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Full text of "Presidential campaign activities of 1972, Senate resolution 60; Watergate and related activities"

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Phase I: Watergate Investigation 

WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 26, 2T, AND 30, 1973 

Book 7 

Printed for the use of the 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 











Phase I: Watergate Investigation 

WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 26, 27, AND 30, 1973 

Bool£ 7 

Printed for the use of the 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 

9«-296 O WASHINGTON : 1973 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3 


(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session) 

SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina, Chairman 
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vice Chairman 


DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr., Connecticut 


Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

Fred D . Thompson, Minority Counsel 

RUFUS L. Edmisten, Deputy Chief Counsel 

Arthur S. Miller, Chief Consultant 

David M. Dobsen, Assistant Chief Counsel 

Terry F. Lenzner, Assistant Chief Counsel 

James B.amilto's , Assistant Chief Counsel 

Carmine S. Bellino, Chief Investigator 

Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator 

Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel 

R. Phillip Haire, Assistant Counsel 

Marc Lackritz, Assistant Counsel 

William T. Maytos, Assistant Counsel 

Ronald D. ROTVi^oA, Assistant Counsel 

Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel 

Howard S. Llebengood, Assistant Minority Counsel 

H. William Shure, Assistant Minority Counsel 

Robert Silverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel 

Laura Matz, Administrative Assistant 

Carolyn Andrade, Office Manager 

Joan C. Cole, Secretary to the Minority 





Thursday, July 26, 1973 2657 

Friday, July 27, 1973 2729 

Monday, July 30, 1973 2795 


Thursday, July 26, 1973 

Ehrlichman, John, former chief domestic adviser to the President, accom- 
panied by John J. Wilson and Frank H. Strickler, counsels 2663 

Friday July 27, 1973 

Ehrlichman, John, testimony resumed 2729 

Monday, July 30, 1973 

Ehrlichman, John, testimony resumed 27C5 

Haldeman, H. R., former assistant to the President, accompanied by 

John J. Wilson and Frank H. Strickler, counsels 2866 


Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr Ehrlichman: 2664-2666, 

2689-2701, 2790-2793, 2797-2799, 2814, 2815, 2862, 2863. Halde- 
man: 2866, 2894-2896, 2906. 

Baker, Hon. Howard H., Jr Ehrlichman: 2665, 

2666, 2701-2710, 2797, 2800, 2863, 2864. Haldeman: 2895, 2905. 

Talmadge, Hon. Herman E Ehrlichman: 2711-2718. 

Inouye, Hon. Daniel K Ehrlichman: 2727-2737, 

2800-2805. Haldeman: 2896. 

Montoya, Hon. Joseph M Ehrlichman : 2679-2690, 

2759-2773, 2810, 2811. Haldeman: 2896. 

Gurnej^ Hon. Edward J Ehrlichman : 2718-2727, 

2737-2758, 2807-2810. Haldeman: 2895, 2896. 

Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr Ehrlichman: 2663-2679, 

2773-2790, 2811-2814, 2861-2863. 

Dash, Samuel, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Ehrlichman: 2815-2860. 

Thompson, Fred D., Minority Counsel EhrHchman: 2863. 


No. 94A — (2658) Letter from President Nixon to Senator Ervin dated 
July 25, 1973, concerning subpenas issued on behalf of the 
Select Committee for certain tapes and records of the White 
House 2907 

No. 95— (2684) IRS cover sheet dated September 1972 entitled "Sta- 
tistics — Requests for Inspection of Income Tax Returns or 
Data From Returns by Federal Agencies for the 6-Month 
Period Jan. 1-June 30,"l972", with attachment 2909 

Note. — Figures in parentheses Indicate page that exhibit was officially made part 
of the record. 




No. 96— (2684) IRS cover sheet dated April 1973 entitled "Statistics- 
Requests for Inspection of Income Tax Returns or Data 
From Returns by Federal Agencies for the 6-Month Period 
July 1-December 31, 1972", with attachment 2911 

No. 97— (2713) Memo randum for the record of Gen. Vernon A. Walters 
(CIA) dated July 6, 1972, re: Meeting with Acting FBI 
Director L. Patrick Gray at 1005 hours on July 6, concerning 
Watergate matter 29 13 

No. 98— (2730) Ehrlichman's handwritten notes re: His investigation 

into Watergate affair 2915 

No. 99 — (2748) Ehrlichman/Kleindienst taped telephone conversation- 2944 

No. 100— (2773) Notes of meeting with Herb Kalmbach, April 6, 1973, 

in San Clemente. Calif 2947 

No. 101^ — (2786) Memorandum for the record of Gen. Vernon A. Walters 
(CIA) dated June 28, 1972, re: Walters and Helms meetings 
with Ehrlichman and Haldeman on June 23, 1972, at 1300, 
in Ehrlichman's office at the White House 2948 

No. 102 — (2786) EhrUchman taped telephone conversation with Pat 
Gray, March 7 or 8, 1973; also taped telephone conversation 
with John Dean immediately following Gray conversation. 2950 

No. 103 — (2786) Ehrlichman taped telephone conversation with Pat 

Gray. (No date shown.) 2952 

No. 104 — (2796) Letter from Robert W. Barker to Senator Ervin con- 
cerning "Million Dollar Secret Fund" allegation, with 
attachments 2954 

No. 104A — (2796) Letter to Vice Chairman Howard H. Baker, Jr., from 

Robert W. Barker, dated August 3, 1973. with attachments. 2974 

No. 105— (2800) Congressional Record insert (pages S5911-S5924) re: 
"Practice by Executive Branch of Examining Individual Tax 
Returns" 2978 

No. 106— (2813) White House "Eyes Only" memorandum dated October 2, 
1972, from John Ehrlichman to John Dean re: Herbert 
Kalmbach written retainer arrangement enclosing hand- 
written draft letter 3005 

No. 107 — (2815) Ehrlichman taped telephone conversation with Clark 

MacGregor 3007 

No. 108 — (2827) EhrUchman taped telephone conversation with Ken 

Clawson 3009 

No. 109 — (2828) Ehrlichman taped telephone conversation with Charles 

Colson on April 17, 1973 3010 

No. 109A — (2906) Sworn statement of Bernard Fensterwald, Jr 3012 

Note. — ^Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part 
of the record. 


U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
presroential campaign activities, 

Washington^ D,G. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m. in 
room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. 
(chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and Weicker. 

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred 
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief 
counsel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels ; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker ; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker ; Ray St. Armand, 
assistant publications clerk. 

Senator Ervin. I am going to make another request to the audience 
that the audience refrain from expressing, in any manner, approval or 
disapproval of any person or any question or any answer. We are 
trying to conduct a dignified hearing which will be as fair as possible 
to everybody concerned, and the committee is going to have to give 
serious consideration to the question of excluding from the hearing 
room persons who audibly express their approval or disapproval of 
any person or any question or any answer in an audible manner, and 
I hope that I will not have to repeat this request again. 

The committee has received, at least I have received, as chairman 
of the committee, a letter from the White House dated July 25, 1973 : 

Dear Mr. Chairman : White House counsel have received on my behalf the two 
subpoenas issued by you, on behalf of the Select Committee, on July 23rd. 

One of these calls on me to furnish to the Select Ck>mmittee recordings of 
five meetings between Mr. John Dean and myself. For the reasons stated to you 
in my letters of July 6th and July 23rd, I must respectfully refuse to produce 
those recordings. 

The other subpoena calls on me to furnish all records of any kind relating 
directly or indirectly to the "activities, participation, responsibilities or involve- 
ment" of 25 named individuals "in any alleged criminal acts related to the Presi- 
dential election of 1972." Some of the records that might arguably fit within that 
subpoena are Presidential papers that must be kept confidential for reasons stated 
in my letter of July 6th. It is quite possible that there are other records in my 
custody that would be within the ambit of that subpoena and that I could, con- 
sistent with the public interest and my Constitutional responsibilities, provide 
to the Select Committee. All specific requests from the Select Committee will be 



carefully considered and my staff and I, as we have done In the past, will coop- 
erate with the Select Committee by making available any information and docu- 
ments that can appropriately be produced. You will understand, however, I am 
sure, that it would simply not be feasible for my staff and me to review thousands 
of documents to decide which do and which do not fit within the sweeping but 
vague terms of the subpoena. 

It continues to be true, as it was when I wrote you on July 6th, that my staff 
is under instructions to cooperate fully with yours in furnishing information 
pertinent to your inquiry. I have directed that executive privilege not be invoked 
with regard to testimony by present and former members of my staff concerning 
possible criminal conduct or discussions of possible criminal conduct. I have 
waived the attorney -client privilege with regard to my former counsel. In my 
July 6th letter I described acts of cooperation with the Select Committee 
as "genuine, extensive and, in the history of such matters, extraordinary." That 
cooperation has continiied and it will continue. Executive privilege is being 
invoked only with regard to documents and recordings that cannot be made pub- 
lic consistent with the confidentiality essential to the functioning of the Office 
of the President. 

I cannot and will not con.sent to giving any investigatory body private Presi- 
dential papers. To the extent that I have custody of other documents or informa- 
tion relevant to the work of the Select Committee and that can properly be made 
public, I will be glad to make these available in response to specific requests. 

RiCHABD Nixon. 

The original letter vrill be made part of the record and given the 
appropriate exhibit number. 

[The document referred to was marked exliibit No. 94A.*] 

Senator Ervin. How the President expects this committee to specify 
each document that he says falls witliin the ambit of one of these 
subpenas is a very surprising thing. We are not clairvoyant. Since 
we have never seen the documents, and since even those of the White 
House aides who are willing to identify the documents are not allowed 
to copy them or any parts of them, the President puts on the committee 
a manifest impossibility in receiving the documents. 

The way the Chair construes this letter, the President flatly refuses 
to give us the tapes that were identified in the subpena as recording 
conversations between the President and John Dean, and he lays down 
the second condition about the written documents which is impossible 
of fulfillment by the commattee because you cannot identify a docu- 
ment which you have never seen, and you have the restriction upon 
Wliite House former aides that could go through these papers and 
identify these documents that they cannot copy them, much less carry 
them out. 

So the Chair finds it a little difl5.cult to see where very much coopera- 
tion comes from the President in these matters. 

This is a serious affair that the committee is engaged in, and here is 
the President of the United States who has informed us that some of 
these recordings do have reference to the matters we are investigating 
but he cannot furnish them to us because we might misconstrue them. 
And then he tells us he will furnish us the documents that he does not 
consider to be Presidential papers if we can identify the specific docu- 
ments, which is an impossibility. 

I would just like to say I think the President could comply with 
the request of the committee in both of these respects, and that the 
Constitution would not collapse, and the heavens would not fall, but 
the committee might be aided by the President in determining the 
truth of his involvement. 

♦See p. 2907. 


Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, for those of us who are lawyers, and 
that is meant to be a term of approval rather than disapproval, I think 
the best way to summarize the present situation is to say thus, the 
issue was joined. 

It is important to note that this committee had cause to issue two sub- 
penas, rather than one. The first subpena specified with, I believe, great 
particularity the conversations, the dates, and the participants that we 
wanted access to on the allegation of the subpena that such conversa- 
tions might be concerned with allegedly legal or criminal activity. The 
second subpena dealt with a rather more general demand for docu- 
ments. I am pleased^ Mr. Chairman, that we chose to issue our subpena 
in two parts rather than one because, as you pointed out, it is far more 
difficult to specify with particularity the documents we seek if we do 
not know what the documents are. But it is fairly easy to specify the 
tapes or the portions of the tapes that we seek. 

In any event, we have arrived at the place now where it would appear 
that the issues are in fact joined, and that the third branch of the 
Grovemment now, the Judiciary, may, in fact, be called on to resolve 
a historic conflict between the remaining two branches. 

I think, as in all litigation in this country, it is our desire, all of us, 
to proceed, if we choose to proceed, to permit the court to make a calm, 
intellectually, and judicially sound judgment on the appropriateness 
of the request of this committee together with all of the significant 
and fundamental constitutional questions that are presented. 

I have only one remaining comment, Mr. Chairman, notwithstanding 
that the issues are joined, I would still hope that there is some way to 
ameliorate the situation. There have been a number of suggestions in 
the past, and I have made many suggestions, both public and in the 
privacy of our executive proceedings. Certain suggestions have been 
passed on, both formally and informally. But, notwithstanding that 
we have reached the point where the issues are joined, and litigation 
may, in fact ensue, I would still hope that we can find a way to permit 
this committee to have access to the relevant portions of the testimony 
or of the evidence that we require quickly and speedily, and without 
a prejudicial effect on our mandate to investigate nor on the appropri- 
ate functioning of the Presidency as an institution. 

I have suggested, for instance, that an informal panel of distin- 
guished Americans not now holding a position in Government may 
review these tapes at the request of both the executive and the legis- 
lative departments and recommend to both the President and the 
Congress what portions are relevant and what portions are not rele- 
vant. I am prepared to go even further, Mr. Chairman — I have not 
discussed this with you or my colleagues on the committee — ^and say 
that as an extension and elaboration of that suggestion, I would be 
willing to have one or two or three or a small group of distinguished 
nongovernmental officials review the tapes and the documents and 
recommend to the President and to tlie Congress that certain docu- 
ments or tapes are or are not relevant to this inquiry, and if they are 
so intermixed with other conversations or if they lend themselves to 
more than one interpretation, that such a panel give to us a finding 
of the net effect of that information. That may not end the contro- 
versy. It may be necessary for the committee to pursue the matter 
further and it may be necessary for the President to disagree but at 


least it would move us one space forward. It is not idle optimism 
that impels me to once again urge that we find a way aroimd this 
joinder of issue for the benefit of the Congress, of the Presidency, of 
the President, for the benefit of the courts, that they may be spared 
the business of defining 200 years after the drafting of the charter 
document implied, explicit, and overlapping apparent powers, and for 
the people of the country. So no matter how small the flicker of the 
flame of optimism may be, I continue to urge that we have an accom- 
modating spirit and that we continue to try to find a way, in this way 
or any other way, that seems promising of result to produce that 
desired end. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator ER\^x. Any other member of the committee have any obser- 
vations they would like to make at this time? 

Then if not, it will be my purpose to call the meeting of the com- 
mittee at an early time and let the committee decide what action it 
shall take. 

There is an order of the Senate which is set forth in paragraph 77 
of the Senate Manual which confers upon this committee the power 
to bring any suit that the committee feels is necessary to enable it to 
perfonn duties it is required to perform by the Senate. It is a very 
unfortunate thing that the President claimed that he has custody and 
control of everything in the "Wliite House because for this committee 
taking a very summary proceeding against the actual custodian of 
these tapes, and the actual custodian of these papers, I don't believe 
even the President would proclaim that he had custody of all of the 
things in E. Howard Hunt's locker, including the alleged telegrams 
that he is alleged to have in his custody. But if his claim be valid, that 
would have to be true, I would think. 

Senator Weicker will resume unless there is some comment by other 
members of the committee. 

Mr. WiLsox. I would just like to say that 

Senator Baker. INIr. Wilson, before you proceed, I don't see — if my 
colleagues have any objection they might say so and I don't want to 
embarrass any one of them — but I don't see any point in having an 
executive session. I think we have discussed the matter and I think 
we are in a position to act and if you want to do that I am perfectly 
willing to make a motion, if a motion would be considered in order. 

Senator Ervix. "Well, it would be considered in order unless any 
member of the committee would rather go into executive session. I will 
leave that up to them, and they could communicate that to me openly 
or privately. 

Senator Gurxey. Speaking for myself, Mr. Chairman, I certainly 
have no objection to going ahead with a meeting. 

Senator Ixotjye. Go ahead, call the roll. 

Senator Ervix. Senator Talmadge is absent but I guess we can 
let him record his vote when he gets here. It has been moved. 

Senator Baker. INIr. Chairman, let me state a motion, since there is 
no objection to proceeding. I move at this time that counsel for the 
committee be authorized under the appropriate laws and statutes of 
the United States including the DeclaratoiT Judgments Act to present 
a justifiable issue to the appropriate court based on the subpena issued 
lawfully by this committee and on a letter declining the honoring of 
the subpena, dated July 25, 1973, signed by the President of the United 


States, and to take such steps as may be necessary to present such issue 
for adjudication. 

Senator Ervix. Is there any second to the motion ? 

Senator Ixotjye. I second the motion. 

Senator Ervin. All favoring the motion let it be known by raising 
their right hand. [Raising of hands.] 

The six Senators present vote unanimously for the motion and 
Senator Talmadge will be given an opportunity to record his vote 
when he comes in. 

The Chair recognizes that there is no precedent for litigation of tliis 
nature but there originally was no precedent for any litigation, and I 
think this litigation is essential if we are to determine whether the 
President is above the law and whether the President is immune from 
all of the duties and responsibilities in matters of this kind which de- 
volve upon all the other mortals who dwell in this land. 

Mr. Wilson, do you want to say something ? 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I have received information overnight 
that the committee, or its staff possesses at least one document in rela- 
tion to the sequence of docmnents of August 3, 1971, which was identi- 
fied by Senator Weicker yesterday. Am I correctly informed, sir? 

Mr. Dash. I indicated there was no correspondence, Mr. Wilson, 
in sequence. If you are talking about a document in sequence, you have 
seen the document that might be considered in sequence and it was 
submitted to you which was the August 11 memorandum from ISIr. 
Young, Mr. Krogh, and Mr. Ehrlichman. That is the only document 
that might be considered in sequence. The question put yesterday to the 
committee which I responded to you was, were there any further cor- 
respondence, was there a reply to this letter or other correspondence in 
sequence? There is a document which may be considered to be in se- 
quence in that it followed that letter, and actually refers to that letter 
but you have seen that document. It was submitted to you, it was in 
August., a memorandum from Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young to Mr. Ehr- 
lichman. I know of no other document that we have in sequence. 

Mr. Wilson. Is that the one in which it is stated that Mr. Hoover 
said he would proceed with a full-scale investigation of the Pentagon 
Papers ? 

Mr. Dash. I think it is the one that says that they would give it an 
FBI special, something of that nature. We have the document, you 
have seen it, it was submitted and it is a matter of record. 

Mr. WiLsox. I just asked you yesterday to produce it. 

Mr. Dash. It was produced and when I was questioning Mr. Ehrlich- 
man you were given that document. 

]Mr. Wilson. Is that the document that is referred to in the New 
York Times this morning? 

Mr. Dash. I did not see any document in the New York Times this 

Mr. Wilson. Let me read you the sentence: 

Reportedly when the hearing r^umes tomorrow he, that is, Senator Weicker, 
plans to show Mr. Ehriiehman another letter, this one from Mr. Krogh to Mr. 
Ehrlichman, in which Mr. Krogh remarks that Mr. Hoover had promised a full 
investigation and knowing that the Bureau had interviewed Mr. Marx' wife. 

Is that an accurate report of the document that you have just 
described to me? 


]Mr. Dash. We will get the document and we will see. 

Senator Er\t[X. ]Mr. Wilson, I might state that it appears by impli- 
cation or intimation, at least from the President's letter that this 
committee does not have all the documents it ought to have. It has not 
been able to get them, and we do not have any Plumbers to go out 
and seek for them. 

]Mr. WiLsox. You have got a pretty good staff that seeks a lot of 

Senator Erven. Yes, sir, but they do not believe in surreptitious 

Mr. Wilson. May I have this clarified before Senator Weicker 
begins — ^that the document shows the reference to Mr. Marx' wife? 

Mr. Dash. Just a minute. Yes, it is the August 11 memorandum, 
Mr. Wilson, which you examined thoroughly when I presented it to 
]\Ir. Ehrlichman for examination. It is the August 11 memorandum 
from ]\Ir. Bud Krogh to Mr. David Young to Mr. Ehrlichman in which 
Mr. Ehrlichman was asked to approve a covert operation to be under- 
taken to examine all medical files. It included a list of names of 
persons that it says the Boston grand jury will meet next week, Justice 
has not made a final decision but it is considering subpenaing the nine 
following individuals and Mrs. Louis Marx is one. Then the memo- 
randum says that, "We have received a letter from Director Hoover 
confirming that the Ellsberg case and related matters will be handled 
on a Bureau special basis." 

And that is the only memorandum or document we have. 

Senator Ervin. I believe Mr. Wilson is asking for another letter 
that was offered in evidence here to the effect, from J. Edgar Hoover, 
stating that they had transmitted to someone all of the files they had 
and stating they would go ahead and investigate everybody and they 
said also including a statement of Ellsberg in which he stated in the 
closing paragraph that they were prepared to interview all other 
people except Ellsberg. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Wilson, do you have a copy of the transcript? 

Mr. Wh,son. No. I remember your giving me a three- or four-page 
August 11 document which is exhibit what? 

Mr. Dash. It is exhibit No. 90.* 

Mr. Wilson. No ; I mean in this proceeding of Mr. Ehrlichman. Did 
it not get a new number ? 

Mr. Dash. We do not have new numbers, it was listed as exhibit No. 3 
of an executive session. 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Yes ; I have that one, I think before me. 
Is that the one in which it says that they were continuing to press the 
FBI to determine some sub j ects in paragraph 6 ? 

Mr. Dash. We are continuing to press the FBI, yes, to determine 
whether the report of a foot locker 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Dash. And that was submitted to you. 

Senator Ervtn. I would like to state that the reason Senator Tal- 
madge is not here at this moment is the fact that he is chairman of a 
very important conference committee on a very crucial piece of legis- 
lation, and that the conference committee is highly desirable since 

♦See Book 6, p. 2643. 


this piece of legislation relates to agriculture. It is absolutely essential 
that the legislation be passed before the beginning of the next fiscal 
year so that the American people who are interested in agricultural 
pursuits can know what they can do, and that is the reason he had to 
give that task priority over his task as a member of this committee 
on this particular occasion. 

]Mr. Wilson, I would ask you the question — I want you to get any 
documents we have got. 

Mr. Wilson, Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am sure you do. 

Senator Ervin. And those documents your attention has been called 
to, do they comport to the document you mentioned as being printed 
in the New York Times ? 

Mr. Wilson. Say that again, sir. 

Senator Ervin. The two documents that your attention has been 
called to, do they refer to the documents reported to in the New York 

Mr. Wilson. I think so. Senator Weicker will explain it if he cares 
to. I do not care to pursue it. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I have any ex- 
plaining to do. You have raised a point, Mr. Wilson, saying there is a 
document outstanding that you have not received when, in fact, you 
had received it 2 days ago. As I understand it, that is the only point 
that has been made here, that you have had that very document in 
your hands for 2 days. 

Mr. Wilson. Then, as far as you know, the New York Times is not 
talking about any other document ? 

Senator Weicker. As far as I know, you have had the information 
that you requested today in your hands for 2 days. I have no other 
documents to go ahead and present to you. 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Weicker. I have some questions for your client. 

Mr. Wilson, Thank you. 

Senator Ervin. And you might proceed at this time with your inter- 
rogation of the witness. 

Senator Weicker, Mr. Ehrlichman 

Senator Ervin. Just 1 minute, Senator. Senator Talmadge has called 
and asked that he be recorded voting in favor of the motion which 
has been adopted by the vote of six other Senators and it is so ordered. 

Senator Weicker. You stated yesterday, Mr. Ehrlichman, that the 
FBI, through its leadership of Mr, Hoover, was not pushing, was not 
pushing the Ellsberg investigation, allegedly because of a relationship 
Mr. Hoover had with Mr. Ellsberg's father-in-law, ]\Ir. I^uis Marx. 
And that it was not until after September 20, 1971, that the FBI "was 
clicking on all eight cylinders". Would that be correct? 


Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not think I said "after."' If I said after I 
should have said by. Senator, and the reason that I picked that date 
is that on or about that date there was a meeting which the Attorney 
General had with the President where he gave the President a progress 
report on this matter, and that was the gist of his report at that time. 


Now, when that commenced I do not need to testify to, because that 
is no*, something that I know of my own knowledge. 

'Senator Weicker. But in any event, one of the difficulties apparently 
on the FBI investigation was the relationship between Mr. Hoover and 
Mr. Marx, is that correct ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is what the Attorney General reported to me. 

Senator Weicker. Are you aware of the fact that Mr. Louis Marx 
was interviewed by the FBI in June 1971, before Mr. Krogh's memo- 
randum to you of August 11, which memorandum has been referred to 
here this morning, and before the September 3, 1971, break-in by Hunt 
and Liddy, part of the covert operation you approved ? Did you know 
that Mr. Marx had been interviewed in June ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I — by the FBI, Senator? 

Senator Weicker. That is correct. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I do not recall that fact. 

Senator Weicker. Well, then, how could you ascribe the reason of 
Louis Marx for the failure of the FBI to get information from Louis 
Marx as the reason for setting up this unit and for having this or 
more specifically, having the unit investigate Ellsberg as they did ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, what I attempted to testify to was the report 
that I had had from two people who were intimately familiar with the 
progress of this case. One was Mr. Krogh and the other was the At- 
torney General, Mr. Mitchell. They both reported to me what I have 
testified to here. 

Now, it may be, I do not know this, and I would be speculating in 
this answer, but it may be that the explanation is that that interview 
was either unsatisfactory or i^erfunctory or did not adduce the infor- 
mation that was desired or that that interview is what resulted in this 
disciplinary action that Mr. Hoover imposed. I just do not know. 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, may we see that report, the FBI report ? 

Senator Weicker. What FBI report? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You mean the interview with Mr. Marx ? 

Mr. Wilson. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Go ahead, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Er^^n. We got FBI reports by permission of Attorney Gen- 
eral Kleindienst on condition that we would not release them to the 
public. If you get 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I think maybe I can be helpful 
here. My knowledge of the interview by the FBI and Mr. Marx comes 
from Mr. Marx and he was interviewed in June of 1971. 

Mr. Wilson. Well, I have now established that the committee is in 
possession of an FBI report. 

Senator Ervin. No ; I am mistaken. 

Mr. Wilson, Is that so ? 

Senator Er\t:n. We do not have the FBI reports. They were allowed 
to inspect them and to make notes from them, that is all. 

Mr. Wilson. No summary ? 

Senator Ervin. They have staff summaries but we got those under 
great difficulties and under an agreement that we would not release 
them to the public. If you can get all of those things with the Attorney 
General's consent, he had custody of them, or Director Kelly, I would 
be delighted for everything to come out that can be shown. It's all 
right with me. 


Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, if I could say a word at this point, 
if Senator Weicker will yield for a second, we have been deeply 
involved in trying to get documents and making documents public. I 
can understand Mr. Wilson's concern in this respect, but you and I, 
Mr. Chairman, were parties to the conversation with former Attorney 
General Kleindienst where very strict requirements were imposed on 
our access to those. Rather than ask the witness to be relieved of the 
obligation, we assumed at that time, for my part, I am willing to ask 
the committee to be relieved of that obligation so we can show that 
information to the witness and counsel; but since I was there and 
know the rather extraordinary^ lengths we went to to gain access to 
them in any form, I am also keenly aware of the promise and the 
commitment that we made with respect to the confidentiality of raw 
FBI data. But I would hope, if there is no objection on behalf of the 
committee, that the committee will formally request the Attorney 
General of the United States to relieve us of that obligation. 

Mr. Wilson. I would be grateful to you if you would do so. And I 
want to tell Senator Weicker I don't question for one moment, sir, the 
remark that you got some information from Mr. Marx, but it can't be 
as accurate, may I say, with all due respect, as the raw report would 
be itself, and I appreciate the suggestion of the offer of the vice chair- 
man on our behalf, perhaps on yours, too, to seek to have that docu- 
ment released to us. 

Senator Ervin. To keep the record absolutely straight, as Senator 
Baker said, this agreement was made between him and myself and 
Attorney General Kleindienst, and we had to accept the terms under 
which we were offered access to summaries and the condition was, as 
we informed the Attorney General, we did not want the summaries or 
any FBI records for use as evidence. We merely wanted them to 
identify persons who could be summoned or subpenaed as witnesses 
because it was revealed by those summaries that they had some knowl- 
edge of the matters we were investigating, and we gave the Attorney 
General our solemn promise that the committee would not release 
these publicly. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I ask consent that counsel for the 
committee be authorized to request of the Attorney General the release 
from that commitment of secrecy so that a copy of the staff summary 
can be given to counsel for this witness. 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you Mr. Vice Chairman, and I assume from 
what has been said and forgive me for pursuing this further because I 
am grateful for what just has been volunteered, members of the com- 
mittee or the staff did read either the summary or the raw report of the 
FBI on this so-called interview with Mr. Marx, and your committee 
does have knowledge of the contents of this report, and we don't 
have it. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, may I speak to this point for a 
minute, please? 

Senator Ervtn. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, may I address myself to this point. 
I think I should point out the piece of history, legislative history that 
at the time the chairman and the vice chairman made the determina- 
tion with the Attorney Greneral that only they would be allowed access 
to the FBI files, the juiiior Senator from Connecticut, excitable as he 
gets, jumped up and down and objected. 


Senator Ervin. I will certainly corroborate that. [Laughter.] 
Mr. Wilson. Senator, maybe we are going to get it now you and 

Senator Weicker. And so, having an investigation to pursue, I went 
down other avenues. I have already told you, I have talked to Mr. 
Marx and I tell you now I have also talked to Mr. Brennan, the As- 
sistant Director of the FBI, head of Division 5 who ordered that the 
investigations take place, so I can confirm to you from both the FBI, 
that did the investigating and fix>m INIr. Marx who was investigated, an investigation took place in June of 1971, and Mr. Chairman, 
you have lived up to your agreement with the Attorney General of the 
United States and I have never seen any FBI file that has come into 
your possession or the possession of the vice chairman or any member 
of the staff, majority or minority counsel. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, and to make the record even clearer, as a result 
of the position stated by the Senator from Connecticut, I called At- 
torney Greneral Kleindienst and asked him to modify the agreement, 
and allow five other members of the committee to see these FBI files, 
and he declined my request, and then after he was succeeded by At- 
torney Greneral Richardson, I wrote him a letter repeating the request, 
and he declined the request to extend that privilege to the other five 
Senators. He did modify to allow one member of the staff designated 
by both the vice chairman and myself to go to look at some of the 
original FBI files but let me tell you, it hasn't been any bed of roses 
trying to get any information out of the executive branch of the 
Government that is germane to this investigation. I am going to sug- 
gest in the interest of time that you communicate to the staff the docu- 
ments that you want instead of us. 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you. 

Senator Ervin. And we will do the best we can. If they are within 
our power we will certainly try to give them to you. 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin, So I would suggest that Senator Weicker proceed 
with the interrogation. 

Senator Baker. Before Senator Weicker does, if I may impose on 
his time one more moment. I hope it clearly appears from this record 
that I don't believe anyone on this committee wants to withhold any 
document or information from this witness or his counsel ; and we 
would not impose any restraint on that were it not for the condition 
imposed by former Attorney General Kleindienst. 

So that was the basis for my unanimous-consent request and I gather 
from the chairman's statement just now that, upon the request of 
counsel, we will proceed in the manner I outlined in my request. 

Senator Er\^n. Yes. 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you both. 

Senator Weicker. You are a good lawyer, Mr. Wilson. I have got 
to get my engines warmed up again. 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Weicker. All right, now, Mr. Ehrlichman, isn't it fair to 
say then that Mr. Krogh — do you have the August 11 memorandum 
before you there? Do you have the August 11 memorandum before 
you? Isn't it fair to say Mr. Krogh's August 11 memorandum asks 
for Mrs. Marx' interview because both you and he already knew 


that he had been interviewed. There is no mention of Mr. Marx. This 
is August 11 now. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. But it asks for Mrs. Marx' interview. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Would you point out where it does that? I don't 
recall that. Yes, it does. 

Senator Weicker. On the page where it says members. It says 
Boston grand jury will meet next week and the first name on there is 
Mrs. Louis Marx. 

]SIr. Ehrlichman. That does not say anything about the FBI inter- 
viewing here. It says they have not made a final decision but is con- 
sidering subpenaing her to a grand jury, I don't see anything about 
interviewing her. 

Senator Weicker. The memorandum to you says the FBI has placed 
the Ellsherg case on special FBI status. 

I am going to very definitely pin down one fact here today, and 
that is that you based the push on the FBI on the fact that there was 
some relationship between the Director and Louis ]Marx which made 
it necessary for you to go outside of normal law enforcement channels, 
and we have already established the fact that Mr. jSIarx was inter- 
viewed in June 1971. 

Did you ever ask any member of the FBI if Mr. Marx had been 
interviewed in June 1971? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, if I disassociate your question from your 
direct statement which I don't agree with. 

Senator Weicker. What don't you agree with ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, if I could explain : What I attempted to 
testify here to tlie committee was the total setting in which Mr. Krogh 
came to me and, in turn, the representation was made to the President 
that the special unit inaugurate investigation of Mr. Ellsberg and his 
associates. The total setting included the Attomey General's informa- 
tion to us with regard to the investigation of specifically Mr. Louis 
Marx but that was not the only problem. It was a general problem with 
regard to the FBI's approach to this whole case. That was the way 
Mr. Krogh reported it to us, it was corroborated by the Attomey Gen- 
eral, and it did not rest solely on the interview of any one witness, 
INIr. ]Marx, Mrs. ]Marx, or any one individual witness. 

So, I had no occasion to inquire of anyone that the FBI or for that 
matter anywhere else, about the specific interview of any one witness 
or any particular witnesses. Mr. Krogh described for us a set of cir- 
cumstances which was general. I did not then recommend to the Presi- 
dent that Mr. Krogh's eventual suggestion be adopted. I talked to the 
Attorney General about it. The Attorney General corroborated Mr. 
Krogh's description of the FBI's general approach to the case. He was 
having his problems, and so that validated Mr, Krogh's report in gen- 
eral. The Attorney General cited this one instance as exemplary of the 
problem, and a particular problem for him at the time vis-a-vis the 
Director. And so then the recommendation was made that these two 
men Krogh was working with, be designated as investigators to go and 
do this following. This was very reluctantly entered into. It was not 
something. Senator, that the '\Vhite House wanted to do or at least 
that I personally wanted to see the White House do, unless we had to 
in order to move this thing along. The President frankly was really 
keeping the pressure on to get results and that was the setting. 


Senator Weicker, Did the Attorney General know you were going 
to get into the covert number business ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The Attorney General knew. 

Senator Weicker. So to solve this problem 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The Attorney General knew and the Director of 
the FBI knew that the l^^iite House was going to send investigators 
out ; yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Let me read to you from the transcript of 

Senator Weicker. In other words, what I gather you are saying he was fixed 
in his views to the extent — 

this is Hoover — 

that he would not agree to a break-in of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. That, of course, overstates it dramatically, Senator. What 
he would not agree to was an investigation of Mr. Marx and others close to 
Daniel Ellsberg. 

Now, let me drop back in time for a moment. 

In July, were you aware that in July 1971, specifically on July 20, 
1971, that the FBI had attempted to interview Dr. Fielding? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I surely was — I was aware of it at some time but 
I don't remember when, Senator, but I do recall the fact that they 
unsuccessfully attempted to interview the doctor. 

Senator Weicker. And this was before you decided to get into his 
records by covert action ; is that correct? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am not sure I knew that before. [Conferring 
with counsel.] 

Senator Weicker. Let's run through the dates again. In June 1971 
Mr. Louis Marx was interviewed by the FBI. You say that you had no 
knowledge of that. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I certainly don't recall having any knowledge 
of it. My consistent impression had been that the Director had disci- 
plined or threatened to discipline people in the FBI for proposing that 
interview. I wasn't aware that the interview had gone through the 
sanctions, as I understood it was proposed, because of the fact that it 
had been proposed. 

Senator Weicker. In fact the interview did take place. In July 1971 
the FBI attempted to interview Dr. Fielding, as you termed it, unsuc- 
cessfully, which is correct. 

On August 3 Mr. Krogh gets a letter, which has been ^iven to you 
and your attorney from the Director of the FBI, indicating full 
cooperation in the matter of the Ellsberg case. On August 11 you get 
a memorandum from Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young which indicates the 
status of the matters and also indicates that "We have received a letter 
from Director Hoover confirming that the EUsherg case and related 
matters will be handled on a bureau special basis." 

Now, in light of all these events, all of which transpired prior to 
the break-in into Dr. Fielding's office, do you maintain that this was 
for any other purpose, other than to smear Dr. Ellsberg ? 

Mr. 'Ehrlichman. I certainly do. Senator. It's a highly selective 
assembling of evidence, if I may respectfully say so. Incidentally, my 
wife chided me a little bit last night because I appear to scowl at you 
when I answer your questions. The fact is you have over your head 


two of the greatest lights I have encountered, and I am afraid that 
has to account for the way I look in your direction; I am sorry. 
[Laughter.] The fact here is that in addition to these facts which 
you have stated, some of which are still not in my knowledge, but I am 
certainly willing to accept. 

Senator Weicker. Which facts are not within your knowledge ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, for instance, I did not know that Mr. Marx 
had been interviewed in June by the FBI. 

Senator Weicker. You said you did not recollect he was interviewed, 
that is what you said you didn't recollect ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. What I said, I have no knowledge but if you tell 
me so, you are relying on Mr. Marx and I am perfectly willing to do 
that, too. 

The point is that all through this period of time on the one hand 
the President of the United States is pressing for results. On the other 
hand, Mr. Krogh is reporting to us from within the White House that 
he can't get the FBI moving, and the Attorney General is corroborat- 
ing to us directly what Mr. Krogh is reporting. 

Now, I can only testify of my own knowledge here what people 
reported to me because I made no independent check of this, and it was 
my clear recollection that up until this meeting of the President with 
the Attorney General around the 20th of September, I had the continu- 
ing impression, because of continuing reports that came to us, that the 
FBI was not yet mo\Ting satisfactorily. 

Senator Weicker. Did you receive this information from the August 
11 memorandum ; is that the basis of it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the August 11 memorandum is not a de- 
scription of what was really going on. It was in the sense a function, 
it was a description of what had been designated by the FBI as a 
categorical designation. 

Now, interestingly enough, it took 3 months for the FBI to get 
around to putting that special case or priority or class A designation 
on this case, whatever it was, and I think the fact that some 60-90 days 
passed before the Bureau would put that designation on, the biggest 
raid in top secret documents hi the history of the coimtry has to indi- 
cate a certain amount of latitude on the part of the FBI up to that 

There was a continuing skepticism on Mr. Krogh's part about the 
bureaucratic paper coming over from the FBI in justification of its 
efforts like the memo you showed me yesterday, and he continued to 
express that skepticism and the Attorney General continued to cor- 
roborate that right up until this meeting and I can't fix it precisely 
by date, but my best recollection is that it was in the third week in 
September when the x\ttorney General vouched for the fact that things 
were moving satisfactorily at that point. 

Now, I am sorry that I can't give you direct personal information 
on this. I can only give you a feel for what it was that the President 
had before him and that T had before me from others on this subject. 

Senator Weicker. You have seen the memorandmn of August 26 
from Dave Young to you. Do you have that memorandum with you? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 


Senator Weicker. Let's go to page 5 : 

In connection with issue (9), it is important to point out that with the recent 
article on Ellsberg's lawyer, Boudin, we have already started on a negative press 
image for Bllsberg. If the present Hunt/Liddy Project Number 1 is successful, 
it will be absolutely essential to have an overall game plan developed for its 
use in conjunction with the Congressional investigation. In this connection, I 
believe that the point of Buchanan's memorandum on attacking Ellsberg through 
the press should he borne in mind ; namely, that the situation being attacked is too 
big to be undermined by planted leaks among the friendly press. 

So you knew there was a press purpose to this break-in? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, as I said yesterday, Senator, I don't have 
a recollection of the memo itself, if you are asking me what I knew 
about an express purpose of the investigation of Daniel Ellsberg, I 
have testified already my understanding of the purposes. 

The object here was not to prosecute Mr. Ellsberg, and as far as I 
am concerned, not to prosecute Mr. Ellsberg and not to persecute Mr. 
Ellsberg. The object here was this same unit conducted with regard 
to the arms, the strategic arms limitation talks and other security 
matters, and that was to find out how it happened and to make sure 
within the Government that it did not happen again. 

Now, with regard to the congressional hearing aspects and the public 
relations aspects of this Ellsberg case, I think you can develop addi- 
tional information on that from others. I am not your best witness on 
that. I do know that there was in the White House a desire to air 
this whole thing once the facts were known, and it was hoped that a 
committee of the Congress would pick it up and would call witnesses 
and would expose how such a thing could happen in our governmental 
system today where the treachery was within the Government, if it 
was, or the treachery was in the think-tank apparatus, if there was, 
and I am not suggesting there was, but whether there was, and who the 
individuals involved were, what their motivations were, and why this 
thing happened. 

So I don't question for a minute that there was under active consid- 
eration the possibility of fostering a congressional inquiry into this, 
and I have to sa}^ it would have been a healthy thing if we could have 
had such a thing. 

But as far as the management of that particular effort is concerned, 
I am not your man. 

Senator Weicker. You are my man. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir? 

Senator Weicker. You are my man; you are a good witness. 

Do you acknowledge this memorandum which I referred to, the 
August 26 memorandum, having received it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know what you mean by acknowledged. 
I see an "E" on it that is certainly very much my "E." And it would 
indicate that I had read it and that I had approved the concept of 
having a meeting on September 9 with Mardian, Buzhardt, Krogh, 
Young, and Macomber, and 1 think that meeting was eventually held. 

Senator Weicker. And one of the questions raised in the memoran- 
dum, if you just slip back to the page before at the bottom of page 4, 
says, "How quickly do we advance to bring about a change in Ells- 
berg's image." 


Mr. Ehrlichman. That is footnoted to the material that you just 

Senator Weicker. That is footnoted through the material I just 
read. So I am going; to just run through the dates I just read because 
I don't think there is much more we can do with the subject. But let's 
review carefully what occurred. 

On June 1971 — let me ask j-ou this, Mr. Ehrlichman, would you at 
this time prefer, in the light of deference of evidence that has been 
presented to you, to leave Mr. Marx aside as one of the reasons for 
entering into this covert operation, or would you like to staj^ with 
Mr. Marx as a reason ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, I can't leave it aside, Senator Weicker, 
because, of coui-se, the fact is that the Attorney General did call and 
did convey his problems with regard to the Marx investigation, and 
that is a matter of history' and record. 

There is no way to blink that aside. Now, you say that there was 

Senator Weicker. Wait a minute. Stop there, Mr. Ehrlichman. We 
are not going into the motives of the Director. We are going into the 
reasons for the break-in in Dr. Fielding's office. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think you have 

Senator Weicker. The investigation took place. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You have asked if I would like to withdraw that 
factor as a justification for the investigation, and it is not something 
that can be withdrawn. It is a fact. 

Now, I cannot explain for you something that is not in my knowl- 
edge, which is the fact that there was an interview of Mr. Marx. It 
may have been a totally satisfactory and productive interview. On the 
other hand, it may have been the kind of a first interview by the FBI 
that requires followup, and that is what precipitated the Director's 
displeasure. I don't know and I guess you don't know. 

Senator Weicker. Well, I know that Mr. Marx met with the 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Who ? 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Louis Marx, 30 years ago in Dinty Moore's 
Kestaurant, and that is the last time they ever met, and they corre- 

Mr. Wilson. Excuse me, Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Yes, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Wilson. I don't believe it is proper, I submit to the chairman 
that it is not proper for a member of this committee to produce evi- 
dence of this sort. 

Senator Weicker. The issue is Mr. Marx. 

Mr. Wilson. I know, but the fact he only saw him in Dinty Moore's 
Restaurant 30 years ago is the rankest kind of hearsay from you. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Wilson, your client is alleging a friendship 
for Mr. Marx. 

Senator Er\t[n. I am not going to tell a Senator of the United States 
how to conduct himself. 

Mr. Wilson. Am I presumptuous in interfering on behalf of my 
client ? 

Senator Ervin. Well, I think you maybe have a right to object to 
the admissibility of testimony. But every Senator of the United States 


■has a right, to do what he thinks his duty requires him to do, and I 
am not going to undertake to prescribe standards for other Senators. 

Mr, Wilson, Well, the record shows my objection, doesn't it? 

Senator Ervin, Yes, sir, 

Mr, Ehrlichman. Senator, could I add my hearsay to this so you 
can evaluate it for what it is worth, "What I was told at the time was 
that the Director, who is well known for his Delmar Racetrack vaca- 
tions in southern California every year, had an acquaintanceship 
with Mr, Marx, which arose from his time in California on those 

Now, I don't know whether that is true or not, but that is what I 
was told. 

Senator Weicker. My conversation is not hearsay, it as a hearsay 
with Mr, Marx in which he told me what I am transmitting to you 
here today. 

Let me review again the dates, and then we will leave this subject; 
in June 1971, Mr, Marx is interviewed by the FBI, 

Mr, Ehrlichman. I don't know. 

Senator Weicker. In July of 1971, Dr. Fielding — an attempted 
interview is had with Dr. Fielding who refuses the interview on the 
advice of his attorney. On August 3 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Do we know why he did that ? 

Senator Weicker. This is something that would have to be dis- 
cussed with Dr. Fielding and his attorney. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I see. 

Senator Weicker. But the interview was refused; that is a fact. 

On August 3, we have evidence before the committee that the 
Director writes to Mr. Egil Krogh indicating full cooperation by the 
FBI. In your testimony yesterday, you termed this puffing, I think 
we finally agreed on that as a term. It is not my characterization ; it 
was your characterization. 

On August 11, you get a memorandum from Mr. Krogh and Mr. 
Young, and in that memorandum it is stated : ''In this connection, we 
would recommend that a covert operation be undertaken to examine 
all the medical files still held by Ellsberg's psychoanalyst covering a 
2-year period in which he was undergoing analysis, approve, disap- 
prove," — -we have your initial "E," with your comments underneath — 
"if done under your assurance that it is not traceable." 

And then on August 26, we have the memorandum which I just 
referred to, and again a memorandum you obviously received, initialed 
by you in which the issue of Ellsberg's press image is discussed, and 
then, lo and behold, on September 3, 1971, the break-in actually occurs. 

Isn't it fair to say, here is my question, that the August 11 memo- 
randum approving the covert activity, your approval to obtain Dr. 
Fielding's records which resulted in the September 3 break-in, was a 
result of Dr. Fielding's refusal to provide this information volun- 
tarily to the FBI and not as a result of any shortcoming of the FBI ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, Senator, by way of answering your ques- 
tion, I think we ought also to include the other reference in your 
exhibits, the letter of October 3 where it appears that the President — 
pardon me, August 3 — where the President, on July 29, found it neces- 
sary to write to the Director, to jiggle up the Bureau. I know of my 
own knowledge that in addition to that, the President had a telephone 
conversation with the Director on this subject, and, of course, the 


other f)art of the memo of August 11, just two paragraphs below where 
I put my "E," where they reported "We are continuing to press the 
FI3I for action on certain items," which I think have to also be weighed 
in along with these other conversations that I have indicated this 
morning in my previous answer, and I think the long and short of 
this is that while you can find typical selective evidence in a matter 
of this kind, you have to take it on all four comers. And I assure you 
that the decision that was made in this matter to put investigators in 
the field was taken most reluctantly and for genuine purposes, and 
the purposes are simply to supplement what was considered to be an 
inadequate effort at the time by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Now, in order for you to satisfy yourself on this you ought to hear 
from Mr. Mitchell, you ought to hear from Mr. Krogh, you ought to 
hear from those who were on the firing line of this, and not simply 
someone like myself, who was receiving these reports secondhand. 

Senator Weicker. I am going to repeat my question which you have 
not answered but, since you have raised this other issue, just what did 
you expect to do with the information so obtained, trying to supple- 
ment the efforts of the FBI? Did you intend to introduce this in 
court ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The purpose of this was to correct what was obvi- 
ously a very serious shortcoming, either in the Government itself or in 
the think tanks who had custody of the secret documents, because the 
confidential documents system had been compromised. 

Senator Weicker. "V^^lat did you intend to do with the evidence so 
obtained from Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. The 

Senator Weicker. Did you intend to introduce it in court ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No, sir, that was not the purpose. The Justice 
Department had prosecutorial 

Senator Weicker. What was the purpose ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Excuse me. Senator. The Justice Department 
had an investigation for prosecution purposes which was ongoing 
under Mr. Mardian. This was not intended to satisfy that need. This 
was intended to satisfy the President of the Ignited States, who was 
saying how could a thing like this happen? What have we done to 
prevent it happening again ? Is this Rand Corp., and all these other 
defense think tanks that are at fault in this or is our own Defense 
Department or is it the State Department or just where is the weak- 
ness in this ? 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Ehrlichman, are you telling me that the 
break-in in Dr. Fielding's office was to satisfv the President of the 
United States? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, now, you have [laughter] misunderstood 
me. Senator. 

The President wanted very much to make sure that a thing like this 
could not happen again. How one learned whether Ellsberg acted 
alone, as a disgnmtled employee of a think tank, whether he acted as 
a member of an international spy ring delivering secrets to a foreign 
embassy or just what his role was, where he fit, had to be determined 
in the opinion of the investigators by every available means. 

Now, obviously, as we discussed yesterday, this business of the psy- 
chiatric profile — incidentally. Senator, I would like to refer to some- 
thing that came in last night. As you all probably are very familiar on 


the committee, when you are a witness here yon get all sorts of sug- 
gestions by telegram and telephone and so on, and someone overnight 
very kindly called in to suggest that the committee staff check the 
Warren Commission report and the Kemer Commission report for 
their references to the use of psychiatric profiles in domestic criminal 
acts, and that was something I did not know about but apparently, 
they felt that the use of the psychiatric profile is a verv' valid investi- 
gatory^ device and, of course, the CIA feels that, too. They have this 
section on it. Yes, we have the citations that were given us by a citizen 
who just wired in or called in. It is the AVarren Commission report 
pages 26, 461, and 781; and the Kemer Commission report page 473. 
So this is apparently a technique of investigation which has consider- 
able authenticity and dignity, and that, this biisiness of trying to get 
additional information to permit the CIA psychiatric profile section 
to complete its work was the purpose of this additional task imposed 
upon these investigatore. 

Senator Weicker. Such CIA work would not be legal, in the United 
States, would it ? 

]Mr. Ehrlichmax. That is a law question I cannot answer. Senator. 
That has been debated back and forth in the ]\IcClellan committee 
already in the Senate. They have not yet issued their report. Evidently 
there is considerable authority for the proposition that it either is or 
that it ought to be, in the Kemer Commission report and in the War- 
ren Commission report. It is one of those gray areas, apparently. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I have one additional question. I 
do not want to impose on the time of the other Senators, but I would 
like to continue for a few additional minutes, if that is possible. 

Senator Ervix. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Ehrlichman, you testified 2 days ago 
that on June 28 you called Pat Gray and had him cancel a meeting 
with General Walters because of the problem with leaks at the FBI. 
Let me be specific. I am now referring to page 5304 in response to 
questioning by the minority counsel, Mr. Thompson — and this is rela- 
tive to calling off that meeting of the 28th with Pat Gray. 

My concern, strong concern about the meeting was that it was going to in- 
clude some staff members from the FBI and as I say we were experiencing these 
leak problems and riglit at that particular time one of the people who would have 
been included in that meeting was under very strong suspicion as being the 
source of that leak. 

Tlien, again, on page 5305, you state : "because at that time we were 
talking with ]Mr. Kleindienst about how to go about smoking out this 
problem around Mr. Gray, frankly." Those are your words. 

And yet, yesterday when you testified on the turning over of docu- 
ments, and this was the same day, on the 28th, to Pat Gray in your 
testimony you make the statement as the reason for gi\'ing two pack- 
ages of documents to Pat Gray and I quote you : "It seemed to me like a 
good way of making sure that the documents did not leak as long as 
Mr. Gray held on to them." 

J^ow, my question is very simple. On the same day you canceled a 
meeting with ]Mr. Gray because of leaks and then turned around and 
gave him documents so they would not be leaked. Which is it ? 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, my problem was not with INIr. Gray per- 
sonally with regard to leaks. Obviously, we would not have turned the 
documents over to him if we thought he was going to leak them. 

The problem was, as you read in the first transcript, was with a staff 
person high up in the FBI or at least, we suspected it was, we never 
established it. At the time we had had a number of conversations with 
Mr. Gray about the problem, and I had had some conversations with 
Mr. Kleindienst about the problem, and we had conversations about 
liow to solve the problem. "Wlien I said we went around Mr. Gray, it 
was that jNIr. Kleindienst, unknown to Mr, Gray, so that he would not 
even know it was being done, was going to plant a story or a fact, and 
we were going to see in such a way that the individual under suspicion 
might be disclosed. It was a long shot but it might have worked. 

Now, I had implicit confidence in Mr. Gray as not being the source 
of the leak because we had had experience with IVIr. Gray in the Justice 
Department and at HEW before that, and he was extraordinarily 
reliable, and so that was not the problem, and I hope that I did not — 
I hope we made that 

Senator Weicker. I do not think you did because you repeat your 
sentence to us because at that time we, and I assume that is you, "were 
talking with Mr. Kleindienst about how to go about smoking out this 
problem around Mr. Gray, frankly." 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is right, and the problem was on his staff. 
It was a holdover from the FBI who had been there when Mr. Gray 

Senator Weicker. Do you go around people when you trust them ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sometimes, sometimes, and it was Mr. Klein- 
dienst's view that that was a way to proceed and I do not say it was 
his view or mine, but that we would not bring Mr. Gray into our con- 
fidence with regard to Mr. Kleindienst's idea for planting a story. 
That is the only time we went around Mr. Gray, that I can think of. 

Senator Weicker. One last series of questions, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to — I can see you wanning up on that 
microphone and I just want to make sure I am not 

Senator Ervin". You just said one last question, I was not wanting 
you to ask one last question, I was going to get there so I would not 
fail to recognize Senator Montoya. So far as I am concerned, you can 
go ahead and ask more than one last question. 

Senator Weicker. This will be my last series on this go-around. 

You testified yesterday that on April 15 you called Pat Gray and 
that he told you he had taken the Hunt papers to Connecticut and 
destroyed them. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not recall his telling me that he took them 
to Connecticut. 

Senator Weicker. All right. Did he tell you that he destroyed them? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Now, let me read your testimony at that point. 

That was — 

and this was in response to Senator Gumey — 

That was in April of this year, we had a conversation. The President asked 
me to telephone Mr. Gray. It was Sunday night and it was the 15th of April at 
about 10 -.15 p.m. I was in the President's EOB Office and he had a meeting that 
day with Mr. Kleindienst, The subject of these documents came up at that meet- 


ing and the President asked me to call Mr. Gray and find out what the documents 
were and where they were. So I did that. Mr. Gray was not home. When he got 
home he called back and we completed the conversation in the President's office. 

Now, let me ask you this. After you received the word from Mr. 
Gray, which I believe was on April the 15th, did you transmit that 
information to the President ? 

Mr. EiiRLiCHMAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. On what day was that ?' 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He was sitting right there. I transmitted it in- 

Senator Weickjir. He was sitting with vou when you made this call 
to Pat Gray? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. And this was on April 15? Is that correct? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Was any action taken by the President, any ac- 
tion recommended by you, when you received word that the Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had gone along and, in fact, 
burned or destroyed, rather. Department files ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. The President took the action that was 
taken, and his first action was to contact either Mr. Kleindienst or 
INIr. Petersen, I am not sure which of the two it was, and he was asked 
to do nothing further until they had an opportunity to check into it 
and report back. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, he asked for a report. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, he asked for an investigation and a corrob- 
oration of this, and circumstances surrounding it so that he would 
know how to take the next. step. 

Senator Weicker. Gray admitted to you that he had destroyed the 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. What is there to investigate in this matter ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, you have a situation that obviously is con- 
siderably more than just an employment problem here, and the Presi- 
dent felt — you see he had spent the major portion of that day or a good 
portion of that day with the Attorney General and the Assistant At- 
torney General on the whole case, and he was desirous of making sure 
that any step that he took was in coordination with those gentlemen, 
and he, as a matter of fact, forbore to take a number of steps on his 
own motion in order to work in concert with the Attorney General 
and the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Petersen. 

Senator Weicker. So on April 15 you and the President learned 
that files had been destroyed, and the reaction of the President is "We 
are going to get a report." 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, he was obviously very concerned and upset by 
this, and 

Senator Weicker. Well, let me recount to you a personal experience 
because I had the identical experience that you and the President had 
on April 25. I was called by the Director, who was still the Acting 
Director, even though he had miffed the President of the United 
States and the head of the Domestic Council, that is, had burned the 
record. I was called by the Acting FBI Director in his office and I sat 
in the chair and the Acting Director turned to me and in essence said 


the same thing that he told you, and the President on April 15, "I went 
ahead and I destroyed these files." 

Now, I had many of the crosscurrents of emotion that I am sure must 
have also attended you and the President. He is the Acting Director 
of the FBI, I am sure that crossed your mind. I am a U.S. Senator, 
I am a member of this committee, and I am sure it must have crossed 
your mind that the President, he was the President of the United 
States and you were one of his closest advisers, and quite frankly I had 
the additional emotion of seeing a man before me who was my friend. 
These were the crosscurrents of emotion when the identical piece of in- 
formation came to me as had come to you 10 days earlier. And I must 
confess that I won't use more colorful language when this was dropped 
in my lap and some thoughts went through my head as to what do I do 
with it. tVhat do I do to meet my obligations not to let down a friend 
but, sir, you can make sure that the information, information of this 
import is made public and made available to the committee. It was 
within the next 36 hours that the Acting Director told me substantial 
portions of what had occurred and it was within that period of time 
that I made sure that the story was laid out in front of the public as 
soon as I got it, not under my name because I am not getting to the 
top of the backs of any of my friends, but it wasn't something that 
could be withheld from the American public. These were facts, they 
were known, all that was left is how were they going to be told. But 
certainly in no ways did it ever occur to me that this was something 
that could be left unattended to, that he could remain as Acting Direc- 
tor of the FBI, that the matters which I had heard of could not come 
to the attention of this committee, and as you know or as the record 
will indicate, having first had the news on April 26 — I beg pardon, 
April 25, the story was told to the American people on the 27th and 
Mr. Gray stepped down as Director on the 28th. 

Xow, would you indicate to me the difference 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir, it's just two different approaches. Senator. 

Senator Weicker. No, the information we received was identical. 

Mr. Ehrlichmaist. The President notified the chief law enforcement 
officer and you notified the newspapers. As I say, it's two different 
approaches to the same problem. 

Senator Weicker. No_, Mr. Ehrlichman, I wanted to make sure that 
I lived up to all the obligations that I had. the obligation as Senator, 
the obligation that I thought he owed the American people as FBI 
Director to tell them the whole story, the obligation I had as a member 
of this committee and the feelings that I had for a friend. There were 
various wavs it could be handled but I wanted him at least to get out 
and have the chance of telling his story before he was left in place by 
apparently vou and the President Avho had discovered the identical 
facts on April 15, but had made no move to either get Pat Gray, relieve 
him of his duties as Director of the FBI, or to give information to the 
American people as to what he had done. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. "Well, Senator, I can't agree with your assertion 
that the President made no move. He immediately informed those 
responsible for this entire investigation. Now this isli as you all on the 
committee well know, a very complex investigation with a lot of aspects 
to it and with real problems of the rights of individuals and various 
kinds of legal overtones. Certainly the President felt, I know he felt 


this had to be done in an orderly fashion by the law enforcement people 
who were responsible for the prosecution of the case. As it turned out it 
was well that he did because Mr. Petersen, in pursuing the investiga- 
tion with Mr. Gray, was able to develop other facts as a result of being 
able to do so without the cameras on, so to speak, which are as I am 
sure you recognize both a positive and a negative aspect of a matter 
of this kind in terms of adducing the facts. 

Now, I think that in hindsight, while it may sound very self-serving 
for me to say so, the President took precisely the right steps in im- 
mediately informing Mr. Petersen as he did, so that the prosecutors 
and the law enforcement people could do their work in making the 
scales before it was all over the newspapers. Now the identical same 
consideration applied in John Dean's situation where the President 
forbore to discharge Mr. Dean at Henry Petersen's request, to give 
Mr. Petersen and his people an opportunity to complete their work 
before that relationship was severed. 

Now, I think that we don't always have the luxury of gratifying our 
first instincts about a matter of this kind when we have the responsi- 
bility for the orderly discussion of the laws in a prosecution of this 

Senator Weicker. What was the purpose of your phone call on 
April 15 to Mr. Gray, incidentally? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I explained it was the result of the President's 
conversation that day with the Attorney General and Mr, Petersen, in 
which the question of these documents came up, and the question that 
he put to me, was whether I had any information with regard to the 
whereabouts of the documents, and I said ''yes, I did." I was there at 
the time when an envelope was delivered by Mr. Dean to Mr. Gray, 
and that he said, "yes, that they were aware of this," and he said, "Has 
Gray ever given them back ?" 

And I said, "I don't know." 

And he said, "Get on the phone and get ahold of Gray and tell him 
what we know about this and jfind out where those documents are and 
what is in them." 

Senator Weicker. In other words, the enforcement agencies, the 
enforcement agencies had been working prior to April 15. 

Mr. Ehrlichma^t. Oh, sure. 

Senator Weicker. The information had been given before the grand 
jury by Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. EHRLiCHMA:Nr. I don't think Dean had been to the grand jury, I 
think Dean had talked with the prosecutors and had given them some 
of this information, if not all of it, but we were operating with what 
the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General had told the 
President, which the President recalled of the conversation and was 
imparting to me. 

Senator Weicker. Well, I would just conclude by again asking you 
why Mr. Gray was left in place when this information was known to 
you and to the President and other membei-s of the executive branch. 

Mr. Ehrlictimax. Well. I believe I have answered that miestion. 
Senator Weicker. It was in aid of the xVssistant Attorney General, 
Mr. Petersen, and the Attorney General. Mr. Kleindienst. I recall hear- 
ing later that Mr. Petersen had. in fact, interviewed Mr. Gray follow- 
ing this, and had received conflictins: stories. This would have been 
prior, I guess, to your interview witH Mr. Gray, and finally that the 


matter had been resolved. They wanted to get a \Aritten statement, they 
wanted to get the kind of evidence that they could use in court, appar- 
ently, and so the President was giving them an opportunity to do that 
kind of thing. 

Senator Weicker. This wasn't the fii"st time that you left Mr. Gray 
in place, was it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. The first time that I left Mr. Gray in place ? 

Senator Weicker. This wasn't the fii*st time, in other words, that in 
an adverse situation to Mr. Gray he had been left in place, is that 
correct ? 

jVIr. Ehrlichmax. I am sorrj% I don't understand your question. 

Senator Weicker. Well, for instance, during his confirmation hear- 
ings, when he ran into some heavy weather, did you have any com- 
ments to make at that time ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Did I ? 

Senator Whicker. Yes. about Mr. Gray. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, indeed. 

Senator Weicker. Can you remember what you said about him in 
the confirmation hearings at that time ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I think you probably are referring to my saying 
that he was hanging in the wind and should be left to spin slowly. 

Senator Weicker. Yes. Let him hang there, ''AVell, I think we ought 
to let him hang there, let him twist slowly, slowly in the wind." 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. That is my metaphor, yes. 

Senator Weicker. And he was twisting slowly, slowly in the wind 
on April 15 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. He was being investigated, investigated, and 
investigated on April 15. 

Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervix. Senator Montoya. 

Senator Moxtoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know we have been on this burglary for quite some time, but I 
want to clear one point. Mr. Ehrlichman. 

At what point did you feel that the FBI really got into the investi- 
gation of the Ellsberg case in a manner that was satisfactory to White 
House expectations? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I cannot fix that date. Senator, except to say that 
it was sometime prior to September 20, because I do recall a meeting 
either that day or very close to it. 

Senator Moxtoya. Is that September 20, 1971 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Moxtoya. And the burglary occurred on or about Septem- 
ber 3 or 4 of 1971 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Around that time. 

Senator Moxtoya. Yes. 

And I believe your testimony indicated that you were notified by 
Mr. Krogh and Mr. Liddy or either of them while you were at Cape 
Cod what, 2 or 3 days later? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No, sir. 

Senator Moxtoya. "^AHien were you notified ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. To the best of my recollection I was notified after 
I returned to the city having been 

Senator Montoya. When ? 


Mr. Ehrlichman [continuing] . Having been at Cape Cod in a kind 
of a remote area where I was not easily reachable and I was never 
notified by Mr. Liddy. My best recollection is that I was notified by 
Mr. Krogh. 

Senator Montoya. Then how many days after the burglary would 
that be? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir ? 

Senator Montoya. How many days after the burglary ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I am sorry I can't fix the date of the break- 
in for you. 

Senator Montoya. Was it within a few days ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It was Labor Day weekend, as I understand it 
that they broke in. Monday was a holiday. My first day back in the 
office was Tuesday, and I think it was probably that Tuesday. 

Senator Montoya. It was the Tuesday after that weekend then ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. ^ 

Senator Montoya. So that would make it 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe that 

Senator Montoya. So that would make it on or about September 4, 
or 5, or 6. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have a calendar here, could I look at it? 

Senator Montoya. Well, the date is not relevant. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I see. 

Senator Montoya. But it would be in that neighborhood, would 
it not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator INIontoya. All right. 

Now, after about September 20, as you indicated, the FBI really 
started working on this investigation. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; I cant' say that, I am sorry. The only thing 
I can say is that I recall a meeting where there was a meeting of the 
minds between the Attorney General and the President as to the per- 
formance level of the Justice Department, including the FBI on the 
Pentagon Papers case, and the President's feeling, based on the Attor- 
ney General's report at that meeting was that the performance level 
was now satisfactory. Now, when — you have asked me for a specific 
date which I can't give you 

Senator IMontoya. It was on or about that time, then ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I assume so. 

Senator INIontoya. All right. 

Then, did you in the White House with your investigative unit, 
develop sort of an investigative partnership with the Department of 
Justice and the FBI ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I would say not. 

Senator Montoya. But you were working in concert toward the 
same objective, were you not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not believe that the White House people 
performed any specific investigations of that character after the 20th 
of September. 

Senator INIontoya. All right. 

Did you impart all the information that you had to the Depart- 
ment of Justice ? 


Mr. Ehrlichman. I did not, but I am sure that either Mr. Krogh or 
Mr. Young did. 

Senator Montoya. Then, is it your testimony that they did? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. That they did what, Senator ? 

Senator Moxtoya. Give all the information which they had to the 
Department of Justice. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I cannot vouch for that. I just assume that. 

Senator Moxtoya. Well, this is one thing that strikes my fancy, 
jSIr. Ehrlichman, that the burglary was committed on September 3 or 
4 of 1971. That you knew about it a few days later upon your return 
from Cape Cod, that Mr. Liddy knew, that ]\Ir. Krogh knew and that 
presumably other people in the "W^iite House knew. Then, why did it 
take them until April 15, 1973, for the I^.S. distiict attomev here in 
the District of Columbia, i\Ir. Silbert, to first find out of that burglary 
and then have to transmit that news to the Department of Justice? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I do not think it did, Senator. 

Senator INIoxtoya. Well, that is what happened, according to the 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya [continuing] . Submitted to this committee by Mr. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. The only thing I can tell you is what Mr. Dean 
told me about that, and that is that the Justice Department had that 
information a good deal sooner than that. 

Senator Moxtoya. Why did IVlr. Silbert have to transmit this infor- 
mation about the break-in to Assistant Attorney General Petersen 
on April 15, 1973, then? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, if Mr. Dean told me the truth he did not 
have to because Mr. Petei^sen already knew it. 

Senator INIoxtoya. You knew the truth ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I knew the truth ? 

Senator Moxtoya. You knew that the burglary had been committed ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No ; you misunderstood me. If ]Mr. Dean told me 
a year or so ago the truth, that ]SIr. Petersen then knew about the 
break-in, then Mr. Silbert's transmittal of the paperwork in April 
of this year was not necessary. 

Senator Moxtoya. But he did transmit it to Assistant Attorney 
General Petersen? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. There is no question about it. 

Senator ISIoxtoya. On that date. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. But the question is whether that was news to 
Mr. Petersen or not. 

Senator Moxtoya. Then, Mr. Petersen, the Assistant Attorney Gen- 
eral, then informed on April 26, informed Judge Byrne of the burglary 
attempt or the actual burglary, I should say. Now, that is also in the 
record in this hearing already. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, so is the fact that Mr. Dean told me a year 
before that or so that Petersen already knew it. 

Senator Moxtoya. Wiy did not Mr. Petei-sen take action then 
before ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I do not know. Senator. As a matter of fact, I 
do not even know that that is true but that is what Mr. Dean told me. 


Senator Montota. There were motions pending in the trial in Cali- 
fornia and petitions in discovery presented to the court to try to get 
all the necessary evidence that might be helpful to the defendant, and 
this did not appear at that time until April 15 when Attorney Greneral 
Petersen presented this evidence to Judge Byrne. Now, is that not odd ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It is something I cannot explain. I think the rec- 
ord is very plain, and I think it is in the committee record, as a matter 
of fact, that the photographs of the break-in were transmitted by the 
CIA to the Justice Department a long, long time before that. 

Senator Montoya. Yes, the photographs were, but there was no evi- 
dence connecting the photographs to the break-in in the Ellsberg psy- 
chiatrist's office until later. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Senator, there was a great big picture, as they 
tell it to me, and I have not seen these pictures, but I understand there 
is a great big picture of Gordon Liddy with his mustache, and a pic- 
ture that has Dr. Fielding's name and address in the background, and 
Gordon Liddy's picture has been in the Post every day, and it does 
not take too much imagination to figure out who he was. 

Senator Montoya. Well, it strikes my fancy that there is no evidence 
in the record here, and this burglary has been discussed, there is no 
evidence here that the Department of Justice knew about it until Mr. 
Silbert's memo was presented to Assistant Attorney General Petersen. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, the only thing I can say 

Senator Montoya. That is the state of the record at the present 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The only thing I can say is that my hearsay is as 
good as Mr. Dean's credibility on the subject, and I am obviously not 
the one to vouch for that. 

Senator Montoya. All right. Now, let us go into anotlier subject. In 
the matter of Presidential appointments. I will start out by asking 
you whether this came within your domain. 

Mr, Ehrlichman. The setting of appointments of the President's 
time ? 

Senator Montoya. No, the matter of the President making Presi- 
dential appointments of the different agencies. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. At some period of time, I did get into that. For 
instance, after the election in 197^2, I was very much involved in that. 

Senator Montoya. Did you get involved at all prior to 1972 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, but on a case-by-case basis where it would be 
a domestic department where I might have something to contribute. 

Senator Montoya. That is what I mean. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Presidential appointments in the different 

Mr. Ehrlichman. But it was not something that was routinely 
cleared to me so that I signed off on every departmental appointment 
or anything of that kind. 

Senator Montoya. Who would run a check on the possible 
appointees ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well 

Senator Montoya. Would it be the FBI ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Ordinarily there would be among other things, 
an FBI check on major appointees to determine conflict of interest 
and this kind of thing. 


Senator Montoya. And so the FBI — would you say that they con- 
ducted very complete and concise checks on these possible appointees ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. They were not very good, Senator, in my opinion. 

■Senator Montoya. In what respect ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Very superficial. They would go around and they 
would talk to a lot of people and get a lot of hearsay about them and 
there would be very little followup. I was consistently critical of the 
quality of that work, 

Senator Montoya. Well, did you provide some input into these 
checks yourself or through your employees ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Very seldom. Occasionally when there was an 
appointee that I had known, an FBI man would come around as they 
would to you or to any citizen, but that was only two or three times, 

Senator Montoya. But the White House did not have a setup for 
checkups ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, yes, there was a special office and it was in 
the office of the counsel where these things were routinely done and 
they had also a personnel office, and the two worked together generally, 
in Mr. Haldeman's area of responsibility, to perfect these files of Presi- 
dential appointees. 

Senator Montoya. What kind of checkups would the FBI conduct ? 
What was their sphere in doing their investigation ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, you know, you fill out one of these long 
forms and you have to put down where you lived for the last 30 years 
and where you have worked for the last '30 years, and as I gather it, 
and I am no expert on this, but I gather they go around and talk to 
people in these different places and they ask about the candidate. 

Senator Montoya. Now, you were Assistant to the President for 
Domestic Affairs ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And have been for quite some time — and were for 
quite some time until your resignation. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. 1970. 

Senator Montoya. Yes. Now, in this capacity, you had to evaluate 
the possible appointments made by the President and provide input 
by way of recommendation after reading reports, would you not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Only occasionally, where they were referred to me 
for my special consideration. 

Senator Montoya. What departments did you deal with as Assistant 
to the President for Domestic Affairs? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Any department that had a domestic aspect to it. 

Senator Montoya. All right. Then, those who worked under you 
necessarily informed you as to what they undertook with respect to 
communication or relations with the different departments under your 
jurisdiction ? Would that be a correct statement ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not on any regular basis, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. But on important policy matters, would they? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I relied on them to conduct their responsi- 
bilities, bringing to me only problems that they felt they could not 
handle themselves. 

Senator Montoya. Well, would you be able to throw some light 
before this committee as to the genesis of the enemies list about which 
testimony has been adduced ? 


Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Moxtoya. Did you receive any memorandum with respect 
to the enemies list from John Dean or any other person in the White 
House ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, not that I can recall. 

Senator Montoya. Did you recall the enemies list with Mr. 
Haldeman ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmaist. No. I did after the testimony here about it be- 
cause I do not recall ever hearing of it before. 

Senator Montoya. Did you discuss the enemies list with Mr. Colson ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Senator Montoya. Now, in your capacity as Assistant to the Presi- 
dent for Domestic Affairs dealing with the different {iepartments, 
were you aware of the effort that was being made to place Mr. Colson 
and Mr. Liddy in the Internal Kevenue Service? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya. You have heard about it since then ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am not sure that I have. 

Senator Montoya. Well, Dean's memorandum reflects something to 
this effect. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I missed that, I am sorry. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 

Now, you do know that the Wliite House made quite a few requests 
for the income tax returns of individuals, do you not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I would doubt that seriously. Senator. 

Senator jNIontoya. You would doubt that there were no requests? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I would doubt that the White House had made 
requests for the income tax returns of individual citizens. 

Senator ]\Iontoya. All right. 

Now, I will introduce for the record the statistical data furnished 
by the Internal Revenue Service in a book entitled "Statistics, Requests 
for Inspection of Income Tax Returns or Data From Returns by Fed- 
eral Agencies for the 6-]Month Period, January 1, 1972, to June 30, 
1972," artd then another volume with the same title for the period 
July 1, 1972, to December 31, 1972. 

Senator ER^^N. The reporter will mark them as exhibits. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 95 and 96.*] 

Senator Montoya. I will turn to the first page of the document in 
each instance and read for your benefit "Tax Checks Requested by 
Federal Agencies. January 1, 1972, to June 30, 1972. Agency : White 
House, No. 477." And then on the second document "Tax Checks 
Requested by Federal Agencies, July 1, 1972, to December 31, 1972. 
Agency : Wliite House, No. 438." What comment do you have on that ? 

^Ir. Ehrlichman. Well, your question was whether or not the Whit« 
House had requested anybody's tax returns and I said I would doubt 
that. Now, I don't know what a tax check is in those statistics. Perhaps 
there is a definition in there, but a tax check, as I understand it, is to 
find out if an individual has tax problems before he is appointed to 
Federal office, because obviously you don't want to appoint an as- 
sistant secretary who is going to be indicted for tax fraud the next 
day. So it is a routine procedure for this personnel office that I men- 
tioned or for the counsel's office to find out from the IRS if these indi- 

*See pp. 2909 and 2911. 


vidiials have problems. That does not mean calling for their returns 
and going through and seeing who they had taken as deductions or 
what their sources of income may be. 

As a matter of fact, my personal experience with this, Senator, has 
been in the instances where the President was considering individuals 
for the U.S. Supreme Court, and he asked me to determine whether 
people that he had in mind had any tax problems, and being kind of 
new to the business I thought that wliat one did was to. you know, get 
the returns and flip through and I discovered that the "White House 
could not get an individual's income tax return, the thing that the 
citizen files with the Government, that it's simply not available, even 
for such a situation as the appointment of a Supreme Court Justice. 

So, what you do is you ask the tax people to tell you if an individual 
that you have in mind has any significant tax problems, and then if 
they do, they would send back a memo saying "This fellow is free of 
any tax problems for the past 6 years" or they would send back a 
memo saying there is a tax problem for the tax year 1970, it is in nego- 
tiations, it will probably be settled by such and such a date. 

Senator Montoya. Well, Mr. Ehrlichman, I asked you those ques- 
tions before I asked you this one and you said that you were not aware 
of any requests ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am sorry your question did not say tax check, 
your question said tax return. Senator, and that is a very different 

Senator Montoya. Do you mean to tell me now there were no re- 
quests for tax returns of taxpayers ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am not aware of one. 

Senator Montoya. Well, would you say that the record of the In- 
ternal Revenue is correct ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, you see we are talking about apples and 
oranges, that is our problem. 

Senator Montoya. No, we are not talking about apples and oranges. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well the apple. 

Senator Montoya. We are talking about one thing. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Tax checks or tax returns. 

Senator Montoya. How can you get a tax check if you don't see a 
tax return? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, you ask somebody else in the Internal 
Revenue Service who has the legal authority to examine it to see if 
there is a problem or not. 

Senator Montoya. Now, you are talking about apples and oranges. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I think I can assure you, Senator, that at 
least in my personal experience, no one on the White House staff has 
any access to your tax return or the tax return of any citizen. At the 
same time if you were being considered by the President for the Su- 
preme Court, it would be a matter of routine for someone on his staff 
to ask the Internal Revenue Service to examine your file, as they have 
the legal right to do, and report to the President whether or not you 
have a tax problem. 

Senator Montoya. Let me read you some other instances where there 
were requests for tax returns from other departments. Department of 
the Treasury for the period January 1, 1972, to June 30, 1972, the 
Department of Justice requested 407 returns as against 477 by the 
White House. 

96-296 O - 73 - pt. 7 - 3 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Are those returns or checks ? 

Senator Montoya. Well, these are tax checks requested by Federal 
agencies under that title. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, you see, I might say this by way of a foot- 
note to all this, and I am by no means an expert in this but I under- 
stand that certain departments and agencies, not the "V^^iite House, 
but certain departments and agencies by statute, by laws passed by the 
Congress, have the right to see returns. The Department of Justice, 
I guess, is one. But that is a very different thing than the question that 
you put to me in the first instance. 

Senator Montoya. Yes, but those are categorized by department here 
in this list, and the Wliite House is categorized separately ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. That is the point I am trying to make. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, if that says the ^^^lite House received 
returns rather than got checks, you know, just memos of checks, that 
would be a different thing. 

Senator Montoya. "Wlio else would have the supervision or author- 
ity to make these requests in behalf of the White House ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I assume 

Senator Montoya. Besides yourself. 

Mr, Ehrlichman. I assume the counsel did. I guess I had the author- 
ity but I exercised it in very few cases as assistant to the President 
and they would be either Cabinet officers or Supreme Court appointees 
ordinarily where the President didn't want to tell a lot of people who 
he was considering. The counsel, I believe, ordinarily and routinely 
had the responsibility for determining whether a person had a tax 
problem or not. 

Senator Montoya. Don't you think that these tax checks and request 
for tax returns represent quite a great number for the White House 
because they only have 400 employees there ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, but you see they are checking the employees 
to be appointed in all of the departments under what are called a 
Presidential appointment. That would be Cabinet, Under Secretaries, 
Assistant Secretaries, agency heads, deputy agency heads of various 
agencies like the Veterans' Administration and places of that kind. 

Senator Montoya. You mean during this period that you were con- 
sidering approximately a thousand persons for appointment and 
announcing to the entire country that you were reducing the Federal 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, there is quite a bit of turnover. Senator. 
I don't know what the number would be, but it doesn't surprise me that 
the volume would be, say 400 in a 6-month period. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You see we have what 2 million Federal employ- 
ees or something, down from 2i/^ million. 

Senator Montoya. Well, you gave us a lecture on political science 
the other day, you tell us. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, that is my best recollection. 

Senator Montoya. All right. Thank you. 

Now, let us go into another phase. 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator — Senator Montoya is 
going to another phase I wonder if he would be kind enough to let me 
see that document from which he is reading. 


Senatx)r Montoya. Yes, two documents. 

Mr. AViLSON. May I return them after the recess ? 

Senator Montoya. You certainly may, sir, 

Mr. Wilson. All right, thank you. 

Senator ISIontoya. Now, on July 21 you were quoted in an article in 
the New York Times as being in favor of releasing the tapes which 
are in controversy. 

Did you make that kind of a statement ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I have had a lot of trouble with quotations 
in the New York Times, Senator, and that is one of them. 

What happened there was that I gave a television interview to a 
fellow, you know they come out and sit on my lawn and as I came out 
in the morning it is pretty well unavoidable, and this fellow said some- 
thing to the effect, "Do you have anything to worry about if these tapes 
get out?" 

And I said, "No, I don't think I have anything to worry about." I 
didn't know I was being taped, but I don't think I said anything there 
that would — that I would be ashamed of. 

And he said, "Well, then, you think the President ought to release 

And I said, "Well, you know you have got to look at this from two 
standpoints, certainly from my standpoint I have no problem but he 
has a much larger picture to look at." 

AVell, the word "certainly" is what carried on the wire, and the 
rest of the sentence didn't get carried, and so I saw the wire story and 
it said : "Ehrlichman today in response to a question, should the Presi- 
dent release these tapes said 'certainly'." 

Well, what I said was in effect, "Certainly I don't have anything 
to worry about but the President has got a lot more worries than I 
have about the country and the separation of powers and his relation- 
ship with the Congress and so on." 

Now, having just said that sentence, I will bet you the New York 
Times tomorrow says, "Ehrlichman says the President has a lot more 
to worry about than he does." 

■Senator jNIontoya. Well, now for 2 days we have been talking about 
a burglary here, the burglary that you justify as legal under implied 
Presidential constitutional power. You say that it was committed as a 
part of an effort to protect the security of our country. Many of us 
say this was clearly illegal. 

Now, I pose this question to you. And I want to develop in my own 
mind a profile of the President and probe into his inner thinking. If 
the President or someone at the White House was willing to order 
this questionable covert action, why does not the President now take 
cognizance of a real threat to the Presidency of our countiT. the ero- 
sion of confidence of our people, the internal institutional chaos that 
has set in, and now perform a really patriotic act, to bring stability to 
our country, perform a legal act by shedding the mantle of executive 
privilege and release these tapes and records to this committee so that 
the American people can have some light on the truth and put an end 
to the Watergate tale of suspense and tragedy ? 

Can you answer that question ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, obviously, that is a question. Senator, that 
ought to be directed to the President rather than to me. 


Let me just tell you my own view of this as a citizen. Obviously I 
don'^t speak for the President, and haven't for a long time. 

The chairman and learned counsel yesterday demonstrated to my 
satisfaction that these constitutional issues are not susceptible of easy 
decision. I would certainly be the last to try to make a quick response 
to your question. It is a profound question that involves the meaniujo: of 
our Constitution and the relationship of our governmental institutions. 
I don't think it is really appropriate for me to respond to it in terms of 
substance here. It is obviously a much more important question than 
someone in my situation ought to try to answer right off the top of his 

Senator Montoya. Well, if you were Chief Counsel at the l^Hiite 
House or if you were acting in the role of Assistant to the President 
for Domestic Affairs, and you were aware of the chaos that is setting in 
in this country with respect to the Presidency, and you were aware of 
other things, what would you advise him ? 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, may I 

Senator ER^^:^r. I believe that a proper question because- 

Mr. Wllsox. May I suggest that I never like to answer "if I" ques- 

Senator Er\t:n. Well, I never did like to answer "if I" questions my- 
self, but I think counsel. Senators have a right to ask them. 

Senator Montoya. I think the Senator is asking it 

Senator Er\t:n. Since the witness has gone afield and expressed 
opinions about the power of the President under the Constitution and 
I think since he was a lawyer for the Wliite House at one time, and 
since he was Chief Domestic Adviser of the President, I think it's all 
right to ask him what he would advise the President. 

Mr. Wilson. I think he wants to answer it my way. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure I fully understood 
the point that was going to be made by Mr. Wilson. I might add this 
one word of caution. We have taken proof from witnesses about what 
they would do in a set of circumstances, and we have heard questions 
put and answers made to hypothetical situations; but the chairman 
has admonished from time to time, as I have, that is not proof of 
material fact in these proceedings. It rather may or may not be rele- 
vant to the state of mind or the attitude of the witness as it bore on his 
conduct. If that is the case here, that is, if it has to do with the impact 
that point of ^dew might have on the witness' conduct I can't see any- 
thing wrong with it. If it has to do with trying to prove the substance 
of the hypothesis, then I think it would be different. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator would yield to me 
on my own time. 

Senator Baker. I will give you part of my time, Joe. 

Senator ]Montoya. This witness is an expert on the President's 
demeanor. He is a specialist on "White House procedures and thinking, 
and I think he would be the best witness, other than Mr. Haldeman. 
to answer such a question which is bothering the entire country, and I 
am not facetious about it. I was really sincere about it. 

Senator Baker. I am not facetious either. I was agreeing with you. 
I was telling him he ought to go ahead and answer the question. 

Senator jMontoya. I know that but I was trying to lay the premise 
for why I asked this particular question. 


jSIr. Ehrlichman. Senator, let me preface my answer by saying I am 
not an expert and that is the very reason I am going to answer this 
question the way I will. You asked me in terms of how the President 
approaches a problem like this, I guess, and you were talking about 
his temperament or his makeup and so on. If I were asked by the Presi- 
dent sitting there to approve this problem and give him a recommenda- 
tion, I would have to know a great deal more about the elements or the 
constitutional law question that are involved than I know sitting here 
today. So one of the first things I would do, as had been my practice 
there is to draw on the very best minds that we could assemble from 
around the country, in and out of Government, to advise on this sub- 
ject. We did this, for instance, in a somewhat critical phase of the bus- 
ing problem, and we had people like Alexander Bickel and Charles 
Wright from Texas and good legal minds from outside, and we had 
the best people we could find inside the Government as well as to 
counsel with us, both by way of memorandum and in person, as to the 
various options that would be available to the President, and cer- 
tainly as assistant to the President it was my job not to decide for 
myself the right thing to do and then tell him, but to try to assemble 
for him as much information, as much valid opinion as there was on 
the subject and spread it before him so that he had the entire picture, 
and that is the way he preferred to work. 

Now I have no' doubt that in this dispute that is precisely what he 
has done, although I don't know that of my own knowledge, I know 
how this man works. So that I would expect that he has drawn upon 
legal scholars, the best people in the Solicitor General's ofRce and the 
Department of Justice and everywhere that he can find respectable 
views as to the relationship of the Presidency to the Congress under the 

Senator Er\t:x. I think you are now testifying about the President's 
mind rather than your own. 

INIr. Ehrlichman. Sir ? 

Senator Ervix. I am sorry I did not sustain the objection. 

]Mr. Ehrlichmax. I understood that was one of the things that the 
Senator was interested in. 

Senator Montoya. I was asking what j^ou would say and not what 
the President would say. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, it would only be after a process of review 
like that that I would be equipped to say. I feel very inadequate my- 
self without the background in constitutional law. I could shoot from 
the hip and say were I sitting in the White House my instinctive re- 
action would be to feel my obligation to preserve the institution of the 
Presidency intact. You see, we passed this torch of the Presidency 
from one man to one man and it is his job for an entire period of 4 years 
to maintain the integrity of and the viability and the constitutionality 
and the function of that office, and there is nobody else who is going to 
help him. The Congress is in the business of strengthening the Con- 
gress' prerogatives, and we liave this constant advei-sary relationsliip 
that goes on between our branches of Government. 

Senator Erm:x. Just in the interest of time, are you not testifying 
that you do not know what you would do if you had a responsibility 
different from the one you now have ? 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir? 

Senator Ervtn. Are you not telling us in short that you do not know 
what you would do if you had the responsibility and the power which 
you do not now possess ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, it was admittedly a hypothetical 

Senator Er\^n. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman [continuing]. To which I was asked to respond, 
Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Er\t:n. I agree, I should have sustained the objection, at 
least, not sustained the objection, but to indicate that what you would 
do sheds no light except as a citizen. It might illuminate the thing, but 

1 interpret your answer to say that since you do not now have the posi- 
tion of adviser to the President, you do not know what you would do if 
you should be restored to that position under the present circumstances. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have a feeling you are objecting to the answer 
and not the question, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. No, no. Well, frankly, I think, I gave my opinion 
about the question. I do not care for iffy questions myself. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I understand. Well, obviously, without a great 
deal of study and a great deal more expertise than I have, I would not 
feel competent to advise either the President or this committee. 

Senator ERV^N. The only thing that I recognize that article is long 
and time is fleeting, in our hearts though stout and brave, still like 
muffled drums are beating funeral marches to the grave. We have 
taken 10 or 15 minutes on this proposition. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Chainnan, I have no other questions other 
than to make an observation that in my opinion, the witness has 
answered that he does not wish to answer. That is in effect your 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, without a great deal more study, Senator, 
it would be very presumptuous of me to involve myself in a question as 
profound as that. 

Senator Montoya. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess at this time, until 

2 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, at 12 :10 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 2 p.m., this same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Thursday, July 26, 1973 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

You spoke of the Kerner Commission and the Warren Commis- 
sion. Both of these commissions were appointed by the President in 
office at the time of their appointment and both of them worked in 
public, did they not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And in that respect they were unlike the Plumbers 
who were appointed in secret and whose identity was kept secret from 
the American people. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, their identity 
was not kept secret. It was the subject of newspaper stories. 

Secondly, the reason that I cited you to the reports of those commis- 
sions was because they both discussed or so my information is, they 


both discussed the use of psychiatric profiles with relation to U.S. citi- 
zens and, of course, one of them brought me to the realization that 
the Secret Service does conduct such an activity with relation to U.S. 
citizens in aid of its protection of the President and the Vice President 
and others in trying to determine in advance who might be threats to 
assassination attempts. 

So it goes to the point that you raised yesterday that such a tech- 
nique would be illegal with regard to U.S. citizens. 

Senator Er\t;n. Well, was not the existence of the Plumbers kept 
secret from the FBI, OIA and other investigative agencies of the 
Government ? 

ISlr. Ehklichman. No, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Did you tell Mr. Hoover about them ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir, and we also told the Attorney General. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

But they worked under cover of darkness and their weapon was 

Mr. Ehrlichman. They did not work under cover of darkness, Mr. 

Senator Ervin. Well, did they burglarize Dr. Fielding's office in the 
daylight or night? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not know, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Was that not reported to you ? 

Mr, Ehrlichman. No, sir. In point of fact, however, as I testified 
yesterday, I had interviews with the Secretary of Defense, Attorney 
General, Director of the CIA, to which I introduced ']Mr. Young and 
Mr, Krogh and they described the function of the special unit. This 
was in advance of their actually coming into full operation. 

Senator Er\t:n. jNIr, Ehrlichman, are you telling me that you do not 
know that the burglary of the psychiatrists' office occurred in the 
nighttime ? 

Mr, Ehrlichman. I did not, Mr. Chairman, 

Senator ER^^N. Do you think it occurred at high noon ? 

Mr, Ehrlichman, I have not heard, and I do not know this, but I 
have heard that it occurred on a holiday during the da^'time but as I 
say, I do not know it. 

Senator Ervin, But anyway, you spoke in derogatory terms of Mr. 

Mr, Ehrlichman, No; I do not intend any derogation of Mr. 

Senator Ervin. Well, you said he should have quit the office, that he 
did not know enough about surveillance, although he had spent his 
lifetime in it, 

Mr, Ehrlichman, I did not say that and I would not intend to say 
that, Mr, Chairman, 

Senator Ervin, AVell, you said he had different ideas about surveil- 
lance fi'om what the A^Hiite House had, 

Mr, Ehrlichman, No, sir. 

Senator ER\aN, Well, you said he would not cooperate with the 
White House, 

Mr, Ehrlichman, ^-VHiat I said was that in a specific instance he had 
very fixed ideas about the degree to which the Bureau should cooperate 
in this investigation. 


Senator Ervin. Yes. He had very fixed ideas when the President 
appointed Tom Charles Huston to devise him a method of having 
American citizens spied on Mr. Hoover had the fixed idea that they 
ought not to resort to burglary, that they ought not to resort to the use 
of undercover military agents, that they ought not to resort to virtually 
unlimited surveillance, and they ought not to I'esort to mail cover, and 
that was stated by Tom Charles Huston in documents put in evidence 
here about 15 times before the President approved those documents. So 
he did not cooperate. 

I am going to speak for his defense beyond the grave since he is not 
here. I call attention to the fact that Tom Charles Huston told the 
White House 12 or 15 times in documents recommending burglary, 
recommending the use of undercover military agents, recommending 
mail coverage, recommending virtually unlimited surveillance, 12 or 
15 times he protested against the use of those things and yet the Presi- 
dent approved them. And here in the very letter that he wrote to the 
man who had charge of the surveillance or the effort to get the record 
of the psychiatrist, here on August 3, a month before the break-in, he 
said that "if he, Egil Krogh, if you concur we will proceed with inter- 
views of all of the remaining individuals except Daniel Ellsberg." 

And knowing Mr. Hoover's ideas, I think he made the exception 
because he did not make it a practice to interview people who were 
under indictment. 

So there he was willing to cooperate. 

And another thing, along about this time, as a Member of the U.S. 
Senate, I was fighting the efforts of the administration to get no-knock 
laws enacted, to get the detention laws enacted, to expand by Executive 
fiat the powei"S of the Subvei-sive Activity Control Board and I was 
fighting against the proposition of being defender of the Department 
of Justice that it was all right to use undercover military agents to spy 
on civilians exercising their firet amendment lights. And at about that 
time, I got a letter from J. Edgar Hoover which T also offer as evidence 
and he said "You" referring to me "You have indeed been one of the 
guardians of our liberties and piT)tectors of our freedoms. 

"All Americans owe you a debt of gratitude." I don't offer that as 
any praise of myself but I offer that as evidence of Mr. Hoover's devo- 
tion to the basic rights of American citizens, the rights not to be bur- 
glarized, and I think that since he can't speak for himself that his 
documents ought to be able to convey his attitude. I can understand 
having heard this testimony, about the Ellsberg matter, why you say 
that Mr. Hoover would not cooperate with the White House, and he 
was on the side of liberty. 

Now, as I understand your testimony that you gave to Senator 
Weicker, you testified that the Plumbers attempted to get the records 
of the psychiatrist in order that someone of the OIA or somebody else 
might develop a psychiatric profile to enable President Nixon to deter- 
mine for himself whether Ellsberg was some kind of a kook or was 
some kind of a foreign intelligence agent. Is that what you told us ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well I don't think it's a question of the President 
determining for himself, Mr. Chairman. I think this was an effort on 
the pait. of the sj^ecial unit to do as they had done in other cases sub- 
sequently, to determine where there were holes in the — either in the 
Federal Government itself or in the Rand Corp. or these outside units 


that would permit a person like Ellsberg and his coconspirators, if 
there were any, to steal massive quantities of top-secret documents 
and turn them over to the Russians. 

Senator EmTEX. Well, maybe you can, but I can't harmonize with 
vour statement to Senator "Weicker that they were not attempting to 
get the psychiatrist's records for the purpose of assisting in the prosecu- 
tion of iSIr. Ellsberg, and that they were getting them in order that 
the President might satisfy himself on certain points. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the President, of course, is charged with 
the proper administration of the departments of the executive branch, 
the Defense Department, the State Department, the CIA, and the out- 
fits like the Rand Corp. and others that contract with those Depart- 
ments, and they have possession of secret documents. 

Now, when you have a situation like this one, and you have infor- 
mation coming in from the Justice Department that this individual 
is involved in a conspiracy, and you have the surrounding circum- 
stances of the delivery of these documents to a foreign embassy, it 
is incumbent upon the President, as the Executive of this executive 
branch, to satisfy himself that he has done everything possible to be 
sure that such a thing does not occur in the future, and in order to do 
that he has to be in a position to know what happened here. Now 
that was the process that was underway, and I think you will agree 
with me that that is a proper executive role. 

Senator Er\ix. Well, I believe Congress set up the FBI to determine 
what was going on in this country, didn't it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Among other things, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator ER^•IN. Yes. It set up the CIA to determine what was going 
on in respect to foreign intelligence, didn't it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. Among other agencies. 

Senator ER^^N. It set up the National Security Agency, didn't it? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. And the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

Senator Ervin. And the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. And a number of others. 

Senator ER^^N. But it didn't set up the Plumbers, did it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Of course the Congress doesn't do everything, 
Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Er\in. No ; but Congress is the only one that has got legis- 
lative power and I don't know any law that gives the President the 
authority to set up what some people have called the secret police; 
namely, the Plumbers. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think if anybody called it that they would be 
badly overstating the situation and we are getting now into this con- 
stitutional argument that you and Mr. Wilson engaged in yesterday, 
Mr. Chairman. 

The fact is that the President is granted constitutional powers to 
make sure these departments of the executive branch work properly 
and when you have a mistake or when you have a shortfall or when 
you have a grievous raid on secret papers like this one, the President 
would be very remiss in his obligation if he didn't move forward on it. 

Senator Ervin. In other words, the way to cope with this thing is to 
set a burglar to catch a burglar. 

Now, let me ask you one other question, I hope this will be my last. 

Didn't it come out very early after the June 17 break-in that $114,000 


of the President's money had been deposited, at least temporarily in a 
bank account among the burglars, Bernard L. Barker ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Ervin. It did not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Ervin. 'V^Hien did vou learn that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know that the President's money ever 
showed up in this. 

Senator Erm:n. It was the proceeds of campaign funds that had 
been given to help reelect the President, don't you know that? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You mean campaign contributions? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I see. Your term was not clear. 

Senator ER^^N. Well, I will call it Nixon's campaign funds and 
maybe we can agree on that. Didn't you find out very soon after the 
break-in that $114,000 of the President's campaign funds had found 
their way into the de]X)sit account of Bernard L. Barker, one of the 
burglars caught in the Watergate ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. Without agreeing with the amount 
because I don't know the amount. 

Senator Ervin. Well, as a matter of fact, didn't you testify in a 
deposition in a civil case that on the 23d day of June, pursuant to the 
President's direction that you discussed this matter of these funds 
being routed coming out of Mexico with General Walters ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Yes ; and the President had talked to you about it. 
He asked you to do that, didn't he ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No ; he sent word to me through Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Er\t[n. Did Mr. Haldeman bring you word and tell you it 
came from the President, that the President wanted you to find out 
something about this, these Mexican checks ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, the thing that Mr. Haldeman said to me 
was that the President had asked that he and I meet with Mr. Helms 
and General Walters to discuss the question of whether a full all-out 
vigorous FBI investigation might somehow turn up and compromise 
some ongoing or CIA activity. 

Senator Ervin. AYasn't it the activity directed to the Mexican checks? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not specifically. 

