■pi. V •-■/< ■ ■ / ^ /
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60
'^■
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7 ; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973
Book 9
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
FRANFLW PIERCE LAW CENTER
ON DEPOSIT 'l^i^i^
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
TJNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973
Book 9
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-296 WASHINGTON : 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. aovernment Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session)
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina, Chairman
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vice Chairman
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, Georgia EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii LOWELL P.WEICKER. Jr., Connecticut
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico
Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Fred D. Thompson, Minority Counsel
RtJFUS L. Edmisten, Deputy Chief Counsel
Arthur S. Miller, Chief Consultant
David M. Dorsen, Assistant Chief Counsel
Terry F. Lenzner, Assistant Chief Counsel
James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel
Carmine S. Belling, Chief Investigator
Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator
Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel
R. Phillip Haire, Assistant Counsel
Marc Lackritz, Assistant Counsel
William T. Mayton, Assistant Counsel
Ronald D. B.otv^v\, Assistant Counsel
Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel
Howard S. Liebengood, Assistant Minority Counsel
H.William SnvRt:; Assistant Minority Counsel
Robert Silverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel
Laura Matz, Administrative Assistant
Carolyn Andrade, Office Manager
Joan C. Cole, Secretary to the Minority
(H)
CONTENTS
HEARING DAYS Page
Friday, Augusts, 1973 __ 3403
Monday, August 6, 1973 3473
Tuesday, August 7, 1973 3559
Monday, September 24, 1973 3661
Tuesday, September 25, 1973 3731
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Friday, August 3, 1973
Walters, Lt. Gen. Vernon A., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Agency. Former Defense Attache to France 3403
Gray, L. Patrick, III, former Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, accompanied by Stephen H. Sachs, counsel 3449
MoNDAT, August 6, 1973
Gray, L. Patrick, III, testimony resumed 3473
Tuesday, August 7, 1973
Kleindienst, Richard G., former Attorney General 3560
Petersen, Henry E., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division 3611
Monday, September 24, 1973
Hunt, E. Howard, retiree of the CIA. Former consultant to the Executive
Office of the President, accompanied by Sidney S. Sachs, counsel 3662
Tuesday, September 25, 1973
Hunt, E. Howard, testimony resumed. 3731
INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE AND COUNSELS
Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr Walters: 3439, 3440.
Gray: 3512-3516, 3537-3542. Kleindienst: 3579-3583. Petersen:
3636-3640, 3646, 3658, 3659. Hunt: 3722-3725, 3750-3754, 3779-
3785, 3796, 3797, 3802-3804.
Baker, Hon. Howard H., Jr Walters: 3440-3447.
Gray: 3516-3522, 3542-3545. Kleindienst: 3583-3587. Petersen:
3640-3643. Hunt: 3695, 3699-3701, 3725-3730, 3754-3758.
Talmadge, Hon. Herman E Walters: 3431-3435.
Gray: 3494-3499, 3525-3527. Kleindienst: 3587-3590. Petersen:
3643-3646. Hunt: 3731-3736, 3760, 3763, 3785, 3786.
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K Gray: 3503-3508,
3530-3533, 3547-3550. Kleindienst: 3593-3596, 3604-3607.
Petersen: 3650-3652. Hunt: 3739-3741, 3768-3771, 3789-3791.
Montoya, Hon. Joseph M Walters: 3423-3426.
Gray: 3508-3512, 3534-3537, 3550, 3551. Kleindienst: 3599-3603.
Petersen: 3656-3658. Hunt: 3746-3749, 3775-3779, 3793-3796.
Gurney, Hon. Edward J . . Walters: 3435-3439.
Gray: 3499-3503, 3527-3530. Kleindienst: 3590-3593. Petersen:
3646-3650. Hunt: 3736-3739, 3763-3768, 3792, 3793.
(m)
IV
Page
Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr Walters: 3427-3431
3447, 3448. Gray: 3489-3494, 3522-3.525, 3545-3547. Kleindienst'
3596-3599, 3607, 3608. Petersen: 3652-3656. Hunt: 3698, 3701-
3703, 3741-3746, 3771-3775, 3786-3789, 3797-3802.
Dash, Samuel, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Walters: 3403-3419
3426, 3427. Petersen: 3611-3632. Hunt: 3661, 3665-3669, 3703-
3707, 3804-3808.
Thompson, Fred D., Minority Counsel Walters: 3420-3423.
Gray: 3554-3558. Kleindienst: 3575-3579. Petersen: 3632-3636.
Hunt: 3707-3722, 3808-3813.
Edmisten, Rufus L., Deputy Chief Counsel Gray: 3473-3488, 3551-3554.
Dorsen, David M., Assistant Chief Counsel Kleindienst: 3560-3575,
3608-3610.
EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
No. 129 — (3407) Memorandum by Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, dated
June 28, 1972, re: Walters meeting v/ith Gray on June 23,
1972, at 1430 hours in Gray's ofRce in the FBI Building 3815
No. 130 — (3410) Walters memorandum of June 28, 1972, regarding his
meeting with John Dean on June 26, 1972, at 1145 hours in
Dean's office, room 106 at the Executive Office Building 3816
No. 131 — (3411) Walters memorandum of June 29, 1972, re: Walters
meeting with Dean on June 27, 1972, at 1145 hours in Dean's
EOB Office 3818
No. 132— (3413) Walters memorandum of June 29, 1972, re: Walters
meeting with Dean on June 28, 1972, at 1130 hours in the
EOB 3819
No. 133— (3416) Walters memorandum of July 13, 1972, re: Walters
meeting with Gray on July 12, 1972, at 1415 hours in Gray's
office 1_. 3821
No. 134— (3417) Walters memorandum of July 28, 1972, re: Walters meet-
ing with Gray on July 28, 1972, at 1100 hours at Gray's
office in the FBI Building 3823
No. 135 — (3417) Walters memorandum dated February 9, 1973, re: Phone
call from John Dean at 6:10 p.m. on February 9, 1973 3825
No. 136— (3419) Walters memorandum dated May 11, 1973, re: Walters
meeting with Dean at 1430 hours at Dean's White House
office 3827
No. 137— (3419) Affidavit dated May 12, 1973, by Lt. Gen. Vernon A.
Walters, re: Recollections of meetings and discussions with
the White House and Gray 3828
No. 138 — (3443) Collection of McCord letters contained in CIA documen-
tation provided Senate Appropriations Committee 3834
No. 139— (3480) Memorandum to Mr. Felt from D. J. Dalbey dated
July 20, 1972, re: Dissemination of Information, the White
House, Criminal Cases 3843
No. 140— (3480) Memorandum by D. J. Dalbey dated July 24, 1972, re:
Answer to note on dissemination of intelligence and security
data to the White House 3846
No. 141— (3521) Article by James W. McCord entitled: "What the FBI
Almost Found" from the August issue of the Armed Forces
Journal International 3848
No. 142 — (3551) Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters for
Acting FBI Director dated July 6, 1972, subject: Information
provided the FBI regarding the Watergate incident 3850
No. 143 — (3551) Memorandum from Vernon A. Walters for Acting
Director of the FBI, dated July 7, 1972, subject: E. Howard
Hunt 3853
No. 144 — (3551) Memorandum from Vernon A. Walters (CIA) provided
Acting FBI Director, dated July 28, 1972, re: Mr. "Cleo's"
contacts with Hunt during August of 1971 3854
No. 144A — (3559) Article from American Nurses Association, Inc 3855
Note. — Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the
record.
No. 145 — (3573) Letter dated April 15, 1973, by former Attorney General
Kleindienst in which he sets forth reasons why he had to
recuse himself from any further contact or involvement in
the Watergate case 3860
No. 146 — (3623) Memorandum dated December 5, 1972, re: TSD photo-
graphs (includes photographs of Dr. Fielding's automobile, Page
business establishment, "Postal Instant Press," etc.) 3861
No. 147 — (3634) Notes Henry Petersen gave President Nixon on April 16,
1973, re: John EhrHchman, H. R. Haldeman, and Gordon
Strachan, concerning Watergate investigation 3875
No. 148 — (3665) Memorandum from Charles Colson to H. R. Haldeman
dated July 2, 1971. Also phone transcript of Colson and
Hunt, July 1, 1971 3877
No. 149— (3670) Phone transcript of Conein, Hunt, and "F.C." (Colson)
July 9, 1971 3881
No. 150 — (3675) Memorandum from Hunt to Colson dated July 28, 1971,
subject: Neutralization of Ellsberg ' 3886
No. 151 — (3681) Affidavit of E. Howard Hunt. Notarized April 5, 1973. 3887
No. 152 — (3695) Phone transcript of conversation between E. Howard
Hunt and Charles Colson, late November 1972 3888
No. 153— (3698) Letter from E. Howard Hunt to Charles Colson, dated
December 31, 1972 3892
No. 154 — (3730) Memorandum to Charles Colson from Krogh and Young
dated August 3, 1971, subject: "Reference to the Memo-
randum to you from Howard Hunt dated July 28, 1971, on
Neutralization of Ellsberg" 3893
No. 155 — (3759) Photograph of John Buckle v 3894
No. 156— (3759) Affidavit of Jerald F. terHorst, dated September 25,
1973 3895
No. 157 — (3807) Memorandum from Charles Colson to John Dean dated
August 11, 1972. Also letter to Charles Colson from E.
Howard Hunt dated August 9, 1972 3897
Note. — Figures in parentheses indicate page tliat exhibit was officially made part of the
record.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
PHASE I: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION
FBIDAY, AUGUST 3, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington^ D.O.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 9 :35 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gumey, and Weicker.
Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief
counsel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels ; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker ; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker ; Michael Flani-
gan, assistant publications clerk.
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
General Walters, will you stand up, please, sir? Hold up your right
hand. Do you swear that the evidence that you shall give to the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
General Walters. I do.
Senator Ervin. Thank you, sir.
General, suppose you just give us your full name and address for the
purposes of the record.
TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. VERNON A. WALTERS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Walters. My name is Yemon A. Walters. I am the Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I am at the present time
Acting Director until Mr. Colby is sworn in after having been con-
firmed by the Senate, and I live in Arlington, Va.
Senator Ervtn. Thank you, sir.
Genral Walters. I am a lieutenant general in the U.S. Army.
INIr. Dash. General Walters, how long have you had the position
as Deputy Director of the CIA?
General Walters. Since May 2, 1972, that is the day I was sworn in.
Mr. Dash. Prior to obtaining that position, what position did you
have?
(3403)
3404
Greneral Walters. I was the Defense attache to France.
Mr. Dash. How long were you in that position ?
General Walters. Four and a half years.
Mr. Dash. Prior to your joining the CIA could you just briefly tell
us what contacts, if any, you have had with the President of the United
States, President Nixon?
General Walters. My first contact with President Nixon was when
he was Vice President. I was detailed to accompany him on a trip
around South America. I went to eight countries with him and served
as interpreter, translator, and aide at that time. In two of those coun-
tries I was in the car with Mr. Nixon when extreme violence was en-
countered, mob violence, and if I were to tell this committee that I
did not feel admiration and respect for the courage and calmness Mr.
Nixon showed at that time, I would not be telling you the whole truth.
Subsequently, I saw — I did not work for Mr. Nixon again during
the period between the time he left the Vice Presidency and the time
he became President, I saw him perhaps two or three times in those
8 years.
After he became President I went on two or three of the trips abroad
he took to countries where I spoke the language and could translate for
him. I have not had any private conversation with the President since
I became Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency ; that is,
since May 2.
Mr. Dash. Shortly after you became Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, did you attend a meeting at the White House
with Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and Director Helms on June 23,
1972?
General Walters. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. Could you tell us how that meeting was arranged ?
General Walters. During the morning of June 23 I received a phone
call, I do not recall exactly how, telling me that I was to be there at
Mr. Ehrlichman's office on
Mr. Dash. You say you received a telephone call ?
General Walters. Yes.
Mr. Dash. From whom?
General Walters. I do not know whether T received it personally
or my secretary received it just stating I was to be at Mr. Ehrlichman's
office from Mr. Helms, it mav have come from Mr. Helms' secretary
at 1 :30 that afternoon. INTr. Helms and I went downtown, we did not
know what the subject of the meeting was. We had lunch together and
at 1 :30 we went to Mr. Ehrlichman's office.
Mr. Dash. All right. Now. will vou to the best of vour recollection,
relate the discussion that was had at that meetinof? By the way, who
could you say actuallv was doin.fr most of the talkincr at the meeting?
General Wat,ters. T believe Mr. Haldeman was doing nearlv all of
the talldng. I do not recall Mr. Ehrlichman actually participating
activel V in the conversation.
Mr. Dash. Now, would vou relate to the committee what Mr. Halde-
man said and what vou or ]\Tr. Helms said ?
General Walters. Mr. Haldeman said that the bufrging of the
Watergate was creatins: a lot of iioise, that the opposition was attempt-
ing to maximize this, that the FBI was invest i era ting this and the leads
might lead to some important people, and he then asked INIr. Helms
3405
what the Agency connection was. Mr. Helms replied quite emphatically
that there was no Agency connection and Mr. Haldeman said that
nevertheless, the pursuit of the FBI investigation in Mexico might
uncover some CIA activities or assets.
Mr. Helms said that he had told Mr. Gray on the previous day, the
Acting Director cf the FBI, that there was no Agency involvement,
that none of the investigations being carried out by the FBI were in
any way jeopardizing any Agency activity. Mr. Haldeman then said :
Nevertheless, there is concern that these investigations — this investigation in
Mexico, may expose some covert activity of the CIA, and it has been decided that
General Walters will go to Director Gray, Acting Director Gray, and tell him
that the further pursuit of this investigation in Mexico —
And I wish to emphasize that the only question of investigation
involved was Mexico —
the investigation in Mexico, could jeopardize some assets of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
Again Mr. Helms said he was not aware of any activity of the
Agency that could be jeopardized by this. Mr. Haldeman repeated :
Nevertheless, there is concern that the further pursuit of this investigation will
uncover some activity or assets of the CIA in Mexico and it has been decided that
you will go and tell this —
Addressed to me —
you will tell this to Acting Director Gray.
Mr. Dash. But, Mr. Walters, could it have been that Mr. Haldeman
asked you or Mr. Helms to go to Mr. Gray and — to first inquire at the
CIA whether or not there might be some problem at the CIA if there
was an investigation in Mexico, rather than saying it was decided that
you should go.
General Walters. I do not recall it being put in a question form. It
was put in a directive form.
Mr. Dash. In other words, you understood that to be a direction.
General Walters. I understood that to be a direction and since Mr.
Haldeman was very close to the top of the governmental structure of
the United States, and as Mr. Helms testified yesterday, the "White
House has a great deal of information that other people do not have.
I had been with the Agency approximately 6 weeks at the time of this
meeting. I found it quite conceivable that Mr. Haldeman might have
some information that was not available to me.
Mr. Dash. And you did not feel it appropriate at that time to inquire
of Mr. Haldeman why it was that he was directing you to go to Mr.
Gray and tell that to Mr. Gray ?
General Walters. No ; I did not. If I had felt there was any impro-
priety in this request I would have given him the same answer I later
gave Mr. Dean, that I would resign rather than do it.
Mr. Dash. By the way, did you wonder why it was that Mr. Halde-
man said it was decided that you. General Walters, should go to see
Mr. Gray and not Director Helms ?
General Walters. Yes, I did. A number of hypotheses crossed my
mind. I thought perhaps he thinks I am military and a lot of people
have the mistaken belief that military obey blindly. I thought he
might have heard reports that there had been some friction in the past
between the FBI and the CIA, and perhaps since Mr. Gray was new
3406
in the job and I was new in the job that that might be a good way to
start out. I did wonder about it but I didn't — this was his privilege
to do it any way he wished.
Mr. Dash. Now, General Walters, did there come a time when you
put in writing, in the form of a memorandum, your recollection of
that meeting on June 23, 1972 ?
General Walters. There did, Mr. Dash, 5 days later. "Wlien this
thing started I did not habitually keep memorandums of my conversa-
tions. However, when on the Tuesday, the following Tuesday, Mr.
Dean put the question to me or he didn't jiut the question but explored
the possibility of the CIA going bail and paying the salaries of the
suspects who were in jail, I realized it was time for me to start keeping
a record. So following that second meeting on the 27th I sat down and
I wrote memorandums for myself ; they wei-e not intended to be a ver-
batim account of the conversation or to cover all aspects of the conver-
sation but notes to jog my own memory. I wrote a memorandum on the
meeting with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, I wrote a memoran-
dum on the meeting with Mr. Gray, I wrote a memorandum on my first
meeting with Mr. Dean on Monday the 26th, and a memorandum of
my second meeting with Mr. Dean on the 27th.
On the 28th I met with Mr. Dean for the third and last time, and I
wrote a memorandum, I believe, the following day.
On the subsequent memorandums; namely, my calls on Mr. Gray,
I wrote those memorandums either on the same day that I had the
talk with Mr. Gray or the following day. If I may, I would like to
make one point clear, I have been alleged to have a splendid memory
and so forth and here I was making confession that I am afraid will
not fit into it.
Mr. Helms was quite right in his testimony yesterday in that the
question regarding bail and paying the salaries of these people came
up on Tuesday. Wlien I reviewed my notes and before I wrote the
affidavit, I did correct this in my affidavit; namely, that the request
regarding bail for defendants was on Tuesday.
Mr. Dash. We will get to that and I think you can restate it when
I ask you about the meetings with Mr. Dean. I want to show you a
copy we have of a memorandum purportedly from you or written by
you on June 28 covering the June 23 meeting and ask you if this is a
correct copy of the memorandum.
General Walters. Right. Yes, Mr. Dash, it is.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, may that copy be marked as an exhibit
and introduced into the record ?
Senator Ervin. I believe this memorandum has previously been
marked as exhibit No. 101.*
Mr. Dash. Now, General Walters, after you left the meeting with
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, did you leave with Director
Helms?
General Walters. I did. We walked downstairs and we stood and
talked close to the car out on West Executive Avenue and Mr. Helms
said to me :
You must remind Mr. Gray of the agreement between the FBI and the CIA
that if they run into or appear to be about to expose one another's assets they
will notify one another, and you should remind him of this.
*See Book 7, p. 2948.
3407
I did.
Mr. Dash. And then what did you do ?
General Walters. I do not recall whether I went back to the Agency
or not. I don't think time would have allowed it because the appoint-
ment had been made to see Mr. Gray at 2 :30 p.m. My recollection
is not clear on this, whether I went back to the Agency or whether I
stayed downtown. I have a feeling I stayed downtown and at 2 :30 I
went to see Mr. Gray.
Mr. Dash. Now, was Mr. Gray, by the way, expecting your visit?
General Walters. Mr. Gray, I believe, was expecting my visit.
Mr. Dash. How do you know that ?
General Walters. I believe he has subsequently testified that Mr.
Dean had told him that I was on my way down.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Now, would you briefly relate to your best recollection what conver-
sation you had with Mr. Gray at that time? This was on June 23, 1972.
General Walters. I said to Mr. Gray that I had just come from the
White House where I had talked to some senior staff members and I
was to tell him that the pursuit of the FBI investigation in Mexico,
the continuation of the FBI investigation in Mexico, could — might
uncover some covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. I
then repeated to him what Mr. Helms had told me about the agreement
between the FBI and CIA and he said he was quite aw^are of this and
I intended to observe it scrupulously.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you tell him who gave you the direction to
General Walters. I did not. I told him I had talked to some senior
j)eople at the Wliite House.
Mr. Dash. Now, was that the sum and substance of that conversa-
tion in Mr. Gray's office ?
General Walters. I believe so. We had expressed pleasure at meet-
ing one another. I had intended to call on him, and so forth, and any-
thing else that occurred I believe will be covered in the memorandum
which is in your possession.
Mr. Dash. I think you testified that you also on June 28 included a
memorandum of the meeting with Mr. Gray on June 23. I would like
to show you a copy of the memorandum and ask you if this is a correct
copy and does it cover the testimony you have just given.
General Walters. Yes, it is a correct copy.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, may that memorandum be marked as an
exhibit and be received in evidence ?
Senator Ervin. In the absence of objection by any committee mem-
ber it is so ordered and will be appropriately marked as an exhibit
and received in evidence as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 129.*]
Mr. Dash. Now, after you met with Mr. Gray did you return to your
offices at the CIA and
General Walters. Yes ; I did.
Mr. Dash [continuing]. And did you make a report of that meeting
to former Director Helms ?
General Walters. And I also started to check on whether this was
a fact. I talked to the people at our geographic area that handles
Mexico and I am not sure whether this was completed on the Friday
*See p. 3815.
3408
afternoon or whether it was completed Monday morning, but it was
soon clear to me that nobody who was responsible for that area in the
Agency felt that the ongoing FBI investigation could jeopardize any
of the Agency sources or activities in Mexico.
Mr. Dash. Well, now, did you subsequently receive any communica-
tion from anybody at the White House after June 23 ?
General Walters. On Monday morning, June 26, 1 received a phone
call from a man who identified himself as John Dean and he said he
wished to speak to me about the matters that Mr. Haldeman and Mr.
Ehrlichman had discussed with me on Friday. I did not know Mr.
Dean. And I expressed so- — something to the effect that I don't know
who you are and he said, "Well, you can call Mr. Ehrlichman to see
whether it is all right to talk to me or not."
Mr. Dash. Did you call Mr. Ehrlichman ?
General Walters. I called Mr. Ehrlichman. I had some difficulty
in reaching him but finally I reached him and I said : "A Mr. John
Dean wants to talk to me about the matters discussed with you and Mr.
Haldeman on the preceding Friday" and he said : "Yes, it is all right
to talk with him. He is in charge of the whole matter."
Mr. Dash. Did you then meet with Mr. Dean on that day?
General Walters. I then
Mr. Dash. The 26th.
General Walters. I then called Mr. Dean again and he asked me to
come down and see him, I believe, at 11 :30 or 11 :45. I believe it is
indicated on the memorandum I wrote.
Mr. Dash. Will you relate to the committee the conversation you
had with Mr. Dean at that time, on June 26, 1972 ?
General Walters. Mr. Dean said that he was handling this whole
matter of the Watergate, that it was causing a lot of trouble, that it
was very embarrassing. The FBI was investigating it. The leads had
led to some important people. It might lead to some more important
people.
The FBI was proceeding on three hypotheses, namely, that this
break-in had been organized by the Republican National Committee,
by the Central Agency, or by someone else ; whereupon I said I did not
know who else organized it but I know that the Central Intelligence
Agency did not organize it. I said, furthermore^ — ^I related to Mr. Dean
my conversation with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman on the pre-
vious Friday, and told him I had checked within the Agency and
found there was nothing in anv of the ongoing FBI investigations
that could jeopardize CIA activities or sources or compromise them
in any way in Mexico.
He then said, "Well, could this not have happened without your
knowledge?" "Well," I said, "oriafinally perhaps, but I have inquired.
I have talked to Mr. Helms and I am sure that we had no part in this
operation asfainstthe Democr-atic National Committee."
He kept ]>ressin2: this. There must have been. These people all used
to work for the CIA, and all this thina:. I said mavbe thev used to, but
thev were not when they did it and he pressed and ])ressed on, on this
and asked if there was not some way I could help him, and it seemed
to me he was explorin.cr perhans the option of seeing whether he could
put some of the blame on us. There was not any specific thing he said
but the general tenor was in this wav and I said to him — I did not have
an opportunity to consult with anybody — I simply said,
3409
Mr. Dean, any attempt to involve the Agency in the stifling of this affair
would be a disaster. It would destroy the credibility of the Agency with the
Congress, with the Nation. It would be a grave disservice to the President. I will
not be a party to it and I am quite prepared to resign before I do anything that
will implicate the Agency in this matter.
This seemed to shock him somewhat. I said that anything that would
involve any of these Government agencies like the CIA and FBI in
anything improper in this Avay would be a disaster for the Nation.
Somewhat reluctantly he seemed to accept this line of argument and
I left.
Mr. Dash. Now, General Walters, since you had made the check
prior to seeing Mr. Dean concerning whether in fact any FBI investi-
gation in Mexico would seriously or not seriously involve any covert
activities of the CIA, and you reported that to Mr. Dean at this meet-
ing, did you believe that you were responding at that meeting then to
the concern that you had received at the earlier meeting from the
statement from Mr. Haldeman ?
General Walters. Yes, Mr. Dash, I did. At the risk of perhaps
seeming naive in retrospect it did not occur to me at that time that
Mr. Dean would not tell Mr. Gray. Mr. Gray was in touch with Mr.
Dean. Mr. Dean told me he was in touch with Mr. Gray. In retrospect
I should, of course, have called Mr. Gray directly. I regret that I did
not.
Mr. Dash. And you had been informed by Mr. Ehrlichman when
you checked as to whether you should talk to Mr. Dean, that Mr. Dean
was a person you could talk to, that he was handling the matter ?
General Walters. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. I think when you were testifying just a little while ago
you said that you may have incorrectly put in your memorandum of
the June 26 meeting something tliat should have been in another meet-
ing. I want to show you your memorandum or a writing that appears
to be a memorandum prepared by you on June 28 dealing with the
conversation you had with Mr. Dean on Jime 26 and ask you if you
want to make a correction as to that memorandum for the record. You
will notice, General Walters, that there is an excised portion of that
memorandum which has been cut out and on our receipt of that, it
appeared to be matters which dealt with national security and, there-
fore, was excised.
General Walters. Fine. I am very appreciative of the committee
for doing this.
Yes, it does. If I were to make a correction somewhat complicated
it would really be that the fourth paragraph, the sixth and seventh
paragraphs belong to the conversation of the 27th rather than the
conversation of the 26th.
]\Ir. Dash. And that dealt with the question of money, bail money
from the CIA.
General Walters. That is correct. This is a correct copy.
]\Ir. Dash. It is a correct copy of your memorandum?
General Walters. Yes, it is.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, could we have that memorandum marked
as an exhibit and received in evidence?
Senator Ervin. The memorandum will be appropriately numbered
as an exhibit and received in evidence as such.
3410
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 130.*]
Mr. Dash. After that meeting with JNIr. Dean on June 26, did you
report back to former Director Helms?
General Walters. I did. I told Mr. Helms generally what had trans-
pired and he approved of my firm stand with Dean and I related in
some detail the various matters that I had discussed with Mr. Dean
and the fact that I had told Mr. Dean that no Agency assets would
be compromised by the pursuit of the FBI investigation in JNIexico.
Mr. Dash. I think you mentioned earlier that you did again meet
with Mr. Dean. IVhen did you next meet with Mr. Dean ?
General Walters. On the following morning, June 27, I received
another telephone call from Mr. Dean summoning me down to his
office. I went down to Mr. Dean's office. I believe the time is indicated
in the memorandum, 11 :30 a.m.
Mr. Dash. I think 11 :45 a.m.
General Walters. 11 :45 a.m., and Mr. Dean said that the investiga-
tion was continuing, that some of the suspects were wabbling and might
talk and I said, "Well, that is just too bad but it has nothing to do
with us because nothing that they can say can implicate the Agency."
So he again said, "Have you not discovered something about Agency
involvement in this matter?" And I said, "No, I have not discovered
anything about Agency involvement in this matter." He said, "Is there
not something the Agency can do to help ?" I said, "I do not see how
we can be helpful." Then he said, "Well, would there be any way in
which you could go bail or pay the salaries of these defendants while
they are in jail?" And I said, "No way. To do so would implicate
the Agency in something in which it is not implicated. I will have no
part in this."
Again I went through the reasoning of the appalling effect it would
have. I made plain to him that if the Agency were to intervene in this,
it would become known in the leaking atmosphere in Washington, that
it would be a total disaster, and I would like to say, if I may at this
point, that I have not spent the whole of my adult life in the Central
Intelligence Agency. I joined it for the first time in May of 1972. But
I am convinced that an effective CIA is essential if the United States
is to survive as a free and democratic society in the rough world in
which we live, and I was determined that I would not see it destroyed
or implicated as might be desired in this business. I further told Mr.
Dean that when we expended funds, covert funds within the United
States, we were required to i-eport this to our congressional oversight
committees and this seemed to cool his enthusiasm considerably. We
had a few more discussions and again he asked me whether there was
any way we could be helpful and I said, "No, we could not be."
Mr. Dash. Did you, by the way, at the meeting on June 28 — do you
have a copy of your memorandum with you ?
General Walters. Yes, I do.
This is the meeting of the 28th or the memorandum written on the
28th?
Mr. Dash. No. The meeting of the following day, the meeting you
have just testified to.
General Walters. On the 28th : yes, I do.
♦See p. 3816.
3411
Mr. Dash. Yes. First let me show you your copy of a memorandum
you prepared on June 29 of your meeting on June 27 and ask if this
is a correct copy of that meeting.
General Walters. Yes, it is.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, if we can have that marked for identifi-
cation and received.
Senator Ervin. That will be marked and appropriately numbered
as an exhibit and received in evidence as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 131.*]
Mr. Dash. All right, now General Walters, the very next day, it
appears that you had another meeting with Mr. Dean.
General Walters. That is right.
Mr. Dash. Did you report to former Director Helms on your 27th
meeting ?
General Walters. Mr. Helms was extremely interested in this whole
business and I reported to him immediately returning to the Agency
on each occasion.
Mr. Dash. On the 28th when you began to write these memorandums,
could you tell the committee what caused you to begin to put this down
in writing?
General Walters. Well, as soon as he broached the question of bail
and paying the salaries of these defendants, I realized that for the
first time there was a clear indication that something improper was
being explored, and I discussed this with Mr. Helms and we agreed,
again I don't know whether he or I suggested it, that we write the
memorandum, that I wrote the memorandum on these meetings and
kept a record of them and that is how the memorandums came to be
recorded. It will be noted I wrote practically five of them on the same
day to catch up with the past.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
The meeting on the 28th it appears was a fairly significant meeting
because it was a followup again of a third meeting that you had with
Mr. Dean. Do you have a copy of that memorandum ?
General Walters. Of my meeting of the 28th ?
Mr. Dash. Yes ; which you prepared on June 29, 1972.
General Walters. Yes, I do have it.
Mr. Dash. Would you read that memorandum in full. General
Walters?
General Walters [reading] :
On 28 June at 11 :30 John Dean asked me to see him at his oflBce in the
Executive OflBce Building. I saw him alone.
He said that the Director's meeting —
That is Director Helms' meeting —
with Patrick Gray, FBI Director, was canceled and that John Bhrlichman had
suggested that Gray deal with me instead.
The problem was how to stop the FBI investigation beyond the five suspects.
Leads led to two other j>eople — Ken Dahlberg and a Mexican named Guena.
Dean said that the $89,000 was unrelated to the bugging case and Dahlberg was
revising to answer questions. Dean then asked hopefully whether I could do
anything or had any suggestions.
I repeated that as Denuty Director, I had no independent authority. I was
not in the channel of command and had no authority other than that given me
by the Director. The idea that I could act independently was a delusion and had
no basis in fact.
♦See p. 3818.
3412
Dean then asked what might be done and I said that I realized he had a tough
problem, but if there were Agency involvement, it could be only at Presidential
directive and the political risks that were concomitant appeared to me to be
unacceptable. At present there was a high explosive bomb but intervention such
as he had suggested would transform it into a megaton hydrogen bomb. The pres-
ent caper was awkward and unpleasant. Directed intervention by the Agency
could be electorally mortal if it became known and the chances of keeping it
secret until the election were almost nil. I noted that scandals had a short life in
Washington and other newer spicier ones soon replaced them. I urged him not to
become unduly agitated by this one.
He then asked if I had any ideas and I said that this affair already had a
strong Cuban flavor and everyone knew the Cubans were conspiratorial and
anxious to know what the policies of both parties would be toward Castro. They,
therefore, had a plausible motive for attempting this amateurish job which any
skilled technician would deplore. This might be costly but it would be plausible.
Dean said he agreed that this was the best tack to take but it might cost half a
million dollars. He also agreed (for the second time) that the risks of Agency
involvement were unacceptable. After a moment's thought he said tliat he felt that
Gray's cancellation of his appointment with Director Helms might well be re-
versed in the next few hours.
Dean thanked me and I left.
Mr. Dash. First, General Walters, where was this meeting to be
held on June 28 which was canceled?
General Walters. I did not know, Mr. Dash, I did not know what
he was talking about. I presume some arrangement outside of me had
been made for Director Helms to see Mr. Gray.
Mr. Dash. But in any event, as your memorandum shows, Mr.
Ehrlichman had indicated he had preferred Gray meet with you on
an ongoing basis.
General Walters. This is what Mr. Dean said.
Mr. Dash. Could you tell the committee at least what your impres-
sion was concerning that part of your memorandum — where you said
this meeting is mostly concerning a Cuban conspiratorial plot and
Dean's statement that he agreed that this was the best tack to take
but it might cost a half million dollars.
General Walters. Yes, Mr. Dash.
Dean went back at this point in the conversation, as I remember
it, to the three hypotheses and he was sort of saying, "Who could
have done this, who could have done this." He did not indicate at any
time that he knew where the origin of this was. Quite frankly at this
point my principal purpose was to divert him from pursuing the
option of involving the Agency in this. I had read, I believe, about
that time an article in the newspaper which put out a hypothesis that
the Cubans might have been at the origin of this in order to try to find
out what the policies of the Democratic Party would be if it were
elected in 1972. This is what I basically said to Dean, that the Cubans
had a plausible motive for doing this.
Mr. Dean, obviously understood this as a suggestion of mine that he
should try to blame the Cubans. In retrospect, as is so often said here
from this table, I should have corrected him. Frankly, I was so relieved
at seeing him apparently abandoning the idea of involving the Agency
or at least retreating on the idea of involving the Agency that I did not
correct his impression when he said he obviously thought I was sug-
gesting that he could buy tlie Cubans.
Mr. Dash. Would that be the inference that ISIr. Dean's statement
that it might cost a half million dollars would actually require paying
somebody off or take this position ?
3413
General Walters. I think so, but I would just like to state Agency
involvement could not be hidden because the Cubans could not be
sustained. I should have corrected Mr. Dean at this point and said
this was not what I was meaning. I was advancing a theory, but I
did not correct him.
Mr. Dash. You have read your memorandum and I have an exact
copy of the memorandum here. I would like to show it to you — dated
June 29 covering your meeting with Mr. Dean on June 28 — and ask
you to look at it and indicate if this is a copy.
General Walters. Yes, it is.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, may I have this memorandmn marked
as an exhibit and received in evidence ?
Senator Ervin. It will be appropriately numbered as an exhibit
and received in evidence as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 132.*]
Mr. Dash. Did you receive. General Walters, a call from Mr. Gray
on July 5 ?
General Walters. Yes.
Mr. Dash. 1972?
General Walters. Yes, Mr. Dash, I did. At 5 :50 in the evening.
Mr. Dash. Could you tell us briefly what that call was about ?
General Walters. I believe that Mr. Gray said to me at this point
that the pressures were mounting to continue the investigation and
that unless he received a written letter from Mr. Helms or from me
to the effect that the further pursuit of this investigation in INIexico
would uncover CIA assets or activities he would have to go ahead with
the investigation. I did not wish to discuss this with Mr. Gray over the
telephone. I told him I would come down and see him the first thing the
next morning. This was at the end of the business day. It was at 5 :50
in the evening.
Mr. Dash. Did you go down the next morning and see him ?
General Walters. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. Would you briefly tell the committee what the nature of
your conversation was with Mr. Gray at that time ?
General Walters. I told Mr. Gray right at the outset that I could
not tell him and even less could I give him a letter saying that the pur-
suit of the FBI'S investigation would in any way jeopardize CIA
activities in Mexico. I told him I had to be quite frank with him. I re-
counted the meeting with Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman. I told him
that I had seen INIr. Dean on three occasions, that I had told Mr. Gray
what Mr. Dean had told me. Mr. Gray seemed quite disturbed by this,
and we both agreed that we could not allow our agencies to be used in
a way that would be detrimental to their integrity.
Since I am discussing what someone else said I would like to refer
here to my memorandum. Now this memorandum, unlike the others was
written, I believe, on the same day that I saw Mr. Gray.
Mr. Dash. Yes, would you refer to your memorandum and read
what you want from it?
General Walters. I think basically this was it, I said I could not
give him a letter to this effect. I could not tell him this and I could not
give him a letter to the effect that further investigation would com-
promise assets of the CIA. He said he understood this. He himself had
told Ehrlichman and Haldeman that he could not possibly suppress
the investigation in the matter ; even within the FBI there were leaks.
*Spo n asm
3414
He had called in the components of his field office and chewed them
out for these leaks. I said the only basis on which he and I could deal
was absolute frankness and I wished to recoimt my involvement in
the case. I told him of a meeting at the White House with Mr. Helms.
I did not mention Haldeman or Ehrlichman's name. I told him that
I had been directed to tell him that the investigation of this case
further in Mexico could compromise some CIA activities. Subse-
quently, I had seen Mr. Dean, the White House counsel, and told
him that whatever the current mipleasant implications of the Water-
gate were that to implicate the Agency would not serve the President,
would enormously increase the risk to the President. I had a long
association with the President, and was desirous as anyone of protect-
ing him. I did not believe that a letter from the Agency asking the
FBI to lay off this investigation on the spurious grounds that it would
uncover covert operations would serve the President.
Such a letter in the current atmosphere of Washington would
become known and could be frankly electorally mortal. I said quite
frankly, I would write such a letter only on direction from the Presi-
dent and only after explaining to him how dangerous I thought his
action would be to him, and if I were really pushed on this matter
I would be prepared to resign. Mr. Gray thanked me for my frankness.
He said he could not suppress this investigation within the FBI. He
had told Mr. Kleindienst this, he had told Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr.
Haldeman that he would prefer to resign, but that his resignation
would raise many questions. It would be detrimental to the President's
interest. He did not see why he or I should jeopardize the integrity
of our organization to protect some middle-level White House figure
who had acted imprudently. He was prepared to let this go to Ehrlich-
man, to Haldeman, or to Mitchell. He felt it was important that the
President should be protected from his would-be protectors. He had
explained to Dean as well as to Haldeman and Ehrlichman; he had
explained this.
Finally, I said that if I were directed to write a letter to him saying
the future investigation of this case would jeopardize the security of
the United States in covert operations of the Agency I would ask to
see the President and explain to him the disservice I thought this
would do to his interest. The potential danger to the President of such
a course far outweighed any protective aspects it might have for other
figures in the White House and I was quite prepared to resign on this
issue. Mr. Gray said this was a very awkward matter for this to come
up at the outset of our tenure, he looked forward to good relations
between our two agencies, thanked me for my frankness and that
was it.
Mr. Dash. I would like to show you a copy we have of your memo-
randum of July 6, covering your meeting on July 6 and ask you if this
appears to be a ^jorrect copy.
General Walters. Yes ; it does.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, may we have this exhibit marked and
received in evidence.
Senator Ervin. This memorandum was previously marked as ex-
hibit No. 97* and is already part of the record.
♦See Book 7, p. 2913.
3415
Mr. Dash. Did there come a time, several days after, that you met
with Mr. Gray again, Acting Director Patrick Gray ?
General Walters. Yes ; I did.
Mr. Dash. Could you tell us the purpose of that meeting and what
was discussed at that time ?
General Walters. We had been passing
Mr. Dash. In other words, when was this ?
General Walters. It was on July 12, Mr. Dash. In the meantime,
the CIA had been cooperating fully with the FBI investigation, pass-
ing them all the material we had on these former employees of ours
and any other matters that were of interest to them. We were continu-
ously passing them memorandums, and I believe that on this day I
was still Acting Director, Mr. Helms was in Australia or on his way
back from Australia, and as I recall it, I gave him another memoran-
dum on this date covering various things that liad been brought out
that we had given Hunt, concerning the assistance given to Hunt,
which had been terminated in August 1971.
Mr. Dash. Now, during this meeting with Mr. Gray, did Mr. Gray
tell you that he had received a call from the President ?
General Walters. Yes ; he did.
Mr. Dash. Could you read that part of your memorandum where he
discussed that call ?
General Walters. He said : "Last Friday" — I believe that mav have
been the day of my previous conversation with him. I do not have a
calendar in front of me. This was written on the 12th. It was the pre-
ceding Friday. He had received a phone call from the President.
The President had called up to congratulate him on the FBI action which
had frustrated the airplane hijacking in San Francisco. Toward the end of the
conversation the President asked him if he had talked to me about the case.
Gray replied that he had. The President then asked him what his recommenda-
tion was in this case. Gray had replied that the case could not be covered up
and it would lead quite high and he felt the President should get rid of the
people that were involved. Any attempt to involve the FBI or the OIA in this
case would almost prove a mortal wound.
Then I put in brackets : He used my words because these were the
words I had used in talking with Mr. Gray.
The President then said:
Then, I should get rid of the people that were involved no matter how high?
Gray replied that was his recommendation. The President then asked what I
thought and Gray said my views were the same as his. The President took it
well and thanked Gray.
In all fairness I must say that Mr. Gray did tell me — I did not put
it in here that the President had told him to go ahead with his
investigation.
Do you wish me to go on reading?
Mr. Dash. Does that complete Mr. Gray's statement to you con-
cerning his call from the President?
General Walters. Yes, it did. We again philosophized some more
as is shown in the memorandum concerning the need for the President
to be protected from his would-be protectors.
]\Ir. Dash. I would like to show you your memorandum of July 13,
which deals with this meeting witb former Acting FBI Director L.
Patrick Gray and ask if this is a correct copy?
General Walters. Yes, it is.
341'6
Mr. Dash, Mr, Chairman, may we have this memorandum marked
as an exhibit and received in evidence?
Senator Ervin. This memorandum will be marked appropriately
as an exhibit and received in evidence as such,
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No, 133.*]
Mr. Dash, Did you have occasion on July 28, 1972, to call on Mr.
Gray again?
General Walters. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. And could you tell us briefly what the purpose of that
visit was?
General Walters. Briefly, I came down to give him additional in-
formation for which he had asked relating to one of our people who
had been in contact with Mr. Hunt during August 1971. I gave him
additional data concerning this and concerning contacts with Mr,
Hunt. I believe they are identified in the memorandum.
Toward the end of the conversation Gray asked me, and I am here
reading, if the President had called me on this matter and I said that
he had not.
"Gray then said that a lot of pressure had been brought on him in
this matter but he had not yielded."
I cannot read mine
Mr. Dash. There it is a fairly
General Walters. Mine is very poor reading here. Anyway, any-
thing to destroy the integrity of our two agencies would be the worst
disservice we could do to the President and I would not do it. He said
he would not either, but he made some reference to money which was
not totally clear to me.
I then told him we would terminate a phone which we had which
had been a number which had been given to Hunt to contact us 2 or 3
years before and he then said, "This is a hell of a thing to happen to
us at the outset of our tenure with our respective offices," and I very
heartily agreed.
Mr. Dash. Did you know what this reference to Mr. Hunt and any
assistance that had been given Mr. Hunt from the CIA was all about ?
General Walters. As you know, Mr. Dash, all this occurred II/2
yeare before I came to the Agency. I really was not familiar with it.
The Agency was continually passing to the FBI material that was
uncovered concerning this contact or assistance to Mr. Hunt, I believe.
One of the memorandums I took to Mr. Gray really summed up a
whole series of shorter memorandums we had sent him and this was
just an ongoing process.
After this date, July 28, 1 no longer participated in this process. It
was done directly through our liaison to the FBI, through Mr. Colby.
Mr. Dash. I take it, the memorandum and the references to the
contacts with Mr, Hinit related back to the prior year, July 1971
General Walters [interrupting]. Yes, they did.
Mr. Dash [continuing]. Meeting that General Cushman had with
Mr. Hunt.
General Walters. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. I would like to show you a coDy we haA^e of vour memo-
randum dated Julv 28, covering your meeting with Mr. Gray on that
same day and ask if it is a correct copy. And you will notice there are
*See p. 3821.
3417
some excisions there of names that were excised because of national
security reasons.
General Walters. Yes. It is as bad a Xerox copy as mine.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Chairman, may that memorandum be appropriately marked
and received in evidence ?
Senator Ervin. The memorandum will be appropriately numbered as
an exhibit and received in evidence as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 134.*]
Mr. Dash. Wlien was your next contact with anybody at the White
House, General Walters? Was this your last series of meetings? I
think you said from there on in the contacts with the CIA and FBI
were taken up by somebody else.
General Walters. Yes. On this matter, certainly. Obviously, in my
job, I attend the meetings at the Wliite House relating to foreign pol-
icy, and so forth, that had nothing to do with this in the meantime.
Mr. Dash. Did there come a time sometime later, when you had
another meeting or call from Mr. John Dean ?
General Walters. I did not have a call from Mr. John Dean. I think
Mr. John Dean had gotten my message loud and clear. The next time
he had business with the Agency he did not call me. He called the new
Director, Dr. Sohlesinger. I believe that was on February 9, 1973, if I
am correct. And Dr. Schlesinger has, I believe, submitted a memoran-
dum for the record, covering this call from Mr. Dean. I was not in
Dr. Schlesinger's office when Mr. Dean called and my only knowledge
of this is the memorandum and what Dr. Schlesinger told me about
Gray's — about Dean's call.
Mr, Dash. And do you have a copy of that memorandum from
General Walters. Dr. Schlesinger's memorandum ?
Mr, Dash, Yes,
General Walters, Yes, I do.
Mr. Dash. Can I show you a copy of a February 9, 1973, memoran-
dum, which I think you are referring to, and ask you if this is a correct
copy.
General Walters. Yes, it is, and it, too, was made on the same poor
copy.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 135.**]
Mr. Dash. Yes. Could you briefly tell us what was the nature of that
contact that Mr. Dean had with Mr. Schlesinger?
General Walters. I believe — and here I go to the memorandum —
He adverted to a package of material that had been sent —
By the CIA—
to the Department of Justice in connection with the "Watergate investigation. He
suggested that Justice be requested to return this package to the Agency. The
only item that would be left in Justice would be a card in the files indicating that
the package had been returned to the Agency —
At its request —
since the material in the package was no longer needed for the purposes of the
investigation. He indicated that the Agency had originally provided these mate-
*See p. 3823.
♦♦See p. 3825.
3418
rials to the Department of Justice at ttie request of tlie Attorney General and
Mr. Howard Petersen.
Then he referred to some ITT matters, which is unrelated.
Mr. Dash. Although this was not your memorandum, do you know
what the package of materials was referred to here that the Agency
had given to Mr. Petersen ?
General Walters. I don't have personal knowledge of it, Mr. Dash,
but my understanding is that it was all of the written material and I
believe also the photographs that were taken by the camera which was
why it was called a package.
Mr. Dash. Under what circumstances were pictures taken with a
camera ?
General Walters. I believe when it was furnished, after it was
furnished to Hunt by whoever used the camera at that time.
Mr. Dash. Were you informed by Mr. Schlesinger or others that this
dealt with the Ellsberg matter ?
General Walters. I don't believe Mr. Schlesinger was familiar with
the package. Mr. Schlesinger just — incidentally, I would like to say at
this point when Mr. Schlesinger came to the Agency in late January
or early February I did briefly go over these various approaches that
had been made to the Agency and to myself so that he was generally
familiar with the background of this. I do not believe Mr. Schlesinger
knew the details. I do believe that he and I agreed that for the Agency
to request the Department of Justice to return these materials would
simply leave an arrow in the file pointing at Langley.
Mr. Dash. Either at that time or afterward, have you been informed
as to what package of materials, which you saw, were either written
materials and photographs, did deal with the attempt to get infoi-ma-
tion from Mr. Ellsberg's psychoanalyst ?
General Walters. I really do not know, Mr. Dash. As far as I under-
stand it, I understood the package to mean all of the material that the
Agency had passed to the Department of Justice from the beginning of
the inquiry and all of the material, all of the assistance, all of the
equipment that had been given to Hunt.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Now, were you asked by Mr. Schlesinger to take any action with
regard to Mr. Dean's request ?
General Walters. Dr. Schlesinger discussed this and agreed the
request was out of the question. Dr. Schlesinger then asked me to do —
to go down and tell Mr. Dean this.
Mr. Dash. And you did ?
General Walters. I did.
Mr. Dash. Could you tell us, when did you meet with Mr. Dean and
have this discussion ?
General Walters. When I called Mr. Dean he was in Florida and
it took me quite a while to get hold of him. I left word at his office
saying I wished to be in touch with him and T finally got a call. An
appointment was made on, I believe, for February 21. On February
21, and this is a very short memorandum — if the committee will bear
with me I would like to read it.
Mr. Dash. Why don't you read the memorandum ?
General Walters [reading] :
At the request of the Director, Dr. Schlesinger, I called on Mr. John Dean at
his office in the White House at 1430 —
3419
That is 2 r30 in the afternoon.
I explained to him that, in connection with his request that the Agency ask the
Department of Justice to return a package of material that had been sent to
them in connection with the Watergate investigation, it was quite impossible
for us to request the return of this as this would simply mean that a note would
be left in the Department of Justice files that the material had been sent back
to the Agency, and we had been asked not to destroy any material in any way
related to this case. I again told him there was no Agency involvement in this
case and that any attempt to involve the Agency in it could only be harmful to
the United States. He seemed disappointed. I then left.
Mr. Dash. I would like to show you a copy we have of your May 11
memorandum and ask if this is a correct copy.
General Walters. May I say one more word about the memoran-
dum?
Mr. Dash. Of course.
General Walters. I did not write a memorandum on this conversa-
tion. In early May, Dr. Schlesinger, who was having a thorough in-
quiry made into all the aspects of this case, asked me whether I had
made a memorandum on it. I said I had not. He asked me to make one
and that is the memorandum I wrote which was written some 2 months
subsequently.
Mr. Dash. May I show you your copy of the memorandum that you
prepared on ISIay 11, 1973 and ask you if it is a correct copy?
General Walters. It is.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, may we have that memorandum marked
and received in evidence ?
Senator Ervin. The memorandum will be appropriately marked as
an exhibit and received in evidence as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 136.*]
Mr. Dash. Did there come a time shortly after you prepared that
memorandum when you put all of the recollections you had concerning
your meetings with the White House and with former Acting Director
Gray in the form of an affidavit ?
General Walters. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Would you tell us the circumstances that led you to put
your recollections of these meetings and discussions you had in the
form of an affidavit ?
General Walters. I was in the Far East in early Mav and when I
came back Dr. Schlesinger — in fact. Dr. Schlesinger called me back.
He had asked anyone in the Agency who had had any connection with
this case whatsoever to write an affidavit. I did so and those are the
circumstances of the writing of the affidavit.
Mr. Dash. And that affidavit does include in substance all of the
matters that you have testified to here concerning your meetings with
the "Wliite House and with ISIr. Gray ?
General Walters. To the best of my knowledge, it does.
Mr. Dash. I show you a copy that we have of the affidavit dated
Mav 12, 1973. and ask vou if it is a correct copy ?
General Walters. Yes. It is a correct copy.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, may we have that affidavit appropriately
marked for identification and admitted in evidence ?
Senator Ervhst. It is so ordered.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 137.**]
♦See p. 3827.
♦*See p. 3828.
3420
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Walters, as I imderstand it, it was your feeling and is your
feeling that on June 23 you were being asked to deliver a message
which would in effect limit the Watergate investigation with regard
to the JNIexican part of it because of the possibility of either compromis-
ing some covert CIA activities or CIA employees, is that correct?
General Walters. Yes, it is.
Mr. Thompson. It seems to me that the crucial question is whether
or not you were being told to deliver a message to limit the investiga-
tion in any other respect. Were you or were you not ?
General Walters. I was not, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. All right. As of June 23 did you know the names
of the people who had been apprehended inside the Democratic Na-
tional Committee headquarters ?
General Walters. I had read the names in the newspapers, yes.
Mr. Thompson. Did you realize that Mr. McCord, for example, was
a former CIA employee ?
General Walters. I believe I did know this, yes.
Mr. Thompson. Did you know Mr. McCord pereonally?
General Walters. I did not.
Mr. Thompson. Did you realize that Mr. Hunt was a former CIA
employee ?
General Walters. Yes, I did.
Mr. Thompson. Did you realize Mr. Sturgis was ?
[General Walters nods in affirmative.]
Mr. Thompson. Did you realize that Mr. Martinez was still on re-
tainer by the CIA ?
General Walters. I don't believe that he was still on retainer at
that time.
Mr. Thompson. Did you know he had been on retainer or an
employee at any previous time ?
General Walters. I believe it came out within discussions within
the Agency that these men had previously been employed by the
Agency.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Did you realize that Mr. Barker had
been a CIA employee in the past ?
General Walters. I believe I knew that all of these men that you
have mentioned were.
Mr. Thompson. With regard to the Mexican aspects, if I remember
correctly, certain checks, allegedly at this point, were funneled through
Mexican banks and they wound up in the bank account of Mr. Barker
in Miami. Have you since understood that to be the case?
General Walters. I since have understood it, but at the time I was
not aware of what the Mexican investigation was about.
Mr. Thompson. I see. But you now realize, at least accordinjr to the
best of vour information, that there were checks which I think in-
volved Mr. Ogarrio, whose name has been mentioned, which were
funneled through a Mexican account to the bank account of Mr. Barker
in Miami, and that some of tho«e funds from that aofonnt, I bolieve,
were taken from some of the defendants apprehended in the DNC. Is
that correct ?
3421
General Walters. I am aware of this in general but I do not know
the details.
Mr. Thompson. All right. But you were not aware of that at your
meeting on June 23 ?
General Walters. No, I was not.
Mr. Thompson. With regard to your memorandum of June 28,
which recounts your meeting on June 23, and I believe you stated since
writing that memorandum, in a covering note submitted to the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee, dated May 18, that although there is
a reference in your memorandum of June 28 that Mr. Haldeman said
it Avas the President's wish that this be done, that you now believe that
he did not in fact say that. Is that
General Walters. When I showed the memorandum to Mr. Helms
he said it was not his recollection that the President's name had been
used. I did not correct the memorandum. The memorandum was for
my own personal use and I did not use it. I did not feel strongly one
way or the other about this. I am not sure whether Mr. Haldeman has
testified to whether he used it or not.
Mr. Thompson. I am scanning your covering note dated May 18.
It is my understanding that as of the time you wrote the note that if
you had to come down on one side or the other as of that time it was
your belief that he did not in fact say this. Is that a correct statement ?
General Walters. I think that would probably be correct.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Then the memorandum
General Walters. If I may just for a second, Mr. Thompson, as I
say, I don't have a strong recollection one way or another. We were
in Haldeman's office. Presumably his power derived from this. Mr.
Helms said he didn't recollect it. I didn't recollect it strongly enough
to challenge Mr. Helms. I accepted Mr. Helms saying: "No, he did not
remember it."
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Haldeman has testified that this matter was
discussed with the President.
General Walters. That is right.
Mr. Thompson. It is not really an issue. It is really a matter of
memory.
General Walters. And I did not feel strongly enough to challenge
Mr. Helms' statement that he did not recall the name.
Mr. Thompson. All right. According to your testimony this morning,
do you believe also that a discussion of bail occurred on Tuesday?
General Walters. Tuesday the 27th ?
Mr. Thompson. Tuesday the 27th ?
General Walters. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. I believe you have it here in your conversation of
the 26th. Is that correct?
General Walters, That is right.
Mr. Thompson. So that would be an error in this regard.
General Walters. I had straightened it out in my affidavit.
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir; I understand.
Let me ask you this. When you had this conversation on the 23d,
what time of day was it ?
General Walters. I believe it was 1 :30 in the afternoon.
Mr. Thompson. 1 :30 p.m. ?
3422
General Walters. It was postponed. I recall it was postponed either
an hour or a half-hour.
Mr. Thompson. Then you had your meeting later that same after-
noon with Mr. Gray.
'General Walters. About an hour later.
Mr. Thompson. At 2 :30 p.m., I believe, according to your memoran-
dum. Do you recall about how long your meeting lasted with Haldeman
and Ehrlichman ?
General Walters. Ten, 15 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Did you go directly from your meeting with Halde-
man and Ehrlichman to your meeting with Mr. Gray?
General Walters. I think I have testified already, Mr. Thompson, I
don't really remember what I did. I don't think I would have had
time to go back to the office. I know I separated from Mr. Helms at
this point and he went back to the office.
Mr. Thompson. Where is the CIA office ?
General Walters. It is way out at Langley. It is 8 or 9 miles out of
Washington.
Mr. Thompson. You would have had to go out 8 or 9 miles and
travel back 8 or 9 miles to the Justice Department ?
General Walters. Yes. As I recall it, I just killed time in downtown
Washington.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Your memorandum stated :
On leaving the White House I diseussed the matter briefly with the Director.
Upon returning to the office I called Oray and indicated it was a matter of some
urgency and he agreed to see me at 2 :30 p.m.
So that evidently was incorrect. Would that be
General Walters. I would say it is perhaps incorrect. I can't guar-
antee it is incorrect. I may have driven straight out and called from the
office and driven straight back.
Mr. Thompson. All right, sir.
What was your normal practice with regard to following up meet-
ings or particular events which you participated in with memoran-
dums ?
General Walters. ^Yhen I was an interpreter I wrote long memo-
randums, Mr. Thompson. Since I was at CIA generally there would be
someone else who makes notes of meetings. These were the only memo-
randums I think I wrote since I have been with the CIA.
Mr. Thompson. These you submitted to us are the only ones you have
Avritten since you have been there ?
General Walters. That is right. ^
Mr. Thompson. I notice that the memorandums of the June 28 meet-
ing was not written until June 28, is that correct ?
General Walters. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. But when you started writing memorandums they
became very prompt, I noticed. First of all, the June 28 meeting you
wrote up June 29. July 5 meeting you wrote the same day. July 6
meeting you wrote the same day. July 12 meeting you wrote the next
day, the l-3th. The July 28 meeting you wrote the same day. Wliat
caused you to start systematically writing memorandums of the events
that were taking place?
3423
General Walters. Mr. Dean's exploration of whether the Agency
could produce bail and pay the salaries of defendants while they were
in jail.
Mr. Thompson. Reference in your memorandum dated July 6, 1972,
you did not see why he, referring to Gray, "or I should jeopardize the
integrity of our organizations to protect some middle-level AVliite
House figures who had acted imprudently." To whom were you
referring ?
General Walters. I do not think we had anybody specific in mind. I
certainly did not know who might be behind this.
Mr. Thompson. Who were you dealing with that you might consider
middle level at the White House ?
General Walters. Middle-level figures, I would say would be Mr.
Dean. But there may have been other middle-level figures, I did not
know who these middle-level figures might be. I did not know who
would be behind this.
Mr. Thompson. Would you consider Haldeman middle level ?
General Walters. No.
Mr. Thompson. What was your feeling with regard to Mr. Dean
when you were dealing with him, when you were talking about these
matters with him ?
General Thompson. At which point in the conversation, Mr.
Thompson ?
Mr. Thompson. Well, start from the beginning, start with the first
meeting you had with him on the 26th and tell us what your thoughts
were based upon those conversations as you began to meet with him ;
what his interests might be.
General Walters. Well, I first of all was struck by his insistence
that the Agency was in some way involved. He pursued this, it could
not have been without your knowing it, is not there some way, it must
have been, look, all these people used to work for the CIA, and so forth
and so on. This is the first thing that struck me was liis insistence of
trying to draw us into it, which made me think he was exploring this
option, which is what made me tell him that I would resign rather
than have the Agencv participate in any attempt to stifle this.
Mr. Thompson. Did you conclude in your own mind that possibly
some of the people directlv involved might be working for some of
Mr. Dean's friends who had intermediaries ?
General Walters. This thought did cross my mind.
Mr. Thompson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montota. General Walters, you indicated that you, and
other witnesses have similarlv indicated, that certain memorandums
with respect to the investi^-ation in-house at the CIA was given to the
FBI. am T correct in that statement?
General Walters. Yps. Senator.
Senator Montoya. Would you tell us what was in that particular
memorandum or in anv other communications to the FBI?
General Walters. T believe that most of these memorandums. Sena-
tor, referred to matters that had occurred before I came to work at
3424
the Agency. There are, I believe, several memorandums in the pos
session — the memorandum, for instance, which I gave Mr. Gray on the
6th contains a recapitulation of the various pieces of information we
had been steadily sending to the FBI, I believe, since June 20.
Senator Montoya. In capsule form, what did this memorandum
indicate ?
General Walters. I believe it indicated Hunt's call at the Agency,
the equipment that had been furnished to him, and so forth.
Senator Montoya. "V^-liat kind of an investigation did you conduct
in-house after you were called to the "\Annte House for this conference
with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman ?
General Walters. I talked to the people in the Agency who were
responsible for operations in Mexico, and it was through them that I
received the assurance that the FBI inquiries in Mexico would not
jeopardize or compromise any of the CIA's operations in that area.
Senator Montoya. "\'\niat kind of investigation did you conduct with
respect to the possible background and possible connection of the
defendants who had been arrested at the Watergate ?
General Walters. I believe that Mr. Helms ordered the — ^our secu-
rity and personnel people to provide all necessary information to the
Department of Justice and the FBI — I am sorry, to the FBI on this.
Senator Montoya. And did you, as a result of this investigation,
uncover the fact that Eugenio Martinez was on retainer at that time?
General Walters. I believe we did, Senator.
Senator Montoya. Did you communicate this to the Department of
Justice and to people in the White House ?
General Walters. I pei-sonally did not. A great deal of communi-
cation was going on. Senator, between our personnel and security
people and the Department of Justice and the FBI. Whether it was
communicated to the "\Aniite House or not, I am not in a position to
answer.
Senator Montoya. Were there any communications with respect to
this investigation delivered to the Wiite House?
General Walters. I am not aware of any. Senator.
Senator Montoya. Wliy did you omit this in view of the fact that
you had been in contact with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, and
Mr. Dean? Did you not feel that the White House should know about
the possible involvement of a man on retainer to the CIA by the name
of Eugenio Martinez ?
General Walters. I believe the FBI was being kept fully informed
and I believe the FBI would keep the White House fully informed of
the pursuit of this investigation.
Senator Montoya. I am not tidying to cross you up or anything like
that, General Walters, I am merely asking you to see if you can recall
whether or not anyone in the CIA communicated with anyone in the
"Wliite House with respect to the in-house investigation and what you
uncovered with respect to these individuals.
General Walters. I pereonally have no knowledge of any such com-
munications, Senator. The FBI was tlie investigating body and, as I
imderstand it, all of the information which became available to us was
furnished to them.
Senator Montoya. With respect to your conversations with Mr,
Gray, was there any mention made in your conversations with him
3425
that possibly the information which you were imparting to him might
be communicated to the "White House ?
General Walters. No, sir, I do not believe — I thought it would be
inappropriate for me to try to tell Mr. Gray how to run his Agency.
Senator Montoya. Now, as you look back to the conversations start-
ing on June 23 and the subsequent conversations with "WTiite House
people, including Mr. Dean, is it your feeling, as you look at this thing
in retrospect, that the "WTiite House, those individuals with whom you
talked were trying to use you for some ulterior motive ?
General Walters. I would say I must draw a distinction between
the two contacts I had with two different people in the "\^niite House.
As I have testified earlier, I had no reason to doubt that Mr. Halde-
man might not have information to which I was not privy that the
further conduct of the investigation in Mexico might jeopardize covert
Agency activities.
Senator Montoya. Are you being charitable there, General?
General Walters. Senator, I do not believe so. As I testified earlier,
if I had thought that Mr. Haldeman was asking me to do something
that was improper I would have made the same threat to resign to
him that I did to Mr. Dean the first time Mr. Dean made a suggestion
I considered improper.
Senator Montoya. How did you interpret the mandate which he
gave you to go to Mr. Gray and to tell Mr. Gray when he had no
information, for you to tell Mr. Gray that an FBI investigation in
Mexico might endanger CIA activities ?
General Walters. I interpreted this as meaning that Mr. Haldeman
had some information which I did not have. I would like to go back
to this time and say that the idea of impropriety or improper action,
I had no reason to doubt the word of a very senior official of the U.S.
Government.
Senator Montoya. Did you think at that moment about asking him
what his background information might be as a premise for the direc-
tive or mandate which he had given you ?
General Walters. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Montoya. Had you thought about it since ?
General Walters. Obviously, there is no sight like hindsight but
given the relative nature of our positions, I still have somewhat of a
feeling it might have been inappropriate to ask him. The "\^Tiite
House bears a great responsibility, they have to do things other people
do not.
Senator Montoya. Why would it have been inappropriate, General,
why?
General Walters. Sir, if in all our dealings with the White House
we doubted what they told us we would have a very difficult time.
I did not feel it was appropriate to ask it because I did not think there
was anything improper in it.
Senator Montoya. Well, on June 23 you had been reading the news-
papers ; you knew that some of these people were involved with the
Committee To Ke-Elect the President and that they had been arrested
and had been in jail, and that they had connections, previous connec-
tions, with CIA. You knew the whole context and, still you did not
think of asking for some kind of clarification with respect to the man-
date which had been delivered to you by Mr. Haldeman ?
3426
General Walters. Sir, Mr. Haldeman indicated to me that he might
have information which I did not have. What I would really have
been asking him is White House sources ; how he had found something
out, had I asked him where he got this information from.
Senator Montoya. Did you in your conference with Mr. Gray try to
develop a dialog with respect to possible reasons that the White House
might have in giving you this directive ?
General Walters. No, sir. I transmitted the message to Mr. Gray.
He made some reference to some people whose names meant nothing to
me, like Ogarrio and Dahlberg.
Senator Montoya. General Walters, in view of the experience of
CIA in this particular matter and the attempts made by some people
at the White House to involve CIA in tasks which were ultravires or
outside of the scope of the Agency, what recommendations do you have
to make to this committee so that this might not occur in the future ?
General Walters. Senator, I think it would really be presumptuous
of me to try to tell this committee what legislation could be effective
in this respect. I must, however, associate myself with what Mr. Helms
said in reply to your question yesterday. Senator, that I do not know
how you legislate honesty and decencv, you^iave got to pick the right
people for these jobs above all else. There was obviously some legisla-
tion that could be effective but I think the most important thing is
the selection of the right people for positions of trust.
Senator Montoya. Well, do you feel that there should be some pro-
vision in the law governing CIA requiring the Director or Deputy
Director or any other employee to report to an oversight committee
in the Congress when someone in the executive department or any other
department tries to use CIA for political purposes ?
General Walters. That could be one solution to prevent a recurrence.
Senator, yes.
Senator Montoya. Thank you very much, General, those are all the
questions I have.
Senator Ervin. There is a vote on in the Senate so we will have to
suspend until the members of the committee can get over and vote and
return.
[Recess.]
'Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
I am informed by counsel that Senator Montoya had finished except
he wanted to have read into the record a memorandum, and without
objection I will let counsel read that memorandum and then recognize
Senator Weicker.
Mr. Dash. General Walters, I understand Senator Montoya had
asked you about when the CIA informed the FBI concerning the em-
ployment of Mr, Martinez, and I understand you have been shown a
copy of a memorandum for the Acting Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, attention Mr. Arnold L. Parnham, subject Mr. Mar-
tinez, from the Director of Security.
General Walters. Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Dash. Yes. I would like to read that into the record which would
indicate, and it was dated June 20, 1972 :
Mr. Martinez was bom on July 8, 1922.
3427
It is a bad Xerox but it looks like Artemi and I think it is —
SA, Pina Del Rio, Cuba, and he is a naturalized United States citizen. He was
educated at the University of Havana and he has a BS degree. He also had two
years additional worli in the school of medicine. Previously married to a Cuban
from whom he is divorced. Mr. Martinez is currently married to a United States
citizen. Mr. Martinez was recruited by the agency in January 1961 in connection
with Cuban operations. The project to which he was assigned was terminated in
1969. Since that time Mr. Martinez has been on a part-time retainer to report on
the Cuban exile community. In connection with this activity he was last met on
June 6, 1972, and has been unable to be contacted since June 14, 1972. For these
part-time activities Mr. Martinez has received a retainer of $100 per month since
1969. Prior to that time he received $8,100 per year for his full time opera-
tional activity. It is to be noted that Mr. Martinez is a real estate partner of Mr.
Bernard L. Barker.
The above information is for use only and should not be disseminatetl outside
your bureau. Please transmit any informaton on this matter to the attention of
the Director of Security.
You have seen that memorandum just prior to your returning to
testify.
General Walters. Yes ; and I think in part it answers one of the
questions Senator Montoya asked me.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Could I ask counsel because I am quite interested
in that. Now either counsel or General Walters, when was this informa-
tion acquired and was it transmitted to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ?
General Walters. I believe there is a letter transmitting it to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation on June 20, 1972, that is 3 days after
the break-in. Senator.
Senator Weicker. Fine, I am not disputing it. As a matter of fact,
one of the questions I had in the back of my mind is what did the CIA
do insofar as these persons were concerned, and I would gather that
you went right to work in investigating the status of these various
people and that is what — June 20, is that the date on this, yes, June 20,
1972, that is within what, 3 days of the break-in, the CIA had com-
pleted — ^had all the other individuals also been investigated by that
time ?
General Walters. I don't believe the investigation — I think it was
an ongoing project, Senator. I believe I testified earlier that starting
on June 20 we began feeding to the FBI as fast as we acquired it, any
information on any of the defendants and anybody in any way con-
nected with this matter.
Senator Weicker. I think it is a very important point, as far as the
Agency is concerned, that it did its job and did it pretty darned fast so
that insofar as those persons that had been ex — with the exception of
Mr. Martinez everybody else was an ex-CIA agent, I am not saying
they all were but they were not in the employ of the CIA; is that
correct ?
General Walters. That is, Senator, if I may make a minor distinc-
tion, only two of them. Hunt and McCord had ever been CIA full-time
employees. The others were contract employees for a short duration
or a longer duration.
Senator Weicker. You and I could make that distinction, I think
in the minds of the American public, contracts or full time really
wouldn't make any difference.
3428
General Walters. I agree.
Senator Weicker. But in any event the rest of the personnel, with
the exception of Mr. Martinez, had left the CIA, were no longer in
the employ of the CIA at the time of the break-in except for Mr.
Martinez.
General Walters. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. Who was on a retainer, contract, or whichever
term you want to go ahead and use.
And yet I gather your investigation still did include, since they had
been ex-employees, either full time or contract, these other individuals,
is that true ?
General Walters. As I understood it, Mr. Helms directed our per-
sonnel and security people to communicate all information available
on these people to the FBI.
Senator Weicker. And by the time the 20th rolls around, the one
person who was on a part-time basis, even a report on him had been
sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
General Walters. I believe the Agency made a very genuine effort
to cooperate with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
Senator Weicker. So that it was with some basis of fact, arrived at
after investigation, that when Mr. Helms talked to the Director on the
22d and said that there is no CIA involvement he just wasn't pulling
something out of the air. I mean he had some facts before him ; isn't
that correct ?
General Walters. With my experience with Mr. Helms, he never
pulls things out of the air, Senator.
Senator Weicker. Right,
When you walked in on the 23d and with the Director you were
cognizant of these investigations, that they had been going on ?
General Walters. I had not seen this particular memorandum. I
knew that these people had been former CIA employees and I knew
that we were furnishing all available information on them to the
Department of Justice.
Senator Weicker. Again, I want to repeat the importance, I think,
of what is being stated here because in the impressions that we give are
equally important to the facts that this committee elicits, that I think
there might have been an impression left that in the meeting of the
23d when you and the Director sit down with Mr. Haldeman and
Mr. Ehrlichman and state that there is no CIA involvement that this,
as I say, just wasn't something that you were saying categorically
without knowledge that the Agency itself had gone into this matter
in the pre\aous days.
General Walters. I believe Mr. Helms was talking on the basis of
what he knew on that dav, on the 23d and the result of all of these
which were communicated to him.
Senator Weicker. Have vou ever counted up, incidentallv, I thought
about this when vou were testifying between you and the Director how
many times in this period did you say there is no CIA involvement
to various individuals ? Have you coimted it up ?
General Walters. Couldn't possiblv count it, Senator. As Mr. Helms
stated yesterday with some warmth it needs constant repeating.
3429
Senator Weicker. Well, I think it does need constant repeating.
We know that the Director turned to Acting Director Gray and said,
there is no CIA involvement on the 22d and I gather in the meeting
on the 23d it was made clear again, both by yourself and the Director
to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, there is no CIA involvement.
Now, I gather when you met with Mr. Dean you were very forceful,
as I would imagine, saying it in a variety of ways, there is no CIA
involvement.
Now, let me— I gather that tlie final chapter is. there is no CIA
involvement being transmitted — and this is only as to the knowledge
that you acquired from Mr. Gray and we will have Mr. Gray before
us later on — ^to the President actually, is that correct ?
General Walteks. Sir, I did not have any personal contact with the
President.
Senator Weicker. No, I am saying in your recollection of the con-
versation, of your conversation, with Mr. Gray where he reported to
you.
General Walters. Yes.
Senator Weicker. Where he reported to you.
General Walters. Yes, I could only assume that he had told that to
the President.
Senator Weicker. Let's go to June 23 in your memorandum because
I do have some questions as to statements made in there.
The first part there where you described the beginning of the
meeting —
On June 23 at 1 o'clock on request I called with Director Helms on John
Ehrlichman and Robert Haldeman in Ehrlichman's oflBice at the White House.
Haldeman said the "bugging" affair at the Democratic National Committee
headquarters at the Watergate apartments had made a lot of noise and the
Democrats were trying to maximize it. The FBI had been called in and was
investigating the matter. The investigation was leading to a lot of important
people and this could get worse. He asked what the connection with the Agency
was and Director Helms repe^ated that there was none. Haldeman said the whole
affair was getting embarrassing and it was the President's wish that Walters
call on Acting Director L. Patrick Gray and suggest to him that since the five
suspects had been arrested this should be .suflacient and it was not advantageous
to have the inquiry pu.shed especially in Mexico, et cetera.
Now, my question to you is right at that point, don't you consider
this to be a rather strange conversation for CIA officials to be involved
in ? I mean with the exception of about one sentence he asked what the
connection of the Agency was, and the Director repeated there was
none, all the rest of those three paragraphs deal with a political situa-
tion here in the United States and has nothing to do with the CIA.
I mean didn't it occur to you at that time that this was a rather strange
conversation for you to be involved in? It sounds more to me like a
meeting of the Republican National Committee than a meeting of the
CIA.
Did this occur to you that this is a rather strange subject for us to be
sitting around and talldng about ?
General Walters. In my mind there was a distinction between the
Agency being involved in the sense of having had any participation
in the operation against the Democratic National Committee. What I
understood Mr. Haldeman to be referring to was CIA activities out-
side the United States.
«fi_2fifi O — 7S — nt. ft-
3430
Senator Weicker. I know, but that is not the context of these com-
ments. This is strictly — it is focusing on- — ^this is an embari-assing
political situation, the investigations leading to important people. Hal-
deman said the whole affair is getting embarrassing and it was the
President's wish that Walters call on Acting Director Patrick Gray
and suggest to him since the live suspects had been arrested, this should
be sufficient.
General Walters. I may not have been complete enough. As I stated
at the outset this is not the totality of what was said. He gave these
general considerations and then the concern he expressed was that the
FBI investigation in Mexico might jeopardize some assets or some
activity of the CIA. He was talking in a philosophical sense about
what had happened in the United States and then the other part that
I understood referred to the possibility of compromise of CIA assets
or personnel outside the United States.
Senator Weicker. All right. So you left the meeting and as Director
Helms said yesterday, and I would like to ask you whether you had
the same feeling, that he frankly was uneasy with — uneasy with
what — with the orders that had been given to you from Mr. Haldeman.
[General Walters nods in the affirmative.]
Senator Weicker. And that he stated yesterday — I am trying to
paraphrase his testimony — that he suggested to you that you might
call on Gray and indicate to him the normal arrangements as between
the FBI and the CIA and that was quite sufficient. Do you recall any
such conversation?
General Walters. I recall such a conversation but I do not recall it
as being quite as limiting as Mr. Helms mentioned yesterday. At no
time did he tell me I was not to deliver the message I had been given
to deliver. He did emphasize that I should remind Mr. Gray of this
agreement between the CIA and FBI not to interfere with one an-
other's operations.
Senator Weicker. So now you go to the Director, the Acting Di-
rector, and you state to him, I will read —
That the investigation south of the border would trespass on some of our covert
projects and in view of the fact that the five men involved were under arrest, it
would be best to taper off the matter there.
Now, General Walters, I am trying to phrase this as best I can
because I certainly believe you to be a man of integrity and I think
your career speaks for that. This wasn't really exactly — ^this concept
that you left with the Acting Director really wasn't the truth, was it?
General Walters. I had no way of knowing, sir. I presume Mr.
Haldeman had information that I did not have, that something in
this investigation would uncover assets of the CIA. I had been with
the CIA 6 weeks at this time. I did not know the details of its opera-
tions in Mexico. Mr. Haldeman was a very well informed man, close
to the top of the American structure of Government. I had no reason
to doubt him. I had no reason to doubt any of the senior people in
Government with whom I was talking at this stage of affairs.
Senator Weicker. All right. Then I may just ask you this question.
T^Hien you said this to INIr. Gray, did you say to Mr. Gray, Mr. Halde-
man has told me to tell you these facts, or did you deliver this to Mr.
Gray as if this were your own idea ?
3431
General Walters. I believe to the best of my recollection that I told
him I had come from tlie White House, that I had talked to some senior
people there and I then wrote this memorandum to him.
Senator Weicker. But as Mr. Gray sees you standing before him as
a representative, and Assistant Director of the CIA, would he have
every right to believe that this was the opinion of the CIA or that this
was coming from the "WHiite House ?
General Walters. I believe that he had the right to think that the
message that I gave to him, that this could jeopardize assets of the
CIA, was essentially correct.
Senator Weicker. And at what point in time did you disabuse Mr.
Gray of this concept that you had left with him on June 23 ?
General Walters. Directly, on July 6. However, on the next working
day — this was a Friday evening — on the INIonday I told Mr. Dean,
who I was informed was in charge of this whole matter, that there was
no Agency involvement, that this would not jeopardize any activities
of the Agency. As I stated earlier, perhaps naively. I believed that Mr.
Dean would tell him since they were obviously in contact with one
another. In retrospect I should certainly have called in Gray and told
him myself.
Senator Weicker. Now, do you — I want to get back to the basis of
tlie belief that Mr. Haldeman would know something about the opera-
tions of the CIA that you and the Director did not know. I find that
to be rather unusual. I am not saying that there are things in the "White
House in a broad general way in the way of policy that they wouldn't
know or that wouldn't be in your knowledge, would be in their's, but
as far as the actual operations of the CIA, is there an>i:hing that you
feel the Wiite House knows that you don't know? You and the
Director?
General Walters. We could know if we went into it, but there are
cases where the White House is sometimes for it, or something is done
for them — these foreign countries — by members of the CIA and it
would be awkward for me to go into details.
Senator Weicker. Without tlie knowledge of the CIA ?
General Walters. Well, I think if it is clearly evident that it is
coming from the "White House, at least at this time, without the
knowledge, it is difficult to say without the knowledge of the CIA. This
is why I felt someone in the CIA might know and wM^ I checked with
the geographic people.
Senatoi- Weicker. Now my last question is very simply this — is it
possible for Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman to give direction to
a CIA agent without the Director or the Assistant Director knowing
ofit?
General Walters. To give instructions, I don't believe so, sir.
Senator Er\t:x. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. General Walters, for how long and in what
capacity have you known President Nixon?
General Walters. I have known President Nixon, I believe. Senator,
since 1957. As I testified earlier, I served as his interpreter during a
trip he made through eight countries in South America.
Subsequently I saw him only on the anniversary of the stoning in
Caracas where the car was attacked by a mob. He used to give a
3432
party — during the time, his reigning years when he was Vice Presi-
dent, he used to give a party once a year, I went to that.
In the years between Mr. Nixon's departure from the White House
and his reelection as President I saw him perhaps three times in those
8 or 9 or whatever it was years.
After Mr. Nixon became President I accompanied him on two trips
around Europe. I saw him on an occasional basis. As I have testified
earlier, I have not seen Mr, Nixon privately to talk to since May 2,
1972, when he swore me in as Deputy Director of the Agency. I have
had one phone call with him in that time frame. He called me for some-
thing concerning his trip to Moscow. Nothing else was discussed.
Senator Talmadge, Would you say that your relationship was per-
sonal as well as professional ?
General Walters. I would say, yes. Senator, when you have shared
the kind of danger that I mentioned this morning there is a certain
element — but I would like to bring out that I have also served as inter-
preter to President Truman, to President Johnson, and to President
Eisenhower.
Senator Talmadge. We have had some testimony. General, before
the committee here that the White House was making efforts to make
all the agencies more responsive to the White House.
Would you say that your appointment as Deputy Director of the
CIA was an effort to make that Agency more responsive to the White
House ?
General Walters. I would say. Senator, that normally a President
appoints people. Presidential appointees, because he has confidence in
them. There has been some testimony that I have heard to the effect
that someone had said I was put in the Agency in order to influence
Agency policy. In all fairness I would like to say that with the single
exception of the events about which I am testifying today, no one in
the White House, the President or anyone else, has ever sought to in-
fluence Agency policy through me.
Senator Talmadge. I am told that you have a very outstanding
background for the position that you hold. Is it true you speak eight
different languages?
General Walters. Yes, Senator, it is.
'Senator Talmadge. I have been told that on one occasion when the
President was in France when you were there as military attache that
he made a 15-minute speech, you listened to it and repeated it verbatim
in French.
Is that correct?
General Walters. That is very flattering but I doubt if it was ver-
batim. Senator.
Senator Talmadge. I wondered if your memory was that
phenomenal.
Now, General, there is one very important point here in your testi-
mony. I don't know whether it has escaped the attention of others,
but it is important from my standpoint.
You have a memo dated here Julv 1-3, 1972, and in that memo — if
you have it before you — vou read it into the record, I believe. It is
on the occasion that the President called Mr. Gray to congratulate
him on the FBI action which had frustrated the airplane highjacking
in San Francisco, and I pick up your exact language at that point.
3433
"The President asked him" — referring to Gray — "if he had talked
to me about the case."
What case are you referring to ?
General Walters. The Watergate, sir. That was my understanding.
Senator Talmadge. The Watergate. I had assumed that was what
you had reference to in this memo.
"Gray replied that he had."
That meant that you and Gray had conferred, of course, about the
Watergate case and Gray, at that point the Director of the FBI, was
reporting that fact to the President of the United States, is that
General Walters. That was my understanding from what Mr. Gray
told me.
Senator Talmadge. All right.
To go on down further then —
The President then asked him what his recommendation was on the matter.
Gray had replied that the case could not he covered up and would lead quite high
and' tliat he felt that the President should get rid of the i>eople that were
involved. Any attempt to involve the FBI or the CIA in this case would only
prove a mortal wound,
And you say that was your word —
and would achieve nothing. The President then said, '"Then," —
I am quoting the President directly now —
"I should get rid of whoever is involved no matter how high?" Gray replied that
was his recommendation. The President then asked what I thought —
Meaning you —
and Gray said my views were the same as his. The President took it well and
thanked Gray. Later that day Gray had talked to Dean and repeated the con-
ver.sation to him. Dean had .said, "Okay."
Is that a correct verbatim quotation from your statement?
General Walters. That is a correct quotation from my statement,
Senator, but as I added earlier, I do recollect — I did not put into the
memorandum — Gray saying that the President had told him to go
ahead with his investigation.
Senator Talmadge. Now, am I to conclude from that that at that
point, and that was July — early July 1972, the President of the ITnited
States had the opinion of the Acting Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency that there was something going on wrong in the White House
staff and he ought to correct it ?
General Walters. This is my assumption from my recollection of
what Mr. Gray told me.
Senator Talmadge. That would be my conclusion, from reading your
remarks here.
Now, am I to assume from your testimony that you felt that these
repeated efforts from the Wliite House staff on the part of Haldeman
and Ehrlichman and subsequently Mr. Dean, when they tried to get
you involved in the coverup against your best iudgment. against your
own will, that it was an effort on the White House staff's part to get
you and Mr. Gray, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, to act in concert to cover up this case ?
General Walters. Senator, T would like to draw a distinction be-
tween the three people you have mentioned.
3434
Senator Talmadge. Yes, sir.
General Walters. As I have testified earlier, I believed at the time
that Mr. Haldeman asked me to ^o see Mr. Gray that he did have or
could have some information. Mr. Ehrlichman, as I recall it, in all
fairness did not take part in this conversation. My first conversation
with Dean on the 26th made me suspicious when he asked me whether
the Ajjency could pay bail or the salary of these people when they were
in jail. I became convinced that the option of doing something
improper was being ex]Dlored. I would remind, however, that I had no
further conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman at any
time after June 23. So there was really a differentiation in what the
three people were asking me to do. As I have said before, if I had
thought Mr. Haldeman was asking me to do something improper I
would not have done it.
Senator Talmadoe. Yes. I am certain you would not have, sir.
There is one final thing I would like to ask you, sir. You had been on
a professional basis with the President of the United States as well as
a personal basis. You saw what was happening in his staff to get two of
the most important agencies in the United States involved in obstruc-
tion of justice. "Wliy did you not, sir, ask for an appointment with the
President and go over and tell him frankly what was happening?
General Walters. Senator, I felt that would have been circumvent-
ing my charge. I reported it to mv superior, Mr. Helms, and I reported
it to the Acting Director of the FBI.
Senator Talmadge. You did not think you should go higher than
that?
General Walters. If I had been pushed or told to do something
improper I would not have, I made that quite plain to Dean. He was
exploring with me. I made it quite plain to him from the very first
meeting if he attempted to order or direct me to implicate the Agency
in any way I would resign and I would go and tell the President and
I did not hear much from Mr. Dean after that.
Senator Talmadge. You have had a long and distinguished career
in the Army. Now, if you saw something going on as a firet lieutenant
that you knew was absolutely inherently wrong and ought to be cor-
rected, would you ever have occasion to bypass the captain and go see
the major in an effort to get it corrected ?
General Walters. If I saw something going on wrong, I believe I
would, Senator. But I must repeat that what Mr. Dean was asking me
to do — he was not asking me, it was all tentative exploration — had
Mr. Dean at any time ordered me to do something improper I would
have asked to see the President.
Senator Talmadge. I am not talking about that. There is no reflec-
tion whatever on your conduct. General. I commend vou for it. You
were asked to get involved in the obstruction of justice and you did
not do it but you did know that some of the closest confidantes and
advisers to the President of the United States were involved in that
conspiracy and you did not inform the President. Wliy not ?
General Walters. I do not quite take the assumption, the same
assumption on the question that you did. Senator, but I will try to
answer it.
First of all, to go back to the climate of this time, the Agency was
under attack with various unjustified accusations. My interviews with
3435
Mr. Dean were alone. It was his word against mine. If I had gone out
and simply accused him of trying to involve me in something and he
had said no, the environment in the United States at that time would
not necessarily have been favorable to my unsupported word. I would
have simply involved the Agency in further publicity in support of
something I could not prove other than by my statement.
Senator Talmadge. General
General Walters. And my overwhelming
Senator Talmadge. Excuse me.
General Walters. My overwhelming concern, Senator, at this time
as it is today, is because I believe that an effective CIA is essential to
the United States and had I gotten us involved in a Donnybrook
which I could not prove other than by my unsupported word, I would
not have served the purpose that I was attempting to serve.
Senator Talmadge. General, I have no further questions. I want to
compliment you on your long and distinguished service to your coun-
try and your absolute candor in testifying before this committee.
General Walters. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Ervhst. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, there are two different versions about what Mr. Haldeman
said to you at that first meeting in your memorandum, and I read from
the memorandum. You said :
Haldeman stated I can tell Gray that I had talked to the White House and
suggested that the investigation not be pushed further.
In your testimony before the Appropriations Committee you had
this to say, and this is from the record of the Appropriations Com-
mittee :
Mr. Haldeman said this. It has been decided that you, Walters, will go to
Mr. Gray and tell him that if the investigation of the Mexican finance part of
this thing is pursued, it may uncover some CIA assets.
Now, that is somewhat different. Which order did he actually give
you or what did he say to you ?
General Walters. Senator, being a lesser man than Matthew, Mark,
Luke and John, I also occasionally have things — I do not in retro-
spect, thinking l3ack and refreshing my memory, I do not recall him
mentioning money.
Senator Gtirney. I am not trying to trip you up, General. Please
believe that. There is a tremendous difference between these two ver-
sions. One version is that Haldeman is ordering you to order the FBI
to stop. The other one is to inform the FBI that if they pursue this
Mexican money business that it may uncover some CIA assets, and
those are two diametrically different things.
General Walters. My best recollection, Senator, as I see it, was the
pursuit of this investigation in Mexico, and limited only to Mexico,
could endanger CIA assets. "Whether the money aspect came into my
mind because Gray mentioned it when I talked to him, which was
prior to my testimony before the House Appropriations Committee,
but long subsequent to the memorandum I wrote' I would rather in this
case trust the memorandum I wrote 5 days later than the testimony I
might have given a long time later influenced by what I knew subse-
quently that the Mexican thing involved money.
3436
Quite presently my recollection is that money specifically was not
mentioned.
Senator Gtjrney. Well, that really is not the thing that I am talking
about. The money is kind of incidental he^^e. What I am talking about
is whether Mr. Haldeman directed you to go to the FBI and tell them
not to — let us use your own words here — "push the investigation
further."
General Walters. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Gurnet. Now, that really is ordering the FBI to stop. The
other one is saying to the FBI that if you pursue something in Mexico,
whether it is money or anything else, that is unimportant, that it may
interfere with CIA and one of the reasons why this is so important and
why I am asking it is that one version, the version you gave before
the Appropriations Committee, coincides, I think, with what the Presi-
dent told Haldeman to do. The other one in your memorandum coin-
cides more with what apparently was going on in the White House
that we have learned before this committee here in these last several
weeks and that was a coverup. That is why it is important to get this
thing pinned down if we can.
General Walters. The only thing I can tell you, Senator, is that to
the best of my recollection at the present time in light of what I know
I was told, you will go to Mr. Gray and you will tell him that if the
investigation in Mexico is pushed further, it may — I did not say stop —
it may uncover some CIA assets.
Senator Gurnet. Well, that coincides more with the testimony that
you gave before the Appropriations Committee and less with your
memorandum here.
Now, then, after you finished this meeting with Haldeman and
Ehrlichman, you and Director Helms, you mentioned that you left the
meeting and you chatted together for a moment, and Mr. Helms re-
minded you to tell Pat Gray that there was a rapport between the two
agencies.
General Walters. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet. But didn't you and Director Helms discuss this
very unusual meeting and this very unusual order? Here is Haldeman,
the Presidential assistant, ordering vou to Sfo to the FBI and instruct
them to do something or not do something. Didn't you and the Director
discuss that unusual meeting?
General Walters. I think we both felt that Mr. Haldeman might
have some information to which we were not privy.
Senator Gurnet. Well, did you ask him ?
General Walters. Did I ask who, sir ?
Senator Gurnet. Mr. Haldeman.
General Walters. I did not ask Mr. Haldeman what information he
miofht have. I felt if he wanted me to know he would have told me.
Senator Gurnet. But isn't the mission of the CIA to find out for the
President as well as for the Defense Department and any other inter-
ested agencies all manner of foreisrn intelligence that may be danger-
ous or detrimental to the Ignited States ?
General Walters. I believe that is the general mission of the
Agency, yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Wio in this Government would be better able to
have that kind of information than Mr. Helms and General Walters?
3437
General Walters. We would have, sir, once we had access to our
sources on this matter. The CIA is quite a large Agency and I don't
believe Mr. Helms after 6 yeai-s and I certainly after 6 weeks did not
know the details of all the Agency operations in Mexico.
Senator Gijrxey. I wouldn't expect that either. General, and I am
not really talking about that. I am saying that it strikes- me as though
you might have been curious and said, '*Mr. Haldeman. what are we
doing down in Mexico that you are afraid is going to be interrupted ?'"
General Walters. Perhaps in retrospect I should have, sir, but the
nature of the direction that was given to me was quite explicit.
Senator Gurxey. Well, but that impresses me, too. It was extremely
explicit, and I wonder why there wasn't some question of it or some
further inquiry either by you or Director Helms there of
Mr. Haldeman.
General Walters. Sir, as soon as I talked with Mr. Gray I went back
to the Agency and attempted to check up to see whether this was a
fact or not.
Senator Gttrxey. You mentioned also that. I think it was in this
first meeting and it may be in one of the Dean meetings — no, it was
the first meeting, the investigation was leading to a lot of important
people. Who were these important people?
General Walters. I was not told, sir.
Senator Gurxey. Did you ask ?
General Walters. No, sir.
Senator Gtjrxey. Did Director Helms ask ?
General Walters. I do not believe he did.
Senator Gurney. In a later meeting with Dean, I think that was the
27th, Dean said that some of these suspects might talk. Talk about
what?
General Walters. I thought he was telling me they might talk and
involve the CIA and it didn't worry me one iota because I knew there
was not one thing that they could say that would involve the CIA.
Senator Gurxey. Didn't it occur to you that he might be saying they
might talk and involve somebody in the Government other than the
CIA?
General Walters. No, sir : that was not the understanding I had of
it. The understanding I had was that they might talk and involve the
CIA.
Senator Gtjrxey. Maybe in the Committee To Re-Elect the Presi-
dent.
General Walters. My understanding was that it referred to us, sir.
That it was a veiled form of a threat.
Senator Gtirxet. It didn't occur to you it might be people in the
White House?
General Walters. Well, by the time I had my meeting
Senator Gtjrxey. They might talk about people who were in the
White House?
General Walters. This thousrht did cross my mind ; yes, sir.
Senator Gurxey. Did you ask him ?
General Walters. No : I did not.
Senator Gurxey. This business about the letter from the CIA to the
FBI that the FBI should not go ahead with this investigation because
3438
it might compromise security interests, who asked the Agency to write
a letter to the FBI?
General Walters. On July 5, Senator, Pat Gray called me and said :
I can't stop this unless I get a letter from yon or the Director, from Helms or
from yon, saying that the fnrther pursuit of this investigation in Mexico will
jeopardize CIA assets.
That was the first mention of it.
Senator Gukney. Did he indicate that somebody had asked him to
talk to you and ask for a letter?
General Walters. I do not have any recollection of that, Senator.
Senator Gurnet. Did you ask him ?
General Walters. No.
Senator GimxET. It was your impression that he was going ahead
and only that could stop him from going ahead ?
General Walters. That was my impression.
Senator Gttrxet. That was the reason for his phone call.
I won't repeat the question that Senator Talmadge asked, I had it
here to ask myself about the long association with the President, and
all of tliese veiy unusual events that occurred between the Wliite House
people and the CIA and the FBI that would certainly lead to indicate
that all was not well in these requests made of you and, of couree, you
realized then you didn't do anything about it and I share Senator
Talmadge's feeling that you acted properly. I do, indeed, and I don't
want to question that.
But I want to ask you whv you didn't go to the President, he
already has done that, but did you ever discuss this with Director
Helms and say, "Now, ISIr. Helms, all this is going on here, something
reallv must be verv strange, do vou tliink we ought to advise the
President?"
Did you ever discuss that with INIr. Helms ?
General Walters. I don't think we did. Senator. I think one of the
reasons for that, which is difficult to see in retrospect, is this was com-
pressed in a verv short period of time. Tlie whole snan of this Avas from
the 28d to the 28th, in this period of 5 days, and after that, after I
told Dean if he pushed me any further I would go to the President.
I never lieard from him again.
Senator Gurxet. Yes, and I can understand that, and that occurred
to me also. But then in February of the next year here comes a call
from Mr. Dean saying:
Now there is some material over there in the FBI that you gave the FBI, the
CIA gave the FBI. I want you —
That is the CIA—
to request that material to be returned to you and simply a card put in there
with that advice that it had been returned without any reference to what the
material was.
