

Senator Ervin. 1973. 

Mr. Moore. 1973. 

I do not recall that article on that date, INIr. Chairman. I would be 
glad to go along with your statement. I just cannot say yes of my own 
knowledge. I will accept it if it is — I do not recall such an article, 
but 

Senator Ervin. Well, I invite your attention — you take the Wash- 
ington Post, do you not ? [Laughter.] 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. You know something, I take two copies. 
[Laughter.] 

Senator Ervin. Yes. Did you not read one or the other of those two 
copies ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir, [Laughter.] 

Senator Ervin. And was not the thing that you were most interested 
in reading about at this time were matters that related to the Water- 
gate ramifications, was there anything more important or more inter- 
esting to you ? 

Mr. ]\IooRE. At that time, yes, inaguration of the President of the 
United States was coming on strong on January 15 and I was quite 
deeply involved in it. I was one of those who believed as I have said 
implicitly at that time that no one in the Wliite House had been in- 
volved, and yes, it was of interest but not the most significant. 

Senator Ervin. Well, the Washington Post for January 15, 1973, a 
copy of which I believe that you read 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin [continuing]. Stated that "Sources close to the 
Watergate case have said that at least four of the five men arrested 
last June in the Watergate are still being paid — the New York Times 
reported in its early editions today." [Laughter.] 

Mr. MooRE. Mr. Chairman, that is what is called a double whammy. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Moore 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin [continuing]. Now I have recounted a great many 
things, all of which except one, I think you admit, were made known 
by the news media within 2 months after the Watergate burglaries 
were discovered. Can you imagine any better way on which a person 
interested in the President's campaign and people who read the Wash- 
ington papers and the New York Times and listened to the radio 
and watched television could have had more reason to suspect that 
something was rotten in the committees to reelect the President than 
were divulged by these news media? 

Mr. Moore. Well, first of all, as I said, the President told me, I think 
it was on May 8, that he had racked his brain as to the coverup, and 
he also told me, sir, that he had, it was his firm conviction which 
at that time was confirmed by every investigation, the grand jury, the 
trial, and So forth, that the only culpable persons were the seven 
defendants. 

Senator Ervin. Well, you are telling me something I didn't ask you 
about. I haven't asked you about wliat the President told you. I have 
been asking what the radio and television and the papers had told you. 

Mr. Moore. And your question is? 



2015 

Senator Ervin. Yes. Didn't you learn from the press and the radio 
and the TV in connection with the matters I have recounted to you — 
didn't this generate a suspicion in your mind that something was 
rotten in tlie Committee To Re-Elect the President? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir, in the Committee To Re-Elect the President. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Well, George Wasliington had a very fuie aide, and which he was 
known as Alexander Hamilton, and Alexander Hamilton wrote Jim 
McHenry on April 5, 1773, "It was my duty to state facts to the 
President." 

Don't you think that you, as a friend of the President, as an aide 
to the President, owed a duty to the President to go to him and tell 
him that you were suspicious that something was rotten in tlie com- 
mittees charged with his reelection and that something ought to be 
done about it? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I picked — the Watergate itself had demonstrated 
that that was a pretty sour operation in that sense, that that could be 
allowed to happen. The question was, Mr. Chairman, whether that 
offense went beyond the seven, beyond Mr. Liddy, if you will, and I 
think most of that evidence you cited there all is consistent wdth the 
President's view which was, and my view, sir, at the time, I believed, 
as I said implicity what the President said on August 29 that this could 
and probably was an unauthorized action under this what I have de- 
scribed as kind of a James Bond group because they would have 

Senator Ervin. Well, the President said it was unauthorized. Don't 
you think somebody close to the President or the President himself 
should liave taken some action to see whether it had happened ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, the President, it either happened or the President 
was told and he believed that it happened and that an in^'estigation 
was made and that the results were unequivocally that no one in the 
White House Avas involved. Clearly two men in the committee were 
involved. 

Senator Ervin. I am not talking about who told the President some- 
thing. I am talking about what the news media told everybody in the 
District of Columbia who read the new^spapers and watch the televi- 
sion and listened to radio. 

Now, you have admitted that it came out very shortly, that burglars 
were caught in the headquarters of tlie opposition political party, and 
that four of those burglars had in their pockets campaign funds which 
belonged to the Nixon campaign. Don't you think that it was time for 
somebodv to act? 

Mr. MooRE. Sir, that was pretty well established earlier. 

Senator Erm:n. Yes. 

Mr. MooRE. And the plain inference was that that was money that 
was used but taken out of that strongbox. "VYlien you give a fellow with 
•a romantic nature and a lack of respect the law who is a James Bond 
and has a safe full of $100 bills to do anything, he can get off of the 
reservation, and I think that is what happened. 

Senator Ervin. Don't you think it was peculiar and tended to excite 
anybody's suspicion that here was a burglar. Barker, who had in his 
savings account $115,000 that belonged to the Nixon campaign fund? 

Mr, MooRE. Yes, sir, yes. 



2016 

Senator Ervin. And don't you think it was a suspicious circumstance 
that ought to be investigated that five burglars were caught in the 
Democratic headquarters in an act of burglary with money that be- 
longed to the Nixon campaign funds in their pockets ? 

Mr. Moore. Certainly should be investigated. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. MooRE. And it had been investigated. 

Senator Ervin. And yet you say you had no reason to suspect that 
anything was wrong despite all of these things being presented by 
news media day after day, week after week? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, Mr. Chairman, with all respect, the news media 
at that time didn't provide proof. The President has pointed out that 
at that time, the FBI was conducting one of the most exhaustive 
investigations in history, that the grand jury, 23 good and true 
citizens, had been finding opposite to what you are suggesting, and 
that he had 

Senator Ervin. But you have testimony 

Mr. MooRE. You can question the thoroughness of the investigation 
in retrospect, but the President was convinced it was thoroughly 
investigated. 

Senator Ervin. But you testified yesterday that the White House 
didn't trust the FBI. They wouldn't let the FBI investigate the Ells- 
berg matter. 

Mr. MooRE. No, sir, I didn't say that, sir. 

First of all, I was referring to Mr. Hoover, who now is not alive 
at the time you are talking about. That was a very special instance 
when the President said that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover was reluctant to 
investigate Mr. Ellsberg because Mr. Hoover was a close friend of 
Mr. Ellsberg's father-in-law. We are now dealing with a different 
period of the FBI. 

Senator Ervin. Now, the FBI was under the direction of Mr. Gray 
at that time, wasn't it? 

Mr. MooRE. That is right. 

Senator Ervin. Don't you know it came out in news media later 
that Mr. Gray himself had burned some of the documents that had 
been taken out of Hunt's executive offices, in the Executive Office 
Building and that Mr. Gray had destroyed them at the request of 
Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean. 

Mr. MooRE. I read that. 

Senator Ervin. Well, now, could you depend on an FBI investiga- 
tion under those circumstances to disclose the truth ? 

Mr. MooRE. So far as I am concerned, sir, you were asking me about 
my curiousity, I first learned about that episode in the latter part of 
April of 1973. So when you are talking about the investigation in the 
summer of 1972 that could have had no bearing. 

Senator Ervin. You found out in April 1973 that Mr. Hunt had 
been an accessory before the fact to the burglarizing of the office of the 
psychiatrist of Ellsberg in September 1971, didn't you ? 

Mr. Moore. I found out that there was a — yes. sir. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Moore. That is roughly right. 

Senator Ervin. And you found out that Mr. Hunt, you had learned 
previously to that time, was a paid consultant of the White House? 



2017 

Mr. Moore, I learned that in the newspapers that he had been a paid 
consultant of the White House. 

Senator Ervin. And yon fonnd out Mr. Hunt had an office in the 
Executive Office Building and was on the White House payroll during 
all of the months from September 1971 until after June 1972. 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I think I have read that it was March 1972. 

Senator Ervin. In any event he had been a White House consultant. 

Mr. Moore. You are quite right. 

Senator Ervin. Can you tell me who kept a burglar on the White 
House payroll during all of those months and allowed him to occupy 
an office in the Executive Office Building? 

Mr. MooRE. I cannot tell you of my own knowledge, no. 

Senator Ervin. Well, there is somebody in the White House who 
had charge of hiring people, isn't he. 

Mr. Moore. Sometimes — there are a lot of people in charge of 
hiring people. 

Senator Ervin. And you still tell me, Mr. Moore and I believe you 
told the Committee, that you had suspicion but you didn't think there 
was anAi:hing at all that ought to have indicated to President Nixon or 
any of his aides, Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman, prior to the 21st 
day of March that there was something rotten in the committees or in 
the White House ? 

]Mr. MooRE. Well, the President has himself said, and I have said 
in my statement, that I wish I had been more skeptical and I think 
he is'the first one, he said it and he believes it, but in looking back, 
and it is always easy afterward, certainly Mr. Hunt, I am not defend- 
ing anything' that IVIr. Hunt did, I had no knowledge of it, the fact 
is that the President was operating with the knowledge that he, that 
was before him. and he had no intimation, nothing direct, no one 
brought to him is my firm conviction of anything specific that would 
have triggered or clued the notion this coverup was going on if it in- 
volved White House people particularly. 

Senator Ervin. Well, everybody in Washington, D.C., had an oppor- 
tunity to learn about this except the President, didn't he ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, Mr. Chairman, in all fairness, I think that every- 
body in Washington, D.C., had a different, the people have their own 
viewpoints and we have a lot of people here who are making a lot of 
charges. 

The President was told, let's start with this 

Senator Er^^n. Told by whom ? 

Mr. Moore. Told by his counsel. Now, we know now that the counsel 
told him apparently — pardon me, I am not sure he was told by his 
counsel. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Moore. He was told by one of his two aides that his counsel had 
reported it, and also if you think back again who would think that — 
going back to this caper, this burglary, this fellow knew who would 
think that anybody in his right mind let alone people as you said 
educated and smart would have authorized it, and all I know is, as I 
say, up through the grand jury proceedings, the investigation, the 
trial, and the pleas there was no proof and no evidence, there was 
plenty of newspaper clippings, but no evidence that it went above 
Mr. Liddy. 



2018 

Now, that is a separate question. 

Senator Ervin. Do you know what evidence was produced down 
there at the trial ? 

Mr. Moore. No, sir, I didn't attend the trial. 

Senator Ervin. Don't you know that the evidence shows that Mr. 
Magruder had paid $199,000 in cash to Liddy before the trial ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, yes, sir, I understand that. 

Senator Ervin. And don't you know that the tracks led right straigiht 
from the Watergate into the offices of the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President, just as straight as a martin going to its home? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And yet nobody knew anj^thing wrong? 

Mr. Moore. Again in fairness, Mr. Chairman, this track led to a cash 
supply that was made available to Mr. Liddy with no responsibility 
of having to account for it and that is always a very bad situation. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Moore. And whether anybody knew what he was doing was a 
separate question and, as you know, the investigation and at this 
time 

Senator Ervin. Well, you have admitted that the news media carried 
news within 2 months after this happened to the effect that Mr. Ma- 
gruder had paid out this money on the authority of Mr. Mitchell and 
Mr. Stans, and Sloan had, in fact, paid out that money. 

Mr. Moore. Well, Mr. Ci. airman, one thing I did not know and 
we have only heard here, and I think everybody knows now, Mr. Ma- 
gruder has now confessed he committed perjury. So when you ask 
what happened In the newspapers, that did not come out. And we 
are here in hindsight. If you put yourself in the timeframe of last 
summer, and this burglary, which, at the beginning, if you will re- 
member, people thought it was so absurd, so stupid, that it simply 
could not have been authorized by • 

Senator Ervin. Well, now, Haldeman was not stupid, was he? 

Mr. MooRE. What is that, sir ? 

Senator Ervin. You told me Haldeman and Ehrlichman are bright 
people, well-educated. 

Mr. Moore. I agreed with you when you told me that. 

Senator Er^^n. And Mitchell is a very highly educated man? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Senator Ervin. T-VHien did you first start suspecting that something 
was rotten in the committees to secure the reelection of the President? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I would say the morning I got a phone call that 
said, what do you think of that caper — that burglary, on Sunday 
morning, and I picked it up and read it. I said somethins: like, sure 
is. This was not Sunday. It was when I learned that McCord and 
Liddy were involved, within that week, that obviously, something 
was rotten. I thought that the rotten had ])een exposed and there was 
the cancer and there it was. That is what I thought. 

Senator Ervin. You do not have any information that anybody, 
any aide of the President, kept either Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlicli- 
man or the President from reading the newspapers or listening to 
the radio or watching television during this time ? 

Mr. Moore. I have heard it alleged, sir, but it is not true. The 
President reads new^spapers and — of course. 



2019 

Senator Ervin. And even Mr. Dean could not keep him, or anybody 
up there, from reading the newspapers or listening to the radio. 

Mr. IMooRE. The grand jury was also reading the same newspapers 
and — no. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator ER^^N. Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Moore, the chairman in his eloquent way has injected a new 
legal principle into a theorem that I have tried to propose several 
times throughout this hearing and it is a valid one. But I would like 
to define it and see if we can agree on the area of inquiry that is be- 
ing probed at this point. 

Often, I would put the question as the central and key issue in this 
inquiry : What did the President know and when did he know it ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. And the chairman, as I understand his line of 
questioning, has now put the question : Wliat did the President know 
or should have loiown ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. And when did he know it ? 

And, of course, it is an established principle of the tort law of the 
United States that a man is charged with knowing or having con- 
structive knowledge of in that he should have known of certain cir- 
cumstances under certain conditions. So I interpret, and I do not pre- 
sume to interpret unduly, the questioning of the chairman to be was 
not in fact the great body of publicity in the Washington news- 
papei-s — the Washington Post, the Star, the New York Times, and the 
other great daily newspapers of the country that find their way into 
the White House — should not the President have known? 

Now, I judge that to be a fair inquiry. But I would like to explore 
\yith you, Mr. Moore, what the state of affairs may have been at that 
time. Obviously, there were newspapers in circulation at the AVhite 
House. Obviously, there were press summaries. Obviously, the news- 
papere were cariying hard news about the arrest of the seven Water- 
gate defendants and subsequent stories about the identification of 
funds that were found on them. Just as obviously, the newspapers 
carried reams of copy about the — going and continuing developments 
of, as the soap operas say, the continuing story of the Watergate. 

Now, what weighs and balances against that? Let us try and put 
oureelves in the situation that existed at the ^-^Hiite House from June 
17, 1972, until— what was it, March 20 or 21, 1973? 

Mr. Moore. March 21. 

Senator Baker. Because I am sure everybody will agree with me 
that these hearings will not be determined on the basis of newspaper 
iiccounts alone, but rather to take into account of what one should 
have been on notice of by newspaper accounts. 

Well, let us assume that those newspaper- accounts were read by the 
press office, included in the press summary, and reached the President's 
desk, eitlier in their original form or some summarized form. We also 
must assume, must we not. from the record that has now developed in 
this hearing just so far, that very early on in June — if my memory 
serves me, on June 20, 1972, and I might be in error by a day or two-^ 



96-296 O— 73— bk. 



2020 

Mr. Miitchell told the President, accordiiio- to his testimony, that he 
was sorry he had not kept closer rein on matters and that he would let 
a thing like this happen and that he was sorry he did not know what 
hai^pened, or words to that effect. 

Are you familiar with that testimony, Mr. Moore? 

Mr. Moore. Except that I could say I did not have an opportunity, 
except when I was sitting here briefly, to read or hear Mr. Mitchell's 
testimony. But, of course, I accept your 

Senator Raker. You understand what I am trying to do? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Senator Baker. I am trying to establish what your sources of in- 
formation might be. The chairman has pointed out that there was a 
great wealth of newspaper reportage and a great wealth of television 
and newspaper coverage on this. But there was also input from other 
sources — ^that is, the INIitchell statement shortly after Watergate that 
he did not know what happened, he did not know hoAv it happened, 
but he was sorry that he had not kept tighter rein on it than that. 
Would thiat tend, once again on the idea of should the President have 
known, as distinguished from whether he did know, would that tend 
to create some question in youi' mind as to whether the President 
should have known — that is, the newspaper accounts on one side and 
the Attorney General of the United States, or former Attorney Gen- 
eral, saying, we do not know what happened — implying that he was 
not involved — and I am sorry that we did not keep tighter rein, but 
we will find out? Would that not, in your mind, create a different 
situation ? 

Mr. Moore. It certainly would. 

Senator Baker. Now, what about Mr. Dean ? Do you have any per- 
sonal knowledge of when Mr. Dean, in June or shoitly thereafter, 
may have told the President that he did or did not know of anything 
that was going on at the Watergate, or whether ]Mr. Colson or ]\Ir. 
Ehrlichman or jNIr. Haldeman ? We know from this record what some 
of those, people say already. But the point in my mind, I am trying to 
establish the matrix of where the President would find the informa- 
tion on which to know or be charged with knowledge of the Water- 
gate affair and the ensuing coverup. Can you give me any further in- 
formation in that respeot? 

Mr. ISIooRE. Perhaps I lost that last question. 

Senator Baker. Yes; I think I might put it for you again. 

]Mr. MooRE. I am sorry. Senator. 

Senator Baker. Weighing the newspaper accounts on one side and 
conversations that the President may have had that you know of, 
either directly from your occupation at the White House or from 
testimony before this committee or otherwise, do you know of coun- 
ter\'eiling information that would have reached the President that 
would indicate that the White House was in fact not involved, or at 
least was acclaimed not to be involved? 

Bear in mind that this whole line of questioning is ])ut to you, 
really, on the basis of a grossly oversimplified summary of the ]\Iitchell 
testimony. As I understand Mr. Mitchell, and T i-eserve the right to 
change my mind when we write the report if I understand or perceive 
it differently, but the Mitchell testimony, as I undei-stand it, was to 
the effect that I did not have anything to do with planning it. I 



2021 

found out about it shortly after it liappened, and I spent the rest of 
my time trying to keep the President from finding out. That in 
essence is what John Mitchell said, I think. 

Well, now, how effective was all that? How well was all that con- 
cealed from the President by Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Dean, Mitchell, 
or by anybody else ? And how would that have weighed in the Presi- 
dent's mind against these myriad newspapers, television, and radio 
reports that we are speaking of, on the question of should the Presi- 
dent have known as distinguished from what did he know ? 

Do you understand what I am saying, Mr. Moore ? 

Mr. Moore. I do. You say, have known, have known of the activity 
of somewhat above the level of Liddy at the Committee. You are 
talking about the break-in. 

Senator Baker. What I am really talking about is what did the 
President know or what should he have known and when did he 
kno-w it ? 

Mr. Moore. I should state by way of background that during this 
period, I was quite involved with preparations for the convention. 
I was not included in any discussions of the Watergate matter that 
summer. So I do not know what other advisers were telling him. But 
the fact is — and also, we must remember, this was the season of 
1972, and I think many of the newspaper accounts which charged 
that the White House must have known or that John Mitchell must 
have known, and which got printed, with headlines, were really 
quoting Democratic candidates. This was a political year and as some 
have said, it was the only political issue that the Democrats thought 
they could do anything with. 

Senator Baker. Aiid in all fairness, political seasons and political 
campaigns probably tend to blunt one's otherwise healthy skepticism 
about affairs, is that not correct? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Senator Baker. I will not pursue this any further. All I am trying 
to do is to establish that there was in fact a great deal of reportage on 
this subject. There was, in fact, a great deal of counterveiling informa- 
tion, apparently, being given to the President in conflict with the re- 
ported and printed news accounts, and that it is a valid area of inquiry, 
what did the President know or what should he have known and when 
did he know it ? 

But do you take all that into account when you make the statement 
that you did make in your opening statement, that you are convinced 
that the President did not know of the coverup until March 21, 1973? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Moore. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge. 

Senator Baker. If you don't mind, Mr. Chairman, Senator Tal- 
-madge. I have one more question I wanted to put. 

It relates to page 15, the first paragraph, of your statement. It begins 
on page 14, the last paragraph. For convenience, I will read it, Mr. 
Moore : 

On March 19. I was called to meet with the President and Mr. Dean in the 

President's EOB office. The President reiterated his desire to get out a general 

I statement in advance of the hearings. He asked us to be thinking about ways 

that this could be done. This would include issuing a full statement or white 



2022 

paper. He was also interested in our thoughts about ways to present our story 
to the Senate in terms of deiwsitions, affidavits, or possible conferences or meet- 
ings which would give the Senate all the information it wished, but which would 
not cut across the separation of powers doctrine. 

You may be aware of my keen concern that we find a way to avoid 
the rocks and shoals of a constitutional confrontation between the 
Congress and the White House on separation of powers and still have 
access to unique information allegedly held by the President on cer- 
tain depositions, conferences, or meetings. I am tantalized by this. My 
question to you is was that in terms of the deposition of the President 
or an affidavit of the President, or a conference between the President 
and this committee? What was spoken of? I don't believe your state- 
ment makes that clear. 

Mr. Moore. That was spoken of in terms of Presidential assistants 
and advisers. 

Senator Baker. Well, then, I am disappointed. I thank you very 
much, 

Mr. MooRE. Surely. I must come up again. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Moore, as I understand it, you were all of 
last year and are now special counsel to the President of the United 
States. 

Mr. Moore. Yes, Senator Talmadge. 

Senator Talmadge. Some of your duties, as I understand your tes- 
timony, related to public relations, briefing, conferences, press state- 
ments. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Taking advantage of trying to get the proper 
statements in the news media, to get the President's posture before 
the public in the correct manner. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, was a meeting held in the "\"\niite House fol- 
lowing the Chapin-Segretti story to respond to that story ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, there was, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. When ? 

Mr. Moore. The late afteiiioon of October 13, 1972. 

Senator Talmadge. Who was in attendance at the meeting? 

Mv. ]\I(»0RE. Mr. Ehrlichman, INIr. Haldeman, INIr. Ziegler, Mr. Cha- 
pin for all or part, and myself. 

Senator Talmai^ge. What was discussed there ? 

Mr. MooRE. The subject was a memorandum from the Deputy Press 
Secretary, ^Vfr. Warren, saying that he had just received a call late 
that afternoon from one of the reporters at the Washington Post to 
the effect that tliey had, they were going to go with a story that they 
had a signed statement from a man in California who would, who said 
that Mr. Chajjin was, along with Mr. Howard Hunt, the prime con- 
tact foi- Mr. Segretti in his espionage or sabotage activities — I can't 
quote the memorandum by word, but it may or may not have said that 
Chaj)in Mas responsible for his hiring. But it also said, if I remem- 
ber light, the reporter said that Mr. Cha]:)in, the source in California 
had also said that Mr. (^hapin had traveled to IVIiami, where he met 
with Mr. Howard Hunt and Mr. Segretti and that he had coached, 
helped coached Segretti on the grand jury testimony. 



2023 

Now, that was a very serious story to be published. I will say very 
quickly, much of it was not true, and that is why we were there. They 
wanted us to, they gave us the opportunity to comment. 

Senator Talmadge. Did Mr. Chapin want to issue a factual state- 
ment about the matter at that time ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, he did. 

Senator Talmadge. Was a statement issued then ? 

Mr. MooRE. A statement was issued that afternoon. Later that after- 
noon, it was given to the Post and it was included in a story which 
had happened — we were told it was going to run the next day. Actu- 
ally, it was held over to run Sunday, October 15. 

Mr. Talmadge. As I see the press statement here, "As a Washington 
Post reporter has described it, the story is based entirely on hearsay 
and is fundamentally inaccurate." 

Is that the statement you issued ? 

Mv. MooRE. Well, that is part of it. 

Senator Talmadge. And you stand on the statement that it was hear- 
say and fundamentally inaccurate? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I think if the statement were read in full, that 
would give a better flavor of what the thrust of it is. 

Senator Talmadge. You state that it was inaccurate? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, did you afterwards write a report to the 
President about the Segretti matter ? 

Mr. IMooRE. I did not write a report to the President. I wrote a first 
draft of a report which could be the basis for perhaps further editing 
and so forth, as a starter for a possible public statement, which was 
a very rough draft. 

Senator Talmadge. When did you make that report ? 

Mr. ^Ioore. I wrote that on March 18— March 22, 1973. 

Senator Talmadge. Wliy were you so late in writing the report, 
Mr. Moore? 

Mv. MooRE. I was requested to write it 5 days before that — 4 days 
before that. 

Senator Talmadge. As I understand it, tlie report is already in the 
record of these hearings as exhibit 34-44.* That is paragraph 7. It is 
attributed as your report. You may correct me if I am in error. 

Mr. MooRE. It was a draft report that would have been submitted 
to a conference, possibly improved or expanded and enlarged. It had 
to do with a starting draft for a possible public statement. 

Senator Talmadge. Let me read paragraph 7. This is attributable 
to you, sir. 

Kalmbach states that he made several payments to Segretti, most of them in 
cash, and that these payments were made during the period September 1971 
to March 1972, and the total amount represented, both salary and expenses, 
- is between $30,000 and $40,000. 

Would you say now that that statement was hearsay and funda- 
mentally inaccurate ? 

Mr. MooRE. No, sir, but when I, the statement we issued on Octo- 
ber 15 did not reflect this knowledge which we developed and which 
we are prepared to state. 



•See Book 3, p. 1299. 



2024 

However, I really think in fairness to Mr. Chapin, Senator, and 
to anybody in the television audience who may be watching, I would 
like to point out that the statement you read leaves out a very signif- 
icant — not intentionally, sir, but there is a little bit more to this. 

The reporter told us what I said he told us. This was a story which 
apparently, obviously, had been in the possession of the Washington 
Post, but they chose to do it in series, apparently, where they had a 
few days earlier come out with a major story, with a front page 
picture of a man named Segretti who was presiding over a massive 
espionage operation. Most of the things that were reported in there 
were statements attributed to — by someone else to someone else. Yet 
the impression was of a massive White House or pro-Nixon espionage 
and sabotage campaign. I really think that I should outline this, be- 
cause it is a matter of pure fairness. 

That story set the stage. Then on the following Sunday, when the 
circulation is the largest thing out, there was a front page picture 
of the high White House aide Avho had this contact, who had been 
named by a Mr. Young who happened to be — well, a Mr. Young who 
told the reporter that Segretti had told him that. They were second 
and third degree hearsay — that Mr. Chapin, and it was linked to 
Mr. Hunt, wei-e contacts and so on. 

The total effect of the two stories was that Mr. Chapin, who sat 
in the office next to Mr. Haldeman, was indeed that active director 
of a massive espionage ring, which again, was based pretty much on 
hearsay. 

If you will note that, it says the story described to us by the reporter. 
Now, that story described by the reporter said that ISIr. Chapin had 
gone to Miami and conferred with Howard Hunt and had coached 
Segretti on his grand jury testimony. The statement we issued ex- 
plicitly, firmly denied that. 

What happened was the Post then did not print that part, but 
they printed the denial. So what you had here was Mr. Chapin deny- 
ing something that never happened and was never even alleged, be- 
cause they dropped the allegation and left in the denial. 

Now, moreover, the splash technique here, yes, it was hearsay. And 
also, there were a lot of other names in the article, just of people who 
went to the same college. In fact, some of them were wrong, didn't 
go to that college, belonged to the same fraternity. So, Ave felt the 
total thrust of that Washington Post story was indeed fundamentally 
inaccurate. 

Mr. Chapin went on and admitted he had known Mr. Segretti, 
known him since college. That was why that, the fact that we had 
before us at that time, that is why that was issued. This happened to 
be in that season — this was now October 15, witli 3 weeks to go in the 
election. We thought that timing had something to do with it. 

Senator Talmadoe. This statement is dated October 15, 1972, 
Mr. Moore. You stated that at that time, you didn't hnve all of the facts. 
Is that the reason you said it was fundamentally inaccurate? 

Mr. MooRE. No, sir. What I said was that tiie fundamental inac- 
curacy, first of all, was this most serious inaccuracy of meeting with 
Howard Hunt, Ave had heard about that from the chairman, and 
coaching him on the grand jury testimony, AA'hich never hapjiened. 
In fact, Mr. Chapin neA-er met Howard Hunt, never saw him. 



2025 

What was done, and Mr. Chapin was in error, was to drag an old 
classmate in 

Senator Talmadge. I am afraid I don't understand the thrust of 
3'oiir testimony, sir. 

Is your testimony that the October 15 statement was accurate or 
inaccurate ? 

Mr. Moore. I don't know which statement you are referring to. 

Senator Talmadge. I am referring to tlie one I just read in tlie 
Washington Post and as I understand you to say, you stated that you 
didn't have the full facts at tliat time and since that time, you have 
been trying to defend the accuracy of the statement. So, I don't know 
exactly what your position is, 

Mr. Moore. I haven't made myself clear. I will try to do it briefly. 

It was our conclusion that the newspaper story which the reporter 
said they w^ere going to publisli was fundamentally inaccurate and 
indeed, in many important respects, it was. 

Senator Talmadge. So your testimony now is that the statement of 
October 15 was accurate when you denied it and said it was inaccurate 
and based on hearsay ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, no, sir; it still is not accurate that jNIr. Chapin 
ever worked with Howard Hunt and met him. That part is still in- 
accurate. It was a very important, a very serious allegation. So, that 
statement still was proper in that very important respect and that has 
never changed. 

Senator Talmadge. So your statement denying the allegation on 
October 15 was accurate ? 

Mr. MooRE. I think it was under the circumstances at the time. 

Senator Talmadge. How do you account for your statement that you 
submitted to the President in your memorandum that Kalmbach states 
that "he made several payments to Segretti, most of them in cash, that 
these payments were made during the period from September 1971 to 
March 1972, and the total amount, representing both salary and ex- 
penses, was between $30,000 and $40,000" ? 

^Ir. ]MooRE. If that was in the Washington Post story 

Senator Talmadge. I am reading from the memorandum that you 
submitted to the President. 

JNIr. ]\IooRE. Yes, but I am talking about — this memorandum was 
written on March 22, 1973, 5 months later, with the benefit of much 
more information and much more detail, and was written for the pur- 
pose of revealing that. 

Senator Talmadge. I am to understand from your testimony that 
your statement that you prepared for the President was an amendment 
or modification of your previous statement, is that correct ? 

Mr. Moore. It was treated with new material, it w^as treated with 
new material. 
• Senator Talmadge. New material ? 

Mr. INIooRE, Yes. 

Senator Talmadge. New modifications, better understanding? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. More facts ? 

Mr, MooRE. Something more than a phone call from the Washington 
Post. 



2026 

Senator Talmadoe. More interest in getting — of |2;iving the facts 
ratlier than concealing- them, tilings of that nature ? 

Mr. ]MooRE. Yes, sir, this was based on a much more complete set of 
facts. 

Senator Talmadoe. Did you discuss this Segretti matter with the 
President ? 

^Nlr. Moore. No, sir. never discussed it as such. If it got mentioned 
it might have been mentioned as I think T testified earlier in a sentence 
about the subjects of this investigation, "Watergate, Segretti, campaign 
contributions ; never discussed the case. 

Senator Talmadge, We have had, Mr. Moore, two conflicting versions 
of the so-called alleged Dean investigation into this whole affair usually 
called the Watergate in 1072. Was there any such investigation? 

Mr. ]\fooRE. I do not know that I know. It is my impression that 
there was not but I am trying to pin down all that confusion. 

Senator Tal^niadoe. Your thinking is there was no investigation ? 

Mr. MooRE. By Mr. Dean? 

Senator Talmadge. Yes, sir, 

INIr. MooRE. That is my impression now. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, Mr. Moore, Mr. Dean testified that in 
February, I believe, you and he were summoned to San Clemente, 
Febi'uary 1973, San Clemente, Calif., and at that meeting, I believe 
Mr. Ehrlichman suggested that hearings, that is, these present hear- 
ings, be publicly analyzed as similar to the ITT hearings and a waste 
of time and highly partisan, is that correct? 

Mr. MooRE. That is, I think, a fair summary of what Mr. Ehrlich- 
man probably said, yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. At that time a policy was adopted that publicly 
the AVhite House would give the impression of cooperating with the 
committee and privately hindering it in every way possible, is that 
correct ? 

Mr. MooRE. Not really, sir, no. First of all, almost nothing, very 
little, was discussed there was adopted as a policy. As I think I used 
the phrase earlier, it was brainstorming. There was that concern that 
this might be a more partisan situation, just on general principles, 
because historically the administration is, I think, at the receiving 
end in the role of a defendant these hearings historically have a par- 
tisan flavor. As I said earlier, that has not eventuated and if you will 
notice that policy as far as I can see, has never been implemented 
where anybody from the administration has taken a view that this 
is a partisan political — so that policy never got adopted and never 
got implemented. It was discussed. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Moore, I believe it was also determined 
at those meetings to send you to see Mr. Mitchell in New York to ask 
Mr. Mitchell to raise some more money, to give the people who had 
been indicted, to aid them to keep their mouths shut, is that right? 

Mr. Moore, No, sir; that statement is not corivct. What was decided 
was, and this was decided on the very first day, was that I would 
indeed get with Mr. Mitchell — nobody said anything about going to 
New York, no matter where I saw him, but the important thing was 
that I visit with him and give him a full report and have a full dis- 
cussion of the role that he and the Committee for the Re-Election of 
the President, which was still in existence, would have to play in re- 



2027 

sponding to and preparing for these hearings now on the second day 
and if it was not of any importance it was not on the agenda on the 
second day and, by tlie way, reference, it is in my statement, I have 
said it many times, this question came np about money being needed 
and would I — why sliouldn't tliat be something for Mr. Mitcliell, 
"Dick Moore, will you see him and see him and ask him?" I have 
explained in full what I thought about that suggestion and what 
happened to it. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr, Dean testified that you were loath and reluc- 
tant to perform such a mission ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I saw that testimony. That conversation did not 
take place. I certainly did not see any point in asking John Mitchell 
to raise money because I did not think there m as a Chinaman's chance 
that he was going to — pardon me, I will have to comment on that — 
I did not think there was a chance he would in the least be interested 
in becoming a fundraiser and I brushed it off. 

Senator Talmadge. You did not look forward. I presume, as an 
attorney at law with any particular relish in making a pilgrimage to 
the city of New York to ask a former Attorney General of the United 
States to raise money for some convicted burglars, did you? 
. Mr. Moore. You have well stated tlie situation. Had there been the 
slightest intimation or feeling that that is what was involved, then 
the trip would not have been made and I might have got educated 
a lot sooner and maybe the President would have learnecl some things 
before March 21. 

Senator Talmaixje. At that ]:>oint, did not the suspicion arouse in 
your mind that something was fundamentally rotten about this whole 
operation ? 

Mr. MooRE. It does now, it did not then. I think I have explained 
what my part there was. There was — I did not get any particular 
message about Avhat ]\Ir. Dean was referring to. I did not know any- 
thing, I was not in on the fundraising side, I did not know what funds 
were used for what or for by the committee or financing, I just did 
not think it through and that was not my i^urpose in seeking to meet 
with Mr. Mitchelb and I also knew, and this was the primary thing 
that this would look to me like one more, whatever it was, the effort to 
pass the buck to John ^Mitchell to raise some money and I knew^ per- 
fectly well he was not going to do it. 

Senator Talimadge. You were counsel to the President of the United 
States at that time? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talimadge. I guess that is about a position of as high trust 
and responsibility as can be had in the country, is it not? 

Mr, Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you have immediate access to his office? 
• Mr. MooRE. Xo, sir. 

Senator Talimadge. You did or did not ? 

Mr. MooRE. Did not. 

Senator TAL:\rADGE. How did you happen — if you wanted to see the 
President how did you go about it ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I usually waited to be asked. I did not have oc- 
casions to 

Senator Tal^iadge. You have requested to see him yourself? 

Mr. Moore. Except on one occasion which I think I described. 



2028 

Senator Talmadge. If you would see a neighbor's house burniiiL^ 
down would you not try to do something to point out the hazard and 
tlie threat to his property ? 

Mr. MooRE. I sure would. 

Senator Talmadge. Well, when you saw tliis imminent perfectly to 
the President of the United States here you were one of his most 
trusted confidential advisers, why could you not walk in the office and 
say '"Mr. President, there is something rotten here and I want to tell 
you what it is" ? Could you not haAC done that ? 

Mr. MooRE. As I said that, I wish I had perhaps l^ecome more 
skeptical earlier or taken more initiative, and yet what I was dealine' 
with, until that moment, when the first criminal action was described 
to me — ^the blackmail effort of Mr. Hunt — and if you take this time 
frame of being called the fight of Febmary 9, and as Mr. Dean has 
testified, I was not a member. I mean I was a new boy, there was the 
fii-st time I was hearing anything, to meet with this group, between 
then and March. I picked up enongli so that it occurred to me, and it 
appears to me, I was the first one in the Wliite House to step up and — 
if I think — as 1 said if Mr. Dean would do it, if he had not done it, at 
that point I would have done it, but that is easy for me to say because 
ho did it at my urging. But that is tlie period February and into March 
and it was only in the latter middle — 3d of March — where these things 
began to put together in my mind. 

Senator Talmadge. It seems to me that a man of your background, 
intelligence, education, ex])erience, character, holding the position of 
high fidelity and trust that you were, were derelict in your duty that 
you did not inform the President. I think some way could have been 
found, if you had to send him a telegram, try to walk in his office, try 
to write him a letter or telephone him, I think in some manner you 
should have informed him. 

Mr. Moore. Senator Talmadge, I am not suggesting for one second 
that I did not try to see the President because I felt that I could not 
get into his office, of course, I could liave. One does not go in lightly, 
however, and to go in with pure gossip until this thing finally hit there 
or rmnor, I did not think that that was proper or wise, and but in a: 
very shoi-t time my mind firmed up on the matter. 

Senator Talmadge. There was a period of 6 weeks from there ; the 
conference at San Clemente of February 10 to March 21 when you 
were sent on missions to raise coverup money and you sat silent? 

Mr. Moore. Sir, I was not sent on a mission to raise coverup money. 

Senator Talmadge. What is it to raise money for convicted bur- 
glars? 

Mr. MooRE. I have been through this several times. T was to meet 
with Mr. Mitchell and I met with him 4 or 5 hours, and if that is all 
there was to it I could have called liim up on the telephone. I went up 
there to meet with him and fill him in on these things. The thought 
that at this point in my life, in my situation at the White House, 
that to be sitting there with the assumption that this reference to 
money by what Senator Inouye had called earlier two of the top 
officers of the United States, I put this on an if basis, because they 
are innocent until presumed guilty and I am not saying there was 
such a plan, but I was, my frame of mind was not apparentlv pre- 
pared to lise to the suspicion that I was sitting in a room witli that 
kind of thing going on, if indeed it was. 



2029 

Now, therefore, and I think I have testified earlier, in the next 2 
or 3 weeks none of the discussions from the San Clemente, La Costa 
meetings as far as I am concerned, got implemented. I heard, I knew 
nothing more about it. There were apparently later meetings at Key 
Biscayne that were testified to. There were some memorandums which 
T never saw, I got busy first on this executive privilege thing, you 
know, that took so much attention and then the Gray hearings started 
and it was this that period where I began to pick up a little bit more 
from a deeply, growingly concerned Mr. Dean who began telling me 
enough or hinted enough so I feel there was something that you could 
go into that, yes, the moment had come when there was something that 
could be said to the President that was specific and real rather than 
surmise and gossip. 

Now, I was wrong in retrospect, I am the first one to admit it, and 
what you say is correct. We would have thought if was not out of fear 
of the President, it was, just did not register that I had enough here, 
nothing touching the White House as far as, that I knew of, unless you 
assume that, you know, that I was aware 

Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. MooRE. All right. 

Senator Talmadge. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker, Mr. Moore, I will try to be brief in my ques- 
tioning of you. I gather then that from what you have stated here 
before the committee that it was only in the latter days of March 1973 
that you started to sus]:)ect that there were matters very seriously 
wrong both Avithin the White House and the Committee To Re-Elect 
the President, which matters were not coming to the attention of the 
President. Is that a correct paraphrase ? 

Mr. Moore. Not quite. When it comes to the committee, I think that 
Mr. Dean had, for instance, told me of the meetings with Liddy and 
Magruder at Mr. Mitchell's office, j^erhaps the very first of March 
or even a day or two earlier, I can't quite date it. 

Senator Weicker. All right. Because you see this is what concerns 
me, in your statement of yesterday the way the statement reads it 
at least gives the impression that the rather key dates as far as 
you were concerned relative to acquiring important knowledge of 
wrongdoings were around the 19th and 20th of March and I am a 
little bit confused because as your testimony has come forth here 
we seem to be backing off that date. I wonder if we just might start 
at the beginning for a minute. I gather your first suspicions really 
were as you stated here this afternoon when you read about the break- 
in by Mr. McCord. that you had a first warning light that you have 
said was your initial warning, is that correct ? 

. Mr. Moore. I don't think that, I don't recall that that was my — 
3^ou talk about the connection with the committee with the break-in. 

Senator Weicker. When you were responding to the chairman's 
questions that the light, the first 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, ISfr. McCord, very quickly, and I think Mr. Liddy 
surfaced very shortly after that and I guess Mr. Hunt's name was 
found in somebody's pocket. Yes, it was very quick that one thought 
that this was related to the committee. 

Senator Weicker. So even back as far as June of 1972 at least 
you had your first inkling things might not quite be right? 



2030 

Mr. Moore. Well, sir, my first inkling that this was a matter, the 
biirtylar, of wiretapping tliat had some connection with the Com- 
mittee To Re-Elect the President or people in it, pnt it that way. 

Senator Weicker. All right. 

Now, what was yoiir relationship with Mr. Ziegler. In other words, 
did yon work with him in a press capacity ? 

Mr. MooRE. Not in any official sense. Occasionally he calls me when 
he w^ants an opinion on any qnestion that he is going to have to dis- 
cuss in a briefing, and it used to be rare. In the month of IVIarch when 
things were beginning about then, I saw him a good deal more fre- 
quently, and go over and discuss how he should respond to some of 
these matters that were coming out of the Gray hearings, for exam}>le. 

Senator Weicker. Did you woi-k with him on his denial of the 
newspaper stories relative to Segretti and Chapin ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. In what capacity did you work with him in those 
denials? 