Senator Ervin. Weren't you asked about these Mexican checks in 
this deposition ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am sure I was. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. But I am sure I also answered in that deposition 
that that subject arose at the meeting and was not a part of the instruc- 
tions that came to me through Mr. Haldeman, 

Senator Ervin. Well, anyway, you had a meeting with General 
Walters on the 23d day of June just 6 days after the break-in 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. In which it became known that $114,000 of the 
Nixon campaign funds had come into Mr. Stans' office in the form 
of three Mexican checks or four Mexican checks and that the proceeds 
of those checks had been deposited in the bank accounts of a burglar 
in Miami, Fla. ? 


Mr. Ehrlichman, I am sure that those kind of elaborate details 
were not discussed. 

Senator Ervin. Well, do you know of any other campaign funds of 
the President, or campaign contributions that were routed into Mexico ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not of my own knowledge, no, sir. 

Senator Ervix. And the President was afraid that if the FBI vigor- 
ously investigated these checks, it might interfere with the CIA ? 

Mr, Ehrlichmax. The President was concerned. He told me later 
that the all-out FBI investigation might compromise some CIA activ- 
ity in Mexico. And the way the FBI was leaking that would be the 
surest way for that CIA activity then to appear in the Nation's press. 

Senator Ervin. And it might also explain how come $114,000 of the 
proceeds of a campaign contribution to him was found in the bank 
account of a burglar, might it not, if they pursued that investigation ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, Mr. Chairman, your inference is very un- 
fair. Because in point of fact the President's instructions to the FBI 
were to conduct a totally unlimited, all-out, full-scale investigation 
of that and every other aspect of this Watergate matter and that Mr. 
Gray, and Mr. Gray alone was to determine the scope. That the Presi- 
dent would not limit that scope at all. 

Senator Ervin. Well, if that was so, why did he ask whether the CIA 
ought to limit it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He gave those instructions upon being reassured 
later that the CIA had no concern. 

Senator ER\aN. Well, the President can remember, can't he? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And he listens to the television occasionally, doesn't 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not very often. 

Senator Er\t:n. Well, didn't the people in the White House read 
and listen to television and discuss among themselves about how all 
these strange things were happening? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. What strange things, INIr. Chairman ? 

Senator Ervin. Such as burglars being found in the headquarters of 
the opposition party with Nixon campaign funds in their pockets. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He was well aware of what was in the news, yes, 

Senator Ervin. Yes. Did you ever talk to the President about that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervt:n. Did you ever suggest to him that there was some- 
thing rather strange about his campaign funds being found in the 
pockets of burglars in the headquarters of the opposition party ? 

INIr. Ehrlichman. It was certainly not necessarv for them to suggest 
that to him. That is the reason he ordered the FBI to do an all-out 

Senator Er^^n. Well, they didn't find out much, did they? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir; they found out a great deal. They con- 
ducted — in fact, Mr. Chairman, on that score, they conducted the most 
intensive FBI investigation that had been conducted in this country 
in terms of the numbers of witnesses contacted. The numbers of leaks 
followed out, the numbers of agents involved in the investigation, the 
devotion of — vigor of the Bureau of Investigation, the most intensive 
investigation since the Kennedy assassination. 


Senator Ervin. And they didn't find out enough to indict anybody 
except the original seven men, notwithstanding the fact that the trans- 
action of the burglary ran right from the Watergate to the Committee 
To Re-Elect the President. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That certainly is not the President's fault. He 
turned the FBI loose. 

Senator Ervin. Well, it might be the fault of some of his aides in 
not insisting it be a little more vigorously done. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I assure you that the President — excuse me, Mr. 
Chairman, I assure you there was no restraint on the FBI in this in- 
vestigation whatsoever to my knowledge. None whatsoever. 

Senator Ervin. Not even when you suggested to General Walters 
that they might have a fear it might interfere with CIA operations ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Let's be clear about what happened there. That 
meeting as you say was on about the 23d, I believe. General Walters 
was not asked to do anything more than have a meeting with the 
Director of the FBI and discuss with him any possible concerns. Now 
in point of fact, the CIA could not reassure us right then with regard 
to the President's concerns, and it was not until the 26th, I believe, 
yes, the 27th — let's see — it was not until the 27th of June that the CIA 
telephoned the FBI to say that they were satisfied that there was no 
CIA involvement in the Mexican aspect of this, and it was very 
shortly after that that the President and Mr. Gray talked, and the 
President instructed Mr. Gray that in view of that the FBI should go 
all out in its investigation. So that is the sequence of events. 

Senator Ervin. Well, the President stated in his May statement : 

I considered it my responsibility to see that the Watergate investigation did not 
impinge adversely upon the national security area. For example, on April 18, 1973, 
when I learned that Mr. Hunt, a former member of the Special Investigations 
Unit at the White House, was to be questioned by the then Attorney General, I 
directed Assistant Attorney General Petersen to pursue every issue involving 
Watergate but to confine his investigation to Watergate and related matters and 
to stay out of national security matters. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is entire 

Senator Ervix. You testified that the Plumbers were dealing with 
national security matters. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, that is an entirely different subject from 
what I was just talking about. You asked me about the Plumbers or 
the CIA? 

Senator Ervin. Well, I have asked you about both, I think. I asked 
you if you did not testify that the Plumbers were dealing with na- 
tional security matters. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And, therefore, here is the President's own statement 
that he said he directed them to stay out of that. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Directed who to stay out of what? 

Senator Ervin. Out of national security matters, the thing that you 
sav the Plumbers were dealinor in. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He did not direct the FBI. He directed Henry 

Senator Er\tn. Well, Henry Petersen was the man in charge of the 
whole affair, was he not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. What whole affair, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Ervin. The prosecution. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, but not the investigation. 


Senator Ervt:n. He also said in that same statement: 

I instructed Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to insure that the investi- 
gation of the break-in not expose either an unrelated covert operation of the 
OIA or the activities of the White House investigations unit and to see that 
this was personally coordinated with General Walters, the Deputy Director of 
the CIA, and Mr. Oray of the FBI. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That was the purpose of the meeting on the 23d 
of June. 

Senator Ervin. So he says to see that the FBI did not impinge on 
any national security matters. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, no, that is not what that says. It says any 
CIA investigations 

Senator Ervin. Well, I will just read- 

Mr. Ehrlichman [continuing]. Unrelated to the Watergate. 
Senator ER^^N [continues reading]. 

Therefore, I instructed Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to insure that the 
investigation of the break-in not expose either an unrelated covert operation 
of the CIA or the activities of the White House investigations unit. 

That was the White House investigations unit, is that not an euphe- 
mism for the Plumbers? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe so. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, 

Therefore, he says and he told Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlich- 
man to see that this was personally coordinated between General 
Walters, the Deputy Director of the CIA and Mr. Gray of the FBI. 

]Mr. Ehrlichman. That was the purpose 

Senator Ervin. And yet, you say Mr. Gray was not limited in any 

INIr. Ehrlichman. That was the purpose 

Senator Ervin. And here is a direct part of the statement the 
President made that he instructed you and Mr. Haldeman to see that 
he stayed out of national security matters. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Would you like to hear what we did? 

Senator Ervin. It would be right interesting if we could. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. We held a meeting with General Walters and 
]Mr. Helms on the 23d of June, and thereafter we asked General 
Walters to be in touch with ISIr. Gray, and then about 4 days later 
the CIA informed the FBI that if the FBI did an unlimited investi- 
gation it would not turn up any CIA operations and would not com- 
promise. Mr. Grav then informed the President and the President 
said : "All right, Pat, I want the FBI to go all out with no strings 

That was on the 6th of July, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. You know, I am reminded of the parable of the 
good Samaritan. In that parable there was a man who went out to 
travel on the road down to Jericho and he fell among thieves and they 
l)eat him and robbed him and left him wounded there lying on the 
road. And then the priests and Levites came down there and pre- 
tended they did not see him and walked by on the other side. 

Then the good Samaritan came down and rendered him aid and sup- 
plicant and the evidence in this case tends to show thus far that all 
the intelligence, not all of them, but the people in charge of the Com- 
mittee To Re-Elect the President, the people in charge of the commit- 


tee, the Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President, and the White 
House aides, like the priest and the Levites walked by on the other 
side and pretended that this thing did not occur. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. May I answer that question ? 
Senator Ervhst. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In point of fact 

Mr. Wilson. Are you going to use the parable ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. I read the Bible but I do not quote it. 
'In point of fact, Mr. Chairman, on four different occasions the 
President of the United States had full-scale reports from the Attorney 
General about the efforts of the entire Department of Justice, the 
efforts of the entire Department of Justice in this, that included not 
only the FBI, it included the grand jury, it included the prosecutors, it 
included everybody who was involved in this investigation. It was fol- 
lowed very closely by those of us in the White House who had an 
interest in this matter one way or the other, Mr. Dean primarily but 
others of us as well. I had a meeting, for instance, with the Attorney 
General on the 31st of July of this year on the break-in, and got a 
full-scale report from him in which he said the investigation was not 
yet completed but that it was very clear to the entire Department of 
Justice that the seven people who were indicted were, in fact, the only 
ones implicated. 

Xow, the "\Miite House had said to its employees — the President had 
instructed that evervone was to cooperate fully in giving evidence to 
the FBI, and they did that. 

Mr. Dean conducted his own inquiry inside the White House with 
regard to Wliite House involvement, and Attorney General Klein- 
dienst, about 3 or 4 days after the Department of Justice completed 
this investigation in September made a complete report to the Presi- 
dent, the Vice President, the Cabinet and the Republican legislative 
leaders at a meeting which I can well recall and the Attorney General 
made the point at that time, in the President's presence, that this had 
been the most vigorous and extensive Department of Justice investiga- 
tion since the assassination and that their conclusion was that the 
people arrested, and then known to be implicated were, in fa<jt, the 
only ones involved. 

Now, that had the scnitinv and interest of the people in the White 
House, the people in the Cabinet, and the other executive branch offi- 
cials and it certainly had the full attention of the Attorney General. 
There was no attempt to shield our gaze and pass over on the other side. 
Senator Ervin. And notwithstanding the fact, did you ever discover 
that Sloan, the treasurer of the committee, at the direction of Ma- 
gruder, after consultation with Stans, paid $199,000 in cash to Liddy 
who masterminded the burglary? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, that is an interesting point, Mr. Chairman, 
because at mv meeting with the Attorney General on the 31st of July 
he said Mr. Sloan had a version of the facts which the prosecutors 
had heard and which were going to be read to the grand jury, and thev 
were. So that that was not concealed from the prosecutors, the investi- 
ficators had turned it up and it was before the grand jury. This was a 
known quantity. Unfortunately, when the matter went to trial, the 
judge and the jury didn't believe INIr. Sloan. 


Senator Ervin. Well, they didn't give him a chance. They didn't 
indict Magruder, and the prosecuting attorneys are reported in the 
press to have said the evidence showed that nobody was involved 
except the seven men under prosecution. 

Don't you know that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I know, too, that they had Mr. Sloan's testimony 
before them. He was not believed and in point of fact, you remember 
in the press, that at the trial, the judge made comments which indicated 
that he did not believe Mr. Sloan. 

Senator Ervin. Well, it has turned out since he was telling the 
truth, I think rather strongly, so they certainly had his testimony that 
Magruder, the Deputy Director, had ordered him to pay this $199,000 
in cash out of Secretary Stan's secret fund and that Secretary Stans 
had told Sloan to comply with the order of Magruder in this respect 
after consultation with Mitchell. 

Now, I can understand why they don't find out some things that are 
so outrageous that they don't believe a party. Didn't Mr. Sloan come 
up and want to tell you about this and you said to him, "I don't want 
to hear anything about it because if I hear anything about it I will 
have to take the executive privilege until after the election." 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know what it was that Mr. Sloan wanted 
to tell me because after we had talked for a few minutes and I had 
determined that he felt he had some exposure, but that he had not 
talked to an attorney, I told him that it would be grossly unfair of me 
to hear him out until he had had an opportunity to talk with an at- 
torney and take counsel on his own situation. 

Senator Ervin. You were one of the men in the White House who 
stood in power next to the President, weren't you ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I worked for the President there. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, and when an agent, when this treasurer of the 
Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President came and told you he 
wanted to tell you about some things that troubled him you refused to 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I thought I was doing that from his stand- 
point, Mr. Chairman. 

Duke Sloan has been a young man that I have known well during 
the time he worked in the White House. I didn't want to see him tell 
me something before he had talked to counsel that later on was going 
to prove his undoing, and you see his wife, Debbie, also worked at the 
A^Hiite House and was well known to my wife and me and I just didn't 
want to see him overreached. 

Senator Ervin. I have got to go and the time is almost up to go over 
there and vote. 

r Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. Before I put another question, I would say that my 
idea is that it is up to the jury to determine whether a witness is telling 
the truth instead of the prosecuting attorney. 

Did vou not call Henry Petersen, the Assistant Attorney General 
of the Criminal Division, who had general supervision of this prosecu- 
tion and ask him not to require former Secretary Maurice Stans to go 
before the grand jury ? 


Mr Ehrlichman. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The circumstances were that 
the— It had come to the President's notice that Secretary Stans was 
gomg to be asked to appear before the grand iury. He "asked me to 
determme if it would be possible for Secretary Stans to give his testi- 
mony as others had, through the device of a proceeding at the Justice 
Department, a deposition, so to speak, under oath, rather than to run 
the gauntlet at the Federal courthouse. 

The President said that a man who was a former Cabinet officer and 
^\Z\t -^^^ ''"^^ ^® subjected to that kind of a situation. I talked 
with Mr. Dean about it and I talked with Mr. Petersen and he agreed 
not to do that. ^ 

Senator Ervin. As a Democrat with a small "d," I am incapable 
ot comprehending why a former Cabinet officer should not have to do 
dld^ het mortals and go before grand juries and so he did not go, 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He gave his testimony. 
Senator Ervin. He gave his testimony? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Excuse me, ]\Ir. Chairman. He gave his testimony 
by deposition. -^ 

Senator Ervin. Yes, he gave his testimony in the absence of the 
grand ]ury, did he not ? 

Mr Ehrlichman. Apparently this was a procedure which had been 
established by the prosecution and a number of other people had done 

Senator Ervin. As I have observed during these hearings before, 
murder and stealing have occurred in all generations but they have not 
made murder meritorious or larceny legal. 

Now, my question is. Mr. Fonner Secretary Stans did not ffo before 
the grand ]ury, did he? He gave his testimony in his office, did he not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir— well, I do not know where he gave it 

henator Ervin. Well, he gave his testimony in the absence of the 
grand lury? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, I believe he gave it at the Department of 

Senator Ervin. Yes. And by that method, there was nobody there 
to ask him any questions except the prosecuting attorney who held 
office at the pleasure of the President. Is that not so? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I do not know who was present, Mr. 

Senator Ervin. Well, you know none of the grand jurors— there 
were 23 grand jurors, I believe under the Federal system, none of the 
grand lurors were there, were they? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not believe so. 

Senator Ervin. So this was a process 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Unless the foreman was there, and I do not know 

Senator Er^^n. This was a process because Secretarv Stans, I 
guess— Shakespeare said about Ceasar what meat our Ceasar eats 
had grown so great but he had eaten such meat that made him so great 
that he did not have to go before the grand jurv like ordinarv mortals, 
and that procedure made it certain that no inquisitive grand juror 
could ask this man who had had charge of the financing of the cam- 
paign, any embarrassing questions, did he not? 


Mr, Ehrlichman. Well, Mr. Chairman, you cannot establish by 
ray testimony who was present because I do not know. 

Senator Ervix. Well, at the instance of the President of the United 
States, you requested the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Petersen, 
to spare Mr. Stans from the ordeal that other people are supposed to 
go through, and go before the grand jury, and have his evidence taken 
in a manner in which no inquisitive grand juror would have any pos- 
sibility of asking an embarrassing question of the man who ought to 
have known more than anybody else about the financing of the cam- 
paign ; did you not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am sure that that is a procedure that was fol- 
lowed in other instances, Mr. Chairman, and I think the President 
had in mind a good deal less the question of what questions would be 
asked Mr. Stans and a good deal more of the fact of when one goes to 
that particular grand jury you run a gantlet of cameramen and news- 
paper people down the hall and up the stairs and it is a very arduous 
thing before you ever get into the room. 

Senator Ervin. You spare a man from that. You also spare him 
from any possible embarrassing questions from any one or more of 
23 grand jurors. 

Now, anybody else who had this special red-carpet treatment other 
than some other '\^^iite House officials? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have no idea. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Well, do you not know that several "Wliite House 
officials were given this special treatment ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I heard that in testimony here but I have no 
personal knowledge. 

Senator Ervin. Do you not think that that is contrary to the princi- 
ple that all men are supposed to stand equal before the law ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I can assure you that I did not have that 

Senator Ervtln. Well, I can understand why you could not get as 
far as you should have gotten in this if you kept witnesses who should 
have known the most about it away from the inquiring questions of 
grand jurors. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, do you have a copy of exhibit 91, which is a memo- 
randum from David Young to John Ehrlichman dated August 26, 
1971, page 2? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe we do somewhere. 

Senator Baker. Will counsel supply a copy to the witness? 

^Ir. Ehrlichman. Well, we had a copy but I am sorry I don't have 
it right at my fingertip. 

Senator Baker. Also, if you have a copy, would you also get a copy 
of the President's statement of May 22,'l971? 

INIr. Ehrlichman. I don't have that with us. 

Senator Baker. Would the staff please supply a copy of that 
document ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have the other document here, Senator. 

96-296 O - 73 - pt. 7 - 4 


Mr. Wilson. Mr. Strickler, my partner, has a trial uptown and he 
didn't come back this afternoon and that is the reason we are bereft of 
these exhibits. 

Senator Baker. I also wanted to draw your attention in this brief 
examination to exhibit No. 3 which is a memorandum for you from 
jNIr. Kro^h and INIr. Young, dated August 11, 1971, and I would like 
to stop long enough 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That I have. 

Senator Baker [continuing] . For staff to supply any of the missing 
documents. Do you have exhibit 91? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, I just need the President's statement of 
the 21st if that is what you are referring to. 

Senator Baker. All right, fine. The May 22 statement of the 

Do you have a mimeographed copy so that we can make the pages 
correspond ? 

Now, is that the mimeographed copy? 

INIr. Ehrlichman. That is the Congressional Record? 

Senator Baker. No ; it is not. I would like you to do that, if you 
will, please. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, I am not trying to imply anything. I am not try- 
ing to put you on the spot. I am not trying to ask any unfair question. 
I simply must say that, having heard your testimony for some days 
and having looked at these documents and the President's statement, 
certain questions have occurred to me that appear to be unanswered 
or partially unanswered or appear to be incomplete. 

I would address your attention first to the August 1, 1971, document 
from Krogh and Young to Ehrlichman which I believe is marked 
according to my copy as exhibit 3 from executive session July, I 
believe, 17, 1973. 

On page 3 of that the paragraphs jump from 4 to 6. What happened 
to paragraph 5, if you know and what did it say? 

Mr. Ehrlichmaist. Well, I can remember what paragraph 5 said. 
I don't know who excised this. It deals with an extremely sensitive 
subject relating to another country. I don't know why it isn't in here. 

Senator Baker. Are you in a position to supply it now for the 
record ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I can, I am not sure you want me to. 

Senator Baker. Counsel for the committee, majority counsel, I be- 
lieve has something he wants to say on the subject. 

Mr. Dash. I just wanted to say that when this was given to us on 
subpena by Mr. Young's counselor, Mr. Young excised it on the ground 
that it contained national security matters involving a foreign country. 
That was his statement to the committee. 

Senator Baker. We are in the most troubled of all troubled waters 
here. Mavbe I can approach it obliquely. 

Can you give the committee some information as to whether or not 
excised paragraph 5, which I gather now the committee does have 

Mr. Dash. No ; it was never given to us. We got that document just 
as it now looks. 

Senator Baker. All right. "V^Hiether or not excised, paraarraph 5, 
which would appear to deal, I gather, in intelligence about a foreign 
country, does or does not have any bearing on the action or conduct 


of principal staff of the White House subsequent to the Watergate 
break-in ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Baker. Does it have to do with the national security matters 
that the President refers to repeatedly in his statement of IVCay 22 as 
being interwoven? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It's germane to the Pentagon Papers situation. 
Senator Baker. Are you at liberty to supply that or is this one of 

the matters where 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I don't think I am. I take it that that would not be 
one of the items exempted from the executive privilege exceptions, so 
to speak. I think this is a matter which somebody ought to get from 
the White House if, in fact, it's going to come from somewhere. I would 
probably be violating two or three statutes if I disclosed at this point. 

Senator Baker. Is it of significant importance? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't think it is, but that is a matter of personal 
opinion. It certainly does not bear on the Watergate. It is tangentially 
related to the special unit investigation of or, yes, investigation of 
the Pentagon Papers matter. But it is very tangential, and I think 
very sensitive. 

Senator Baker. All right. 

Does it have something to do with the characterization that the 
President placed on the situation in the third paragraph on the first 
page of his ISIay 22d statement, which is very short and I will read it : 
"Important national security operations which themselves had no 
connection with Watergate have become entangled in the case." 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It could. I think it would fall within that 

Senator Baker. Do you know whether it does or not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I would say it does. I would say it does, 
and I can say this : It's one of those collateral matters. Senator, that 
would be interesting and titillating and whatnot, but it would cause 
more mischief than the good would be produced from the disclosure. 
I am perfectly content under appropriate safeguards and permission 
or whatnot to talk to the committee about it in executive session or 
whatever arrangements you would like to make provided I have the 
leave of the White House to do so. But 

Senator Baker. You see what I am driving for, Mr. Ehrlichman? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. If the President does in fact try to make a major 
case for the idea that there was a commingling of Watergate and 
non-Watergate related activity, and that he took measures after the 
break-in designated frequently in this record as the coverup, to pro- 
tect non-Watergate related activity. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. This would be one of those. 

Senator Baker. If that would be so then we need to know about it. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There would be that kind of a situation where 
in thinking about it, say, the FBI making an investigation of this 
i^articular matter referred to in this paragraph, and then that some- 
how leaking it would be very unfortunate. 

Senator Baker. Right. 

Are you using that as an example or 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sure, that is a hypothetical 


Senator Baker. That is not a characterization of the missing 
paragraph ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, no, no, indeed. 

Senator Baker. I understand that you would be willing to dis- 
cuss this fully with the committee in executive session provided you 
had leave from the White House to do so. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Absolutely. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that staff 
propound such a request to the White House so that we might pursue 
the matter further. 

Senator Ervin. Without objection that will be done. 

Senator Baker. I invite your attention to exhibit No. 91, Mr. 
Ehrlichman, a memorandum from Mr. Young to you dated August 26, 
1971, the middle of page 2. It is not very long and I will read it, too : 

It may well be that although Ellsberg is guilty of the crimes with which he 
is charged, he did not in fact turn the papers over to the New York Times. The 
Defense Department's analysis of the printed material may even show that 
Ellsberg did not have some of the papers which the New York Times printed. 

And this is the part I would like to draw your attention to : 

Furthermore, the whole distribution network may be the work of still another 
and even larger network. 

That didn't mean much to me on first reading but in light of other 
circumstances that have come to my attention, and in light of the 
missing paragraph 5, in light of the repeated references by the Pres- 
ident in his May 22, 1973, statement to the intermingling of affairs, 
my curiosity was greatly heightened. Now, this was a memorandum 
to you ? 

Do you know what they were talking about ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I know that there was a very respectable — let 
me shorten it. Yes, sir, that is the answer to the question, I do know. 

Senator Baker. Can you tell us ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I can tell you — ^your question related to paragraph 
5 and I take it we would pass any reference to that. 

The reference in the other exhibit was to a respectable body of 
opinion among the investigators in the Government : ( 1 ) That Daniel 
Ellsberg may not have been the man to turn the stuff over to the New 
York Times, and (2) there were a number of other people involved 
either in association with him or operating separately. 

I saw just enough of the investigation material to persuade me that 
there are indeed other people involved in that case who have never 
been indicted. 

Senator Baker. Who has knowledge of that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The Department of Justice has. Mr. Mardian, 
who was the Assistant Attorney General in charge of that prosecution 
does. I take it Henry Petersen does. I am not sure that either Mr. 
Krogh or Mr. Young do on any kind of detailed basis. But the people 
who made the prosecution decisions in the case which have been the 
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General or the two 
Assistant Attorneys General. 

Senator Baker. I rather think your question is responsive and may 
very well be entirely accurate but I get the feeling there is something 
else there. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, there undoubtedly is and I don't know the 
full details of it. 

Senator Baker. I am talking about what you know, Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am tiptoeing just a little bit, Senator, because, 
frankly, I don't want to say somebody's name or advance an innuendo 
of any kind that would be unfair to anybody. 

Senator Baker. No, I don't want you to make a charge here that 
somebody may have been involved in the Ellsberg situation. 

Mr. EnRLiCHMAisr. Right. 

Senator Baker. Or the psychiatrist break-in or the Pentagon Papers. 
I specifically do not want that. 

Wliat I do want to know is the breadth and range of your informa- 
tion as to that event or other security problems that may have had some 
bearing on the contentions of the President in his May 22 statement. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think the statement of May 22 referred less to 
that reference, that is this distribution network and others in the 
coconspiracy, than it did to other activities of the special unit or other 
problems that the special unit addressed itself to. 

Senator Baker. Other than the Ellsberg matter ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Senator Baker. What ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I mentioned two that are in the public domain, 
the SALT leak and the India-Russia leak, that is not 

Senator Baker. Indo-Pakistan situation ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, this had to do with a treaty between Russia 
and India and it compromised a CIA document which appeared in the 
New York Times and other newspapers. 

Senator Baker. What other examples ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is as far as I can go because that is all in the 
public domain and I am under an express injunction from Mr. Buz- 
hardt that executive privilege has been invoked as to the other matters. 

Senator Baker. Are you willing to discuss these matters by leave of 
the "\'\Tiite House in executive session ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. If — I am in a situation where it isn't a question 
of my willingness. I am, you know, in a situation where I am willing to 
answer anv proper question but I am also in a situation where certain 
subjects of this kind of a sensitive national security nature are simply 
not mine to give. 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Vice Chairman, this has already been considered 
bv Mr. Buzhardt, and with respect to a 1971 investigation, I guess 
the witness will fix these in this area without further definition, and 
without mv having a single knowledge of a fact about it. I have a letter 
from INIr. Buzhardt. 

Senator Baker. I am sorry, Mr. Wilson, I cannot hear you. Would 
you move your microphone ? 

Mr. Wilson. I am sorrv. sir. Shall I begin again ? 

Senator Baker. No, I think that is not necessary. I got the first part 
but it was trailinsr off badly. 

Mr. Wilson. With respect to an anonvmously stated investigation 
in 1971, which is perliaps one of the four instances of the Plumbers' 
activities, I hold a letter from Mr. Buzhardt dated Julv 23. directing 
us to claim privilege pursuant to the Constitution doctrine of the 
separation of powers. 


Senator Baker. On what ? 

Mr. Wilson. I am very happy to pass this up. 

Senator Baker. No, no ; I accept your word for it, but on what ? Does 
it specify on what ? 

Mr. Wilson. Yes ; it is identified only in here with regard to what 
we know to be a fourth instance of the activities of the Phimbere. 

Senator Baker. A fourth instance ? 

Mr. Wilson. Yes. 

Senator Baker. There were three instances described by the Presi- 
dent in his statement of May 22, as I recall. 

Mr. Wilson. It is possible, sir, that I am a little confused and that 
the third and fourth instances may merge into a single instance. One 
would be the Pentagon Papers, which is in the public domain. The 
second is the SALT, there has been some reference here to the com- 
promising of the CIA with respect to an Indian matter. I do not 

Senator Baker. With respect to an Indian matter ? 

Mr. Wilson. Yes 

Mr. Ehrlichman. This is with respect to the India-Russia Treaty 
that I just mentioned. 

Mr. Wilson. If the reference in here to a 1971 investigation overlaps 
the third or is an independent fourth, I do not know, sir. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Ehrlichman is shaking his head no, to the 
former and yes, to the latter. It does not overlap the fourth function. 
Can you tell us what the fourth function is ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Under this letter I cannot, sir. 

Senator Baker. Would you tell us in executive session if you have 
permission of the "White House ? 

Mr. Wilson. Can I answer that ? 

Senator Baker. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Wilson. We already have an admission against it, admonition 
against us and I would believe sir, of course, if you will ask him we 
will go back and submit it but we have already a direction to claim 
the privilege with respect to that item. That is what I hold in my 
hand, sir. 

Senator Baker. Do you represent, Mr. Ehrlichman, this to be a 
matter of extreme national importance in terms of national security? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. Can you tell me whether or not the fourth item 
Mr. Wilson referred to has to do with the commingling of Watergate 
and other security matters? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not inherently, Senator. The concern here, I 
think, would be that, just as we have this situation now, an inquiry 
into the Watergate leads to an inquiry into this matter which, in turn, 
would compromise it. 

Senator Baker. ^Ir. Ehrlichman. I will not take much longer. 
Let me refer you to a few pages in the President's statement, and 
incidentally, this is not a waste of time. This is a terriblv important 
matter because on the one hand, you have an allegation bv the Presi- 
dent that national security matters accounted for part of his conduct 
subsequent to Watergate. On the other hand, we have examples of 
wiretapping, of the Ellsberg break-in and other things, and very 
frankly, I am not sure you have entirely con^dnced all of the committee 


that these are matters of extraordinary national importance that they 
fit the description that the President makes in his statement of May 22. 
I will reserve judgment on that until later but the fact that there is 
a missing paragraph in one exhibit, the fact that there is reference to 
another matter, the fact that Mr. Wilson mentions another fourth 
category of conduct which, as far as I know, we never knew about, 
if those facts are true — whether they are inimical to the President's 
best interest or supportive of his best interest is not important to this 
inquiry at this moment — it makes the record obviously incomplete. 

Now, I need to know how we go about testing the several pieces 
made by the President on the question of national security. The press 
has carried the account that the whole Watergate affair is cloaked in 
a shield of national security, and to be very frank with you, the 
President's statement of May 22 could be entirely correct in every 
respect, and I suppose we all assume that it is, but it is still so general 
and subject to so many interpretations that it cannot stand unaided 
the close scrutiny that this committee is trying to undertake. 

Now, I want to know, on whatever basis I can find out, what those 
other considerations were. I do not want to know them in a way that, 
as a citizen of the United States, I think they might jeopardize the 
safety or the future of my Nation, but I have got a delicate balancing 
job on my hands here trying to find out and trying to evaluate whether 
they are in fact of that importance. I am sort of at a loss as to how 
I do that. 

Let me put one other item into the equation. You spoke of, or I 
believe Mr. Wilson spoke of, a 1971 report. I want to put 

Mr. Wilson. Investigation. 

Senator Baker. Sir ? 

Mr, Wilson. Investigation. 

Senator Baker. I want to put a specific question to you. Whether or 
not any of these functions had to do with anything related to, say, the 
Indo-Pakistani War. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, you see, whether I answer yes or no. Sena- 
tor, I have added to it cominjj into the public domain, and I think I 
am precluded from making a fair response to your question because we 
could sit here and by 20 questions eliminate a number of alternatives 
so that it would be — it would become more readily apparent. Let me 
say if you and I were sitting across a table and we did not have all 
this it would not be nearly the problem that it is, but 

Senator Baker. Are you telling me, Mr. Ehrlichman. there are some 
matters of such grave national security importance that you would 
in effect bite the bullet and take the examination, interrogation that 
you have gone through so far ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am not sure I understand your question. 

Senator Baker. Well, my question is this : If, in fact, the conduct 
of the "White House and its major staff after the Watergate inquiry 
was based on national security considerations, just assume for the 
moment that there was some element of an obstruction of the investiga- 
tion of the Watergate situation because of some national security issue. 
How srre^t must that national security issue be to take all the punish- 
ment that an administration and witnesses have taken ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well 


Senator Baker. What I am asking you is, is it that important or am 
I playing games? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In my opinion it is that important, Senator. 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Vice Chairman, I believe it would be well if you 
would permit me to read this letter to you because it answers some of 
your questions. 

Senator Baker. I would like that very much. 

Mr. Wilson. Then, of course, with the permission of yourself and 
the chairman, it may be put in the record. It is dated the 23d of July 
and it is addressed to me and it is signed by Mr. Buzhardt, as special 
counsel to the President. 

This is in reference to your inquiry concerning the extent of the President's 
waiver of executive privilege in connection witli testimony before the Senate 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Am I in close enough for everybody to hear me ? 
Senator Baker. Yes, sir, we can hear fine. 
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. 

As you know the President said in his Statement on May 22, 1973: "Execu- 
tive privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony concerning possible criminal 
conduct or discussions of possible criminal conduct in matters presently under 
investigation, including the Watergate affair and the alleged coverup." This 
is the total extent to which the President waived executive privilege. 

The 1971 investigation about which you inquired was in no way related to 
the Watergate affair, the alleged coverup, or to any Presidential election. This 
matter does involve most sensitive national security matters, the public dis- 
closure of which would cause damage to the national security. 

Accordingly, if your clients, Mr. John F. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman, are 
interrogated about this particular investigation, the President has requested 
that you inform the committee that your clients have been instructed by the 
President to decline to give testimony concerning this particular investigation, 
and that the President, in so instructing your clients, is doing so pursuant to 
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 

Senator Baker. Do I understand, Mr. Wilson, this adverts only 
to the 1971 investigation? 

Mr. Wilson. To my knowledge it does and I have no idea what 
that is. This is the key to me. May I pass this to the Chair and I would 
like to pass up the original and keep the Xerox myself in my unselfish- 
ness. [Laughter.] 

Senator Baker. I am not going to press that any further at this 
point. I intend to pursue it a little further a little later in maybe a 
little different way. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, could I extend my remarks in response 
to vour general question with regard 

Senator Baker. Yes. sir. 

^Ir. Ehrlichman. With regard to the legitimacy of the President's 
concern with regard to these various national security problems. 

The chairman and others have questioned me alwut the President's 
concern about the CIA possibly being involved in this, which was, 
as you know, of limited concern dating from the — about the 20th of 
June to about the 6th or 7th of July. I would ask the committee to 
have its staff secure a document dated July 6, 1972, from General 
Walters to the acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
relating to that subject. I don't think I should testify regarding the 
content of that in any degree of particularity, I think the document 
speaks for itself, and will go to the general question which the chair- 


man will put and I think will satisfy tlie committee with regard to 
the authenticity and the genuineness of the President's concern on that 

subject. 1 • • Q 

Senator Baker. Do you suggest that as an aid to my general mquiry i 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Ehrlichman, I am not trymg to advise you or 
to advise the President, but I think it is urgently important that this 
committee weigh and the executive department weigh not only the im- 
portance of national security versus other considerations, but that we 
weigh as well the relative importance of national security to domestic 
security, that is the welfare of this Nation, and this undertaking is no 
small task. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I understand it, if this, Senator 

Senator Baker. I need to know whether or not we are playing games 
or whether in fact this was a legitimate area of inquiry with the com- 
mittee or am I being stopped ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. We are not playing games. 

Senator Baker. OK. I will stand on that. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Obviously I am not in any position to deliver for 
you under the circumstances,' but it seems to me that the chairman, 
the vice chairman, the committee— or the entire committee, can find 
someone in the executive branch to sit down on a confidential basis and 
talk through this one particular matter or if they will tell you that I 
can do it I would be happy to do it on that basis, but it is a— simply 
a matter which — in the scale which you have just described heavily 

Senator Baker. Which way ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In favor of national security, in my opinion. 

Now, you may disagree with me but I don't think you will. 

Senator Baker. Well, Mr. Ehrlichman. I am going to pursue this, 
I am not quite sure how but you see the dilemma the committee is in ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sure. 

Senator Baker. We have on one hand rather elliptical or not com- 
plete allegations of national security concern of such grave importance 
that the risk is run that it might be "misunderstood, that the allegations 
and claims of national security considerations arc suspect in the minds 
of some. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I understand. 

Senator Baker. And on the other hand, the concern that if there 
are in fact vital national interests involved we have an obligation as 
Senators and as citizens to find it out the right way. But we are left 
right now in an untenable position. We have got to press this further 
in conjunction with the tapes, in conjunction with the documents, in 
conjunction with the President's May 22 statement, in conjunction 
with a dozen other things I could name. We need to know what f actore 
were taken into account to verify or invalidate the claim of national 
security which itself is in some quarter suspect, and I, for one, hoiie 
that we can add that to the long list of things on which T believe the 
committee needs to make a definitive statement. 

Now, I have lectured you more than I have questioned you, but T 
tliink you understand the dimensions of my concern. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I certainlv do. 


Senator Baker, And I think you understand there is information 
available that heightens our curiosity, or at least mine, about this. 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Vice Chairman ? 

Senator Baker. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Wilson. With respect to the responsibility I have with respect 
to this matter, I am perfectly willing to go back to Mr. Buzhardt with 
a message, if you will give it to me, that in executive session, and I 
want to be very careful not to offend anybody, but the leaks out of your 
committee investigations have been colossal. 

Senator Baker. We probably have a track record for that, Mr. 

Mr. Wilson. And whole pages of interviews with my clients have 
been quoted verbatim, and the staff denies, and I believe them that 
they have been the sources of that. 

Now, if I can say to Mr. Buzhardt that we would have an executive 
session with the seven responsible Senators of this committee, and we 
would have a meeting with no one else, and we would have an absolute 
assurance from all seven of you that the words we give you will not go 
out of the — away from the seven of you — I will go back to Mr. Buz- 
hardt and seek to get this opened up. 

Senator Baker. Do von have this information \-ourseIf ? 

Mr. Wilson. No ; I do not, sir. 

Senator Baker. Does Mr. Buzhardt have it ? 

Mr. Wilson. I don't know. I assume he has because he has spoken 
about it. I said to you earlier, I want to be very careful about it. I 
do not know what this 1971 investigation is about. I take him literally 
from his own document. I haven't sought to find out but I certainly 
will go back, if the chairman and the six other members of this com- 
mittee will give me their own assurance that we can meet with you 
m camera, and what we tell you will go no further, I will recom- 
mend to Mr. Buzhardt that we be permitted to do so. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Wilson, for mv part I intend to take imder 
advisement the whole thin.q: and I will make an independent judg- 
ment on how I will proceed takinaf fully into account your very pren- 
erous suggestion. But I want to conclude just by sayinsr this: 
Obviously, the point we have been discussine: is not the whole Water- 
gate situation. Obviously, it has nothinsf to do or very likely has 
nothing; to do with the Waterp-ate break-in. It probably doesn't have 
anything to do with a lot of thinsrs and a lot of them have been truly 
shockinsf, at least to the view of many people. 

But it may or may not have something to do with a material allega- 
tion of the President in his Mav 22 statement. If there is informa- 
tion available that validates it, it is important to know. If there is in- 
formation which tends to discredit it, we sure need to know that, and I 
reserve the right to pursue that further, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Wilson. I will not make any inquiry of Mr. Buzhardt until I 
hear from vou, sir. 

Senator Baker. Thank vou, sir. 

Senator Eratn. Well the next Senator. I believe will be Senator 
Talmadffe, and there is a vote on now and I think we might as well 
go and vote. 


Senator Er\^n. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Talmadge is recognized. 


Senator Talmadge. INIr. Ehrlichman — we will wait until your coun- 
sel arrives. 

INIr. Ehrlichman. Thank you Senator. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Ehrlichman 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Senator Talmadge, excuse me for being 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Ehrlichman, Lt. Gen. Walters, then Deputy 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that he met with 
Mr. Gray on July 6, 1972. Mr. Gray was tlien Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. According to Mr. Walters, Gray told him 
that he had told you that he could not possibly get the FBI to suppress 
the investigation and that he told you he would prefer to resign, is 
that true? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not recall any conversation with Mr. Gray 
in which he threatened to resign or stated that he would resign, 
Senator. I had had several conversations with Mr. Gray between the 
Watergate break-in and that date. The principal subject of those con- 
versations, as I recall, was the continuing problem of leaks in the 
FBI but there were also conversations relating to the scope of the 
investigation. He had had a conversation, as I recall, with General 
Walters prior to that date, and I believe it was on that date that the 
President instructed Director Grav to go forward with full speed on 
the FBI investigation without anv limitation. 

Could I iust check my calendar very quickly and see? 

Senator Talmadge. Certainly. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, AVhich date was that? Well, it was on the 6th 
of July that Mr. Gray had the definitive conversation with the Presi- 
dent on the telephone, in which the President instructed him to go 
forward without limitation on the investigation. 

Senator Talmadge. I was not asking you what the President told 
him. I was asking what you told him. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I understand. I certainly had no occasion to tell 
Mr. Gray to the contrary on that date, nor 

Senator Talmadge. Did you ever at any time approach Mr. Gray 
with an idea of getting the FBI to suppress the investigation ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. You did not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Gray will be a witness before this committee 
at a later date. In order to refresh vour memorv, I want to read a 
memorandum that was sent to the Appropriations Committee from 
the Deputv Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This memo 
is dated Julv 6, 1972, and I am quoting now, Lt. Gen. Vernon G. 
Walters — and I quote: 

"He said," and he refers to Mr, Gray, "That he fully understood 
this. He himself had told Ehrlichman and Haldeman that he could 
not possibly suppress the investigation of this matter." 

Do you think General Walters is an honorable man, do you not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I know General Walters and I believe him to be 
such. If I can comment on that 

Senator Talmadge. There is another one and then I will ask you 
to comment on both statements. 

Mr, Ehrlichman. Thank you. 


Senator Talmadge. Tlie same memo still referring to Mr. Gray : 

Gray thanked me for my frankness and said this opened the way for fruitful 
cooperation between us. He would be frank with me, too. He could not suppress 
this investigation with the FBI. He had told Kleindienst this, he had told Ehrlich- 
man and Haldeman that he would prefer to resign. 

Would you comment on that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir, I wonder if I might see a copy of that, 
if you have no objection. 

Senator Talmadge. Certainly. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. And the reason that I would like to see it is that 
I do not believe, if that is General Walters' memo or memorandum of 
conversation that there is anj^hing in it which asserts that I ever 
asked Mr. Gray to suppress the investigation. 

Senator Talmadge. I wondered why he would volunteer mentioning 
the fact that he had told you if you had not asked him. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. For the simple reason that following our meeting 
with Director Helms and General Walters on the 23d of June he had 
a series of conversations with General Walters, and the subject of 
those conversations, as I understand it, was a question of whether or 
not the FBI could press forward with its investigation, particularly 
of the Mexican money without compromising some CIA operation, 
and Mr. Gray informed me, as he informed the President, that he could 
not possibly conduct his Watergate investigation without looking into 
that aspect of it. 

Senator Talmadge. You stated also, I believe, that Mr. Gray had a 
conversation with the President on that same date, the 6th day of July, 
did you not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Isn't it a fact that at that time Mr. Gray told 
the President of the United States that "Persons close to him were 
going to wound him." 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I, of course, did not overhear the conversation. 

Senator Talmadge. You know that to be a fact, do you not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. My report on the conversation of that came from 
the President. He recounted to me what I know about the conversation 
and that certainly was not a part of it. 

The President expressed the view to me, shortly after that telephone 

Senator Talmadge. I think Mr. Gray is going to testify to that at a 
later date, and if Mr.. Gray swore under oath before this committee 
that he told the President that, would you state that Mr. Gray was 
lying ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I say, I didn't hear the conversation. Sena- 
tor, and I don't know what the conversation was, whether that was in 
there or not. Nor do I know to whom he was referrinsr. But the point 
that the President made to me on the 6th of July on that subject was 
that he had grave concern about whether or not the CIA had made the 
proper judgment in telling Mr. Gray that thev would not in any way 
have this operation compromised bv a full FBI investigation, but 
since they had done so, then the FBI should go ahead and the chips 
should fall where they may. 

Now I cited to Senator Baker a few minutes ago a communication 
from the CIA to the FBI bearing that same date, and I hope you will 
have an opportunity to read that and to see 


Senator Talmadge. I don't want you to get into any area of national 
security that might compromise this country m any way whatever. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. Well, I simply 

Senator Talmadge. Nor does this committee want it, certainly not 

in public session. , , ^ j- 4.1, „^^ 

Mr Ehrlichman. I see no reason why we need to discuss the con- 
tents at all but I would just like to call at the point m the record to 
call the attention of the members of the committee to that letter. 

Senator Talmadge. That letter as I understand it, relates to a wholly 
different matter. What General Walters was talking about was the 
Watergate burglary as I understand it. ^ j, ^ ^^ n 1 +^^ ^^ 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No. sir. As a matter of fact, the final two or 
three paragraphs relate to this very subject inatter and its ini- 
portant, I think to note several things m there: The first f the date 
that the CIA finally determined whether or not there would l)e LdA 
exposure from an FBI investigation, and the date that they sent that 
information to the FBI, and some of the other circumstances which 
would put a reasonable man on inquiry as to whether or not there 
might be CIA involvement not only in some of the peripheral things 
but in the break-in itself. _ , . w 1 14. 

Senator Talmadge. In order that this record might be complete, 
Mr Chairman, I would ask at this point that this memorandim from 
Lt. Gen. Walters, dated July 6, I believe, be inserted m full m the 
record at this point. , , j. ^ 

Mr Ehrlichman. Could I ask. Senator, as a matter of Personal 
prii-ilege, perhaps, that instead of a mere excerpt being included that 
the fulfstatement be included. Thank you very much. 
Senator Talmadge. The full statement. 
Any objection, Mr. Chairman ? 
Senator ER%aN. None whatsoever. 
Senator Talmadgf.. I thank the Chair. 

Senator Er\-[n. The exhibit will be received as such and an ap- 
propriate number will be given. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 97. I 
Senator Talmadge. The White House through Mr. Buzhardt has 
sent this committee a memorandum on the substance of !Mr. Dean s 
conversations, phone calls with the President. It also states that on 
March 30. 1973, the President directed you to investigate the whole 
affair Is that correct ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, I don't know if investigation would be 
the proper word. He asked me to be in a position to advise him on 
the law involved and as many of the facts as I will be able to adduce 

quicklv. -Tj, , 

Senator Talmadge. I will read the T\Tiite House statement of March 
30 : "After it became obvious that Dean would write no report, the 
President directed Ehrlichman to investigate." 

Is that a fair statement ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, I have tried to avoid the word "in vesti na- 
tion" as to what I did, because I simolv did not have either the time 
or the facility to conduct what I would call an investigation in a full 

Senator Talmadge. Then the answer is you did not investigate. 

♦See p. 2913. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. I conducted an inquiry, I talked to a number of 
people who had knowledge of the matter. I formed a hypothesis but I 
by no means formed what I would call hard evidentiary conclusions 

feenator Talmadge. Did you report to the President? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. When ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. On the— excuse me-- on the morning of April 14 

Senator Talmadge. What did you tell him ? 

V, ^l' -^HRLiCHMAN. I told him Substantially what these various people 

had told me more m a narrative form. I told him that I felt that the 

matter was commg to a head through the fact that both the prosecutor 

l^A *f,Af;stant Attorney General were making progress in the case, 

fiT ^-x Tx ^ *^ ^^ ^^^^ ^ serious involvement of Mr. Dean and 
other White House people in this matter. 

'a ^^^ Talmadge. Now, let's move to another point. 

A White House member also on the meeting between John Dean and 

and I quote"^ '''' ^^' ^^^^' '^^' *^^* ^^^"^ *^^^ ^^^ President, 

ah^^i? ^"" fv4 "^.P"^'' June 17 White House knowledge, that Magruder Drob- 

H-,fd.^°r^^5^* ^^J?^'" P^^'*^^^^ ^"^^' t^^t Straehan probablv^Sew That 
Haldeman had possibly seen the prints of the wiretaps through StrachJI' that 
E^riichman was vulnerable because of his approval of Kalmbach's ?undraislng 

So even though the mite House memo mentions you as probably 
.IT T l1^ "" V'^P^'JJt^'^ ?" *^"^ ^ff^^^' ^"d that information was 

ZTrlZ^^"'^ -\ IV^- ^'"^.^^ '''^^^^^ ""'^''S^ that vou, 9 days 
later, would be appointed to investigate yourself? ^ 

.of^l'/T^r^"^^^- ^* d^P^^d^ I think. Senator, on what Mr. Dean 
actually told the President. If he told the President what he told me 

r^.^l^\T\^'\^r''' ^ ^^"^ *^^^ ^t would be altogether strange bJ 
abebnt th^' *^^1 "^^.^^ that Mr. Haldeman and I were not indict- 
able but that each of us had apparent involvement, mv apparent 

Mr. Kalmbach recruited to raise this money 

HeVJd ^f fw l^^^ '' "?^^- ^"^"'. ^r^^'^"^ ^^^^^Pt that it looks bad. 
He said at that time, and this was right about March 21 or some place 

offense.''^' """ *^^' ^'^ ''''^ constitute an indictable or crimi^ 
£.1; '^ ^ ^""^^ *^^ P^,^^^?nt th« same thing, then I guess it is 

wlfaTr J^th^TresTd^i^^ "'^' ''^^" ''''' ^^"' ^^" ^^^'^ ^^ 

Mr. Ehrltchman. No, I do not. 

Senator Talmadge Now, to move on to another matter, you taped 
a conversation with Mr. Kleindienst on March 28, 1973 

Did you tell Mr. Kleindienst that you were doing so? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

^J^u^^^^ Talmadge During this conversation did Mr. Kleindienst 
sa\, hirica is really lousing things up." 

sir^^he^d™'"''^^''' ^^ ^ ''^''^" ^''''"' looMng at that transcript, yes, 

Senator Talmadge. What did he mean by that statement? 

.Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I would have to look at the whole, at the 

T ^f^ t^f.^\^"Pt m order to get the sense of it. This was a call in which 

i had a list of questions that I was to ask Mr. Kleindienst, that I had 


taken from the President, and I have forgotten how we got into 


Senator Talmadge. Sirica is the U.S. district judge trying these 
Watergate cases, is he not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. What page is that on — oh, here it is, 
I find it. I asked what the progress of the — in effect the status of 
the — judicial process was at that point in time, which is one of the 
things that I was requested to ask, and the question was ""\\Tiat prog- 
ress are they making risfht now? Have vou had a reading on it?" 

And then he said, "Because of the judge's sentencing procedures 
that that process had been delayed." 

And then he made the comment that you quoted and then he went 
on this same paragraph and said that he would check on the status 
and give me the answer to the question that I was directed to ask him 
as soon as he found out. But that was an attempt to bring the Presi- 
dent up to date, the President had asked me to impart to him a number 
of specific questions about whether or not the Department of Justice 
had anv information about the involvement of certain people at the 
White House, certain people at the Committee for the Re-Election, 
and he said that I was to tell the Attorney General that the President 
wanted to hear direct from him and not through any staff people, if 
such information existed or came to the Attorney Greneral's hand. 
The Attorney General said he did not have any such information, that 
the evaluation of his office was that Mr. McCord's letter to Judge 
Sirica was hearsay and not entitled to great weight, and that he was 
not possessed of any personal knowledge of any involvement of any- 
one in the White House or of Mr. ISIitchell, who was one of those that 
I specifically asked about. 

Senator Talmadge. Were you informed on March 21 of this year 
as to the substance of the Dean-President Nixon conversation of that 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Senator Talmadge. The White House memo on that meeting states, 
ond I quote: 

Later that afternoon it was tentatively decided that everyone would go to 
the grand jury. However. Dean wanted immunity, Haldeman suggested that they 
write the whole thing out, release it from the White House. Ehrlichman said 
there should be no executive privilege claim and that no one should ask for 
immunity. The President told them to discuss these matters with Mitchell. 

Do you still say that the President had no knowledge on March 21 ? 

INIr. Ehrlichman. I thought your question was whether I had 
knowledge of the content of the President's meeting with John Dean 
which they held between themselves. I was not at their meeting. 

Now, this is another meeting, sir, which was later in the day, as 
T understand it, at which the discussion was not as to who was involved. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you have knowledge? 

Mr. Ehri.ichman. Of the contents of the President's meeting with 
John Dean? 

Senator Talmadge. Of your conversation with Dean and of the 
President's knowledge. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, I had — I am sorry. Senator, I am not sure 
T understand your question. 


Senator Talmadge. Were you not in the meeting, the conversation 
that took place m this White House memo on the afternoon of the 
21st day of March? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I was in a meeting with the President, and Mr 
Haldeman and Mr. Dean late in the afternoon of the 21st My under- 
standmg is that the President had had a private meeting with Mr 
Dean that morning, which is the meeting that you previously referred 
to where Mr. Dean is supposed to have told him all these things 

benator Talmadge. Were you not in the meeting with Dean when 
he said that you were indictable? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. You were not ? 

You still say that you had no knowledge or the President had no 
knowledge of what Dean was talking about? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I do not know. Now, the President did 
not tell me what the contents of his meeting with Mr. Dean on the 
1:1st was. 

Senator Talmadge. What I cannot understand is how you can con- 
tribute to the conversation of that date if you had no knowledge as 
to what had transpired prior thereto. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the conversation that I engaged in late in 
the afternoon of that day, which included Mr. Dean and Mr Halde- 
man and the President, related to the White House response to this 
committee s inquiry and to the grand jury inquiry, and the question 
of executive privilege, and whether it should be invoked and as to 
what subject, and the question of attorney-client privilege, and the 
question of immunity. Now, those were general subjects. They did not 
relate to the implication or the culpability of individuals 

Senator Talmadge. In your 60-minute interview over television, as 
1 recall, you stated that taped conversations or where you thought 
there would be information or facts that "I would have to impart 
accurately and faithfully to the President or someone else." Is that a 
correct statement? 

Mr Ehrlicjiman. That was my general purpose in turning on my 
dictating niachine and recording telephone conversations. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you relate the facts of these taped conversa- 
tions to the President? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not in every case, no, Senatoi*. 

Senator Talmadge. To anyone else ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Ehrlichman, I have listened to you testify 
now for 2 davs and I judge vou to be a highlv intelligent, extremelv 
articulate faithful servant of the President of the United States, and 
1 do not believe all this could take place in the White House without 

uTited^'stat^es ^''* '*' ^ ^'^ ^^""^^ ''''^ ''^^'''^ '* ^"^ ^^^ President of the 
Mr. Ehrlichman Well, now, you say all this. Senator. We had on 
the one hand a very full scale investifl:ation. On four separate occasions 
1 was present when the Attorney General of the TTnited States said, 
either to me or to the President directly, that the fruits of that very, 
very vigorous investigation satisfied him: that the only people indict- 
able were the seven individuals who had been indicted. On repeated 
occasions, and this telephone call which we have just read little bits of, 


on March 28, 1973, was typical of the President's continual questing 
for additional information. Here he is on March 28 saying to the At- 
torney General, ''Do you have anything more to give me over at the 
Department of Justice on this? What about this McCord letter? Do 
you haA e anything to tell me about John ^Mitchell ? If you do, call me 
direct. Don't work through some stall' person that is liable to keep it 
away from me." 

Senator Talmadge. Let me ask you this : Do you mean to tell me that 
you. as one of the highest officials in the land, sat there in the White 
House after authorizing the sum of $350,000 to pay for lawyers' fees, 
bail bond, and everything else on this coverup, supremely ignorant that 
you were obstructing justice? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I had nothina: whatever to do with the $350,000, 
Senator. I did not know the $350^,000 existed. 

Senator Talmadge. I think the record authorizes you paid it, author- 
ized the payment. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. If the record says that the record is wrong 
because. Senator, it was not until well into the month of March of 
this year that I had even heard about the $350,000 fund. 

Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

Senator Ervin. Go ahead and ask him. 

Senator Talmadge. You had heard about Mr. Kalmbach, hadn't 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He had nothing to do with the $350,000 funds 
I had heard of. I had heard Mr. Kalmbach raising some money for 
a defense fund back in June and July of the previous year but there 
is no connection between those two. 

Senator Talmadge. You knew nothing about it? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. It's hard to believe that a man of your intel- 
ligence could have been involved in so much complicated complicity 
and knew nothing about it? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I beg to differ with you. Senator. This was not 
my beat. This was not my business. I was, as my log will demonstrate 
to you, plenty busy with other things. I had absolutely no occasion 
to worry about political polling or those kinds of things that that 
money was associated with, and I just never heard of it. 

Senator Talmadge. You didn't operate in a complete vacuum, did 
you ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I operated in a complete — [laughterl — I operated 
in a maelstrom of domestic issues. And my life was full of problems 
but it wasn't those kinds of problems. I was concerned with legisla- 
tion, I was concerned with budget. I was concerned with getting mes- 
sages up here in the Congress on domestic subjects. I Avas concerned 
about helping the congressional liaison people with congressional 
votes. I was concerned with briefing the press on domestic issues. My 
life was very full for 14, 15, 16 hours a day. Senator, but I certainly 
was not omniscient in the WHiite House. I didn't keep track of Mr. 
Dean, I didn't keep track of Mr. Haldeman, I didn't see Mr. Strachan 
for months at a time down there. 

Senator Talmadge. I might draw a little parallel, Mr. Ehrlichman. 
Every public servant I know has a very busy life. A U.S. Senator, 
compared to tlie President of the United States, is a relatively minor 

96-296 O - 73 - pt. 7 - 5 


office, but our office also works 18 hours a day. I have got some very 
loyal, hard-working, dedicated people on my staff but they don't work 
in a vacuum. Every one of them knows what the other one is doing, 
and in our office we don't keep secrets from each other, and when 
something of importance arises that they think I, as a U.S. Senator 
from Georgia, ought to know, they don't conceal it. They bring it to me 
and inform me, and I can act on it intelligently and not in the dark. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield the floor. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Gumey. 

Senator Gurnet. Thank you, Mr, Chairman. 

On June 19, Mr. Ehrlichman, you had a meeting, I believe, with 
Mr. Colson and Mr, Dean, And there has been testimony here that 
there was some discussion at that meeting about instructions to Mr, 
Hunt to leave the country. Can you shed some light on this ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe I can. Senator. There were two other 
people at that meeting also, Mr. Kehrli, the staff secretary, and Mr. 
Clawson, I think the first time I heard this story about getting Hunt 
out of the country, and I take it that is what you are referring to, 
was sometime this year, either late in March or early in April, when 
Mr. Dean in my office told me I had said that. He said very dramati- 

I went to that telephone over there to the comer of your office and I picked 
it up and called somebody and sent Hunt out of the country and you remem- 
ber that just a half hour later we decided that we shouldn't do that and I went 
back and called it off. 

Senator Gurnet. When did this meeting occur ? 

Mr, Ehrlichman, Dean is recounting this to me this year. 

Senator Gurnet. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, Sometime late March, early April, someplace in 
there. I said, "John, I don't think that ever happened. When is that 
supposed to have happened ?" 

He said, "That was at the meeting where we talked about Hunt 
and his plight and his safe and you remember that." 

And T said, "No, sir, I sure don't." 

Now, coming off of that encounter. I thouffht it was a dead issue 
until after the President had talked with Henry Petersen around 
April 15, someplace in there, and the President then said to me, "The 
prosecutor says vou tried to get Hunt out of the country." 

And I said. "No. sir," 

Now. I called Mr. Kehrli and I called Mr, Clawson and I called 
Mr. Colson, and I said. "What do you remember about this meeting, 
this is supposed to have happened ?" 

Senator Gurnet, This is after vou and Dean had your confrontation, 

Mr. Ehrlichman, And after I had been informed that he had ap- 
parently given this storv to the prosecutor. And each of them, Kehrli 
and Clawson said, no. Clawson said first, "What do you want me to 
remember" or something to that effect, and I said, "I want you to 
remember everything that happened four square because this is some- 
thing T am drawina: a plan on," 

And he said, "It didn't happen as far as I can recall." 

But anvway I 2rot to Mr. Colson and he said, "That didn't happen 
in vour office, thnt happened in mv office." And he said, "I had a con- 
versation with John Dean about that and T told John Dean, 'For good- 


ness sakes, if you try to send Hunt out of the country turn it off. 
It is a dumb idea.' And he did." 

Senator Gurnet. How did Colson know that Dean had tried to tell 
Hunt to get out of the country^ or told him to get out of the country? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Because' Colson said, "He tried to peddle that 
story to me." 

Senator Gtjrney. ^Vhen did he try to peddle that story ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. He didn't tell me. But then m checking around a 
bit I discovered that in this time era, Mr. Dean was apparently saltmg 
the mine a little bit. He was getting around and suggesting events to 
different people. He did the same thing with Mr. Haldeman, I under- 
stand, and these 

Senator Gurxey. On the Hunt again ? ^ 

Mr. Ehrliciimax. Xo; this was on something else, and I cant 
remember what it was but I just remember Haldeman saying, "Well, 
that happened, you know he was in here peddling one of these stories 
to me." 

Senator Gurxey. This is all during the period of March and April, 
somewhere in there. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. This was after the Camp David attempt by Mr. 
Dean to collect his thoughts. 

Senator Gurxey. I see. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax^ And so, anyway, Colson told me this, and that 
concluded the matter as far as I was concerned in corroborating my 
absence of any recollection of such a thing having happened. But 
apparently there was a pattern through those weeks of Dean trying to 
assert these sort of antics to the landmark across the landscape. 

Senator Gurxey. Did you go back to Dean after that and say, "I 
checked this storj- on you"^and it never happened. Why are you telling 
me this?" 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No; by that time Mr. Dean and I were not com- 
municating with one another. 

Senator Gurxey. Wiat other things did he try to peddle, to whom? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Other than this particular tale to Mr. Colson and 
me and the one about Mr. Haldeman which I am soriy to say I can't 
recall. The deep-six business of the disposal of the document was also 
given to the prosecutors and came back to me the same way. That he 
did not try to plant on me that I can recall. 

Senator Gurxey. Wi\y would he plant the Hunt story, I mean what 
purpose would that serve ? 

Mr. Ehrlichm,^x. I confess, I don't know except — well, this is really 
remote, but I do understand that in fact Mr. Dean did make the call to 
have Hunt leave the country, and like some othor episode that we dis- 
cussed the other day he has tried apparently to tie events of that kind 
to someone else's authority. 

Now, I don't know the date of the actual call but I have heard and, 
as I say this is really secondhand, that Hunt got such a call, either got 
it from Dean or on Dean's say-so and it's a little bit like the McCord- 
Caulfield situation, he is tying it back to me. 

Senator Gurxey. As far as you are concerned you never gave him 
that instruction? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax'. Correct. 

Senator Gurxey. At this June 19 meeting or any other meeting? 

INIr. Ehrlichmax. That is correct. 


Senator Gurnet. On the phone or any o^ther way? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct. 

Senator Gurnet. There has been a controversy and certainly a 
question in my own mind about the so-called investigation that may 
have been done or might not have been done around June and July 
into the Watergate affair. Of course we first heard about it, I guess 
from the President's press statement in August. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right. 

Senator Gurnet. In which he said that the White House investi- 
gation has been conducted bv John Dean and everybody is clean in 
the White House and the White House has had nothing to do with 

What do you know about that? Can you give the committee any 
information on that? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well 

Senator Gurnet. Did Dean ever conduct an investigation? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe he did, Senator, and 

Senator Gurnet. By the way, who prepared that statement for the 
President, where did he get that information? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. For the press conference? 

Senator Gurnet. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He got it from me and he got it from Ron 
Ziegler but primarily from me. 

Senator Gurnet. All right, go on. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. During the months of June and July as I testi- 
fied before, John Dean had really two basic responsibilities; one was 
to determine whether there was any White House involvement in this 
break-in, and the other one was to keep us informed of developments 
as they occurred. 

Senator Gurnet. Well now, who gave him those instructions? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am sure that I gave him the latter instructions 
the first day. 

Senator Gurnet. To keep you advised? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. To keep me advised because it was a breaking 
campaign issue and I felt that both Ron Ziegler and I needed to have 
that information. As far as the former is concerned, looking out for 
White House wrongdoing, that is the inherent and long-established 
duty of the counsel to the President, and he had been performing that 
function in other settings and contexts since the time he first came 
there, and as a matter of fact, it's interesting that in your exhibit that 
he wrote at Camp David he says, ""\^nien I first heard about this out 
in San Francisco as I was flying in I knew that I was going to have 
to get into this right away" and then he goes on in that exhibit to say, 
"I set about to contact everybody that I thought might have any 
knowledge about this thing and I had personal interviews with a 
number of people and here are my findings" and then he starts out 
and he lists what he finds from his interviews about different people 
in the White House that he thought might have some connection with 
this, me, and Colson, and a whole lot of people. 

Senator Gurnet. Are you talking about his statement? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am talking about his. 

Senator Gurnet. He gave to us? 


Mr. Ehrlichman. No, no ; I am talking about the work product of 
his 6 days at Camp David which is, I believe, is exhibit No. 39, my 
numbering may be wrong. 

Senator Gurney. I see. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Is that correct, Mr. Dash? 

Senator Gurney. I understand. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have an index of your 

Senator Gtjrney. I thought you were talking about his statement 
that he read to the committee? 

^Ir. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. You are right, it is 39. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, exhibit No. 39. I am talking about a docu- 
ment which the President asked him to prepare. 

Senator Gurney. I understand. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. And this all comes, of course, from these con- 
versations that we have been referring to over here on the 21st of 
INIarch where he comes in and he says whatever he said to the 

Senator Gurney. Yes; but let's get back to this Dean investigation 
and report. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right. 

Senator Gurney. During those months of June and July because 
that is pretty significant. 

jNIr. Ehrlichman. All right. 

The key date in all of that, in my opinion, is — well there are two 
Icey dates. The first one is July 31 and that is the date of a meeting 
that I had with Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Dean. And 
at that time the report to me from both of them was that there was 
no ^Vhite House involvement in the planning or the discussion of the 
break-in, which is really the question that we are talking about there. 

Then the Department of Justice investigation is finished the second 
week in September, and the Attorney General makes report to the 
President and the Vice President and the Cabinet in which he reit- 
erates this, and then into the— of course that — pardon me, that post- 
dates the President's statement of August 29, into the August 29 period. 
I am talking to Dean, Ron Ziegler is talking to Dean, and we are con- 
tinuallv updating the things that Ron Ziegler is saying to the press 
about White House involvement. 

Senator Gurney. Now, this is almost on a daily basis that vou are 

Mr. Ehrlichman. On almost a regular basis, one thing we were 
scrupulous about was never to have Ron Ziegler go out and say 
something that was erroneous. [Laughter.] 

We had to rely on somebody for authentication, and the man we 
were relying on was the man who was in the cockpit of this thing 
from those two standpoints, both White House wrongdoing and infor- 
mation, and so we were checking independently and we were checking 
collectively on this right straight tlirough, and I think Mr. Ziegler 
would tell you, as I must tell you, that we Avere getting nothing but 
reassurances all through this period of time from Mr. Dean corrobo- 
rated by the very, I think, sincere and genuine opinions of the Attorney 
General with regard to that question, all the way through this period 
of time. 


Senator Gurnet, Now, at the beginnmg of this investigation, back 
there, I suppose it must have started a few days after the break-in in 
June, did anybody get John Dean in and sit him down, the President 
of the United States and say, "John, I want you to conduct an investi- 
gation and find out if any White House people are involved," or did 
you get him in and do the same thing ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The first day, Monday, at noon, John Dean and 
I sat down and we talked about our need for information, and we 
talked about substantially in the terms that I have given you here, but 
I think you have to understand in our staff system that for me to say 
"Now, John, I want you to go and find out if anybody in the "White 
House was involved in this," was really superfluous because he is the 
man, and he is a self-starter in that regard, and it is, just no question 
about it, having been in that job I was doing that kind of thing. As 
tips would come in during my tenure as counsel, I would follow them 
up, and find out if there was a conflict of interest, if somebody on the 
White House staff was potentially involved in a crime or a tax fraud 
or something of that kind, and try to root him out of there before we 
had a problem and we did that and we got him out. For me to have 
said, "Now, John, this is something new and I want you to find out 
if anybody in the White House is involved," would have been to insult 
his intelligence and to just simply restate what everybody assumed 
he was doing. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, all right. We will assume that was being 
done and you knew about it and he knew what his job was. How about 
the President, did he know Dean was doing this, too ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 
Senator Gurnet. How did he know ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He knew because I was telling him and as Dean 
was feeding me information and progress reports on the case I was 
passing those along to the President and I am sure Bob Haldeman 
was, too. 

Senator Gurnet. How did Dean make his progress reports to you ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman, Mostlv on the telephone, but also in person. 
Senator Gurnet. And almost daily, is that right? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Not necessarily, but as something would occur, 
and particularly where something was about to break, he had extraor- 
dinarily good sources of information, obviously, in the prosecutor's 
office or the U,S, Assistant Attornev General's office or somewhere, so 
that we had anywhere from 24 to 36, 48 hours lead on some of these 
things before they became newspaper stories. 

Senator Gurnet. Some of this, as you know, particularly as it 
came out in the Gray confirmation hearings, and two of the commit- 
tee members sat on those hearings, the chairman and myself, were 
very disturbed, I think every member of the committee was — Judi- 
ciary Committee I am talking about — when we found out that two 
whole logs of raw FBI 302"'s ended up in the "Wliite House, in John 
Dean's hands and then we also found out later that other people 
apparently looked at them, too. This is a highly unusual procedure. 
Did you know that was going on ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, I am not aware that it is unusual, and 
for this reason. "Wlien I was counsel we had situations that came up 
where an individual was charged with wrongdoing or something of 


that kind, and I had to try to make a recommendation to the Presi- 
dent. I can recall vividly one case where an individual that he pro- 
posed to appoint had an ex-wife who really unloaded on the FBI 
what amounted to really sensational slander, and it took the FBI lit- 
erally weeks to unweave this story and finally clear this man of these 

Now, during that time, rather than to rely on an FBI summary, I 
insisted on seemg the interview data because this was a serious matter 
for this man, his reputation and his relationship to the President. 

To my knowledge, the counsel to the President has had access to 
these 302's, as they are called, and I think properly so, if they are 
properly used. 

Now, I do not know about the circumstances of their being shown 
to anyone else. I do not think that that is necessary or indicated in the 
proper function of the counsel's office. 

Senator Gurney. Does counsel have access to them directly, through 
those who have custody or does he through the Attorney General ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I am not familiar with how Mr. Dean got or 
used them. But in my experience when I was 

Senator Gurnet. Let me tell you, he bypassed the Attorney General 
as nearly as I can determine the testimony, and went directly to some- 
one else in the Justice Department. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, I do not think that would be unusual. I think that 
would be a matter of fairly common practice, at least it was when I was 
counsel. My contact on something of that kind — well, I cannot say. It 
would ordinarily have run through Bud Krogh, who was my assistant 
at that time to someone at the Justice Department but I rather doubt 
that it would be the Attorney General personally. 

Senator Gurxey. Because these 802 forms involved people other 
than those in the White House, as I understand it, I guess they in- 
volved people in the Committee To Re-Elect the President, too. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, my — I cannot testify to what Mr. Dean got 
or what he used. My impression was that he was drawing on FBI 
reports as a part of his investigation process and more than that, he 
Avas sittinff in on the interviews that the FBI agents were conducting 
with the White House people, and he did that with the knowledge and 
consent of all of us. with the expectation that he would be picking up 
impressions and information during that process that would enable 
him to carry out his function of determining whether there was any 
"\V>»ite House wrongdoing. 

Senator Gttrney. Well now, he conducted this investigation through 
June and Julv, and was there a time when he came to you and said. 
"Now. I have finished this job and here are my results" ? 

Mr. Ehrijchman. Well, I considered that July 31 meetins: a point 
of virtual finalitv with regard to that inquiry. I came out of that 
July 31 meeting feeling that I had the straight word on White House 
involvement, and 

Senator Gttrney. How many people did he interview in the White 
House in this investigation of his ? 

Mr. Ehrtjchman. T haven't anv idea but T would judge 

Senator Gttrney. He was renortin.qr to you ? 

Mr. Etirltchman. Well, I don't think he reported to me in numeri- 
cal terms as to the number of people he interviewed or the number of 


FBI reports that he saw. The field of inquiry was relatively nar- 
row. It was obvious that the people in the mailroom, and the people 
in the congressional liaison section and so on were not the subject of 
his inquiry. He was looking primarily at a few political operators in 
the White House, plus a few other people around the periphery, and 
he satisfied himself, apparently, ostensibly of the noninvolvement of 
those people, and that was the essence of his report in specific terms as 
to specific people. 

Senator Gurnet. Then did you go to the President somewhere 
around this time ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir, I did. 
Senator Gurnet. When was that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, that would have been very shortly after 
July 31. 

Senator Gurnet. What did you say ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I said that I had had this meeting and I gave 
the President the substance of the meeting. 

Senator Gurnet. And that is based upon — that is when the Presi- 
dent decided to issue his August 29 statement. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't believe so. I think that came considerably 
later and there is another not too long story of events that goes in 
between there that explains how that came about. 
Senator Gurnet. What were those ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, that has to do with my strong feeling com- 
ing out of the July 31 meeting that the Watergate was a political lia- 
bility that ought to be shed, that we ought to get rid of it as a political 
issue, and the only way to do that was to make a clean breast of it. 

Now, we had a foundation, we had an anchor stone in the sense that 
nobody in the White House was involved so it didn't come directly to 
the candidate, to the President, and if, indeed, there were people in 
the Committee To Re-Elect who were involved then that was a man- 
ageable political liability, and this was at the time when the opposi- 
tion had nominated their candidate, he didn't appear to be as formid- 
able as he might have been. He was having his own vicissitudes at that 
time. We were going into our convention period very strong, and it 
looked to me like we could take the shock, if there was indeed a shock, 
from a disclosure of somebody at the Committee To Re-Elect being 
involved, and that that would be an acceptable, that would be an ac- 
ceptable political minus, so to speak. 

So I began to advance the thousrht that we might make a very com- 
prehensive statement on this subject. 

Senator Gurnet. Wbpn did vou advance this thought? 
INIr. Ehrlichman. Well, it would have been starting in the early 
July davs, and up until the time I left to go to the convention about 
the middle of August. 

Senator Gurnet. Let me ask iust one other Question here : "^^Hiv did 
John Mitchell resign ? Did you have any part in the negotiation that 
went on at that time ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Xo, sir. I can't honestlv answer that ouestion. I 
do not know. I believe what I heard about that and what I was told, 
which was that it was for family reasons. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, here is a man who is goinsr on full charge 
running a campaiani and then this burglarv takes nlace and a few davs 
later resignation, didn't that arouse vour curiosity ? 


Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, out of fairness to him there were other 
thin^ goin^ on at the same time. He was having a very tough family 
situation, I know at that time, and it was 

Senator Gurney. I don't want to get into that. 

Mr. EliiRLirHMAx. Xo. it was tearing him up, and i know it so it was 
not a thing that really made me skeptical because I knew how it was 
eating him up, and so he is not an individual who shows it a great deal 
but you could tell. So. it did not surprise me and the reason that was 
stated was credible to me. knowing what I knew about that situation. 

Senator Gurney. Was there any skuttlebutt around the White House 
around about that time that the resignation was to get rid of a liability 
to the campaign ? 

Mr. EHRLicn^rAX. No, at least none that I 

Senator Gtjrney. Never discussed this with anybody ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. None that I gave any credence to at the time. 

Senator Gtjrney. Well, what was there that you didn't give any 
credence to? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, I say, if there was any I gave it not credence 
at the time. I can't recall any frankly. I accepted as legitimate the 
statement that was made that'he was resigning for family reasons. 

Senator Gtjrney. I see. I think my time has expired, Mr. Chairman, 
so I will yield. 

Senator Ervix. Senator Inouye. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Mr. Chairman, I am not quite finished with this 
effort to get the story out. 

Senator Gtjrxey. That is right. We did leave that. May I indulge the 
committee just a few minutes more to finish that. 

Senator Ervix. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Because it does explain why the President made 
the statement on August 29 and I think we are sort of on one-leg and 
not the other. 

At the time that I left to go to Florida for the platform committee 
deliberations a week or 10 davs before the convention, I had laid out 
for mv colleagues, who were those interested in the campaign, my vro- 
posal that on the day that the President was in Hawaii meetinqr with 
Prime ^Minister Tanaka would be an ideal dav for Clark MacGregor 
to step out as the new campaign manager and lay this all out and say 
whatever it was that could be discovered. 

By independent investigation, by a firm of outside attornevs or 
investigators, or however it had to be done, and then sav, "This is the 
whole storv," and match that with a "White House statement based on 
what I had learned at the end of Julv, that there was no one in the 
White House involved, and then move on. The President being in- 
volved in a foreign policy negotiation, removed from the continental 
United States seemed to me just a natural match. 

Senator Gurxey. And vou proposed this to someone ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I did propose it. I discovered it was not accepted, 
it in fact was strongly obiected to by others who Avere much more 
closely tied in to the campaifirn strategy on the grounds 

Senator Gurxey. '\A^o did you propose it to ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, we had this Monday-Thursday eroup that 
met reanilarly that consisted of Mr. MacGregor. Mitchell. Harlow, 
and Colson and I breached it to that group because it included vir- 


tually the management elements of the campaign and then, as I say, I 
left earlier than the others about a week or 10 days to go and look 
after the platform. 

My belief, and I am only stating my belief, my assumption is that 
prior to the commencement of the convention that idea was set aside 
as a poor idea because the Watergate was not our issue. It was their 
issue, and one did not talk about their issue. One only talked about 
our issues, and that we would be prejudicing the rights of individuals 
who might be involved, and we could not do that, and there were other 
reasons of that kind that were apparently advanced in discussion, and 
it simply didn't ever get off the ground. 

Well, I didn't forget the idea. After our convention, when the Pres- 
ident went to California, it seemed to me still very legitimate for us 
to make very clear the fact that the White House was not involved, 
even if we could not take the other leg of the argument and say that 
the Committee To Re-Elect had had a similar investigation itself. So 
I discussed this with the President. He agreed that this would be a 
very good thing. He questioned me closely on how certain he could 
be of the soundness of that assertion and I told him what I knew dating 
from July 31 through any subsequent events, and I vouched to him 
that everything that had been reported to me corroborated that what 
he was about to say if he were asked at this press conference, and so 
on August 29 he went out and spoke as to the White House only with 
regard to this. 

Now, by way of some corroboration, if it is needed on the matter 
of the Committee To Re-Elect side, Mr. Dean, in fact, wrote up a 
few pages of what Clark MacGregor might say if he did go out and 
have a press conference on this subject. Either on the date I suggested 
or some other date, and Mr. MacGregor, I think, does remember hav- 
ing received that memo, it was his opinion that it was very bland, 
innocuous, and did not make a case convincingly. Mr. MacGregor had 
conducted his own inquiry at the committee and had interviewed 
everybody in the hierarchy over there, and had more or less satisfied 
himself, but he did not feel he was in a position to personally vouch. 

Senator Gtjrney. Just one question there. At that time, of course, 
you knew that Mr. Dean and Mr. Kalmbach were engaged in raising 
money to pay these defendants, and we will use their version, for legal 
fees and family support. Now, there was certainly some White House 
involvement in this business whether it was legal or illegal, it was 
White House involvement. Did you ever tell the President about that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not know that I ever did. Senator, and I 
think the inquiry here — and I do not think this is an artificial dis- 
tinction — that the whole focus here at this time was on how this thing 
happened, and we were talking about this thing being the break-in. 
I do not think that there was anybody who really felt that there was, 
at least I did not feel that there was any kind of a coverup going on 
at that time. I did not^ — it just did not dawn on me and I considered 
what Mr. Kalmbach was doing perfectly proper. But the President 
spoke to the question, "How did this break-in occur?" And he said, 
"Nobody in the "WTiite House had anything to do with the planning 
or discussion of this break-in," which was the subject that everybody 
was focusing on at that point in time and in which Mr. Dean's investi- 
gation went to. 


Senator Gurnet. Well, thank you, :Mr. Ehrlichman. That is all, 
Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Er\^n. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, in a question propounded by Senator Talmadge 
you responded that during the early days of April of this year you 
began an inquiry to determine whether AVhite House staff people 
were involved in the Watergate covenip. That is correct, isit not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I do not think the inquiry was quite that. 
Senator, but I did commence an inquiry, yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. Will you name those people? 

Mr Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. I talked with Mr. Paul O'Brien, who 
was an attornev for the Committee To Re-Elect. I talked with Mr. 
Kalmbach, I talked with Mr. Dean, I talked witli Mr. Colson, I talked 
with Mr. Strachan, I talked with Mr. Mitchell. I talked witn Mr. 
Magruder, I talked once again to Mr. Strachan on a second occasion, 
and these were interviews, pei-sonal interviews. 

Senator Inouye. As a result of these meetings you concluded that 
Mr. Dean and others were involved. I believe this is what you said ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I hypothesized. Senator, I cannot dignify this by 
calling it an investigation in the real sense. I was told enough things 
by these people, some of it hearsay once and twice removed, but with 
a pattern to it that I was able to go to the President and say, "All 
right, here is a sketch, here is a hypothesis of what I think happened 
here and what has been going on." 

Senator Inouye. What did Mr. O'Brien tell you, sir ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, I wonder if I could refer to my notes of 
that conversation so that I 

Senator Inouye. Will you look up your notes Ijecause I^would be 
interested in knowing what Mr. Strachan told you, Mr. Kalmbach, 
Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. All right, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Senator, I had not noticed it was almost 5 o'clock, 
and I do not imagine 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, it might be a good time to recess at 
this time to provide Mr. Ehrlichman time to look over his notes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, I might say your staff has had a copv of 
these notes for 2 or 3 months, and I will be referring to the same thing 
that I turned over to the committee. 

Senator Inouye. I just wanted it for the record, sir. 

Senator ER^^N. We have been here a very long day and it is almost 
5 o'clock, and I am informed we will have a vote right at 5 and I 
believe it would be a good time, since Senator Inouye cannot finish this 
afternoon, we will take a recess. 

The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow. 

[Wiereu}X)n, at 4 :55 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 
10 a.m., Friday, July 27, 1973.] 

FRIDAY, JULY 27, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washington^ B.C. 

The Select Committee met, pureuant to recess, at 10 :05 a.m., in 
room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. 
(chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and Weicker. 

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred 
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief 
counsel ; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire. Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels: 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Filer RaAmholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron MclNIahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; John Walz, 
publications clerk. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye, will you resume your examination 
of the witness. 

Senator Inoitye. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, when we recessed yesterday we were discussing 
your interviews as part of the inquiry made in behalf of the President, 
and in response to one of my questions you indicated that you had dis- 
cussed or talked with Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Dean, Mr. 
Mitchell, and again with Mr. Strachan, and you have indicated that 
you had maintained interview notes. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Of some of those. Senator, and I neglected to 
say I also talked to Mr. Krogh because of something that came up in 
the course of these interviews that I wanted to inquire about, so he 
would be an additional individual that I talked to. 

Senator Inottte. We have no notes on Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Dean, Mr. 
Mitchell, and Mr. Strachan. Is there anv reason for this? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You should have. There are notes for Strachan 
and Dean. There are no notes for mv talk with either — for my talk 
with Mr. Kalmbach. We did turn over to the committee staff the 
transcript of mv interview with Mr. Mitchell which is a very, very 
poor one. It is not very helpful. It is very sketchy. 



Senator Inouye. Mr. Dash, do we have the copies of the Kalmbach, 
Dean, Mitchell, and Strachan 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There are no Kalmbach notes, Senator. There are 
Dean and Strachan notes. The notes that I have here are O'Brien, 
Dean, Colson, Magruder, and Strachan. 

Mr. Dash. Senator Inouye, whatever you have, is what we received. 
In other words, that was intact, delivered to us in that form, and we 
have no other notes. 

Senator Ervin. Let the reporter assign it the appropriate exhibit 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 98.*] 

Senator Inouye. Then we have here, Mr. Ehrlichman, one Strachan 
and you had two Strachan meetings. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There are only notes for one. 

Senator Inouye. We have a Reisner meeting. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. I think that is actually the — ^that is the Dean 
meeting, J. D. is up in the corner of it. That is the Dean meeting on 
April 13 at 3 p.m. 

Senator Inouye. Then, we have an O'Brien meeting. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Senator Inouye. And Colson and Shapiro. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right. 

Senator Inouye. And Magruder. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Correct. That is it. 

Senator Inouye. We have no Mitchell. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; you have the transcription of two tapes, 
Mitchell and Magruder, that are both very, very hard to read, hard to 
understand because the tapes are hard to understand. You also have 
the tapes themselves, and they are for whatever they are worth. I do 
not think you can make much from them. 

Senator Inouye. I received these notes early this morning, Mr. 
Ehrlichman, and I must confess that I find it very difficult to under- 
stand your hieroglyphics here. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sure, right. 

Senator Inouye. So, if I may ask you, whenever the initial "H" 
appears, is that for Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not necessarily. You would have to take it in the 
context. Senator, that could also be Hunt in some cases here, although 
I used the double "H" for Hunt on occasion. 

Senator Inouye. JNM is John Mitchell ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. And JSM is Magruder ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. L or LD or LID is Liddy ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, LID is certainly Liddy, and I do not re- 
call — yes, I have used L also for Liddy in the Magruder notes. 

Senator Inouye. And K or EK for Krogh ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe so, yes. 

Senator Inouye. And CC for Colson ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Senator Inouye. Now, there is a Greek symbol, the symbol pi, who 
is that? 

•See p. 2915. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. That is the President. . i o ^ o 

Senator Inouye. That is the President of the Lnited btates? 

If%ve may, may we begin with your meeting with Mr. O'Brien? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inoute. At San Clemente. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right. 

Senator Inoute. Please tell us what transpired. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. All right, sir. The circumstances of this meet- 
ing were that Mr. O'Brien indicated that he had some information 
that he felt the President should have. He called and asked for an 
appointment with Mr. Haldeman. In view of the fact that 4 or 5 
days previously the President had asked me to get into this, he was 
referred to me. We met in my office at San Clemente, and he began 
to tell me about what he believed would be Mr. Magnider's testimony— 
oh, in the upper right comer you will see that he told me that the pur- 
pose of his being on the coast was to see Herb Kalmbach m connection 
with some of the civil litigation which Mr. O'Brien was handling for 
the Committee To Re-Elect. 

Senator Inoute, And this happened on April 5 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. April 5 at 10 in the morning; yes, sir. 

He said that there had been four meetings which led up to the 
Watergate break-in, and you will see the meetings were referred to 
by numbers with circles around them. We start with No. 1, which is 
actually the fourth one that he described to me, which was a meeting 
between Liddy, Dean, and Mitchell in the Attorney General's office 
in November." He said that Mr. Mitchell-; — 

Senator Inoute. November of what year, sir ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That would have been 1971. That was a meeting 
which Mr. Mitchell apparently did not recall, which was held for the 
purpose of Mr. Dean introducinc: Liddv to Mitchell. 

The second meeting appears in the date notebooks of various parties, 
and that was a meeting between Dean, Liddy, and Magruder for the 
purpose of introducing Liddv to Magruder, and that was held on 
January 27, 1972. 

There was a subsequent meeting on February 4 involving: Dean, 
Liddv. Masrruder, and ]\Iitchell. He said that the third meeting was 
"canceled." that is to say. the parties agreed that it would be described 
as a meeting that had been canceled, and then he refers later on to 
the construction of that story or that version. 

He said that John Dean, and bear this in mind now — is hearsay 
twice removed, this is Maffruder telling O'Brien, telling me, he said 
that "Magruder said that Dean kept Haldeman advised by memo of all 
of these meetings. Actually, there were four meetings, and then he 
starts through asrain. The first meeting in November which I have 
described, he said there was actually a third meeting which was not 
r.nv of these that I have heretofore described, where a $1 million budget 
was proposed bv Liddv. Everyone at the meeting agreed that that 
budget would not be adopted. 

Senator Inoui-e. Did he sav foi- what reason ? 

Mr, Ehrlichman. I didn't ask him. I don't believe at that point. 

Senator Inoute, Was it because of the price tag alone ? 


Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know, Senator, from this conversation. 
He didn't say. 

He said that between meetings No. 3 and No. 4. Mr. Colson phoned 
twice to Jeb Magruder. 

Now, in parentheses I have only according to Jeb, which indicated 
what Mr. O'Brien told me that this was, the only person he had ever 
heard this from was Magruder urging that this program go forward. 
Now I have the notation "Not price," and I don't know what that 
refers to. That does not jog my recollection at all. 

He said that Liddy had a commitment from Krogh, that Hunt had 
a commitment from Colson, and these commitments, I took it, related 
to Executive clemency. That was the context in which that comment 
was made. 

Senator Inouye. Liddy had a commitment from Krogh ? 

Mr. Ehruchman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inotjye. That he could receive Executive clemency? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That was what Mr. O'Brien said that Mr. 
Magruder had told him. 

Senator Inouye. And Mr. Hunt said that he had a commitment 
from Mr. Chuck Colson? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; I am not saying that Hunt said that. Bear 
in mind this is Magruder speaking to O'Brien now. Because of this 
assertion, I did contact Krogh later on to determine when he had had 
contacts with Liddy and to try to either verify this or set it aside. 

Parenthetically, circumstances indicated that he had had no contact 
either direct or indirect with Liddy and so the — it was not borne out 
by anything that I could find collaterally in the time in which I 

He said that. He said at the fourth meeting Dean arrived late, 
Magruder, Dean, Liddy, and Mitchell attended the meeting. There 
was an intelligence budget of $200,000-$250,000. Dean said to Liddy 
that he. Dean, would have nothing further to do with this. I asked 
him about charts and he said the charts did exist, and the reason I 
asked him, of course, is that there was something in the press at this 
time about the existence of a set of charts. He said that the code name 
"Gemstone" was used, that that term was not translated into what 
it really stood for at this meeting. The party, he said, apparently 
didn't know, or that is what Magruder told him. I said, "Was bugging 
involved?" and he said, "Yes, bugging was one of the methods in- 
volved." It also involved counteractivities at the convention. 


Senator Inouye. Do you know what the $1 million budget involved ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He didn't tell me. This characterization at the 
bottom of the first page referred, so far as I can recall, to the $200,000- 
$250,000 budget. 

He told me that there was a second intelligence operation at the 
Committee To Re-Elect which was not involved in this series of four 
meetings. This involved a cab driver who volunteered at the Muskie 
headquarters. He had been reeruited by a friend of Ken Rietz who 
was a former FBI man in Tennessee, and he went into the Muskie 
headquarter and volunteered and became Senator Muskie's chauffeur 
and a friend of the family, and went to INIuskie's house for dinner, and 
soon began carrying all of the Senator's mail back and forth. 


Senator Inouye. And lie photographed all the mail? 

iSIr. Ehrlichivian. Yes: he photographed all of the mail. 

Senator Inouye. Wlio is this friend of Ken Rietz? 

Mr. Ehrlichmak. The FBI man? I don't know. I don't have his 
name but apparently your staff should because when the Senate staff 
was looking for someone for this committee staff, he was approached, 
and so it shouldn't be too hard to find out who that was. He declined 
the employment apparently. [Laughter.] 

One of the pieces of mail apparently was printed in Evans and 
Novak and so everybody in the ^Muskie organization was ques- 
tioned about it except the chauffeur, and the chauffeur was a volun- 
teer, he was paid nothing. Eventually he was transferred from Eietz 
to Howard Hunt for purposes of management and reporting. 

Then I have a notation that Rietz became worried at some point 
about cash fimds, and I believe that refers baciv to this business of the 
transfer. In other words, Rietz didn't like what he saw about cash in 
the organization and he wanted out and at that point he discontinued 
any connection with this kind of activity and Howard Hunt took it 

I have a note Magruder was pushing, and I think what that refers 
to is a statement that Magruder was pushing generally for intelligence 

He told me that Magrader told him that there had been an entry 
into the Democratic headquarters in May and that a bug had been 
planted, that he was satisfied that neither Dean nor Mitchell had 
knowledge of either the Mav or June break-in but that Mr. Maginider 

Then he mentioned that he had been caught — no, I think this is 
Mr. O'Brien speaking for himself. He was advising caution with 
regard to John Dean's objectivity, in the advice he might be giving 
the President in this matter. 

Senator Inouye. Who is Hofgren? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Hofgren is Daniel Hofgren and that name relates 
to the note that I will come to farther down on the page. 

Mr. O'Brien said that Magruder reaches Strachan, Haldeman, Col- 
son, and the President in his stor^-. I said, "How does Magrader reach 
the President?" 

And he said in this circumstance, Magruder lired Gordon Liddy, he 
will say, Gordon Liddy went to Gordon Strachan and Gordon 
Strachan came to Magruder and said, "Move him back," that is, this is 
Strachan talking to Magrader saying, "Move Liddy back. The Presi- 
dent wants this project to go on." 

I said, "Is there any other way that this reaches the President?" 

And he said, "Xot that I know of ." 

Now, he said, "According to Mr. Hofgren, Mr. Magruder's wife was 
indicating to three friends apparently that there was a possibility that 
Mr. Magiiider would be indicted and that he was planning to leave the 

And that is the reference to Hofgren at the top of the page. 

Now, Mr. O'Brien said that neither Magruder nor Alitchell in his, 
O'Brien's opinion, were inevitably hung in this case by the evidence as 
he underetood it at that point. He said, "Frankly, John Dean is the key 

96-296 O - 73 - pt. 7 


Mr. O'Brien was concerned about the post- Watergate situation and 
about the handhng of money and then he began telling me about this 
money situation which concerned him. He told me about Mr. Rivers 
Mr. Kalmbach's man who delivered $25,000 in cash to Attorney 
Bittman by leaving it in a phone booth, and I said, "What became of 
the money?" 

•^^u^u ^^^^' "^ believe it was deposited to their firm account." He 
said. There has been obstruction of justice," in his opinion. I asked 
him to define what he meant by that. He said that a defendant in a 
criminal case is also a witness, and the purpose of giving money to 
such a defendant becomes very important. It is OK if one gives them 
attorneys fees and defense funds or possibly even subsistence but not 
consideration to not talk, in other words, the quid pro quo of silence. 

Then he said, "Money flowed to Howard Hunt, in turn to Howard 
Hunt s wife, and then in turn, $19,000 to Mr. McCord, which in turn 
went to McCord's attorney." 

And this was an example that he was citing to me. 
■Kf^^ ^?^^' Tuesday of this week, meaning the week of the 5th, that 
McLord was going to present a letter to the court which implicated 
Attorney Parkinson. He quoted McCord as saying this letter is a lie 
but I am goin^ to get these bastards. He felt that having said that to 
the attorneys in the case that that comment was privileged but ap- 
parently McCord got cold feet. He stood up to deliver the letter against 
I'arkinson m court but then he sat down without doing so. 

Then he characterizes Mr. McCord, Mr. O'Brien does, in the adiec- 
tives that you see there in the exhibit. 

He said later and I don't know what later— I know what later 
refers to, I was interrupted in this meeting, and went out, I believe, 
to take a phone call and came back. He said that Mrs. Hunt had writ- 
ten a memo which named Bittman and Parkinson as involved in the 
money business. That there is a memo from Parkinson to Dean to 
LjaRue. The memo went to LaRue because LaRue was responsible for 
obtaining the funds for this purpose. 

Just before Howard Hunt was sentenced, which would have been in 
March, as I recall, although it doesn't sav so here, Bittman phoned 

Brien who, m turn passed a messace to Dean, Mitchell, and LaRue 
that Hunt was making a demand for $70,000. 

Then he said in his opinion the attornev-client privilege will not 
cover meetings he was in or anv conspiracy that he was in, and that 
refers to 'John Dean, and then he mentioned to me that Dean's attor- 
ney IS Mr. Hogan. That Dean is represented and that he is actively 
counselms: with an attorney. 

He said that two blocks of monev were delivered bv Mr. Mitchell, 

1 take It, not personally but by the campaign to Mr. Haldeman. 
Senator Inoute. How many dollars ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know and I don't think he knew. I believe 
1 asked him. 

Senator Inoute. Was this in cash ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know that either. He just said that he— 
because I was pressing him for any White House involvement and 
all through these interviews, Senator, that was the key question all 
the way through. 


He said the night of the Watergate break-in, Sloan and Stans took 
cash home amounting to about $81,000 which they returned the next 
day. This Avas given to LaRue on advice of Mardian and this money 
was used for subsistence for the defendants. He said Mr. LaRue has 
$100,000 now, $81,000 of which he has held since that time, since, for 
the past 11 months. 

Sloan said to O'Brien that $1 million to $2 million in cash had 
come in. Stans reported that it was about $1,700,000, which included 
$275,000 that had gone to Kalmbach and $350,000 sum which had gone 
to the White House. He said, Mr. O'Brien said, that one sheet of 
paper exists with an accounting of this $1,700,000 on it, and three 
people know where that accounting is. 

Senator Inouye. Who are the three people ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I will come to that later on in the accounts. I 
think I had better take this seriatim, if you don't mind, to explain 
the hieroglyphics as we go along. 

He said as far as his reputation was concerned that Mr. Stans was 
"done" but that he, O'Brien, did not foresee that Mr. Stans would be 
indicted. He is not guilty of any perjury, he had been very foxy in the 
statements which he had made, that if he could spend a week with 
Mr. Kalmbach and could get their accounts straightened out, he didn't 
foresee that there would be any liability in Mr. Stans. 

Then we talked about the civil suits. There were two. The Demo- 
cratic suit and the Common Cause suit. He felt if the Committee To 
Re-Elect would only file with the Congress an accounting of all con- 
tributions that the Common Cause lawsuit could be mooted. It would 
take somewhere between 2 weeks and 6 months to get those accounts 
in shape and he didn't know just how long it would take. He said that 
Mr. Stans was extremely opposed to doing this because this would 
break faith with the contributors who had contributed anonymously. 
He said if we didn't do this, he said, "I am satisfied we are going to 
lose the case." 

In the Democratic National Committee suit, settlement negotiations 
were underway because Larry O'Brien was now on the payroll of 
Dwayne Andreas. Mr. Andreas held his future — Mr. O'Brien as long 
as the countersuits existed couldn't get credit, couldn't buy a house, 
Robert Strauss wants to settle the case, Mr. Mitchell met with Strauss 
the previous day. The number that was being kicked around was a 
$500,000 settlement and he said there are $5 million available in the 
Committee To Re-Elect treasury to make that settlement. 

Howard Hunt was a prime — Howard Hunt was a prime contact for 
Segretti according to Mr. O'Brien and I don't know what his source 
for this information is. I think we have gone out of the ]\f agruder part 
of the source business now. That Hunt supplied a Florida printer to 
three key Segretti men, one a man named Norton in Los Angeles and 
one from Tampa and another from Florida whose names he didn't 
know. These three men performed dirty tricks. 

Senator Ixouye. What were the dirty tricks ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the only one I have a note of is generator 
of Canuck letter and presumably he meant by that that either Segretti 
or one of these three people were the generator of that letter. A^Hiat his 


source is for that I do not know. I asked him about Dwi^ht Chapin's 
involvement m this. He said, "Well, Chapin will take a bath," by which 
he meant his reputation of his good repute will be affected. He said 
someone IS working newsmen for more favorable stories, and his 
source of infonnation on that was a reporter named Lasky who told 
him that this was going on. 