Wliat did vou tliink INIr. Dean wastrvingto do then?
General Walters. Well, as you will recall. Senator, he called Dr.
Schlesinger, not me. I thought he was tryina: to, as I put it, leave an
arrow in the Department of Justice files pointing at Langlev.
Senator Gtrxet. But again, didn't that occur to vou and Director
v^chVsinofer, and I do remember now the call was to him but you and
he discussed it, and vou also discussed it, did vou not, in reviewing
3439
all these other facts that liad occurred in 1972 ? Weren't those brought
up again? Didn't you say you talked to Director Schlesinger about
that?
General Walters. I talked to Director Schlesinger before Dean's
call.
Senator Gurnet. He knew about these things.
General Walters. He knew about the events that had gone before;
yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Well, in your discussion about this latest request
about Mr. Dean did you and he raise the question that this looks like a
coverup over there at the '\^Tiite House that Mr. Dean may be involved
in?
General Walters. No, sir; I think we regarded it as making an im-
proper suggestion to us that would incriminate the Agency which
was not implicated and we refused to do this and Mr. Dean asked
nothing further of us.
Senator Gurnet. But why would he want to incriminate the Agency ?
That wouldn't do him any good.
General Walters. I don't know.
Senator Gurnet. Or the cause that he was so eagerly working at at
that particular time, would it ?
General Walters. I don't know what his motivation was. Senator.
Senator Gurnet. Motivation to me looks like he wanted that mate-
rial out of there so that it wouldn't be seen by the prosecutors or some-
body in charge of prosecuting the case. It was definitely a part of the
coverup.
General Walters. That could have been the case, yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet. But anyway there wasn't any discussion about
that.
General Walters. No, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Well, I think my time has elapsed and I certainly
agree, as I say, with Senator Talmadge that the CIA is clean and not
involving themselves in this messy business that we have been dis-
cussing here for several weeks. But I do wish that somelx>dy had
warned the President of the United States, it would have been very
helpful I think. That is all.
General Walters. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Ervin. I would just like to announce that Senator Montoya
is floor manager of the pending bill before the Senate and for that
reason cannot be here.
General, a first approach of John Dean to you was to inquire whether
or not the CIA was involved in the Watergate break-in, wasn't it?
General Walters. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. And you assured liim as well as everyone else you
conversed with that the CIA had no part in the Watergate burglary.
General Walters. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Erm^n. Yes.
Tlien he told you that he had a problem and his problem was to stop
the investigation with the five men that were caught in the Watergate,
and he wondered whether the CIA could afford him any assistance,
and you informed him that the CIA could not afford him any assist-
ance in the solution of that pix>blem and would not.
3440
General Walters. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
As you stated in — your communications about this matter with
either Mr. Dean or anybody else covered a period of only, the period
from June 23 to June 25.
General Walters. June 28, Mr. Chairman.
Senator ER\^]sr. June 28, 1 mean. And that no further approaches of
any kind were made to the CIA and that you assumed that whatever
problems that Dean had, you assumed the communication you had
made to Dean had put an end to any effort to enlist any aid of any
kind on the part of the CIA.
General Walters. That was my impression, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Er\^n. Yes.
Now, you were asked whether you thought you should have made
any communication to the President, but you were unaware of the fact
that on July 6, you were later acquainted by Mr. L. Patrick Gray, the
Acting Director of the FBI that he had communicated with the Presi-
dent and that he had informed the President that some of his aides
were doing him moral injury.
General Walters. That was what he told me, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Now, you have testified so clearly that I have no further questions.
I just wish to make two comments. I assume from your evidence that
you accompanied President Nixon when he was Vice President on a
tour to South America when he suffered attacks by individuals or
groups down there.
General Walters. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And you testified that he displayed great courage,
and I would like to say that from hearing what I heard over the media
and from what I read in the newspapere that I certainly concur in that
opinion. I would also like to say that I concur in your opinion that in
the precarious world in which our Nation now exists, that one of the
best ways to make certain that our Nation can remain a free country is
to have an efficient and viable organization like the CIA.
General Walters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chainnan.
Senator Eraten. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. General, I have told a number of witnesses, almost
every witness, I guess, that they should not assume from my questions
that I believe or disbelieve their testimony or that the nature of the
inquiry signifies anxiety or concern on my part or satisfaction but
rather my questions are designed to elicit particular information and
in some cases to test that information against the testimony of other
witnesses, documentation, and circumstances. I am sure you under-
stand that.
General Walters. I do. Senator.
Senator Baker. It may be that some of the questions I am going to
ask you you have no personal knowledge of, and if that is the case I
would be happy to be directed to a better primary source of
information.
I have today received three bound copies of documentation which
I understand was supplied by the CIA to the staff of this committee.
I have not yet had an opportunity to examine them.
3441
I understand from Mr. Dash that the material was supplied by the
CIA to the Ai^propriations Committee and by the staff of the Appro-
priations Committee to the staff of this conmiittee.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Senator Baker. But in any event, the significant thing is that I have
only just seen it and there has not been an opportunity to read it and
digest it, so if I skip around a little it does not mean that I am trying
to pinpoint a particular item of being of significant importance but
rather that is what I have been able to run across so far.
Let me state one other thing in preamble. I am in no way trying to
buttress the idea that the CIA was involved in Watergate. I am mak-
ing no such allegations. I have a great respect for the CIA and a great
appreciation for what it has done, for you, for Director Helms, for all
of those other great gentlemen who have served this Xation, I believe,
very well and very diligently.
So with that preamble, I would like to ask you a few questions. I
notice in this document a whole series of letters from McCord to the
Agency. Are you familiar with those letters ?
General Walters. I became familiar with them, I would say, the
beginning of June of this year. Senator.
Senator Baker. Now, to begin with, Mr. Chairman, I might note, as
we have on previous occasions that these documents are nominally
classified top secret, handle via comment control system only, and
marked inside on several pages for administrative use only and sensi-
tive. We understand, I understand, Mr. Chairman, that insofar as the
evidence, the material that may be contained in these documents is
clearly relevant to the inquiry of this committee that we have the
authority by communication from the "WTiite House, and by the
inherent authority of this committee and the Congress to put them in
the record notwithstanding.
Senator ER\ax. I so construe our authority.
Senator Baker. Would you bear with me for just a moment. General,
while I go back and try to find the INIcCord letters ? I am sorry for the
delay, Mr. Chairman, Ijut I say it is only while questioning began that
I have had an opportunity to look at these documents, and I noted their
location by paper climb and that turns out to be not the very best form
of index.
Maybe you can tell me. General, while we are still looking for these
letters, how many letters were there from Mr. ^NlcCord to the CIA
after he was arrested on June 17 that are reflected in these documents?
General Walters. Senator, it is quite difiicult for me to answer this
question, since I had no personal contacts and knowledge of them until
I heard about them in a general way about a month ago.
Senator Baker. But vou are aware that there are a number of them ?
Greneral Walters. Yes, I have heard that discussed and mentioned.
Senator Baker. Have you read the letters?
General Walters. No, sir ; I have not.
Senator Baker. I am referring now to what appears to be copy No.
2, tab N, and the first entry is a letter dated January 5, 1972, which
simplv savs "Notes" and is unsigned, but which has accompanying it
a Xerox copv of an euAelope addressed to Paul F. Gavnor, G-a-v-n-o-r,
4629 35th Street, North Arlington, Va. Do you recognize that name ?
3442
General Walters. I believe that is a member of our organization,
yes.
Senator Baker. Is that a standard method of reachmg, conveymg
information to your Agency ?
General Walters. I would not know, sir.
Senator Baker. Do you know who Mr. Gaynor is ?
General Walters. 1 know he is an Agency emploj^ee, I do not know
in detail what he does.
Senator Baker. Do you know why Mr. McCord would be writing
to him?
General Walters. I have heard it said he knew Mr. McCord while
Mr. McCord was still working with the Agency.
Senator Baker. Could you tell us what Mr. Gaynor's function is?
General Walters. I believed he worked in the Office of Security of
the Agency.
Senator Baker. He worked with Mr. McCord when he was there,
the Office of Security ?
General Walters. I have been given to understand that. I have no
personal knowledge of it.
Senator Baker. Much of this is information we already have in the
testimony of Mr. McCord and, an additional preamble might be in
order. I am not trying to contradict the testimony of Mr. INIcCord. As
a matter of fact, much of this corroborates this but I want to do this to
reach a final area of inquiry, the January 5. 1972, quote says :
The outfit tried to lay the operation at the feet of the CIA this week and failed.
Yesterday they tried to get all of the defendants to plead guilty, thus protecting
those higher up of involvement and that failed. Barker and Hunt were allegedly
to plead, so it is said. McCord and Liddy refused.
3. In revenge now the prosecution is planning to state that the motives of at
least some of the defendants was blackmail. This came out of the ACLU hearings
today in which the ACLU lawyer said he was told this by the prosecution that
blackmail was the motive.
4. The outfit is even getting predictable. It was anticipated that when I refused
to implicate CIA they would undertake a massive character assassination
attempt.
5. The judge is not buying this ploy. He indicated as miich this morning,
referring to it as a cover story and indicating that the world was watching this
case, the Democrats were criticizing its handling and that the jury was going
to get to the bottom of it. He said that he would personally examine the tapes
of testimony and send any to the grand jury that involved higher-ups or lower
figures involved. Some of the newsmen say they are scapegoats, we are scape-
goats, they are right.
Corrected telephone call data. Call to Israeli Embassy September 21, 1972,
8:35 a.m., telephone 762-8720. Called Chilean Embassy October 10, 1972, 4:50
p.m., telephone number the same.
There are ditto marks under it.
Do you have any idea why INIr. McCord would be passing on that
information to the CTA ?
General Walters. I have no idea whv he would, sir, except what T
read in the newspapers. T gather he still felt a certain sense of loyalty
to the CTA and he was anxious that it not be blamed for something
for which it was not responsible.
Senator Baker. Once again, I am iiot tr3nng to put you on the spot,
is the first inference to draw from that information that Mr, McCord
was at least hoping that j^ou would investigate whether or not those
calls to those two embassies were recorded ?
3443
General Walters. I do not know what he was trying in here, Sena-
tor. As I told you, I had no knowledge of this letter until June of this
year.
Senator Baker. Thank you, General.
General Walters. Or the existence of it.
Senator Baker. The next page,
It would appear that we have headed them off at the pass — it would appear
that we have headed them off at the pass. The crisis appears to be over —
Also addressed to Mr. Gaynor. Are you familiar with that state-
ment ?
General Walters. I believe these were published in the newspapers
unless I am mistaken.
Senator Baker. These letters ?
General Walters. I do not know whether they were but I have read
them somewhere, I have heard that statement before.
Senator Baker. "We took them up on the brink on this but I do not
believe they will try it again." I am reading parts of it because it is
very much — Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the collec-
tion of McCord letters, to go with the cover envelopes might be
received in evidence as an exhibit.
Senator ER^^^^. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. ISS.*]
Senator Baker. The next item is unaddressed but it is dated Decem-
ber 29, 1972, and it appears to have been transmitted in an envelope
also addressed to Mr. Paul F. Gaynor, postmarked from Rockville,
Md., on December 29 at the same address. ""WHiat is needed," is the
salutation.
Evidence of illegal Government wiretapping of our telephones either on na-
tional security grounds or domestic security grounds, both of which are done on
authority of the Attorney General's signature alone. There were two national
security calls by me from our home phone, 762-0187. One was made to the Israeli
Embassy on and the other was made to the Chilean Embassy on .
Both calls were witnessed by my wife. I am convinced from at least June 17th
to early July there was a wiretap on our home and office phones on authority of
the AG's signature alone. On June 26, 1972. the Supreme Court declared such
wiretaps illegal and several cases have been dismissed on these grounds recently
rather than disclose the adversary's pressing — in the adversaries pressing for
the contents of such calls and conversations and the names of the party involved.
There is no question but that our home and office phones are still being tapped.
It is being done without a court order. We are in an excellent position to have
the oases dropped. What I need is proof, logs, transcripts or testimony from an
FBI agent or two who had monitored such calls. Evidence of perjury or false
swearing by Gary Bittenbender, the MPD —
I take it to mean the Metropolitan Police Department —
officer, I know he is lying. Some additional evidence, even circumstantial would
help.
Going on and reading other portions of the thing, I think in fairness
to some semblance of completeness of this thing, since I am omitting
parts of the letter, but thev will in their entirety be included in the
record, I might say that also on this tab were statements as follows
by Mr. McCord:
I have released Gerald Alch as my defense attorney in the Watergate case.
In meeting recently in which plans for our defense of the Watergate trial were
discussed he persisted in a proposal that I claim the Watergate operation was
*See p. 3834.
3444
a OIA operation. That is flatly untrue and when I rejected it he then went on
to make a second proposal. The second proposal then was that I claim that the
four Cubans and I cooked up the bugging operation on our own. This was also
untrue. When the hundreds of dedicated, fine men and women of the CIA no
longer write intelligent summaries and reports with integrity, without fear of
political recrimination, when their fine Director is being summarily discharged
in order to make way for a politician who will write or rewrite intelligence the
way the politicians want them written instead of the way truth and best judg-
ment dictates, our nation is in the deepest of trouble and freedom itself was never
so imperiled. Nazi Germany rose and fell under exactly the same philosophy of
governmental operations.
Now, I understand that I am imposing on you, Greneral, but do you,
can you give us any insight into why Mr. McCord was passing on these
reports to the CIA on a regular basis addressed to this person ? Have
you ever inquired into it or can you give me any insight?
General Walters. I have not really inquired into it, I just heard it
discussed. I gather Mr. McCord at least in this period still felt an
intense feeling of loyalty toward the Agency, He did believe that some-
body was trying to frame it.
Senator Baker. But it did seem like he was asking for help from the
CIA?
General Walters. He may have been, sir, but as I say, I did not
see these letters.
I would like to make one comment, however. It is perfectly obvious
that anyone who thinks Dr. Schlesinger can be pushed around or
made to write anything that will suit anybody, has never met Dr.
Schlesinger.
Senator Baker. I entirely agree with you. I have met Dr. Schles-
inger, I have had some rather heated debates with Dr. Schlesinger
when he was Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and since
I am on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and I must say we
came away neither of us claiming victory, I think, but I came away
with a very, very heightened respect for his integrity, and also for
his toughness.
General Walters. Six months of working for him gave me the same
feeling.
Senator Baker. I wouldn't imply for a moment nor would I con-
done the implication that that description would fit Dr. Schlesinger.
I don't believe that for a second.
I have just violated the rule that I put on myself that I wouldn't
comment on the testimony but in that one I will.
General Walters. Sir, if I may, I would like to say my statements
apply to James Schlesinger.
Senator Baker, Pardon ?
General Walters. My statements apply to James Schlesinger who
is Secretary of Defense.
Senator Baker. That is right, and he was once head of the CIA and
before that Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
General Walters, Right,
Senator Baker. And who knows what he may be next, [Laughter.]
I am reading now from a memorandum of December 29, 1972, also
in an envelope addressed to Paul Gaynor. One paragraph reads:
Their persistence in wanting to let Gary Alch call Helms to testify and to call
Vic Marchetti to lay the background re : CIA employees once caught in the act
refusing to admit it, also re : custom and tradition of CIA along this line.
3445
Reading now from paragraph 4 —
The fixed police oflScer's report, that of Gary Bittenbender, not Carl as previ-
ously reported. Tlie impact of his statement is one which can be read two ways
giving them a fallback position. One, that I claimed to him at the time of
arraignment that this was a CIA operation, and (b) that this was an operation
wliich we, the Cubans and I, coolied up on our own. No such statements were
made. They are absolutely false.
Now, here is a simple sheet of paper that has the words "Mitchell,
Dean, Magrnder, Colson, and Liddy" on it attached to that memoran-
dum with this explanation:
And beyond that, the MDP oflBcer's name is Carl Bittenbender. The pressure
is still on. They can go to hell. Any time you need me to testify before a congres-
sional committee in your behalf, just yell.
Xow, this was addressed to Mr. Gaynor of the CIA, Was there any
thought, that you know of, in the CIA, of calling Mr. McCord to testify
on behalf of the CIA?
General Walters. No, sir. Not that I have ever heard.
Senator Baker. Another one, handwritten to Mr. Paul Gaynor, post-
marked Washington, D.C. The post date is illegible. And there is none
on the typed memorandum.
Jack. Sorry to have to write you this letter but felt you had to know. If Helms
goes, and if the WG operation is laid at CIA's feet where it does not belong,
every tree in the forest will fall. It will be a scorched desert. The whole matter is
at the precipice right now. Just pass the message that if they want it to blow,
they are on exactly the right course. I am sorry that you will get hurt in the
fallout.
Another one, December 22, 1972, addressed to INIr. Paul Gaynor, at
a different address, 1005 South Quebec, Arlington, Va. [Reads :]
Dear Paul, there is tremendous pressure to put the operation off on the
company.
Is the CIA referred to internally sometimes as the company ?
General Walters. Sometimes.
Senator Baker [continues reading] :
Don't worry about me no matter what you hear. The way to head this off is
to flood the newspapers with leaks or anonymous letters that the plan is to place
the blame on the company for the operation. This is of immediate importance
because the plans are in the formative stage now and can be preempted now if
the story is leaked so that the press is alerted. It may not be headed off later
when it is too late. The fix is on. One of the police oflScers in the MFD intelligence
department is to testify that one of the defendants told him that the defendants
were company people and it was a company operation. He has probably been
promised promotion for changing his story to this effect. Be careful in your deal-
ings with him. I will do all I can to keep you informed. Keep the faith.
And another one. addressed to Mr. Richard Helms, Director, Central
Intelligence Agency, Langley, Va., on a postmark I believe of July 30,
1972, marked "personal."
From time to time I will send along things you may be interested in from an
info standpoint. This is a copy of a letter which I sent to my lawyer. With best
regards.
Unsigned.
And another one. There is no accompanying envelope as far as this
compilation indicates.
3446
Dear (blank) :
A few interesting bits of information you will be interested in. When Paul
O'Brien was engaged by tlie Committee as their lawyer in this case the Committee
told him that the operation was a OIA operation. He says he did not learn other-
wise until one of the defendants told him the facts and he says he blew up over it.
The prosecution under Silbert had, of course, begun that line with Judge Belsen
from the very first hearing. Although never coming right out and saying to it
was inferred by him in every hearing that I witnessed and learned that he did
so with the other defendants in the bond hearings.
Now that the CIA story has not held water or, more directly, will not be
allowed to stand by the CIA, the prosecution is now planning to charge that
Liddy stole the money for the operation from the Committee and in turn bribed
McCord and Hunt to participate, giving McCord a $16,000 bribe on one occasion
-witnessed by a participant who had turned state's evidence. Rest assured that I
will not be a patsy to this latest ploy. They will have to dream up a better one
than this latest story. The state's witness cannot only be impeached on the stand,
but can be charged with perjury before the Grand Jury, and to federal oflicials,
if he has made such a statement to them. If Committee ofl5cials allege that Liddy
stole the funds for such operation they also have perjured themselves and are
subject to such a prosecution. Liddy may stand still for this but I will not.
And the final paragraph, Mr. Chairman, and I will stop reading.
As I have mentioned before, I don't think a fair trial is ever going to be ob-
tained in Washington for the reasons I have heretofore stated. The prejudicial
press coverage, the high percentage of registered Democratic voters, from whom
the jury would be picked, and the pro-government leanings of such a jury, most
of whom would be employed by the government and subject to a bias or duress
from the prosecution, are only some of the reasons. The matter of timing of a
change of venue motion is I realize best left in the hands of the lawyers. The fact
remains that I have lived in Washington since 1942 and know certain things about
the District of Columbia from a first-hand knowledge, having lived there in the
past, that I wanted you to be aware of.
Now, General, as I say, I haven't had time to read all this. There is
a veritable forest of paper clips that I have put on this thing already
and I am going to read it over the weekend if I can and I want to talk
about it some more.
It would appear obvious to me that since you came on board in your
present capacity or your service in other capacities to the Agency that
you do not have firsthand knowledge of this.
General Walters. I wasn't aboard at the time. I do not have first-
hand knowledge.
Senator Baker. Well, I would appreciate your advice on who would
have firsthand knowledge of it so I could talk to them.
General Walters. I would say probably the best man to talk to
would be Mr. Osborne who is our director of security.
Senator Baker. Can you venture any estimate based on your
examination
General Walters. Or Mr. Helms.
Senator Baker. All right, sir. Thank you.
Can you venture an estimate based on your knowledge of CIA
operations, and Mr. Hunt, the facts as you found them since June 17,
on any reasonable basis as to why Mr. McCord would be giving you
this information periodically and regularly?
General Walters. I tried to explain it previously, Senator. I believe
Mr. Hunt felt a very strong sense of loyalty to the Agency. I believe
he felt there was a conspiracy against the Agency to involve it and
discredit it and this is what I believe, and this is purely my own
personal opinion and I can't substantiate it with anything other than
my judgment, that he
3447
Senator Baker. Would you have conducted-
General Walters [interrupting]. Wanted-
Senator Baker [continuing]. Conducted an investigation or cause
one to be done at the CIA on why McCord was in touch and certain
other matters that I would like to discuss with you more privately?
General Walters. Had it come to my knowledge at the time I would
have, Senator.
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
And the one to address that to now would be Mr. Colby ?
General Walters. Mr. Colby.
Well, technically it would be me today but if he is sworn in tomorrow
or the next day it would be him.
Senator Baker. Why don't I ask you and you pass it on to him?
General Walters, I will.
Senator Baker. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervix. These letters in my judgment would corroborate
certain testimony given by McCord to this committee to the effect
that there was a plan among some people to try to blame this on the
CIA, including his own lawyer, and that he resented it and knew that
or believed with all the intensity of his nature that the CIA was not
implicated in any way in the matter.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman
Senator Ervin. Is that not correct ?
General Walters. That would be my assumption also, Mr. Chair-
man.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I might say since that represents a
commentary on my interrogation, which I appreciate, but that is cer-
tainly one interpretation and that is why I went to some pains to
explain it. I am not making charges. I am simply inquiring for infor-
mation. But I am afraid it is not the only possibility and I think I
owe it to myself and to the committee to try to find out as much as I
can and in addition to talking to Director Colby or possibly to Ambas-
sador Helms, or Mr. Osborne or others, I think I would like to talk to
Mr. Gaynor. I think I would like to know whether he ever answered
those letters and what, if any, action he took.
Thank you, sir.
General Walters. Very well, sir.
Senator Erven. I certainly concur in your opinion we ought to get
as much light on this subject as we can.
Senator Weicker, do you have any other questions ?
Senator Weicker. I have a few questions, Mr. Chairman.
General Walters, you have indicated that Mr. Haldeman gave you
a direction — ^that is the best way to phrase it — ^to carry it to the Acting
Director of the FBI. Let me quote exactly from your memorandum
here:
Haldeman said that the whole afifair was getting embarrassing and it was the
President's wish that Walters call on Acting FBI Director Patrick Gray and
suggest to him that since the five suspects had been arrested that this should be
sufficient and that it was not advantageous to have the inquiry pushed, essentially
Director Helms said that he had talked to Gray on the previous day and had
made plain to him that the Agency was not behind this matter, that it was not
connected with it.
3448
And as I gathered when you and I were talking before, you indi-
cated there well could have been, based on something that was within
his knowledge, that might not be in your knowledge, or the knowledge
of the Director, is that correct ?
General Walters. That is correct. Senator.
Senator Weicker. Well, if that was the case, why would he not tell
you what it was if this was something within his knowledge ?
General Walters. I do not know why he would not tell me, sir.
Senator Weicker. Just one quick question in passing here. That same
paragraph, "Suggest that since the five suspects had been arrested this
should be sufficient."
Sufficient for what ? Did that ever occur to you ?
General Walters. Not really, no, sir. I did not draw any particular
assumption from it.
Senator Weicker. Now, both you and Director Helms have testified
that there was discussion of Mexico. I would like to leave it in a broad
way. I do not know whether it was Director Helms referring to money.
You have indicated it did not come up then but there was discussion
of Mexico,
General Walters. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Mexican relationship, et cetera, rather than any-
thing as specific as money, is that correct?
General Walters. That is correct, sir.
Senator Weicker. Do you think that that discussion was substantial
enough so that a man of normal recall would remember it? I mean, di5
it form a part of the discussions that morning ?
General Walters. It did, Senator. The way I underetood it was he
felt if the FBI continued its investigation in Mexico in some way
which was not clear to me, it would uncover either personnel or activi-
ties of the Agency in Mexico.
Senator Weicker. So it did come up in more than just a casual way?
General Walters. Oh, it was quite specific.
Senator Weicker. Quite specific.
General Walters. And the request to the FBI to, in a sense, not push
the investigation at that point was limited only to Mexico, nowhere
else.
Senator Weicker. Now, I will read to you from Mr. Haldeman's
testimony before this committee :
Mr. Dash. Do you recall discussing at that meeting that one of their concerns
was that the CIA might want to have an investigation by the FBI with regard to
the Mexican money?
Mr. Haldeman. No, I did not.
Mr. Dash. Mexican relationship.
Mr. Haldeman. I do not recall the Mexican question being raised either by the
President that morning in his instructions to me to hold the meeting or by me in
the meeting.
Do you dispute Mr. Haldeman's testimony on that point?
General Walters. I will stand on my own recollection of the matter,
Senator.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions.
Senator ER\T>r. General, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank
5'^ou for your appearance here and the testimony which you have given
the committee.
General Walters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
3449
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 12 :25 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., this same day.]
Afternoon Session, Friday, August 3, 1973
Senator Baker [presiding] . The committee will come to order. The
chairman has been temporarily delayed, and he asked that we resume
the hearings in the interest of time.
Would counsel call the next witness ?
Mr. Dash. Patrick Gray.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Would you please stand and hold up your right
hand ? Do you swear that the evidence you are about to give before the
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Gray. I do, sir.
Senator Baker. Thank you, sir. You may be seated.
Mr. Gray. Mr. Chairman, if I may please, I would
Mr. Dash. Mr. Gray, prior to doing that for the record, could we
have your full name and address?
TESTIMONY OF LOUIS PATRICK GRAY III, FORMER ACTING DIREC-
TOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ACCOMPANIED BY
STEPHEN H. SACHS, COUNSEL
]\Ir. Gray. Yes ; my full name is Louis Patrick Gray III. I live in
Stonington, Conn.
Mr. Dash. And we see that you are accompanied by counsel. Will
counsel please identify himself for the record ?
Mr. Gray. Counsel, if I may, may I introduce, Mr. Chairman, my
counsel to the committee ?
Senator Baker. Certainly.
]Mr. Gray. He is Stephen H. Sachs of Baltimore, Md.. of the firm
of Frank. Bernstein, Conwav & Goldman, and we are also accom-
panied today, INIr. Chairman, by his secretary, Mrs. Marie H. Hertslet.
Senator Baker. Who is blushing becomingly in the back of the room.
Mr, Dash. Mr. Chairman, the questioning of Mr. Gray will be done
bv Mr. Rufus Edmisten. deputv chief counsel, but I understand, Mr.
Gray, that you have a statement that you wish to read to the committee
first,
Mr. Gray, Yes, T do. Professor Dash. With the kind indulgence of
the committee, I would like to read this statement.
Senator Baker. Would you please, proceed, Mr. Gray?
Mr. Gray, Thank vou, sir,
Mr, Chairman, T do not welcome this opportunitv to appear before
this committee. In fact. T regret deeply the circumstances which neces-
sitate mv appearance today. At the same time. I appear before you
voluntarily as an officer of the United States to testify without claim
of pri-vnlege or immunity.
My prepared statement will cover two areas believed to be of pnme
interest to the committee — the CTA dimension and the Howard Hunt
files. I cannot possiblv re^aew the entire Watergate investigation in
3450
the time available and I do not believe the committee expects me to
launch into such a review. Nevertheless, upon the conclusion of my
statement, I stand ready to answer any questions which the committee
or counsel may desire to ask about any aspect of my stewardship of
the FBI.
I do have, Mr. Chairman, a few preliminary remarks which precede
my discussion of the areas believed to be of prime interest to the
committee.
I was appointed Acting Director of the FBI by Attorney General
Kleindienst on May 3, 1972. 1 looked upon this appointment as a return
to the service of my country similai" to that which I had rendered in
the U.S. Navy for 26 years. I looked forward then to many years of
additional service to the country in the company of the honorable and
dedicated men and women of the FBI.
On May 16, 1972, my personal staff and I moved into the offices
formerly occupied by the late J. Edgar Hoover; 1 month later, on
June 17, 1972, the burglary of the headquarters of the Democratic
National Committee in the Watergate Hotel occurred.
At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge that I am fully,
totally, and comj)letely responsible for the performance of duty of
myself and of the men and w^omen of the FBI during the year that I
served as their Acting Director. They, of course, are not in any way
responsible for my performance of duty or for any personal acts or
judgments of mine which occurred during the period I served as Act-
ing Director.
THE CIA DIMENSION
At the time of the Watergate break-in I was on the west coast visit-
ing FBI field offices and meeting a coimnitment to make a commence-
ment address at Pepperdine University Law School in Santa Ana.
I returned to Washington on the evening of June 20 and received a
phone call from John Ehrlichman the next morning. Mr. Ehrlichman
informed me that John Dean would be handling an inquiry into
Watergate for the White House, that I should deal directly with John
Dean concerning the investigation and that Mr. Dean was expecting a
call from me. Mr. Ehrlichman and I then discussed the matter of pro-
cedural safeguards against leaks and I told him that we were handling
this case as a major special with all of our normal procedures in effect.
I also indicated to him that we were going to conduct an aggressive
and vigorous investigation and would probably be interviewing people
at the Wliite House.
I called Mr. Dean upon my return to my own office at 10 a.m., and
arranged to meet with him at 11 :30 a.m., in my office on June 21, 1972.
At our meeting he discussed with me the sensitivity of the investigation
and the need to avoid leaks in a political year. He also informed me
that he had the responsibility to handle this inquiry for the White
House and would sit in on any interviews of White House staff per-
sonnel. Mr. Dean stated that he would be there in his official capacity
as counsel to the President.
I know that I specifically asked Mr. Dean on two occasions if he
would be making his reports direct to the President. I believe that this
was one of those occasions and I believe that the other occurred when
we were discussing the transmission of FBI file material to him to
3451
assist him in his inquiry, I asked Mr. Dean if he would be reporting
directly to the President or through Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman.
He informed me that he would be reporting directly to the President.
At this meeting with Mr. Dean there was no discussion of whom
we were going to interview or where our leads might take the investi-
gation. We did discuss the scheduling of White House interviews
through Mr. Dean and his sitting in on the interviews as counsel to
the President.
On Thursday, June 22, 1972, after being briefed by Mr. Charles W.
Bates, Assistant Director, General Investigative Division, regarding
the latest developments in the Watergate case and undoubtedly as a
result of information developed at that briefing, I telephoned Director
Helms of the CIA. I told him of our thinking that we may be poking
into a CIA operation and asked if he could confirm or deny this. He
said he had been meeting on this every day with his men, that they
knew the people, that they could not figure it out but that there was no
CIA involvement.
I met again with Mr. Dean at 6 :30 p.m. the same day to again discuss
the scheduling of interviews of White House staff personnel and to
arrange the scheduling of these interviews directly through the Wash-
ington field office rather than through FBI headquarters. At this meet-
ing I also discussed with him our very early theories of the case;
namely, that the episode was either a CIA covert operation of some
sort simply because some of the people involved had been CIA people
in the past, or a CIA money chain, or a political money chain, or a
pure political operation, or a Cuban right wing operation, or a com-
bination of any of these. I also told Mr. Dean that we were not zeroing
in on any one theory at this time, or excluding any, but that we just
could not see any clear reason for this burglary and attempted inter-
cept of communications operation.
I believe that it was at this meeting on June 22 that I told him of
our discovery of a bank account in the name of Bernard Barker, who
was arrested in the Watergate burglary, and the fact that a $25,000
check associated with Kenneth Dahlberg and four checks drawn on a
Mexican bank payable to Manuel Ogarrio, in the total amount of
$89,000, were deposited in the Barker account. I do not have a clear
memory of telling him about my telephone call earlier in the day to
Director Helms regarding the question of CIA involvement. It is
likely that I would have discussed the Helms call with him in connec-
tion with our discussion of the theories of the case, since Mr. Helms
had informed me that there was no CIA involvement.
On Friday, June 23, 1972, Mr. Bates met with me again to brief me
on recent developments. I telephoned Mr. Dean following my meeting
with Mr. Bates. I am quite certain that this call again involved the
Barker bank account and the Ogarrio and Dahlberg checks. Either in
this call or in the meeting of the preceding evening Mr. Dean first
raised with me the idea that if we persisted in our efforts to investi-
gate this Mexican money chain we could uncover or become involved
in CIA operations. I remember telling Mr. Dean in one of these early
telephone calls or meetings that the FBI was going to pursue all leads
aggressively unless we were told by the CIA that there was a CIA
interest or involvement in this case.
3452
At 1 :35 p.m. on Friday, June 23, 1972, Mr. Dean telephoned me and
said that General "Walters, Deputy Director, CIA, would be calling for
an appointment that afternoon and I should see him. Mr. Dean said,
"He has something to tell you."
At 1 :56 p.m. on Friday, June 23, 1972, the secretary to General
Walters called my secretary and asked for an appointment. He was
scheduled to see me at 2 :30 p.m. that afternoon.
Mr. Dean called me again at 2 :19 p.m. and it is my recollection that
this was a call to ask if I had scheduled a meeting with General "Wal-
ters for that afternoon. I told him that the meeting had been scheduled
for 2 :30 p.m. I seem to remember that he asked me to call him after
the meeting.
I met with General Waltere at 2 :34 p.m. on Friday, June 23, 197'2.
He informed me that we were likely to uncover some CIA assets or
sources if we continued our investigation into the Mexican money
chain. I understood his statement to mean that if the FBI persisted
we would uncover CIA covert operations and that the CIA had an
interest in Messrs. Ogarrio and Dahlberg and in the $114,000 involved.
He also discussed with me the agency agreement under which the FBI
and CIA have agreed not to uncover and expose each other's sources.
I had not read this agreement and still have not, but it was logical to
me at that time and I did not question General "Walters.
I undoubtedly said to General Walters that we will handle this in
a manner that would not hamper the CIA, and that I would have to
make a determination as to how the FBI would proceed with our in-
vestigation in this area.
I knew from Mr. Dean's earlier telephone conversation with me on
this day that General Walters would be coming to see me, but I have
no recollection or memory whatsoever of General Walters informing
me at this meeting that he was coming to me after talking to the "White
House, or that he had talked to the "Wliite House at all. I understood
him to be stating a CIA position, not a Wliite House message.
At this point I would like to comment on General Walters' memo-
randum of this meeting, which I understand to be in evidence before
this committee. With respect to General Walters' statement in para-
graph 2 of his memorandum that "his — ^Gray's — problem was how to
low key this matter now that it was launched," I may have said words
to this effect to let him know that we would handle the CIA aspects of
this matter with kid gloves. I can state categorically, however, that any
sentiment of that kind expressed by me was an effort by me to abide
by the CIA-FBI agreement and related solely to the possibility of
exposing CIA covert activities in the pursuit of our investigation into
Mexico. This sentiment, if expressed, could in no way have related to
any effort by me or the FBI to "low key" the Watergate investigation
generally.
In fact, the FBI did not low kev the Watergate investigation gen-
erally and instructions were issued at the outset of the investigation
and regularly thereafter to insure that this case was handled as a
major case under the immediate supervision of the special agent in
charge of each field office to which iuA-estigative leads were referred
by the Washington field office or any other field office setting out leads
to be pursued.
3453
With respect to the rest of the paragraph, I may have mentioned
the $89,000 to General Walters. I do not remember, but, if I did, I
would have talked in terms of four checks in this total amount — not
"a check" as his memo states — ^^simply because four checks were in-
volved. I probably also spoke of the name Ogarrio as well as Dahlberg
simply because these two men, Mr. Ogarrio and Mr. Dahlberg, were
always associated in my mind with the $89,000 in four checks, the
Ogarrio checks, and with the $25,000 in one cashier's check, the Dahl-
berg check, which were traced to the bank account of Bernard Barker;
With respect to General Walters' comment in paragraph 3 of this
memorandum that I said "that this was a most awkward matter to
come up during an election year," it is certainly possible that in the
course of my conversation with General Walters I may have expressed
the thought that the Watergate case was a "hot potato" for a new
Acting Director and the FBI in an election year, and for the President,
too. I know that I expressed this thought to many people at various
times. "Watergate is just what I needed" was a refrain I know I struck
with friends on numerous occasions. General Walters' references to
"he — Gray — would see what he could do," and "he * * * — Gray —
would have to study the matter and see how it could best be done,"
could only relate to my admitted desire to pursue this investigation
without compromising CIA assets and resources. In no way, shape, or
form did I say or seek to imply to General Walters, or to anyone else,
for that matter, that the FBI investigation would be other than aggres-
sive and thorough. The only conceivable, limited exception was the
alleged national security considerations being presented to me by Gen-
eral Walters and Mr. Dean which, as the record will show, brought
about a delay in the interview of several persons for a period of 10 days
to 2 weeks.
As a matter of fact, and as my testimony will make clear in more
detail, I ordered our agents to continue to probe the Mexican money
chain and the Dahlberg relationship during this period that the per-
sonal interview with Mr. OgaiTio was being held in abeyance and Mr.
Dahlberg was evading us as we tried to interview him.
Finally, I have no recollection whatever of General Walters making
any statement as he alleges in paragraph 4 of his memorandum to the
effect that his "job had been an awkward one."
Upon General Walters' departure, I telephoned Mr. Dean and told
him of the meeting with General Walters. I told Mr. Dean that we
would hold up our interviews temporarily and work around this prob-
lem until we determined what we had encountered.
At 3 :15 p.m. I telephoned Assistant Director Bates to tell him of
my visit from General Walters and to tell him that CIA had an
interest in this matter and that we may have uncovered a CIA money
chain. In this telephone conversation, I undoubtedly ordered Mr. Bates
to temporarily hold up an interview with Mr. Ogarrio but to continue
to conduct appropriate investigation at Banco Internationale at Mex-
ico Citv regarding the four Ogarrio checks, to continue to follow Mr.
Dahlbers's movements and to continue to obtain tollcall records of his
Ions: distance phone calls as we sought to interview him.
On the afternoon of Fridav, June 23, 1972, I again telephoned Mr.
Dean on two occasions, once at 3 :24 p.m. and once at 3 :47 p.m. I can-
not be absolutely certain that the names Ogarrio and Dahlberg were
3454
mentioned in connection with the CIA situation. It is my best recol-
lection, however, that they were and I undoubtedly told him that we
would continue our periphei-al investig:ation because of the a])parently
inconsistent reports I had received from Helms and AValters. He
requested that we not conduct any interviews that would expose CIA
sources in connection with our investigation into the sourc-e of the
$114,000 in checks that were deposited in Mr. Barker's bank account.
Again I told Mr. Dean that we would hold off temporarily with inter-
views of Ogarrio and work around this problem to determine what we
were encountering.
On Tuesday morning, June 27, 1972, I met with Mr. Bates and
Mr. Mark Felt, Acting Associate Director, to receive a briefing on the
latest developments. While they were in the office Mr. Dean called.
The call involved establishing the chain of custody for the contents of
Howard Hunt's safe and his providing us with photographs of certain
White House staff members to aid us in identifying an individual who
had been with Mr. Hunt at the Miami Playboy Club in December of
1971. In this conversation I also told Mr. Dean that if Mr. Dahlberg
continued to evade us he would be called before the grand jury.
Although I cannot pinpoint the exact telephone conversation, I believe
that by this date Mr. Dean had requested that Mr. Dahlberg not be
inter^dewed because of alleged CIA interest in him.
In this same conversation, I also told Mr. Dean that it was extremely
important that the FBI continue its aggressiveness until we determine
the motive, reasons, and identity of all persons involved. I said that I
might be called upon at a later date to testify before congressional
committees and we could not have the FBI accused of not pursuing
this case to the end.
Following the briefing by Mi". Felt and Mr. Bates and as an out-
growth of it, I telephoned Director Helms of the CIA and asked him
to tell me specifically if the CIA had any interest in Mr. Ogarrio that
would prevent us from interviewing him and also asked that he and
General Walters meet the following day at 2 :30 p.m. in my office with
me, Mr. Felt, and ]Mr. Bates to review our respective positions in this
investigation. Director Helms told me that he would have to check to
determine whether the CIA had any interest in Mr. Ogarrio and would
call me later. I advised Mr. Felt of this meeting and also asked that he
notify Mr. Bates. Director Helms called me back later that afternoon,
told me the CIA had no interest in Mr. Ogarrio, and confirmed our
meeting for the next day.
Just 7 minutes after Director Helms' call to me, Mr. Dean called me
at 3 :47 p.m., and although I cannot be absolutely certain, I believe this
was a call again requesting me to hold ofi' interviewing Mr. Ogarrio
and Mr. Dahlberg because of CIA interest in these men. I cannot
recall if I told him that I had just talked to Director Helms who
informed me that CIA had no interest in Mr. Ogarrio and that I was
going to order that Mr. Ogarrio be interviewed. I seem to remember
that Mr. Dean said to me that these men have absolutely nothing to do
with Watergate, but I cannot remember whether he said this to me in
this conversation or in earlier conversations.
On Wednesday, June 28, 1972, at 10:25 a.m., Mr, Dean telephoned
me and talked about rumors of leaks from the FBI, the material from
Hunt's safe previously delivered to the FBI, rumors of a slowdown in
3455
the FBI, and leaks from the FBI concerning the tracing of the $114,-
000. Once again I believe there was some discussion about Ogarrio
and Dahlberg and it is my recollection that I was asked if I had
ordered the interviews of Ogarrio and Dahlberg. I replied that I had
either ordered or was going to order the interview of Ogarrio. In this
discussion, I may have told Mr. Dean that I had arranged to meet with
Director Helms and Deputy Director Walters at 2 :30 p.m. that after-
noon to try to get this CIA situation resolved, but I cannot be positive
that I did.
At 10 :55 a.m. on this same day Mr. Ehrlichman called me. I was
not available, but I returned his call at 11 :17 a.m. His first words,
issued abruptly, were : "Cancel your meeting with Helms and Walters
today ; it is not necessar^^." I asked him for his reasons and he simply
said that such a meeting is not necessary. I then asked him point blank
who was going to make the decisions as to who is to be interviewed. He
responded, "You do."
I then telephoned Director Helms to tell him that I was canceling
our meeting. I also advised Messrs. Felt and Bates of the cancellation,
but stated that the three of us would meet. In this same conversation
with me, Director Helms requested that we not interview active CIA
men Karl Wagner and John Caswell. I passed this information to Mr.
Felt and instructed that these men not be interviewed. Before orders
could get to the field, however, Mr. Caswell had already been inter-
viewed.
I met with Mr. Felt and Mr. Bates in my office at 2 :30 p.m. on this
Wednesday afternoon, June 28, to review the CIA situation. In this
meeting I was brought up to date on all the latest developments in
the case. I can recall specifically discussing with them the alleged com-
partmentalization at CIA where the right hand is not supposed to
know what the left is doing in sensitive operations and asked if this
could occur. We agreed that it was possible, but unlikely in the absence
of some special Wliite House interest in the highest classification of
national security interests where the need to know was rigidly con-
trolled.
Mr. Bates pointed out that under no circumstances should we back
off any investigation at the request of CIA without forcing them to
reveal completely their interest in this matter. We all agreed that the
FBI's reputation was at stake and I assured fhem that I would not
hold back the FBI in this investigation at anyone's request, including
the President of the United States, in the absence of overriding and
valid considerations. I told them that if I were ordered to do so with-
out valid reasons, I would resisrn.
It was in this meetine; that I believe I gave Mr. Felt and Mr. Bates
instructions to go ahead with the interview of Mr. Ogarrio and to con-
tinue our efforts to locate and interview Mr. Dahlberg.
At 3 :58 p.m., June 28. Mr. Dean called and I was not available.
I returned the call at 4:35 p.m. and I believe now that this call in-
volved a request bv Mr. Dean to hold up on the interview of Miss
Kathleen Chenow for alles^ed reasons of national securitv until she
returned from her vacation in England. I'm sure I said we would
hold up for the time beinsr but she would have to be interviewed soon.
I can recall saving that we will interview her in England unless she
returns from vacation at an early date. Mr. Dean gave me her address
3456
in England in this conversation, I believe, and I passed it along in
a call to Mr. Felt in which I instructed him to temporarily discontinue
leads to interview and investigate Miss Kathleen Chenow in England.
In the evening of this same da}^, Wednesday, June 28, 1972, a cable-
gram was sent to our legate in Mexico City instnicting him to interview
Mr. Ogarrio concerning the four checks in the aggregate amount of
$89,000. This order was issued in the afternoon meeting with Mr. Felt
and Mr. Bates, I believe, because of the phone call I made to Director
Helms on June 27 asking if the CIA had any interest in Mr. Ogarrio
and his reply to the effect that CIA had no interest.
At 8 :15 a.m. on Thursday, June 29, 1972, I issued orders to cancel
the interview of Mr. Ogarrio and to instruct the Minneapolis Field
Division to make no further attempts to interview Mr. Dahlberg but
to continue to obtain records of his long distance calls. I am fairly
certain that I did so as the result of a telephone call I received from
Mr. Dean at home, prior to my departure to Dulles Airport for an
inspection trip to San Diego and Phoenix. He again urged that these
interviews be held up for national security reasons or because of CIA
interest. I called Mr. Felt, or his office, and gave these cancellation
orders. On my own initiative I also ordered that George INIunro, CIA
station chief at Mexico City, not be interviewed because I noted in one!
of the many reports that crossed my desk that he was CIA station chief
in Mexico City.
In San Diego, on Friday, June 30, I received a call from Mr. Felt.
He informed me that Assistant U.S. Attorney Silbert wanted the
FBI to interview Mr. David Young, Mr. Ogarrio and Miss Chenow
and that our Washington Field Office recommended interviews of Mr.
Mitchell, Mr. Young and ]\Iiss Chenow. I instructed Mr. Felt to tell
Mr. Dean that we were going to interview Mr. Mitchell, Mr, Young,
Miss Chenow, and any others that we must interview, and I also told
him to give to Mr. Dean the message from Assistant U.S. Attorney
Silbert. iust as we had received it
Mr. Dean had called me earlier that morning to complain bitterly
about alleged leaks from the FBI. In this conversation it is my recol-
lection that he ajrain raised the question of not interviewing Mr. Ogar-
rio and Mr. Dahlberg and stated that they had absolutely nothing to do
with Watergate, but I cannot be certain.
Mr. Dean called me a^ain that afternoon. I do not recall whether
or not Mr. Dean and I discussed Messrs. Offarrio and Dahlberg in this
conversation. I do know that Mr. Dean asked me to consider setting
up a special sfroup in the FBI to investigate the entire matter of leaks.
I told him that it was not necessary and that I would not take such
action.
Mr. Felt called me later that afternoon to report that Mr. Dean
informed him that Mr. Youne; and Miss Chenow would be available
for interview during the first part of the cominjr week. He also told me
that Mr. Dean was still complaining about alleged leaks from the
FBI.
On Mondav, July 8, 1972, I scheduled a meeting with Messrs. Felt,
Bates, and Kunkel. snecial ajrents in charge of the Washinofton field
office, to review the investiaration to date and to consider all ramifica-
tions of a possible CIA involvement. This meeting lasted from 2:30
p.m. until just about 4 p.m., and we discussed every possible theory,
3457
the conflicts to date in CIA interest or not, and the compartmentaliza-
tion aneg:ed to exist in CIA.
Mr. Dean called at 2 :40 p.m. and I merely told him that I was in a
meeting: and that I would return his call.
In this meeting I stated that I was not going to hold off any longer
on this phase of our investigation at the request of anyone unless I
received from CIA a written request not to interview Mr. Ogarrio
and Mr. Dahlberg.
I returned Mr. Dean's call at 3 :59 p.m., and he called me again at
4 :14 p.m. I believe it quite likely that in one of these phone calls I told
Mr. Dean that the FBI was going to interview Ogarrio and Dahlberg
unless we had a writing from the CIA requesting that we not do so.
On Wednesday, July 5, at o :54 p.m., I telephoned General Walters.
My contemporaneous notes of this call read as follows :
7-5-72 Wed— 5 :55 p.
TCT General Walters.
(Dick Walters)
1. I will need a request in writing rather than the verbal request to refrain
from interviewing Ogarrio and Dahlberg because of CIA interest.
2. Position of developing investigation indicates there is CIA involvement in
that some of these men have been used by CIA in part and there is indication
some are currently being used ; there is the dollar chain either CIA or political ;
I do not want to uncover and surface a CIA national security operation in pur-
suing these leads, but I must for the record have in writing from CIA a request
to refrain on the basis of national security matters or I must proceed.
3. He stated that he would respond not later than 10 a.m., tomorrow.
4. I said that I would order the interviews if I did not have the writings
by 10 a.m.
At the bottom of this telephone memorandum I have written "gave
above info to JWD, WMF, CWB, from 6 p to 6 :10 p.," and those men
are Messrs. Dean, Felt, and Bates.
At this point I would like to comment on General Walters' memo-
randum of this phone call which I believe is in evidence before this
committee.
With respect to General Walters' statement that I told him that
"the pressures" on me "to continue the investigation was great," I am
quite certain that I did not so express myself. It is entirely possible,
however, that on the limited question of the alleged impact of the
investigation on CIA/national security matters, the only topic Gen-
eral Walters and I were discussing, I may have expressed the thought
that the leads to Messrs. Ogarrio and Dahlberg were clear and that
their interviews were a necessity which only the clearest expression of
national security interest should prevent and that the FBI, for the
sake of its own integrity, would refrain from conducting the inter-
views only if we received such a written request from the CIA.
With respect to General Walters' statement that "he [Gray] had
talked to John Dean," while I have no specific recollection of telling
General Walters that I had talked to John Dean, it is entirely likely
that I did tell General Walters that I had informed Mr. Dean that
the FBI was going to interview Messrs. Ogarrio and Dahlberg unless
we had a writing from the CIA requesting that we not do so.
3458
On Thursday, July 6, 1972, 1 met with General Walters in my office.
I remember that he delivered to me tlie writinfj that I requested and I
remember that it indicated the CIA had no interest in Oj2:arrio or
Dahlberg. After reading the document, I concluded that there was no
reason for us to not interview Messre. Ogarrio and Dalilberg. A^Hien
General Walters departed my office at about 10 :2i> a.m. or 10 :oO a.m.,
I ordered the interviews of Ogarrio and Dahlberg immediately.
My recollection of the convei"sation with General Walters at this
meeting diffei-s with his in several respects.
My principal recollection is his preoccupation with the fact that he
was unable to give me a writing stating that there was a CIA interest
in Ogarrio and Dahlberg and his telling me that he would resign if he
were asked or directed to give me such a writing. He reported this
thought to me several times during our conversation.
I recall that General Walters indicated a feeling of irritation and
resentment at the extent to which White House aides had involved
themselves in the question of CIA interest but I do not recall his giving
me any details and I have absolutely no recollection of his disclosing
to me that he had been instructed to bring a false report to me. I asked
for no details.
I, too, was concerned and disturbed at the contradictory reports I
had been receiving from Director Helms, Mr. Dean, and General Wal-
ters with respect to CIA interest and at the abnipt cancellation by
Mr. Ehrlichman of the meeting I had scheduled with Director Hehns
and General Walters on June 28. I undoubtedly so expressed myself
to General Walters.
My recollection is that he and I then engaged in a general discussion
of the credibility and position of our respective institutions in our
society and of the need to insure that this was maintained. Toward the
end of the conversation, I recall most A'ividly that General Walters
leaned back in the red overstuffed leather chair in which he was sitting,
put his hands behind his head and said that lie had come into an inher-
itance and was not concerned about his pension, and was not going to
let "these kids" kick him around any more.
We stood up together as he prepared to leave. I cannot recall which
one of us suggested that we ought to call the President to tell him of
this confusion and uncertainty that had been encountered in determin-
ing CIA interest or no CIA interest. I believe it was General Walters
who suggested it first, because I can firmly recall saying to him, "Dick,
you should call the President, you know him better than I." I believe
he said, "Xo, I think you should because these are persons that FBI
wishes to interview." We did not settle on who, if anyone, would make
such a call and General Waltere left.
At this point I would like to comment on some aspects of General
Walters' memorandum of our meeting of July 6.
(a) With respect to General Walters" assertion in paragraph 1 that
"in all honesty I — Walters — could not tell him to cease future investi-
gations on the grounds that it would compromise the security interests
of the United States. Even less so could I write him a letter to tliis
effect." _
We did not at any time discuss a curtailment of the entire investiga-
tion. In our telephone conversation on July 5 I had asked him specifi-
cally about Messrs. Ogarrio and Dahlberg and had said to him that in
3459
interviewing them we did not want to uncover and surface a CIA
national security operation. In our July 6 meeting I most definitely
recall General Walters saying that he could not write a letter stating
that our investigation of Ogarrio and Dahlberg would jeopardize na-
tional security. I distinctly remember that his inability to write such
a letter to the FBI was the strong central theme of his comments
throughout the meeting.
(b) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 1 that
"he — Gray — himself had told Ehrlichman and Ilaldeman that he could
not possibly suppress the investigation of this matter * * *"
I did not discuss the Watergate investigation with Mr. Haldeman
at any time except that during my confirmation hearings in 1973 at the
request of Senator Kennedy I telephoned Mr. Ilaldeman to ask whether
Mr. Dean had shown Mr. Haldeman copies of the FBI reports of
interview.
At no time did anyone ever order or request me to suppress this
investigation. As I have testified, I was obviously aware of the "hot
potato" aspect of the investigation, sensitive to any implication that
the FBI would not do a thorough job and undoubtedly told any num-
ber of people, perhaps including Mr. Ehrlichman and certainly
including Mr. Dean, that the FBI would follow its leads wherever
they led.
I was saying privately as well as publicly, and I may have told Gen-
eral Walters, that there was just no way to stop or divert an FBI
investigation once it began. I was making the point publicly in response
to press inquiries that no one man could do it and to control an FBI
investigation would require control of too many people from the At-
torney General down to the case agents. I also was saying at this time
and later that even if an attempt were made to control and direct an
FBI investigation, the details of such an effort would leak. And in this
connection I probably mentioned to General Walters my Saturday^
June 24, 1972 meeting with our Washington field office agents on the
subject of alleged leaks of FBI information.
(c) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 2 con-
cerning his alleged report to me of his White House conversations.
I have no recollection of being told by General Walters that he and
Director Helms had met with "V\niit€ House staff assistants and that
General Walters had been directed to t^ll me that pursuit of the in-
vestigation would uncover CIA covert operations. I have absolutely no
recollection of any kind of being told by General Walters that he had
been instructed by "WTiite House aides to bring a false tale to me con-
cerning CIA interest and that he had in fact done so on June 23. I am
sure that if General Walters had told me this I would remember it.
Indeed, I was shocked when I first read newspaper accounts in May
1972, apparently based on this memorandum. I have no recollection of
General Walters mentioning any visits or discussions with Mr. Dean.
As I have already indicated, I do remember that he repeatedly stated
his inability to write a letter indicating that the CIA had an interest
in Messrs. Ogarrio and Dahlberg and that he would resign if directed
to do so. I am quite certain that he spoke of such a course as dangerous
to the President and, although I do not recall his use of the phrase
'mortal wound," I know that I used it in my subsequent conversation
3460
with the President and it seems to me quite likely that I picked up
the phrase from General Walters.
(d) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 3
that I informed him that I had told Attorney General Kleindienst
that I could not suppress the investigation.
Never did I have any occasion to say to the Attorney General that
I could not suppress the investigation within the FBI. And I cer-
tainly do not believe I said this to General Walters. I had no reason to
do so. Again, I believe that General Walters may be confusing my
possible references to my public remarks and my thoughts that to con-
trol an investigation of the FBI, one would have to control everyone
involved from the Attorney General down to the case agent. My con-
tacts with Mr. Kleindienst were extremely limited throughout the
investigation, never involved discussion of its details and always as-
sumed that the investigation would be full and thorough. In fact, at
the outset of the investigation I had a telephone conversation with
Mr. Kleindienst in which we explicitly agreed that this should be a
vigorous investigation. I may very well have mentioned this to Gen-
eral Walters.
(e) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 3 that
"he — ^Gray — had told Ehrlichman and Haldeman that he would prefer
to resign, but his resignation would raise many questions that would
be detrimental to the President's interests."
I have no recollection wliatever of having made this statement to
General Walters. I certainly never made such a statement to either
Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman. I had so expressed myself to my
own people within the FBI in the context of our discussions of our
determination to proceed to interview Messi-s. Ogarrio and Dalilberg
unless we received a written statement of CIA interest. A narrative
memorandum prepared by Assistant Director Bates of the General
JEnvestigative Division recounts a meeting between Mr. Felt, Mr. Bates,
and me on June 28, 1972, and I quote from that memorandum :
(Mr. Bates) pointed out that under no circumstances sliould we back off of
any investigation at the request of CIA without forcing tliem to reveal completely
their interest in this matter. Mr. Felt and I both pointed out that the FBI's repu-
tation was at stake as well as Mr. Gray's position : that we did not feel that we
should hold back under any circumstances unless the reasons therefore were
publicly expressed. Mr. Gray made it plain that he would not hold back the FBI
in this investigation at anyone's request, including the President of the United
States, and if he were ordered to do so he would resign.
It is certainly possible that I discussed this conversation with Mr.
Felt and Mr. Bates with General Walters in the context of his telling
me that if he were directed to write a letter asserting CIA interest in
Messrs. Ogarrio and Dahlberg he would resign.
(f) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 3 that
"he — ^Gray — was prepared to let this go to Ehrlichman, to Haldeman,
or to Mitchell, for that matter."
I have no recollection whatever of mentioning specific names and do
not believe that I did but it is certainly possible that I told General
Walters that I would take the investigation wherever it led.
(g) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 3
that —
3461
He — Gray — felt it iniiwrtant that the President should be protected from his
would-be protectors. He had explained this to Dean as well as Haldeman and
Ehrlichman.
It is possible that I expressed the sentiment contained in the first
quoted sentence in the context of respondin^^ to the general expressions
of ii-ritation at White House aides I heard from Genc^ral Walters. I
could not have told him that I "explained this" to Dean, Haldeman,
and Ehrlichman because I never expressed such a sentiment to any of
them. I had said to Dean on several occasions that the FBI would
investigate the case no matter how high it led and may well have told
that to General Walters.
(h) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 3
that—
He said he was anxious not to talk to Mitchell because he was afraid that at his
contiraiation hearings he would be asked whether he had talked to Mitchell about
the Watergate case and he wished to be in a position to reply negatiT^ely.
It is quite possible that I expressed mj^self along these lines. If I
did I am sure that it was in the context of our discussion about express-
ing our concerns to the President, particularly who, if not the Presi-
dent himself, could be talked to.
(i) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 3 that :
He — Gray — ^said he would like to talk to the President about it but he — Gray —
feared that a request from him to see the President would be misinterpreted by
the media.
My recollection concerning our conversation about talking to the
President is recorded above and I recall nothing further, but it is pos-
sible that I did state that I believed a request by me to see the President
would be misinterpreted by the media.
( j ) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 3 that :
I said that if I were directed to write a letter to him saying that future investi-
gation of this case would jeopardize the security of the United States and covert
operations of the Agency, I would ask to see the President and explain to him
the disservice I thought this would do to his interests. The potential danger to
the President of such a course far outweighed any protective aspects it might
have for other figures in the Wliite House and I was quite preparetl to resign
myself on this issue. Gray said he understood this fully and hoped I would stick
to my guns. I answered him I would.
As stated above, I absolutely do not recall General Walters saying
or implying that White House aides had directed him to write a letter
falsely claiming CIA interest but the general thoughts in this excerpt
about "danger to the President" and "disservice" to the President's
interest if General Walters were to be directed to write such a letter
are what I recall as being the central part of the discussion General
Walters and I engaged in.
(k) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 5 that
I could not "sit on this matter and that the facts would come out
eventually."
I probably did say to General Walters that the facts would come out
eventually, as I always believed they would. But I would have had no
reason totell him that I did not believe I could sit on this matter. For
the fact was that we were not sitting on it ; we were investigating it on
a high priority basis. I may again have told him that there was no way
3462
for any one man or group of men to control an FBI investigation even
if one Avished to do so.
After General Waltei-s left the office I sat at my desk quietly and
null led over our conversation. I vras confused, uncertain and uneasy.
I was concerned enough to believe that the President would be
infoi'med.
I decided to call Clark MacGregor to request that he inform the
President of what I would tell him. I decided on Mr. INIacGregor
because I knew he was close to the President and had his confidence.
At 10 :51 a.m., Thursday, July 6, 1972, I spoke to Mr. MacGregor
at San Clemente, Calif., via White House switchboard and I told him
that Dick Walters and I were uneasy and concerned about the confu-
sion that existed over the past 2 weeks in determining with certainty
whether there was or was not CIA interest in people that the FBI
wishes to interview in connection with the Watergate investigation.
These, of course, are not my exact words but they do express the
thoughts that I conveyed to him.
Again, although these are not the exact words, I also conveved to
him the thought that I felt that people on the '\"\niite House staff were
careless and indifferent in their use of the CIA and the FBI. I also
expressed the thought that this activity was injurious to the CIA and
the FBI, and that these "^^^ite House staff people were wounding the
President.
I asked if he would please inform the President, and it is by best
recollection that he said he would handle it.
Thirty-seven minutes later, at 11 :28 a.m. on Thursday, July 6, 1972,
the President called me. He expressed his congratulations to the FBI
and asked that I express his congratulations to the agents in San
Francisco who successfullv terminated a hijackins: there the previous
day. I thanked the President and then said to him, and to the very
best of my recollection these are the words :
Mr. President, there is something I want to speak to yon ahoTit.
Dick Walters and I feel that i)eoj>le on your staff are trying to mortally wound
you hy usinjs: the CIA and FBI and by confusing the question of CIA interest in,
or not in. i>eople the FBI wishes to interview.
I have just talked to Clark MacGregor and asked him to speak to you about
this.
There was a slight pause and the President said, "Pat, vou iust con-
tinue to conduct vour aggressive and thorouirh investi.q-ation.''
Following this conversation I experienced no further concerns of
this kind. I believed that if there was anvthing to the concerns I
expressed to the President or to ^Ir. ^lacGregor that I would hear
further in the matter. I did not. Frankly. I came to the conclusion that
General Walters and I had been alarmists, a belief I held for many
months.
General Walters came to my office acrain on July 12. 1972. At this
meeting he apparentlv gave me a memorandum which. I am now
informed, contained information to the effect that the CIA furnished
certain aliases to Liddy and Hunt and certain paraphernalia to Hunt.
X^^ntil I brioflv saw a copy of this memorandum this sprinof in the
offices of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia containing
a notation of its receipt in my handwritiuir. I had i\o recollection of
this memorandum. I still do not recall noting its contents at the time.
3463
I am told that the original of this memorandum was found in my
safe after I left tlio FBI. I probably gave it to my secretary to put in
the safe after General Walters left my office. It is also possible that I
may have routed it to Messrs. Felt and Bates as I know I did with
tlio July 6, 1972, memorandum that General "Walters brought to me.
I know that it has been suggested that the information in this memo-
randum concerning the aliases of Liddy and Hunt would have been
of material assistance to the FBI Watergate investigation since Liddy
and Hunt used those aliases — Warren and Leonard — in some of their
pre-Watergate travels which were under investigation. The insinua-
tion lias been made that I somehow purposely suppi'essed this infor-
mation to hinder the investigation. This is nonsense. First, as I have
stated, I do not recall noting the significance, if any, of the informa-
tion at the time. Second, I am positive that the FBI had by then
clearly established that Liddy and Hunt were "Warren" and
"Leonard." And. third, if I had any intention of suppressing this
information I would certainly not have left it in my safe. In short,
any suggestion that I had any improper intention in my handling of
this memorandum is absolutely false.
I have also heard it suggested that the paraphernalia referred to in
this memorandum was in fact used in the break-in of the offices of Dr.
Ellsberg's psychiatrist. I state categorically that I had absolutely no
knowledge of such an event or the plans for such an event until it was
reported in the newspaper this spring.
At this point I would like to comment on General WalteiV memo-
randum of July 13 with respect to his meeting with me on July 12.
(a) With respect to General Waltei-s' assertion in paragraph 3 that
"He tlianked me and said that this case could not be snuffed out and it
would lead quite high politically."
I do not remember how or why this subject could have come up at
this meeting. In any CA'ent I could not have said, "It would lead quite
high j)olitically," because I had no basis for such a belief. I suppose. I
could have speculated that "It could lead quite high politically" or
stated that in a case of this nature there is no telling where leads might
run. I do not remember any paai of the convei-sation which might have
caused me to be talking about "snuffing" out the case. After the July 6,
1972. writing was delivered to me and I ordered the immediate inter-
view of Messi-s. Ogarrio and Dahlberg. we liad no problems with CIA
interest, or noninterest, in our prospective interviewees.
(b) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 8 that
"Dahlberg was in the clear. He had gotten the check from Maurice
Stans and had deposited it in the Mexican Bank."
I do not remember talking to him about the Dahlberg check. He may
have asked me. In any event if we did discuss it. I could not have made
these statements. The facts were that Mr. Dahlberg when interviewed
told us that he had collected these moneys in Boca Raton and had
turned them over to Mr, Stans and did not know what happened to
them tliereafter. These funds, to the best of our knowledge in the FBI,
were never deposited in the ^Mexican bank and Stans did not give the
check to ]Mr. Dahlberg. Mr. Dahlberg gave the check to Stans.
I do not recall discussing this with General Waltei-s, but, if I did,
I would certainlv have discussed it on a factual basis. I think he was
3464
just mixed up in writing or dictating his memo simply because he was
not as familiar Avith the facts in these particular transactions as I was.
I may very well have told him it was undoubtedly a political contribu-
tion or it was political mone}'. All along we in the FBI thought this
to be a CIA covert operation, a CIA money chain, a political operation,
a political money washing operation or a combination thereof.
(c) With respect to my report to General Walters of my phone call
with the President, including the statements attributed to me, that the
President asked if I had talked to General Waltei-s about the case, that
the President asked for my recommendation in the case, that I told
the President it could not be covered up, would lead quite high, and
that the President should get rid of the people that were involved.
I have already testified as to my entire recollection of my telephone
call with the President.
With regard to General Walters' version of my conversation with
the President, I have to say that it does not square with my memory
of what I said to the President or what I said to General Walters
about the call from the President. At this July 12, 1972, meeting with
General Walters it is my best recollection that I merely said to him
that I had spoken to the President last week on the subject we dis-
cussed when the President called to congratulate us on a hijacking.
I certainly do not remember discussing the conversation other than
to tell him just what I had said to the President.
I am quite positive that I did not say to the President that the case
could not be covered up, and I have no recollection whatever of tell-
ing him that it would lead quite high, and that I felt the President
should get rid of the people who were involved, and I am just as posi-
tive that I did not make such remarks to General Walters. I probably
did tell General Walters that on several occasions I had told John Dean
that this investigation would have to expose whoever is involved no
matter how high it reached, that Mr. Dean responded, "No matter how
high?" and that I said, "Yes, no matter how high." Perhaps General
Walters has confused mv conversation with Mr. Dean with my con-
versation with the President.
The only response by the President I now recall or have ever recalled
to my remarks was that we should continue our thorough and aggres-
sive investigation.
(d) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 3 that :
Later on that day, Gray had talked to Dean and repeated the conversation to
him. Dean had said, "OK." Gray had heard no more on the subject. He asked
whether the President had spoken to me and I said that he had on another
matter, but had not brought up this matter with me.
I could not have said that I talked to Mr. Dean and repeated the
conversation to him. I did not at any time tell Mr. Dean that I had
spoken to the President. Mv logs, moreover, show no calls to or from
Mr. Dean and no visits with Mr. Dean from Julv 6, 1972, through
July 11, 1972.
I did ask General Waltei's if the President had spoken to him about
my call. He said he had talked to the President but not on this subject.
I did tell him that I had heard no more on the subject from anyone.
(e) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 4 that :
Gray then said that the TT.S. attorney had subpenaed the financial records of
the Committee To Re-Elect the President. It had been suggested to him that he
3465
stop this. He replied that he could not. Whoever wanted this done should talk to
the Attorney General to see if there w-as any legal way to do this. He could not.
I have absolutely no recollection of anyone ever contacting me to
stop any subpena. t believe I would recall such an event if it occurred.
I would certainly have directed any such inquiries to the Attorney
General, Assistant General of the T".S. attorney.
I simply do not know how General Walters could have received this
thought, it is possil)le that we could have been discussing a news story,
if there was one, a]>out the FBI not subpenaing appropriate records.
But I do not remeniljer discussing this subject with General Walters.
(f ) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 4 that :
He said that he had told the President in 1968 that he should beware of his
subordinates who would try to wear his Commander-in-Chief's strii>es.
T probably said this to General Walters because I had expressed this
thought to the Piesident in a letter to him just after his election in
1968.
(g) With respect to General Walters' assertion in paragraph 5
about resigning, I have no memory of again discussing with General
Walters our respective resignations at this meeting.
General Walters came to my office again on July 28, 1972, at 11 a.m.,
to meet with me, as he says in one of his memorandums, to clarify the
last memorandum he had given me in reply to inquiries from Parham
re '*(^leo." I now know that Mr, Parham was a special agent assigned
to the FBI Alexandria field office.
I do not recall or remember the details of this meeting with any
degree of precision. It is possible that I recounted the details of this
meeting to Mr. Felt or to Mr. Bates and either one of them may have
a memorandum in their files regarding it, or the FBI files may contain
other relevant information on Mr. Cleo.
I know that I did have a telephone conversation with Mr. Helms
regarding Mr. Cleo and this could very well have been the subject
of a call I made to Mr. Helms on Thursday, July 27. 1972, at 9 :25 a.m.
I am quite certain that I was told by Mr. Helms that Mr. Cleo was
an electronics engineer for the CIA who had no connection with
Watergate, but I am not certain that Mr. Helms and I discussed Mr.
Cleo on July 27, 1972, at 9 :25 a.m., even though I am quite certain
that we did have the conversation regarding Mr. Cleo. I just cannot
be sure of the exact date and time.
I know that I discussed Mr. Cleo with Mr. Felt on Friday, July 21,
1972. along with three other matters in a meeting with him from
2 :30 p.m. to 3 :10 p.m. He may very well have notes on this discussion.
Further, Mr. Parham may be able to shed some light on his own
inquiries re Mr. Cleo.
At this point I would like to comment on some aspects of General
Walters' memorandum of this meeting.
With respect to General Walters' comments concerning furnishing
equipment to Hunt, I have no recollection of General Waltei-s' passing
this information on to me. Hunt's prior CIA activities, whatever they
were, did not have sicmificance for me in relation to Watergate.
I probably did ask General Walters if the President had called
him ; yet, I have no specific recollection of doing so, nor do I recall
his reply.
3466
At no time in any of my conversations \Yitli General Walters do I
recall or remember sayinfj to him that pressure had been brought to
bear on me. Any possible reference to "pressure'' could only refer to
the ISIexican matter — the Barker, Ogarrio, Dahlberg dollars — and the
asserted CIA/national security dimension.
General "Walters and I may have been discussing the credibility and
integrity of our two agencies and I could have tokl him that it began
to look as if the Mexican money chain was also a political contribution
chain from Texas contributors and that we were going to have to run
it down in relation to the criminal investigation of the bugging of
Democratic headquarters.
If General Walters told me that they intended to terminate the
965-959S number, it had no significance to me. I did not know any-
thing about such a number and certainly would not have asked any
questions about this number simply because I would have believed it to
be a number associated with CIA operations and I would not have
made any inquiries concerning this number.
I could have said to General Walters, "This is a hell of a thing to
happen to us at the outset of our tenure with our respective offices,''
although I do not remember saying it to him on this i)articular
occasion.
The only other CIA contacts I can recall at this time are as follows :
(a) On October 18, 1972, Director Helms visited me. He said he had
come by to see me as a courtesy before he went to see the Attorney
General. He said that one of his lawyers had met with Assistant U.S.
Attorney Silbert the previous week. Mr. Helms also told me that CIA
was to provide documented answers to questions of the assistant U.S.
attorney.
He did not tell me what the subject matter or nature of the questions
was and I did not ask him, feeling that CIA business was not my busi-
ness. In fact, I had a hard time trying to figure out why he came to see
me because his conversation was so general and nonspecific. I assumed,
of course, that the questions had to do with Watergate and CIA's role
in Watergate, if any; however, I did not question Director Helms
about this and he did not offer to enlighten me.
(b) General Walters came to see me again on February 21, 1973, at
9 a.m.
My notes of this meeting show that the topics discussed involved
national security projects of great sensitivity. If the committee wants
to hear about this meeting, I would respectfully request that my testi-
mony be taken in executi^'e session.
(c) General Walters came to see me again on Thursday, April 12,
1973, at 10:37 a.m., on one of the national security projects we dis-
cussed in the meeting of February 21, 1973. If the committee wants to
hear about this meeting I respectfully request that my testimony be
taken in executive session.
There has been hearsay testimony before this committee to the effect
that I was fuinished material from the CIA containing photographs
of Gordon I^iddy standing in front of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist's
office. This statement records my entire recollection of receipt of in-
formation concei-ning Hunt or Liddy. I never at any time was in
possession of such photographs or knew of their existence. I also had
and have no information related to any discussions between the "Wliite
3467
House, Department of Justice, and CIA on the subject of retrieval by
the CIA of CIA information furnished to the Department of Justice.
THE HOWARD HUNT FILES
Prior to a meeting I had with Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman in
Mr. Ehrlichman's office on the evening of June 28, 1972, I had no
knowledge from any source whatever of the existence of these partic-
ular files or of the information and instructions I was to receive that
evening.
I arrived at Mr. Ehrlichman's office at about 6 :30 p.m. that evening
for the purpose of discussing with him the many rumors and allega-
tions concerning leaks of information from the FBI regarding the
Watergate investigation. One of his secretaries told me to go right on
into his private office. Mr. Dean was in the office talking with Mr.
Ehrlichman. I remember being surprised at Mr. Dean's presence be-
cause I had not known that he would be at the meeting.
After the usual greetings were exchanged, Mr. Ehrlichman said
something very close to, "John has something that he wants to turn
over to you." I then noticed that Mr. Dean had in his hands two white
manila. legal-size file folders. It is my recollection that these folders
were not in envelopes at this time.
Mr. Dean then told me that these files contained copies of sensitive
and classified papers of a political nature that Howard Hunt had
been working on. He said that they have national security implica-
tions or overtones, have absolutely nothing to do with Watergate and
have no bearing on the Watergate investigation whatsoever. Either
Mr, Dean or Mr. Ehrlichman said that these files should not be allowed
to confuse or muddy the issues in the AVatergate case.
I asked whether these files should become a part of our FBI Water-
gate file. Mr. Dean said these should not become a part of our FBI
Watergate file, but that he wanted to be able to say, if called upon
later, that he had turned all of Howard Hunt's files over to the FBI.
I distinctly recall ^Ir. Dean saying that these files were "political
dynamite," and "clearly should not see the light of day."
It is true that neither Mr. Ehrlichman nor Mr. Dean expressly
instructed me to destroy the files. But there was, and is, no doubt in
my mind that destruction was intended. Neither ]Mr. Dean nor Mr.
Ehrlichman said or implied that I was being given the documents
personally merely to safeguard against leaks. As I believe each of them
testified before this committee the "\Miite House regarded the FBI as
a source of leaks. The clear implication of the substance and tone of
their remarks was that these two files were to be destroyed and I
interpreted this to be an order from the counsel to the President of
the United States issued in the presence of one of the two top assist-
ants to the President of the United States.
It is my recollection that I asked for large brown envelopes in
which to place the files. I believe that Mr. Dean stepped briefly into
the outer office to obtain the envelopes and placed each file in a sep-
arate brown envelope in Mr. Ehrlichman's inner office and handed
them to me.
Although mv memorv is not perfectly clear on this, I believe Mr.
Dean then left Mr. Ehrlichman's office and I stayed for 5 or 10 minutes
3468
to discuss the rumors and allegations of leaks from the FBI. These
Avere the same rumors that had been rampant in the first week of the
invostioation. I believe that I told Mr. Ehrlichman that I had spoken
to all of the agents assigned to the case and was quite confident that
these leaks had not come from the FBI.
I then left Mr. Ehrlicliman's office with the two manila envelopes
containing the files, went to my car, placed the files in my briefcase,
and proceeded to my apartment. I placed the files on a closet shelf
under my shirts. After 2 or 3 weeks I took them into the office and
placed them in my personal safe.
To the best of my recollection I removed the files to my home in
Stonington, Conn., in late September or early October 1972 and placed
them in a chest of drawers in the area just outside my bedroom. I
intended to burn them but I did not get around to doing so until after
my illness, hospitalization, and convalescence in the latter half of
November and December.
I distinctly recall that I burned them during Christmas week with
the Christmas and household paper trash that had accumulated imme-
diately following Christmas. To this point I had not read or examined
the files. But immediately before putting them in the fire I opened one
of the files. It containecl what appeared to be copies of "top secret"
State Department cablegrams. I read the first cable. I do not recall
the exact language but the text of the cable implicated officials of the
Kennedy achninistration in the assassination of President Diem of
South Vietnam. I had no reason then to doubt the authenticity of the
"cable'' and was shaken at what I read. I thumbed through the other
cables in this file. They appeared to be duplicates of tlie first cable,
I merely thumbed through the second of the two files and noted that
it contained onionskin copies of correspondence. I did not absorb the
subject matter of the correspondence and do not today, of my own
knowledge, know what it was.
Mr. Dean has described in testimony before this committee a con-
versation with me at a Department of Justice luncheon which he
placed during or shortly after Januai-y of this year, at which I alleg-
edly told him to "hang tight" on not disclosing my receipt of the docu-
ments and informed him that I had destroyed them. I recall no such
meeting or conversation with Mr. Dean at a De]>artment of Justice
luncheon, and my records do not indicate any such luncheon meeting.
I shall now set forth for the committee my recollection of all con-
versations I have had with Messrs. Dean, Ehrlichman, and othere
about the June 28 meeting and its aftermath.
I believe that Mr. Dean called me at my home in Connecticut in late
October or early November. As I recall it, he asked me on that occasion
if I still had the two files he gave to me. I said I did and that they were
in a safe place in my home at Stonington. I believe Mr. Dean asked if
I had read them and I told him, tmthfully, that I had not.
The sequence of the next discussions I had about these files is some-
Avhat hazy in my mind. My best recollection now is that over a span of
several days during my confii'ination hearings in early March of this
year I had discussions on the subject with Assistant Attorney General
Petersen, John Dean, and John Ehrlicliman, in that order. I believe
that Mr. Petersen called me and told me that Dean had stepped out of
an interview being conducted by assistant U.S. attorneys in Mr. Peter-
3469
id
sen's presence to inform Mr. Petersen that he had turned two files from
Hunt's safe, havino- nothin<r to do with WatergTite, over to me. Mr.
Petereen told me that lie informed Dean to take it up with me and
asked me if Dean had done so. I told Mr. Petersen, truthfully, that
Dean had not. I certainly did not acknowledge to Mr. Petersen that
Mr. Dean had turned over any such files to me but I do not recall Mr.
Petersen asking m.e that question on this occasion.
I must acknowledge the possibility, however, that Mr. Petersen may
have asked me if Dean had turned over such files to me. If he did ask,
I am certain that I would have denied receipt of such files because of
the instructions I received from Messi-s. Ehrlichman and Dean on
June 28, the information I had been given about their national security
implications and the injunction that they "should never see the light
of day."
I recall calling John Dean shortly thereafter and asking him
whether he had told Henry Petersen about the two files. He told me
that he had. I then asked him, in effect, if he told Mr. Petersen the
whole story, namely, that the files were given to me in John Ehrlich-
man's presence with the assurance that they had nothing to do with
Watergate, were sensitive and classified with national security over-
tones, should not be part of the FBI files, were political dynamite and
clearly should not see the light of day. He said he had not told Mr.
Petersen all of this. I told Mr. Dean that, if, as I had been assured,
these files were of the character he described and had nothing to do
with Watergate he ought not to be discussing them at all but that, if
he did, he should at least tell Mr. Petereen the full story of their sig-
nificance and the instructions to me.
Within a few days after this call, perhaps the next day, I called John
Eiirlichman. This is the conversation which, unknown to me, John
Ehrlichman tape-recoi'ded. I believe this committee has a transcript
of that tape. I believe this call to be a call reflected in my logs as made
on March 6, 197-3, at 6 r-U p.m. I come to this conclusion in substantial
part because at the outset of the conversation the transcript reports
me as informing Ehrlicliman that during my confirmation hearings
"this morning," members of the Judiciary Committee received copies
of a letter from the American Civil Liberties Union objecting to my
offer that members of the Judiciai-y Committee could examine the
entire FBI Watergate file. The transcript of my confirmation hearings
reveals that such a letter was received by the committee on the morning
of March 6.
The transcript of this conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman also
reveals that 1 state to Mr. Ehrlichman that : "I am being pushed
awfully hard in certain areas and I am not giving an inch and you
know those areas." The assumption appears to have been made by
Mr. Ehrlichman and by various membei-s of this committee in their
questioning of Mr. Eiirlichman that the "certain areas" in which I was
being pushed was the receipt by the FBI of the contents of Hunt's safe.
In fact the subject of the contents of Hunt's safe did not arise in my
confirmation hearings until the next day, IVIarch 7.
I was being pushed, however, with respect to my turning over FBI
reports to Mr. Dean and it was clear to me that my relationship with
]Mr. Dean was coming under increasing criticism by members of the
Judiciary Committee. There is no doubt that I was concerned that the
3470
committee would, as it subsequently did, inquire into the circumstances
of the turnover to the FBI of the contents of Hunt's safe. Because of
the instructions I had received from Messrs. Dean and Ehrlichman
when the two files were given to me and my absolute conviction that
these files, tinged with political and national security implications,
had nothing whatsoever to do with Watergate, I had no intention of
volunteering to the committee my receipt and destiiiction of these files
and did not do so. I would not and did not make any false statements
under oath but I acknowledge that I purposely did not volunteer this
information to the committee.
I justified my reticence not only because I then believed in the recti-
tude of the administration whose nominee I was and in the integrity
of the men who gave me the files and instructions, but because my brief
look at the file of State Department cables had confirmed for me
what I thought were overwhelming considerations of national security.
I had no way of knowing then, of course, that the cables were fab-
ricated nor, I might add, did I know then what I have since learned —
that I was being left, in Mr. Ehrlichman's elegant phrase, to "hang
there and twist slowly in the wdnd."
It was in this context, and knowing that Mr. Dean had already told
Mr. Petersen about the files, that I had my conversation with Mr.
Ehrlichman on March (5. There is no doubt that the message I intended
to give to Mr. Ehrlichman was that he should tell Mr. Dean that he
should not disclose the delivery to me of those two files.
At about 10 :?)0 p.m. on the evening of April 15, 1973, I received a
call from Mr. Ehrlichman. His remarks Avere very short, terse, and to
the point. He simply told me that Dean had been talking to the prose-
cutors for some time and "we think you ouglit to know about it." It
was ob\'ious from his tone and the manner in which he spoke that no
questions wei-e invited and none were asked. I merely said thanks as he
was hanging up the phone. I may have said, "Good evening, John'" or
"Hello, John'" when I picked up the phone and it is my firm recollec-
tion that he started talking right away and made no response.
At shortly after 11 p.m. Ehrlichman called me again. This time his
remarks were just as short, terse, and to the point. He said. "Dean has
been talking about the files he gave you and you better check your hole
card."
I said, "John, those pa[)ers were destroyed long ago."
Again it was plain and obvious from his tone and the manner in
which he spoke that no questions were invited and none were asked.
Both of these calls were of extremely short duration, less than 15
seconds each. His manner was fast talking and he seemed tense.
I know that Mr. Ehrlichman has testified that in these conversations
I told him I would deny i-eceiving the files and asked him to support
me in that denial. I have absolutely no recollection of such an exchange
and believe that both conversations were substantially as I have
described them. I realize that the conversations may have been
recorded without my knowledge.
On Monday, April IG, 1973, at 10:54 a.m.. Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Petersen came to see me. He said that Mr. Dean told the prose-
cutoi-s he had turned over two of Hunt's files to me. I denied that I had
received them. Mr. Petersen went on to say that Mr. Dean had said
these two files had nothine: to do with Watergate. He also said that
3471
Mr. Dean told the prosecutors that Mr. Ehrlichman had said to him,
"Dean, you drive across the bridge each day, throw them in the river."
I was extremely troubled at my denial to Mv. Petersen. I slept little,
if any, that night.
On Tuesday, April 17, 1973, at approximately 9 a.m., I placed a call
to Mr. Petersen on my private line. He was not in and I left word. He
called me back and, at my request, we met in my office later in the
morning. I started our meeting by admitting that Dean had given me
two white manila files in Ehrlichman's office. He asked if I had them
and I told him 1 had burned them. He asked if I knew what was in
them. I told him I had not read the files. He said, "The assistant U.S.
attorneys will want you before the Federal grand jury."
On Wednesday, April 25, 1973, 1 telephoned Senator Weicker asking
to meet with him. For a week I had thought about this matter and of
Senator "Weicker's staunch and valiant support of me and his warm
friendship. I had a duty to tell him of these two files, yet my shame
was so deep that it was hard to pick up the phone and call.
Senator Weicker and I met twice that day in my office and again
the next day. I told him the manner in which I had received the files,
that I had not read them, and that I had torn them in half and thrown
them in my burn wastebaskets under my desk in my office on Julv 3,
1972, after returning from a visit to the San Diego and Phoenix field
divisions. We discussed this subject at gi-eat length and he questioned
me intensively on the entire matter. I persisted in my assei-tions to him
that I had not read them, and that I had thrown them in my bum
wastebaskets in my office on July 3, 1972.
I really cannot explain why I failed to tell Senator AVeicker all the
facts at this time and made the misstatements to him concerning the
date I destroyed the files and my knowledge of what one of them con-
tained. A sense of shame is all I can remember. I suppose I felt, in
some irrational way, that I would look better in his eyes if I had
destroyed them pi'omptly and never looked at them. I have subse-
quently revealed all the facts of the matter to Senator Weicker, the
statf of this committee, the prosecutors, and the grand jury.
At the time I accepted the two files from Dean and Ehrlichman, at
the time I destroyed them, and on the several occasions, prior to my
denial to Henry Petersen on April 16, in which I resisted disclosure of
the fact that I had received and destroyed the documents, I believed
that I was acting faithfully, loyally, properly, and legally pursuant to
instructions given me by top assistants to the President of the United
States. I have come to believe, however, what I should have realized
then, that my accei:)tance of the documents in the first place, and my
keeping them out of the normal FBI files, was a grievous misjudgment.
My destroying them and resistance of disclosure only compounded the
error. That the documents were not in fact Watergate evidence, while
legally significant, does not lessen my present belief that I permitted
myself to be used to perform a mere political chore. I shall carry the
burden of that act with me always.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement, sir.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Gray, the committee got copies of your state-
ment late and both counsels for the committee have not had an oppor-
tunity to study it, and it is almost 4 o'clock, after 5 days of hearings
3472
hei-e, and if you have no objection, the committee will postpone the
niterrogation until Monday,
Mr. GR.VY. Mr. Chairman, I am at the command of the committee.
Senator Jlrvix. The connnittee will stand in adionmment until 9 -30
Monday morning.
[Whereupon, at 3 :46 p.m., the committee was adiourned until Mon-
day, August 6, 1973, at 9 :30 a.m.] ^
MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington^ D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 9 :45 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and Weicker.
Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief
counsel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lcnzner, assistant
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. INIayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel ; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt. office of Senator Inouye; Robert
Baca, office of Senator Montoya; Ron McMalian, assistant to Senator
Baker ; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker ; Ray St. Armand,
assistant publications clerk.
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will examine the witness.
Mr. Dash. My. Chairman, INIr. Rufus Edmisten, deputy chief coun-
sel, Avill question the witness. I would like to state, Mr. Chairman,
with your permission, that before Mr. Edmisten begins, that as we
approach the recess period, I would like to state that the hearings
have had the untiring support of the entire staff, secretaries, assistant
chief counsel, and all staff meml)ers around the clock, but the assistance
given to the committee and the untiring assistance given by Rufus
Edmisten, deputy chief counsel, has really assisted us in having the
kind of successful hearings we liave had. As chief counsel I want to
make this ]:>ublic statement concerning the aid I have been given by
INIr. Rufus Edmisten, deputy chief counsel.
Mr. Eomistex. In the words of Senator Ervin. I would like to thank
Mr. Dash for his eloquent prevarication on my behalf.
Mr. Gray, for the record, would you state your name and address?
TESTIMONY OF LOUIS PATRICK GRAY III— Resumed
Mr. Gray. Yes. It is Louis Patrick Gray III, Stonington, Conn.
Mr. EnisnsTEN. INIr. Grav, I am going to ask you a few questions
regarding vour background and how you came into the Nixon admm-
istration. I believe you attended Rice'Univei-sity and graduated from
the U.S. Naval Academy in 1940, is that correct?
(3473)
3474
Mr. Gray. That is correct. I attended Rice^ — it was then Rice Insti-
tute — from 1932 to 1936 in Houston, Tox., and tlien entered the Naval
Academy, <jraduated in 19-10.
Mr. Edmistex. And then for a special prog:i-am you entered Georo;e
Washington University Law School and received vour J.D. degree
in 1949.
Mr. Gray, Yes. 1 was selected to attend law school under the Navy's
postgraduate law }:)rogram.
Mr. Edmistkn. Your entire career was spent as a naval officer until
your retirement in 1960, T believe.
Mr. Gray. That is correct, sir. I served on battleships for II/2 yeai"S
and then in submarines for the balance of my career.
Mr. Edmisten. Then you engaged in the practice of law and in cer-
tain business endeavors in C^onnecticut from 1961 to 1969, and then
you came on board as the executive assistant to Mr. Robert Finch, I
believe, at HEW.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Edmistex. Wliat did you do down there?
Mr. Gray. As Mr. Finch's executive assistant, I helped him in the
transition as the Nixon administration came in and I guess you would
say I was his man Friday. I worked from 6 :30 in the morning to 9 or
10 o'clock in the evening and worked at standup desks there in my
office and handled primarily all of the paperwork and all of the deal-
ings with the assistant secretaries and with the other personal staff
members of the Secretary, and in general the operation of the Office
of the Secretary was pretty much in my hands subject to the Secre-
tary's desires.
Mr. Edmistex. Mr. Gray, w^hen did you first become acquainted with
President Nixon ?
Mr. Gray. My i-ecollection is that it goes back to when I was a fresh-
man in law school and the President was a freshman Congressman and
it was at a party out at the Chevy Chase Club to which I had been
invited by the doctor who had really saved my life during the war,
Mr. Edmistex. Now, I understand that you served on Mr. Nixon's
personal staff from the date of your retirement from the Navy on
June 30, 1960, until the election in 1960 and then you served again on
his campaign staff in 1968.
Would you say from those two experiences that you have a close
personal relationship with the President? "^'NHiat is your relationship
with the President ?
Mr. Gray. Mr. Pxlmisten, I serA'ed from June 30 when I retired from
the Navy and wont over to room 361, Senate Office Building, until
shortly after January 1961. I served primarily as what I would call a
logistician. INly first joli, for example, was working with analysts with
regard to handling of the mail. During that campaign I had a lot to do
with obtaining space. I put together an organization known as Retired
i\.rmed Services Men for Nixon. T i^ut together a group of lawyers and
got a volunteer organization set up in the Solar Building basement
here in Wasliington to answer mail. It was that type of tiling. But,
Mr. Edmisten, T did not serve in the campaign of 196S. The only thing
I did in the campaign of 19(),S was prepai-e a lettei" for the Pi-esident's
signature going to the National Association of Small Business Irtvest-
mont Companies ivgarding tlie Ptosiflent's position Avith reference to
3475
NASBIC, But I was not active in the campaign of 1968 at all other
than doing that paper at the request, as I remember, of Dr. Glenn Olds.
Mr. Edmisten. You would say, then, that you have not been a close
personal friend of Presidents but a casual acquaintance over the years.
Mr. Gray. Our relationship has been more professional than per-
sonal and I don't think the President would consider it personal and it
would be presumptuous of me to say that. A lot of people like to bask
in the glory of the President and maybe I am human enough to want
to do it, too, but the facts are, as he would probably say himself, that
our relationship is professional, that of a centurion to the Senate. It
was that kind of thing.
Mr. Edmisten. After you served w^ith Mr. Finch at HEW and went
back to law practice again and then I noticed in your biographical
sketch that you were a special consultant to the President's Cabinet
Committee on Education. What was that ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. I was asked to come back and work with the
Cabinet Committee on Education because apparently there was some
intelligence in making the transition from the unitary — the segregated
school system to the desegregated school system in some southern
States was going to be difficult and the President's Cabinet Committee
on Education wanted citizens State advisory committees set up and I
was asked to go into Mississippi first and then into Georgia and work
with leading citizens of those two States, black and white, who were
not really actively engaged in politics. This was to be a citizen effort
and I went into Mississippi for 6 weeks and then I went over into
Georgia and I set up both of those two State advisory committees and
then other people picked up the work thereafter based on the work
that had been done in those two States.
Mr. Edmisten. Now, Mr. Gray, I will just briefly state and you can
agree or disagree, that in 1970 you were nominated to be Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, and you were confirmed by the
Senate. Then in February 1972 you were nominated to be Deputy
Attorney General and I notice from the record that you never became
Deputy Attorney General. What happened?
Mr. Gray. I was Deputy Attorney General-designate and we had —
Mr. Kleindionst and I had appeared before the C-ommittee on the Judi-
ciary and as I — I think that my name was reported out by the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary but a newspaper ai"ticle, a columnist,
Mr. Anderson's column, as I recall, came out and Mr. Kleindienst
asked that his liearings be reopened. That column had to do with cer-
tain charges made in connection with the ITT settlement.
Mr. Edmisten. Did I interrupt you ? Sorry.
Mr. Gray. No. I just wanted to say that that reopening of Mr.
Kleindienst's hearings stopped any further action with regard to my
nomination. I continued as Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
and Deputy Attorney General-designate.
Mr. Edmisten. Is it fair to say, with the exception of a couple of
interim years of private practice of law, that you spent your entire
adult life devoted to Government service of one kind or another?
Mr. Gray. Yes. That could be correct except for those years you
have already enumerated, Mr. Edmisten.
Mr. Edmisten. I noticed in your prepared statement that you
devoted a substantial part of it to^our recollections and those of Gen-
eral Walters regarding conversations he had with you, with others
3476
and with the President. I do not intend to question you in that area. I
will leave it to minority counsel and to the members of the committee.
But I have some questions and I don't want you to infer in any way
that I am attemptinrr to browbeat you or be discourteous but I think
they are ({uestions that have to be asked regarding other phases that
were not mentioned very substantially in your statement.
In your statement you say that when the Watergate break-in
occurred on the 17th that you were in California and you returned
to Washington and you state that on June 21 you received a telephone
call from ^Ir. John Ehrlichman at the White House and he informed
you that John Dean would be handling the "Wliite House investigation
of the AVatergate affair. I think he also told you that John Dean would
be the only one handling the investigation.
Now, at this point how well did you know John Ehrlichman, and
how well do you know him now ?