Mr. Moore. Like utility infielder capacity. They wanted a collective 
judgment on how to respond to this phone call from the Washington 
Post, and 

Senator Weicker. In other words, that was on October 15, 1972, 
you did get involved in the Segretti aspects? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Of the situation that confronts us. You see, I 
just want to make clear one thing: I lump Mr. Segretti and all that 
business in with Watergate. Someitimes, I don't want to be so narrow 
as just include the-break-in in the Watergate, all of them is the same 
matter, I just want you to understand it. You did work with Mr. 
Ziegler in the Segretti-Chapin matter back in October of 1972? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Then again the matter came up relative to the 
response that IVIr. Segretti had been paid by Herbert. Kalmbach, the 
President's attorney. That was another matter that you worked with 
Mr. Ziegler on, is that cor]'ect ? 

Mr. MooRE. Response by Mr. Kalmbach ? 

Senator Weicker. By Mr. Ziegler, no, no, by Mr. Ziegler. 

Mr. MooRE. Mr. Ziegler? 

Senator Weicker. To the stories relative to Segretti and Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Moore. I don't think I recall that. Was this a separate story you 
are referring to ? 

Senator Weicker. This was the next day, this was all involved in the 
same matter of Segretti, newspaper reports of the Segretti matter. 

Mr. Moore. I can perhaps summarize vei'^" quickly. We had that 
meeting on Friday. The stoiy appeared Sunday, and of course it was 
a major stoiy. Monday morning Mr. Ziegler would be subject to press, 
a lot of c^ueries at his press conference («) ; (b) I rather think Mr. 
Ehrlichman was going on one of the Sunday interview shows and there 
was a meeting in the Roosevelt room to discuss l)oth those things, how 
do we respond to this and frankly. Senator Weicker. we did think, I 
did, and most of us. that the thrust of it as far as the White House 
was concerned. Chapin's role of hiring his old college chum is what 
he called it was wrong, is wrong but we thought the meaning of it 
apparent since to get it closer and closer on the Presidency required 



2031 

■ that there was a political thing in the story right in the political 
season and required, of couree, as honest an answer as we could make 
but also one that takes into consideration the chai-ge was rather politi- 
; cal so we met and discussed how it could be properly handled. 

Senator AVeicker. All right. 

Mr. Moore. That was a meeting of Sunday and I took part in 
that. That is, I told no 

Senator Weicker. In other words, to prepare an honest response? 

Mr. MooRE. Sure. 

Senator Weicker. Which you have indicated it was obviously nec- 
essary to go into some of the background of these matters, is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Moore. Right. 

Senator Weicker. Did you have occasion to talk to either Mr. Chapin 
or Mr. Segretti ? 

Mr. MooRE. I have never met or talked to Mr. Segretti. 

Senator Weicker. I see, and INIr. Chapin ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. And specifically about these matters? 

Mr. MooRE. Oh, yes. 

Senator Weicker. So it is fair to say that insofar as the Segretti 
aspect of what confronts tliis committee, your knowledgeable to some 
extent, to some extent in October of 1972, is that not correct ? 

Mr. Moore. Knowledgeable from the standpoint of White House 
connection, not Segretti's oi>erations. 

Senator Weicker. And you did go into — the denial was a rather 
brief denial l)y Mr. Ziegler, as I recall. The denial read: 

I will not dignify with comment stories based on hearsay, character assassina- 
tion, innuendo or guilt by association. That is the White House position. 

Now it doesn't take very long to go ahead and dream up or to con- 
trive that particular answer. So clearly the discussions — and again, 
I compliment you in the performance of your duties in trying to be 
of assistance here, there liad to be some basis for whatever action, 
whatever res]:)onse was going to be given. I gather the conversations 
related to what went on ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. All right. So that as of October insofar as the 
conversations relative to the response by the White Plouse, you were 
aware of the Segretti matter, maybe not totally but you were aware 
of some of 

Mr. Moore. I learned of the Segretti matter that week, read about 
it in the Washington Post, and got into it in that followup story. 

Senator Weicker. All right. 

Now, in INIr. Dean's testimony he makes a statement, and I would 
.like to have your comment on it, that he attended with you a meeting 
on December 13, 1972. 

Do you recall such a meeting ? 

]Mr.' ]\Ioore. I think I may have already testified that that meeting 
I don't recall very well. I have read about it. JNIy independent recollec- 
tion is very slim and I can 

Senator Weicker. I think it is very important, I really do. 

Mr. Moore. Go ahead, I am not sure tliere wasn't much to the meet- 
ing is what I am trying to say but go ahead. 



2032 

Senator Weicker. Let me read Mr. Dean's testimony and you feci 
free to go ahead and comment on it. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. He says when he testified or in his opening state- 
ment rather before the committee : 

Present at the meeting were Haldeman, Moore, Ziegler, and myself. Ehrlich- 
man had shown up for the earlier meeting in Haldeman's office but when it was 
moved to Ziegler's office he never returned to the meeting, to the best of my 
recollection. Nothing was resolved at the meeting and it was the consensus of 
the group that the White House should continue, in Dick Moore's words, to 
"hunkerdown" to nothing on the general theory that no one would be arrested 
for what they didn't say. 

Would you comment on that ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. I don't — I don't have independent recollection of 
that. I have used a Johnsonian phrase "hunkerdown'' in my time. I 
don't think I used the word "arrested," whether that was said at that 
meeting but I have been known to say this to several of the young 
fellows over there that when in doubt keep your mouth shut, don't 
sound off, everybody talked to everybody and nobody got in trouble. 

Senator Ervin. If Senator Weiclcer would excuse me. you are just 
expanding on the philosophy a man never regrets saying too little. 

Mr. Moore. I didn't get that. I have no idea what that quote referred 
to or what or if it was said but it was 

Senator Weicker. But I gather that is what you are saying to the 
committee that it is possible that you might have been at that meeting, 
in other words, or are you^ 

Mr. MooRE. The meeting of 

Senator Weicker. The meeting of December 13. 

Mr. Moore. Yes ; I recall that, I think this related to, there was at 
least up for consideration a package that Mr. Dean had prepared, a 
draft of a narrative about the Segretti matter. It was very much of a 
draft. It was an earlier vereion of the one that I later wrote, and it had 
some, that proposed that maybe Mr. Chapin sign a deposition about 
his part, and again I want to say that Mr. Chapin from the beginning 
said, "AYliy don't I just issue a statement saying I thought we ought to 
have a prankster on our side the way they always have got us, I hired 
my chmn and got word to Mr. Kalmbach to finance it and I did it and 
I am sorry I did it and 2:et it out." 

He wanted to do that the first day. And it wasn't done, and so later 
in December, this came back up. I had a feeling that meeting, was that 
supposed to be in somebody else's office, and then indeed up in Ziegler's 
office Avhich is not where meetings are held as a rule, was brief, and the 
question was John Dean's memos just raised more questions than they 
asked. It was not a complete statement, it wouldn't have been a proper 
one to put out and I think I probably said unless, I don't know, that 
the resolution, the day, I don't know what happened to it, nobody 
knew what happened to it, it wouldn't justify or do the job and it 
wasn't justified and was just shelved. It was just brief and that is all 
there was to it. 

That is my version as I best remember it to the best of my recol- 
lection. 

Senator Weicker. This would be the December 1972 meeting? 

Mr. Moore. Yes ; yes. 



2033 

! Senator Weicker. Mr. Moore, would you refer to your statement, to 
I this statement he — and specifically page 4. 

I Let me ask the first question, am I correct in assuming that the 1971 
and the 1972 as they appear there are typographical erroi-s and should 
read 1972 and 1973. 

Mv. Moore. Yes, Senator Weicker. 

And then I asked it to be corrected, were you here yesterday when I 
testified about tliis paragraph. 

Senator Weicker. I wish you Avould go ahead and tell me. 

Mr. Moore. I think this came up, first of all, I corrected that and I 
had then my reading copy. Actually, sir, this sentence got left in this 
draft when it was filed by mistake because it didn't really relate, it is 
out of place but it doesn't matter it is perfectly correct, except that in 
reading it and before going on I I'ealized that in early December we had 
discussed the Segretti matter or the first half, so I had written on my 
reading copy, '"In latter December 1972'" and, but in reading it I didn't 
say that way. It w^as there and I showed it to the committee yesterday. 
So that if you are asking about 

Senator Weicker. Yes; your statement should now read 

Mr. MooRE. It should be in latter December 1972 and 1973. 

Senator Weicker. Latter December 1972 and 1973. 

Mr. Moore. That is right. 

Senator Weicker. And basically as I understand it the December 13 
meeting attested to by Mr. Dean to the best of your recollection is 
as you describe it here and you were in attendance at that meeting. 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. So it is now true, just so I recap, I don't want 
to get ahead of ourselves here, your first inkling came about knowledge 
of Air. McCord's break-in in Watergate when it came to you by route 
of tlie press reports then, in fact you engaged in a session relative to 
the Segretti matter in October of 1972, and then again in a session 
on December 1972, again the matter of Watergate is under discussion 
and/or Segretti all being the same matter. 

Now, during the confirmation hearings for Mr. Gray, if you will 
recall he was asked to — about Mr. Kalmbach, and he submitted a 
document showing the FBI had learned of the Chapin-Kalmbach- 
Segretti connection. 

Now, did you assist in this — this obviously raised problems, obvi- 
ously raised problems with Mr. Ziegler because of his previous denial 
now being confronted with the Gray testimony and more particularly 
the 302 file which is in the hearings and which was very explicit as to 
Mr. Kalmbach's activities with Chapin, et al., did you help Mr. Zieg- 
ler prepare a response to the latest Segretti problem as it emanated 
from the Gray hearings ? 

Mr. Moore. I was in a meeting with Mr. Ziegler and Mr. Dean, I 
think this is — yes, and as I understand it was not, I don't recall exactly 
what do you call 302 is the interview report. 

Senator Weicker. That is right, FBI raw interview. 

Mr. Moore. And Mr. Dean expressed his concern in talking to Mr. 
Ziegler, that what this was, as I take it was a matter out of raw files 
that Mr. — that Pat made available. 

Senator Weicker. Eight. 



2034 

Mr. Moore. And the American Civil Liberties Union had just is- 
sued a letter to that effect, and suddenly, to the surprise of some we 
find ourselves in the company of the American Civil Liberties Union 
and Mr. Dean suggested 

Senator Weicker. "VVliy is that so surprising? I must confess, in tlic 
light of what is coming out of these hearings, it is surprising. 

Mr. MooRE. I am being somewhat facetious, as I am sure you 
understand. 

Senator Weicker. Eight. Well, I do not understand, but I 

Mr. Moore. In any event, it was jVIr. Dean's suggestion and we be- 
lieved that — perhaps I should not have made that joking remark, 
because we have never been accused of being allies of the American 
Civil Liberties Union — that is, the Nixon administration — but some 
of our opponents. But the fact is, the President always felt strongly 
about this file thing, and as he expressed at his press conference, these 
raw files. Yes, Mr. Dean suggested at this point, we ought to bring that 
subject up, and that might be one effective way of injecting some 
factors into this equation that belong there. And that was a suggestion 
that was made to Mr. Ziegler in my presence. 

Senator Weicker. Specifically. I do not quite understand what the 
suggestion was. 

Mr. MooRE. Well, it was that IVIr. Ziegler, in addition to — Mr. 
Ziegler raised the point that the information that they were referring 
to was based on raw files and he hoped that raw files from the FBI 
would no longer be made public. He sort of took the offensive, I sup- 
pose under the theory tliat the best defense is a good offense. He did 
not deny, of course — I do not recall the text of the press conference. 
Did he deny that Kalmbach made the payments? 

Senator Weicker. Well, the response was by Mr. Ziegler "JNIy com- 
ments stand," quote, end of quote. This in liglit of the file which be- 
came available and which made it very, very clear as to the Kalm- 
bach-Chapin-Segretti chain of payments. 

Mr. ]\Ioore. Well, of course, the Kalmbach role, in fact, almost a 
verbatim copy of that — the Kalmbach role had already been })ub- 
licized quite fully with reference to Government sources about the 
payments. And I cannot remember this point. Senator Weicker, when 
Ziegler said in wliat, March, that he stood on his denial, whether he is 
referring back to that October 15 statement or whether there is some 
intermediate comment. Because Kalmbach's name had been coming up 
almost daily. 

So I cannot really respond unless I know what the previous state- 
ment was that he was standing on. 

Senator Weicker. Oh, the previous statement that he was referring 
to, again, was the one which I read to you — "I will not dignify with 
comment stories based on heai-say, character assassination, innuendo, 
or guilt by association. That is the Wliite House position." 

]Mr. Moore. Well, I did not advise him with respect to his statement, 
"I stand on tlie previous comment." 

What I do wonder, sir, is whether, in all those weeks, there had not 
been other i-esponses by Mr. Ziegler to questions about Mr. Kalmbach 
that he might have been standing on. I would have to go back and re- 
search those. 



2035 

Senator Weicker. Then clearly, forgetting Mr. Ziegler for a mo- 
ment, clearly during this period of time, starting off with the October 
15 statement and right through the Gray hearings, when the Kalmbach 
matter was raised, you were in consultation with Mr. Ziegler and other 
persons in the White House relative to the Kalmbach-Segretti-Chapin 
matter. 

]Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. And this is all considerably before March 19 or 
•JO, is it not? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, sir 

Senator Weicker. To get on with the 

]\Ir. MooRE. Senator, could I make a comment? There was a strong 
view among some of us that the full Segretti story should be published 
and that is what my memorandum was a starting point for on May 22. 

Second, when you say that, and I understand and I am not arguing 
with it, you say that you view Watergate as including Segretti, I un- 
derstand it in that sense, that Watergate is a name for all the illegal 
or improper activities that might have been going on in the campaign. 
But in terms of the President's knowledge of the Watergate, I think 
that becomes, I speak more specifically. I speak of the burglary, the 
break-in, and the so-called coverup. 

Senator Weicker. Are you indicating to me that the President had 
knowledge of events other than the break-in ? 

Mv. ISiooRE. No ; I am referring to your statement that I said I did 
not know anything until, that was incriminating or possibly incrimi- 
nating, until INIarch. I was talking about the President's knowledge 
of the subject of the break-in and the coverup. I did not know any- 
thing at that time that I could have put forth until 

Senator Weicker. The coverup of Watergate ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Although you had knowledge of the coverup of 
Segretti-Chapin-Kalmbach ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, sir, that is a— I do not think that "coverup" there 
applies in the same sense. I am talking about what was a conspiracy, 
alleged conspiracy to obstruct justice by payments to defendants. As 
I understand it, that has not been alleged or suggested with respect 
to Mr. Segretti or those activities. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, all your statements before the 
committee here today only relate to Watergate and the break-in at 
Watergate and nothing else? 

Mr. Moore. Well, all the statements except when we are discussing 
the Segretti matter. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, knowledge of Segretti, Chapin, 
Kalmbach, and other matters are not included? 

- Mr. IVIooRE. Well, sir — yes. This statement of mine — I came here, 
as I understood, my main testimonv, and I understood it — in fact, 
we indicated when we did meet with the staff the other night that 
the Segretti affair was not to be part of the hearings, but would come 
later. But it does not matter — the staff did not say they were au- 
thorized. I think Mr. Thompson said that he was not planning, but 
he could not promise. 

Is that fair enough, Mr. Thompson? Or Mr. Lenzner? 



96-296 O — 73— bk. 5- 



2036 

Senator Weicker. I am not trying to get into the details, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. Moore. No; but my statement really basically relates to what 
I thought was the essential question on which I could shed some light. 

Senator Weicker. I suppose really, that the point I frankly am 
making is that from reading your statement, the impression is given 
that around March of 1973, you appear on the scene and are positively 
shocked by various matters that are brought to your attention. And 
the point I am trying to make is that very clearly, you were workinu: 
right along with the same group of men in various activities whicli 
clearly you felt and the others felt should not come to the attention 
of the American people. Is that right ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I felt they should and Mr. Chapin felt they 
should. But at the time, I must remind you that in that October 15 
period, these facts were not known and we still do not know. Senator 
Weicker — I do not know ; I have no knowledge of what Mr. Segretti 
did. I know he has been charged with an offense in Florida. What I do 
know is that Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan, who were college class- 
mates, hired him and if you read that report, turned him loose to be 
on his own and travel around and harass and — they really genuinely, 
I think, felt they were hiring a Dick Tuck, who, by the way, happened 
to have been on the payroll of the other Presidential candidate. 

Senator Weicker. Now, I am not trying to cast any particular light 
on the testimony that you have given here that is not of your own 
belief and your own thinking. But the fact remains that you partic- 
ipated in a flatout denial of an event where you knew the facts to 
be different from the statement which was made. Is that not correct? 

Mr. Moore. No ; I will not accept that. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, you accept the fact that on 
October 16 — on October 16 — when Mr. Ziegler said, "I will not 
dignifv" in relation to this Segretti matter, when he made the state- 
ment, "I will not dignify with comment stories based on hearsay, char- 
acter assassination, innuendo, or guilt by association. That is the White 
House position." 

You shared in the preparation of that statement. You also shared in 
at least some knowledge that there was some basis for the charges made 
relative to Segretti and Kalmbach. 

Mr. MooRE. The charges — well, first of all, let me clear up one thing. 

Senator Weic ker. I do not want to go into the details. But in other 
words, was that statement correct? 

Mr. INIooRE. The charges were based on innuendo, hearsay, and guilt 
by association. 

Senator Weicker. No, was that statement correct on the basis of the 
knowledge that you and/or INIr. Ziegler had ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, the knowledge that we had — first of all, I do want 
to explain. Senator Weicker, about this statement which talks about 
the Watergate, I did use it and I thought everybody understood that, 
because the testimony made it clear in the sense that 

Senator Weicker. T understand. 

Mr. Moore. Second, this comes — as I said, I am ready to answer 
questions on all other aspects, but I had at length and in complete de- 
tail, never held anything back, told the staff of my full participation 
in my responses to the Segretti matter. 

Senator Weicker. I understand. 



2037 

Mr. Moore. Just in case anybody got tlie impression that I was hold- 
ing back, I understood that that statement would come later on, at a 
later date in the hearing and I will be ])repared to do it at that time. 

So that is why I don't have Segretti in this statement. 

Senator Weicker. I understand. 

And I am not asking you for the details of the Segretti matter. 

Mr. MooRE. Eight. 

Senator Weicker. I am asking you whether or not on the basis of 
your knowledge on October 16, 1972, the statement that was made — 
"I will not dignify with comments stories based on hearsay, character 
assassination, innuendo, or guilt by association. That is the White 
House position" — on the basis of your knowledge, nobody else's, was 
a correct statement? Since you participated in 

jyfr. ]MooRE. Senator Weicker, as I said earlier, I did not participate 
in that phrasing. And also, I don't know what context that is in, be- 
cause there were stories that were all related that were loaded with 
hearsay, innuendo, and guilt by association. "\\Tiere they had gone to 
the same fraternity, they therefore suggested that he was a conspira- 
tor, or lived across the street. That kind of thing was loaded into 
that story. 

Now, I dare say you will find many other comments that are dif- 
ferent from that and I don't know exactly what he was replying to 
with that question. 

Senator Weicker. Let me ask you whether or not you didn't testify 
before this committee that you had had a meeting prior to the issuance 
of that statement by Ziegler — is that correct^ — on Chapin? 

Mr. Moore, Well, sir, you say prior to 

Senator Weicker. Did you indicate to me that you had a meeting? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I guess you should give me the date of that state- 
ment ? 

Senator Weicker. The date of the statement is October 16, 1972. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes; I had a meeting the very day before. 

Senator Weicker. On October 15 ? 

Mr. Moore. Right. 

Senator Weicker. And at that meeting, you have indicated to me 
that the matter was discussed to some extent — I am not saying all the 
facts were laid out, and I am not implying all the facts to you at all. 

Mr, MooRE. No. 

Senator Weicker. But the denial is very brief, very short, very com- 
plete. I am asking you on the basis of the knowledge which you ac- 
quired on October 15 whether that denial was correct? 

Mr. MooRE. I think, first of all, it was not a denial. It was a refusal 
to comment. It said. ''I will not dignify with a response," as I under- 
stand it. If I heard you correctly. 
. Senator Weicker. "I will not dignify with comment." 

Mr, MooRE. So I don't think he denied anything. And I think he 
correctly asserted that that story was loaded with heareay, innuendo, 
and guilt by as.sociation. Now, the fact that some of us, including me, 
wanted a fiiller statement doesn't really matter. But I do think that 
if you woidd go back and read not just the one story — and this was a 
sequence — first, the Segretti story, then a Chapin story, then a full 
page story, saying, of course, Chapin is the closest man to Haldeman, 
Haldeman is the closest man to the President, ergo the Segretti thing 
was done by the White House. 



2038 

Also, everything was hearsay. The source was a youno: lawyer who 
happened to be a young Democi-atic politician, who told the reporter 
that somebody told him and that is what was published. And on that 
Monday, plus all the names of the people who also went to U.S.C. If 
you went to TT.S.C, you were guilty of something, according to that 
article. 

So that was a pretty good, pretty fair statement. And what else was 
said in that press conference 

Senator Weicker. Was it a fair statement relative to the newspaper 
articles or was it a fair statement in relation to the knowledge which 
you had acquired the day before ? 

Mr. Moore. I am sorry. Perhaps I had better have the question 
before I answer it. 

Senator Weicker. The day before 

Mr. Moore. No; what was the question in response to? I don't 
happen to have the transcript of the Ziegler testimony. What was the 
question ? 

Senator Weicker. Earlier, at the daily morning White House brief- 
ing, Ziegler said, "I will not dignify with comment stories based on 
hearsay, character assassination, innuendo or guilt by association" 
adding, "That is the White House position. That is my position." 

This is a general article — if you would like to have the whole article, 
I will be glad to submit it to'you. It is entitled "GOP Hits Post for 
Hearsay", 

Mr. iNIooRE. Senator Weicker, I don't think the Post denied the 
hearsay. I think we should have put out a franker statement. It was 
not such a bad story from the White House point of view, unless it 
turns out that IVIr. Segretti did illegal things, which I don't know what 
he did. The fact that one young man in the White House or two young 
men got the bright idea of getting a college chum to act as a Dick Tuck, 
who, as I say, has been identified as having been on the payroll of 
Senator ]VIcGovern in his campaign — this was wrong but it was not a 
major issue in this campaign to be turned into a tremendous issue. I 
noted it was just as the campaign practices, just put out their warning, 
their alert the day before, this is a season when you can expect stories 
that will be blown out of proportion, because there isn't time to answer 
them. The act of these two young men and act of misjudgment hap- 
pened. It was wrong. 

Senator Weicker. And you knew about that on October 15 ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes ; I knew that Mr. Chapin had approved the hiring 
of Segretti. 

Senator Weicker. All right. You knew about it on October 15. 
Therefore, the statement on October 16 — never mind as to what the 
sources of the Post were or the press or anything else. Your own 
knowledge, of your own knowledge, due to a meeting held on October 
15, you knew "that this statement issued by ]Mr. Ziegler was either 
wrong or, from the phraseology which you haA^e used, was mislead- 
ing, or a weaseled denial — let's put it that way. 

Mr. MooRE. It could be — yes, I think we are in the area of weasel 
words. I would be a lot better, I could be more helpful if I knew what 
it was he was not dignifying. The question he was res]wnding to 
might have been a question saying, I assume that ^Nlr. Haldeman was 
running the espionage operation. You know, I don't know what the 
question was. 



2039 

In other words, the reporter's question to which that was a reply 
could have been something quite offensive and quite wrong. I don't 
know. But in any event, we should have, of course — Mr. Chapin's 
instinct was right, let me put out my story and say what I did. We 
should have done it. But by the same token, had we done that, it would 
have been a victory for some, what I would call at least political 
journalism, in that the admission could not have been separated from 
tlic wild charges, including the false and irresponsible charge that 
Dwight Chapin had conspired with Howard Hunt to coach a man 
on his testimony. We took the view that we would issue a statement and 
that statement,' in retrospect, if you looked at it under all those cir- 
cumstances, was pretty fair. 

I don't know that we should have continued, but I still don't know 
what he was not dignifying. 

Senator Weicker. I will be glad to go ahead and submit to your 
counsel up there so they may look at the various documents. 

Mr. Moore. I regret— I know Mr. Ziegler regrets — I won't speak for 
him, but I know — any situation that — Mr. Ziegler didn't have the facts 
that are in this report. I didn't have the facts that are in this report. I 
later developed them, I later wrote them, I later urged that they 
be made public. 

Senator Weicker. I want to state that these statements were stuck 
by after the Gray hearings, or during the course of the Gray hearings, 
around the first of March, when it became clear even from the FBI 
reports 

Mr. Moore. They were out before that. Those reports had been re- 
ported in Time and Newsweek much earlier. 

Senator Weicker. What I am saying to you is the denial was reiter- 
ated around the first of March, after Mr. Gray appeared at his^ con- 
firmation hearings and divulged the raw 802 file relative to Mr. Kalm- 
bach. And even with that, even as a matter of public knowledge, the 
denial was reiterated. 

Ml-. MooRE. Well, that was wrong. That was wrong. I didn't know 
it had happened, if it did. 

Senator Weicker. Very briefly, Mr. Mitchell testified as follows: 

Mr. TiioMPsox. Let me ask you to recall as specifically as you can exactly what 
he said to you concerning money. 

This is relative to your visit with Mitchell. 

My. Mitchell. Well, I don't know as I can remember the specific phrase but 
there is one thought that sticks in my mind which may or may not be the exact 
words but it was something to the effect, you would not be interested in helping 
raise money in connection with these activities, would you? 

It was more of a question than it was a plea and my answer to 
that was negative. 

. ;Mr. Thompson. What activities? 

' Mr. Mitchell. The activities, the payment for the support and the legal fees 
of the people that were involved in Watergate. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he specifically mention support for the people involved 
in the Watergate? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this was the general tenor of the subject matter; yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you have any talk about 

Mr. Mitchell. Or at least I understood when he talked about raising funds 
that this is what they were talking about. 

Would you comment on Mr. Mitchell's testimony in that regard? 
Mr. Miller. Could we have a copy ? We can't get our hands on it. 



2040 

Mr. Moore. Senator, my comment is that this appears to me to 1 x^ 
a classic example of the twofold hazard when two people talk and 
one has something in his knowledge in his mind and the other do(\s 
not. You will note — let's see. He said, He was first asked what I said 
and he said, "Mr. Moore said, 'You would not be interested in helping 
raise money in connection with these activities, would you?'" 

Now^, you will note Mr. Mitchell in his opening comment did not 
say that I made any reference to money for defendants or anythini:- 
of that sort. 

Mr. Thompson. What activities? 

Mr. Mitchell. The activities, the payment of the support and the legal fees 
of the people that were involved in the Watergate? 

Now, he didn't say that I said that. Mr. Thompson said, "Did he," 
meaning Mr. Moore, "specifically mention support for the people 
involved in the Watergate ?" 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this was the general tenor of the subject matter ; yes. 

The subject matter may have been in his mind and that may have 
been the tenor or what he was thinking, but he didn't say that I said it 
and I didn't say it. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Moore, so that I am not unfair to you, I 
want to reemphasize, and I will forward this to your counsel, that in 
the afternoon session, Mr. Dash, in essence, reiterated this question 
to Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash said : 

Mr. Mitchell, did Mr. Richard ^Moore sometime in February come to see you 
in New York for the purpose of asking you to participate to try to raise some 
funds for the legal defense of the defendants? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Richard Moore came to Nev,' York on February 15 and, as 
I recall, we had lunch to discuss a number of items concerning the forthcoming 
hearings of this committee, and I believe, if my memory serves me right that it 
was a casual reference to the thought that some people thought I might be 
interested in that subject matter and, as I recall, I had a very strong resentment 
of the concept that was disposed of in one or two sentences. 

Ml-. Dash. Now the subject matter, again of casual reference, was seeking 
whether you would be interested in raising funds for the legal defense of the 
defendants? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. But that was not the prime basis of the 
discussion. 

Mr. MooRE. Well, again, I would like to look at that, because it 
strikes me that the words were Mr. Dash's words, rather than Mr. 
Mitchell's. Would you let me finish. I would like to go back. 

He said this Avas the tenor of the subject matter. Now, Mr. Mitchell 
has testified that he was approached before by Mr. Dean about it and 
had kept turning it down. And the tenor of the subject matter was his. 
He did not say I used any such words. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Moore, let me make myself very clear. I am 
only asking you. I am not believing or disbelieving Mr. JSIitchell's 
version. I am asking you to tell me whether or not Mr. Mitchell's ver- 
sion, which is very clear between these two pieces of testimony, is 
correct or incorrect. That is all I am asking you. 

Mr. Moore. It is incorrect. 

Senator Weicker. It is incorrect? 

Mr. Moore. It is incorrect, but you also asked me for my comment. 

Senator Weicker. Please go right ahead. 



2041 

Mr. Moore. My comment is, going back now, did Mr. Mitchell 
specifically mention support for the people ? Well, that was the general 
tenor. "Or at least, I understood when he talked about raising funds 
that that is what they were talking about." 

You have there a surmise by Mr. Mitchell months later that when 
I spoke about money, he thought that is what they were talking about 
down in California. What I did say to him was that I didn't know 
what this was about, but there was a suggestion that he be nominated 
to be a fundraiser. And since he apparently had been nominated, 
according to Mr. Dean's testimony, at least, tw^o or three times before, 
he made his own construction and interpretation. But there is no 
statement by Mr. Mitchell that I ever made any reference to raising 
money for the defendants. 

Senator Weicker. Would you care to go ahead and comment on his 
second piece of testimony ? 

Mr. Moore. I would like to look at that. 

Well, Senator Weicker, you are quoting Mr. Dash, not Mr. Mitchell, 

Senator Weicker. I am quoting Mr. Mitchell. He is responding to 
Mr. Dash's question, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. Moore. It is the very same thing. Mr. Dash — these are Mr. 
Dash's words : "Now, the subject matter, again of casual reference, was 
seeking whether you would be interested in raising funds for the legal 
defense of the defendants." The words, "raising funds for the legal 
defense of the defendants" are Mr. Dash's words. 

Senator Weicker. This is Mr. Dash's question. 

Mr. Dash. But wliat is Mr. Mitchell's response ? 

Mr. Moore. "That is correct." 

Senator Weicker. I can't think of anything 

Mr. Moore. It is already clear that this subject matter, which has 
been also in the other testimony is in Mr. Mitchell's mind, or as he said 
before, "or at least I understood when he talked about raising funds 
tliat that is what they were talking about." 

The subject matter was in his mind based, and Mr. Mitchell never 
once said that I referred to raising funds for the defendant. But he 
thought that that is what the purpose was and whether or not it was, 
I can't say. But it is clear that I never used the words, he never said 
I used the words. 

Senator Weicker. Why did you say a few moments ago there that 
Mr. Mitchell was incorrect ? 

INIr. jNIoore. Well, you pressed me on that. The question you gave 
me was, would I comment? Then you interrupted my comment. He 
was correct — well, it is correct, I assume, that that is what Mr. INIitchell 
said. I was trying to make my comment and I am not sure what you 
meant when you said correct. Correct that he thought it was, yes. I 
am sure it was correct on what he thought. But you know perfectly 
well I did not say "correct" meaning that I had used those words. The 
fact is that it is correct that he 

Senator Weicker. I am trying to give you an opportunity to respond 
to testimony of another witness, which certainly I do not think puts 
you in a good light, 

_ Mr. Moore. I understand that, sir. And the testimony of the other 
witness never once said that I used the words that have been attributed 
tome. 



2042 

Senator Weicker. You do not feel the testimony of Mr. Mitchell 
indicates tliat when yon requested money of him, it was for a defense 
fund rather than for the Committee To Re-Elect the President? 

Mr. MooRE. I understand it suggests that that is what interpreta- 
tion he pLaced upon it. It does not suggest that I said it. And I did not. 

Now, we have this evidence that this matter of trying to enroll Mr. 
Mitchell as a fundraiser had been broached before. And when I said 
to him, and I used the words, as I recall, I do not know what this is 
about, but you have been invited to become a fundraiser if some more 
money is needed. 

If Mr. Dean's testimony is correct, that this was the second or 
third time he had been pressed to raise money for, as it happens, for 
the defendants, that he apparently interpreted my comment just that 
way and so testified. But when asked whether I said it, he did not 
say that I said it. And I did not state it that way and as I said, if I 
did, if I thought that out of that meeting came an unlawful situation, 
I would not have been there. 

Senator "Weicker. What was your understanding as you left La 
Costa and went to Mr. INIitchell as to what the basis for your request 
of INIr. IMitchell was ? Just to beef up the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President ? 

Mr. Moore. I did not analyze it, sir, and I should have, obviously. 

Senator Weicker. You left La Costa with a specific request to ask 
for money of Mr. Mitchell. Now, clearly, as an intelligent human 
being, you would have asked for some basis for that request. 

Mr. Moore. Yes. The more I got into that, the more I would have 
been in a fundraising position. I knew the outcome, Senator. I know 
John ISIitchell well. I have carried requests from Mr. Ehrlichman to 
him before and Mr. Haldeman. And I just, to me, this was an area at 
the discussion on the second day that had nothing to do with me, had 
nothing to do with the kind of subject matter that I am expected 
to be helpful on. and T was not interested in going u]3 and giving 
Mr. Mitchell a pinch or putting the arm on him to raise money or 
anything like that purpose. I did not know what the situation was 
over there. They seemed to have a lot of funds for whatever purpose. 

Senator Weicker. Stop right there. Mr. INIoore. Not for whatever 
purpose. What was the purpose? What was the purpose that you re- 
quested him to raise money for? 

Mr. Moore. I never knew^ precisely. I did not ask him. I did not 
know. ' ""■ 

Senator Weicker. You just asked him, you were supposed to raise 
money, 

Mr. Moore. Yes, as I testified. 

Senator Weicker. That is all ? 

Mr. Moore. What I said was, "I do not think — I think I know what 
your answer to this will be but you have been invited to raise some 
more money and you have been invited to be a fundraiser," and I got 
a short answer. 

Senator Weicker. Of course, Mr. IMitcliell has already testified there 
was plenty of money for the Committee To Re-Elect" the President, 
is that correct? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Did he discuss, did lie say, that to you Avhen you 
were there ? 



2043 

Mr. Moore, No. "Wliat he said in effect to me at that point, it was 
about the third of a series, as I remember, of things that I put to him 
which I knew he would not have any interest in but just about, the 
words like "tell them to drop dead,'' or "get lost." 

Senator Weicker. All right. 

Just as we wind up here, the fact is that starting in June of 1972, 
and through October of 1972, relative to the Segretti matter and then 
in the La Costa meetings in February, and the subsequent meeting 
with John Mitchell, let me ask you one question, you make the state- 
{jment in your prepared statement you say on page 11, "I had a some- 
what blunt reply such as 'thank you very much, I am indeed interested 
and, as you know, I may be a star witness.' " 

What did he mean by that? 

Mr. Moore. Oh, I think what he meant was, Senator Weicker, he 
iid it with a smile and a rather sarcastic "thank those young men out 
:here, don't they know," and he stopped after that, "that I have a 
very definite interest" — he was asked to become more interested in 
:he hearings and he said "don't they know I am quite interested and 
ioesn't it occur to them that I am interested to the point where I may 
iome up as a star witness," something like that. 

Senator Weicker. AMiat was the basis for that comment ? 

Mr. MooRE. I think he knew by that time in the investigation of the 
ictivities of the campaign he directed would involve him as a witness. 

Senator Weicker. Did you assume that, too ? 

Mr. MooRE. Certainly. 

Senator Weicker. And this is when, on February 15 ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. February. 

Mr. Moore. February 15. 

Senator Weicker. And then comes your series of meetings with 
John Dean in March and, as I gather it, and it was a little un- 
certain from your prepared statement, you start off "On March 19 
Dr possibly before, we met later that day, the President told me 
E. Howard Hunt was demanding a large amount of money," et cetera. 
Later on you say this revelation was the culmination of several other 
guarded comments Mr. Dean had made to me in the immediately pre- 
ceding day," so I imagine that means before March 19, and then later 
311 you indicate "Mr. Dean had also mentioned to me that earlier ac- 
■ivities," and I did not have this in the copy you gave to me but I 
rather think you read it in "in these days in March," is that written 
into your copy ? 

Mr. Moore. Let me look at that, copy, I missed that, too. 

Senator Weicker. So in any event, we can say that relative to cam- 
paigning activity that was best not be made public either before or 
after the election of 1972, you had knoAvledge that, in effect, started 
back in June with only press warnings of a break-in but running 
rather consistently through up until the 19th or 20tli of INIarch. And 
mind you, my comment is not, I did not say Watergate, I said cam- 
paign activity, which was best not known by the American people, 
either before or after the election, that you had a running knowledge 
oi this commencing in June of 1972. 

i Mr. Moore. The only knowledge — you speak of running knowledge, 
i Senator Weicker — the' only knowledge I had, and it did not run very 
long, was that Mr. Chapin and then I subsequently learned that Mr. 



2044 

Strachan had indeed engaged and launched Mr. Segretti, that 1 
wanted to make it public, that I drafted, and Mr. Dean Avanted to 
make it public, Mr. Chapin wanted to make it public, and it did not act 
made public, it should have, and I — look, a lot of things obviousI\ 
should have been done that woidd have been right and better but thi^ 
is one of them. I think that — but, in terms of perspective — well, yes. 
I am sorry that I did not push harder to get that out, that is right. 

Senator Weicker. Do you think that you had any better position | 
than John Dean in giving to John Dean the advice that he should gc 
to the President and tell the President anything? 

INIr. ]\IooRE. Well, you say better — the only knowledge I had, and 
that was a statement second-hand, his statement about the blackmai 
of the demands of Mr. Hunt. 

Senator Weicker. I am trying to deal with only your own persona 
experience. 

Mr. Moore. Yes. I — the man, it appears, 200 and some pages anc 
more of it, who had the most knowledge — well, no, I think, I don't 
know who had the most knowledge. Mr. Dean had knowledge that 1 
didn't have. He had facts that he could give the President I could noi 
give him. I encouraged him to do it with the President. As I say ] 
thought he was receptive, it is true he reached the j^oint where h( 
should, but he can do it and I could not. All I could have told th( 
President was "Dean said this to me and I think you ought to call hin 
in and find out what he is talking about." He went in himself and i1 
he hadn't I don't know where I would have gone in. 

Senator Weicker. You could have told the President lots of thing; 
you told me right now ; right ? 

Mv. IMooRE. Well, yes, sir. I take it you mean when you say a lot o: 
things 

Senator Weicker. On the one hand 

Mr. Moore. The Segretti matter. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Dean who you consider to be the fount of al 
the best knowledge relative to all the irregularities. 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I shouldn't — as I said, I retracted that imme 
diately, that is a conclusion that is unfair all around. I don't know, 1 
can't say who had the most knowledge. 

Senator Weicker. You felt he had such knowledge that certainly \i 
should be transmitted to the President ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes ; and it was. 

Senator Weicker. Over here we have the general knowledge which 
the chairman referred to which is newspaper knowledge down at this 
end of the scale here. 

Mr. INIooRE. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. OK. Where do you place yourself in this spec- 
trum as to knowledge, firsthand knowledge, not hearsay knowledge? 

Mr. Moore. The only • 

Senator Weicker. Better than the newspapers? 

ISIr. IMooRE. Apparently in some cases not, the way it turned out. 
But the only area that I had knowledge was in, of that kind, was that 
knowledge involving the hiring of Segretti and the arrangement that 
Mr. Kalmbach — was made with Mr. Kalmbach to compensate him, 
and then in JNIarch or, if you will, February, and I look right now, of 
course, looking back I should have thought about that money matter. 



2045 

If it had come up in a more important way or under different circiim- 
4;inces but in any event 

Si'uator Weicker. Which money matter ? 

Mr. Moore. This matter we discussed. 

Senator Weicker. The money matter with Mr. Segretti ? 

Mv. Moore. Yes. It was in March when my suspicions began to get 
(111 firmed with much — with the help of Mr, Dean who gradually 
hopped the thing here or there and all I can say is that I became part 
)f the, which I would call the, main, if you will, Watergate area of 
nvestigating or coping with this hearing February 9, preoccupied 
n the Gray hearing but in March, I don't know who, I don't know 
mybody who, got there earlier than I did. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, did you feel — well, Mr. Dean 
lid? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I don't know anybody who joined with Mr. Dean, 
vhether I encouraged him, which is what I say, or whether initiated 
)r whether he was ready to go and he asked me and I gave him encour- 
igement is immaterial. By that time I helped at least, but in a mini- 
num way, to accomplish the fact that the man who did have this 
:nowledge did go to the President and. in my opinion, from everything 
[ know, for the first time tell the President of the United States things 
hat were going on which the President didn't know and which 
hanged the whole situation and put the President in a position of 
Qoving. 

Senator Weicker. And certainly, though — or let me ask you the 
luestion. Would it have been helpful for the President if you too, had 
t that time rather than waiting until April, had gone and talked to 
he President ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes, sir, admittedly. 

Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. In a minute the committee will take a recess until 
Vionday but I would like to ask my last questions of Mr. Moore. Mr. 
loore, how often did Ron Ziegler have press conferences ? 

Mv. Moore. How often, ]\Ir. Chairman ? 

Senator Ervin. During this time, how often did Ron Ziegler, the 
-^resident's press secretaiy, hold news conferences? 

Mr. Moore. Well, in the early years of the administration he used 
)0 hold them almost daily. He now shares that with his deputy and I 
lo not know how often he holds them. 

Senator Ervin. How often were news conferences held on an aver- 
ige between June 17, 1972, and March 21, 1973 ? 

Mr. Moore. By either Mr. Ziegler or his deputy, eveiy day. 

Senator Ervin. Every day ? 

Mr. ISIooRE. Just about. 

.Senator Ervin. And virtually every day or rather any time any of 
:he charges were made by the news media about irregularities in con- 
lection with the campaign or the action of the committees there was a 
denial by Mr. Ziegler or his deputy ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, yes, in general, yes. 

Senator Ervin. Don't you agree with me that it would indicate 
that some members of the White House staff were getting knowledge 
of what these charges were from the news media ? 

Mr. MooRE. I am not sure I understand that question. 



2046 

Senator Ervin. Well, if Mr. Ziegler denied the charges, he had t( 
find out what the charges were to know how to deny them, did he not 
That is my point. In other words, Mr. Ziegler or his deputy would no 
have been denying charges made by the news media unless they kne\ 
what the charges were. 

Mr. INIooRE. Well, Mr. Ziegler, in answering questions, can onl; 
respond to what he was asked. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Moore. And is that what you mean ? Yes, he was responding. 

Senator Ervin. A man can't deny a charge unless he knows wha 
the charge is. 

