PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 31, AUGUST 1, AND 2, 1973
Book 8
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
FRANKLIr^ FIERCE LAW CENTER
CoBcord, New Hampshire 03301
C^' ""■^"■SIT JAN3 11974
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 31, AUGUST 1, AND 2, 1973
Book 8
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3
Stock No. 5270-01968 ■
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session)
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North CaroUna, Chairman
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vke Chairman
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, Georgia EDWARD J. GURNEY. Florida
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr., Connecticut
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico
Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Fred D. Thompson, Minority Counsel
RUFUS L. Edmisten, Deputy Chief Counsel
Arthur S. Miller, Chief Consultant
David M. Dorsen, Assistant Chief Counsel
Terry F. Lenzner, Assistant Chief Counsel
James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel
Carmine S. Bellino, Chief Investigator
Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator
Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel
R. Phillip Haire, Assistant Counsel
Marc Lackritz, Assistant Counsel
William T. Mayton, AssistaiU Counsel
Ronald D. Rotunda, Assistant Counsel
Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel
Howard S. Liebengood, Assistant Minority Counsel
H. William Shure, Assistant Minority Counsel
Robert Silverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel
Laura Matz, Administrative Assistant
Carolyn Andrade, Office Manager
Joan C. Cole, Secretary to the Minority
(H)
CONTENTS
HEARING DAYS
Page
Tuesday, July 31, 1973 3017
Wednesday, August 1, 1973 3135
Thursday, August 2, 1973 3231
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Tuesday, July 31, 1973
Haldeman, H. R., former assistant to the President, accompanied by John
J. Wilson and Frank H. Strickler, counsels, testimony resumed 3017
Wednesday, August 1, 1973
Haldeman, H. R., testimony resumed 3136
Thursday, August 2, 1973
Helms, Richard M., American Ambassador to Iran, former Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency 3232
Cushman, Gen. Robert E., Jr., Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. Former
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 3289
INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE AND COUNSELS
Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr Haldeman: 3081-3086,
3114-3118, 3132, 3133, 3138-3142, 3162-3165, 3177-3180, 3195-
3198. Helms: 3267-3273, 3279, 3280. Cushman: 3299, 3300, 3308.
Baker, Hon. Howard H., Jr Haldeman: 3086-3091,
3118-3122, 3158-3162, 3183-3188, 3198, 3199, 3209. Helms: 3259-
3267, 3276-3279. Cushman: 3300-3304, 3308.
Talmadge, Hon. Herman E Haldeman: 3091-3096,
3135-3138. Helms: 3256-3259. Cushman: 3305, 3306.
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K Haldeman: 3100-3104,
3122-3124, 3146-3149, 3169, 3170, 3181-3183, 3199-3202. Helms:
3253, 3254, 3273. Cushman: 3304.
Montoya, Hon. Joseph M Haldeman: 3109-3113,
3125-3127, 3153-3157, 3174-3177, 3188, 3189. Helms: 3250.
Gumey, Hon. Edward J Haldeman: 3096-3100,
3124, 3125, 3142-3146, 3165-3169. Helms: 3254-3256. Cushman:
3306-3308.
Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr Haldeman: 3104-3109,
3127-3132, 3149-3153, 3171-3174, 3189-3195, 3202-3207. Helms:
3273-3276, 3280. Cushman: 3308, 3309.
Dash, Samuel, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Haldeman: 3017-3061,
3207-3222.
Thompson, Fred D., Minority Counsel Haldeman: 3062-3081,
3222-3226. Helms: 3242-3249, 3280, 3281, 3287-3289. Cushman:
3297.
Dorsen, David M., Assistant Chief Counsel Helms: 3232-3242,
3281-3287.
Hamilton, James, Assistant Chief Counsel Cushman : 3289-3297,
3309-3311.
TV
EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
No. 110 — (3026) White House memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from
Bruce Kehrli. Subject: Committee for the Re-Election
Support 3313
No. Ill — (3060) U.S. Senate subpena served H. R. Haldeman to appear
on May 4, 1973 3316
No. 112 — (3060) U.S. Senate subpena served H. R. Haldeman to appear on
July 18, 1973 3318
No. 113— (3132) White House letter to John Wilson from J. Fred Buzhardt,
dated July 30, 1973, re: President instructing Haldeman to
decline to testify to Senate Select Committee on listening to
tape-recorded conversations 3320
No. 114 — (3132) Justice Department letter to Samuel Dash, signed by
John H. Davitt, Chief, Internal Security Section, Criminal
Division, advising no information in their files, or FBI files,
of any criminal acts involving Democrats 3321
No. 115 — (3190) White House memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from
Ronald H. Walker, dated October 14, 1971, re: Charlotte,
N.C., demonstrations 3322
No. 116 — (3190) Personal and confidential letter to John Mitchell from
Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., re: Accounting of $2,000 that Haldeman
requested be made available to Ron Walker 3324
No. 117 — (3192) White House memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from Jeb
Magruder, dated January 21, 1970, re: Monitoring system... 3325
No. 118 — (3207) Letter to Senator Ervin from Hans Linde, professor of
law at the University of Oregon, dated July 25, 1973, re:
Supreme Court opinion in ^fee/ V. United Slates 3327
No. 119— (3207) Text of Supreme Court decision in Ahel v. JJynted States.^ 3329
No. 120 — (3221) White House memorandum for John Dean from H. R.
Haldeman, dated January 28, 1971. Subject: Hughes retainer
of Larry O' Brien, with attached memorandum 3369
No. 121 — (3221) Memorandum from Charles Colson for H. R. Haldeman
dated March 30, 1972. Subject: ITT 3372
No. 122 — (3266) Routing slip and memorandum dated August 30, 1971.
Subject: Additional request from Mr. Howard Hunt for agency
support - 3377
No. 123 — (3283) Routing slip and memorandum dated August 23, 1971.
Subject: Request by Mr. Howard Hunt for special agency
secretarial support 3380
No. 124 — (3292) Transcript of taped meeting between General Cushman
and Howard Hunt on July 22, 1971 3383
No. 125 — (3295) Memorandum for John Ehrlichman from General Cush-
man regarding contact with Mr. Howard Hunt; dated January
3. 1973 3390
No. 126 — (3295) Memorandum for John Ehrlichman from General Cush-
man, dated Januarv 10, 1973, regarding meeting with Howard
Hunt on July 22, 1971 3391
No. 127 — (3311) Memorandum for General Cushman with attached
memorandum for the record, dated August 26, 1971. Subject:
TSD request for guidance on extent of assistance to Mr.
Howard Hunt 3392
No. 128 — (3311) White House memorandum for Richard Helms, Director,
CIA. Subject: Domestic intelligence; dated July 23, 1970,
with attachments 3394
Note.— Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
PHASE I: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION
TUESDAY, JULY 31, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington^ D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 9 :40 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, INIontoya, Baker, Gur-
ney, and Weicker.
Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred
D, Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief
counsel ; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant ; Jed Johnson, consultant ;
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels ; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels ; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt. office of Senator Inouye; Robert
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker ; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker ; Michael Flani-
gan, assistant publications clerk.
Senator Er^^n. The Select Committee will come to order, and the
counsel will proceed to question the witness.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Haldeman, T think vour statement was quite lengthy
and it covered much of the ground which our questions are going to be
aimed at but to go over again, and I think you mentioned how you
started your political activities with the President. Could you tell us
how and when you first met President Xixon ?
TESTIMONY OF HARRY ROBINS HALDEMAN, ACCOMPANIED BY
JOHN J. WILSON AND FRANK H. STRICKLER, COUNSELS— Resumed
Mr. Haldeman. We met only very briefly on fii-st impression in 1951,
I believe, when he was a U.S. Senator from California and I was in
Washington on a visit, and paid a courtesy call on the Senator's office.
I had no continuing contact with him from this time on until 1956
when I actually started
Mr. Dash. How did it come about that you started to work with him
politically ?
(3017)
3018
Mr. Haldeman. T volunteered to serve in the 1956 campaign and my
services "vvere accepted.
Mr. Dash. And during this 1968 campaign what was your role in
that campaign ?
Mr, Haldeman. In the 1968 Presidential campaign I was chief of
staff for Mr, Nixon.
Mr. Dash, After that campaign when President Nixon was elected,
you became assistant to the President and staff director, is that not
true?
Mr. Haldeman. Staff director was not part of the title but it was
part of the function.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Now, could you tell us as clearly as you can what that function
was, as staff director?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, I described in my statement the initial inten-
tion that we had in staffing the White House to have four or five prin-
cipal assistants to the President with general responsibilities and no
specific areas of responsibility. Those intentions had to be abandoned
as we moved into specific areas, and mv responsibility became that of
White House Chief of Staff, as it had been personal chief of staff for
Mr. Nixon during the campaign.
That included the administrative responsibility for the operation
of the "V^Hiite House office, the planning and implementation of the
President's schedule, the overseeing of the process of paperwork com-
ing to the President and going out from the President, and the func-
tions that are required within the Wliite House office with relation
to the flow of paperwork to and from the President, and the general
coordinating function amongst the various segments of the White
House staff,
Mr. Dash, 1 take it that it would be fair to say that under the
President you were, in fact, the boss of the White House, was that
not so?
Mr, Haldeman. Administratively, yes; substantively or from a
policy viewpoint, no.
Mr. Dash. Could you explain that?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
I had the administrative responsibility for the operation of the
office. I had the supervision of the White House office budget, for
instance, but I did not exercise policy or substantive responsibility or
authority over the assistants to the President who had those responsi-
bilities. As I tried to delineate in my statement. Dr. Kissinger in the
area of foreign policy and Mr. Ehrlichman in the area of domestic
policy, others in the areas of congressional relations, press relations,
communications with the executive branch, general consultation to the
President, and that sort of thing did not report to me on the substance
of their responsibilities but if they needed more office space or more
staff facilities we had to work that out within the '\^Tiite House budget
and the available space and that came under my office's responsibilities.
It was generally handled by the staff secretary,
Mr. Dash. Mv. Haldeman, without limiting it to the question of
who reported to whom or how maybe the hierarchical chart would
look, as a matter of fact, your close relationship with the President,
3019
and your activities as chief of staff did not limit itself to just the
administrative functions. As a matter of fact, even in Mr. Ehrlichman's
role you would, from time to time, be asked by the President and
would make expressions with regard to policy; would you not?
Mr. Haldeman. Not to any great extent on policy, Mr. Dash. I
would on procedure or the question of whether everything that should
be available was available to the President in a policy decision matter,
but not an opinion as to whether this was the policy we should pursue
or should not pursue.
Mr. Dash. Would you be asked from time to time by the President
concerning your views on various policy issues?
Mr. Haldeman. I am sure from time to time, but not as a regular
process, and I would not want to imply that I was a part of the policy-
making process in terms of substance. I was in terms of procedure.
Mr. Dash. You spent quite a bit of time with the President in your
working day; did you not?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, you traveled with the President, and
spent more time with the President than perhaps anyone else other
than Mr. Ehrlichman; would that be true?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, could you tell us what your direct staff did that
aided you in carrying out your administrative functions?
Mr. Haldeman. My direct personal staff consisted of one or two,
depending on the period of time, one or two administrative assistants,
and several secretaries, and that was it. The administrative staff in the
White House was supervised by the staff secretary, and he had respon-
sibility for the operations of the mechanics of the White House, the
support units and that sort of thing. Then as Mr. Butterfield has
described to you, as my deputy, he had responsibility for a number of
specific areas of White House operations. I don't know if you want me
to ffet into details on that or not.
Mr. Dash. You mentioned Gordon Strachan. What was Gordon
Strachan's position with you ?
Mr. Haldeman. He was a staff assistant to me.
Mr. Dash. When did he become a staff assistant to you ?
Mr. Haldeman. Probably in 1970.
Mr. Dash. And also what was Mr, Higby's role with you?
Mr. Haldeman. He also was staff assistant or administrative
assistant.
Mr. Dash. Now, could you distinguish between the two roles, Mr.
Strachan's role and Mr. Higby's role?
jNIr. Haldeman. Yes. Mr. Higby had been in that position with
me during the campaign, in fact he had been with me in private busi-
ness before I joined the campaign, and
'Mr, Dash. Was this the advertising business you testified to ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir, yes.
He was my principal assistant, if you want to describe it that way,
and was thoroughly familiar with all of the operations of my office,
backed me up, handled phone calls and correspondence for me, over-
saw the operation of my office, and handled contact for me with a
number of the other administrative offices in the White House.
3020
Mr. Strachan came in later, as 'I have indicated, as a second staff
assistant, and was responsible for handling paperwork in my office,
in and out of correspondence and papers, as I think he has described,
and had the responsibility for the political area, and for liaison with
the Committee To Ee-Elect the President when it was formed.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Ehrlichman testified to the fact, I think, that
you were at the same university together.
Mr. Haldemax. Yes, for a couple of years we both attended UCLA.
Mr. Dash. Were you instrumental in bringing Mr. Ehrlichman to
the White House staff?
Mr. Haldemax. Not really to the White House staff. 'I was instru-
mental in bringing INIr. Ehrlichman into the Nixon campaign of 1960,
and his association with INIr. Nixon at that time and in subsequent
campaigns, those of 1962 and 1968, resulted in the President bringing
him into the "White House staff.
Mr. Dash. And I take it that you enjoyed both a personal relation-
ship with Mr. Ehrlichman as well as a business relationship with
Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Haldemen. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. "What was your actual working relationship in the White
House with INIr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Haldeman. It was one of two equals with different areas of
responsibility. Mr. Ehrlichman's in the area of domestic policy, mine
in the area that I have described. We met with the senior assistants,
the other senior assistants in the White House on a regular basis each
morning to review the day's work, and met from time to time during
the working day, some days, and some days not, on specific matters that
might come up that would involve both of us. But he operated quite
independently from me, and I from him.
Mr. Dash. But basically would it be fair to say that on almost a
daily basis you kept each other informed as to important matters that
were going on ?
Mr. Haldeman. We kept— the entire staff did. That was the purpose
of the 8 :15 a.m. staff meeting, I don't mean the entire staff but the
four or five senior staff members did so in a 15 minute to half hour
meeting every morning.
Mr. Dash. Now, what was your working relationship to Mr. John
Dean?
Mr. HAL-DEMAisr. It was the relationship of, in conjunction with his
function as counsel to the President. He was a member of the staff
with a specific area of responsibility, legal mattei-s, relationships with
the Justice Department and other agencies related to legal matters.
Mr. Dash. "LJnder what circumstances would he report to you ?
Mr. Haldemax. He would report to me administratively, again if he
needed more people in his office or if he needed more office space, some-
thing of that sort. He received assignments from me or via me from
the President in things that needed to be taken care of that the Presi-
dent initiated. He had a reporting responsibility, I guess you would
say, to me, in the sense of his general responsibility as counsel in terms
of reviewing documents for the President's signature and general, if
it is not downgrading the profession, general legal housekeeping. But
3021
he also reported to a number of other people on the staff directly as he
was called upon by them for substantive assistance in their areas.
Mr. Dash. As Chief of Staff, Mr. Haldeman, could you tell us how
tigiht a ship you ran in the White House ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, it has been aanply reported here as being: a
tight ship, and I tried to run a tight ship, and I think successfully
most of the time.
Mr. Dash. And would it be fair to say that you were a hard task-
master and often cracked the whip ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't loiow. I didn't feel I Avas a hard taskmaster.
I felt I was a just taskmaster but I guess some who didn't rise tx) the
task felt that the wliip was cracked sometimes. We operated of neces-
sity on a basis of very extensive delegation of authority and of ex-
pecting people to get done what they were told to get done, to handle
the responsibilities that they were understood to be handling and to do
them without making any mistakes. We did throughout the White
House operation operate on a what is known in some views as a zero
defect system. We attempted to do everything right.
Mr. Dash. How close to zero did you get ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. That is hard to evaluate.
Mr. Dash. Well, therefore, would it not be also true that in your
job especially in making recommendations to the President or being
able to make decisions, that you certainly wanted to be on top of the
important facts you needed to make those decisions ?
Mr. Haldeman. I didn't have to make decisions for the President.
Mr. Dash. I said in making recommendations or in any decisions
that you had to make in tlie TSHiite House.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, but let me — I was not making recommenda-
tions even to the President for decisions. I did take the responsibility —
have the responsibility, for getting the material to the President for
making decisions, and I did review the material before it went to the
President to be sure it was complete. But I did not make the recom-
mendation. The recommendation was made by the staff member or
administration official responsible for the area in which the decision
rested.
Mr. Dash. Well, then, to carry out this function to see to it that the
President had the information he needed, you saw to it that you were
on top of the facts.
Mr. Haldeman. I saw to it that the facts were available. I did not
attempt to stay on top of all the facts on any given matter. We had
other people far more able than I in any given subject area who main-
tained the knowledge of the facts.
All I did was raise the question if it appeared that the facts weren't
complete or that one side had not been presented adequately or that
the views, opposing views had not been included.
Mr. Dash. Well, but at any time when you needed the facts, you
could be able to get them very quickly, or at least you expected to be
able to get them very quickly ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, moving forward to the establishment of the Com-
mittee for the Re-Election of the President. We have had testimony
on this but we would like your testimony on what you know about how
3022
the Committee for the Re-Election of the President got started for the
1972 campaign.
Mr. Haldeman. The committee — the concept of the committee was a
result of a desire on the part of the President, and the rest of us, that
the campaign for reelection be handled outside of the White House
and by people not on the White House staff but assigned to general
Wliite House duties and the organization or means of doing this was
the Committee To Re-Elect the President.
It was set up — you have better information than my recollection on
this — but it was set up in 1971 and started on a gradual basis and built
as the election time for the campaign time drew closer in terms of
staff and activity at a fairly substantial rate.
We looked to the Committee To Re-Elect to handle the mechanics
and operations of the political campaign. We expected and had close
liaison and communication back and forth with the committee, or the
people at the committee, at a lot of levels — in the White House, from
the White House to the committee, and from the departments in the
Grovemment to the committee, and Government appointees. As you
know, we had an intensive surrogate program, for instance, of speakers
that were out.
Mr. Dash. Why, Mr. Haldeman, was it necessary to set up this
separate entity, the Committee To Re-Elect the President, when there
was a national Republican Committee and a political entity in the
Republican Party for the campaign of 1972?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, very simply because the national committee
is the official body of the Republican Party. It has the responsibility
for mobilizing the Republican vote and turning out the Republican
vote, for developing and supporting candidates. Republican candi-
dates for office at all levels. State and Federal, and the campaign for
President required beyond the Republican Party the effort to reach
out to independent voters and to Democrat voters to make an appeal
to them for support, as well as to mobilize the Republican troops that
the national committee had the responsibility for. So there was quite
naturally a need for an organization beyond the Republican National
Committee.
As you know, after the convention there was a further organization
set up of Democrats for Nixon, which was directly involved in an
effort to develop Democratic support specifically.
Mr. Dash. But as set up, did not this Committee To Re-Elect the
President really constitute a form of alter ego to the White House
and the administration? In other words, the political branch?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, no, I do not believe so. I think it was set up
so that tlie White House would not be totally involved in the business
of preparing for it, conducting a political campaign. But
Mr. Dash. Is it not
Mr. Haldeman. Excuse me, go ahead.
Mr. Dash. I was just going to say that is it not true at the time it
was set up that a number of AVhite House staff people did move over
and take a position in the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President?
3023
Mr. Haldeman. Some White House staff did. Some people from
other departments and some people from outside.
Mr. Dash. And it is true that Mr. Mitchell, the Attorney General,
had been designated to actually run the campaign when he left his
office as Attorney General in March. Is that rig'ht?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, what particular role did you play in either staff
assignments or the moving of staff from the White House to the com-
Mr. Dash. Did you receive quite a few memorandums from the
Re- Election of the President?
Mr. Haldeman. I played a role in the sense of an understanding
with the committee that if they were going to talk to people in the
White House about moving over to the committee, and they did, as
you have indicat-ed, take a number of people from the White House,
that it would be done with our concurrence at the White House, that
they would not move in and there were some problems in this regard
from time to time, where there was somebody they wanted who was
also needed at the \Vhite House and it posed a conflict that we wanted
to resolve. There was also a problem at several points in time of the
committee running people into jobs at higher salary levels than they
had been receiving at the White House and this was a matter of con-
cern to me. I did not like people being persuaded to leave the White
House and join the election committee for the purpose of making
more money, and so I was involved in the question of compensation to
that extent.
I was consulted, I would say, on the senior people that moved from
the White House, or middle level people. There were a number of
people from the White House that moved over to the committee that
I had no involvement at all.
Mr. Dash. Now, were you also consulted with regard to major de-
cisions that the committee was making ?
Mr. Haldeman. Some ; but not on a consistent basis. We had — rather
than being consulted on major decisions — ^we had a close working re-
lationship with the committee that was implement^ in the campaign
period by the twice-weekly meetings in Mr. Ehrlichman's office with
the campaign committee people and senior White House people, and
we — in order to maintain continuing coordination, the campaign direc-
tor, Mr. Mitchell, and later Mr. MacGregor, sat in the regular morning
White House staff meetings, so that the campaign people, or the cam-
paign director, at least, would know what the ongoing business at the
White House was, issue positions, and that sort of thing, and vice versa,
so that he could keep us posted at the White House as to what was
developing in the campaign.
Mr. Dash. Did you receive quite a few memorandums from the
committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir, I think ^ou are referring to Strachan's
political memorandums. I did not receive memorandums directly from
the committee. Gordon Stracihan, as my staff man with that area of
responsibility, received all.
Mr. Dash. Just what was his area of responsibility ? What was he
supposed to do ?
3024
Mr. Haldeman. He was supposed to handle the liaison between my
office and the campaign committee.
Mr. Dash. And
Mr. Haldeman. To keep him — I can expand on that a little bit.
Mr. Dash. Yes, please.
Mr. Haldeman. To keep himself basically fully posted on the cam-
paign, on what was going on, to keep me posted as I needed to be, for
information for the President, and to be available to answer questions
or follow up on matters that might be raised by the President and, from
time to time, others in the A^Hiite House with relation to the campaign.
Mr. Dash. Now, were you consulted in any way at times on budgets
or matters involving the financing of the committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. Only on a very general basis. As I indicated in my
statement, I did receive overall budgets, I believe, from time to time
and I did receive information in more specific nature on advertising
budgets because that was an area in which I was more directly con-
cerned, and I reviewed the advertising budgets primarily for- — -with
relation to the question of timing, of intensity of advertising, and to
some degree regional concentration. I did not get into the details of the
budgets and I did not believe that I had any responsibility for budget
authority or appiT>val.
Mr. Dash. I would like to show you, Mr. Haldeman, a memorandum
of February 3, 1972, from Mr. Bruce Kehrli to you concerning Com-
mittee for Re-Election support which discusses general budget items.
Do you remember that memorandum? Have you seen it before?
Mr. Haldeman. I would have to look at it first, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Look at it and tell me whether or not
Mr. Haldeman. Can I take a second ?
Mr. Dash. Yes. Please.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. Without — I had better look at the whole thing.
I was going to give you a general
Mr. Dash. Take your time, Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Haldeman. I can't read part of this on the bottom of page 2. It is
a bad copy.
Mr. Dash. Very bad photocopy. It is the only one we have received.
Mr. Haldeman. It doesn't appear to be a significant area, though.
ISIr. Dash. I didn't intend to ask you anything about that bottom
area.
Do you recall that this particular memorandum, which has "ad-
ministrativelv confidential" on it, deals with the question of the Presi-
dential and first family travel budget and then it has items for pre-
convention, convention, and postnomination budget. Then on the sec-
ond page, there is some reference to staff and also there is a reference
to Mr. Colson, and a statement of $900,000 for the Colson office which
consists of $6f>0,000 for mailin.<r and information retrieval, $150,000 to
expand his mailing list, and about $90,000 for "black" projects, black
in quotes.
Do you recall those items and why they were being presented to
you in memorandum?
Mr. Haldeman. This overall memorandum, as it indicates, is for
financial support for the Wliite House from the Committee for the
Re-Election of the President. As I think I indicated, the committee
provided financial support for activities that were not deemed to be
governmental activities but that were conducted by the White House,
3025
the principals of these being, of course, the travel of the President
when he was on a purely political trip. At any time during the cam-
paign period that the President or any member of his family made a
trip, they were required, of course, by security regulations to travel on
Government aircraft and with Government security, but the committee
reimbursed the Government for the cost of all such trips at all times so
that there would be no cost to the taxpayer for the purely political
activity of the President.
This same would apply to other activities that were carried out by
other staff members. The item I had filed as staff and reimbursement
of specific staff members, I would assume, had to do with their travels
and expenses incurred in speaking tours and that sort of thing on
behalf of the election campaign as constrasted to their duties in the
Government.
The Colson office question appears to be primarily for mailings and
Mr. Colson's office was the point of contact with groups and organiza-
tions outside of Government, labor organizations, business organiza-
tions, veterans' organizations, other particular interest groups, and I
am sure that at his instance there were a number of mailings designed
for these specific groups, and that this was to cover support for those
mailings.
Mr. Dash. Do you know what the reference to "black" projects
means ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure.
Mr. Dash. We have had testimony before on black advance projects.
Do you know what that means ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have heard that testimony. T would not think that
this would relate to black advance projects as such because Mr. Colson
was not concerned with advance work or campaign travel at all that
I am aware of.
Mr. Dash. Well, then there is one item that says : "This budget does
not include "White House polling expense which I understand will be
handled in another way."
Is that a reference to what later did happen — ^the transmittal of
$350,000 from the committee to the White House for polling purposes?
Mr. Haldeman. I think that probably is ; yes. I am not positive but
it would appear to be.
Mr. Dash. Well, at least to this extent, would this cover this area
you were saying you were advised of general budget matters?
Mr. Haldeman. No, not at all. I was speaking of the campaign
budget rather than the — this is what I would call campaign support
for White House budget. I also saw from time to time or at times the
overall campaign budget, the big spread sheets that spread out the
planned expenditures on a month-by-month basis for the various cam-
paign activities.
Mr. Dash. Now, I think in your statement you also said that
Mr. Haldeman. Could I interject to say
Mr, Dash. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. Going back to this one : This, you haven't indicated
but this is a memorandum that I approved, and on the last page it
indicates my approval. It sought my approval. It sought my approval
from the staff secretary of the White House to submit a budget that
the White House estimated would be its expenses that would be prop-
3026
erly allocable to the reelection committee rather than covered by the
White House budget.
Mr. Dash. You may also want to read the note that you wrote after
your approval,
Mr. Haldeman. Sure. I wrote, I initialed the approval and then said,
"Unless AG wants whole budget, if so, give it to him with undei-stand-
ing it is a very rough guess." My point being the recommendation here
was that we submit only the preconvention budget in February, in
other words, the budget for the time up to August 20, and my point
there was that there was — I was recommending we submit only that
unless he wanted the entire thing. It would be difficult to estimate the
postconvention budget at that time.
Mr. Dash. INIr. Chairman may we have this memorandum put into
the record as an exhibit?
Senator Ervin. The reporter will mark it with the appropriate
exhibit number.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 110.*]
Mr. Dash. Now, what was your relationship with Mr. Mitchell in
the Committee for the Re-Election of the President ?
Mr. Haldeman. It was one of very close communication and cooper-
ation, not on a very frequent basis but he kept me posted on what was
going on and what problems he had, if anv, in the campaign, and he
had problems from time to time with the White House in cooperation
and he was seeking for information that he would raise with me, and I
passed on to him complaints and information and suggestions from
the A\niite House, other people in the White House, and from the
President.
Mr. Dash. How did you communicate ? Did you meet frequently or
did you do it by telephone or in what way ?
Mr. Haldeman. A little bit of each. To start with he was in the
morning staff meeting so there was a chance to communicate there. We,
during the campaign period, had the twice weekly meetings in Mr.
Ehrlichman's office and that was for the purpose of iust exactly this
kind of communication. If anything came up that needed to be covered
on a quick basis it was covered by telephone.
We met from time to time not with any great regularity or fre-
quency. By that I mean in other meetings than the ones I have, the
regular staff meetings that I have indicated.
Mr. Dash. In the summer or the fall of 1970, Mr. Haldeman, were
you not concerned about the existing program of intelligence gather-
ing with regard to either domestic dissent or security ?
Mr. Haldeman. You said in 1970.
Mr. Dash. 1970.
Mr. Haldeman. 1970 is that — let me — I forget which programs went
into effect in which years ; 1970 was the time of the concern on domestic
security.
Mr. JDash. How did this concern arise ?
Mr. Haldeman. ^lay I read from the President's May 22 statement
where he outlined this?
Mr. Dash. I think we have that. Why don't we have your testimony
on it?
►See p. 3313.
3027
Mr. Haldeman. All right. My testimony would be in exact accord
with that.
Mr. Dash. Did you help prepare the President's statement ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir, I did not. But I would say that that deline-
ates in a few words the extent and nature of the problem as it existed
at that time. The reason for the White House concern and the reason
for attempting to take some action.
Mr. Dash. I still would like rather than your reading the President's
statement
Mr. Haldemax. I haven't read it, I didn't read it.
Mr. Dash. I know, I said would you just give us as briefly as you
can your own recollection
Mr. Haldeman. Sure.
Mr. Dash [continuing]. Of what that purpose was, what the prob-
lem was?
Mr. Haldeman. The problem was, and I have indicated this in my
statement also, I believe, was the wave of violence, bombings, arson,
trashing, and other sorts of activities of damaging property, some of
them killing people, that were sweeping across the country at that
time.
Mr. Dash. And this led to what we have now been referring to as the
Huston plan, did it not ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, it did.
Mr. Dash. And I take it you were aware of all of the facets of the
Huston plan, what the recommendations were that were being made
and as it finally went up to the President.
Mr. Haldeman. Not in any detail. The inception of the so-called
Huston plan was a meeting that the President called — first, Mr. Hus-
ton, as a staff man, had done some preliminary work on analysis of the
problem, and analysis of the efforts to deal with the problem, and of
the shortcomings that appeared to be in existence at that time with
relation to the problem and the efforts to deal with it as a result of
which the President called a meeting of the heads of the various secu-
rity agencies, the FBI, the NSA, the CIA, and the DIA. I sat in that
meeting, as did Mr. Huston. The President discussed with these agency
heads the nature of the problem, the shortcomings of domestic intelli-
gence, the concern that some of these activities that were underway or
being threatened during that period of time were possibly, at least,
and I think demonstrably, as I recall, connected with foreign activities.
Some of the organizations that were declaring themselves out to
destroy institutions and in some cases the Government, were doing
their training in foreign countries and were studying under foreign
dissident orsfanizations, and there was a feeling that there was a cross-
over here that needed to be dealt with in terms of better intelligence,
that we didn't know who was causinar these things, who was directing
them, who was financing them, nor did we know what they were going
to be directed to.
Mr. Dash. How did you receive specific evidence of these events?
You didn't know, you say, who was doinff what, but obviously you
were concerned that the events occurred. What evidence occurred as
to who might be involved?
Mr. Haldeman. There was evidence in terms of the people who were
3028
carrying some of them out, at least, in self-declared, both intentions
and in backing, and the reasons for what they were doing.
There was some intelligence — there was some FBI intelligence in
this area, there was some Secret Service intelligence in this area as it
related to Presidential threats and security. And there was some inves-
tigative reporting by the press going on as to the background of some
of these activities, and all of these I think would add together to be the
sources at that time of what we did have.
Mr. Dash. But is it your statement that you were not fully aware
of the specifics of the Huston plan?
Mr. Haldeman. I was not — let me get into how that was set up. In
the meeting with the President and the heads of the security agencies
the problem was outlined and the President made it very clear that
he expected some cooperation, which there did not — which did not
exist at that time between these agencies, in getting better information,
evaluating the information more effectively, and disseminating it so
that action could be taken if there was action indicated, or at least
awareness — there would be awareness of what was happening or what
was going to happen.
The group assembled in his office at that time was designated by
the President as a task force to prepare recommendations for him as
to what ought to be done, what steps should be taken to meet the prob-
lem and carry out the request that the President made of this group.
It is my understanding that that — those agency heads themselves
or by designation of members of their staff did set up such a task force
under the chairmanship of Director Hoover which prepared an exten-
sive set of recommendations. ]Mr. Huston worked with them, I under-
stand on this, or at least they transmitted these recommendations to
him upon their preparation, and those recommendations were sub-
mitted to the President. They were submitted, as was customary pro-
cedure to ]Mr. Huston, the staff man assigned to that project, through
Mr. Huston to me and through me to the President.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Huston actually reported to you?
Mr. Haldeman. He reported through me in this particular area. He
was — well, I do not know where he was assigned at that time. He was
sometimes — part of the time he was at the White House he was on the
staff of the counsel and part of the time he was on Mr. Buchanan's staff.
Mr. Dash. Well, in reporting to you or through you, you saw all of
the papers that were being reviewed, did you not ?
Mr. Hai.demax. I saw all the papers — not all the working pai>ers of
the committee. I saw the recommendations that went to the President.
Mr. Dash. All right. Did you read the recommendations that went
to the President ?
Mr. Haldemax. I am not sure I did or not. If I did it was not in any
detail. I had an idea it was a proposal for ah expanded intelligence
activity,
Mr. Dash. Wei'e you aware in that proposal there was a recommen-
dation for both national and internal security, that there be an
increased use of wiretapping and surreptitious entry or break-in ?
Mr. Haldemax. I am not sure whether I was or not. I may very well
have been.
3029
Mr. Dash, Were you aware that Mr, Hoover, Director of the FBI,
opposed, at least entered his opposition to most of the recommenda-
tions in that plan ?
Mr. Haldeman. I knew that — I think in the recommendation itself
which was signed by Director Hoover as chairman of the committee,
he had indicated in the various recommendations his disagreement
with some of them in spite of the fact that they were the committee
recommendation.
He was transmitting them as the committee recommendation with
his dissent.
Mr. Dash. Well, now, did Mr. Huston seek to get your assistance in
overriding Mr. Hoover's objections?
Mr. Haldeman, Yes ; I think he did.
Mr. Dash. And did he send a series of memorandums to you with
regard to that ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have seen the memorandums that have been put
into exhibit and reprinted in the papers and they would indicate that
he did, yes.
Mr. Dash. Well, did you just see them as they were reprinted in the
papers or do you actually recall receiving those memorandums and
reading them ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have a general recollection. I cannot identify hav-
ing seen or acted upon any specific memorandum without looking at it
and reviewing it, I do know that there was a definite concern on Mr,
Huston's part and on the other side, on the President's part, that there
was — we knew there was a problem going into this. One of the reasons
for bringing this group together was the fact that communication
between the FBI and other intelligence agencies was at best minimal,
Mr, Dash, Let me just show you one memorandum and I think this
has already gone into the record. See at least if you can recollect it. It is
a memorandum dated August 5, 1970, from Mr. Huston to you, subject,
"Domestic Intelligence"*, which is primarily dealing with the problem
of Mr. Hoover's objections and indicating that the program ought to
move forward and asking your assistance. I ask you to take a look at
it, see if you do recall it and if you do, would you comment on it?
Mr. Wilson. May we keep this, Mr. Dash ?
Mr. Dash. It is my onl}-^ copy at the moment. We can make a Xerox
copy for you. Unfortunately, our Xerox machine is broken down. That
is why members of our committee do not have copies.
This has been entered in the record at a prior time.
Mr. Haldeman. I cannot positively, without any doubt, say I read
that memorandum at the time it was sent to me but I have a very clear
recollection of the general content of the problem that existed at that
time and I probably did read this memorandum.
Mr. Dash. Would it be fair to characterize that memorandum as
Mr. Huston being considerably upset over Mr. Hoover's obstinacy in
opposing the plan and
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash [continuing]. And indicating that it was quite urgent that
the plan go forward and seeking your assistance?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
•See Book 3, exhibit No. 37. p. 1325.
3030
Mr. Dash. Do you know why Mr. Hoover opposed the plan ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. I do not recall whether this memoran-
dum outlined the nature of his objections or not.
Mr. Dash. Now, are you aware after the plan was submitted to the
President, that this plan was in fact approved by the President ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. After that approval, was the plan implemented?
Mr. Haldeman, No ; it was not. As I understand it, the approval
was rescinded, I believe it was 5 days later by notification to the agency
head and that, therefore, in effect, the plan was not implemented.
Mr. Dash. Why was it rescinded?
Mr. Haldeman. Again, as I understand it, because of Director
Hoover's objection to a number of parts of the plan.
Mr. Dash. Did you know that Mr. Mitchell opposed this plan, the
Attorney General?
Mr. IIaldeman. I am not sure that I knew that he did or that he
did not.
Mr. Dash. Well, he has testified here before this committee that he
was not in on the original planning of the plan but when he first
learned about it, I think he says to Mr. DeLoach of the FBI, that he
went to see you and the President and strongly opposed it and then
the plan was not implemented. He assumed that it was partly on the
basis of his objection. Do you recall that ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not; but that is not necessarily — I certainly
would not deny that. If Mr. Mitchell does feel that is the case, I do not
recall — I do recall the plan not being put into effect. I recall con-
siderable discussion back and forth as to whether it would be or not,
and the ultimate decision first, to approve and then to rescind.
Mr. Dash. Did you become aware of an in-house White House effort
for that special investigative unit after the Huston plan was
rescinded ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, the step following the rescission of the Huston
plan as it is now called, was the formulation of an intelligence evalua-
tion committee that was another interagency and interdepartmental
group. It was not an in-house Wliite House group, although there was
a White House representative, I believe Mr. Dean, on that intelligence
evaluation committee and its purpose was — one of the purposes of the
Huston plan, coordination between the various intelligence agencies
and an attempt to share and evaluate intelligence.
Mr. Dash. And who was supervising this?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. It was set up — it was not an in-house
White House unit, as I said, it was an interagency unit. I believe John
Dean was the White House representative on it and I am not sure
how it was structured.
Mr. Dash. Would it be true that it was Mr. John Dean's role to be
liaison for the Wliite House on intelligence programs like this?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes ; it would be.
Mr. Dash. Now, did there come a time when there was an in-house
White House special investigative unit ?
Mr. Haldeman. You are leading— the question relates, I assume,
to this special investigations unit that was set up in 1971.
3031
Mr, Dash, Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. I was aware that such a unit was set up, at the
President's request, yes.
Mr. Dash. And did you know who was put in charge of that?
Mr. Haldeman. I think that David Young of the National Security
Council staff and Bud Krogh of the Domestic Council staff were the
principal men assigned to that work.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Wilson, if we can have that memo back, we will make
a Xerox copy for you.
You say Mr. Krogh was taking general supervision with Mr, Young
in that area?
Mr. Haldeman. I knew that Krogh and Young were assigned to
this responsibility. I do not believe I know, or knew at the time, wlio
was over whom.
Mr. Dash. Did you know that Mr. Hunt and Liddy took a part in
the role of the so-called Plumbers?
Mr. Haldeman. I guess so ; it is hard, now knowing it so thoroughly
through testimony here, to know whether I specifically knew they were,
as those two names were involved in this assignment at that time
or not.
Mr. Dash. Well, is it your testimony, Mr. Haldeman, that in your
role as chief of staff, where you certainly had administrative respon-
sibilities over everything that was going on in the White House, office
space, and where the telephones would be set up and things like that,
that an operation of this kind, a special investigative unit would not
come to your attention, so you would know who was involved, who
the staff people would be, who would be working, who would be on
its payroll?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I would know that such a unit existed but this
unit was set up as an internal unit using as the two principal staff
people, people that were already on staff. This wasn't an addition to
staff. This was a reassignment of people, one on Dr. Kissinger's staff
and one on Mr. Ehrlichman's staff, to a special project. That was done
very frequently and probably most of the time without my knowledge
because these were assignments that would come and go.
]\Ir. Dash. Well, if new people were brought on the staff like Mr.
Hunt or Mr. Liddy, wouldn't you have to know about that as the
Staff Director?
Mr. Haldeman. Not necessarily by name. If they were brought on
without an existing budget, each division within the White House —
the White House budget was broken down by divisions within the
White House and each division had an individual responsibility for
it. In addition — I don't know if this was true at that time but at some
point in time the domestic council, Mr. Ehrlichman's area, had a seii)a-
rate budget, funded separately by the Congress, not from the White
House budget. So any activities of the domestic council or conducted
within the domestic council budget I would very frequently not be
aware of at all.
Mr. Dash. Well, you knew at least Ehrlichman.
Mr. Haldeman. The same would be true of the National Security
Council budget which was also separate.
Mr. Dash. You know the reason why this separate investigating
unit was set up, do you not ?
3032
Mr. Haldeman. Yes; I knew the approximate cause was the Penta-
gon Papers leak and that it was set up for the purpose of looking into
that and other national security leaks at that time.
Mr. Dash. And you were personally also, when I say personally, cer-
tainly in your role as the chief of staff of the White House, and your
pei-sonal role, interested in seeing that such things did not occur. You
were concerned about such leaks, were you not ?
Mr. Haldemax, I was personally concerned about them, yes.
Mr. Dash. Did you discuss with Mr. Ehrlichman at any time, not in
any official reporting role, the work of the special investigating unit —
what it was doing about looking for these leaks?
Mr. Haldeman. Xo ; I do not think so, other than the fact there was
such a unit and thev were w^orking on this. We niay have from time to
time, talked about whether they were making any progress or we were
getting any information.
Mr. Dash. Did this come up in the senior staff meetings when you
h"!d s'-'^^'^" staff meetings to keep on top of what was going on at the
White House?
Mr. Haldemax. It may have. I do not recall any specific reference
to it.
Mr. Dash. Did it come to your attention ?
Mr. Haldemax. The subject of leaks came up often, of course.
Mr. Dash. Oh, yes; as a matter of fact, I think in your own state-
ment, at one point, there was a plan by which you youi'self have indi-
cated the President dubbed you the Lord High Executioner
Mr. Haldemax. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. For leaks.
Mr. Haldemax. That, however, was on a broad basis not specifically
related to any individual leak or to the — necessarily the area of
national security or domestic security.
Mr. Dash. I understand.
Mr. Haldemax. It was the whole leak problem.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you leani in discussions with Mr. Ehrlichman
or at your senior staff meetings in the mornings, about the focusing in
on Mr. Ellsberg as a suspect, not only as a suspect but as an effort to
get more information about him ?
Mr. Haldemax. I do not think so ; not through those means. Ells-
berg was, of course, a figure in the public reporting of it, so I assume he
was at that time, and whatever was in the press ] was aware of.
Mr. Dash, Did you know there was an effort to get a psychiatric
profile on Mr. Ellsberg ?
Mr. Haldemax. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did you know that a group had been sent out to Cali-
fornia to seek, through covert activity, access to Dr. Fielding's records?
Mr. Haldemax. No ; I did not.
Mr. Dash. The psychoanalysis of Mr. Ellsberg?
Mr. Haldemax, I did not.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Ehrlichman at no time would be discussing this
with you ?
Mr. Haldemax^, He did not discuss it with me.
Mr. Dash. Now. T take it vou were also aware of the Sandwedge plan
which Mr, Caulfield presented ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
3033
Mr. Dash. And that also was a proposed intelligence plan ; was it
not?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes ; it was.
Mr. Dash. Are you aware of what occurred on that ?
Mr. Haldeman. Of what occurred to dt ?
Mr. Dash. That plan.
Mr. Haldeman. It was dropped.
Mr. Dash. Did you have any role in seeing to it that it was dropped ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe I did. I think that it sort of dropped
of its own weight.
Mr. Dash. Well, somebody had to say no. Who said no on this plan ?
Mr. Haldeman. It is my impression that nobody ever got around to
saying no. Nobody ever said yes and so it never happened.
Mr. Dash. Did you know Tony Ulasewicz ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I did not.
Mr. Dash. Never met him ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Mr. Dash. Did you know that he was working for certain White
House projects?
Mr. Haldeman. I knew there was a man employed outside on certain
A^Tiite House projects. I, at some point, knew his name but at that point
did not know how to pronounce it.
Mr. Dash. Did you know it as a different name ? Did you ever hear
of a Mr. Rivers ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Mr. Dash. When Mr. Magruder was playing a very active role in the
Committee for the Re-Election of the President, certainly in the fall
of 1971, were you aware in the communications that you were probably
getting from Mr. Strachan that there was a concern in the oncoming
campaign of demonstrations and violence that might take place ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes ; that was a matter that was discussed from time
to time and I was very much aware of it.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware of the fact that there was a feeling,
that there was a need to develop an intelligence capacity to determine
who might be involved in this kind of activity and how to prevent it?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not recall a discussion of intelligence capacity
in that sense. There was definitely discussion of the problem and of
needing to know what the nature of the problem was. It was most
intensive in relation to the convention site, and the potential problem
that was rumored to be building at San Diego and we did have intel-
ligence on that. We had Secret Service intelligence.
Mr. Dash. That is riorht. But, did not Mr. Magruder talk to you
directly or by memorandums concerning the need for the committee to
have its own in-house capabilities for intelligence with regard to
the campaign ?
Mr. Haldeman. He may have.
Mr. Dash. Did you become aware that Mr. Gordon Liddy was em-
ployed by the Committee for the Re-Election of the President?
Mr. Haldeman. At some point I did, yes.
Mr. Dash. When was the first time you became aware?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure.
Mr. Dash. Did you become aware during the late period of 1971,
November or December ?
3034
Mr. Haldeman, I am really not sure, Mr. Dash, when I knew. I do
not know for sure when he did become employed.
Mr. Dash. Let me ask you this, were you aware prior to the June 17
break-in ?
Mr. Haldeman. That Mr. Liddy was at the committee, yes.
Mr. Dash. Did you have anything to do when he was employed?
You said when certain senior people would be employed, they would
have to have some clearance on your part. Now, he was employed as
counsel for the committee. Did his name come by your desk for
ai:>proval ?
Mr. Haldeman. His name came by my desk at some point in con-
nection with his salarj'. That was one of the cases where I think a
salary was going to be paid that was higher than what he had been
getting at the White House or was out of line with some other salary
and there was some discussion of the salary question in that connection.
Mr. Dash. You do not recall anything further about that?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Mr, Dash. That is the only recollection you have of Mr. Liddy's em-
ployment and your role in the employment ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. I believe it is.
Mr. Dash. Did you learn at a point in time of a meeting in Mr.
INIitchell's office, one on January 27, 1972, and then another meeting
on February 4, 1972, attended not only by Mr. Mitchell but by Mr«
Dean, Mr. Liddy, and Mr. Magruder ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. How did you learn of that meeting?
Mr. Haldeman, Well, I am not positive. I learned of it in recem
months and probably also in the summer of 1972 by way of Mr. Dear,
recounting to me the fact, or his assertion that there had been thest
two meetings, as 'I recall, he told me that they had been in Decembei
and January of 1971-72, and that he had attended the two meetings
that he had come to me after the second meeting and had reported
to me that at that meeting there had been presented an intelligence
plan that was totally inconceivable and absurd, he characterized it
in some colorful phrase, I think, of that kind, and said that he had
turned the plan off, that INIitchell had concurred with him in turning
this plan off, that he felt that there should be no further discussions
of this kind of an intelligence program, and he intended to partici-
pate in no such discussions, and that he recommended the White House
not particinate if there were anv such further discussions and that
there should not be any and that I agreed with him.
Mr. Dash. Now, this discussion you are now testifying to that you
had with Mr. Dean is in the summer of 1972, is that after the June 17
break-in that this took place?
]\f r. Haldeman. Yes, yes, it is, and I am not positive — it is a general
recollection that this took place in the summer. It is a clear recollection
that it also took place in March of this year.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Now, vou sav in the discussion vou liad with Mr. Dean, that Mr.
Dean told you that right after the February 4 meeting in 1972, lie came
to you and T think you have already described how he described this
meeting and he said the White House or something should not be
3035
involved and 'be turned off and you agreed. Do you recall his doing
that?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not recall it with any clear recollection but I
was willing to accept Mr. Dean's very specific and very positive re-
counting to me of what had happened. I did not find it incompre-
hensible, and I do want to make one point that arises in this, that I
have only recently become aware of though, because my recollection
very clearly is that Mr. Dean told me that these meetings took place
in December and January of 1971-72, and that he reported to me after
the second meeting. I do not have any recollection of his ever saying
to me what the specific dates were of the meetings.
I, when we got into the March period of this year and started an
intensive checking of facts and figures and logs and so forth, checked
my log to see whether, in fact, I had met with John Dean at any point
early in 1972 that could have been the meeting that he had described
to me, and I found that there had been such a meeting on February 1.
That I assumed was the meeting to which he referred and was, in the
back of my mind, a general confirmation that he probably had come
and told me about the situation and that February 1 was the time that
he had done so.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Mr. Haldeman. I did not realize, Mr. Dash, until watching these
hearings that the two meetings were held on January 27 and February
4, and if, in fact, Mr. Dean met with me on February 1, then our
meeting — well, Mr. Dean did meet with me on February 1. If our
meeting on February 1 was the meeting at which he told me about an
intelligence plan, it apparently was between the two meetings, rather
than after the second meeting, and that may be the reason — well, I do
not want to speculate, but I will say that I have checked my log also
to determine whether there was any other meeting with Mr. Dean
during that period of time and I find no meeting in the months of
January or February except the meeting on February 1.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Haldeman, we have received copies of your log.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Would you say that your log and the log you kept were
accurate in the sense that every meeting that you would have had with
Mr. Dean would appear on the log?
Mr. Haldeman. I think they would in that — do you want me to de-
scribe the genesis of that log so you know what its basis is ?
Mr. Dash. Yes. I think that might be helpful.
Mr. Haldeman. All right.
This was not a date book. This was not an appointment book and I
didn't maintain any appointment book because I didn't maintain any
predetermined schedule.
This log that you have was maintained by my secretary whose desk
was immediately outside the only door to which there was access to
my office, and she recorded in this log every person coming into my
office and the time he came in and every person leaving my office and
the time that he left.
That part of the log is very accurate and was very accurately kept
in that it was firsthand knowledge of the secretary at the desk of
people coming in and out. That desk was always, or virtually always.
3036
manned when I was in the office. If my principal secretary wasn't
there, another ^irl would fill in while she left the desk.
The log does have some potential inaccuracies in the effort to record
my participation in meetings outside of my office because then she
was only aware that I had left the office and was not always aware
where I had gone or with whom I had met.
Mr. Dash, Well, then, leaving aside any report that Mr. Dean made
to you of these meetings, were you not informed by Mr. Strachan
through a political matters memorandum of a sophisticated intelli-
gence system that the Committee for the Re-Election of the President
had developed for the approval of Mr. Mitchell sometime shortly after
March 30?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall Dean so informed but I don't recall
any of the other 30 or 29 decision items that were apparently also
covered in that memorandum and it is not surprising that I wouldn't.
Mr. Dash. Would a political matters memorandum dealing with a
sophisticated intelligence plan for the committee at a budget of
$300,000 strike your attention ?
Mr. Haldeman. As Mr. Strachan has described it, a three-line item
in a rather thick political matters memorandum dealing with, among
other things, apparently 30 decisions that had been made by Mr.
Mitchell at the Key Biscayne meeting, would not strike my attention;
no.
Mr. Dash. Well, do you recall asking or having Mr. Strachan pre-
pare a talking paper that covered a number of these items and includ-
ing the intelligence plan ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; and that wouldn't be the normal process Mr.
Dash. You are referring to, I assume, the talking paper that he referred
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman [continuing] . In terms of the
Mr. Dash. That is right.
Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. Meeting I was to have sometime
shortly after that
Mr. Dash. The April 4 meeting.
Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. With Mr. Mitchell. And Mr, Strachan,
when he knew that I was having a meeting with Mr. Mitchell or hav-
ing a meeting with anyone else with regard to the campaign or the
committee, on his own initiative and within his area of responsibility
prepared for me a talking paper listing those items of discussion that
he assumed would be useful or desirable to discuss at that meeting. The
talking papers were not drawn up jointly by the two of us and I did
not tell him what to put on them, I knew what I wanted to talk about.
Wliat he was doing was trying to jog me by way of a talking paper on
items that I might not think about that he thought might be useful to
discuss.
Mr. Dash. Now, when you received a political matters memorandum
and read the item, how did you indicate that you had noted the item
or read it ?
Mr. Haldeman. Varying ways. I sometimes made margin notes. I
sometimes made checks by items, and I sometimes made no mark at all.
3037
Mr. Dash. And if you had read it and made a check that would ap-
pear on them, I take it?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And if there was a talking paper for a meeting with Mr.
Mitchell on April 4, that would be part of that political matters file,
would it not?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know.
Mr. Dash. I am asking the question if there were such, it would be
part of the file, would it not ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know that it would be. I am not
Mr. Dash. A number
Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. I am not sure I undei-stand what you
mean.
Mr. Dash. Are there a number of political matters memorandums
you received — you say you received a number.
Do you recall how many political matters memorandums Mr.
Strachan sent you?
Mr. Haldeman. Over the 2 years?
Mr. Dash. No ; during the period, say, from January 1972, through
June 17, 1972.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall a number, I would have to guess.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Mr. Haldeman. Probably in that sort of a period it would be 10,
something like that.
Mr. Dash. All right ; his testimony is that this particular political
matters memorandum was numbered No. 18 and if you wanted to find
out what was included in political matters memorandum No. 18 to
refresh your recollection right now, where would you go?
Mr. Haldeman. I would go to Mr. Strachan.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Strachan doesn't have the document, I take it. Would
the document be at the White House ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, I understand from Mr. Strachan's testimony
that he destroyed the document, so I presume it w^ouldn't be.
Mr. Dash. It is not at the White House ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know whether it is or not, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Have you gone to the White House in preparation for
your testimony?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. To look at papers of yours ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have looked at my notes, yes.
Mr. Dash. Your notes. Have you looked at any of the political mat-
ters memorandum?
Mr. Haldeman. No; I haven't.
Mr. Dash. You heard Mr. Strachan's testimony prior to your testi-
mony here. Did you go to the White House to see if there was a politi-
cal matters memorandum No. 18 at the White House ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now Mr. Strachan has testified that he did present to
you, shortly after the break-in when you returned to Washington,
this particular political matters memorandum No. 18, which included
the reference to the sophisticated intelligence plan at $300,000 and
the talking paper and I think some other matters, and that you said,
and this is his testimony, you said that the file should be clean after
3038
he had indicated that this particular file inig;ht link you by some way
to the break-in or the activity of the break-in. Do you recall that con-
versation with Mr. Strachan?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall the conversation. T don't recall the
testimony as being quite as you have described it. And as I said in my
statement, I don't recall Mr. Strachan or my giving Mr. Strachan
such an instruction.
Mr. Dash. Such an instruction to see that the file would be clean ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
JNIr. Dash. You didn't use that expression.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't remember using it, no, sir.
Mr. Dash. Do you have any explanation as to why, after that
meeting, Mr. Strachan would go out and shred that political matters
memorandum No. 18?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, by Mr. Strachan's statement, which is the
only really source I can use for knowing why, he indicates that he
destroyed what he considered to be politically embarrassing material
and as I recall under direct questioning he quite specifically said that
he did not think he was destroying anything that contained any
evidence of illegal activities.
Mr. Dash. But on the direct questioning he said that he did it not
on his own initiative but on your instructions.
Mr. Haldeman. He said that in his statement, I believe.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. No. I guess that is right. It was not in his state-
ment. It was questioning.
Mr. Dash. Yes. Now, do you recall after receiving the political
matters memorandum — you don't actually recall receiving that polit-
ical matters memorandum — do you recall telling Mr. Strachan in
April, sometime shortly after the meeting with Mr. IMitchell, that he
should contact Mr. Liddy and tell Mr. Liddy to transfer his capa-
bilities from Mr. Muskie to Mr. INIcGovern with special emphasis on
the relationship to Senator Kennedy?
]\Ir. Haldeman. No, I don't.
Mr. Dash. You don't recall giving him that instruction?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Do you have any idea why Mr. Strachan would testify
under oath here that he received that "instruction from you?
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Dasli, I think that my attempt to determine why
someone else does something is something that I should not get into.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Mr. Haldeman. I sincerely feel that in this whole thing we have
bogged down so much into opinion of what one person thinks some
other person might have done rather than what that person knows he
did or didn't do.
Mr. Dash. Well, you say that Mr. Strachan worked for you from
1970 on.
]\Ir. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Did you during that period of time develop an opinion
concerning his loyalty, concerning his character for veracity?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. I had a very high opinion of both his loyalty
and his thoroughness and his veracity.
3039
Mr, Dash. Now, Mr. Haldeman, when and how did you learn of the
break-in on June 17, 1972 ?
Mr. Haldeman. That seems to be the crucial question and I have to
give I guess the most incredible possible answer. I don't know, Mr.
Dash. I simply don't remember how I learned about it or precisely
when or from whom. But let me explain that at that time, that week-
end, I was in Key Biscayne. The President was out at Walkers Cay and
I was at the Key Biscayne Hotel and I am sure that some time during
that weekend somebody told me that the Democratic National Com-
mittee had been broken into. I am not sure who or when.
Mr. Dash. Now, what did you do when you learned that, when or
whoever told you ?
Mr, Haldeman. Nothing.
Mr. Dash. Nothing ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Mr. Dash. While you were at Key Biscayne, did you have any
information that somebody connected with the Committee To Re-Elect
the President was involved ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think I did and I think that came in a phone con-
versation with Jeb Magnider on the 18th, on Sunday, which it has
always been my impression was placed by him to me, but I understand
he says it was placed by me to him and I am not sure which is which.
But there was — the point of that phone conversation, the purpose of
it was to review a statement that the committee was planning to release,
and it was releasing it in conjunction with the earlier publicized, or
assumed about to be publicized, fact that Mr. McCord, who did have a
connection with the committee, had been one of those arrested at the
scene of the break-in.
Mr. Dash. What came through your mind when you learned that
Mr. McCord — did vou know, by the way, who Mr. McCord was?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe I did. He probably told me at that
time who he was.
Mr. Dash. I take it you did learn that he was the security chief of
the Committee To Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Did it occur to you that this might be an embarrassing
matter for the campaign ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. When did you get back to Washington after the break-in ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think on the evening of — on Monday evening,
which would be the 19th.
Mr. Dash. Is that when you had a meeting with Mr. Dean ? Did Mr.
Dean report to you then about what he had learned about the break-in ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not — I don't believe so. I am not sure that I
had a meeting with Mr. Dean at that point. I believe we probably got
back late Monday evening and that I went home.
Mr. Dash. When did you meet with Mr. Dean after you got back ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think, and I have got sort of a capsule of my
record here that is subject to correction by the details, but I think there
was a meeting the morning of the 20th, in which I was present with
Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Ehrlichman, and that Dean was, Mr. Dean was,
in part of that meeting and Attorney General Kleindienst was there
part of that meeting.
3040
Mr. Dash. At that meeting do you recall that there was a general
discussion as to what happened, what information was current con-
cerning the break-in and the relationship with the committee?
Mr. Haldeman. I have no specific recollection of the contents of that
meeting but I am sure, that given the time situation, that it must have
been in regard to the Watergate break-in.
Mr. Dash. Now, it is true, if you look at your record that during
that period right after you get back there are about two or three meet-
ings on different days.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. I think you met with him on the 20th, on the 23d, and on
the 26th. Does your record show that ?
Mr. Haldeman. I show — there is an example now of my log of
June 20 that does not show a meeting with those people that I have
identified, that I have got in my summary here as a result of informa-
tion from other sources. What my log shows is a meeting in John
Ehrlichman's office which is all my secretary would know. She didn't
know who was in the meeting.
Mr. Dash. Right.
Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry then you were going
Mr. Dash. I was saying do you have a record of a meeting with Mr.
Dean on the 23d and again on the 26th after the meeting with him on
the 20th?
Mr. Haldeman. Not in the log, no. The 23d ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. It doesn't show me I don't believe.
Mr. Dash, Do you have it in the summary that you have received
from other sources?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; that doesn't show a meeting with Dean, either.
I think I talked with Dean on the phone that day, that morning. I
don't believe I met with him but I am not sure.
Mr. Dash. You indicated in your earlier testimony that Mr. Dean
did give you a report of what happened and told you at that time that
lie had told you earlier about telling you after one of the meetings.
Could you place in any one of those meetings when he told you ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I can't.
Mr. Dash. Would it be your recollection that it would be during
that week when you got back ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not necessarily, no. As I say, the only meeting that
I see with Dean during that week was the meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's
office on the 20th apparently.
Mr. Dash. Did the President either communicate with you or did
vou have a meeting with the President prior, shortly prior, to June
23, 1972?
Mr. Haldeman. I am sure I did. Do you want me to check ?
Mr. Dash. You met frequently with the President so you
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. So you are pretty sure you can find such a meeting?
Do you recall prior to that meetino; on June 23. the President having
a discussion with vou concerning the investiaration that would be on-
going with rejrard to the Watergate break-in and a concern he had
that such an investigation by the FBI might include the work of the
special investigating unit in the "White House and also the CIA ?
3041
Mr. Haldeman. Not prior to the 23d. I do recall such on the 23d.
Mr. Dash. On the 23d?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Was that on the 23d itself ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Is that what prompted your having a meeting with Mr.
Helms and IMr. Walters on the 23d ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And Mr. Haldeman, could you tell us what was the pur-
pose of that meeting with Mr. Helms and Mr. Walters ; what you said
and what they said ?
Mr. Haldeman. OK.
Mr. Dash. To the best of your recollection.
Mr. Haldeman. I have covered that in my statement and I — I don't
know how much detail you want to get into on that. I have made a
more detailed statement before another Senate committee that is look-
ing into this matter in considerable detail and I would be glad to read
that statement or put it into your record.
Mr. Dash. Let me just ask you this question because I think we do
have your statement.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And I think we also have your more detailed statement
that has been submitted to us.
Mr. Haldeman. OK.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Helms and Mr. Walters have recounted their recol-
lection of the meeting and Mr. Walters has testified, and provided
memorandums indicating that at that meeting he was, in effect, ordered
by you to go to see Mr. Gray and tell INIr. Gray that an investigation
of the Watergate matters might uncover CIA activities and, therefore,
to restrict the investigation to such an extent as not to do that.
Do you recall that such a conversation took place?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, without — I am not sure of the accuracy and I
don't think you want to get into the specifics of Mr. Walters' testi-
mony. I think vou are asking for my recollection of that conversation.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. So without commenting on either of the accuracy
of Mr. AYalters' recollection or your recitation of it, because he has
given a number of different statements and depositions in this thing
that make it rather complex, but the meeting, one of the purposes of
the meeting, as assigned to me by the President on the morning of
the 23d when he told me to have, to have me and Ehrlichman to meet
with Director Helms and Deputy Director Walters, in addition to
ascertaininor whether there was any CIA involvement, whether there
was anv CIA concern about earlier activities of people who had been
arrested at the Watergate, was to tell the CIA Directors that the FBI
had expressed concern that as to whether there was CIA involvement
or any impinarement.
Mr. Dash. Did you know at that time Mr. Helms had actually told
Mr. Gray the day before, on the 22d, that there was no CIA
involvement?
Mr. Haldeman. I did not know that prior to our meeting with Mr.
Helms and Mr. Walters.
3042
Mr. Dash. Did he tell you at the meeting?
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Helms told me at the meeting there was — had
no CTA involvement in the Watergate operation and he had so in-
formed Director Gray, so I learned that at that meeting. I didn't
know it prior to the meeting.
Mr. Dash. "Why was Mr. Walters asked to go back to Mr. Gray
and discuss CIA proiblems?
Mr. Haldeman. Because — ^^and there seems to be a very difficult
point to get across — ^but because there were other items of concern.
The matter, the question raised was not solely the question of whether
the CIA had been involved in the Watergate break-in but also whether
the investigation of the Watergate break-in, which was to be thorough
and total, could possibly impinge upon the acti\aties totally unrelated
to Watergate and related to national security or to covert CIA oper-
ations, the activities of some of the individuals who had also been
involved in the Watergate and had been arrested at the Watergate.
Mr, Dash. But didn't this involve the concern over the Mexican
checks which had come through the committee and took a route
through INIexico and back to the committee through cash and ulti-
mately some of that money ending up in the possession of some of the
burglars?
i\Ir. Haldeman. That — ^I don't recall the state of knowledge about
that whole circuit of activitv at the time of the June 23 meeting.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall discussing at that meeting that one of their
concerns was that the CIA might want to liave an investigation by
the FBI with regard to the Mexican money?
Mr. Haldeman. No; I do not.
Mr. Dash. Mexican relationship?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall the Mexican question being raised
either by the President that morning in his instructions to me to hold
the meeting or by me in the meeting.
Mr. Dash. All right now. Were you aware, by the way, there was
any followup by ]\Ir. Dean with Mr. Walters concerning these same
concerns that you have testified to?
INIr. Haldeman. I was not at the time. It was not until this all was
under investigation by the other Senate committee.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt to ask Mr. Dash — ^he
referred to having copies of the appearance, transcript of the appear-
ance, of Mr. Haldeman before another committee. I would like to ask
if he has copies of the transcript of Mr. Haldeman's appearance before
the grand jury?
Mr. Dash. No.
Mr. Wilson. Or a summary of it from the district attorney's
office?
Mr. Dash. No; we have not sought such information, and I think
the committee's position has been that under rule 6(d) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure that this committee is not entitled to it,
Mr. Wilson,
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Dash, I think we have asked Mr. Haldeman in our interviews
as to his testimony before the grand jury, which rule 6(d) does permit
him to give us, and I won't ask him now because I think we have had
that information.
3043
Now, were you aware, Mr. Haldeman, that during this period after
the break-in during the latter part of June through July and in
August there actually were daily meetings between Mr. Dean, Mr.
Mitchell, Mr. Mardian, Mr. LaRue, and frequently Mr. Magruder,
and at such meetings the discussion of Mr. Magruder's involvement
came up and a plan developed for Mr. Magruder to tell a false story
before the grand jury?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean has testified
Mr. Haldeman. Not in, anywhere in, that period of time.
Mr. Dash. I am talking about that period of time.
Mr. Haldeman. Not until recently.
Mr. Dash. I know you have more recent information, I am really
directing you now to that period of time.
Mr. Haldeman. I did not.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean has testified he was serving merely as a liaison.
The reason he was over at these meetings over at the committee was
that he was there to report back to you and Mr. Ehrlichman what
was going on, and that he, in fact, did report back and inform you ex-
plicitly about Mr. Magruder's problem, that Mr. Magruder was in-
volved and that it would be a serious question as to whether he could
get through the grand jury. Do you recall Mr. Dean making such re-
ports to you ?
Mr. Haldeman. He did not so inform me.
Mr. Dash. Did vou ever have any information that led you to be
concerned about Mr. Magruder's involvement in the break-in of the
Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate?
Mr. Haldeman. At that time ?
Mr. Dash. At that time.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe so. The onlv way I would have
other than Dean telling me, which I do not think he did, would be if
there were press reports and again, it is hard to remember what was
said when, but there were various allegations at various times as to
someone's
Mr. Dash. You are responding concerning Mr. Dean's responding
to you
Mr, Haldeman. Right.
Mr. Dash. Because that was the testimonv before the committee.
Now, do you recall any meeting with Mr. Mitchell ? Mr. Mitchell
has testified before this committee that he learned for the first time on
June 21 after being debriefed by Mr. Mardian and Mr. LaRue when
they spoke to Mr. Liddy, about Liddy's operation which not only
included the break-in at the Democratic National Committee head-
quarters, but his Plumbers operation which included the Ellsberg
break-in, the forged Diem cables and some other things and Mr.
Mitchell characterized these things as White House horrors. He fur-
ther testified that shortlv after learning of these things, he reported
them to you and to Mr. Ehrlichman for the purpose of discussing the
need to keep the lid on these things, that they should not get revealed
to the public.
Do you recall Mr. Mitchell reporting what he learned from Mr.
Mardian and Mr. LaRue in these areas?
3044
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir, if I could expand on that
Mr. Dash. Yes. Please do not rest on a no or a yes answer. You are
giving me more of those than I got from Mr. Ehrlichman [laughter]
and we will be very pleased to have your expanded remarks.
Mr. Haldeman. Well — excuse me. Did the vice chairman have
Senator Baker. I was just about to say, Mr. Chairman, I have no
criticism of side remarks. I have made my share in this hearing. But to
say we get more yes or no answere from him than we did from Mr.
Ehrlichman may not be significant to the record but it seems to me not
particularly in assistance to our inquiry of this witness.
Mr. Chairman, might I make one other request at this time? I am
having trouble following some of tliis testimony, not only in terms of
available exhibits but in terms of reference to previous transcript
pages. When, as in this case, Mr. Mitchell testified so and so, it would
be very helpful if counsel, both counsel, that is, minority and majority
counsel, would annotate their notes so that they know what reference
they are speaking of, and if it is in a statement that a witness has made
as in the case of Mr. Strachan, if they could annotate it for the pur-
poses of that statement, it would be helpful.
I do not expect that we can change horses in the middle of the
stream and do it today, but if we could, say, beginning this afternoon
or tomorrow
Mr. Dash, Tomorrow.
Senator Baker. That would be very helpful.
Mr. Dash. Senator Baker, in the interview that has been provided
to all Senators, the various references to Mr. Magruder's testimony
as it related to Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Strachan's or Mr. Mitchell's
testimony, do have various page references to the transcript noted.
Senator Baker. I am not talking about that, Mr. Dash. I am talk-
ing about your questions to the witness. That is what I am having
trouble keeping up with.
Mr. Haldeman. I have not been interviewed, though, Mr. Dash,
since
Mr. Dash. I am not talking about
Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. Since INIr. Mitchell and Mr. Strachan
have testified.
Mr. Dash. No. I am talking about a summary of the interview which
has been prepared in advance for the committee's use
Mr. Haldeman. I see.
Mr. Dash [continuing]. Which does have cross references to the
various transcripts.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman
Mr. Thompson. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I think the point being
that when you do go into a statement of what another witness said,
the summary, of course, is a summary and hopefully accurate but it is
not verbatim and one word or an emphasis, particular emphasis, is par-
ticularly important. So I personally plan to abide by that and think it
is a good procedure.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I want to say very frankly that on one
occasion in reference to Mr. Strachan this morning, Mr. Dash made an
unfaithful paraphrase of the testimony.
Mr. Dash. Can you refer to that ?
Mr. Wilson. Yes. I will give it to you.
3045
Senator Ervin. Let's don't get into a controversy about that. We
have not got enough daylight to burn as it is and I think that if counsel
can comply with the request of Senator Baker it would be well, but I
have to say I think it would be very difficult to examine the witness
if you have to stop and annotate the basis of each part of the question.
Senator Baker. Mr. Dash, just a minute. Just so the record is en-
tirely clear on the subject, I am not suggesting that counsel should
reference, in their question, transcript numbers. I am simply saying it
should be available so if we want to know, we can. I do not suggest
that to members of the committee but under our new procedures
whereby members of the committee are going to severely limit their
examination, counsel would carry a greater burden of the examina-
tion. What I am saying and what I am indicating as a new procedure,
I certainly would not call for today. I simply ask that when counsel
propound questions that assume something, they have available on
their notes the transcript so I can privately ask where it comes from.
Senator Ervin. I think that would be very helpful to the members
of the committee.
Mr. Dash. On this particular question as it appears in the sum-
mary that has been given to every member of this committee, Mr.
Chairman, dealing with the question of White House horrors, the
summary does provide that this refers to the Select Committee trans-
cript, pages 3692 to 3693, and also pages 3735, 3697, and 3698, Mr.
ISIitchell's testimony. This is part of a summary that has been pro-
vided for each member of the committee. But I will have that avail-
able for you, Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. And supply it as often as you conveniently can,
Mr. Dash, so we do not have to ask for it.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Dash, I was going to expand on the "no"
answer to that question, if I could.
Mr. Dash. Yes, sorry.
Mr. Haldeman. Not the "no" answer, but the "no" in answer to
the question.
Mr. Dash. Right.
Mr. Haldeman. The reason T say that is that I did not know of
any of the items that I can recall reading in the newspaper or hear-
ing Mr. Mitchell testify to under the category of White House hor-
rors at this time last year. I learned of some of them in March and
April of this year and others of them in the course of these hearings,
but I did not know of the items that have been enumerated in — if you
have INIr. Mitchell's testimony there or if you have something where
you could list those specific things which he cataloged
Mr. Dash. The things he described
Mr. Haldeman Fcontinuingl . Which he cataloged as White House
horrors. T believe T did not know of the existence.
Mr. Dash. I will give you some examples, but the ones — and I
do not believe T am mispara phrasing the testimony — ^he spoke of the
Ellsbero- break-in.
Mr. Haldeman. T did not know of that.
Mr. Dash. The Diem cable.
Mr. Haldeman. I did not know of that.
Mr. Dash. The sniritino- out of Miss Dita Beard from town.
Mr. Haldeman. I did not know that.
96-296 O - 73
3046
Mr. Dash. And certain wiretaps that had been taking place for cer-
tain security purposes.
Mr. Haldeman. I did know of security wiretaps.
Mr. Dash. Now, when did it come to your attention, Mr. Haldeman,
that certain funds were being raised to pay for the legal fees of the
defendants ?
Mr. Haldeman. Sometime in the period shortly after the Water-
gate break-in and I am not sure again of any specific date or occasion
on which I became aware of that, but I was told at some time in that
period and I was told at other times subsequently, I am sure by John
Dean, and I think possibly also by John Mitchell, that there was an
effort by the committee to raise funds to pay for the legal fees and
for family support of the defendants who had been arrested in the
Watergate burglary.
Mr. Dash. Now, when you received that information from Mr. Dean
and/or Mr. Mitchell, did you raise any question? Did you ask why
Mr. Mitchell, who was heading up the campaign, and Mr. Dean, who
was counsel to the President, would be involved in raising funds to
pay for legal fees and families of burglars and wiretappers?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I did not. This was incidental information that
I received and dismissed. I did not pursue it in any way.
Mr. Dash. Well, did you consider that if that became public that it
might be a matter of embarrassment to the campaign ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I did not consider that.
Mr.DASH.lVliynot?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure that one is able to explain why he did
not think something, but I did not. The reason — let me say that as a
partial explanation — I have had a general awareness that there was a
public effort to raise funds for the Watergate defendants and I do not
know that I knew that these efforts were different than the public
effort.
Mr. Dash. Do you know what
Mr. Haldeman. There was a reference to the Cuban fund.
Mr. Dash. Do you know whether it was a public effort to raise funds
f or Mr. Liddy, Mr. Hunt, Mr. McCord ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; and I never heard any discussion of this in my
contacts other than as a group, the defendants. There was no discussion
of individuals by name.
Mr. Dash. You say you did not consider it, but I can at least ask
the question : Is it vour view that persons who had high positions in
administering the President's reelection campaign and certainlv the
President's counsel, had anv business participating in raising funds
for the paying of lesral fees for burglars, wiretappers, or conspirators?
Mr. Haldeman. Tliis is not a Question that occurred to me, Mr. Dash,
and I did not ask it of myself or any of them.
Mr. Dash. You formed no moral judgment on it at all ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. By listening to passing reference, is it your recollection
that you condoned it?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, T do not think I was cnlled upon t/O condone
or condemn. I think I recei ved infonnation and that was that.
Mr. Dash. Well, when Mr. Dean gave you information of that kind,
3047
I take it, he expected that if you ^lys agreed with that action you
would tell him so.
Mr, Haldeman. Not necessarily. I do not think it was submitted to
me for approval. I think it was transmitted to me as information.
Mr. Dash. Just a point of information.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, there came a time, and I think we referred to this
briefly when you looked at that memorandum, that you learned that a
large sum of money, $350,000, had come from the Committee To Re-
Elect the President to the White House.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, I did not learn that it had come from them. I
caused it to come.
Mr. Dash. You asked for it?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And I think your statement indicates that it was for
polling purposes.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, it was not used for polling purposes,
was it ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct, it was not.
Mr. Dash. Then you learned, and I think it is your testimony, it
went back to the committee.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And is it your statement that you saw or knew of no con-
nection between the money going back, the $350,000 or whatever
amount went back to the committee, that you were aware of no connec-
tion between that money going back and the need for more funds to
pay the legal defense fees and family support fees of these Watergate
defendants?
Mr. Haldeman. Let me very specifically refer to my statement and
to the development of events in that regard. I can repeat the statement
if you want to.
Mr. Dash. I do not want you to repeat the statement.
Mr. Haldeman. OK.
Mr. Dash. If you could just briefly answer the question whether or
not you knew of a connection between the money going back and the
need for it for a defense fund.
Mr. Haldeman. As I said in my statement, I was asked by Mr.
Straohan after the election what should be done with the cash fund
that he had been custodian of. I told him that it should be returned
or not returned but turned over to the Committee To Re-Elect and
that he should work out the means of doing that with John Dean.
Subsequently, I was told that there was a problem in doing that.
Subsequently to that, I was told by John Dean again as I had been told
earlier, that there was a continuing need for legal fund, legal fees, for
the Watergate defendants and at that time, following this sequence
of events, I then said we have a desire to deliver funds to the committee.
The committee apparently has a desire for funds and I suggested that
Dean try to carry out both of those two objectives, which he subse-
quently did.
Mr. Dash. All right. Now you knew, at least that this $350,000
represented campaign funds, did you not ?
3048
Mr. Haldeman. No; they did not in my understanding represent
campaign fimds. The $350,000 came from, as I indicated in my state-
ment, the, what is known now, T think, as the 1968 primary siirpkis
fund.
Mr. Dash. When I say campaign fimds, I am not just referring to
the 1972 campaign funds. This was money that had been collected from
contributors for the election of President Nixon.
Mr. Haldeman. I did not know by what means this money had been
collected or for what purpose. I knew, as I have testified, that Mr.
Kalmbach was custodian of a very substantial cash fund after the 1968
election. I have heard it testified to here that that fund was generated
as — or came into being as — a surplus from funds raised in the 1968
primaries.
Mr. Dash. Well, I guess you knew that the money was certainly
in the control or in the possession of the Committee for the Re-Election
of the President, the $350,000 initially?
Mr. Haldeman. No; I learned that subsequently also. It was my
understanding that the money was under the control and in the posses-
sion of Mr. Kalmbach.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Now when you asked for the $350,000 you asked for $350,000 of
what money ?
Mr. Haldeman. Of the money that was in the control and possession
of Mr. Kalmbach and which we had been using during the period from
1968 to 197'2, among other purposes, had been using for polling.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Mr. Haldeman. We had used a substantial amount of it for polling
during that period, and my point was, it was my understanding that
that money was going, whatever was left of tliat money was going, to
be turned into the campaign committee and would be considered part
of the cash on hand or whatever when they started the reporting
period April 7. Prior to the start of that reporting period I made the
request and it was discussed with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Stans, and I
am sure also with Mr. Kalmbach, either at the same time or different
time, my request that $350,000 of that remaining fund be set aside and
not turned over to the committee and not therefore be made part of the
campaign funds. I subsequentlv learned that — T thought the money
was to be picked up from Mr. Kalmbach, I thought it was in his pos-
session. I subsequently learned that the money had already apparently
been commingled in some way with other funds that did relate to the
1972 campaign but I don't know when.
Mr. Dash. All right.
You knew how Mr, Kalmbach and whv Mr. Kalmbach was raising
funds, did you not ? The funds that came into IVIr. Kalmbach's control,
did you know that these funds had something to do with political
campaigns ?
Mr. Haldeman, With political campaigns, yes.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. But not necessarily with the 1972 Presidential
campaign.
Mr. Dash. That was my question and I stated I was not concerned
at this point with what campaign the money was related to, that it
3049
was money at least under Mr. Kalmbach's control which had been
raised for political campaign purposes.
Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry, you said it came from campaign funds
and since this inquiry is dealing with the 1972 campaign I made the
misassumption you meant 1972 campaign funds.
Mr. Dash. All right. So knowing the money jNIr. Kalmbach had con-
trol over was political campaign funds, from whatever campaign, you
also then knew after it was being sent back to the committee and there-
fore approved of its use, this campaign fund money was being used
for paying legal defense fees and support fees of criminal defendants.
Mr. Haldeman. I did not specifically know that any or all of this
money would be used nor do I know now that any of it or all of it has
been used for that purpose.
Mr. Dash. I thought your testimony was that at the time it went
over you also learned of the need, and you also approved of the need
of using the money for this purpose or you did not approve ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir ; I did not approve of the need for money. I
did know of the need and I was not in a position to approve of the need
for the money for that purpose, and my interest at that time was in
delivering the money to the committee.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Mr. Haldeman. My interest was not — my motive, in other words —
was not for the purpose of whatever the committee was going to do
with the money. My motive was that my potential use for the funds
had no longer existed and I did not want the responsibility of main-
taining custody of the funds.
Mr. Dash. Let's leave it at the fact that you knew that the money
was going to be used for defense purposes.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir, I am sorry.
Mr, Dash. You knew that.
Mr. Haldeman. I can't leave it at that.
Mr. Dash. Well, I am reading from your statement at page 36.
Mr. Haldeman. All right.
Mr. Dash [reading] :
At a later time Dean mentioned to me the committee's need for funds for legal
and family support for the Watergate defendants, and I suggested to Dean that
he try to work out a way of solving both problems by our desire to deliver funds
to the committee and the committee's need for funds.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct, but I did not know, Mr. Dash, what
was to be done with the funds that were delivered. I didn't know
whether any or all of them were to be used for that purpose. I did not
know that they were not.
Mr. Dash. Let me put it another way, did you instruct them when
the money went over that it would be highly improper to use campaign
funds for paying for the legal defense for the Watergate defendants?
Mr. Haldeman. I made no instructions as to the use of the funds at
all.
Mr. Dash. Did you feel that you should have made any ?
Mr. Haldeman. I felt that the funds were no longer appropriately
kept under my control and authority and that they should be turned
over to the Committee To Re-Elect, and handled by them.
3050
Mr. Dash. And were you not concerned at how the Committee To
Re-Elect the President conducted its business in a way that might
embarrass the President of the United States ?
Mr. Haldeman. Had I thought that the committee was going to con-
duct its business in a way that would embarrass the President I would
have raised that question.
Mr. Dash. Well, I guess and I will just end with this question on
this issue : Do you believe that spending political compaign funds to
pay for the defense of criminal defendants could embarrass the
President ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know. I don't know what — it depends on the
circumstances and situation, I think.
Mr, Dash. What about these circumstances and this situation in-
volving the Watergate ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know that I can make a judgment on that.
I again don't know clearly yet what the circumstances actually are.
What was done and for what purpose.
Mr. Dash. Is it your view there have been no embarrassing, or there
has been no embai-rassment as a result of this incident?
Mr. Haldeman. It's very clear that there has been enormous em-
barrassment as a result of the overall situation, yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. T am not going into the particular meeting of Septem-
ber 15 which you have already testified to, and I think you have re-
ferred to the fact that this September 15 meeting was with the Presi-
dent and Mr. Dean. But I think the committee is interested and some
questions were put to you concerning your access to the tapes. I think
your testimony was, and your statement was, that you did review these
tapes and that you had access to these tapes actually in this very month
of July 1973 ; is that true ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct, not to all the tapes.
Mr. Dash. No ; I am talking about the tape dealing with the meeting
on September 15.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. The tape for the meeting of Septem-
ber 15,1 did listen to
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. In July of this year.
Mr. Dash. With a little more detail, could you tell us who initiated
the request for your listening to that tape ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure whether I did or whether the Presi-
dent did in a message to me, but it w?s one way or the other on the
basis that it ended up being that I should listen to it and give him a
report as to its content.
Mr. Dash. Do you know when in July you actually received that
tape?
Mr. Haldeman. It was — I do have a calendar, I was here, this was
after I moved to California, and I came back to Washington for a
several-day period that I believe was July 9, 10, and 11, or in approxi-
mately that time and it would have been during that trip.
Mr. Dash. Was it prior to Mr. Butterfields' testimony to this com-
mittee concerning the tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. Oh, yes ; there was no question about that.
Mr. Dash. Now, could you tell us, in what form was the tape, was it
a cassette, was it a reel, and how did you get the tape?
3051
Mr. Haldeman. Was it what ?
Mr. Dash. Was it a cassette or a reel ? What physical form was the
tape in?
Mr. Haldeman. It is a reel. It is on a regular tape, round tape reel
in a box.
Mr. Dash. And you say you listened to this in your home ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct,
Mr. Dash. Here in Washington ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Was it delivered to you or did you go and obtain it ?
Mr. Haldeman. It was delivered to me at the EOB in a guest office
that I was using, the reason I was back here was to spend some time
reviewing notes in the files that I can't take out, and those are in the
EOB up in the attic and I was over there, and they had provided me
with an office to work in when I wasn't up in the file, and the tape was
delivered to me at that office.
Mr. Dash. Why did you select at this time this particular tape ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, let's see, I am not sure. I had already heard,
as I indicated, the March 21 tape. The President, as he has said, had
already listened to some of the other tapes. This was a tape that he had
not listened to and a tape that I had not listened to and it was obvi-
ously of a meeting of considerable importance, the testimony regard-
ing which was contradictory to both my recollection and the
President's.
Mr. Dash. And Mr. Dean's concerning the meeting on September 15
you are referring to?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct; yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. At that point did you ask or request to listen to any other
tapes besides the September 15 one?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure whether I asked or whether, again I
don't know which side the point came up on but there was a suggestion
of listening to some other tapes also but I did not do it.
Mr. Dash. Why?
Mr. Haldeman. Because they concerned meetings that apparently
also the President had not reviewed and that I had not reviewed, of
course, because I had listened to only the March 21st one prior to this
time but they were meetings in which I was not present at all, and I
had made the decision myself that it would not be appropriate for
me to be in the position of listening to tapes of meetings, at this point
in time at least, of listening to tapes of meetings at which I had not
been present.
Mr. Dash. But in late April you listened to a tape of March 21 of
Mr. Dean and the President when you were not present at that meeting.
Mr. Haldeman. I was present at a substantial portion of it.
Mr. Dash. Substantial portion of it, but you did listen to the full
tape?
Mr. Haldeman. That is right.
Mr. Dash. Now that you had a very rare opportunity to get access
to the tapes, I take it if you had asked for it, you could have had access
to all of the relevant tapes that were testified to the conversations by
Mr. Dean.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know that as the case, Mr. Dash.
3052
Mr. Dash. You have indicated that you yourself placed a control on
yourself and didn't ask for it but the President asked you to review
this one and give a report ?
Mr. Haldeman. Had the President asked me to review others I
would have had access to them to review them, yes. I would not have
had access on my own authority to any tape.
Mr. Dash. Not on your own authority, but if you had requested, do
you have any reason to believe you would not have been shown a tape
of a meeting with Mr. Dean on February 28 or with the President, or
with Mr. Dean and the President on March 13 as well as the one on
March 21 ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have no reason to believe that I would have been
given access or that I would not have been. I don't know.
Mr. Dash. You say this was delivered to you at the EOB office and
you took it to your own home ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And you listened to it alone ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Did you return it personally to the EOB office ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Did you make notes?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Of the tape ? Did you retain those notes ?
Mr. Haldeman. I retained them at that time and then turned them
over to the President later.
Mr. Dash. And you kept no copy of it ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did you show those notes to your counsel ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I did not.
Mr. Dash. Did you discuss with anybody else besides the President
the contents of that tape ?
Mr. Haldeman. I reported the general
Mr. Dash. I am sorry.
Mr. Haldeman. I reported the general content or let's say I con-
firmed to the President via, I believe, Mr. Buzhardt, by phone call
from California, my confirmation that the President's and my recol-
lection of that meeting or our recollection that Mr. Dean's testimony
was inaccurate regarding that meeting, that our recollection was cor-
rect. His testimony was inaccurate. I did not report in any detail on
the contents of the tapes.
Mr. Dash. To whom did you report this ?
Mr. Haldeman. I believe to Mr. Buzhardt by telephone.
Mr. Dash. When you returned
Mr. Haldeman. That was to Mr. Buzhardt for transmission to the
President. It may have — ^^I think it was to Mr. Buzhardt, it may have
been to someone else on the President's immediate staff.
Mr. Dash. Do you know when and where and to whom you returned
the tape?
Mr. Haldeman. Steve Bull was the man by whom, through whom
I acquired the tape and returned the tape.
Mr. Dash. Now, we had
Mr. Haldeman. I should explain that, as Mr. Butterfield indicated,
he was the man in charge of this thing during the time he was there.
3053
Mr. Bull replaced Mr. Butterfield in that role and in the office that
Mr. Butterfield had occupied when Mr. Butterfield had left the White
House and Mr. Bull was fully aware of this operation and means of
carrying it out and so forth, the taping activity and it was — he was,
as Mr. Butterfield indicated there weren't very many i)eople who knew
about this and Mr. Bull was the one man on the staff who did.
Mr. Dash. Of course, you knew about it during the time you were
on the staff?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. Did you meet with the President after listening to that
tape and make a report to him ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I did not.
Mr. Dash. Did you make any written report to him ?
Mr. Haldeman. Pardon me ?
Mr. Dash. Did you make any written report to the President ?
Mr. Haldeman. Only by turning the notes over to him, I did not
expand on the notes.
Mr. Dash. Now, this committee has a subpena which was a continu-
ing subpena to you to turn over such things as tapes, notes, or things
of that matter.
Why did you not turn over your notes or the tapes to this committee
which were in your possession ? The subpena specifically called for you
to turn over tapes that were in your custody or possession and you had
that tape in your custody or possession and did not turn it over.
Mr. Haldeman. I did not consider it to be in my custody. It was
handed to me to listen to for the President and report back to the
President which I did.
Mr. Dash. And you had it in your hands?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. You had it in your home?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Subpenas are issued to people who have such things al-
though they don't own them and they are required to honor them, but
I won't argue the law with you but you did not, at least based on our
subpena, turn that tape over to us on our subpena.
Mr. Haldeman. I was not aware that I was under any such obliga-
tion. Perhaps counsel can advise me as to whether I was.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I would like the gentleman to point out
where there is any continuing subpena.
Mr. Dash. The subpena calls for the witness to turn over to this com-
mittee all items that he has in his possession.
Mr. Wilson. "V^^ere there is this — read the subpena, Mr. Dash.
Do not paraphrase it like you have other things this morning.
Mr. Dash. You have the subpena now.
Mr. Wilson. I have the subpena and it is issued to produce on May 4
'•all materials and documents listed on the attached sheet in your pos-
session, custody, or control." Did we have any further subpena?
Mr. Dash. No, you did not.
Mr, Wilson. Is this a continuing subpena ?
Mr. Dash. Yes; Mr. Haldeman has been under continuing subpena
to appear here.
Mr. Wilson. Is this subpena a continuing subpena?
3054
Mr. Dash. I think we can argue the law.
Mr. Wilson. You know it is not.
Senator Ervin. I will say that the subpena says documents and I
would say that the President says these tapes are documents. He says
that himself.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, we are not concerned with subject
matter. We are concerned with time
Senator Ervin. Well, I was just
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. And what kind of subpena this is and it
is unfair of ISIr. Dash to give the impression that there is a continuing
subpena on this. There is not.
Mr. Dash. Well, I do not think
INIr. Wilson. I request that you withdraw it.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Wilson, every witness who has been subpenaed
has understood his subpena continues until this investigation is
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman
Mr. Wilson. That is not the law, sir, of either the Congress of the
United States or of the courts.
Senator Ervin. Well, I say that is the understanding.
Mr. Wilson. It is not the understanding with me.
Senator Ervin. Well, I am not responsible for your understandinar.
fLaughter.l
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to see a copy of the
subpena. It is my understanding the issue in controversy is not whether
tliere is a continuing requirement for the witness to appear before the
committee, which I think there is until he is released and discharged,
but rather whether there is a continuing responsibility to supply docu-
ments past the return date which I understand to be May 4. I am not
depending or suggesting one course of action or the other but there is
a substantial difference between the continuing nature of the respon-
sibility of a witness to appear and of subpena duces tecum to produce
certain documents on a given date. I do not have the subpena and I,
too, am not going to argue the law but I really recommend that we
get on to something else.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Haldeman. when did it first come to vour atten-
tion that there was an issue of Executive clemency being either
requested or being discussed concerning any one of the defendants ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure I imderstand what you mean, that
there was an issue of clemency being discussed.
Mr. Dash. Well, did vou ever hear, and tell us the first time you
heard, that there was discussion or concern about ffiving Executive
clemency to these defendants, either requested by the defendants or
considered by people of the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President to give this or assert this for the defendants ?
Mr. Haldeman. The first specific recollection T have of any reference
to clemency in this context was in March of this vear when we started
looking into all of these allegations. There was, I think, some reference
to clemency or promises of clemency earlier in press allegations or
other discussion, but I do not recall any — if you are referring to inter-
nal discussions of the issue of clemencv, there was none until it was
raised as a point in reporting to the President.
Mr. Dash. In early January 1973 you heard internally no reference
to any Executive clemency issue ?
3055
Mr. Haldeman. I do not recall any such. You are referring, I assume,
to the discussion that other people have had with
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. Regarding Hunt's offer and I did hear about, — I
mean, regarding Colson's contacts or communication with
Mr. Dash. Did you hear about it at that time ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe so.
Mr. Dash. I am only asking about your recollection at that time.
Mr. Haldeman. I understand.
Mr. Dash. And what you heard from the testimony or anything like
that?
Mr. Haldeman. It is hard to sort it out sometimes.
Mr. Dash. I know.
Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry.
Mr. Dash. Did you hear about any blackmail attempt by Mr. Hunt
for funds, for more funds ?
Mr. Haldeman. March 21.
Mr. Dash. And how did that come to your attention ?
Mr. Haldeman. In the meeting with the President when Mr. Dean
raised it. He had already raised it with the President before I came
into the meeting but it was — I should not say Mr. Dean raised it. He
had obviously reported on it to the President before I came into the
meeting. When I came into the meeting it was again discussed.
Mr. Dash. Now, were you aware of the fact that actually large sums
of money in March had been paid to Mr. Hunt in response to the
demand ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware that Mr. LaRue was playing a role in
transmitting those funds to Mr. Hunt or Mr. Bittman ?
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Dean sadd so at the
Mr. Dash. Meeting of the 21st ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. I do not believe he said that when
I was in the meeting of March 21, but he told me that on — in the
phone call of March 26 when he spun out to me quite a long recitation
of various problem areas, one of them being the blackmail question,
and then he got into the money and
Mr. Dash. Is that the long phone call you stated when he was at
Camp David ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct, yes.
Mr. Dash. Well, at pages 2259 to 2260 of the transcript of
Mr. Dean's testimony, he testified that he reported these demands to
you and Mr. Ehrlichman in December 1972. You do not recall that?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, moving on to the La Costa meeting on February 10,
I think ;70u have given us in your statement a description of that meet-
ing and its purpose. Mr. Ehrlichman in his testimony to us stated that,
and quite candidly, that a good part of the meeting was for the pur-
pose of developing either dilatory particulars or any other efforts to
prevent this committee even from holding hearings, if possible.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not — I do not recall Mr. Ehrlichman saying
that a,nd I certainly do not recall any discussion of preventing the
committee from holding hearings. I do recall a great deal of discussion
regarding how to deal with the committee's hearings and as I have
3056
covered in my statement, some areas of concern that arose in our mind
in connection with the committee's dealing — ^holding hearings.
Mr. Dash. Well, do you recall, as Mr. Ehrlichman testified, a dis-
cussion at La Costa concerning the need for perhaps supplying addi-
tional defense funds in the criminal case because the fact that the
criminal cases would be pending would be a basis for preventing this
committee from holding hearings ? Strategy ?
Mr. Haldeman. I recall ]\Ir. Ehrlichman's testimony the other day
to that effect. As I said in my statement, I do not recall any discussion
of money at the La Costa meeting and I am absolutely certain that if
there were any such discussion it would have to have been an incidental
one because while I was in and out of the meeting to some extent I did
not miss any major portion of the meeting and if there had been a
major discussion I would be — I would recall it. I do not.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall that the meeting dealt with the question
of evaluating the various members of this committee and an attempt,
if possible, to have some impact on selecting minority counsel of the
committee ?
INIr. Haldeman. Yes; there was some discussion of that.
Mr. Dash. And was there any implementation of or, a follow-
through on that ?
Mr. Haldemax. I do not know that there was. I am not sure.
Mr. Dash. Well
Mr. Haldeman. I have a feeling that that was, as far as minority
counsel, for instance, was after the fact because he had already been
selected.
Mr. Dash. I take it, you were aware of the so-called agenda items
that Mr. Dean has testified to which went to the President with regard
to his meeting with Senator Baker.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes ; I covered those one-by-one in quite detail in
my statement.
Mr. Dash. Was that a followup of the La Costa meeting?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe it was. Any event that happened
subsequent to another event in some degree may be a followup on the
earlier event but I do not think this was solely designed as a followup
to La Costa.
Mr. Dash. Now Mr. Magruder testified that in January he met with
you during the pendency actually of the Watergate trial, and that at
that meeting he unloaded — he said he told evervthing about the Water-
gate matter and indicated even that he would be committing perjury.
Do vou recall that testimony ?
Mr. Haldemax. I recall the testimony, yes.
Mr. Dash. All right. Now, do you recall having such a meeting
with Mr. Magruder and his giving you that information?
Mr. Haldeman. As I covered in considerable detail in my statement,
Mr. Dash, I do not recall such a meetinff and I am snre vou recall
our meeting with the staff on the evening of the day that Mr. Magruder
had ffiven his testimony and my total inability to sort out that in my
mind.
At that time T asked the staff if vou could provide me by contacting
Mr. Magnider, with anv more information as to when and what regard-
ing that meeting and if you hav^e any of that it might be helpful in
trying to
3057
Mr. Dash. Let me put the question this way. Without reference to
the particular date, did you have any meeting around that time in
January with Mr. Magruder or did Mr. Magruder in that early part
of the year, January or February, tell you all about his involvement
in the Watergate ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, that is a two-part question and let me take
the first part. Did I have a meeting with Mr. Magruder at any time
during that part of the year? I was not raising the question of date
because I was trying to hang on that I did not meet with him on a cer-
tain date. I was asking him the date he feels he met with me in order
that I could check back and see if there was any way I could sub-
stantiate that.
On the second point, did he ever make these statements, give me this
information ? As I said in mv statement categorically, he did not. He
did not in January, and he did not in February at the meeting we held
on February 14, and he did not on March 2 at the meeting we had at
that time.
Mr. Dash. All right. Now, turning to the March 21 meeting that
Mr. Dean had with the President that you were involved in to some
extent. Mr. Ehrlichman also — again, I am not going to go into that
meeting
Mr. Haldeman. 'I am sorry, I missed the date.
Mr. Dash. March 21.
Mr. Haldeman. Thank you.
Mr. Dash. I am not going into that meeting 'because I think we had
plenty of testimony. I think your statement covered it quite adequately.
I am interested in the fact that in April when you were still in the
White House you did listen to that tape.
Can you give us the specific details as to how it came about that you
listened to that tape? Who did you go to? How did you get the tape?
Why did you get the tape ?
ISir. Haldeman. The President asked me to listen to the tape and
report to him on the contents, specifically questions that he had in
his mind on it, and I got the tape also from Steve Bull. I listened to it
in my office, in a little anteroom to my office.
Mr. Dash. And was that in preparation of anything the President
was doing at that time ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe so. other than the President, as I
have indicated, was very much involved in trying to uncover the Water-
gate thing. He was dealing daily, I think, meeting daily with Assist-
ant Attorney General Petersen, who was in charge of the case at the
Justice Department, and he was spending a considerable amount of
time and thought on matters relating to Watergate.
Mr. Dash. I think that
Mr. Haldeman. That meeting, you see, was the meeting — ^that meet-
ing was the meeting at which John Dean had supposedly laid out to
him all the facts of the Watergate. We are now to the point where on
April 14 John Ehrlichman has given him his theory of the Watergate
based on the interviews that he had had and then on the 15th. the At-
torney General and Assistant Attorney General have given him their
reports based on the interviews that the prosecuting attorneys had
had with Mr. Dean and Mr. Magruder. And at that point the Presi-
3058
dent had quite a bit of information, some of it conflicting and some
of it corroborating.
Mr. Dash. Was that when he asked you to listen to the March 21
tape ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. It was after that.
Mr. Dash. After the April 15 meeting with Attorney General
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash [continuing] . Petersen ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am sure it was.
Mr. Dash. Was it before his statement of April 17 ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe so but I am not sure.
Mr. Dash. Did you have any role in the preparation of that state-
ment of April 17?
Mr. Haldeman. No. I do not think I did. I did not normally have a
role in the preparation of statements.
Mr. Dash, You knew that the tapes were there. You are one of the
few people at the "WTiite House who knew of the system. By the way,
have you heard or reviewed Mr. Butterficld's testimony concerning his
description of that system ?
Mr. Haldeman. I heard it at the time he was here. I have not had an
opportunity to review it.
Mr. Dash. To your knowledge, was that a fairly accurate statement
of the system ? I would rather not get into the time of asking you to
restate it.
Mr. Haldeman. In a general sense regarding the operation of it, yes.
I think he was wrong in timing it. I think he so indicated that he
might
Mr. Dash. Oh, yes, when it started.