Mr. Gray. I think that during the campaign of 1960, if I remember
correctly, INIr. Haldeman was the chief advance man and Mr. Ehrlich-
man was an advance man then in that campaign and I knew them only
in that capacity. I had no personal relationship or no close contact
with them at all, and coming back into Government in the Nixon
administration as executive assistant to Secretary Finch, my rela-
tions with both Mr. Haldeman and ]\Ir. Ehrlichman were professional,
on the telephone, that sort of thing.
It is not a social relationship, never has been, I have never been
in Mr. Ehrlichman's home and he has never been in my home. Ours
has been purely a working professional relationship in the respective
position in which we have found ourselves.
Mr. Edmisten. How well did you know John Dean?
Mr. Gray, I met Mr. Dean for the first time at the time of the 1971
demonstrations when he was at a meeting in the Attorney General's
conference room and I asked some people later on who that particular
individual was and I was told who he was. That is when I first met
Mr. Dean ; first knew who Mr. Dean was.
Mr. Edmisten. Did you meet with Mr. John Dean in an area around
your apartment on one of the first two Sundays in July? I think
maybe in one of your interviews you thought it was the first Sunday.
Did you have that meeting ?
Mr. Gray, Yes, sir ; after some 3 months of reconstruction and work-
ing over notes, memorandums, records, logs, and talking with my wife,
regarding this entire matter, I did have a meeting with Mr, Dean on
either Sunday, June 25, or Sunday, July 2,
Mr, Edmisten, What were the circumstances that Mr, Dean would
be at your apartment?
Mr. Gray. Mr. Dean called me, as I recollect, called me on the tele-
phone on a Sunday morning and said that he wanted to meet with me
and wanted to talk with me and I said "Well, fine, we can meet in my
office in the Department,'' and he stated that this would not be practical
because of the fact that there are not too many people present at the
Department on Sunday and that it would be easily noticed that he
would be coming into the Department of Justice and there would be
another leak and I suggested, "All right, we can meet over here, my
apartment is very small, we cannot meet in the apartment but we can
meet over here," and we agreed to meet over at the apartment and I
met him outside the apartment and we walked around the apartment
3477
building and sat down and chatted on a bench overlooking the channel
there. This is in Southwest Washington in Harbonr Square
apartments.
Mr. Edmisten. So, Mr. Dean at that time was saying that tliere pos-
sibly would be improper inferences drawn or improper appearance if
he would go directly to your office or you were to go directly to his
office ?
Mr. Gray. Xo; I did not take him to be saying that, I took him to be
saying there would have been another leak. Dean would have been seen
entering the Department of Justice but I did not really in fairness and
in honesty, take him to be saying this was an improper thing to be
doing.
Mr. Edmistex. At this meeting with Mr. Dean did he discuss with
you his desire that you turn over any FBI documents relating to the
Watergate investigation to him ?
Mr. Gray. I cannot be absolutely certain. I know that one of the first
remarks he made was that this was a heck of a note when the Acting
Director of the FBI and the counsel to the President have to meet on
a park bench in order to avoid leaks. We could have discussed on that
particular Sunday afternoon the various theories of the case that the
FBI had had and had been considering and that he and I had already
discussed. We could have discussed the leaks that were rampant in
that first 2-week period and it is entirely possible that he could have
raised with me the question of making available to him the FBI mate-
rials available to me for his use in the conduct of his inquiry. I cannot
state it with that kind of certainty but I can say that it is entirely
possible. My recollection is and my remembrance is as that subject was
raised in a telephone call with Mr. Dean following that Sunday
meeting.
Mr. Edmistex. So that the first occasion you turned over any kind of
FBI documents to Mr. Dean was when ?
INIr. Gray. To the best of my recollection, following this meeting on
the bench there at the Harbour Square apartments, a phone call ensued
during the week and it was in that phone call that Mr. Dean raised
the question of making available to him the materials, FBI file mate-
rials that were available to me.
Mr. Edmisten. Was that around July 9 or something like that ?
Mr. Gray. I would say that I believe it to be in the week of July 9.
Mr. Edmisten. Now, the first thing then, that you turned over to
Mr. Dean were FBI teletypes, is that true ?
Mr. Gray. That is correct. He asked me if I would make available to
him FBI file materials that I had available to me.
Mr. Edmisten. What are teletypes?
Mr. Gray, The teletypes are the orders and instructions that are
issued to the field by the FBI headquarters, by me, the Acting Director,
and they can be reports of summaries of investigations conducted m
the field, they are brief summaries, three or four lines on each facet,
they can be any number of other things, they could consist of deeds,
sent out for interviews, that type of material.
Mr. Edmisten. Can they be fairly described as raw FBI materials?
Mr. Gray. I have never really understood what "raw FBI mate-
rials" are, Mr. Edmisten, and I think lots of confusion has been gen-
erated about that. When the FBI sets up a file and starts a file we
begin with the first serial in the file, then everything goes in it. There
3478
could 1)0 evaluations in there, there could be teletypes of the kind that
I am talkino- about, there could be reports of inter\-iews, FT-o02s,
there could be anonymous letters that are uncvaluated, that type of
thing. This was material that eventually found its way into the FBI
Watergate investigative file.
Mr. Edmisten. Now let's go chronologically. Do I understand on
July 17 Mr. Dean requested that you give him a summary of the
various events that had transpired in connection with the investiga-
tion ? Did you accommodate his request ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir; he asked me if I could prepare, cause to be
prepared a. summary of the status of the investigation to date and I
discussed with him the format and told him I thought that should be
in the form of a letterhead memorandum Avhich was the type of format
that we used in preparing such summaries and I told him that I
thought tliat this should be addressed to the Attorney General, as was
the case in such a format.
Then I know I had a telephone conversation with Mr. Felt con-
cerning that and this was a type of thing that was regularly done in
accordance with the FBI standard operating procedure, in fact it had
been proposed as of June 19 and I stopped it at that time. I got the
opinion from our Office of Legal Counsel and I think my instructions
to Mr. Felt were, as I remember it, just to have the Assistant Director
in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel prepare an opinion having to
do with this subject matter and such an opinion was indeed prepared.
However, at the time I had the telephone conversation with ]Mr. Felt I
told him that I thought this was proper and I would do it even if
Senator INIcGovern were President.
Those are my exact words to Mr. Felt. I felt it was proper but what
I was trying to do with the memorandum was try to set up some stand-
ards and procedures for the deliveries of FBI material through the
Cabinet officer, through the political officer.
Mr. Edmisten. I am going to question you about that memorandum
in a moment, but going back to the teletypes, what were the circum-
stances surrounding the turning over of the teletypes ? Did he come to
you, did you go to him, or what ?
INIr. Gray. In that telephone conversation I asked him if he had the
proper safeguards for this material, could he keep it in safety in his
office. I don't know whether I mentioned a four-drawer tumbler lock
safe, the appropriate type of safeguard, but I was interested in whether
or not he could safeguard it, and he assured me that he could and he
did have the facilities to do it, then he said he wanted to send Mr. Field-
ing over to pick them up.
I said, no, that you would have to come OA^er and pick them up
yourself and T recollect that he asked me if he could come ovei- and
read them in the office and I said. "No, that would be impractical be-
cause there are too many people in and out of my office all day long, a
constant stream of people and constant stream of ])hone calls and con-
stant stream of mail." and I turned that down and he did come over and
he did receive them from me in a brown Government-issued type brief-
case, the kind that I have with me today, behind me.
Mr. EoMisTEN. All right.
Mr. Gray. I delivered them to him pei-sonally.
3479
Mr. Edmisten. We have heard a lot of talk about FBI 302 forms.
Just what is an FB 1 302 ?
Mr. Gray. FBI 302, Mr. Edmisten, is a report of interview. It is not
an investigative report. It is a part of an investigative report and it is
merely the agent's recounting of the interview that he had with the
individual Ijcing interviewed.
Mr. Edmisten. Now, is it true that on July 26, 1972, in response to,
I would cliarge it as a demand, you can tell me if it wasn't, a demand
from Mr. Dean that you gave him several FBI 302s?
Mr. Gray. It is my best recollection, Mr. Edmisten, it was in that
time, that week, the 26th, 27th, 28th, that Mr. Dean called and
requested that I make available to him the interview reports that I
had available and I did, and I believe my best recollection is that those
were [)icked up once again by him on July 28. Those were two groups
of interview reports, FBI form 302s that I had. A group delivered to
me — I think the first group was delivered to me on June 30, the second
group delivered to me on July 17
Mr. P^DMiSTEX. Xow, you told Mr. Dean that he could have what had
been given to you, of course, there were tliousands of volumes of other
materials that didn't come directly to you that, of course, Mr. Dean
didn't get.
Mv. Gray. That is correct. That is correct.
Mr. EDMisn:x. When you were Acting Director, I think you men-
tioned a moment ago, Mr. Felt. Who was he ?
Mr. Gray. W. Mark Felt was my xVcting Associate Director in the
Federal Bureau of In\estigation when I served as Acting Director.
Mr. Edmisten. Who was Mr. Dalbey ?
Mr, Gray. Mr. Dalbey was the Assistant Director in charge of the
( )fhce of TiOgal Counsel and very wise counsel.
Mr. Edmisten. I have a memorandum here that you referred to a
moment ago which is dated July 20, 1972, to Mr. Felt from Mr. D. J.
Dalbey and the subject is dissemination of infoiTnation, the "White
House, criminal cases.
Xow, I would appreciate it if you could identify' this memorandum.
It is No. 63 in your files — if we could have one taken down, please —
if you could identify that and if you would look at the bottom page of
it and the supplemental memorandum that goes with it and tell me if
those are your notations on the bottom of the back page of each
memorandum ?
Mr. Gray. Mr. Edmisten, I do not have that supplemental
memorandum.
Mr. Edmisten. It is 65 in your file.
Mr. Gray. Yes. I recognize both of these and these are exhibits 63
and exhibit^ — exhibits 63 and 65 of the more than 200 exhibits that we
have submitted to the committee, right.
Mr. Edmisten. What is the notation on the back page of the primary
memorandum ? It is in your handwriting, you said ?
Mr. Gray. The last sentence in the memorandum is : "The authority
and the obligation of the FBI is to keep the Attorney General fully
informed and to leave the rest to him," and I underlined that and
drew a line from it and stated, "Do so in this particular case and in
all future cases," and signed it G, III, 7:20, 8:57 p.m.
Mr. Edmisten. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request that these two
memorandums be properly identified and inserted in the record.
3480
Senator Ervin. Without objection, they will be marked appropri-
ately as exhibits and admitted as such.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 189* and
140.**]
Mr. Edmisten. I know you mentioned this memorandum a moment
ago but I want to read certain portions of it and — first of all. you had
this memorandum written, did you not, INIr. Gray ?
Mr. Gray. Yes. I asked thut this memorandum be prepared.
]\Ir. Edinitstex. And your desire to be informed "on the legal basis
for dissemination by the FBI to the White House of information con-
cerning a ci'iminal case being investigated, more specifically a case
being investigated as a ci'iminal case foi- pi-osecution, involving viola-
tion of title 18. Ignited States Code, and which does or may imjilicate
Federal employees or subjects" — now, we are talking about the Watei--
gato case, are we not ?
Mr, Gray. That is correct, and T do not think there was any doubt
in anybodv's mind that that is what we were talking about.
]\Ir. EnMTSTEX. Now. you asked for this memorandum, did you not,
in response to Mr. Dean's demands for your FBI materials? He
wanted to know what to do about it.
jNfr. Gray. I asked for it in connection with the preparation of the
letterhead memorandum summarizing the investigation which was the
renuest made by Mr. Dean.
INIr. ED]\rTST7:x. Then the memoi-andum went on to further state that
"any information provided to the Wiite House by the FBI should be
channeled through the Attornev General'- and it is stated "the require-
ments are that wo follow the chain of command and not bvpass anv
link in it. This means that we advise the Wiite House, if at all, through
the Attorney General and not around him,'' and then the supplemental
to that memorandum, Mr. Grav, listed certain exceptions where the
White House can be informed of FBI materials directly if they have
to do with domestic or forei<ni intelligence.
Xow, the back page of that supplemental memorandum also reads:
. . . matters which the President necessarily acts more directly on his own
initiative than is the case with the criminal law. Tlins, there seems qnite a rea-
sonable distinction between a constant flow of advice to the "\;Miite House on
matters of criminal law on the one hand and on matters of domestic and foreign
intelligence on the other.
Now, ]\Ir. Grav, T know we miffht have some interp'-etations that are
different on a Ici^al memorandum of this nature but did not that memo-
randum reall V sav that. "Look, we in the FBI are not su]:)|iosed to turn
over to the White House unless we did it through channels" because
you did that when vou sent vour memorandum to INIr. Dean throujrh
the Attornev General on the 21st, T believe, and then is it not true, INfr.
Grav, that vou turned right around after vou procured this memo-
randum and turned over a whole batch of .S02's to Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Gray. T think. Mr. Edmisten, before T answer that question I
should refer iust a little bit to the policv within the Denni-tment and
within the Federal Bureau of luA^estiffation and what INIr. Hoover's
practice had been to send over an>i:hing that the Director desired to
send over.
*Spe p. 3,94.S.
►♦See p. 3846.
3481
My objective here in asking for this opinion was limited solely to
a letterhead memorandum which wo had to initiate. We had to take
material already resting within our files, pull it all together, distill it,
and put it together in a form of a letterhead memorandum summariz-
ing the status of the case, and I think that you also find the language
in our exhibit 63 here that we are referring to in which it says :
We did not consider the matter of disseminating such information to the
\Miife House on specific White House retiuest.
And in this later situation we assume since the President is the top
boss of the executive branch, he can obtain from that branch any
information he wishes. This is a different matter legally and otherwise
from the one in which we would on our own decision initiate dissemi-
nation of the information.
So we were dealing, I think, ]Mr. Edmisten, with a different type of
situation. At least I, at that time, envisioned that in that manner and
what I was trying to do, my objective was to begin to set up formalized
standard procedures within the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
the dissemination of information but there is no doul)t in my mind that
when the counsel to the President of the United States asked for in-
formation I was going to giv^e it to him and I did, sir.
Mr. Edmistex. Well, you sent the memorandum through channels,
through the Attorney General.
Mi-. Gray. Yes, sir.
Mr. Edmistex. And then I mentioned that you sent the 302's directly
to Mr. Dean.
Xow, we might Idc using Senator Ervin's lightning bug concept of
hindsight right now but do you not know that 302's are more impor-
tant than any memorandum because they contain the raw data that
FBI agents collect from all over the country, innuendo. When Mr.
Kleindienst came I remember first to this committe, to Senator Ervin
and Senator Baker and Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson and I were in
the room and Mr. Kleindienst said very specifically to Senator P^rvin
and Senator Baker, 'T will not have raw FBI data spread around in-
discriminately,'' and so it has been the position of the President and
Attorney General Kleindienst that the raw data is by far the most
important. So I am saying you sent the memorandum through channels
and then, Mr. Gray, in spite of Mr. Dean being counsel to the Presi-
dent, you gave him the 302's.
Mr." Gray, Yes, sir; and you must make a distinction again I think
})etween raw data and what I sent to him. There was no raw data in
these teletypes. This was not unevaluated information. This was not
anonymous letters and that type of thing and, as a matter of fact,
Mr. Edmisten, when we were considering what type of material to be
sent to the Ervin Select Subcommittee, my position was at the incep-
tion and was throughout to send everything that we had because there
wasn't anj-thing in there of the type of material that is so often
referred to as raw data, this anonvmous stuff, this inuendo, and this
sort of thing. That tvpe of material was not in the FBI investigative
file of the Watergate'investigation and I think you can look at it today
and go right down through it.
Mr. Edmistex. Well, 302 is not evaluated either.
Mr. Gray. No.
3482
Mr. EnMisTEN. It is only an agent's written remembrance from Avliat
he elicited from some witness.
Mv. Gkay. That is correct. That is correct. It is merely what he
remembere of his inter\iew with the pei'son interviewed.
]\rr. Edmistex. Did you consult with Mr. l\'tersen and Mr. Klein-
dienst about the advisability of ^ivin<; the FBI data to Mr. Dean?
Mr. Gray. No. sir ; I did not.
Mr. Edmistex. "Why did you not?
Mr. (tray. I didn't do it because I thought I was the Acting Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and when I hav^e a request
from the counsel to the Piesident of the Ignited States I don't have to
go run around to the Attorney General and to the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Gi-iminal Division and ask them to hold my
hand and help me respond in making a decision. I did not do that and
I would not do that.
Mr. Edmistex. I don't mean to quibble Avith you but you had 26
j-ears of military experience and you know things about the chain of
conunand. You didn't work for jNIr. Dean, did you? Youi- direct super-
visor and your boss, so to speak, was Mr. Kleindienst, wasn't it?
Mv. (iRAY. That is correct. And also the President of the United
States is my boss and when the counsel to the President levies a request
upon me, I am going to comply with that request aiul I did comply
with it.
Mr. Edmisten. Well, if every person in departments and agencies
were to follow that rule, then I can see having to call off the Federal
Government — various counsels to the Pi-esident were called up by the
Govermnent agencies and countermand, in other words, step into the
internal operation of every agency.
Mv. Gray. I don't think that that would occur. I think the FBI
occupies a ])eculiar position with reference to the President of the
United States and that the President of the United States looks to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in a little different manner than he
does the other departments of Government.
Mr. Edmistex. You did understand, IVfr. Gray, that Dean was speak-
ing for the President of the United States. Tie said that to you. I
believe.
]\Ir. Gray. Xo question about it. I asked him specifically on two
occasions and maybe even three occasions. I can't be certain of the
third occasion so I can't testify to it under oath but I specifically
asked, "John, are you re])orting directly to the President or througli
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman?'' and he told me, "Directly to the
Pi-esident.''
Mv. Edmistex. I know Mr. Ehrlichman called you up on that first
day and said, "Mr. Dean will be handling the investigation,'' but after
that time did you ever again ask Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman
"Is John Dean able to speak for the President ?" Did you ever do that ?
Mr. Gray. Xo. The thought never entered my mind to do that. And
I didn't — you know, I didn't talk with Mr. italdeman at all during
this investigation.
I did talk with IVfr. Ehrlichman but the thought certainly never
crossed my mind to ask him again, you know, for reassurance. I asked
John Dean and I believed John Dean.
INIr. EnMis'rax. I am going to move on to that date Avhich has had a
great effect on your life, I am sure, June 28, 1972, when you met with
3483
Mr. Ehrlicliman early that morning and you told him that you would
like to see him that afternoon and you finally did go to the White
House and you met in Mr. Ehrlichman's office with Mr. Dean.
Why did you want to see Mr. Ehrlichman that day ?
Mr. Gray. On June 28, that was the day of the telephone call from
Mr. Ehrlichman in which I believe that either we set up the appoint-
ment to meet that evening with regard to the heat that I was taking
concerning the leaks that were alleged to be coming from the FBI or
that was an appointment set up by his secretary dealing indirectly
with my secretary but it was in a telephone call, Mr. Edmisten, at
11 :17 a.m. that morning. That was the call in which lie counseled my
meeting with Director Helms and Deputv Director Walters of the
CIA.
Mr. Edmisten. In your statement you made reference to the fact that
when you arrived at the 'White House and you walked into Mr.
Elirlichman's office, you were very surprised to see Mr. Dean. That sur-
prises me that you were surprised. You had spoken with him I think
16 times since the 21st and you had met with him at least once. Why
were you surprised to see John Dean in the meeting in Mr. Ehrlich-
man's office?
Mr. Gray. Because I had been let to believe — it was my understand-
ing that I was going to meet with Mr. Ehrlichman. I was not told that
anyone else was going to be there.
^Ir. Edmistex. As I mentioned a moment ago. in this meeting the
events transpired which had an unprecedented impact on your life,
and I certainly don't intend, 'Mv. Gray, to attempt in any way to brow-
])eat you or to ask any condescending questions but there are some
questions you know that should be asked.
That was the day tliat Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean handed over to
vou the contents of the Hunt safe which had not been turned over to
the FBI.
Can you reconstruct that meeting a little better than you did in your
answer? Were ]\Ir. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman acting strangely?
Mr. Gray. I didn't think that tliey were acting strangely at all; no,
I didn't notice anything strange about the meeting. I was surprised
to see John Dean there and Mr. Ehrlichman's first remarks to me were
as I remember, as closely as I can remember it. "John Dean has some-
thing to turn over to you."
]\Ir. Edmistex. I notice in your statement, there was no indication
that 3'ou at any time made any resistance to taking any files.
Mr. Gray, t asked the question wlietlier or not these files should
become a pai-t of the FBI files and I was told no, but if you are asking
me did I resist and did I say no, I don't want these files or you keep
them yourself ; no. I did not.
Mr.' Edmistex. Xow Mr. Dean said that the files had national secu-
rity implications, they were political dynamite, they were absolutely
not connected with the Watergate, and I know you have asked yourself
this fjuestion probably dozens of times, why didn't you tell Mr. Dean
and Mr. Ehrlichman to take their own files and destroy them ?
Mr. Gray. I don't think that the thought ever entered my mind to do
that. Tliese men were telling me that these are sensitive, they were
classified, thev had national security implications with political over-
tones, had absolutely nothing to do with Watergate. As I recall it was
either Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Dean who said they should not be
3484
aHowed to iniiddv tho issues in tlic Watergate case, and tlien it was in
conchision tliat, Mr. Doan cmpliasizod tlu naiional sornrity iin])l!<'a-
ticns Siiid t^K' fact tlii-.t tl-ty avi it political dynamite and clearly should
not set tlu ]i<rht of day. 1 was roceivino orders front (he counsel to tho
President and one of two top assistants to the Piesident and T was not
al) mt to que!-tion those.
Mr. Ki>]\:iSTEN. You had been in fre([uer;t contact with Mr, AValters
and Mr. Helms, did it occur to you in that meeting, since the papers
w'oe not rolatecl to Watergate, you mi<iht su<x<i;est to ]Mr. Ehrlichman
and ^Fr. Dean they turn them over to Mr. Helms or Mr. Walters^
Mr. (JrxAV. No, sir, I didn't think that.
Mr. Enisris'iT.x. Did you ever think that after you took the files out
youi"Self, miirht these not involve Water<2:ate, why shouldn't 1 turn
them over to Mr. Waltei-s, I have had a <ri'eat relationshii) with him.
Mr. Gray. I dichi't know whether they involved CIA, didn't know
what they involved in that point of time. In point of fact ijoinfji: back
to that period, those files were not of that moment to me because of
assurances that I had received that they had absolutely nothin<r to do
with Watertrate and were not connected with "Watertjate in any way.
]\Ir. Kn^iisTEX. You held those files for approximately (> months, and
I am not ffoing to ask questions about the different vei-sions of where
you <rot them or wliether yon looked at them or didn't, but your final
testimony is that yon took them to Connecticut and you burned them
with the Christmas trash. I just w-ant to know what kind of state of
mind were you in to hold those so-called explosive files for that amount
of time and never look at tlieni.
]\Ir. Gray. I didn't ])elieve they were explosive files in the first place.
I was told they had absolutely nothino- to do with AVaterofate and had
no connection with Watergate and on the basis of all my backirround,
training', and experience, I had no neeel to know and I wasn't concerned
about lookin*;. I didn't have the natural curiosity of the cat or of the
female. In hindsi<jrht, orranted, God knows, I should have looked at
those files, I should have looked at them that eveninc: in the office and
said if I hael looked at them that evenin»j; in the office T would have
said give these to the State Dei)artment.
When I did look at them just before burning them I saw they were
State Department cables, what I believed to be bona fide State Depart-
ment cables, but they weren't of that moment to me so that the burning
was on my mind every single day.
Mr. Edmistkx. When you had that little brief glimpse of these
cables at that time with your Christmas burning trash, you saw that
they involved the State Department. Did it occur to you at that mo-
ment. I can give these to the State Department now. I know they are
not in my bailiwick and I haven't been the recipient of withholding
somethijig from my own Agency ?
Why didn't you trive them to the State Dejiai-tment at that time?
Mr. Gray. No, I didn't think in those terms at all and I must lionestly
say that to you, T wish I had, I wish I had brought them back, I wished
a hundivd thousand times T had been a blackmailer or a leverage man
or an edgeman to hold those things, you know, and have them and be
able to i)roduce them in front of this connnittee today, but the facts
are otherwise. I carried out my orders and I desti'oved them, in fact I
was ashamed of what I read in that dispatch to believe that my Govern-
3485
ment would bo involved in that kind of an eflfort to assassinate the
President of another nation.
Mr. Edmistkx. Who, in your mind, when you were burning the pa-
pers, did you think wanted them burned, the President, John Ehrlich-
nian, Jolin Dean, somabody else ?
Mr, Gray. I really can't be sure of that. I felt that I was taking
orders from the counsel to the President and the assistant to the
President but I have got to say in all honesty and fairness and decency
if I had looked at those files that evening and saw what they were and
said to those two men I want a written order from the President before
I am going to take these files, I don't think I would have gotten that
order.
Mr. Edmisten'. I am going to ask just a couple of questions about
the scope of your investigation, not in any way to impugn any individ-
ual FBI agent, not to impugn you, or not to investigate the investi-
gators. Now in a recent article published in the August 1973 Armed
Forces Journal, Mr. McCord set forth some gaps in the FBI investi-
gation which he considered to be fundamental.
Now, some of those questions raised by ]Mr. McCord and bear repeat-
ing here to see if you can shed some light on it.
First of all, he suggested that it was absurd for the FBI not to have
interviewed every employee of the Committee To Re-Elect the
President.
^Vhat about that, Mr. Gray ?
Mr. Gray. Suffice it to say that the professionals within the FBI
felt that the leads ran to (\() employees of the Committee To Re-Elect
the President and we had no additional leads to interview any other
people and I would like to say as a general comment, if I may, that
the professionals in charge of this investigation have stated categori-
cally that they were never restricted, limited, or refused in any way
with regard to running out any leads that they wished to run out, with
the exception of the delay in the Central Intelligence Agency inter-
views of Senor Manuel Ogarrio and Mr. Dahlberg which I previously
related in my statement.
Mr. Edmisten. I am going to leave other details until later, but Mr.
McCord cited in the aiticle a situation involving him personally. He
says in the ai-ticle that if he had been interviewed by a friendly FBI
agent, one in whom he had trust, that he would have confessed but
"there is evidence that senior supervisory personnel of the FBI tried
to get approval to get to me seeking a confession in July 1972 but were
turned down at the highest levels," What is to that ?
Mr, Gray, I do not know what Mr, McCord is referring to at the
highest levels and I can only speculate as to what he may be referring
to and I can tell you and it is among the exhibits w^hich I have already
turned over to the committee, I believe it was on June 28 that the
meeting that I had at 2 :30 in the afternoon with Mr, Felt and Mr,
Bates when Mr, Bates mentioned the fact that there was a special
agent of the FBI who knew the McCords well, that this special agent
was not stationed here in the Washington field division but was in
another field division, and the suggestion was made that perhaps this
agent could go to Mrs, McCord and detemiine whether or not Mr.
McCord was willing to talk with us.
3486
I might digress for a nioineiit and say at the inception my agents
tried rigorously to interview tlic suspect and all of them refused to be
interviewed and Mr. McX^ord was no exception ; he refused to be inter-
vicAved, and this agent was Special Agent Dennis Malian, who had
talked to Senor Martinez and we caught an awful lot of heat in the
new^spapei-s because of the fact that Senor Maitinez was represented
by an attorney at that time. But nevertheless, the suggestion was made
to me that this agent be permitted to talk with Mrs. McCord and seek
to prevail upon her to determine whether or not Mr. McCord would
be willing to talk Avitli us.
I gave instructions to contact this agent, Special Agent Guthrie of
the Birmingham Field Division of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, and determine whether or not he knew the McCords, how Avell he
knew the McCords, whether or not he would be willing to contact Mrs.
McCord, as was suggested that he do, and he was contacted by Mr.
Bates and he did say that he knew the INIcCords well and he did say
that he would be willing to do anything that would assist the FBI
or the McCords. That report was made to me by Mr. Bates and I gave
it some very, ver}' serious consideration. I knew that Mr. McCord was
represented by an attorney, I knew if he wanted to talk to us he could
have made the otl'er himself, in some way could have made it known
himself in some way that he wished to talk with us. I considered that
case law on the point and I finally decided that on the basis of ethics
and Avhat had happened to us before wnth regard to Special Agent
Mahan's honest efforts to talk with Senor Martinez, that ethics and
case law" i^rohibited me permitting that to go forward, and I may be
the man that Mr. McCord is referring to at the highest levels who
turned that down, but the fact of the matter is that I turned it down at
the time when I was reviewing all of my notes here. Kecently, I said if
I had i)ermitted that to go fonvard i)erhaps ethics would not be a
consideration today, perlia])s w^e would have broken the case, but I felt
at the time that ethics and case law were against me and I cannot go
around behind that attorney's back.
INIr. Sachs. May I l^e permitted a brief legal point in connection with
Mr. Gray's latest answer?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Sachs. Thank you, ]\Ir. Chairman.
I simply want to bring to the attention of the committee the fact
that it is at least my interpretation of the Supreme Court's mandate
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. reports 436, that when a man refuses
to be intei'viewed, it is the obligation of the investigators — a man in
custody refuses to be interviewed — it is the obligation of the investi-
gators to cease the interview. In the case of Massiah v. U.S., 377
U.S. 201, really elaborates the point and make especially clear where
a man is represented by an attorney, an attempt b}^ the Govern-
ment to circumvent that relationship and to interview him, notwith-
standing without the attorney's knowledge, is also of serious question
constitutionally, and so I bring those two cases, Mr. Chairman, to the
attention of the committee because I think they support the judgment
that Mr. Gray made as well as canon 7 of the Canons of Ethics which I
think is further support for that.
Senator Ervin. I recognize that: at the same time, I think it is
worthy of observation that there was nothing to prevent the procuring
of search warrants and searching the premises of any of the accused.
3487
Mr. Sachs. Xothing with the possible exception of probable cause.
Mr. Edmistp:n. Well, Mr. McCorcl certainly goes on to say
Senator Ervin. I cannot see a lack of probable cause where a man is
caught in an act of burglary.
Mr. Gray. May I address myself to that, Mr. Chairman? We did get
a considerable number of warrants for Mr-. McC'ord with regard to his
bank accounts, McCord Associates, and all tliat, and fjuite frankly and
honestly, I do not know whether we ever asked the assistant U.S. attor-
ney for a search warrant for his home.
I believe tliat the Watergate investigative file would show that we,
after Mr. Baldwin's testimony of July 10 to us, that we did at some
time then go out there, but I cannot testify as to the fact on that
because I simply do not know whether or not the agents requested a
search warrant of the assistant U.S. attorney. They did not make such
a request to me, I can testi fy to that as a fact.
Mr. EluMiSTEx. You know nothing of Mr. McCord's assertion when
senior personnel of the FBI sought search warrants they were turned
down and before that he had talked about $18,000 in his house, lots of
electronic equipment in his care, all of this paraphernalia which would
have been leads towai'd the investigative end. You know nothing about
search w^arrants being turned down ?
Mr. Gr^vy. I turned down none, none were presented to me, I heard
no discussion about it becau.se, as I have said, we subpenaed the records
of McCord and Associates, we sub[)onaed tlie bank accounts of McCord
and Associates, we subpenaed Mr. McCord's bank account, personal
bank account, we subpenaed his other bank account that he had, I think
it was Dedicated Friends of America, but specifically, no request was
made directly to me and, as a matter of fact, search warrant requests
did not come to the acting director, by the same token, leads did not
come to the acting director. These were generated at the case agent
level working directly witli the assistant U.S. attorney. There were
very few requests to interview that came to me or to get warrants that
came to me. I know of no request for warrants that came to me.
Mr. Edmis'itx. I obviously could list a number of other things but
I believe that we can wait for that later. I want to ask you a couple
of ending questions about your confirmation hearings. "Who initially
suggested, Mr. Gray, that you be nominated as FBI Director?
Mr. Gray. I think initially this probably came up in the summer of
1971. I can remember I was the assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, then and was busily engaged in the various litigations that
were going on in connection with the injunctions involving demonstra-
tions, Vietnam veterans, and that sort of thing, and the use of Lafay-
ette Park and so on, and I can remember one meeting with former
Attorney General ]Mitchell in his office when I was reporting to him
on this litigation and he said to me, he said, "I don't want to add to
your troubles but how would you like to be considered for the position
of FBI Director?*' And I said, "General. I will serve in any position
and in any capacity that the President wishes me to serve." That was
the end of that. I heard no more about it. And it was not until the
morning of the day after Mr. Hoover's death, and I believe that morn-
ing was ]\ray 3, that, and I can't recall all of the peeople who were
sitting around in the Attorney General's office, but one of them made
the suggestion, after we liad considered who should be named acting
director, that why not consider Pat Gray, and it was later that after-
noon that, well, earlier than that, about noon the Attorney General
telephoned me from his car and told me to meet him in his office that
3488
afternoon about 2 :15 or 2 :20, and I met him and I went np, walked
right in and he said, "I am <i:oing to name you Acting Director of the
Fodei'nl l^nivau of Investigation."
Mr. Edmisten. During your confirmation hearings there was quite
a bit of controversy about your peiliaps involvement in the ITT matter,
and they were digging in on you heavily about the Watergate investi-
gation. Sometime during that time, I think around March 7 or 8, you,
in your statement alluded to it, had a call with Mr, Ehrlichman and
ho seemingly approved of tlie way you were handling yourself. But, of
course, unknown to you tliat same day he called Mr. John Dean and
therein ensued the famous quote tliat I think we ought to "let him
hang tliere, let him twist slowly, slowly in the wind."
At what ]>oint in your confirmation hearings did you discern this
attitude on the part of the Wliite House ?
Mr. Gray. I never did. Tlie first knowledge I had on that was when
I was shown in the assistant U.S. attorney's office that telephone
conservation.
Mr. Edmisten. What was happening? Do you know now, what was
ha}5pening to you ?
Mr. Gray. What was happening to me ?
INIr. Edmistex, As far as the White House was concerned ?
INfr. Gray. INIr. Edmisten. that calls for a judgment, you know, that
I am not prepared to make because I didn't have all of the facts on the
other side, but knowing at least what I know now, and knowing that in
the service of my country 1 withstood hours and hours of dei^th charg-
ing, shelling, bombing, but I never expected to run into a Watergate
in the service of a President of the United States and I ran ito a buzz-
saw, obviously.
INfr. Edmisten. Is it possible that the attitude of the White House
changed because you were attempting in a manner without compromis-
ing the FBI's integrity to tell the Judiciary Committee everything
that you laiew.
Mr. Gray. Well, now, there is no question about it in mv mind be-
cause the original offer that I made was rescinded on ^Nfarch 16. I
offered everv Senator of the United States a complete FBI investi-
gative file. Everytime a Senator Avonld ask me a question that I could
not remember. I would go to the FD302 to get the exact information
and put an insert in the record and I can see now that this was perhaps
very unsettling. I believed it was the right thing to do. I was j^roud of
that investigation. I thought the FBI did a terrific job and I even sent
a message to the FBI expLaininff Avhv I made that complete FBI inves-
tigative file available to every IL S. Senator to be accompanied by two
special agents of the FBI Avho would respond to their questions.
Mr. Edmisten. Thank vou. Mr. Chairman.
I have no further questions at this time.
Senator Eratx. Mr. Thompson,
Mv. THO:>rpsox. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to defer what
questions I may have until after the members of the committee have
had an opportunity to question this witness. And also if I mav I would
like to waive my privilege of questioning this witness at this time to
Senator Weicker.
Senator Ervin. Without objection on the part of any member of the
committee, the Chair will rule that Mr. Thompson can waive his right
3489
to question at tliis time to Senator Weicker, in which case Senator
AVeicker will not be subject, since he is exercising counsel's time, will
not be subject to the 10-minute rule.
Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gray, I would like to, if I could, just set the background prior to
this (juestioning because of certain comments that have been made rela-
tive to our relationship, the fact that I look upon you as I do because
of a longstanding friendship, et cetera.
Prior to 19G0 wlien I came to Washington, at which time you came
to serve Mr. Finch or with Mr. Finch, had you and I ever met?
Mr. Gray. No, sir.
Senator Weicker. Have you been in my house or I in yours in a
social sense aside from the meeting that we had in my home relative to
this matter here?
Mr. Gray. Xo, sir, I didn't even know who you wore. [Laughter.]
Senator Weicker. And the positions that you were offered in the
administration, these weren't positions that I recommended you for
but rather positions that came about in your relationships with the
administration, is that correct?
Mr. Gray. Yes. I didn't even know you. Senator Weicker, and T
made no request of you and the only reason I got into the administra-
tion at all was through Bob Finch and I had to labor mightily even
to get in and come back here and serve my country at a tremendous
financial sacrifice.
Senator Weicker. It is true, however, that since the matter of
Watergate has arisen and problems associated thereto that you and I
have had increasing frequency of contact.
Mr. Gray. Yes, Senator Weicker, tliat is correct.
Senator Wekker. Xow, I would like to read to you, if T might. Mr.
Gray, a portion of the President's statement of April ;]0, 197^5, specifi-
cally that portion which states :
Until March of this year I remained convineefl that the denials were true and
that the charges of involvement by members of tlie White House staff were false.
The comments I made during this i>eriod and the comments made l>y my press
secretary in my Ijehalf were Itased on the information provided to us at the time
we made those comments. However, new information then came to me which
persuaded me that there was a real possibility that s<^mie of the.se charges were
true, and .suggesting further that there had been an effort to conceal the facts
both from the public, from you, and froui me. As a result, on March 21 I per-
sonally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into
the matter and I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get
all the facts and to rei>ort them directly to me right here in this office.
My first question to you, in light of the President's statement of
.Vpril 30, where he states that on March 21 he personally assumed the
responsibility for new inquiries and personally ordered those conduct-
ing the investigations to ''get all the facts and report them directly to
me right here in this office." My first question is: Did you ever receive
after March 21 or from March 21 on a directive from the President
of the United States relative to these Watergate matters, which direc-
tive inquired of vou as to what vour investigations were producing,
sir?
Mr. Gray. Xo, sir. The President did telephone me on March 23 and
this was the typical buck-up type of call
3490
Senator Weicker. May I stop heio for 1 minute, Mr. Gray ? Was the
FBI investigating — ^^vere tliey still involved in investigations of
Watergate in March?
Mr. Gray. Yes; because it was due to the action that I took — ^I tried
to take it in October and I did take it in December to get us into the
activities that were political in nature, you might say. They involved
the activities of Mr. Segretti and to the best of my knowledge, infor-
mation and belief, and I believe that I have exhibits before this com-
mittee which indicate all of what I am saying nght now, Senator
Weicker, we were at that time still investigating.
Senator AVeicker. And you received from March 21 on — we will get
to the phone conversation in a minute — no order from the President
as one who was conducting the investigation "to ^et all the facts and to
report them directly to me," the Pivsident, "right here in this office"?
Mr. Gray. I did not, sir, and I received no such order from anybody.
Senator Weicker. All right.
Now, would you please tell the committee as to what happened in the
phone call of March 23 ?
Mr. Gray. The March 2H phone call from the President, once again,
it was a surprise to me. I did not really expect to see it. That followed
the testimony I had given on March 22 and which in response to a
question from Senator Byrd I had said that Mr. Dean had probably
lied when he was talking with oui- agents and the Avay the questions
were phrased by Senator Byrd theie was no other answer I could give.
But the President called me on March 23 and it was in the nature of
a buck-up call to say, and 7 cannot i-emember his precise words, but to
say I know the beating that you are taking up there and it is very
unfair and there will be another day to get back at our enemies and
there will always be a place for you in the Nixon administration, and
I thanked the President and then T I'emembered distinctly him saying,
"You will recall, Pat, that I told you to conduct a thorough and aggres-
sive investigation," and I remembered that so distinctly because I had
the eerie feeling that this was being said to me but why, and I related
it immediately to the July G telephone conversation I had had with the
President in the previous year.
Senator Weicker. Now. the July G telephone convei-sation as I recall,
this one emanated from the west coast . is that correct ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. That is the one that I testified to in my statement.
Senator Weicker. Do you have any understanding as to where the
March 23 phone call emanated from ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, I do not know. T do not know as of this day and
maybe I do not know if my telephone logs would show on March 23.
We can take a look but I do not know of my own independent recol-
lection right now.
Senator Weicker. But you do recall the nature of the conversation.
It was. No. 1, to buck 3'ou ud in relation to your confirmation hearings,
and having done that, the President turned to you and said, "You will
remember, Pat — our previous conversation?"
Mr. Gray. No; he just said, "You will remember, Pat, I told you to
conduct a thorough and aggressive investigation."
My daily log, which was presented before this committee, for Fri-
day, March 23, 1973, shows that at 1 :11 p.m., on that day "Presi-
dent Nixon telephoned and spoke to Mr. Gray." That would indicate
3491
to me that that telephone conversation was made in Washington, since
there is no reference at all to San Clemente or Key Biscayne and nor-
mally the people who kept this log would make such references.
Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Gray, I would like to move along, if we
can, to the events of April, more specifically those events which com-
menced with your telling me of the burning of the files in your office on
April 25. I think that has been gone into in detail. If there is anything
you want to add, any further question, I am sure they will develop
that, but I would like to move from April 25 to the afternoon of April
26 and have you recount to the committee in your own words what
transpired in the late afternoon of April 26.
Mr. Gray. AVell, Senator Weicker, it was after 6 o'clock in the eve-
ning when I was leaving and I believe it to be somewhere between 6 :15
and 6 :30 and I was driving out the gate and the police officer there, of
the GSA security force. Officer Cousin, whom I used to say hello to
every night as we drove out, exchanging a few pleasantries, said to me
that Mr. Petersen had called and it is urgent and you are to call him
right away, and I got out of my car and I walked into the guard booth
there and I telephoned Mr. Petersen and Mr. Petersen said that he had
had a call from the Attorney General, Attorney General Kleindienst,
and Attorney General Kleindienst wanted to meet with us in his office
at 7 p.m. Mr."^ Petersen said he was calling from the golf course and was
coming in directly from the golf course and it was about the stories
and rumoi-s that were on the media circuit that the files had been
burned. And I said, fine, I will go back up to my office and wait a
while, and I asked my driver, Special Agent Thomas Mote, who is also
a good friend of mine, to park the car and wait for me, and I went on
up to the office and at about 7 :15 p.m. I walked over to the Attorney
General's office and I found the main door locked and I walked to
what we call an alcove door that loads almost directly into his own
private office and I can remember pulling out my key and the door was
open. I did not have to use my key. And I walked right in, walked
through the conference room, walked into the secretary's area and
picked up the phone, called Mr. Petei-sen and told him that I was here
in the Attorney General's office and just then the Attorney General
walked in — I could hear his footsteps — and I told Mr. Petersen the
Attorney General walked in, come on up, and I went back immediately
and the Attorney General said to me the President had called him and
is concerned about the reports that these files were burned and that we
had to meet and make some recommmendation to the President.
By then Mr. Petersen liad come up. We both sat in chairs in front
of the Attorney General's desk and I told them that I had spoken with
you. I did not say to them that you had talked to the press, even though
you had told me that you did. You said to me you are probably going
to be the angriest man in the world at me for talking to the press and
I told you, no, you ought to be the angriest man in the world at me.
I did not say that you had given this mformation to the press but I
said I believe that Senator Weicker knows all about this because I have
spoken to him.
Then Mr. Kleindienst said let's have a drink. [Laughter.] And Mr.
Petersen and Mr. Kleindienst and I all went into a little private office
off of his main office and Mr. Kleindienst fixed a drink for himself
and Mr. Petersen and I do not drink and I just sat there in an over-
3492
stuffed leather chair and Mr. Kleindienst was sitting riglit in front of
me facing me and he said to me, "It doesn't seem to me that you can
continue as acting director of the FBI,"' and I said, "Well, Dick, it
does seem to me that I can continue as acting director of the FBI
because these files had absolutely iiothing to do with "Watei'gatc and
the men and women of the FBI luicw I have done nothing to stifle this
investigation, but that I will accede to whatever the President wishes.
If he wishes me to continue to serve, I will serve. If he wishes me to
resign, I will resign."
Mr. Kleindienst then went into his other office and said he was going
to talk to the President and during his absence Mr. Petersen was pacing
up and down in the office, walking back and forth, and I remember
him distinctly saying, "Pat, I am scared." And I said, "Henry, why?"
And I am still sitting there in that chair. And he said, "I am scared
because it appears that you and I are expendable and Haldeman and
Ehrlichman are not." And I said, "Henry, do you think I should get a
lawyer?" And — this is the first time I had entertained the idea, and he
said, "Yes." And I did. Later.
But then Mr. Kleindienst came back into the office and sat down in
the chair again, facing me, and said "The President wants you to con-
tinue to serve as acting director," and I said, "Fine, Dick, I will do
it." And then all three of us left the office. We walked out of the office
together.
Senator Weicker. Now, would you move to the morning of the 27th ?
Mr. Gray. Well, when I got home that evening I got — it was after
8 o'clock and I did quite a bit of thinking about this and I thought
that I had better really resign, that this was not the thing to have
done and that there was no way in the world that I would be able to
explain it to the FBI. It would take too long. So coming into the
office that next morning, I asked two members of my personal staff,
the oldest two members, to come in and sit down with me. I told them
all the facts and I said, I just feel that I can no longer command the
FBI. They agreed with me and I told them, I said, all right. T^Hiat
I want you to do, I am going to call Marjorie in, my secretary, and
dictate my resignation. I want you to prepare a statement to go along
with it. Earlier that morning, at about 8 o'clock, wlien I first came in,
I called Mr. Felt, reached back on my console, pushed his button and
called him and I said, "Mark, later on I am going to want to talk with
you and members of the personal staff about this story of the burning
of the files but I feel that I can no longer command the FBI." I told
him that earlier. Then they came— the members of my personal staff
came — the two members of my personal staff came back in at about
10 :15 in the morning. I asked Mr. Felt to come in. We went over the
whole thing again, went over the statement. We went over my letter of
resignation and I told Mr. Felt to have the acting directors assemble
at 11:30, that I was going to toll the Attoniey General that I was
going to resign and that was all that was to it.
I can't — I believe that I did tell the Attornev General. I am pretty
sure that I told the Attorney General. I haven't even looked at my
logs to see if there is a tele)'>hone call to him but I am pretty sure that
I told him that I was going to resign.
I had Mr. Felt set up tlio meeting with the assistant directors at
11 :80 in my conference room so I could appear before them and tell
3493
them. And I did. I met with them and I told them exactly what had
happened and I said, Mr. Felt will tell you all the details but I feel
that I can no longer command the FBI.
I shook hands and I said goodbye.
I think it was then, at about noon, that I called Mr. Higby. I called
Mr. Haldeman's office asking to speak to the President and I got Mr.
Higby and Mr. Higby said that the President and Mr. Haldeman and
Mr. Ehrlichman were in Mississippi with Senator Stennis, and I think
it was Meridian, but I am not sure of the town, and that he would have
to get to them with regard to my statement to him that I was going to
resign, that I could no longer command the FBI, and that if I tried to
do so, there would be insurrection and mutiny, and that this resigna-
tion had to be accepted. And that was just at about noon.
And I believe — let me refer to my logs.
Senator Weicker. Go ahead.
Mr. Gray. Yes. I telephoned Mr. Higby at 12 :18 p.m. and I told
him at that time that my resignation had been written and was on its
way over, and he said, let me talk to them, the party down there in
Mississippi, before you send this over.
And then there was another call at 1 :59. Mr. Higby spoke to me and
said, "Please send your resignation over. They are expected back at
about 3 o'clock." And I believe it was in this call that I told him I also
wanted to issue a statement along with this resignation of mine and
this — my recollection is that it took him aback a little bit and he said,
"Nobody at the White House is going to want to issue this statement,"
and I said, "No, my statement is harmless. I am going to issue it," and
I read it to him. And then he called me back at 2 :09 p.m. and told me to
go ahead and send the resignation over and send the statements over to
him, which I did.
Senator Weicker. Now, after your resignation was announced, did
you receive anv information
Mr. Gray, men I left.
Senator Weicker. Or any indication that according to White House
officials, those associated with the "VVliite House, the fact that yours was
not a resignation but rather you had been kicked out ?
Mr. GrxVy. Yes, sir. I left the department that afternoon about
2 :45 p.m., and drove, as I recall, to Connecticut and I think it was the
next day that I talked with my executive assistant, who told me that
there had been stories that had been carried on the wires to the effect
that I had been thrown out and that he had taken it upon himself
to — because he had participated in this whole thing with me — he had
taken it upon himself to issue a correcting statement attributed to FBI
sources.
Senator Weicker. Then, at any point, I repeat, between March 21
and April 27, which marked the date of your resignation, at any time
during that period did you or were you requested by the President
of the United States to give to him information, facts, et cetera, rela-
tive to the Watergate situation ?
Mr. Gray. I was not given any orders by the President of the United
States or anyone to give them any facts about the Watergate situation
until Mr. Petersen came to me on April 16, and I have already testified
to that in my statement. This is when they asked me whether John
Dean had given me two of Howard Hunt's files.
3494
Senator TVeicker. After March 30, it has been testified to before this
committee, that Mr. Ehrliclmian Avas placed in charge of the Water-
gate investigation as of March oO. So my question to you is, aside from
the phone call of April 15, which phone call again has been testified to
before this committee, and also I believe has been testified to by you,
did ]Mr. Ehrlichman make any inquir}- of you as to the mattei-s attend-
ant to "Watergate ?
Mr. Gray. Xo, sir : he did not. There were calls with Mr. Ehrlichman
but thcA' did not involve Watergate and I know I met with ]\[r.
Ehrlichman and ]Mr. Timmons in ]Mr. Ehrlichman's office regarding
the possibilities as to whether or not there were sufficient votes to carry
my nomination out of committee. I know we discussed at that partic-
ular meeting I would probably be the best man to take the FBI through
the liearings before the Ervin Select Committee but I recall abso-
lutely no requests of me for information regarding the conduct of the
investigation or about the continuance of the investigation other tlian
those that were the reports that were going back on the specific items
that the Department of Justice was asking us to inquire into to in-
vestigate in connection with Segretti activities, the interA'iews of ^Ir.
Chapin I have reference to, and those documents are exhibits before
this committee, I have submitted them.
Senator Weicker. INIr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this
time.
Senator Er\^x. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Gray, you had long service in the U.S. Navy,
I believe?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; 26 years of it.
Senator Talmadge. What was your rank when you retired ?
Mr. Gray. Captain.
Senator Talmadge. You were accustomed to carry out orders of
superiors, were j'ou not?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir; in the Navy I was trained in, you said "aye,
aye, sir."
Senator Talmadge. It was the same l^nvj I served in, I may say also,
Captain Gray.
Now, getting to these Hunt papers that were turned over to you on
June 28, 1 believe it was, 1972, is that right ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, in the evening.
Senator Talmadge. And thev told vou never to let them see the
light of day?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, these, as I best remember it. Senator Talmadge,
this was in the concluding remarks of INIr. Dean when he said to me
that these have national security implications, they are political dyna-
mite and clearly they should not see the light of day.
Senator Talmadge. Was it your thinking when you received that
order that Tennyson must have had in mind when he wrote the
"Charge of the Light Brigade," "Theirs was not to reason why, but do
or die."
Mr. Gray. I do not know that I thought in those terms. Senator
Talmadge. [Laughter.]
But I really, you know, I took this as an order and I did ask the
question, "Should these become a part of the FBI investigative file?"
3495
Senator Talmadge. You accepted it as an order and you executed it
as an order and you carried it out as an order, is that correct?
Mr. Gray. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. What did you think the source of this authority
was
Mr. Gr.\y. Well, as I have testified, I cannot really say it came from
the President but I can say to you, Senator Talmadge, that one thing
I neglected to say in the course of the conversation in the Attorney'
General's little private office when he was sitting there, after having
talked with the President, Mr. Kleindienst said to me there must be
no implication that in burning these files there was any attempt of a
coverup at the White House, and 1 told him, I said, "Dick. 1 clearly got
instructions, I thought, to bum those files and I burned them and that
is going to be my testimony."
Senator Talmadge. You assumed that Dean's authority came from
the President, did you not ?
Mr. Gray. He was standing right there in the presence of the top
assistant to the President.
Senator Talmadge. You assumed that Ehrlichman's order came
from the President ?
Mr. Gray. 1 had to believe they were acting for the President, yes.
Senator Talmadge. You assumed that it came from the Chief Ex-
ecutive of the United States of America acting in that capacity, sub-
ordinates?
Mr. Gray. I made that assumption but, Senator Talmadge. in fair-
ness and decency and honesty. I have to say I just cannot testify under
oath that the President ordered them to do this.
Senator Talmadge. I can understand that.
Mr. Gray. But I made that assumption, there is no
Senator Talmadge. You were in the Xavy, when you got an order
from the fleet commander you assumed it came from the Chief of
Naval Operations, did you not?
Mr. Gp^y. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. And in turn that he was appointed by the Presi-
dent of the United States, it came from the authority of the President;
is that an accurate statement?
Mr. Gray. That is correct.
Senator Talmadc^e. I believe you, in some statement, stated you
wrote the President. I believe ■
Mr. Gray. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge [continuing]. In 1968, to beware of his subordi-
nates, they were attempting to wear his stripes as Commander in Chief ;
is that correct?
Mr. Gray. Yes. sir: T wrote that to him. that was in connection with
my letter to him saying that I was delighted to hear his remarks on
the evening there in the Waldorf because I was writing in terms of
the divisiveness and polarization that had set upon our country and
it seemed to me he was saying he was going to yield this and I wrote
it in that connection. I wrote him a verv idealistic flowering letter and
that letter was introduced in evidence before the Nedzi subcommittee,
but in the letter I did just say that. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. What made you think then that his subordinates
were trving to take advantage of the positions that they were bemg
placed in?
3496
Mr. Gray. That was very early in tlio ffrtnie and I did not know any
of those subordinates but I knew sometimes tliis would occur in the
area of White House politics and I was merely telling him that I had
nothino; specific in mind. Senator Talniadjie. because I did not even
know who were going to be the subordinates.
Senator Talmadge. That was foreboding on your part on behalf of
a friend?
Mr, Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. You had that suspicion in 1968. What made you
abandon that suspicion in 1972 ?
Mr. Gray. The thought never occurred to me at all again, you know,
that letter had to be dredged up out of memory.
Senator Talmadge. You assumed then when they gave those instruc-
tions it came from the Chief Executive of the United States of
America.
Mr. Gray. Xo question about it, because I had had prior experience
in the administration and I knew that those men did give ordei-s. I
knew that thev used to come over and do that sort of thing, they used
to do that at HEW.
Senator Talmadge. Let us get back to your telephone call. I believe
the President of the United States called you the night of July 6,
1972, to congratulate you on the good work the FBI had done in
preventing the hijacking of an airplane in California ; is that correct ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir; it was before noon, though. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Before noon. You took advantage of that oppor-
tunity, I believe, to relate to the President of the United States your
concern in behalf of some of the operations of his subordinates; is that
not true?
Mr. Gray. That is correct.
Senator Talmadge. Well, now, there is a memoraaidum dated, July
13, 1972, signed by Lt. Gen. Vernon G. Walters, Deputy Director of
the CIA, some different from the conversation that you had with the
President in your testimony that you presented to us last Friday.
Now, as I recall the facts, you and General Walters had several
conversations from time to time about interference you were having
from the White House trying to drag in the CIA in the investigation,
is that not true ?
Mr. Gray. Senator Talmadge, I have to say that I talked with Gen-
eral Walters on June 23 when he met with me and I did not have any
other contact with him until July 5, I believe, when I telephoned him
and then I met with him on July 6, and it was at that July 6 meeting
where his preoccupation with his inability to write a letter saying there
was CIA interest in Senor Ogarrio and in Mr. Dahlberg became of
considerable importance.
Senator Talmadge. Let me read now what General Walters had to
say about your conversation, about your conversation with the Presi-
dent and ask you wherein you differentiate. General Walters, quoting
you: "The President then asked him what his recommendation was in
the matter. Gray had replied that the case," that is, the Watergate
case he is referring to is it not ?
Mr. Gray. I am sure it is. Senator Talmadge.
3497
Senator Talmadoe. "The case could not be covered up and would
lead quite hi^li and he felt that the President should ^et rid of the
people that were invoh'^ed." Did you tell General Walters that?
Mr. Gray. I have no recollec'tion or memory of telling General Wal-
ters that because my recollection of my message to the President is
entirely different. My recollection is that it was I who first raised the
question with the President. It was a surprise to me that the President
called me back so quickly after 1 had spoken with Mr. MacGregor and
it was with some fear and trepidation. I might add, that I really liter-
ally bhii'ted out to the President, "Mr. President, I have something
that I want to speak to you about." So my recollection of that conver-
sation is quite different.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Walters' memo was written right after the
conversation that you recollect later on, was it not?
Mr. Gray. Yes ; that is his testimony, Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmaixje. Let's read some more of General Walters' state-
ment now and see where the conflict is between you and him.
I am quoting further General Walters and he is reporting your tele-
phone conver-sation to the President :
Any attempt to involve the FBI or the CIA in this case would only prove a
mortal wound. He used my words. And would achieve nothing
Did you tell the President that ?
Mr. "Gray. I told the President that Dick Walters and I feel that
people on your staff arc trying to mortally wound you by using the
FBI and the CIA and by confusing the question of whether or not
there is CIA interest in it or not, or in the people that the FBI are to
interview.
Senator Taj.matx)y.. ^Yhom did you have reference to when you men-
tioned members of his staff?
Mr. Gray. Had the President asked me. I would have mentioned
Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman because I was still smarting a little bit
under the cancellation of the June 28 meeting.
Senator Talmadge. Let me read further now, still quoting General
Waltei-s :
The President said then, and I quote, "Then I should get rid of whoever is
involved no matter how high." Gray replied that was hi.s recommendation.
Did that conversation take place?
Mr. Gray. Senator Talmadge, I have no, absolutely no memory of
that, and my recollection of my conversation with the President is as
I have testified to. And I have also submitted to this committee some
exhibits, some responses with regard to General Walters' statements.
I don't believe we are that far apart but I believe that he is taking
over things that we talked about at that time and putting them in there
in improper context, not direct context.
Senator Talmaix;e. Let me read further now :
The President then asked what I thought, that is referring to Walters, and
Gray said my views were the same as his. The President took it well, thanked
Gray, later that day Gray had talked to Dean and repeated the conversation to
him, Dean said; OK.
Is that correct?
3498
Mr. Gray. I did start out my conversation with the President by
saying Dick Walters and I feel, so there is no question about the fact
that I mentioned that General Walters certainly shared in my views,
Senator Talmadge, but I did not call John Dean. I told very few
people of this; there were very few people who really knew of this
conversation with the President of the United States.
Senator Talmadge. Then the diiference between you and General
Walters' testimony, I take it, is in the subject of detail and not the
tenor of the conversation ?
Mr. Gray. No question about it, Senator Talmadge ; the message was
delivered.
Senator Talmadge. Let me ask you something that I think is very
important.
The only evidence that this committee has had to date implicating
the President of the United States is that of John Dean and you and
General Walters.
Did you think that your conversation with the President on July 6,
1972, was sufficient to adequately put him on notice that the White
House staff was engaged in obstructing justice ?
Mr. Gray. I don't know that I thought in terais of obstruction of
justice but I certainly think there was, it was adequate to put him on
notice that the membei-s of the White House staff were using the FBI
and the CIA.
Senator Talmadge. Do you think an adequate, do you think a reason-
able and prudent man on the basis of the warning that you gave him at
that time, would have been alerted to the fact that his staff was
engaged in something improper, unlawful, and illegal ?
Mr. Gray. I do, because I frankly, I expected the President to ask
me some questions and for 2 weeks thereafter, I think it was on the
12th and again on the 28th, I asked General Walters if the President
had called him and when I heard nothing, you know, I began to feel
that General Walters and I were alarmists, that we had a hold of
nothing here and it is true that I must say that I called Clark Mac-
Gregor with some fear and trepidation because I didn't have all of
the specifics. I had General Walters' continued reiteration that if he
was directed to write such a letter to me he would resign and we did
discuss his resignation and I even mentioned to him I had already
said this to my people.
Senator Talmadge. One or two final things, 'I think my time has
about expired. Captain.
I believe you made a denial to someone that you burned papers last
Christmas during the Christmas celebration, during that period in
Connecticut.
Who did you make that denial to ?
Mr. Gray. Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen on April 16
of this year in my office.
Senator Talmadge. Did you make any other denial that was a fabri-
cation or falsehood ?
Mr. Gray. I didn't tell the whole story, the correct story to Senator
Weicker. I testified to that yesterday.
Senator Talmadge. You failed to volunteer at that time or did you
tell him an outright falsehood ?
Mr. Gray. To Senator Weicker ?
3499
Senator Talmadge. Yes.
Mr. Gray. I told him an outright falsehood. I said I burned those
papers on the 3d day of July in a wastebasket in my office in the FBI,
and it was not true, I did not tell him the tnith.
Senator Talmadge. That is twice j^ou yourself. Captain, have
admitted you told a falsehood. Why do you think this committee
should believe you now rather than maybe believing you were still
telling a falsehood ?
Mr. Gray. 1 am sitting up here testifying to you under oath and
knowing full well that the substance of my testimony is critically
important to this Nation.
Senator Talmadge. You are a lawyer, you are well aware of the
penalty of perjury?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator TAt,MADGE. Thank you, Captain ; I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Gray, let's go back to the meeting with Gen-
eral Walters, the first one on June 23.
What did he say to you when he and you talked together ?
Mr. Gray. The best as I — the best tliat I can remember. Senator
Gurney, is that he stated to me that if we proceeded with our investi-
gation into it, and my recollection is Mexican money chain, we would
uncover CIA assets and resourrces and then he mentioned to me the
agreement between the agencies not to uncover one another's sources
and although I had not read that agreement at that time and have not
read it yet, I said to him I understand this, it is logical, it makes sense,
and I recollect that he also said that if we did proceed to investigate
south of the border we could interfere with some CIA covert activities.
Senator Gurney. Did you want to go on further?
Mr. Gray. I think he also told me that we had the five people and
the matter ought to be tapered off there.
Senator Gurney. Did he tell you that he had previously had a
meeting with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, because I had no recollection or memory of that
and I was outraged when I read this in the newspapers, I think it
was in May of this year.
Senator Gurney. Then he never did tell you what he told the com-
mittee here not long ago, that Mr. Haldeman actually gave him an
instruction to go over to you and tell you something ?
Mr. Gray. He did not tell me to the very best of my memory and I
have searched it and dredged it, because I have got to be fair to him,
but I do not remember him telling me; I knew, however. Senator
Gurney, from a phone call from John Dean that he was coming to
see me.
Senator Gurney. He, Dean, set up the meeting or else warned you
it was going to take place ?
Mr. Gray. He told me.
Senator Gurney. Alerted you ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, he told me General Walters would be calling for an
appointment, I should see him and that he had something to tell me.
Senator Gurney. Then why do you think that General Walters
was there after you finished your meeting and he said to you what he
did, what was your impression as to his reason for being there with
you?
3500
Mr. Gray. My impression was he had brought to me a CIA message
that we had some problems, some difficulties and that we would have
to maneuver around them until we could see exactly where we were
going with that investigation and indeed that is just exactly what I
ordered my people to do.
Senator Gurney. At any later date did he call you on the phone or
come to you in a meeting and say, "Mr. Gray, I have had my people
here in the CIA go all over their records and files and we can't find
any covert operations in Mexico that you could interfere with."
Did he ever say that to you ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, the only meeting, the only thing that occurred
along those lines is when after two meetings with my people we finally,
I finally made the decision that I had to have a writing from the CIA
if I was to continue to refrain from interviewing Ogarrio and Dahl-
berg. That is what I was interested in. I was interested ii> Ogarrio and
Dahlberg. We had done everything we could do to trace the money
except interview those two men and my message to him was either you
have got an interest in Ogarrio and Dahlberg or you haven't, and if
you have I need it in writing or I am going to go ahead and interview
those people.
Senator Gurney. Now, at that point — of course, he has testified and
said that he couldn't give you any such written assurance. Did you get
the idea that he had been perhaps instructed by somebody to try to get
you to slow down or steer clear ?
Mr. Gray. I got the idea that what he was saying to me was that he
might be instructed or that he could be instructed. He was telling me
that if I am directed to write to you in this vein, I am going to have
to resign. This will be a disservice to the President. I would have to
ask to see the President. And this is the July 6 meeting where his total
preoccupation was with, if I am directed to write such a writing, I can-
not do it. And it was at that meeting that he handed me also that long
memorandum.
Senator Gurney. Did he recount to you then or on any other occasion
these phone calls he had with John Dean ?
Mr. Gray. Absolutely not, sir. My first recollection of knowing any-
thing about those is when I read that newspaper and worked up a
rebuttal that night in my apartment and called my attorney that even-
ing and told him that I wanted to go on television the next day to
rebut this.
Senator Gurney. He told you nothing about these, I would call them
hints and suggestions that the CIA do something about this ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. And particularly, did he tell you about Dean's
request of the CIA through General Walters to furnish bail money
and support money for the defendants?
Mr. Gray. No, sir. That was never mentioned in that conversation. If
things like that had been mentioned in that conversation, Senator
Gurney, he would have sat right there while I called the President
of the United States.
Senator Gurney. Let me go into here, in my remaining few minutes,
about the FBI investigation. There have been a gi-eat many, I think,
accusations or hints or suggestions along the way here that the FBI
conducted a somewhat less than full investigation of this Watergate
3501
matter, and I would like to start at the beginning and see from you
the acting head of the FBI then exactly what they did do. In the first
place, who authorized the investigation ?
Mr. Gray. In the very beginning, in the very early part of it, I asked
whether or not we were in it and did we have jurisdiction. Initially,
you know, it was thought to be a burglary which would just be a
District of Columbia case, would be a Metropolitan Police Department
case. Senator Gurney. Then it was thought to be a bombing case. And
then later on my agents detected those devices and as a matter of fact,
we were already justifying our entry into the case on the Interstate
Transportation of Stolen Property statute and my guys were in it
already. But later on the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Divi-
sion, the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, stated that this
would be an FBI case but I would like the record to show quite clearly
and it can be substantiated that we were in it prior to that time.
Senator Gurnet. And after you started the initial investigations,
your people did advise you that this was a case in which the FBI had
jurisdiction, so you ought to continue.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. They not only advised me of that and I discussed
it with Mr. Felt and there is documentation to this effect, that this
would be conducted as an aggressive, vigorous, thorough, no-holds
barred investigation.
Senator Gurney. Just how vigorous and thorough was this? For
example, how many agents did you have working on this?
Mr. Gray. There were over 300, Senator Gurney, and there were over
27,000 man-hours of time, as I remember. There was considerable over-
time and I think there is an exhibit before this committee, I think 53
of our 59 field offices were involved and four of our foreign offices were
involved and instructions were continually going to the field to take —
the special agent in charge of each field division was to take this in-
vestigation under his own personal supervision, utilize as many special
agents as were needed to do a vigorous, imaginative, thorough investi-
gation and follow all logical leads as quickly as possible.
Senator Gurney. I think in a previous question by the chief counsel,
or assistant chief counsel, who interrogated you, you refer to this arti-
cle by Mr. McCord where he said that top professional people tried
to do thus and so and were prevented from doing it, and I do remember
your answer to that, but my question is, who were the top professional
people in charge of this investigation ?
Mr. Gray. I would say that the individual most directly in charge
of it would have been the special agent in charge of the Washington
field office, Mr. Kunkel, who was commended by the U.S. attorney and
then Mr. Bates, who was the assistant director of the General Investi-
gative Division, and certainly Mr. Felt and certainly Mr, Gray, me,
sitting up there at the top of the heap, with the paper flowing back
and forth. But the case agents were working on a daily basis there
with the assistant IT.S. attorneys and the field supervisors were work-
ing with the case agents as were the Bureau supervisors, and there is
ample documentation. Senator Gurney, before this committee in the
form of exhibits. I don't want to take the time of the committee to
read them— where the men of the FBI themselves recounted on two
specific occasions that I know of the vigor of the investigation, the
fact that there were no limitations or restrictions placed upon them.
3502
It is truB that we were investigating only violations of the IOC, the
Interceptions of Communications statute, and the conspiracy statute
and it is true also that in October we sought to broaden that investiga-
tion but it was not considered on the basis of the evidence then avail-
able that it was prudent to broaden it. That was a Department of
Justice decision and order to us.
Senator Gurnet. Did you at any time ever instruct anybody in the
FBI to low key or go soft on this investigation ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; and I think every agent of the FBI will support
me in that testimony. In fact, they did support me in that testimony
before the confirmation hearings. There is a memo to that eflfect where
they were polled and they were asked and they all came back up with
an unequivocal reply. The only lead that was not followed was that
one lead of the Karl Wagner of the CIA where Mr. Helms had re-
quested that we not interview these two covert members of the CIA
and before I could give the order out one had already been interviewed,
John Caswell, but we did not ■
Senator Gurnet. To your own knowledge, did any of the other peo-
ple in charge of this investigation in the FBI give any instructions
to low key or soft-pedal this investigation ?
Mr. Grat. No, sir. I certainly have no knowledge whatsoever of
any member of the FBI doing that sort of thing. And that is why I
feel that Mr. McCord is really unfair — Mr. McCord is really being
unfair to the dedicated men and women of the FBI in his article
because these people worked around the clock and day and night and
that includes the agents as well as the secretaries.
Senator Gurnet. Wliat about Mr. Wagner of the CIA ? Do you know
what his job area was ?
Mr. Gray. I know now but I did not then and I know only from hav-
ing read the newspapers and I am proceeding now on the assumption
that they are correct. But my recollection from reading it in the news-
papers is that Mr. Wagner was General Cushman's executive assistant.
Senator Gurnet. On this matter of search warrants, does the FBI
ordinarily ask for search warrants on their own or do they receive
instructions from the Justice Department, that is, the particular U.S.
attorneys in charge of a criminal matter?
Mr. Grat. I think that, and, you know, I am not experienced enough
to know what the procedure is at that working level. Senator Gurney,
so my answer has to be taken in that vein, but I think what would
happen, that an agent would consider whether or not he needed a
search warrant and then would go ask an assistant U.S. attorney or
the assistant ILS. attorney could tell him probable cause lies, here is the
warrant, go get it. But I cannot reallv be that sure of the nitty gritty of
the investigative process at that level.
Senator Gurnet. How many people did the FBI interview on the
Committee To Ke-Flect the President and in the "\^n'iite House?
Mr. Grat. Oh, I do not know the exact number. I think it was 60 or
more at the Committee To Re-Elect the President and I have f orirotten
the number at the White House. It may be 15 to 20, in that ball park.
Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurnet. As I recall your testimony before the Judiciary
Committee in your confirmation proceedings, you testified that this
3503
was one of the most extensive investigations in the history of the FBI.
Is that not correct ?
]Mr. Gray. That is correct, sir.
Senator Gurney. All right. Now, one final question. If that were so,
and I certainly believe you, and I certainly know that the files of the
FBI will show the extent of the investigation, why do you not think
this led beyond Liddy and Hunt ?
Mr. Gray. I do not know. I have asked myself that many times and I
wonder were the agents awed by the people that they were interview-
ing but when I asked the question, did the agents ask tough questions
and I was assured that they had indeed asked tough questions. And
one must conclude at this point in time that what was being told to
the agents was not correct, was not accurate.
Senator Gurney. Well, to put it another way, perhaps the reason
why it did not lead beyond those two is because there was a massive
coverup involved and people were not talking or they were not telling
the truth.
Mr. Gray. That certainly can be concluded at this point in time,
Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. Thank you. I think my time has elapsed.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you, sir.
I would like to get back to June 28, sir.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. At that time you received papers from Mr. Ehrlich-
man and Mr. Dean. Were you aware that these papers came from the
safe of Mr. Hunt ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; I was, Senator, because one of the things that
Mr. Dean said to me, he wanted to be able to say that he had turned
over everything from Hunt's safe in the event that such a question
were asked him later on.
Senator Inouye. Were you not suspicious that very sensitive papers
would be in the safe of Mr. Hunt ?
Mr. Gray. I knew from what we had developed to that date that
Mr. Hunt had been working in connection with the Pentagon Papei-s.
I felt that he could very, very likely have been involved in working
with national security-type material. Yes, sir. I was aware of that.
Senator Inouye. When did you first learn that Mr. Hunt was in-
volved in the Watergate break-in ?
Mr. Gray. I believe that that was probably — it either occurred in
a summary briefing that I got via telephone from Mr. Felt on June 19
when I was in Palm Springs where he read from a summary, or it
occurred when I got back to Washington and had my first briefing
here in Washington, Senator.
Senator Inouye. So you knew prior to the receipt of these papers
Mr. Hunt was involved in the break-in ?
Mr. Gray. I knew that — I did not know that he was involved in the
break-in. I knew that he was an individual that we were looking for^
that we wanted to talk to him because of the fact that his check had
been discovered, I believe, among the effects of the men who were ac-
tually involved in the break-in.
3504
Senator Inotjte. Then, how could you conclude that the papers that
were in the office of ]\Ir. Hunt had nothing to do with the Watergate
break-in ?
Mr. Gray. Well, I took the word of Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman
and as I said to you earlier. Senator, the information that we had was
that Hunt had been working there in the White House on the Pentagon
Papers and other affairs of this nature and I thought it highly likely
that there could be national security-related papers in his safe.
Senator Inotjte. They impressed upon you that these papers we're
highly sensitive?
Mr. Gray. Sensitive and classified with national security implica-
tions. Those are the words I remember, and with political overtones.
These are copies of papers that Howard Hunt has been working on.
These are the words I recollect, sir.
Senator Inouye. In terms of classification, what classification did
you have in mind ?
Mr. Gray. I was certainly thinking of secret or top secret
classification.
Senator Inouye. If these were top secret classification, and I presume
as acting director of the FBI you are well aware of security proce-
dures, did you feel it was adequate enough to just hide it under your
shirts? [Laughter.]
Mr. Gray. You know, Senator Inouye, to be absolutely honest with
you, I did not even think of those terms. As a matter of fact, the secu-
rity at Harbour Square, the apartment I lived in, is very good. It is
much better than it is in the Department of Justice, I might add
[laughter]. But this is the truth, sir. But I did not consider it.
Senator Inotjye. When Mr. Dean called you in Connecticut to in-
quire about these papers, how did you respond to him, sir ?
Mr. Gray. My best recollection is that I told him I had the papers
with me here in Stonington and they are in a safe place.
Senator Inotjye. Now, if you had received the impression on June 28
that you had been given orders from your Commander in Chief to
destroy these papers, why did you wait 6 months ?
Mr. Gray. That is a very good question. Senator Inouye, and it is
one that I have thought about a great deal, and my own thinking at
the time was that there was no hurry. I had these papers in my posses-
sion and I was going to burn those papers. That was firmly fixed
in my mind. And I do not like to admit this, but I did not even know
at that time that the two little red wastebaskets under my desk in the
office of the acting director of the FBI were burn baskets. I had it
fixed in my mind to take these papers with me to my home in Stoning-
ton and to bum them there where I had the facilities to burn them.
That was my thinking.
Senator Inotjye. Now, you have testified that when you, just prior
to burning, rifled through or riffled through the papers, that is correct,
sir?
Mr. Gray. I testified that I opened, I believe, Senator, the first file,
the smaller of the two files, and noted that this was a State Department
cablegram and it looked like it had been mimeographed. It was a
coarser type of paper and it was black on white and it had the top-
secret stamp on it, and I looked at the first cablegram and I read it,
and then I riffled through the others and
3505
Senator Inoute. Now, what did the first cablegram say ?
Mr. Gray. I cannot with any certainty at all remember the precise
words except to say to you, Senator Inouye, that it had to do with
South Vietnam and it had to do with the assassination of President
Diem and it implicated Kennedy administration officials in promoting
or provoking that assassination.
Senator Inoute. Then, how would this be politically embarrassing
to the Nixon administration ?
Mr. Gray. I do not know. This is what I was told, sir.
Senator Inouye. Now, at that moment did you not get a bit
suspicious
Mr. Gray. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Inouye [continuing]. That here was something that they
told you would be political dynamite and politically embarrassing I
presume to the present administration and not to Mr. Kennedy ?
Mr. Gray. This is possible, Senator Inouye, but what I am saying
to you is that I did not become suspicious because at that point in time
I felt that I had copies of top secret cablegrams that were in the files
of State Department and these were copies of cablegrams that Howard
Hunt had been working on.
Senator Inouye. Just a few minutes ago you testified that if Mr.
Dean had requested of you FBI assistance in furnishing bail and sup-
port money for the Watergate defendants, you would have had him
sitting there while you called the President.
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; that is not quite what I testified to. I think Sena-
tor Gurney's question to me was did General Walters say to you that
Mr. Dean had said this to him? In other words, did General Walters
recount his conversation with Mr. Dean when Mr. Dean asked him,
General Walters, could the CIA go bail and furnish money for these
suspects and I said if General Walters had told me that, I would have
had him sitting right there and we would have called the President
together.
Senator Inouye. Why did you not do the same thing when Mr.
Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean told you to destroy sensitive papers ?
Mr. Gray. I really had no suspicions of them.
'Senator Inouye. What is the difference between the two ?
Mr. Gray. Well, the difference was that some things had transpired
between June 28 and July 6 and General Walters was telling me at that
point in time that he could not give me a directive in writing and the
implication being, to me at least, anyhow, I was interpreting that to
mean that somebody is going to order him to write a directive to me
saying that the CIA does have an interest in Messrs. Ogarrio and
Dahlberg.
Senator Inouye. On June 28 did you feel it was something that
would be reasonable to suspect the President of the United States to
request you through his subordinates to destroy sensitive papers which
were found in the safe of one suspected in the Watergate break-in?
Mr. Gray. No, and I have testified earlier in response, I think, to a
question from Senator Talmadge, that I made the assumption that
these people were acting with color of authority and within the powers
of their office, but I also said that I cannot say that I know as a fact
that they received a direct order from the President of the United
States to call Pat Gray over there and tell him to bum these documents.
3506
Senator Inotjye. In all the years that you have served in the Navy
did any superior officer request of you an illegal act?
Mr. Gray. That is a pretty broad question, Senator Inouye, and I
am trying to think very hard. I am thinking of some wartime opera-
tions and thinking of some of the things we did. They could be classed
as illegal, perhaps. And I am thinking particularly when I commanded
a submarine during the Korean war. But — —
Senator Inouye. And you followed those orders implicitly without
questioning ?
Mr. Gray. Well, you know, Senator Inouye, you are getting me to
the point where I am going to have to tell you what those orders are
and those are very, very sensitive orders.
Senator Inouye. What I am trying to say, did you feel a bit strange
that the President was requesting you to do something which was
rather illegal ?
Mr. Gray. No, I haven't testified that the President was requesting
me to do that. That hasn't been the thrust of my testimony.
Senator Inouye. You have testified that you had assumed that the
orders had come from the Chief Executive ?
Mr. Gray. That I assumed that these men are acting within the
color of their office and within their authority, absolutely there is no
question about that.
Senator Inouye. And you didn't think it was strange for the Pres-
ident through his subordinates to ask you to commit an illegal act?
Mr. Gray. I think that I may have testified earlier that if I had
stopped then and there and said, I want in writing from the Presi-
dent of the United States to do this, that I wouldn't have gotten it ;
but I didn't have that thought at that time. Senator Inouye; there
was no reason for me to have that thought at that time, I was not that
suspicious.
Senator Inouye. Was this the practice that has been referred to as
deniability ?
Mr. Gray. Sir, I don't know because I don't know about that prac-
tice of deniability. I know what it refers to, I know it refers to earlier
testimony here, but I had never heard that utilized within the Depart-
ment of Justice.
Senator Inouye. Now, on March 23 of this year you had a conver-
sation, a telephone conversation with the President. And you have
just testified that when the President said, "Pat, remember, I told you
to conduct a thorough investigation," you said you had an eerie feeling.
"What did you mean by that ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, I thought he was trying to put that on the record,
so to speak, relating all the way back to the July 6 conversation.
Senator Inouye. Are you suggesting that the President was putting
this on tape ?
Mr. Gray. You know, at the time, Senator Inouye, I didn't know
that these conversations were being taped but, nevertheless, I had that
eerie feeling that the President is reminding me of something and
why. That was my reaction. But at that time I didn't know tliat these
were on tape.
Senator Inouye. Further elaborate on the eerie feeling.
Mr. Gray. Sir?
Senator Inouye. Can you further elaborate on the eerie feeling?
3507
Mr. Gray. No, it was just that T had the feeling that I was being
reminded of something and the only thing that I could think of was
the July 6 telephone conversation.
Senator Inoute. You said reminding you of something to place it
on the record. Is that what you said ?
Mr. Gray. Yes.
Senator Inouye. And what came to your mind at that point ?
Mr. Gray. The prior conversation that the President had had with
me.
Senator Inotjye. I have just one final question.
This may sound like a very ridiculous question, but three articles
have been written suggesting that the December 8 plane crash in Mid-
way Airport in Chicago was not just an ordinary plane crash, and that
there were some insidious activities involved.
People have suggested that there were certain passengers with cya-
nide in their system and that the FBI had refused to investigate this.
Are you aware of these articles ?
Mr. Gray. I hesitate to say "No" to you because I may have read of
them, but when you say. Senator, "cyanide in their system," I am quite
sure I haven't read of that one and I am equally certain that there was
no refusal on my part as acting director of the FBI to investigate
that. I don't know that the matter did come up. I would have to check
to see whether or not a request was made.
Senator Inouye. Did you request that the Midway crash
Mr. Gray. Did I ? Did the FBI ? I do not know. I cannot answer that
question. Usually a crash like that is investigated first by, it is my
understanding that it is investigated first by the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board but I would have to check FBI records to see
Senator Inouye. Wasn't the FBI a bit curious when one of the pas-
sengers happened to be Mrs. E. Howard Hunt with $100 bills in her
possession ?
Mr. Gray. I don't know whether the FBI was a bit curious or not.
I can't really answer that question.
Senator Inouye. It was on the front pages of most of the papers of
the United States.
Mr. Gray. I realize that. I am aware of that. And the only thing I
can say to you is at that period of time I was still hospitalized in Con-
necticut and' I don't know whether a directive came over for the FBI
to interview or not interview. I really don't.
Senator Inouye. Now, you riffled through these papers, I just
wanted to give you time to think about this. Can you recollect as to the
contents of those other papei-s in the Hunt file ?
Mr. Gray. The only recollection I have of those. Senator Inouye, is
that they were onion skin copies of correspondence, that is what they
appeared to be to me.
Senator Inouye. After reading the Diem cablegram you were not
curious about the other papers ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir; I was not and I did not read them or I would
testify today to you what was in them. I wish I could. If I may I would
like to correct one thing at least in my testimony. You know when I
took that action I didn't consider that to be an illegal action at the
inception or at the end, Senator Inouye, on my part, and I still don't.
3508
I viewed that as non- Watergate and certainly on the basis of what I
saw clearly non- Watergate.
Senator Inotjye. If this had been a legal act didn't you find it a
bit strange that Ehrlichman and Dean would ask you to do the dirty
job, why couldn't they have taken it back into their wastebasket and
burn it?
Mr. Gray. I think now, looking back on it, and I thought nothing of
it at that time, that they indeed wajited to be able to say that John
Dean had turned over everything in Howard Hunt's safe regardless
of its characterization to the FBI.
Senator Inoute. You are saying that as far as you are concerned
the act you committed was normal, proper, legal, and yet you were not
curious as to why these men very privately, secretively, asked you to
destroy these papers.
Mr. Gray, No ; I was not curious and I am not going to say to you
at this point, Senator Inouye, that it was proper and all the rest of it
because I know now it wasn't.
Senator Inotjte. But at that time you considered it proper.
Mr. Gray. I did.
Senator Inouye. If it was proper why can't Mr. John Wesley Dean
III, take it home to his backyard and burn it ?
Mr. Gray. Those questions were not raised in my mind because on
the basis of my training and dealing with the Office of the President,
when I was on active duty in the U.S. Navy, I revered that Office and
I revered the people in it and I respected them and I had no reason to
raise any suspicions.
Senator Inouye. Then you were a bit insubordinate in waiting 6
months to destroy the papers and not following the orders of the
President of the United States.
Mr. Gray. Yes; that is a conclusion that can be drawn, Senator
Inouye.
'Senator Inouye. "WTiy did you wait these 6 months ?
Mr. Gray. As I testified earlier, I was not in any hurry at all to
burn these and I knew I had to burn them because I had no facilities
for destruction at Harbour Square, my apartment, and I did not know
that those two baskets under my desk in the FBI were burn baskets.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
iSenator Er\^n. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
[WTiereupon, at 11 r55 a.m., the committee was recessed until 2 p.m.
of the same day.]
Afternoon Session, Monday, August 6, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gray, this morning you recounted the different dates of com-
munication with the '\Yhite House, with ISIr. Dean, with Mr. Ehrlicli-
man, and then also with General Walters. I believe that the first con-
tact you had with respect to the Watergate case was on January —
June 20 when you received a call from Mr. Ehrlichman informing
you that Mr. Dean would handle the investigation. That was the tenor
of that call, is that correct ?
3509
Mr. Gray. Senator Montoya, that was on June 21, sir.
Senator Montoya. Well, I have it from your logs here that it was
the 20th, but let us say that it was the 21st. And then on June 22 you
made a telephone call to Mr. Helms of the CIA. I believe you did that.
Or you telephoned somebody with respect to the $25,000 in the bank
account in Miami, did you not ? Or did you
Mr. GR.VY. What
Senator Montoya [continuing]. Or did you inform Mr. Dean that
evening and was he the first one ?
Mr. Gray. What I did, sir, on June 22 was to have a meeting at
about 5 o'clock with Mr. Bates, the Assistant Director in charge of the
General Investigative Division, and it was following that meeting that
I telephoned Mr. Helms to tell him of our thought that we may be
poking into a CIA operation. That was one of the theories that we
had, sir.'
Senator Montoya. Now, why did you get into the investigation and
into the discovery of the bank account and the Dahlberg involvement
in this money transaction so soon ? Had you received a request for this
information to be obtained or to try to trace the money that was found
on the defendants, the source of the money ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. It was a part. Senator Montoya, of trying to
trace the money that was found on the defendants and we had learned
that it had gone through the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank and the
Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, at least the series numbers with
the prefixes "c," and "/," I believe, and we were trying to run down
that money as a part of our investigation, and that is how we came
across the — and also by virtue of the fact that we had subpenaed Mr,
Barker's bank accounts there in Miami.
Senator Montoya. What did Mr. Helms tell you when you called
him?
Mr. Gray. I told Mr. Helms that I was calling to tell him of the
thought that we may be poking into a CIA operation in connection
with the Watergate burglary, and he told me that he had been meeting
with his men on this every day and that, although we know the people,
we cannot figure this one out, but there is no CIA involvement.
Senator Montoya, All right. Then, that evening you met with Mr.
Dean.
Mr. Gray. That is correct, sir.
Senator Montoya. And you told Mr. Dean about the Miami bank
account and you brought the name of Bernard Barker to his attention
and also the $25,000 check which was associated with Kenneth Dahl-
berg.
Mr. Gray. I believe that at that meeting, which — at which we dis-
cussed the scheduling of our interviews and the various theories of
the case that we and the FBI were considering, I told him in connec-
tion with those theories that we were not zeroing in on any one par-
ticular theory but I think I most probably discussed the sum total of
the money, the $114,000, the four checks for Senor Manuel Ogarrio and
the cashier's check for Mr. Dahlberg, the $25,000 one, sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you tell Dean about Helms' statement previ-
ously that there was no CIA involvement ?
Mr. Gray. I either told Mr. Dean in that evening meeting or I told
him in a telephone call the following morning, yes, sir.
3510
Senator Montoya. Now, on June 23, 1 believe you received two tele-
phone calls or had two telephone communications with Dean. One of
these was at 11 :06 a.m., and it was during this call that Mr, Dean
brought to your attention or raised first the idea that if you persisted
in your efforts to investigate the ]\Iexican money chain that you would
be uncovering or become involved in CIA operations. That is from
your statement on page 6.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. That is what I recollected and that accords with
the notes that I have.
Senator Montoya. Then on June 23, that was after that morning
meeting at the Wliite House between Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman,
Mr. Helms, and Mr. Haldeman, you received a call from Mr. Dean ask-
ing you or telling you^ that General Walters was going to call you for
an appointment.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. Mr. Dean called me that afternoon but, of course,
at this time, Senator Montoya, you realize I didn't know that there
had been any meeting at the White House.
Senator Montoya, Yes, I recognize that.
Mr, Gray. I did have that telephone call from Mr. Dean.
Senator Montoya. I recognize that. Then at 2:19 Mr. Dean called
you to find out if you had scheduled an appointment with General
Walters and at 2 :30 you actually met, or 2 :35 you actually met with
General Walters and it was at this meeting that General Walters
delivered the message to you that there was no CIA involvement and
you did not know that this message was coming from the "V^Hiite House.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. At that meeting he indicated to me that if we
continued our investigation, we would be apt to uncover some CIA
Senator Montoya. You were likely to uncover some CIA assets or
sources if you continued your investigation into the Mexican money
chain,
Mr, Gray, That is correct, sir, and he also mentioned the agency
agreement and he also mentioned that if we persisted in our investi-
gative efforts south of the border, we would uncover CIA covert ac-
tivity and that since we had five men in custody, we should taper off.
Senator Montoya. Didn't you think that this was kind of strange for
General Walters to be telling you this when Mr. Helms had told you
the day before that there was no CliV involvement ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; I didn't because it was a subject that came up
quite a few times with regard to whether or not the right hand really
knew what the left hand was doing in the CIA. We discussed this
compartmentalization.
Senator Montoya, Well, did you ask him
Mr, Gray. We also discussed the possibility that there was indeed
some information known only to the Wliite House in connection with
this particular facet.
Senator Montoya. Well, did you ask General Walters a question
to this effect, now, General, you are telling me this today and your boss,
Mr. Helms, told me that yesterday.
Did vou make an inquiry as
Mr. Gray, No, sir.
Senator Montoya [continuing]. As to the conflict?
3511
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; I did not, and I don't think that the thought ever
entered my mind to question the deputy director of the CIx4. along
those lines.
Senator Montoya. Well, didn't you think it was important for the
Director of the FBI to ask that particular question?
Mr. Gray. Generally, Senator Montoya, in my dealings with the
people from the CIA, I ask very few questions and looking back on it,
this was one of the mistakes I made. For example, I didn't ask Mr.
Helms any questions at all when he asked me not to interview the two
CIA men. I just issued the orders.
Senator Montoya. Well
Mr. Gray. In other words, I didn't have those kinds of suspicions
at that time.
Senator Montoya. Well, you were directing this investigation. You
were having some staff meetings with your Chief for Inspections, Mr.
Bates, and the rest of the investigatorial staff at the headquarters of
the FBI here in Washington.
Didn't it occur to you that this was a very important ingredient in
your investigation to resolve it ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; because I immediately following that visit tele-
phoned Mr. Bates and gave him instructions that there was some CIA
involvement here, that we should proceed very gingerly and very
discreetly and carry out the investigation at the Banco Interacionale,
and also continue to try to trace his checks through the correspondent
banks but to hold off interviewing Mr. Ogarrio.
Senator Montoya. Then why did you at 2 r35 p.m., shortly after your
meeting with General Walters on this day, call Mr. Dean and tell him
that you had agreed to hold back the FBI investigation ?
Mr. Gray. No ; I didn't call Mr. Dean and tell him that I had agreed
to hold back the FBI investigation. I never told anyone that
Senator Montoya. Well, should I be more specific ? You had agreed
to hold off on questioning of Mr. Ogarrio.
Mr. Gray. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. Did you tell him that ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir. What I told Mr. Dean was that General Walters
had visited me, had indicated to me that there was some CIA involve-
ment, and that we would proceed very gingerly and very discreetly
and work around this until we could determine what we had ahold of,
and I did that because in the early telephone conversation he had asked
me to talk with him following General Walters' visit with me.
Senator Montoya. Mr. Dean called you approximately 18 times be-
tween June 22 and July 6 when you talked to the President ?
Now, most of these calls were concentrated on Mr. Dean trying to
prevail on you not to go through with the inquisition of Mr. Ogarrio
or Mr. Dahlberg.
Didn't this indicate to you, Mr. Gray, that there was an attempted
coverup emanating from the White House ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; it did not because all along we in discussing our
various theories had considered that there was the possibility that this
was a CIA covert operation, a CIA money change, a political opera-
tion, a political money change, and if I had any thoughts at all on this
3512
thing it was zealous counsel trying to avoid political embarrassment
to his President, but I did not really have any suspicion on that.
Senator Montoya. My 10 minutes are up, Mr. Chairman, so 1 will
follow tliis later.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Gray, when the White House witnesses, by the
expression I mean those who worked as White House aides, Mr. Dean
was present at the time in the capacity of counsel ; wasn't he ?
When FBI interrogated White House witnesses, Mr. Dean was pres-
ent to listen to the interrogation ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, he had discussed this but whether or not he was
present Mr. Chairman, at each interview, I cannot state with certainty,
I have to see the report of interview, the FBI 302.
Senator Ervin. When the employees of the Committee To Re-Elect
the President were interrogated, commiti.ee counsel were present ;
weren't they ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, and the same thing occurred when we interro-
gated people at the Democratic National Committee in September.
Senator Ervin. The committee lias been furnished two ta^^es by
John Ehrlichman whicli taped conversations between you and
Ehrlichman. Did John Ehrlichman notify you he was taping your
coiiA-ersation ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, I had no knowledge of that.
Senator Ervin. The first of these tapes says you were reporting to
Ehrlichman, apparently your testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and you said you defended vigorously the right of an
employer to insist that his counsel be present at interviews of his
employees, particularly when there are implications that these
employees may have been involved in hanky-panky that would reflect
adversely on the employer.
Wouldn't the converse of that be true and if the employer luid been
guilty of hanky-panky those employees would be less reluctant to
divulge that to the FBI if the lawyer for the employer was sitting
there listening ?
Mr. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't know what the answer to that
question would be not knowing the facts and not being able to
Senator Erv^n. All you have to know is a little human psychology
to answer that question. If the FBI is interviewing an employee of the
Committee To Re-Elect the President and the lawyer for that com-
mittee is there listening to his testimony, don't you think that would
have a deterrent effect on what the witness would say ?
Mr. Gray. Of course, it is the preference of the FBI and has been
the preference of the FBI to have these interviews without the pres-
ence of the attorney, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. As a matter of fact, didn't a number of the wit-
nesses who worked for, rather a number of the interviewees, if I could
call them that, who were interviewed by the FBI in the presence of
the lawyer for the committee, didn't they call up the FBI and ask to be
interviewed in the absence of that lawyer ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; those were Committee To Re-Elect the President
people.
Senator Ervin. Yes; and didn't you think there were some tracks
leading right straight from the Watergate into that committee ?
Mr. Gray. I am sorry, I missed that.
3513
'Senator ER\^^'. Don't you think some of the evidential tracks were
leading from the "Watergate burglary into that committee ?
Mr. Gray. Certainly it began to look that way as the investigation
progressed.
Senator Er\t:x. WHienever these witnesses who worked for the com-
mittee said they didn't want to be interviewed about the Watergate
with the committee lawyer sitting there listening to their testimony
and asked for private interviews with the FBI.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; that occurred.
Senator Er\^x. Doesn't that sustain the point witnesses under those
circumstances are very reluctant to talk about the hanky-panky on the
part of their employer ?