He said that Chapin had had a lot of Segretti contact. He said 
feegretti had an immediate worry which was that he had received these 
payments of cash as you see here in the exhibit totaling $40,000 by 
April 15 he was going to have to pay his income tax, he needed guid- 
ance from somebody as to how to show that money as income or not 
and he lacked money to pay his taxes. 

He said he has the problem of how one describes his business, and 
now to deduct a. business expense under those circumstances. 

He said that Mr. Segretti had kept a very complete diary in which 
he had cataloged all of his expenses. 

He then told me about Mr. Fensterwald, who was an attorney repre- 
senting I^IcCord He said that Mr. Alch wanted out as McCord's 
attorney. McCord had done some things which Alch did not approve 
ot such as phoning the Embassies of Chile and Israel with the thought 
they were tapped so he could be dismissed from the Government's 
actions against him. McCord also had sent an unsigned letter to Jack 
Oaulfield which Mr. O'Brien described as sick, which related to the 
CIA and Mr. Helms and so forth. 

1 ^"^ ^^'^^^^ Caulfield had taken the letter to Mr. Dean. Caulfield 
had seen McCord three times. I asked him whether Caulfield had made 
any offers to^IMcCord. He said he didn't know. He thought perhaps 
he had offered clemency but he thought also this would be sus^ptible 
ot proof because McCord very well may have tapped it 

Senator Erw?^ I hate to interrupt the proceedings but there is a 
vote on in the Senate and members of the committee have to so 
perform their senatorial duties, 
r Recess.] 

Senator Baker [presiding]. The chairman has been temporarily 
detained and he asked me to recommence the hearings and to permit 
Senator Inouye to continue with his examination. 

Senator Ixoutte. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired but I 
wanted the committee to know that my line of questioning was a very 
simple one. I just, wanted the committee to be aware of the symbols 
in your notes and to better understand the interview notes 

Mr Ehrlichmax. Senator, on that, there is a kind of a personal 
shorthand that runs through there of a few Greek letters which I will 
be glad to give a Rosetta stone to the staff, if they need it. 

Senator Inotjte. Will you provide us with 'your transcript of the 
meeting with INIr. INfitchell also? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. I have done so, I believe. 
Mr Dash Again, what I have given to you, Senaitor Inouye, is 

everything that we have received, and we have no 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Did you give him the cassette and the transcript 
ot the cassette, counsel? 

^■u^^-Tr-'^f^^' ^^ ^^^'^ *^^ tape— that is right. We have the tape of 
the Mitchell meeting but I am talking about the notes. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. The thing I referred to in answering the Senator's 
question was that tape and the transcript of the tape, which is all that 
I have of that meeting. 

Mr. Wilson. I think, Mr. Vice Chairman, that Mr. Strickler and 
Mr. Hamilton had an exchange whereby the transcription that we had 
was sent up. Is that right, Mr. Hamilton ? 
Mr. Hamilton. That is correct. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, now that I better understand the 
hieroglyphics and the notations and the symbols, I would like to yield 
the floor to permit me time to study these notes so that I can ask ques- 
tions based upon these notes at a later time. So I thank you very much, 
Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Senator Baker. Thank you. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Gurney, I understand, has a few additional questions, but 
since he has not returned to the hearing room yet, I wonder, Senator 
Weicker, if you are in a position to continue with your examination ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Vice Chairman, before the Senator begins, 
if I could just put a concluding note on Senator Inouye's exami- 
nation of this item. More or less to drop the other shoe, these notes 
were not included in the President's papers, unlike my other notes, at 
the President's specific instance, in order that they could be available 
to the Attorney General and the prosecutors as source material and, 
of course, the committee. They were transmitted first by a phone call 
to the Attorney General and then by conference with the prosecuting 
attorney and then by an appearance at the grand jury during which 
these were all gone through in great detail. 

Senator Inouye. Do you have a copy of the report which you pre- 
sented to the President ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir, my report to him was oral. 
Senator Inouye. Was it taped ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have to assume so. It was given in the Execu- 
tive Office Building office. 

Senator Inouye. On what day, sir ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. On April 14. 
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, sir. 

Senator Baker. I note that Senator Gurney has now returned to 
the committee table, and if it is agreeable then, we will proceed with 
interrogation by Senator Gurney instead of Senator Weicker, in the 
regular course. 

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, we have touched base once or twice on the Kalm- 
bach transactions between him and you, and I would like to clean up 
one other point on that. That was the conversation you had with him 
on April 19 — telephone conversation — and this was the one that was 
taped. We have a record of the tape here, of course. Do you have a 
copy of that? * 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe I do. 

Senator Gurney. Let us turn to page 5. There was some conversation 
about his coming over and talking to you. Is this phone conversation, 
as I understand it, was just prior to the time he was going to appear 
before the grand jury? 

•See exhibit No. 77, Book 5, p. 2215. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Senator Gurney. I think the day before, and he was here in Wash- 
ington and talking to you and he said something about touching base 
with you before he went down to talk to the grand juiy and you said 
to him, "Well, it is all right, but, of course, they will ask you about it," 
and indicated maybe you do not want that information to come out. So 
I will start there, if you want to, that is, if you want to come over and 
talk, they will ask you. 
"Kalmbach. Will they?" 
And you said "Yes." 

Kalmbach said, "well, maybe I shouldn't," and you said they will 
ask you to whom you have spoken about your testimony and I would 
appreciate it if you would say you have talked to me in California, 
because at that time I was investigating this thing for the President. 
Kalmbach. And not now. 
Ehrlichman. Well, I would not ask you to lie. 
Kalmbach. No, I know. 

Ehrlichman. But the point is 

Kalmbach. But the testimony was in California. 

Can you tell the committee what that would be all about? I mean, 
why would you want him to tell the grand jury that this phone con- 
versation between you and him that day in Washington would better 
be reported to be in California? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, no, no, no. I was referring to an interview 
that I had with Mr. Kalmbach in California in connection with this 
inquiry that I was doing for the President, and by that I simply did 
not want Mr. Kalmbach to omit, in his testimony, if they asked him 
what contacts he had had with me, be sure to tell them about that one 
ill California because I was going to have to tell them about it and I 
did not want him to be caught unawares. That was a meeting which 
was not held m my office, it was held in his automobile and I was a little 
concerned frankly, that he might for some reason omit to testify to it 
I was intending to testifv^ to it also, obviously, I would have to say 
AvlK) i talked to m the course of this investigation. 

Senatof Gurney. Were you concerned about his reporting this par- 
ticular conversation that we are talking about now ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. ^o, no ; as a matter of fact, I turned over this 
transcript to the prosecutors and the grand jury. 

Senator Gtjrney. How often did you tape conversations on the 
recording device you had in the office on your telephone ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I did not hear the first part of your question, 

Senator Gurxey. How often did you use the recording device that 
you had on your telephone to record conversations ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. In routine business, very occasionally, not very 
often. As I got into this Watergate phase, after March 30, I began 
more and more to use it with people that I thought were somehow or 
another involved m the matter, and I used it in connection with the 
stories that came back to me about the charges that were being- leveled 
against me by Mr. Dean in my calls to Colson, and Clawson, and 
Kehrli, and Clark MacGregor— people that I thought might provide 
me with some supporting evidence for my recollection as to what 
actually had happened. 


Senator Gurnet. Well, that could be understandable. How about 
Kalmbach; Kalmbach was your very good friend, was he not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes ; but he was also very knowledgeable in this 
case and he had been one of the people that I had interviewed to try 
to get information for the President on the money end of this thing, 
and so I considered him to be a witness, if you please, in the inquiry. 
Senator Gurnet. Of course, Kalmbach's reaction, as I am sure you 
know, was total shock at this recording. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I understand, and I regret very much but I had 
an assignment from the President that I felt I had to carry out. As a 
matter of fact, I did some checking on Mr. Haldeman, who is also 
my very good friend. I did that because I felt I had to bring to the 
President whatever information was available in the higher interest. 
Senator Gurnet. Are you saying now this is during the period of 
time that the President had reassigned the business of Watergate to 
you and from Mr. Dean ; is that correct ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. Going back to that, that assignment of investiga- 
tion of the Watergate to Dean, and now I am not talking about June- 
Julv, I am talking about February of this year ; as a matter of fact, 
I think Dean talked to the President on February 27. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. That is right. 

Senator Gurnet. And in that conversation with the President, the 
President assigned the investigation of Watergate, at least that cur- 
rent phase of it, to Dean. As I recall, he said that he wanted Dean to 
report directlv to him. He also said that it was taking up too much of 
your time and also Haldeman's time. Was that ever discussed with 
vou or with Haldeman, the President's decision to have Dean now 
become the chief investigator of Watergate, February 27 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, Senator, except chief investigator, I think, 
is sliffhtly off the track. The preoccupation at that time, as far as the 
President was concerned, was not in an invest iaration of the facts as 
nearly as it was to get some one person in the White House who was 
going to look after a number of existing problems with relation to 
this whole subiect matter and they were primarily the problems of 
executive privilege and separation of powers as he saw it then, not a 
question of who done it. 

So rather soon after this meeting we had at La Costa which was, 
incidentally, the meeting was the result of the President saying, "Who 
is in charge and what plans are being made and how is the work 

Senator Gurnet. And this came at about the time this committee 
was created; is that right? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is right; yes, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. Concern about what to do about the investigation 
of the committee, how to respond to it? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir; that was certainly part of it. 
Senator Gurnet. Go on. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Coming out of that session, as a result of our 
report back to him that the work was largely undone, that a tremen- 
dous amount of work was left to be done in terms of developing the 
administration's position on executive privilege and attorney-client 


privilege and marshalingr all of the files that had to be marshaled and 
all the rest, that he said, "Well, I want Dean to take charge of this 
I want yon fellows to get ont of it." He said to me, "I have got some- 
thing else I want yon to do and I want yon to press on it," so I started 
cff on an entirely differejit project that had to do with legislation, and 
from al3ont the third week in Febrnaiy the nndei-standing was that 
I was out of it. Bob Haldeman was basically out of it and Dean was 
the leadman in the ^YhAie Plonse on this whole subject of privilege, 
the committee, the gi-and juiy, and all of the collateral questions that 
were associated with this. 

Senator Gurxey. Did Dean make any reports to you after that or 
only to the President? 

Mr. Ehrlighman. I saw very little of IVIr. Dean in those months 
a^id quite a few weeks went by when I didn't see him at all, or for 
that matter really talk to him vei-y much. Let's see, in the month of 
February, after the President made that assignment I didn't see him 
at all. The month of :March I didn't see him at all for the first 20 days 
and then 1 saw him in connection with the Hunt blackmail twice on 
the 20th and on the 21st but that was the, only subject that was dis- 
cussed and then, of coni-se, there was the meeting on the 22d with 
Mr. Dean and Mr. ]\Iitchell, and then the President, and then from 
then on I had virtually no contact with Mr. Dean except one meet- 
ing with— m :Mr. Haldeman's company the day we got back from 
ban Clemente, of April 8, once on April 10, and' then this meeting of 
April 13 for which the notes exist that are in Senator Inouye's hands. 
Senator Gurnet. Just one further question on that. Was there ever 
any suspicion in your mind that the President appointed Dean to sort 
of l3e in charge of Watergate on February 27 because he might have 
had some suspicion that maybe you were involved or Haldeman was 
involved or somebody else in the ^^Tiite House was involved? 

Mr. Ehrliciiman. Well, what the President explained to me was 
that the central question here was one of executive privilege and the 
aA-ailabihty of Presidential assistance to testify before the Congress. 
You will recall this had come up in the setting of Peter Flanigan and 

coming before the, what the 

Senator Gurnet. Judiciary Committee. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Judiciary Committee. 
Senator Gurnet. Kleindienst. 

Mr Ehrlichman. And through my notes of meetings with the 
President, there are three or four references to the President's strong 
concern that Haldeman and I were test cases, so to speak, of the avail- 
ability of Presidential assistants to testify before the Congress, and I 
kiiow there were some questions about his reference to us as principals, 
i think you have to take it in that setting. We were principals on the 
question of the availability of assistants to testify. 

Now, the precedents that might be set by our testifying he was con- 
cerned, would in turn, open up Henry Kissinger's testifying and the 
whole panoply, so to speak, of Presidential assistants and very soon 
you would have a breakdown of the -Wliite House staff system because 
everybody would be up here testifying like Cabinet Secretaries do 
every day and couldn't get any work done. 


So, basically, he thought that was where one drew the line, and he 
wanted Dean to focus very hard on that. I don't think, on the 27th, 
that the President was advised of any implication in this matter of 
either Mr. Haldeman or me, and in ix)int of fact he continued to be 
confident through the 30th, 1 know, and as matter of fact, on through 
April 16, because he had a reix)rt from Mr. Petei-sen, the Assistant 
Attorney General, and the Attorney General to the effect that neither 
Mr. Haldeman nor I were criminally involved in this matter m any 
respect. So, and that was on the occasion of their meeting on that Sun- 
day which would have been the 15th, wouldn't it '? 

So, I don't think, particularly Febniary 27, but continuing down 
through the next '6 weeks, that he had any real concern about that. 

Senator Gurney. Well, you mentioned meetings with Dean so I 
guess it is a good time to go to those. 

Let's go to this meeting between you and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. 
Dean following the March i^l meeting of Dean with the President. 
That is when the roof sort of started to cave in, and I am curious to 
know what transpired in that meeting between the three of you after 
the meeting between Dean and the President, when presumably accord- 
ing to Dean's testimony, substantiated by Moore in what Dean told 
Moore, Dean told the President everything he knew about Watergate. 
Then there was a meeting, as I understand it, between the three of you. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. There was a meeting at 8 lio p.m. on the 21st. 
Senator Gurney. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. And then that meeting moved to the President s 
office after about an hour. 

Senator Gurney. Now, could you describe to us what happened in 
your office — it was in your office, wasn't it, the first meeting ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. 1 am not sure. I don't recall ofihand. 
Senator Gurney. I have in the log here y :4:5 to 6 p.m.. Dean, Halde- 
man, that is the only thing it says. It doesn't say where, although there 
is another note that day of a meeting. It says Haldeman's office, so I 
would assume perhaps this 3 :45 p.m. meeting was in your office. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know. My notes don't show. 
Senator Gurney. It is a minor point. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In any event it was either in Mr. Haldeman's 
office or mine. I am sure. 

The convei-sation 

Senator Gurney. Who called the meeting? Do you remember? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, I do not. I do not. The conversation, as I 
recall it, largely involved the question of testimonial availability of 
White House staff people. It was this continuing question that was 
ongoing. Mr. Dean did not report in my hearing what he had told the 
President that day. 

Senator Gurney. He never mentioned anything about his meeting 
with the President? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, not that I can recall at all. We were 
largely, at both that meeting and continuing in the meeting which took 
place in the President's office aftei-ward, we were taken up with the 
question of how to get the story out, No. 1, how to get Wliite House 
people to testify fully, under what circumstances, whether they should 


kT .1 ^ ^;''''^'J^^^^ ^^ *^"^ committee, waiving all privileo-e or 
whether they should be made available fully to the grand i ury and not 
to this committee at all, whether the attorney-client pStes?m 
existed as to Dean and he talked to us quite a bit about the faw of 
ait^mey-chent privilege as I recall on thai occasion, and so it ^isThat 

Now Mr. Dean and I got into a difference of opinion at that time 
about the question of immunity, and how that should be hand Sd 
As I recall, right around this time, I think ^lanaiea. 

Senator Gurnet. Now wi ^ do you mean about immunity? 
n.o. +■• ?™^«^^^- Wei, his theory was that the President should 
negotiate blanket immunity for the White House staff with the Attor 
ney General so that the entire White House staff, lock stock and 
barrel, could testify freely before the grand jury L to kny and all 
cS: Tl'^' the air and ever^^body 4uld i. Si^une ?rL pro^! 

SandDoh oi"' ^'li •* ""'^^ ^^^ '^"^ ^ "^^ f ^^"^ either a practical 
staiidpomt or a public appearance standpoint, and we got into a 
difference of opinion on that. That was again-^pardo^mf SenS^r 
Senator Gurney. Well now, why did he say that? ' 
Mr. Ehrlichman Well, he was looking for formula, he had come 
up with a concept that there ought to befome kind of 'a commisS 
an independent commission that would be set up. ^^"^"^^^^^^n, 

onsWfW G^^^^5^-.B"t ^^51^ somebody talks about immunity, obvi- 
ously they are afraid of ending up in the pokey. Did he say, "Now 
we are all going to jail so he had better get some immunity here '^^ 

nnf fou 7"i"' a/""' ^?' ^^ '"-'^ ^^ ^^ concerned that people would 
not ta k freerv'. Now, Mr. Dean is an immunity expert.. Mr Dean to d 
us early m the game that he was the author of the statute wS the 
Congress eventually adopted granting immunity to people fn certain 
criminal situations so that they would testify aVin^^ Wgher-i'ps ^^ 

ZSl """'^Z ''^'"'^"''- ''^^^ ^ ^'^ ^^''^ "^ <l"ite an account^^g of 
he difference between use immunity and transactional immunity Ind 
^nt,'T?i^' ^climcalities of this and he explained that immunity was 
sort of the. lubricant that was needed in this thing to get people to 
come forward and to fullv tell their stories ^ ^ 

withTidd.^T''^- ^^^^"Tbody is innocent of everA'thing and stop 
with Lidd.v , why would people worry about immunitV ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, I don^t think at that stage that there was 
any necessary assumption on our part that everybody was innocIS 

weSbfe'w'^' this was. impU in the con^.rs Jtirth't Se 
were liabilities. We were thinking m terms of Mr. Magruder, we were 
thinking m terms of people at the committee, but Mr Dean was alS 

w'ari^^d'? 7}^'l ^r^'^'-'i '^''^^' House would not come ToT- 
waid and testify freely without immunity 

waTrenr.tll ^'''' ^^'',* picked up, I guess, about this time and then 
was leplayed over and over m his conversations with Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Gurney. Did he mention to you in this discussion who 
would need immunity m the Wliite House? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No ; he did not. 

Senator Gurney. No names were mentioned at all « 

'Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir ; not that I can recall. 


Senator Gurnet. Who did you think might, because you had some 
discussion on this ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't think that I thought who might at that 
point. Bear in mind I had been totally out of touch with this situation 
for some period of time. My reaction to his proposal was to simply 
say to him that that was out of the question, that we simply could not 
expect anybody to grant immunity either on a blanket basis or on an 
individual basis to anybody in the White House. I said that rather 
early in the conversation and that may have inhibited any specifics 
that Mr. Dean otherwise might have been willing to come forward 

Senator Gurney. What was Mr. Haldeman's reaction? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He didn't express a reaction that I can recall to 
that. He was concerned, as I recall, with the general subject of execu- 
tive privilege because he had been hearing from Mr. Mitchell strongly 
about executive privilege and he conveyed to us Mr. ^litchell's strong 
feeling that the executive privilege position that the administration 
was taking was untenable. 

Senator Gurney. And he didn't say anything about this conversa- 
tion he had had, this long conversation earlier in the day with the 
President of the United States ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir ; he did not. 

Senator Gurney. Did you know at that time about who may have 
been knowledgeable about the break-in. You know at some point in 
time he told you that some people knew about it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, no. 

Senator Gurney. This was later? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That developed as a result of phone calls that 
Bob Haldeman was getting while we were in San Clemente following — 
we left, I left 

Senator Gurney. I don't want to get bogged down on that. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, I left about 5 or 6 days later for Galifomia. 
While we were out there, we began realizing there was a strong con- 
flict between Dean and Mitchell on this whole question of people going 
to the grand jury or the committee and so on, and could not get a feel 
of it because I didn't know what was behind it and I began trying to 
find out what was behind it, and then I talked to Mr. O'Brien and that 
is the first that I knew about these four meetings back in November 
and December, January, and February where these plans were laid. 
Then I began inquiring through Mr. Moore and others as to what 
INIr. Mitchell might have testified to that was worrying him, and why 
he didn't think Dean ought to go near the U.S. attorney or the grand 
jury and what his concerns were. 

Senator Gurney. Is it fair to say that up to this March 21 date 
you had no knowledge of what Dean's activities were in connection 
with Watergate, and now I am talking about possible illegal activi- 
ties, other than the Kalmbach business, and this talk you had on 
Executive clemency? Is that a fair thing to say? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I did not know what he had to do with the 
Kalmbach business except in the recruiting of Mr. Kalmbach. 

Senator Gurney. Well, I am only talking about what has trans- 
pired here this we^k. 


]Mr. Ehrlichman. Right. I do not know about what lay behind that 
in terms of these meetings in Dean's office with LaRue and Kalmbach 
and all the others. 

Senator Gtjrney. But you knew nothing about his activities other 
than these little bits and pieces that we mentioned? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, in retrospect, I evidently knew about bits 
and pieces but I never had enough to alert me to put it together. I 

Senator Gurney. Well, all right. Is there anything else that occurred 
in that 1 hour that we should know back to the March 21 meeting 
in your office or Haldeman's? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You will get better information on that meeting, 
I think, from INIr. Haldeman, since he took notes during the meeting, 
I did not. 

Senator Gtjrney. "What transpired in the President's office when 
you moved the meeting over there? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There was virtually a replay of this difference 
of opinion between Dean and me on the question of immunity for the 
"VA^ite House staff. The President was advancing a premise at that 
meeting everybody goes to the grand jury, nobody goes to the Senate 
committee, and we go to the grand jury right away, and the White 
House staff marches down there in platoons, if necessary, and we get 
it all cleaned up, and if there is any problem, why, the problems are 
smoked out. 

Senator Gurney. Was that the decision when the meeting ended? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, no ; as I say, it was advanced as sort of a 
premise for argument and ]Mr. Dean said, "Well, that is what I have 
been saying, we ought to do that. We ought to do it under a blanket 
immunity and in that way a,ll the truth will come out," and I was 
saying, I think that is just, I just think that is wrong. No. 1, I do not 
think anybody in the White House is entitled to immunity if they 
have done som^ething wrong, and then they ought to take the penalty. 
ISIore than that, I think it would be just terribly misunderstood by the 
American people. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Again, you will find that throughout these kind 
of things Mr. Haldeman seldom, if ever, takes an advisory position. 

Senator Gurney. He just listens, was that it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He listens, he takes notes. He undoubtedly gives 
his opinion but he does not usually give it in an open meeting. 

Senator Gurney. Of course, he must have realized that he was 
involved in some way here and I should think he would have some 
opinion upon his future at a very important meeting like this. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am not sure that either he or I had any real 
appreciation at that point in time that we were, in fact, involved in 
this, as you put it. 

Senator Gurney. Well, but we do have the evidence that he 
instructed Strachan to shred some papers that might have some weight 
on this. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, I must say that story has arisen in the 
last 6 weeks, as far as I know. 

Senator Gurney. I am not saying you knew anything about that, I 
am simply saying I am surprised. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not think he knew about it either. I inter- 
viewed Strachan at great length and my notes are here and I asked 
him, because I was trying to find out about Mr. Haldeman, frankly. 
I said, "Tell me eveiything you know about how Haldeman might be 
tied into this thing," and he gave me four or five instances of some 
contact that Mr. Haldeman might have had with the Watergate busi- 
ness. There was not a scintilla of a mention of shredding documents 
anywhere in that. 

Senator Gurney. What you are saying is we may get dillerent testi- 
mony from the next witness. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, and I am saying, too, that as we sat in this 
March 21 meeting, I do not think Mr. Haldeman or I had any contem- 
plation that there was going to be a suggestion of our implication. 

Senator Gurxey. Well, now, what did the President say to this 
difference of opinion between you and Dean on immunity ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He said that he would like to have us have a 
meeting with John Mitchell, and sit down and talk with him not only 
about that, about the basic question of whether staff should appear here 
or at the grand jury or both, but also recasting the administration's 
approach to the question of executive privilege because he knew Mr. 
Mitchell had very strong views on that. 

Senator Gurney. Did the meeting end on that note ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. All right. The next day you did have such a meet- 
ing, did you not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, we did. 

Senator Gurney. With the three of you and Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right, and then that meeting likewise went over 
to the President's office in the afternoon. 

Senator Gurney. Will you describe those two meetings ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I was only in a part of the first meeting held in 
Mr. Haldeman's office, that was the day Secretary Shultz came back 
from the monetai-y conferences and we were in the midst of a reexam- 
ination of phase III, the economic program, and I was sent to the 
airport to meet Secretary Shultz, ride back with him in a helicopter 
and bring him up to date on what the President wanted to meet with 
him about, and arrange for a time that afternoon when the Secretary 
could come over and we could have a further meeting and get into 
the work that had been in progress during his absence. 

The Under Secretary — I guess it is called Deputy Secretary— of the 
Treasury, Mr. Simon, likewise rode back and we had that session. 

So I joined, I rejoined, excuse me, the Dean-Mitchell-Haldeman 
meeting, not too long before it went over to the President's office. 

Senator Gurney. What transpired while you were there ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir ? 

Senator Gurney. What transpired while you were there ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. While I was there there was largely a discussion 
of executive privilege, and Mr. Mitchell's views that the Kleindienst 
testimony or — I do not remember whether he testified, but anyway, 
the administration position had been too restrictive, and that it was 
untenable both, he thought, from a legal standpoint and also from a 
political standpoint. 


Senator Gurnet. Now, again, in this meeting in the President's 
office, there was no discussion of gory details of Watergate? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There was none, there was none. 

Senator Gurnet. Just the technicalities of perhaps how to bring 
out the whole story ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, when the four of us went to the Presi- 
dent's office again, it was largely how to get the whole story out, the 
question again of the grand jury, of immunity, in John Mitchell's 
presence with the President trying these various things out on John 
Mitchell and it finally ended up with the President assigning to Mr. 
Dean that he wanted Mr. Dean to sit down and write out a statement 
as completely as possible of the facts of this whole subject matter. 

Senator Gurnet. This is why he went to Camp David some time 
later, a few days later ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Apparently. That is what I was told, that he 
found it impossible to do this job with the Gray hearings going on, 
and the distractions, and Mr. Gray making accusations against him, 
and so on. 

Senator Gurnet. Now, this really puzzled me. Here on March 21, 
and that is the day before we are talking about now, supposedly from 
the testimony we have from Mr. Dean, and the testimony we have from 
Mr. Moore that Dean told Moore, Dean told him all about Watergate, 
that is, all Dean knew about Watergate, and then there is a meeting in 
the President's office between the President and Dean and you and 
Haldeman, and then there is another meeting between the three of you 
and Mitchell, and then you join the President, which, of course, is the 
next day. Did not the President say at any of these meetings, "Now, 
listen fellows, here I have heard all about this from John Dean, what 
gives here, what are we going to do now, what plans do you have, who 
is going to get this out ? AVe have got to do it." No discussion of that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, I have great difficulty in believing that 
the President was told what Mr. Dean says he was told because of the 
President's approach to this, which I saw in these two meetings. 

Now, I do not know what Mr. Dean told him. I guess Mr. Haldeman 
was in one of those meetings or part of it and maybe he is in a position 
to tell you. 

Senator Gurnet. He never told you anything about what transpired 
in the meeting between the President, Haldeman, and Dean ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, he told me what Mr. Dean has testified to is 
not true. I am forced to the assumption by the President's conduct 
afterward that one of two things was taking place. Either he still 
confidently believed that the AAHiite House was without blame, and that 
Mr. Mitchell was without blame and was acting accordingly, or he was 
involved in setting a few snares on the trail and was plaving it cool, 
because he did not get into any of the January, February, March plan- 
ning meeting business or the involvement of January of John Mitchell 
or any of those kinds of subjects which presumably ISIr. Dean had laid 
all out for him, if you are to believe Mr. Dean. 

Senator Gurnet. You mean, to put it another way, he was in the 
process of getting the information out from everybody. Is that right ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It would be one of the two, and the assignment to 
IMr. Dean to go and write all this down would fit that hypothesis. In 


other words, he was not going to move against anybody until he had 
this down and could see what this fellow really had and then would go 

Senator Gtjrney. Well now, around about this time or somewhat 
later, and there are so many meetings here that I have really forgotten 
which occurred \\4ien, so perhaps I am going to have to rely on you for 
that, but did the President lift the phone up at any time and say, "John 
I want you to come over to the office here and talk about Watergate, 
what you know about it." 

jNIr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, not until way late in the game. He lifted 
up the phone one day and called me down and said, "I am satisfied 
that John Dean is in this so deeply that he simply cannot any longer 
have anything to do with it." 

Senator Gtjrkey. That is when he transferred the assignment to 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. What date was that? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. March 30. 

Senator Gurnet. And tell us again precisely what transpired in 
that phone conversation beyond what you have already. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, that was a meeting in the President's office 
on ^March 30, and it was, as I recall, quite brief. We had had, we were 
getting ready to leave that same day, as a matter of fact, for Cali- 
fornia, and he called me down, I am looking for the time to help me, 
to recall the time of departure here. Yes, we leave at 3 o'clock in 
the afternoon, we had had a long meeting that morning with Secre- 
tary Shultz and Mr. Sonnenfeld about the economy, and that ran 
from 9 a.m. to about, I don't know, what, 10 a.m. or 11 a.m., something 
of that kind, a long session, as I recall. He called me down for just 
about 10 minutes at noontime, and said what I have just told you, 
and I said, "Well, what is it you expect me to do basically" and he 
said, "I want you to step into what Dean has been doing here. I need 
to know about executive pri^dlege, I need to know about attorney- 
client privilege, I need to have somebody set this strategy with regard 
to testifying at the committee and the grand jury and these other 
places and I need to know where the truth lies in this thing." And 
the only tipoflf that 1 had had to that was a request from him on the 
27th, I believe it was, yes, on the 27th. 

Senator Gurnet. Is that the meeting between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. 
with the President? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe — yes, yes indeed. Tliat was for the pur- 
pose of dictating to me a list of questions that he wanted put to the 
Attorney General, and I believe that telephone call to the Attorney 
General which actually was not completed until the next day because 
he was traveling, is in your file, phone call with Kleindienst on the 
28th, and I then went down a handwritten list of questions that the 
President had put to me about the progress of the case, about the 
involvement of John Mitchell, possible, any i>ossible evidence that 
Kleindienst might have, any possible evidence of anybody else being 
involved at the Committee To Re-Elect, any evidence of any White 
House staff being involved and the President told me to tell the Attor- 
ney General that if he had any such evidence or if he developed any 


such evidence, that he was then to transmit it directly to the President, 
not through me, not tli rough anybody else at the White House but 
direct to the President, and in that message I did, as you see in the 
transcript, that I did transmit to the Attorney General. 

Senator GuRNEY. Do we have those questions that he 

Mr, Ehrlichman. Xo, sir, j^ou do not. They are a part of my notes 
of the meeting of the 27th which are in the President's file. 

Senator Gurnet. How many questions were there ? 

Mr. EiiRLiciiMAN. Well, there ai-e about 10 or 12 topics, I think, 
written out on a piece of paper. 

Senator Gurney. Would you give us to the best of your recollection 
what the topics were and what the questions w^ere '( 

Mr. EiiRLiCHMAN. I think I can do that best. Senator, by looking at 
that telephone couA^ersation and — because I think that that transcript 
is quite faithful to the list. I just went down the list in talking with 
the Attorney General. I don't seem to have that in mj^ 

Senator Gurney, The telephone. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The telephone call with Mr. Kleindienst on the 

Senator Gurney. I wonder if the committee would hand this to the 
witness, Mr. Ehrlichman. That apparently is it. If we have another 
copy I wish I could have it, too, but I think it is better you have it at 
the moment. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. We have a copy here ; I may have stuck it back in 
the file. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator Gurney. I have a copy here now. 

Senator Ervin. Let the reporter assign that the appropriate exhibit 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 99.*] 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Actually the first sentence, as 1 recall, is only 
partly on this transcript and it said, "There are a number of things 
the President wanted me to cover with you," and only the latter half 
of that sentence is in the transcript. 

Senator Gurney. If we could, Mr. Ehrlichman, this is very impor- 
tant, but if you could summarize these as briefly as you can it will help 
out the committee because I think my own time is running out here, 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You will see in the fourth paragraph I said. 
"No. 1, he wanted me to ask you these two things that I did yesterday 
about the grand jury and about Baker," meaning Senator Baker, and 
then we go into an inquiry about some statements that Senator Weicker 
had made to the press which the President had asked Pat Gray to check 
into. Then, and the President wanted a report on whether Senator 
Weicker had any evidence or not to support these assertions. 

Senator Gurney. I think perhaps you had better explain a little 
more about Senator Baker who is not 'here so we can know that there 
is no 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the President had designated John Dean as 
the Wliite Mouse contact on Watergate, or the AVhite House leadman 
on Watergate, as I say in February. He had also designated the Attor- 
ney General as the administration contact to the committee, and had 

•See p. 2944. 


asked the Attorney General to be in touch with Senator Baker with 
regard to committee rules and technical matters of that kind. 

Senator Gurney. This was just a liaison matter 'i 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. So he can find out what was going on, what the 
committee planned to do, that sort of thing ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmx^n. That is correct. So he was asking for a report 
from the Attorney General on that. 

By the way, it comes back to me that in the meeting that Dean and 
Mitchell and Haldeman and I had in the President's office on the 22d 
that the President had picked up the phone and called the Attorney 
General and had given him some questions to ask Senator Baker about 
committee timing and that kind of thing so that he would be advised 
of the facts, and he had not yet had the report back from the Attorney 
General on that. 

Then this first page is about Senator Weicker's statements, which 
was one of the items on the list. 

Then at the bottom of page 2 I said, "The President said for me to 
say this to you that the best information he has had and has, is that 
neither Dean nor Haldeman nor Colson nor I nor anybody in the com- 
mittee has had any prior knowledge of this burglary. He said that he 
is counting on you to provide him with any information to the contrary 
if it ever turns up. And you just contact him direct. Now as far as the 
Committee To Ke-Elect is concerned he said that serious questions 
somebody raised with regard to Mitchell and he would likewise want 
you to communicate with him any evidence or inferences from evidence 
on that subject." 

Senator Gurney. I think we had better stop there. 

The chairman points out to me that we have a vote on the Senate 

Senator Ervin. We will stand in recess. 


Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney will resume the questioning of the 

Senator Gurney. I think we were there at the bottom of page 2, 
Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir; I saw during recess that I had skipped 
over the Attorney General's remarks in the middle of page 2 where in 
response to my general inquiry, a previous inquiry also, he said he has 
been emphasizing publicly that "The President wanted the matter in- 
vestigated, to let the chips fall where they may, but second, if anybody 
has any information we not only want it, we expect to get it, so we can 
investigate it and if these indict other people and that anybody who 
withheld information would be obstructing justice." The Attorney 
General was saying this to the press and he was getting this out in 
every way that he knew how. 

Now, then at the top of page '3 the significance of the McCord letter 
which was drafted by Mr. McCord and handed to Judge Sirica and 
Which Judge Sirica read publicly was discussed and evaluated by the 
Attorney General. 

Then, we return to the question about whether or not Mr. Mitchell 
was involved, and that led to a statement by the Attorney General that 

96-296 O - 73 - pi. 7 - 7 


if ISIr. Mitchell were to be involved, and he says here that he has no 
evidence at this time that he is, but if he were, that we should give some 
thought in such an event to having a special prosecutor, the Attorney 
General would feel he would have to recuse himself. Then I asked 
him what the President's position would be in the event of such a 
thing and at the bottom of page 3 and middle of page 4 he advises such 
a procedure. Then we discussed, and again this is an item on my list, 
the matter of immunity; who determines whether immunity will be 
granted mechanically, and he said the Department of Justice deter- 
mined that insofar as the grand jury was concerned but so far as the 
Senate committee is concerned that it made that determination in 
conjunction, I don't think he said in conjunction with the court, but 
that these were two separate procedures. 

Then another item on my list was the status of the court action which 
I have referred to previously in testimony here, in answer to a question 
by Senator Weicker, and then finally I was asked to tell him that there 
was a possibility that the President wanted to see him in San Clemente 
the following Saturday. The Attorney General at that time was in 
Arizona, was planning to be in Los Angeles, and in point of fact that 
meeting did take place in San Clemente subsequent to this phone call. 

Senator Gurney. Did the President tell you at the time he gave these 
questions to you why he was asking you to inquire of the Attorney Gen- 
eral rather than Mr. Dean, did that come up ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Xo, sir, it did not come up and I did not ask. 

Senator Gurxey. But in retrospect you think he was perhaps having 
doubts whether he was getting a full story or not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, up until then Mr. Dean had been the contact 
with the Attorney General in matters of this kind. 

Senator Gurxey. Then on what date did the President give this full 
assignment to you to run Watergate down for him ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Two days later. 

Senator Gurxey. I think I had better stop there, Mr. Chairman, 
because I have taken enough time. 

Senator ER^•IX. Well, Senator, I would not want to cut you off. This 
is a very serious investigation we are making and you could proceed 
until noon if you have further questions and then we can recess for the 
lunch hour. 

Senator Gtjrxey. Thank you, Mr. Chainnan. 

Let me then complete, if we can, the assignment you had from the 
President to now, be the sort of chief Watergate investigator in the 
T^Hiite House. 

Would you tell the committee about that, what you found and what 
you reported to the President ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I have tried to disclaim the designation "investi- 
gator," Senator, because I don't consider what I did to be an investiga- 
tion, to a conclusive result. 

Senator Gurxey. You certainly can define yoiu* role. I didn't mean 
to imply something you were not doing. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I had to get up to speed on this. I was not follow- 
ing the law on the matter and so the first thing that I did in another 
convereation with the Attorney General was to arrange to have some- 
one in the Department of Justice prepare for me a thorough brief of 


the laws of attorney-client privilege, executive privilege, obstruction 
of justice and all of these subject that we seemed to be encountering in 

Senator Gurnet. Who was that? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. A man named Axel Kleiboomer. 

Senator Gurnet. Perhaps you can try to spell it. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. K-1-e-i-b-o-o-m-e-r, a first-rate young man, a 
good lawyer, who did the, just the briefing, and he moved to me by 
courier at San Clemente a great deal of very useful legal reading 
and I spent the first 2 or 3 days out there in trying to assimilate some 
of this background of law. 

Senator Gurnet. What dates are these? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. This would have been the 2d, 3d, 4th of April, 
along in that period. 

Now, the Attorney General had been at San Clemente on March 31, 
and I had had a brief meeting with him at that time and that he had 
had a private meeting with the President that day. And then he left. 
Finally JNlr. O'Brien's arrival at San Clemente 

Senator Gurnet. Did you and the Attorney General discuss Water- 
gate at all? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, the fact that I had this assignment. 

Senator Gurnet. But nothing of substance about facts? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. But not facts as such. He indicated in this con- 
versation on the 28th, just 2 days before or 3 days before, that we 
had everything he had, in effect, that is the substance of his responses 
here, and that continued to be the case in the brief conversation that 
I had with him before he saw the President. I told him that I was 
trying to get on top of this and I would need some help, some briefing 
help, and he said he would find the best guy he could and he did, and 
so we got into it. 

Mr. Kleiboomer sent me two big notebooks of brief, and as I say 
that was sort of heavy going, and I just sat and read it. 

With Mr. O'Brien's arrival, however, that was my first interview, 
and it brought me a whole new picture of this whole matter. A lot of 
information in what Mr. O'Brien gave me that I had never heard 

Senator Gurnet. You have recounted most of that to the com- 
mittee, have you not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; I am not quite through. 

Senator Gurnet. All right. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There is quite a bit of business in those notes 
about money, about the involvements of people who had various funds 
of money and carried money around and who got money and how 
Liddy got money and this kind of thing which was all a brandnew 
subject to me at that point. I reported in quite sketchy detail to the 
President after I had talked to Mr. O'Brien, and he urged me at that 

Senator Gurnet. Will you tell us very briefly what he told you about 
this money and other things ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. O'Brien? 

Senator Gurnet. Yes. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. He told me about a fimd of money that 
existed at the Committee To Re-Elect, of which he knew, and he had 
a piece of paper that had a lot of information on it, this was Bart 
Porter's account, as he called it. It was in cash from Sloan to Porter, 
about $50,000 of it was pre-April 7 money, $37,000 of it went to Gordon 
Liddy, and then he has a whole lot of payments out, most of which I 
believe Mr. Porter has testified to here. 

Senator Gurnet, I see. 

Well, let's not go over those that we already know. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Right. 

Senator Gurnet. But give us new information. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He told me about some campaign violations, cam- 
paign funding violations, which he said the General Accounting Office 
knew of which involved, oh, nothing over about $10,000 but a lot of 
ditterent items. He told me about Liddy getting some money for 
Cuban demonstrators in Washington, D.C., you had testimony on that, 
1 guess, and so then I got into the question of who ran the Committee 
lo Ke-Elect at various times, particularly during the planning period 
here. He said that Magruder said he was running the committee but 
he was seeing Mr. Mitchell twice a day during this period of time' and 
he felt It was safe to say that :Mitchell was running the committee 
even when he was Attorney General. 

Now, that is the balance of the interview with O'Brien, but that 
gave me a lot of perspective on this thing that I had never had before. 

Senator Gurnet. Did he give you any information on the planning 
of the break-m ? ^ 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes; and I testified with Senator Inouye about 
that, those four meetings and that whole business. 

Senator Gurnet. Fine. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I had only one other substantive interview while 
we were at San Clemente in the remaining 3 or 4 davs and that was 
with Mr. Kalinbach, but I became aware through Mr. 'Haldeman, who 
was reporting to me, conflicting conversations that he was having with 
JNIitchell and Dean on this whole subject of should Dean go to the 
grand ]ury or should Dean go to the prosecutor, and we began trying 
to understand what lay behind this. Well, I had the background of 
Mr. O^Brien s interview, and we zeroed in on the fact that it had to 
do with these four meetings or three meetings or whatever there were, 
and whether or not Mr. Mitchell might have some exposure for perjury 
on account of having testified that the meetings were canceled or not. 

Senator Gurnet. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. And so I had Bob Haldeman trying to get a 
straight answer out of Mr. ]\Iitchell and he said he could not, so I called 
Dick Moore and asked him if he would talk to John Mitchell because 
i knew they had a close relationship. 

Senator Gurnet. And that was the reason for Moore's trip to New 
York ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; it was not. It was subsequent to that trip 
to New York. I believe this was a telephone call which Mr. Moore 
said he made to John Mitchell, and Mr. Moore, I believe, also talked 
to Mr. Mitchell's attorney, although I am not positive of that. But 
in any event, Mr. Moore reported back that Mr. INIitchell was con- 
fident that he had not in any way violated any perjury statute. 


and that he just did not think it was a ^ood idea for the President's 
lawyer to be going out and testifying; in other words, it was an at- 
torney-client privilege kind of position that he was contending for. It 
did not satisfy me. , , j 

Senator Gurnet. Mitchell now talking about Dean should not 

testify? . .11 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct. This thing continued to be a 
nagging question, and so we called John Dean, as we were headed 
back, I talked to Haldeman further about this. Dean was not talking 
to me, all through this period of time, I had not had phone call one 
from him, which was very unusual because I used to hear from him 
from time to time on various subjects, including Watergate, but I was 
completely not on his telephone list and Bob Haldeman was hearing 
from him all the time. So we talked about what Bob Haldeman 

Senator Gurnet. Did he know that you were performing the role 
for the President ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe so. 

Senator Gurnet. All right. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe so. I did not tell him but I believe he 

well knew it. • v • 

As a matter of fact, just before we departed for California this 
question arose of Mr. Dean being fired by his law firm for unethical 
conduct and I sent for his personnel package in order to check it. The 
personnel package arrived in Fred Fielding's arms with scotch taj)e 
around it a number of times, and he said, "What do you want this 
for?" And I said, "Well, there is a story"— and that refreshed my 
recollection, I did have one phone call from John Dean and that was 
on that subject. He did call me at San Clemente about that and he said, 
"I understand you wanted to get my personnel package," and I said 
"Yes, there is this story about your having been accused of this un- 
ethical conduct," and he then told me the long story which he re- 
counted to this committee, that he eventually was able to get the 
attorney who made the charges to retract the charges, which satisfied 
me, but I think through Fielding and through my conversation with 
Fielding on that occasion, Mr. Dean must have known that I was ac- 
tively in this. 

Senator Gurnet. I see. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In any event, on the way back we called and 
asked John Dean to meet us in my office when we returned to Wash- 
ington that night, and he did so. 

Senator Gurnet. What date ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, April 8, 9. 

Senator Gurnet. April 8 between 5 and 7 p.m. ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right ; that was a Saturday or Sunday — ^that was 
a Sunday night, and we had a 2-hour meeting. Bob Haldeman, John 
Dean, and I, to try and understand what this hangup was between 
Mitchell and Dean. We still did not have a feel for it. Then, for the 
first time, Mr. Dean talked to us about the four meetings or the three 
meetings back in January and February and explained some of the 
nuances of the coverup story with regard to Mr. Magruder and the 
meeting which he. Dean, Magruder, and Mitchell had had in Mr. 
Mitchell's law office at a time when they were gathered with the 
attorneys in the case to discuss grand jury testimony where the three 


of them had retired to Mr. Mitchell's partners' office away from the 
attorneys and had discussed how to reconcile their respective recol- 

fimpTLfT]^//'''^?* ^'^ "'Y-^^ 1972 period. So that was the first 
time that I had from Mr. Dean directly this subject matter 

f ^. ^^JS'^ GuRNEY. Did he talk to you at that time about his orchestra- 
tion of the perjury of Magruder ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He did, but he did it in very delicate terms He 
did not m any way admit to me flatly that he had, in fact orchestrated 
it to perjury. He indicated that he had had a part in the preparation 
of the testimony, that there were, well, I have forgotten how, it was 
a very careful explanation which did not really implicate Mr Dean 
in suborning to perjury by any means, but he indicated that he was 
well familiar with the problems between Magruder and Mitchell 
on the one hand. He felt that Mr. Mitchell had problems which were 
causing Mr. Mitchell to say that Mr. Dean should not go and talk to 
the prosecutor or the grand jury and so this was very thoroughly dis- 
cussed and hashed over during that meeting. 

Senator Gurnet. These problems between Dean and Magruder, 
specifically, did they involve who was responsible for the break-in, in 
giving the green light to it ; is that what you mean « 
. Mr. Ehrlichman. I gathered not. I think they involved disputes 

fr. ilVu''^}^''^T ^^ ^'^ ""^^^^ ^^^^ Pl^^® at these Liddy meetings, 
so-called, back in the early part of 1972. ^' 

Senator Gurnet. I see. 

Did he go in at that meeting to any detail about his own involve- 
"^^a ^"^ on— Dean, I am talking about>-coverup ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman No; not in evidentiary terms at all. We talked 
about the President's desire. The President on the flight back, as I 
Th3,T ^^^,\}^^^^^^^.^^ the flight back of about, nearly 2 hours 
about this and the President decided he wanted Mr. Dean to so to 
the graiid jury, so we conveyed that to Mr. Dean at that time. 

Senator Gurnet. l^Hiat was his reaction to that « 

Mr. Ehrlicioian. He was still very much interested in the question 
n!-.^t?T'' '^'i?^! ^'^^ some information, as I recall, about how the 
p osecutoi-s felt about^the Whit« House, and so he imparted that to us, 
that he did not feel that anybody in the White House was a target of 
the prosecutors, that they were after some people who had obstructed 
justice, like Mardian and LaRue and people at the committee, but that 
he, Dean felt that something like an estoppel or functional immunity 
or something could be worked out with the prosecutors if he went to 
aid titlfy ^^ generally in agreement with the idea that he go 

Senator Gurnet. Was there any discussion at that meeting about 

your role m Watergate or Haldeman's role in Watergate? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That did not come until this meeting of April 13 

Senator Gurnet. Well, could we go into that one ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. On the 13th, after 2 :30 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon 
1 ha,d a conversation with Dean which was apparently as a result of 

ZfTJrf''^:1rl' ^''^? ^^^^ ^^^^^ the prosecutor. He told me 
that Liddy had talked with the prosecutors off the record very com- 
pletely and that they might get him to talk on the record. That his 


attorney was going to try to get Mr. Mitchell to support his view that 
Liddy ought to talk on the record. And it turned out that that was 
incorrect apparently, but that was at least what he told me, and I 
suspect what was happening here was that the prosecutors were telling 
him this, trying to get him to move, to come forward and make a dis- 
closure. Apparently, the prosecutors were playing this kind of a game 
with a lot of these people at this time. Saying, "so and so has talked 
so you better had come and talk," and passing this word along. He told 
me that Hunt was back testifying before the grand jury at that time 
but lying, that the grand jury was also taking testimony or the pros- 
ecutor, at least was taking testimony from Strachan and McCord, that 
there would be no indictment of anyone in the White House, that at all 
costs he felt a special prosecutor should be avoided in this case, because 
of the involvement, he said, of Caulfield and Krogh. I did not get the 
significance of that at the time but presumably that referred to some 
of Caulfield's intelligence-gathering activities and Krogh's involve- 
ment with the Plumbers. 

He said, "It is a close question as to my," Dean's "liability," and 
I have a note that says, "Then summoned before the grand jury," but 
I don't know what that means any more, it does not recollect anything 
to me. He said, "They won't subpena me but it is better if I cooperate. 

Now, he went back into the meetings in Mitchell's office about 
money. I was inquiring of him now about coverup money. He said that 
"The way I got involved, I," Dean got involved, "was that Mitchell 
requested me to help." 

He said, "LaRue and Mr. O'Brien would urge that money be made 
available. Mitchell would postpone making a decision until the last 
minute and the way he would get this thing off his desk would be by 
calling me," Dean. He said, "The U.S. attorney does not want to 
cause the White House problems. They tell Dean that Magruder and 
Mitchell are involved in the pre-Watergate matter and that LaRue, 
Mitchell, and Mardian are involved in the post- Watergate matter." 

He said, "I don't think Jeb can crack a deal" meaning a deal with 
the prosecutors, "for immunity." 

Then I have a little symbol on these notes which summarizes the 
exposure which he thought that Bob Haldeman and I had in this 
matter, mine being my connection with Herb Kalmbach in the pro- 
vision of money for the defendants, and I have the number 350 which 
relates to the $350,000 fund which presumably involved Bob Halde- 

He said, "Neither one of these are indictable but they are going 
to be awkward to explain. I don't think either one of them are a prob- 
lem for you in an ultimate sense." He said, "The probable scenario for 
the future will probably look like this. On May 1 the grand jury is 
going to break this case. About May 15 there are going to be indict- 
ments. Then the Attorney General is going to go to Senator Ervin and 
tell him that the hearings are going to prejudice the new case, and that 
they couldn't possibly get a fair trial. He will ask that the hearings 
be held off a month or two until the trial is over," and then he said, "In 
my personal opinion, if they are held off then there never will be 
Senate hearings. So I don't know what John Mitchell will do, whether 
he will take a plea or what he will do under those circumstances. 


he^.""- ^"""™'"»- No- «"■• Tl>at I hadn't heard until this testimony 
paS^r &" "■■ *" <""*^^ '•<' "^ h-""g with L.Rue at this 

|na|?^r.r\^rtierrruS?nr ^^~*- 
q^'t^oThar th": °" f: iz" r^^'T:- ^ ^i""^ ™ ^ad tiZsZt 

hisSa^ in al of th f „ni f '^'P"™'^'''™ "'"'"' ^o^n Mitchell and 

"I wonSiTwe t7V' "Yn^-'rti'-g^ Bob H^ldeln saying, 
Mitche 1 " Tt wl » 'f^'5'"S.aIl this anguish just to protect John 

K: d s ^i js^crth!!t;resS;ror„;?„"ds'':^ LtShi? 

Ml. Mitchell thought his silence was somehow serving the Presidencv 
lent ff f T''"P'''''''"'i'?"' """ """^ President didn'f wa^it 1 im to sk 
P ?^na p^inrthatT'"""^ ""'?'' Mr Mitchell felt froni hi ow 
tSt was «o to hin, I !, tVv'"''"*. ",* '''*' °"'» "Shts, in which case 
WtLt ■ !■• -^"'' ^ delivered that message to him at that time 

time " "'' " contmumg question all the way through this period rf 


Senator Otjrnet. Now, through this period of time, beginning with 
that assignment on — is it March 31 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Thirtieth. 

Senator Gurney. March 30, were you reporting to the President 
what you were finding out ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I reported to him after I talked with Mr. O'Brien 
but very briefly on that subject, and I just said : "I am beginning to 
get a feel for this thing but I have got so much hearsay here I don't 
think it's worth taking a lot of your time." He said : "You know, what 
are you finding out?" So I said: "Well he tells me there were these 
meetings back in the early times when Liddy had this plan, and so on." 
I took him kind of sketchily through the O'Brien business and I said : 
"This is hearsay two, three and in some cases four removed," and 
I said "We cannot move on something of this kind until we find out." 

Now, in San Clemente again when we came to this funny conflict be- 
tween Dean and Mitchell, I mentioned that to him, and I said "We are 
trying to get to the bottom of it," and two or three times he said "Have 
you got that figured out yet?" and when we talked on the airplane 
going back and we talked about Dean goin^ to the gi-and jury and he 
said finally "I am not going to wait, he is going to go." He said : "Have 
you ever figured out what that is," and I said "No, we are going to 
see Dean. We don't know what that is." 

Senator Gurnet. Well, now, did you make a complete report to the 
President ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. When was that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That was on Saturday morning, April 14. 

Senator Gurney. 'What did you tell him ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I told him basically a narrative of my 
interviews with these various people starting with O'Brien and run- 
ning through everybody that is on this list except Mitchell and 
Magruder whom I had not yet — with whom I had not yet talked and 
Strachan the second time when I got into the whole question of Bob 
Haldeman's involvement. 

Senator Gurney. Now, so we can wrap this up and I can release the 
floor here, did you at that time give him a complete account of Water- 
gate as we know it now, and if you did not, what portions did you not 
tell him that you didn't know? Perhaps we can get at it that way 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I didn't know, for instance, any of the 
behind-the-scenes business of the money beyond what Paul O'Brien 
had given me here and a little feel of it that Dean had given me which 
I think I have just described to you about as well as I can. The sub- 
sequent interviews that I had with particularly Magruder that after- 
noon — you see the outcome of this report to the President was, he said 
"I want you to talk to Magruder; I want you to talk to Mitchell," 
and then he also told me he wanted to find out more about Bob 
Haldeman's involvement. So those three followed that preliminary 
report and none of the things that I developed from any of them were 
included in it. T^Tien I completed them, then I came back and reported 
what those three individuals told me and laid that out for him. 

Senator Gurney. And was that a fairly complete account of 
Watergate ? 


]\Ir. Ehrlichman. It included the planning meetings, it included 
the two entries, and the reasons for going back. It included quite a 
lot but not the whole storj'^ of the coverup by any means. 

Senator Gurnet. The fact that there had been one going on with- 
out all of the gory details. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Eight, and obstruction of justice, both from the 
committee and Mr. Dean's part in it, I am frank to say I did not feel, 
since the full implication of Mr. Dean's involvement in the after- 
math yet at that time. 

Senator Gurnet. And what date was that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That was on Saturday, April 14. 

Senator Gurnet. What was the President's reaction ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That I must immediately advise the Attorney 
General, which I then did within the hour. 

Senator Gurnet. And that was the end of the meeting ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes ; the meetings went on, however, the follow- 
ing day. The President had a long meeting with the Attorney Gen- 
eral and Mr. Petersen, who, in turn had had meetings with the prose- 
cutor, then I had another meeting with the President because I had 
seen Gordon Strachan that morning while the President— Sunday 
morning— while the President was talking to the Attorney General 
and Mr. Petersen. So then, I had a further report to give to the Presi- 
dent, Sunday following that meeting that he had had. 

Senator Gurnet. Can you very briefly tell us the important parts 
of that? 

IVIr. Ehrlichman [conferring with counsel]. 

Counsel reminds me that I should say we are adidsed that the 
Attorney General had an all-night meeting Sotinday night with Mr. 
Petersen and with the U.S. attorney and the prosecutors and ])osted 
himself on things. He then met with the President after church Sun- 
day morning. I met with the President after that. We then had a 
further meeting later on that Sunday, I had one or two meetings, I 
forgot which, I got home and was told to turn around and come back 
so we had another Sunday night meeting at which the President 
went over and over this information and I think it was at that time 
that I called Mr. Gray and discovered the documents had been 
destroyed and so we went over that at length and implications of that 
and I had further conversations with the Attornev General, I guess, 
the next morning but this went on over a period of about 4 days, Fri- 
day, Saturday, Sunday, Monday. 

Senator Gurnet. Then, it was April 17 that the President issued 
his statement that he was aware of new developments in Watergate? 

INIr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurnet. I think I had better stop there. Thank you, Mr. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Er\t[n. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

[A^Tiereupon, at 12 :20 p.m., the committee was recessed, to recon- 
vene at 2 p.m., this same day.] 


Afternoon Session, Friday, July 27, 1973 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Montoya will examine the witness. 

Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mt. Ehrlichman, you have testified that during the period from 
June 17 or shortly thereafter, up until the time you resigned your 
position at the White House that you intermittently kept up with the 
course of the investigation that was going on in-house, out of house, 
and otherwise? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. And that shortly after June 17, according to 
testimony presented here by Mr. Strachan, and, I believe, confirmed by 
you, you were assigned to be in charge of the investigation shortly 
after it had occurred? 

ISIr. Ehrlichman. That is not correct. Senator. 

Senator ^Montoya. All right, give me your version of it. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I thini: what Mr. Strachan testified to was 
that in a conversation with Mr. Higby, who apparently was in Florida 
with the President on that weekend, Air. Higby said that I knew about 
it or was in charge of it or some such thing. The fact is that on that 
weekend of the Watergate break-in, I, apparently, was one of the few 
senior members of the White House staff who was here in the city, 
and the rest were either with the President in Florida or somewhere 
else, and so for the brief time on the Monday before the President's 
party got back, and I think they got back late Monday, as I recall, I 
started the ball rolling. 

Senator Montoya. What did you do? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I called Mr. Dean, who had just returned from 
the Philippines, and he and I had a meeting on Monday noon, and from 
then on, as far as I was concerned, he had the ball. 

Senator Montoya. Who threw the ball to him ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I did. 

Senator Montoya. What instructions did you give him? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I told him that I thought that it was important 
for us to keep well informed of all of the fast-breaking events in this 
matter in order that our press office could be fully briefed and kept up 
with the developing events because I, as I testified before, I saw this as 
a real campaign issue. 

Senator Montoya. Did he report to you frequently on what he was 
uncovering ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I saw him a total of nine times in the next 2 weeks, 
which is an unusually large number of times for my contacts with 
Mr. Dean. 

Senator Montoya. What did you see him about during those nine 
times ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, among other things — well, let me just 

Senator Montoya. I mean, with respect to Watergate. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 


He told me a number of things, and I have tried to make a list of 
them here and I will give them to you. He told me about the general 
facts of the surveillance of the Democratic National Committee head- 
quarters, the fact that the Howard Johnson Motel had been employed 
as a listening post, the fact that a hotel room in the Watergate Hotel 
had been found which had some of the burglars' possessions in it. The 
fact that they used fictitious names and papers, and that they had 
large quantities of money in $100 bills. He told me about the fact that 
Hunt had a safe still at the Wliite House, and then I testified previ- 
ously to the meetings, the meeting which we held :Monday afternoon 
to try to determine the facts with regard to Hunt's employment at the 
White House, and that was as a result of a report from Mr. Dean. 

Senator Moxtoya. Well, did you feel, Mr. Ehrlichman— I do not 
want to go mto all the details— did you feel Mr. Dean was telling you 
almost everything he was uncovering on a day-by-day basis? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That was certainly my assumption. Senator, yes. 

Senator JNIontoya. Did this continue after the first 2 weeks? 
^ Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir; before very long I left the city, I believe 
It was the 26th— well, I will have to check that. Well, of course the 
24th and 25th I was away. The President went to Harrisburg to see the 
results of the Agnes flood and we were gone those 2 days, and then 
the ;29th I left, for a trip to Springfield, 111., Lansing, Mich., northern 
California, and finally ended up at San Clemente. 

Senator Montoya. I think we can save some time, Mr. Ehrlichman; 
I just want to go through with you, the communications that you 
had with ]\Ir. Dean with respect to Watergate over the long span up 
until April 15, 1973. & f f 

Mr. Ehrlichman. All right, sir. I think 

Senator Montoya. I mean in a general way. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have that in summary form and perhaps I can 
give that to you rather quickly. In the month of June I saw him nine 
times, and eight of those times related to Watergate. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In the month of July, I saw him three times and 
only two times related to Watergate. In the month of August, four 
times of which two— no, pardon me, none related to Watergate. Sep- 
tember, three times, and I am not able to tell you as to what. One of 
those meetings was with regard to the foreign grain sales and I don't 
know what the other two were. October, I saw him twice ; once was the 
Common Cause lawsuit and I don't know what the other one was. 
Aovember, I saw him four times; one was with regard to the AVater- 
gate, two with regard to Segretti which I guess you lump into that 
general subject. December, five times, twice on the subject of Water- 
gate. •' 

January, seven times of which Watergate could be considered to 
have been the subject of three of those meetings. February, five times, 
three of which, including La Costa, were on the subject of Watergate. 
March, three times, and one of those times was with regard to the 
Hunt blackmail; well, actually two of those were, and the other one 
the question of testimonial appearance. 

Senator Montoya. Was that in March ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 


Senator Montota. What about the January meeting, didn't you 
testify about the January meeting with respect to Mr. Hunt? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, and that is one of the three, that is actually 
two of the three that I mentioned. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. And April, three times, and all of those were 
Watergate matters. . • , t.^ 

Senator Montoya. So you, in effect, met quite a few times with Mr. 
Dean about Watergate ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Would you say that during those times that you 
met with him that you discussed fully all aspects of Watergate, White 
House possible involvement and also possible involvement of person- 
nel at the CRP? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, as it turned out, no. I thought so at the 
time but I now know that that was not the case. 

Senator Montoya. Well, were you engaging in speculation with Mr. 
Dean as to who might be involved as a result of these conservations ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. On occasion we did. 

Senator Montoya. Quite a few figures or names were discussed 
during your conversations ; is that not correct ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You mean a great number of people? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, I wouldn't say that. Senator. 

Senator Montoya. Well, then, as a result, did you use this informa- 
tion and what you independently collected as a basis for briefing Mr. 
Ziegler preliminary to any press conferences that you might have 
had — that he might have had ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not inevitably, no. There would be time, for 
instance, when I was not with Mr. Ziegler. I had an independent 
travel schedule and very often Mr. Ziegler would have briefings and 
I wouldn't be available or he would be out of town with the President 
and I would be here in Washington. But we tried as nearly as possible 
to talk over, particularly technical matters. 

For instance, when the civil depositions were being taken, Mr. 
Ziegler and I, I recall, had a conversation about a civil deposition, 
what the rules of evidence, were, why hearsay could come into a civil 
deposition where it couldn't come into a trial. Things of that nature. 

Senator Montoya. The point I want to make, Mr. Ehrlichman, that 
you have testified here that on numerous occasions you did brief Mr. 
Ziegler preliminary to any press conferences that he might have. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I don't think I said it quite that way, 

Senator Montoya. How did you say it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. What I attempted to impart was that on more 
or less a daily basis Mr. Ziegler and I would try to touch base about 
any current issues that needed my assistance, and not in every case 
would he need my assistance for some of these things. But where we 
had, for instance, the issue of the Clean Water bill and the President's 
possible veto of that bill, where we had the spending limit that was a 
hot issue in the Congress, Mr. Ziegler and I would sit down and we 
would talk through what the central issues were, why the President 


took the position he did, what the other view was, to try to o-ive him 
a working knowledge of the subject matter and we tried to^do that 
with various aspects of this case as it went along. 

Senator Montoya. But did you ever brief him on Watergate on 
the part or concern of the White House and so forth ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know quite what you mean by brief 

Senator Montoya. Did you provide any input 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I am sure I did. 

Senator Montoya [continuing]. Into the background that went into 
the press conferences? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am sure that I did at times. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 
^ Now, there were quite a few pronouncements by the White House 
Dy tne President with respect to the Watergate affair, and I am going 
to relate those in sequence. 

On August 29, 1972, the President, in response to a question stated, 
and this is part of his answer : 

In addition to that within our own staff under my direction counsel to the 
President, Mr. Dean, has conducted a complete investigation of all leads which 
might involve any present members of the AYhite House staff or anybody in the 
Government. I can say categorically that his investigation indicates that no one 
in tl e \Jhite House staff, no one in this administration presently employed was 
involvedmthisbizarre, very bizarre incident. 

Then on a subsequent date, the President in his October 5, 1972, con- 
ference stated m response to a reporter's question as follows : 

Now, when we talk about a clean breast, let us look at what has happened. The 
FBI assigned 133 agents to this investigation. It followed out 1,800 leads It con- 
ducted l,oOO interviews. 

Then subsequently, during the press conference of April 17, 1973 the 
President stated as follows : ' 

On March 21, as a result of serious charges which came to my attention, some 
of which were pul)licly reported, I began intensive new inquiries into this whole 
matter. Last Sunday afternoon the Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General 
Petersen, and I met at length in the EOB to review the facts which had come to 
me in my investigation and also to review the progress of the Department of 
Justice investigation. 

Then he stated : 

As a result, on March 21, I personally assumed the responsibility for coordi- 
nating intensive new inquiries into the matter, and I personally ordered those 
conducting the investigation to get all tlie facts and to report them directly to me 
right here in this office. 

That was prior to the time that he assigned responsibility to you to 
conduct a further inquiry, which was on March 30, 1973, is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I thought that press conference, you said 
It was April 1<, is that not correct? That would have been after. 

Senator Montoya. Yes, but I am referring to the date of March 21, 
which you recited. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, yes, indeed. 

Senator Montoya. Now, up to that time, Mr. Dean had been talking 
to yoir^ other people m the White House had been talking to you, and 
there had been quite a few articles in the Washington Post by Mr. 
Woodward and Mr. Bernstein, and, in fact, most of the information 


about which you were inquiring with all these FBI people, had already 
appeared in the Washington Post. Now, did you read the Washington 
Post on or about that time ? 

Mr. Ehrlighman. What time, Senator ? 

Senator Montoya. During the coui-se of your different conferences 
with Mr. Dean, during the course of your different inquiries. Were you 
reading the Washington Post about what was being uncovered throu^ 
Woodward and Mr. Bernstein ? 

Mr. Ehrlighman. Well, I would not certainly want to leave the 
impression that the White House relied on the Washington Post for 
reliable information very much at the time. The fact is that our news 
summai-y contained digests of what a great number of newspapers 
were printing, both about the Watergate and other matters. 

Senator Montoya. But, as a matter of fact, they were uncovering 
more than all these FBI people were. 

Mr. Ehrlighman. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya. At least, there has been no information coming to 
us that was more accurate than what these reporters were uncovering 
at the time. 

Mr. Ehrlighman. Then, I think you are in trouble, Senator. 

'Senator Montoya. Well, I think the whole country is in trouble. 

Mr. Ehrlighman. I submit to you, sir, that the FBI reports, which 
we were receiving at that time, on the face of them and from every- 
thing w^e knew about it and from everything the Attorney General was 
telling us about it, and everything that the prosecuting attorneys were 
telling us, could be relied upon. 

Senator Montoya. All right. Now, let me ask you this question. You 
said that you conducted an inquiry pursuant to instructions from the 
President, instructions which you received on March 30. Now, who 
did you investigate, who did you interview, and with w^hat objective 
in mind were you conducting this inquiry ? 

Mr. Ehrlighman. I was, as I say, it was not really an investigation 
in the technical sense of the word, and I have declined to identify it as 
such at all times. But, as I said before, the people whom I interviewed 
included Paul O'Brien, Herbert Kalmbach, John Dean, Gordon Stra- 
chan, Charles Colson, John Mitchell, and Jeb Magruder. I had a tele- 
phone conversation with Mr. Gray, which may or may not be con- 
sidered to be included in that, and Mr. Krogh. 

Senator Montoya. Did you interview Mr. LaRue ? 

Mr. Ehrlighman. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Mardian ? 

Mr. Ehrlighman. No. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Ehrlighman. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Stans ? 

Mr. Ehrlighman. No. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Sloan ? 

Mr. Ehrlighman. No. 

Senator Montoya. In fact, you turned him out of your office, so to 

Mr. Ehrlighman. No, I do not believe that is quite fair. Senator. 
What I did was, I think what I should have done, which was to say to 


him "before you talk to somebody in my situation go and talk to a 
lawyer since you are the treasurer and you tell me you have got the 
legal liability for all this and you have not talked to a lawyer ; do go 
talk to a lawyer first." 

Senator Montoya. All right. Would you say that you conducted very 
intensive interviews with these people ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. As I said, Senator, I can't claim this to be an 
exhaustive investigation. I conducted, I think, reasonably thorough 
interviews. They lasted between an hour and 2 houi"S, most of them. 

Senator Montoya. Were they conducted in your office ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir? 

Senator Montoya. Were they conducted in your office ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not in every case. My principal concern was to 
try and get a feel whether anybody in the White House was involved 
in this. I felt that is the place I had to begin. So most of my questions 
were not directed to what people like Mr. Mardian or Mr. LaRue did 
at the committee. Occasionally people told me those things. But my 
principal focus was to say "AVhat do you know about the people in the 
White House ? Do you know about anybody else in the White House 
who might have been involved?" or if they were talking about an 
individual in the White House I would say "What else do you know 
about him that might in any way involve him in this?'' and that was 
my principal focus. But the other part of my job, other than just 
interviewing these few people, was to try and get on top of these very 
complex law questions which Mr. Dean had been working with and 
which I had not, and it took a great deal of my time, and I might say, 
this was the — one of the President's principal focuses at this time — 
was this dilemma of separation of powers, executive privilege, at- 
torney-client privilege, the whole legal underpinning of this process. 

Senator Montoya. If you will pardon me, Mr. Ehrlichman, you 
testified about that this morning and I don't want to appear repe- 
titious in my questioning and I don't want you to appear repetitious 
in your answers. I am merely interested in trying to ascertain from 
you what type of an inquiry. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator ]Montoya. Now, during the interviews which you had in 
your office, did you on occasion tape the conversations with these 
people ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. On two occasions. 

Senator Montoya. Which were those occasions ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder. 

Senator Montoya. AAHiere are those tapes ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In the possession of your staff. 

Senator Montoya. All ri^ht. 

Did you transcribe any interviews or arrange for their transcrip- 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In the sense of sitting down and dictating a sum- 
mary or anything of that kind ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. 'Wlio lias those interviews ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I think what I did was to turn over my 
handwritten notes to the committee staff. There is one such transcrip- 


tion of my interview with Mr. Kalmbach which I don't think that I 
have given to the committee staff ; I am not sure. 

Senator Moxtoya. Are you prepared to give it to us? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Oh, yes; certainly, certamly. 

Senator :Moxtoya. Would you do that? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. It may be that they have it. That question came 
up this morning and I don't think we decided for sure. 

Mr. Dash. We have a phone call transcription, not an interview. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Xo, no ; this is a narrative that I dictated after 
my interview with Mr. Kalmbach. 

Mr. Dash. No ; we do not have that transcript. 

Mr. WiLsox. Did I not give you, Mr. Dash— I think I gave to the 
U.S. attorney's oiEce less than a one-page memo of a meeting between 
Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Kalmbach on April 6, 1973 ? 

Mr. Dash. No; Mr. Wilson, I have no recollection of that. 

Mr. WiLSOX. We will supply it right now. 

Mr. Dash. You may have given it to the prosecutor's office. 

Mr. WiLSOX. Beg pardon ? , /» . i. 

Mr. Dash. You may have given it to the prosecutor's office but not 
to this committee. 

Mr. WiLSOx. I always meant to give you the same things, but per- 
haps I didn't do it. . 

Mr. Dash. I know you have tried, but if you have it, we would like 

to have it. 

Mr. Wn^sox-^. Sure. 

Senator MoxTOYA. ^^^o else did you take notes on ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Just those that I mentioned this morning. Sena- 
tor. Do you want me to go through that list again ? 

Senator Moxtoya. No; I don't. I merely want you to tell this com- 
mittee what did you ascertain as a result of these interviews with 
respect to each of the individuals. 

Did they convey to you any indication that they might have been 
involved in the Watergate affair prior to June 17 or in the coverup 
after June 17 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, sir. they did. 

Senator Moxtoya. All right. 

Will you name those names ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, sir. I wonder if I could refer to my notes 
in order to do that accurately ? 

Senator Moxtoya. Certainly you may. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax [conferring with counsel]. I had this morning 
described fully the contents of my interview with Mr. O'Brien, I be- 
lieve. And also my interview with Mr. Dean. The one which remains, 
which is responsive to your question, I think, is my interview with 
Mr. Magruder on April 14 at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. His attorneys, 
Mr. Sharp and Mr. Bierbower, were with him at the time of the inter- 
view and they had just come from an interview with the U.S. at- 
torney. The interview took about, I would guess about 11^ hours, 
and if you like. Senator, I can just take you quickly through the nar- 
rative of what Mr. Magruder told me or I can pick things out, if you 
are interested in something particularly. 

Senator Moxtoya. Just give me your conclusions from that inter- 

96-296 O - 73 - pt. 7 


JNIr. Ehrlichman. The conclusions from the interview were that 
Mr. Magruder and, according to him, Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. LaRue, 
participated in an express and specific approval of the plan to break 
into and bug the Democratic National Committee headquarters. That 
this was an agreement or an approval which occurred in Key Bis- 
cayne at a meeting attended by the three of them, and in addition to 
that particular project, McGovern headquartei^ and the Fontainebleu 
headquarters of the Democratic Convention were likewise to be 

Senator Montota. What date was this, again ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. This was an interview which I held on Aoril 14 
1973. ^ 

Senator Montoya. All right ; proceed. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That, and here you understand, this is what Mr. 
^lagruder is saying to me, I cannot vouch for the truth of this but it is 
what he reported to me. That the proposal which was approved at 
that time, had its genesis in a $1 million proposal which Mr. Dean 
and Mr. Liddy prepared. I asked him specifically about Mr. Dean 
because, as I say, I was focusing on Wliitc House people, and his de- 
scription of Mr. Dean's participation in that planning was quite active 
Mr. Liddy told Mr. Magruder, he said, that Mr. Dean had authorized 
the $1 million figure as the beginning budget level. 

Senator Moxtoya. Did you, from your knowledge of the White 
House and the assignment of Mr. Dean, reach a determination that 
Mr. Dean had that kind of authority ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, no, no, indeed. 

Senator IMontoya. You did not believe that, did you ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. What Mr. Magruder was telling me? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I did not know what to believe at this time, 
Senator. I was getting so many different hearsay stories from so many 
different people, I was not trying to evaluate what to believe and what 
not to believe. 

Senator Moxtoya. All right ; proceed. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. He said, he took me through the four meetings 
m early 1972. ^ 

Senator Moxtoya. I believe you testified to that and I do not want to 
go into repetition. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes ; this is out of Magruder's mouth, and then he 
said at some point m time he informed Mr. Strachan, who was his 
primary contact at the White House, that they had an intelligence 
capability. He said, "I got no problems from Mr. Strachan and so I 
read that as an OK from higher up." 

I asked him whether he had any knowledge of whether anyone 
higher up than Mr. Strachan in the mite House had in fact approved 
this, and he said he had no knowledge of any higher ups having done 
so, only— and the only peo])le in the ^Vliite House that he focused on as 
having any connection whatsoever with this were Mr. Colson Mr 
Strachan, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Howard. 

^•??T^*o^ Moxtoya. INIay I interject here. What particular authority 
did Mr. Strachan have vis-a-vis the White House ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Mr. Strachan was about a fourth-level White 
House staffer with almost no authority of his own. 


Senator Montoya. Well, what particular assignment did he have 
during the compaigii ? I understood that he was going from Mr. Halde- 
man's office to the CRP and back and forth. Did you know of this 
assignment ? 

JVIr. EiiRi.iCHMAx. No, sir. 

Senator INIontoya. Have you since found out about this assignment? 

Mr. Ehrliciiman. In the course of these hearings I have learned a 
great deal more than I ever learned when I was in the White House. 

Senator Montoya. You mean you did not find out while you were at 
the White House about IMr. Strachan's assignment? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I knew almost nothing about the scope of Mr. 
Strachan's assignment while he was in the White House until late, you 
know, in the ]\Iarch-April period, when I got into it and I began in- 
terviewing people and he was one of the people I interviewed. 

Senator ISIontoya. What did you find out about him ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. At that time ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

]\Ir. Ehrliciiman. That he was the liaison man between Mr. Halde- 
man and the Committee To Re-Ele«t for the purpose of keeping both 
ends of his liaison informed of the acts and desires of the other. 

■Senator Montoya. Did you know him ? 

IMr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator ]\Iontoya. Did you know him to be a very reliable young 

IVIr. Ehrlichman. Well, I did not know him well enough to form an 
opinion as to his reliability. 

Senator Montoya. If he conveyed anything to the OR.P or brought 
anything to J\Ir. Haldeman from the CRP, would you say that he was 
carrying out his assignment properly ? 

JNIr. Ehrlichman. I could not speculate as to that, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Why can't you ? 

iNIr. Ehrlichman. Well, I just do not have that kind of knowledge. 
Now, so far as reliability is concerned, something occurs to me that 
perhaps you ought to know. My first interview with Mr. Strachan was 
on the occasion of his having just returned from the grand jury, and 
he came in rather shaken and told me that he did not know what to do, 
and he was looking for somebody to give him some advice. He said that 
be had just come back from testifying to the grand jury that he had 
delivered $350,000 to Mr. LaRue, and he said : 

As soon as I left there I knew that was wrong. I had not delivered $350,000 to 
Mr. LaRue, I had delivered some lesser sum because I remember that they took 
some money out or I took some money out. 

I have forgotten how he put it, but some money had been taken out 
for advertising. "What should I do?" And I said, "Well, do you have 
an attorney," and he said, "No, I do not," and I said : 

That is the first thing I think you ought to do, is get some advice. The second 
thing, it seems to me, that you ought to do, subject to your attorney's advice, is 
to go and tell the prosecutor you think you have made a mistake in your testimony. 

But that is probably the only real gage I have of Mr. Strachan's 
testimonial reliability. 

Senator ISIontoya. Then, what did you find out about — ^what con- 
clusion did you reach with respect to Mr. Strachan as a result of the 
interviews that you had ? 


]Mr. Ehrlichman. '\^Tiat he told me in the second interview I had 
with him I felt was correct and the truth and that he was trying very 
hard to tell me everything he knew. I had a favorable impression of 
what he told me, that is, of the — of his attempt to tell the truth. 

Senator ]\Iontoya. The point I am tr\dng to make is, did you reach 
any conclusion from the interviews with respect to him as to whether 
or not he was involved either in the pre- June 17 complicity or after? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I see. He told me that he had received from the 
Committee To Re-Elecfc notice that they had an intelligence capability. 
He — ^and I confronted him with what Mr. ]\Iagruder had alleged which 
was that Mr. Magruder had sent over to him a budget which included 
specific reference to bugging and he said no he would have remembered 
if anything like that had come over. He was sure he had never seen 
anj'thing like that. He said that he did recciv^e from Mr. Magnider 
some material designated Sedan Chair, and it looked to him like syn- 
opses of wiretap information. Of course, we have learned since that 
Sedan Chair was not a wiretap but that was the only thing he said he 
received. He said he got no Gemstone material at all. 

Senator Montoya. INIr. Ehrlichman, I am just interested in what 
you concluded as a result of the interviews with respect to these in- 

]SIr. Ehrlichman. All right. ]My conclusion with regard to Mr. 
Strachan was that he was a messenger, that he was not an active plan- 
ner or executor of any plan but simply a conveyor back and forth. 

Senator Moxtoya. All right. Now what conclusion did you reach 
with respect to Mr. Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. ]My conclusion after talking with Mr. Kalmbach, 
as you will see in this memorandum that we have now given the staff, 
I take it, perhaps it is best if I simply read you a short portion of that 
as my then contemporaneous conclusion. That will probably be the best 
evidence. Do you have that, counsel ? 

Mr. Wilson. I gave them the only copy I had. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Do you want to read it? 

Senator Montoya. Let me, I am running out of time now. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. All right, very shortly. Senator 

Senator Montoya. I merely wanted to get an indication as to what 
kind of an inquiry you had conducted with respect to each individual. 

INIr. Ehrlichman. All right. My inquiry with him was as to his 
money-raising efforts and whether or not he knew, either directly or 
whether he knew circumstances surrounding his efforts which might 
have put him on notice that he was engaged in an effort to buy the 
silence of defendants and I was satisfied that he did not know. 

Senator jNIontoya. All right, what inquiry did you make about Mr. 
Kalmbach ? 

INIr. Ehrlichman. I interviewed Mr. Kalmbach. 

Senator Montoya. Just briefly, what inquiry did you — you inter- 
viewed him ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

iSenator Montoya. All right. And you taped his conversation? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. I made this memorandum afterward 
which I have given to the staff. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. In that I think 3'ou will see that it's niy conclusion 
that he acted in the best of faith thinking that he was simply engaged 
in raising money for the defense fund purposes that he has testified to. 

Senator Montoya. All right. Then how many intervie\ys did you 
conduct as a result of your being commissioned by the President to go 
into this? . . 

^h\ Ehrlichman. Well, let me refer to my list again. Ten. 

Senator Montoya. Ten ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. How long did it take you to conduct these 

interviews? » -i t? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I did this in the period between April 5 

and April 14. 

Senator Montoya. The President indicated that he had also 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Excuse me, I am sorry. Senator, April 15, I beg 
your pardon because I saw Mr. Strachan at 9 o'clock on Sunday 
morning the 15th. 

Senator ^Iontoya. All right. 

Now, what was this statement of the President all about when he 
stated that on March 21 as a result of serious charges "which came to 
my attention, some of which were publicly reported, I began intensive 
new inquiries into this whole matter." 

Wiat did he mean by that ? 

]Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, I think what he meant by that was the series 
of events starting :March 21 and culminating April 17 which would 
have been his conversation with INIr. Dean on the 21st; the McCord 
letter to Judge Sirica on what, the 23d or whatever it was; his sending 
Mr. Dean to Camp David to write out his statement ; Mr. Dean's return 
without the statement; his turning the investigation over, taking it 
from Mr. Dean, his turninor the inquiry over to me ; my efforts to talk 
to witnesses through this time ; the parallel efforts, and I don't mean 
to in any way diminish the efforts of the investigators in the Depart- 
ment of Justice and in the prosecutor's office who were doing an ex- 
traordinarilv effective job right at this time. 

You see, when I talked to :Mr. ^Magruder, for instance, he had already 
been to see the U.S. attorney and told him everything as a result of 
their efforts. So these were all parallel efforts going on and there was a 
lot of reporting. The President had his meeting with the Attorney 
General and Mr. Petersen on that Sunday, and they compared notes 
as to all of these investigations, and theii this all came to a head on 
that following Tuesday. 

Senator ^Montoya. Would you then say that up until ^larch you were 
convinced, and the President was convinced in the Wiite House that 
there was no White House involvement ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISIoxtoya. You were convinced up to that time? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, sir, and I was saying that all across the 
country because I believed it. 

Senator Moxtoya. And you kept saying this to the President on the 
basis of information which you were receiving from Mr. Dean and 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. In the best of faith, yes, sir. 


Senator Montoya. All right. 

Then why on January 3 were you so concerned that Mr. Hunt miffht 
blackmail the White House ? ^ 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Why was I so concerned ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr Ehrlichman Well, any time that somebody levels a blackmail 
threat against— well, excuse me, that happened March 20, that did 
not happen eJanuary 3. 

Hunt" ktter^?^'''™^^' "^'"^'"'^ ^"""^ ""^^ ""'' January 3 with respect to the 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, but that was not blackmail. 
Senator Montoya. Well he was asking for help. 

kne^' ?"^^^^^^^^* ^^^' ^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^* making any threats that I 
Senator Montoya. Well, I believe the testimony which has been ad- 
th«?tr P "plicated that Mr. Hunt was getting kind of nervous, 
«^at Mr Parkinson imparted this infonnation which he received from 
t^';i. iVn'^f %^^''' ^^'^f'f^ and Mr. Mitchell, in turn, imparted it 
:!. ?T ?J^ ■^^T'V,''^ ^^'^'^ ^^^'^ conference was convoked where 
letter "' "^^ Colson, and others were present about the Hunt 

Mr. Ehrlichman I am sorry, Senator, I don't think that is the way 
that meeting came about. ^ 

Senator Montoya. All right, tell me how it came about, 
n wf;. f^ M^'^'^'^'f ""• ^^y^inderstanding is tliat Mr. Hunt had written 
a letter to Mr. Colson, and I recall seeing the letter, and that that plus 
a telephone call from either Mr. Hunt or Mr. Bittman, and I don't 

Tw ' m"'^'^ '° i^;"u ^^^^'T'^ ««^^^' P^-ecipitated the meeting 
Senator Montoya. Why would you 


Senator Ervin. You may proceed. Senator Montoya. 
aiT^Z.^lTT"'^- ^!r Ehrlichman, I believe the last question I 
asked yon was why was there so much concern around the White House 

vo^l at w'^ IZ^^^^' ^r' r '^"^^^^^ ' ^^ -i^- -f the fLt ?ha 

l7JTw^tft^^ ^^'^^ ^P ^ *^^* *™^ y«^^ ^^^« ^" convinced there 
was no \\ hite House involvement 

aueSion^'^Pw''^ t' ^'1^' '^ ^ '^?^^ ^^ *^k^ *h« assumption of your 
ml pWn^f ? '/ '^''* agree there was so much concern about the 
White House for clemency for :\Ir. Hunt. The fact is 

Senator Montoya. Why did you have this conference ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. We had the conference because Mr. Colson had 

?J'7 ?' ^-'^/"^Ti;^ f °"t ^^'' Hunt, and his melancholia, and iS 
frame of mind, and his letter which said that Mr. Colson, in effect had 
abandoned his friend and Mr. Colson was moved by this ' 

It was the occasion for discussing what kind of a contact Mr Colson 
might make with Mr. Hunt to reassure him on a personal basis The 

resS^to W llr^ 7' ?''~^''- ^^^^^"'^ ^^-'^^ desire to make a 
lesponse to that etter which was a very compelling letter I believe 
It IS m your exhibits. So that is how the meeting originated 
the ^ontP^^? M^'^^ Well, Mr. Colson testified afi^ut this meeting in 
the context of Mr. Hunt bemg very concerned and that he might blow 


the lid off and indicate something which would be unsavory to the 
White House ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Colson said that ? • i • 

Senator Montoya. I believe he did or someone else m the testimony 
of these hearings. .ox 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Colson hasn't been here yet, benator, you 
must mean someone else. 

Senator Montoya. I don't mean Mr. Colson, Mr. Magruder. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Magruder wasn't there. 
Senator Montoya. All right. ^ . ■, ^ ^ ^u 

There was talk about clemency for some of the defendants at the 
"White House, was there not ? . 

Mr. Ehrlichman. At that meeting there was talk about it and the 
talk was that under no circumstances should it be offered nor should 
it even be discussed. . iir /-. i o 

Senator Montoya. Did ^ou conmiunicate this to Mr. Colson « 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. i^ u i j 

Senator Montoya. Were you aware that Mr. Caultield had com- 
municated an offer of clemency to Mr. McCord ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. At that time ? 

Senator Montoya. No, I believe that was right after January 3. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, you mean at some other time did I become 
aware of it. 

Senator Montoya. Yes. . 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I heard of it quite a long time after it happened, 
yes, sir, and I heard of it during my inquiry, during the interviews of 
some of these people. 

Senator Montoya. Did Mr. Caulfield ever communicate to you that 
pursuant to word from Mr. Dean he had communicated an offer of 
clemency to Mr. McC^rd ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Xo, sir. 

Senator Montoya. I will go to another matter. I believe you have 
testified here that when the President authorized an investigation of 
the Ellsberg matter that he talked to Mr. Krogh and that in that dis- 
cussion there was no contemplation that a burglary should be 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It was never discussed. 

Senator Montoya. All right. And I believe you also stated that you 

were unaware that Mr. Krogh or anyone else had given the authority, 

but your testimony was that you assumed that Mr. Krogh had given 

permission to go into the Ellsberg psychiatrist's office. You assumed. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 

Now, let us go into the statute which is 18 U.S.C. 2511, subparagraph 
3. I believe that you and your attorney have tried to justify this as a 
legal venture and not a burglary because of this subparagraph 3, which 
gives to the President implied lowers over the security of our Nation. 
Now, if this particular thing or provision contemplates that the 
President take such measures in order for them to be valid, if your 
interpretation is correct, the President did not take any measure to 
give authority, Mr. Krogh, as you have testified, you just assumed he 
had authority, but you are not sure that he did and, therefore, there 
was no authority imparted from the only person that could give that 


authority for the commission of this biirglai^ and, therefore, wouldn't 
you say that it was not a legal venture in promotion of the internal 
security of this country ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, Senator, my assumption was not with re- 
gard to whether Mr. Krogh had authority. My assumption was with 
regard to whether he had authorized the act by Mr. Hunt and Mr. 

Senator Montoya. How could he authorize it if the President had 
not contemplated it when he gave the original charter for this in- 
vestigation to jNIr. Krogh ? 

JNIr. Ehrlichmak. Well, I suppose it is the difference between a gen- 
eral agency and what we used to call a special agency in law school. 

Senator Montoya. But wouldn't you say that in view of the provi- 
sion upon which you are relying that specific authoritv from the only 
one who could give it— namely, the President of the United States- 
was necessary in order to make it valid ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No ; I would think that since we are talking with 
a constitutional rather than a statutory power, that a general delega- 
tion of capacity to Mr. Krogh would"^ be required rather than some 
specific authorization of some specific act. 

Senator ;Montoya. But there is not a statutory power. This is a re- 
cital of a reservoir of constitutional power in the President. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is what I just said. Senator. 

Senator Montoya. So, in view of the fact that there was no specific 
authority — I will ask you this question again — ^by the President, and 
in view of the fact that you are not sure whether Mr. Krogh had any 
authority to do so, and he certainly did not under the wording of this, 
would you say that that burglary was legal ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, again, you are misstating what 'I under- 
stand about ^Ir. Krogh's authority. The thing that I say 'I had to as- 
sume was what passed between Mr. Krogh and Messrs. Hunt and 
Liddy, because I do not know. I do know what pa^ed between the 
President and Mr. Krogh and that was a delegation of very general 
authority on this subject, and, in my opinion, that delegation of au- 
thority was very broad, and very deep. 

Senator Montoya. All right. Now, I might say to you Mr. Ehrlich- 
man, that your testimony has been contradicted by many of the wit- 
nesses who have appeared heretofore, and I believe that this commit- 
tee has the task of judging your testimony against the testimony of 
others with respect to other matters of substance, and these other 
people are INIr. Dean, Mr. jNIitchell, Mr. INIagruder, Mr. Strachan, Mr. 
LaRue, Mr. Kalmbach, and Mr. Sloan. 1 believe you have indicated in 
your testimony something contradictory of theirs in one manner or 
another, in one detail or another, and it is the duty of this committee 
to judge your testimony against this background and against all these 
threads of testimony offered by these individuals. 

That is all I have to sav Mr. Chaii-man. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I would not want your remarks to go 
uncontradicted, Mr., or Senator Montoya. I am not aware of conflicts 
between my testimony and some of those that you read, No. 1. No. 2, 1 
understand the function of the committee to be legislative rather than 
adjudicatory. So I don't think that you are necessarily in the business 


of making findings of fact as to the testimony of specific witnesses. 
But passing that for the moment, it seems to me that whether there 
are conflicts in the evidence is not nearly as important as to whether or 
not conflicts in the evidence are supported, one side or the other, by cor- 
roborating independent evidence on material points, and I hope that 
you will find it possible, and the other members of the committee will 
find it possible, to examine the various extrinsic pieces of evidence such 
as the letter from the CIA to the FBI and things of that kind, to 
determine which of conflicting testimony is entitled to the greater 

Senator Montoya. I am sure that we will do that. I personally will, 
I can assure you, Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. I will weigh the weight of the testimony, and I 
will also give consideration to any documentary evidence that you pre- 
sent here and certainly I think all the members will. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Good, thank you. 

Senator Ervin. I think one of the prime functions of this committee, 
outside of making recommendations for legislation, is to find the facts 
and what the facts are — whether the testimony is from witnesses or 
from documents. Senator Weicker. 

Mr. Wilson. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, may the notes of the meet- 
ing of April 6 which I passed to the Chair be included in the record at 
this point? 

Senator ER\^N. Yes; the reporter will mark it as an exhibit and 
admit it as such. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 100.*] 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, sir. Excuse me Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I think a bell has just rung for a 
vote and this might be the proper time to recess. 

Senator Ervin. We will recess and hurry back as fast as we can. 


Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker, you may examine the witness. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Ehrlichman, I am going to refer to your 
opening statement before the committee and specifically on page 11 of 
that opening statement, and in the bottom of paragraph you state: 

The counsel has always had political duties. The President is the Nation's 
Chief Executive but he is also by longstanding tradition his political party's 
leader. Any President has a political role to play whether he is going to run 
for re-election or not. But if he is a candidate then he is both an executive and 
a practicing politician. Every such politician wants information, and the Presi- 
dent, in his politician role, is no different from the others. He needs and wants 
information about issues, supporters, opponents, and every other political sub- 
ject known to man. For the year 1969 to 1970 when I left the post of counsel, 
I attempted to gather purely political information for the President as I was 
expected to do, out of real concern for reciprocity, attempted to use only con- 
ventional nongovernmental sources of information ; as one might hire political 
aides in a political campaign. Tony Ulasewiez was hired to do this chore of in- 
formation-gathering. He was paid from existing Nixon political money by check 
under an appropriate employer's tax number. Among other assignments he ex- 
ecuted potential opposition for vulnerability. So far as I am aware, in my tenure 
as counsel, Mr. Ulasewiez conducted his assignments legally and properly in all 

♦See p. 2947. 


I would like to read to you from testimony given by Mr. Ulasewicz 
to this CM>mmittee. 

Senator Weicker. Now, I would like to, if I could, try to get into the general 
nature of the investigations, the other investigations which you conducted. Is 
it a fact that these investigations or some of these investigations were back- 
ground checks on individuals intended to develop questionatole facets of the per- 
sonal lives of these individuals ? 

Mr. Ulasewicz. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Weickeb. Now, when we are talking about questionable facets, would 
this include sexual habits? 

Mr. Ulasewicz. These were allegations and that might be included in the 
category, I guess. 

Senator Weickeb. That would be included in the category. Drinking habits? 

Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weickeb. Domestic problems ? 

Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weickeb. Personal social activities? 

Mr. Ulasewicz. Yes, sir. 

And then finally, in concluding his testimony whereby he character- 
izes his information-gathering, I will continue to read: 

Senator Weicker. I repeat my question, how would you categorize the informa- 
tion you turned over to Mr. Caulfleld ? 

Mr. Ulasewicz. I would say 

Senator Weickeb. Was it of a national security nature? 

Mr. Ulasewicz. No, sir. 

Senator Weickeb. Was it of a domestic security nature? 

Mr. Ulasewicz. No, sir. 

Senator Weickeb. Dirt? 

Mr. Ulasewicz. No, it would be of a political nature. 

Senator Weickeb. Political dirt? 

Mr. Ulasewicz. All right, sir. 

Now, since in your opening statement you indicated that you were 
the one who was responsible when you were counsel to the President in 
turning over political information or information of issues, supporters 
of opponents or any other, and since you are the one who hired Mr. 
Ulasewicz, I wonder if you might not comment to this committee as to 
the information which you turned over to the President and again on 
the characterization that Mr. ITlasewicz gave his own job. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not know what period Mr. Ulasewicz was 
referring to in your, in response to your question. Senator, I can only 
speak for about 6 or 7 months that his tenure and mine overlapped. I 
think that the investigations which he did at the time that I was coun- 
sel in 1969 and the fii-st month or two of 1970, perhaps, did not in any 
way relate to the political campaign of 1972. So, I do not know whether 
this IS in the scope of your inquiry or not. But just generally 

Senator Weicker. I think it is A-ery much in the scope of ithe inquiry 
on the election campaign of 1972 and, I believe, if I am not mistaken, 
this covers the period after the 1968 election up until the 1972 election. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, in any event, the one principal investigation 
that I recall which Mr. Ulasewicz reported to me on, and I am sorry 
that I do not have — I do not think there were very many major ones 
of a political nature, my understanding of what he did had to do with 
Black Panthers and other violent group intelligence, and that is the 
other thing that stands out in my recollection. But Mr. Ulasewicz was 
sent to Edgartown to keep track of the development of the Chappa- 
quiddick story and it slips my mind as to just what the date of that was 


but I do recall his keei^ing us informed on a regular basis of develop- 
ments as tliey became available there. 

ISenator Weicker. And so you transmitted this information to the 
President 'i 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In smnmary form. He produced almost nothing 
that was not a matter of newspaper reportmg, as it turned out. !So 
there was very little to, there was \ery little to pass on that would have 
been of any moment that you could not have read in an ordmary 

Senator Weicker. Well, of course, Mr. Ulasewicz testified that part 
of the information which he received was a matter of public record, 
other information that he received was a matter of, was received or 
gotten in an investigatory way. But why did you feel the necessity to 
have somebody like Mr. Ulasewicz investigate the Black Panthers 'i 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh 

Senator Weicker. Is there some reason why possibly the law 
enforcement army, is this another area that J. Edgar Hoover was weak 

on ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; he had his comiections with the New York 
Police Department at one point in time, had been in intelligence in- 
volving violent groups of that kind, and he had sources, particularly 
in the New York Police Department Intelligence Division, and so he 
would be the recipient of information because of that former associa- 

Senator Weicker. Well, I know, but that still is not a satisfactory 
answer. Was there some inadequacy on the part of normal 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I previously 

Senator Weicker [continuing]. Normal law enforcement agencies? 

']SIr. Ehrlichman. Right. I previously testified, I think, Senator, we 
were not getting an accumulation of intelligence from the police and 
the sheritt's offices and the State police of various municipal and State 
organizations. It was some time — I think it was probably the second 
year or possibly into the third year before there was set up in the 
Justice Department a facility for accumulating all of this. Mr. Ulase- 
wicz, in the sixth or seventh month that he worked in the counsel's 
office when I was counsel, did a kind of makeshift job of getting some 
of this information and feeding it in. 

Senator Weicker. So in fact during this period of time we all slept 
better at night knowing Mr. Ulasewicz was on the job, is that right? 

jSIr. Ehrlichman. Well, I don't know about that, Senator. 

Senator Weicker. I am going to pui-sue this for a minute because,, 
let's get into the hiring of Mr. Ulasewicz. Was he brought down to 
the White House and interviewed for a job by the personnel at the 
White House ? Just how was he hired ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No ; he was hired because he was well known to 
Mr. Caulfield. Mr. Caulfield recommended him highly, and he was 
hired by me after a very brief meeting but principally on Mr. Caul- 
field's say-so and recommendation. 