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure it was all put into eifect on the same
dav. I think some parts
Mr. Dash. Eight,
Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. Were added later or something, but
the nature of the operation was accurately described by Mr. Butterfield.
Mr. Dash. Well, during this whole period you say that when the
President was really trying to get at the facts and you knew yourself
there were certain meetings, is this the only time that you were asked
while you were at the "White House, to look at a tape ? Was it only the
March 21 tape?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, and I think it was because the March 2'lst one
was the one where John Dean had in some detail spelled out specifics
regarding the Watergate. The earlier meetings were on other subjects
apparently, or matters that did not get into specifics which was what
the President was trying to find out at that time.
Mr. Dash. By the way, did Mr. Dean ever show you in April, a list
of persons who would be involved in the Watergate which included
your name on it ?
Mr. Haldeman. I certainly do not recall that at all.
Mr. Dash. I take it from vour testimony that you were not involved
in any wav in the break-in ? You did not have any of the information in
advance that would lead vou to know that there would be any kind
of intelligence of this kind. You were not aware of any of the activities
which other witnesses testified to, or some witnesses testified, of a cover-
up nature such as having Mr. Magruder commit perjury, although you
3059
were aware of certain money being used for a defense fund, that it
never was your view or opinion that this was improper or illegal. Why,
Mr. Haldeman, did it become necessary for you to resign your position
as the second man, really, to the President of the United States ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think I described that in my statement. It became
necessary or, at least in my view, became proper for me to do so because,
in particularly the latter 2 weeks of April, the intensity of charges,
inferences, and implications regarding the Watergate and regarding
my possible involvement in it, the allegations made or feeling ex-
pressed that the President should clean out the White House and all
that sort of stuff, was building up to a very heavy crescendo and the
necessity had become apparent that I was going to prepare to appear
before the grand jury and give them as much information as I could,
and it became clear that I would be appearing before the Senate com-
mittee, and as all of these things came to a point, it became obvious,
and it was not hard to determine that I was not able to carry out my
regular duties effectively. I was concentrating a great deal of time
on the things that were coming up day-to-day in relation to Water-
gate, and the operation of the White House and the Office of the
President is such that I felt it was very damaging to the operation
of the Office for anybody in the sensitive position that I was in to be
distracted at all, and I had been distracted for some time and I was
very concerned about it.
Mr. Dash. Well, how long
Mr. Haldeman. And I felt the proper way for me to deal with that
distraction was either to take a leave of absence until the whole matter
was cleared up or to resign my position and get the matter cleared up
and devote my time and attention to doing that, and after discussion
of those two alternatives, I concluded that the latter was the better one
and the proper one and I submitted my resignation.
Mr. Dash. How long after April 30 then did vou maintain an office
at the White House?
Mr. Haldeman. I used the office that I had occupied for some days
after that, and then a substitute replacement — I should say substitute.
A replacement was designated for my position, and that was only a
matter of several days, I think, and I urged that he move immediately
into my office, I felt it was symbolically important that he do so, and I
moved out of the office at that time.
Mr. Dash. Did you continue to visit the White House or maintain
office space there thereafter ?
Mr. Haldeman. I didn't maintain office space, 'I did continue to visit
the White House, not on a regular basis but I did continue to visit the
"V^Hiite House after that for several reasons : One, and again without
trying to overstate it, but the position that I had there was a focal
point for a lot of things, and it was not the kind of situation where you
could announce on Monday that you were resigning and walk away
and have everything take care of itself. I spent considerable time try-
ing to be of assistance to others in the White House and to my successor
in taking over my duties, my non- Watergate duties, and to work with
him on that.
I also spent some time at that time reviewing my notes that were, by
the day I resigned, they were impounded and put under security of the
Secret Service.
3060
Mr. Dash. All right, Mr. Haldeman, just one final question and per-
haps a request ; and I have asked this of Mr. Ehrlichman.
The President has indicated that there may be certain papers, if we
could describe them with specificity, he may be in a position to turn
over to us.
Would you be willing to look at some of the papers that relate to
your involvement during this period of time, of your relationship, and
assist the committee in identifying those papers so the committee could
describe them to the President in a request to see them ?
Mr. Haldeman. I would be certainly willing to pursue the appro-
priateness of that. I am not sure what is involved in that request. I
will
Mr. Dash. We will take it up with counsel and we can perhaps pur-
sue this later with you.
I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. I would just like to make one further observation
about the subpena.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervix. I was under the impression that the witness was
appearing under the original subpena which was a subpena duces
tecum which was dated May 2 and required him to appear on May 4
but I find he is appearing here under his second subpena which was
issued on July 10.
Consequently, tlie theory that I had that the original subpena, which
is a subpena duces tecum, was continuing I think it has been superseded
by the last subpena and, therefore, I think that Mr. Haldeman, since
he didn't have the tape in his possession on May 4, at any time between
May 2 and May 4, that he was not required to produce the tapes before
this committee.
Mr. Haldemax. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. And I will also concede the position which you took,
since there were two subpenas instead of one and the second superseded
the first, that your legal position is right.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, INIr. Chairman.
May we make both subpenas a part of this record ?
Senator Ervin. Yes. The reporter will mark them with the appro-
priate exhibit numbers.
[The subpenas referred to were marked exhibits Nos. Ill and 112.*]
Mr. Dash. Do you have the date, Mr. Haldeman, as to when you
actually had in your possession the tape in July?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir ; I am not sure what day it was.
Mr. Dash. Do you know whether it was the early part of July or
the middle of July ?
Mr. Haldeman. As I told vou it was sometime during the period that
I was here, the week of July 9.
Mr. Dash. You can confirm that date, can you not?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know how I can.
Mr. Dash. Did you sign a receipt for that tape ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Mr. Wilson. What's the relevancy of that, Mr. Chairman ?
►See pp. 3316, 3318.
3061
Mr. Dash. If the tape was in his possession at the time he was served
the second subpena that calls for the turning over of those tapes at that
time.
Mr. Wilson. 1 beg your pardon, the second subpena is ad testifican-
dum and the chairman made that clear just now. I think that is a very
serious misstatement. I don't understand Mr. Dash doing a thing
like that.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Wilson, I think that is sort of what would be
called a tempest in a teapot, and I certainly agree that Mr. Haldeman,
and I expect if I had been in his position and I was loaned this tape by
the President of the United States who says he has sole control over it,
I think I would have returned it under the circumstances. I also cer-
tainly would have advised him like you advised him since the second
subpena was a subpena ad testificandum and not a subpena duces tecum
he was under no obligation to produce the tape here and now.
Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Chairman, may I say I don't understand any
of those Latin words but I would want it clearly understood that my
counsel did not advise me to return the tape, or not to return the tape,
or to turn it over to the committee. My counsel did not know that I
listened to the tape.
Senator Ervin. That is the reason I think that the thing is all right
and I think that it is a tempest in a teapot and so we will proceed with
the examination of the witness.
Mr. Thompson. May I proceed, Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Ervin. Having been a lawyer myself, I can sympathize or
rather understand why lawyers will sometimes raise a tempest in a
teapot.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, should I go ahead right now?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson, was the point you were referring to a moment ago, about
your difference of recollection about what was stated to be the previous
testimony of Mr. Strachan, the statement by Mr. Dash that Mr. Stra-
chan testified that Mr. Haldeman told him to destroy documents ?
Mr. Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Was that what you were referring to ?
Mr. Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. I think in all fairness we might go ahead and clear
that matter up now. I do have the transcript of the page of Mr.
Strachan's testimony and I was questioning him and I said, "You said
that he — and I believe I am quoting your words — said to make sure
that the files were clean. Are those words that he used as best you can
recall ?" And he says, "Pretty close." I said, "Were you operating
strictlv on his words to make sure the files are clean?" and he says,
"That is correct."
Also on page 5119 of the transcript Mr. Strachan says, "He told me
to make sure the files are clean." Also on page 5156 of the transcript,
"He told me to make sure the files were clean and I went and destroyed
them."
I believe the record does show that he did not use the words that he
told him to destroy any files but to make sure the files were clean. T
96-296 O - 73 - Bk. 8
3062
don't think we are quibbling over words because Mr. Strachan also
testified that in using the phrase "make sure the files were clean" on
page 5066, "Looking back now it could be given a double meaning," so I
understand your concern and wanted to clear that up.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Thompson, in order to clear up my question, I never
did intend to imply or suggest that Mr. Strachan testified that you
indicated he destroyed the files and he used the word "clean" and the
question I put was that he said he destroyed the tapes and the question
put by me to him was did he destroy them on his own initiative.
Senator Gtjrney. What are we talking about — ^tapes?
Mr. Dash. I said files, not tapes.
Mr. Wilson. We will have the transcript tomorrow morning
and
Senator Ervin. I would suggest we let each lawyer phrase his own
questions in his own way.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Haldeman, let me ask you about a few things
before lunch, if we can. I want to ask you first of all about this June 23
meeting with Mr. Helms, and Mr. Walters, and Mr. Ehrlichman. You
have alluded to that and you have addressed yourself to that in your
statement.
What first caused you to believe that perhaps there was some CIA
involvement or CIA exposure which resulted in this particular
meeting?
Mr. Haldeman. I at no time believed there was CIA involvement or
CIA exposure, and I was not operating as a principal in this matter on
the basis of any belief that I held.
What first instigated the — or what started the process that led to this
meeting was a report to me by Mr. John Dean on, either late the evening
of the 22d or early the morning of the 23d, that in his communications
with the FBI, the FBI was concerned as to whether there might be
some CIA involvement or whether their investigation was in danger of
impinging upon or compromising any CIA activity.
Mr. Thompson. Was it Mr. Gray then who first brought up the sub-
ject that this possibly could be, or that he might be concerned about it?
Mr. Haldeman. It was Mr. Dean who first brought the subject up to
me. I have never discussed this subject with Mr. Gray, I didn't that
dav and I have not since.
Mr. Thompson. Did he state he was basing his discussion or his con-
cern on conversations with the FBI or with Mr. Gray specifically?
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Dean said that, yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir. What I am getting at is why the President
directed you to have such a meeting, and my understanding was that
Mr. Gray or someone in the FBI had first raised this point that it was
not vou, it was not the President, but someone in the Bureau.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Dean reported this to me, said there is this
concern and I believe that he said, "I think we ought to have General
Walters get over and work this out with Pat Gray."
In any event when I met with the President that morning, as was
my custom, I had a number of items to go through with him that had
come to mv attention or that be liad requested me to do something
about that I was reporting back on. One of those items was this report
from Dean and the suggestion, I believe a suggestion from Dean, that
3063
there be some communication set up between the two agencies, and the
President, in response or reaction to my giving him this information
said very quickly, and this was not a major official edict by the Presi-
dent of the United States signed on parchment paper. This was a very
fast conversation or a fast item in a series of items in a fast conversa-
tion where the President said, "You and Ehrlichman ^et together
with Helms and Walters and make sure they coordinate with the FBI,
have Walters go over and talk to Gray and be sure that there isn't any
problem here. Also find out if the CIA was involved and find out if the
CIA has any concern about the Bay of Pigs question being reraised."
Because of the fact that some of these people had been involved,
in the Bay of Pigs activity of the CIA and also to cover the point that
he had some concern — the President — about the possibility of the in-
vestigation of Watergate being extended beyond Watergate itself into
matters unrelated to Watergate, that covered national security areas,
and it came about that fast, probably faster because he is more articu-
late than I am, and I jotted that down.
I did it. The meeting was held the afternoon of the 23d, according
to the President's instructions as I understood them. Mr. Walters at
the meeting agreed that he would meet with Director Gray, and that
was the end of it as far as I was concerned. My responsibility was to
bring these matters to the attention of Director Helms and General
Walters and to request General Walters to meet with Pat Gray and
that was the extent of my interest in the matter and the extent of my
activity in it.
Mr. Thompson. Were you really basing it on two basic questions :
one, CIA involvement, and two, other possible CIA exposure, if you
can use that broad phrase.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes; plus also the question of — well, OK, the other
CIA exposure could also cover
Mr. Thompson. Watergate
Mr. Haldeman. It could cover the question of investigation expand-
ing into CIA, CIA covert activities. You specified it. I tried to be as
precise as I can because there has been so much question back and forth
as to what did bring this about.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
When you asked, and I assume you asked then, Mr. Helms and Mr.
Walters whether there was not in fact CIA involvement
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And did they respond to you at that time ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes ; Mr. Helms said that there was no CIA involve-
ment in the Watergate at all and he had so infonned Pat Gray.
Mr. Thompson. All right. He told that on the 23d?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. What about the question about other possible CIA
activities that might be exposed, did they respond to that ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not in any detail, no. The only area where there was
a response to that, and it was in my interpretation sort of a curious
response, was on the, CIA problem, question of whether there was a
CIA problem with relation to the Bay of Pigs, and on that one Mr.
Helms jumped very rapidly and very defensively to say, "That is of
no concern at all. We don't want to get into that at all." It was a sort
of little different reaction than the flat and calm reaction that there
3064
had been no CIA involvement in the Watergate. There was — well, it's
not irei'mane.
Mr. Thompson. Were yon satisfied with his response to your second
inquiry?
Did yon leave that meetinar satisfied that there was no possibility of
uncovering other possible CIA activities?
Mr. Haldeman. Not completely, so, no; but I wasn't concerned
about whether there was or not. The job that I was to carry out was to
request the CIA to meet with the FBI and work out the question
whether there was anv such problem.
Mr. Thompson. Were you aware of the fact that John Dean met
again with Walters on June 26 ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Mr. Thompson. You did not tell Dean to meet with Walters any
more and follow this up in any way ?
Mr. Haldeman. No; the extent of my communications with Dean in
this whole subject area, to the best of my recollection, was a very brief
confirmation back to him that we had had the meeting with Walters
and Helms and that Walters was going to be meeting with Gray. I
don't think I went into any more detail than that because that really —
the point was to get the two of them together to work out whether
there would be any problem or not.
Mr. Thompson. Was it Dean's responsibility to follow up or your
responsibility?
Mr. Haldeman. I didn't see it as either Dean's or mv responsibility
to follow up. I saw it as Walters' and Gray's responsibility to follow
up.
Mr. Thompson. Did you report back to the President?'
Mr. Haldeman. I don't specifically recall doing so but I would sur-
mise that I did, and again, in the same sense that I did to Dean simply
saying that we had held the meeting and that there was no CIA prob-
lem as far as Watergate was concerned and that they were meeting
to go into the other areas.
Mr. Thompson. Did you become aware of the fact that Acting Di-
rector Gray had called the President on July 6 ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe — ^I am aware of it now, certainly.
I don't believe I was aware of it at the time.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Let's go on to this INIarch 21 conversation. I believe the first hour of
the conversation was between Mr. Dean and the President, and then
you came in and the three of you met for 40 minutes; is that correct?
INIr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. And you have listened to the tapes of the entire
conversation, the part in which you were present and also the part
when you were not present. I would like to explore with youa little
bit more in detail some of these points that you bring out in your
statement.
You say. for example, that Dean reiterated or mentioned more than
once something to the effect that these were matters which were new
to the President.
Could you elaborate on that? Did he state it flatly in that way or
did he by some indication imply that?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. As I recall he
3065
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise a point of
order here.
Senator Irvin. Yes.
Senator Weicker. As I understand it, minority counsel is now ask-
ing of the witness testimony based on these Presidential tapes ; is that
correct ?
Mr. Thompson. His own recollection plus his refreshing of that re-
collection by listening to the tapes ; that is correct.
Senator Weicker. Well, the point of order that I raise, Mr. Chair-
man, is that as you well know the committee has not had access to
these tapes but that is immaterial for the time being.
The fact is no other witness has had access to these tapes and very
frankly — ^and I don't cite any great privilege theory and I am not a
great constitutional lawyer — but I think I understand the concepts
of fairness in the American way, and to me it is grossly unfair to
any witness who is before this committee, and testifies on the basis
of something which has been given to him, and to him alone, and I
raise this as a point of order that I intend to raise, not only as to
the INIarch 21 meeting but also as to the September 15 meeting, that
this committee should not hear from this particular witness infor-
mation which has been solely accorded to him and which has been
denied to anyone else in the United States of America.
Senator ER\^N. Well, I ruled yesterday that executive privilege
didn't apply. Of coui-se, I will have to say the letter from Mr. Buzhardt
reminds me of the lady in Shakespeare who said she would never con-
sent but she said that wliile she was consenting.
This is, I think, a little planned action in which the White House
allows Mr. Haldeman to use the tape which the White House denies to
this committee, and then lets Mr. Haldeman make the interpretation of
the tapes for this committee, and then sends down through the counsel
a three paragraph letter, the third paragrapli protesting in a feeble
way the coverage of executive privilege, at the same time having it
foreordained, as far as the White House counsel was concerned, that
the committee would overrule this claim. I share the feeling of the
Senator from Connecticut about the President of the United States
denying this committee the original tape, and if this was a court of
law this would never have been admitted in evidence because the ruling
is that only the best evidence can be received. This evidence really,
with all due respect to it, is hearsay since the original tape is up in the
White House in the exclusive possession of the President, and this is
just some kind of a post facsimile of it. I think it is counterfeit evi-
dence but I am going to admit it because it is the best we can get.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I abide by the ruling of the Chair
but I just want to point out : My concern all along has not been as to a
constitutional confrontation as between this committee and the Presi-
dent of the United States in regard to the tapes ; it has been the fact
that there was always the possibility that citizens of this country
could be denied their rights under the sixth amendment to the Consti-
tution by the President of the United States, specifically the right to
witnesses to prove their innocence or guilt, as the case may be.
And here we have a case, very, very clearly in point, as to what has
always been my concern, where, in fact, this information has been
denied individuals, never mind the committee, individuals, who may
3066
or may not be indicted, who may or may not go free depending on the
information contained in those tapes and vet one individual, one pri-
vate citizen, does have a right to them and, as I say, just on the basis
of fairness I don't have any special doctrine to put forth before this
committee but on the basis of fairness— it certainly doesn't seem to me
to be the way we do things either in the Congress or in our daily lives
here.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, might I say a word in this respect?
Surely no one doubts that I feel strongly about the availability of the
tapes. I think surelv the fact that this committee has taken a position
authorizing litigation over the availability of the tapes and the sub-
pena speaks for itself. I too have some concern, as I first had when I
first read Mr. Haldeman's statement, about the disclosure of this infor-
mation to this witness without access to this committee when this com-
mittee is involved in a lawsuit or about to be involved in a lawsuit over
the same subject.
I entirely agree with my chairman that it is a strange situation, and
I must say that we were in a position where we probably had no other
reasonable alternative except to overrule the objection and to direct
the witness to answer, which he did with the addendum to his testi-
mony on yesterdav. It seems to me that the forces set in motion led
us inexorablv to that. I haven't quite figured out why yet, and I gaze
deeply into Mr. Wilson's eyes and wonder, but some day I will know
why.
But anyway, we have crossed that bridge and it seems to me that the
alternative question is: What would we do if we did not ask now that
we have got into the matter?
So, having reached that point, I must say that I share with Senator
Weicker his concern for fairness but, by the same token, I can't resist
the temptation to find out all we can find out and I guess that is where
we are right now.
Senator Ervix. Well, I would designate that this method of getting
tapes to the committee is what I would call a leak in the tapes and I do
not seem to be quite as much concerned about certain calamities of
leaking things as I confessed to be in times past.
Senator Bakkr. I must say, Mr. Chairman, that one of the direct
bvproducts of this situation where we have in effect had testimony now
about tapes by Mr. Haldeman, one of the byproducts inevitably is to
even increase further the need that this committee has for those tapes.
And I am not c:oing to take a lot time to argue that point. I think it.
too, is self-evident, but if there is anv way, Mr. Wilson, that you can
help us get those tapes, in assistance to the credibility or the value of
your client's testimony, then may I implore you to do so.
Senator Ervin. I might say
Senator Wf.tcker. And may I. Mr. Chairman, implore the President
of the United States, not Mr. Wilson, to do so. That is who is respon-
sible.
Senator Ervix. Since we are giving interpretations of things, I will
giA^e mv interpretation of the letter the President wrote to me on
July 23, 1073, and I think he sustains our desire, the necessity of us
having the tapes. He says :
However, as in any verbatim recording of informal conversations, the.v con-
tain comments that persons with different persi)ectives and motivations would
inevitably interpret in different ways.
3067
And since the President assures us that the committee mijjht inter-
pret the tapes in quite a different way from the way Mr. Haldeman has
interpreted them, I am j^oing to have to confess that I am ffoinjy to be
rather scrupulous in considering; whether I should accept Mr. Halde-
man's interpretation.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I think what you have said is what I
stru^g:led to say and that is, we are past the point of admissibility.
Now we are in the business of wei^hin^ the value of the testimony and
it would be of great assistance if we had the original data and informa-
tion which I have spoken to previously.
Mr. Chairman, this is a good time for lunch.
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess.
Mr. WiLsox. What time do we come back ?
Senator Ervin. Two o'clock.
[^^Hiereupon, at 12 :27 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at
2 p.m., this same day.]
Afternoon Session, Tuesday, July 31, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order, and counsel will
resume interrogation of the witness.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Haldeman, I was beginning to ask you a'bout the March 21
conversation and I think it might be helpful if we separate that part
of the conversation which you participated in directly and that part
of the conversation which you did not participate in and which you
listened to on the tapes.
First of all, we have your ability to recall your own conversations,
and your credibility, in the first category, and, in the second category,
your interpretation of other conversations which may or may not be
just as good as someone else's interpretations, so let us just deal with
that first category first of all, if we might, the part that you partici-
pated in, the part of the March 21 conversation with President Nixon
and Mr. Dean in which you participated.
First of all, I would like to ask you to what extent your listening to
the tape refreshed your memory ?
Mr. Haldeman.' I would say that it confirmed my memory. I do
not believe it added a great deal.
Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you specifically with regard to some of
the points that you have mentioned and ask you to elaborate on them,
if you will, and raise any other points if you have not, if they exist
and you have not set them forth in your statement.
First of all, you mentioned in your statement that there was a dis-
cussion regarding the Hunt threat, the President again explored in
considerable depth the various options and tried to draw Dean out on
his recommendation. This is part of the conversation in which you per-
sonally participated?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
]\fr. Thompson. Exactly what was discussed with regard to the Hunt
threat and how did the President try to draw him out?
]\Ir. Haldeman. It was very much, as I described, what I heard oh the
tape later as having taken place in the earlier part of the conversation.
Either the President or Mr. Dean, when I came in, turned to that sub-
3068
ject and said that there had been a threat by Mr. Hunt just ri^ht at ;
that point in time — ^that he was demanding: $120,000 and that if ho did
not get it he would reveal the seamy things he had done for Ehrlich-
man, and then the President went through a line of questioning
Mr, Thompson. First of all, did he relate to whom that threat was i
communicated or by whom ? |
Mr. Haldemax. I am not sure that he did in that portion of the '
conversation. In other words, when I was there, I think so, and whether
it was then or earlier what he said was, and what he said to me later
in the same regard was, that it had been relayed directly to him, to
John Dean by Mr. Bittman who was Hunt's counsel.
Mr. Thompson. Was the figure of $1 million mentioned in your
presence?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. The point was made that this kind of thing, if
it were extended on into a period of time could go to as much as $1
million.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Elaborate on that discussion a little bit,
who said that?
Mr. Haldeman. Dean said it in answer to the President saying —
well, I believe in answer to the President — saying, "Well, how much is
this going to involve?" It is possible at that point that the President
said it, saying that Dean had told him it could amount to as much as
$1 million.
Mr. Thompson. Frankly, I get from looking at your statement,
that the discussion of $1 million from your addendum, occurred before
you entered the room.
Mr. Haldeman. There is no question that this whole discussion of
the Hunt blackmail, so-called, was — had been, it was clear when I
came in — eliminating my knowledge now of what happened before
from the tape — it was clear, when I came in, to me that they had al-
ready discussed this matter and that the point that was being discussed
and the questions and so on, that were being raised had been discussed
before, the President was pursuing it further in interrogating John
Dean.
Mr. Thompson. All right. But you don't specifically mention in your
addendum that the $1 million was discussed. I assume there are prob-
ablv several things that were discussed that you don't have in your
addendum. That is one of the things I am trying to find out.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, if I may, I prepared two addenda depending
on what the ruling of the committee would be as to the restriction
that had been placed on me by the A^Hiite House, and in the effort to
get all of these materials ready we left out — and it's my fault, not the
tvpists — left out part of what should have been in the addendum that
I submitted that was in the addendum that I didn't submit regard-
ing the conversation after I came into the room.
Mr. Thompson. Do you have that ?
Mr. Haldeman. If I could read just a pertinent paragraph which
should have been in this addendum T would like to.
Mr. Thompson. All right. I think it probablv is appropriate if you
make that available to us now: if you only have one copy you go
ahead and read it if that is the best way to proceed.
Mr. Haldeman. We only have one copy. I will read it and then
submit it.
3069
Mr. Thompson. Go ahead and read it.
Senator Ervin. I would request after you read the copy you make
it available to the committee so we can Xerox it and give members and
counsel copies.
Mr. Wilson. I may have one.
Mr. Haldeman. We may have another one. I won't read the whole
thing because it's redundant except for the portion that should have
been included in both and wasn't, regarding the time I came in.
Mr. Thompson. Instead of doing it piecemeal, if you think it will
be helpful and if there are other matters, go ahead and read the en-
tire addendum.
Mr. Haldeman. I think verbatim in most cases because this only
covers a portion of what the other one covers but there was a part left
out in timing.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Senator Weicker. Verbatim of what ?
Mr. Thompson. Are you saying the same as the addendum which
you have already submitted ?
Mr. Haij>eman. That is right. I will submit the entire thing and
you can
Mr. Thompson. Right
Mr. Haldeman. I will be glad to read it all if you would like me to.
Mr. Thompson. Just read the portions you desire right now and we
will take a look at it and we may ask you to read other portions.
Mr. Haldeman. OK.
I say that to the best of mv recollection when I entered the meeting
there was a discussion regarding a Hunt threat that he be given $120,-
000 or else he would tell about things he had done for Ehrlichman. It
was clear this had also been discussed earlier in the meeting. The Presi-
dent asked Dean some leading questions about what he would recom-
mend, how such a payment could be made and so on.
There was a reference to a long-term need for as much as $1 million.
Dean described a process of transferring and delivering the funds and
this is when Dean said next time he would be more knowledgeable, at
which I laughed. That reference is why I realized I had left this out in
the addendum omitted because in the conclusion I made the point on
impressions that his statement that he would be more knowledgeable
next time and my laughing at that is also an event that he says took
place in the March 13 meeting but in fact took place on March 21.
Then I think it picks up from the addendum that I already have. It
is that one paragraph that was left out.
Mr. Thompson. You say in the addendum which you have already
submitted that, "The President tried to draw Dean out on his rec-
ommendation." That is obviously a conclusion on your part, in what
manner did he draw him out ?
Mr. Haldeman. By asking a number of questions about what, how
you would get some, this kind of money which Dean said was hard to
do and then the President responded it wasn't hard to do to get it biit
the question was then what do you do with it, how do you deliver it,
what has been done in the past with it, what are the processes involved,
and that kind of, what I would call, leading questions.
Mr. Thompson. In the part of the conversation in which you partici-
pated, in what part did this particular point arise, in the first
3070
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Thompson [continuing] . Part,
Mr. Haldeman. Yes ; I believe that was the first matter that came up,
the first matter that came up when I was in the meeting.
Mr. Thompson. What makes you think, from what you have testified
to, that the President was trying to draw Dean out? What do you
mean by saying draw Dean out ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think he was asking the kind of question that was
designed to try to find out, try to get the information for himself as
to what really was involved in all of this, and what Dean knew about it.
Mr. Thompson. Do you think there was a question in the President's
mind at that time as to Dean's personal involvement in the matter?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know. That is something I am not pre-
pared to
Mr. Thompson. Wliy would the President ask, you know, what do
you do with it when you get it, things of this nature ?
Mr. Haldeman. He was trying to find out what the process was.
Dean had described this — I am back to what he had done earlier, but
he had described it as a, one of the examples of the things that had
been happening and it was a thing the President was pursuing.
Mr. Thompson. Going back into the other category a minute, the
tape that you listened to of conversation between the President and
Dean before you arrived. Had this same dialog taken place, substan-
tially the same dialog?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, in more detail.
Mr. Thompson. In more detail ?
Mr. Haldeman. More extensively.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know why or did anyone express to you,
either then or later, as to why the same conversation was gone into
again, the same dialog in your presence if they had already carried
on this conversation? "Wliy was it repeated in your presence?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I don't know why.
Mr. Thompson. What I am, wondering is exactly why the President
would ask these questions. Was he really interested in whether or not
$1 million could be raised for this ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, no; I do not think he was — the questions he
was asking were not in the direction of a — whether $1 million could be
raised but rather in the direction of what this process was that Dean
was describing of blackmail and what was done about it.
Mr. Thompson. Why would he want to know the process, do you
think?
Mr. Haldeman. I think he was trying to find out what was going on.
Mr. Thompson. What do you mean, what was going on ? "^AHio exactly
was ti-ying to do the blackmail, exactly how they were trying to carry
it out?
Mr. Haldeman. He had already been told who was doing it. He
was trying to find out how it was teing carried out, how would it
Mr. Thompson. Did he ask Dean's participation in case they went
about that method of raising money ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure that ho did. T think he was asking him
in a more^ — he was not asking in a specific sense. He did not say what
do you do, w^hat does so and so do? He asked wliat would be done.
3071
what would happen ? He was — ^they were open kind of questions, as
I recall it.
Mr. Thompson. This was
Mr. Haldeman. I have made the point as I have indicated in the
earlier session, he would — would lead them one way and then he would
lead them the other way. In other words, he would ask : Do you do this ?
Is this your recommendation ? Is this what we need to do ? Is this what
ought to be done ? That was what you are saying.
Then, he would go the other way and say, but you cannot do that.
In other words, we can raise that kind of money but it would be wrong
to do it.
Mr. Thompson. I am asking for a conclusion from you. Why would
he ask Dean if this was his recommendation to him, if in his own mind
he was not going to consider it, unless he was suspicious of Dean and
wanted to know Dean's own involvement in the matter or to what ex-
tent Dean would possibly go in order to raise this money ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think he was at a point where he had — well, it is
very difficult for me to characterize the motives except that he was
trying — it was clear he was trying to get information.
Now, why he was trying to get the information is not clear to me.
Certainly, 1 would say it was not clear to me then. I think that he had
heard a number of things in that meeting and this was, I think, the
most shocking thing to him, the one that was of most concern to him,
and was the one he was exploring in most depth.
Mr. Thompson. You stated previously — ^I believe it is in your
addendum — that in the first part of the conversation, where you were
not present, the President said something to the effect that it was
wrong.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
INIr. Thompson. I take it he did not say that in your presence.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not recall that he did but it is — it is very hard
on something like this, as I am sure you understand, to say affirma-
tively that something was not done because I am going on recollection
of what I can — exactly what was done.
JNIr. Thompson. Continuing on with the points that were discussed
in your presence, did you state that they discussed Ehrlichman's sug-
gestion that everyone in the White House should go to the grand jury ?
]Mr. Haldeman. That is right. There apparently had been a meeting
of the President and Mr. Ehrlichman that morning prior to the meet-
ing with Mr. Dean at which this suggestion had been raised by Mr.
Ehrlichman.
Mr. Thompson. Well, how was this suggestion raised? Who raised
this suggestion?
Mr. Haldeman. I believe the President did in saying that — ^how do
we deal with — he is looking now at the total situation, that there now
appears to be this — various problems that Dean has enumerated, facts
regarding this whole thing that the President had not been until
that time aware of, and then the question — he started exploring, what
do vou do about it.
Mr. Thompson. Was he trying this out on Dean, so to speak, to
see how Dean would react to it?
3072
Mr. Haldeman. That is certainly possible. I think he was seeing
how I would react to it, too.
Mr. Thompson. How did you react to it?
Mr. Haldeman. My reaction, I think — either at that meeting or at a
meeting later — was that the way to get this thing uncovered and out
was to put out a White House statement. That was my view on the
thing at that time, that we should try to put the whole — all the facts
together, put them into a definitive statement of those facts and release
it and that was my view as contrasted, I believe at that time, to Ehrlich-
man's view that a way to get all this established and in a proper forum
and recognizing — see, I didn't understand the legal problems involved
and the points of rights of defendants and all that which were of con-
cern to the others and which were apparently an impediment to my
idea. It wasn't my sole idea but the idea I was espousing of putting
out an overall statement on the subject.
Mr. Thompson. Of course, you are not a lawyer. Did you realize at
this time that the grand jury testimony was taken in secret?
Mr. Haldeman. I know a lot more about grand juries today than
I did then, and I did not know, and I think again in this period, I didn't
know how a grand jury worked but I suggested at one point or raised
the question — I didn't know whether it was in that meeting or some
other meeting — ^that the grand jury sounded like a good idea if we
could then release the grand jury testimony. I didn't know that you
couldn't release grand jury testimony and I thought maybe that was
an approach, in other words, make a record at the grand jury and they
release the record. I now know the grand jury can't do that, but I also
know now that the people who testified at the grand jury can do that.
So, in effect we could have followed that road.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Haldeman, what was Dean's reaction to the
suggestion that you go before the grand jury ?
Mr. Haldeman. His suggestion or his reaction — I don't know that
he reacted to it at that meeting. He may have.
Mr. Thompson. There has been other testimony on that subject. What
was his general feeling in that regard from what you know of con-
versations which you personally have had with him?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, it did come up in the afternoon meeting that
same day.
Mr. Thompson. The 21st?
Mr. Haldeman. I believe so. And it came up several times in the
period of that week. Mr. Dean's position on the grand jury idea was
that it would be a good idea to have everybody go to the grand jury
but with immunity, and that that was the best way to get out the
truth, as if everybody were granted immunity. Now, again, he should
have known as a lawyer — I didn't know at that time that one acquires
immunity only by first invoking the fifth amendment and had I known
that, I would have strenuously objected to that approach as John
Ehrlichman did object, not on the ground of the fifth as I recall it
but on the ground that it just — it didn't make anv sense.
Mr. Thompson. Did anyone ask him why he felt that either he or
the others in the White House needed immunity ?
INIr. Haldeman. I didn't hear you, I am sorry.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever ask Dean why he felt that he or others
in the White House would need immunity?
3073
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. I think that
■Mr. Thompson. In other words, if not wrong there would be no
need for immunity.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, he had indicated at that point, at least to the
President and at later points when this was discussed he had indicated,
he had told me, that he felt there was a potential problem and that
it extended — in his view it extended certainly to himself and possibly
to me and possibly to Ehrlichman, Kalmbach, Mitchell, and Magruder.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Some of these matters were discussed between the President and
Mr. Dean before you arrived on the 21st, is that correct?
Mr. Haldeman. That is right.
Mr. Thompson. Well, we will get to those in a minute. Let's con-
tinue with the part in which you participated.
You stated in your addendum that Dean said that he was aware that
he was presenting things to the President that the President had not
previously known. How did this come up? In what manner did he
state it? Wliat was the President's reaction?
Mr. Haldeman. He — I recall one, because it is in the notes, one
specific thing where, as they were discussing one of these items,
Dean — ^the President was asking some questions that T don't think the
Questions were quite making sense to Dean and he said, well, Mr.
President, I know that I am covering things with you here that you
have known nothing about. It was a clear and flatstatement to that
effect.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Haldeman, did you ever discuss this conversa-
tion on the 21st with the President at any subsequent time or discuss
at any subsequent time the same matters that you discussed on the 21st?
Mr. Haldeman, I am not sure what you mean.
Mr. Thompson. Well, you refer in your addendum also to the fact
that the President said on later occasions he had no intention of doing
anything about money.
ISIr. Haldeman. I see what you mean.
INIr. Thompson. And he did not know anything about the coverup.
When did that conversation take place and what was discussed in that
conversation ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. That — I can't pin the specific con-
versation on that. This was in going back and going over these steps.
From that point on, from INIarch 21 on, the President became very
much involved in seeking information about some of these things and
talking about them with various people. As you know, he put Mr.
Ehrlichman into the fact-gathering business on March 30. While we
were in Key Biscayne over the weekend on the 23d he raised a number
of questions that came out of his sorting through what he had been
told by John Dean on the 21st, and I am not sure at what particular
time he would have said this but it is very clear that he had made
that point.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Now, does this pretty well exhaust all the subjects, all of the major
points of the conversation of the 21st in which you participated?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, then, the point that the President wanted
Dean to meet with Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Ehrlichman, and me and there
3074
was some discussion about that, when that should be, how we should
do that, or something to that effect, and such a meeting was set up
for the next morning.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Now, let's go into the other category, the part of the conversation
between the President and Mr. Dean when you were not present. You
mentioned first of all that Dean t/old the President that there was no
White House involvement with regard to the break-in of the DNC
and that he had gotten his information from Liddy, is that correct?
]Mr. Haldeman. Yes ; we went through, I believe, some of the details
of how the break-in had been engineered and brought about, based
on, I think, the testimony that had been provided to it, at the trial,
and so on, and then said, however, that he had talked with Liddy right
after the break-in and Liddy had told him that there had been nobody
in the White House involved.
Mr. Thompson. Let us separate that into two categories, the break-in,
on the one hand, and the so-called coverup on the other hand. What
did he say concerning who might have known about the break-in, who
might have been involved in the planning of the break-in, and so forth ?
Mr. Haldeman. He said that Liddy, of course, had been that he,
I am almost sure that at this time he was not certain but his opinion
was that Magruder had been involved in the planning and knowledge
of the break-in, and he indicated that he was not sure whether Mr.
Mitchell had known about it or not.
Mr. Thompson. Did he say anything about you ?
Mr. Haldeman. No. Li regard to the break-in? Or knowledge of
the break-in ? You say you were dividing it into two parts.
Mr. Thompson. Yes, yes, sir, I am. I was asking specifically with
regard to the fruits that he felt you might have seen which might
have been some indication of that. As far as I can remember that was
the onlv part that he mentioned.
Mr. Haldeman. He said as far as — at that time the terminology was
pre-June 17 and post-June 17, and his, he divided his report into pre-
June 17 and post-June 17, and regfarding pre-June 17 he said Liddy
had told him that no one in the White House was involved, his own —
he described his meetings with the Attorney General and Liddy and
Mr. Magruder at which there had been intelligence plans discussed.
I do not believe that he indicated, I am virtually certain he did not
indicate, any thought that these meetinirs had specificallv related to the
break-in at the Democratic National Committee but had been general,
perhaps for general intelligence programs but with totally inconceiv-
able kinds of activities. I believe he told the President that he had
reported to me on those meetings, after the second of those meetings,
and that he had told, had recommended to me that this be turned over
and he be not involved in, at all in any such things.
Mr. Thompson. Is that a meetins: that you do not remember?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. The meeting which I do not recall —
I have no specific recollection
Mr. Thompson. Alleged meeting is a better wav to put it.
Mr. Haldeman fcontinuingl. That he described, but T verv definitely
recall his recoimting his assertion of this meeting to me at later points
in time.
3075
Mr. Thompson. And he told that to the President, too, as best you
can remember?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, I think he did.
And then he, I believe, said that his concern, as far as the White
House was concerned, as far as the White House was involved in the
pre-June 17 area, was in two possibilities. One, that there had been a
phone call from Colson to Magruder which could have been con-
sidered or could be construed as pressure by Colson on Magruder to
go ahead with this project. He, I do not think, went into any real
specifics on that, and the other point was the question of whether
Haldeman had seen the, as he called them, I think, the fruits of the
bugging activity, because it was his understanding that the fruits had
been sent to Strachan.
Mr. Thompson. "UTiat was the basis of his understanding?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know that he identified a basis, I do not
recall that he did. I think he simply said it.
Mr. Thompson. Did he at any time subsequent to that talk to you
about where he was getting his information, where he got his infor-
mation, that you possibly might have seen the fruits of some of this
surveillance activity ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think at that very — it is hard to put this into
when, but he had told me that Magruder had told him that he had
sent bugging material to Strachan.
Mr. Thompson. Did he tell you that Strachan had said anything
to him about his receiving such material?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; the only recollection I have as far as Strachan
is concerned, is that he had consistently said that he had not received
such material.
INIr. Thompson. All right. Does that pretty well cover the pre-June
17 discussion?
Mr. Haldeman. Those two points were basically it, as far as pre-
June 17.
Mr. Thompson. What about post- June 17?
Mr. Haldeman. Post-June 17, he said that there were also two areas
of concern. That one was clemency and the other was money, and in
the clemency area where he felt there was a potential problem was
this — the fact that, as he put it, at that time, as best I can recall, Colson
had talked with Hunt or Bittman about clemency. There had been a
conversation, I do not think he went any further than that, I do not
think he asserted that there had been any offer or anjrthing of that sort,
simply that there had been a conversation.
Mr. Thompson. Was there any mention at any time, either in your
presence or out of your presence that you heard from the tape, about
Colson's offering Hunt Executive clemency, or possibly relaying a
message that he could expect it through someone else?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, there was in the sense that on March 23 when
I got to Key Biscayne, the President had gone down the day before,
tlie President called me over to his house and he then having read the
McCord letter — he had not read it but had been given, had been told
of the reading of the McCord letter, and the allegations that were
contained in that, had raised the point with me that here we were
with new ongoing developments on the Watergate and the White
3076
House was still not moving ahead to get this thing cleared up, and
he had picked up facts from Dean and he had information from Dean
that lie was concerned about, and he specifically asked me to call
Colson and to ask him about this question of whether he had offered
clemency or had any conversation regarding clemency with Hunt.
Mr. Thompson. All right. All of this that you have been relating,
is from the tape, as I understand it ?
Mr. Haldeman. No; no, sir, not by March 23 has nothing to do
with it.
Mr. Thompson. I am sorry, I am not talking about March 23 ; I
will just jump back a little bit.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes; anything that I am talking about in terms
of the INIarch 21 meeting in the morning is
Mr. Thompson. From the tape?
Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. Is of necessity from the tape, yes.
Mr. Thompson. You are talking about a personal conversation with
the President on the ^3d?
Mr. Haldeman. That is right. You asked if there had been any
conversation after that.
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Haldeman. Of course, there wasn't — I don't recall any con-
versation after that in the March 21 meeting if that is what you meant
and I am sorry, I didn't understand that to be your question.
Mr. Thompson. Wliat about during the 21st meeting?
Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry, about what?
Mr. Thompson. Was there any mention at any time in the 21st meet-
ing which you participated in or part of the meeting which you did
not, of the general subject matter of Colson, or anyone else, having
offered Hunt Executive clemency ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is the point I just said. Dean did rej)ort to the
President that one of his two post- June 17 concerns was clemencv,
and that in that regard the reason for his concern was that it was his
understanding that Colson had talked with Hunt or with Bittman
about clemency.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
The discussion of the 23d, of course, followed that, along the same
line?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. You have already mentioned the so-called blackmail
point that was discussed.
Mr, Haldeman. That is right, which was cited as an example of
the problem of money.
He also — ^that was the most recent example — he did describe to the
President some background in the sense of money for defendants, that
there had been an effort, in fact, money had been obtained and pro-
vided to the defendants, and I am virtually certain that he said that
this was for legal fees. In other words, let: me put it the other way,
I do not recall in that meeting either when T was there or at any time
prior to when T came in, but what T heard from the tape, any reference
to monev l^eing supplied for defendants' silence.
Mr. Thompson. But only what you have related.
What did you hear on the tape concerning the Ellsberg matter?
3077
Mr. Haldeman. That, I think, was only a passing reference as he was
talking about other possible areas of concern. His principal areas of
concern, post-June 17 — well, I have already described it, were money
and clemency, pre-June 17 were the phone call and the fruits, and
then he said there are other possible related problems that may come
out, and among them are, I am not trying to cite a conversation because
I think some of these came up, these weren't presented as a list of other
problems, they came up in relation to other things he was talking
about, but he, in the course of the conversation, referred to the Ellsberg
doctor break-in which was the first time I had heard any reference to
that, I mean when he talked about this later was the first time I had
heard any reference to it.
I made — I am sure I heard it before I heard the tape because I think
it was discussed during the Camp David period, but the Ellsberg
break-in, something about, something at the Brookings Institution, the
Segretti matter, Kalmbach's general money raising and expenditures.
Mr. Thompson. Chappaquiddick ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is right. The Colson investigation of Chap-
paquiddick, there was a reference to that.
Mr. Thompson. Did the President indicate he was familiar with
any or all of these potential problems that Dean raised ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I don't believe he did. I think they were sort
of — these were not, I don't recall any of these being gone into in any
detail. They were raised as other potential problems.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Ehrlichman — Mr. Haldeman, I would — you
know it is bound to happen, I guess.
Mr. Haldeman. I knew it was bound to happen, I was waiting to
see who would be the initiator.
Mr Thompson. You realize, of course, that about all we have to go
on as far as this tape part is your own recollection credibility.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. And has it ocurred to you that these tapes might
be made public as a result of a court determination on potential
lawsuits?
Mr. Haldeman. I am very much aware of that and I am very much
aware that my accuracy in attempting to describe the contents of those
tapes is subject to verification, possible verification, and I would not
want to imply that I am making any greater than normal attempt to
be accurate, but I assure you, I am making every possible attempt to
be as accurate as I can.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Haldeman, let me ask you about another point.
Did you have discussions with Dean from time to time about your
own personal involvement, what vulnerability you might have with
regard to post- June 17 activities ?
Mr. Haldeman. John raised the question of possible vulnerability
with me during our series of phone conversations while he was at
Camp David and I was at Key Biscayne or perhaps after I was back
in Washington — he was still at Camp David — generally in terms not
of legal vulnerability, and he generally spelled it out that way. It
would come up as he was describing what he was findina: and what
the problems were. He said, "There is a possibility of a problem for you
here in the question of the $350,000" and that would arise if it were
determined or felt or alleged that this money were used for defend-
96-296 O - 73
3078
ants' silence or something of that sort, and whenever he raised that
point, which he did several times, I recounted my understanding from
him that that was not the purpose of this money.
Mr. Thompson. But in your face-to- face conversations with him
did he ever raise any other point that might make you legally vulner-
able to raise some appearance of impropriety ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, in the March period again, he did at times
raise the point that another possible vulnerability on my part would
be my having OK'd Kalmbach raising funds, but at other times he
cited that only as John Ehrlichman's vulnerability, in other words,
that he had only checked with John Ehrlichman.
In other words, that didn't always come through the same way.
Sometimes it was that he had checked with John Ehrlichman and me
before he asked Kalmbach to raise money and at other times he said
he had only talked to John Ehrlichman.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall when the last time you discussed this
matter with him was — the last time he mentioned your possible
problems ?
Mr. Haldeman. The last time I mentioned my possible problem.
Mr. Thompson. Then he mentioned your possible problems to you
in your Camp David conversations when he was there; I believe he
went there on March 23, did he not?
Mr. Haldeman. INIarch 23, came back on the 28th — no, I am sure,
because we had continuing discussions on through the period up to
April, I guess up to mid-April so I would guess that this question
would have arisen during the course of those discussions at some point.
Mr. Thompson. Now, of course, from his testimony before this
committee and from newspaper stories that leaked out at various
periods of time, there have been many other statements made concern-
ing your activities starting back as early as June 1972. "When did you
first get an indication that he was going to state that you were impli-
cated in other ways besides the two ways that you have mentioned?
Mr. Haldeman. I guess from the newspaper stories that were report-
ing what he was supposedly going to tell this committee.
Mr. Thompson. Well, were you talking to him during the period of
time when his attorney was talking to the assistant U.S. attorneys
about his involvement ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. Well, I was during the period — during the
week of April 8 — April 1 — during the time we were in San Clemente,
and he was in Washington, and he told me that his attorneys had met
with the U.S. attorneys in informal sessions, two such sessions in
that — during that week in April, and he told me what the nature of —
general nature, at least, of their discussions had been and he told me,
as I said in my statement, that the U.S. attornevs had told his attor-
neys that they were not concerned with any post-June 17 questions
and that they were only concerned with the pre-June 17 problems and
that in that area they were not seeking Dean as a principal nor as a
target, as apparently they put it, but were seeking him as a witness
and that they had indicated to him that they probably would not be
seeking me as a witness, even, and had no interest in me as a principal,
or target.
Mr. Thompson. On April 14 Ehrlichman made his report to the
President, is that correct?
3079
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. And Petersen made his report to the President — his
findings.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. On April 17 the President made his statement about
major developments having come about, no one in the White House
would have immunity, something to that affect, and on April 19 Mr.
Dean issued his famous scapegoat statement. What did you take that
to mean at the time ?
Mr. Haldeman. I did not know.
Mr. Thompson. Was this any indication
Mr. Haldeman. At that time there was no — I did not know why he
would feel compelled to make a scapegoat or that he — a statement that
he would not be a scapegoat.
Mr. Thompson. Did he up until that time give you any indication
that he was going to make any allegations against you except those
two matters with regard to the money ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, and he did not indicate those as allegations he
would make to me. He indicated that he was talking with me on a very
cooperative basis as to what he considered to be potential problems,
and in the nature, at the time that we were talking about them, of being
embarrassments rather than legal problems. But he did say that this
could even get to the point of being a legal problem if it developed
into a circumstantial chain of, I think he put it, a circumstantial chain
of evidence leading to this.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Haldeman, let me ask you one more line of
questions. You have in your statement on page 28 the following para-
graph where you make some allegations yourself. You say —
Moreover, the pranksterism that was envisioned would have specifically ex-
cluded such actions as the following: violent demonstrations and disruptions,
heckling or shouting down of speakers, burning or bombing campaign head-
quarters, physical damage or trashing of headquarters and other buildings,
harassment of candidates' wives and families by obscenities, disruption of the
national convention by splattering dinner guests with eggs and tomatoes, indecent
exposure, rock throwing, assaults on delegates, slashing bus tires, smashing
windows, setting trash fires under the gas tank of a bus, knocking policemen from
their motorcycles.
Do vou have any basis for these allegations ?
Mr. Haldeman. These have all, as I understand it, been documented
as specific events and this is not an attempt to make a complete list. It
says "such as," and there were a number of others
Mr. Thompson. Did you x>ersonally
Mr. Haldeman. Including one I would have loved to put in here
but mv lawyers made me take it out for the tender mercies of the
television audience, but all of these I have been told are documented
incidents that took place. Some of them are incidents which I person-
ally observed so
Mr. Thompson. Go down the list, if vou will and tell us about the
ones of which you have personal knowledge.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, the violent demonstrations and disruption I
have substantial knowledge of because there was a fairly extensive
program of violent demonstration and disruption during President
Nixon's campaign at a number of campaign stops. That one of the
3080
more notable examples was in San Francisco at a luncheon appearance
at the Palace Hotel, I believe it was, where the violence and activity
was such that the entire block in which the Palace Hotel is situated
had had to be cordoned off by police and with mounted police. It was
in a state of complete siege with men with guns and I believe bayonets,
and mounted policemen wearing gas masks. It was quite a scene. I had
been widely reported as a movie fan and I took some movies of that
because it was sort of a remarkable situation.
During that time there was a considerable amount — I understand a
considerable amount of property damage by the demonstrators, break-
ing windows and that sort of thmg, in the general area of the hotel, and
I believe that was the time that one of them stabbed a policeman with
a knife.
There was almost invariably heckling or shouting down of speakers
and specifically the President of the United States, at virtually every
public campaign rally during the campaign. There was also an orga-
nized group of demonstrators with very unpleasant signs and very
vocal lungs that would try to shout down the President as he spoke.
A prime example of that, there was sort of, I felt, a tragedy. That
was one that took place on the grounds of the Statue of Liberty. This
was not a campaign appearance. It was a dedication of an immigra-
tion museum on that island where the Statue of Liberty is located and
there were demonstrators that had situated themselves, obviously for
the benefit of television, right in front of the President and between the
President and the television cameras, and they attempted to shout him
down and did so quite effectively because they were so close to the
microphones that the same microphones he was speaking into, were
picking up their shouts and you might remember the newscast of that
event because the President, one of the rare times that he did so,
directly referred to the demonstrators and made the point that he
hoped that the television cameras would include the thousands of
people that had gathered there for this ceremony who were there for
a constructive purpose instead of just focusing on this small group of
people who were trying to disrupt it.
The burning and bombing of campaign headquarters, I have no per-
sonal knowledge of, in that I have never been in one that was burned
or bombed but there have been a number of news reports and I think
official investigations of those and I do not think there is any question
of the fact that Nixon headquarters, one of them in Arizona, I believe
in Phoenix, was burned down and one in Hollywood on Fairfax
Avenue was blown up by a bomb. As a matter of fact, I think that is
one where one of the people who brought the bomb in was killed in the
explosion.
Physical damage, trashing of headquarters and other buildings,
there was a considerable amount of that.
The harassment of candidate's' wives and families by obscenities.
Mrs. Nixon and Tricia and Julia were subjected to such harassment
in very crude form in a number of their public appearances. As vou
know, they traveled on independent schedules, campaigning on behalf
of the President's reelection, and all of these incidents have been,
I understand, put together in a documented form and this question —
I referred to some of these things at the time I met with the committee
staff the first time and I was asked at that time, by the staff, to provide
3081
more information than the general comments that I had to make, and
I indicated that I would do so. I requested that this be done and I
assume that it has and that the committee — I trust that the staff has
received some documentation.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Haldeman, I think we have what we need avail-
able. I wanted to know what you knew from personal knowledge and
recollection and you are one witness who can address this subject
matter. Obviously it is relevant.
Mr. Haldeman. I didn't cover the national convention things but I
can testify to that, too, as can any of the people who were at the
Republican Convention and remember the problems that delegates
had in getting to the convention hall because of the slashing of bus
tires, threats of violence to delegates, the trash fires under — ^these were
mostly covered, most of them covered on television, so I don't think
they are events that are unfamiliar with the American people.
Mr. Thompson. You make the statement on page 29, "So far there
has been no investigation of these activities and very little publicizing
of them." You are in error on the first part. They are being investigated.
Mr. Haldeman. I am happy to hear that I am in error and welcome
being corrected.
Mr. Thompson. You say some of these instances took place with the
clear knowledge and consent of the opposing candidates in the last
election. Do you have any basis for that statement ?
Mr. Haldeman. I understand there is some in the documentation.
The one specific that comes immediately to mind on that is the occasion
of a trip to Los Angeles to the Century Plaza Hotel at which there
was a very large demonstration staged out in front. The handbills to
notify people of this demonstration, of this planned demonstration,
where to be, at what time, and that sort of thing, were handed out by
the McGovern headquarters and I understand there was a phone call
program set up in the McGovern headquarters there for calling people
to urge them to come and attend this demonstration.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Haldeman, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will reserve any further questions I have until
after members of the committee have questioned the witness. Thank
you.
Senator Ervin. Were you at the McGovern headquarters ?
Mr. Haldeman. Pardon me, sir?
Senator Ervin. Were you at the McGovern headquarters at that
time?
Mr, Haldeman. No, I was not. This was reported in the newspapers
and the manager or one of the officials of the McGovern headquarters
issued an apology, an acknowledgment and an apology for that having
been done.
Senator Ervin. Did he acknowledge that he had instigated it?
Mr. Haldeman. The manager had ?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know that he had.
Senator Ervin. That is the thing. You know, we have had a little
demonstration or so here but I haven't consciously staged it.
Now, when did you last see this tape ?
Mr. Haldeman. Which tape, sir?
Senator Ervin. Which one was it you saw in July ?
3082
Mr. Haldeman. The tape of the September 15 meeting:.
Senator Ervin. And when did you see the other one ?
Mr. Haldemax. I saw the other one or listened to the other one in
April, the latter part of April.
Senator Ervin. Now, the President consented for you to put in your
interpretation of these tapes in your statement.
Mr. Haldeman. The President authorized me to testify as to my
recollection of meetings in which I was present.
Senator Ervin. Did the President give you consent to put your
interpretation of these two tapes in your statement? That is my
question.
Mr. Haldemax. No sir, not — he specifically gave — authorized me to
give my recollection, obviously aided by having listened to the tapes.
Senator Ervin. Wasn't there a little bit of collaboration between
you and attorneys for the White House in the preparation of this
statement ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know what you mean, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin, Collaboration. Don't you know what the word col-
laboration means?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir, but I don't know what you mean by collabo-
ration between me
Senator Ervin. Didn't the attorneys for the President know what
was in your statement ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. Well, will you please tell me why they put this third
paragraph in this letter of July 30, 1973, that, if asked to testify as to
facts which he learned about meetings or portions of meetings which
he did not attend, but of which he learned solely by listening to a tape
recording of such meeting, the President has requested that you inform
the committee that Mr. Haldeman has been instructed by the Presi-
dent to decline to testify to such matters, and that the President, in
so instructing Mr, Haldeman, is doing so pursuant to the constitu-
tional doctrine of separation of powers.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman
Senator ER\aN. Wait a minute. I am asking your witness a question,
Mr. Wilson. This is no question of law.
I am asking you why the attorneys for the President wrote such a
letter as this and gave it to your lawyer instead of this committee.
Mr, Haldeman, I don't know how they knew it, I represented to my
attorneys my concern that in preparing my statement I was obviously,
of necessitv, dealing with matters that covered events, the knowledge
of which I had as a result of listening to the tapes, and I asked my
attorneys to ascertain for me what requirements I would be under in
terms of separation of powers restrictions as to my testimony in that
regard.
Senator Ervin, Isn't the inference irresistible that the attorneys for
the Wliite House knew that you had in your statement references to
your interpretation of these tapes?
Mr. Haldeman, At the time I raised the question T did not have
them in my statement, Mr, Chairman, I was trving to determine what
to put in my statement and on the other hand what not to put in.
Senator Er\t[N, Do you mean to tell me, Mr, Haldeman, that you had
no communication in any fashion with attorneys for the White House
3083
about what you had put in your statement or contemplated putting in
your statement ?
Mr. Haldeman. I had no specific discussion.
Senator Ervin. I am not asking about specific. Any kind.
Mr. Haldeman, No, no ; I haven't discussed with them what I was
putting in my statement. I have discussed with them the knowledge
on my part that this was an area in which I would have to testify.
I wasn't sure
Senator Ervin. You have told me just exactly what I have been ask-
ing you. You do say that you informed the attorneys for the White
House of the area you were going to have to testify and that included
the tapes.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir; I am sorry. If I gave that impression I
didn't mean to. I informed via my attorneys.
Senator Ervin. Well, you
Mr. Haldeman. Attorneys.
Senator Ervin. Do you know if your attorneys consulted with the
White House attorneys ?
Mr. Haldeman. I understand they did, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Yes, sir.
So instead of sending the letter to the White House attorneys about
what they objected to from the committee, they gave it to your lawyer
to communicate to the committee.
Mr. Wilson. What is wrong with that, Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Ervin. I am not saying anything is wrong. It just shows
there has been a little, what we call in North Carolina, "connegling
together."
Mr. Wilson. Well, let me answer you now, sir. I can answer you on
that.
Senator Ervin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Strickler and I had discussions with Mr. Buzhardt
on a simple principle and that was to what extent they would permit
us to disclose these tapes without discussing in what manner they
would be proposed, and so far as I know, not until Mr. Haldeman took
the stand yesterday afternoon did the WTiite House have a copy of his
statement nor any ideas what the inferences were to be.
Senator Ervin. Well, I practiced law a long time, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. So have I.
Senator Ervin. And I know that lawyers don't ordinarily do things
like this without the consent of their clients.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir ; but I will tell you again that the White House
did not know what the contents of those statements were going to be.
Senator Ervin. Well, the Wliite House has stated according to the
tapes "which have been under my sole personal control and will remain
so, none has been transcribed or made public and none will be," and
yet despite that fact, here a witness appears and makes them public
just a few days after that and it raises this inference in my mind,
Mr. Haldeman — I will be glad to have your response — should we infer
that the private word of the White House becomes inoperative a few
davs after it is given ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir; I think that it is quite clear that because
the White House had made that statement— the President had made
that statement — I was faced with a question as to what I was to do
3084
with knowledge that I had when I appear here with the requirement
and the desire to transmit all of the knowledge that I have as best
I can, and I, faced with that dilemma, asked my attorneys how to
deal with it in the terms of what I was permitted to testify to and
what I was restricted from testifying to, and in that regard, the \Vhite
House's response as I understand it, and this I can't give you a legal
analysis of, but from a layman's viewpoint, it would appear to me
that the Wliite House's response to my question as to what I am sup-
posed to do was that they obviously could not restrict me from testify-
ing as to knowledge I had as a result of my ha\ang been in attendance
at a meeting, but thev did place upon me the restriction that I must
not testify to information which I had gained solely from the process
of listening to the tape.
Senator Ervin. When did the White House lawyers learn that you
contemplated using your interpretation of these tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir, that was not the point I raised.
Senator Erven. I am asking you a question. I am not asking you
about the point you raise. When did the TVHiite House lawyers learn
that?
Mr. Haldeman. You will have to talk — to ask Mr. Wilson because
I raised the question with Mr. Wilson.
Senator Ervin. When did Mr. Wilson tell you — if it's not a con-
fidential communication?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't understand.
Mr. Wilson. IVhat did you say, Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Ervin. My question is very simple.
Mr. Wilson. What was that last observation of yours about a
confidential
Senator Ervin. I asked when did the White House lawyers find out
that Mr. Haldeman was contemplating divulging to the public his
interpretation of the tapes which he, unlike this committee, had been
permitted by the President to hear?
Mr. Wilson. May I answer that?
Senator Er\t^n. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Last weekend.
Senator Ervin. Last weekend?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Well, what day ?
Mr. Wilson. Sunday.
Mr. Haldeman. Sunday, I think.
Senator Ervin. When ?
Mr, Wilson. Sunday.
Senator Ervin. Monday of last we«k ?
Mr. Wilson. Sunday of last week.
Senator ER^^N. Mr.'Haldeman, did after this Sunday, did the Presi-
dent communicate with you and give you any communication on this
subject ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. Well, if his lawvers didn't convev their information
to him they were somewhat deficient in the performance of their pro-
fessional task in my judgment. So they have had 48 hours.
Mr. Wilson. Which lawyers?
Senator Ervin. I am talking about the White House lawyers.
3085
Mr. Wilson. Yes, I hope you didn't include me in that fee of
deficiency.
Senator Ervin. Now, when the privilege of executive privilege be-
longs to the White House, and it ought to have been asserted by the
White House lawyers, why did they have your lawyer to call the matter
to the attention of this committee and ask for a ruling ?
Mr, Haldeman. I will have to defer to my counsel, Mr. Chairman.
I don't understand the legal processes here.
Mr. Wilson. We did the same thing with respect to the document
that I think you have determined not to put in evidence. You have a
letter involving the same principal, dated July 23.
Senator Ervin. I don't know any document anybody has refused to
put in evidence.
Mr. Wilson. I didn't say you refused to do anything. I said you
didn't put it in evidence.
Senator Ervin. We have got a lot of documents we haven't put in
evidence. Well the fact is here
Mr. Wilson. Do you want me to describe this in more detail ?
Senator Ervin. No sir, no sir.
The fact apparent here is that the President of the United States
stated on July 23 that in effect he had sole control of the tapes, and
that none would be made public. Here is the man next to him in the
White House who appears before this commitee this week and puts his
interpretation in evidence, makes it public, and it appears here there
has been conferences between his counsel and counsel to the White
House by which a mode of procedure would be devised whereby the
White House counsel instead of appearing and making the objection
themselves, as would be the normal thing, they give the letter to the
counsel for the witness to present to the committee.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Chairman, may I
Senator Ervin. So I would say that the clear indication is that the
White House's counsel wanted Mr. Haldeman to reveal his interpreta-
tion of the tapes to the public. Notwithstanding
Mr. Wilson, The same procedure, Mr. Chairman, was used on July
23 with almost the identical third paragraph. And you accepted it and
it was addressed to me just as this one is. I see no impropriety in writ-
ing the letter to me. You didn't raise
Senator Erven, Mr. Wilson, there was nobody's interpretation of
the tapes involved at that time,
Mr. Wilson, Mr, Chairman, you have a perfect right to rule out
these interpretations if you want to.
Senator Ervin. No
Mr. Wilson. We are imposing them upon you.
Senator Ervin. No, I am not because I just think it's very peculiar
for you to be interposing an objection which, in the nature of things,
should have been interposed by ithe White House lawyers, I think that
this is susceptible to interpretation that this was an effort on the part
of the White House lawyers to join Mr, Haldeman in making his,
Mr. Haldeman's, interpretation of these tapes, which the President
withholds from this committee, public.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Chairman
Senator Ervin. My time is up.
3086
Mr. Haldemaist. If I could simply say that it's — anything that I have
discussed regarding information I gained solely from the tapes I have
so spoken here after the Chair overruled the objection of the White
House to my doing so.
Senator Ervin. Yes, this was what I would call a powderpuff objec-
tion. If they had really meant the objection to be sustained, they would
have been right here raising Cain about it themselves.
Mr. Wilson. They weren't here on the 23d on the other one.
Senator Ervhst. This has got nothing to do with the tapes, Mr.
Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, it does.
Senator Ervin. My time has expired so, Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Er\^n. I will go to vote.
Senator Baker. Why don't you wait just for a minute.
I don't want to take very much time on this but just as a preamble,
Mr. Chairman, just as a preamble, nobody is mad, I trust, and we are
going to get to the facts and we are going to draw inferences from
them ; we are going to state conclusions, and finally we are going to
write a report. Now, we can do that as we go along or we can do that
when we finish. I was always fearful of a jury that tried to give a
verdict before the proof was in and I, for my part, and I impose this
on no one else, I don't intend to do that, but I would like to clear up
one point to make sure I fully understand it.
Do I understand, Mr. Haldeman, your testimony to be that you
prepared your statement together with your counsel, and not in col-
laboration with the White House?
Mr. Haldeman. That is absolutely correct. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. But that on the matter of the legal issue, that might
or might not be of interest to this committee relative to the admissi-
bility of certain information used by you from the tapes to refresh
your recollection, as you put it, on that issue, and it's a pretty hot
issue. You know, we have got a lawsuit that is pending now with Mr.
Cox, on the one hand, and this committee preparing to file suit, havinsr
authorized it, on the other hand, on a matter of some considerable
sensitivity, a legal principle that, as I have indicated before, has never
before been really defined or determined bv the highest court of the
land. Your attorney contacted counsel for the "White House to discuss
what strictures or restrictions would be placed on you in that resnect.
ISTow, is that susceptible to comment by you and if Mr. Wilson
cares to comment on that, I would be glad to hear either of you in
that respect.
Mr. Haldeman. I would say your description is correct and the
reason it might
Senator Baker. And, Mr. Wilson, I am sorry.
Mr. Haldeman. And the reason my counsel inquired of the 'N^^ite
House was because I asked my counsel what to do in this, what I con-
sidered to be a very sensitive and difficult situation and I sought
advice, and I sought it of counsel.
Senator Baker. And, as a result of that, Mr. Wilson, you did con-
tact the attorneys for the "White House ?
3087
Mr. Wilson. Yes. Mr. Strickler and I both had separate conversa-
tions on Sunday about it and your description, lest it appear that I
evaded an answer, your description is correct.
Senator Baker. And in response to your query to the White House
lawyers about what their position would be they gave you a letter
dated July 30, addressed to you ?
Mr. Wilson. That is right.
Senator Baker. Answering your question or your query ?
Mr. Wilson. That is right, yes.
Senator Baker. And it was signed by Mr. Buzhardt who designates
himself as special counsel to the President and reads as follows:
If asked to testify as to facts which he learned about meetings or portions of
meetings which he did not attend but of which he learned solely by listening to a
tai>e recording of such meeting, the President has requested that you inform the
Committee that Mr. Haldeman has been instructed by the President to decline to
testify to such matters and that the President, in so instructing Mr. Haldeman,
is doing so pursuant to the Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
Did you conceive that letter addressed to you, Mr. Wilson, to be
responsive to the question put by you ?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And you passed that information on in the form of
a statement to this committee, on yesterday, that there was a portion of
the testimony which the committee might or might not want to com-
pel the witness to testify to.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Does that fairly represent the factual situation ?
Mr. Wilson. It certainly does.
Senator Baker. Mr. Wilson or Mr. Haldeman, I practiced law for
17 years before I came to the Senate, and I remember many times that
a client of mine on cross-examination by opposing counsel would be
asked, "Did you ever talk to anybody about your testimony?" and
before I could look up they would say, "No, I never did." You know
it is almost a standard technique, but I am going to ask one more time
just to make sure we have it in perspective. Mr. Haldeman, did you
first prepare your testimony in coordination with the White House?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you advise the White House of the substance,
the detail or any substantial part of your testimony before you came
here?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. But did you advise them of the one issue we have
already covered, that is your information derived from those tapes?
Mr. Haldeman. I did not advise them of the information. I advised
them of the question that I had.
Senator Baker. And you did that through counsel ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes ; that is correct.
Senator Baker. All right. So much for that.
Let me move on to another matter.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Vice Chairman
Senator Baker. I am sorry.
Mr. Haldeman. Just to be sure I am absolutely correct; I have re-
ported to the President on the contents of the tapes that I listened to,
as a report to the President, not in the context of giving and not in the
3088
time of the preparation of my statement, nor have I indicated that —
what of that content would be in my statement.
Senator Baker. All ri^ht, fine.
For fear my time runs out, and Rufus back here calls the clock on
me before there is anybody else to ask questions, but let me move on
to an entirely different subject now that we have got past the situation
of the moment. I must say, Mr. Haldeman, that what I am about to
say next is based partly on my personal observation and my informa-
tion about the way you ran a tight ship at the "WTiite House. I think
you did run a pretty tight ship, and the next question I am going to
put to you is fairly subjective, but I would care for your comment.
How in the world could you run such a tight ship and still on the
morning of June 17, 1972, have the papers emblazoned with the charge
that 5 defendants, later 7, had been caught in the Democratic
National Committee headquarters at the Watergate, followed on
closely with the identification of one of them as the security officer
of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, soon involving the gen-
eral counsel for the Committee To Re-Elect the President, soon in-
volving the transaction of funds, the number of other thinafs that this
i-ecord is burdened with now for many weeks; how could you run a
tight ship and know all these things and not suspect that something
was going on.
Mr. Haldeman. There is no intimation on my part, I don't believe —
well, I will speak for myself, there is no intimation of my part that
I didn't suspect that something had gone on. I knew that something
had gone on. I didn't know what. I still don't know what exactly in
terms of who did what, when, and how.
Senator Baker. You have given us a pretty clear statement of what
you learned and when you learned it, and that statement, of course,
Mr. Haldeman, will be tested against the testimony of other witnesses,
documentary evidence. Hopefully some day these tapes, and the docu-
ments that the committee seeks, and the circumstances, the proba-
bility and the improbability of the statement, will be Aveighed in the
balances as the testimony of every other witness is weighed in the
balances and some day I will have to arrive at a conclusion because
some day I will have to help write a report from this committee.
The one thing that keeps recurring to me, and the one thing I have
tried to put to every witness who has unique information in addition
to their own personal information and knowledge is, "Wliat did the
President know and when did he first know it?" You were closer to the
President of the United States more often than probably any other
person in the world outside his immediate familv. I want to know
what you can tell me in that respect, what did the President know
and when did he know it ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have tried to tell that in the recounting of my
statement; but what the President knew about the Watergate, again
if we can divide to pre-June 17 and post-June 17, what he knew was
basically what has been clearly established here. There doesn't seem
to he much contention about what he knew and when on the pre-June
17 acti\nties, as T see it.
He knew through the normal channels that the events had occurred,
he knew, as ongoing developments in the course of the investigation and
prosecution took place, that spex^ific individuals were charged, tried,
3089
and convicted. He was informed and acted on the basis of the infor-
mation given him that the information that was made known was the
complete information. He was told, as I think as has been recounted
here several times, the only one in which I believe I was present was an
occasion which perhaps the vice chairman was also present, which was
a breakfast of the Cabinet and the — some of the Kepublican leadership
in the Congress, and the senior members of the White House staff in
September, I believe, on September 12, 1972.
Senator Baker. I was — just for the record I was in Tennessee cam-
paigning for my political survival at that time on that day.
Mr. Haldeman. All right, sir, a number of your colleagues were
present at that breakfast meeting and the purpose of it was to review
the upcoming campaign, a number of these people were going to be out
campaigning for the President and so on, and the course of the meeting
covered campaign issues and questions and answers on various things
that the speakers would want to know.
In the process of that, the Attorney General of the United States
spoke on the subject of the Watergate, and reported to this group that
the facts of the investigation of the Watergate, including the statistics
of numbers of interviews and all the facts that have been gathered
and so forth, and then reported to this group, and the President, as he
had reported earlier, that the indictments would be brought down in
the next few days, and that they would complete the investigation,
the investigation had been completed, and that there — it was clear to
him and to the investigators and prosecutors that the guilt for the
commission of the crimes at the Democratic National Committee was
limited to those people who would be indicted, that it does not rise
further in the membership of the staff of the Committee To Re-Elect
the President or the White House.
Senator Baker. Let me pick up one or two stitches and, by the way,
let me say for the record, there is a vote in progress which I have now
already missed. There is nobody else on the committee here and I am
going to continue past my 10 minutes and yield a commensurate amount
out of my next round to equalize things, but let me continue in this
Avay. Rather than put a rather rhetorical question, which I did, what
did the President know and when did he know, which he alliterates
pretty much but does not elicit a response, let me ask you two or
three things which are of interest to me. What did the President say
to you when he found out that Liddy and McCord, two officials of
the CRP, and important officials, were caught in the Watergate or
in connection with the Watergate situation, can you tell us that?
Mr. Haldeman. No, he expressed at any time that you got — the dis-
cussion turned on the question of the break-in at the Democratic com-
mittee, just utter incomprehension as to how such a thing could have
happened and why such a thing would have happened.
Senator Baker. Did he ever ask to talk to McCord or to Liddy ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I do not believe so.
Senator Baker. Was it ever discussed ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not to my knowledge, no.
Senator Baker. Did anyone ever suggest it to him ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe so.
Senator Baker. Did you ever talk to McCord or Liddy?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
3090
Senator Baker. I see Senator Inouye has returned now and I am
past my time, and if I may, I will ask one more question before I yield
to him. You know this tape situation has gotten to be a pretty cele-
brated aifair.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir ; I understand that.
Senator Baker. And you understand that I made the motion to in-
stitute litigation to test the privilege of the President to withhold that
information from us, and that I feel very strongly about this subject.
As I have indicated earlier, I think my concern in that respect is
heightened by your testimony and your reference to portions of that
tape. I also remarked, parenthetically to Mr. Wilson, that I gazed deep
into his eyes and could not divine quite what was going on and I still
cannot and I am going to continue to tantalize him a little with that.
What I want to point out to you is that one statement in your addendum
seems to me to be of extraordinary importance and I want to test the
accuracy of your recollection and the quality of your note-taking from
those tapes, and I am referring to the last, next to the last, no, the third
from the last sentence on page 2, which reads, "The President said
there is no problem in raising $1 million. We can do that but it would
be wrong,"
Now, if the period were to follow after "We can do that," it would be
a most damning statement. If, in fact, the tapes clearly show he said
"but it would be wrong," it is an entirely different context. Now, how
sure are you, Mr. Haldeman, that those tapes, in fact say that?
Mr. Haldeman. I am absolutely positive that the tapes
Senator Baker. Did you hear it with your own voice?
Mr. Haldeman. With my own ears, yes.
Senator Baker. I mean with your own ears. Was there any distor-
tion in the quality of the tape in that respect ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I do not believe so.
Senator Baker. Mr. Haldeman, my final question as a follow-on
to that is do you have anv idea whether or not any other witnesses
who were present at other Presidential conversations that relate to the
mandate of this committee to inquire, might also be entitled to hear
those tapes as they relate to their conversations in order to refresh
their recollection ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know, Senator. But I — it is my under-
standing that no one would. In the first place, almost — I do not think
anybody that has appeared or will appear before this committer knew
of the existence of the tapes.
Senator Baker. What about John Dean ? He knows now.
Mr. Haldeman. He Imows now.
Senator Baker. Do vou have any idea that Mr. Dean would be per-
mitted to go to the White House and listen to those tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir, it is my understanding that no one has been
nor will be.
Senator Baker. Is the rationale for your utilization of them that
it is an aid to the refreshing of your recollection for reporting to the
President as a former staff member ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Senator Baker. Would not that precisely exact situation apply to
John Dean ?
3091
Mr. Haldeman. Not at this point in time, no.
Senator Baker. Would you be agreeable, Mr. Haldeman, if it could
be negotiated otherwise, to bringing those tapes up here, those two
tapes and playing them ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, Senator, you are asking me to take a position
on a legal issue
Senator Baker. No ; I am not.
Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. Contrary to the position that the
White House has taken.
Senator Baker. No ; you are perfectly free to confer with your coun-
sel if you wish. I am not asking, will you ask the President to do it. I
am not asking you if you think we violate the doctrine of separation of
powers. I am simply saying -would Haldeman, a witness before this
committee, be agreeable as an individual, if we can otherwise procure
the tapes, to them being brought here and being played in public?
Mr. Haldeman [after conferring with counsel]. Having been ad-
vised by counsel that in his opinion I am not creating a legal prob-
lem by the answer that I would give, and that I would want to give
without even talking to counsel, is that I would welcome that oppor-
tunity because they would confirm what I have told you.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Haldeman, following up Senator Baker's
line of interrogation, why were you, and you alone, to the exclusion
of every other witness who has been before this committee, permitted
to listen to the tapes?
Mr. Haldeman. I was not permitted to listen in my capacity as a
witness before this committee. I was asked to listen in my capacity
or former capacity as a staff assistant to the President and as the
assistant to the President who knew of the existence of the tapes.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Ehrlichman was not permitted to listen to
them, was he ?
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Ehrlichman, I do not betieve, was aware of the
existence of them. "
Senator Talmadge. Now, you listened, I believe, once in April, that
was before you left the White House.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct ; I listened to one of the tapes at
that time.
Senator Talmadge. And subsequent thereto in July after you became
a private citizen ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. Why would a private citizen be more entitled to
listen to those tapes than a Senate committee of the Congress of the
United States?
Mr. Haldeman. That is a question that I cannot answer, Senator.
Except that I did it as a means of reporting to the President.
Senator Talmadge. You are aware that the President has stated
that he himself has listened to the tapes, and that he is satisfied that
they sustain his point of view, although he stated that someone else
might get a different interpretation. Now, you have listened to the
tapes. In your judgment, is there any way you could get a different
interpretation other than what the President of the United States
said about it?
3092
Mr. Haldeman. Senator Talmadge I think that the President's
statement was that the tapes would sustain the position that he has
taken with regard to matters here. I do not believe that, and I may
be wrong but I do not believe that he said that that would be sub-
ject to interpretation by other people. I believe he said that the tapes
contained commentary and discussion that would be or could be sus-
ceptible to interpretation. In my opinion, if you are asking my
opinion, it would be that any reasonable person who listened to the
tape, as I did, would come up with the same conclusion that I have
and that the President has on an overall basis.
Senator Talmadge. Mj recollection is that the President wrote this
committee that he himself, after listening to the tapes, was satisfied
that they sustained his viewpoint but that they could be subject to
some other interpretation, and I read the letter from the President,
I personally lisfcened to a number of them. The tapes are entirely consistent
with what I know to be the truth and what I have stated to be the truth. How-
ever, as in any verbatim recording of informal conversations they contain com-
ments that persons with different perspectives and motivations would inevitably
interpret in different ways.
That is a letter addressed to the chairman of this committee dated
July 23.
Mr. Haldeman. I believe that is consistent with my answer to your
question. Senator, which I would take to say that his conclusion and
his belief is that the conclusion would be as he stated but that there
were also comments in the tapes subject to various interpretation.
Senator Talmadge. Let us get into another area briefly, please, Mr.
Haldeman. I believe you requested $350,000 be sent in cash, be made
available to your discretion at the White House, is that correct ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And that money was so sent?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. It was not in the White House but it was
available.
Senator Talmadge. Available at your discretion ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is right.
Senator Talmadge. And it was money left over from the 1968
campaign ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir. That was my understanding.
Senator Talmadge, Did not that money ultimately wind up in the
hands of laAvyers to defend criminals, and criminals to pay the bail
bond, to support and sustain their families?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know that it did. Senator. I only know
that it ended up being delivered to Mr. LaRue of the Committee To
Re-Elect the President.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. LaRue has testified before this committee
how he spent the money. Most of it, I think, wound up in the hands
of lawyers and families to sustain themselves while their husbands
were in jail and being prosecuted for various crimes.
INIy question is this : That contribution was made to friends of the
President for political purposes, to elect him. Do you not think it a
violation of trusteeship to spend that money to pay for the support
of criminals and lawyers for criminals?
3093
Mr. Haldeman. I do not attempt to judge the reason for the defense
funds that were set up. I did not attempt to judge it at the time they
were set up and I do not know now.
Senator Talmadge. Under your control, was it not?
Mr. Haldemax. What the impression was of it now ?
No, sir ; it was not under my control. It was moved from under my
control to the control of the committee.
Senator Talmadge. You sent it to the Committee for the Re-Election
of the President at their request ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not at their request. I sent it at
Senator Talmadge. At your request?
Mr. Haldeman. At my request.
Senator Talmadge. You knew what they were going to do with it?
Mr. Haldeman. I did not know for sure what they were going to do
with it or in fact they were going to do anything.
Senator Talmadge. You had a pretty good idea, did you not?
Mr. Haldeman. I knew they had at the same time a need for these
funds, for defense funds.
Senator Talmadge. Suppose you were a candidate for public office,
I was one of your admirers and wanted to see you elected, I wrote out
a check and mailed it to you in furtherance of your campaign efforts
to get elected to public office. Would you not think it would be a viola-
tion of the public trust if that money I sent to you ultimately wound
up to defend criminals ?
Mr. Haldeman. It would depend, I would have to say. Senator, on
the circumstances of the individual situation to which — ^the hypotheti-
cal case or actual case. I am not fully familiar and I am not able to
make the judgment.
Senator Talmadge. Now let us get into another area. On page 25 of
your statement to the committee, "I requested or approved use of these
funds for such purposes as the continuing polling that we did during
that period, for campaign support to a candidate for Governor in Ala-
bama," and then skip over to page 26. "The Alabama campaign funds
were in support of the candidate for the Democratic nomination for
Governor who was opposing former Governor Wallace."
Now, that also was money contributing to the further political efforts
of the President, was it not ?
Mr. Haldeman. I assume it was, Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Do you not think it was a violation of the trust
to take that from the President's political efforts and spend it in the
Democratic primary in the State of Alabama ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I do not believe so. As I said here it was the
belief of the President's advisers on the southern political scene that
this was a sound political move on behalf of the President.
Senator Talmadge. How much money was sent to Alabama?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. The testimony has been, I believe —
counsel ? Mr. Dash ?
Senator Talmadge, About $400,000.
Mr. Haldeman. $400,000.
Senator Talmadge. Who transmitted that money ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know. .
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Kalmbach testified that he himself handled
two secret funds in different hotels, that it was given to people un-
96-296 O - 73
3094
known to him, a total of about $400,000, and he understood that it was
to go for political purposes in Alabama. He did not even know the
name of the individual to whom he ffave it, who they were, had never
seen them before. Would you verify that statement ?
Mr. Haldeman. I cannot verify it. I have heard the statement by
Mr. Kalmbach.
Senator Talmadge. Well, how did yon handle this money ? You re-
quested it, then. You stated in your own statement, money to go to the
Governor's race in Alabama.
Mr. Haldeman. That is right. I requested that the money be allo-
cated for this purpose. I did not — I was not directly involved in the
process of making the transfer of the funds.
Senator Talmadge. Now, in this so-called investigation of the cover-
up, the entire investigation was left to John Dean, was it not ?
Mr. Haldeman. The investi.ofation of the coverup ?
Senator Talmadge. Yes. Whatever was taking place in the White
House.
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure.
Senator Talmadge. There has been a lot of testimony that John
Dean was requested to make an investigation. Do you know any-
thing about that investigation ?
Mr. Haldeman. An investigation of the Watergate, yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. All right. Whatever it was. No one else was in-
volved in the investigation at that time ?
Mr. Haldeman. No one at the White House, no. There were hun-
dreds of other people involved in the investigation in the administra-
tion, the executive branch.
Senator Talmadge. Well, this was a matter where specific charges
were being made almost daily in the news media, was that not true ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir, it was not with nearly that frequency but
there were indeed charges made from time to time.
Senator Talmadge. And even using the President being involved
and the highest associates around him; is that not true?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe so.
Senator Talmadge. You recall the facts that occurred daily in the
news media in the country, do you not ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe any charges
Senator Talmadge. Speculation.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe there were charges that the Presi-
dent was involved. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. My question is this : "VMiv, considering the serious
nature of those charges and you, the President's closest confidential
associate, Mr. Ehrlichman next closest to you and the President, was
it left solely to the discretion of Mr. Dean and no one else ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, it was not in any way left solely to the dis-
cretion of Mr. Dean. It was under the supervision of the Justice De-
partment and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and it was an
investigation of unprecedented scope.
Senator Talmadge. I thought all that came much later.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. All of them were going on simultaneously?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, indeed. The FBI investigation started im-
mediately, as I understand it.
3095
Senator Talmadge. You and Mr. Dean were not doing the investi-
gation at the same time, were you ?
Mr. Haldeman. Pardon me?
Senator Talmadge. You and Mr. Dean were not doing the investi-
gation at the same time, were you?
Mr. Haldeman. I was not doing any investigation at all. Senator.
Senator Talmadge. You finally got into it at a later date, did you
not?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Ehrlichman got into it.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Ehrlichman was asked by the President on
March 30 of this year to make an effort to assemble what facts were
available and any other information he could get at that time.
Senator Talmadge. There has been a lot of testimony on these de-
mands for money. That caused trouble for the White House. How
could any of the Watergate defendants cause trouble for anyone at the
White House considered sufficient to consider demand for Executive
clemency ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know.
Senator Talmadge. You never did get into the area of Executive
clemency, no discussions with anyone at any time ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not until March of this year, when it was raised in
Mr. Dean's report to the President.
Senator Talmadge. On April 17 of this year the President an-
nounced that on March 21 he began an extensive new investigation into
Watergate as a result of startling new information which he had re-
ceived on that date. Who conducted that investigation ?
Mr. Haldeman. At the outset Mr. Dean, subsequently — well, let us
see. You are talking about a statement he made on what date ?
Senator Talmadge. April 17, that he had discovered startling new
information.
Mr. Haldeman. All right. He had discovered the information on
March 21 and from the time of March 21 through
Senator Talmadge. That is correct.
Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. Through the — on, for about a week, it
was Mr. Dean who was supposed to be giving him a full report and
then starting March 30 he asked Mr. Ehrlichman to assemble the facts
for him and try to give him a full report on it as he saw it.
Now, at the same time it is my impression, and if I — I would like
to avoid impressions as much as possible, but I think this one is very
much to the point that you are raising. I think that the President
was investigating the thing himself also. He spent considerable time
on this. He asked me from time to time to make phone calls, as I
testified this morning. He talked with people and he asked questions
that I think were a part of a personal effort on his part to gain in-
formation firsthand, although no attempt to make an overt personal
investigation because that was something that just would not be pos-
sible for him to do.
Senator Talmadge. To your knowledge, did the President believe
that you were involved on March 2, 1973, when Mr. Dean implicated
you?
Mr. Haldeman. On March 2?
Senator Talmadge. Yes— March 21, I believe, is the correct date.
3096
Mr. Haldeman. March 21.
Senator Talmadge. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe that Mr. Dean implicated me on
March 21 except to say that there was a potential problem that could
develop in connection with the transference of the $350,000.
Senator Talmadge. Did he question you about it extensively ? The
President ?
Mr. Haldeman. The President? He asked me about the matter of
the $850,000; yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Ehrlichman testified that Mr. Petersen had
pressed the President to fire you on April 15 because of the impli-
cations of the matter. Mr. Ehrlichman said that he voluntarily resigned
under no pressure from the President. How about you ? Did the Presi-
dent ask you to resign?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. The President and I discussed, as I testified
this morning to the — to this committee, that at that time it became
apparent to me, and I am sure it was apparent to the President, that I
was not in a position to carry out my duties effectively and properly,
and the question was discussed in terms — during the period of the last
couple of weeks of April — in terms of a leave of absence or a resig-
nation and ultimately decided on my part that a resignation was the
proper course. The President agreed with that.
Senator Talmadge. Now, you have been implicated by both Mr.
Dean and the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Petersen, and you were
not asked to resign. That is your testimony, is it?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe that I had been implicated. Senator.
Senator Talmadge. I am talking about what others have said.
INIr. Haldeman. Yes, sir, but I mean
Senator Talmadge. Dean so testified. I understand the Assistant
Attorney General had urged the President to fire you on April 15.
Do you know anything about that?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, you are basing that, as I understand it now,
on Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony. My recollection is slightly different
but
Senator Talmadge. You disagree with Mr. Ehrlichman at this point.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. I would like to explain my point. My recol-
lection is slightly different and perhaps not substantially different in
that it was my understanding that Mr. Petersen's recommendation was
that the President place us on leaves of absence because the testimony,
the information that he had, concerned or contained matters that would
be embarrassins^ to us in terms of our continuing in our position. He
specifically, as I understand it, informed the President that he did not
have anything that legally implicated us on that basis and the Presi-
dent, it is my understanding, asked him — said that he would not take
action to place us on leaves of absence in the absence of specific charges
or information that did implicate us which Mr. Petersen, as I under-
stand it, never produced.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Haldeman. My time has expired
and I must go to the floor to cast a vote also.
Senator Gumey.
Senator Gtirney. Thank you.
Mr. Haldeman, your statement was very full and comprehensive and
so were the questions by counsel today.
3097
I have more — mostly bits and pieces of information I would like to
ask you about to sort of fill in.
On this business with Mr. Strachan, cleaning up the files, and his
later shredding, I think he testified, as I recall, that later on during
an airplane trip on Air Force One he brought up this question with
you. Do you recall that ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. As I said, I don't recall a report from him.
I don't recall requesting him to do — ^to clean up the files nor do I recall
a report that he had done so.
Senator Gurnet. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Mitchell anything
about the break-in or the coverup of Watergate ? And now I am — of
course, I know you did late this year, in March, but I am talking about
earlier, after the break-in, or during 1972 ?
Mr. Haldeman. After the break-in I am sure there were discus-
sions — ^there were discussions regarding the break-in and the ongoing
developments in the Watergate case and I am certain that Mr. Mitchell
was in some of those discussions. So the answer regarding the break-in
would be yes.
'Senator Gurnet. I should have phrased my question a little better.
Did you ever discuss any matters with him that indicated to you that
there was a coverup, is what I really intended to ask.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir ; I attempted in my statement to try to draw
a distinction between what now is termed coverup, which I feel is a
loose term, that is not maybe defined in each person's mind the same as
in each other person's, and it has so generally come to mean the illegal
acts that have been made forth here, that when you say coverup, if by
coverup you mean any of the illegal actions that were or have been
alleged to have been taken, then my answer would be very clearly no.
Senator Gurnet, I did intend that. I did intend to refine it to in-
clude the illegal actions.
Mr. Magruder worked for you as a staff man in the White House ;
did he not?
Mr. Haldeman. He did for a short period of time. He came in to the
White House as a special assistant under my direct responsibility as a
project man and continued in that role for approximately 4 months,
I believe, at which time he moved over to Herb Klein's office as Deputy
Director of Communications, which was a post he held for a year, over
a year I believe, before he went to the reelection committee.
Senator Gurnet. Were you at all close to him during this period
of time in the White House ? Were you close personal friends, see a
lot of each other ?
Mr. Haldeman. No. He was a member of my staff. During the time
he was a member of my staff and I saw him fairly frequently on a
business basis but I had no social relationship with him.
Senator Gurnet. Did he do any reporting to you when he was in his
capacity of the Committee To Re-Elect the President as deputy cam-
paign director?
(Mr. Haldeman. Some, yes ; but he primarily reported to Mr. Mitchell
and I dealt primarily with Mr. Mitchell on matters relating to the
reelection committee.
Senator Gurnet. Again in any conversations that you had with Mr.
Magruder in the year 1972, did you discuss any of the illegal aspects
of the coverup of Watergate ?
3098
Mr, Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Gurnet. One of the questions or issues brought up at the
La Costa meetino; in California was this business of raising money, and
I know you testified about it in your statement. My recollection was
that you did not recall that the issue was discussed ; is that correct ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have no recollection of the discussion of money
in that meeting.
Senator Gtjrney. Of course, out of that meeting arose the dispatch
of Mr. Moore on the mission to New York to talk to Mr. Mitchell about
raising more money but you have no recollection of that at all?
Mr. Haldeman. It is my understanding from Mr. Moore's testimony
that he went to New York to talk to Mr. Mitchell about a number of
things.
Senator Gurnet. Well, that is true. There were other things at the
meeting.
Mr. Haldeman. And among them was the question of raising money.
I have no recollection of that having been brought up. As I said this
morning, I was in, I believe, most of the meetings or I was in the room
most of the time that the meetings in La Costa were underway and
I simply have no recollection of the discussion of money. As I said
in my statement, if there was one, I am virtually certain that it would
have been in the context of the type that Mr. Moore described which
was very incidental to the meeting. That was not a principal subject
under discussion at that time. It may have been a matter that came up
peripherally.
Senator Gurnet. Mr. Dean stated — either in his testimony or —
really I think both in testimony before the committee and also in dis-
cussions with committee staff prior to his appearance here, that he
reported to you several days after the meetings with Mr. IMitchell on
the Liddy plan that involved Dean, Mitchell, Magruder, and Liddy —
reported to you about this Liddy plan.
Do you have any such recollection ?
Mr. Haldeman. As I have stated, I don't have a recollection of the
instance of his reporting that to me. I have a general recollection of his
telling me that there had been such an occasion and I have a very clear
recollection of his telling me last summer some time and a very clear
recollection of his telling me in March of this year in considerable
detail and several times of such a meeting. I also mentioned earlier
that there is a date question there which raises some puzzlement in my
mind as to what actually happened there. I had been willing to accept
Mr. Dean's recollection, recounting to me of this meeting on the basis
of the check of my log which had indicated that there had been such
a — that I had had a meeting with Mr. Dean on February 1. That was
in March when I was back looking through logs.
Then in June or July as these hearings got underway and I dis-
covered that the two planning meetings were not in December and
January as Dean had told me but were in fact on January 27 and
February 4. 1 now find n question in my mind.
Senator Gurnet. And your best recollection is that he did not re-
port to you in February of 1972 ?
Mr. Haldeman. I would have to put it that I don't recall his doing
so. He has told me about it so many times that I have heard the story
fairly frequently.
3099
Senator Gurnet. Did I understand you to say that your logs do not
show that you had a meeting with Dean in February ?
Mr. Haldeman. My log does show that I did have a meeting with
Dean on February 1 and that that was the only meeting I had with
Dean in either February or January
Senator Gtjrney. I see.
Mr. Haldeman [continuing] . Of 1972.
Senator Gtjrney. Do you recall what that meeting on February 1
involved ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Gtjrney. One of the points of controversy here which has
become important is the so-called Dean investigation in June, July,
and August following the break-in. Mr. Dean's testimony, of course,
was he never conducted such investigation. What is your recollection ?
Mr. Haldeman. My recollection is absolutely clear," totally unequivo-
cal, and without any shade of doubt in any way. shape, or form, and
that is that Mr. Dean was conducting an investigation, that every-
body who would be in a position to be interested or concerned with it
knew that he was, and that Mr. Dean knew that he was. I included in
my statement some quotes from exhibit 34-^3* which to my view, at
least, confirmed that Mr. Dean knew he was and if I could take just a
second, because I didn't put it in there, I would like to read — I think it
is two sentences from exhibit, I believe 34-39** which Mr. Dean also
put into evidence before this committee
Senator Gtjrney. Go right ahead.
Mr. Haldeman. And in which this — incidentally, 34—39 is the draft
of a proposed letter or affidavit to be submitted by Mr. Dean to the
Senate Judiciary Committee in response to its request that he appear
before that committee with regard to matters in connection with the
Gray confirmation hearings, and this draft which Mr. Dean put into
evidence shows on its last page a line for sworn, you know, I swear
that this is the truth or something of that sort, which would indicate
that it was his intention to make this a sworn statement to the
committee.
Senator Gurney. This, I suppose, was contemplated in response
to the Judiciary Committee wanting Dean to come before it
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Gurnet [continuing]. To testify in connection with his
FBI reports that he obtained from the Justice Department.
Mr. Haldeman, That is right, and in the process of that, on page 2
of exhibit 34—39 at the bottom, he enumerates facts that he would like
to give to the committee concerning the matters which have been
publicly raised and the second of those facts that he says he would
like to give to the commiittee I would like to quote :
Second, it has been suggested that the fact that I conducted an investigation
of this matter at the direction of the President made it inappropriate for me
to obtain FBI information relative to their investigation. To the contrary, in an
investigation of this importance, it was incumbent on me to obtain all avail-
able information from every appropriate investigative resource and I would
have been derelict indeed if I had not requested information from the FBI.
♦See Book 3. p. 1263.
**See Book 3, p. 1252.
3100
That is in this draft that Mr. Dean himself has placed into evidence.
And I say that one of the major puzzles in my mind in this whole case
at this point in time is how John Dean possibly could contend or feel
that he did not conduct an investigation, that he was not being looked
to for conducting an investigation in the sense of being — of White
House involvement and of being aware of all of the facets of the on-
going investigation by other agencies.
Now he was certainly not called in and commissioned "Chief Special
Investigator for Watergate" and put in charge of all investigating
activities that were being conducted in the Watergate matter, but he
was the man at the Wliite House who was investigating White House
or potential "White House involvement in Watergate and who was
maintaining lAHiite House coordination with the other governmental
agencies that were conducting the overall investigation of Watergate.
That is, I believe, absolutely clear.
Senator Gurnet. In other words, this affidavit which was never used
before the Judiciary Committee prepared by him, states in effect that
he was making an investigation ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, it would appear so. Senator Gurney. I can't
verify the document. I accept it as something that the committee has in
evidence.
Senator Gurnet. I think my 10 minutes have run out but let me ask
just one other question.
You know, March 13 has been a vital date in the Dean testimony.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Senator Gurnet. That is, the meeting with the President on
March 13. And he stated in that meeting, of course, the President
brought up Executive clemency as well as the $1 million. I am curious.
Why wasn't that tape listened to? Do you have any idea why the
President didn't instruct you to listen to that tape as well as the one
on the 21st and September 15 ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know. For one thing, that was a meeting in
which I was not present except for a few minutes.
Senator Gurnet. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. It was — that may have been one of the meetings — of
the tapes that the President listened to himself — also. As the President
has indicated, he has listened to some of the tapes himself.
Senator Gurnet. Thank you, Mr. Haldeman.
My time has elapsed and I yield, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inoute. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Haldeman, I am certain you have seen the letter of the President
dated July 23, 1973, addressed to the chairman of this committee. If
not
Mr. Haldeman. Is that the letter that was read earlier. Senator?
Senator Inoute. I believe so. I will just read part of the first para-
graph.
Mr. Haldeman. Thank you.
Senator Inoute [reading].
Indeed, the special nature of tape recordings of private conversations is such
that these principles apply with even greater force to tapes of .private Presi-
dential conversations than to Presidential papers.
3101
And in your opening statement on page 19, the third paragraph, you
say :
I have had access under the supervision of a Secret Service agent to my hand-
written notes regarding conversations with the President which are in the
President's files.
I presume from this that the Secret Service agent was with you at
all times.
Mr. Haldeman. When I was in the files ; yes, sir.
Senator Inoute. Do you recall the testimony of Mr. Alexander
Butterfield?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, I do.
Senator Inouye. I am certain you recall that in response to an in-
quiry, Mr. Butterfield testified that these tapes were in the exclusive
custody of a Secret Service agent at all times.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall that but I am sure that was his
understanding.
Senator Inouye. How, can you explain how this tape, the tape of
September 21, was placed in your custody and permitted to take home
and listen to in your living room or your den or wherever it was, at
your leisure and I presume it was kept in your custody for nearly 24
hours, was it not ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes ; I am sure it was.
Senator Inouye. How would you explain that, sir? Here the Presi-
dent says that the tapes are much more important than Presidential
Papers. You have indicated that when you were looking at your papers
you had a Secret Service agent at all times and yet you were permitted
to take this tape home.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. First of all, I believe you said
September 21.
Senator Inouye. March 15.
Mr. Haldeman. No ; this is the tape of September 15.
Senator Inouye. I stand corrected.
Mr. Haldeman. Is the one — I just wanted to be sure we are talking
about the right tape. But at the time that I took the tape home and
listened to it, the existence of the tapes was not known to anyone other
than the limited people that Mr. Butterfield identified, and it was not
contemplated, I do not believe, that its existence would ever be known
to people, and it was a request to review material for the President
which he knew I was familiar with and concerning a meeting in which
I had been in attendance. Now, I should — let me also say just so the
record is completely open on this, that I also had several other tapes
in my possession at that time of other meetings which it had also been
suggested or requested that I review but which I did not listen to
becaiise I believe thev involved, I think all of them involved meetings
at which I had not been in attendance at any time, any part of the
meeting. In the September 15 meeting I had been in attendance for
the entire meeting, and I decided not to listen to the tapes of the meet-
ings to which I had not been — at which I had not been present — and I
returned them without listening to them.