Mr. MooRE. That is a sound principle. 

Senator Ervin. That would indicate that somebody, Mr. Zieglei 
and perhaps some other White House aides, were receiving informa 
tion from the news media about the charges of irregularities in th( 
campaign. 

Mr. Moore. Sure. We did read the newspapers, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Moore, you have been very patient. I hate t( 
bring you back Monday, but I think it Avouldn't be very fair to you oi 
the other members of the committee who have to interrogate you t( 
continue this. It has been a long day and I presume it won't incon 
venience you too much to come back Monday. 

Mr. MooRE. Mr. Chairman, of course, I shall be here. 

Senator Ervin. At 10 o'clock in the morning. 

Mr. MooRE. At the additional session, and I want to thank you foi 
the courtesy of the members and the staif and I shall be here Monday 

Senator Ervin. I want to thank you now for the extreme patience 
shown during your entire interrogation. 

Mr. MooRE. Thank you. Senator. 

[Whereupon, at 5 : 25 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
10 a.m., Monday, July 16, 1973.] 



MONDAY, JULY 16, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washington^ D.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in 
room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. 
(chairman), presiding. 

Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, Gur- 
ney, and Weicker. 

Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred D. 
Thompson, minority counsel ; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief coun- 
sel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David M. Doi*sen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant ; Eiler Ravniholt, office of Senator Inouye ; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker; K Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flani- 
gan, assistant publications clerk. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Some have asked what the power and objectives of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities are. I have never 
found a finer statement in respect to the desirability and the aim 
and necessity of congressional investigations than that made by Rich- 
ard M. Nixon in relation to his activities as a Congressman holding 
membership on tlie Un-American Activities Committee of the House, 
with particular reference to the investigation into the Hiss-Whittaker 
Chambers affair. This statement appears in the chapter entitled "Poli- 
tics With Honor" in his "Six Crises," and I will read it : 

Despite its vulnerabilities, I strongly believe that the Committee serves 
^ several necessary and vital purposes. Woodrow Wilson once said that Con- 
gressional investigating committees have three legitimate functions : First, 
to investigate for the purpose of determining what laws should be enacted. 
Second, to serve as a watchdog on the actions of the Executive Branch of the 
Government exposing inefficiency and corruption. Third, and in Wilson's view, 
probably most important, to inform the public of great national and inter- 
national issues. 

I had served on the Committee long enough to realize that Congressional investi- 
gations of Communist activities were essential to further all these purposes. I 
knew that if the Committee failed to follow through on the Hiss case the 
effectiveness of all Congressional investigations and particularly those in the 
field of Communist activities might be impaired for years but more important 
by far than tlie fate of the Committee the national interest required that this 
investigation go forward. If Chambers were telling the truth this meant that 
the Communists had been able to enlist the active support of men like Alger Hiss 
in education, background and intelligence among the very best the Nation could 

J (2047) 



2048 

produce. If this were the case then surely the country should be informed and 
Congress should determine what legislative action might be taken to deal witli 
the problems. 

This is the end of the quotation. 

I would like to add that I consider the investigation being conducted 
by this committee most crucial to the welfare of the Nation. Tin 
committee, in short, is investigating allegations that men exercisiii:^ 
great financial power, great political power, and great governmental 
power have impaired, if not destroyed, the integrity of the process 1)t 
which Presidents of the United States are nominated and elected. 1 
do not know anything in which the country could have a greater in 
terest than anything which requires Congress to determine whether oi 
not such conditions existed and whether legislation is necessary tc 
prevent their recurrence at some future date. 

Does any member of the committee have statements they would like 
to make at this time on this subject or any other? If not, the Chair 
will recognize Senator Montoya. 

Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Moore, you have been testifying for some time before this 
committee and I will try to confine my questions to the areas which I 
believe you might throw some light on the affair. You have had time 
to reflect over some of the statements which you have made, and ovei 
the lack of recollection that you have manifested with respect to some 
of the items contained in the questions asked of you. 

One of the important questions asked of you deals with the La 
Costa meeting in California on February 10 and 11 where for 2 days 
you met with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Dean trying to 
develop some kind of strategy with respect to the Watergate affair. 
])erhaps other situations. 

It has been testified to before this committee by Mr. Dean, and I refer 
to page 167 of his statement as follows : 

Mr. Dean. I said as far as I was concerned, that they would have to take this 
up with Mitchell, that is fundrai.sing, in that Mitchell felt it wa.-^ a matter for 
the White House. At this point Ehrlichman told Mr. Moore, who was hearing all 
this for the first time, that he, Moore, should go to Mitchell and simply lay it out 
that it was Mitchell's responsibility to raise the necessary funds for these men. 
It had been decided at the outset of the first day of the meetings that Moore 
would go to New York and report to Mitchell on what had been resolved regard- 
ing dealing with the Senate hearings and now Ehrlichman was telling Moore that 
an important element of his visit with Mitchell would be for him to get Mitchell 
to raise the necessary future funds for the seven Watergate defendants. 

Then quoting from Mr. Mitchell's testimony at page 3777 of the 
transcript, in answer to a question propounded by Mr. Thompson, 
minority counsel, he said as follows or perhaps I should quote the 
question from the transcript : 

Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you to recall as specifically as you can exactly 
what he said to you concerning money. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I do not know as I can remember the specific phrase but 
there is one thought that sticks in my mind which may or may not be the exact 
words but it was something to the effect "You would not be interested in helping 
raise money in connection with these activities, would you?" It was mnr? of a 
question than was a plea, and my answer to that was negative. 

Mr. Thompson. What activities? 

Mr. Mitchell. The activities of the payment for the support and the legal fees 
of the people that were involved in the Watergate. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he specifically mention support for the people involved in 
the Watergate? 



2049 

:\Ir. Mitchell. Well, this was the general tenor of the subject matter, yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Did yon have any talk about 

:Mr. Mitchell. Or at least I understand when he talked about raising funds 
that this is what they were talking about. 

Mr. Thompson. That is the way you received it from your end of the 
conversation? 

:\Ir. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you also discuss the Committee To Re-Elect, how the Com- 
mittee To Re-Elect was going to function from then on? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Now, in view of the two statements which have been made with 
o;reat clarity that your mission in New York was to try to get money 
for these defendants, in view of the fact that these people have pre- 
sented their testimony almost exactly, would you want to change 
yours? 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD A. MOORE— Resumed 

Mr. MooRE. No, sir. But first that is quite a long question. Senator, 
and could I have the page reference that you read from so I can 
have it. 

Senator Montoya. Yes, from Mr. Mitchell it was page 3777 of the 
transcript, and the statement by Mr. Dean was on page 167 of his 
statement as presented to this committee. 

Mr. INIooRE. We don't have the Mitchell testimony, if it is possible 
for me to have it. 

Senator jNIontoya. I will be glad to furnish you my copy. 

Mr. Moore. While we are waiting, I would like to say very firmly 
as I said yesterday, if you wall read the Mitchell testimony carefully, 
you will find that he never once said that I ever used the word "money" 
for these defendants or anything like that. It was clearly a case of his 
having said that I came in and had a question about, he didn't use tlie 
word, his Avords were these activities, according to him, you have 
heard my testimony that I said "John, I don't Imow what this is quite 
about but it seems you have been nominated to be a fundraiser. There 
may be a need for money coming up", and he said "Get lost" or some- 
thing like that, or "Tell them to get lost." 

Senator Montoya. How^ could you tell him that you did not Imow 
what that was all about when you had spent 2 days at La Costa, Calif., 
with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Dean talking about 
these things? 

Mr. MooRE. I did not, as I have testified, know the nature, and I 
don't know that it has been established to this day, wdiat the purpose 
of that money was. All I did is, I think I made it plain, I was — that 
was one more case of trying to pass the fundraising job to somebody 
else and anybody who has been in politics knows that finding a finance 
chairman is the hardest thing in the world, getting people to raise 
nioney is difficult. I kneAv John Mitchell had no interest in raising 
money, I kncAv him that well. I wasn't going to ^et into a discussion 
why I should give him a sales pitch on becoming a fundraiser. I 
brushed it off and he testified, it seemed to me, he said it in a sentence 
or two, it wasn't exactly a question, in other words, I didn't even ask 
him, what I said was, "I think I know the answer to this," but I asked 
and that is all. So the testimony — and also in La Costa you will find 
that the testimony that relates to this is clearly an expression of 
opinion by Mr. Dean, not an expression of what was said in the 
meeting. 



2050 . 

Senator Montoya. You knew there was a balance in the finances in 
the Committee To Re-Elect the President at that time, did you not? 

Mr, Moore. I think I must have known. I don't know, I didn't lla^•o 
any direct information but it was a well-known fact, I think. 

Senator ISIontoya. What did you conceive your mission to be — ^to tell 
Mr. Mitchell to raise some finances if you did not have the details? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I didn't know and, as I said, I didn't want to get 
into it. I didn't want to get into this position of persuading Joliii 
Mitchell to be a fundraising — I had enough to ask him. I want to re- 
peat, Senator, I had a lot of things to ask him to do and this was the 
least as far as I was concerned. 

Senator Montoya. As a lawyer, Mr. Moore, didn't it arouse your 
curiosity you were going to ask a big man like Mr. Mitchell to raise 
some funds and you did not tell him what they were for? 

Mr. MooRE. It seemed to me that as I best recall it, I was not think- 
ing so much as what for as a factor— I wasn't going to make any- 
thing of requesting him to do this. If I were to try to think of what 
it might have been, and I don't think I did, at the time, I don't think I 
went into it, you had all kinds of lawsuits, you had individual de- 
fendants, you have seven individual defendants who were also crim- 
inal defendants, you had plaintiff suits by individuals, and what— 
there were a lot of funds through there and I was never part of any as- 
pects of the fundraising business and never interested in getting into 
it and whatever funds we used, I don't know what committee funds 
to this day, they used to defray the cost, for instance, of Mr. Stans' 
personal lawsuit, I don't know, I didn't ask. I don't know what it was 
and I didn't go into it. 

Senator Montoya. You didn't discuss these things with Mr. 
Mitchell? 

Mr. Moore. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Well, as a lawyer, Mr. Moore, with a great deal 
of experience, and can you conceive of any person going to see another 
person and asking that person, "To please raise some money, I can't 
tell you what it is for.'' 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I can conceive of it because it is exactly what 
happened. 

Senator Montoya. Can you conceive that kind of a situation ? 

Mr. Moore. I certainly can, because that is what happened, Senator. 
And the point is, that I have been trying to make for 2 days when this 
comes up, is that this was on the second day, a two-, or three-, or four- 
sentence exchange where one more little buckpassing assignment Avas 
given to me that I had no interest in pursuing and knew that the 
recipient of the suggestion would have no interest in it, and I simply 
tucked it away as one thing I would do in the minimum manner 
as that is exactly what I did. And Mr. ^Mitchell's testimony confirms 
that that is what I did. 

Senator Montoya. Would this be one of the reasons why you can't 
remember so well, Mr. Moore, that if you would admit that you did 
ask Mr. Mitchell to try to get tliis funding for the silencing of the 
defendants and for the representation of the defendants, that you 
now would be involved in the coverup ? 

Mr. Moore. No, sir. That is not true. 

Senator Montoya. If you had, would you not be involved now? 



2051 

Mr. Moore. Well, first of all, you are asking a hypothetical ques- 
tion. And you are asking a hypothetical question that goes to the 
ultimate stage of the puri^oso as being an illegal purpose. If that had 
been the purpose and if I had known it to be the purpose and if I had 
then done what you just suggested, then I would like to point out 
I, perhaps, would not have been so anixous — first of all, it is not so. 
And I perhaps would not have been so eager to urge John Dean to 
go in and tell the President everything that had been happening, in- 
cluding, presumably, this, which would have involved me had this 
been the case. And of course, I perhaps might have been here asking 
immunity, w^hich I have never asked or suggested. 

Senator Montoya. Then, Mr. Moore, let me ask you the question 
another way. 

Mr. MooRE. All right. 

Senator Montoya. Because of your possible feeling and belief that 
you might become involved, is this one of the reasons why you hesitated 
to confront Mr. Mitchell with more specificity with respect to the 
fundraising ? 

Mr. MooRE. The reasons — first of all, you have assumed a fear there 
which I did not have. Second, the reasons why I confronted Mr. Mitch- 
ell as I did was exactly what I stated and it is exactly the way I put 
it on these other things that I asked him that I knew he would have no 
interest in doing. 

Senator Montoya. How could Mr. Mitchell, a very intelligent man, 
as well as Mr. Dean, testify that your mission there w^as to get money 
for the defendants ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, Mr. Mitchell's testimony was, that was the conclu- 
sion he drew, that he had been, had had this request at least twice be- 
fore, two or three times before. Now^, I can see how, if the Metropoli- 
tan Life Insurance Co. has been sending a man in to see me two or 
three times and the third day a man comes in from the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. and I saicl to him, just said hello, and I am busy ; 
and somebody said, w^iat was he there for? Your answer would be, 
he was here to sell me life insurance. The answer could have been that 
you were there for the American Red Cross, trying to get a dona- 
tion. But the answer that this man was there for this purpose would 
be interpreted — I might have been an innocent conveyor. 

We are also assuming, and I want to make it clear that this was 
this arrangement, which allegedly was illegal and might have been, 
I am not saying. But a man is charged with this, and it has been sug- 
gested, and I am not assuming anything that is contrary to the pre- 
sumption of imiocence of anybody in that room or anybody at all. So 
we are talking of substance here. 

The answer is in my opinion, and this is what we talked about a 
number of times, that'is, the double hazard of one saying something 
and the other person having a different frame of reference and in- 
terpreting it differently. 

Senator Montoya. 1 can readily understand, Mr. Moore that oc- 
curring between two persons, but not when the same subject matter 
has been dealt with by three persons — in this case, Mr. Dean, Mr. 
Mitchell, and yourself. And they seemed to fortify each other's testi- 
mony in this regard and you seem to have a feeling that you did not 
discuss with specificity tlie particular mission that you had in mind 
when you went to visit INIr. Mitchell. 



96-296 O— 73^bk. 



2052 

Mr. Moore. Well, Senator IMontoya, gomg back to your — I didn't 
quite — your previous question, where you made certain assumptions. 
If there were a conspiracy and so forth, it is entirely possible that I 
would have handled a little better beino- asked to relay this messaofe, 
being put in this position. But you are speaking of three persons. It 
is entirely possible that Mr. Mitchell with his knowledge — you will 
not-e, in Mr. Dean's testimony, he said, Mr. Moore — and I was sum- 
moned the night before, at least^ — was hearing all this for the first time. 
And to take the leap which has not yet been established, but assume 
at the moment that I was sitting in the room and two of the men at 
the highest level of the greatest Nation in the world, that they were 
talking about an illegal objective on the second day in a 2-day meet- 
ing, with a three-sentence or four-sentence conversation, that this 
was — I was not, apparently, mentally pi-epared to take the leap to 
assume that here on this visit to the President's Western White House, 
with his two closest top-level advisers, that they were talking in this 
offhand way about something that was illegal. 

All I knew was that time and again in my days at the Justice 
Department, I was asked to intervene to persuade John Mitchell 
to do something that he didn't want to do, whether it was to make 
a speech or hold a press conference or that kind of thing. And here 
I was in that role again — would you, Dick, go on up ? And he didn't 
relish it. He didn't like to be programed by Mr. — he respects them, 
but he didn't like to be programed by Mr. Ehrlichman and INIr. Halde- 
man. And in that kind of context. I said, "I am not going to pursue 
this wnth John Mitchell. I will mention it and I know what his an- 
swer is going to be." That is what happened. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Moore, I want you to understand clearly 
that I don't want to attribute to you any dishonest motives whatsoever. 

Mr. Moore. Thank you. 

Senator Montoya. I am just trying to probe your mind and ask you 
to tell me whether you were doing this for the reasons that I have 
ascribed. 

Mr. Moore. No. No, Senator, I think that I will say in closing that 
whatever — of course, whatever conversations that had taken place 
that were background of this — remember, I was a new boy. If there 
were such a thing as this conspiracy, I hadn't been initiated. I hadn't 
been given the pin and the instructions. I didn't know anything. I 
arrived at midnight the night before and met on this subject, that 
was kind of the first time. If there had been any such motive, there 
were plenty of times, plenty of opportunities with those who did know 
to discuss the kind of thing that Mr. Dean has testified to which, if 
anything was said like that, it wasn't in my presence, as I recall. But 
it is iwssible that things could have been said that went over my head, 
but I don't think so. 

Senator Montoya. Well, you have or had at that time great ad- 
miration for John Mitchell and I presume you do still, do you know? 

]Mr. Moore. He is my good friend. 

Senator Montoya. And you woi-ked under John Mitchell? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. And you had great admiration for John Dean 
and he had great admiration for you. 

Mr. MooRE. Riffht. 



2053 

Senator Montoya. He so expressed it in this committee. 

Now, if he said certain things, would you say he said them because 
he believed them to be true ? 

Mr. INIooRE. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. And would you say the same thing about Mitch- 
ell ? If he said certain things, he' said them because he believed them 
to be true ? 

Mr. MooRE. I worked for a year for him. I never knew him to tell 
me an untruth. 

Now, I do want to say. Senator, when you speak of truth, it is 
entirely possible — in fact, there is an old aphorism, kind of a cor- 
ollary to Ervin's law, that when two people tell exactly the same 
story, you loiow one of them is lying, and probably both. Judge 
Stewart of Ohio used to tell young lawyers that. 

Senator Montoya. I understand that, Mr. Moore. I just want to put 
this thing in proper focus so that the testimony of the two can stand 
against your version of what took place. 

Now, let us go into another matter. You indicated here that you and 
Mr. Dean had discussed different phases of Watergate prior to the time 
that Mr. Dean was counseled by you to go in to see the President and 
tell it like it was. 

Now, would you relate the dates more or less of those conversations 
with Mr. Dean'and w-hat you discussed serially with him with respect 
to the involvement in Watergate ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I am not sure I can discuss them in sequence, be- 
cause it did not flow that way, but I wnll make an effort. 

Senator Montoya. Well, I believe you had a meeting on March 14 
with Mr. Dean when he told you about Mr. Hunt demanding a lot of 
money. Do you recall that ? 

Mr. MooRE. Sir, I believe that I testified — I believe — that that was 
either late in the day of March 19 or early in the day of March 20, 1973, 
that Howard Hunt had told him — ^that he had learned of this Howard 
Hunt blackmail thing. 

Senator Montoya, What day in March ? 

Mr. Moore. March 19, late in the day, or early in the day of March 20. 

Senator Montoya. Did you have another conversation with him on 
March 20, the next day ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. And w^as it during this conversation that Mr. 
Dean told you everything about Watergate, or what you conceived to 
be everything ? 

Mr. MooRE. No. The thing that he had told me that clarified for the 
first time in my mind that there was a possible criminal or highly 
improper activity that might affect the White House was on the 19th, 
when he first described what I regarded as a really criminal act of a 
blackmail demand by Howard Hunt in return for, or it was reported 
that he said that unless he received this money by Wednesday, the 21st, 
his words were he would say things that would be very rough on the 
White House or very embarrassing to the White House or would 
in\olve tlie A^Hiite House. I do not know the precise words, but it ^yas 
the "^^Hiite House. And wliere they led, of course. Dean was starting 
with his knowledge of his presence at those meetings, which he felt 



2054 

and I felt and he so described as innocent participation, meaning Mr. 
Mitchell, Mr. Liddy, Mr. Magrnder. for example, that the combina- 
tion now took this into the White House. The thing had been building 
up. That is when I said, John, tlie time has come — the President just 
does not know what is going on. You can go and tell him. 

Senator Montoya. Was this on the 20th ? 

Mr. Moore. The 20th, yes, sir, was the day that I made my talk 
with him Avhen Ave left the Oval Office. It was triggered by the final — 
the advice that he gave me either the night before or possibly that 
morning. 

I have kind of a strong recollection that it was the day before, 
evening, or the next morning very early. It appears clear now to be 
the 10th in my mind, that this w^as the point where this thing might 
involve, possibly not the President — I did not know — but the fact 
that it might have involved people in the White House, some new 
things that apparently, for the first time, I had gotten that it went 
beyond the committee or employees of the committee or outside people, 
colleagues, advisers to the committee, fundraisers, that kind of thing, 
that this was a hard comment to the effect that the White House w^ould 
be involved and that was it. 

Senator Montoya. Then, it Avas on the 21st, the day after, that Mr. 
Dean went in to see the President and told him everything ? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes sir. He said he told him everything. That is Avhat 
he told me. 

Senator Moxtoya. Do you believe that he did ? 

Mr. Moore. I cannot form a belief on that, Senator, because at that 
point, there were so many new facts t'lat entered into the equation 
since it had become known that — first of all, "everything"' is a very 
big word and I do not knoAv Avhat he told him, so I cannot comment. 

Senator Montoya. Did not the President relate to you that Dean 
had been in to see him and liad told him quite a bit about this affair? 

Mr. MooRE. He did when I brought it up. The President did not — 
you say — the President did not tell me what Dean liad told him. either, 
except to confirm that this l^lackmail conversation, because I men- 
tioned tliat to the President and he sparked with. said. Yes, that is 
whfit he told me. That is in the record. I testified about that. 

Senator Montoya. Well, perhaps the President did not tell you 
everything, but did he tell you enough to indicate to you that Mr. Dean 
had actually talked to him" about this affair? 

Mr. Moore, Oh, yes, in tliis sense, that he said, "Dean did come in"' — 
let me say — yes, he said Dean did come in. I raised the question, I said, 
"I noticed the date of March 21 in your statement, ]\Ir. President, you 
learned of serious new charges,'" I said "I take it that John Dean told 
you those." He said, "Oh, did you knoAv about that?"" Or something 
like that and I said. "Yes, I had been talking to him the day before, 
we had l)een with you,"" and I said, "Did he tell you about that black- 
mail matter involving Howard Hinit?'" He said. "Yes,"" tluit is the 
v(.i V — ]i(. did say tlmt exactly, and that, the rest is all in the record, 
and yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. T think that is enougli background for my next 
cjuestion. 

You recall the meeting of March 22 wlieu there was a general dis- 
cussion around the White House that Mi-. Dean should act as liaison 
with the Watergate committee or this committee, to be more exact. 



2055 

Do you recall any of the conversation that had been taking place at 
the time? 

Mr. Moore. Senator, did you say a meeting on March 22 ? 

Senator Montoya. Well, there were some discussions on or about 
March 22. 

Mr. MooRE. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. Indicating that Mr. Dean should act as liaison 
between the White House and this committee. 

Mr. Moore. To the best of my recollection, I first heard that here 
or read about it. I do not think I was in any discussions on the 22d. 
The only discussions I remember on the 22d 

Senator Montoya. Would you not 

Mr. MooRE [continuing]. Well, if I could continue, there were other 
meetings going on, indeed as Mr. Dean testified to but I believe that 
was the day when the news wires in the forenoon announced Senator 
Byrd and Mr. Patrick Gray had agreed that Mr. Dean had told a lie 
in a certain situation and I think I was — Ron Ziegler called us and 
said, "Hey, I am going to get questions on this. Can you come over 
and talk about it" ? Dean came in Ziegler's and mine meetings, there 
were other meetings going on, if there was a meetin^j; about liaison 
with the Senate I was not privy to it and it was not in my meeting 
because I did not know about it. 

Senator Montoya. But you do know there is testimony before this 
committee to that effect? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 

Now, on March 23, Mr. McCord's letter to Judge Sirica was divulged 
and read. You recall that incident, do you not? 

Mr. MooRE. I do. 

Senator Montoya. And in that letter Mr. McCord stated that others 
were involved and that perjury had been committed. 

Now, did vou get involved in anv phase of reaction -with respect to 
this letter? " 

Mr. Moore. No, sir; no sir; not that I recall. Whether Eon — there 
was, of course, conversation all over the building the minute that 
story broke because it was an important story but I did not recall 
getting involved in any phase of any reaction to it. 

Senator Montoya. Were you keeping in touch with Mr. Dean all 
through this time? Were you seeing him every day and conversing 
with him about different matters? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. That— yes. 

Senator Montoya. And, of course, you knew about the President's 
pronouncements to the i:>ress and what Mr. Ziegler would go out and 
say by way of a press statement in behalf of the President. You were 
acquainted with all these things, were you not? 

Mr. Moore. When you say acquainted, I did not attend Ziegler 
press briefings. 

Senator Montoya. No, but you read about them, did you not? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, like anvbody else, some I knew about in advance, 
matters to be discussed as to what direction he might want to take 
others I read about the way anybodv else would read about it. 

Senator Montoya. Now then, on March 26 the Prcvsidejit, in a press 
conference through Ziegler stated that he had complete confidence in 
Mr. Dean. You recall that, do vou not ? 



2056 

Mr. Moore. I do. 

Senator Montoya. Now, there was a statement in the Washington 
Post and I will read it to yon nnder date of March 27 : 

President Nixon denied today that White House counsel John Dean III, had 
any prior knowledge of the Watergate hugging, and said he had ahsolute and 
total confidence in Dean. The President telephoned Dean this moniing from his 
oflBce in Key Biscayne to discuss a Los Angeles Times report that Dean and 
former Presidential assistant Jeb Stuart Magnider had advance knowledge of 
the bugging of Democratic headquarters. Following the conversation AVhite House 
press secretary Ronald Ziegler flatly denied that Dean had prior knowledge of 
the hugging. "The President has complete confidence in Mr. Dean and wanted 
me again here this morning to publicly express President Nixon's ahsolute and 
total confidence in Mr. Dean on this regard," Ziegler said. 

Do yon have any reason to donbt that this statement was made in 
behalf of the President by Mr. Ziegler? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I have no donbt, yon know, that the statement was 
made. When yon say speaking on behalf of the President, that phone 
call he apparently was mistaken abont, bnt that was a statement made 
on behalf of the President, yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. How conld IMr, Ziegler and the President make 
this statement of full confidence in Mr. Dean when Mr, Dean on 
December — on INIarch 21 had gone in to see the President and told him 
all ? How conld the President make this public statement ? 

Mr. INfooRE. Well, firet of all, I cannot speak for the President on 
this, I do not know. I would just like to clear the record on that 
statement. 

Senator Montoya. Is it not incomprehensible that he would? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, he did it and he is an intelligent man, the President 
is and whether here in the middle of what was his own investigation he 
had his reasons for not revealing publicly suspicions that he held, I do 
not know. I can only surmise bnt I also want to point out that state- 
ment said Mr. Dean had knowledge of the Watergate break-in and 
bugging in advance. That is not, that has not been proven and it has 
been denied, so that just to keep the record straight. 

Now 

Senator Montoya. Yes, but the point is 

Mr. MooRE. The President 

Senator Montoya. The main thrust of this statement was that he had 
complete confidence in Mr. Dean and Mr. Dean had told him about 
everything he had done up to the time that he met with the President 
on March 21. 

Mr. MooRE. Well, I cannot speak for the President's motives. I do 
not know. T trust him. I note that in due course Mr. Dean was asked 
to resign. Whethei- this, therefore, was a temporizing part of an in- 
vestigation, where he was not prepared to acknowledge his total dis- 
position until he had further confirmation, I do not know. Also, as T 
said, I do not know that Mr. Dean told the President everything. But 
I am sure the President had a perfectly sound and good reason for at 
that point in responding to that Los Angeles Times story, which was 
the story he was responding to in that way and 

Senator Montoya. Then, on March 28, according to an article 
written by Clark Mollenhoff he asked Mr. Ziegler if the President still 
had confidence in Mr. Dean, and in response Mr. Ziegler told Mr. 



2057 

Mollenhoff that he would check with the President, and he did check, 
and then came back and told Mr. Mollenhoff that the President had 
total and complete confidence in Mr. Dean. 

Now, would that not sound kind of odd, the President having ex- 
pressed on two occasions complete confidence in Mr. Dean when Mr. 
Dean had leveled with the President about everything on INIarch 21 ? 

]Mr. INIooRE. "Well, at first as I said, I do not know that Mr. Dean 
told the President everything on March 21, all I know is that he said 
that ; I do not know. 

Senator ]\Iontoya. Didn't you indicate that the President had told 
you that INIr. Dean had told him everything about this thing? 

Mr. Moore. No, indeed I did not say that and if I did I would like 
to correct that. He did confirm that he had come in, that he had talked 
to him, the only thing he confirmed to me that Dean told him was the 
Howard Hunt' blackmail incident. That is all the President told me 
that -Dean had told him, and I must say, sir, that the President chose 
to make that statement through Mr. Ziegler to Mr. Mollenhoff on 
^farch 28, according to that story and I certainly trust INIr. Mollen-- 
hoff's reporting. I don't have the facts and I don't think anybody in 
this room does as to what stage the President's separate investigation 
was at at that time. It may be that at that very time, the President 
was searching for confirmation of a decision he later made and was not 
prepared to alert anyone to the fact that Mr. Dean was under the sepa- 
rate investigation. Now if that was his motive, I think we should have 
the facts on it. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Moore, let me give you the connection that 
you are trying to loosen here. 

Now, on April 17, 1978, the President issued a statement, in fact it 
was his own, it was the President's remarks, it was part of the Presi- 
dent's remarks announcing development of procedures to be followed 
in connection with the investigation. This is what the President said 
on that day : 

My second announcement concerns the Watergate case directly. On March 21, 
as a result of serious charges which came to my attention, some of which were 
publicly reported, I began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter. 

Now% there is the President telling the country that he was told on 
March 21 of very serious charges, and some of which were publicly 
reported. Now, would you say that the President had knowledge of 
these charges at the time that he affirmed his confidence in Mv. Dean 
and also the time that he reaffirmed his confidence in Mr. Dean, ac- 
cording to Mr. Molenhoff, on March 28 ? 

Mr. MooRE. When you say these charges, sir, when you started to 
answer — what charges are you referring to ? 

Senator INIoxtoya. I presume the President was referring to the two 
very things we are talking about. 

Mr. jNIoore. Serious charges ? 

Senator IMoxtoya. Yes. 

Mr. MooRE. I don't know that any one of those serious charges was 
a self-made charge by Mr. Dean against him. I do not know what 
those serious charges were. I think that is exactly the point, that the 
President was at this very time in a process, as he said later, he re- 
newed and intensified his investi<ration even to these matters and I 



2058 

don't knoAv what those charges were and I don't think anybody in 
this room knows yet, and I think we will find out. But at that point 
the President was not advertising to anyone what, who was a suspect, 
that is quite proper, who mitrht be involved, and that is quite proper. 
He said it in o-eneral terms and I don't know what those serious 
chargfes were. 

Senator Moxtoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervix. Mv. Lenzner, 

Mr. Lexzner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Moore, I told you this morning: before we betjan, and I want to 
repeat it now, that I promised that I won't ^o back before 1939 in 
any questions that I asked, is that ao;reeable to you, sir? 

Mr. ISfooRE. Yes, I appreciate it because my preparation stopped at 
1940, so thank yon. 

Mr. Lexzner. I wanted to clarify for the record, first, Mr. Moore, 
on pa^e 3814" when I was asking you some questions about a meeting 
concerning ITT. 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. I want to (make sure that the record is accurate on 
that. I am sure I asked you whether that meeting was held in Mr. 
Ehrlichman's office. The transcript reads Mr. Rohatyn's office and 
it should read Mr. Ehrlichman's office and I take it that it should 
read Mr. Ehrlichman's office, to the best of your recollection. 

Mr. MooRE. My recollection is very clear that you said Mr. Ehrlich- 
man but I would like to make this comment. 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Moore. In terms of oral communication how does one leap 
from the Ehrlichman to the totally unlikely name of Rohatyn? I 
looked up in the phone books and that is not in any phone book in 
this area so there is a case of someone who had probably been in 
that later hearing, a reporter or a typist, who would when you said 
Ehrlichman, he heard Rohatyn and spelled it right, too. 

Mr. Lenzner. He is the next witness, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. MooRE. That is quite an example of the twofold hazard of oral 
communication, but go ahead. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, we will interrogate him next. 

I wanted also to clarify one other thing. On June Y when we did 
go over 

Mr. MooRE. What date? 

Mr. Lenzner. June 7 when we left Mr. Miller's we did go over 
the dates that I referred to in the law inquiry, and I understand 
also that you had a meeting with Mr. Silbert at the U.S. attorney's 
office sometime in May of 1973, is that correct? 

Mr. Miller. Mr. Lenzner, if I may interject at this point again, 
I don't know, I suppose it goes to one's recollection or either that or 
your committee reports are inaccurate. That meeting that you have 
referred to several times when you were interi'ogating this witness 
on Thursday of last week, that meeting in my office occurred on the 
8th day of June, not the 7th day of June as you continually refer 
to it and those questions you asked this witness on Thursday about 
that meeting, that meeting did not take place until the next day. 
I don't know whether your committee staff report reflects that report 
or not but that meeting took place on the 8th and not the 7th. 



2059 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, the interview, the typed interview indicates it 
was on June 7. 

Mr. Miller. I have in my diary, I have witnesses in my office that 
that meeting occurred in my office the 8th day of June, if your stajff 
memorandum is incorrect, so be it. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, the point, the only question I am asking now, 
Mr. Moore 

Mr. Moore. Before you do, I have here the 10 references in the rec- 
ord where you gave the wrong date, and I would like to offer it with 
the request that it be corrected and — if one wants them. However, of 
course, it is my theory that, of the fact Mr. Lenzner, of failing to 
remember a bare date without some connection and reference is some- 
thing that can happen to anybody, and I welcome them to the club. 
It obviously does not affect the substance of what happened at the 
meeting. 

Mr. Lenzner. I understand that. 

Mr. MooRE. I am not trying, you know, to press that but it is just a 
reminder that a day by itself does not always connote something 
to someone. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, my point now, Mr. Moore, is that we did go 
over the dates in 1972 that I inquired about, and I also understand 
you went over those dates at the U.S. attorney's office with someone in 
May 1973, is that correct? 

Mr. Moore. Well, now, let's see. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you have an interview 

Mr. Miller. Mr. Lenzner 

Mr. Lenzner. Let me repeat the question, did you have an interview 
with the U.S. attorney's office in May of this year? 

Mr. Moore. Well, just a moment. No, no. 

Mr. Lenzner. When was that interview ? 

Mr. Moore. April 30. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did you go over some of these dates at that time? 

Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address an inquiry to 
the chairman. 

Mr. Lenzner. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Miller has a question. 

Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, just a question that I would raise. Mr. 
Lenzner has indicated that he is going to commence to interrogate 
Mr. Moore about interviews that he has had in the U.S. attorney's of- 
fice. Of course, Mr. Moore has been there in April, he testified or can 
testify he gave a full and complete interview to the U.S. attorney's 
office. On Wednesday of last week he spent most of the day with the 
special prosecutor and members of his office. 

Now, I am perfectly willing, if the committee desires, that you inter- 
rogate this man concerning what subject matter the U.S. attorney's 
office and the special prosecutor went into with respect to what his 
•knowledge was. I query, Mv. Chairman, whether at this stage of the 
game that this is something that should be considered by tlie commit- 
tee ; if I were a ]:)rosecutor myself I think I would have some reluctance 
to have individuals within, before my office, then appear before the 
committee and be interrogated about what they were asked. iVs I say, 
it is up to the Chair. 

Senator Ervin. Well, I would say that the general nile is that a 
witness may be asked what he has stated to any other person for the 



2060 

purposes of either corroborating a witness or contradicting the wit- 
ness, and I know of no exception which would excuse a witness from 
testifying as to what he told the prosecuting attorney. 

Mr. Miller. As I say, Mr. Chairman, I have no hesitancy in letting 
him answer the question. But he didn't know 

Mr. Lenzner. I am not going to go into 

Senator Gurnet. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney. 

Senator Gurney. May we inquire of counsel what his concern is? I 
do not think he stated it and I think perhaps the committee ought 
to know what the concern is. 

Mr. Miller. The only concern I would have. Senator Gurney, is 
that it is my understanding, perhaps even knowledge, that there are 
going investigations into violations of the penal laws of the United 
States, that the questioning or interrogation of witnesses and what 
they were asked about would permit others who perhaps were under 
investigation to ascertain the thrust of what the prosecutor was seek- 
ing, what areas he was probing into, and generally disclose publicly 
where his investigation was going. My experience in the past has 
been that prosecutors are normally reluctant to have this happen for 
the simple reason that it permits those who are being investigated and 
are potential defendants from getting a bird's eye view of what the 
prosecutor's case is. That is the only reason I raise the issue. 

I hasten to add that we have no objection if he wants to interro- 
gate these witnesses, because we cooperated fully with all of these 
various agencies. 

Senator Gurney. What counsel is really saying is it might possibly 
jeopardize the cause of the prosecution. Is that it ? 

Mr. Miller. That would be my concern if I were the prosecutor. 

Senator Gurney. I thought so. 

Mr. Miller. I am not the prosecutor. I am representing Richard 
Moore. 

Senator Gurney. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Lenzner perhaps 
could tell the committee the thrust of his questioning, what he has in 
mind. Then, perhaps we would know whether he needed the evidence 
or not. 

Senator Ervin. Well, Senator, I would think that the prosecutor 
has one function under the Constitution and this committee has an- 
other and each one can exercise his function independently of the 
other. And I do not know what the counsel wants to elicit from the 
witness, but I do not believe that this committee should abdicate its 
function for fear that the exercise of its constitutional function might 
hnpair the capacity of the prosecutor to perform his constitutional 
function. I think the doctrine of separation of powers clearly requires 
this view. 

Senator Gurney. I could not agree with the chainnan more. I totally 
subscribe to that. My only— the question that I was raising is that if the 
testimony is not all that pertinent, do we want to jeopardize a prosecu- 
tion ? I think this committee certainly wants all of the culprits brought 
to justice and does not want to interfere with that process. That is the 
only reason I was raising the question. 

Mr. Lenzner. The only question I have, Mr. jSIoore, is on April 30, 
did you go over with the U.S. attorney's office dates in 1972 of 
meetings ? 



2061 

Mr. Moore. Well, would you mind, when you say — I had quite a few 
meetings in 1972. Would you identify them ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Generally, did they ask you questions about meetings 
in 1972 ? That is all I am asking, 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. I also hope you understood that when we reviewed 
some of those same meetings here last week, I was only intending to 
probe your recollection in view of the fact that you did remember 
meetings and incidents that did happen and some incidents that did 
not happen so clearly. I was trying to exercise a purpose of determin- 
ing how vivid your recollection was on other meetings. I did not intend 
in any way to embarrass you in front of the Nation. You understand 
that. 

Mr. Moore. I did not feel the least bit embarrassed, Mr. Lenzner. 
The only problem that I had was that the subject matter appeared to 
be extraneous — you know, the Dita Beard business and so forth — and 
I had a hard time connecting your question about a AYliite House in- 
vestigation with this episode. 

Mr. Lenzner. I understand. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Moore, in this context, when you prepared your 
statement last week, did you recollect at that time your conversation 
with the President on April 19 ? 

Mr. MooRE. When I prepared my statement ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Moore. Yes. Yes ; I made reference to the meeting. 

Mr. Lenzner. Does your statement reflect your conversation with the 
President concerning ^Ir. Ehrlichman's in^-olvement with Mr. Ellsberg 
and also the possible criminal liability of Mr. Haldeman? Did your 
statement mention that at all ? 

Mr. ;Moore. My statement? 

Mr. Lenzner. Your statement that you read to this committee last 
week, sir. Does that reflect your meeting of April 19 that I just 
described ? 

Mr. MooRE. I am not sure. Let me be sure I have what the question is. 

Mr. Lenzner. The question is, does the statement that you prepared 
include that meeting on April 19 with the President? 

Mr. Moore. Well, yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. Could you point out the specific reference to it? 

Mr. MooRE [reading]. "At no time during this meeting or during 
succeeding meetings" — — 

Mr. Lenzner. Will you state what page you are on ? 

Mr. MooRE. Page 13. [Continues reading.] "Or during succeeding 
meetings on March 15, INIarch 19 and 20, all of which were attended 
only by the President, Mr. Dean, and myself, did anyone say anything 
in my presence which related to or suggested the existence of any 
coverup or any knowledge or involvement by anyone in the White 
House then, now, or in the Watergate affair." 

Mr. Lenzner. Mr. Moore, I am asking you about your meeting 
on April 19 with the President, where you discussed Ellsberg, Ehrlich- 
man and 

Mr. Moore. I have March 19. You are talking about April 19? 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MooRE. And the question is, is it in this statement? 



2062 

Mr. Lenzner. Is it reflected anywhere in your statement? And if 
it is not, can you explain why 

Mr. Moore. No, sir. 

Mr. Lenzner. AVliy was that left out ? 

Mr. MooRE. It was the two 19ths. We are talking about April 19 
and I was thinking of March 19. 

Mr. Lenzner. The April 19 meeting- is not referred to. Can you 
explain why you did not include that in your opening statement? 

Mr. Moore. Well, a lot of things — yes, if you will look at the portion 
where I speak of the time frame where I thought I had evidence that 
would relate to w^hat I thought was the basic subject, the meetings 
which I attended with Mr. Dean and the President. And I took the 
time frame of February 6 as the start of my acquaintance with the 
subject up to and including, I said, March 21, the date that the Presi- 
dent first learned of the possibilities or facts that he referred to in 
his later statement. I had, as you know, a lot of things that are not 
included here. I indicated that I would be glad to go into any and 
all subjects. But this was the heart of what I thought I sliould provide 
and so stated. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, after you learned in March about the meetings 
in Mr. Mitchell's office wnth Liddy, Magruder, and Dean, did you 
ever see Mr. Mitchell again or talk Avith him after that? 

Mr. Moore. Oh, I am sure I did. 

Mr. Lenzner. On a number of occasions ? 

Mr. Moore. No, once or twice, I saw him once when he was in the 
White House; he was down there on a visit. I have seen very little 
of him. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, did you ask him on that occasion or any occa- 
sion about the meetings that he had in his office with Mr. Liddy, Mr. 
Dean, and Mr. Magruder that Mr, Dean had described to you? 

Mr. MooRE. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. I believe you saw him on March 28, 1973, at the White 
House with Mr. Haldeman. Did you have any discussion on that date ? 

Mr. MooRE. You say you believe I saw him. 

Mr. Lenzner. I am reading from a notation in Mr. Haldeman's 
diary that indicates you, Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Mitchell met on that 
date. 

Mr. Miller. Wliat was the date ? 