Mr. Gray. This could very well be but it is something, you know,
that I can't say with any certainty of fact, but in connection with the
presence of counsel at interviews this is a phenomenon that the FBI
is encountering more and more and we desire, of course, not to take
the interviews in that manner but sometimes we are placed in the posi-
tion if we want the interview we are going to take it in that manner
or not get it.
Senator ER^^x. Xow, it was the 3d day of July that you met with
Ehrlichman and Dean and they gave you two folders, didn't they?
Mr. Gray. That was June 28, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervix. Do you not know that prior to that time they had
surrendered to the agents of the FBI a lot of material that came out
of the safe of Hunt ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; I had a discussion about the materials delivered
from Mr. Hunt's safe on the morning of June 27.
Senator Ervix. Xow at this time. Dean stated to you, as he gave you
these palmers in the presence of Ehrlichman, that there were highly
sensitive documents, that they had nothing to do with Watergate but
they must not see the light of day ?
Mr. Gray. He said more than that to me but that was included
among the tilings he did say to me.
Senator ER^^x. You construed that to be a somewhat indirect way to
tell you to destroy the documents ?
Mr. Gray. The clear impression in my mind, JNIr. Chairman, then
and now was just that.
Senator ER^^:x. Mr. Ehrlichman was standing close enough to you
and Mr. Dean to hear what Mr. Dean said ?
Mr. Gray. Yes. sir ; we were all very close together, within 18 to 20
inches of one another.
Senator Er\t:x. You did take those documents into your possession
and later 3-ou burned those documents with the trash which accumu-
lated in connection with Christmas packages and the like?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; I did.
Senator Er\t:x. You opened one of those packages and you dis-
covered they were State Department telegrams marked top secret?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir; they were State Department cablegrams.
Senator Ervix. You could tell from the telegrams in their then state,
whatever their original state may have been, that they indicated that
pei-sons connected with the administration of Jack Kennedy had
apparently made some suggestions about the assassination of Diem in
Southeast Asia ?
3514
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, that is the thrust of the message in the cablegram,
to the best of my recollection, of those words.
Senator ER^^N. Now, did yon not ascertain further in the investiga-
tion that these had come out of the safe of Hunt in the Executive Office
Building and that Hunt had been to John Ehrlichman's knowledge
kept on the White House payroll for about 9 months after he had been
guilty of being an accessory before the fact to the bnrglarly arising
out of the office of P^llsberg's psychiatrist ?
Mr. Gray. The first I knew about any burglarj- of Dr. P^llsberg's
psychiatrist was when I read about it in the newspapers, Mr. Chair-
man, so I do not know that I had that particular information that you
are specifying here now, sir.
Senator Ervin. Well, you did know that Hunt was then implicated
or allegedly implicated in the Watergate atf air ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; I knew that he was — on that date that he was a
person that we wanted to interview and we had tried to talk with him,
sir.
Senator Ervin. And did you not ascertain later that these telegrams
had been taken out of the State Department and put in the custody of
Hunt for the purpose of letting Hunt alter them by forgery so as to
make this reflection upon the Kennedy administration 'i
Mr. Gray. I do not know that the FBI ever determined that in its
investigation, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me that this is something
that I recall coming up much after the fact. I do not think that we
ever determined that.
Senator Ervix. Well, do you not think that it was very peculiar for
a man who had been implicated in a burglary in September 1971 to be
kept on the White House payroll and be giAen the custody of top secret
State Dei^artment cablegrams?
Mr. Gray. Well, knowing what I know now and not knowing it at
tliat time, Mr. Chairman, there is no question about it. It was not
proper.
Senator Ervin. This committee has been trying to find out who kept
Mr. Hunt on the White House payroll after Mr. P]hrlichman admitted
that he had learned about his participation in the burglary but thus
far neither the FBI nor this committee has been able to discover that.
Mr. Gray. I cannot testify with any certainty to that but I think in
our FBI investigative file there are indications that his timesheets
were initialed by Mr. Colson. I do not know whether you have had
those FD-302's, but I think that there is an indication in there to that
effect.
Senator Ervix. Now, I have always understood these 302 files were
the original reports made to the FBI by the agents after they inter-
viewed witnesses.
Mr. Gray. Well, he interviews the witness, sir, and however he takes
his notes I do not know because that is a part of the mechanics that I
never became familiar with, and I have been informed, and it is my
understanding, that the FD-302, the report of intervieAV, is what the
agent dictates or writes out from his notes of the inteivievr and which
is later to be used in court under the Jencks Act p]-ocedures.
Senator Ervix. Well, he makes some notes and then he puts out sup-
port of what his notes say on 302's ?
3915
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. They are the result of his interview.
Senator Ervix. And Dean was ^iven, I believe you testified before
the Judiciary Committee, about 80 FBI reports?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, I did testify before the Judiciary Committee to
that effect.
Senator Ervin. Now, did the FBI ever make any investigation to
determine whether or not the $10,000 in $100 bills which Mrs. Hunt
had in her possession when she was killed in the airplane accident were
things that came from the Committee To Ke-Elect the President ?
Mr. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I do not know. I wish I could answer that
question but I do not know the answer to that, sir.
Senator Ervin. Well, on June 17, 1972, five burglars were caught
red-handed in the National Democi-atic Committee headquarters in
the Watergate witli Xixon campaign funds in their possession, were
they not ?
Mr. Gray. I do not know, Mr. Chairman, that I could characterize
them as Nixon campaign funds. We tried very diligently, even to the
extent of interviewing tellei-s in 7?> different branch banks, to try to
tie it down with that specificity. That was a direct order that I gave.
And I just do not know that we could tie it down. We know that the
money came in, that it went out, and we know that it came back into
the Committee To Re-Elect the President, but whether it was the same
money I do not know, sir.
Senator Ervix. Well, diiferent money came out of the checks. Do
you not know that four of these burglars, that is. Barker and the three
Cubans, had in their possession at the time of their arrest in the Water-
gate 5'8 $100 bills which boi-e the serial numbers of the bills that Barker
drew out of the Miami bank account which contained the pi-oceeds of
the four Mexican checks and the Dahlberg check ?
Mr. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I wish I could answer your question in
the afiirmative. We tried to prove that but unfortunately, the Republic
National Bank in Miami and the Girard Bank & Trust Co. in Phila-
delphia did not keep the serial numbers, so we could not track it with
that specificity.
Senator Ervin. We have evidence here to the effect that these 53
$100 bills bore the serial number of the Miami bank and the ISIiami
bank pursuant to law, which I understand applies when they deal out
$5,000 in casli, kept the serial numbers.
Mr. Gray. My information and the exhibits that I have submitted
to this committee which were the copies of memorandums submitted
to me as acting director of the FBI do not indicate that. That is all
that I am saying. We were told that the banks did not keep the serial
numbers.
Senator Ervin. Well, the testimony here is to the effect, as I construe
it, that four Mexican checks which were cashier checks issued by the
Mexican bank to Ogarrio and a $25,000 check known as the Dahlberg
check, were received by the Committee To Re-Elect the President here
in the city of Washington and that a short time later they were de-
posited to the bank account of the firm of Bernard L. Barker, in Miami,
Fla., and that Bernard L. Barker drew out after some days vast sums
of this money in $100 bills and that the bank, pursuant to law, kept
the serial numbers and that these checks found in the possession of
351(6
these men bore those serial numbers, but you say you do not know aboui'i
that? ' ?
Mr. Gray. Well, ISIr. Chairman, what I am saying to you is tha<|
all the exhibits that I have submitted to you which were the memo-]
randums submitted to me, agree with everything you say with the one|
exception that we were not able to tie down the serial numbers. We
asked them specifically if they kept the serial numbers of the $100 bills
and the}' told us they did not.
Senator Ervix. Well, I hold in my hand a photostatic copy of the
Dahlberg check for $:25,000 issued on the First Bank & Trust Co..;
of Boca Raton, on April 10, 1972, and it bears the notation to the effect)
an endorsement showing it was negotiated to the order of the Republic
National Bank of Miami, Fla., for deposit only. Barker Associates,
Inc., trust account.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. We detected that. We are in agreement there.
We don't have any problem with that, sir.
Senator Ervix. And you have no problem about the four Mexican
checks being part of his account ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, no, sir, we agree.
Senator Er\^n. Now, you do know from your conversations with
General Walters that the White House, and I refer in that to Ehrlich-
man, handling about these Mexican checks on the 23d day of June 1972,
which was 6 days after the break-in.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. I am pretty certain of that because I believe that '
certainly I either discussed it with John Dean on the evening of June j
'22 or on the morning of the 23d in that telephone call.
Senator Ervix. You say on the evening of the 22d or the 23d you j
discussed it with Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Gray. Not with My. Elirlichman ; no, sir,
Senator ER^^x, With Dean ?
Mr, Gray. With Mr. Dean ; yes, sir.
Senator Era^x, Now, was that before or after Mr. Ehrlichman told
you that Dean was handling this matter for the Wliite House ?
Mr, Gray, That was after, sir.
Senator Ervix. So after that you discovered on that day that the
fact that the four INIexican checks and the Dahlberg check had existed
were known to John Ehrlichman and Dean ?
Mr. Gray. I don't know whether it was known to Mr, Elirlichman,
sir. I know that I discussed them either on the evening of Jime 22 or
in the telephone call of June 23, with ]Mr, Dean,
Senator ER^^;x, Now, your logs show that you had two phone con-
versations on June 22 — I will have to come back to this because I am
informed that my time is up.
Senator Baker,
Senator Baker, Well, Mr, Chairman, you Averen't informed by me.
Senator Er\ix, No.
Senator Baker, I plead innocent to that.
Mr, Gray, over the weekend I had an opportunity to read carefully
your statement consisting of 51 pages. Tliere are a number of thouglits,
there are a number of questions that occur to me but there is one in
particular that stands out with great clarity and potential importance.
3517
According to my count, and I may not l^e exactly correct, but accord-
ing to my count, you enumerate 27 major items of testimony that are
in disagreement between you and General Walters. There are a great
number of other conflicts in your testimony with that of other wit-
nesses — Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, and others. But there are very,
very material conflicts between you and General Walters. I recite just
a few.
On page 7 you state :
Categorically, however, that any sentiment of that kind expressed by me was
an effort by me to abide by the CIA-FBI agreement and related solely to the
responsibility of exposing the CIA.
You have a disagreement on the conversation about the Dahlberg-
Ogarrio checks. About any number of other things, I won't burden
my 10 minutes allocated for this examination by enumerating them
but surely you are familiar with them.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Baker. Xow, can you give tliis committee any assistance by
way of reconciling these patent conflicts between vou and General
Walters?
Mr. Gray. I am not so sure that they are that patent in that they are
that conflicting really. He says low key and the evidence clearly is
that we moved discreetly, not that we low keyed, because even after
talking with him we continued to conduct the investigation of Banco
Internacionale. We continued to look to the correspondent banks to
see if we could find anything. The only thing we didn't do. Senator
Baker, was to interview Mr. Ogarrio and we were continually trying
to interview Mr. Dahlberg, but as I mentioned to Mr. Dean in the tele-
phone call of June 27, Mr. Dahlberg
Senator Baker. What was the relationship between 3'ou and Gen-
eral Walters, were you friendly and cordial, were you antagonistic or
hostile toward each other, why did you have such varying viewpoints?
Mr. Gray. I thought the relationship was friendly and cordial and
I have no reason to believe it is other than that today.
Senator Baker. You suspect it may be less f i-iendly and cordial after
disputing him on 27 major issues.
Mr. Gray. I don't think so because I told him this in the assistant
U.S. attorney's office, "Dick, this isn't the way it happened and this
is not my recollection or memory of it at all," and my outrage when I
fii"st saw a newspaper article commenting on his testimony was very
genuine and very real.
Senator Baker. Your outrage ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Is there any one or two, are there a few examples of
what caused that outrage ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir; that these men had apparently had a meeting at
the White House and no one called me and told me about a meeting at
the ^^Hiite House prior to them coming over to me. That is one of the
things.
Senator Baker. You are talking about the Helms meeting ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, on the 23d.
3518
Senator Baker. T^t's move oif that for a moment. I would like to,
if we have time, examine some of the other of the 27 areas of disagree-
ment, but I have a number of other things.
On page 4 of your statement, Mr. Gray, if I read it and understand
it correctly, it clearly indicates that you initiated the inquiry about a
possible CIA involvement before anyone else mentioned it to you. Is
that a correct reading of that?
Mr. Gray. What language are you referring to ?
Senator Baker. The third paragraph of page 4, where it says on
Thursday, June 22, after being briefed by Charles Bates, assistant,
General Investigative Division, regaiding the latest development in i
the Watergate case, undoubtedly as a result of information developed
at that briefing, I telephoned Director Helms of the CIA and told him
of our thinking that we may be poking into a CIA operation and asked
if he could confirm or deny this. Now^ the question really is whether or
not anyone from the White House or the Justice Department or any
place else had suggested to you that there might be a CIA involve-
ment and you should check on it at that point.
Mr. Gray. At that point, no, sir; that was one of the theories that
we developed ourselves within the FBI because of the people who were
involved in the Watergate burglary.
Senator Baker. The peoi)le involved having been formally asso-
ciated with CIA ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; having CIA contacts.
Senator Baker. How fast did you find out, how quickly did you
learn that these people were involved with the CIA at sometime pre-
vious, and I believe at the time in question Mr. Hunt was still involved
on a consulting l)asis, how soon did the FBI know that ?
Mr. Gray. That we didn't know but I have exhibits here of my early
briefings which I have submitted to the committee which indicate that
as of June 21 and June 22 it appeared to us in our discussions that
there could be a CIA operation involved.
Senatoi- Baker. Pretty clearly at that part of your statement on
page 4 when you talked to Director Helms, I take it that this was the
fii-st time you talked at the time about this subject. Helms says, "No,
we aren't invol ved, we don't have any CIA involvement."
Mr. Gray. He told me there was no CIA involvement.
Senator Baker. How do you reconcile that, if you do, with the Wal-
tei-s statement on page 6 saying that on Friday, June 28, Walters
informed you that you were likely to "uncover some CIA assets or
sources if we continued our investigation in the Mexican money
change."
To me that is a conflict in the statements by Mr. Helms and General
Walters.
Mr. Gray. Indeed it is a conflict and I viewed it as a conflict and
I attributed it to what we later tliscussed in our meetings in the FBI
on June 28 and July 8 to the compartmentalization which is alleged
to exist within the CIA. Whether it exists or not I don't know and
I don't know whether any people in the FBI know as a fact whether
It exists or not and whether the right hand always knows what the left
hand is doing.
Senator Baker. At this point, June 23, 1972, had anyone from the
White House or outside the FBI tried to suggest to you that there was
CIA involvement?
3519
Mr. Gray. On June, prior to this meeting, on June 23 ?
Senator Baker. Yes.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; Mr. Dean had either in that evening meeting of
June 22 or in the telephone call on the morning of June 23 and I said
to him if there is CIA involvement let the CIA tell us.
Senator Baker. All right, now, the reason for these questions I hope
has begun to appear to you. The allegation is made in a legitimate area
of inquiry to decide whether or not the White House or anyone con-
nected with the "VVHiite House or the CRP tried to plant the idea that
the CIA was involved and to what extent, if any, CIA or anyone in the
CIA tried to further that appearance.
Mr. Gray. That is right, Senator.
Senator Baker. When you called Helms, Helms said no, there is no
involvement. You talked to Dean, Dean suggested there might be.
Then you talked to Walters and Walters said you very well may un-
cover a CIA operation.
Is that in essence what happened up to this point ?
Mr. Gray. That is right, with the one exception that I told Mr. Dean
that if there is CIA involvement you let them tell us.
Senator Baker. So Mr. Dean and General Walters were suggesting
to you that there was CIA involvement. Director Helms had already
told you there wasn't CIA involvement.
Mr. Gray. That is right, sir.
Senator Baker. It appears on page 13 of your statement, Mr. Gray,
that Director Helms called you and I don't see the date, and I don't
have it in my notes, but at one point Director Helms called you and
asked you not to interview active CIA men Carl Wagner and John
Caswell.
Mr. Gray. Yes, that was in a telephone conversation, Senator Baker,
X believe, which occurred on June 28, 1 am sure it was.
Senator Baker, Do you know why Helms called you, were you in
fact investigating these people or had you notified them you wanted
to interview them ?
Mr. Gray. I did not notify Director Helms that we were going to
interview either one of these men, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you know that you were going to ?
Mr. Gray. I did not at the time he called me, I did not know.
Senator Baker. Did you since learn your agents were about to do
that and that triggered Helms' interest ?
Mr. Gray. I am saying after Director Helms called, I accepted his
word and I immediately ordered that the interviews of John Caswell
and Carl Wagner be held in abeyance.
Senator Baker. You indicate that, but what I am reaching for is
why Helms called you. He received notice that you might do that.
What was the reason for him trying to suggest that you not interview
these two men ?
Mr. Gray. Senator Baker, I do not know but I know that I also have
a telephone note in November which indicates that Director Helms
had called my No. 2 man stating to my No. 2 man at that late date he,
Director Helms, was going to call Assistant Attorney General Petei-sen
regarding the interview of Carl Wagner to see if it could not be con-
ducted. I do not know.
3520
Senator Baker. Could not be conducted ?
Mr. Gray. To be held off.
Senator Baker. Do you know who these two people are, did you
then or have you since learned ?
Mr. Gray. I do not know who John Caswell is and I have since
learned of Mr. Wagner and I believe I am correct in saying this,
because I have learned it from the new^spapers, I believe, that he was
General Cushman's executive assistant.
Senator Baker. Was he General Cushman's executive assistant at
that time ?
Mr. Gray. I do not now.
Senator Baker. Do you know whether either of these names show^ up
in conjunction wnth the Watergate affair ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, I have since learned those names, I believe I am
correct in saying this, I know I am correct in saying it with regard to
Caswell, I believe I am correct in saying it with regard to Wagner,
that those names were in one of the notebooks, little pocket telephone
address-type notebooks that we uncovered, and I believe that it was
Mr. Hunt's notebook but that would have to be subject to verification ;
I am not that positive of it.
Senator Baker. Do you know w^ho has custody of that material now ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, I would assume the FBI does because those leads
were sent out from the Washington field office.
Senator Baker. Did you inquire of Director Helms w hy he did not
want Wagner and Casw^ell interviewed ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, I did not. In dealing w^th people from the CIA
I did not ask the questions along those lines. I accepted wiiat they told
me.
Senator Baker. On page 14 of your statement, and you may have
already covered this in earlier testimony, you mentioned Miss Kathleen
Chenow and a request by John Dean she not be interview^ed or that
she be interviewed in England. Do you know who she is or wiiat her
connection with the situation is ?
Mr. Gray. I believe he told me she worked on the NSC staff and I
have since found out that Miss Chenow^ was INIr. Young's secretary,
I believe I am correct in stating that.
Senator Baker. We are running out of time, Mr. Gray, let me ask
you one or two other questions, if I may.
On page 20 I guess you come close to summing up your state of mind
about the CIA situation when you say that you w^ere concerned and
disturbed about the contradictory reports you were receiving from
Helms, from Dean, from Walters, and the abrupt cancellation by Ehr-
lichman of the meeting scheduled with Helms and Walters on June 28.
Now, did you develop in the course of your investigation any further
information that w^ould bear on any of these questions, first, that this
was connected with the CIA, that is, the Watergate situation, or,
second, that it was not and someone w^as trying to use the appearance
and identification of past CIA operations as a convenient hook on
which to hang their hat or, third, any other reconciliation of those
concerns and contradictions?
Mr. Gray. Well, after I ordered the interviews following that meet-
ing with General Walters, we did determine that these were contribu-
3521
tions, political contributions and this was a political contribution chain
rather than a CIA money chain.
iSenator Baker. But at any event to tie it together, Helms through-
out told you there was no CIA involvement. Walters at some point said,
yes, there was, or there might be. Dean said, yes there was, or there
might be. The meeting to reconcile those conflicts was canceled and
that is as far as you can go with it.
Mr. Gray. That's as far as I can go with it except for our June 28
meeting with Mr. Felt and Mr. Bates and myself to review this, my
July 3 meeting with Mr. Felt, Mr. Bates and Mr. Kunkel to review
the CIA ramifications.
Senator Baker. On another subject, Mr. Gray. I have before me a
copy of the August issue of the Armed Forces Journal International
and in that is an interesting article which is copyrighted by that publi-
cation, authorized by James W. McCord, Jr., entitled ""Wliat the FBI
Almost Found."
Do you have that article or have you read it ?
Mr. Gray. It has been called to my attention. Senator Baker, and
I
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have a copy of that article and I
would ask that it be identified for the record and received as a part of
the record and then deliver a copy of it to the witness.
'Senator Ervin. If there is no objection, that will be done.
[The article referred to was marked exhibit No. 141.*]
Senator Baker. Is someone taking a copy to the witness? Do you
have the document?
Mr. Sachs. We had one but^
Senator Baker. I just handed it to somebody. What happened to it?
I would especially call your attention, Mr. Gray, to a paragraph
near the end of the article — it is the fifth from the last paragraph. It
is a short three-line paragraph that says : "The question then is who
kept the wraps on the FBI in its investigation of the Watergate case,"
and Mr. McCord in his article, and this is the first of a three-part
series, and I look forward to receiving the next succeeding install-
ments, but the suggestion is made that in the normal and ordinary
course of events search warrants would have been sworn out and
executed to search the vehicles and premises of the people involved in
the Watergate arrest, and none were, suggesting that someone stopped
that normal procedure from operating, that had they done that, they
would have found, in ISIcCord's residence and his automobile electronic
equipment, they would have found $18,000 in $100 bills, carbon copies
of wiretap logs and a copy of a letter signed by John Mitchell au-
thorizing McCord to go to the Internal Security Division of the
Department of Justice to obtain information regarding violence
allegedly planned for the Republican National Convention.
He suggests as well that as he puts it, "senior personnel of the FBI
wanted to get such search warrants but they were turned down."
Now, there are a number of other statements by Mr. McCord, who,
as you know, has been a witness before this committee.
Now, if those allegations are in fact true, they bear and merit the
very close scrutiny of this committee. Begin at the beginning. Was
♦See p. 3848.
3522 1
there in fact suppression of the efforts of "senior FBI personnel'' toj^
gain search warrants to search the premises of tlie Watergate)
defendants ? 1
Mr. Gray. I testified this morning, Senator Baker, that I thought {
Mr. McCord was being \ery unfair to the dedicated men and women i
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and I will make that statement ^
to you again, sir, because those men and women would not tolei'ate '
suppression, and furthermore, 1 know of no such suppression of any
desires to get a search warrant, and I would like to read, if I may,
from an exhibit which is before this committee. I would like to read
the language of some of the FBI men themselves.
Observations as to any limitations on Investigation. It is the unanimous vi(\\
of Assistant Director Bates, his No. 1 man, Ricliard R. Gallaglier, Section Chief
Charles Bolz, and Supervisor Charles A. Huzum and John J. Clynick as well as
A. C. Kunkel of the Washington field otfice that there were absolutely no limita-
tions placed on the FBI's investigation of captioned matter —
This is the Watergate case —
It was understood by all persionnel involved in this investigation that it was to
be a most thorough and exhaustive investigation with all leads receiving top
priority and suflicient personnel assigned to assure prompt handling of all
investigations. Our investigation throughout has been aimed at developing vio-
lations of the Interception of Communications and Consi)iracy statutes. Investi-
gation was directed toward identifying each participant in the bugging, including
identification of those who may have recruited the subjects, financed the oi>era-
tion or participated in any fashion. In this connection we were particularly
interested in funds that may have been used to finance the Watergate incident.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Gray.
Mr. Gray. And I just say. Senator Baker, that this question was
raised again later on in the year and there is a dociunent before this
committee, an exhibit before this committee which I have presented
to it, that the agents were not restricted in pursuing any lead which
they wished to pursue with the one exception of Mr. Wagner.
Senator Baker. My time has expired, Mr. Gray, but 1 cannot resist
a last final question.
On page 11 of your statement you speak of trying to gain assistance
in identifying an individual who had been seen with Mr. Hunt at the
Miami Playboy (^lub. Did you ever find out who that w\as ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, indeed we did. We were able to track down and
identify that individual as Mr. Liddy who was under the alias at that
time of Mr. Leonard. We tied him together with his alias as of July od.
Senator Baker. The statement just sort of stands out. I do not
understand the significance of it. Is there any ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, there is not. That was a telephone call that I was
nierely recounting, a call that I had with Jolm Dean in which I asked
him for some photographs to assist the Washington field office in mak-
ing identification.
Senator Baker. Thank you very mucli.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator AVeicker. ]\Ir. Gray, I would like to go back, if I can, to
late June and ending with the call to the President on July 6. What
was the significance to the FBI of the Mexican money ?
Mr. Gray. Well, the significance to us, sir, was that it was either —
at that time in our theories that it was eithei a CIA money chain or a
political mone}' chain and it was important to us to try to track it
3523
down and determine what it was, whether it was dollars used to finance
the burglary and the bugging of the Watergate.
Senator Weicker. And did — in the course of the investigation, did
you arrive at a determination as to w^hich of those two
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. We were able to determine that indeed, it was a
political money chain as we were calling it in the FBI. Political con-
tributions, Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Was this Mexican money one of the few pieces of
hard evidence that the FBI had at that time ?
Mr. Gray. At that early stage it was. It was not — I believe I am cor-
rect in saying — until June 28 that we had the lead to Mr. Liddy, but I
believe it was at that early stage, sir.
Senator Weicker. So that the Mexican money was — could be termed
as enormously important to the investigation of the Watergate?
Mr. Gray. It was the only money chain that we had right at that
point in time, sir.
Senator Weicker. All right.
Now, at what point in time did your antennas alert you to the fact
that somebody might be trying to interfere with the investigation I
Mr. Gray. I think that I had perhaps a feeling along those lines or
a feeling that somebody at the White House knows a lot more than
we know, beginning when my meeting with Mr. Helms was canceled,
but it was a feeling then that maybe this is an activity on the part of
people to put some kind of cloak on the political contribution aspects
of the thing, but the suspicions really began to generate along those
lines rather solidly when I had the meeting with General Walters.
Senator Weicker. This being what meeting, the
Mr. Gray. The July 6 meeting, sir.
Senator Weicker. The July 6 meeting.
All right. Now^, Mr. Gray, the question has been asked, it has been
debated, as to what it was that you intended to convey to the Presi-
dent of the United States on July 6. Now, could you tell this committee
what it was that you intended to convey in that phone conversation?
Mr. Gray. I had no knowledge of any attempt at a coverup at that
point in time. There is no question about that. I had no knowledge
of, no susi^icion of, or no awareness of, and I was trying to tell the
President that I believed Dick Walters believed that people on his
staff were using the FBI and the CIA to confuse the question of
whether or not there was CIA interest in or noninterest in people that
we wanted to interview, and it could very well have been the activity
on the part of overzealous individuals over there to protect the Presi-
dent. I said trying to mortally wound the President.
Senator Weicker. Was it a question or did you attempt to convey
that insofar as the investigation of the Mexican money was concerned,
that there w^ere those that were trying to impede the investigation ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir. I do not think I even — I am sure I did not men-
tion the Mexican money chain to the President.
Senator Weicker. Well, then, let us — I am trying to pin this down
and be very specific as to exactly what message you conveyed to the
President. Did you try to convey the fact that you felt there were those
individuals on his staff who were impeding in any way the investiga-
tion of the AVatergate matter, without reference to the Mexican
money ?
3524 i
Mr. Gray. I think probably what was going through my mind was
the careless and indilterent attitude toward both of the agencies and
their use of them, and it was with reference to what money that we
believed — I did not say money to the President but 1 had this in my
mind, that it was either a CIA money chain or a political money chain,
but I felt that by their actions of trying to confuse us, that they would
be mortally wounding the President.
Senator AVeicker. By this time, by July 6, had you made the deter-
mination that this was a political money chain rather than a CIA
money chain ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, because we had not really conducted the inter-
views. We had to await the interviews of the individuals concerned.
Senator Weicker. All right.
Now, let us continue on that phone conversation with the President.
Did you in that phone conversation suggest to the President that the
matter of Watergate might lead higher ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir. To the best of my recollection, the words that I
have been using consistently or the words that stick in my mind are the
words that have always been in my mind and the only other thing that
I did say to the President was that I have just spoken to Clark Mac-
Gregor about this this morning and asked him to talk with you about
it, Mr. President, and there was a slight pause and then the President
said to me, Pat, you continue to conduct your thorough and aggressive
investigation.
Senator Weicker. Did you raise to the President the fact that you
and Dick Walters were concerned or was this a question from the
President to you?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; this was a question, really it was a matter that
I raised and I didn't really from my meeting with General Walters
draw the feeling that I had to call the President and indeed and in
fact that is why I called Clark MacGregor and I was surprised that the
President called me and I just blurted out to him when he finished
congratulating me on the highjacking, I just blurted out to him, Mr.
President, there is something that I have to speak to you about.
Senator Weicker. And then what did you say ?
Mr. Gray. I gave him the message, Dick Walters and I feel that
there are people on your staff who are trying to mortally w^ound you
by using the FBI and the CIA to confuse the question of whether or
not there is CIA interest in or noninterest in people that the FBI
wishes to interview.
Senator Weicker. Did you get into a discussion with him relative
to your being given assurances that the CIA was not involved ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir; the President, as best as I can recollect it, did not
ask me any questions because if he had I would have suspected that he
would have asked me who do you mean and I Avould have told him.
Senator Weicker. Well, now, Mr. Gray, I w^ant to read to you a
statement made by the President of the United States on May 22,1973 :
On July 6, 1972, I telephoned the Acting Director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray,
to congratulate him on his successful handling of the hijacking of a Pacific
Southwest Airline plane the previous day. During the conversation Mr. Gray
discussed with me the progress of the Watergate investigation and I asked him
whether he had talked with General Walters. Mr. Gray said that he had and that
General Walters had assured him the CIA was not involved. In the discussion
Mr. Gray suggested that the matter of Watergate might lead higher. I told him
to press ahead with his investigation.
3525
Now, you have characterized or you set your description of this con-
versation alongside that of General Walters and you said that you will
stick with your version of the conversation.
Mr. GutVY. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker, Will you also stick with your version of the con-
versation set aside that version given by the President of the United
States on May 22?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; because this is my memory and my best recol-
lection and it is a memory I have had for a long, long time.
The only thing I was interested in, Senator Weicker, in talking with
General Walters on this July 5 telephone conversation, was Ogarrio
and Dahlberg. I just wanted to know if they had any interest in them
or not so that we could interview them and I told him that. I wasn't
interested in anything else. I wasn't interested in reading a 2%-page
memorandum about previous information furnished at the working
level from the CIA to the FBI. I just wanted the answer to that
question.
Senator Weicker. One last question in this round.
Do I have any time left ?
When was the first time that you realized — I had it written down
a certain way and I realized that could be misconstrued. I had, when
was the first time you started to realize you were "swinging.'' That
could be interpreted both ways.
When was the fii*st time that you realized that you were hanging,
twisting slowly in the wind ?
Mr. Gray. I think perhaps. Senator Weicker, the first time I realized
this and realized I was in a situation where I was going to have to
scramble to extricate myself was really either in my April -lb conversa-
tion with you, but I think more the point was really made with me on
the evening of April 26 in the meeting in the Attorney General's office
when I had the conversation with Assistant Attorney General Petersen.
Senator Weicker. And this relates to Mr. Petersen's statement rela-
tive to you and he being exjjendable ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, he said, "Pat, I am scared."
Senator Weicker. As to the interpretations coming forth from the
White House, whether or not you had resigned or whether you had
been kicked out, did that start to reaffirm or strengthen those sus-
picions ?
Mr. Gray. I do not know that I really thought of it that way, I just
thought of it as a very unfair way to handle a factual situation that
was different.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions on this round.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Captain Gray, in your previous testimony you
stated that you conferred with Mr. Dean on June 21 last year. There
were many theories as to who was responsible for the break-in in
Watergate and almost all of them involved the CIA. When did you
check out the theory of the Committee for the Re-Election of the
Pi-esident involvement ?
Mr. Gray. I think that that was encompassed. Senator Talmadire, in
the theory that we had that this was a political operation, we did not
think it was just the CIA, sir.
96-296 O— 73— pt. 9— S
3526
Senator Talmadge. Did you interview the officials of the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President ?
Mv. Gray. Yes, we interviewed, if my memory is correct, 60 people
over there.
Senator Talmadge. When ?
Mr. Gray. We have a list of those interviews and we have placed
it as an exhibit before the committee, sir, but I can
Senator Talmadge. When did they start?
Mr. Gray. I will have to look.
Senator Talmadge. Certainly.
Mr. Gray. We began, sir, on June 17. Miss Gleason was one inter-
viewed, and I noticed some earlier ones here. jSIr. Odle was interviewed,
on June 19. These were contacts. These could either be an interview or
a telephone contact by us to them or them to us.
Senator Talmadge. Did you investigate the possibility of White
House involvement?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, we did and we interviewed people in the White
House and I believe the very first interview there was ]\Ir. Colson —
no, it was earlier than that — we talked with, T think, Mr. Butterfield
on June 17. We talked with him regarding
Senator Talmadge. Was that a full field investigation or just a
telephone friendly chat ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, that particular .call was to call Mr. Butterfield
to determine whether or not Mr. Hunt was in the employ of the White
House, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Getting back to the papers now that ]Mr. Ehr-
lichman and Mv. Dean delivered to you, did you not think it was
strange that top secret papers would be in the hands of White House
advei-saries and that they would tell you, the Acting Director of the
FBI, a supposedly nonpolitical organization, not to let them see the
light of day because they were political dynamite ?
Mr. Gray. Senator Talmadge, I have got to say to you that at the
time that I received those, the answer to your question has got to be
no, because I did not have those kind of suspicions.
Senator Talmaixie. You did not think your office as Director of the
FBI was an extension of the White House, did you ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, I did not. I had only been in the FBI, really
actively on duty there and when this whole thing broke, you know,
about 4 weeks. I am not trying to make an exculpatory statement
because I have told this committee earlier that I stand responsible for
my actions and the actions of the men and women under my command
during my tenure as acting director and I am merely trying to recite,
as a fact, those suspicions did not enter my mind and I have not been
that kind of a pereon in all of my life. I have not been suspicious of
people. I have not lived nor was I raised or brought up with or served
with people that I had to be suspicious of. Looking back on it is
another matter, sir.
Senator TALi\rAD(;E. You stated that you opened one of the files in
your home in Connecticut af (^hristmas. saw tliat it implicated officials
of the Kennedy administration in the assassination of President Diem,
and had no doubt, no reason to doubt the authenticity of the papers,
then you burned them. '\^niv didn't you show them to the President ?
3527
Mr. Gray. Those were copies of documents and the thought never
entered my mind I should show them to the President. If the President
needed any knowledge along those lines I am sure that Mr. Dean or
]\Ir. Ehrlichman either would have or could have conveyed it to him,
but the thought had not entered my mind.
Senator Talmadge. Did it ever cross your mind if these documents
were indeed authentic that it might throw a new light on the assassina-
tion of President Kennedy ; that is, retaliatory action ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; I never gave that a thought and you know even
in looking back on it and analyzing it, these were copies of documents,
these were not the originals of the documents.
Senator Talmadge. Now after Mr. Dean and ISIr. Ehrlichman's ac-
tions which prompted you to call the President and inform him that he
was being mortally wounded, did you begin investigations into Mr.
Dean's and Mr. Ehrlichman's possible role in the break-in ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; no one of us did and when I didn't hear from the
President those suspicions that I had as I testified to earlier were dis-
sipated and I really and sincerely believed that General Walters and
I had been alarmists and that is why I testified, I think
Senator Talmadge. In other words, you thought if the President had
no suspicions that your suspicions were ill-founded, is that correct?
Mr. Gray. Senator, I certainly tliought that in view of the message
that I had given to the President that if there were anything to it
there would have been some checks made on it and each of the follow-
ing two successive meetings I luid with General Walters I asked him
if the President had called him and his answer in each case Avas no,
except that on one occasion, as I recollect, he said, yes, he did call me
but on a different matter.
Senator Talmadge. Now one final question. I read one sentence from
the President's statement. "In the discussion Mr. Gray suggested that
the matter of Watergate might lead high." I am quoting from the
President of the Ignited States in his statement. Your testimony was
some members of his staff might mortally wound him. Did the Presi-
dent ask who?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; he did not.
Senator Talmadge. He did not ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Captain Gray.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the floor.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Gray, just to follow up on the questioning
that Senator Talmadge was doing. In retrospect it occurs to all of us
it was rather strange that your suspicions perhaps weren't heightened,
but isn't it a fact that even in Washington, and I guess probably else-
where in the country, around about that time in June that this break-in
occurred, thought that this was a crazy, hairbrained scheme that was
done by some stupid fool and ended probably with Hunt and Liddy.
Wasn't that the general feeling aroimd Washington ?
Mr. Gray. It appeared to be from the reports; it appeared to be from
the discussions that we had within the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation and even in my first conversation with Director Helms he said
to me we can't figure this one out. And even in a conversation that I
3528
had with Mr. Petersen on the 2d day of June, he said to me tliat we
are at sixes and sevens, we can't figure this one out, the most we will
get is IOC, intercept communications violations or burglary. Yes, we
were groping in those days. We were looking, we were seeking, and
there was plenty of activity, there were more leads really than we could
follow out and people were working literally around the clock. Senator
Gurney, to try to put this all together.
Senator Gurney. Now, my own recollection is that anybody I talked
to during this period simply dismissed it out of hand, that anybody in
high authority could have had anything to do with this hairbrained
scheme.
Mr. Gray. Senator Gurney, I would say to you that even during the
discussions that we had in the Federal Bui'eau of Investigation during
my confirmation hearings, that we still felt, and we made these state-
ments at the luncheon table — these are luncheo7is at which would be
the senior men of the FBI present — that they disbelieved and these
men were far too intelligent to have any part in this kind of a sordid
affair, and this indeed was a frame of mind. I do not know liow
prevalent it was and I can only testify really, as to mv knowledge
of it.
Senator Gtjrney. Well, I am only testifying as to what I know and
people I talked to. It certainly was my own feeling.
Just one or two final questions here because I think we certainly
have probed about everything that you could — light you could shed
on this. I do recall that when you had your first meeting with John
Dean on this Watergate matter you said you discussed several theories.
We have talked about a couple of them here, of course, the CIA
theory, that somebody at the Committee To Re-Elect was responsible,
as indeed it turned out that two were. But you also mentioned a theory
of double agent.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Guristey. Did you ever explore that theory and did you ever
run anything to the ground about that and why did you think it might
be a double agent ?
Mr. Gray. We, in the FBI, thought it might be a double agent be-
cause of the replacement of the tapes, and we did everything we could
to try to run that into the ground, and a. hen I say replacement of the
tapes, Senator Gurney, I mean the replacement of the tapes on the
door locks in the Watergate that it just seemed to us that people who
are breaking and entering are not going to come back and find the
tapes on the locks removed and just willy-nilly put other tapes on
there and then go about their business. We were unable to develop
anything along those lines at all, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did you not get any kind of a hint at all from any
investigation that it might have been that ?
ISIr. Gray. No, sir, we did not.
Senator Gurney. Did you ever determine in your investigation of
the actual mechanics of the break-in whose decision it was to leave
the tapes on the door ? On the doors ?
Mr. Gray. Senator Gurney, I have to be honest with you and say
I just do not remember and I have not got an FD 302 to refer to so I
could answer your question, sir. I just do not know.
3529
Senator Gurney. Wliat about the Attorney General's role in all of
this? Of course, he really is your immediate boss at the Justice De-
partment. What did he tell you or not tell you to do as far as this FBI
investigation of Watergate was concerned ?
Mr. Gray. He placed no restrictions on me whatsoever, Senator
Gurney, and in the very— the very first telephone conversation that
I had with him on this which is also an exhibit before the committee,
he agreed with us that this should be a vigorous and a thorough investi-
gation and he stated that it was a matter for the investigators, the
prosecutors, and courts, and I believe really, that whatever informa-
tion he had of substance on the investigation came through the De-
partment of Justice side, through the Criminal Division side, because
he and I had no talks of substance regarding this particular inves-
tigation.
Senator Gurney. There has been some question, I am sure you
know, about whether I\Ir. Dean conducted an investigation or not.
His testimony was that he was greatly surprised when the President
of the United States on August 29 said in a public statement that
Mr. Dean has conducted a thorough investigation, paraphrasing the
words here now, and found no one involved at the White House. In
your many conversations with him during this period of time, what
did you think INIr, Dean was doing ?
Mr. Gray. I believed that he w^as conducting an investigation and I
believed that he was reporting to the President because he told me he
was and I believed that even as late as November he was looking into
the relationships of Segretti and Strachan and Chapin and I just
believed that he was conducting an investigation.
Senator Gitkney. Then, from what you knew of your own knowledge
as to what he was doing with your many contacts, the statement made
by the President of the United States on August 29 that he was con-
ducting an investigation did not surprise you at all, did it?
Mr, Gray. Did not surprise me because I believed him to be con-
ducting an investigation.
Senator Gurney. I do not have any further questions, Mr. Chair-
man.
Yes, I do. Just one other question.
There is another fact that turned up here. In February apparently
Dean contacted the CIA and asked them to retrieve their files on —
I cannot think whether it was Watergate or the Ellsberg thing. Any-
way, those materials that Hunt borrowed from the FBI, the Hunt
files. Did Dean ever contact you with regard to this?
Mr. Gray. No, sir. We did not have, I am assuming the particular
file tliat is being referred to because this is a file that was delivered to
the Department of Justice at the request of the Attorney General and
the Assistant Attorney, Crimina] Division, and to the best of my
knowledge, we did not have this file unless some of the material
referred to in that file was delivered at the working level from the
Director of Security at CIA to the Alexandria field office agents who
were liaison with the CIA. I know that from the newspaper accounts
which I read about long after I left the FBI that there were alleged to
be some ]iictui"es in there of, I forget who the individual was, either
Hunt or Liddy, standing in front of Dr. Fielding's office, Dr. Fielding
3530
beino; the psychiatrist for Dr. Ellsber^, I believe, and I know that I
did not at any time see any such pictures and I do not know that any-
one in the FBI ever saw any such pictures.
Senator Gurney. At any rate, there was no contact Avith you or any-
one in the FBI to your knowledge, by Mr. Dean on this?
Mr. Gray. No, sir.
Senator Gurney. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you.
Mr. Gray, this morning you testified that on June 28 when you met
with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean you were convinced that the mes-
sage being conveyed was a message from the President as it related
to Mr. Hunt's papers. Is that not correct, sir?
Mr. Gray. Well, that may very well be your interpretation of my
answer but we w'ere dealing then in assumptions and I think just so the
record is real clear, I could not testify that the President gave them an
order to give me those files. No, sir. I testified that they were — that I
believed them to be acting under color of their office and in their official
capacity. I had no reason not to believe that.
'Senator Inouye. How^ was this meeting arranged, sir ?
Mr. Gray. That meeting was arranged, Senator, to the best of my
infonnation, either in that 11 :17 a.m. telephone call that morning that
I had with iMr. Ehrlichman to discuss the leaks that had been occurring
in the first week, the allegations and rumors of leaks coming from the
FBI in the first week of that investigation, or it was arranged between
my secretary and Mr. Ehrlichman's secretary.
Senator Inouye. And where was this meeting held, sir?
Mr. Gray. This meeting was held in Mr. Ehrlichman's office at the
White House, sir.
Senator Inouye. So on June '28 you had no reason to be suspicious of
either INIr. Dean or Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Gray. None whatsoever, sir.
Senator Inouye. And you felt that the request being made was not
improper, illegal, or unprofessional, or unethical ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; I did not.
Senator Inouye. But then, by July 6, because of intervening activi-
ties, you got suspicious ?
Mr. Gray. I got suspicious when I saw General Walters lean back in
that red overstuffed chair of mine in my office and put his hands behind
his head and say, I have an inhei-itance, I am not worried about mv
pension any more, and I am not going to let those kids kick me around.
That, coupled with his preoccupation in that meeting with his in-
ability to deliver me a letter that would tell me that the CIA had an
interest in Ogarrio and Dahlberg and if he were directed to write
such a letter, that he
Senator Inottye. And so
Mr. Gray. That he would have to talk to the President.
Senator Inouye. You felt compelled to call upon jNIr. INIacGregor
and the President of the United States to
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. Senator, I did. T called ]Mr. INIacGregor and I
did not call the President because as I testified earlier, I did not feel
that I had that much to go direct to him. You know, it is a pretty
awesome thing to call the President of the United States, but I had
3531
enough, I felt, that the message should be given to the President and
I was indeed surprised when the President called me, and when I
heard nothing further on this, and repeatedly asked General "Walters
if the President had talked with him about this, I felt that he and I
were — I do not think we were goof-offs but I think we were alarmists,
that we had seen things that were not there.
Senator Inouye. But at that moment didn't you get a bit suspicious
about the Hunt files ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, I did not. I didn't even think of that. You know,
the Hunt files to me — when I took them they were non-Watergate.
They weren't on my mind day and night. Senator. I was a pretty bus}^
guy working 18 to 20 hours a day on that job and I wasn't, you know,
thinking about those two files all the time. Perhaps I should have been
but I wasn't.
Senator Inoitye. Did you believe that Mr. Dean and ISIr. Ehrlich-
man in trying to involve the CIA were doing so with the color of
authority ?
Mr. Gray. I certainly did. I had no other alternative but to believe
that.
Senator Inouye. If that is the case, why did you call the President
on July 6 to say that you are being mortally wounded ? If this was
]Mr. Gray. Because" I felt from talking with General Walters that he
was going to be asked to write me a letter saying that there was CIA
interest in Ogarrio and Dahlberg and I should not interview these
two gentlemen. And that is the reason. It was his fear of a future act
and that is why I said, "Trying to mortally wound you.*'
Senator Inouye. And this future act was an act on the part of these
two men or did you believe that it came with the color of authority?
Mr. Gray. I believed that he was going to be directed by someone —
he didn't specify who. The only inkling I got was "These kids" and
I drew from that my own interpretation to be John Dean, with whom
I had been dealing and talking about the CIA, and John Ehrlichman
who had caused me to cancel my meeting with Mr. Helms and General
Walters.
Senator Inotjye. When did you interview Mr. Dean and Mr.
Ehrlichman?
Mr. Gray. Mr. Dean was never interviewed because quite frankly,
Senator, I believe everyone in the FBI thought he was on our side.
We were working with him on a practically almost daily basis.
Senator Inouye. Even if he was about to mortally wound the Presi-
dent you felt he was on your side ?
Mr. Gray. We kept working with him and when the President did
not respond in any way and when the concerns that I had with regard
to any interference on the part of the CIA were removed, I had no
suspicions, and as I told vou earlier, I felt that I was an alarmist and
that General Walters and I were both alarmists.
Senator- Inouye. When did you suspect that Mr. Dean got off your
team?
Mr. Gray. Sir?
Senator Inouye. When did you believe that Mr. Dean got off your
team?
3532
Mr. Gray. The first indication, Senator Inouye, that I had, certain,
was the morning — and I believe very definitely it was a Monday,
March 26, when two of my staff came in to me with regard to an article
that had ui)i)eaivd that weekend in, I believe it was the Los Angeles
Times conceiiiing allegations that Mr. McCord was making concerning
Mr. Dean and ^Ir. Magruder, I believe.
Senator Inouye. And up until then you felt that Mr. Dean was not
in any way involved in any improper activity ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir. Aiid we — this was a matter that we discussed
in the FBI at these luncheons that I have previously testified to, and
I would meet and have lunch wdth members of my personal staff and
the various assistant directors of the FBI.
Senator Inouye. When did you interview Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Gray. I don't know the exact date. I think it was about the
middle of .July, though, sir, about the 14tli of July if my memory
Senator Inouye. This is after the meeting you held wnth Mr-
Walters?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. What sort of interview was this ?
Mr. Gray. I don't know, sir, Ix'cause it was conducted by the agents.
Senator Inouye, Did you see a report on this interview ?
Mr. Gray. I probably did but I can't recall the FD 302, sir. I don't
have it available to me.
Senator Inouye. Didn't you consider the interview of the second-
most important man in the White House staff important enough for
your personal involvement?
Mr. Gray. Well
Senator Inouye. At least reading the report ?
Mr. Gray. Oh, yes; I am sure I read the report. Senator Inouye, but
I read quite a bit of reports, you know, teletypes and papei-s. It was a
knoW'U fact in the Federal Bureau of Investigation when I w^ent honie
every evening I had four briefcases with me. When I went on my trips
to the field offices I had four briefcases with me. And when I w^ent to
Connecticut on weekends I had four briefcases with me. There was an
awful lot of paper that flowed across my desk. I am sure that I read
this report of interviews, Senator. But I cannot recall it.
Senator Inouye. Wlien did you become a member of the Justice
Department?
]Mr. Gray. I think I moved into the Civil Division on December 7,
1970, and I was sworn in on December 14. 1 am not sure of the dates but
that is very close.
Senator Inouye. During that time, from 1970 until your service as
Acting Director of the FBI, were you required to handle classified
material ?
Mr. Gray. Very little of it, sir.
Senator Inouye. As Acting Director of tlie FlU were you re-
quired to handle classified material ?
Mr. Gray. One of the strange things I found out about the FBI
was that the FBI did not stamp things seci'et, top secret, and confiden-
tial to any great extent. ]\fost of our paper is not stamped in that
manner. Some of it was, however, but a very, very small portion of it.
3533
Senator Inotjye. I ask this because I found it rather strange your
voluntarily telling us that under your desk you had two waste-
paper
Mr. Gray. Baskets.
Senator Inouye. Receptacles.
Mr. Gray. Yes.
Senator Inouye. Painted red.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. And you didn't know that this was the burn
basket?
JNIr. Gray. Absolutely not. Another thing I can tell you, Senator
Inouye, I didn't know until jNIarch of 1973, that daily logs were kept
as they were kept in my telephone room. These were details that I just
didn't concern myself with. I was concerning myself I thought with
an awful lot more important items really.
Senator Inouye. Did you have a shredding machine in your office ?
Mr. Gray. I do not know, sir, I could not answer that question.
Senator Inouye. You were in charge of the Nation's most important
criminal investigation division. Did you have any criminal law ex-
perience, sir?
Mr. Gray. Not as a practitioner of criminal law except with regard
to general courts-martial in the Armed Forces of the United States.
Also, Senator Inouye, if I might say, the FBI was involved with
more than just criminal law\ As you know^, we had an intelligence
function, too, and I know you are aware of that.
Senator Inouye. V/hen these papers were given to you for this ulti-
mate destruction, with your criminal law background, didn't it ever
occur to you that you might have been called upon to obstruct justice?
Mr. Gray. No, sir; it did not occur to me at all because I had no
reason to believe that I was engaged in any such act. I do not believe
so today and I know that that material at least that I saw was certainly
non-Watergate evidence.
Senator Inouye. "V\lien did it occur to you as Acting FBI Director
that papers were destroyed in the FBI ? You said you didn't know that
the cans were for burning.
Did it ever occur to you that the FBI Avould destroy any papers
or did you feel that every piece of paper that came in to the FBI was
kept at all times?
Mr. Gray. No, I think that I probably had the thought that paper
was destroyed but I can't say as a fact that it was. I don't know as a
fact that it was.
Senator Inouye. The only document that you have ever destroyed
as Acting Director of the FBI were those two Howard Hunt files?
Mr. Gray. Oh, I Avould sit at my desk and tear up little telephone
notes and things like that.
Senator Inouye. I am not talking about that, I am talking about
classified material. Burned or shredded.
Mr. Gray. No, I did not.
Senator Inouye. I have just been notified that my time is up, sir.
Thank you very much.
Senator Ervin, Senator Montoya.
3534
Senator Montoya. Mr. Gray, this morning under examination by
Mr. Edmisten you responded tliat you had approximately 60 leads
with respect to the CKP. That is correct, isn't it?
JMr. Gray. Yes, sir. I don't know, Senator Montoya, in the interest
of accuracy I would have classified them as leads. I would classify
them as interviews or contacts there. This is using the verbage of the
FBI.
Senator Montoya. How do you develop those lead and what do they
mean ?
Mr. Gray. These leads are developed by the agents working the case
at the case agent level in conjunction with all of the agents and in
conjunction with the field supervisor, their supervising that particular
case, and sometimes in conjunction with the special agent in charge
of the field division. They develop them and they say these are people
we ought to interview because there has to be a logical reason.
Senator Montoya. How did you develop the leads with respect to the
White House people ?
Mr. Gray. I don't know exactly how the^y^ were developed but I would
rather suspect that they stem from the* tact when we first found out
that Howard Hunt was employed there we wanted to find out who
employed him and then go talk to that individual to find out for what
purpose he was employed and what were his duties.
Senator Montoya. You called Mr. Butterfield. Did he give you 20
names ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; I think that my recollection now, Senator Mon-
toya, is he told us that Mr, Golson had engaged ISIr. Hunt's services.
I am relying heavily on my memory now and the best evidence of this
would be the FD-362 itself.
Senator Montoya. Going back to Mr. Dean and his calls to you, how
many times would you say that iSIr. Dean called you to tell you not to
pursue the planned interview with Mr. Ogarrio and Mr. Dahlberg
between June 22 and July 6 ?
Mr. Gray. I don't know, I haven't totaled those up and I would say,
perhaps just a guess, half a dozen times that that was discussed and
that request was made and was made indeed on June 29 after we had
already ordered, after I had already ordered the interviews on the
evening of June 28.
Senator ISIontoya. And how many times did Mr. Helms tell you
that there w^as no CIA involvement ?
Mr. Gray. Mr. Helms didn't tell me that in that specific manner
except for the June 22 conversation because my other conversations
with him were directed to asking him a specific question. For example,
the conversations I had with him on the 27th where I asked him spe-
cifically does the CIA have an interest in Manuel Ogarrio and he said,
"I will have to check and call you back," and he called me back that
afternoon and he said, "No, we don't have an interest in INIanuel
Ogarrio."
Senator Montoya. How many staff meetings did you have with INIr.
Bates and Mr. Felt between June 22 and July 6 when you called
Mr. MacGregor?
Mr. Gray. On the CIA ramifications we met on June 28, the three of
us, and then on July 3 I called a meeting of myself, INIr. Bates, Mr.
3535
Felt, aiid Mr. Kunkel, the special agent in charge of the Washington
field office.
Senator Montoya. Did you get any other briefings as to the state of
the investigation that was going on frorn other people in the FBI
during those meetings, or at any other meetings ?
Mr. Gray. Not
Senator Montoya. Between those dates-
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; I don't recall any at all.
Senator JMontoya. How were you keeping up with the state of the
investigation ?
Mr. Gray. In that period of time there were these initial briefings
that I had that I have previously testified to and then we have covered
the June 28 and the July 3 meetings that I had and then there were
the teletypes that were flowing across my desk all the time during this
period.
Senator Montoya. Didn't you think that Mr. Dean was being too
persistent in his request that you not pursue the interview with Mr.
Ogarrio and Mr. Dahlberg?
]\lr. Gray. No, I didn't think that he was being too persistent. I
thought he was being, I would have to say now, zealous in it but at the
time under the circumstances existing with the confusion of the interest
in or noninterest in, no, I didn't
Senator Montoya. Well, he even continued to request that you not
pursue this interview-interrogation even after you had told him that
the CIA had assured you that there was no danger of involving CIA
in Mexico, isn't that correct ?
Mr. Gray. That is correct. On June 29, to the best of my recollection
and certainly the conclusion that I had to draw from that, that there
was information possessed in the White House that was not possessed
by either the FBI or CIA.
Senator Montoya. You were talking to two very knowledgeable
men, Mr. Felt and IMr. Bates, with respect to investigations. They were
briefing you and you were going over the state of the investigation
and the progress made therein.
Now, didn't it ever occur to you or to them, or to all of you col-
lectively, that the Dean persistence was actually a design to cover up
something with respect to this investigation ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, it did not, and I think the reason it didn't is that
we were investigating one small facet which in our mind was either
going to turn out to be a CIA money chain or political contribution
money chain, so I can truthfully say we didn't get that excited about
it except to say that these leads were going to be covered eventually
and we did continue to work those leads with the sole exception of
interviewing the individuals concerned, sir.
Senator Montoya. Then what was the basis for your concluding
with General Waltei-s that the President was about to be victimized
or that he might be mortally wounded ?
IMr. Gray. Because General Walters conveyed to me the very clear
impression that he was going to be directed to write a letter to me that
would say that there was CIA interest in, say, Manuel Ogarrio and
Mr. Dahlberg. That was his preoccupation and that was when he
would discuss with me and did discuss with me the fact that he was
3536
going to resign, he would ask to see the Presidont, that this would be
a great disservice to the President, that this would be injurious to both
of our institutions.
Senator Montoya. Then on July 6 you did call Mr. IMacGregor at
10:51 a.m. and received a call from the President at 11 :28 a.m.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Very soon thereafter.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Didn't this trigger some curiosity in your mind ?
Mr. Gray. I was surprised. Senator Montoya, to receive the call
that quickly and the question indeed has been asked me, do I think there
is any tie-in ? I don't know, I really don't, I don't know whether Mr.
MacGregor spoke to the President or whether he did not speak to the
President.
Senator IVIontoya. Then, did you in view of the closeness of the two
telephone calls, did you think of calling Mr. MacGregor to ascertain
whether or not he had called the President ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, I did not because I felt and believed that if there
were anything to the substance of my report that I would hear further
from it and questions would be asked and no questions were asked and,
in fact, General Walters was not even called.
Senator Montoya. Weren't you interested in finding out what the
reaction of the President was if Mr. IMacGregor had told him alx)ut
your message ?
Mr. Gray. Well, I may very well have been interested but I am not
going to go bang on the President's door and demand a reply. I felt
I had given the Chief Executive Officer of the Nation the information
that I ought to give him and, you know, I was really surprised because
I was going. Senator Montoya, I will tell you quite frankly I was
going to leave it there with Clark MacGregor, I didn't feel I had
absolutely enough
Senator Montoya. Wliy did you select Mr. MacGregor as the mes-
senger to carry on your message, why didn't you call the President
yourself ?
Mr. Gray. Because I didn't feel I had enough to call the President
myself and one does not call the President without giving it some due
consideration and even when I did talk with him I blurted the words
right out.
Senator Montoya. But you had a feeling at that point that the
President was being victimized or that he might be mortally wounded.
Mr. Gray. That if General Walters were directed to write such a
letter, yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. Now, why didn't you go to Mr. Kleindienst, or
did you ?
Mr. Gray. No, I don't believe that I reported this to Mr. Klein-
dienst at all because I looked upon it as my responsibility to handle
this.
Senator Montoya. Did you ever report any part of this investiga-
tion or the results thereof to Mr. Kleindienst at any stage between
June 22 and sav April 1, 1973 ?
Mr. Gray. No, I didn't Senator, in the form of substance because
that just isn't the way it is done within the Depr-rtment of Justice.
The Attorney General works with the Assistant Attorney General in
3537
charge of the Criminal Division. The Attorney General could have
called me at any time and said I want this or I want that from you.
He didn't.
Senator Moxtoya. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Senator Er\'ix. During the Judiciary hearing on your nomination,
you contacted John Ehrlichman dailv. didn't vou. by telephone i
Mr. Gray. Sir?
Senator ER^^x. During the time the Senate Judiciary Committee
■was passing on your nomination to be Director of the FBI, you had
daily conversations by telephone with John Ehrlichman.
Mr. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I don't know whether they were daily or
not but whatever my logs show in that regard that
Senator Ernix. You have a copy of the tape of Mr. Ehrlichman of
March 7 or 8, 1973 ?
Mr. Gray. I have Tuesday, March 6, 1973, Mr. Ehrlichman called
me at 6 :34 p.m. that evening.
Senator ER^^x. Xow. you were very much concerned that it might
come out in the Judiciary Committee hearings that the contents of
Hunt's safe were delivered, a part of them were delivered at one time
to agents of tlie FBI other than yourself and that these two envelopes
were delievered to you yourself at another time ?
Mr. Gray. I do not know that I was concerned. The message — if you
are referring to that telephone call, the message that I was giving him
then in that March 6 telephone call did not have to do with the contents
of
Senator ER^^^'. I am asking about the next one. In other words, it
says "another thing" — now. this is you talking to Ehrlichman — "an-
other thing I want to talk to you about is that I am being pushed
awfully hard in certain areas and I am not giving an inch and you
know those areas and I think you have got to tell John TTesley" — a
good Methodist name — ''John Dean to stand awfully tight in the saddle
and be very careful alx)ut what he says and to be absolutely certain
that he knows his own mind, that he delivered everything he had to
the FBI and do not make any distinction between, but that he de-
livered eAcrvthing he had to the FBI."
Xow, that was in effect asking John Ehrlichman to tell John Dean in
case he testified before the Judiciary Committee that he must say that
everything was delivered to the FBI at one time.
^Ir. Gray. Senator ErA'in, what I was telling Mr. Ehrlichman there
was told to him on the evening of March 6 because
Senator Ervix. Yes.
Mr. Gray. It is not ]March 7 or f-i because that is the day on which we
received a letter from the ACLU and what I was — I can pin it down
with that because the language of mine is right there with reference
to the letter that was delivered on that day and that call was in the
evening of March 6.
Senator ER^^^'. "Well
Mr. Gray. In the areas. Mr. Chairman — ^Mr. Chairman, if I may,
the areas I was being pushed awfully hard in were the fact that I had
criven to !Mr. Dean reports of FBI interviews and had permitted Mr.
Dean to sit in on FBI internews.
Senator Ervix. TYell. the interpretation I place on this is that you
were asking- John Ehrlichman to tell John TTeslev Dean to be careful
3538
wliat he said and to say that all of these things that came out, all the
contents of Hunt's safe were delivered to FBI agents at one time
instead of some of them being delivered to the agents and the other
being delivered to the Acting Director ?
Mr. Gray. That is correct, and, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the
message I gave to Mr. Ehrlichman was to tell John Dean to shut up
but was not certainly a message to tell him that if asked under oath
that he could not testify because I had previously spoken to John Dean
on this very subject and had asked him if he had told Henry Petersen
everything about those very same files that he had told me.
Senator Ervin. Well, John Ehrlichman said, "right," in reply to
your statement?
Mr. Gray. I do not know what that means, sir.
Senator Ervin. Well, you asked him to tell John Dean to say that
all of the contents of tlie safe were delivered to the FBI at one time
instead of part of them being delivered to the agents and others being
delivered to you.
Mr. Gray. I was telling John Ehrlichman to tell John Dean to shut
up unless he told the real facts about it, no question about that.
Senator Ervin. And at the top of the next page it states "and he" —
that is Dean^"delivered it to those agents. This is absolutely
imperative."
Mr. Gray. That is correct. I told him that to distinguish between
the Watergate evidence and the non- Watergate evidence as they told
me.
Senator Ervin. And Elirlichman says, "All right." And this bug-
ging that John Ehrlichman did shows that he called Dean and he told
Dean that you had called him and that you had said to him, Ehrlich-
man, to make sure that old Jolin W. Dean stays very firm and steady
on his story that lie delivered everv document to the FBI and tliat he
does not start making nice distinctions between agents and directors?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Ervin. And then Ehrlichman asked Dean, why did you call
me, that is, why did you call him — "to cover his tracks?" And Dean
savs. "veah, sure. I laid this on him yesterday."
"Ehrlichman. Oh, I see. OK."
Now, as a matter of fact, is not the interpretation of that transaction
that you called Ehrlichman and asked him to see that Dean said, when-
ever he talked, that all of the contents of Hunt's safe had been delivered
to the FBI at one time, to the agents rather than part to the agents
and part to the Director ?
Mr. Gray. I think you have got to put that in the proper context,
Mr. Chairman. I had just had a call the day before ivom John Dean
regaixling this in wliich I went into it chanter and verse with him
because he had told Henry Petersen of the delivery of these two files
to me and I had asked John Dean if you, John, have told Henry every-
thing you told me about those files, that they were non- Watergate
evidence, non-Watergate-related, should clearly not l^e permitted to
see the light of day, were political dynamite. So this has got to be put
in that proper context but there is no question about it that in that
telephone call I was saying to John Ehrlichman to tell John Dean
to shut up because he was making nice distinctions thel"e that those
two did not make with me at all. My assumption was that they had
3539
delivered all of the Watergate evidence that was in Mr. Hunt's files
to the Agency.
Senator Ervin. It seems to me this is a very simple proposition. Is
this not it in its sense, that you asked John Ehrlichman to see that
Dean refrain from telling the truth about this and tell on the contrary
that all of them were delivered to the FBI at one time and John
Ehrlichman agreed to do that and to call Dean and repeat your request
to him?
Mr. Gray. Certainly, that was not my understanding of the call.
They cannot tell me one thing, Mr. Chairman, you know, and then tell
another thing. I certainly told — I do not make any bones about it. I
told John Ehrlichman to tell John Dean to shut up.
Senator ER^^N. Yes.
Mr. Gray. But just the day before
Senator Ervin. Mr. Gray
Mr. Gray. I told
Senator Ervin. Is it not the interpretation to be placed on this that
you were asking Ehrlicliman to tell John Dean not to tell the truth
about how some of them got to you and some of them to the agents of
the FBI?
Mr. Gray. No, sir, because
Senator Ervin. Well, I do not believe I will question further. Just
let the record show that the two tapes from John Ehrlicliman — well,
the recording, I believe, instead of bugging, two recordings of eJohn
Ehrlichman of his conversations be put in the record at this point
unless somebody else interprets it.
Now, this was thought to be a sort of ordinary burglary at first and
then it came out that one of the burglars was the chief security officer
of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. Then in a short time
it was discovered that a White House consultant who then had an
office in the White House was implicated, and that the chief counsel
of the Stans' committer. Finance Committee To Re-Elect the Presi-
dent, was also implicated, did it not ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, that is right.
Senator Ervin. So it came out while the burglary might have been
ordinary, the burglare were extraordinary [laughter]. And a short
time after that you found the FBI investigations got a lead indicating
that some political money was possibly involved in the form of four
ISIexican checks and the Dahlberg check, a total of $114,000.
Mr, Gray. That is correct, sir. We found those early in the investi-
gation in the Republic National Bank.
Senator Ervin. And after you started working on that you got a
phone call from John Ehrlichman informing you that John Dean
was interested in the White House in connection with the FBI and
the CIA.
Mr. Gray. I do not^ — Mr. Chairman, I am not sure whether you are
referring to the first telephone conversation
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Gray. I had with — from INIr. Ehrlichman on June 21.
Senator ER^^N. I do not know whether it was the first one but the
time he called you up and told you that John Dean was representing
the "VYliite House in this investigation.
3540
Mr. Gkay. That was the very first day that I was back from my trip
to tlie west coast. Tliat was on June 21 that lie informed, me that John
Dean would be conducting the official inquiry for the White House.
Senator Ervin. Now, after that time you either had the coiimiuni-
cations in person or by telephone with Jolni Dean according to your
logs as follows :
June 21, three communications. June 22, five conimunications. June
27, two communications. June 28, two communications. July 3, 'd
communications, and July 5, 4 communications, making a total of 26
communications between you and Dean from June 21 to July 5.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. That is probably correct. 1 have not added them
up.
. Senator Ervin. And John Dean kept suggesting that if the investi-
gation led to this political money, that it might impinge upon CIA
activities 'i
Mr. Gray. Well, he did not characterize it as political money at all,
Mr. Chairman. He told me that there was definitely a CIA interest in
these two gentlemen.
Senator Ervin. And then General Walters, who has testified that
before he went to see you he went to the White House and talked to
Ehiiichman and Haldeman about this and was asked to convey a mes-
sage to you to the etiect that there might be CIA involvement. General
Walters came down and told you there might be CIA involvement.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. That was on June 23.
Senator Ervin. Did you construe all of these communications you
had as an effort on the part of John Dean to slow down or end the
investigation into the Mexican checks and the Dahlberg check?
Mr. Gray. Well, I continued the peripheral investigation, as I have
previously stated, Mr. Chairman, but there is no question about it, that
there was a temporary delay encountered in interviewing Mr. Ogarrio
and jNIr. Dahlberg. No question about it.
Senator Ervin. Well, did you draw the inference from all of these
contacts with John Dean that he was trying to persuade the FBI to
lay ofl' of the investigation of these checks and assigning as a reason
for it that it might impinge on the CIA ?
IVIr. Gray. Yes, sir. That is what was happening.
Senator Ervin. And wasn't that the reason that you thought that
one of the aides was mortally wounding the President ?
Mr. Gray, Well, coupled with General Walters' statement to me at
least three times during my July 6 meeting, if he were directed to
write such a letter to me saying that there was CIA interest, and
coupled with Mr. Ehrlichinan's cancellation of the meeting that I had
scheduled on June 28, the answer is "Yes", sir.
Senator Ervin. So isn't it somewhat difficult to reconcile your state-
ment that you thought that John Dean was mortally wounding the
President with the idea that he was acting above reproach until you
discovered to the contrary next INIarch ?
Can you reconcile those two ideas ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, because, you know, after I talked with the President,
Mr. Chairman, I felt surely that General Walters and I were alarmists
and that what we had believed to be so was not so.
Senator Er\t;n. I have used up my time but if the committee will
spare me about 2 or 3 more minutes I will subside for the rest of
the day.
3541
On July 6, rather, General Walters and you talked, and you agreed
that the way that they were trying to slow down or stifle the investi-
gation into these Mexican checks and Dahlberg checks might do
infinite harm to the President.
Mr. Gray. I agreed with General Walters that if he w^ere directed
to write such a letter, this could be mortally wounding to the President
and when General Walters got up to leave after putting his hands
behind his head and saying to me, I have an inheritance, I am not con-
cerned about my pension any more, I am not going to let these kids
kick me around, we discussed wliether or not the President should
be called. And I don't know whether it was I who first mentioned it
or whether it was General AValters who first mentioned it.
Senator Ervin. But you did both agree that the President ought to
be notified, didn't you ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, we did.
Senator Ervix. And so you first called Clark MacGregor and you
indicated to him that you thought something was wrong and then you
got the call from the President'^
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Ervin. And you told the President in that call that some
of his aides were wounding him mortally ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. I said Dick Walters and I believe that some
people on your staff are trying to mortally wound you.
Senator Ervin. Yes, and when you gave that information to the
President, didn't you expect the President to ask you who it was that
was wounding him mortally and how they were wounding him
mortally ?
Mr. Gray. I blurted this message out to the President with great
fear and trepidation and I did expect that the President would ask
me a question.
Senator Ervin. And the President asked no questions at all ?
Mr. Gray. Xo, sir, he did not. lie merely told me — when I said
to him — I gave him that message and then I said I have just spoken
to Clark MacGregor and I have asked him to speak with you, Mr.
President.
Senator Ervin. And you say you worried about the matter for 2 or
3 weeks, that you got no questions from the President, did you?
Mr. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I don't think I testified that I worried
about it. I checked with General Walters on the meeting of Septem-
ber 12 and on the meeting of — I mean, July 12 and July 28 to see if
the President had called him. I was interested
Senator Ervin. You were concerned about it ?
Mr. Gray. I was interested to know, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. During that time did you consider any of the old
ancient adages which say there is none so blind as he who will not see
and none so deaf as he who will not hear ?
iMr. Gray. Xo, I don't think I did, ^Ir. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Well, in view of your testimony here, just for your
consolation, the 15th chapter of Psalms talks about the people, the
kinds of people that are going to dwell in the holy hill of the Lord
and it says among those that he who sweareth to his own hurt, changes
not, and I Avould say that you might lay claim to that lesson because
of the testimony you have given before the committee here.
96-296 O — 73 — pt. 9 10
3542
Mr. Gray, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
May I just make an observation, sir. On the very first Sunday that
I went to INIass after being appointed. Acting Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the lesson of the Mass, and the little leaflet
that was passed out at Mass, was the story of Job, and for some strange
reason I put that in my briefcase and I have kept it tliere ever since.
[Laughter.]
Senator Er\^n. Senator Baker.
Please do not laugh any more than you have to [laughter].
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have found that I can contend with
one sermon at a time but to have both the chairman and the witness is
almost more than I can bear, but I am sure my soul is salved and
improved by the example.
Did you ever tape your telephone conversations or your conversations
in your office ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; I never did.
Senator Baker. Was it ever done for you ?
Mr. Gray. To the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, this
was never done and I saw no reason to do it.
Senator Baker. In light of the McCord article, which after all lay
pretty strong charges against the nature and quality of the FBI in-
vestigation of the Watergate, in light of that article, if we chose to
look into the matter and interviewed the senior and principal agents
and others who were actually involved in the investigation, could you
tell us who we ought to talk to ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir; I could and I think I would refer you also,
Senator Baker, to exhibits before this committee, Nos. 76, 77, 134:, and
181.
Senator Baker. What do they
Mr. Gray. They set forth the language of the men of the FBI, the
intensity, the figure of this investigation and its aggressive approach,
and as I have testified earlier, I think Mr. McCord is being very un-
fair in his allegations toward the very dedicated men and women of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Senator Baker. Of course, much of the testimony, Mr. Gray, by
many witnesses would be characterized as unfair by one party or the
other depending upon the point of view. But are you in a position to
supply us with the names of all of those officials of the FBI who par-
ticipated?
INIr. Gray. Yes, sir; they are on those exhibits, they do give the
names, they list them all out, and I think I could remember most of
them right now if you wanted me to testify to them into the record.
Senator Baker. No; I don't but I wish you would, if you don't
mind, compile a list so we don't have to comb through the exhibits of
every person in the FBI who had some part in the investigation of
the Watergate episode and submit it as an exhibit, if there is no
obiection.
Mr. Gray. I would and I would also direct your attention
Senator ERAax. That is to be printed in the record when received.
Senator Baker. IVIr. Chairman, I would like to ask that staff receive
that exhibit and include that in the range of their investigatory re-
sponsibility to look into and interview with those FBI people.
Senator Eratcn. Yes.
3543
ISIr. Sachs. Excuse me, Mr. Vice Chairman. I am not sure that it is
within the power of or ability of Mr. Gray or myself to come up with
the names of all of the agents — Mr. Gray no longer is working there —
who were involved in the Watergate investigation. What Mr. Gray
had reference to, Mr. Vice Chairman, is those copies of documents
which he does have in his possession. I can tell you that one effort that
we have made to learn for our own purposes, for preparation purposes,
information from the FBI in recent weeks has been denied us. I am
not complaining about that but I am explaining I frankly think it is
an impossibility for Mr. Gray to come up with all of the names that
your question seems to assume. We will do the best we can.
Senator Baker. That is all I can ask you to do.
Mr. Gray. Did you want me to get every agents There are 343 of
them. The exhibit I referred to are the key agents, the case agent in
charge of the case in the Washington field office and then the field
supervisors and special agent in charge of the Washington field office.
Senator Baker. Let me put it this way. I really don't know what
I want. I don't suppose we are going to interview or investigate all
34:3 agents but we might, but what I am interested in is information
we can derive by interviewing FBI personnel bearing on the allega-
tions made by Mr. ^McCord in his article which says senior personnel
of the FBI sought search warrants and were turned down, and other
matters and charges and allegations that are made in that article. That
is really what I am after.
Any other names you can supply us that you think would be helpful
in testing the quality of the investigation, and the enthusiasm and the
thoroughness of the investigation, will be helpful, but I have to yield
to your superior judgment in that respect. Obviously I am not calling
on you to give us exact details because you are not in a position to do
so at this point, but you are in a far better position than I am. If you
do your best in that respect I would appreciate it.
The last thing I want to ask you, there has been a lot of talk about
the FBI being demoralized, a lot of talk about the quality of the in-
Aestigation, as I have indicated, the McCord article aside, there has
been a good bit of speculation about how thorough and how probing
it was.
To make a long story short, the FBI is soit of in a tough spot. It
has been an elite organization enjoying a superb reputation and I
think it is still a great organization and will continue to be.
I would like to ask this: It seems to me that the thought begins to
emerge that maybe there is something about the nature and the rela-
tionships of the FBI to other branches of Government and particu-
larly to the Justice Department and the White House that don't
necessarily make it the best possible agency for the investigation of
alleged political activity of this type.
Xow, before I ask tlie question I want to tell vou in advance I have
a deep and abiding distrust of a Federal police system. I would be
greatly shocked and surprised if this country ever came to a Federal
police force.
Do you have any thoughts you can give this committee on how the
FBI mifflit be structured vis-a-vis being an arm and part of the
Justice Department or not, or whether it should or should not be the
3544
chief iiivestifjatory arm for thino;s of that type ? Surely you have bettei-
insight into that than I do but can you comment on tlie nature of the
FBI, its future role and how it might relate to political controversy^
Mr. Gray. Well, this is a very difficult qnestion to answer because
E found in some of my research that there has never been a situation
like this that the FBI lias been confronted with. Watergate was
unique.
I would like, if I might. Senator Baker, to say to you that the re-
ports that I get are that the morale in the FBI is high, that the FBI
is not demoralized, and even letters that I get today from some of the
street agents who still write to me indicate this. I don't feel that morale
has been hurt at all. What has happened has been that an acting
director had to leave, he had to leave proudly but with a broken
heart, and I think the agents feel that, too, and I don't think their
morale has been hurt a bit. It was a very difficult investigation, I am
sure, for those men even on the street as some of the exhibits before
this committee will attest to.
For example, where one of our special agents was accused by two
newspaper reporters as being the source of their story, a very contro-
versial and very inflammatory story, he got himself right in the jaws
and it so happened that that same special agent I defended rathei'
vigorously in connection with the interview of ISIrs. Mitchell. I wasn't
going to let that agent down but he did say to INIr. Mitchell, all right,
Mr. Mitchell, if you tell me so that is good enough for me. It is this
type of thing. I think perhaps those street agents in this kind of situa-
tion may very well have been overawed by the individuals with whom
they had to come in contact in the course of their interviews and they
may not have asked as tough questions as we might have wished them
to do, yet I had a report from them that they had asked those tough
questions. But they are good men and strong men and well-trained
men and they are dedicated men and devoted to this country and I
don't know that putting them in an independent agency would create
a national police force. I think with the proper individual selected to
head that agency and with the idealism and with the love for this
country that is so necessary I think that it could safely be done and
removed completely from the political wars, but there is no question
about it that wuth us being within the Department of Justice we were
right in the matrix of politics, no question about it.
Senator Baker. Is it a fair inference to draw from your statement
that it might be possible to have an independent agency but still retain
essentially the same jurisdiction the FBI has today ?
^Ir. Gray. Yes, sir; my feeling, even in my confirmation hearings I
testified I wanted to work with the Committee on the Judiciary, I
wanted to work with an oversight committee and I had talked even
with people who heavily criticized the FBI because I wanted their
views, I want to know what they thought.
I met with the professors who had the Princeton conference to see
what their views wei-e, but I think that with the type of man and
woman that serves in the FBI, that legislators could consider the idea
of an independent agency operating under an oversight committee
without fear of the creation of a national police force. This became a
bugaboo. I didn't see any evidence at all in the year that I, almost the
3545
year I had in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, of any tendency
toward a national police force, I saw just the opposite.
Senator Baker. Well, Mr. Gray, I think that is very helpful and
I am sure we will have an opportunity to discuss that both in the
public forum and private conversations as legislators in the future, but
I think your suggestions are well taken and I think they will in fact
be taken into account.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Gray, this is the end so far as my
questioning is concerned, but there is one loose end I think I want to
pursue.
This morning I read to you the President's statement of April 30
wherein he says :
As a result ou March 21 I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinat-
ing intensive new inquiries into the matter and I personally ordered those con-
ducting the investigations to get all of the facts and to report them directly
to me right here in this office.
I asked you whether or not you had received such an order from
the President at that time and you indicated "No."
Mr. Gray. That is correct, Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Now, just so if any responses come in the future
from various and sundry parties that we put them in the proper con-
text, it could be interpreted the reason why you received no such order
was a lack of confidence in you. It could be interpreted that way. I am
not saying that is the case but it could be interpreted that way.
Do you have any knowledge that there was a lack of confidence, a
lack of faith in you at this time, March 21, on the part of the President
of the United States ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir. As a matter of fact, I received a call from the
President on Marcli 23 wherein, among other things, he told me there
would always be a place for me in the Nixon administration.
Senator Weicker. Now, I would like to get to the one lost end here.
You had another conversation with the President of the United States,
as I understand it, on April 5. Could you recount to this committee
the nature of that phone conversation ?
In order that we might shorten up here, as I understand it, on April
4, it was suggested to you, and you may want to make further comment,
I you withdrew your nomination on that day or the next day. On April
5, it was indicated to you by the Attorney General, Mr. Kleindienst,
that you would be allowed to withdraw your name and that the White
House was expecting a call. So with that background, if you want to
add to that background, please do.
Mr. Gray. I called the President that evening after I had met with
the assistant directors of the FBI at 5 p.m., to tell them I was going
to request the President to withdraw my nomination. And I called the
President and I told him that it was obvious that I did not have the
votes and that the nomination Avould not come out of the committee
and I thought that the best thing that I could do would be to request
him to withdraw my nomination and he told me that this was a, and
these are not his exact words, I know that, but the thought is here,
that this was a bitter thing to have happened to me, there will be an-
3546 I
other time to Hglit our enemies, and he again said, "I am quite positive
there will be a place for you in the Nixon administration," and 1 be-
lieve that i read to lum my letter requesting that my nomination be
witlidrawn in which i said to him that 1 would be perfectly willing
to serve should it be his desire until my successor would be named and
conhrmed and the President said to me, ""i will want you to do just
that." And 1 did ; 1 remained there mitil April 26, April 27, actually.
Senator Weigkek. So that at least insofar as up to April 5 was con-
cerned you had lirsthand knowledge expressed, tirsthand knowledge
of the President's conhdence in you insofar as the President himself
expressed it to you ?
Sir. Gray. \ es, sir ; because I am quite certain I read to him that
paragraph in my letter where 1 said 1 would remain "should you desire
until a successor is nominated and confirmed."
Senator Weigkek. iSow, lastly, Mr. Gray, as far as I am concerned,
this trail started with a phone call to me from you on April 17 in the
morning around 9 o'clock, where you indicated that the lid was going
to blow oil' — and starting at that moment in time through our meetings
on the 25th, 26th, and subsequent days, slowly but surely you told a
complete story to me, to the committee stalf , and to the committee and
I believe here to this committee today.
And probably nobody has more right to wonder why the story was
so slow in coming, and in some instances was incorrect, than 1 have
because you told it to me first. But I think at least 1 would like to go
on record in saying that at each point along the way more truth came
from you, earlier, even though it might not have been the whole truth,
more truth came out earlier than from any other person that I en-
countered in this town. I think a good example of that, because I do
want to try to relate something in the peoples' mind tliat happened
right here before this committee. We all talk about the July 6 phone
conversation with the President. I remember hearing that at 7 :30 in
the morning on the morning of May 10. General Walters, of course,
gave it in testimony before, I believe, the Armed Services Committee
on May 18. The first we learned from the President was on May 22. I
just use that as a simple example to the many matters that you and I
discussed.
So certainly, I for one, am deeply appreciative of what must have
been a very difficult role and nobody is exonerating anybody else, and
you have admitted to this committee yourself as to the burdens that
you have to bear. But at least, as an end to my particular question
ing, I notice that a minute ago you commented maybe the agents were
overawed by those they had to go ahead and interview\ Of course,
I suppose my question to you, Pat, is ; were you overawed by the men,
the institution of Government that you worked for ?
Mr. Gray. I do not know that I was overawed but I certainly had a
very — ^well, tlie only way to classify it — deep and abiding respect built
up over the years for the Office of the Presidency and knowing and
feeling in my own mind that no matter who comes into that Office he
always rises to the burdens of that Office and that the individuals in
it, in my judgment and in my book, have always been above and beyond
reproach and perliaps with tliat in mind, Senator Weicker, you could
say yes, that I was o\erawed, but I believed and I trusted and I think
I had every reason to believe and to trust and at no time did I ever
3547
consider that I was dealing with individuals who were trying to sweep
iiie into the very conspiracy that I had the responsibility of investigat-
ing. That is a madman's horror and 1 just did not have that feeling.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Gray, you have testified that on April 27 of
this year, Mr. Petersen said that you and he were expendable and
Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman were not.
Mr. Gray. Senator Inouye, I think that was the evening of April 26
in the little office oil of the Attorney General's larger private office.
Yes, sir ; he did say that to me.
Senator Inouye. Did you agree w^ith this observation?
Mr. Gray. No, sii'. I was sitting — I was sitting in the overstuffed
chair and I remained sitting there as Mr. Petersen paced up and down
and he said to me, "I am scared, Pat,'' and I said, "Why?" he said,
"Because I believe that you and I are expendable and Haldeman and
Ehrlichman are not" and I still stayed in the chair and I said, "Do
you think I should get a lawyer?" and he said, "Yes, I do," and then
I did get up out of the chair.
Senator Inouye. Is it your testimony that you agreed with Mr.
Petersen's observation?
Mr. Gray. I couldn't agree with it because I had no basis on which
to agree with it.
Senator Inouye. Then why did you seek advice of counsel ?
Mr. Gray. Because I valued Mr. Petersen's opinion.
Senator Inouye. But you didn't agree with him ?
iNIr. Gray. I didn't agree with him in the sense that he and I were
expendable and Haldeman and Ehrlichman were not. But I agreed
with him, certainly. As I have testified earlier, it appeared to me that
I was — I was going to have to scramble to extricate myself.
Senator Inouye. Extricate yourself from what ?
Mr. Gray. From the situation in which I found myself at this point
in time.
Senator Inouye. Was that necessary? You have testified that all
your activities as far as you Avere concerned were legal and proper
and ethical.
Mr. Gray. That is correct, but when the Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Criminal Division tells me that he and I are ex-
pendable, you know it is a prudent thing to do to look to 3'our defenses
and keep your powder dry, Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye, In resj^onse to Senator Baker's questions you indi-
cated that the FBI, because of its involvement with the Justice De-
partment, was in the matrix of political activity in Washington. Am I
correctly quoting you, sir?
Mr. Gray. I don't know w^hether I said the matrix of political ac-
tivity but certainly in a political matrix, there is no question about it.
Senator Inoiye. In the fall of 1972, during the Presidential cam-
ipaign, you were reported to have made several speeches and some have
suggested that these were politically inspired. Is it your belief that
these were justified and nonpolitical speeches?
Mr. Gray. Senator Inouye, I have testified that I believed that I
went out to talk about the" FBI and to talk about America which I
3548
love very, very deeply. This is my country and I was talking about that
coiuitrv because there were lots of people w})o were knocking this
country and J was talking about this country of ours.
In. fact, Senator, I was told by the Attorney (leneral that there were
people at tlic AVhite House wlio were complaining that I was making
too many speeches and the knothead that 1 am, believing as deeply as
I believed in my country and not belie\ing at all that these could be
taken as political speeches, I said I am jolly well going to continue
to make those speeches in behalf of my country.
Xow other men will dift'er with me and they have, sir, but this was
what was in my heart, in my mind in making those speeches.
Senator Inouye. You have indicated that you were convinced that
the FBI made a very thorough investigation of the Watergate inci-
dent and you cited the fact that 60 employees or staff personnel of the
Conunittee To Re-Elect the President were interviewed by your agents.
Is that correct, sir ?
Mr. Gray. That is only one of the facts that I cited. Senator, and
that was in response to a direct question from one of the members of
the committee as to how many employees of the Committee To Re-
Elect — but that is not the basis on which I reach my judgment that the
investigation was thorough and aggressive. That is just one series of
leads that Avere pursued, sir.
Senator Inouye. In September of 1972, a nonoperating bug was
discovered in the Democratic National Committee office, I believe in
the phone belonging to Mr. Spence Oliver. We have received reports
that the FBI conducted 80 interviews with DNC and McGovern cam-
paign committee personnel for that little unoperating bug. Is that
correct, sir?
Mr. Gray. I do not know the number that we conducted, sir, but I
know that the assistant U.S. attorney was very insistent that that be
wrung out very thoroughly because the contention was made that this
bug had been there all the time and had been one that had been missed
in the initial search back on June 17, 1972, by the telephone company
and the FBI. But I do not know hoAV many people we intervicAved, sir,
and I did not order us to interview 10, 20, 190, or whatever, Senator.
Those leads, Senator, are originated and generated and set out down
at the case agent level. The Acting Director of the FBI, Patrick Gray,
did not order x number of interviews, sir, at the Democratic National
Committee headquarters.
Senator Inouye. Was there any suggestion that the Democrats had
planted the bug themselves to Jurther embarrass the administration?
Afr. Gray. I do not know that there was any suggestion of that at
all, sir. I did not hear it, I did not make it or anything like that.
Senator Inouye. This is as far as your relationship Avith INIr. Dean
is concerned. First, INfr. Dean requested destruction of certain classified
documents. These are the Hunt papers. Then he suggested inipi'o})ei-ly,
as you have testified, to the invohement of the CIA in the Watergate
incident and then, he suggested that INIr. Ogarrio and Mr. Dahlberg
not be questioned and as a result, the intervicAvs were delayed.
Then, all of the White House intervieAAS, the intervieAvs of White
House personnel, were being monitored by Mr. Dean. But you have
indicated that none of these events caused you to be suspicious of Mr.
Dean. Is that
3549
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; I did not. I did not because he is there as the —
sitting there as counsel to the President and if I may, Senator Inouye,
he did not request that these documents be destroyed. I think my state-
ment quite clearly stated that it is true that I did not get a direct order.
This was my impression of the conversations, that I drew from it the
clear impression that this was what was
Senator Inouye. There was a message there.
Mr. Gray. Yes ; that this was what was going to be done, that this
is what Gray should do, but in all fairness and honesty, they did
not give me a direct order. They did not say, "Pat, destroy these."
Senator Inouye. And without a direct order you destroyed classified
information ?
Mr. Gray. The impression that I had was that they should be de-
stroyed. Senator Inouye, and I am j list trying to be as honest as I can
with you and as clear as I can.
Senator Inouye. As Director of the FBI, did you operate on the
basis of impressions ?
]\Ir. Gray. Well, I think that is too broad and general a question
for me to answer with a simple yes or no. This was not just an im-
pression type of situation. I was dealing there with the counsel for the.
President and with the assistant to the President and what I am saying
to you, is to me the clear import of the message was destruction, sir.
Senator Inouye. And you have testified that on April 27 of this
year, you for the first time became suspicious of Mr. Dean as a result
of an article appearing in the Los Angeles Times. Am I correctly
Mr. Gray. No; if I may. Senator, it was March 26 on a Monday
when that Los Angeles Times article, I think, of the preceding Sunday
was brought to my attention, sir.
Senator Inouye. March 26.
Mr. Gray. Sir?
Senator Inouye. March 26 ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. INIarch 26.
On March 27 an article appeared in the Washington Post and the
headline read "Xixon Denies Dean Knew of Bugging"'.
The article reads :
President Nixon denied today thiat White House Counsel John Dean, III, had
any prior knowledge of the Watergate bugging and said he had "absolute and
total confidenee in Dean." The President telephoned Dean this morning from his
office in Key Biscayne to discuss with him the Los Angeles Times report that
Dean and former Presidential Assistant Jeb Stuart Magruder had advance knowl-
edge of the bugging of Democratic Headquarters.
Now, your Commander in Chief had said that Mr. Dean was clear
and clean. Did you still believe that Mr. Dean was involved in some
way ?
Mr. Gray. No ; I think I told — my testimony was. Senator, that this
was the first inkling that I had that he could be involved and that this
was confirmed for me later on by the telephone calls on the 15th and
the subsequent developments.
'Senator Inouye. Did the President's statement in any way suggest
that you were overly concerned ?
Mr. Gray. That I was overconcerned ? No, because I testified that
this was the first inkling that I had that he could have been involved
3550
in this. Indeed and in fact, this was subsequently confirmed later on
with the telephone conversations of April 15 and the events that have
followed, but this was— this was tlie first glimmer, Senator. That is
what I am saying to you. The question was asked me when did I first
have an inkling or when did I first become aware of it and I tried to
describe it.
Senator Inouye. And did the President's statement raise that
inkling ?
Mr. Gray. I do not — you know, I cannot remember back to that
particular day and that particular statement to be able to give you a
fair description of my state of mind and react to that article and to
your question, sir.
Senator Inouye. So up until then you were convinced that Mr. Dean
and for that matter Mr. Ehrlichman, or Mr. IMitchell or Mr. Magrudei
were not involved at all ?
Mr. Gray. That is right, sir, and I was not only convinced but the
senior executives of the FBI were. We discussed this. You know, this
is not something that we did not discuss. We considered that these
people were far too intelligent to be involved in this kind of sordid
business. I did regard every other fact.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator ER^^N. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. Mr. Gray, I am going to be very brief with j^ou
I think we have covered almost every phase of your part in the in
vestigation. I want you to know that I have read your statement very
carefully, not once, not twice, but three times trying to figure out what
motivated you to say in your last sentence, "I shall carry the burden
of that act with me always."
Now, this moA'ed me very much and I can appreciate your situa-
tion. And I see that throughout your statement — I see a thread of
hurt Avhich encompasses a pattern experienced by many others at the
White House and at the Committee To Ee-Elect the President.
Xow. we as human beings cannot help but have compassion and
intense feeling brought about by the burning rays of Watergate. Whyjji
do you think that the tentacles of Watergate touch so many good
people so adAcrscly ? Can you explain that to me ?
Mr. Gray. Well, Senator. I would like to say in Spanish to you, if
you would not be insulted, ''Yo tengo much dolor en mi corazon ahora.'"
Senator Montoya. "I have a lot of hurt in my heart at this time
Mr. Gray. Si.
Senator Montoya. That is what you said.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; yes, sir.
I said early in the game that I thought that Watergate would prove
to be a spreading stain that would tarnish everyone with whom it came
in contact and T am no exception. I had a responsibility, Senatoi
]\fontoya, I believe, not to permit myself to be Tised. not to permit my-
self to be deceived, and T failed in tliat responsibility and I have never
failed in anything that I have undertaken until this point in time. Andp
it luirts.
Senator IVTontoya. And many others did. too.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; and they are hurting, too.
j 3551
Senator Montoya. Under similar circumstances.
Mr. Gray. That is right, and my sympathies go to them.
Senator Montoya. In spite of their motivations ?
Mr. Gray. That is correct, sir.
Senator Montoya. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Ervin. I have no further questions. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. I have no questions, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Er\tn. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. No.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. No further questions, sir.
Senator Ervtn. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. I have no further questions.
Senator P^rvin. Senator Montoya.
Counsel will resume questioning.
Mr. Edmisten. ]Mr. Gray, Mr. Walters turned over some memoran-
lums to you. What were they ? And I do not mean the ones that he
svrote regarding his account of his conversations with you.
Mr. (iray. The one that I best recollect is the July 6 memorandum,
rhe July 7 memorandum, I know that I received. I cannot remember
fvhether I received it in an envelope or how I received it from him but
[ received it from him personally and I know that I wrote at the
)ottom righthand corner of it, "Received 2:15 p.m., 7-12-72, from
LG.W." — the abbreviation of Lieutenant General Walters.
Mr. Edmisten. There are three memorandums.
Mr. Gray. I think there was another one that was on the July 28
neeting that was an unsigned memorandum.
Mr. Edmisten. Let me show you three memorandums. You identify
:hem and I think that will be sufficient.
Mr. Gray. All right, sir.
Yes. Yes, Mr. Edmisten.
Mr. Edmisten. The last one has been identified by the CIA. Do you
iccept that?
Mr. Gray. Yes; I will accept their identification, INIr. Edmisten.