Senator Inouye. Are you suggesting that the special label of top
secret is placed on these secrets after Mr. Butterfield made it known to
3102
us, that prior to that it was all right for private citizens to have access
to it?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. I think that the access here was not in the
capacity as private citizen but in a capacity as a former assistant to
the President who was aware of the existence of the tape and was able,
and had been present at the meeting, was able to review the tape for
the President and report to him on its content.
Senator Inouye. I gather from your opening remarks that you ad-
mire the President very much, sir.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. And that you have at no time knowingly disobeyed
any of his lawful instructions ?
Mr. Haldeman. I, in all honesty, would not be able to say that but
wherever I have disobeyed any of his instructions knowingly I have
informed him.
Senator Inouye. We have here a letter dated July 30 addressed to
your attorney, Mr. Wilson, and it says in part, "The President has
requested that you inform the committee that Mr. Haldeman has been
instructed by the President to decline to testify to such matters." And
yet, unless my recollection is wrong, you appear to some of us as being
overly eager to testify on this. In fact, you had your addendum ready.
Mr. Haldeman. Senator, I had two addenda ready because I wanted
to be prepared for whatever the ruling might be. I have put the
other addendum also into the committee record, which would have
been the addendum I would have read had the committee not ruled
that I was required to testify as to the earlier meeting.
Senator Inouye. I am certainly aware at the time of your testimony
this tape in particular and a few others were rather controversial.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. And the outcome of whether these tapes would
be made public or not would have to be eventually determined by the
courts.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. And the President so indicated that that should
be the route ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. "Why did you not join the President in that route?
Mr. Haldeman. Pardon me ?
Senator Inouye, Why did you not obey the President's instruction ?
Mr. Haldeman. "Why did I ?
Senator Inouye. Why did you not obey it ?
Mr. Haldeman. I did not because the chairman ordered me not to.
Senator Inouye. Were you prepared
Mr. Haldeman. The committee, as I understand it, instructed me
that I must testify, I must not abide by the instruction of the Presi-
dent to withhold information gained solely from the tapes.
Senator Inouye. Will you abide by every wish
Mr. Haldeman. Every wish.
Senator Inouye. Any order of this committee?
Mr. Haldeman. Every lawful order of this committee properly
made, certainly.
Senator Inoute. We have a few things we would like to get from
you, Mr. Haldeman, at some later time. [Laughter.]
3108
Senator Ervin. No, no, you have 2 more minutes.
Senator Inouye. If I may, Mr. Haldeman, I would like to go through
your statement, sir.
Mr. Haldeman. Sir?
Senator Inotjye. This is on page 23 where you discuss the establish-
ment of the special investigations unit which later became known as
the Plumbers, and the supervisor was Mr. Ehrlichman and two prin-
cipal staff members, Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Inotjte. We have the CIA, the FBI, the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and all of these agencies, I
have been told, have competent people. Why did you find it necessary
to form this special investigations unit ?
Mr. Haldeman. I did not find it necessary to form this unit, and
I
Senator Inotjye. Somebody did.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir ; the President formed the unit.
Senator Inotjye. Why do you think the President found it necessary ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think the President is the one that has got to
explain that and I think he has in his statement of May 22.
Senator Inotjye. Did the statement suggest that the CIA, the FBI
and the other agencies were inadequate in performing their duties ?
Mr. Haldeman. The statement said and I am quoting, "It created
a situation" the leak of the Pentagon Papers, "in which the ability of
Government to carry on foreign relations even in the best of circum-
stances could have been seriously compromised. Other governments no
longer knew whether they could deal with the United States in con-
fidence. Against the background of the delicate negotiations the United
States was then involved in on a number of fronts with regard to
Vietnam, China, the Middle East, nuclear war arms limitations, U.S.-
Soviet relations and others in which the utmost degree of confidential-
ity was vital, it posed a threat so grave as to require extraordinary
actions. Therefore, during the week following the Pentagon Papers
publication," the President, "approved the creation of a special in-
vestigations unit within the White House."
Senator Inotjye. Is the President suggesting there that he could not
trust the CIA?
Mr. Haldeman. Senator, I am not the one to question on that. I was
not involved in the creation of the unit. I was aware of it but I do
not have firsthand knowledge as to reasons or the problems involved
therein.
Senator Inotjye. May we go to page 25, it is in the middle of the page,
in discussing the substantial fund, of large cash fund, and you have
indicated, as Mr. Kalmbach has indicated, "He looked to me as well as
to other people from time to time, for direction or approval, et cetera,
disbursements of the funds."
Mr, Haldeman. Yes, sir.
'Senator Inotjye. Who were the other people ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. Apparently Mr. Ehrlichman, at least,
in connection with the TTlasewicz payments, and there may have been
others, I do not know. Mr. Kalmbach, I was picking that up from Mr.
Kalmbach. I said, as he indicated, he looked to me as well as to other
3104
people from time to time. I stated that as acquired from Mr. Kalm-
bach's testimony here.
Senator Inoute. My final question during my 10 minutes, on that
same page you say, "I requested or approved use of these funds for
such purposes, et cetera, for campaign support to the candidate for
Governor in Alabama." Just for the record, who was this candidate,
sir ? You approved $400,000.
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure what his name was. He was the man
who opposed Governor Wallace in the primary for the nomination for
Governor.
Senator Inotjye. Was this candidate aware of this support ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know if he was aware of the source of the
support. I am sure he was aware of the support.
Senator Inotjye. Was he aware of the nature of the support ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know. I had nothing to do with the dealings
with the candidate or his campaign people and I do not know what
the arrangements were.
Senator Inoitye. You had the job of approving the $400,000 ex-
T)«nditure and you were not curious as to how it was spent?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir, because this was worked out by other people
who were advising the President on the political situation in the
South.
Senator iNornrE. Are you satisfied that these $400,000 went to the
purpose that you had intended ?
Mr. Haldeman. As to whether they did or whether they did not. I
do not know.
Senator Inotjye. And as one in charge you were not concerned ?
Mr. Haldeman. I was not in charge of the funds. Senator. Mr. Kalm-
bach was.
Senator Inotjye. But you requested or approved the use of this
fund.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. A request was made for this ad-
mittedly very major allocation of funds for this purpose.
Senator Inouye. I ask this because in your opening remarks in the
area of advertisements and material you had to give the final OK.
Mr. Haldeman. That is because those related to Presidential policy.
When you run an ad that states, makes a statement, it becomes a state-
ment by the President, and I wanted to be sure that the Wiite House
had the final authorization in that process.
Senator Inouye. So you were concerned about the minute details
of those ads but not as to the expenditure of $400,000 ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Inotjye. I thank vou, sir.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Haldeman, I would like to for a few more
minutes relate to your, the acquisition of these tapes. As I understand
it you listened to the tape of March 21 in April, and you listened to
the tape of September 15 in the early part of July. Is that correct?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. And I would have to get the transcript, which
isn't in my hands now, as to the testimony that you gave earlier this
afternoon, but did I hear you say that you were put into a dilemma by
the "WHiite House relative to those tapes?
3105
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. Well, let me ask you a question then: Do you
think that you were put into a dilemma by the letter of July 23 from
the President of the United States to this committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure that I would say that put me in a
dilemma. I think that I found myself in a dilemma as I was preparing
this statement and realized that I would be testifying as to my knowl-
edge of the content of those two meetings, and that there was the —
that I had heard the tapes as well as having been present at both meet-
ings and there was the additional factor of my having heard the tape
of that part of the March 21 meeting, at which I was not present, and
this clearly posed a problem.
Senator Weicker. Well, that is exactly what I am referring to.
In other words, clearly, as you were preparing to come before this com-
mittee, did it not give cause for concern when you read the sentence
in that Presidential letter which said :
Accordingly the tapes which have been under my sole personal control will
remain so. None has been transcribed or made public and none will be.
Is this what posed a problem to you ?
Mr. Haldeman. That — yes, it would be. The question of — the prob-
lem was really posed before that in my own mind, I think in the sense
that I knew there was a problem.
Senator Weicker. What was the nature of the problem ?
Mr. Haldeman. The nature of the problem was that I had knowl-
edge of two meetings which I had attended, and which I was going
to testify to, but that I also had had my recollection of those meetings
refreshed by having heard more recently the tapes of those meetings
and that I had heard the portion of the March 21 meeting in which
I was not in attendance.
Now that, in itself, puts me in, I think Senator Baker described
it quite well, a rather difficult situation. But with this statement I have
the further problem of the President stating that these tapes will not
be made public, and yet my testimony as to that part of the March 21
meeting which I was not in attendance was, in effect, a violation of
the nonpublicizing of the tapes. I did not feel that my testimony, as
to the other parts of that, of the March 21 meeting or as to the totality
of the September 15 meeting, posed that same problem. For that rea-
son I requested my counsel to get a determination from the White
House as to how I should deal with the situation.
Senator Weicker. Is not the problem then that you knew what
you had done in regard to these tapes, specifically that you had heard
two of them, that in the case of one of them, at least, you took notes
which may or may not be interpreted as transcribing?
INIr. Haldeman. T took notes in both of them.
Senator Weicker. Or took notes of both of them which may, or
may not, be interpreted as transcribing, but this, what you knew that
you did, and here comes a Presidential letter after these actions of
yours in which the statement is made or the impression is given that
nobody else but the President has had these tapes. Isn't that the
essence of the problem?
ISIr. Haldeman. No, because the President knew that I had heard
the tapes.
Senator Weicker. But clearly the impression is given to the public,
to the committee in the letter to the committee, and certainly to the
3106
public, that nobody, other than the President, had these tapes or lis-
tened to these tapes. I mean wasn't that the concern in your mind ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, it wasn't. The concern in my mind was how
I would deal with my situation concerning my testimony before this
committee.
Senator Weicker. Well, would you describe that sentence then as
being accurate in light of the fact that you had access to the tapes?
]Mr. Haldeman. I think
Senator Weicker. And that you had listened to the tapes?
JMr. Haldeman. Would you read me the sentence again.
Senator Weicker [reading] :
Accordingly, the tapes which have been under my sole personal eontrol will
remain so. None has been transcribed or made public and none will be.
Mr. Haldeman. I would say that that was accurate at the time it
was written because they had been under the President's control : he
had directed me to listen to them and report to him on them. I was
acting on his behalf in doing so, and the
Senator Weicker. In what capacity were you acting on the Presi-
dent's behalf? I now refer specifically to the September 15 tape which
you heard in early July, the 9th, 10th, 11th of July. As I understand
it, you certainly were not an employee of the U.S. Government.
Mr. Haldeman. I was not but I was a former employee of the Gov-
ernment, former assistant to the President who was one of the few
people who had knowledge of the existence of the tape and who had
firsthand knowledge of the contents of the meeting having been present
at the meeting.
Senator Weicker. But what is the element of control ? I don't under-
stand the elements of control as between you and the President. How
does he control you; you are a private citizen? You are not his
employee.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, I am not his employee but I assure you that
I will, as a private citizen, carry out the instructions of the President as
effectively and diligently as I would as an employee. I am sure he
would consider that to be the case.
Senator Weicker. How could the President have been in control
of these tapes while they were in your house ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think that is — I think he was in control of them ; he
knew that I had them. He had asked me to listen to them. He knew I
was going to report to him on the contents of them and return them
to him.
Senator Weicker. All right, the rest of that sentence reads, "None
has been transcribed." Did you go ahead and transcribe any portion
of these tapes ?
Mr. BL^ldeman. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. What did you do ?
Mr. Haldeman. I made notes.
Senator Weicker. And j^ou do not consider that transcribing?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I do not. I would make — I made notes in the
same sense that I would make notes if I Avere, if I had made notes in
a meeting and transcribing would be to expand those or to — in the
case of a tape, a transcribing would be, in my view, a literal repro-
duction in writing of the sound on the tape.
3107
Senator Weicker. Could the President control — could the President
control what you did with these tapes while you had them? Could the
President control that ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not physically ; no.
Senator Weicker. The sentence reads, part of that sentence, "None
has been transcribed or made public."
Do you feel that when the President turns something over to a
private citizen that, in effect, it has now gone outside of Government
channels and it is in the public's hands ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not feel at the time he said that it had been
made public in the sense that I do not feel having me listen to the
tape in order for me to report to him on it was a matter of making
the tape public, no. I think he had every reason to believe he could
rely on my confidentiality.
Senator Weicker. In other words, because of your definition, very
precise definition of these words in the letter of July 23 from the
President to this committee, you do not feel that there is any in-
accuracy to that statement relative to the fact that you had had access
to the tapes at an earlier date and had listened to them.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe so. I believe the President considered
my access to be totally under his control.
Senator Weicker. Well, we have an awful lot of things then on our
heads, you know, in the last couple of months, and I realize that both
in numbers and in quality it almost puts us into a state of shellshock,
but when I read a sentence, and this is the way I took it when we got
the letter here on the committee, "Accordingly, the tapes which have
been under my sole personal control remain so and none has been tran-
scribed or made public and none will be." I think probably I got the
same impression the rest of the American people got which was the
fact that nobody else had gone ahead and either had the possession of
those tapes or had listened to those tapes.
Now, we have your explanation, as I said, in very narrow terms as
to this particular sentence but as a matter of common sense, as I have
said earlier, it would seem to me any way that the dilemma that you
found yourself in was a dilemma created as between the words of the
President in his letter and your deeds of an earlier date.
Now, in your questioning by Senator Inouye, you made a statement,
and this is the area that I would like to concentrate on in the few
minutes that you have when you said it was not contemplated that the
existence of these tapes would ever be known.
How did you contemplate, withholding the existence of these tapes
from this committee and the U.S. attorneys or the special prosecutor?
Mr. Haldeman. I never contemplated the existence of them being
known. These were tapes that were produced with the knowledge of a
very limited number of people. They were for a very limited purpose,
and it was my understanding that their existence would not become
known.
Senator Weicker. Well, let's get out then to the start of your state-
ment here before the committee today where you give the appearance
of an individual, and as one part of a branch of government that is
most anxious to get all the truth before the American people, and on
page 3 of your opening statement you state as follows :
3108
One of the great tragedies of our time is that, for the moment at least, a
cloud hang.s over the accomplishments of the past 4 years and the promise of the
next 4 years because of Watergate, its aftermath, and related matters. This has
spawned an unceasing barrage of charges, countercharges, allegations, innuendo,
hearsay, rumor, speculation, hypothesis, which I devoutly hope these hearings
and the concurrent work of the Justice Department and the special prosecutor
will bring to an early and definite conclusion so the Nation and its leadership
can again turn their thoughts and their efforts to more productive enterprise.
And you further state on page 2 of your opening statement the
following :
I have full confidence when the entire truth is kno\\Ti it will be clear to the
American people that President Nixon had no knowledge of or involvement in
either the Watergate affair itself or the subsequent efforts of a "coverup" of the
Watergate.
Now, ]\rr. Haldeman, with reference to the above two statements,
what steps have you taken on your own initiative to clear up this
matter and to assist in seeing to it that the full truth regarding the
Watergate and the coverup be made known to the American people,
which steps, I might add, if I can just qualify it, was not in response
to the press, to this committee, or to some other congressional com-
mittee or arm of the judicial branch of Government. AVhat have you
done and what has this administration done on its own initiative to
bring the truth before the American people ?
Mr. Haldemax. What I have done, I have done nothing before the
press because, as I said here, I felt it was more appropriate for me to
try to do whatever I would do before the proper legislative and ju-
dicial bodies. I have attempted to cooperate as fully as I can with your
staff in several long meetings, and I have looked to the opportunity to
do so before the full committee which I am now doing. I have told
the grand jury everything that I could tell them. I have tried to meet
with the U.S. attorneys and review the thing with them. I did in a
short meeting give a very full deposition on the matters germane to
their lawsuit to the attorneys representing the Democratic National
Committee and their associates.
As far as what the administration has done, it is my understanding
that tlie administration conducted through its appropriate arms, the
FBI. and the Justice Department, an enormously extensive investiga-
tion, and enormously thorough prosecution, and I have raised the
question with ])rincipally John Dean who was our contact with that
investigation, sometimes at my own instance and sometimes at the in-
stance of the President, as to why or whether we can't get all these
facts and get them put together and get them out and get them known.
I did not ever succeed in getting that done, although there were
minor steps taken along the way.
I now, today, see reasons for that failure that I didn't see at the
time and, as I said in my statement, I still don't feel that I know
what actuallv did happen or who actually did it.
Senator Weicker. Well, how do you — first of all, let me say this,
that as I read your statement, every one of the actions which you
indicate to me was a reaction rather than an action, a reaction to this
committee or the prosecutor or whatever arm of Government is mov-
ing forward, but how do you jibe making a statement before the com-
mittee, on the one hand, or to me, that you advocated putting out the
truth, getting out the complete statement, with the statement you
3109
make to Senator Inoiiye where you go ahead it was not contemplated
that the existence of these tapes would ever be known.
Certainly is there a greater repository of the truth in this matter
than these particular tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir, I think there is. I think there is a much
greater repository in the testimony of firsthand witnesses. The tapes
relate only to several meetings with the President. The problems of the
Watergate and the things we were trying to get out over a long period
of time until March 21 or if you want to go back to February 27 didn't
relate to meetings with the President at all, and I think that the facts
need to be brought out, and will be brought out, are being brought out,
and I don't think that in that connection, the tapes are the essential
matter at all.
Senator Weicker. But who is going to do this, who is going to bring
these facts out, that is the essence of my question to you. Is the Presi-
dent going to bring the facts out ?
Mr. Haldeman. I would think that the place ultimately that the
facts will be brought out and the appropriate action taken with re-
gard to those facts is through the judicial process which I have full
confidence in and feel is the proper place to deal with criminal acts.
Senator Weicker. So the American people are going to know the
truth not by the leadership of their executive branch of Government
but by the leadership of the judicial and legislative branches of
Government, is that you answer ?
Mr. Haldeman. My answer is that when you are dealing with crimi-
nal acts, and dealing with the questions of, the fine questions of law
which I certainly am not qualified to comment upon, that the place
for them to be dealt with, the forum for them to be handled in, is the
judicial process.
Senator Weicker. Well, I have just gotten the word from the bell-
ringer that the time is up but I would suggest to you in my closing
statement, and we will have additional time here, Mr. Haldeman. In
times ahead as you are all sitting there in La Costa trying to figure
out what to do about this committee and how to go ahead and slow it
down or handle it or whatever term you want to use, that maybe the
best way to have put this committee totally out of business would have
been for the executive branch of the Government of the United States
to have stood forth and told the entire story, and that would have been
by far and away the best, the cleanest, the most above-board way of
putting Senator Ervin and all the rest of my colleagues here right
out of this room.
Mr. Haldeman. As I indicated in my statement, that was one of the
principal purposes of this La Costa meeting.
Senator Weicker. And it never happened ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is right.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator ]Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Haldeman, when you took the September 15 tape to your home,
I believe you indicated that you played it in your home?
jVIr. Haldeman. Yes. sir.
Senator INIontoya. ^Vhat kind of a tape player do you have?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't have a tape player for this ; I was supplied
96-296 O - 73
!|
3110
with a tape player by Mr. Bull, with a machine for listening to the
tape.
Senator Montoya. TVliat kind of a machine was it?
]Mr. Haldeman. I don't know, sir. It was a battery-operated port-
able tape recording device.
Senator Montoya. It was a regular portable machine then?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And how many times did you play this?
Mr. Haldeman. Once.
Senator Montoya. Did you have a recording device on this machine?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. It was just a straight tape player?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, there is, as you probably know, it is a tape
machine that both records, the machine is capable of recording or of
playing tape. It can only do one thing at a time; and at the time I
was using it, it was playing, not recording.
Senator Montoya. So you played the tape from the beginning to
the end, is that it?
JNIr. Haldeman. The tape of that part of the — that part of the —
tape that concerned the September 15 meeting.
Senator Montoya. All right. You only played one side then?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, and I didn't play the entire side because these
tapes cover an extended period of time, and the portion that I played
was only that portion relating to the meeting with Mr. Dean. I had
to skip a little bit and listen, actually September 15 was an afternoon
in which I was meeting with the President all afternoon, I listened
to little bits to find where the Dean meeting started. As soon as the
Dean meeting started, I listened to that in its entirety and then turned
it over.
Senator Montoya. Were all the reels uniform that you used for
taping purposes in the White House?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know, Senator, because I have not reviewed
them.
Senator Montoya. What size of a reel was this, more or less?
Mr. Haldeman. Seven inches, maybe.
•Senator Montoya. About 71^^ inches. That is standard.
Mr. Haldeman. All right. If 7V^ is standard, I would assume it was
a 714-inch reel.
Senator Montoya. Yes. And the March 21 tape, would you say that
was about the same size ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir ; on the same size reel.
'Senator Montoya. And what did you play that in ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry ?
Senator Montoya. What did you play the tape of the ^Nlarch 21 meet-
ing in ? Wliat kind of a tape recorder ?
Mr. Haldeman. Either the same one or similar one to the one I used
for the September 15 tape.
Senator Montoya. You only ran the tape once and you stopped it
occasionally and made notes, is that about it?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. All right. Now, how long did it take you to
transcribe these notes?
3111
Mr. Haldeman. I did not transcribe the notes, Senator.
Senator Montoya. How long did it take you to play this tape, and
how long did it take you to make notes from these tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. I did not time it.
Senator Montoya. Well, will you estimate the time with respect to
the March 21 date?
Mr. Haldeman. That is difficult to do because I am not sure.
Senator Montoya. All right. Now, did the March 21 tape have the
conversation and dialog between the President and INIr. Dean as well
as the dialog in which you participated after the President and Mr.
Dean had met ?
Mr. Haldeman. What I listened to was the entire content of the
President's meeting with Mr. Dean in which I was present for the
final 40 minutes.
Senator Montoya. All right. Did you listen to yourself, too?
Mr. Haldeman. The 40 minutes in which I was present?
Senator Montoya. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And that was on the same tape ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. All right. Now, if it was a Ti^ tape, and I am
going to show you one, you only listened to one side, this would be
only about 30 minutes.
Mr. Haldeman. It depends on tlie speed of the tape. Senator. The
tape recording machine had — in fact, I had a problem with that be-
cause the machine has a number of settings for how fast you run the
tape.
Senator Montoya. All right. What was the speed of the tape?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know. There were, I think, four different
settings, and when I first started it, I got that noise you are familiar
with of a tape that is running too fast, and I moved it down to the
lowest speed that the tape recording machine operated at and that
provided the sound at the proper level.
Senator INIontoya, Well, that is why I asked you how long it took
you to play the tape. Can you estimate the time?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. The meeting took an hour — I mean, 105
minutes, 60 minutes — 65 minutes after I came in, a total of 105 minutes.
Senator ^Montoya. And would you say that the tape ran 1 hour
and 40 minutes?
]Mr. Haldeman. Well, 105 minutes, yes ; 1 hour, 45 minutes.
Senator ISIontoya. An hour and 45 minutes?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Senator Montoya. Are you sure about that?
jNIr. Haldeman. Yes. I am reasonably sure. As I say, I did not time
it when I listened to it.
Senator Montoya. I just want to know the facts, what kind of a
tape you had and
Mr. Haldeman. I can find out for you. Senator. I can get
Senator Montoya. And what kind of a speed the tape had. I think
that is very relevant.
Mr. Haldeman. I see that it is and it is easily — well, I assume it
is easily obtained. It is a matter of fact and I am sure can be ascer-
3112
tained. I know that they recorded these tapes at the slowest possible
speed so as to get the most amount of material onto an individual
reel, because as you can imagine, this was producing quite a lot of tape.
Senator Montoya, Well, who would change these tapes when the
tapes ran out?
Mr. Haldeman. It is my understanding that this was handled
entirely by the — by several staff members of the Technical Security
Division of the Secret Service.
Senator Montoya. All right.
Now, let us go into another subject matter. I believe you stated
that the President did not get interested in trying to unravel the
possible involvement of the White House until after the March 21
meeting when he announced that he wanted an intensive investigation.
Is that correct?
]Mr. Haldeman. He did not make an announcement after the March
21 meeting.
Senator Montoya. Well, he announced on April 17 that on March 21
he had determined that he would conduct and begin an intensive
investigation into the Watergate affair.
]Mr. Haldeman. Which he had done.
Senator INIontoya. All right.
Mr. Haldeman. He was announcing a month later that he had
done so.
Senator INIontoya, "Why did he not do this before and why did you
and Mr. Ehrlichman — why did not both of you initiate investigations
of your own?
Mr. Haldeman. Senator, I can speak for myself. I did not initiate
an investigation of my own in this or any other matter simply because
I was not the person to initiate investigations or conduct investigations
and particularly in this matter which v;as the subject of, as I under-
stood it, the most intensive or one of the most intensive investigations
in American history.
Senator Montoya, Well, I believe you stated that both you and Mr.
Ehrlichman relied on what Mr. Dean was doing and relied on the in-
formation which he was bringing to you, and that is why you did not
manifest greater concern or go to the President or words to that effect.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, we relied on what the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Justice Department were doing as reported to
you by Mr. Dean.
Senator Montoya. And as a result of the
Mr. Haldeman. And from time to time, by the Attorney General
and others.
Senator Montoya. And as a result of the information which you
were receiving from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the informa-
tion which you were i-eceiving from Mr. Dean, you felt that there was
no need to implement those investigations and start on your own
under White House auspices or under Mr. Ehrlichman or yourself?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct, with one minor exception, which is
that I wasn't receiving any information fiom the FBI. I was receiv-
ing — Mr. Dean was and I was receiving information from Mr. Dean.
Senator Montoya. Was he imparting it to anybody who might have
taken it to the President ?
Mr. Haldeman, Imparting what, sir?
3113
Senator Montoya. The FBI information.
Mr. Haldeman. He was not imparting any detailed FBI informa-
tion to any of us, at least, not to me.
Senator Montoya. xill right.
Mr. Haldeman. What information he was imparting to us was in
summary form and verbal and was to the point that there had been
nobody in the White House involved in the Watergate matter, which
was the area of his specific concern and responsibility.
Senator Montoya. All right. Now, in the Washington Post on
October 10 appeared a story to the following eifect : "FBI agents have
established that the Watergate bugging incidents stem from a massive
campaign of political spying and sabotage conducted on behalf of
President Nixon's reelection and directed by officials of the White
House and the Committee for the Re-Election of the President." And
the article continues.
Now, did this not excite the concern of those people in the White
House, the Chief of Staff specifically, and the Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Domestic xlffairs, Mr. Ehrlichman ? Did not this story excite
some kind of concern ?
Mr. Haldeman. To a degree, but there had been a number of stories,
many of them with some degree of accuracy and many of them with
no accuracy whatsoever. So a story is one step in raising a question on
that, but certainly not definitive.
Senator Montoya. Then there was
Mr. Haldeman. May I say. Senator, that the allegation — I do not
have that story before me but the allegation there, as I recall it, at-
tempted to tie a number of what I believed to be at the time unrelated
events together into a massive plot of — however it was defined there,
espionage and sabotage.
Senator Montoya. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me to finish my
question
Senator Ervin. OK.
Senator Montoya. Now, on October 16 there was another story
linking Mr. Kalmbach as attorney for the President with Mr. Segretti.
Then on — in the Evening Star of Monday, October 23, there was a
story linking Mr. Magruder, the Assistant Director of the CRP. Then
on October 25 in the Washington Post there was another story linking
Mr. Chapin, Mr. Strachan, who were employees of the White House.
Then on October 25, 1972, there was a story in the Washington Post
linking Mr. Dwight Chapin and Mr. Strachan and also another story
later on linking Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Colson and reciting
an article in Time magazine.
Did not all these things and other stories excite the concern of those
people who had the administrative responsibility to inform the Presi-
dent as to what was going on from the outside ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, they certainly did in that sense. Senator, and
the President, of course, was fully aware of those stories too, and asked
questions. We did not have to excite the attention of the President to
those
Senator Montoya. Do you mean to tell me that he
Senator Ervin. I want to be fair. If I am going to enforce the 10-
minut© rule on other Senators I expect I will have to enforce it on you
and myself.
3114
Senator Montoya. All right. I just want an answer
Senator Ervin. You can come back to him and you have another
turn but if I do not hold each Senator to the 10-minute rule I am in
trouble and if I treat them all impartially I am not in quite so much
trouble.
Senator Montoya. All right, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervhst. When I said that your interpretation of the tapes
was released to the public through this committee, that it was what we
call "connegling" in North Carolina, I was paying a compliment to the
legal dexterity. You were forbidden by the President to testify about
your interpretation of the tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Notwithstanding, you prepared a statement giving
your interpretation of the tapes, and brought it down before the
committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. I prepared that as one alternative and another
stat/cment not giving my version as the other alternative
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. Pending the decision of the committee as to how to
deal with it. I wanted to be prepared for either eventuality.
Senator Er\tn. Then the lawyers for the President didn't advise
the committee in any way by letter or by personal appearance that the
President had any objection to your testifying about your interpreta-
tion of the tapes. And then instead of doing so, they entrusted the
lawyer of the client who had prepared the statement giving his inter-
pretation of the tapes to raise the objection to them and
Mr. Haldeman. Well, Mr. Chairman
Senator Er\in. And I would have to say that not only is that what
we would call very skillful legal dexterity, connegling in North Caro-
lina, but if the writer of the Book of Ecclesiastes had been here he
wouldn't have been able to say right that "there is nothing new under
the sun." And that's the genuine truth.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Chairman, I can affirm that this act was indeed
nothing new under the sun because this is the procedure we have been
following in this matter ever since I retained counsel and since I have
appeared before a number of committees of the Senate, the House of
Representatives, before the grand jury, and before the U.S. attorneys.
Wlienever any question arose relating to "\\niite House restriction,
Presidential restriction on my testimony, whether it was in the early
days of this process pure executive privilege at which time I was fore-
closed from testifying as to anything relating to a conversation with
the President, or whether it was a question of national security which
was imposed upon my testimony in some other areas, or whether as it
has been in recent days a question of separation of powers, in each case
where such a question arose or a period that it was going to arise — —
Senator ER^^N. I believe
Mr. Haldeman. I asked my counsel to request advice from the White
House as to how we were to deal with this. Counsel received that advice
in the form of a letter from the counsel at the ^^liite House and such
letter was delivered in the case to your staff regarding executive
privilege and to the grand jury, the IT.S. attoriieys in regard to execu-
tive privilege, and so on.
3115
So, this was not a new process that was dreamed up as of the arrival
of the tapes on the scene.
Senator Ervin. Well, it is rather unusual for your lawyers to inter-
pose an objection but I will bypass that.
Mr. Wilson. Wliat did you say was unusual ?
Senator Ervin. I think it is unusual procedure. It may be familiar
to Mr. Haldeman but to me it is very unusual for attorneys for a client
to trust an attorney who has a diverse interest to interpose their
objection.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, that is the process that has been followed in
this case since the day I left the Wliite House and started the trial of
testifying, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. I don't want all my 10 minutes to be used up.
Mr. Wilson. I don't quite understand you. Is that criticism of me ?
Senator ER\^N. No, sir. It is just praise for the legal dexterity of
the attorneys for the White House that they can get another lawyer
to do their work for them without drawing their salaries.
]Mr. Wilson. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Dean testified he had a talk with the President
on March 13.
Were you present at that time?
INIr. Haldeman. As I said in my statement, Mr. Chairman, I do
not recall being present at that meeting but the President's log does
show that I was in for the first 12 minutes of it or for 12 minutes
after the start of it.
Senator Ervin. You haven't heard the tape of that meeting?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you don't know what Mr. Dean said during
the time you were not present?
INIr. Haldeman. No, sir, and I don't recall anything he said during
the time I was present.
Senator Ervin. Let's see.
On this meeting, the tape showed that INIr. Dean told the President
in this that you had gotten the fruits of the bugging from Strachan.
Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry. When
Senator Ervin. Mr. Dean told the President that you had gotten
the fruits of the bugging from Strachan, didn't he?
Mr. Haldeman. In the March 21 meeting.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. He told me that I may have. It was his under-
standing that Strachan had gotten the fruits of the bugging.
Senator Ervin. Yes, and he stated also that you had OK'd the re-
turn of the $350,000 which Strachan had gotten from one of his friends
to store, in cash.
INIr. Haldeman. It was not a friend of Strachan's but it was funds
that Strachan had held in custody during the campaign period.
Senator Ervin. Well, he told you that you had OK'd the return
to the committee from the $350,000, didn't he?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. He told the President in addition that part of those
3116
funds had been used by LaRue to pay the lawyers for the defendants
in the Watergate case.
]\Ir. Haldeman. I am not sure that he did.
Senator Ervin. Well, didn't he say that one of the things was the
fact that you had used these Kalmbach funds?
Mr. Haldeman. No. That I had authorized the return of them to
the committee. I don't know that he went to the next step. I don't
recall that he did.
Senator Ervin. Didn't he tell about the Segretti affair and say you
had used funds for Segretti and you had authorized Kalmbach to pay
funds for Segretti for the dirty tricks ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have the feeling, Mr. Chairman, that he had
already — that he had already described the Segretti activity to the
President at some earlier point and that he simply alluded to it in this
March 21 meeting.
Senator Ervin. Well, you did authorize Kalmbach to pay the money
to pay Segretti, didn't you ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And he also told the President that Colson, while
he said that nobody in the Wliite House was involved, he was talking
about the bugging and the burglary, wasn't he ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And then he proceeded to say in these respects, that
I mentioned, in which he said they could claim that 3^011 were involved.
Mr. Haldeman. With regard to the fruits.
Senator Ervin. Yes, and then he said that it might involve Colson
because he had urged expedition of the Liddy proposal.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. And then he also said that Colson could be involved
because he allegedly had said something to Hunt about Executive
clemency.
Mr. Haldeman. To Hunt or to Bittman, yes, sir.
Senator ER\^N. And also he said Colson could be involved because
he had suggested the bombing of the Brookings Institution.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. I don't believe there was any reference to an
individual in connection with the Brookings thing and I
Senator Ervin. He did say the White House could be allegedly in-
volved on account of the proposal to bomb the Brookings Institution,
didn't he?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. Did he mention the Brookings Institution ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Well, what did he say there about it ?
Mr. Haldeman. He said there was some problem regarding the
Brookings Institution as I recall it.
I don't believe — my recollection — I don't know whether it is in that
meeting or in another meeting but the way he referred to it was a sec-
ond-story job at the Brookings.
Senator ER^^N. What is a second-story job ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know what a second-story job is. I assume
it is a burglary. But in any event, whatever it was wasn't carried out.
I had not heard the story about the allegation of bombing of Brook-
ings until it appeared in the press.
3117
Senator Ervin. Now, in addition to the emphasis on break-in, on
burglary, he said he told the President that Magruder was certainly
involved.
Mr. Haldeman. That he felt he was, yes.
Senator Ervin. And he said there is a possibility or probability that
Mitchell was involved in the break-in burglaTy.
Mr. Haldeman. He said he didn't know whether Mitchell was or not.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Then he also told the President that Hunt was demanding more
money and that he told the President that Kalmbach had raised money
to pay the lawyer fees for the defendants in the case.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. Yes, and also that he told him that Hunt was at-
tempting to get $120,000 more by blackmail and that Hunt threatened
that if he didn't get the $120,000 that he would tell the seamy things
he had done for Ehrlichman.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And then the President got to discussing with him
how much it would take to satisfy the demands of the blackmailers.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And he said $1 million or suggested that figure.
Mr. Haldeman. He said it could go — over a period of years it could
go to $1 million, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Then the tape said that the President said that there
was no problem raising $1 million.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, I should put that the way it really came, Mr.
Chairman, which was that Dean said, when the President said how
much money are you talking about here, and Dean said over a period
of years probably $1 million, but it would be very hard — it is very hard
to raise that money. And the President said it is not hard to raise it.
We can raise $1 million. And then got into the question of — in the one
case before I came into the meeting making statements that it would be
wrong and in other exploration of this getting into the — ^trying to
find out what Dean was talking about in terms of $1 million.
Senator Ervin. Are you familiar with the testimony Dean gave about
his conversations on the 13th and the 21st of March with the President ?
Mr. Haldeman, I am generally familiar with it, yes, sir.
Senator ER^^N. Well, this tape corroborates virtually everything he
paid except that he said that the President said there would be no
difficulty about raising the money, and you say the only difference in
the tape is that the President also added, but that would be wrong.
]\Ir. Haldeman. And there was considerable other discussion about
what you do, what Dean would recommend, what should be done,
how — what this process is and this sort of thing. It was a very — ^there
was considerable exploration in the area.
Senator ER\^N. The tape recorded that, did it not? And also Dean
testified about the discussion between Ehrlichman and him as to how
they would bring this matter out before the grand jury?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not understand the reference t^o Dean's dis-
cussion with Ehrlichman.
Senator Ervin. Well, just like you say here in your statement, that
they discussed the question how to bring this out and Ehrlichman
suggested everybody go before the grand jury.
3118
Mr. Haldeman, Ob, I see.
Senator Ervin. And then Dean suggested they go before the grand
jury with immunity.
Now, can you point out any other differences except that about the
President saying that would be wrong and what Dean testified?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. I think that the differences in the appearance
in the Dean testimony, at least, as I would understand it, that Dean
said it will take $1 million and the President said that is no problem
and that was no problem and that was the end of the matter, and that
was not the end of the matter. I think that is a terribly important
difference, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. The original tape would be about the best way to
determine whether what Dean said or whether your version is right,
would it not?
Mr. Haldeman. I guess so, yes.
Senator ER^^;N. Well, my time is up.
Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Haldeman, let us talk about the money for a minute. I would
like to talk about the excess of funds that you say you understood
were left over from the 1968 campaign and also about the $350,000.
Mr. Haldeman. All right.
Senator Baker. Do you have any information about how those 1968
funds were raised, who did it ?
j\Ir. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. "Whether it was in cash or on deposit?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, it was my understanding that — I think it
was my original understanding and probably through this entire
interim period that whatever funds it was Kalmbach had were all
in cash. I understand from the testimony that has been given here
that there was a certain amount in cash and an additional amount in
bank deposits of some kind.
Senator Baker. I am talking now about the 1968 campaign surplus.
Mr. Haldeman. So am I. If I understand it, the testimony that
has been given here, and I should not be trying to characterize it,
but my recollection is that you have been told that there was $1 million,
a little over $1,100,000 or something like that, in cash.
Senator Baker. Left over from the 1968 campaign?
INIr. Haldeman. That was my understanding, and about $600,000
or $700,000 in bank accounts.
Senator Baker. You mean a total of $1,700,000 or $1,800,000?
Mr. Haldeman. That was my understanding of the testimony and
it would be in accordance with my general understanding of the
amount of money that Mr. — of which Mr. Kalmbach was custodian.
Senator Baker. Over $1 million you understand was in cash and
the balance was in accounts.
Mr. Haldeman. At the time, as I say, I thought it was all in cash.
Senator Baker. Do you know why it was in cash?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Or how it came to be in cash?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. I would have assumed it was contributed
in cash.
3119
Senator Baker. Do you know what happened to the fund at some
subsequent time?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, as I have indicated in my statement, the fund
was put into ]Mr. Kalmbach's custody. I knew following the 1968
election that Mr. Kalmbach did have a very substantial cash fund
and that it was available for use on request and discussion with Mr.
Kalmbach and I used, or asked for the use of, a substantial amount
of those funds for polling during the 4 years from 1968 to 1972.
Senator Baker. How on earth do you use cash for polling? Did
you actually pay in cash?
]Mr. Haldeman. I did not but I believe it was paid for in cash. And
it was done because these were — ^these were polls that were taken at
the White House recjuest for White House use only, really for the
President's information only, and we did not want the — either the
knowledge of the polling or the results of the polling to be generally
known outside of the
Senator Baker. In any event, there was, according to your under-
standing, over $1 million in cash that was turned over to Kalmbach
who held it until, and this is the point I am getting to, it was turned
over or was it turned over to the Committee for the Re-Election of
the President?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, you have to start through a subtracting proc-
ess because a lot of it, if not all of it, was used during the period from
1968 to April 7, 1972. I can account — I understand that there was
about $400,000 used for polling. It has been testified here that $400,000
was used for the Alabama governorship campaign. I forget how much
has been testified liere was used for Segretti, but you have that figure.
And I forget how much was used for Ulasewicz, but you have that
figure. It is my understanding that all of those things came out of this
fund.
Senator Baker. Did the $350,000 in cash come from that fund ?
Mr, Haldeman. That is my understanding; yes, sir. Now, I am not
totally clear, as I indicated in my statement, as to the precise sources
and allocations and disbursements of the fund Mr. Kalmbach — of
which Mr. Kalmbach was custodian, and only Mr. Kalmbach can give
you that information in that he was custodian of this surplus 1968
fund. He also undertook to raise funds in 1970 from supporters of the
President for support of candidates for the House and Senate. And it
is my understanding there were funds left over from that endeavor
also, and then INIr. Kalmbach in 1971 undertook to raise a very sub-
stantial startup fund for the 1972 campaign.
Senator Baker. Mr. Haldeman, what I am trying to reach really, is
whether or not the $350,000 was a part of the $1 million or more in
cash that was accumulated after the 1968 campaign, and apparently
your testimony is that it was, according to your understanding.
Mr. Haldeman. That is exactly right. My understanding
Senator Baker. I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you request the transfer of that $350,000 in
cash to the White House ? That is, was it your request that produced
that transfer?
3120
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, in discussion with, I believe, Mr. Mitchell, Mr.
Stans, and INIr. Kalmbach.
Senator Baker. Did you ever discuss that with the President?
Mr. Haldeman. The President knew that we had a fund available.
I do not know that I discussed the specific amount.
Senator Baker. Did he know that $350,000 in cash was coming to
the ^^nute House?
Mr. Haldeman. As I say, I do not know about the specific amount,
but he knew that I would have available a fund for private polling.
Senator Baker. According to my notes, that transfer was made
between Hugh Sloan and Strachan on April 6, 1972. Does that accord
with your understanding?
INIr. Haldeman. That is my understanding. I think there has been
testimony somewhat different from that but not importantly so.
Senator Baker. And you have already testified, I believe, that money
was not in fact used for polling.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Baker. But rather as paid by check, I believe, from one
of the other accounts of the Committee To Ee-Elect the President or
the finance committee.
Mr. Haldeman. Apparently so, at the end of the campaign. I did
not realize that.
Senator Baker. There is some testimony in the record, Mr. Hplde-
man, about a mining — mining of the Haiphong Harbor advertisement
that was run in the newspaper, paid for out of this account. Did you
direct the payment of that account?
Mr. Haldeman. As I said in my statement. Senator Baker, I was
told by Strachan that $22,000 had been removed from the $350,000
to pay for advertising. I do not know that I — ^that he has ever told me
or that I know what the purpose of the advertising was, but 1 have
heard from somebody at some point that it was in relation to Vietnam
support advertising.
Senator Baker. The point I am trying to reach here is, did you
authorize the payment from this fund of the cost of that advertising?
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Strachan says he checked with me before he
delivered or took the $22,000 out, had it delivered to the advertising
people, and I do not recall his having done so, but that is what he had
to open it.
Senator Baker. And that was in cash, Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. At least that is my understanding. I did not —
I was not directly involved in the transaction.
Senator Baker. Is it also your understanding that the ad did not
cost $22,000 and that there was some amount which I believe is vari-
ously stated at $15,000 or —$15,200 or $7,800 or some such amount that
was left over. There seems to be some dispute in the record on that
point. Were you aware of that ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not until I heard it on television here.
Senator Baker. Do you know — well, you do not know if that is
tlie fii-st you heard of it. I was about to ask, do you know who retained
custody of the excess of that money?
^Ir. Haldeman. I am not familiar with it. It w^as my understanding
that the $22,000^1 believe I was told that the $22,000— had been
delivered to the advertising agency.
3121
Senator Baker. Do you have a firm recollection on that?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I do not. That is my
Senator Baker. Do you know the name of the advertising agency ?
Mr. Haldeman. My recollection is — I was told, I believe it is Ba-
roody Associates or something — ^^has Baroody in the name.
Senator Baker. Do you know where they are located ?
Mr. Haldeman. I believe they are here in Washington, and they
were I think, placing an ad for the "Tell It To Hanoi Committee"
or some group of that sort.
Senator Baker. Mr. Haldeman, did you experience — did you actu-
ally supervise the use of this cash for polling between 1968 and 1972 ?
Mr. Haldeman. I requested or instructed that polls be taken, that
polling be done, and that instruction was implemented by either Mr.
Strachan or Mr. Higby of my office directly with the polling organi-
zation, and they then made the arrangements, and I am not sure
whether — which one of the two it was or perhaps both of them at
different points in time, made the arrangements for Mr. Kalmbach
to make payments to the polling company.
Senator Baker. But Kalmbach actually made the payments ?
Mr. Haldeman. I believe so.
Senator Baker. Physically transferred the funds.
Mr. Haldeman, I believe so. I am not sure, but that is my under-
standing.
Senator Baker. Do you know the name of the polling companies?
Mr. Haldeman. They used a number of polling companies.
Senator Baker. Could you give us according to your best recollec-
tion, the names of those companies ?
Mr. Haldeman. Opinion Research — I am not sure whether — I do
not think any of those — probably principally Opinion Research. There
were other polls taken by the Harris organization and by — there is
another, Michigan Opinion Research, I think, and then a polling firm
in California, but I am not sure that — whether any of those were
taken from this source or whether all from this source were
Senator Baker. What was its average billing, approximately? What
would a poll of this sort cost— $15,000, $20,000 ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. It would depend on the nature of the
polls. We took a number of different kinds of polls, many of them
telephone polls and some of them personal interview polls.
Senator Baker. What I am reaching for is who actually gathered
up a bundle of $100 bills, if that was the case, and physically delivered
it to the polling organization ? Would that have been Mr. Kalmbach ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is my understanding; yes, sir.
Senator Baker. But you do not have any personal knowledge.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you in fact — I am told my time is up. Let me
finish this one question.
Did you in fact recommend the employment of Mr. Ulasewicz ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you discuss his employment?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe so. I was aware that there was
such a person.
3122
Senator Baker. What was the extent of your knowledge of the
proposed operations of Mr. Ulasewicz?
]NIr. Haldeman. That is about it. He was a man that was working
through Mr. Ehrlichman on special investigations.
Senator Baker. What role did you play in the payment or author-
ization of payments to Mr. Ulasewicz?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe any.
Senator Baker. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Senator.
I have another question on the tapes, Mr. Haldeman.
I would like to ask a question which I believe is in the minds of
many people.
On July 9, 10, or 11, you are not certain, but on one of these 3 days,
you were presented with several tapes and a tape recording machine
in the Executive Office Building. You took this machine and the tapes
home somewhere in Bethesda, and that evening you played the tape
which you have testified was a recording of the conversations had in
the oval office on September 15.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. My question is, can you from your knowledge,
assure us that this tape that you listened to was in fact a faithful
recording of the conversation which was held in the office on
September 15?
Mr. Haldeman. I cannot of my own knowledge. I can say that the
tape was delivered to me as such. It was in a box identified by that
date, and it was very clear that the voices that I heard were those of
the President, Mr. Dean, and myself.
Senator Inouye. After you finished with the tape recording, what
did you do with the tape?
Mr. Haldeman. I rewound it, put it back in the box, and put the
box in the case that it had come in with the tape recording machine.
Senator Inouye. And what time was that, sir?
Mr. Haldeman. It was in the evening. I do not know what time.
Senator Inouye. When did you return this tape?
jNIr. Haldeman. Well, as I told you, I had some other tape, and I
think that I left the tape machine and the tape at my residence when
I left the next day, and I think the following day was when I picked
up the additional tapes which were of other meetings and which I
then also took home the following evening and then did not listen to,
and then I think I returned
Senator Inouye. Did you testify
Mr. Haldeman. 1 think I then returned the whole — all the tapes
and the machine. I took the tapes out of the envelope that they had
been delivered to me in and put them in the case also and delivered all
of them back on the following day.
Senator Inouye. So your testimony is that the so-called September
15 tape recording was in your possession for 2 days.
Mr. Haldeman. I think it probably was.
Senator Inouye. Who Avas in that house during that time ?
Mr. Haldeman. No one. My family had moved to California, and
there was nobody else using the residence at all.
Senator Inouye, Can you assure this committee that no one else got
hold of the tapes during that absence ?
3123
Mr. Haldeman. I can to the best of my knowledge, Senator, assure
you of that in the sense that the tapes, the machine, and the tape itself
were put in the suitcase and left in the closest of my study in my house.
The house was locked when I left, and there was no evidence when I
returned that anybody had been in the house, and when I took the
case — the carrying case — out, no evidence that anybody had moved it
or opened it.
Senator Inouye. Can you assure this committee from your direct
knowledge that the tape of September 15, which you returned 2 days
later, is the same tape which is presently in the tape library in the
White House?
Mr. Haldeman. I can assure this committee that I returned all of
the materials that I — machine and all of the tapes, and I don't know
what happened to them from there on. So I don't know what is in
the files.
Senator Inouye. This is the question that the people are asking:
Is it possible that this tape during those 48 hours could have been
doctored ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't consider it to be possible.
Senator Inouye. You are not certain that the tape you listened to —
that is now the tape in the library.
Mr. Haldeman. I firmly believe that it is. You asked if I could
testify as to my personal knowledge. I have not gone back to the tape
storageroom and relistened to the tape to ascertain whether in fact
it is the one that I listened to.
Senator Inouye. Thank you.
Now, I would like to get to the section on some of the activities
which you attribute to opponents of the President. You have men-
tioned burning of campaign headquarters, damage to headquarters,
splattering of dinner guests with eggs and tomatoes, slashing of bus
tires: Can you testify to this committee that the people who were re-
sponsible for these criminal acts were on the payroll of the Democratic
National Committee, or Mr. Wallace, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Muskie,
Mr, Jackson, Mr. McGovern ?
Mr. Haldeman. I can't to my own personal knowledge make that
statement ; no, sir. I have, as I indicated to the minority counsel this
morning, I believe in your absence or possibly you were here, said that
it is my understanding that as much documentation as is available
has been turned over to the staff for investigation into these incidents.
Senator Inouye. Do you have any documentary evidence in your
possession at this time ?
Mr. Haldeman. Any documentary evidence ?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. Now, wait. Excuse me, correction. I do have,
I believe, what is probably a copy of the report that was turned over
to the committee, at my home in California. I don't have it with me
here.
Senator Inouye. And this evidence will link members on the staff of
these candidates in their involvement in these illegal activities ?
Mr. Haldeman, In some of them. I have carefully indicated here
that some of these took place with the clear knowledge and consent
of agents of the opposing candidate. Others were acts of people who
3124
were clearly unsympathetic, but may not have had direct orders from
the opposing camps.
Senator Inoute. Were you aware of the former Assistant Attorney
General, Mr. Mardian, who testified here just a few days ago?
Mr. Haldeman. I heard some of it.
Senator Inotjye. At that time
Mr. Haldeman. I have not read it.
Senator Inouye. At that time Mr. Mardian was in charge of internal
security and under oath he testified that no information was ever
brought to his attention that "Anybody in the Democratic Party posed
any threat at all in the form of violence or otherwise to the Republican
Party or the security of the United States." Do you disagree with that
statement, sir?
Mr. Haldeman. I would disagree — I don't disagree that any was
brought to his attention, I don't know what was brought to his atten-
tion, but I have the distinct feeling from this information that there
were such acts carried out.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Haldeman, are you aware that on May 24 of
this year, this Select Committee requested of the Department of Justice
any evidence that they may have concerning links between violence or
disruption and the Democrats ?
Mr. Haldeman. I was not aware of that ; no, sir.
Senator Inoute. And we have received no official report or evidence
to date. Can you explain why the Department of Justice cannot pro-
duce such evidence at this time?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know that they cannot. I would assume that
they should be able to, and as I say what evidence I have had brought
to my attention I think has been turned over.
Mr. Dash. I would like to clear it because, Mr. Wilson, we have
received from you a documentation of this kind.
Mr. Haldeman. It was not received from me, Mr. Dash. It was sent
from, I believe. Ken Khachigian, K-h-a-c-h-i-g-i-a-n.
Senator Baker. On that definitive piece of testimony the floor is
yielding to Senator Gumey.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't vouch for the accuracy of that spelling,
Mr. Reporter.
Senator Gurney. In the interest of trying to expedite the hearings,
I only want to ask one question at this moment.
One of the important pieces of testimony and something that was
supposed to have occurred at the September 15 meeting — this was a
statement by John Dean when he was here that that is when he first
thought that the President knew about Watergate and about the
coverup and, as I recall, he gained that assumption on this statement :
He said to the President after there was some talk about Watergate
"I don't think Watergate can continue to be contained." Now you were
at the meeting, Mr. Haldeman, and also you reviewed the tape. Do
you recall that any such statement was made by John Dean as to the
President like that ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I don't, and I don't recall hearing it in the tape
when I listened to it recentlv. There was a discussion, as I think I in-
dicated in my statement, of Dean saying that the indictments that had
been brought down meant the end of the investigation by the grand
312'5
jury but that now there would be other investigations, and that the
GAO audit was underway. I think, at that time and that that was —
I don't think it related to Watergate, but he was talking more in
general campaign terms, and then there was considerable discussion
of the Patman Committee inquiry that was, I guess, proposed at that
time or was, in fact, underway, I am not sure which, and he said that
something to the effect that nothing would come out to surprise us,
which I took to mean that whatever facts there were that we already
knew them, and that they were, as he had represented them.
Senator Gurnet. There was no offering of any facts by Mr. Dean
about this Kalmbach raising of money and carrying money around
by Mr, Ulasewicz ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Senator Gurnet. And leaving it here and there and paying people
off.
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Senator Gurnet. None of that discussion ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Senator Gurnet. As far as you can recollect, you have reviewed the
tape of this meeting, he, Mr. Dean, never made any such statement
"That I don't think Watergate can continue to be contained" to the
President ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe so.
Senator Gurnet. As I say in the interest of time I am going to
yield at this point, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Baker. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montota. Following up our previous dialog, Mr.
Haldeman
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir
Senator Montota. I laid the foundation about the statements which
had appeared in the press and which certainly must have come to the
attention of the President and people at the White House, especially
you and Mr. Ehrlichman with respect to possible involvement of White
House personnel as well as CRP personnel.
Now did he ever discuss these articles with the President or did
anyone else?
Mr. Haldeman, Yes, the President was quite a thorough reader of
the news and was very much aware of those articles at the time they
appeared, and he initiated discussions, I would not call them discus-
sions, he would raise the question of it, you know "What's the story on
this or what's this thing about ? "
'Senator Montota. Well, would he raise these matters with you or
with Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Haldeman. At varying times, I would imagine, probably both of
us, each of us.
Senator Montota. Well, what information did you have to ade-
quately inform him on these things ?
Mr. Haldeman. It would depend on the particular story that had
arisen.
Senator Montota. Well, I told you about the stories that had arisen ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, but each of them referred to different matters.
For instance, if it was the story on the Segretti matter, I had fairly
96-2S6 O - 73 - Bk. 8
3126
specific information bo give him. If it was a broad-scale allegation of
an espionage, I did not have any information to give him.
Senator Montoya. Well, what about the stories with respect to
Mr. Kalmbach giving out money to Mr. Segretti ? You stated that you
called that to his attention, informed him as to the facts; what about
Mr. Magruder, the story of Mr. Magruder that you might have been in-
volved before June IT in the Watergate affair. Did you inform him of
that?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't remember the nature of that story and it was
something that I think was denied at the time.
Senator Montoya. Now what about — there must have been some dis-
cussion if you people denied it ?
Mr. Haldeman. We people did not deny. Senator.
Senator Montoya. Who denied it ?
Mr. Haldeman. I assume Mr. Magruder did. That would be the
logical place for denial.
Senator Montoya. And this was discussed with the President ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall a discussion with the President of that
particular matter. I don't know that it was not.
Senator Montoya. Would you not say that he would be concerned
with respect to the assistant director of the Committee To Re-Elect the
President ?
Mr, Haldeman. He would be concerned if it were proven that or
there were a supportive allegation that he had done something of that
sort, yes.
Senator Montoya. What about the story where — which relates to the
FBI agents reports indicating that there was political spying and
sabotage conducted by people in the President's Re-Election Commit-
tee and also directed by officials of the Wliite House ?
Mr. Haldeman. Senator, I don't know that story was — as I said
there were a number of stories during that time. Some of them had
some basis in fact, some of them didn't, and our reaction was, in terms
of a newspaper story by those who had knowledge of the event that was
under coverage, to try to determine what the facts were and make sure
that if the story were correct that it be allowed to ride but if it were
not correct or contained some areas of error that those be cleared up
and corrected.
Senator Montoya. These stories were appearing in the press every
day, in the Evening Star, in the Washington Post, in Time magazine,
and in the press across the country, and you mean to tell me that the
President did not ask you or Mr. Ehrlichman to try to complement
the investigation that Mr. Dean was conducting at the time ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. He did not ask us to do so. He was
fully aAvare that there was an investigation underway. He was equally
aware. Senator Montoya, that there was a political campaign
underway.
Senator Montoya. Then besides these stories that were appearing in
the press every day Mr. Dean informed the President on March 21
about possible involvement on the part of White House personnel, and
personnel at the CRP, and then on INIarch 22, INfr. Mitchell came in to
see the President, and I believe you and Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean
were present at that meeting.
3127
Now, did not the President ask Mr. Mitchell about any possible
involvement on the part of people working for the CRP ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir ; he did not.
Senator Montoya. He did not direct any questions to Mr. Mitchell
at that time with respect to any possible involvement before June 17
or after with respect to the coverup ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator I^Iontota. Did he ever ask Mr. Mitchell at any subsequent
date with respect to these things, to your knowledge?
Mr. Haldeman. Not to my knowledge. As Mr. Ehrlichman has testi-
fied he did ask Mr. Ehrlichman to talk over this subject with Mr.
Mitchell and Mr. Ehrlichman did so.
Senator Montoya. Don't you think this was very unusual because
the President had trusted Mr. Mitchell implicitly, had appointed him
head of his own campaign. He had been his Attorney General and his
confidant and friend, don't you think it unusual for t - President not
to ask INIr. Mitchell about these things ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. I think that what the President would have
done is what the President did do, which is to try to find out the fact
rather than to confront a man with what in the President's hands at
that time were unsubstantiated and very general in the case of Mr.
Mitchell, very general allegations.
Senator Montoya. Doesn't a man when he is trying to elicit facts
with respect to anj^hing that connects him, go to one of his close friends
if he knows that it is within the power of one of his close friends to
disclose some facts or shed some light on those possible involvements ?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, Mr. Mitchell had said that he had no involve-
ment, and that statement was well known to the President.
Senator Montoya. No, but Mr. Mitchell also testified here that if
the President had asked him that he would have cited chapter and
verse about all these things, and still the President did not ask Mr.
Mitchell, did he ? That is your testimony.
Mr. Haldeman. To my knowledge, he did not.
Senator Montoya. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Did you have any personal contact, Mr, Halde-
man, with Henry Petersen either iDefore, before the Watergate
break-in ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. After the Watergate break-in ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Senator Weicker. You have never met with Mr. Petersen ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Senator Weicker. You have never had occasion at any time to talk
with him or meet with him ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. At any time up until your departure from the
White House?
Mr. Haldeman. Or since. I don't believe I have ever met Mr.
Petersen.
Senator Weicker. Now, you state in your opening statement —
3128
In the selection of his personal White House staff, the President emphasized
the qualities of integrity, intelligence, and initiative. He urged that we bring in
young people, men and women with great energy, enthusiasm of youth to provide
those qualities, along with the wisdom and experience of the more senior mem-
bers of his administration.
Now, who would you cateo^orize as being the ultimate person that
the President would look to insofar as personnel matters within the
White House were concerned ?
Mr. Haldeman. It would depend on the area in the White House.
Senator Weicker. Well, let's talk about the White House staif.
Mr. Haldeman. Pardon me.
Senator Weicker. The White House staff.
Mr. Haldeman. It would depend on which part of the White House
staff.
Senator Weicker. Aside from Dr. Kissinger's operations.
Mr. Haldeman. In the domestic area, Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator Weicker. Insofar as other persons are concerned. In other
words, you didn't look upon your own role in any way, in other words,
as having any charge of personnel, either at the White House or
Mr. Haldeman. Oh, yes, indeed.
Senator Weicker. All right.
Mr. Haldeman. But not the total charge of personnel.
Senator Weicker, What areas were you in charge of ?
Mr. Haldeman. White House operations, the staff secretary, the
support units within the White House.
Senator Weicker. What do you mean by support units?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, the speech writing and research group, the
people who prepared the news summary and did that kind of activity
for the President, the le^al counsel's office from the administrative
viewpoint, the special assistants that worked on projects from time to
time. People came and went depending on the need at various times.
Senator Weicker. And in the selection of personnel, whether by
you or by Mr. Ehrlichman, the President emphasized the quality of
integrity, intelligence, and initiative ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now, to what extent did you play a role in the
staffing of the Committee To Re-Elect the President ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have already discussed that in some detail. The
role that I played was one of consultation in the area of moving White
House staff people over there in connection with whether they were
people that could and should be diverted from the "White House to the
committee ; some questions of compensation because of balance between
the White House and the committee.
Senator Weicker. I am a little bit confused by your opening state-
ment as to exactly what your relationship is. You say that you did not
function as the White House liaison but you say that "the President
looked to me as his basic contact with the campaign organizations."
Mr. Haldeman. As his basic contact.
Senator Weicker. All right.
Now, you say you maintained communication with John Mitchell
in this regard until July of 1972, and then with Clark MacGregor.
All right.
3129
And you say that "Grordon Strachan on my staff handled the day-
to-day liaison with tlie committee for me in virtually all my contact
with the committee."
Mr. Haldeman. That is right.
Senator Weicker, Well, in view of your initial statement here about
the qualities of integrity, intelligence, and initiative, what is your
reaction, what is your reaction to the fact that several of these young
men who were hired both by the White House and the Committee To
Re-Elect the President, come before this committee and have admitted
to being parties to the payment of hush money, perjury, subornation
of perjur}% and other illegal and unethical conduct and who sets the
example since I can only assume from what you said when they came
into the White House and came into the Committee To Re-Elect the
President they had the qualities of integrity, intelligence, and
initiative.
Mr. Haldeman. They were certainly selected with the hope that
they had those qualities. And I believe that virtually all of them did,
and do.
Senator Weicker. Well, would you consider Mr. Magruder at the
outset to have been someone whom you had confidence in?
Mr. Haldeman, Yes, he was.
Senator Weicker. Is this one of the reasons why he went to the
Committee To Re-Elect the President?
]Mr. Haldeman. It was one of the reasons, yes.
Senator Weicker. Well, now, we have had Mr. Magruder before
this committee testifying as to certain things that he did.
Are these matters that you feel that you should share responsibility
for?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. I don't feel that I should share responsi-
bilities for them. I was not a part of his doing them. I feel a deep
sense of sorrow, if in fact what has been discussed here is what
happened. Because I think it is a very tragic thing. But I feel no sense
of responsibility in those areas because I was not involved in those
areas.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Strachan, did you go ahead and have a re-
sponsibility for his hiring?
Mr. Haldeman. Not originally, I don't believe. I think he was
already on the staff when I came to know him.
Senator Weicker. I think it is fair to say though he was one of
your assistants that you had some responsibility for?
Mr. Haldeman. I had the responsibility for his coming into my
office, absolutely, but I don't believe I had the responsibility or even
knowledge of his original coming on to the White House staff.
Senator Weicker. All right.
But nevertheless you had the responsibility of naming him as one
of your assistants, specifically your liaison with the committee.
Mr. Haldeman. That is right, yes, yes.
Senator Weicker. Now, here it is July 31, 1973, and your state-
ment, on more than one occasion you take the testimony of Mr.
Strachan and blow him, Mr. Strachan, out of the water, to use a
modem expression, is that right?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe so.
3130
Senator Weicker. Well, you certainly indicate you disagree rather
thoroughly with what his recollection of the facts is.
]Mr. Haldeman. On a couple of points I do.
Senator Weicker. I would say rather important points.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir, they are, but I have tried to indicate that
I — he has said that certain things were said or certain things were
done which I am not aware of.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Dean, did you have any contact with Mr.
Dean's coming to the — or any involvement with Mr. Dean's coming
to the White House ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir ; I did.
[Conferring with counsel.]
Senator Weicker. Do you feel you share any responsibility for the
things which Mr. Dean testified to before this committee?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I certainly do not.
Senator Weicker. Do you feel that your contacts with Director
Helms of the CIA have enhanced his reputation since the matters of
your meetings with him have come to public attention ?
Mr. Haldeman. You are using the plural, Senator, I had one meet-
ing with Director Helms in this regard, and I had that meeting with
him at the direction of the President, did what I was told to do by
the President, and I feel that it was completely proper and in the
national interest to do so.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Gray, did you have any contact with Mr.
Gray or any
Mr. Haldeman. Virtually none.
Senator Weicker. Or any ivolvement with his being selected or
considered as a Director of the FBI ?
ISIr. Haldeman. Not really, no.
'Senator Weicker. I just wonder, I realize my time is running out
and I have many questions which I will get to tomorrow, but I just
wonder in light of your statement where the President emphasized the
qualities of integrity, intelligence, and initiative, and I have seen so
many young people come before this particular committee in the ca-
pacity of, in their various capacities, with the Committee To Re-Elect
the President, and I have seen other persons of a more mature age,
who had various functions to perform in Government, and I have seen
so many lives just so completely shattered, if you will, on the very
quality which you emphasize or you said you emphasize in selecting
people, who set the example for what happened.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe that anyone has to have set the
example, and I think that there are probably many explanations for
what happened, and I am not sure that any of us really knows what
the true explanation is. But I cannot. Senator, if I could be permitted
a moment, I cannot let this line of inquiry and the point that you are
making, which is a very understandable point, simply lie there iDecause
you are referring to six or eight, maybe young people, and you are
referring to six or eight as you have described them, more mature peo-
ple for whom great problems have arisen, in some of the cases at least
because of their acts.
In other of those cases perhaps because they have been falsely ac-
cused or have been brought into something that was not in any way
of their doing. But in any event, take all of those people, and then
3131
look at the rest of the people that have not been brought before this
committee, and that will not be because they had in no way any in-
volvement in any of this matter, and who have performed in out-
standing fashion for the President and for this country, and I still
have a very great sense of pride in the caliber and the performance
and the proven record of the many young men and women and the
many older men and women that I had a part in bringing into this
administration in one way or another, and that others in the adminis-
tration had a part in bringing in, and overall that President Nixon
attracted to the service of this Government, and to the service of his
administration and who, in my mind, judging by the results, and look-
ing at it in the total context, not just in this microcosm of Watergate
and the few people who have become enmeshed in it, some by their
own doing and some inadvertently and some probably wrongly, some
certainly wrongly, I would hate to see a sweeping conclusion drawn
that there was something wrong with the people or the selection of the
people, that have served this administration in the past and that are
serving it now, and that will serve it in the future because I still stand
four square behind the statement that I made in my opening statement
that this was the most outstanding, most dedicated, and most able
group of people with whom I have ever been associated and with whom
I ever hope to be associated.
Senator Weicker. Well, I am afraid that we had best review maybe
exactly what this track record consists of.
Mr. Haldeman. I tried to give you the accomplishments of the
administration.
Senator Weicker. The Attorney General of the United States in
whose office matters are discussed, which matters come to your atten-
tion, and which matters certainly in no way can be categorized as rep-
resenting integrity or intelligence — initiative, yes.
A Secretary of Commerce, again whose associations with the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President, whose associations with this admin-
istration are now under question, and I have gone down and I can
continue to list the names of those who have appeared, of those who
have appeared before this committee, but Mr. Haldeman, I think that
in li.ofht of the facts that are coming out, both you and I would agree
that this went far beyond just a few men breaking into the Watergate
but rather it's revealed, it has revealed a situation both within the
Committee To Re-Elect the President and within the White House,
whereupon everything that was touched was corroded.
Mr, Haldeman. No, sir, I will not in any way, shape, or form ever
accept that allegation or contention. There is no way that any man in
this country can make and establish the case that everything in the
AVhite House, evervthing that the White House touched was corroded
and I think that does a grave disservice to the country even to state
it and I apologize immediately for having responded with that amount
of vigor.
Senator Weicker. No.
Mr. Haldemax. Because you touched off a spark that I should have
quenched in and responded with a little more patience and care, but.
Senator, that is just a thing that is not true and it is a tragic thing
that anybody could even think that it might be true,
3132
Senator Weicker. Well, I see this every day as I sit here when these
people come before us and I would only say this, that the real problem
is that your definition as to who does a disservice to the country has
always been far too broad a definition.
Senator Ervin. I would like to put in the record a copy of a letter
to Mr. Wilson from Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt, and in view of some of
the testimony of Mr. Haldeman, I would like to state that by direc-
tion of the committee, the chief counsel wrote a letter to the U.S.
Department of Justice asking what information they had in the
Internal Security Division or Federal Bureau of Investigation, con-
cerning the action of Democratic candidates, and they got this reply
on June 8, 1973 ; that is, the action during the 1972 election :
This is in response to your letter to me of May 24, 1973, requesting any
"information received by the Internal Security Division, Department of Justice,
which indicates or alludes to any criminal act or conspiracy i>eri>etrated, or
planned by or involving in any way any Democratic Presidential Candidate,
including Senator Muskie or Senator Humphrey, or the Democratic National
Committee, in connection with any violence group or disruption group carrying
out or conspiring to commit any unlawful or disruptive act."
A thorough search of the files of the former Internal Security Division reflects
no information of the kind which you requested. In addition, I inquired of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation whether any information of the type you
requested was ever furnished to the Internal Security Division by the FBI. I
have been informed by the FBI that a search of their files "disclosed no infor-
mation relating to the Committee's request."
The letter will be printed in the record.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 113 and
114.*]
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Chairman, may I say that letter confirms re-
cently what I said in my statement that your minority counsel said
I was in error on, whicli I said there has been no investigation of these
allegations, and the fact that these agencies have searched their files
and found nothing would confirm that there has been no investigation.
Senator Ervin. Yes, but wouldn't it be reasonable to suppose that
if any such acts occurred as you stated that there would have been an
investigation ?
Mr. Haldeman. T don't think so.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman
Senator Ervin. Well, did you make any complaint?
Mr. Haldeman. Pardon me?
Senator Ervin. Did you make any complaint?
Mr. Haldeman. I didn't. I don't know whether complaints were
made or not.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Pardon me, sir.
Senator Ervin. Well, they say they have no information.
ISIr. Haldeman. In their files.
Senator Ervin. 'In their files, and
Mr. Haldeman. They did not have any information in their files
on the Watergate either, which was one of the problems.
»See pp. 3320, 3321.
3133
Senator Ervin. No, but there was plenty of reason for that.
[Laughter.]
jNIr. Haldeman. That may be for this, too.
Senator Ervin. AVell, I would think that the FBI and the Depart-
ment of Justice are under the control of the administration, and I
would have thought that it was the duty of the administration to
have made a complaint to them if any such thing had occurred as you
delineated.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, what has your committee done to in-
vestigate this situation?
Senator Ervin. We have had to spend a lot of time in investigating
Watergate and haven't had any leisure to investigate anything else.
Mr. Wilson, I suspected that.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, pardon me, sir, may I address that
just briefly? I believe we have
Senator Ervin. We have some subpenas out, I understand.
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir, and some interviews are in the process of
being conducted. It appears to me that part of the reason for form-
ing this committee is to investigate these types of activities. The reso-
lution under which we are operating applies to campaign activities of
1972 and, of course, applies to Democratic activities as well as Repub-
lican activities. As to whether or not at some time j)revious the Justice
Department had any indication of any wrongdoing, this would be
relevant, but I certainly would not think it would be determinative.
I, for one, assure this witness and everyone else that I consider it
part of our duty to explore these matters and they will be thoroughly
explored, and if these matters come to light, it will be across the table
and not in the newspapers ; you pointed out that they have not been
reported and may never be reported until these witnesses testify here.
Mr. Haldeman. Some have been and some have not.
Mr. Thompson. Right.
Senator Ervin, I would say if Mr, Haldeman has any reliable in-
formation that any individual candidate or any person working for
a candidate for the nomination or for the election, he ought to transfer
it to this committee. This committee will investigate it.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman
Senator Ervin. From the description, I just got an idea the country
must have been in a state of insurrection during the last election,
Mr, Haldeman, Had you traveled with us, Mr. Chairman, you would
have at times had that impression because it was indeed created at some
times during the campaign.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, our staff is in the process of making such
investigation and is in the process of looking at these matters whether
it be involving the Democrats or Republicans, This set of hearings
deals with the Watergate situation, and that is why such testimony has
not come out but another series of hearings will be held which will
involve that investigation.
Mr. Haldeman. That was my understanding, Mr. Dash, and cer-
tainly is my hope.
Senator Ervin. Well, if there is no objection from any source, the
committee will stand in recess until 9 :30 a.m, tomorrow,
[Whereupon, at 5 :50 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at]
9 :30 a.m., Wednesday, August 1, 1973.]
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1973
UjS. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington^ D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 9 :30 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and Weicker.
Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred D.
Thompson, minority counsel ; Ruf us L. Edmisten, deputy chief coun-
sel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels ; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels ;
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Ray St. Ar-
mand, assistant publications clerk.
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
At a meeting of the committee this morning it was decided that the
committee will call the following witnesses: Mr. Helms, General
Walters, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, former Attorney Gen-
eral Kleindienst, former Acting Director of the FBI Gray, and
General Cushman, and then recess.
Since the Senator from Georgia has been compelled to be absent
from the committee during a good part of the recent examination of
this witness, in order to handle the agricultural bill on the floor of
the Senate and for that reason, since he has had no opportunity to
interrogate the witness, without objection the Chair will recognize
him first for that purpose.
Senator Talmadoe, Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
shall attempt to be as brief as possible inasmuch as I must preside
over an executive session of the committee very shortly.
Mr. Haldeman, we have had evidence here before this committee
from witnesses and exhibits inserted in the record about various memo-
randums concerning White House requests for audits into individuals'
tax returns.
Will you comment on that?
(3135)
3136
TESTIMONY OF HARRY ROBINS HALDEMAN— Resumed
Mr. Haldeman. I can only comment to the extent, Senator, that
there have been, over the time that I was in the Wliite House, a number
of inquiries made or pieces of information brought to the attention of
various people within the White House, from time to time, that there
were potential questions that should be investigated regarding business
or financial activities of individuals, and there was a concern or a feel-
ing that the IRS had been — during the time of our administration
being out of office and subsequently even during the time that this
administration came into office — there had been considerably more
zeal shown by the IRS in looking into potential questions of those who
were supporters of this administration than zeal shown in looking into
inquiries that were directed or raised regarding those who were known
and vocal opponents of the administration, and these factors would be
brought to the attention of various people at the White House from
time to time with a query as to why there wasn't some kind of investi-
gation into the dealings of some particular person with regard to some
matter and those would be referred to the IRS. That would be the
context in which I recall the question being raised.
Senator Talmadge. Here, I believe, is a talking paper prepared for
you to use with Secretary Walters, who was then Secretary of the — or
Director of the IRS, and here is paragraph (c) , "H. R. Haldeman" or
"H.R.H.," I assiune that means you, "should tell the Secretary,
Walters, that he must be more responsive in two key areas, personnel
and political actions. First, Walters should make personnel changes to
make IRS responsive to the Pre-sident, Walters should work with Fred
Malek immediately to accomplish this goal. (Note: there will be an
opening for General Counsel IRS in the near future. This should be
the first test of Walters' cooperation.) "
Did you use this talking paper ?
Mr. Haldemax. Could I see it, please. Senator?
Senator Talmadge. Certainly. Do we have another copy of this ? I
will show it to you and then ask you to return it to me.
Mr. Haldeman. This doesn't indicate to whom, by whom it was
prepared, or to whom it was directed. I agree with you it does refer
to "H.R.H. should tell the Secretary." I don't recall seeing it.
Some of the items in discussion or referred to in here — it doesn't
seem to be dated either. Is there any further identification of this
paper?
Senator Talmadge. That was one of the exhibits that Mr. Dean
placed in the record when he testified here, and I think that was
reported to be a talking paper for you to use in discussions with the
Secretary of the Treasury to try to make the Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue Service more responsive politically and more responsive to the
requests from the White House about audits of foes of the White
House tax returns.
Mr. Wilson. Senator Talmadare, I am sure you would not ask any
question which isn't relevant. Would you mind indicating the time
factor here, the relevancy of this within your resolution, if the Chair-
man will permit it?
Senator Talmadge. It all has relevance, I think, to the 1972 election.
Apparently that is what it was geared up for and it is within the pur-
3137
view of our committee if it relates to that. I would certainly think that
if you have a paper relating to trying to make the Internal Revenue
Service more politically responsive that it certainly would be within
the purview of this resolution that created this committee.
Mr. Wilson. I was concerned about the date of it. If it had been back
in 1969 or 1970 I would doubt it.
Senator Talmadge. When was Walters revenue commissioner, do we
have the dates here before the committee somewhere, some member of
the staff? Perhaps Mr. Haldeman would know.
Mr. Haldeman. I haven't any idea.
Mr. Dash. It was after 1970 because INIr. Thrower was before him
and there were some documents relating to Mr. Thrower in 1970 and
Mr. Walters came in after Mr. Thrower.
Senator Talmadge. One of the portions of that document does relate
to Mr. Thrower, I believe.
Did you ever have any conversations at any time with the Secretary
of the Treasury or anyone else about making the Internal Revenue
Service more politically responsive ?
Mr. Haldeman. Only in this — I don't recall any specific conversa-
tions with the Secretary of the Treasury. If I had any or I was a
participant in any such conversations, they would have been in the
context that I referred to earlier, Senator, which was the question of —
well, as Mr. Dean indicated that the IRS bureaucracy at the lower
levels was very strongly staffed with people or at least it was the feel-
ing that it was — I don't know anything about it because firsthand I
have made no investigation into this, this was the allegation — with
people whose positions were due to previous administrations and
whose interests were in the policies and philosophy of previous admin-
istrations, and that the diligence with which they pursued cases that
had been referred to them relating to potential misdoings by opponents
of this administration were not pursued with the diligence that they
were pursuing matters relating to supporters of this administration.
This had been the case when we were out of office and continued to be
the case even after we had been in office for several years, and there
was discussion of that question, and that, in that context, I may have
had — I know I have been in discussions where that kind of feeling was
under — was a topic under discussion.
I have not, I don't believe, ever met any Commissioner of the IRS
other than Mr. Cohen who was Commissioner before we came in and
who is now the attorney for the Democratic National Committee for
their lawsuit and took a deposition from me some weeks ago.
Senator Talmadge. Did you or anyone, to your knowledge, within
the White House ever request the White House to make a political —
an audit of any taxpayer?
Mr. Haldeman. In the sense of referring information that had come
to our attention or information that appeared to indicate a reason for
an audit, it is quite possible that that was done. I recall no specific such
request.
Senator Talmadge. Now, would they be foes of the administration
or friends of the administration ?
Mr. Haldeman. These would be inquiries or information that would
come in from friends of the administration regarding foes of the
administration. Or those who were considered to be.
3138
Senator Talmadge. Do you remember a particular effort to "get,"
so-called get Clark Clifford ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I don't.
Senator Talmadge. You don't recall that ?
Mr. Haldeman. I know that there was considerable — now wait a
minute, Clark Clifford.
Senator Talmadge. He is a prominent Washington attorney, as you
know.
Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry ; I was thinking of a different pei-son.
Senator Talmadge. Do you recall any effort to quash an audit of any
friendly taxpayer ?
Mr. Haldeman. To quash an audit ?
Senator Talmadge. Or to stop an audit, or to stop an investigation.
Mr. Haldeman. No. I do recall, as I say, the concern here of the bal-
ance between the zeal that was applied to inquiries into supporters as
contrasted with inquiries
Senator Talmadge. See if I am understanding your statement now,
it was the feeling of some in the White House that i^erhaps officials in
the IRS were more zealous in their audits of friends of the adminis-
tration than they were foes, is that your statement.
Mr. Haldeman. That was the contention that was raised, yes.
Senator Talmadge. Let me say this, Mr. Haldeman. I am the second
ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, and our jurisdic-
tion is the Internal Revenue Service among others, as you know. We
have tried our dead level best to keep that totally nonpolitical and
nonpartisan, totally objective, without favor, without fear to any tax-
payer in the United States, and I certainly hope we can continue to keep
it that way.
Mr. Haldeman. I am sure, sir, that you have attempted to do so, and
I hope that you have been successful.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you. I believe my time has expired, Mr.
Chairman. Please return that exhibit.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir. :
Senator Ervin. Now, INIr. Haldeman, can you tell us what day in
July of this year you saw the tape of the September 15 meeting?
Mr. Haldeman. It was July 9, 10, or 11, Senator.
Senator Ervin. Now, when did that meeting occur?
Mr. Haldeman. Meeting?
Senator Ervin. Yes. That meeting did occur ?
Mr. Haldeman. "What meeting, sir ?
Senator Ervin. The 15th, and you were present and Dean was pres-
ent and the President was present.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And it occurred in what is called the Oval Room ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. And you knew that this conversation the President
held in the Oval Room or conversations held in his office in the Execu-
tive Office Building during the spring of 1971 down to a few days ago
were recorded, did vou not?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir. I am not sure of the precise date when it
started, but it was in that general area.
Senator Ervin. And you also knew that the telephone calls received
by the President in those two offices were recorded ?
3139
Mr. Haldeman. On that one particular phone; yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. So the President undoubtedly has the tape in his
possession of the September 15 meeting.
Mr. Haldeman. That is my understanding.
Senator Ervin. Now, that was the day that the indictments were
handed down.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Er\^n. And the people indicted were McCord and E.
Howard Hunt, who at the time of the break-in was still on the White
House payroll and had an office in the Executive Office Building.
Mr. Haldeman. Excuse me, sir. I do not believe that is correct. It is
my understanding he was not on the White House payroll. It is
Senator Ervix. Well, you are not certain about that, are you?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir; but it is my understanding that he was
erminated at the White House some months prior to that.
Senator Er\t:n. Yes, sir; but do you not know that he had an office
in the Executive Office Building until after this, and some of his per-
sonal belongings and some of the things he had been working on, the
oapers, were still in his office at the Executive Office Building at the
ime of the break-in?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not aware of his office setup. I know there
\\Qre materials of his still in the office at EOB, yes.
Senator Er\tn. And he had been a consultant to the White House?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, I understand he had.
Senator Ervin. ^^Hien did you learn about the break-in of Ellsberg's
isychiatrist's office?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. Sometime in March or April of this
V'oar.
Senator Ervin. Well, the evidence here is that it occurred in Septem-
jer 1971. So this man who some people would claim and I would claim
ivas an accessory before the fact of burglary was on the White House
payroll for a long period of time after that.
Xow, were you responsible in any way for that fact?
Mr. Haldeman. I was neither responsible for it nor aware of the fact
"»f the earlier action.
Senator ERV^N. Now, at that time did you not know that Hunt was
ilso doing some work for the Committee To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know that I did, Mr. Chairman. I do know
that now, yes.
Senator Ervin. Yes. Another man indicted was E. Gordon Liddy,
who was at the time of the break-in the chief legal adviser to Secretary
Stans' Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. I knew he was the general counsel at the
finance committee.
Senator Ervin. And James W. McCord, Jr., who was indicted, and
he was the chief security officer of Mitchell's Committee To Re-Elect
tlie President.
Mr. Haldeman. I learned that after the break-in, yes.
Senator Ervin. And the other four indicted were Cuban Americans
from Miami, Fla. So three of the people indicted were connected with
the Committee To Re-Elect the President ; had been at the time of the
break-in.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
3140
Senator Ervin. Now, you, of course, read the newspapers, did you
not?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervix. And if you had read the newspapers, do you not
know the newspapers on July 31 broke the story that $89,000 in cam-
paign funds had been routed in the fonn of Mexican checks to the bank
account of Bernard L. Barker, one of the Cuban Americans who was
one of the men caught redhanded in an act of burglary ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am sure I read that when that was printed, yes.
Senator Ervin. And did it not appear about the same time that in
addition to that, the $25,000 check which had been contributed to the
Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President v.as also involved in a
deposit with the Mexican checks totaling $89,000, making a total
deposit of $114,000 in the bank account in Miami of Bernard L. Barker,
one of the burglars?
Mr. Haldemax. Mr. Chairman, I cannot confirm all those facts. If
you are quoting from newspaper at the time, I am sure you read those
in the newspapers at the time.
Senator ER\^N. Well, I can assure you they ap])eared in the Wash-
ington Post on the
Mr. Haldemax. OK.
Senator Ervin [continuing]. On the dates these things appeared —
and also it appeared on August 22 that the Committee To Re-Elect the
President had purchased electronic gear. Are you familiar with that ?
Mr. Haldeman. No. I do not remember — oh, that was their security
system.
Senator Erv^n. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. Equipment.
Senator Erm:n. Well, anyway, when the meeting was held on the
15th day of September, those facts had all appeared in the newspaper.
Mr. Haldeman. I am sure they had.
Senator Ervin. And did you ever discuss any of these facts with the
President?
Mr. Haldeman. As they appeared, I am sure that I did^ yes, or that
he discussed them with me.
Senator Ervin. Well, since these campaign funds had been in the
hands of the Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President and the
expenditure had been controlled by the Committee To Re-Elect the
President, did that not engender in your mind a reasonable suspicion
that something was wrong with the Committees To Re-Elect the
President ?
Mr. Haldeman. Absolutely. There was no question, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. There was something wrong.
The question was who was wrong, how far up did the level of wrong-
ness go, and who specifically was involved ?
Senator Ervin. And from your discussion with the President, you
know the President was aware of those facts?
Mr. Haldemax. In a general sense, yes.
Senator Ervin. And all prior to the 15th day of September.
]Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. 1972.
]Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
3141
Senator Ervin. Now, that was the day they handed down the indict-
ments of the seven men and none of the high officials in the Finance
Committee To Re-Elect the President, or the Committee To Re-Elect
the President, except the chief counsel, G. Gordon Liddy, was included
in the indictments.
Mr. Haldeman. That is right.
Senator Ervin. Now, Dean has testified in substance that on that
day he was called to the Oval Office of the President and had a con-
versation in which, after the indictments were handed down, and no
high official, that is, neither Magruder nor Mitchell nor Stans had been
indicted, and he was called to the Office of the President and the
President told him in the meeting you had told of the fine work he
had done on Watergate about it, is that not so ? He said that, and is
that not true?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not have Dean's testimony before me, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Well, you were there. Did the President call Dean
into the Oval Office?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator ER^^N. Did he congratulate Dean on the fine job he had
done in connection with the Watergate affair?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. He did not make — as I have said, he did not
make the statement that Mr. Dean said he made and he did not open
the meeting by congratulating Mr. Dean either.
Senator Ervin. Well, did he commend his action in any respect?
Mr. Haldeman. Only as I indicated at a later point in the meeting.
Senator Ervin. You said the President thought it was time to com-
mend him, did you not, in your statement, or something to that effect?
Mr. Haldeman. Gave him a pat on the back because he had been
working hard on the matters.
Senator Ervin. What is the difference between a congratulation
and a commendation?
Mr. Haldeman. It is a question of how it is put and for what
purpose.
Senator ER\^N. But he did commend him ?
Mr. Haldeman. He at a later point in the meeting, not at the open-
ing as Mr. Dean indicated, at a later point in the meeting made a com-
ment, Mr. Dean had done a fine job, had worked hard on it. Dean made
the point at the opening of the meeting that it had been a tough 3
months.
Senator Ervin. Yes. What had he done to your knowledge, other
than to sit when the FBI was interrogating witnesses and hear the
witnesses on the Committee To Re-Elect the President and any White
House aide may have said to the FBI ?
Mr. Haldeman. In addition to that he, as he had said in his own
Camp David report and in his intended affidavit for the Judiciary
Committee, had met with and talked with everybody that he thought
might have any involvement in this thing. He had been consistently
called upon to respond or provide information regarding each of these
various newspaper stories, some of which you have just referred to,
that came up from time to time, as to what the facts were. He was
maintaining a very close liaison with the Justice Department, the
3142
Assistant Attorney General, and the U.S. attorneys, and was spending
an enormous amount of time and a lot of effort trying to run down what
at that time appeared to be a very complex case because he was trying
to determine the validity of various charges that were made.
Senator ERV^N. And he reported to you everything he did in that
connection ?
Mr. Haldeman. He obviously didn't report everything he did, no, sir.
Senator Ervin, He reiwrted everything he found out ?
Mr, Haldemax. I don't believe he did that. I, at the time thought
he was reporting in general everything. He did not report any details to
me, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Erven. Mr. Haldeman, don't you know that when you have
a man who is counsel for the President, sitting and monitoring inter-
views of witnesses by the FBI that that has a tendency, natural ten-
dency, to inhibit those witnesses making a full disclosure ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir, I don't know that. It is my understanding
that is not an unusual procedure, and that, in fact, the counsel for the
Democratic National Committee sat in all of the FBI interviews with
the membei-s of the Democratic committee staff. I think that was the
procedure that was being followed in that investigation.
Senator Ervin. Don't you think it has a tendency to keep a witness
from disclosing anything that he thinks might be unpleasant news to
the person sitting there ?
Mr. Haldeman. I shouldn't think so, no.
_ Senator Ervin. Well, our understanding of human psychology might
differ slightly on that. Each one of us is entitled to his own opinion.
My 10 minutes are up.
Senator Gumey.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Haldeman, yesterday we got into the
April 18 — ^March 13, 1972, meeting between Dean and the President
very briefly. I know your testimony is that you were in there only a
short time and that you didn't hear any discussion of Watergate. But
there were serious allegations made by Mr. Dean in his recount of this
meeting to the committee and I want to ask you specific questions on
that.
Wliile you were present at the meeting did you hear any discussion
between Mr. Dean and the President about Executive clemency ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe so. I don't have any recollection of
any of the conversation on the March 13 meeting and, as I said. I have
no notes on that meeting so I have nothing to establish what the con-
versation was at all while I was in the office.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Dean also said that there was a discussion
about the money demands being made by the defendants, and he also
stated that it was during this discussion of the money demands that
you walked into the office. The President asked him— so Dean said —
what it would cost in terms of money and Dean said "Oh, probably
about a million dollars." Again I am going to ask you this because I
want a specific answer. Do you recall any conversation like that
between the President and Mr. Dean ?
Mr, Haldeman. No, sir, I don't, and if I could make a comment in
that regard, on the 13th Mr. Dean's testimony, as T recall it, and appar-
ently you have it there and can verify this, was that the meeting was
3143
principally — ^the 13th meeting was principally for another purpose, I
believe, regarding executive privilege or — no; I think that was the
day that the Judiciary Committee had requested that Mr. Dean appear
to testify before that committee, and that I believe Mr. Dean's testi-
mony was that the principal matter under discussion with the Presi-
dent in the March 13 meeting was that question of Dean's appearance
before the Judiciary Committee and, of coui-se, the executive privilege
and lawyer-client privilege questions that arose from that. He testified,
as I recall that that occupied the major portion of the meeting but that
toward the end of the meeting the discussion turned to a — to this mat-
ter of Watergate and specifically the questions of clemency and the
money demands.
Now the log shows. Senator, that I was in the meeting during the
first 12 minutes of the meeting, not at the end of the meeting. There-
fore, if the discussion as Mr. Dean has testified turned to these mattei"S
at the end of the meeting this would indicate it turned to those matters
at a time I was not in the meeting and, therefore, I cannot, if he is right
on that part, I can't confirm or deny what was said. If he is right on or
if he — if his contention is that I was in the meeting at the time this was
said, then it must have been said at the beginning of the meeting rather
than at the end which is unlikely since the purpose of the meetmg was
something else.
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. And I would further substantiate my belief that
those matters, clemency and money demands, were not discussed at
the March 13 meeting because they were, in fact, discussed at the
March 21 meeting in such a way as not to seem at least that they had
been discussed earlier. They seemed to be coming out for the first time
at that time.
He also mentioned — excuse me.
Senator Gurnet. Go on.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, he also mentioned that at the March 13 meet-
ing was the time that he made some allusion to, in the process of
handling this money, and saying that he had learned things that he
had never known and that next time around he would be more knowl-
edgeable which he was saying in the way of a quip and at which I
laughed. That happened on the March, in the March 21 meeting. I
can't imagine that I would laugh at the same joke a week later that he
had used a week earlier.
Senator Gurney. What you are saying is he might have been con-
fused about the date of the meetings that these matters came up.
Mr. Haldeman. I think that is right.
Senator Gurney. Now, just one or two more specific questions be-
cause I do want to pin this down on the matter of Executive clemency ;
he said that the President said that he had discussed this matter with
Ehrlichman, and that he had also discussed it with Colson.
Do you recall any such discussion while you were present ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not at the March 13 meeting nor at any other time
in that context.
Senator Gurney. Just one other question.
These, of course, are highly critical matters. If they had occurred
then both you and the President would have been, at least as of that
3144
date, knowledgeable that a coverup was going on and that possible
serious criminal activities were going on ; is that correct ?
Mr. HLvLDEMAN. Yes, it would be.
Senator Gurney, So then my question is : It would be pretty unlikely
that you would forget those things if indeed you had been present
Avhen they had been discussed ?
Mr. Haldemax. I think that is correct, although I have to say.
Senator, that this was a period when the President was starting to
acquire information and consequently I was getting information that
I had not had before; and once we get up to March 21 and into the
time after that, I do find it difficult to recall what items came to my
attention and thus into my knowledge at which points in time except
by reference to those things where I have notes, and I do not have notes
on the March 13 meeting. That would indicate, incidentally, that there
was no discussion while I was in the March 13 meeting that was of
sufficient importance that I would feel compelled to make a note on it.
Senator Gurnet. The President — has the President ever discussed
with you at some later date after March 13 that he had discussed these
matters we have been talking about with Dean on March 13?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. My — no.
Senator Gtjrxey. Let's turn to the March 21 meeting. There is dis-
crepancy in the testimony there, too — ]\Iarch 21 meeting. For example,
Dean testified that he said at that meeting that Haldeman and Ehrlich-
man could be linked to the coverup.
Do you recall any such statement?
Mr. Haldeman. I recall in the period of the meeting at which I was
not present in his review of all the various potential problems relating
to the Watergate matter his reference to a problem that he felt Ehrlich-
man might have with regard to the Hunt situation, and a problem that
I might have with regard to the matter of the $350,000. I don't recall
any direct statement that Haldeman and Ehrlichman have these prob-
lems in the sense that you have just said them.
Senator Gtjrney. Do you recall any direct statement by Dean that it
was his opinion that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean were
indictable?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Gtjrney. In connection with the Watergate ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Gtjrney. Do you recall anything in that meeting about the
President stating that his reference to the million dollars on March 13
was a joke? That he really didn't mean what he said?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Senator Gtjrney, Do you recall any discussion by Dean about Ma-
gruder's false testimony before the grand jury ?
Mr. Haldeman. There was a reference to his feeling that Magruder
had known about the Watergate planning and bi-eak-in ahead of it, in
other words, that he was aware of what had gone on at Watergate.
I don't believe there was any reference to Slagruder committing
perjury.
Senator Gtjrney. I am talking about, and I am sure you know from
your listeninir to the testimonv. and probablv reading excerpts of testi-
monv, that Dean and Ma<rrudei- conferred about Magruder's testimony
before the grand jury prior to his appearance?
3145
Mr, Haldeman. Dean at some time, and it may have been at that
meeting but I cannot firmly establish that, did refer to his having met
with Magruder prior to his grand jury appearance. He made it quite
clear that he had not coached him on what to say, or anything of that
sort, but had worked with him in the way that I understand an attor-
ney works with a client preparing for a questioning, by giving him the
kind of questions, asking liim the kind of questions that he might
expect the grand jury to ask him and allowing him to answer.
Senator Gurnet. But you have no recollection about coaching on
perjured testimony?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Gtjrney. Dean stated that he gave a written report in No-
vember about Watergate to you and to Ehrlichman. Can you tell us
anything about that ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think it was in December, wasn't it ?
Senator Gltrney. Well, it was either November or December.
Mr. Haldemax. Is that one that he has put into evidence here?
Senator Gurxey. I don't recall. I haven't seen it if it is in evidence.
Counsel is not here.
The point is
Mr. Haldeman. Counsel is right behind you, Senator.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. My question was this : Dean testified that he did
give a written report in either November or December of 1972 on
Watergate to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. Has that ever been
put in evidence before us? I am not talking about the Camp David
report.
Mr. Dash. No. I don't recall, and as a matter of fact, he did say
that he had drafted something and then I think his testimony was that
it was considered not a viable report. That was, to my recollection, not
one of the exhibits that he submitted to us. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. My recollection is he said he gave copies to Mr.
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dash. He either gave it to them or discussed it with them as to
what it would include and then he decided not to go with it.
Senator Gurney. Can you give us any recollection like that ?
Mr. Haldeman. I really am not, like you, very clear on it, and the
only thing I can say is that there were discussions at various points in
time of the effort to try to get a report put together and put out as to
what had happened at the Watergate, at least as far as the White House
was involved or as far as the AVhite House knew, and this I can only
surmise, might be a draft of such an effort which was offered, discussed,
and rejected for some reason. I believe there were other such efforts,
I don't know if they ever reached draft stage but they were certainly
in discussion stage at several points, and I think Mr. Ehrlichman
referred to one at the convention time. That there was a hope that we
could get the story fully cleared up at that time.
Senator Gurney. But back in November or December do you recall
a written draft given to you or shown to you by Mr, Dean on Water-
gate?
Mr. Haldeman. I have no specific recollection of such a draft ; no.
3146
Senator Gurnet. Do you have any recollection of a discussion at
that time ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not a specific discussion. I have, as I have indi-
cated, a recollection of discussions from time to time on this subject.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Chairman, I think my time is up. I yield the
floor.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Haldeman, I am certain you are acquainted with Mr. Alexander
P. Butterfield?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. When was the last time you ever met with Mr.
Butterfield or communicated with him?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure of the date. Senator. It would have
been sometime prior to his departure from the White House and the
record could be established as to when that was. I am not sure.
Senator Inouye. Was it in February of this year, March of this
year, April, May, June, or July?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, it was certainly not in June or July. I doubt —
it was not in May, June, or July. I doubt that it was in April and I
am not sure when — at what earlier point it would have been.
Senator Inouye. And since that time you have never spoken to him
or communicated with him?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe so.
Senator Inouye. Was Mr. Butterfield aware of your listening to
the March 21 tape?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Senator Inouye. I have here a copy of a memorandum dated Janu-
ary 20, 1970, labeled "Administratively Confidential," for Mr. Halde-
man from ]Mr. Butterfield, relating to Mr. A. Ernest Fitzgerald. I
would just like to read the first three paragraphs and ask for your
comments, sir.
INIr. Haldeman. Could I see a copy of it. Senator?
Senator Inouye. Would you like to study this before I read this?
Mr. Haldeman. Either before or after. I would like to see it.
INIr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator from Hawaii
if he would be kind enough to indicate the relevancy of this document
which is dated January 20, 1970?
Senator Inouye. Would you care to read the third paragraph? I
would like to know if that is the attitude of the people at the White
House.
Mr. Wilson. At that time?
Senator Inouye. The third paragraph, sir. And I think it is very
relevant to the interrogation here. Or would you care to have me read
it, sir?
Mr. Wilson. If I can pick out the third paragraph, which appears
to be an indented paragraph
Senator Inouye. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wilson. It does not help me much.
Senator Inouye. I will read it for you, sir. [Reading:]
I may be beating a dead horse at this late date but it was only a few days
ago that Alan(?) Wood(?) called to ask if we had arrived at any particular
3147
Administration line regarding Mr. A. E. Fitzgerald and someone else asked the
same question at about the same time. You will recall that I relayed to you
my personal comments while you were at San Clemente but let me cite, then,
once again partly for the record and partly because some of you with more polit-
ical horse sense than I will probably want to review the matter prior to next
Monday's press conference.
And the third paragraph, sir:
Fitzgerald is no doubt a top notch cost expert but he must be given very low
marks in loyalty, and after all, loyalty is the name of the game.
Was this the top priority in the White House, sir ?
Mr. Wilson. Excuse me a minute. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inotjye. Yes.
Mr. Wilson. I am still in the dark on relevancy to this investigation.
Senator Erven. Mr. Wilson, I would say I am not familiar with that
entire document but you and I as trial lawyers will recall that testi-
mony is also admissible to show the attitude of a witness, and this wit-
ness has testified about his interpretation of the tapes entrusted to him
by the President and I think that his attitude about loyalty to the
President is admissible on the question to test the validity of his inter-
pretation of the tapes. I think that would be admissible in a court of
law for that purpose.