Mr. MooRE. The date is March 28, 1973 ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MooRE. Well, if you will give me a moment to — I just want to 
see if I have any notes. 

Mr. Lenzner. Take your time, Mr. Moore. While you are doing that, 
I am told by my associate up here that Mr. Miller spoke about our 
meeting on Thursday, June 8. Mr. Lackritz tells me that Thursday of 
that week was June 7. 

Mr. Miller. The meeting was Friday, the 8th of June was the date 
of the meeting, Mr. Lenzner. I have competent evidence available if 
necessary. 

Mr. Lenzner. Go riglit ahead. Mr, Moore. Can yon describe what 
you are looking at to refresh your recollection ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir, some notes I made for this purpose after my 
discussion of dates with you. 



2063 

You are telling me that Mr. Haldeman's diary shows that I was 
present in a meeting on March 28. 

Mr. Lenzner. That is correct. 

Mr. Moore. At which Mr. Mitchell was present. Can you tell me if 
anybody else was present ? 

Mr. Lenzner. The diary only indicates that Mr. Haldeman joined 
the meeting at approximately 9 o'clock. I would be glad to 

Mr. Moore. Do you know where ? I don't have that. 

Mr. Lenzner. It looks like Mr. Haldeman's oiRce in the Wliite 
House, because I think this diary would not reflect this entry unless 
it was his secretary at his office. 

Mr. MooRE. What day of the week are we on ? 

Mr. Lenzner. This is Wednesday. 

Mr. MooRE. Could you tell me whether that is a diary of a meeting 
that took place or a meeting that was scheduled ? 

Mr. Lenzner. I will be glad to show you the diary. 

Mr. MooRE. At the moment, I have no recollection of such a meeting. 

Mr. Lenzner. It indicates "Haldeman returned, joined Mitchell and 
Moore." 

It is on the righthand side, Mr. Moore, of the diary entry. 

Mr. Moore. The time appears to be 12 :45 o'clock, is that the way 
you have it ? 

Mr. Lenzner. About 8 :45 o'clock, I think it says, yes, sir. 

Well, I don't want to belabor it. 

Mr. MooRE. No; I don't usually get in that early. I have no recollec- 
tion of the meeting. I don't really think I was at that meeting. 

Naw, I admit the diary shows that. I don't know whether it could 
have been Powell Moore, my good friend from Milledgeville, Ga., 
whose name has been confused with mine a few times, and I might 
say for the benefit of anybody that I should, that I am Richard and 
he is Powell. 

Mr. Lenzner. Above the entry at 8 :45 o'clock, it says "Dick Moore." 
I don't want to belabor the point. 

Mr. Moore. I see that now. 

Mr. Lenzner. The only question I am asking you is : Did you ever, 
when you did see Mr. Mitcliell, ask him about tlie meetings Mr. Dean 
told you about in his office ? 

Mr. Moore, No ; I never did. 

Mr. Lenzner. You testified that on or about March 19, Mr. Dean told 
you that Hunt was demanding, I thinkVou said o\:er $100,000. 

Mr. Moore. What I said was he meiitipned a larger amount and I 
didn't remember what it was, but I have since read that it was over 
$100,000. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, whatever it was, he wanted it by Wednesday 
.or he 'was going to embarrass tlie White House. Now, did you ask 
Mr. Dean for any specifics as to how he could embarrass the White 
House ? 

Mr. MooRE. No. No. 

Mr. Lenzner. When you cliaracterized it as blackmail, what was 
your basis for so characterizing it ? 

Mr. Moore. He said some chai/acterization to, things have gotten to 
a terrible— I have forgotten — I have just learned that Howard Hunt 
is demanding x thousand dollars and I want it before, deposited or, 



2064 

before he is sentenced; in fact, he wants it by Wednesday and if he 
does not get it, lie is going to raise liell with the White House or he 
is going to say things that will raise hell with the White House, or 
words to that effect. I don't remember the precise words. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, if yon realized that this was a pretty serious 
thing going on, did you take any action? Did you contact any law 
enforcement agencies to advise them that a crime of some proportion 
was about to be committed the next day or the day after ? 

Mr. Moore. No. I was talking to the counsel of the Chief Magistrate. 
I thought that the main thing -was to — no ; I didn't. 

Mr, Lenzner. And if you had talked to the FBI or the U.S. attor 
ney's office, they would have been able to provide surveillance and 
perhaps prevent a serious crime from being completed, is that not 
correct ? 

Mr. MooRE. I don't know what they would have done. They might 
have said, what evidence do you have ? I don't know Avhat they would 
have done. What I had was someone. Dean told me that someone had 
told him that Howard Hunt had said this. Maybe the FBI would have 
acted. I don't know. The time frame is pretty fast, anyway. We got 
there the next day, within 36 hours. 

Mr. Lenzner. That is my point. 

Mr. Moore. It was Friday, right. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, when you talked to the U.S. attorney's office 
on April 30, did you relate that conversation that you had with Mr. 
Dean concerning the blackmail ? 

Mr. MooRE. I am pretty certain I did and I also at that time had a 
notion it was — it could have been earlier, but I think I said — I knew 
it was before Wednesday. For some reason, that time stuck in my 
mind and I did tell him about it. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, when you met with the President and Mr. 
Dean on March 30, did j^ou have a discussion which concerned Mr. 
Mitchell? 

Mr. Moore. Here we go again. March 30 ? I did not have a meeting 
with the President 

Mr. Lenzner. I am sorry. I apologize. I meant March 20. 

Mr, MooRE. March 20. And the question was did I 

Mr, Lenzner. Did you have a discussion about Mr. INIitchell on 
that date, with Mr. Dean and the President? 

Mr. Moore. No, sir. 

Mr. Lenzner. All right. 

Now, we furnished you, Mr, Moore, with a — let me ask this. Did 
you and the President agree on that date that the investigation should 
be made public immediately after the sentencing of the defendants? 

Mr. MooRE. Did the President and I agree that the report should 
be 

Mr. Lenzner. That the investigation which was ongoing at that 
time should be made public and that a statement should be released 
after the sentencing of the defendants. 

Mr. Moore. On March 20 ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Moore. You referred to an investigation that was ongoing at 
that time. "Wliich investigation are you referring to? 



2065 

Mr. Lenzner. I take it that means whatever fact that the White 
House liad obtained ? 

Mr. Moore. You mean were still under investigation or — you say 
an investigation going on at that time. Now, I am not sure what that 
refers to. 

Mr. Lexzner. Well, I am not sure, either, sir, but you were at that 
meeting. I am asking you, was there a discussion about an investiga- 
tion that was going on and that the results of that investigation 
should be made public ? 

Mr. MooRE. There was no discussion of any investigation that was 
going on. There was an expression by the President that he was in 
favor of getting the story out as soon as we could. 

Mr. Lenzner. And there was no discussion of Mr. Mitchell or the 
Vesco case to your recollection ? 

Mr. Moore. No, sir. 

INIr. Lenzner. Now, w^e furnished you, Mr. Moore, with a copy of the 
'\Miite House reconstruction of a variety of meetings between the 
President and Mr. Dean and I want to direct your attention at this 
point to the date in that reconstruction that was furnished us by thc> 
AAliite House of :March 20, 1973. 

Mr. Miller. Could I request an additional copy? I seem to have 
mislaid mine. 

Mr. Lenzner. I think we gave that to you last week. I don't know 
if we have one. Let me read you tlie entry. 

Mr. Moore. If I could work from the diary. 

Mr. Lenzner. We have a copy that we can furnish you. 

As I said, Mr. Moore, just so your understanding is accurate, this 
is a document of information that was furnished us by the AVliite 
House which is a reconstruction by them of the meeting on March 20 
and other meetings, but this meeting on INIarch 20. 

Mr. Miller. Was this furnished by the White House ? 

INIr. Lenzner. This was furnislied by the 'Wliite House, ves, Mr. 
Miller. 

On March 20, the entry : "Dean discussed Mitchell's problems with 
the grand jury, Vesco, and the Gurney press conference." 

Do you see where ■ 

]Mr. MooRE. I saw that. 

Mr. Lenzner. "The President and Moore agreed that the wdiole 
investigation should be made public and that a statement should be 
released immediately after the sentencing of the defendants." 

Now, INIr. IVIoore, is that an inaccurate reconstruction by the Wliite 
House of that meeting ? 

Mr. ]\IooRE. I believe it is, because I don't believe those things were 
said in my presence. But I am just — I don't know — who in the A^Hiite 
House prepared this ? Do you know anything about this ? 

]Mr. Lenzner. I l^elieve it was iVIr. Buzhai'dt, I assume concerning 
the people who were at that meeting — I would hope that they talked 
to you about that before they reconstructed. 

Mr. Moore. Well, I don't know why they wouldn't, but they did not. 

INIr, INIiLLER. ]Mr. Lenzner, I have been informed and I don't know 
whether it is fact or not that this document was not in fact prepared 
by the White House. 



2066 

Now, that is hearsay information on my part. 

Mr. Lenzner. I think Mr. Thompson received this information from 
Mr. Buzhardt. Maybe he can clarify this. 

Mr. Thompson. Excuse me just a minute. Perhaps I can shed a little 
light on this, we discussed this a time or two before. 

Senator Ervin. I might suggest that the press had indicated that 
during the week of the cessation of the hearings of the committee while 
the Russians Avere visiting America, that somebody leaked the sul> 
stance of Mr. Buzhardt's statement to the press. It has been stated in 
the press that, as I understand it, that this statement was subsequently 
repudiated by the 

Mr. Thompson. May I address myself to that for just a minute? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. It was stated a time or two before, that the substance 
of this was communicated to me orally over the telephone by Mr. Buz- 
hardt — I don't recall the exact date^ — pursuant to the committee's 
inquiry as to what did in fact occur on those dates. This information 
v.-as submitted to me orally. I took longhand notes. That same day, I 
dictated from those notes the summai-y which has been referred to. I 
gave a copy to Mr. Dash and it Avas made available to members of the 
committee. 

Now, perhaps the preciseness of those conversations and so forth, can 
be disputed to a certain extent, but I believe it has been verified that 
the substance of what is in that document is accurate. 

Obviously, there is room for some slip-up in the nature of the way 
the thing was transmitted. We did not discuss at that time how it 
would be used or whether or not it would be made a part of the record 
or whether or not it would be the official White House position. And 
that is the way it transpired and that i-esulted in the document we are 
referring to. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Thompson, I could add this. On receipt of it, I did 
make contact with Mr. Garment and Mr. Buzhardt so that if we were 
going to use it — they saw your reconstruction of the notes. They did 
come down to my office and read your notes and stated that although 
it was not a verbatim statement of the telephone call, it was generally 
accvirate. 

Mr. Miller. Generally accurate? 

Mr. Dash. They found nothing on these. They said it was not a 
verbatim statement Avord for word, but that it was an accurate 
statement. 

Mr. Miller. An accurate statement as distinguished from generally 
accurate ? 

Mr. Dash. It was accurate, yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. You might Avant to take this up, ISIr. Moore, Avhen you 
return to the "\Aniite House. 

Mr. MooRE. If I could get this — if you had questions about 

Mr. Lenzner. The question Avas : Does that entry of INIarch 20 coin- 
cide with your recollection of Avhat Avas discussed on that date ? You 
liaA'e already indicated that you couldn't recall a discussion about 
Mitchell, Vesco. and the grand jui-y. and you have also indicated there 
Avas no discussion about you and the President agreeing to make this 
iiiA^estigation public. 



2067 

Now, are you saying that this entry is not an accurate reflection of 
that meeting? 

Mr. ]MooRE. Well, some of it is reasonably accurate and some of it I 
can't recall. 

For instance, it does refer to that suggestion about challenging the 
conunittee to its own investigation, which I stated. I think I stated in 
various languages, various words at various times, that the President 
indicated his desire to get the whole statement out about the whole 
thing and that we agreed. I think probably — I don't know whether 
Mr. Dean raised the question about waiting until after the sentencing, 
but there was, I recall no firm decision on that. 

Mitchell's problems with the grand jury — grand jury and Vesco — I 
don't think there was any discussion of that. I don't know about 
whether Mr. Dean reported something going up there or something, I 
don't know. I don't recall at that meeting and I wonder whether the 
long and short of it was whether Mr. Dean's logs show whether Mr. 
Dean had another meeting with the President that day. Maybe you 
have something there. And I am not sure whether we got there at the 
same time. 

Mr. Lenzner. Let me ask you this, Mr. Moore. 

You did testify that when you left the Oval Office on March 20, I 
concluded the President could not be aware of the things that Mr. Dean 
was worried about. Now, did that include, for example, the threat by 
Mr. Hunt to blackmail the White House? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. Did it also include the earlier activities of Mr. Hunt 
and Mr. Liddy that Mr. Dean had also indicated could be embarrassing 
to the A^Hiite House ? 

Mr. MooRE. I had no laundry list in my mind. I had — except the 
Howard Hunt matter, but the general feeling that the man in that 
Oval Office, who was telling us so strongly that anything anybody 
knew should be disclosed as soon as possible and we should get the 
story out, and he had said it before, that this was utterly incompatible 
with liis having knowledge, prior knowledge of any of these things, and 
that is what I said, when I left I said, "John," I pointed into that 
room, I said, "the President doesn't know the kind of things that you 
are talking about and worrying about. Have you told him," and so 
forth. 

You have heard the story. 

Mr. Lenzner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MooRE. And it was a sense that this man with this frame of mind 
and with a desire to tell the whole story, whatever it was, didn't know 
the whole story, didn't have anything of the whole story. That was 
my conviction. 

- Mr. Lenzner. And I take it including the things done. He was telling 
you about Hunt and Liddy 's activities I think 

Mr. Moore. The whole field of suspicion and knowledge and prob- 
lem that seem to be lying there. 

Mr. Lenzner. Mr. Moore, do you agree now that your understanding 
of the President's information and knowledge was basically incorrect? 
That he did, in fact, have information by that meeting on March 20 
concerning Mr. Strachan and also possible involvement in Watergate 



2068 

and also concerning the Ellsberg break-in involving Hunt's. 
Liddy's 

Mr. Moore. I have no reason — you have heard my statement on 
that, of course, that he did not, that it was my judgment that he did 
not. I know of nothing to change that. 

Mr. Lenzner. All right, sir. 

Now, could you again refer back to the White House reconstruction 
of meetings with Mr. Dean. If you wdll look at the item on March 13. 

Mr. MooRE. I know. 

Mr. Lenzner. It says, "Dean said there was nothing specific on 
Colson, that he didn't know about Mitchell but that Strachan could 
be involved," and then on March 17, at the bottom of the paragraph it 
said, and this is an admission by the White House of the discussions 
that took place on that day, "Dean told the President of the Ellsbei'g 
break-in but that it had nothing to do with the Watergate." 

And you were not }:)resent at those meetings but does that informa- 
tion, as admitted by the White House now indicate that in fact your 
perception was wrong and Mr. Nixon, the President did know about 
both Strachan's possible involvement and the Ellsberg break-in ? 

Mr. MooRE. It seems to me the answer to that question can only 1 le 
given to you by someone who was at the meeting and when you speak 
of the White House report, and you use the word "WHiite House as a 
building rather loosely, anything done in the White House is done 
by a person, and when you speak of this as a White House report, 
Mr. Thompson very candidly and properly has said this is his summary 
of a telephone conversation. 

So, I want to get those — ^now, all I know is what I saw and heard, 
and I do not know what the nature of these conversations were or what 
the frame of reference was about their adjectives and there are words 
in here about involvement, I have no knowledge of what was said, I 
wasn't there. There is — Mr. Buzhardt obviously was not there if he 
made the phone call. I don't know what the source of the statements, of 
the recollection are, so I would say that this again is, could well be 
Ervin's law of the third power over the telephone, and summarized so 
I can't speak or vouch for anything in this which has been variously 
described, as you know, a White House document and then it turns out, 
I remember asking whether it was in the New York Times, it was, and 
it was a report of a telephone conversation that I cannot account for 
that. It doesn't change my opinion one bit, and I think if you want to 
get at that you should ask someone who was at the meeting. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, we have had Mr. Dean up here, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. MooRE. All right. 

Mr. Lenzner. We have his version. Would you recommend that we 
also get anybody else who was up there at that meeting as a witness? 

Mr. Moore. AVell. there are cei-tain constitutional considerations here 
that even as important as these hearings are the Constitution may be 
more important, and — but, no. let me just re-read this. "\^niat I get out 
of it mostly is— [conferring with counsel] a statement under these 
circumstances fourth-hand, I guess, whatever that Strachan could be 
involved, I don't take as knowledge that might have come through to 
the President in those terms, if indeed it was said, so I can't comment. 
We have had so much of this conversation problem and we have seen 
it illustrated quite a bit today back and forth, I can't comment on that. 



2069 

Mr. Lenzner. Of course you were not at those meetings and this is the 
White House version of those meetings so you can't testify as to 
whether the President did or did not know about that information, 
how detailed it was, what he did after those meetings to obtain addi- 
tional information, isn't that correct ? 

Mr. MooRE. That is correct. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you know, by the way, after he learned about the 
Ellsberg break-in whether he called in Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Krogh, 
and interrogated them as to their possible involvement in the Ellsberg 
break-in ? 

Mr. Moore. No ; I do not. 

Mr. Lenzner. You also testified that on or about April 13 or 14 you 
learned then of Mr. Ehrlichman's relationship to ;Mr. Ellsberg. Now, 
again I don't want to quarrel with your recollection, Mr. Moore, but 
isn't it- true that you, in fact, learned of that information sometime in 
early March. 

Mr. Miller. Where does the transcript represent that testimony? 

Mr. Lenzner. I will get that for you in a second. It is the last ques- 
tion on the afternoon of July 13 — I am sorry, it is on page 3845. 

Mr. Miller. 3845. 

Mr. Moore, What was your question, can I have the question ? 

Mr. Lenzner. The question is did you in fact learn in early March 
about the Ellsberg break-in from Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. MooRE. Wlien you say learn about the Ellsberg break-in, that 
had been in the newspapers long ago, hadn't it, so when you say learned 
about, what do you mean ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Well it wasn't in the newspapers in March of this 
year. It was in the newspapers after it was disclosed out in trial on 
April 25. 

Mr. Moore, It was the break-in of the psychiatrist's office, wasn^t that 
in the news ? 

Mr. Lenzner. I don't think so. It was first disclosed about April 25 
when Judge Byrne 

Mr. MooRE. I mean in the newspapers, didn't the document disclose — 
I don't know whether I read it before but I thought I did, 

Mr. Lenzner. All right, sir, let me ask you this. 

INIr. MooRE. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. You did go see the President on April 19 and you had 
a discussion about what Dean had told you concerning Mr. Ehrlichman 
and Mr, Ellsberg and 

Mr, MooRE. Go ahead, yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. Is that correct? 

Mr. Moore. Yes, 

Mr, Lenzner. At that time, did the President tell you that Mr. Dean 
•had advised him of that incident on March 17 ? 

Mr. MooRE, No, he did not, 

Mr. Lenzner. And similarly in answer to, I think, Senator Gurney's 
question, you have also testified Mr, Dean didn't tell you what he had 
told the President, is that correct ? 

Mr, INIooRE. He testified that he let it all out and told him everything. 

Mr, Lenzner. But he didn't tell you the specifics of whether he 
talked about the million dollars or about the Ellsberg break-in or any- 
thing else? 



2070 

Mr. Moore. That is right. 

Mr. Lenzner. Are you also aware that the clay before your meetino; 
with the President on April 19, that is on April 18, the President 
ordered Mr. Petersen of the Department of Justice to confine his in- 
vestigation to the Watergate case and not get into national security 
matters, including the Ellsberg case ? 

Mr. MooRE, I am not aware of that. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, you had read the President's statement of May 
22, had you not, sir. Let me read it. 

Mr. MooRE. I thought you meant of my own knowledge, right. I will 
be glad to 

Mr. Lenzner. Let me read the pertinent part. 

For example, on April 18, 1973, when I learned that Mr. Hunt, a former mem- 
ber of the special investigations unit at the White House, was to be questioned l),v 
the U.S. attorney I directed Assistant Attorney General Petersen to pursue every 
issue involving tlie Watergate but to confine his investigation to Watergate and 
related matters and to stay out of national security matters. 

Mr. Moore. I would like to find the reference to it. If you will recall 
a 4,000-word statement, Mr. Lenzner, and I am just looking for the 
reference, at the early part or 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, it is under the 

Mr. Moore. Does it have a caption '? 

Mr. Lenzner. The caption is "Forbidden Area." 

Mr. Moore. That is a newspaper reproduction ? 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, I guess it is, sir, I do not know. 

Mr. MooRE. The caption "Forbidden Area'' does not appear in the 
official text. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, let me 

Mr. MooRE. I will find it, I just do not like to take a paragraph with- 
out knowing what the context was, is it^ — just give me a moment and 
I will find it. 

Mr. Lenzner. Let me pass this up to you. 

Mr. Moore. Well, maybe — yes, I now have it, Mr. Lenzner. 

Mr. Lenzner. That special investigation unit was with reference to 
the plumbers' activities, is that not correct ? 

Mr. MooRE. It refei-s to national security matters. 

Mr. Lenzner. And it refers to special investigation unit, does it 
not? 

Mr. Moore. "I directed Assistant Attorney General Petersen to pur- 
sue every issue involving Watergate but to confine his investigation 
to Watergate and related matters and to stay out of national security 
matters." 

If there is a reference to the plumbers maybe you can point it out. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, the sentence above it where it 

Mr, MooRE. The what ? 

Mr. Lenzner. The sentence above that where it refers to Mr. Hunt. 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Lenzner. As a former member of the special investigations 
unit. That was the plumbers unit, was it not ? 

Mr. MooRE. Special investigations, I will go along, I guess so, go 
ahead. 

]Mr. Lenzner. The question is really, Mr. INIoore, was that not an in- 
dication that there was an intent to keep the lid on the Ellsberg 
break-in story ? 



2071 

Mr. jNIoore. I cannot testify to that. If you read it, I confine that 
here. I am not trying to read the President's mind. I think that he has 
expressed throughout this his interest in protecting tlie national se- 
curity and, when you use words like "keep the lid on" and that kind of 
thing that is your characterization of the President's statement and 
you are free to make it but I do not join in that interpretation. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, can you explain then, Mr. Moore, why the 
President, who received information on March 13, concerning Mr. 
Strachan, and on March 17 concerning the Ellsberg break-in, on March 
21 from Mr. Dean on the other matters, failed to communicate any of 
this information to the Department of Justice, the FBI or any law 
enforcement agency ? Can you explain why that information was not 
transmitted to investigative units outside the White House ? 

Mr. INIooRE. Well, now, Mr. Lenzner, you have got three things in 
there and maybe the reporter can read them back and I can take them 
one by one because I cannot give you a collective answer. Could you, 
sir? 

Mr. Lenzner. Would you like to comment on that ? 

Mr. MooRE. I do not know what information he received from Mr. 
Strachan about Mr. Strachan. 

Mr. Lenzner. Looking again at the "Wliite House log reconstruction, 
and you know that he received information from Mr. Dean on March 
21, can you explain to this committee why that information was not 
transmitted to a law^ enforcement agency before Mr. Dean in April 
himself transmitted the same information to the U.S. attorney's office ? 

]Mr. Moore. Well, that is really why I wanted the question read back 
because I do not know of anything in your question that indicated the 
President received any knowledge of any illegal activity. 

Mr. Lenzner. Well, you have already read the White House re- 
constructed version of tlie meetings between Mr. Dean and the Presi- 
dent which indicates information allegedly involving criminal activi- 
ties. Now, what I am asking you if the President had that infomnation, 
and he admitted on May 22 in liis statement that he did receive such 
information, why then did he not transmit that information to a law 
enforcement agency so it could be investigated ? 

Mr. MooRE. Well, Mr. Lenzner, we are talking about — you keep call- 
ing the White House report and so forth, we are talking about a re- 
capitulation of wliat someone told Mr. Buzhardt who told Mr. Dash 
what was said at tlie meeting and Avhat it says is, about Mr. Strachan 
was, that he might be involved, involved in what, in w^hat w^ay, I just 
do not know, and I do not think any of us know and certainly there is 
nothing here that I can find on which to predicate a question to the 
television audience that the President knew of criminal activity that 
he did not report. I do not find it here. 

Mr. Lenzner. Assuming that this is an accurate reconstruction and 
it refers to the Ellsberg break-in on March 17. 

Mr. MooRE. Wliere is the reference to the break-in ? 

Mr. Lenzner. March 17. 

Mr. MooRE. A'\niere is that reference ? 

Mr. Lenzner. On page 3 of the White House version of the meetings. 
This is my last question, Mr. Moore, if you can finish it. 

Mr. MooRE. All right. 

Mr. Lenzner. And the President did indicate that he was aware 
when he talked to you later about the blackmail threat? 



2072 

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Lenzner. And the White House version again indicates that on 
March 21 the President received information that Magruder probably 
knew, Mitchell possibly knew, that Strachan probably knew and that 
Haldeman had possibly seen the fruits of the wiretaps througli 
Strachan and that Ehrlichman was vulnerable because of his approval 
of Kalmbach's fundraising efforts. Can you explain now why that in- 
formation, as admitted by the White House, was not transmitted to a 
law enforcement agency for further investigation until April, after 
Mr. Dean had already talked to the U.S. attorney's office? Can you ex- 
plain that at all? 

Mr. Moore. I have no explanation of my own knowledge. 

Mr. Lenzner. How can the committee find out the answer to that 
question, Mr. Moore ? 

Mr. Moore. Well, I think the first thing is, I am sure you can find 
out what the facts were. The President, as I think I said yesterday. 
] did not think the President would, as a lawyer, or could as the Chief 
Executive, immediately take public action, for example, on the basis 
of whatever it was that one man told him in that meeting, and that he 
had to test to find out the true facts for himself, in my opinion. I was 
not there, I did not talk to him, as you know, between March 21 and 
some time in April. 

He did make these moves, you do have the April 17 statement where 
suddenly the entire approach changed, executive privilege, coopera- 
tion, we were all free to come up here, no one would be covered up, no 
one would be granted immunity, no matter how high in the administra- 
tion. But I do not think that after a year of rumor and hints, and so 
forth, that the President could act on a presumably factual basis be- 
cause one person had told him these things. It started them, it triggered 
them, it started to renew and intensify and today, as you know, total 
changes have been made already in the structure of the White House 
in the top personnel, and I think that he moved, and he moved pretty 
judiciously and he moved pretty effectively, and I think as chief mag- 
istrate he really was working with Mr. Kleindienst, the Attorney Gen- 
eral, and Mr. Petersen, the criminal head, and so forth. I think the 
results speak for themselves and I think there is where it stands. 

Mr. Lenzner. You have no explanation then, though, when Mr. 
Petersen and Mr. Kleindienst went to talk with the President in April, 
why he had not, prior to that time, furnished them with the informa- 
tion he had concerning these allegations. 

Mr. Moore. I don't know whether he did or not, and I don't know 
what information he had, and I don't know at what point he was 
ready to accept this to the point of giving it, putting it into the hands 
of the criminal division, and I must say, one thing you must remem- 
ber, that when things start to move in the department they often end 
up in the newspapers, and I think this was too important — this is my 
opinion, I shouldn't be surmising, should I, Mr. Attorney — but that 
he wanted to have a pretty good idea himself what was going on l)efore 
he went outside the walls of the White House alone, although I don't 
know, maybe he was talking to them. I don't know. I gave you the 
narrative and the sequence and the result of things are moving forward 
and they are moving forward on all levels. We have the special prose- 
cutor, we have these liearings, we have the complete release of attorney- 



2073 

client privilege, the executive privilege, we have the open book being 
offered by the President of the United States, and I think that he 
reached that decision and that conclusion in a judicious, sensible way, 
lawyer-like way, and the way of a responsible Chief Executive, 

Mr. Lenzner. I have no more questions, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Thompson. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Owing to the necessity of the chairman and vice 
chairman meeting with certain parties at this time, the meeting will 
stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Moore, for your cooperation with the 
committee. 

Mr. Moore. Am I excused, now, sir ? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

[Whereupon, at 11 :45 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
2 p.m., the same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Monday, July 16, 1973 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Butterfield, will you stand and raise your right hand ? 

Do you swear that the evidence you shall give the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Butterfielx). I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Be seated. 

Suppose for the record that you state your name and present occu- 
pation. 

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD, ADMINISTRATOR, 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. Butterfield. ]My name is Alexander Porter Butterfield. I am 
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. My home 
address is 7416 Admiral Driv^e, Alexandria, Va. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, at a staff interview with Mr. Butterfield 
on Friday, some very significant information was elicited and was 
attended by the majority members of the staff and the minority mem- 
bers. The information was elicited by the minority staff member. 
Therefore, I would like to change the usual routine of the questioning 
and ask minority counsel to begin the questioning of Mr. Butterfield. 

Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Butterfield, I understand you were previously an employee of 
the White House. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Butterfield. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Over what period of time were you employed by the 
White House? 

Mr. Butterfield. I would like to preface my remarks, if I may, Mr. 
Thompson, with one statement. 

Mr. Thompson. I am sorry, go right ahead. 

Mr. Butterfield. Although I do not have a statement as such, I 
would simply like to remind the committee membership that whereas I 
appear voluntarily this afternoon, I appear with only some 3 hours 



2074 

notice and without time to arrange for permanent counsel or for 
assistance by a temporary counsel. 

That is all I have to say, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. During what period of time were you employed at 
the White House, Mr. Butterfield ? 

Mr. BuTiT.RFiELD. I was at the White House as a deputy assistant 
to the President from the first day of the Nixon administration, Jan- 
uary 21, 1969, until noon of March 14, 1973. 

Mr. Thompson. And what w^ere your duties at the White House ? 

Mr. Butterfield. My duties were many and varied, as a matter of 
fact, Mr. Thompson. I will try to state them briefly. 

I was in charge of administration— that is to say that the staff secre- 
tary, who is the day-to-day administrator at the White House, re- 
ported directly to me. And, of course, I reported to INIr. Haldeman, as 
did everyone. 

In addition to administration, I was responsible for the management 
and ultimate supervision of the Office of Presidential Papers and the 
Office of Special Files. Both of those offices pertained to the collection 
of documents which will eventually go to the Nixon library. 

Third, I was in charge of security at the White House insofar as 
liaison with the Secret Service and the Executive Protective Service 
is concerned and insofar as FBI background investigations for pro- 
spective Presidential appointees is concerned. 

A fourth duty was that I was the secretary to the Cabinet and had 
that duty not from January 21, 1969, but from November, I believe No- 
vember 4, 1969, through until the day I departed, March 14 of this 
year. 

I was additionally the liaison between the President and the Of- 
fice of the President and all of the various support units. By that I 
mean the Office of the Military Assistant to the President and the 
Office of White House Visitors, again the Secret Service, the Execu- 
tive Protective Service, tlie residence staff. Mrs. Nixon's staff — I served 
as sort of a conduit between all those elements and the Office of the 
President. 

Finally, I was in charge of the smooth running of the President's 
official day, both in Washington, D.C., and at the western "\^Tiite House 
in San Clemente. I had nothing to do with the smooth running of 
his day in Florida or in Camp David, but I was responsible for the 
smooth implementation of the official events on his calendar in Wash- 
ington and in the western White House. 

That pretty well sums it up, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. You were employed on January 21, 1969, and con- 
tinued to be employed until March 14 of this year, is that correct ? 

Mr. Butterfield. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Butterfield, are you awai-e of the installation 
of any listening devices in the Oval Office of the President? 

Mr. Butterfield. I w^as aware of listening devices; yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. ^Vlien were those devices placed in the Oval Office? 

Mr. Butterfield. Approximately the summer of 1970. I cannot 
begin to recall the precise date. My guess, Mr. Thompson, is that the 
installation was made between — and this is a very rough guess — April 
or May of 1970 and perhaps the end of the summer or early fall 1970. 

Mr. Thompson. Are you aware of any devices that were installed 
in the Executive Office Building office of the President? 



2075 

Mr. BuTTERrrELD. Yes, sir, at that time. 

Mr. Thompson. Were they installed at the same time? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. They were installed at the same time. 

Mr. Thompson. Would you tell us a little bit about how those devices 
worked, how they were activated, for example ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. I dou't havc the technical knowledge, but I will 
tell you what I know about how those devices were triggered. They 
were installed, of course, for historical purposes, to record the Presi- 
dent's business and they were installed in his two offices, the Oval 
Office and the EOB office. Within the west wing of the White House, 
there are several, at least three, perhaps four — the three that I know 
of— boxes called Presidential locator boxes. These are square boxes 
approximately 10 by 10 inches, and on them are several locations, about 
seven locations, which would tell where tlie President might be at any 
time, locations such as the residence — that is one of them; the south 
grounds is another ; Oval Office is another ; EOB office is still another ; 
west wing, meaning west wing of the White House, is another; and 
out, I think, is the last one. When the President moves — east wing is 
still another and I think that covers all of the locations indicated on 
the box. 

When the President moves from his Oval Office, for instance, to his 
Executive Office Building office and he departs the west wing and 
crosses the street, it is my understanding that the Secret Service agents, 
members of the Executive Protective Division who cover him — it is my 
understanding there are four, five, six of them — when he moves across 
the street, one of them covers the central location, which may be the 
switchboard under the east wing, or it may be the Secret Service Com- 
mand Post, I don't know. If it is the Secret Service Command Post, 
it is in the Executive Office Building. It says the President is leaving 
the west wing and going to the EOB office. They would know this. 
And the little light moves from the Oval Office to EOB office. It doesn't 
actually move to the EOB office until the President actually enters the 
EOB office. As that light moves, there is a tie-in audio signal so that if 
one is preoccupied, as I might be, I realize that the locator box is indi- 
cating a change in the President's location and that kind of informa- 
tion was important to me. My office was located immediately adjacent 
to the President's Oval Office on the west side. My duties involved going 
in and out frequently and working directly with the President. Mr. 
Steve Bull, who at that time worked on the other side of the President, 
on the east side of the Oval Office, had one of these locator boxes, and 
Mr. Haldeman had a third. I believe there was a fourth in Mr. Chapin's 
office— in fact, I am sure there was a fourth in Mr. Chapin's office. We 
were probably the four who would be the most concerned, or at least 
most immediately concerned with the President's whereabouts and the 
fact that he was changing locations. 

In that the Oval Office and the Executive Office Building office were 
indicated on this locator box, the installation was installed in such 
a way that when the light was on "Oval Office," the taping device was 
at least triggered. It was not operating, but it was triggered — it was 
spring-loaded, if vou will, then it was voice-actuated! So when the 
light was on "Oval Office," in the Oval Office and in the Oval Office 
only, the taping device was spring-loaded to a voice-actuating situ a- 



2076 

tlon. When the President went to the EOB office, the light was on. In 
the ElOB office, there was the same arrangement. It those two offices, 
the arrangement was the same and the taping picked up all conversa- 
tions or all noise in those two offices when the light was at those 
positions. 

Mr. Thompson. We discussed the Oval Office and the EOB office. 
What about the Cabinet room? Was there a taping device in the 
Cabinet room ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Yes, sir, there w^as. 

Mr. Thompson. Was it activated in the same way ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir, it was not, and my guess is, and it is only 
my guess, is because there was no Cabinet room location per se on 
the locator box. There was only a west wing indication. When the light 
was on west wing that meant the President was in one of two places, 
tlie Cabinet room or the barbershop. When he went into 
the Cabinet room the light went to west wing. But he could have been 
someplace else in the west wing and so to insure the recording of 
business conversations in the Cabinet room a manual installation was 
made. 

Mr. Thompson. I do not want to hurry you, Mr. Butterfield, but I 
understand there is a vote in about 12 minutes so if we could go through 
it rather rapidly the first time we might come back up and pick up 
some of the loose ends. 

I understand the recording device in the Cabinet room was manually 
operated then, is that correct ? 

Mr. Butterfield. That is correct. 

Mr. Thompson. There were buttons on the desk in the Cabinet room 
there tliat activated that device ? 

Mr. Butterfield. There were two buttons. 

Mr. Thompson. Pardon me, was there also an activating device on 
your telephone ? 

Mr. Butterfield. Yes, sir. There was an off-on button, one said 
"Haldeman" and one that said "Butterfield" that was on and off 
respectively, and one on my telephone. 

Mr. Thompson. How was the device usually activated, by the buttons 
or by your telephone activator ? 

Mr. Butterfield. To my knowledge, the President never did pay any 
attention to the buttons at the Cabinet table. It was activated, the but- 
ton on my telephone, by me. 

Mr. Thompson. So far as the Oval Office and the EOB office are con- 
cerned, would it be your testimony that the device would pick up 
any and all conversations no mattei' wliere the conversations took place 
in the room and no matter how soft the conversations might have been? 

Mr. Butterfield. With regard to the Oval and EOB offices? 

INIr. Thompson. Yes, sir. 

INfr. Butterfield. Yes, sir, it is my 

Mr. Thompson. Was it a little more difficult to pick up in the 
Cabinet room ? 

]Mr. Butterfield. Yes, sir, it was a great deal more difficult to pick ' 
up in the Cabinet room. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. We have talked about the rooms, now if 
yvQ could move on to tele])hones; are you aware of the installation 
of any devices on any of the telephones, first of all, the Oval Office^ 

Mr. Butterfield. Yes, sir. 



2077 

Mr. Thompson. What about the Executive Office Building office of 
the President ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Yes, sir. The President's business telephone at 
his desk in the Executive Office Building. 

Mr. Thompson. "VNHiat about the Lincoln Room ? 

Mr. BuTTEKFiELD. Ycs, sir, the telephone in the Lincoln sitting room 
in the residence. 

Mr. Thompson. What about Aspen cabin at Camp David ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Only in, on the telephone at the President's desk 
in his study in the Aspen cabin, his personal cabin. 

Mr. Thompson. It is my understanding that this cabin was some- 
times used by foreign dignitaries, was the device still present during 
those periods of time ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir, the device was removed prior to occupancy 
by chiefs of state, heads of government, and other foreign dignitaries. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. Would you stat« who installed these 
devices, all of these devices, so far as you know ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. I did not say, no, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, who did ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. The Secret Service. The Technical Security Divi- 
sion of the Secret Service. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. You alluded to a reason for the installa- 
tion of these devices. Would you state why, as far as your understand- 
ing is concerned, these devices were installed in these rooms ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. There was no doubt in my mind they were in- 
stalled to record things for posterity, for the Nixon library. The Pres- 
ident was very conscious of that kind of thing. We had quite an 
elaborate setup at the White House for the collection and preservation 
of documents, and of things which transpired in the way of business 
of state. 

Mr. Thompson. On whose authority were they installed, Mr. 
Butterfield? 

Mr. Butterfield. On the President's authority by way of Mr. Halde- 
man and Mr. Higby. 

Mr. Thompson. Did the President instruct Mr. Haldeman and 
Mr. Haldeman instruct Mr. Higby who, in turn, instructed you? 

Mr. Butterfield. Mr. Haldeman instructed Mr. Higby to tell me 
and as I said earlier, I was the liaison with the Secret Service and it 
would be proper for me to give the instruction to the Secret Service. 

Mr. Thompson. During your tenure at the White House as far as 
your own knowledge is concerned, who else knew about the presence 
of these recording devices ? 

Mr. Butterfield. The President, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Higby, and 
I, plus the Secret Service people who I would prefer not to name in 
this public hearing in that this kind of thing is a part of their profes- 
sion, and I am not sure of the correctness of that statement and the 
propriety of refusing. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. What other non-Secret Service personnel 
besides those you have mentioned now know of those devices ? 

Mr. Butterfield. When I departed — there was one other, my sec- 
retary knew also, at this time, although she was not informed early 
on. She was informed much later because there were a number of 
occasions on which I just could not be there to press this button and I 



2078 

briefed her and asked her to do it for me but she does not, did not, 
have any idea of the extent of this. I think she was only aware of the 
Cabinet room. Perhaps she was aware of the Oval Office. AVlien I de- 
l)arted I was authorized to brief Steve Bull, who now occupies that 
office, and now has many of the responsibilities that I had. 

General Haig, who is sitting at Mr. Haldeman's desk, sir, and I 
believe that is all, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. As far as you know, did Mr. Ehrlichman or 
Mr. Dean know about the existence of the presence of those devices? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. It would be very unlikely. My guess is they 
definitely did not know. 

Mr. Thompson. "\^^iere were the tapes of those conversations kept, 
maintained ? 

Mr. BuTTEKFiELD. I cauuot say where. I am quite sure in the Exec- 
utive Office Building in some closets or cupboards or files which are 
maintained by the Technical Security Division of the U.S. Secret 
Service. 

Mr. Thompson. Were these tapes checked periodically ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Yes ; they were checked at least daily. They were, 
I think some were, used more frequently than others. Of course, they 
were — the Secret Service knew this, they made sure that they were 
checked periodically and sufficiently. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know how many conversations or how many 
days would be represented on one particular tape ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir ; I do not. There were a number of days 
during which the President was not at the White House, so, or the busi- 
ness was light. Other days that business was exceedingly heavy, I 
could not say. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever hear any of these tapes being played? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Yes, sir ; I did. It was my duty to insure that the 
equipment was working properly. I checked the Oval Office. EOB 
office. Cabinet room tapes several times and, as I told you earlier, it 
was always working properly in the Oval Office and EOB office. It 
was very, very difficult to pick up conversation in the Cabinet room 
and I ne\^er did check any of the telephones. 

Mr. Thompson. Were any of these tapes ever transcribed as far as 
you know ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. I did not hear you, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Were any of these tapes ever transcribed, reduced 
to writing or typewritten paper, so far as you know ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. To my recollection, no. 

Mr. Thompson. Was there ever any discussion of transcribing any 
of these tapes ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. To my recollection, no, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. You mentioned that they were for historical pur- 
poses. Was there ever any discussion about going ahead and catching 
up on the tapes that you had previously recorded ? 

Mr. Bu'iTERFiELD. Well, by discussion I was thinking of discussion 
by others. On at least one occasion, not necessarily in a serious vein 
but in very offhand rather casual conversation to ]\ir. Haldeman. I did 
say that wo should go ahead and get a leg up on the transcribing of 
these tapes in tliat the storage prol)lem was getting to be quite fan- 
tastic, and eventually they had to be transcribed for the Nixon library 



2079 

and it was my suggestion that we get four or five illustrious, worthy 
secretaries and begin the typing. So that at the end of the Nixon term 
we would at least have a year or a year and a half or 2 years out of 
the way. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you talk to any of the Secret Service agents 
when they went about installing these devices in the various offices? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Did I talk to them when they went about the 
installation ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. Were you present during the installation? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir, I was not. I simply gave instruction in my 
office, immediately after I was asked to do just that. 