Mr. Edmisten. I mainly want to get those in the record. Mr. Chair-
nan, if we could admit these memorandums for the record.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 142*, 143**,
md 144***.]
Mr. Edmisten. At one time during your confirmation hearings you
laid that you, in concert with Mr. Petersen, determined the scope of
he FBI investigation but at the same time, you said that you and your
igents were not allowed to follow leads.
Now, I am asking if you can determine the scope, do you not neces-
;arily determine the leads you can follow ?
Mr. Gray, Yes ; and that is not exactly a correct answer because the
icope of this investigation, as I think the exhibits before this committee
vill show, is determined by the Department of Justice and I think I
•an say that without fear of contradiction because there is documen-
ary evidence before this committee of my efforts in October to include
K)litical activity within the scope of this investigation. There is also
*See p. 3S50.
♦♦See p. 3853.
♦♦♦See p. 3854.
3552
documentary evidence before this committee of my attempts again
in December to include political activity within the scope of this in-
vestigation. But the Director of the P'JU does not set the scope of the
investigation in a situation of this type. We had an intercept of com-
munications investigation and a burglary investigation going and
there did come a time when I felt that the activities of Mr. Segretti
should be looked into more carefully and I had a memorandum pre-
pared by my Assistant Director in charge of my office, legal counsel,
and then we met people— I should say my people from my accounting
and fraud section of the General Investigation Division met with Mr.
Petersen on this particular subject and at this time Mr. Petersen did
not feel that there w^as sufficient factual evidence on which to go into
that area to enlarge •
Mr. Edmisten. Mr. Petersen made that determination.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Mr. Edmisten. You did not ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir. I did not. That is a matter of written record
documentation before this committee.
Mr. Edmisten. Now, who determines the leads, then? You said
you didn't determine the leads. Who determines the leads?
Mr. Gray. I didn't determine the leads. What I mean by that, the
leads are originated and generated at the case agent's level working
with the assistant U.S. attorney and in conjunction with the other
agents who are working on the case but the Acting Director of the
FBI does not determine and set out the leads, sir.
Mr. Edmisten. Mr. Gray, you are a lawyer. You know the term we
use "making a contemporaneous writing" follow^ing a conversation.
Did you make any contemporaneous writings following your conversa-
tions with Mr. Walters and with others and the President in relation
to Mr. Walters' contemporaneous writings?
Mr. Gray. No, sir ; I didn't. Usually I would make brief notes of a
conference but mostly I relied upon the documentation that would be
within the FBI as revealed by my orders to them, but I did not sit
down and scribe out everything that was said at every meeting that I
attended. I did not do that.
Mr. P^dmistex. So you do not have a contemporaneous writing, a
memorandum like Mr, AValter does ?
Mr. Gray. Not on the subject of those meetings. I have quite a few
notes of telephone calls and what I liave I have submitted to this com-
mittee. I have submitted everything to this committee and they are
among the very first exhibits.
Mr. Edmisten. Do you have notes of your telephone call with the
President?
Mr. Gray. No, I did not make any notes of those telephone calls
with the President.
]\Ir. Edmisten. It was a rather momentous occasion ; wasn't it ?
Mr. Gray. I know it, but. you know, those kind of telephone calls,
Mr. Edmisten, I think you kind of tend to remember. I didn't write
them down.
Mr. Edmisten. Now, during your tenure as the Acting FBI Director,
was there any discussion in your office about recommending that the
President appoint a special prosecutor for the Watergate case ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, there was. On the
3553
Mr. Edmisten. Did you do it ? Wlio drew it up and what-
Mr. Gray. Two of my staff people drew it up and came in to talk
with me about it and I went over it very carefully with them and dis-
cussed it with them and discussed it with the Attorney General that
same day, March 26.
Mr. Edmisten, WTiat did the Attorney General say about it?
Mr. Gray. The Attorney General did not approve of the recom-
mendation. He stated that this would be very harmful to the Depart-
ment of Justice and this was just an act that could not be taken.
Mr. Edmisten. Mr. Gray, during your confirmation hearings you
offered the entire membership of the Senate Judiciary Committee FBI
records. Now, you were told not to do that. Who did it? Who told you
not to ?
Mr. Gray. Mr. Edmisten, I offered the entire FBI Watergate in-
vestigative file to every Member of the U.S. Senate, not just the mem-
bers of the Senate Judiciary Committee, but those orders — no. I should
say my offer was rescinded by an order that I received from the Attor-
ney General.
Mr. Edmisten. Have you ever had any indication that any of your
agents were engaged in any so-called dirty tricks for the Wliite House ?
Mr. Gray. I don't know what you mean by "dirty tricks." I have
told you that I authorized a surrepticious entry on one occasion solely
to protect the lives of innocent Jewish men, women and children, and
I would do it again, but this was in the course of national security
and domestic peace and tranquility, but I know of no agents of mine
engaging in dirty tricks.
Kfr. Edmisten. That is the question I wanted answered, yes.
Mr. Gray. No, sir.
Mr. Edmisten. Now, when you were before the Senate Judiciary
Committee for your confirmation hearings, did Mr. Kleindienst make
contact with you and tell you that he would like for you to meet with
him everyday afterward to sort of have a skull session about what you
had done that day and what you maybe might do the next day ?
Mr. Gray. Yes. I think he did, and those meetings quickly went by
the board. Very, very few of them — I think there was only one of them
that was held at 5 o'clock and I think my logs would reveal that be-
cause of the amount of work that I was engaged in in just keeping up
with the Bureau work and doing the necessary preparation for tlie
hearings.
Mr. Edmisten. Did you ask for him to meet with you at some point
in that time and he said, "No, Pat, it is all over now"?
Mr. Gray. No, I don't remember that.
Mr. Edmisten. Something to that effect ?
Mr. Gray. I don^t remember that, Mr. Edmisten, if that did occur.
Mr. Edmisten. So if you don't remember that, then, you can't com-
ment on whether or not you were getting the feeling then that you
were being dropped ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir. At no time did I get the feeling that I was being
dropped until after I had requested that my nomination be withdrawn
and Mr. Kleindienst told me that there were other candidates being
looked into.
t
3554
Mr. Edmisten. If an FBI agent of yours had taken documents f roir
Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlicliman in the manner in which you did and
had not reported it to the FBI, there would be a very large possibilitj
that they would be indicted and at least fired ; is that not true ?
Mr. GrRAY. I am not so sure that that would be true because these *
men were my superiors and certainly they would be his superiors and
I am not at all certain that I would view the matter in that frame.
Mr. Edmisten. When the President spoke with you on March 23
1973, you stated this morning that you had a strange feeling, I believe
that maybe your call was being recorded. Well, now, you have had time
to reflect and to know that there has been discovery of certain taping.
Does that cause you to have any different reflection now about the ^
President's conversation to you that day ?
Mr. Gray. Well, Mr. Edmisten, I don't want to let you put words
in my mind. I just can't do that. I told — my testimony I think was not
that I had the eerie feeling that it was being recorded but the eeriej
feeling that it was being said for a purpose and I related it back to
the same words I heard on July 6 in the conversation, sir.
Mr. Edmisten. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Gray, let me ask you a few more questions about
the FBI investigation into the Watergate matter.
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. And I don't mean to go into it for the third or fourth
time or to be unduly critical of the Bureau or its agents but I do thinki
a determination as to wliotlier it was a good or bad investigation is'
relevant. If it was not a good investigation, why Avas it not; it is
relevant from the standpoint of the future of the Bureau and possibly
its relation to the White House or the executive branch.
We have been furnished some information from the Bureau and the'
indications are that there were 343 agents who investigated this case.
They conducted 2,347 interviews. I believe 56 of the 59 field offices
were involved and 22,403 man-hours were expended on this particular
investigation.
And yet we know now that there were tremendous relevant factors
which w^ere not uncovered l)v the FBI, that the only persons indicted
were the persons who were in the DNC or in the Watergate itself at
the time of the break-in. So while it might not be deemed relevant
for you to characterize whether it was a good or bad investigation in
isolation, I think it would be because of the factors I previously
mentioned.
Can you still say that it was a terrific investigation as I believe you
put it earlier this morning in light of these factors?
Mr. Gray. INIr. Thompson, I had the deepest sense of pride in those
men. I had the deepest sense of pride in that investigation which is
one of the reasons that I offered it to the U.S. Senate, the Members of
the U.S. Senate, and even beginning early in April where I believed
that I was going to continue to remain in the position of acting di-
rector, we began to audit that investigation in the FBI. I sat with
some of the top people to prepare to take the FBI investigation through
the meetings of this Select Committee and I felt then and I feel now
that that was a very, very, very good investigation but I would also
have to say that we have to take wliat people are telling us, too, and
3555
[n many cases in conjunction with the assistant U.S. attorney, people
^ere brought right to the grand jury. We tried with the ways available
to us to do the very best job we could.
Mr. Thompson. Well, how do you test whether or not an investiga-
tion is good 'i Is it not in the results that are produced ?
Mr. Gray. It is in the results that are produced and we thought that
we had produced some pretty decent results until all these
, Mr. Thompson. I am not talking about the time even when you were
f;estifying before the Judiciary Committee in February. I am talking
fibout as of now.
Does it really matter as to how many manhours were expended or
iiow many interviews were conducted or how many agents were as-
signed to the case if the results were not produced, if the job in eifect
|was not done, as it appears to be in certain cases now ? It has nothing
to do with the motivations or any evil intent on behalf of anyone.
Mr. Gray. I realize that, Mr. Thompson, but I still say to you that
on the basis of everything that we liad to work with and on the people
we interviewed I think that those agents did a magnificent job.
Mr. Thompson. Let's discuss a few of those, and if your recollection
oi any of these matters differs from my notes, please tell me. This is
[based on limited information, but I believe, for example, Mr. Halde-
man was not interviewed at all ; is that right ?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir ; that is correct, and that was taken up during
the meetings that we had prior to my confirmation hearings and I
isked the question and was told by the senior executives that we had
absolutely no leads that led to Mr. Haldeman and no lead was set out
to interview Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Thompson. That gets to another point.
You mentioned several times that you were not naturally curious,
or that you were not curious. But does not a good investigator, just
from the standpoint of an investigator, have to be very curious and
loes he not have to follow the leads out to their logical conclusions
ind their logical possibilities?
Here you had the Committee To Re-Elect. Here, if I recall, you had
people caught inside of the DNC, some were employees of the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect. You knew, of course, the Committee Tc Re-Elect
was the President's committee. You realized that Mr. Haldeman had
'ontacts, to say the least, Avith the Committee To Re-Elect, and there
certainly were contacts between the "\Yhite House and the Committee
To Re-Elect, and if anything beneficial was derived from the DNC
by the Committee To Re-Elect or any of its agents that there was a
very good possibility that someone in the A^Hiite House would know
about it or that it would be possibly useless or not as useful. These are,
of course, matters of speculation, but aren't these things that investi-
gatore are sui^posed to do, si:)eculate to the logical conclusion, and if
you did would that not lead directly to Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Gray. No, sir; I would have to say, Mr. Thompson, in all fair-
ness and with respect to you, that my agents did not come up with any
leads going to Mr. Haldeman and, as a matter of fact, I think all of
us were babes in the woods there with regard to the relationship that
existed. We did not know of that relationship that existed.
Mr. Thompson. You did not ask ?
Mr. Gray. No, I didn't, I did not.
355>6 L
Mr. Thompson. I believe you did interview Mr. Ehrlichman. Youi
interviewed him once, very early in the jjame, as I understand it.
Mr. Gray. That is right, sir ; and that documentation is in the record ,
and as I recollect that was at the request of the Assistant U.S. Attorney ;
Silbert working with the case agents.
Mr. Thompsox, There seemed to be various people who might be j
described as principals now who were interviewed only once and very ^
early. It seems as things developed, as new disclosures were being made,
these people were not being reinterviewed. A^^io made the determina-
tion as to who was to be interviewed ?
Mr. Gray. Those leads were originated and generated right down
at the working level, the case agent level working with the Assistant
U.S. Attorney and subject to review, of course, by the field supervisor
and even by the special agent in charge of the Washington field office
and then even up into FBI headquarters with the Bureau supervisor
working on the case and with the Assistant Director of the General
Investigative Division.
Mr. Thompson. You mentioned you were hamstrung because of the
information that was being furnished to you by the people who were
interviewed. Who makes the determination as to what questions or
what lines of inquiry are pursued with the individuals who are
intervicAved ?
Mr. Gray. I asked that question of my people and there is docu-
mentation before this committee with regard to that wliich sets forth
the fact that no agent is specifically told the questions to ask and how
to ask the questions, that these men are pretty well trained as investi-
gators and reliance is placed upon them to ask the proper questions and
I believe that they did.
Mr. Thompson. Well, Gordon Strachan, as an example, was inter-
viewed and evidently interviewed rather extensively but he also evi-
dently was interviewed only with regard to the Segretti situation. Of
course, liindsight again is better than foresight, but with regard to
wlietlier or not he ever saw any materials which could be construed as
results of electronic eavesdropping, I assume in the interview you
found out he personally did have contact with the Committee To Re-
Elect and in effect, was Ilaldeman's liaison between the 'V\niite House
and the committee. The auestions nbout those ])ossibilities is that even
thouirh there were no leads, or perhaps not even any accusations, those
possibilities were not pursued with Air. Strachan when he was inter-
viewed on August 28.
jNIr. Magruder was interviewed on July 20 and evidently was inter-
viewed with regard to financial matters only. He testified at the trial,
I think primarily with regard to financial matters and, of course, we
know that lie was receiving these r(>sults fi-om liis own testimony.
Dean, I believe, was in fact interviewed on June 26 or 27, but only
with regai'd to the materials in Mr. Hunt's safe.
So it does seem tliat not only miglit you liave been hamstrung by
the particular answers you were getting, if you were being lied to, of
coui'se, but someone was hamstrinc'ing himself in not pursuing these
other inquiries ot' not iroing back and following up on them.
Is this an unfair characterization or does this not seem to be true?
Mr. Gray. I think it may be a little unfair because I cannot really
account for the state of mind of the agents with regard to the specific
3557
questions that they are asking and I do know that the prosecution
strategy was to endeavor to drive to conviction. Convictions were ob-
tained on the basis of the FBI investigations and then after conviction
to hope that some of those convicted would disclose some relevant facts,
which is indeed what occurred.
Mr. Thompson. This is no excuse, of course, if these facts are true.
The earlier that this information could be derived the better, I would
assmne, would it not, regardless of prosecution ?
Mr. Gray. Tliat is correct, JNIr. Thompson, but what I am saying to
you is that I do not know the state of mind of each one of those in-
dividual agents as he asked questions and developed his report and as
those reports were viewed. I really do not.
Mr. Thompson. Well, again, going back to what we were discussing a
minute ago, I do not think it is as important as to the state of mind
of the agent because I do not know of anyone who is accusing any field
agent of doing other than what he thought his job was. But with regard
to whether or not it was in fact a good investigation, even in retrospect.
Lest there be any intimation that there were political considerations
with regard to these men, you might point out the political composition
or lack of political composition of the Bureau itself, the agents. I do
not know how many people realize how much turnover there is within
the Bureau, for example, when a new administration comes in. Could
you tell us briefly about that composition of the Bureau?
Mr. Gray. Relatively none, sir. Right behind me and all down the
line throughout the ranks of the FBI you have all career professionals.
The only people during my tenure who were not career professional
members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were the Acting Di-
rector and his personal staff. '
Mr. Thompson. Of course, you were appointed by the President?
Mr. Gray. Yes, sir; I was appointed by the Attorney General, sir.
Mr. Thompson. And you have related several matters here of con-
tacts with the White House which evidently caused you some concern
during the course of this investigation. Mr. Ehrlichman canceled a
meeting which you were going to participate in, I believe, and Mr.
Walters.
You were concerned about what was going on with regard to the CIA
implications and you took it upon yourself to talk to the President
about the matters which I believe you stated was something you did
not do lightly.
You Avere receiving requests from John Dean for FBI material and,
although you ultimately determined that it was the correct thing to
do, you were, I suppose, sufficiently concerned that you asked for a
legal memorandimi or a legal opinion from your own people to make
sure you were on firm ground ?
Mr. Gray. I knew I was on firm ground. What I wanted to do, I
testified earlier, I took a step in the direction of standardizing within
the Federal Bureau of Investigation the delivery of such materials
through the Cabinet officer, and if you will look at that particular
memorandum that was developed you will find comments are made
right in there that Mr. Hoover disseminated when and wherever he
wanted and this has been the practice in the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and I was trying to reach a different objective.
9R-29ft n 7?t_
3558
INIr. Thompson. But these were contacts that you were having or
questions or matters that I assume caused some thought in your mind
as to whether or not they were the correct things to do. I am especially
referring to the cancellation of the meeting and the things that led up
to the telephone call from the President, and what you told him on
July 6. My question relates to the inquiry Senator Baker was pursuing
awhile ago. what would lead us to believe that future Directors would
not have these same contacts by White House personnel and what
would lead us to believe anything other than that they would feel that
they should acquiesce or do what the boss is ordering in effect. Does
this point out some structural defect in the FBI or some situation with
regard to the relationships between the FBI and the Justice Depart-
ment or the FBI and the White House that should be rectified?
Mr. Gr^vy. I think every President has looked upon the FBI as his
own province, not just this President. In fact, research that we did in
the Federal Bureau of Investigation on this question revealed just
that. And I think that the one suggestion that I did make to Senator
Baker is that I do not fear the FBI as an independent agency with the
idealistic, properly motivated individual there as head, reporting
through an oversight committee or committees here in the Congress.
I wanted to do that. I had that as one of the proposals that I made and
T think it will work. I met with theHouse Judiciary Committee early
in the game, I wanted that kind of relationship with the legislative
branch l)ecause the FBI is in a difficult position in its present matrix.
Mr. Thompson. Would that take it out of the Justice Department,
according to your
INIr. Gray. According to my view it would be an independent agency,
yes.
Mr. Thompson. Would this completely absolve the difficulties with
regard to the relationship the Director might have with the "Wliite
House ?
Mr. Gray. I don't know that it would. It is pretty broad that I
could answer you and say that it would completely resolve it. I think
that the matter is going to have to be studied a little more intensely,
Mr. Thompson, than you and I could discuss it.
'Mr. Thompson, ifnder your recommendation, then, I assume the
Director would not be looking to the President as his direct employer,
so to speak, as the situation exists now.
Mr. Gray. That is correct.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Gray.
Senator ER\aN. Any further question from any member of the
committee ?
Captain Gray, you haAe cooperated fully with the committee and
the staff in these hearings and I want to thank you on behalf of the
committee for your cooperation.
Mr. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the vice
chairman and the members of the committee and the committee staff
for the courtesies shown to me in a difficult situation. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervtn. The committee will stand in recess until 9 :30 a.m.
tomorrow.
["\^niereupon. at 5 :03 p.m., the committee was adjourned until Tues-
day, Aug. 7, 1973, at 9 :30 a.m.]
TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington^ D.C.
The Select Committee met. pursuant to recess, at 9 :45 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and Weicker.
Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred B.
Thompson, minority counsel ; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief coun-
sel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, "William T. Mayton,
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels;
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy
minority counsel ; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement,
research assistant; Filer Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert
Baca, office of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flani-
gan, assistant publications clerk.
Senator Ervin. The commitee will come to order.
The committee met in executive session this morning and decided to
postpone filing a suit until counsel for the committee have an oppor-
tunity to ascertain and study the reaction of the White House attorneys
to the motion of the Special Prosecutor.
I would like to put in the record a statement of the American
Nurses Association setting out the code of the nurses in respect to their
attitude tow^ard revealing confidential information they acquire while
serving the patients.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 144A*.]
Senator Ervin. The counsel will call the first witness.
Mr. Dasii. Former Attorney General Richard Kleindienst.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Kleindienst, will you stand and hold up your
right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to ^ve to the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Kleindienst. I do.
Senator Ervin. You might identify yourself for the purposes of
the record, giving your name and address.
♦See p. 3855.
(3559)
3960
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST, FORMER ATTORNEY
GENERAL
Mr. Kleindienst. Mr. Chairman, my name is Richard G. Klein-
dienst. My address is 8464 Portland Place, McLean, Va.
I do not have a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I am here vol-
untarily to provide to you, the members of the committee, and the
counsel, whatever information that I have and which you deem to be
relevant to your investigation.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, Mr. David Dorsen, assistant chief counsel,
will open the questions.
Mr. DoRSEN. Mr. Kleindienst, am I correct that you are presently
engaged in the private practice of law ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir. After I left the Department of Justice
I opened up an office in Washington, D.C., and I am a private prac-
titioner by myself.
Mr. DoRSEN. And you resigned as Attorney General as of April 30,
1973?
Mr. Kleindienst. I believe that it was April 30 ; yes, sir. Effective
upon the qualification and appointment of my successor.
Mr. Dorsen. Could you please summarize for us briefly your back-
ground, especially with respect to your positions with the U.S.
Government ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I have only had two positions with the U.S. Gov-
ernment. That was the position of Deputy Attorney General of the
United States, a position that I believe that I was — commenced around
February 1969, and the other position that I have had with the U.S.
Government is the Attorney General of the United States, a position
that I commenced on or about June 8, 1972.
Mr. Dorsen. When for the first time did you leani that there was
electronic surveillance of the Democratic National Committee head-
qiuirters at the Watergate ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I learned it for the first time after June 17 when
the individuals who were at the headquarters were arrested. I don't
know whether I learned of the electronic surveillance on Saturday,
June 17, or sometime in the early part of the next week.
Mr. Dorsen. But on June 17 you were notified of the fact that there
had been a break-in ?
Mr. Kleindienst. At approximately 8 o'clock in the morning, as
Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen of the Criminal Division
of the Department of Justice called me at my home and indicated to
me that there had been a break-in at the Democratic national head-
quarters at the Watergate Hotel. All the information that he had at
that time was that there was a break-in and I believe he said to me it
looks like it might have l>een a bombing case.
The next knowledge of any kind that I had with respect to it came,
oh, approximately 31^ hours after that when I met with Mr. Gordon
Liddy and Mr. Powell Moore in a section of lockers at the Burning
Tree (^lub, which is a golf club in Washington, D.C.
Mr. Dorsen. How did that come about, Mr. Kleindienst?
Mr. Kleindienst. The reason I was at the Burning Tree Club, they
had their annual member-e-uest golf tournament in which I was a
participant. I think I was scheduled to tee off for the Saturday round
3361
in the afternoon. I was having lunch in the main dining room area of
the Burning Tree Chib. I looked up and Mr. Gordon Liddy, who I
recognized, came in with Mr. Powell Moore and I likewise recognized
him.
Mr. DoRSEN. Who is Mr. ! *owell Moore ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Mr. Powell Moore was the Deputy Public Infor-
mation Officer of the Department of Justice when I was there as the
Deputy Attorney General. When Mr. Mitchell resigned as Attorney
General and went over to the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President, Mr. Powell Moore went with him to the campaign com-
mittee. I do not know what his title was at the campaign committee
but I knew Powell Moore quite well as a result of our association to-
gether at the Department of Justice.
Mr. DoRSEN. I believe you indicated you recognized Gordon Liddy.
What were the circumstances under which you first met or got to know
Mr. Liddy?
Mr. Kleindienst. The only association I ever had with Mr. Liddy,
except for this particular meeting on Saturday, June 17, was in the
year 1969 when I headed, on behalf of the executive branch, a task
force that was looking into and devising a program of action with
respect to the marihuana traffic from the country of Mexico into the
United States. I believe that Mr. Liddy at that time was an officer or
employed by the Treasury Department and he was one of the repre-
sentatives from the Treasury Department in that task force. There
were representatives from six or seven Departments of the Govern-
ment. That would have been in the late spring of 1969 and the summer
of 1969. To the best of my recollection I never saw Gordon Liddy after
that time in the intervening years until that Saturday morning on
June 17 and I have not seen him since.
Mr. DoRSEN. What was the nature of the experience that the Justice
Department had with Mr. Liddy in connection with his role in Opera-
tion Intercept ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I had no experience with him because he was
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury. He had one
assignment, as I recall, with respect to going from town to town along
the United States-Mexican border to inform the business community
we were quite concerned about so-called Operation Intercept. My recol-
lection, which is not very precise, is that the manner in which Mr.
Liddy was giving information with respect to our program was un-
satisfactorv and I believe that based u))on information that I got, I
recommended to the Secretary of the Treasury or Mr. Rossides, who
was, I think, his immediate superior, that Mr. Liddy be called back
from that assignment and not to continue any further with it.
Mr. DoRSEN. Do you have any other recollection about any possible
problems with Mr. Liddy or why his performance was considered
unsatisfactory ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir.
Mr. Dorsen. Directing your attention to the locker room of the
Burning Tree Country Club, what happened when you saw Mr. Moore
and Mr. Liddy there ?
Mr. Kleindienst. The first thing that I remember with some pre-
ciseness is the fact that Mr. Liddy, when he came into the entranceway
of the dining area and saw me, in a rather furtive manner made a
3562
motion to me like this, indicating; come here. I got up out of my chaii!
and went over there. He was very agitated and seemed to be quitfl
upset. He said that I have to talk to you in private. Where I was stand-'
ing was not a very private place; there must have been BO or 70 meni
who were eating or standing around. Right to the left of where he was!
there was a little locker room complex at the club. I looked in there!
and no one was in there so I said, '"Gentlemen, come in here, I think!
this w^ould be a private place to talk." We went in there. Mr. Liddyl
said that I have been asked to come out and give you a report with',
respect to the Watergate break-in last night or the break-in at thej
Democratic National Committee, I do not know which he said. Hel
said to me that he believed that some of the persons who were arrested
might be employed by either the White House or the Committee fori
the Re-Election of the President.
My reaction to that statement w^as instantaneous and rather abrupt
I think he also said, although I do not have too precise a recollection
of it, that Mr. Mitchell had asked him to come out and talk to me.
Tliat was incredible to me. The relationship I had with Mr, Mitchell
was such that I do not believe that he would have sent a person like;
Gordon Liddy to come out and talk to me about anything; he knew
where he could find me 24 hours a day. In any event, as a result ofl
my surprise, my incredulity, and, I think, my instant realization of'
the implications of what he had just said prompted me to pick up the
telephone and locate Mr. Henry Petersen. That I was able to do very
quickly. All I had to do w\as to call the Justice Department switch-
board and have her call him at home and put him on the phone. Since
Mr. Petersen had called me at 8 o'clock I did not have to explain much
to Henry. I told him, and I have always been under the impression I
said to Mr. Petersen, that Mr. Gordon Liddy of the cam|)aign com-
mittee is here. Mr. Petersen, based upon a conversation I have had
with him, does not remember my mentioning Mr. Liddy 's name, but
in any event, I was intent upon giving him a very specific direct
instruction right then that wdth respect to those Avho were arrested at
the Watergate they should be given no treatment ditferent than any-
body who might have been arrested in circumstances of that kind. I
was quite upset. To the best of my recollection, the next thing I did
was to turn to Mr, Liddy and tell him to leave the premises because I
know immediately thereafter Mr. Moore and Mr. Liddy left.
Mr. DoRSEX. Mr. Kleindienst, aside from the conversation you had
with INIr. Petersen which you have just described, to wdiom else did you
recount the incident at Burning Tree ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I might have told Mr. Dean, I do not recollect
doing so. I have no recollection of recounting this incident to anyone
else until I w^as interrogated by personnel from the Select Committee
and also personnel from the Special Prosecutor Cox staff.
Mr. DoRSEN. You are aw^are, are you not, that Mr. Dean has testified
with respect to reported conversations you had with him?
Mr. Kleindienst. Right.
Mr. DoRSEN. On the subject ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I have no recollection of mentioning it to him. If
he recollects it inasmuch as the events occurred, then I think on that
instance I would have to credit Mr. Dean's testimony.
Mr. DoRSEN. Did you participate in a conversation with Mr. Henry
Petersen and Mr. Dean concerning the possibility of going to the
3563
[President because the circumstances and events indicated that there
tefvvas more to the Watergate break-in than appeared ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, the characterization that you put at the end
I don't think was relevant to our meeting. But I believe it was either
Monday or certainly no later than Tuesday that Mr. Dean, Mr. Peter-
sen, and I had a conference that took place in my office. The purpose of
Mr. Petersen and Mr. — and myself being with Mr. Dean was to in-
dicate to Mr. Dean the apprehension and the grave seriousness with
which we received the news of this fantastic event that had occurred
at the "Watergate Hotel, to inform him as counsel to the President that
the Department of Justice and the FBI would be compelled and would
immediately launch a full-scale intensive, thorough investigation into
all the facts surrounding it, that tliis was a felony, that in addition to
being a felony, if you can think of anything worse, it also went to the
very heart of our political system, and that it was an act of such a
heinous nature that we were going to call forth and bring about an
investigation immediately.
I think ISIr. Petersen interrupted or said that either myself or Mr.
Dean should contact tlie President personally to indicate to him the
gravity of the situation, the consequences of it, and I believe Mr. Peter-
sen said in that remark that either Mr. Dean or I should urge the
President to make a statement immediately setting forth his attitude
in response to this fantastic event. I believe that Mr. Dean volunteered
at that point to the effect that, well, I am going out to San Clemente
land I will convey your suggestion, Mr. Petersen, because I will be
! seeing the President myself. I believe I concurred in that. I don't know
how long that meeting lasted but I think that that is the substance of
what transpired at that time.
Mr. DoRSEN. There has been testimony, Mr. Kleindienst, that shortly
after this meeting there allegedly was an eifort to implicate or involve
the CIA as part of the Watergate coverup and that was done by Mr.
Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, and ]Mr. Haldeman.
In late June or early July 1972, were you aware of these events?
Mr. Kleindiexst. I was not aware of the meetings that have been
testified to here by Mr. Gray, Ambassador Helms, or General AValtei-s.
I had no knowledge of such meetings until I heard their testimony in
this matter.
I have a vague recollection of Mr. Gray mentioning to me sometime
during that period of time that assertions were being made that there
is a possible CIA involvement in the whole Watergate situation and
the fact that I believe lie expressed to me that if there is actual CIA
involvement in this matter, it would certainly complicate the investi-
gation of the FBI.
So that statement must have been made by him prior to the time that
he had ascertained that there was no CIA involvement. Having so
ascertained it, to my recollection he never mentioned that situation
to me again.
To my recollection, I never had a conversation with Mr. Dean, Mr.
Ehrlicliman, or anybody at the White House with respect to the
so-called CIA matter.
Mr. DoRSEN. Did Mr. Gray mention to you his telephone converea-
tion with the President on July 6, 1972 ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Not to my recollection.
3964
Mr. DoRSEN. During the summer of 1972, were you aware that Pat-
rick Gray was making avaiLable to John Dean FBI teletypes and
302's?
Mr. Kleixdienst. No, sir. The first time I became aware of that was
in the confirmation hearing of Mr. Gray to be the permanent Director
of the FBI.
Mr. DoRSEN. Had Mr. Dean spoken to you about the possibility of
the FBI supplying to the White House such documents ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Mr. Dean raised a question with both myself and
Mr. Petei-sen. Both of us were very quick to tell him that we did not —
that we would not give him raw investigative data from FBI files. I
told him based upon his representation to us and my belief throughout
this matter that he was counsel to the President ; he represented him
continually. He was dealing strictly with the President, that the Presi-
dent had delegated him to more or less be responsible for an oveiTiew
of the investigation insofar as it might relate to White Plouse pei-son-
nel. I told Mr. Dean that since I had been in the Department of Jus-
tice — I hadn't been Attorney General but a week when this fantastic
situation occurred — ^^that it had always been my policy and one that
was shared by Attorney General Mitchell, that only under the most!
restricted circumstances should raw FBI investigative data be given;
to anybody. I believe I did indicate that we wouldn't mind suimnariz-{
ing pertinent information that was relevant to his inquiry orally for
him so that he could make a report to the President. I believe I also]
indicated that if there was a particular file that the President of the
United States personally wanted to see, that I would be willing to take
that file personally up to the President, sit down wdth the President
and let him look at it and then bring it back.
Mr. DoRSEN. During the summer of 1972, were you aware or made
aware of a Saturday night phone call from Mr. John Ehrlichman to
Henry Petersen ?
Mr. Kleindienst. In the summer of 1972 ?
Mr. Dorsen. Summer or fall.
Mr. Kleindienst. I do not know if it was an evening call. I became
aware of a call that Mr. Ehrlichman made to Mr. Petersen I believe
in the middle of the day, sometime between July 7 or 8 and August 8
or 9, at a time when I was at the Pocono Lake Preserve in Pennsyl-
vania with my family on a vacation. I became aware of such a call ati
that time.
Mr. DoRSEN. How did you become aware of it ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I became aware of the call because Mr. Ehrlich-j
man called me. He started the conversation out, I think, by sayingi)
either "Dick" or "General," depending on the nature of the conversa-;
tion how he would address me. He said : "I have just talked to Henry,
Petersen and I am very upset about my conversation with him becausej
I gave him an instruction which he refused to follow," and I think my>
first reaction whicli was again rather al)rupt and instantaneous was
""V^Hiat were you doing talking to Henry Petersen in the first place and!
giving him insti-uctions of any kind ?" and he said, "Never mind that, I;
asked him to have the FBI and T^.S. Attorney's Office not harass Secre-
tary Stans with respect to interrogations, not to harass the Secretary.''
And I said, John, you have got to be out of your mind. What did
Mr. Petersen say to you? Well, I think he said in a polite way he told.
3565
me to go to you know where, and I said, well, Mr. Ehrlichman, I think
by that time 1 may have been calling him Mr. Ehrlichman, I said you
are awfully lucky Henry Petersen is the kind of man that he is that he
;does not blow off the handle. I said if he resigned today and has a press
! conference and repeated your conversation with him you could prob-
ably be involved in an obstruction of justice complaint, and I said
Henry did exactly what I would expect him to do. Then I remember
saying to Mr. Ehrlichman I never want you again to call up anybody
in my Department and give them specific instruction. I said if you have
something to convey to Mr. Petersen or anybody over there you can
call me. He said well, I cannot reach you all the time, and I said well,
John, we have transacted most of our business on the telephone, I had
a telephone installed up here to be available to you and the President
or anybody else 24 hours a day. He said I will not agree to that, and I
said all right, John, if you will not agree to that I will come down
Monday, I would like to meet with you and the President, and if the
President tells me that you have the authority and the power to give
specific instructions to people in the Department of Justice then I will
submit my resignation. At that point Mr. Ehrlicliman then treated the
matter lightly, do not get excited, I was only kidding, do not worry
about it, it will never happen again, and I can say to you that it never
did happen again.
Mr. DoRSEN. Am I correct that Mr. Stans did not actually appear
before the grand jury ?
Mr. Kleindienst. That is my understanding.
Mr. DoRSEN. And how did that come about, in view of your con-
versation with Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. Kleindienst. That came about as a result of conferences that
I had with Mr. Petersen.
Mr. Petersen said that if you are dealing with persons of high posi-
tion, persons of great notoriety or prestige, it is not uncommon, de-
pending upon the circumstances, instead of having them appear before
the grand jury directly, to liave them interrogated by an Assistant
U.S. Attorney or the U.S. Attorney with a court reporter and give
them questions and get answers from them, otherwise tlie same ground
rules would apply, they would not have a lawyer with them, their
attorney could be in the next room, if they wanted to consult with
their attorney they could step out and do that. He said that par-
ticularly he saw no objection to it in view of the fact as of that time
there was no evidence of any kind in our possession that would indi-
cate culpability or criminal conduct on behalf of Mr. Stans.
I have had very little experience with the grand jury procedure.
I authorized that procedure with respect to Mr. Stans and I will take
personal responsibility for it.
Mr. DoRSEx. Now, before T ask you your relationship with John
Ehrlichman in reference to the Justice Department during this period,
I would like to read a few sentences from John Dean's testimony
before this committee from page 2808.
Throughout the Watergate investigation Haldeman and particularly Ehrlich-
man. had complaine<l about Mr. Kle'ndienst's passive roV in the investisration
and prosecution. Haldeman and Ehrlichman were both aware of the strained
]! relationship between Kleindienst and the White House. I knew that Ehrlichman
1 was riding hard on the Justice Department in an effort to undermine Mr.
^Kleindienst. I also knew from conferences with Kleindienst he had little affec-
tion for Mr. Ehrlichman.
3566
Is this a fair statement of your relationship with :Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. IvL^nxDiExsT. T tliink the last statement Mv. Dean made at that
time would have been subjective in nature. I do not think I had a feel-
inij one way or the other in that way about Mr. Ehrlichman. I had
had, <renerally speakin<r. a satisfactory working- rehitionship with
Mr. Ehrlichman. He had a very difficult assignment and role to ful-
fill on behalf of the President of the United States. I often wondered
liow John Eliilichman could leally take onto liimself the multitudi-
nous chores and responsibilities tliat he did. I made it a point to the
extent possible to work witli and get along w^ith everybody at the
Wiiite House and indeed, in the Government, as a means by which I
would discharge my i-esi)onsibility in tlie (lovei'mnent.
I did not know— nol)ody told me that I Avas not getting along with
tlie White House. I have a persoimlity and pei-sonality characteristics
which people tell me can sometimes be irritating and I am sorry about
that and I suppose I could have ii-ritated people up there fiom time to
time. So far as a passive role at the l)e[)artment of Justice, the decision
that I made on June IT wlien I became aware of this in terms of my
role as the Attorney (xeneral was essentially this : That I should not do
anything more or less in this as a major in\estigation than I would in
any other case. In every other case that I ever Avas involved in at the
Department of Justice of a criminal nature, I looked to ]\Ir. Henry
Petersen to l)e prima lily responsible for the direction of the
investigation.
And let me say this about Mr. Petersen. I believe that Henry Peter-
sen is the finest career lawyer that this country has e\er had. In 41^2
years of association with him I found him to be intelligent, fair, coura-
geous, honest, dedicated to the administration of our criminal justice
laws and I suppose that of all of the people that I was associated there
with who would be under me in the Department I respected him more,
looked to him more for advice and counsel, relied upon him more, and
thanked the Lord constantly there was a man like Henry Petersen.
^ly admiration for liim was such, I believe Henry Petersen is the
first career lawyer in the Department of Justice who was ever
appointed by the Pi-esident to be an Assistant Attorney General and I
thought it was a great compliment to his career of service. Conse-
quently, on any other, as I did on any other criminal matter, I looked
to Henry Petersen, I i)i-obably saw him several times a day. I did not
absolve myself of the ultimate responsibility as the Attorney General
in the matter but I relied upon Henry and I got information from
Henry Petersen. With the exception of oiu' event, I never talked to
^fr. Sill)ert, Mr. Glanzei-, Mr. Campbell or the U.S. Attorney, I never
gave them any direction. H" there was a policy matter Mr. Petersen
would submit to me which was proper for me to discharge as the
Attorney (Jeneral, I made those decisions. If tliey were right, I will
take the credit for it and if they were wrong I will take the responsi-
bility for it. That could have Wen to people at the White House a
passive role in the Watei-gate case. It is tlie role that I tried to pursue
while I was there until Sunday, April 15, 1973.
Mr. DoRSEN. I would like to turn to a meeting that took place among
you, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Ehrlichman on July 31, 1972. Do you recall
that meeting?
Mr. Kleindienst. Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, and myself?
1
3567
Mr. DoRSEN. Yes.
Mr. Kleindienst. Without something else to prod my memory T
have no recollection of that.
Mr, DoRSEN. Well, I will read from page 5285 of Mr. Ehrlichman's
testimony before this committee :
There came a time when there Avas a feeling that, at least on my part, hasetl
upon what Mr. Dean was telling me about the unfolding of this thing, that Mr.
Magruder may have had some involvement and that culminated in a meeting
with the Attorney General at the end of July, on July 21, where Magruder was
specifically discussed, but just where in there I acquired information I can't
tell you.
Mr. Kleindienst. I have no recollection of any such meeting. The
only recollection I have of anybody ever saying anything to me
about Mr. INIagruder was Mr. Petersen's characterization to me after
he appeared before the grand jury as a witness, that he said, Magruder
just barely, you know, got by. As a result of our conversation, I
gathered he meant by that that he didn't sound like a credible witness.
However, there was no othei- evidence available to the U.S. Attorney
to contradict what he said and that is the only characterization of Mr.
Magruder that I heard.
Incidentally, Mr. Dorsen, let me make another gratuitous statement,
if I may, and that is about these three young lawyers in the U.S.
Attorney's Office who conducted this investigation. To me those three,
along with Mr. Petersen, are tlie unsung heroes of the Watergate case.
I think a lot of people should be given a lot of credit, the Senate, the
press. Judge Sirica, but there haven't been very many people around
talking about these career people in my Department.
These three young men were career lawyers. I believe that they are
all Democrats. They were there before we came in. They were given
this assignment bv the I".S. Attorney and they were never interfered
with. Under very difficult circumstances, the obvious political notoriety
of it, the problems with respect to the press, the interest of the Nation
with respect to this terrible, reprehensible event that had occurred,
imposed upon these voung men a burden that few prosecutors, I think,
have ever had. I had complete faith in them throughout this thing. I
do today. And I hope someday that they will get the recognition that
they really deserve for conducting a thorough, comprehensive investi-
gation.
And let me conclude my gratuity by this remark, that this case, it
seems to me, was ultimately broken not by Magruder and Mr. Dean
going to the Senate, or the press, or the judge, but by going to the
U.S. Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia, to Mr. Silbert, Mr.
Glanzer, and Mr. Campbell, and giving them the information that
really had unfolded this and brought us to the point where we are
today.
Excuse the interruption but I wanted to make that testimony for
some very fine men that I admire very much.
Mr. Dorsen. All right. Mr. Kleindienst.
I would like to move ahead to February 22, 1973, and to your meet-
ing with the President on that day and ask you if j'ou can summarize
for the committee what occurred.
Mr. Kleindienst. February 22, 1973.
Mr. Dorsen. Correct.
3568
Mr. Kleixdienst. Without something else to prod my memory, Mr.
Doi-sen, I haven't tlie sli^rhtest idea. Incidentally, for the benefit of the
committee and counsel, throughout the time that I was in the Depart-
-ment of Justice I did not keep lengthy memos of my conversations. 1
didn't write memos to the file. I didn't write self-congratulatory
memos back and forth. When I dealt with people at the White Housi'
and with the President of the United States I did it as a Cabinet
ofhcer, as the Attorney General, in good faith. I gave him my best
opinions at the time and I did not keep copious memorandums foi- the
benefit of my grandchildren 50 years from now or anybody else. Con-
sequently, and I think you can see there as a result of my logs, that it
would not be uncommon for me to have 50, 60, or 70 telephone calls or
meetings in a day.
So, unless you have something else about February 22 to the Presi-
dent of the United States, I haven't the slightest idea what I did then.
Mr. DoRSEX. I believe we raised it with you at one of the preparatory
sessions and Mr. Dean testified about it as the meeting in which yoii
were trying to be brought back into the family, where the agenda was
prepared and I think ettorts were made to have you stay on as Attorney
General past the deadline which you had set for yourself.
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Well, I didn't know that I wasn't a member of
the family. The President of the Ignited States, incidentally, never
gave that indication to me. I never had anything but the finest rela-
tionship with him. Again, for the record, the only instruction the
President of the United States ever gave me at any time after Watei -
gate was to see to it that the Dei)artment of Justice and the FBI con-
ducted a thorough, complete, intensive investigation, and I think tln'
phrase that he used several times is, let the chips fall where they will.
If that was the meeting, however, at which the President discussed
with me my tenure in the Department of Justice, and I don't know i t'
it was that date or not, I did liave such a meeting because I recall tln'
President asking me to come up to see him on rather short notice.
By way of preface, before the election I communicated to the Presi-
dent through Mr. Mitchell the fact that I would like to stay as the
Attorney General until September 197H which would be coterminus
with the expiration of my term as President of the Federal Bar Asso-
ciation. My reason for doing so was one strictly of financial reasons.
I will have three children in college this year. My service in the Gov-
ei-nment had depleted a rather modest estate. And I just could not
afford to stay longer in the Government of the Ignited States.
After the election, when I had meetings at Camp David, I went to
Europe for 10 days and had meetings with respect to drug enforce-
ment matters in London, Paris, Madrid, and Bonn. I was informed
by Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman that my request had been
acquiesced in and then I had a subsequent meeting with the President
in which he likewise said that that would be fine.
At a meeting after the inaugiiration and before April 15, whether it
was FelM'uary 22 oi- not, Mr. Dorsen, the President called me in and he
said, "Dick, I don't want you to think about leaving as the Attorney
General in September." He said, "I understand your personal cir-
cumstances. It is going to be a hardship for you, but I have to have
you stay until this Watergate situation is over." He said, "I just can't
3569
have a new Attorney General, confirmation and all the problems, and
somebody comiii«i: in brandnew right now."
As I always have tried to do, I tried to respect the wishes of the
President of the United States. I said, "I hope it is not going to be long
after September. I won't be thinking of that date now. 1 want to get
out of here as soon as I can, but 1 will agree with you that 1 will not
submit my resignation in September.''
iNIr. DoRSEN. I am going to pass by certain other events that oc-
curred in this period, including any role you may have played in the
confirmation hearings of Mr. Gray, your receipt of any records from
the CIA, and discussions as to the role you were perhaps to play in
connection with this committee, and direct your attention instead at
this time to a conversation I believe you had with Mr. Ehrlichman on
]\Iarch 28, 1973.
Do you recall that conversation ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir.
Mr. DoRSEN. May we have shown to the witness what purports to
be a transcript of a conversation on March 28, 1973, between Mr.
Kleindienst and Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. Kleindienst. Is that the one that Mr. Ehrlichman taped?
Mr. DoRSEN. That is correct.
Mr. Kleindienst. Then I — I have had my memory vividly refreshed
with respect to that conversation.
IMr. DoRSEN. Did Mr. Ehrlichman, before that conversation started,
tell you he Avas taping it ?
]Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir. And if he had, some of the words that I
used and that appear in this exliibit would not have been said by me,
Mr. Dorsen.
Mr. DoRSEN. Well, in the interests of moving along I will not at-
tempt to question you about the contents of that conversation but
merely about INIr. Ehrlichman's not advising you.
Do you know whether Mr. Ehrlichman made a practice of recording
these phone calls?
Mr. Kleindienst. I don't know. I learned of this as a result of these
hearings. I don't think I have language, appropriate language in a
public hearing of this kind, to describe the reaction that I had when
I learned of this. I think it is reprehensible. I think it is incredible.
The concept of somebody at the "\\lnte House taping a telephone con-
versation with the Attornev General of the United States when he is
talking to them about business that relates to the President of the
United States is iust bevond my comprehension. And like I say, I don't
want to be subjective but T don't think I have at mv command language
that adequately expresses my feelings about this incident.
Mr. DoRSEN. Does that document that I have shown you appear to
be an accurate transcription of the conversation ?
Mr. Kleindienst. T think so.
Mr. Dorsen. Mr. Chairman, may T request that the transcript be
placed in evidence?
Mr. Kleindienst. T would like to have the opportunity for the bene-
fit of two persons who used to be friends of mine. Senator Weicker
and Judge Sirica, to explain some of the concepts that I had and why
I used some of the language that I did as a result of my conversation
with INIr. Ehrlichman.
3570
Mr. DoRSEN. Well, Mr. Kleindienst, just because I do not want tc
monopolize your time here I would just as soon as — this will be dom
at another occasion lie re, I can assure you.
If nobody else does it, I will come back to it.
Mr. Kleindienst. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. The record shows that the transcription of the Ehr-
lichman tape of his conversation with the witness has been entered asj
exhibit No. 99.* i
Senator Weicker. Let the record also show there is no reason foil
Mr. Kleindienst to use the expression "used to be a friend of mine.'l
Mr. Kleindienst. Thank you, sir.
Mr. DoRSEN. Early in April 1973 did you have a conversation withj
Mr. Ehrlichman on the subject of Judge Matthew Byrne becomingj
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ? i
Mr. Kleindienst. On or about April 5, as I recall, I was in Lot!
Angeles, Calif., attending a regional U.S. attorneys' conference |
Either while I was there or before I left, on the night before thet
meeting that I am going to describe, I believe I got a telephone caljl
from Mr. Ehrlichman or somebody on his staff indicating to me thalj
perhaps the President was going to want to talk to me at San Cle-i
mente. I believe I indicated that my reservation to leave was Saturday)
morning because I either wanted to get home or had a meeting Satur-i
day night in Washington, D.C. |
I was then informed that — to standby for a helicopter to come neaijl
the hotel w^here I was staying early the next morning to take me to!
San Clemente for the purpose of meeting with them and the Presi-i
dent. I believe later that night I was informed that the decision wasp
made for me to go there and 8 o'clock in the morning I went to a lotjj
near the hotel, the helicopter came in and I went to San Clemente.l
That is the first and only time I was ever in San Clemente. My meet-j!
ing started with Mr. Haldeman and INIr. Ehrlichman. Most of the
meeting was consumed with a discussion based upon my recommenda-
tion of a selection of a special prosecutor for the so-called Watergate!
situation. This is a suggestion that I first started making to the White'
House in September of 1972 and a suggestion that I made many times.
The suggestion was rejected both by Henry Petersen and the White
House for essentially the same reason. Mr. Petersen said that if youi
bring in a special prosecutor that would be a slap at the career people
in the Department of Justice, an insinuation they had not done their
job, they are not entitled to that, and the A^^lite House kept saying'
to me that it would be a reflection upon me as the Attorney General
if I had to bring in a special prosecutor, somebody would say I had
not done my job. My answer to them at all times was well, we have
done a great job, if we can get a fair, objective, credible, outstanding
lawyer with knowledge and experience to come in here and take a
look at what we have done, I had such confidence in what we had done!
he would say we had done a good job and I thought that would be
good in view of the politics of the situation and, second, I wanted
somebody to make the ultimate prosecutive decision who was not a
Presidential appointee.
So that persons who had legitimate interest in this, politically or
otherwise, could not say that any decision, ultimate decision was a po-
*See Book 7. p. 2915.
3571
litical decision and I thought from that standpoint of appearance of
justice, confidence of the people of the United States in our criminal
justice system, it would be a very worthwhile thing.
I I never publicly revealed these recommendations of mine. I always
I felt that the response by the career people in the Department and the
[White House was legitimate and in good faith, and I never had the
[practice of calling a press conference every time somebody at the
'White House disagreed or the Pi-esident disagreed with one of my
(recommendations. But in any event, about April 5, apparently they
were ready to discuss this matter very seriously and we spent some
time discussing how it would come about, who it might be, what his
role w^ould be, what delegation of responsibility I would give him,
how could we select the jjerson. And I had a lot of ideas because I had
been talking to quite a few people about it and I even had some names.
I think I had three in particular and I remember ISIr. Ehrlichman
saying, well, come up with a list of five possible names, and I said I
will try but I do not know if you need five.
But in any event, that consumed most of the conversation.
I recall the question of the new Director, permanent Director of the
FBI came up, and they asked me for my recommendations. I had two
names that I recommended to them, and that w^e discussed that day.
One was Henry Petersen and one was Judge Byrne in Los Angeles.
I think that the consensus of our conversation with respect to Mr.
Petersen was that you could not find a better, more qualified person
to be permanent Director of the FBI, but because he had been in
charge of the Watergate investigation at the Department of Justice
as the Assistant Attorney General, he could be controversial and that
he might have difficulty being confirmed. In other words, if you had
him you might have a Watergate hearing as part of his confirmation.
I understood that and the reality of it, having gone through a con-
firmation hearing of my own a year before.
Then, they asked me why I was so strong on Judge Byrne. I think
that they were surprised to learn of my very close personal friendship
with Judge Byrne. I met Judge Byrne when I became a Deputy At-
torney General. He had been appointed I^.S. attorney for the central
district of California, that is to say, Los Angeles, which is one of our
largest U.S. attorney's offices, under President Johnson. When we came
in in 1969 there were many serious cases and matters that were still
pending in his office. He came highly recommended by everybody at
that time, the bench, the bar. Republicans, Democrats, and Mr.
Mitchell and I prevailed upon him if he would, to stay on for another
year as U.S. attorney in this administration so he could administer
the caseload that he had in that verv large and significant office.
He consented to do so and I think that is a kind of act of patriotism
on his Dart to stav on. I think he is quite identified with the Demo-
cratic Party in California and discharged and discharged fairly and
responsibly the duties of that very significant office under a Republican
President. As a result of that Matt and T became very good friends.
As a result of that friendsliip mv estimation and opinion of him
flrrew daily from the standpoint of his intelligence, his ability, his
knowledge, his conviction, experience as a prosecutor, his whole con-
cept of societv and his fairness. I was verv^ pleased when Senator
Tunney and Senator Cranston recommended him to be a Federal dis-
3572 !
(
trict judge. The way we had allocated it, it was their turn to come up
with one and I wanted to suppress my pleasure to those two Senators
for fear it might prejudice INIatt. He is an outstanding judge. And
then I think I gave him those qualities. He is a bachelor, he is about
40 years of age, he is dedicated to the law, and as I said in these troubled
times as a result of Watergate, as a result of Pat Gray's misfortunes,
that this would be regarded I think with complete credibility, there
could be no charge of politics because of his bona fides as a Democrat,
and then I said you will have a man who will be fair and forthright
and honest in this job.
I don't know whether ISIr. Ehrlichman suggested to me that I contact
Mr. Byrne or not. I do know that in that conversation, I said, or I
believe that I did, my recollection is that I have not talked to Matt
Byrne since the Ellsberg trial started. I said I expressed good wishes
to' him through mutual friends in Los Angeles, but that he and I have
just not talked together since the Ellsberg trial started. Neither one
of us wanted, at least I, and I am sure he felt that we wanted anybody
to think from the appearance of justice I was going in his back
chambers and trying to get some special consideration for the Govern-
ment in that very significant and vital case.
I have no recollection of Mr. Ehrlichman ever indicating to me at
that meeting he himself was going to talk to Judge Byrne. Because
of the standard that I had set for myself in not talking to Judge
Byrne throughout this trial, if Mr. Ehrlichman had indicated to me
that he was going to I am confident that I would have said John, you
cannot do that while this trial is going on, or at least 3^ou should not.
Really you, on behalf of the President, are really no different than I,
a member of the President's family. In any event, when I first learned
of the fact that Mr. Ehrlichman had contacted Judge Byrne, I know
1 registered a feeling of surprise that such a meeting had occurred. I
know Judge Byrne well enough to know that he did nothing improper
as a result of that meeting, or those meetings, nor would he permit
anybody else to put him in a situation of impropriety. The Ellsberg
trial was just about ready to come to a conclusion, the evidence Avas
just about in, it was going to the jury, and because of the delay that
had already occurred I didn't think there was that kind of a problem.
Mr. Gray was continuing to act as the Acting Director of the FBI,
and I thought, with great distinction.
That is what I recollect of the Byrne incident.
ISf r. DoRSEN. I just want to allude to a few of the subsequent events
briefly at that time, however important they are. I do not want to
pursue it in detail now, but am I correct that on the early morning
hours of April 1.5, 1973, you had a meeting with Mr. Petersen, U.S.
Attorney Harold Titus and the prosecutors at your liome ?
Mr. Ki,EiNinEXST. It was just one of the prosecutors and that was
the chief prosecutor, Mr. Silbert.
Mr. DoRSEN. Am I correct that this meeting dealt with the dis-
closure of Mr. Magruder and Mr. Dean to the prosecutors?
Mr. Ki.EiNDiENST. Yes, sir.
Mr. DoRSEN. Following that meeting, am I correct that you made
an appointment to see the President later in the day on April 15, 1978?
]\Ir. Kleixdiknst. That meeting commenced at approximately 1
o'clock in the morning, it terminated around 5 o'clock in the morning.
3573
I was up at 8 :30 a.m. As a result of that meeting we agreed that I had
to see the President. I put a call in to the White House at 8 :30 a.m.,
the President returned my call at 9 :80 a.m. I told him it was absolutely
imperative that I see him right away. He said that I have the Sunday
service at the White House at 11 a.m. I told him that rather than go
to church with my wife and children I would go up there and attend
that service at 11 o'clock and be available to see him after that was
over.
I think the reception lasted until approximately 1 o'clock and around
1 o'clock in the afternoon I met with the President in his office in the
Executive Office Building.
Mr. DoRSEX. Now, am I correct that at least part of the meeting
was devoted to briefing the President and that one of the decisions
made on the afternoon of April 15 by you would be that you would
in effect withdraw from the supervision of the prosecution of the
Watergate case?
Mr. Kleindiexst. The whole meeting was devoted solely to talking
about the information that I had obtained that night and the conse-
quences that inevitably must flow from it.
Mr. DoRSEX. Xow, I would like to show to you a document which
you provided the committee dated April 15, 1973. The first page is
typewritten. The page under it is handwritten. I ask if you can
identify that for the committee ?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Yes. I know what you ha\'e in your hand, Mr.
Dorsen. I furnished it to the committee. The document underneath, in
my handwriting, is a document that I wrote out in my office in the
presence of Mr. Petersen after he and I had met with the President of
the United States in which I set forth the reasons why I had to recuse
myself from any further contact or involvement in the Watergate
case and in which I designated him to substitute for me as the Attorney
General of the United States in anything further concerning the
W^atergate case.
I further requested that he communicate this decision of mine to —
in the contents of this memorandum to U.S. Attorney Titus, Silbert,
and to Acting Director Gray of the FBI. I signed it and I had Mr.
Petersen sign it indicating the time that he received it. It was impor-
tant for me to establish the time when I no longer had any connection
with the Watergate thing.
I then Xeroxed a copy of my handwritten statement and gave it to
him and I kept the original. And this is it— the top document that you
handed me is a typed document of my handwritten document.
Mr. Dorsex. Mr. Chairman, I request that the document identified
and summarized by Mr. Kleindienst be admitted into evidence.
Senator Ervix. It will be received and appropriately marked as an
exhibit and admitted in evidence as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 145.*]
Mr. DoRSEX. What does the word "recuse" mean in this context?
Mr. Kleixdiex'st. It is a technical word used by lawyers and par-
ticularly those in Government service which signifies that for one
reason or another, usually ethical reasons, that you withdrew from any
further participation in a particular matter.
♦See p. 3860.
ftfi-5>ftR n 7Q.
3574
Mr. DoRSEN. When did you first learn of the fact, which apparently
is a fact, that White House employees or persons working at the behest
of the AVliite House employees burglarized the office of the psychia-
trist of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg 'i
Mr. Kleindienst. 1 learned that amazing bit of information some
time in the morning of Wednesday, April 25, 1973.
Mr. DoRSEN. And how did you learn it i
Mr. Kleindienst. Mr. Petersen called me and said that he had a very
urgent matter and could he come up to my office. I do not know if I
had anybody in thei-e but if 1 did 1 got him out. He came up in a
minute and handed to me, without saying anything, a copy of a memo-
randum dated April 16 from Mr. Silbert to himself, a buck slip from
him to Mr. Kevm Marony, the Deputy Assistant Attorney beneral
for the Internal Security Section of the Criminal Division, and a
memo from a Mr. John Martin to Mr. Marony dated some time that
week. I do not recall the date of that. It would have been after April
16 and before April 25.
I read the two memos after I had recovered my composure and had
uttered some of my abrupt remarks. He and I then began to discuss the
dire serious nature of this amazing revelation. We discussed it for
some time. It had a — it had a fantastic potential effect upon the trial
of the EUsherg case. It had a — certainly a fantastic potential with
respect to the constitutional rights of Mr. Ellsberg, a defendant. And
I believe our conversation kicked around until just before noon.
At noon I had an appointment to go with Solicitor General Gris-
wold to the Department of Defense and be with him at a luncheon in
his honor by the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the U.S. Army.
I remember in the car outlining a hypothetical situation to Dean
Griswold as a means by which, as I did quite often to get the benefit
of his advice and his wisdom and his counsel.
Prior to the time I went to lunch, Henry and I had arrived with-
out difficulty and simultaneously at two conclusions. No. 1, that we
had to transmit this information immediately to Judge Byrne through
our chief prosecutor, Mr. Nissen, in Los Angeles, without delay, and
No. 2, that because of the explosive — just because of the nature of the
situation, that I should immediately contact the President and inform
him of this situation and also of what I was going to do.
Before lunch I then placed a call to the "White House. Usually when
you call and want to see the President they want to know what you
want to talk to liim about. I was very insistent in this instance to say
it was a matter of great urgency but I could not describe the reason
for the meeting.
When I got back from my lunch in honor of Dean Griswold, soon
thereafter I received a call from the W[\\i% House that if I could come
over right away, I could see the President. I did. I gave him— I had
tliose memos, those i)apers with me. I had some — I had a couple of
cases that, you know, I could discuss, you know, a little note pad, but
I did not give those citations. He, without iiesitation. one moments
hesitation, said that the course of action that T was going to pursue
was the only thing possible to be done. He caused the memos to be
Xeroxed. He kept a copy of the memos and T left.
The meeting did not last very long because there was no problem in
liis mind or my mind or anybody else's mind as to what we had to do
under the law.
3575
Mr. DoRSEN. Did you have an impression one way or the other as
to whether this was the first time that the President learned of these
events ?
Mr. Kleindiknst. I do not know if I (jathered that impression, Mr.
Dorsen. I know he was very upset about it. He was very upset about it.
Mr. DoRSEX. Did he say whether this was the first time he had heard
this?
Mr. Kleindienst. To my recollection he did not, and I — I just
would not know. The fact that he was so provoked, the language that
he used to describe the idiocy of the event, indicated to me that he had
not learned of it, you know, except just soon, but I do not believe I
asked him — it was not my habit to interrogate the President of the
United States and I do not — all I know is he was very, very provoked.
Mr. Dorsen. And was an announcement made later that day ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, either while I was at the President's Office
or when I came back the memos were teletyped to Mr. Nissen, my
chief prosecutor in Los Angeles, and Mr. Petersen then thereafter gave
him instructions as to what he w^as supposed to do. I believe his instruc-
tions were that he was to give them to Judge Byrne and then be guided
by Judge Byrne's decision.
Mr. DoRSEN. And am I correct that approximately 1 week later you
left the Department of Justice?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes. T^et me explain the reason for the delay
between April 16 and April 25. I think — one of the important things
that had to be determined by the Department of Justice before a dis-
closure of this information would be made to Judge Byrne was whether
or not the fact of the burglarization of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist was
known to anybody in the Department of Justice at any time before
or during Dr. Ellsberg's trial, because that would be one of the most
significant inquiries that the judge and the other side would have.
Indeed, if it could be made known that any of our attorneys or the
prosecutors were aware of this fact and did not disclose it, they would
have been guilty of contempt of an order of the judge and they would
also have been guilty of dereliction in their duty as a prosecutor of
the United States of America.
The Martin memorandum that was addressed to Mr. Marony clearly
and unequivocally set out the fact that nobody in the Department of
Justice had any advance knowledge of this before or during that
trial, and it was — I think Mr. Petersen was delaying bringing this
matter to my attention until that fact could be ascertained. So that in
no way was Mr. Ellsberg prejudiced, you know, in the trial of this
case as a result of either our knowledge of any of the contents and
I subsequently learned they did not get any information out of the
psychiatrist's office anyway.
Mr. Dorsen. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Kleindienst, as T understand it, Mr. Dean ca,me
to you shortly after the break-in and indicated that he was looking
into the matter for the White House or keeping abreast of the matter
for the "WTiite House.
Mr. Kleindienst. I think he was a little bit more specific than that,
ISIr. Thompson. The representation that he made to me and to Mr.
Petersen throughout was that he was doing this for the President of
3576
the United States and that he was reporting directly to the President.
He had been delegated by the President to be posted and informed
througout the course of tiie investigation to enable him to report di-
rectly to the President of the United States.
Mr. Thompson. Did you have any subsequent contacts with him that
would indicate whether or not he was in fact carrying on what he
described his job to be.
Mr. Klein DiENST. I had no reason to doubt that assertion by him
until I met with the President of the United States, Sunday after-
noon, April 15. • , 1
Mr. Thompson. Did he tell you on more than one occasion that he
was reporting directly to the President ?
Mr. Kleindienst. 1 would say just continuing.
Mr. Thompson. Was this a matter that concerned you somewhat?
Mr. Kleindienst. No.
Mr. Thompson. Exactly what was his role ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I assumed that that is what he would be doing
as counsel to the President.
Mr. Thompson. Did you consider this a proper role for a man in his
particular position as counsel to the President ?
Mr. Kleindienst. As counsel to the President?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kleindienst. 1 thought it was what he might have been there
for. I had nothing but the highest opinion and estimation of Mr. Dean
as a result of the II/2 years he served as a deputy to me when I was
Deputy xVttorney General and throughout this whole situation.
I have no reason to question that at all.
Mr. Thompson. You stated that he approached you concerning the
FBI files, and you in effect told him that if the President needed to see
a particular file, you would deliver that file yourself.
Mr. Kleindienst. Correct.
Mr. Thompson. And you did not know that Mr. Gray was giving
him files. I assume then, if we can reconstruct this matter, that he
approached INIr, Gray after he approached you.
Mx\ Kleindienst. I don't know.
Mr. Thompson. Did Mr. Gray ever tell you that he was giving files
to Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. In your relationship witli the Director of the FBI,
if lie was in fact giving files to Mr. Dean, would you consider this a
matter tliat he would properly report to you or discuss with you before
he would do so?
Mr. Kleindienst. I don't know. I think if Pat, who I — I have a lot
of sadness about some of the people involved in this, and I think Pat
occupies one part of my heait. I think if Pat Gray had been aware of
the fact that John Dean had made this request of me and I had said
no or if he had raised the question to me and I had said no, I am certain
that Pat Gray would have, you know, complied with my direction.
The only way I can explain it is that I think Pat justified it in his
own mind and I think tliere is a basis for justifying it in his own mind.
He had no i)ai'ticular reason to know how 1 felt about it.
So I guess it is just a subject matter that, when you are busy, as the
Director of the FBI and the Attorney General of the United States
3577
are, it just didn't come up. I know if he had told me that I would have
specifically directed him not to do so.
Mr. TiiOMPSOx. Mr. Kleindienst, when Mr. Ehrlichman called you
on April 14, did he discuss the fact that he was conducting or had con-
ducted his own investigation?
Mr. Kleixdienst. Yes, he did, and based upon revelations made
here, I assume that is one of the calls that was taped. On Saturday
afternoon, April 14, 1 was again out at the Burning Tree Club. I want
to tell the chairman that I only play ^olf on Saturday and I don't do
it on Sunday, and a lot of these meetmgs occurred on Saturday. So I
don't want you to think I am completely profligate.
Senator Ervin. The chairman had to observe that he, the chairman,
has never had a golf stick in his hand, he has had too many other things
to do.
Mr. Kleindienst. I feel sorry for you, Mr. Chairman.
Well anyway, back at Burning Tree : About 3 :30 in the afternoon, I
got a call from Jan Hruska, Miss Hruska, who is Mr. Ehrlichman's
secretary, and she said, "Mr. Kleindienst, Mr. Ehrlichman is going to
want you to come down to the White House and see him this after-
noon." And I said, ''Jan, that is all right with me if I can come down
right now because I am going to the White House correspondents' din-
ner and I have to be at a reception at 6 o'clock and if it is going to be
delayed I will not be able to come down." She said, '"I will call you right
back." A couple of minutes later she called me right back and said,
"Where can you be on the telephone at 5 :30?" and I said, "I will be at
home." She said, "Fine, Mr. Ehrlichman will call you at home at 5:30
p.m." I rushed home from Burning Tree, changed my clothes, and was
dressed, ready to go to be there by 6 p.m., so after I talked with Mr.
Ehrlichman I could make my 6 o'clock reception.
Mr. Ehrlichman started out, and again, I think he said, "General,"
but I am not sure, I would like to see the tape of it.
"General, I have been meaning to call you and give you a report but
I have been too busy and I haven't been able to do it, but I have got
a report to make to you," and I said, ''What is that, John?" He said,
"I have been conducting an investigation for the President with re-
spect to the possible involvement of "White House and campaign per-
sonnel in the Watergate situation for the past couple of weeks." And
I said, "John, you mean you have been interrogating people with
respect to their conduct?" And he said, "Yes, I have," and I think I
remember saying, "John, have you talked to anybody who indicated
to you that they might have been involved in criminal conduct," and
he said, "Yes, that is true." And I said, "John, you want to be very
careful; that kind of information should go to the FBI, and if you
don't turn it over to the Department of Justice you might find your-
self in a situation where you might be an accessory after the fact or
obstruction of justice."
My purpose was to try to help Mr. Ehrlichman out and give an indi-
cation of what the law was and what can happen if you do certain
things. He said, "Well, it doesn't really make any difference any more,"
and I said, "Why not, John," and he said, "Mr. Magruder has been
over here at the White House this afternoon and telling us that he
has been meetinrr with the U.S. Attorney's Office and giving them
testimony and evidence that would implicate people high and low in
the White House and in the campaign committee." I think I might
3578
have uttered some fantastic indication of surprise and then he abrupt-
ly terminated the call, as I remember it, by saying, "Have a good time
at the White House correspondents' dinner," and the phone went
down.
Needless to say, I didn't particularly enjoy the dinner. Some time
that evening I got hold of Mr. Petersen and told him that I had to
see him, and tliis is one aspect of this tliat I am not precise about.
My wife keeps telling me that 1 called Henry Petersen Hrst, and I
always believed tliat he called me. But in any event, I left the White
House correspondents' dinner early. I usually stay, it gives me an
opportunity to gig back members of the press after they have been
gigging me all year. And I have so many friends among them. In any
event, I decided to leave early. When I got home, I had a conversa-
tion with Henry, and he said, "It is important that we get together
with you tonight." That was around 12 o'clock. I live out in McLean.
He and Titus and Silbert were there by 1 o'clock in the morning.
Mr. Thompson. Did you ever have any other conversation with
Mr. Ehrlichman as to the findings of his investigation?
INIr. Kleindienst. No.
INIr. Thompson. Did you ever find out what he in fact reported to
the President?
Mr. Kleindienst. No. He opened the conversation up by saying
that I have been meaning to call you before now, which would indi-
cate that he had intended to do so but hadn't.
jNIr. Thompson. Your conversation with Titus, and Silbert, and
Petersen, was it about 4 hours, from 1 in the morning to about 5
o'clock ?
Mr. Ki>eindienst. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did they tell you the substance of what Magruder
and Dean had been telling them, telling the U.S. attorney ?
Ml-. Kleindienst. Yes, sii-, and I got some of my wife's personal
stationery and made rather copious notes of what they told me so I
could report it to the President the next day.
Ml-. Thompson. Can you recount to us briefly what they told you
at tliat time?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, they in effect summarized the testimony
or statements or purported statements of Magruder and Dean, which
in one way or another would im])licate Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaEue, them-
selves, INIr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Mardian, you name it.
It was a verv lengthy meeting. This is the first time since June 17. 1972,
that anybody had given me any credible evidence that any of these
people Avere involved in any way in either the coverup or that incident.
Two of those men are two of the closest friends I have had in my life
and I think one of the things I did that night, 1 wept. But it was a long
meeting, Mr. Thompson, and it was a comprehensive meeting and I
made com]nehensivo notes of what occurred.
Mr. Thompson. Do you recall if thev told you that IVIr. Dean at that
time had made allegations against the President concerning Presi-
dential coverup ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No.
Mr. Thompson. Thev did not ?
Mr. Kleindienst. They said Mr. Magruder was not looking for
immunity and Mr. Dean was bargaining with his attorney for immu-
3579
nity and that his statements to them were on a conditional basis
through his attorney predicated upon whether he got immunity or not.
JMr. TiioMPSox. You went to see the President on the 15th ?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. The same day.
Did you tell him substantially what thejr had told you ?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. To the best of my ability because I took the notes
tliat I had written on my wife's stationery and had them in my pocket
and I read from my notes.
Mr. TiioMPSOX. And what was the President's reaction ^
Mr. Kleixdiexst. He was dumbfounded. He was very upset, he
was — he was very upset.
Mr. TiiOMPsox. I believe you mentioned in an interview that he was
partially consoling you.
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Well, I was very upset about this, Mr. Thompson.
I don't think since my mother died when I was a young boy that I ever
liad an event that has consumed me emotionally with such sorrow and
sadness as this situation and he was very considerate of my feelings.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Kleindienst, did you have occasion at any time
after the break-in in 197-2 to talk to the President either in person or
by telephone about the Watergate matter?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. I didn't — I know I had a conversation with him
almost immediately afterward.
Mr. TiioMPSOx*. JDo you recall what was said in that conversation?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Well, what was said about that is, he said, Dick,
I told him what we were doing and he said, Dick, you have got to have
a thorough intensive complete investigation of this and I think that
that is when he first said let the chips fall where they will.
During the summer, we had the Rei)ublican Convention. I was gone
for approximately a month up in the Poconos and then the campaign
came along. I didn't have many conversations with the President dur-
ing that i)eriod of time, none that I can specifically recall. I had two
meetings with him up at Camp David after the election and after I
had returned from Europe. We didn't have to talk much about the
Watergate, I knew what I was doing, he knew what I was doing, but
the extent to which it was brought up was in the same context.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Kleindienst, I have no further questions.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervin. Did John Ehrlichman tell you he was bugging, I
use that word unadvisedly, rather recording your conversation with
him?
]Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir. If I ever felt he had I don't know if I
would have ever talked to him again.
Senator Ervin. You stated, as I understand your testimony, that
the President indicated by his conversation, when you reported what
you knew about the Watergate affair to him, that
Mr. Kleindienst. What meeting are you talking about, Mr. Chair-
man?
Senator Ervin. The 15th.
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Er\^n [continuing]. That he indicated by his reply that he
did not know— that he was ignorant about the Watergate affair?
3580
Mr. Klkindienst. Well, I would say that tho information, the
nature tliat T described with liiuj, would have come to his attention
conti'mi)oraneously. If Mr. Ehrlichman is talkinj^ to Magruder all
afternoon the day before I would just assume, althouoli lie didn't say,
that Mr. P^hrlichman would have made a report like this to the Presi-
dent. But I would <rather from my meetin<r; with the President that
lie had no such knowledge until immediately prior to my meetini?, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator KiniN. Now, do you ajiree with me that of all of the human
beings on the face of the Karth that the one who knows most about
this is the President himself, that is, about the President's state of
knowledge?
INfr. Klktndienst. You mean the one person who most — knows most
about tliis situation?
Senator Ehvin. The one who knows more about what the President's
state of knowledge was between June 17, 1072, and April 15, 197?), is
tho President himself?
Ml-. Kt>ktni)Ienst. Well, Mr. Chairman, T would agree that the
l^residenl knows more about what he knows than I know what he
knows.
Senator Ervtn. That is what T meant.
In July, sometime between July 7 and August 0, T believe you said,
John Elirlichman called Henry Petersen and entered a protest that
the prosecuting attorneys were harassing Secretary Stans because
they Avei'e calling upon him to perform an obligation which devolves
u])on all citizens of the TTnited States.
Mr. Klkixdienst. That is essentially it. T think Mr. Petersen will
be a better witness as to the consideration between Mr. Ehrlichman.
My attention really Avasn't so much consmned with what Ehrlichman
said to Petei-sen and Pet(M-sen said to Ehrlichman. I was interested
in ^Iv. Ehrlichman not giving directions to people in my department.
Senator EmiN. Yes.
Here Avas a person that had been delegated by the President with
ti-emendous gov<M'mnental ]iower, John Ehilichnian, uiidertakinir to
dictati^ to the Department of Justice how witnesses should be treated?
"Sir. Keetnoiexst. Yes. I tliink Mr. Elirliclimnn made a mistake
on (hat; he never did it again and he |)robably wishes he hadn't
done it.
Senator Eratx. As I understand from vour testimonv — if 1 am
wi'ong you let me know — you agree that Assistant Attornev Genei-al
Pelei'sen could excuse Stans from going before the gi-aiul jurv and let
him testifv bv deposition in some private offices or public offices apart
fi'om the gi'and jui'v?
Afr. KEEixniExsr. INfr. Peteison made that recommendation to me
and T will take the full responsibilitv for that. Senator Ervin.
Senatoi- Eiaix. Well, that troubles me a little bit because of my con-
viction that all men. regardless of whether they are princes or peasants
oi- former Cabinet members and just ordinai-y Amei'icans, ought to be
treated equal before the law.
Tt also gives me misgivings for another reason. T'^ndei- the statute
we liave gi-and juries couijKised of anvwliei'e fi'om IG to -I'^ men. and it
is a part of th(> judicial process that they shall have an opportunity to
cross-examine a witness.
3581
Mr. Kleixdienst. May I make a point right there, please ? I think
one of the things Mr. Petersen said to me when we discussed this thing
was that if the grand jury, when they received his w'ritten testimony,
had any reason for waiiting to interrogate Mr. Stans directly, that then
Mr, Stans would be required to go before the grand jury.
Senator P^rvix. Do you not agree with me that a grand juror could
cross-examine Mr. Stans better than he could a piece of paper or
words on it ?
Mr. Kleindiexst. I think, and I am not trying to rationalize or
debate the matter with you, Mr. Chairman, you take the situation in
the context I found it ; there was no reason to suspect Mr. Stans of
illegal conduct. I know that in tliis administration with, say, very
important Democratic officials, they had had a procedure like this, but
I think now with the hindsight that we are able to exercise, maybe 1
would have done something clill'erent.
Senator Ervix. I think that when John McCormick w^as excused
from going before the grand jury that was also an affront to justice.
Mr. Kleixdiexst. I am not prepared to dispute that. Senator. That
is why I personally will take the responsibility for that.
Senator Ervix. I am not saying anything, I am not insinuating there
is anything more than error of judgment. I would like to make that
plain.
Mr. Kleixdiexst. I want to make it clear here I am not trying to
impose responsibility for that decision on anybody else but myself.
Senator Ervix. And I might confess that I have an overriding sense
of curiosity as to what Secretary Stans stated in his deposition. I have
asked for copies of the deposition but it appears not to be forthcoming.
Mr. Kleixdiexst. There is another law. I think. Senator Ervin, that
precludes or prohibits the disclosure of testimony before a grand jury
to anybody.
Senator Ervix. Yes. I am not asking for testimony before the grand
jury. I am asking for the testimony taken before the prosecutor. That
is quite a different situation.
Mr. Kleixdie^^st. That was testimony taken for the purpose of the
grand jury and it was given to the grand jury.
Senator Ervin. But I know of no law which exempts testimony
taken before prosecutors. It is only testimony taken before grand
juries. I do not want what was taken before the grand jury, I want
what was taken before the prosecutors.
Now this troubles me not only from the fact that Secretary Stans,
notwithstanding the fact I think Presidents and Secretaries have feel-
ings like the rest of us and are entitled to no special consideration, but
it also troubles me.
I will just make one other observation, rather, a question. This
causes me misgivings because Secretary Stans testified before this
committee that the treasurei- of his committee disbursed in cash thou-
sands of dollars to Liddy, that his treasurer remonstrated about the
unwisdom of disbursing this money, and that, in spite of his remarks,
that he went and talked to Mitchell about it and that it is quite possible
that if Stans had gone before the grand jury, some inquisitive grand
juror might have broken this whole story in July or August 1972 and
this Nation might have been spared the agony it has gone through since.
3582
Do you know whether Stan's attorneys were given a copy of the
deposition ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, I do not, sir.
Senator Ervin. I appreciate your commendation of the FBI investi-
gation. A lot of innocent things sometimes impede an investigation.
For example, this committee has information to the effect that the only
question asked of Sloan, who had disbursed thousands of dollars of
campaign funds in cash, was whether Baldwin, the man who bugged
the Watergate from the Howard Johnson Motel, was on the committee
payroll.
Mr. Kleindienst. I find that hard to — I am not saying that that is
true — not true, but you know, until Judge Sirica entered an order
which compelled me and other officers of the Department of Justice
from discussing this thing, and because of the political nature of it
and certainly to — it was with great pride that I was publicly saying
all over the 'United States the nature of our investigation. 1 thhik I
referred to the fact that as of that time, the middle of the summer,
before they went to the grand jury, 1-1,00() man-hours, 1,700 witnesses,
333 agents, 53 out of 59 field offices, some witnesses interrogated 2 and
3 times, practically everybody at the campaign committee, people at
the White House, and I thought, that was a remarkable achievement
of the FBI and I think the FBI is a great institution.
Senator Ervin. Well, I do, too, but I think that maybe like Homer
sometimes, they might nod just a little Dit.
Mr. Kleindienst. Well
Senator Ervin. I know one thing
Mr. Kleindienst. They are human I ings, too.
Senator Ervin. From my long experience in the practice of law,
that if you do not ask the right questions you do not get the right
answers.
Mr. Kleindienst. But again, I think. Senator, and I am not saying
this to self-serve myself, but for the career people of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in a very, very unusual situation, I have
nothing but pride and admiration for their professionalism and their
constancy and as I say, giving the Congress its due, giving the press
its due, giving tlie judiciary and Judge Sirica its due, I am sad to
say that not enough has been given to the career people of my De-
partment and the FBI for what they did in this situation. And I
want to be here to make tliat testimony for them.
Senator ER^aN. Yes. Well, I appreciate your loyalty to them and
I trust they are deserving of it.
We do have testimony before this committee from Mr. Sloan that
he told some of the prosecuting attorneys about the disbursement of
this money to Liddy and also about the fact that Magruder had at-
tempted to persuade him to commit perjui-y rather than reveal the
truth, and that he did that before the indictments were returned.
Mr. Kleindienst. I did not know that.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Ehrlichman, who expressed an opinion on
many points, said that the reason that they did that, he thought, was
because they decided that they would trv the case in their own minds
and they decided that Magruder was telling the truth and Sloan, was
not.
3583
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, you know, when you have a — in our system
of justice, as you know, Senator Ervin, you have to have evidence to
indict somebody. We do not put people on the rack and extract the
truth out of them. We do not crush their fingernails or beat them
over the head. And prosecutors, if they are responsible, they should
not, it seems to me, on mere allegation or suspicion, seek
Senator Erven. Well, I am not.
Mr. Kleindienst [continuing]. Seek the indictment of somebody
without evidence.
Senator Ervin. I am just pointing out the fact that these facts did
exist. I do not avert that human errors of judgment sometimes impede
us from reaching a conclusion.
Mr. Kleindienst. Sure. Sure.
Senator Ervin. And I do not want you to think that any questions
I have asked you or any observations I have made reflect or are in-
tended to reflect in any way on you. My contacts with you have im-
pressed me with the fact that you are a rather forthright individual
and I think that this whole thing might have been avoided if people,
some other people in the Government emulated your example when
you told John Ehrlichman and John Dean there were certain things
you would not permit to be done.
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, T am a human being and I make my mis-
takes and have my fallibilities. Senator Ervin.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Kleindienst, I would reiterate what the chairman has just said.
As a matter of fact, I had planned to call attention to what I believe to
be a series of facts and circumstances to which you have testified or
about which this committee has taken proof from other witnesses that
seem impressive to me in the context of the questions I am about to
ask you.
It appears that when on June 17, 1972, you were approached on
trying to get these Watergate burglars out of jail, you in fact said no,
they are going to be treated like everybody else. Is that essentially
correct ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And when John Dean asked for FBI files, you in
effect said if the President wants FBI files, let the President ask, but
you are not going to get them, is that right ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir ; or anybody else.
Senator Baker. And when John Ehrlichman called your people
and complained and then called you to complain about the way cer-
tain matters were being handled, you told John Ehrlichman, don't
you talk to my people any more. If you want to talk, talk to me. Is
that essentially correct?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And when you received information about the
Ellsberg break-in, you found it to be of extraordinary importance
and vou went to the President and talked to him about it.
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. T^^en on April 15, 1978, the U.S. Attornev's Office
and others came to you at the late hours of the ni^^ht and laid out a
detailed case of extraordinary involvement by White House officials
3584
and the Committee To Re- Elect officials, apparently you promptly
set up a meetino; with the President; is that right?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And you told the President about it.
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And when you told the President about it, you
wrote a note on the spot virtually saying that because of my personal
and professional relationship with some of the people that may be
charged with crimes, mentioning John Mitchell and others, that I
recuse myself and require, Petersen, that you assume these responsibili-
ties and act as Attorney General ; is that right ?
INIr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Well, on that basis, Mr. Kleindienst, I join in the
chairman's statement. 1 think if more people had acted in that way
that the great trauma that we know as Watergate might A^ery well not
have happened or not continued, at least not into the coverup phase.
Now, let me move on, then, to two or three other things. The chair-
man and I joust from time to time about that grand jury appeai'ance
and at the time the matter first came up I confess I did not know tliere
was legal precedent for taking proof outside the presence of the grand
jury and that proof — that precedent was brought to my attention. So
as the chairman properly says, it is not illegal to take depositions and
submit them to the grand jui'y. It then becomes just a matter of judg-
ment as distinguished from illegality.
I still confess I am surprised at that procedure and that jirecedent
for it exists through the appellate courts. But, nevertheless, I believe
you have now indicated that in hindsight, and we are blessed with
hindsight in this hearing, that in hindsight it might have been better
to do it another way.
Let me ask
Mr. Kleindienst. That is one of the difficulties of being a prose-
cutor. You know, we have facts and circumstances at the time and
then in a proceeding such as this, and I think the chairman knows
that I am in hearty appro\al of these proceedings, or, let us say, a
special prosecutor can come back in and look over your shoulder and
say, now with all tlie facts before us, you know, why did you use such
bad judgment and did what you did ? That is the difficulty of being
Henry Petersen or Dick Kleindienst or P^arl Silbert, you know.
Senator Baker. That is the penalty for being a U.S. Senator, too.
You look back and say why did I vote the way I did on a particular
measure sometimes ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I raised that question in my mind. [Laughter.]
Senator Baker. Well, I have raised that question in my mind about
the Justice Department a few times. I guess we are about even. But
what I am really going to get into next will be the final preamble to
the rather more detailed — rather more philosophical inquiry. I would
like to know in greater detail about the conversation Mr. Thompson
asked you about with the President about 1 o'clock in the afternoon on
April 15, 1973.
By the way, I assume that conversation was taped if it was in the
EOB office. You knew those conversations were being taped ?
Mr. Kleindienst, No, no, I did not.
Senator Baker. Have you ever asked for a copy of that tape ?
3585
Mr. Kleixdienst. Well, I have written a letter to Mr. Wilson, the
attorney for Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, making a demand
upon them to furnish me copies of any tapes they have in their posses-
sion and I have likewise written a letter to Mr. Garment to request
copies of any tapes that they have in their possession between me, Mr.
Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Baker. Have you had a reply to that?
Mr. Kleixdienst. No, sir; I have not.
Senator Baker. Would you like to join us in a lawsuit? [Laughter.]
No, I withdraw that question.
Could you — you did refer to notes, rather extensive notes that you
took. Are those notes in your possession ?
Mr. Kleixdienst. No, sir, they are not, and I have tried to find them.
For a hard-nosed 50-year-old geezer like myself, I was in kind of a
state of shock from April 15 to April 29 and I don't know what
happened to them. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. All right.
Well, let's try to reconstruct it for a little while and I hope some-
body is keeping time on me because I don't want to run over 10
minutes.
Rather than go through a detail twice, that is, when you took notes,
the second time when you told the President, let's talk about what you
told the President.
Mr. Kleixdienst. Well, I told him what I had written down on my
notes.
Senator Baker, All right. What was
JSIr. Kleindiex'^st. I took copious notes.
Senator Baker. 'What was that ?
Mr. Kleixdienst. Well, it was the summary of the statements made
to me primarily by Mr. Silbert, what Mr. Magruder had been telling
the prosecutors for a week and what INIr. Dean had been telling them
for a week, and it was wath respect to particular individuals. The
primary thrust of it was the efforts made by many to — you used the
term "coverup" — to cover up, you know, and to obstruct the FBI in-
vestigation of the Watergate incident during the summer. It described
these meetings from IMagruder's point of view with ]\Ir. Mitchell, the
three meetings. It — ]\Ir. Dean apparently was telling them informa-
tion and conduct by him that w^as completely inconsistent with every-
thing that IVIr. Dean was telling me from June 17 up until, you know,
shortly before April 14.
I don't pretend to recall
Senator Baker, There are two or three points.
Let me try to reduce it to that. The information you received from
the prosecutors on the early morning of April 15, 1973
Mr, Kleixdiex^st, Yes, sir.
Senator Baker fcontinuing], Essentiallv was a repeat of the Ma-
gruder and Dean testimony before the U,S, Attorney for the grand
jury,
Mr, Ki^fjxdienst. That is all it was.
Senator Baker, All right.
And in that I assume from the testimonv w^e have received from
Magruder and Dean they were saying in effect that thev didn't know
about it or — well, let me think now. Dean I guess would have said he
3586
didn't know about it beforehand tind beg:an to suspect afterward and
told the President or rather assumed that the President knew some-
thing in September 1972. 1 am thinking of the Dean testimony now.
Mr. Kleindienst. No.
Senator Baker. Did that ever come out ?
Mr. Kleixdienst. To tlie best of my recollection the information
given to me by Mr. Silbert did not and'the notes I took did not in any
way implicate the President of the T'nited States.
Senator I^aker. Did you mention tlie September meeting?
Mr. Kleindienst. I can't recall any si)ecific dates, Senatoi- Baker.
Senator Baker. If you had to judge would you say that there was
any part of that conversation that said that the President knew or had
reason to know" of the
Mr. Kleindienst. Nothing.
Senator Baker [continuing]. Alleged coverup prior to March 1973 ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Nothing was said to me that night that would
implicate the President of the United States, to my recollection.
Senator Baker. We have evidence that Mr. Dean talked to the Presi-
dent in March. Now obviously the President knew something. I am
not quite sure what Mr. Dean told the President. But we have his
testimony before us.
Mr. Kleindienst. I don't know either. Mr. Petersen I understand is
going to be called to testify. He has. had quite a traumatic experience
in this, too. I don't think as intense as mine. He has a very good mem-
ory and recollection and 1 think I would really rely or be w illing to
rely more on Henry's recollection of the information he got before
that meeting and what they gave me that night.
Senator Baker. All right.
Let's go to the meeting with the President, then, if we depend on
Mr. Petei-sen to tell us what ho told you and elaborate that subject
matter furtlier with that witness.
Mr. Kleindienst. All right.
Senator Baker. I must ask you, Mr. Kleindienst, a little more about
the President's reaction. Particularly, did he give the appearance of a
man who received the impression the first time or one wiio had some
familiarity with the subject matter.
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, he gave me the impression of a person
who either received it from me the first time or at least contemporane-
ously. The reason why I i)ut that (jualification on it is as a result of
Mr. Ehrlichman's telephone call to me the evening before at 5:30,
and I would guess, and I am now speculating that based upon — you
know the proximity of Mr. Ehrlichman to the President that if Ma-
gruder was up there in the A^Hiite House Saturday afternoon telling
them what he had been tellinof the TT.S. Attorney's Office, I have just
got to believe that Mr. Ehrlichman called up the President and said
T have just talked to Magruder and I have got some very interesting
information for you. But I know the President's attitude in response
to the information that I gave him was such that it was at least of a
contemporaneous knowledge and one of — ^well, he w^as just very upset
about it and he w^as very concerned about it and he was very hurt
by it and he was very troubled by it.
Senator Baker. Did he make any statements that he had heard
this from Dean before or hadn't or did he make any statements, "This
3587
is the lirst time I ever heard this," or any statements to the effect that,
''1 had wondered about it, but when you tell me, JDick, i believe it" 'i
I am just trying to fantasize.
Mr. Kleindienst. Not tliat I recall, Senator. And I was very upset
that day. I know John Mitchell is one of the best friends I have
ever had. 1 love him. i admire him. Ajid 1 just — it just broke my heart
that his name was even mentioned in this thing and the President
was spending part of his time to help me with a personal situation.
But 1 do not recall the President said anything like that.
Senator Baker. Well, I guess the summation, then, of your recol-
lection is that the President gave the impression of receiving the in-
formation for the first time or having received much of the informa-
tion shortly before your meeting with him.
Mr. Kleindienst. Shortly before. Yes, sir. That is how I would
interpret his conduct, what he said, his demeanor, and his attitude.
Senator Baker. And you have requested tapes of — copies of tapes
or opportunity to listen to
Mr. Kleindienst. I have not requested copies of tapes of meetings
I have had with the President of the United States. I have requested
copies of tapes with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Baker. I believe I will yield at this point, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Kleindienst, why did you resign as Attorney
General of the United States ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Weil, it was just a combination of events. Senator
Talmadge. I had to recuse myself on the morning, the afternoon of
April 15. I suppose the most pressing, important, significant matter
before the Department of Justice as of that date was this Watergate
situation, wliich meant that I as the Attorney General could not act
as tlie Attorney General in our most significant matter.
Then came the Ellsberg psychiatrist burglary. Then came the situa-
tion with respect to ]\Ir. Gray and the documents that he received
and subsequently destroyed.
By the time those events had unfolded in my life, I really had ar-
rived at the conclusion in my own mind that I could no longer func-
tion as the Attorney General of the United States. And here I am back
at Burning Tree again. But that weekend, prior to April 29 they had
a member-member golf tournament and I remember talking to four
people out there whose judgment I respect a great deal, prior to Sunday
morning, and told them of my decision. Three agreed with it and one
disagreed, the one being one of my Senators from Arizona. I then had
determined my own mind on the following day, Monday, to tell the
President that T had to leave the office of Attorney General. It was an
impossible situation for me, Senator, and then around noon of that
day I got a call from the White House the President wanted to see me
and I remember saying to myself and to them, two of these gentlemen,
that I am glad that I am going to be able to see the President today,
I didn't know what he wanted to see me about and I would be able to
give him my decision, and then that was the Sunday when he dis-
cussed with me the resignation of Mr. Haldeman and ISIr. Ehrlichman
and Mr. Dean and the anpointment of Attorney General Richardson.
Senator Talmadge. Would it be fair then to summarize your resig-
nation by sayinir you had a feeling of unhappiness and frustration
about the turn of events ?
3588
Mr. Kleindienst. Then also, Senator Talmadge, you can't I think,
from the standpoint of our fellow citizens, maintain an appearance
that justice is being evenly and impartially administered when you
have a person such as I who is in the office, even though I recused
myself, and been involved in the investigation and the criminal justice
process witli respect to men like Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Mardian, in
the proximity that T had with them, and have names like Mr. Halde-
man, and ^Mr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Dean, Mr. LaRue, and other men
with whom T had had a very close intimate relationship for some 414
years, it just seemed to me that from the standpoint of the adminis-
tration of criminal justice in the Ignited States that Kichard Klein-
dienst should 110 longer be the Attorney (lieneral and it was ihe saddest
realization I liave ever had to make in my life.
Senator Talmaix;e. Tliere is one other thing 'I don't understand and
Senator Baker tourlied on it. You indicated in your conversations with
the President of the United States when you informed him of events
that you had discovered from the Assistant Attorney General of the
United States' testimony in the grand jury room, an element of sui'-
prise by the President of the United States and perliaps a previous lack
of knowledge of those events, yet the President's statement himself
that he issued indicated staitling new information was discovered on
March 21. Now your convei'sation with the President was some 3 weeks
subsequent thereto. Appai-ently the President had had previous star-
tling information. Do you have any idea what that was ?
Mr. Ki.EiNDiExsT. No, sir.
Senator Talmadoe, Would you testify again that to the best of your
knowledge, of course, you are a skilled lawyer, that the President at
this time he talked with you indicated no previous knowledge what-
ever of that subject matter?