Senator Weicker. Well, but where did you hire him ? 

JNIr. Ehrlichman. Where did I hire him ? 

Senator Weicker. Right. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I met him in an airport while I was on a 
trip to New York, as I recall, and Mr. Caulfield, as I recall it, arranged 
a meeting for us. I hired him, I guess, in the White House, that is I 
made the decision and authorized Mr. Caulfield and made the arrange- 
ments with Mr, Kalmbach to pay him. 

Senator Weicker. In your first meeting with him, was it in the VIP 
lounge in LaGuardia Airport ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. That was the only meeting with him I ever had. 
Senator Weicker. That was the only meeting ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. So that this is some new situation whereby we are 
going to meet potential White House employees in the lounges of air- 
ports or what ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. As I tried to say in my opening statement he was 
not a "Wliite House employee. 
Senator Weicker. I see. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. And he was never held out to be and as a matter 
of fact, the very point of having him was that we were not gathering 
political infonnation with Government people. I didn't feel that we 
ought to have Government people in that business. That we ought to 
have a fellow who is established on the outside, who was paid on the 
outside, and you have this anomaly of having to conduct some political 
activity, both of a fundraising and of a staff and of an investigatory 
nature, and you do it with political funds, and they have to be outside 

Senator Weicker. Well, isn't it true, and certainly neither one of us 
is in the position of being a novice here politically, that the reason why 
you would want him on an outside jmyroll is that you would not want 
to claim him if he were found out. Would that be a fair description ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I don't think the way it was set up there 
would be any way to disclaim him. Senator. Because he was being paid 
very directly from Nixon campaign funds in the hands of a trustee 
committee, and there just was no way to disclaim him. Everybody 
would be able to find out Mr. Ulasewicz' employer through just the 
employer number, if nothing else. 

Senator Weicker. Well, I will tell you maybe everybody found out. 
Maybe everybody knew but we had to do an awfiil lot of digging 
around here to find out who Mr. Ulasewicz was and what role he had 
to go ahead and play. 

I would like to have your concept and I think this is very important ; 
now we are questioning into the real events of the real business of this 
committee, what's your concept of political information. You see, un- 
fortunately, thanks to the Committee To Re-Elect the President, and 
some of the witnesses who have appeared here, everybody thinks that 
the Senators at this table and others engaged in politics go running 
around hiring Ulasewicz' types to dig up dirt on each other, and I just 
can't allow that to fly without contesting it because really it's going 
to make elections rather interesting in the future if it does. 

I wonder if you might, since you were the one who was responsible 
for hiring this man, and since we have had a description by this man 
of exactly what his job consisted of, which was dirt, I wonder if you 
might tell the committee what your concept is of politics here in the 
United States insofar as this type of activity is concerned ? 


IMr. Ehrltchman. Well, I think that certainly there is rooni for 
improvement in the practice of politics in this country, there is no 
arfjument about that. But, at the same time, I think that each candi- 
date who contests the candidacy of an incumbent has the obligation 
to come forward and contest the fitness of that incumbent for office 
both in terms of his voting record and in terms of his probity, and 
in terms of his morals, if you please, and any otlier facts that are im- 
portant or germane to the Voters of his district or State or the country, 
for that matter. I think a candidate for office assumes that burden 
of proof. He assumes the burden of proof of showing the unfitness 
of the incumbent and I don't think in our political system that is 
limited to his voting record or his absenteeism. If it were, we would 
countenance the perpetuation of scoundrels in office who were thieves 
or who were fraudulent or who were profligate or who were otherwise 
unfit for office, so I think it's perfectly competent for a challenger to 
meet head-on the issue of the fitness of an incumbent. 

Senator Weicker. Do you mean to tell nie and this committee that 
you consider private investigators going into sexual habits, drink- 
ing habits, domestic problems, and personal social activities as a proper 
subject for investigation during the course of a political campaign? 
Mr. Ehrltchman. Senator, I know of my own knowledge of incum- 
bents in office who are not discharging their obligation to their con- 
stituents because of their drinking habits, and it distresses me very 
much, and there is a kind of an unwritten law in the media that that 
is not discussed, and so the constituents at home have no way of know- 
ing that you can go over here in the gallery and watch a Member 
t-otter onto the floor in a condition which, of at least partial inebria- 
tion which would preclude him from making any sort of a sober judg- 
ment on the issues that confront this country. 

Now, I think that is important for the American people to know, 
and if the only way that it can be brought out is through his opponents 
in a political campaign, then I think that opponent has an affirmative 
obligation to bring that forward. 

Senator Weicker. Now, this is getting very interesting. [Laughter.] 
Again we contrasted similar situations yesterday and again I am 
just not going to let these things get laid on the table without giving 
another side to the argument. 

I have had eight election campaigns, 8 years, 6 against Democrats 
and 2 against Republicans, I suppose it would be considered self- 
serving to say that I have never done anything like that, so I won't. I 
will refer to 'my opponents. I know of no Democratic opponents out 
of the six and no Republican opponents out of the two that has ever 
done what Mr. Ulasewicz was doing or what you are, in effect advo- 
cating here. 

Now it seems to me it is up to the constituency, whatever that con- 
stituency happens to be, to make a determination of the fitness of the 
man or woman that they go ahead and elect, but do you really want 
to bring the political system of the United States, of our campaigns 
down to the level of what you are talking about right now ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I conceive of it this way. Senator. I know 
that in your situation your life style is undoubtedly impeccable and 
there wouldn't be anything at issue like that. 
Senator AVeicker. I'm no angel. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. I thought you were. 

Senator Weicker. Believe me, I am not. I worry about you seeking 
people on the landscape here and I have a greater worry now before 
you here, and I will put it that way. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think you will agree with me, Senator, that 
someone with a serious drinking habit is of doubtful fitness for the 
kmd of heavy duty that you bear, for instance, or that any Senator 
bears in the Senate of the United States. That is certainly a material 
question that has to be raised in a political campaign, at least so it seems 
to me. 

Now, if that is not something that the incumbent's opponent should 
bring out, then you are leaving the constituency to the tender mercy 
of the journalists in the community as to whether or not that is re- 
ported to the constituency because they don't have any way of know- 
ing really, especially the constituencies remote from here where people 
get here very seldom to make an observation. So, I would be very 
concerned about that and it seems to me that Avould be a very legiti- 
mate subject of inquiry. Maybe my standards are all haywire and 
everybody in the Congress ought to be immune from scrutinv on that 
subject, but that just seems to me to be an indefensible position on 
your part. 

Senator Weicker. You think we have no scrutiny around here ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir? 

Senator Weicker. You think we have no scrutiny around here? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, in all candor 

Senator Weicker. I mean I have got news, let's count them, they 
are all over here at this stage of the game and they are all the time 
not just to hear you and I talk. If there is anything that is quite 
obvious in Washington, D.C., it is that every aspect of our lives, legis- 
latively, personally, and in every way, is subject to the scnitiny of a 
free press and subject to the scrutiny, at least the Congress is subject 
to the scrutiny of a free press. [Laughter.] 

And also, subject to the scrutiny of our constituency. 

Senator Baker. Our wives. 

Senator Weicker. And our wives, right. [Laughter.] 

I want to state right now, and I, obviously you and I, are at logger- 
heads on a very basic issue here and one that* I think not only relates 
to Mr. LTlasewicz' activities, and I am not so sure we don't come right 
back to the break-in in Daniel Ellsberg's oiRce again, that I am quite 
satisfied that our systems, our institutions, are perfectly capable of 
passing decent judgments, fair judgments, hard judgments, on politi- 
cal figures, public officials, without the covert operations of men like 
Mr. LTlasewicz. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, I would only disagree with you by say- 
ing this much : I think that your assumptions with regard to the full 
reportage by the media of the personal conduct of people in public 
life gilds the lily unduly. Certainly you members of this committee 
are being subject to, subjected to scrutiny by the television and by the 
writing press to a degree and your conduct is being evaluated and 
measured in a way that seldom happens to a Member of the U.S. Senate 
or the Congress of the United States, and I think it is possible for some 
IMembers to exist under a, in a sheltered situation for years and years 


and years here, and perpetuate themselves in office, so to speak, because 
you know and I know tliat the advantag^es are heavily in favor of the 
incumbent. You are in a position to favor reporters with stories and 
so on. It is an uphill struggle for someone to take on an incumbent 
U.S. Senator under any circumstances, and the press are not always as 
tough on others as they might be on the members of this committee in 
this setting. 

So, I think you and I have a difference of opinion but I think that 
reasonable minds can differ on this subject particularly in the area of 
drinking, in the area of fitness of that kind to discharge the duties. 

Now, certainly there are limits, and I would be the first to agree with 
you, that there are areas where, of subject matters that would be totally 
offensive to me as they would be to you. and I don't mean for a minute 
to contend for mattei"S beyond those limits. 

But I do think that that is one of the things that this whole pro- 
ceeding is about, I think it's an attempt to try to define the lines within 
which an inquiry as to an incumbent, his life, his performance, his 
voting record, are subject to proper inquiry. 

Senator Weicker. I know, but if this is a matter of proper inquiry 
in the course of an election campaign, 1 mean why isn't it a proper, why 
isn't it proper inquiry as far as all Members of Congress are concerned 
insofar as the relationships between the executive branch and the 
legislative branch. "N^Hiy not ? Is this material, in other words, going to 
be used between the executive and legislative branches of the Govern- 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't think I understand. 

Senator Weicker. Well, you apparently consider it proper informa- 
tion to figure out to go ahead and win an election. 

Is it proper information to dig out to go ahead and carry an issue ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You mean blackmail, no. 

Senator Weicker. I mean as between the executive and legislative 
branches of the Government. 

]Mr. Ehrlichman. In other words, you have a piece of information 
and you have a Congressman and j'ou say Congressman 

Senator Weicker. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, it is not proper. 

Senator Weicker. In an election campaign? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think it is proper to provide legitimate facts to 
an electorate that bear on the fitness of an incumbent. 

Senator Weicker. Of course, what you are saying and where we 
disagree and I want to make this clear, Mr. Chairman, if any other 
member of the committee wants to comment now I don't think any- 
body realizes what is being done here right now. You definitely have 
two different concepts of politics in this country^ meeting head on. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I might say. Senator 

Senator Weicker. Let me finish and then I will be glad to go ahead 
and listen to you. 

yir. Ehrlichman. Pardon me, surely. 

Senator Weicker. I always thought we settled these matters on 
the basis of issues, on what you stood for, on a public stance that your 
opponents took that was a bad stance, how you can present yours, how 
you move around in a campaign, but to sit here at this moment in 


time and tell me that we are goin^- to settle our elections on the basis 
of sexual habits and drinking habits and domestic j^roblems and per- 
sonal and social activities. 

Well, I tell you, you stick to your version and I am going to stick 
to mine. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, I was going to say in what we have 
asked the FBI to do, to determine the fitness of an individual for 
appointment to the executive branch to the Cabinet, the sub-Cabinet, 
to the agency positions and so on, these kinds of questions of fitness, 
drinking habits, habitual intoxication, immorality, are all considered 
to be important questions to ask and to settle upon, and the review, 
as far as I know in the selection of people in this administration has 
been very rigorous and the standards have been very high. 

Senator Weicker. No. 1, please don't put the FBI in the same cate- 
gory as Mr. lllasewicz. Now, I just don't think it is a fair comparison 
at all. I think these are two entirely different entities. I am proud 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. The subjects are the same, Senator. 

Senator Weicker. I might add you keep on talking about the enor- 
mous advantages an incumbent enjoys. iSIay I point out according to 
your theory the President was the incumbent. He was the incumbent. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Please don't misunderstand me, I think an incum.- 
bent President has an enormous advantage. 

Senator Weicker. Yes, but this one not only had an enormous 
advantage but apparently you went around and had this type of infor- 
mation handed to him which added to the advantage that he had. 
I would say made him rather unbeatable. 

Well, in any event let's leave that subject for the time being, 
although I find it unbelievable. 

Yesterday, in response to a series of questions concerning the need 
for the Plumbers you stated as follows : 

And I assure you that the decision that was made in this matter to put investi- 
gators in the field was taken most reluctantly and for genuine purposes and the 
purposes are simply to supplement what was considered to be an inadequate 
effort at the time by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Now, in order to satisfy yourself on this you ought to hear from Mr. Mitchell. 

That was your response, you will find that incidentally, counselor, 
if you have the transcript, on page 5535 of yesterday's testimony. 

Now, in order for you to satisfy yourself on this you ought to hear from Mr. 

We have already heard from Mr. INIitchell and he testified before this 
committee that the first that he had heard of the White House horrors, 
the Plumbers operation, was on June 21. 1972. This was after he left as 
Attorney General. Is Mr. Mitchell lying? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. As I said in my testimony the other day. Senator, 
Mr. Mitchell's recollection here is evidently hazy because the President 
authorized the creation of this unit on July 24, and asked that we meet 
with several members of the Cabinet. 

Senator Weicker. July 24, 1971 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. To meet with several members of the 
Cabinet whose departments would be the subject of the special unit's 
stimulation, so to speak, to get them to perform better in this area of 


leaks. On July 28 we had that meeting with Mr. INIitchell, at which 
Mr. Young, Mr. Krogh, and I briefed Mr. Mitchell on the President's 
desires, on the purpose of the special unit and what it would be doing. 

Senator Weicker. On what date was this ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. July 28. 

Senator Weicker. 1971 ? 

Mr. Ehrliciimax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. So, when ]Slr. Mitchell said that the first he 
learned of the White House horrors wjis on June 21, there has been 
some debate it might be June 20, 1972, that was inaccurate, is that 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Well, that answers that. 

Now, I am going to follow through some dates and times with you, 
Mr. Ehrlichman. On June 20 or 21, 1972, Mr. Mitchell, according to 
his testimony, learned for the first time, which you have just indicated 
was not true but I will follow through, according to his testimony, 
learned for the first time of the Ellsberg bi-eak-in and other activities 
of the Plumbers, which he called the White House horrors, and Mr, 
Mitchell was shocked by these revelations and feared the disclosure of 
these events might cost the President the election. That is what he 
testified to in front of this committee. 

Xow, the next day, June 22, 1972, at your office — ^I beg your pardon, 
the next day INIr. Mitchell met with you at your office at 11 :45 a.m. 
Do you have that on your log? 

jNIr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Which meeting followed a group meeting he had 
attended with you at 9 o'clock. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is right. 

Senator Weicker. And which meeting followed a phone call between 
you and Mr. Mitchell at 11 :20 a.m. That is on Mr. Mitchell's, according 
to Mr. Mitchell's logs. Phone call, in other words, he met with you 
at 9 a.m. or it was at a group meeting with you at 9 o'clock on the 
22d in the morning, ISIr. Mitchell's logs show he had a phone con- 
versation with you at 11 :20 on June 22, and then at 11 :45, he meets 
with you. 

Now, what did you and Mr. Mitchell discuss at your 11 :45 a.m. 
meeting that you could not discuss either at 9 o'clock when you met 
with the group or at 11 :20 a.m. on the phone? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not know. Senator. Does his log show 
whether he originated that phone call or I did, because I cannot re- 
construct that meeting. I just do not know what that meeting was 

Senator Weicker. You mean the 11:45 a.m. meeting? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. No; I do not know. 

]Mr. Ehrlichman. It would depend, and it would help me to recon- 
struct to know whether I had placed it, in which case probafbly the 
President had asked me to refer something to him or whether he had 
placed it but, I just draw a blank on it, I am sorry to say. 

Senator Weicker. Do you think there is any possibility, consider- 
ing the fact that ^Ir. INIitchell had received the report from Messrs. 

96-296 O - 73 - pt. 7 


LaRiie and Mardian, either the day before or 2 days before, depend- 
ing on which ^^ersion you want, that he specifically discussed with 
you this problem, this problem of the break-in, the ^Vhite House 
horrors, and his fear as to what it would do in the election? 

ISIr. Ehrltchman. I would su^g^est that it had not happened that 
way, for this reason. I suspect that this meeting; was convened for 
the reason contained in the phone call, whatever that was, and I am 
sorry to say I do not know what it was, but had it been something 
that was in his mind in the morning when we all got together at 
9 :30 or 10 he most likely would have stayed back, as sometimes 
happened with some of those people in the meeting. From time to time 
Clark MacGregor, for instance, would stay back after everybody else 
left and he would talk about something that he had on his mind. I 
am really surmising there. I just do not know. I can tell you this, that 
at no time did INIr. Mitchell express to me his concerns which he 
described here to the committee about the so-called horrors. 

Senator Weicker. At no time? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I do not recall his ever doing so. 

Senator Weicker. All right. 

On the same dav, according to Mr. Gray's statement to this com- 
mittee, in General Walters' memo of June 28, 1972, Mr. Gray routinely 
inquired into the possible CIA involvement in the Watergate case 
and was told bv Director Helms that there was no involvement. 

The next dav, on June 23, you and Mr. Haldeman called Mr. Helms 
and General Walters to a meeting in your office, which meeting Gen- 
eral Walters characterized as follows. And T think it important to read 
this memorandum. This is General Walters' June 28, 1972: 

Memorandiira for the record : 

On June 23 at 1300 on request I called with Director Helms on .Tohn Ehrlich- 
man and Robert Haldeman in Ehrlichman's office in the White House. 

Haldeman said that the "bussing" affair at the Democratic National Com- 
mittee headquarters at the Watergate apartments had made a lot of noise and 
the Democrats were trying to maximize it. The FBI had been called in and was 
investigating the matter. The investigation was leading to a lot of important 
people and this could get worse. He asked what the connection with the Agency 
and the Director repeated that there was none. Haldeman said that the whole 
affair was getting embarrassing and it was the President's wish that Walters 
call on Acting FBI Director Patrick Gray and suggest to him that since the 
five suspects had been arrested that this should be sufficient and that it was not 
advantageous to have the inquiry pushed, especially in Mexico, et cetera. 

May I stop here for one second? The reason for mv reading this 
memorandum is that obviously, there are four participants in this 
meeting and I want each one to have a chance to go ahead and com- 
ment on it, even though all of it does not apply to you there, you are 
one of the participants at this meeting. 

Director Helms said that he had talked to Gray on the previous day and had 
made plain to him that the Agency was not behind this matter, that it was not 
connected with it and none of the suspects was working for, nor had worked for 
the Agency in the last 2 years. He had told Gray that none of his investigations 
was touching anv covert projects of the Agency, current or ongoing. 

Haldeman then stated that I could tell Gray that I had talked to the T\Tiite 
House and suggest that the investieation not be pu.shed further. Gray would 
be receptive as he was looking for guidance in the matter. 

The Director repeated that the Agency was unconnected with the matter. I then 
agreed to talk to Gray as directed. Ehrlichman implied — 



It looks like "I should" — I don't want to say anything incorrect 

I should do this soon — 

I will get a clean copy — 

and I said I would try to do it today. 

Upon leaving the White House I discussed the matter briefly with the Director. 
On returning to the office I called Gray, indicated that this was a matter of some 
urgency, and he agreed to see me at 1430 that day. 

Now that was General Walters. 

Mr. Helms stated to this committee during an interview as follows : 

A few minutes later Haldeman and Ehrlichman walked in and Haldeman in no 
uncertain terms instructed Walters to see Pat Gray <jf the FBI and instruct 
him not to pursue his investigation in Mexico concerning Gerry M. Dalhberg 
since it might involve the CIA. Helms had no idea what they were talking about 
with resi>ect to Mexico and when he asked he was told, "Never mind what it's all 
about." But they wanted Walters to go to Pat Gray right then and there. 

End of quote in the interview with Mr. Helms. 

Now, isn't it a fact that the meeting with Director Helms and 
General Walters on June 23 was an effort to hinder the investigation ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, that meeting was convened at the Presi- 
dent's request. I learned later that the President was operating on the 
basis of an independent source of investigation and out of a concern 
that an all-out FBI investigation might compromise some CIA 

My recollection of that meeting is at considerable variance with 
General Walters in the general thrust and in the details. In point of 
fact, as I recall it we informed Mr. Helms and General Walters that 
the meeting was being held at the President's request for the reasons 
I stated. 

Mr. Haldeman said that the Watergate was an obvious important 
political issue and that the President had no alternative but to order a 
full all-out FBI investigation until he was satisfied that there was 
some specific area from whicli the FBI should not probe for fear of 
leaks through the FBI of disassociated and disconnected CIA activi- 
ties that had no bearing on Watergate. As I recall there were a couple 
of basic questions that were asked of these gentlemen. One was whether 
the CIA was directly involved in the break-in itself and they said it 
was not. 

The other was whether or not there was any disassociated CIA 
activity, past or present, which might be disclosed through a vigorous 
FBI investigation. They did not make the same kind of a categorical 
response to that question as they had made to the other. As a matter 
of fact, my recollection is that a response to the effect that they don't 
keep track, that is the Director and the Deputy Director, of these re- 
gional activities, such as the one in Mexico, they would want to check 
with the regional man. 

Now you have in your 

Senator Weicker. They had done that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir? 

Senator Weicker. They had done that ? 

^Ir. Ehrlichman. I tliink their letter of July 6 to the Acting Direc- 
tor of the FBI shows that they had not done that and they did not do 


that and they did not assure the FBI until June 27 as to the Mexican 
situation. Then they confirmed that oral assurance of June 27 in writ- 
ing on July 6 and on July 6 is when Director Gray called the President 
and said "I now have a memo from the CIA assuring me that there is 
no problem," and the President said "Let's go all out." So that is the 
sequence of events. 

Senator Weicker. Why did the Director call the President ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Because he received — I assume because he had 
this memorandum. 

Senator Weicker. Oh no, oh no. ^^^ly did the Director call the 
President ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In point of fact I think the President called 
the Director. 

Senator Weicker. That is correct. The Director had called Mr. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is time. 

Senator Weicker. x^nd he had expressed to Mr. MacGregor doubts 
as to this situation. He felt this was the best way to go ahead and get 
in touch with the President, and the President called him back shortly 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I wasn't at the meeting between Mr. Gray and 
INIr. MacGregor so I don't know what they said but, I do know what 
the President told me. 

Senator Weicker. But you do know 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That INIr. MacGregor told him when he came 
and called on the President on July 6 that he had been talking to 
Pat Gray and Pat Gray felt it was important that he talk to the 
President right away and the President picked up the phone immedi- 
ately and called him. 

Senator Weicker. And did Pat Gray tell the President that there 
were forces of those around him who were trying to wound him ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I had never heard that. 

Senator Weicker. Is it not a fact that General Walters and Pat 
Gray both felt it was necessary to call the President on this matter, 
that both of them had the same apprehensions that the investigation 
was being interfered with? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think it was important for Pat Gray to have 
talked with the President, too. I heartily concurred with that. I hope 
you understand that when Mr. Haldeman and I met with the OIA, 
it was for the purpose only of conveying to those gentlemen the Presi- 
dent's concern and the meeting did not culminate in any instructions 
to anyone except a request to General Walters that he sit down and 
talk to Pat Gray about this matter, and reassure Pat Gray, if he could 
be factually reassured. 

Now, that, in fact is what happened, and Mr. Haldeman and I dis- 
connected from this after that one 20-minute meeting. 

Senator Weicker. All right, let's drop back in time again here to 
the meeting on June 23. You are sitting here with the Director of the 
CIA and with General Walters. Would it not be logical to address 
any request of the CIA to the Director of the CIA ? 

iSIr. Ehrlichman. Not if you were told by the President that he 
wanted to work through General Walters. 


Senator Weicker. Let me repeat Mr. Helms' testimony or his inter- 
view rather, his interview with this committee. Helms had no idea 
what they were talking about with respect to Mexico and when he 
asked he was told : "Never mind what it's all about" but they wanted 
Walters to go to Pat Gray right then and there ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. The President's instructions were not to me, they 
were to Mr. Haldeman and he is going to be your best witness as to 
those instructions but my understanding of those instructions second- 
hand is that the President said that he wanted General Walters and 
Pat Gray to work this out between them. And that was confirmed to 
me by the President at a later time but I didn't know it at the time of 
this meeting. 

Senator Weicker. And then we also have General Walters' memo- 
randum which I have read to you in which he dndicates concern over 
the Watergate investigation in a political sense and you disagreed 
with that? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am — the memorandum that you read to me 
was dated the 28th of 

Senator Weicker. Have you got that memorandum ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. June 28 which was considerably 

Senator Weicker. Five days afterward ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes; and, as a matter of fact after the CIA 
finally determined that it had no involvement or exposure on the 27th 
and orally informed the Bureau to that effect. It was then and only 
then that General Walters sat down and reconstructed these meetings. 

Senator Weicker. So, in effect, your testimony stands in conflict 
with the versions of that meeting told by, as I have read them to you, 
of both General Walters and Director Helms ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. One last series of questions, Mr. Chairman, and 
then I will move along here. I would like to, if we could, get to the 
taped telephone conversations, the conversations which you taped. 

Do you have both those before you ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Which are those, Senator ? 

Senator Weicker. These would be to — I find it strange in the United 
States to say which are those as if this was normal practice. These are 
the conversations with Pat Gray on March 7 or 8, and the following 
conversation with John Dean, whatever that happens to be. 

I wonder if at this time we might not, Mr. Chairman, have these 
entered as exhibits. 

Senator ER^^N. What do you want entered as exhibits? I didn't 
quite get what you wanted entered as exhibits. 

Senator Weicker. The two, the transcriptions of the two taped tele- 
phone conversations, the first between Mr. Ehrlichman and Pat Gray, 
the second one between Mr. Ehrlichman and John Dean. 

Senator Ervin. Did Mr. Ehrlichman identify the one that he was 
a party to ? 

Senator Weicker. He was a party to both, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. The two papers will be marked as exhibits and 
admitted as such. I am sorry, I thought maybe you were referring to 
the General Walters matter, the memorandum which you read pre- 
viously. We will also enter that with tlie appropriate exhibit number. 


[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 101, 102, and 

Mr. Wilson. Is there a pending question, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Weicker. I want to be sure Mr. Ehrlichman has a chance 
to look over the material. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is fine. 

Senator Weicker. All right, let's get first to the conversation be- 
tween yourself and Pat Gray. The first portion of it, let me try to 
synopsize that. Gray makes some jDreliminary — unless you want the 
whole thing read. If you want the whole thing read we can do that. 
Would that be better to handle it that way so there won't be any 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Why don't you just ask whatever you have on 
your mind. Senator, and see if I can answer. 

Senator Weicker. Well, Gray, Pat Gray made some preliminary 
remarks concerning the position at the judiciary, these are phone con- 
versations of March 7 or 8, 1973, when Pat Gray is before the 
Judiciary Committee. Subject of his confirmation. Gray made some 
preliminary remarks concerning his position, that the Judiciary Com- 
mittee could only question his procedural conduct of the investigation, 
not the substance since the Ervin committee would do that. He also 
pointed out the very same day that ACLU submitted a letter to the 
committee stating the same position. 

Gray then went on to say, and then I am going into the exact quote, 
and this is Gray to Ehrlichman: 

Another thing I want to talk to you about is 'that I'm being pushed awfully 
hard in certain areas and I'm not giving an inch and you know those areas 
and I think you've got to tell John Wesley to stand awful tight in the saddle 
and be very careful about what he says and to be absolutely certain that he 
knows in his own mind that he delivered everything he had to the FBI and 
don't make any distinction between — 

And then something goes on that is inaudible — 

but that he delivered everything he had to the PBI. 

Now what did you assume this to mean, what is he talking albout 
here when he says, "And you know those areas I think you have got 
to tell John Wesley" ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I assume he was talking about his method of 
the delivery of the contents of Hunt's safe, the fact that some went to 
the Washington field office and some went to the Director directly. 

Senator Weicker: 

Ehrlichman. Right. 

Gray. And that he delivered it to those agents * * * this is aibsolutely 

Ehrlichman. All right. 

Gray. You know I've got a couple of areas up there that I'm hitting hard and 
I'm just taking tbem on the attack. 

Ehrlichman. OK. 

Gray. I wanted you to know that. 

Ehrlichman. Good. Keep up the good work, my boy. Let me know if I can help. 

Gray. AH right. He can help by doing that. 

Ehrlichman. Good, I'll do it. 

You then immediately called Mr. Dean ; is that correct ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

*See pp. 2948-29.52. 


Senator Weicker. I would like to go ahead and read, if we could, 
this conversation. 

Dean. Hello. 

Ehblichman. Hi. Just had a call from your favorite witness. 

Dean. Which is? 

Ehblichman. Patrick J. Gray. 

Dean. Oh, really? 

Ehblichman. And he says to make sure that old John W. Dean stays very, 
very firm and steady on his story that he delivered every document to the FBI 
and that he doesn't start making nice distinctionsi between agents and directors. 

Dean. He's a little worried, is he? 

Ehblichman. Well, he just doesn't want there to be any question. He says he's 
hanging very firm and tough and there's a lot of probing around. 

Dean. Yeah, he's really hanging tough. You ought to read the transcript. It just 
makes me gag. 

Ehblichman. Really? 

Dean. Oh, it's awful, John. 

Ehblichman. Why did he call me? To cover his tracks? 

Dean. Yeah, sure. I laid this on him yesiterday. 

Ehblichman. Oh, I see. OK. 

Dean. I laid it on him to, you know to fuse the issue so I don't have any idea 
what he said up there today. 

Ehblichman. I see. It was a funny phone call. Said he was going in to object 
to the jurisdiction of the group to get into the substance and that their only 
jurisdiction was to — 

again inaudible there — 

was procedural efforts and his competence and he says the AODU put a letter in 
to the same effect. 

Dean. Yeah. Wally picked up an interesting one on the grapevine today that 
planned strategy now is to proceed in this one as they did in the Kleindienst. 

Ehblichman. Down to the point of calling you? 

Dean. Down to the point of calling me and 

Ehblichman. I^et him hang there? 

Well, I think we ought to let him hang there. Let him twist slowly, slowly in 
the wind. 

Dean. That's right. I was in with the boss this morning and that's exactly 
where he was coming out. He said I'm not sure that Gray is smart enough to run 
the Bureau the way he's handling himself. 

Ehblichman. Well, OK, you're on top of it. Good. 

Now, INIr. Ehrlichman, that portion of the transcript, "Yes, sure, 
I laid this on him yesterday," and you said "Oh, I see, OK." What is 
being referred to there? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I do not know. I do not know and never did 
know, I do not know what INIr. Dean had talked to him the previous 
day about. I was looking as you were reading, to see if I could see what 
had been transpiring in that particular week in those hearings, and it 
seems to me that the issue was primarily 

Senator Weicker. Dean sat in on the interviews that the FBI con- 
ducted during the Watergate investigation and the question of whether 
Dean would come to the Judiciary Committee and testify. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think that this was one of a series of telephone 
calls that Mr. Gray made to me and Mr. Dean at the close of his testi- 
fying every day to give us his view of how things had gone for the 
day, sometimes rather optimistic, but in direct response to your ques- 
tion, I do not know to w^hat that does refer, that is to say, what Mr. 
Dean talked to him about the previous day. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, that would then go into the same 
area of "I laid it on him, too, you know, to fuse the issue." Again your 


response would be similar there— you do not understand what he was 
talking about? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, that is correct ; unless it refers back to this 
question of who the documents were delivered to. If it refers to some 
other subject, I do not know. 

Senator Weicker. Let me ask you a question. Yesterday you testified 
to two separate events. One was April 15 where Mr. Petersen and 
Attorney General Kleindienst informed the President, and I think 
you said yourself also, of the fact that the record, the Hunt records, 
had been burned by Pat Gray and that precipitated the phone con- 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. They had a conversation 

Senator Weicker. If I can finish that, that precipitates the phone 
conversation to Gray in the evening ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. At the time of that telephone call in the 
evening, neither the President nor I knew or had any reason to believe 
that Mr. Gray had destroyed the documents. 

Senator Weicker. Well, I think it might be— let me get back to 
that question, I will get back to that question in just a minute. 

You also —let me drop back in time— at the beginning of April you 
went out and you had a talk with Judge Byrne relative to the FBI 
directorship. Now, it is clear from this taped telephone conversation 
that you do not think very much of Mr. Gray unless for some reason 
or another swinging around in the breeze is a new term of endearment 
that I do not know an.>i:hing about, and obviously, from what John 
Dean says, the President does not think very much of Pat Gray. He 
says that "I am not sure Gray is smart enough to run the Bureau the 
way he is handling himself," and obviously, Dean, Dean says, "He 
makes me gag." So John Dean does not thing very much of Pat Gray. 
What m heavens' name is Pat Gray doing up there at these confirma- 
tion hearings as the nominee of the administration ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, Senator, I think you will remember those 
conhrmation hearings and the revelations of the manner in which Mr. 
Gray responded during the hearings, and I think it is fair to say that 
there was pretty general disenchantment in the manner in which he 
handled himself during that time. What I was looking at while you 
were reading was the various events that took place starting back 
around the first of the month in those hearings, and climaxing on the 
^^^^f March with Mr. Gray saying that John Dean probably lied to 
the FBI, and then later privately recanting that charge to Mr. Dean 
and admitting that it was an overstatement, and so on. At this point 
in time there was general disenchantment of Mr. Gray's conduct in the 
process of confirmation, there is not any question about it. 

Senator Weicker. But, do you mean to tell me if there is this degree 
of disenchantment that you are going to keep this man on as the 
nominee and then later on as Acting Director, in fact, until April 27, 
when m fact, it is Pat Gray that steps down, is that correct? There 
must be some reason, there must be some reason. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I think the situation was evaluated as being 
perhaps doubtful and painful as it existed but perhaps more painful 
to withdraw the problem, and so there was a weighing of the alterna- 
tive evils, and it was felt on balance that at some time along in there 


and I have forgotten along where it was but it must have been about 
this time that that nomination was essentially doomed, that it was not 
going anywhere in the committee and that Ave had to set about finding 
some alternative, and somewhere along in this period of time the 
President begins active consideration of an aiteniative list. 

Senator Weicker. But March 7 or 8, obviously, from the language 
that everybody uses here, and you say nomination is doomed, and yet 
nothing happens until April 27, and only then because at least a good 
portion of the Pat Gray story was made public on the 26th, 27th. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. A¥ell, Senator, the die was cast long before that, 
and the, as I explained to you yesterday, I believe, the only reason that 
the President forebore to 'remove Mr. Gray prior to that date was in 
cooperation with the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney 
General, who had asked him to permit them an opportunity to com- 
plete their work. 

Senator Weicker. Having gotten to April 15, on April 15 appar- 
ently matters came to your attention which involve specifically Mr. 
Gray admitting that he destroyed the documents, so we can now add 
10 more days onto the time when Pat Gray is kept in place. Do you 
think there 'is any possibility of the fact tha't either Pat Gray was kept 
in place so that there was an Acting Director of the FBI under the 
control of vou and Mr. Haldeman or that Pat Gray was kept in place 
so that he could be pait of the Monday night TV spectacular when you 
and Haldeman and Kleindienst and Dean were let go ? Do you think 
that any of those might have been reasons for holding him in place ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am sure it was neither of those, Senator, because 
in point of fact as you say, the President was fully advised of the facts 
on the 15th. As so'on as 'he decided to move he immediately replaced 
Mr. Gray with Mr. Ruckelshaus, who was one of the names that had 
been on 'this alternative list for some time, so that it was not a situa- 
tion — I cannot think of any particular advantage to anyone in that 
delay except to the investigators. And that is to say, Mr. Petersen and 
the Attorney General, who felt that they had to make their case. 

Senator Weicker. On March 7 or 8, "in discussing Pat Gray, Dean 
says "He makes me gag," you have got him hanging, and the President 
says, "He is not smart enough to run the Bureau." 

Now, this is an evaluation m.ade of the Director of the, or the 
nominee for the directorship of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
This is the man who is supposed to serve us all, and these evaluations 
are made on the 7th or 8th of ^March, and nothing happens. And then, 
on the 15th of April the man even turns to you and says he burned the 
files, he admits it and he is still held in place and you are telling me 
that basically all that was involved here was someone wanted an inves- 
tigation aft-er April 15. What would be the reason for holding him. in 
place between March 7 and April 15 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the decision was made to let the confirma- 
tion process run, and that ran until, let us see, the first part of April, 
as I recall. April 6. 

Senator Weicker. Did the President ask for his resignation ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think not. I believe that Mr. Gray submitted his 
resignation and informed the President. 


Senator Weicker. If the information about Mr. Gray had not been 
made public do you think he still would have submitted his resigna- 
tion on April 27 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I have no idea as to the state of the in- 
vestigation at that point. The President was working directly with 
the Attorney General on that and with Mr. Petersen, and I think they 
were calling the tune pretty well as to the timing. 

Senator Weicker. Do you think the President would have asked 
for his resignation by the 30th ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not know. Senator, I haven't any idea. 

Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Er\t[n. 'V^^ien was it that you phoned Henry Petersen, As- 
sistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division of the 
Justice Department and having general supervision of the prosecu- 
tion, and conveyed to him the President's request that Maurice Stans 
not be compelled to go before the grand jury ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am not sure, Mr. Chairman. I could search 
this log and see if I could find it. 

Senator Ervin. Well, it was some time considerably before Septem- 
ber, was it not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I would assume so. 

Senator Er\t:n. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe I have that date in my log but I can- 
not recall it offhand. I will find it for you overnight if you would 
like me to. 

Senator Ervin. It was before the bills of indictment were returned 
by the grand jury in September lOT^. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It was during the original grand jury process. 

Senator Ervin. Now, you stated yesterday that some other wit- 
nesses were not required to go before the grand jury. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is my understanding. 

Senator Erwn. But you did not make any phone calls about them. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Ervin. I am bound to say just by way of observation that 
your testimony is that Maurice Stans was excused from going before 
the grand jury pursuant to the request made by the President. Under 
our system of criminal jurisdiction, witnesses are supposed to go be- 
fore the grand jury so that the grand jury may ask them questions 
even though they may be questions that the prosecuting attorneys 
do not see fit to ask. 

The testimony of Maurice Stans was taken in the Department of 
Justice in the absence of the grand jury and in the presence of the 
prosecuting attorneys. TVliat their testimony was the committee 
doesn't know and has no way of getting access to it. 

Maurice Stans was the director of the Finance Committee To Re- 
Elect the President, and one can reasonably assume that he knew 
more about the finances involved than any" other human being or 
should have known more about it. 

I don't know whether it was a 16-man or 23-man grand jurv, but 
if he had gone before the grand iurv, any one of those grand jurors 
who had an inquisitive mind could have ascertained bv questioning 
Maurice Stans what Maurice Stans testified before this committee. 


At that time they were investigating; the break-in of the Watergate, 
and it was known that five burglars had been caught in the Water- 
gate redhanded in an act of burglary in the headquarters of the Demo- 
cratic National Committee. It was known that one of them, McCord, 
was the security officer of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. 
It was known that the other four burglars had in their possession at 
the time they were caught, campaign funds belonging to the Nixon 

A few days later George Gordon Liddy, the chief counsel of the 
Finance Committee To "Re-Elect the President, of which Stans was 
director, and E. Howard Hunt, who was on the TVHiite House payroll, 
and who had an office in the White House, and who had been asso- 
ciated in the Ellsberg matter with Liddy, were arrested and charged, 
in effect, with masterminding the burglary. 

Maurice Stans testified that instead of depositing such moneys in 
the bank which would have made a documentary record of their 
receipts and disbursements possible, he had $1,700,000 kept in two 
safes in cash in the office of his committee. 

He testified that over $1 million of this money was disbursed in 
cash. He testified that his treasurer, Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., came to him 
and told him that he had grave misgivings about disbursing thousands 
of dollars in cash to Liddy on the orders of Jeb Magruder, the deputy 
director of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, of which John 
INIitchell, former Attorney General, was the director. 

He testified pursuant to the misgivings expressed to him by Sloan, 
he held a consultation with '^litchell. He testified that after he held 
this consultation with Mitchell he had a consultation with Sloan, 
and he told Sloan that Mitchell said that he should go ahead and con- 
tinue these disbursements which Sloan said ultimately ran to $199,000 
in cash to Liddy. He also stated that when Sloan sort of reiterated 
his misgivings, that he, Stans, said to Sloan, "I don't know what this 
money is being used for — I don't want to know what this money is 
being used for and you don't want to know either." 

Now, I am not saying anything about what the President's inten- 
tion was. The President ought to never have made a request which 
had the effect of bypassing the judicial process by which witnesses in 
investigations go before grand juries on the subject being questioned 
by grand juries. 

But, as a result of the President's request, which you communicated 
to Petersen, and which Petersen and the prosecuting attorneys com- 
plied with, which they ought never to have done, the grand jury which 
was trying to find whether any persons ought to be indicted and 
whether any persons had procured the other. The seven defendants, to 
break into the Watergate, were implicated. If Stans had given his 
testimony before the grand jury that he gave to this committee, it 
would have indicated that the evidential tracks led directly from the 
Watergate burglary into the office and to some of the high officials in 
charge of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, and the Finance 
Committee To Re-Elect the President. And as a result of the prosecut- 
ing attorneys giving Mr. Stans a privilege that no citizen of the Ignited 
States was entitled to have at the request of the President, the grand 
jury was deprived of the benefit of this testimony. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Cliairman 

Senator Ervin. And only the seven people originally arrested were 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Chairman 

Senator Ervt:n. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Lest the viewers be left with the impression that 
the grand jury did not see the deposition, I think it is important to note 
that the grand jury did, in fact, have that deposition read to them and 
included the questions of the prosecutors ana Mr. Stans' responses, as I 
midei-stand it, and then, of course, the grand jury had the opportunity 
to indicate to the prosecutors any additional questions that they might 
wish to have asked of Mr. Stans or in point of fact, as counsel advises 
me, they could have asked that Mr. Stans then be brought to the grand 

Senator Ervin. But you do not know what was in the deposition, do 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir ? 

Senator Ervin. You do not know what was in the deposition? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Senator Ervin. And you were not in the grand jury room ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think you are leaving the impression, Mr. Chair- 
man, that the deposition was somehow or another kept away from the 
grand jury. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, but depositions have been kept away from this 
committee and I know from trying to extract testimony from Mr. 
Stans, that you had to pull testimony out of him, that you had to get 
a question as strong as two team oxen. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Are you suggesting that his testimony before 
the grand jury would have been available before this committee, Mr. 
Chairman ? 

Senator Ervin. No, I am not. That is exactly what I am talking 
about. But the grand jury would have heard him, would have seen Mr. 
Stans in person, and the grand jury could have asked him the questions 
if they weren't satisfied with what the attorneys were asking, and 
instead of letting him go and be seen and heard by the grand jury, 
they treat him like no American citizen was entitled to be treated. 
They took his testimony secretly, with nobody present except perhaps 
the reporter and the prosecuting attorneys, and this committee can't 
find out what Stans said before the grand jury, and you don't know, 
and I don't know but this is the kind of a situation that makes people 
grieve over justice being so treated, even at the request of the Presi- 
dent of the United States. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have no quarrel with your major 
thesis that it's an extraordinary and unusual situation for one to give 
testimony for grand jury purposes by deposition instead of personally. 
But I would make only one collateral point, and this is not said in 
defense of anyone, it's simply an observation. Had Mr. Stans testified 
before the grand jury in person, this committee would not have had 
that testimony either. The important thing, the point that you make, 
and with which I fully agree, is that the grand jury system did not 
function in the prescribed way. The grand jury did not have face-to- 
face confrontation. It was unique and it was different. But for fear 


the image may be left that we were as a committee deprived of that 
testimony, a grand jury's deliberations are and they ought to be 
inviolate, and they would not have been available to tins committee in 
any event. 

Senator Ervin. My point is this : That if the grand jury had had the 
testimony which Mr. Stans gave here in person, they might well have 
concluded that there was a prima facie case that ofticials of the Com- 
mittee To Re-Elect the President had hired these seven men to bur- 
glarize the Watergate and by reason thereof they might have indicted 
them for being accessories before the fact to a murder, but they didn't 
have the benetit of the testimony of Mr. Stans' evidence in person. 

Senator Baker. Did the chairman say murder ? I think you meant 

Senator Ervin. No — burglary, burglary. 

Senator Baker. There is a new surprise every day, but I was not 
prepared for that one. 

Mr. Wilson. May I answer that? 

Senator Ervin. No, sir, I don't think so — you are not defending 
anybody except JMr. Ehrlichman and you are not a witness, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Wilson. This would be defending Mr. Ehrlichman against 
that remark. 

Senator Ervin. Well, you are not a witness, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Wilson. But you say I am here defending Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, sir; you are here to defend Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Wilson. I can make a pertinent answer to what you just said. 
May I make it? 

Senator Ervin. Our rules don't entitle you to, but if you can explain 
why Mr. Stans ought to be treated in a different way from any other 
citizen in the United States when there is no law that allows it, I 
will be glad to hear your explanation. 

Mr. Wilson. How do you know that Mr. Stans' deposition that 
went to the grand jury is any different from his testimony before 
this committee? 

Senator Ervin. I don't know because there is no way to tell it but 
I know if he had testified before the grand jury and given the same 
evidence he gave before this committee, the grand jury would have 
had a reasonable basis for reaching a conclusion that there was a prima 
facie case and that is all the grand jury has got to find that oflBlcers 
of the Committee To Re-Elect the President had procured this bur- 
glary and they could have presented them for indictment as accessories 
before the fact to burglary, because the evidence is that the money 
came right out of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, right 
to these people. 

The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock Monday. 

[Whereupon, at 4 :55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
10 a.m., Monday, July 30, 1973.] 

MONDAY, JULY 30, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign AarrvrriES, 

Washington^ D.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair- 
man), presiding. 

Present: Senators Er^dn, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and Weicker. 

Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred D. 
Thompson, minority counsel ; Ruf us L. Edmisten, deputy chief coun- 
sel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels ; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Maji;on, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sandere, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker ; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker ; Michael Flani- 
gan, assistant publications clerk. 

Senator Ervin. I have on a number of occasions requested the audi- 
ence to refrain from any action which indicates approval or disap- 
proval of anybody or of any question or any answer, and I ani going 
to have to with much reluctance. It does not assist the committee for 
people to demonstrate, and I am going to have to instruct the officers 
to eject from the hearing room anybody who engages in any demon- 
stration in the future. 

During the exaniination of Secretary Stans he was asked certain 
questions with reference to the existence of a fund in the Department 
of Commerce while he was Secretary. He denied the existence of such 
a fund, and I have received a letter dated July 27, 1973, from his at- 
torneys : 

This letter is another appeal to your Committee to act in a spirit of fairness 
which requires the clearing up of the misleading record made during the appear- 
ance of Honorable Maurice H. Stans on .Tune 12, 1973, over nationwide tele- 

I addressed a hand-delivered letter to you on July 5, 1973, together with en- 
closures. Copies are attached. As noted in that letter, even though Mr. Stans 
denied that he had ever seen the Magruder Memo (copy attached) and stated 
there was no such political fund in the Department of Commerce, the media, 
based upon your hearing record, erroneously referred to a "million dollar secret 
fund", which in fact did not exist. 



In addition to the letter from Richard Whitney and two aflSdavits from former 
Secretary of Commerce for Administration Larry A. Jobe, furnished earlier, we 
enclose herewith another affidavit from Joseph E. Casson, former executive 
assistant to Mr. Stans at Commerce, stating that he had advised Mr. Magruder's 
office that no such political fund existed or was contemplated. Moreover, Mr. 
Casson has told me that he never discussed the fund inquiries with Mr. Stans 
and that no one else did in his presence. 

It is abundantly clear that Mr. Stans had never seen the Magruder memo prior 
to his testimony and that there was no such political fund. If he had been asked 
about the memo in staff interviews, he could have clarified the matter. That was 
not done, however, Mr. Stans was asked to identify a memo he had never seen. 
Later your Committee had Mr. Magruder affirm he had written the memo but 
did not pursue any facts of the non-existent political fund. As a result, the public 
has been misled to Mr. Stans' damage and embarrassment. 

Feeling that the only way to correct this matter fairly as a clarifying state- 
ment in your public and televised hearings, we suggested to staff counsel that the 
record be cleared up without delay in accordance with the enclosures. (See pro- 
posed statement furnished on July 11, 1973). 

We again request this action be taken without further delay. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 104. Subse- 
quent to this date further correspondence was received and is shown as 
exhibit No. lO^A.*] ' 

Senator Ervin. There are a great many documents which would take 
too long to read over TV but they state in effect exactly what Mr. 
Stans testified ; namely, that there was no such political fund in his 
department. He stated that very positively. He also at that time cor- 
roborated the testimony of Mr. Sloan to the effect that there was $1 mil- 
lion which had been spent out of funds kept in safes in the offices of 
the conmiittee. I do not know what the news media referred to, but in 
an effort to be fair to Mr. Stans, who positively denied the existence of 
any such funds when he testified, we will insert in the record without 
objection on the part of any member of the committee, a letter from 
his, Mr. Stans' attorney, dated July 5, 1973, a letter from Richard P. 
Whitney to Mr. David Dawson of the committee staff dated June 25, 
1973, a verified letter from Mr. Larry A. Jobe to the chairman of the 
coimnittee dated June 18, 1973, a letter from Mr. Larry A. Jobe to 
Mr. David Dorsen, dated June 29, 1973, and certain exhibits attached 
thereto, and a statement from Mr. Larry A. Jobe to Secretary Stans 
dated January 19, 1972, and a copy of the Magruder statement an- 
nexed to that letter of July 28, 1972, being in the form of a confidential 
memorandum for the Attorney General and an affidavit by Joseph E. 
Casson dated the 23d day of July 1973, and a statement for the record 
which was received by the committee on Julv 27, 1973, all of these will 
be admitted in the record. I will state on behalf of the committee that 
these are documents which tend to corroborate Mr. Stans' testimony 
that there was no political fund in the Department of Commerce while 
he was Secretary of that Department, and I trust that this clarifies the 
situation sufficiently. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Chainnan, I have two short matters which 
are the result of weekend research but go to questions which were 
asked on Friday near the close of the session, and I wonder if I might 
be permitted to supplement the record. 

*See pp. 2954 and 2974. 


Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The first has to do with the question of the 
propriety of the manner in which Mr. Stans' testimony was presented 
to the grand jury. It appears that this question has been decided by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit in a recent case 
involving alleged corruption in the office of the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives. It is the case of United States v. Zweig^ and in 
that case Zweig, who was Speaker McCormack's administrative as- 
sistant, was charged with accepting bribes or committing other illegal- 
ities as administrative assistant, representing McCormack, a Demo- 
crat, of Massachussetts, was asked to give his testimony to the grand 
jury, and the testimony was taken not by pei-sonal appearance be- 
fore the grand jury but by three assistant U.S. attorne3's coming to 
his office on two occasions, on one of those occasions taking his testi- 
mony in the presence of Mr. McCormack's nephew, an outsider to 
the proceeding. 

The defendant in the case appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 
stating very much the same kind of objection that was stated here 
to the procedure. In 441 Federal 2d at page 114 the court apf) roved 
the taking of Speaker McCormack's testimony for grand jury use 
by this process. 

Senator Ervin. I will look into that decision. I have looked in the 
Federal statutes and I can find no statute which warrants the taking 
outside of the presence of a grand j ury of the statement of any witness 
for presentation to a grand jury where that witness is available, is able 
bodied, and is available to the grand jury. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Chairman 

Senator Ervin. So far I have found nothing to the contrary but I 
will look into that case and see if it reveals any such facts. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You and Mr. Zweig read the statute the same way 
but the second circuit disagreed with him. 

Senator Ervin. Well, I think that is a different principle. When you 
get on the trial of a case, the trial court does not undertake to review 
what kind of testimony was presented before the grand jury. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask for the citation of the 
case again? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It is 441 Federal 2d at page 114. 

Senator Baker. And that was from the U.S. Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. 414 at page 

Mr. Ehrlichman. 441 Fed. 2d at 114, it's a 1971 case. 

Senator Ervin. I might suggest, for the purpose of shedding further 
light on the subject, I request the staff of the committee to communi- 
cate with the Department of Justice and with the U.S. District Attor- 
ney for the District of Columbia, and with the assistant district attor- 
neys who had actual charge of the prosecution of the case, and with the 
special prosecutor, and ask them to furnish to this committee a copy of 
the statement made by Secretary Stans in the Department of Justice 
to the prosecuting attorneys. That would clearly be admissible either 
to corroborate or to contradict Secretary Stans and it would not fall 
within the exemption provision of testimony before the grand jury 

96-296 O - 73 - pt.7 


because it would be a statement made before third parties and I ask 
the staff to ask for that. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Chairman, the other matter that I have 

Senator Baker. Before I go to Mr. Ehrlichman, do I understand, 
Mr. Chairman, you are asking for a copy of the statement made by Mr. 
Stans to the U.S. attorneys that was subsequently submitted to the 
grand jury? 

Senator Ervin. I don't know whether it was submitted to the grand 
jury or not. I don't know what was submitted to the grand jury and 
I have no way to find out. 

Senator Baker. Do we make a distinction between what was and was 
not submitted ? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Senator Baker. Thank you. 

Senator Ervin. In other words, all I want is the statement made in 
the presence of the prosecuting attorneys. I don't want anything that 
happened before the grand jury. We are not entitled to it. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Chairman, the other matter I have was in 
supplement to my answer to Senator Montoya on the subject of tax 
returns. I have been provided with a copy of the Congressional Record 
for April 16, 1970, pages 5911 to 5924 which is a colloquy bringing 
forth contrasting procedures under the Kennedy administration and 
the Nixon administration with regard to White House access to income 
tax returns and other tax records. 

It appears that the regulations which the Nixon administration im- 
posed upon such access were a novelty, they had not been in effect 
before. They required requests in writing and they enumerate the 
number of such White House requests up to this 1970 date and it is a 
total of nine requests. I would point out to the committee also the 
practice under the Kennedy administration where 6 days after in- 
auguration, Mr. Bellino, special consultant to the President, called on 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and undertook inspection of 
many, many tax returns for days at a time. There is extensive descrip- 
tion of Mr. Bellino's examination of the tax return of various individ- 
uals for "days on end" at page 5913. 

Senator Ervin. Did President Nixon at any time between the time 
that the break-in of the Democratic headquarters in the Watergate 
became public knowledge, down to the 21st day of March 1973 ask you 
to ascertain for his enlightenment how it happened that some of the 
burglars caught in the Watergate had funds in their pockets which 
came from the Committee To Re-Elect the President? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Ask me to personally ascertain that, Mr. Chair- 

Senator Ervin. Yes, 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He did not ask me to personally involve myself 
in any inquiry or investigation in this matter until March 30. He did 
ask me, and the only request of me that might bear on this was a 
request he made to me about the 6th of July, a matter of 3 weeks 
after the break-in where he asked me to direct Pat Gray, the Director 
of the FBI, to make an unlimited investigation, and to take no instruc- 
tions from anyone as to the scope of the investigation, but Mr. Gray 
alone was to determine that scope and I did convey those instructions 
"to Mr. Gray. 


Senator Ervin. Now, I may be wrong but I construed your testimony 
at the moment that the President asked you to talk to General Walters 
about funds that had been sent into Mexico ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not specifically, no, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Well, were those funds mentioned to you by General 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Those funds were mentioned in the meeting 
and I can't recall Avho raised the question, but those — that circum- 
stance, not the fund themselves, but the circumstance of there being a 
Mexican source of money, somehow came up in the meeting by one 
of the participants using that as an example of the kind of thing 
which might involve a CIA activity. 

Senator Ervin. Well, did you not later learn that those funds found 
their way into the bank account of Bernard L. Barker? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir, as I understand it, the CIA about 6 days 
later determined that there was no connection with any CIA activity 
and they so informed the FBI on the 29th, I believe it was, and that 
letter of July 6 between the CIA and the FBI gives the date by, I think, 
it was about 6 days later the CIA told the FBI there was no so-called 
Mexican checks. 

Senator Ervin. That is not an answer to my question. 

My question was if you didn't ascertain after that time that those 
Mexican funds had found their way at least temporarily into the bank 
account of Bernard L. Barker, one of the burglars caught in the 
Watergate ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I didn't have any special knowledge. I 
believe I read that in the newspaper, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator ER\aN. And you also found out that some of those funds that 
were withdrawn from the Barker bank account were the funds in the 
pockets and the bedrooms of burglars ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There again, I believe I read that in the press. 

Senator Ervin. Didn't that suggest to your mind there was some- 
thing wrong in the Committee To Ee-Elect the President? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Certainly. 

Senator Ervin. And that was way back in the summer of 1972. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. At just about the time we knew the FBI was all 
out in its investigation of this matter. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Baker, I might state that, having finished 
myself, I am going to impose the 10-minute rule on others for this 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I will expedite your 10-minute 
rule somewhat by saying that Mr. Ehrlichman has been on the stand 
now for his 5th day. We have covered a great amount of testimony. I 
am sure there are other questions that would occur to all of us, were 
we permitted now, after a recess, to go over the transcript and derive 
and suggest new lines of inquiry. 

I think, however, Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time that I am 
going to forego any further questions with the full understanding, 
Mr. Ehrlichman, that if there are other matters particularly within 
so-called phase II or phase III of this operation of this inquiry, hav- 
ing to do with the alleged "dirty tricks" operation or more in detail 
about the transactions, I understand you, as other witnesses, would be 
willing to return and to testify further on that or any other subject. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. I would, Senator. I don't believe that I would 
have a great deal of information on either of those phases to assist 
but I would be happy to be available. 

Senator Baker. The only point I make is if we forego questions 
now, it does not imply we cannot ask vou questions later. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Certainly. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Wilson handed a copy of the Congressional 
Record dealing with income tax during the Kennedy and Nixon ad- 
ministrations. Was it your wish that that be examined by the com- 
mittee or made part of the record or what was the purpose of that? 

Mr. Wilson I just thought it would be made part of the record but. 
m effect, you want to ask any questions about it. make any statements, 
it IS a very long statement. Very long colloquy, rather. 

Senator Baker. And it is your contention it relates to the testimony 
of the witness, Mr. Ehrlichman, in response to queries put largely 
by Senator Montoya on the examination of income tax returns? 

Mr. Wilson. That is the purpose of it, sir. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, if there is no objection I would 
like to see the document identified for the record and accepted for 
that purpose. 

I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. The document will be identified for the record and 
received as an exhibit. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit N"o. 105.*] 

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, may we now study your April 13, 1973, C.C. and 
Shapiro interview note? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. I will get my copy. 

All right, sir. 

Senator Inouye. Will you please proceed, sir. On the first line, 
executive privilege, I believe it says, 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. This— I should say that this meeting was 
held primarily at Mr. Colson's request at the end of the day on the 
13th of April. The first thing that he said was that he had some- 
some suggestions and points of view that he would like to have con- 
veyed to the President and that was the purpose of the— the purpose 
of the meeting, but I also conceived of it as some opportunity to 
develop additional information because I was in the course of ^this 
inquiry. That first line refers to R. K. being Richard Kleindienst to 
the Congress about executive privilege and he simply noted that it has 
the Hill up in arms. 

Senator Inouye. Please proceed, sir. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Then he said that Mr. Hunt at 2 p.m., on the 
coming Monday would once again be testifying both from the stand- 
point of hearsay and firsthand'. He said his sources were both within 
the Government and Mr. Bittman, Mr. Hunt's attorney, that he would 
testify that f imds had traveled 

Senator Inouye. What funds are we talking about? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, we are talking about these funds for the 
defendants in the criminal case, that fund from Parkinson and— 
traveled fr om Parkinson and O'Brien to Hunt to the Cubans and on 

*See p. 2978. 


other occasions from O'Brien to Hunt to Mrs. Hunt, and I have down 
the sum of $10,000 in the latter — in the latter category. He said all of 
this transmittal of funds information will be coming out. 

Then he said with relation to Mr. McCord, as I recall the setting of 
this was that McCord was coming up with all sorts of wild stories. His) 
later story was that Hunt and McCord, and he didn't know whether 
Liddy has been involved in this or not, has made a trip to Las Vegas. 
They landed. They had an airplane standing by. They were going to 
break into the safe of Hank Greenspun who was a publisher in Las 
Vegas and that McCord was saying that this was a maneuver master- 
minded by Charles Colson. Mr. Colson vehemently denied that he had 
any knowledge or acquaintanceship with such a maneuver or that he 
had anything to do with it, and he cited this simply as an example of 
the far out kind of allegations that ]McCord was making at that time. 
I said, well, where does such a thing all fit in this whole — in this whole 
Watergate business and he said, well, I don't think that it does fit and 
McCord said that it was some kind of a Howard Hughes operation 

Now this. Senator, I hasten to point out, is kind of hearsay and I 
do not assert the truth of any of this, but I am simply describing what 
Mr. Colson was describing as Mr. McCord's rather extreme charges at 
that point. 

Then he went on to tell another version of the inception of Water- 
gate which he termed "Liddy heareay" which was to the effect that 
Howard Hunt opposed the Watergate break-in, the second break-in, 
that Hunt characterized it as stupid, that Liddy told Hunt that it 
could not be called off, that Mr. Mitchell had ordered it and that it 
must go ahead. 

Now here again, Senator, I do not vouch for any of the reliability of 
that but that is simply hearsay second- or third-hand. 

Mr. Colson said he was also ]3icking up the rumor that Mr. Mitchell 
had a "blood oath" to Mr. Liddy that there would be a Presidential 
pardon for Mr. Liddy. 

He said that he thought that there was a possibility of Liddy cor- 
roborating ]\IcCord — pardon me, of Hunt corroborating McCord and 
you would have a situation of two people testifying to hearsay, so- 
called double hearsay. He then reported to me on information that they 
were hearing and again this is in the nnnor stage, about two grand 
juries who were investigating Mr. Mitchell. In addition to the New 
York grand jury looking into the Vesco matter, that there was a sec- 
ond grand jury in Washington, D.C., which was looking into money 
which passed from a man named Klein to Mr. ^Mitchell in considera- 
tion of Government contracts for Klein. 

Mr. Hundley. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I do feel I must break in. 
I discussed this with Mr. Hunt's and Mr. Mitchell's attorney and note 
for the record in response to a question, Mr. Ehrlichman has now men- 
tioned the Vesco grand jury in New York, he is touching upon another 
matter that is completely unrelated to this hearing and I would urge 
the chairman to rule at this time that there should not be any more 
evidence taken about this April 13 meeting. 

Senator Ervin. This committee agreed at the start as I understand 
it, at least agreed when Mr. Mitchell was hei-e and also when Mr. Stans 
was here, that we could not go into the Vesco matter, '\\niile the com- 
mittee undoubtedly has authority to investigate all campaign contri- 


butions, the committee unanimously felt that out of fairness to Secre- 
tary Stans and Mr. Mitchell and. in view of the fact that there was an 
indictment pending about this, that we ought to refrain from ^oing 
into it. I would, therefore, request that you omit any statement m re- 
gard to the Vesco matter. 

Senatx)r Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I say that. I entirely agree with 
you. It really is probably not a matter of law but a sense of fair play 
that would indicate when there is a criminal case pending, when there 
is an indictment, when there is a trial impending, that not only the 
witness who may be the named defendant in this case ought not to have 
to testify on that subject, but I think other witnesses should be cau- 
tioned to avoid it as well. I think the stiatement is well taken and I 
commend you for urging that precaution in the interest of fairness. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator Ervin. And without objection, the committee will strike 
from the record any testimony thus far given in reference to the 
Vesco matter. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Chairman, I might say for myself, I do not 
feel comfortable about perviewing second- and third-hand hearsay 
and a great deal of this I cannot, I caimot assert to be true but it is 
simply my notes of a meeting and what someone else asserted to me. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. I think it is unfortunate that all those of us 
who interrogated witnesses do not confine our questions to elicit from 
the witness what he has personal knowledge of or in reference to 
statements made by parties involved with him. But unfortunately, 
it seems impossible to enforce that kind of a rule in congressional 

Mr. Ehrlichmax, If I may skip, then, down to the name Mardian, 
toward the bottom of that page 

Senator Inoute. Mr. Chairman, in view of the possibility that the 
rest of this interview might inadvertently touch upon the Vesco trial, 
I would like to forego any inquiry at this time and go into something 

Mr. Ehrlichman-. Senator, could I put something in perspective on 
the last page of these notes? Somehow or other these notes have ap- 
peared in the press and there are a number of adjectives which have 
been speculated in the press very unfairly to Mr. Mitchell, and I wish, 
if I may, simply to make clear that these six or seven references to 
Mr. Mitchell on the last page were Mr. Shapiro's secondhand charac- 
terization and did not in any way constitute an evaluation either by 
Mr. Colson or me of Mr. Mitchell, either as an individual or as a poten- 
tial witness, and I am afraid some very cruel inferences have been 
derived from this last page that are totally unjustified and unfair. 

Senator Ervtn. Thank you. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Ehrlichman, in the last few minutes remaining 
I have a few questions here which may be a bit repetitious but just for 
the record, sir. did the President ever ask in your presence prior to 
March of this year for information on exactly how the Watergate 
break-in came about ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. In this sense, that on repeated occasions 
the President asked that a complete and definitive statement of the 
whole Watergate matter, how it was planned, how it was executed, 


the whole picture, be set down on paper and released, and I have gone 
through my notes of meetings at which this subject was discussed, and 
can say that on at least eight occasions the President made that 

Senator Ixottye. Did the President ever receive satisfaction ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, and, I think, one of those occasions was 
just prior to his sending John Dean to Camp David and set all this 
down in March of this year, but he asked Clark MacGregor to do this 
back in September, he asked for a statement on a narrow part of 
this, on Segretti, in November. In November later in the month, 
around Thanksgiving time he asked that, in response to a letter that 
he had received from a friend about this expressing real concern about 
it he said that, he wanted this cleaned up before the Congress came 
back, that a complete definitive statement go out. He did the same 
thing again on December 8 where he instructed John Dean to do a 
Watergate summary. He did the same thing on December 11 and said 
he wanted that statement by Christmas. Again he did it prior to our 
meeting in La Costa on February 10 and one of the major purposes 
of that meeting was to impress upon Mr. Dean the urgency for such 
a statement. He did it again in my presence in a conference with 
George Bush on March 20, and again on March 22 in this meeting 
that Mr. Mitchell, Dean, Haldeman, and I had with the President 
where he said that he wanted John Dean to complete such a state- 
ment by that weekend. 

Senator iNoims. Were you aware, when did you become aware of 
the President's request to Mr. MacGregor ? 

Mr. EHRLiCHMAisr. On September 13. 

Senator Inouye. Didn't you know at that time Mr. MacGregor 
hadn't any information to give ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the information had been given in Mr. 
MacGregor's presence and in the President's presence by the Attorney 
General, Mr. Kleindienst on the previous day, at which time Mr. Klein- 
dienst assured the Cabinet and Mr. MacGregor and others assembled 
that in point of fact no one in the Wliite House was involved, that 
the investigation had been extremely vigorous by the Department of 
Justice, that the seven persons responsible had, in fact, been indicted, 
and he gave a total endorsement to the method of investigation, and 
the results of that investigation. 

The President felt that there were ample facts available at that 
point for Mr. MacGregor to do a definitive statement. 

Senator Inouye. How do you respond to INIr. MacGregor's state- 
ment that he was "lied to" by you. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I think that what Mr. MacGregor has 
done, I saw that in the press over the weekend. Mr. MacGregor has 
said, "Yes, they asked me to make a statement back in July. August, 
and September but I should have known about the CIA and I should 
have known about the special unit, and I should have known about 
other things that were happening in the "Wliite House." It seems to 
me that, if I may say so, that is an irrelevancy. In point of fact, back 
in the convention and immediately after the convention days, and fol- 
lowing' up on the Attorney General's complete report on September 
12 to the President, Mr. MacGregor and others, that Mr. MaxiGregor 


was in an excellent position to step out, based upon this extensive 
Department of Justice investigation, and make a very full and com- 
plete statement of the facts as we believed them at that time. 

Senator Inouye. Would not that have been repetitious; didn't the 
Attorney General himself give the President a report ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. Why should Mr. MacGregor, who was listening in, 
give another report ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the thought here was there should be two 
reports, one with regard to the A^-liite House and "Wliite House involve- 
ment which in fact the President did get in August, but the other part 
and the important jDart was the involvement or noninvolvement of the 
various Committee To Ee-Elect personnel and that was the report 
which the President was pressing for from Mr. MacGregor in Sep- 

Senator Inouye. My final question in this round, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell in his testimony suggested that he withheld informa- 
tion from the President, and in fact he lied to the President because 
he didn't want the lid to be blown oif . 

Did you ever keep information away from the President or lie to 
the President? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have certainly never lied to the President, Sena- 
tor, at least I hope I never have. Certainly not told him intentionally 
anything that was not true. 

Now, as far as keeping things from the President, a great deal of 
my time was spent trying to evaluate what should and should not be 
considered a matter for Presidential attention, and certainly I did not 
indiscriminately just shovel everything that came on my desk to the 
President. I have made dozens and I suppose hundreds of judgments 
over the 4 years that matters of information and even matters for de- 
cision need not go to the President. That in the hierarchy or priority 
of how he should devote his time, that this was, whatever it was, was 
a matter which would need necessarily occupy his attention or that 
could better be decided by someone else, and so I have on literally hun- 
dreds of occasions been involved in a decision of that kind. 

Senator Inotiye. Did you consider the break-in of Dr. Fielding's 
office important enough for Presidential notification ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I did not. 

Senator Inouye. That was not important ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It was a — it was an event, it had occurred. There 
wasn't anything that the President could do about it. There wasn't 
anything that he was called upon to do about it. It was in a continum 
of investigation, and I simply made the judgment that it would un- 
necessarily tax his attention luider circumstances that really it was 
something that he could do nothing about. 

Senator Inouye. Didn't you consider the meetings involving Mr. 
Liddy, Mr. Magruder, Mr. 'Mitchell, Mr. Dean, and the office of the 
Attorney General and later in Key Biscayne were important enough 
for Presidential notification ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Certainly, and I did notify him of that within 
an hour or two of having learned of it. 

Senator Inouye. When did you learn about this ? 


Mr. Ehrlichman. I learned about that in my interview with Mr 
O'Brien in Key Biscayne — or in San Clemente, in the early part of 
April of this year, on April 5. 

Senator Inotjye. Didn't you Imow about this in June of 1972 ? 

Mr. Ehelichman. No, sir. 

Senator Inouye. You mean to say you were kept in the dark until 
April of this year ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Strachan never discussed this with you ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, indeed. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean never discussed this with you ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Haldeman never discussed this with you ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. * 

Senator Inouye, Weren't you curious when reports were being 
made in the press about these meetings ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. When reports were being made in the press ? 

Senator Inouye. Suggesting that these meetings had been held. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I think those reports — I don't know jyst 
when those reports appeared, Senator, but I don't think they were very- 
much previous to my having talked to Mr. O'Brien here. 

Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, my periscope indicates that the Zweig 
opinion has been brought to you and to save some time it is the last 
footnote on the last page of the opinion. You don't have to read any- 
thing else. 

Senator Ervin. I was intrigued by this statement in the opinion in 
requiring Zweig to come before them. It says on page 121 : 

Indeed in investigations such as the grand jury was conducting here, the 
grand jury and the government would have been subject to proper criticism 
if the grand jury had failed to indict Zweig's attendance as a witness. It is 
altogether in the public interest that gra^yi juries should inquire with care and 
thoroughness before they file formal charges against anyone. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I might make a statement, if I may. 
Since I indicated when I remarked on this situation on the previous 
examination of Mr. Ehrlichman that I, too, thought it was improper 
to conduct the hearings other than before the grand jury, I freely 
confess I was not aware of the case that you have now presented to 
me. I also note that footnote 70, page 121, lists some five or six other 
cases to the same effect, and that the Shepherd citations compilation 
shows that in this case certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which, of course, has the effect of affirming the second circuit 
court of appeals' decision. The operative language is footnote 7, 
which says : 

One such contention, 

That is, that indictment was defective — 

is that the indictment should have been dismissed because the grand jury received 
testimony from Speaker McCormack in an unlawful way. Instead of calling 
McCormack to testify in person the grand jury .sent three a.ssistant U.S. attorneys 
to interview him on two occasions, once in the presence of his nephew. 

And to make a long story short, the court of appeals held, and the 
Supreme Court concurred inferentially by denying certiorari, that was 
the appropriate way to proceed. 


Now the question still presented, I suppose, and which this commit- 
tee ought to reserve, Mr. Chairman, is whether or not the test of in- 
convenience applied to Speaker McCormack would similarly be ap- 
plied by the court to Mr. Stans and, of course, we do, or at least I do, 
reserve that question ; but I think counsel for the case 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Vice Chairman 

Senator Ervix. Just one observation. When the Supreme Court 
denies application for a writ of certiorari, it makes no decision. It 
does not express an opinion that the opinion of the lower court is good 
or bad, wise or foolish, or unsound, it just refuses to take the case. 

It says here that Speaker McCormack was excused because it was 
difficult and inconvenient for him to come. That is not the testimony 
here. The testimony is that it was to spare him the humiliation of hav- 
ing to be confronted by the press. But this is beside the point that I was 
making, and the point that I am making is : Without regard to the 
good intentions of the President in requesting Mr. Stans be excused 
from a personal appearance, and without regard to your action in com- 
municating the President's request to Mr. Petersen, the fact is that in 
the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Stans the grand 
jury might have been denied evidence which would have justified the 
grand jury in considering whether there should be some indictments 
returned in respect to persons who were officers of the Committee To 
Re-Elect the President. It goes to the wisdom of action. I am not too 
much concerned about the illegality. I think it is verv unfortunate 
for the President of the United States for even the best of motives to 
undertake to make a request which has the effect of obviating an or- 
dinary feature of the judicial process; that is, the appearance of a wit- 
ness before a grand jury and according to the grand jury an oppor- 
tunity to question the witness. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I want to say only one more thing. I 
do not want to belabor the point. I said as far as I was concerned, I in- 
dicated on the record it was unlawful to do that. Now, I find it is at 
least arguably lawful to do that. It was at least in this factual situa- 
tion when Speaker McCormack was not required to appear before 
the grand jury to give his deposition. I think the committee will 
reserve, to the incoming of the report, the evaluation of the wisdom 
or lack of wisdom of doing it that way, but I apologize and that was 
the reason for my interjection, of the witness and Mr. Wilson to 
previously expressing my impression that that was an irregular pro- 
cedure. Apparently, that is not, on its face at least, an irregular pro- 
cedure and I have nothing further to say about that. 

Senator Ervin. I think it is irregular in the sense that it is not 


Senator Er\^n [continuing]. And I think it is very unfortunate. We 
can maybe clear up the matter if we ever get a statement of what he 
told the prosecuting attorneys and I certainly agree with the Senator 
from Tennessee that this is a matter to be weighed and considered by 
the committee later and not on the spur of this moment. I was merely 
suggesting some misgivings of mine. 

Senator Baker. Thank you. 


Senator Ervhst. And I have legal misgivings as well. Notwithstand- 
ing the fact my experience has been, in the long years of practicing 
law, that I can find a Federal decision in one of the circuits that will 
sustain any point on any side of the question. 

Senator Baker. It has been my experience practicing law too, when 
the Supreme Court denies certiorari I am out of business. 
Senator Er\^n. Yes ; and so is the Supreme Court. 
Senator Baker. That is up to them to decide. I have argued long and 
hard with them and sometimes I won and sometimes I lost, and I like 
it better winning but that is not always the way it goes. 
Senator Ervix. Senator Gurney. 

Senator Gurney. Mr. Ehrlichman, on April 14 you gave your report 
to the President on Watergate. On April 30 you resigned from the 
Wliite House staff. Now, in the 2 weeks in between you had several 
meetings with the President of the United States. I presume some of 
these were on Watergate and conversations that led up to your resig- 

Will you tell the committee what you said to the President and 
what the President said to you at these meetings ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, notwithstanding AVatergate, the business 
at the A¥hite House went on during those 2 weeks and quite a few of 

these meetings were with regard to the business at hand, and I will 

Senator Gurney. I am not interested in that, only Watergate matters. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Eight. Quite a bit of the convei-sation during this 
period of time had to do with John Dean's status in the White House. 
Henry Petersen became the President's confidant and righthand man 
on Watergate, following April 15. The President decided that he 
would work with Mr. Petersen personally. He did. He had a number 
of meetings with Mr. Petersen who gave him a good deal of addi- 
tional information which I did not have and to which I am not privy. 
One of the first things that Mr. Petersen apparently asked the 
President to do was fire Mr. Haldeman and me. 
Senator Gurney. "Wlien was that, do you know ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, it must have been very early in the game, 
shortly — on or shortlv after the 15th. 

The President pressed him for the basis of this request. Mr. Petersen 
acknowledged that there probably was no legal liability but that he 
felt that as a matter of appearances that this is the step that the Presi- 
dent should take. 

At the same time Mr. Petersen was urging the President not to fire 
Mr. Dean until such time as the prosecutors had had an opportunity 
to perfect their negotiations and their interrogation of Mr. Dean. And 
so there was a lot of conversation between us over this period of time 
both as to what our status should be in the White House and what Mr. 
Dean's status should be. 

On Monday, the 16th, I believe it was, the President telephoned me 
and said that he was going to see Mr. Dean that morning. He had 
decided that Mr. Petersen's desires to the contrary notwithstanding, 
he was going to request that Dean either take a leave or resign. 

He asked that letters be prepared that would be appropriate to both 
of these alternatives and he more or less dictated what should be in 


those letters. I say more or less. He literally did dictate what he wanted 
in them. I had my secretary type them basically from the notes that I 
took from that conversation of the President and I understand that 
later on he did present them to Mr. Dean and Mr. Dean refused to sign 
either one. So he reported that to me later on in the day. 

There were those kind of — those kind of questions that were going- 
on in discussion. At a point in time he asked Mr. Petersen 

Senator Gurnet. Stop right there. Did the President tell you why 
he wanted to fire Mr. Dean or have him resign ? 

Mr. Ehrliciiman. Well, he felt that since Mr. Dean was continuing 
to come to the — kiome to the White House and apparently had access to 
his files and to other files presumably, in the central files of the Wliite 
House, that it was — they had then basically an adversary relationship 
and that it was an unhealthy situation, there ought to be a clean 

This obviously did not take place. Mr. Petersen, I gather from talk- 
ing with the President, Mr. Petersen strongly urged the President 
following that, to make no move where Mr. Dean was concerned and 
the President acquiesced in that. 

We became — that is, Mr. Haldeman and I — became the targets of 
newspaper and other media attention about the 22d, about Easter, and 
from then on through the 30th, very vigorous newspaper attack, is the 
only thing I can say. The Los Angeles Times printed a totally dis- 
honest and false story about my intervention in some Middle East ac- 
tivity. We were continually finding — I was continually finding myself 
laying aside the work of the day to prepare press statements or to 
research documents, things of this kind. 

What I am leading to. Senator, is 

Senator Gurnet. Just a moment. At that point I think we should 
strike from the record — Mr. Chairman, I think we should strike from 
the record mention of this Vesco case. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Senator Gurnet. We are trying to keep this 

Senator Ervin- Yes ; it can be stricken from the record. 

Mr. HuNDLET. Mr. Chairman, I just want to state for the record, you 
know, the witness is being responsive and he has mentioned this case 
twice this morning. It just does not suffice for Mr. Mitchell's purposes 
every time it happens to strike it from the record. 

Senator Ervin. Well, we are glad to have the interjection about the 
Vesco matter stricken but I believe that is as far as we can go at this 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In any event 

Senator Ervin. And I will ask the witness to 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am sorry. That 

Senator Ervin [continuing] . Any refrain from further refer- 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I had a personal interest in that one. I am afraid, 
Mr. Chairman, and this was the instance, however, that directly led to 
my realization that I simply could not do my job there and continue 
with the denials and harassment and all that that was going on. 

We began discussing very seriously with the President the need for— 
and this was separate— I began discussing and I understand Mr. Halde- 


man began discussing with the President the need for a leave of ab- 
sence about this point in time. And as we progressed into this week of 
April 23, that was the subject that was under serious consideration, 
alternatives, who could pick up for me and carry on the domestic side 
and work the policy questions, move the information to the President, 
and so on. And by the time the President went to Camp David on, I 
think the 27th, after we returned from Mississippi — from Senator 
Stennis' ceremony in Mississippi — I think the President was scheduled 
in his own mind, and it was my impression from talking with him on 
the airplane, that he had settled in his own mind that we should take 
a leave of absence at that point. 

Mr. Haldeman and I discussed this on the 28th and it was our mutual 
feeling at that point that even a leave of absence thing would be mis- 
understood and that we should simply make a clean break of it. The 
President invited us to Camp David on Sunday, the 29th, and we 
separately discussed with the President our point of view on this at 
that time. We both had extended private meetings with him and the 
upshot of that was we submitted our resignations. 

Senator Gurnet. Then, in summary, between April 12 and April 30, 
in these meetings where you discussed Watergate, it was mainly a dis- 
cussion of how more and more you were becoming ineffective because 
of the media exposure to Watergate, including vou and also Mr. Halde- 
man. And those were principally the discussions that led up to the 
resiofnation ? 

Mr. Ehrltchman. There were other points obviously being raised. 
Mr. Petersen was pressing the contention, for instance, that I had 
urged Hunt to get out of the country and I had urged Mr. Dean to 
destrov the contejits of the safe and he was playing back to the Presi- 
dent in justification of his argument that we should be fired — testi- 
mony that was being picked up bv the prosecuting attorneys. So I in 
turn was trving to gather such evidence as I could on those points and 
as I said before, I talked to the people who were at the meeting of June 
19 and I reported to the President what they had said. 

Likewise, during this period of time we consulted counsel and laid 
out the facts for counsel and took his opinion as to whether or not we 
were guilty of any legal wrongdoing and made that report to the Presi- 
dent. So we were very much personally involved in trying to indicate 
to the President what our point of view was, our recollection of the 
facts, where the truth of this matter lay. 

Senator Gtjrney. Let me put it this way : In any of these meetings 
did the President say to you, "John, it has come to my attention that 
you were involved in the coverup in such and such a fashion and I can- 
not keep you on because of that?" Did any of the conversations go in 
this vein ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. They went in the vein, "this fellow is making 
accusations against you," being John Dean. "These are serious allega- 
tions. I have confidence that what you are telling me is true but let us 
face it, the prosecuting attorney "through Mr. Petersen is strongly 
urging that I put you on leave of absence and I have to listen to that 

Senator Gurnet. Did the President ask you to resign ? 

Mr. Ehrlighman. No, sir. 


Senator Gurney. That is all, Mr. Chairman. In the interests of time 
I am not going to take my full 10 minutes. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you. 
Senator Montoya. 

Senator Montota. I just have one question, Mr. Chairman. 

The other day we brought out that the President in two press con- 
ferences, the press conference of April 17 and the press conference of 
April 30, 1973, had alluded to the date of March 21 which was the date, 
significant date in his mind, when he had really ordered an intensive 
investigation. Then in your opening statement you indicated that you 
had been commissioned by the President to start an investigation or 
an inquiiy, as you called it, on March 30. 

Now, can you tell me what infomiation was given to the President 
as a result of the intensive investigation which began on March 21 and 
lip to the time that you assumed your own inquiry on March 30 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That was never presented to me, Senator, in any 
sort of capsulized or organized form. In other words, I didn't sit down 
with the President and — in a situation where he said to me, now, here 
IS everything I have learned in the last 9 days. So— but at the same 
time in his reaction to this narrative report which I gave him, it was 
evident to me that he had information or impressions, at least, about 
this matter which were independent of anything that I was advancing 
to hnn. So that— and I know that during the time that I was working 
on this, on and after the 30th, that the President was not limiting his 
sources of information to just what I had told him. I said the other 
day that in this meeting of March 22, the President must have been 
doing one of two things, either proceeding without any infonnation 
gained on the 21st or else he was playing a very cool game and setting 
traps for people. 

In my own mind I am convinced it was the latter, that the President 
had picked up enough information to begin to get started on this and 
that he was— he was checking a lot of people through a lot of other 
people. I know, for instance, he had me check on Bob Haldeman and 
I am sure he didn't tell Haldeman that I was doing it. 

Senator Montota. I assume when he made the statement at the 
press conference, to wit, "On March 21, as a result of serious charges 
which came to my attention, some of which were publicly reported, I 
began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter." 

I interpret this statement lo mean that he received serious charges 
personally and also through the press. 

Are you aware of any communication by anyone to the President 
with respect to serious charges which came to his attention ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I have heard the testimony here that Mr. 
Dean had this conversation w^ith him on the 21st, Mr. Haldeman was 
in some of that meeting. 

At the same time, or right around this period of time, Mr. McCord, 
of course, was making charges both in the press and through a letter 
to the district judge. I assume that all of those are referred to in that 
statement but I don't know. 

Senator Montoya. Well, you are assuming that he was referring 
partly to the report which Mr. Dean had given him ? 

Mr, Eiirlichman. I assume so but I don't know that. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 


Now, why would not the President come out with this information 
and also the information which you imparted to him on April 14 at 
his April 17 conference ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Just say that this is everything I know. 
Senator Montoya. What actually you had imparted to him and you 
indicated that you had really given him some very substantial informa- 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I think in going through the notes here 
with Senator Inouye and your examination, you see that a lot of what 
I gave him was hearsay once and twice removed. I would have felt it 
very unwise and unfair if the President had simply made a public 
statement of all of this hearsay at that point in time. It would have 
very unfairly raised charges and inferences against people that may 
ultimately prove to be totally false. So I think what it stands for, the 
whole thing stands for, Senator, is that the President was alerted, he 
began to move, that he needed a great deal more information even 
on April 18 than he had in order to say definitely this is what happened, 
this is what happened, and this is what happened, without being ter- 
ribly unfair to innocent people. , 
Senator Montoya. That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman. 
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Ehrlichman, when did the name of Judge 
Byrne first arise to your knowledge as a possibility for the FBI 
directorship ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe. Senator, that his name was on the 
original list of prospects, oh, I don't know when, perhaps back as far 
as shortly after Director Hoover's death. I am not sure but it had 
always been one of the names on a list of seven or eight names. 

Senator Weicker. And you indicated to me in my questioning last 
Friday that around this period of time, March 7 and 8, there was cer- 
tain disenchantment as to Mr. Gray. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Would it be somewhere in around that period 
that other names were being considered ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. I don't believe— I don't believe as early as 
that. To the best of my recollection, other names were not really con- 
sidered until about the time that the President went west, which 
would have been about March 30. 1 could be wrong on that. But that is 
the first that I recall any serious decision of alternatives. 

Senator Weicker. Well, in their testimony, let's just review certain 

In the conversation, the taped telephone conversation, between your- 
self and John Dean on March 7 or 8, and I am quoting verbatim now : 

Ehrlichman. Well, I think we ought to let him hang there. Let him twist slow- 
ly, slowly in the wind. 

Dean. That's right. I was in with the boss this morning and that s exactly 
where he was coming out. He said I'm not sure that Gray's smart enough to run 
the Bureau the way he's handling himself. 

Now, in your questioning about this last, and I am reading verbatim 
from the transcript, your response was : 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, Senator, I think you will remember those confirmation 
hearings and the revelations and the manner in which Mr. Gray responded dur- 
ing the hearing and I think it is fair to say there was pretty general disenchant- 
ment in the manner in which he handled himself during that time. 


What I was looking at while you were reading was the various events that 
took place starting back around the first of the mouth in those hearings and 
climaxing on the 23rd of March with Mr. Gray saying that Jolui Dean probably 
lied to the FBI and then later probably recanting that charge to Mr. Dean and 
admitting that it was an overstatement and so on. At this point in time there 
was general disenchantment of Mr. Gray's conduct in the process of confirmation 
there is not any question about it. 

Do you recall having an interview with the Chicago Tribune on 
March 28 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Well, let me go ahead and cite to you your 
responses m that interview. This, mind you. is on March 28, some 20 
days after your comments and Dean's 'comments, and I think they 
are also— the mterview can be taken in the light of what you told this 
committee last Friday. 

Question. Would the President be unhappy if the Senate refused to confirm L 
I'atrick Gray as Federal Bureau of Investigation's Director in light of the Presi- 
dent's repudiation of Gray's offer of raw FBI files to the Senate Judiciary Com- 
mittee and subsequent incidents in which Gray seemed to tacitly agree that John 
Dean might have lied to FBI agents ? 

Answer. I don't think that the Administration's position on Mr. Gray is neces- 
sarily related to those two incidents. The President supports Mr. Gray's nomina- 
tion enthusiastically and has from the beginning. As far as I know, there is no 

Question. Is there a backup point? 

Answer. No, no one else is under consideration at all. 

Question. The President made it a point to ask Ron Ziegler (White House Press 
Secretary) to express his confidence in John Dean the other day. Was the absence 
of such an expression from Mr. Gray significant in any way ? 

Answer. Oh, no. Ron, I am sure has expressed confidence in Mr Gray or he 
would if asked. I certainly do and I know the President would want me to. 

Question. He is still the man for the job as far as you are concerzied ' 

Answer. Oh, sure. 

Now, Mr. Ehrlichman, specifically I would like to laiow what the 
version IS. Did the White House support Gray's nomination or not? 
^ Mr. Ehrlichman. We supported Gray's noniination right up to the 
time it was withdrawn. 

Xow Senator, I am sure you realize when a nomination is still up here 
and still before the Senate, we support that nomination right down the 
line. TOat I may say to John Dean privately, the inhouse disenchant- 
ment with that nomination, certainly would never be reflected in state- 
ments to the press. Until the President decides that he is going to have 
to withdraw that nomination, then by George, we are going to root for 
the — we are going to root for the team. 

Senator Weicker. Can we paraphrase "by George, we are goine to 
he to the press"? J »= ^ ^ ^ 

Mr. Ehrlichman. We are certainly not going to indicate to the 
press our disenchantment, that is right. 

Senator Weicker. One last question. I just received this document 
and I think it raises some interesting questions I have not done and I 
don't want to impede the committee the necessary background on it 
except as I have the document in my hand now I am going to read it 
to you and I will show it to you. I don't know if we have a copy or not. 
It IS from the ^Y\lite House, Washington. It is dated October 2, 1972. 
For John Dean, and it is from John Ehrlichman and it has your initial 
E on your name there and I will show this to you. 

Mr. Dash. We have copies. 


Senator Weicker. Do yon have a copy of it ? Will someone please 
give Mr. Ehrlichman a copy ? 
The niemorandnm dated October 2, 1972, from the White Honse : 

For John Dean : Herb Kalmbach, thinking ahead to the possibility of the matter 
of the privilege being raised at some time or another, snggested that there 
should be a written retainer arrangement in existence in advance. 

He has written out this long-hand draft. I'm sure you'll find the basic question 
of whether or not such a letter is advisable to be the first hurdle. 

If you think that one may be inadvisable I would suggest you talk to Herb 
direct. Otherwise, would you work on a revision? John E. Ehrlichman. 

Now, the draft which Mr. Kalmbach Avrote out reads as follows : 

Dear Mr. Kalmbach: For your files this letter is to confirm that you have 
been and are now acting as legal counsel to the White House on various assign- 
ments. In such capacity as our legal counsel, we expect you to treat these matters 
as being entirely confidential. We consider all aspects of these assignments to 
be within the attorney-client privilege and you are therefore precluded from 
making any disclosures with respect to these matters. 

Should you, be requested to comment on any of your legal assignments in 
this regard, we instruct you to invoke the attorney-client privilege rather than 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 106.*] 

Senator Weicker. 'Now, this was Mr. Kalmbach's draft which ob- 
viously you read and sent on to Mr. Dean for his comments and/or 
revision. This was October 2, 1972, when in effect an attorney-client 
privilege was trying to be set up in advance. 

Would you like to explain to this committee as to whether or not, 
No. 1, this didn't arouse any suspicions on your part and why it is 
that we have to set up attorney-client privileges, attorney-client re- 
lationships in order to assert the attorney-client privilege in advance? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, as you see from the covering memo, Sen- 
ator, I am simply transmitting from Mr. Kalmbach to Mr. Dean a 
suggestion of Mr. Kalmbach. I don't relate it to any specific incidents 
or projects at all. I can't — Mr. Kalmbach would come once ever couple 
of months and call on me and we would go down a list of items and 
this was one that I recall he left with me at such a meeting. He said 
that he was concerned about sort of the informality of his arrange- 
ment and he wasn't vouching for it being a terribly good idea. As 
you see by the covering memo, I wasn't at all sure whether it was 
advisable and I referred it to John Dean. I am not sure what ever 
became of this, whether there was any action taken on it or not. 

Senator Weicker. Well, all you say is whether it is advisable is the 
first hurdle. 

Mr. Ehrt.ichmax. Right. 

Senator Weicker. Inadvisable to talk to him, correct, otherwise you 
would work on a revision ? 

Mr. Ehrlich:max. I have no — at the time I had no feel for whether 
this was a good idea or not. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, you felt this was merely an at- 
tempt of Mr. Kalmbach to formalize his relationships with the Wiite 
House ? 

Mr. Ehrliciimax. That was my assumption, yes. I think that, if you 
take it on its four comers that is what his handwritten draft says, and 
I was in no position to judge as to whether tliat was or was not appro- 
priate under the circumstances. 

♦See p. 3005. 

96-296 O - 73 - pt. 7 


Senator Weicker. Well, the whole thrust of his memorandum is to 
set up this relationship in order he does not have to make any dis- 
closures ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, as I say, I think 

Senator Weicker. It had nothing to do with employment? 

Mr. Ehrlichivian. The basic question so far as I was concerned here, 
was not whether there was a relationship or not but whether this was 
an advisable thing for the T^^ite House to be doing with an attorney 
on the outside. 

Senator Weicker. But it is your statement, this is your interpreta- 
tion of Herb Kalmbach's thinking ahead of the matter of privilege 
being raised sometime on the matter, this is what you are saying to 
John Dean ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right. 

Senator Weicker. Why would he be thinking ahead ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Obviously, I am not in a position at this time, at 
the time I wrote this, to know what his thought was, as I said. That is 
something that I asked Dean to get into with Kalmbach direct. I took 
myself out of it. 

Senator Weicker. And it did not, in conjunction with other matters 
that you had discussed with Mr. Kalmbach, it has no relationship at 
all, it is just a matter of formalizing his employment status at the 
White House ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, it may have been in connection with some- 
thing that we discussed but I would not know. 

Senator Weicker. I have no further questions at this time, Mr. 

Senator Ervin. It could be 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Chairman, counsel brings to my attention an 
omission. Senator Montoya asked me a question about Clark Mac- 
Gregor, and his response to my testimony. There is in the committee 
staff's possession a dictabelt recording of the conversation which Mr. 
MacGregor and I had which bears on this point and I would ask that 
that transcription simply be made a part of the record. 

Senator Ervin. Now, the evidence before this committee is that the 
only thing Mr. Kalmbach had done in connection with these matters 
was that he had raised money and had the money transferred through 
Ulasewicz to the defendants and their counsel in the criminal action, 
and that he had disbursed money to Segretti. 

Aren't these documents that Senator Weicker called your attention 
to susceptible of the interpretation that it was an effort to cloak him 
with a suspicious pretense of having acted in the capacity of counsel 
so he might invoke the attorney and client privilege ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, I think— the first part of your statement 
is exactly correct, you are operating on very limited knowledge based 
on the little bit of evidence that I had here about what Mr. Kalmbach 
did. He did a great many other things some of which he did for the 
AVhite House. Now, I do not conceive that money-raising effort to be 
for the Wliite House, and this attorney-client privilege statement, 
this retainer statement attempts to identifv his relationship to the 
White House, not to the Committee To Re-Elect. So I think just the 
opposite would be true in that this would relate to some of those things 


which he had done in connection with the San Clemente property 
or something that was germane to a legitimate White House activity. 

Senator Er\t;n. There would not have been any necessity for writing 
out a document to that effect. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I would hope 

Senator Er\t;n. With respect to anything he did as a private attor- 
ney for the President, I never have heard any evidence or heard it 
suggested that he was ever attorney for the White House. I thought 
he was a personal attorney to the President. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, I hope you will take the opportunity to 
take that evidence so that you would have this in proper context. 

Senator Ervin. Well, in the interest of time, I will — if there is no 
objection on the part of any Senator — I will have these two documents 
put in the record and marked as exhibits regardless of what the 
explanation was. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Mr. Chairman, may I ask this other document, 
the telephone transcript, the conversation between Mr. MacGregor and 
me be put into the record? 

Senator Ervix. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Thank you. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 107.*] 

Senator Ervix. I have no further questions. 

Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. I have no further questions. 

Senator ER^^x. Senator Inouye? Senator Gurney? Senator Mon- 
toya ? Senator Weicker ? 

If there are no further questions of Senators, then under our proce- 
dures we will turn to counsel. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Ehrlichman, I am going to move on very quickly 
to the main area of our inquiry, which is the Watergate and the 
coverup. But I will just ask a couple of questions to get back to the 
Ellsberg break-in, and not into the break-in itself and not get into 
the legal questions of the legality of the break-in itself, but the sin- 
cerity of your statement that you felt it was legal. 

Now, the first question that I have to ask in that area — is it not 
a fact, Mr. Ehrlichman, that this is the first time you have asserted 
publicly before any investigating body the claim that the break-in of 
Dr. Fielding's office was legal for national security? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, I think unlike the other investigative 
bodies this one goes far beyond mere fact and gets into these asso- 
ciated questions. The other investigative bodies, as you call them, 
have been basically grand juries, where we have not gotten into 
questions of law nor for that matter, the surrounding and sort of 
collateral questions. So that I have never been called upon, I do not 
think, to in any way treat of that subject on any previous occasion. 

Mr. Dash. But you have s):)oken publicly on this subject, have you 
not. on this so-called Ellsberg broak-in ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Well, I do not know what you call speaking 
publiclv. I have talked to the press. 

Mr. Dash. And you also appeared on Mike Wallace's program "60 

♦See p. 3007. 


Mr. EHRLiCHMAisr. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall in that interview your statement that there 
was no way to condone that action ? Now, if in fact you believed that, 
at that time, that it was legal, and had, as your attorney indicated, 
the section of the Code which gave symbolic basis for the legality, 
would you be saying there was no way to condone it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I think you will remember my testifying 
here, Mr. Dash, that at the time it was reported to me I did not con- 
done it. It was simply beyond my contemplation that there would be 
a resort to that particular — to the break-in in order to do this job 
that they were assigned to do, this investigation. 

Mr. Dash. But you have testified and spent quite a bit of your 
time testifying, in answer to questions, that the break-in was actually 
a legal act in the interest of national security. Then taking your 
statement that you did not know in advance that is what they would 
do, nevertheless, you indicated that that was perfectly legal under 
the law in the interest of national security. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe that is a sound position. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you also testify that you spoke to the Presi- 
dent in March about it and that he also indicated to you that he be- 
lieved that national security required it or that it was justified under 
national security? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, he did. 