Mr. Thompson. Did they indicate they were familiar with how 
they should go about installing these devices ? 

-Mr. BuTTERFiELD. There was sort of the intimation that they were, 
yes, sir. But that is very definitely my interpretation of that. No one 
said that to me. 

Mr. Thompson. Would it be an intimation that they had done that 
before ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiEiJD. I liavc heard that rumored and together with the 
intimation on this occasion I mentioned I assume that it has but I 
certainly do not have any proof, far from it. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. 

Mr. Butterfield, as far as you know from your own personal knowl- 
edge, from 1970 until the present time all of the President's conver- 
sations in the offices mentioned and on the telephones mentioned, were 
recorded ? 

Mr. Butterfield. That is correct, until I left. Someone could have 
taken the equipment out but until the day I left I am sure I would 
have been notified. 

Mr. Thompson. And as far as you know, those tapes are 
still available? 

Mr. Butterfield. As far as I know, but I have been away for 4 
months, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. I have no further questions. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Butterfield, just a few questions, because I think Mr. 
Thompson's questions have pretty much elicited most of the testi- 
mony. I think what you are saying was that at all times certainly in 
the "\Vliite House itself, either in the Oval Office or in the Executive 
Office of the President where there was a locator light that whenever 
the President moved the locator light moved where the President was, 
it triggered the microphones and then whenever anybody started to 
speak in that office where the microphones were as the voice activated 
the device, the recording devices began to operate, is that not true? 
, Mr. Butterfield. That is tiTie, yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. When someone finished speaking would it stop at that 
point or would there be some lag picked to pick up an answer? 

Mr. Butterfield. It was explained to me by those who installed 
the equipment that the equipment allowed for a lag so that no portion 
of a conversation would be omitted, so if I were talking to you and 
stopped talking just momentarily the tape would not stop, it would 
continue for a moment or two so that it would pick up your response 
if you should respond immediately. 



2080 

Mr. Dash. Now, was your understanding that this operated on an 
ongoing basis daily, that this system operated on an ongoing basis 
daily ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. To your knowledge, did the President ever ask while he 
was in the Oval Office to have the system not operate, the locator light 
not show in that office so as to trigger the device ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir. As a matter of fact, the President seemed 
to be totally, really oblivious, or certainly uninhibited by this fact. 

Mr. Dash. Well, at least, he authorized it to be installed in the first 
place and thereafter, as j^ou say, he has not paid any attention to it '. 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. That is true, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And by not paying attention to it, that meant that the 
device was working at all times ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Ycs, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And this is true in the Cabinet Room, where you said the 
President could, by switch, turn it off. As a matter of fact, it was you, 
you said, or your secretary, whenever there was to be a Cabinet meet- 
ing, that would see to it by a button on your phone that microphones 
would be activated. 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. I doii't waut to involve my secretary to that extent. 
When I went in, I had to go to my phone and push a button. I de- 
scribed it — it was most mysterious to her and at a later date, I ex- 
plained what I meant and asked her to say nothing and I am sure she 
never did. 

Mr. Dash, The tapes you mentioned were stored, are they stored by 
a particular date? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Yes, sir, they are. 

Mr. Dash. And so that if either Mr. Dean, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. 
Ehrlichman, or Mr. Colson had particular meetings in the Oval 
Office with the President on any particular dates that have been 
testified before this committee, there would be a tape recording with 
the President of that full conversation, would there not? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Now, who authorized you to brief ISIr. Bull when you left 
your employment in the White House ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. I wcut iuto IVIr. Haldeman and pointed out the 
necessity for briefing Mr. Bull. He was going to occupy my office. In 
fact, he did occupy my office, oh, 2 to 3, maybe even 4 weeks prior to 
my being sworn in at the Federal Aviation Administration. Mr. Halde- 
man understood the wisdom or the necessity for that and told me to 
go ahead. 

Mr. Dash. Now, I think the only part of tliis system wliich is re- 
moved from time to time is, I think you testified, that at Camp Da\dd, 
which is removed when foreign dignitaries or lieads of state are pres- 
ent. I take it that is for national security purposes ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. That is true, yes sir. That is certainly my under- 
standing. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Now, I am not sure whether you testified to 
this, hut you tested the system at one point, did you not ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD, Ycs, sir. 

Mr. Dash, To see if the Oval Office or the EOB office, that you could 
pick up sound even though it was hardly audible when a sound was 
made in the room? 



2081 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. IVliat was the result of your test ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. The result was that voices, conversations, were 
picked up very well, veiy clearly. 

Mr. Dash. Even if there was a whisper. 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. In either in the Oval Office or the Executive Of- 
fice Building. I can't tell you about a whisper. I just don't know. But 
it would appear that even low tones were picked up well. 

In the Cabinet Room, some voices, those who spoke up quite loudly, 
could be heard. Anyone who had the habit of spealdng softly could 
not be heard veiy well at all. In fact, you just, you could not begin to 
get all of, most of the conversations. 

Mr. Dash. Now, with regard to the telephone taps, they were oper- 
ated, were they not, by — as soon as the President, who may have used 
his telephone,* lifted up his telephone and engaged in a conversation 
or received a conversation on his President's phone, the recording de- 
vice began to record the telephone conversation. 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. That is my understanding, Mr. Dash, but I lack 
all of the technical knowledge of the telephone recording device. 

Mr. Dash. But so far as you know, all telephone calls were also 
recorded. 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Fi'om the President's office telephone on his desk 
in the Oval Office? 

Mr. Dash, Yes. 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. And his regular office phone in the Executive Of- 
fice Building, and the desk telephone in his study at Camp David 
and his telephone in the Lincoln sitting room — ^those four phones ? 

Mr. Dash. Just one last question. If one were therefore to recon- 
struct the conversations at any particular date, what would be the 
best way to reconstruct those conversations, Mr. Butterfield, in the 
President's Oval Office? 

Mr. BtTTTERFiELD. Well, in the obvious manner, Mr. Dash — 'to obtain 
the tape and play it. 

Mr. Dash. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. The questions of counsel and the answers of the wit- 
ness have been so clear, I have no questions. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have only one brief question. 

Mr. Butterfield. it is my understanding that on an interview this 
past Friday, as pointed out by Mr. Dash, you volunteered this infor- 
mation in response to a question put by minority staff about how cer- 
tain information supplied by the White House might have been so 
exact and some query was made about whether or not Mr. Dean might 
have thought there was a recording device. My understanding is that 
you at that time said that there are recording devices in these offices. 
• Is that essentially the situation as it transpired in your interview on 
last Friday? 

Mr. Butterfield. Yes, that is essentially correct. As they led up to 
the question, I said nothing. When asked the direct question, I an- 
swered openly and freely. With regard to the query concerning Mr. 
Dean's suspicions, my guess was that that was his imagination only. 
I am sure that the President wovdd not lead Mr. Dean to, off to the 
side. The President seemed completely unaware of these. I am sure that 
he forgot them from time to time, or perhaps for good long periods of 
time. 



2082 

Senator Baker. The point I am leading up to is this, Mr. Butter- 
field. You have in fact been veiy straightforward in your answers in 
the interview, in the interview just before this hearing, and I think 
now in your testimony. But just so that we are entirely clear on the 
matter, you have notified counsel for the Wliite House of your inter- 
view and of your testimony, what you are going to testify here today ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Ycs, sir, I have. But I 

Senator Baker. Was there any intimation to you that executive 
privilege should be claimed on your part ? 

Mr. Bun-ERFiELD. No, sir, there was not. 

Senator Baker. Now, Mr. Butterfield, you are here under subpena, 
you are here at the request of the committee. For my part, I think you 
have been most helpful and we thank you for your forthright 
statement. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Butterfield. I would like to make one statement before we 
adjourn. 

Senator Ervin. I think there may be some other questions of some 
other members of the committee. 

Senator Talmadge. I shall be quite brief, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Butterfield, I understood you to say that all calls to the 'White. 
House of whatever nature and character would be taped. Is that an 
accurate statement ? 

Mr. Butterfield. Into those telephones, to and from those tele- 
phones I mentioned, yes, sir, that is an accurate statement. 

Senator Talmadge. If a Senator or Congressman or Governor called, 
it was taped ? 

Mr. Butterfield. Yes, the tape would not discriminate. 

Senator Talmadge. Was there any warning signal to let them 
know the conversation would be taped ? 

Mr. Butterfield. Again, I am not aware of the technical details. 
I am told that when devices are on telephones, there is oftentimes a 
clicking sound. But other than that, I would guess that no one would 
be aware, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. No one verbally undertook to say. Governor, 
your conversation will be taped, was there ? 

Mr. Butterfield. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Or Mr, Senator, or Congressman, or Mr. Pri- 
vate Citizen, whatever the case might be ? 

Mr. Blttterfield. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Were the visitors who went into the '\^niite 
House warned that their conversations with the President would 
be taped ? 

Mr. Butterfield. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. None of them had knowledge that their conver- 
sations were being taped ? 

Mr. BLTT'iTiRFiELD. No, sir, although I would say one thing, which 
I think perhaps should be said at this point. When people go to visit 
the President, almost always, I know of very, very few exceptions, a 
staff member sits in on the conversation, often takes notes. That is 
standard procedure in order to record commitments made by the Pres- 
ident, at least the thread or the substance of the business discussed, and 
that, of course, does go into the Presidential papers. 



2083 

Senator Talmadge. Now, when the President left the Wliite House, 
were his conversations with others taped also? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Senator Talmadge, I didn't hear you, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. When the President left the premises of the 
White House, were his conversations with other people taped ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, they were not, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Do you know whether or not the Attorney Gen- 
eral of the United States approved the recording of these telephone 
A-erbal conversations ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. I have no idea, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. If any call was made from one official in the 
"Wliite House to another one, Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Dean or Mr. Dean 
to Mr. Ehrlichman, was that also taped ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Not to my knowledge, sir. I have no knowledge of 
any other taping devices at all. 

Senator Talmadge. Only the conversations with the President by 
telephone and in his presence, is that an accurate statement ? 

Mr. Butferfield. To and from those specific four telephones. 

Senator Talmadge. And the reason for this tape, insofar as you 
know, is solely to serve historical purposes ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. I am sure of that, yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. If no staff member was there, would a party be 
told that the conversations were taped ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No ; the party would not, sir, under normal 
procedures. 

Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Butterfield. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. 

Senator ER\T]sr. Senator Gumey ? 

Senator Gubney. I have one or two. 

On the technical details of this, where were the recording machines 
kept, do you know ? 

Mr. Butterfield. At least most of the recording machines were in 
the basement of the west wing of the White House. 

Senator Gurnet. And who was in charge of those ? 

Mr. Butterfield. The Chief of the Technical Security Division of 
the U.S. Secret Service. 

Senator Gurnet. And did the Chief or someone under his direction 
handle the changing of the tapes and the putting them on, the taking 
them off? 

Mr. BurrERFiELD. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. And also the storage ? 

Mr. Butterfield. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. Did anybody else handle those, to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Butterfield. I am as sure as I know I am sitting here that no 
one else handled the tapes other than this individual I mentioned, the 
Chief of the Technical Security Division, and the two or three people 
designated by him. And it was 

Senator Gurnet. "WHiat about in Key Biscayne and San Clemente, 
the Florida and western A^^iite Houses? Were there any recording de- 
vices there to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Butterfield. Not to my knowledge or recollection. I do not 
recall any instructions being given with regard to those locations, sir. 



9fr-296 O — 73 — bk. 5- 



2084 

Senator Gtjrney. And what about on the business phones in those 
two locations ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir. At least not through me, sir. 

Senator Gurney. I don't have any other questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye? 

Senator Inouye. Just one question, sir. 

Do you have any information to indicate that this taping was prac- 
ticed in other administrations ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Well, in all honesty, Senator Inouye, I have heard 
the rumor — I could not begin to identify the source, but I have heard 
those rumors for several years, and on tlie occasion which I described 
earlier, at the time that I called in the Secret Service people and 
gave them this particular instruction, there was the intimation, there 
was the, by their gestures or by their response to me, that they knew 
how to proceed. And from that, I would guess that it had been done. 
But I am only guessing when I say that. 

Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, sir. 

Senator Ervin. We will take a brief recess, because there is a vote 
on the Senate floor. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Weicker was the next questioner but I don't believe he is 
in so I will go to Senator Montoya at this time, and recognize Senator 
Weicker when he comes in. 

Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Butterfield, was there any mechanism available whereby the 
President could turn off the recording in the Oval Office or in the 
Executive Office? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya. In other words, it was not within the power of 
the President or anyone working under him in those particular offices 
to turn oif this recording. 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir. But technically speaking one could order 
that the locator light be moved even though the President might be 
in that position. But that would not happen under normal circum- 
stances. I know of no occasion on which that happened. 

Senator Montoya. Well, did you know whetlier anyone else had 
the proper mechanism to turn the recording oif? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir, I am sure no one did and, as a matter 
of fact, I doubt if anyone, other than the Secret Service members and 
I, perhaps I explained it to Mr. Higby, knew how that could be turned 
off or knew how it worked, as a matter of fact. 

Senator Montoya. So what you are saying is there is no possibility 
that this, any conversation in the Oval Office or in the Executive 
Office or in the Camp David study room could be turned off. There 
is no possibility of that ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir, not from within those offices, they would 
have to instruct me to have the equipment moved, changed. 

Senator Montoya. Were you ever instructed ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir, I was not. 

Senator Montoya. Did you — were you able to monitor the conver- 
sations from your office? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir, I could not monitor it. 



2085 

Senator Montoya. All you could tell from your office was that there 
were conversations going on, and that the machine was working, is 
that right? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. But I couldn't even tell that at any given time. I 
only liad to rely on the Secret Service members to see that the tape 
was, you know, was being used, and the equipment was operational, 
that the tapes wei'e changed frequently. 

Senator Montoya. Now, is there any ])ossibility that the tapes which 
were collected, that some of them could be missing or could have been 
destroyed ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Not to my knowledge. There shouldn't be. The 
Secret Service are highly trustworthy. It was their responsibility to 
change the tapes and to store — and to mark the tapes and to store 
them. 

Senator Montoya. Who had responsibility for the storage, for the 
removal and the storage, of these tapes besides yourself? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Well, I ultimately, but the director of the technical 
Security Division was given that responsibility by me, and he carried 
it out. 

Senator Montoya. Was he the only one besides yourself ? 

Mr, BuTTERFiELD. He and those who worked for him. 

Senator Montoya. Did Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman or anyone 
else who worked for the President have authority to go into this par- 
ticular room where the tapes were stored ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Mr. Haldeman had authority to do anything in 
the White House, sir, in that he was in effect the chief of the staff. Tt 
would be very unlikely for him to do that. He entrusted the respon- 
sibility to me. Mr. Ehrlichman, to the best of my knowledge, and I 
feel quite certain of this, knew nothing about the tapes. 

Senator Montoya. Were the tapes properly labeled to indicate what 
conversations were contained therein ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Notliiug about the conversations. The Secret Serv- 
ice, and again I say that I trust them implicitly, could not listen to con- 
versations. They, too, however would check to make sure that the 
equipment was picking up sound. They would make a quick check on 
that and make sure it was picking up sound from time to time, and T 
made more elaborate or extensive checks on about three occasions. 

Senator Montoya. And you state that the tapes were primarily to 
record conversations within these particular offices so that we could 
preserve history for posterity ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Ycs ; there really is no question in my mind about 
it. Senator Montoya. That was often on the President's mind and, as I 
said, he was very conscious of our having a good system for collecting 
the things which transpired with regard to the affairs of state. 

Senator Montoya. Then why. Mr. Butterfield, wasn't anybody re- 
cording history at Key Biscayne or at San Clemente or at other places ? 
Whv was that gap, why the gap there ? 

Mr. Butterfield. t can't answer that question except that when 
the President did go to Key Biscayne and to Camp David he was go- 
ing ])rincipally for the reason of resting and relaxing. Those are re- 
sorts. Tlie western White House admittedly is truly a western White 
House. Tt is the western extension and I cannot answer your question 
with regard to it. It is a gap. 



2086 

Senator Montoya. Was there ever any discussion on trying to fill 
this gap ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. There may have been. I am very foggy on that. 
There may have been, someone may have 

Senator Montoya. To your knowledge, there wasn't? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Not to my specific knowledge, I can't say that. 
I have a very fuzzy recollection of a possible conversation, perhaps we 
should do it out there but when we were out there, as you may know, 
the schedule was relatively light. The President does work, he does 
see people but he uses the time to check his thoughts and to lay out 
plans and that sort of thing. So whereas there is a gap I would not say 
it is a serious one. 

Senator Montoya. That is all, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker, I am sorry you were out a while 
ago when we resumed so I called on Senator Montoya and I will now 
afford you an opportunity to examine the witness. 

Senator Weicker. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Butterfield, just three very brief questions : As I understand the 
listening devices in the Oval Office and the EOB were activated in two 
ways : They were activated, No. 1, by the presence of the President and 
than No. 2, by voice, is that correct ? 

Mr. Butterfield. That is correct, you are being properly technical. 

Senator Weicker. Eight. 

Mr. Butterfield. The President had to be there. If he were not 
the locator light would not indicate the location. 

Senator Weicker. So it would not, unless you have specific informa- 
tion to refute my supposition on this matter, no one other than the 
President could be in one of these rooms and have the conversation 
taped ? 

Mr. Butterfield. No ; no one could. I was often in the Oval Office 
with Mr. Bull discussing plans that the cleaning people in there at 
night, none of that is picked up, because the indicator light indicating 
residence, out or wherever the President might be. 

Senator Weicker. It is a two-step system and both steps have to be 
in place before the taping starts ? 

Mr. Butterfield. Yes, sir. With regard to the Oval Office and the 
Executive Office Building office. 

Senator Weicker. Now, insofar — well, let me just ask this question. 
Would any other area — I am trying to think what the other areas were 
that you mentioned, Camp David, I am talking now about the listen- 
ing devices, not the phone. 

Mr. Butterfield. The Cabinet room only, sir. 

Senator Weicker. And the Cabinet room. In the Cabinet room 
would it be possible for conversations in the Cabinet room to be taped 
without the President's presence ? 

Mr. Butterfield. Yes; by pushing one of the buttons under the 
table, the one on the out, on the left, on the out -board side Avas the 
on button, the button on the right, on the out-board side was the off 
button. Also, by pushing a button on my telephone. I frankly have 
forgotten whether it was one button you pusli on and it lit and you 
pushed it again and it went out or whether there were two buttons 
but it was an unmarked button on my telephone face and it was a 
large telephone' with many dials, with many buttons. 



2087 

Senator Weicker. Do you know of any instance when this did occur, 
a taping of a conversation held in the Cabinet room without the Presi- 
dent present? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir ; as a matter of fact, on a number of 
occasions at Cabinet meetings, and I know this from firsthand 
knowledge in that I sat in on all Cabinet meetings except those few 
executive sessions which were held, no more than two or three in a 
4-year period, the President would leave the Cabinet room, and the 
Cabinet meeting would continue under the chairmanship of the Vice 
President perhaps or under the chairmanship of Secretary Rogers. 

As a general rule, I would leave too, if the President left. ]Vly con- 
cern was the President's concern. I was — I had no real business remain- 
ing if he were not there, and I would go back to my office and push 
the off button and we would stop recording. It was only for the Presi- 
dent's business and that again, supports my earlier guess really, but 
I feel certain knowledge, that it was purely for historical purposes. 

Senator Weicker. Now, insofar as the listening devices on the tele- 
phones are concerned, they, however, did not need any two-step pro- 
cedures, is that correct? 

Mr. Butterfield. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, as soon as one got on the 
telephone, that activated the system ? 

Mr. Butterfield. Those specific telephones, yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. And it could be someone other than the President ? 

Mr. Butterfield. On one of his telephones, yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, both parties to the telephone, 
neither one of them would be the President of the United States and 
the convei-sation would be taped? 

Mr. BuTTt^RFiELD. That is correct. But there again, sir, I would 
remind you or you may have noticed it, I am sure you have guessed 
it, that it is highly unlikely that anybody would be sitting in the 
Lincoln sitting room or at his desk in one of those offices or in his 
study at Camp David. 

Senator Weicker. Why do you think these systems were installed 
in 1970? If in fact it was installed for historical purposes, would 
it not have made a great deal of sense to have this installed at the 
outset of the administration? 

Mr. Butterfield. It would have made a great deal of sense, but I 
am sure it was not thought of. I am sure I speak for other people when 
I say that, but I am certain that was the reason. A great many systems 
evolved. We had a system for preserving records of what transpired in 
the President's meetings. These memorandums were called : Memo- 
randums for the President's File. And when I spoke to either Senator 
Talmadge or Senator Inouye a moment ago or whoever it was — I am 
not sure — about a procedure for having a staff member sit in on all 
calls on the President — the President was never alone with anyone 
who might call on him. It might l)e his old Duke Law School profes- 
sor, but someone would sit in on that meeting and preferably make 
mental notes of what transpired, because actually writing notes had a 
tendency of inhibiting the guest, and we did not want to do that. The 
point I am making is that as much was remembered and as much was 
recorded, at least mentally, as possible during the meetings and after- 
ward spit out into a dictating machine and written uj) in any manner 



2088 

whatsoever. We did not care about punctuation, we did not care about 
grammar, we just wanted the substance of what transi>ired in that 
meeting for a special file, which was called Memorandums for the 
President's File. We did not think of that at the outset of the admin- 
istration. And I think it was — I think we were about into the first 
year. It was roughly January or February of 1970 when we began 
that procedure. So it was just a case of evolution, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Now, in the interview which you had with the 
staff of this committee, w^hich interview, I gather, took place on July 13. 
1973, at 2 :15 p.m., the interview, as reported by this staff, concludes 
with, and I would like to have your comments on this matter : Butter- 
field stated, "This is all something I know the President did not want 
revealed, but you asked me and I feel it is something you ought to know 
about in your investigations. I was told no one was to know about the 
information I have told you." 

Is that a correct quotation ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. I could uot Say that it was correct, but there was 
some reluctance on my part to reveal information which I felt could 
have a number of serious repercussions with regard to foreign govern- 
ments. It is very obvious that this could be — I cannot say that any 
longer — is embarrassing to our Government. And also because I felt 
it could be, something the President w^ould like to present at a later 
time in defense of his own position. 

Senator Weicker. Did anybody indicate to you that you should not 
reveal it? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. No, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Have you had any conversations with him ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. I Started to say quite the contrary, but I won't 
say quite the contrary. No one has contacted me at all. I was tele- 
phoned on — I forgot the date, but roughly early April, it might have 
been mid-April — by Mr. Higby, who said, not that I needed to be 
reminded to be totally truthful, but who said, be sure you tell the 
truth, or words to that effect, the whole truth or nothing but the 
truth, whenever you are called upon to testify. And I must say, I 
resented slightly his telling me that, but I know Larry well and I didn't 
really — ^and I said, of course I will. So I have had no instructions to 
the contrary. 

I do feel that I am lacking in knowledge of judicial procedure. I do 
feel that I would have perhaps done better if I had had counsel. I 
just don't know. But I would not want to be — I might say, too, that 
I knew when I was interviewed on Friday afternoon that those same 
staff members of yours had interviewed Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Higby. 
I knew that they had complete knowledge of this. My assumption 
was that they had been asked the same questions precisely, and my 
assumption, of course, was that they had answered openly and honestly. 

So I say I was a bit reluctant only because of the import. But obvi- 
ously, not so reluctant that I failed to answer. 

Senator Weicker. Well, I just want to thank you very much, Mr. 
Butterfield. Let me say something right now : You don't need coun- 
sel. Let me also say, you don't need any of those assumptions which 
you have just given me. You have got the greatest thing going for 
you, which is, you told the truth to the committee. 

Thank you very much, sir. 



2089 

Senator Ervin. This committee has taken some testimony to the 
effect that one Tom Charles Huston was appointed to conduct a 
study for the White House in the summer of 1970. Do you know any- 
thing about that? That is, of your own knowledge. I am not asking 
you what you read or may have read about it. 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Yes, I do, sir, very little, and I remember even 
less. 

Senator Ervin. That preceded the installation of these listening de- 
vices and telephone equipment, didn't it ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Oh, I could not begin to say. Senator Ervin, 
and I, myself, would not tie the two together. 

Senator Ervin. Wouldn't this fact that they were all under the cus- 
tody of the Secret Service indicate that these tapes were not for pub- 
lic information? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Ycs, it would indicate that. 

Senator Ervin. I want to thank you very much on behalf of the 
committee. 

Senator Gurnet. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one or two more 
questions? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Senator Gurnet. Mr. Butterfield, where are the records kept that 
show where the tapes can be found? For example, if you wanted to 
find one of a certain date, is there a file book or file record under a 
certain date? 

Mr. Butterfield. If there is, Senator, it is maintained by the Tech- 
nical Security Division of the Secret Service. On those few occasions 
on which I checked tapes to see if they were working and that con- 
versation was coming in clearly, I simply called the chief of that 
office and spoke only to him and paid, send me a tape from the Oval 
Office — I didn't specify a date; I had no — you know, just send me 
one. And I preceded to check it. And as I say, I did that only about 
three times. 

Senator Gurnet. Do you know of your own knoAvledge whether 
anyone has ever sought to get any of these tapes or has gotten any of 
these tapes, other than yourself in the testimony that you have just 
given this committee ? 

Mr. Butterfield. No, sir. If Mr. Haldeman 'wanted to do that, he 
could call the same individual, the chief of tlie Technical Security 
Division, and ask him to bring the tape over, or whatever, and not 
inform me. And, of course, the Secret Service agent would do that. 
But all of that was channeled through me. I feel certain that Mr. 
Haldeman would not have done that and under any normal circum- 
stances, should anyone else do it, I would have been notified and the 
Secret Service would not have responded, in fact, until I had given 
my approval. 

Senator Gurnet. Now; is it your testimony that if anybody had 
ever asked the Secret Service for these tapes, that they would have 
notified you? 

Mr. Butterfield. Yes : that is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. And that has never occurred, is that correct? 

Mr. Butterfield. Yes; only if it had been someone senioi' to me and 
there were a number of these i^eople, but the only ones senior to me who 
knew of this was Mr. Haldeman other than the President. If they 



2090 

instructed someone not to tell me, that would be the case, but I would 
not guess that that would happen. 

Senator Gurney. In any event, the person to find out about the 
records and how they were kept and where they are kept and who 
had access to these tapes is the chief of the Teclinical Service of the 
Secret Service ? 

Mr. BuTTERFiELD. Ycs, sir, he would know. 

Senator Gurney. Thank you. 

Senator Ervin. The Chair has received a letter from Mr. J. Fred 
Buzhardt, Counsel for the President, dated July 16, 1973, reading as 
follows : 

Dear Mr. Chairman : 

This letter is to confirm the fact stated to your Committee today by Mr. Alex- 
ander Butterfield that tlie President's meetings and conversations in the White 
House have been recorded since the Spring of 1971. I am advised that this 
system, which is still in use, is similar to that employed by the last Administra- 
tion, which discontinued from 1969 until the Spring of 1971. A more detailed 
statement concerning these procedures will be furnished to the Committee shortly. 

Sincerely, signed, Fred Buzhardt. 

Mr. Butterfield, on behalf of the committee, I want to commend you 
for the f orthrightness of your testimony. 

Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, sir. I will be the first to agree with Mr. 
Buzhardt. I only guessed at the time. That is pretty good evidence, I 
think, of how fuzzy one's recollections can be to be off a full year, 
but if they say the spring of 1971, obviously, that has been checked 
with the Secret Service, who would have a record, and I stand corrected 
on that point. 

I have one closing statement. I really said this at one point in my 
testimony, but I would feel better if I were allowed to say it once again. 

In accordance with White House instructions, and by that I mean 
the telephone call I mentioned to you, Senator Weicker, from Mr. 
Higby, and again, I might say, not that I needed any instructions on 
the matter of honesty, I have freely and willingly appeared for inter- 
views and answered all questions put to me, not only honestly, but 
openly. This matter which we have discussed here today, I think, is 
precisely the substance on which the President plans to present his 
defense. I believe, of coui-se, that the President is innocent of any 
crime or wrong-doing, that he is innocent likewise of any complicity. 
And certainly, that is so in the face of the kinds of evidence ^nd ex- 
hibits, at least that I know^ about, which have been put before this 
committee to date. 

I knew when I was interviewed by your staff members on Friday 
afternoon, as I said earlier, that Messrs. Haldeman and Higby had 
preceded me in September by similar interviews. I certainly assumed 
that each had given an open and honest answer to that particular ques- 
tion, that I was being asked that same question so as to corroborate 
the f act^ — by that, I mean their answers. 

I only hope that I have not by my openness and by my adherence 
to all instructions received to date, given away something which the 
President planned to use at a later date in support of his position. 

That is all I have, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Well, thank you very much. 

Counsel will call the next witness. 



2091 

Mr. Dash. Will Mr. Herbert Kalmbach come to the witness table, 
please ? 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Kalmbach, will you stand and hold up your right 
hand, please, sir? Do you swear that the evidence which you shall give 
to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I do. 

Senator Ervin. State your name and address for the record and pro- 
fession for the purposes of the record. 

TESTIMONY OF HERBERT W. KALMBACH, ACCOMPANIED BY 
JAMES H. O'CONNOR, COUNSEL 

Mr. Kalmbach. My name is Herbert Warren Kalmbach and my 
address is 105G Santiago Drive, Newport Beach, Calif. 

Senator Ervin. The Chair knows you are accompanied by counsel, 
and I will request the counsel to state his name and address for the pur- 
poses of the record. 

Mr. O'Connor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is James H. 
O'Connor, Phoenix, Ariz. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Kalmbach, I know you have prepared a brief state- 
ment. Would you like to read tliat statement to the committee? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes ; I would. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman,' and members of the Senate 
Select Committee, prior to the time this committee began to take testi- 
mony in this matter and before the issuance of a subpena, I voluntarily 
appeared and offered to testify to whatever knowledge I had that 
would be helpful to the conmiittee in its investigation. My decision to 
do so was prompted by the chairman's remarks to the Senate on Feb- 
ruary 6, 1973, and, by my desire to clear my name of any suggestion of 
improper activity with respect to events leading up to or following the 
so-called Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972. Also, for the record, I 
wish to state that I have never asked for immunity nor have I indicated 
that I would exercise my fifth amendment rights before this committee 
or any other investigative body relative to the subject of this inquiry. 

Even though I have earlier submitted copies of my personal resume 
to the committee's staff for distribution, a brief summary of that bio- 
graphical statement may be appropriate for the purposes of this open- 
ing statement. 

I was born in Michigan in 1921 and moved with my family to Cali- 
fornia at an early age following the death of my father in 1932. I was 
raised in southern California and spent almost 51/2 years on active 
'duty in the Navy during World War II. I completed my under- 
graduate work and laAv school education at the University of Southern 
California in 1951. It was at law school that I first met my old and 
close friend, Jim O'Connor, who has been acting as my counsel in this 
matter. 

Since graduating from law school, I have been active in the practice 
of law and in corporate management work in southern California 



2092 

and in Arizona. In 1967, the present firm of Kalmbach, DeMarco, 
Knapp & Clnllingworth was founded with offices in Los Angeles 
and Newport Beach. Also, for more than 20 years, I have been active 
in political work — particularly in recent years in the area of campaign 
finance. 

Since early 1969, 1 have been engaged in activities on the President's 
behalf in three major areas. 

First, it has been the source of great pride and personal satisfaction 
to me and to my partners to have had the responsibility for handling 
personal legal matters for President Nixon and members of his imme- 
diate family for the past 4 years. During this period, practically all 
of the contacts that I had' relative to these matters were handled 
through either John Ehrlichman or John Dean. 

Second, I acted as trustee during the period from January of 1969 
to early February of 1972 for certain surplus funds which had accrued 
principally from the primary period of the 1968 campaign. While 
Maurice H. Stans was the individual with whom I dealt at the time 
I accepted such trusteeship, I disbursed from such funds only at the 
express direction of H. R. Haldeman or others clearly having the 
authority to direct such disbursements. 

Third, I agreed to solicit early pledges of financial support for the 
President's 1972 campaign beginning in November of 1970. This as- 
signment was completed in the spring of 1972. The original records of 
this activity were turned over to the finance committee after Mr. Stans 
had assumed the post of finance chairman on February 15, 1972. I 
thereupon directed my secretary to destroy my files which were wholly 
personal and supportive of the original files earlier transferred to 
the finance committee. This action on my part was intended to insure 
the continued confidentiality of the contacts that I had had with 
various contributors with whom I had dealt during this period. Copies 
of what remaining records I have and such bank records as I have been 
able to retrieve have been supplied to the committee's staff prior to my 
appearance here today. 

Finally, I want to take this opportunity to deny any prior knowledge 
of the Watergate break-in, in or participation in, the formulation of 
any planned conspiracy to cover up that incident or act of campaign 
sabotage or unethical activity. My actions in the period immediately 
following the break-in which involved the raising of funds to i)rovide 
for the legal defense of the Watergate defendants and for the support 
of their families were prompted in the belief that such was proper and 
necessary to discharge what I assumed to be a moral obligation that 
had arisen in some manner unknown to me by reason of earlier e^'ents. 
The fact that I had been directed to undeitake these actions by the 
No. 2 and No. '^ men on the A^^iite House staff made it absolutely 
incomprehensible to me that my actions in this regard could have been 
regarded in any way as improper or unethical. 

I am here befoi-e you today to tell the truth about my activities dur- 
ing the period in question. It is not my purpose to testify for oi- against 
any individual. I wish to cooperate fully with the committee, and in 
that sjDirit, I am now ready to answer your questions to the very best 
of my ability. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Dash. Thank you, Mr. Kalmbacli. 



2093 

Mr. Kalmbach, when did you first meet President Nixon? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was in tlie mid-lOSO's, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Now, there came a time, did there not, that you played a 
role in campaign f undraising for the President ? When was that, prior 
to the 1972 campaign ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. In 1968 I was associate finance chairman for that 
campaign. 

Mr. Dash. Now, what, if anything, did you do with any funds left 
over from the 1968 campaign ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Stans, in mid-January of 1969, asked me to 
to accept the trusteeship for certain surplus funds from that campaign. 

Mr. Dash. Where were those funds kept ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Prior to that time they had been kept in New York, 
I am not certain as to exactly where in New York. 

Mr. Dash. These Avould be in safe deposit boxes? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Kalmbach, who could authorize disbursements from 
these funds? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Haldeman principally, and at a later time also 
Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Mitchell and others who clearly would stand in 
the shoes of these people. 

Mr. Dash. Would that include Mr. Strachan and Mr. LaRue at all ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, it would. 

Mr. Dash. When did you begin working as the President's personal 
attorney ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Beginning in March, I think it was, in 1969. 

Mr. Dash. Would you please describe the types of legal mattei-s 
for which you and your firm worked for the President? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Initially the work had to do with the acquisition 
of the jDroperty in San Clemente which was to become the western 
White House. We have also done work on his behalf in estate plan- 
ning, and also have done personal tax work in coni unction with his 
CPA. 

Mr. Dash. Do you still work on legal matters for the President? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. During this period of time now, in which you have had 
a relationship for many years with the President, both in the cam- 
paign fund operation and also as a personal attorney, how often did 
you meet with the President? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Before this appearance here today, I have gone 
back over my records and, to the best of my ability, my records have 
shown that I met with him probably four or five times since ISIarch of 
1969 alone oi' with one or two others. 

Mr. Dash. Did you receive telephone calls from the President? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. How often would you receive a telephone call? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Again my records would indicate probably four or 
five telephone calls during that period. 

Mr. Dash. Therefore, since actually during that period of time this 
was not a frequent contact relationship or telephone relationship, who 
in the Wiite House did you have contact with concerning your activi- 
ties on behalf of the President ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Principally John Ehrlichman and then after John 
Dean came to the ^Hiite House in mid-1970, also John Dean. 



2094 

Mr. Dash. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Kalmbach, that when you 
did speak to them on legal matters that you — it was in your mind you 
were speaking with the President? 

Mr. Kalmbagh. Yes, sir ; I would. 

Mr. Dash. When were you first asked to raise money for the 1972 
campaign, and by whom? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was in November of 1970 by Mr. Haldeman. 

Mr. Dash. What position did you have in the 1972 campaign ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Beginning on February 15, 1972, I agreed to act 
as the associate finance chairman through the period ending April 7. 
the date that the new law became effective. 

Mr. Dash. Now in February 1972, did you have funds in your poses 
sion that were raised during campaigns ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Excuse me, Mr. Dash, what was that date ? 

Mr. Dash. In February 1972. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Just prior to February? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. What did you do with those funds in February 1972 ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. In the first few days of February of 1972. I closed 
all of the checking accounts that I had, one was in New York and, 
I believe, two in California, and sent all of those checks to Mr. Sloan 
at the finance committee in Washington, and I also closed and emptied 
the several safe deposit boxes and transferred those funds to Mr. Sloan 
so that I zeroed out my account. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know approximately how much money was in- 
volved in terms of turning over the money to Mr. Sloan ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. How much was that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. In the first week I would say in 19 — in February of 
1972 the total was $915,000, and that total would include approxi- 
mately $233,000 in cash, and approximately $670,000 in checking ac- 
count balances. 

Mr. Dash. After you turned over this money did you destroy any 
records that you had ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. Dash. Will you tell us what records and why ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. After I turned over the moneys I transferred my 
files on the people that I had seen, the pledges that I had received, the 
essentials of my records, to Mr. Stans and to the finance committee. It 
was my belief then that my records that I still retained were wholly 
personal and supportive of what I considered to be the original rec- 
ords, and once I was certain in my own mind that the original rec- 
ords had been in fact transferred to the finance committee then I 
directed my secretary, a Mrs. Harvey, to destroy those personal and 
supportive records for the reason of confidentiality. 

Mr. Dash. Now, these personal supportive records were bank rec- 
ords and checks, were they not? 

Mr. K^vlmbach. There were some, yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. When did you resign from your position as associate 
finance chairman ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. As of April 7, 1972. 

Mr. Dash. While you were at the finance committee did you have 
any contact with Gordon Liddy ? 



2095 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Could you describe the nature of that contact or any as- 
signments that you gave Gordon Liddy ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. As best as I can recall, Mr. Dash, my first acquaint- 
ance with Mr. Liddy was in the latter part- of March, although I think 
I had lunch with others, with Mr. Liddy in January, when I first met 
him, and the first time that I had really worked with him was in the 
latter part of March when he came aboard the finance committee as 
counsel to the committee. 

In my position as associate chairman I gave him several assign- 
ments asking for legal opinions and the like, and I can recall one or 
two trips that I asked him to take, to contact attorneys for contributors 
to help in legal problems. 

Mr. Dash. You had no contact with him or any relationship with 
him on any intelligence or fact-gathering operations ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you give Mr. Stans an advance on his expenses 
in February 1972 ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. How much ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I gave him $50,000. 

Mr. Dash. Wliy did you give him that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I beg your pardon ? 

Mr. Dash. Wliy did you give him that ? AYliy ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Stans had come to me and asked me for these 
funds as an advance for pereonal expenses for the forthcoming 
campaign. 

Mr. Dash. Was a receipt given to you for that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Now, are you aware of the transaction whereby $350,000 
left the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, the finance 
committee, and went over to the "V^Hiite House ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I am. 

Mr. Dash. Can you tell us briefly of your own knowledge how that 
took place? 

Mr. Kalmbach. About the last pait, the last week in March or very 
early in the first few days of April, and I am not certain, I was called 
by Mr. Higby from the Wliite House and was asked as to how much 
cash would be available for transfer to the White House. I then 
checked with Mr. Sloan. I called Mr. Higby back and told him that I 
had found there was $350,000 in cash in Mr. Sloan's safe that would 
be available. 

Then Mr. Higby — I think there were one or two additional calls 
back and forth and it is my recollection that Mr. Higby then called 
and informed me that Mr. Strachan would come over to the finance 
committee and pick up the $350,000 that afternoon. And again, this 
was within a week of April 7 or thereabouts. 

I then spoke to Mr. Sloan and asked Mr. Sloan to give me the funds 
in time for the pickup by Mr. Strachan, which he did. And as I best 
remember it, Mr. Dash, the funds were put in my office in the finance 
committee. Mr. Strachan came over at 1 :30 or 2 in the afternoon — 
I am not certain — and picked up the briefcase from my office and then 
left the office. 



2096 

Mr. Dash. These funds were all in cash ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, they were. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know the denomination of the bills that went 
ov^er? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I do not. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you mentioned INIr. Higby and Mr. Strachan. You 
are aware that Mr. Higby and Mr. Strachan are both assistants of 
Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I am. 

Mr. Dash. And you know that they could have been 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know why the request, why the $350,000 was 
needed ? 

Was any infonnation given to you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I am not certain, Mr. Dash, that it was expressed 
to me, the purpose. But I know that it was my assumption, and it 
may have been expressed to me, but it was my assumption that it 
would be used for polling purposes. 

Mr. Dash. When did this take place ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I would think within 7 days of April 7, 1972. 

Mr. Dash. Now, following this, Mr. Kalmbach, the break-in at the 
Watergate on June 17, did you receive a call from Mr. Stans asking 
you to come to Washington ? Shortly after that period ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Excuse me, Mr. Dash. Would you repeat that 
question? 

Mr. Dash. I said following the break-in at the Watergate, which 
took place on Jmie 17, sometime after that period, did you receive a 
call from Mr. Stans to come to Washington from California? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, my recollection is that I received a call from 
Mr. Stans, probably early in the week, the 20th or thereabouts, to 
come to Washington and to meet with Mr. Sloan to reconcile my cash 
records. There was no reference at all to the Watergate break-in. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you report to Mr. Stans after that meeting? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. "V\^iat, if anything, did you say to Mr. Stans? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I just informed him that I had met with Mr. Sloan 
and that we were in agreement on the cash records, and he said, fine, 
and as far as he was concerned, I Avas discharged from that respon- 
sibility and my accounts had balanced. 

Mr. Dash. Did you destroy any records after that meeting with 
Mr. Sloan? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, I did. I destroyed my own personal cash rec- 
ords, knowing that the original record was in the finance office. 