Mr. Kleixdiknst. Senator, he might have said something to me
going back to March 21. I have no recollection of it. And I don't think
that I would be a reliable ])erson with respect to precise recollection
on the events that occurred on April 15. I was up all night, I went to
bed at 5 a.m.. didn't get any sleep, T got up out of bed at 8 :30 a.m.,
and I don't think I would trust myself as, you know, a precise witness
on the events of that day.
Senator Taemad(;e. There is one other thing you may want to com-
ment on and that is this famous taped convei-sation that Ehrlichman
made of you, and you are quoted in there as "Sirica is really lousing
this thing up.'' What did you mean by that ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I had to call Senator Weicker and Judge Sirica
the day after this amazing document hit the streets, and Judge Sirica
is one of the fine Federal judges in the Ignited States. He and I are
close pei'sonal friends. I have nothing but the highest estimation for
him. Also, as a lawyer. Senator Talmadge, I have never publicly said
a critical or derogatory thing about a judge in my life.
What I meant by that statement was that as a result of the sentencing
procedures of Judge Sirica, and I think that lawyers could argue, you
know, as to the propriety of it, and there is a means by which you test
that out in an apjKvil, not in public statements. It prevented us fmm
getting Liddy, Hunt and tlie otliei- five back befoi*e a grand jury after
their conviction and sentencing immediately to interrogate them under
immunity to find out what they knew. They did not testify at their own
3589
trials and it is a standard procedure that the Department of Justice,
Senator Tahnadge, as your prosecutors everywhere, if you have a
conspiracy-type situation when you liave convicted a person or persons
and they are sentenced, then you bring them back before a grand jury,
put them under oath and give them immunity and say now tell us
everything you know^, and if they refuse to do so they can be punished
for contempt. That is what we wanted to do. Judge Sirica as a result
of his sentencing procedures, and I know Judge Sirica believes firmly
because he is a firm believer, that he was doing the right thing. It just
did not suit our purposes at the Department of Justice, we wanted to
get at Liddy and Hunt and the rest of them immediately.
Senator Talmadge. One final thing. I believe you testified that you
had written Mr. Garment, counsel to the President, requesting copies
of the tapes Mr. Ehrlichman made of your conversation ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmaixje. Has your view of executive privilege changed
since you testified before congressional committees on April 10, 1973 ?
Mr. Kleindienst. From the standpoint of the law and the Con-
stitution, my opinions as a lawyer have not changed. And I was
rather flattered that Attorney General Richardson, who I think is
a much better lawyer than I, came up with essentially the same
opinions from the standpoint of policy, and I never got around to my
second round, Senator Talmadge. My first testimony was as a lawyer
talking about the Constitution and then I was prepared the next week
to go up there on behalf of the administration and discuss the policy
with respect to executive privilege.
As a matter of constitutional concept it is exactly what it was then
in the standpoint of policy, I think executive privilege should be used
very sparingly as it has been throughout history.
Senator Talmadge. You do not believe the evidence of a coverup of
a crime would come under the purview of executive privilege, do you ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Senator Talmadge, if the President of the United
States wants to exercise, based upon the doctrine of the separation of
powers, a privilege not to give to the judiciary or to the Congress of
the United States any document in his possession, I think under the
Constitution that is his constitutional right.
Senator Talmadge. Even if it is evidence of a crime not related
in any way whatever to the performance of his duty and office?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir; that is my opinion. I said that several
months ago.
Senator Talmadge. Did you not write a memorandum different from
that at one time? I thought T had read it on one occasion.
Mr. Kleindienst. Gee, if I did
Senator Talmadge. I thought I saw a memorandum that you stated
on one occasion, where, if the President could prevent a witness from
appearing before a committee, that he could protect all of the several
million Federal employees in the performance of their duty.
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, the only memorandum I know I wrote was
the testimony that T gave before the U.S. Senate and that was pre-
pared testimony that I read. T am not familiar with any other memo-
randum that I wrote mvself. Senator Talmadge, and that document
is before the U.S. Senate, that document and my testimony.
3590
Senator Talmadge. And you would state again that no matter how
heinous the crime may be, the evidence of that is in the President's
possession, and in no way related whatever to the performance of a
governmental duty, it would still come under the doctrine of executive
privilege ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, under my understanding of the Constitu-
tion and the law, and incidentally, there are not any cases in this area.
1 think the last case in the Supreme Court was around the year 1830
having to do with a post office contract. There just is not any literature
on the subject matter and the reason why there is not is that this
throughout the decades has been a political matter, you know.
Senator Talmadge, So your conclusion is based on a judgment rather
than judicial interpretation?
Mr. Kleindienst. My understanding of an interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States, a document that I revere very much.
Senator Talmadge. And I am certain that you do, but I do not see
how a government can function if we take the position that each of
the three separate branches of government are a government unto
themselves and not subject to the system of checks and balances that
must be applied to all.
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, I think as a result of events and circum-
stances and what I read in the newspaper, that question might soon be
answered for us by the judiciary.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you very much, Mr. Kleindienst. I have
no further questions.
Mr. Kleindienst. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurnet. Mr. Kleindienst, some of the people in the White
House who have been before us as witnesses were not too happy about
the appointment of this committee. As a matter of fact, they were
rather concerned and nervous about it. You had a reaction. What
was your reaction?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, I think my reaction was this. I think under
our Constitution with its great protections for indixiduals who are
accused of crimes, that, first, you should prosecute somebody under
the law so that they are guaranteed tlieir rights under the Constitu-
tion and they can get a fair trial, and I think — I am now an individual,
I am not an officer- of the United States, and many might disagree
with my opinion — T think I would have preferred to have permitted
tlie Deiiartnient of Justice to go ahead and prosecute each based upon
the evidence and then I have always said that there is an appropriate
forum for the Congress of the United States to publicly ero in and
examine the conduct of public officials. Now it is said that the public's
right to know is more important than whether or not two or three
people are prosecuted. My personal feeling is that the public's right
to know should not be paramount to safeguards specificallv inserted
in the Constitution of the TTnited States for the protection of an:
individual. "Because the essence of our Constitution is that it seeks to.
protect individuals and not society, you know. T guess we can all i
debate this.
T have never uttered a word in mv life that the Congress of the
United States or Senate of the United States should not ever be vigi-
359.1
lant and available to examine the conduct of public officials in the
exercise of their public trust.
Senator Gurney. Well, that was my recollection, setting the timing
aside of when w^e w'ould hear them and when the prosecutors would
examine and prosecute. As I recall, you publicly stated this was prob-
ably a good forum and a healthy thing for the political side of the
country
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes.
Senator Gurney [continuing]. To inform the public.
Mr. Kleixdienst. We are consumed now, it seems to me, with the
negative aspect of Watergate and very few people, it seems to me, at a
time to w^rite about the triumphs of this situation. The triumphs are
many. It proves to us that the institutions of freedom in this country
are vital and that they are at work. People say that w^e don't have free-
dom of the press. We have the most free press in the world. Our crimi-
nal justice system works, our judiciary works, the Congress works, and
then also out of all of this, and I have been a citizen politician for
many years, I think as a result of these tragic revelations that volun-
tarily politicians and officeholders in this country for decades are
going to have imposed upon them a higher standard of conduct than
they have had before. I don't think any candidate running for any high
office in this country is ever again going to want to say you are involved
in a Watergate situation. You can't legislate morality, you can't legis-
late men's hearts, and I think that really the decades ahead for my chil-
dren, my grandchildren, is going to show and demonstrate a much
higher level of conduct in American politics and that is a great
achievement.
Senator Gurney. Well, I couldn't agree with you more. I think you
are absolutely right. I think it will have a ventilating and a cleansing
effect, and I think politics and government will be the better for it.
Mr. Kleindienst. Some people have despair, but our country is so
great and so strong that the idiocy of a few people, you know, can't
shake the foundations of this great society and this great democracy.
Senator Gurney. On this same subject of good and bad, put it that
way, I w^ould like to examine into this FBI thing a little more because
I think the FBI has been a great institution in this country.
Mr. Kleindienst. And still is.
Senator Gurney. And still is. And from the evidence and testimony
I have heard, I think they did a pretty thorough job, but I would like
to examine one or two little aspects of perhaps why they weren't able
to come a little closer to finding out some of the broader implications.
For one thing, when FBI people interview^, they do it on a voluntary
basis, don't they, and they can't swear a witness, they simply go and
interview him ?
Mr. Kleindienst. And also if somebody is a punitive defendant, he
has the right to take the fifth amendment and not talk to them.
Senator Gubney, He doesn't have to meet with them if he doesn't
want?
Mr. Kleindienst. Also, people lie to the FBI. Unless you have some
evidence brought forth by somebody else, because of our protection
of due process, the FBI doesn't get the guy, slam him against the wall,
and crack him between the teeth and say, "Tell me the truth." We
prohibit that kind of interrogation.
3592
Senator Gurney. The problem, 1 guess, was that there was a coverup
and people weren't advancing information.
]\Ir. Kleindienst. I have arrived at that conclusion, Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. I think that is what we found here in these many
weeks.
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. One question on that meeting with the President.
T am not sure that it was covered.
Mr. Kleindienst. Wliat meeting is that ?
Senator Gurney. This is the April 15, Sunday meeting.
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Did the President ever — did he tell you in the
meeting what he had been advised previously by John Dean?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir ; not to my recollection.
Senator Gurney. That was not discussed ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No. I was more interested in telling him what I
loiew and then dealing with the consequences of that knowledge on
my part, my own deep feelings and what to do next. The decision to —
my recommendation to — have Henry Petersen act in my place and
stead — getting Heniy — Henry was working on his boat and came
into his first meeting with the President with tennis shoes and a dirty
T-shirt, very embarrassed — going back to my Department— executing
a document by which I recused myself, and then going home.
Senator Gurney. Your logs show a number of phone calls and
meetings during this period of time from the June 17 break-in until,
well, through almost your resignation, phone calls with Colson, for
example. Did those cover Watergate at all ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I never recall ever talking about Watergate with
Mr. Colson.
Senator Gurney. There are also a number of telephone conversa-
tions with Mr. LaRue. Did you ever discuss Watergate with him?
Mr. Kleindienst. Never.
Senator Gurney. And also one or two with Haldeman. Did you
discuss Watergate with him ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Never.
Senator Gurney. There were a few phone calls with Mr. Krogh.
What were thev the subject of?
Mr. Kleindienst, I think that was brought to mv attention bv Mr.
Haire of your committee yesterdav, ^hat I had some conversations
with Mr. Krogh on Mondav the dav before the general election. I think
you will also see on that dav there must have been 60 or 70 calls, and
I had meetings witl\ Mr. Colburn who was Director of the U.S. Mar-
shal Service and Chief Wilson of the Metropolitan District Police.
Those conversations had to be with respect to problems involving
demonstrators in anticipation of the election returns the next day.
Senator Gurney. They had
Mr. Kleindienst. Mr. Kro.q-h, one of his assimiments was to coordi-
nate on behalf of tlie Wiite House, District of Columbia, and Depaii"-
ment of Justice in tliis situation ; nothing with respect to this situation.
Dr. Ellsberg, or anvthing else. I never heard of the so-called Plumbers
until it became publicly revealed.
3593
Senator Gurney. Did the President at any time during all of this
period over time instruct you to go soft or slow upon this FBI
investigation ?
Mr. Kleindiexst. Never at any time.
Senator Gurxey. One thing about these affaire is that some people
get brushed with tar when I don't think that is probably a fair thing.
I must say as far as you are concerned, I think this is a good time to
bring it out, that when you departed you were lumped with Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, and Dean. I thought this was most unfortunate myself
because actually you were not in their class, I guess we might put it
that way, in any respect.
Do you want to comment on that ?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Xo, the President asked me whether I would con-
sent to have my name mentioned that following night. I did, and I
would prefer not to make any other comment about it.
Senator Gurxey. But in any event, your resignation was your own
decision, and you were the one who suggested to the President that
you resign ?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurxey. Thank you, that is all.
Senator Ervix. Senator Inouye ?
Senator Ixouye. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kleindienst, in response to a question relating to the famous
conversation you had with Mr. Ehrlichman which was electronically
recorded, I believe you said that you just couldn't find the appropriate
words to describe this, but you used two words, that it was reprehensi-
ble and unethical.
Now, was it reprehensible because Mr. Ehrlichman could make self-
serving statements, whereas you, not knowing that this was being
recorded, would make statements publicly
Mr. Kleixdiexst. I think my attitude is a little more subjective than
that. Senator. I have never taped a telephone call in my life. I have
never had it transcribed or written down.
I think on a couple of occasions since I w^as in the Department,
because of an unusual call I had my secretary make notes on another
line. That was a very unusual situation.
But when you are dealing in good faith with people who you regard
with trust and confidence, who are with you discharging a mutual
obligation and undertaking, in this case on behalf of the President of
the United States, to me it is the grossest breach of good faith imagin-
able for one person to make a tape recording of that conversation
without telling the other person. If I had suspected that INIr. Ehrlich-
man was doing that without telling me I would never speak to him
again.
Senator Ixouye. On April 15, at about 1 p.m., you have testified
that you had a meeting with the President to advise him of the con-
versation you had at your home early that morning.
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Yes, sir.
Senator Ix^ouye. Where was this meeting held ?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. In my home.
Senator Ixouye. I mean with the President.
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Oh, in his office in the Executive Office Building.
3594
Senator Inoute. Were you aware that this office was electronically
wired to tape your conversation?
Mr. Kleindienst, No.
Senator Inouye. You didn't consider that reprehensible?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, if I was ever president of a chamber of
commerce I wouldn't do it. I will never be President of the United
States. I don't like it and I was surprised to learn of it and I think I
was in Europe a couple of weeks ago when I heard of it and I jjave one
of my characteristic attitudinal responses. I don't personally like it
but i do differentiate between a President and somebody like Mr.
Ehrlichman talking to me, both of us who are working on behalf of
the President when our business was for the President of the United
States.
Senator Inoute. Then you had another conversation later that
month at wliich time you advised the President of the break-in in Dr.
Fielding's office. Wliere was this meeting held ?
Mr. Kleindienst. That was likewise in his office at the Executive
Office Building.
Senator Inotite. And you were not aware that this conversation was
recorded ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir; I did not know that any conversation
that I had with the President of the ITnited States was recorded until
a couple of weeks aafo when T was in Europe on business.
Senator Tnottye. In July 1972, you have testified that you received
a call from Mr. Ehrlichman relating to Secretary Stans' appearance
before the grand jurv. And you have testified that vou felt that Mr.
Ehrlichman was involved in an act constituting obstruction of justice.
I believe vou used these three words.
Mr. Kleindienst. No; it could ha^-e been construed as that. I was, I
think my attitude then was that Mr. Ehrlichman, and I had to feel
then he was pressed with burdens that the President imposed upon him
or he imposed upon himself. He had no background or experience in
the criminal law. I just thought it was kind of a stupid mistake that
he made, and I was more concerned. Senator, to have a verv precise
clear understanding with Mr. Ehrlichman that that would not happen
again in the future.
Senator iNomT:. Did vou not think this was important enough for
your reporting to the President pei-sonall v ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No. He treated it lightly at the end, said, do not
worry about it. It will not happen again.
I called the President of the TTnited States verv seldom in mv 41^
years in the Government. I tried to not imi^ose mvself upon him or
insinuate mvself upon him. I was prepared, howcA^er, to request a meet-
ing immediatelv with the President if Mr. Ehrlichman had persisted
in his original attitude that he would feel free to do this because I said,
John, I said, then I will come down and we will meet with the Presi-
dent and if the President tells me that that is — vou have that authoritv,
then I will submit my resignation as the Attorney General of the
ITnited States.
It was not necessary for me to have that meeting, Senator.
3595
Senator Inoute. Mr. Kleindienst, you have testified that when you
first learned about the break-in, I believe from Mr. Petersen, that your
reaction was one of shock.
Mr. Kleindienst. On the break-in ?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
Mr. Kleindienst. On Mr. Petersen's call to me ; no, because he did
not know much about it at 8 o'clock on Saturday morning. June 17.
The one that shocked me was Mr. Liddy coming out — I recollect say-
ing that Mr. Mitchell told him to come out and fill me in. The thing
that shocked me was his fantastic statement that maybe people who
were employed by the White House or the campaign committee were
involved or were arrested last night. That floored me.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Liddy was known to you. You worked with
him on Operation Intercept. He was a member of the Justice Depart-
ment and I am certain you are aware that he was counsel to the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect the President.
Mr. Kleindienst. I did not know that latter, sir. My association
with Mr. Liddy was very minimal and very brief as I described in
1969, and I do not believe I ever ran into him or ever saw him again
until
Senator Inouye. He must have had some standing with you because
I doubt if you would have responded to someone saying, come here,
come here.
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, I knew him, Senator, and Mr. Moore, who
did have standing with me, was with him. Mr. Moore and I were
directly associated together in the Department of Justice when he was
the Deputy Director of our Public Information Office.
Senator Inouye. Realizing the explosive potential of this break-in
because the break-in involved the headquarters of an opposition
political party, did you not feel it was important enough to directly
advise the President of this conversation with Mr. Liddy ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I do not think I would advise the President. The
investigation got underway immediately and it was known within
hours or shortly thereafter, days, essentially what Mr. Liddy told me,
that is to say, and I think the first — I think Mr. McCord was identi-
fied almost immediately after they got rid of the aliases and he was
further identified as being employed by the campaign committee. That
became public knowledge almost immediately thereafter. Senator.
Senator Inouye. My final question for this round, sir, in July 1972,
Mr. Baldwin — do you recall Mr. Baldwin, who was involved in the
break-in ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I know the name. That is all.
Senator Inouye. He cooperated with the prosecutors and advised
them that two phones in the headquarters of the party had been
bugged, one belonging to Mr. Larry O'Brien and the other to Mr.
Spencer Oliver. Were you aware of this, sir ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I do not recollect whether I was or not, whether
Mr. Petersen told me or not.
Senator Inouye. Well, for some unknown peason, when the FBI
went through the complex, the headquarters complex, they just
removed one bug, the one in Mr. Larry O'Brien's, and did not remove
the one in Mr. Spencer Oliver's. Were you aware of this, sir ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir.
3596 I
I
Senator Inouye. Now, on September 13 the Democratic National j
Committee requested the phone company to sweep that area, to have i
another look at it, and at that time they came across this bug in Mr. '
Oliver's '
Mr. Kleindienst. In a phone ?
Senator Inouye. Yes. Phone. Were you aware of this, sir?
Mr. Kleindienst. Gee, I might have been aware of it. Senator. I
have no present i-ecollection of it.
Senator Inouye. And after that the FBI conducted a very intensive
investigation. They interviewed 80 members of the McGovern cam-
paign committee and the Democratic National Committee. Were not
the FBI people aware of Mr. Baldwin's advice to the prosecutors that
there were two bugs ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I do not know. I do not know. I think Mr. Peter-
sen might have better knowledge of that, or the FBI itself. I do not
know.
Senator Inouye. I have just been notified that my time is up. I
thank you.
Mr. Kleindienst. Thank you. Senator Inouye.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker,
Senator Weicker. Listen, you did not take a swing at me. I am not
going to take a swing at you. No.
I wanted to add to Senator Baker's comments earlier where he cited
those instances where you had tried to live up to the spirit of the job
which you held, both in what you did and in the way you related to
others. I just wanted to add to that list the fact that when importuned
to take a swing at the junior Senator from Connecticut, you told him
you would not do it.
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, I was trying to talk him out of it, and.
Senator, I was trying to use vernacular in suggesting language that
would be calculated to talk him out of it and that is why I might have
used some language that I did. I am not trying to ingratiate myself.
You and I have had a very warm, friendly relationship, Senator, and
I have a high regard for you.
Senator Weicker. Thank you very much. I have already expressed
myself on that point.
Let me get to some facts here which I think might be helpful to our
investigation.
In the statement of April 30, 1973, by the President, the President
stated :
As a result, on March 21, I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinat-
ing intensive new inquiries into the matter, and T i^ersonally ordered those con-
ducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to me
right here in this office.
Did you receive such orders from the President of the United States
on March 21 %
Mr. Kleindienst. I haA'e no recollection of talking to the President
about that. I might have, but I do not recollect it. Senator Weicker.
Senator Wek^ker. Well, I should think that would be a pretty sig-
nificant event. Obviously, the language of the President in his state-
ment is very strong.
Those conducting the investigations to get all the facts, to reix)rt them directly
to me right here in this office.
3597
I imagine if you received such instruction you would have recalled
it now.
Mr. Kleindiexst. I have no recollection of that.
Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Kleindienst, I cannot, unfortunately,
leave your resignation at the point where you indicated to this com-
mittee that you preferred not to comment. I, too, in addition to, I
believe it was Senator Gurney, found it rather strange to have you
lumped in here in this same statement, I might add, with Messrs.
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean, and so I am going to ask you the
question as to whether or not this matter was not discussed with the
President prior to this April 30 statement, whether or not — I will
just get them on the table and let you answer them in your own way —
you preferred to announce your own resignation, whether or not the
President prevailed upon you not to announce your own resignation
but to be lumped into this group.
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Well, I think the President and I had by differ-
ent routes arrived at about the same conclusion. Obviously, we had
because Mr. Richardson was up at Camp David that afternoon and I
think the decision — I think the President made the decision, that he
had to get another Attorney General. I had arrived at it independently.
The President discussed specifically with me the fact that he wanted
to announce my resignation the next day and he asked me to permit
him to do so. I consented and I would prefer not to comment further
about it.
I have had a lot of great things in my life and I have had some
unpleasant things and that is just all part of life.
Senator Weicker. I know, Mr. Kleindienst, but I think it is impor-
tant to this committee to understand exactly what transpired in that
instance. Did you want to resign yourself and make your own
announcement ?
Mr. Kleixdienst. Well, I informed the President when I first got
np there that I had arrived at the soulful conclusion that I had to leave
and I think the President rejoined by saying, I think you are right.
A couple of months before, our conversation was that he wanted me
to be sure and stay past September when I left. One of the things he
said, I have got to have a whole Attorney General. I cannot have half
an Attorney General. And then came the convei-sation with respect to
the manner in which it was going to be done.
He asked me personally if I would permit him to do it then and he
wanted to be able to announce the change in the Government, Mr.
Richardson's appointment, and I consented to that.
Senator Weicker. In other words, it was his desire that you be put
into this group. It was not your desire ?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. He asked me to permit him to announce my resig-
nation then and I consented to it. Senator.
Senator Weicker. I still have to ask the question, why— -why you
were not permitted to go ahead and announce your own resignation ?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. The President asked me to permit him to do it —
that Monday night.
Senator Weicker. When you first arrived at Camp David, did you
want to announce your own resignation ?
Mr. Kleixdiexst. Yes, sir. I had so informed him before our
conversation.
3598
Senator Weicker. So it was at the importuning: of the President yoi
did not announce your own resignation but, rather, went along witl
liis request to be put into this group, is that correct ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, he is the President of the United Statesj
I was serving him. He asked me to do it. I did.
Senator Weicker. I would like to, if I could, ask a few random ques
tions until my time expires.
The sequence insofar as Mr. Gray is concerned, April 5 he withdraws!
his name for consideration for the Senate, is that correct ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir. I believe that is the date. April 5.
Senator Weicker. And I believe also at that time you wrote a ver}
warm personal note of appreciation to Pat.
Mr. Kleindienst. I have the highest regard for Pat Gray. I think'
he is one of the finest men I ha\e ever known in my life and I feel very|*
sorry for him.
Senator Weicker. Now, on April 27, following the conversations in
your office on the 26th, he steps down.
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. Now, what transpired in the meantime here? Oii
more specifically, more specifically, at what point did you become;
aware that apparently both the Pi-esident and certainly Mr. Ehrlich-
man and Mr. Dean had come to the conclusion that Pat Gray would
not be the man for the Directorship o-f the FBI ?
Mr. Kleindienst, Well, you have to distinguish between, I guess
the events that occurred after April 5 when it was, I think, indicated
sometime around that time, and before April 15, Mr. Gray's nomina-
tion had been withdrawn from the Senate. And then after April 15
and before April 30 I had a meeting with Mr. Gray and Mr. Petei-sen
in my office in the middle evening around 8 or 8 :30, The next day he
then resigned as the Acting Director of the FBI.
I do not know when I learned of the decision that Mr. Gray's name
would be withdrawn from the Senate to be the Acting — to be the per-
manent Director, I am sure I would have known about it around that
time.
Senator Weicker. Around what time ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, the time that it was withdrawn, his nomina-
tion was withdrawn. You see
Senator Weicker. We had testimony, Mr. Kleindienst, before this
committee that he would indicate that both Mr. P^lirlichman and the
President had soured on Pat Gray around March 6 or March 7.
Mr. Kleindienst. I did not know about that. I knew, I guess, as of
the time I was out in San Clemente around April 5 that I must have
known the decision was made because we were talking about my rec-
ommendations for a person for the President to nominate to be the
next permanent Director. So I guess I knew about it prior to April 5.
I do not believe I was informed tliat day of the decision. I think I
probably knew that before.
Senator Weicker. Now, in testimony yesterday Mr. Gray indicated
to the committee — I think I am correct in my paraphrase — that when
they met in your office on the evening of the 26th, you advised Mr. Gray
that you thought it best that he step down.
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, I did, and Pat really did not agree with that.
I called the President, gave him a report of the meeting, what Pat
\ 3599
'told me. I said, Mr. President, my recommendation is that Pat step
down. Pat does not feel that way about it. And then my recollection is,
Senator — and I have read Pat's testimony yesterday, but my recollec-
tion was that I said, Pat, tomorrow you have a meeting with the top
people of the FBI and get their reaction as to whether or not as a
result of this situation you can credibly serve as the Acting Director
until a permanent Director comes along. He seems to recall that that
was his own thinking. Maybe not. I do not know. In any event, the
next morning he did meet with the top people of the FBI and he called
me and said that, and I recall him saying that, you are right, the
people here do not feel that I can credibly remain as the Acting
Director, and then I recall I said, Pat, I think you ought to call the
President yourself and submit your resignation to him this morning
and you do that directly.
Now, that is my recollection of it.
Senator Weicker. I have no dispute with your recollection.
May I just ask one question? I do not want to interrupt.
Mr. Kleindienst. I want to set the record straight on one thing.
You recall Mr. Gray had made an offer to the Members of the U.S.
Senate that they could have access to the FBI files and then that order
was rescinded. I believe that you were scheduled to go up there on a
Saturday morning to see them and I called you personally and said that
I ordered that to be rescinded. No one else was responsible for that
decision except myself. I disagreed with the position taken by Mr.
Gray in his confirmation hearings and that I was the one, w^ho as the
Attorney General of the United States, who rescinded that offer by
Mr. Gray and I think I called you personally and it was not a pleasant
task for me, to call you personally that I had rescinded it, and I think
there was something said yesterday to the effect that somebody else
had made that decision. Nobody else did. I made that and I want to
take that responsibility.
Senator Weicker. The last question, because my time is up, when
you called the President, did the President tell you that Pat Gray
should step down, on the evening of the 26th ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No. I think I gave him my recommendation and
I also, to the best of my ability, reported Pat Gray's position on it
and I think the President then said to me, well, if Pat does not want
to resign immediately or right now, I am not going to require him
to do so until we can analyze the matter further or give some addi-
tional information. That was the President's posture.
Senator Weicker. Thank you. My time is up.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. Mr. Kleindienst
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. About how many times did you speak to the
President between June 17 and the time of your resignation ?
Mr. Kleindienst. How many times?
Senator Montoya. Yes.
Mr, Kleindienst. Boy, it would be a guess. The committee has in its
possession my telephone logs that would more accurately reflect that.
I would say 10 or under times and that is just a guess. Senator
Montoya.
Senator Montoya. Ten ?
3600
Mr. Kleindienst. Ten or under. That is a guess on my part.
Senator Montoya. How many times did you visit with him at the
White House during this time ?
Mr. Kleindienst. That is from June 17, the Watergate situation, |
Senator ?
Senator Montoya. Yes.
Mr. Kleindienst. I don't believe, aUhough I could be mistaken, that
I visited with him after June 17 at the White House until I returned
from Europe after the election and then I had two meetings with him
at Camp David.
Senator Montoya. Were those the only two meetings either at the
White House or Camp David ?
Mr. Kleindienst. To the best of my recollection, sir, and I could be
wrong, and again my appointment book or my logs would be the best
evidence of that.
Senator Montoya. Did you during those meetings or during those
telephone conversations discuss Watergate with the President ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, in a very broad way. I didn't know much
about it and I was in charge of the investigation. I had confidence in
it. I would have indicated to him what I was doing, what the FBI and
the Criminal Division and the prosecutors were doing generally.
Senator Montoya. Did you discuss with him the possibility that
some members of the White House or the CRP might be involved?
Mr. Kleindienst. I had no basis for such a discussion. I did not —
I had no evidence of that, of any credible nature until April 15, 1973.
Senator Montoya. Did he ever ask you any questions as to whether,
from the evidence or state of the evidence that you had, there might be
some involvement by personnel from the AVhite House ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Not that I r-ecall because. Senator Montoya, if I
had come into possession of evidence of that kind, I like to think
and I am confident of the fact that I would have informed him
immediately.
Senator Montoya. Who would the President go to for an investiga-
tion of this type ? Would he go to the Department of Justice ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, the Department of Justice through the FBI
and the U.S. Attorney's Office had had a prodigious investigation
interrogating all kinds of people up there. I think by the time, oh, on
or about when March came along. Senator Montoya, instead of 1,700
people being interviewed, the interviews had gone up to 2,500, or 2,600
or 2,700 people.
Senator Montoya. Well, who was actually in charge of all this in-
vestigation, the Department of Justice ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir; the FBI, the Criminal Division, and
the U.S. Attorney's Office.
Senator Montoya. And would that be you as the head of the De-
partment of Justice and those working under you ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. And you — do you have any knowledge whether
or not the President talked to Mr. Petersen about this investigation
at any time ?
INIr. Kleindienst. I am almost postive that Henry Petersen never
talked to the President of the United States until Sunday, April 15,
1973.
3601
Senator Montoya, All right. Then I will read to you, in view of
your answers, the statements contained in the President's address of
April 30, 1973 :
Last June 17 while I was in Florida trying to get a few days rest after my
visit to Moscow, I first learned from the news reports of the Watergate break-in.
I was appalled at this senseless, illegal action and I was shocked to learn em-
ployees of the Re-Election Committee were apparently among those guilty.
Here he says, "I immediately ordered an investigation by appropi-
ate Government authorities."
Now, he did not talk to you about this. So apparently the President
was wrong in this statement.
Mr. Kleindienst. Well
Senator Montoya. Well, let me read further :
As the investigations went forward, I repeatedly asked those conducting the
investigation whether there was any reason to believe that members of my Ad-
ministration were in any way involved. I received repeated assurances that
there were not.
Mr. Kleindienst. May I comment right there, please ?
Senator Montoya. Yes.
Mr. Kleindienst. I think that that is a fair statement for the Presi-
dent to make because John Dean was over in my office on the Monday,
you know, following the break-in and was there quite continuously
and his purpose in being there, according to his representation, was
to get general information from me and ^Ir. Petersen and I think it
would be logical that Mr. Dean was going back and reporting, I
thought, to the President. I don't know if he was or not, but at least
to Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman.
Senator Montoya. Well, he said, "I repeatedly asked those conduct-
iing the investigation." INIr. Dean was not conducting the investigation.
Mr. Kleindienst. Right there, Senator IVIontoya, I don't believe T
talked to tlie President on Saturday. June 17. T might have, but I know
I talked to him sometime immediately thereafter and my conversation
with him and the direction he gave me, he didn't have to say, now
Kleindienst, you know you have got to go out there and investigate
this. I think I understood what my duty was. But there was no doubt
in my mind as to what the President wanted to have done in this thing.
If he didn't
Senator Montoya. Why-
Mr. Kleindienst [continuing]. If he didn't want to have it done,
I don't think I would have been there.
Senator Montoya. Well, why would the President couch his state-
ment in these specific terms ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I don't know.
Senator Montoya. All right.
Mr. Kleindienst. Other than the comments I made.
Senator Montoya. Let me read the next paragraph.
As a result, on March 21, I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinat-
ing intensive new inquiries into the matter and I personally ordered those con-
ducting the investigation to get all the facts and to report them directly to me
right here in this office.
Now, if you state that the President never talked to you about this
and to your knowledge he did not talk to anyone in the Department of
3602 I
Justice, could it be possible that he was talking to the U.S. District [
Attorney downtown ? j
Mr. Kleindienst. No. I construe that statement as of March 21, j
Senator Montoya, to mean that he was having, as I learned subse- \
quently, Mr. Ehrlichman, conduct an in-house investigation. That
is — based upon what Mr. Ehrlichman told me Saturday evening,
April 14, that is what I would assume the investigation was; an
in-house non-Department of Justice investigation.
Senator Montoya. Well, Mr. Ehrlichman testified that there was
really no investigation going on on his part and Mr. Dean has also
indicated that he was just going around trying to find out what was
being done, that is all. But the actual investigation was being con-
ducted by the Department of Justice.
Mr. Kleindienst. We never stopped our investigation. At no time
did the Department of Justice ever consider that the Watergate case
was closed.
Senator Montoya. Now, did it ever occur to you that you might
visit the President and inform him as to what you might be reading in
the newspapers and what curiosity was being aroused in your mind as
to possible implication on the part of people at the Wliite House or at
the Committee To Re-Elect the President ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I didn't have any reason to do that. There were
people up there who read the newspapers and can brief the President
on that.
Senator Montoya. Yes ; but you were in charge of the Federal in-
vestigation and you were the Attorney General- — —
Mr. Kleindienst. Senator Montoya
Senator Montoya [continuing]:- Of the United States.
Mr. Kleindienst. With God as my witness, not until the night of
April 14 or between the hours of 1 and 5 o'clock in the morning in my
home on Sunday, April 15, was I ever given any credible evidence by
anybody that would indicate the criminal culpability or complicity
of any top White House or campaign people in this entire matter.
Senator Montoya. Were you
Mr. Kleindienst. And as soon as I got that information, I imme-
diately set in motion a meeting wnth the President of the United
States.
Senator Montoya. You were being briefed quite constantly at the
Depai-tment of Justice about the state of the investigation
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. AYere you not ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir.
Senator Montoya, And wasn't there any evidence indicating com-
plicity on the part of people at the CRP ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. Any evidence brought to your attention?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir, Henry Petersen and I speculated almost
constantly, particularly after the trial and Judge Sirica sentencing
procedures, that it was just possible that Gordon Liddy or Mr. Hunt
or one of the five, if Ave could get them before a grand jury, give them
immunity and compel them to testify, could liaA'e evidence to offer
that would involve somebody else. But I remember Henry Petersen
saying to me even after the McCord statement, that standing by
3603
itself, with just hearsay and speculation and conjecture, that that
document itself did not provide evidence with respect to the guilt of
anybody else.
Senator Montoya. I Avill ask you one more question.
When Mr. Ehrlichman was testifying before this committee I asked
him if the White House knew of the burglary of the Ellsberg psy-
chiatrist's office on or about September 4 why didn't you tell the
Department of Justice, and he indicated in his answer that that in-
formation had been imparted to the Department of Justice.
Mr. Kleindienst. That is absolutely untrue.
Senator Montoya. All right.
Now, I have it here in the transcript. I have the transcript.
Mr. Kleindiexst. To my knowledge that is untrue.
Senator Montoya. Well,! have it here in the transcript. My ques-
tioning starts — ^this is a question of Mr. Ehrlichman :
Well, there is one thing that strikes my fancy, Mr. Ehrlichman, that the burg-
lary was committed on September 3 or 4 of 1971, that you knew about it a few
days later upon your return from Cape Ood, that Mr. Liddy knew, that Mr. Krogh
knew, and that presumably other people in the White House knew, then why did
it take them until April 15, 1973, for the U.S. District Attorney here in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Mr. Silbert, to first find out about that burglary, then to have
to transmit that news to the Department of Justice?
Mr. Kleindienst. Senator Montoya, the memorandum from Mr. Sil-
bert to Mr. Petersen dated Monday,' April 16, said that an unidentified
source has informed us yesterday, Sunday, April 15, about this situa-
tion. One of the things that Mr. Petersen told me was that that uniden-
tified source in the Silbert memorandum to him was John Dean and
John Dean is the one who told the prosecutors on Sunday evening
April 15 about the Ellsberg break-in.
Senator Montoya. I am not questioning your veracity, I am just
pointing out that perhaps Mr. Ehrlichman deceived this comniittee
with that statement.
Mr. Kleindienst. I don't want to comment on Mr. Ehrlichman's
testimony. All I am saying to you is that to my knowledge and the
knowledge of Earl Silbert, and Henry Petersen and responsible people
of the Department of Justice the first knowledge that we ever had of
the break-in of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist was Sunday evening,
April 15.
Senator Montoya. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Kleindienst. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervin. I have no further questions. I think you have been
rather thoroughly interrogated.
I do have two observations, one of which will be no surprise to you,
and that is I find myself incapable of accepting the theory that the
President has a constitutional power to suppress testimony about
criminal acts on the part of members of the executive branch of the
Government. I can't reconcile that notion witli the simple words of the
second article, which prescribe the President's duties in these words:
"He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
Now, my other statement is, I would like to in fairness state that
during the time you were in the Attorney General's office and this com-
mittee was in existence, that you manifested a willingness and desire
to cooperate with this committee to the fullest possible extent.
3604
Mr. Kleindienst. Thank you, sir.
Senatoi- Baker. Thank you very much. I also do not have further
questions. I nii<i-ht make, as 1 have previously, a remark of thanks to
Mr. Kleindienst for his cooperation and for his testimony today. I
think it is \cry helpful. And to say one word about the question of the
scope and the extent of the doctrine of executive privilege. I note with
great interest the disagreement between the chairman and the witness
on that subject, and they both distinguished legal authorities, one a
former Attorney General of the Ignited States.
Mr. Kleindienst. One not as distinguished as the other.
Senator Baker. One a former Attorney General of the United
States and the other the possessor of one of the original copies of the
Constitution, I believe [laughter].
Senator Baker. I might say that my father taught me that you can
try to settle a lawsuit all your life but the court finally decides.
Mr. Kleindienst. That is why we have courts.
Senator Baker. That is one reason I am glad we filed suit. There
may be a great quarrel we have authority to sue or whether the Presi-
dent should or should not have to yield up these tapes under one of the
other doctrines or theories that is set out in the litigation, but finally,
unless the court ducks the issue, and I fervently hope they do not,
finally then the court will decide and my distinguished chairman and
my distinguished former Attorney General will not have to argue
about that because the law will be what the court says it is.
Mr. Kleindienst. On the doctrine of separation of powers, that is
going to be decided by the judiciary and not by the Senate or by the
Executive Office.
Senator Baker. It is like the yoimg lawyer I mentioned earlier who
was arguing a case before the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice said,
"Young man, that is not the law," and the young fellow said, "It was
the law until Your Honor spoke."
Mr. Kleindienst. I guess that is right.
Senator ER^^N. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Inouye.
Senator Inotjye. Thank you, I just have a few questions.
Mr. Kleindienst, you are aware that Mr. Ehrlichman met with
Judge Byrne while the judge was presiding over the EUsherg case?
INIr. Kleindienst. I learned that ; yes, sir.
Senator Inoute. Did you think that this was highly improper ?
]\Tr. Kleindienst. Boy, I know that I as the Attornev General of
the United States and as an officer of the Department of Justice that
had a case before Judge Bvrne, it would have l>een highly improper
fo7' us to have done it and to have done it only through our prosecutor
in the presence of the attorneys on the other side, regardless of what
the situation was. T^^iether or not the same restrictions would apply to
a person on behalf of the President of the United States I am doubt-
ful. In all fairness to ^fr. Ehrlichman, because the mission was very
limited and very specific, it had nothing to do with the case. I think
just jTonerallv si)enking, because of the nature of the Ellsberg trial
find the involvement of the administration and the Department of
Justice and. vou know, its controversv, it was mv opinion probablv
ill-advised just because from the appearance, vou know, of the ad-
ministration of justice. ISfy knowledge of Judge Byrne, however, is
3605
such that I can't imagine a circumstance existing under which he
would ever permit himself to be compromised or in any way interfere
with the administration of his duty as a Federal judge.
Senator Inouye. Was it not highly improper to involve the Presi-
dent of the United States? The testimony shows that the President
was brought into the conversation, even briefly,
Mr. Kleindienst. I understand that the President just walked out
and said "He will do" and went back and all I know is what occurred
at this meeting.
Senator Inotjye, Canon 9 says a lawyer should avoid even the ap-
pearance of j)rof essional impropriety ; a law;)'er should promote public
confidence in our system and in the legal profession. You don't think
that this
Mr. Kleixdiexst. I don't know and I am trying to be fair about this.
I don't know whether what Mr. Ehrlichman did was as a lawyer, as
an officer of the court. He wasn't representing the United States in the
thing, he had nothing to do with the trial. I think I would prefer to
characterize Mr. Ehrlichman's role there as an agent of the President
of the United States pursuing an objective of the executive branch of
the Government and I don't know if that canon would be applied to
him in that situation.
Senator In^otjye. In the hierarchy of the Justice Department are
you considered superior to Mr. L. Patrick Gray, the Director of the
FBI?
Mr. Kleindienst. To whom ?
Senator Ixouye. Mr. Gray.
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, I don't consider myself superior to any-
lx)dy. I think Mr. Gray was under the authority and jurisdiction of the
Office of the Attorney General.
Senator Ixouye. Were you in a position to direct him or to give him
orders ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I believe so and I have done so from time to time.
Senator Ixouye. And did he have a responsibility to report to you,
sir?
Mr. Kleindienst. Oh, sure.
He also had responsibilities to discharge. I had nothing but the
utmost confidence and trust in him. The Department is a big one, it has
got 50,000 employees, 17 divisions. I met with Pat Gray quite fre-
quently. He attended our staff luncheon every Friday noon and he
also was a close friend of mine. Senator. He was going to be the Deputy
Attorney General if and when I got confirmed as the Attorney Gen-
eral. Then Director Hoover passed away and I was in the forefront of
those recommending Mr. Gray to be the permanent Director to succeed
Mr. Hoover.
So, I have had nothing but the closest finest relationship with Pat
Gray and he and I, we are kind of both stubborn people, but we never
had a problem between us and it was never a question of my ordering
Pat Gray, we had a discussion and I would make a recommendation
and I can't ever recall a recommendation in the discharge of his official
duties of mine that he didn't follow.
Senator Inouye. Did Mv. Grav ever tell you about the instructions
he received from Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman to destroy classified
papers?
3606
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, he did, he told me that on the evening of
April 25 the night before he withdrew as the Acting Director of FBI.
Senator Inouye. He didn't tell you in the year 1972 ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir; that is the first time 1 had ever heard of
that situation, was that night.
Senator Inouye. Do you think he should have told you as soon as he
received those instructions?
Mr. Kleindienst. Gosh, Pat Gray has lived a great life and is a
great patriot and I think he made one mistake, I think it is going to
burden him the rest of his life. I am sure he didn't and that is an inci-
dent and I would put that against his career service and what I know
about him as a man and say well, here is a human being that made a
mistake.
Senator Inouye. You — were you aware of the attempt made by Mr.
Dean to influence FBI investigations of Mr. Ogarrio and Mr.
Dahlberg?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir.
Senator Inouye. When did you learn of this, sir ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Most of this testimony vividly came to my atten-
tion — that is the CIA situation ?
Senator Inouye. This is when Mr. Dean told Mr. Gray to stop the
investigation of Mr. Ogarrio and Mr, Dahlberg.
Mr. Kleindienst. Senator Inouye, I might have been informed of
that last summer but I have no specific recollection of it. Mr. Petersen
would have been the one who would have known about that. If he felt
there was a serious interference with the orderly work of the Depart-
ment, I know that Henry would have come to me and I think I have an
idea what I might have said to John Dean. Inasmuch as that kind of
incident didn't occur, I don't think that I knew about it or it was
regarded as a serious interference with our work.
Senator Inouye. As Attorney General did you know a Mr. Ken
Khachigian.
Mr. Kleindienst. Ken
Senator Inouye. K-h-a-c-h-i-g-i-a-n.
Mr. Kleindienst. I don't believe so. Senator.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Haldeman in his testimony said that Mr. Kha-
chigian had prepared a report which indicated that demonstrations
and other violent activities were carried out under the guidance of
agents of the opposition party.
Were you aware of that ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No. I was for 4I/2 years responsible for the coordi-
nation of the effoi-ts of the executive branch in the Government regu-
lating demonstrations and dissent and probably had more information
about it than anybody in the United States. I have never heard of that
name and I don't recall ever talking to Mr. Haldeman about it or ever
getting any memorandum or report from him.
Senator Inouye. As the person in charge of this investigation, were
you aware of any involvement of the Democratic Party or the candi-
dates, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Humphrey ?
Mr. Kleindienst, I think the only incident I was ever aware of, the
President during the cami)aign was to make an appearance in Los
Angeles, and the reason why I became aware of it, I was out there
speaking myself. As a matter of fact, I had a speech canceled because
3607
the President was going to be there. And I think the McGovem head-
quarters in Los Angeles was used by some to organize a demonstration
against the President's appearance in Los Angeles. I think that is the
only incident that I was aware of.
Senator Inouye. Was this a violent demonstration ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, I think there was quite a lot of preparations
made and I think the President had to change his plan and arrive at
the hotel by a helicopter as compared to what otherwise he wanted
to do.
Senator Inouye. Other than that you are not aware of any involve-
ment ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I received no report of any arrests or anything
like that, Senator Inouye.
'Senator Inouye. I thank you very much.
Mr. Kliendienst. Thank you, sir.
Senator Erven. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurney. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Just two brief questions on the Ellsberg matter.
When you notified the President of the break-in of Dr. Fielding's
office, did he exhibit surprise at the information you gave to him ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, I know he was very provoked. Senator
Weicker. I think we could have had a contest on which one of us was
the most irritated by it. I do not know whether I could testify whether
he had had any prior knowledge of it and it was not my habit to inter-
rogate the President of the United States.
Senator Weicker. Did you have prior knowledge of the fact since
the inception of the Ellsberg matter, the President had taken a rather
personal role in that ?
Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir; I never heard about the Plumbers
Senator Weicker. I am not talking about the Plumbers.
Mr. Kleindienst. About the Ellsberg break-in ?
Senator Weicker. No, the Ellsberg matter.
Mr. Kleindienst. The lawsuit ?
Senator Weicker. The lawsuit. The matter from its inception.
Mr. Kleindienst. I might have discussed briefly with the President
about the Ellsberg suit. I know I would have talked with Mr. Ehrlich-
man about our position on the suit and our desire to do everything
possible to convict Mr. Ellsberg of the crimes that we alleged in our
complaint, but I never had anybody interfere with me.
Senator Weicker. I am not talking- about interference; I do not
mean to give that impression.
Mr. Kleindienst, I did not need anvbody to put me down the road
on that lawsuit, and I do not recall having any conversations with
the President about it.
Senator Weicker. Do you recall receiving a call from the President
requesting a progress report on the Ellsberg case and getting in touch
with Mr. ]\Iardian and then getting in touch with the President at
Camp David?
Mr. Kleindienst. I could have but I do not recall that.
3608
Senator Weigker. Do you tliink the President's surprise or his being
provoked, I guess is the exact term that you used, at the information
you gave to him, do you think it was because the information was
public or because of what had happened?
Mr. Kleindienst. Well, the, numner in which he characterized the
act itself left it umnistakably clear to me that he had a very negative
attitude about that conduct.
Senator Weickek. T have ono comment I would like to make, Mr.
Chairman, because of something Mr. Kleindienst said which I could
not ha\e agreed with more.
I find it a little hard to reconcile with youi" definition of separation
of powers, but I noted in your comments on our democracy how you
stated that the emphasis of our democracy is to pi'otect individuals
rather tlian society.
Mi-. Keeindiens'I'. To me that is the foundation of our Government
and our Constitution.
Senatoi- Weickeh. T think it is, too.
Mi-. Kr-EiNDiENST. It distinguishes it from almost every other gov-
ernment in the Avorld.
Senator Weicker. I think it is, too. That the individual is important,
each one of us.
Mr. IvLEiNmExsT. Each one of us.
Senator Wek'ker. Is impoi-tant, far more important than society,
and certainly there are none of us that are better than anyone else, if
you will, and yet it seems to me that some of the things that went on
in this pei'iod of time were done in the name of society, protection of
the individuals sometimes being disregarded to a certain extent, and
I wondered liow you, for exami)le, in the latest exchange with the
committee equate this deep feeling that you have — ^and I feel exactly
as you do on this point — with the fact that the President has informa-
tion which could involve, let us say, freedom of someone, such as the
tai^es might relate to the freedom of a particular individual, never
mind the constitutional confrontation between the committee and the
executive branch, information that might relate to the freedom of a
particular individual that he would not be obliged under the sixth
amendment of the Constitution to hand that information over. How
do you
Ml". Keeindiexst. I am iust a private individual now. Senator, and
I do not have a thought about my attitudes on that, and I would like
to be excused from doing so i-ight now.
Senator Weicker. T have no further questions.
Senator Baker. I thought for a minute that the witness Avas going
to say he was just a country lawyer.
Mr. KleindieXvSt. As a matter of fact, that is all I am. Senator
Baker.
Mr. DoRSEN. Do you recall an October 24, 1972, meeting with Rich-
ard Helms at which certain records of the CIA were turned over
to you ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. DoRREX. What did vou do with those records?
Mr. Keeindiex^st. The day before, I believe Ambassador Helms
called me and said that Silbert had requested the CIA to supply some
W'ritten information to him. He said I have no objection to giving that
to the U.S. attorney's office; however, I would like to deliver it to you
3609
personally so that you could pass the admonition to the U.S. attorney's
office that some of the material could be, oh, well, if it was revealed,
could interfere with the mission of the CIA. He agreed to come into my
office the next day. He came in with his general counsel. He had an
envelope in his hand. As soon as he got there, I called Henry. Henry
came up. I explained the situation to Henry. Henry took the envelope
and left to go to his office with Mr. Huston, the General Counsel of the
CIA, and Ambassador Helms, he and I have a very warm friendly
relationship, stayed for a couple of minutes and chatted and he left
and that is all I know about the incident.
Mr. DoRSEN. Your records show a few contacts in early 1973 with
Jeb Magruder. Do you recall what those were about ?
Mr. Kleindienst. Yes, sir, he was working for the Inauguration
Committee. I intended to host at my home during the inauguration a
party for everybody who is here from Arizona, and I was talking to
Magruder throughout that period of time to get assistance and help
from him to make that possible.
Mr. DoRSEN. Do you recall attending a luncheon with Mr. Ehrlich-
man and Mr. Dean between the time of the conviction of the Water-
gate defendants and the time of their sentence at which the subject
of possible leniency for the defendants came up ?
Mr. Kleindienst, I did not when I talked to you or Mr. Haire yes-
terday. I talked to Mr. Petersen yesterday to see if he could recall any-
thing, and I now remember that at a luncheon I had there, I think we
had several matters to discuss, the question came up as to the proce-
dures of sentencing, what happens, and Mr. Ehrlichman did not have
much of a knowledge of the criminal justice system, and I think they
were talking about what happens when somebody is convicted of a
crime, how the sentence is meted out, what is the probation report,
what happens when you go to jail, when are you eligible for a pardon,
when do the circumstances arise for Executive pardon, and it was a
technical procedural discussion that I had. No individual name was
mentioned at that time.
Mr. DoRSEN. When Mr. Petersen came to you on the early morning
hours of April 15, I believe you indicated that no information was
imparted to you that Dean could implicate the President of the United
States, is that correct ?
Mr. Kleindienst. That is correct.
Mr. DoRSEN. Was there any explanation given as to whether Mr.
Dean was holding back things or relying on executive privilege or
anything of that nature ?
Mr. Kleindienst. I think that Mr. Silbert to the extent that, I at
least believed at the time he gave me in summary form every bit of
relevant information that he had obtained from Mr. Magruder and
Mr. Dean ; I believed that at the time.
Mr. DoRSEN. When did you first learn Patrick Gray had burned the
Hunt file?
Mr. Kleindienst. The night before he left the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Mr. DoRSEN. During the time you were Deputy Attorney General,
were you aware of the nature of the political activity bv Mr. Mitchell
includins: specifically any contacts he may have had with Mr. Liddy?
Mr. Kleindienst. I was never aware he had any contact with Mr.
3610
Liddy. My custom when I was Deputy Attorney General was to meet
Mr. Mitchell at 9 o'clock and 5 o'clock every day when we were both
in town. Immediately prior to March 1 when Mr. Mitchell left, I
I'ecollect once or twice seeing Mr. Magruder in his office when I came
up for my 5 o'clock meeting. When I arrived Mr. Magruder would
leave and I would have my 5 o'clock conference and that is just about
the extent of my knowledge with respect to Mr. Mitchell's association.
Mr. DoRSEN. One final question.
Wliile you were Attorney General, did you engage in any partisan
political activities?
Mr. Kleindienst. With the exception of one occasion after I was
confirmed by the U.S. Senate and I went back to Phoenix, Ariz., when
the Trunk and Tusk Club gave a dinner in my honor, that is a Re-
publican club, I have never attended a political meeting. Republican
Party meeting of any kind since I entered the Department of Justice
o]i January 29, 1969.'
Mr. DoRSEN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. On behalf of the committee I want to thank you for
your cooperation and your appearance here today and as far as I know
you are excused from further attendance unless we notify you again.
Mr. Kleindiexst. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
["Wliereupon, at 12 :45 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
2 p.m., the same day.]
Afterxoox Session, Tuesday, August 7, 1973
Senator Ervix. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will call the first witness.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Henry E. Petersen.
Senator P^rvix. Mr. Petersen, will you stand up and raise your right
hand? Do you swear that the evidence you shall give to the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you Grod ?
Mr. Petersen. I do, sir.
Senatoi- Er\tn. You might state your name and occupation and
residence for the record.
TESTIMONY OF HENRY E. PETERSEN, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Petersen. My name is Henry E. Petersen. I am Assistant Attor-
ney General in the' Criminal Division, V.S. Department of Justice.
I reside at 916 Daleview Drive, Silver Spring, Md.
Senator Ervix. Counsel will interrogate the witness.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Petersen, how long have you been Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Criminal Division, Chief of the Criminal
Division ?
Mr. Petersex. January 1972, 1 believe.
Mr. Dash. And prior to that appointment, Mr. Petersen, what posi-
tion did you hold in the Depaitment of Justice ?
Mr. Petersex. Immediately prior to that I was Acting Assistant
Attorney General for the jieriod October 1971 to January 1972. Prior
to that, 'Mr. Dash, I was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
Criminal Division.
Mr. Dash. Wlien actually did you first join the Department of
Justice, Criminal Division ?
Mr. Petersex. I first joined the Department of Justice in 1947. I
joined the Criminal Division in, I think it was June 1951.
Mr. Dash. How and when did you first learn of the break-in of the
Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate on
June 17, 1972 ?
Mr. Petersex. Approximately 8, 9 o'clock in the morning while I
was at the breakfast table. I received a call from the U.S. Attorney
Harold Titus of the District of Columbia who advised me that five
people whose identities even at that point were somewhat in doubt, had
been arrested at Democratic national headquarters in possession of
what was considered to be at that time explosive equipment.
Mr. Dash. Did you follow up on this call ?
Mr. Petersen. At that point I called the Attorney General at his
home and told him about it, primarily because I did not know what
the security arrangements were at the Republican National Commit-
tee To Re-Elect the President, whatever political office they had, and
(3611)
3612
if indeed persons had intentions of trying to demolish the Democratic
headquarters 1 thought the same might be in offing for the Kepublican
headquarters and I thouglit he ought to be forewarned.
Mr. Dash. Well, how soon did an investigation under the sponsor-
ship of the Department of Justice begin in this case ?
Mr. Petersen. Investigation was underway at that time. Mr. Titus'
staff had already been alerted and he had assistants working on the
matter at that point with the Metropolitan Police Department and the
FBI who were ]ust coming into it.
Mr. Dasii. Now, what role as Chief of the Criminal Division did you
play with regard to the U.S. Attorney's Office investigation?
Mr. Petersen. A general supervisory role, Mr. Dash. One of the
early questions I had to decide was the degree of supervision that
should be involved and since we knew at the close of Saturday, June
17, that what we liad thouglit to bo ox))losive devices were electronic
listening devices, and that an individual named E. Howard Hunt was
possibly implicated as a result of the fact that some of his checks or
some information relating to him had been found at the scene, that
there were immense political repercussions possible. And I decided at
a very early stage that that investigation ought to be as isolated from
the political element as it could possibly be. And 1 suggested that Mr.
Titus appoint as principal assistant, Earl Silbert, to conduct the in-
vestigation in his office and report to Mr. Titus and to myself on a
daily basis, oral reports on a daily basis.
Mr. Dash. Wliat was your relationship with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation during the investigation? Did you get any kind of re-
porting from the FBI ?
Mr. Petersen. Well, the FBI, of course, reported — their reports to
the prosecutors, Mr. Silbert and company, were more immediate than
their reports to me. Their reports to me had to wait the normal process
of bureaucracy, the preparation of the reports and the submission
through normal channels, whereas the prosecutor on the scene was
getting the witness statements almost immediately but the reports
were coming oA^r to me rather slowly at first, very slowly. As a matter
of fact, when the publicity developed, with the cooperation of Inspector
Baldwin I did not have statements ni my office. I had to call the Bureau
and ask them to send it over. They sent a whole package of reports at
that time.
Mr. Dash. Was this slow reporting to you or did the prosecutors,
the IT.S. Attorney's Office, have that report?
Mr. Petersen. Well, they had the 302, ves. It was just
Mr. Dash. Just how it came up to your office as Chief of the Crimi-
nal Division.
Mr. Petersen. That is correct. I was hearing about it from INIr.
Silbert.
Mr. Dash. Now, shortly after the break-in, do von recall receiving
a telephone call from Mr. Kleindienst who was at the Burning Tree
Count rv Club?
]Mr. Petersen. Mi-. Kleindienst and I communicated three times on
Saturday, June 17. The first call I placed approximatelv at 8 o'clock
in the morning. The second call I was about to place when — indeed,
if I had not heard his testimony or had discussed it with him, I would
have said I placed the second call but he tells me he did, but in any
3613
event since I do not recall, I am sure it is true. The third call I com-
municated to him and lie was making a speech at the Statler-Hilton
Hotel and I had to run him down through the security service down
there. He had to speak very guardedly. What I was trying to report
to him was tliat documentation relating to a White House consultant
had been found at the scene. 1 thought it was important that he have
that information.
Mr. Dash. Did he tell you about a meeting he had or an encounter,
really, at the Burning Tree Country Club with Mr. Liddy shortly
after the break-in ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes ; recently. The second call, whether I made it or
he made it, I remember predominantly because he said, Henry, I want
these people treated the same as everybody else. I conveyed to him at
that point the information about the electronic equipment and I guess
I thought it a little odd that he should make that statement because I
did not know any other way to treat them. But 1 do not recall him
telling me that Liddy was there. If he did, I simply do not remember it.
Mr. Dash. What were your relationships with Mr. Jolm Dean at the
White House during this period of time ?
Mr. Petersen. Good. Good. John Dean, I guess, was kind of an un-
official liaison with the Justice Department since he had been there.
We knew him. He worked in the Deputy Attorney General's office.
He was in communication with us frequently with respect to inter-
l^retations of the Corrupt Practices Act. So we had frequent dealings.
Relationships were good.
Mr. Dash. Did he inform you that he was in charge in any way or
liaison between the Wliite House and any investigation.
Mr. Petersen. Not at that stage, Mr. Dash.
I suppose the practice of discussing tliis matter with John Dean
arose the first instance out of the request of Mr. Silbert and the FBI,
i-ather than of their complaints that the White House was dragging its
feet.
Mr. Dash. Do you know about when this took place ?
Mr. Petersen. This was early in the investigation. People were to be
interviewed and appointments were not being kept or being delayed
and they would call upon me to expedite them and I would call John
Dean and I liave to say whenever I called him he was frankly helpful.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall a meeting on or about June 20, 1972, in Mr.
Klenidienst's office, where Mr. Dean was and at which Mr. Dean made
some statements to you, according to his testimony, that this investiga-
tion should go very high, in fact it might involve the "White House;
in fact he testified he didn't know how far it might go.
Mr. Petersen. I remember the circumstances, I don't remember it as
Mr. Dean testified to it. I was called up to Mr. Klendienst's office. Mr.
Dean was already there. They asked for a status report and I gave
them a general status report on the nature of the investigation. We had
some discussion. I think commonplace discussion. My God, what has
happened, who is doing this and what type of a situation is this. And
1 told him that, I remember the words very distinctly, I said, "John,
I don't know who I am talking about but whoever is responsible for
this is a damn idiot and there is only one thing that the President of the
United States can do and that is cut his losses and the way that he
should do that is to instruct the Attorney General publicly to run an
3614
iill-oiif, inv<',sti<i:ation aiid let, Mic devil livl<n the, hindmost. And that
(Mi^dit lo he, done ininicdiatclv." We. had some, discussions of that and
linally Dciiii Siiid, "Well, llic Picsidcnt is out in San Clemcnte." I said
i( is well ('nou<j:h lor- somebody to <!:o out. tlicic and Mr. Kleindienst
said, "Jolin, set that up." Dean thon fj^ot up to loavo, and wo, had some
(roiivcrsations about the invest if^at ions and I told him I had no inten-
i ion of conduclinj; a fishinjj: expedition but wo wore certainly goin^ to
conduct a thoroujjfh in\'esti<2:i«tion of this matter.
liMler on I iisked iii?n what liiul be(>n decided and he said, "Yes,
somebody is ^^oin^^ to <j:o oui but it has Iwen decided it should be mo."
Mr. I ),\sii. Meaning; Ml. Dean?
Mr. Pktkkskn. Mr. Dean i-aOier than Mi". Kleindienst, which T
(liou<rht was a little awkward, bul (|uite honestly I took it as anothei-
indicalion oi' as an indication that i)erhaps the Attorney General, who
I Ihink mosi hii>:hly of, was pei'haps imt in the best <iraces at the White
House and I hat they would rather have Mr. Dean biief the l^resident.
After- tiial there was an aIl-consuinin<; silence, T lUMcr heard anythin<;
and I (inally asked Dean aborrt it and he said, ''Yes, you arc to I'un an
all-out in\('stio^at ion" but un foit unately we never- heard anvthin*; fr'om
the l*r-esident.
W \ can jumj) ah(>ad. In my later- conversations with the President
on A|)r'il 15, T told him this and he said. Dean had never- come to
liim, ami 1 said if it occurivd airain, aiul I cer-tairdy hoi)ed it did not,
1 worrld be ir|) t her-e kru)ckinii:on the door- mvself.
Ml-. DAsri. ]ji'\ me r-ead tlu> portion of the testimony tliat Mr. Dean
jfavo us on pao-t> -JlTJ) of the tr-anscri])t in which he indicates tliat
INfr. Kleiiulienst had another- meetiri - while vou wer-e up tliere in
Mr-. Kleiruliensfs otlice, that you and he wont to Mi". Kleindienst's back
ollice and lie said to the best of mv recollection "We did not discuss
specifics, i-ather- it was a <rcne!-al discussion. I told them T had no,"
meaninir vou, Mv. Peter-sen, "I had lU) idea whei-e this thinj»: mijxht end
but I told him 1 did not think tire White House coidd withstand a wide
ojxMi irwestliration.'"
Do you recall him sayino- that ?
Mr. Pi'.TKrjsKx. Do 1 r-ecall him sayino; that ?
IVfr-. Dash. Yes, do you ?
Mr-. Pktkhskn. No, T do not. T do recall some discussion, some concern
about this ouirht not to be an excuse in a political year to run a <rcneral
|)r-obe of the White House. T had lU) pi-oblem ajir-eeino- with that. T
ctM-tainly didn't conceive the occui-r-ence as a specific cr-ime — a sjKvific
cr-ime as an excuse for- me to run a ireneral investigation of the White
1 louse and all of its activities. T assured them there would be no fishinjr
expeditiori as far- as AVhite House activities were concerned in this
investiijation but that we would run a thoi"oup:h investigration of that
buri2:lai-v.
Afr. Dash. Do vou rvcaW ha\ iuix any convei-satiou with the Actintr
Dir-ector of the FIH, (nav, over iiiviuir Mr. TXnm investiirative repoi'ts
suchasi'^OJfiles^
Ml-. PiriT-rtsKN. Conversation with Mr. Grav ?
Mr. Dash. With Afi-.tiray.
Mr. Pkikkskx. T had no convei'sation with ^fr. Gray about investi-
irative reports until sometime after April 15 Avhen wo discussed
3615
Mr. Dash. 1 am addressing myself now to the time while the investi-
gation was lVx;usiiig on tlie \\'iiit<i i louse stall and also on the Com-
mittee for the Ke-KJectioji of the l-'resident.
Mr. Petkjjslx. Abs^jluteiy not. 1 can elaborate on that. 1 don't want
to anticipate your question.
Mr. Dash. 1 guess tiie next question is: Did Mr. Dean ever ask you
for permission to have ^302 files, raw files of the FBI?
Mr. Petersen. Xo, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did it ever come to your attention that such raw files
were being used by Mr. Dean, tliat he had them in his possession dur-
ing any inquiry that he was making {
Mr. Petersen. No, sir. Mr. Kleindienst called me at one stage and
I recall this very vividly, it was on the telephone, and he said 1 have
just spoken to John Dean and he has a.sked if he can have the FBI
reports and 1 answered liim very quickly and abruptly and said, tell
him no, and 1 was ~>() abrupt that he just stalled to laugh. His reaction
was, you are a big help. And 1 then was a little embarrassed to tliink
that he might feel that I w^as inconsiderate of his relationships with
the President or the White House and I said, well, hear me out. If
the President calls you up and sa,ys I want those reports, you click
your heels and say, Yes, sir, or if they want to send out a memoran-
dum, say, from the President and .say send those reports over to X, Y,
and Z, I said we can do that, but we ought not to give those reports on
an oral request to any White House staffer, and he said, I think I
agree with that.
That is the last I heard of it.
Mr. Dash. What was the basis of your decision to safeguard these
reports ?
Mr. Petersen. Prudence, prudence. I didn't think there was, I had
no suspicion of John Dean as such. Indeed, on April 1.5 when I heard
b\ his own admission that he was involved I was the most surprised
person in Washington. I guess, but it was simply prudence. I didn't
think when Mr. Hunt who had worked over there was involved and
wliere there was so much opportunity for cynicism that prudence
dictated we should make those reports available. I thought Mr. Dean,
if he was, as I understand, charged by the President to keep abreast
of this situation, was entitled to ultimate facts, but I didn't think he
needed evidentiary facts.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware of any practice in the past of pro^ading
302 or raw FBI filfs to White House staff persons on request ?
Mr. Petersen. Xo, sir, I was not.
Mr. Dash. So that this would be an unusual request so far as you
were concerned ?
Mr. Petp:rsen. It would be an unu.sual request so far as I was con-
cerned but I have to add. Mr. Dash, that the best witness on that would
have to be somebody from the FBI bf^cau.sfi I would suspect that re-
quest would go directly to them in many instances.
Mr. Dash. I^t me ask you about this.
If the request went specifically to the FBI. would the Director of
the FBI or the Acting Director of the FBI be under an obligation to
check with the Attorney General before he acceded to such a request?
Mr. Petersen. Well, like in all things I think maybe sometimes.
I don't want to sound like a lawyer, which I am, sometimes yes and
3616
sometimes no. If it were, for example, a background investigation
of Henry Petersen for a Wliite House appointment and they wanted
to see them, I am sure they would be happy to carry them over there,
but if it were an investigation of somebody who was closely tied in wdth
some susi^ected wrongdoing, I think again prudence would dictate
they go to the Attorney General.
Mr. Dash. And if it involved actually sending over a large number
of 302's involving the investigation of P"BI while questions were being
asked of stall' members of the Committee for the Re-Election of the
President, what would your thinking be?
Mr. PE'noRSKN. Again I think this is imprudent. It is very hard to
say, well, you can't have that, we suspect you of wrongdoing to an-
other Government official. You don't do that, at least I do not, but
nonetheless I would think that in your position it would be wise for
you not to have these reports to prevent embarrassing questions from
being asked.
Mr. Dash. I think we may have had some description of this in
the past but perhaps you can add this to the record. Exactly what is
included in a ;U)2 file?
Mr. Petersen. The statement of a witness.
Mr. Dash. And is it an evaluated report ?
Mr. Petersen. No, it is a statement of the witness as given to the
FBI agent.
Mr. Dash. That might include just anything the witness might say,
which might be based on rumor or gossip ?
Mr. Petorsen. That is right.
Mr. Dash. By the way, during this period of time early in the
investigation, wei'e you aware of any restrictions on the investigation
placed l)y the President concerning national security or CIA involve-
ment or the internal investigative unit at the White House?
Mr. Petersen. Only, I suppose I have to answer that no, I had
some discussions with Mr. Gray concerning the potential of CIA in-
volvement and one such discussion was on July 5 and he had come
to my office to discuss the matter and he had some prior communica-
tions with the (TA personnel and he indicated that there was, lie had
been led to believe there was some CIA involvement and I said, "Pat,
you can't accept that, at least vou can't acce)>t that orally, vou had
better get that in writing and if you accept it I am not going to be
bound by it because I just don't believe that, it is too convenient,'"
and he agreed with that, but that was the only— he came back later
and said, "Well, there apparently was no CIA involvement."
I had no other communications.
Mr. Dash. Well, the President in his statement of May 22 did
state that he asked Mr. Haldeman and Mr. EhrHchman to restrict
the investigation so as not to reveal national security matters or CIA
involvement. Did Mv. Haldemnn and Mr. Ehrlichman get in touch
with you as Chief of the Criminal Division and tell you or convey
that instruction of the President to you ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware, by the wav, of the meetin<TS that Mr.
Walters had Avith Mr. Gray concerning the question of CIA involve-
ment on June 23 and some later meetings that Mr. Dean had with Mr.
Walters concerning: this?
i
3617
Mr. Petersen. I was not aware at all of the Dean meetings until the
recent disclosures. I was aware that Mr. Gray was in touch with Mr.
Walters to try and detennine whether or not there was any CIA in-
volvement in connection with the Mexican transactions.
Mr. Dash. And he later
Mr. Petersen. That is all.
Mr. Dash. And he later reported to you he learned there was no
CIA involvement?
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you ever discuss with Mr.
Mr. Petersen. Mr. Dash, I guess I ought to qualify that. I think
that is in the record, that there is some CIA assistance with respect
to E. Howard Hunt and there may have been — but on the direct ques-
tion with respect to the Mexican transaction, no.
Mr. Dash. Yes, and Mr. Petersen, I am confining these questions
now to the very early period within actually a week or so after the
break-in. I think the testimony before the committee is that Mr. Helms
spoke to Mr. Gray on June 22 and said there was no CIA involvement
and the meetings between ]Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Ambassa-
dor Helms, aiid Mr. Waiters was on June 2o. and then shortly after-
wards, in fact, on the same day, on June 23, General Walters spoke to
Mr. Gray. It is in that area, that time period, that I am directing my
questions.
Mr. Petersen. I had no such instructions.
Mr. Dash. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder's
appearance before the grand jury ?
Mr. Petersen. John Dean called me at the time of Magruder's
appearance before the grand jury and asked how Magruder made out.
I did not know and I called Earl Silbert and he said, well, you know,
as you all know, he is a very articulate young man and he described
hirn, he made a good witness in his own behalf, but, Henry, nobody
believes the story about the monej'. And, you know, that is — in those
words are what I told Mr. Dean.
Mr. Dash. Did you know what that was all about?
Mr. Petersen. Well, we were focusing on the money. Mr. Dash.
Maybe it is a poor boy syndrome but we could not imagine how $350,-
000 was just tossed out and nobody wants to know where it went or
what it was used for and. of course, the grand jury had the poor boy
syndrome, too. I gue.ss. They could not understand that either.
" Mr. Dash. AVere you aware of the fact that Mr. .Sloan told the prose-
cutor. Mr. Silbert. of Mr. Magruders effort to have him pick a different
sum of money that he paid to Mr. Liddy ?
Mr, Petersen, I was not aware of it at the time, I was subsequently
aware of that and. of course, talked to Earl Silbert about it and they
went into the grand jury.
Mr, Dash, You say subsequently. Was that prior to the indictment ?
Mr. Petersen. I think after. Mr. Dash, but what it came down to is
it was one on one. There it was a conflict, Sloan was a good witness in
other respects.
Mr, Dash. Actually, you said that Mr. Dean called you about how
Mr. Magruder made out. This was. I take it, after his final appearance
before the grand jury ?
3618
Mr. Petersen. After his appearance before tlie grand jury. I do not
know whether
Mr. Dash. Had he shown some interest prior to that? Of course, I
think there were three appearances that he had.
Mr. Petersen. Yes, of couree, first of all, the statements were at the
White House, coming from the White House that John Dean was
charged with preparing a report, and what have you. John Dean's
statements that were made to me were : I am responsible to keep the
President informed and, you know, if I get in there and he asks me a
question, he really chews me out if I do not know the answer and,
Henry, you liave got to keep me posted on these things. They wanted
to know — if there was going to be a new^sworthy item, they would like
to know about it at or about the time it happened. So to that extent
I tried to keep him informed of the ultimate facts and when I did not,
he would call.
Mr. Dash. Right, and, therefore, you did tell him that he had got
through the grand jury.
Now, can you recall a time when Mr. Ehrlichman got in touch with
you concerning the appearance of Mr. Stans before the grand jury ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir ; I can.
Mr. Dash. Can you briefly tell the committee about that in your own
words ?
Mr. Petersen. I cannot give you the date, Mr. Dash, I think that
Mr. Dash. Approximately w^hat period ?
Mr. Petersen. It is isolated. It was during the summer. It was
before the indictment. It can be fixed because it was immediately
before the return date of the subpena that was served on Mr. Stans.
I received a call at 11 :45 in my home. I was sitting at the kitchen
table and it was Mr. Ehrlichman and he charged Earl Silbert with
harassing former Secretary Stans and I told Mr. Ehrlichman that
Mr. Silbert w\as not a responsibility, that I had approved of that, and
that it was not harassment, that it was true he had been interviewed at
least twice by the FBI but we simply — I am hesitating because I want
to be fair to Mr. Stans — basically his testimony, his interviews were
the same as he gave the committee. Let me put it that way.
As I recall his appearance up here, there was some question about
whether the committee believed his statements that he did not know
what happened to the money, that all he did was collect it. We had
some difficulty, the same difficulty, and we felt that if that was his
story, that we ought to have it under oath. So to that extent we called
him basically the third time and it was right
Mr. Dash. "Wliat did INIr. Ehrlichman want ?
Mr. Petersen. What did he want? I asked him that question twice
and he never spelled it out except to stop harassing Mr. Stans and
I said we were not harassing him and he charged that Earl Silbert
was acting like a local prosecutor. Well, Mr. Silbert is a local pros-
ecutor [laughter].
Mr. Dash. Did you get the impression that Mr. Ehrlichman was
perhaps asking that Mr. Stans be excused from going to the grand
jury ?
Mr. Petersen. Well, that is what he was driving at. I asked him
twice what he wanted and he never answered other than to say stop
harassing. I asked him, I said, well, if Stans has a problem with the
3619
subpena, why doesn't his lawyer call him, and he said it was not neces-
sary, that Ehrlichman was calling me and we ended up telling him to
tell his lawyer to call me.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr, Kleindienst later speak to you about the same
matter?
Mr. Petersen. Mr. Kleindienst called me Sunday evening the day
after and said, are you upset, and I said about what? He said about
the Ehrlichman call. And I said no, I am not upset. I was a little mad
but it was his mistake, not mine, that I thought it was highly indis-
creet, and Kleindienst said, well, what is it all about, and I told him
that we wanted Stans' testimony under oath and he said, well, why
don't you come on down early in the morning. I have got to see
Ehrlichman about this and you come on, you and Silbert come. on
down and give me a briefing and we met, I think it was in my office
at 8 o'clock the next morning and briefed Mr. Kleindienst on the
status of the investigation.
I told him there is no need for you to be concerned about me. No point
going over to the White House and getting in a fight about me. He
cannot do anything to me. We will get his testimony.
I did discuss with Mr. Silbert and Mr. Kleindienst whether or not
we should make a concession. One of the concessions that we did make
was that we would take his testimony and what I described as under
grand jury conditions, that is, under oath, without his lawyer being
present, in order to avoid publicity and
Mr. Dash. Were you aware or did Mr. Kleindienst tell you about
his telephone conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman ?
]\Ir. Petersen. No, sir. I never heard of that. Indeed, I did not know
from whom he had learned of the conversation until very recently.
Mr. Dash. You said you did agree on a concession. Could you tell us
where was Mr. Stans interrogated ?
Mr. Petersen. He was interrogated in my conference room by the
prosecutors on the case with a reporter present and no one else.
Mr. Dash. And not before the grand jury ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Who else, by the way, was given a similar concession
during the investigation ?
Mr. Petersen. Colson, Kehrli, and Young.
Mr. Dash. Colson, Kehrli, and
Mr. Petersen. Young.
Mr. Dash. Was this requested by anybody in the ^Hiite House?
Mr. Pe^fersen. I think it was requested by John Dean in order to
avoid publicity.
Mr. Dash. Is tliere any special reason ? Is that the reason, to avoid
publicity, that this concession was given to White House staff?
Mr. Petersen. No. I don't think — that is all. Frankly, Mr. Dash,
one of the most difficult things I have had to do since I have been in
the Justice Department are decisions with respect to public officials,
because the concerns are tremendous. You err seriously if you don't
conduct an investigation where it should be conducted and if you do
conduct an investisration where it should not be, you do a terrible dis-
service to the public official involved. It is no help to sav, Avell, Mr.
Public Official, we want you to Imow you have been cleared and we are
sorry about all the publicity. That is a very serious thing and I have
3620 I
in the past made that type of concession to avoid that type of pub- ,
licity and I have tried to resolve tliese problems by conducting where I
necessary investigations of public officials in as discrete a fashion as j
possible until we can be precisely sure of our facts. And then you can 1
open up i
Mr. Dash. You are aware that when you did this, as you did in the
case of Mr. Stans, that you do prevent 'the grand jurors opportunity
of asking questions that might open up certain areas. j
Mr. Petersen. Obviously, but you see, Mr. Dash, not all witnesses i
go before a grand jury. The grand jury doesn't get the opportunity to i
question everybody in every case.
INfr. Dash. Were you aware that ISIr. Stans himself or his attorney |
received a transcript of his statement that he gave under these cir- j
cumstances ? i
Mr. Petersen. I am not aware whether he did or not.
Mr. Dash. Would there be any policy about his getting it if he had|
asked for such a statement? Would a witness, for instance, appear- jj
ing before the grand jury^ — —
Mr. Petersen. He would not get it and I would say in the sense wejj
were doing this under grand jury conditions, I would not suppose
that he did get it but I don't know whether he did or not.
Mt. Dash. The scope of the investigation itself — who set the scope
of the investigation in this case? Was it set by the prosecutors?
Mr. Petersen. Well, I am not sure I understand what that means.
Mr. Dash. What actually was considered within the scope of the
grand jury investigation and not within it ? i
Mr. Petersen. Watergate was considered within the scope of thei
grand jury investigation. Federal cornipt practices violations Ij
wanted handled separately and they were handled to the extent that {
we could do so and I think invariably we did accomplish it by the!
fraud section of the Criminal Division' with whatever the U.S. Attor-i
ney's Office was involved. So to that extent we tried to separate thei
two.
Now, they couldn't remain inseparable. There were some witnesses
who were common to corrupt practices violations that were before that
grand jury and where they were, we tried to combine both efforts and
have them all questioned by Silbert at one time.
Mr. Dash. Did you participate in a decision not to get into the so-
called dirty tricks activitv of Donald Segretti ?
Mr. Petersen. I sure did. I sure did.
Mr. Dash. Can you recall, did Mr, Dean raise that question to you? ;
Mr. Petersen. No, sir. Well, I don't remember whether he did or
not. I don't recall him raising it. That question was raised with me by
two people — Earl Silbert, wlio said, you know, in effect, we are not
experts on the Corrupt Practices Act.' We don't see anv violation. Do
you ? And I said, "No, not on the basis of what we have." This is around
August or September. The FBI in October— Charley Bowles who was
in charge of the accounting and fraud section called me and said,;
"Henry, you know we are not investigating these. Do you see a viola-
tion," and I said, "No."
You know, dirty tricks j)er se are not a violation to my knowledge
and the only violation we ha\e been unable to uncover in connection
with these things is the failure to accurately subscribe to a political
3621
Ijtatement that is promulgated — failure to subsciibe being a violation
Df U.S. 18,613, and that is what the investigations have gone off on,
,3ut mere dirty tricks, oral false schedules, for example, or passing an
'item of information on, was not a violation to my knowledge.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Segretti was called for questioning before the
^rand jury. Do you recall telling Mr. Silbert to limit his investigation
if Mr, Segretti to the so-called Watergate activities and not get into
:he dirty tricks ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, I did indeed.
What we were after was the relationship between Hunt. I misspoke
ifiyself, I don't remember that, I was confusing with Kalmbach. To
Segretti, we were relating, trying to relate his relationships to Hunt,
svhether or not they had any significance to the Watergate thing.
Now, I am unsure whether I knew at that time he had some relation-
ship to Kalmbach. In any event, I told Silbei-t I didn't want him get-
ting into the relationships between the President and his lawyer or the
fact that the President's lawyer might be involved in somewhat, I
hought, illegitimate campaign activities on behalf of the President.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall this conversation, that Mr. Dean testified
to, on page 2245 of the transcript ? He said :
After my conversation with Chapin, I called Mr. Petersen at the Department
>f Justice and explained the problem that was confronting Segretti. I told
Petersen that to the best of my knowledge Segretti had no involvement in the
Watergate incident but he had had dealings with Hunt in connection with some
campaign activities he had been performing for the White House.
I also informed Petersen that he was being paid by the President's personal
ittorney, Mr. Kalmbach, and that he liad been recruited by Chaiun and Strachan.
I said that these facts, if revealed, would obviously be quite embarrassing and
?ould cause political problems during the waning weeks of the election. Mr.
Petersen said that he understood the problem and would determine what he
could do.
Do you recall that ?
Mr. Petersen. I don't remember in those terms. It could well have
been I told Silbert I wanted him to confine his investigation to the
Watergate, I don't regard this crime as an excuse for us to run a gen-
eral investigation of the Wliite House and the entire Republican
Party.
Mr. Dash. It did turn out, did it not, that a grand juror on the jury
did ask Mr. Segretti certain questions that brought out the names of
Mr. Chapin and others?
Are you aware of it?
Mr. Petersen. I have heard about that. I wondered if that was by
chance or Earl Silbert's way of disagreeing.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall having a conversation with Mr. Dean with
reference to responding to Congressman Garry Brown's letter con-
cerning the Patman committee investigation ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, but that is a very confused situation, too. He
mentioned that to me and seemed to think I had the letter and I did
not. The letter was in the deputy's office. Ultimately I was consulted
with respect to the letter and I do remember Mr. Dean asking me
what our policy was with respect to congressional committees and I
told him our policy was to advise them if there was a pending prose-
cution, ordinarily our relationships were good enough so we could do
that, work it out and our problems were generally with the investi-
gative committees like the McClellan committee and what have you.
96-296 O — 73 — pt. 9 15
3622
Mr. Dash. Were you aware the Patman committee was in fact
planning to call or subpena a number of the witnesses that would be
involved in the criminal prosecution ?
Mr. Petersen. Only from the public press.
Mr. Dash. Was it your position that such a congressional committee
might prejudice the criminal prosecution ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, and I sent a letter. The letter was prepared by
my staff in the office of legal counsel, it was sent to Congressman Pat-
man setting forth our position and the fact that under i\\^ DeJaney
case the Government is regarded as a monolith and the actions of a
congressional committee are attributable to the prosecution in that and
it might result in prejudicial publicity, yes.
Mr. Dash. Did you later learn what happened to the subpenas that
were proposed to be sent in the Patman committee investigation?
Mr. Petersen. I have no idea about that.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, the vote was against subpenaing
them and
Mr. Petersen. I understand.
Mr. Dash. It never got off the ground.
Mr. Petersen. I understand there was such a vote.
Mr. Dash. On October 24, 1972, do you recall receiving certain docu-
ments from Mr. Kleindienst which had been turned over to Mr. Klein-
dienst by CIA relating to Mr. Hunt's activities ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, I do.
Mr. Dash. On October 24, were these just documents or did they
include photographs, do vou know?
Mr. Petersen. My recollection Is that there was a series of photo-
graphs attached to the package. I guess to recount the situation I was
called up to Mr. Kleindienst's office, Mr. Helms and his counsel, Larry
Houston, were there, they expressed some reservations about potential
embarrassment to the CIA and that they were there with certain in-
formation as a result of questions generated by INIr. Silbert, they hoped
it would not be necessary to disclose them, I took the information and;
left with Larry Houston, sat down and examined their concerns and
their concerns related to the hope that had been furnished to CIA and
there was one possible wholly unrelated valid CIA activity involved
which they were most desirous of protecting. I assured them we would j
trv and do that, made arrangements to get Earl Silbert over there and
while he went over the documents, we studied those photographs and
we couldn't make any sense of them at all.
Mr. Dash. To refresh your recollection, do you recall that there;
were actually two times you may have received certain documents,;
once documents alone from Mr. Kleindienst, on October 24, and somej
documents in which photographs were attached sometime in the earlyj
part of Jainiary — ^January 3 ?
Mr. Petersen. No, I don't remember any January 3d, Mr. Dash. We!i
got some documents from CIA in October and some documents fromi
CIA in December. [
Now, I could be mistaken, thev may have been attached to the De-|
cember documents but my recollection is they were in the October
package.
Mr. Dash. May I show you a copv of a memorandum dated Decem-!;
ber 5, 1972, and attached to it are Xerox copies of photographs and
see if these are the records that you did receive ?
3623
yh'. Petersen. I recognize one which is a picture of Mr. Liddy in
lont of a stationery store which has the sign on the window "Xerox
'opies While You Wait." I recognize that one. I recognize another
)ne in which there is an address 11923 on the building, a car outside.
recognize another one in which there is written in on it — two auto-
nobiles — resei-ved Dr. Fielding, reserved Dr. Rothberg.
Mr. Dash. Actually what you did receive were Xeroxes of photo-
iiaphs, not photographs themselves ?
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Mr. Dash. And do they appear something like these Xeroxes I have
liown you?
]Mr. Petersen. Those I have mentioned to you ; yes, sir.
]\[r. Dash. When you received these, was there any indication to
on as to wliat investigation these drafts related to ?
Mr. Petersen. No, we Avere investigating, of course, activities of
lunt and Liddy out in California, trying to figure out why, what its
elationship to Watergate was, and Silbert and I sat down and went
)ver these documents and we couldn't relate them to anything. Later
ve asked CIA, I guess, and they didn't have any descriptive data or
legatives or actual photographs or anything that would assist us.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware of the special investigating unit which
lad been called the Plumbers that was in the White House ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did your Criminal Division play any role in the investi-
gation of the Pentagon Papers leak ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware of the investigation that this so-called
nvestigating unit was making of Dr. Ellsberg or his psychiatrist?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. And when you noticed, I think there was some evidence,
iome of these photographs referred to a Dr. Fielding, did you know
vho Dr. Fielding was ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
]\Ir. Dash. Or whether or not he was related in any way to IVIr. Ells-
)erg. So that in receiving these documents, would it be fair to say that
hey did not put you on notice of any break-in or effort to break into
3r. Fielding's office?
Mr. Petersen. They did not.
Mr. Dash. Or had any relation to the investigation by the Justice
Department investigation of Mr. Ellsberg or the prosecution that was
roing on ?
Mr. Petersen. We didn't relate those documents to the Ellsberg
;ase, I think, until the time of ISIr. Krogh's affidavit in connection
vith the Ellsberg matter.
Mr. Dash. INIr. Chairman. I would like to have the memorandum
)f December 5, 1972, with the accompanying Xerox copies of photo-
graphs marked appropriately and admitted in evidence.
Senator Ervin. Let the reporter assign it the appropriate exhibit
umiber.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. l-tfi.*]
♦See p. 3S61.
3624
Mr. Dash. Around December 22, 1972, in connection witli hearings
on Mr. Bittman's motion, I understand, concerning certain items that
were taken out of Mr. Hunt's safe, did ]\Ir. Dean tell you that he had
given certain items from Mr. Hunt's files to Mr. (xray ^
Mr. Petersen. Yes, we had an all afternoon session which started
around 2 or 2 :30 p.m. in which we were interviewing Mr. Dean, Mr.
Fielding — Fred Fielding of the White House stall', and Bruce Kehrli
with respect to their search of IMr. Hunt's office immediately after it
was ascertained that he had some part in the break-in.
Mr. Bittman in his motion on behalf of Mr. Hunt had alleged that
there were two notebooks present among Mr. Hunt's possessions that
were not accounted for in the FBI inventory and we were trying to
determine where they were, if they existed, did the FBI agents have
them, did Dean, Fielding, Kehrli come across them, did they retain
them or what have you, and w^e spent all afternoon interrogating those
three people anticipating they would be called as defense witnesses
on the motion to suppress. At approximately 6:30 that evening my
recollection is we were interrupted with news on the DeCarlo com-
mutation.
Mr. Dean pulled me aside and said the statement in there were true, i
he had given everything to the FBI, but some documents he had given
to Mr. Gray personally and I said, "Well, John, I just want to know
one thing, are thev related to Watergate," and he said, "They are abso-
lutely unrelated." I said, "Well, if you are asked that question, you
are going to have to tell the trutli." I remember his answer very vividly.
"Henry, I will tell the truth, I am not going to lie for that damn
Ehrlichman. I may lie for the President but I am not going to lie for
him." I said, "INIore than that, John, I am willing to take your word
that they are not related to Watergate, but defense counsel is not going
to be. Now if you are asked that question, those documputs are goinp-
to have to be produced and you had better talk to Pat Gray about it"
and he said he would. We broke up on that note and we were going to
get back to it, supposedly.
T was off on a Christmas holidav. When we came back, negotiations
were undertaken with respect to the plea of guilty bv Hunt and at
the suggestion of the pi'osecutors I approved the acceptance of a plea
to three counts, the conspiracy count, burglarv count, and eavesdrop-
ping count, which as I recall would have subiected them to about 25
years, and the court w^ent us on'- better and insisted they plead to
everything, which they did. With the acceptance of the plea the motion
to suppiTSS was not pressed and, of course, I guess I just no longer
had in the forefront of mv mind those documents or that question
with respect to those notebooks.
Mr. Dash. Did there come a time when you followed up and asked
Mr. Grav whether or not he did receive certain documents out of
Mr. Hunt's safe from Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Pktet?sex. During the course of Mr. Gray's confirmation hearing
he had occasion to call me about some point and in the course of that
conversation I had asked him verv casuallv if he had ever received
documents from John Dean from Hunt's safe or office which were not
given to the agents and he said, no. The next occasion came on or
3625
iboiit April 15 when John Dean was beino- debriefed by the prosecutors
md he related this to him and Silbert asked me about it and I said
fes, and told him I had asked Pat Gray and Pat Gray said no, and I
yent back to Pat Gray either on April 16 or 17 and asked him again,
;old him what John Dean had said, and he said Henry, that is not so.
\.bout this time I was having some discussion with the President about
t, I had imparted this information to him and he said well, I think
3ean is telling the truth on this, you ought to ask Ehrlichman, When
left there I went over to Ehrlichman's office and he was not there
md I frankly did not bother going back to him. We double-checked
vith Dean's counsel and they were sure of it and I went back to Mr.
iray the following week, around the 25th, 26th, and asked him again
md this time he said yes, that he had received such documents, that
hey had implied that he ought to destroy them, that he had taken
hem home over the weekend and brought them back and tore them up
md thi-ew^ them in the burn basket. I said
Mr. Dash. Did he tell you why he had destroyed them, whether he
.vas acting under instructions?
Mr. Petersex. Well, I asked him if he read them and he said no, and
le said, well, they just said thev were ])o]itically sensitive.
Mr. Dash. Did you say he did not know the contents of the papers?
Mr. Petersen. I asked him if he read them and he said he did not.
Mr. Dash. Where did you say that ]\Ir. Gray Avent before he burned
;hem ?
Mr. Petersen. He went to Connecticut. He was in travel status, as I
f'ecall his statement to me, and after he received the documents he was
^oing up over the weekend or to make a speech and took the documents
>vith him and told me he brought them back to the office and toi'e them
ip and pointed down to the basket beneath his desk and said I put
:hem in there.
Mr. Dash. Without reading them?
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Mr. Dash. On the 26th, which was quite some time beyond the
period we have been talking about, Mr. Gray has testified that on that
day, apparently that is the day he did admit to you that he destroyed
the documents, you said to him that you were scared and that you and
tie, Mr. Gray, were expendable and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlich-
man were not expendable.
Did you say anything like that to him and, if so, why ?
Mr. Petersen. I am not sure you have the time right, Mr. Dash. As
[ recall it, that was the night before Mr. Gray resigned. It was the day
m which this item that we are discussing was ]>ublicized and 1
"eceived a call from the President, as did Mr. Kleindienst in the
evening, and the President asked me whether or not I thought Mr.
jrray ought to resign and I told him that T thought Mr. Gray's posi-
:ion was untenable. And he said we will discuss it with the Attorney
jreneral. He, too, had talked to the Attorney General and, of course.
[ did discuss it with the Attorney General and pursuant to the Presi-
ient's instructions we asked Pat Gray to meet us and we did meet in
:he back office of Mr. Kleindienst's office and we discussed the situation
md in my conversations with the President I expressed some sym-
oathy for Mr. Gray, who I think most highly of. I have no hesitancy;
[ liked the man verv much. And I told the President, "Mr. President,
3626
T think he is an innocent victim," and the President said, "yes, Henry,
niavbe, but there are o:oin^ to be a lot of innocent victnns before this
is over." So it was in that context, the context of commiseration. I
did not want to be there, we wei-e in effect, suggesting that the man
resign, and when Mr. Kleindienst went out of the room to talk to the
President again, you know, I said Pat, we are all going to be embar-
rassed before this is over. I am scared, we have a constitutional con-
frontation here, we have the Presidency of the strongest nation m the
world teetering in the brink. I do not rememl^er saying that wc woiv
expendable, Ehrlichman and Haldeman were not, but I may have. I
was upset.
Mr. Dash. Are you aware that Mr. Gray's testimony is that lie
informed vou on April 17 that he had received the documents? Are yon
aware that at that earlier time he gave you that information ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir. My recollection is that I went to see him<)ii
the 16th or 17th and he denied it, I went back to see him the following
week after double-checking with Silbert and Dean's counsel and the
President, what have you, and it was Tuesday of that week, I think,
maybe the 25th, 26th.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall that sometime after the conviction of the
seven Watergate defendants and the sentence, having lunch with Mr.
Kleindienst, Mr. Dean and ISIr. Ehrlichman and a question of leniency
for the defendants coming up.
Mr. Petersen. No, no, I ne^•er had
Mr. Dash. Let me rephrase the question. Are you aware of a lunch j
that Mr. Kleindienst had with Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman in i
which a question of leniency came up concerning the defendants in the
Watergate case ?
Mr. Petersen. AVell, I am aware of a time when I received a tele-
phone call from Mr. Kleindienst who said I am just now leaving the
White House and I am on my wav to the airport and on the way by 1
will stop by and you go downstairs and I will pick you up. You can
ride out to the airport with me and I want to get some information
from you, and I cannot fix the date except that it was a time when
Mr. Kleindienst was going to Boston and he was meeting his wife at
the airport.