Mr. Wilson. If I were in a court of law I w-ould take an exception
to that, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervtn. Yes, well, we will note your exception and admit the
evidence. [Laughter.]
Senator Inouye. Mr. Haldeman, was loyalty the name of the game
at the White House and was loyalty much more important than the
truth?
Mr. Haldeman. I would not say that either of those was the case.
I would say that loyalty was important. I would say that the truth is
overridingiy important.
Senator Inouye. Then the recommendation from Mr. Butterfield
was, even after admitting that he is a topnotch cost expert, "We should
let him bleed for a while, at least."
Mr. Haldeman. There -were a number of intervening recommenda-
tions there, too, I believe, Senator.
Senator Ixouye. Yes. You are accusing him of blowing the whistle
on the Air Force.
Mr. Haldeman. No. I am not accusing him of anything. I did not
write that memo, sir.
Senator Inouye. This memo was
Mr. Haldeman. The memorandum accuses him.
Senator Inouye. And it is quite critical of someone who was attempt-
ing to expose to full public view the truth.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, Senator, I do not know any of the ins and outs
of Fitz— is it Fitzgerald ?
Senator Inouye. Yes, sir.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Butterfield was a retired Air Force officer who
obviously had strong personal views and had strong lines of communi-
cation and contact with others who had strong personal views in the
Fitzgerald matter. I am not qualified to comment on the facts in the
Fitzgerald case. I can only say that in answer to your question as to
attitude of this witness, that loyalty did not override truth.
3148
Senatx)r Inotjte. Thank you, sir.
On page 30 of your opening statement, the last paragraph says:
If, as alleged, he or those under his direction were responsihle for the letter
which falsely defamed Senators Muskie and Humphrey, then on behalf of every-
one associated with the Nixon campaign, I would like to and do apologize to
both of these men.
Did you have any purpose in leaving out Senator Jackson ?
Mr. Haldeman. Absolutely not. If Senatoi- Jackson was also
defamed in that letter, I would very much want to correct my omission
as being unintentional and to extend my apology very definitely to
include Senator Jackson.
Senator Inouye. I just wanted the record to be clear because his
name was glaringly omitted.
Mr. Haldeman. I appreciate that. It was not intentionally so and I
appreciate the opportunity to correct it.
Senator Inouye. Thank you.
On page 81 of your opening statement you said :
The President looked to me as his basic contact with the campaign organiza-
tion and I maintained communication with John Mitcliell in this regard until
July 1972, then with Clark MacGregor.
Mr. Haldeman, would you say that in the campaign organization the
matter of fundraising and the spending of such funds would occupy a
high priority in consideration ?
Mr. Haldeman. In my consideration ?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. Would fundraising be considered important in a
campaign ?
Mr. Haldeman. It is impoi-tant in a campaign. It was not an impor-
tant factor in my consideration with the campaign.
Senator Inouye. During your contact with Mr. Mitchell and Mr.
MacGregor, were you aware of the balance sheet as to how much you
had available and how much was being spent ?
Mr. Haldeman. I had a general awareness of the campaign budget
overall and at one or two points in the campaign 1 was approached by
Mr. Stans who was functioning as the finance chairman with an expres-
sion of concent that too much money was being allocated in some areas.
Senator Inouye. Then would I be correct in assuming that at the
end of the year 1972 you were aware that the campaign committee had
a surplus of over $3 million ?
Mr. Haldeman. I was aware, I would say by the end of 1972 — at
some point there I was aware that there was a very substantial sur-
plus; yes.
Senator Inouye. Now, if you considered the raising of funds for the
Watergate defendants to be legal, moral, an obligation, proper, hu-
manitarian, why didn't you use these campaign funds? You had a
surplus of over $3 million.
Mr. Haldeman. First of all, Senator, I didn't consider it either to
be any of those things or the opposite of any of those things. I did not
weigh it in its context of legality, morality, or necessity. I simply
accepted what I was told, which was that these funds were being raised
for the purpose of legal fees for the defendants.
3149
As to the question of why I didn't use those funds, I didn't have
the control of those funds or the position to use those funds.
Senator Inouye. You were the President's representative, the cliief
of staff of the White House. Couldn't you have suggested this ?
Mr. Haldeman. I could have suggested it, yes.
Senator Inouye. But you decided not to.
Mr. Haldeman. It didn't occur to me to.
Senator Inouye. Was this special fundraising necessary because the
use of the money was illegal ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Inouye. If it wasn't to your knowledge, I find it quite
difficult to understand why the available $3 million — incidentally, it is
now over $5 million — was not spent.
Ismy timeup, sir?
Senator Ervin. It just is.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Haldeman, last night I took your opening
statement after the hearings were over and I read it and I reread it
and there was something about it that bothered me and I think I
finally put my finger on what it was. It was that section which you
labeled Segretti.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Senator Weicker. And what bothered me was the fact that under
the title of Segretti you listed various and sundry acts, violent in
nature, illegal acts, and then left the intimation that these acts be-
longed to Senator McGovern, the Democratic Party, et cetera.
Now, I know that it not exactly the way it reads if you read it very
carefully but that is the impression that is given; and this is what
bothered me, the impression that even now in your statement you are
trying to give the same image to the opposite candidate and the oppo-
site party, that it is my contention and which I intend to prove here
this morning that you tried to give during the course of the campaign,
specifically — specifically that the opposition party and the opposition
candidate are soft on communism and soft on law and order.
You say in your opening statement, and let me read it:
Moreover, the pranksterism that was envisioned would have specifically ex-
cluded such acts as the following : violent demonstrations and disruption, heckling
or shouting down speakers, burning or bombing campaign headquarters, physical
damage or trashing of headquarters and other buildings, harassment of candi-
dates' wives and families by obscenities, disruption of the national convention
by splattering dinner guests with eggs and tomatoes, indecent exposure, rock
throwing, assaults on delegates, slashing bus tires, smashing windows, setting
trash fires under the gas tank of a bus, knocking policemen from their motorcycles.
I know that this Committee and most Americans would agree that such activi-
ties cannot be tolerated in a political campaign.
Mr. Haldeman, I would first of all point out it is not a question as
to whether these activities could be tolerated. These activities which
you listed are clearly illegal and they are not a question of whether
we agree on it or not. In most cases there are specific laws that are
meant to be enforced against such activities, which enforcement, of
course, is in the hands of various judicial local. State, and Federal
officials.
3150
But unfortunately the activities I have described are all activities which took
place in 1972 against the campaign of the President of the United States by his
opponents.
By his opponents.
Now, do you mean by that word "opponents" in your statement at
that point of your statement the Democratic Party or Senator
McGovem?
Mr. Haldeman. Senator, that question would be answered should
it arise in any one's mind at that point in the statement, the following
sentence says
Senator Weicker. Let me get to the
Mr. Haldeman. May I read it, please ?
"Some of them took place with the clear knowledge and consent of
agents of the opposing candidate in the last election."
Senator Weicker. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. And "others"
Please, Senator, may I finish ?
Senator Weicker. I want you to answer the point at
Mr. Haldeman. I am answering it.
Senator Weicker. You are moving on to my next question. At that
point in your statement where are listed all these activities. This is the
way you phrase your statement. I didn't phrase it, "against the cam-
paign of the President of the United States by his opponents."
Mr. Haldeman. And then I immediately went on to say, and I quote
from the next following sentence in my statement :
Some of them took place with the clear knowledge and consent of agents of
the opposing candidate in the last election. Others were acts of people who were
clearly unsympathetic to the President but may not have had direct order from
the opposing camp.
In the following paragraph when I referred to the fact that there
had been no investigation and little publicizing, I again characterized
the two different possibilities by saying: "Either those which were
directly attributable to our opponent or those which certainly served
our opponent's interest but did not have his sanction," clearly recog-
nizing. Senator, the precise point that you are making here, and I do
recognize it.
Senator Weicker. The precise point that I am making is I want vou
to clearly tell me exactly which of these acts, rather than commingling
the two, and giving an impression, I want you to tell me which of
these illegal acts you ascribe to Senator McGovem and/or the
Democratic Party.
Mr. Haldeman. I am not able to do that at this time. Senator. I have
indicated to the committee yesterdav that the documentation on these
is available, it was my understanding that the committee had it. I
find apparently it does not and I will make sure it gets it and that that
verification can be made item by item and I would emphasize that this
is a — such a list. There are a number of items, other items, and this is
put in general terms such as burning or bombing campaign head-
quarters. The material that will be furnished, or that I thought had
been furnished, cites the specific headquarters, the specific dates, the
specific incidents that took place, the nature and extent of the damage
that the bomb did, and that sort of thing.
3151
Senator Weicker. Well, now, isn't it actually true, Mr. Haldeman —
let's cite here the next paragraph :
So far there has been no investigation of these activities and very little pub-
licizing of them, either those which were directly attributable to our opponent
or those which certainly served our opi)onents' interests but did not have his
sanction.
Now, isn't it true that the acts which you list there didn't serve your
opponents' interests, that they did on occasion serve your candidate's
interests ?
Mr. Haldeman. If they did I can't conceive of how they did, sir.
Senator Weicker. All right.
I would like to submit to you a document on White House stationery,
memorandum for Mr. H. R. Haldeman from Ronald H. Walker.
Mr. Dash. I think all members of the committee have copies.
Senator Weicker. I think all members of the panel have a copy and
I submit this copy to you.
At the same time 1 would like to submit for your inspection and
your counsel's inspection a document dated February 10, 1973, memo-
randum for John Dean from H. R. Haldeman.
All right now, let's discuss the first memorandum which I presented
to you. [Reading :]
The White House, Washington, October 14, 1971, 5 p.m.
Memorandum for : Mr. H. R. Haldeman
From : Ronald H. Walker
Re : Charlotte, North Carolina — Demonstrations
1. The most recent intelligence that has been received from the Advanceman
Bill Henkel and the USSS [United State.s Secret SerA-ice] is that we will have
demonstrators in Charlotte tomorrow. The number is running between 100 and
200 ; the Advanceman's gut reaction is between 150 and 200. They will be violent —
with a penciled underlining of "violent." "They will have extremely
obscene signs," underlining "obscene" and next to the word "obscene"
penciled in writing which to me, and you will have to confirm this,
seems to be the same as the writing below your initialing, appears to
be vours, if not, I want vou to say so, sayinc: "Good."
Is that your writing there where it says "good" ?
Mr. Haldeman. I believe it is ; yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. "As has been indicated by their handbills. It will
not only be directed toward the President, but also toward Billy
Graham." Underlining "also toward Billy Graham" where you pen-
ciled in "great." [Laughter.]
INIr, Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I thought the silence was to be enforced
here in this hearing.
Senator Er\in. Mr. Wilson, I wish you would tell me some way I
can keep people from laughing, I don't approve of it, and I wish thev
would restrain themseh'es and I have tried to restrain them but I don't
know ; I have been told that the onl v thing that distinguishes humanity
from a lofty attitude of disdain called a brute creation, is the fact that
man laughs and brute creation does not, but I am sroing to request
evervbody to try to restrain their laughter, and it will help us to pro-
ceed in a more orderlv fashion.
While I am on this, I hate to hear all of this about things like this
supposed to be happening in the Garden of Eden, North Carolina, and
nobody must laugh at that [laughter] because I believe that.
3152
Senator Weicker. I would also request, along with the chairman, the
fact that order is kept in this room. This is an extremely serious mat-
ter, a document which is now being presented and the one to follow I
think probably get to the very heart of this entire investigation.
Senator Ervin. And Senator, I might state I can testify about that
because I went down to Charlotte on that occasion with the President
and I saw my constituent, Billy Graham, and I can testify there were
about a handful of students or young people with some placards there
that really didn't interfere with anybody.
Senator Weicker [reading] :
According to Henkel and the USSS, and it is also indicated on the handbills
being distributed by the demonstrators, the Charlotte police department is
extremely tough and will probably use force to prevent any possible disruption
of the motorcade or the President's movements.
And again the jDenciling "good" next to that.
Then, No. 3 — I had better read the whole exhibit :
'My instructions to Henkel are to control the demonstrators outside the Coliseum
as much as he can with the help of the USSS and the police department, from the
city of Charlotte. He is to set up as fine a screening system as possible. There
are 8,000 seats in the Coliseum and we have printed up 25,000 tickets. It is a
known fact that there are demonstrators who have tickets. Therefore it will be
necessary for us to .set up a screening system to eliminate anyone that has a false
or fake ticket. We will set up our normal checkpoints, using 25 Veterans of
Foreign Wars and between 50 and 60 ushers that are being provided by the local
Republican Party. There will also be a volunteer lawyer corps to handle any legal
questions that might arise, as far as us denying entrance on the grounds of a
phony ticket.
The thing that bothers me is that we are for the most part paralleling the
system that we had designed for the Wright-Patterson Air Force Museum dedi-
cation in Dayton, Ohio. Realizing the attention that was drawn to the techniques
used there, and the concern that has since been expressed by Ziegler, Warren,
and most vehemently by Pat Buchanan, the feeling is that the Press Corps, espe-
cially the liberals, are very much aware of how the demonstrators are being
handled, and although the White House has not been identified with these proc-
esses, we are very much suspect. Buchanan maintains that they will be the look-
out for demonstrators and how they are being handled, and it is his feeling that
this could be extremely damaging to the President's posture, even if the White
House is only indirectly involved. The Billy Graham people have been of great
help but they've got their own problems with citizens' organizations sponsoring
the Billy Graham Day, and have pretty well backed off from any of the arrange-
ments with the exception of crowd building. Therefore, we have got very little
support in handling demonstrators in the hall.
Question : Should we continue with our plan to prevent demonstrators from
entering the Coliseum?
Under "Yes" the initial "H," and the pencil notation, "As long as
it is local police and local volunteers doing it, not our people."
My question specifically relates to what mentality it is in the White
House that goes ahead and indicates "good" when the word "violence"
is mentioned, when "obscene" is mentioned, at which violence and
which obscenity is to be directed against the President of the United
States. How in any way can that be good ?
Mr. Hai^demax. Senator, I can explain that T think very easily.
The problem that we had during the campaign of violence, of dem-
onstrations, of obscene signs, of efforts to heckle and shout down the
President when he was delivering a speech, were very great. They
were not recognized as being very great and there was an attempt made
in the coverage of many of these events to present tliis as a totally off-
3153
the-cuff reaction of certain people in the audience who were jiist there
and disagreed with what the President said and were expressing their
disagreement in a proper exercise of their right to do so as contrasted
to planned organizations that were put together for the purpose of
creating violence and creating these things in the way that the intelli-
gence indicated this one was going to be handled.
The reason for reacting to the indication that they would be violent,
obscene, and directed toward Billy Graham as good was that if, in fact,
they were going to do this in this way it would be seen that they were
doing so clearly. Sometimes they weren't that ineffective. They did a
better job of disguising their ti-ue intents and their true method of
operation, and the reaction of "good" to those indications was very
much in that sense.
Let me point out that the whole point of the memo very strongly
confirms my feeling that this sort of activity was not to our benefit in
showing the extremes that, steps that were planned, in order to try to
avoid these people having the opportunity to carry out their violence
and their obscenity and directing it toward the President and Billy
Graham, at least in the hall. AVe had no real practical means of doing
much outside the hall and, in fact, as I recall that meeting, there were
some demonstrations outside but there was reasonably good control
and the Charlotte police force, I think, was extremely tough, and I
think they did do a good job, including, as I recall, at that occasion
some local police forces did — you have to use force in order to restrain
the activities that were attempted. That happened in this case. But as
you can see here there were strong efforts made by our advance men to
try to avoid incidents and this kind of problem. We had the intelligence
that there were going to be this group there, that they would be violent
and have obscene signs. That at least would show up with the public
there and the press there and in a place like North Carolina where the
people are wise enough not to feel that that is a very good thing to do,
that it would put this in its true pei-spective.
Senator Weicker. To be continued.
I have been informed that my 10 minutes are up so I say that will be
continued.
Senator Ervin. I can't resist the temptation to say I was at that
meeting and it was one of the most orderly meetings I ever attended.
There was no disturbance inside the hall ; the President made a very
well deserved tribute to Billy Graham, and Billy Graham made some
very complimentary remarks about the President. There were some
people outside with placards that were excluded from the hall bv the
police and, incidentally, I read in the paper where the Federal ]udge
down in Charlotte held these young people had been unfairly excluded
from the meeting, their constitutional rights
IVIr. Haldeman. Mr. Chairman, that is what we were dealing with,
the question is : How do you properly exclude or include people in a
meeting of that sort ?
Senator Ervin, I appreciate your tribute to the people of North
Carolina and I affirm they well deserve it.
Senator Montoya.
Senator Monotya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Haldeman, you indicated in your previous testimony that Mr.
Larry Higby was your administrative assistant, so to speak.
3154
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya, And that Mr. Alex Butterfield was a staff assist-
ant working under you and under Mr. Higby.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. Mr. Butterfield was Deputy Assistant to the
President and was a deputy to me and would have been considered
senior to Mr. Higby.
Senator Montoya. All right.
Now, did both report to you ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Senator Montoya. Did they report to you on important matters?
Did they report every time on important matters ?
Mr. Haldeman. I cannot verify that they reported every time. They
had areas of responsibility. Senator, that they carried out without the
necessity of reporting to me.
Senator Montoya. Well, was it the requirement with respect to their
duties that if anything unusual was going on in the White House and
they were involved in it that they had to report to you ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir, not if they were able to deal with it on their
own. Instructions had been just the opposite. As was our policy and
our standard procedure, any man in the staff was — had the clear under-
standing he should deal with all matters that came under his respon-
sibility as best he could and should not refer them upward unless there
was a necessity for it.
Senator Montoya. Did you have staff conferences with them on
occasion ?
Mr. Haldeman, Yes.
Senator Montoya. Was Mr. Strachan also included in the staff
conferences ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. There were several different procedures at
different times and I am not able to establish which procedure was
in effect at which time. There was a period at which, during which,
I attempted to hold a twice-weekly meeting of a group that included
Mr. Butterfield, Mr. Higby, Mr. Strachan, also Mr. Kehrli, Ray Price,
John Dean, and several others, who for the purpose of coordinating
their work in somewhat the same sense that we held the senior staff
meeting each morning. But this procedure, because of the time of day
that we tried to do it, did not work out very well because I was not able
to attend many of those meetings and, therefore, we dropped it.
Senator Montoya. I notice Mr. Strachan would present vou with
memorandums on different occasions with respect to activities going
on in the White House and also at the CRP. Was he the one who would
transmit what was going on in the offices of Mr. Higby and Mr. Butter-
field or did you obtain independent information from them?
Mr. Haldeman. I obtained — I worked directly with Mr. Butterfield
on matters that he felt he needed to bring to me and directly with Mr.
Higby on a much more frequent basis on matters he felt he needed to
bring to me.
Senator Montoya. Are you acquainted with the project which was
launched in the White House to develop an enemies list?
Mr. Haldeman. I am aware of the existence of enemy lists or oppo-
nents lists, yes, sir.
'Senator INIontoya. What do vou know about it?
3155
Mr. Haldeman. I know that from time to time we received from
within the White House and from outside the White House, from
supporters of the administration, both in the Congress and from the
general public, complaints that people in and out of Government were
being treated by the White House in ways that people that were op-
posed to administration policies, and specifically who were vocally
expressing public opposition to administration policies, and this would
most frequently relate to the position on the war in Vietnam because
that was the policy most thoroughly under discussion.
People who were expressing vocal opposition were at the same time
being extended extraordinary courtesies by the White House in the
form of invitations to social events and other functions at the White
House, appointments to honorary boards and commissions, inclusion
on delegations to events, and that sort of thin^.
Senator Montoya. I am talking about enemies, not friends.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir ; that is what I am talking about — people.
I am talking about complaints by friends that pneople who were oppo-
nents and were vocally expressing their opposition were being, in the
view of our friends, treated like friends in the sense of receiving these
special courtesies from the White House.
Senator Montoya. And you were compiling a list of these people ?
Mr. Haldeman. And as a result of the concern by our friends that
we were in their view unwisely extending these courtesies to the people
who were opposing administration policies, and on some occasions
people who, after receiving an invitation to the White House and being
at the White House used that as a platform for getting extraordinary
publicity for their expression of opposition, that as a result of these
complaints there was a program of drawing up a list of those who, in
prominent public positions, were believed to be expressing opposition
to administration policies, and who, therefore, should not be receiWng
these courtesies. TL ^ was in the same context as a list of those who
were supporting such policies and who should be extended such cour-
tesies and who many times were not.
Senator Montoya. Have you seen exhibit 50, which has been intro-
duced bv Mr. Dean in evidence here ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure that I have. I would like to see it.
Senator Montoya. Or exhibit 10, and I will read you some names.
Wliat did these people have to do with the Vietnam war ?
Mr. Haldeman. Excuse me, sir, but could I have copies of those ?
Senator Montoya. Yes, sir; let me just read them and then you can
comment on them : Mr, Eugene Carson Blake, ^Ir. Leonard Bernstein,
Arnold Picker, Ed Guthman, Maxwell Dane, Charles Dyson, Howard
Stein, Allard I^wenstein, Morton Halperin, Leonard Woodcock, Dan
Schorr, Mary McGrory, Lloyd Cutler, Thomas Watson, Tom Wicker,
Clark Clifford. That is the list. Do you want to see
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir; I do not need to see it. I would think that
the public record of the time would indicate that a number of those
people were, in fact, quite vocally and publicly opposing administra-
tion positions on the war.
Senator Montoya. Why did you label them as enemies, then? Did
they not have a right to comment on the war ?
Mr. Haldeman. "Wliy, certainly they did ; but they did not have a
3156
right to be extended the courtesy of the President's hospitality in order
to express their opposition.
Senator Montoya. Well, are you in effect telling me that this enemies
list was compiled so that it would serve as an exclusion list for the
White House?
Mr. Haldeman. In effect, yes.
Senator Montoya. Why was so much time wasted in the White
House with memos and communications l>etwee]i staff members in try-
ing to compile this list, then ?
Mr. Haldemax. First of all, I don't believe a great deal of time was
wasted in doing so. The time that was expended in doing it was for the
purpose that I have indicated, and was a part of carrying out the effort
of the White House to extend our policies to carry out the policies of
the administration rather than to provide a forum for the expression
of opposition.
Senator Montoya. Well, if your objective was, as you have stated
it, why was it an effort to involve IRS in auditing some of these people
and why were there orders from the Wliite House to the FBI to check
on some of these people ?
Mr. Haldeman. I would like to know what those oi-ders were and
perhaps I can respond to them.
Senator Montoya. All right.
Mr. Higby, who was your administrative assistant, has given in-
formation to this committee that while he was in the Grand Tetons
with the President and you, he was asked by you to call Mr. Hoover
and get a complete background on Daniel Schorr; and Mr. Higby
did this, and he has submitted testimony to this committee in secret
to that effect.
Now, would you deny that ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you do that ?
Mr. Haldeman. I requested a background report on Mr. Schorr, or
asked Mr. Higby to request one, not in connection with the enemies
list and I am not sure in what connection it was, but I am sure there
was something that arose at the time that this request was made and
I don't know in what context, but there had been, as has been indicated
here in earlier testimony, concern from time to time about statements
that were made and the reasons for them in terms of national security
questions and I don't know that this was in such a context because I
simply don't recall what the reason was for it.
Senator Montoya. TVHiy would you order a check in that context?
Was Mr. Schorr being considered for an appointment?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir ; he was not.
Senator Montoya. Wliy would you check on him, then ?
Mr. Haldeman. The check was made — I don't know why, but the
check was made.
Senator Montoya. You ordered it?
Mr. Haldeman. The request for the check was in connection with
something apparently — I assume that arose at that time that generated
a request for the background report on Mr. Schorr. The request I
would like to emphasize. Senator, was not a request for an investigation
of Mr. Schorr and at the time that the request was made it was for the
3157
background file which the FBI has on individuals, that is, a summary
report on their activities and background.
Senator Montoya. Wouldn't you call it an investigation when the
FBI goes out to try to get the background on an individual ?
Mr. Haldeman. When they go out to do it, I would ; but the request
was not that they go out to do it. The request was for the file — what
happened
Senator Montoya. What file ? Do you have a file in the White House
on Mr. Schorr ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. The FBI did, or may have.
Senator Montoya. How did you know they have ?
Mr. Haldeman. They have a file on most people who are known pub-
licly and the request was for whatever file they have.
Senator Montoya. You mean the FBI has a file on every American
that is known publicly ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think they probably do. I have not been through
their files so I can't verify that.
Senator Montoya. Well, you just stated that
Mr. Haldeman. I said, I think they did.
Senator Montoya. Now, assuming that Mr. Schorr is one case, now
I will give you an instance where you ordered FBI checks on eight
other individuals.
Did you do that?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know. I would like to hear what they are.
Senator Montoya. Well, Mr. Butterfield has so testified that you
did.
Mr. Haldeman. Could I hear them, please ?
Senator INIontoya. Yes. The testimony of Mr. Butterfield is as fol-
lows. It is on page 10 of his interview before the committee, and this
is his testimony: "Haldeman and occasionally Ehrlichman had re-
quested an FBI check on nonappointees." To Butterfield's recollec-
tion — this is a memorandum of his testimony — to Butterfield's recollec-
tion there may have been eight such requests. Among them were Frank
Sinatra, Daniel Schorr, Helen Hayes.
Now, what do you have to say to that ?
Mr. Haldeman. In the case
Senator Montoya. Was Helen Hayes being considered for an ap-
pointment? [Laughter.]
Mr. Haldeman. Quite possibly so. Helen Hayes had helped Presi-
dential appointments and commissions at a number of times and that
is quite possible.
Senator Montoya. Was Frank Sinatra being considered for an
appointment?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. Frank Sinatra was bein^ considered as an
entertainer at the White House and was an entertainer at the T\Tiite
House.
Senator Montoya. And was Daniel Schorr being considered for
entertainment at the "V^Hiite House ? fLauqfhter.]
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. I have already covered the Daniel Schorr
appointment.
Senator Montoya. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Haldeman. INIr. Chairman, could I
Senator Ervin. Your time is up.
3158
Mr. Haldeman. You stopped me at a comma rather than a period.
Senator Ervin. Yes. You can finish the sentence or paragraph or
whatever it is.
Mr. Haldeman. Thank you, sir.
I would simply like to say in the case of any entertainer at the White
House and for that matter I believe any guest at the White House
there is automatically a check made of his FBI file to determine
whether he poses any security threat or any potential embarrassment in
any other sense and this is not — it is unfortunate that those particular
names have been raised and singled out in this forum because I would
not like the record to imply that there was any allegation of wrong-
doing on the part of any of those three people, any of the other five
that were apparently on the list of eight that have not been named
or any of the others of hundreds of people who have been so checked.
And since this question has come up, I would also like to say that it has
become popularly referred to here as the enemies list, and I would like
to plead guilty to a certain indelicacy, if that is what it was referred
to in our administration, because in reading one of the books by one
of the learned scholars who served in the Johnson administration, I saw
that at their time, this list was referred to as the anathema list and
I must say that is a much more delicate term for it.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Yesterday,
while I was conducting the examination of Mr. Haldeman, I ran sub-
stantially over my 10 minutes because nobody else was here. But today
I intended to abbreviate this portion of my questioning to try to m^ke
up for it.
Mr. Haldeman, did you or did you not in June of 19Y2 arrange
directly or through John Dean or anyone else for a 24-hour surveillance
of Senator Kennedy ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall making such an arrangement. I know
that it has been testified that such a request was made and was not
carried out and I am not familiar with the specifics of the reason for
the request but there were times when there was a very definite interest
in the activities of Senator Kennedv, some political and some not
political at all, but in relation to trips that he made with regard to
early release of POW's and matters dealing with the North Vietnamese
and the peace settlement efforts that were underway.
Senator Baker. "\Yhat I am trving to develop is whether or not you
authorized such surveillance or observation or investigation of Senator
Kennedy.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not recall ordering any surveillance of Senator
Kennedy but I do want to emphasize that there were questions raised
about Senator Kennedv's activities in various regards from time to
time, and such a question could have come up.
Senator Baker. Do you recall or do you have any knowledsre of anv
surveillance of Senator Kennedy relating to Mr. Caulfield in 1970
or 1971?
Mr. HatvDeman. Surveillance of Senator Kennedy?
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir; I do not.
3159
Senator Baker. In which Mr. Caulfield might have been involved?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not recall that but I was not familiar with Mr.
Cauliield's activities.
Senator Baker. Do you recall any surveillance of Senator Kennedy
in 1969 in which Mr. Ulasewicz may have been involved ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Do you have any information about Mr. Ulasewicz'
observation, investigation, or surveillance of Senator Kennedy at any
time, Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have no familiarity at all with Mr. Ulasewicz'
operations with regard to any individual. I was not familiar with what
he was doing or with what his objectives were or what his results \yere.
Senator Baker. Did you read the Washington Post this morning 'i
Mr. Haldeman. Are you referring to the article at the top of the
page ^ I did see it.
Senator Baker. Did you read it ?
Mr. Haldeman. I read through it c[uickly. I cannot say that I am
fully familiar with its contents. I skimmed through it in the car on
the way down.
Senator Baker. Did you have any information about that ? Can you
tell us whether or not Mr. Ulasewicz did in fact maintain facilities in
New York City to try to gain information about tlie so-called Chappa-
quiddick situation ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you have any involvement in that ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Do you know who did ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Do you know whether it happened or not ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Haldeman, in this abbreviated round of ques-
tioning I am going to ask a question you may want to think about and
I will come back to later, if there is another round and I think there
will be another round.
In previous examination I asked you whether or not as the closest
man to the President, except for his own family, running a taut ship
as his chief of staff, you knew or should have known that something
was going on based on newspaper accounts or information that you
might have gained, and otherwise, and you indicated, I believe, that
you still do not know what went on; but that in retrospect you do
see road signs or indications that maybe you would interpret differ-
ently now than you did then. Is that essentially a correct summation of
your reply ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe I said that I saw road signs that I
would now interpret differently. I may have. My feeling is that with
the knowledge or at least the information that I have now, I can
probably force myself back and relate it to things that at the time they
occurred appeared totally differently to me. But I would like to
emphasize in relation to the White House, which was my area of
concern and my area of responsibility, other than whatever was under-
taken by Mr. Dean, and I do not profess to, nor do I allege, that any-
thing was or was not undertaken by him, only going by what has
3160
been said here, that that was the area in which I was not familiar
and was the only area that I am aware of today in the White House
where there is any reason to, even with the information 1 now have,
any reason to feel that something was overlooked.
Senator Baker. Mr. Haldeman, I have repeated often in these hear-
ings that I intend to save my conclusions for later and not state them
as I go along and I will continue not to state them as we go along,
but I am going to restate a concern that I have also uttered from
time to time.
What is there about the White House operation, in this or any
previous administration with which you are familiar, what is there
about the Presidency or the isolation of the Presidency, and I do not
say that in a critical way and you can think of it in terms of the
nature of the Presidency or requirements for, as you say, time to think
about important things ; you can think of it even in terms of the safety
of the Presidency because this country has lost fine Presidents at the
hand of assassins — but what is there about the nature of the Presi-
dency and the staffing of the Presidential system that would either fail
to ascertain that something was going on or interpret it in such a way
as to lead in a different direction ?
Now, you may or may not accept my premise, but as I said yesterday,
how can you read the newspapers, how can you listen to the television,
how can you hear that Hunt and Liddy and McCord were involved
with — or at least Liddy and McCord — were involved in official posi-
tions in the Committee To Re-Elect the President ; how can all these
things come to your attention, if you assume they did ; and even if you
start with the assumption that the charges and allegations are without
foundation in fact, and that is the American way of doing it, to assume
that every person is innocent, but how can you do that and run an
operation and still not initiate some sort of intense inquiry at the ear-
liest possible moment ? What is there about the system, what is there
about your operation or the Presidential operation, what is there about
the White House that would keep you from picking up the telephone
on June 17 and saying: "Where is this fellow McCord and what in
the world is going on ?"
Now, that is a mouthful of a question, but do you understand what I
am driving at? What is there about the institutional arrangement at the
White House that would not inevitably lead you into a quick, urgent
inquiry of what in the world happened down there, if nothing else on
the basis of newspaper accounts?
Mr. Haldeman. Senator, you, in the early stages of that question,
said that I might not accept the premise and that is, I believe, where
I would have to start because I do not believe I can accept the premise
which is that such an inquiry was not undertaken or that interest was
not shown or that something was not done, and that simply is not the
case. The most intensive inquiry ever conducted and certainly in pro-
portion to the nature of the crime, the inquiry was beyond the scope
of imagination — almost. There was such an inquiry but I must go back,
and the fact that you are compelled to ask the question, and I under-
stand completely your motivation for doing so, distresses me because it
indicates to me that what I have tried to say has not effectively been
said because I have not made the point clearly to you that first of all,
3161
there was such an inquiry. Second, that as far as the White House was
concerned, the total assurance was that nobody there had been involved.
It was clear that there were people at the committee involved. It was
not clear who they were, at first at least. It became apparently clear
as to who they were. There were still some questions but they were
questions that were hard to answer, and there were a lot of able people
spending inordinate hours trying to determine the answers to those
questions as I understood it. And I was not an investigator. I didn't
instigate investigations into other things except when I was ordered to.
In this case, there was so much underway that anything I would have
done beyond that would have been a drop in the bucket, and I didn't
have the capability or the time to go into that kind of a thing and as
I said in my opening remarks, this is an enormously important matter
today.
Senator Baker. Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Haldeman. And it has become so but it wasn't at that time.
Senator Baker. I understand that and I understand your testimony,.
I believe, and I accept your testimony at face value for purposes of
the moment. As I indicated to you earlier, when we have heard all of
the proof, and not before as far as I am concerned, but when we have
heard all of the proof, then I will take your testimony and the testi-
mony of other witnesses and try to reconcile it. If I can't reconcile
it I will decide where the truth lies. That is my responsibility. That is
not what I am driving at. I take the facts as I find them, but let me
give you an analogy and maybe that will help. And this really isn't
meant to be a self-serving statement. I only use it because it is an
analogy known to me.
Had I in my campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1972 read in the Nash-
ville newspapers that someone on my campaign staff had done thus
and so and had been arrested for it, it wouldn't have been 30 seconds
until I picked up the phone and would say what in the world is going
on ? Now, I am not asking you to compare the merit of those reactions.
I am not asking you even to comment on what I think my reaction
would have been. God knows what it would have been, but I am not
asking for that.
What I am asking is any insight you can give me on why a situation
in Nashville, Tenn., is different from a situation that you might expect
from the White House in Washington. Is there something about the
isolation, about the majesty, about the mystique, about the isolation of
the Presidency or the staff arrangement that causes a different reaction
other than that which I think you know I think might have occurred
in other circumstances?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't think in the mystique or any of those kinds
of characteristics that there is. Senator Baker, but I think that in the
first place, the President did have such a reaction as you would have
had in your senatorial campaign and did ask that these things be done,
but as the areas of responsibility and assignment of a man expand, the
necessity for delegation also expand, and having been involved in some
earlier campaigns of Richard Nixon, I can tell you from personal
knowledge that yeai-s ago he would have been on top of this with all
foure and would have been pursuing it personally with great diligence.
Senator Baker. Even in 1968 ?
3162
Mr. Haldeman. No, I do not think so in 1968, because in 1968 he
delegated strongly the managements of his campaign and the respon-
sibility for the management of his campaign, and he, by great self-
discip'line, kept himself away from the operations of the campaign
and, as President of the United States, exercised an even greater degree
of self-discipline in that regard, and did require of himself this dele-
gation, and while he raised these questions he looked to other people to
carry out the responsibility of developing the answers to them, and
he thought that that is what was being done.
Senator Baker. Do you think it could have been done otherwise ?
Do you think he could have been on all fours, as you say, on top of
this thing?
Mr. Haldemax. I think he would have been if he had been willing
to give up the Vietnam negotiations, and follow up on the domestic
initiative plans that he was trying to get underway prior to the election
to offer as voter choices, and if he had been willing to suspend tlie
preparation of the budget for the next fiscal year and that sort of thing
but I do not think he possibly could have done so unless he had been
willing to do that.
Senator Baker. I am going to do as I do with all of the other testi-
mony we receive, and most of the advice we receive in the committee,
I am going to receive it at face value, I am not going to promise you
that is where I am going to come down when we finish, but at some
point I want to examine with you more why the Presidency operates
as it does, why it may or may not be necessary for it to do that vis-a-vis
politics and campaign ?
Mr. Haldeman. I would welcome that opportunity.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Haldeman, it appears from your answers to my
previous questions, that prior to September 15, five burglars were
caught in the Watergate in the office of the Democratic national head-
quarters, with campaign fimds belonging to the Nixon committee in
their pockets. A short time thereafter a former White House consult-
ant. E. Howard Hunt, and G. Gordon Liddv, the chief legal officer
of the Stans committee, were also arrested and charged with procuring
these five burglars to do the burglarizing.
Now. certainly. President Nixon had some control over his com-
mittee. Did he at any time, to your knowledge, summon John Mitchell,
the director of the committee to procure his reelection, or Jeb Stuart
Magruder, the deputy director of that committee, or Maurice Stans,
the head of the finance committee for his reelection, or Hugh W. Sloan,
Jr., the treasurer of that committee, or Robert Mardian, or any other
person, into the TVHiite House and demand of them how it happened
that burglars were caught in the headquarters of the opposition
political party with funds donated for his reelectioh in their pockets?
Mr. Haldemax. He did not call any of those people in and demand
that. He had been told i
Senator Ervix. Told by whom ? '
Mr. Haldemax. That we have reiterated a number of times; he had
been told by Mr. Mitchell, as Mr. Mitchell said
Senator Ervix. Mr. Mitchell said he did not tell him and the Presi-
dent did not ask him.
3163
Mr. Haldeman. I believe Mr. Mitchell said that he had met with
the President shortly after the Watergate and had talked with him
about it at that time.
Senator Ervix. But Mr. Mitchell testified with the most absolute
positiveness that he never told the President about any of these things
and that the President at no time asked him about it, notwithstanding
the fact that he met with the President on many occasions in reference
to the campaign.
Mr. Haldeman. But, Mr. Chairman, we are dealing with two dif-
ferent things here. One is the fact of the Watergate burglary, which
is the point that you have cited, and that, as I understand it, Mr.
Mitchell did talk with the President about shortly after the burglary.
Senator Ervin. He called him up and told him he was sorry that
matters had got out of hand, and he had not exercised as much super-
vision but he also testified the President did not ask him any questions
about what he was talking about, as I recall the testimony.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, at that point I believe the President had been
told what the facts were as they were known at that time. I do not
believe he had anything to question him about other than what Mr.
Mitchell talked with him about. The things that developed from that
time on the President was not aware were developing, the stories and
things that went back related to the earlier event.
Senator Er\t:x. Mr. Haldeman, we haven't got a particle of testi-
mony so far that the President himself personally took any active
interest in any time between June 17, 1972, and March 1973, except to
make inquiries allegedly through Dean as to how this all happened.
Mr. Haldeman. Through Dean, through Ehrlichman, and through
me.
He made inquiries at various times, as John Ehrlichman has testified
and as I have and as John Dean has.
Senator Ervin. ^Vhat did you and Ehrlichman do about it?
Mr. Haldeman. We referred them to John Dean who was the man
responsible for dealing with them.
Senator Ervin, Oh, John Dean was the only man in the White House
who was asked to take any concern of finding out how it was that these
burglars were caught in the Watergate with the President's campaign
funds in their pockets?
Mr. Haldeman. This is absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman; he was
the only man in the White House asked to do that because there were
hundreds of people outside of the White House i)i the executive branch
doing precisely that.
Senator Er\'in. Well, didn't Dean get from the FBI in the early
stages of the investigation reports of interviews of the FBI ?
Mr. Haldeman. He got some of them ; yes.
Senator Ervin. Did you see any of those reports yourself?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator ER^^N. Didn't anybody in the White House that you know
of have any concern about the President's welfare to see the reports
other than Dean ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not to my knowledge, no.
Senator Er\in. Now, we have had a good deal of questioning here
about what was said in the meeting of March 13, 1973, which you
attended for only 10 minutes, I believe you said.
3164
Now, you undertook to express an opinion or to draw an inference
that Dean did not say to the President certain things which allegedly
occurred in your absence by reason of your interpretation of the record
for March 21 ?
Mr. Haldeman. Excuse me, sir; it is my understanding that the alle-
gation by Mr. Dean was that they took place in my presence. Not in
my absence.
Senator Ervin. Well, you were there 10 minutes.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
'Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. Twelve minutes.
Senator Er\^n. Now, isn't the best evidence that you know on the
face of this earth of what actually transpired at that meeting the tape
recording made of the meeting ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you have been questioned at length about actual
or supposed discrepancies between the versions that you gave of the
21st meeting and those of Mr. Dean ; isn't the best evidence that you
know of on this earth as to what actually was said by the President
and by Dean or by anybody else on that occasion the tape recording
of the conversations ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you have also testified about your interpreta-
tion of the September 15 meeting and your personal recollection of
what happened ; isn't the best evidence known to you on the face of
this earth concerning what was actually said at that meeting the tape
recording of that meeting ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, it is.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Now, the President released or rather permitted you to hear the
tapes of the meeting of March 21, 1973, and the meeting of September
15, 1973, didn't he?
Mr. Haldeman. 1972 ; yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. 1972, yes.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Senator Ervin. Did you have those tape recordings with you when
you prepared your statement giving your interpretation?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I did not.
Senator Ervin. And what did you have in the way of documentary
evidence at the time you prepared your statement giving your interpre-
tation of what occurred at the meeting of September 15, 1972, and
March 21, 1973?
Mr. Haldeman. I had no documentary evidence. I had only my
recollection.
Senator Ervin. I am frank to concede you impress me as a very
highl}^ intelligent man, but do you not concede that your memory may
be somewhat fallible like that of other human beings ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do readily concede that, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Don't you think that the best way to check these
alleged discrepancies is for this committee to haA^e access to those tapes?
Mr. Haldeman. In the context that you put the question, I agree
with you, sir.
3165
Senator Ervin. And the President gave you access to the tapes, and
you have come down and testified before this committee as to your
interpretation of the tapes, and the Presidency had not been destroyed
and the Constitution hasn't collapsed and the heavens haven't fallen,
have they?
Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry, are you asking me a question, sir?
Senator Ervin. Yes, that is a question. I intended to put a question
mark after it.
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure what the question was, I thought you
were making a statement.
Senator Ervin. I will ask you again.
I said, notwithstanding the fact that the President gave you access
to these tapes, and notwithstanding the fact that you have testified
publicly as to your interpretation of what the tapes meant, the Presi-
dency has not been destroyed, and the Constitution has not collapsed,
and the heavens haven't fallen ? Now, there is a question mark there.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know whether to answer yes or no, but I
agree that the heavens have not fallen.
Senator Ervin. But you don't know about the Constitution and the
Presidency ?
Mr. Haldeman. The Constitution and the Presidency also still stand.
Senator Ervin. Well, good. I am glad. I expect I have used up about
my 10 minutes or near about. I do have more questions later.
Senator Gurney, I believe you are next.
Senator Gurnet. Mr. Haldeman, the resignation of John Mitchell,
as chairman of the Committee To Ee-Elect, was certainly a major
event in 1972 in this whole Watergate affair.
Could you tell us what you know about that ? Did you discuss this
with the President, and what were the discussions held between you
about Mitchell's resignation ?
Mr. Haldeman. I did discuss it with the President, I discussed it
with Mr. Mitchell, and I can say that that resignation or the decision
by Mr. Mitchell that it would be imperative that he resign, developed
over a period of some days prior to the time that he actually did submit
his resignation. He came reluctantly but irrevocably to the conclusion
during those days that there was no other course that he could follow
for the personal reasons that are no longer very personal, I guess, he
was having a very serious problem and he has indicated that that was
the case, and he so indicated to me at the time, and he felt that there
was no way that he could handle that except by relieving himself of
the responsibilities as the President's campaign director, and he, when
he arrived — I had advised the President of this developing view on
Mr. Mitchell's part during the time that he was expressing it to me,
and when we met for lunch on June 30, I think that is the correct
date — yes, when we met for lunch on June 30, the President, Mr.
Mitchell, and I, it was understood by all three of us that was the
purpose of the luncheon and it was, that purpose was, carried out at
that Umcheon.
Senator Gurney. Obviously, I don't want to get into the personal
response behind Mr. Mitchell's resignation, but I must say that my own
reaction when all this business occurred was like this : As I recall I
think Mrs. Mitchell had been campaigning for the President, that is,
3166
making speeches and appearances prior to the Watergate break-in ; do
you recall if that is a fact ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't, Senator Gurney. I am not sure whether he
had been or not. I would imagine that he had been making some but
he
Senator Gurney. I am talking about Mrs. Mitchell.
Mr. Haldeman. That Mrs. Mitchell had been?
Senator Gurney. Yes, not Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Haldeman. At an earlier time she had been doing some, I
believe ; yes.
Senator Gurney. Well, that was my recollection, and I must say
that, now this is my own personal reaction from reading about the
resignation of Mr. Mitchell in the paper when the event occurred, and
the reason for it, the personal reason, it struck me as rather strange,
and I must say also it struck me as though it might be an excuse to
conveniently get rid of a liability, and that is really why I am asking
the question.
Mr. Haldeman. I can only say in response to that concern that you
apparently have that in no way, as I understand it, was the case. That
that concern, I must say. Senator, was expressed by Mr. Mitchell, that
that appearance could well arise from the fact that he felt he had to
take and that was a matter that he was concerned about — it was folt.
Senator Gurney. I was not the only one.
Mr. Haldeman. In spite of that concern he felt there was nothing
that he could do, and he was reluctant to give up this responsibility.
He believed very deeply in the President's reelection and wanted to
help and as I believe he has indicated he did continue to help to the
maximum degree that he could in the time after he left office as cam-
paign director officially. But he just felt that given the circumstances it
was not possibile for him to continue to carry the overall responsibility
for the day-to-day operation of the campaign. That he could be avail-
able at times, but there were other times that he simply couldn't hv
available and that during that time had been the case, there were time?
when he was able to be available.
Senator Gurney. Well, you touched upon my next observation aiic
question. Certainly from the testimony that we have had here before
the committee, Mr. Mitchell spent a great deal of time following h\-
resignation directly on the campaign. I can't recall now all of th(
meetings but there were regular meetings, as T recall, of the so-callec;
group, that is the top people that were planning the campaign, anci
there is almost the appearance that while he wasn't campaign director
and I would assume that he didn't spend 100 percent of the time on it
that nonetheless he spent a great deal, and there is the appearance that
perhaps the change was more in name than in fact.
Mr. Haldeman. Xo, it was not more in name than in fact. It wa-
very much in fact and there is a vast difference between the responsi
bility that one feels, if you are a conscientious man. if j'ou are th(
responsible executive officer of an organization, and responsible foi
the management and running of its day-to-day operations as con
trasted to being a consultant available for that organization to be ot
whatever help that you can on your time availal^ility. 'WTien you tak(
on a job as a campaign manager, and I am sure your campaign man
3167
' agers have felt the same responsibility, you take on a 24-hour, Y-day-a-
week job, and you work at it on that basis and you — that is one of the
problems of political life is that you must pretty much discard any
other resixinsibilities and any other demands on your time, especially
during th.Q period of the campaign, and that was the problem that Mr.
Mitchell was facing was that the total demands of the responsibility
of managing the campaign versus the really zero demands but still
continuing opportunity to participate and be of help in whatever way
he could following his relief from responsibility.
Senator Gurney. Well now let me put the direct question : In these
conversations which you had with the President and Mr. Mitchell prior
to his resignation, was there any discussion that he ought to resign
because he had knowledge of the Watergate break-in ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. And because, after that he participated in the
coverup ?
Mr. Haldeman. Absolutely not.
Senator Gurney. No discussion of this at any time ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Senator Gurney. John Dean worked directly under you, did he not,
i Mr. Haldeman, in the White House ?
Mr. Haldeman. Administratively, yes. Substantively, he worked
under other people depending on the nature of the particular task he
was engrossed in.
Senator Gurney. Did he report to you regularly ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. Would he report to you on pretty important
matters ; keep you advised ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, not on substantive matters because he would
report to the person responsible for that area.
Senator Gurney. There was one statement that Mr. Dean made
about his recollection of the March 21 meeting that struck me as being
bizarre, to say the least. That was a statement that the President at
some time during the meeting, and I am paraphrasing now, said : "I
am impressed with your knowledge about this Watergate aifair, Mr.
Dean. I think you ought to brief the Cabinet on it."
Do you recall any such statement as that ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think I do. I think it was in that meeting and I
do recall a suggestion that he should do so.
Senator Gurney. Well, that struck me as strange, and I remember
asking, I think, Mr. Dean, at the time, that if he had apprised the
President of all the details about Watergate, that he, John Dean,
knew at that particular time the break-in, the talks, of couree, in ^Ir.
Mitchell's office, the Liddy plans, and also the great involvement in
the coverup, why in the world anybody would want the Cabinet briefed
on that, because it was a total recount of something that obviously was
very illegal.
Mr. Haldeman. Would you like me to speculate on a reason?
Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. That is all I really can do. But I think as the Pres-
ident had done himself on a number of occasions and had sought to
have done by others was not talking in terms of trying to brief the
Cabinet on each of these possible problem areas that Mr. Dean had
3168
laid out for him, which had to be dealt with, but rather to brief the
Cabinet on the noninvolvement of the White House which Mr. Dean
had again reaffirmed and to assure the Cabinet that there had been —
there was still continuing investigation and that it still did not show
any "V\niite House involvement in the Watergate and to provide that
assurance.
Now, that was one of the areas that not just the Cabinet but that the
President wanted the people to understand. At that point there was no
certainty as to what the problems were at the reelection committee.
There was a new uncertainty, let us say, and there were also new prob-
lems. I do not believe that the President intended that Mr. Dean brief
the Cabinet on all of those — that range of problems.
Senator Gurnet. Around about this March 21 meeting and I honestly
do not recall now, and I have not examined the transcript to find out
exactly what meeting it happened in, I think it is the one that was held
between you and Ehrlichman and Dean after you had talked with the
President — anyway, the point of the matter was — was there any dis-
cussion at that meeting I just referred to or any other in and around
this time about having John Mitchell step forward, I think that term
was used — I might use this term — take the rap for Watergate?
Mr. Haldemax. I do not think at that time. There was in the — that
second week in April a developing view on both John Dean's and John
Ehrlichman's part that, as they were getting additional information
from various people, actually pretty much from the same people, that
there was a real possibility, at least, growing in their mind that John
Mitchell had been aware of the Watergate break-in. and so forth, and
that if that were the case, and if he would decide to say so, that that
would be a major step in opening up the problems of what really had
happened in the Watergate case.
It was not discussed in terms of scapegoatism or someone taking the
rap, and it was not discussed in terms of putting the pressure on Mr.
Mitchell to do this. It was discussed in the terms if this were the case
and if it happened that would certainly be a major step in the direction
of trying to unravel this whole thing. And that unfortunately now
as it gets talked about, gets misnlayed, and it srets as frequently as hap-
pened in these hearings through no fault of the hearings but just in-
herent in the process — something that one person says somebodv else
told him that someone else thought becomes a statement of fact by the
partv testifvinff at the time here and that is unfortunate but I am
afraid probably inevitable.
The onlv thing that happened in the time of the March 21 meeting
that would in any wav relate to the point that vou are raising was the
incident that I recall happening; after the meeting that John Dean, I
think, recounted as happening before the meeting and for some reason
I have a phvsical picture of this one. We were standing on the top of
the steps of the EOB. John Ehrlichman. John Dean, and I, after the
meeting with the President, before we went down the steps and across
the street, and Dean was kind of looking out over the landscape and
sort of musing to himself and said, you know, maybe the wav to deal
with this whole thing now is to draw the wagons around the White
House and let the chips fall where thev may outside because nobody in
the White House is going to be hurt by a full disclosure process, but
the problem with doing that is the "question of what it does to
3169
Magruder and Mitchell. And he was not saying it in the sense that he
knew what it would do to Magruder and Mitchell but that he was —
that that is where the problem would arise, he felt.
Senator Gurney. In any of your meetings with Mitchell or in any
phone calls that you had with him in this time frame, March-April,
did you ever say, "Now, look, John, didn't you really know about this
break-in and weren't you deeply involved in this coverup and don't you
think it is time to take the lead and unravel all this ?"
Mr. Haldeman. I did not. That was, I believe, the essence of John
Ehrlichman's meeting with Mr. Mitchell on April 14.
Senator Gurxey. My time has elapsed.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Senator Ervix. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Haldeman, have you ever been cited by any court in the United
States for illegal or unethical campaign activities"?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure what "cited" means. Senator. My name
was included, although I was not a defendant, in a suit relating to the
1952, 1962 campaigns for Governor of California.
Senator Inouye. In a judgment rendered on November 2, 1964, the
court did cite you and others for carrying out illegal and unethical
campaign activities and did enjoin you from ever using such tactics
again, and the case was never appealed. Isn't that so ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have not seen that judgment. I have seen press
references to that that said that I was, I guess "cited" is the correct
term, as having had knowledge of the matter that was under discussion.
I don't know what the proper term is— under judgment there.
Senator Inouye. On September 5, 1963, you gave a deposition in
California. If I may, I would like to read the questions and answers:
Did you review this Exhibit E, the post card poll, with Mr. Nixon?
Your answer :
No, I don't think so. I think again I posted him on the fact that we were going
into this project on the same basis that I did with Weinberger and Martin,
which would have been my practice when in this kind of thing.
Question: Did you tell him the contents of Exhibit E, the post card poll?
Answer : Perhaps in general terms, not on any specific basis. I don't know.
Question : Did you show him the draft?
Answer : I don't think so.
Question : How many conversations did you have with him?
Answer : I am sure only one.
Then on January 8, 1964, a deposition was taken of Miss Leone
Baxter. I believe she was retained by your organization to carry out
public relations activities. And in this deposition it says :
Yes, if this conversation with Mr. Nixon in Los Angles took place approximately
on August 25, 1962, when was your next meeting with Mr. Nixon concerning the
campaign?
Answer : I don't think I had another meeting with him until I went over the
copy with him and with Mr. Haldeman.
Question : About what date was that?
Answer: All of this seems to have transpired along about in the same
timing, very concentrated in late August, early September, as I recall of these
meetings and conversations.
Question : Where did the meeting take place?
Answer: Now, which meeting?
3170
Question : The one with you and Mr. Nixon and Mr. Haldeman to go over the
copy.
Answer. At Mr. Nixon's home.
Question :
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman — excuse me, Senator, I have not seen
this inquiry predicated on a question. I have not interfered up to this
point with respect to the question of relevancy. I think it stands out
in bold relief. I would like to say that I think this is outside the scope
of your resolution.
Senator Inouye, Mr. Chairman, may I respond to that, sir?
Senator Ervin. "Well, it may be relevant but I believe it would be
advisable, I hate to say this, Jbut to refrain from interrogating that
far back.
Senator Inouye. May I respond, sir, Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Er\t:n. Yes, sir.
Senator Inotjye. I believe it is relevant to the investigation to have
some understanding of Mr. Haldeman's approach to political cam-
paigning, and, second, Mr. Chairman, these hearings began on May 17,
1973, and since then I believe we have had 32 days of intensive ques-
tioning of witnesses and we have had before us men and women of high'
standing in our community, men and women supposedly with unim-
peachable characters, and to the confusion of all of us here, Mr. Chair-
man, many of these witnesses have time and again contradicted other
witnesses, in other words, suggesting that one witness was faulty in^
his recollection or committed outright perjury, and I think it is rele-
vant to this investigation to determine a witness' credibility.
For example, when Mr. Dean was before us, no one objected to
question posed about reasons for his dismissal from his first job and
I believe this touched upon his credibility.
Senator Ervin. Well, Senator, I would approximate this to the rule
in criminal cases, though we are not trying a criminal case, but it is a
good guide to follow. I do think you can ask the witness about hie-
attitude but I do not believe we ought to go back that far to ask himi
about specific acts just like trying a man for one thing and then prov-
ing he did some other things. If we do this with Mr. Haldeman. then
anybody in the committee would be entitled to recall every witness here
and do the same thing, go back into their past actions and things, and<
I just think it is unwise to open the door and
Senator Inotjye. I shall abide by the Chair's rulings. I just wanted!
to compare these two depositions, one which says
Mr. Wilson. I object to discussion of the deposition.
Senator ER^^N. Well, I do not know verv well how I could keep jom
from saying something that was within the sphere of your responsi
bilities even thousrh I thought it was wrong or do the same for the*
Senator from Hawaii the same wav.
Mr. Wilson. A description of these depositions is to let in the very,
thing I say is irrelevant.
Senator Ervin. Well, I have ruled that the Senator will not
Senator Inotjye. I will not ask the question. Mr. Chairman. I thought
it miffht be a o-ood opportunitv for Mr. Haldeman to provide some
clarification. These depositions are a matter of record. Anybody can
pick this up and quote from this.
¥
3171
Senator Ervin. Yes ; but they are res inter alia acta, something like
hat. [Laughter.] So I think we had better desist at this point.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield just for a
aoment ?
Senator Inoute. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have received word that the Fed-
eral aid to highways bill is now pending on the floor of the Senate,
't is a $20 billion authorization and I am the senior Kepublican on
he jurisdictional committee and I would like to be excused from these
jroceedings until the Senate acts on that matter.
Senator Ervin. Well, that is understandable. That is a very im-
)ortant bill and you have been a very interested member and after 75
)r 80 conferences getting a compromise bill, and since your views on
he bill are almost the same as mine, I will excuse you. [Laughter.]
Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Haldeman, I had presented to you two
locuments. You briefly went over the first. Now, I would like to ask
rou whether or not you
! Mr. Haldeman. Excuse me, sir.
Senator Weicker [continuing]. Recognize the second dcoument?
Mr. Haldeman. I only have one.
Senator "Weicker. I asked that both be given to you at that time.
Mr. Haldeman. Here it comes, I guess.
Mr. Wilson. May I have a copy, please ? The Senator wanted me to
lave a copy, too.
Mr. Haldeman. Is the second document dated February 10 ?
Senator Weicker. Memorandum from John Dean to H. Haldeman.
Mr. Haldeman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. I would like another copy.
Senator Weicker. You do not have the February 10 document?
Mr. Wilson. I do not.
Senator Weicker. Does ]\Ir. Haldem.an have the February 10
Mr. Haldeman. He just gave me one. Mr. Wilson was asking for
mother copy.
Senator Weicker. Can the committee provide Mr. Wilson another
3ne?
Mr. Haldeman. All right, sir ; I have read it.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Haldeman, do you recognize this?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Senator Weicker. Let me read it. Dated February 10, 1973. Memo-
randum for John Dean from H. R. Haldeman. [Reading:]
We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist
money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in 1972,
We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovern and thus to the Democrats
as part of the peace movement.
The investigation should be brought to include the peace movement which
leads directly to McGovern and Teddy Kennedy. This is a good counteroffensive
to be developed. In this connection we need to itemize all the disruptions such
as the Century Plaza, San Franci.«!co, Statue of Liberty, and so on.
You should definitely order Gray to go ahead on the FBI investigation against
these who taped Nixon and Agnew in 1968.
We need to develop the plan on to what extent the Democrats were responsible
for the demonstrations that lead to violence or disruption.
There's also the question of whether we should let out the Fort Wayne story
now — that we ran a clean campaign compared to theirs, libel and slander such as
against Rebozo, et cetera.
3172
And lastly — I beg pardon, reading directly —
We could let Evans and Novak put it out and then be asked about it to mak«
the point that we knew and the President said it was not to be used under an;i
circumstance.
In any event, we have to play a very hard game on this whole thing and ge>
our investigations going as a countermove.
Is that what the document states ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is what this document states.
Senator Weicker. And this document states it is a memorandun
from you to John Dean. Is that a memorandum that you prepared?
Mr. Haldeman. I will accept responsibility for the memorandum
although because of some bad English and other problems in it,
would point out that it is not initialed by me, which it would have beei
had I written the memorandum and sent it. I believe that this was {
memorandum prepared from notes or from telephonic instructions t<
a staff member who then wrote it up and sent it out over my name
Having said that, I am disclaiming responsibility for the English ano
typos, and accepting overall responsibility for the memorandum.
Senator Weicker. In other words, accepting responsibility for tb
thrust of the memorandum, if not the actual words used ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Well, I guess the first thing to ask here is I wouk
like to get your version as to what this first paragraph means :
We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communis
money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in 1972
We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovem and thus to the Democrat
as part of the peace movement.
Mr. Haldeman. I think there was, or I know that there was, somi
information, I don't know how good it was that there was foreigi
money used to support the financing of demonstrations. The poin
here was to develop the story that that had been the case, develop thi
facts on it.
Skipping down to the fourth paragraph it does say, "We need t<
develop the plan on to what extent," this is the bad English agaii
"but to what extent the Democrats were responsible for the demonstra
tions that lead to violence or disruption."
In other words, this was to determine the facts and get out the storj
with the objective of tying, where the facts did so, tying those demon-
strations to those who were responsible for them.
Senator Weicker. Well now, are you tying the Democratic Party
or let me ask you, what are you tying the Democratic Party to ? Let'f
be specific.
Mr. Haldeman. I am asking to develop a plan on to what extent the
Democrats were responsible for demonstrations that led to violence
or disruption.
Senator Weicker. You say :
We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist
money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in 1972.
We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovern and thus to the Democrats
as part of the peace movement.
This is one paragraph here, the head of this memorandum.
Mr. Haldeman. That is right, I am reading
3173
Senator Weickeb. Are you trying to tie the Democratic Party to
Communist money or foreign money 'i
j Mr. Haldeman. I am trying to tie the demonstration that is — were
instigated by McGovern or McGovern campaign people to those
I people. I am trying to get out the story of what the facts were in regard
to the instigation of and financing of demonstrations.
Senator Weicker. Well now, this is dated February 10, 1973. And
i interestingly enough I have made my own notes and I go back to your
i opening statement before this committee and I expressed myself as to
I the image that you were trying to portray here, being rather clever with
words, as to these matters being linked to the Democratic candidate,
to the Democratic Party, and I didn't receive or I didn't get this par-
ticular memorandum until after I had made my own impression as to
what thoughts you were trying to convey in your opening statement, so,
! in other words, I had my impression of your opening statement in try-
ing to tie the Democratic Party and George McGovern to the image of
being soft on communism and being soft on law and order and all of
a sudden this memorandum appears and here you are suggesting as a
counteroffensive that these entities, this individual, and this party be
tied in with foreign and Communist money and that it be tied into
I the demonstrations. Is this what you — let me ask you — is this what you
believed during the course of the campaign of 1972 ? Was this to be the
thrust of the attack ?
Mr. Haldeman. Let me — I don't understand your references to soft
on communism and soft on law and order. Is there something that I
have said that leads to that ?
Senator Weicker. Well, I think that you're definitely trying to
make a linkup here. I just have your own memorandum before me on
that point.
Mr. Haldeman. My own memorandum makes no reference to Mc-
Govern being soft on communism.
Senator Weicker. No, it just tries to go ahead to link Mr. McGovern
to demonstrations and to communism ; is that right?
Mr. Haldeman. Tries to link Mr. McGovern or the McGovern cam-
paign to
Senator Weicker. And the Democrats.
Mr. Haldeman. And the Democrats and the peace movement to the
demonstrations and to the point that I understood there was backing
on, or information on, that there was foreign or Communist money
used in support of demonstrations. If, in fact, those were the facts, it
was my feeling that they should be known.
Senator Weicker. No, you say, you don't want to develop the fact,
"We need to get our people to put out the stor}' on the foreign or
Communist money that was used," in the last election.
Mr. Haldeman. He says that was the case.
Senator Weicker. Do you mean to tell me that as a man closest to
the President of the United States, you issued a directive linking the
Democratic Party and the Democratic candidate to Communist money,
to demonstrations, because you thought that was the case, that you are
willing to go ahead and do that as the man closest to the President of
the United States, you were willing to throw that party and that name
around in that fashion?
Mr. Haldeman. Only if it is the case. Senator, and only
96-296 O - 73 - Bk. 8
3174
Senator Weicker. Isn't it your job before you issue a memorandum
to make sure that it either is or is not the case ?
Mr. Haldeman. Isn't that
Senator Weicker. Isn't that what this country is about?
Mr. Haldeman, That is why the memorandum was directed to the
counsel to the President who had the facts, as I understood it, on this
case.
Senator Weicker. "We need to get our people to put out the story,"
this is not a request for an investigation. If it were a request for an
investigation, wouldn't this be the type of thing which certainly we
should put into the hands of our law enforcement branches here in the
United States, either the FBI, CIA, the National Security group, or
any valid law enforcement branch ? This isn't a request for an investi-
gation of these facts. This is to put out the story.
Mr. Haldeman. It was my understanding that there were facts that
led to these points.
Senator Weicker. What are the facts ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know. I have stated what my understanding
was. Mr. Dean was the one I understood had the facts.
Senator Weicker. I think I have come close to my time now, Mr.
Chairman. I am going to be candid with you, and I am going to con-
tinue on this subject every 10 minutes until we get this right out on
the table. But I want you to know this, that if I am emotionally
wrought up at this point in time it is because these things have been
imputed or an attempt has been made, and I think we have stopped
here, to impute these matters and other matters here to your party and
to your candidate.
i am going to tell you, my job is to go ahead and beat Democrats and
I have done a pretty good job, quite frankly, and I am agin you, and
quite frankly go into the record and find out who made some of the
sharpest attacks on Mr. McGovern, attacks based on facts that were in
the record, fair enough. But this type of business here when it ema-
nates from the highest councils in the land, I think is a disgrace, and I
think, quite frankly, the tactics, this is Febiiiary 10, 1973, 1 don't think
there has been any change in tactics from the election campaign of
1972 as to when you sit before this committee right now,
Mr. Haldeman.
Senator ERAaN. Senator Montoya, I believe it is your turn.
Senator Montoya. I just have two short questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Haldeman, following the questioning of my previous turn, I
want to ask you since you said that checks of people were routinely
made by the FBI, why did you personally request FBI background
checks on certain persons ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure without knowing what the specific
circumstances were in each instance, Senator.
Senator Montoya. Well, you indicated that checks were being made
routinely about some of these persons and they were routinely made by
the FBI, so why was tliere a need for you to request checks on these
persons other than for the purposes that were outside of the scope
about which your testimony alluded ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know that I did request any checks outside
that scope.
3175
Senator Moxtoya. Well, we went into the check on Mr. Schorr, and
Mr. Biitterfield testified that there were approximately eight pei-sons
on which you had ordered checks, to his knowledge, and he mentioned
three, I don't know of the other five, but I understand that you did
order checks on many individuals.
Mr. Haldeman. Where do you understand that, Senator, and who
were they ?
Senator Montoya. I understood Mr. Butterfield to say that you had
ordered checks on different individuals but he knew of eight checks
that you had ordered and he was only able to mention three.
Mr. Haldemax. And that as I recall from what you read from your
staff report which I have not seen, included requests from both Mr.
Ehrlichman and from me.
Senator Montoya. Now, why did you have to order these checks on
certain individuals if the FBI was doing this routinely? That is the
question I am asking.
Mr. Haldemax. Without knowing the specific circumstance and the
specific individual I couldn't tell you, sir ; but I would submit that
there are, it is not unusual or unlikely that if, for instance, a pending
invitation to entertain at the IVhite House or a pending invitation to
participate on a delegation or something of that sort were being con-
sidered that it might well be a step taken to make a prior check before
that was pursued in any way that could become embarrassing to the
individual if, in fact, the check proved unsatisfactory. We found in a
number of cases that people who were under consideration did have
problems, that did show up in their FBI files or as a result of FBI
checks that resulted in a decision not to make the appointment or issue
the invitation on a very proper basis because, to avoid embarrassments
to the White House and to avoid embarrassments to the individual.
Senator Moxtoya. Well, who was in the business of ordering IRS
checks at the White House on individuals ?
Mr. Haldemax. It would depend again on the situation. I can't
answer when on a broad basis.
Senator Moxtoya. Wliat individuals had that authority ?
Mr. Haldemax. I am not sure. It would depend on the specific
situation.
Senator Moxtoya. Well, you were chief of staff there, don't you
know — don't you know of somebody who had the central responsibility
to approve these requests by personnel at the White House ?
Mr. Haldemax. The general procedure would have been for such
requests to be made through the counsel's office. But there, I am sure,
were exceptions.
Senator Moxtoya. Do you know whether Mr, Colson made any
checks ?
Mr. Haldemax. I don't know.
Senator Moxtoya. Do you know whether Mr. Caulfield requested
any of these, any of this information ?
Mr. Haldemax. I don't know but he was, of coui*se, in the counsel's
office so
Senator Moxtoya. Now, I want to ask you one final question. The
other day I asked a question of Mr. Strachan who worked for you,
who was very dedicated in following your orders, and who expressed
3176
great concern that right after the Watergate break-in that he might
not have enough information and he impressed tliis committee that
he was almost shaking in his boots because lie didn't have enough m-
formation to adequately mform you at the Wliite House upon your
return from some trip.
Now, I asked him a question which you know about already, and the
question revolved aromid what advice, in view of his experience he
would have for the people, for the young people, of this country with
respect to public service, and very dramatically he answered, ''Stay
away."
Now, I am trying to elicit from you, Mr. Haldeman, you knowing
this young man so well, and he having impressed me with his testimony
and his sincerity and his soldierly dedication to duty, I want you to tell
me from your knowledge of this young man what might have inspired
him to make such an answer from his experience and background 'i
Mr. Haldeman. Well, Senator Montoya, let me say that when he
gave that answer I found it to be one of the saddest moments of this
hearing because it is an answer that I would certainly give in exactly
the opposite direction and I would have hoped that Mr. Strachan
would have answered in exactly the opposite way from the way that
he did. You have asked my opinion.
Senator Montoya. I am going to ask you what is your advice to the
young people of this country because we are in public service, and I
feel that we should put this matter in proper context. To me public
service is a trust, public service is an honor, and I am sure that you can
shed light on this in view of your previous connection at the White
House as the No. 1 man next to the President; what advice do you
have?
Mr. Haldeman. My advice, Senator, to any young man or young
woman who feels that he or she has the ability, and the interest to serve
this country in any way in the Government or in any other way, that
he should pursue that or she should, that interest, to the fullest of his
or her ability. I think it would be tragic, and maybe the greatest of all
tragedies that seem to be flowing out of this whole situation, if it
would result in any individual who had decided at some point or who
had been thinking at some point of coming into the Government to
serve in elective office, in appointive office, or as a staff member to a
Member of Congress or in the White House or any of the Government
agencies, if that decision were changed as a result of what has gone on
here, that would be, in my mind, an overriding tragedy.
I would like to say that one of the proudest things that I have in
the back of my mind is the intention of my oldest son to enter Govern-
ment service when he completes his college work, which he is in the
middle of now, and his intention to go to law school following that,
and I hope to God that he enters Government service in some way.
Senator Montoya. Well, I would like to add to that advice and that
would be this : I hope that all young men who come into the Govern-
ment service and who have the splendid opportunity that those men
who have appeared before this committee have, that they will at all
times be alert and careful and avoid a Watergate pit.
Would you agree with me on that ?
Mr. Haldeman. With all my heart, sir.
3177
Senator Montoya. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. There is a vote on. The committee will stand in recess
until 1 :30 unless there is objection.
[Whereupon at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1 :30
p.m., the same day.]
Apternoon Session, Wednesday, August 1, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
There have been a number of inquiries as to whether the committee
would have a Saturday session, and since I am the only person, among
all of the inhabitants of this country, who still believes people ought
to work at least to noon Saturday, there will be no Saturday session of
the committee because I am afraid nobody would be here except myself.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Haldeman, the Presidential aides in the White House had a
habit of writing memorandums to one another, did they not?
Mr. Haldeman. They did write memorandums; yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And is it reasonable to assume that most of the mat-
ters that had been discussed in the White House during 1972 and 1973
evolved in a sense in written memorandums and are still in the White
House unless they have been shredded or destroyed; would that not
be true?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I would not believe that is true ; a great deal
was discussed which was not reduced to memorandums.
Senator Ervin. But a great deal was reduced to memorandums
was it not ?
Mr. Haldeman. Some were, not anywhere near a large proportion of
what was discussed.
Senator Ervin. For example, this memorandum that Senator
Weicker was asking you about from you to John Dean dated Febru-
ary 10, 1973, would have been preserved in the White House, would it
not?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. I imagine it would be.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Now, I am asking you if this memorandum was not made as a result
of the meeting out in La Costa, Calif.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not see how it could be since it is dated the same
day that the meeting started.
Senator Ervin. Well, were you out at that meeting ?
Mr. Haldeman. In La Costa ; yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And if you made it on the same day the meeting
started, it must have been made as a result either before the meeting
occurred or after it occurred, which was it ?
Mr. Haldeman. I cannot tell you. As I said to Senator Weicker, I do
not believe that I dictated this memorandum. I think it was written
from notes or a phone conversation, and I do not know that it had any
connection with the La Costa meeting.
Senator Ervin. Well, you say on page 13 of your statement that in
your role as the President's chief of staff : "I concentrated my attention
and activities each day on those matters on which the President was
concentrating his attention and activities."
3178 I
The President was not concentrating his attention and activity in *
matters mentioned in this memorandum which f)urports to be from
H. R. Haldeman to John Dean, was he ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe he was.
Senator Ervin. Yes. Now, as a matter of fact, this was a memoran-
dum that was made, and was not the meeting of La Costa lield as a
result of the creation of this committee by the Senate ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir, it was.
Senator Ervin. And does it not reflect a purpose, if there was a
ooverup, does it not reflect a jDurpose to cover up the coverup ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not believe so.
Senator Ervin. By that I mean, you were discussing the way in
which to try to forestall this committee's action by developing a
counteroffensive.
Mr. Haldeman. I would not say that anything in this memorandum
had any relationship to forestalling this committee's action.
Senator Ervin. Well, let us see. "The investigation should be
brought to include the peace movement which leads directly to McGov-
em and Teddy Kennedy." What investigation ?
Mr. Haldeman. Of the demonstrations against the President in 1972.
Senator Erven. Well, the memorandum starts out and says:
We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist
money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in 1972.
We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovern and thus to Democrats as a
part of the peace movement.
Now, what does that mean? This was after the election and had
nothing to do with the election.
Mr. Haldeman. It had to do with the aftermath of the election. I do
not believe it has any direct relationship to the activity of this com-
mittee, however, because this was not in reference to the committee.
Senator Erven. Well, was it just a newspaper offensive that was to
be started in which a charge was going to be made that the Democrats
were allied or rather had received money from the Communists and
foreign sources?
Mr. Haldeman. I think that it was, yes ; as a measure of counter-
attack.
Senator Ervin. Well, there is a memo on February 10, the same day,
1973 from Higby to John Dean :
As I am sure Bob's probably mentioned to you, we need to get a thorough
itemization as quickly as possible for all disruptions that occurred in the cam-
paign. We'll need this for our Watergate tactics with the Ervin Committee.
Mr. Haldeman. Right, but I don't see that as a means of disrupting
or turning off the activity of the committee. I see it as a counterattack
to the material that would be developed.
Senator Erven. You said first a while ago, if I recall correctly, that
this memorandum that purports to be from H.R. Haldeman to John
Dean had no reference to this committee.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe it did.
Senator Erven. Well, this memorandum from Higby to John Dean,
which is the same date, does refer specifically, "We'll need this for our
Watergate tactics with the Ervin committee."
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, I see that it does.
3179
Senator Ervin. Yes. Now, Higby was your assistant, wasn't lie?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir ; yes, lie was.
Senator Ervin. I am not going to question you at length on this, but
I do say you refer to something about the Fort Wayne story, maybe
you ought to let that out now. Also a question of whether we should let
out the Fort Wayne story now :
That we ran a clean campaign compared to theirs of libel and slander such as
against Rebozo, and so forth.
We could let Evans and Novak put it out and then be asked about it to break
the point that we knew and the President said it was not to be used under any
circumstances.
Now isn't that an effort to manufacture something retroactively ?
Mr. Haldeman. It wasn't to manufacture something, and the reason
that I don't believe I dictated this memorandum is that Mr. Dean
didn't, had no knowledge, I don't believe, of what I was referring to in
the Fort Wayne story, and I would not have sent any such reference
to him.
Senator Ervin. Well, do you think somebody was forging your name
on this document ? Is that what you are saying ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I indicated to Senator Weicker that I took the
responsibility for the document but not for the dictation of it. It is not
signed by me and when I send a memorandum of this sort, that I dic-
tated and read myself, I initialed it by my name.
Senator Ervin. What are the initials on this ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know what that is in the upper right-hand
corner but that isn't
Senator Ervin. Isn't that for Haldeman file; isn't that what that
"H.F."isfor?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know, Mr. Chairman. My guess would be
since there is a date of February 16 it is for follow up on the 16th.
Senator Ervin. Well, whoever wrote this document addressed it to
the man who was supposed to be looking after the White House's
affairs rather exclusively, I think, John Dean, didn't he ?
Mr. Haldeman. In regard to the Watergate, yes.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. But he also was involved in the analysis of demon-
stration intelligence, too.
Senator Ervin. So the point is made, "We could let Evans and
Novak put it out," they are two columnists, aren't they, who ran a
column in this country's papers and after it says, "And then be asked
about it to make the point that we knew and the President said it was
not to be used under any circumstances."
Now, isn't that a statement that after it is put out in a column by
Evans and Novak, that you all would be asked about it and you would
all say you knew about it all the time but the President in past cam-
paigns had directed that it not be put out under any circumstances?
Mr. Haldeman. And that is precisely the case.
Senator Ervin. Why didn't you say so ?
Mr. Haij)eman. I did say so.
Senator Ervin. So the President knew about it ?
Mr. Haldeman. The President knew about this particular story, yes.
Senator Ervin. And he told you not to use it under any circum-
stances ?
3180
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. And it wasn't.
Senator Ervin. And you knowing that while you deny authorshipi
of this ? Do you deny authorship of this ?
Mr. Haldeman. I deny dictating this memorandum, but I have ac-
cepted responsibility for its contents, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. 1 will come back. Wait a minute, Mr. Strachan wa&
your liaison between you and the Committee To Re-Elect the Presi-
dent, was he not ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And he brought you memorandums and documents?
Mr. Haldeman. He sent them to me, yes.
Senator Ervin. And he testified that he brought you a memorandum
which stated at Key Biscayne on the 30th of March, John Mitchell
had approved of what he called a sophisticated intelligence plan and
that you put a mark indicating that you had read that. You say he did
not bring you that or do you say you just do not have any recollection
of it?
Mr. Haldeman. I said I did not have any recollection of that specific
item or of that memorandum in the clear specific sense. I have no ques-
tion that I was sent political memorandum No. 18 to which he referred.
I do not think itwas quite as specific as you just made the reference to
the thing. As I recall Mr. Strachan's testimony, which is the only thing
I can go on, he said that among the other 30 items that he reported!
from that meeting was one saying the committee now has a sophisti-
cated intelligence operation budgeted at $300,000.
Senator Ervin. Now, did Mr. Strachan have a custom of preparing
what I call talking papers for you when you were going to have inter-
views with people?
Mr. Haldeman. When I was having meetings with Mr, Mitchell.
Senator Er\^n. Right after the Key Biscayne meeting of March 30.
1972, Mr. Mitchell had an appointment with you, did he not, in the
White House?
Mr. Haldeman. We met on April 4.
Senator Ervin. April 4. And Mr. Strachan has testified here that he
prepared for you a talking paper mentioning this same subject as
something you should make inquiry of Mr. Mitchell about. Now, do
you recall that talking paper?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I do not in any — not specifically, but Mr.
Strachan had a practice of preparing the — a paper that would include
his suggestion of items that might — ^that I might want to raise in
meetings with Mr. Mitchell.
Senator Ervin. Now, I take it you are not denying that he furnished
you such a talking paper but you merely state you have no recollection
of having seen it. Is that correct?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gumey.
Mr. Haldeman. I might, if I could, Mr. Chairman, just on that same
point, however, follow up with the point that in that meeting with
Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Strachan in his own testimony said he had no knowl-
edge of what was discussed, that those talking papers were his sug-
gestion of things he thought I might want to raise with Mr. Mitchell.
He has no knowledge that I did raise any of them with him., and I do
not believe that that was discussed at the meeting of April 4 with
3181
Mr. Mitchell, because that meeting was in conjunction with the meet-
ing Mr. Mitchell and I had with the President the same day at which
other matters were discussed relating to the ITT meeetings, and the
plans that Mr. Mitchell was making for assigning regional campaign
: responsibility to individuals that he reviewed with the President.
Senator ER\T:]sr. Senator Gumey.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
i I am sure there are many more questions that could be asked of the
; witness on various phases in this whole Watergate affair but as I
understand this phase, it is restricted to the break-in and the coverup.
[: I think the witness has testified very fully on that. Frankly, I cannot
think of any other questions that I could ask him that would shed any
more light on those two issues. I think that the central theme of what
t : we are trying to get at in this phase is the involvement or noninvolve-
I ment of the President of the United States in the break-in and the
coverup, and as I say, I cannot think of a single question to ask the
i( witness on this.
;. The committee has agreed, I think — we have discussed it in executive
i session — that it is important to expedite this phase of the hearings so we
{ can get them over, hopefully, next week. My own personal view is that
J I think these hearings are damaging this Government seriously, the
\ Nation, and also its relations in the world abroad. Therefore, I do not
! intend to ask any more questions of this witness.
Senator ERviisr. Senator Inouye.
Senator Ixouye, Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Haldeman, just for the record, since there are a few unanswered
questions relating to the tapes, will you tell the committee as to who
knew about the existence of the recording system in the White House ?
Mr. Haldeman. Other than the members of the Technical Security
; Division of the Secret Service, and I do not know who in that orga-
nization knew of it, but it was the smallest number of people feasible
within the requirements they had technically to conduct the prepara-
i tion of the tapes and the storage of them.
The only other people that I am aware of that knew of the existence
of the tapes at the time I was at the T^Hiite House were the President,
myself, Alex Butterfield, and Mr. Higby. I did not know Mr. Butter-
field's secretary was aware of them but I understand he has so testified.
I do not believe anyone else did and I do not recall whether Mr. Butter-
field has indicated that anyone else did. If he has and if you want to
check those names with me, I can confirm my knowledge as to their
knowledge.
Senator Ixouye. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion — was he aware of this ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Inouye. Was the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency aware of this ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Inouye. Did you have a room that was secure, with no
recording devices, where Mr. Helms could discuss highly sensitive mat-
- i ters with the President of the United States ?
! Mr. Haldeman. Well, there were only two rooms — excuse me, three,
because the Cabinet room also had this capability on a switched-on-
and-off basis. The only two rooms which were covered by this taping
3182
were the Oval Office of the President in the White House and the other ■
office, the alternate office of the President in the Executive Office Build-
ing, and tlien as I said, the Cabinet room which was on a switcli. The
others were automatic.
Senator Inouye. Are you aware if the CIA Director ever discussed
highly sensitive mattere with the President and had the discussion
recorded ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know.
Senator Inouye. I am just bringing this up because I believe there
are laws that would prohibit this, the compromising of the Central
Intelligence Agency, but that is not our concern.
What in your mind was the purpose of recording these conversa-
tions ?
Mr. Haldeman. S'^ that the President would have for his own use
and reference on a historical basis an accurate and precise record of
everything that was said by him and by other people with whom he
was conferring.
Senator Inoute. Was it the intention of the President to eventually
release all of the tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. It is my understanding that it was he — his
intention was not ever to release the tapes.
Senator Inoute. Then, how would you account for the historical
aspect of the tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. For his own use.
Senator Inouye. Now, on July 9, 10, or 11 you were given the tape
of September 15, sir ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Senator Inouye. And I believe you also indicated that you were
given other tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes. I believe
Senator Inouye. Can you recall the dates of these tapes, sir?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. They were of other meetings during
the March-April period and I am not sure which ones.
Senator Inouye. Meetings involving what people ?
Mr. Haldeman. The President, Mr. Dean, and myself, but — no, they
didn't involve me. The President and Mr. Dean.
Senator Inouye. In your response to Mr. Montoya's inquiry you
suggested that you were not acquainted with the mechanism of the
taping device, the tape machine. In fact you weren't aware that they
had different speeds.
Mr. Haldeman. I believe I indicated that I was aware. I wasn't
aware of what speed to set this at and I had to experiment with the
switch in order to set it at the proper speed for these tapes.
Senator Inouye. To start and stop did you have to experiment also ?
Mr. Haldeman. No. There is a button on it that indicates start and:
stop, I think. I shovild say really yes, I did have to experiment with it.
I had to determine how to do it but it was not difficult to do.
Senator Inouye. And you testified that you heard it once ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. You didn't replay it ?
Mr. Haldeman. I did not replay it ; that is correct.
Senator Inouye. Is it possible that in the pressing of your buttons
you may have accidentally erased portions of it ?
3183
I Mr. Haldeman. It is my understanding that that is not possible
\ unless you push the record button which has an erasing feature on it
which I did not do. I can assure you, Senator Inouye, that I did not
make any effort to erase or in any other way alter the tapes that I
listened to in any form.
Senator Inoute. If I may ask a final question on the tapes ; it has
I been suggested that there is some connection between July 9, 10, 11, and
1 13, and I will draw the picture for you, sir. On the 9th, lOth, and 11th,
! on one of those dates you listened to this tape of September 15. On
July 13 Mr. Butterfield in his interview advised the committee of the
existence of the recording devices and that is why earlier this morning
I asked you if you had any conversation with Mr. Butterfield. Is there
any connection between these tapes ?
Mr. Haldemaist. Absolutely none, Senator. I did not have any con-
i versation with Mr. Butterfield. I did not know on July 13 or, in
I fact, until it became publicly known that Mr. Butterfield had informed
i the committee.
Senator Inoute. Thank you very much, sir.
I believe my time is up.
Do we have a vote, sir ?
Senator Baker. Yes, we do have a vote and since there are no other
members of the committee present I will take the next sequence of
examination.
Mr. Haldeman, I think you and I may have joined the issue on the
wrong subject when we had our philosophical dissertation on the
nature of the Presidency or the staffing arrangement there.
Let me pick up and try from a different tack. And my usual pre-
amble that I have come to give but which is not diminished in its
sincerity by the fact I give it repeatedly is that I am not trying to lead
you into the criticism of the staff arrangement, nor of the President,
but rather simply to probe into the nature of things.
It is interesting to me that vou indicate that in previous campaigns,
in your judgment, the President would have been on top of the cam-
jjaign, so to speak, which implies to me that he would have been in
charge of at least the major decisions or in control of the decisions
on the major developments. I classifv the matters that we have spoken
of as a major development. As I understand your testimony, you have
indicated that you think that would not have been the case in 1968
because the President, at that time a candidate for President, had al-
readv come to delegate a great deal of authority for the campaign and
clearlv that was not the case in 1972. Citing as you did his concern
for the international situation and for the several domestic initiatives
that were underway.
I don't know that I can get much closer to the situation except maybe
to refine and reframe my question. That is, what is there about the
arrangement, what is there about the demands of the Presidency or
this man who is President, who is my friend and is your friend, what
is there about this or i^recedinsr administi-ations that creates a situa-
tion where a President — let's take just the incumbent President and
1972 — is not involved in the major decisionmaking situation. What is
there about it that compels that or if it doesn't compel that, where was
the judfifment made or was it possible to have an alternative judgment?
Think for a moment, if you will, about the testimony of John Mitchell.
3184
John Mitchell testified — I hope this is not unfair to him or the com-
mittee — ^thaf , no, he didn't know about the break-in before it happened,
but, yes, as soon as he found out he devoted the rest of his time to keep-
ing the President from knowing. That is obviously an ovei-simplifica-
tion but that is, I believe, close to what John Mitchell testified.
And now take your testimony that, no, you didn't know about the
break-in and you didn't know about the coverup, but that the arrange-
ment and circumstances were sucli that you don t know that you should
have known under those circumstances. I believe in your statement you
say the question is not what did the President know but how could the
President have known. I think that is essentially what you said.
That might be a good place, as the preachers say, to take our text.
Let's take that part of your statement. Have you got your statement
before you ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. That part. Could you read that section of your
statement ?
Mr. Haldeman. Do you know what page it is ?
Senator Baker. No, I am sure I don't. I can't even find a copy of it
up here. But — here is a copy.
Mr. Haldeman. I have found it. Page 49.
Senator Baker. Page 49, the second paragraph, the question is asked
how could the President not have known, and your answer is to reverse
the question, how could the President have known. Well that is a
pretty good way to approach it.
You understand my concern ; I am concerned for any situation that
would keep the President from knowing. I am concerned with an anal-
ysis of the staffing arrangement at the White House in this or previous
administrations, or the nature of the Presidency or the demands oi
foreign policy or domestic initiative that would prevent the President
from knowing and would lead you to ask how could the President
have known. You underscore the word "have" and I am concerned
for the arrangements, the relationships that may have come into being
over many administrations that would create a situation where the
query is made how on earth could the President have known because
here we are dealing with a matter that has turned out to be one of
extraordinary importance.
Now let's examine just for the minute: The President read news-
papers as the chairman is fond of saying and I am sure he watched
television, he got his daily news summary, he had an extremely ener-
getic, dedicated, and loyal staff. They were aware. They weren't iso-
lated. I use the word "isolated" from time to time but not in that
context. They were aware of what was going on around them but what
was it that caused you or them or anyone that you know of to decide
this wasn't a matter of sufficient urgency that you could go walking
into the Oval Office and say. "Mr. President, there are two major
figures in the Committee To Re-Elect the President that got caught
in the Watergate down there. We don't know what happened," because,
as you say, "We didn't have any prior knowledge of it but what in tlie
world are we going to do?" A key and operative phrase there is:
""What are we going to do?" thereby giving the President the oppor-
tunity to decide.
3185
Now describe for me in more detail how that did happen or how that
might be avoided in the future.
Mr. Haldeman. You have given me a big task, by the way.
Senator Baker. Yes, it is a big task.
Mr. Haldeman. A wide range of questions.
Senator Baker. But you are the world's leading expert on that event
in that respect, so let's see what we can do with it.
Mr. Haldeman. First, in order to try to — do I get time for my
answer or did he use up the 10 minutes of his question ?
Senator Baker. Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Haldeman. I think that I have got to, first of all, divide and
then attempt to concur.
Senator Baker. Why don't we settle for divide and then attempt to
explain. [Laughter.]
Mr. Haldeman. All right. Divide into Watergate or pre-June 17
and post-June 17, because the section of my statement to which you
have referred and which we have been quoting from is the section
regarding the so-called coverup which I had earlier in that section
defined as the illegal acts being taken if, in fact, they were, to cover up
the information regarding the criminal activities that took place at the
Watergate Hotel or Watergate office building.
Now, then you put your question in the other sense of these two peo-
ple who were caught, who were connected with the committee, why
didn't something happen ?
Now, the President did know
Senator Baker. Would you hold for just a minute. Go ahead, sir,
the chairman was pointing out we have only 5 minutes left to vote on
final passage on the highway conference report, and I will take advan-
tage of my colleagues here and of the television audience to say that I
made my speech on it and I have worked on it for 8 months and if
everybody doesn't know how I feel on the highway bill it is too late
to change, but I am more interested in this right now, so if you would
go ahead I would appreciate it.
Mr. Haldeman. All right.
The question then was put why didn't he do something about the
two people from the election committee who had been arrested at the
Watergate and I submit that he did in the sense of using the facilities
that were available to him, the FBI, the Justice Department, and so
on.
Senator Baker. Was that a fairly casual way to handle a situation
of extraordinary notoriety at that time ?
Mr. Haldeman. I certainly don't think so. I don't believe it was
handled in a casual way at all.
Senator Baker. Let's stop just for a second and think about it, con-
jure up in your mind's eye a situation where on June 17 the television
and newspapers were full of the allegation that burglare had been
caught in the Democratic National Committee and either on the I7th
or 18th that McCord and Liddy were involved. Now tell me what hap-
pened at the White House when that information was received so that
we can judge how casual or how frantic the activity was.
Mr. Haldeman. The information, I don't know how the information
was received at the Wliite House. The President was in Walker's Cay
3186 j
and I was in Key Biscayne at the time that this took place. I don't I
believe that the papere on the I7th or even the 18th were quite as (
festooned with this as you have described. I have seen it alluded to,
that it appeared at the bottom of page 36 in the New York Times.
Senator Baker. It got off that though.
Mr. Haldeman. In later days it certainly moved forward and up.
The question of Mr. Liddy being involved, I think, arose later rather
than at that time, so I am^hat is to characterize the situation as it
was right at that weekend. I don't know what there was at the White
House in this. Mr. Ehrlichman has testified that he was the only guy
in town at the time and that he was in contact with various people in
regard to this information as it was coming in from the Secret Service
apparently via the Metropolitan Police.
Senator Baker. Can I interrupt you for a moment there?
Mr. Haldeman. Sure.
Senator Baker. Let's examine that nook and cranny just for a
second. Let's assume you were aware, and I assume you were, that
the President had delegated virtually all of his political campaign ro-
sponsibility to other people as you say to free him for other concerns.
Would that not have heightened your sense of responsibility to look
into political matters as a result of his withdrawal from political de-
cisions and the monitoring of political events ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not mine personally as long as I was satisfied that
other people were doing so, and on a satisfactory basis and that I was
so satisfied.
Senator Baker. Were you still satisfied in the days following June
17?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, I was satisfied that the effort was being made.
It wasn't a fully successful effort and there were questions tliat
remained and new questions that arose but as questions remained and
as new questions arose those were pursued also.
Senator Baker. Let's adopt the lightning bug syndrome or, I guess
better said, the lightning bug theorem that the chairman alluded to in
the most colorful terms. As you know the lightning bug illuminates
from behind and has a better view in retrospect than he does about
where he is going. I don't know where we are going but looking at it
in retrospect, could you devise a situation for us, or can you conjure
up a set of affairs where a President would be more keenly in tune
with the political consequences of a situation and still not neglect his
foreign policv and domestic initiative? Can you see how it might have
been handled differently?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir. But — well, that is accepting that he wasn't
attuned to the political contest. I think he was.
Senator Baker. All risrht, let's make one thing perfectly clear.
[Laufifhter.] And that is that by these questions T am not implying a
criticism, indictment, or finding against the President nor of the staff
system. I am trving to look now into the future to see how these inter-
relationships existed and how thev miirht exist in the future.
Can vou irive us some advice on how the staffing nrranfrement or how
the political undertaking misfht have been done differently so that it
would have reacted in a different way for instance, more quickly, say.
to the Watergate situation ?
3187
How could you do that and still be President? I think you could do
that but I would be interested in your view about how that might be
done.
Mr. Haldeman. I am sure there are probably countless ways and
each President of the United States from the first to the present one
has had a different staff system than any of the others, and each of
them, I am sure, has found his staff system to be suited to his way of
operation, and I am sure that each of them has found failings in his
staff system, including the incumbent.
I don't think you can lay out a formula. Senator Baker, that is a
way that a President's office should be staffed or conducted that will
solve the problems that might arise. I think that has to be worked on in
the terms of the man who holds the office, the way he wants to work, and
if you look at just our recent Presidents, the ones that you and I are
personally familiar with, in terms of their operation there were vast
differences in tlie way each of those men personally worked and vast
differences in the way the White House staff was structured to work
with that man and I would submit that a White House staff, the reason
that a White House staff, the principal staff as contrasted to support
staff of the "White House, the reason that it changes completely m its
totality when there is a change of President, is exactly that. Each man,
it is a uniquely personal office.
Senator Baker. It really is and I agree we probably cannot lay out,
in what is left of my 10 minutes, a different modus operandi. More-
over, we probably cannot describe how the staffing arrangements vis-
a-vis the political undertaking, vis-a-vis the President's personal
preferences can be redesigned, but let us see if we can draw any infer-
ences from it. This is patently overphilosophical but would this sug-
gest to you that politics and the Presidency are so intertwined that you
cannot separate them ? That a President must continue to be a political
President ?
Mr. Haldeman. There is no question about that and I do not think
there is any question but that this President was a political President,
is a political President. I think every President must be.
Senator Baker. I am disturbed about the impression I have that I
guess one of our most political Presidents, in effect, withdrew from the
political scene to the point where
Mr. Haldeman. Oh, no ; I would not say that he withdrew from the
political scene. I would say he withdrew from the mechanics of the
operation of his political campaign. There is quite a difference.
Senator Baker. Are we about to draw the inference that maybe it is
necessarv for a President to be more involved in the nitty-gritty of
politics in a campai.orn?
Mr. Haldeman. Xo, I would not draw that inference even with the
ghastlv evolvement of what has developed from a mistake that was
made in, at some point by some people within that campaign. I do not
think that that mistake bv its commitment would indicate that it
would be desirable for a President to get into the mechanics of a cam-
paip-n. I would submit if T were managing vour campaign for Senator
that it would not be desirable for you to get into the mechanics of that
campaign. I think you are better off, anv candidate is better off, con-
ducting his personal part of the campaign, stating the issues, debat-
3188
ing his opponent, leading the charge, and leaving the mechanics of the
operation up to his campaign managers but I realize that that again,
is a uniquely personal question that must be dealt with in the terms of
the way the individual candidate chooses to act.
Senator Baker. OK. My time has expired but if we get another
round I am going to continue with this so you might think about how
you would have gone about designing a system that would have pre-
vented this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. Mr. Haldeman, going back to your memorandum
of February 10, your version of it still puzzles me. Let us see if we
can put this in proper context and give the main thrust of the memo-
randum at the same time. I believe the pertinent sentences in this memo-
randum are the following :
We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist
money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President. We
should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovem and thus to the Democrats.
And the following paragraph :
This is a good counterofEensive to be developed.
Then, in the last paragraph :
We could let Evans and Novak put it out and then be asked about it to make
the point that we knew and the President said it was not to be used under any
circumstances.
Now, this was a plan which evolved on February 10, a few months
after the election of 1972. So it is patently clear from the gennane
sentences which I have read, that you people were trying to fabricate
a situation and not develop the facts, otherwise you would not have
used the phrase "to put out the story," otherwise you would not have
said :
We could let Evans and Novak put it out and then we would be asked about it
and we would say at the White House we knew about it but the President said
it was not to be used under any circumstances.
Would you say that that is the contents, import and meaning of this
memorandum ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. Well, what do these words mean, then ?
Mr. Haldeman. I think I have got to point out that the last para-
graph referring to Evans-Novak which you have read is in conjunction
with the preceding paragraph regarding the Fort Wayne story. Those
two go together and do not relate to the earlier paragraph, the first
paragraph, regarding the demonstrations. They are two totally sepa-
rate matters. I can support that. The reason is that either Evans or
Novak was aware of what is referred to here as the Fort Wayne story
and that has nothing to do with demonstrations or the matters referred
to in the earlier part of the memorandum.
Senator Montoya. How can you support this statement on Febru-
ary 10 retroactively to the campaign ?
We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovern and thus to the Democrats.
Now, could you say in all sincerity that all demonstrations could be
tied to McGovern ?
3189
Mr. Haldeman. No, I could not.
Senator Montoya. Well, why did you say that in this sentence?
Mr. Haldeman. Because it is not well put together and I certainly
admit that. The point there, as is indicated in a further paragraph, is
to develop the plan on to what — this language is terrible — to what ex-
tent the Democrats were responsible for the demonstrations that led to
violence or disruption.
Senator Montoya. Now, I see in this a pattern of going back retro-
actively to develop or to use the FBI, to use the other investigatorial
resources of the administration, to bring in a story before the American
people to show the complicity of the McGovern campaign in something
that they were not responsible for.
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. Let me quickly correct a misapprehension or
misunderstanding on the use of the FBI to which you alluded. One
paragraph in which you said you should "definitely order Gray to go
ahead on the FBI investigation against those who tapped Nixon and
Agnew in 1968," again has nothing to do with demonstrations. That
has to do with a point that had been raised by the President at an
earlier time that he had been informed that his campaign, and he him-
self had been tapped. Wiretapped, by the FBI on order of the White
House during the 1968 campaign and because at this time in February
there was a resurgence and review of the 1972 campaign and discus-
sion of things that were alleged to have been done by our campaign
committee, or people working with them, and because we were dealing
with the Watergate and the wiretapping matter, the question had come
up as to whether or not this was a time to confer and put out the story
behind this report of wiretapping of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Agnew during
the 1968 campaign.
Senator Montoya. "What made you so sure that Evans and Novak
would put out anything that you gave them ?
Mr, Haldeman. I was not sure of that and as I have tried to indicate,
the reference to Evans and Novak is in connection with the Fort
Wayne story, not in connection with any of the preceding matters in
this memorandum.
Senator Montoya. Well, I am sorry, but I see that pattern in this
memorandum and if that is true, then I fear for the authenticity of
the tapes at the White House in the event that the court should order
that we have them.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, I can assure you. Senator Montoya, that it is
not true and that you need not fear for that authenticity as far as I am
concerned or as far as I was involved with them.