Mr. Dash. Now, on your visit to Washing-ton on June 21 or June 22, 
did you discuss the Watergate break-in with anybody? That was 
right after that period of time ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, other than in casual conversation, I can't recall 
that I did, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Wasn't that a kind of topic of conversation over at the 
committee ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was, but other than just being a very major news 
item, that was the extent of it. I didn't discuss it beyond that. 

Mr. Dash. It was a major news item especially with relation to the 
committee, was it not? 



2097 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, it was. 

Mr, Dash. Did you find a lot of interest when you were there at 
the committee concerning that incident ^ 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, again, Mr. Dash, it was a topic of discus- 
sion, and I know that I did talk about it, but it was nothing more 
than that. 

Mr. Dash. All right after that meeting, you returned to California ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you receive a telephone call from Mr. John 
Dean on June 28 ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. And what did he tell you on the telephone ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. As I remember the telephone conversation, Mr. 
Dean called me. It was in the early afternoon, midafternoon, on the 
28th. He told me tliat it was a matter of extreme importance that I 
return to or come back to Washington, preferably by the first avail- 
able flight, to undertake a very important assignment. 

Mr. Dash. And what did you do in response to that call ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I took a' 10 or 10:1.5 or 10:30 flight that night. 

Mr. Dash. Arriving in Washington when ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Arriving in Washington at 6, 6 :15, 6 :30, the follow- 
ing morning. 

llr. Dash. Now, what did you do next, Mr. Kalmbach ? 

]VIr. Kalmbach. I then took a cab into town and checked into the 
Statler-Hilton Hotel. 

Mr. Dash. Did you then meet Mr. Dean, either at that time or a 
later time that day ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, after I checked in and changed, I think prob- 
ably I liad some breakfast, I called Mr. Dean around, as I can best re- 
call, around 9 in the morning in his office in the Executive Office 
Building. 

Mr. Dash. And what transpired? What was the call about? What 
did Dean say, what did you say, and wliat followed ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It seems that in recalling that conversation, I told 
him that I am here in Washington at the Statler, and I can come over 
to your office right now if that is what you wish. 

He replied, "No, you are at the Statler, I am here at the Executive 
Office Building, whv don't we both start walking and meet in front 
of the Hay- Adams Hotel ?" 

I said, "all right." This had never happened before, but it Avas a nice 
day and I said, "all right, I will do that ; I will meet you in front of the 
Hay-Adams," and then left the hotel. 

i was there about 9 :30, 1 would guess, and I think I saw him coming 
up through the park and I suggested that we have coffee at the Hay- 
Adams. He said, "No, let's just walk in the park," which we did. 

We walked for a time and I recall that he put his foot up on the 
bench and made some Avicle gestures, indicating to me that I should 
do likewise, which I am not certain that I understood what he meant 
by that, but I recall that very clearly. 

Mr. Dash. He made wide gestures and asked you to do likewise? 

Mr, Kalmbach. Wide gestures, well, indicating that perhaps we 
were being observed, I don't understand, but I do remember that he 
did, in fact, do that, and suggest to me that I do likewise. 



2098 

Mr. Dash. You would certainly be a greater target of observation 
if you were making wide gestures, would you not ? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. I would think so. 

Mr. Dash. Well, what, actually, did you and Mr. Dean discuss? 
What did he say to you, other than making gestures? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, he indicated that the reason for this call and 
for my coming back to Washington was that it was necessary to talk 
to me about a very important assignment, namely that, he said — he 
used the editorial, "We," — "We would like to have you raise funds 
for the legal defense of these defendants and for the support of their 
families." 

Mr. Dash. '\'Vlien you say these defendants, now— 

Mr. Kalmbach. The Watergate — — 

Mr. Dash, These were the seven defendants, Mr. Hunt, Mr. Liddy, 
Mr. McCord, Mr. Barker, Mr. Sturgis, Mr. Gonzales 

Mr. Kalmbach. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you knew that they were for all of these defendants ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I just remember that he said the Watergate defend- 
ants at that time and I was not even certain at that point in time that 
I even knew their names. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Did you ask him any questions about that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, I did. I recall that in my conversation with 
him, I asked whether or not it would not be perhaps preferable to have 
a public committee formed to raise funds for these people and for 
these purposes. And also, I recall that I wondered aloud about whether 
or not maybe they could mortgage homes or raise funds in that way 
until a public committee could be established. His answer to that was 
that there was no time for this, that a public committee might be mis- 
interpreted, and he just waved it aside and pressed on with his request. 

Mr. Dash. Did he tell you how much money might be involved? 

Mr. Kalmbach. My recollection is that he indicated $50,000 to 
$100,000 for this assignment. 

Mr. Dash. Did he stress, since he had indicated to you that a public 
effort might be misinterpreted, did he stress that this had to be com- 
pletely secret ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, he made a very strong point that there was ab- 
solute secrecy required, confidentiality, indicating that if this became 
known, it might jeopardize the campaign and would cause misinter- 
pretation as to the reasons for raising these funds and for the help of 
these people. 

Mr. Dash. Now, since you were to raise these funds, how would you 
know how much was to be given to which defendants? Was there a 
discussion about that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, there was. 

Mr. Dash. Could you tell us about that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. After he had made the request, I asked him if I, 
when I raised the funds, should I give them to him for distril)ution, 
and he said, no, not to me. And he indicated, I think, Mr. LaRue would 
be the person 

Mr. Dash. Is that Mr. Fred LaRue ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Fred LaRue would be the person who would be 
giving me directions in this assignment as to spe^'ific amounts and 



2099 

specific individuals. And as I can best recall this conversation, I was a 
little perplexed on this because I did not know these people at all. 
And it is 

Mr. Dash. Did you know Fred LaRue ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I, of course, knew Fred LaEue but casually. 
But as to how to distribute these funds — then again, my best recollec- 
tion is that he indicated at that point that perhaps Mr. Ulasewicz 
might be the one to act as the distributor for the funds. 

Mr. Dash. Is this Tony Ulasewicz ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. Dash. Is that the Tony Ulasewicz who has testified before this 
committee before ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It is. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know Tony Ulasewicz ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. Had you worked with him in the past ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I had met with him two or three times total from 
mid-1969 until approximately October 1, 1971, and I had three conver- 
sations, two or three conversations, during that period. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have confidence that Mr. Ulasewicz was the kind 
of person who could be useful in this kind of assignment ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I knew that he had been acting and under- 
taking assignments for the White House for that period and I certainly 
knew that he had the confidence of whoever it was that he was w^orking 
with, and when he mentioned Mr. Ulasewicz as someone to do this, I 
said that I would, I certainly would have confidence in him. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know whether or not — did you know what kind 
of assignments he had undertaken for the White House before? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir ; I did not, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. But you knew^ that he would be somebody that you could 
have confidence in ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I knew that he was a retired New York City 
police officer who was competent and I was certain that he was some- 
one that could be trusted and I would be 

Mr. Dash. Who other than Mr. Dean were you thinking of when you 
say they would have confidence? Did you mean Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, whoever he was talking for. He was using the 
editorial "we" all the time. 

Mr. Dash. Well, if he was talking for anybody over in the White 
House, who did he work with most often, to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Dash, Yes. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, he worked with practically everyone in the 

"White House. But, of course, principally 

• Mr. Dash. Who above him ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. He reported to Mr. Ehrlichman. And he also 
worked closely with Mr. Haldeman. He did not mention their names 
in this conversation. 

Mr. Dash. Have you ever been given any other assignment of this 
nature in the past ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. After meeting with Mr. Dean, what did you do ? Did you 
indicate, first, that you would accept this assignment from Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I did. 



96-296 O — 73 — bk. 



2100 

Mr, Dash. And you did accept it under the basis that if Mr. Dean 
was asking you as the President's counsel, that he had authority to 
ask you for that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Absolutely. I had known Mr. Dean since mid-1970, 
and I had complete trust in the man and knowing that he was counsel 
to the President. 

Mr. Dash. All right, then, you accepted this assignment. What did 
you do right after that meeting with Mr. Dean? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I walked back to the Statler-Hilton and I think 
within a matter of minutes after I was back at the hotel I called Mr. 
Stans. 

Mr. Dash. What did you say to ;Mr. Stans ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I told him that I had been given a special assign- 
ment reo[uiring as much cash as perhaps he would have available, 
and I think I mentioned $50,000 to $100,000, and asked him if it would 
be possible that he could help me in this assignment. 

Mr. Dash. What did he say ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. He said that he w^ould see what he could do. He 
said that he would have, as I remember it, he said he would have to 
go to a safe deposit box but that he would meet me at the Statler- 
Plilton in my room early in the afternoon. 

Mr. Dash. Did he meet you early in the afternoon? 

Mr. KIalmbach. Yes, sir, he did. 

Mr. Dash. Did he have anything with him ? 

Mr. Ivalmbach. Yes, he did. He had — he gave me $75,100. 

Mr. Dash. How were they packaged ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was in $100 bills, as I remember it. 

Mr. Dash. Did he indicate to you the source of that monev, Mr. 
Kalmbach? 

Mr. I^lmbach. He did. As to $45,000 he said that it Avas the bal- 
ance of the $50,000 that he had earlier given me. He said that he 
was giving it to me now but he did not indicate, as I remember it 
at all, the source of the balance of those funds. 

Mr. Dash. Did you tell Mr. Stans at any time when you asked for 
this money, wlien you received it, what that money was going to 
be used for ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, I did not. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Stans question you as to why you needed the 
money ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Again, Mr. Dash, when I talked to ISIr. Stans, we 
had known each other a number of years, I told him it was for a 
very important assignment, that I had been advised that it was in 
complete confidence, that I could not tell him the nature of the as- 
signment, that he would have to trust me, and he said "Of course, I 
do trust you, Herb", and with that he gave me the funds. 

Mr. Dash. All right. 

Now, what did you do with the money that Stans gave you? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I held the funds until the following day when I 
gave them to Mr. Ulasewicz. 

Mr. Dash. How did you make contact with Mr. I^lasewicz? 

Mr. Kalinibach. When I had met with Mr. Dean I recall that, it 
seems to me that I asked him to get in touch with Mr. Caulfield who 
he knew well, and who knew Mr. I^lasewicz' number in New York, 



2101 

and to ask Mr. Caulfield to call me and give me that number, and 
then I would call Mr. Ulasewicz, and that is, that is what I recall that 
I did. I received a call, and then called Mr. Ulasewicz late in the after- 
noon on the — let us see, it was the 29th and asking him to come down to 
Washington the next day, on the 30th. 

Mr. Dash. Did ^ou say anything on the telephone as to why he 
should come down ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, I just said I w^anted to see him for a special 
assignment. 

Mr. Dash. Then you had a meeting with him ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. Where did you meet with him ? 

Mr. Kalmbach, I met with him at my room in the Statler-Hilton 
Hotel. 

Mr, Dash. Did you tell Mr. Ulasewicz or ask him to undertake 
this assignment ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, I did. I told him exactly Avhat Mr, Dean 
had told me, namely that this, the purpose of this assignment was to 
provide funds for these defendants, for their legal help and also to 
provide support for their families, and I stressed again the state- 
ment that Mr. Dean had given to me that it must be in absolute secrecy 
and confidentiality, and he thoroughly understood and took the funds 
and left and went back to New York. 

Mr. Dash. So he agreed to follow out this assignment that you had 
requested ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Prior to Mr. Ulasewicz' coming down did you again meet 
with Mr. Dean? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes. I met with him Friday morning at which 
time 

Mr. Dash. Friday morning ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. At which time I told him that I had contacted Mr, 
Ulasewicz, that Mr. Ulasewicz would be in Washington that after- 
noon and that I had raised $75,100. 

Mr. Dash, Wliere was that meeting ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. In my room at the Statler, 

Mr. Dash. Could it have been, Mr. Kalmbach, that you first had 
coffee in the coffee shop with Mr. — this was the Statler-Hilton ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, it was. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, could you first have met in the coffee shop and then 
in your room ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, it could have been but my recollection is that 
we met in my room. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you testified that you met — when you met with Mr. 
•Ulasewicz you stressed the secrecy that Mr. Dean had stressed with 
you. Did you arrive at any method with Mr. Ulasewicz as to how you 
would €arry out this assignment, under a covert operation? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, the only method w^as that we would — it was 
again stressed, absolute secrecy. In my conversations with Mr. 
Ulasewicz when I stressed that, in our tallcs between ourselves, it was 
agreed that we should use teleplione booths, talk between telephone 
booths and, of course, as it later became procedure that in his con- 
versations with various of these people to whom he was — that he was 
contacting, he would use an alias. 



2102 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Ulasewicz would use an alias ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes^ he would. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know what Mr. Ulasewicz' alias was during this 
transaction ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, I think there were several. 

Mr. Dash. Does the name Rivers make 

Mr. Kalmbach. That was one of those, yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did he suggest that name ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I do not know whether he did or whether 
I did, but in our conversation — but then back, I would then report to 
either Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue, who would give us the directions or 
give me the directions, I would then give Mr. Ulasewicz the direc- 
tions, he would then make the contact with the people. 

Mr. Dash. Under your diiection your conversation would be with 
Mr. Ulasewicz on the telephone ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And they would be from telephone booth to telephone 
booth. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, usually. 

Mr. Dash. Could you just give me a scenario how you would contact 
Mr. Ulasewicz, or how he Avould contact you, what one would say to 
the other, and how you would do it? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, if there is a typical, and I don't know if there 
is, but it would, I would receive a call either from Mr. Dean or Mr. 
LaRue with instructions to get x amount of funds over to one of the 
defendants or- one of the attorneys. I would then call Mr. Ulasewicz, 
and so inform him. 

Mr. Dash. You would call him and reach him at his home number? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I would reach him in New York at his home 
number. 

Mr. Dash. What would you tell him to do ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I would call him from a pay phone. He would then — 
he told me the number of another pay phone and 15 minutes later I 
would call him and he would be at the pay phone. 

Mr. Dash. When you called him did you use a telephone credit card ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, always it was in cash and it was using a good 
number of quarters. 

Mr. Dash. Putting a lot of quarters in the telephone as you went 
along ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And when you referred to particular people who re- 
ceived, who would receive that, take for instance Mr. Hunt, did you 
have a particular code name for Mr. Hunt ? 

Mr. Kalmbacif. I think we did. I think we called Mr. Hunt, just 
called him "The Writer," he had been an autlior, we called him "The 
Writer."' I think we called T^lrs. Hunt "The Writer's Wife.'' 

I don't know that we liad any otlier names for anyone else. 

Ml'. Dash. Did you have any particular code name for the money 
that was being distributed ? 

Ml-. Kalmbach. No. If there is a code name the name developed in — 
when I was at the Statler and Mr. Ulasewicz came down to receive the 
$75,100 that I had received from Mr. Stans. he came into the room 
and he didn't have a briefcase with him, so he just went to the shelf 



2103 

in the room and wrapped it in a laundry bag, and so I, after that we 
both called it the laundry, as to how much money you had available. 

Mr. Dash. And he carried it back then 

Mr. Kalmbach. That was just — and he carried it back in that 
laundry bag, as I recall it. 

Mr. Dash. Kind of a significant name at this time to be used for 
that money, was it not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever use the term "script" in such a conversa- 
tion? 

Mr Kalmbach. I think we had that term "script."' 

Mr. Dash. Script for the writing? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Meaning the script of all of the players involved, 
the defendants and certain of these attorneys that were representing 
certain of the defendants. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did Mr. Ulasewicz have any knowledge or reason 
to know about these activities? He knew what you knew, did he not? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did you discuss with him at all the property of this 
activity ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir; I just told him that it was proper, and 
I told him that the purpose, as I have stated, was to furnish legal 
help for these people, and to furnish them with family support. 

Mr. Dash. You did know, of course, that the particular people who 
were getting this money for their legal defense or support of families 
were charged or indicted with, under the crime of burglary, and illegal 
wiretapping and conspiracy, did you not? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I knew the essence of the charges; yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. All right. 

Other than being told by Mr. Dean that this would be an appropriate 
thing to do, you made no independent inquiry as to the property of 
this? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No ; I made none. 

Mr. Dash. Now, how were instructions about the distribution of 
funds given to you and Mr. Ulasewicz? Was that by phone from Mr. 
LaRue or Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Probably 90 percent of the time it was by tele- 
phone. The other 10 percent was in personal discussion with him in 
his office or more usually in Mr. Dean's office. 

Mr. Dash. Now, what was the first instruction you received to give 
money ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Again, as I have tried to reconstruct this, Mr. 
Dash, the first instruction that I received, which I passed to Mr. 
Ulasewicz was to have Mr. Ulasewicz give $25,000 to Mr. Caddy. 
.1 don't know much of Mr. Caddy, I understand he is an attorney 
here in Washington. And, as I recall it, this was probably from approx- 
imately July 1 through July 6 or 7. There were a number of calls. 
I would talk to either Mr. Dean or Mr. LaEue, I would then call Mr. 
Ulasewicz who, in turn, would call Mr. Caddy. He would have some 
response from Mr. Caddy, and I would call back up to either Mr. 
Dean and Mr. LaRue. 

Mr. Dash. "V^Hiat was the response from Mr. Caddy ? 
Mr. Kalmbach. Well, the sum and gist of it was in that Mr. Caddy 
refused to accept the fimds. 



2104 

Mr. Dash. In that manner ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. That is correct. That was the end-all. There were 
several telephone calls, but the final wrap-up on it was that he refused 
to receive the funds. 

Mr. Dash. Wlio was contacted next, which lawyer? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think Mr. O'Brien was contacted and again with 
the same result. 

Mr. Dash. He refused to receive the funds ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And then who next was approached ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think then it was Mr. Bittman, and Mr. Bittman — 
I think this may have been when the name Rivers was used, Mr. 
Dash, but my recollection would be that Mr. Bittman received $25,000, 
probably sometime during the second week of July 1972. 

Mr. Dash. Did you follow any usual procedure that Mr. Ulasewicz 
would make the contact and pay the money, he would call you and then 
you would call Mr. Dean and tell him it had been accomplished ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Or Mr. LaRue. 

Mr. Dash. Or Mr. LaRue. Were all these phone calls booth to booth ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Even when you spoke to Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes ; that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Or Mr. LaRue ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. What other lawyers were supposed to receive money, to 
your recollection, Mr, Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, after the disbursal to Mr. Bittman, I think 
there was — most of the remaining funds went to Mrs. Hunt who, in 
fact, was the person who did the distributing thereafter and she dis- 
tributed to these other attorneys. 

Mr. Dash. Mrs. Hunt? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Now, when you next — when did you next return to 
Washington, after this first series of meetings, where you received 
this money and met with Mr. Ulasewicz, when did you next return to 
Washington ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, the next time that I was back in Washington 
involved in this assignment, Mr. Dash, was, I think it was, on July 19. 

Mr. Dash. What happened at that time ? Wliat brought you back ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, at that time, T think I was asked to come 
back, I think by either Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue, and to meet with Mr. 
Dean and Mr. LaRue in Mr. Dean's office in the Executive Office 
Building. 

Mr. Dash. Did you receive any money from Mr. LaRue at that 
time? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr, Dash. How much was that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Oh, some $40,000 was received from Mr. LaRue 
at that time. 

Mr. Dash. "Where did you receive it? 

Mr. Kalmbach. In Mr. Dean's office. 

Mr. Dash. Did you receive any additional instructions at that time? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I may have, Mr. Dash. I am not certain as to that. 



2105 

Mr. Dash. What did you do with this money, this $40,000, was this 
in cash by the way ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, it was in cash. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know the denominations of cash ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think it was primarily $100 bills. 

Mr. Dash. What did you do w^ith this new supply of money? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I took these funds and I think I went to New York 
late that afternoon, stayed at the Regency Hotel, and gave the funds 
to Mr. Ulasewicz, who came to my room in the Regency, probably 
around 8 :30 or 9 that evening. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you returned the following week, did you not, 
Mr. Kalmbach, to Washington ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. Dash. Now, why did you return, when did you return, and who 
did you see? 

Mr. Kalmbach. About this time, Mr. Dash, I was being urged — 
you will recall from my testimony that the funds that were given to 
me by Mr. LaRue were'not solicited by me, they were simply given to 
me to be given to Mr. Ulasewicz. Ai30ut this time, I was asked by 
either Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue to raise additional funds. I began to 
have a degree of concern about this assignment. 

Mr. Dash. What began to cause you to have that degree of concern ? 
Was it the nature of the covert operations, was it the fact that you 
were paying this money to defendants? Could you give us a little 
description or basis or background of that concern ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think the primary reason for my concern was the 
secrecy and the clandestine, covert nature of this activity, 

Mr. Dash. Sort of like a 007 operation. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Like a James Bond scenario. 

Mr. Dash. And you were part of that whole scenario ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. The President's personal attorney ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. And it was very distasteful to me and it had created 
this degree of concern. The concern was sufficient to make me certain 
in my own mind that I wanted to talk to John Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Dash. Why? 

Mr. Kalmbach. One, I wanted John Ehrlichman to confirm that 
John Dean did in fact have the authority to direct me to undertake 
this assignment. 

Second, I wanted him to assure me as to the propriety of this as- 
signment. In any event, I requested a meeting with John Ehrlichman. 
My records indicate that I met with liim in his office at 3 :30 on July 26. 

Mr. Dash. Could you describe that meeting for us 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. "VMiat you said to him and what he said to 
you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. As I have stated, the reason for the meeting 
was to get the assurance as to Mr. Dean's authority and as to the 
propriety. 

Mr. Dash. Also, at this time, you were being asked to go out and to 
raise some additional funds on vour own, were you not, Mr. Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir; and this would be the first time, Mr. Dash, 
that I would be going to an outside contributor. I know that the secrecy 



2106 

involved in this was, as I say, very distasteful. It was probably the 
primary item of concern, feeding this concern that I had. 

Other factors would include the fact that, oh, Mr. Haldeman and 
Mr. Ehrlichman, back around April 7, had indicated to me that I had 
been involved in this fundraising activity for such a long period 
that 

Senator Ervin. I think the committee had better recess and go to 
vote. There is a vote on in the Senate. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Kalmbach, we were just at the point where you had 
come into Washington on the 26th to see Mr. Ehrlichman because, 
as you testified, you had developed a real concern based on the secrecy 
of the activity of working with Mr. ITlasewicz and the delivery of 
money and tlie fact that you were now being asked to go out and raise 
new funds -and you wanted to see Mr. Ehrlichman in order to find out, 
one, whether or not Mr. Dean had the authority to ask you to do this, 
and, I think, tw^o, w^hether or not it was proper. Could you then take it 
on from there, Mr. Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Again, I ask you what did you say to Mr. Ehrlichman 
and what did he say to you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. When I first went into that meeting with Mr. 
Ehrlichman, I told him, you are familiar with this assignment? He 
said, "Yes, I am." 

Mr. Dash. Would you say that again? What did you ask him? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I said, "You are familiar with this assignment that 
I had received from John Dean?" He said, "Yes, I am." 

Mr. Dash. By tliat assignment, you meant the payment of the 
money ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. You Avere sure that he understood what you were talk- 
ing about ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Absolutely. And I went through it as far as the 
secrecy and Iioav this secrecy was bothering me, indicating to him that 
this is something that was new and foreign to me. I wanted him to — 
told him that tlie press was giving me concern, the whole secrecy 
thing — the press, this, and that. 

Mr. Dash. "\^niat do you mean, the press ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I mean the press coverage on the Watergate. 
I was beginning to have concern about this assignment. And I wanted, 
and T said, "John, I want you to tell me" — and you know, I can remem- 
ber it verv vividly because I looked at him, and I said, "John, I am 
looking ric:ht into your eyes. I know Jeanne and your family, you 
know Barbara and my family. You know that my family and my 
reputation mean everything to me. and it is just absolutelv necessary 
John, that you tell me, first that John Dean has the authority to direct 
me in this assignment, that it is a proper assignment, and that I am 
to jro forward on it." 

Mr. Dash. And did he look at you in the eyes? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes ; he did. 



Mr. Dash. What did he say to 



vou 



Mr. Kalmbach. He said, "Herb, John Dean does have the authority, 
it is proper, and you are to go forward." 



2107 

Now, he said, in commenting on the secrecy, he explained that as 
saying that but for the secrecy, this whole assignment, getting these 
funds to these people for this purpose could get into the press and be 
misinterpreted. And then I remember he used the figure of speech, he 
said, "They would have our heads in their laps," which again would 
indicate to me that it would jeopardize the campaign. 

Mr. Dash. Did he say something like this was political dynamite ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I do not remember that, but I remember the 
"our heads in their laps" remark. He might have said political 
dynamite. 

But the effect of all this, Mr. Dash, was to 

Mr. Dash. To reassure you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. The effect actually was that it washed out the con- 
cern that I had had— that had built up preliminary to this meeting, 
and I went out of that meeting certain that it was proper for me to go 
back to California and approach this contributor, this first contributor 
that I would approach in this program. 

Mr. Dash. Well, even though he told you then that you would have 
to maintain the secrecy and that if it ever got out, they — and I take 
it that he may have meant the Democrats 

Mr. I^\LMBACH. Yes. 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. Would you have our heads in their laps 
and it might jeopardize the campaign, that did not suggest to you any 
impropriety in doing that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No ; it did not. 

Mr. Dash. Why not? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It suggested to me that the concern was that this 
would have a — if it got into the press, misinterpreted 

Mr. Dash. How could it be misinterpreted ? 

Mr, Kalmbach. Misinterpreted in whatever way — that funds were 
being given to these people. 

Mr. Dash. Now, how could your providing funds through either 
Mr. Dean's aegis or through Mr. Erlichman's aegis, through the com- 
mittee, to burglars, wiretappers, and conspirators be misinterpreted? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, the misinterpretation would be that this was 
being done to silence these people. 

Mr. Dash. Could anybody have had any other interpretation ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I did. 

Mr, Dash. What interpretation did you have, Mr, Kalmbach ? 

Mr, Kalmbach, I had the interpretation, as I stated in my opening 
statement, that I felt that the green light had been given to these peo- 
ple in some manner, expressly or implicitly, and maybe by just, just 
by chance, where they had gone forward on this idiotic and stupid 
thing in this Watergate break-in and illegal act, and that someone — 
•and I never knew to whom Mr, Dean and Mr, LaEue reported, I just 
had the feeling that someone had given the go-ahead in some mamier 
and that someone felt that even though these people had done an 
illegal act, the decent thing to do is to provide them with, at least 
provide them with lawyers and provide them with family support, 

Mr, Dash. And not to see that certain people were fired and to 
come out and disclaim it rather than actually support these people 
before they were charged with any offense ? 



2108 

Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Dash, I had no background knowledge at all. 
This is just the impression that I received and I thought that frankly, 
it was, again, a very humane thing. 

Mr. Dash. So in a real sense, you took your so-called moral stand- 
ard from Mr. Ehrlichman's statement that it was appropriate? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, Mr. Dash, I think it is more that I had such 
trust in Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman that I, if I were advised by 
them, assured by them, in my mind, there was no possibility that 
there would be any 

Mr. Dash. Impropriety ? 

Mr. Kalmbach [continuing]. Any impropriety ; no, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Now, at that time when you had been reassured by Mr. 
Ehrlichman, did you pick up any additional money from Mr. LaEue 
while you were in Washington? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes ; I recall that I picked up approximately $30,- 
000 the next day that Mr. LaRue gave to me in his office at 1701 
Pennsylvania Avenue. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have any additional instructions with regard 
to that money ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I may have, Mr. Dash. I don't recall. 

Mr. Dash. What did you do with that money ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I called Mr. Ulasewicz, who came down to Wash- 
ington, and stayed at the Statler-Hilton, and I gave him those funds 
in his room at the Statler-Hilton. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Now, you then had returned to California, did 
you not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did you raise that additional amount of money that you 
were asked to raise ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, I did. I called Mr. Thomas V. Jones sometime 
between, I think it was August 1 and August 5, 1 am not certain as to 
the date, and indicated that I would like to come by and see him. 
He had earlier indicated to me that he would have funds for me if 
there was any special need. 

Mr. Dash. Did he — who, by the way since you have named him, who 
is Mr. Jones? 

Mr. Kalmbach. He is chairman of Northrop Corp., in California. 

Mr. Dash. And has he been a political contributor to Mr. Nixon, 
the President ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, he has personally. 

Mr. Dash. And when he indicated to you earlier if you needed any 
help he would provide those funds, was tfiat in the area of contributing 
to the President's reelection campaign? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Now you called him and told him what? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I called him and I think I reminded him on the 
telephone of his earlier statement to me, and he indicated immediately 
that he would be glad to see me, and we worked out a time that was 
mutually convenient. I went to his office, in Century City in West Los 
Angeles, I think it was in mid-afternoon and met with him there, and 
we had a 15-minute meeting or thereabouts, and he took from his desk 
a package, and handed it to me. I put it in my briefcase, and left his 
office and went back to Newport Beach. 



2109 

Mr. Dash. What was in the package? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was $75,000 in cash. 

Mr. Dash. And do you know what denomination the money was in ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. $100 bills, as I remember it. 

Mr. Dash. Wlien you spoke to IVIr. Jones did you tell him why you 
wanted the money ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, again just with Mr. Stans, I told him that 
it was for a special assignment. I did not — I told him it was an as- 
sigimient that I could not reveal the nature of it, that I had been given 
the assignment by one in authority at the White House and that was 
sufficient. 

Mr. Dash. Would it be fair to say that he would assume that it had 
something to do with the campaign to reelect the President ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think it would be yes. 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, it did not, did it ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, it was for the purpose that I have stated. 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Now, how did you — what did you do with these funds, did you give 
them to Mr. Ulasewicz ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Within, I think it was the next day or possibly 
the day following, Mr. Ulasewicz came out to California at my re- 
quest, and I met him in Orange County in front of the Airporter Inn in 
Orange County, near my office in Newport Beach. 

Mr. Dash. Could you describe how you gave him the fimds then? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. I asked him to meet me in front of the 
Airporter Inn, I drove over in my car, picked him up, we drove and 
parked and talked, I gave him the funds, I think we probably re- 
viewed our own notes as to how much had been received and how much 
had been distributed and to whom, and then after, I think it was, a 
half hour or so, I let him out in front of the Orange County Airpoi-t. 

Mr. Dash. So again in method of transmission of the funds it was 
in sort of a covert secret method ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. You did it in the automobile, out on the road ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Absolutely. 

Mr. Dash. And transferred it to him in the original packet ? 

Mr, Kalmbach. Yes, in the original packet, I am certain. 

Mr. Dash. Now, and then did he fly back to New York ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Presiunably that night, although I am not certain 
of that. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever discuss that $75,000 that you raised with 
Mr, Jones with anyone ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, my memory is that within a few days after 
that I was in Washington, and I think I saw Mr. Ehrlichnmn at that 
•time and I told him of the fact that I had raised $75,000 from Mr. 
Jones for that assignment. That is my recollection of, with the time 
I met with Mr. Ehrlichman. I think there were other things we dis- 
cussed. 

Mr. Dash. What was Mr. Ehrlichman's reaction when you told 
him you had raised that money ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was just fine, without more 

Mr. Dash. He was — you were following out the original reassurance 
and he knew you were doing the job ? 



2110 

Mr. Kalmbaoh. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dasti. A^Hiile you were on that same trip to Washington your 
calendar shows at 8 a.m. a meeting with John Connally, on August S. 
Do you know, was that in relationship to this in any way ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. In no way whatsoever. 

Mr. Dash. Did you discuss your activities with him at that time 'I 

Mr. Kalivibach. As to this assignment ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Absolutely not. 

Mr. Dash. Now, when did you decide to stop raising any money for 
the defendants and their attorneys ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Dash, probably in mid-August and then con- 
tinuing, it is my recollection that Mr. Dean and Mr. LaRue contacted 
me and indicating they needed additional funds, and by this time in 
late August this whole degree of concern had come back on me. It had 
come back on me to the level that I knew that I did not want to partic- 
ipate any longer in this assignment. 

Mr. Dash. Wasn't Mr. Ehrlichman's reassurance enduring? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, it was not. 

Mr. Dash. What was — was the concern again the covert activity, 
the secrecy of it ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think that was the primary factor, Mr. Dash. I 
think that Mr. Ulasewicz mentioned some cautionary words that from 
a professional i^olice officer who gave me some pause. I think there 
were other things within the press. 

Mr. Dash. You mean the newspaper stories about Watergate were 
coming more and more to the fore, were they not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, and I think that just all of it together was 
enough so that by, certainly by, as I say, late August, September, I was 
certain that I would not continue in this assignment. 

Mr. Dash. Did you discuss this with Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I did not. 

Mr. Dash. You did — your calendar shows an 8 :15 a.m. breakfast 
with Mr. Ehrlichman on August 29 which was about the time you were 
making this decision. Did you discuss it with him at that breakfast ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, I did not. I don't recall, Mr. Dash, that I ever 
discussed this with Mr. Ehrliclnnan after making that decision. 

Mr. Dash. Did you tell John Dean anything ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I just simply told him that I would do no 
more, and I advised Mr. LaEue, too, that I could do no more. 

Mr. Dash, Now, during the months of July and August were you in 
frequent contact with Mr. LaRue to receive instruction for distribut- 
ing these funds ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think during that time that my contacts again — 
I don't remember whether they were with Mr. LaRue or Mr. Dean, 
they were interchangeable in a sense, but there were instructions to 
disburse the funds right up to, I think the last instruction I received 
Avas in, oh, again my memory tells me 17 or 18 of September. 

Mr. Dash. Wei-e the instructions to distribute the remaindei" of the 
funds immediately? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes. I think the words were there was a — the direc- 
tion was for me to have the funds disbursed immediately to Mrs. 
Hunt, and then the balance of the funds to Mr. LaRue, which was the 
first time that I can recall that Mr. LaRue received funds. 



21111 

Mr. Dash. All ri^ht. Did you request a reconciliation of your cash 
records with LaRue in the last money you distributed ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. Dash. Tell us about the reconciliation and where it took place ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Again, my memory is that the reconciliation was 
probably on the 21st of September. 

Mr. Dash. Who was there, where did it take place? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think it took place in Mr. Dean's office, and I 
think that Mr. LaRue was present, and I was — that is my recollec- 
tion as to the date, and at that time I just went through the, my entire 
record that I had in my notes indicating the total funds received, to- 
tal disbursed, and those, in that income and outgo, agreed with Mr. 
LaRue's records. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall what that total amount was ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Beg pardon ? 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall what the total amount was? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think it was approximately $220,000. 

Mr. Dash. What happened, what did you do with your notes at the 
termination of the meeting ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I then destroyed the notes. 

Mr. Dash. Where ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. In his office, in Mr. Dean's office. 

Mr. Dash. How were they destroyed ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, my recollection is that I asked him to shred 
my notes, and he was smoking, and I am not sure who used matches, 
but the notes were destroyed. 

Mr. Dash. Were you ever again, Mr. Kalmbach, asked to raise money 
for the defendants, after you broke off, decided in September that 
you would not do it anymore for the concerns that you have expressed, 
were you ever again requested to do the same thing ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, I was. 

Mr. Dash. Could you tell us when you can recall that happening 
and who was there ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think I may have been approached once or twice 
after the September 21 meeting, but I remember with great particu- 
larity a meeting that occurred on the 19th of Januaiy in Washing- 
ton, in Mr, Mitchell's office. 

Mr. Dash. Who was there with Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. There was Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, Mr. LaRue, 
and myself. 

Mr. Dash. Would you please tell us very briefly what the discussion 
was, who said what, what you said ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I had been asked by Mr. Dean at a meeting held just 
minutes before at Blair House that Mr. Mitchell wanted to see me in 
•his office, and I recall that it was a rainy afternoon and we ran through 
the rain a half block to 1701 Pennsylvania, went up to Mr. Mitchell's 
office, and when we walked into his office we joined Mr. Mitchell, who 
was seated at his desk, and Mr. LaRue who was also in the office. 
After we w^ere seated and after the opening amenities, I think it was 
Mr. Dean that led the conversation and immediately I could see that 
the purpose of this meeeting was to ask me to raise additional funds. 
And immediately, as soon as that became known, Mr. Dean said the 
need for raising additional funds for lawyers and for family support, 



2112 

I knew I wanted to withdraw as soon as possible, and I excused myself 
within, I think, 10 minutes at the most, 10 or 15 minutes. 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Mitchell was present, was in his office ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, he was. 

Mr. Dash. Did he participate in the discussion ? 

Mr. Kalmbaoh, I remember he was smoking his pipe. He was aware 
of the conversation. We were all seated right around his desk, but it 
is my recollection that Mr. Dean led the conversation. I do not re- 
member, Mr. Dash, what comments Mr. Mitchell or Mr. LaRue added 
to the conversation, 

Mr. Dash. Well, at any rate, you turned them down ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. Dash. That was the end of your fundraising for the defendants 
in the Watergate case ? 

Mr. ELi^LMBACH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash, I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, I think for the record, it was January 19, was it not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, it was. 

Mr. Dash, 1973. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson, Mr. Kalmbach, you state that the immediate reason 
you became involved in fundraising was a telephone call which you 
received from John Dean on June 28, is that correct ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. Thompson. For that reason, I would like to compare some of 
your testimony with that of Mr, Dean, to see whether or not your recol- 
lection is correct. 

First of all, you state that you checked into the Statler-Hilton Hotel, 
is that correct, when you arrived here on the 29th ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe Mr, Dean says he met you in the May- 
flower Hotel. Could you be mistaken ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, I do not think I am mistaken. I think Mr. Dean 
may be mistaken on that. 

Mr. Thompson. He states that a few days later, you met in Lafay- 
ette Park and talked with him. Did you meet with him a few days after 
the 29th in Lafayette Park ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, My recollection, Mr. Thompson, is that I met 
him on the morning of the 29th in Lafayette Park as I have testified. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you think there is a confusion of running two 
meetings into one, or something to that effect, perhaps, in his mind? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, I do not know, Mr. Thompson, what his recol- 
lection is. I know what Mr. Dean has testified to. We just liave a dif- 
ferent memory on this. My memory is that we met in the park that 
morning on the 29th and then met at the Statler-Hilton on the 30th. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. In his conversation, he said something, I 
believe, to the effect that he told you everything; that he told you 
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell were interested in your raising 
this money. Is that correct ? 

Mr, Kalmbach. No, I do not have any recollection of him mention- 
ing those people. He just used the editorial "we." 

Mr. Thompson. Are you saying that he did not say it or that you 
do not have any recollection of his saying it ? 



2113 

Mr. Kalmbach. I do not recall that he said it, 

Mr. Thompson. He also suggested that you suggested the use of 
Tony UlaseAvicz, is this correct? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No. 

Mr. Thompson. Who suggested the use of Tony Ulasewicz to you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Again, as I have stated, my memoi-y of that meeting 
is that I stated that I Avould give him the funds, and if not Mr. Dean, 
I would give the funds to Mr. LaRue. It was at that point, not know- 
ing who was going to receive the funds, that my recollection is that he 
suggested Mr. Ulasewicz, which I agreed with and as I had trust in 
Mr. Ulasewicz. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you know Ulasewicz before the 29th of June ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, only — I think I had met him two or three times 
in total during the period from mid-1969 until approximately Oc^ 
tober 1 of 1971. And only two or three times. 

Mr. Thompson. What did you understand his function was or assign- 
ments were during that period of time? 

Mr. Kalmbach. My understanding is that he was doing investiga- 
tive work for the White House. I was not certain as to the nature of the 
assignments other than just investigative work. 

Mr. Thompson. In the first week of July, did you receive a tele- 
phone call from John Dean in which he indicated that attoiTiey Caddy 
was to get a certain amount of money and Hunt was to get a certain 
amount of money, and perhaps other people ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, I remember receiving a call and I am not 
certain, Mr. Thompson, whether it was Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue in- 
stiiicting me that Mi". Caddy was to be given these funds. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, let me ask you about the meeting on 
July 19 which you had in Mr. Dean's office. If I remember Mr. Dean's 
testimony correctly about this, or liis prepared statement on this, he 
said the purpose of that meeting was for you to determine in your own 
mind exactly to whom the payments were supposed to be made. He 
didn't talk about the passing of any money in his presence. Can you 
tell us the purpose of that meeting ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. There was — again my recollection of that meeting 
was that some $40,000 was given to me by Mr. LaRue in Mr. Dean's 
office and there may well have been instmctions given to me at that 
time. 

Mr. Thompson. But there is no question about the passing of money 
on that occasion? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, there is no question. 

Mr. Thompson. Was that in Mr. Dean's presence ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. As I remember it, the three of us were together in 
his office at that time. 

• Mr. Thompson. Do you recall whether or not he was on and off the 
telephone during that period of time ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I think he probably had some calls, but the 
three of us were together in that meeting. 

Mr. Thompson. Facing each other ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think Mr. Dean was at his desk and Mr. LaRue and 
I were seated together at his desk. 

Mr. Thompson. In mid-September, did you receive a telephone call 
telling you to tell Tony Ulasewicz to give Mr. LaRue $30,000, 1 believe 



2114 

in the Howard Johnson's across from the Watergate, ironically 
enough ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes. The instruction was to give Mr. LaRue the 
$30,000. I am not certain in my memory whether I was told how it 
was to be handed to him. 

Mr. Thompson. First of all, let me ask you, who told you to do this ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Again, it was either Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, if the money was going to LaRue, it looks 
like you could determine in your own mind whether LaRue was saying, 
"give it to me"' or whether Dean was saying, "give it to LaRue." 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think, Mr. Thompson, this particular conversation 
was with Mr. Dean and it was to give these funds to Mr. LaRue, 
and I think — again, my recollection is that I asked Mr. Ulasewicz to 
call Mr. LaRue at his apartment in the Watergate Hotel. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. The reason I ask this is because I do not 
think Mr. Dean mentioned that particular telephone conversation or 
any conversations concerning his asking you to deliver certain 
amounts of money or the passing of any money in his presence. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes. Well, I wanted to make it clear that I — it was 
interchangeable as far as I was concerned between Mr. Dean and Mr. 
LaRue on these instructions, that whereas Mr. Dean had told me that 
Mr. LaRue would give me instructions. I recall that oftentimes. Mr. 
Dean would talk to me about instructions and who was to receive 
what. 

Mr. Thompson. Was anyone instrumental in pushing you to continue 
to raise money, either Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue or anyone else ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, I think that Mr. Dean was probably the one that 
talked to me Inost often about this to continue in this program. And 
it seemed to me that Mr. LaRue miglit have spoken to me once or twice, 
but I do not recall that. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you believe you had more conversations with 
Dean than you did with LaRue about it ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. As far as being urged to raise additional funds, yes, 
sir. 