We rode out to the airport and he said, I just had lunch with Dean
and Ehrlichman and they raised a question of whether or not leniency
could be accorded these defendants. And I said absolutely not. I said
indeed, we are going to do just the contrary. It is not the practice in
the District of Columbia to recommend specific terms, jail terms, but
it certainly is the practice to recommend for jail or no jail and we
intend to recommend jail time for these people and beyond that, after
they are sentenced we intend to call them back and immunize them and ;
in order to compel their testimony as to whether or not other persons
are involved, and if they ai-e contumacious and refused to testify they
will be held in contempt. We discussed more what the procedure was, I
the sentencing procedures and when they would be sentenced and what
have you, and he finally said do me a favor, go on back and go on)
over to the White House and tell those crazy guvs over there what vou
just told me before they do something thev will be sorry for. And
I said, well. OK, and T went back to my office and on the way backs
I thought I have not been over there yet and this is not the time to go.
3627
so I called John Dean on the telephone and told him, John, there is no
point in my coming over there, we are going to recommend jail time
and these people are going to be immunized and we then discussed
what innnunity meant, what the alternatives are — and they are : you
can be contumacious and go to jail almost immediately or you can lie
and take your risk that the Government will be able to' prove it, which
may give you a little bit of time, or you can cooperate, and I spelled
those out for him and that ended the conversation.
Mr. Dash. We have had testimony from Mr. Kleindienst and I think
Mr. Kleindienst indicated that you perhaps would be our better wit-
ness as to what occurred on April 14 which led also to a meeting on
April 15 with the President. AVhat actually led to the meeting that
you had with Mr. Titus, Mr. Silbert, ;Mr. Glanzer, Mr. Campbell, on
April 14?
Mr. Petersen. Mr. Silbert was trying to get me all throughout the
day on April 14. I did not get home until approximately 6 oi- 7 o'clock
in the evening. I called him and he said it was imperative that he see
me, that he. Titus, Silbert, Glanzer, meet with me immediately. And
1 agi'eed. So we set up a meeting in my office at 8 :30 that night. They
came down and they launched into the fact they had made a break-
through in the Watergate case and that it was of significant propor-
tions and that they were in the course of attempting to negotiate an
agreement for John Dean's testimony and they had received certain
information from him in the course of the negotiations which they had
agreed not to utilize unless some type of agreement was reached. They
had received also testimony from Jeb Stuart Magruder which seemed
to corroborate the skeletal facts Mr. Dean had given them and that on
the basis of all of these facts they concluded that Mr. Mitcliell, Mr.
Mardian, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman,
Mr. Dean, were putative defendants.
Mr. Dash. When you had that information, did you call Mr.
Kleindienst or did Mr. Kleindienst call you ?
]\fr. Petersen. That was the night of the White House correspond-
ents'* dinner and I had great difficulty in getting in touch with Mr.
Kleindienst and we finally left word for the White House to get in
touch with his car, radio car, and he called me I guess around 12 :3n
a.m., after the dinner. We then made arrangements to meet at his home.
Mr. Titus and Mr. Silbert and I arrived at his home around 1 :30 or
2 o'clock in the morning and we proceeded between then and 5 a.m. to
give him a recitation of what we thought was in the offing and who
was involved.
Mr. Dash. I take it these are the same facts that you had been
briefed on by the prosecutors.
Mr. Petersen. That is right, and, of course, it was the unanimous
recommendation of all of us that he inform the President immediately
because of the implications. This was really the first information that
we had to tie it to people of the stature of Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Halde-
man and Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dash. And did you set up a meeting or did Mr. Kleindienst set
up a meeting with the President?
Mr. Petersen. Mr. Kleindienst agreed he would set up such a meet-
ing with the President and, as I recall, he said he was going to— there
3628
was a prayer breakfast over there and he would attempt to set it uj{
while he was there.
I next heard from Mr. Kleindienst at approximately 2 o'clock Sun-
day afternoon and he asked me to come down to the office and I did so
ancl while there, he said he was ^oin^ to go and see the President agaii^
at 3 or 3 :30 p.m., and maybe it would be a good idea if I would com^
with him, and I said OK.
Mr. Dash. "Was it at that time that you and Mr. Kleindienst gave a
complete briefing as to what you had learned from the prosecutors —
Mr. Petersex. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash [continuing]. To the President?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Can you tell the committee what the reaction of thejj
President was at that time ? li
Mr. Petersen. "Well, I guess the reaction of the President was one|
of concern when I remember remarking to Mr. Kleindienst how ij
admired his calm. I would have been cussing and fuming. He was con-|
cerned, and you have to understand that I had seen the Presidentf
only on ceremonial occasions or briefings on legislation. He didn'tji
know me from Adam. i
Mr. Dash. This was your first face-to-face meeting with the Pres-j
ident, then, wasn't it? i
Mr. Petersen. Yes ; at any time in a situation where he was relying I
solely on my advice, and here I was recommending that two people
whom he had known and worked with for years be dismissed.
Mr. Dash. Who were they ?
Mr. Petersen. Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dash. "What was his reaction to that recommendation?
Mr. Petersen. He understood my concerns and he appreciated my
candor and my concern for the Presidency and my position was that I
can't guarantee you that we have a criminal case at this point, but I
can guarantee you that these people are going to be a source of vast
embarrassment to the Presidency and for that reason I think that the
best thing that you could do would be to get rid of them immediately.
The President's response was interesting. He said, yes, but he owed
them an obligation of fairness, too, and I didn't disagree with that. ^
If somebody came in and said about my two assistants you have got
to fire them immediatelv, I would take time to look.
Mr. Dash. ^YhRt office
Mr. Petersen. He took lonsfer tlian I would have liked. I guess I
was a little impatient but he did it and that was the important thing.
Mr. Dash fcontinuingl. "\Aniat office was this meeting held in?
Mr, Petersen. In the old Executive Office Building.
Mr. Dash. "Were you aware at the time, Mr. Petersen, that these
conversations Avere being taped ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir: but it didn't surprise me. I would have an-
ticipated — I think if vou had asked me I would have thought that was
a fair possibility and frankly let me say for the record I have no ob-
jection. I think the Chief of State ou.qfht to do it.
Mr. Dash. Did you make any recommendation with regard to Mr.
Dean?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, I did. The President said, "You know, Halde-
man and Ehrlichman deny this and I have got to find this out. Dean in
3629
effect has admitted it. Should I request his resignation?" And I said,
"My goodness, no.. Now, here is the first man who has come in to co-
operate with us and certainly we don't want to give the impression
that he is being subjected to reprisal because of his cooperation. So
please don't ask for his resignation at this point" And the President
agreed to hold off until I — until he heard from me further on that
issue. That carried on until about the 26th or 27th of October and in
a statement on the telephone I reached the conclusion after discussions
with Silbert that we had reached an impasse in our negotiations with
Mr. Dean.
Mr, Dash. You don't mean October. You mean April.
Mr. Petersen, Right, Mr. Dash. April, excuse me.
We had reached an impasse in our discussions with Mr. Dean and
that I could no longer iusdfy the President's not asking for his
resignation, and
]\ir. Dash. Prior to that time, do you recall having a discussion with
the President concerning immunity that might be afforded witnesses ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Could ycu tell us briefly about that ?
[ Mr. Petersen. Well, I think that started — that started the preceding
Wednesday. Mr. Ehrlichman had called Mr. Kleindienst and Klein-
dienst called me up there and said he just had a call from John Ehr-
lichman and Ehrlichman wants to say he didn't think any White
House aides ought to be immunized and it didn't make much of an
impression on me and I just made a witticism and said, "Well, tell
Ehrlichman he can't count on it." and I didn't think anything more
about it. Of course, wlien T learned at the end of the week
Mr. Dash. And at this time Mr. Dean was in these conversations, in
cooperation with tlie prosecutor.
Mr. Petersen. That is right. At tlie end of the week when I learned
Dean was cooperating ii made more sense. The President took it up.
The President — we went on with this for about 2 or 3 davs. We had a
difference in viewpoints, of coui'se. The President's concern — I hope
I accurately reflect liim but it seemed to me the President's concern
was that from a public j-clations point of view, certainly he wanted to
leave the impression that he as President was not causing persons who
were in the uppei- echelons of his administration to be immunized and
freed from liability. He wanted to make certain that in that respect no
one got the impression that they were getting favored treatment.
Well, you know, T understood that to be a consideration but I also
understood that if it were in the intei-ests of the prosecution, that it
might be necessary to immunize some high echelon person.
Mr. Dash. Did vou explain that to the President ?
Mr. Petersen. I did indeed.
Mr. Dash. And did you get an understanding of who would make
the ultimate decision on immunity ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. And who would be given that ultimate decision ?
Mr. Petersen. Me.
Mr, Dash. Now. did that point in time
Mr. Petersen. At tliat point in time.
3630
Mr. Dash. On April IS. did the President call you concerning: the
immunity question ?
Mr. Petersex. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Can you tell us briefly about that call ?
Mr. Petersen. The President called me — I recall it was in middle or
late afternoon— and said that as a result of his conversation with the
President he felt that — Dean had said he had been immunized, said
the President, and I said, "Mr. President, that is not so. We are in the
process of determining whether or not he should be immunized but we
have made no decision and so far as normal immunity is concerned,
only I can orrant it. The prosecutors don't have the authority. I am
certain that is not so but I will check."
I called Earl Silbert and said — and he said, of course, just what I
said and I said, '"That is fine, but go on back to his counsel" and his
counsel agreed, "Xo, we are just in a preliminary negotiation, and no
immunity has been offered or accepted."
When I called the President back I told him that. He said, "Well,
you know, I have it on tape if you want to hear it," and I said "No,
I don't want to hear it because I don't want to get anything except
what we are getting from John Dean directly."
Mr. Dash. He said he had it on tape. Did he indicate it as a tape of
Mr. Dean?
Mr. Petersex. No ; he did not, and I didn't ask him.
Mr. Dash. Is that where the matter stood ?
Mr. Petersex. That is where the matter stood; yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. On April 16, did you receive a memorandum from Mr.
Silbert concerning the Ellsberg psychiatrist's break-in?
Mr. Petersex. Yes, sir ; I did.
Mr. Dash. Was that the first time that you learned of that break-in?
Mr. Petersex'. To be precise I ought to correct that. The memoran-
dum was dated April 16. I think I received it on the I7th, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Right. Was that the first time you learned of the
break-in ?
Mr. Petersex. I think Earl told me on the telephone — this is what
told us — "I am sending you a memorandum."
Mr. Dash. And what did you do when you received that memo-
randum ?
Mr. Petersex. I sent it to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin
Marony. I said. "Kevin, check this out. Let me know what this is
about." Mr. Marony came back with a note from him and a memo-
randum from one of his staff in which they said we have no such
information, nor does the FBI. Then we asked him to check whether
or not there was a i)sychiatrist involved, and what have vou. They
did and thev turned up from the FBI records that an individual by
the name of Fieldiiifr had been interviewed.
Well, that clicked. That led us to the photographs and then we made
the connection. I advised the President of that and kind of in resnonse
to his, well, what's new, and I told him that we had received this
information.
Mr. Dash. Did he iiirlicnto that he know anything about that break-in
when you told him about it ?
3631
Mr. Petersen. No ; he did not, Mr. Dash. I have to be very careful
there. I woukl like to rephrase the question for you, if I can. I sup-
pose it
Mr. Dash, Please do.
Mr. Petersex, The question probably would be did he indicate he
knew anything about it rather than anything about the break-in. And
the President said when I told him, ''I know about that. That is a
national security matter. You stay out of that. Your mandate is to
investigate Watergate."
Now, he didn't say he knew about the burglary. He said he knew
about it — about the report. I think that is a ^ital distinction to be
recognized,
Mr, Dash. When were you reporting this to the President ?
Mr. Petersen. It was on xVpril 18, sir. And he said stay out of it
and after I got off the telephone, why I called up Mr. Silbert and I
called up Mr. Marony and said, "Mr. Silbert," I said, "The President
said stay out of it. Earl, and that is it." I called up Mr, Marony and
said, "Just forget it,"
Then I proceeded to ponder the situation, I discussed it with some
of miy staff, so in terms of the actual, and the question involved of
wliether or not it was producible under Brady v. The United States,
which holds that exculpatory materials should be made available to
the defense. Well, there are two views of Brady, one, that anything
that may lead to an acquittal should be produced and another only
that which goes to guilt or innocence is producible, and obviously, the
prosecution usually takes the more narrow point of view and under
that narrow a point of view it was not produced — and we stood on
that for a day or so and then I rationalized that that miofht be true
but this was really not the case to test that and I thought if we tested
this in this sort of case we would probably lose it and it was such a
celebrated case and it would certainly have political overtones that
that type of thing ought to be disclosed, but I really didn't quite know
wliat to do.
Mr. Kleindienst had recused himself of Watergate and finally on
the 25th T went on up to ]Mr. Kleindienst's office and said, "Look, you
are out of the Watergate but vou are not out of Ellsberg. T need some
help." And we spent most of the day talking about this and he solicited
some independent opinions and concluded that T was right, that in-
deed it should be disclosed, and so I said. "Well, you know, the Presi-
dent has giA'en me a"
I Mr. Dash. You communicated that to the President ?
Mr, Petersen, I told Mr. Kleindienst that the President instructed
me to forfret about it but nonetheless I thought we ought to go to the
President and if he was nnhapnv about it we would simplv have to
take the consequences and y\v. Kleindienst ajrreed with that. He went
to the President. The President ajrreed. Mav T sav. ^Nlr. Dash, that T
have been distressed bv some of the criticism in the press, mavbe even
other places about the President on thnt score and T think it is wholly
unwarranted. He made— he took a position with me and T think I can
count mvself as not the most senior but at least a senior official in the
ndministrntion. We disapreed with it. We went back to him and he
finallv ao-reed with us and T tliink the ultimate thino- is that he came
out with the r'mht answer and T think he had every right to expect us
3632
to come back to him if we disagreed, and so I think the criticism is i
wholly unwarranted.
Mr. Dash. Did you receive a call from the President on April 30,
1973 ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Could you tell us what that call was about?
Mr. Petersen. April 30, 1973 ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Petersen. He called up and said, you can tell your wife that
the President has done what needed to be done, and I want to thank :
you for what you have done.
To the extent that requires some explanation in the course of our i
conversations, I was impressing upon the President the situation so •
far as I was concerned was degenerating, and it was vitally affecting :
the people's confidence in the TMiite House, and I related to him a •
conversation that I had with my wife at the breakfast table in which ^
she had said, "Do you think thePresident is involved?" And I related !
that to the President and I said, "If I reach the point where I think ,
you are involved, I have got to resign. If I come up with evidence of ^
you, I am just going to waltz it over to the House of Representatives."
but I said, "Wliat is important is that my wife, who is no left wing
kook, is raising these questions of me, and that indicates to me that
you have got a most serious problem.**
And that affected the President quite strongly, and when he called
me on April 30, he made that point.
^Ir. Dash. This was the dav that he announced the resignation of
Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Ehrlichman. and the leaving of the office at
his request of ^Ir. Dean.
Mr. Petersen, That is right.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Petersen, let me ask you a few more detailed questions about
your meeting with the President on April 15. You stated that you told
him on that occasion that although you possibly didn't have a criminal
case against Haldeman and Ehrlichman, that it could be very em-
barrassincr to the Presidency.
TMiat information did you liave on Haldeman and Ehrlichman at
that time ? T\Tiat had Dean told the prosecutors about Haldeman*s and
Ehrlichman's involvement in the Watergate matter ?
Mr. Petersen. "Well, we had not too much on ^Ir. Ehrlichman at
that point. We had Dean*s statement that Ehrlichman had told Dean
to "deep six** certain information recovered by Dean from Mr. Hunt*s
office. If you don*t mind. I will refer to my notes on this.
Mr. Thompson. Yes. sir.
Mr. Petersen. Too. that Mr. Dean had said that Ehrlichman
throush Dean had informed Liddy that Hunt should leave the coun-
try. Hunt corroborated this in part in that he testified that Liddy
had told him that Liddv's principals wanted Hunt rut of the country.
Hunt did not testifv with respect to or identifv Ehrlichman.
That is the basic information, the only information we had on Ehr-
lichman at that point.
3633
Mr. Thompson. Had he said anything at that point about furnish-
ing money to the defendants or the defendants' families or about
Ehrlichman's approval of money being raised and distributed to the
families?
Mr. Petersen. Yes. I think that that was mentioned — well, that
Ehrlichman had said, well, tell them we will do what we can, you
know. It was not specific with respect to any amount of money.
Mr. THOifPSOX. Was Kalmbach mentioned in this regard?
Mr. Petersen. Kalmbach was mentioned but not with any definitive
nature of the allegations against him, only that
Mr. Thompson. The major emphasis was on the "deep six" comment ?
Mr. Petersen. So far as Ehrlichman was concerned. So far as
Haldeman was concerned. Dean had allegedly told Haldeman that
there was a series of meetings, three in number, with John Mitchell
which took place in MitchelTs office.
Mr. Thompson. Beg your pardon ? I am sorry. "\Miat did you say ?
Mr. Petersen. Dean had told Haldeman, according to Dean, that
there was a series of meetings, three in number, in Mitchell's office in
wliich Liddy. Magruder, Dean, and Mitchell were present, and at each
of these meetings the Liddy operation was discussed, the purpose being
to obtain information about Democrat Presidential contenders.
On two occasions. Mitchell refused to authorize the budget pro-
posals, the first being for $1 million and the second $500,000. On the
third occasion. Mitchell approved a reduced budget of $300,000, The
operation was described as Operation Gemstone. Magruder had said
that the budget information was given to Strachan. Magruder also said
that the information given to Strachan was for delivery to Haldeman.
But Magruder was not in a position to say that Strachan actually
received it — actually delivered the information or that Haldeman
actually received it.
Dean stated that after the second meeting with Mitchell. Liddy
and ]NLigruder returned to the "VMiite House, relayed the information
to Haldeman. and the nature of the proposal was discussed and stated
that we ought not to have any part of them. Dean stated Haldeman
agreed. But I pointed out to' the President that apparently no one
took the laboring oar to try and stop them, and I thought that that
was certainly the responsibility of someone like Haldeman.
Magruder further stated that he caused to be delivered to Strachan
for transmittal to Haldeman a summary of the intercepted conversa-
tions. Again I told the President. ^Magruder was not in a position to
say that Strachan actually delivered that information. Strachan at
that point was being interrogated, and there was some indication that
he might be willing to cooperate, and I told the President those negoti-
ations were underwav and we thought that they would ultimately bear
fruit and that that would in etfect give us two or possibly three wit-
nesses against Haldeman and that was a very dire situation, and while
I couldn't say we had a criminal case at the time, certainly one was
in the offing.
Mr. Thompson. When did you make those notes ?
Mr. Petersen. Sir ?
Mr. Thompson. When
3634
Mr. Petersen. The President asked me to reduce to writin<r what 1
said to him about those two, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, and I did
that and <rave it to him on April 16.
Mr. TiioMPSOX. And that is the same thing that yon have before you
right now ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Would there be an objection to making that a part
of our record ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. If we could at a subsequent time make a copy of
that, unless you have an extra copy.
Mr. Petersen. I do not know whether I have an extra copy, INIr.
Thompson, but I will be happy to give this to you and you give me a
copy back. That will satisfy me.
Mr. Thompson. Would that be agreeable with the chairman?
Senator Erm:n. All right. Let the record show the notes identified
by Mr. Petersen will be appropriately marked as exhibits and admitted
into the record as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No, 147.*]
Mr. Thompson. All right, Mr. Petersen. So essentially, to go into a
little bit more detail — you have touched on this — one White House
member, Mr. Dean, was telling some very significant and dire things
about two other White House members, Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehr-
lichman. "Wliat was the President's reaction to this situation ? Did he
express a particular belief or disbelief in any version or any individual
or how did he evaluate the posture of those ?
Mr. Petersen. I think it is fair to say he was kind of upset about
Dean. He said that when he first learned about this that there were
more problems in store for him than he had anticipated on March 21
and he had asked Jolm Dean to reduce these to writing and sent him
up to Camp David to do so and apparently Dean was unable to reduce
them to writing and the President commented, I suppose because of his
involvement, and he was concerned that perhaps Dean was trying to
lighten the load on himself by impeaching Haldeman and Ehrlichman
and the question in the forefront of his mind was the validity of the
Dean information. That was the importance of Magruder's informa-
tion and the possibility of Strachan coming through as a corroborating
witness.
Mr. Thompson. Did he say precisely what Dean had told him on
March 21 ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir ; he did not. -
Indeed, he said that he told Dean to go up and write a report and |
he never got such a report and Dean was unable to write it.
Mr. Thompson. How did you phrase it a moment ago? What did he
say al)out the 21st?
Mr. Petersen. He had fii*st learned tliat— the words are mine, not '
the President's. He fii-st learned that there were more significant
pi'oblems than he had anticipated on March 21.
Mr. Thompson. Did he indicate that on March 21 he had learned
what you wei-e telling him ? i
Mr. Pe'torsen. No, sir; he did not. What he did suggest was that ]
after Dean had failed to piovide him this report, he had told Ehrlich- '
♦See p. 3875.
3635
I[nian to conduct an investigation. T never asked him for the product
d of Ehrlichman's investigation, nor do I know what it consisted of.
_ Mr. TiiOMPSOX. Did you ever discuss with the President the possi-
bility of his talking to Liddy or Liddy's lawyer ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sii". During the course — I did suggest to the
President that he ought to hear Jolni Dean himself, that he ought to
hear from John Dean what John Dean was telling the prosecutors to
aid the President in making up his mind with respect to his future
course of conduct toward Haldeman and Ehrlichman.
At my home later that Sunday evening, on April 15, Charlie Shaffer,
Mr. Dean's lawyer, called and present were Mr. Silbert and Mr. Glan-
zer, stated that he — Dean had had a call from Mr. Ehrlichman who
wanted to meet with Dean and requested our advice. We told him not
to meet with Mr. Ehrlichman but that it would be perfectly agree-
able to meet with the President. Thereafter he called back and said
that Mr. Dean had sent a message back to the AMiite House suggesting
Ithat he would be happy to meet with the President, and what have
you. The President called me that evening and said he had received
that message and should he meet with him and I said by all means. He
called again to say that the meeting had been set up. He called then
again around 9 :?)6 or 9 :45 — I did not know that Mr. Dean was still
there — and said that he had received information that Liddy was wait-
ing for some sort of signal from the White House, and the President,
as to whether or not he should be cooperative oi' testify and the Presi-
dent charged me with conveying that information to ]NIr. Liddy. I got
in touch with Mr. Tom Kennelly, who is local counsel for Mr. Liddy,
passed that message on to him. I was thereafter called around mid-
night by Mr. Maroulis, who is principal counsel for Mr. Liddy and
imparted the same information, namely, that if Mr. Liddy was not
cooperating out of any sense of misguided loyalty or loyaltv to the
administration, or what have you, that he was misguided and the Pres-
ident wanted him to cooperate. Mr. Maroulis thanked me for the
information and that was it. We have not heard from Mr. Liddy.
Mr. Thompson. Did the President ever tell you anything else that
was discussed in his conversation with Dean on April 15 ?
Mr. Petersen. No ; I did not want to hear it.
Mr. Thompson, "Why ?
Mr. Petersen. The reason I did not want to hear it was because we
were in negotiation with Mr. Dean and that negotiation was predi-
cated upon certain promises, that he would make certain disclosures
to us in order for us to determine whether or not an immunity should
be accorded him upon our representation that we would not use that
information directly or indirectly against him if no deal was struck.
So I did not want to receive information that came from Mr. Dean
from any other source in order to keep that situation, very difficult
situation, as clean as it could possibly be. The President offered to
let me hear the tape and I did not want to hear it.
Mr. Thompson. Up until April 30, when Dean was discharged, had
Dean told the prosecutors anything that would in any way implicate
the President in obstruction of justice or anything along those lines?
Did he mention a September 15 conversation, for example, or that he
had previously told the President of these matters and the President
had failed to act ?
3636
Mr. Petersen. No, sir; Mr. Dash. As late as April 27, I can be very
certain about that, on April 27 I received a call from the President
who said do you have any information that would reflect on the Pres-
ident on this thino;? I said, no. He said, would you come over, and I
did. I went over to the A^Hiite House and he repeated the question and
I said, no. I said, I do not have that type of information. I am sure the
prosecutors do not. If they did they would convey it to me immediately,
and we discussed it and
Mr. Thompson. Can you state the basis of his concern ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes; two reporters, one from the New York Times
and one from the AVashinfrton Post, posed the question at the White
House press office with the implication that this information was in
the hands of prosecutors. AVell, he said, well, would you mind calling
to make doubly sure and I did not
Mr. Thompson. Exactly what information, that the President was
somehow involved?
]Mr. Petersen. Somehow involved. It was just as general as that. I
said yes, I w^ould call. I went into the Cabinet room and made a call,
called Earl Silbert, and told him of the reports that had been received
in the "VAHiite Plouse press office and he said absolutely no, there was
no such information available.
Mr. Thompson. Did I understand you to say that on April 15, when
you discussed the fact that you felt Haldeman and Ehrlichman should
be dismissed, the President said in effect that Dean should be dismissed
also, he seemed to be involved to a certain extent ?
Mr. Petersen. It certainly was clear the President wanted to treat
all three alike.
Mr. Thompson. Because of your suggestion the President evidently
waited until April 30 before dismissing Dean.
Mr. Petersen. That is right. ^
Mr. Thompson. He was kept on the staff primarily as far as you
know because of your request that
Mr. Petersen. From prosecution ; yes. sir.
Mr. Thompson, Thank you.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Petersen, is it not a part of the judicial process
that witnesses shall go before grand juries if they are able bodied and
available so that grand jurors may interrogate them ?
Mr. Petersen. That the grand jurors may interrogate them ; yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, I am not an expert on Federal statutes but I
have searched in vain for any Federal statute or any rule of court
which would exempt from a ]iersonal appearance before a grand jury
anv witness who is able bodied and readily available to the grand jury.
Is there any such statute ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now. there were three Wliite House aides, Colson.
Young, and Krogh, and former Secretary Maurice Stans who were
exempted from going before the grand jury in person.
Mr. Petersen. I think we ought to clarify that, Mr. Chairman.
Colson. Krogh. and Younjr, I don't believe, were subpenaed. We just
decided we wanted their testimony, we wanted it under oath and we
did not use the subpena process. So to that extent there is a distinction
with Avhat we did with Stans. At the outset we were goinarto take Stans
before the grand jurv and we issued a subpena for that purpose; yes,
so that is a disting-uishable situation.
3637
Senator Ervin. Now, there is no statute that allows a witness to be
exempted from going before a grand jury to avoid publicity that is
distasteful to the witness ?
Mr. Petersen. No; I think it is a question of fairness versus
prudence.
Senator Ervin. As you correctly stated, all witnesses don't go before
grand juries, but isn't it customary and indeed isn't it a proper practice
to send before a grand jury every witness whom the prosecutor has
reason to believe can give testimony which would afford a reasonable
basis for indictment against anybody ?
Mr. Petersen. With a little deference, Mr. Chairman, I think that
is too general. Many times we present only the minimum of witnesses
and rely on hearsay information which is admissible in the grand
jury.
For example, we might put two Bureau agents on who will impli-
cate seven people. Rather than call all of thc^. witnesses that would be
necessary to trial we just call one or two l)efore the grand jury.
Senator Ervin. Now, it certainly is desirable to send before the
grand jury every witness tliat can furnish a basis for the indictment
of a person who otherwise might not be indicted, isn't it ?
Mr. Petersen. You say desirable and I guess that is right. But
what I am trying to porti-ay, not every witness in every investigation
goes before a grand jury. Indeed in most investigations most wit-
nesses do not go before a grand jury. Now, I think again to be per-
fectly candid and honest with you, you have to distinguish between
the types of investigation. A matter of presentment where the case is
open and shut and the investigative agency has dug it up and there is
no problem. The agents can go in, and one or two Avitnesses, and you
put it in.
In an investigatory grand jury where you are really out swinging
and you have got to get them under oath and you want the compul-
sion of t\w grand jury ajii)earance; you ai-e riglit, it customarily is the
practice to bring them all aboard.
Senator Ervin. Well, very shortly after tlie break-in was discovered,
the pi'osecutors were in the possession of evidence which showed that
of the fi\'e burglars caught redhanded in the Watergate, four of them
had in their possession moneys which were traced to some, or checks
contributed to the reelection campaign, weren't they ?
Mr. Pf:tersen. Checks ? Cash.
Senator Ervin. Cash which was traced?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator ERV^N. The checks which had been donated to the reelec-
tion campaign?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Now, didn't that indicate to your mind very grave
suspicion that the tracks led from the Watergate into the Committee
To Re-Elect the President ?
Mr. Petersen. Sure did. But here is the point, Mr. Chairman. That
was visceral. We didn't have the evidence— we had five. We added
Hunt and Liddv bv investigation. I never believed that Liddy was to
be the all and end all. I could not, as Assistant Attorney General, come
out as a public official and say there is more involved because I couldn t
prove it.
96-296 0—73 — pt. 9 16
3638
Senator Ervin. You had the serial numbers, the evidence of the
serial numbers of the bills from the Miami bank that showed it came
out of the proceeds of these checks.
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator ER^^N. You had the fact that Liddy was chief counsel of the
Stans finance Committee To Re-Elect the President ?
Mr. Petersen. Absolutely.
Senator Ervin. You had the fact that McCord was chief security
officer of the Mitchell Committee To Re-Elect the President and you
had the fact that Hunt was acting in collaboration with Liddy and
McCord.
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Senator ERvaN. Now, also you had the fact that Maurice Stans was
the man that had control of the money, the finance Committee To Re-
Elect the President.
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. You got some evidence, didn't you. pretty early that
he kept large sums of cash in safes in his offices ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator ER\^N. And you had the fact that Mitchell was political
chairman and that Magruder was the deputy political chairman under
Mitchell?
Mr. Petersen. Both Mitchell and Magruder appeared.
Senator ER^^[N. And also you had available the testimonv that Stans
gave — ^the same testimony he gave before this committee. You had the
testimony from Stans to the effect that Sloan, the treasurer, had
expressed misgivings about paying large sums of cash to Liddy on the
orders of Magruder and that Stans had come back to Sloan and
repoi-ted he had consulted with Mitcliell and Mitchell said it was all
right to pay the money to Liddy on Magruder's orders ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And still no effort was made to indict Stans or
Magruder ?
Mr. Petersen. That is not correct.
Senator Ervin. Or Mitchell on that evidence ?
Mr. Petersen. That is not correct. Senator. We just didn't have the
evidence. "We had real strong suspicions. We had a real gut reaction,
but we didn't believe that story, but we couldn't prove — we couldn't
prove tlie perjury, for one thing.
Senator Ervin. What story was it you didn't believe ?
Mr. Petersen. Wc didn't believe* that Magruder, Porter, Mitchell,
Stans, didn't know wliat that money was for, that they gave $350,000
to Liddy or thereabouts, whatever the amount was, and he just
expended it. That was the story. Tluit was the reason.
Senator Ervin. You didn't believe that story, did you ?
Mr. Petersen. No; but that was the reason. You are talking about
the conduct of tlie investigation ?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Ml*. Petersen. And here is what we had in mind. We recognized
that there were problems in that case, but all the evidence showed was
that Liddy and Hunt were involved. That was the reason at a very
early date, as early as November. Ave decided, one, we will prosecute
them and, two, after they are prosecuted we will immunize them.
3639
Now, one of the things, you will excuse me, I have to get something
off my chest.
I resent the appointment of a special prosecutor. Damn it, I think
it is a reflection on me and the Department of Justice. We would have
broken that case wide open, and we would have done it in the most
difficult circumstances. And do you know what happened. That case
was snatched out from under us when we had it 90-percent complete
with a recognition of the Senate of the United States that w^e can't
trust those guys down there, and we would have made that case and
maybe you would have made it different, but I would have made it
my way and Silbeit Avould have made it his way and we would have
convicted those people and immunized them and we would have got-
ten a breakthrough. I am not minimizing what you have done or
the press or anyone else, but the Department of Justice had that case
going and it was snatched away from us, and I don't think it fair to
criticize us because at that point we didn't have the evidence to go
forward.
Senator ER^^N. I am just
Mr. Petersen. Excuse my emotions, but I have been there too long
and this has been a terrible year. [Laughter.]
Senator Ervin. I am asking you some questions.
Now, at an early stage before any indictments were returned, there
had been caught in the Watergate, plus the general counsel of the
committee, plus another aide of the committee, and evidence that
money came out of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, to Liddy
in vast sums.
Now, why ^vas that not sufficient evidence to make out a probable
cause to believe that people in the Committee To Re-Elect the Presi-
dent had hired these people to burglarize the Watergate?
Mr. Petersen. The simple fact of the matter is that the testimony
was that those funds were made available to Liddy to conduct an
intelligence operation for the Committee To Re-Elect the President
and Liddy had gone off on a gambit of his own. That was the
testimony.
Senator Er\^n. And I believe you stated that the prosecutors did
not believe what Sloan had to say about the money ?
Mr. Petersen. AVliat Sloan had to say? "VVliat Magruder had to say
about the money. That is the reason we called John Mitchell to the
grand jury because we did not believe Magruder.
Senator Ervin. This is not any criticism of you
Mr. Petersen. I understand. Just excuse my emotion. The simple
fact of the matter is, every lawyer tries a case differently, and I am
too sensitive about criticism of the Justice Department, 1 confess.
Senator Ervin. Well, I have been impressed by the time I have been
in Washington, the few contacts I have had with vou and also your
i-eputation. You are a very forthright individual and you have testified
in a very forthright manner here and vou have also testified in a very
forthright manner in respect to the questions that have caused me
concern.
Mr. Petersen. Well, you know, I respect you so much it bothers me
when you disagree with me. [Laughter.]
3640
Senator Ervin. Well, I practiced law a long time, and I always dis-
agreed with at least half of the lawyers I came in contact with, so
it is no reflection on you.
Mr. Petersen. I would rather be on your side.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I do not want
to prolong this analysis of the situation' before the grand jury or the
status of the ongoing investigation and the efforts toward prosecution
much longer, but there are a few points or few questions I would like
to put to you and maybe a few observations to help me put it in per-
spective. To begin with, there is no assurance that no one is going
to be indicted noAv, Stans or any other number of persons who may be
indicted as a result of the ongoing investigation of the grand jury now
in the hands of the special prosecutor. There is no current tlireat of
the bar of the statute of limitations in that respect ?
Mr. Petersen. That is correct. But I have to say I cannot give you
a precise status report since the case has not been with us since the
appointment of the special prosecutor.
Senator Baker. I understand that. The point of the fact is that
people have not yet been indicted does not necessarily mean they will
not be indicted ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir ; I anticipate they will be.
Senator Baker. Is it not your duty as a Government attorney, as a
member of the Justice Department, and supervising the proceedings
before the grand jury to go into the factual situation to determine
probable cause, which is the test before a grand jury, is there probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed and that a particular
named individual committed it. That is the technical and literal func-
tion of the grand jury?
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Senator Baker. You have a greater responsibility than that, if you
are going to prosecute the case because the test at trial is not probable
cause.
Mr. Petersen. Precisely.
Senator Baker. The test at trial is : Ts this man, as the Constitution
provides, is this man guilty of the alleged crime, of the charges laid
against him, beyond a reasonable doubt, and that is a very different
thing.
Mr. Petersen. That is precisely right.
Senator Baker. Is it the practice of the Justice Department or your
practice to proceed to compile evidence not only to meet the test of
probable cause but to meet the test that is necessary to get a conviction
in that case as well ?
Mr. Petersen. Absolutely. It is a professional responsibility and
indeed, we have a rule of thumb down there that the guy who returns
the indictment ought to try it.
Senator Baker. Has there been anything in the handling of this
prosecution by you, by the U.S. attorney's office, by the assistant IT.S.
attorney or anyone else you know connected with the Justice Depart-
ment, that in your judgment, has jeopardized the possibility of showing
probable cause or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the several people
that we have spoken of?
3641
Mr. Petersex. No, sir. I have to say we are not perfect prosecutors
and my guess is if we went over it again we would do some things
differently. I do not know anything specific.
Senator Baker. I know a few things and I am going to get to those
in a minute.
Mr. Petersen. I do not know of any instances where I can say we
impaired the investigation.
Senator Baker. But in any event, the blackboard is still a blank,
the grand jury has yet to act on many of the principal characters
being investigated in this respect ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. The chairman and I have jousted and disagreed
slightly and I hope in a most agreeable way on the question of the
appropriateness or the desirability of giving testimony outside a grand
jury. It happens I agree with him, I think it is not good judgment. But
as we liave already agreed on, I think it is not illegal.
Let me ask you this one point, to take the Stans testimony as a
particular illustration. As I understand it, you put it in these terms,
we took the Stans testimony under grand jury conditions, which
means, I take it, under oath or with investigation or examination
conducted by a U.S. attorney, without other people present, includ-
ing the absence of the witness' attorney.
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Senator Baker. Yon did it that way. "Was the transcript, the write-
up of that material then presented to the grand jur5% was it read to
the grand jury?
Mr. Petersen. It was made available to the grand jury and it was
read into the grand jury.
Senator Baker. Was there any step taken to prevent the grand
jury from asking for Mr. Stans to appear then or later?
Mr. Petersen. No.
Senator Baker. Is there any jirohibition against it now or any
impediment in the way of this or any other grand jury ?
Mr. Petersen. No.
Senator Baker. From now calling Stans to find out
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Do I understand then, that your motivation, and
whether we judge it to be the right decision or the wrong decision, is
not important to this, but it was your motivation at the time that an
investigation of public officials has a high degree of sensitivity be-
cause of the potential for harm as well as the jjotential for justice,
that is, if charges are made against a public official in a public place,
the story on page 38 that thev found nothing on which they might
indict him, fades into insignificance by comparison to the original
charges that he appeared before the grand jury.
Mr. Petersen. Ihere was another factor. Ehrlichman called and
was criticizing us for harassing Stans. He had been interviewed twice.
And, you know, we did not, Ave wanted that testimony under oath and
if there was anything more and Ehrlichman said that is all you are
going to get, I "said that maybe but we want it. But the part of the
T^roblem was that in that investigation, as you all know, there were
far too many leaks. A grand jui-y was not functioning as a grand jury
3642
should. There was not the secrecy surrounding it, indeed, you could
follow tlie investigation in the newspapers, as I did.
Senator Baker. Every leak from that grand jury was a felony, was
it not?
Mr. Petersen. At least contempt, probably. But you see, if it is a
leak by witnesses it is not. That is part of the problem. An awful lot
of self-serving statements by witnesses after they came out of the
grand jury, indeed, statements on what they testified to. We were to
the extent that we were responsible for the grand jury subject to some
criticism because all of this publicity surrounded it and we were all
sensitive to that.
Senator Baker. I am about to run out of time, but let me ask you
two or three other things. All of the statements the chairman made
about the money chain, about the information available to you, on the
identity of Liddy, on the identity of Hunt, and any number of other
people, all of that information that the chairman very properly iden-
tifies as an integral part of this record was in general terms or maybe
very literally was all that presented by one witness or another to that
grand jury ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. So it was not wheedled from the grand jury?
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Senator Baker. So all of that information appeared before the
grand jury ?
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Senator Baker. So far as you know there may still be indictments on
the basis of that information and the grand jury is perfectly entitled
to hear hearsay information ?
Mr. Petersen. That grand jury was not unaware of its rights.
Senator Baker. How often is it in your experience that you call a
potential defendant before a grand jury ? I know it is often done.
Mr. Petersen. Well
Senator Baker. Is it the rule or the exception ?
Mr. Petersen. It is the exception and indeed, there is a specific rule
of law which requires if you call a putative defendant before a grand-
jury you specifically warn him of his rights.
Senator Baker. That he is a target ?
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Senator Baker. There is some talk there is no statute that authorizes
you to take testimony out of the sight of a grand jury. There is no
statute that requires you to place a witness before the grand jury
either, is there?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Petersen, your own investigation and conduct
of it and your motives in taking the Stans testimony in the manner
it was done is suspect in the eyes of some, otherwise we would not be
inquiring into this, and I suppose you would not be a witness. Let us
get something straisrht on the record here. Were you appointed to your
present position bv President Nixon ?
Mr. Petersen. To mv present position ; yes, sir.
Senator Baker. How long have you been with the Justice
Department ?
Mr. Petersen. Since 1947.
3643
Senator Baker. How did you first receive employment, under what
conditions ?
Mr. Petersen. I walked in and asked for a job and they gave me
a job as messenger.
Senator Baker. You are the first Assistant Attorney General that
ever came up through the ranks ?
Mr. Petersex. I guess, I really do not know.
Senator Baker. Are you a Republican or a Democrat ?
Mr. Petersen. Well, I like to think I am nonpartisan but I am a
registered Democrat.
Senator Baker. Is there any reason that you can think of why you
would not conduct and did not conduct an energetic, vigorous investi-
gation calculated to do nothing exce))t to prosecute those that you could
find the evidence to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ?
Mr. Petersen. No ; one thing that argues in favor of that is my own
selfishness. I will not do a damn thing to jeopardize my reputation
for anybody and I told Attorney General Kleindienst that immedi-
ately after that, I was not going to jail for anybody and he could
expect political pressures and if he was smart he would do like I do,
have a selfish regard for his own reputation and reputation of the
Justice Department and he did and so did I.
Senator Baker. Can I change the subject in the few brief moments
I have left? I have been told I have 1 minute. I understood your
testimony to be you agreed not to use the Dean testimony unless you
could reach an agreement, I assume, about immunity?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Is it fair to say that Mr. Dean did generally co-
operate with you at that stage in the proceedings?
Mr. Petersen. No. Well, Mr. Dean was advancing his own interest
at that stage of the proceedings, it was entirely preliminary negotia-
tion and never proceeded to fruition.
Senator Baker. Was his information materially helpful to you at
that point in which he was giving you information so that you could
judge whether or not there was the basis for immunity?
Mr. Petersen. That information did not satisfy us that we should
immunize Mr. Dean.
Senator Baker. Was it a question of deciding what you were going
to get versus what vou were going to give ?
Mr. Petersen. That is always a consideration.
Senator Baker. That is the general immunity question ; is it not?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Is that still an open question with Mr. Dean?
Mr. Petersen. That is a judgment the special prosecutor would have
to make whether or not it is open. Senator, we are on very dangerous
area.
Senator Baker. Would vou prefer that we did not talk about it?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, because I think this is going to be a seriously
litigated issue.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Er\^n. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Petersen, I have been tremendously
impressed with your forthrightness and your candor as a witness.
Mr. Petersen. Thank you. Senator.
3644
Senator Talmadge. You have had a long: and distin^iished career in
the Justice Department and came up from the ranks and the President
appointed you to a position of enormous responsibility.
Now, under those conditions, where does a man's lovalty lie? You
have testified that when the President of the United States ^ave an
order you clicked your heels, yet within a very short period of time
you found that some of the closest confidants, most trusted aides and
advisers to the President of the Ignited States, were involved in a cam-
pai^ to obstruct justice.
Under those conditions, what does a man do ?
Mr. Petersen. Senator, I do not know. You know, about 3 weeks ajro
I was at a party and present was the president of Gonzaga Hiffh School
in Washin^on, D.C., which I attended. They are strong on philosophy
and one of the questions I raised with him, whether or not lovalty was
a valid philosophical concept and I have reached the conclusion that
it is not because it is not sufRciently broad, that it is valid onlv to the
extent that you can be loyal to what vou regard as sfood and to the
extent that there is demanded more lovaky to which you refjard as
bad, you cannot subscribe to it. So if the President of the TTnited States
asks for FBI reports I would assume the President of the TTnited
States as Chief Executive Officer in a proper exercise of his authority
would have a right to those reports to determine whether or not his
underlings were serving the best interests of the Ignited States.
Now, on the contrary, if the President of the United States said I
command you not to exercise your statutory obligation with respect to
immunity in this instance, and the President and I debated that and
we reached the conclusion that that was my responsibility and there
was not anything in the world that he could do to take it away from
me, so your question is a good one and I have struggled with it and you
know I do not want to say I am not loyal, that is a terrible thing to
say, but T have to sav that I am loval to what I rearnrd as mv princinles
and to the extent that others adhere to the principles I am loyal to
them, too.
Senator Talmadge, You went back to see the President and vou
persuaded him to change his mind. Wliat would you have done if he
had not changed his mind ?
Mr. Petersen. On the Ellsberg thing ?
Senator Talmadge. Yes.
Mr. Petersen. Mr. Kleindienst and T discussed that and if the Presi-
dent had not agreed with us we would have had to resign. We were
both prepared to do so.
Senator Talmadge. Both of you ?
Mr. Petersen. We discussed that before Mr. Kleindienst went to the
AVhite House that afternoon.
Senator Talmadge. You had agreed to do so ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Do vou think the Office of Attorney General and
its assistants serves the President of the United States or the people
of the United States?
Mr. Petersen. T think 98 percent of the time he does both. T think
Avhere there is a conflict he had to adhere to his lesral and professional
responsibilities which are. T think, to the larger mandates of the Con-
stitution and the people of the TTnited States.
3645
Senator Talmadge. You think wlien a conflict would arise between
serving the President of the United States and the people, it would be
a matter of conscious, canon of ethics, the laws, the Constitution, and
judgment?
Mr. Petersen. I think that there are certain obligations in the con-
cept of loyalty that are required. In that situation I think that it is
incumbent to be forthright with the President, to say I disagree and
give him an opportunity to replace you with a Cabinet officer or Presi-
dential appointee or whatever, who happens to adhere more to the line
that he thinks. I think that degree of loyalty is required but I think
basically, the old adage to your own self be true.
Senator Talmadge. You made a very impassionate plea there reject-
ing the idea of a special prosecutor.
Mr. Petersen. I said I resented it, I didn't reject it. I recommended
against it in the first instance. I reluctantly came to the conclusion
that it was necessary and it was necessary because of, if you will excuse
me, the temper in the Senate of the United States. I don't at all agree
with the Senate's insistence on the appointment of a special prosecu-
tor. You know. Senator, Mr. Hoover had a basic concept for which
he was sometimes criticized and that is that you don't wash your dirty
linen in public. He had problems during the time he was within the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and he handled those within the
Bureau quietly and efficiently and expeditiously. And the footnote,
the principal point in connection with that was the importance of the
people of the United States in having confidence in their law enforce-
ment agencies and I don't think it did a service to the Department
of Justice or the people to insist on the importance of appointing a
special prosecutor at that point in time. I think it could have been
handled differently. I think the Senate committee could have called
the prosecutors up there in executive session and said what have you
got, let's see what kind of job you are doing, subject them to some type
of scrutiny. If convinced they were doing a decent job, go ahead and
let them do it, but to appoint a special prosecutor means that the
Department of Justice, a vital institution, one of the oldest Cabinet
agencies, one of the foremost principals of civilized society, is inade-
quate to do the job it is appointed to. I think that is terrible.
Senator Talmadge. Pursuing that one point further, wlio made the
decision to appoint the special i^rosecutor ?
Mr. Petersen. I think the President recommended it.
Senator Talmadge. That is what I thought. You inferred it was the
Senate.
Mr. Petersen. Well, that is my point of view and it may be that I
have a biased point of view. My own point of view is that first of all,
the President didn't want to do it. I didn't want to do it. I recom-
mended against it, Kleindienst recommended in favor of it. From mv
point of view it was the Senate's insistence that precipitated it and I
think it is unfortunate. I finally reached the conclusion at the later
stages of the proceeding and told the President the situation is dete-
riorating too rapidly and I regret it, I think there is such a lack of
confidence that you have to recommend that it be done.
Senator Talmadge. You referred to washing dirty linen. This was
not the dirty linen of the Department of Justice but the dirty Imen
of the people of the ITnited States, was it not, Mr. Petersen?
3646
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir; but when I say that, I say it in a very
selected sense, the implication being that the Department of Justice
was incompetent to do that job, that is, there was something wrong,
not that the Department of Justice was responsible for these acts but
the Department of Justice in the exercise of its professional respon-
sibility was unable to do its job. Dirty linen only in that limited sense.
Senator.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Mr.
Petersen, again I want to compliment you on your eloquence, forth-
rightness, and candor, sir.
Mr. Petersen. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurxey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Perhaps I might take a little bit of heat away from you by giving
you my own ideas about why a special prosecutor was appointed. I
remember a meeting the Republican Senators on the Judiciary Com-
mittee had with Mr. Richardson before his confirmation proceedings.
It is customary for a nominee to come around and visit with all of us
Senators, Republicans as well as Democrats, and it was the unanimous
advice of the Republican Senators on the committee to Mr. Richardson
that if he wanted to be Attorney General he would have to api^oint
a special prosecutor. I think I am saying what you really didn't want
to say. It was a political decision and it was our advice that if we are
going to have an Attorney General we would have had to have a
special prosecutor.
Mr. Petersen. I would, if you say if you take me or leave me.
Senator ER^^N. This is not to say t -e idea was a good one or bad
one, it is to confirm your, I think, implication that there were some
politics connected with it, and I am not indicating that the politics
were good or bad. A lot of decisions in Washington are made with
political overtones as well as other things because that is what govern-
ment is all about.
Mr. Petersen. Political is a political act in the broadest sense of
the term.
Senator ER\^N. You were about to answer a question that Mr.
Baker posed to you ahovd the grand jury and you didn't complete
it and I was curious. You said the grand jury was not unaware of
and then stopped.
Mr. Petersen. The grand jury was aware of its rights to insist on
calling people and indeed Ave had explained to them what the situation
Avas and what the publicity problem was and they understood at the
time of the Stans subpena,'but thereafter Mr. Stans and Mr. Mitchell
appeared for civil depositions and Mr. Stans and Mr. Mitchell were
making statements to the press and, the grand jury very rightly said
if they are doing this there is no reason why they shouldn't come
up here, and we said that is fine. They wanted to hear Mr. ;Mitchell.
'There was no substantive reason at this point on the record. They
didn't believe Magruder's story and they wanted another witness to
say whether that was true or false and they subpenaed John, we sub-
penaed John Mitchell. The grand jury was aware at that point they
could have issued their own subpena if we had refused or tliat they
could haA-e gone out and said tlie prosecutors Avon't subpena them.
They Avere not unaAvare of AA'hat they could do.
3647
Senator Gurnet. Incidentally, back to that special prosecutor issue
again.
As I remember, I was asked, not once but many times, about my own
opinion on the special prosecutor, since I was on the Judiciary Com-
mittee, as you know. This is more in appearances back home in Florida
politically. And I said I don't think we ought to have one because I
think one of the things we need more than anything else is to get these
people indicted and tried as soon as we can.
I think that is what this country needs mxore than anything else, to
clean up Watergate in the courts so that the people will have confi-
dence in the system, particularly tlie judicial system, and the appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor, as I see it, is simply going to slow this
process up by certainly many weeks and many, many months because
the new men that are going to be brought in are going to have to com-
pletely brief themselves on matters that have been going on now^ for
many months.
Mr. Petersen. That is true.
Senator Gurxey. And I would like to ask vou, as the Assistant At-
torney General in charge of this whole affair, isn't it a fact that we
have slowed up justice by doing this and that the indictments are go-
ing to be held up and we are not going to get the justice we should
have gotten until a long time after we could have gotten it? Isn't
that a fact ?
Mr. Petersen. Well, I think that is a fact and we are all in favor
of speedv justice and it is goins: to be delayed in this instance.
But I have to say, and I am happy to say that you agreed with me,
but especially since you have a different perspective. But as T have
thought about this thing, and I certainly would have taken that posi-
tion, the same position with you all, indeed I planned to come to see
Senator Ervin as I did with Mr. Patman, urging you not to conduct
the hearings and what have you.
But if I had been a Senator of the TTnited States, I am not at all sure
that I w^ould have taken the same position.
Senator Gurnet. Well, I think all of us with hindsight and 20-20
vision would have made different decisions, but now I am talking
about
Mr. Petersen. All I am saying, I can respect the point of the com-
mittee that there are larger interests in here than simply the prosecu-
tion. That is a valid point of view.
Senator Gurnet. I think there are, too, and I think now that all of
the dirtv linen has come out in these hearings and now that we know
as much as we do about this who^e Watergate affair, it is probably
better we have a special prosecutor just to make sure that everybody
understands that the prosecution is bein<r done by somebody who is
independent of the administration. But that wasn't the point I was
ma kin jr.
Mr. Petersen. I understand.
Senator Gurnet. The point I was making is that actually justice
would have been more speedily arrived at.
Mr. Petersen. We pay the price.
Senator GtTiNEv. If we hadn't gone in that direction.
Mr. Petersen. Yes. sir.
3648
Senator Gurney. Did you know at any time, Mr. Petersen, that Hal-
deman and Dean were trying to get the CIA to stop the investigation
of the FBI as far as the Mexican money was concerned ?
Mr. Petersex. Only to the extent of Pat Gray's conversation witli
me on or around July 5.
Senator Gurney. Wliat did he tell you at that time ?
Mr. Petersen. He didn't tell me he had been contacted by the White
House. He told me he had been in contact with (^lA and that thei-e was
some, it was a very guarded conversation type of thing, well, need to
know situation, and I simjily, well, that may be, but don't accept that
unless you accept it in writing, but T had no more information than
that on that.
Senator Gurney. You didn't know anything about the White House
involvement?
Mr. Petersen. No.
Senator Gurney. Just CIA ?
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Senator Gitrney. At any time during this whole sad affair, either
last year or this year, until the events that transpired around April did
anybody try to pressure you to stop or slow down or soft-pedal this
investigation that you were in charge of ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir, the only thing that could possibly cast in
that category would be the call from Ehrlichman with respect to Stans'
subpena and, you know, frankly, that didn't bother me too much. As I
told Kleindienst, he just made a mistake. But no one else. There was
some pressure to get the indictment out, get the indictment, they
wanted it out by September 1. We couldn't do that. I frankly promised
them September 1, we couldn't do it until September 15. That didn't
impair the investigation. We were ready to go to trial in November,
but Judge Sirica had a bad back and continued the thing on his own
motion.
Senator Gurney. Let me inquire about the contacts you had with
the President of the Ignited States. The log here shows a great many
phone calls as well as some meetings. Of course, you have covered some
of them.
Mr. Petersen. Some of them, yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. Wliat about those four phone calls which the Pres-
ident initiated to you after your afternoon meeting with him on
April 5. What wei-e those about ?
Mr. Petersen. The first was should I meet with John Dean. Yes.
The second was a meeting has been set up. The third was if Liddv is
not talking because of any sense of misguided loyalty to me, you had
better disabuse him and I am issuing orders to vou to that effect. The
fourth one, I have had a meeting with Dean, he has given me basically
what he has told you and I think it has been helpful.
Senator Gurney. Without going over all of these, because I know
you have covered some of them, but I can't identify what you have
and what you haven't. Generally, what was the President calling you
about during this period of time ?
]Mr. Petersen. Status reports, immunity, the Ellsber^r thing.
Strachan's testimony. We had Strachan like this and Magruder on one
side and Strachan on the other and we finally decided to put them both
3649
on a lie detector. He wanted to know how they came out, that sort of
thing.
Senator Gurnet. He was keeping almost in daily touch and some-
times, of course, several times a day ?
Mr. Petersen. One qualification I ought to put. The President had
asked me to give, after I gave him the initial memorandum, gave me
a complete memorandum of everything that you have on the White
House personnel and I caused an examination of the records to be
made and found that I had to tell him as we had previously agreed,
Mr. President, I cannot produce all of that other information, it is
grand jury information and we previously agreed — he and I — I should
not disclose grand jury information to him.
Senator Gtjrxey. One general question here. I don't know whether
you can put a handle on it or not. During all of this investigation
and trials and everything did you at any time suspect that there was
a coverup going on Watergate ? Did you have a feeling on it ?
Mr. Peterse>7. Visceral reaction. The word T used to the prosecutors
and Kleindienst. nobody acts innocent. You couldn't translate that.
There was an overriding concern. There were no records. Things were
destroyed. They didn't act like innocent people. Innocent people come
in and say, "Fine, what do you want to know?" It was not like that,
it was a visceral reaction. Yes, that is the reason we were so insistent to
get this thing, get them tied down to sentence and immunize them.
Senator Gurnet. It was your thought when you got to that stage
of the point, you would get ])robab]y what happened after McCord
got the message from the judge ?
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Senator Gurnet. One other thing. The Senate, of course, out of
our hearings and some of these confirmations we have had during the
past year, and especially the Gray confirmation hearings, have been
concerned about the status of the FBI. Suggestions have been made
by one or two Senators very impressed with the idea of perhaps set-
ting up the Agency as an independent agency and out from under
Justice.
As one who probably has had as much experience with the FBI over
the years, at least in preparation of evidence for criminal cases, what
would be vour own opinion on that. Mr. Petersen ?
Mr. Petersen. I would be reluctant to see that done. Like most
things in a democracy, decisions are a result of a compromise and you
operate at a lower level of efRciencv than is maximally possible. That
may be so. You might have a more efficient investigative asrency if you
.separated them, nut them out. but I would find it a little frio-htening:
I think thev ought to be subject to some desfree of political control.
You see. it is ver\' stranire. Senator, you know, before !Mr. Hoover
died he was criticized for his independence. After his death, the Bureau
is beins' criticized because thev are not independent enough. Which-
ever is the truth I think it points up somethinsr that is verv important,
the Bureau ousrht to neither be independent nor completely dependent
and I think the answer is to have a stronsr investiorative aq-encv under
the char.o-e of the Attornev General. I think the Office of the Attorney
General is a very, ven- difficult one. I think that he ouo-ht not to have
responsibilitv of Presidential adviser. I think he ought to be the At-
3650
torney General of the Imited States in charg'e of Htij^atin^r the Gov-
ernment's business, in charge of investigation, but I don't think he
ought to be either political or legal adviser to the President.
Senator Gurxey. To put it another way, you think that perhaps tlie
dangers of political supervision are less than a total independent in-
vestigating agency.
Mr. Petersen. I think so ; yes, sir.
Senator Gurnet. Thank you, Mr. Petersen.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Petersen, in his testimony before this commit-
tee, Mr. Dean stated that he had informed the President that "perhaps
Liddy would agree to cooperate if the President would meet with
Liddy's lawyers and give the signal that Liddy was apparently waiting
for." This is supposed to have happened on or about April 1.5.
He then stated that, "The President picked up the telephone and
called Petersen and told him if Mr. Liddy's lawyer wanted to see him
to get a signal that the President was willing to do this."
Do you remember such a call, sir ?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir ; and that was not the context of the call. The
question was not that the President was agreeable to seeing Liddy's
lawyers. Indeed, if he had suggested it I would have recommended
against it. I do not believe the President of the United States ought to
be involved in the law-enforcement business.
What the President said was, if he is waiting for a signal from me,
or from the TVhite House, that he should cooperate, I want that signal
given and you get in touch with his lawyers immediately. That, I did.
Senator Inouye. What was the signal, sir ?
Mr. Petersen. I called Mr. Tom Kennelly and I told him that the
President had instructed me to get in touch with Mr. Liddy's counsel
and have requested that they advise Mr. Liddy that the President
expected everybody to cooperate in this investigation. Mr. Kennelly
assured me that he would do so. He conveyed that information to Mr.
Maroulis, who is not only Mr. Liddy's counsel but I am told, a long-
time friend.
Mr. Maroulis called me around 12:15 that night to confirm it for
him and he assured me he would convey that information to Mr. Liddy.
Senator Inouye. This afternoon you testified that you and your
prosecutors could not believe Mr. Magruder, especially his story about
money. Am I
Mr. Petersen. That is right. Senator.
Senator Inouye. If that is the case, and if you did not believe Mr.
Magruder, why did you put him on the stand as a Government
witness ?
Mr. Petersen. Because we could not disprove it. All we had was a
visceral reaction, what I call the poor boy syndrome. You know, in
effect, what thev were saving is well, vou all do not know how these
things operate. Here we have a $30 or $40 million political campaign,
$350,000 is not much. Well, maybe it is not to them.
Senator Inouye. So you placed on the stand a Government witness
you could not believe ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir. That is — well, I just said that. We did not
believe — well, that is right. I mean, I had a visceral reaction that he
3651
was not telling the truth, but for a prosecutor we have to go beyond
that. We did not have any evidence to suggest it. He got on the stand,
told his story, told his story to the grand jury. We could not refute it.
I did not like the story but I did not have any evidence. All I could
say is it does not add up.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean in a statement before this committee
testified that he called you after Mr. Magruder's appearance before
the grand jury in August of 1972. Did he call you, sir?
]\Ir. Petersen. Yes, sir, he did.
Senator Inouye. He further testified that he asked you how Mr.
Magruder's testimony went and you were supposed to have resj^onded
that Mr. Magruder had made it through "by the skin of his teeth."
Mr. Petersen. That is not correct. I remember the conversation very
well because, I did not know the answer when Dean called. I had to
call Silbert. I did call Silbei"t and Silbert said, he is an ai-ticulate
young man. He made a good appearance, good witness in his own
behalf, but nobody believes the story about the money. But there is
no — the grand jury did not. They just — they were — again, that over-
states it but they were uncomprehending how such a large sum of
money could be given to a man and he had no requirements to file
records or to account for it or explain to his superiors how it was spent,
and that is the statement that I gave to Mr. Dean. He made a good
witness but the grand — nobody believes his money story. And that was
where we were focusing our eiforts. That is where we were concerned
because the records had been destroyed.
Senator Inouye. I will read the full paragraph and if I may have
your comments.
Following Magruder's appearance before the grand jury I received a call from
Higby requesting information for Haldeman as to how Magruder had done
before the grand jury. I subsequently called Mr. Petersen who said he would find
out and call me back. Petersen called back and said he had made it through by
the skin of his teeth. I called Haldeman and .so informed him and .subsequently,
informed Mitchell and Magruder. I recall that Haldeman was very plea.sed
because this meant that the investigation would not go beyond Liddy.
Mr. Petersen. I mean, I have no comment except that the obstruc-
tion was successful, Senator. I mean, that is what it was. We had lying
witnesses, and, of course, that is the problem with the forthcoming
prosecution. You have got people who have lied two or three times
under oath.
Senator Inouye. In July of 1972, soon after tlie break-in, Mr. Alfred
Baldwin, who was in the hotel, I believe advised the prosecutors that
on May 30 two bugs had been placed in the Democratic National
Committee headquarters.
Mr. Petersen. I am not sure of that. Senator.
Senator Inouye. And after the arrest thev found one bug in Larry
O'Brien's telephone. Mr. Baldwin had notified your prosecutors that
the other one was in Mr. Spencer Oliver's telephone. For some reason
that telephone was not searched.
On September 13 the C. & P. Telephone Co. made a sweep and found
this bug and a few days later the Vice President of the ITnited States
and the Attorney General suggested that this bug had been placed in
there by Democrats to confuse the issue and embarrass the
Republicans.
3652
If the prosecutors knew that there were two bugs there why wouldn't
the FBI be
Mr. Petersen. This was a source of concern to the prosecution, Sena-
tor. After that second device was found in Spencer Oliver's telephone
we went back to the FBI and there are records and files of the De-
partment of Justice reflecting this, the memorandum from INIr. Silbert
in which he quite literally questioned whether the Bureau was telling
the truth. The Bureau said they had checked that telephone and there
was nothing there and the investigation was proceeding on the grounds
that it may have been installed at a later date or by someone at the
committee to exacerbate the situation.
We did not know what the truth of that was and we instituted —
asked the Bureau to look into this doubly sure, to make certain that
they knew what they were talking about. I am not at all certain.
Frankly, I think they missed it and they did not want to admit it.
That is all. That is my own evaluation of it. One thing about the
Bureau, they are never good at admitting their mistakes. [Laughter.]
Senator Inouye. Mr. Dean, in his interview with this commiitee,
stated that immediately after the break-in he held a meeting with Mr.
K'leindienst and yourself and at this meeting it was discussed that,
although he had no direct evidence, he was afraid that this matter
could lead directly to the President. Did he ever say such a thing?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir. As a matter of fact, that whole conversa-
tion is entirely miscast. It was Kleindienst and I who were telling him
that, you know, obviously, this thing had dire political ramifications
and the only thing that could be done would be for the Department
of Justice to run it all out and the President ought to be told. Mr.
Dean's statement, perhaps honestly, you know, miscast that in a very
favorable lijrht to him. That is all I can say.
Senator TNOirrK. I believe my time is up, sir. Thank you, very much.
Senator Er\-ix. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Mv. Petersen, 1 would like to ask you a question
that I asked other witnesses before this committee. I again refer to
the President's statement of April 30, 1973, in which he states:
As a result, on March 21st I personally assumed the resqwnsibility for co-
ordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter and I personally ordered those
conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to
me right here in this office.
And my question to vou is. on March 21. or tlierealxints, did vou re-
ceive any such orders from the President of the United States?
Mr. Petersen. >iio. sir. Our understanding of that is that he charged
Ehrlichman with conductimr that inquiry at that point.
Senator Wetcker. 'Sir. Ehrlichman's own testimony, just so the
record stays strai.o^ht, is he was charged on March 30.
Mr. Petersen. Well, all I know is the ^Vfarch 21 date, sir.
Senator Weicker. T wish somebodv would answer the Question so
that I do not have to continue to race around this town trvinjr to find
out who it was that was ordered to conduct these investigations. The
President stated :
I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts
and report them directly to me right here in this office.
This committee has received testimnnv that 'Mr. Ehrlichman was
ordered to conduct an in\-estie:ation on ISIarch 30. Mr. Grav has denied
3653
that the FBI received any orders. Mr. Kleindienst has denied that as
Attorney General he received any orders. You denied you received
any orders. Exactly who was it in the city of Washington who was
ordered on March 21 to conduct investigations ?
Mr. PErERSEx. I have no way of knowing. The only time I was ever
in the White House for an extended discussion was April 15.
Senator Weicker. Insofar as this committee has been able to develop
the evidence, assuming that the earliest point in time was March 30
in a directive to Mr. Ehrlichman, we have a gap really, of 9 days
between the 21st when this new infoj-mation came to the President and
the 30th which is Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony, his testimony given
before the committee as to when any investigations were conducted.
As far as you are concerned, your investigation commenced on April
15, is that correct ?
Mr. Petersen. No.
Senator Weicker. Well, I mean, in other words, the President put
you in charge of this matter on that date. Would that be
Mr. Petersen. Kleindienst recused himself and I was the next guy
there.
Senator Weicker. All right. Now, there are a couple of questions
that came to mind as I kept on reading this statement. This statement
was made on April 30 and the reference is to new information on
March 21. There is no reference at all to April 15 which I consider
to be a rather significant date insofar as the information given the
President, at least information by you and Mr. Kleindienst, or At-
torney General Kleindienst.
Nowhere in this memorandum of April 15 — nowhere in here is
mentioned the fact of your conducting the investigation as of April
15. Could you give me any reason? Were you consulted at all prior
to this statement being made ?
Mr. Petersen. The April 30 statement ?
Senator Weicker. The April 30 statement.
Mr. Petersen. I knew that the President was up at Camp David
working on something but I was not consulted with respect to its
content ; no, sir.
Senator Weicker. And yet, you were the one that was put in charge
of the investigation as of April 15, right ?
Mr. Petersen. That is right, but if I had been requested I think I
would have demurred. I did not regard it as my obligation to— well,
you talk about conflict. I did not want to be — what I just said about
the Attorney General. I did not want to be sitting there advising the
Attorney General — the President with respect to what type of state-
ment should come out of the "\^^lite House. I wanted a free hand to run
the investigation. That was prepared by counsel at the White House.
Senator Weicker. Now. in the course of that investigation. In the
course of your findings, even before you were officially put in charge,
did it come as a surprise to vou that the Attorney General, Mr. Klein-
dienst, was arrayed with ]\Ir. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and
Mr. Dean?
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir; and I was very disappointed with the Presi-
dent's action in that regard. Indeed, as a matter of fact, Mr. Klein-
dienst in our meeting on April 15 had raised a question as to whether
or not, since he was recusing himself, he should resign, and we dis-
96-296 O — 73 — pt.
3654
cussed it and I recommended against it and the President recom-
mended against it, so I was considerably surprised and frankly,
disappointed.
Senator Weicker. Now, you indicated that on April 26— this was
the evening in Mr. Kleindienst's office, the evening that Pat Gray
returns to talk with you and the Attorney General in his office — that
prior to that meeting you had talked to the President.
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. And we had evidence from Mr. Kleindienst in
the morning that he talked to the President during the course of that
meeting. And yet, when the meeting is over, Mr. Gray is still in posi-
tion. Why wasn't any action — can you give me at least from your
conversation with the President, and/or your recollection, why wasn't
Mr. Gray notified right then and there this is it ?
Mr. Petersen. Well, I happened to be in Mr. Kleindienst's office
when the call came through.
Senator Weicker. Right.
Mr. Petersen. The President spoke to Mr. Kleindienst. Obviously,
I could hear only Mr. Kleindienst's half of the conversation. Immedi-
ately after he got off the telephone he said we have to talk about Pat
Gray, and what have you, and then the telephone rang again and
this time it was for me and I walked out to the back office and took it.
It was the President and he asked what I thought and T told him
that I thought Pat's position was untenable, that I thought he was
an innocent victim and I regretted it, and what have you, and he said,
well, talk to Kleindienst about it and the two of you get together
with Pat Gray.
We called Pat's office and he was just about to leave. We ran him
down, brought him back there. We sat down and discussed the situa-
tion and not tearfully but almost so, and at the conclusion Mr. Klein-
dienst went out — I do not know whether he had another call from
the President or went out to make one, but that was it.
We left with no decision. I was under the strong impression that Mr.
Gray would resism. I thought he had to think it over and I expected
he would think it over. So when he called me the next morning and
told me that after a night of thought he decided that he had no other
alternative, I was not surprised.
That is all I can tell vou about it. Senator.
Senator Weicker. Did you mention in testimonv before the com-
mittee here this afternoon— it iust slinped bv and I am not so sure tliat
I understood the context, and I miarht not have understood the sub-
stance either, which said that the President offered tapes to vou?
Mr. Petersen. The President called on April 18 about the John
Dean conversations on the night of April 15. His question was. has
John Dean been immunized, and I said no. And he said, well, he says
he has. And I said tliat is not true.
We got into an artrument which was ridiculous because neither one
of us was present when the agreement w^as entered into, and I said,
wait, I will check with the prosecutors. He said, well, I have it on tape.
I said I will take your word for it. T do not want to hear it. And so let
me check with the Prosecutor.
So I called up the prosecutor, and Silbert said no. I said, well, go
back and check with his lawver.
3655
That was the tape that was referred to. 1 told Mr. Cox about that
day at the White House. I am told that the President said that that
was a statement of- — tape of his recollections of the meeting. Now,
whether it was a taped conversation or not, I do not know, of the meet-
ing as opposed to a tape that the President made of his own recollec-
tions. One is true, but I do not know which.
Senator Weicker. I am sorry. I just lost you on that last part.
Mr, Petersen. One of two possibilities exist. Either that was a tape
being utilized at the time the President met with John Dean
Senator AVeicker. I see.
Mr. Petersen [continuing]. Or after the meeting the President sat
down in front of a tape recorder and recorded his own recollection. I
don't know which he was referring to.
Senator Weicker. I see. I see.
But in any event, he offered — was it on April 18
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker [continuing]. A tape to you of this conversation
with John Dean?
Mr. Petersen. That is right.
Senator Weicker. Of his conversation with John Dean ?
Mr. Petersen. That is right, which I refused to listen to.
Senator Weicker. Which you refused to listen to, right ?
Just two more questions. On September 13, 1972, dropping back
just a little bit
Mr. Petersen, The date. Senator ?
Senator Weicker. September 13, which date — let me give you what
occurred there which might refresh your memory fai- better than a
date.
Did you receive a summary memorandum from Mr. Silbert which
indicated that there might have been others higher than Liddy and
Hunt involved in the Watergate matter ?
Mr, Petersen. September 13, 1972?
Senator Weicker. Back in September 1972.
Mr. Petersen. I don't recall such a memorandum. About the only
thing I could think of would be a prosecutor's memorandum which
probably came in about that time just before the indictment, but I
think that that is unlikely that there is such a memorandum. If you
recall
Senator Weicker. Did you get summaries from Mr. Silbert?
Mr. Petersen, No, I got oral reports from Mr. Silbert of the investi-
gation as it progressed, usually on a daily basis. There was a written
recommendation with respect to pi'osecution and the basis of prosecu-
tion of the seven on or about the second week in September just before
the indictment.
Senator Weicker. And was there any indication in that memo-
randum that more might be involved ?
Mr. Petersen. I don't recall. Senator; no, sir.
Senator Weicker. Then lastly, this last question I have got, you
indicated with some anger, and I must say I can't blame you
Mr. Petersen. I apologize for my intemperance.
Senator Weicker, You are a professional man. I don't blame you
for sticking up for your branch. Mavbe there was some sort of lack
of confidence on the part of the Senate in you, members of the Justice
3656
Department, professional staff over there. Has it occurred to you that
maybe the lack of confidence did not exist in you, that
Mr. Petersen. Yes. Yes. I like to think that. It occurs to me every
day. [Laughter.] But I think it is a self-serving thought, Senator.
Senator Weicker. The quest for the truth, at least in a legal sense —
this is something that is looked upon, at least so far as the American
people are concerned — they look to the executive branch of Govern-
ment. Don't you think that is true? I mean, rather than to blame it on
yourself or feel that is a relationship between you and us in this
matter ?
Mr. Petersen. Senator, that is what I was — ^the thought I was try-
ing to get across when I said I would take one position as a prosecutor
and perhaps another as a Senator of the U.S. Senate. I understand
the larger implications. I don't really like it.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator Montoya. Mr. Petersen, don't you find it very peculiar
that the President offered to play this particular tape with respect to
Dean, and he refuses any tapes to the prosecutor downtown and to this
committee ?
Mr. Petersen. No, not especially.
Senator Montoya. Why?
Mr. Petersen. I think that — well, let's take an attorney workpaper.
We argue that they are privileged. New counsel comes in to assist old
counsel. Old counsel shows him his workpapers. That is quite a differ-
ent thing than turning it over to the other side, to the defendant's
lawyer.
If the President obviously thinks of this as the other side at least
in terms of the executive versus the judiciary or executive versus the
legislative branch, I don't think that is necessarily inconsistent, Sena-
tor. I think that the President was willing to let me hear it because
it was apropos to our discussions, but at that point, at that T^oint he
considered me bound by executive privilege and he had told me so.
He subsequently released me, but at that point he certainlv did.
Senator MontOya. Well, couldn't he do this with Mr. Cox?
Mr. Petersen. I don't know.
You know, I hesitate to comment on what he could do with Mr. Cox.
The question is in litigation. I understand it has been argued today
and it is one of the grand issues of law. You know, it lias onlv been
litigated once. It is a very interesting issue and I don't think I ought
to cornment on it. Senator. I would be delighted to discuss it with you
in private.
Senator Montoya. Wouldn't you think that if the President called
Mr. Cox and played the tapes to him on an executive privilege basis
that Mr. Cox would honor that commitment ?
Mr. Petersen. Well, I wouldn't if I were Mr. Cox.
Senator INIontoya. You would what ?
Mr. Petersen. I would not if I were INIr. Cox. I would want those
things without qualifications. It doesn't do him any good to get in-
formation that he can't use.
Senator Montoya. Have you in tlie Department of Justice dis-
cussed the significance of keeping the tapes in the sanctuary of execu-
tive privilege, the legal significance?
3657
Mr. Petersex. I have no% Senator, discussed it with anyone. I have
given it some thought.
Senator Montoya. What kind of thought have you given it?
Mr. Petersen. Well, first of all, I am not at all shocked that the
President of the United States records conversations. Whether or not
he is selective about it is something else. I am not even shocked that he
does not disclose, because to disclose I think would put everybody on
camera and you might have some lack of candor on the part of his
advisers.
I think it is terribly important for the head of state, the head of
state of the strongest Nation of the world, to have some records.
Let's assume that some visiting statesman comes in here.
I don't see any objection to that. I certainly have no objection. If his
conversations were recorded I don't have any objection.
Senator Montoya. Wliat about the evidentiary significance of the
tapes w^ith respect to a defendant's rights ?
Mr. Petersen. With respect to w^hose rights. Senator ?
Senator Montoya. Defendant's rights. Or let me ask you the ques-
tion in this form.
Will not the failure to produce the tapes lead to some cases possibly
being dismissed since the information on the tapes could be claimed to
be exculpatory in nature?
Mr. Petersen. Well Senator, I really don't know the answer to that.
Let me tell you it has come up in another context. It comes up in the
context of this committee. It comes up in the context of what is now
the Jackson committee, the McClellan committee. It is one of the ques-
tions that we are struggling with down there, we and the committee.
We are not in a confrontation situation but it is of mutual concern to
both of us. We are investigating a case. They are interviewing some of
the same witnesses. They take statements from those witnesses. The
question is, are they producible? They are certainly not producible
unless the Senate passes a resolution. If the Senate doesn't pass a reso-
lution, does our case get thrown out ? I hope not.
Senator Montoya. Yes, but you didn't answer my question.
Mr. Petersen. I don't know the answer.
Senator Montoya. Well, have you given
Mr. Petersen. I have given it some thought.
Senator Montoya [continuing]. The situation some thought?
Mr. Petersen. I know it is a problem. Yes, sir. Whether it is from
the executive branch or legislative branch, the same problem exists.
Senator Montota. Well, isn't this in the same category as a wiretap ?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir; absolutely not.
Senator Montoya. Not produced in court?
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. I mean an illegal wiretap.
Mr. Petersen. No, sir.
Senator Montoya. Why not ?
Mr. Petersen. Because White v. United States decided by the Su-
preme Court holds that consentual eavesdropping is not illegal.
Senator Montoya. And do you mean to tell me that there isn't a
court in this land that would dismiss a case against the defendant if
exculpatory information was contained in tapes imder the umbrella
of executive pri\nlege and is stored in the White House ?
3658
Mr. Petersen. No, sir, I do not mean to tell you that. I am telling
you that that is an issue that concerns us. If exculpatory information
is given to another branch of government and tlie Department of
Justice as the agents of the executive branch brings a case, it is very
conceivable that the Congress of the United States, or the President,
or the courts, or somebody else may be required to produce exculpatory
information under court order. That is certainly possible.
Senator Montoya. Well, it would be on this basis and for that
reason, then, wouldn't it?
Mr. Petersen. I am not sure I get the gist of your comment.
Senator Montota. If a court would order the production of those
tapes, it would be to protect the rights of defendants.
Mr. Petersen. Well, that would depend on their context. It if was
exculpatory information, if the court held there was no privilege and
if the court held that it was producible and if the court held that the
Government was a monolith and the Department of Justice was re-
sponsible for the Presidency and the Congress, it is conceivable they
would throw the case out if we didn't produce it even though it wasn't
under our control, yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. All right. Now, I will ask you about your testi-
mony before the committee in private. I have a witness summary here
which indicates as follows, and this is paraphrasing your testimony :
Sometime after the Watergate break-in Petersen and Dean had more extensive
contacts because of complaints from the FBI or the prosecutors about White
House foot-dragging.
What did you mean by that ?
Mr. Petersen. Well, what happened was if the Bureau wanted
something, they would go about it through their own devices. A meet-
ing would be set up. It would be canceled, or Dean would say we will
send it up but he would be slow in getting back to them on time. Then
the Bureau would come — "foot dragging" is my phrase. The Bureau
would come and say, you know, we have been after them for a week.
I would call Dean and he would send it up. Or Silbert would say I am
trying to set up a meeting of the agents with so and so. I would call
Dean and say expedite it.
Senator Montoya, My time is up. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. "\^Tien was it that you and Mr. Kleindienst had a
meeting early in the stages of the
Mr. Petersen. Well, Dean testified it was around the Monday or
Tuesday following. I really don't recall. It was in the very early stages
of the investigation.
Senator Ervin. Did Dean say the AVhite House couldn't stand a
wide-open investicration ?
Mr. Petersen. No. I don't understand that.
Senator ER%aN. What was it he said that caused you to say that the
matter was of such importance that it ought to ibe reported to the
President of the United States?
Mr. Petersen. Well, you know. I don't knoAv what he said. I think
I was just pontificating, to be perfectly honest with you. Here we had
a violation, a burglary of the opposition political pai-ty bv persons who
were^ identified with the Committee To T?e-Elect the President in an
election year and I thou.eht that was an aAvesome political consequence
and the President ought to really jump out on it.
3659
Senator Er%"in'. And you suggested he ought to be notified.
Mr. PetePvSEx. Yes. sir.
Senator ER■v^^^ His attention ought to be called to it.
Now. in the early days of this investigation, did it become obvious
to you that there was a conspiracy, that this crime was of the nature
of conspiracy?
Mr. Petersen. I think that at the outset we considered it a con-
spiracy : yes. sir.
Senator Ervin. And is it not true, on your experience in investigat-
ing cases, that conspiracies ordinarily are made in secrecy and carried
out in secrecy ?
Mr. Petersen. Absolutely.
Senator Ervin. And in lisht of and I don't contend — that this is
an easy case to break. I think it was a very difficult case to break be-
cause i think the evidence before this committee indicates that a com-
paratively small number of men had parricipated in these matters
and naturally they had a self-interest which would prompt them to
try to conceal it. In the light of testimony here, we have received testi-
monv that sums of money of approximately $4-50 .C^X' were paid to these
original defendants and their counsel and their families and the in-
ference might be drawn that it would pay to keep them silent. So I
don't think it is a very easy case to break. So I do think we need to con-
sider all angles and all viewpoints of this to make a complete picture
for the committee and I want to take this occasion to thank you on
behalf of the committee for very candid and very expressive evidence,
very eloquent testimony.
Mr. Petersen. Thank vou for your comments, sir.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman. T have a number of other questions
that will 1 -e collateral to the main points that have been made by Mr.
Petersen and bv the members of the committee. I will reserve those
except to say that I. too. wish to thank Mr. Petersen for his forceful
presentation, for the clarity of his expression, for our ability to srain
an insight into how the investigation proceeded. We are grateful for
that. Tliank you.
Mr. Petersen. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Ervin. Anv further questions?
Senator OTTRNTrr. Xothin^ further. Afr. Chairman.
Senator TTeicker. Xo further quesrions.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye. any farther quesrions?
Senator Inottte. Xo nuestions.
Senator Montota. Xo quesrions.
Senator Ervin. Any further quesrions of counsel ?
Air. Dash. I have no further quesrions, Mr. Chairman-
!Mr. THorpsoN. Xo further ouesrions. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Well, the committee wants to thank you again for
your cooperation.
Mr. Petersen. T^.ank vou. sir.
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess subject to the
ca ll of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 4:4-5 pjn.. the committee was adjonmed. subject
to the call of the Chair.]
I
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee ox
Presidential Campaign AcTi^aTiES,
Washington^ D.C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, Gur-
ney, and Weicker.
Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred D.
Thompson, minority counsel ; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief coun-
sel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant;
David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels; Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, Ronald D.
Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; Eugene
Boyce, hearings record counsel ; H. William Shure and Robert Silver-
stein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, research assist-
ant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Bruce Jaques, Jr., office
of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahon, assistant to Senator Baker; A.
Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker ; Ray St. Armand, assistant
publications clerk.
Senator Er\^n. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will call the first witness.
Mr. Dash. Mr. E. Howard Hunt.
Senator ER\aN, Mr. Hunt, will you stand up and raise your right
hand? Do you swear that the evidence which you shall give to the
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mr. Hunt. I do.
Senator Erain. Let the record show that Mr. Hunt is testifying
under order granting him use immunity.
Counsel will proceed with the interrogation of the witness.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Hunt, are you accompanied by counsel ?
Mr. Hunt. I am.
Mr. Dash. Will counsel please identify yourself for the record?
Mr. Sachs. My name is Sidney S. Sachs, I am a lawyer, a member of
the bar of the District of Columbia and I am accompanied by my part-
ner, Mr. Robert M. Scott and my law clerk who has been helping in
this case, Mr. Henry Goldman.
Mr, Dash. Mr. Hunt, do you have a statement which you wish to
read to the committee ?
(3661)
3662
TESTIMONY OF E. HOWARD HUNT. ACCOMPANIED BY
SIDNEY S. SACHS, COUNSEL
Mr. Hunt. I do.
^fr. Dash. Will you read it, please ?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name
is E. Howard Hunt. I am here today to answer questions bearinor on
your current investifration. I have been informed that it is permissible
for me to make a preliminary statement, and I want to take advantage
of that opportunity. I will describe my personal backerround. my rela-
tionship to the Watergate entry, and the events which have befallen
me since that day.
I was born in 1918 at Hamburo:, X.Y. My father was a lawyer-judsre ;
my mother was a pianist and a housewife. I was educated in the Dublic
sciiools of Florida and Xew York, and in 1940 o^raduated from Brown
ITniversity. Six weeks later T volunteered to serve in the Armed Forces.
"Wliile a destroyer officer on the Xorth Atlantic convoy run before
Pearl Harbor, I was injured and medically discharfred. Later I volun-
teered and became an Air Force intellifrence officer. In 1944. I volun-
teered for the Office of Stratecric Services, the forerunner of CIA, and
was sent to China where I was engaged in partisan warfare until the
end of the war.
In 1949, 1 joined the CIA, from which I retired on Mav 1, 1970. hav-
ing earned two commendations for outstanding contributions to opera-
tions ordei^d by the Xational Security Council.
During the "21 veai^ I spent with CIA. I was engaged in intelligence,
covert action, and counterintelligence operations. I was trained in the
techniques of physical and electronic surveillance, photography, docu-
ment forgery, and surreptitious entries into guarded premises for
photography and installation of electronic devices. I participated in
and had the responsibility for a number of such entries, and I had
knowledge of many othei'S.
To put it unmistakably. I was an intelligence officer — a spy — for the
Government of the United States.
Tliere have been occasions, as one mio^ht expect, when covert opera-
tions by the United States or other nations have been exposed. Such
episodes have not been uncommon. When such mishaps have occurred
it has been universally the practice for the operation to be disavowed
and covered up. Usually, this has been done bv official intervention
with law enforcement authorities. In addition, the employing govern-
ments have paid legal defense fees. Salaries and family living expenses
have been continued. Former CIA Director Helms has testijfied before
this committee in regard to some aspects of this practice.
After retiring from CIA. I was employed by a firm whose officials
maintained a relationship with CIA. Some months after I joined the
firm. I was approached by Charles W. Colson, special counsel to the
President, to become a consultant to the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent. Mr. Colson told me the T\"liite House had need for the kind of
intelligence backerround which he knew I possessed. Tliis was the basic
reason for mv employment, which I undei-stood at the time was ap-
proved by John D. Ehrlichman. and now understand was approved
also by H. R. Haldeman. both assistants to the President of the United
States.
3663
P'rom the time I began working at the TMiite House until June 17,
1972, the day of the second Watergate entry. I engaged in essentially
the same kind of work as I had performed for CIA. I became a mem-
ber of the special investigations unit, later known as the Plumbers,
which the President had created to undertake specific national secu-
rity tasks for which the traditional investigative agencies were deemed
by the President to be inadequate. In this connection, I was involved
in tracing leaks of highly classified information.
These investigations led to an entry by the Plumbers into the office
of Dr. Lewis Fielding. Dr. Daniel EUsberg's psychiatrist. The entry
was authorized by Mr. Egil Krogh. deputy to John Ehrlichnian. It
was considered necessary because of the belief that Dr. Ellsberg or his
associates were providing classified information to the Soviet Union.
The operation was carried out with my assistance, imder the direction
of G. Gordon Liddy. a lawyer, former FBI agent, and member of
the Plumbers unit.
The Fielding entry occurred in September 1971. In late Xovember.
I was told by Mr. Liddy that Attorney General John X. Mitchell pro-
posed the establishment of a large-scale intelligence and counterintelli-
gence program, with Mr. Liddy as its chief. ^Ir. Liddy and I designed
a budget for categories of activities to be carried out in this program
which came to be known as Gemstone. It was my understanding that
the program had been approved by Messrs. Jeb .Stuart Magruder. a
former TVTiite House aide, and John W. Dean III. Counsel to the
President. Later I learned that Charles TT. Colson. Special Counsel
to the President, had approved it. too.
In April 1972. Mr. Liddy told me that we would be undertaking the
Watergate operation as part of the Gemstone program. He said that
he had information, the source of which I understood to be a Govern-
ment agency, that the Cuban Government was supplying funds to the
Democratic Party campaign. To investigate this report, a surreptitious
entry of Democratic national headquarters at the Watergate was made
on May 27. 1972, and a second entry on June 17. The second entr-*- was
accomplished by a group, two of whose members had been among those
who accomplished the Fielding entry. I was indicted for my part in the
Watergate entry.
Following indictment and prior to my guilty plea, the court ordered
the Government to produce all material taken from my White House
safe, and other evidence. Some material was produced, but significant
material was withheld or destroyed. Because the Government had
withheld evidence. I knew there was no chance of proArins: my defenses.
In addition, my wife had been killed in an accident in December and
I was deeply depressed and anxious to devote myself as quickly as
possible to the welfare of my children. Accordingly. I had no alterna-
tive but to concede that I was legally wrong and so I pleaded guilty,
hoping for merciful treatment by the court.
Instead, on March 2^3 of this year. I was provisionally sentenced to
prison for more than 30 years. The court stated that my cooperation
with the ofrand jury and with this committee would be considered in
determinins: my final sentence.
Since beinsr sentenced. I have been questioned under oath on more
than 2.5 occasions, often for manv hours.
3664
I have answered thousands of questions by innumerable investi-
gators, prosecutors. «2:rand jurors, and staff members of this committee.
I am informed that such intensive and repeated interrogation is a most
extraordinary procedure and of dubious legality. Even so, urged by
the court to cooperate fully, I have not contested the procedure. In
fact, I have answered all questions, even those which involved con-
fidential communications between my attorneys and myself.
After my plea, I learned of obstruction of justice by Government
officials. I learned of willful destruction and withholding of evidence,
and perjury and subornation of perjury before the "Watergate grand
jury. This official misconduct deprived me of evidence which would
have supported my position that, (a) my participation in the Water-
gate was an activity authorized within the power of the President of
the United States, and (b) if my participation was not so authorized,
I justifiably believed that it was.
Within the past few days, therefore, I have asked the court to permit
me to withdraw my plea of guilty and to dismiss the proceedings
against me. I believe the charges should be dismissed because, based on
revelations made public since my plea, evidence is now available to
prove that my participation was not unlawful, and because, to quote
Judge Byrne when he dismissed charges in the Ellsberg case :
The totality of the circumstances of this ease — offend a "sense of justice." The
bizarre events have incurably infected the prosecution of this case.
It has been alleged that I demanded clemency and monev for mv
family and for those who helped in the Watergate entry. T did not ask
for clemency. Mr. Liddy assured me that, in accordance with the estab-
lished practice in such cases, funds would be made available. I did
seek such fimds. but I made no threats.
Now T find mvself confined under a sentence which mav keep me in
prison for the rest of my life. I have been incarcerated for 6 months.
For a time I was in solitarv confinement. I have been phvsically
attacked and robbed in jail. I have suffered a stroke. I have been trans-
ferred from place to place, manacled and chained, hand and foot. I am
isolated from my four motherless children. The funds provided me
and others who participated in the break-in have lonsr since been
exhausted. I am faced with an enormous financial burden in defend-
inir myself against criminal chare-es and numerous civil suits. Beyond
all this. I am crushed bv the failure of my Government to protect
me and my family as in the past it has always done for its clandestine
agents.
In conclusion. I want to emphasize that at the time of the Watergate
operation, I considered my participation as a dutv to my country. I
thought it was an unwise operation, but I viewed it as lawful. I hope
the court will sustain my view, but whatever that outcome. I deeplv
regret that I had any part in this affair. I think it was an unfortunate
use of executive power and I am sorry that I did not have the wisdom
to withdraw. At the same time. I cannot escape feeling that the countrv
I have served for mv entire life and which directed me to carry out
the Watergate entr\- is punishing me for doing the very things it
trained and directed me to do.
Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the committee, I thank you
for your attention and vour patience. I will now undertake to answer
your questions to the best of my ability.
3665
Mr. Dash. ^Mr. Hunt, your statement has, I think, put sufficiently
in the record introductory material concerning your background and
your career and your present status under the question of Judge Sirica ;
therefore, I will not go into those questions or repeat that.
In the early part of 1971, ]Mr. Hunt, did you discuss with Mr. Colson
the possibility of your obtaining a position at the Wliite House ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
!Mr. Dash. Did you have a telephone conversation with ^Ir. Colson,
and who initiated that telephone conversation?
Mr. Hunt. I had numerous telephone conversations with Mr. Colson,
Mr. Dash. I would apprecir e your being a little more specific.
]Mr. Dash. Yes.
On July 2, 1971 — July 1, actually — did you receive a telephone call
from yir. Colson?
]Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. Let me show you what purports to be a transcript of that
conversation. "Would you please look at it ?
Mr. Hunt. I have examined the purported transcript, Mr. Dash.
^fr. Dash. Does that purport to be or reflect the conversation vou
had with Mr. Colson?
Mr. Hunt. It does: yes.
Senator Er\t:n. The document will be appropriately marked as an
exhibit and received as such along with the introductory memorandum
for Mr. Haldeman from Mr. Colson.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibit Xo. 148.*]
^Ir. Dash. Xow, in that conversation with Mr. Colson. did Mr.
Colson question you concerning vour viewpoints and attitudes con-
cerning the Pentagon Papers of Mr. Ellsberg ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And would you look at page 2, the last line? "Would you
read that for the committee ?
Mr. Hunt. Colson's question?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Hunt [reading].
Let me ask yoii this, Howard, this question : Do you think with the right
resources employed that this thing could he turned into a major public case
against Ellsberg and coconspirators?
Mr. Dash. How did you respond to that on the top of the next page ?
Mr. Hunt. My response was as follows :
Yes, I do, but you have established a qualification here that I don't know
whether it can be met.
Mr. Dash. "\"\"^ould you continue to read the next few lines?
Mr. Thompson. Pardon me, Mr. Dash. May we have copies?
]\Ir. Dash. You should have copies of that. I understand we are
checking out that a full set of all these exhibits were handed out. Some
of the people next to me have indicated that that particular transcript
is not there.
Mr. Thoj^ipson. Are vou making arrangements to have copies avail-
able?
Mr. Dash. Yes, they are being run off now. There should be a copv
in the set that was given to everA' member and yourself. Mr. Thompson.
•See p. 3S77.
3666
Mr. Thompson. Could we delay momentarily until wc get copies of
that, so we will be able to follow along ?
Mr. Dash. I can continue the questioning without reference to that
transcript, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Mr. Dash. Did you understand, by the way, Mr. Hunt, that from
that conversation, Mr. Colson was exploring the idea with you of a
major effort to discredit Mr. Ellsberg in the press?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, did Mr. Colson eventually offer you a position in
the White House?
Mr. Hunt. He did.
Mr. Dash. And I think you have indicated in your statement that
he referred to specific qualifications. Can you repeat that ? What did he
indicate to you were 3'our qualifications which led you to that particu-
lar position ? What qualifications ?
Mr. Hunt. The fact that I had an investigative background of some
years and also, that I had been involved in ])olitical action operations.
Mr. Dash. Now, were you interviewed by anyone besides Mr.
Colson?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Who was that ?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. John D. Ehrlichman.
Mr. Dash. At whose directions, Mr. Hunt, did you work when you
took this position ? Under whose directions ?