Senator Montoya. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator ER^^N. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. I would just like to make one very simple point so
that it does not go or set flown past us on answering. I do not think
I or any of my Republican colleagues on the Senate floor or in the
course of mv politics in the last several years in any manner, shape, or
form attribute bombings or demonstrations or lawlessness or Com-
munist money, et cetera, to the Democratic Party or Senator Mc-
Govern. I want to make verv clear that this is Mr. Haldeman's opinion
of the Republicans that I circulate with. And quite franklv, insofar as
a counterattack on this committee is concerned, I think it again im-
portant to point out that the U.S. Senate voted 77 to nothing, every
96-296 O - 73 - Bk. 8
3190
Republican, every Democrat, to go ahead and authorize this investi-
gation. So I think just in a partisan sense it is important that we under-
stand these impressions of what the candidate of the Democratic Party
was or what the Democrats as a party were up to were Mr. Haldeman's
impressions and they are not the impressions of the Republican Party.
Now, Mr. Haldeman, I am going to have given to you — first of all,
Mr. Chairman, before I forget, could I make the memorandum of
October 14, 1971, that is — specifically it is the letter or the memoran-
dum to Mr. Haldeman from Mr. Walker; could that be made an
exhibit?
Senator Ervin. Let the record show it will be marked appropriately
as an exhibit and admitted as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 115.*]
Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Haldeman, I am having given to you
a letter dated July 7, 1971, from Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., to John Mitchell
and, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this entered as an exhibit.
Senator Ervin. That will be marked as an exhibit and admitted as
such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 116.**]
Senator Weicker. This letter from Hugh Sloan to the Attorney
General :
JULTf 7, 1971.
Personal and confidential.
The Honorable John Mitchell,
The Attorney Oeneral,
Washington, D.C.
Deab Mr. Attorney General : Jeb Magruder has apprised me of your request
to have an accounting of the $2,000 that Bob Haldeman's office requested be made
available to Ron Walker.
The breakdown enclosed is intentionally sketchy since he preferred not to list
names of recipients or detail their activities unless we insist, as he feels that this
is a highly sensitive subject and one which should not be committed to writing.
You will note that there is a cash balance on hand of $900 from the original
$2,000 which Ron is holding in his safe until needed. This, of course, raises the
question of whether we should retrieve this sum and, in the future, make dis-
bursements only on a case by case basis rather than make available lump sum
allocations for discretionary use.
I would appreciate your guidance in this instance.
Sincerely yours,
Hugh W. Sloan, Jr.
Now, Mr. Haldeman, I wonder if you could give this committee
information in exsictly as to what it is that is being referred to here
in the way of these activities where it says :
The breakdown enclosed is intentionally sketchy since he preferred not to list
names of recipients or detail their activities unless we insist.
Could you give to the committee any information as to what it is
that is being talked about here ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt the Senator? Senator,
I feel about you as I did about some of the others. I do not think you
would ask an irrelevant question.
Senator Weicker. That is right.
Mr. Wilson. Would you mind telling me how this becomes relevant ?
•See p. 3.322.
♦•See p. 3324.
3191
Senator Weicker. Yes, because, do not forget I already have given
to Mr. Haldeman an earlier memorandum of October in which there
appears to be some sort of a connection between Mr. Haldeman and
Mr. Walker. That memorandum related to the Charlotte, N.C., demon-
strations. That was October 1971. This letter is July 1971, and I was
wondering whether or not the matters discussed in Mr. Sloan's letter
related to the advance type of work that Mr. Walker obviously was
involved with, and whether or not there might be certain activities in
the course of that advance work which were best not discussed or which
were sensitive as Mr. Sloan describes. That is the connection.
Mr. Wilson. Could you develop first, if you please, that it relates to
the subject matter of this committee's authority ?
Senator Erven. I think that matter has been gone into before par-
tially by Senator Weicker, and also with Mr. Haldeman, and also by
myself. That is the Charlotte thing.
Mr. Dash. Also, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sloan was usurer of the
Committee To Re-Elect the President. The letter is on the letterhead
and the address of the committee and the money of the Committee To
Re-Elect the President and it is addressed to Mr. Mitchell in his ca-
pacity as the director of the Committee To Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Excuse me for interrupting you.
Senator Weicker. Not at all.
Now, Mr. Haldeman, can you indicate to me as to what activities
were being discussed or recipients are being discussed here?
Apparently it relates to your office.
Mr. Haldeman. I can't except to say that Ron Walker was the chief
advanceman. He was responsible for the advance work for the Presi-
dent's trips, foreign and domestic, and including campaign trips,
and that this apparently relates to some activity on the part of Mr.
Walker or members of his advance group that related to campaign
activities as contrasted to governmental, and whenever there was an
activity, a trip or any use of advancemen for campaign rather than
official purposes, their expenses and costs were taken care of by the
reelection committee.
Senator Weicker. Well, there is nothing to be ashamed of in the way
of advance work. All of us that have been candidates, from the Presi-
dent on down, certainly have men who do this preparatory work. Why
would this be highly sensitive ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know, and if you have anything that goes
beyond what is in this letter that would indicate why it would be, I
would be happy to try to respond to it.
Senator Weicker. Well, unfortunately, of course, they are referring
to the matter in relation to your office, so I am trying to ask as to
whether or not you would have that kind of knowledge. If you don't,
then certainly I don't intend to pursue the question.
Mr. Haldeman. My office requested that the money be made available
to Mr. Walker.
Senator Weicker. It would not in any way have anything to do with
paid demonstrators. Is this something that you ever came across in the
course of your dealings at the Wliite House ?
IVIr. Haldeman. No. sir. Paid demonstrators — paid by us, you mean ?
Senator Weicker. That is right.
Mr. Haldeman. No.
3192
Senator Weicker. To your knowledge there were never any demon-
strators paid to specifically demonstrate against the President ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Senator Weicker. Now, to move on to some testimony which you
gave yesterday, on page 6428 of yesterday's transcript the following
dialog took place between yourself and me :
Senator Weicker. Well, would you consider Mr. Magruder at the outset to have
been someone whom you had confidence in?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, he was.
Senator Weickeb. Is this one of the reasons why he went to the Committee
To Re-Elect the President?
Mr. Haldeman. It was one of the reasons ; yes.
Senator Weickeb. Well, now, we have had Mr. Magruder before this committee
testifying as to certain things that he did.
Are these matters that you feel that you should share responsibility for?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir. I don't feel that I should share responsibilities for
them. I was not a part of his doing them. I feel a deep sense of sorrow, if, in fact,
what has been discussed here is what happened. Because I think it is a very tragic
thing. But I feel no sense of responsibility in those areas because I was not
involved in those areas.
During the course of yesterday's questioning I tried to find out or
tried to solicit from you a statement as to who was responsible for
these persons of integrity, which is a word you applied to them when
they first came to the White House, having fallen into their present
state of affairs. And then I came across the following memorandum
which I will now have presented to you which I think might supply
part of the answer.
If you have anything to add to it, I want you to comment.
This was a memorandum of January 21, 1970, "Administratively
Confidential ; Memorandum for Mr. Haldeman from Jeb Magruder.
Re : Monitoring System."
Senator Ervix. Have the reporter mark it as an exhibit.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 117.*]
Senator Weicker. Now, let me point out that the system, without
reading the entire memorandum — this is entirely — I would consider it
legal and proper monitoring. It is relative to monitoring the news by
Mr. Magruder, and so forth.
Nothing wrong, nothing improper. But it is interesting to note at
the bottom where it says to "approve, disapprove, comment," a state-
ment is made in your handwriting which I wonder couldn't best de-
scribe the reason for everything that we have had said before us here
during the course of these hearings because where it says "approve,
disapprove, comment," your handwriting is, "I'll approve whatever
will work and I am concerned with results — not methods," with an
"H".
Don't you feel that might not have been psychology that led to the
excesses which we have had described to this committee?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I certainly don't.
Senator Weicker. The results
Mr. Haldeman. I would — since you referred to the memorandum,
could I read the memorandum ?
Senator Weicker. You sure can.
Mr. Haldeman. It is a long, dull memorandum but I think we are
on a subject now
•See p. 3326.
Senator Weicker. I have stated
Mr. Haldeman. One set of things without
Senator Weicker. I could be wrong.
Mr. Haldeman. Without talking about what my comment related to.
Senator Weicker. Let me put down, Mr. Haldeman, I said it was
proper and it was legal.
Mr. Haldeman. I know it, but I think it ought to be understood.
This is a long memorandum from Magruder to me in January of 1970,
which was a time when Magruder was on the White House staff work-
ing in Herb Klein's office as director — deputy director of commimica-
tions for the executive branch. And it is — the subject is "Monitoring
System" and the memorandum says, "Recently you have had a num-
ber — " I am going to read this fast because it is dull but I think it
ought to be in the record :
Recently you have had a number of comments regarding the effectiveness of
our monitoring system. I have indicated to you that this system is not, at this
point in time, working effectively and that I planned to act on it when I moved
over to Herb Klein's office. Rather than wait until I move —
Excuse me. This is before he moved over, apparently
— I thought it might be better to give you my thoughts on why it is not operating
effectively and what options we have to solve this problem.
As the system is set up now, we have a number of people here and in the
RNC who are supposed to monitor the media —
That I monitor what is reported in the media.
These individuals are to call in daily regarding the media but, because they are
spread out and do not feel this is a priority situation, relatively little information
flows in.
This was monitoring in local areas of media coverage in those local
areas.
This was true during the period of time Alex Butterfleld handled it and it
continues to be true. My feeling is that this problem exists because it is spread
out and has not become a priority situation. There are two groups in the White
House who are basically set up to do this type of work and probably they would
be more effective.
Pat Buchanan already summarizes the reports from these sources in his com-
mentary. He basically monitors them at the present time, but it seems to me he
could be asked to do an official monitoring report as he summarizes each of the
media. This could then be used for immediate counteraction by the Communica-
tions Department. The advantage of this is that the monitor has no relation with
the press and will give us a very unbiased opinion as to what is happenening with
the media.
The second group is the Communications Department itself. They basically
review the news and are watching these same media on a regular basis. This
group could indicate the coverage by the media and then initiate counteraction.
The problem with this approach is that the Communications Department, because
it relates directly with the press, has a tendency to want to get along with them
rather than initiate counteraction. Although it is true that I would be there and
could probably force the situation, it might not be as successful as it would
be if the report came over from Buchanan and periodically had comments, etc.,
from people like yourself. It is my personal opinion that the Communications
Department would then do a better job in counteracting what has been reported.
It is that memorandum which I was asked to approve or disapprove
and which I did not approve or disapprove but put a question mark
because I didn't understand where what he outlined here would work
any better than what was happening or not, and I explained my ques-
3194
tion mark with the handwritten note, "I'll approve whatever will
work — and am concerned with results — not methods.''
That is in terms of this memorandum and I submit that it is in terms
of this memorandum and should not be extrapolated to cover a state-
ment or an authorization or a nonauthorization of anything other than
the matters covered in this memorandum.
Senator Weicker. Well, of course, Watergate again was a question
of truth without concern for methods, was it not ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not on my part.
Senator Weicker. No, but certainly not on the part of anyone other
than the Committee To Re-Elect the President; is that correct?
Mr. Haldeman. It was on the part of somebody at the Committee To
Re-Elect the President.
Senator Weicker. And when we get into the governmental sense in
the Ellsberg matter again results without concern for methods. Would
that not be an accurate description ?
Mr. Haldeman. The Ellsberg matter I am not commenting on at all.
Senator Weicker. I am talking about the break-in.
Mr. Haldeman. I am talking about the break-in.
Senator Weicker. Do you not think the method is very important?
Let us, first of all, talk in a constitutional sense. Do you not think it is
very important as to how we arrive at a rule in this country ?
Mr. Haldeman. In some cases method is extremely important. In
this particular case the method, the staff system, or the procedure by
which he did this was at least to me not important. What was im-
portant is that they set up some kind of a procedure that would get
results. What I am saying here, in effect, is you figure out the method ;
you are responsible to me for the results in this matter. [Confer with
counsel.]
Senator Weicker. Do you think it is important as to the methods
that we use insofar as the election of a President of the United States
is concerned, Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry. Senator, I did not hear.
Senator Weicker. Do you think it is important, insofar as the
methods we use to elect a President of the United States, that methods
are important ?
Mr. Haldeman. I certainly do.
Senator Weicker. Do you think we ought to elect Presidents on the
basis of Watergate-type activities?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. Do you think that we ought to elect Presidents on
the basis of the digging up of all the personal political dirt we can on
their opponents ?
Mr. Haldeman. Putting it into digging up all the political dirt it
puts it in a terminology that makes it sound bad. I would say that it
is very important to know the facts about an opponent in a political
campaign, whatever they may be.
Senator Weicker. And then, lastly, do you think that in terms of
your memorandum on the Charlotte demonstrations, do you think
maybe that rather than to intentionally expose the President to dan-
gerous situations, that it is important" that we protect him in every
way rather than to go ahead and actuallv approve of violence and of
obscenity so that he gets put into an underdog role ?
3195
Mr. Haldeman. Senator, I was not approving the violence. I was
commenting on the fact that it was going to be apparent this time
apparently, that there was a plan for violence and obscenity where that
had been covered up in other times. The rest of the memorandum goes
on to quite painstaking and detailed activities designed to bring about
the results that the chairman has described which was that there were,
in fact, no violent demonstrators or as I recall, any hecklers or any
other problems in the coliseum itself but there were some outside.
Senator Weicker. We are not here
Mr. Haldeman. He went to a lot of work, as you can see, and got
into the question the chairman has indicated the result of it, some sort
of lawsuit as to whether people had been illegally excluded from that
meeting, that exclusion process was an effort to attempt to avoid the
kind of confrontation that we did not want.
Senator Weicker. Well, we are not here as a committee, let me assure
you, because Richard Nixon was elected President. That is not why this
committee sits. This committee sits not because of the results but be-
cause of the methods.
Mr. Haldeman. I understand that.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Haldeman, I invite your attention on the bottom
of page 36 and top of page 37 of your statement. Now, the way I inter-
pret that statement is that sometime in the neighborhood of November
and December and January, that you had the problem of returning to
the committee the $328,000"that remained out of the $350,000 fund, and
that Dean informed you that the committee needed funds so it could
finance needed funds for legal and family requirements for the
Watergate defendants. You suggested to Dean that he try to work out
a method of sohdng both the problems, that is, the return of the money
to the committee and the funds to satisfy the needs of the committee
for funds for legal and family support for the Watergate defendants.
And that the funds were returned and Dean told you that $40,000 of
the funds had been used and been given to LaRue for use for legal
and family support of Watergate defendants; is that correct?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir ; it is not correct. Only the final point that
you made is not correct, which is Dean did not tell me that $40,000
had been given to LaRue for that purpose.
Senator Ervin. But you told Dean that if he and Strachan could
arrange for the return of the funds it would solve both problems, the
return of the funds problem and also the need of money by the com-
mittee for legal and family support.
Mr. Haldeman. It appeared at that point to be self-evident, my
having previously raised one problem.
Senator Ervin. In other words
Mr. Haldeman. The problem that I had, Mr. Chairman, was the
problem or that my agents had, Mr. Strachan and assisted by Mr.
Dean, the problem that I had submitted to them was the problem of
turning the funds that remained in our custody over to the Committee
To Re-Elect. That was mv problem.
Senator Ervin. Yes. But you told Dean he could solve both your
problems and as far as you were concerned, it could soh-e both your
problem of gettins the funds back and the committee's problem for
gettinsr some money for these purposes.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct, but one of those was my problem.
3196
Senator Ervin. In other words, you gave or at least acquiesced in
the use of some of those funds by the committee after the return to the
committee, for legal and family support for the Watergate defendants.
Mr. Haldeman. I acquiesced in the use of any or all of those funds
for whatever purpose the committee desired to use them for.
Senator Erven. Yes.
And at the time you were informed they needed some of them for
that purpose.
Mr. Haldeman. After I had asked that they be returned, yes.
Senator Erven. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. Turned over.
Senator Erven. I think that you established you acquiesced in the
future use of those funds for that purpose and there is other testimony
before this committee to the effect that $40,000 of it was given to LaRue
and he used them for that precise purpose.
So you at least consented them to be used for that purpose.
Now, here is the situation.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Chairman, before you move to the situation, I
did not consent that they be used for that purpose.
Senator Erven. Well, sir
Mr. Haldeman. I did — I was aware of the need that Dean had re-
ported to me of the committee for funds. I was, before that, aware of
my request to Mr. Strachan or instructions to Mr. Strachan that the
funds I had or had in my custody or in his custody, be turned over to
the committee.
Senator Erven. Well, I will just read your statement in the record
and let the statement be interpreted by anybody who wants to place an
interpretation on it.
Mr. Haldeman. All right, sir.
Senator Erven [reading] :
At a later time, Dean mentioned to me the committee's need for funds for legal
and family .support for the Watergate defendants. I .suggested to Dean that he
try to work out a way of solving both the problem of our desire to deliver funds
to the committee and the committee's needs for funds.
Dean later told me that he had worked this out and that part of the cash, I
believe $40,000, could be delivered immediately to the committee via Fred LaRue.
He had Strachan do this, I am told, and several days thereafter. Dean had
Strachan deliver the balance to LaRue.
Now, you can place your interpretation on that but I interpret that
Dean told you they needed money for this purpose, and you said he
could solve that problem as well as your problem of getting back the
funds by turning them over to the committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. Could I put the next two paragraphs in the record
concurrently with that, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Erven. Yes, sir.
Mr. Haldeman. Do I need to read them or can I just request that
they also be put in ? I will read them, the next paragraph says :
To sum up, after my original instruction to Strachan to transfer the money to
the committee, my involvement in the transfer of funds was entirely through
John Dean. He told me of the problem in transferring the $350,000 to the com-
mittee. He told me he had worked out the problem. He told Strachan how, when
and to whom to make the transfer. He told me the transfer had been made.
He did not. at any time, in this sequence advise me or imply that the transfer
itself or the purpose of the transfer was to buy the Watergate defendants'
silence or that it was in any way illegal or improper.
3197
Senator ERviisr. But he did tell you that he wanted s6me money to
pay the legal fees and family support for the Watergate defendants ?
Mr. Haldeman. The purpose of the transfer was
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. I was aware that was a need of the committee.
Senator Ervix. And he told you this was to give them family sup-
port and pay legal fees but was not to buy their silence ?
Mr. Haldeman. He did not tell me it was not to buy their silence.
Senator Ervin [reading] :
Well, he did not at any time in this sequence advise me to imply that the
transfer itself or the purpose of the transfer was to buy the Watergate defend-
ants' silence or that it was in any way illegal or improper.
Mr. Haldeman. That is precisely correct, Mr. Chairman. But he also
did not tell me in the other direction that it was not to buy silence.
I The question of buying silence never arose positively, negatively, or
in between.
Senator Erven. Well the only construction I can put on it is Dean
came to you, told you the committee needed some money to pay lawyer
fees and family support for the seven Watergate defendants, that you
told him you had this problem of which Dean was already conscious of
getting the money transferred back to the commitee and you say he
could arrange with Strachan for you to accomplish both purposes,
that is the purpose of getting the money retransf erred to the committee
and the purpose of the committee to get funds to pay legal fees and
family support for the Watergate defendants. Now, that took us a
long time to get to that very simple interpretation.
Now, on the basis of that, I would say the evidence tends to show
that you consented that the use of funds for payment to the families
and legal fees.
The evidence in this case shows that seven men were indicted for
burglarizing and bugging the Watergate, including three employees
of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. After the arrest of these
men they made demands upon the Committee To Re-Elect the Presi-
dent through the counsel of that committee for funds for their defense
and for the support of their families; that thereupon about $450,000
derived from funds which had been contributed for the political use
of President Nixon's committees or President Nixon, were paid to
these seven, their lawyers, and their families, with the consent of cer-
tain officials of the White House and certain officials of the Committee
To Re-Elect the President.
Now, you made some distinction yesterday when you were interro-
gated by Mr. Dash, between campaign funds and some raised in the
primary of 1968. Now all of these funds were contributed by indi-
viduals to advance the political acti\aties and political interests of
President Nixon in one way or another.
I would like to ask you how you can justify the use of funds contrib-
uted to advance the political interests of President Nixon, either as a
candidate in 1968 or in 1972, with defraying the defense and the sup-
port, of seven persons charged with burglarizing or bugging the Demo-
cratic National headquarters.
Mr. Haldeman. I would not attempt to justify that. I don't know
that the funds — I don't know what the source of the funds were or
what the purpose of the funds was.
3198
Senator Ervin. I thought jrou said that many of these funds had
been raised by Mr. Kalmbach in connection with the primary of 1968.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe they were — I don't know by whom
they were raised. I only know that they were funds that remained after
the 1968 campaign that were turned over to Mr. Kalmbach's custody
for use for other purposes.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Haldeman, let's don't quibble about it. The evi-
dence is that all of these funds were funds which had been raised some-
time either, they were raised to advance the political interests of
President Nixon and there is not a scintilla of evidence that a single
penny of them came from any other source. If you know of any evi-
dence that it came from any other source I would be glad to have it
here now. But my question is
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know about the sources of the money. Other
people have testified and are your proper sources for that.
Senator Ervin. Everybodj;; has testified including yourself that all
the funds we have been talking about came from these donations or
opntributions, everybody. But assuming they were, can you justify the
use of funds contributed for political purposes to pay for the defense
costs of burglars and buggers?
Mr. Haldeman. I was not in a position so to justify. This was a
decision, whatever decision was made, for paying legal fees or reim-
bursements was made by people at the committee and people who were
in charge of dealing with this situation.
Senator Ervin. Well, I will ask you to review in hindsight and you
have given your opinion about many things in hindsight.
Can you justify in the light of the information you have the use of
politically raised funds to pay or defray the defense costs of persons
charged with burglarizing and bugging the Democratic national head-
quarters in the Watergate.
Mr. Haldeman. On my own I can't make that justification. I don't
know what basis the justification or reasoning was on the part of
those who did make that decision.
Senator Ervin. Unfortunately I was not bom yesterday and I have
observed the political organizations a long time, and I have never yet
seen a political organization which was an eleemosynary institution.
But assuming that the Committee To Ke-Elect the President were
eleemosvnarv institutions, can you tell this committee why it was when
it picked out the objects of their eleemosynary concern that they didn't
select anybody except seven men who were accused of complicity in
burglarizing and bugging the headquarters of the opposition political
party?
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Chairman, as I have said, I can't speak to the
reasons or factors in the decisions that were played by other people.
Senator Ervin. Well, I think you and I both reach'the same inca-
pacity to justify or explain either one of those things so if my time
is not up, i will yield back the balance.
Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. T think we have done
pretty well with our 10-minute rule, Mr. Chairman. I think it has
expedited things very materially. But I think in the course of things
Mr. Haldeman has not had a chance to think much about what I asked
3199
him to think about, if he remembers what I asked him to think about.
How would you prevent this ?
Mr. Haldeman. You asked me a lot of things to think about, Senator
Baker.
Senator Baker. I know it ; what I ended with and you can start with
is the idea that something went on that shouldn't have gone on. We
haven't quite figured out what in its entirety, nor how certainly, nor
who was responsible, nor when they knew about it; those things are
things I will write about when I get ready to write my part of the
report. But without trying to solve those things now, we can start with
the irreducible minimum. I think that somebody ought not to have
broken into the Democratic National Committee headquarters and
they certainly should not have been responsible officials of the Repub-
lican Party; and what I am asking you is: How on earth can we
reinject Presidential presence from the political standpoint or a staff
rearrangement so if this thing were ever to come up again, someone
would zap it before it got out of hand. That is what I am asking your
advice about.
Mr. Haldeman. My view of that would still be that it is not a matter
of restructuring the President or the Office of the President. It is a
matter of restructuring the campaign structure, the organization with-
in which the problem took place and probably the overview of that
organization from the President's office.
Senator Baker. What would you do ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know. You said you are going to be doing
some writing on this. I plan to do some thinking and some writing
on the same subject. But I want to do some thinking before I do the
writing.
Senator Baker. That is usually a good idea. [Laughter.]
I usually try to think before I talk but I ani not alwaj's successful
in that respect.
Mr. Chairman, we have had the witness for some time and I have
asked a lot of questions and in the interest of time I will pass at this
point.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inohye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, sir.
Mr. Haldeman, on page 48 you describe the efforts of coverup. If I
may read to you :
This coverup appears to have involved illegal and improper activities such as
perjury, payments to defendants for their silence, promises of Executive clem-
ency, destruction of evidence, and other acts in an effort to conceal the truth
regarding the planning and commission of crimes at the Watergate.
Would you agree that these efforts were, in fact, carried out?
Mr. Haldeman. I would agree that there has been, as I said at the
start of that paragraph, "On the basis of testimony before this com-
mittee," that there is substantial evidence that I guess each of these
has been carried out.
Senator Inouye. Do you now know from information that you have
receiA'ed that these activities did, in fact, occur ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not on the basis of information I have received
other than what I have heard at these hearings, plus some information
in hearsay form that I received in the latter part of INIarch — early part
of April of this year while I was still at the White House.
I
3200
Senator Inouye. Now, you have described these activities as "cover-
up." You also used another word, "containment." How would you
describe "containment" ?
Mr. Haldeman. I would, as I did here, describe it as actions — well,
let me read the paragraph :
The containment effort, as I would use the term, did not contemplate or involve
any act in obstruction of justice. On the contrary, while hoping to contain the
"Watergate inquiry to the facts of Watergate there was a concurrent effort to try
to get the true facts of Watergate and get them out to the public.
I am sorry, it is the preceding paragraph that describes it or one up
earlier where I describe a number of steps that were taken to contain
the Watergate case in several perfectly legal and proper aspects. One
was to avoid the investigation going beyond the facts. Watergate and
even to other nonrelated activities in the area of national security.
Another was to attempt to reduce or avoid the adverse political and
publicity fallout from false charges, hearsay, and so on arising from
activities in connection with the Watergate, such as the various investi-
gations and so on. I emphasize false charges as contrasted to the true
ones.
A third was concern for distortion or fabrication of facts in the heat
of a political campaign that would unjustly condemn the innocent or
prevent discovery of the ^ilty.
Its acts in those areas m an attempt now — I don't know whether the
terminology is good in either case — in an attempt to try to separate in
terms of discussion containment from coverup, "coverup" having
become an omnibus term that included — includes not only the illegal
activity that everybody automatically assigns to the terminology now
in "coverup," but also activities that were not illegal or improper and
were, in fact, activities that were the logical steps, I would believe, to
take in trying to deal with an adverse political situation.
Senator Inouye. Did containment involve the effort to influence the
composition of the membership of this committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. I couldn't hear your question, sir.
Senator Inouye. In your scheme of containment, was an effort made
to influence the composition of this committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe to influence — well, there was discus-
sion of the composition of the committee ; yes.
Senator Inouye. Was an effort made to influence the composition ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know that an effort was ever made. I know
that there was discussion of the composition of the committee in the
context of concern that this had the potential of becoming, and it was
discussed in the press as having a potential of becoming a partisan
political foi-um rather than an objective search for the facts.
Senator Inouye. Did your containment efforts also include the selec-
tion of the counsel to this committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. There was discussion also of the question of selec-
tion of counsel raised ; yes.
Senator Inouye. Did it go ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know that you could put that in the contain-
ment effort. This committee activity really comes later than that in
time.
Senator Inouye. Did containment also involve influencing the Pat-
man committee ?
3201
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know that it covered influencing the Patman
committee. I think it related to — covered the concern as to what the
effects of the Patman committee investigation might be in the middle
of an election campaign.
Senator Inoute. I am certain you are aware of testimony we have
received relating to the Patman committee with suggestions that efforts
were made by officials in the Wliite House to stop the proceedings of
the Patman committee. Were any efforts made to stop the proceedings
of the Patman committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure any efforts were made. I know there
was discussion regarding the problem of what an investigation — public
investigation — of the Watergate matter in the middle or in the climax,
really, the political campaign ; what that effect might be.
Senator Inotjye. Did containment also include discrediting members
of this committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. I have here a copy of an article which appeared in
the Charlotte Observer dated May 17, 1973, and the headline reads,
"Did Haldeman Go After Ervin"?
Have you seen this article, sir ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, I have ; but I would like to see it again because
I haven't recently.
Senator Inotjye. It says :
The White House made an attempt two months ago to enlist North Carolina
Republicans in a campaign to discredit Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., reliable sources
have told the Observer. High officials in the North Carolina Republican Party
confirmed Wednesday that H. R. "Bob" Haldeman, at that time President Nixon's
Chief of Staff, made two attempts to get local party oflScials to "dig up something
to discredit Ervin and blast him with it."
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure what — there has been some followup
stories to this.
Do you have the others ?
'Senator Inouye. No. This is the only one I have.
Mr. Haldeman. And the chairman I know
Senator Inotiye. My only question is : Did you make two calls to
local partv officials in North Carolina in an attempt to "dig up some-
thing to discredit Ervin and blast him with it" ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I did not; and I think that this refers to a
totally different — I think it is a distorted report, I would put it, of a
totally different question that arose. There was at one point a sug-
gestion raised which I discussed I believe with Harry Dent as to
whether the Republican Party in North Carolina could not develop
and put into the field a viable candidate to oppose Senator Ervin in
the — in his reelection effort on the basis that the administration
would — it would be a good thing for the administration to have a
spokesman on the Republican side in the campaign taking that posi-
tion as contrasted to Senator Ervin's position on certain issues.
Now, the thought here, I must say, was not that there was any hope
that such an effort would be successful in defeating him but merely
that the view of this side would be represented. I don't believe that
there were any calls regarding any effort to dig up something to dis-
credit Senator Ervin.
3202
Senator Inottye. Was a discussion of an effort to — "dig up" is not
a very good word — to develop a candidate to oppose Senator Ervin?
You said you don't believe that there were any calls. Is there a
possibility that calls were made ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not by me.
Senator Inoute. And it is your testimony that at no time did you
discuss with Mr. Dent or with any North Carolinian to make an effort
to discredit the chairman of this committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. To discredit him, no, sir. This article goes on to say
that people referred to — Dent denied that Haldeman had contacted
him, Rouse, the State chairman who again was supposed to have con-
tacted, declined to comment. Republican sources confirm the story
while emphasizing there had been no attempt on their part to attack
Ervin in his role as the Senate's chief Watergate investigator.
That is — again, I think it is a rather tenuous story. I think the
chairman spoke to this story at an earlier time in these hearings and
expressed his viewpoints on what had or hadn't taken place.
Senator Inotjye. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
Senator Ervin. I said at that time that I had reached the unhappy
state where all of my indiscretions were barred by the statute of limi-
tation and I was incapable of committing any further indiscretions.
[Laughter.]
Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. No.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montota. I have no questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Just as an addendum to the questioning of Senator
Inouye ; did Mr. Higby make any calls to North Carolina ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not to my knowledge. He may have been the one
who called Dent on the question of the candidate to oppose Senator
Ervin.
Senator Weicker. Had you ever been involved in any conversations
relative to actions against members of this committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. To what do you refer, sir ?
Senator Weicker. Well, to try to embarrass members of the
committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't believe so. I am not sure what you mean.
Senator Weicker. Well, that is why I am asking the question.
Mr. Haldeman. I have answered the question.
Senator Weicker. You have answered the question that at no time
were you involved in any conversations with Mr. Higby or Mr. Dent,
which conversations would relate to getting information that might
be embarrassing to members of the committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. May I surmise as to the intent of your question ?
Senator Weicker. I am just asking the question. Please answer it.
surely
Mr. Haldeman. OK, because I have seen the press reports in this
area and I would be happy to comment on them.
If I am correct in the assumption that what you are talking about
is the question of campaign contributions to your campaign in 1970.
Senator Weicker. Well, would you like to answer that question?
3203
Mr. Haldeman. I will be glad to comment on the point there.
Senator Weicker. Sure.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't have a question to answer, but at some point
it was my understanding that a comment had been made, and I believe
by you, Senator Weicker, to the effect that there was all this cash
floating around in this campaign and Republican candidates certainly
didn't get any of this cash, and in reacting to that statement, I asked
Mr. Higby to determine whether or not the funds that Mr. Kalmbach
had raised for support of candidates for the Senate and House in 1970,
whether there had not been a substantial contribution to your campaign
in Connecticut at that time, and in fact whether there had not been a
substantial cash contribution to your campaign.
Senator Weicker. All right. Then what happened?
Mr. Haldemax. I was told by Mr. Higby that he was — that it was
confirmed to him by one individual that there had been a contribution
by another that he was not able to give him the information as to
whether there had been or whether it had in fact been in cash or not.
Senator Weicker. Xow, first of all, do you have the statement that
I made as to the fact that Republican candidates in 1970 did not get
any help from the administration ? Do you have that?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Senator Weicker. Well, of course, there was no such statement by
me. Any reference was made to the campaign of 1972, which I am
going to get into in a short time anjrway.
Was there an attempt — in other words, was information sought as
to whether or not these contributions were reported or not ?
Mr. Haldemax. I do not believe so. The question that I was inter-
ested in was whether there had been a cash contribution or not.
Senator Weicker. In other words, you were not interested in any
way embarrassing this member of the committee ?
Mr. Haldeman. I was interested in finding out whether there was a
cash distribution as a reaction to
Senator Weicker. Did you work with Mr. Higby on this ?
Mr. Haldeman. I talked to Mr. Higby about it. I think Mr. Higby
made the phone calls.
Senator Weicker. And who did he talk to ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Dent ?
Mr. Haldeman. I believe so, but I am not sure.
Senator Weicker. Was Colson contacted on this matter ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know.
Senator Weicker. Let me just very briefly here now go over this set
of papers which I think maybe we lost sight of even though all of them
have been entered as exhibits, starting with the February 9, 1973, mem-
orandum to John Dean from H. R. Haldeman, initialed by you.
Mr. Haldeman. Do I have that one?
Senator Weicker. February 9, 1973. If you do not, I should certainly
want you to have it.
Mr. Haldeman. I have February 10, Senator.
Senator Weicker. I think you ought to have the February 9 one.
February 9, 1973, memorandum to John Dean from H. R. Halde-
man. Would you see that Mr. Haldeman gets a copy of it, and also,
Mr. Chairman, if it has not been already entered — has it been entered
as an exhibit ? Could counsel guide me on that one ?
3204
Mr. Dash. February 9 ? Yes.
Senator Weicker. February 9 memorandum.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Senator Weicker. It is part of the series, February 9 and two
February 10 memorandums.*
Now, this memorandum for John Dean from H. R. Haldeman,
"Eyes Only," initialed "H."
Obviously, the key on the Ervin Committee is the minority staff and more im-
portantly, the Minority counsel. We've got to be sure we get a real tiger, not an
old man or a soft'head
And I can attest to the fact that we did have a real tiger.
and although we let the Committee membership slip out of our grasp, we've got
to find a way to be sure we get the very best man we can for counsel.
I have not concentrated on that since. What does that mean : "and
although we let the committee membership slip out of our grasp"?
Wliat happened there ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know. [Laughter.]
Senator Weicker [reading] :
Also, you should go ahead and have Kleindienst order the FBI project on the
1968 bugging so as to gather the data on that and get the fullest possible
information.
Also, Mitchell should probably have Kendall call DeLoach —
Is that Deek DeLoach ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Senator Weicker [reading] :
Have Kendall call DeLoach in and say that if this project turns up anything
that DeLoach hasn't covered with us, he will, of course, have to fire him.
What does that — I really do not know what that means at all. What
is being referred to there ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is referring to the 1968 bugging of Mr. Nixon
and Mr. Agnew and apparently, others in the campaign or in connec-
tion with that campaign which took place at a time that Mr. DeLoach
was a — I am not sure of his title but a high official in the FBI and with
which it was presumed Mr. DeLoach was familiar.
Senator Weicker. Well, how do you presume, just out of curiosity,
to indicate that if Mr. DeLoach is not forthcoming that Mr. Kendall
should fire him ? Mr. Kendall is not employed by the Government, is he
in — is this the gentleman who is the head of Pepsico, is that right?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. And Mr. DeLoach, I gather, is an employee of
Pepsico, is that right ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, he is now.
Senator Weicker. I see. Well -
Mr. Haldeman. He was
Senator Weicker. I do not understand how you issue a memorandum
indicating that if this individual does not cooperate Mr. Kendall'
should have him fired. Did you have some hold or did Mr. Mitchell
have some hold over Mr. Kendall ?
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Mitchell had a personal relationship with Mr'
Kendall and I think ISIr. Mitchell had been in touch with Mr. Kendall
♦The documents referred to were previously entered as exhibit No. 34-33. See Book
p. 1240.
3205
or Mr. DeLoach or both regarding this matter and had not gotten the
information that he was seeking and this was a question of applying
additional pressure to attempt to get the information from Mr. De-
Loach that they had not received.
Senator Weicker. Oh, I see. In other words, we now have the White
House reaching down in the person of you and I gather saying to
citizens of this country that if they do not do what is asked of them,
they will be fired. I do not see any other interpretation on that. Is that
correct ?
Mr. Haldeman. That is the suggestion that is there. [Laughter.]
Obviously, there was no ability on our part to carry it out.
Senator Weicker. You took a good swing at the pitch, I will say
that.
Mr. Haldeman. Pardon me?
Senator Weicker. You took a good swing at the pitch, I will say that.
Then the memorandum of February 10, from the White House,
Washington, February 10, 1973, memorandum for John Dean from
Larry Higby. Do you have that memorandum ?
Mr. Haldeman. From Dean to Higby, on the 10th, no.
Senator Weicker. All right. I have to — would somebody please
give
Mr. Haldeman. Excuse me. We do have it, Senator.
Senator Weicker. This one is confidential, February 10, memoran-
dum for John Dean from Larry Higby. [Reading:]
As I am sure Bob's probably mentioned to you, we need to get a thorough item-
ization as quickly as possible of all the disruptions that occurred in the campaign.
We'll need this for Watergate tactics with the Ervin (Committee. That is, the
Democratic planned activities at the Century Plaza together with pictures, indi-
cations of violence and Communist activity and all that sort of thing — the
violence in San Francisco — the headquarters burning in Phoenix and other
areas — the demonstrations at the Statue of Liberty, et cetera.
You know, I saw that memorandum and had sort of a very familiar
ring to it when I saw the memorandum dated February 10, 1973. This
pretty much, if I am not mistaken, is the wording of the testimony
that you gave to this committee today, was it not ?
Mr. Haldeman. It relates to several of the same incidents, yes. They
are incidents — ^they were the incidents that come immediately to mind
of those — of the kind of thing we were talking about.
Senator Weicker. Certainly, I do not think either of us could con-
sider these tactics to get the truth to the Ervin committee without
violating the constitutional concepts of executive privilege or separa-
tion of powers.
Mr. Haldeman. This was not in relation to getting truth to the Ervin
committee. This was in relation to getting the truth regarding activity
by the opposition out to the American people.
Senator Weicker. As far as I am concerned, everything I have heard
so far in the way of these memorandums and what is going on behind
the scene was to bomb the Ervin committee right out of the water
rather than go ahead and get the truth to it.
Then, we do know the second memorandum of February 10, 1973,
which you and I have discussed this morning. This is the one ; "We
need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist
money that was used in support of the demonstrations against the
-296 O - 73 - Bk.
3206
President in 1972. We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovem
and the Democrats as part of the peace movement."
It is funny how the word "Communist" keeps popping up in Higby's
memorandum and now the memorandum from you to Dean. Let me
read you some testimony that was given to this committee :
I have the greatest respect for Mr. McGovem as a Senator and as a Presidential
candidate. I disagree personally with the kind of philosophy I saw in a similar
circumstance turn Cuba into a Communist state.
Senator Inotjye. However, you are willing to place Mr. McGovem in jeopardy,
did you not, to injure him?
Answer. If we were successful in obtaining documents that implicated a for-
eign government of Cuba in the operation, if this hurt Mr. McGovern it would
be the nature of the evidence, not I. Mr. McGovem, to me, is as impersonal in
that aspect as it would be when I w^as a bombardier in the Second World War in
Germany and bombed a town. I have nothing — I do not know Mr. McGovern per-
sonally or any of these people. There is no personal grudge in anything, as I
interpreted it.
Do you know who said that ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I do not.
Senator Weicker. That is Bernard Barker. He is in jail. And I do
not quite — I see also — I have got a paragraph there and then let me
repeat this paragraph.
We need to get our people to put the story on the foreign or Communist money
that was used in support of the demonstrations against the President in 1972.
Is there some connection, is there something this committee has
missed in its investigations whereby you feel that, in fact, there is a
connection between Mr. McGovern's candidacy and Communist money
just as apparently Mr. Barker operated on that same basis in his
break- in at the Watergate ?
Mr. Haldeman. The point I made in my statement was precisely
that I hope the committee will investigate that possibility and deter-
mine whether there was or not and I do hope that the committee will
do so. I understand that you will.
Senator Weicker. Yes, but, of course, at the time you wrote this
memorandum you had the full force of all the law enforcement agen-
cies in the Federal Grovemment to find out if such a serious allegation
existed, was it not your job at that time, the job of the executive branch
of Government to investigate rather than to go ahead and put stories
out? I mean, you know Mr. Barker is in jail today because somebody
sold him that story. Now, that is what I am talking about. Mr. Barker
is in jail today because somebody sold him the story of the connection,
if you will, between Mr. MoGovem's candidacy and communism in
Cuba. That is the reason why he went into the Watergate as he
explained it to this committee and he is sitting up in Danbury, Conn.,
right now.
Now, I see a paragraph here again in the memorandum which you
wrote to Jo|^hn Dean, "We need to get our people to put out the story
on the foreign or Communist money that was used in support of the
demonstrations against the President in 1972."
How many more Americans were supposed tx) believe this if you had
put out the story? This was not a memorandum to the committee,
memorandum to investigate on the part of law enforcement agencies
but to put out a story.
3207
Mr. HL^LDEMAN. It was a memorandum to the counsel. John Dean
did not put out stories. The point here was to get the information for a
story. If the information did not exist there would not be any story.
Senator Weicker. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. After the discussion on the question of whether the
President has power to suspend the fourth amendment, in what he
claims to be national security cases, which occurred on the committee
between Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Wilson on the one hand and myself
on the other. I received a letter from Hans Linde, professor of law,
school of law. University of Oregon, setting forth his opinion that in
the case of Ahel v. United States^ 362 U.S. 217, it shows that the entire
Court in that case reached a conclusion that the Federal Government
has no right to search the premises of a foreign agent supposedly
guilty of espionage without procuring a warrant as required by the
fourth amendment. The case went off on a different point but my read-
ing the case makes me adopt Mr. Linde's suggestion that all nine
judges agreed on that point, although the case was decided on other
grounds.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, may I say I have got at least 50 letters
saying I am right.
Senator Ervin. Yes, sir. Well, the only thing I am going to put in
is Mr. Linde's letter, if there is no objection.
[The letter referred to was marked exhibit No. 118.*]
Senator Ervin. Also put in the decision he refers to and let it be
printed in the record for the future study of this conmiittee.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 119.**]
Senator Ervin. I have no further questions.
Senator Baker. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurnet. I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Haldeman, since your testimony yesterday, have
you checked your calendar or any other record to be able to tell this
committee what day specifically you were in Washington in July of
this year to hear the September 15, 1972, tape ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't have a calendar, Mr. Dash, to check.
Mr. Dash. Or any record I said.
Mr. Haldeman. Let me see. I believe I came to Washington on — I
have not checked this since yesterday, to answer your question directly.
Mr. Dash. Well, I take it there would be some record you could
check, either an airline coupon, a check or something that could be
able to provide a date that you can give this committee. Would you do
that?
Mr. Haldeman. I could check the airplane thing and supply it to
you.
Mr. Dash, Would you supply the committee that date ?
•Rpe p. 3327.
••See p. 3329.
3208
Mr. Haldeman. Surely. It was though, I am virtually certain that
I was here, that I believe I came to Washington on Saturday, July 7.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Vice Chairman, what is the relevancy of this
inquiry ?
Senator Baker. Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. The relevance of this inquiry is we are trying to see when
Mr. Haldeman did have access to the tape. I don't think every date we
ask has to be supported by relevancy, within the area.
Mr. Wilson. He told you one of three dates. What difference does
it make to you ? Do you want to have him out of town on those dates ?
Mr. Dash. No, Mr. Wilson. I hope you don't have to be so defensive.
I have asked you
Mr. Wilson. You hope I won't be what ?
Mr. Dash. So defensive.
Mr. Wilson. I am not defensive.
Mr. Dash. I asked your client for an answer, your client is answer-
ing, he doesn't need a lawyer.
Mr. Wilson. If you are trying to say I am offensive
Senator Baker. Mr. Wilson, I think we will really get to the rel-
evancy of it quicker if we let Mr. Dash proceed. If it turns out not to
be relevant we can pass on that point. I understand they are prelimi-
nary questions. He is simply trying to establish the time frame in
which these events may have occurred. Is that essentially correct?
Mr. Dash. That is right and I have asked if Mr. Haldeman would
be willing to provide us with that record.
Mr. Haldeman. I can find out when I was in Washington, yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. I am not sure the record is still clear as to who got in
touch with whom to arrange for you to have the specific tapes at that
time.
Mr. Haldeman. I talked with Steve Bull.
Mr. Dash. Fine.
Did Steve Bull tell you that the President wanted you to have the
tapes, is he the one who conveyed that message ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure whether he did or whether this was in
an earlier phone conversation with Mr. Buzhardt ; it would have been
with Mr. Buzhardt.
Mr. Dash. Did you at any time have a specific call with the Presi-
dent with regard to the tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. Not with regard to the September 15 tape.
Mr. Dash. All right. It would either be with Fred Buzhardt or Mr.
Bull who conveyed to you the desire of the President that you listen
to this tape and give him a report, is that true ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir. I believe that is correct. I can't, I don't
think it was anyone else. There would be the other possibility of Gen-
eral Haig but I don't believe it was.
Mr. Dash. Did you come to Washington specifically for that
purpose ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; I was going to be in Washington anyway.
Mr. Dash. 'Wliile you were in Washington you made contact with the
White House, is that
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dasii. It was at that time you had such a communication.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, why was it necessary, Mr. Haldeman, to take the
3209
tapes to your house ? Why could you not hear them at the Executive
Office of the President ?
Mr. Haldeman. I could have but I was — ^I had, I was using a guest
office that was in an open office suite, it would have been difficult and a
little awkward to do and that is the reason I took it home.
Mr. Dash. Now, besides the particular September 15, 1972, tape, you
mentioned that you had other tapes. Would you tell us what dates
those tapes referred to ?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure. I was asked that this morning and I
am not sure what dates they were. They were dates within that
sequence of meetings in the period from February 27 through April.
Mr. Dash. You testified that you listened only to the September 15
tape but you did not listen to the others, and I think
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. I think you indicated you were not a party to those
conversations.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. You had listened to the March 21 tape, that part of it
which you were not a party when Mr. Dean was with the President.
Why, when you had the tapes over a period of time now we know, over-
night, and had time to do so; actually what prevented you, why did
you not listen to the tapes ?
Mr. Haldeman. I simply decided not to because I had not attended
the meetings and I didn't feel comfortable listening to those tapes.
Mr. Dash. But you were under no instruction not to, were you not?
There was no instruction you shouldn't listen to the tapes.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. This was not conveyed to me.
Mr. Dash. Because you were actually given those tapes.
Mr. Haldeman. The tapes were given to me.
Mr. Dash. And for the purpose of, I take it, to hear.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And you made your own decision then not to listen to
them.
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now
Senator Baker. Before you go on, just so I am clear in my own
mind, do we have for the record the tapes that the witness did have in
his possession?
Mr. Dash. No ; he doesn't recall, I take it.
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure which ones they were.
Senator Baker. How many were there?
Mr. Haldeman. I think there were three.
Senator Baker. Three rolls of tape.
Mr. Haldeman. Three dates which would be three reels.
Senator Baker. Three dates.
Mr. Haldeman. I should also point out I was given, which I don't
believe I have indicated earlier, I was also at the same time in each of
these cases given the telephone tapes that covered the same dates. In
other words, the request apparently to the custodian of the tapes was
for the tape for that date, and telephone conversations are recorded
on different reels than the conversations in the office, so I did have both
in April when I listened to the March 21 tape and in July when I
3210
listened to the September 15 tape, I had the telephone tapes for that
day also available. I did not listen to any telephone tapes.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall whether or not you listened to the March 13
tape?
Mr. Haldeman. I have not listened to any tape, Mr. Dash, except
September 15 and March 21.
Mr. Dash, Did you recall whether you had the March 13 tape ?
Mr, Haldeman. That may have been one but I am not sure.
Mr, Dash. All right. Now with regard to your listening and your
testimony concerning the September 15, 1972, meeting with the Presi-
dent's taped conversation, can you give us a little more detail, if you
can recall, of the discussion on the tape that api^ears in your statement
with regard to Mr. Dean's mentioning of Judge Richey in the civil
suit?
Mr. Haldeman, I covered that, I tried to cover it in the statement
as much as I could recall.
Mr. Dash. Your statement is your complete recollection of what
that was.
Mr. Haldeman. I would say so.
Mr. Dash. Did you recall whether the President had any specific
response when Mr. Dean mentioned that he would, according to your
statement, keep Rhomer McPhee abreast of what was happening ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall any response.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall whether Mr. Dean talked in terms of "con-
taining" the situation at the meeting?
Mr. Haldeman. By using quotes you are asking if I recall that
specific word.
Mr. Dash. In using the word that he was trying to contain the situa-
tion or had been containing it.
Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall the use of that word.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall whether Mr. Dean raised the facts that there
were several other hurdles that would have to be leaped before these
events would come to rest?
Mr. Haldeman. Well, as I have indicated, I don't recall the termi-
nology, "several other hurdles." I did say that he said there would be
other — ^that the grand jury activity was concluded but that there would
be other investigatory processes underway such as the GAO audit and
congressional inquiries.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall whether he stated that he couldn't guaran-
tee that the matter would not unravel, usin.q:the word "unravel."
Mr. Haldeman, I don't recall the use of the word "unravel." As I
said I do reeall his saying that he felt in these ongoing inquiries noth-
ing would come out to surprise us, in other words there was nothing
that we didn't already know.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall whether the President told Mr. Dean at
that time, in that conversation, to keep a list of people who were giving
them trouble for his later use ?
Mr. Haldeman. Dean referred in that meeting to the fact that he
was keeping a list or keeping track of people that were clearlv not our
friends that had emero-ed out of this work in this ])rocess. There was,
as T recall — I shouldn't anticipate a-ou — but as I recall Dean's testi-
mony he said that the President told him to keep a list of the people
3211
in the press who were opposing us. I don't recall any reference to press.
I recall this as a statement initiated by Dean that he was keeping track
of people who were clearly not our friends, and the President saying
something about "That is good," or something, "You should."
Mr. Dash. Do you recall whether the President stated that Mr.
Timmons should get on top of the Patman hearings during this
conversation ?
Mr. Haldemax. I don't recall it. It is so logical that he would — that
it is easy to assume it without — I have to say I don't have a specific
recollection of a reference to Mr. Timmons.
Mr. Dash. I am only asking for your recollection.
Mr. Haldeman. I know it.
Mr. Dash. Now with regard to the March 21 meeting which you
heard some time in April, do you recall whether Mr. Dean began the
conversation by explaining that to continue the coverup it would be
necessary to have perjury and more demands for money and more
perjury. Do you recall that ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Mr. Dash. With regard to that same date, do you recall at that meet-
ing, the listening to that tape, Mr. Dean beginning the conversation
by explaining to the President that there was "a cancer on the
Presidency."
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. He used that term.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall whether Mr. Dean also indicated to the
President that he would just give a broad, a very broad picture and
let the President ask any questions as to areas he wished more informa-
tion on ?
Mr. Haldeman. No.
Mr. Dash. By the way, during that meetins: did the President want
grand jury appearances discussed with Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, in the sense that he, at the latter part of the
meeting he said that he wanted Dean to get together with Mitchell, Mr.
Mitchell, Mr. Ehrlichman, and me and in that same portion of the
meeting he referred to Mr. Ehrlichman's suggestion. One way of deal-
ing wiui that suggestion at that point would be for everyone to volun-
tarily go to the grand jury.
Mr. Dash. And when you say that your recollection is on the tape
that the President said it was wrong to pay $1 million, was that in-
tended also to smoke out Dean ?
Mr. Haldeman. No ; well, I don't know.
Mr. Dash. That would not be.
Mr. Haldeman. It is hard to tell.
Mr. Dash. It was vour interpretation, I think, that the conver-
sation was to sort of — I think it was your term — to sort of "smoke out"
Dean.
Mr. Haldeman. It mav have been. I don't recall a comment in re-
sponse to it. I would not be able to characterize it, I don't think either
wav.
Mr. Dash. During that conversation were Mr. LaRue's name and
Mr. Kalmbach's name mentioned ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
3212
Mr. Dash. Do you know with what respect ?
Mr. Haldeman. LaRue in connection with the recitation of examples
of blackmail or money demands, and Mr. Kalmbach in connection with
the fact that he had raised funds for legal fees.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Haldeman, just one last series of questions on
the tapes and then just a few other questions. There have been ques-
tions by some members of the committee raised yesterday concernino:
whether you applied a strategy, I think, in revealing what you had
heard on the tapes before the committee. Let me just make one or two
statements and then see if you agree : From your testimony, and cor-
rect me if I misstate your testimony, your testimony makes it very
clear, I believe, that you are completely loyal to the President, and
fully support the President's position. Would that be a correct state-
ment?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And I take it you are also aware that the President has
refused to honor the subpena issued by this committee for tapes and
including specifically these two tapes, one the September 15 tape and
the March 21 tape. I take it you are aware of that.
Mr. Haldeman. I am aware of that, yes.
Mr. Dash. And his reason for doing so has been on executive privi-
lege and separation of powers reasons ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And that at the present time the issue will be going to
the courts ?
Mr. Haldeman. I understand that.
Mr. Dash. Now, in Mr. Buzhardt's letter to vour counsel, Mr. Buz-
hardt states that the President had instructed you not to reveal the
contents of the March 21 tape to the committee for the same reason,
on the basis of executive privilege. You are aware that that was there,
if you were asked questions concerning that.
Mr. Haldeman. Concerning the portion.
Mr. Dash. The portion.
Mr. Haldeman. Concerning any matters, I can't quote it, but my
understanding of its intent was the prohibition was against testimony
concerning any matters which I learn solely from listening to the
tape.
Mr. Dash. That is what I am referring to.
Mr. Haldeman. T^Hiich would, in effect, as given the facts we are
faced with, would in effect mean that portion of the ISIarch 21 tape that
covered the meeting prior to my joining it.
Mr. Dash. Well, the question I have, which, at least puzzles me, is
that since the President has refused to honor our subpena, and the issue
of law is to be determined bv the courts, whv did vou not follow the
President's example and refuse to honor the chairman's order and
obev the President's instructions and await the court's decision on the
law?
Mr. Haldeman. I will defer to counsel. I acted on advice of counsel.
Mr. Wilson. Do you want to know what counsel's advice was?
Mr. Dash. I take it he acted on advice of counsel ?
Mr. Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And I would appreciate hearing that, yes, if counsel is
willing to give it.
3213
Mr. Wilson. Sure. I said if the committee ordered the disclosure of
this information he should obey the order of the committee rather than
to go into contempt is what I said. What would you have said?
Mr. Dash. I would preserve that answer to when I was counsel for
Mr. Haldeman rather than as chief counsel to this committee.
Now, INIr. Haldeman, on page 13 of your statement you characterized
your role, toward the bottom of the statement and leading on to page
14 on the top, "Take in my role as the President's chief of staff I con-
centrated my attention and activities each day on those matters on
which the President was concentrating his attention and activity. I
did not maintain an independent schedule of appointments or activities
on my own."
I think there has already been some testimony concerning the enemies
list. Did you consider your role as chief of staff to participate in de-
veloping or supervising or being involved in an enemies, political
enemies project?
Mr. Haldeman. I certainly didn't consider it as a principal part of
my role but I was fully aware of this project.
Mr. Dash. Right.
I think you indicated primarily that the political enemies' role was
one for the purpose of making decisions as to whether certain persons
who were on that list would be given the privileges of the White
House.
May I show vou a memorandum for John Dean from Gordon
Strachan of October 26, 1971 ?
I think members of the committee have all been given copies of that
memorandum. You will notice, Mr. Haldeman, that actually the memo-
randum of October 26 is a memorandum from Mr. Strachan to Mr.
Dean which picks up on an accompanvins: memorandum of Octo-
ber 19, 1971, "eyes only" from Mr. Lyn Nofziger to you with reference
to Chet Huntley.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr, Dash. And the memorandum says :
The State Chairman of Montana tells me Huntley claims to be a Republican
and will support and work for whatever Republican runs against Senator Metcalf
next year.
John Whitaker has ordered the Department of Agriculture to quit dragging its
heels on "Big Sky," probably without any knowledge of the above or of my own
project.
I believe we should (check one) :
1. Give Mr. Huntley aH the helo we can with a clear understanding that he re-
ciprocates with help to us in Montana.
2. Continue along the course we have been following since Mr. Huntley's
intemperate remarks.
3. Same as #2 until we see how Mr. Huntley performs.
And then this is sent on by your assistant, ]\Ir. Gordon Strachan,
to John Dean, and in that memorandum he says :
Lyn Nofziger sent the attached information on Chet Huntley to Bob Haldeman.
Since you have the action on the political enemies project would you make a
determination on what should happen, advise Nofziger, and mention your decision
to me.
Then to go back to October 19 there appears to be a preference, a
line drawn on No. 8, "Same as No. 2 until we see how Mr. Huntley
performs" and some indication so informed, L.N., probably Lyn
Nofziger.
3214
What would be No. 2, "Continue along the course we have been fol-
lowing since Mr. Huntley's intemperate remarks."
Do you recall the course you were following with Mr. Huntley
because of so-called intemperate remarks ?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I don't, Mr. Dash. This isn't my writing on this
memorandum.
Mr. Dash. No, I think the writing probably is Mr. Dean's who
received this memorandum from Gordon Strachan to make additions
and report back to him which, I would take it, Mr. Strachan would be
reporting back to you,
Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall this. I don't know that he did.
Mr. Dash. All right. But in any event, this deals with political ene-
mies, and would you say that this memorandum dealing with political
enemies has anything to do with extending "White House privileges?
Mr. Haldeman. No, not in this case.
Mr. Dash. The testimony has indicated that in the break-in of the
Democratic National Committee headquarters Mr. Lawrence O'Brien,
.the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, as one of the
targets. Mr. Dean has testified before this committee that Mr. O'Brien
had been a Wliite House target for a period of time prior to the
break-in. Were you aware, Mr. Haldeman, that Mr. O'Brien was the
subject of investigation by White House staff, for instance for the pur-
pose of uncovering embarrassing information about him ?
Mr. Haldeman. As was the case with a number of major political
figures we received or there was received, I didn't, information from
time to time that, suggestions as to what Mr. O'Brien or other people
were doing, where their business interests, activities lay, and that sort
of thing, and the suggestion was we would be provided from out in the
field, from people who knew him in other areas that we ought to be
checking into this or that, that kind of question did arise.
Mr. Dash. Well, as a matter of fact, in January, spexiifically on Jan-
uary 28, 1971, were you not aware of an inquiry that was made con-
cerning Mr. O'Brien and did you not issue a memorandum to Mr. Dean
suggesting that information be leaked to the newspapere ?
Mr. Haldeman. If I could see the memorandum I would be glad to
respond to it.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. Without going into the backup memorandum this
would be the kind of thing I was talking about.
Mr. Dash. And let me read the memorandum, January 28, 1971,
memorandum for John Dean from H. R. Haldeman, subject Hughes
Retainer of Larry O'Brien. [Reading :]
You should continue to keep in contact with Bob Bennett as well as looking
for other sources of information on this subject. Once Bennett gets back to you
with his final report, you and Chuck Colson siiould get together and come up with
a way to leak the appropriate information. Frankly, I can't see any way to handle
this without involving Hughes so the problem of "embarrassing" liim seems to be
a matter of degree. However, we should keep Bob Bennett and Bebe out of it at
all costs. Please keep me advised of your progress on this and any plans you
decide on.
I think the backup memorandum has to do with the fact of Hughes'
retainer when Mr. O'Brien was involved in a certain consulting firm,
is that not true ?
3215
Mr. Haldeman. I haven't looked at the backup memorandum. That
is the subject thing and I will look at it if you want me to.
Mr. Dash. You may and I certainly don't want to give you anything
without your reading it.
Mr. Wilson. Is there a pending question ?
Mr. Dash. I asked whether or not the backup memorandum supplied
the information which supported this memorandum to Mr. Dean that
this information should appropriately be leaked.
Mr. Haldeman. Well, it supplies information that — I will read the
whole thing if you want me to, it is an awfully long detail information.
Mr. Dash. No.
Mr. Haldeman. But it obviously supplies information regarding
Larry O'Brien's relationship with the Hughes organization in some
way, that they had offered him a piece of the Hughes action in Las
Vegas or something, is what it says.
Mr. Dash. Did you consider that something that might be politically
advantageous to have released if Mr. O'Brien had that particular
retainer ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And
Mr. Haldeman. That would appear to be the case. At least those
who were providing the information considered it so.
Mr. Dash. That was also in your role as the President's chief of
staff where you concentrated your attention on activities each day to
those matters on which the President was concentrating his attention
and activities?
Mr. Haldeman. ISIr. Dash, something like this is a very incidental
memorandum, and was not part of my general concentration on the
President's activities, obviously.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire whether all of
these documents shown the witness will be made part of the record of
this case in haec verba.
Mr. Dash. I intend after I am through with the questioning to ask
the chairman to have them marked.
Senator Ervin. Some of them have already been admitted in the
record when Mr. Dean was testifying but I am certain all of them will
be put in the record, marked exhibits and put in the record as counsel
inquiries of the witness about them.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Dash. By the way, I am not sure again from reading the record
whether I asked you when I was talking to you about the Plumbers
operation, whether you were aware that Mr. Hunt was employed as
part of the Plumbei-s operation.
Mr. Haldeman. I think I probably was.
Mr. Dash. Do you know how you first came to meet Mr. Hunt ?
Mr. Haldeman. I have never met Mr. Hunt.
Mr. Dash. Do you know who first brought Mr. Hunt to your atten-
tion ? Did anybody bring Mr. Hunt to your attention ?
Mr. Haldeman. No. It was my understanding — again, I do not know
when I knew it — that Mr. Hunt was brought into the White House
as a result of his — of Mr. Colson's having Imown him outside.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall Mr. Colson's ever talking to you about Mr.
3216
Hunt and recommending him to you as a person the White House
really ought to have working for it ?
Mr. Haldeman. He may have, but only on the basis — not on any
basis of my knowledge of Mr, Hunt.
Mr. Dash. Now, in your statement on page 8 in speaking of the
President's decisionmaking, you state that he insisted that when a
matter was brought to him for decision, the full range of options and
the full range of viewpoints regarding those options be presented to
him rather than just arguments of the exponents of every particular
side. He saw the staff's responsibility of being that of insuring that this
was always the case.
Now, as chief of staff, Mr. Haldeman, did you consider it your
responsibility to provide the President with all the information you
had involving an important matter requiring a decision that the
President would have to make ?
Mr. Haldeman. The information that I had regarding a matter
Mr. Dash. That would be related
Mr. Haldeman [continuing] . On which he was making a decision ?
Mr. Dash. Yes. And by the way, I think you may have given us
this testimony. Mr. Colson's role in the White House was what ?
Mr. Wilson. Are there two questions pending now ?
Mr. Dash. No, he has answered my last question. Now I am asking
him what Mr. Colson's role in the White House was. The last question
to Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Colson was special counsel to the President.
He had a range of responsibilities and it varied over a period of time.
His principal responsibility was liaison and contact with outside orga-
nizations and groups of people, labor, business, agriculture, education,
religion, and so forth.
Mr. Dash. Now, if Mr. Colson transmitted information to you
relating to a matter that might be pending with the President for
Presidential decision or action ; would you transmit that information
to the President ?
Mr. Haldeman. That would be my usual procedure.
Mr. Dash. Now, on page 41 of your statement, when the question
was put to you concerning an April 4 meeting with Mr. ISIitchell,
relative to Mr. Strachan's testimony that he undei-stood that vou were
meeting with Mr. Mitchell on a talking paper concerning the intel-
ligence plan, your notes taken at that meeting with the President in-
dicate the discussion covered the ITT-Kleindienst hearings and a
review of Mitchell's plans for assigning regional campaign respon-
sibilities.
Now, I would like to show you a memorandum, Mr. Haldeman, of
March 30, 1972, which was 5 days prior to that meeting with the Presi-
dent, from Mr. Colson to you — subject : ITT.
Mr. Haldeman. OK.
Mr. Dash. I am going to refer to a particular part of it, but if vou
would like to read the entire memorandum first, please take the time
to do so.
Mr. Haldeman. I guess I had better. I have not see i this.
Mr. Dash. Yes. I should ask you, do you recall the memorandum?
Mr. Haldeman. Not so far. Let me look at it.
Mr. Dash. Well, why do you not take the time to read it ?
3217
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, while Mr. Haldeman is examining that,
Mr, Strickler called my attention to the fact that the memorandmn
from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Dean, subject, Hughes' retainer of Larry
O'Brien has attached to it two pages of a document dated January 26,
1971. Obviously, it is not a complete attachment since there is an in-
complete sentence at the bottom of the second page. Are there other
pages, Mr. Dash ?
Mr. Dash. I do not have the other pages, Mr. Wilson. The particular
memorandum that I was specifically referring to that I wanted Mr.
Haldeman to answer was the January 28, 1971, memorandum, and I
think there is sufficient information on the January 26 memorandum
to at least give you an idea of the subject matter.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, but the question is what is on the third page ?
Mr. Dash. I do not know but I do not think it is really relevant to
the question I asked.
Mr. Wilson. Have you seen the third page ?
Mr. Dash. I have not seen it.
Mr. Wilson. How do you know ?
Mr. Dash. This was an exhibit. As I suggested to you that the ques-
tion I asked dealt with the January 28, 1971, memorandum and not
the attachment.
Mr. Wilson. I understand that but you did make an attachment of
an incomplete document.
Mr. Dash. They came together. They came as they were.
Senator Ervin. That is all the committee got. Now, if you get access
to the White House papers, you can get the third page. We cannot.
Mr. Dash. My point, Mr. Wilson, was I was not asking any ques-
tions concerning the attached document.
Mr. Wilson. It is my natural curiosity to know what would be on
the third page.
Mr. Dash. No efforts
Mr. Wilson. Might be extremely interesting.
Mr. Dash. Might be. I think we both perhaps would like to read it.
Mr. Wilson. This is incomplete, then, is it not ?
Mr. Dash. That is what we have.
Mr. Wilson. This is incomplete, is it not ?
Mr. Dash. I said yes. It does have — maybe actually, two more pages.
Mr. Wilson. Sir?
Mr. Dash. There may be additional pages.
Mr. Wilson. Yes. Three or more.
Senator Ervin. I just suggest perhaps those who have access to the
White House tapes might find some way of having access to the papers.
Mr. Wilson. I do not think that is good an answer as the question,
is the committee using incomplete documents here ?
Senator Ervin. Well, that is the only kind of document that Mr.
Dean could get out of the White House. [Laughter.]
Mr. Dash. Again, I think the record
Senator Ervin. That is all we have.
Mr. Dash. Again, I think the record should show
Mr. Wilson. As I have said before, if this were a court of law that
could not go in.
Mr. Dash. Well-
3218
Senator Ervin. I think it could, unless you thought it had been sup-
pressed by the one offering it. We do not know whether there was any
third page. A third page may have been detached on account of hav-
ing something to do with national security.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Wilson, again, the only question to your client had
to do with a complete memorandum of January 28, 1971. There was no
reference or any questions on the accompanying
Mr. Wilson. For what it is worth, I do not accept the explanation
of either the chairman or Mr. Dash. This may be unimportant to both
of you but I do not want this to go by without saying I do not think
that is a proper document.
Mr. Dash. Have you read the memorandum, Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, not
Mr. Dash. Sorry the discussion perhaps has interrupted your
reading.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, and I have not tried to read it comprehensively
because it is long and general. I have a general feel of it.
Mr. Dash. It deals obviously as you read it concerning Mr. Colson's
concerns about matters that might be coming before the hearing that
was the confirmation of Mr. Kliendienst as Attorney General. And I
am just going to refer actually, to two paragraphs.
On page 3 of the first part of the memorandum, the last paragraph
says:
Neither Kleindienst, Mitchell nor Mardian know of the potential dangers. I have
deliberately not told Kleindienst or Mitchell, since both may be recalled as wit-
nesses and Mardian does not understand the problem. Only Fred Fielding, myself
and Ehrlichman have fully examined all the documents and/or information that
could yet come out. A summary of some of these is attached.
Now, I am referring now to the attached summary. Could you look
at the very next page and paragraph 2 at the bottom :
There is a Klein to Haldeman memo dated June 30, 1971, which, of course,
precedes the date of the ITT settlement, setting forth the $400,000 arrangement
with ITT. Copies were addressed to Magruder, Mitchell and Timmons. This memo
put the AG—
The AG here in the memo —
on constructive notice at least of the ITT commitment at that time and before
the settlement, facts which he has denied under oath. We don't know whether
we have recovered all the copies. If known, this would be considerably more
damaging than Rieneke's statement. Magruder believes it is possible, the AG
transmitted his copy to Magruder. Magruder doesn't have the copy he received ;
he only has a Xerox of the copy. In short, despite a search, this memo could be
lying around anywhere at 1701.
No. 1701 being the Committee for the Re-Election of the President.
Now, that, I take it, was the kind of explosive information to come
into your possession on March 30, 1972, 5 days before you met with the
President and which you said your notes showed that the discussion
was ITT and the Kleindienst confirmation. Did you bring that matter
to the attention of the President ?
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know. I do not think so. I do not think that
I received or read this memorandum. It is not familiar to me. Cer-
tainly, the attachment is not. There was discussion of the problems
of the Kleindienst nomination and as he has spelled out here, ap-
parently there had been a meeting that morning with Clark Mac-
(iregor and Walt Johnson, who were the congressional liaison people
3219
at that time and Colson felt that there were matters that they dis-
agreed with me on the analysis of the Kleindienst nomination. I do
not know what that was.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt again to say I thought
I received information from you this morning from the list of wit-
nesses, Mr. Colson is not going to be called as a witness?
Senator Ervin. Not until after the recess.
Mr. Dash. The question is whether or not you recall the memo-
randum and ever receiving that information.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not recall — I recall a lot of problems and a lot
of information that conflicted on the problems of the nomination and
the maneuvering that was going on to block the nomination. I was
not — again as jn almost any of these cases — was not a principal as this
memo really indicates in the effort to work out the problems of the
nomination and I do not recall reading of the information in the
backup memorandum. I do not recall any of it.
I have a general recollection of the whole area of discussion of that.
Mr. Dash. When you say you do not recall, obviously, we are re-
ferring back to March 30, 1972, which is over a year ago. It is not your
testimony, I take it, that you did not in fact receive this or read this
memo. It is your testimony I take it, that you do not recall.
Mr. Haldeman. That is my testimony.
Mr. Dash. And if you had in fact received this memorandum, which
would have given you information that the Attorney General may have
committed perjury in the Kleindienst confirmation hearings, would
this not be a matter that you would have taken up with the President?
Mr. Haldeman. I would have either taken it up with the President
or ascertained — taken it up with someone who had direct knowledge of
the situation to take it up with the President, yes.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Haldeman
Senator Gurnet. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to com-
ment when we had our executive session meeting this morning, which,
of course, was devoted solely to whether Mr. Colson would appear as
a witness, there was no ^ving of information to any of the committee
that this matter was going to be gone into or this memorandum. This
came as a total surprise to us during the day here.
Mr. Dash. This memorandum was just received by me.
Senator Gxjrney. I would have thought it would have been much
fairer had we had this before us when we were discussing whether
Mr. Colson was going to appear as a witness or to put it in another
way, since we had decided that he would not appear as a witness, it
seems to me it is highly unfair and highly irregular to bring this mat-
ter up now. We should have waited until Mr. Colson came before us.
Mr. Dash. Well, Mr. Chairman, the memorandum came to our at-
tention just this morning. Our staff interviewed a secretary last night
and received the memorandum and I was just given it shortly before
giving it to the members of the committee, and Mr. Haldeman is here
as a witness and it is a memorandum to Mr. Haldeman on a matter in
which he does refer in his statement, that his notes show that he had a
particular meeting with the President on the ITT-Kleindienst matter
5 days after this memorandum.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a further
statement and request that we have Mr. Colson before us as a witness.
3220
As you know, the vice ohairman and myself felt very strongly we
should have him here as a witness because he has always been con-
sidered as one of the principal witnesses along with Mr, Haldeman, Mr.
Ehrlichman, since the very beginning of this hearing, but, of course,
we have had some extremely important pieces of evidence. There was
the Dean evidence that Colson told Dean that Colson had a meeting
with the President of the ITnited States in which the matter of Execu-
tive clemency was discussed. There was the evidence that Colson made
a phone call to Magruder pressuring him to go on with the Liddy plan.
There was the very important evidence that there was a meeting be-
tween Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Colson and Mr.
Dean. I am not sure whether Haldeman was there or not but Ehrlich-
man, Colson, and Dean, concerning the discussion of what they ought
to do about talking to Hunt's lawyer.
These are all extremely important pieces of evidence to this main
case of whether the President of the United States was involved or not,
and for the life of me I think it is totally unfair that Mr. Colson is
not brought here as a witness in these main proceedings. Now, we have
this matter here which we knew nothing about at all and this is more
reason why we should have him here, and incidentally, I understand
that both Mr. Colson and his lawyer are very anxious to come before
the hearings at this particular time. I am further advised that his
lawyer is not going to be available at a later date. He is going to be
tied up with a very important case in court. And I would urge again
that the committee reconsider and have Mr. Colson before us.
Mr. Wilson. May I add to that ?
Senator Ervin. Wait a minute. The Senate has twice voted to adopt
a list of witnesses they thought they could finish in a reasonable time
and the committee voted the last time this morning, and I just do not
believe the committee will reconsider the matter and vote a third time,
but, of course, if the Senator from Florida wants the committee to
reconvene to do that I will be glad to reconvene.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman
Senator Ervin. Wait a minute. I do not mean to be short. As I con-
strue the questions of the counsel to Mr. Haldeman, they relate to what
knowledge Mr. Haldeman had about the matters and what he did on
the basis of that knowledge.
Now, Mr. Wilson, if you
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman. I would only supplement Senator Gur-
ney's descrintion of evidence here by saving that in the course of Mr.
Ehrlichman's testimony, there was referred to and perhaps put in
evidence a taoed conversation between Mr. Colson and INIr. Hunt in
which a clear blackmail attemnt was made and
Senator Ervin. Well, Mr. Wilson, the committee has to be guided
by a majority of the committee and we cannot take all of the evidence
that is available between now and any reasonable time and the com-
mittee has voted twice on the witnesses that would be called and I jpro-
pose, until the committee overrules me, to adhere to the committee
rules. It would be very desirable if we could get all the witnesses here
at one time and aret through with the thing, but the easiest way to solve
the question of the President's involvement is for the President to
bring the tapes down here and then we would not have to bother a
whole lot of other witnesses.
3221
Senator Gurnet. I must say, Mr. Chairman, I cannot miderstand
why the majority members on the committee do not want this extremely
important evidence brought before this committee and this Nation
now as to the President's involvement, which is the main issue we have
before us.
Senator Ervin. Well, the committee has considered it twice and has
voted to the contrary twice. That is, they voted what witnesses would
be called no later than this morning, and I do not know any way you
can run a committee except by majority vote.
Senator Gurnet. I might say, too, that the main reason appears to
be that perhaps it will delay our proceedings too long. I, as one mem-
ber, am very willing to stay here just as long as it takes to get the main
evidence as to the President's involvement or not and I do think, too,
that on these little pieces of evidence we are talking about, it should
not take very long. We do not have to go into the dirty tricks depart-
ment or anything like that, but simply the main issue of whether or not
j the President of the United States is involved.
! Senator Ervin. Well, there is nobody here except you and myself
and the committee has voted twice to the contrary. No later than this
morning they voted what witnesses to call twice, and that is the agenda
before the committee until it is reversed.
Senator Gurnet. But the only time we ever voted on Mr. Colson as
an issue was this morning. We did not vote twice on him.
Senator Ervin. We voted twice on the question of what witnesses
would be called and Mr. Colson was not included either time.
I suggest the counsel proceed with the questioning. We can call
another meeting of the committee.
Mr. Dash. I am just about completed, Mr. Chairman, and just have
really one question.
Mr. Wn^ON. Is Mr. Colson ever going to be called ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Senator Ervin. I hope so and I hope we get the tapes, too,
[Laughter.]
We could cut off this investigation, really, we could cut off this in-
vestigation very shortly if the President would make the tapes which
he says are in his exclusive control, open to the committee.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Haldeman, really just one last question.
In your testimony in its entirety, it is time, is it not, that you con-
sistently denied any prior knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic
National Committee headquarters at the Watergate on the early morn-
ing of June 17, 1972, or any participation in the coverup thereafter?
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. In the coverup as I have described
it, illegal or improper actions.
Mr. Dash. Yes. As you described them.
That about completes my questioning Mr. Chairman, but I would
like to have the two memorandums — the one for John Dean from Mr.
Haldeman concerning the Hughes retainer of Larry O'Brien, and also
the ITT memorandum of March 30, with the attachments — entered
as committee exhibits.
Senator Ervin. Without objection they will be entered as such.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 120 and
121.*]
►See pp. 3369, 3372.
96-296 O - 73 - Bk. 8 -- 14
3222 .
Senator Ervin. I am going to have to adjourn or take a recess and ^
get over to vote. '
Mr. Dash. While you are still here — well
Senator Ervin. I am not sure your question and answer will keep
me from voting.
[Recess.]
Senator Baker [presiding] . The committee will come to order. Sen-
ator Ervin and other members of the committee are on their way to the
Senate floor to answer this rollcall and the chairman asked me to re-
convene the hearings and to proceed.
Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. This will be very short because you answered the question
I was putting which is that vour testimony in its entiretv does deny
any participation in the break-in before or on June 17, 1972, or in the
coverup as you have defined it afterward.
Mv last concluding statement, which does not reallv call for you to
reply because I do not wish vou to attempt to draw distinctions between
other persons' evidence. I think you have properly declined to do so i
but for the committee to believe your testimonv would require it to |
disbelieve important parts of the testimony of Mr. Dean. Mr. Mitchell, |
Mr. Maerruder, Mr. Strachan, and the sworn testimony in other forms
of Mr. Helms and Mr. Walters who will also be brought forth to testify
to what they have testified before in this proceeding.
Now, of course, that does not call for anv comments on your part.
You have given your testimonv but it is a statement to the committee
that it has to do with other witnesses, in balancing the credibility oi
witnesses, it has its responsibilitv.
I have no further ouestions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Vice Chairman, if T could respond very briefl"'
to Mr. Dash's very brief summary, there is a substantial question o:!
interpretation as well as questions of fact in the discrepancies that yoi
cited between my testimonv and that of other witnesses that vou hav(
cited. I will not attempt to characterize any individual, other wit-
nesses' testimony, in terms of either its discrepancies from mine ir
terms of facts or its discrepancies from mine in terms of interpretatior
or implication or inference. I would simplv not want, however, voui
statement to rest with the impression that in all these cases, all the
differences are clear differences of fact because in fact thev are not.
Mr. Dash. I will take your statement, Mr. Haldeman, and I do not
think it is appropriate to go into, as you have not gone into, an attempt
to make those distinctions. This is a responsibility the committee will
have to deal with, and I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Haldeman, you have testified that you were out
of the few people who were aware of the taping system at the Whit<
House.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. According to vour understanding, when was th<
taping svstem installed in the EOB and Oval Office?
Mr. Haldeman. I have to go on the basis of the information sup
plied the committee by other people on that and the best informatioi
i 3223
'would be that that you have received from the Treasury Department
or Secret Service or the Technical Security Division. Whatever they
have told you I am sure would be the most accurate source. My recol-
lection is that it was in 1971 but I am not sure.
Mr. Thompson. So, from 1968 to 1971 there was no taping system?
As far as you know ?
Mr. Haldeman. I will correct that on a minor basis. From 1969,
January 20, until 1971, there was one — there was none that I know of.
I understand there was prior to January 20, 1969.
Mr. Thompson. What do you base that understanding on?
Mr. Haldeman. The comments of others that indicated to me that
bhere was such a capability available.
Mr. Thompson. Hearsay is not preferable but we would be
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson [continuing]. We would be out of business if we did
lot accept it, unfortunately.
Mr. Haldeman. I would urge that that also is a question that can be
ietermined by far more — with far greater validity from the people
ivho would be familiar with it, such as the Technical Security Division
)f the Secret Service because any installation of any kind in the
^resident's office would have to be done with the knowledge of, if not
)y, the actions of the Secret Service.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know anyone besides the Secret Service who
night be a source of knowledge in that regard ?
Mr. Haldeman. I would think that possibly principal members of
he former President's staff.
Mr. Thompson. Did [^ou ever have any discussions with any of them
ibout this matter or similar matters ?
Mr. Haldeman. In a general sense, and I would prefer not to try
o characterize now a recollection of a conversation or conversations
, vith other individuals, and I think we are into an area that is not
j -elevant to this discussion and should be handled in some other forum.
Mr. Thompson. Could you make any recommendations as to who we
, night ask about these mattei:^ ?
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, but I would prefer to do it in an executive
ession basis or a private basis so that I would not improperly bring
n a name that I should not.
Mr. Thompson. Would you be willing to do that ?
Mr. Haldeman. I would be willing to do that on any basis to the
nembers or counsel.
Mr. Thompson. Would you tell us who suggested that the taping
system be installed in the Oval Office and the EOB office of the
^resident?
Mr. Haldeman. I am not sure whether it was my suggestion or the
-•resident's suggestion. It grew out of a conversation between the two
)f us regarding the problem of accuracy of record of conversations
he President was holding in his office that were not, meetings and
onversations that were not. attended by third parties, or by third
)arties on his immediate staff, who could make records for him.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know of your personal knowledge who was
n charge of the tapes at the time you were at the White House ?
iti(
3224
Mr. Haldeman. You mean physical custody of the tapes?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not know of my personal knowledge. My under-
standing was and is they were in the custody of the technical security
division.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Mr. Haldeman, you have been asked about the so-called Dean inves-
tigation and, on the one hand, you have been asked why you didn't
launch your own investigation and why you relied on Dean — I think
that is a proper inquiry — and, on the other hand, with regard to other
political matters you have been asked, why you investigated and why
you did not rely on the FBI.
Mr. Haldeman. I noticed that.
Mr. Thompson. The only conclusion I can draw, and you correct me
if I am wrong, is that there were some matters which the White House
staff deemed it advisable or appropriate or necessary to look into and
some where it did not, at least to an extent. Could you give us some
indication of what type of questionable, illegal — if not illegal, ques-
tionable — activities you or the Wliite House staff or the President con-
sidered appropriate yourself to look into yourself and what type mat-
ters would summarily be sent over to the Justice Department ?
Mr. Haldeman. I should say not only in the case of investigating
but really almost any other kind of matter that the White House would
not and should not become directly involved unless or until it had
developed that whoever was supposed to be handling it had not or was
not handling it appropriately, adequately, and sufficiently thoroughly.
That ultimately became the case in the Watergate matter, but not until
later. It ultimately became the case at a far higher degree of priority
in terms of monumental leaks of just critically important national
security information at a time when that information, some of it, was
related to the war in which this Nation was currently engaged, and the
necessity for moving fast and the necessity for moving thoroughly in
that kind of a situation, a matter involving the very reality, certainly
the foreign policy and the integrity of the Nation and perhaps ulti-
mately the survival of the Nation, didn't allow for any temporizing or
any delay, and those investigations that were undertaken, and there
weren't very many although they have been built up and by reputation
over the last few weeks made to seem as if they were something that
was about the only thing that was happening in town during those 8
years, they were of a different level of problem and a different level of
importance. They regard the Nation's security.
Mr. Thompson. I wonder sometimes myself, in dealing with these
matters and having done so for several months now so intensely, if I
can put things in a practical framework ; I know it is hard to look ba^k.
Obviously as a starting point it was the FBI's job to investigate this
matter.
Mr. Haldeman. This is correct.
Mr. Thompson. And the question is how much more above that you
should do or that you could do. At that time, going back to June of
1972, did you have any reason to expect that the FBI would not do a
thorough job of investigating the matter ?
Mr. Haldeman. None whatsoever.
3225
Mr. Thompson. Were there ever any restraints placed on them,
so far as you know, in the Bureau with regard to this particular
investigation ?
Mr. Haldeman. None, except in the very limited sense that I have
talked about and in a limited period of time with regard to the national
security considerations.
Mr. Thompson. At that particular time did the White House staff,
so far as you know, or the President
Mr. Haldeman. Let me go back. I am sorry, Mr. Thompson, just a
second. Those were not limitations to the Watergate investigation, they
were limitations ongoing beyond that into other areas.
Mr. Thompson. At that time as of June, and the following months
in 1972, did you or any of your fellow staffers at the White House and
the President, so far as you know, have any reason to expect anything
less than a competent job from either the Attorney General or the
Acting Director of the FBI ?
Mr. Haldeman. Absolutely not.
Mr. Thompson. In retrospect, of course, the Bureau has taken a lot
of criticism because of the job that was done, a lot of talk has been
made about the extent of the investigation, and how many agents were
put on the investigation, and how many interviews were conducted,
and so forth, but the fact does remain that other developments have
come about since their original findings, I think we have to conclude
that.
Mr. Haldeman. That is right.
Mr. Thompson. I am trying to get back to the time this thing was
developing, in the latter part of 1972.
Mr. Haldeman. I wouldn't limit it either to the FBI. There was
also a Federal grand jury sitting and hearing witnesses and there
were
Mr. Thompson. Of course, basicallv what they deal with is informa-
tion supplied to them as a result of FBI investigation but that is
INIr. Haldeman. No, I wouldn't accept that at all. If that is all they
did thev wouldn't call witnesses, they would see and read reports all
day. I think the grand jury, and I was in that grand jury room, and it
is a stuffy little black room, and those poor people on that grand iury
I have a great sympathy for, because they have sat there for a long,
long time now hearing for hours and hours and hours on end the ques-
tioning of very, very many people who might be able to give them any
information about the Watergate, and they were ^ving it to them
under oath and under interrogation from the senior assistant IT.S.
attorney and two other assistant T^.S. attorneys and all 2vS members of
the grand iury. So I would not say in any way the investigation or the
determination of facts was limited to the FBI. The grand jury was
very thoroughly pursuing this process and there was a trial in Federal
court, with a very diligent Federal judge who pursued the process of
trying to determine the facts also.
Mr. Thompson. I think the question is probably raised in some peo-
ple's minds and I think perhaps the implication from some of the
questioning, as to whether or not the lack of thoroughness, if there was
one, in retrospect was due to political reasons. Some people concluded
there was a bad investigation with regard to the Watergate. A docu-
3226
ment was introduced yesterday indicating that at least the Interna"
Security Division had no information about illegal Democratic activ
ities, and I assume that was submitted to show that that was a thorough
investigation so, you know, we are trying to analyze investigations
from hindsight as to why one investigation would be good and anothei
one would not be good and I think that raises a political question.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. What do you know about the political compositior
of the Bureau as an institution? Obviously, the Director is appointee
by the President. What about going down from there, what do yoi
know about the FBI as an institution, how it is composed ?
Mr. Haldeman. I know very little that isn't known by probably th(
average U.S. citizen, maybe not as much. I have no reason to believ<
that the FBI is or was at that time in any way politically influenced
Mr. Thompson. I am not talking about influence. I am talking abou
the structure. Is there a massive change ?
Mr.' Haldeman. Certainly not the structure.
Mr. Thompson. Is there a massive change of agents ? For example
when a new administration comes in are the agents fired ? I think yoi
and I probably know a little bit more than the average citizen abou
that particular point but I think it needs to be discussed.
Mr. Haldeman. In some departments where a number of the peopL
are political or Presidential appointees, there is a substantial chang
in personnel, starting at the White House where there is a total chang
in the noncareer personnel, and this goes to a greater or lesser degre
through the departments. At the Federal Bureau of Investigatior
there was, to my knowledge, no change of personnel at the time tha
this administration took office, and no major change in personnel dui
ing the time that this administration was in office up to the time of th
death of the Director, when of course, there was the necessity t^
appoint an Acting Director and start the process of selection of a ne\
Director. I don't believe that even at that time there were any whole
sale changes. There were some changes in personnel, of course, but iv
wholesale changes.
Mr. Thompson. Of course, the Director had been there through sev
eral administrations.
Mr. Haldeman. Quite true.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know whether his chief assistants were new
whether or not they had been there through prior administrations ?
Mr. Haldeman. I don't know for a certainty because I don't kno^
any of them, and I don't know what the administrative structure ol
the Bureau is, but it is my understanding that there were not mani
changes. That the men who were there were men who were there for f
long time.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Mr. Haldeman, I have no further ques
tions, thank you.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Haldeman, the staff thinks that you haven'i
fully complied with the subpena duces tecum, and I haven't had ai
opportunity to investigate the matter, so I am going to suggest thai
the staff notify you wherein they think that you may have failed tc
comply with it, by letter, and then you can consult your attorney anc
get his advice and take whatever course of action you see fit.
Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.
3227
Senator Ervin. I don't think we can straighten it here now, and it
may be an inadvertence that could be corrected. So I will ask the staff
to write you a letter.
Mr. Wilson. Does this conclude the examination today of this
witness ?
Senator Ervin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wilson. May I make a statement ?
Senator Ervin. Well
Mr. Wilson. I want to make a motion, and I would like to have, if
possible, all the members of the committee present, but particularly
Senator Inouye, because I am going to address my remarks to and
about him.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Wilson, the rules do not permit that, and the
rules just allow you to advise your client and to object to the compe-
tency of evidence.
Mr. Wilson. This is a law point.
Senator Ervin. Sir ?
Mr. Wilson. This is a law point.
Senator Ervin. Well, we are not passing right now on law points,
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Well, whatever you call them up here then.
Senator Ervin. If your client wants to make a concluding statement,
J le is entitled to make one.
J Mr. Dash. Under our rules, Mr. Haldeman, you are entitled to make
J I concluding statement as well as an opening statement. If you wish
I address the committee and make a concluding statement, you cer-
j :ainly may.
Mr. Haldeman. I understand the rules. I made an attempt to cover
J n my opening statement everything that I felt I could bring before
^ his committee to be of help to it in its inquiry. I have attempted dur-
j ng the time I have been here with the committee to be fully responsive
[ ;o the questions put to me and to help in any way further that I could
u n its inquiry, and I will continue to assist any appropriate legislative
)r judicial body in their efforts to reach the facts, to ascertain and
, iiake known the truth in the Watergate case, and, as a final comment,
I would simply like to reiterate my pride in having served as an assist-
mt to President Nixon for the first 4 years that he served this Nation
. is President of the United States.
It is, and I know that it will be, the high point of my life, and I
J. want to express appreciation to all of the people with whom I served
|( in that White House during those 4 years, who have given so much
, and worked so hard to meet the standards that all of us believed were
j set before us by the President and by ourselves, and I express my
deep regret and sorrow that in a few instances there was a failure in
J. that regard. I am not sure where that failure was yet, and I don't
think this committee is sure where that failure was, and I don't think
!j the people are sure where that failure was. I hope that that will be
„ determined, because only when it is will it also be known where the
,t failure wasn't, and the one thing I am absolutely certain of from the
J bottom of my heart is that that failure wasn't on the part of the vast
] majority of fine men and women who have served and are serving with
President Nixon in his efforts to lead this Nation.
3228
Senator Ervin. Mr. Haldeman, I want to thank you on behalf of
the committee for your testimony and also commend the manner in
which you answered questions. You answered questions and then
stopped, and your answers were responsive to the questions, and that
is the reason, I think, we were able to finish your examination in 3 days.
And I want to commend you on the manner in which you have answered
questions.
Mr. Wilson, we don't ordinarily entertain motions, but if you will
indicate the nature of your motion, I will be glad to take it up with
the committee.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I wish Senator Inouye had been present because
he has injured my client, John Ehrlichman
Mr. Haldeman. Now, you did it. [Laughter.]
Mr. Wilson. I am so pent up about this I don't believe I can be
so articulate.
Senator Inouye has injured my client, John Ehrlichman, on one
occasion, and this morning he injured this client of mine by what I
think was a blow below the belt, and I wanted to discuss both of them.
Senator Ervin. I would suggest that you take this up with Senator
Inouye and see if you all can reach a satisfactory adjustment in the
matter.
Mr. Wilson. I don't think it is possible we can do so.
Senator Ervin. We can't do it in his absence, I don't believe.
Mr. Wilson. Would you like to hear the grounds, sir ?
Senator Ervin. No, sir. I don't believe the committee will pass on
criticism about committee members.
Mr. Wilson. This is in defense of my client in this very room.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, can I make a suggestion ? We have
called on Mr. Haldeman to respond to certain questions, I believe, more
or less legal or technical questions, with regard to the response to the
subpena duces tecum. Since obviously Mr. Wilson's motion, or what-
ever it is, relates to Senator Inouye, and since under any circumstances
this committee would have to consider where that motion would lie
rather than before we got to the matter of the motion itself, might 1
suggest, Mr. Chairman, and to you, Mr. Wilson, that if you do, in fact
have a motion to make in this respect, we will be glad to hear what you
have to say, but would you make it at the same time that you make youi
response, or Mr. Haldeman will make, to the request from the staff or
the sufficiency of the response to the subpena duces tecum.
It seems patently obvdous that you feel very strongly about it. It
seems just as obvious that it would not be fair to go forward with that
without Senator Inouye here, and I think we ought to get a first look at
the thing in writing before we try to come to terms with it.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Vice Chairman, one of my motions, and I am not
going to mention what it is, has to do with expunging from the record
certain things. I think you may have been out of the room, and the
record will be typed up by tomorrow morning and it will be in there
and to me it is important that I get my motion before you before the
record is typed up.
Senator ER\^N. The record we make is tentative and we will give
you a chance to designate those portions after the record is typed up.
The record is typed up immediately. It does not become the permanent
3229
ecord and so we will give you an opportunity to designate those parts
nd we will take it up in the committee and in executive session.
Mr. Wilson, But, sir, the things that were said, the questions that
rere asked, which were highly irrelevant, and you ruled they were, are
oing out to the world as a pai't of the record of this case, and this
omes from a man who also called my client, John Ehrlichman, a liar
ver national television, and I think
Senator Er^tln. Well, you can deal with that, national television is
jOt on the committee.
i Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I think we have a good way to han-
le this. If, in fact, Mr. Wilson will submit his position, I am sure the
)mmittee will consider it. And if it appears necessary, Mr. Chairman,
)r Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman to return, in conjunction with
;r. Wilson's motion, we can take that up later; but I really suggest
' Mr. Wilson, and I would be bold enough to suggest to the chairman,
lat we see what he has in mind and reserve the right to treat it either
I public session or in executive session as the facts and merits may
I dicate.
Senator Ervin. Yes, I think that would be the wise course of action.
I The committee will stand in recess until 9 :30 in the morning.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
30 a.m., Thursday, Augusts, 1973.]
THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington, D.C.
The Select Committee met, pui-suant to recess, at 9 :35 a.m., in room
18, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Er\dn, Jr. (chair-
lan), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
rurney, and Weicker.
Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred D.
'hompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief coun-
,il; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
i)avid M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
j iiief counsels ; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton,
illonald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Ij lugene Boyce, hearings record counsel ; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
, linority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
[lobert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
I isearch assistant ; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye ; Robert
aca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
j-aker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; John Walz,
ublications clerk.
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
I am constrained to make some remarks concerning a member of this
)mmittee. Senator Danny Inouye of Hawaii. Senator Inouye is an
jnerican, native-bom American of Japanese ancestry. I do not know
finer American. He showed his devotion to our country by fighting
nder its flag, not only for the liberty of our country, but for the lib-
dy of the free world in the Second World War. He suffered severe
ounds which necessitated the amputation of his right arm. He was
ecorated with the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary
eroism in action with an armed enemy of the United States. And he
as proved himself in the latter days as one of the most dedicated
.mericans this country has ever known, and I feel that events of yes-
irday make it appropriate for me to make these remarks concerning
member of this committee who has proved himself one of the most
allant of all Americans in the history of this Republic.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. ^Ir. Chairman, may I say that I have known Danny
mouye since I have been in the Senate. There is no man who is more
(3231)
3232
loyal or dedicated to his country. I do not know anyone on this com
mittee who has made a greater contribution to its efforts than Senatoi
Inouye. I have a great affection for him as well as a great admiratior
for him. We are in a tension- filled atmosphere and it is unfortunatf
that things of this sort occur.
I think a mark of Senator Inouye's greatness is that I am sure i
will not affect his further consideration of matters that are brough
to our attention, and I am sorry that the events of the last several day;
have occurred. I hope and think that it will not affect the objectivit;
and the efficiency, the effectiveness, of this committee, and I comment
you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing that matter to the attention of th
official record, I believe now that it is behind us and we can get on wit]
the business at hand.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervin. If there are no further comments, the counsel wi
call the first witness.
Mr. Dash, Former Director Helms.
'Senator Ervin. Will you stand up, and raise your right hand ? D
you swear that the evidence you shall give to the Senate Select Coir
mittee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth, tli
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Helms. I do.
Senator Ervin. You might state your full name and present addre.'
for the purposes of the record.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. HELMS, AMBASSADOR TO IRAN
Mr, Helms. My name is Richard Helms, and I am presently An
bassador to Iran, resident in Teheran.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could we suspend for just a moment
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Dash. Mr. Helms, I should have addressed you as Ambassad(
Helms, and Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Helms will be questioned in
tially by Mr. David Dorsen, assistant chief counsel.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe the witness has bee
sworn.
'Senator Ervin. Yes.
Senator Baker. Was he sworn ?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr, DoRSEN. Ambassador Helms, how long have you held yoi
present position ?
Mr, Helms, I have been in Teheran since the middle of March <
this year.
Mr, DoRSEN. And prior to that, were you the Director of the Centr:
Intelligence Agency ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, I was. Director of Central Intelligence was my titl
Mr. DoRSEN. How long were you Director ?
Mr, Helms. Approximately 6^ years. I believe I was sworn in c
June 30, 1966, and I left office when Mr, Schlesinger became Direct(
on February 2, 1973.
Mr. Dorsen, How long have you been or were you with the Centr
Intellisrence Agency ?
Mr, Helms. From the day its doore opened in 1947.
3233
Mr. DoRSEN. Did you learn, Ambassador Helms, in July of 1971,
hiat E. Howard Hunt had been made a consultant to the White House ?
Mr. Helms. I was informed of this.
Mr. DoRSEX. And do you recall how you were informed ?
Mr. Helms. Not specifically any longer. I just remember being told
lat he had gone to work for the White House, but precisely under
hat circumstances I was told and on what specific date I do not recall.
Mr. DoRSEN. Did you have a conversation with General Cushman
mcerning Howard Hunt in the summer of 1971 ?
Mr, Helms. Yes. I recall that General Cushman informed me that
e had authorized giving to Howard Hunt a tape recorder and a
limera, and I asked for what purpose and he said he wanted to conduct
one-time interview, and that he had been properly authenticated by
16 "White House and that he was working at their behest.
Mr. DoRSEN. How long have you known Howard Hunt ?
Mr. Helms. I had known him over the years when he worked for the
jgency.
i Mr. DoRSEN. And do you recall approximately how long he worked
)r the Agency ?
Mr. Helms. He must have worked for almost somewhere over 15
jars an3rway.
! Mr. DoRSEN. And what was General Cushman's position at that
me?
Mr. Helms. In July 1971 ?
Mr. DoRSEN. That is correct.
Mr. Helms. He was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. DoRSEN. To your knowledge, was the tape recorder and the cam-
a given to Mr. Hunt ?
Mr. Helms. I was informed that it was, and my preoccupation at the
ne was to find out whether these were normal pieces of equipment,
id by "normal", I mean simply available in any store in downtown
ashington that carried this kind of equipment, or whether there was
mething tricky about them and I was assured they were purely
utine, straightforward pieces of equipment.
I might say parenthetically within the last couple of days, in talking
ith some of the gentlemen at Special Prosecutor Cox's office, there is
me memorandum there about a clandestine camera having been given
Howard Hunt. I frankly don't know, sir, what a clandestine camera
The camera takes pictures or it doesn't, that is all it was.
Mr. DoRSEN. Could you describe the camera a little bit more ?
Mr. Helms. I have never seen it.
Mr. Dorsen. Do you know whether it was a camera that was con-
aled in some way?
Mr. Helms. I was told it was put in a tobacco pouch, carried in a
ibacco pouch.
Mr. Dorsen. Were you advised of any further requests by Mr. Hunt
r assistance?