Mr. Dash. If he did that in March — ^you are aware of his May 22 
statement. "WHiy would it be necessary for the President in his May 
22 statement to make a public apology actually, and take personal 
responsibility for what he said was illegal means that he was not 
made aware of in advance? Rather, would he not have stated, as 
President, if he thought that this was a legal act and in the interest 
of national security, that all acts of the Plumbers group were legal, 
and in the interest of national security ? Why would he feel it neces- 
sary to apologize to the people of America and take responsibility and 
say he had no foreknowledge of any legal means ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, you are asking the wrong person, Mr. 
Dash, to explain the President's statement of May 22. I was gone 
like 3 weeks at that point, and had no part in the preparation of that 

Mr. Dash. Well 

Mr. Ehrlichman. My statement here with regard to my under- 
standing of the law is not meant to speak for the President nor any- 
one except myself. This is my view based on the advice of eminent 
counsel, and I think it is a sound one. 

Mr. Dash. When did you first get that view — you said, based on 
the advice of eminent counsel ? Is it not true that you have recently 
been advised by counsel based on the statutes provided for you that 
this was a legal act ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, certainly. 

Mr. Dash. And that, therefore 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I had no occasion to brief it until I left the White 
House, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Then you never really believed at the time or had any 
viewpoint when the break-in took place that this was legal ? 


Mr. Ehrlichman [conferring with counsel] . Well, I certainly had 
a ^dewpoint, and I certainly had a strong feeling of the propriety of 
the President's actions in attemipting to plug these leaks. 

Mr. Dash. That is not my question. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, it is. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Ehrlichman, that is not the question, the question 
is the break-in. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Dash, are you going to interrupt my 
answers ? 

Mr. Dash. No, and you have used the questioning for making 
speeches throughout the hearing. 

Mr. Ehrtjchman. Let me give my answer and if you do not feel 
it is responsive why don't you point out where it is not ? 

Mr. Dash. I hope you will give a responsive answer. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I will do my very best. I understand your ques- 
tion to be whether or not I had a belief or impression that the thing 
that the President had assigned here in creating this special unit was 
legal and proper, and my answer to you is that I had a continuing 
impression that the charge given to Mr. Krogh on July 24 was in all 
respects within the President's constitutional prerogatives. I had 
then a present impression that this was well within the President's 
national security powers, and that has continued to be my impression 

Now, since I left the White House and have retained counsel, ob- 
viously, they have done some intensive briefing on the subject and you 
have seen the fruits of that in the colloquy between the chairman 
and Mr. Wilson. It is a much more refined and precise and substan- 
tiated position on the law than I had any occasion to make prior to 
this time. 

Mr. Dash. I will not at this point want to retrace the legal argu- 
ments because that is not the issue I am questioning on. 

Is it also true that you were totally ignorant, Mr. Ehrlichman, of 
the fact that actually the President and ]\Ir. Haldeman had been in- 
formed that surreptitious entries or break-ins for national security 
purposes were clearly illegal and constituted the crime of burglary 
prior to that break-in? Were you ever aware of that? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, if you are speaking of the Huston, the Tom 
Huston memos, of course, the subject there was an entirely different 
subject, and that was domestic intelligence, domestic security. Here 
you are dealing in the area of foreign intelligence and national secu- 
rity and it is quite another subject. 

Mr. Dash. Have you reviewed that document, Mr. Ehrlichman? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash. AVell, Mr. Ehrlichman, the document deals both with 
national security and with internal security and when that document 
was presented by tliis committee here in testimony, the chairman, 
with the support" of the committee, excised out those areas of national 
security. But it dealt with a total plan of dealing with intelligence 
gathering both involving foreign countries and national security as 
well as internal security, and let me read to you 

Mr. Ehrlichman. "VVliat is the document, Mr. Dash ? 


Mr. Dash. The document is the so-called Huston plan, and we have 
it here with Mr. Murphy, who has been in custody of the plan and we 
can show you the part that has been put into the record has excised out 
the national security parts. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, before we go on, just to make sure 
that the witness, who I understand has testified that he had not seen 
the document, so the witness is familiar with it, why don't we supply 
him with either the original copy which Mr. Murphy has here or other 
copies ? 

Mr. Dash. I can supply him with the copy which appeared in the 
New York Times ; it has been compared by Mr. Murphy with the origi- 
nal and it is accurate with the original but we can also show him the 
one Mr. Murphy has. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, to shorten this up. Counsel, I am not aware 
that I ever saw 

Senator Ervin. Just 1 minute. I think Mr. Murphy can show you the 
original. I think it would be better than the other one. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Is it a question whether I am familiar with this 
document ? 

Mr. Dash. No, no, I asked whether or not you were aware whether 
the President and Mr. Haldeman had been ever informed prior to this 
break-in, that such break-ins for national security were, in fact, clearly 
illegal and constitute the crime of burglary. Mr. Murphy can show you 
at least that section I am talking about. 

[Witness confers with Mr. Murphy.] 

Mr. Dash. Yes, of course, counsel can see it. 

Mr. Wilson. I should assume so. What are all these pasted pieces 
here ? 

Mr. Dash. The pasted pieces, Mr. Wilson, were pasted on to cover up 
areas which the committee believed involved national security. 

Mr. Wn^soN. Well, I don't want anything handed up here which has 
expurgated portions of it. 

Mr. Dash. Underneath is the actual document. 

Senator Er\in. Well, the committee excised those in the interest 
of national security. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Dash. But they deal with national security and I am going to 
read a statement in this report which refers both to national security 
mvolvmg foreign powers and internal security which was the ration- 
ale of the persons who prepared this statement. 

Mr. Wn^soN. Are you going to leave out any part of that document, 
Mr. Dash ? 

Mr. Dash. No, I am reading right from the document now. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Whereabouts ? 

Mr. Wn.soN. The one Mr. Murphy just showed me ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. WiLsox. Verbatim and complete. 

Senator Er\^x. No, sir, we are not. These documents related to both 
the methods to be applied in gathering international intelligence and 
domestic intelligence— the same thing. We left it out at the instance of 
the security agents of this country, and because of our own conviction 
that we did not want to expose methods of obtaining international 
intelligence, we excised that. 


Mr. Dash. ISIr. Wilson, the content, and I think in the interest of 
national security, the content of what the document says about na- 
tional security is not relevant to the question I am putting to Mr. 
Ehrlichman. The fact that it dealt with national security and in- 
volving foreign powers is relevant, and I want to read the statement 
that was given to all of the parties who were planning this, and ulti- 
mately presented to the President of the United States, and I quote : 

"Use of this technique" — meaning surreptitious entry and breaking 
in, either for national security or internal security purposes — "is 
clearly illegal. It amounts to burglary." 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, wait, Mr. Chairman, I object to reading 
portions of this document. I ask for the time it takes for me to read 
verbatim everything that Mr. Murphy holds in his hand before this 
examination continues. 

Senator Ervin. Well, your motion is denied. This committee has 
some regard for preserving the information that relates to the methods 
of gathering international intelligence, 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Dash has just given his own 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Wilson, your motion is overruled by the com- 
mittee unless somebody objects. 

Mr. Wilson. But I have a new motion and that Mr. Dash is para- 
phrasing this document. 

Mr. Dash. I am not. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You just did. 

Mr. Dash, I am not paraphrasing, I am saying, and I think the com- 
mittee found, by the very fact that it excised out portions, that this 
provision that I am now reading dealt with both national security and 
international security. But I am not referring to the specific items of 
national security for the reason the committee excised it. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, Mr. Dash, I just looked at what you intend 
to paraphrase, then I must strongly disagree with your description. 

Senator Ervin. The Chair will have to say the chairman is quite 
familiar with these documents, and the Chair is not going to divulge 
anything about the methods by which our very security agencies col- 
lect foreign intelligence, and they were excised from the thing at the 
unanimous consent of the committee. 

Mr. Dash. At the advice, by the way, of the various security agen- 
cies which reported to this committee that they dealt with national 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't quarrel with their advice. I quarrel with 
your paraphrasing, Mr. Dash. 

Senator Baker, Mr. Chairman, could I say a word at this point? 
I understand the point Mr. Wilson makes to be that he wants to see 
the document that is the source material from which questions are 

Would it be helpful to have a clean expurgated copy of this docu- 
ment deleting those sections designated as national security interest 
supplied to you so that you can be interrogated on those portions? 

Mr. Wilson. What concerns me, Mr. Vice Cliairman, is that ac- 
cording to Mr. Ehrlichman's last answer, the paraphrase which 
Mr. Dash gave just now does not fit the text. 


Senator Weicker. T^Hiy don't we go back one step, and not para- 
phrase, and I don't want to get into the argument whether you were 
or weren t but why doesn't somebody pick up that document and read 
It and then ask the questions? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I may be able to shorten this up, Mr. Vice 
Chairman. Apparently what Mr. Dash is doing here is charo-ing me 
with somebody's opmioii in this document without having fii-st laid 
the foundation that I have ever seen the document before or par- 
ticipated m the promulgation of the opinion, and 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Elirlichman, I asked you a question. 

Mr. Wilson. Let the witness answer the question 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Wilson, please. 

Mr. Thompson. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, as I understood it when 
the gavel was used just then Mr. Ehrlichman was in the middle of an 
answer, I do think it's unfair 

Mr. Dash. No ; it wasn't. 

Mr. Thompson. Excuse me, Mr. Dash. We ought to let the 
witness answer the question and then if it's inappropriate and 

Mr Dash. ]Mr Thompson, I don't want to get into a debate with 
you. feo tar we have not heard answers but all we have had are 

Mr. Thompson. That is your conclusion. 

Mr. Dash. I want an answer and I don't want counsel to interfere 
with the answer. 

Senator Ervin. Wait a minute, I think the Chair can clean up all of 
this controversy, and we will get along a little faster. 

The Chair has read all of the documents referred to. The documents 
cover the fields of foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence, and 
u ^^C^iir ^^^^-"^"'^'^ anything they applv the same certain principles to 
both. We excised the references to foreign intelligence in the interest of 
national security at the request of various intelligence gathering par- 
ties, and the documents relating to both— the same thing— recommend 
the present restrictions should be modified to permit the use of this 
technique, that is : surreptitious entrv. "The use of this technique," the 
document states, "is clearly illegal. It amounts to burglary. It is also 
highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. How- 
ever, It IS also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intel- 
ligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion." 

Now that is what it shows. 
_ Mr. Dash. The question Mr. Ehrlichman was not that I was charg- 
ing you with knowledge of this nor charging vou with the reasoning 
behind this. I merelv asked you the question, "Were you aware that the 
President of the United States had been informed of this plan, that 
this technique was clearly illegal and amounted to burglarv?"'That 
was the simple question I asked and again you jumped ahead and 
stated that I charged you with a particular thing. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I was not. 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Now I take it also that when such plans are made, and 
these were made through an interagency group involving the CIA, 
the FBI, and other security groups that are ultimately remembered 


for the action of the President of the United States, that such plans 
are carefully researched and evaluated. Would that be a fair 
assumption ? 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, that is not the way we are going to 
conserve time. I think what we are going through now is evidence that 
this committee is in fact tired. But that is — the question of whether it% 
evidence or not is something that we will pass on, and I frankly am 
not interested in what this witness tliinks about whether it is or is not 
evidence. I am interested in what he knows or doesn't Iniow. I re- 
spectfully recommend that we move on to hard evidence. 

Senator Erven. The witness has stated that he knew nothing about 
these documents, and the documents are in evidence and the committee 
can draw such conclusions from the documents. I don't believe that the 
witness ought to be compelled to testify about matters that he said he 
knew nothing about. 

Mr. Dash. But you did testify, Mr. Ehrlichman, that in March of 
this year you spoke to the President and discussed this particular entry 
and he said that he knew that it was legal and justified for national 
security. Did he mention to you that he had received any kind of a con- 
trary advice at any other time ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well now, that question makes an assumption not 
in evidence, Mr. Dash, that the President said he knew it was legal. I 
don't believe I have ever testified to that. Maybe some other witness 
has, but I don't know where you got that idea. I could not answer the 
question with that assumption in it. 

Mr. Dash. I thought that was your testimony. I asked you the ques- 
tion earlier whether or not in March you talked to the President and 
the President said that he believed it was legal and justified for 
national security and I thought you answered in the affirmative. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I certainly would not want to give you the 
impression that the President had given me a legal opinion on this at 
that time. But what the President said was that he felt that it was 
important, and it was necessary, that in the context of the massive 
thefts, the turnover to the Russian Embassy and all the context of that 
operation that he certainly could not criticize the men who had under- 
taken this in good faith believing that they were responding to the 
urgency of the circumstances. 

Mr. Dash. All right. The testimony you do leave with the committee 
is that your own personal evaluation as to its legality was a recent one 
after advice of counsel ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I certainly would not want to leave that 
impression either, Mr. Dash, and I would simply stand on my actual 

Mr. Dash. Well, the record will so show. 

Now, you testified that you met and in effect your log shows that you 
met twice with Mr. Dean on June 19, 1972, which was 2 days after the 
break-in at the Watergate, once at noon, alone, and again at 4 p.m. with 
Mr. Clawson, Mr. Colson, and Mr. Kehrli. Now at the noon meeting 
with Mr. Dean, can vou e:ive us vour recollection as to what that meet- 
ing was about and whether you were discussing the Watergate break- 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes ; T believe we were, and T believe that it was 
basically to determine between us the inquiries which I felt he ought to 
make in order to try to determine what had taken place. 


Mr. Dash. Did he not at that time report to you that he had spoken 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, I don't believe so. 

Mr. Dash. He made no report at that time to you as to any of the 
investigations lie had made during the day of the lyth i 

Mr. Ehrlichman. 1 have the impression that Mr. Dean hadn't been 
at work very long at that time, and that he was just getting started. 

Mr. Dash. All right. 

Now, at 4 p.m., what was the purpose of the meeting with Mr. Dean, 
Mr. Clawson, Mr. Colson, and Mr. Kehrli i 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The principal purpose, as I recall, was to be in 
a position to answer inquiries which, I guess, Mr. Clawson was get- 
ting or the press people were getting, about Hmit's White House 
status, of whether he was still an employee of the White House, if not 
when he had terminated and under what circumstances, and so forth. 

Mr. Dash, And isn't that when Mr. Kehrli was brought up to check 
the record 'i Would Mr. Kehrli have the record of that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Kehrli was the stall' secretary and would 
have to be involved in any discussion of that kind. There was another 
subject or two discussed at the time but as 1 recall, that was the pre- 
cipitating question. 

Mr. Dash. Well, aside from Mr. Hunt on the payroll, wasn't the 
focus at that meeting on the question of Hunt himself? Hunt's status 
at the White House and also the question that Mr. Hunt had a safe 
in the White House and that the safe ought to be opened ? 

Wasn't that part of the discussion ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, it was, as I previously testified. 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

And actually that safe was opened at that time on the evening of 
the 19th? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know. I think it must have been either 
that evening or the next morning. 

Mr. Dash. Now, what was the concern and who brought up the con- 
cern of what the contents of Mr. Hunt's safe would show ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't recall, Mr. Dash. Somebody at the meet- 

I think the way it came up was not so much a personal concern as 
it was an inquiry by the investigation — either the Metropolitan Po- 
lice and/or the FBI, as to whether Hunt had any belongings in the 
White House. 

Mr. Dash. Now, on June 20, 1972, you met at 9 o'clock with Mr. 
Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell joined by Mr. Dean at 9:45, joined by 
Attorney General Kleindienst at 9:55, and then at 10:30 you had a 
meeting with the President. 

Was that also a followup to find out what was going on in terms 
of Watergate ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think this was the process of trjdng to get 
everybody together who might know anything, to try and get a pic- 
ture of what the investigation was going to be, whether there might 
be other people involved, just what the — ^to try and get the campaign 
director and the head of the Department of Justice and everybody 
together in one place to ask questions. 


Mr. Dash. Now, by that time Mr. Dean had testified that he inter- 
viewed INIagriider, Liddy, and he also testified that he told you about 
Liddy's activity, about the fact that Liddy had stated that Magruder 
had pushed him into the break-in and he also testified that he briefed 
you on the earlier meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office on January 27 and 
February 4, 1972. 

Did Mr. Dean give you all of that information at that time ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, he did not give me all of that information. 
He gave me some of it. 

Mr. Dash. What part of it do you acknowledge that he gave you? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. By the time he came in at 9 :45 that morning or 
at what time ? 

Mr. Dash. During that meeting. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, during that meeting. I don't believe that 
Mr. Dean contributed very much affirmative information at that 
meeting. I think that meeting waiS more for the purpose of hearing 
from Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Kleindienst, what the progress of the in- 
vestigation was and that was known at the time. My impression is 
that Mr. Dean told me about his conversation — part of his conversa- 
tion with Mr. Liddy at some other time. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know when ? 

Mr. EHRLicHMAisr. No, I don't, but the best recollection I have is 
that it was at some time more remote to his conversation with Liddy 
than this if in fact it occurred when you say it did. 

Mr. Dash. Now, the meeting at iO :30 that you had with the Presi- 
dent, did you report to the President what you had learned from the 
parties who attended the earlier meeting ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I told Senator Baker, I believe, the other day that 
Watergate was not discussed at that meeting and since then I have 
rechecked what sketchy notes I have and I find I was in error on that. 
I am sure there must have been some discussion of the Watergate with 
the President on that occasion on the 20th. 

There were three principal subjects covered at that meeting. One 
of them was Government wiretapping and it is obvious to me that 
there must have been some Watergate discussion that led into this 
discussion in which I took an assignment from him to get some sta- 
tistics for him about the incidents of Federal wiretapping in domestic- 
foreign situations, that is, situations involving TT.S. citizens and 
foreign governments which was a statistic he did not have and which 
he wanted. 

Now, I am surmising and reconstructing because I have no direct 
notes on this, but I am just — I am just certain that we did discuss 
Watergate at the outset of that meeting. 

Mr. Dash. Well, now, on the 23d there is no indication that you met 
with the President between June 20 and 23. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. I met with the President in the company of 
others on the 21st at 12 :38 and at 5 :20 on the 22d. 

Mr. Dash. Did you meet with him long on the 22d? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash. I mean by yourself. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I see. 

Mr. Dash. And the reason T ask that is that on the 23d you did have 
your meeting with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Helm and Mr. Walters and 


since the President, in his May 22 speech specifically says he told both 
you and Mr. Haldeman that he was concerned about the CIA problems 
and asked you to see to it that the investigation did not uncover these 
things, on the 20th when you met with the President, did the President 
give you such instructions or raise these questions with you ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. Those instructions came through Mr, Halde- 
man and were given to me I think the morning of the day of the meet- 
ing which would have been the 23d. 

Mr. Dash. So actually the President's statement on May 22 that he 
instructed Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman, really should have 
been, he instructed Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, no, because he instructed me to attend the 
meeting but he instructed me through Mr. Haldeman and a great 
many of my requests from the President would come either from the 
staff secretary or from Mr. Haldeman or possibly someone else. It 
was not always face to face. 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Hunt's safe was opened on the evening of 
June 19 according to the testimony received and Mr. Dean met with 
you on June 21. Mr. Dean has testified that prior to that meeting he 
had examined the contents of the safe which were placed in his office 
and at this time, did he inform you of the contents of the safe on the 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, your question, of course, assumes that Mr. 
Dean knew the contents of the safe. I have heard him testify both ways. 
Maybe I am wrong, but I thought his testimony was that he did not 
know the contents of the safe, but that Mr. Fielding had inspected 
the contents of the safe. 

I recall only one conversation with Mr. Dean about the contents of 
the safe in any sort of descriptive terms and I am sorry I cannot tell 
you whethei- it was on that occasion or the following week, but what 
he described for me was simply that there had been papers, a gun, some 
electronic equipment of some kind which I have heard described 
variously as a tape recorder and other kinds of electronic equipment, 
and that he reported to me that Fielding felt that some of the papers 
were very politically sensitive. 

Now, that was the full report, and when he gave that to me, whether 
it was the end of the week of the 19th or some time at the beginning of 
the week of the 26th, I am not able to tell you. 

Mr. Dash. Did he not, when he reported to you about the contents of 
the safe, indicate it also included a forged cable involving President 
Kennedy and the so-called Diem assassination ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; he did not. 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Dean has testified, and whether it was on this 
day when he reported to you on the contents or at a later day, that when 
he told you about the contents with regard to the briefcase, which ap- 
parently had some electronic equipment in it, that you said or told 
him to deep-six the contents. 

Now, did you tell him to deep-six the contents when he gave you a 
description of the contents of the safe ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I testified in response to Senator Gurney's 
question on that. In point of fact, Mr. Dash, what Mr. Dean testified 
to here, you are confusing one of his — one of his press leaks with his 
testimony, I think. He testified here that I told him to get rid of the 
briefcase, not the contents. 


You probably read in one of the news magazines the other version, 
but the fact is that I never gave him any suggestion or direction to do 
either one. 

Mr. Dash. I think Mr. Dean did testify to deep-six the briefcase 
and certainly not take the contents out before he deep-sixed it. But 
you say you never gave him that instruction ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Do you use the term deep-six? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Do I use it ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I used it quite a bit since it was suggested 

Mr. Dash. Prior to that ? 

Mr. Ehrijchman. Prior to that I do not think that was a familiar 
part of my lexicon. 

Mr. Dash. Apparently Dean did not seem to understand either what 
you meant and when asked, is it his testimony that you mentioned the 
fact he goes over the bridge and he could drop it into the water. Do 
you recall that testimony ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. I recall some testimony — oh, do I recall the 
testimony ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. I recall hearing him say that here. 

Mr. Dash. And do you recall having told him that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No ; I did not tell him that. I do recall a conver- 
sation with Mr. Dean about the river because just at this time Mr. 
Dean's house was in the process of being flooded by the Potomac, and 
we had quite a bit of discussion about the fact that he was away from 
work several days, sandbagging his house and moving the furniture, 
and so on, and we were discussing that in the context of his having held 
this material from the FBI for what he was concerned might be con- 
sidered to be an inordinate period of time. 

Mr. Dash. And so he may have gotten mixed up in your question 
about the house and the river 


Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. With the contents? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. I do not think that Mr. Dean is at all mixed 
up. I think he knows exactly what he is trying to do. 

Mr. Dash. He is trying to testify. 

Now, Mr. Fielding testified in the depositions in the Democratic 
National Committee suit on May 15, 1973. It was Mr. Dean's testimony 
before this committee that after he alleged 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Fielding testified that it was Mr. Dean's 
testimony ? 

Mr. Dash. No, no. I have not finished my question, please. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I am already mixed up. Could we start 

Mr. Dash. Yes. Mr. Dean testified after you had instructed him to 
deep-six or drop the briefcase in the water, that he went to see Mr. 
Fielding and reported back to Mr. Fielding that that was the instruc- 
tion they were concerned about, primarily because too many people 
had actually seen what had come out of the safe. 


Now, Mr. Fielding has given his deposition in the Democratic Na- 
tional Committee suit on May 15, 1973, and let me read you what Mr. 
Fielding states in that deposition. 

In a question concerning the conversation he had with Mr. Dean, his 
answer was: 

I would say it was closer to the 20th than the 27th. I am afraid I cannot really 
pinpoint it much more than that. In the course of the conversations that we had, 
John indicated that there was a lot of concern about this material and we had 
a discussion about it. I would have said this is not a quote, that it would be 
unfortunate if some of this stuff leaked out or is revealed to the press. By the 
same token, it all has to be turned over. It is all evidence, even though obviously, 
some of it is totally unrelated to the break-in. In the context of that kind of con- 
versation, Mr. Dean indicated to me that Mr. Ehrlichman had suggested to him 
this was in the context of a conversation about a briefcase, that he deep-six the 

Now, this is Mr. Fielding's deposition recalling what Mr. Dean told 

Now, I just raise that to you on the basis that Mr. Dean testified 
that he had gone back to tell Mr. Fielding that you had told him that 
and Mr. Fielding has so deposed that he has. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, Mr. Dash, it is perfectly silly to suggest 
that I would go to the elaborate lengths that I did in making sure that 
the Secret Service and Kehrli and the GSA and somebody from Dean's 
office was present at the opening of the safe and that I would give in- 
structions for taking custody of the contents and then make a sug- 
gestion like that. I mean, I think you have to give me credit for un- 
derstanding the importance of evidence in a case of this kind and I did 
understand that and on the 19th made darn sure that that evidence was 
preserved in a way that if there were a subsequent trial, the evidence 
could be identified and placed in evidence carefully. 

Mr. Dash. It was Mr. Dean's testimony that he had to so instruct 
you that that was the problem, that so many people had seen it that 
it would be inadvisable to do it. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, why don't you ask Mr. Colson, Mr. Kehrli, 
and Mr. Clawson, who were also at that meeting, who it was that estab- 
lished the process by which the integrity of that evidence would be 
preserved, and then perhaps you will get some independent view of it. 

Mr. Dash. Is it not true that you did seek to ask Mr. Clawson and Mr. 
Colson certainly by a telephone call concerning whether or not you 
had made such a statement to Mr. Dean ? And you have copies — I am 
now referring to a transcript of a telephone call that you had with Mr. 
Clawson which your attorney has provided under subpena to us. There 
is no date on this transcript. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There is a date on mine. 

Mr. Dash. No date on mine. What date do you have ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. April 17. 

Mr. Dash. April 17 does appear on the Colson transcript. Now 

Mr. Ehrlichman. For some reason they excised the date from your 

Mr. Dash. Now, I will read this telephone conversation and ask that 
it be made part of the record. It is short and I can read it but I will 
refer primarily to where you were asking Mr. Clawson to recall being 
at a meeting and where the question of Hunt's safe had been discussed 


and at which Mr. Kehrli and Mr. Colson and Mr. Dean were present. 

Now, that meeting took place clearly on June 19. 

Senator Ervin. Without objection, it will be marked as an exhibit. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 108.*] 

Mr. Dash. It is interesting because he says he has a vague memory 
and he does not recall the details and you say at the bottom. [Reading :] 

Well, it is interesting because Dean who as you know, has talked to the U.S. 
attorney at great length, cites some comments of mine in that meeting as 
evidence of corrupt attitude on my part and I'm looking for anybody who can 
help me to recall what took place there. 

Clawson. That's a helluva note, John. 

Ehrlichman. I agree. 

Clawson. If you want me to be forthwith and straightforward with you, I'll 
recollect anything you want me to. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. That is what I testified to the other day. 
Mr. Dash. Mr. Ehrlichman says : 

Well, no, let me, let me tell you what my problem is and then you can . . . I've 
got to tell what I recall and what I don't recall. He alleges that I said two 
things at that meeting. One, that we ought to deep six the contents of the safe, 
quote, unquote. And, two, that we ought to get Hunt to leave the country. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Go on. 
Mr. Dash. I will read it. 

Oh, I could . . . listen, John, if anything like that. If either one of those two 
things were said that would be viWd in my mind. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think the word is "recollection." Vivid in my 

Mr. Dash. "Vivid in my mind" is what I have here. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is funny. Mine says "recollection." 

Mr. Dash. I wonder why we have a different transcript. This is 
all we got from your attorney. We did not retype this. 

Let me read on and see if we have any other differences. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I would think so. I would think so. 

Clawson. And that's objectively. 

Ehrlichman. Now, in point of fact, Dean phoned Liddy and asked Liddy to 
have Hunt leave the country. 

Clawson. That's new news to me. 

Ehrlichman. Yeah, but you see this . . . and what he's doing is- saying well, 
I was just being a good German and carrying out orders. 

Clawson. No, I would have absolutely no trouble in remembering either one 
of those two things had that been said. 

Ehrlichman. Well, OK. 

Clawson. I would just remember that. 

Ehrlichman. Yeah, that's a fairly dramatic event. OK, thank you very much. 
Awfully sorry to have bothered you. I just don't understand. 

Clawson. If there's anything I can do in this thing, please let me . . . 

Ehrlichman. I will. I will. Thank you. Ken. 

All right. Now, why — if the only meeting that Mr. Clawson attended 
with you during that period of time was on June 10, during the day 
prior to the time the safe was opened — why would you be asking Mr. 
Clawson if he could recollect whether you had said anything to Mr. 
Dean about deep-sixing anything about the safe? It was obviously at 
the meeting on the 19th, when the safe was not yet open, such a conver- 
ation could have occurred then. 

*See p. S009. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, this was the version that was reported to 
the President as having taken place at this meeting on the 15th or 16th 
by Mr. Petersen who in turn was reporting what Dean was alleging 
to the U.S. attorneys, so the President confronted me with this and I 
said, "when was this supposed to have happened," and he said, "well, 
what they tell me is that it happened at this m.eeting where you all 
discussed Hunt and this safe and all this business." So that is why I 
focused on that meeting as the time that Dean alleged this was sup- 
posed to have happened. That is the best information I had at the time. 

Mr. Dash. All right, but it is quite obvious that since the safe had 
not been opened yet, and taking what you say to be true, Dean cer- 
tainly would not be claiming that you were telling him to deep-six 
something on that day. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Dash, Mr. Dean has had so many versions 
of these stories that I do not think you can assume that any one of 
these would be more reasonable than any other. I appreciate your situ- 
ation vis-a-vis Mr. Dean and the committee, but I think you have to 
recognize that there are many, many versions of this story that have 
been floated to you and the prosecutor and all in the interests of 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean has testified that whatever discussions took 
place about deep-six took place after the safe was open and, 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, not — I submit 

Mr. Dash. He has testified to this under oath. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, here. 

Mr. Dash. And, therefore, what I suggest to you is that Mr. Clawson 
would not be a person who might have recalled that even though you 
may have recalled that was the date that was relevant at the time. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. If you accept that version at that time. Now, the 
thing that I said to you, Mr. Dash, was you get Mr. Clawson and ask 
him who it was that hedged the contents of this safe about with several 
witnesses and with a procedure to guarantee the integrity of the evi- 
dence in that safe and I think he will tell you that I was the one who 
insisted upon that procedure at the meeting on the 19th. 

Mr. Dash. All right. You again called Mr. Colson on April 17 in 
which you made a similar inquiry 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. Concerning that. 

Now, your conversation with Mr. Colson is vou say, "Two quick 
questions", after the preliminary introduction when vou said "hello." 

Senator Baker. ^Vliat are you reading from, Mr. Dash ? 

Mr. Dash. The transcript of April 17, conversation between Mr. 
Colson and Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Senator Er\^n. Without objection, it will be marked as an exhibit. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 109.*] 

Senator Baker. Does the witness have a copy ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have a copy. I have found that the transcript of 
the other conversation I had did not jibe with Mr. Dash's. 

Mr. Dash. Wlien I was reading, Avere there any otlier items? 

♦See p. 3010. 


Mr. Ehrljchmax. I do not know, Mr. Dash. I was more interested in 
5'oiir assertion than anything else. 

Mr. Dash. I was just reading. I was not inserting. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Xo. Assertions, not insertions. 

Mr. Dash. I said I was reading, not asserting. 

You say : 

CoLSON. Two quick questions. 

I think it is the first time you get into the subject matter. 

One thing I should tell you is that our great find last night really started ac- 
celerating. Something coming out this morning. Dean involved. Now I notice 
the LA Times has it this morning but the people that Shapiro has been getting 
information from, you know, the town is buzzing with, is alive with the story, 
so I doii't think we have a helluva lot of time. 

Can you tell us what that great find was last night that was coming 
up in. the LA Times ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No, sir, I sure cannot. 
Mr. Dash. All right. Mr. Colson says: 

I just thought I would let you know that. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I appreciate it. 

Colson. Did he, when he went over there, was he given any immunity? 

Ehklichman. Not yet. What they've done, apparently 

Colson. They shouldn't give it to him. 

Ehrlichman. I know it. What they said to him is that unless he turns up 

corroborated evidence against Haldeman and me 

Colson. Is that who he's trying to make? 

Ehrlichman. Sure. 

Colson. Who, Dean is? 

Ehrlichman. Yep. 

Colson. That's John Mitchell again. 

I guess I'll read this — 

Son of a bitch. 

Ehrlichman. Unless he does that he doesn't get immunity. Now my grapevine 
tells me that you are going to be summoned over there today. 

Who was the grapevine, by the way, Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. At that point in time I do not know. I do not 
know who that would have been. 

Mr. Dash. Would it have been Mr. Petersen ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No. Mr. Petersen was not my source for anything 
at that time. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Colson says : 

Oh, really? 
And you say, 

Yep. And that they're going to ask you about a meeting in my office which 
Dean has highlighted as the central gemstone 

Interesting term there. Any purpose for using it? 

in the case against me and so just in case you get hauled over there before 11 
o'clock, maybe I'd better tell you about it. It was a meeting that Kehrli, Clawson. 
you. Dean and I had here. 

Colson. I wasn't there. 

Ehrlichman. In my office. 

Colson. I was not there. Dean tried this one out on me Friday night, and I 
said the only thing I can ever recall, .John, is I once told you I thought it was a 
stupid, god-ciamn thing for Hunt to be unavailal)le. 

Ehrlichman. Well, that's the meeting where supposedly I ordered him to tell 
Hunt to leave the country. 

96-296 O - 73 - pt. 7 - 12 


OoLSON. Never heard that. And I will so state under oath. 

Ehrlichman. Or that I admonished everyone that we ought to figure out some 
way to deep-six the contents of Hunt's safe. 

OoLSON. No. No way. I was the one who said go get Hunt's safe and be sure 
it's preserved for the FBI. 

Ehrlichman. Right. 

CoLSON. A, and I think A is the earlier answer, and B, it's stupid to get an- 
other country. But that was in my office, not yours. And you weren't present. 
I can handle that one easily. 

Ehrlichman. But you were not in a meeting here? 

Ck)LS0N. Well, I may have been but I sure don't remember that. 

Ehrlichman. That's the way. OK. 

CoLSON. Alright? I can handle that. 

Ehrlichman. Thank you. I'll see you at 11. 

CoLsoN. There's a couple of things you and I need to do to protect each other's 
flank here but we'll talk about that, but no, I'm serious. 

Ehrlichman. Fair enough. 

CoLSON. Let's get it clearly understood that ison of a bitch doesn't get immunity. 
I want to nail him. 

Ehrlichman. Well, I'm doing my best. 

CoLSON. No. I want to nail him. I'll take immunity first. 

Ehrlichman — 


Senator Baker [now presiding]. Just a minute. Mr. Dash, if you 
will suspend for just a moment. 

The chairman admonished me before he left to take care of other 
business to tell the audience and all those present that lie is entirely 
serious about maintaining decorum in this hearing room. It is inappro- 
priate for the audience to respond in any way to the statements made 
by the witness, by counsel, or to anything else. On the express and ex- 
plicit instructions of the chairman I caution the audience that the 
committee will not permit demonstrations. 

Mr. Dash. I think you say "OK." He says, "All right," and there 
is a thanks at the end. 

Now, Mr. Colson in that discussion indicated to you that he did not 
recall being at least at the meeting with Mr. Clawson, Mr. Kehrli, 
you. and. Mr. Dean. But it is true he recalls that a discussion concern- 
ing getting Hunt out of the country was in his office and you were not 
there. But again, INIr. Colson claiming not being present at the meeting 
or on the 19th. Could Mr. Colson in any way verify for you that you 
had not said to Mr. Dean to deep-six the contents ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I am satisfied. Mr. Colson was present. I 
have an office log system that logs people in and out of my door on an 
actuality basis, so to speak. 

Only the people who actually go in and out are logged and they are 
logged at the time that they do go in and out. So, it would be— you 
know, there is always room for some error, but I think it a practical 
certainty that he was there in fact. And I was much more interested 
in whether or not he had any recollection of such a conversation. 

I think there are two important things in that conversation, Mr. 
Dash, that you kind of skipped over. One was the fact that Mr, Dean 
tried this story out on Mr. Colson which goes to my answer to Senator 
Gurney the other day that at a point in time, right around this second 
or third week in April, Mr. Dean was very busily engaged in planting 
stories here and there as lie attem]:)ted to plant this story with me that 
I supposedly ordered him to have Hunt leave the country. 


The second thing is on the matter of immunity, I had been con- 
sistently taking the position since March 22, that no one in the ^Vhite 
House should seek immunity in any form whatsoever, that it was ex- 
tremely inimical to the interests of the President and the White House 
for someone in the White House staff to, in any way, seek to be excused 
for his actions under any circumstances. And my efforts — and I should 
have said this in response to Senator Gumey's question of a few min- 
utes ago with respect to what we were talking about during the days 
April 15 to 30— one of the things that we were talking about was the 
public policy that might be involved in anyone in the White House 
seeking to be immunized from the consequences of his act as an induce- 
ment to testify, and I felt strongly then and I was continuing to feel 
strongly at this time that that was wholly an improper procedure. 

Mr. Dash. I just have this followup on that, just one or two quick 
questions on the immunity. 

Is it true, Mr. Ehrlichman, that you called Mr. Kleindienst sometime 
before April 14 and expressed the same view that nobody should be 
offered immunity ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Prior to April 14 ? 
Mr. Dash. Prior to April 14, yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well. I recall— I recall calling Mr. Kleindienst on 
about March 28, and inquiring of him about the procedures involved 
in securing immunity, and then at some point in time I conveyed to 
him the President's decision that no one in the White House should be 
extended immunity. 

Mr. Dash. The question is whether you personally 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I conveyed ? 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. Urged not the President's position but you 

personally suggested to Mr. Kleindienst _ 

Mr. Ehrlichman. As a personal point of view ? 
Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, it is not out of the question because I was 
strongly stating that point of view consistently through this period 
of time. 

Mr. Dash. Right, and did you participate in the preparation of the 
President's statement of April 17 ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. In which he stated there was nobody in the White House 
that will be offered immunity in criminal investigations. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. At this point, Mr. Chairman, as I see the time— but I 
have a number of other questions, I suggest it is time to recess. 

Senator Ervin. I would suggest we run 10 minutes more and recess 
at 12 :30. 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Mitchell has testified that on June 21 he was 
debriefed by Mr. Mardian and Mr. LaRue on their talk with Mr. 
Liddy and that was the first time that he heard about Liddy's opera- 
tions which he referred to— I mentioned earlier to you— what he called 
the \Vhite House horrors. They included the Ellsberg break-in, the 
Diem cable, the spiriting out of Dita Beard from town, and ceJ^J-'^"^ 
wiretapping activities. He listed a number wliich lie called n hite 
House horrors and I had had them as so-called Liddy operations and 


this is the first time that he learned about them. He said on the 21st — ^I 
know you have testified that maybe Mr. Mitchell's memory isn't cor- 
rect, but are we really agreeing on the same thing ? I think your testi- 
mony — when you referred to your diary and had certain meetings with 
various persons concerning the operation of the special investigative 
unit — at that time did you, when you had those meetings, discuss with 
them, especially Mr. Mit^chell, the break-in of the Ellsberg psychia- 
trist's office ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is a very complicated 

Mr. Dash. All right. Let me put it much more clearly. You have 

Mr. Ehrlichman. All right. 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. That Mr. Mitchell's statement to us, that 
the first time he heard of the AVTiite House horrors and the Plumbers' 
activities involving Mr. Liddy, was the 21st, was in error because you 
had reported sometime earlier to Mr. Mitchell on this special investiga- 
tive unit. Is that not correct ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, you see, we get into problems now, just for 
instance in that question. The first time I discussed the so-called 
Plumbers' activities and Mr. Liddy with Mr. Mitchell would be quite 
different than the first time I heard of or discussed these other things. 

Mr. Dash. Right. That was the question I was trying to clarify be- 
cause the question 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You see, what I testified to, in answer to a ques- 
tion, was that the existence of the special unit and its function, its 
purpose, as the President conceived it and the charter which he gave 
to Mr. Krogh on July 24, was discussed with several agency heads and 
Cabinet officers almost immediately thereafter. 

Now, I don't think I was asked the question whether or not I ever 
discussed the Ellsberg break-in as such with Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall 
ever doing so. 

Mr. Dash. Well, the question that came out was Mr. Mitchell's tes- 
timony that he learned of the Plumbers on the 21st when Mr. Mardian 
debriefed Mr. Liddy. He learned of Liddy's operations involving the 
break-in, the Diem cable, and the other things, and he said he first 
learned of that, what he called White House horrors, on June 21. 

Now, on the next day, on June 22, you met with Mr. MacGregor, Mr. 
Colson, Mr. Mitchell at 9, and then you had a second meeting with Mr. 
Mitchell alone at 11 :45. I know you have been asked about that meet- 
ing at 11 :45, because apparently there was a phone call in between, and 
the question I put to you is whether or not Mr. Mitchell, at that meet- 
ing, told you about what he learned from Mr. Mardian. He has so 
testified that he did report to you what he heard, and he reported 
about the so-called White House horrors and talked to you about the 
need to keep the lid on to protect the election. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. As I told Senator Gurney, I can't recall specifi- 
cally the reason that Mr. Mitchell called or I called him. We got to- 
gether at 11 :45 on the 22d. I can say this, though, with great assurance ; 
I never knew until the other day when it was testified to here, that 
Gordon Liddy had had some part in the Dita Beard business. I just 
never heard that from anyone. Nor had I heard about this cable until 
it was — whether discussed in the press as a leak from your staff or else 


in the testimony here, one or the other, but contemporaneous with all 
of this, I was not aware of either of those events at all. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Mitchell never informed you of that. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. By the way, if in fact Dita Beard had been spirited out 
through the help of Mr. Liddy or Mr. Hunt, and if in fact Mr. Liddy 
had something to do with the Diem cable forgery, and they were not 
Plumbers' work, who else had access to Mr. Hunt and Liddy's time and 
services while they worked for Mr. Krogh under you ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, of course, they ceased to work for Mr. 
Krogh under me on the special unit around September 20, and I don't 
Itnow the dates of those events, but my hunch is that they were later 
than that, and I would just be speculating then. I don't have any idea. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Hunt still was working at the White House at that 
time, during these periods of time. 

Mr, Ehrlichman. I can't tell you that of my own knowledge. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall when you were attempting on the 19th to 
fix a time when Hunt had left, what time you did fix ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. As a matter of fact, on the 19th I don't think 
we fixed any time. There was still a lot of confusion and I think Mr. 
Kehrli was going to go back and check some records. 

Mr. Dash. Now, despite your claim, Mr. Ehrlichman, that you had 
so many things to do that Watergate was really not central in your 
focus, you do seem to have been busy on Watergate matters since on 
the very next day, June 23, you and Mr. Haldeman met with Mr. 
Helms and General Walters and we have had— and I am not going 
over that testimony because I think it's been fairly clearly covered, 
but you did meet with Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Walters, 
and the topic of the conversation there was the question of whether 
CIA involvement was involved, was that not so ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Dash, I would like to go back to the pre- 
amble to your question, because any answer that I might give might 
seem to adopt its assumptions. There isn't any dispute in the evidence 
that in the 12 days before I left Washington and went to California, 
that I had a number of meetings with regard to Watergate, both with 
Mr. Dean and on this occasion with Helms and Walters. I have never 
put a contention to the contrary. 

But if 3'ou will look at my log, and you will look at the other record, 
you will see that once June 26 came and I left town, or whatever that 
date was, let's see, June 29 came and I left town, that my frequency 
of contact with this subject dropped off practically to zero. So I would 
not want the little lead in to your question to give anybody the false 
impression that you apparently have entertained. 

Mr. Dash. Well, the impression at least I want to leave and you are 
leaving also, is that right after the break-in you were heavily involved? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I testified to that two or three times, and the 
reason that I was, I think you know. 

Now, once we get to this Helms-Walters meeting, again T think you 
know that meeting was convened by the President because of a very 
strong concern he had about the jeopardy of the CIA's integrity, 
secrecy of its operations. And he wanted to be absolutely sure that this 
all-out FBI investigation could go forward without jeopardizing that 


Mr. Dash. You have characterized, at least so testified, concerning 
that it was a meeting at which you were making an inquiry as to 
whether or not there was CIA involvement and that actually Mr. 
Helms and Mr. Walters were going to make a check on that. As a 
matter of fact, Mr. Walters had testified, and Mr. Helms that they 
had already, especially Mr. Helms, had had a meeting the day before 
with the Acting FBI Director, Mr. Gray, in which he told them 
there was no CIA involvement and he was being ordered 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I hope you get a chance to ask him about that 
CIA letter of July 6 and why it was that it was not then for another 
6 days until the CIA give firm assurance to the FBI that there was 
no CIA exposure. 

Mr. Dash. Well, do you know, as a matter of fact, the reason for 
that is that after Mr. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Are you going to testify now, Mr. Dash? 

Mr. Dash. No. There is testimony which will come forward from 
Mr. Walters and that, as a matter of fact, based on your direction 
or Mr. Haldeman's direction, he did, in fact, go and tell Mr. Gray 
something different than what Mr. Helms had told him the day 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You are confusing 

Senator Baker [interrupting]. Just one minute, Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You are confusing two things. 

Senator Baker. We are going to continue these hearings past 
August 3, it would appear and that is going to be over my firm 
objection and maybe even beyond the scope of my energy and re- 
sources. But we are not surely going to serve the purpose of trying 
to expedite this thing if we not only do not inquire of the witness 
about what he has testified to, or what other witnesses have, but what 
future witnesses may testify to. 

I have not heard Walters' or Helms' testimony and if it is neces- 
sary to call this witness back and to ask him questions about the 
Helms and Walters testimony. I think we ought to do it. But just 
in the pure interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest 
that our inquiry, all of us, including me, that we limit our inquiry 
to what this witness has said or what other witnesses on this record 
have said on the same subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I agree with that, of course, but it was 
this witness who has constanth^ referred in his testimony to Mr. 
Walters' July 6 statement, and it was in response to that this ques- 
tion was put. 

Senator Ervin. I would just suggest that counsel rephrase his 
question and ask the witness to testify what he said and what Mi. 
Walters said. I think that would be perfectly relevant. 

Senator Baker. I think that would be perfectly proper. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Chairman, I think just at the time Senator 
Baker spoke I was in the process of pointing out to counsel you have 
two different subjects, one is direct CIA involvement in the break- 
in, and the other is possible unrelated CIA activities wliich might 
be disclosed by a vigorous FBI investigation. 

Now, I think you have to be very careful in defining what it was 
Director Helms and Mr. Gray discussed the previous day, and what 
it was we discussed at this meeting, and how the things narrowed down 


at this meeting, and Avhat it was General Walters was going to go and 
talk to ]\Ir. Gray about. 

Senator Ervin. I think this may be an appropriate time to recess 
for lunch. 

Mr. WiLsox. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire about the schedule. Mr. 
Haldeman is our next witness and I would like to ask would you 
suggest that he be here at 2 o'clock ? He has a statement which would 
take no longer than 2 hours to read and I would suggest that he read 
it the same day. 

Senator Ervix. I would suggest that he come in at 3 o'clock. I think 
we can finish with Mr. Ehrlichman at that time. I don't know whether 
we can or not. 

[Whereupon at 12 :30 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 
2 p.m. on the same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Monday, July 30, 1973 

Senator Ervin, The committee will come to order. 

Counsel will resume the interrogation of the witness. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Ehrlichman, following the meeting that you had 
on June 23 with Mr. Waltere, Mr. Helms, and INIr. Haldeman, did 
you instruct Mr. Dean to contact ]\Ir. Walters and follow up on the 
June 23 meeting ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. I simply notified Mr. Dean that there 
had been a meeting, that General Walters was going to be talking 
with Mr. Gray, and that we had indicated to General Walters that 
Mr. Dean would be his contact from that point forward. 

Mr. Dash. Did there come a time when General Waltei-s did call 
you and tell you that he was going to have a meeting or that Dean had 
contacted him and was it all right for him to speak to Mr. Dean? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It either happened that way or I told him at 
the time of the meeting on the 23d that Dean would be his contact, 
one or the other, but I am quite sure that I indicated to General 
Walters that Dean was the White House man who was looking after 
this whole subject. 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware that Mr. Dean did in fact meet with 
General Walters on June 26 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, I was not aware of those meetings. 

Mr. Dash. There were a series of meetings ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, I understand there were, and I was not 
aware of that series of meetings until just recentlj'. 

Mr. Dash. And Mr. Dean did not report to you on them? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, he did not. 

Mr. Dash. Now. on June 28, 1972, you met with Mr. Dean and Mr. 
Gray, and we have had some testimony on that, and on that same day 
you had two earlier meetings with Mr. Dean. Do you recall what the 
two earlier meetings were about before the meeting with Mr. Dean and 
Mr. Gray? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not specifically. T surmised that one of them was 
simply an informational meeting knowing that I was about to leave 
town for an extended i:)eriod of time. As I recall, there was a conversa- 
tion and whether it was by meeting or whether it was by teleplione, 
I cannot recall, but on the same day that we met with Pat Gray I am 


quite sure we had a conversation about turning over the contents of 
Hunt's safe to Mr. Gray. 

Mr. Dash. All rightf. 

Then, you had your meeting with Mr. Gray and I think you have 
already testified to the circumstances under which a particular packet 
or envelope was turned over to Mr. Gray. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right. 

Mr. Dash. I think we have had full testimony on that. 

Now, by the way, did you know at the time the packet of materials 
was turned over to Mr. Gray what was contained in the packet? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash. Had you been told by Mr. Dean they were sensitive ma- 
terials, politically sensitive materials ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. I think you testified in response to a question of Mr. 
Gurney on page 5438 of the testimony, Senator Gurney asked you : 
"Did you ever have any commmiication with Mr. Gray about these 
documents after this meeting?'' and referring to the June 28 meetino- 
and you answered, "Yes, sir." And Senator Gurney said, "And recount 
it to the committee," and your answer was : 

That was in April of this year that we had a conversation. The President asked 
me to telephone Mr. Gray. It was a Sunday night and it was the 15th of April 
about 10 :15 p.m. I was in the President's EOB office, and he had a meeting that 
day with Mr. Kliendienst. The subject of these documents came up at this 

Then, you were asked to call Mr. Gray. You referred to that tele- 
phone call. You said : 

I told him at that time that the delivery of the documents to him 
to Mr. Gray, 

had been the subject of this conversation between the Attorney General and the 
President that Mr. Dean apparently had told the prosecuting attorney about 
the fact that he had made the delivery. Mr. Gray said. "Well, he cannot do that " 
and I said "well, he did say that," and he said "if he says that I will deny it " 
and I said "well, Pat, it isn't a subject for denial. Obviously, it is not something 
you can deny. I recall the episode very clearly." and well, he says "You have got 
to back me up on this," and he went on to say "I destroyed the documents." 

I think at that point you said you were nonplussed about it and you 
hung up. Then you decided, after talking to the President, that per- 
haps you had not made it clear that you were not going to back him 
up and you called him back and without my reading the testimony, 
you made it very clear to him that if you had to go to testify you 
would tell the truth about that. 

Now, is it not true, Mr. Ehrlichman, this was not the next time that 
you had a conversation with Mr, Gray about those documents ? That 
at the April 15 meeting, did not Mr. Gray 

Mr. Ehrlichman [interrupting] . The next time 

Mr. Dash [interrupting]. The question put by Senator Gurney that 
after the June 28 meeting, did you have again occasion to talk about 
those documents with Mr. Gray, and your answer was 

Mr. Ehrlichman [interrupting]. I see. 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. The April 15 phone call. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You are referring to the rather oblique reference 
in Mr. Gray's phone report to me about his confirmation hearings per- 
haps, and that is correct. 


Mr. Dash. On March 7 and 8 ? 

Mr. Ehelichman. We discussed it in a much less specific way, in 
terms of what he was testifying to in the confirmation hearings, about 
whether he had delivered all — whether Dean had delivered all of the 
documents to the FBI in a package or in parcels. 

Mr. Dash. Well, Mr. Ehrlichman, actually, although it was as you 
put it perhaps from a more oblique way but the conversation really 
was pretty much the same. Only this time i\Ir. Gray in his telephone 
call, and I am referring to the transcript of the telephone call that you 
had with Pat Gray on March 7 or 8, 1973, and that is the one that you 
testified at length with Senator Weicker about. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. And what I am referring to is that at this time wasn't 
the conversation somewhat different, and let me just read — ^Mr. Gray, 
toward the bottom of the first page of that transcript, says : 

Another thing I want to talk to you about is that I am being pushed awfully 
hard in certain areas and I am not giving an inch and you know those areas that 
I think you have got to tell John Wesley to stand awfully tight in the saddle and 
be very careful about what he says, and to be absolutely certain that he knows in 
his own mind that he delivered everything he had to the FBI and don't make any 
distinction between but that he delivered everything he had to the FBI. 

And you say "Right." 

Then he says, "And that he delivered it to those agents, this is 
absolutely imperative," and } ou say, "All right." And he says, "You 
know I have got a couple of areas up there and I am hitting hard, I am 
just taking them on the attack," and you say "OK." "I wanted you to 
know that," and you say "Good, keep up the good work, my boy. Let 
me know if I can help," and he says, "All right, he can help by doing 
that," meaning, I take it, John Dean, and you say, "Good, I will do it." 

At that time, in your telephone call with Mr. Gray when he suggests 
that to you, this is before Mr. Dean has gone to the U.S. attorney's 
office and made any statement that such a delivery was made to ^Ir. 

You did not, then, tell Mr. Gray as you did when you were calling 
from the President's office, "That didn't just happen that way, Mi- 
Gray, I was there and I saw that it was delivered to you. It wasn't all 
turned over to the FBI," whv didn't you tell him then instead of saying 
"OK," or "All right," why didn't you then catch him up there and say, 
"Well , the truth is, Pat, vou did get them." 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the conversation with Gray, as I read it, 
that you have just quoted was Grav saying to me, "I am saying that 
the FBI got all these documents, which is true but I am not making 
any nice distinction about the fact that it came in two parcels." Now, 
I suppose that from a hindsight standpoint there was a hint there that 
he had some other problem with these documents but I didn't pick up 
that hint. I didn't understand what he was concerned about, and so I 
took it that what that was all about was simply ^Ir. Gray saying to me, 
that that is the matter in which he was testifying and that he certainlv 
would not want Dean to volunteer anything that m any way would 
disrupt that testimonv. It would keep integral, or protected the tact, 
that in fact that they had come to the FBI in two parcels instead ot one 

parcel. ,. i , n 

Mr D\sh As a matter of fact, Mr. Ehrlichman. didn't you really 
pick it up and you didn't file it because you called Mr. Dean shortly 


afterward, immediately following according to the transcript, and 
the conversation is as follows with Mr. Dean : 

Mr. Dean. Hello. 

Mr. Ehelichman. Hi. Just had a call from your favorite witness. 

Mr. Dean. Which is? 

Mr. Ehelichman. Patrick J. Gray. 

Mr. Dean. Oh, really. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. And he says to make sure that old John W. Dean stays very, 
very firm and steady on his story and he delivered every document to the FBI 
and he doesn't start making nice distinctions between agents and directors. 

Mr. Dean then says : 

He is a little worried, isn't he? 

And you say: 

Well, he just doesn't want there to he any question. 

He says: 

He is hanging very firm and tough and there is a lot of problems around. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Probing around. 

Mr. Dash. Probing around, excuse me. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is just exactly what I said. 

Mr. Dash. What you are doing is you actually carried out Mr. 
Gray's request. Far from telling Mr. Gray when he called you that as 
a matter of fact there were two deliveries, he did receive something 
personally as he was trying to tell you later in his discussion when you 
were calling from the President's Office, you did call Mr. Dean and you 
did carry that message to Mr. Dean, and you did tell Mr. Dean that Mr. 
Gray wants Mr. Dean to be sure to stand tight and make no distinc- 
tion between FBI agents and directors, that all went to the FBI and, 
therefore, weren't you, in fact, participating in the covering up of 
that situation in which a packet was given to Pat Gray which later 
was destroyed? 

Now, you didn't know it at that time ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Didn't know it? 

Mr. Dash. You didn't know it at that time ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. So far as I was concerned it was a perfectly 
proper way to go about delivering these documents to the FBI. Having 
the concern that we did that either the field office or tlie lower echelon 
of the FBI was leaking this stuff all over, to put it in the hands of the 
Director was a perfectly appropriate device. There was no coverup in 
that and I don't apologize for it for a minute. 

Mr. Dash. But why 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The coverup that I was invited to participate 
m, in the call from the President's office, was of quite another nature 
and this was Pat Gray suggesting to me, "I never got them" and "I 
will deny I ever got them" and that kind of thing which I just 
couldn't countenance. 

Mr. Dash. Isn't he saying the same thing in the earlier call ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash. He is saying let's not make a distinction and let's make 
it clear that it went to the FBI so that no one would ever think I ever 
got them. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No ; I don't think you can read that into it, Mr. 


Mr. Dash. Did you ask him — did you ever say anything to him, 
such as, what is the problem, Pat ? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. I wish I had. 

Mr. Dash. AVliat is the problem ? Why would Mr. Gray ask you to 
tell John Wesley, "To stand tall and make no distinction," what came 
into your mind that it would be concerning him ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, if he had testified "It came in two parcels 
and I have the one, I have the one parcel and it has nothing to do with 
Watergate but I am holding this one parcel" that they would zero in 
on that as they had zeroed in on other aspects of this thing and at- 
tempt to open it up and get at the political embarrassing documents 
and exploit it. 

Mr. Dash. To that extent you were assisting him in preventing that 
from happening ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I would hope so — that was the whole idea of de- 
livering it in two parcels so far as that was concerned. 

Mr. Dash. Then you were carrying out, well, again, you may dis- 
agree with my tenn by carrying out, at least a coverup of delivering 
to Mr. Gray the separate sensitive political documents so it wouldn't 
be exploited. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, there was no intent here to, in any way, do 
away with those documents or keep them from pei-sons who had a 
proper right to them. 

The thing that disturbed me in the April conversation, of course, 
was his invitation to me to side in with him in the story that he never 
got the documents in the first place, against the background of his 
having destroyed them, and after hanging up the phone I thought, 
well, I have got to juat make this as clear as possible to him that I am 
not in this. 

Mr. Dash. But at that point Mr. Dean had already been to the prose- 
cutors and cut you out of the packet. It was clear that Mr. Gray 
had got the packet. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, it did not — it did not come to the President 
from the U.S. attorney that the documents had been destroyed. So 
far as I know, that was discovered in this phone conversation with 
Mr. Gray for the first time. 

Now, I heard testimony here to the effect that I knew back m Jan- 
uary or sometime, that these documents had been destroyed and that 
is totally incorrect. In point of fact, had I Imown anything about the 
destruction of the documents back at that time, I dare say that my 
recommendation to the President, with regard to Mr. Gray's nomina- 
tion, would have been very strongly negative. 

Mr. Dash. Well, my question to make it very clear does not go to 
your knowledge of the destruction of the documents at that time. It 
goes to the question of your knowledge that he did receive the packet 
and that von did, in fact, carry out Mr. Gray's request to tell Mr. Dean 
to stand tight in such a way that he shouldn't make a distinction be- 
tween FBI agents and directors and 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Just as it says. 

Mr. Dash. Just as it says there as you have indicated to keep any 
politically embarrassing matters from being exploited. 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Leaked. 
Mr. Dash. Or leaked. 


Now on July 26 your diary shows you met with Mr. Kalmbach and 
by that time, you already OK'd, I take it, I\Ir. Dean's use of Mr. Kalm- 
bach for raising funds for legal defense of the Watergate defendants. 
J\ow, how did that come about? Did Mr. Dean come to you and say 
AT ^V^^^te^i *» be able to contact Mr. Kalmbach for this purpose « 
_ Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I wouldn't want to answer this question 
m any way that might seem to adopt the lengthy preamble that you 
]ust delivered. I have testified a couple of times about the conversation 
that 1 actually had with Mr. Dean in this connection and very simply 
as I recall, it was a phone call or it may have been one of these in- 
formation meetings, he said, "I wish you would back me up. John 
MitcheJl feels very strongly that he has got to try and recruit Herb 
to do this defense fundraising and I am going to ask him to do that." 
It was just— just about that much. 

Mr^^DASH. And on that alone you allowed Mr. Kalmbach, at least 
Mr. Dean to go to Mr. Kalmbach and ask him to do it? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I didn't allow anybody to do anything. I mean, 
it wasn t up to me to grant permission to anybody to do anything under 
those circumstances. ^ & 

Mr. Dash. Well, I think Mr. Kalmbach has testified that, and I 
think you used the term during your interview, that you had sort of a 
lock on Mr. Kalmbach and I think your testimony is that, in order to 
protect Mr. Kalmbach from being imposed upon, that you would say 
that after he had done his original work that they couldn't come to 
him and ask him to do other fundraising without getting any approval 
through you or Mr. Haldeman; isn't that right? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I couldn't possibly agree to that very long 
question, Mr. Dash. There are so many things wrong with it. What 
actually happened, as I again testified a couple of times to you, is that 
when the April 7 campaign financing law was coming 'into effect, 
Mr. Kalmbach let us know or let me know that he didn't want to do 
any more fundraising m the campaign. Morrie Stans was pressing 
him hard to help him, very tough job. Herb wanted to be relieved of 
that and he wanted to do some other kind of chores in the campaign 
\t ^r-T"?.. ^^? "^^^^ interesting. And so we agreed that if either 
Mr. Mitchell or by then I think it was— let's see, I guess it was 
Mr Mitchell still then, and Mr. Stans approached Herb that Herb 
could use me and Bob Haldeman as an excuse, that he was working 
for us and that we would back him on that. 

Mr. Dash That is what I thought I had asked you. Maybe my ques- 
tion wasn t that clear. I thought I said that you had made an arrange- 
ment with Herb to protect him. ' 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You have a way of festooning your questions, Mr. 
l^ash, with facts that apparently are only in your^nowledge. 

Mr. Dash. Well, we won't go back and forth on this. I will follow up 
the questioning. ^ 

Now, did you know at all how much money would be involved « 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash. You didn't inquire ? 

Mr, Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know how the money was going to be raised ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash. Did you inquire ? 


Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 
Mr. Dash. Now, you knew- 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. You are speaking now as of the time of my con- 
versation with Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dash. With Mr. Dean, yes. You knew, of course, by that time 
that Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy were among the defendants who would 
be assisted by this. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I assume so. I am not certain of that but I assume 

Mr. Dash. I think the newspapers and public record would have 

brought that out. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I can't relate the two. 

Mr. Dash. Now, again, didn't you have a special purpose to assist 
in the paying of their legal defense fund ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I didn't have any purpose, general or special. 
Mr. Dash. Well, in other words, vou are saying ;Mr. Hunt and Mr. 
Liddy, who had been involved in the Plumbers' activity and the Ells- 
berg break-in now and being involved here, were you not concerned 
that unless they were paid their legal defense fees that they might well 
cause some trouble ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No. As I recall, the context in which this was dis- 
cussed was primarily a Cuban emigre stimulated defense fund which 
John Dean told me about, that was being created in Florida and would 
be the vehicle for this, and so if anything, my focus would have been 
on those participants in this in that particular conversation. 
Mr. Dash. Well then, why did they need Mr. Kalmbach ? 
Mr. Ehrlichmax. To bring money in, I assume, and this was 
again— again. I did not question this at all. It was something that was 
just brushed over in passing. 

Mr. Dash. In other words, you did not think at this time that this 
money would go to pay Mr. Hunt's lawyers or Mr. Liddy's lawyers? 
Mr. Ehrlichmax. It just was not a question that I addressed my- 
self to one wav or the other, either affirmatively or negatively. 

Mr. Dash. And this is the kind of thing that you did treat that 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, sir. , ■,- -, i 

Mr. Dash. Now, having, as you indicated, just treated it as lightly 
as you did when Mr. Dean came, you did meet :Mr. Kalmbach on the 
26th. I know there is a dispute in vour testimony concerning what the 
purpose of that meeting was. Mr. Kalmbach has testified here and 
he testified that because of the clandestine manner in which he was 
being asked to have this monev disbursed, he really became concerned 
and that he reallv wanted to check on Mr. Dean's authority and he 
trusted you so much that he came to you. I think we have had his testi- 
mony of his dramatic confrontation with you, which involved, look 
into my eyes and I will look into yours, do I really have to do it, and 
at a later telephone call which spoke about that meeting. 

Now, is it still vour testimony that Mr. Kalmbach did not come to 
you and express deep concern about his carrying out this activity— 
this defense raising money and wanted to come back and aj'iv^yo^^ 
whether or not it was proper and should he really do it and do it 
secretly ? 
Mr. Ehrlichmax. Would you restate the question ? 


Mr Dash. Well, on July 26, did Mr. Kalmbach come to you and, 
as he has testified before this committee, express his deep concern about 
the propriety of his continuing and raising this money and ask vou to 
tell him it is all right ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Dash, I have no recollection of any con- 
versation with Mr. Kalmbach, be it on this date or on the 14th when 
we met and I believe discussed this same subject in which he asked me 
to vouch for the propriety of what he was doing. 

As I explained before to Senator Gurney, I would be very, very 
slow to assure Herb Kalmbach of the propriety of any undertaking 
unless I myself were satisfied of it, because Herb is the last fellow 
in the world that I would want to involve in something that was im- 
proper. So I just do not recall that happening and I doubt very seri- 
ously that it ever did happen in those kind of terms. 
T ^^^y^"^ previous question or attempt had something in it about 
John Dean's authority and that is the reason that I wanted vou to 
repeat the question. 

I am not aware of any possible question of John Dean's authority 
to ask Mr. Kalmbach to do something as being an issue between us 
at any time. It does not make sense. It does not— it is not related to 
our true relationship in any way. In other words, for someone to come 
to me and say, ''Does John Dean have authority to ask me to do it?" 
IS out of whack with what was our real relationship, which was Herb 
Kalmbach could do an>i^hing he wanted to do, but that if he wanted 
an excuse, we would be his excuse not to do it. And it developed he 
agreed to do this and he was well down the road, you see, starting 
back m June and here we are talking about the third week in July, 
and he has been doing this all this time. That is more characteristic, 
it seems to me, of our true relationship which was that he was a free 
agent to do anything he wanted to do, but if he was looking for 
an excuse, we would be his excuse not to do it vis-a-vis Mr. Mitchell or 
Mr. Stans. So this business of John Dean's authority is what really 
got me kind of doubtful about your other form of question. 

Mr. Dash. Well, the question was based on Mr. Kalmbach's testi- 
mony under oath here in which he testified that he had come to you 
to check on that authority. ^Yhen Mr. Dean, he said, asked him to do 
something, or vou, that he felt such people so high up in the '\^^ite 
House, it was like coming from the President and that he would fol- 
low these instructions because he wanted to be of service. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, let me comment on that, if I may, Mr. 

Our relationship with Herb Kalmbach was never one of principal 
and aofent where we simply issued instructions to him when we wanted 
him to help out. It was always very much on a peer relationshin where, 
if there were a project that we were interested in having his help on, 
of one kind or another, be it legal work of anything else, we requested 
him and if he did not feel comfortable with it or he had an adverse 
relationship in the office, his private practice, or if he just did not like 
the sound of it, he felt very free to sav no, thank you, and this business 
of his marching to orders from the Wiite House does not — it just does 
not rinsrtrue to me. 

Mr. Dash. May I refer you to vour telephone conversation with Mr. 
Kalmbach on ApVil 19, 1973, and ask you to look at page 4. And I will 


read whatever vou want me to read but let me start with Mr. Kalm- 
bach's statement or I can begin with you, Mr. Ehrlichman, somewhat 
down the line : 

But I think the point which I will make in the future if I am given the chance, 
that you were not under our control in any sort of slavery sense but that we had 
agreed that you would not be at the beck and call of the committee. 

Mr Kalmbach. And, of course, too, that 1 act only on orders and, you know, 
on direction and if this is something that you felt sufficiently important and that 
you were assured it was altogether proper, then I would take it on because I 
always do it and always have. And you and Bob and the President know that. 

Then, you replj^ — 

Yeah, well, as far as propriety is concerned, I think we both were relying en- 
tirely on Dean. 
Kalmbach. Yep. 

Ehrlichman. I made no independent judgment. 
Kalmbach. Yep. Yep. 

Ehrlichman. And I'm sure Bob didn't either. 

Kalmbach. Nope and I'm just, I just have the feeling, John, that I don t 
know if this is a weak reed, is it? 
Ehrlichman. Who. Dean? , , ■■ x. 

Kalmbach. No, I mean are they still going to say well. Herb, you should have 

Now, you testified, one, that it was not on orders, that he did not act 
that way, and, two, that the question of propriety never came up, but 
here is Mr. Kalmbach talking to you and you are certainly not dis- 
agreeing with him, that he is saying that — 

I act only on orders and, you know, on direction and if this is something that 
you felt sufficiently important and that you were sure it was altogether proper, 
then i would take it on because I always do it. 

Now, at that point you say that the propriety issue, you based upon 
Dean's judgment and made no independent judgment, and neither did 
Bob Haldeman make any independent judgment. 

Now, I take it that this is where the testimony rests. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. What is your question, Mr. Dash ? 

Mr. Dash. Well, the question is that when Mr. Kalmbach called you 
on this particular date, on April 19, he was reminding you that he was 
acting on orders? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Or did I remind him, Mr. Dash ? 

Mr. Dash. You were reminding him then that you relied on the 
propriety issue? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. What I am reminding is that "You were not 
under our control in any sort of a slavery sense." And that is 

Mr. Dash. Not a slavery . . 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Precisely what I am testifying here, prmcipal 
agent or servant or w^hatever you want. 

Mr. Dash. Not a slave but he says "I take orders and if you direct 
me, I do it?" 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You have been highly selective, Mr. Dash. I will 
stand very flatly on all four corners of that conversation. 

'Mr. Dash. I think you have and it is obvious what you are telhng 
Mr. Kalmbach now is you made only independent judgments on the 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is what I testified to you. 

Mr. Dash. I know, Mr. Kalmbach has come and testified to us that 
he counted so much on your reassuring him that it was proper, and 


you told him, accordinof to Mr. Kalinbacli's testimony that, yes, it was 
important that he do it and that had to be secreted and that if they 
did not do it that way they might have their head in their lap. The 
record Avill show it so. 

Mr. Ehelichman. As you see, my recollection before he testified is 
the same as it is now. 

Mr._ Dash. Now, in August 1972, we have had testimony on this, but 
I am just raising this. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. We had testimony on all of that. 

Mr. Dash. Well, I know, but right now it is a question of bringing 
some of this down to a little more finiteness than we have had it. You 
called Mr. Petersen and asked that Mr. Stans not go to the. grand 
jury. You did that in Augaist 1972. I tliink we liave had plenty of 
testimony on that. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Do we know that ? I was not able to fix that date. 
What date do you have for that ? 

Mr. Dash. Sometime in August of 1972. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I am not able to say. 

Mr. Dash. I do not have the specific date. 

Now, do you recall meeting Mr. Kalmbach again on August 8 ? It 
is in your diary that you did. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Not with regard to any specifics that were dis- 
cussed in the meeting. I see it on tlie log and I have no doubt that it 
took place. 

Mr. Dash. All right, now Mr. Kalmbach's recollection was that 
after he had that meeting with you, he then went out and he obtaine^d 
some private funds from a private contributor, $75,000, and that when 
he saw you on the 8th, that he just reported to you that he was able 
to raise $75,000 from a private campaign contributor for this defense 
fund. Do you recall his reporting to you that he was able to raise 
that money at that time ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I had the impression that that was what he was 
telling me July 14 out in his office because we discussed his use of 
Tony Ulasewicz to cany money, and my impression was that he was 
carrying that from the west coast to the east coast. I never did know 
the aniount that he raised until I talked to Mr. Kalmbach in April 
of this year while I was conducting this inquiry, and I don't recall 
his ever telling me who it was that he raised the money from, although 
I heard him testify to the effect that 

Mr. Dash. Did he tell you how much he raised ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I think in April he did, yes. I think he told me 

Mr. Dash. Well, I mean earlier. I am talking about some time in 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No. I don't think I knew about it before April 
of this year. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know at all that he raised it from a private 
campaign contributor ? 
Mr. Ehrlichmax. Campaign contributor ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. Somebody who had been giving campaign funds for 
the reelection of the President. 


Mr. EiiRLiCHMAN. T think he described to me that it was a business — 
my impression was it was two people and they were in California and 
that was all tlie description that I think I had. 

Mr. Dash. Did that raise any problem in your mind that maybe Mr. 
Kalmbach was goincr to campaign contributors for defense funds? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. I didn't connect the two, I don't believe. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Now, after June 17, the date of the break-in, 
what information did you have, Mr. Ehrlichman, about Mr. Magru- 
der's involvement in the Watergate ? Shortly after. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There was a lot of— there was a lot of suspicion 
shortly after and I would put this in, say. the first 6 weeks after the 
break-in, a good deal of suspicion of Mr. Magruder largely based on 
what Mr. Sloan was saying to people, and so there was a good deal of 
speculation that I can recall during that— during that period of time 
and it culminated in the conversation which Mr. Dean and I had with 
the Attornev General on July 31. where this was specifically discussed; 
that is, Mr. Magruder's involvement. The Attorney General said based 
on the FBI interviews and prosecuting attorneys' examination into Mr. 
Magruder's involvement, that it appeared that any involvement that he 
had related to money and there was a square dispute between Mr. 
Magruder and Mr. Sloan as to the truth of the assertion about 
Mr. Magruder's involvement, and that the Attorney General antici- 
pated that Mr. :Magruder might possibly be going to take the fifth 
amendment before the grand jury. 

Now, that remained the open question, so far as I knew, until Dean 
or someone told me that ^Magruder had in fact testified to the grand 
jury, and then as matters unfolded, he testified at the trial and he was 
icoiisidered to have told the truth and he came out, sort of the— out of 
the shadow at that point. 

Mr. Dash. All right. But were vou aware that during this period of 
time, the end of June, July, and August, that Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, 
Mr. Mardian, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Dean, were in frequent meetings, 
daily meetings, discussing the fact that Magruder's involvement 

INIr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. And the fact that Magruder was going to 
tell a particular story to the grand jury ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, I was not. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean has testified he acted as a liaison and he did 
inform you. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, well, that is not correct. 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, if he had, it would not be inconsist- 
ent with the meeting in the j^resence of the Attorney General, where 
the Attornev General reported there was nothing of Mr. Dean's being 
silent, if in "fact, Dean was involved in a coverup, I take it he would 
not let the Attorney General know about it. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. AYould you repeat that question ? 

Mr. Dash. I was saying, you said the only time vou had any clear 
understanding, at least the Attorney General's understanding of Mr. 
Magruder's involvement, was when he met with you and ]\Ir. Dean 
and told him there was no involvement. Is that true? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. i\Ir. Maernder and 

Mr. Dash. The Attorney General. 

O - 73 - pt. 7 - 13 


Mr. Ehrlichman [continuing]. Mr. Magruder and the Attorney- 
General met with Mr, Dean and me. 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't recall any such meeting. 

Mr. Dash. You did say the Attorney General reported to you con- 
cerning Mr. Magruder, did you not ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. And what did he tell you? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Just what I just testified, that they considered 
it an important conflict in the evidence as between Sloan and Ma- 
gruder, and the way it looked to the Attorney General at that point in 
time. Mr. Magruder might take the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you were aware that on September 15 the indict- 
ment came down on the so-called seven defendants ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. You had a meeting with Mr. Haldeman on September 15. 
Did you discuss the indictment at that time ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I did not have any extraordinary meeting 
with Mr. Haldeman on the 15th. That would have been just the early 
morning staff meeting, I assume, which would have included all of the 
department heads in the "V^^iite House. 

Mr. Dash. Wliat time was that meeting ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. 8 or 8 :15 in the morning. 

Mr. Dash. I think the diary we have on you shows a meeting of 11 in 
the morning. Does your diary show that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Let me check. You are correct. I do not know the 
purpose of that meeting, Mr. Dash. I have no idea. The indictments, 
however, the market around the "WTiite House sort of discounted that 
September 15 action, so to speak, by reason of the Attorney General's 
announcement of September 12 to the President and the Cabinet, to 
some of us assembled, that the seven suspects were the only ones who 
would be indicted. So I do not think the announcement on — ^the formal 
announcement on the 15th was in fact any news to discuss. 

Mr. Dash. "\^nien did you first learn of Mr. Segretti's activities and 
the possible role of Mr. Chapin in those activities ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think that was at the time it first began to be 
talked about in the press. I had not heard of Segretti as an individual 
prior to that time. 

Mr. Dash. Then, did you hold any meetings involving that incident ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Involving what incident? 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chapin's role in the Segretti matter. 

INIr. Ehrlichman. There were a number of meetings to determine 
what the "\^Tiite House news position or press position should be on 
that, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did you, as a result of those meetings, leam about Mr. 
Chapin's role with Mr. Segretti ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am not sure that I learned about them in those 
meetings as such, but I did begin to learn more at the end of October 
and the first couple weeks of November, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did you participate in the preparation of the public 
statements concerning Mr. Chapin's role ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, I did. 


Mr. Dash. Is it not true that those statements did not, in effect, ac- 
knowledge Mr. Chapin's role in either employing Mr. Segretti or hav- 
ing Mr. Segretti work for the campaign ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You say did not in effect, acknowledge? 

Mr. Dash. Did not acknowledge. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Did not acknowledge? Well, I was under the im- 
pression that the material that was being worked on — and you have 
an exhibit and I think has my handwriting on it 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax [continuing]. Had a couple of depositions that 
were, or affidavits that were, proposed to be attached which did make 
rather full and complete acknowledgement. Unfortunately, those were 
not released, but that would have been the form of release that I would 
have preferred. 

Mr. Dash. But you recommended there be a full release of Mr, 
Chapin's involvement ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall in September 1971 traveling with the 
President, I think joii indicated you traveled with the President to 
Japan at that time. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Mr. Dash. When did you go to the President in Japan ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The President went to Hawaii to meet the 
Japanese Prime Minister in September. Is that what you mean ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. Did you accompany him? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did you stop on your way at the Benson Hotel in 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, we did sometime, and I cannot remember 
whether it was on that particular trip or not. My recollection is we 
went — let us see — no, we went right straight out and right straight 
back to Hawaii, went out on the 80th direct to Hickam, and we 
came back from Hickam direct to El Toro on September 1. 

Mr. Dash. When, ]Mr. Ehrlichman, did you first become aware 
that Mr. Hunt was seeking Executive clemency? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am not sure that I was ever aware in the 
terms that you have just framed your question, that Hunt was seeking 
Executive clemency, in those flat terms. 

Mr. Dash. When 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I became aware after Mr. Colson had had his 
conversation with Mr. Bittman — Mr. Bittman had attempted to open a 
conversation with INIr. Colson on that subject which Mr. Colson says 
he refused to engage in. 

Now, that is as far as that ever went in behalf of Mr. Hunt, so 
far as I know. 

Mr, Dash. And you do not know of any assurances that Mr. 
Bittman or Mr. Hunt received from Mr. Colson concerning an Execu- 
tive clemency? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, ]\Tr. Colson stated to me precisely the 
opposite, that he had been very careful in not making any assurances 
to him. 


Mr. Dash. Now, I think, your diary shows you did meet with Mr. 
Colson and Mr. Dean on January 3, and then you met with the Presi- 
dent and Mr. Haldeman on January 4 and again with Mr. Dean and 
Mr. Colson on January 5. This is approximately the time that Mr. 
Dean had testified that the request or the issue came up concerning Mr. 
Hunt's desire for Executive clemency. Mr. Colson and Mr. Dean, ac- 
cording to Mr. Dean's testimony, spoke to you about it and that you 
said, according to his testimony, that you would check with the Presi- 
dent and came out and said that no commitment should be made, but 
that some assurance should be given to him. Do you recall that, not 
the testimony, but do you recall him doing that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Doing what, Mr. Dash ? 

Mr. Dash. Being asked by Mr. Colson and Mr. Dean to raise the 
question of Executive clemency for Hunt with the President ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. All right, stop right there. They did not do that. 
Now, go ahead. 

Mr. Dash. All right. 

You are checking with the President whether or not it would be pos- 
sible to give Mr. Hunt Executive clemency. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That would be on the 4th of January in the com- 
pany of Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Haldeman ; is that right ? 

Mr. Dash. Sometime around that. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That meeting at 3 :02 on the 4th. Is that the meet- 
ing you are suggesting ? 

Mr. Dash. You met with the President a couple of times during that 
period of time but on the 4th you did meet with the President ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I did not, as a matter of fact. I met with the 
President one time on the 4th at 3 :02 in the company of Mr. Halde- 
man and Dr. Kissinger. Is that the time you are suggesting that I 
asked the President if we could give Mr. Hunt Executive clemency? 

Mr. Dash. Did you meet with the President on January 5 ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not according to mj' record. Oh, excuse me. Dr. 
Kissinger and I had a 10-minute meeting with the President at 4 :55 
on that day. 

Mr. Dash. Did you at any time meet with the President and dis- 
cuss Executive clemency? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. When? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In July of 1972. 

Mr. Dash. Now, why in July of 1972 would you be discussing Exec- 
utive clemency with the President ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Because it occurred to me as an organizational 
proposition that sooner or later somebody was going to raise tliis issue 
and I thought it would be a very good idea to talk it through with the 
President before it came up in any specific context, and find out exact- 
ly where we stood. 

Mr. Dash. By that time the indictment had not come down ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct. 

INIr. Dash. It was shortly after the break-in. '^'iniy would it even 
come to your mind that any of the defendants would have raised the 
question of Executive clemency? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Because you had a defendant who was an em- 
ployee of the Committee To Ke-Elect the President and it seemed to 


me just a very natural thino; that inferences would be raised at some 
time in the future. We had a long walk on the beach on that particular 
day and we talked about a lot of subjects and this was one of the sub- 
jects we talked about. 

Mr. Dash. Had you had any discussion with IVIr. Colson or Mr. 
Hunt at that time about it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. At that time ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. EHRLicHMAisr. Not that I can recall. 

Mr. Dash. It would seem unlikely that you would and it just is 
somewhat surprising that so early after the break-in you would even 
be talking about Executive clemency with the President. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Who did it surprise, Mr. Dash ? 

Mr. Dash. I said it does seem surprising. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. To you ? 

Mr. Dash. To me, that you in July, shortly after the break-in, before 
any indictments, that you would be discussing Executive clemency, but 
that is your testimony, that you did. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. All right, that is what happened. 

Mr. Dash. And you never did after having any discussions with Mr. 
Dean later on in January ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am sorry, I did not hear tlie question. 

Mr. Dash. And you never again discussed that with the President 
after talking with Mr. Dean about Executive clemency? 

Mr. EHRLiCHMAisr. Never again ? No, I think there were discussions 
in March and April of this year about the allegations that Mr. Dean 
was making. 

Mr. Dash. I am referring back earlier to the January peiiod be- 
cause, to put the point in time accurately, just before Mr. Hunt pleaded 
guilty is when Mr. Dean 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. INIr. Dean's original stors^ was, of course, that I 
jumped up from the meeting and ran downstairs and popped into the 
Oval Office which, of course, was nonsense. So then, he contrived this 
other story and neither one of them are true, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. On February 10, 1973, you, INIr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean, and 
Dick Moore did meet in La Costa, did you not? 

Mr, Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Could you tell us what the purpose of that meeting was? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, that meeting was called because the Presi- 
dent had asked who was handling the preparation of the White House 
case for the Senate Select Committee hearings, and what planning 
was being done, and what was the White House ])osition going to be 
on matters like executive privilege, and there were no answers to 
those questions. We had just come from the inaugural, everybody 
had been very busily occupied up to that ]:)oint, and frankly, there 
was not anybody handling that, and so one of us, and T forget who, 
called John Dean and asked him to come out, and sit down and talk 
through this whole subject of Wiite House response, so to speak, 
to the upcomino; hearings of the Senate Select Committee. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did the discussion include just — not only the "N^Hnte 
House resnonse in general on executive privilege issues, but did it also 
include what steps you might take in terms of affecting the resolution 
authorizing this committee ? ^Vliat steps you might take in obtaining 


a minority counsel that would be helpful, and evaluation of members 
of the committee as has been testified by Mr. Dean before this commit- 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, there were — it was a little bit like attorneys 
meeting before a trial to talk about the upcoming- trial and what 
the selection of the jury would be like, and the kind of jurors that you 
would prefer to have in a case of this kind, and what opposing counsel 
was like and so on and so forth. It was sort of a general brainstorming 
session on the subject, and all those subjects that you mentioned 
came up, as did a whole raft of other subjects relating to these up- 
coming hearings. 

Mr. Dash. Now, are you aware of then what assignments were given 
to anybody to follow up on this discussion ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, Mr. Dean was given an assignment to at- 
tempt to prepare a general statement of Watergate in its broadest 
aspects, money, Segretti, planning and discussion of the break-in, 
the widest kind of a preliminary statement because it was decided that 
rather than to die by inches in terms of having questions asked and 
tiny bits of fact come out in answers through the process of the 
hearing, it would be much better if the entire story were laid out 
in a comprehensive statement in advance. So Mr. Dean was given that 

After a number of hours of discussion, it was sort of the consensus 
of the meeting, that the best possible management entity would not 
be the '\Vhite House or Government people but would be the Committee 
To Re-Elect, and so the thought was that the Committee To Re-Elect 
with John INIitchell stepping back into the management of it, would 
be an ideal focal point for all kinds of the various management 
problems associated with these hearings. 

Dick Moore was going to go and talk with John Mitchell about this 
idea. I heard the testimony about Dick Moore going up to talk to him 
about money, that had to do, as I recall, with a specific aspect of this. 
Mr. Dean raised the point that these defendants in the break-in case — 
many of them either had cases that were pending sentencing, were on 
appeal, or in some kind of an interlocutory stage and that they might 
have the right to have their rights protected by seeking a judicial delay 
of the committee hearings. It was recognized in the course of passing 
that was going to obviously require the services of attorneys and the 
attorneys would have to be paid and so that was, as Dick Moore testi- 
fied, a rather passing subject but nevertheless it was noticed as a money 
problem that could not be satisfied out of campaign funds and that 
he should also talk to John Mitchell that 

Mr. Dash. But why would you, Mr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Halde- 
man, and Mr. Dean, with your positions in the White House concern 
yourselves over the criminal defense lawyers case that misfht have 
some imnact on delayinsr this committee. Was it a stratefrv issue ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. It was in the nature of a strategy issue and it was 
a passing strategy issue. I wouldn't want it to get out of proportion 
and have you focus on it. 

Mr. Dash. I am not trying to focus on it. 

Mr. Ehri.ichmax. Being sort of a central stratesrv" issue here, it was 
merely a glancing blow or passinjr reference to an aspect of this which 
Mr. Dean raised as a legitimate part of the strategy questions. 


Mr. Dash. All right. 

Taking it as a passing blow or something, and not certainly a cen- 
tral theme, it was considered as a strategy to keep this committee from 
going forward with its hearings. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. This meeting covered dilatory tactics, it covered a 
wide variety of subjects, including dilatory tactics, but certainly not 
limited to them. 

Mr. Dash. What did you have to be afraid of ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir ? 

Mr. Dash. TVliat did you have to be afraid of the committee getting 
started ? 

Mr, Ehrlichman. I think it was conceived that the attack would be 
liighly partisan, that it would be strongly antiadministration, and anti 
the President. Senator Ervin was then believed to be a very partisan 
man, and I think there was strong concern that this whole process of 
this Select Committee would have worked to the serious disadvantage 
of the administration. There was no — there was certainly no acceptance 
of the thought that the undertaking was totally benign. 

Mr. Dash. This was on February 10, the La Costa meeting we are 
talking about. 

Then, I take it, have you had an opportunity, and I don't want to 
take any time on it, to see the agenda items that Mr. Dean testified that 
later went in to the President concerning the discussion with Senator 
Baker and also minority counsel issues? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. I did. I think that the suggestion that that 
somehow relates to the La Costa meeting is badly overdrawn and 
fanticized. I tliink Mr. Haldeman is your better witness on this, but 
from what I know of what took place at the La Costa meeting, the 
relationship between the two is much more tenuous than Mr. Dean 
attempted to draw out. 

Mr. Dash. I agree with you Mr. Haldeman is, but in a followup of 
La Costa rather than I^a Costa. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. Even there I think the proximate relationship 
is doubtful. 

Mr. Dash. Let's go back briefly to perhaps your diary which is not 
as accurate as the A^Hiite House log. On January 4, 1973, you indicated 
that you perhaps wouldn't take up in the presence of Dr. Kissinger the 
issue of Executive clemency. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, I didn't say that. I just asked you if that was 
the meeting you were relating to. 

Mr. Dash. On January 4, 1973, does your diary show that you met 
with the President from 3 :02 p.m. to 4 :44 p.m. and that you were with 
Mr. Haldeman in that meeting from 3:02 to 4:44 which is the full 
period, Mr. Collins from 3 :04 to 3 :05, and 4 :18 to 4 :49, and Mr. Kis- 
singer — ^Dr. Kissinger 4 :30 to 5 :15. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well. I don't have all those refinements in my 
diarv but I show that Dr. Kissinger was in the meeting I was in for 
approximately 45 minutes of a total of about 1 hour and 40 minutes, 
something of that kind. 

Mr. Dash. There was a time when you were with the President and 
Mr. Haldeman and yourself alone? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I assume so. 


Mr. Dash. In March 1973 did you become aware — and I think you 
so testified^-of the increased demands of Hunt for money, so-called 
Hunt's blackmail ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I wouldn't use the word increased because 
I think — I didn't have any frame of reference in which to identify this 
as an increase. I certainly am familiar with the blackmail. 

Mr. Dash. Of a demand, of the blaclonail. Who informed you of 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dash. Did it raise a question in your mind at least at this time, 
again having recall that money was paid for defense, of the propriety 
of paying this money when such a demand was being made? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, certainly — well, let me separate out all of the 
testimony that you have just inserted in that question and maybe you 
could restate the question without all the embellishments. 

Mr. Dash. I will ask just the same question : You had found nothing- 
wrong and, as a matter of fact, just beforehand, on the February 10 
meeting, again had discussed making certain payments or going up to 
Mitchell — having Mr. Moore go see Mr. Mitchell about raising some 
funds for the defendants, and now in March 1973, some time in March 
you become aware of a demand, Mr. Hunt's, of what you just called 

Mr. EHRLiCH]\rAN. The difference between the two is dramatic. There 
was no suggestion at La Costa that any money be paid in consideration 
of anybody's silence or anything of that kind. The money we were 
talking about at La Costa was to compensate attorneys who would file 
motions in behalf of the defendants, and as far as I am concerned that 
would have been a completely legitimate undertaking, privately raised 
funds for that purpose. This was a flat out blackmail attempt, if money 
was not paid then Hunt would say so-and-so, but if money were paid 
he would not say so-and-so. That is the first time I encountered any- 
thing of that sort in this entire — what would that be, 10 months? 

INIr. Dash. Well, were you aware that back in November Mr. Hunt 
had a telephone conversation with Mr. Colson, and Mr. Colson taped 
that conversation with regard to Mr. Hunt wanting money and being 
very unhappy that he wasn't getting the kind of money he was 
requesting ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I have heard testimony about that and that 
I ani supposed to have heard that tape. 

Mr. Dash. Did you hear that tape ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't recall ever hearing that tape. I recall Mr. 
Dean coming to Camp David on one occasion during the 2 months we 
were up there. We have repeatedly — since he testified to that effect — 
we have repeatedly tried to get a transcript or a copy of that tape 
without success from your staff but I would certainly like to see it 
because I 

Mr. Dash [interrupting]. Have you 

Mr. Ehrlichman [continuing]. I just draw a blank. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Wilson, have you made a request ? 

Mr. Wilson. Neither I nor 'Mr. Strickler asked Mr. Hamilton for 



Mr. EHRLiCHMAisr. Well, in any event, the answer to your question 
is that I just really draw a blank on that. It doesn't relate to anything 
I can recall. 

Mr. Wilson. ]May we have it now ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. I have a copy, if somebody would take it for you 
to joeruse. 

Senator Er^t^ist. If it will refresh your recollection and, if so, I would 
like you to respond. 

Mr. Wilson. May we keep that ? 

Mr. Dash. It is my only copy but I will make a Xerox copy for you. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Counsel, I don't recall ever either seeing this 
transcript or 

Mr, Dash. Mr. Wilson, would you like a copy of that? 

Mr. Wn.sox. Please. 

Mr. Dash. You can return it and we will see that you do get a copy. 

You stated a little earlier prior to my showing you that document 
that Mr. Hunt was making a demand — either I get so much money or 
I will tell this or that. "Wliat conceivably could Mr. Hunt have tolcl? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The way John Dean explained it to me, the threat 
was in terms of he would tell seamj- things about what he did at the 
White House for Mr. Krogh and me. Now, I took that to refer to the 
California break-in which is the only thing I could think of that 
would — that he ever did at the "\Miite House for me of any kind for 
that matter. And I asked ]\Ir. Dean if he knew what this was about 
and he said he assumed that that is what it was about. 

Mr. Dash. Now, do you recall a meeting with ]Mr. Dean and with 
Mr. Mitchell, I think, probably on March 22. Did you ask Mr. Mitchell 
whether or not Hunt's demand had been taken care of ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I heard that testified in point of fact, my recollec- 
tion of that is that that conversation was between Mr. Dean and Mr. 
Mitchell and it was Mr. Dean saying just, is that matter taken care of, 
without reference to Hunt or anybody, and Mr. Mitchell sort of grunt- 
ing and saying maybe, or I guess so, or something very vague. 

]Mr. Dash. Did you learn about that time that in fact Mr. Hunt's 
demand had been taken care of ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. In fact it wasn't until the testimony here 
that I was aware of that. 

Mr. Dash. And did you have any knowledge or awareness of Mr. 
Fred LaRue's role 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash [continuing] . In making those payments ? 

Did you by the way tell the President about the blackmail demand ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. By the time I discussed it with him, he already 
knew of it. 

Mr. Dash. Now. it appears from certainly the Wiite House logs we 
have received, that after the La Costa meeting, some time after Feb- 
ruary 10, Mr. Dean's meetings with the President increased really sig- 
nificantl}^ because he had very few meetings jirior to that time and then 
they were quite frequent. Could you explain to your knowledge, if you 
have any, why that occurred ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir, I think I can. 


At our next joint meeting, Mr. Haldeman's and mine, with the 
President, he said, well, how did the weekend go or words to that effect 
and when can I expect that statement, meaning this broad statement 
that Mr. Dean was to prepare. 

One of us, and I think it was I, said I don't think you are going to 
get that statement, and he said, why not? And I said, well, John Dean 
has a lot of reasons why such a statement should not be released, and 
they related to the rights of defendants and to the civil suit that was 
pending and to the problems of executive privilege, and so on. 

And the President expressed considerable patience and began to 
lean on me pretty hard, and I said, well, Mr. President, I am in the 
middle on this and I would be very grateful if you would have a per- 
sonal conversation with John Dean about these problems, so that you 
would get a firsthand feel for the objections that he is raising to the 
request that you have been making. And he said, all right, I will do 
that. And it was very soon after returning to Washington that he — ^I 
have a note in one of my meetings with him that he wanted to see John 
Dean immediately that day, and he did, and that was the fii-st meeting 
of this series. But I think it was — and about that same time the Presi- 
dent said, I want you to stay out of this, to me. He got me started on a 
massive so-called surrogate operation of sending the Cabinet and ad- 
ministration people into the country on questions of impoundment and 
overspending and budget cuts and things of that kind, and I have 
very explicit instructions in my notes to the effect that I am to dis- 
continue any further devotion of time to the whole Watergate subject, 
that Dean has it, that the President is satisfied that he Ys in charge 
and from that point forward I am out of it. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you or anybody in your presence ever recom- 
mend to the President that it might be a good idea to have a number of 
meetings with Mr. Dean if executive privilege was going to be raised 
with regard to Mr. Dean's appearance ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. You mean attorney-client privilege. 

Mr. Dash. Or executive privilege. 

Mr. Epirlichmax. No. 

Mr. Dash. It came up during the Gray hearings and the issue of 
Mr. Dean being subpenaed down or invited down, that the question 
would be that if he didn't meet with the President very much, whether 
there could be very much executive privilege or attorney-client privi- 
lege and to your knowledge in only asking whether you advised the 
President or in your presence advised the President that that would 
be an 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. You will remember, Mr. Dash, that I testified 
when I first got into this matter on March 30 again that one of the 
great remaining open questions was this whole business of how at- 
torney-client privilege worked vis-a-vis the President and counsel to 
the President, and I had to call for a lot of briefing on that. It was 
still an open question but I was not well versed in the subject prior 
to that time and relied entirely on Mr. Dean to preserve that relation- 
ship in whatever way it should be preserved. 

Mr. Dash. Now we have had testimony from Mr. Dean 

Mr. Wilson [interrupting]. Mr. Dash, may I interrupt you a mo- 
ment to address the Chair ? 


Mr. Chairman, again on the question of scheduling, it is obvious 
that the examination of Mr. Ehrlichman will not be completed as we 
had hoped in time, and I want to mention again that Mr. Haldeman's 
statement will require at least 2 hours to read. I wouldn't like him 
to start it this afternoon and not complete it. If Mr, Dash — and I 
didn't want to limit Mr. Dash — if he goes for another hour, could 
I either have the assurance of the committee that Mr. Haldeman 
could read his whole statement before w^e recess this evening or that 
we will begin in the morning ? 

Senator EmT:x. Mr. Dash has just assured me that he has only about 
15 minutes more. There will be a question of the other interrogator, 
being Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Dash. I am about finished, Mr. Wilson. 

Senator ER■^^x. AVe can certainly read his statement today because 
the committee decided this morning to start the meeting at 9:30 in 
the morning and run to 5 or 5 :30 and to expedite these things be- 
cause I think the country would like to get the investigations over, 
particularly this phase. 

Mr. WiLSOx. I would be in favor of night meetings. 

Senator Er\t:n. Well, we will certainly see that Mr. Haldeman 
gets to read his entire statement today and I hope that we can com- 
plete the examination, notwithstanding the fact that I am just a 
little tempted to confess that at the time ^Nlr. Ehrlichman was testi- 
fying about a while ago, I am sorry the conclusion was drawn that 
I was so partisan. I was partisan to the Constitution because I was 
fighting for the congressional view in respect to impoundment and 
also for the idea that the Constitution requires the confirmation of 
such imporrant officers as Director and Deputy Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget. I was also calling attention about that 
time to the fact that the Supreme Court had held when a witness was 
subpenaed to appear before congressional committees, if they didn't 
appear they could be arrested and brought before the Senate, and that 
was in direct opposition to the theory that there was an executive 
privilege that entitled a former, or resident, or "Wliite House em- 
ployee, or aide from appearing before a congressional committee. I 
am sorry that caused a feeling that I was sort of partisan, because I 
doubt whether there is a Democrat in the Senate who voted more to 
sustain the President's position on economic issues and on war issues, 
and just the other day I voted against the war powers bill because I 
thought it encroached on the constitutional domain of the President. 

Excuse the interruption. We will finish it. [Laughter.] 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, it ought to be noted that that time 
will be deducted from counsel's time. 

Mr. Tnoarpsox. Not minority counsel. 