Mr. Thompson. All right, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Kalmbach. I have no further questions, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock 
tomorrow. 

["\'\niereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 10 a.m., Tuesday, July 17, 1973.] 



TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washmgton. B.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :15 a.m., in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair- 
man), presiding. 

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and Weicker. 

Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred D. 
Thompson, minority counsel ; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief coun- 
sel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels ; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flani- 
gan, assistant publications clerk. 

Senator ER^^x. The committee will come to order. 

The Chair recognizes Senator Montoya. 

Senator Montoya. Thank you, ]Mr. Chairman. 

Mr, Kalmbach, yesterday you indicated that you had been called 
to Washington on' June 28 by ]Mr. Dean. Mr. Dean has previously 
given testimony to this before this committee and I believe he indi- 
cated that when he spoke to you on the telephone that he was doing 
so on behalf of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. Is that correct? 

TESTIMONY OF HERBERT W. KALMBACH— Resumed 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, my memory of that telephone conversation 
is that he used the editorial "we." He did not mention anyone's name. 

Senator Montoya. Did he mention any other details with respect 
to the urgency of the call ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. He indicated simply that it was an urgent 
matter that was necessary that he wanted me to come back to Wash- 
ington the first available opportunity. I think he said the next avail- 
able plane. 

Senator Montoya. Did vou ask him what he meant by the editorial 
"we" in that call ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Montoya. Did you assume anything when he told you that ? 

(2115) 



-296 O — 73— ,bk. 



2116 

Mr. Kalmbaoh. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Did you understand him to mean that it might 
be his associates at the White House when he used the word "we"? 

Mr. ICalmbaoh. I was not certain, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. But you did leave that night on the 28th 
and arrived here 6 :30 the next morning ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And it was then that you met Mr. Dean at the 
Hay-Adams Hotel ? 

Mr. Kalmbaoh. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And after a little conference there you proceeded 
to Lafayette Park and there you indulged in a little gesturing with 
him on the horizon, and viewing the panorama of Washington. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And Mr. Dean testified that as follows and I 
quote from his testimony. It appears on page 3174 of the transcript : 

Mr. Dean. Well, I told him everything that I knew about the case at that 
time, I told him that I wa.s very coneerne<l that this could lead riight to the 
President. I did not have any hard facts. I hoped that I was incorrect. I explained 
to him in full the seriousness of the matter. I relayed to him the fact that some 
records had been destroyed. I told him virtually everything I knew at that time 
and I think there was no doubt in his mind about the sensitivity of the situation. 

Would you say this is a correct statement on the part of Mr. 
Dean? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, my recollection of that conversation was 
simply that he indicated that he wished me, he used the word again 
"we" that I was being asked to raise funds for the legal defense of 
these people and for the support of the families. 

Senator Montoya. Well, did he mention the other ramifications of 
this particular case vis-a-vis possible involvement of the White House? 
He had already indicated to you that the President might be hurt by 
this. 

Mr. KajjMbach. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya. He did not. 

Now, then after this meeting you proceeded to go back to your 
hotel, and you called Mr, Stans to make available to you as much 
money as he could, is that correct ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And it was then that Mr. Stans brought to you 
the sum of $75,100. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And after this you proceeded to call Mr. 
Ulasewicz ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, that is right. 

Senator Montoya. Ulasewicz in New York and he came down and 
you gave him instructions. 

Mr. Kalmbach. I gave him the funds, Senator, on the 30th, and I 
am not certain Avhether or not I gave him instructions at that time. 

Senator Montoya. Well, when did 5^ou receive your instructions 
from ISIr. LaRue ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. My memory is that I received instructions from 
either Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue within a few days after the 30th, and I 
think it was by telephone. 



2117 

Senator Montoya. Well then, would you say that Mr. Ulasewicz 
came into Washington to collect the money on the 30th ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And you had talked to Mr. LaRue and Mr. Dean 
by that time ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I don't recall that I had talked to Mr. LaRue, Sena- 
tor. But I had talked with Mr. Dean. 

Senator Montoya. But most of the instructions which you received 
with respect on the distribution of this money came from Mr. LaRue 
actually, isn't that correct ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Probably most of them but I always regard both 
Mr. Dean and Mr. LaRue as interchangeable as far as receiving 
instructions. 

Senator Montoya. Now, why did you pick on Mr. Ulasewicz ? 

Mr. I^LMBACH. Mr. Ulasewicz was in — as I remember it, when I 
mat with Mr. Dean in Lafayette Park, and I had asked him if I 
should give the fund to him, and he indicated no, and then whether 
or not I should give the fund to Mr. LaRue, it is my memory that at 
that point he indicated whether or not Mr. Ulasewicz might be the 
person to handle the distribution of the funds, and I said that would 
be acceptable to me and that I would trust that man. 

Senator Montoya. Why did you say that? Had you known Mr. 
Ulasewicz ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I had not. I had met him two or three times 
but I did know that he had been on assignment, had received instruc- 
tions from people in the White House for a period of years and that 
he was trusted. 

Senator Montoya. You knew he was a reliable man? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And who had he performed assignments for at 
the White House ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, I am not certain as to what assignment he 
had received. I simply know that, and did know at the time that, he 
had been receiving or handling assignments for the White House and 
for certain people in the White House over a period of years. I think 
that probably he was reporting primarily to Mr. Caulfield. 

Senator Montoya. But you didn't know the nature of those assign- 
ments ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Montoya. How could you determine his reliability then? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, simply it was a matter of trust. If he had 
been performing duties for the White House over a period of years, 
I was certain that he could be trusted. 

Senator Montoya. Then, you got together with Mr. LTlasewicz and 
determined that you would use the telephone booth approach in com- 
munications ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And you did confine yourself to that kind of com- 
munications from then on with him ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir; that and the rather infrec|uent meetings 
that we had, yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Who devised this kind of communication? Did 
you suggest it or did he to you ? 



2118 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think the two of us were talking and we both 
imderstood — he had advised him that this was to be a thoroughly con- 
fidential assignment, and I think I wondered to him as to procedures 
to follow, and we developed those procedures together. I probably 
wondered aloud about using the telephone booths, and he indicated 
that that was the procedure, and I think between the two of us we 
developed the procedures. 

Senator Montoya. Well, were you trying to protect the confiden- 
tiality of the assignment or w^ere you actually afraid that you might 
be tapped ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, sir; I just — we were attempting to make cer- 
tain as to the confidentiality. 

Senator Montoya. You were not concerned about being tapped ? 
Mr. Kalmbach. Well, yes, sir, I think we were. We didn't know if we 
would be. 

Senator Montoya. Who do you think might have tapped you ? 
Mr. Kalmbach. We just didn't know. 

Senator Montoya. Then this secrecy continued up until the time you 

gave Mr. Ulasewicz $75,000 at the airport in California, is that correct? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It continued. Senator, up until through the time that 

Mr. Ulasewicz made the final distribution, and I think that was in, on 

September 18 or 19 of 1972. 

Senator Montoya. Now, it has been reported that the sum of 
$450,000 was expended with respect to the Watergate defendants, 
including their defense and also the coverup, and I believe that you 
have testified that you were responsible only for approximately 
$205,000. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, my memory is that approximately $220,000 
was the amount that was my distribution to Mr. Ulasewicz. 
Senator Montoya. Do you know who raised the rest of the money ? 
Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I do not. 

Senator Montoya. Do you have any quarrel wdth the figure that 
G AO has come up with, to wit , $450,000"? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I have no knowledge. Senator, as to anything other 
than the $220,000. 

Senator Montoya. Now, as you look back in retrospect, Mr. Kalm- 
bach, and in view of the secrecy that was imposed upon you and what 
you had to go through in order to develop a line of communication in 
carrying out your mission, do you feel that you proceeded correctly ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. In retrospect, Senator," I feel that I— it was some- 
thing I should not have been involved in. 

Senator Montoya. And at what point did you really become con- 
cerned, or did you become concerned at the beginning ? 

Mr. Kalmbacpl No, sir, I did not at the beginning. But through the 
month of July, Senator, particularly the middle of July and on, when 
the entire secrecy procedures began", they did disturb me. It was dis- 
tasteful to me. That, in conjunction with the press stories that I would 
read, raised an element, a level of concern with me. 

Senator Montoya. Now, if you had done this differently, would you 
then have gone to the President, your client and friend, and told him 
about what was going on ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I am sorry. Senator ? 



2119 

Senator Montoya. Acknowledging that you would have done this 
differently, would you have gone to the President, your client and 
friend, and told him everything that was going on ? 

Mr, Kalmbach. Sir, at the time, I of course understood that it was a 
proper assignment. 

Senator Montoya. Well, you understood that it was proper because 
you had been assured by Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean that it was a 
proper assignment, and that is all you knew about it ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Well, you have been practicing law for quite 
a few years? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And in view of the secrecy imposed upon you 
and the different methods of procedure that you had to resort to, 
didn't you try to put this, as a lawyer, in the proper context and 
come up with some grave concern on your part? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. At the outset, it was a matter of complete 
and implicit trust in Mr. Dean and then in Mr. Ehrlichman. There was 
no question in my mind that these men would ask me to do anything 
improper. 

Senator Montoya. Now, did you feel that it was the proper thing 
to raise money for these defendants when there were implications 
not only in the press, but also in conversations, that money was being 
used to silence these defendants? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. I had understood at the time that Mr. Dean 
made the request of me, and then again, when Mr. Ehrlichman con- 
firmed Mr. Dean's authority and the propriety of this assignment, I 
understood then it was for a proper purpose. 

Senator Montoya. You visited the White House quite often, did 
you not? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, not often, but from time to time; yes, sir. 

Senator IMontoya. Well, you had a White House pass? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator Montoya. Was that in force all the time? 

Mr. Kalmbach. During this period. Senator? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir; it was. 

Senator Montoya. How long did you have this "WHiite House pass, 
and do you still have it? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I still have it, Senator, and it would be my recol- 
lection that I have had the pass since early in 1972. 

Senator Montoya. And did you have available to you, when you 
came into town, any AYliite House cars to pick you up at tlie airport? 

Mr. Kalmbach. From time to time; yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And they did pick you up? 

Mr. Kalmbach. From time to time ; yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Did you have any direct line to the President 
from your home telephone line ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. At one time I did, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. And when was that time? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think that was in 1970, perhaps in 1971, but I 
don't recall with any particularity. 



2120 

Senator Moxtoya. Did you have any conversations through that 
direct line with the President? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. As I have testified, Senator, my recollection is that 
I have probably talked to the President no more than four or five 
times since June of 1969, and I think that I probably talked to him 
on that particular telephone once or twice. 

Senator Montoya. So actually, in view of all these arrangements, 
I would say that you were a person very close to the President and 
very interested in his welfare ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Certainly very interested in his welfare; yes, sir. 

Senator Moxtoya. Xow, going into the Jones contribution, what you 
say was $75,000 ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Moxtoya. And I understand Mr. Jones says it was $50,000. 
Could there be a mistake here somewhere ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, Senator, I can only testify as to my knowl- 
edge. 

Senator Moxtoya. And when you approached Mr. Jones, you ap- 
proached him as a fundraiser for the President or the President's re- 
election, did you not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, for the reelection. 

Senator Moxtoya. And it was in that context that you went to Mr. 
Jones ? 

Mr, Kalmbach. Yes, sir, it is. 

Senator Moxtoya. And you told Mr. Jones that this was a very secret 
thing, secret mission, that you were on, and that you needed the 
money. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, my memory of that meeting with Mr. Jones 
is that I told him that it was a special assignment. I don't think I 
said secret assignment; I said special assignment, the nature of which 
I could not reveal to him. 

Senator Moxtoya. Well, when you said that, wouldn't that also 
mean a secret assignment ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It might ; yes, sir. 

Senator Moxtoya. All right. Xow, would you say that when ^Mr. 
Jones gave you this money, in view of your presence there, in view 
of the fact that he knew you were the President's emissary and that 
the President was running for reelection, that the money would be 
used for political purposes ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Moxtoya. And it was not used for political purposes, was 
it? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was used for the legal defense of the defendants 
and for the families' support ; yes, sir. 

Senator Moxtoya. Would you say that this was a violation of the 
understanding that you thought existed at the time that Mr. Jones 
turned this money over to you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, at the time. Senator, I told ]Mr. Jones that it 
was for a special assignment, and I felt it was not at variance. Now, in 
retrospect, I do feel that it was. 

Senator INIoxtoya. Well, would you say that Mr. Jones is entitled 
to a refund from the committee ? 



2121 

Mr. Kalmbach. Possibly, Senator. I did tell him it was a special 
assignment. Whether or not there would be, it would involve a refund, 
I am not certain. 

Senator Montoya. Now, if you used this money for these defendants 
and you were right in so using it, then Mr. Jones is going to be subject 
to the payment of a gift tax, would you say ? You are an income tax 
lawyer and have become well versed with the tax laws of this country. 

Mr. Kalmbach. The question as to the tax, I am not certain on that 
point. Senator. It was used for the purpose indicated. There might 
be a gift tax problem there. 

Senator Montoya. Well, if it was not used for political purposes, it 
was used for some other purpose, there is a question there as to whether 
that transfer of money was exempt from the gift tax ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Would you not say that? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator ]Montoya. I understand that you did not call the President 
because you assumed that the President knew about all these things. 

Mr. ICalmbach. Senator, I did not speak with the President. I spoke 
to ]Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman and had no belief that I should speak 
to the President about this matter. 

Senator Montoya. Well, you indicated earlier that if you had known 
what you know now in retrospect, if you had realized all these things, 
you certainly would have called the President about all these 
ramifications. 

Mr. Kalmbach. If I had known at the time when I met with Mr. 
Dean that he was asking me to do an illegal act, I would have imme- 
diately gone to Mr. Ehrlichman and spoken to him about it, because 
I just could not believe, and it is incomprehensible to me to feel that 
I could possibly believe that anyone. JNIr. Dean as counsel to the Presi- 
dent, later Mr, Ehrlichman, assistant to the President for domestic 
affairs, could ask the President's personal attorney to do an illegal act. 

Senator Montoya. That is all. 

Senator Talmadge [presiding]. Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Kalmbach, in reading over your resume, you 
indicate that you were selected in 1969 as personal counsel to the 
President. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, that is right. 

Senator Weicker. Who selected you as the President's personal 
counsel ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Haldeman called me. Senator. I think it was in 
March 1969 with that request. 

Senator Weicker. Did you have any discussion with the President 
at all upon your being hired as the President's personal counsel ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I do not recall a discussion at the outset. Senator. I 
was reporting on the negotiations for the purchase of the property 
through Mr. Ehrlichman at that time. I recall a telephone conversation 
that I had with the President in June 1969 as to this matter, but not 
any other conversation prior to the closing of that escrow. 

Senator Weicker. It is not my intention to get into the — what we 
will call the real estate matter here. 

Mr. Ivalmbach. Yes, sir. 



2122 

Senator Weicker. But as I understand it. then you were selected or 
you were chosen by Mr. Haldeman to perform the function of personal 
counsel to the President. 

Mr. Kalmbacii. Mr. Haldeman called me on behalf of the President. 

Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Kalmbach. I would like to g:o to pa^e 3 
of your statement and specifically discuss a sentence which I think is 
very precise insofar as the words used. That sentence which states : 

My actions immediately following the break-in which involved the raising of 
funds to provide for the legal defense of the Watergate defendants and the sup- 
port of their families was prompted in the belief that it was proper and necessary 
to discharge what I assumed to be a moral obligation that had arisen in some 
manner unknown to me by reason of earlier events. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator AVeicker, Xow, as a paraphrase of that, I am trying to 
fathom that sentence. Would this be a proper paraphrase? [Reading :] 

I assumed I was acting properly based upon an assumption of mine that facts 
existed, of which facts I had no knowledge. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, I was acting in a certain belief that I was 
being asked to do a proper assignment and, in my mind, I believed that 
a moral obligation was felt to exist on the part of someone, and I never 
knew and do not know on the part of who or more than one person, that 
the money should be given to these people for their legal defense and 
for the support of their families, and again. Senator, I felt in my own 
mind that it was a very human thing to do. 

Senator Weicker. Well, now, let us just spend a little time, if we can, 
on the words that you used in that sentence. Now, first of all, what fac- 
tors prompted you to believe that your conduct was proper and 
necessary? 

Mr. Kalmbach. The factor. Senator, that I was being asked by the 
President's counsel, Mr. Dean, to undertake this assignment. 

Senator Weicker. So that forms the basis for the words "proper and 
necessary," is that correct ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. All right. Upon what factors did you assume that 
there was a moral obligation ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. That was my own assumption. Senator, just based 
on this assignment and the request that had been given to me by Mr. 
Dean, that there must have been some feeling that there was a moral 
obligation here to be discharged. 

Senator Weicker. Why would you feel it was a moral obligation ? 
Why not a legal obligation, as distinguished from a moral obligation ? 

Mr, Kalmbach. Senator, those are just my feelings; it was a moral 
obligation. 

Senator Weicker. Did you feel — did you have a feeling — that maybe 
somebody owed somebody something here; is that another way of 
phrasing it? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Sir, I know I had the feeling that someone in some 
manner, expressly or by reason of some action, had directed these 
people to go forward on this assignment, and the assignment was, as 
I say, stupid and illegal, idiotic, but there was a feeling that as long 
as they had been directed to undertake this, that there was at least a 
moral obligation to provide for lawyers for them and for the support 
of their families. 



2123 

Senator Weicker. Well, let's get to another word here where you 
say, "to be a moral obligation had arisen in some manner unknown to 
me by reason of earlier events." Now, as an attorney, are you telling 
me that you would commence activities that, in effect, might risk your 
entire career? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator AVeicker. On a belief that such activities were proper and 
necessary to discharge a moral obligation that had arisen in some man- 
ner unknown to you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes. sir. Senator, I was again — it was a matter of 
absolute trust in Mr. Dean, and later in Mr. Ehrlichman. I had no — 
as I have stated, it is incomprehensible to me, and was at that time, I 
just didn't think of it, that these men would ask me to do an illegal act. 

Senator Weicker. Obviously you must have made some inquiry as 
to the earlier events that occurred. I mean you have stated here today 
this might have been stupid, it might have been illegal, I believe you 
said, idiotic, but what led you to those conclusions I You must have 
made some inquiry of the facts before you embarked on this particular 
course of action? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Xo, I did not. Senator. It just was plain on its face 
that it was: (1) illegal, (2) stupid and idiotic. 

Senator Weicker. But nevertheless you associated yourself with 
illegal acts and, therefore, risked an entire career ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Sir, I associated myself with an assignment to pro- 
vide funds which I thought was, and absolutely believed at that time, 
to be the decent thing for these people who I felt a moral obligation 
was felt to be owed to them, that they had been told in some manner — ■ 
and I had no understanding as to how that was done, and I don't have 
that at tliis time — but in some manner they were told to go forward. 

Senator Weicker. But then when you responded to Senator Mon- 
toya's question that in retrospect you are not so sure that you did the 
right thing in retrospect, is that really, is that entirely, is that being 
entirely candid with the committee ? Didn't you have reservations even 
then when you were asked to do these things \ It isn't so much a matter 
or just retrospect now. You had suspicions then ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Xo, sir. I am being entirely candid. Senator. I had 
no reservations and went immediately, I think that the fact that, 
within a matter of minutes after I spoke to Mr. Dean, I had called 
Mr. Stans and within a matter of hours I had raised $75,100, is indica- 
tive of the fact that I had no reservations. 

Senator Weicker. All right. Let's get back to this sentence. "Were 
prom])ted in the belief that it was proper and necessary to discharge 
what I assumed to be a moral obligation.'' 

Xow, if these activities were believed by you to be proper, why 
was cash used instead of the normal procedure in handling payments 
of such amounts? 

Mr. Kalmbach. This was what I was directed to do. Senator. 

Senator Weicker. If these activities were believed by you to be 
propel', why was it necessary to obtain the services of Anthony 
Ulasewicz to distribute the money to the defendants and their 
attorneys ? 

Mr, ivALMBACH. Again this was the procedure that I was directed 
to follow. 



2124 

Senator Weicker. If these activities were believed by you to bo 
proper, why was Mr. ITlasewicz ^iveii a code name, Mr. Rivers, and 
why were Mr. and Mrs. Hunt o^iven tlie code name of the Writer and 
the Writer's wife, and Mr. Haldeman the code name of the Brush ? 
[Laughter.] 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, again this was just an abundance of 
caution in the carrying out of the assignment, the confidentiality, and 
the secrecy of the assignment all of which gave me this ongoing 
concern. 

Senator Weicker. So again, Mv. Kalmbach, let me repeat the ques- 
tion I asked earlier when you made the statement here that in retro- 
spect you felt it wasn't the proper tiling, it is not just in retrospect, 
was it ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was absolutely improper. Rut given my belief 
at that time that it was — I was certain as to the propriety, I did go 
forward. 

Senator Weicker. If these activities were believed by you to be 
proper, then why did Mr. ITlasewicz, at your instructions, distribute 
the moneys to the defendants and their attorneys in luggage lockers 
at National Airport and telephone booths and counters in restaurants 
and in trash cans? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, again this was in the carrying out of this 
assignment. I spoke to Mr. ITlasewicz and he indicated to me that the 
manner in which these distributions would be made was something 
that he would take care of and it would be better if I didn't even 
know about it. 

Senator Weicker. If these activities were believed by you to be 
proper, then why did you feel compelled in mid-July of 1972 to inquire 
of John Ehrlichman the propriety of what you were doing? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Sir? 

Senator Weicker. If these activities were believed by you to be 
proper, then why did vou feel compelled in mid- July of 1072, July 26, 
1972 to inquire of John Ehrlichman the propriety of what you were 
doing ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, as I have testified beginning with the dis- 
tribution, I think, first Mr. ITlasewicz was to contact Mr. Caddy and 
then Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Bittman, and the secrecy involved, primarily 
the secrecy involved, the press, other factors, gave rise to a degree 
of concern, and it was — I made up my mind that the only proper thing 
to do to make certain as to the authority of Mr. Dean to direct me in 
this assignment and to make certain as to the propriety, was the rea- 
son why I asked for the reason with Mr. Ehrlichman on the 26th. 

Senator Weicker. If these activities were believed by you to be 
proper, then why did you at the end of September of 1972, and again 
on January 19, 1973, refuse to take any further part in the distribution 
of these funds to the defendants and their attorneys ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. By that time, Senator, again* after I had seen Mr. 
Jones and had been approached by either Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue to 
raise additional funds, this level of concern came back on me and I 
made up my mind that this was something I would not be involved in. 

Senator Weicker. This is the point that I am ti-ying to make here to- 
day, because I see. Mr. Kalmbach — the picture of an individual that 
might at the outset have started off without any knowledge, but get 



2125 

some suspicions in fast order along the way. Yet, you have testified 
before the committee that hei'e today, as you sit before us, in retrospect, 
these things are wrong. At what point in time did you really say to 
yourself, I have had it, I am not going to risk my career on what is 
going on ? At what point in time ? It is not as you sit before us. It must 
have been at some earlier point in time. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. When was that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. That was sometime in the latter part of August, 
in September of 1972, Senator, that I knew that I had reached that 
point of concern. 

Senator Weicker. And you made no attempt at that point in time 
to contact your client, the President of the United States ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Weicker. You have indicated as to the talk you have had 
with Mr. Ehrlichman, although that actually took place in July ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Did you make any attempt at this point in time, 
in August or September, to get through to the President, either per- 
sonally or via some individual or individuals ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, I did not, Senator. 

Senator Weicker. You have testified that on July 27, 1972, you 
called Mr. Jones of Northrup Corp. to raise additional funds for the 
defendants. Now, upon whose authority did you request funds of Mr. 
Jones at that corporation ? 

Mr. Ivalmbach. Excuse me. Senator, would you mind repeating 
that? 

Senator Weicker. You have testified that on July 27, 1972, you 
called Tom Jones of Northrup Corp. to raise additional funds for the 
defendants. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. I think that my testimony is that I, some- 
time between August 1 and August 5, that I called Mr. Jones. 

Senator Weicker. All right, in that time period, between August 1 
and August 5 ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Now, upon whose authority did you request funds 
of Mr. Jones at that corporation ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was on my own authority. I called Mr. Jones to 
raise funds for this assignment. Now, I had earlier talked to Mr. Ehr- 
lichman and my recollection is that the time that I met with Mr. 
Ehrlichman, I advised him I was going to see Mr. Jones, This was in 
fact the first contributor that I would approach in this assignment. 
Senator. And Mr. Ehrlichman at that time confirmed, as I have tes- 
tified, that the assignment was proper, that Mr. Dean did have the au- 
thority to direct me in the assignment, and told me to go forward. 

Now. the statement to me to go forward on this assignment was 
washed away, the level of concern that had built up and had occasioned 
my request for this meeting and I felt that the concern was washed 
out entirely and I just went forward, based again, Senator, on absolute 
trust in this man. 

Senator Weicker, Absolute trust in John Ehrlichman ? 

Mr, Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 



2126 

Senator Weicker. Well, did you always confer with Mr. Ehrlich- 
man before you solicited the principals of large corporations such as 
Mr. Jones of North rup ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Weicker. Did you confer with anyone at the "V\niite House 
prior to requesting such donations of corporations? 

Mr. Kalmbach. You mean from Mr. Jones ? 

Senator Weicker. Well, from Mr. Jones or any other corporations 
that you contacted ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, the other solicitations that I was involved 
in were solicitations of individuals throughout the 1971 period and 
early 1972, Senator. 

Senator Weicker. I beg your pardon. Will you repeat that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Throughout the 1971 period and early 1972 for 
f undraising for the campaign. 

Senator Weicker. And what occasioned you to solicit particular 
corporations or individuals? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, sir, I had known most of these people from 
earlier years and I approached them as individuals or as corporate 
heads, asking that they, if they would agree to be helpful to the re- 
election by having such executives within that company, as were in- 
terested in support of the President and the President's programs, to 
agree to contribute toward the reelection financially. 

Senator Weicker. Did you always ask for the donations in cash ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I never did that. 

Senator Weicker. Except in the case of Mr. Jones ? 

ISIr. Kalmbach. Except for Mr. Jones, yes, sir, and that was under 
that special assignment. 

Senator Weicker. Did Mr. Jones indicate any surprise at all as to 
the nature of the contribution, it being in cash rather than by check? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. Again, when I appeared at his office some- 
time between the 1st and the 5th, and I do not remember when it was, 
he had the funds in his desk drawer and it was in the form of cash. 

Senator Weicker. A^Hiy Mr. Jones and why the Northrup Corp.? 
That was what I am trying to set right in my own mind. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Again, Mr. Jones had talked to me several weeks 
before and had indicated to me that he had additional funds or funds 
available for any special need that I might have or the campaign would 
have and that I could call for those funds at any time. And I. in my 
own mind, I decided that I would call him, but I wanted to talk to John 
Ehrlichman beforehand. 

Senator Weicker. But the name of Northrup and Mr. Jones came to 
you directly or came to you through John Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, not through John Elirlichman. 

Senator Weicker. I just have a few more questions. 

During the course of this testimony, Mr. Mitchell has testified that 
he wished he had known of the $1,100,000 surplus left over from the 
1968 campaign. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Now, I would like your comments about that 
statement. Do you have any evidence that Mr. Mitchell might have 
known or did know about the fact that there was a surplus in the 1968 
campaign ? 



2127 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, I believe that I had advised Mr. Mitchell 
at various times that I did liave funds under my control. 

Senator Weicker. And this would possibly account for the fact that 
his law partner, Mr. Evans, is one of the cotrustees of a portion of 
that money? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, Mr. Evans was a sicrnatory on the accounts and 
on the safe deposit boxes — certainly the accounts. 

Senator Weicker. And to the best of your recollection, there were 
times when you indicated to Mr. Mitchell that there were such surplus 
funds from the 1968 campaign ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. I have no further questions. 

Senator Baker [presiding]. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Kalmbach, you are a senior member of a most prestigious law 
firm and among your clients, you number some of the Nation's cor- 
porate giants — Marriott Corp., United Airlines. Travelers Insurance, 
MCA, Atlantic-Richfield, Dart Industries, Great Southwest Corp. 
Then you have the University of Southern California, the Nixon 
Foundation, and the Stans Foundation. I gather from this that you 
are a man whose wisdom and judgment is sought after; you are not a 
yes man, and you are not a follower ; you are a leader. Least of all, I 
don't suppose you would take orders from a lesser official like John 
Dean. And I would gather from your success that you must be^ a 
great lawyer. Therefore, like Senator Weicker, I find it extremely dif- 
ficult to believe that you are not aware that illegal activities were being 
carried out. 

If a client came to you and related the exact story that is now being 
related here, and he said, Mr. Kalmbach, should I raise these funds? 
What would you have advised this client ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. If the client had come to me in this situation, which 
is wholly separate from any situation that I could believe anyone 
would be faced with, I would have asked him to exercise caution and 
make inquiries. 

Senator Inouye. Is that the advice you would have given the client? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I would certainly, on the face of it, I would have 
asked him to have made inquiries. But in my situation, Senator, I 
was dealing with the counsel to the President of the United States. 
It was a matter of absolute trust in the man's integrity and honesty. 
And again, as I say, it was absolutely inconceivable to me that this 
man could ask me to do an illegal act, and I have never done an 
illegal act. 

Senator Inouye. Would you relate to the committee a criminal 
case relating to the 1962 elections in California and the parties who 
■ were involved in this? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, my best recollection on that is that there 
was a matter that was filed in California. I have done some checking 
on the pleadings, the judgment. The summation of that was that 
there was an order, I think, to desist in the practice of circulating 
certain printed literature. I was not aware of this. I was not involved. 
I did check this out. I was not named in the lawsuit or in the judgment. 
Senator Inouye. Who were those named in the lawsuit ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, without checking on that suit 



2128 

Senator Inouye. I am certain you know who were involved? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I am certain it was Mr, Haldeman, I think was 
one of them. I don't know if the President was named. My recollection 
is that he was. But without checking on the pleadings itself, I would 
ask that I be allowed to do so before I made a 

Senator Inouye. Was Mr. Ehrlicliman involved ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I don't recall that his name was involved. 

Senator Inouye. And it is your belief that because of the trust- 
worthiness of Mr. Ehrlichman, you were convinced that everything 
was proper and legal ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Absolutely. 

Senator Inouye. You were in charge of the surplus 1969 funds, 
weren't you ? 

Mr. IvALMBACH. Yes, sir, I was. I was the trustee for these funds. 
Again, Senator, on the basis of trust. 

Senator Inouye. These were cash funds ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Sir, there were $1,900,000 in cash and $570,000 in 
a checking account. 

Senator Inouye. Isn't it strange that when the campaign closed, 
the campaign committee for the President indicated that they had a 
debt? Why wasn't this surplus used to pay the debt ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator. I was spoken to by Mr. Stans in mid- 
January of 1969 and was advised that these funds were surplus and 
he characterized the funds as primarily from the primary campaign 
and I didn't question that. 

Senator Inouye. But you were aware that the Nixon campaign com- 
mittee of 1968 had declared that they were in debt ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I don't recall that that was the case. Senator. It 
would be my recollection that there was, that we finished that cam- 
paign in the black. 

Senator Inou^'e. Evidence seems to indicate that the committee and 
the Republican Party had incurred some debts in the 1969 campaign. 
However, would you tell us if you were absolutely certain that the 
attorneys who had received these funds, the funds that you had 
raised 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye [continuing]. Were certain to declare the receii)t 
of such in their income tax returns ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I have no knowledge. Senator. 

Senator Inouye. Do you think they were going to do that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. Then why all the secrecy ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Again, Senator, I was advised by Mr. Dean and 
then it was confirmed by Mr. Ehrlichman that tliis was the procedure 
to be followed. 

Senator Inou^ye. If the recipients, the lawyers and their clients- 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye [continuing]. Were to declare and recognize the 
receipt of these f mi els officially in their income tax returns, why all the 
secrecy in the delivery of these funds ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, again. Senator, the actions by these attorneys 
would be — that would be the way I would expect that they would show 
them. But as to the procedure that I was to follow to get the funds 



2129 

over to these people, there was just no question as to the procedure, 
and that was the all-encomi^assing- confidentiality. Senator. 

Senator Inouye. So you took the advice and the instructions from 
Mr. Dean unquestioniufrly ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Absolutely. 

Senator Inouye. You have indicated that you had a meeting with 
Mr. Stans, after Avhich you destroyed certain important documents, 
the reports and the record of contributions, is that not so^ 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, my memory on that is that I gave my 
reports, what I considered to be original reports, to Mr. Stans in 
February, March 1972 and thereafter destroyed what I considered to 
be personal and supportive documents and papers. 

Senator Inouye. Why did you destroy these papers ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I destroyed them to maintain the absolute con- 
fidentiality of my records. 

Now, there wei-e certain other — I think certain other — checks that 
were destroyed during this period inadvertently, but what I intended 
to do was to make ceitain that all personal and supportive papers 
that I had, Senator, were destroyed. I did not know that if I was — 
if I died or if something should happen where these records became 
public, I felt that I would breach, I would have breached the con- 
fidentiality that I had with the people with whom I had talked, and 
I have a very strong feeling about, if I give a man my word that 
is what I feel I shoulcl adhere to. 

Senator Inouye. Was it a matter of confidentiality or illegality ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Sir ? 

Senator Inouye. Was it illegality or confidentiality, sir ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was confidentiality. 

Senator Inouye. Were you convinced that the activities in which you 
were involved were completely legal ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. Absolutely. 

Senator Inouye. Can you advise this committee as to exactly how 
much all of the attorneys have received ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Sir, in the assignment that I undertook ? 

Senator Inouy^e. Yes, sir, or their clients, whichever. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, sir, my memory is that I caused approximately 
$220,000 to be given to Mr. Ulasewicz which w^as disbursed. Now. as to 
the total amount that was given to attorneys from the $220,000 plus or 
minus, I would think it is between $100,000, $130,000, in that area, I 
am not certain. 

Senator Inouye. Wlio were the attorneys who received the money ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I have testified. Senator, that Mr. Bittman 
received, I believe $25,000, and that Mrs. Hunt distributed the funds 
to other attorneys. 
- Senator Inouye. Who were the other attorneys ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. The names of the other attorneys, I think, are Mr. 
Rothblatt, I think Mr. Bailey was one of the names. 

Senator Inouye. Will you identify them fully, sir? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I do not know the first name. Senator. 

Senator Inolte. Who is Mr. Bailey ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think he was the attorney, I think, for Mr. McCord. 

Senator Inouy'e. Wliat is his first name ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I am not certain. 



2130 

Senator Inouye. Is it F. Lee Bailey ? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. I do not know. Just Mr. Bailey. Mr. Rothblatt— 
excuse me, Senator. I think Mr. Margoulis was another of the attor- 
neys. 

Senator Inouye. Are you certain that these men received these 
funds? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. I am not certain, but there Avould be — it would be 
my understanding that they had received funds, but as to the amounts 
I just cannot say. 

Senator Inouye. Did you at any time loan a sum of $20,000 to Mr. 
Ehrlichman from campaign funds? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. No, sir. I did loan Mr. Ehrlichman $20,000 from my 
own funds, not from campaign funds. 

Senator Inouye, In your testimony you have suggested that you had 
a meeting with Mr. Dean at which time he briefed you on how to testify 
at your FBI interrogation. Is that correct, sir ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I had a meeting with Mr. Dean, Senator. I believe it 
was on September 29, prior to my interview by the agents of the FBI, 
and the reason for that meeting' is that I advised — told Mr. Ehrlich- 
man, I believe, that I was — I had been asked to meet with the agents, 
that, in fact, I had set that meeting up, I believe it was. on Labor Day 
at 10 o'clock in my office in Los Angeles, and Mr. Ehrlichman had 
indicated that Mr. Dean was conducting an investigation of the so- 
called Segretti matter, and that I should meet with him and recount 
in entirety my role with Mr. Segretti, which was that of paying him 
funds, and to so advise Mr. Dean. I did that. 

Senator Inouye. In your meeting with Mr. Dean, did he suggest 
that you commit perjury ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, he did not. 

Senator Inouye. In retrospect, sir, as a lawyer, what recommenda- 
tions would you give this committee as to possible legislation to pre- 
vent the reoccurrence of some of the activities in which you were 
involved ? 

Mv. Kalmbach. Sir, I would have two or three suggestions. No. 1, 
I think that without knowing the regulations of, as far as this new 
law is concerned, the Federal Election Campaign Act, I think it 
should be made clear that funds could not be used for this purpose. I 
think there should be — perhaps legislation should be enacted to pro- 
hibit the use of cash. Those would be two suggestions. Senator. 

Senator Inouye. My final question, sir. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. At the time you were asked to raise funds for the 
special assignment, were you aware that the Committee To Re-Elect 
the President had an overabundance of money ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I was aware that the committee was — had a sur- 
plus, the fund was not running in a negative position, yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. Didn't you question the advisability of this special 
assignment to raise funds when funds were then available? 

Mr. Kalmbach. "Well, Senator, again it gets back to the fact that I 
had been dealing for at least 2 years, I think, with Mr. Dean in a posi- 
tion of absolute trust. He had been, in fact, the alter ego to the Presi- 
dent in matters that I had been dealing with as far as the President's 
personal work. I was dealing with Mr. Dean on matters involving the 



2131 

foundation, and a<rain, as I say, Senator, when I S])oke witli Mr. Dean 
and he made this request of me, it was just — it didn't come into my 
mind that this could be imi)roi)er. I just feU tliat I should oo forward 
as a special assignment to raise these funds. This man had at one time 
I recall toward the first of the year, had been supplyino; the finance 
committee with opinions as to legality, legal opinions, and again it 
was just, there was no question in my mind. Senator, and it was a 
matter of absolute trust in the character of this person, and I just 
went forward and, as I say, within a matter of a few minutes I called 
Mr. Stans for funds. 

Senator Ixouye. At no time did you question the propriety, at no 
time did you question the wisdom, of Mr. Dean. If Mr. Dean had ad- 
vised you to take a certain step in relation to one of our clients, let's 
say United Airlines has a case before the CAB and Mr. Dean says you 
should advise your client to do such and such, would you without 
question so advise United Airlines? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir ; I would not have. But there was an assign- 
ment being given to me by Mr. Dean on behalf of others that he simply 
named as "We" and again it was a matter of absolute trust that I go 
forward. 

Senator Inouye. In retrospect are you now convinced that you were 
involved in a criminal activity ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. In retrospect now, in this testimony, realizing from 
what Mr. Dean has testified, that this was improper, an illegal act. 
It is just as if I have been kicked in the stomach. 
Senator Inouye. Thank you, sir. 
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
Senator Ervix. Senator Gurney. 
Senator Git^xey. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Kalmbach, going back just a minute again to the — your, han- 
dling of cash in the 1972 campaign, the turnover of the cash to the 
Committee To Re-Elect the President, and the destruction of the 
records. 
Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurxey. Was there anything illegal about this destruction 
of records? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Not in my understanding, Senator. 
Senator Gurxey. Wasn't the law that prior to April 1972, there was 
no need to keep any records of cash raised or disbursed or held, isn't 
that correct? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, that is my understanding. 
Senator Gurxey. Wasn't it a common practice not to keep such 
records ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, it was. 
- Senator Gurxey. But even in spite of this, didn't you keep accurate 
records and turn those over to the Committee To Re-Elect the Presi- 
dent, you simply destroyed those copies remaining in your hands, 
isn't tiiat correct ? 
Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, it is. 

Senator Gt^rxey. It may interest you to know. Mr. Kalmbach, that 
our staff is investigating other campaigns and there is going to be 
interesting information about how they handled their own affairs. I 



96-296 0-^73— bk. 5- 



2132 

think we may find that it was somewhat similar, which is not sur- 
prising because that was the practice prior to April 1972. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurxey. We changed that in the Congress. I take it from 
your testimony you certainly are glad we did and this will make for a 
much more not only accurate but, let us sav, responsible and reliable 
handling of campaign funds, isn't that your belief ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Senator Gurney. In connection with the secrecy matter, I under- 
stand from your testimony that you disbursed certain amounts of 
money to Mr. Segretti. This was done on the orders of whom? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was done on the orders of ]Mr. Chapin. Senator. 

Senator Gurxey. And what did he tell you in his instructions to 
you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. This was in either late August or early September 
of 1971. Mr. Chapin asked me to meet with then Captain Segretti who 
was in the Army, asked me to meet with him to come to an agreement 
with him as to a compensation level and reach that agreement and 
begin disbursing funds to him for activities that he would be perform- 
ing for the White House. 

Senator Gurxey. In this connection, was it your understanding that 
you were disbursing these funds which were in your control at that 
time pursuant to the instructions of Mr. Haldeman or under his juris- 
diction. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. it was. Mv. Chapin, as I remember our con- 
versation, did not mention iNIr. Haldeman but Mr. Chapin was stand- 
ing, clearly standing, in the shoes of Mr. Haldeman as one of Mr. 
Haldeman's senior deputies. 

Senator Gurxey. During that time frame, as I understand your re- 
sponse, you were disbursing funds out of that resource of cash upon 
Mr. Haldeman's instructions or under his supervision, is that correct? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurxey. Did you ever have any discussion with Mr. Halde- 
man about this ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. About the disbursal of funds ? 

Senator Gurney. To Segretti. 

Mi-. Kalmbach. I do not recall that I ever did. Senator. My recollec- 
tion is clear as to my meeting with Mr. Chapin and my understanding 
was clear that he was speaking on behalf of Mr. Haldeman. But I do 
not recall that Mr. Haldeman's name was mentioned. 

Senator Gurxey. You had several contacts with Ulasewicz during 
this time of raising money and turning it over to him for disbursal for 
these Watergate defendants. Did he ever talk to you in anv of these 
conversations, about the fact that he was using this money that he ob- 
tained from you. and paying it over to people for coverup or hush 
money or payoffs ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, is this during this assignment period? 

Senator Gttrxey. Yes. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Sir, he did not use that language. I remember that 
he had some cautionary words to me which fed this concern that came 
back on me aftei- I had seen Mr. Jones and that, combined with the 
secrecy piocodures and combined with the press coverage, all of this 



2133 

brought my level of concern to the point where I kneAv that I would 
not do more. 