Mr. Helms. Subsequent to this conversation of which I have just
i en speaking I learned, I believe in a memorandum, that Mr. Hunt
;ked to have a secretary who was stationed with the CIA in Paris
ought back from Paris and assigned to him in the White House.
e also wanted this to be done secretly and he didn't want anybody
know about it. That, to me, was unacceptable. I saw no reason for
3234
this. It seemed to me that the Agency was being used, if it was bein
asked to have somebody brought back to Paris and assigned to a ma
doing unidentiified chores at the White House, so I got hold of Ger
eral Cushman and told him that I thought this was totally unacceptabl
and I wouldn't stand for it. I don't recall whether it was then or a fe^
days later but at some point the various additional requests whic
Hunt was making of the Agency seemed to be totally unacceptabL
and I asked General Cushman to call Mr. Ehrlichman and tell hii
that we just weren't going to do this anymore.
Mr. DoRSEN. Now you have indicated that in your conversation wit
General Cushman that you indicated to General Cushman that Joh
Ehrlichman should be called. Why was it that John Ehrlichman wi
to be called ?
Mr. Helms. Because it was my distinct impression that he was tl
one who had arranged with General Cushman to have Hunt get thes
pieces of equipment.
Mr. DoRSEN. Wlien for the first time did you learn of the burglai
of Dr. Louis Fielding's office; that is, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psycliii
trist's office?
Mr, Helms. I forget which weekend in May it was, I think the se
ond weekend of May this year, 1973. I was in Shiraz, and I picked u
on Sunday an English language newspaper and saw on the first pa*
of it there had been a burglary in the office of a psychiatrist in Cal
fornia and the burglary had been done, it was said in the newspapi
story, with the assistance of CIA equipment. That was the first tin
I had ever heard of Dr. Fielding, a burglar, or the fact that Dr. Ell
berg had had a psychiatrist.
Mr. DoRSEN. Do you Imow of your own knowledge whether ai
equipment was used in the burglary that was the property of the CI.^
Mr. Helms. I have been assured by members of the Agency, ai
this assurance was given me when I was back here in May testifyii
before four other congressional committees, that the equipment th
was given to Hunt was not used in the burglary of Dr. Ellsberg
office, that actually Mr. Hunt was physically not at the office, he w;
staked out at Dr. Fielding's residence, and that since he wasr
given any burglary equipment by the Agency I have alwa
wondered how it was that he used that equipment in the break-in, i
this is one of the things that seem to have been perpetuated as one (
the myths around here that he somehow got burglary equipment f roi
the Agency which helped him to break into places and I am not awa:
of any burglary equipment he ever got from the Agency.
Mr. DoRSEN. During the summer of 1971, did you learn of a reque
by a member of the Wliite House staff for the Central Intelligen
Agency to do a psychological or psychiatric profile of Dr. Ellsberj
Mr. Helms. Yes ; I was familiar with this request. Sometime befo
this Mr. David Young, who was one of the assistants at the Whi
House, had originally been on Dr. Kissinger's staff, informed me th;
he was being transferred to ]Mr. Ehrlichman's staff, in other word
he was going to work for Mr. Ehrlichman, and that he had been giv€
duties in connection with general security procedures in the Goven
ment, classification of documents, investigation of leaks, and a clutc
of other such matters.
3235
Subsequent to that he called me and said that he wanted to get into
lese things, he wanted to find out how the Agency and the intelligence
. immunity handled the classification of documents, and other security
ocedures, and I said I thought that under the circumstances that the
'st thing for me to do would be for me to put him in touch with the
gency's Director of Security, a gentleman named Howard Osborne,
ho would then be able to talk with him and be as responsive to his
quests as the Agency could be.
It was apparent to Mr. Osborne that Mr. Young originally made
I e request for a profile on Mr. Ellsberg. Mr. Osborne then brought
lis request to me.
Mr. DoRSEN. Excuse me. Could you briefly summarize at the present
■ ne what this profile is ?
Mr. Helms. There had been — well, I guess — I am sort of searching
:r a word here, but in any event, over a period of some years the
.^ency had developed a technique for putting together a lot of infor-
1 ition about a foreigner, maybe a foreign statesman or a foreign dig-
1 :ary, and then attempting to analyze what sort of a human being he
\is. These things were called variously, I think, psychological pro-
1 is, is as good a title as any, psychological stud.y. The idea was to give
i dghts into what motivated some of these individuals, why they did
i ings the way they did, and so forth.
David Young knew that the Agency wrote papers such as this
1: iause he had seen them when he was on Dr. Kissinger's staff. So, he
t ;n said that he wanted the Agency to do this and he remonstrated
^ th him. I said we have nothing — we know nothing about Dr. Ells-
1: g. I have never laid eyes on him in my life. We have no records on
i n. We know nothing about him and I think this is an imposition to
i c us to do this.
FTe pleaded with me. He said that this was very important, that the
^ hite House was very much interested in getting this material sorted
t, that Mr. Ehrlichman regarded it as highest priority, so did Dr.
ssinger, that we should help that, we were the only ones they knew
town that did things of this kind, had practice in doing them, and
jase, would we do so.
[ want to say here that the Agency has a charge under the statute —
i National Security Act of 1947 which makes the Director responsi-
for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unau-
)rized disclosure. That is written into the law. And this is a charge
it has been on the Director since 1947. And it has been a very difficult
irge because finding out how leaks occur and how the enemy gets
ivilege information and things of that kind is very difficult to do
thout having an investigative staff and the Agency never has had an
^estigative staff for these purposes and therefore this charge about
ks and investigations therefore has been a very difficult if not
possible charge to carry out. And when I was testifying before the
nate Foreign Kelations Committee back in May, in response to a
3stion from Senator Hubert Humphrey, I suggested that this Ian-
age in the law either be taken out or amended in such a way that it
IS a fair charge on the Director rather than what I felt was an
fair charge, but it was that charge which gave him the leverage to
•ll^her oblige me to go along with an effort to make this profile.
3236
Mr. DoRSEN. Did the staff of the Central Intelligence Agency there
after prepare such a profile ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, they did.
Mr. DoRSEN. And was it forwarded to Mr. Young ?
Mr. Helms. I understand that it was forwarded to Mr. Young, tha
it was found to be unsatisfactory, that Mr. Young remonstrated wit
the people who had written it about the fact that it was unsatisfactorj
I believe it was — I have learned since that it was pointed out to ther
that more material was going to have to be provided, otherwise, the
couldn't do any better than they had done already, and Mr. Youn
said, "All right, we will try and get you some more material," whic
I believe he did.
'So that the second profile was written.
Mr. DoRSEN. And was the second profile delivered to Mr. Youn
also?
Mr. Helms. I believe so.
In other words, this is the second version. I think probably that i
better English.
Mr. DoRSEN. And did you have a conversation with Mr. Young i
connection with the delivery of the second profile to him ?
Mr. Helms. Yes. As a matter of fact, I did call him and I told hir
that the psychologists and psychiatrists who worked on this were ver
disturbed about the whole exercise. They didn't feel the material the
had been given was adequate, that they were being put in an unfai
position, that they didn't want their professional reputations put o
the line as a result of this kind of an exercise, and that if he was insist
ing on having this, then I wanted his understanding and his undei
standing that he would not identifv it for the Agency and put thes
fellows in jeopardy, put these fellows' professional reputation i
jeopardy.
Mr. DoRSEN. During the period that the two profiles were prepare
which I believe took us into early November of 1971, what was you
understanding as to the identity of the persons over at the White Hous
who were involved in requesting the profile and providing informatio:
to the Aarencv for the profile ?
Mr. Helms. I never heard of anybody being connected with thi
exercise except Mr. David Young, and when I returned here in ]\Ia
of this year, 1973, 1 was informed at the Agencv that durinsrthis perioc
this psychologist who had been consulting with David Young at th
White House, that Howard Hunt had been present on one occasior
anyway, and that he had specificallv asked not to inform me that h
had been present. They certainly did not inform me, so I was totall.
unaware of his identification with this exercise in any form whatevei
Mr. DoRSEN. And the first time you heard about his participatio]
was in May of 197S ?
Mr. Helms. That is correct.
Mr. DoRSEN. To the best of vour knowledge was anv of the materia
that was used in the preparation of the psvchological profile derivec
from the ofRce of the psychiatrist of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg or from an}
other illegal or improper source ?
Mr. Helms. I have never heard that alleged.
Mr. DoRSEN. I would like now to direct vour attention to June o
1972 and ask you when for the first time did you hear of the break-ii
j 3237
1 of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the "Watergate ?
1 Mr. Helms. It is my impression that I heard about it, read about it
in the newspapers and heard it on the radio, but this is not any lapse
of memory. This is just one of those things that this far back it is
hard to know just exactly who might have told me or how I might
have heard it. Certainly it was big news from the moment it happened.
Mr. DoRSEN. And during the days immediately following the
i break-in were there conversations at the CIA concerning the break-in ?
i Mr. Helms. Yes. In the first place, sometime on that weekend I
received a telephone call from Mr. Howard Osborne, the Director of
Security, to inform me that — of the names of the individuals who had
participated in the break-in and also to say that Mr. Hunt in some
fashion was connected with it. Mr. Osborne's call to me was a perfectly
routine matter that had been — there was a charge on him as Director
of Security to inform me whenever anybody in the Agency got in any
kind of trouble, whether they were permanent employees or past
employees. In other words, right now, so I didn't have to catch up
with these events like suicides and house break-ins and rapes and the
various things that happened to the employees of any organization in
a city like Washington, so this was a perfectly routine thing and
vvhen he heard about these ex-CIA people who had been involved in
this burglary he called me up and notified me about it.
On Monday, when I came to the office, there had been no mention
in the papers of Mr. Hunt. So I got hold of Mr. Osborne and said how
come you told me that Mr. Hunt was involved with this and he said,
"Well, there were some papers found in the hotel room, one of the
hotel rooms with Hunt's name on it and it looks as though he was
somew^here in the area when the break-in took place." So I said, "All
right," and then from then on, obviously there were various conversa-
tions in the Agency as we went to work on various requests from the
FBI for information about the people and their backgrounds, and so
forth, that had formerly been employed by the Agency.
Mr. DoRSEN, Am I correct that James McCord also was a former
employee of the Agency ?
Mr. Helms. He was.
Mr. Dorsen. And when did Mr. McCord and Mr. Hunt leave the
employ of the Agency ?
Mr. Helms. They left it at different times in 1970. They were both
retired, as I recall it.
Mr. Dorsen. Now, directing your attention to June 22, 1972, which
was the day before your meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Halde-
man, and General Walters at the White House, did you have a con-
versation with Patrick Gray on that afternoon ; namely, the afternoon
of June 22?
Mr. Helms. I believe that the committee is in possession of a memo-
randum which says — a memorandum or note from Mr. Gray that says
I had this conversation. I have no reason to question that at all. I
was talking back and forth with Mr, Gray at various times in con-
nection with this Watergate break-in, so I have no reason to doubt
that there was one on the 22d of June.
Mr. Dorsen. In these conversations did you discuss the possibility
of CIA involvement in the break-in ?
ri6-296 O - 73 - Bk. 8
3238
Mr. Helms. I assured Mr. Gray that the CIA had no involvement
in the break-in. No involvement whatever. And it was my preoccupa-
tion consistently from then to this time to make this jKjint and to be
sure that everybody understand that. It doesn't seem to ^et across very
well for some reason but the agency had nothing to do with the Water-
gate break-in. I hope all the newsmen in the room hear me clearly now.
Mr. DoRSEN. I would like to move then to June 23, 1972, and ask
you if you recall attending the meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr.
Haldeman, and General Walters.
Mr. Helms. I do recall attending that meeting.
Mr. DoRSEN. Where was that meeting held ?
Mr. Helms. That meeting was held in Mr. Ehrlichman's office on
the second floor, office wing — west wing of the White House.
Mr. Dorsen. Do you recall the time of that meeting ?
Mr. Helms. The meeting had been originally scheduled for 12
o'clock. It was changed to 1 o'clock and it took place shortly after 1
o'clock.
Mr. Dorsen. Could you please describe to us in substance what hap-
pened at that meeting?
Mr. Helms. General Walters and I arrived first and waited for a
few minutes. Then Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman came into the
room. As best I can recall what was said, Mr. Haldeman did most of
the talking, so — and whatever Mr. Ehrlichman contributed in the
course of this was either to nod his head or smile or to agree with
what Mr. Haldeman said. I just simply want to introduce it this way
because it is a little easier for me to describe.
Mr. Haldeman said that there was a lot of flak about the Watergate
burglary, that the opposition was capitalizing on it, that it was going
to — it was apparently causing some sort of unified trouble, and he
wanted to know whether the Agency had anything to do with it. I
assured him that the Agency had nothing to do with it. He then said
that the five men who had been found in the Democratic National Com-
mittee headquarters had been arrested and that that seemed to be
adequate under the circumstances, that the FBI was investigating what
this was all about, and that they, unified, were concerned about some
FBI investigations in Mexico.
He also at that time made some, what to me was an incoherent ref-
erence to an investigation in Mexico, or an FBI investigation, running
into the Bay of Pigs. I do not know what the reference was alleged to
be, but in any event, I assured him that I had no interest in the Bay
of Pigs that many years later, that everything in connection with that
had been dealt with and liquidated as far as I was aware and I did
not care what they ran into in connection with that.
At some juncture in this conversation, Mr. Haldeman then said some-
thing to the effect that it has been decided that General Walters will
go and talk to Acting Director Gray of the FBI and indicate to him
that these operations — ^these investigations of the FBI might run into
CIA operations in Mexico and that it was desirable that this not
happen and that the investigation, therefore, should be either tapered
off or i-educed or something, but there was no language saying stop,
as far as I recall.
At this point the references to Mexico were quite unclear to me. I
liad to recognize that if the White House, the President, Mr. Halde-
3239
man, somebody in high authority, had information about something
in Mexico which I did not have information about, which is quite pos-
sible — the White House constantly has information which others do
not have — that it would be a prudent thing for me to find out if there
was any possibility that some CIA operation was being — was going to
be affected, and, therefore, I wanted the necessary time to do this. I
say this in explanation of the fact that there seems — ^that since I had
consistently pointed out that no CIA operations had been violated by
any investigation up to then, that we had had nothing to do with the
Watergate burglary, the fact of the matter was that if an investiga-
tion continued to go on it might run into something we were doing in
Mexico. This possibility always had to exist. No^dy knows every-
thing about everything. So at this point I think it was repeated a sec-
ond time that General Walters was to go and see Acting Director Gray
with this charge. It was then indicated that Acting Director Gray
would probably be expecting the call, that he was looking for some kind
of guidance in this matter, and that this should take place as soon as
possible. I believe Mr. Ehrlichman at that point made his sole con-
tribution to the conversation, which was that he should get down and
see Gray just as fast as he could.
We left this meeting, General Walters and I, and went downstairs
to the automobile and I spoke to General Walters along the following
lines. I said when you go to see Acting Director Gray, I think you
should confine yourself to reminding him that the Agency and the
FBI have a delimitation agreement, an understanding for many years
that if the Agency runs into any FBI agents or operations, the FBI
shall be immediately notified and if the FBI runs into any agents or
operations, it shall be immediately notified.
I was not sure whether Acting Director Gray was familiar with this
because he had not been Acting Director of the FBI for very long. I
wanted General Walters to understand about this because he had been
with the Agency, I think, only about 6 weeks at that time, had been
having briefings, and I was not sure whether this had ever come to
his attention. In other words, I was asking him to make a legitimate
request of the Acting Director of the FBI, that if they ran into any
CIA operations in Mexico or anyplace else they were to notify us
immediatelv, and I thouarht General Walters should restrict his con-
versation with Acting Director Gray to that point. Precisely whether
he did or not, well, you will have an opportunity to ask him.
Mr. DoRSEN. To your knowledge, did General Walters have a meet-
ins: with Patrick Gray ?
Mr. Helms. Yes; he had one very shortlv after this meeting in the
White House because he reported to me later in the day about his
meeting with Gray, that he had been to see him, that the general pur-
port of what they had discussed, and then the first time I Teamed that
Acting' Director Grav had told General Walters at this meeting about
some monev having been sent to Mexico. I was unaware of any monev
having been sent there at the time, and even that explanation did not
sav what the money was for. But also floating around in this at the
time was the name of a Mexican lawyer that we had been asked to
check out bv the FBI to find out if this man was in any way connected
with the CIA. His name was Oflfarrio. I believe, and we had been run-
ning a tracer, which is a work of art of going through the record to find
3240
out and check with our people in Mexico to see if they knew him, and
so forth, and it was some day subsequent that we got the information
back that he was indeed a lawyer in Mexico, but we had never had any
connection with him and I so notified the FBI.
Mr. DoRSEN. Now, on Monday, June 26, did General Walters receive
a telephone call from John Dean ?
Mr. Helms. General Walter's told me that he had been called by a
man he did not know in the White House named John Dean, and that
Dean had asked to see him, and when Walters said, "Well, what do you
want to see me about," and so forth, I believe Dean referred to the mat-
ters on which we had talked with Haldeman and Ehrlichman on the
previous Friday. In any event. Dean said to General Waitere, "If you
want to verify my bona fides and who I am and my authority to talk
with you please call John Ehrlichman."
So by the time Walters talked to me he said he had talked to Dean,
had verified by telephone conversation with Ehrlichman that it was
all right to talk to Dean and that he was going down to see him.
Mr. DoRSEN. "WTien General Walters came back from seeing ]\Ir.
Dean, did he talk to you about the meeting ?
Mr. Helms. He reported the meeting to me and told me that Dean
had raised with him this question of the Watergate burglary, that
there was a lot — ^there were a lot of problems in connection with it,
problems unidentified. Was there any way in which the Agency could
help, and so on.
It was quite clear that some kind of feelers were being put out to see.
(a), if there was any agency involvement or, (6), whether the agency
was prepared to assist in some way which was not at all identified.
It was at this meeting with General Walters when he was reporting
this to me, that I told him that I wanted him to be absolutely certain
that he permitted nothing to happen using the agency's name, facil-
ities, or anything else in connection with this business. I said I did not
care whether he wanted to be a scapegoat, 1 did not care whether he
was prepared to quit on the issue, I did not care anything about that.
I simply wanted him to do absolutely nothing because I told him point
blank even though he was a military oflficer and even though he was a
Presidential appointee, that if he did something wrong it would
besmirch the name of the agency no matter whether he took the blamc^
or not, and that was simply not going to happen, I wanted him to be
abundantly clear on this in any conversation he had with Mr. Dean or
anybody else and as he reported to me on the subsequent two converea-
tions with Mr. Dean, I not only reaffirmed this but I said, "You han«j:
in there, you are doing fine, but don't you yield an inch."
Mr. DoRSEX. You have alluded to the two meetings that General
Walters had with John Dean on the 27th and 28th. Did General
Walters notify you before each meeting and brief you as to what oc-
curred after each meeting: ?
Mr. Helms. General Walters was very good about this. As best I
recall it, he told me each time he was going down there and when the
meeting was over he came back and reported what had taken place
at it.
Mr. DoRSEN. Could you briefly summarize, of course. Ambassador,
what General Walters told you with respect to the meeting of the 27th
and the meeting of the 28th ?
3241
Mr. Helms. It is my recollection that it was at the meeting of the
27th, which was Tuesday, I believe, that the issue first came up of
whether or not the CIA, out of its covert funds, was prepared to pro-
vide bail money for the defendants in the Watergate burglary. Not
only did this issue come up, but I also believe that the additional point
was made would it be possible for the CIA to pay the salaries of these
individuals while they served their jail sentences. General Walters, and
I have told you about the conversation I had with General Walters the
day before about how he was to guide himself in this matter, pointed
out to Mr. Dean that the Agency could not possibly do anything like
that. That he had no authority to do it on his own, that his authority
is derived from me and that he knew what my position was, and in
addition, he said he could not conceivably imagine that a thing like
that would remain secret forever, and last but not least, under the
ground rules which we operate with the Congress, or which the Agency
operates with the Congress of the United States, any exceptional ex-
penditure of this kind would have to be identified with the chairman
of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the chairman of the
House Appropriations Committee. This obviously cooled Mr. Dean's
ardor.
Mr. DoRSEN. And it was so reported to you ?
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Mr. Dorsen. During the week of the 26th did you receive a telephone
call from Patrick Gray with respect to setting up a meeting between
representatives of the two agencies ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, I do recall a conversation to set up a meeting be-
cause I was anxious to have one with him. There were a lot of traces
we were running, the involvement of these former CIA people that we
had been passing to the FBI, there was starting to be a lot of leaks out
of the FBI for the first time that I could remember on matters of this
kind but leaks of ongoing operational material, and I wanted to get
together with him and some of his people to see if we could not get
some of these things not straightened out so much as get to walking
along in harmony.
So we agreed to have the meeting the next da;^. The next morning,
which I believe was the 28th, I may be mistaken, it is all in the record,
I am sure, he called back and said that he was so busy that he could not
make the meeting, it was not possible for him to hold it and he would
probably have to put it off until the following week. I told him I was
sorry about that because I was planning to leave the end of the week in
which we are speaking to go to Australia and that I was not going to
be there the following week, if he had a meeting, it was going to have
to be with General Walters.
Mr. Dorsen. Now, may I ask you about the second two meetings on
the 27th and 28th between General Walters and Mr. Dean ? Did the
summarv that vou gave us apply to the two meetings together or was
that solely with respect to the meeting of the 27th ?
Mr. Helms. I am not able any longer, Mr. Counsel, to sort out
precisely what, out of my own memory what occurred at each of these
meetings. I have two very clear recollections, one was that it was at
the second meeting that the question of the bail money came up because
I don't recall that at all in connection with my longer conversation
with General Walters after the first meeting. As far as the third meet-
3242
ing was concerned, my distinct impression of that was that this was
just more feelers and it was relatively short because Mr. Dean was get-'
ting nowhere with General Walters.
Mr. DoRSEN. Just one or two questions more, Mr. Ambassador. Yoi;
were familiar, were you not, with the fact that General Walters wae
preparing memorandums of these meetings ?
Mr. Helms. Yes ; because after the issue came up of possible bail oi
paying the salaries of the fellows who had broken in, this struck mt
we were getting into an area here which was very questionable, verj
questionable indeed and, therefore, these various meetings ought to b(
a matter of record in case this ever came up at any future time. So ii
was at that point that in a conversation, as I recall it. General Walters
either General Walters or I, or both of us, agreed that these thing;
ought to be reduced to writing and a record ought to be kept.
Mr. DoRSEN. Am I correct then that you did go to Australia arounc
July 1 of 1972?
Mr, Helms. Yes, I did.
Mr. DoRSEN. And that Patrick Gray did not reschedule the meeting
between the two of you before you left.
Mr. Helms. I never met with him.
Mr. DoRSEN. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Helms, as I understand it you had a conversa
tion with Patrick Gray on June 22, when you advised him that th<
CIA was not involved in the break-in. Was your conversation limitec
to CIA involvement of the break-in or did you go into whether or no
the investigation might uncover other CIA operations possibly ?
Mr. Helms. I don't recall ever discussing with Mr. Gray this ques
tion of its uncovering other CIA operations.
Mr. Thompson. Strictly the break-in discussion,
Mr. Helms. We had no involvement and I believe as part of thi:
conversation there was this business about the Mexican lawyer ; I don'
recall whether he was specifically mentioned, the Mexican lawyer wa:
mentioned at that time, but Mr. Gray had on his mind in some way th<
idea that there was some CIA involvement that they were running
into and I was attempting to reassure him that this was not the case
as best I knew it,
Mr. Thompson. CIA involvement in the Watergate break-in itself
Mr. Helms. Or in some way connected with it.
Mr. Thompson. I see. Did he state the source of his concern*
Mr. Helms. He never did.
Mr. Thompson, Did he indicate whether or not it was due to tht
Bureau's own investigation or whether or not someone else had tolc
him that from outside the Bureau ?
Mr, Helms. I was unable to tell. I simply was surprised that this
kept coming up.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
So the next day you had the conversation with Mr. Walters, Mr
Haldeman, and Mr, Ehrlichman as I understand. I would like to gc
over briefly what you stated was discussed in that conversation. I be-
lieve you stated that Mr. Haldeman indicated that the Watergate was
being capitalized on, that five members had been arrested and that
seemed adequate and that sort of thing. Obviously the Watergate
3243
investigation was the reason for the meeting, was it not, as to what the
investigation might disclose. That was the basis for the meeting.
Mr. Helms. Well, I can only assume in hindsight that it was, Mr.
Thompson, because at the time nobody had identified to us why we
were being called to the White House. In other words, we arrived and
waited to know what the sub j ect of the meeting was.
Mr. Thompson. When they stated their concern about possible Mexi-
can involvement or Mexican involvement with the CIA, they of course
were talking about the Watergate investigation turning up other in-
volvement ; were they not ?
Mr. Helms. I assumed this is what they were talking about, yes. But
as I mentioned a moment ago, and I do want to underline this, I was
totally unfamiliar at that time with what Mexico had to do with
anything.
Mr. Thompson. But you had talked to Pat Gray the day before and
I believe you stated that you thought that he might have mentioned
a Mexican lawyer at that time.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, but when the Mexican lawyer's name was
mentioned there was never any implication as to why they were even
asking about him so that this was not very revealing.
Mr. Thompson. What I am concerned about is just the extent to
which the Watergate situation was actually discussed. I think it would
be fair to say that from what has been reported and from some of the
testimony in this forum and others that the Watergate investigation
was the reason for the concern, and that there could be a legitimate
concern that it could have been a possible coverup of the Watergate
investigation itself. This is the area I would like to address myself to
and I would like to refer to your testimony before the Committee on
Armed Services, Thursday, May 17, 1973.
Now, I had a little bit of difficulty getting this myself last night
or this morning and I have just investigated it. If you would like in
the course of my discussion of it for us to recess with permission of
the chairman of the committee so you can have a copy of it or copies
of certain pages, I feel like we can do that. But if it is all right with
5'ou I will go ahead and proceed right now and read certain portions
of that and ask you certain questions based on that.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I note that the transcript from which
Mr. Thompson is about to read is nominally classified as secret. I take
it that there is no objection on the part of the committee or any claim
on the part of the committee that it does not have the authority to per-
mit counsel to go ahead and read from that document as it relates to
the mandate for inquiry of this committee.
Senator Ervin. As I understand from the resolution, also from the
statement made to the staff of attorneys by the White House attorneys,
they left the question of matters of this kind to the determination of
the committee.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I entirely agree with that. I simply
wanted to make sure that the record reflect it at that point. It is the
committee's position that notwithstanding the nominal secret classi-
fication, that by reason of our inherent authority and by reason of com-
munications to us from the Wliite House, that we have the authority
to read from that document into the public record.
3244
Senator Ervin. And I might add that the Senate committees which
took this evidence have also said as far as they have it in their power
they consent to the use of it.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Helms, were Mr. Walters and yourself being
questioned at the same time on this occasion ? Were you in the same
room together ?
Mr. Helms. On that occasion General Walters was sitting on my
right and General Cushman was sitting on my left and we were in the
room together the whole time.
\ Mr. Thompson. All right. Let me read, if I might, and if you prefer
m^o read other portions that go back a little further, then I will, but
there is a general preliminary section here where you state it was not a
very long conversation, and you had mentioned the Bay of Pigs.
Mr. WooLSEY. Let us go back to the meeting itself for a moment. When Mr.
Haldeman said that it had been decided that the General should call on Mr. Gray,
did he say or intimate in any way who had decided upon that course of action?
Ambassador Helms. Well, you can make an intimation of that but I would
rather not draw out the intimation, if the Chairman will relieve me of that. Here
was Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, the two most senior officials in the White
House next to the President himself, giving this instruction. And I really feel
like now, as I did then, that it would have been presumptuous to have pressed
them any harder as to how they had come up with this, or where they had gotten
the idea, or who was behind it.
Mr. WooLSEY. You said Mr. Haldeman mentioned the Bay of Pigs. Did he men-
tion the Watergate case itself in the course of the conversation?
Ambassador Helms. No.
Mr. WooLSEY. He did not?
Ambassador Helms. No.
Senator Symington. General Walters, you confirm that, do you?
General Walters. Yes, sir. He did not mention the Watergate.
Senator Symington. I heard you volunteering, and as long as you did, I
thought it should be on the record.
Mr. Woolsey. Maybe this is something that we should get cleared up. But the
Committee was given a copy of General Walters affidavit
General Walters. He did in the introduction when he said, this case had stirred
up a lot of things and the opposition is attempting to exploit it. That was the
reference I testified to previously. I believe as he came in he said, the Watergate
has stirred up a lot of things. And the opposition is attempting to exploit it-
this is General Walters talking — and it has been decided that you will go. That
was the inevitable lead into the whole reference.
Senator Jackson. He decided that you will go?
General Walters. To Mr. Gray, tell him that if he pursues the Mexican part
of the financing of this business it will uncover CIA assets or schemes for moving
money.
Mr. WooLSEY. I should perhaps read into the record here a few sentences from
General Walters' affidavit : "As I recall it, Mr. Haldeman said that the Watergate
incident was causing trouble and was being exploited by the opposition. It had
been decided at the White House that I would go to Acting FBI Director Gray
and tell him that now that the five suspects were arrested, further inquiries into
the Mexican aspect of the matters might jeopardize the CIA's activities in this
area."
Was there any discussion in the meeting at all of Watergate?
Ambassador Helms. Not to the best of my recollection. And I frankly was hard
put at the time to understand what Mexico was involved with. This was only a
week after the break-in. I did not know why Mexico was being mentioned, and
it never occurred to me that it had anything to do with the Watergate burglary.
Senator Symington. General Walters, do you agree with that?
General Walters. To me the whole question was connected by virtue of the
beginning of the thing when he said the Watergate could be opened as a prelimi-
nary, as a lead-in, as to why he wanted me to go. It was obviously a lead-in to
this, but he did not go into any discussion of the Watergate other than what I
said in the beginning.
3245
Then you go to other matters, Mr. Helms.
Let me see if I smnmarized this correctly. The question was put
directly to you first, as to whether or not there was any Watergate
discussion and you said there was not.
Mr. Helms. That was the way I recalled it, Mr. Thompson, at the
time. Since then I have seen General Walters' memorandum for the
record. I have talked with him about this and we went over again what
had occurred and I frankly at that point had forgotten this lead-in to
the conversation. After all, I had been away for some time. I had been
involved in other things and if my memory was less than perfect at
that time, it was less than perfect. I had no intention of jiggery,
pokery, or anything else.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I am certainly not accusing you or any other
witness of anything but I do want to clear it up. Let me make sure I
have my chronology right. I am reading from page 21-A of the tran-
script : The question was posed to you, you said, "No." He said, "Did
you know ?" You said, "No."
"General Walters, do you confirm that," and General Walters said
'Yes, sir, he did not mention the Watergate." Then Mr. Woolsey said,
'This is something we should get cleared up," and he refers to General
VValters' affidavit at that time which he had previously submitted in
which he mentioned these things.
Mr. Helms. Mr. Thompson, what I am referring to and what I saw
subsequently was a memorandum for the record which, I believe, is in
he custody of the committee which was written several days after this
Tune 23 conversation.
Mr. Thompson. Correct. That is the memorandum dated June 28,
L972, 1 believe.
Mr. Helms. I think that is correct, and it was that memorandum
ivhich I subsequently saw which I had not seen at the time I was
estifying. I talked to General Walters about it. I had no reason at that
)oint to question General Walters' memorandum. He has an excellent
ibility to recall. As you probably are aware, he is an excellent linguist
md anybody that can speak five or six languages with the ability that
le can, certainly has the mental equipment to recall something for 5
lays after the events took place. And I obviously talked to him about
his and had clearly forgotten that introductory aspect of this.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Helms, are you basing your testimony now on
/our own memory or on Mr. Walters' memory ? I mean, you recounted
;our faith in his memory which I am sure is probably well placed, but
[ would think that this would be a rather significant matter.
! If Haldeman and Ehrlichman as has been widely reported from the
:)asis of this memorandum which I just referred to, came in and said,
! ive people have been arrested and that ought to be enough, and if that
s the lead into how the CIA or FBI should conduct its investigation
md the basis of CIA contact with FBI, I would think that this was
' something that you would remember.
! So, I am realiy trying to determine whether your testimony is based
ipon your own independent recollection or iust after having read this
nemorandum and your faith in General Walters' recollection.
Mr. Helms. Well, it is a combination of the two, Mr. Thompson, be-
cause when he logged my memory and we went back over the meeting
'ogether, then I did recall these other remarks having been made.
3246 ,
Mr. Thompson. Well, he jogged your memory here in the testimony
before the committee also. On page 21-A here after a member of the
committee evidently raised the matter of the affidavit of memoranduir
General Walters said this — he did in the introduction when he said
referring to the meanings of the Watergate, that this case had stirrec
up a lot of things and the opposition is attempting to exploit it.
I believe jour testimony here today was attempting to capitalizt
on it. [Reading:]
That was the reference I testified to briefly, I believe —
and I assume he is referring to his affidavit or memorandum —
I believe as we came in he said the Watergate has stirred up a lot of things '
The opposition is attempting to exploit it. It has been decided that you will go
that was inevitable lead-in.
Mr. WooLSEY. I should perhaps read into the record a few sentences of Genera
Walters' aflSdavit
and then at that time they read into the record a few sentences oJ
General Walters' affidavit which you just referred to which is th(
memorandum I referred to.
As I recall it, Mr. Haldeman said that the Watergate incident was causing i
lot of trouble being exploited by the opposition, decided by the White House,
should go on Acting Director FBI Gray, and five suspects were arrested. Furthei
inquiries into the matter might jeopardize some CIA activity.
And another question is put by a member of the committee :
Was there any discussion in the meeting at all of Watergate?
Ambassador Helms. Not to the best of my recollection.
Mr. Helms. Well, I didn't recall at that time but when I went ovei
this with General Walters and we tried to piece this meeting together
then I did recall that these matters had been alluded to.
Mr. Thompson. Did it occur to you or has it affected you eithe
consciously or subconsciously, that it could be to some extent em
barrassing to General Walters if you testified contrary to him ?
Did you discuss that possibility with him when you went over thes«
matters ?
Mr. Helms. No, because I saw him just a moment before we actuallj
went into the room.
Mr. Thompson. Of course, it was after you got into the room before
you realized that you had any conflict in your testimony, was it not '
Mr. Helms. That is right.
Mr. Thompson. And you were in the room before you first realizec
what this memorandum stated, were you not ? And the memorandumi
if I
Mr. Helms. As a matter of fact, that memorandum was not on fil*
at that time as I recall it. There was an affidavit, but I believe that those
memorandums were submitted subsequently to the committee. I maj
be wrong.
Mr. Thompson. In comparing your testimony today with what hii
memorandum says, a couple of things do strike me. His memorandum
dated June 28 says that :
June 23, at 1300 on request I called Director Helms on John Ehrlichman and
Robert Haldeman in Ehrlichman's oflSce at the White House.
Haldeman said that the "bugging" affair at the Democratic National Com-
mittee headquarters at the Watergate apartments had made a lot of noise and
the Democrats were trying to maximize it.
3247
Then down here he said —
Since five suspects had been arrested that this should be suflBcient.
Let me ask you a few other things about this memorandum while we
are on it, Mr. Helms, He states in here also that Haldeman said the
whole affair was getting embarrassing and it was the President's wish
that Walters call on Gray and suggest to him that since five suspects
had been arrested this should be sufficient. It was not advantageous to
have the inquiry pushed, especially in Mexico.
Do you recall the President's name being mentioned ?
Mr. Helms. No, I still don't agree with General Walters about that.
I don't recall it having been put that way.
Mr. Thompson. Director Helms said, again reading from the Wal-
ters' memorandum, he talked to Gray on the previous day, they made
plain to him that the Agency was not behind the matter and was not
connected with it. None of the suspects were working for it nor had
<vorked for the Agency in the last 2 years. He had told Gray that none
Df the investigators were touching any covert projects of the Agency,
current or ongoing.
Did you tell Mr. Gray that it was touching none of the covert projects
)f the Agency or did you have any basis for saying that at that time ?
Mr. Helms. I was unaware of any covert projects of the Agency
:hat had been touched on up at that time.
Mr. Thompson. Did you tell Gray that, if you recall, or did you just
limply tell him the CIA was not involved in the Watergate break-in ?
Mr. Helms. I told him the CIA was not involved in the Wategate
)reak-in. I do not recall that I had told him that it had not thus far
'un into any CIA covert projects.
Mr. Thompson. Did you tell him that none of the suspects was work-
ng for the CIA nor had worked for the Agency in the last 2 years ?
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. At least one of the suspects had worked for the CIA
Drevious to the last 2 years, then, is that correct ?
Mr. Helms. Who was that, sir ?
Mr. Thompson. Well, I am asking you. You said none of them had
worked for the CIA within the last 2 years. I assume that before that
it least one of them had.
Mr. Helms. Well, Mr. McCord had been an employee for the CIA
"or 20 years before he retired. Mr. Hunt had worked there at least
he 15, maybe more, and a couple of the Cubans had at some time had
I contractual relationship with the Agency.
Mr. Thompson, Do you know which two Cubans ?
Mr. Helms. Do you mind giving me the names ? I am not a computer
md I can't
Mr. Thompson. Would it be Barker, perhaps Mr. Barker?
Mr. Helms. Barker, I think, had a relationship back in the early
sixties. I think — is Sturgis another individual ?
Mr, Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Helms. I think he at one time had been. Martinez had been on
iort of a retainer to report on individuals who came in from Cuba as
o whether they would be worth interrogating or interviewing or not
n Florida, and he had been on that retainer of about $100 a month
)ii the understanding that he would report in from time to time when
3248
he had something to report. When I found out that he was still or
the — had this connection with the Agency at the time of this break-in
he was cut off.
Mr. Thompson. When was he cut off ?
Mr. Helms. Right after we had discovered that he was Involved ir
the break-in.
Mr. Thompson. You mean Martinez was on retainer by the CIA ai
the time of the break-in ?
Mr. Helms. That is right. But in Florida, for the purpose I havt
identified.
Mr. Thompson. I beg your pardon. In Florida — I didn't understanc
that last statement.
Mr. Helms. Mr. Martinez was the resident in Florida as far as th(
Agency knew. Because he lived in Florida and because he was a Cubar
exile, he was kept on a loose arrangement whereby he would report t(
the Agency from time to time Cubans who got out of Cuba eithei
legally or illegally whom he thought might have some informatioi
that would be useful to the U.S. Government and then he would repon
in and give the name of this individual.
Mr. Thompson. When was he taken off retainer by the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. When it was ascertained that he was involved in th
break-in, he was taken off right then.
Mr. Thompson. When was it ascertained that he was involved ii
the break-in?
Mr. Helms. Well, I assume when his name was given to us by thi
FBI, which was the — I imagine within 24 hours or 48 houi-s or 7
hours after the break-in.
Mr. Thompson. How was this done? Did the CIA communicate wit-
Mr. Martinez ; was there any paperwork involved ?
Mr. Helms. I do not recall the precise details of the way it was done
There are many people in the Agency who could tell you — it may evei
be in your record — the Agency has been most cooperative in turninj
over lots of written material about these various matters and I imagin
it is in there someplace. I just do not remember.
Mr. Thompson. It seems to me, Mr. Helms, that there might wel
have been concern as to the role of the CIA by all parties involved a
this particular time right after the break-in in June of 1972 if, in fact
one of the persons who had broken in was at that time on retainer b}
the CIA. Did you know at the time of your conversation with INIr
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman on the 23d that Mr. Martinez was ii
fact on retainer ?
Mr. Helms. I do not recall. I imagine I may have. But that does noi
mean that the CIA was involved in the burglary.
Mr. Thompson. No, sir ; no, sir.
Mr. Helms. And I do not think you ought to put words in my mouth
Mr. Thompson. I did not think I was. The issue seems to be whethei
or not there was legitimate concern with regard to either at that time
whether the CIA was involved in the burglary or whether or not otliei
covert CIA activities might be exposed, or whether or not Haldemar
and Ehrlichman quite frankly were using this as an excuse to cover uj
the Watergate investigation which also quite frankly has been wideh
implied, to say the least. That is what I am trying to get at.
I 3249
" Now, you have already mentioned the fact that you had talked to
Patrick Gray and there was some talk besides the people involved in
the Watergate break-in ; McCord was a former CIA agent ; Hunt was
a former CIA agent; Martinez was on retainer at the time of the
break-in; Sturgis, a former contact, a former employee of the CIA,
Also I understand there was some talk about an attorney down there as
being a CIA contact, I suppose would be the correct way to put that,
would it not ?
Mr. Helms. That was what we were asked, if we had any connection
with him.
J Mr. Thompson. You talked to Mr. Gray, I believe, on June 27 about
Mr. Ogarrio down there ; did you not ?
Mr. Helms. The FBI asked us if this Mexican lawyer had any con-
j nection with the Agency. We conducted an investigation to ascertain
, whether or not he had, and I reported to Mr, Gray that he had no
, connection with the Agency ; we knew nothing about him.
J Mr. Thompson. But what I am trying to get at is the 27th — 4 days
I after this meeting — there was still some discussion as to whether or
not there was a problem of Mr, Ogarrio, If my notes are correct, Mr.
Gray called you about this matter at about 11 :30 a.m., and you could
^, not or did not respond immediately. You returned Mr. Gray's call at
3 :40 that afternoon, and said that the CIA did not, in fact, have any
J, interest in Mr. Ogarrio ; is that your recollection ?
Mr. Helms, That is right. But I want to point out, Mr, Thompson,
J in case there is any question in your mind that whenever we were
. initially asked about this Mexican lawyer it would have taken a few
days to ascertain this, to be sure about it. We have to check files and
j, records and we would have to check with people in Mexico, and this
is not something that would happen from one minute to the next. But
, I do not recall when the first inquiry was made to us about a man
J named Ogarrio, I just simply know from the records since I have
p consulted the record on this point, that I did report this back to Mr.
J Gray that we had no connection with him, the Agency had no con-
nection with him on June 27. I believe you have documents there in
^ my own handwriting attesting to this. -
( Mr. Thompson. Well, Mr. Helms, in order that we are as clear as we
can be on this, I would like to ask you one more time whether, to the
'[ best of your independent recollection, Mr. Haldeman did say that the
opposition was capitalizing on the Watergate and five men had been
, arrested, and that was adequate?
Mr, Helms. I cannot vouch for those exact words. But as I recon-
, structed this meeting with General Walters and went over it with him,
there was some sort of a lead-in or reference at the beginning of the
conversation to this burglary,
Mr, Thompson, And it was after your sitting there in the same room
r with General Walters and hearing his testimony that it did, in fact
occur, and it was after your reading his memorandum where he stated
that it did in fact occur, before you first mentioned yourself that you
recalled that it did in fact occur, is that correct ?
Mr. Helms. That is relatively — yes, I am sure, that is good enough
anvway.
Mr. Thompson. I have no further questions, thank you.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
3250
Senator Montoya. I just have two questions, Mr. Chairman, than]
you.
Mr. Ambassador, did you know James McCord personally ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. How long had you known him ?
Mr. HJELMS. Well, it is hard to tell you when I might have first me
him but I saw him from time to time during, let us say, the time tha
I was Director of the Agency during those 6i/^ years, I recall his hav
ing been in my office on two or three occasions on various matters.
Senator Montoya. What kind of a man was he ?
Mr. Helms. He had a good reputation.
Senator Montoya. And what was his reputation for veracity ?
Mr. Helms. I have never had any cause to question Mr. McCord'
reputation for veracity.
Senator Montoya. Would you say that his reputation as a humai
being, as a man, as an employee was very good ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, it was. He left a good record behind him.
Senator Montoya. And what can you say about Mr. Hunt ? Had yoi
known him ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, I did know him.
Senator Montoya. What was his reputation ?
Mr. Helms. Well, Mr. Hunt was — had a, well, he had a good reputa
tion, there was some questions at various times during his employmen
about how well he carried out certain assignments but there wa
nothing malign about this. It was just a question of his effectivenes
Mr. Hunt was a bit of a romantic, he used to write books in his spar
time, and I think there was a tendency sometimes for him to get a littl
bit carried away with some of the things he was involved in but he ha
never done an5rthing illegal or nefarious that anybody was aware o
and when he left the Agency he left a decent record behind him.
Senator Montoya. What would you say about his reputation fo
veracity ?
Mr. Helms. Well, I have said, sir, that he was a romantic, I thin
that I just do not have any way of being able to answer that. I wouL
have assumed that in matters of importance he would tell the truth.
Senator Montoya. Now, since you spent so much time as Directo
of CIA, the Agency, what recommendations can you make to thi
committee concerning new legislation to help prevent the misuse o
the Central Intelligence Agency for political or other purposes othe
than the assigned purposes delineated in the act?
Mr. Helms. Well, Senator Montoya, I do not know how one leg
islates these matters. I have never understood how morality and prope
conduct and decency can be legislated about. In Washington over th
years, there have been many occasions when various people have triei
to manipulate some organization or another in an improper way. Thi
is not new to us, we read about it in the papers constantly, but how yo^
legislate about this I swear to you, sir, I do not know.
Senator Montoya. Would you say that in view of your experienc
with respect to this episode there was an attempt by some people t<
manipulate the Agency and its facilities ?
Mr. Helms. Well, there was no question that there seemed to be ai
effort to "use it." In quotes. Quote, use it, unquote.
Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
3251
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Ambassador, during the period of time from
January 20, 1969, until the spring of 1972, January 20, 19
Mr. Helms. January 20, 1969. I am just trying to fix the date.
Senator Weicker. Eight, basically, from the beginning of 1969.
Mr. Helms. From Inauguration Day ?
Senator Weicker. Yes.
Mr. Hjjlms. I see.
Senator Weicker. To the spring of 1972, were there occasions when
you were contacted by either the Attorney General John Mitchell, or
the Deputy Attorney General Eobert Mardian ?
Mr. Helms. Well, I used to see Mr. Mitchell quite frequently because
Mr. Mitchell had duties given him by the President that had nothing
whatever to do with the conduct of the affairs of the Department of
Justice, so I saw him with some regularity in meetings in his office on a
variety of matters having to do with the affairs of the Agency and
with our various operations.
Senator Weicker. Were there any times when in these contacts with
either Mr. Mitchell — I don't recall your having said whether or not
you had ever met Mr. Mardian or not.
Mr. Helms. I did meet him. I met him one day in Mr. Mitchell's
office, as a matter of fact.
Senator Weicker. Were there any contacts that you had with either
Messrs. Mardian or Mitchell where you were asked to bring the CIA
into investigations of a domestic nature ?
Mr. Helms. I don't recall any such meetings. I know that the time
that I mentioned that I met Mr. Mardian in Mr. Mitchell's office,
it is my recollecton that the reason he was there was that he had been
put in charge of an internal security operation or division of the
Justice Department, and that he was going to get together a group of
individuals from the various intelligence organizations to sit with him
in an effort to make up some reports and analyses, and so forth, about
domestic unrest and things of that kind, but it was always made very
clear by me, and I never was challenged by Mr. Mitchell that anything
that we contributed to these meetings had to be as a result of our work
overseas of material we had developed there which may have some
bearing on things in the United States. For example, the Fedayeen,
the terrorists, we had been working on them, we had been working on
certain people involved in drug smuggling and a variety of things.
Senator Weicker. But at no time, in other words, or there wasn't
any sort of a pattern of requests of trying to bring the CIA into mat-
ters that you would consider properly outside the scope of the CIA.
I am not questioning your reaction at all.
Mr. Helms. I don't recall them, Senator Weicker.
'Senator Weicker. Do you recall discussing with the committee staff
that you were being pushed into the domestic investigation area ?
Mr. Helms. This committee staff?
Senator Weicker. Yes.
Mr. Helms. Well, at various times questions come up, well, I remem-
ber one time there was a discussion with some of these, the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board about domestic operations, and
so forth, and they didn't think they were going satisfactorily and could
the Agency make a contribution to this and I pointed out to them
3252
very quickly it could not, there was no way. But this was a matter thai
kept coming up in the context of feelere, how can we do a better job
isn't there somebody else that can take on some of these things if tht
FBI isn't doing them as well as they should, are there no other f acili
ties. It was in that context, it was not a direct pressure on me "Go do it.'
Senator Weicker. Did you ever consider resigning your position an
Director of the CIA because of these types of feelers or indications''
Mr. Helms. No, Senator Weicker, I don't mean to be immodest bui
I felt that I understood about these matters and these delimitation
and I thought I could take care of the Agency better if I stayed when
I was.
Senator Weicker. I gathered from your statement that you have i
great pride in the Agency.
Mr. Helms. I do, sir.
Senator Weicker. And the only point I am trying to bring out, anc
let me just relate to your last answer, did you have any concern thai
if you left the Agency as its Director that it might get into these othei
types of areas ?
Mr. Helms. Well, I don't know that my thinking ever went quit(
that far but — because I had no reason to suppose that my successoi
would be a man of inadequate caliber.
Senator Weicker. But you felt that
Mr. Helms. I have been around a long time and I thought I under
stood pretty well what we were supposed to do and not supposed to do
and if there are any sins the Agency has committed they are on m^
shoulders, I am not palming them off on anybody else. I knew th«
ground rules and I knew the laws and all the rest of it and I did m^
very best to keep the Agency free and clean and sailing straight.
Senator Weicker. And I gather you felt that, you yourself felt that
it would do just that as long as you were — excuse the expression—
at the helm.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Weicker. In your meeting with Mr, Haldeman and Mr
Ehrlichman and General Walters and with General Cushman there ai
that meeting also, the meeting of the 2^3d.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir ; as I recall it we were asked to come togethei
by Senator Symington, and General Cushman was sitting on my left
and General Walters on my right and we were sitting right togethei
at the table.
Senator Weicker. Why wouldn't such a request as Mr. Haldemar
was making be made to you ? You were the Director of the CIA, and
the request that was being made was having to do with the Actins
Director of the FBI, so why not talk to yon ? Were you being talked
around here ? I would like to get your impression.
Mr, Helms. Yes, I was being talked around, and this^I don't know-
exactly in what form this came up but I was assured that it had been
decided that General Walters was to do the talking and obviously I
wondered at the time as to why.
Senator Weicker, Did you express any — did you make any comment
at the time ?
Mr, Helms. Saying that he shouldn't do it, that I should do it ?
Senator Weicker, No; that, you know turning to Mr. Haldeman.
3253
"Mr. Haldeman, if you have got anything to say to my Agency would
you please say it to me rather than to my subordinates."
Mr. Helms. I know 1 did not lemonstrate. JNo ; we were sitting there,
all the four of us, and it was being made clear this is the way it was
going to be done or they wanted it done that way.
Senator Weickek. I have no further questions at this time, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Vice Chairman, before proceeding I would
like to thank both of you for your very generous remarks this morn-
ing and, if I may, I would like to take the liberty of thanking you in
Hawaiian, Mahalo and Aloha, which means thank you very much and
I love you both.
Mr. Ambassador, you have indicated that as Director of the CIA you
had the statutory responsibility for "the protection of intelligence
sources and methods."
Mr. Helms. From unauthorized disclosure, Senator Inouye, is the
rest of the sentence.
Senator Inouye. Yes, sir.
Now during the period from June of 1971 until your new assign-
ment in Iran did you have occasion to report on matters falling under
that category to the President of the United States ?
Mr. Helms. No, sir ; I did not report any matter of that kind directly
to the President of the United States. We had a subcommittee of the
U.S. Intelligence Board charged with security. This involved a system
of clearance and how the community would work together in classify-
ing documents and matters of this kind. When there were leaks which
seemed to be unauthorized, particularly of material that was in intelli-
gence channels, the matter was referred to this U.S. security sub-
committee to see if any information could be ascertained as to what
agency of Government had leaked the information or what individual
of Government had given this information out. These investigations
usually aborted. Efforts were made to the security officers of other
agencies to find out who may have done these things iDut I don't remem-
ber any of them coming to any successful conclusion. We had no inves-
tigative staff for this. We had no rights to investigate in the State
Department, for example, or in the Department of Defense. We simply
counted on their people to contribute to this effort, but we had very
poor results and one of the reasons that I have felt burdened by this
charge and the statute over the years is that it gave me a responsibility
which I had no devices for carrying out.
Senator Inouye. Were these discussions ever held in the Oval Office
or the Cabinet Room or the President's Executive Office Building?
Mr, Helms. Well, not the discussions on matters having to do with
the Abuse of Security Committee. I am sure at various times in the 4
years since January 20, 1969, there were discussions about leaks. I
remember one early in the administration which took place in the Oval
Office, there were several Cabinet members there, and I remember I was
there myself.
Senator Inouye. Were you aware that these conversations may have
been taped ?
Mr. Helms. I was not.
96-296 O - 73 - Bk. 8
3254
Senator Inotjye. Mr. Butterfield has testified that these conversa-
tions were being taped.
Do you think, as Director of the CIA, it is your statutory respon-
sibility to get hold of these tapes ?
Mr. Helms. That it would be my statutory responsibility ?
Senator Inouye. Or whoever the Director is today. In order not to
compromise the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. Frankly, sir, it wouldn't have occurred to me, and I
didn't know that there were any tapes in existence while I was Direc-
tor, and since then I really haven't thought about it.
Senator Inotjye. If you knew that these were being taped, do you
think it would be a statutory responsibility under the National Secu-
rity Act for the Director of the CIA to call upon the White House to
receive those tapes ?
Mr. Helms. Well, sir
Senator Inouye. Because otherwise it might compromise the sources
and methods of the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. I wouldn't have thought so. Senator Inouye, because we
were supposed to protect them against unauthorized disclosure and
discussions with the President, and his duly cleared Cabinet ministers
would not constitute unauthorized disclosure.
Senator Inouye. A few days ago, we had testimony indicating that
three of these tapes were placed into the hands of a private citizen,
kept away from the official custodian for 48 hours. Would you consider
that proper ?
Mr. Helms. I would not consider that proper.
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, sir.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Ambassador, what were Hunt's areas of work
at the CIA?
Mr. Helms. Senator Gurney, he was with the Agency for many years
and had a variety of assignments.
Senator Gurney. You might pull that mike over.
Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I didn't move it over, I beg your pardon.
Senator Gurney. All right.
Mr. Helms. He had a variety of assignments, and I honestly think
I would be putting my memory to too much of a test to remember what
they all were. I remember he had one assignment in connection with
the operations leading up to the so-called Bay of Pigs, but that is
readily available in the Agency if you get his personnel record and that
would be accurate.
Senator Gurney. I am not interested in a detailed ac^'ount. I won-
dered if his areas were in the sort of work he was doing on June 17.
Mr. Helms. It would be hard for me to recall that but — I just don't
remember.
Senator Gurney. How often does the CIA help out former employ-
ees in the loan of equipment, as in the case of Mr. Hunt ?
Mr. Helms. Well, I can only say. Senator Gurney, that this was an
extraordinary exception, and it was done because we had been asked
to do it by the "V\niite House.
Senator Gurney. Has it ever been done before, to your knowledge I
Mr. Helms. Not to my knowledge.
3255
Senator Gukney. Well, do you think it has been done before without
your knowledge ?
Mr. Helms. There is always a possibility, Senator Gurney. It is a
large organization. I would hope not, but I can't say that it had never
been done ; no, of course not.
Senator Gurney. But at least no other CIA person has said to you
that, "Yes, we did this on some other occasion with so-and-so."
Mr. Helms. I don't recall that having been said to me.
Senator Gurney. But since this was such an unusual request, why
did the CIA go ahead and cooperate with Hunt ?
Mr. Helms. Well, General Cushman had already authorized this, as
I undei-stood, at the time on the basis of Mr. Ehrlichman having asked
that the Agency help. At that time, as I recall it he was. General Cush-
man was, simply told that this was for him to conduct an interview.
We had no way of knowing whether this was an interview in the
United States or an interview overseas, it had already ^ .. ?n done by the
time I learned about it, and the
Senator Gurney. Wliat was your reaction when Cushman told you ?
Mr. Helms. Well, I was not pleased about it because I didn't quite
understand why it was that he couldn't have acquired these things
someplace else.
Senator Gurney. Weil, I must say that same thought occurs to me.
If these were routine items of apparatus, the White House certainly
would have resources enough to get those themselves.
Mr. Helms. I would have thought so, Senator Gurney. I have
learned — ^I learned when I came back here in May, that there were
some other things given to him such as a voice changer or something,
and I believe that a wig has become almost legendary in this whole
matter, but I didn't recall anything about the wig at the time, but I
don't question that it was done.
Senator Gurney. Did General Cushman ever ask him now, Mr.
Hunt, what do you want these things for ? What are you going to use
them for ?
Mr. Helms. What General Cushman told me, as I recall it, that he
wanted this for a one-time interview, but General Cushman can cer-
tainly attest to these things for himself.
Senator Gurney. He didn't tell anything to you ?
Mr. Helms. At that time, I think it is only fair to remember that
nobody had ever suggested that anybody was going to do anything
illegal or improper.
Senator Gurney. I understand. But it is such an unusual request
and I am really surprised that no one had a little more curiosity about
what was going to be done.
Mr. Helms. Well, it was a very high-level White House official who
asked him for this help, and we tried to help, and it didn't seem it was
going to do anybody any great harm.
Senator Gurney. I guess probably your answer would be the same
to Mr. Young's request about the profile ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, I have genuine regrets about being pressured into
that. On Monday morning, there are a lot of football games which if
played again may have been played differently, and you know I am not
proud of that one.
3256
Senator Gurnet. There were, of course, these conversations with
Haldeman and Ehrlichman which you have described, and Mr.
Walters, I guess, had others that he reported to you about, and then
the conversations with Mr. Gray, and then, of course, the conversations
with Mr. Dean when he was pressing for things like bail money and
salaries while people might be in prison.
Did it ever occur to anybody to go to the President of the United
States about this time and advise him of these very unusual things that
were going on in the White House ?
Mr. Helms. Well, sir, my preoccupation at that time, and all through
these months, was to keep the Agency at a distance from this whole
problem, and when I saw — realized that these feelers were being made,
there was never a proposal made, it was never said, "Will you do this ?"
It was suppository, you know, would it be possible, is this something
that could happen, and so forth, and since we had stood firm, it seemed
to me that that was adequate under the circumstances.
Senator Gurnet. Well, I certainly commend you for that, and you
did do the right thing in keeping the Agency out of it.
In the phone call with Mr. Gray which you had did you think in this
phone conversation that he was trying to involve the CIA in any way ?
Mr. Helms. I didn't have that sensation, Senator Gurney. The sensa-
tion I had was I couldn't quite understand why it was that he kept
thinking that the CIA was somehow involved.
Now, what generated this on his part I don't know to this day quite
honestly but it seemed strange, well, we seem to be running into some
CIA involvement and I couldn't understand what he was talking about
or how he knew this because I couldn't see any involvement or I
couldn't find any involvement and what motivated this I don't know
and I honestly don't know even now.
Senator Gurnet. One final question. Mr. Thompson went over this
with you but I am asking another question and that, of course, is this
business of whether Haldeman and Ehrlichman were making their
requests or Mr. Dean, for that matter at the request of the President
of the United States and I don't want to go over that tesimony again,
I have heard it but let me ask you this : In all of these transactions be-
tween you and these people and Walters and these people that were
later reported to you, did you get any idea at all that President Nixon
was involved in any coverup here and wanting to use the CIA in the
coverup ?
Mr. Helms. President Nixon was not put forward by any of these
people in their discussions. They were conducting them on their own
as far as I was aware. Now, implicit in this was the fact that I was
talking to the President's chief of staff and what conversations he
had had with the President he never said, and, but he was such a senior
official that I had to assume that this was something that they wanted
done.
Senator Gurnet. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Ambassador, you have had a long and dis-
tinguished career, both as a member of the CIA for many years and
ultimately its Director for more than 6 years, and now as a distin-
3257
guished Ambassador representing the Government of the United
States.
Will you tell us why you left as Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency ?
Mr. Helms. I had a conversation with the President after the elec-
tion, I believe it was on November 20 at Camp David, and we talked
about it, my future, and he indicated that he wanted to make a change,
and this was in the context of making a lot of changes in the adminis-
tration. I was at that time pushing 60 and about to come to what we
had in the Agency as the regular retirement age, this is not a statutory
thing but I had a policy in the Agency that when officials got to be 60
that they retired, and this, therefore, seemed a good time to do this.
That is why I left.
Senator Talmadge. You did not leave on your own initiative, then ?
Mr. Helms. I did not submit my resignation in the form of — ob-
viously, the President always has your resignation. You do serve at the
pleasure of the President for the time being. That is what the com-
mission says. So that this was a mutually arrived at arrangement.
Senator Talmadge. You did not have any impression that you were
being pushed out ?
Mr. Helms. Well, it was not put to me that way, anyway.
Senator Talmadge. In other words, when the President makes a sug-
gestion, you do not have to determine whether you have been pushed,
shoved, or led ; do you ?
[Mr. Helms smiles.]
Senator Talmadge. Would that be an affirmative answer?
Thank you, sir.
Did the White House contact you for a reference when they employed
Mr. Hunt?
Mr. Helms. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Did you not think that was strange, to employ
an ex-representative of the CIA without checking on his credentials
with the Director of that Agency ?
Mr. Helms. I did. Senator Talmadge. In fact, I went to some trouble
at the time to see if anybody else in the Agency had been checked with
other than me, in other words, had they gone to the personnel office or
had they gone to the security office, and I established that no contact
was made with the Agency anywhere about Mr. Hunt.
Senator Talmadge. No contact whatever ?
Mr. Helms. No.
Senator Talmadge. Now, what was your reaction when Mr. Young
came to you in the summer of 1971 and informed you that the Presi-
dent's assistant, Mr. Ehrlichman, had assigned hirn to lead a White
House investigation of security leaks ? Were you surprised that that
was being handled outside the FBI ?
Mr. Helms. I suppose that I was, Senator Talmadge, but there had
been so much talk about leaks and so much concern about them at this
particular era that I suppose that what would have been normal sur-
prise was somewhat dulled by this fact that maybe they were not
getting very far in establishing how these leaks had occurred. This was
somewhat of an extra effort to get into this. But I
Senator Talmadge. Did not
Mr. Helms. But I want to sav to you now that I never dreamed that
this was going to lead to a kind of an activist role. I thought this was
3258
pulling the material together and doing those things which for years
had been done in the Government. This is not the first President who
has been concerned about leaks. That has been kind of an endemic and
chronic concern in the White House ever since I can remember.
Senator Talmadge. Did not J. Edgar Hoover have a reputation for
running a pretty tight ship ?
Mr. Helms. He did.
Senator Talmadge. And an eflBicient organization.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And anything relating to domestic activity the
FBI normally handled.
Mr. Helms. They did, and he insisted on it.
Senator Talmadge. And you insisted on handling the foreign ac-
tivity ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And you had a perfectly valid agreement be-
tween the two of you as to who would encroach on what activities and
not encroach on them ; did you not ?
Mr. Helms. We did. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. And it worked very well
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge [continuing]. You think, in the national interest.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Now, when they requested of you that you do
this psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg, how could such a profile be
made if psychiatric records were not obtamed ?
Mr. Helms. Well, Senator, there is a question of terminology' about
this. The psychological profiles which the Agency had been doing on
foreign individuals were not based on psychiatric records. They were
based on general intelligence information and from this information
and from interviews and things of that kind, all this material was put
together and an effort was made to draw a profile of this man as to
what kind of a human being he was, but there was never implicit in
this ever that you had to have psychiatric material in order to do it.
Senator Talmadge. In other words, you did not have to put him on
the couch.
Mr. Helms. No, sir. And none of them ever were put on the couch.
Senator Talmadge. I believe you testified that the only involvement
the CIA had in this entire operation was to provide a tape recorder
and a camera to Mr. Young ?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. That was to Mr. Hunt.
Senator Talmadge. To Mr. Hunt ?
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Senator Talmadge. And that was done at a request from Mr.
Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Helms. It is — my recollection of how that liappened was and
General Cushman, I believe, will be here shortly and, now, can clarify
this specifically, it was my impression that Mr. Hunt came to see Gen-
eral Cushman and asked him for these things, having been sponsored
by Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator Talmadge. Was it your understanding over the yeare that
when an assistant to the President of the United States or the Chief of
Staff of the President of the United States or the counsel for the Presi-
3259
dent or security advisor for the President request information or mate-
rials or equipment from the CIA that this request is from the
President ?
Mr. Helms. Well, this is implicit in it, sir, and Presidents have
tended in recent years to operate through these principal assistants
because they cannot be on the telephone all the time themselves and
one gets used to this course of dealing.
Senator Talmadge. If you had thought otherwise it would not have
been complied with ?
Mr. Helms. That is right.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Helms. Thank you, Senator Talmadge.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Helms, when did you firet come to know Mr. McCord ?
Mr. Helms. Mr. McCord ?
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Helms. Senator Baker, I do not recall exactly when I first met
Mr. McCord.
Senator Baker. I believe you indicated that you knew him some 20
years.
Mr. Helms. If I indicated that, and I did not think that I did, I
simply was making a statement to the effect that we had worked in this
Agency, the same Agency, over this period of 20 years, but exactly
when he came into my sight, when I first shook hands with him, I
honestly do not remember.
Senator Baker. Very well, I misunderstood. But I guess your testi-
mony then was that you knew of his employment by the CIA for about
20 years.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. And I had seen him on various occasions during
the period that I was Director. There was a project which came to my
ittention from time to time in which he was involved and I think he
may have been in my office three or four times during that period.
Senator Baker. Did you know the nature of his assignment responsi-
oilities within the Agency ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Baker. Could you tell us what they were?
Mr. Helms. They were in the security office and they had largely
CO do with the physical security of our properties and plans and things
if that kind. There was one time when he had an assignment dealing
with a defector and I believe that he was the man who was taking
3are of this defector and doing some interrogation of him.
Senator Baker. Was Mr. McCord generally regarded as a good
employee, an effective employee of the Agency ?
Mr. Helms. He was.
Senator Baker. Were part of his responsibilities to search for and
monitor the possibility of the installation of wiretap equipment in
U.S. installations by others?
IMr. Helms. I cannot recall whether he was in the countersurveil-
lance part of the security office or not. I am sorry. But this could be
easily ascertained.
3260
Senator Baker. Do you know whether or not a part of his functions '
were to monitor the current state of the art of electronic surveillance
equipment and to make recommendations on its usefulness to the
Agency ?
Mr. Helms. I do not remember. If there is a document to that eflfect
I have no reason to question it.
Senator Baker. Do you know in general whether or not Mr. McCord
was proficient and knowledgeable of the general field of electronic
surveillance ?
Mr. Helms. I think he must have known about it. I can only make a
comment here and I am not desirous of making anybody laugh, but it
is quite clear that those fellows who entered the Democratic National ;
Committee did not know anything about the active way of going into
buildings and getting out without getting caught.
Senator Baker. You sort of adopt the Ulasewicz theorem, that I
would not have gone in there with no army. Is that what you are
saying ?
Mr. Helms. I am not familiar with that statement, but
Senator Baker. All right. Is it fair to say, and I do not mean to
put words in your mouth, that you are implying, at least, or maybe
saying that the McCord operation was not in keeping with modern and
efficient standards of electronic surveillance as you know them?
Mr. Helms. Amateurish in the extreme.
Senator Baker. How do you square that with the idea that McCord
had been with the Agency for 20 years and that he was regarded as an
effective employee ?
Mr. Helms. Well, Senator Baker, I do not know whether these are
proper matters for me to discuss in this forum but I would like to
point something out to you.
The breaking and entering and not getting caught is a very difficult
activity and for it to be done properly, one has to have trained indi-
viduals who do nothing else and who are used to doing this frequently
and are trained right up to the minute in how to do it.
Senator Baker. Was McCord in that category ?
Mr. Helms. Obviously not. TLaughter.]
Senator Baker. Well, obviously — obviously the results would not
bear that out but you see what I am searching for, whether or not ho
was in fact proficient, notwithstanding that his performance was not
proficient.
Mr. Helms. That was not his function in the Agency as I ever recall
it, was to do this kind of thing.
Senator Baker. When did Mr. McCord leave the emplov of the
CIA?
Mr. Helms. In 1970. I have forgotten what month. He retired per-
fectly legitimately.
Senator Baker. It was a normal ordinary retirement from the
CIA?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. At his request ?
Mr. Helms. As far as I know.
Senator Baker. What about Mr. Hunt? I believe your testimony
is that he worked for the iVgency for 15 years, approximately; did
you know him ?
3261
Mr. Helms. Or more. I do not remember exactly how many years.
Senator Baker. For a significant length of time.
Mr. Helms. I do know him ; yes, sir.
Senator Baker. How well did you know him ?
Mr. Helms. I knew him relatively well because he and I over many
years worked for the same general section of the Agency.
Senator Baker. What was his responsibility for the Agency ?
Mr. Helms. Well, as I replied to Senator Gurney, he had a variety
of assignments and I would plead with you to simply ask the Agency
to give you the employment record because I do not recall it. I do
recall he had an assignment in connection with the operations leading
up to the Bay of Pigs. I do recall that.
Senator Baker. Can you describe for us what sort of activity he
had in the Bay of Pigs operation ?
Mr. Helms. I think he had to do with certain aspects of the propa-
ganda in connection with the — propaganda against the Cuban Gov-
ernment, the Castro government.
Senator Baker. There was a CIA operation ?
Mr, Helms. Yes.
Senator Baker. And this would have been in the early sixties, I
believe.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Was Mr. Hunt familiar with electronic surveil-
lance and surreptitious entry ?
Mr. Helms. I honestly do not know.
Senator Baker. Mr. Hunt, I believe, was on the payroll in some
capacity with the CIA. Was he an employee or a contractor ?
Mr. Helms. He was an employee.
Senator Baker. And I believe you indicated
Mr. Helms. A staff employee is what we call them.
Senator Baker. And that continued through shortly after June 17,
1972?
Mr. Helms. No. He retired and went to work in Washington for
somebody else and he retired sometime in 1970.
Senator Baker. Mr. Hunt's was not 1962 or 1965 ? Did he retire on
disability ?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. He retired because he was anxious to make more
money than he can make in the Government. He had had some finan-
cial problems due to the fact that a daughter had been in a bad acci-
dent and had developed some illnesses, I believe physical as well as
psychiatric, that he had run up a lot of doctor bills. He had a suit in
connection with this accident. I believe he was looking for an oppor-
tunity to make more money than he could with the Government.
Senator Baker. Was Mr. Liddy ever employed by the CIA?
Mr. Helms, No, sir.
Senator Baker. Or have any connection with it ?
Mr. Helms. Well, that having any connection with, I have found is
very dangerous. I have to watch myself about this. I was never aware
of any connection he had with the Agency.
Senator Baker. Did anyone ever inquire of you whether Liddy had
any relationship to the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. Well, I have been asked this at various times and I have
gi\'en the same answer that I have to you.
3262
Senator Baker. Yes, sir. I am not really trying to establish so mucl:
that he did or did not have a relationship as I am trying to establisl
whether or not an inquiry was made, particularly by the White Hous(
staff or someone connected with the- investigation of the Watergat(
subsequent to June 17.
Mr. Helms. I was never aware of any inquiry.
Senator Baker. All right. What about Mrs. Hunt ?
Mr. Helms. Somewhere in the dimness of my recollection I — coulc
we consult the actual emplojonent record ? It seems to me that Mrs
Hunt was at one time employed by the Agency before she married hiir
or something, but I am not sure about that.
Senator Baker. There has been published speculation to the effec
that Mrs. Hunt was very closely involved with the CIA and possibb
the superior of her husband, Mr. Hunt. Could you give me the insigh
into that?
Mr. Helms. Well, that is not true.
Senator Baker. OK.
Mr. Helms. Was she not employed in some embassy here in Washing
ton in recent years before she died ?
Senator Baker. I do not really think that may be mutually inclu
sive, Mr. Helms.
Mr. Helms. Well, it is. I want to make that clear. It is.
Senator Baker. Perfectly clear.
Mr. Helms. Perfectly clear. [Laughter.]
Senator Baker. But you have some dim recollection that Mrs. Huni
may at one time have been employed by CIA but you would want fo:'
us to check the CIA records ?
Mr. Helms. I would appreciate it if you would do that.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that that be done.
What about Mr. Barker? I believe you had testified he had somt
relationship with CIA.
Mr. Helms. That was a contractual relationship, I })elieve, in tb.
early sixties during the time when there was a great deal of activity ii
Florida over Cuban operations, I believe he was terminated in the mid)
die sixties and I do not believe there was any relationship with hin
after that time.
Senator Baker. Did you know Mr. Barker?
Mr. Helms. No.
Senator Baker. Mr. Sturgis ?
Mr. Helms. No, I do not know him either.
Senator Baker. Was he employed at one time by the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. In your files, Senator Baker, there is the testimony whicl
is classified, that I gave on February 7 before the Senate Foreign Rela*
tions Committee in which I discussed all these gentlemen and I wai
much better up to speed about their relationships at that time than
I am now and if you would not mind consulting that record, I woulo
accept it.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, in that respect I would propose
that the testimony of this witness and others before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, taken on May 17, 1973, March 6, 1973, anc
the Committee on Appropriations on May 16, 1973, and there is
one other one — which one is that — on February 7, 1973, be incor-
porated in the files and records of the committee with leave of the
3263
committee to decide what portions of that transcript may be excerpted
from inclusion in the record as appropriate.
Senator Ervin. If there is no objection, that will be done.
Senator Baker. jMr. Martinez worked for the OIA and I believe
he is the one who was taken off the payroll shortly after June 17, 1972.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you know Mr. Martinez?
Mr. Helms. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Is he the only one who was taken off the payroll
after June 17?
Mr. Helms. There were no others on it.
Senator Baker. I guess the answer is yes, then.
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Senator Baker. Thank you. And Mr. Martinez was receiving $100
a month
Mr. Helms. That is my recollection but that is in the February 17
testimony.
Senator Baker. Well, I won't burden the record in that respect.
According to my understanding of the summary of the staff inter-
views with you, Mr. Helms, these things appear and I will go through
them if you don't mind and stop as you may request, or you may
comment on them after I finish.
On July 7, 1971, General Cushman received a call from Ehrlichman
idvising that Hunt, a former CIA employee, had been added to the
security office in the Wliite House. Information was passed on by
Cushman to you on Friday.
Mr. Helms. Senator Baker, I interrupt only to say that I never
leard that he had been added to the security office of the White House.
[ just heard that he had been employed by the White House. I don't
■enow whether they have a security office.
Senator Baker. Yes, but in any event someone thought to notify
he Agency that a former employee of the CIA had been added to the
^Vhite House staff.
^Ir. Helms. Yes.
Senator Baker. So it was clear that someone at the White House
inew that this man was a former CIA agent.
jSIr. Helms. Yes, I can only assume that.
Senator Baker. And on July 22, according to our information, and
his I understand to be based on a summary of your interview with
he staff, on July 22, Hunt visited General Cushman and requested
he Agency, the CIA, to furnish him with identification documents,
m alias, and physical disguises. Are you aware of that?
Mr. Helms. Yes, I am, because I have seen a document recording
hat meeting.
Senator Baker. And they were supplied.
Mr. Helms. I believe — yes, yes.
Senator Baker. Was there any protest to the supplying of this
naterial to Mr. Hunt ?
Mr. Helms. Well, as I testified earlier, when I was informed of this
somewhat later — some of the items you mentioned I don't recall having
Deen told that he had been given, and it was the tape recorder and the
I
I
3264
camera that I recall having been told about and that is what sticks in
my memory.
Senator Baker. Did you later learn on good authority, particularly
from Agency authority, that Hunt requested and received bogus iden-
tification documents, an alias and a physical disguise ?
Mr. Helms. Yes. There was a voice changer, wasn't it, and a wig!
Senator Baker. I was coming to that. Then on several occasions
Hunt met with CIA people and received further alias documentation,
specifically the name of Edward Joseph Warren, disguise material
which I believe may have included a wig, a speech alteration device
which some of us would devoutly wish for, a recorder in a typewriter
case and a camera in a tobacco pouch.
Mr. Helms. I have heard that that is what he was given.
Senator Baker. And all these things were requested by Hunt of the
CIA, and CIA supplied them and this postdated the time when you
were notified that this former CIA agent was going to work for the
White House.
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Senator Baker. Was Mr. Liddy present — do you know or have you
since learned — on more than one of these meetings and received similai
disguises and alias documentation, especially in the name of George F
Leonard, at Mr. Hunt's request ?
Mr. Helms. Senator Baker, I have never met Mr. Liddy. I don't
know Mr. Liddy.
Senator Baker. Did you receive this information ?
Mr. Helms. I was given this information in May of this year.
Senator Baker. By CIA people ?
Mr. Helms. Yes. Is it not true that at the time that this material
was given to Mr. Liddy, it was given to him under an alias ?
Senator Baker. I believe under the name of George F. Leonard.
Mr. Helms. That may be.
Senator Baker. But I understand the name of George F. Leonarc;
together with the alias documentation was supplied by CIA.
Mr. Helms. Yes. My only point waS, at the time, he was not identi
fied to CIA people as Mr. Liddy, was he ?
Senator Baker. I am not sure.
Mr. Helms. I didn't think he was.
Senator Baker. He may or may not have been but my notes indicate
that Mr. Liddy, at the request of Mr. Hunt, was supplied with ar
alias, to wit, George F. Leonard, and an alias documentation to verifj
that identify, by the CIA. This postdated the time when the White
House had served notice on CIA that former agent, Mr. Hunt, was
coming in to their employ. On August 26, Mr. Hunt delivered to the
CIA film which he had taken for developing, and it was in fact devel-
oped by the CIA.
Mr. Helms. That is
Senator Baker. Did you know or have you seen that ?
Mr. Helms. No. I have been told that that occurred.
Senator Baker. And the CIA delivered prints from those negatives
to Mr. Hunt and kept file copies of the prints and negatives in the
CIA records.
Mr. Helms. I was — I don't know about these events from firsthand.
Senator Baker. Well, have you learned
3265
Mr. Helms. So what I may have been informed may not be accu-
rirate. I had thought that when the film was developed, the developed
film was returned plus the films themselves, that the only thing the
Agency retained was some sort of a Xerox of the photographs.
Senator Baker. But in any event
Mr. Helms. The negative, in other words, is not still in the posses-
sion of the Agency I 'believe.
Senator Baker. But the prints were.
Mr. Helms. Xeroxes.
Senator Baker. All right. Xerox prints.
]\Ir. Helms. I say this. Senator Baker, only in the interest of pre-
cision because photographs that have been Xeroxed are not as clear
IS the original prints.
Senator Baker. Well, I agree with you they certainly are not but
yRo of those photographs, we learned from another part of the record,
,vas a picture I believe of Mr. Liddy standing in front of the deci-
nated files of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist which was a rather graphic
form of identification.
^Ir. Helms. I am aware of that.
J Senator Baker. But you are aware that some form of photographic
•ecord, probably a Xerox copy, of the photographs of the Ellsberg
)reak-in were retained in the OIA file.
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Senator Baker. And that the CIA received the film from Hunt and
leveloped it.
Mr. Helms. That is correct, but may I say that at that time nobody
3 cnew what these films represented. I have told that since, too.
Senator Baker. Surely it would arouse some modest amount of
uriosity to see that, and I won't pursue that any further because
hat is not the point I am reaching for, but on August 26, you were
id vised of increasing demands made by Mr. Hunt. He had already
iiade several which had been acceded to, the ones I have just
■ lescribed — increasing demands from CIA for technical and other
ssistance including that to be supplied with a personal secretary
hen located in Paris.
Did you have personal knowledge of that?
t Mr. Helms. I did and it was at that time that I spoke to General
'ushman as I have already said.
: Senator Bakj:r. That was in effect the straw that broke the camel's
• )ack.
i Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, you put that well.
Senator Baker. And you declined to go any further and my infor-
nation, based on the staff interview with you, Mr. Ambassador, indi-
■ates that you were apprised of these facts by Cushman and that you
old Cushman that Hunt had now gone too far and that Cushman
should tell Ehrlichman that no further assistance would be afforded
o Hunt.
yi' Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Cushman did apprise Ehrlichman on August 27,
tnd on August 30 and he sent you a memorandum on which you
vrote the word "good."
3266
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. Would you please read what General Cushmar
wrote to me on which I wrote the word "good." I think that makes
Senator Baker. Yes, sir. I don't have that in the summary staff gavi
me but I have now been handed what appears to be a Xerox copy o
a memorandum entitled at the top "Official Routing Slip." Item 6 say:
"Howard Hunt," and under remarks, with the date August 27, 1971
in the left-hand margin, "I called John Ehrlichman Friday and ex
plained why we could not meet these requests. I indicated Hunt wa:
becoming a pain in the neck. John said he would restrain Hunt."
And below that is the initial "C," I take it, from him.
Mr. Helms. Which was Cushman's initial.
Senator Baker. And below that is the word "good" with th
initial
Mr. Helms. E. H.
Senator Baker. R. H. That is the document.
Mr, Helms. A little hard to read but that is what it is.
Senator Baker. That, too, is a Xerox copy.
Mr. Chairman, this does not appear to be in the record. If it is not
might I ask that it be included now as an exhibit to the witness
testimony.
Senator Ervin. It will be marked appropriately as an exhibit an(
admitted in the record as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 122.*]
Senator Baker. Mr. Helms, is it clear from all of this, that the CIA
at whatever level — and you to some extent were aware of the fact tha
Mr. Hunt, at least, was deeply involved in Wliite House activity wit
CIA support— and that you blew the whistle after a great number o
things had already occurred ?
Mr. Helms. Senator Baker, if we go to July and August of 197:
I certainly was totally unaware of any illegal activity, any imprope
activity, or anything that would have raised a question about the typ
of thing that Mr. Hunt was involved in. I assure you there hadn'
been any intimation whatever that there was any question of a bui
glary, there was any question of stealing anything, there was an
question of his having committed any illegal or improper acts.
Senator Baker. I don't doubt that, Mr. Helms. I take your testimon.
the same way I do the testimony of every other witness. I start wit]
the good faith assumption that you swear the truth and I have n
reason to doubt that unless other and contradictory evidence is mad
to appear, but I don't suggest that I am trying to lead you into
contradiction. I am rather trying to establish a relationship on whic]
the White House or the CIA would base its perception of the fear tha
CIA might have been involved in these things.
Now, let's see how that goes. We have got Hunt, we have got McCord
we have got Barker, we have got Sturgis, we have got Martinez. W
have got two sets of forged identity documents. We have got a voic
alteration device. We have a wig, a camera, a tobacco pounch. We ha\-
got the processing service for that. We have got the certain knowledg
that all these things were discussed between White House staflF an(
CIA staff and I wonder if that doesn't lead us to the idea that whei
these people are caught that somebody would certainly say, well, wha
was the CIA involvement ?
*See p. a377.
j 3267
Mr. Helms. Well, Senator Baker, I have the jrreatest respect for you
md if you would — if those were the thought processes that have gone
hrough your mind I have no reason to argue with them. I simply, a
noment ago was not trying to make a self-serving statement. I was
limply trying to indicate that there has been a tendency, it seems to
ne, in recent times to have everything run in reel time, as though all
•f these things were known and had happened and that, therefore, one
hould have had the good sense to know this thing or that thing at a
ertain period of time and I simply was trying to point out that this
ras not the case.
Senator Baker. Well, I am accepting that at face value and by the
ame token I hope, Mr. Ambassador, you don't think these questions
re accusatory, certainly not of you, maybe not even of the CIA, prob-
bly not even of the CIA. But I am trying to establish a set of facts on
^hich perceptions might or might not be based, particularly whether
r not an inquiry should be made after the arrest and the attendant
(ublicity about whether or not the people involved were in fact CIA
ivolved.
I am not saying they were. I am trying to establish the validity of
n inquiry in that respect and I have not made up my mind on that
oint. I am going to weigh that very carefully as I am going to weigh
11 the other evidence and it is going to be February 28 before I state
conclusion. But your identification of these components is very help-
iil to me and I am grateful for it.
Mr. Chairman, I will conclude — I am sure my time is over but I
an't conclude without saying that I think Mr. Helms, at great per-
; )nal sacrifice, has agreed to appear before this committee and other
Dmmittees. His information has been most helpful. His testimony has
een forthright, I believe, and forthcoming. It may be that at a future
: me we will require other information from Mr. Helms but I hope not.
. Ce has a very important post to return to, but at this point — Mr. Chair-
i lan, I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Thank you. Senator Baker.
; Is not the Director of the CIA appointed by the President subject
) confirmation by the Senate ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Does the same thing apply to the Deputy Director ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
, Senator Ervin. Now, inasmuch as these materials were furnished to
J [r. Hunt in July and August 1971, at the request of Mr. John Ehr-
, chman, is it not reasonable to assume that the White House knew
t lat Mr. Hunt was engaged in undercover work, that is, Mr. Ehrlich-
lan knew that Mr. Hunt was engaged in undercover work ?
I Mr. Helms. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can only assume that if Mr.
f Ihrlichman asked that Mr. Hunt be helped — I realize that in this life
. ssumptions are very dangerous — one would have assumed that he
( sked for this help for some reason and he must have known what the
, aason was but at least I would have assumed he knew but I can't
j Tove it, I don't know and I didn't know myself at the time.
Senator Ervin. You did know that Mr. Ehrlichman was a very
mportant aide in the White House and that he requested this aid for
Ir. Hunt. You also know that when the CIA put an end to giving
3268
help to Mr. Hunt, that Mr. Ehrlichman was notified that Mr. Hun
had become a pain in the neck.
So, didn't it strike you as strange when you learned of these things;
that the White House would engage in undercover work on its owi
initiative rather than resort to the use of the FBI ?
Mr. Helms. Well, you know. Senator Ervin, at that time there wa
no intimation that this was even undercover work. What I under
stood Mr. Hunt had told General Cushman was that he wanted t^
conduct an interview and there was no intimation that this was under
cover work.
Senator Ervin. Well, now, here is a wig. You didn't think that th
wig was to improve the appearance of the pulchritude of Mr. Huni
did you ? [Laughter.]
Mr. Helms. I assume that in retrospect because I didn't remembe
about the wig at the time, Mr. Chairman, as I have testified, but I hav
assumed in retrospect that Mr. Hunt wanted to conduct his intervie\
disguising himself as someone else but that we didn't know that a
the time.
Senator Ervin. Well, when a man undertakes to disguise himsel
as someone else, he is engaged in undercover work, isn't he ?
Mr. Helms. Well, we run into a definitional problem, sir.
Senator Ervin. Well, you didn't think that he applied for this voic
alteration device in order to sing a different part in the choir, did you
Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, my problem here is that at the time tha
this was going on, I do not recall having been told that he had bee
given a wig and a voice alteration device. I found that out in May o
this year. So, that this business of the — of however one interpret
undercover work or however one defines it, no intimation w^as give
to me at that time that Hunt was involved in undercover work.
Senator Ervin. Well, we have had some discussion here, that moi:
of us human beings are sort of lightning bugs. We carry our illuming;
tion behind us, see better in retrospect than we do in prospect. But i
retrospect don't you think it would be reasonable to infer that jM
Hunt was engaged in something that might be called detective worl
undercover work?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. In retrosj)ect.
Senator Ervin. A covert activity ?
Mr. Helms. Certainly, certainly.
Senator Ervin. Now, the same thing, I believe that Mr. Liddy wa
furnished some material under an alias, not under his own nam
during this same period of time ?
Mr, Helms. I believe that is true.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Now, you stated that when you learned of the break-in at the Water
gate, I believe you were out of the country ?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. I was here at that time.
Senator Ervin. You were here?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. I thought you said something about reading it h
foreign-language newspapers.
Mr. Helms. No, sir. The question that I was asked which I reat
about was the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office.
3269
Senator Ervin. Oh, yes. That is right. I beg your pardon. I re-
member now. And it just shows that even the chairman of this
committee doesn't have an infallible memory of something that
occurred just a few minutes before.
Now, after the break-in, when was the first time you had any
contact with anybody from the White House?
Mr. Helms. 'It was at that June 23 meeting.
Senator Ervin. June 23. You and General Walters were requested
by the White House to come to the White House, were you not ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, we were asked to come to Mr. Ehrlichman's
office.
Senator Ervin. And you had a conversation with Mr. Haldeman
and Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Is that correct? And they expressed concern about
the possibility that if the FBI continued certain investigations in
Mexico that it might interfere with some of the activities of the OIA ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Did they mention exactly what activities the FBI
had in Mexico?
Mr. Helms. No, sir, they did not.
Senator Ervin. Was there anything said about Mexican checks?
Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, it is my recollection, and I can only
say my honest recollection, that the first time I heard about any
money or a check going to Mexico was later on the day of the 23d,
when General Walters reported to me about his conversation with
Acting Director Gray in the afternoon — early in the afternoon. I
believe that happened an hour and a half after we had been with Mr.
Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Gray had mentioned to
General Walters, as I recall it was something about a check for some-
thing over $80,000 that had showed up in Mexico but this was the
first I had heard about money.
Senator Ervin. That was after your visit to the White House, but
on the same day of your visit to the White House?
Mr. Helms. That is right. I do not recall Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr.
Haldeman mentioning anything about money.
Senator Ervin. Did they say anything, either one of them, as to
wliat specific matters gave the White House concern about the possi-
bility that FBI investigations might in some way collide with the
setup of the OIA?
Mr. Helms. No explanation weis given, Mr. Ohairman, and as I
testified earlier this morning, it was not possible for me to know
everything that we were doing in Mexico or what the FBI might be
running into and I simply thought it was prudent to do some check-
ing before I got assertive about this.
Senator Ervin. Now, the Director of the OIA or the Acting Director
of the OIA is also a Presidential appointee, is he not?
Mr. Helms. The Director and the Deputy Director of Oentral Intel-
ligence are, by statute, Presidential appointees and subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate.
Senator Ervin. And the same thing has recently happened with
respect to the Director of the FBI, has it not ?
3270
Mr. Helms. I believe it has. I think he now is subject to confirmation. (
Senator Ervin. Anyway, after you and General Walters visited the
White House and had a conversation with Mr. Haldeman and Mr.
Ehrlichman in which they expressed concern about the possibility of
FBI investigations in Mexico colliding with the work of, or the agents
of, the CIA, General Walters did receive a communication from Mr.
Gray, the Acting Director of the FBI, concerning these Mexican
checks ?
Mr. Helms. I believe that Acting Director Gray spoke to them in
their meeting about this. I do not remember a communication — I mean
a written communication.
Senator Ervin. Did Mr. Gray say anything about or express any^
concern as to whether the FBI operations might impede the CIA ini
some manner? In pursuing the investigation about these $89,000 in
Mexican checks ?
Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, I honestly do not remember. But I be-
lieve that General Walters, who had the conversation and who I believe
will testify here, might be able to clarify this for you, because he was
the one, after all, who was with him.
Senator Ervin. Yes. Now, then you or General Walters had several
meetings or phone calls with Mr. Gray about this matter ?
Mr. Helms. My recollection is that during this period I personally
did not see Acting Director Gray. I talked to him on the telephone.
It was only General Walters who visited with him and talked with
him.
Senator Ervin. Did you talk to Mr. Gray about the Mexican checks ?
Mr. Helms. I never talked to him about Mexican checks. I talked
to Mr. Gray on the phone about this Mexican lawyer.
Senator Ervin. Ogarrio or something like that ?
Mr. Helms. That is right.
Senator Ervin. But General Walters did report to you that, in his
meetings with Mr. Gray, that Mr. Gray talked about the Mexican
checks ?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, he did.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Helms. But as I recall this now, it was a sum in excess of $80,000
on the check but nobody ever explained to me at that time what this
money was for or how it got there or anything about its purpose.
Senator Ervin. Then after that time, the CIA — acting either
through you or General Walters — undertook to make it perfectly clear
to Mr. Gray that the FBI's investigation into the matters relating to
these Mexican checks would not interfere with the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. Well, sir, what we made clear to Mr. Gray was that if
by any chance they ran into any of our operations they were to abide
by our longtime understanding to notif v us.
Senator Ervin. Yes, and that ended the matter as far as the CIA
and the Mexican checks are concerned, did it?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator ER^^N. Then a short time after that, Mr. Dean contacted
the CIA on two successive davs?
Mr. Helms. Three successive days.
Senator Ervin. And the CIA assumed that he was representing the
White House, didn't they?
3271
Mr. Helms. Well, you see, Mr. Chairman, when he, Mr. Dean, called
General Walters, General Walters was not acquainted with Mr. Dean
and I think that somehow in the conversation. General Walters
intimated why should he come down and talk to Mr. Dean, Mr. Dean
said you get ahold of Mr. Ehrlichman and he will attest to the fact
I am authorized to talk to you, and General Walters told me he had
reached Mr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Ehrlichman had so stated.
Senator Ervin. Yes. In these conversations, just in the interest of
time, I will lump them together. The first approach that Mr. Dean
made was that he requested that the CIA pay the defense costs and
the support of these five men that had then been caught in the
Watergate.
Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, may I, with great deference, correct
your statement?
Senator Ervin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Helms. These were feelers to find out if there was some way
that the CIA might do — according to General Waltere' reports to me,
he was never requested to do anything.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Well, Mr. Dean made inquiry of General Walters as to whether or
not there was any way in which the CIA could bear these costs?
Mr. Helms. I think that is probably a good description.
Senator Ervin. Then on a succeeding day he made, after he was
advised by General Walters that it would be beyond the authority of
the CIA, and that he knew that you wouldn't countenance it, then Mr.
Dean returned and asked if the CIA could arrange bail for the persons
arrested in the Watergate.
Mr. Helms. I had a distinct recollection, and why this stuck so
firmly in my mind I am not entirely sure, it was on the second day that
this question of bail and salaries was raised. In other words, there were
three sessions, Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday and it was at the
Tuesday session that these matters came up.
'Senator Ervin. Now, you stated that you did the best you could and
you did succeed in stopping any further advances to the CIA in this
respect and I presume that in so doing you were acting under the
statute and pursuant to the statute which says that the CIA has no
law enforcement powers of a domestic nature and has no function in
regard to internal security.
Mr. Helms. Not only that, Mr. Chairman, but a trust is put in the
Director of Central Intelligence about the money that is given to him
by Congress and there are certain understandings with the Appropria-
tions Committees of Congress about what this money shall be spent
for and how it shall be handled and I was very clear in my mind
about those and there was nothing about this request that we could
have accommodated within those guidelines.
Senator Ervin. And that was made very clear to Mr. Dean?
Mr. Helms. I believe it was.
Senator Ervin. Now, there has been some examination indicating
that perhaps you and General Walters had some discrepancy of a
slight nature in the testimony you gave before, I believe. Senator
Symington's committee.
3272
Mr. Helms. That is right, and this misunderstanding was all hang-
ing out there in the committee. I mean, this is just the problem of
human recollections. I realize through these hearings, as I was told
by some gentleman this morning that people seem to have a good
forgettery when they get into this chair. I do not pretend to be any
better or any worse than anyone else and my memory is fallible from
time to time, but I am doing my very best at all of these hearings to
tell you what I remembered at the time. And as far as the small
disagreement between General Walters and I were concerned when
we talked it over and analyzed the conversation and reconstructed it,
I had to admit I had forgotten.
Senator Ervin. This question is not asked intimating any criticism
at all because I just illustrated myself this morning that my memory
is quite fallible, and also there are some other good men's memories,
I will strike myself out of the good men, but the memories of other
people are fallible. The Gospel of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John
tell us that when Pontius Pilate, the Roman Governor, ordered the
crucifixion of Christ that he wrote out a title and had it placed, put
on the cross, and people who have an opportunity to read something,
where it is just reduced to writing, it is more apt to be accurate than
just what we hear. And it is rather significant that these writers of
these four Gospels disagreed exactly what this title that was put on
the cross said.
The 37th verse of the 27th chapter of Matthew says that the writing
which was put on the cross read as follows:
"This is Jesus, the King of the Jews."
The 26th verse of the 15th chapter of St. Mark has a different
version. It says "The King of the Jews."
The 38th verse of the 23d chapter, St. Luke, has still a different
version of what the title was, and it says, "This is the King of the
Jews."
And then the 19th verse of the 19th chapter, St. John, has a fourth
version of the same words or the same title, rather, "Jesus of Nazareth,
the King of the Jews."
And so I say that if those four good men could have different ver-
sions of the same words, it is quite undei-standable why you and I and
other human beings have sort of fallible memories about things
sometimes.
There is another thing I have noticed about the human mind and
that is this, that sometimes when something occurs, at first we have
the recollection that certain things were said, and our memory does
not tell us that certain other things were said, but when we hear the
testimony of other people or sometimes look at a document that our
memories become refreshed and things that were hidden somewhere
in an unconscious part of our mind become fresh to our memories
iigain. So I just want to sa}^ these things because I do not attribute
too much importance to the fact that human beings do not recall all
conversations and all, even all written words exactly alike. And I
would just like to say this, iSIr. Helms, from the observation of the
work you did as Director of the CIA and from the contacts I had
with you, I think you did a magnificent job in that capacity.
Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chainnan.
I
3273
Senatx)r Ervin. Any other Senator have a question ? I ■will recognize
Senator Inouye first and then I will recognize Senator Weicker.
Senator Inotjye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, in response to the chairman's question you used a
word which intrigues me, "feelers," I presume feelers coming from the
Wliite House. When did you realize that the Wliite House was feeling
you out about the possibility of using your Agency as a coverup for
the Watergate burglars ?
Mr. Helms. When I used, Senator Inouye, the word "feelers," I was
describing what I understood was the way Mr. Dean put, conducted a
conversation with General Walters which had to do with whether there
was a possibility that the Agency could provide covert funds to pro-
v^ide bail for the men who had laroken into the Watergate, and also
whether or not when they were convicted and sent to jail the Agency
would pay their salaries while they were in jail.
Now, according to General Walters' report to me this was not a
request of him by Mr. Dean, it was sort of postulating what could be
ione under the circumstances, and this is why I thought maybe a de-
scriptive word as anv would be feelers.
Senator Inotjye. Do you not consider that the suggestion being made
)f the possibilities constituted a very serious departure from the statu-
orily prescribed functions of your Agency ?
Mr. Helms. It would have been if we had in any way become in-
volved in this.
Senator Inouye. That being the case, did you feel that you should
lave advised the two senior Members of the House and the Senate, the
hairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House and Senate?
^Ir. Helms. Well, Senator Inouye, I did not, and I do not recall
laving thought that that was an obligation I had at the time. I thought
hat my job was to keep the Agency clear of all this and as long as I
urceeded in keeping it clear of it that was my job and my business.
Uk\ further, that these conversations were held in such a fashion that
here was — if I understood General Walters' report to me accurately —
o make the assertion that we had been asked to do this would have
•een denied. This -was a possibility that was being discussed. But I
lo not want to lean heavily on thait, please, I want to lean heavily on
he fact that I was trying to keep the Agency clean, and that I did not.
^s long as I kept it clean I felt I was doing my job.
Senator Inouye. But whatever was being suggested in your mind
vas improper?
Mr. Helms. The improper thing would have been if we had done it.
Senator Inouye. Did you advise your successor, Mr. Schlesinger, of
hese feelers.
Mr. Helms. I don't recall our discussing this, no. As a matter of
act. I had, the conversations I had with Mr. Schlesinger when he came
nto the Agency had to do almost entirely with operational matters
nd liaison relationships and things of that kind. I didn't get into
hese matters as I recall.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, thank
-on, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Erven. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Helms, I would like to. Ambassador Helms,
would like to, if I can, go back to the meeting of the 23d and I am
3274
now using the transcript of the hearings, specifically that portion o ■:
the transcript which relates to Mr. Haldeman's recollections of tha
meeting.
Mr. Helms. You are now quoting frorii Mr. Haldeman?
Senator Weicker. That is right, that is right. I think this is a goo(
opportunity to try to not so much settle the question as to whether o
not Watergate was discussed, because to be candid there was no ques
tion that it was insofar as Mr. Haldeman was concerned, but rathe
what was said. I think that is what is important here. I think every
body concedes the fact that Watergate was discussed at this meeting
regardless, as I say, of the slip of your recollection at those hearings
nobody disputes that either in your later recollection or Mr Halde
man's testimony before the committee.
Mr. Haldeman said "So without commenting on either the accurac;
of Mr. Walters' recollection and your recitation to it" and he is talkiii
to Mr. Dash, "because he has given a number of different statements i;
depositions in this thing that makes it rather complex, but the meetint
one of the purposes of the meeting as assigned to me by the Presiden
on the morning of the 23d when he told me to have, to have me an(
Ehrlichman meet with Director Helms and Deputy Director Walter
in addition to ascertaining whether there was any CIA involvement
and I put that as point No. 1, "whether there was any CIA concer:
about earlier activities of people who had been arrested at the Watei
gate." I put that as point No. 2. "And three, was to tell the Cli
Directors that the FBI had expressed concern that, as to whether ther
was CIA involvement or any impingement."
Now, he elaborates that, he elaborates on this in the followin
statements :
Mr. Helms told me at the meeting that there was no CIA involvement i
the Watergate operation and he had so informed Director Gray ; so I learned thfi
at that meeting. I didn't know it prior to the meeting.