Mr. Dash. I think we have had testimony on the March 21 meet- 
ing of Mr. Dean and Mr. Dean testified that he gave a full story to 
the President concerning who might be involved in the Watergate, 
either in the break-in or the coverup, and tliat you did have an after- 
noon meeting with Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean, and the President on 
the 21st. Mr. Dean's testimony is that at that meeting lie stated to all 
three of you, Mr. Dean, Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Ehrlichman, were 

Did Mr. Dean so state? 


Mr. Ehrlichman. I have no recollection at all, Mr. Dash, of that 
being said at that time. As a matter of fact, it was several weeks 
after that, before we had a conversation with Mr. Dean, in which he 
finally alluded to my relationship) with Mr. Kalmbach as presenting 
some embarrassment to me but certainly nothing that would be in- 
dictable, but back on March 21, 1 don't believe that Mr. Dean's theory 
of the case had crystallized yet. 

Mr. Dash. Well, of course, on March 22, I think you have already 
testified, you met with the President, Mr. Haldemaii, Mr. Dean, and 
Mr. Mitchell? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Let the record stand as the actual testimony, 
anything at that time, your guess was that he probably was not letting 
it out because he was still in the midst of his investigation. 

It appears from your testimony and Mr. Mitchell's testimony, Mr. 
Dean's testimony, that the President did not confront any of the 
parties at that meeting with any of the charges, is this true? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct. Now ■ 

Mr. Dash. On March 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct without adopting all of the pre- 
ceding 11 sentences in your question. 

Mr. Dash. Well, I took your testimony ■ 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I knew you paraphrased and I do not adopt 
your paraphrase. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Let the record stand as was the actual testi- 

On March 28 you called Mr. Kleindienst. Now, certainly on March 
21, the President has referred in his May 22, and I think his April 17 
statement, that he learned new facts, serious facts. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Charges, I believe he states. Charges is, I think 
the word. 

Mr. Dash. Charges, on March 21. And Mr. Dean has testified as 
to what at least so far as he was concerned, what charges he made. 

Now, you weren't at that meeting, to be sure, on March 21, and yet 
when you called Mr. Kleindienst, you stated in that call that : 

The President said to me to say to you that the best information he had and 
has in this, is neither Dean, nor Haldeman, nor Colson, nor I, nor anybody in the 
White House had any prior knowledge of the burglary. 

Then you went on and that he was to get more information. 

Now, I take it that if the President had received information from 
Mr. Dean, for instance, say Mr. Strachan had information on March 
21, he would not be instructing you to call Mr. Kleindienst to give that 
message, would he ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I certainly am not going to respond to that 
question, Mr. Dash. It involves your own personal hypothesis and it 
invites me to join you in it which I am not willing to do. I have stated 
what my hypothesis is with regard to the President's conduct after 
March 21 and I don't happen to agree with youre. 

Mr. Dash. Well, I take it, perhaps mayjbe the best evidence of what 
occurred on March 21 between Mr. Deaii and the President might be 
the tapes that recorded that conversation. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Or someone else who was present, like Mr. Halde- 


Mr. Dash. We could still have the tapes also that might corroborate 
that discussion. 

Now, did Mr. Dean ever show you a list, a handwritten list, actually, 
on his part that he made up after he had gone to the prosecutors, in 
which he had listed various people, who he claimed, based on informa- 
tion he was getting from the prosecutors and information he was giv- 
ing to the prosecutors would be indictable for criminal charges? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Is that this exhibit that you have in your hand? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. Exhibit 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. He never showed that to me. 

Mr. Dash. Did he ever show you that? 

Mr. EHRLiCHMAisr. No. 

Mr. Dash. He has so testified that he did and I guess that again you 
would say would be untrue on his part ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. You have also testified that you were asked to make an 
inquiry on March 30 by the President. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, 

Mr. Dash. And you reported to the President on April 14? 

Mr, Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. And the President came out with a statement on April 17. 

Now, in between that time, on April 15, were you aware of the fact 
that Mr. Kleindienst and :Mr. Petersen met with the President and 
reported fully to the President as to what information they were 
getting in the grand jury investigation ? 

Mr, Ehrlichman. Well, I precipitated that meeting, yes, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. How did you precipitate it? 

■Nlr. Ehrlichman. By calling Mr. Kleindienst at 5 :15 on the after- 
noon of the 14th at the President's request, and advising him of my 
report to the President that morning, and also my interviews with 
Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder. Then after that call, as you know, 
the Attorney General had an all night meeting with his U.S. attorneys 
and his prosecuting attorneys. He then made arrangements to see the 
President after church on the morning of the 15th, 

Mr. Dash. And would you say that actually the President's state- 
ment on April 17 was based on the meeting with Mr. Kleindienst and 
with Mr. Petersen ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You mean exclusively ? 

Mr, Dash. Not exclusively but to a large part. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. How large ? 

Mr. Dash. Well, you have testified frequently to questions put to 
you concerning your inquiry and you have indicated that you wouldn't 
call it an investigation. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I am very modest about it. 

Mr. Dash. All right. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Because I don't consider it to be a total investiga- 

Mr. Dash. Eight, and you said it was he'arsa;^ on hearsay and dif- 
ferent people were coming in and you were taking notes, Mr. Klein- 
dienst and Mr. Petersen at least, were able to give the President a 
fairlv complete report on what they were getting in the grand jury 
which was testimony under oath probably and also information they 
were getting from the prosecutors' office. 


Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, as I testified I think to Senator Montoya's 
question, there were really a number of converging lines at this point 
and I certainly didn't intend and, as a matter of fact, I hope I ex- 
pressly disclaimed any credit for cracking the case or anything of that 
kind, but you had the grand jury effort, you had the prosecuting attor- 
neys working along with the grand jury on the one hand. You had the 
Department of Justice effort and then you had this sort of subsidiary 
inquiry that I was making, all of which could be contributed to the 
President's fund of knowledge on this subject. 

Now, the statement on the 17th was not intended by any means to 
cap it. The inquiry went on after that, and so I think you have to see 
this as a convergence of a number of different efforts that finally has 
brought this thin^ into the open. 

Mr. Dash. I think you testified that you participated in the prepara- 
tion of that statement on the I7th. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. By the way, although you had left the White House, did 
you participate in any way in the statement of May 22 of the 
President? "^ 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. 

Mr. Dash. By the way, Mr. Ehrlichman, have you ever received 
either directly or indirectly, since the 1st of January 1969, any cam- 
paign funds for any purpose ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Any campaign funds for any purpose? 

I had some expenses reimbursed at the convention which were not 
legitimate Government expenses and which were reimbursed to me 
by the Committee To Re-Elect, and I have forgotten what those were. 
They were quite nominal as I recall. 

Mr. Dash. They were nominal. 

Mr. Ehrlicpiman. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Would that be the extent of it ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, it is possible that I was still receiving re- 
imbursement of expenses from the 1968 campaign in January 1969. 
I am not prepared to say without 

Mr. Dash. But if so, would that be a nominal amount or would 
it be a large amount ? 

Mr. Ehrlichiman. No, it would be, I think, fairly extensive because 
at that time, you know, in the 1968 campaign I was the tour director 
and I was racking up a fair amount of personal expenses in that 

Mr. Dash. I am not asking. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. But I am just not able to recall whether those 
kept coming m that late or not. They were pretty slow. 

Mr. Dash. I am just talking about after the 1968 campaign, 1969, 
thereafter. I am not asking questions. 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I want to raise a question of relevancy 
with respect to this date that Mr. Dash is relying upon. May I say 
with great respect, I think your resolution does not reach this far, 

Senator Ervin. I do not think the resolution reaches anything ex- 
cept the Presidential election of 1972 and any campaigns which pre- 
ceded that which were relevant to the selection of candidates to run in 


Mr. Wilson. Which would be the primaries. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, sir. It would be primaries or the campaigns of 
the candidates prior to the primary. I do not think it would reach 

Mr. Dash. Well, the day after the 1968 election, weren't the funds 
that were received in 1969 used for the 1972 campaign ? Of course, the 
campaign began the day after the 1968 election. 

Mr. WiLsox. That was not your question but I want to address my- 
self to that question also. 

Mr. Dash. All T asked was, and I think I received an answer, whether 
or not from 1969 onward Mr. Ehrlichman received an}^ campaign 

Mr. Wilson. Well, I say 

Senator ER'\^N. I do not believe we can go back, if you received any 
funds that were collected in the 1968 campaign that were turned over 
to the committee for use in 1970. 1 think that would be valid but 

Mr. WiLSOX. Let the question include those primaries then, sir. The 
way the question is asked 

Senator Er^t:x. I do not think what he received in 1968 would be 
within the pur\aew of our resolution. 

Mr. WiLsox. You and I agree. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, there is one other point, and I do 
not mean to belabor it since the Chair has already ruled, but if there 
is information which the staff has on some aspect of the matter in sonie 
respect, I understand it has not been brought to the attention of mi- 
nority, so I would like to request that majority staff might do that be- 
fore thev pursue the questions. 

Mr. Dash. I am not pureuing the question any further, I just asked 
the question. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chainnan. I reiterate my request and I am sure 
the chairman will agree. 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Senator Baker. The understanding is that the information will be 
equally shared so if there is a point I would like to have it. 

Senator Ervix. In other words, my tentative ruling, unless it is upset 
by the committee, is that we have no jurisdiction to investigate any- 
thing connected with campaign funds which were left over from the 
1968 election unless those funds were used in connection with the 1972 
election. . j. 

Senator Baker. The Chair has ruled and I agree with him, for what- 
ever that is worth, and I think we ought to go ahead. 

Mr. Dash. Eight. 

Now, in preparation for your testimony, Mr. Ehrlichman, have you 
had access to your records at the "\Aniite House? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. It is what I suppose you would call limited access. 
I can go in and look at records but I cannot copy, I cannot take notes, 
and I am not allowed to take them from the room. * -i oa 

Mr. Dash. How long did you stay in the White House after April 30 
when you tendered your resignation ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. About 21/2 weeks. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have access at that time to your records? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, I did. I had— well, no, excuse me I did not 
have custody of my records at that time. My custody ceased on April 


30, so thcat then I was subject to the limitations which were then im- 
posed by the office of the counsel there from that day forward. I liter- 
ally, physically gave up custody and possession of the records on 
April 30. 

Mr. Dash. Now, based on the President's latest statement concern- 
ing our efforts to get what might be relevant documents that are not 
covered by executive privilege as considered by the President, that 
we would have to ask for it specifically, and describe the records 
specifically, would you be willing to assist the cormnittee in identify- 
ing certain of your records still in the l^^iite House which we might 
feel necessary to ask for by description and with specificity ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I would want to take counsel on that before I 
responded to that. 

Mr. Dash. Now, have you prior to your testimony before this com- 
mittee, discussed your testimony with Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Discussed my testimony with him ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You mean how I was going to answer questions ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. We discussed the subject matter very exten- 
sively but I have not discussed my testimony. 

Mr. Dash. In other words, you discussed the subject matter of your 
answers but not the testimony as such ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not the subject matter of my answers but the 
subject matter that is at issue here, I have discussed with him both 
during and since. 

Mr. Wilson. :Mr. Dash, Mr. Chairman, may I ask, would you permit 
Mr. Ehrlichman to describe how the preparation for this hearing was 
pursued and the preparation of their individual statements? 

Senator Ervin. Yes, if he wishes to make a statement on it. 

Mr. Dash. That is my last question and if he wants to finish with 
that I have no further questions. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, as you know, several weeks ago, I would im- 
agine 5 weeks ago or so. Mr. Haldeman moved. I have seen him to con- 
sult since then, except for perhaps a total of 20, 30 minutes maximum. 
My opening statement in this matter was prepared personally and 
without any consultation with :Mr. Haldeman, as I assume his was, be- 
cause I have certainly not had any consultation with him on his. I 
have spent virtually every day since my tennination at the Wliite 
House 21A weeks after the 30th in attempting to get straight the dates, 
the places, the times, the persons pi-esent, the subject matters covered, 
and to go back into the White House records and take a look at my 
records, to try to refresh my recollection as to what has taken place in 
the premises. From time to time, prior to his departure, ]Mr. Halde- 
man and I have discussed aspects of this matter, but certainly not in 
terms of testimony here, only in terms of what actually took place in 
that research effort. 

Mr. Dash. I take it that those times you did discuss it it was in an- 
ticipation of both of you appearing before this committee ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Dash, you are not the only girl in town. There 
are lots of other inquiries going on. 

Mr. Dash. In anticipation of testimony to all the other girls. 
[Laughter.] I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 


Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I believe Senator Weicker has a 
question on this very point and I -would like to yield to him at this 

Senator Weicker. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Ehrlichman, do you assume that your testimony is in complete 
accord with that of Mr. Haldeman when lie appears before this com- 
mittee, and that there exists no conflict between both of you with re- 
gard to all the events that this committee has covered? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, I do not assume that, Senator. 

Senator Weicker. Well, under those circumstances, may I ask then, 
how it is possible that you are both being represented by the same 
attorney? Is there not a potential conflict of interest in the event 
Mr. Haldeman does not agree with your recollection of the events ? 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, may I answer that question ? I am the 
one who is the subject of that question and I would like to answer it 
for Mr. Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. I would like to hear the answer because I think 
Mr. Ehrlichman's answer is quite clear, there is potential conflict 
between the two of them. 

Mr. Wilson. There is no potential conflict at all. 

Senator Weicker. Your client has answered that there is. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not assume there is a coincidence. 

Mr. Wilson. Senator Weicker, let me say something to you, sir. To 
suggest that I am involved in a matter where there is a conflict be- 
tween two clients is the same as to suggest to me I am not sensitive, 
that I am guilty of some fraud when I sit here. 

Senator Weicker. I would have the reporter reread the question 
that I asked to Mr. Ehrlichman and have Mr. Ehrlichman's response 
to my question. 

[The reporter read the question and answer requested.] 

Mr. Wilson. Is that your testimony ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not make an assumption on that. 

Senator Weicker. In other words 

Mr. Wilson. May I continue now ? 

Senator Weicker Tcontinuing]. The seme question your client 
answered. He said "No," in other words, there possibly could be a 
conflict ? 

Mr. Wilson. He did not say that at all. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I did 'not. I said I had made no assumption, 
that was the question you asked me. 

Senator Weicker. 'in other words, that it could be in conflict. 

Mr. Wilson. It could be no conflict that I am aware of, sir. 

Senator Weicker. I asked your client the question. 

Mr. Wilson. No; ])ut I am entitled to answer the question because 
you are assailing mv integrity. 

Senator Weicker. I am not assailing your integrity. I am question- 
ing your client, and I question— let me get an answer from him again. 
Let 'me ask him the same question. Do you assume that your testimony 
is in complete accord with that of Mr. Haldeman when he appears 
before this committee ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I malie no assumptions. Senator. I have no way 
of knowing whether his testimony is going to coincide with mine or 

-296 O - 73 - pt.7 


Senator Weicker. So that it is possible that there would be a 
conflict ? 

Mr, Wilson. I say there is not. 

Senator Weicker. I am asking Mr. Ehrlichman. So, it is possible 
there would be conflict? 

Mr. Wilson. We are the ones 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Wilson. No, Mr. Chairman, you know, you parliamentarians 
have a phrase that I want to use, I want to rise to a point of personal 
privilege. I am a very sensitive person about this, and I don't want 
Senator Weicker or anybody else to insinuate that I am representing 
two clients who have conflict. 

Now Mr. Strickler and I know definitely there is no conflict between 
these two gentlemen. I want to say also that the 

Senator Er\t[n. I was proceeding on the theory that Senator Weicker 
was merely addressing this particular question to your client and not 
to you. Now, he did address one question to you and you denied there 
was any conflict of interest, and I don't believe that this is a matter 
that the committee ought to pursue as to the conflict of interest of 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Otherwise I would like to speak for about 
a half hour. [Laughter.] 

Senator Weicker. In other words, Mr. Ehrlichman, there is no con- 
flict, I am asking your client, not you, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Ehrlichman, 
in other words, there is no conflict between your testimony and the 
testimonv of Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, you told me earlier that you could 

Senator Erven. Wait a minute. Let Senator Weicker complete his 
question including putting a question mark after it. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Wilson. Where does that leave me ? 

Senator Erwn. We will let your client answer it first and then if you 
want to address a statement to the Chair, I will be glad to receive it. 

Mr. Wilson. I will address it at great length. Go ahead. Senator 
Weicker, ask my client a question. [Laughter.] 

Senator Weicker. That there exists, and I am asking you the ques- 
tion as to whether or not there exists, or could exist a conflict between 
both of you, you and Mr. Haldeman, with regards to the events that 
this committee is covering as far as testimony is concerned. Or let me 
repeat the question right from the outset and' again from the reporter, 
that I have it in front of me, do you assume your testimony is in com- 
plete accord with that of Mr. Haldeman ? 

Senator Erven. Well, Senator, I don't like to make rulings on ques- 
tions but I don^t see how the witness can possibly answer that until Mr. 
Haldeman testifies. 

Senator Weicker. But unless he has talked to Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Ervin. Yes; it would be quite evident if he and Mr. Halde- 
man got together and compared notes and agreed to testifv in like 
manner, or whether they got the witness to consult with Mr. Haldeman 
for the purpose of refreshing his recollection in that matter, you can 
go into the whole area — but until Mr. Haldeman testifies I don't believe 


the witness could say whether his testimony conflicts with Mr. Halde- 
man's testimony, which has not yet been given, but you can certainly 
ask him whether or not they got together and compared notes and 
agreed on what testimony he is going to give. 

Senator Weicker. I will be glad to ask that although I must confess 
that I am completely satisfied with the statement made by counsel, 
that there is no conflict between the testimony of Mr. Haldeman and 

Mr. Wilson. I say that without qualification on the basis of more 
years of practice of law than any one of you sitting on that committee, 
including the chairman. 

Senator Weicker. That there is no conflict between the testimony 
of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I think you are operating here on really 
two levels. 

Senator Ervin. Senator, I think that is prophetic power and I will 
have to admit we lawyers sometimes acquire some little prophetic 
power as to what our clients are going to testify. 

Mr. Wilson. Of course, we Imow what the two are going to testify 
to and we are not aware of any material conflict. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Wilson. I mean there may be a little variance in incidents 
just like two people seeing an accident on the street. But there is no 
material conflict to my knowledge. I give you my professional as- 
surance of that. Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. That answers my question. 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. I don't think there is any way that I can pursue a 
couple of lines of questioning I had in mind and still get on with the 
business at hand as we all want to, so I will forgo any questions of 
Mr. Ehrlichman at this time. 

I would like to say this, and I don't know whether it is appropriate 
but I feel compelled to say this : That I am a lawyer and I am used 
to courtroom procedure, and this witness has been the subject of 
moans and groans from the audience, hisses, applause, sustained ap- 
plause on some occasions and other demonstrations and, as far as I 
Imow, he is the only witness who has been subjected to all of these 
things. I think it's unfair to the witness and I don't think it does the 
work of this committee anv good. 

It's not that you, Mr. Ehrlichman, are to be treated any better than 
any other witness but you shouldn't be treated any worse. It doesn't 
go" to the weight of your testimony or its credibility or whether we 
believe it or not, but t think it just goes to a matter of common decency 
and courtesy to which all witnesses are entitled. I think that situation 
has been rectified now, at least I hope it has, and I just wanted to 
state that for the last few days' testimony, I have regretted this situ- 
ation and find it personally embarrassing. Thank you. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Thank vou. 

Senator Baker [presiding]. Are there other questions of this 
witness ? 


Mr, Ehrlichman. Mr. Vice ChaiiTnan, I think under the rules I 
am entitled to make a brief closing statement and I would like to 
avail myself of that privilege. 

Senator Baker. You are indeed and you may proceed. 

Mr. Ehrliciiman. Thank you. 

Mr. Vice Chairman and members of the committee, I prepared for 
this hearing with just two objectives : First to state the truth as nearly 
as recollection and research could enable me to do and thereby to 
establish the falsity of the charges made against me by your star 
witness. For nearly 5 days I have submitted to your cross-examination 
to permit a test of the truth of my testimony. In my opening state- 
ment I listed a number of questions which I asked you to inquire about 
because I believe they are central to this matter and because I have 
some information about them. 

In the past 5 days a great deal of time has been spent mostly on a 
few of them. As a result, there is now remaining one matter which I 
believe is important enough to mention in passing to the, committee. 
I did not have an opportunity to review with the committee my notes 
of my second interview with Gordon Strachan. I think it is important 
to the committee to know that as you read those notes the questions 
which I continually put to Mr. Strachan all the way through were : "Is 
there anything else ? Are you giving me the whole list ? Are these all the 
people in the 'White House who are involved, and have you told me 
everything you know about their involvement ?" In other words, the list 
you see in the Strachan notes is intended, as I recall the interview 
with Mr. Strachan, to be an exclusive list, and that does not appear 
on the face of the notes, and I think it's important for you to have 

My secondary objective here was to be prepared to raise a voice 
for the President, who is unrepresented here. As your questions devel- 
oped, I had no opportunity to do so as his advocate, I only shed some 
1 ight on facts which disproved a few of the false allegations which have 
been advanced against him here. I do not apologize for my loyalty to 
the President any more than I apologize for my love of this country. I 
only hope that my testimony here has somehow served them both. 

I could not close without commenting on Gordon Strachan's answer 
of the other day to the question. "Do you have any advice for the young 
Americans who are expressing their "disenchantrnent with government 
and the political process?" Gordon said, "Stay away." And your gal- 
lery laughed. But I don't think many other Americans laughed at that 
answer, I certainly didn't, nor do I agree with Gordon's advice. Our 
political system and our real governmental institutions are not just the 
buildings and the laws and the traditions that one sees here in the city 
of Washington. Our government and our politics are only as idealistic 
as honest as the people in those buildings who administer the laws and 
run the campaigns and fulfill the traditions. If some young Americans 
Imow that their ideals or ideas or motives are sounder or purer than 
those of the people now in politics or government, then I think Gordon 
should have said to them, "Come and do better. Don't stay away." 

Somehow, in politics and government it seems that there is always 
someone to fill the job. If you don't take it, you can be sure that some- 
body else will. We are either going to have highly motivated able peo- 


pie running the political campaigns and filling the oflEices in govern- 
ment or we will surely have seat-warmers and hacks who will fill these 
places and the country will be the worse for it. People must be attracted 
who will come here to fight for what they believe in and to work long 
hours to get things done. I hope that young people don't stay away. I 
hope they come here and apply their idealism and their enthusiasm and 
their high moral principles. I hope they come and test their ideas and 
their convictions in this marketplace. I hope they do come and do 

With young Americans : If you come here, come with your eyes wide 
open. If you go to work for the President and the executive branch 
there are very few in the Congress or the media that are going to throw 
rosebuds at you. If you favor change in what our government is, and 
what it does in our society, you will have to fight for it. No such thing 
has been won here by default, at least not recently, and be prepared to 
defend your sense of values when you come here, too. You will en- 
counter a local culture which scoffs at patriotism and family life and 
morality just as it adulates the opposite, and you will find some people 
who have fallen for that line. But you will also find in politics and 
government many great people who know that a pearl of great price 
is not had for the asking and who feel that this country and its herit- 
age are worth the work, the abuse, the struggle, and the sacrifices. 
Don't stay away. Come and join them and do it better. 

Mr. Vice Chairman, this Select Committee has an awesome re- 
sponsibility to find the truth. Such a search cannot be made by one 
whose eyes are clouded by preconception or partisanship, it can only 
be found by those with open mind, free of bias and unfairness. I am 
confident that the truth is there to be seen. It only needs the see-ers. 

Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Ehrlichman, thank you very much. As with 
other witnesses, I express the gratitude of the committee for your ap- 
pearance and testimony. I am sure you understand as other witnesses 
do, that the functions of this committee are manifold, but that one of 
the functions of this committee is to develop what I have referred to 
as a definitive statement on Watergate and the other matters that were 
mandated to us in the Senate to inquire into. 

We will take your testimony, we will weigh it against the testi- 
mony given us by other witnesses, against circumstances, against docu- 
mentation, and against whatever relevant information we can find in 
order to arrive at the truth. As I have also indicated, as the chairman 
has indicated, from time to time we are not here dealing with defend- 
ants. We are going to find no one guilty or innocent of specified crimes 
but we are going to try to find what happened, when, and who knew 
about it. 

You have given us a great volume of information and we thank you 
for it. If I may take ^^e brief privilege of adding an addendum to 
your advice to young people, I, too, was concerned about Mr. Strachan's 
advice. I feervery certain that one of the gravest consequences of 
Watergate, so-called, or of these hearings would be that young people 
drop out or that the citizens of America are disillusioned and drop 
out of the political system. I very much hope they drop in and that 
the next and succeeding elections^ we have more people participatmg 



in the elective process than we have ever had, because truly and surely 
the system of government in the United States is examining itself and 
that it approve of its strength and not of its weakness. 

Are there other questions of this witness ? Thank you very much. 

Would counsel call the next witness? 

Mr. Dash. It is Mr. Haldeman and we understand, Mr. Chairman, 
that the statement is just coming up now. It was given to us yesterday 
evening and we were just able to start reproducing it and we have part 
of it on its way. 

Senator Baker. Would you prefer to have a recess? 

Mr. Dash. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you could call a short recess. 

Senator Baker. In light of that situation and in light of the fact 
the chairman has not yet returned from the last rollcall vote, the 
committee will stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair. 


Senator Ervtn. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Haldeman, wait a minute. Is your counsel coming in here ? 

Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir, he is on his way. 

Senator Ervin. Wait until counsel comes in. 

Mr. Wilson, I am sorry I was over on the Senate floor voting at the 
time Mr. Ehrlichman finished testifying because I would like to have 
tlianked him for his testimony in behalf of the committee. 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Haldeman, will you stand up and hold up your 
right hand ? 

Do you swear that the evidence that you shall give to the Senate 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Haldeman. I do. 

Senator Ervin. Suppose you give us your full name and your address 
for the record. 


Mr. Haldeman. My name is Harry Robins Haldeman. My current 
address is 24 Harbor Island, Newport Beach, Calif. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Wilson, suppose you state your name and ad- 
dress again for the record. 

Mr. Wilson. I thought it was no secret that Mr. Strickler and I are 
representing Mr. Haldeman, too. The address of both of us— we are 
partners— is 815 15th Street Northwest, Washington, D.C. 

Senator Er\^n. Now, as I understand it, Mr. Haldeman, you have 
a prepared statement which you would like to read before any interro- 
gations are made, is that right ? 

Mr. Haldeman. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. You may proceed. 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, may I say 

Senator ER^^N [interrupting! • Yes, sir. 

Mr. Wilson [continuing]. What I said with respect to Mr. Ehrlich- 
man. Let the record show that he is here pursuant to a subpena. 

Senator ER^^N. That is true. He is here under compulsory subpena 
process issued by the committee. 


Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Chairman and membei-s of the Senate Select 
Committee, as you know, I met vohmtarily with the Senate committee 
staff on two occasions for lengthy interviews to answer any questions 
they might want to ask of me ; and I requested nearly 3 months ago an 
early opportunity to appear before this committee. 

I have also appeared bef oi-e, and cooperated as fully as I could with 
another committee of the Senate, a committee of the House of Rep- 
resentatives, the U.S. attorneys, the grand jury and the attorneys tak- 
ing depositions for the Democratic National Committee in their civil 
suit, all in regard to the matters before this committee. In all of these 
appearances I have never taken the fifth amendment and I have never 
sought immunity or any other kind of deal. 

During the 3 months since I resigned from the White House staff, I 
have scrupulously avoided discussing any substantive aspects of the 
Watergate case or related matters in the press, despite enormous pres- 
sure. I have carefully avoided leaking any information, expressing 
any opinion or conclusion, answering any charges or commenting on 
any testimony by others. As I have stated countless times to reporters 
and to the TV cameras, I will cooperate fully with the appropriate 
judicial and legislative bodies involved in this case. I feel they are the 
proper and appropriate forums in which to present complete explana- 
tion and answer fully all questions. 

On each of these 'occasions, I have further stated to the press that 
I have full confidence that when the entire truth is known, it will be 
clear to the American people that President Nixon had no knowledge 
of or involvement in either the Watergate affair itself or the subse- 
quent efforts of a coverup of the Watergate. It will be equally clear, 
despite all the unfounded allegations to the contrary, that I had no 
such knowledge or involvement. 

I had the rare privilege for 4 years of serving on the White House 
staff under one of America's greatest Presidents and with the most 
outstanding, dedicated, and able group of people with whom I have 
ever worked. Those who served with me at the 'White House had com- 
plete dedication to the service of this country. They had great pride 
in the President they served and great pride in the accomplishments of 
the Nixon administration in its first 4 years. 

I cannot imagine anything more satisfying than to have had pe 
opportunity to play a part in the first Nixon administration— which 
brought about the end of America's longest and most difficult war ; the 
end of the cold war which had been a fact of life for as long as many 
of us can remember ; the opening of communications and dialog with 
the leaders of the Soviet Union and the leaders of the People's Repub- 
lic of China; the building of a structure that can well lead not to ]ust 
one but many generations of peace ; the start of the return of the power 
of Government to the people by revenue sharing and Federal reorgani- 
zation; the whole new approach to domestic programs designed to 
bring those programs into line with the real needs and desires of the 
people. We all felt and still feel that the first 4 years was a tune of lay- 
ing the groundwork for even greater accomplishments in the second 
term and we have complete faith that that promise will be met. 

One of the great tragedies of our time is that, for tlie moment at 
least, a cloud hangs over the accomplishments of the past 4 years and 
the promise of the next 4 years because of Watergate, its aftermath, 


and related matters. This has spawned an unceasing barrage of charges 
and countercharges, allegations, innuendo, hearsay, rumor, specula- 
tion, hypothesis, which I devoutly hope these hearings and the concur- 
rent work of the Justice Department and the special prosecutor will 
bring to an early and definite conclusion so that the Nation and its 
leadership can again turn their thoughts and their efforts to more pro- 
ductive enterprises. 

During this period with its intense concentration on every aspect of 
the Watergate and everything related to it, the sense of proportion re- 
garding the time period under study becomes grossly distorted. In 
looking at the year 1972, it is important— especially now during these 
hearings — to try to keep a sense of perspective as to where things fit. 
The harmless eye of a fly viewed under a microscope can become a 
terrifying object in spite of its actual insignificance. Likewise, the 
Watergate viewed under the microscope of this hearing and the inten- 
sive coverage of all of its aspects can become a terrifying sight if one 
loses track of the perspective in which it should be viewed. This is in 
no way an attempt to minimize the importance of the problems posed 
by the Watergate or the necessity to get to the truth and to take the 
necessary actions to deal with the facts and prevent a recurrence. 


During the transition period in 1968 I had the opportunity to 
nieet with and receive some very valuable advice regarding the Office 
of the Presidency from a man of great experience on that subject. 
President Dwight Eisenhower. He made the point to me very 
strongly that the greatest responsibility I would have over the next 
4 years would be to make sure that President Nixon had the time and 
the opportunity to concentrate on the few overridingly important 
matters that would come to his attention during that time, and that 
he be spared the interruptions and temptations to divert himself to 
day-to-day trivia that Avould get in the way of the really major ac- 
complishments. President Johnson gave me exactly the same advice. 

President Nixon was also a man with strong views on the Office of 
the Presidency, having observed the conduct of that Office for 8 years 
troni one step away as Vice President of the United States. ' 
„-Pur concern was to try to set up the staff and the operation of the 
VVliite House Office so that President Nixon would have the oppor- 
tunity to achieve the goals that he had set for himself, to concentrate 
on the painstaking step-by-step actions that were required in order 
to achieve those goals, and to avoid being diverted by matters which 
could be handled as well or better by others. The staff system for the 
n hite House was set up with this objective in mind and was developed 
with the President's full concurrence. 

The decision facing the President was whether to watch all the 
details, see whoever wanted to see him, read everything that was 
sent to him; or to delegate that authority and, by the exercise of 
major self -discipline, spend his time on the largest issues that con- 
Ironted the people he was elected to represent. The easy decision 
would have been to follow the first course because that course would 
have made him popular and accessible and show what has been called 
charisma or the nice guy. President Nixon elected to follow the second 


course. Some have called it isolation, but he viewed it as doing what 
he was elected to do. He had pledged to the American people that he 
would search for a generation of peace which, despite the efforts of 
many people, is a goal that had never been accomplished within this 
century. President Nixon took that pledge seriously and he has come 
a long ways toward achieving it. If his time during the first term 
had been obscured bjr partisan political matters, or by visiting with all 
of the people who wished to see him, or by reading the entire content 
of all of the multitude of memos written to him, there would have been 
no beginning of a road to a generation of peace because the one irre- 
placeable thing that the President had available to him — his own 
time — would have been taken from him. 

This in no way implies that President Nixon spent 100 percent of 
his time on matters relating to international affairs. He carefully 
planned and divided his time so as to cover all of those matters that 
required his attention, but he carried out an extensive delegation of 
authority to other members of his administration and his staff to see 
that all matters were handled properly and thoroughly, but only those 
which the President himself had to deal with actually came to the 

President Nixon also was very much concerned that he receive a 
wide range of views, opinions, and information as to what was being 
reported in the press and in the news media. Consequently, he did not 
limit himself to reading one or two newspapers but directed that a 
comprehensive summary of all news media be prepared for him on a 
daily basis. He read this carefully each day in addition to reading a 
nuniber of newspapers. He insisted that when a matter was brought to 
him for decision, the full range of options and the full range of view- 
points regarding those options be presented to him rather than just 
the arguments of the exponents of one particular side. He saw the 
staff's responsibility as being that of insuring that this was always 
the case. 

In the selection of his personal White House staff, the President em- 
phasized the qualities of integrity, intelligence, and initiative. He 
urged that we bring in young people, men and women with the great 
energy and enthusiasm of youth to provide those qualities along with 
the wisdom and experience of the more senior members of his admin- 

As the first term progressed, many changes were made in the staff 
structure and in the staff system, <'«)nstantly adapting to the ongoing 
needs of the Office of the President. The atmosphere at the White House 
was one of great enthusiasm, great dedication, great cooperation, and 
great satisfaction as progress was made toward many of the President's 
goals. At the same time, there were, of course, many disappointments, 
and many frustrations as the progress wasn't as fast as all of us would 
have liked in all directions; but a review at the end of the first term 
provides the basis for the conclusion that the whole thing worked very 

As we started the year 1972, the year in which the President would 
be up for reelection, we also approached the critical time of culmina- 
tion or at least of major steps toward the accomplishment of several of 
the President's major goals, the end of the war in Vietnam, the opening 


of relations with the People's Republic of China, the achievement of 
agreements to limit nuclear arms and other agreements with the Soviet 
Union. President Nixon's concentration was, of course, on these ex- 
tremely important matters. He started the year concentrating on the 
planning for the trip to the People's Republic of China which took 
place in the latter part of February and which, because of the enor- 
mous amount of painstaking planning ahead of time, was a tremen- 
dously successful trip. 

Following that trip, there were several months of intense concentra- 
tion on steps to try to bring the war in Vietnam to a conclusion and to 
plan for the negotiations with the leaders of the Soviet Union. The 
months of March and April were almost totally dedicated to those two 
efforts with a number of other activities intervening, such as a trip to 
Canada to meet with the leaders of that Government. 

On INIarch 8 the President announced one of the most difficult deci- 
sions he had had to make — the decision to mine the harbors and to 
bomb targets in North Vietnam, and that announcement preceded by 
less than 2 weeks the departure for the meetings with the leaders of the 
Soviet Union in Moscow. INIost of the month of June was occupied in 
activities following up on the Soidet trip, and then the President spent 
a good part, of July at the Western White House in San Clemente 
where he_ had the opportunity for long and detailed meetings with 
Henry Kissinger on foreign policy, and on the negotiations to attempt 
to end the Vietnam war and with John Ehrlichman on initiatives in 
the area of domestic policy. 

The first part of August was spent mostly at Camp David preparing 
for the acceptance speech the President was to give at the Republican 
Convention later that month and on developing plans and positions 
for the campaign that would follow. Inmiediately after the conven- 
tion, the President went to the Western White House in San Clemente 
to prepare for his trip to HaAvaii to meet with the leaders of the Japa- 
nese Government. He returned to Washington right after Labor Day 
and concentrated during September on the ongoing business of the 
Government with a few brief trips to various parts of the country for 
campaign appearances. 

As the Vietnam negotiations intensified in October, they required a 
great amount of the President's time and attention, although he had 
many appointments and meetings on domestic matters in that month 
also; and made two or three trips for campaign appearances. Much to 
the consternation of the opposition and the press, he did not drop the 
business of Government and turn to the political campaign, but rather 
made the decision that he would concentrate his attention on the con- 
duct of the office of the Presidency with confidence that the voters 
would make their decision on the basis of his conduct of that office. 

November, December, and January were probably the 3 most de- 
manding months of the entire time that I served in the White House. 
The Vietnam negotiations were up and down, on and off ; and the need 
for daily concentration on developments in that area was intense. 
In addition, this was the period in which the President and a number 
of the key staff people were engaged in a total reorganization of the 
structure of the Office of the President and of the executive branch 
of the Government, as well as a complete review of the staffing of the 


entire executive branch. There was, of course, also the need to pre- 
pare for the activities of the inaugural and for the President's in- 
augural address on January 20. 

After the Vietnam cease-fire in late January, there was still a 
need for considerable attention to that area; and the work of re- 
structuring and restaffing the executive branch of the Government, 
as well as developing new program approaches in the domestic area, 
continued at an intensive pace. 

It was not until late February that President Nixon devoted any 
substantial amount of attention to the Watergate case and matters 
related to it. In the last few days of February he started a series of 
meetings with his counsel John Dean, originally concentrating pri- 
marily on the problems of separation of powers and executive priv- 
ilege that were raised by the creation of the Senate Select Committee, 
and a few weeks later by the request of the Judiciary Committee, 
that John Dean testify "in connection with their hearings on the 
nomination of Mr. Gray to be Director of the FBI. From mid-March 
through the month of April the President spent a considerable amount 
of time and attention on Watergate, in spite of the fact that he was 
also dealing with the restructuring of his branch of Government, 
with serious matters in the domestic economy, and meetings with a 
number of foreign leaders, including President Thieu of South Viet- 
nam and Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy. 

I have reviewed this picture, Mr. Chairman, as a means of pointing 
out to this committee, and the American people, the fact that the 
specifics of Watergate and the activities of the investigation follow- 
ing Watergate were not a principal focus of interest in the White 
House or by the President during the period from June of 1972 
up to March of 1973. My own notes on meetings with the President 
during that period indicate very few and very brief references to 
Watergate. It was not only the principal matter occupying the atten- 
tion of the President and his senior staff, but it was a matter which 
rose only occasionally and only briefly. 

In my role as the President's chief of staff, I concentrated my at- 
tention and activities each day on those matters on which the President 
was concentrating his attention and activity. I did not maintain an in- 
dependent schedule of appointments or activities on my own. I 
traveled with the President when he was out of Washington and I 
concentrated on those matters that were of concern to the President 
at any given period of time. The fact is that the Watergate case was 
not a matter of concentration on the part of the President at any time 
until March of 1973 and, therefore, was not a matter of concentration 
on my part either. 

And the atmosphere at the White House through this period was— 
as it had been for the entire first term— not one of fear or repression, 
but one of excitement, extremely hard work, dedication and ac- 


At the outset of the Nixon administration in 1969 it was our general 
intention to have a group of Assistants to the President who would 
all function as generalists with no specific areas of responsibihty, each 
available to move into whatever area had a need at any given point 


in time. Inevita'bly, however, the requirements of the office caused a 
more specific delineation of areas of responsibility. 

My role as White House Chief of Staff was administrative rather 
than policymaking. I worked directly with the President in the 
plannmg and execution of his daily schedule, in providing for him the 
niformation he wanted from the members of his staff and the rest 
of the administration, and in disseminating from him to those people 
his mstructions and opinions. Henry Kissinger served as Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs and was responsible for 
the development and implementation of White House policy in the 
area of foreign policy, national defense and national security. John 
Ehrhchman, as Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, had 
similar responsibilities in the development and implementation of 
domestic policy. At various times during the first term there were 
other principal assistants to the President for specific responsibilities. 

There was a very substantial difference between the roles of Dr. 
Kissinger in the formulation of and implementation of foreign policy 
and Mr. Ehrlichman in the formulation and execution of domestic 
policy versus my role in the administration and operation of the White 
House staff and the President's personal activities. 

They were each department heads with areas of policy responsi- 
bility. They worked directly and frequently with the appropriate 
Cabinet officers and agency heads. They worked directly and fre- 
quently with the President. By delegation from the President, under 
clear guidelines, they acted for the President in the process of de- 
veloping policy and carrying it out. 

On the other hand, I worked only very rarely with anyone outside 
the White House staff. I spent a great deal of time with the President— 
and the rest of the time preparing for meetings with the President, 
transmitting his instructions and guidance to others for implementa- 
tion, and when necessary following up on performance. 

My working days were totally unstructured. I had no independent 
schedule. I was at the call of the President at all times. 


I was born, raised and spent most of my life in Los Angeles, Calif. 
After serving 2 years on active duty in the Navy V-12 program, I 
completed my college education at UCLA and then joined the J. Wal- 
ter Thompson Co. Advertising Agency. I was with J. Walter Thomp- 
son for 20 years in their Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York 
offices and in 1961 became a vice president of the company and 
manager of the Los Angeles office. 

In addition to my business career and my participation in politics 
and government service, I spent a great deal of time in work with a 
number of educational and community organizations in California. 
Included among these activities was service as chairman of the board 
of trustees of the California Institute of the Arts, member of the 
board of regents of the University of California, member of the Cali- 
fornia Coordinating Council for Higher Education, vice president of 
Junior Achievement, trustee of the Coro Foundation, member of the 
board of directors of the Better Business Bureau and president of the 


UCLA Alumni Association. Even after joining the Federal Govern- 
ment I had the oppoi-tnnity to serve as a trustee and member of the 
executive committee of the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts 
and as vice president of Ford's Theater Society. 

My association with Eichard Nixon began in 1956 when I took a 
3-month leave of absence to be an advance man in his campaign for 
reelection as Vice President of the United States. I performed a similar 
function in 1958, when Vice President Nixon traveled the country on 
behalf of candidates for the House and Senate. In 1960 I took a years 
leave of absence to serve as chief advance man and campaign tour 
manager in Vice President Nixon's Presidential campaign. In 1962 I 
again took a year's leave of absence — this time to manage Mr. Nixon's 
campaign for Governor of California. 

In 1968 I was chief of staff for Mr. Nixon in his campaign for the 
Presidency and then joined the White House staff as Assistant to the 
President.^ These opportunities for community service and political 
participation have been very gratifying to me. The high point of my 
life, of course, has been the opportunity to serve for 4 j-ears as Assist- 
ant to President Nixon and to have had a part in the truly outstanding 
accomplishments of his first term. 


Mr. Chairman, my statement and testimony before this committee 
will be based on my best recollection after a careful review of logs, 
notes, et cetera, to try to reconstruct the facts as best I can. 

I am severely limited in this effort because, despite the intense fbcus 
of attention today on each minute event of last year, at the time they 
happened most of these things were not of great importance and were 
not recorded in any detail, if at all. This is especially true for the period 
prior to March 1973. From that time on my presidential notes regard- 
ing the Watergate case are much more voluminous because the Presi- 
dent was then directing a great deal of his attention to the Watergate 
matter, whereas he had not done so earlier. 

I have had access, under the supervision of a Secret Service agent, 
to my handwritten notes regarding conversations with the President 
which are in the President's files. I have not been permitted to malce 
copies of them or to take notes from them. I have been under exactly 
the same restrictions as Gordon Strachan described. My files are in 
the same room as his. I kept no records of my own : all my records are 
in the President's file. 

I might mention that my handwritten notes on sheets of yellow 
paper from June 1972 and through February 1973, make a stack about 
8 inches high. All of the pages on which there is any reference or any 
note regarding Watergate during that period add up to less than one- 
eighth of an inch. In other words, my Watergate notes amount to no 
more than 1 percent of mv total notes during the period. 

Until March I made very few notes regarding conversations with 
John Dean because these conversations were not reported to the Presi- 
dent, except in a general summary form. They consisted of details re- 
garding his investigation which were of no concern to the President ex- 
cept, of course, the assurance always that no one in the "\Miite House 


was involved. Through the period of March and April of 1973, 1 have 
quite detailed notes regarding Dean conservations because at that 
time he was giving me information for the President. 


Turning to the question of security problems, it has been alleged that 
there was an atmosphere of fear at the White House regarding security 
matters. I can state categorically that there was no climate of ftear at all. 
There was, however, a healthy and valid concern for a number of mat- 
ters in the general area of national security and for a number of other 
matters in the general area of domestic security. This was a rational 
concern, and it was of sufficient import to require that considerable 
thought be given to steps to combat the actual problems and potential 
dangers that existed. 

With regard to leaks of information, especially in the national secu- 
rity area, it became evident in 1969 that leaks of secret information were 
taking place that seriously jeopardized a number of highly sensitive 
foreign policy initiatives that had been undertaken by the administra- 
tion, including the ending of the war in Vietnam, the Middle East 
crisis, nuclear arms limitation, and the establishment of new relation- 
ships among the great powers. These initiatives were closely inter- 
related ; leaks about any one of them could seriously endanger all of 
them ; and such leaks were taking place. 

In order to deal with these leaks, a program of wiretaps was in- 
stituted in 1969 and continued into early 1971. The President has stated 
that each of these taps was undertaken in accordance with procedures 
that were legal at the time and in accord with longstanding practice 
in this area. This program was authorized by the President of the 
United States and the wiretaps were determined by coordination be- 
tween the Director of the FBI, the President's Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, and the Attorney General of the United States. 

In 1970 the domestic security problem reached critical proportions 
as a wave of bombings and explosions, rioting and violence, demon- 
strations, arson, gun battles, and other disruptive activities took place 
across the country — on college campuses primarilj- — but also in other 

In order to deal with this problem, the President set up an inter- 
agency committee consisting of the Directors of the FBI, the CIA, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. This 
committee was instructed to prepare recommendations for the Presi- 
dent—which they did. The report they submitted included specific 
options for expanded intelligence operations and Mr. Huston, the 
White House staff man for this project, was notified by a memorandum 
from me of the approval of the President. 

As has been reported, Director Hoover expressed opposition to parts 
of this program and as a result, the agencies were subsequently notified 
that the approval had been rescinded. This approval was withdrawn 
before the plan was implemented so the net result was that it never 
went into effect. 

Instead of this program, an Intelligence Evaluation Committee was 
created in December of 1970 that included representatives of the White 
House, CIA, FBI, NSA, and the Departments of Justice, Treasury, 


and Defense, and the Secret Service. The mission of this committee was 
to improve coordination among the intelligence community and to 
prepare evaluations and estimates of domestic intelligence. 

In mid-1971 the New York Times started publication of the so-called 
Pentagon Papers which had been stolen from the sensitive files of the 
Departments of State and Defense and the CIA and which covered 
military and diplomatic moves in a war that was still going on. The 
implications of this security leak were enormous, and it posed a threat 
so grave as to require, in the judgment of the President and his senior 
advisers, extraordinary action. As a result, the President approved 
creation of the Special Investigations Unit within the '^V^lite House 
which later became known as the Plumbers. John Ehrlichman was 
responsible for supervision of this group. Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young 
of the Domestic Council and National Security Council staffs were the 
two principal staff members. While I was aware of the existence and 
general purpose of this unit, I was not familiar with any of its specific 
activities or assignments. 

Also in mid-1971, to deal with the general problem of leaks through- 
out Government departments and agencies — ^the President directed 
me to set up a program of spotting these leaks and reporting them to 
the department head involved. He announced this in a Cabinet meet- 
ing and unfortunately dubbed me with the dubious honor of lord high 
executioner, that was his phrase, not mine. The purpose of this pro- 
gram was to make department heads throughout the Government con- 
scious of the leak problem and aware of their responsibility to deal 
with it in their departments. This involved no investigations on the 
part of the White House. 


Turning to the 1968 surplus campaign funds, during the interim 
period between the 1968 elections and the start of the 1972 campaign, 
Herbert Kalmbach was custodian of a large cash fund which I under- 
stand was a surplus from the 1968 primary elections. In addition, he 
undertook to raise funds from supporters of the President to aid con- 
gressional and senatorial candidates in the 1970 elections. Also, in 

1971 Mr. Kalmbach raised a substantial fund as the "start up" for the 

1972 campaign. 

I am not familiar with all the specifics of sources, amounts, or dis- 
bursements of these funds, although Mr. Kalmbach did keep me peri- 
odically posted on his activities in this area. As he has indicated, he 
looked to me— as well as to other people from time to time — for direc- 
tion or approval as to the disbursement of the 1968 surplus funds. 

I requested or approved use of these funds for such purposes as 
the continuing polling that we did during that period ; for campaign 
support to a candidate for Governor in Alabama ; and for funding 
Donald Segretti. It is my understanding that these funds were also 
used for other purposes, such as the funding of Mr. Ulasewicz— opera- 
tions with which I was not familiar. 

The Alabama campaign funds were in support of the candidate for 
the Democratic nomination for Governor who was opposing fonnor 
Governor George Wallace. It was the belief of some of the President s 
friends and advisers on the southern political scene that Mr. U allace 


might very well become a third party candidate in 1972 and thus 
raise again the potential problem of an indecisive election that might 
be turned to the House of Kepresentatives. They felt that the best way 
to avoid this eventuality was to defeat Governor Wallace in his bid 
for the gubernatorial nomination in Alabama. This was the reason 
for providing campaign financial support to his opponent. 


Turning on the Segretti matter. Early in the precampaign period I 
agreed with an idea that was suggested to set up a man functioning 
independently of the White House, the Committee To Re-Elect and 
the National Committee for the purpose of generating for our side 
the same kind of campaign activities that were so ably carried out 
over the years for Democratic candidates and in 1972 for Senator 
McGovern by Dick Tuck, a man who has been widely praised by politi- 
cal writers as a political prankster, whose basic stock in trade is em- 
barrassing Republican candidates by activities that have been re- 
garded as clever and acceptable parts of our political tradition. 

The repertoire of the political prankster includes such activities as 
printing up embarrassing signs for the opponent, posing in trainman's 
clothes and waving the campaign train out of the station, placing an 
agent on the opponent's campaign train to produce witty newsletters 
mocking the candidate, distributing opposition signs at rallies for use 
by members of the crowd, encouraging band leaders to play rival songs 
at rallies and so forth. 

The activities we had in mind, and for which we drew careful 
boundaries, specifically excluded anything remotely connected with 
the Watergate type of activity. 

Moreover, the pranksterism that was envisioned would have specifi- 
cally excluded such acts as the following : Violent demonstrations and 
disruption, heckling or shouting down speakers, burning or bombing 
campaign headquarters, physical damage or trashing of headquartei-s 
and other buildings, harassment of candidates' wives and families by 
obscenities, disruption of the National Convention by splattering din- 
ner guests with eggs and tomatoes, indecent exposure, rock throwing, 
assaults on delegates, slashing bus tires, smashing windows, settting 
trash fires under the gas tank of a bus, knocking policemen from their 

I know that this committee and most Americans would agree that 
such activities cannot be tolerated in a political campaign. But un- 
fortunately the activities I had described are all activities which took 
place in 1972 — against the campaign of the President of the United 
States by his opponents. Some of them took place with the clear 
knoAvledge and consent of agents of the opposing candidate in the last 
election ; others were acts of people who were clearly unsympathetic 
to the President but may not have had direct orders from the opposing 

So far there has been no investigation of these activities and very 
little publicizing of them, either those which were directly attributable 
to our opponent or those which certainly served our opponent's interest 
but did not have his sanction. 


There is no question that the 1972 campaign -vvas not a chissic in 
decorum — for either side. In any event, having agreed to the suggestion 
of a "Dick Tuck for our side," I was told by Dwight Chapin and 
Gordon Strachan that they liad a former college friend they felt would 
be a good man for this project. They may have told me that his name 
was Don Segretti, but it would have meant nothing to me. I have never 
met or had any personal communication with Mr. Segretti. 

I agreed that if this man wanted to take on this activity, Herbert 
Kalmbach should arrange for his compensation and expenses from 
the 1968 campaign fund surplus. 

It was my clear understanding that Segretti would act independently 
and on his own initiative within the broad guidelines outlined above. 
It was also my clear understanding that he was to engage in no illegal 
acts. Mr. Strachan has told me that he was so advised and that he 
understood that. I had no specific knowledge of Segretti's activities 
or the details of how or with whom he worked. I do not believe that 
there was anything vrrong Avith the Segretti activity as it was conceived. 
I have only limited knowledge, and that acquired only lately, as to 
how it was actually carried out. 

If, as alleged, he or those under his direction were responsible for 
the letter which falsely defamed Senators Muskie and Humphrey, 
then, on behalf of everyone associated with the Nixon campaign, I 
would like to and do apologize to both of those men. That act was 
clearly outside the bounds within which he was to work. 


The President and all of us at the White House were determined 
that the campaign organization and operation should be set up outside 
of and independent of the White House and this was the reason for 
the development of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. The 
committee operated autonomously under the direction of John Mitchell 
and later Clark MacGregor but, of course, with close liaison and com- 
munication with the White House at many levels. 

The President looked to me as his basic contact with the campaign 
organization, and I maintained communication with John Mitchell 
in this regard until July 1972, and then with Clark MacGregor. 

I did not function as the White House liaison with the Committee 
To Re-Elect the President. This fimction was handled by various 
people at various levels with regard to specific areas of projects. For 
example, John Dean on legal matters, John Ehrlichman and his staif 
on substantive domestic policy. Chuck Colson on group support, et 
cetera. I had no official relationship with or position on the Committee 
To Re-Elect the President or the finance committee. 

Gordon Strachan on my staff handled the day-to-day liaison with 
the committee for me and virtually all my contact with the connnittee, 
except for that with Mitchell or MacGregor, was tlirough Strachan. 
He received copies of committee materials and memorandums, sat in 
on many of their meetings and stayed in toucli with key people. I met 
with Strachan only about once every week or two during the campaign. 

Strachan periodically sent me general information on campaign 
planning, organization and activities. He sent me from time to tirne, 
the overall budget and various campaign materials. This was primarily 

pt.7 - 15 


for information purposes and usually took the form of a summary 
memorandum, backed up by a huge amount of supporting miaterial 
which I rarely read. 

In the spex'ific case of advertising and promotional materials the 
standard procedure required a final signoff by me before the ads or 
materials were considered approved. Thus, in this particular area I 
did, in effect, exercise approval authority but even here I did not have 
control over either the personnel or the policies involved in developing 
the material. I only had a final signoff on the end product. 

Strachan also routed these materials to others in the White House 
who were concerned with them. 

I also had a j)articular interest in polls and in scheduling and paid 
more detailed attention to these areas. 

I think it was very clear to lall concerned that the committee was 
running the campaign, not the White House. 

I do not believe I had contix?! over any funds at the committee nor 
did I exercise any authority or direction as to the utilization of funds, 
except in a general sense. I never signed a campaign check. 

I was, to some degree, involved in the decision process regarding 
funds to be used for advertising and polling. The committee also 
allocated funds to pay for expenses incurred by the President or the 
White House that were clearly campaign expenses as contrasted to 
Government expenses. This would include such things as cost of cam- 
paign travel, advance men, et cetera. 

Some indication of my vo\e in the campaign may be found in the 
fact that I visited the committee headquarters only once during 
the entire campaign period and that was on the occasion of the Presi- 
dent's visit to see the headquarters and meet the campaign workers. 

Also, I had very few meetings with any members of the staff of 
the To Re-Eleot the President, except those with John 
Mitchell which were on a frequency of about once a week during the 
time he was campaign director. In addition to that, I did sit in the 
semiweekly campaign review meetings held in John Ehrlichman's 
office and, of course, as has been indicated, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Mac- 
Gregor sat in the regular morning White House staff meeting so that 
there could be full coordination between the White House and the 
committee on overall strategy. 

My contact with the campaign, in other words, was through fairly 
infrequent meetings with Mr. Mitchell and fairly infrequent meetings 
with Gordon Strachan of my staff ; but I kept in general touch with 
campaign activities through Strachan's summary memorandums and 
the meetings described above. 

THE $350,000 

Prior to the April 7 date on which the new campaign spending leg- 
islation took effect it was agreed by Mitchell, Stans, I believe Mr, 
Kalmbach and me that $350,000 of the 1968 surplus cash funds should 
be set aside to cover possible needs for special private polling by the 
White House apart from the regidar polls conducted by the commit- 
tee. This was in anticipation of a possibly hard-fought close election. 

I understand from Gordon Strachan that he received the cash from 
Hugh Sloan on April 6. He, in turn, arranged to have this cash held 


in a safe deposit box or safe by another individual outside the Gov- 
ernment. It is my understanding from Strachan that this transfer was 
made immediately and the entire $350,000 was placed in safekeeping 
outside the "WTiite House. 

I did not feel we should keep such a large amount of cash at the 
White House, nor did I feel it was a good idea for it to be in the physi- 
cal custody of a member of the Wliite House staff which was why 
these arrangements were made. I never at any time saw or handled 
the currency, and I must rely on Strachan's reports to me as to how 
it was handled. 

I have been informed by Strachan that there was one withdrawal 
in April or May of 1972 of $22,000 to pay for some advertising not 
directly related to the election campaign. This was at the request of 
Dick Howard of Chuck Colson's office. I think Strachan said the 
money was delivered directly to the advertising agency. 

The balance of $328,000 was not used. I instructed Strachan after 
the election in November to turn over the unused funds to the commit- 
tee since the White House had no further need for them. I told him 
to work out with John Dean the means of doing this. Strachan has 
informed me that the funds were turned over in January 1973, al- 
though he incurred some difficulty in doing so after he took possession 
of the funds on November 28, 1972. 

In December I became aware, probably via Dean, that there was 
some difficulty in turning over the cash to the committee, presumably 
because it posed reporting problems. 

At a later time, Dean mentioned to me the committee's need for 
funds for legal and family support for the Watergate defendants. I 
suggested to Dean that he try to work out a way of solving both the 
problems of our desire to deliver funds to the committee and the com- 
mittee's need for funds. 

Dean later told me that he had worked this out and that part of the 
cash, I believe $40,000, could be delivered immediately to the commit- 
tee via Fred LaRue. He had Strachan do this, I am told, and several 
days thereafter, Dean had Strachan deliver the balance to LaRue. 

To sum up: After my original instruction to Strachan to transfer 
the money to the committee, my involvement in the transfer of the 
funds was entirely through John Dean. He told me of the problem in 
transferring the $350,000 to the committee. He told me he had worked 
out the problem. He told Strachan how, when, and to whom to 
make the transfer. He told me the transfer had been made. 

He did not, at any time in this sequence, advise me or imply that 
the transfer itself or the purpose of the transfer was to buy the 
Watergate defendants' silence or that it was in any way illegal or 

It is my understanding, that all this took place in the period of 
November to January, but I am not sure of the timing. 

I have no recollection of any knowledge of the reported transaction 
on November 28 when Dean had Fred Fielding of his office pick up 
$22,000 in cash from Mr. Stans. ostensibly for the purpose of replacing 
the $22,000 that had been expended from the $350,000 in April. 

I do recall that one of Dean's problems in the process of ti-ansfoiTing 
the $350,000 to the committee was the fact that $22,000 had been 


disbursed. So it is quite possible that he did have it replenished 
prior to having the cash turned over to LaRue, but I do not believe that 
he ever reported this fact to me. 

In fact, Gordon Strachan's report to me in April of 1973 was that 
the $22,000 had not been replaced and that he had delivered only 
$328,000 to Mr. LaRue and not the full $350,000. However, Strachan 
also told me after his grand jury appearance that he had told them, 
the grand jury, that he had delivered $350,000. I said that was con- 
trary to what he had told me and he said he had made a mistake at 
the grand jury. I urged him to correct it, if that was the case. He 
told me later he had called Mr. Silbert about the mistake and was 
told he could correct it before the grand jury. When he appeared at 
the courthouse to do so, the U.S. attorneys would not let him do it, 
and instead warned him he had committed perjury, was in serious 
trouble, should start preparations to go to jail, and should hire a 


I had no knowledge of, or involvement in, the planning or execu- 
tion of the break-in or bugging of the Democratic National Com- 
mittee headquarters. 

To the best of my knowledge, I did not see any material produced 
by the bugging of the Democratic headquarters. 

After the June 17 break-in, I asked Gordon Strachan whether 
he had had any knowledge of such an operation. He said he had not; 
but that he realized in thinking back that there had been three "in- 
telligence reports" received by him identified by the code name "Sedan 
Chair" that said something to the effect that "confidential sources 
report that * * *". He said he did not at the time know the identity 
of the confidential sources. He realized after the June 17 break-in, 
thinking back, that these reports could have been based on the Water- 
gate or some other wiretap source. 

I have absolutely no recollection of seeing any such report and it 
is quite likely that 1 did not see it even if it was included in a Strachan 
transmission to me since I rarely, if ever, read through or even looked 
at all of the materials that he sent in to me in these reports. 

I do not recall ever seeing any material identified by the name "Gem- 

I have no recollection of giving Mr. Strachan instructions to 
destroy any materials, nor do I recall a later report from Strachan 
that he had done so or that the files were clean. 

Mr. Strachan has made clear in his testimony that he destroyed 
materials not because he thought the contents concerned criminal 
activity, but because he felt if they ever became public they would 
be politically embarrassing. He confirmed that he had reread the con- 
tents many times and that they did not suggest any illegality or crim- 
inal activity; they suggested matters which, if they became public, 
would be politically embarrassing. 

I should point out that on two occasions in April 1973 — once to me, 
before his grand jury appearance and the other to John Ehrlich- 
man— Strachan listed the areas of what he considered to be tough 
questions or trouble spots, On neither of these occasions did he men- 


tion to either of us that he had been instructed to destroy any ma- 
terials or make sure files were clean. 

I think the eiYort to bring in my April 4 meeting with John Mitchell 
as in some way significant with regard to intelligence is a little far- 
fetched. By his testimony, Strachan doesn't know what was discussed 
at that meeting. All he says is that, in routine fashion, he put an item 
on the talking paper regarding the adequacy of intelligence. As a mat- 
ter of fact, the meeting with Mr. Mitchell that day was in connection 
with a meeting of Mitchell and me with the President. My notes taken 
at the meeting with the President indicate the discussion covered the 
ITT-Kleindienst hearings and a review of Mitchell's plans for as- 
signing regional campaign responsibilities to specific individuals. 
They indicate no discussion of intelligence. 


John Dean, in his Camp David report— which is now exhibit 34-43* 
before this committee — says that when he arrived in Washington on 
Sunday afternoon, June 18, he realized that the President would have 
to know everything that he could find out. He realized at that point 
that he would be asked to assemble all of the facts so that the White 
House could be fully informed as to what had transpired and how it 
would affect the President, but having been on an airplane for ap- 
proximately 25 hours he did nothing further that evening. 

The next morning, after reading all of the news accounts of the 
Watergate incident, he spoke with John Ehrlichman, who instructed 
him to get the facts together and report to him. He then called the At- 
torney General to get what facts he knew. He called Gordon Liddy 
and met with him. Dean asked Liddy if anyone at the White House 
was involved and he told him no. . 

During the days and weeks that followed. Dean discussed the in- 
cident with everyone who he thought might have any knowledge or 
involvement. . 

The source of these facts is John Dean's report, or the start ot it, 
which he wrote at Camp David in March of this year. 

There is absolutely no question in my mind, or, I'm sure, in the mmds 
of anyone at the White House, or at the Justice Department, that John 
Dean was in fact conducting an investigation for the "VYhite House 
regarding the Watergate as it might involve the White House. It is 
inconceivable to me that there could be any doubt in Dean's mind. 

Dean moved in immediately after the incident as sort of the Water- 
gate project officer in the White House. This was in keeping with our 
usual procedure ; the responsibility was his and he had the authority to 
proceed. Dean kept Ehrlichman and me posted from time to time on 
developments and, through us, the President. He apparently did not 
keep us fully posted and it now appears he did not keep us accurately 

The President, Ehrlichman and I were very much involved m 
many other vital matters through this entire period and we made no 
'attempt to get into the details of, or in any way take over, the Water- 
gate case. 

*See Book 3, p. 1263. 


The view of all three of us through the whole period was that the 
truth must be told, and quickly ; although we did not know what the 
truth was. Every time we pushed for action in this direction we were 
told by Dean that it could not be done. His concern, as I understood it, 
was that the case was complex, it involved rights of defendants and 
other legal complexities, the facts were not clear, and that nothing 
should be done publicly. 

As long as we were confident that the facts he told us were correct, 
we had to agree with this, since there was no proof of any involvement 
of higherups at the committee, and any premature speculation regard- 
ing any such involvement would have been unfair and damaging. Espe- 
cially since the top officials at the committee had denied any 

Thus, as it now appears, we were badly misled by one or more of the 
principals and even more so by our own man, for reasons which are 
still not completely clear. 

At no time did I give Dean any instructions to cover up anything in 
this case. I did, however, occasionally receive his verbal reports of the 
facts and his intended actions and relayed these to the President. None 
of these reports concerned a coverup. 

I had no personal motivation to cover up anything because I had no 
personal involvement and I knew the President had no involvement. 1 
understood and believed that no one else in the "V\niite House was 
involved in the Watergate planning and break-in, and I still under- 
stand and believe that. It was obvious that some people at the com- 
mittee were involved, but I had no idea who, or how far up, and I still 
don't — because I don't know now whom to believe. I may add that 
until the recent period both John Mitchell and Jeb Magruder denied 
any Watergate involvement. 

The President raised questions as to the facts of Watergate from 
time to time during the period of June through the election. His in- 
terest consistently was to get the facts and get them out. He had some 
concern, especially in the early stages, regarding the possibility of 
compromising national security and an interest, therefore, in seeing 
that the investigation was thorough with regard to Watergate, but 
that it was limited to Watergate and not extended into earlier un- 
related national security activities of some of the people involved. 

Throughout this period, Dean assured us that there was absolutely 
no evidence that anyone in the White House had been involved in 
Watergate in anj^ way. He was sitting in on FBI interviews; review- 
ing FBI reports; he was in constant communication with officials of 
the Justice Department and the reelection committee ; and was clearly 
staying closely in touch with all facets of the investigation and related 

On or about August 27, the President instructed me to ask Mr. 
Ehrlichman to give to Pat Buchanan the information that Buchanan 
would need for preparing the President's briefing book for an up- 
coming press conference on any questions that might arise regarding 
Watergate. I passed this request on to Ehrlichman and assumed that 
he carried it out. On August 29 the President had a press conference 
at which he stated the Dean investigation indicated that no one in 
the Wliite House or in the administration presently employed had 


been involved in Watergate. I was not at all surprised to hear the 
President say this at the press conference since it was thoroughly 
consistent with everything that Dean had told me, and I, therefore, 
find it hard to understand why Mr. Dean now professes to have had 
such great surprise when he heard this statement. 


In these hearings and in the general discussion of Watergate, the 
word "covenip" has come to have a broad and very ill-defined mean- 
ing. As John Dean said, the coverup had a broad range. Anything 
that might cause a problem came within the coverup. 

Definition by usage has now come to connote illegal or improper 
activities — although some steps were taken to contain the Watergate 
case in several perfectly legal and proper aspects. 

One, as the President has stated, was to avoid the Watergate investi- 
gation possibly going beyond the facts of the Watergate affair itself 
and into national security activities totally unrelated to Watergate. 

Another was to avoid or at least reduce adverse political and public- 
ity fallout from false charges, hearsay, and so on, arising from various 
activities in connection with Watergate, such as the Justice Depart- 
ment investigation, the Democratic National Committee suit, the 
Common Cause suit, the Patman hearings, and the Ervin committee 

A third was concern for distortion or fabrication of facts in the heat 
of a political campaign that would unjustly condemn the innocent or 
prevent discovery of the guilty. 

The containment effort, as I would use the term, did not contemplate 
or involve any acts in obstruction of justice. To the contrary, while 
hoping to contain the Watergate inquiry to the facts of Watergate, 
there was a concurrent effort to try to get the true facts of Watergate 
and get them out to the public. The President frequently cautioned 
against any coverup of Watergate or even the appearance of a cover- 

On the basis of testimony now before this committee, it appears 
that there also was an effort to cover up, as well as to contain. This 
coverup appears to have involved illegal and improper activities, 
such as perjury, payments to defendants for their silence, promises 
of Executive clemency, destruction of evidence, and other acts in an 
effort to conceal the truth regarding the planning and commission 
of crimes at the Watergate. 

Tlie critical question then becomes the determination of who com- 
mitted these acts, who directed them, who was aware of them. 

I committed no such acts and directed no such acts and I was aAvare 
of no such acts until March of this year, when the President intensified 
his personal investigation into the facts of the Watergate. I am con- 
vinced that the President had no awareness of any such acts until 
March of this year. 

The question is asked : "How could the President not have known? 
Very easily. Reverse the question. How could the President have 
known ? 

Only if he were directly involved himself or if he were told by 
someone who was either directly involved or had knowledge. The fact 



is that the President was not directly involved himself and he was 
not told by anyone until March, when he intensified his own investiga- 
tion. Even then, he was given conflicting and unverified reports that 
made it impossible to determine the precise truth regarding Water- 
gate or the coverup and, at the outset at least, he was relying primar- 
ily on one man, John Dean, who has admitted that he was a major par- 
ticipant in the illegal and improper coverup, a fact unknown to the 
President until March 1973. 

Any attempt on my part at this time to try to identify those who 
participated in, directed, or knew of the illegal coverup would of ne- 
cessity be based totally on hearsay. 


There was a concern at the White House that activities which had 
been in no way related to Watergate or to the 1972 political campaign, 
and which were in the area of national security, would be compromised 
in the process of the Watergate investigation and the attendant pub- 
licity and political furor. The recent public disclosure of the FBI 
wiretaps on press and NSC personnel, the details of the Plumbers 
operations, and so on, fully justifies that concern. 

As a result of this concern and the FBI's request through Pat Gray 
to John Dean for guidance regarding some aspects of the Watergate 
investigation, because of the possibility of CIA involvement, the Presi- 
dent directed John Ehrlichman and me to meet with the Director and 
Deputy Director of the CIA on June 23. We did so and ascertained 
from them that there had not been any CIA involvement in the Water- 
gate affair and that there was no concern on the part of Director Helms 
as to the fact that some of the Watergate participants had been in- 
volved in the Bay of Pigs operations of the CIA. We discussed the 
"\Yhite House concern regarding possible disclosure of non -Watergate- 
related covert CIA operations or other nonrelated national security 
activities that had been undertaken previously by some of the Water- 
gate participants, and we requested Deputy Director Walters to meet 
with Director Gray of the FBI to express these concerns and to 
coordinate with the FBI, so that the FBI's area of investigation of 
the Watergate participants not be expanded into unrelated matters 
which could lead to disclosures of earlier national security or CIA 

Walters agreed to meet with Gray as requested. I do not recall 
having any other communication, or meeting, with Walters, Helms, or 
Gray on this subject. I did not, at this meeting, or at any other time, 
ask the CIA to participate in any Watergate coverup, nor did I ever 
suggest that the CIA take any responsibility for the Watergate break- 
in. I believe that the action I took with the CIA was proper, according 
to the President's instructions, and clearly in the national interest. 

There were a number of newspaper stories and allegations raised 
during the period following the Watergate break-in that posed new 
questions regarding the facts of Watergate or related matters. "Wlien- 
ever any such questions arose, the President would again ask that the 
facts be ascertained and made known publicly as completely and 
quickly as possible, but there always seemed to be some reason why 


this could not be done. There was no effort on my part to direct mj'- 
personal attention or take any personal action on these matters because 
the FBI and the Justice Department were responsible for, and were 
conducting, an extremely extensive investigation and because Mr. Dean 
was responsible for White House liaison with all aspects of the investi- 
gation. I knew John Dean to be an extremely capable, thorough, hard- 
working, and intelligent man and I had full confidence, as did the 
President at that time, that Mr. Dean was in fact carrying out this 
responsibility diligently and thoroughly. 

There is another aspect to the containment ai-ea. It must be recog- 
nized that this wias the period of a political campaign. There were a 
number of attacks on the administration, the President, and the reelec- 
tion committee irising out of Watergate and allegations in connection 
with it. These attacks were, of course, not helpful to the reelection 
cause and there was a continuing effort to avoid any false accusations 
or allegations from being made in the public press and to answer any 
that were. 

There was also frequent discussion of the need for counterattack — 
the need to point out that while Watergate was not in any way an 
acceptable or excusable action, it also was not the only improper action 
by the two sides in that particular election campaign. I have cited 
earlier some examples of activities tliat Avere carried out against the 
President's reelection effort. Many of the campaign strategists felt 
that Watergate was getting all of the attention and the improper 
activities on the other side were being ignored. 

While there is no effort and no intent to try to impede the legitimate 
investigation of the facts regarding Watergate and any other criminal 
or improper activities, there was a concern about the exploitation of 
unproved charges and the sensationalizing of required appearances 
by various people for depositions in the civil suit, et cetera. 


I was told several times, starting in the summer of 1972, by John 
Dean and possibly also by John Mitchell, that there was a need by 
the committee for funds to help take care of the legal fees and family 
support of the Watergate defendants. The committee apparently felt 
obliged to do this. 

In March 1973, Dean told me that at some point in 1972 he, at 
Mitchell's suggestion, had asked me if it would be OK for him to 
contact Herb Kalmbach to ask him to raise some such defense funds. 
He says I agreed. He also says that he checked Ehrlichman on the 
same point. I do not recall such a request. I should also point out 
that at sometime Dean has said that he checked with botli Ehrlicliman 
and me on this point and at other times he has said only that he 
checked with Ehrlicliman. 

Later in March 1973, Dean raised the point that there was a po- 
tential problem Avith relation to the funds for defendants. He described 
this as a possible political embarrassment, and indicated that it 
might even become a legal problem. The problem would arise if it 
was determined that these funds had been used to induce the defend- 
ants to refuse to testify. 


I emphasized my clear understanding that the purpose of the funds, 
as described to me by Dean, was for legal fees and family support; 
and that I had understood from Dean that both Mitchell and Dean 
felt this was a proper and impoi-tant obligation to the defendants. 

Since all information regarding the defense funds was given to me 
by John Dean, the counsel to the President, and possibly by John 
Mitchell, and since the arrangements for Kalmbach's collecting funds 
and for transferring the $350,000 cash fmid were made by John Dean, 
and since John Dean never stated at the time that the funds would 
be used for any other than legal and proper purposes, I had no reason 
to question the propriety or legality of the process of delivering the 
$350,000 to the committee via LaRue or of having Kalmbach raise 

I have no personal knowledge of what was done with the funds 
raised by Kalmbach or with the $350,000 that was delivered by 
Strachan to LaRue. 

It would appear that, at the White House at least, John Dean was 
the only one who knew that the funds were for "hush money," if, in 
fact, that is what they were for. The rest of us relied on Dean and 
all thought that what was being done was legal and proper. No one, 
to my knowledge, was aware that these funds involved either black- 
mail or hush money until this suggestion was raised in March 1973. 


To the best of my recollection, I had no meetings or discussions with 
Jeb Magruder regarding Watergate after our phone call of June 18, 
1972, which has already been reported, until February 14, 1973. A 
review of my log confirms that I had no meetings at all with Magruder 
in 1973 until February 14. 

We did meet on February 14 for about an hour and a quarter at 
Mr. Magruder's request in my office. The purpose of the meeting was 
to discuss his plans for the future. He felt that the Watergate matter 
was now settled as far as he was concerned; that his work at the 
inaugural committee was done and that it was time for him to make 
his future plans. He said he was interested in the possibility of run- 
ning for office in California and he was also interested in the possi- 
bility of returning to a Government post in Washington. He was 
especially interested in a White House position in connection with 
the bicentennial. I advised him that there was no possibility of a 
Presidential appointment, or a White House position, until all of the 
Watergate matters had been cleared up, including the Senate hearings, 
which were, at that time, about to get underway. 

I believe that, at this time, he had just returned from a trip to 
California where he had taken soundings as to the political possibili- 
ties and his job opportunities. I urged him, if he was interested in 
California politics, to go to work in private business out there and 
get himself reestablished in the State and then go into politics at a 
later point. I recommended that he not consider coming back into the 
Federal Government because if his interests were in California he 
now had the need to reestablish liimself there. All of this was in the 
nature of political advice to a man who indicated his interests in nm- 
ning for political office. 


He said, however, that all of the people he had talked with in Cali- 
fornia had nrged him to go back into Government for a while ; that 
he had strong family reasons for wanting to stay in Washington be- 
cause his children were well established in the schools here ; and 
that he had lost some of his interest in running for office in Califor- 
nia and was more interested in the idea of staying in Washington. 
Since the Presidential appointment or White House post was out of 
the question, I suggested that he look into other Government possi- 
bilities and that he work with Jerry Jones and the White House per- 
sonnel office in that regard. 

I met with Magruder again on March 2 (I believe again at his re- 
quest), at my office, with John Dean also present, for about an hour. 
At this meeting we reviewed the same general subjects we had dis- 
cussed on February 14, and I gave him a list of jobs in the Govern- 
ment that had been developed by the personnel office. He expressed 
interest in one of the jobs on the list, a post at the Department of 
Commerce, and he subsequently did take that post. 

I do not recall any discussion of any of the particulars of the 
Watergate matter or the so-called coverup — other than what I have 
already indicated regarding his feeling that the matter was now be- 
hind him. 

I feel certain that there was no such discussion because had he 
told me the kinds of things that he has indicated to this committee 
that he told me regarding perjury, et cetera, I would have remem- 
bered them clearly and I would have done something about them. 

Mr. Magruder has stated that he met with me in early January of 
1973, before the inaugural, although he was unable to specify a date. 
Mr. Dean, on the other hand, has indicated in his testimony that 
I met with Mr. Magruder in late January. 

I do have a vague feeling that I talked with Magruder or at least 
knew about his plans prior to his trip to California, which I believe 
was in early February. I cannot recall any specific conversation or 
meeting. My feeling may arise from the fact that apparently John 
Dean talked with me in late January about Magruder's plans for 
going into politics in California and his plans to make a trip out 
there. Mr. Higby has told me that Mr. Magruder did request a meet- 
ing in January, but that I was unable to schedule one. I did later 
agree to such a meeting but when he called Magruder to set it up, 
:Majrruder had already left for California. It is possible that Magruder 
told Higby of his California plans and Higby relayed them to me. 
Magruder's recollection of the substance of the alleged January 
conversation is in many respects very much along the lines of my 
recollection of our conversation on February 14, and I have the feel- 
ing that we are dealing here with a simple error in recollection of 
specific dates, which is certainly understandable. 

At no meeting with Magruder did he raise with me a monolog 
as he has described, laying out the true facts or claiming that ho had 
committed or was going to commit perjury or that there had been 
any other illegal coverup activities undertaken in connection with the 
Watergate investigation. 

I should also explain. Mr. Dash, that my outline of the Magruder 
meetings of February 14 and March 2 is somewhat different than the 
review I gave the committee staff when I met with them late into the 


evening of June 14. That meeting was immediately following Mr. 
Magnider's testimony before the full committee in which he had 
referred to a January meeting. Having heard that reference for the 
first time, I made an effort to try to recall the facts of my meetings 
with Mr. Magruder as best I could. I knew from my log that I had 
had meetings with him on February 14 and March 2, and I had a gen- 
eral feeling that I had met with him once before he went to Cali- 
fornia and once after he came back. So I assumed that that was the 
case and reconstructed the two meetings to the best of my recollec- 
tion based on that premise. I found out later that Mr. Magruder's trip 
to California was apparently in early February ; therefore, our meet- 
ing on February 14 was after his return from California and the 
meeting on March 2 was a followup of the Februarj^ 14 meeting. I 
hope this correction is helpful. 

On April 14, 1973, I phoned Magruder at the President's request 
and asked him to meet with Ehrlichman that day. I have turned over 
to the committee a tape recording of this conversation. At the time 
we talked, Magruder had already decided to tell the full truth, and in 
fact, I believe, had done so in a meeting with the U.S. attorneys. 
During the phone conversation, Magruder said that his testimony had 
not implicated me. He also said that one of the problems he was facing 
was that he had committed pei-jury when he testified before the grand 
jury and the trial. I responded that I did not know anything about 
that, and he replied that even if I didn't, he did. He did not contra- 
dict me, thus showing that, at that point in time at least, I did not 
know he had perjured himself. 


I was in meetings with the President all afternoon on September 15, 
1972. At the end of the afternoon, the President had John Dean come 
in. This was the day that the indictments had been brought down in 
the Watergate case, and the President knew John Dean had been 
concentrating for a 3-month period on the investigation for the Wliite 
House. I am sure, therefore, that the President thought it would be a 
good time to give Dean a pat on the back. 

• There was no mood of exuberance or excitement on the President's 
part at the time the indictments were brought down. He does not take 
joy from the misfortunes of other people, and I don't think he found it 
very pleasant that the people had been indicted. Naturally, however, 
it was good news as far as the White House and the administration 
were concerned that when the indictments were brought down, after a 
thorough investigation, it had been established there was not any in- 
volvement by anyone in the White House, This confirmed what Mr, 
Dean had been telling us, and we had been reporting to the President 
over the period of the past 3 months. 

As was the case with all meetings in the Oval Office when the Presi- 
dent was there, this meeting with Mr. Dean was recorded. At the Pres- 
ident's request, I recently reviewed the recording of that meeting — at 
which I was present throughout — in order to report on its contents to 
the President. I should interject here that I also reviewed the record- 
ing of the March 21 meeting of the President, Mr. Dean, and myself 
for the same purpose, and I have made reports to the President on both 
of those meetings, T have not at any time listened to anv other record- 


ings of the meetings in the President's Office or of the President's 
phone calls. 

The President did not open the meeting of September 15 with the 
statement that, "Bob has kept me posted on your liandling of the 
"Watergate," or anything even remotely resembling that. He said, "Hi, 
this was quite a day, you've got Watergate on the way," or something 
to that effect. Dean responded that it had been quite a 3 months and 
reported to the President on how the press was handling the indict- 
ments and, apparently, a Clark MacGregor press conference. 

The discussion then covered the matter of the new bug that had re- 
cently been discovered in the Democratic National Committee head- 
quarters and the question of whether it had been planted by the DNC 
and the matter of Mr. Nixon's campaign being bugged in 1968 and 
some discussion of whether to try to get out evidence of that. There 
was some discussion about Judge Richey hearing the civil case and a 
comment that he would keep Roemer McPhee abreast of what was 
happening. I don't recall any comment about the judge trying to ac- 
commodate Dean's hopes of slowing down the suit, but there was some 
discussion about the problem of the civil case depositions interfering 
with the criminal prosecution — apparently as a result of a conversa- 
tion between Judge Richey and Assistant U.S. Attorney Silbert. 

Dean indicated that the indictments meant the end of the investiga- 
tion by the grand jury and now there would be the GAO audit and 
some congressional inquiries, such as the Patman committee, but he 
assured the President that nothing would come out to surprise us. In 
other words, there was apparently no information that would be harm- 
ful that had not been uncovered already. The President did at that 
point commend Dean for his handling of the whole Watergate matter, 
which was a perfectly natural thing for him to do. Dea_n reported that 
he was keeping a close eye on possible campaign law violations by the 
opposition ; said there were some problems of bitterness at the reelec- 
tion committee between the finance committee and political groups; 
and said he was trying to keep notes on people who were emerging out 
of all this that were clearly not our friends. 

There was, as Mr. Dean has indicated, quite a length^; discussion of 
the Patman hearings and the various factore involved in that. There 
was some discussion of the reluctance of the IRS to follow up on com- 
plaints of possible violations against people who were supporting our 
opponents because there are so many Democrats in the IRS bureauc- 
racy that they won't take any action. 

There was a discussion of cleaning house after the election, moving 
quickly to replace people at all levels of the Government. The meeting 
closed, as I recall, with a fairly long philosophical discussion. 

I totally disagree with the conclusion that the President was aware 
of any type of coverup and certainly Mr. Dean did not advise him of 
it at the September 15 meeting. 


On February 7, 1973. the Watergat- case moved into a new phase 
with the establishment of the Senate Select Committee. The announce- 
ment of the plans for the Senate probe was the reason for holding a 
weekend meeting, February 10 and 11, in southern California with Mr. 
Ehrlichman, Mr. Dean, Mr. Jiloore, and myself. These meetings have 


been thoroughly reported and I would concur in Mr. Moore's descrip- 
tion of them as sort of brainstorming sessions regarding the whole 
range of questions of strategy regarding the Senate hearings, a review 
ot possible problems, and general discussion of how to deal with a 
number of new factors. 

It was obvious that the Senate hearings would generate massive pub- 
licity. In calling and hearing a wide range of witnesses one at a time 
on national television there would be a lot of charges and hearsay with 
no opportunity to answer them, in the same news cycle at least, and 
there was of course the real concern that the committee hearings might 
evolve into a very partisan exercise. 

There was a freewheeling discussion of these various possibilities 
and problems and of ways and means of trying to deal with them or 
counteract them. 

I feel that Mr. Dean in his statement to the committee has, in a num- 
ber of instances, substantially misinterpreted the intent or implica- 
tions ot things that might have been said at the meeting. 

Also I believe he has overlooked one of the principal purposes of 
the meeting, which was a discussion at great length of how to develop 
some way to learn the entire Watergate story— including the other 
actnaties that were by then bunched together as Watergate— and get 
It out in Its totality and accurately. This was considered as one of the 
best ways to counteract the potential of adverse publicity arising from 
a drawn-out public hearing. The feeling was that putting all of the 
tacts out, m one place, at one time, would give the American people 
a more accurate picture of the truth than would the drawn-out process 
ot hearing one witness at a time over an extended period 

Another objective, which was the President's objective, was to 
try to work out ways and means by which the facts of Watergate or 
any testimony that could be provided by anvbody in the Wliite House, 
who had any knowledge, which would be of interest to this committee 
could be provided m the most complete form but without getting into 
the problem of the separation of powers and executive privileo-e. 

I don't recall any discussion of the question of raising money, but 

1 ^"^-l"!? ^?^^ -^ *^®^® "^^^^ ^^y' ^^ ^^s ^^ the form that Mr. Moore 
described ; that is, a very incidental item occupying only a few minutes 
in a series of meetings that lasted for many hours. It was not a prin- 
cipal point of discussion. There was no discussion of a covenip of 
Watergate during these meetings. 

Dean put into evidence as exhibit No. 34-34* an agenda he says was 
requested by me for a meeting with the President as a followup to 
i^a Costa on February 19 or 20. He seems to feel that this is a very 
signihcant document that is self-explanatory as evidence of a continu- 
ing coverup. I completely fail to see it that way. 

There w^ere five items on the agenda. First, a meeting of Senator 
^aker with the President which, it was my understanding Senator 
Baker had requested, and which seems to me to be perfectly natural 
as one step to be taken in working out the various problems regarding 
\Yhite House staff appearances at the Senate committee hearings, et 
cetera. Second, the question of submitting Maurice Stans' name for 
conhrmation to the Senate for a post requiring such confirmation This 
was a step designed to deal with two questions, first to give Mr. Stans 

♦See Book 3, p. 1243. 


the opportunity to reenter Government at a suitably high level and, 
second, to provide him with the opportunity in a very short period 
of time to appear publicly and under questioning, to clear up all 
charges regarding his role 'in the Watergate, if any, and to give him 
a chance to, as he requested of this committee, get back his good name. 
Third, a question of whether Magruder could have a White House job. 
At that time I had already told Magruder that that would not be 
possible, but I think, the point here was to check that decision with 
the President to be sure he concurred. Fourth, the question of 
Buchanan sitting in on the hearings as a watch dog of the press — 
an idea that Dean says I suggested, although it is my recollection he 
suggested it at the La Costa meeting. In any event, this was certainly 
not a coverup move, but exactly the opposite. Fifth, the question of 
the Attorney General meeting with the President. That, too, was a 
logical step because we were into the matters of executive privilege and 
the question of Wliite House staff members going to the hearings was 
important for the President to discuss with the Attorney General. 
As it concurrently or shortly thereafter developed, Senator Baker 
requested that Mr. Kleindienst be his contact with the administration. 

In the latter part of Februarv, as the questions of executive priv- 
ilege and other matters dealing with the Senate Watergate inquiry 
intensified, the President saw that this was involving a substantial 
amount of time of a number of people in the White House and particu- 
larly seemed to be involving Ehrlichman and me in more expenditure 
of time than the President felt was productive. Consequently, he met 
with John Dean at the end of February regarding the matters of 
executive privilege, the Senate hearings, and so forth, and he gave 
instructions to me and I am sure to others, that all Watergate matters 
were to be handled by Dean at the White House and by Kleindienst 
at the Justice Department and that no one else was to devote time to 
the subject and that no one else was to get into the matter with the 
President. He was trying to avoid everyone getting into the act. wast- 
ing time, and diverting attention — which is a real danger when a 
highly publicized and volatile matter such as this comes up. 

This decision of the President's led to the series of meetings that 
he had with Mr. Dean starting February 27 and running through 
March 21, meetings that were primarily concerned, at the outset, I 
believe, with executive privilege matters. That continued to be a 
major point, but as that 3-week period went on, the President's concern 
did grow regarding conflicting Watergate stories and, from what he 
indicated to me, he was intensifying pressure on Dean to find out a 
way to get the full storv out. 'Dean at this point was clearly in 
charge of anv matters relating to the Watergate. He was meeting 
frequently wi'th the President and he still indicated that he was posi- 
tive there was no White House involvement. During this time, the 
Gray hearings also became a matter of focus and the executive privi- 
lege question arose in connection with them, too. I have the feeling 
that during this period the President was gradually getting more of 
a feel of the possibility that there might be some problems involved 
in the Watergate matter that he had not even dreamed of and that 
that led to the meeting of March 21. in which John Dean was going 
to give the President the full story. 


I should point out one question that Mr. Dean raised regarding a 
comment made by the President in his meeting of February 27. He said 
the President told him he wanted Dean to handle the Watergate matter 
as it was taking too much of Ehrlichman and Haldeman's time and 
they were principals in it. Dean indicates that he did not understand 
what it was the President meant by the statement that Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman were principals. If this statement was made, I think 
it is quite clear in the context in which that meeting was held. At that 
time the major issue was whether the President would pennit his 
principal aides to be called up to the Senate committee to testify. At 
that time the President considered it inconceivable that anyone would 
think that the White House counsel would be called to testify and, 
therefore, was not even considering the possibility of Mr. Dean going 
before the Senate hearings. He was concerned about the question 
of Haldeman and Ehrlichman being called. In that sense, I was a 
principal in the matter of executive privilege. It is significant that 
the President, according to Dean's report, also emphasized that he 
would never let Ehrlichman and Haldeman go to the Hill, and I 
think it is in that connection that he would look at us as principals. 


The March 13 meeting Mr. Dean had with the President shows 
on the President's log as having run from 12 :42 to 2, an 80-minute 
meeting, approximately. The President's log also shows that I was in 
that meeting for 12 minutes from 12 :43 to 12 :55. Mr. Dean has testified 
that this was a long meeting, mainly regarding the Gray hearings 
and Dean's invitation to appear there. He says that toward the end 
of the conversation they got into a discussion of Wategate matters and 
the question of money demands being made by the defendants. He 
says that it was during this conversation that Haldeman came into 
the office for a brief interruption but tliat Haldeman then stayed on. 
It was then. Dean says, that he told the President there was no money 
to pay the individuals; the President asked how much it would cost; 
Dean estmiated $1 million ; the President said that was no problem and 
looked over at Haldeman and repeated that statement. Dean then 
goes on to describe a conversation regarding Executive clemency and 
then back to the question of money, ending with a laugh from me 
at Dean's comment that next time he would be more knowledgeable. 

The log, however, shows that I was in for 12 minutes at the beginning 
of the meeting and not at the end. 

I have no notes on the March 13 meeting and I have no recollection 
of that meeting at all. I do not recall going into the President's office 
and mterrupting the meeting with John Dean, but I am sure that I 
did if the log so indicates. However, I seriously doubt that the con- 
versation John Dean has described actually took place on March 13. 
I doubt it because of the difference in timing as shown in the Presi- 
dent's log, but I also doubt it because a discussion of some of those 
matters actually occurred during a meeting on March 21. 

There is also a timing problem regarding the meeting of March 21, 
since Dean has stated that I was only in that meeting for the last 5 
minutes or so when the President called me in to suggest that a meet- 
ing be set up with John Mitchell. My log indicates that I was in a 


meeting with the President from 11 :15 to 11 :55 on the morning of 
March 21. I do recall that meeting and I recall being in it for sub- 
stantially more than the 5 minutes that Mr. Dean remembers. 

I was not present for the first hour of the meeting, but I did listen 
to the tape of the entire meeting — including that portion before I 
came in. 

TVTiile I am free to testify to everything which I can recall happen- 
ing during the time I was present, the President has directed that I 
not testify as to any facts which I learned solely by listening to the 
tape of the meeting. 

My counsel will present a letter* in this respect and I shall obey the 
decision of the cormnittee as to its ruling thereon. Depending on that 
decision, I shall issue an appropriate addendum to this statement con- 
cerning the March 21 meeting. 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Senator Baker [presiding]. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Wilson. I am obliged to present to the committee a communica- 
tion which I received this morning from the Wiite House and I would 
like to read it, if I may, and a page carry a copy of it up to you while 
I am doing it. 

Senator Baker. Would you proceed, Mr. Wilson ? 

Mr. Wilson. It is addressed to me by Mr. Buzhardt. 

This concerns your inquiry as to the extent of the President's waiver of ex- 
ecutive privilege with regard to the testimony of Mr. Haldeman before the Sen- 
ate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. Your inquiry was 
directed to Mr. Haldeman's knowledge of the contents of tape recordings of con- 
versations of meetings in the President's office on September 15, 1972, and March 
21 1973 

Under the waiver of executive privilege stated by the President on May 22, 
1973, Mr. Haldeman is not constrained by any claim of executive privilege as to 
conversations at meetings which Mr. Haldeman attended, if such conversations 
fall within the May 22, 1973, guidelines. 

If asked to testify as to facts which he learned about meetings or portions of 
meetings which he did not attend, but of which he learned solely by listening 
to a tape recording of such meeting, the President has requested that you in- 
form the Committee that Mr. Haldeman has been instructed by the President to 
decline to testify to such matters, and that the President, in so instructing Mr. 
Haldeman, is doing so pursuant to the constitutional doctrine of separation of 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Vice Chairman, I have no argument to supplement 
that letter. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Wilson, is it your preference that the committee 
act on this at this point or would it be agreeable for counsel to the com- 
mittee to take that matter under advisement until Mr. Haldeman 
finishes his statement ? 

Mr. Wilson. I think, sir, that if it is not inconvenient, and in order to 
continue the continuity of this statement, if the committee could act at 
this time upon that letter, I think it would be very helpful to us. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Wilson, if there is no objection from the commit- 
tee, and I note that two members of the committee— three members of 
the committee are not present — if there is no obiection from any mem- 
ber of the committee, the committee then Avill stand in recess while 
we confer on this matter. 

*The letter was subsequently received and appears In Book 8 as exhibit No. 113. 

-296 O - 73 - pt. 7 - 16 


Senator Ervin. I have read Mr. Buzhardt's letter giving his view of 
executive privilege and I have taken the position all the time— and if 
the members of the committee disagree with me they might so state 
and ma}^ overrule me— that the matters which this committee is author- 
ized by Senate Resolution No. 60 to investigate, are not covered by 
executive privilege of any kind. 

Furthermore, I think if Mr. Haldeman has been authorized by the 
White House to hear tapes, even though he was not present when the 
tape was made, that he is authorized to testify about them. I am sorry 
in a way this is not a court of law where you can rule, but the best evi- 
dence of what these tapes say is the tapes themselves and as a member 
of the committee, I continually pray that the good Lord will give the 
White House guidance to let this committee see the tapes. [Laughter.] 

But as far as I am concerned I overrule the claim of executive privi- 
lege interposed in the last paragraph of Mr. Buzhardt's letter. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I think that your observation about 
the best evidence is entirely true, but we don't have the tapes and we 
have to deal with the facts as we find them, and apparently we find that 
Mr. Haldeman does have information derived from the tapes of the 
meeting of March 21. 1 think, and I continue to think, that we will be 
Jjetter served by having the tapes themselves, but we are about to have 
litigation over that. So in the meantime, I think, we have got to make 
do as best we can and T concur in the chairman's ruling. 

Senator Ervix. I am constrained, however, to observe that it is a 
strange thing that Mr. Haldeman can hear the tapes but this com- 
mittee cannot hear them. And I hope that they will eventually be made 
available to the committee because we have heard a lot of complaints 
about hearsay testimony and this is hearsav, but if Mr. Haldeman is 
permitted to hear the tapes, it looks like that the representatives of 
the American people in the Congress ought to be allowed to see them. 
So you have got a ruling and you may proceed. 

Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. What is the ruling? 

Senator Ervix. The ruling is that the claim of executive privilege 
is not valid in the view of the committee. You can tell us what the tapes 
said, or your version of it, notwithstanding we take the position that 
the tapes themselves would be the best evidence of what was actually 
said. So you can proceed to give your testimony as to what vou heard 
those tapes say or how you interpret the tapes. 

Mr. Haldemax. If I might comment first, Mr. Chairman, in response 
to your remarks, I would want to emphasize that I have listened only 
to two tapes, the tape of the September 15 meeting, at whicli I was pres- 
ent for the entire meeting, and the tape of the March 21 meeting at 
which I Avas present for 40 minutes out of a 105-minute meeting, and I 
have heard that portion of the tape on Jklarch 21 when I was not in 

Senator Ervix. When did you hear the tapes played ? 

Mr. Haldemax. The March 21 tape I heard in the latter part of 

Senator Ervix. And Avhen did you hear the September 15 tape? 

Mr. Haldemax. I heard it in the early part of July. 

Senator Ervix. Of this year, of course ? 

Mr. Haldemax. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervix. Because it wasn't recorded until that time. 


Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, let me ask one or two other qualify- 
ing questions on the statement. As the chairman pointed out, Mr. 
Haldeman, we don't have the tapes and it lool^ like we are going to 
have a lawsuit over that, but just for the sake of further establishing 
the value or susceptibility of misinterpretation of the information 
you are 'about to give us, did you in fact listen to the tapes, that is, 
physically listen to them as distinguished from reading a transcript of 
the tape ? 

Mr. Haldeman. Yes. There has been to my knowledge no transcript 
made of any of the tapes at any time. I listened to the actual tape. 

Senator Baker. Can you tell us where you did it? 

Mr. Haldeman. I did the— I listened to the March 21 tape in my 
office at the White House, and I listened to the September 15 tape 
in my residence. 