Senator Gurney. What were these terms, cautionary terms, I think 
you called them ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Something to the effect that this procedure is so un- 
usual, or there were — I cannot recall the exact language. Senator. It 
was sufficient for me with the other factors that were involved to know 
that this was something that I would not continue in. 

Senator Gurxey. But he never mentioned the word "coverup"' or 
anything similar to that that would indicate that it was a coverup? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Xo, sir, I do not recall that he did. It was simply 
cautionary words as to this procedure. He was, after all, a retired 
New York City police detective and professional in that field and 
these cautionary words — and again, I do not remember exactly what 
they were — those plus these other factors raised this level of concern 
even though I had seen Mv. Ehrlichman on July 26. It just came back 
on me and I knew at this point that I would not do more. 

Senator Gurney. Did Ulasewicz ever tell you what any of these 
defendants told him in his contacts with them while he was handling 
this money and paying them ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, he did. 

Senator Gukney. What did he say ? 

Mr. Kalmbach, At various times, he would report discussions that 
he had had with various of these individuals, primarily, I think, with 
Mrs. Hunt, which I would then relay back to either Mr. Dean or Mr. 
LaRue, and I think they moi-e primarily had to do with amounts to 
individuals, that sort of thing. 

Senator Gurney. Do you recall anything besides amounts to indi- 
viduals ? 

Mr. Kalmbach, I do not. Senator. 

Senator Gurxey. How many times did you discuss money for these 
Watergate defendants at the White House ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. With Mr. Dean, several times, but only once with 
Mr. Ehrlichman and I think the second time, when I advised — my 
mernory is that I advised Mr. Ehrlicliman of my — the fact that I had 
received these funds from Mr. Jones in early August. 

Senator Gurxey. You have described that, of course, already to the 
committee. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurxey. Did you ever have any discussions with Mrs. Himt 
personally ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Never. 

Senator Gurxey. Did you ever discuss or was there eA^er anv discus- 
sion with Mr. Dean. Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. ^litchell, 
Mr. Colson, or anyone else, that this money was being used for coverup, 
or hush money, or payoff money ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Senator Gurxey. Tliat never arose in any of these various meetings 
that you had ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Senator Gurxey. Mr. Stans indicated when he was here, in his tes- 
timony, that Dean and Ehrlichman had assured you that this request 
for the $75,100 was something legal. Do you remember any discussion 



2134 

that you had with IMr. Stans about the legality or the illegality of the 
$75,100 when you received that from him ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, my memory of my visit with Mr. Stans, 
first the telephone visit and then my visit with him in the hotel room, 
was simply that I told him that I had received a very important as- 
signment from someone in authority at the White House, that it was 
proper, that I could not divulge the nature of the assignment, and that 
he would have to trust me. And his response was that. Herb, I certainly 
trust you, and he gave the funds to me without more. 

Senator Gtjrney. And that was the sum and substance of it? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, that is the sum and substance of that 
conversation. 

Senator Gurney. Let's go to the meeting in Mr. Dean's office where, 
when you, and Mr. LaRue, and Mr. Dean were there. As I understand 
the purpose of this meeting, it was to get instructions from Mr. LaRue 
on the handling of this money. Was the meeting June 29 ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I don't recall any meeting on June 29. I 
think the meeting I recall with particularity would be on July 19, 
when I received some $40,000 from Mr. LaJRue to be given to Mr. 
LTlasewicz, with no indication to me as to the source of those funds. 

Senator Gurney. Was that the 18th or 19th ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. My recollection is the 19th. 

Senator Gurney. I am not trying to trip you up. I just happen to 
have the 18th here. I may have put it down wrong. Your recollection 
is the 19th. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Excuse me, Senator. 

Senator Gurney. Counsel says it was the 19th, too. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. What participation did Mr. Dean take in this 
meeting? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, he was part of the meeting, I think he did, 
he was on the telephone once or twice, but he was certainly part of the 
meeting and was aware of wliat was being discussed. Senator. 

I am not clear in my own mind as to whether or not there were 
instructions given at this meeting, but in all likelihood, instructions 
were given. But I can't say for certain. But I am certain that approxi- 
mately $40,000 was given to me by Mr. LaRue to be given to Mr. 
Ulasewicz. 

Senator Gurney. Again, you say that he participated in the meet- 
ing. Could you be a little more explicit, because I am sure you know 
his recollection is somewhat different. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, sir, I know the three of us conversed together 
in the meeting, so in my view, we were all three at the meeting. 

Senator Gurney. How did the meeting occur? I mean by that, did 
you arrive first? Who was there when you came into the office? What 
was said? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I don't remember exactly who was there first. It 
was, my memory is that we all arrived — we, Mr. LaRue and I arrived 
separately. Whether I arrived first or last, I am not certain, but Mr. 
Dean, of course, was in the office and there was a discussion of these 
funds that Mr. LaRue had for me and possibly directions for dis- 
bursement to these people by Mr. T'lasewicz, which I would convey 



2135 

along with these funds, which I then took up to New York that night 
to be given to Mr. Ulasewicz. 

Senator Gurney. Your recollection is it was a meeting between 
three people — Dean, LaRue, and Kalmbach — a participation of all 
these three people and Mr. Dean's nonparticipation was only when 
he happened to be on the phone. Is that right ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, that would sum up my memory of that 
meeting. 

Senator Gurney. Did he have many phone calls, do you recall ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Oh, I think two or three throughout this period. 
Probably the meeting Avas 30 minutes in length. 

Senator Gurney. There was another meeting in Mr. Dean's office, 
as I recall, on September 21, the same three people. This meeting, I 
understand, was to reconcile records. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. At that meeting, I went through my records as to 
funds I had received, the totals, and the funds that had been dis- 
bursed, against the totals. I wanted to make certain that they were in 
complete agreement with what Mr. LaRue and Mr. Dean so under- 
stood and once I had that confirmation, then I w^as satisfied and felt 
that I had discharged, I was discharged formally from this responsi- 
bility. 

Senator Gurxey. Was this meeting, too, a meeting between these 
three people ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It is my recollection that it was, yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Were all three participating in it ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. That is my recollection, yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. "Why was it held in Mr. Dean's office? Any rea- 
son for that? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I think it was just probably the most con- 
venient place, rather than for Mr. Dean — Mr. Dean had many tele- 
phone calls all the time and I think the feeling was that this was the 
most logical place to meet. 

Senator Gurney. On both these meetings that we have been talking 
about, do you recall who suggested Mr. Dean's office? Who set up the 
meeting ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I really don't. I am not certain of that. And 
I think in view of the fact that I Avanted to effect this confirmation 
of my records, that probably I asked for the meeting. But I don't re- 
member. Senator. 

Senator Gurney. Why did Dean need to be present ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I think the only reason, probably, was that 
Mr. Dean was someone that I had been receiving directions from and 
I felt that it was appropriate in case there was any haziness on the part 
of anybody, that all three would be present. That would be my memoiy 
of why. 

Senator Gurney. Perhaps another way of putting it, is in this par- 
ticular enterprise that you were engaged in, you thought he was the 
person who was directing it. Is that fair to say ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. I had the feeling that Mr. Dean was the 
primary person directing it. After all, he had been the one to see me on 
the 29th. Mr. LaRue liad also given me instructions. But I regarded 
the two, really, as interchangeable but with Mr. Dean probably the 
primaiT one. 



2136 

Senator Ervix. We have two votes coming up in the Senate — one 
bein^ held now and we have a vote on final passagje of a bill the Senate 
has been considering for about a week or 10 days at 10 minutes to 12. 
For that reason, the committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
2 p.m., the same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Ttjesday, July 17, 1973 

Senator Er\^x. The committee will come to order. 

This morning I received a letter dated this morning, that is, July 
17, 1973, from the Honorable George P. Shultz, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, reading as follows : 

Dear Mr. Chairman, at the direction of the President, I hereby enclose a letter 
relative to testimony by the Secret Service to congressional committees. Sincerely 
yours, George P. Shultz. 

The letter from the President to Secretary Shultz which was en- 
closed in Mr. Shultz' letter to me reads as follows : 

The White House, Washington. July 16, 1973. 

Dear Secretary Shultz, I hereby direct that no officer or agent of the Secret 
Service shall give testimony to congressional committees concerning matters ob- 
served or learned while performing protective functions for the President or in 
their duties at the White House. 

Thi.s applies to the Senate Select Committee which is inve.stigating matters 
relating to the Watergate break-in and the current efforts which I am informed 
are being made to subpena present or former members of the White House de- 
tail of the Secret Service. 

You will please communicate this information to the Director of the Secret 
Service promptly and either you or he should then personally notify the chair- 
man of the Senate Select Committee. You should further advise the chairman 
tliat requests for information on procedures in the White House will be given 
prompt consideration when received by me. 

Sincerely, Richard Nixon. 

The committee had subpenaed certain of the agents of the Secret 
Service, and they appeared in obedience to the subpena. Senator Baker 
and I as members of the commit^^ee and members of the committee 
staff, thereupon undertook to interrogate one of these Secret Service 
agents, Al Wong. At that time counsel for the Secretary of the Treas- 
ury entered a plea of executive privilege, claiming that under this 
plea of executive privilege the witnesses, Mr. Wong and the other 
Secret Service agents, could not be required to testify before the com- 
mittee. Counsel read copies of the two letters Avhich I have just read 
to set forth and sustain the plea of executive privilege. 

As a consequence of these letters. Senator Baker and I convened 
a special executive session of the entire committee, feeling this is a mat- 
ter of such import that the entire committee should consider it. 

After discussion the committee reached the conclusion that it was 
not worthwhile at the present time to engage in any controversy with 
the witnesses on the question of Avhether or not they should be required 
to testify before the committee — the committee feeling that this was 
not a matter the witnesses were pennitted to determine for themselves. 
But the committee noted the closing sentence in the letter from the 
President to the Secretary of the Treasury reading as follows: 

You should further advise the chairman that requests for information on pro- 
cedures in the White House will be given prompt consideration when received 
liy me. 



2137 

The committee hopes that the word "procedures" is much broader 
than the strict interp'etation that that word might imply and it is 
only interested at this stage in getting access and the right to use in 
the hearings the records and tapes in the possession of the White 
House which are relevant to the matters which the committee is author- 
ized by Senate Resolution No. 60 to investigate. 

Being desirous of adjusting this matter, if possible, on an amicable 
basis with the "White House, the committee decided that the chairman 
should send a letter to the President asking for his cooperation in 
making available to the committee records and tapes which are rel- 
evant to the matters which the committee is authorized to investigate, 
and relevant to the testimony of witnesses who have appeared before 
the committee or who are subpenaed to appear before the committee. 
I sincerely hope that this course of action will bear fruit and that we 
will be able to get access to the records and tapes which we think are 
relevant and necessary to our investigation in a manner that is satis- 
factory to everybody concerned. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with 
your description of the situation as the committee finds it. 

I would note further that the committee decided, as you very accu- 
rately pointed out, that it would serve no imm.ediate purpose to engage 
in a conflict or controversy with the Secret Service on whether they 
should or should not disclose information at their disposal but rather 
the decisionmaking authority resided elsewhere. 

It is in a spirit of conciliation that we are dispatching a letter which 
we have now authorized to the President making these requests: (1), 
who is the custodian of the tapes. (2) , who has had access to the tapes. 
(3), how do we go about receiving that information and the tapes as 
they relate to the lawful inquiry of this committee, not to a general 
fishing expedition, not on matters that are clearly protected by execu- 
tive privilege, such as foreign affairs, internal communications not re- 
lated to the "Watergate situation, but how do we go about getting those 
relevant portions of the tapes. 

"We are, I hope, being both patient and optimistic in taking this 
course of action instead of pursuing an effort to compel testimony 
from Secret Service agents in which we might or might not prevail 
in this litigation or otherwise. So, I commend the chairman for the 
action taken, for his description of the situation, and I am hopeful 
that we will have a response very, very promptly because these hear- 
ings are ongoing. It is a matter of monumental importance, and I hope 
that we can have a discussion very quickly. 

Now, the last point I would make. ]NIr. Chairman, if I may, is the 
fact that it is public knowledge that a tentative meeting betAveen you 
and the President had been arranged for. The president's imfortunate 
illness has intervened to apparently delay that or at least possibly 
delay that, and may I say for my part that I hope that that meeting 
can occur as quickly as possible, or in lieu of that meeting that at least 
the principal staff of this committee and principal staff of the "WHiite 
House might immediately begin conversations on how we could gain 
access to the documents and the tapes. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Any other member of the committee have any 
observations? 



2138 

If not, we will resume the questioning of the witness, and I believe 
Senator Gurney was interrogating the witness at the time we took 
the recess. 

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be as brief 
as possible. 

Mr. Kalmbach, I would like to go back to the first meeting that you 
had with Mr. Dean when he instructed you to raise money and then 
turn it over to Mr. Ulasewicz for payment to these defendants. As 
you undoubtedly know, there is some dispute as to whether the meet- 
ing took place. Mr. Dean was positive it took place in the Mayflower 
Hotel. What is your recollection as to where it took place? 

Mr. Kalmbach. My recollection. Senator, is that the meeting on 
the 29th took place in front of the Hay- Adams and then we met and 
talked in Lafayette Park. Then my recollection is that on the 30th, 
which is the Friday morning, that we met in my room at the Statler- 
Hilton. 

Senator Gurney. And you were staying at the Statler-Hilton, not 
the Mayflower? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. In connection with this testimony, Mr. Chair- 
man, I would like to present some exhibits here and insert them in the 
record. 

Senator Ervin. Will someone hand the exhibits to the witness? 

Senator Gurney. These exhibits, I will briefly outline, are a letter 
from the Mayflower, which is dated June 27 of this year and simply 
says that Mr. Kalmbach was not a registered guest between June 1 
and July 1, 1972; a letter from the Statler-Hilton replying to a 
subpena of this committee; the subpena of this committee for the 
records of the Statler-Hilton ; and then the bill of the Statler-Hilton. 
Mr. Kalmbach's bill ; and then a registration card, plus what appears 
to be the im]nnnt of a credit card. I would simply like to ask the witness 
if he would turn to the registration card, which is the last exhibit, 
and, do you recognize that printing — it really is not a signature — on 
the registration card as your printing? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir ; it is. 

Senator Gurney. This is what you entered on that card when you 
registered in at the Statler-Hilton ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. On June 29, 1978 ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. And that is an imprint of your credit card there 
above the registration cai'd ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Those will ])e admitted into evidence as the proper 
exhibits. 

Senator ERAaN. The papers identified by Senator Gurney and the 
witness will be marked appropriately as exhibits and admitted in the 
record as such. 

TThe documents referred to were marked exhibit Xo. 76.*] 

Senator Gi^rney. Now, let us go to your fundraising efl'orts and let 
me ask you this question, because there has been some and will be, I 
think, some speculation as to whether these are individual contribu- 

* See p. 2209. 



2139 

tions or otherwise. "Wlien you were soliciting funds at any time, like 
the one you solicited from Mr. Jones of the Northrup Corp., did you 
ever solicit corporate money, or were these always individual solicita- 
tions ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I always solicited individuals. Senator, and never 
asked for corporate funds. I Avell knew that corporate fund contribu- 
tions were illeo:al and I would never ask for corporate funds. 

Senator Gurnet. As far as you knew, they were individual funds. 
That is what you thought you were receiving? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes. sir. 

Senator Gurnet. In Mr. Stans' May 8 interview with the commit- 
tee — not his testimony here, his interview — he stated he held daily staff 
meetings with key associates of the finance committee, including Kalm- 
bach, Washburn, Evans, Nunn, and on occasion. Reed, Hofgren, and 
Liddy. At these meetings, did the matter of Watergate ever come up 
in any respect, either in the planning stage or any other stage ? Do you 
know ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Pardon me. Senator. Would you repeat the ques- 
tion, please ? 

Senator Gurnet. "When Mr. Stans was interviewed by the conimit- 
tee staff on ]\Iay 8, he said he had daily staff meetings Avith his key 
associates of the finance committee, which included you, Mr. Kalm- 
bach, Washburn, Evans, Xunn, and on occasion. Reed, Hofgren and 
Liddy. My question was, did the question of Watergate ever come up 
in any of these meetings ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. I am talking now, of course, about the planning 
of the break-in. the bugging, the burglary, and all the rest of the busi- 
ness connected with Watergate. 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I left the committee on Friday, April 7. 
and had been in attendance at several staff meetings for the period 
preceding, several weeks, and I recall at no time was any mention made 
of such a thing, no sir. 

Senator Gurnet. Now, let's go to the moneys that you gave to Mr. 
Ulasewicz, and as I understand, these were given to him on four sepa- 
rate occasions. June 29 was the first one and I think you gave him at 
that time $75,100. Is that correct? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. I think, Senator, that was on June 30; 
Friday, June 30. 

Senator Gurnet. What instructions did you give Mr. Ulasewicz 
when you turned this money over to him ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Again, my best memory is that I asked Mr. Ulase- 
wicz to take the funds and return to New York, return to his home in 
New York, and that I would be in touch Avith him as to instructions. 
• Senator Gurnet. In other words, on June 30, you did not give him 
any specific instructions? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I do not recall that, no sir. 

Senator Gurnet. All right. What instructions did you give to him 
after June 30 about this part icular $75,100 ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, again, my memory is that sometime im- 
mediately after Mr. Ulasewicz returned to New York and I returned 
to California, I received instructions, I think from Mr. Dean, or it may 
have been from Mr. LaRue — I am not certain — asking that I give 



2140 

the instructions to Mr. Ulasewicz to contact Mr. Caddy. And I think 
those instructions were received within a period of a few days after 
I returned on the 30tli. 

I thereupon called ]Mr. Ulasewicz' home in New York and gave him 
those instructions. He then went to AVashiujfjton and there were several 
calls back and forth, I think, between he and Mr. Caddy. Then he 
would then call me. I would then contact either Mr. Dean or Mr. 
LaRue until finally, at one point, eventually, it was clear that Mr. 
Caddy would not receive the funds. 

Senator Gurxey. You say he would not receive them? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. Yes. sir. 

Senator Gurxey. Well, now, what eventually happened to them? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. Well, eventually. Senator, I think that an attempt 
was made to contact Mr. O'Brien, with the same result. ]Mr. O'Brien 
would not accept delivery of the funds. 

Senator Gurxey. Now, this is an attempt on the part of Mr. 
Ulasewicz? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. Yes, sir; at my direction, and I had received the 
direction from either Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue. 

Senator Gurxey. Go on. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Then I think it was in the second week of July that 
eventually, a delivery was made of $25,000, I think to Mr. Bittman, 
by Mr. T^lasewicz, ao:ain at my direction and after I had received 
directions from either Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue. 

Senator Gurxey. In other words, that $25,000 was turned over by 
either Dean or LaRue instructinof you to instruct Ulasewicz to give 
it to Bittman? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. Yes, sir ; that is r-ight. 

Senator Gurxey. Now, that accounts for $25,000. What about the 
$5,100— $50,100? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. Well, sir; my recollection is that I think Mr. Ulase- 
wicz disbursed some $8,000 to Mr. Liddy. I know that I had instructed 
Mr. Ulasewicz to deduct from the funds that I gave to him what- 
ever he needed for his expenses. 

Senator Gurxey. Was this $8,000 to Liddv upon your instructions? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. Yes, sir ; I am certain that it was. 

Senator Gurxey. Received from whom ? 

Mr. Kalmbacii. From Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue. 

Senator Gurxey. Go on. 

Mr. Kalmbach. And also, $1,000 was— I received $1,000 which I had 
turned over to Mr. Strachan at the '\^liite House in response to his 
request for $1,000. 

Senator Gurxey. All right. 

Mr. Kalmbach. About that time. Senator, I received some $40,000 
from Mr. LaRue — I think it was on the 19th of July — which I 
gave to Mr. T^lasewicz. And from that time forward, T think mv mem- 
ory is that almost all of the funds went to ]\rrs. Hunt, with some 
$80,000 going to INlr. LaRue on or about the 19th or— 18th or 19th of 
September — that when the final pavment was made to Mr. — one pay- 
ment of some $80,000 to Mr. LaRue and, T think it was some little 
more than $50,000 to ]Mrs. Hunt at that time. 

Senator Gurxey. Well, if we can go back now, we were down to. 
we accounted for $84,000 out of the $75,000. 



2141 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. Which would leave $41,000, plus another $40,000 
from LaRue — $81,000. Now, at that point, what happened as far as 
the instructions to do something with the $81,000? What was the next 
step? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, throughout this period, several times, I 
received instructions to instruct Mr. Ulasewicz as to disbursals and as 
I say, I think most of those disbursals after mid-July, I think, went 
to Mrs. Hunt, who in turn distributed funds to various of the de- 
fendants and to various of the attorneys involved. 

Senator Gfrxey. Well, can you give us a little better understanding 
than that. Did you receive word from Dean or LaRue to give x 
amount to Mrs. Hunt ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, I remember that, I was told from time to 
time to give x amount to Mrs. Hunt. 

Senator Gurney. Do you remember what those amounts were and 
when? 

]Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. But in reconstructing this history in trying 
to develop what the amounts were and to whom these funds went, my 
memory is that approximately $150,000 or thereabouts went to Mrs. 
Hunt, out of which certain of the attorneys w^ere paid and various 
of the defendants. Beyond that $150,000, there was $30,000 that was 
given to INIr. LaRue in the final disbursal. Twenty-five thousand dol- 
lars was given to ]\Ir. Bittman. I think $8,000 was "given to Mr. Liddy, 
as I remember it, $1,000 to Mr. Ulasewicz, and $1,000 which I retained 
and delivered to Mr. Strachan. Now that total is approximately 
$220,000. 

Senator Gurney. And the amount, as I recall, was $219,000? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. So then as I understand it this rather large 
amount to Mrs. Hunt, approximately $150,000 was paid from time to 
time and you don't actually recall the specific dates and the amounts? 
_ Mr. Kalmbach. No. sir; T do not. T don't recall — T recall with par- 
ticularity the dates when I received funds, but I don't recall -with 
anything like particularity as to the dates that I called Mr. ITlasewicz 
or when instructions were given to Mr. Ulasewicz to make these dis- 
bursals and, as I said, after mid-July, I think most of all of the 
money went to Mrs. Hunt who, in turn, distributed the funds to vari- 
ous attorneys and other defendants, plus the $30,000 that went to Mr. 
LaRue in September. 

Senator Gltrney. What is your recollection of the instructions that 
you were receiving from Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue at this time so far 
as payments to Mrs. Hunt are concerned? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, the instructions as I remember it, were to give 
.her funds for attorneys, and I recall the names of the attorneys over 
and above Mr. Bittman, Mr. Rothblatt, I think, Mr. Bailey and Mr. 
Maroulis, plus there were attorneys for — but I never, I could not, 
I do not remember the names of attorneys for other of the defend- 
ants, and a lesser amount was given to those attorneys, some three 
attorneys for three of the defendants. 

Senator Gurney. Who did the instructions come mainly from, Mr. 
Dean or Mr. LaRue ? 



2142 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, initially it's my recollection that they came 
primarily from Mr. Dean, but shortly thereafter or shortly into the 
period there they be<yan to come more from Mr. LaRue or although 
I always gained it interchangeably. Senator. 

Senator Gurxey. In the raising of the money, as I understand it you 
received four amounts here that totaled $219,000. Where did most of 
the pressure come from to raise this money, do you recall that, from 
whom ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. I was just — I was given my instructions, 
again by Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue and then I recall that Mr. Ulasewicz 
would receive communications from the ]")eople that he was talking 
to and primarily Mrs. Hunt, which I would relay back to these people, 
and then I would relay again back down after I received my instruc- 
tions, I would then call Mr. Ulasewicz. 

Senator Gurnf.y. Just one final question, Mr. Kalmbach : Did you 
have any discussions following the break-in of Watergate down to 
now with the President? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Senator Gtjrney. About Watergate ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No. Not at any time. 

Senator Gurney. Neither on the phone nor in person ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Senator Gurxey. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervix^. Senator Talmadge. 

Senator Talmadge. Thank you. ]\Ir. Chairman. 

Mr. Kalmbach, I want to get into an area that you have not testi- 
fied on, that we have had reports in the press about it. Are you familiar 
with funds going into the State of Alabama during the 1970 election? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator. I am familiar with funds that I disbursed 
in 1970 under instructions. I. at that time — I had no knowledge as to 
where the ultimate distributees would be. 

Senator Talmadge. Will vou tell us about that fund, please? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. During the 1970 period I was raising funds 
toward the — in the senatorial races, and also I was directed by Mr. 
Higby on three different occasions to disburee funds out of trust 
funds that I had under my control. I recall tliat there was a call that 
Mr. Higby made to me, in — I think it was in late March of 1970- — 
directing that I disliurse $100,000 to someone there in New York. 

I took these funds from the })ox, safe dej^osit box, at the Cliase Man- 
hattan Rank in New York and delivered them to an individual at the 
Sherry Netlierlands Hotel in New York. 

Senator Talmadge. Who was the individual ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I did not know his name, and do not know him. 

Senator Talmadge. Hoav did you know you gave the $100,000 to the 
right man ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I was advised at a latei- date tliat I had given the 
funds to tlie right person. 

Senator Talmadge. Who gave you the instructions as to whom to 
meet and where? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I talked to Mr. Higby, and lie instructed me, and I 
said that I would deliver the funds at the Sherry-Netlierlands Hotel, 
and an individual then came up to nie and the identification was proper, 
and I 



2143 

Senator Talmadge. Was there a password ? 

Mr, Kalmbach. No, sir, 1 don't recall the procedure now, but it was 
definite that it was the man 

Senator Talmadge. You didn't walk into tiie lobby and give the first 
hundred thousand, give the hundred thousand to the first man you 
saw, did you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Xo,sir. [Laughter.] 

Senator Talmadge. What was the arrangement whereby you could 
make the proper contact ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I don't recall the specific arrangements. Senator. 
It was simply that he — I was in the lobby, and I think I was in a par- 
ticular colored suit and he came up to me and identified himself as being 
from someplace and I don't recall where it was. 

Senator Talmadge. Did he have a Southern drawl ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I don't remember it ; no, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. You didn't hear his voice ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I heard his voice but it was not distinctive. 

Senator Talmadge. What was the signal as to how he could identify 
himself to you to receive the $100,000 ? 

Mr. Kal3ibach. Well, I think the signal was that he asked me if I 
was — I forget whether I was — from some State, and I replied, yes, 
or something, and that was sufficient but I don't recall the exact 
procedure. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you have a code name ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Talmadge. Did he have one ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I don't recall it. 

Senator Talmadge. Do you know what the purpose of that money 
was for ? 

Mr. Kal3ibach. I did not. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you have any suspicions ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, 1 did not. 

Senator Talmadge. You didn't think they were going to take it 
somewhere and burn it up, did you ? [Laughter.] 

Mr. Kalm.bach. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, tell us about the next contributir Oiat 
you made and the circumstances thereof. That was the first $10(;. ' ' 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Where did that money come from ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was funds that I held in trust that Mr. Stans ' 
entrusted to me. 

Senator Talmadge. Was that leftover money from the 1968 cam- 
paign ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Proceed, please. 

Mv. Kalmbach. Then I think within a month, Senator, I was again 
asked to disburse $200,000 following the same procedure. 

Senator Talmadge. Did Mr. Higby also request you the second time? 

Mr. Kalmbach. That is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. All right. Go ahead. 

Mr. Kalmbach. And my recollection is that I asked one of the sig- 
natories on the box, Mr. Franz Rain, to take the funds to the — again 
to the — Sherry-Netherlands Hotel, and disburse to an individual, 
which he did. 



2144 

Senator Talmadge. Was it the same individual ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I do not know. 

Senator Talmadge. You didn't deliver the second $100,000 ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Talmadge. You just made it available ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. All right, that is $300,000. Now, tell us about the 
next amount. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Then finally there was a third communication 
again, I think it was from Mr. Higby directing that another $100,000 
be disbursed in the same manner, although at this time I was asked to 
disburse to an individual in Los Angeles, in the lobby of the Bank 
of California Building on Flower and 6th Street. 

Senator Talmadge. You delivered $200,000 and an agent delivered 
the other $200,000 ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. That is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. And your directions or instructions to deliver 
the money came from Higby twice, and who the third time ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. From Mr. Higby the tliird time. 

Senator Talmadge. All three times ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you have any suspicion as to where that 
money was going ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I did not. I made the assumption Avithout 
knowing that it was going into campaigns but I did not know which 
campaign. 

Senator Talmadge. "What was your assumption ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. That it was going into various of the campaigns but 
I did not know which. 

Senator Talmadge. What campaigns ? 

Mr. KALMTiACii. The various of the campaigns in the 1970 election 
year. 



Senator Talmadge. More than one campaign or just 



one 



Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I think I made the assumption it was going 
into more than one. 

Senator Talmadge. Was that not, in fact, money that was used to 
try to defeat Governor Wallace in Alabama in 1970 ? 

ISIr. Kalmbach. Senator, I have never known this to be a fact. I 
think subsequent to the disbursals, I heard comments to the effect 
that part or all of those fimds did, in fact, go to that campaign but 
I did not know at the time and the only evidence or indication that 
I have had subsequent was just various comments. 

Senator Talmadge. A man of your intelligence and ability and back- 
ground certainly would not be in the business of just walking up to 
strangers in liotels and giving them $400,000 for nothing, would you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

SenatoT- TAL]\rADGE. You suspected that it was going to stop Gov- 
ernor Wallace in Alabama, did you not? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I did not at that time. 

Senator Talmadge. But you subsequently suspected that ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Do you know that of your own knowledge? 

Mr. Kalmbacit. I do not know it as a fact, Senator. 



2145 

Senator Talmadge. It is common knowledge though, in circles that 
handled that money, is it not, Mr. Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I beg your pardon, Senator? 

Senator Talmadge. It is common knowledge in the circles that 
raised the money and dispensed it, is it not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I think there is a belief that part or all of it 
did go to that campaign but again. Senator, I would not have the 
certainty that that is true. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, there is one thing I did not understand 
from your testimony to date. Wlio made the decision as to how much 
of this money that would go to these defendants and their lawyers? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, the decision, as I remember it, Senator, was 
always handed to me either by Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue, and then it 
would be passed from me to Mr. Ulasewicz on to these individuals. I 
think Mr. Ulasewicz received certain communications again that he 
relayed to me, and I relayed on up, which perhaps was confirmed as 
to suggestions, but there was no negotiating at all on the part of either 
Mr. Ulasewicz or myself. 

Senator Talmadge. Your answer, then, is Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue 
determined how much each of these people and their lawyers would 
get? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, ultimately. 

Senator Talmadge. Did any of tiie attorneys that the money was 
delivered to ever indicate what source it came from or wonder what 
source it came from or make inquiries about what source it came from ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I do not recall that any did. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. It would be strange to you as a lawyer if some 
intermediary came into your office and gave you $25,000 and never 
indicated the source, would it not? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, it would. 

Senator Talmadge. Would you not have some deep dark suspicion 
about it and want to have more knowledge about it? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I would be suspicious, yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, you stated yesterday that you believed that 
the payment plan 

Mr. Kalmbach. Incidentally, Senator, I want to add that I had the 
feeling that these men were anticipating a call from Mr. Ulasewicz 
but I had no knowledge as to how or who had communicated with, 
for example, IVIr. Bittman. I had no knowledge as to how or who 
had communicated with him, so that he was anticipating a call from 

Mr. Ulasewicz. That was handled, I think 

Senator Talmadge. What you are saying is delivery of the money 
did not take the lawyers by surprise, is that it ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, it did not or the calls did not. 
• Senator Talmadge. You stated yesterday that you believe that this 
payment plan was so important because it came from Mr. Dean, the 
President's personal counsel. Did you, because of that, suspect that 
the President himself might have approved it ? 
Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 
Senator Talmadge. You did not ? 
Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. You just took it at face value because the Pres- 
ident's counsel himself indicated that to you ? 



2146 

Mr, Kalmbach. Well, ag:ain. Senator, here was a man that I had 
been dealing with for a year and a half, or 2 years, at that time, a man 
in whom I had absolute and complete trust. He was standing, really, 
in the shoes of the President, on the President's legal work that a 
partner and I would be talking to him about. It was again without — 
because my own nature is that I trust my friends and trust my part- 
ners, and I had absolute trust in this man. And when he made this 
request of me, I did not hestitate. 

Senator Talmadge. Well, you, yourself, were the President's per- 
sonal counsel. You represented him in personal matters. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Dean represented him, I presume, pri- 
marily in offical matters, did he not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Well, did you not feel free as the President's 
personal lawyer, to check it out with him at that time ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, as I think I have testified, I think I have 
met with the President not more than four or fi^-e times since 1969. 
He has such a very busy schedule 

Senator Talmadge. I would hope tliat my personal lawyer would 
feel perfectly free to communicate with me at any time and I am 
quite sure that he would, particularly if a matter arose that might 
be suspicious affecting my interest. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. You testified, I believe, that you finally became 
concerned about the James Bond nature of all of these affairs and 
finally, went to INIr. Ehrlichman to determine Mr. Dean's authority, 
is that not correct ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, and to confirm the propriety. 

Senator Talmadge. And he told you that ]\Ir. Dean did have the 
authority to do so. Xow, you met with Mr. Ehrlichman a number of 
times, I believe, in July, did you not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think once or twice in addition to that meet- 
ing, but I am not certain as to that. Senator. 

Senator Talmadge. I believe in your testimony and depositions in 
the suit filed by the Democratic committee, you had dinner with Mr. 
Ehrlichman in California, as I recall, Jufy 6. You also, I believe, 
stated that you had met with Mr. Ehrlichman on July 14. And you 
finally, I believe, met with ;Mr. Ehrlichman on July 26, 1972, in "his 
office to confirm the authority of Mr. Dean to authorize the payments. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. And you did meet with ]\Ir. Enrlichman on 
those three occasions, did you not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, I am not certain on the first meeting if that 
was a large dinner meeting or if I was with him alone. I am just not 
certain of that. 

Senator Talmadge. I believe I am informed by a member of the 
staff that the first meeting, which occurred on July 6, occurred on your 
calendar, so that meeting might have been in your own office. Do 
you recall such a meeting ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Sir? 

Senator Talmadge. Do you recall such a meeting in your office on 
July 6 in California ? 



2147 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, but it could have happened. I do not recall. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, did you believe or have reason to believe 
that because Mr. Ehrlichman told you to go ahead with these mat- 
ters that the message might have been relayed to the President by 
Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I think I made the assumption that it had been. 

Senator Talmadge. Did the President ever speak to you after the 
press had released an account of the stories involving you with Mr. 
Segretti in September of last year to ask you what had occurred ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. I believe you stopped raising money for the de- 
fendants in September 1972, did you not? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you stop these fundraising efforts because 
your name had been publicly associated in connection with Donald 
Segretti ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. I think that that was part, perhaps part of 
it, but the primary concern that had fed my earlier concern and came 
back on me, Senator, was these secrecy procedures. The fact that Mr. 
Segretti was asked by — talked to by the Bureau, by the FBI on the 
Segretti matter was something that — I had given him funds from 
about the 1st of October or the last of September, to the first of 
February, never knowing what he was involved in, and suddenly, 
these stories began coming out and I did not — it was something that 
I had concern about. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you notify anyone at that time that you 
thought that fundraising and distribution was improper? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Sir ? 

Senator Talmadge. Did you notify anyone at that time that it 
was your conclusion that this fundraising was improper? 

Mr. Kalmbach. For this assignment ? 

Senator Talmadge. For the payment of such affairs as Segretti, 
the defendants, their living expenses, their bail, their lawyers' fees, 
and one thing and another ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I indicated. Senator, that I would not be involved 
in this. 

Senator Talmadge. And that was the time you stopped raising 
money for that pur]:)Ose ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Did the President call you after the election in 
November 1972? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, he did. 

Senator Talmadge. That was after you had raised funds for pay- 
ment to these defendants and other purposes, was it not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. It was, and it was after the election and after I had 
raised a substantial amount of money for the reelection campaign be- 
ginning back in November of 1970, Senator. 

Senator Talmadge. What was discussed in that conversation relat- 
ing to Watergate ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Nothing. 

Senator Talmadge. Why did you not mention to the President at 
tliat time your fundraising activities ? 



96-296 O— 73— bk. 5- 



2148 

]\Ir. Kalmbach. I had no reason to, Senator. He called me to thank 
me for all the help that I had been in the reelection campaign. It was 
something; following the election. It was something that was very 
thoughtful of him to do, and it was 

Senator Talmadgp:. Don't you think the President's personal lawyer, 
who had become so suspicious of what he was doing in the campaign 
that he quit, terminated his activities, that that would have been a 
good time for him to inform the Presidejit that these things occurred, 
Mr. President, and I think you ought to know about them? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator, when I — in my dealings, I was dealing 
with Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman, two men that the President had 
implicit trust in. It was my belief that any concern I had was suf- 
ficient for me to not go forward, but it was just that feeling. I didn't 
have any belief in fact that this was improper. But I had sufficient 
concern about the procedures that I was following, distasteful, that I 
didn't want to be involved at all. 

Senator Talmadgp:. You didn't think you were performing a service 
for Mr. Dean, did you ? You thought you were performing a service 
for the President of the United States, didn't you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Senator. I thought I was performing a service for 
the peoj^le that Mr. Dean referred to as "we.'' 

Senator Talmadge. ^Yho did you think were "we" ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I thought probably he was talking about the senior 
people at the Committee To Re-Elect, and possibly some of the people 
at the White House. 

Senator Talmadge. Det's see if I can put that in perspective, now. 
You thought all of these people that you were rendering service 
for 

Mr. Kalzsibach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge [continuing]. Were on the same team, and all 
of you were rendering service for the President of the United States, 
isn't that true ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I thought that I was being helpful on this 
assignment. 

Senator Talaiadge. You would not go all over the countiy, giving 
away hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash and engaging in sur- 
reptitious activities, for some clerk in the White House, would you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. I don't blame you, sir. 

Now. did JNIr. Dean call you in California in January 1978 and urge 
you to see if you could talk ]Mr. ]Magruder out of nmning for elective 
office in California? 

Mr. Kalmbach. He, I think that he did talk to me about Mr. 
Magruder, who was thinking of coming back to California, and his 
plans were not fixed. 

Senator TAL:\rADGE. Did you talk to ]Mr. Magnider ? 

Mr. KAL:NtBACH. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you dissuade him ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. I don't recall that I diSvSuaded him. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you ui-ge him to run or not to nin? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I didn't — it was my recollection of that meeting. 
Senator, simply that Mr. iSragi-iider was talking to people in Cali- 
foniia to make up his mind at a later date as to whethei- to return to 



2149 

California to seek office or not. And I didn't encourage him one way 
or the other. 

Senator Talmadge. You didn't execute the Dean mission at that 
time, did you ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I don't recall that it was a specific mission in that 
sense. 

Senator Talmadge. Didn't Mr. Dean urge you to tiy to dissuade 
Mr, Magruder from seeking public office in the State of California? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, Senator, I don't recall that I understood it 
that Avay. I did meet with Mr. ]\Iagiiider, and I think that he just had 
talked to many people in California and he was going back to Wash- 
ington. I did not know whether he was planning to ran for office or not. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you meet with him at Dean's request or not? 

Mr. Kai-mbach. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. You did not ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sii'. 

Senator Talmadge. So you deny Mr. Dean's statement that you did ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I don't deny that Dean called me. I am not certain 
as to what was said specifically. Senator. But I don't recall that I 
spoke to Mr. Magnider to dissuade him from running for office. 

Senator Talmadge. Let's see who all raised money, to the best of your 
knowledge, for these defendants. "N^Hiat role did Mr. Stans play in 
that? 

Mr. Kal^ibach. No role, to my knowledge, other than giving me 
$75,100 on the 29th at my request, at which time I would not tell him 
tlie purpose of this assignment. 

Senator Talmadge. Other than that, you know of nothing ? 

Mr. Kalivlbach. That is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Nothing to my knowledge. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Ehrlichman? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Ehrlichman I met with for the first time, I 
discussed this with Mr. Ehrlicliman on July 26. Then my memory is 
that I confirmed that I had received an additional $75,000 from Mr. 
Jones in early August when I met with Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Colson? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Not at all. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. I don't recall ever talking to Mr. Mitchell about 
this, except at the meeting in his office on Friday, the 19th of Janu- 
aiw 1973. 

Senator Talmadge. That was when lie declined to raise funds for 
that purpose? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Sir? 

Senator Talmadge. That was when Mr. Mitchell specifically de- 
clined to raise money for that purpose, wasn't it ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. Tliat was when I had been asked by Mr. 
Dean to come over to Mr. Mitchell's office. And Mr. Dean raised the 
subject then, and I said I would not do more and excused myself. 

Senator Talmadge. There was one thing that disturbed me in your 
statement, and Senator Weicker pursued it at some length. I still 
couldn't get a conclusive answer. 

Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir. 



2150 

Senator Talmadge. jNIf. Kalmbach, what made you think that there 
was any moral obligation to raise funds and pay lawyers and sup- 
port their families and bail money for convicted burglars ? 

Mr, Kalmbach. Senator, it was a feeling that I had at the time, 
I know, that I felt that in some way, and I had no understanding 
as to what, how it had happened, but I had the feeling that in some 
way, someone in authority had pressed the green light and had en- 
couraged these people to go forward — now, on a very stupid, idiotic 
assignment, an illegal act. I had the feeling that someone in authority 
someone or more, felt that the least that could be done for these people, 
who had perhaps discharged or followed an assignment, was to pro- 
vide them with lawyers and to provide support for their families. And 
I felt that that is under the general head of a moral obligation. 

Senator Talmadge. Let me see if I can simplify it for you and 
see if you can agree. You thought they were part of the common 
team that you were playing on, is that right ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, I felt that they were a team of individuals 
who had been asked to do this improperly, and that the human thing 
to do, the decent thing to do, is to at least provide them with legal 
help and provide them with support for their families. 

Senator Talmadge. Well, if an ordinary burglar had broken into 
the Mayflower Hotel, you wouldn't feel that way about him, would 
you? 

Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Was it because these people were on the same 
team and engaged in a common effort that you felt that you had a 
moral obligation, sir ? 

Mr. Kalmbach. Well, Senator, I had no knowledge at ail, in any 
way, shape, or form as to the Watergate break-in. But I felt at the time 
that I was talked to by Mr. Dean that someone in authority must have 
liad the feeling that the least that could be done for these people, who 
I felt had been ordered to go about this assignment 

Senator Talmadge. Did Mr. Dean