Now, and here is what I would like to question you on as to wha
your recollection is. We get into what he considered to be the mai
point :
Mr. Haldeman. Because, and this seems to be a very difficult point to Rt
across, but because there were other items that concern the matter, the questio
raised was not solely the question of whether the CIA had been involved in tli
Watergate break-in but also whether the investigation of the Watergate break-ii
which was to be thorough and total, could possibly impinge upon the activlth
totally unrelated to Watergate and related to national security or to covert (" i
operations ; the activities of some of the individuals who had also been involve
in the Watergate and had been arrested at the Watergate.
T^t me just reread that :
But also whether the investigation of the Watergate break-in, which was to b
thorough and total, could possibly impinge upon the activities totally unrelated ti
national security or to covert CIA operations.
Now, is that the instruction that you recall or is that the subjec
matter that you recall being related from ISIr. Haldeman to Genera
Waltei-s, or is it of a different nature, and if so what is it ?
Mr. Helms. Well, I recall being asked if there was any CIS
involvement.
Senator Weicker. Right.
Mr. Helms. And I answered negatively.
Senator Weicker. Correct.
3275
Mr. Helms. I recall, as I said earlier this morning, that Mr. Halde-
man made some reference to the Bay of Pigs ; I referred to it as an in-
coherent reference because it was frankly, in my recollection, I don't
know exactly what he, what point he had in mind but I reacted to
that question very firmly.
Now, the Bay of Pigs is the rubric for a very unhappy event in the
life of the CIA. A dead cat that has been thrown at us over the years
ever since and, therefore, it is one to which I am likely to react and
react rather quickly, for the simple reason that the Bay of Pigs was
long since over, the problems arising from it had been liquidated. I
was well aware of this, and I didn't care what any investigation had
to do with the Bay of Pigs that could have gotten into anybody in-
volved with it, about it, below it or above it, I didn't care, and I was
trying to make it clear to Mr. Haldeman on that occasion. The fact
that some of those people who broke into the Watergate had at one
time had relationship with the Agency, including Martinez who had
had them up until just a few days before, didn't make any difference
to me. I mean there was nothing that anybody was going to find out
about investigating them that was going to bother us as far as I was
aware.
We then get down to the question of what an FBI investigation in
Mexico might turn up, and as I explained earlier, I did not have in
my head all of our operations in Mexico but what was more important
I didn't know where the FBI was investigating in ^Mexico, I didn't
. know who they were following, I didn't know what they were up to, so
I regard it as prudent to inform myself a bit about these things before
1 I came down flatly and said, "Let the FBI go ahead and investigate
in Mexico, they will never run across our operations," because this
might not have been the case. Do I answer your question, sir ?
\ Senator Weicker. All right. So what then did Mr. Haldeman, to
the best of your recollection, tell General Walters?
, Mr. Helms. The thrust of what I understood Mr. Haldeman to say
[ to General Walters was that he wanted him to speak to Acting Direc-
tor Gray to restrain whatever investigation the FBI was conducting
in Mexico, because it might run into certain CIA operations down
; there, and I just explained to you why it was that I could not say
', on the spur of the moment it couldn't possibly happen.
Senator Weicker. So
Mr. Helms. Senator Weicker, I would also like to mention here
if you don't mind, something I said a moment earlier, that often the
White House gets information about things that other people in the
Government are not privy to. The President and other people in the
White House have a great many sources of information and I didn't
' know what they had on their minds about CIA operations in Mexico
at that point or might have had on their mind.
Senator Weicker. Now, immediatel v upon leaving this meeting with
General Walters, did you have any discussion with General Walters ?
' Mr. Helms. Yes.
^ Senator Weicker. Relative to the discussion which had taken place
with Mr. Haldeman and INIr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Helms. As I testified earlier, I told General Walters that I
tliought when he saw Mr. Gray that he should point out to Mr. Gray
that there is a delimitation agreement between the FBI and the CIA
3276
wherein if FBI investigations run into CIA matters they ivere to be
reported to the CIA and if CIA operations run into FBI matters they
were to be reported to the FBI, and I thought that this was all, the
whole distance he had to go in his conversations with Mr. Gray. That
was a legitimate request. It was made because I didn't know whether
Mr. Gray was familiar with this, he hadn't been Acting Director for
very long. I wasn't sure General Walters was very familiar with it
because he had only been in the Agency about 6 weeks or so, so I just
wanted to be sure these relatively new people were talking about what
I thought was important and legitimate things.
Senator Weicker. Would it be proper to say that you were com-
fortable with General Walters going to Pat Gray with what you indi-
cated to him outside of the meeting and that you were uneasy if he had
gone to Pat Gray with what had been transmitted by ]\Ir. Haldeman (
Mr. Helms. I accept that.
Senator Weicker. One last question : When I asked you in the first
round of questioning as to whether or not you felt you were being
talked around during that meeting of the 23d and as you have testified,
I gathered this pride that you have in the independence of the CIA, the
belief that you have in the trust that is imposed upon the Director by
the Congress, and I gather you surely don't hesitate to express those
feelings to this committee and I gather you don't hesitate to express
them or you didn't hesitate to exi^ress them to anybody else while you
were Director of the CIA, now do you feel that this might have betMi
one of the reasons why you were talked around at this meeting of the
23d?
Mr. Helms. Well, certainly that occurred to me. I had mixed emo-
tions about this. Any sensible person, I think, would have wondered
why I was not asked to do this. Various interpretations, I suppose,
could have been thought up, but the fact of the way it was handled is
in itself an unusual event, and General Walters, I think, and he can
speak for himself about this, felt they were asking him to do it because
he was an Army officer and used to taking orders. Well, I have been
in the Government a long time and used to taking orders, too, so I
think one was forced a bit to the conclusion that for some reason they
felt he might carry out the instructions more fully and more pre-
cisely than I might have. I just don't know ; I never have been told.
Senator Weicker. Thank you very much.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I won't take long, I have three ques-
tions and they won't consume very much time.
As I understood your testimony, Mr. Ambassador, Hunt was su])-
plied with certain equipment, I don't recall what you said he was sup-
plied with, but that it was not used in the Ellsberg burglary.
Mr. Helms. Well, Senator Baker, this is the point I was trying to
make, that you read out to me a moment ago the equipment that he
was given, and I submit to you as a highly intelligent human beinii.
could you break into a building with that equipment ?
Senator Baker. I don't know, but what I am reaching for is, if it
wasn't used for that, what was it used for ?
Mr. Helms. I don't know to this day.
Senator Baker. Can you give us any idea, were there other oper-
ations that required this rather elaborate and exotic spy set?
3277
Mr. Helms. You know the spy set was, if you put it together, I
think, is consistent with what the chairman was saying that this would
be the kind of thing you would want if you were going to conduct an
interview with an individual whom you didn't want to recognize you
for who you were.
In other words, under an assumed name for whatever purposes.
Senator Baker. Do you have any idea what that might be ?
Mr. Helms. No.
Senator Baker. We have heard testimony, I believe, from other
witnesses that it is the practice of the CIA in the event that one of
their agents get into trouble that the Agency takes care of their family
and that sort of thing, is that in fact the policy of the CIA?
Mr. Helms. Well, for example, it is now public knowledge that
Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau were working for the CIA, were cap-
tured, arrested, convicted, and put in jail in China, and during the
period they were in jail their salaries were paid just as though they
were on our rolls, so when they came out they had quite a tidy piece
3f money to take care of them for whatever period of time thej^ wanted
use it for. We supported the families of one of them during the
period.
Senator Baker. Is the answer yes?
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Senator Baker. Do I understand the thrust of your testimony to
)e that the things I listed earlier about the wig, about the camera,
md about the voice altering device, about the psychological profile
jossibly, and a number of other things were all down by the CIA
jut you learned all or most of them much, much later?
yir. Helms. No, I was involved in the psychological profile ; I don't
^vant to duck that one.
Senator Baker. All right.
Mr. Helms. I authorized it being made.
Senator Baker. All right.
What about the others ? I understand you learned about these things
much later ?
Mr. Helms. Somewhat later. Because, you see, if you find my
inswer equivocal, let me explain it. ]My recollection was that I heard
about the tape recorder and the camera within the time frame of
•July-xiugust 1971. It is the wig and the other things that I did not
remember having been told about at that time, which I learned about
considerably later.
Senator Baker. And to this day you do not know what those things
were used for?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. You know. Senator Baker, I want to explain
something to the committee. I have been away in these recent months,
so I have not had access to the newspapers here of the full testimony
before this committee. This may have been explained many times in
Congress, and I may have missed it, so that I am not — I just do not
know.
Senator Baker. Why did you not, when you found out about these
things, launch an inquiry into it?
Mr. Helms. Well, quite frankly, as of the time that this was all
going on, do you realize that at the time of the Watergate burglary,
3278
there was no evidence that had ever come to my attention that thii
equipment had been used for any illegal or improper act?
Senator Baker. But you knew it was outstanding. At the momen
you found out this stuff had been issued, this support supplied by CIA
did you do anything to investigate what it was used for ?
Mr. Helms. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Why didn't you ?
Mr. Helms. Frankly, it did not occur to me.
Senator Baker. You knew a day after this happened that two o
three or four of your former CIA agents, and one of them still on thi
payroll, were involved. Did you launch yourself an investigation t-
see what was going on ?
Mr. Helms. About the Watergate burglary, sir?
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Helms. Certainly.
Senator Baker. What did you do ?
Mr. Helms. We checked on all these people, their relationships wit"
our people, their relationships with the Agency. We went through a]
of that and turned all that material over to the FBI.
Senator Baker. Did you talk to these people, pick up the phone au'
say what in the world is going on ?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. We never talked to any of them as far as I ar
aware. After all, they were in jail at that time.
Senator Baker. Well, that is right. They were. I will not pursii
this, Mr. Chairman. It strikes me, though, that there were great ind^
cations — maybe hindsight is the only way we can look at this — indica
tions of a deep cross-identification with CIA personnel, CIA materia
and a past history of relationships with CIA, that you did not kno^
about, except for the psychological profile ; and I cannot help pointin
out the similarities between your contention, as Director of the CIA
and the contention of the President that he did not know all thes
other things.
Mr. Helms. Well, now, let us halt a minute. When we looked int
these various relationships of these individuals with the Agency, w
turned over to the FBI ever3d;hing that we were able to establish aboi
this.
Now, therefore, I assume that what you are saying is that somehoA
I should have gotten to these fellows who were in jail and asked then
each one of them, what he had been up to, but it did not seem to ni
that that was my function. They were in the hands of the law enforce
ment authorities. The FBI was conducting an investigation. They wer
the proper authorities to do this, and quite frankly, I think if I liai
intruded into this matter at that time, it would have been an imprope
act on my part.
Senator Baker. That is almost precisely what Mr. Ehrlichman an*
Mr. Haldeman have told us.
Mr. Helms. That may be, sir.
Senator Baker. But you had people in the CIA that you later learne(
had supplied these wigs and voice altering devices and cameras an(
processing equipment and aliases and forged documents. Did you sro ti
the people inside the CIA and find out how come thev did it and fo
what purpose? You say it was not for the Fllsber.^i tiling. I am con
sumed by curiosity, what else was going on ? Wliat else was it used for
3279
Mr. Helms. Senator Baker, all this is in your record. All of the
memorandums, all of the inquiry of the investigation of various indi-
viduals in the CIA. You have it there, stacks of papers.
Senator Baker. No part of that record tells me what those things
were used for if we exclude the Ellsberg situation.
Mr. Helms. I do not know what they were used for.
Senator Baker. What I am saying is why don't you know? Why
didn't you find out ?
Mr. Helms. Because I thought, frankly, that when these individuals
had been arrested that that was the FBI's job.
Senator Baker. And so did the White House.
Thank you.
Mr. Helms. Was it not the FBI's job ?
Senator Baker. Well, maybe it was, but I have used the analogy
)nce or twice, and I feel a little ill at ease using it. If I had someone
)n my staff who was caught red-handed robbing a jewelry store, let
: done the Democratic National Committee, and I read about it in the
. lewspaper then or later, I have a hunch that I would have jumped up
md down and screamed until I found out what happened.
Mr. Helms. I have no reason to question that you might have, sir.
Senator Baker. But I have no reason to question that you might
uive, too, and that is why I am asking why you did not, because I have
I o reat admiration for you, Mr. Helms. I think you have done extraor-
li]iary service for your country.
Mr. Helms. You know, I would like to be worthy of your comments,
1 5enator Baker, and I trust that I am, but at the time that these men
I vere arrested, it did not seem to me that it was the proper thing for
lie to get into that affair as to why they had been arrested or their
1: last.
\ Senator Baker. It just did not seem like a big event at the time ?
Mr. Helms. No. It was a big event, but it did not seem to me that
t was a proper job for me to undertake to investigate how they had
! rotten there or why they had been arrested.
' Senator Baker. All right. Lest I be misunderstood, Mr. Chairman —
.Ir. Ambassador — I now continue to have, and nothing I have asked
ou by way of testing the situation by your evidence should imply
)t nything to the contrary, I continue to have an enormous respect and
It dmi ration for you for what you have done and what you will do,
II ind I appreciate your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Helms. Thank you.
vSenator Er\^n, One question. Did you draw the conclusion that if
It 'OU had undertaken to investigate the burglarizing of the Watergate,
hat it would have been inconsistent with the prohibition of the act
ii; inder which you operate, that the CIA has no function in respect to
nternal security?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not talking about that,
am talking about investigating his own staff within his own organi-
I ;ation and that certainly doesn't violate any domestic security
r )rohibition.
Senator Er\ix. No, but didn't you testify that you did investigate
nsideof theCIA?
3280
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And turned over the information to the FBI ?
Mr. HJELMS. Yes, sir, and also you have it in the records of thi;
committee.
Senator Ervin. Any further questions ?
Senator Weicker. Yes. I would like to — since an analogy has beei
drawn I think it is proper to pursue it.
On June 17, 1972, was Mr. Hunt a member of the CIA? Part o
CIA?
Mr. Helms. No, he was not.
Senator Weicker. Was Mr. Liddy a part of the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. No, Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Was Mr. Barker a part of the CIA?
Mr. Helms. No, Senator.
Senator Weicker. Was Mr. McCord a part of the CIA?
Mr. Helms. No, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Was Mr. Martinez a part of CIA ?
Mr. Helms. Mr. Martinez was getting a retainer of $100 a month o;
a fiduciary relationship. He was not a staff employee of the CIA.
Senator Weicker. This operation was down in Florida insofar a
screening those persons coming over from Cuba and ascertaining as t
whether or not they should have an intelligence value?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Sturgis, was he a member of the CIA?
Mr, Helms. No, sir ; not at that time.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Gonzales, was he a member of the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Baldwin, was he a member of the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Barker, was he a member of the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. So apparently the only member of the CIA i
all of these^ matters on June 17, 1972, was Mr. Martinez who was o
a $100 retainer down in Florida, relative to the screening of Cuba
exiles.
Mr. Helms. That is correct. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Did you turn over the records of these men i
the FBI?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. When ?
Mr. Helms. As soon as — well, I don't know the precise dates, but —
Senator Weicker. All right.
Mr. Helms. But the FBI started inquiring of the Agency about th
background of these men as soon as the men had been arrested an
we started providing the information from that day.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions.
Mr. Thompson. If I understand the analogy, and T am not sure thr
I do, but perhaps your idea is, then, that because it was former CI.
employees and not present CIA employees, that ir some way woul
relieve you of the responsibilities you might otherwise have. Is thf
a fair
Mr. Helms. Yes, I think so, I think, Mr. Thom])Son, that I shoul
make it clear, because I was asked at another hear ng one time, whe
3281
in individual resigns or retires from the CIA, that is the end of his
dentification with the Agency as far as we are concerned. Certainly,
jnder American laws one has no way of keeping a string on people like
•.his. So when they walk out the door, they turn in their badge and their
jmployment with the Agency is finished unless some sort of a contrac-
tual or fiduciary relationship is established with them. This is not the
;ase with these others except for Martinez.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I can see that, and as long as we are talking
ibout analogy, and not reaching any conclusion but just really think-
ng aloud, by the same token, there were no present White House
employees involved in the break-in either. They were also former
tmployees. So if we have an analogy I imagine the analogy still holds
ip.
Thank you.
Senator Ervtn. Can you be back at 2 o'clock ?
Mr. Helms. Beg pardon ?
Senator Ervin. There will be a recess until 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 12 :33 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
1 2 p.m., this same day.]
I Afternoon Session, Thursday, August 2, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. Counsel will
esume the interrogation of the witness.
Mr. DoRSEN. Ambassador Helms, who was the normal contact from
tie White House to the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. Dr. Kissinger.
Mr. DoRSEN. Was there much contact between Mr. Ehrlichman or
Ir. Haldeman and the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. There was some. Of course, not nearly as much. There
^as more with Mr. Ehrlichman than there was with Mr. Haldeman.
; Mr. DoRSEN. Can you give us some idea of the number of contacts
( etween Mr. Ehrlichman and the CIA during the time you were
; )irector?
Mr. Helms. That would be difficult, Mr. Counsel, because I do not
now any way to come up with a statistic. I suppose that I have had a
I ozen or so contacts with him myself over a period of 3 or 4 years.
Mr. DoRSEN. Were many of these requests for information or
equests that the CIA do something ?
Mr. Helms. There were a variety of things. There were meetings
. tiat I attended which Mr. Ehrlichman called. I recall one particular
ctivity when the White House was redoing the method of classifica-
ion of documents and devising some new procedures for declassifying
1 ocuments, there were some meetings in order to rewrite these regula-
ions and I remember attending at least one, there may have been two.
Mr. DoRSEN. Now, in connection with the request in July of 1971 for
he CIA to furnish support for Mr. Hunt, it is your understanding, is
: not, that Mr. Ehrlichman contacted General Cushman, is that
orrect?
Mr. Helms. That was my distinct impression.
Mr. Dorsen. In June oi 1972, when you were at the meeting in Mr.
^hrlichman's office, am I correct that it was General Walters who was
' sked to go to Patrick Gray by Mr. Ehrlichman ?
3282
Mr. Helms. He was asked by Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. DoRSEN. Excuse me, by Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Mr. Dorsen. Did you make any connection then or subsequently con
cernin^ the fact that the two deputies who were asked to participate
in the facts you described were both military men ?
Mr. Helms. Well, I did not know whether it had to do with the fac
they were military men or they were particular appointees of this ad
ministration or just exactly whether they were old friends and there
fore, seemed to be easier to deal with them. I really do not know whicl
of these considerations loomed the largest.
Mr. DoRSEN. Now, were you aware, prior to the Ma^^ 22, 1972, an
nouncement by the President, of the organization known as the Plumb
ers or the fact that there was such an organization in the White House
Mr. Helms. You mean the May 22, 1973
Mr. DoRSEN. Excuse me, 1973.
Mr. Helms. I had never heard of a Plumbers unit.
Mr. DoRSEN. Were you familiar with an investigative unit in th
White House?
Mr. Helms. I did not know there was any unit in the White Hous
that was actively carrying out, if you like, burglaries or activist activj
ties of this kind.
Mr. DoRSEN. With respect to the material supplied to Howard Hun1
you referred to the wig as a fairlv famous item. Was the wig that wa
supplied to Mr. Hunt by the CIA the same wig allegedly worn b
Hunt, the red wig, when he saw Dita Beard ?
Mr. Helms. I have been told in recent times that the wig provide
by the Agency was a brunette wig, it was a dark hair, anyway, an
so that the Agency technicians rather resented the fact that the re
wig had been tied in with the CIA because it was such a lousy fi
[Laughter.]
Mr. DoRSEN. Ambassador Helms, are you familiar with the memr
randum to which there was a covering routing slip from Genera
Cushman to you with the date August 23, 1971, on it ?
Mr, Helms. Yes. This is indeed the memorandum that you showe
me.
Mr. DoRSEN. That is correct. Could we show this to the witness an
I would just like to have you identify it, please.
Mr. Helms. Cameras.
Yes ; I am familiar with the memorandum.
Mr. DoRSEN. I would like the Ambassador to hold it for anothe
minute, and is that the memorandum, the memorandum in chief, if '
may use that expression, does that deal with the request of Mr. Hun
for the secretary to which you referred earlier ?
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Mr. DoRSEN. And is a portion of the routing slip in your hand
writing?
Mr. Helms. Yes, there is.
Mr. Dorsen. Could you read the routing slip to us, please, including
the portion which I understand is in General Cushman's handwriting
and the portion that is in your handwriting ?
Mr. Helms. The part that is in General Cushman's handwriting
appears first, it says, "FY I and guidance on how to handle." An(
»t
3283
then General Cushman's initial appears. My note back to him says "If
Hunt renews the request please let me know and I will speak to Ehr-
[ichman about it." Or rather, "Speak to Ehrlichman at once." These
Xeroxes are not famously goo(i.
Mr. DoRSEN. Mr. Chairman, with the committee's permission I would
like to have that received in evidence.
Senator Ervin. Without objection it will be marked appropriately
IS an exhibit and received in evidence as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 123.*]
Mr. DoRSEN. Ambassador Helms, this morning you were shown, or it
vas read to you the memorandum dated August 31, 1971, and I would
ike to show you a copy of that at this point and to refresh your
•ecollection. This is the one which states, "I called John Ehrlichman
^'riday and explained why we could not meet these requests. I indicated
lunt was becoming a pain in the neck. John said he would restrain
lunt."
j Signed by General Cushman and you wrote "good," is that correct ?
I Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
! Mr. DoRSEN. I direct your attention to the last typewritten page of
; hat memorandum, and I read to you No. 3.
"I told Mr." — and the name is blanked out at the request of the
ylA — "that Mr. Hunt's latest requests drew us even further into a
ensitive area of domestic operations against Americans and that all
uch requests should be referred to General Cushman's office. Mean-
while these requests should not be met," and there is a signature, the
nitials DDCI, which represents a position in the CIA.
What does that paragraph mean ?
Mr. Helms. I don't know what this gentleman had reference to. It
5 signed hj the executive assistant to the deputy director and what he
as referring to there I have no idea. I heard of no specific Americans
eing involved at that time.
Mr. Dorsen. Do you have any knowledge of domestic operations
gainst Americans ?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. I don't know what he had in mind.
; Mr. DoRSEN. In your conversations with — excuse me, Mr. Chairman,
I his I believe has been received in evidence and copies were supplied
his morning.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
I think Senator Baker requested that be made a part of the record
nd it was.
Mr. DoRSEN. Each Senator received a copy this morning.
Do you know what General Cushman was told concerning Mr.
lunt's operations?
Mr. Helms. I don't specifically, Mr, Counsel, all I recall was what I
aid this morning that when Hunt came to him and asked for this
-ssistance he said it was for a one-time interview.
Mr. DoRSEN. Do you know whether the camera that was given to Mr.
lunt was returned to the CIA prior to September 3, 1971, which has
)een given as the date of the burglary ?
Mr. Helms. I don't know. I have heard it said that the camera was
lot returned but that is really hearsay. I am not sure that that was
ccurate information but it was somehow my impression that he did
i lot return this equipment.
•See p. 3380.
3284
Mr. DoRSEN. According to the record of the CIA the camera was
returned but the recorder was not.
Mr. Helms. Was it? But you have this in the records, don't you?
Mr. DoRSEN. That is correct.
jNIr. Helms. And I think it should be in the records of the committee
because I don't think this should depend on my memory. It is a relevant
fact and I would like to identify myself with what the record shows.
Mr. DoRSEN. Now, earlier you were asked by Senator Talmadg(
whether you w^ere asked by the White House concerning Mr. Hunt ir
terms of supplying a reference and you indicated that you were noi
so consulted.
What reference would 3'ou have given if asked?
]Mr. Helms. Well, that is a terribly difficult question to ask me u
July or August of 1973, after all the evidence that has been brough
forward. I think that what would have been in my mind at the time wa
to wonder why they wanted him and w^hat his talents were that the;'
wanted to avail themselves of and I think my answer would have beej
largely dependent" on what they told me.
Mr. DoRSEN. Am I correct that in the last years of Mr. Hunt'
service with the CIA he was given a somewhat different assignmen
than he had before?
Mr. Helms. Yes. I believe that in his recent years there he wa
stationed in Washington, for one thing, and precisely what his dutie
were at the time I don't know but they were not particularly oper
ational. But as I explained this morning, he was having some famil
difficulties, and so forth, and he was trying to work these out as wel
as do his job, and so on, so that I can only assume that we were takin;
these human factors into consideration and had assigned him in
place where he could accommodate himself.
Mr. DoRSEN. Did a question arise at a later time as to whether i
fact Mr. Ehrlichman had communicated to the CIA with respect t
Mr. Hunt?
Mr. Helms. Yes. And not terribly long ago. It seems to me tha
it was at the end of last year that — and I would like to say, ]Mr. Chair
man, that I believe that there is in your record a paper which wil
give the precise dates and details about these things, but my recoUec
tion is that sometime in November, I guess it was, November or Decern
ber of 1972, Mr. William Colby and INIr. John Warner of the Agenc;
visited Mr. Henry Petersen at the Justice Department and I believ
Mr. Petersen had Mr. Earl Silbert with him and perhaps two or thre
other people. I am not too sure who all the individuals were. An(
during this meeting they w^ere going over some material having to d'
with Howard Hunt and the question came up about who had gotten-
who had arranged for Howard Hunt to get assistance from the Agenc;
and Mr. Colby identified the individual in the White House as Mr
Ehrlichman.
As best I recall it, some days go bv and one day I got a call fror
IMr. Dean who said that he had understood that it had been state*'
to Mr. Petersen that Mr. Ehrlichman was the man who liad sponsors
^Ir. Hunt and that Mr. Ehrlichman didn't remember this, and couL
there be some confusion?
My recollection of the conversation was that I said I — Genera
3285
Cushman was the one who had dealt with this matter and that I
thought they could get the information from him.
Mr. Dean then said he thought there ought to be a meeting to
discuss this and I said, fine, but be sure that you have General Cush-
man at the meeting.
Then subsequent to that telephone call a meeting was called in
Mr. Ehrlichman's office about this matter. I went to this meeting with
i\Ir. Colby since INIr. Colby had had the conversation with Mr. Peter-
sen and we found in INIr. Ehrlichman's office, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr.
Dean, and there were the two of us. But General Cushman was not
there.
Mr. Colby was asked to explain what he had had to say and he did
so. Mr. Ehrlichman, as I recall it, said that he didn't remember these
conversations or this conversation with General Cushman. The meet-
ing then ended up in a rather unsatisfactory manner because the only
person that could have been helpful in this was General Cushman and
at the very end Mr. Ehrlichman said, "Well, why don't you have
General Cushman call me." He asked Mr. Colby to do this and I veri-
fied to Mr. Colby to call General Cushman and let him know.
Now, also, if memory serves, when I got that first telephone call
from Mr. Dean, I believe I instructed Mr. Colby to tell General Cush-
man this meeting might be coming up so he would be prepared for it.
INIr. DoRSEN. Was there any reason given why General Cushman
was not at the meeting?
^Ir. Helms. There was no reason given that I recall.
Mr. DoRSEN. And General Cushman would be the person most
familiar with the question on who called
ISIr. Helms. He was really the only one who could verify it.
Mr. DoRSEx. Now, during the recess we did look at more records
and discovered that the first transmission from the CIA to the FBI
occurred on June 20, 1973. Would that be consistent with your
recollection ?
Mr. Helms. 1972, sir, if it was — the break-in was in 1972.
Mr. DoRSEN. Excuse me.
Mr. Helms. It doesn't correspond to my recollection as mentioned
in this morning's testimony when I said that as soon as the FBI
started asking us questions about these people we began replying, so
that would track very well.
Mr. DoRSEN. With respect to General Walters' memorandums on
the subject of how they represent your recollection as well as General
Walters' recollection, could you please state to us again what contact
you had in terms of reading them or speaking to General Waltere
before he wrote them?
Mr. Helms. Well, when General Walters and I decided that there
should be memorandums for the record of these various meetings and
conversations, if I recall it, he wrote several on the same day. In
other words, he was catching up. He wrote the meeting of the 23d
and I think he wrote his meeting with Dean on the 26th and on the
•27th, and there may be another memorandum. It certainly is all in
your record there. But in any event, he was writing them all to catch
up and then I believe after that he began to write memorandums for
3286
the record as soon as he had a meeting so this was not necessary any
longer.
I do not recall how carefully I read these various memorandums
because he had reported to me the content of these meetings orally at
this time and I did not feel at that juncture, as I recall, a constraint
to read through every line to be sure this was exactly what he told me.
In other words, I was not distrustful of his record.
Mr. DoRSEN. But you did peruse them to the extent of making sure
they were generally accurate, is that correct ?
Mr. Helms. I think so, yes.
Mr. DoRSEN. And before General Walters wrote each memorandum
he had already articulated to you almost immediately after the meeting
the circumstances of what occurred at each meeting is that correct ?
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Mr. DoRSEN. Now, there was some question this morning as to
whether or not the President's name was invoked during the June 23,
1972 meeting, and I believe it is your best recollection that it was not,
is that correct ?
Mr. Helms. Yes. That is correct. General Walters, as I recall the
language in the memorandum, said something about it is the Presi-
dent's wish. I did not recall that language having been used.
Mr. DoRSEN. When for the first time did you take note of your
difference with General Walters' memorandum ?
Mr. Helms. I believe we discussed that even at the time as to just
exactly how this had been put.
Mr. DoRSEN. So that was one instance where yoii saw fit to
Mr. Helms. I am afraid there is a disagreement even now between
us as to just how this was worded.
Mr. DoRSEN. But, in other words, did you discuss possible disagree-
ments in the subject matter of the memorandums even at that time^
Mr. Helms. I think he felt at the time, since this was just a memo-
randum to jog his memory, and so on, there was no reason to put
down we had a difference or re-edit the language or redictate the
memorandum.
It is veiy interesting, Mr. Counsel, in a lot of memorandums, if one
had known then what one knows now, they would liave been compiled
more carefully. The language would have been more judicious. There
would have been a lot of things written that did happen.
Mr. DoRSEN. Thank you for the memorandums we do have, Mr.
Ambassador.
Now, one question I think is quite important. I believe you testified
that you were asked, during the same June 23 meeting, as to whether
there was any involvement by the CIA in the Watergate. Is that cor-
rect ? Were you so asked that
Mr. Helms. Yes, I believe I was, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. DoRSEN. And you replied no ?
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Mr. DoRSEN. Now, before Mr. Haldeman turned to General Walters
and told him to go and speak to Patrick Gray, was any question di-
rected at you or Genei'al Walters as to whether further investigation
by the CIA might uncover assets or ojoerations of the CIA ?
Mr. Helms. Further i n vestio-ation bv the FBI?
3287
Mr. DoRSEN. Excuse me. FBI. Might uncover assets or operations
of the CIA in Mexico ?
Mr. Helms. I do not lecall that this point was ever put to either of
us in the form of a question. It was my recollection or it is my recol-
lection that General Walters was asked to go and speak to Mr. Gray
about this because there was a possibility that it might run into CIA
operations. I was not asked whether it would or it would not.
Mr. DoRSEx. Did you comment one way or the other at that meeting
as to whether you thought it might uncover such operations? Was
there any discussion of that subject ?
Mr. Helms. I am sorry, Mr. Counsel. I do not recall any.
Mr. DoRSEN. At any time did the CIA announce that it was conduct-
ing an investigation into the Watergate?
Mr. Helms. Announce that it was conducting ?
Mr. Dorsex. Yes.
Mr. Helms. No. You mean a public announcement ?
Mr. DoRSEN. Yes.
Mr. Helms. No.
Mr. DoRSEN. Was there any decision made within the CIA that there
would be an investigation of the Watergate, or is the opposite true ?
I am talking about any CIA discussions as to whether there would be
an independent investigation by the CIA.
Mr. Helms. I am not trying to be picky. We are talking about Water-
gate now ? We are talking about the burglary, right ?
Mr. DoRSEN.I am talking about the burglary, yes.
Mr. Helms. There was no public announcement. We simply did as I
indicated this morning, and that is, check with the various people that
had had to do with the burglary, check on their records, check with
others that had had dealings with them to be sure what their status
was, and all the rest of it.
Mr. DoRSEN. And am I correct that there were a number of, quite
numerous amounts of communications between the CIA and the FBI
and the Justice Department ?
Mr. Helms. Many.
Mr. DoRSEx. And to your knowledge, was any relative information
withheld by the CIA to' the FBI and Justice Department information
that you were aware of while the events were taking place in June,
July, or August of 1972 ?
Mr. Helms. Sir, I do not believe so. Does the record show that there
was anything of this kind ?
Mr. DoRSEx. No. I am not suggesting that at all, Mr. Ambassador.
I am just asking for your knowledge. I have no knowledge to the
contrary.
Mr. Helms. Well, I do not either, but I just want to be sure that my
recollection tracked with the facts.
Mr. DoRSEX. Senator Baker, Mr. Vice Chairman, I have no further
questions.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompsox. Mr. Ambassador, did General Walters indicate to
you between the time of June 23 and June 28 that he was in any way
concerned about the propriety of the request or order that Mr. Halde-
man had o-iven him ?
3288
Mr. Helms. I do not know whether we ever mentioned the propriety
of it. I think that — in fact, I am sure that we discussed why the request
was being made. We had been asked to do it. What was behind it. We
did not have the information to put together at that time. And I am
sure as associates would, we were, you know, expressing wonderment to
each other as to what this was all about.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know why, for example, he waited until
June '28 to prepare this memorandum which we have been referring
to where he sets all these things out ?
Mr. Helms. Well, Mr. Thompson
Mr. Thompson. Why he waited 5 days in order to do that?
Mr. Helms. Well, Mr. Thompson, I do not know, but he will cer-
tainly be able to testify to that.
Mr. Thompson. Did not discuss this
Mr. Helms. But as I indicated this morning, I do not remember
any more which one of us was the one that decided or whether we just
agreed in the conversation together after the request from Dean for
the 'Agency to provide bail or salaries for the breakers-in — or in-break-
ers, or whatever they are — that at that time it seemed desirable to put
some of this on the record because this was getting a bit far afield
and into a rather strange area, we thought, and that these various
meetings then ought to be caught up, and I think that is the reason
that on the same day he did several at the same time
Mr. Thompson. Between the time of your conversation on the 23d
and the time he prepared his memorandum. Dean had contacted him
three times, had he not ? On the 26th, 27th, and 28th.
Mr. Helms. Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, anyway.
Mr. Thompson. I believe that is right.
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. So would you say by that time, then, that he had
become concerned about the matter and was covering his tracks, so
to speak ?
Mr. Helms. Well, you see, Mr. Thompson, I wish you would help
me with a point here. It is my recollection, contrary to what those
memorandums show, that it was on Tuesday, the second meeting with
Mr. Dean, that Mr. Dean made — mentioned bail and salaries, whereas
General Walters' memorandum indicates that that comes on the Mon-
day. And because my recollection is that it came on the Tuesday, that
it was after that that I — that we agreed he should write these memo-
randums and, therefore, he wrote the first of them on the very next
day.
i do not know whether his memory now that he has thought it
over
Mr. Thompson. At least, there may be some difference between the
memorandum and interview. My understanding was, frankly, that on
the 2Tth, Dean had asked him if there was any way that the CIA could
possibly be involved and whether or not the CIA could have been
involved without Walters' knowledge, and then, the following day, on
the 27th, mentioned the witnesses involved and as to whether or not
salary could be paid them and bail money could be raised. And on the
28th, a more general discussion as to whether or not General Walters
had any ideas as to how the matter could be alleviated.
3289
Mr. Helms. His memory may straighten that out now. I do not
know, but the reason that I cling to my recollection in this particular
case is that the question of bail and salaries hit me rather hard. That
made an impression on me and it was that which I believe motivated
us to say you had better start getting this in the record, and I think
that happened on the Tuesday, which I believe is the 27th and, there-
fore, he would have been writing these memorandums thereafter.
Mr. Thompson. Now, I know it is difficult to conclude what another
man was thinking but I assume you talked with him from time to
time. Might we conclude now that it was not so much the 23d meeting
in and of itself but the subsequent contact with Dean that inspired
him to put the matter in writing?
Mr. Helms. Yes, I think that is right, a combination of it.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, sir.
I have no further questions.
Senator Baker. Are there other questions of the witness? If there
are no other questions, Mr. Helms, on behalf of the committee may I
thank you for your appearance and reiterate we have some appre-
ciation of the inconvenience that we may have caused you. We are
grateful for your testimony, and wish you good luck.
Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the committee for
its consideration.
Senator Baker. Thank you, sir.
Would counsel call the next witness, please?
Mr. DoRSEN. General Cushman.
Senator Baker. The committee will come to order.
Would the witness please rise and hold up his right hand.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give to
this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
General Cushman. I do, sir.
Senator Baker. Would you be seated, please, sir. It is my intention
to continue with just the preliminary phase of this examination
through counsel and then if the chairman and other members of the
committee have not yet returned, to recess briefly while we await their
return, and incidently while I try to go make this vote.
jNIr. Hamilton, would you go ahead and start with the preliminary
questions, please?
Mr, Hamilton, General Cushman, would you state your full name,
please ?
TESTIMONY OP GEN. ROBERT E, CUSHMAN, JR„ COMMANDANT,
U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Cushman. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.
Mr. Hamilton, And what is your address?
General Cushman, My address is Marine Corps Headquarters,
Washington, D,C,
Mr, Hamilton, And your home address, General Cushman ?
General Cushman. The Commandant's quarters, 8th and Eye, SE.
Mr, Hamilton. And your current position with the Marine Corps
is Commandant, is that correct?
3290
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hamilton. When did you become Commandant?
General Cushman. January 1, 1972.
Mr. Hamilton. Before that date, General Cushman, were you the
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir ; I was.
Mr. Hamilton. What was your tenure at that position ?
General Cushman. I was there almost 3 years.
Mr. Hamilton. Do you have the dates, sir ?
General Cushman. I don't have the date of taking office exactly. I
think it was about April 15 when I moved into the Deputy Director's
chair, April 15, 1969.
Mr. Hamilton. I believe you told us at a staff interview your tenure
there was from May 7, 1969, to December 31, 1971 ; is that correct, to
the best of your recollection ?
General Cushman. That is correct. I had the figures with me.
Mr. Hamilton. Did there come a time on or about July 7, 1971, when
you received a call from the White House requesting CIA assistance
in regard to a White House project ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir; I received a call on July 7, 1971, from
Mr. Ehrlichman who said that Howard Hunt had been hired as a con-
sultant to the White House on security matters, that he would be com-
ing to see me, and could I lend him a hand or words to that effect.
Mr. Hamilton. If the witness will excuse me and I think we are now
beyond the preliminary questioning and beginning to get into the
substantive part of the testimony. The other members of the committee
have not yet returned and I know General Cushman 's testimony is very
important and relevant so the committee will stand in recess for a few
moments until we have the return of our other members.
[Recess.]
Senator Ervin. Proceed.
Mr. Hamilton. General Cushman, now that other members of the
committee have returned, I would like to ask you the same question I
asked before we had that brief intermission.
Did there come a time around July 7, 1971, when you received a call
from the White House requesting CIA assistance in a White House
project?
General Cushman. Yes, sir. On July 7, 1971, 1 received a call from
Mr. Ehrlichman who stated, as best I can remember the words, that
Howard Hunt had been hired as a consultant to the White House on
securitv matters, that he would be coming to pay me a visit and could
I lend him a hand.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, did you consider this request from Mr.
Ehrlichman to be a usual request, a commonplace request ?
General Cushman. This was the original such request that I could
recall by Mr. Ehrlichman. I used to get calls frequently, of course,
from other people saying that someone would come to call on me.
Usuallv they were looking for a job, that sort of thinff.
Mr. Hamilton. But I take it that from the White House, with the
exception of calls from the National Security Council, that this is the
only call that you have had ; is that correct ?
General Cushman. As far as I can recall, yes.
3291
Mr. Hamilton. So would it be fair to characterize it as you did in
one of the staff interviews as an extraordinary request?
General Cushman. Well, since all he said was that Howard Hunt
would be coming to call I don't regard it as extraordinary. It was
unusual.
Mr. Hamilton. And did you agree to see Mr. Hunt?
General Cushman. I did.
Mr. Hamilton. Why did you do that, sir ?
General Cushman. Well, I had no reason to refuse that I could think
of. As I say, I had been seeing people regularly off and on in that posi-
tion who were looking for jobs or in some cases wanting to sell some-
thing to the Agency, that sort of thing.
Mr. Hamilton. General Cushman, did you ask Mr. Ehrlichman to
give you sufficient facts to enable you to ascertain whether the request
that he made came within the CIA's statutory jurisdiction and would
not involve it in the internal security area or in domestic police or law
enforcement matters?
General Cushman. No, sir ; since his request was simply that he was
coming to call, and would I see him. In my mind he simply established
the bona fides of Mr. Hunt as being employed by the White House.
The White House, of course, in the form of the National Security
Council is the boss of the CIA.
Mr. Hamilton. Did you subsequently meet with Mr. Hunt in your
office on July 22, 1971 ?
General Cushman. Yes, I did.
Mr. Hamilton. Was the conversation of that meeting taped?
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hamilton. Why did you tape this conversation ?
General Cushman. I taped it so that I would have a recollection
of it since Mr. Hunt did not want anyone else in the room. When he
arrived he asked that it just be the two of us. Consequently I recorded
the conversation so I wouldn't have to take notes.
Mr. Hamilton. Did Mr. Hunt know that he was being taped ?
General Cushman. No, sir ; I didn't tell him.
Mr. Hamilton. Was taping a conversation a common practice on
your part?
General Cushman. No, sir. I probably taped about half a dozen over
3 years.
Mr. Hamilton. General Cushman, the Central Intelligence Agency
has provided us with a partial transcript of this meeting, and I would
like to show you now a document entitled "Meeting between the DDCI,
General Cushman, and Howard Hunt, 22 July 1971."
General Cushman. Yes, sir; it is DDCI, which is Deputy Director,
Central Intelligence.
Senator Ervtn. I hate to interrupt but there is another vote on in the
Senate and so we will have to suspend since Senator Talmadge and
I and Senator Weicker have to go and vote.
[Recess.]
Senator Baker. Would the committee come to order.
The chairman ?ias indicated he wishes us to proceed while he answers
this rollcall vote. Would counsel proceed with the interrogation.
Mr. Hamilton, General Cushman, I have just shown you a docu-
3292
ment entitled "Meeting Between the DDCI, General Cushman, and
Howard Hunt— 22 July, 1971."
Are you familiar with this document ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir. I might interject here that that is DDCI,
which stands for Deputy Director, Central Intelligence, rather than
one.
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you. General.
Now, is this transcript that I have given you an accurate partial
recording of the meeting between you and Mr. Hunt on that date ?
General Cushman. I think it is ; yes, sir,
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Vice Chairman, I would like for this to be
inserted into the record.
Senator Baker. If there is no objection, it will be received and
identified as an exhibit to the record.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 124.*]
Mr. Hamilton. Now, referring you to page 3 of the transcript,
General, does it show that you affirmed to Mr. Hunt on that date that
Mr. Ehrlichman had called you regarding assistance to Mr. Hunt ?
General Cushman. It seems to in that Mr. Hunt used the word
"Ehrlichman" in starting a sentence, and I said "Yes, he called me."
Mr. Hamilton. And did you make a similar statement, that it was
Mr. Ehrlichman who had called you in a July 8, 1971, meeting between
senior Agency officials. That is recorded in the official minutes of that
meeting ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, would you please tell the committee the nature
of Mr. Hunt's request to you and the reasons he expressed when need-
ing assistance?
General Cushman. Yes, sir. He started right out in the conversation
as soon as he got in the office saying that he had been charged with a
highly sensitive mission by the White House which involved an inter-
view of a person whose ideology he was not certain of, and that he
felt that he had to disguise himself to conduct this interview, and
requested that the Agency provide him with the materials to estab-
lish that alias and to mask his appearance or change it so that he
would not be identifiable to the person he was interviewing.
Mr. Hamilton. Did you ask Mr. Hunt to give you sufficient facts
so you could ascertain whether the CIA assistance involvement in this
matter would be permissible under statutory jurisdiction ?
General Cushman. No, because I considered that a one-time inter-
view, as he stated it, was perfectly OK.
Mr. Hamilton. What aid and assistance did you initially provide
Mr. Hunt?
General Cushman. I asked my executive assistant, Mr. Wagner, to
arrange with the technical services people in the Agency to meet with
Mr. Hunt and to provide him with what was necessary.
Mr. Hamilton. And what was the assistance they gave him, tlie
specific assistance ?
General Cushman. Well, I found out later that the}^ gave him a
driver's license, I believe a social security card, some things to carry
around in his pocket that would back up the name on the drivei's
license. They gave him I believe a wig and a speech altering device.
•See p. 3383.
3293
Mr. Hamilton. Did Mr. Hunt make any request to you as to how
these items should be delivered ?
General Cushman. He said that he did not want to come back into
the Agency and could they be delivered to him at a house, safe house,
as it is called, somewhere off the premises of the CIA.
Mr. Hamilton. And did you agree to this ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Hamilton. And did you subsequently report your actions to
Mr. Helms who was then the Director of the CIA ?
General Cushman. I discussed it with him to the best of my recol-
lection a couple of days later. As I recall, on July 7 I was the Aoting
Director. Mr. Helms was not present. And therefore on the 8th is
when I announced at the staff meeting about the phone call. Then after
Mr. Hunt did appear on July 22, it is the best of my recollection that I
did so report to the Director, probably along with a lot of other things
that we talked about frequently, and whether he remembers this I
don't know. The last time I talked to him he said he didn't recall as to
whether I had talked to him or not. I think I did.
Mr. Hamilton. Is it your recollection, General, that he indicated his
approval of the actions you had taken ?
General Cushman. Yes.
Mr. Hamilton. Did there come a time around August 18, 1971, when
Mr. Hunt began to make additional demands on the Agency ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir. On July 18, 1971, he conveyed to me,
lot directly — I never did talk directly with Mr. Hunt after the inter-
v^iew as far as I recall — but he relayed through my executive assistant
:hat he wanted the services of a stenographer whom he knew and we
:uiTied that down. I discussed it with Mr. Helms. We both agreed it
was not a proper request.
Mr. Hamilton. Was it rejwrted to you that these new requests that
Mr. Hunt was making was in conjunction with what he described as a
new assignment that he had been given by the White House ?
General Cushman. I can't recall that exactly. I thought so. But I am
aot sure. I do know that I thought at the time that since he was a paid
consultant, that he should be hiring a stenographer if he needed one
ind that he was i:)robably trying to lighten the expenses of his job, so
:o speak, by borrowing whatever he could from us. And that was some-
thing that we could not do.
Mr. Hamilton. Would you outline for the committee the other
requests that Mr. Hunt made of the agency besides the requests for a
secretary ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hamilton. And would you also indicate while doing this, Gen-
iral Cushman, which requests the Agency granted and which ones
ivere turned down?
Genral Cushman. Yes. As I say, I regarded the secretary thing as
jomething entirely separate, that he was trying to save the expenses
3f hiring a stenographer. And that request did get relayed to me
promptly along about August 18. However, the other requests I didn't
really find out about until they were cumulative and the technical
services people began to worry about these requests and they called
my office to see whether the instructions still stood to help Hunt out,
I found that he had been given a tape recorder and that he had
3294
been issued a camera. I found out that the camera had been used to
expose some film and that we had developed it and delivered the
prints, I think it was, to him. I found out that he had brought in
another man whom I find out in 1973 was probably Liddy. He had
brought in another man and talked the technical services people into
giving that man an alias and some false papers. So all in all it struck
me that he was exceeding what he had told me he was going to do ;
namely, a one-time interview, and that he was going to do this himself.
So we discussed it, Mr. Helms and I, and decided to turn it off.
Mr. Hamilton. Just for the record, the recorder was contained in
a typewriter case, that is correct?
General Cushman. I believe so. I never have seen any of the equip-
ment. Until this year I never really saw a list of what had been issued,
Mr. Hamilton. And the camera was the type of camera that could
be disguised in a tobacco pouch.
General Cushman. That is what I understand.
Mr. Hamilton. General, do you know what any of the equipment
that Mr. Hunt obtained was used for?
General Cushman. I think he kept it. I believe the technical services
people asked for its return, but it was not returned, with the excep-
tion, I have been told, of the camera, I believe it was, as being not
suited to whatever it was he wanted to use it for.
INIr. Hamilton. Do you know what it was actually used for?
General Cushman. No, I have no idea.
Mr. Hamilton. Did Mr. Hunt also request that he be given a New |
York address and phone services in New York?
General Cushman. Yes, sir. And this was when we decided that
these requests were clearly escalating into improper requests, in that
they would involve CIA people. He wanted an oflB.ce, and he wanted
the telephone to be monitored, as an answering service would, wher
he was not there, and this, so to speak, was just too much, and I called
up Mr. Ehrlichman and told him we could not accede to these types oi
requests. That I thought he was, he, Mr. Hunt, was not exercising
proper judgment, and that, therefore, I passed the word on.
Mr. Hamilton. What was Mr. Ehrlichman's comment at that time ?
General Cushman. He said "OK," which I took to mean that we
did not have to accede to Hunt's request, and said that he woulc
restrain Mr. Hunt.
Mr. Hamii/ion. Was this action taken on your own part or at tht
instruction of Mr. Helms ?
General Cushman. We talked it over, and I made the phone call. It
was on his instructions.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, that date on which you called Mr. Ehrlichman
which I believe you said was August 27, 1971. Is that correct?
General Cushman. August 27, 1971.
Mr. Hamilton. Did Mr. Hunt make another request of the Agency ?
General Cushman. I do not have any knowledge of it firsthand, I
have been told that he asked for a credit card and that this was turned
down.
Mr. Hamilton. Is it your information that he asked for that credit
card on August 31 ?
General Cushman. Yes, that is what I understand.
3295
Mr. Hamilton. When did you first learn of the break in of Dr. Ells-
berg's psychiatrist's oflfice ?
General Ccshman. I think it was when I was in Europe just before
being called back to testify to the oversight committees of the CIA,
which was May 13. I think I heard about it about the 10th when it
appeared in the newspapers.
Mr. Hamilton. That was May of which year ?
General Cushman. 1973, sir.
Mr. Hamilton. Did you have an occasion in January of this year,
to prepare two memorandums to Mr. Ehrlichman on your contacts
with Mr. Hunt?
General Cushman. I did, sir.
Mr. Hamilton. I would like to show you memorandums that are
iated January 8 and January 10, 1973, on the subject contact with Mr.
Hunt, and I will pass these copies over to you. I believe the committee
has already been provided with copies of these memorandums. General
Cushman, are these the two memorandums that you prepared ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir ; they certainly look like copies of them.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that these memorandums
36 submitted into the record at this time.
Senator Ervtn. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 125 and
.26*.]
Mr. Hamilton. Do these memorandums contain a summary of your
'experience with Mr. Hunt that you have just given us in testimony ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir ; they do.
Mr. Hamilton. Would you give us the circumstances that sur-
rounded the preparation of these memorandums, in your own words,
Dlease, sir ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
I believe the date was December 13, 1972. I was Commandant of
he Marine Corps at the time, and Mr. Colby came to see me, he was
hen the No. 3 man in the CIA, he came to see me and stated that the
Vgency had been directed to prepare a summation of their contacts
vith Howard Hunt.
This had been directed, I gathered, by the Department of Justice,
he prosecutors in the case. So he refreshed my memory on the phone
•all. I could not remember in December of 1972 who had telephoned
ne from the White House. I thought it was Mr. Ehrlichman, but I
vas not sure. When I had conversation on July 22 with Howard Hunt,
I number of names had been dropped in the conversation, Mr. Col-
ion's, Mr. Ehrlichman 's, maybe Mr. Dean's. I do not know; in any
'.vent, I could not be very certain. I refreshed my memory from the
ranscribed conversation, and while Ehrlichman's name appeared in it,
[ did not know whether this was sufficient for me to go putting it in
vriting or not ; and the tape, of course, was the property of the Agency,
'0 1 did not know just where I stood on that.
I then prepared the first memo which is dated January 8 — wait, I
lave to go back a little bit. Apparently, these papers were the subject
ater of conversation between Mr. Colbv and the prosecutor and, I
gather, Mr. Ehrlichman, I do not know. The next thing that happened,
•See pp. 3390, 3391.
3296 I
to my own knowledge, was along about January 7 or 8 this year, Mr.
Colby called and said that Mr. Ehrlichman disputed the phone call
incident, and would I prepare a memorandum stating to the best of my
recollection, what had happened. So I prepared the first memorandum,
in which I said Ehrlichman, Mr. Colson, or perhaps Mr, Dean. I
simply cannot recall at this late date which one it is, of my own
knowledge.
I then got a call, as I remember it, from John Ehrlichman saying,
"Look, I can't recall prior to July 22 and, in fact, my records show I
was out of town for a considerable length of time."
Well, this shook up my recollection even worse, and so I offered,
without being asked, I offered to take names out of it since I did not
think it would be fair when I could not swear to it. And then, I wrote
the second memorandum in which I said that I could not recall whc
placed the call at this late date but it was someone whom I recognized '
in the Wliite House.
The fact of the matter was that I had not combed through the
minutes of the daily staff meetings. I had checked my own files and in
the office at CIA to see whether there was any record of this phone call
and I could not find one. However, in preparing the statement before
the committees that Dr. Schlesinger had to make in May he had a
thorough search made of all possible documents and came up, I believe
liis secretary found them, came up with the minutes of the meeting ol
July 8, in which I definitely stated that Mr. Ehrlichman had called
So, based upon that I swore out an affidavit, I believe it is May 13
and used that affidavit before the CIA oversight committees, the thre*
of them before whom I had to testify.
Mr. Hamilton. So the record will be clear, I would like to read tin
relevant portions from these two memorandums, a sentence or tw(
from each.
The January 8 memorandum states :
I received a call over the White House line from either Mr. Ehrlichman, Mi
Colson, or perhaps Mr. Dean ( I simply cannot recall at this late date just whicl
one it was) stating that Mr. Hunt vpould call on me to ask for some support an(
that he was working on a matter for the person calling.
Now, in the January 10 memorandum this sentence appears :
"I cannot recollect at this late date who placed the call, but it wa
someone with whom I was acquainted, as opposed to a stranger." Aiu
the names of Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Colson, and Mr. Dean appear no
where in the memorandum.
General Gtjshman. Right.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, if I could ask you just a few questions oi
these two documents. First of all, since you reviewed the transcrip
of your conversation with Mr. Hunt on December 13 and because oi
page 3 of that transcript it is stated that it was Mr. Ehrlichman wIk
had called you, why did you have any real doubt that indeed it wa;
Mr. Ehrlichman who had made the telephone call to you in July 1971
_ General Cushman. Well, my recollection was that it was Mr. Ehr
lichman, but I was more concerned with putting it down on a piece o
paper. I didn't know, as I say, that I could get a transcript of tli<
tape — I didn't have this transcript. The Agency had it and showed i
to me. And the fact that it was a tape recording and that it belongec
to the Agency made me a little worried. I wanted something to cor
3297
roborate it. Perhaps I was wrong on that, but that is the way I felt
about it.
And it wasn't until May of this year that we found what I consider
to be corroborating entry in the records.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, after the January 8 memorandum was sent to
:he White House, did you also receive a call from Mr. Dean?
General Cushman. As I recall, I did get a call from Mr. Dean in
svhich he said that we didn't know each other and he was certain he
mdn't talked to me, and I had to agree with him, that we had not met,
md that I couldn't explain why I put his name in, frankly.
But his name was in the papers a lot and Mr. Hunt I think may
lave mentioned him sometime during the conversation I had with him
)ut I am not sure of that.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I don't believe in the transcript which we have,
vhich admittedly is a partial transcript because some of these sections
ire blocked out, not typed, I don't believe, in that transcript that Mr.
Dean's name appears in it.
Do you have any other explanation at this time why his name did
ippear in the January 8 memorandum ?
General Cushman. No, I don't, only what I have said.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, I believe you stated that you removed these
hree names from the memorandum voluntarily ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hamilton. Is it your testimony that Mr. Ehrlichman put no
)ressure at all on you to have his name removed ?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Mr. Hamilton. In your press conference that you had when you
ame back from Europe, you stated at page 19 that you tore up the
rst memorandum at Mr. Ehrlichman's request, and did Mr. Ehrlich-
lan make a request to you that the first memorandum be torn up and
hat a second memorandum be substituted ?
General Cushman. No. I would say that that is an inaccurate phras-
ig. He didn't ask me to tear it up. In fact, I guess he kept the original
s far as I know, but I tore up the copy when I wrote the new memo-
andum on January 10, 1973. But he did not make a specific request
hat I tear it up.
Mr, Hamilton. So the statement you made in your press confer-
nce
General Cushman. Is not precise.
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. Is inaccurate.
My final question, and I think this may be of some interest to the
ommittee. If you tore up your copy of the memorandum, how did
ou produce for us last night the copy of the January 8 memorandum
hat we now have?
General Cushman. The secretary who took it when I dictated it
ver at the Agency had retained her stenographic notebook.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. General Cushman, as I understand it, you reviewed
he transcript of this conversation with Hunt on December 13, 1972.
CJeneral Cushman. Of this year,
Mr. Thompson. Of this year?
( reneral Cushman. I mean
3298
Mr. Thompson. Last year.
General Cushman. 1972 ; yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. OK.
Was that with Mr. Colby, who is now Director?
General Cushman. Yes. Mr. William Colby.
Mr. Thompson. And, of course, Mr. Ehrlichman's name is mentioned
in there as the person who had originally contacted you. Yet on Janu-
ary 8 of this year when you wrote your memorandum you said it was
either Ehrlichman, Colson, or perhaps Dean.
Now, you say that Colson's name was mentioned and I believe the
transcript does bear this out. Of course, Ehrlichman was, but I think
Mr. Hamilton is right that Dean's name is not mentioned in the
transcript and I believe you said that Dean was also right when he
told you that as far as he was concerned, you didn't know each other
at all.
Did anyone suggest to you that it might have been Dean ? Did any-
one suggest to you to put his name in
General Cushman. No, sir. I have great difficulty in reconstructing
my thought processes of putting the name in, and the best I can do
is that it may have been mentioned by Hunt during our meeting but
was not in that part of the conversation which has come out in the
transcript. Or it may have been.
Mr. Thompson. You keep referring to a partial transcript. Why \>
it partial?
General Cushman. I don't know, sir. Just what they gave me.
Mr. Thompson. Is it partial in that it cuts off at some point in the
conversation or is it partial because there are excerpts from it where
the tape cannot be
General Cushman. I don't know whether the tape is unreadable oi
whether it was just simply chit-chat. There are portions of the tape
that are unreadable, I have been told, because of airplane noises and
the like.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall who you talked to in the TVTiite House
concerning this matter between December 13 and January 8 of 1973, ii
anyone ?
General Cushman. I don't recall talking to anybody in the White
House until about the 8th. Mr. Colby called me and said that I should
write out the memorandum and then aft^r I wrote the memorandum on
January 8, as I recall, then I got two phone calls, one from Mr. Dean
and one from Mr. Ehrlichman, both protesting the use of their names
in the memorandum, saying in one case that we hadn't talked and
hadn't met each other, in the case of Mr. Dean, and in the case of Mr.
Ehrlichman, he said he was out of town according to his records.
Mr, Thompson. Assuming that Dean's name is not in the transcript
or assuming that his name did not come up in the conversation with
Hunt at all, do you have any idea where you might have gotten his
name?
General Cushman. From the newspapers.
Mr. Thompson. Well, don't you think you would remember it if you
talked to the counsel to the President ?
General Cushman. Well, I probably should have, if I had talked to
him, but I don't think I did.
3299
Mr. Thompson. No one suggested to you that his name should be
ncluded in the memorandum ?
Greneral Cushman. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. I have no further questions. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervin. General, this visit from Hunt occurred on July 22,
:971?
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Senator Erven. Did you receive a phone call or communication be-
fore you wrote the memorandum of January 8, 1973, what has been
ailed the first memorandum in which you stated
General Cushman. I — yes, sir. I was asked to prepare that Janu-
ry 8, 1973, memorandum for Mr. Ehrlichman by a phone call from
Ir. William Colby.
Senator Ervin. Now, did you at that time receive information to the
ffect that Mr, Ehrlichman claimed that he was not in Washington on
uly 22, 1971, when the phone call came from Mr. Colby about Hunt's
riginal visit?
General Cushman. Mr. Chairman, I think that was a call which
ime after Ehrlichman saw the memorandum I wrote on January 8.
le called me, as I remember it, saying my records show that I was
at of town.
Senator Ervin. Now, give again, if you don't mind, the name of the
lan whose call resulted in the writing of the memorandum of Janu-
ry 8, 1973, in which you stated the call may have come from Ehrlich-
lan or Colson or Dean.
General Cushman. Yes, sir. That was Mr. William Colby who
illed.
Senator Ervin. Mr. William Colby.
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Then you prepared that memorandum of January 8,
)73, and sent a copy to the Wliite House.
General Cushman. Sent the original, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. The original. And after you had done that, you re-
vived a phone call from Mr. John Ehrlichman.
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And Mr. John Ehrlichman stated in the phone call
lat he was not in Washington at the time the call was made to you
re]:)aratory to Hunt's visit of July 22, 1971.
General Cushman. Yes, sir. I would like to refresh the committee's
lemory, Mr. Chairman, that at the time I wrote the January 8, 1973,
leniorandum, I didn't have any recollection of what day it' was that
lis phone call came, so I was quite shaken up when Mr.' Ehrlichman
lid. "Mv records show I was out of town for a considerable period
f time."
Senator Ervin. Yes. Did Mr. Ehrlichman ask vou to prepare a
?cond or substitute memorandum for the memorandum of January 8,
973? ^
General Cushman. No. I told him that I couldn't recall well enough
> swear to it, as to his telephone call, and that I would rewrite the
lenio and take his name out of it.
Senator Ervin. Yes, and did you send him a copy of it?
General Cushman. I sent the original of the second one.
3300
Senator Ervin. Yes, sir. Now, when you were preparing for your
testimony before the oversight committee of the CIA, there was a
search made to find some record of who did make the call about Mr.
Hunt's visit.
General Cushman. I think primarily all of the records were searched
because Dr. Schlesinger had to testify and he was newly appointed,
and he didn't know anything about any of this and had to finetooth
comb the records to make sure he had all the operative facts that he
could testify to.
Senator Ervin. That was in reference to the testimony of Br.
Schlesinger on his confirmation hearing. That is right.
General Cushman. No, sir, he had to testify also as to what he knew
about any connection between CIA and any of these affairs.
Senator Ervin. In other words, I was right the first time when ]
thought there was testimony before the CIA oversight committee.
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, at that time one of the secretaries came uf
with the records which showed that the phone calls had been initiates
by Mr. Ehrlichman, did she not?
General Cushman. Yes, sir. If I am not mistaken, Dr. Schlesingei
so testified. And then, of course, I used it also.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
General Cushman, I may have missed a part of your testimony wher
I was out of the room, trying to answer a rollcall on the floor of th«
Senate. Did you describe for the committee how you came to tap
the conversation with Mr. Hunt?
General Cushman. Yes, sir. When he came in the door he said tha'
he would like to have the meeting to be just between the two of u:
because it was highly classified and very sensitive. So I told my execu
tive assistant to please remain outside the room, and I set the machim
in motion.
Senator Baker. Did Mr. Hunt know it was being taped ?
General Cushman. No, sir, not that I know of.
Senator Baker. How did you set the machine in motion?
General Cushman. Simply push a button.
Senator Baker. Is it a regular practice to record your conversation
in your office ?
General Cushman. It is possible to do so at all times but I probabl;
used that only about six times or so during the 3 years.
Senator Baker. Are those tapes available ?
General Cushman. I do not know, sir. I assume that the Agency stil
has them.
Senator Baker. Could we have them ? I notice there are a numbe
of omissions in here and references to plane noise and the like. If w
wanted to, could the committee have those tapes ?
General Cushman. I do not know, sir. I do not have any custody o:
them. You will have to ask the CIA, I guess. They do not relate ix
this at all.
Senator Baker. Well, the Hunt part does.
General Cushman. You mean the tape, I thought you were asking,
for the maybe half dozen tapes that resulted from my conversation}
over a 3-year period.
3301
Senator Baker. No, no, no, I am talking about the transcription of
your meeting or rather the tape of your meeting with Mr. Hunt on
July 22, 1971.
General Cushman. I imagine the counsel would ask the Agency
for it.
Senator Baker. The only point I am trying to make is that you do
not object if we
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Get access to it.
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. General Cushman, can you tell me what, beyond
what is in this transcript, and I have now read the transcript of the
conversation as carefully as I can and even though it may be somewhat
repetitious, what material Mr. Hunt requested and what material or
services that the Agency supplied to him ?
General Cushman. Well, the way it was set up was that he simply
asked me for material that would provide him with an alias so that
the person he was interviewing would not know who he was.
Senator Baker. Did he tell you who that person would be ?
General Cushman. He did not. He simply said it was a person, it
was a highly sensitive one-time interview and that the person was of
an ideology of which he was not sure and he did not want to disclose
lis identity while he was interviewing the subject, and he said that
this was a' highly sensitive mission charged upon him by the White
House, to visit and elicit information from an individual.
Senator Baker. Did you gain the impression that since he wanted
iisguise material that the man might have known Mr. Hunt ?
General Cushman. It could have been that, yes, sir ; and it entered
my mind that this might be it. There was great concern at the time
over security leaks and he had been hired on as a consultant on security
matters.
Senator Baker. Did he ask for the voice alteration device for that
purpose ?
General Cushman. Well, if I may come to this chronologically, I
5aid OK, and based on this and the fact he said this was in the national
interest and so forth, and I had my executive assistant call the tech-
nical services people in the Agency and say that Mr. Hunt would be
levying a request upon them and would they honor it, so this is the way
it went from there on. I was not kept apprised on a daily basis of what
iie was getting. I found out after the event.
Senator Baker. I understand from the document that has been
iianded to me by counsel that what was supplied was a Massachusetts
driver's license — I see, this was back in September 1960 when Mr. Hunt
was working for the CIA, I assume.
General Cushman. Yes, sir, the first two items on that list are not
'germane to this issue, I do not believe. They were issued 13 years ago
or some such time.
Senator Baker. And District of Columbia driver's license also in
1960. Then in 1971 alias documents issued in the name of Edward
Joseph Warren. I understand he specifically requested the alias
Edward.
General Cushman. Yes. I believe he did.
Senator Baker. Did he explain why ?
^6-296 O - 73
3302
General Cushman. No, sir, he never requested any of these things
from me.
Senator Baker. Disguise materials, wig, glasses, speech alteration
device, and then about a month later a tape recorder, a typewritei
case, and business cards in the name of Edward J. Warren. Then some
5 days later a commercial Tessina camera disguised in a tobacco pouch
associate disguised (wig and glasses) in the name of George F. Leon
ard, documents to reflect that. Do you understand now that wa^
Mr. Liddy?
General Cushman. That is what I have heard.
Senator Baker. Yes, on the 27th your facilities developed and re
turned film to New York and you were requested to provide a Ne\^
York address and New York phone service, which you declined ; and i
credit card was requested and declined. Is that the sum total of th(
CIA support for Hunt and Liddy ?
General Cushman. I cannot answer that, sir. All I know is that h
the sum total of the technical services relationships with him.
Senator Baker. Do you know of any other support or collaboratior
with Mr. Hunt or Mr. Liddy other than technical services ?
General Cushman. Not of my own knowledge, but I did hear testi
mony before other committees to the effect that there was a psychiatric
profile and some dealings concerning that which I know nothing about
Senator Baker. But you know of no other interrelationship betweei
Hunt and Liddy and the CIA other than those that we have no\^
covered ?
General Cushman. No, sir, I do not. I might point out, too, sir, tha
if you will notice the calendar which goes with those items, that every
thing up until just a few days before we called the White House an(
said no more, everything was consistent with the purposes of conduct
ing an interview under an alias. Then when the requests began to seal
up to an office in New York, I think it was, and an answering servic
for telephones, these things were not consistent in my mind with th
purposes of a one-time interview, and also they would involve Agenc
personnel and that, therefore, in discussing it with Mr. Helms w
agreed, and he told me to do so, to call the White House and tell then
we could not comply with the request.
Senator Baker, General Cushman, do you know how many times th'
CIA has provided such technical or logistical support for any otlie
arm or agency of the Government for internal activities ?
General Cushman. No, sir. There has been a considerable, well,
guess it is a matter of controversv, they have assisted, I believe, otho
l^olice — I should not say police — departments by furnishing them witl
information on an invention of the Agency which, as I recall, assistoc
in determining whether a hand that held a gun had fired it, this sort o
thing. I do not know of my own knowledge of this being done before
Of course, it could have, I was there a little less than 3 years, but somt
other time.
Senator Baker. Did vou know Mr. McCord personally ?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. You did know Mr. Hunt personally ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir, not well but I knew him.
Senator Baker. I notice in the beginning of your conversation h.i>
speaks of the fact that you appeared to have lost some weight. He say?
3303
that he has, too, and there is some other conversation on that tape
which led me to believe that you were acquainted.
General Cushman. Yes, sir. He retired in 1970, 1 think I went to his
retirement ceremony and a party they had for him. I think that he
recollects meeting me when I worked for Mr. Nixon in his capacity as
Vice President because he had me monitoring the Bay of Pigs opera-
tion. In case he should have been elected, he wanted to know what was
going on, and so I met a number of the people connected with that oper-
ation back in those days. I do not r«iall whether Hunt was in on this
and I met him at that time or not. He says so.
Senator Baker. Just one or two more questions. Did you know Mr.
Liddy?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Martinez ?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Barker ?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Any of those who were involved in the Watergate
situation ?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Baker. We have testimony from former Director Helms
this morning or I understand his testimony to be that material which
was used here was not used in the Ellsberg break-in. Does that accord
with your information and understanding?
General Cushman. I have no knowledge, sir.
Senator Baker. You simply do not know? And you do not know
prhat it was used for except for the statement of Mr. Hunt that it was
for, I guess it would be fair to call it, a covert interview, or at least a
concealed identity interview ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And that is all you know about it ?
General Cushman. It would not be so unusual to have that kind of
in interview. For example, those who seek asylum in this country some-
:imes had to be interviewed, and the person of the interviewer had to be
{ept secret so that this was not a new type thing for us, really.
Senator Baker. And the reason I was asking you about whether you
mpplied any other facilities or services for Mr. Hunt was I notice also
n the transcript some reference to a safe house here in Washington.
General Cushman. Yes, sir; he did not, as I explained earlier, I
)elieve while you were out, that he did not want to rush to the Agency
building because he was afraid he would be spotted, I guess, by former
issociates and, therefore, he requested that the technical services people
neet with him somewhere off the premises and we furnished him with
:hat kind of a place.
Senator Baker. That is what you were talking about in that part of
;he transcript which reads, "I would not want to be seen walking out
>f here. I am sure thev have got safe facilities downtown "
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker [continues reading] :
General Cushman. Yes. They sure as hell did on my last tour of duty here.
Mr. Hunt. I remember FE — my private office is just a stone's throw from the
Roger Smith Hotel — and it was practically an FE Division. They had so many
spooks there.
3304
That is what he was referring to ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, the distinguished Senator from
Hawaii must take a plane shortly. I yield as much of my time as he
may desire to the Senator from Hawaii at this time.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
General Cushman, we have spent much time today and in the weeks
past discussing the break-in into the office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychia-
trist. I believe we have testimony telling us how it was done and who
were the participants and when it was done. I believe the most im-
portant question is why was it done or the justification for this
break-in.
A few days ago Mr. John Ehrlichman said that the justification was
national security and that these Pentagon Papers had been given to
some official in the Soviet Embassy.
The New York Times on June 16 began its publication of the
Pentagon Papers. As Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency at that time, were you aware or did you have information
indicating that copies of the Pentagon Papers had been transmitted to
the — some official in the Soviet Union prior to June 16, 1971 ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir. I do not know of my own knowledge,
but it was so stated at one of our morning staff conferences, I believe.
Senator Inouye. Are you aware of who was responsible for this?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Inoute. Articles have appeared quoting "reliable sources'
from the FBI suggesting that they are not aware of any transmitta:
of copies of the Pentagon Papers to the Soviet Embassy. Was tlii.'
matter discussed with the FBI ?
General Cushman. I do not know, sir. I was not involved in that
We had quite a session with a small group of people, not including
me, who read all the volumes to see what — as they were printed, oi
course, in the New York Times — everyone would be reading them, sc
they were read from the point of view of what intelligence sources.
methods, and so on, were going to be compromised and given away.
As I recall — well, I do not know. These people reported to Mr.
Helms. They did not report to me and I do not know just when it
stopped, when they finished reading them, what they did with their
conclusions, except that I imagine some kind of action may have had
to have been taken concerning certain intelligence sources and methods,
perhaps, to stop using them if they had been compromised.
Senator Inouye. It says — the activities of the Soviet Union, I pre-
sume, come within your jurisdiction. Did you make anv effort to in-
vestigate whether these Pentagon Papers did in fact get into the hands
of the Soviets ?
General Cushman. No, sir. That was not part of my job.
Senator Inouye. Was it not considered important enough for an
investigation ?
General Cushman. Well, this was up to the Director, sir — Mr, Helms.
Senator Inouye. Do you know whether the Director made an effort
toward this end ?
3305
General Cushman. Only that he put together this group of people,
an ad hoc committee, if you will, to read the entire Pentagon Papers,
all the volumes, see if there had been any compromise.
Senator Inouye. I see. Well, thank you very much. General Cush-
man. We have a vote at this time, so the committee will stand in recess,
subject to the call of the chair.
Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Senator Baker. The committee will come to order.
Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. General Cushman, you stated in your affidavit
that you assisted Mr. Hunt because you were given instructions to do
so by Mr. Ehrlichman. You assume that command came with the au-
thority of the President of the United States, I take it, did you not ?
General Cushman. He spoke with the authority of the name of
the President because he was one of three chiefs of staff — Mr. Halde-
man, Mr. Kissinger, and Mr. Ehrlichman. I consider that all three
spoke with that authority.
I have been trying to recall those exact words which I am not able
X) do. It was something on the order of give them a hand or lend them
I hand. There were no specific items requested or anything of that
iind.
Senator Talmadge. Now, you were the Deputy Director of the OIA
md Mr. Helms was the Director.
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Did you wonder why he called you and not
Mr. Helms?
General Cushman. I think I was Acting Director on the day he
;alled but nevertheless, I had met Mr. Ehrlichman many years before,
)ack in about 1960. I believe it was. It may have been that he had
cnown me before, I don't know.
Senator Talmadge. Do vou think it was abnormal that the White
^ouse would request to disguise one of their own men to use for
security purposes and not the Federal Bureau of Investigation ?
General Cushman. It was unusual, yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Did you wonder why they wanted to go to those
musual extremes?
General Cushman. No. This was left to Mr. Hunt to tell me what
le was doing, which he did when he came on July 2, and stated that
)n White House instructions, he was to conduct a one-time sensitive
nterview.
Senator Talmadge. Your affidavit states that you finally advised
iir. Ehrlichman the Agency would not have anvthing further to do
^^ith Mr. Hunt. Isn't that rather forceful language to use when you
lad assumed that Mr. Ehrlichman was speaking with the authority
)f the President himself?
General Cushman. Well, sometimes vou have to do that, sir.
Senator Talmadge. You never did check out Mr. Hunt's authority
mth the President himself, did you ?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Were vou personally close to the President ?
General Cushman. I don't consider myself close, but I had worked
lor him for 4 years when he was Vice President.
3306
Senator Talmadge. In what capacity, sir?
General Cushman. Sir?
Senator Talmadge. In what capacity?
General Cushman. I was his Assistant for National Security
Affairs.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you very much, General.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Baker. Senator Gurney?
Senator Gurnet. General, you did mention in your testimony that
you knew ISIr. Hunt before. Had you seen him for some time prior
to his
General Cushman. I have been trying to recollect, sir. I think that
I probably attended his retirement ceremony and the brief party
they give oldtime employees when they retire. This would be some
time, I think, in 1970, when I was Deputy Director. I probably may
have known him back in the olden times. I did a tour in the Central
Intelligence Agency from 1949 to 1951. I may well have run into him
there, too. Probably did. Eather small outfit, just beginning then.
Also, when I was working for Mr. Nixon in his capacity as Vice
President, when I was his Assistant for National Security Affairs,
I dealt with the liaison between his office and the CIA, and in par-
ticular I monitored the progress of the Bay of Pigs planning. In case
Mr. Nixon got elected President, he would then need to know all the
details of that operation.
Senator Gurnet. Well, I was thinking more in terms of this time
frame that we are speaking about now. I noticed in the transcript of
the meeting between you and Mr. Hunt there was a reference there to
a phone number. I will read the pertinent parts of the transcript.
Mr. Hunt said: "I will be talking to the same people in and out,
and if it goes a little bit well, that is swell."
Then there is something here that is illegible, "I just don't exist.
It is not possible this Friday."
And your reply is, "OK. Let's see. You gave me a No. 1 time where
I could get you."
What did you mean by that ?
General Cushman. I believe he left with my secretary, as I recon-
struct what I was talking about there, a number at the White House
where he could be reached.
Senator Gurnet. Well, was that when he came in this particular
time?
General Cushman. No, sir. I think it was when he called the office
to make the July 22 appointment because it had not been firmed up
in the phone call of Mr. Ehrlichman who simply left it that he would
come and see me at some time in the future. So he must have called
my secretary to set up the date, as best I can reconstruct this.
Senator Gurnet. And it was your secretary who had his phone
number ?
General Cushman. I believe so ; yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Had you been in touch with him on any other
occasions
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Gurnet [continuing]. In the time frame we are talking
about?
3307
General Cushman, No, sir.
Senator Gurney. He goes on to say, "Right." I guess he is talking
about this number. "Chuck Colson, and my office is unattended so far
but that is a direct line 'to Colson 's office and my office is two floors
up," and you say, "All right, fine. Whoever is there can get hold of
you."
I presume Hunt is talking about this phone number that must have
been
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet [continuing]. Colson's number.
General Cushman. That is what I understood it to be so we could
get in touch with him if we needed to.
Senator Gurnet. Did you have any conversations or contact with
Mr. Colson?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Just one other small inquiry here. This is a staff
preparation of highlights of the staff's interview with you on August 1,
and it has an item here, August 27, 1971. I will just read what the
staff said. This was in reply to Hunt's further demands.
"In response Cushman called Ehrlichman and told him that Hunt
had poor judgment and was becoming a pest and Ehrlichman said he
would restrain Hunt."
I was just curious about why did you think he had poor judgment?
General Cushman. Well, he worked in the Agency for, I guess 20
years, and when he first came in to see me, he asked for the materials
for a one-time interview, and up until I think it was about August 20,
^r thereabouts, his requests were pretty consistent for the purposes of
conducting such an interview except for the stenographer request. But
:hen when he escalated to request for an office and for a telephone
mswering service, this would involve CIA people, and while I still
didn't sense anything sinister, it seemed to me that he should know
better than to ask for all these things.
Frankly, I thought he was simply trying to cut down his expenses
ind this sort of thing.
Senator Gurnet. In other words, in your mind it was poor judgment
bhat these further requests far
General Cushman, Yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet [continuing]. Far exceeded, and he should and
lught to know that.
General Cushman. Yes, sir, and then the thought entered my mind
that he was obviously trying to get the Agency to assist him further
and further, and unless we really went to the mat to find out exactly
what he was doing, I just felt that this was not wise, and the Director
agreed with me.
Senator Gurnet. Did you think he was doing this on his own, or did
you think someone was pushing him, perhaps ?
General Cushman. Oh, no, sir. He said he had a White House task to
conduct an interview. I didn't talk to him after that, and it was only
when the technical services people began to wonder at these new de-
mands, the last 3 or 4 or 5 days there, in Au.qust, that they called up
my office and said, "We are bearinnins: to get a little worried about these
requests. Should we continue to fill these requests?"
3308
And I talked to the Director, and he said no. He called Mr. Ehrlich-
man and told him no.
Senator Gurney. While you were Deputy Director, had there been
any other demands like this from the White House to assist in projects
of this sort ?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. This is the only one ?
General Cushman. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Thank you. General.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. No questions.
Senator Ervin. I have just one question. In taking a camera, or-
dinarily does that consist of an interview ?
General Cushman. It would be if he desired to take a picture sur-
reptitiously of the person he was interviewing ; it could be, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Thank you.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question in that respect.
The camera in the tobacco pouch that was supplied him supposedly
consistent with his equipment to have a clandestine interview, was that
the same camera in which the film was removed and developed showing
the inside of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office ?
General Cushman. I don't know, sir.
Senator Baker. Was there any other camera or any other processing
done?
General Cushman. No, sir. We processed, again as I understand it.
it wasn't to my knowledge until after the event until this year some-
time, he asked that a roll of film be picked up at the airport and devel-
oped for him, and this was done, and the pictures, I gather, were
handed back to him.
Senator Baker. But you don't know whether they were taken with
this tobacco pouch camera, do you ?
General Cushman, No, sir.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, just one brief question. General
Cushman, when you prepared the January 8 memorandum for Mr.
Ehrlichman, I might haA^e been out of the room when you testified to
this fact, did you go back into your records or more specifically did you
go to the tape recording and listen to it prior to responding to that
memorandum ?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. I mean prior to writing that memorandum.
General Cushman. No, sir. Mr. Colby came to my office and showed
me what you, sir, have on the table in front of you and I went through
it and in there it seemed to back me up, that I thought it was Ehrlicli-
man. I still wasn't all that sure about swearing to it when all that I had
was a tape which was in the custody of the Agency and a rather imper-
fect transcript which had been provided me by the Agency in terms of
a lot of airplane noise and this sort of business, and I myself have not
1 istened to the tape.
Senator Weicker. But in any event, I haven't read the whole tran-
script, the name Dean was nowhere in that transcript, was it?
General Cushman. It is not in the transcript, no, sir.
3309
Senator Weicker. It was between January 8, 1973, and January 10,
1973, on both the corroboration of the secretary's minutes.
General Cushman. No, sir, I got two phone calls, one from Mr. Dean
saying "It couldn't have been me," and one from Mr. Ehrlichman say-
ing "I was out of town during this general period of July 22 previous."
It was not until May of this year when all of the Agency files were
given a very thorough going over in order to prepare Dr. Schlesinger,
who had no knowledge of any of this, to prepare him for testimony
before the CIA oversight committees, and of course I took advantage
of their finding that to corroborate my previous guess that it had been
Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator Weicker. And I gather Mr. Ehrlichman said — in other
tvords between January 8, 1973, and January 10, 1973 Mr. Ehrlichman
5aid — he was out of town and Mr. Dean said, "It can't be me." Did you
lear from Mr. Colson ?
General Cushman. No ; I never did.
Senator Weicker. So you just decided it was best not to put any
lames in the
General Cushman. Yes, sir, I agreed, in fact I made the offer I
vould take the names out since I would not, based upon what I have,
vant to swear to it.
Senator Weicker. And you didn't feel that a tape recording was the
)est possible evidence of who the person was ?
General Cushman. Well, I didn't know. It kind of shook me up
v^hen I was told by Mr. Ehrlichman that he was out of town, too. I
)egan to think I was perhaps — what you see here in this transcript
night have been just a suggestion, in other words, Mr. Hunt named
ilr. Ehrlichman first, starting a sentence with his name.
Senator Weicker. Eight.
General Cushman. Then I say yes, he called me, and I don't know,
rhen I was told that this was impossible or almost impossible, I began
o worry about it. None of us at that time knew when the phone call
lad been made. I couldn't recollect what day.
Senator Weicker. I see.
General Cushman. Then in May when I was called back from
Europe to testify I found that on July 8 I had made the statement
hat the call had been made by Mr. Ehrlichman and, therefore, it must
lave been on the 7th.
Senator Weicker. So there is no question in your mind now as you
ppear before this committee, however, who made the call ?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. Thank you very much.
Senator ER^^N. Any further questions ?
Counsel has some questions.
i IMr. Hamilton. General Cushman, you are now very certain in your
, estimony that it was Mr. Ehrlichman who called yoii on July 7, 1971.
[ it page 108 of your testimony before the Senate Armed Services Com-
, nittee on May 14 of this year, you indicated that mavbe it had been
^r. Haldeman who had called vou. Now, did Mr. Haldeman have any
nvolvement at all with Mr. Hunt's relationship with the CIA in this
natter ?
General Cushman. No, sir ; not with me certainly.
3310
Mr. Hamilton. Is there any reason that Mr. Haldeman's name wa
left out of that January 8 memorandum when you were speculating o;
the person who might have called you ?
General Cushman. No. I just didn't think that he had called and
thought the others might have made the call.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, you said, I believe, in response to a questio
that I asked you that you were not sure if Mr. Hunt had said when h
escalated his request to the Agency that he had a new assignment,
would like to show you a memorandum that is dated August 26, 197:
I believe the date has been obscured by the Xeroxing process, and th
subject of this memorandum is TSD Request for Guidance on Exter
of Assistance to Mr. Hunt.
Now, you will notice that in the copy that I have given you thei
are certain blanks. We have excluded certain names so we won't con
])romise anyone at the Agency whose name should not be revealed, i
call your attention to paragraph 3 and there is a sentence in there thf
reads, "According to ■ — Mr. Hunt said that he needed the camei
in connection with a 'new assignment,' " new assignment being i
quotes.
Does that refresh your recollection as to whether
General Ctjshman. Yes; this is what I couldn't put my finger c
yesterday. That is correct.
Mr. Hamilton. Do you recall if anyone in the Agency inquired i
to what this new assignment was that Mr. Hunt had been given?
General Cushman. No, sir.
Mr. Hamilton. You testified that in December 1972, Mr. Colby can
to you and asked vou to prepare a memorandum on your relationshi]
with Mr. Hunt. Do you know who had asked Mr. Colby to make th
request of you?
General Cushman. No, sir; I do not except that I understand it wi
the prosecutor in the Justice Department.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, if it was the prosecutor whv was the memi
randum addressed to Mr. Ehrlichman and sent to Mr. Ehrlichmar
General Cushman. Because I provided, first of all, to Mr. Coll
verbally that I thought I recollected the phone call, and T srather thi
they wrote it up, some sort of a synopsis of all of the dealings of tl
Agency with Mr. Hunt, and that this, I gather, was on the subject <
conversation between Mr. Colby and the prosecutor and, I sruess, M
Ehrlichman because I then received a call in January from Mr. Colt
saying that Mr. Ehrlichman did not recollect this telephone call wha
soever, and that he did not think he was even in town at the time an<
therefore, would I put the facts down on a piece of paper and send
to Mr. Ehrlichman ? So T said, OK, and T did that.
Mr. Hamilton. Finally, I would like to clarifv for the record yoi;
statements on this psychiatric profile on Daniel Ellsberg that was pn
vided by the CIA. I take it, that at some time you have learned thi
such a profile had been prepared ?
General Cushman. In May of 1973.
Mr. Hamilton. And I take it, from your testimony and from thi
answer that you had nothinff to do with the preparation of this profile
General Cushman. Yes, sir, that is correct.
3311
Mr. Hamilton, Now, is it the normal course from your knowledge
and experience for the CIA to prepare a profile on an American
3itizen ?
General Cushman. No, sir; it is not, it would be unusual.
Mr. Hamilton. Can you think of another instance where this has
been done that can be revealed ?
General Cushman. Well, my accounting would not be exhaustive, of
course, but during the 3 years I was there I do not recall any other
3eing made on an American.
Mr. Hamilton. And I take it, this procedure is usually reserved for
foreign leaders ; is that correct ?
General Cushman. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Senator Ervtn. Without objection, I will put in the record the memo-
•andums dated August 26, 1971, and August 27, 1971, and have them
narked appropriately as an exhibit.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 127.*]
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, you might also — so we have the
rhole caboodle in the record — put in the transcript of the tape-
ecorded conversation between Mr. Hunt and General Cushman dated
uly22, 1971.
Senator Er%t:n. Yes; that will be marked appropriately as an
xhibit** and put in the record as such.
General, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you for your
ppearance and for your testimony.
General Cushman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Baker. Before the General leaves, did you place in the
ecord, Mr. Chairman, the memorandum of August 1971?
Senator Ervin. I just did that.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much.
Thank you, General.
Senator Ervin. Now, the "Wliite House furnished us three documents
^hich Senator Baker and I submitted to Mr. George F. Murphy,
)eputy Director of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy who is
n expert in intelligence matters with the request that these docu-
lents be sanitized so as to remove all reference to foreign intelligence
nd that has been done and Senator Baker and I have both inspected
tie documents and without objection, they will be put in the record at
lis point.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 128.***]
Senator ER\^N. Mv understanding: is the staff will not be ready for
reneral Walters until in the moi-ning. and for that reason the com-
littee will stand in recess until 9 :30 tomorrow morning.
rWHiereupon, at 4 :05 p.m., the. hearing was recessed, to reconvene at
:30 a.m., Friday, August 3, 1973.]
*Sep p. 3392.
♦•Previously entered as exhibit No. 124 on p. 3383.
*•* Seep. 3394.
3313
EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
;^^
/
/vr--;;-"7i-:Aiivri
COUriL)LiiTlAL
EXfflBIT No. 110
ThC WHITE HOUSE
WAS M I HOTON
February 3,
/^ JV
MEMORANDUM FORi
FROM: •
, BUDJECT:
H. R. HALDEMAN
BRUCn KEHRLI f'>'-''^
Committ.cG for the
Re-Llcction Support ' -' '.;•.'('
On February 1, the source of financial support for the White House ^'/i'
shifted froni the RNC to the Coramittee for the Rc-Election of the'. , 'j .
President. . ,, . >•_
The Attorney General has requested (via Jeb Magruder) a rough estimate
of the support that the V.'hite House will need in 1972.
I have net with Dwight Chapin, Harry Dent, Bill Timmons, Herb Klein', :;.
Dick Ho\.'ard, 'and Frank DeCosta of the Vice President's staff, to
discuss their financial neciris for 1972. All agreed that any budget .
estimate for the year should be divided into two parts — one - •.
covering expenses before the Convention and a second covering post r 'i
nomination costs. .\ ; ,, , ' ",.^-.>,
The estimates for each of the categories are broken dov.'n as follov/as-;/:.
1. Presiden tial and First ra ir. ily Trave l -- The total
of $1,(jC(i,000 cor.sirts of $^.00,000 for transportation,
$500,000 for pro:r.otion of events and arrangements, • ' |
$350,000 for advnnccman costs and $50,000 for of f ieial '' . ';
gifts and photos. Tliis last item includes the cost of • , ^
reprcxj\icing and distributing a new official photo. A * v;''
■detailed summary nnrl the rationale for those figures. 'V'
arc? included at Tab A. •!,.-;- \\
lA pre and post convention breakdown s)iov;s: . •'■♦•',-..
Pre-Convcntioh Convention and \ < . Total '
Po t- 1 K'oni i n a t icin ' '' ; .; '
'TrnnrpMtnt ion (uro of .M'-l, !,,:.', .
'JfVr! "<;•;:, l!cU>-^ '■■v |C)lj;:ictl . jV- '• iv " ■ ';
cviir.L.i)
.. /
AOvaneencn cotits
('•''";/:.<• in. .'•• '
5:i,ooiv-
625,000 \'.
' - ceo, 000
•jo, ' ^
.' i5('0,O0O
200,000
150,000
•';.' 360,000
2 r., (•'-'.
2'), ceo V
.'•'.. 50,000
3314
2. Staf f — Tiic total of $100,000 will go for re- ' '
intburr.enient to staff members who are carrying out- 'f'-'
political business for the President. Dill Timmons,'* - •: ..
Herb Klein, Harry Dent and John Dean v/ill be receiving ■■,"
most of the tr.oncy. This also covers travel expenses -j^ir,
for non-political trips over and above the maximum ,.'i. ; ' '
amount a llov.cd by law. Also, ve have cracked dov/n* j. ' ■
on staff mciTiljcrs who had been reimbursed by outaido >.!•'••
organizations for non-political events and generally . . '
can expect to pick up more of their expenses.
*-_'-'^.'^* 'colson — The $900,000 for the ColaojL.of fice con- ^'". T- ",
J*. ' .sists of $660,000 for mailings and iniarma t"i"on""r e tf i e va 1 P ■ '
.••r\'$150,000 to exnc-»nd his mailing lists and"al)oTIT"!f70T0'00-^ • > ,'
••'.., .'for "black" projects — those that have to be done .'
,.,'.■' outside the KNC. These costs cover only White House , ';
, , • ^rrequircmonts and not those of tlie Committee to Re-Elect j -J
« ;. ■'■"the' President. ' ^/r'Z'
v.
'>H*^
.^. formally the costs of expanding mailing lists and in-
^'"•" '. ^rmation retrieval would not be included in an "RNC" ' V-,'
«•. . .. • Support budget; they would be hidden in another portion '^'i,'
. ,■ , of the RJ'.'C liudgct by mutual agreement betv/eGn the i;hitc \.\.
'•,-; House and RNC. i'owevcr, since the UKC v/ill be reimbursed vi'
' i by the Comiiittcc for all costs incurred by the White House,'
'■' :, these are included to give tiie Attorney General, n more '";|"
J ,', accurate picture of the actual expenses. ' ■■'.- .'•'''}:'
, ' \r'\ A. Vice Presiden t — The Attorney General has requested ■''^],
, • :• that no jittoi.ipt be made to estimate the Vice Prcoident ?s _ j'j
^ expeniiCf' until he has met with the Vice Prenidcnt to , i.'.l'
"' ' i...' determine his role in the campaign. The Attorney General f'
.J '■ " . (per" Mayruder) requested that last year's estimate of • V.'
; $50,000 be used for budget purposes until a more accurate
• figure is determined. r ' '. .m - *
Thif budget does not include VJhite House polling cxpenseej i/hlch I y^
understand will bi; handled in another nanner. .• , •,,■
Tn \.hZ't years \:c hi'vc su!:- itted budget figures to the RNC. that v.'ore;
':■ a'.' ••,'-■ t ,■ . ::r;".-,l o.'^ ', ^ -. i .•.-. fo'" I '.'C •vyc'iolr.njccl advantage it •.
a:- ■■■..u oi ...A lu.:. .,;;.,■ . .. .-■ "v:.- .r -...'yrl-. : li:.•:-'^-•;...t^.^;:l ;thr V.::C .V;.
■•■.':".■-.'•• (s(!-.^j-v .M ']\-'.j ': ) . Thi:; .ilso muI ll.;- Ji^X in a' bcitter . • ■■ :
'j. , .' . • ■ ; rif • - • :■•■ ■'•'■: '■•;■:' lo vi-'uxci-.t f rhn 'V' .,'
tl.i i i:}ancc Co::j-al l^r. ;.;jm';o Liii. ;c:..;.j ..;.>..... i^'..v\.-.i. \: -w ;,,-:!,;
al'.';i-. :^ -far a!>:)V" the intdc oted aiiiount au:"! Lh)5; yoar v.'c'rc all on\, ;V:
I!. ']^::\c- lc■i•l^, 1 recoi. ; 'i-iii' Lluit Lhc actual CT.ti'i.ate be; puljmittcd. ..
3315
liCC0.^^f^1Ct;DATIOI^^ ;
That you approve subnisBion of o nly the pre-convcntion budget
(Tab C) at this tine and as plans tor Presidential travel are
finalized, submit n convention and post noMination budget in
June .
APPROVE
Submit v;hole budget __^^^<>^-;. "l/— ^ ) j^
".i^ ^.^y''
c/
3316
Exhibit No. ill
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Conarefisi of tfjc Mnitcb g>tatts(
To ,, ,.^- ^» Haldeman^
?5ur£(Uant to lawful authoHty, YOV ARE HEREBY COMMA,VDED
appear before the SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OX PRESIDEJ^TIAl
CAMPAIOiff ACTIVITIES of the Senate of the United States, on
„.M^y .L _ , 1971.., at .10.120 „ o'clock a_„. m.
at their committee room ....l^i?...PiJ.^?.?.n.J?.?ate. off ice. BuiJ.di^^
then and there to te»tify^owhxtt<yyouo!3n(qp^:>lsaozoocrekt±ixfaoioocUt:e^
mo4M>v mndoT^ ^wnsiderativrKybjfxxaidxoBTnmibtee . j
brine .with..XOU .any and all mat^^ ^,
on the attached sheet in your possession, custody, or
control.
hereof fail not, as you will answer your default under the paint and pen*
alties in such oases made and provided.
To ^
to serve and return.
©iben under my hand, by order of the committee, thU
..„.". day of ^1. , in the year of om
Lord one thousand nine hundred and .seventy, .three.
f^r^_L-_.<;ili
!?..{k?:?::r-
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Pretidenttal
Cam,paiin Aotivitiet.
3317
and bring with you the following: ,
Any and all documents and records and copies thereof
including, but not limited to, books, files, ledgers,
books of accounts, correspondence, receipts, appoint-
ment books, diaries, memoranda, checks, check stubs,
deposit slips, bank statements, petty cash records,
photographs and negatives, recordings, notes, telephone
records, credit card vouchers, and. records, airline
and railroad records, whether the property of H. D.
Haldeman or any other person, firm, organization or ,
institution, relating directly or indirectly to the
Presidential Campaign of 1972,. including but not
limited to the events involving the break-in and
electronic survelliahce of the Democratic National
Committee Headquarters at the Watergate and related
events prior and subsequent thereto.
-^"
15
iw 1^
&
96-296 O - 73 - Bk. 8
3318
Exhibit No. 112
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Consretfjf of tfje Knitcti ^tattsi
rtH.t.?i._Hal!3en)an^
■ — , -. — _ , ©rccllns :
JDurKtiant to lawful authority, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to
appear before the SEPTATE SELECT COMMITTEE OX PRESIDEXTIAL
CAMPAtOX ACTIVITIES of the Senate of the United States, on
July...l.8.t.h^.. , 197.}.., at 19. o'clock ..?.!.. m.,
or as soon thereafter as you may be called,
at their committee room G..30.8,...New. senate Of fic^^ ,
then and there to testify what you may know relative to the subject
matters under consideration by said committee.
This subpoena only applies to the public Select Comnaittee hearings.
such cases made and p
ana return.
hereof (ad not, as you will answer your default under tht pains and pen*
alties in such cases made and provided.
To.,
to serve
&iben under my hand, by order of the committee, this
..../...Q. day of ... J.HIX , in the year of our
Lord one Diousand nine hundred and s.eyenty-three
.^.'?::^. (iu~!?:?:^f..'..;b.„.cif ...'
Chairman, Senate Select Cominitle« of Prettdenttal
Campaign ^otUiliet,
RR
3319
hLiLn.jl IST^
I made service of the laithin suhpena
by JUX^HOL
thewimn^norned^,^,.^:^^ I
cu gu^^^C;, , Z). ^
at ^JLi ^~^ o'clock . ,-p... m., oi»
the ^^^J^&^ d<ry
of .b2>A^ -" m3
^ined^J^df/lrl2/i^.-^j^:^
3320
Exhibit No. 113
the white house
WASHINGTON
July 30, 1973
Dear Mr. Wilson:
This concerns your inquiry as to the extent of the President's
waiver of executive privil6"ge with regard to the testimony of
Mr. Haldeman before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities. Your inquiry was directed to Mr. Haldeman'
knowledge of the contents of tape recordings of conversations of
meetings in the President's office on September 15, 1972 and
March 21, 1973.
Under the waiver of Executive Privilege stated by the President
on May 22, 1973, Mr. Haldeman is not constrained by any claim
of executive privilege as to conversations at meetings which
Mr. Haldeman attended, if such conversations fall within the
May 22, 1973 guidelines.
/ If asked to testify as to facts which he learned about nneetings or
I portions of meetings which he did not attend, but of which he
i learned solely by listening to a t ape record ing of such meeting,
i the President has requested that you infornn the Committee that
I Mr.^^aldcman has been instru cte d by the President to decline to
\ te stify to such rna tters, and that the President, in so instructing
\ Mr. Haldeman, is doing so pursuant to the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers.
• Sincerely,
_-'lr. Vred buzha'rdt
Special Counsel to the President
Mr. John Wilson
Whiteford, Hart.Carmody & Wilson
815 Fifteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20005
3321
Exhibit No. 114
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20S30
Addrcs* t\rp\j to the
DWieion fadicatrd
■o4Rcf«<aIiiltljib>D()N
. nana 8, iwa
Honorable Samuel Dash
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on Presidential
Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Dash:
This is in response to your letter to me of May 24, 1973,
requesting any "information received by the Internal Security
Division, Department of Justice, which indicates or alludes
to any criminal act or conspiracy perpetrated, or planned by.
or involving in any way any Democratic Presidential Candidate,
including Senator Muskie and Senator Humphrey, or the Demo- • .
cjratic National committee, in connection with any violence
group or disruption group carrying out or conspiring to ■' _*■
commit any unlawful or disruptive act."
h thorough search of the files of the former Internal- .