Senator Baker. All right. Can you tell us something of the quality 
of the tape, that is, were voices clearly distinguishable, were there pe- 
riods when they were inaudible ? What was the general quality of the 

Mr. Haldeman. The quality varies. It's good at times and not good 
at times. It's the kind of tape recording you have in a large room, 
which the Oval Office is, there is a lot of echo and bounce, it's difficult 
to follow the convei-sation completely but it is not by any means im- 

Senator Baker. Can you tell us whether or not those two tapes are 

still in existence? 

Mr. Haldeman. I do not know, I have no knowledge. They were 
returned by me to the Wliite House custodian and I have no knowldege 
of where they are from that point on. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Gurney. Mr. Chairman, can I ask a question ? 

Senator Ervin. One question then. Who permitted you— were you 
authorized by the President to hear these tapes ? 

Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir; as I indicated in my statement, I heard 
the tapes at the President's authorization and for the purpose of re- 
porting on their contents to the President. 

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, may I make a lawyer's reservation 
with respect to your remarks? In some other context before this hear- 
ing is over, I would appreciate the opportunity to debate with you, 
sir, the question of the extent of the constitutional doctrine of separa- 
tion of powers, sometimes called executive privilege. In other words, 
you indicated, sir, that you didn't think this was a valid reason, and 
I gathered under all occasions. I just want you to know that maybe 
before we are through here I may take the liberty, if you will permit 
me, of raising the question in some other context. 

Senator Ervin. Always glad to be wiser today than I was yesterday. 

Senator Gurney. Mr.* Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney. 

Senator Gurney. Mr. Haldeman, did you take notes as you were lis- 
tening to these tapes ? 

Mr. Haldeman. Yes ; I did, Senator. , m xi 

Senator Gurney. And the notes were taken simultaneously with the 
listening to the tapes ? 

Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. 


Senator Gurney. Thank you. 

Senator Inotjye. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Er\t;n. Senator Inouye, 

Senator Inouye. I have a question. Mr. Haldeman, who had physi- 
cal custody of the tapes at ttie time of the hearing of them ? 

Mr. Haldeman. The Technical Security Division of the Secret 

Senator Inouye. What person specifically ? 

Mr. Haldeman. I don't know. I don't know. I obtained them 
through Mr. Bull, the man who replaced Mr. Butterfield as the Pres- 
ident's aide. 

Senator Inouye. Was he there at all times ? 

Mr. Haldeman. Pardon me ? 

Senator Inouye. Was he there at all times when the tapes were 
played ? 

Mr. Haldeman. No, sir ; he was not there at all when the tapes were 

Senator Inouye. We were told that the Secret Service had exclusive 
custody over these tapes and they w^ere left in your care. 

Mr. Haldeman. The particular tapes that I listened to, yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator ER^^x. Senator Montoya. 

Senator Montoya. Did I understand you to say that you took the 
September 15 tape to your home ? 

Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. 

Senator Montoya. How long did you keep it there ? 

Mr. Haldeaian. Overnight. 

Senator Montoya. Who was present when you played this tape? 

Mr. Haldeman. No one. 

Senator Montoya. "V^Hio was present when you played the March 21 

Mr. Haldeman. No one. 

Senator Ervin. I think we subpenaed those notes of yours. Did you 
bring them ? 

Mr. Haldeman. No, sir ; my notes are in the President's files, I don't 
have any notes. 

Senator Ervin. Oh, the President keeps the notes and he keeps the 
tapes. [Laughter.] 

Mr, Haldeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Anyway, we have made a ruling and we might as 
well proceed. 

Mr. Haldeman [continues reading his statement]. I will proceed 
with the addendum on the March 21 meeting. I was present for the 
final 40 minutes of the President's meeting with John Dean on the 
morning of March 21. Wliile I was not present for the first hour of 
the meeting, I did listen to the tape of the entire meeting. 

Following is the substance of that meeting to the best of my recol- 

Dean reported some facts regarding the planning and the break-in 
of the DNC and said again there were no White House personnel 
involved. He felt Magruder was fully aware of the operation, but 

I 2897 

he was not sure about Mitchell. He said that Liddy had given him a 
full rundown right after Watergate and that no one in the "V^^ite 
House was involved. He said that his only concerns regarding the 
"Wliite House were in relation to the Colson phone call to Magruder, 
which might indicate White House pressure, and the possibility that 
Haldeman got some of the "fruits" of the bugging via Strachan 
since he had been told the "fruits" had been supplied to Strachan. 

He outlined his role in the January planning meetings and re- 
counted a report he said he made to me regarding the second of those 

Regarding the post-June 17 situation, he indicated concern about 
two problems, money and clemency. He said that Colson had said 
something to Hunt 'about clemency. He did not report any other 
offers of clemency although he said he felt the defendants expected 
it. The President confirmed that he could not offer clemency and 
Dean agreed. 

Regarding money, Dean said he and Haldeman were involved. 
There was a bad appearance which could be developed into a cir- 
cumstantial chain of evidence regarding obstruction of justice. He 
said that Kalmbach had raised money for the defendants ; that Halde- 
man had OK'd the return of the $350,000 to the committee; and that 
Dean had handled the dealings between the parties in doing this. He 
said that the money was for lawyers' fees. 

He also reported on a current Hunt blackmail threat. He said 
Hunt was demanding $120,000 or else we would tell about the seamy 
things he had done for Ehrlichman. The President pursued this m 
considerable detail, obviously trying to smoke out what was really 
going on. He led Dean on regarding the process and what he would 
recommend doing. He asked such things as— "Well, this the thing 
you would recommend? We ought to do this? Is that right?" and he 
asked : "Where the money would come from ? How it would be deliv- 
ered?" and so on. He asked how much money would be involved over 
the years and Dean said "probably $1 million— but the problem is that 
it is hard to raise." The President said "there is no problem in rais- 
ing $1 million, we can do that, but it would be wrong." I have the 
clear impression that he was trying to find out what it was Dean was 
saying and what Dean was recommending. He was trying to get Dean s 
view and he was asking him leading questions in order to do that. This 
is the method the President often used when he was moving toward a 

Dean also mentioned his concern about other activities getting out, 
such as the "Ellsberg" break-in, something regarding Brookings, 
the other Hunt activities for Colson on Chappaquiddick, the Segretti 
matter, use of Kalmbach funds, et cetera. 

When I entered the meeting, there was another discussion regard- 
ing the Hunt threat and the President again explored in considerable 
depth the various options and tried to draw Dean out on his recom- 
mendation, i-i ii • 

The meeting then turned to the question of how to deal with tins 
situation and the President mentioned Ehrlichman's recommendation 
that everybody should go to the grand jury. The Preside^nt told Dean 
to explore all of this with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell. 


There was no discussion while I was in the room — nor do I recall 
any discussion on the tape — on the question of clemency in the con- 
text of the President saying that he had discussed this with Ehrlich- 
man and with Colson. The only mention of clemency was Dean's 
report that Colson had discussed clemency with Hunt and the Presi- 
dent's statement that he could not offer clemency and Dean's agree- 
ment — plus a comment that Dean thought the others expected it. 

Dean mentioned several times during this meeting his awareness 
that he was telling the President things the President had known 
nothing about. 

I have to surmise that there is a genuine confusion in Mr. Dean's 
mind as to what happened on March 13 versus what happened on 
March 21, because some of what he describes in quite vivid detail as 
happening on March 13 did, in fact, happen on March 21. The point 
about my laughing at his being more knowledgeable next time, and 
the question that he says he raised on March 13 regarding the $1 
million are so accurately described, up to a point, as to what really 
happened on March 21 that I believe he is confused between the two 

Mr. Dean's recollection that the President had told him on March 13 
that Ehrlichman had discussed an offer of clemency to Hunt with him, 
and he had also discussed Hunt's clemency with Colson is at total 
variance with everything that I have ever heard from the President, 
Ehrlichman, or Colson. I don't recall such a discussion in either the 
March 13 or the March 21 meeting. 

Now, to the question of impression. Mr. Dean drew the erroneous 
conclusion that the President was fully knowledgeable of the coverup 
at the time of the March 13 meeting in the sense : First of being aware 
that money had been paid for silence, and that, second, the money de- 
mands could reach $1 million and that the President said that was 
no problem. He drew his conclusion from a hypothetical discussion 
of question since the President told me later that he had no intention 
to do anything whatever about money and had no knowledge of the 
so-called coverup. 

I had no difficulty accepting the President's version based on years 
of very close association with President Nixon and on hundreds of 
hours of meetings with him. Having observed the President over those 
years in many different situations, it was very clear to me on March 
21 that the President was exploring and probing, that he was sur- 
prised, that he was trying to find out what in the world was going on. 
He did not understand how this all fit together and he was trying to 
find out. 1 was pushing hard for that kind of information from Mr. 

The President, further, was concerned about how this ought to be 
dealt with and he was interested in getting views from Ehrlichman, 
Dean, Haldeman, and Mitchell because he felt that those views might 
be enlightening as to what the true situation was. 

For that reason he asked that the meeting be held with the four of 
us in the immediate future and such a meeting was scheduled the next 

Senator Baker [interrupting]. Mr. Haldeman, before you continue, 
is that the end of your addendum ? 

Mr. Haldeman. Yes, it is. 


Senator Baker. Would you supply us with copies or the original so 
that we could have copies ? 

Mr. Haldeman. I believe 

Senator Baker. I understand — has a copy been supplied to the com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. Dash. It is being reproduced now. 

Senator Baker. Thank you very much. 

Senator Ervin. You may proceed with your original statement. 

Mr. Haldemaist. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, and I met with the President later that 
afternoon of the 21st. That meeting dealt with the questions of the 
grand jury, the Senate committee, and executive privilege in connec- 
tion with gathering the facts and getting them out. I think there was 
some discussion of Ehrlichman's theory that everybody should go to 
the grand jury ; and Dean's reaction that that would be fine as long 
as we had immunity. Mr. Ehrlichman, as I recall, very strongly shot 
down that thought from Dean saying it did not make any sense at all. 
Dean has testified that he argued that the way to get the truth out 
would be to send everybody to the grand jury with immunity. That, in 
itself, is rather indicative of the different attitudes. Mr. Ehrlichman 
was arguing for going to the grand jury without immunity in order 
to get the truth out. Mr. Dean was arguing for going to the grand 
jury with immunity to get the truth out. 

I recall an incident after that afternoon meeting that Mr. Dean also 
recalls, but he says it took place before and he sees it a little bit dif- 
ferently. I remember that Dean and Ehrlichman and I were standing 
on the top of the steps of the EOB, the Executive Office Building, out- 
side the President's office. Dean said, sort of thoughtfully, that maybe 
the solution to this whole thing was to draw the wagons around the 
White House and let all the chips fall where they may, because that 
would not hurt anyone in the White House, nobody here had a prob- 
lem—but his question was : What would that do in the way of creating 
problems for Mitchell and Magruder? The significance of that com- 
ment was that it still seemed to be clear in Dean's mind that the prob- 
lem did not lie in the White House. 

The next step was the meeting of Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Dean, and 
myself the next day with the President. 

The four of us met first in the morning in my office and had some 
discussion of Dean's report to the President, although not in any de- 
tail. Most of the discussion was regarding approaches to dealmg with 
the situation rather than a review of the facts of the situation. 

Mitchell turned the discussion to the problem of executive privilege, 
and he argued very strongly that the position the President had taken 
and was maintaining regarding executive privilege appeared to the 
public to be a coverup on the part of the President and that it was 
bad politics, bad public relations, and a bad idea. Dean at that meeting 
again argued his idea of everybody going to the grand jury with im- 
munity in order to get the facts out. 

That was the day the news report was received regarding Pat Gray 
accusing Dean of having been a liar in some report he had given to the 
FBI. That interrupted the meeting and there was some discussion 
about it. 


We met in the afternoon in the EOB office with the President and 
that, too, was a discussion of how to handle the situation rather than 
any further exploration of the facts. At that meeting the grand jury 
argument was ruled out. Ehrlichman again opposed the idea of going 
to the grand jury with immunity and the more discussion there was, 
the more it seemed that it was not a practical thing and probably not 
within our control anyway. 

Mitchell very strongly recommended that the President drop his 
claim of executive privilege, contending that was a bad position for 
him to be in. That view, for the time of that meeting at least, prevailed 
and the decision that came out of the meeting was for the President to 
waive executive privilege and to permit all White House staff people 
to go to the Senate committee and testify fully in open liearing. But it 
Avas felt that before that was done, and in order to avoid the problem 
that had been discussed earlier of the committee hearings resulting 
in the facts coming out piecemeal, one witness at a time, and being the 
subject of a major news stoiy, there should first be a complete report 
put out by the Wliite House prepared by Dean covering all of the facts 
so that what all of us would say would already be known in one place 
rather than having bits and pieces come out over a period of time. 

So, as I recall. Dean was told at that meeting on the afternoon of 
March 22, to prepare a full written report for public release regarding 
the facts as they were known to him and as they in any way involved 
anyone in the ^^Hiite House. We talked about including in that, even 
though it was not related to Watergate, all of the facts on the Segretti 
matter so that any question that might arise on that would also be 

There was also at that meeting a question of the Senate committee 
rules and how the committee was going to operate. The President had 
expected Kleindienst to be in contact with Senator Baker, the vice 
chairman of the committer, regarding these matters. We were not sure 
whether he had been or not and the President picked up the phone dur- 
ing the meeting and called Kleindienst to talk to him about maintain- 
ing the contact with Senator Baker. 

John Dean was asked how long it would take him to write a report 
and he said it would probably take 2 days. He was told to go ahead with 
that process and the meeting ended on the note that the way this would 
be handled was that all of us would go to the Senate committee without 
any claim of executive privilege but that first there would be a com- 
plete report put out publicly. 

Through this period of time, I still had full confidence in John Dean 
and I think the President did. He had not in any way hit himself 
except on the indirect point that there -was a possible circumstantial 
chain of evidence leading to a charge of obstruction of justice than of 
legality. If it was his intention to impress the President, Ehrlichman, 
and me with the fact that he and the two of us were heavily involved 
in a coyerup program of illegal activities, he did indeed fail to do so 
and it is my very clear impression that that was not his intent at that 
time. He did start dropping some indications that Magruder at least, 
and possibly Mitchell, had serious legal problems and the President 
did become concerned about the problem of Watergate and the new 
information that had been brought to his attention. That was the rea- 
son for his decision that afternoon, and for some changes in his decision 


over the following week, regarding the "Wliite House staff going to the 
Senate committee without executive privilege; but more importantly, 
regarding the assignment to John Dean to prepare a full and complete 
report on all of the facts of the matter. After the March 22 meeting in 
the afternoon, the President left for Key Biscayne. The rest of us 
remained in Washington. I went to Key Biscayne the next morning to 
join the President for the weekend. John Dean went home to write his 
report, but found that he was besieged by reporters as a result of the 
Pat Gray allegation that he had lied, and so the President, in talking to 
him on the phone the next day, suggested that he go to Camp David 
where he would be free from the press and would have an uninter- 
rupted opportunity to get his report prepared. I am convinced that 
there was a discussion of Dean writing a report, and that when we left 
the meeting on the afternoon of the 22d it was clear in all of our minds 
that that was Dean's assignment and that he was expected to do so over 
the next couple of days. 


Over the weekend that Dean was at Camp David I had several 
phone conversations with him. There was a story that Dean and Ma- 
gruder knew about the bugging and that was a matter of concern 
to Dean with which he was dealing. He had obviously been working 
on the report he was supposcrl to be preparing and perhaps talking 
to people. He seemed now to feel that Magruder was definitely m- 
volved. He gave that indication, which he had given before, on the 
phone. He was not at all sure about whether or not Mitchell was 

On the 26th, I had a long phone call with Dean. It is interesting 
because he said there was no communication on that day of any 

I had called Dean— this is on the 26th— to ask if he would have 
any problem if the President announced that day that he was request- 
ing that Dean be called to the grand jury without immunity, and 
I specified that because in the earlier discussions Dean had made the 
point of immunity. Dean said, "No, I would have no problem with 
that." Then he said, "I have been working on this whole thing and 
trying to analyze what our problems are." 

He said there is a problem with Magruder regarding the planning 
meetings, because apparently he has testified as to the number of meet- 
ings and the content of the 'meetings and his testimony was different 
than what mine would be if I went to the grand jury now. He said 
there was onlv one meeting, and it was- for the purpose of discussing 
campaign spending laws; while, in fact, there were two meetings and 
they were for the purpose of discussing intelligence presentations 

by Liddv. 

He said, "In looking over this whole thing, there are several areas 
of concern. One is the blackmail area. Blackmail started way back. 
This was the first time he spelled this out to me. Mitchell was hit 
by Parkinson or O'Brien, who were liit bv Bittinan, who Avas hit 
by Hunt, who had been hit by the defendants saving that they needed 
money and if thev did not get it thev wore iroiucf to cause trouble. 
It was not spelled out much more than that. T do not think. 


Mitchell told Dean — ^this is Dean now recounting to me what his 
report apparently- was showing — to tell Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
to get Kalmbach to raise the money and Dean did. Kalmbach raised 
some $70,000, which he gave to LaRue. 

Then, we got to the question of the $350,000 and there was a problem 
there because the $22,000 was spent out of that and there 'was a 
problem of how to return it and account for the missing $22,000. 

Then there was the problem of blackmail to the Wliite House 
directly. He said there were two instances of that, one — Mrs. Hunt 
called Colson's secretary and said something about a demand for 
money. The other was Hunt's the preceding week. 

Regarding clemency, he said Colson talked to Bittman. He did not 
make any commitment but told him he would help. 

He referred to a letter McCord had written to Caulfield requesting 
a meeting. Mitchell told Dean to have him see him and find out what 
he was up to. 

Another problem area was Dean's delay in turning over the evidence 
in Hunt's safe to the FBI. Another was a call Liddy had made to 
Krogh. Apparently, he had been given a brushoff by Krogh and that 
had made Liddy mad. 

Following that phone call, the President dropped his plan to an- 
nounce that Mr. Dean would be requesting an appearance immediately 
before the grand jury in order to lay out all the facts as he knew them. 
The problem was that Dean had not really sorted out the facts at that 
point and it was not appropriate for him to go to the grand jury. 

Dean has said in his testimony that there was no discussion' in the 
March 26 phone call of his going to the grand jury — yet, that was the 
reason for the call. 

In one of the phone calls from Camp David, I believe on the 27th, 
Dean told me that he had talked with Pnul O'Brien who had told him 
Magnider had said that he had gone ahead with the Watergate opera- 
tion on orders from Strachan, who said Haldeman had ordered it be- 
cause the President wanted it done. This is the same report that Dean 
testified he had given to me in early February. Another confusion in 
dates — but an important one. 

By the 30th. Dean had not delivered any report and he said he had 
not been able to write one; and the President stopped dealing with 
Dean. In effect, he had stopped dealing with him after the 23d. 

I do not believe my attitude toward Dean had changed at that point. 
I was puzzled and maybe Dean was reading some puzzlement; but I 
had been in frequent communication with him in quite lengthy phone 
conversations while he was at Camp David — contrary to the implica- 
tion he has created that he was practically incommunicado while he 
was up there. I had the feeling that he was telling me quite openly 
what the problems were and what he was trying to work out. 

On March 30, the President made the announcement that nobody in 
the '\'\Tiite House would go to the Senate hearings but that all members 
of the "\^niite House staff would, of course, appear before the grand 
jury, if called, and would cooperate fully. 

Also on the 30th, the President put Mr. Ehrlichman officially on the 
"Watergate investigation and told him to develop the facts in the case 
and try again to get to a final conclusion. 



From April 1 to 7, I was in San Clemente with the President. 
Despite Mr. Dean's statement that during tliat period he, under advice 
of counsel, endeavored to avoid any contact with Haldeman, Ehrlich- 
man, or Mitchell — ^we talked on the phone daily. The main problem he 
seemed to have during that period was the continuing one with 
Mitchell regarding the discrepancy on the number of meetings. 

It is my understanding that Dean hired a lawyer, Mr. Shaffer, about 
March 30. He had indicated earlier that he might do this so he— and, 
through him, the President — could consult an attorney familiar with 
criminal law on the implications of some of the concerns Dean was 
developing. He told me that his lawyer had told him he should not 
write anything down about the Watergate case and, if he had written 
anything down, he should not show it to anyone and he should not talk 
to 'Mitchell or Magruder. He did not mention to me that his lawyer 
had told him not to talk to me or Ehrlichman and he did, in fact, con- 
tinue to talk — to me, at least. 

He told me his lawyers had met privately with the U.S. attorneys 
on April 4. He told me again on April 7 that his lawyers had met with 
the U.S. attorneys on April 6. This despite the fact that in his testi- 
mony he has said that his lawyers were meeting with the prosecutors 
but this was unknown to Haldeman or Ehrlichman. 

He further said that the U.S. attornevs had told his lawyers— and 
he believed that this was the straight information because this was an 
eyeball-to-eyeball meeting — that the U.S. attorneys were only inter- 
ested in the pre-June 17 facts. They had no concern with post-June 17. 
They only wanted Dean as a witness. They did not consider him a 
target of their investigation. They did not consider Haldeman as a 
target and probably would not even call him as a witness. Liddy had 
told them everything but his lawyers didn't know it ; and Liddy com- 
pletely cleared the ^^Tiite House ; that is, in telling them everything, 
Liddy had confirmed that nobody in the White House had had any 

We returned to Washington on April 8. During that week Ehrlich- 
man continued his investigation — and on Saturday the 14th reported 
his conclusions to the President in the form of a verbal statement of 
his theory of the case based on all of the information he had acquired- 
still, of necessity, mostly by hearsay. 

There were several "meetings with Dean that week and I recall a 
continuing concern on Dean's part regarding the discrepancy with 
Mitchell and the planning meetings. I don't recall any major changes 
in Dean's view of the facts from what he had reported on the phone 

By the end of the week both Dean and Ehrlichman had come to the 
view that Mitchell had approved the Watergate plan and there was 
some discussion that, if that were the fact, and if ^litchell decided 
to step forward and say so, it would he a major step in clearing up the 
Watergate mystery. This was not discussed in any context of asking 
Mitchell to do this as a scar'cgoat or to divert attention from others— 
but as a major step in bringing out the truth. 

Over the weekend, both Magruder and Dean met with the U.S. 
attorneys in private sessions and gave their full accounts of the Water- 


gate. These meetings were reported to the President on Sunday the 
15th by Attorney General Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General 
Petersen. Their report was not very surprising to the President, since 
it confirmed, with minor variations, tlie theory that Ehrlichman had 
given him on Saturday. 

Because the Dean and Magmider testimony seriously implicated 
John Mitchell, Kleindienst removed himself from responsibility on 
Watergate and the President put Petersen in full charge. 

By the end of April, it had become apparent to me that, because 
of the increasing intensity of charges and rumors in which my name 
was raised and the need for me to appear before the grand jury and 
this committee, it was no longer possible for me to perform my White 
House duties effectively. After some discussions regarding leave of 
absence versus resignation, I concluded I should resign and the Presi- 
dent agreed. I resigned on April 30. 

I said then that I was confident that when the full truth was known 
it would be clear I had had no knowledge of or involvement in Water- 
gate or any "coverup" and I had not failed to meet the very high 
standards of integrity which President Nixon had properly expected of 
everyone on his ^Yhite House staff and which I have always held for 

I have that confidence in full measure today and I welcome the op- 
portunity to help in the process of making the truth known. 

Senator Er%^n. I think it is appropriate not to take up the exam- 
ination of the witness until in the morning. I do want to make some 
observations concerning the matter which Fred Thompson men- 

Unfortunately we did have on several occasions while Mr. Ehrlich- 
man was testifying some demonstrations from some members of the 
audience. I deplored those demonstrations and may have been at fault 
in not squelching them more vigorously. 

I want to announce now that no such demonstrations will be per- 
mitted in the future and if any person who engages in one can be 
identified, the oflEicers should eject him from the committee hearing 
room because I certainly agree with Fred Thompson who has ren- 
dered very valuable services to this committee that it would be highly 
desirable if we could do exactly the same here as is done in a court- 
room and conduct an investigation in an atmosphere of judicial 

I am going to say, however, that the questions put to Mr. Ehrlich- 
man were rather robust and the answers given by Mr. Ehrlichman in 
response to those questions sometimes were rather robust, too. I quote 
the King James version of the Bible and I think that the proverb 
says that "Merry hearts doeth good like a medicine," and sometimes 
I think a man personally has a constitutional right to laugh even in 
a solemn hearing room. But I am going to suggest that possibly 
Mr. Ehrlichman invited some of the demonstrations by certain testi- 

For example, when I asked him if he didn't bug the conversations 
of Kalmbach and Kleindienst, I believe, he said, no, he didn't bug 
them. He didn't bug the conversations, he merely recorded them. 
And I think that that might have invited a little demonstration of 


the inability of the audience to determine exactly the precise line be- 
tween bugging and recording of phone conversations without con- 
sidering the other party. 

And then one time I was questioning Mr. Ehrlichman and he said 
I had interrupted his answer which I may have done because some- 
times I get a little impulsive, and he said that I interrupted his answer 
because I didn't want to hear what he was going to tell me. 

Well, I am sure that Mr. Ehrlichman gave as good as he got, 
whether it was tit for tat during the hearings, and that is quite normal 
because I think he is a rather vigorous and emphatic man. 

And another thing — a worse demonstration was probably intrigued 
by me or was my fault because when I stated that I didn't agree with 
Mr. Ehrlichman on the proposition that the President had no con- 
stitutional right to suspend the fourth amendment, Mr. Ehrlichman 
asked me how I knew that, and I said because the amendment was 
written in the English language and that is my mother tongue. So I 
think it produced what I thought was a demonstration, perhaps of the 
biggest proportions anyone could have and I would have to say maybe 
I contributed to that myself. 

But I think we gave Mr. Ehrlichman an opportunity to fully answer 
all of the questions that were put to him by the committee members 
or by the attorneys. 

I also think that we gave Mr. Wilson a fair opportunity to present 
his arguments about the inherent or implied powers of the President, 
and I think that on most occasions when :Mr. Wilson interposed an ob- 
jection to evidence that without serious objection of any other member 
of the committee, I sustained his objections. And I hope that in the 
future there will be no more demonstrations of any kind and I hope 
that when people attempt to laugh, anybody in the audience, that they 
will laugh as inaudibly as possible and I am going to be very— I am 
as mild-mannered a man as ever cut a throat or scuttled a ship and I 
am going to enforce the rule against demonstrations as fully as T can 
and I certainly do agree with the propriety of Mr. Thompson making 
the observations which he did, notwithstanding the fact that I thmk 
that Mr. Ehrlichman by his replies, as well as myself by my questions 
and responses to his questions, may have invited a little bit of a 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I think that probably requires ]ust 
a very brief but not too brief addendum. I think we have come a long 
way, Mr. Chairman, in these hearings. AVe have come a long way as a 
united committee, bv and large, free of at least the grosser forms of par- 
tisan political confrontation. We have come a long way m terms of 
time, in terms of the expenditure of emotional traits and energ>' and 
resources. As I said this morning, we are tired. I have no apolog>^ for 
that, and I find that in attitudes and T am not being critical there. I sim- 
ply mean that we have got to get about the business of finishing these 
hearings. I applaud. Mr. Chairman, for very effective action in trying 
to establish and maintain decorum in this hearing room. I tlimk it has 
been absent on occasion. I think we are all at fault. T assume my part^ot 
the burden. I confess that I can't resist trying to match you story tor 
storv' which will turn out to be absolutely impossible, but T share my 
part of the burden. But this is a historic and important and significant 


occasion and it must not be subjected to the charge of being run in a 
cavaher or casual way. So I think we profited from today, and I think 
that the remarks were well taken by you, Mr. Chairman. I think the 
remarks by Mr. Thompson were well taken. I think the audience no 
doubt will cooperate with us in the future and that will merely expedite 
the purpose of this hearing which is to receive facts and ultimately to 
state conclusions. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Ervin. I would like to add just a little bit more in this vein. 
This committee had to be appointed from the membership of the Sen- 
ate, and every Member of the Senate either calls himself a Eepublican 
or calls himself a Democrat, although sometimes on their voting records 
it's hard to distinguish between the two. But I think that every mem- 
ber of this committee has worked very conscientiously in an effort to 
bring out the truth in these matters. I think that they have tried to be 
as fair as human beings can because human beings do get provoked a 
little bit even when their intentions are the best and I am proud of 
all the members of this committee. 

I am also very proud of the committee staff. Sam Dash has done a 
marvelous job as chief counsel and Fred Thompson has done a marvel- 
ous job as minority counsel, and they have cooperated as members of 
the committee have, I think, exceedingly well, and I hope that we will 
be able to continue this cooperation, and I hope that we can find what 
the truth is, whatever it may turn out to be. 

Senator Baker. The healing balm has now been applied, Mr. Chair- 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, before we recess for the day, I have a 
sworn statement which the committee has received from Mr. Bernard 
Fensterwald, who is :Mr. McCord's attorney, and I would like to sub- 
mit it for the record. 

Senator Ervin. Let the reporter mark it with the appropriate ex- 
lubit number. 

[The statement referred to was marked exhibit No. 109A.*] 

Senator Ervin. AYe will stand in recess until 9 :30 in the morning. 

[Whereupon, at 6 :15 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 
9 :30 a.m., Tuesday, July 31, 1973.] 

•See p. 3012. 




Exhibit No. 94A 


July 25, 1973 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

White House counsel have received on my behalf the two 
subpoenas issued by you, on behalf of the Select Conrimittee, 
on July 23rd. 

One of these calls on me to furnish to the Select Committee 
recordings of five meetings between Mr. John Dean and 
myself. For the reasons stated to you in my letters of 
July 6th and July 23rd, I must respectftaiy refuse to produce 
those recordings. 

The other subpoena calls on me to furnish all records of any 
kind relating directly or indirectly to the "activities, partici- 
pation, responsibilities or involvement" of 25 named individuals 
"in any alleged criminal acts related to the Presidential election 
of 1972. " Some of the records that might arguably fit within that 
subpoena are Presidential papers that must be kept confidential 
for reasons stated in my letter of July 6th. It is quite possible 
that there are other records in my custody that would be within 
the ambit of that subpoena and that I could, consistent with the 
public interest and my Constitutional responsibilities, provide 
to the Select Committee. All specific requests from the Select 
Committee will be carefully considered and my staff and I, as 
we have done in the past, will cooperate with the Select Committee 
by making available any information and documents that can 
appropriately be produced. You will understand, however, 
I am sure, that it would simply not be feasible for my staff 
and me to review thousands of documents to decide which do 
and which do not fit within the sweeping but vague terms of 
the subpoena. 

Honorable Sam J. Ervin -2- 

It continues to be true, as it was when I wrote you on July 6th, 
that my staff is under instructions to cooperate fully with yours 
in furnishing information pertinent to your inquiry. I have 
directed that executive privilege not be invoked with regard to 
testimony by present and former members of my staff concerning 
possible criminal conduct or discussions of possible criminal 
conduct. I have waived the attorney -client privilege with regard 
to my former Counsel. In my July 6th letter I described these 
acts of cooperation with the Select Committee as "genuine, 
extensive and, in the history of such matters, extraordina'ry. •• 
That cooperation has continued and it will continue. Executive 
privilege is being invoked only with regard to documents and 
recordings that cannot be made public consistent with the confi- 
dentiality essential to the functioning of the Office of the President 

I cannot and will not consent to giving any investigatory body 
private Presidential papers. To the extent that I have custody 
of other documents or information relevant to the work of the 
Select Committee cind that can properly be made public, I will 
be glad to make these available in response to specific requests. 


Honorable Sam J. Ervin 


Select Committee on Presidential 

Campaign Activities 
United States Senate 
Washington, D. C. 20510 


ExmBIT No. 95 




JANUARY 1. 1972 - JUNE 30 ^ 1972 


rPTRMBFR 1972 

-296 O - 73 - pt. 7 - 17 


January 1, 1972 - June 30, 




White House 


Department of Justice 


Department of Treasury 


Department of Commerce 


Department of State 





W Exhibit No. 96 





JULY 1, 1972 - DECEMBER 31. 1972 





JULY 1, 1972 > DECEMBER 31. 1972 

Agency Number 

White House 438 

Department of Justice 365 

Department of Treasury 241 

Department of Commerce 50 

Department of State 64 

Export -Import Bank 9 

TOTAL 1,167 


Exhibit No. 97 

6 July 1972 



At 1005 on 6 July I saw Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray at his 
office. We were alone during our conversation. I handed him the 
Memorandum which is attached and said that it covered the entire 
relationship between the Watergate suspects and the Agency. In all 
honesty I could not tell him to cease future investigations on the 
grounds that it would compromise the security interests of the U.S. 
Even less so could I write him a letter to this effect. He said that he 
fully understood this. He himself had told Ehrlichman and Haldeman 
that he could not possibly suppress the investigation of this matter. 
Even within the FBI there were leaks. He had called in the components 
of his Field Office in Washington and "chewed them out" on this case 
because information had leaked into the press concerning the Watergate 
Case which only they had. 

I said that the only basis on which he and I could deal was absolute 
frankness and I wished to recount my involvement in this case. I said 
that I had been called to the White House with Director Helms and had 
seen two senior staff assistants. (I specifically did not name Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman. ) I said that we had been told that if this case were 
investigated further, it would lead, to some awkward places, and I had 
been directed (the implication being that the President had directed 
this although it was not specifically stated) to go to Acting Director Gray 
and tell him that if this investigation were pursued further, it could uncover 
some ongoing covert operations of the Agency. I had done this. 
Subsequently, I had seen Mr. Dean, the White House Counsel, and told 
him that whatever the current unpleasant implications of the Watergate 
Case were, that to implicate the Agency would not serve the President 
but would enormously increase the risk to the President. I had a long 
association with the President and was as desirous as anyone of 
protecting him. I did not believe that a letter from the Agency asking 
the FBI to lay off this investigation on the spurious grounds that it j, 

would uncover covert operations would serve the President. Such a ' 
letter in the current atmosphere of Washington would become known 
prior to election day and what was now a minor wound could become a 
mortal wound. I said quite frankly that I would write such a letter 
only on direction from the President and only after explaining to him 
how dangerous I thought such an action would be to him and that, if I 
were really pushed on this matter, I would be prepared to resign. 


Gray thanked me for my frankness and said that this opened the 
way for fruitful cooperation between us. He would be frank with me 
too. He could not suppress this investigation within the FBI. He 
had told Kleindienst this. He had told Ehrlichman and Haldeman 
that he would prefer to resign, but his resignation would raise many 
questions that would be detrimental to the President's interests. He 
did not see why he or I should jeopardize the integrity of our 
organizations to protect some middle -level White House figure who 
had acted imprudently. He was prepared to let this go to Ehrlichman, 
to Haldeman, or to Mitchell for that matter. He felt it important 
that the President should be protected from his would-be protectors. 
He had explained this to Dean as well as to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, 
He said he was anxious not to talk to Mitchell because he was afraid 
that at his confirmation hearings he would be asked whether he had 
talked to Mitchell about the Watergate Case and he wished to be in a 
position to reply negatively. He said he would like to talk to the 
President about it but he feared that a request from him to see the 
President would be rnisinterpreted by the media. I said that if I were, 
directed to write a letter to him saying that future investigation of 
this case would jeopardize the security of the U.S. and covert opera- 
tions of the Agency, I would ask to see the President and explain to 
him ^he disservice I thought this would do to his interests. The 
potential danger to the President of such a course far outweighed 
any protective aspects it might have for other figures in the White 
House and I was quite prepared to resign myself on this issue. 
Gray said he understood this fully and hoped I would stick to my guns. 
I assured him I would. 

_Gray then said that though this was an awkward question, our 
mutual frankness had created a basis for a new and happy relation- 
ship between our two Agencies. I said the Memorandum I had given 
him described in detail the exact measure of Agaicy involvement or 
non -involvement in this case, including information on Dahlberg and 

He thanked me again for nny frankness and confidence and 
repeated that he did not believe that he could sit on this matter and 
that the facts would come out eventually. He walked me to the door. 

VJLJJVA.^ i^r-"t^ •^^l- ■ **» 

Vernon A. Walters 
Lieutenant General, USA 


/(•i:5-73 % 

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Exhibit No. 99 

Conversation with AG Kleindienst, March 28, 1973 

K. Kleindienst. 
E. Ehrlichman. 

E. The President wanted me to cover with you. Are you on an outside line? 

K. I'm at my parents' house. 

E. Oh, fine, OK, so it's a direct line? Number one, he wanted me to ask you 
those two things that I did yesterday about the grand jury and about Baker. 
He had me call Pat Gray and have Pat contact Lowell Weicker to ask 
Weicker about this second story that he put out yesterday to the effect that 
he had information about White House involvement. And Weicker told Gray 
that he was talking there about political sabotage and not about the Water- 

K. About the Segretti case? 

E. Yeah, and that he was quite vague with Pat as to what he had. 

K. I called him also, you know, after I talked to the President on Monday. 

E. Well, the President's feeling is that it wouldn't be too bad for you in your 
press conferences in the next couple of days to take a swing at that and just 
say we contacted the Senator because we continue to exercise diligence in 
this thing and we're determined to track down every lead and it turns out 
he doesn't have anything. 

K. I would really at this delicate point question the advisability of provoking, 
you know, a confrontation with Weicker. He's essentially with us, he and 
Baker get along good. 

E. Is he? 

K. Baker has had a long talk with him and told him to shut up and said that 
he would and I talked with him on Sunday after he said he didn't have any- 
thing but he's kind of an excitable kid and we just might not want to 
alienate him and I think that if he finds himself in a direct word battle with 
the White House and me and loses face about it I think in the long run we 
might need that guy's vote. 

E. I see. You don't think that this is evidence of alienation to the point of no 
return then? 

K. No. You mean by Lowell? 

E. Yeah. 

K. No I don't. He's pretty disenchanted with the whole concept of it. Connect- 
icut politician 

B. Well, use your own judgment on it, Richard. 

K. On TV I guess 7 or 8 times this Sunday when I finished my testimony before 
my appropriations committee all three networks I referred to the letter that 
I sent to Sirica and I also emphasized and repeatedly said (a) the President 
wants this investigated, let the chips fall where they will but secondly that 
if anybody has any information we not only want it we expect to get it so 
we can investigate it and if necessary indict other people and that anybody 
who withholds information like that is obstructing justice. But I did not 
refer to Weicker. And my judgment right now is not to do so. 

E. OK, OK. 

K. If he gets to that point, the hell with him. 

E. Well, our uneducated and uninformed impression was that he was trying 
to develop an attack line here on the White House or the President. 

K. If that ... if we would conclude that that is what he's up to that he is 
completely alienated then I say we've got to take him on. 

E. Well, keep track of that and you'll be talking to Baker and you get a feel of it. 
OK, now, the President said for me to say this to you. That the best in- 
formation he had and has is that neither Dean nor Haldeman nor Colson 
nor I nor anybody in the White House had any prior knowledge of this 


burglary. He said that he*s counting on you to provide him with any in- 
formation to the contrary if it ever turns up and you just contact him direct. 
Now as far as the Committee to re-elect is concerned he said that serious 
questions are being raised with regard to Mitchell and he would likewise 
want you to communicate to him any evidence or inferences from evidence 
on that subject. 

K. With respect to them, unless something develops with these 7 people who 
were convicted all those people testified under oath before a grand jury and 
their testimony was not contradictory and until something comes along I 
think this fellow McCord if he has something besides his own testimony in 
addition to that to refute the sworn testimony, then you'd have to do it. 
The comment that I made yesterday about McCord was that it takes 

E. Take him for what he is. 

K. He's facing a long jail sentence and he has all kinds of motives to say all 
kinds of things but I also pointed out that most of the people, well, these 
people who were involved were interviewed by the FBI and they testified 
under oath before a grand jury to the contrary of what McCord is saying. 
But I understand the President's direction. 

E. He's concerned about Mitchell. 

K. So am I. 

E. And he would want to have a private communication from you if you are 
possessed of any information that you think he ought to have with regard 
to John. 

K. Now he ought to think about John — 'McCord or Liddy or Hunt or any of 
these 7, you know, testify under oath specifically to their knowledge they 
have a basis for saying so that Mitchell or any of these guys knew about it ; 
we have a very serious problem. Possible perjury, possibility of going back 
to the grand jury, they have a grand jury determine when anyone should be 
indicted. When you talk about Mitchell and me that really creates the 
highest confiict of interest. And we want to give some thought to having 
in such an event having a special prosecutor. 

E. What is the procedure for that ? 

K. Well, I don't know. I think that the President could appoint somebody as 
a special prosecutor to direct the FBI to cooperate with him, giving them an 
opportunity to hire some attorneys, you know, on his staff and then just 
have complete authority to have his own investigation and if there's evidence 
that comes out that there were acts of criminal behavior have them presented 
to a grand jury then proceed with it. 

E. Could you have somebody brief out how that's done? Just so we know? And 
the question would be whether the President or Sirica or you or you know 
who actually does it? 

K. Well it wouldn't be the judge. The judge has no jurisdiction. I think it 
would be the President. 

E. OK. 

K. But it has its own problems that by doing that you in effect say publicly 
well OK the Department of Justice and the Attorney General the U.S. 
Attorney and the FBI all corrupt. I've now found that out and have got to 
get myself a new 

E. Of course we've resisted that right straight through. 

K. I think that we have to do it in the event that it appears that Mitchell him- 
self is going to be involved in any further litigation because all the men who 
are doing this who have worked for him been appointed and I think if it 
came down to him that that's what I would seriously start thinking about, 

E. Also this business of the grant of immunity to witnesses before the grand 
jury, is that peculiarly in the province of the court? 

K. No, that's the Department of Justice. 

E. That is? 

K. In almost every criminal case of any consequence when we convict some- 
body the next thing to do is haul them back in before a grand jury to find 
out what they know. You have to do it in this case — always going to do it. 
Quite a limitation posed on us John is that — who couldn't cut it (inaudible). 
But you have two really distinct situations here. You have the Watergate 
inquiry by Senator Brvin, that's the political side of it. And then you have 
the obligation imposed npon us to investigate criminal conduct. Two separate 
distinct operations. They're getting all fuzzed up. 


E. What progress are they making right now, have you had a reading on it? 

K. Well, the last time I talked to Henry Monday because of Sirica's sentencing 
procedures it got a little boxed up. Sirica is really lousing this thing up. I 
don't know. I'm going to talk to Petersen this morning and I'll call you 

E. OK, great, that's all I had on my list. 

K. Thanks, John. 

E. Now, he said that there was a possibility he'd like to see you in San 
Clemente Saturday morning first thing. So you might just keep that in the 
back of your mind. Don't rearrange any of your schedules or anything but 
I'll let you know if that materializes. We'd send a chopper up to LA for you. 
Thank you. 

K. OK. 


Exhibit No. 100 

Notes of a meeting with Herb Kalmbach, April 6, 1973, 
in San Clemente, California approximately Noon, 

Kalmbach was very concerned about the effect of his testimony 
with regard to raising money for the Watergate defendants upon 
Kalmbach' s reputation and family. 

It is his recollection that John Dean telephoned him to ask him to 
do so upon the representation that both Bob Haldeman and John 
Ehrlichman had OKayed his doing so. 

Kalmbach assunaed that he would not be asked to do anything 
illegal or improper , he had no occasion to check the law nor to 
inquire into the disposition of the funds, he arranged for a "Mr. Rivers" 
to carry the money from California to Washington and to deliver it 
according to John Dean's instructions. 

Kalmbach does not know to this day how the money was used. He 
was not willing to disclose to me who he raised the money from but 
miy impression is that he raised it from two individuals who paid 
him cash and desired passionately to remain anonymous. 

Kalmbach has the impression that the money was to be used for 
comipassionate purposes, that is, the support of the families of 
the imprisoned defendants, and that the money was being furnished 
to them by way of a moral obligation for the well-being of the 
fannilies. He understands, that some of the money was to be used 
for attorneys' fees for the men either directly or indirectly. Kalmbach 
has retained the services of an attorney named Paul O'Connor of 
Phoenix, a long-time friend, and he asked that I see Mr. O'Connor 
on his first visit to Washington as a courtesy. I agreed to do so. 

4t « >i( 



Exhibit No. 101 

28 June 1972 



On June 23 at 1300 on request I called with Director Helms 
on John Ehrlichman and Robert Maldeinan in Ehrlichman's office 
at the White House. 

Haldeman said that the "bugging" affair at the Democratic 
National Committee Hqs at the Watergate Apartments had made 
a lot of noise and the Democrats were trying to maximize it. 
The FBI had been called in and was investigating the matter. 
The investigation was leading to a lot of important people and 
this could get worse. He asked what the connection v/ith the - 
Agency was and the Director repeated that there was none. 
Haldeman s?.id that the '.vhole affair was getting ennbarrassing 
and it was the President's wish that V/alters call on Acting FBI 
Director Patrick Gray and suggest to him that since the five 
suspects had been arrested that this should be sufficient and 
thai- il- ^vas iiot advantageous to have the enquiry pushed, especially 
ia Mexico, etc . 

Directov Holms said that he had talked to Gray on the previous 
day and had inade plain to him that the Agency v/as not behind this 
matter, tiiat it v/as not connected with it and none of lIig suspects 
v/as v/orkin<,' for. nor liad worked for the Agency in the last two 
yeai'J. lie had told Gray that noa-i oi his invt: stigaiionj v/as 
touchia;"; any co'/ert projects of the Agency, currcnc or ongoing. 

Haldcmaii tlieii stated that I could tell Gray that I had talked 
i.o the v;iut: Hou.;.- and sn-^::o3t that th.e investi;>atlon not be push.^d 
fuvrhoi-. Gray v.-ould h ?. receptivo as he wol-j looking for guidance 
In tho itiatter. 

'T''i-> Di '.••:.ctoi- '•cpor.ted i!iat tiu; .'Vgciicy v/at; unconnected with tiie 
mattel-. I then i.'ii-^-'''^ to l.^lk to Gi-.'.y » •' cii n;ct..M.l, Elivlichman 
if:-! :}'['• -2 d 1 cc;i-;;i do this soon in.;'- I $a.iu I wodd trv- to v!o it todav. 


Upon leaving the Whits House I discussed the matter briefly 
w'lh thr Dirc-c^or, On returning to the office I called Gray, 
itj'lUated tliat this was a matter of some urgency, and he agreed 
to see me .it 1430 that day. 

Vernon A. Walters 
Lieutenant General, USA 


Exhibit No. 102 

Conversation with Pat Gray, March 7 or 8, 1973 
E. Ehrlichman 
G. Gray 

E. Been testifying today ? 

G. Yeah, I'm having a ball. Let me just tell you an unusual development that 
happened today I think you'll be intere.sted in and it's not a disaster or any- 
thing, it's just a total surprise I think to everybody including me and all 
the committee members. Over the weekend I had prepared a rather forceful 
statement saying that this function of the committee was . . the function of 
this committee was to look into my qualifications and to examine my pro- 
cedural conduct of the Watergate not to get into substance that this had 
been assigned to the Ervin select subcommittee and they would erect the 
proper safeguards to protect those who were innocent and were just stand- 
bys in this whole matter here of this criminal offense and I talked about 
constitutional due process and the right to privacy and all that kind of stuff. 
What the hell should turn up this morning to the chairman of the committee 
and each member of the committee and then a copy was delivered to me in 
the hall as we were walking into the hearing room but a three pa?e letter 
from the ACLU practically saying the same damn thing. So what has hap- 
pened is that we got a state of consternation up there right now with the 
AOLU and the FBI in the same bed. And I don't know what the hell they're 
going to do on that. I wanted you to know that that development occurred 
and I also got another letter today along the same lines from a professor 
who's pretty highly respected and I talked with Jim Eastland. We're going 
to throw that letter into the hopper tomorrow, too. I'll read that — that's 
one of the first things I'll do tomorrow morning. 

Another thing I want to talk to you about is that I'm being pushed awfully 
hard in certain areas and I'm not giving an inch and you know those areas 
and I think you've got to tell John Wesley to stand awful tight in the saddle 
and be very careful about what he says and to be absolutely certain that he 
knows in his own mind that he delivered everything he had to the FBI and 
don't make any distinction between ... but that he delivered everything 
he had to the FBI. 

E. Right. 

G. And that he delivered it to those agents . . . this is absolutely imperative. 

E. All right. 

G. You know I've got a couple of areas up there that I'm hitting hard and I m 
just taking them on the attack. 

E. OK 

G. I wanted you to know that. 

B. Good. Keep up the good work, my boy. Let me know if I can help. 

G. All right. He can help by doing that. 

E. Good, I'll do it. 

CJonversation with John Dean same day immediately following 

E. Ehrlichman 
D. Dean 

D. Hello. 

E. Hi. Just had a call from your favorite witness. 

D. Which is? 

E. Patrick J. Gray 
D. Oh, really? 


And he says to make sure that old John W. Dean stays very very firm and 
steady on his story that he delivered every document to the FBI and that 
he doesn't start making nice distinctions between agents and directors. 
He's a little worried, is he? 

Well, he just doesn't want there to be any question. He says he's hanging 
very firm and tough and there's a lot of probin' around. 

Yeah, he's really hanging tough. You ought to read the transcript. It just 
makes me gag. 

Oh, it's awful, John. 

Why did he call me? To cover his tracks? 
Yeah, sure. I laid this on him yesterday. 
Oh, I see. OK. 

I laid it on him to, you know, to fuse the issue so I don't have any idea what 
he said up there today. 

I see. It was a funny phone call. Said he was going in to object to the juris- 
diction of the group to get into the substance and that their own jurisdiction 
was to . . . was procedural efforts and his competence and he says the ACLU 
put a letter in to the same effect. 

Yeah. Wally picked up an interesting one on the grapevine today that planned 
strategy now is to proceed in this one as they did in the Kleindienst. 
Down to the point of calling you? 

Down to the point of calling me and 

Let him hang there? 

Well I think we ought to let him hang there. Let him twist slowly slowly 

in the wind. 

That's right. I was in with the boss this morning and that's exactly where 

he was coming out. He said I'm not sure that Gray's smart enough to run 

the Bureau the way he's handling himself. 

Well, OK, you're on top of it. Good. 


Exhibit No. 103 
Conversation with Pat Gray 

G. Gray. 

E. Elirlichman. 

E. Hi, Pat. 

G. John, I thought I'd better just give you a report. They worked me over 
plenty today but I went on the offensive pretty hard and as I told John 
Dean in my noon report to him to look at the transcript and we may have 
even won some of the public relations battle today. I don't know. This after- 
noon was easier from the standpoint of questions than this morning but I 
defended vigorously the right of the Counsel to the President in his official 
capacity to be present at those interviews. I defended vigorously the right 
of an employer to insist that his counsel be present at interviews of his em- 
ployees particularly when there were implications that these employees may 
have been involved in hanky-panky that would reflect adversely on the 

E. Is that going to make problems for the Bureau and other contexts? 

G. No. No. You see, it's a thing where this is happening more and more even 
though I have to say for the record our preference is that this not occur 
and the norm is that it does not occur but in these past few years it has been 
occurring more and more and more and it's just the thing that we have to 
face up to. 

E. People being interrogated having counsel? 

G. Yeah. And we got into the thing, you know, we brought it out and hit it hard 
oh at least three times today with three different Senators. In fact, even 
Jim Eastland hit it for me in his questioning about our investigation of the 
Democrats and the little red black box and how many times it took us to 
get O'Brien and all that kind of stuff and the fact that they put their coun- 
sel in the interview too. 

E. Good. 

G. Now, just from sizing this thing up it looks to me like this probably. Tunney 
said to me today that the last thing he said when he was closing out his 
questioning is that he's going to move in the committee in their executive 
session that John Dean be called and of course I didn't respond in any way 
at all because that's their business and I told John I wanted the President 
to hang in there on that executive privilege and I told Eastland that in no 
way can I see a man with an attorney-client privilege — ^the President — 
being called on and I told John to make sure that you and the President 
understood that he ought to stand strong and tall in that saddle and if this — 
don't do anything to save me. That's what I'm saying. 

E. I get it. 

G. Of course he's got to make the judgment. I can't. 

E. Do you think that there is enough votes on the committee to hold you 

G. No, I don't. My feeling right now is that if we can keep those Republicans 
together we'll be alright. We'll probably be able to defeat that kind of a 
motion but you know I haven't asked did the White House or the Depart- 
ment of Justice have anything to do with your confirmation hearings because 
we're trying to keep it nonpolitical but now I'm beginning to think that 
maybe a call to Roman Hruska or however you all do that but I wouldn't 
let it get out among the guys at the lower level at all at the White House 
in making any move or it'll backfire. 

E. Do you think on the Dean subject, huh ? 

G. I think on the fact that they ought to stay together on this thing and that 
this is the counsel to the President, this is attorney-client privilege — god- 
damn constitution. What the — ^they treat the Berrigans one way and they 
want to do it differently here. I said that to some of the Republican Senators 
and to the chairman. 


Good. I got a call from the press room a little while ago about whether 
I had had any phone conversations with you about the — they got an inquiry. 
T got them exactly, John. I've got the exact accounting of it and I think 
we had five calls during the whole thing and I saw you twice and what I have 
stated, you know, they got to this today and I said everyone of these were 
procedural. I advised both Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean that we were 
going to conduct this investigation with the full aggressiveness and vigor 
within the capabilities of the FBI. We were going to run it right to wherever 
it led and I said both of them agreed with me completely. I had no hindrance, 

How did my name come into it? 

Well, they asked me pointblank, just straight out. Did you have a telephone 
conversation at any time with Mr. Ehrlichman period. Just straight out. 
You know, those meetings were procedural meetings. 

And they asked me who I met with with you and my recollection was there 
was nobody. You and me period. And that's going to be my testimony. 
And when you said procedural you meant with relation to how you were 
going to conduct the Watergate investigation. 

Right. And I said this was informative only and I emphasized and repeated 
that I got no direction, no guidance, no hindrance, no impedance, no handi- 
caps whatsoever from anybody and that there was agreement that this is 
the only way that it could be done. I didn't say, you know, that the President 
came out later and made a public statement on it. That's for one of those 

Republican Senators to 


I counted them today. It's 5 telephone calsl to you and twice I saw you. 

I'll give you a note on it. 

Alright. Did they ask who initiated the calls or anything of that kind? 


OK. Very good. 

I'll send you over a note. You'll have it first thing tomorrow. Date and time. 



Exhibit No. 104 
wilkinson, cragun & barker 



r < 

WASHINGTON, D. C.20000 ,> 

(202) 633-9600 


July 27, 1973 

\*.ROSEl. M 













1 R, BELL 





ALAN 1. n 





Honorable Sam J. Ervin, Jr. 
Chairman, Senate Select Committee 

on Presidential Election Activities 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Senator Ervin: 

This letter is another appeal to your Committee to 
act in a spirit of fairness which requires the clearing up of 
the misleading record made during the appearance of Honorable 
Maurice H. Stans on June 12,' 1973, over nation-wide television. 

I addressed a hand delivered letter to you on 
July 5 1973, together with enclosures. Copies are attached. 
As noted in that letter even though Mr. Stans denied that he 
had ever seen the Hagruder memo (copy attached) and stated 
there was no such political fund in the Department of Commerce, 
the media, based upon your hearing record, erroneously re- 
ferred to a "Million Dollar Secret Fund", which in fact did 
not exist . 

In addition to the letter from Richard Whitney and 
two affidavits from former Secretary of Commerce for Adminis- 
tr.ition Larry A. Jobe, furnished earlier, we enclose here- 
with another affidavit from Joseph E. Casson, former executive 
assistant to Mr. Stans at Commerce, stating that he had advised 
Mr. Magruder's office that no such political fund existed or 
was contemplated. Moreover, Mr. Casson has told me that he 
never discussed the fund inquiries with Mr. Stans and that no 
one else did in his presence. 

It is abundantly clear that Mr. Stans had never seen 
the Magruder memo prior to his testimony and that there was 
no such political fund. If he had been asked about the memo 
in staff interviews, he could have clarified the matter. That 
was not done, however. Mr. Stans was asked to identify a memo 


Honorable Sam J. Ervin, Jr , 
July 27, 1973 
Page Two 

ho had never seen. Later your committee had Mr. Magruder 
affirm he had written the memo but did not pursue any facts 
of tlie non-existent political fund. As a result, the public 
has been mislead to Mr. Stans' damage and embarrassment. 

Feeling that the only way to correct this matter 
fairly is a clarifying statement in your public and tele- 
vised hearings, wo suggested to staff counsel that the 
record be cleared up without delay in accordance with the 
enclosures, (see proposed statemait furnished on July 11, 

We again request this action be taken without 
further delay. 

SincQ^c/ly yours, 

wiLi^i^soN, crag^J7& barker 

'By : Robert W . Barker 

cc; Each Member of the Committee 
Hon. Maurice H. Stans 


cm«=;l£S * 





N N 













• /Vol adrnxluJ 







WASHINGTON. D. C. 20008 

(202) S33-9aOO 




July 27, 1073 




Pr.vid Doraon, i'.cciuii'o 
Con-ito Polcct Coi.iriiittco on 

Pronic'ontial CoiiipaiQa Activities 
r.oo.-.i I'TclC 

Kcv; Con.ito Office Building; 
V.'aGii iugton , D . C . 

Doar David: 

As pci* oui' tallt, I r;cr.d you r,. co^iy of tho 
ir.or.t rocont letter wo have v/i'itte;i oa tho Co.'Oiaorco I'und 

I hcrjc in jLaii'.'.cri.-j that you <^an net the record 
atrpi3;ht. I'/io^o v.'r.3 no c-v.cli cccrot ^^olitical fund. I 
;-ip.vo been ascurcd by nuv.'.cror^." people that tho diccrctiouary of tho Dopaa.'t;.i::-nt of Co:.:..ierco v/a.o iiGcd tiololy for 
authorized covernr.iontal purposes. 



By: r.obort \1 . Bairker 
: Uufus Eduiistcu, IlGCiuiro ^y^ 




nnc J i«roncE 





1735 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W.. , 


(Z02) 033-9aOO 



July 5, 1973 


noscL H. HroE 

MERBEnr F. Ol&li 


Honorable San\ J. Ervin , Jr. 
Cliainnan, Senate Select Committee 

on Presidential Election Activities 
United States Senate • • " 

Washington, D. C. ' • 

Dear Mr. Chaimian: 

When the Honorable Maurice 11. Stans appeared 
before your Committee he was interrogated about a 
inemornndiim dated July 28, 1971 (Committee Exhibit 27) 
from Jeb S. Magruder to the Attorney General concerning 
an alleged discretionary fund in the Department of Commerce 
which v/as I'eportedly available for activities beneficial 
to the President's re-election (Tr. 1638). Even though, 
prior to his testimony, Mr. Stans had met with your staff 
on two occasions to review the scope and subject matter of 
his testimony he was asked about this memorandvun in the 
public hearing without prior notice or chance to refresh 
liis recollection concerning the subject matter of the memo. 
He testified that he had not previously seen the document 
during his administration. He further stated that there was 
no fund in the Department of Commerce, apart from authorized 
budgeted funds, and certainly no fund set aside in the 
Department to help in the election campaign. This unfortunate 
episode occurred, as you know, over nationwide television. 

Based on this I'ecord, the media referred to the 
"Million Dollar Secret Fund". For example, the New York 
Daily News had front page headlines which referred to the 
"fund" and on page t\vo, the headlines ran "Commerce 
Department Fund For Nixon is Revealed". Press service 
reports on the nonexis'tent "Fund" were carried throughout 
the nation, with little or no recognition being given Mr. 
Stans' denial of the existence of such a political fund. 
We feel that the "surprise" approach to the interrogation 
in great part contributed to. this unfairness. 

96-296 O - 73 - pt.7 


Honol'ablu bam J. KrVili , Jr. 

July 5, 1973 

Page Two • ' " • 

Vi'e have now received copies of clariiTying information 
from two persons well acquainted with tliis matter and who make" 
clear that there Was no secret political fund. I attach 
copies of their communications: 

1. A copy of a letter from Dick Whitney to 

Mr. David Dorsen of your staff conf inning that there- was no 
such fund and that J.Ir. Stans liad not been made aware of the 
discussions he had v/ith I.iagruder. 

2. A copy of tv/o affidavits from Larry A. Jobe, 
former Administrative Assistant Secretary of the Department 
of Commerce, indicating that there was no such fund and 
that Mr. Magruder had been so advised. 

This adverse publicity is very injurious to Mr. 
Stans' reputation and material to his right to a fair trial 
in the Vesco case in New York.. We suggest that this unfair 
and luifounded adverse and damaging publicity be corrected 
to the extent possible, as is usually done in a libel case, 
by publication of equal prominence. 

"Accordingly, as part of your hearing, on behalf 
of Mr. Stans, I respectfully request tliat this letter and 
the communications referred to above be read into the record 
of your hearings ovei' nationwide television. This might be. 
done by either (1) myself as counsel for Mr. Stans, or 
(2) the Chaimian, a Gommittee member or one of its Staff. 

Vi'e strongly urge that this be done at the outset 
of your hearings when tliey resume next week, so that there 
be as little time as possible between the unfair and in- 
jurious suggestions that such a political fund existed and 
this clarifying statement to the contrary. . 

We shall be pleased to discuss this matter with . 
you and to cooperate in any way possible to cleai' up this' 
unfortunate sitxiation. 

Sincerely .-yours, 



Ricliard P. \'Jliitncy 

21 V/est Kirkc Street 

Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015 

June 25, 1973. 

Mr. David Dorsen • ■ * ' 

Assistant Counsel 

Senate Conmittee on Presidential Activities 

U. S. Senate * * 

V'ashington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Dorsen: 

Although it has been several weeks since I met with you, I did 
want to confirm in v/riting a few of the points'we covered in our 
conversation. Specifically, those points which pertained to the 
July 28, 1971 memorandum from Mr. Magruder to John Mitchell indi- 
cating the existence of a $1,000,000 political fund in the Depart- 
ment of Commerce. 

Tlie memorandum contained three paragraphs. The first paragraph 
indicated that I X7as the Special Political Assistant to the Secretary. 
In point of fact, I was Executive Assistant to the Secretary and my 
duties v/ere va.ried. 

The second paragraph of the memorandum indicated that a 
$1,000,000 fund existed in the Department of Commerce for political 
purposes. As I told you, no such fund ever existed or was contem- 

The third paragraph implied that Mr. Stans knew about this fund 
and would help other departments to set up their o^m fund. As no 
such fund existed, I do not know how Secretary Stans could possibly 
have known about it. 1 certainly never discussed any such idea with 
Mr. Stans, 

Very truly yours, 

Richard P. Whitney 


cc: Mr. Robert W. Barker 


June 1.8, 1973 

Senator Samuel J. Ervin , Jr. . ■ 


Senate Select Coirunittee on Presidential 

Election Activities • _ 
Washington, D.C. • 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

My name is Lari'y A. Jobe and I presently 
reside at 6247 DeLoache, Dallas, Texas. At this 
time, I am Managing Partner of the Dallas office 
of Alexander Grant St Company, Certified Public Accoun- 

From March 1969 until June 1972, I served 
as Assistant Secretary for Administration in the 
Department of Commerce. In that capacity I had 
responsibility for budget matters for the Department, 
among other functions. 

During the testimony of Secretary Stans on 
Tuesday, June 12, 1973, a memorandum was Introduced 
into the record. Secretary Stans was questioned about 
this particular memo and asked whether he knew any- 
thing about it. 

I looked at the replay of this testimony on 
the evening of June 12, 1973. The memo, which was 
read and introduced into the record, was from Jeb 
Stuart Magruder to John N. Mitchell. This memo, dated 
July 28, 1971, indicated that Dick V/hitney, then Executive 
Assistant to Secretary Stans, had informed Magruder that 
Secretary Stans had at his disposal a discretionary fund 
of approximately $1 million within the Department of 
Commerce. The memo stated that this fund v/as available 
for use for certain activities which would be helpful 
to the reelection of the President. The memo went on 
to ask Mitchell whetlier Secretary Stans should talk 
with other cabinet officers to assist them in setting 


•up such a fund. At the bottom of the raemo,^t'here was 
a" place for Approved, Disapproved or Cbimnent . 

I immediately recalled seeing this memorandum 
at the time I was Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Administration. Sometime J>*uAr-^ 'to Mr. V/hitney's leaving 
the Department in August (l^TS) Mr. ^mitney came into my 
office with the above meraorHncium. 

At that time, I took a great deal of time and 
effort to describe to Mr. Whitney the various funds which 
we did have available to the Department of Commerce. I 
told him that we had no funds that could be used for 
political purposes. I stated that we were totally con- 
strained to use our funds only for those purposes for 
which they had been appropriated by the Congress. Mr. 
vmitney understood this fully and agreed with this con- 

As I recall, Mr. Whitney, at this time, requested 
that I then meet with Mr. Magruder in order to clarify the 
matter. Subsequently, I did meet with Mr. Magruder and had 
the similar discussion with him that I had with Mr. vmitney. 

Mr. Magruder did not suggest any further course 
of action. I never heard more of the matter and dismissed 
it from my mind. . , 

So far as I am aware, Mr. Stans had never seen 
that memorandum. I never showed it to him. I never 
mentioned the fact that I had seen such a. memo. 

The memorandum was not brought to Secretary 
Stans' attention because I did not think it necessary 
to bother him with it. In my mind the matter was properly 
disposed of. 

In 1971 we did establish a Secretarys' Reserve 
for departmental purposes. As I recall, the reserve was 
set at 1% of the general and acbninistration expenses with- 
in the Department. The Secretary had the authority to 
designate the use- of these funds; but for Departmental 
purposes only. I was given the responsibility to administer 
this fund working with the heads of the bureaus and agencies 
involved and the Secretary. As I recall, we did do a number 
of studies with these monies. Funded by this means were 
such projects as a multinational economic study, an analyses 
of the machine tool industry, experimental technology studies 
and establishment of a Patent Office production control 
system Much of it was used by Secretary Stans' successor 


after he had loft the Department. . . .- . 

A study describinf; this fund and recommending 
its institution was prepared by my staff, competent 
career civil servants. The details of all projects in 
this fund were handled for me through the Office of Budget 
and Prosram Analysis, in the Department. This unit also 
monitored these projects. 

I presume that this is the fund which was 
misconstrued in conversations between Magruder and Whitney. 
I would be pleased to answer any further questions which 
your Committee or its staff may have regarding this matter. 

• - . ■ • Sincerely yours , 


cc: Maurice H. Stans 

Sworn and subscribed to thi 

day of June, 1973. 


~"No t aj.- y ^oibiic in and for 
Dallas County, Texas 


June 29, 1973 

Mr. David Dorson, Assistant Chief Counsel 
"Senate Select Committee on Presidential 

Election Activities 
1418 New Senate Office Building 
vrashington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Mr. Dorson: 

On June IS, 1973, I sent a statement to the 
Committee regarding a matter which it is presently 
investigating. My letter related to a memorandum from 
Jeb Stuart Magruder to John N. Mitchell suggesting that 
Secretary Stans had at his disposal a discretionary fund 
of approximately $1 million within the Department of 
Commerce. My letter of that date fully describes my 
recollection of events surrounding that memorandum as 
I remembered them at that time. 

Since that time, additional information regarding 
this matter has come to my attention and I would like to 
amend my statement to include this information. 

On the second page of my 3_etter to the memorandvira 
in the fifth paragraph, I stated that: "So far as I am 
aware, Mr. Stans had never seen that memorandum, I never 
showed it to him. I never mentioned the fact that I had 
seen such a memo." I now find that I had brought this 
matter to his attention, through a memo of my own, dated 
January 19, 1972. The purpose of this statement is to 
correct any misleading implication which I may have made 
in my prior letter. 

On Tuesday, June 26, 1973, I received a call from 
Mr Robert Barker, attorney for Maurice H. Stans. Mr. Barker 
informed me that Arden Chambers, Mr. Stans' secretary, had 
been to Minnesota to review certain of his files in connection 
with another matter'. He explained that in that review she, 
coincidentally, found a memo which I had written to Secretary 
Stans which relates directly to the subject matter of the 




.Magrudei'-Mitchell memo. Mi'. Rarker .stated that. Mr. Stans 
had also forgotten about the memo I had written and was 
totally unaware of its existence. He read this memorandum 
to me over the phone. I recalled writing the memo and 
receiving an answer v/ritten on the face of the- memorandum 
from Mr. Stans. I am attaching a copy of that memorandum 
for the Committee's information. 

This moriorandum was v;ritten to Secretary Stans 
on January 19, 1972. I received his reply on January 26, 
1972. It is significant to note that Secretary Stans had 
already submitted his resignation to the President at that 
time and that he actually left the Department a few days 
after his reply to me. " 

At this time I cannot explain the reasons for 
the time lapse between the writing of the original memorandum 
on July 28, 1971 and ray memo to Secretary Stans of January 19, 

Apparently I wrote this memorandum because I 
felt I had a responsibility to follow-up for Mr. Magruder 
after I had my meeting with him. To follow-up, I wrote 
this particular memorandum. 

As far as I remember, after receiving Secretary 
Stans' reply, I never discussed the matter with Mr. Magruder 
or others thereafter. I do not recall ever discussing Secretary 
Stans' reply with him. I forgot about the memo after receiving 
his reply and, apparently, let the matter' drop. 

Again, I think it is important to' point out that 
the one percent Secretary's reserve we had established has 
been misconstrued. This fund was never used for anything 
except activities related to the Department of Commerce and 
for projects consistent with the manner in which Congress 
had appropriated the funds. 

I have discussed this matter with Messrs. Gray 
and Reissler of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 
Dallas, In addition, I have discussed this matter with 
two members of the Select Committee Staff,. Mr. Wayne Bishop 
and Mr. Michael Ilerschman. 

Coincidentally, the date on the second page 
of my prior statement referring to Mr. V/hitney's leaving 
the Department of Commerce should have been August 1971 
not August 1973. ' 


Should you have any further questions regarding 
this matter, please let rae know. . 

LA Job e 

cc: Mr, Robert Barker 

/^ a-iJ<y 

Sworn and subscribed to this 29th day of June, 1973. 

Notary 'jPublii'c' ini and for 
Dallas County, Texas 



I7]> Naw Yoih A«t., N.W. Wiihlnglan, 0. C. 2000* (]0]| «J)-tlOO 



/L.>''Z<:^,fC^ xt-'-^ifS— 5^. 

/}^^^<2-^ ^ .i!JM 9n 'iQVi ^ 

UN 2 1973 

^:and£r gr/\nt i, CO. 



anuary 19, 1972 

Secretary Scans 

Several months ago, Dick Whitney discussed with Chet 
Hagruder the fact that the Secretary of Commerce had 
established a "discretionary fund." Dick indicated that 
such funding availabl'e to a Cabinet Officer could be 
•very helpful during the course of the campaign. I 
presume Dick v;as talking about the 1 per cent reserve 
of S&£ which we had each agency establish. 

Apparently, Dick volunteered your services to brief other 
Secretaries so that they would have similar flexibility * 
to respond to key initiatives and programs during the 
election year. Based on this conversation, Hagruder sent 
a memorandum to the Attorney General, who approved your 
proceeding to brief other Cabinet Officers- on the establish- 
ment of such a fund. 

The Committee for the Reelection of the President is now 
wondering about the status of this effort. I have two 

1. V/ere you av/are of such a commitment . 
on your part? 

2. If so, the Committee is interested in 
knowing the status of your conversations 
with other Cabinet Officers'. 

I v;ill be happy to do anything further in this matter that 
you desire. ' • . 


LarryM. Jobe 


July 2Q, 137i • •, ' 


>U>\OKjV!DUM rOil TliS ATTOMCV CE^T^iiyU. 

Dick VOilt-'icy who ia Eocrctory Starui' ixjlitical Goccial XaaistiUt^ 
spent Borio tiaa with pie Ciocusain'j 197^. Can iU'SA viicij b4 
brought up night bo usoiul in other dopaxtnianta, 

Tho Socretoxy hns built ly? a diacxotionajT/' fiuid At Corccrco that 
vili total flpproxir.atoly 51,000,000. ila ia using thia luad for 
coaCoroncoo, hirijig, oni othoi* aotivitia* that vill in* banoiicial 
to tho Proaidont'a jca-aloction, 

• IS you fool it is npjiropriato , Socratnjry Staim aii^ht discuss t^j 
concbpt with othar Cabinet Oxficora t<3 aon ii thoy «Jdi» dovalop 
th« .suaia kind o£ SanH viUiia th;iix cvn C^j;)^^:^:^^)^^:^. 

Apjrov o. Piaappyo'/a ' Oscssaat' 

j£3 0. ii;\CB»xis:a 

bcc: Mr. Holdoaan 

JS^ Chron 
>r3M AG rile 






) SS. 

Joseph E. Casson, being duly sworn, deposes and says as 

follows: . 

1. I am a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia 
and I am currently engaged in the private practice of law. 

2. From approximately March of 1971 until approximately 
February of 197E I served in various administrative capacities as 
Assistant and Executive Assistant to Secretary of Commerce 
Maurice H. Stans. 

3. During the late Summer and/or early Fall of 1971, I 
received at least two phone calls from individuals at the White 
House asking me to provide information on an alleged "fund" at 
Commerce which was to be used for political purposes. In each 
instance the caller indicated that Mr. Magruder's office wished 

information on the fund for application to other Departments and 


Agencies. My recollection as to the callers is unclear, but one 
of the callers may have been a Mr. Porter. 

4. In each instance I informed the caller that no such 

"fund" existed or was contemplated and that his information in 
this regard was incorrect and unfounded. I further explained 
that while certain general purpose monies were included in the 
C.mincirco budi^ot, Ihoy could only be used for Commerce related 


activities and not for political purposes. I further advised each 
caller that I could not envision the practicality of establishing 
budgeted general purpose monies in other Departments where 
they did not already exist. 

5. After receiving each of these calls, I informed Assis- 
tant Secretary of Commerce for Administration Lawrence Jobe of 
their occurrence and indicated my feeling that someone in the 
Department's Administrative section should undertake to clear up 
these misconceptions concerning the Department's budgeted funds. 
At some point during this period he assured me that he intended 

to have a meeting with Mr. Jeb Magruder in order to put a stop 
to the matter. It is my recollection that I was advised that such 
a meeting was held. Thereafter, to my recollection, my office 
received no further inquiries on this matter. 

6. I never informed Secretary Stans of these events at 
any time prior to June 19V3 because I believed that the matter had 
been satisfactorily terminated and also because it became apparent 
to me that the initial misconception arose out of an inopportune 
conversation by Mr. Richard Whitney, my co-worker, and I saw 
no purpose in aggravating his embarrassment. 

7. The information herein is based solely on my personal 
recollection of these events. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me 
thi& .^£^y of July 1973. 

, Ni)l.iry I'lililii- / /• /> 

My commission expi r c s ; /^ /3'^ //</ 

District of Columbia 

2 - 


statement for the Record 

LJr. Chairman, I would like to make a correcting 
statement for the record. It deals with the testimony of 
Mr. Maurice H. Stans when he appeared before the coDunittee 
on June 12. At that time he was asked to identify a memorandum 
dated July 28, 1971 from Jeb S. Magruder to the Attorney General 
concerning an alleged $1 million fund available in the Department 
of Commerce for political purposes in 1971. The memo suggested 
that Secretary Stans discuss with other cabinet officers the 
development of such a fund in their departments. At the hearing 
on June 12 Mr. Stans denied any knowledge of the memorandum and 
testified that there was in fact no such political fund in the 
Department of Commerce. Later when Mr. Magruder was before this 
committee he acknowledged that he had written the memorandum. 

When Mr. Stans and Mr. Magruder were interrogated about 
the memorandum it had just come to the attention of the staff. 
Time had not permitted the verification of the facts alleged in 
the memorandum. Since that time, however, the staff has been 
able to investigate the matter further. Its representatives have 
talked with Mr. Richard Whitney, former Executive Assistant to 
Mr. Stans, who is mentioned in that memorandum, and with Mr. 
Larry A. Jobe, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Administration, who had supervision over budgets and funds at 
the time. We have received a letter from Mr. Whitney and two 
affidavits from Mr. Jobe. At this point I ask that the letter 
and the two affidavits be made part of the record. 




Both Jlr. Whitney and Mr. Jobe have made clear that 
there was in fact no such political fund in the Department of 
Coraiaerce. They also make clear that jMr. Magruder's memorandum 
T/as not brought to Mr. Stans attention; that Mr. Magruder was 
advised that there was no fund in the Department of Commerce 
which could have been used for political purposes. While there 
were discreationary funds in the Department for authorized gov- 
ernmental purposes, they could not be used in the manner suggested 
by Mr, Magruder. Further, Mr. Whitney and Mr. Jobe make clear 
that the subject of the Magruder memorandum was never brought 
to Mr. Stans attention until a few days before he left the 
Department of Commerce. 

Mr. Chairman, in fairness to Mr. Stans and in the 
interest of accuracy, the record should reflect that the committee 
now is satisfied from the evidence presently available to us that: 

1.. Mr. Stans did not see the Magruder memorandum 
until it was shown to him at the hearing on June 12. 

2. The Magruder memorandum was never discussed with 
Mr. Stans by Mr. Whitney. 

3. Mr. Magi*uder was advised by Assistant Secretary 

Jobe tliat there was no fund for political purposes in the Department 
of Commerce. 

4. Mr. Stans was not informed of the subject raised by 
the Magruder memorandum until six months later, a few days before 
he left the department and took no action of the Kind requested 
in the memorandum 

5. No funds of tlic Department of Commerce were used for 


activities and not for political purposes. I further advised each 
caller that I could not envision the practicality of establishing 
budgeted general purpose monies in other Departments where 
Ihey did not already exist. 

5. After receiving each of these calls, I informed Assis- 
tant Secretary of Commerce for Administration Lawrence Jobe of 
their occurrence and indicated my feeling that someone in the 
Department's Administrative section should undertake to clear up 
these misconceptions concerning the Department's budgeted funds. 
At some point during this period he assured me that he intended 

to have a meeting with Mr. Jeb Magruder in order to put a stop 
to the matter. It is my recollection that I was advised that such 
a meeting was held. Thereafter, to my recollection, my office 
received no further inquiries on this matter. 

6. I never informed Secretary Stans of these events at 
any time prior to June 1973 because I believed that the matter had 
been satisfactorily terminated and also because it became apparent 
to me that the initial misconception arose out of an inopportune 
conversation by Mr. Richard Whitney, my co-worker, and I saw 
no purpose in aggravating his embarrassment. 

7. The information herein is based solely on my personal 
recollection of these events. 


^Joseph E. Casson 

iibscribcd and sworn to before nrve 
ii&..2,£^ay of July 1973. 

,.- Nnl.iry I'ulilli- / /, > 

ly conimlssion c-xsAvcb'./- /J/^ //^/ 

/ / . 

• District of. Col umbij 

- 2 - 


96-296 O - 73 - pt.7 - 21 


Exhibit No. 104A 




























iVjt adnnttad in tliM 

DutTxct ofGf^ivjniui 

LAW ornccs 


1735 NEW YORK AV r N U E, N . W. 


(202) B33-3BIHI 








y. itfSiMON 














ALAN 1. R 









August 3, 1973 

Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr. 

Vice Chairman, Senate Select CommvLtee on 

Presidential Election Campaign Activities 
Koom 3311 

New Senate Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 


Dear Senator Baker : 

In accordance with my U;lephone conversation 
with Don Sanders of the Committee staff, I forward 
herewith a copy of a letter addrtr-:sed by this firm to 
Chairman Ervin on July 3, 1973, which we asked to be 
included as part of the official record of the hearing 
under S . Res . 60 . 

We are anxious that thJs letter be made part 
of the record, but we have had no acknowledgement and 
no indication whether such would be the case. 

Sincerely^ yoUrs , 


By : Robert fl 



Sam Dash, Esquire (w/enclosui-e) 
Fred Thompson, Esquire (w/enclosure) 
Don Sanders, Esquire (w/enclosure) 

July 3, 1973 

The Honorable Sam J. Ervin 
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on 

Presidential Election Campaign Activities 
United States Senate 
Room G-308, Senate Office Building 
Washington, D, C, 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

On behalf of the Honorable Maurice H. Stans I write 
this letter for the record of your proceedings to clarify 
certain impressions which may have erroneously been given to 
your Committee during the testimony of Mr, McCord. 

Enclosed are pages 429 and 430 of Mr. McCord 's 
testimony relating to intelligence material. At page 430, 
Mr. McCord indicates that this material was passed on to 
certain senior staff members, including Mr. Sloan, who passed 
it to Mr. Stans. 

On behalf of Mr. Stans, I wish to advise you for 
the record that neither Mr. Stans, nor his secretary, have 
ever received any such intelligence reports. I have also 
checked through Mr. Sloan's lawyer, Mr. James Stoner, and 
learn that Mr, Sloan had never received such reports for Mr. 

We would appreciate your including this letter as 
part of the record so this matter may be clarified. 

Sincerely yours, 


By: Robert W. Barker 

Hon. Maurice H. Stans 
James R. Stoner, Esq. 




SGr.'.ator Keicker. Kow. when yea racei^'ed this £ii-5.i-.erial, 
•{•yhat. did y&?i do ^^It^i ifc? 

Mr. MaCord, If it vers of siiffisiesit co.isisquericse,,. I v.'ouid 
pass) it along *io Mr. ^2itc;hei.1. 's ojifieo, ?:;3a£lly througli 5'ir, 
Odlo^ Qr-i-te often p 3: would pufc it in a pi\v2ir:o:;'<irid"i';a i'or iiitu 
for Gistribiition fee those othe.r 3''r.iiff rsasaioers of •li-je Ccianittoe 
xdiO v?o'al<2 ncrir.aily want; to kiiov? of forfcI-iGoir'.iyii.t deraoastra-iioj-s 
iii 'die Wayhingtori £ree- sOiiis of vyhich laight. a irfact the Cossuittei 

Senator Weicker. 'JvTay did yovi feel this '.i-as -- - liot.?;, you 
^souid pass tliis on co Mr. Mitchell at tJie Cortcsittse to Re~ 
elect tile Preside?.Jt, is ihat correct? 

l^iTp McCordo YeS( sirc^, aad other jstaff u'iiiE&'srs. 

Senator Weicker. Well, ancl other staf.u r.ierobers , ^-iho 
is "and other staff rasBsbers"? 

Mr.KcCordo i^bout six of tlie £3£iior staf:c members^ v^ich 
ind uced I4r. Sloan? who p«a ssed it to Hr . Sta^^s, included Mr. 
Liddy, included Mr. Odle, inclijded the prospsistiva officers 
for ?ir, Kitehisli'S v;ife, Rrs. Mitchell, anc t.-;o cr three othar 
division cihiefs there under Kr^ Mitchell. 

Seiiator WeicJter. And this al^xt^sfc on « daily basis? 

Mr. McCord. Yes, sir. 

Senator Vi'eicker. And this is material wf.'iich you your- 

■ t 
self received s^nd you yourself distributed? 

Mr. McCord, Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker, Well, Mr, Chairman., I have s. lot of 


other questions , but T. asa afraid I am goiag to have to di- 
gress -diet one far a few i5ia\st;es rsx-S I vro'^Id like to defer fco 
yois to b.a-7a ether qTj.5Stioi;is?.g 'i-.aJse plans, X wo^^ld hop® that 
tSiere will bs an opport^anit-y to proceed to ft^^y^er qrissfcioning 

OS t±£iJ3. 

•She She.i-^"m£5i. I laighfc state .t-hat Senator Iric:.sye haa to 
ge at fcur o'clock and it, 2iight be adviseble for v.s to ^e-csse 
at four asid I^fe *feh© v-fitBess aome. bsak oa TiieedaVc 

Hsnator Weickexo I bag Saaa-feos Mcntoya's pardon and 
thanlc y ui p yc-^;? Senator. 

SsKator Moniioya. ISnaiok YOiX, lar. Chairman, 

Mr» I'JeCordf cjcing bask to the time tliat you -^^ere hired, 
I %?ould like to ask v-ou if you had a psrsoKaX a«quair4t£!as® with 
the Presic'szit? 

tJr. ?-icCor<3., Ho? sir. 

Senator Jtontoya. Had you worked t-jith him in any capacity*' while he was \?ice President or before? 

Mr.McCord. lio^ sir. 

Senator Montoya. Had you doae any ':'Jork in his behalf while 
you were ^^orking for the CIA? 

Mr.McCord. I was a staff neinbes- of the CIA while he wa? 
Vice President. He may have had access to saatsrial or reports 
which I v;rote. 

Senator Montoya. Oid you ever speak to him during 
those seaie times? 


Exhibit No. 105 



Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. Pres- 
ident, I wish to discuss a matter which 
has been raised in the press and the 
Halls of Congress in the past few days, 
and on which there appears to have been 
a certain element of misunderstanding. 
I shall, to the best of my ability, review 
it from the beginning to show how the 
practice i>f examining tax returns by the 
executive branch has been conducted 
during the preceding administrations as 
well as the manner m which it is being 
conducted under this administration. 

This statement is going to be made as 
nearly as possible without trying to pro- 
ject the argument into the political 
arena. I think such- projections are most 
unfortunate on a question which is so 
vital to so many people. But now that it 
has been projected on a false basis be- 
fore the public I think it should be clari- 
fied. That is the reason I ask the Senate 
to bear with me for just a short period 
of time, during which time I shall review 
the procedure followed by the executive 
branch during the present as well as the 
past two administrations. 

This argument started on April 12, 
1970, and I am going to read the press 
release as it was then given by Mr. 
O'Brien. The press release, dated Wash- 
ington, D.C., April 11, 1970, reads: 
O'Brien Charges Violation of Federal i!jAw 
BY Nixon Administration in Mollenhoff 
Access to Income Tax Retxtrns 
Washington, D.C, April 11, 1970. — Law- 
rence P. O'Brien, Cliainnan of the Demo- 
cratic National Committee, today charged 
that the Nixon Administration's practice of 
tvirning over confidential federal income tax 
returns to a White House aide violates fed- 
eral law and Treasury regulations governing 
the confidentiality of tax returns. 

"Federal law and regulations protect the 
individual taxpyayer's right to privacy and 
such indiscriminate access by a political op- 
erative in the White House is a clear viola- 
tion of the legal rights of American citi- 
zens," O'Brien said. 

"I call upon President Nixon to terminate 
immediately this illegal access of his per- 

sonal staff to confidential tax retvirns of 80 
million Americans," O'Brien said. 

"If this action Is not taken voluntarily," 
O'Brien added, "we are prepared to initiate 
legal action that will end this practice." 

O'Brien's statement was based on a legal 
opinion signed by Mortimer M. Caplin and 
Sheldon S. Cohen, former commissioners of 
the Internal Revenue Service, and Mitchell 
Rogovin, former Assistant Attorney General 
iox Tax Division and former Chief Counsel 
Internal Revenue Service. 

The full text of the legal opinion sub- 
mitted by Caplin, Cohen, and Rogovin to 
O'Brien is attached. 

"I asked for this opinion upon learning 
of the Internal Revenue Service's practice 
of turning over confidential income tax re- 
turns to Clai-k Mollenhofif, si>ecial counsel to 
the President, on a 'need-to-know* basis," 
O'Brien said. "The views of these recognized 
tax experts leave little doubt as to the ille- 
gality of the procedures which now are being 

"It is particularly troublesome to learn of 
this practice when so many millions of Amer- 
icans are at this moment poring over their- 
individual income tax returns and are can- 
didly disclosing p>ersonal information of the 
utmost sensitivity," O'Brien said. 

"Only immediate action by President 
Nixon to stop these Illegal procedures will 
restore the American people's confidence In 
the Internal Revenue Service, as well ss dem- 
onstrate the willingness of the Nixon Admin- 
istration to obey federal law and regulations 
In the conduct of its own affairs," O'Brien 

I repeat one quotation of Lawrence 
O'Biien's release: 

"I call upon President Nixon to terminate 
Immediately this Illegal access of his per- 
sonal staif to confidential tax returns of 80 
million Americans," O'Brien said. 

"If this action is not taken voluntarily," 
O'Brien added, "we are prepared to initiate 
legal action that will end this practice." 

O'Brien's statement was based on a legal 
opinion signed by Mortimer M. Caplin and 
Sheldon S. Cohen, former commissioners of 
the Internal Revenue Service, and Mitchell 
Rogovin, former Assistant Attorney General 
for Tax Division and former Chief Counsel, 
Internal Revenue Service. 

I now read the letter which was at- 
tached to Mr. O'Brien's April 11 state- 
ment. The letter is dated April 9, 1970. 
It is addressed to Mr. Lawrence P. 
O'Brien, the chairman of the Democratic 
National Committee, 2600 Virginia 
Avenue NW., here in Washington: 


April 9, 1970. 
Mr. Lawrence F. O'Brien, 
Chairman, Democratic National Committee, 
Washington, DC. 

Dear Mr. O'Brien: It has been reported 
that an aide to the President ciirrently has 
access to federal Income tax returns upon his 
written request. You have asked for a legal 
opinion on whether this rejwrted arrange- 
ment with the Internal Revenue Service com- 
ports with existing law and regulations. It 
is our legal opinion that such access is not 
in conformity with existing law and regu- 
lations relating to disclosures of tax returns. 

Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code 
sets up the statutory procedures necessary to 
insure that tax returns and the confidential 
Information appearing thereon are not made 
available to people who have no legitimate 
interest in the return. First enacted in 1910, 
this central provision of our present law pro- 
vides that returns will be open for inspection 
"only upon order of the President and under 
rules and regulations prescribed by the Sec- 
retary or his delegate and approved by the 
President." The inviolate nature of tax in- 
formation is fundamental to our tax sys- 
tem, not only In the name of privacy, but 
also to insure increased and more accurate 
taxpayer compliance. As to the latter, more 
accurate reporting on income tax returns ap- 
pears to bear a close relationship to the de- 
gree of confidence in which the information 
is held by the Internal Revenue Service. 

The regulations promvilgated under section 
6103 provides in detail, the maiuier and cir- 
cimistanoes under which tax returns may be 
legally inspected by the public, state tax offi- 
cials. Treasury officials. Executive Department 
officials, U.S. Attorneys and Department of 
Justice attorneys. Executive Branch agencies, 
and Cnogresslonal Committees. Specific re- 
quirements for inspection of federal income 
tax returns have been prescribed in the regu- 
lations to intentionally make it burdensome 
to secure Inspection of such returns. This is 
in order to maintain the confidentiality of 
such returns except in unusual circum- 
stances, melding the legitimate needs of gov- 
emrhent with the right to privacy of the 
individxial. For example, with respect to In- 
spection of returns by executive departments' 
officials other than the Treasury Department, 
the request mvist be in writing, it miist be 
made by the head of the Agency requesting 
the opportunity to inspect the return, the 
request must relate to a matter officially be- 
fore the Agency head, it must specify the tax- 
payer's name and address, the kind of tax 
reported, the taxable period covered, the rea- 
son why inspection is requested, and the 
name and official designation of the person 
by whom insi>ectlon is to be made. 

The federal official In the news report is 
Special Counsel to the President and as such, 
he is an employee of the Executive Office of 
the President. Reg. Sec. 301.6103(a)-l(f) cov- 
ers access to tax returns by such an employee. 

Under this regxilation, the President would 
be the only Executive Branch official with 
the authority to request the Oammlssioner to 
make tax returnus available to employees of 
the Executive Office of the President. Such a 
Presidential request would presumably have 
to comply with the variovis requirements of 
the regulations detailed above. 

It has been suggesited that since the em- 
ployee In question aots as agent for the 
President In matters of investigation, no 
written request by the President is required. 
We are unaware of any theory of law whldi 
would support such fin argument. Indeed, 
this t3rpe of argument has been speedflcally 
rejected by the very language of the regula- 


The criminal sanction relating to the dis- 
closure of oonfldentLal tax tnfonns.tlon Is 
found In section 7213 of the Code. It makee 
it a misdemeanor for tny federal employee to 
divulge tax Information except as provided 
by law. 

If tax returns are made available In a man- 
ner not In conformity with section 6103 oi 
tlie Code and the regulations, it woiild appear 
that such dlvulgence of tax Information Is 
not as provided by law. 

A copy of section 6103 and the pertinent 
regulations are attaohed for yoior conven- 


MORTIMEn M. Caplin. 
Sheldon 3. Cohen. 
Mitchell Rogovin. 

As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Caplin was 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
under the Kennedy administration; Mr. 
Cohen was the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue under the Johnson administra- 
tion; and Mr; Rogovin was an employee, 
first in Treasury and then in Justice, 
under both administrations. 

When this dramatic statement was 
made by Mr. O'Brien there was vmder- 
standably a lot of concern expressed by 
members of the press, by Members of 
Congress, and by millions, I daresay, of 
American citizens as to what was hap- 
pening here in Washington and whether 
the Internal Revenue Service was being 
turned into a Gestapo, as the allegation 
of the chairman of the Democratic Na- 
tional Committee would indicate. 

The chairman of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation, the Senator from Louisiana 
(Mr. Long) , called the Joint Committee 
on Taxation together to explore these 
charges, and we asked Commissioner 
Thrower to appear before our commit- 


This meeting was at 3 o'clock on Tues- 
day of this week. Having read this state- 
ment I felt we should go beyond and see 
what the precedents were. So I directed 
this wire early on Monday morning, 
April 13, to the Honorable Ralph W, 
Thrower, the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, Department of the Treasury, 
In Washington: 

In connection with your meeting tomor- 
row with the Joint Committee will you 
please have available Information regarding 
the number of times tax retvims were re- 
quested by the Executive Branch during each 
of the administrations since 1960. Signed, 
John J. Williams, Senator from Delaware. 

Later I supplemented that and asked 
that he furnish the various regulations 
or rules which were discussed in the. 

Commissioner Thrower has furnished 
and I received these yesterday — a series 
of the regulations which have governed 
the executive branch on the handling of 
ttiese tax returns over the years begin- 
ning with the Kennedy administration. 

I might say first, however, before go- 
ing to that that I asked the staff of the 
joint committee, under the direction of 
Larry Woodworth, with whom all of us 
are acquainted, to prepare a memoran- 
dvim as to the various branches of Gov- 
ernment to whom tax returns are avail- 
able and the manners In which the re- 
turns could be examined. I shall read his 
memorandum first. This is entitled, 
"Provisions of the Statute and Regula- 
tions Relative to Publicity of Income Tax 


The Code provides (section 6103(a)) that 
generally Income tax returns are to be open 
to Inspection only up>on order of the Presi- 
dent under rules and regulations prescribed 
by the Secretary of the Treasury or his dele- 
gate and approved by the President. 

Fovir exceptions are made to the above lim- 
itation as to the publicity of ret\ims. Income 
tax retiuns may be made available to: 

(1) State Income tax officials for the pur- 
pose of administering the State income tax 
law or to obtain information to be furnished 
local taxing authorities. The Inspection may 
be made only upon request of the governor 
and only for State tax administration or, 
up>on his request, can be made availble to 
local tax administrators. 

(2) In the case of corporate Income tax 
retiu-ns, to shareholders having an interest 
■ot 1 percent or more. 

(3) The Committee on Ways and Means, 
the Senate Finance Committee, the Joint 

Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 
and any select committee authorized to In- 
vestigate tax retxuiis, and 

(4) The p>ersons who filed the returns. 

He then lists the various regulations 
regarding disclosure, and I ask unani- 
mous consent that all of these regula- 
tions be printed in the Record at this 

There being no objection, the regula- 
tions were ordered t-o be printed in the 
Record, as follows: 


The existing regulations (Reg. § 301.6103 
(a) -1(f)) contain a general authority re- 
garding Inspection of returns by the execu- 
tive departments. They specify that If the 
head of an executive department (other than 
the Treasviry) or any other establishment of 
the Federal Government desires to Inspect, 
or have an employee of his Inspect, an In- 
come tax return he may do so If : 

(1) It Is in connection with some matter 
offlclaUy before him; 

(2) there Is a written application signed 
by the head of the executive department or 
other Oovemment establishment desiring 
the inspection; and 

(3) the api>lication states the name of the 
pesrsom for whom the return was made, the 
kind of tax. the year, the reason why the 
Inspection Is desired, and the name and 
official designation of the person by whom 
the inspection is to be made. 


If the provisions of the regulations referred 
to above are not fully complied with. Section 
7213 of the Internal Revenue CifOde relating 
to unauthorized disclosure of Information 
applies. This provides for a fine of not more 
than $1,000 or Imprisonment for not more 
than 1 year, or both, for improper release of 
Information on tax returns. Also, if the of- 
fender is an officer or employee of the United 
States Government the section provides that 
he is to be dismissed from office or discharged 
from employment. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. As I 
stated, I had asked the Commissioner to 
go back and outline from the beginning 
just how this problem had been admin- 
istered throughout the years by the vari- 
ous Presidents. 

The first official record was a mem- 
orandum dated May 23, 1961, addressed 
to the Honorable Robert H. Knight, the 
General Counsel of the Treasviry, and 
the subject is "Inspection of Returns by 
Congressional Committees." This mem- 
orandum is signed by Mortimer Caplin, 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 


under the Kennedy administration and 
one of the men who signed the mem- 
orandxmi which I read earlier and upon 
which Mr. O'Brien based his statement 
of April 11. 

I shall put the entire memorandum 
into the Record, but I shall move over to 
page 3 of it first. The first part of it 
relates to the manner in which congres- 
sional committees can obtain access to 
tax returns; but on page 3, under item c, 
Mr. Caplin outlined the rules vmder 
which a representative of the Kennedy 
administration could examine tax 

At this time I am quoting Mr. Caplin, 
who was then the Commissioner of Inter- 
nal Revenue: 


On January 26 Mr. Bellino, Special Con- 
sultant to the President, called at my office 
and requested permission to inspect our files 

on and othera. Although we had no 

precedent to guide us, we decided that Mr. 
Bellino, in his capacity as a representative of 
the President, could inspect o\ir flies without 
a written request. 

I imderscore that point — "without a 
written request." 

This "reflects the view that Section 6103 
of the Cade specifically provides that returns 
shall be open to inspection upon order of 
the President, and since Mr. Bellino's official 
capacity constitutes him the representative 
of the President, the action taken is regarded 
as conforming to law. Based on this decision, 
we permitted Mr. Bellino to inspect the files 

relating to . Since that time we have 

also permitted him to inspect tax retxirns 
and related documents pertaining to other 

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield for a question? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield. 

Mr. CURTIS. Whom is the Senator 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I am 
quoting Mortimer Caplin, the Commis- 
sioner of Internal Revenue imder the 
Kennedy administration and the same 
man who signed the letter to Larry 
O'Brien saying that it was a violation 
of the law for anybody in the executive 
branch to examine these returns except 
by written request. 

It is fantastic how some of these bu- 
reaucrats can change positions after they 
leave office. 

Yes, I am quoting from Mr. Caplin's 
own regulation which was issued under 
date of May 23, 1961. I would point out 
again the significant part of it, that on 
January 26 Mr. Bellino, as President 
Kennedy's special consultant, was given 
permission to examine any tax return 
without any written request. 

This was 6 days after the administra- 
tion took office and this ruling that they 
did not have to have any written request 
was made by Commissioner Caplin. 