Security Division reflects no information of the kind which ''■
you requested. in addition, I inquired of the Federal • •
Bureau of Investigation whether any information of the type
you requested was ever furnished to the Internal Security ^ .-v- :
Division by the FBI. I have been informed by the FBI that -,'
a search of their files "disclosed no information relating >^^.
to the Committee's request." -,
Sina&rely
OHN hT^DAVITT, Chief
ternal Security Section
Criminal Division
•- ^\^l*A^*-* VVjU^ \C\^ti:. AJI - -^ S^tt .^^
3322
Exhibit No. 115
U
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
RE:
E WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I NGTON
October 14, 1971
5:00 p.m.
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
RONALD H. WALKERJj^'i.
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA -
DEMONSTRATIONS
1, The most recent intelligence that has beTen received from the
Advanceman Bill Henkel and the USSS^s that we will have
demonstrators in Charlotte toniorrow. The number is running
between 100 and 200 ; the Advanccmaji's gut reaction is between
y^ /Il50 aiid 200. They will be /Violort; /they will have extremely
^^t/t' Hjrjbscjixuj signs, as has been indicated by their handbills
*not only ber directed toward the President, but a lso toward
Graham.ji/They
It will
illy,
(^Xhu^
Cro-c
11 have smoke bombs, and have every intention
of disrupting the arrival and trying to blitz the Coliseum in order
to disrvipt the dedication ceremony.
2, According to Henkel and the USSS, and it is also indicated on the
hajidbills being distributed by the demonstrators, the Charlotte
, ' police department is extremely tough and will probably use force
' to prevent cuiy possible disruption of the motorcade or the President'
movements.
7'
3. My instructions to Henkel are to control the demonstrators outside
the Coliseum as much as he can with the lielp of the USSS and the
police department, froni the city of Charlotte. He is to set up as
fine a screening system as possible. There are 8000 seats in the
Coliseum and we have printed up 25, 000 tickets. It is a known fact
that there are demonstrators who have tickets. Therefore it will
be necessary for us to set up screening system to eliminate anyone
that has a false or fake ticket. We will set up our normal checkpoints,
using 25 Veterans of Foreign Wars and between 50 and 60 ushers
that are being provided by ths local Republican Party. There will
also be a volunteer lawyer corps to handle any legal questions that
might arise, as far as us denying entrance on the grounds of a
phony ticket.
3323
The thing that botlicrs mo is that we are for tlie most part
paralleling the system tliat \vc had designed for tlie Wright-
Paterson Air Force Muse\im dedication in Dayton, Ohio.
Realizing the attention that was drawn to the techniques used there,
and the concern that has since been expressed by Ziegler,
Warren, and most vehemently by Pat Buchanan, the feeling
is that the Press Corps especially the liberals are very much
aware of how the demonstrators arc being handled, and although
the White House has not been identified with these processes,
we are very much suspect. Buchanan maintains that they will
be the look out for demonstrators and how they are being handled,
and it is his feeling that this could be extremely damaging to
the President's posture, even if the White House is only indirectly
involved. The Billy Graham^people have been of great help but
they've got their own problems with citizens' organizations
sponsoring the Billy Graham Day, and have pretty well backed
off from any of the arrangements with the exception of crowd
building. Therefore, we have/got very little support in handling
demonstrators in the hall.
Should we continue with o-^x plan to prevent demonstrators from
entering the Coliseum? /
Yes ^4v_, No
.^^.
3324
Exhibit No. 116
hugh w. sloan. jr.
SUITC 27?.
)70J PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. N. W.
WASHINGTON. O. C. 20000
(202) 3D3.4550
July 1 , 1971
Personal S Confidential
The Honorable John I-litchell
The Attorney General
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
Jeb Mag ruder has apprised me of your request to have an
accounting of the $2,000 that Bob. Haldeman's office
requested be made available to Ron Walker.
The breakdovm enclosed is intentionally sketchyrsince
he preferred not to list names of recipients or oetail
their activities unless we insist, as he feels that this
is a highly sensitive subject and one which should not
be ♦committed to writing.
You will note that there is a cash balance on hand of $900
from the original $2,000 v/hich Ron is holding in his safe
until needed. This, of course, raises , the question of
whether we should retrieve this sum and, in the future,
make disbursements only on a case by case basis rather j
than make available lump sum allocations for discretionary
•use .
I would appreciate your guidance in this instance.
Sincerely yours.
enclosure
3325
Exhibit No. 117
the white house
W A g II I N O 'i' O N
January 21, 1970
DMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
EMORANDUM FOR: MR. HAJLDEMAN
ROM: ■ JEBS. MAGRUDER
E: Monitoring Sys
IN
tern \ ^
:cently)you have had a number of comnnents regarding the effectiveness
1 our monitoring system. I have indicated to you that this system is not,
i this point in tinne, working effectively and that I planned
jicn I moved over to Herb Klein's office. Rather .than wai
jhought it might be better to give you my thoughts on why it is not ope
lig effectively and what options we have to solve this problem.
to act on it s^/<]
Lt until I move,7|Cy
it is not ope'rSt
J the system is set up now, wc have a numbeNTj of people here and in the
'^C who are supposed to monitor tlie media.QyThese individuals arc to
11 in daily regarding the media but, because they are spread out and do
!t feci this is a priority situation, relatively little information flows in.]^
is was true^uring the period of time Alex Butterfield handled it and Iv
cntinues to.be true. My feeling is that this problem exists because it is
iiead out and has not become a priority situation. There are two groups
ithe White House who are basically set up to do ;this type of work and
^pbably they would be inore effective.
It Buchanan already sumrriarizes. the reports from these sources in his
«-nmcntary. He basically monitors them at the present time, but it
Sams to me he could be asked to do an official monitoring report as he
.•■nmarizes each of the media. This could then be used for immediate
Canteraction by the Communications Department. The advantage of
ts is that the) monitor has no relation with the press and will give us a
'•ry unbiased^opinion as to what is happening with the media.
^)M1NISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
3326
The second group is the Communications Department itself. They basi-
cally review the news and are watching these same media on a regular
basis. This group could indicate the coverage by the media and then
initiate counteraction. The problem with this approach is that the Com-
munications Departnnent,/ because it relates directly with the press, has
a tendency to want to geFalong with them rather than initiate counteraction.
Although it is true that I would be there and could probably force the situa-
tion, it might not be as successful as it would be if the report came over
from Buchanan and periodically had coinments, etc. , from people like^ '-:•..
ybuTs'elf. It is my personal opinion that the Connmunications DepaxLment
would then do a better job in counteracting what has been rej
O'
Comment:
^ka^ Cvyv^^^
riL ^^
.<?-—
^U^uJl/U'
^y^/^^^ji:.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
3327
Exhibit No. 118
ailVERSITY OF OREGON
SCHOOL OF LA«
BUOENE, ORBOON 9740)
telephone (code 50J) iS86-)8)7
July 25. 1973
Hcirable Sam Ervin
Jr;ed States Senate
<an"ngton, D.C. 20510
k- Senator Ervir.:
I refer to your exchanges with Mr. Ehrlichman and his counsel on their
:1 m that the Fourth Amendment did not stand in the way of a Presidentially
luorized search of a psychiatrist's office in pursuit of "national
lerity" information about one of his patients in an espionage context.
respect
ic I ii.jr iiiiuiiiiukiuii aLnjui. uiic ui ills ^QLiciiLa ill an cspiuiiavjc uui
I It is not accurate that the Supreme Court has not spoken with
fuch claims.
Suppose forbidden disclosure to a foreign power was not only suspected
u known with a high degree of certainty. Suppose the person whose quarters
e to be searched was believed to be the most important espionage agent of»
hU.S.S.R. in the United States, at the height of the Cold War. Could the
Jcutive branch agents then enter and search his quarters for espionage
H pment and its fruits without violating his rights under the Fourth
mdment?
The ansv/er is clear from the case of Col. Rudolf Abel, Abel v. United
fces, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). The entire Supreme Court agreed that the search
f bel's apartment, in this very prototype of a "national security,"
»ter-espionage case, was governed by the same Fourth Amendment limits that
■ rn searches to enforce the crimiaal and deportation laws. Abel's con-
ior, was sustained by a narrcv; 5-4 margin because the search of his
J tment by the F.B.I, was conducted incident to what the majority concluded
ia valid arrest for deportation. Tne four dissenters disagreed even with
h conclusion. But on the premises of the majority opinion, the Court was '
oiimous that if federal agents had simply entered Abel's apartment in his
fence on their "national security", counter-espionage mission, they would
a acted in violation of the Fourth Amendment despite having the strongest
1 of evidence of Abel's espionage.
At the outset of the Court's opinion. Justice Frankfurter states the
s e unmistakeably:
"We have considered the case on the assumption that the conviction
must be reversed should we find challenged items of evidence to have
seized in violation of the Constitution and therefore improperly
admitted into evidence. . . . (Of course the nature of the case, the
fact that it was a prosecution for espionage, has no bearing whatever
upon the legal considerations relevant to the admissibility of evidence.)
362 U.S. at 219-20.
3328
Honorable Sam Ervin -2- July 25, 1973
In the light of Abel . can there be the slightest doubt that if the White
House "plumbers" had burglarized Ellsberg's own quarters, they would have
violated the Constitution, and that use of any evidence obtained in this
fashion would have led to reversal of any criminal conviction based thereon?
Does the White House position claim that the "houses, papers, and effects"
of persons in the position or Ellsberg's psychiatrist are less protected
than Ellsberg's (or Abel's) own quarters? Would "national security" permit
a raid on the files of Ellsberg's lawyer, or tapping his. telephone conversa-
tions, without violating the Fourth Amendment?
I regret that some members of Congress, including the Judiciary Committe
have in the past been prepared to assume that there is some "national securit
exception to the fourth Amendment. Mr. Ehrl ichiian's unrepentant defense of
the Ellsberg raid should give the Congress pause about the inescapable reach
of such a doctrine in practice. The Supreme Court's opinion In Abel v .
United States is directly to the contrary.
Sincerely yours,
Hans A. Linde
Professor of Law
Ima
3329
Exhibit No. 119
ABKL v. UNITED STATES. \ 217
ABEL, ALLV3 MARX, allvs COLLINS, alias GOLDFUS,
,^,..-_ v. UNITED STATES. ' .- . .-.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
■' • . THE SECOND CIRCUIT. *
No. 2. Argued Februar>' 24-25, 1059. — Restored to the calendar for
■ • reargument March 23, 1959. — Rearmed November 9, 1959. — • -
; ^ . V , -.\ ' Decided March .28, 1960. . - -_ .;.:. ^^..v ;*' j
.Immigration and Naturalization Service officers arrested petitioner
on an administrative warrant for deportation, searched the hotel
.-room where he was arrested, his person and his luggage, and seized
-certain articles. After petitioner had checked out of his hotel
room, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation made- a fur-
ther sATch of the room, without a warrant but with the consent
" of the hotel management, and seized certain articles which peti- '
tioner had left there. The articles so seized were admitted in.
evidence over petitioner's objection at his trial for conspiracy to
commit espionage, and he was convicted. Held: These searches "
- and seizures did not violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, and
■ the use in evidence of the articles so seized did not invalidate,
petitioner's conviction. Pp.,218-241. . '
1. On the record in this case, the Government did not use the
■ administrative warrant of the. Immigration and Naturali::ation
' Service as an improper instruinent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in obtaining evidence for ' a." criminal prosecution.
,. Pp. 225-230, : .,./,. . '.: ,', ■ ■•-; '- ..; ■ ^■ .-i.---^
-■^ ' ^. Petitioner's claim that the administrative warrant under which
he was first arrested was invalid under thg Fourth Amendment is
,' "not piKjperly before this Court, since it was not made below and
y' was e.xpreasly disavowed there. Pp. 230-234. "' . . ,
•. :\3. The articles seized by the immigration officers during the
" - searches here involved were properly admitted in evidence. Pp.
^ 234-240. , •- : ' - -^ ; "; " V^. - • - '; •
4. Immigration officers who effect an arrest for deportation on
'.'an administrative warrant have a right of incidental search r.n.d-
' , ogous to the search permitted criminal law-enforcement officers
incidental to a lawful arrest. Pp. 235-237.
. "' "^ 5. The search of the hotel room by an F. B. I. agent withotit a
warrant but with the consent of the hotel management, after peti-
3330
tioner had relin(;ui:-hed tl;
k' ronr.-i
, ::nil the r^cizi're q\ articles whit'i
pctiLioncr ha.u. ;ib;'.ni.lop.?-'.
fh;-e V,
\T0 L-.vf'ii, ,uvl <ur:h arri'^le^ v.-ere
properly admitted in evir
i-nc".
Vp. 2'A)-2'A.
2.38 F. 2d 483, aiTiraied.
James B. Donovan argued and rearsued the cause for
petitioner. With him on the briefs was Thomas M.
Debevoise 11. ■ '.-. _
SolicitoT General Rankbi argued and reargued the cause
for the United States. With him on the original brief
-were Acting Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Wil-
liam F. Tom-pkins and Kevin T. Maroney. With him
on the supplemental brief on reargument were Assistant
Attorney General Yeagley, John F. Davis, William F.
-Tompkins and Kevin T. Maroney.
' Me; Justice Frankfihiter delivered the opinion of the
Court.. . - ,'\:. ■-^_-. ' - -^ ,.'^r' . r "^-r ■^:"^ ....
■ The question in this case is whether seven items were
properly admitted into evidence at the petitioner's trial
for conspiracy to commit espionage. All seven items
were seized by officers of the Government without a
search warrant. The seizures did not occur in connec-
tion with the exertion of the criminal process against
petitioner; They arose out of his administrative arrest
by the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service as a preliminary to his deportation. A motion to
suppress these items as evidence, duly made ■ in the
District Court, was denied after a full hearing. 155 F.
Supp. 8. Petitioner was tried, convicted and sentenced
to thirty years' imprisonment and to the payment of /a
fine of S3,000. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 258 F.
2d 485. We granted certiorari, 358 U. S. 813, limiting
the grant to the following two questions: ."
"1. Whether the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
. the Constitution of the United States are violated by
3331
\2:zL r. LMi^D .5 'V:: !:::>. 21:*
217 Opinion of the Cnnrt.
a search and the seizure of evidence without a search
.vvarrant, after an alien suspected and officially
accused of espiona<5e has been taken into custod;/
for deportation, pursuant to an adminiotrative Immi-
gration Service warrant, but has not been arrested
for the commission of a crime?
. - ". "2. Whether the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
. the' Constitution 'of the United States are violated
., .when articles so seized are unrelated to the Immigra-
• - " 'tion Service warrant and, together with other articles
. obtained from such leads, are introduced as evidence
- ' in a prosecution for espionage?"-. . ■/ ^ \ - ,.
- J ~ Argument was first heard at October Term," 1958. The
■ case having been set down for reargument at this Term,
■ 359 U^ S. 940, counsel were asked to discuss a series of
additional ^questions, set out in the margin.* ■;
. - . We'have considered the case on the assumption that
"." the conviction must be reversed should we find challenged
items of evidence to have been seized in violation of the
Constitution and therefore improperly admitted into evi-
dence. , We find, however, that the admission of these
' .items was free from any infirmity and we affirm the
judgment. (Of course the nature of the case, the fact
- that it was a prosecution for espionage, has no bearing
'-. . • ♦"!. Whether under the laws and Constitution of the United States
:' (a) the administrative warrant of the New York Acting District
. ■ Director^ of the Immigration, and Naturalization Service was validly
-' issued, (b) such administrative warrant ct)nstituted a valid basis for
'-arresting petitioner or taking him into custody, and (c) such' warrant-
furnished a 'valid basis fpr the searches and seizures affecting «his
■-^person, luggage, and the room occupied by him at the Hotel Latham.
■ Sj.'"2. Whether, independently of such administrative' warrant, peti-
^_tioner'?- arrest, and the searches and seizures affecting his person,
;_ luggage, and the room occupied by him at the Hotel Latham, were
,; -yalid under the laws and Constitution of the United States.
• "3. Whether on the record before us the issues involved in Ques-
. tions '1 (a),' '1 (b),' and.'2' are properly before the Court."
3332
£20 OCTOBER TEP.M, 1959.
Opinion of the Court. 362 U.S.
.whatever upon the legal considerations relevant to the
admissibility of evidence.)
The seven items, all in petitioner's possession at the
time of his administrative arrest, the admissibility of
which is in question, were the following:
(1) a piece of graph paper, carrying groups of
numbers arranged in rows, allegedly a coded message ;
(2) a forged birth certificate, certifying the birth
of "Martin Collins'' in New York County in 1897 ;
(3) a birth Certificate, certifying the birth of
"Emil Goldfus" in New York in 1902 (Emil Goldfus
died in 1903) ;
(4) an international certificate of vaccination,
issued in New York to "Martin Collins" in 1957;
(5) a bank book of the East River Savings Bank
containing the account of "Emil Goldfus";
(6) a hollowed-out pencil containing 18 micro-
films; and
(7) a block of wood, wrapped in sandpaper, and
containing within it a small booklet with a series
of numbers on each page, a so-called "cipher pad."
Items (2), (3), (4) and (5) were relevant to the issues
of the indictment for which petitioner was on trial in
that they corroborated petitioner's use of false identities.
Items (1), (6) and (7) were incriminatory as useful
means for one engaged in espionage.
The main claims which petitioner pressed upon the
Court may be thus summarized: (1) the administra-
tive arrest was used by the Government in bad faith;
(2) administrative arrests as preUminaries to deportatipn
are unconstitutional; and (3) regardless of the validity
of the administrative arrest here, tlie searches and seizures
through which the challenged items came into the Gov-
ernment's possession were not lawful ancillaries to such
an arrest. These claims cannot be judged apart from the
.circumstances leading up to the arrest and the nature of
3333
ABEL V, UNITED STATES. ^ 221
217 . Opinion of the Court.
the searches and seizures. It becomes necessary to relate
these matters in considerable detail.
Petitioner was arrested by officers of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (hereafter abbreviated as
I. N. S.) on June 21, 1957, in a single room in the Hotel
Latham in New York City, his then abode. The atten-
tion of the I. N. S. had first been drawn to petitioner
several days earlier when Noto, a Deputy Assistant Com-
missioner of the I. N. S., was told by a liaison officer of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereafter abbreviated
as F. B. I.) that petitioner was beheved by the F. B. I. to
be an alien residing illegally in the United States. Noto
was told of the F. B. I.'s interest in petitioner in connec-
tion with espionage.
An uncontested affidavit before the District Court
asserted tRe following with regard to the events leading
up to the F. B. I.'s communication with Noto about peti-
tioner.- About one month before the F. B. I. communi-
cated with Noto, petitioner had been mentioned by Hay-
hanen, a recently defected Russian spy, as one with whom
Hayhanen had for several years cooperated in attempting
to commit espionage. The F. B. I. had thereupon placed
petitioner under investigation. At the time the F. B. I.
communicated with the I. N. S. regarding petitioner, the
case against him rested chiefly upon Hayhanen's story,
and Hayhanen, although he was later to be the Govern-
ment's {Principal witness at the trial, at that time insisted
that he would refuse to testify should petitioner be
brought to 'trial, although he would fully cooperate' with
the Government in secret. The Department of Justice
concluded that without Hayhanen's testimony the evi-
dence was insufficient to justify petitioner's arrest and
indictment on espionage charges. The decision was there-
upon made to bring petitioner to the attention of the
I. N. S., with a view to commencing deportation pro-
ceedings against him.
96-296 O - 73
3334
-JIT OCTOBER TEPJ'.I, 1959.
Opinion of the Court 362 U.S.
Upon being notified of the F. B. I.'s belief that peti-
tioner was residing illegally in this country, Noto asked
the F. B. I. to supply the I. X. S. vv-ith further information
regarding petitioner's status as an alien. The F. B. I.
did this within a week. The I. N. S. concluded that if
petitioner were, as suspected, an alien, he would be sub-
ject to deportation in that he had failed to comply with
the legal duty of aliens to notify the Attorney General
every January of thei? address in the United States.
8 U. S. C. § 1305. ,Noto then determined on petitioner's
administrative arrest as a preliminary to his deportation.
The F. B. I. was so informed. On June 20, two I. N. S.
officers, Schoenenberger and Kanzler, were dispatched by
Noto to New York to supervise the arrest. These officers
carried with them a warrant for petitioner's arrest and
an order addressed to petitioner directing him to show
cause why he should not be deported. They met in New
York with the District Director of the I. N. S. who, after
the information in the possession of the I. N. S. regarding
petitioner was put before him, signed the warrant and the
order. Following this, Schoenenberger and Kanzler went
to F. B. I. headquarters in New York where, by prear-
rangement with the F. B. I. in Washington, they were
met by several F. B. I. officers. These agreed to conduct
' agents of the I. N. S. to petitioner's hotel so that the
I. N. S. might accomplish his arrest. The F. B. I. officer
in charge asked whether, before the petitioner was ar-
rested, the F. B. I. might "interview" him in an attempt
to persuade him to "cooperate" with regard to his espio-
nage. To this Schoenenberger agreed. : .^'•
At 7 o'clock the next morning, June 21, two officers of
the I. N. S. and several F. B. I. men gatliered in the
corridor outside petitioner's room at the Hotel Latham.
All but two F. B. I. agents, Gamber and Blanco, went into
the room next to petitioner's, which the F. B. I. had
occupied in the course of its investigation of petitioner.
3335
ABEL V. UNITED STATES. 223
217 Opinion of the Court.
Gamber and Blasco were charged with confronting peti-
tioner and soliciting his cooperation with the F. B. I.
They had no warrant either to arrest or to search. If peti-
tioner proved cooperative their instructions were to
telephone to their superior for further instructions. If
petitioner failed to cooperate they were to summon the
waiting I. N. S. agents to execute their warrant for his
arrest.
Gamber rapped on petitioner's door. When petitioner
released the catch, Gamber pushed open the door and
walked into the room, followed by Blasco. The door was
left ajar and a third F. B. I. agent came into the room
a few minutes later. Petitioner, who was nude, was told
to put on a pair of undershorts and to sit on the bed,
which he did. The F. B. I. agents remained in the room
questioning petitioner for about twenty minutes. Al-
though petitioner answered some of their questions, he
did not "cooperate" regarding his alleged espionage. A
signal was thereupon given to the two agents of the I. N. S.
waiting in the next room. These came into petitioner's
room and served petitioner with the warrant for his arrest
and with the order to show cause. Shortly thereafter
Schoenenberger and Kanzler, who had been waiting out-
side the hotel, also entered petitioner's room. These four
agents of the I. N. S. remained with petitic^er in his room
for about an hour. For part of this time an F. B. I. agent
was also in the room and during all of it another F. B. I.
agent stood outside the open door of tlje room, where he
could observe the interior.
• After placing petitioner under arrest, the four I. N. S.
agents undertook a search of his person and of all of his
belongings in the room, and the adjoining bathroom,
which lasted for from fifteen to twenty minutes. Peti-
tioner did not give consent to this search; his consent was
not sought. The F. B. I. agents observed this search but
took no part in it. It was Schoenenberger's testimony to
3336
2::4 OCTOBER TZP..M, 1059.
Opinion of the Court. 362 U.S.
the District Court that the purpose of this search was
to discover weapons and documentary evidence of peti-
tioner's "aUenage" — that is, documents to substantiate the
information regarding petitioner's status as an alien which
the I. N. S. had received from the F. B. I. During this
search one of the challenged items of evidence, the one
we have designated (2), a birth certificate for "Martin
Collins," was seized. ' Weapons were not found, nor was
any other evidence regarding petitioner's "ahenage."
When the search was completed, petitioner was told to
dress himself, to assemble his things and to choose what
he wished to take with him. With the help of the
I. N. S. agents almost everything in the room was packed
into petitioner's baggage. A few things petitioner delib-
erately left on a window sill, indicating that he did not
want to take them, and several other things which he
chose not to pack up into his luggage he put into the
room's wastepaper basket. When everything had been
assembled, petitioner asked and received permission to
repack one of his suitcases. While petitioner was doing
so, Schoenenberger noticed him sUpping some papers into
the sleeve of his coat. Schoenenberger seized these.
One of them was the challenged item of evidence which
we have designated (1), a piece of graph paper containing
a coded message.
When petitioner's belongings had been completely
packed, petitioner agreed to check out of the hotel.
One of the F. B. I. agents obtained his bill from the hotel
and petitioner paid it. Petitioner was then handcuffed
and taken, along with his baggage, to a waiting automo-
bile and thence to the headquarters of the I. N. S. in New
York. At I. N. S. headquarters, the property petitioner
had taken with him was searched more thoroughly than
it had been in his hotel room, and three more of the chal-
lenged items were discovered and seized. These were
the ones we have designated (3), (4) and (5), the "Emil
3337
ABEL t;. UNITED STATES. 225
217 Opinion of the Court.
Goldfus" birth certificate, the international vaccination
certificate, and the bank book. • - ■ ^ -
As soon as petitioner had been taken from the hotel,
an F. B. I. agent, Kehoe, who had been in the room adjoin-
ing petitioner's during the arrest and search and who, like
the I. N, S. agents, had no search warrant, received per-
mission from the hotel management to search the room
just vacated by petitioner. Although the bill which peti-
tioner had paid entitled him to occupy the room until
3 p. m. of that day, the hotel's practice was to consider a
room vacated whenever a guest removed his baggage and
turned in his key. Kehoe conducted a search of peti-
tioner's room which lasted for about three hours. Among
other things, he seized the contents of the wastepaper
basket into which petitioner had put some things while
packing -his belongings. Two of the items thus seized
were the challenged items of evidence we have designated
(6) and (7) : a hollow pencil containing microfilm and a
block of wood containing a "cipher pad."
Later in the day of his arrest, petitioner was taken by
airplane to a detention center for ahens in Texas. He
remained there for several weeks until arrested upon the
charge of conspiracy to commit espionage for which he
was brought to trial and convicted in the Eastern District
of New York. %
I.
The underlying basis of petitioner's attack upon the
admissibility of the challenged items of evidence concerns
the motive, of the Government in its use of the "adminis-
trative arrest. We are asked to find that the Government
resorted to a subterfuge, that the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service warrant here was a pretense and sham, '
was not what it purported to be. According to petitioner,
it was not the Government's true purpose in arresting
him under this warrant to take him into custody pending
3338
226 OCTOBER TER:,I, 1050.
Opinion of the Court. 362 U.S.
a determination of his deportability. The Government's
real aims, the argument runs, were (1) to place petitioner
in. custody so that pressure might be brought to bear
upon him to confess his espionage and cooperate with the
F. B. I., and (2) to permit the Government to search
through his belongings for evidence of his espionage to
be used in a designed criminal prosecution against him.
The claim is, in short, that the Government used this
administrative warrant for entirely illegitimate purposes
and that articles seized as a consequence of its use ought to
have been suppressed.
Were this claim justified by the record, it would indeed
reveal a serious misconduct by law-enforcing officers.
The deliberate use by the Government of an administra-
tive warrant for the purpose of gathering evidence in a
criminal case must meet stern resistance by the courts.
The- prelimin ary _st ages o f a cr iminal pr osecution must
b e pursued in strict obedience to the safeguards an d
re strictions ^_f_th£_CQiistitution aiid la ws of the Unite d
States . A finding of bad faith is, however, not open to
us on this record. What the motive was of the I. N. S.
officials who determined to arrest petitioner, and whether
the I. N. S. in doing so was not exercising its powers in
the lawful discharge of its own responsibilities but was
serving as a tool for the F. B. I. in building a criminal
prosecution against petitioner, were issues fully canvassed
in both courts below. The crucial facts were found
against the petitioner.
On this phase of the case the district judge, having
permitted full scope to the elucidation of petitioner's,
claim, having seen and heard witnesses, in addition to
testimony by way of affidavits, and after extensive argu»-
ment, made these findings:
"[T]he evidence is persuasive that the action taken
by the officials of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service is found to have been in entire good faith.
3339
ABEL t;. UNITED STATES. 227
217 ' Opinion of the Court.
The testimony of Schoenenberger and Noto leaves no
doubt that while the first information that came to
them concerning the [petitioner] . . . was furnished
by the F. B. I. — which cannot be an unusual happen-
ing — the proceedings taken by the Department dif-
fered in no respect from what would have been done
in the case of an individual concerning whom no such
information was known to exist.
"The defendant argues that the testimony estab-
lishes that the arrest was made under the direction
and supervision of the F. B. I., but the evidence is
to the contrary, and it is so found.
"No good reason has been suggested why these
two branches of the Department of Justice should
not cooperate, and that is the extent of the showing
m^de on the part of the defendant." 155 F. Supp.
'8, 11.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, after careful
consideration of the matter, held that the answer "must
clearly be in the affirmative" to the question "whether
the evidence in the record supports the finding of good
faith made by the court below." 258 F. 2d 485, 494.
Among the statements in evidence relied upon by the
lower courts in making these findings was testimony by
Noto that the interest of the I. N. S. in petitioner was con-
fined to petitioner's illegal status in the United States;
that in informing the I. N. S. about petitioner's presence
in the United States the F. B. I. did'not indicate what
action it- wanted the I. N. S. to take; that Noto- himself
made the decision to arrest petitioner and to commence
deportation proceedings against him; that the F. B. I.
made no request of him to search for evidence of espionage
at the time of the arrest; and that it was "usual and
mandatory" for the F. B. I. and I. N. S. to work together
in the manner they did. There was also the testimony of
Schoenenberger, regarding the purpose of the search he
3340
22'i OCTOBER .TEP.rvI, 1959.
Opinion of the Court. 362 U.S.
made of petitioner's belongings, that the motive was to
look for weapons and documentary evidence of alienage.
To be sure, the record is not barren of evidence supporting
an inference opposed to the conclusion to which the two
lower courts were led by the record as a whole: for
example, the facts that the I. N. S. held off its arrest of
petitioner while the F. B. I. solicited his cooperation, and
that the F. B. I. held itself ready to search petitioner's
room as soon as it was vaciated. These elements, however,
did not, and were not required to, persuade the two courts
below in the face of ample evidence of good faith to the
contrary, especially the human evidence of those involved
in the episode. We are not free to overturn the conclusion
of the courts below when justified by such solid proof.
Petitioner's basic contention comes down to this:
even without a showing of bad faith, the F. B. I. and
I. N. S. must be held to have cooperated to an impermis-
sible extent in this case, the case being one where the
alien arrested by the I. N. S. for deportation was also
suspected by the F. B. I. of crime. At the worst, it may
be said that the circumstances of this case reveal an op-
portunity for abuse of the administrative arrest. But
to hold illegitimate, in the absence of bad faith, the
cooperation between I. N. S. and F. B. I. would be to
ignore the scope of rightful cooperation between two
branches of a single Department of Justice concerned
with enforcement of different areas of law under the
conmion authority of the Attorney General.
The facts a re i hat the F. R I. suspec t£d petitioner bo^h
of espionage andjllegalj;esidejicejn_jhej^^
an alien. Tliat agency surely acted not only with pro-
priety but in discharge of its duty in bringing petitioner's
illegal status to the attention of the I. N. S., particularly
after it found itself unable to proceed with petitioner's
prosecution for espionage. Only the I. N. S. is authorized
to initiate deportation proceedings, and certainly the
3341
ABEL V. UNITED STATES: ' 229
217 Opinion of the Court.
F. B. I. is not to be required to remain mute regarding one
they have reason to believe to be a deportable alien,
merely because he is also suspected of one of the gravest
of crimes and the F. B. I. entertains the hope that crimi-
nal proceedings may eventually be brought against him.
The I. N. S., just as certainly, would not have performed
its responsibilities had it been deterred from instituting
deportation proceedings solely because it became aware
of petitioner through the F. B. I., and had knowledge
that the F. B. I. suspected petitioner of espionage. The
Government has available two ways of dealing with a
criminally suspect deportable alien. It would make no
sense to say that branches of the Department of Justice
may not cooperate in pursuing one course of action or
the other, once it is honestly decided what course is to be
preferred. For the same reasons this cooperation may
properly* extend to the extent and in the manner in which
the F. B. I. and I. N. S. cooperated in effecting petitioner's
administrative arrest. Nor does it taint the administra-
tive arrest that the F. B. I. solicited petitioner's coopera-
tion before it took place, stood by while it did, and
searched the vacated room after the arrest. The F. B. I.
was not barred from continuing its investigation in the
hope that it might result in a prosecution for espionage
because the I. N. S., in the discharge of its duties, had
embarked upon an independent decision to initiate pro-
ceedings for deportation.
Thte Constitution does not require that honest law
enforcement should be put to such an irrevocable choice
between 'two recourses of the Government. For a con-
trast to the 'proper cooperation between two branches of
a single Department of Justice as revealed in this case,
see thef story. told in Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17.
That case sets forth in detail the improper use of immi-
gration authorities by the Bureau of Investigation of the
Department of Justice when the immigration service was
3342
230 0CT02ER TE?.:.I, 10')9. .'
Opinion of tlie Court. 362 U.S.
a branch of the Departmenu of Labor and v/as acting not
within its lawful authority but as the cat's paw of another,
unrelated branch of the Government.
" We emphasize a-'^:;ain that our view" of the matter woul d
b e totally different had the evidence established, or wer e
t he courts below not iustified in not finding; , that t he
a dministrative warrant was here emploved. as an instr u-
m ent of criminal law enforcement to circumvent th e
'ta tter's legal restrictions, rather than as a bona fide pre -
l iminary step in a deportation proceedin;-;. The test i s
w hether the decision to prcceecL iid ministrativeb L-toward
d eportation was influenced by. and was "carried out for ,
a purpose of amassing ej.'idence in the p r osecu ti on for
crime. T he record precludes such a find ing by this Court .
11.
■The claim that the administrative warrant by which
petitioner was arrested was invalid, because it did not
satisfy the requirements for "warrants" under the Fourth
Amendment, is not entitled to our consideration in the
circumstances before us. It was not made below; indeed,
it was expressly disavowed. Statutes authorizing admin-
istrative arrest to achieve detention pending deportation
proceedings have the sanction of time. It would empha-
size the disregard for the presumptive respect the Court
owes to the validity of Acts of Congress, especially when
confirmed by uncontested historical legitimacy, to bring
into question for the first time such a long-sanctioned
practice of government at the behest of^'a party who not
only did hot challenge the exercise of authority, below,
but expressly acknowledged its validity.
.The grounds relied on in the trial court and the Court
of Appeals by petitioner were solely (in addition to the
insufficiency of the evidence,, a contention not here for
review) (1) the bad faith of the Government's use of
3343
. ; • ABEL u. UNITED STATES, 231
217 .' . Opinion of the Court. . . , '' ..
the administrative arrest warrant and (2) the Tack of a
power incidental to the execution of an adminiotrative
-warrant to search and seize articles for use as evidence
in a later criminal prosecution. At no time did petitioner
question the legality of the administrative arrest proce-
dure either as unauthorized or as unconstitutional. Such
challenges were,, to repeat, disclaimed. At the hearing
on the motion to suppress, petitioner's counsel was ques-
tioned by the court regarding the theory of relief relied
upon: -
"The Court: They [the Government] were not at
liberty to arrest him [petitioner] ?
"Mr. Fraiman: No, your Honor.
"They were perfectly proper in arresting him.
"We don't contend that at all.
, '*^As a matter of fact, we contend it was their duty
to arrest this man as they did.
"I think it should show or rather, it showed ad-
mirable thinking on the part of the F. B. I. and the
Immigration Service.
"We don't find any fault with that.
"Our contention is that although they were per-
mitted to arrest this man, and in fact, had a duty
to arrest this man in a manner in which they did,
they did not have a right to search his premises for
the material which related to espionage.
- *■ .- . .• .. . , ' w.'v-;
,- , ■ s . -. ■■" ■
"... . He was charged with no criminal offense. in -
thiswajrant, , \. / ' ". '' ; . •;.:'
"The Court: He was suspected of being illegally in
^; the country,. wasn't he? ^ " .. -'j- .' ■ /
* ; "Mr. Fi-aiman: Yes, your Honor. ' ^ ,.'.
;* . "The Court: He was properly arrested. *^ * - -.
_^. "Mr. Fraiman: He was properly arrested, we. con-
cede that, your Honor." ;. : ' ■- ..
Mieao O-60— 19
3344
232 . OCTCBIlR term, 1959.
. - ■ Opinion of the Court. 362 U. S.
Counsel further made it plain that the arrest warrant
whose validity he was conceding was "one of these Im«
migration warrants which is obtained without any back-
ground material at all." Afi&rmative acceptance of what
is now sought to be questioned could not be plainer.
The present form of the legislation giving authority to
the Attorney General or his delegate to arrest aliens pend-
ing deportation proceedings under an administrative war-
rant, not a judicial warrantwithin the scope of the Fourth
Amendment, is § 242 (a) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952. (8 U. S. C. § 1252 (a)). The regula-
tions under this Act delegate the authority to issue these
administrative warrants to the District Directors of the
I. N. S. "[a]t the commencement of any proceeding [to
deport] ... or at any time thereafter . . . whenever,
in [their] . . . discretion, it appears that the arrest
of the respondent is necessary or desirable." 8 CFR
§ 242.2 (a). Also, according to these regulations, proceed-
ings to deport are commenced by orders to show cause
issued by the District Directors or others ; and the "Oper-
ating Instructions" of the I. N. S. direct that the appli-
cation for an order to show cause should be based upon
a showing of a prima facie case of deportability. The
warrant of arrest for petitioner was issued by the New
York District Director of the I. N. S. at the same time
as he signed an order to show cause. Schoenenberger
testified that, before the warrant and order were issued,
he and Kanzler related to the District. Director what they
had learned from the F. B. I. regarding petitioner's status
as an ahen, and the order to show. cause recited that peti-
tioner had failed to register, as aliens must. Since peti-
tioner was a suspected spy, who had never acknowledged
his residence in the United States to the Government or
openly admitted his presence here, there was ample
reason to beheve that his arrest pending deportation was
"necessary or desirable." The arrest procedure followed
3345
. " ABEL V. UNITED STATES. 233
217 Opinion of the Court. *
in the present case fully complied with the statute and
regulations. . . . -
Statutes providing for deportation have ordinarily
authorized the arrest of deportable aliens by order of an
executive official. The first of these was in 1798. Act
of June 25, 1798, c. 58, § 2, 1 Stat, 571. And see, since
that time, and before the present Act, Act of Oct. 19,
1888, c. 1210, 25 Stat. 566; Act of Mar. 3, 1903, c. 1012,
§ 21, 32 Stat. 1218; Act of Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, § 20,
34 Stat. 904; Act of Feb. 5, 1917, c. 29, § 19, 39 Stat.
889; Act of Oct. 16, 1918, c. 186, § 2, 40 Stat. 1012; Act
of May 10, 1920, c. 174, 41 Stat. 593; Internal Security
Act of 1950, c. 1024, Title I, § 22, 64 Stat. 1008. To te
sure, some of these statutes, namely the Acts of 1888,
1903 and 1907, dealt only with aliens who had landed
illegally in the United States, and not with aliens sought
to be deported by reason of some act or failure to act since
entering. Even apart from these, there remains over-
whelming historical legislative recognition of the pro-
priety of administrative arrest for deportable aliens such
as petitioner.
The constitutional validity of this long-standing admin-
istrative arrest procedure in deportation cases has never
been directly challenged in reported litigation. Two lower
court cases involved oblique challenges, which were sum-
ruiarily rejected. Podolski v. Baird, 94 F. Supp. 294; Ex
parte Avakian, 188 F. 688, 692. Seb also the discussion in
Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17, reversed on other grounds
sub nont. Skeffington v. Katzefj, 277 F. 129, where the Dis-
trict Court made an exhaustive examination of the fair-
ness of a group of deportation proceedings initiated by
administrative arrests, but nowhere brought into question
the vahdity of the administrative arrest procedure as such.
This Court seems never expressly to have directed its
attention to the particular question of the constitutional
validity of administrative deportation warrants.* It has
3346
234 OCTOBER TERM, 1959.
Opinion of the Court. 362 U.S.
frequently, however, upheld administrative deportation
proceedings shown by the Court's opinion to have been
begun by arrests pursuant to such warrants. See The
Japanese Imrnigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86; Zakonaite v.
Wolj, 226 U. S. 272; Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149;
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524. In Carlson v. Landon,
the validity of the^^rrest was necessarily implicated, for
the Court there sustained discretion in the Attorney Gen-
eral to deny bail to alien Communists held pending
deportation on administrative arrest warrants. In the
presence of this impressive historical evidence of accept-
ance of the validity of statutes providing for administra-
tive deportation arrest from almost the beginning of the
Nation, petitioner's disavowal of the issue below calls
for no further consideration.
III.
Since petitioner's arrest was vahd, we reach the ques-
tion whether the seven challenged items, all seized during
searches which were a direct consequence of that arrest,
were properly admitted into evidence. This issue raises
three questions: (1) Were the searches which produced
these items proper searches for the Government to have
made? If they were not, then whatever the nature of the
seized articles, and however proper it would have been to
seize them during a vahd search, they should have been
suppressed as the fruits of activity in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. E. g., Weeks v. United States, 232
U. S. 383, 393. (2) Were the articles seized properly
subject to seizure, even during a lawful search? We have
held in this regard that not every item may be seized
which is properly inspectible by the Government in the
course of a legal search; for example, private papers
desired by the Government merely for use as evidence
may not be seized, no matter how lawful the search which
3347
ABEL y. UNITED STATES. 235
217 Opinion of the Court.
discovers them, Gouled v. United States, 255 IT. S. 298,
310, nor may the Government seize, wholesale, the con-
tents of a house it might have searched, Kremen v. United
States, 353 U. S. 346. (3) Was the Government free to
us,e the articles, even if properly seized, as evidence in a
criminal case, the seizures having been made in the course
of a separate administrative proceeding?
The most fundamental of the issues involved concerns
the legality of the search and seizures made in petitioner's
room in the Hotel Latham. The ground of objection is
that a search may not be conducted as an incident to a
lawful administrative arrest. •
We take as a starting point the cases in this Court
dea\jng with the extent of the search which may properly
be made without a warrant following a lawful arrest for
crime. The several cases on this subject in this Court
cannot be satisfactorily reconciled. This problem has,
as is well-known, provoked strong and fluctuating differ-
ences of view on the Court. This is not the occasion to
attempt to reconcile all the decisions, or to re-examine
them. Compare Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192,
with Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, and
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452; compare Go-
Bart, supra, and Lefkowitz, supra, with Harris v. United
States, 331 U. S. 145, and United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U. S. 56; compare also Harris, supra, with Trupiano
V. United States, 334 U. S. 699, and Trupiano with
Rabinowitz, supra (overruling Trupiano). Of these
cases, Harris and Rabinowitz set by far the most permis-
sive limits upon searches incidental to lawful arrests:
In view of their judicial context, the trial judge and the
Government justifiably relied upon these cases for guid-
ance at the trial; and the petitioner himself accepted the
Harris case on the motion to suppress, nor does he ask
this Court to reconsider Harris and Rabinowitz. It
would, under these circumstances, be unjustifiable retro-
3348
236 OCTOBER TERM, 1959.
Opinion of the Court. 362 U.S.
spective lawmaking for the Court in this case to reject the
authority of these decisions.
Are there to be permitted incidental to valid adminis-
trative arrests, searches as broad in physical area as, and
analogous in purpose to, those permitted by the appli-
cable precedents as incidents to lawful arrests for crime?
Specifically, were the officers of the I. N. S. acting law-
fully in this case" when, after his arrest, they searched
through petitioner's belongings in his hotel room looking
for weapons and documents to evidence his "alienage"?
There can be no doubt that a search for weapons has as
much justification here as it has in the case of an arrest
for crime, where it has been recognized as proper. E. g.,
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 30. It is no less
important for government officers, acting under estab-
lished procedure to effect a deportation arrest rather than
one for crime, to protect themselves and to insure that
their prisoner retains no means by which to accomplish
an escape.
Nor is there any constitutional reason to limit the
search for materials proving the deportability of an alien,
when validly arrested, more severely than we limit the
search for materials probative of crime when a valid
criminal arrest is made. The need for the proof is as great
in one case as in the other, for deportation can be accom-
plished only after a hearing at which deportability is
established. Since a deportation arrest warrant is not a
judicial warrant, a search incidental to a deportation- ar-
rest is without the authority of a judge or commissioner.
But so is a search incidental to a criminal arrest made
upon probable cause without a warrant, and under
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S., at 60, such a search does not require
a judicial warrant for its validity. It is to be remem-
bered that an I. N. S. officer may not arrest and search
on his own. Application for a warrant must be made to
an independent responsible officer, the District Director
3349
ABEL v. UNITED STATES. • 237
217 - . . _ Opinion of the Court.
of the I. N. S., to whom a prima facie case of deportability
must be shown. The differences between the procedural
protections governing criminal and deportation arrests
are not of a quality or magnitude to warrant the deduc-
tion of a constitutional difference regarding the right of
incidental search. If anything, we ought to be more
vigilant, not less, to protect individuals and their prop-
erty from warrantless searches made for the purpose of
turning up proof to convict than we are to protect them
from searches for matter bearing on deportability. Ac-
cording to the uniform decisions of this Court deportation
proceedings are not subject to the constitutional safe-
guards for criminal prosecutions. Searches for evidence
of crime present situations demanding the greatest, not
the least, restraint upon the Government's intrusion into
privacy; although its protection is not limited to them,
it was at these searches which the Fourth Amendment
was primarily directed. We conclude, therefore, that
government officers who effect a deportation arrest have
a right of incidental search analogous to the search
permitted criminal law-enforcement officers.
Judged by the prevailing doctrine, the search of peti-
tioner's hotel room was justified. Its physical scope,
being confined to the petitioner's room and the adjoining
balhroom, was far less extensive ,than the search in
Harris. The search here was less intensive than were
the deliberately exhaustive quests in Harris and Rabino-
witz, and its purpose not less justifiable. The only things
sought here, in addition to weapons, were documents conr
nected with petitioner's status as an alien. These may
well be considered as instruments or means for accom-
plishing his illegal status, and thus proper objects of
search under Harris, supra, 331 U. S., at 154.
Two of the challenged items were seized during this
search of petitioner's property at his hotel room.' The
first was item (2), a forged New York bjit^ certificate
3350
238 . OCTOBER TERM, 1959. ■
Opimon of the Court. ' .362 U. S.
for "Martin Collins," one of the false identities which
petitioner assumed in tliis country in order to keep his
presence here undetected. This item was seizable when
found during a proper search, not only as a forged
official document by which petitioner sought to evade his
obligation to register as an alien, but also as a document
which petitioner was using as an aid in the commission of
espionage, for his undetected presence in this country was
vital to his work as a spy. Documents used as a means to
commit crime are the proper subjects of search warrants,
Gouled V. United States, 255 U. S. 298, and are seizable
when discovered in the course of a lawful search, Marrqn
V. United States, 275 U. S. 192.
The other item seized in the course of the search of
petitioner's hotel room was item (1), a piece of graph
paper containing a coded message. This was seized by
Schoenenberger as petitioner, while packing his suitcase,
was seeking to hide it in his sleeve. An arresting officer
is free to take hold of articles which he sees the accused
dehberately trying to hide. This power derives from the
dangers that a weapon will be concealed, or that relevant
evidence will be destroyed. Once this piece of graph paper
came into Schoenenberger's hands, it was not necessary
for him to return it, as it was an instrumentality for the
commission of espionage. This is so even though Schoen-
enberger was not only not looking for items connected
with espionage but could not properly have been searching
for the purpose of finding such items. When an article
subject to lawful seizure properly comes into an officer's
possession in the course of a lawful search it would be
entirely without reason to say that he must return it
because it was not one of the things it was his business to
look for. See Harris, supra, 331 U. S., at 154-155.
Items (3), (4), and (5), a birth certificate for "Emil
Goldfus" who died in 1903, a certificate of vaccination for
'^Martin ColUns," and a bank book for "Emil Goldfus"
3351
; ABEL u. UNITED STATES. . 239
217 Opinion of the Court.
were seized, not in petitioner's hotel room,, but in a more
careful search at I. N. S. headquarters of the belongings
petitioner chose to take with him when arrested. This
search was a proper one. The property taken by peti-
tioner to I. N. S. headquarters was all property which,
under Harris, was subject to search at the place of arrest.
We do not think it significantly different, when the accused
decides to take the property with him, for the search of
it to occur instead at the first place of detention when the
accused arrives there, especially as the search of property
carried by an accused to the place of detention has addi-
tional justifications, similar to those which justify a search
of the person of one who is arrested. It is to be noted
that this is not a case, like Kremen v. United States,
353 U. S. 346, where the entire contents of the place where
the arrest was made were seized. Such a mass seizure
is illegal. The Government here did not seize the con-
tents of petitioner's hotel room. Petitioner took with him
only what he wished. He chose to leave some things
behind in his room, which he voluntarily relinquished.
And items (3), (4), and (5) were articles subject to sei-
zure when found during a lawful search. They were all
capable of being used to estabhsh and maintain a false
identity for petitioner, just as the forged "Martin CoUins"
birth certificate, and were seizable for the same reasons.
Items (l)-(5) having come into the Government's pos-
sesion through lawful searches and seizures connected
with an arrest pending deportation, was the Government
free to use them .as evidence in a criminal prosecution to
which they related? We hold that it was. Good reason
must be shown for prohibiting the Government from
using relevant, otherwise admissible, evidence. There is
excellent reason for disallowing its use in the case of evi-
dence, though relevant, which is seized by the Govern-
ment in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution. "If letters and private documents can thus
3352
MO OCTOBER TERM; 1959.-
... Opinion of the Court. 362 U. S.
be seized and held and ucsd in e-zidence against a citizen
acciised of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment declaring his ri^ht to be secure against such searches
and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Consti-
tution." Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 393.
These considerations are here absent, since items
(l)-(5) were seized as a consequence of wholly lawful
conduct. That being so, we can see no rational basis
for excluding these relevant items from trial: no wrong-
doing police officer would thereby be" indirectly con-
demned, for there were no such wrongdoers; the Fourth
Amendment would not thereby be enforced, for no illegal
search or seizure was made; the Court would be lending
its aid to no lawless government action, for none oc-
curred. Of course cooperation between the branch of
the Department of Justice dealing with criminal law
enforcement and the branch dealing with the immigration
laws would be less effective if evidence lawfully seized by
the one could not be used by the other. Only to the extent
that it would be to the pubhc interest to deter and prevent
such cooperation, would an exclusionary rule in a case like
the present be desirable. Surely no consideration of civil
liberties commends discouragement of such cooperation
between these two branches when undertaken in good
faith- When undertaken in bad faith to avoid constitu-
tional restraints upon criminal law enforcement the evi-
dence must be suppressed. That is not, as we have seen,
this case. Individual cases of bad faith cooperation .
should be dealt with by findings to that effect in the'cases '
as they arise, not by an exclusionary rule preventing effec-
tive cooperation when undertaken in entirely good faith.
We have left to the last the admissibihty of items (6)
and (7), the hollo wed-out pencil and the block of wood
containing a "cipher pad," because their admissibility is
founded upon an entirely different set of considerations.
3353
ABEL V. UNITED STATES. 241
217 Douglas, J., dissenting.
These two items were found by an agent of the F. B. I.
in the course of a search he undertook of petitioner's hotel
room, immediately after petitioner had paid his bill and
vacated the room. They were found in the room's waste-
paper basket, where petitioner had put them while pack-
ing his belongings and preparing to leave. No pretense
is made that this search by the F. B. I. was for any pur-
pose other than to gather evidence of crime, that is, evi-
dence of petitioner's espionage. As such, however, it was
entirely lawful, although undertaken without a warrant.
This is so for the reason that at the time of the search
petitioner had vacated the room. The hotel then had the
exclusive right to its possession, and the hotel manage-
ment freely gave its consent that the search be made.
Nor was it unlawful to seize the entire contents of the
wastepaper basket, even though some of its contents had
no connection with crime. So far as the record shows,
petitioner had abandoned these articles. He had thrown
them away. So far as he was concerned, they were bona
vacantia. There can be nothing unlawful in the Gov-
ernment's appropriation of such abandoned property.
See Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, 58. The two
items which were eventually introduced in evidence
were assertedly means for the commission of espionage,
and were themselves seizable as such. These two items
having been lawfully seized by the Government in con-
nection with an investigation of crime, we encounter no
basis for discussing further their admissibility as evidence.
'^ . . . Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black
concurs, dissenting.
Cases of notorious criminals — like cases of small, mis-
erable ones — are apt to make bad law. When guilt perme-
ates a record, even judges sometimes relax and let the
police take shortcuts not sanctioned by constitutional
3354
242 OCTOBER TEILM, 1959.
- Douglas, J., dissenting. 362 U. S.
procedures. That practice, in certain periods of our his-
tory and in certain courts, has lowered our standards of
law administration. The harm in the given case may
seem excusable. But the practices generated by the
precedent have far-reaching consequences that are harm-
ful and injurious beyond measurement. The present
decision is an excellent example.
The opening wedge that broadened the power of admin-
istrative officers — as distinguished from police — to enter
and search peoples' homes was Frank y. Maryland, 359
U. S. 360. That case allowed a health inspector to enter
a home without a warrant, even though he had ample
time to get one. The officials of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (I. N. S.) are now added to the
preferred list. They are preferred because their duties,
being strictly administrative, put them in a separate
category from those who enforce the criminal law. They
need not go to magistrates, the Court says, for warrants of
arrest. Their warrants are issued within the hierarchy of
the agency itself.^ Yet. as I attempted to show in my
dissent in the Frank case, the Fourth Amendment in origin
had to do as much with ferreting out heretics and collect-
ing taxes as with enforcement of the criminal laws. 359
U. S., at 376-379.
Moreover, the administrative officer who invades the
privacy of the home may be only a front for the police
who are thus saved the nuisance of getting a warrant.
We need not go far to find examples. In Maryland v.
Pettiford, Sup. Bench Bait. City, The Daily Record, Dec.
16, 1959, the police used the mask of a health inspector
* Section 242 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
66 Stat. 208, 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (a), provides "Pending a determination
of deportability in the case of any alien . . . such alien may, upon
warrant of the Attorney General, be arrested and taken into custody."
3355
ABEL V. UNITED STATES. 243
217 ■ Douglas, J., dissenting. • .-
to make the Frank case serve as an easy way to get a
search without a warrant. Happily, they were rebuked.'
But that case shows the kind of problems the Frank
doctrine generates. The present case is another example
of the same kind, although here the police are not re-
bulced. The administrative official with an administrative
warrant, over which no judicial official exercises any super-
vision and which by statute may be used only for deporta-
tion, performs a new role. The police wear his mask to
do pohce work. That, in my view, may not be done,
even though we assume that the administrative warrant
2 In the Pettiford case it appears that a police officer assigned
to the Sanitation Division gained entrance into a home without a
wariant and discovered that the defendant who occupied the premises
was engaged in lottery activities. He then signaled to a policeman in
charge of gambling activities who was waiting outside in accordance
with a prior agreement. Lottery slips were seized and over the
defendant's objection were received in evidence in a criminal trial.
A motion for a new trial was granted. The Supreme Bench of
Baltimore City said in its opinion:
"Section 120 of Article 12 of the Baltimore City Code provides
that if the Commissioner of Health has cause to suspect that a nui-
sance exists in any home, he may demand entry therein in the day-
time and the owner or occupier, is subject to a fine if entry is denied.
A conviction under this Section by the Criminal Court of Baltimore
City was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States in a
five to four decision. Frank vs. Maryland [359 U. S. 360]. . . .
"In^this case, it is evident that a principal, if not the chief purpose
of the entry of the police officer assigned to the sanitation division
was to endeavor to secure evidence of a lottery violation for his
colleague. 'The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion.
by the police ... is basic to a free society.' Wolf vs. Colorado, 338
U. S. 25, 27. An exception, to that security, upheld because indis-
pensible for the maintenance of the community health, is not to
be used to cover searches without warrants inconsistent with the
conceptions of human rights [embodied] in our State and Federal
Constitutions." •
3356
244 . OCTOBER TEUM, 1959. .
Douglas, J., disientbs. 362 U. S.
issued by an administnitive rather than a judicial officer
is valid for an arrest for the purpose of deportation. We
take liberties with an Act of Congress, as well as the Con-
stitution, when we permit this to be done. The statute
permits the arrest of an alien on an administrative war-
rant "[p] ending a determination of deportability." ^
The Court now reads the Act as if it read "Pending an
investigation of criminal conduct." Such was the nature
of the arrest.
With due deference to the two lower courts. I think the
record plainly shows that F. B. I. agents-were the mov-
ing force behind this arrest and search. For at least
a month they investigated the espionage activities of
petitioner. They were tipped off concerning this man
and his role in May; the arrest and search were made on
June 21. The F. B. I. had plenty of time to get a search
warrant, as much if not more time than they had in John-
son v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, and Kremen v. United
States, 353 U. S. 346, where the Court held warrantless
searches illegal. But the F. B. I. did not go to a magis-
trate for a search warrant. They went instead to the
I. N. S. and briefed the officials of that agency on what
they had discovered. On the basis of this data a report
was made to John Murff, Acting District Director of the
I. N. S., who issued the warrant of arrest.
No effort was made by the F. B. I. to obtain a search
warrant from any judicial officer, though, as I said, there
was plenty of time for such an application. The admin-
istrative warrant of arrest was chosen with care and cal-
culation as the vehicle through which the arrest fend
search were to be made. The F. B. I. had an agreement
with the officials of I, N. S. that this warrant of arrest
would not be served at least until petitioner refused to
•Note l,tupra.
3357
, . ABEL V. UNITED STATES. 245
217 Douglas, J., dissenting.
"cooperate." The F. B. I. agents went with agents of the
I. N. S. to apprehend petitioner in his hotel room. Again,
it was the F. B. I. agents who were first. They were the
ones who entered petitioner's room and who interrogated
him to see if he would "cooperate" ; and when they were
unable to get him to "cooperate" by threatening him with
arrest, they signaled agents of the I.N. S. who had waited
outside to come in and make the arrest. The search was
made both by the F. B. I. agents and by officers of the
I. N. S. And when petitioner was flown 1,000 miles to a
special detention camp and held for three weeks, the
agents of the F. B. I. as well as I. N. S. interrogated him.*
Thus the F. B. I. used an administrativie warrant to
make an arrest for criminal investigation both in viola-^
tion of § 242 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act ■'' and in violation of the Bill of Rights.
The issue is not whether these F. B. I. agents acted in
bad faith. Of course they did not. The question is how
far zeal may be permitted to carry officials bent on law
enforcement. As Mr. Justice Brandeis once said, "Expe-
rience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 479 (dissenting
opinion). The facts seem to me clearly to estabhsh that
the F. B. I. agents wore the mask of I. N. S. to do what
otjierwise they could not have done. They did what they
could do only if they had gone to a judicial officer pursuant
to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, disclosed
♦Immigration officials (who often claim that their actions have
an administrative, finality beyond the reach of courts, see Litdecke v.
Watkins, 335- U. S. 160; Jay, v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345) have no author-
ity to detain suspects for seci^t interrogation. See United States v.
AfmJter, 350 U. S. 179. -_ ^'
• Note 1, awpra. • •■ • ..^ r ^
3358
248 OCTOBER TERM, 1959.
Douglas, J., diisentin^. 362 U.S.
their evidence, and obtained the necessary warrant for the
searches which they made.
..If the F. B. I. agents had gone to a magistrate, any
search warrant issued would by terms of the Fourth
Amendment have to "particularly" describe "the place to
be searched" and the "things to be seized." How much
more convenient it is for the police to find a way around
those specific requirements of the Fourth Amendment!
What a hindrance it is to work laboriously through consti-
tutional procedures! How much easier to go to another
official in the same department! The administrative
officer can give a warrant good for unlimited search. No
more showing of probable cause to a magistrate! No
more limitations on what may be searched and when !
In Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214, federal pohce
officers, who obtained evidence in violation of federal law
governing searches and seizures and so lost their case in
the federal court, repaired to a state court and proposed
to use it there in a state criminal prosecution. The Court
held that the Federal District Court could properly enjoin
the federal official from using the illegal search and seizure
as basis for testifying in the state court. The federal
rules governing searches and seizures, we held, are
"designed as standards for federal agents" no more to be
defeated by devious than by direct methods. The present
case is even more palpably vulnerable. No state agency
is involved. Federal police seek to do what immigration
officials can do to deport a person but what our rules,
statutes, and Constitution forbid the police from doing
to prosecute him for a crime. •.
The tragedy in our approval of these short cuts is that
the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment is
removed from an important segment of our life. We
today forget what the Court said in Johnson v. United
States, supra, at 14, that the Fourth Amendment provision
3359
ABEL V, UNITED STATES. 247.
217 Douglas, J,, dissenting,
for "probable cause" requires that those inferences "be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate" not "by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." This is a protection given not only
to citizens but to aliens as well, as the opinion of the Court
by implication holds. The right "of the people" covered
by the Fourth Amendment certainly gives security to
aliens in the same degree that "person" in the Fifth and
"the accused" in the Sixth Amendments also protects
them. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228,
242. Here the F. B. I. works exclusively through an
administrative agency — the I. N. S. — to accomplish what
the Fourth Amendment says can be done only by a judi-
cial officer. A procedure designed to serve administrative
ends — deportation — is cleverly adapted to serve other
'ends — criminal prosecution. We have had like examples
of this same trend in recent times. Lifting the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment for the benefit of health
inspectors was accomplished by Frank v. Maryland, as I
have said. Allowing the Department of Justice rather
than judicial officers to determine whether aliens will be
entitled to release on bail pending deportation hearings
is another. See Carlson v. London, 342 U. S. 524.
Some things in our protective scheme of civil rights
are entrusted to the judiciary. Those controls are not
^Iways congenial to the police. Yet if we are to preserve
our system of checks and balances and keep the police
from being all-powerful, these judicial controls should
be meticulously respected. When we read them out of
the Bill of Rights by allowing short cuts as we do today
and as the Court did in the Frank and Carlson cases, police
and administrative oflficials in the Executive Branch
acquire" powers incompatible with the Bill of Rights.
" . The F. B. L agents stalked petitioner for weeks and had
plenty of time to obtain judicial warrants for searching the
3360
243 OCTOBER TEILM, 1959.
"Brennan-, J., dissenting. 362 U.S.
premises he occupied. I would require them to adhere to
the commend of the Fourth i^mendment and not evade it
by the simple device of wearing the masks of immigration
oflficials while in fact they are preparing a case for
criminal prosecution.
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom The Chief Jus-
tice, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas join,
dissenting. „
This is a notorious case, with a notorious defendant.
Yet we must take care to enforce the Constitution without
regard to the nature of the crime or the nature of the
criminal. The Fourth Amendment protects "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
This right is a basic one of all the people, without excep-
tion; and this Court ruled in Weeks v. United States,
232 U. S. 383, that the fruits of governmental violation
of this guarantee could not be used in a criminal prose-
cution. The Amendment's protection is thus made effec-
tive for everyone only by upholding it when invoked by
the worst of men.
The opinion of the Court makes it plain that the seizure
of certain of the items of petitioner taken from his room
at the Hotel Latham and used in evidence against him
must depend upon the existence of a broad power, with-
out a warrant, to search the premises of one arrested,
in connection with and "incidental" to his arrest. This
power is of the sort recognized by Harris v. United States,
331 U. S. 145, and later asserted even where the arresting
officers, as here, had ample time and opportunity to secure
a search warrant. United States v. Rahinowitz, 339
U. S. 56, overruling Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S.
699. The leading early cases do not recognize any such
power to make a search generally through premises
attendant upon an arrest See Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
3361
., ABEL V. UNITED STATES. 249
217 Brennan, J., dissenting.
United States, 282 U. S. 344; United States v. Lejkowitz,
285U. S. 452/
The general question has been extensively canvassed
here, in the general context of an arrest for crime, in the
Harris, Trupiano and Rahinowitz cases. Whether Harris
and Rahinowitz should now be followed on their own facts
is a question with which the Court is not now faced.
Rather the question is whether the doctrine of those cases
should be extended to a new and different set of facts —
facts which present a search made under circumstances
much less consistent with the Fourth Amendment's pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches than any which
this Court has hitherto approved. Factual differences
weigh heavily in this area: "There is no formula for the
determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances." Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, supra, at 357. In Harris
and Rahinowitz, the broad search was performed as an
incident to an arrest for crime under warrants lawfully
issued. 331 U. S., at 148 ; 339 U. S., at 58. The issuance
of these warrants is by no means automatic — it is con-
trolled by a constitutionally prescribed standard. It thus
could be held that suJEcient protection was given the indi-
vidual without the execution of a second warrant for the
search. Cf. Clfirk, J., dissenting in United States v.
Rahinowitz, 176 F. 2d 732, 736, reversed, 339 U. S. 56.
And while a search generally through premises "incident"
to ah arrest for, crime without a warrant has been sanc-
tioned only inferentially here,' even if such a search be
deemed permissible under the Fourth Amendment, it
woiild not go so far as the result here. Such an arrest may
* Earlier expressions looking the other way, Agnello v. United
States, 269 U. S. 20, 30; Marron v. UnUed States, 275 U. S. 192, 19S-
199, were put in proper perspective by their author in Go-Bart and
Lefkowitz. See 282 U. S., at 358; 285 U. S., at 465.
' See United States v. Rahinowitz, sxtpra, at 60. -
3362
2oa- OCTOBER TER:.!, 1059.
Brennan, J^ clLsentins. 362 U. S.
constitutionally be made only upon probable cause, the
existence of which is subject to judicial examination, see
Henry v. United States,'2Q\ U. S. 98, 100; and such an
arrest demands the'prompt bringing of the person arrested
before a judicial officer, where the existence of probable
cause is to be inquired into. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc,
5 (a) and (c). This Court has been astute to fashion
methods of ensuring the due observance of these safe-
guards. Henry v. United States, supra; Mallory v.
United States, 354 U. S. 449; McNahh v. United States,
318 U.S. 332. . .
Even assuming that the power of Congress over aliens
may be as great as was said in Galvan v. Press, 347
U. S. 522, and that deportation may be styled "civil,"
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 594, it does not
follow that Congress may strip aliens of the protections
of the Fourth Amendment and authorize unreasonable
searches of their premises, books and papers. Even if
Congress could make the exclusionary sanction of the
Amendment inapplicable in deportation proceedings, the
fruits of the search here were used in a prosecution whose
criminal character no dialectic can conceal. Clearly the
consequence of the Fourth Amendment in such a trial is
that the fruits of such a search may not be given in
evidence, under the rule declared in Weeks v. United
States, supra. We need not, in my view, inquire as to
whether the sort of "administrative" arrest made here is
constitutionally valid as to permit the .officers to hold
petitioner's person for deportation proceedings. With
the Court, this issue may be treated as not properly before
us for our consideration, and the arrest may be treated for
the purposes of this case as lawful in itself. But even
with Harris and Rahinowitz, that does not conclude the
matter as to the search. It is patent that the sort of
search permitted by those cases, and necessary to sustain
the seizures here, goes beyond what is reasonably related
3363
ABEL u. UNITED STATES. 251
217 Brennan, J., dissenting.
to the mechanics of the arrest itself — ensuring the safety
of the arresting officers and the security of the arrest
against the prisoner's escape. Since it does, I think it
plain that before it can be concluded here that the search
was not an unreasonable one, there must be some inquiry
into th,e over-all protection given the individual by the
totality of the processes necessary to the arrest and the
seizure. Here the arrest, while had on what is called
a warrant, was made totally without the intervention of
an independent magistrate; it was made on the authoriza-
tion of one administrative official to another. And after
the petitioner was taken into custody, there was no obli-
gation upon the administrative officials who arrested him
to take him before any independent officer, sitting under
the conji^tions of pubUcity that characterize our judicial
institutions, and justify what had been done.^ Con-
cretely, what happened instead was this: petitioner, upon
his arrest, was taken to a local administrative head-
quarters and then flown in a special aircraft to a special
detention camp over 1,000 miles away. He was incar-
cerated in solitary confinement there. As far as the world
knew, he had vanished. He was questioned daily at the
place of incarceration for over three weeks. An executive
procedure as to his deportability was had, at the camp,
after a few days, but there was never any independent
inqujry or judicial control over the circumstances of the
arrest and the seizure till over five weeks after his arrest,
when, at the detention' camp, he was served with a bench
warrant for his arrest on criminal charges, upon an
indictment.
The Fourth Amendment imposes substantive standards
for searches 'and seizures; but with them one of the '
important safeguards it establishes is a procedure; and
*This procedure ia statutorily based on § 242 (a) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 208, 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (a).
3364
Brenxan, J., dJisentm^. 362 U.S.
central to this procedure is an independent control over
the actions of officers effecting searches of private prem-
ises. "Indeed, the informed and deliberate determinations
of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what
searches and seizures are permissible under the Consti-
tution are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers
and others who may happen to make arrests," United
States V. Lefkowitz, supra, at 464. "Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a mag-
istrate between the citizen and the police." McDonald v.
United States, 335 U. S. 451. 455. It is one thing to say
that an adequate substitute for this sort of intervention
by a magistrate can be found in the strict protections with
which federal criminal procedure surrounds the making
of a criminal arrest — where the action of the officers must
receive an antecedent or immediately subsequent inde-
pendent scrutiny. It goes much further to say that such
a substitute can be found in the executive processes em-
ployed here. The question is not whether they are con-
stitutionally adequate in their own terms — whether they
are a proper means of taking into custody one not charged
with crime. The question is rather whether they furnish
a context in which a search generally through premises
can be said to be a reasonable one under the Fourth
Amendment. These arrest procedures, as exemplified
here, differ as night from day from the processes of an
arrest for crime. When the power to make a broad, war-
rantless search is added to them, we create a complete
concentration of power in executive officers over the
person and effects of the individual. We completely
remove any independent control over the powers of ex-
ecutive officers to make searches. They may take any
man they think to be a deportable alien into their own
custody, hold him without arraignment or bond, and,
having been careful to apprehend him at home, make
a search generally through, his premises. I cannot see
3365
ABEL u. UNITED STATES. 253
217 Brennan, J., dissenting.
how this can be said to be consistent with the Fourth
Amendment's command;, it was, rather, against such a
concentration of executive power over the privacy of the
individual that the Fourth Amendment was raised. I
do not think the Harris and Rahinowitz cases have taken
us to ]this point.
If the search here were of the sort the Fourth Amend-
ment contemplated, there would be no need for the elabo-
rate, if somewhat pointless, inquiry the Court makes into
the "good faith" of the arrest. Once it is established that
a simple executive arrest of one as a deportable alien gives
the arresting officers the power to search his premises,
what precise state of mind on the part of the officers will
make the arrest a "subterfuge" for the start of criminal
proceedings, and render the search unreasonable? We are
not; I fear, given any workable answer, and of course the
practical problems relative to the trial of such a matter
hardly need elaboration; but the Court verbalizes the
issue as "whether the decision to proceed administra-
tively toward deportation was influenced by, and was
carried out for, a purpose of amassing evidence in the
prosecution for crime." But under today's ruhng, every
administrative arrest offers this possibility of a facile
search, theoretically for things connected with unlawful
presence in the country, that may turn up evidence of
crime; and this possibihty will be well known to arresting
officers. Perhaps the question is how much basis the
officers had to suspect the person of crime; but it would
appear a strange test as to whether a search which turns
up criminal evidence is unreasonable, that the search is
the more justifiable the less there was antecedent prob-
able cause to suspect the defendant of crime. If the'
search were made on a valid warrant, there would be
no such issue even if it turned up matter relevant to an-
other crime. See Oouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298,
311-312. External procedural control in accord with the
96-296 O - 73
3366
254 OCTOBER .TER:,I, 1959.
Brenma-V, J., dissenting. 362 U.S.
basic demands of the Fourth Amendment removes the
grounds for abuse; but the Court's attitude here must be
based on a recognition of the great possibilities of abuse
its decision leaves in the present situation. These pos-
sibilities have been recognized before, in a case posing less
danger: "Arrest under a warrant for a minor or a trumped-
up charge has been familiar practice in the past, is a
commonplace in the police state of today, and too well-
known in this country. . . . The progress is too easy
from police action unscrutinized by judicial authorization
to the police state." United States v. Rabinowitz, supra,
at 82 (dissenting opinion). Where a species of arrest is
available that is subject to no judicial control, the pos-
sibilities become more and more serious. The remedy is
not to invite fruitless litigation into the purity of official
motives, or the specific direction of official purposes. One
may always assume that the officers are zealous to perform
their duty. The remedy is rather to recognize that the
power to perform a search generally throughout premises
upon a purely executive arrest is so unconfined by any
safeguards that it cannot be countenanced as consistent
with the Fourth Amendment.
One more word. We are told that the governmental
power to make a warrantless search might be greater
where the object of the search is not related to crime but
to some other "civil" proceeding — such as matter bearing
on the issue whether a man should forcibly be sent from
the country. The distinction is rather hollow here, where
the proofs that turn up are in fact given in evidence in a
criminal prosecution. And the distinction, again, invites
a trial of the officers' purposes. But in any event, I think
it perverts the Amendment to make this distinction. The
Amendment states its own purpose, the protection of
the privacy of the individual and of his property against
the- incursions of officials: the "right of the people. to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects*" See
3367
ABEL V. UNITED STATES. 255
217 Brennan, J., dissenting.
Boyd V. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 627. Like most of
the Bill of Rights it was not designed to be a shelter for
criminals, but a basic protection for everyone; to be sure,
it must be upheld when asserted by criminals, in order
that it may be at all effective, but it "reaches all alike,
whether accused of crime or not." Weeks v. United
States, supra, at 392. It is the individual's interest in
privacy which the Amendment protects, and that would
not appear to fluctuate with the "intent" of the invading
officers. It is true that the greatest and most effec-
tive preventive against unlawful searches that has been
devised is the exclusion of their fruits from criminal evi-
dence, see Weeks v. United States, supra; Boyd v. United
States, supra; but it is strange reasoning to infer from'
this that the central thrust of the guarantee is to protect
against a search for such evidence. The argument that it
is seems no more convincing to me now than when it was
made by the Court in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360.
To be sure, the Court in Boyd v. United States, supra,
and in subsequent cases ^ has commented upon the inti-
mate relationship between the privilege against unlawful
searches and seizures and that against self-incrimination.
This has been said to be erroneous history; ' if it was, it
was even less than a harmless error; it was part of the
process through which the Fourth Amendment, by means
of the exclusionary rule, has become more than a dead
letter in the federal courts. Certainly this putative rela-
tionship between the guarantees is not to be used as a
*9ee, e. g., Gouled v. United States, supra, at 306; United States v.
Lefkowitz, supra, at 466-467. The Weeks case itself, though drawing
great support from Boyd, appears to rest most heavily on the Fourtb
Amendment itself. .
' The famous attack on the Boyd case's historcal basis is, of course,
to be found in 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), §§2184, 2264.
The attack is incident to Wigmore 's strictures on the exclusionary- rule,
/d., §§2183-2184.
3368
25fc OCTOBER TER.M. 1039.
BtiENNAN, J., dissontin?. 362 U.S.
basis of a stinting construction of either — it was the Boyd
case itself" which set what might have been hoped to be
the spirit of later construction of these Amendments by
declaring that the -start of abuse can "only be obviated
by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally
construed." 116 U. S., at 635.
Since evidence was introduced against petitioner which
had been obtained in violation of his constitutional guar-
antees as embodied in the Fourth Amendment, I would
reverse his conviction for a new trial on the evidence not
subject to this objection.
• It is not without interest to note, too, that the Boyd case itself
involved a search not in connection \vith a prosecution to impose fine
or imprisonment, but simply with an action to forfeit 35 cases of plate
glass said to have been imported into the country under a false
ci^stoms declaration.
3369
ExraBIT No. 120
MEMORANDUM
THE WIIITH IlOUSli
WAIIIINOTON
January 28, 1971
CONFinENTIAL
.MFMOUANDUM FOR: JC^HIN Hl^AN .
/ / -
FROM: 11. R. HALDEMAN 'y'
SUBJECT: Huplics Retainer of Larry O' Hricn
Yovi should continue to keep in contact with Boh Bennett, as well
a.<* looking; for oilier sources of information on this subject. Once
Bc/^i'S^it fiC'io o.ick to yc.Ki .ylti! V.'iS fii'.ul i'oport, you a..cl Ckuck
Col son should Rct topether and come up with a way to leak the
appropriate information. I-'rankly, I can't see any way to
handle this without involving Hughes so the problem of
"embarrassing" him sceins to be a matter of degree. However,
we should Ktnp Bob Bcnnclt and Bcl»e t>ut of it at all costs.
Please keep me advised of your progress on this and any plans
you decide on.
CONFIDENTIAL
3370
the: white house
WASHING TOM
Jaminry P6, I97I
COHFXnislirTAT,
Ml'210RANl)UM VOW'. ' 11. R. IIATJ^JS-IAIIA-/
row: . .TOiiN dj'::an ^^■
DUWECT: "»'.(i«.-.i!' )JotnJnor of hivry O'Brien
Purr.n.int to your McmovanOum of vfanuaiy .1.8, 19Y-1> T have conducted
an imiuivy inl.o tlio rc.lnt i onr.ldp lic;tv;cc.n Larry O'Uricn and llovmrd
Ui\",hc;2. ?!y pnainlnury fuKlinf'.r; nrc net forth bclou.
Firfit, I.yn Nof/.ipcr, vho you thou;^ht. >iad been dolns nome work In
thlc area, rcpcu'l.Cfd that >ic lind no knov;lc:cl^c' of npcclficB, but
hadchcarsay i n Torinati on of tlx; relatioii:;l)ip.
6ci:uii(i> I n;LEi;uf.:;.cd uie niriuofr \ii\'n 'snu>v. i\c'uu/.o v/iio jiidicui,cu
Dial )ric infori.'.'ilion ri.['rrd\}\; tlio )•(■;.■■ i r.rr h-'d caic fro.-'i I;n1>ort
Ha>icu, tho rcicc-nily rfilcMcJ licad of llu^.h::;' Ilr.vn-ja opr.rjil.ion.
Dcbc; tald tliat thio iufoi-iintjon liad co:-":: to Ivir. fLUrntlon et a
time when Mahcu von profor.i.ltif conf.alcrablc- fricadlin.ocr, towards
the AOjnJnl c.brrl.lon, but. tl-il. it war; not (locirncntt d inforrr-tion.
Hobo Indicated t)>at hr; felt that Mrilicu had po;;r;il'.ly retained
O'Brien for )iir; i-.orvieen \;.ithoal. j-.ny diieet knovHcd^je by Ilu.^hes
hlmcol.f. Bcbo ir; unclrr t))o :iinpi-c:-.r;:icin tliaL Mahcu liad n cood l>it
of freedom uitli llucric;:;' inon.y \;hcn Jiinninf. the. Nevada opcraLlon.
Bcbc fitrther indicated t)ial, he felt he could acquire r.oine docu-
nicnl.ation of lliia facL if f.ivcn a little time and that he vould
proceed to try to ^et any inioj-riation he could, lie alco re-
'qucr.tod tliat :i f any r.etj on be taken witli regard to huc.hec that
he be notified becaur.e of lii:; familinrily v/itl» the delicacy of
t)ic relationr-.hipr; nr; a rer.u.i.t of l)ii' o\m dealAiK',n vJth the Ilvichco
people .
Tlvird, I have n^:■.o been inrcuiiod i>y a tioureo of .Tack C-.nil field' 6
that O'Brien an;I I-iahen nrc Ic^ui; time fjienU. fi'c>:ii Ihe Boston RTca,
a friendiihJp \.'!iich dat-^'; bark to early or p.^-c-Kenncdy dayr;.
Dui'in^i the Krn.i'-cly Adtn' ni.'itir'lion, tliorc ajip^"ently var. a con-
tinuou.o liai.'^on VkLvcltx O'J'ricn and Malr.u. V.Oic n O'Brien left
the V/hitc Ilouoe prior to beeoidlnj, Por.liiaiJter Gc-ne)-al, it \e
olletcd, that N:)ieu offered O'BvJen a ))iecc of the Hui^hcr. action
in I»ur. Wccna (believed to be about a .t' 100, 000 ftirnnr.cin: nt) .
3371
O'Brlcn apparently (IJd not ncccpt tlio oITcr. Aftor Icfavinc tljc
Covcrmicnl, 0'Dr;lcn fojincd a VJu.';)iiiif;lon-I.'c.A/ Yorl; ■|ja;;c(l pu1).lic
rclationfj f.lvm nncl broi^^lit Into tho finn a man by t>ic naxe of
C.laudc Dcrrnilicly, \j1i(> Ii'kI lK.i;n OTiivlf-'u' c K/xcutive Afisi.ot'jnt
vlil.Tc lie \.'a.'; rci;-.l)ii-t:l.r r Ccik)-.''.! . 'I'licrc; In f.onic l>nr,:lr. to bellovn
tlint the; lIii(.1ii;;-0' J^rJfii fiiumcla'J. rcl-ainfr Lraiisjictionr. have hcnn
liancUcd by ncr.nnl.lrl.'; and Mnlicii, vrllh O'Hricn end ctop removed.
Caulf.h'ld' » rourcc J'urllicr inVlcal.cd tlial Malicu, apparently, was
the )iian \i]io forx/ardr.d fill hu^'.lK-f.' jioli.t.Ic.al conLrJbuLionri, jKir-
roaally> to bolli jarl.if.G over the lact ten year?;. TL Jr. uci.erted
tliat lie dtnll. v;Jth a rnnn by I he name of Vic Johncon (nou deceased)
vho he beli(;ved va.-. one of th.-^ Nixon fund ralcerr. over thj yearti.
I ar:r.ii'nc Diii; in Dtc Vie Jolinr.on v^ho \m: v.[\)i the Con-'/recolonal .
Cnm]viir.M Com-" 1. 1. lor-. 11. ic alr.o noled that fornicr K-j-publ J ran
Concre.'-.i'i'in l^'vt Hilling;:;, A/ho J r; a fj-iend of Murray Chotiner'c,
has been retained by lialieu in connection viLh the lIu(sheG* intereots
for oeveral yeart;. It Is farther alleged that fonncr J'TO Accnt
DicH- Jlaiiner hn:; cerved ao an aide to M.alien and Danncr it; an
nr.r.ocial.e of former fJcn'itor r^nillic-rn mid nanner profencc; a
friendL;lij]i v/itli 13c;bc Hebo/o. I li.ave not eonfiri.ied tliiy latter
fad. vil.li Bcbc. Tlic Clark Clifi'ord law firm has been the
\7aGhincton rcprecentative of tlio Hu.'^hcG' lcc.il intercfits in
V/achln<_',ton for a nuiii>)er of yearrj.
Fom-th, Bob Bennett, c;on of Kepator V.'allacc; Bennett of Utah, has
recently left tlic nejcrtment of Trancportation to take over tho
Mullen pLiblie Helationr; firm here in V/at^hin-ton. Chuck Colt;on
informr. inc tliat Bob Brnnett Is p. trunt-jd and f.ood friend of
'the Adjiiinlrtration. One of Bob's nev clicnti; io Howard Huches.
Bennett infornifj mo that tliere is no doubt about the fact that
Larry O'Brien was retained by Howard HuthcG and the contract ic
Btill in cxiytenco. llie arranrorients were mcde by llahcu and
Bennett believes that O'Brien, throut'ih his associate Dcsaultelc, .,
is coinc to seek to have lhi:;;hcG follow throuch on the alleecd
retainer contract even though Malieu has been removed. Bennett
•believes that Barry O'Brien has removed himself IVorn the
operation in a visible way, but for all practical purposes, is
still involved uitli the former Ixu-ry O'Brien Associates which is
now run by Docaultcls. Bennett believes that Desaultels is
collecting', on the Hu^lies contract and placin:', fundxi in a reserve
account for O'Brien when O'Brien returns to the firm. Bennett
also indicates that he will br- coin;^ to tho V.'ect Coast to talk ^ "
about the cprcifics of his Hughes relationship with Mr. Gay
(the man- vho is rcsjxnnGlblc for releasing Ilahcu) . Bennett
alr.o indicated. that he felt confident that lif it vac nccccsary •;-
to document the retainer vith O'Brien that he could 'Cet the '^ ,.
. 1^ v.. .1 I.I ■■■! • ■ ' ■ ■ . •■
' ■ I . . IhmI .1.1 ■ . M . •
3372
EXfflBIT No. 121
March 30, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H.R. HAIDEM\.N
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: ITT
There are four points in the analysis you outlined to MacGregor and
me this morning with which MacGregor, Wally Johnson and I disagree:
1. Mitchell, Kleindienst or Mardian dealing with Eastland and
MacGregor presumably dealing with the other members of the
Committee guarantees a divided approach. One or the other
has to call the shots. Kleindienst has already this morning
told MacGregor that he, MacGregor, should not deal with any
of the other Republican Senators (Scott, Cook, etc.) but rather
should deal only through Hruska, In the kind of day-to-day
operation this is, that is simply an untenable arrangement.
I know you and the President are concerned that all of us are
taken away from other more important matters. You should be,
however, equally concerned that Mitchell in the last 30 days has
done little with respect to the campaign and that may be a more
serious loss than MacGregor 's time and mine.
2. On the one hand, you have the assessment of Kleindienst, Mardian
and Mitchell as to what will happen in the Committee and on the
Floor. On the other hand, you have the legislative assessment
of MacGregor, Colson and Johnson which is very different.
(Johnson spent from 1968-1970 as Minority Counsel of this
same Committee and has been involved in all of the confirmation
battles of this Administration either from the Committee end or
from the Justice Department end. He left the Committee to go to
Justice in 1970. MacGregor spent 10 years in Congress. I spent
5 years as a senior Senate assistant and 9 years in law practice,
involving very considerable contact with the Hill. The Justice team
simply has not had the same experience.)
3373
Admittedly it is all opinion at this point. Mr. Johnson, MacGregor
and I unanimously do not believe that Kleindienst can be confirmed
by June 1. Johnson does not feel he can be confirmed at all and
on this point I am at least doubtful. I emphasize that this is an
opinion and a judgment call. Lots of things could happen: We
could get a big break in the case; the media could turn around
and become sympathetic to Kleindienst; the Democrats could
decide that they are better having him in the job than beating
him. Obviously, there are many unforeseen possibilities, but
as of now that is our best assessment. I would think that what-
ever decision we make now should be based on the most know-
ledgable — and I would add the most detached — assessment
of our legislative prospects.
Wally Johnson has done a detailed analysis of the various proced-
ural moves that are likely to be made in Committee or on the Floor.
He is not shooting from the hip. He has analyzed it and a Senate
vote in his judgment cannot be achieved by June 1; the Democrats
will only let it come to a vote if they have votes to reject Klein-
dienst, which is the least desirable outcome. Neither Johnson,
MacGregor or Colson are prepared to predict whether we can
hold the votes necessary to confirm him should the nomination
in fact get to a vote.
Assuming MacGregor, Johnson and Colson are correct, then
setting June 1 as our deadline date merely puts the hard decision
off to a time when it will be considerably more volatile politically
than it is today. Kleindienst's withdrawal will then be an admission
of defeat but it will come two months closer to the election. There
will have been two months more of rancor and publicity. In June
Kleindienst will be a hot issue for the Democratic Convention.
Confirmation of Kleindienst's replacement will also be vastly
more difficult in June than it would be now. Obviously this again
is opinion.
The most serious risk for us is being ignored in the analysis you
gave us this morning — there is the possibility of serious additional
exposure by the continuation of this controversy. Kleindienst is
not the target; the President is, but Kleindienst is the best avail-
able vehicle for the Democrats to get to the President. Make no
mistake, the Democrats want to keep this case alive — whatever
happens to Kleindienst — but the battle over Kleindienst elevates
96-296 O - 73
3374
-3-
the visibility of the ITT matter and, indeed, guarantees that
the case will stay alive. It may stay alive in any event and hence
the key question not addressed in your analysis is whether pen-
dency or withdrawal of the Kleindienst nomination serves to
increase the Democrat's desire to continue. That is the hardest
call to make but for the following reasons it may be the most
important point to make.
Niether Kleindienst, Mitchell nor Mardian know of the potential
dangers. I have deliberately not told Kleindienst or Mitchell
since both may be recalled as witnesses and Mardian does not
understand the problem. Only Fred Fielding, myself and Ehrlich-
man have fully examined all the documents and/or information
that could yet come out. A summary of some of these is attached.
3375
Certain ITT files which were not shredded have been turned
over to the SEC; there was talk yesterday in the Conmittee
of subpoenaing these from ITT. These files would undermine
Griswold's testimony that he made the decision not to take the
appeal to the Supreme Court. Correspondence to Connally and
Peterson credits the delay in Justice's filing of the appeal to
the Supreme Court in the Grinell case to direct intervention
by Peterson and Connally. A memo sent to the Vice President,
addressed "Dear Ted", from Ned Gerrity tends to contradict
John Mitchell's testimony because it outlines Mitchell's agree-
ment to talk to McLaren following Mitchell's meeting with
Geneen in August 1970.
It would carry some weight in that the memo was written contem-
poraneous with the meeting. Both Mitchell and Geneen have
testified they discussed policy only, not this case, and that
Mitchell talked to no one else. The memo further states that
Ehrlichman assured Geneen that the President had "instructed"
the Justice Department with respect to the bigness policy.
(It is, of course, appropriate for the President to instruct the
Justice Department on policy, but in the context of these hearings,
that revelation would lay this case on the President's doorstep.)
There is another internal Ryan to Merriam memo, which is not
in the hands of the SEC; it follows the 1970 Agnew meeting and
suggests that Kleindienst is the key man to pressure McLaren,
implying that the Vice President would implement this action.
We believe that all copies of this have been destroyed.
There is a Klein to Haldeman memo dated June 30, 1971 which
of course precedes the date of the ITT settlement, setting forth
the $400,000 arrangement with ITT. Copies were addressed to
Magruder, Mitchell and Timmons. This memo put the AG on
constructive notice at least of the ITT commitment at that time
and before the settlement, facts which he has denied under oath.
We don't know whether we have recovered all the copies. If
known, this would be considerably more damaging than Rieneke's
statement. Magruder believes it is possible, the AG transmitted
his copy to Magruder. Magruder doesn't have the copy he received;
he only has a Xerox of the copy. In short, despite a search this
memo could be lying around anywhere at 1701.
3376
Tje Justice Department has thus far resisted a request for their
files, although their files were opened to Robert Hannnond, one
of Turner's deputies and a hold-over who is now a practicing
Democratic lawyer in Washington. Hammond had access to several
memos that could be embarassing. Whether he kept them or not
is unknown, but it is probable that he recalls them. One is a memo
of April 1969 from Kleindienst and McLaren to Ehrlichman respon-
ding to an Ehrlichman request with respect ot the rationale for
bringing the case against ITT in the first place. There is a
subsequent April 1970 memo from Hullin to McLaren stating
that Ehrlichman had discussed his meeting with Geneen with
the AG, and suggesting to McLaren that Mitchell could give _
McLaren "more specified guidance". There is another memo
of September 1970 from Ehrlichman to the AG referring to an
"understanding" with Geneen and complaining of McLaren's _ _
actions. There is a May 5, 1971 memo from Ehrlichman to
the AG alluding to discussions between the President and the
AG as to the "agreed upon ends" in the resolution of the ITT
case and asking the AG whether Ehrlichman should work directly
with McLaren or through Mitchell. There is also a memo to
the President in the same time period. We know we have control
of all the copies of this, but we don't have control of the original
Ehrlichman memo to the AG. This memo would once again contra-
dict Mitchell's testimony and more importantly directly involve
the President. We believe we have absolute security on this file
within Justice, provided no copies were made within Justice and
provided there are no leaks. We have no idea of the distribution
that took place within Justice.
Merriam's testimony will of necessity involve direct contact with
Jack Gleason. I can't believe that after Merriam's testimony.
Gleason will not be called as a'>witness.
A TRUE COPY 9^298 8615
3377
Exhibit No. 122
d£:r wil,i_ check class, atio.n to.^PF(d bottoni
!~ f JiNCLASSfFJHD f~ j CONyJDE.NTIAL I | SKCitKI
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
roi
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CONCURRENCE
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f OLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
uMS. ADOHSSS
j UNCLASSIFIED | | CONFIDENTIAL { |
007 lis* previous »di(h
3378
30 August 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT : Additional Request from Mr. Howard Hunt
for Agency Support
1. Mr. Deputy Chief, TSD telephoned on 27
August 1971 to report additional requests fronn Mr. Howard Hunt.
He said that Mr. Hunt had telephoned Mr. his regular
TSD contact, on 26 August 1971 and asked hinn to meet a courier
at the airport to receive exposed film and arrange for its devslopm.ent.
Mr, Hunt also arranged to pick up the developed film later. Mr.
said that the pseudonym of Mr. Hunt's colleague, whose
identity remains unknown to us, is
2. Mr. said that he was increasingly concerned at the
nature of assistance requested by Mr. Hunt. TSD had initially
furnished Mr. Hunt with notiiial pocket-litter documentation. Hunt
was now pressing for fully backstopped docum.entation..and support.
A driver's license and credit cards (including Hertz and Avis) had
been requested in pseudon-y-m. Mr. said that he had turned
down this request. Hunt had also asked that the Agency arrange to
backstop a New York phone number either through an answering service
there or by a hookup which would permit the New York number to be
answered in Washington. Hunt also wanted the Agency to arrange for
a New York business office to acknowledge him. Mr. said
this service was beyond TSD's capabilicy and would have to be handled
by the Office of Security.
3379
3, I told Mr. that Mr. Hunt's latest requests drew
us even further into the sensitive area of donaestic operations
aaainst Americans and that all such requests should be referred
to General Cushman's office. Meanwhile these requests should
not be met.
3380
Exhibit No. 123
;TNOei=? WILL CHECK CLASS! ^TIOiN TOP AND 30TT0.M
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
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aET'JSN
CONCURRENCE
IMFOa.MATlON
SlSf^ATURE
Remarks t.
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Tfs ^.i^-^iJu^ xy^
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■OLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ACOHESS ANO PHONE NO.
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Usa previous editions
3381
23 August 1971
MEMORANDUM FOx^ THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Request by Mr. Howard Hunt for Special
Agency Secretarial Support
1. Mr. Howard Hunt, a retired Clandestine Service officer who
is a White House consultant on security matters, telephoned on 18 August
to request that the Agency furnish him a secretary for a temporary
assignment of between 30 and 90 days. He said that he needed the secretary
to work on a highly sensitive assignment and that Mr. John Ehrlichman had
suggested that he call General Cushman.
2. Mr. Hunt said that he wanted the services of a specific individual.
Miss who was working in the Paris Station. He said that
he didn't want Chief, EUR to know that he or the White House was involved
in the request. He suggested that the Director's office should recall the
young lady at once, explaining to all concerned that she was urgently needed
for an unspecified special assignment. He again stressed that White House
involvement should not be mentioned to anyone but General Cushman or the
Director.
3. Miss is a year old, GS-5 clerk-typist from
4. After discussing the case with General Cushman, I informed
Mr. Hunt that the Agency would be very reluctant to withdraw
in the middle of her overseas assignment. It would involve xmnecessary
ercpense and would disrupt the work of the Paris Station. I suggested that
if Mr. Hunt would furnish us with the qualifications desired we might be
3382
able to pro-.'ide z>. fully qualified secretary from Headquarters. Mr. Hunt
replied that was the only secretary he would accept because
ut "the loy^ilty factor, " and l^.e would withdraw the request if he could not
L;e!: her. I suggested that he taho the matter up with General Cushman if
it would make hinn feel better. He replied that he might do this but would
iirjt tall< to Mr. Ehrlichman. Several days have gone by and we have
i^ei'.rd no more of the matter.
EA/DDCI
3383
Exhibit No. 124
Mfietinq Batween the DDCI (General Cujhman) and Howard Hunt - 22 July 71
Goneral Cviahman: Hey, good to see you. Come on in, have a seat.
Mr. Phmt : Could we make this just the two of us?
General Cushman: All right, sure. We certainly can.
Mr. Hunt: Thank you very much. I've been charged with quite a
highly sensitive mission by the White House to visit and elicit
information frqna an individual whose ideology we aren't entirely
sure of, and for that purpose they asked me to come over here and
see if you could get me two things: flash alias docvunentation, which
wouldn't have to ( it's to be backstopped ) and some
degree of physical disguise, for a one-tune op -- in and out.
General Cushman: I don't see why we can't.
Mr. Hunt: We'll keep it as closely held as possible. I don't know how
you or your cover people want to work it, but what I would like would
be to meet somebody in a safehouse ( NOTE: Plane comes over at
this point, and words are very indistinct. ) physical disguise.
V/e'rs planning on (traveling) either Saturday or Sunday. Tomorrow
afternoon probably would be the earliest it could be acconnplished,
so if somebody could (do it by tomorrow afternoon, it would be a
great job. )
Well, you're looking very well.
General Cushman: Well, it's a nice job.
3384
Mr. Hunt: I know. I saw yoU at the Wisner Memorial presentation
that day, you know, the plaque that's downstairs, and, if you pardon
my saying so, you seem to have lost a little weight.
General Cuahmans Yes, I've taken some off. I sort oi go up and down. When
1 go down, it's because I go on the wagon and don't eat very much at
all, and this is hell to pay when you're being entertained and going
to embassies and dinners, but it's the only way I can lose weight is
to be miserable, relatively miserable.
Mr. Hunt: Yes. 1 have the same problem. And, curiously, since
I've retired, the thing I've missed most is the gym facilities, because
I used to get down there. I'd be there about fifteen minutes before
the Director would arrive, so we'd kind of overlap a bit, and that
really kept my weight down, because it discouraged midafternoon
snacking, you know, and then I didn't feel a need to drink when I got
home because I was too tired, you know, so I do miss that facility.
General Gushman: Well, I don't use it. I ordinarily trot or jog for thirty
minutes in the morning at home. If I wait until afternoon, I'm too
tired. I'm just getting to that old-age point where, when I get home
in theaternoon, I may work in the workshop or do a little bit of work
in the yard, but I don't feel like running.
Mr. Hunt: I know what you mean.
General Gushman: I'm amazed at the boss, because he's still doing it, you
know. It may be five-thirty or five o'clock when he gets down there.
I'm usually pooped. I don't want athletics at that point.
3385
Mr. Hunt: Yes, that's right. I try to do a littla aetting-up exercise
in tli3 morning, but I'm not consistent about it. (Next part indistinct,
but they're still talking about exorcises. )
General Cuskman: Say, I can get in touch Nvith you at the White House, can't I?
(to tell you) what address to go to, and so forth.
Mr. Hunt: Right. So we can lay on -- you think tomorrow afternoon
is ample time?
General Cuskman: I'll give it a try, yes. I haven't talked to anybody yet.
I suppose they can do it. I haven't been in this business before,
haven't had to.
Mr. Hunt: Well, Ehrlichman said that you were the --
General Cuskman: Yes, he call ed me. I rrs an I haven't been in the cover
business, so I don't know if they operate real fast, but I suppose they do.
Mr. Hunt: Well, I Icnow they can.
General Cuskman: Yes, I suppose tkey ( )
Mr. Hunt: It's just a question of getting some ( ),
some physical disguise.
General Cushman: What do you need? That will be the first thing they'll ask.
Mr. Hunt: Vfell, I'll need, let's see, what have I got here? I probably
need just a driver's license and some pocket litter.
General Cushman: Driver's license --
Mr. Hunt: Driver's license in any state at all, I don't care; some
pocket litter of some sort, ( ) pretty standard stuff.
General Cushman: Pocket litter?
3386
Mr. Hunt: Yes, that's what thay call it.
(I'tQTE: They both speak together at thia point, and I can't make out what is said,)
General Cushman: Yovt don't care in what name?
Mr. Hvint: I would like the first name to be Edward, that's all, if it
could be Edward, because I'm being introduced to this gentleman by
just one name. (Note: few words indistinct) early this morning that
somebody by the name of Edward would be getting in touch with him*
General Cushman: And any state for the driver's license.
Mr. Hunt: Yes, any state, it doesn't make any difference, and I'm
just going to have to check into a hotel, and I'll use this alias docu-
mentation for that,
Gensral Cushman: Yea.
Mr. Hunt: And I'll be talking to the same people, in and out, and if it
goes a little bit well, that's swell. (You can't be a beggar. )
I just won't exist. It's not possible this Friday.
Gensral Cushman: OK. Let's see, you gave me a number one time where I
could get you.
?vtr. Hunt: Right. Chuck" Cols on - - my office is unattended so far, but --
that's a direct line to Colson's office, and my office is two floors up,
(and I'm only there part of the time).
General Cushman: All right, fine. Whoever is there can get a hold of you.
Mr. Hunt: Anybody can get a hold of me --
General Cushman: And I can give them the --or should I ask for you to call
me back?
3387
Mr. Hunt: No, Joan Hal l is --
Goaeral Cuahman: l3 the gal who answers tha phone.
Mr. Hunt: Ye3. She'll answer the phone, Joan Hall, and --
General Cushman: And I can give her the time and the address.
l^tr. Hunt: Uh huh.
General Cushman: OK.
Mr. Hunt: I jus^t -- you know, I know so many people out here, it's
just well that I'm not seen ( ). (If I'm going to put on a
physical disguise, it's going to stick.) I wouldn't want to be se en
walking out of here. I'm sure they've got (safe) facil 
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