Mr. CURTIS. How many returns did 
he let Mr. Bellino see? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. No one 
knows. I asked for the nvmiber of tax re- 
turns which were requested by each ad- 
ministration. I was advised that there 
were seven requests under the Nixon ad- 
ministration signed by Mr. Mollenhofif 
Involving nine tax returns. I will later 
outline the procedure followed by the 
Nixon administration, but they were all 
with a written request. 


The Commissioner was asked how 
many returns had been inspected by the 
previous administration so that we could 
get a comparison, and they said that 
since there were no written requests ap- 
parently no records were kept or— If 
there were they cannot be fomid — they 
were unable to answer. However, the 
Commissioner did say that their records 
show that Mr. Bellino was in the Treas- 
ury Department examining the tax re- 
turns of various individuals and the lan- 
guage he used was "days on end." 
There must have been a very large num- 
ber involved. 

I will continue quoting from Mr. Cap- 
lin's May 23, 1961, ruling relating to this 

Further, in a letter dated January 26, and 
received January 30, Attorney General Bo- 
lder t P. Kennedy asked that Mr. Bellino be 
permitted to review All flies, records, and 
documents requested by him in order to co- 
ordinate the investigation of certain indi- 
viduals being conducted by the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Justice Department 
and other Government agencies. Permission 
was granted for Mr. Bellino to inspect such 
files in a letter dated Februai-y 1, 1961. 

Additionally, Senator John L. McClellsCn, 
In a letter dated March 24, designated Mr. 
Bellino as a staff member of the Senate Per- 
manent Subcommittee on Investigations, a 
subcommittee of the Committee on Govern- 


ment Operations, authorized to inspect re- 
t\;ms pursuant to Executive Order 10916. 
As such, he is authorized to inspect those 
docuents made available to the Subcommit- 
tee under requests made pursuant to this 

In the Interest of providing a more de- 
tailed statement there is attached a Techni- 
cal Memorandum prepared in the office ol 
the Chief Counsel, which sets forth the his- 
torical background of (1) the requirement ol 
a committee resolution, and (2) the execu- 
tive policy against supplying photocopies of 
returns to Congressional Committees. If you 
should desire additional information please 
let me know. 

Signed, "Mortimer Caplln, Commis- 
sioner of Internal Revenue.'.' 

I move now to the next letter we have, 
showing- how the Nixon administration 
handled it. I do not find any correspond- 
ence or ruling imder the Johnson ad- 
ministration thus far which changed this 
practice. However, I find that when the 
Nixon administration took over, this 
loose practice of the Kennedy adminis- 
tration wherein tax returns were exam- 
ined by White House staff was corrected. 
What procedure does this administration- 

Mr. Thrower stated that when he as- 
sumed office In 1969 he was advised by 
the White House that Mr. Mollenhofif 
would be assigned to a position compara- 
ble to that which Mr. Bellino held un- 
der the Kennedy administration, and 
Commissioner Thrower felt that in the 
interest .of orderly procedure the man- 
ner of allowing anyone from the execu- 
tive branch to examine a tax return of 
any individual without having a writ- 
ten request or having it In writing for 
future reference was wrong. The Com- 
missioner conferred with the White 
House, and this is a memorandum of 
procedure they worked out under date 
of September 18, 1969. 

This is the memorandiun addressed to 
the Honorable Clark 'R. Mollenhoff, 
Deputy Counsel to the President, signed 
the C<wnmissioner of Internal Revenue, 
and the subject is inspection of tay re- 
turns and related files. These are the 
rules agreed upon at that time: 

September 18, 1969. 
Memorandum to: The Honorable Clark R. 
Mollenhoff, Deputy Counsel to the Pres- 
PVom: Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 
Subject: Inspection of Tax Returns and Re- 
lated Files. 

Following through on oiu- recent luncheon 
conversation, I have been thinking about 
ways that we can meet those situations In 
which you may want to Inspect tax returns 
or other Internal Revenue Service flies while 
at the same time carrying out ooir responsi- 
bilities under the disclosure statutes. 

As you know, the basic rules governing 
disclosure of tax retiarn information are set 
forth in 26 U.S.C. 6103 et seq., and the penalty 
provisions themselves are in 26 U.S.C. 7213 
and 18 U.S. 1905 

I wotUd suggest that every time you have 
occasion to inspect a tax return, application 
for exemption, or other Internal Revenue file, 
you send me a memorandum briefly setting 
forth the natuie of the request. Naturally, 
we will infer in every case that the request 
Is either at the direction of, or In the inter- 
est of, the President. I have taken the lib- 
erty of drafting a suggested format that 
you may wish to consider. If you wan* to 
look at the retvims or flies of more than one 
perscwi or organization, you tnay list all of 
them In one memorandum. 

After receiving your request, we will make 
arrangements for the flies to be assembled 
in my immediate suite of offices here anci 
we will notify you as soon as they are ready 
for inspection. Since most of the matrelal in 
which you will be interested will be located 
in one of our regional or district offices, it 
will be necessary for us to obtain it and 
bring it to Washington. If, after inspection 
of the Sdes, you want copies of any of the 
material Inspected, we will be happy to make 
them for you. 

I trust this arrangement will be satis- 
factory and Icok forward to a mutually re- 
warding relationship between o\ir respective 

Signed, "Randolph W. Thrower." 

Mr. GrORE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield. 

Mr. GORE. The able Senator has re- 
feiTed to the conference with Commis- 
sioner Thrower and has now read a 
memorandum which was denied to the 
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue. I 
trust that it will be in order to make a 
few remarks about it. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. If the 
Senator will yield for a moment, the Sen- 
ator is in error. This memorandum was 
not denied to the joint committee. They 
have this information, and the Senator 
is a member of that committee. It was 
also sent to me because I was the one 
who originally requested it. But I speci- 
fically requested that the full report be 
sent to the joint committee, and it was 
delivered to them first. They acknowl- 
edged receipt of it. Th6 Senator is a 


member of the committee, and it is 
available; but I have a copy of it if he 
wishes to see it. 

Mr. GORE. I appreciate the correction. 

I requested this memorandiun, and 
Mr. Thrower said he would have to ob- 
tain permission from the President to 
supply it. 

I had not been advised that it had 
been supplied to the committee. I am 
glad that it has. I congratulate both the 
President and Commissioner Thrower 
upon supplying it. 

Now, would the Senator from Dela- 
ware yield further? 

Mr. wrLUAMS of Delaware. I yield. 

Mr. GORE. To begin with, I am not 
acquainted with the details of what 
happened in previous administrations. 
It is only recently that I became a mem- 
ber of the Joint Committee on Internal 
Revenue. I am aware of what has hap- 
pened here. Commissioner Thrower is 
a fine man and I do not wish in any 
way to be imkind to him. 

However, in fairness to the Senate, I 
must state that I question the propriety 
and discretion, or lack thereof, of his ac- 
tion in supplying and in agreeing to sup- 
ply Mr. Mollenhoff in an open ended 
arrangement with tax returns and copies 
of tax returns without a direct com- 
munication from the President of the 
United States, either verbally or in writ- 

Commissioner Thrower testified that 
he had neither from the President. He 
relied entirely upon the representations 
of Mr. Clark Mollenhoff whose veracity 
I do not question. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. The 
point I want to get into the record 
straight Is that Commisslorier Thrower 
did not say 

Mr. GORE. I beg the Senator's par- 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I want 
to get the record straight. Again the 
Senator from Tennessee is in error. 
Commissioner Thrower said he did not 
rely entirely upon the statement of Mr. 
Mollenhoff. He said he was told by an 
oflQcial repres«itative of the President 
that Clark Mollenhofif was being desig- 
nated for this position and that the 
arrangement was to be made with Mr. 
Mollenhoff to work out procedures. He 
did not Identify the other individual. 

I doubt if all of those men are in direct 
commvmication with the President any 
more than they were under preceding 

I thought we should keep the record 
clear. I do not think there is any ques- 
tion in the minds of anyone but that 
Mr. Mollenhoff Is the deputy counsel to 
the President, and he did hold the same 
oflficial position that was held by indi- 
viduals in preceding administrations who 
had access to the tax returns. We should 
give Commissioner Thrower the credit — 
I also give credit to the Nixon admin- 
istration — for recognizing the danger in 
the loose manner 4n which it had been 
handled heretofore under the Democratic 
administrations where they were freely 
examined by White House employees 
without any written requests. Commis- 
sioner Thrower arranged that Mr. Mol- 
lenhoff would sign on the line the name 
of the taxpayer and at the same time 
be ready to justify why they needed that 
return. And I think they should. I. am 
amazed that Commissioner Caplin had 
handled this same situation so loosely. 
If there Is abuse I will join the Senator 
or anyone else in cleaning up abuses; but 


let us remember that the law provides 
that the President can get these returns, 
and the law provides, and it is intended 
to provide, that the Ways and Means 
Committee, the Finance Committee, and 
the Joint Committee on Taxation, op- 
erating independently of eaeh other, any 
one of them can request and get a tax 
return. These committees have gotten 
them over the years with or without the 
consent of the President and even over 
the objections of the Commissioner when 
they needed to. 

That is the law and has been over the 
years, and every President and every au- 
thorized committee has utilized this au- 

Surely the Senator from Tennessee, 
who is an able lawyer, was aware of that 
fact, and I cannot imagine just what 
Mr. Caplin was thinking about when last 
week he signed a letter denouncing his 
own decisions made as a Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue as having been il- 

The President and the congressional 
committees must have this authority, 


but at the same time we must see that 
it is not abused. 

I emphasize that we must have this 
authority. For example, I go back to 
my experience in the exposure of cor- 
ruption in the Internal Revenue Service 
in the 1950 period. This corruption was 
at a high level. The then Senator from 
Virginia Mr. Harry Byrd, and the Sen- 
ator from North Carolina Mr. Hoey, and 
myself, were appointed by Senator 
George of Georgia as a subcommittee to 
examine the allegation that certain high 
oflBcials in the Revenue Service had 
abused their public oflBces. We needed 
certain tax returns to proceed with this 

We hard a situation where the former 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue went 
to the penitentiary. A Deputy Commis- 
sioner of Internal Revenue serving at 
the time was indicted. A chief counsel of 
the Alcohol Tax Unit was also subse- 
quently indicted. 

Therefore, we could not expect co- 
operation from the executive branch or 
from the Internal Revenue. Our commit- 
tee had to have that authority. I want 
to review this because this is very im- 
portant background as to why we have 
to have this authority. The question may 
be asked, why did we not go to the De- 
partment of Justice? 7. did go to the De- 
partment of Justice during that period 
and tried to get their cooperation, I did 
not get it. Later I foimd out why. 

One of the chief counsels, an Assistant 
Attorney General acting in the Tax Divi- 
sion of the Department of Justice, was 
likewise involved in this conspiracy and 
later went to jail. 

Then one might ask, why did we not 
go to the President? I was unable to get 
a conference with President Truman. 
I tried hard at that time to do so. I 
wanted to report these allegations to the 
executive branch and get their assistance 
at the time I could hot understand, why 
I was unable to get an appointment with 
President Truman. 

I resented that very much at the time, 
although I understood later why I did 
not get that appointment. 

I want to say here, first, lest there be 
any misunderstanding, that during all 
that investigation — and there was a lot 
of corruption exposed — never was there 
one single instance where one could 
point a finger at Harry Truman or any 
member of his family as having done 

anything dishonest. I want to emphasize 
that. But at the same time, there was 
a lot of corruption in his administration 
which needed cleaning up. 

I found out later why I could not get 
an appointment with President Truman. 
The man I had to go through to get the 
appointment was Mr. Matt Connelly, the 
White House staff man, and President 
Truman's representative. I told him I 
wanted to talk about the alleged corrupt 
situation in the St. Louis revenue office 
and the Washington office. Later, Mr. . 
Connelly himself was indicted. 

Thus we had the situation where the 
Department of Justice, the Internal 
Revenue, and the White House aide were 
all involved in a conspiracy to fix tax 

In a situation such as that, the only 
other recourse, in order to protect the 
taxpayers, was that at least we had some- 
one or some committee in Congress 
which would act. Th€ Finance Commit- 
tee, with the assistance of the Senator 
from Virginia, Mr. Harry Byrd, as well 
as Senator Hoey from. North Carolina, 
took an active interest in this matter, so 
that in spite of — I emphasize in spite of — 
getting no cooperation from the execu- 
tive branch we were able to expose that 
corrupt regime. We were not getting 
much cooperation from the Treasury in 
the various 64 district offices, the reason 
being 12 of them were indicted, and eight 
of them went to the penitentiary at 
that time. Altogether, there were 100' 
some odd revenue employees who went 
to the penitentiary during that era. 

Fortimately, we had the situation 
where the congressional committees 
could ftmction. We did have access to 
these returns, with or without the per- 
mission of the executive branch. 

Now I want to make a hypothetical 
reversal of that situation. Hypothetical 
and on the assumption that it will never 
happen. But it could happen. 

For example, there are three congres- 
sional committees which can get tax 
returns without any consent from the 
Treasury Department. We can get them. 
The Senator knows that both the Finance 
Committee, of which he is a member, 
and the joint committee, of which he is 
also a member, can get the returns no 
matter what the President says and no 
matter what the Commissioner of Inter- 
nal Revenue says because the law says 
that we can get them. 


SupF>ose the time ever came — and God 
forbid that it would come — when we 
would have the top echelon of the Pi- 
nance Committee and the top echelon 
of the Ways and Means Committee, 
which comprise the joint committee, all 
of them went crooked at one time. Then, 
without the President's authority where 
would there be the check to protect the 
American taxpayers ? 

I want to say that this is hot any sug- 
gestion as to what can or will happen. 
I do not think it will happen. But I would 
not have thought it would happen simul- 
taneously before where we would find 
the Bmeau of Internal Revenue here in 
Washington, the top echelons of the De- 
partment of Justice, and someone con- 
nected with the White House, all engaged 
in this same type of conspiracy. 

But suppose it did? Then the law 
provides that there is a check wherein the 
President of the United States could 
move in, and he would take action to 
protect the American people. 

These safeguards were included as 
checks. At the same time I fully realize 
and I supEKjrt the fear of Senators that 
there could be abuse in this matter. Cer- 
tainly there can be abuse. I recognize 
that. I recognize the danger. 

But if any man can show me where 
this privilege has been abused, I do not 
care whether it is in the executive 
branch or the legislative branch, I will 
lead the fight against it. But let us not 
defeat the practice here on a lot ot po- 
litical innuendoes and assumptions. 

What I am pointing out is that over 
the years it has been historical that the 
President could under the law have ac- 
cess to tax returns, and that covers the 
agent he designates. We know that the 
President of the United States — Jack 
Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, or Richard 
Nixon — are not personally going to ex- 
amine the returns. He delegates that 

The senior Senator from Tennessee 
delegates resi>onsibility in his office. He 
has to. The Senator from' Tennessee is 
a member of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation. Our joint committee has the 
authority to obtain tax returns. We do 
get tax returns. We have had access to 
several tax returns in the last 12 months, 
and we have delegated our chief of staff, 
Larry Woodworth, and his assistants to 
examine them. 

I do not think that I have seen one. 
I do not think the Senator from Ten- 

nessee has seen one. We have delegated 
authority to our staff and we did not 
do it in writing. 

But that-does not mean there "has been 

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield. 

Mr. GORE. Mr. President. I thank the 
Senator for his generous references. As 
the Senator knows, the Senator-, from 
Delaware and I vote together frequently 
on matters of tax preference. On mat- 
ters like this we nearly always vote to- 

When the committee met with respect 
to that matter, it was on the motion of 
the senior Senator from Delaware, sec- 
onded by the senior Senator from Ten- 
nessee, that "the President supply to the 
committee a copy of the memorandum 
with respect to individual returns which 
Mr. Mollenhoff requested and also a re- 
quest to the President to inform the com-^ 
mittee whose tax erturns had been sup- 
plied to Mr. Mollenhoff and why. 

I will state this to make it perfectly 
plain, that this is no contention between 
the senior Senator from Delaware and 
the senior Senator from Termessee. As 
I said etrlier, I am not referring to the 
procedure of previous administrations. 


Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. 
President, if the Senator will yield, I un- 
derstand that we cannot be in the Cham- 
ber all the time. I do not think he was 
here when I read the memorandum 
signed by Mortimer Caplin, Commis- 
sioner of Internal Revenue. 

The memorandum is dated May 23, 
196L It describes the procedures under 
which he operated. I would like to read 
that again if I may. 

Mr. GORE. I think I heard some of it. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I want 
the Senator to hear all of it. That is what 
we are talking about, but first let me 
again correct the Senator from Tennes- 
see. It was his motion that the committee 
ask for the names of the tax returns 
examined by Mr. Mollenhoff. My motion 
broadened this request to cover the 
names of all taxpayers whose returns 
were examined by all the administra- 
tions since 1960. 

It was Mr. Caplin, the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue imder the Kennedy 

96-296 O - 7a - pt. 7 - 22 


administration, who raised this question 
as to the procedure that the Nixon ad- 
ministration was following, and I pointed 
out that this administration is insisting 
upon signed letters before any returns 
are made available. 

Now let us see how Mr. Caplin han- 
dled this when he was in office. 

I again quote from Mr. Caplin's May 
26, 1961, regulation: 


On January 26 Mr. Bellino, Special Con- 
sultant to the President, called at my office 
and requested permission to inspecl; our flies 

on and others. Although we had no 

precedent to guide us, we decided that Mr. 
Bellino, In his capacity as a representative of 
the President, could inspect our files without 
a written request. 

I emphasize that. There was no writ- 
ten request for these tax returns by Mr. 
Bellino or the President or anyone else, 
who was working at the White House 
at that time. 

Commissioner Thrower said he could 
not tell us how many returns were ex- 
amined by the Kennedy representative 
but that they did spend days and days 
examining them. 

I read further from the Caplin 1961 
regulation : 

This reflects the view that Section 6103 of 
the Code specifically provides that returns 
shall be open to inspection upon order of 
the President, and since Mr. Bellino's officiafi 
capacity constitutes him the representative 
of the President, the action taken is regarded 
as conforming to law. Based on this decision, 
we permitted Mr. Bellino to inspect the files 

relating to . Since that time we have 

also permitted him to inspect tax returns 
and related documents pertaining to other 

Mr. Caplin must have had his tongue 
in his cheek when he signed the O'Brien 
letter last week charging anyone who had 
allowed a White House representative to 
examine a tax return without a written 
request to be in violation of the criminal 

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- 
sent that the entire ruling of Mr. Caplin 
under date of May 23, 1961, be printed 
at this pK>int in the Record. 

There being no objection the mem- 
orandum was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows: 

Memorandum -FOR the Honorable Robert H. 
Knight, General Counsel op the Treas- 

subject: inspection of returns by 
congressional committees 
In the Treasury staff meeting on March 
31st it was pointed out that Mr. Carmine 
Bellino, Special Consultant to the President, 
had objected to c«rtain regulations and Serv- 
ice policies affecting Congressional Commit- 
tees authorized to inspect returns by Execu- 
tive Orders. Specifically, he objected to (A) 
the regulations requiring the adoption of a 
• resolution by a full Congressional Committee 
before its representatives may obtain permis- 
sion to inspect tax returns and (B) the pol- 
icy against allowing Congressional Commit- 
tees to obtain photocopies of returns. It was 
suggested that we would submit our views 
concerning possible changes in present rules 
and procedures respecting these matters. 
A. Requirement of a resolution by a full 

congressional committee 
The requirement for a resolution adopted 
by the committee is contained in Treasury 
Decisions 6132 and 6133. The decision to re- 
quire a full committee resolution for the in- 
spection of returns was made by officials of 
the Treasury Department and approved by 
the President. Prior to the issuance of these 
Treasury Decisions in May 1955, a Congres- 
sional Committee authorized by Executive 
Order to inspect returns was permitted to do 
so solely upon the written request of the 
chairman of the committee or of a subcom-r 
mittee thereof. No resolution of the commit- 
tee was then required. 

Mr. Bellino objected to the "committee res- 
olution' requirement of the regi^lations be- 
cause the task of assembling a quorum of a 
full committee for this purpose is very in- 
convenient, particularly where the member- 
ship is large. He stated that this is a burden- 
some requirement. For example, in April 
1960, the Special Committee on the Federal 
Aid Highway Program, a Subcommittee of 
the House Committee on Public Works, re- 
quested permission to inspect certain re- 
turns. That request was denied because a 
resolution had not been passed by the full 
committee, consisting of thirty-two mem- 
bers, as required under the regulations. 

Relief from the situation described may 
be provided by amendment of the regula- 
tions to permit, in the alternative, acceptance 
of a resolution adopted by a subcommittee, 
and signed by its chairman. This alterna- 
tive should eliminate the problem but would 
retain a system of control needed by the 

B. The policy against allowing congressional 
committees to photocopy or obtain photo- 
copies of returns 

Under our present policy representatives 
of Congressional Committees are not sup- 
plied or permitted to make facsimile or 


photocopies of returns or related documents. 
However, they are permitted to inspect re- 
turns and certain related documents on 
premises of the National Office or a field 
oflace of the Service. Blank returns and other 
forms are furnished for transcribing data 
contained in the file opened for inspection. 
Access is granted not only to returns but 
also to administrative files, including rev- 
enue agent and special agent reports, with 
the exception of certain confidential docu- 

This policy has been approved in the past 
by President Eisenhower, Secretary Hum- 
phrey, and Commissioners Andrews, Har- 
rington, and Latham. The reasons for the 
policy apparently include the following: 

1. It is essential to maintain the confi- 
dential nature of tax returns except insofar 
as the inspection of such returns is required 
in the public interest. Our tax collecting 
process depends upon the voluntary re- 
sponse of millions of taxpayers and they are 
entitled to rely on the statutory protection 
which safeguards the confidential nature of 
the information they furnish the Service. 
The use of photocopies exposes such con- 
fidential information to a greater extent 
than present methods of inspection. Im- 
proper or indiscreet disclosures could re- 
duce public confidence in the Service and 
have adverse efifects on the collection of rev- 
enue. While the use of photocopies might be 
advantageous to a committee, it would not 
appear to be essential to the discharge of 
the committee's functions. 

2. The possible disclosure of tax returns 
or related data at committee sessions held 
as public hearings, and the accompanying 
risk of disclosures to unauthorized persons, 
including the press, have been matters of 
continuing concern to the Service. 

3. When a Congressional Committee ex- 
pires, its files may not be destroyed and the 
possibility of unauthorized disclosure may- 
be increased. 

However, our practice of not furnishing 
photocopies of returns to these committees 
is difficult to defend for the following 
reasons : 

1. Section 6103 (a) (3) of the Code provides 
that whenever a return is open to inspection 
a certified copy shall be furnished upon re- 

2. Section 301.6103 (a) -2 (T.D. 6546) of the 
related Regulations on Procedure and Ad- 
ministration provides that a copy of a re- 
turn may be furnished any person who is 
entitled to inspect such return, upon 

3. Our present policy provides distinctive 
treatment to such Congressional Committee 
requests since taxpayers. States, and Agencies 
of the Executive branch of the Federal Ctov- 
emment may be furnished copies of returns 
upon receipt of a proper application. 

Notwithstanding the above, we would like 
to retain the present policy since it provides, 
a degree of protection against improper and 
indiscreet disclosures. However, if it is de- 
termined that this policy should be liberal- 
ized, we shall, of course, be guided accord- 
ingly. No amendment of regulations would 
be required to affect a change. 
C. Inspection of returns and files by Mr. Car- 
mine Bellino 

On January 26 Mr. Bellino, Special Consul- 
tant to the President, called at my office and 
requested permission to inspect our files on 
and others. Although we had no prece- 
dent to guide up, we decided that Mr. Bel- 
lino, in his capacity as a representative of 
the President, could inspect our files without 
^a written request. This reflects the view that 
Section 6103 of the Code specifically pro- 
vides that returns shall be open to inspec- 
tion upon order of the President, and since 
Mr. Bellino's official capacity constitutes him 
the representative of the President, the ac- 
tion taken is regarded as conforming to law. 
Based on this decision, we permitted Mr. Bel- 
lino to inspect the files relating to . 

Since that time we have also permitted him 
to inspect tax returns and related documents 
pertaining to other persons. 

Further, in a letter dated January 26, 
and received January 30, Attorney General 
Robert F. Kennedy asked that Mr. Bellino be 
permitted to review all files, records, and 
documents requested by him in order to co- 
ordinate the investigation of certain indi- 
viduals being conducted by the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Justice Department and 
other Government agencies. Permission was 
granted for Mr. Bellino to inspect such files 
in a letter dated February 1, 1961. 

Additionally, Senator John L. McClellan, 
in a letter dated March 24, designated Mr. 
Bellino as a staff member of the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 


a subcommittee of the Committee on Gov- 
ernment Operations, authorized to inspect 
returns pursuant to Executive Order 10018. 
As such, he is authorized to Inspect those 
documents made available to the Subcom- 
mittee under requests made pursuant to 
this Order. 

In the interest of providing a more de- 
tailed statement there is attached a Tech- 
nical Memorandum prepared in the office of 
the Chief Counsel, which sets forth the his- 
torical background of (1 ) the requirement of 
a committee resolution, and (2) the execu- 
tive policy against supplying photocopies oi 
returns to Congressional Committees. If you 
should desire additional information please 
let me know. 

Mortimer Caplan, 



Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I will in 
a minute. I am reviewing this record for 
the benefit of the Senator from Tennes- 
see and not to point the finger at the 
Kennedy administration. I am not rais- 
ing any question of impropriety with re- 
spect to the man who was in the White 
House. I do not think that anyone has 
raised a question that Mr. MoUenhofE 
has acted improperly with respect to 
handling these tax returns except by 

If any Senator knows of impropriety 
in this matter let us put our foot on it 

If there are any charges of improper 
use of these returns by Mr. MoUenhoff 
speak out, do not just cast doubts by 
these wife-beating questions as to what 
could happen. 

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield. 
Mr. GORE. Neither two wrongs nor a 
multiplicity of wrongs constitute a right. 
I do not wish to allege any illegal act. 
I have not researched this law to that 
extent. But I say to the Senator in all 
seriousness that I think it is indiscreet, 
injudicious, and unwise, and I will go 
so far as to say improp>er for the Com- 
missioner of Internal Revenue to make 
an open-ended arrangement with a poli- 
tical operative without direct orders or 
instructions from the President himself. 
It throws uneasiness into the minds of 
millions of Americans concerning the 
confidential nature of the tax returns. 

If nothing else comes from this, re- 
gardless of what may have occurred in 
past or present administrations, I will 
join with the senior Senator from Dela- 
ware in trying to formalize protection to 
preserve the privacy of the American 
citizen in his tax return. 

This is not to question the right of a 
congressional committee with a need to 
know, with a need to have access to tax 

The Senator from Delaware wondered 
if I had ever seen one. I do not think I 
have seen but one tax return in the 12 
years I have been on t^ae Finance Com- 
mittee. And this was requested by the 
committee emblematic of a question on 
legislation, not with respect to the 
wrongdoing of a taxpayer. 

I think it ought to be formalized. I re- 
peat, for a Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue to make ap. open-ended ar- 
rangement for an agent, whoever he may 
be, whatever his name is, whatever his 
role is, without an instruction from the 
head of the agency is of questionable 

I do not say it is illegal. 

I had thought it was, but I am not 
prepared to say positively that it is. I 
have an adviser on my staff who says 
that it is. But I am not prepared to say 
so in view of what the Senator says. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. The Mol- 
lenhoff arrangement is not open ended. 
The Senator's criticism can more prop- 
erly be directed toward the procediu-e 
under his own administration. Let us be 
fair with our criticism. 

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. In just 
a moment. The only open ended arraiige- 
ment that I know of around here in the 
matter of tax returns involves the com- 
mittee of which he and I are members. 
We voted open ended authority to our 
staff. The Joint Committee staff can ex- 
amine the returns. That Is open ended 
authority. We do not put it in writing. 
Perhaps the Senator and I should look 
at our inner selves and see if we are 
operating properly. 

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I agree. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I think 
we should face the facts. 

The suggestion was made in Mr. 
O'Brien's statement that there was an 
indiscriminate examination of tax re- 
turns imder the Nixon administration. 

That is not true. The President has 
said that no such vise has been made. I 
would certainly hoi>e that this would be 
the basis of the examination of tax re- 
turns in all administrations; namely, in 
situations where questions are raised as 
to the propriety of conduct of some pub- 
lic official or someone in the adminis- 

Certainly, if he considers appointing a 
member to the courts he can, or at least 
he should, get that person's tax returns 
and have them examined before he sends 
the nomination to the Senate for con- 
firmation. If, on the other hand, an al- 
legation comes in that Joe Doaks, who Is 
already a member of the executive 
branch or maybe even on the White 


House staff, Is doing something improper 
the President should examine it, and if 
it is true, take the appropriate steps. If 
he needs the man's tax returns to get this 
information he should have the au- 

The Senator is well aware of the fact 
that the Commissioner said he knew of 
no instance where this authority has 
been abused. I am going to cite one case 
to point out why I think this authority 
is importa nt. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, may we 
have order? 

ate will be in order. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. 
President, I am going to cite one case to 
point out why I think this authority is 
important. I am not going to reveal 
the name; however, this is not a hypo- 
thetical case. In this instance the alle- 
gation was received from some fellow 
who had been before the courts, and he 
had received what he thought was an ex- 
ceptionaly heavy sentence. He was angry 
and his complaint was, "Why should 
this judge be so rough on me as a delin- 
quent taxpayer" — not that he was in- 
nocent — "when he is more guilty than 
I am." Certainly that situation needs in- 
vestigation. It was referred to proper 
channels at the White House. What did 
they find? They found that for « out 
of the 9 years prior to the time this man 
was appointed to the Federal bench he 
had not filed or paid his Federal income 
taxes. I repeat that. For 8 to 9 years prior 
to the time he was appointed as a judge 
and confirmed by the Senate he had not 
paid his Federal income taxes or filed any 
return. Just before being confii-med, ap- 
parently thinking he was going to get 
the appointment, he filed belated returns 
for all those years; and in a matter of 
months he was nominated and con- 
firmed, and he is serving today. 

The only way the President can now 
get rid of him would be to ask him for 
his resignation vmless we in the Senate 
say that we will back him in removing 
this particular judge. I am sure the Presi- 
ent will furnish the name of the man if 
the Senate wishes to act. Why should 
he not investigate such a charge? 

If there are abuses of public trust that 
is what we are talking about. Certainly, 
allegations which of times cannot be sup- 
ported do come in with respect to John 

Doe. When I was working with the Sena- 
tor from Virginia allegations came in 
with respect to many Joe Does. We would 
get his tax returns and we would find 
nothing to substantiate those allegations. 
This is a very delicate matter and must be 
handled with discretion. 

The very suggestion that the tax re- 
turn of Joe Doe has been requested by a 
congressional committee or by the execu- 
tive branch in itself constitutes a damag- 
ing indictment against the individual. It 
is iinfair to publish these names unless 
guilt is established. 

The Senator knows that he and I and 
every other member of the Joint Com- 
mittee were assured by Commissioner 
Thrower that no request had been re- 
ceived from this administration since he 
has been in oflBce involving an elected of- 
ficial, nor any on the basis that they were 
going to be examined to determine if 
John Doaks had paid the proper income 
tax. The amoimt of taxes to be paid is 
the job for the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue and not the job of a congres- 
sional committee or the White House. 

Mr. President, as a Senator I often 
have had people write to me that Joe 
Doaks is not paying his income tax. I 
have one standard form letter which 
states; If you have any information in 
that regard, you should write directly 
to the Director of Internal Revenue in 
your area or to the Commissioner and 
send him that information. To handle 
these otherwise would be wrong. I have 
directed my attention toward procedures.. 

I would be the first to rise in this 
Chamber and criticize the executive 
branch or any representative of it if they 
indiscriminately started to get tax re- 
turns of the average taxpayer. That same 
statement applies to congressional com- 
mittees. That is the job of the Commis- 
sioner of Internal Revenue. If It is ever 


departed from under this administration, 
either at the congressional or at the leg- 
islative level or if it is shown to have 
been departed from by other adminis- 
trations I shall be the first to rise in this 

But they have a responsibility when 
these allegations involve propriety to 
take some action. Why should they not 
look at them and find out if this charge 


against some oflBcial of Grovernment is 
true? I would not want a judge on the 
Federal bench who might be judging me 
when he has not paid his income taxes 
for 8 or 9 years. 

Mr. GORELMr. President, will the Sen- 
ator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I shall 
yield to the Senator in a moment. 

If this screening process had been in 
practice at that time the nomination of 
that judge would not have been sent to 
the Senate for confirmation. 

Of just what are Senators afraid? 

There seems to be general agreement 
that no instances of impropriety of the 
handling of this authority has as yet been 
cited, yet there seems to be a fear. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Is the junior Senator 
from Michigan correct that under exist- 
ing law and the law that has been in 
effect the Governors of the several States 
which have income tax laws have the 
right to inspect Federal tax returns? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. The 
Governors, or they can delegate the au- 

Mr. GRIFFIN. That is my next ques- 
tion. Does it have to be the Governor or 
can he designate? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. He can 
and he does designate someone in his 
behalf in practically all situations. Some 
States that do not have income taxes 
may not use the authority. I vmderstand 
42 or 43 States do designate. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Would it not be a pecu- 
liar situation if the Grovernors of all 
States can designate someone to examine 
Federal tax returns when they have a 
question, and a question is raised about 
the President of the United States hav- 
ing designated a representative to do the 
same thing? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Not only 
that, but it would be ridiculous to say the 
Governor has to do it personally or that 
the President has to do it personally. 
Certainly that is ridiculous. 

I commend the Nixon administration 
for having laid down these sounder 
rvdes. Maybe they need to be tightened 
up more. Maybe Congress needs to ex- 
amine our own procedures. 

The Senator from Tennessee referred 
to the fact that the White House is a 

political organization. Congress is a poli- 
tical organization. I resp>ect that fact. 
There is nothing wrong with that. The 
White House is part of the political arm 
of Government, but by the same token we 
in Congress on occasion have been known 
to be somewhat political. Who is to say 
a congressional committee is any less 
honorable or any less political than the 
man in the White House? 

As I emphasized earlier, I am not ques- 
tioning the manner in which the Ken- 
nedy administration operated, even 
though they had no written request; but 
at the same time let us not put a halo 
around Mortimer Caplin's head on the 
basis that his suggestions apply to every- 
body else but him. His later position is 
just a little bit ridiculous. I shall be look- 
ing forward to his comment on his own 
regulations of 1961. 

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I shall 
yield in a moment. 

But if Mr. Caplin really thinks that 
he was in violation of the law to allow 
examination of these tax returns in 1961 
without written orders and really wants 
to go to the Department of Justice to 
plead guilty maybe they would render 
assistance. I am reminding him of his 
own regulations in a friendly spirit. 

Mr. HOLLAND and Mr. BAKER ad- 
dressed the Chair. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield 
to the Senator from Florida. 

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr, President, perhaps 
I can throw a little light on the question 
raised by the Senator from Michigan. 

At the time I served as Governor of 
the State of Florida, we had no State 
income tax and we do not now, but we 
did and do have an intangible property 
tax; that is, a tax on the holdings of 
intangible personal property, including 
the securities, of citizens. We have many 
citizens in our State who did own securi- 
ties and filed an intangible property tax 

One of the ways of checking against 
the accuracy of those returns was to see 
what they filed in their income tax re- 
turns with the Federal Government 
showing the income or dividends from 
their various corporate investments and 
notes or mortgages. 

The program worked out was that the 
Governor would make the request, but 


that the income tax returns when sent 
down, as they were in many, many cases, 
would be referred to the comptroller of 
the State of Florida who was the tax 
enforcement officer of the State. The 
Governor at that time, for those 4 years, 
did not see any of those income tax re- 
turns. There was no occasion for him to 
see them. It was simply a cooperative 
effort to see that the laws were obeyed 
and taxes were paid. I think it was help- 
ful to both governments. I would not 
want anything that comes out here tp 
jeopardize that procedure in any way, 
because many States that have State in- 
come taxes and the several States that 
have intangible property taxes rely upon 
the procedure, which is handled not for 
political reasons whatever, but for prac- 
tical enforcement of the tax laws of those 

I hope that this explanation will be 
helpful to the Senator from Michigan. 

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield 
to the Senator from Tennessee. 

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I want to 
majte sure that the junior Senator from 
Tennessee fully understands the thrust 
of the important remarks made by the 
Senator from Delaware. Do I understand 
correctly, according to the Senator's pre- 
vious statement, that there have been 
seven instances' of requests for tax re- 
turns by the executive department in 
this administration? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Seven 
was the figure given to us the other day. 
but that embraced the tax returns for 
nine individuals. 

Mr. BAKER. There were nine tax re- 
turns, but seven individual requests were 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Deleware. Yes. 

Mr. BAKER. Do I understand cor- 
rectly that the requests of the admin- 
istration have been made in writing, in 
conformity with the requirements of the 
Internal Revenue Code? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. All re- 
quests under the Nixon administration 
have been in writing, in conformity with 
the regulations issued by Commissioner 
Thrower. The Internal Revenue Code 
states that tax returns will be issued 
upon the basis of regulations worked out 
by the Treasury Department and ap- 
proved by the President, which means 
the administration can write them in 

any way he wishes.. Mr. Thrower has 
written regulations and the White House 
has concurred that it would be more or- 
derly procedure to make the requests in 
writing each time and make the man sign 
for them. I think that is good. The way 
Mr. Caplin did it under the Kennedy 
administration, no record was made and 
nobody was accountable, which I think 
was the wrong method. 

It was a loose and dangerous practice, 
yet I hear very little mention of that 
loose practice under the Democratic re- 

Surely they are not advocating double 

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Caplin, during his 
tenure as Commissioner of Internal Rev- 
enue, promulgated, and the White House 
at that time approved, a regulation which 
did not require such a request to be in 
writing. Is that correct? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. That is 

Mr. BAKER. And the White House 
can approve it? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. It must 
approve it. 

Mr. BAKER. So no written i-equests 
were made, and there was no way to tell 
how many returns were examined, dur- 
ing the Johnson and Kennedy admin- 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I do not 
remember any figures being given as to 
what happened under the Johnson ad- 
ministration, but we were told that under 
the Kennedy administration they spent 
"days on end" examining taxpayers' re- 

Mr. BAKER. If the Senator will yield 
for one further question, the letter which 
the Senator referred to in his remarks 
was written by Mr. O'Brien and whom 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I read 
the press release and the statement 
which Lawrence O'Brien released as 
chairman of the Democratic National 


Committee. Mr. O'Brien was on the 
White House staff during the Kennedy 

Mr. BAKER. Was Mr. O'Brien, who 
made these charges, on the White House 
staff during the Kennedy administra- 


Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. During 
the time he was on the staff, and later 
he was Postmaster General. I do not 
quite know in which capacity he was at 
which date. 

Mr. BAKER. Who else was involved in 
the press release besides Mr. O'Brien? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. Mor- 
timer Caplin. 

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Mortimer Caplin. 
Was he Commissioner of Internal Rev- 
enue in the previous administration? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Yes. 

Mr. BAKER. Would Mr. Cohen have 
necessarily been involved in the promul- 
gation of the regulations of the Internal 
Revenue Service with respect to the dis- 
closure of personal returns? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I would 
think so. There is no report of his chang- 
ing the orders promulgated under the 
previous Kennedy administration. 

Mr. BAKER. Who was the third 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mitchell 
Rogovin. He was also during that time 
in the Treasury Department and later 
moved to the Justice Department. 

Mr. BAKER. Do we have any basis for 
knowing whether or not these three gen- 
tlemen were aware of these operations 
at the White House during the Kennedy 
administration^the examination of re- 
turns without written request? Has the 
Senator inquired into that, or does he 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I have. 
Certainly Mr. Caplin must know because 
he signed the order saying they could 
get them without written request. I think 
I know Mr. Caplin well enough to know 
that he would not sign a letter without 
knowing what was in it. One time as 
Commissioner he said that the White 
House could examine tax returns with- 
out written request — which I join the 
Senator from Tennesee in condemning 
as a rather loose arrangement for I 
think there should be some record. Later 
after Mr. Caplin left oflBce he comes to 
the conclusion that such requests should 
be signed by the President. 

Mr. BAKER. If the Senator will yield 
further to me, I would like to say I asso- 
ciate myself with the Senator from Del- 
aware and my senior colleague in say- 
ing that this Is an area where there is 
great potential for abuse. I personally 
will have to be educated as to why the 
executive department, or the President, 

for that matter, should have access to 
income tax returns, but I am willing to 
be educated in that respect. However, I 
will point out that I think the illustra- 
tions the Senator from Delaware has 
made point out the necessity for a close 
examination of these regulations and 
point out, as well, that it is a situation 
of long standing that we should look into. 
Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I wish to 
point out that it is essential that. there 
be some check over both the executive 
branch and the legislative branch. 

The Senate Finance Committee and 
the House Ways and Means Committee 
have always delegated this duty to our 
staffs. I will cite an example. When we 
had the tax reform bill before us last 
December, the suggestion was made that 
a nvunber of individuals as a result of 
loopholes in the tax law were escaping 
the payment of income taxes entirely. 
Of course a loophole cannot be closed 
unless we know what It is. We have 
very high caliber staffs on the joint com- 
mittee, a staff that we trust completely. 
The committee staff examined many re- 
turns to see how that avoidance of tax 
took place. In that manner we were 
able to close the tax loopholes. I know 
I would not, and I doubt if any member 
of the Senate Finance Committee or 
House Ways and Means Committee 
would, examine the returns. There is no 
reason why we shoiild. We were getting 
hypothetical cases of how those tax loop- 
holes occur. That is an example of why 
it is necessary for committees to have 
access to tax returns. 

The Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Mc- 
Clellan) has done a remarkable job with 
his investigation committee in exposing 
corruption. The McClellan committee 
needs to examine tax returns, and he can 
get them with the permission of the Pres- 
ident. I drfend his right to see those tax 

Sure there are abuses, but until abuses 
are shown, let us not stop that right. 

Other agencies have the right to ex- 
amine income tax returns. 

Health, Education, and Welfare gets 
those returns. The question was raised: 
why? A person can collect social security 
benefits, but if his earnings rise beyond 
a certain point his payments may be de- 
creased or stopped. So officials in that 
department occasionally have to spot- 
check returns. 


Do not ask me why, but the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture was listed in 1968 
as requesting pei'mission to examine the 
tax returns of 709 taxpayers. 

The Department of Commerce has ex- 
amined a number of tax returns. We find 
listed the FDIC. Of course the Depart- 
ment of Justice naturally would; it would 
be expected. The Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board. The Securities and Ex- 
change Commission. The SmaU Business 
Administration. The Comptroller of the 
currency. The Federal Communications 
Commission. The Department of State. 
The Renegotiation Board. The Depart- 
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
The Department of Labor. The Tennes- 
see Valley Authority examined tax re- 
turns. The Department of the Army. The 
Veterans' Administratipn. 

These are some of the agencies that ex- 
amined top returns in 1968. 

Several Senators addressed the Chair. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I would 
like to finish, if I may. 

The Civil Service Commission. The 
Department of the Air Force requested 
and examined tax returns. The Post- 
master General wanted to examine the 
returns of four taxpayers. 

The Secretary of Transportation. The 
Biu-eau of Accounts. The National Se- 
lective Service Appeal Board, and the 
Post OflBce Department itself. All those 
are agencies that in 1968 examined tax 

Maybe they are not properly circum- 
scribed. If they are not we as much as 
anyone else should be to blame. But al- 
together, these agencies examined in 1968 
a total of 

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? The Senator has been 
holding the floor for some time. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Yes, I 
shall yield. They examined in 1968 the 
returns of 3,393 taxpayers and this figure 
does not include those requested by the 
White House. We were told that 1969 
would propably show a comparable fig- 

Perhaps these agencies need these re- 
turns for various reasons. Certainly U.S. 
attorneys and the various agencies have 
to have them. 

I yield to the Senator from Maryland. 

Mr. TYDINGS. Has Mr. Mollenhoff 
asked for the tax returns for Governor 
Wallace or any member of his family? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I do not 

Mr. TYDINGS. Has Mr. Mollenhoff 
asked for the tax return of any Member 
of this body? 

Mr. WHiLIAMS of Delaware. I do not 
know what returns Mr. MoUenhoff asked 
for. The Commissioner told the joint 
committee that the retiims of no elected 
official had been requested. 

Mr. TYDINGS. Has he asked for the 
return of any U.S. district judge, or any 
judge of a circuit court of appeals? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. As I say, 
I do not know. The Senator can request 
the names of all of them. 

Mr. TYDINGS. Agreed. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Com- 
missioner Thrower told our commit- 
tee — and that is all I know about it — 
that under the Nixon administration 
there were seven requests from Mr. Mol- 
lenhoff involving nine taxpayers, I be- 
lieve. The Senator from Tennessee is 
nodding his head. That it is nine. 

Mr. TYDINGS. How about that let- 
ter? Shall we sign it together? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Just a 
moment. A total of nine. And he said 
also that he felt he could not properly 
tell us the names, but he did say they did 
not involve any elected public offcials. 
That means that Senators would not be 
covered. That was the statement we 

Mr. TYDINGS. How about any sitting 
judge or justice? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I do not 

Mr. TYDINGS. Would the Senator 
from Delaware agree that whether it oc- 
curred in the Kennedy administration 
or the Nixon administration, or any 
other administration, to let a political 
operative in the White House, with no 
background in investigative work such 
as having served In any investigative 
agency, have carte blanche access to the 
income tax returns of anyone in the 
United States, would be a very danger- 
ous thing, and should be corrected by 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. That is 
a leading question. The Senator was not 
here when I read the procedure under 
previous administrations so I would like 


to point out to him that the loose prac- 
tice has been corrected. I agree with 
him completely that the manner in 
which it was handled before was verj' 
dangerous. Since the Senator was not 


here, I shall read Mr. Caplln's method 
while he was Commissioner, because I 
do not think it can be pointed out too 
often, the loose manner in which it was 
handled under the Kennedy administra- 

Mr. TYDINGS. I heard the Senator 
read about the Kennedy administration. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of- Delaware. I read 
also the way it has been improved under 
the Nixon administration. 

If there are those who do not like the 
appointees of the President or do not 
like the President himself, that is one 
thing. But if this is a case where they 
do not trust Mr. Mollenhoff they ought 
to say so and state why. 

Mr. TYDINGS. It does not make any 
difference who it is. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Does the 
Senator know of any abuse in the man- 
ner In which the White House is now 
handling this problem? 

Several Senators addressed the Chair, 

Saxbe) . The Senator from Delaware has 
the floor. 

Mr. TYDINGS. When we write to Mr. 
Mollenhoff, the Senator from Delaware 
and I together, and get the names of 
those persons whose returns he requested, 
we can determine whether or not there 
are any political imphcations. 

But I recall very well, when I was U.S. 
attorney, nobody saw income tax returns 
unless the Attorney General of the 
United States requested it for a specific 
investigation. No U5. attorney or anyone 
else. The Internal Revenue Service 
handled them. Whenever income tax re- 
turns were used in the Government, they 
went through channels that were com- 
pletely circumspect and outside the pos- 
sibility of any type of political implica- 

Now, if President Kennedy or any 
other President has a system whereby 
someone, not through the ordinary 
course of governmental operations, 
could, carte blanche, examine your in- 
come tax return or mine, I think that is 
a very, very dangerous thing. I think the 
apprehension of it can be most upsetting. 
We in the United States pay our taxes 
voluntarily. We are one of the few na- 
tions in the world where the taxpayers 
voluntarily pay their taxes, and we do it 
because we have confidence that the re- 
turns are confidentially handled. 

To have it revealed here that the con- 
trary has been done, I think, is very dis- 

concerting, regardless of the administra- 
tion, or whether the man's name is Mol- 
lenhoff, Jones, Smith, or anything else, 
tal, and ought to be released only imder 
specified statutory provisions, completely 
outside political channels. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I would 
agree with the Senator and am glad that 
the Nixon administration has corrected 
the loose practice previously followed. 
But when he says "outside political chan- 
nels" would the Senator say the Senate 
Finance Committee, which has access to 
tax returns under the law, the Ways and 
and Means Committee, which has access 
to tax returns under the law, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, which has ac- 
cess to tax returns under the law, the 
Committee on the Judiciary, on which 
the Senator has served — every committee 
of Congress 

Mr. TYDINGS. Right. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Just a 
minute. Would the Senator say we have 
to be political in our motivation, or are 
we to 

Mr. TYDINGS. Absolutely not, because 
we do it imder prescribed rules. In the 
Committee on the Judiciary, when we 
have nominations, no one sees that in- 
come tax return unless the individual 
member of the committee goes to the 
chairman, and he sits down alone, with 
no staff member. That is specifically 
within the lines of ofi&cial work. 

But to give to someone who is not in 
any way working for the Department of 
Justice, whose chief public mission is 
poUticai in nature, the right to examine 
income tax returns, whether it is a Re- 
publican or Democratic administration, 
or any kind, Ithink, is a very, vrey up- 
setting thought. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I am 
glad that the Senator is upset, because I, 
too, was upset at what was going on un- 
der the previous administration. But I 
want to say 

Mr. TYDINGS. It is a dangerous thing. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. But the 
ix)int is, the law gives to the President 
the right — they have always had that 
right ; that is the law — the President has 
it as President, and the U.S. attorneys 
could get these tax returns. They do get 
them. They have to get them. 

Mr. TYDINGS. To try a case the In- 
ternal Revenue Service has already made. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Surely 
they do. 


Mr. TYDINGS. But they do not insti- 
gate it. The case is brought to them by 
an Internal Revenue Service intelligence 
agent, who received the case from a reve- 
nue agent, who acquired it through an 
audit. That comes in the normal course 
to the Department of Justice. The At- 
torney General has the right to ask the 
Internal Revenue Service for an income 
tax return, but that is a part of the day 
to day operations of the E>epartment of 
Justice. That has nothing to do with 
someone who has a political backgroimd, 
who has responsibilities in political cam- 
paigns, having the power to go and take 
anybody's tax return and look it over. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. 
President, let us get it straight. There is 
much being said here hypothetically. 

I said earlier that President Nixon had 
laid down rules that these tax returns 
were not to be available under any cir- 
cumstances to Mr. Mollenhoff or any- 
one merely on the basis of examining 
whether Joe, Tom, Dick,^ or Harry was 
paying his proper income taxes, but only 
in cases where there may be abuse of 
the public trust. 

I am just trying to review the record 
and outline the law, and I do not want 
to get into a political discussion of 
whether Members on the other side of 
the aisle wanted Mr. Nixon as President, 
or whethfeJf xfiey would have had more 
confidence in a man Mr. Humphrey 
would have appointed. That is. not the 
point. The President, not the Senator 
from Maryland, appoints his Chief Coun- 
sel. Every President has appointed some- 
one to represent him. If some Senator 
feels It is being abused he should spell 
out the charge. But I will say. as I 
pointed out before that the Nixon ad- 
ministration has laid down rules whereby 
this is done in writing, and that is more 
than was done before. So let us at least 
give them that much credit. 

If there is still abuse, that is another 
matter. The Conunissioner made it clear 
to our committee. He said that of those 
that were requested not one of them in- 
volved an elected public official. That is 
all I know. 

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WIT J JAMS of Delaware. In just a 
moment. There have been seven requests 

for nine returns, each of them putting in 
writing the name of the man. 

There Is this danger about releasing 
the names, and I understand it. I point 
out one case they cited and said we 
could use it, hoping we could do some- 
thing about it: An allegation came into 
the executive branch that a member of 
the Federal bench — the complaint came 
from someone who thought his sentence, 
perhaps, was too harsh — but the report 
came in from this individual that this 
judge himself was just as bad or worse 
than the man convicted. 

They called for that man's tax returns. 
They foimd that in 8 out of 9 of the 
preceding years before he was nominated 
and confirmed by the Senate he had not 
filed a return nor had be paid his in- 
come tax. He did file a belated return 
just before his name was. sent to the 
Senate, and he was confirmed by the 
Senate, and he is a member of the Court 
today. The President in power at the 
time should have checked that or the 
committee shovild have known it. I hope 
we can get that man to resign. If not I 
hope there is enough interest in the Sen- 
ate that we can take htm off the Bench. 
He should not be the judge of his fellow 
man when he himself would not pay his 
own income taxes. 

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. The 
White House has tried to assure that 
this power is exercised with discretion. 
No business operations are threatened 
with tax investigations, nor has the 
FBI been sent aroimd at late hours in 
the night. 

I promised to yield to the Senator 
from Colorado. 

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator for 

First of all, the Senator has also re- 
ferred to this: The man who made this 
press release, LawTence O'Brien, occu- 
pied a very, very political E>osition with 
President Kennedy during the time that 
these orders were made or access was 
made to the IRS files by Mr. Bellino. Is 
that not true? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. That Is 
true. The charges were made out of the 
office of the Democratic National Com- 



mittee by Lawrence F. O'Brien, as chair- 
man of that committee. 

Mr. ALLOTT. I think it would be in- 
teresting to have Mr. O'Brien aftswer the 
question — perhaps the press would be 
kind enough to tJut this question to 
him — perliaps the press would be kind 
enough to put this question to him — 
as to whether or not he examined any 
income tax returns during the time he 
was with the President in the White 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I would 
welcome his answer personally. I would 
doubt very much that he did. I would 
be surprised. I said earlier that I do not 
question that Mr. Bellino may have kept 
this confidential. I do not know of any 
evidence otherwise. But the fact is that 
under that Kennedy administration he 
examined tax returns without writteri 
request — if we want to use the word that 
the Senator from Maryland used — 
wholesale, by going in and getting any 
return with no records made. I think 
that was a very loose operation. I think 
the man's name should be on record so 
there would be reponsibility if we found 
they were abusing this and turning it 
into political persecution — and it could 
be; let us face it. I recognize that danger. 
Then we could go back and see who 
the President's representative was who 
called for the returns, and why. 

Mr. TYDINGS. How would we know? 

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, the Sen- 
ator yielded to me. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I do not 
know how we would know, any more than 
the Senator or I know, as a member of 
the committee. The only way I know in 
which I could satisfy some people would 
be to say that only the members of the 
Democratic Party could do this. I am 
getting tired ^f this political bickering. 
The Senator asks how we would know 
that some man down there is not going 
to abuse it. We do not know. We do not 
know that the President of the United 
States is not going to do something 
wrong. We do not know that John Wil- 
liams or that Joe T'ydings is not going 
to abuse our public trust. But let us not 
start asking questions and question the 
integrity of a man until we know what 
we are talking about. 

Mr. TYDINGS. We have guidelines. 

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield to me? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I have 
not heard of any case that has been 

I yield to the Senator from Colorado. 

Mr. ALLOTT. "The Senator from Mary- 
land has had an opportunity to intervene 
in this matter, and I would Uke an op- 
portunity, also. 

I, together with Senator Magntjson, 
who is chairman of the Independent Of- 
fices Comjnittee, got a real shock in this 
area in the hearings of 1965, and I want 
to refer to specific pages in those hear- 
ings, from 1080 through 1105, in which 
will be foimd a complete discussion of 
the access of the Federal Trade Commis- 
sion — of all things — to the IRS files. 

"They first denied that they had access 
to them, and I read Paul Rand Dixon's 
answer : 

What we got ofiF the income tax was names, 
sir; that's all we get. 

Before we got through examining him, 
we found that they were maintaining a 
staff of three or four people all the time 
at the IRS — ^all the time. This was in 
1965. Because of the investigation and 
the questioning we subjected them to — 
both Senator Magnuson and I — that 
practice, according to the subsequent 
statement of Mr. Dixon, next year was 
not resumed. It was stopped. 

Is this not the fact: The very man who 
set up the regulations — which were no 
regulations at all, in effect — for Mr. Bel- 
lino in 1961 is the man who today signs 
a letter, which the Senator has placed in 
the Record or has read into the Record, 
which says that this is an illegal act. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Etelaware. "That is 

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. Mortimer Caplin, to 
be specific. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. Cap- 
Un now says that what he did while he 
was Commissioner was illegal, and he 
said the requests should be in writing. 
They are in writing now. 

I think this is an area in which we 
should be ever cautious. I would have 
appreciated it, and I think I would have 
equally as such respect for Mr. Caplin's 
position, had he written the committee 
rather than writing the Democratic Na- 
tional Committee. I do not know what he 
figured the Democratic National Com- 
mittee could do about it, except politics. 
Mr. O'Brien said: 

K this action is not takem voluntairtly, we 
are prepared to initiate legal action that wlU 
end this practice. 


He was condemning a loose practice 
that his own administration initiated but 
which has been corrected long ago by the 
Nixon administration. But I goiess they 
will not initiate prosecution retroactively 
on themselves. 

I think this matter should be put into 
proper perspective, and called what it is, 
namely, gutter politics. They have tried 
to give the impression throughout the 
country that_these tax returns under the 
Nixon administration have been used in- 
discrminately. They have not, and that 
is the point. And the Commissioner has 
said that there has been much less use in 
this administration than heretofore. 
There have been seven requests with nine 

Here is another letter which I will put 
In the Record, dated August 10, 1964. 
This is addressed to the Honorable Ber- 
trand M. Harding, the Acting Commis- 
sioner of Internal Revenue, in Washing- 

Department of Justice, 
Washington. August 10, 1964. 
Hon. Berth AND M. Harding, 
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. Harding: In connection with an 
ofiacial Investigation, I would appreciate re- 
ceiving uncertified photostatic copies of the 
income tax returns for the years 1958 
through 1963 for the enclosed list of tax- 

It is also requested that these retirrns be 
forwarded to Mr. Walter J. Sheridan, 450 
Mllner Building, 210 South Lamar Street, 
Jackson, Mississippi. In the event these re- 
turns are not located, it Is requested that 
Mr. Sheridan be notified at the above ad- 

Your cooperation tn this matter is greatly 


Herbert J. Miller, Jr., 
Assistant Attorney General. 

I do not know who Mr. Sheridan is. I 
would hope he wa^ the U.S. attorney. 

Let us not try to make a mountain out 
of a molehill. I have yet to hear one man 
anywhere speak of a specific example of 
abuse of handling these returns under 
the Nixon administration. 

I recall that years ago a Member of 
the Senate was censured for trying to 
condemn his fellow man by innuendo, 
without specific charges. If anyone has 
any question to raise concerning abuse, 
name the case, and I will help to have it 

checked. If he is right I do not care who 
it is: I will help to correct the abuse. 

Let us not say, "Did he get the return 
of Mr. X," and throw out a lot of names. 
I think it is unfair to any man. Merely 
asking such a question indicates suspi- 
cion on the part of the man who does so. 
It is unfair. 

Mr. ALLOTT. Does not the question 
alone, "Did you get the return of George 
Wallace?"— — 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. That 
alone constitutes a semicharge, and I am 
surprised at the man who did it. 

Mr. ALLOTT. Does that not constitute 
a sort of cloud itself? 

Mr, WILLIAMS of Delaware. It is, and 
it is wrong. 

I would say that if any oflBcial In the 
executive branch of the Government — 
I do not care if it is Clark Mollenhoff 
or my own brother — is getting tax re- 
turns of the average citizen, as a mem- 
ber of the executive branch, not a mem- 
ber of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
for the sole purpose of seeing whether 
or not that citizen is paying enough taxes 
or as a political threat, that is wrong. 
If a man has done something wrong as 
a Government oflBcial or as a prospective 
Government ofi&cial, when there is such 
an allegation involving a Government 
transaction, it is their business to check. 
I only wish such a check had been in 
force under some preceding administra- 
tion, because then we woijld not have a 
Federal judge sitting today, passing 
judgment on American taxpayers, who in 
private life did not pay his income taxes. 

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President,, will 
the Senator from Delaware yield?' 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield. 

Mr. SPARKMAN. I want to seek some 
information because we hope to finish 
this bill today and we expect a rollcall. 
I hope that Senators still in the Cham- 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I hope so, 
too. I told the Senator that I would not 
be but a few minutes, but I do not want 
to shut off this colloquy 

Mr. SPARKMAN. I realize that, but a 
good many Senators have asked me when 
they could get away because we expect 
a rollcall vote some time today 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Well, we 
are dealing with a very important sub- 
ject here, and I think they are all anxious 
to stay aroimd and get a better under- 
standing of the law. 



Mr, SCOTT. Mr. President, if the 
Senator from Delaware wiU yield, could 
I ask whether he himself intends to ask 
for a rollcall on the bill? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I under- 
stand it will be requested; yes. 

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, will the 
Senator from Delaware yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield. 

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I thank 
the distinguished Senator from Dela- 

I should like to compliment him on the 
job he has done in looking into a situa- 
tion that, up to now, or rather, before he 
spoke, might very well have been pre- 
sumed, in the minds of a great many 
I)eople, merely to reflect upon the politi- 
cal activities of the present administra- 

I join the other Senators who already 
have expressed their strong convictions 
that this system is not a reprehensible 
one, that it is defensible, that it has re- 
sulted in real benefit accruing to the peo- 
ple of this country. 

Let me say, Mr. President, that I do 
not think the average taxpayer is too 
much disturbed about having his tax re- 
turns examined. Obviously, most of us 
would hope that those near neighbors of 
ours would not have the pleasure of try- 
ing to make comparisons between what 
we may do and they may do; but so far 
as the average taxpayer in this country 
is concerned, I do not think that he fears 
an examination of his return by the 
President, or by anyone else, because I 
happen to believe that most of the people 
in this countrj' are honest. 

I do not think it is-iair at all to allege 
that we will destroy the whole system, if 
we let the cat out of the bag to the effect 
that former Presidents and former stafE 
members of Presidents have examined 
tax returns. I do not think that any 
President, insofar as I know of — not a 
single one — has exercised that authority 

I would ask my distinguished col- 
leagues on the other side, and en this side 
of the aisle as weU, whether they are 
concerned, if it disturbs them that 106 
or 108 — ^whatever the number was — per- 
sons working for the Internal Revenue 
Service who have been convicted, a num- 
ber of whom are now serving their sen- 
tences, does that disturb them? It surely 

does not disturb me and I do not think it 
disturbs the average taxpayer at all, that 
in this country of ours the President of 
the United States and certain commit- 
tees of Congress are going to be looking 
into the returns filed by all taxpayers. It 
does not make one bit of difference if 
they happen to be, at a precise point in 
time, the Collector of Internal Revenue 
for the United States, that they, too, are 
not going to be exempted from the scru- 
tiny that should be assured all the people 
will be exercised by this Government, by 
the checks to which the Senator from 
Delaware has already referred, which 
constitutes the best assurance I know of 
that we will be treating all the people in 
this country alike. I do not know of a 
single taxpayer in this covmtry — are 
there 70 million — 35 million? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Eighty 

Mr. HANSEN. Eighty million taxpay- 
ers. I should think that when 106 people, 
who have served the Government of the 
United States in the collection of taxes, 
have been convicted of violations, that 
this was the best way, the best possible 
way I know of, to convince the more 
than 210 million, or however many mil- 
lions of people there are in this country 
today, that this system is good. We are 
calling upon the people of this country 
voluntarily to tell the Government what 
taxes they owe. 

I, too, resent the questions that were 
put to my distinguished friend from 
Delaware by saying, "Has this person's 
tax return been examined?" 

We could very easily turn around and 
ask our friends on the other side of the 
aisle, "Has that person's taxes been 

I do not know. 

All I can say is that Mr. Mollenhoff is 
answerable to the President of the United 
States. The President of the United 
States was elected by a vote of the people 
of this country. I recognize his right, and 
I defend him in his right, to name who- 
ever he wishes to serve as his represent- 
ative. I leave' it up to the good judgment 
of the people of this country. When they 
no longer want to extend the mandate 
they granted in 1968, let that judgment 
be made by the people of this country. 

If Mr. Mollenhoff, or whoever may 
serve imder any President, those who 
served imder President Truman, those 


who served under President Roosevelt — 
I do not know under whom Mr. Noonan 
served, the former Commissioner of In- 
ternal Revenue who was convicted and 
who served time; but I am certain it was 
not the intent of the President of the 
United States, whoever he was, imder 
whom Mr. Noonan served, to have that 
kind of business going on. I do not think 
it is up to us to say that in our judgment, 
Mr. MoUenhoflf is a political operator. - 

There are many people serving in high 
positions in Government today. The im- 
portant thing is that they have the con- 
fidence of the President of the United 
States and that their actions be judged 
in the light of the good sense of the peo- 
ple of this country; and if they do not 
like the way that business is being han- 
dled, there is provided the opportunity 
every 4 years to change that around. 

I have every confidence Mr. MoUen- 
hofif will act in a most responsible fashion 
to serve the Presidency of the United 
States. If it just happens that some read 
into his actions a political motivation, 
let it be noted that he has asked for the 
tax returns of only nine individuals and 
that he made seven requests to get the 
nine returns. Compare that, if you will, 
with what was done under President 
Kennedy. But I am not objecting to that. 
I think it is good. I am proud that Sena- 
tor McClellan has done the great job he 
has in this coimtry. I am just delighted. 
I think that all the people of this coun- 
try are far better ooff , because he had the 
right, as Chairman of the Committee on 
Government Operations, to make the in- 
vestigation he has. Had he denied that 
right, this country would be far worse off 
than is now the fact. 

I do not think there is any validity 
to the charge. It would occur to me that 
If I wanted to be political, that what may 
have started out as an allegation that 
seemed to have some political connota- 
tion, in the light of the discussions which 
have been made by the distinguished 
senior Senator from Delaware, has now 
been turned right aroimd. I do not blame 
those who complained. It is like the man 
who caught a wildcat and would like 
someone to help him turn it loose. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. Pres- 
ident, I shall yield the floor in just a 

moment, but I want to make just one 
point here, in case what has been said 
may be interpreted as a criticism of Mr. 
Bellino who was the man examining the 
returns under the preceding administra- 
tion without written requests. I knew 
Mr. Bellino when he was serving as the 
counsel of the Committee on Govern- 
ment Operations. I knew him personally. 
I had tremendous respect for Mr. BeUino. 
I am confident, based on my knowledge 
of him and on the Senator from Ne- 
braska who was also on the committee 
and who knows Mr. Bellino, that he did 
not turn this into a political persecution 
operation. I have that much confidence 
in him. I want the Record to show that. 
I did not raise the questions, but I do 
think it would have been better to have 
had his requests in writing. 

President Keimedy had the right to 
outline, as the law says, the regulation 
under which it operates, and as the reg- 
ulations were outlined there would be no 
written request. I wish there had been. I 
am glad that the present administration 
is using written requests only; but, nev- 
ertheless, I do not attribute to Mr. Bel- 
lino any suggestion that he was doing 
anything in his capacity other than that 
which he should have done as a repre- 
sentative of the President. 

At the same time I would hope that 
those who frankly admit they have not 
been able to raise any charge of im- 
proper handling of these returns as far 
as Mr. Mollenhoff is concerned would ex- 
tend to him the same degree of respect. 
There is no evidence that I can find 
which would show that Mr. MoUenhofif 
has not acted with discretion. What are 
they scared about? 

If there is something wrong and Sen- 
ators want to change the law let us get 
to it. We have the same objective no 
matter which side of the aisle we are 
on. We are not going to accomplish any- 
thing on a partisan basis. We would not 
render any service to our country. 

In the heat of such a political discus- 
sion we might leave the impression that 
the integrity and the secrecy of tax re- 
turns are not being properly respected. 
I think that they are. There is no evi- 
dence to the contrary. And let us not 
make any charge by innuendo. 


Such low tactics are below the dignity 
of the Senate. 

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I shall 
yield to the Senator from Nebraska and 
shall then yield the floor. 

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I thank 
the Senator. I am sure I speak for many 


in the Chamber in expressing gratitude 
to the Senator from Delaware for set- 
ting the record straight. 

It is very clear that the actions of 
Commissioner Thrower, the Office of 
the President, the President himself, 
and Mr. Mollenhoff were in accord with 
both the law and the regulations. 

So far as Clark Mollenhoff is con- 
cerned, he does not need any defense. 
Clark Mollenhoff is a man of the high- 
est integrity and character. He is a 
lawyer and is well trained. There is not 
a man in Washington that has re- 
searched as many investigations as 
Clark Mollenhoff has. 

People who might wonder about Clark 
Mollenhoff are not those that are afraid 
that he would be a party to something 
Wrong, but they are rather afraid that 
he might be piu'suing the public interest. 

I again commend the distinguished 
Senator from Delaware for clearing up 
an item that might be disturbing the 
American people. 

I am just politically minded enough 
to want to say a kind word .about 
Lawrence O'Brien. The chairman of a 
political party has a very tough job. He 
has to build the business day after day. 
And some days business is poor. 

He has to support candidates that are 
strong, and he has to support candidates 
that are weak. 

The chairman has got to stand there 
and push ahead all the time. 

I hope that those who are his superiors 
will not be too rough on him for his 
error in this matter. 

Mr. Caplin and Mr. Cohen particularly 
should have caught the error, because 
Mr. Caplin Is on record In writing for 
a position which is apparently totally 
contrary to what he advised Mr. O'Brien. 

I hope that those who are Mr. O'Brien's 
superiors will be forgiving because the 
burden on the chairman of either party 
is very heavy. He has to try to support 

candidates and some of them are not 
very good candidates. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. Pres- 
ident, I thank the Senator. I conciu* in 
that statement. I thought the record 
should be set straight because these ques- 
tions have been raised. 

I have had many Senators who are not 
on the committee ask whether there has 
been a violation of the law. And I thought 
the record should be set straight. 

I want to say that there is no evidence 
to substantiate such a political attack as 
that made by Mr. O'Brien. No suggestion 
has been made in any committee meet- 
ing that I have attended indicating that 
anything Improper has been done in the 
handling of these returns by the execu- 
tive branch imder the preceding admin- 
istration, under this administration, or 
by any congressional committee. 

When the question was raised as to 
HEW, someone asked, "Why do they need 
tax returns?" We found that they need 
them to check the information on social 
security benefits. 

There may be a reason for all of this. 
If abuse is shown anywhere we want to 
handle it, but let us handle it in the best 
interest of the revenue service, not as a 
political issue. 

I thought that we should get the record 
straight from the beginning so that we 
would know that it is not something un- 
usual when tax returns can be examined 
by a representative of the President. It 
has always been done. It should be done. 
I would not have much respect for any 
man in the White House who did not dis- 
charge his responsibility when something 
was called to his attention. 

I have the utmost respect for both Mr. 
Bellino and Mr. Mollenhoff, but there 
can always be something to go wrong. 
We should be on guard for that. 

I think that the chairman of our Fi- 
nance Committee, who is also the chair- 
man of the Joint Economic Committee, 
should be commended for calling the 
committee together promptly in order to 
determine the basis of Mr. O'Brien's 

If someone raises a question of abuse 
tomorrow I would say that we should 
examine it. It should be examined. If 
there is any basis for it we should clear 
it up and correct it. If the manner in 
which the returns are being handled by 
the agencies or by the varioiis divisions 
of the executive branch of the Govern- 


ment or by congressional committees is 
improper let us face it. 

I know the chairman will bear me out. 
We were all surprised when we f oimd the 
vast number of executive departments 
that had had access to the returns over 
the past several years. 

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield. 

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I am happy 
that the Senator brought this matter up. 
It is a matter that should be considered 
by the Smate. It should be discussed. 

About ^ week ago, Chairman Mills, 
after having heard the story that Mr. 
MoUenhoff had access to income tax re- 
turns, suggested to me that we should 
meet. I agreed and we would have met 
perhaps a week sooner had we been able 
to get all the Members together quicker. 

Certain things came to my attention 
which I thought we should act on. For 
one thing, it is important for all to im- 
derstand that no citizen has any right to 
object to the President or to a Govern- 
ment agency, such as the Justice Depart- 
ment, taking a look at his tax return on 
a completely responsible basis. For one 
to look at a man's tax returns for an im- 
proper purpose, of course, is something 
that everyone has the right to object to. 

I believe we would all agree that the 
Bellino precedent is really not very good. 
It is not good to send someone over with- 
out a written authorization from the 
President and without any written au- 
thorization at all to look at anyone's tax 
returns. Obviously, that is not a good 

My impression is that this precedent 
did not continue under the Johnson 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. The Sen- 
ator is correct. 

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, it would be 
fair to say that President Johnson did 
not follow this practice at any time. If 
he had, we would find out, I would think. 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. Pres- 
ident, I made that statement earlier. 

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, in this par- 
ticular instance, I would suggest that 
we should pass a law to say on just 
what terms and conditions a p>erson des- 
ignated by the President is entitled to see 
someone's tax returns. 

As far as I am concerned, the Pres- 
ident, himself, is entitled to see every- 
one's tax returns. But I do not think that 

when that authority is delegated, it ought 
to be spelled out in writing. The Pres- 
ident ought to sign a document saying, 
"I designate Mr. Mollenhoff, or whoever 
it may be, to be my man to look at cer- 
tain tax returns for these specified 

Tiien we would know who the man is 
and why he wanted to see the returns. 

I hope that the Senator will agree that 
when one goes to look at a tax return, 
he ought to make such a request in writ- 
ing and state why he asked to see the 
return, and whose return it was, so that 
if he is doing this thing in an irrespon- 
sible way, this fact could be expected to 
come back and haunt him, in the man- 
ner in which this Bellino matter came 
back to haunt him. 

The Senator knows as well as I do that 
what we have here might not be as much 
a matter of serious concern as the fact 
that Governors have this tax information 
available to them, perhaps altogether too 

It seems to me the procedure we spell 
out for the President should apply to 
Grovernors as well. If someone wants to 
see a tax return, there should be a. rec- 
ord that he wanted to see it, why he 
wanted to see it. 

As the Senator from Delaware knows, 
members of the Committee on Finance 
and the Joint Committee have the right 
to see tax returns. I do not recall of 
any case where we asked to see the 
actual name of the individual involved 
or the company. We normally say 'we 
would like to know if company A did 
this, and if they did, then how much 
was involved and the other pertinent 

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. The 
Senator is correct. In addition, if a re- 
turn did have to be examined we had 
Mr. Woodworth or his staff do it as the 
case of Mr. John Doe. It would be highly 
improi>er for the Committee on Finance 
or any other committee of Congress or 
anyone in the executive branch, wher- 
ever it may be, to start examining tax 
returns on an indiscriminate basis. That 
is not what we are here for. We have 
the Internal Revenue Service to do that. 
In the Committee on Finance we were 
examining returns to see if there were 
legal loopholes in the law that needed to 
be corrected from a legislative stand- 
point only. The various agencies should 
look at them only in the administration 
of their duties and not on the basis of 

96-296 O - 73 - pt.7 - 2? 


anything else, and as I understand it 
that is what is being done. 

If there is evidence of violations by any 
agency of government I would be the first 
to rise to oppose it because I would not 
want that to happen. We do have to pro- 
tect the American taxpayer. We collect 
this money on a voluntary basis, but at 


the same time we have to convince the 
American people that we are on guard 
trying to protect their interests and at 
the same time trying to assure that there 
is not only secrecy in the tax returns but 
also integrity on the part of the officials 
administering the agency. 

I think something good may come of 
this discussion here today because, as 
the Senator pointed out, there can be 
problems particularly as relating to the 
States and other agencies. Maybe we in 
Congress need tighter rules; maybe the 
White House needs tighter rules. But let 
us do it working together with one 
thought in mind, and that is to promote 
a better government. I have no evidence 
that there was improper use made of tax 
returns under preceding administrations 
or this administration, none whatever. 

I have expressed my high regard for 
Mr. Bellino. I have the same high regard 
for President Nixon and his representa- 
tive Mr. MoUenhoff, and I hope others 
share that high regard. I am going to 
resi>ect all of them until somebody comes 
in and says that a certain particular case 
was handled wrong. When it comes to 
that I will examine the matter on its 
merits, and whoever is responsible will be 
held accountable. Meanwhile let us not 
lose respect for our fellow man nor try 
to discredit him for partisan political 

I yield the floor. 


Mr. GORE. Mr. President, this is a 
very disturbing matter that has been dis- 
cussed here. I wish the record to show 
that I have not referred to any action of 
President Nixon in this regard. 

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may 
we have oi'der? 

ate will be in order. 

Mr. GORE. A number of statements 
have been made with respect to Presi- 
dential action with regard to the issuance 
of regulations. 

The committee session which I at- 
tended did not have any evidence of any 
action on the part of President Nixon at 
all and I do not wish to allege any. I have 
not made reference to any. 

I did make a statement that the pro- 
cedure appeared to be loose, indiscreet, 
inadvisable, and I will say again im- 
proper, and as I said it was open ended. 

Here is what we have : A memorandum 
of conversations between Commissioner 
Thrower and Mr. Clark R. MoUenhoflf. 
The memorandum states: 

Following through on our recent luncheon 
conversation — 

I then come to the sentence : 

I would suggest that every time you have 
occasion to inspect a tax return, application 
for exemption, or other Internal Revenue file, 
you Send me a memorandum briefly setting 
forth the nature of the request. Naturally — 

Listen to how tight this is. 

Naturally, we will infer in every case that 
the request is either at the direction of, or in 
the Interest of, the President. 

The Commissioner testified he had had 
no instructions from the President oi-ally 
or in writing, and yet this memorandum 
stated he naturally assimies that every 
request will be at the direction of or in 
the interest of the President. What does 
"in the interest of" mean? 
I shall read another sentence: 
After receiving your request, we will make 
arrangements for the files to be assembled In 
my immediate suite of offices here and we 
will notify you as soon as they are ready for 

Real accommodating, is it not? Real 

If, after Inspection of the files, you w&nt 
copies of any of the material inspected, we 
will be happy to make them for you. 

Mr. President, I say this is an indis- 
creet way to treat a taxpayer's tax re- 
turn. Who whispered to the distinguished 
senior Senator from Delaware that a tax 
return of a judge had been pulled and 
examined? Nobody whispered that to me. 
Has anybody whispered that to the 


chairman of the committee? Who 
whispers this about? How does it come 
that poUtical figures are alleged to be in- 
volved, that hints are being whispered 
about them? This is disturbing. 

I do not say the President had any- 
thing to do with it. I do not know. I 
would be inclined to think he did not. 
But by what right, by what possession, 
does the Commissioner of Internal Reve- 
nue say that he will -assume that every 
request Mr. Clark Mollenhoff' makes is at 
the direction of the President or in the 
interest of the President? 

If nothing else comes of this, I hope 
we will arrive at a formalized procedure, 
because this is loose. I think it is irre- 
sponsible and improper. I cannot say it 
is illegal. I had previously thought it was. 
I am not prepared now to say so. But I 
want to make it so it is illegal. 

This is not to question the right of the 
President to have access to a tax return. 
I do not question it. I think he should. I 
think if congressional committees have 
a need to know, it should be made avail- 
able to them. But this does not go to a 
political operative going on a fishing ex- 
pedition to find out what he can about 
tax returns. 

Somebody might write a letter about 
another judge. Nothing has been alleged 
here with respect to the instance cited, j 
Who has whispered the facts or the] 
name? I do not know the name or the 
facts, but nobody has alleged that the 
judge did anything wrong. Nobody has 
alleged any criminal acts. I just do not 
know the circumstances. I will not pre- 
sume what the circumstances are. But if 
the contents of one taxpayer's files can 
be whispered about, the contents of 
every taxpayer's files can be whispered 

We need to formalize a procedure to 
preserve the privacy and the confidential 
natm-e of the tax returns of every tax- 

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, much at- 
tention has been directed today in the 
Senate to the controversy between the 
Democratic Party chairman, Lawrence 
F. O'Brien, and Republican chairman, 
Rogers Morton, concerning the wisdom 
of a discretionary power in Mr. Clark 
MoUenhoff to investigate income tax re- 
turns of private citizens. 

I have no evidence to indicate and no 
reason to believe that Mr. MoUenhoff 
has abused his discretionary power. On 
the other hand, I fully understand the 
concern of some that such a power could 
be abused if it were used sti'ictly for po- 
litical purposes. 

* It occurs to me that our concern about 
possible misuse of power to investigate 
tax returns might be more profitably di- 
rected toward the Internal Revenue 
Service. The possibilities of abuse at that 
source would seem limitless since IRS 
has access to all income tax retm-ns. 

For example, on April 13, 1970, a news- 
paper account indicated that a special 
task force of Internal Revenue agents 
had been assembled in Alabama and are 
asking questions about eight named po- 
litical figures in Alabama, one being the 
brother of a candidate for statewide of- 
fice and five of whom are currently cam- 
paigning for office In the State Demo- 
cl-atic Party primary scheduled for May 


5, 1970. These newspaper accounts cite 
"confidential field reports" and allega- 
tions made In a confidential report of the 
Internal Revenue Service's Audit Dlvi- 
/islon as source of authority. 

Mr. President, no one questions the 
right of Internal Revenue agents to In- 
vestigate income tax returns if motivated 
by the duty to protect the public interest 
by fair and Impartial enforcement of the 
law. On the other hand, If the Investi- 
gation Is motivated by political consid- 
erations — that is another story. 

It stands to reason that any publicized 
investigation by the Internal Revenue 
Service tends to create a suspicion, to 
say the least, and suggests the possibility 
of a violation of law. 

The newspaper accoimts state that 
the Investlgiation is still in its preliminary 
stages and tha4; no charges have been 
.brought against anyone. Nevertheless, 
the publicity concerning the investiga- 
tion was allegedly based on informaitlon 
obtained from the Internal Revenue 
Service. The election Is less than 3 weeks 
hence. The candidates named in the 
publicity are placed In a grossly unfair 


position of bedng compelled to refute the 
Implications of the annoxmced Investigra- 

The timing of this investigation has 
created questions in the minds of many 
Alaibamions. They want to know if the 
investigation is politically motivated and 
who is responsible for the timing end for 
the release of supposedly confidential in- 
formation If any such information was. 
In fact, released. It seems to me that 
these are valid questions. 

Mr. President, I campaigned for the 
o2&ce of U.S. Senator from Alabama em- 
phasizing among other things my sin- 
cere conviction that the Federal Estab- 
lishment should not undertake to Inter- 
fere in State political races. I hold flrmly 
to that conviction. 

I hope sincerely that we have not wit- 
nessed in Alabama a pattern for future 
political activities of this or any other 


Exhibit No. 106 




_ \ *< OCTOBER 2, 1972 ACJ^ \i^^ 


Herb Kalmbach, thinking ahead to the possibilit/ of the 
matter of privilege being raised at some time or another, 
suggested that there should be a written retainer arrangement 
in existence in advance. 

He has written out this long-hand draft. I'm sure you'll 
find the basic question of whether or not such a letter ia 
advisable to be the first hurdle. 

If you think that one may be inadvisable I would suggest 
you talk to Herb direct. Otherwise, would you work on a 
revision? \,^ 

John p. Ehrlichman 


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Exhibit No. 107 
Conversation with Clark MacGregor. 

E. Ehrlichman. 
M. MacGregor. 

E, Hi, Clark. Gee, you're nice to call back. 

M. Well, you bet, sir, I'm sorry I was away. I went to one of those very exciting 
dedication ceremonies of the new building and housing with Federal Power 

E. Say I missed that. But I just want you to know it wasn't because I wasn't 

M. I want to give you a detailed report. 

E. That's why I called, really. 

M. We may get around to that someday. Actually, I think that's a great idea — 
they have a new building in the north capitol street area near Union Plaza 
area in that old, it's been torn up so much and they have a federal agency 
in there. I think it's a darn good idea. 

E. It helps the town. I am asking you to plumb your recollection, Mr. Mac- 
Gregor. Back in the days following the Convention we were all at the con- 
vention and then if you will remember, the President went to San Clemente 
for five or six days and then he went on to Honolulu. 

M. Yes, I remember. 

E. Do you remember a sequence of events where we hatched a plot to have 
Clark MacGregor go out and make disclosures on the Watergate case? And 

M. Yes. 

E. And said, wouldn't it be an ideal time when the President is in Hawaii so 
that he's detached and so on and so forth? 

M. I do recall it. 

E. And we had extensive discussions and I'm, what I'm trying to track down is 
a memo that was written about that and I can't find any record of it and 
it may be that I am just imagining that there is such a thing. 

M. John, I don't honestly recall a memo. Now, as I think back on that it may 
be that my recollection will change but I recall the circumstances that 
brought me to San Clemente and I think I came with some reluctance but 
not because of Watergate, because 

E. Other things you had to do. 

M. Yes, that's right, and because Bob Haldeman said to me that he felt that 
it was imperative that I come out and visit with Bob and with you about 
the question of if you will White House oversight of Committee activities 
in certain key states. 

E. Oh, yes, that was the problem we discussed at the convention and so on. 

M. And directly to our discussion which you and Bob and I think Fred Malek 
and I had a meeting in your office and that consumed much of the morning. 
We were — I think you and Bob and I were on some other matters for part 
of the mornine in Bob's office: then it seems to me we convened rpolly in 
your office with Fred Malek and then we met briefly with the President; 
then we trooped up to hear the President respond to the questions put to 
him and th^t wfi<5 Anernst ;?9 in the outdoor, sort of out door give and take 
session he had with the press. 

E. Yeah, yeah, good for you. 

Well, the thing that I am trying to recall is the details of this concept that 
we should make a clean breast of the Watergate right at that time. It 
becomes material in this whole investigation that's going on now only for 
the question of the part that .Tohn Dean may have played in giving advice 
that we ought not to do it at that time. 


M. Again, I'm going to rely on recollection and I'll look at home tonight, John, 
because I didn't retain a great many papers. I thought it was no purpose 
behind, somebody else was going to be the historian, but I do recall that 
sometime in advance of that San Clemente discussions which we just covered, 
which took place on August 29, sometime prior to that the idea was voiced by 
Maurice Stans or others that maybe I ought to go before the press and say 
here's the written accounting of what transpired and I'm prepared to answer 
your questions about this and that although I never saw a memo I did see 
a draft, a rough draft, which I think was the one filed through John Dean, 
which consisted of five to seven double spaced pages on regular 9 x 12 paper, 
non-legal size pai)er with a sort of a historical summary. That I know, that 
particular paper, I think probably came to my attention in my campaign 
office at 1701 sometime a week to two weeks in advance of the Republican 
Convention and it resided for some time in my right hand drawer of the desk 
where I kept papers that I wanted to pick out and look at from time to time 
but haven't decided to act on. I don't recall that there was any accompanying 
memo at any time or anything in letter form that referred to the question 
of whether Clark MacGregor should make this statement. 

E. We had some pretty heated telephone conversations, as I recall, about your 
doing this. 

M. Well, I think that may be right. 

B. Yeah. You decided in your own mind that it was not a wise thing to do and 
we went back and forth, back and forth on it. Is that about right? 

M. Yes. Maybe. I think — ^I felt one of, well, I think you may be right, but I'm 
trying to probe my own recollection, my own motives. 

E. Yeah. 

M. It seems to me I felt at that time that certain things that were set forth 
there were things that were strange to me and that I would not be able to 
handle very well in terms of questions. And I think that rather than the 
question of the issuance of something it was a question of whether I was 
the appropriate person to . . . Maury Stans at that time was saying to me 
he wanted to do it. 

E. Oh, yeah. Yeah, I remember that, and you felt, in fact you said what would 
I say if they asked me to vouch for these things and at that time you had 
conducted no independent investigation. 

M. Except you should know that what I did was during the first week of July, 
that would have been on Monday, July 3, for the few people who were around 
and then more extensively on Wednesday, July 5. I did ask to come into my 
1701 office Fred LaRue, Jeb Magruder, Herb Porter and two or three others 
and simply close the door and put it to them face to face. 

E. One by one? 

M. Yep, did you in any . . . were you in any way involved or did you 
have any prior knowledge before June 17 of the events that are known as 
the Watergate? 

E. And they said no? 

M. Yeah. 

E. OK, if you find it convenient and could rummage around and see if you have 
anything on that particular transaction, I'd be very grateful to you. 

M. OK, I will, John, I'll be looking for that, as I say, that double spaced, I can 
remember it was on white paper and it was on first sheets, not onion skin 
and I don't know that it had any particular title, but it did run 5-7 pages. 

E. And it would been a sort of a script of what you might have said? Is that it? 

M. Or issued, or handed out to the press. Kind of a white paper. 

E. I get it. 

M. I think it was referred to by one or more persons at that time as a white 

E. Well, the memo I had in mind was one that I wrote that was a conceptual 
thing that said this coincidence of event were coming off the convention, 
McGovern is our opposition, Clark MacGregor is a bright new image, the 
President will be in Hawaii — why not take advantage of that coincidence 
of factors and let's make a clean breast of things. 

M. I recall that what you have just said was presented to me I think partly by 
Bob Haldeman and partly by you but I don't recall ever seeing it in writing. 

E. Yeah, yeah. OK. 

Thank you, Clark, sorry to have bothered you. 

M. Oh, no bother. 


Exhibit No. 108 

Conversation with Ken Clawson 
C. Clawson. 
E. Ehrlichman. 

E. You called me? 
C. No I didn't call you. 

B. I'm sorry. I got a message at home to call you. I'll be jiggered. Is this Ken 

C. Unless it was Jim Clawson. 

E. Couldn't have been. Isn't that strange. Gee I hoi)e I didn't wake you up. 

C. I'm out of it with this damn cold. 

E. Oh, that's too bad. While I have you could I ask you something. I'm awfully 
sorry to bother you. You may recall a meeting in my office which I think 
you sort of convened to talk about a press report during the AVatergate 
aftermath, when it broke, a press report about Hunt's safe being in the 
AVhite House. And you and Chuck and Bruce Kehrli came up here and met 
with Dean and me to talk about what you know what our response should 
be and so forth. Do you remember that? 

C. Vaguely. I remember better an earlier meeting in which the question was 
should we give out Hunt's dates of employment and what Charley's role was 
in hiring him. 

E. Yeah. Well, this focuses particularly on what we ought to do about the 
contents of the safe, what we ought to say to the press, what we ought to do 
about Hunt and so forth. Do you have any present recollection of that? 

C. A vague memory, yeah, but I don't recall any of the details of it. 

E. Well, it's interesting because Dean who as you know has talked to the U.S. 
Attorney at great length, citp« some comments of mine in that meeting as 
evidence of corrupt attitude on my part and I'm looking for anybody who can 
help me to recall what took place there. 

C. That's a helluva note, John. 

E. I agree. 

C. If you want me to be forthwith and straightforward with you, I'll recollect 
anything you want me to. 

E. W^ell, no, let me, let me tell you what my problem is and then you can . . . 
I've got to tell what I recall and what I don't recall. He alleges that I said 
two things at that meeting. One that we ought to deep six the contents of the 
safe, quote, unquote. And, two, that we ought to get Hunt to leave the 

C. Oh, I could . . . listen, John, if anything like that. If either one of those 
two things were said that would be vivid in my mind. 

B. I would think so. I would think so. 

C. And that's objectively. 

E. Now, in point of fact, Dean phoned Liddy and asked Liddy to have Hunt 

leave the country. 
C. That's new news to me. 
E. Yeah, but you see this . . . and what he's doing is saying well I was just 

being a good German and carrying out orders. 
C. No, I would have absolutely no trouble in remembering either one of those 

two things had that been said. 
E. Well, OK. 
<^\ I would just remember that. 

B. Yeah, that's a fairly dramatic event. OK, thank you very much. Awfully 
sorry to have bothered you. I just don't understand. 

C. If there's anything I can do in this thing, please let me . . . 
E. I will. I will. Thank you, Ken. 


Exhibit No. 109 

Conversation with Chuck Ooison, April 17, 1973. 

C. Colson. 

H. Holly Holm (Colson's secretary). 

B. Ehrlichman. 

E. Hello. 

H. Hello, Mr. Colson's office. 

E. Yes, this is John Ehriichman. 

H. Hi, Mr. Ehriichman. 

E. Mr. Colson in? 

H. Yes, just a minute please. 

C. Hello. 
E. Hi. 

C. Hi, John, I'll be over about 11 if that's convenient. 

B. Fine, that's very good. 

C. Two quick questions, though. One thing I should tell you is that our great 
find last night really started accelerating. Something coming out this morn- 
ing. Dean involved. Now I notice the LA Times has it this morning but 
the people that Shapiro has been getting information from, you know, the 
town is buzzing with, is alive with the story, so I don't think we have a 
helluva lot of time. 

E. All right. 

C. I just thought I'd let you know that. 

E. I appreciate it. 

C. Did he, when he went over there, was he given any immunity? 

E. Not yet. 

What they've done, apparently. 
C. They shouldn't give it to him. 
E. I know it. What they said to him is that unless he turns up corroborated 

evidence against Haldeman and me. 
C. Is that who he's trying to make? 
E. Sure. 
C. Who, Dean is? 
E. Yep. 
C. That's John Mitchell again. Son of a bitch. 

B. Unless he does that he doesn't get immunity. Now my grapevine tells me that 
you are going to be summoned over there today. 

C. Oh, really? 

E. Yep. And that they're going to ask you about a meeting in my office which 
Dean has highlighted as the central gemstone in the case against me and 
so just in case you get hauled over there before 11 o'clock, maybe I'd better 
tell you about it. It was a meeting that Kehrli, Clawson, you, Dean and 
I had here. 

C. I wasn't there. 

B. In my office. 

C. I was not there. Dean tried this one out on me Friday night, and I said the 
only thing I can ever recall, John, is I once told you I thought it was a 
stupid, god-damn thing for Hunt to be unavailable. 

E. Well, that's the meeting where supposedly I ordered him to tefl Hunt to 

leave the country. 
C. Never heard that. And I will SO state under oath. 
E. Or that I admonished everyone that we ought to figure out some way to 

deep six the contents of Hunt's safe. 
C. No. No way. I was the one who said go get Hunt's safe and be sure it's 

preserved for the FBI. 
E. Right. 


0. A. and B it's stupid to get another country. But that was in my oflSce, not 

yours. And you weren't present. 
C. I can handle that one easily. 

B. But you were not in a meeting here? 

C. Well, I may have been but I sure don't remember that. 

B. That's the way. OK. 

C. All right? I can handle that. 
E. Thank you, I'll see you at 11. 

C There's a couple of things you and I need to do to protect each other's flank 

here but we'll talk about that, but no, I'm serious. 
E. Fair enough. 
C. Let's get it clearly understood that son of a bitch doesn't get immunity. 

I want to nail him. 
E. Well I'm doing my best. 

C. No, I want to nail him. I'll take immunity first. 
E. OK. 
C. All right? 
E. All right. 
C. Thanks. 


Exhibit No. 109 A 

MAY 24, 1973 


From a lawyer ' s standpoint, I find it so.r.ewhat unseemly 
to have to involve myself in a public dialogue such as we are 
having today and had yesterday. 

However, Mr. Alch ' s lengthy statement of yesterday cast 
aspersions on my client's veracity and my personal motivations 
in representing Mr. McCord. A response is necessary to clear 
up the record, hopefully once and for all, so that this Committee 
can proceed with its business. 

My statement is very brief, but I will be happy to answer 
any questions you have either during or after my statement. 

My first interest in the Watergate Affair began, as it did 
for most Americans, on June 19th when we read about it in the 
newspapers. At that time I had some specialized interests in 
the Affair, in addition to my interests as an ordinary citizen. 

I am a lifelong Democrat. Certainly, as I'm sure the majority 
of this Committee will agree, that is nothing to be ashamed of. 
Nor does it automatically follow that my motivations should be 
suspect because I am a Democrat. If that were true, this Com- 
mittee should not be in business. 

*Subsequent to the testimony of Gerald Alch in Hearings of May 23 and 24, 1973, 
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, the committee received 
this statement to be included in the record. 


As a lifelong Democrat, it was my suspicion that we were 
only seeing the tip of the iceberg, and that the election was 
about to be lost because of illegal activities. 

The wiretap aspects of the case were of particular interest 
because I had spent three years of my life as a Senate Counsel 
attempting . . . unsuccessfully ... to get a federal law outlwing 
all wiretapping. 

I was also interested as a person who believed most strongly 
that the U.S. Government has lied blatantly in vitally important 
matters when they thought they could get away with it. 

Thus, I had a number of interests in Watergate from the 

My interest in Jim McCord began with a request by a mutual 
friend, Lou Russell, by Mrs. McCord and by Mr. Alch to see if 
I could do something about the $100,000 cash bail set by the 
trial judge. I thought then and I think now that such a bail 
was excessive under the circumstances. Recently, I believe, 
John Mitchell was released on his own recognizance. Further, 
there are many accused and convicted felons walking the streets 
of Washington on a fraction of this bail. I believed that with 
his background and ties with the Community, Mr. McCord was a 
good bail risk. 



I went to friends to see if they would help. As I know 
it is important to Minority Counsel Fred Thompson, I will state 
that one of the persons approached was an employee of the Demo- 
cratic National Committee; ultimately, he said he thought it 
would be counter-productive for him to try to help, and he 
politely refused. Ultimately, the $100,000 was raised by myself, 
Mrs. McCord and some of her friends and relatives. The money is 
now in two accounts at the Riggs National Bank. 

When Jim McCord was before Judge Sirica for sentencing, the 
Court postponed sentencing, suggesting that Mr. McCord give his 
information to both the Grand Jury and to the Senate Committee. 
Apparently knowing of my long Senate experience, McCord asked me 
if I could arrange a meeting with the proper Senate authorities 
and assist him legally in this matter. Such a meeting was arranged 
promptly, and Mr. McCord has spent a good part of his time since 
that date in meeting with the Committee and its staff. 

The country wants to know the truth about Watergate and 
related events. This Committee does. Chief Judge 3oiin~Sirica 
does. And James McCord does. The moment Judge Sirica indicated 
that the length of his sentence might depend on the degree of 
his cooperation with the Grand Jury and the Senate, at that moment, 
McCord ' s interests, the country's interests, and the interests of 
truth coincided. All that has been done since then, including 


cooperation with this Committee, has followed that one single path. 
If having the truth brought out means implicating the President 
or some of his top staff, so be it. As Senator Talmadge said last 
week, let the chips fall where they may. 

I do not apologize for this approach to seeing the truth 
come out, and neither does Jim McCord. 

Yesterday, my motivations in taking on Mr. McCord as a client 
were impugned by Mr. Alch. All I can say in rebuttal is that 
Mr. McCord happens to want me as his lawyer and does not want 
Mr. Alch. If Mr. Alch has any objection about that state of 
affairs there is a proper forum to argue that in, and that is, 
of course, before a Lawyer's Grievance Committee. He and I are 
both members of the Massachusetts Bar and he can take the matter 
up with that Bar's Grievance Committee. I know this Committee 
has neither the time nor inclination to hear lawyers making 
charges and counter-charges against each other. 

I'd be happy to answer any questions which the members of 
this Committee might wish to ask. 

I swear that the preceding is true and correct to the best 
of my recollection. 




rnard Fensterwald, ' J^t . 

Subscribed before me this ^7 day of /''/Cj \J , 1973. 

f-ly Commission Expires FebraoiY 28. 1978 Notarv Public 



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