Mr. Hunt. Under Mr. Colson 's direx;tion.
Mr. Dash. Can you describe your initial assignment under
Mr. Colson?
Mr. Hunt. IMr. Colson instructed me to become the ^^Hiite House
resident expert on the origins of the Vietnam war. At the same time,
I had a collateral responsibility for determining certain leaks of highly
classified information which"^ included the leaks of the Pentagon
Papers.
Mr. Dash. Now, is it true, Mr. Hunt, that from the beginning of
your employment, Mr. Colson asked you to collect what could be called
derogatory information about Daniel Ellsberg?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. What was to be done with this information when it was
collected ?
Mr. Hunt. My assumption was that it would be made available by
Mr. Colson or someone in his confidence to selected members of the
media.
ISIr. Dash. Did you by the way, early in your employment, collect
the list of certain media representatives who might be interested in
such material?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mv. Dash. Now, following the asignment you received from Mr.
Colson, how did you develop the information on ]\Ir. Ellsberg?
Mr. Hunt. It was developed through intensive study of reports
furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Mr. Dash. Were there any other materials that you used?
Mr. Hunt. There were certain overt materials.
3667
^Ir. Dash, I didn't hear your answer.
Mr. Hunt. There were overt materials.
Mr. Dash. What do you mean by overt materials?
Mr. PIuNT. ISIaterials published in the press. To be more responsive,
Mr. Dash, I have a feeling I have left something hanging here which
t don't want to do.
The same unit, the special investigations unit that was receiving in-
formation on a frequent basis from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, was also receiving reports from other Government agencies such
as the Department of Defense, the Department of State, National
Security Agency, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, and so
on. So that as part of my reply to your question, I would include those
Government agencies as sources of information on Dr. Ellsberg.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you recall Mr. Colson asking you to interview
Col. Lucien Conein?
Mr. Hunt. I do.
INIr. Dash. Who is Lucien Conein, or who was he at the time you
interviewed him?
Mr. Hunt. At the time I interviewed Colonel Conein, he had just
returned from the Army, I believe, and was in the process of retiring
from the CIA, or had retired therefrom. He and I had trained together
in the Office of Strategic Services for service in the Far East. In fact,
we had shipped out to China together and worked in China together
during World War II. I had seen him infrequently during the inter-
vening years, but we had maintained a friendly relationship.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall when the initial interview with Colonel
Conein took place?
INIr. Hunt. It was on or about July 8, 1971.
Mr. Sachs. Excuse me, Mr. Dash,"could we confer for just a moment?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Sachs. Mr. Chairman, is it possible that the photographers who
are right here, just a few feet from us and clicking their cameras, could
be asked to remove themselves to some more distant place so that
there would be less distraction to Mr. Hunt? There are, as you can see,
Your Honor, maybe a dozen people here who are doing their jobs,
undoubtedly, but it is a little distracting.
Senator ER^^N. Mr. Hunt, do they distract you ?
Mr. Hunt. They do, Mr. Chairman.
Senator ER^^N. I will have to ask the photographers to sort of get
over to the side somewhere where they won't distract Mr. Hunt.
[Laughter.]
As far as this committee is concerned, we have to receive Mr. Hunt's
testimony.
Mr. Hunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize to the pho-
tographers in\'X)lved.
Mr. Dash. All right now, Mr. Hunt, are you ready to proceed?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Will you just briefly describe what occurred. Did you
initially interview Colonel Conein ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. Did you follow that interview by a telephone conversa-
tion with Colonel Conein ?
3668
Mr. Hunt. On the following day.
Mr. Dash. VVliat were the circumstances that led you to make a tele-
phone call after the interview ?
Mr. Hunt. During my initial interview with Colonel Conein on
July 8, it developed that' a portion of the tape recording of that con-
versation was inaudible. Accordingly Mr. Colson suggested that I tele-
phone him and attempt to reconstruct the inaudible portion of the
telephone — of the recorded convei-sation of the prior day.
Mr. Colson, at the same time, was on another extension, introduced
himself to Colonel Conein as "Fred Charles" and took a minor part in
the conversation that ensued between Colonel Conein and myself.
Mr. Dash. Do you have any explanation as to why Mr.
Mr. Hunt. Excuse me.
Mr. Sachs. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry.
Senator Er\^n. T am going to have to ask the photographers to get
somewhere where Mr. Hunt cannot see them.
I am going to have to ask them to desist, I hate to do that but I want
the witness not to have his attention distracted.
Mr. Dash. Can you explain to the committee, Mr. Hunt, why Mr.
Colson wanted to be a part of that conversation and why he chose the
pseudonym "Fred Charles."
Mr. Hunt. Well, you have asked me two questions, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. I want you to answer the first one, why did he want to be
a part of that conversation ?
Mr. Hunt. He wanted to be a part of the conversation so that he
could interpose himself to ask a specific question, whatever specific
questions might occur to him as relevant to the subject of our conversa-
tion and our prior interview, and in effect to hear for himself at first-
hand Colonel Conein's reply.
Mr. Dash. Why did he use the name Fred Charles ?
Mr. Hunt. To avoid being connected in Colonel Conein's mind with
the White House.
Mr. Dash. Do you know what the purpose of Mr. Colson's asking
you to interview Colonel Conein was ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Could you explain that?
Mr. Hunt. I would have to go back a number of years and make it
a matter of record that Colonel Conein had worked for the CIA in
Vietnam, I would say almost uninterruptedly since 1954. Colonel
Conein had a high degree of intimacy with some senior officials of the
several governments that had held power in South V^ietnam. He was
also a military officer, he spoke French, he spoke Vietnamese to some
extent, he was intimately familiar, too, and I believe this gets to the
crux of your question, with the events leading up to the coup that
resulted ultimately in the deaths of Premier Diem and also brother-in-
law.
Mr. Dash. Was the interview supposed to be directed toward that
coup and the underlying causes of that coup?
Mr. Hunt. It was.
Mr. Dash. Which led to the assassination of Premier Diem.
Mr. Hunt. It was.
3669
Mr. Dash. Do you have, :^^r. Hunt, a copy, a transcript of that tele-
phone conversation, I think which the committee has provided you
during the executive session?
^Ir. HtiNT. I do.
JNIr. Dash. Now, would it be also fair to say that one of the purposes
of the conversation was to get information from Colonel Conein which
might be derogatory against Dr. Ellsberg?
Mr. Hunt. One of the purposes ; yes, sir.
JNIr. Dash. Would you turn to page 4. Do you see that in the third
paragraph from the top of page 4 referring to H, which I take it to be
yours, ]NIr. Hunt, you say, after a reference to a INIr. Vann, that I am
getting very curious about that guy and what his connections with
Ellsberg would have been, and then at the bottom of page 4 you have
FC and I take it that is Fred Charles ; is that correct ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And that was Mr. Colson ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Daspi. And also question
Mr. Hunt. For the record it was Mr. Colson who recorded the tele-
phone call, not myself.
Mr. Dash. Yes, your statement for the record is that the call was
recorded by Mr. Colson.
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And Fred Charles, being Mr. Colson, states: "Do you
think that Ellsberg or Vann had any connections with the drug
trafficking?" Would it be fair to say there was at least a query being
made in an attempt to connect ^Ir. Ellsberg with drug trafficking?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Will you turn to page 6, where the transcript indicates
that you were asking questions of Colonel Conein concerning certain
State Department cables. Could you instruct the committee as to what
the purpose of vour request of Colonel Conein was leading to?
INIr. Hunt. I would never attempt to instruct the committee, Mr.
Dash, I would attempt to inform.
Mr. Dash. Would you assist the committee, inform them?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir. Mr. Colson and T were jointly interested in the
circumstances that led iip to the assassination of the President and, I
believe, the premier of South Vietnam. We felt that somewhere there
should be an instructive record of exchanges between Washington and
Saigon. We knew also that there were several channels that could have
been utilized.
In addition to the normal State Department communications with
its Embassy, there was the normal CIA communication channel with
its station in Saigon. There were also so-called back channel communi-
cations facilities for both organizations, there were communication
cable facilities
Mr. Dash. INfr. Hunt, what I really was directing your attention to,
and perhaps this question might make it clearer: Was there an effort
on the part of your questioning of Colonel Conein to attempt to get
some indication from him as to whether or not the Kennedy adminis-
tration was related in any way to the coup ?
-296 O— 73— pt. 9 18
3670
Senator Gurnet. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire what this line oi
questioning has to do with the Presidential campaign of 1972 ? It is
very interesting but I don't think it lies within the purview of the
committee.
Mr. Dash. Senator Gurney, I think the following questions will
indicate the line of questioning which
Senator Gurney. Will counsel simply state to the committee what
he has in mind ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
I think Mr. Hunt will answer a few questions that will follow the
questions that I am now asking, which will show an effort by Mr. Col-
son to try to discredit the Kennedy administration and therefore the
Democratic Party during the election and relating it to the assassina-
tion of Premier Diem and for that purpose attempting to bring the
Catholic vote away from the Democratic Party, and to show that a
Democratic President had a role in the assassination of a Catholic
premier.
Senator Gurney. I thought this had to do with national security
leaks that occurred way back in July 1971, this conversation. I can't
see how that can possibly relate to the Presidential campaign of 1972.
Mr. Dash. Well, the effort, and I think Mr. Hunt has already re-
sponded to a question put by me to him that the purpose was to get
derogatory information and leak it to the press during the Presidential
campaign and I think if I am allowed to follow up with some questions
I can show the connection.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, much of the information being cov-
ered by Mr. Dash and the point made by Mr. Gurney are involved in
I believe the legal concept of whether or not the questions themselves
should state a conclusion or whether they should elicit facts from which
the committee may draw conclusions. In order to get the thing in some
sort of order, I would suggest if there is no objection, and I ask unani-
mous consent that the transcript of the telephone conversation in its
entirety may be entered in the record at this time.
Mr. Dash. I intended to do that.
Senator Baker. Is there any objection ?
Senator ER\aN. Let the record show that the transcript of the entire
telephone conversation is hereby made part of the record and marked
appropriately as an exhibit.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 149.*]
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, rather than pursue the matter any
further might I simply suggest that the counsel to the committee at-
tempt to establish the factual situation and, if need be, state and
thereby inform the committee what those questions are intended to
serve without trying to build a statement of conclusion on the basis of
each question. That after all is the factfinding mission of the commit-
tee. I don't want to hornswoggle us by making strict rules of evidence
but I do think we will get along faster if we could establish the facts
and deal with the conclusions a little later.
•See p. 3881.
.-^671
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I think my questions and the answers to
the questions will establish the facts and will be quite relevant to the
resolution under which this committee is operating, and I will go to
another question which will clarify that.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, before we go on does counsel under-
stand what I was saying?
Mr. Dash. Yes, I do.
Senator Baker. Does counsel agree with it ?
Mr. Dash. Well, I would like to ask a line of questions, Senator
Baker, that will demonstrate the facts and the conclusions that the
committee can draw, but I will not draw the conclusions. The commit-
tee will draw the conclusions.
Senator Baker. Do I understand, then, that counsel agrees with me,
that the conclusionary part of this thing is a function of the com-
mittee ?
Mr. Dash. Oh, yes. My statement concerning conclusions was in re-
sponse to a question put by Senator Gurney as to what the relevance
of the question was to the resolution and, therefore, it was necessary
for me to state the inference that was to be drawn from the questions,
that it is relevant to our resolution. Otherwise, I could not have re-
sponded to Senator Guniey's question.
Senator Baker. Mt. Chairman, I make the request of counsel that
we proceed as promptly as possible, stating the reasons for the ques-
tions which were asked without trying to establish a basis for a con-
clusion on each question. Counsel is free to accept that recommenda-
tion by the vice chairman or reject it, but I place it before counsel for
consideration.
Senator Gurxey. Mr. Chairman, may I also make this observation?
Actually, all this material we are talking about here and questioning
about we have had before the committee in one form or another. These
are amplifications of that. But I really think what we ought to do to
get along with committee business is to get to something new and not
to rehash something old. This is not really a trial. We are not seeking
to corroborate testimony or evidence we have heard before. What we
are trying to do is to get at some new facts. I would just suggest that
following Mr. Baker's suggestion, possibly, we could get this by a very
short explanation of the counsel, plus putting it in the record, and then
get on to new business.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman
Senator Ervin. Just a moment. The evidence we have taken thus far
indicates that Mr. Hunt had much to do with the mattere the com-
mittee is investigating. I think perhaps we would make a little bit
more siDeed if we just questioned the witness.
Senator Baker. Before you proceed, Mr. Dash, Mr. Chairman, I
agree with you and I hope very much that we will simpl}^ question the
witness and not try to build statements of conclusion as we go along.
I fully intend to draw inferences and state conclusions of my own, but
that will come on or about February 28. But I hope we can sharpen up
questions to elicit facts without developing hypotheses as we proceed.
Mr. Dash. That is my intention, Senator Baker, and that is what I
have been trying to do.
3672
At this early time of your employment at the White House, Mr.
Hunt, did you have access to State Department cables covering the
period of the Diem assassination ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. A^^iy did you have access to them ?
Mr. Hunt. Because I had requested such access and it had been
granted me.
Mr. Dash. Now. in the review of these cables, did you notice any
irregularity of sequence?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. In what period did the gap in sequence occur ?
Mr. Hunt. The period immediately leading up to the assassination
of the Premier of South Vietnam.
Mr. Dash. Did you show the cables to Mr. Colson and offer an inter-
pretation of them ?
Mr. Hunt. I showed him copies of those chronological cables, yes,
sir.
Mr. Dash. And what interpretation, if any, did you give him con-
cerning the cables ?
Mr. Hunt. I told him that the construction I placed upon the
absence of certain cables w^as that thev had been abstracted from the
files maintained by the Department of State in chronological fashion
and that while there was every reason to believe, on the basis of an
accumulated evidence of the cable documentation, that the Kennedy
administration was implicitly, if not explicitly, responsible for the
assassination of Diem and his brother-in-law. that there was no hard
evidence such as a cable emanating from the "WTiite House or a reply
coming from Saigon, the Saigon Embassy.
Mr. Dash. What was Mr. Colson 's reaction to your statement and the
showing of the cable to him ? Did he agree that the cables were suffi-
cient evidence to show anv relationship between the Kennedy adminis-
tration and the assassination of Diem ?
Mr. Hunt. He did.
Mr. Dash. Did he ask you to do anything ?
Mr. Hunt. He suggested that I might be able to improve upon the
record. To create, to fabricate cables that could substitute for the
missing chronolojjical cables.
Mr. Dash. Did you in fact fabricate cables for the purpose of indi-
catins: the relationship of the Kennedy administration and the assas-
sination of Diem ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. Did vou show these fabricated cables to Mr. Colson ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
INfr. Dash. "\ATiat was his response to the fabricated cables?
Mr. Hunt. He indicated to me that he would be probablv getting in
touch with a member of the media, of the press, to whom he would
show the cables.
Mr. Dash. And were you in fact put in touch with a member of the
media ?
Mr. Hunt. I was.
Mr. Dash. Who was that?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. William Lambert of Life magazine.
3673
Mr. Dash. "What was your instruction concerning the relationship
you were to liave with Mr. Lambert ?
Mr. Hunt. To show Mr. Lambert the context of the other legitimate
cables that I acquired from the Department of State, to permit Mr.
Lambert to hand-copy the texts of the fabricated cables, but I having
warned Mr. Colson previously that the cables were not technically
capable of withstanding f)rofessional scrutiny, that Mr. Lambert was
not to be allowed to remove the cables for photocopying purposes.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Lambert use the information?
Mr. Hunt. Not to my knowledge, no.
Mr. Dash. Now, are you aware from your conversation with ISIr.
Colson and the use of these cables of any strategy that Mr. Colson had
with regard to Catholic voters ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Could you describe that more fully ?
Mr. Hunt. I believe it was desired by Mr. Colson, or at least some of
his colleagues, to demonstrate that a Catholic U.S. administration had
in fact conspired in the assassination of a Catholic chief of state of
another country.
Mr. Dash. Did you show the fabricated cables to Colonel Conein?
]Mr. Hunt. T did.
Mr. Dash. Under what circumstances ?
Mr. PIunt. Prior to Colonel Conein's apj^earance on a — I believe
NBC-TV network special concerning Vietnam.
]Mr. Dash. And did Colonel Conein use any of this information from
the fabricated cables in his program ?
Mr. Hunt. I would have to answer in these terms, Mr. Dash, that I
had shown him the fabricated cables in the broader context of the
overall cables, that he was then inten-ogated by a camera and interview
crew and that I believe he made, if not specific reference to the cables
I showed him, at least they reinforced his own belief that there had been
direct complicity by the Kennedy administration in the events leading
up to the assassination of the South Vietnamese Premier.
Mr. Dash. Now, as part of ]N[r. Colson's plan to publicly discredit
Mr. Ellsberg, did you prepare a derogatory article on Mr. Leonard
Boudin, Ellsberg's lawyer?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
iSIr. Dash. Did vou show this to ]Mr. Colson ?
JSTr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. What was his suggestion when you showed it to him?
^Ir. Hunt. He indicated that he would be passing the information to
a member of the press, the article tliat I had prepared.
Mr. Dash. And, in fact, was the material that appeared in that
article reflected in any news story that you were aware of?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Can you state to the committee what particular news
storv ?
Mr. Hunt. It was an article authored bv Mr. Jerrv terHorst. who
represented one of the Detroit newspapers in Washington. It formed
the second half of a story that Mr. terHorst was publishing on Ells-
berg and Ellsberg's defense.
3674
Mr. Dash. Did you subsequently in a memorandum to Mr. Colson
suggest tlic manner in which additional derogatory information might
be developed on Ellsberg and how a file might be constructed to destroy
his public image and credibility ?
INIr. Hunt. Yes.
]\Ir. Dash.. Do you have a copy that the committee provided you in
executive session of a memorandum from you to Mr. Colson dated
July 28, 1971, entitled "Neutralization of Mr. Ellsberg?"
Mr. Hunt. I do.
Mr. Dash. Now, you will notice in that memorandum, Mr. Hunt,
that one item, I think No. 7, there is a reference to obtaining Ellsberg's
files from a psychiatrist-analyst. Do you see that reference as one of
the items?
Mr. Hunt. I do.
Mr. Dash. Did you at the time you made that recommendation con-
template that it might be necessary to engage in a covert entry or
break-in ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. Also, there is a reference that a psychological assessment
from the CIA be requested of Mr. Ellsberg. Is that correct ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. AVliat was the purpose of the psychological assessment,
Mr. Hunt?
Mr. Hunt. One of the problems the administration was having with
the Ellsberg indictment — I believe I am probably being presumptions
in using so large a frame of reference — was that nobody really could
comprehend why Ellsberg had done what he did, which was to take
possession of and publicize documents with the highest classification
and sensitivity.
We knew that some had been made available to the Soviet Union by
one means or another. Mr. Ellsberg's personally stated justification for
having performed these acts was not comprehensible to any of us in the
White House who were charged with determininsr his motivation and
the manner of the leaks. I believe that it was my initial recommenda-
tion that Ave attempt to probe or plumb Dr. Ellsberg's mind by means
of a covert psychological assessment. We had no idea what type of an
animal we were dealing with.
Mr. Dash, Would it also be true. ]\Ir. Hunt, that the information
that might be obtained from either the profile or psychiatric materials
from his analvst might be used to discredit Mr. Ellsberg?
Mr. Hunt. Might be used, yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And if received, would that also be presented to the press
media ?
Mr. Hunt. I would have to qualifv^ mv reply, Mr. Dash, by saying
that it would depend upon the nature of the items discovered.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you know whether or not vour recommendation
or your memorandum on the neutralization of Mr. Ellsberg: was
implemented ?
Mr. Hunt. In terms of each item, sir ?
Mr. Dash. Yes, in terms of some of these items.
Mr. Hunt. Welh I know tliat all overt nress materinl on EUsbei'f'"
continued to be collected. A request was levied on the OIA for a covert
3675
psycholoo^ical assessment on Dr. Ellsberg. I believe that the CIA, the
FBI, and perhaps the Counter-intelligence Corps were requested to
provide the Plumbers group with their full holdings on Ellsberg. And
in due course, we did enter the office of Dr. Fielding, who had been
Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, to determine if there were any psychiatric
notes.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Chairman, this particular memorandum,
July 28, 1971, from Mr. Hunt to Mr. Colson, the subject, "Neutraliza-
tion of Ellsberg," I would like to have identified for the record and
admitted in evidence.
Senator Ervix. It will be appropriately marked as an exhibit and
received in evidence as such.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 150.*]
Mr, Dash. Now, I think you testified in your statement, you have
indicated that you did indeed engage in a break-in. Was it subse-
quently determined that an attempt should be made to obtain Dr. Ells-
berg's medical files from the psychiatrist's office ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr, Dash. You have a memorandum which the committee provided
you, dated August 27, 1971, from Mr. Ehrlichman to Charles Colson.
with the subject "Hunt-Liddy Special Project No. 1"?
Mr. Hunt. I have such a memorandum.
Mr, Dash, That is dated August 27. I think this was previously put
in the record by the committee, attached during Mr. Ehrlichman's tes-
timony, I have just been informed that it is exhibit No, 91 in the com-
mittee record.
Do you have a copy of that memorandum ?
Mr, Hunt. I beg your pardon.
Mr, Dash. Do you have a copy of that memorandum ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir, I do,
Mr, Dash. Let me just read the memorandum; it is brief. This is
from Mr. Ehrlichman to Mr. Colson :
On the assumption that the proposed undertaking hy Hunt and Lidd.v woukl
be carried out and would be successful, I would appreciate receiving from you
by next Wednesday a game plan as to how and when you believe the materials
should be used.
This is referring to Hunt-Liddv special project No. 1.
Mr. Hunt, what, from your understanding, on the date of August 27,
1971, would Hunt and Liddy's special project No. 1 be?
Mr. Hunt. I would assume it to be the Fielding entry, based on the
fact that ;Mr. Liddy and I, as of that date, would just have returned
from our initial reconnaissance of Dr. Fielding's professional premises
in Beverly Hills, we would have submitted a feasibility studv.
Mr. Dash. And that the reference there for Hunt and Liddy special
])roject No. 1 would refer to the proposed covert entry of Dr. Fielding's
office for the psychiatric file ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
INIr. Dash. Now, in fact, you and Mr. Liddy did go to Los Angeles
to determine whether a covert entry was feasible and you did determine
that it was ; did you not ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
♦See p. 3886.
S676
Mr. Dash. And in fact you and Mr. Liddy and three Cuban-Ameri-
can characters, Mr. Barker, Mr. ]Nf artinez, and ISIr. De Diego did break
into Dr. Fielding's office over the Labor Day weekend in 1971 ; is that
true?
Mr. Hunt. One limitation, that neither Mr. Liddy nor I were ever on
the premises of Dr. Fielding.
yir. Dash. And there were no files of Dr. Ellsberg found, is that
true?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
]Mr. Dash. You recruited ISIr. Barker, Mr. Martinez, and Mr. De
Diego ; is that true?
]\Ir. Hunt. Yes, sir. Well, more specifically, I obtained Mr. Barker's
cooperation and he obtained the cooperation of IMessrs. Martinez and
De Diego.
Mr. Dash. What was your prior relationship with Mr. Barker?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Barker had assisted me during the CIA's sponsored
effort which came to be known as the Bay of Pigs operation.
Mr. Dash. Did you take photos of the inside of Dr. Fielding's office
to show the forced open files ?
Mr. PIuNT. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did somebody in the group take photos?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. To whom were these photos shown ?
Mr. Hunt. They were shown within room 16 to Messrs. Krogh and
Young.
Mr. Dash. When you say room 16, Mr. Krogh and Mr. Youna; — bv
the time this program developed which led up to the covert entry of
Dr. Fielding's office, you had begun to work with Mr. Krogh, Mr.
Young, and Mr. Liddy ; was that not so?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
INIr. Dash. How did that occur? You originally, I think, testified
that you were assigned to Avork for Mr. Colson. How did the transfer
of relationship in assignment take place?
Mr. Hunt. Through a process resembling osmosis almost. I had dis-
covered early in my reading of the overt materials relating to the
publication of tlie Pentagon Papers, mv researclies into Dr. Ellsber.of's
background that considerably more documentation would be necessary
for my purposes. I so advised or informed Mr. Colson and he told me
that these materials, that is to say classified materials, bearing on my
researches were to be found in room 16 and I should check with Mr.
Liddy for that purpose. I found the holdings that were in room 16
were quite extensive, and I began as a matter of course and custom to
go there every day to acquaint myself with additional information as it
flowed into room 16 from the various Government agencies that were
making contributions. So it was that I spent less and less time in office
338 which had been assigned to me by IVfr. Colson and a great deal
more time in room 16 which became known as the Plumbers unit, the
special investigations unit.
Mr. Dash. And by the time you had filed your memorandum on
neutralization of Mr. Ellsberg, you were then working with the so-
called Plumbers?
Mr. Hunt. Almost entirely ; yes, sir.
3677
Mr. Dash. Did you attempt to show the photographs that were taken
during the Fielding break-in to Mr. Colson ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. And what occurred when you did ?
Mr. Hunt. I told Mr. Colson I would like to try to put a date on
this, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash, Do you have a date for that?
Mr. Hunt. I do.
On Labor Day weekend, 1971, that is to say the 3d of September,
the entry in Dr. Fielding's office was accomplished. The following
Tuesday, that is to say the first working day after Labor Day, was the
morning on which I attempted to show i\Ir. Colson the Polaroid pho-
tographs that had been taken by team members of the violated cabinets
in Dr. Fielding's premises.
Mr. Dash. How did he react to your attempting to show him the
photographs ?
Mr. Hunt. He declined to look at what I had in my hand, continued
to stride into his office without breaking his pace and said "I don't
want to hear anything about it."
Mr. Dash. Were you assigned by Mr. Colson to interview a Mr. Clif-
ton De Motte of Providence^ — being told by Mr. Colson or anybody else
that Mr. De Motte allegedly had derogatory information on the Ken-
nedy family?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Wlien was this, approximately ?
Mr. Hunt. I would say approximately July 1971.
Mr. Dash. Is it true that you undertook to have this interview with
Mr. De Motte disguised ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. How did you obtain the materials for the disguise ?
Mr. Hunt. Through the CIA.
Mr. Dash. And could you just very briefly tell the committee how
you were able to obtain materials from the CIA that would permit you
to disguise yourself?
Mr. Hunt. Shortly after my employment began at the T^Hiite House,
I reported to Mr. Colson that I had been given credible information to
the effect that a Mr. Clifton De Motte was believed to have information
reflecting unfavorably on certain members of the Kennedy political
grouping. This having been based on the experience of an individual
named "Clifton De ^fotte" who had been an unofficial part of the Ken-
nedy entourage during the, I believe, 1960 election. IMr. Colson felt that
the lead ought to be followed up and asked me whether I could under-
take to elicit information from him during an interview with the
proviso that mv connection with the White House not be rcA^ealed.
T said that this would require my having some sort of alias or false
documentation and perhaps even physical disguise.
Mr. Colson asked me whether or not I could provide it. I said I could
not and I in turn asked him whether or not such disguise — documenta-
tion might be available throuofh either the Secret Service or tlie FBI
representatives at the "WTiite House. Mr. Colson indicated that the mat-
ter was too sensitive to involve either the Secret Service or the FBI
and he inquired whether perhaps on the man to man, a personal l)asis.
3678
I mifrht not bo able to acquire documentation and dis^ise equipment
from former associates at the CIA.
I told him that this was out of tbe question. Mr. Colson then postu-
lated the thoufrht or the question rather of what would be required to
obtain the cooperation of CIA. I said that it had been my past expe-
rience that a call from the White House broug:ht almost instant
response from the CIA. Mr. Colson said to me, "Very well, I will look
into it and ^ret back to vou."
:Mr. Dash. All riorht.
Then when was — how were you informed, and in what way were you
notihed that you could then go make contact with the CIA for the
disguise ?
Mr. HtTNT. The pi-ecise details at this point
Mr. Dash. If you could just briefly tell us that.
Mr. Hunt [continuing]. Are not entirely clear. The crux of tlic
matter is that I did receive at one point a call from a Mr. Carl Wagner
who was the principal pei-sonal assistant to Gen. Robert Cushman of
the Marine Corps who was then the Deputy Director of the CIA set-
ting up an appointment for me with General Cushman at CIA
headquartei-s.
Mr. Dash. And did you obtain disguise materials?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
!Mr. Dash. And so disguised, you did interview Mr. De Motte ?
Mr. HujfT. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Wliat was the outcome of that interview. ]Mr. Hunt ?
Mr. HtrxT. It was detennined by both Mr. Colson and myself that
the information was useless.
Mr. Dash. In the latter part of 1971. Mr. Hunt, did you become
aware of the fact that Mr. Liddy was to become counsel for the Com-
mittee for the Re-Election of the President?
Mr. HrxT. I did.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Liddy recruit you to help him develop large-
scale covert political intelligence plans for the Committee To Re-Elect
the Pi-esident ?
^Ir. HrxT. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Wlien was this plan
Mr. Sachs. Excuse me, Mr. Dash.
Mr. HrxT [conferi-ing with counsel]. Mr. Dash, could I trouble you
to repeat the question having to do with recruitment ?
Mr. Dash. What, which question, the previous ?
Mr. Sachs. The question that he just answered before the last ques-
tion, he would like repeated, please.
Mr. Dash. Perhaps the reporter can repeat the question.
fThe reporter read the question.]
Mr. Htxt. I would like to modify mv response, if I might, Mr.
Dash.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. HrxT. In late November 1971. Mr. Liddy approached me savins
that the Attorney General of the United States. Mr. .John Mitchell,
required the establishment of a large-scale intellijrence and counter-
intelligence prosram. That he. Mr. Liddy. was about to become its
chief, and Mr. Liddy would like to assure himself of my cooperation.
3679
Mr. Dash. Was this the plan that came later to be kno-;vn as
Gemstone?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash, '\^^lo did you understand from the conversation with Mr.
Liddy were actually directing the development of this political intelli-
gence plan ?
Mr. HuxT. My understanding was as follows : that the plan had been
proposed and or required by the Attorney General of the United
States. Mr. Mitchell. That Messrs. John W. Dean III, the then counsel
for the President of the United States, and Mr. Jeb Stuart Magruder
a recent "\Miite House aide, were those who were active in its
formulation.
Mr. Dash. Xow. did you. in fact, help Mr. Lidd}' prepare the de-
tailed plan and budget of the plan ?
Mr. Hunt. I did with the exception of that portion of the plan which
dealt with electronic surveillance.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Hunt, the committee has already had ample testi-
mony concerning presentation of this particular plan to former At-
torney General Mitchell. Mr. Dean, and Mr. Magruder by Mr. Liddy
on January 27. 1072 and February -i. 1972.
Xow. prior to that Januarv 27 presentation, did you have a discus-
sion with Mr. Colson concerning that you would be giving fewer hours
to the TVhite House work because of the time that vou had to spend
withMr. Lidfl->
Mr. Hunt. I told Mr. Colson that because of the increased amount
of time I was spending with ]Mr. Liddy that I would be able to give
far less time to Mr. Colson than I had done in the past.
Mr. Dash. TVhat. if anything, did Mr. Colson say to you about that ?
Mr. HrxT. He ^^aid that he understood this.
Mr. Dash. Did he indicate by words or statement that he under-
stood the plan that you were working with Mr. Liddy on ?
Mr. Htjxt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Could you give us a little fuller explanation ?
!Mr. Httxt. On one occasion, and it must have been in conj'unction
with this particular interview. Mr. Colson told me that he had. in
fact, supplied Mr. Mitchell witli my bona fides. He further indicated
that he was aware of the overall intelligence plan and his only problem
with it was that he would much prefer me — see me heading it rather
than Mr. Liddy.
I told him that the situation was fine as far as I was concerned, that
T had cooperated witli Mr. Liddy before, -ue ofot along well. I had
alreadv a full-time job with a public relations firm and was not seek-
inar full-time employment such as ]Mr. Liddy had.
Mr. Dash. Is it true that this conversation took place in January*
prior to the Januarv 27 meeting with former Attomev General
Mitchell?
Mr. HrxT. "Whose meeting ?
Mr. Da>h. Your meeting with Mr. Colson. when did this take place ?
^fr. Htxt. Yes. but who met with Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Dash. Xo. I sav did this meeting vou had with Mr. Colson take
place in January- prior to the Januarv 27 presentation by Mr. Liddy of
the nlan to Attorney General Mitchell ?
Mr. HrxT. To the best of mv recollection, it did.
3680
Mr. Dash. Do you know where the conversation with INIr. Colson
took place?
Mr. Hunt. Between myself and Mr. Colson ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Hunt. In ^Ir. Colson's office.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you tell Mr. Colson at that time that you
planned to recruit and use members of the same Cuban- American
community that had worked with you in the Ellsbero; break-in?
Mr. Hunt. Either on that or another occasion, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Colson was aware, was he not, of the role you and
Mr. Lid ly played in the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office ?
Mr. Hunt. I was not so aware at the time. I have come to under-
stand that subsequently.
Mr. Dash. At the time that Mr. Colson was indicating to you that
he was aware of an intelligence plan that Mr. Liddy was working on,
was there any other intelligence plan besides the Gemstone plan that
Mr. Liddy was working on ?
Mr. Hunt. No.
Mr. Dash. Was it your impression, therefore, that Mr. Colson was
speaking of the so-called Gemstone plan ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Hunt, Mr. Colson has submitted to this committee
an affidavit. Do you have a copy of that? I think the committee lias
given you a copy.
The affidavit is signed by you dated April 5, 1973, and I think it is
brief enough to read. It is :
I, E. Howard Hunt, having been duly sworn do hereby depose and state as
follows :
1. I understand that allegations and statements have been made to the effect
that Charles Colson, former Counsel to the President, had prior knowledge or in
some way was involved in. or participated in, the break-in at the Democratic
National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel on June 17, 1972.
2. I never at any time discussed with Mr. Colson any plans with respect to this
incident.
3. I have no knowledge whatever, personal or otherwise, that Mr. Colson had
any prior knowledge whatever of this incident. To my knowledge, no one else ever
discussed this matter with him prior to June 17, 1972.
Did you sign this affidavit ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. "WTiat were the circumstances which led you to sign this
affidavit ?
Mr. Hunt. This affidavit was passed to me in the Federal court-
house by my attorney, my then -attorney, Mr. William O. Bittman
prior to an appearance of mine before the Federal grand jury. To the
best of my recollection Mr. Bittman indicated to me that he had re-
ceived the affidavit in draft form from Mr. Colson's office, and won-
dered if there would be anv problem on my part about si.<Tning it. I
indicated that I had no difficulty with it whatever, and did, in fact,
sign the affidavit.
Mr. Dash. All right, now, Mr. Hunt, does this affidavit that vou
signed negate the testimony that vou have just given, that Mr. Colson
did inform you in January 1972 that he was aware of what had come
to be known as the Gemstone plan ?
Mr. Hunt. Does it negate it ?
I
3681
Mr. Dash. Does it negate it ?
Mr. Hunt, No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Can you explain %vhy it does not?
Mr. Hunt. Because the information that Mr. Colson possessed in
January, that I possessed in January, referred only to an overall intel-
ligence program. It had nothing to do with a specific break-in at the
Democratic national headquarters.
Mr. Dash. And this particular affidavit deals only about Mr. Col-
son's knowledge of the specific break-in of the Watergate ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter or have the affidavit
identified as an exhibit of the committee and admitted in evidence.
Senator Ervin. The affidavit will be appropriately numbered and
received in evidence as an exhibit.
[The affidavit referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 151.*]
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Hunt, is it not true that you only recently told
the staff of this committee in executive session, specifically within the
last week or two, of the fact of Mr. Colson's knowledge of the so-called
Gemstone plan in January 1972 ?
Mr. Hunt, May I consult with counsel ?
[Conferring with counsel.]
Mr. Hunt, Mr, Dash, I would appreciate having the stenographer
read the question back.
[The repoi-ter read the question.]
Mr. Hunt. In the interest of accuracy, Mr, Dash, let me say or
repeat the testimony I have given in the executive session to the effect
that on an occasion when I introduced Mr. Liddy and Mr. Colson for
the first time, following that particular meeting, Mr. Liddy said to me,
as we left Mr. Colson's office, "I believe we may have done us some
good." which was indicative to me that they had been discussing the
Gemstone plan. However, only recently — ^and I have said that from the
beginning of the interrogations — I have, w^ithin recent weeks, let us
say, added to my testimony to state, in effect, to enable me to provide
a ])ositive i-esponse to the question you have just posed me.
Mr. Dash. Is it not true, Mr, Hunt, that on May 14, 1973, on page
323 of the transcript, that in specific questions that I j^ut to you
whether or not any other person than the persons who had been in-
volved in the discussion with Mr, Liddy, and you named persons such
as Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, knew about the overall
intelligence plan? Let me just quote your statement on page 323 and
my question:
During that time, did you ever indicate in the presence of Mr. McCord that
these plans would have, that you were in touch with other persons yourself in
the White House, Mr. Colson or anybody else concerning these plans?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir. I would not have done that, because it was true to the best
of my knowledge that Mr. Colson had no specific knowledge. He had no knowl-
edge of my dealings with Mr. Liddy from me. Now, if Mr. Colson had collateral
knowledge or awareness, he did not confide in me.
W_iat I am asking. Mr. Hunt, is : Is it not true that on :May 14, 1973,
your statement was that Mr, Colson did not to your knowledge have
any awareness of an overall intelligence plan ?
♦See p. 3887.
3682 ^
Mr. Sachs. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I detect a little bit of con-
fusion. If I could just have 1 minute to talk to Mr. Hunt, I think it
might expedite this.
Senator Ervin. Certainly.
Mr. Sachs. Mr. Dash, if the committee will — I think I have a notion,
Mr. Dash, as to the line of questioning you are about to pursue in
order to refresh Mr. Hunt's i-ecollection as to the testimony he recently
gave in executive session. It was clear to me before you undertook this
last question that he did not quite clearly understand what you were
driving at and he and I liave now discussed that briefly. I think per-
haps if you will ask your first question, or perhaps I could ask it, he
could quickly answer it and we can go on to something else.
I think what you are asking him is whether in the past few weeks,
he had added to his explanation of his conversations with Mr. Colson
the fact that in January of 1972 there was a conversation between him
and Mr. Colson which indicated that Mr. Colson had knowledge of the
Gemstone program.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Sachs. I think he can answer that quickly.
Mr. Dasti. Well, the question that I put to you is : Is not this the first
time that you have told the committee that ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Prior to telling the committee that, have you informed
any other investigative body, including the grand jury that is presently
sitting, about that information ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Can you explain to the committee, Mr. Hunt, what ap-
pears to be contradictory testimony in the executive session and now
before this committee as to Mr. Colson's prior knowledge of this
general plan?
Mr. Hunt. T can attempt to, Mr, Dash.
Mr. Dash. Would you please do that?
Mr. Hunt. Yes. It derived as a result of repeated questioning bv the
committee staff concerning events which transpired on the occasion of
my ha\ang introduced Mr. Liddv and Mr. Colson for the first time.
A theory of Mr. Colson's perceptions of the meetings was entered into
and developed, which brought back to my mind for the first time the
prior conversation that I had held in January with Mr. Colson.
Mr. Sactis. ^Ir. Dash, mav I ask that the recording clear that there
is no contradiction between Mr. Hunt's testimony on this point today
as against his testimony in the executive session? I think that might
have been inferred from your question.
Mr. Dash. I think the record is clear on that. I again made it very
clear that Mr. Hunt is testifving today consistently with what he has
told the committee in executive session in the last week or two. I was
pointing out in the interest of fairness that Mr. Hunt had not given us
this testimony on earlier occasions and Mr. Hunt has just given us an
explanation of why he had not.
I would like to follow that up. Mr. Hunt, and ask you whether or not
your motion that is now pending in the court for the removal of your
plea of guilty, or the withdrawal of vour plea of guiltv. in which you
indicated in the motion that you believed that Mr. Colson approved
i
3683
the overall plan, has any relevance to your recent testimony before the
executive session or before this committee ?
Mr. Sachs. I am a little troubled, Mr. Dash, by your use of the word
"relevance."
Mr. Dash. Why?
Mr. Sachs. You might want to ask me that.
Mr. Dash. I will put the question more directly, Mr. Hunt.
lAre you now giving us your best recollection of what truthfully
transpired in January as opposed to what you were telling us earlier
during the period of interrogation?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I am not clear. I got lost about 10
minutes ago.
Is the burden of the query that Mr, Hunt is now giving us informa-
tion for the first time and only recently gave it to us in executive ses-
sion as distinguished from his earlier appearances in executive session
by reason of or connected with the fact that he is attempting to change
his plea from guilty to not guilty ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Senator Baker. Is there any implication in counsel's question that
the two are not inconsistent, but rather that this is additional informa-
tion that may have bearing on the application of Mr. Hunt to change
his plea ?
IVIr, Dash. The last question I put to Mr. Hunt, and perhaps he can
answer it is: Is there any motivation on your part to give us this more
recent testimony concerning INIr. Colson's awareness of the plan con-
nected in any way to your motion to withdraw your plea of guilty?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir; and if I may consult with counsel, there is an-
otlier point I would like to make pertinent to this.
I would like to add, Mr. Dash, that my legal position vis-a-vis the
motion does not depend upon Mr. Colson's knowledge or nonknowl-
edire at that time.
Mr. Dash. All right. Now, Mr. Hunt, after the February 4 meeting
that Mr. Liddy had with the former Attorney General in which there
was another turndown on the so-called Liddy plan, did Mr. Liddy ask
5'ou to introduce him to Mr, Colson ?
Mr. Hunt. He did,
Mr, Dash. T\^iat reasons did he give you for this ?
Mr. Hunt, He indicated to me that, first of all, he admired Chuck
Colson as a man who got things done. He expressed his own desire for
a substantial position in the forthcoming administration. He indicated
to me that inasmuch as John Mitchell would be leaving the adminis-
tration and he, Liddv. was known and identified as a ISIitchell man.
that Mr. Liddy would like to touch base with IVIr, Colson, who would
be staying on in the administration at least through the election, and
so have another power base, as it were, on which he could depend at
such time as
^fr, Dash. Did vou arrange such a meeting?
Mr. Hunt, T did.
y\v. Dash. And do you know when that, approximately, took place?
^Ir. Hunt. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. But do vou recall it was in the month of February?
Mr. Hunt, May T consult my notes, Mr, Dash ?
3684
I would relate it to the phone call concerning which Mr. Magruder
has already given testimony.
]\rr. Das}t. All right, noAv, did you introduce IMr. Liddy to Mr.
Colson?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. After you did, what did you do ?
Mr. Hunt. I withdrew to the back of the room and sat, smoked my
pipe, leafed through a magazine while Mr. Liddy conversed with Mr.
Colson.
Mr. Dash. Why did you withdraw to the back of the room?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Liddv having given me the preamble, the reasons for
his desire to meet Mr. Colson, T felt that it was a personal matter and
did not want to involve myself or interpose myself in any way.
Mr. Dash. How lonsr did the meeting take place ?
Mr. Hunt. Approximately 10 or 12 minutes.
Mr. Dash. Did you observe Mr. Colson use the telephone during
that meeting?
Mr. Hunt. On several occasions.
Mr. Dash. After the meeting, did you have a conversation with Mr.
Liddy?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. What did Mr. Liddv tell you ?
Mr. Hunt. He said, "I think I mav have done us some good."
Mr. Dash. At that time what was your interpretation of that
message ?
Mr. Hunt. I realized that he had been speaking with Mr. Colson
about the Oemstone operation.
Mr. Dastt. "Whv did vou drnw that interpretation from the state-
ment, "T think I have done us some good" ?
Mr. Hunt. Because that was the only common subject concerning
which he could have done us any good.
Mr. Dash. All right
Now, the committee has alreadv heard testimonv from Mr. Magru-
der that while you were in Mr. Colson 's office Mr. Colson telephoned
Mr. Magruder and ur<?ed him, "to get off the stick and get the budget
approved for Mr. Liddv's plans."
Now. what plans of !Mr. Liddy could Mr. Colson have been referring
to at that time ?
Mr. Hunt. It could only have been the Gemstone concept.
Mr. Dash. Why do you say that ?
Mr. Hunt. That was the onlv one that was under consideration.
Mr. Dash. Durinsr part of this period, Mr. Hunt, when you were
working for Mr. Liddy between December 1971 and March 1972. did
you receive anv other assignments from Mr. Liddv for political espio-
nage against Democratic candidates for the Presidency ? Specifically
did von have a dealing with a person known to you as Fat Jack?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Could vou describe how these dealings took place and
what the assignment was ?
Mr. Hunt. There came a time when Mr. Liddv asked me as an
accommodation to meet with a orentleman who was handling an agent
inside Muskie headquarters. He described the gentleman's physical
3685
appearance. We arranged a meeting point in front of the Eoger Smith
Hotel and I gather that Mr. Liddy also described my appearance to
the other gentleman so that at the appointed time we had no difficulty
in recognizing each other.
Mr. Dash. What was the purpose of these meetings?
Mr. Hunt. So that I could pick up material that derived from
Muskie headquarters from this penetration agent.
Mr. Dash. What kind of materials were these ?
Mr. Hunt. They were in photographic form.
Mr. Dash. Could you describe the nature of the photographs ?
Mr. Hunt. On only one occasion did I have — did I look into the
envelope. I saw that there were advance schedules, perhaps some policy
statements, material of medium value, I would say.
Mr. Dash. Was the person you knew as Fat Jack paid for this work ?
Mr. Hunt. I have no way of knowing.
Mr. Dash. Did you at any time in any envelope that you delivered
see any money?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Was that given to him ?
Mr. Hunt. It was.
My understanding, to amplify that point, Mr. Dash
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Hunt [continuing]. Was that the money was to go to pay for
the photographic services that had been rendered to Fat Jack.
Mr. Dash. Did you know who he was in touch with ?
Mr. Hunt. No.
Mr. Dash. Did you have any knowledge at that time or to this date
of the real identity of the person you knew as Fat Jack ?
Mr. Hunt. No.
Mr. Dash. Did you yourself recruit a person to infiltrate the cam-
paign of a Democratic Presidential candidate ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. Could you tell us who and in what campaign ?
Mr. Hunt. His name was Thomas Gregory. He was a student whom
I recruited to pose as a volunteer to work inside Muskie headquarters.
Mr. Dash. What was his assignment ?
Mr. Hunt. His assignment was to acquire for us policy papers, work-
ing papers, advance schedules of the Muskie party, lists of contribu-
tions of contributors, bank statements, that sort of thing that would
normally flow out of political campaign headquarters.
Mr. Dash. Did there come a time when you transferred Mr. Gregory
to the McGovem campaign ?
Mr. Hunt. There did.
Mr. Dash. What was his assignment there ?
Mr. Hunt. It was the same with one addition.
Mr. Dash. What was the addition ?
Mr. Hunt. The addition was to prepare for an electronic surveil-
lance or electronic penetration of McGovern headquarters.
Mr. Dash. How was he to prepare for that ?
Mr. Hunt. He prepared for it initially by providing me with a floor
diagram of McGovern's office building. I introduced Mr. Gregory and
Mr.^ McCord who in April met for the first time. Mr. McCord then
flft-2Qfi n 7S-
3686
told Mr. Gregory what would be rexjuired to satisfy his own particular
technical interests. Mr. Gregory took Mr. McCord through the Mc-
Govem headquarters. They continued as it were, doing business
between themselves in connection with the electronic surveillance
attempt.
Mr. Dash. Was there, in effect, an attempt to break into the McGov-
ern headquarters?
Mr. Hunt. There was an attempt to enter it, yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Wliat happened ?
Mr. Hunt. It was unsuccessful.
Mr. Dash. Now, was this activity part of the overall Gemstone plan ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. During this same period and prior to the Watergate
break-in, Mr. Hunt, did you and Mr. Liddy work on a political espio-
nage plan involving a target in Las Vegas ?
Mr. Hunt. Apart from Gemstone ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. "What was the target and how did you leani about it?
Mr. Hunt. Excuse me. [Conferring with counsel.] I take it, Mr.
Dash, you have no objection to my reciting this chronologically.
INIr. Dash. I have no objection to responding to my question the best
wav you can.
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
There came a time when my employer, Mr. Robert Bennett, in-
formed me that he had heard a rumor around Las Vegas to the effect
that a publisher named Hank Greenspun had information which would
"blow Muskie out of the water" in case Muskie became a candidate.
I reported by very brief memo this information to Mr. Liddy. Mr.
Liddy responded enthusiastically seeing in it initially an opportunity
for us to travel at company expense as it were, to Las Vegas and have
an enjoyable time.
Very shortly after his initial reaction Mr. Liddy informed me that
he, in effect, had been able to confirm the rumor or at least that he had
heard from another source this rumor, and that there was a disposition
on the part of his principals to pursue it.
I reported this matter back to Mr. Bennett and within a short period
of time 'Sir. Bennett introduced me to a Mr. Ralph Winte who was
then the head of security for either the Hughes Tool Co. or one of its
many subsidiaries.
At our initial discussion Mr. Bennett, Mr. Winte, and I discussed
Las Vegas, the Nevada political situation, the litigation then in prog-
ress between Robert Maheu and Mr. Hughes, the position politically
sneaking vis-a-vis !Mr. Greenspun and ]\fr. Hughes, the allegation that
Mr. Greenspun or others had bribed or bought certain judges in Nevada
and so on.
This came to — this discussion reached the point where Mr. Bennett
suggested that there was a commonality of interest between the Hughes
Tool Co. and Mr. Liddy and myself.
Mr. Winte and I withdrew to my office where he indicated that he
was disposed to cooperate with me in the matter. I had no prior ex-
perience in Las Vegas, and he said he would attempt to produce a floor
3687
diagram of the Greenspun office, and I asked him whether his firm,
with its multitudinous interests in Las Vegas, could provide us with
support facilities such as hotel rooms, automobiles, and so forth. He
indicated that there would be no problem.
INIr. Dash. Now, in other words, what you are saying is that your
conversation with ISIr. Winte indicated that the Hughes Tool Co. also
was interested in gaining information that may be in the possession of
Mr. Greenspun that was related to their lawsuits that were pending,
is that true ?
]\Ir. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And that you were asking for assistance from them with
regard to their resources out in Las Vegas ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dasii. Did that include an airplane or an escape plane should
that be necessary ?
Mr. Hunt. That came later, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. I am just trying to abbreviate your response.
INIr. Hunt. The answer is "Yes" ; it did.
Mr. Dash. Did you go out to Los Angeles and further communicate
with Mr. Winte?
INIr. Hunt. I did.
;Mr. Dash. Was that for the purpose of determining whether or not
you could agree on a plan to make an entry and locate a safe in the
Greenspun office ?
Mr. Hunt. I would have to answer in this form, Mr. Dash, that
there came a time approximately 2 weeks later following my first
meetins: with ISIr. Winte that Mr. Liddy and I had other reasons to
go to the west coast, and I informed Mr. Winte that we would be at
the Beverly Wilshire Plotel on a particular date. At that time Mr.
Winte joined us and I introduced him to Mr. Liddy I believe under a
pseudonym for the first time.
During the course of that conversation the question of an aircraft
was aired for the first time.
Mr. Dash. Was it part of the plan — should it follow through and
should there be a safe, that there would be an entry and that the con-
tents of the safe would be emptied and that a different place you would
divvy up what belonged to Hughes and what belonged to your interest ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. What happened to that plan ? Was it fruitful ?
Mr. Hunt. INIr. Winte had indicated to me and to Mr. Liddy also
that he could provide the on-the-ground support facilities which
would be required for an entry operation if such an entry operation
were de^-ised, but that with resrard to the aircraft, he would have to
refer to his superiors for authorization. It so happened that the follow-
in<r. the meeting among Mr. Winte, Mr. Liddy, and myself, the Muskie
candidacv was rapidly losing impetus, and no one was particularly
interested in the inform.ation that Mr. Greenspun might have pos-
sessed if. in fact he ever did, concerninsr INIr. Muskie.
Mr, Dash. So the plan was dropped ?
Mr. Hunt. The plan was droi^ped and either Mr. Bennett or Mr.
Winte told me at a later date that in any event the availability of the
. aircraft had been declined.
3688
Mr. Dash. All ri^ht now, Mr. Hunt, with regard to the Democrat
Convention in Miami, did you give any assignments to Mr. Barker?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. And what, if any, assignment did you give Mr. Barker?
Mr. Hunt. We are speaking now only of the Democratic Convention.
Mr. Dash. Democratic.
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Barker's principal assignment was to develop a net-
work of informants along the Miami Beach hotel complex who could
report to us concerning cami^aign developments, convention develop-
ments, policies of individual Democratic candidates.
Mr. Dash. Did he also have an assignment to procure a houseboat
as a base for electronic surveillance ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And did he also have an assignment to recruit some per-
sons who might be disreputable looking young men, hippies, to pose as
McGovern supporters ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. "Wliat were they sup]X)sed to do ?
Mr. Hunt. They were supposed to demonstrate in front of the Doral
Hotel some evening and behave outrageously to bring discredit upon
the bulk of the useful McGovem supporters.
;Mr. Daspi. Now, Mr. Hunt, I think you, in fact, did participate in the
break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the
Watergate on or about May 27, 1972, is that not true ?
Mr. Hunt. I do not know if the word "participate" embraces it
Mr. Dash. You did not make an entry yourself ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir. I participated in it.
Mr. Dash. And is it not true that you recruited Mr. Barker to bring
up the team of Cuban- Americans to assist in this plan ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And is it true that it was his job to engage in photograph-
ing Democratic Party documents?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, it is true, is it not, that you also participated in the
second break-in, using the "participating" as you indicated before
that you definitely did not break in the Democratic National Commit-
tee headquarters on June 18, 1972 ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. "\Miere were you situated when the entry team was
arrested ?
Mr. Hunt. In room 214 of the Watergate Hotel, which is another
building.
Mr. Dash. What did you do immediately after you were made aware
that an arrest had taken place ?
Mr. Hunt. I closed up Mr. McCord's briefcase, which contained elec-
tronic equipment, and with Mr. Liddy, we left the premises. I drove
to the White House, where I inserted the briefcase belonging to Mr.
McCord, into my two-drawer safe. I went — I believe I called Mr.
Douglas Caddv's apartment, he being an attorney.
^Ir. Dash. ^Yho is Mr. Caddy ?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Dous:las Caddy, an attorney and a former employee
of the Mullen Co., and asked him if he could receive me at that early
hour of the morning.
I
3689
yiv. Dash. Did you take .-. ny money out of the safe ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Dash. How much ?
Mr. Hunt. I took out $10,000.
Mr. Dash. "\\Tiere did you get that money ?
Mr. HuxT. That was contingency money that had been provided me
by Mr. Liddy.
]\Ir. Dash. Contingency just in case there was this kind of trouble?
Mr. HuxT. Yes, sir ; in case there was a mishap.
]Mr. Dash. What did you do with that money ?
Mr. Hunt. I took it during the course of the early morning to Mr.
Caddy's apartment and gave it to him on behalf of the five men who
had been arrested.
Mr. Dash. Did you make an analysis or review of the contents of
your safe at that time or a later time ?
'Sir. HuxT. Xo, sir : not at that time.
Mr. Dash. When did you, if you did ?
Mr. HuxT. Excuse me.
]Mr. Dash. Mr. Hunt, this might help you. Do you recall returning
to vour office at the EOB and looking through the contents of your
safe?
!Mr. HuxT. Yes, sir.
^fr. Dash. And do vou recall that that was on or about June 19,
1972?
Mr. Httxt. Yes, sir,
Mr. Dash. Just very briefly, can you describe the contents of your
safe at that time, what you had in there ?
Mr. HuxT. Well, there was a great deal of material, Mr. Dash.
]Mr. Dash. Just by category.
Mr. Hux'^T. There were the fabricated Vietnamese cables that I had
shown to ^Ir. Colson, Mr. Conein, and Mr. Lambert. There was mate-
rial relating to Gemstone; there were transcripts of my conversations
with Mr. Clifton De Motte, for example. There was a very substantial
amount of material, part of which was shown me at the time of dis-
covery by the U.S. attorney — perhaps I am not being responsive.
Mr. Dash. Yes, you are being responsive. Did it also include the
briefcase which included Mr. McCord's electronic equipment?
Mr. Hux'T. Oh. yes : that was there.
Mr. Dash. Xow. did you inform anyone on that day of the contents
of vour safe ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. ^Yho was that ?
Mr. Htjxt. 'Sir. Colson's secretary.
Mr. Dash. What is her name ?
Mr. HuxT. Her name was Mrs. Joan Hall.
Mr. Dash. Did you characterize or say anything about the contents?
Mr. Htjxt. Yes, sir : I did,
Mr. Dash. TMiat did vou say ?
Mr. Htjxt. Before I left the White House for the last time. I stopped
by Mr. Colson"s office, not to see him but simply to inform Mrs. Hall,
whom I knew held the combination to my safe, that it contained sensi-
tive material. I simply said to her. "I just want you to know that that
safe is loaded."
3690
Mr. Dasit. Now, did yon hear from Mr. Liddy during this period
of time?
INIr, ITuNT. What period of time ?
Mr. Dastt. Shortly after, around June 19 or around that time?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Dash. AYhat, if anything, did he tell yon ?
Mr. Hunt. Toward midday on tlie 19th, I got a telephone call from
him at my ISIullen Co. office saying that he needed urgently to meet me.
We met at the corner of the USIA building, which I believe is at iTtli
and Pennsylvania Ave. We met. walked around the block. During the
course of the conversation, he told me that it was necessary for me to
get out of town, that "they" wanted me to get out of town.
Mr. Dash. Did he indicate who "they" were?
Mr. Hunt. Not at that time.
Mr. Dash. Then, was it a fact that that paiiicular order was
rescinded ?
Mr. Hunt. He told me that it was.
Mr. Dash. Now, in fact, you did leave Washington, did you not ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. And did you ultimately go to California ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. At that time, did you make arrangements to obtain
Counsel ?
Mr. Hunt. I obtained local counsel in California, but not Washing-
ton counsel.
Mr. Dash. Well, in California, who did you meet, what California
counsel ?
Mr. Hunt. I was staying at the home of an attorney, an old friend
named Morton B. Jackson. Mr. Liddy appeared out there unannounced
on «Tune 21. I reiterated my request to him that he or somebody obtain
counsel for me in the Washington area. Mr. Liddy gave me $1,000 and
said, this will help with Jackson.
I thereupon gave the $1,000 in cash to Mr. Jackson, retaining him as
my counsel on the west coast.
Mr. Dash. And did Mr. Jackson refer you to any Washington
lawyer?
Mr. Hunt. In due course, he did.
Mr. Dash. Yes, and what lawyer was that?
Mr. Hunt. He referred me some time later to two attorneys, neither
of whom were known to, I believe, either Mr. Jackson or myself. Sim-
ply through an alphabetical process, I decided to retain, to inquire of
Mr. Bittman whether or not he would be interested in representmg me.
Mr. Dash. And did you retain Mr. William Bittman ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. And when did you first meet Mr. Bittman in
Washington ?
Mr. Hunt. On the night of July 3.
Mr. Dash. What was your understanding, Mr. Hunt, concerning
legal fees and support of your family that you would receive ? What
general understanding did you have?
Mr. Hunt. At the time Mr. Liddy appeared at the home of INIr.
Jackson on June 21, I raised the question with him, as I had with
A
3691
several other people since I had left Washington, concerning counsel,
and furthermore, how counsel fees, living expenses, and so forth, are
going to be taken care of. Mr. Liddy said, don't worry about that, it's
all going to be taken care of just like the company, or the Agency. To
me, that meant in the traditional CIA or clandestine services fashion.
He then produced $1,000, which was pretty hard evidence that there
was money available for this sort of thing.
Mr. Dash. All right, now, later
Mr. Hunt. Might I just continue with my thought?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Hunt. I said to him, by now the paralysis that gripped the
White House, the CREP, in the wake of the arrest must have ebbed
to some extent. Please tell me, who is the action officer now?
And he said, it is Mardian, or at least it was as of the time I left
this morning.
And I found that encouraging news.
Mr. Dash. Now, when you returned to Washington and retained
Mr. Bittman, did there come a time when Mrs. Hunt, your wife, had a
contact with Mr. O'Brien, Paul O'Brien, at the Committee To Re-Elect
the President?
Mr. Hunt. I believe she had that contact with Mr. O'Brien before
I returned to the east coast.
Mr. Dash. And what was the purpose of that contact ?
Mr. Hunt. To continue to seek counsel and to make sure that the
arrested men and those of us who were still out would be taken care
of in customary fashion.
Mr. Dash. To your knowledge, was she assured by Mr. O'Brien that
support money for counsel and for the family would be forthcoming ?
Mr. Hunt. I do not believe that she received that sort of assurance
from Mr. O'Brien. As I recall her relating the incident to me, Mr.
O'Brien was horrified by the revelations, but said he would look into
them.
Mr. Dash. When you say horrified by the revelations, what
revelations ?
Mr. Hunt. The revelations that my wife had given him.
Mr. Dash. Do vou know what revelations your wife had given Mr.
O'Brien?
Mr. Hunt. I understand, and again, this is only hearsay from my
late wife, she had hold him that we had been acting on l>ehalf of the
Attornev General of the United States and the Counsel to the Presi-
dent of the T'nited States, that we had been apprehended, men were in
jail, that bond money, bail money, counsel fees, all that sort of thing,
were needed and needed immediately. My understanding is that this
all Avas news to Mr. O'Brien at that time. He did say, however, that he
would look into the matter immediately.
Mr, Dash. Xow, there did come a time, did there not, after the
retainment of Bittman, that you received a call or Mrs. Hunt received
a call from ^Mr. Rivers?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
^fr. Dash. And what did Mr. Rivers have to say, to your knowledge?
Mr. Hunt. Mv late wife reported to me that— and we are skipping
now over the authentication of Mr. Ri^-ers. In any event, when Mrs.
3692
Hunt responded to the gentleman whose operational alias we knew as
Iviveis and knew him to be an appiox)riate person for her to deal
with
Mr. Dash. You say that we are skipping over authentication?
Mr. Hunt. We are skipping over his authentication.
Mr. Dash. Yes. Was a call first made by Mr. Kivers to Mr. Bittman ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. What was Mr. Bittman's reaction to that call ?
Mr. Hunt. He rejected it, declined to speak to Mr. Rivers.
Mr. Dash. Then, what did he do thereafter ?
Mr. Hunt. Within a day or so, he had occasion to be in conference
with Mr. Paul O'Brien and possibly Mr. Parkinson and mentioned
tliis call as a curious matter. I believe at that point, he was assured
that Mr. Rivers was an appropriate person for Mrs. Hunt to be in
touch with.
Mr. Dash. Then again, is that when Mr. Bittman called you or Mrs.
Hunt?
JNIr. Hunt. Yes.
]SIr. Dash. And what arrangements were made at that time?
Mr. Hunt. That Mrs. Hunt — excuse me.
^Ir. Sachs. Do you mean arrangements with regard to further con-
tact with Mr. Rivers?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Hunt. That by means of the usage of public telephones, Mrs.
Hunt and Mr. Rivers would speak with each other, which in fact, they
did.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware that payments were in fact made by
Mr. Rivers to Mrs. Hunt?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. I think that the record will show that we have already
liad testimony as to the identity of Mr. Rivers as Mr. Tony Ulasewicz.
Did you know, by the way, at the time that Mr. Rivers was Mr. Tony
Ulasewicz ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did you have occasion to see a series of accounts, or a
couple of accounts that Mrs. Hunt made to Mr. Bittman concerning
payments she received from Mr. Rivers ?
Mr. Hunt. Only recently.
Mr. Dash. Was that by this committee ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
I would like to say I have been shown them by — I have been shown
copies by the committee. I have been shown what purported to be
originals by Mr. Bittman, who I believe was submitting them to the
grand jury.
Mr. Dash. And did they indicate to you that payments were made
covering Mr. McCord, Mr. Barker, and the other persons who had
been arrested?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Did there come a time, Mr. Hunt, when you went to your
attornev, Mr. Bittman, to tell him that you wanted to plead guilty?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. ^YhB,t was the occasion for that ?
3693
Mr. Hunt. I had made up my mind, following my — in fact, during
my return flight from Chicago after the death of my wife — tliat was
on December 10. My wife was killed in a plane crash at Midway
Airport on December 8.
Mr. Dash. And in fact you did enter a plea of guilty?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. After your wife's death did you receive a call from Mr.
Bittman concerning funds that he had for you ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. Did you receive those funds ?
Mr. HuSTT. I did.
Mr. Dash. Do 3'ou recall how much that was ?
Mr. Hunt. On the first occasion ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Hunt. Or do you want the seriatim ?
Mr. Dash. Do you have them in seriatim and perhaps we can ex-
pedite them by just giving us a very brief statement of the funds that
you did receive through Mr. Bittman.
Mr. Hunt [conferring with counsel]. On July 3. 1972, I retained
Mr. Bittman with a $1,000 cash payment. Some days later Mr. Bitt-
man reported to me in a letter and also verballv that he had received
the sum of $25,000 as further retainer. He indicated the money had
come to him anonvmouslv and it had been delivered to his office, that
it was to be used in my behalf and considered as a retainer.
Later on. perhaps in the month of October, I have no date for this,
I was informed bv ^Ir. Bittman that an envelope had been delivered to
his office for me. I opened the envelope in his presence and counted out
$20,000 which I turned OA-er to him.
Early in Januarv or late December of 1972 — no, January of 1973 or
late December of 1972, Mr. Bittman telephoned me to inform me that
he had received an envelope at his house. He told me that this had been
left in his mailbox. Previous telephonic instructions were to the effect
that it was an envelope for me. I received the envelope unopened from
his hands, took it to mv home and found that it contained $15,000. I
i'-ave $12,000 of those funds to Dr. ^fanuel Artime to assist in the de-
fense funds of the four men from ^liami. that having been my prior
understanding from the conversation with my wife that a committee
was being formed in ^Nliami for the defense of the four Miami men,
and then I subtracted $3,000 which she had told me she had placed at
the disposition of other defendants from our own funds and therefore
or thereby reimbursed mvself to the extent of $3,000. The rest went
to Miami.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Hunt, I think it might expedite matters if you could
provide the committee with a record of those payments, and let me just
ask you if vou have the total fiffure that you paid Mr. Bittman by way
of fees that vou received thrcuffh these means.
Mr. Hunt. That I received how, sir?
Mr. Dash. That vou received through the support money that was
coming in either through 'Sir. "Rivers or through any other source.
Mr. Sachs. I am not sure I understand it.
:Mr. Dash. I am asking for the total amount of money that you paid
Mr. Bittman in legal fees.
3694
Mr. Sachs. That Mr. Bittman was paid.
Mr. Dash. Yes, or that INIr. Bittman was paid.
Mr. Hunt. $156,000.
Mr. Dash. Would you submit to us a statement of the details that
you were giving us a moment ago? I think it would, help us expedite
the questioning.
Mr. Sachs. We will be glad to.*
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Now, did you ever call ]\Ir. Colson to complain about the problems
of the payment of fees ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall when you made that call ?
Mr, Hunt. On November 24 last.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you have a copy of the transcript that Mr.
Colson made of the telephone call ?
Mr. Hunt. I do.
Mr. Dash. During that call what, in effect, were vou telling Mr.
Colson, why did you make that call ?
Mr. Hu>rT. I made the call, Mr. Dash because my wife had indicated
to me because she had been placed in a very false and difficult position
vis-a-vis the Cubans and the other people who were or had become
her "clients," she was unwilling to continue in the role that she had
agreed to accept at the urging of ISIr. Rivers, that is to say to be the
go-between.
She felt also that perhaps because she was a woman, her words, her
urgings, her representations were receiving insufficient weight or were
not being seriously enough received by whoever the sponsors were, and
it was in that spirit that she asked me to communicate with Mr. Colson,
which I did.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Now, on page 3 of that transcript, did you say the following :
All right, now we've set a deadline now for close of business on the 25th of
November —
And I take it it is a deadline to receive funds —
for the resolution on the liquidation of everything that is outst<inding. And this —
they're now talking about promises from .July and August. It nist has been an
apparent unconcern. Of course, we can unders^tand some hesitancy T>rior to the
election, but there doesn't seem to be any of that now. Of course, we are well
aware of the upcoming problems of the Senate.
Did you make that statement during that call ? Does this transcript,
by the way, reflect, to your recollection the conversation you had with
Mr. Colson ? You will recall we showed you that transcript during the
executive session.
Mr. Hunt. I do, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. You have had a chanc« to read it ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. What is your answer to my question whether that state-
ment wnsmade as it anTtears in the transcript?
Mr. Hunt [conferring with counsell. I have no specific recollection
of making the statement. Mr. Dasli. However, inasmuch as it appears
in a transcript I accept it in orood faith and will say under those
circumstances that I made the statement.
•Not received at time of publication.
3695
Mr. Dash. Now, let me just make one further reference on page 5
if you will look at the top where you say —
Well, that is fine for we are protecting the guys who are really responsible, but
now that that's — and of course that is a continuing requirement, but at the
same time, this is a two-way street and as I said before, we think that now is
the time when a move should be made and surely the cheapest commodity avail-
able is money.
Do you see that statement ?
Mr. HuxT. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Would you adopt that as something you would have said
during that conversation ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker, Mr. Chairman, just 1 minute. I am not sure I under-
stand. The question is that one you would have said or did say
Mr. Dash. He did say in the transcript.
Mr. Hunt. I will accept that as a statement that I made.
Mr. Dash. Now, after you stopped receiving funds from various
supporting sources did Mr. Bittman ask for more funds from you?
INIr. Hunt. Mr. Bittman informed me of the current state of my
deficit balance with him, yes.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this conversation
with Howard Hunt of late November 1972, which was recorded by
Mr. Colson, identified as an exhibit and entered in evidence.
Senator Ervix. It will be received in evidence as an exhibit and
appropriately numbered as such.
[The document referred to Avas marked exhibit No. 152.*]
Senator Baker. IMr. Chairman, could I ask a question about it just
very briefly. Mr. Hunt, were you aware that this conversation was
being recorded ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you — how did you come to know of its
existence ?
Mr. Hunt. I can't recall whether I learned about it through the
grand jurors or through this committee.
Senator Baker. Could I ask counsel hoAv we received it ?
Mr. Dash. We received this from IVIr. Colson.
Senator Baker. From INIr. Colson ?
Mr. Dash. Yes, from Mr. Colson.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Mr. Hunt. I might say that I feel, in retrospect, I was set up on
this one.
Senator Baker. T am sorrv, T didn't hear you.
INIr. Hunt. That I was set up, as it were. T had requested an oppor-
tunity to speak with Mr. Colson pnd the message I srot back was that
if I would call him from a phone booth at a particular time, on a par-
ticular day, he would sneak with me. Obviously, he had his recording
equipment runninp- at that time.
Senator Baker. Do you have any reason to suspect that any part of
the transcript is not correct ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Thank yoii.
•See p. 3888.
3696
Mr. Dash. But it is tnie, in following up on your statement, that you
may have been set up, havincr liad a chance to read this ti-anscript, is it
not true that throu^jhout the transcript Mr. Colson repeatedly savs to
you, you wish to give him any facts, he doesn't want to hear anythino;
about the facts, not to tell him anything ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dasit. And that goes through the entire transcript ?
Mr. Hunt. Tt certainly does.
Mr. Dash. I think I asked you, did Mr. Bittman ask you for any
additional funds after the support money had stopped? I don't know
whether vou had answered it.
Mr. Hunt. I thought I had replied to that question, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. I didn't hear your answer.
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bittman kept me informed from time to time with
the state of my deficit balance with his firm. I did not interpret that as
a demand for" funds but rather he w\is keeping me informed of how
much money was owed. At that juncture I was not considerinsr debts
owed to Hojgan and Hartson as being personal debts of mine although
I came later to accept them in that spirit. I felt they should be paid bv
the people or groups who had sponsored the Gemstone program. And
I encouraged Mr. Bittman to turn to others for the payment of his
fees rather than myself.
Mr. Dash. Now there came a time wherein Mr. Bittman was required
to withdraw as your counsel, did there not ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes,
Mr. Dash. And you retained
Mr. Sachs. Excuse me just a minute.
Mr. Hunt [conferring with counsell. Mr. Dash, T don't know that
I can say of my own knowledge that he was required to withdraw as
my counsel.
Mr. Dash. I meant required by his own action. He did withdraw as
your counsel, did he not ?
Mr. Hunt. He did.
Mr. Dash. That was not your action ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. You did not — this was his own volitional action?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. To your knowledge then, vou have retained — is Mr. Sachs
the counsel you retained immediately thereafter?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did there come a time, Mr. Hunt, when vou wrote to Mr.
Colson concerning the problems that you were having — you wrote a
letter to him ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash, "^Hiat was the occasion of that letter ?
Mr. Hunt. I believe the letter
Mr. Dash. Do you have a copy of a letter dated December 31, 1972?
Mr. Hunt. December 31 ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir; I believe the letter is self-explanatory.
Mr. Dash. Yes, sir ; and this letter followed the death of your wife ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
3697
Mr. Dash. Was it a letter in which you were again asking for assist-
ance from Mr. Colson ?
Ml'. Hunt [conferring with counsel]. In effect, 3'es, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you get any response from Mr. Colson after
Avriting that letter ?
Mr. Hunt. Indirectly.
Mr. Dash. How indirectly, what kind of response, who contacted
you ?
Mr. Hunt. Through counsel.
Mr. Dash. What did he tell you ?
Mr. Hunt. That Mr. Colson would be meeting with him on, I be-
lieve, the 3d or 4th of January.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Bittman and Mr. Colson meet ?
Mr. Hunt. I understand that they did.
Mr. Dash. Did INIr. Bittman give you the results of that meeting ?
Mr. Hunt. He did.
Mr. Dash. What, if anything, did Mr. Bittman tell you about the
meeting he had with Mr. Colson ?
Mr. Hunt. First of all, that Mr. Colson was a great and good friend
of mine, that he so considered himself to be, and I was a fine patriotic
fellow, and if worse came to worse he would take my children into his
OAvn home, that he was very sorry that I had ever become involved in
this entire scheme. The other two matters — I ought to say parentheti-
cally that I had asked INIr. Bittman — well, first of all, the rationale for
meeting. To understand INIr. Colson's response I really should go back
a little, INIr. Dash. I had asked Mr. Colson to receive Mr. Bittman for
the following reasons : One, I wanted Mr. Colson to be very sure about
the reasons for my plea of guilty, I wanted him to understand all of
the circumstances of the fact which had weighed on me in making my
plea or the plea I was about to make.
Second, there were two CIA matters which were unresolved and in
which I felt White House intervention could be, to say the least, very
useful.
Third, there was an active motion on the part of mv counsel for the
suppression of certain evidence obtained from my White House safe
through the unauthorized drilling and seizure procedures that had
been employed by i\[r. Dean and company and I wanted all of these
matters discussed with Mr. Colson at that time.
What ]Mr. Bittman reported back to me, I have already indicated
to you. I got no information from him concerning INIr. Colson's as-
sistance with the CIA matters which had to do with my annuity and
the changes of survivorship benefits for my annuity, other than to say
that Mr. Colson would always be delighted to help me to the extent
that he could, whether as a private citizen or in the White House, but
purely as a personal matter. The suppression motion I do not think
was reported — was reported back to me until the following day, when,
after Mr. Bittman and ]Mr. Colson had met a second time.
Mr. Dash. Did you ask :Mr. Bittman to transmit any message to
you about your plea-of-guilty decision, concerning the length of
sentence you might obtain or any clemency or consideration that the
Government might give you, if you pleaded guilty ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
3698
;Mr. Dash. ^fr. Chairman, the letter of December 31, which precipi-
tated the meeting between Mr. Bittman and Mr. Colson, I would like
that identified as an exhibit and entered into evidence.
Senator Ervin. The letter will be received in evidence as an exhibit
and appropriately numbered as such.
[The letter referred to was marked exhibit No. 153.*]
Mr. Sachs. Excuse me, Mr. Dash. May I ask when the committee
plans to recess?
Senator Ervin. At 12 :30.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just pose a ques-
tion to the witness, since he has been relating conversations between
him and Mr. Bittman.
Do I understand that the witness is waiving the attorney-client
privilege in this particular instance ? I am a little bit confused. I want
to make sure that I understand and the witness understands his— —
Senator Ervin. He read a statement in which he said he was waiv-
ing that.
Mr. Sachs. No, I am soriy, Mr. Chairman. There may be some
confusion.
T am glad you asked that question, Senator.
The attorney-client privilege, as to Mr. Bittman and as to me, is not
being waived.
Mr. Dash. Counsel, Mr. Sachs, and Mr. Hunt made that statement
also. Senator Weicker, in executive session and agreed to answer cer-
tain questions concerning conversations with Mr. Bittman, reserving
the right not to waive all of his relationship in terms of his attorney-
client relationship.
Senator Weicker. Well, T think it is important to point this out,
because obviously, the chairman and myself are laboring under the
same misapprehension that possibly there might be a waiver here.
I am glad to have counsel state it.
Mr. Sachs. I think I should supplement what I have said by saying
that, as the committee knows. Judge Sirica stated that his cooperation
with this committee and with the grand juries would be waived by him
in the ultimate sentence which he imposes. Under the force of that
statement of Judge Sirica, we have advised Mr. Hunt to answer fully
all the questions, but we believe that that does not constitute a waiver,
as it would in more voluntary circumstances.
Senator Er\t[n. I made the statement I had on the basis of this state-
ment on page 5 of his prepared statement. He said : "In fact, I have
answered all questions, even those which involve confidential communi-
cations between my attorneys and myself."
Mr. Sachs. Senator, you have corrected our statement. Our state-
ment was ambiguous. We did not mean all attorneys. There were, the
privilege has been waived, as I understand it, with Mr. Jackson and —
excuse me.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Sachs, would you like to have or would your
client like to have a recess now instead of waiting ?
Mr. Sachs. I do think, Senator, that my client would appreciate a
respite. But just to finish that question, we were a little inaccurate in
that statement. I am sorry. He has waived one privilege, that with
Mr. Jackson.
•See p. 3892. 1
3699
Senator Ervin. Well, I will ask you to indicate to the committee if
any questions are asked on points that you think he has not waived his
right, you will just state it ?
Mr. Sachs. He is answering all questions. Senator, but he is stating
that by doing that, he is not waiving his privileges.
Senator Baker. ^Mr. Chairman, may I make sure I understand the
situation in just one brief moment ?
Attorney-client privilege is a personal privilege to the client and
not the attorney, and it would apply to each question that is asked. If
this witness chooses to exercise the privilege, he will claim that privi-
lege before answering a specific question. Is that correct, sir? If there
is any further concern of an attorney-client privilege, we will know it
at the time that the question is asked ?
Mr. Sachs. Yes, Senator, but I am afraid that to me, at least, your
question reflects a little confusion.
He is not refusing to answer questions as to conversations between
him and his counsel, which he normally would do if I were claiming
the privilege. At the same time, he is not waiving the privilege.
Senator Baker. I am not confused. I do not understand that, but I
am not sure that that is a discernible distinction in the body of the law.
Either you claim privilege or you do not claim privilege.
Mr. Sachs. Well, he is answering the questions. I think the issue as
to whether his answers constitute a waiver may come up one day if an
effort is made to question Mr. Bittman. But this witness is under Judge
Sirica's admonition that if he does not answer the questions, he is going
to be in trouble. So he is answering all questions. He is not claiming
privilege as to his answers to questions, but he is not releasing Mr.
Bittman.
Senator Baker. At some point. Judge Sirica or some other judge
will have to pass on the legal effect of those answers.
Mr. Sachs. That is my understanding.
Senator Baker. But my question is to you for the purpose of this
committee's deliberations, if we are confronted with an attorney-client
privilege, we will be notified of it at the time of the question, I pre-
sume, bv you or your client.
INfr. Sachs. I take that to mean that if there comes a point in these
hearings when Mr. Hunt wants to refuse to answer a question by the
committee on the ground of privilege, you would like to be notified.
Senator Baker. That is correct.
Mr. Sachs. The ansAver to that is yes. you will be notified.
Senator Baker. Thank you very much.
Senator Ervtist. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
rWhereupon, at 12 :22 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., this same day.]
Afternoon Session, Monday, September 24, 1973
Senator Er\^n. The committee will come to order.
You may proceed.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Sachs, did vou want to amplify your remarks con-
cerning the attornev-client pri\alege ?
]Mr. Sachs. Mr. Chairman, when we recessed shortly after noon I
was under the impression that the question of Mr. Hunt's waiver-of-
3700
privilege was absolutely clear but I am told by those with whom T am
associated, that it was not absolutely clear, so I would very briefly like
to try to make it clear.
Our position, INIr. Hunt's position, with reofard to the privilege which
existed between, and exists between him and INIr. Bittman is that Mr.
Hunt under the pressure of Jud<re Sirica's admonition has answered
and will continue to answer all questions regarding conversations be-
tween him and Mr. Bittman which because of the privilege he would
not, in my opinion, have to answer. He is going to answer those ques-
tions. But, at the same time, our ]X)sition is that by answering these
c{uestions he is not waiving the privilege insofar as any statements or
testimonv by Mr. Bittman might be concerned.
Now, this did come up, as we said, in the executive committee ses-
sion, and I have during the recess found the page at which a more
lengthy discussion appears, and it is page 452 of the September 20
session.
Senator Ervin. Yes. Your position is very clear. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Sachs. Thank you.
Senator Baker. ISIr. Chairman, I am terribly sorry to say it is not
quite clear to me still.
Is this a fair restatement of your position then, that as far as the
doctrine of attorney-client is concerned, to the extent that Mr. Hunt,
for whatever reason, chooses to answer questions that otherwise might
be protected by that doctrine, he has waived that doctrine as to himself
and the answers he thinks he mav make but he has not waived it so far
as any other statement by Mr. Bittman might be concerned on other
sabiect matter or on that subject matter beyond his statement ?
Mr. Sachs. Senator Baker. I would prefer, if vou would permit me,
not to take the position at this time that bv Mr. Hunt's answering
questions he has waived the privilege as to himself. I would prefer to
])hrase it that he has answered the questions without taking the next
step and stating as his position the lesfil conclusion that one might
want to argue from that. I do not think the net effect is any different
between us.
Senator Baker, It is not important for the purposes of the commit-
tee to resolve that question. As I said earlier, I suppose if the issue
ever arises that a court would have to decide that, we would not. But
the point that keeps sticking in my mind and I want to be clear on is
that we are not precluded from discussing these matters with Mr, Bitt-
man, at least insofar as Mr. Hunt has alluded to.
Mr. Sachs. Well, our position is that you are precluded, that is what
we are not waiving. "\Ye are not vraiving Mr. Hunt's right to maintain
the confidentiality of his communications with his lawyer insofar as
that lawyer's testimony miglit be concerned. You may argue. Senator
Baker, as you have suggested, or one may argue, that by answering
questions as he has, by operation as Mi'. Hunt has, bv operation of law
that privilege has been lost, we recognize that that point may be
argued. We will take the opposite position, because he has not volun-
tarily answered the questions concerning his confidential communica-
tions with Mr. Bittman.
3701
Now, I think, since we have gotten into it this far, I really then must
make one other point which does appear in the executive committee
record, and that is that our office has been in this case a very short
time. We were retained sometime during the month of August, and
since we were retained we have had other matters of urgency which
have prevented us from devoting full time to this case. We have
devoted, quite a number of people in our office have devoted, a great
deal of time to the case but though we certainly under these circum-
stances, do not feel — are not as acquainted or are not as familiar with
the terribly complicated factual situations that surround this case, not
sufficiently acquainted with them to be able to advise Mr. Hunt intelli-
gently as to what consequences, if any, might flow from his waiving
that privilege. Therefore, our reasoning is, that if in that state of
inadequate knowledge, we were to advise him to waive the privilege it
really would not be comjDetent advice and, therefore, feeling unable so
to advise him we have on the contrary advised him not to waive it, and
he is following our advice.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I think I will conclude our colloquy
on legal principles and doctrine here by simply saying that the under-
lying reason and rationale for pressing you on that point is to make it
clear that as we proceed there may be other questions of Mr. Hunt vis-
a-vis relationship to Mr. Bittman. There may be questions of Mr. Bitt-
man. But I think the very best wa}^ to handle this now is to deal with
each question, one at a time, and see how the doctrine might apply if
at all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Speaking for myself, and the committee would
liave to make up its own mind to this particular opinion, I would not
want this committee to engage in any activity which, in effect, would
force your client, Mr. Sachs, to give up any of his civil liberties or his
rights or his privileges, whether those are granted by law or by usage.
I want to make that point clear.
Now, it is quite one thing for the committee to vote immunity, and
liandle the question and answer process within certain guidelines
which have been well established by the law. It is quite something else
to sit here and imply that the committee is being foi-ced to do some-
tliing that I don't think any committee or court or anyone else in this
land has the right to do, which is to take an individual and, in effect,
force him to give up his civil liberties or his rights or his privileges,
as I say, whether those matters were granted by law or usage.
INIr. Dash. IMr. Chairman, I think the record should also show that
when this issue came up in executive session that I made it very clear
to counsel, just as Senator Weicker has mentioned, that this committee
did not want counsel either to advise Mr. Hunt to waive client-attorney
l^rivilege or for Mr. Hunt to waive any right that he has solely because
he is under a sentencing procedure which might call upon the commit-
tee to make that report to Judge Sirica and all we wanted was his own
statement of the facts based on what he wished to give us, recognizing
that there was a fact in history that he is under such a sentencmg
procedure. But I emphasized over and over again to Mr. Hunt that he
96-296 0— 73— pt. 9 20
3702
sliould not make any jndjrment with regard to this committee based on
any concept of coercion but should make the decision voluntarily and
based on the advice of his own counsel.
Mr. Sachs. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I must — I would
like to reply to what Senator Weicker and Mr. Dash have said. I don't
think any useful purpose would be served at this time in tryinof to re-
enact the many conversations or recount the many conversations which
have taken place between members of the staff and counsel for Mr.
Hunt, refjardless of whether those conversations have included state-
ments from which we might have been entitled to believe that if Mr.
Hunt did not waive his privilege he would receive a bad report to
Judge Sirica, regardless of the— of how this factual matter might be
resolved.
The fact is, and I don't think anyone can dispute this, that at the
moment that Mr. Hunt was sentenced by Judge Sirica for a period
of more than 30 years, under a provision of the law which gives
rludge Sirica the right to amend that sentence, to change the sentence
after receiving reports fi'om prison authorities. Judge Sirica in a
lengthy statement included a very clear statement that he would
weigh — that was the word he used — ^the cooperation that Mv. Hunt
gave to grand juries and this committee in his final sentence.
Now, we think that we have no alternative but to read that as a
warning that if Mr. Hunt does not answer all questions, and if he does
not waive this privilege. Judge Sirica may say, "Well, you did not
waive your privilege, you did not cooperate. Your sentence must be
more severe."
Now, it is possible, of course, that Judge Sirica would not take that
position. But there is very definitely a likelihood, if indeed not a
probability, that he will based on what he has said.
So, whatever this committee does with regard to articulating the
notion that Mv. Hunt should or should not waive his privilege, Mr.
Hunt is testifying, and has been, under that threat.
Senator EmaN. Also ]Mr. Hunt is testifying in a sense involuntarily
because he is testifying, pursuant to an order of immunity, under a
statute which says the testimony he gives before this committee cannot
l>e used against him elsewhere and if that statute means what it ap-
parentlv says, his testimony before this committee cannot be used for
any purpose even to establish, an alleged waiver of a privilege, it
would seem to me, logically and justly.
INIr. Sachs. "With great pleasure, T agree with you, INfr. Chairman.
Senator Weicker. I want to make one thing clear, speaking for my-
self in my own questions on this matter, that outside of the grant of
immunity, if there is any question that T pose to your client, which
question vou consider under normal conditions to be violative of your
client's rights, but you are permitting — this is outside of the grant of
immunity — but vou are permitting your client to respond because you
feel you are under pressure, I want you to advise me, counsellor, be-
cause I don't want the answer.
Mr. Sachs. Senator. I appreciate your — the expression you have
just made, but T am not really sure that it is possible for me to advise
Mr. Hunt within those — within that suggestion. We are talking to
Judge Sirica as well as to this committee. We are talking to the judge
1
3703
who is sentencing INIr. Hunt, and I really, with all deference, would
suggest that you gentlemen really can't help yourselves but exercise —
but carry out, by your questioning, but carry out the warning that or
the — well, in a way, you can't keep yourselves from holding the sword
that Judge Sirica is holding over his head.
Senator Weicker. I think it is perfectly possible for your client to
go ahead and respond to questions within the grant of immunity, if you
will without going afield and being in the position of violating other
rights which he has, and the attorney-client privilege is that type of
situation.
Mr. Sachs. Let me add, please, that by what I have said, I do not
mean to suggest that INIr. Hunt is not motivated also to some extent
by a desire to do what now appears to be the thing that his country
requires. He respects the authority of this committee and its purposes
Lind he does desire to tell the truth. He is not — well, I think that makes
the point.
The only other thing I would have to say is that I think we have to
hear his 6- or 8-inch pile of transcripts reflecting the questions and
answers that have already been made to him and given by him and it
is, of course, possible that questions will be asked today that have not
Ijeen asked but it is fairly unlikely that anything new will be touched
on, so while, Senator, you may ask a question and be willing that we
not answer it on that basis, the great likelihood is that it will already
have been asked and answered.
Mr. Dash. I just have a couple more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunt, shortly before your sentencing on March '23, 1973, did
you meet with Mr. Paul O'Brien in INIr. Bittman's office ?
Mr. Hunt. I met with Mr. Paul O'Brien in the law office of Hogan
and Hartson, not specifically in the premises assigned to Mr. Bittman.
Mr. Dash. And can you just very briefly tell us what you told Mr.
O'Brien and what Mr. O'Brien told you at that meeting?
Mr. Hunt. I will be glad to.
I believe, Mr. Dash, you are referring to the second meeting I had
with Mr. O'Brien?
Mr. Dash. Yes, just prior to the sentence.
Mr. Hunt. I had requested that Mr. Bittman arrange a meeting
between myself and Mr. O'Brien, inasmuch as Mr. Bittman had kept
me apprised of the extent of my legal indebtedness to the firm of
Hogan and Hartson. Mr. O'Brien, I knew, was the current contact that
Mr, Bittman had on the committee, not only for matters relating to
the various civil suits that had been filed, but also and more relevantly
in connection with the payment of legal fees for Mr. Bittman's services
in my behalf. Mr. Bittman indicated to me that his representations
for the payment of legal fees had been ineffective and I suggested to
Mr. Bittman that he permit me to speak with Mr. O'Brien about that
matter. That is the background of the meeting itself.
^Vlien Mr. O'Brien came to the offices, we were shown into a private
interview room and I spoke to Mr. O'Brien at some length about the
size and nature of the legal bills. I think at that time, they amounted
to approximately $60,000. I told him at the same time that I was very
much concerned about the future of my family, that I would very
much like to have the equivalent of 2 years subsistence available to
3704
them before I was incarcerated, that incarceration beino: due in a very
short period of time. And I put it to Mr. O'Brien that I had eng^aged
as he might or might not know, in other activities, which I believe I
described as seamy activities, for the White House. I do not believe
that I specified them. However, I did make reference to them. The
context of such reference was that if anyone was to receive benefits at
that time, in view of my long and loyal service, if not hazardous serv-
ice for the White House, that certainly I should receive priority
consideration.
Mr, Dash. Would Mr. O'Brien be able to at least draw an inference
on his part that because of the so-called seamy activities that you said
you engaged in in behalf of the White House, that if you were not paid
this sum of money, these may become public ?
Mr. Htjnt. I will answer in just one moment.
Mr. Sachs. Excuse us, please.
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Dash, in answer to your question, I would have to
say that Mr. O'Brien might have assumed any number of things from
our colloquy. However, I would with a great deal of deference, and
begging the pardon in advance of the chairman of the committee, quote
from certain testimony given in the early sessions of this committee,
the first green bound volume, page 325, when Mr. Alch was being
questioned.
Senator Ervin, said, and I quote :
Well, where two men communicate with each other by word of mouth, isn't
there a two-fold hazard in that communication, in, first, that the man who speaks
may not express himself clearly, may not say exactly what is in his mind? And
if he does, the man who hears it may put a different interpretation on the words
than the man who spoke them ?
Mr. Dash. Well, Mr. Hunt, there has been considerable testimony
which we will not get into now before the committee which indicated
that both Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell and a number of others believed
that there was considerable pressure being placed by you at that time
for money and that the danger of not paying you was that there might
be some public exposure of the seamy matters. In fact, Mr. Ehrlichman
testified that there was a blackmail threat. So the question put to you
was did you intend by telling Mr. O'Brien that, one, the $60,000 had
to be paid, and, two, you had engaged in certain other seamy matters
on behalf of the White House. Did you intend to create that threat,
that unless that money was paid, you would make public the acts that
you had engaged in on behalf of the White House ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, how did Mr. O'Brien respond to you when you
asked for this money ?
Mr. Hunt. Well, it was more than simply a question of asking for
money. Mr. Dash, it was reallv mv first opportunity to catalosr the
many difficulties we had had — ^that is to say, my late wife principally
and, to some extent, mvself — in finding the means to defend ourselves
that had b»en promised us as lon.qr ago as the previous June 21. I
told — Mr. O'Brien told me, I should say — that he was finding himself
increasinjrlv ineffective as a cro-betwoen. T don't recall whether he used
the word "impotent" or "impotence," but he felt that his position was
a very difficult one. He recognized that assurances had been given, that
3705
to some extent, they had in the past been carried out, but he felt that he
was becoming less and less effective as an intermediary.
Mr. Dash. Did he mention Mr. Colson to you ?
Mr. Hunt. For that reason, Mr. O'Brien suggested that I originate
and send to Mr. Colson what he termed a strongly worded memoran-
dum, or a tough or a hard memorandum to Mr. Colson.
Mr. Dash. And what did you do after that ? Did you write such a
mxcmorandum to ISIr. Colson ?
Mr. Hunt. I did not write the memorandum to Mr. Colson, but in
response to Mr. O'Brien's suggestion. I believe that orally, I expressed
surprise that he would have brought Mr. Colson's name into the deal-
ings at this late stage of the game. I asked him why he wanted me to
send the memorandum to Colson and Mr. O'Brien said, to the best of
my recollection, well, there are some of us who feel that Chuck stayed
out of this too long, that it is time he got his feet wet along with the
rest of us, words to that effect.
My response was equivocal. I did not indicate to Mr. O'Brien
whether I would or would not address such a memorandum, but I was
disturbed by his suggestion.
Mr. Dash. Now, after that meeting with Mr. O'Brien, did you take
steps to either try to have a meeting with Mr. Colson or to write to
Mr. Colson ? What efforts did you make to follow up on Mr. O'Brien's
suggestion ?
Mr. Hunt. Excuse me.
I reviewed at once for Mr. Bittman, upon Mr. O'Brien's departure,
the substance and thrust of Mr. O'Brien's conversation. I told Mr.
Bittman that I had no intention of writing the recommended memo-
randum, but I thought that I should get in touch with Mr. Colson so
that I could explain the situation to him, notify him of the suggestion
that had been made by O'Brien, whom I classified, politically speak-
ing, as a Mitchell man.
We haven't gotten into this in testimony so far before this com-
mittee, but there appeared to be a definite division within the White
House itself, at least in the lower levels, between the so-called Mitchell
men and the so-called Colson men. Accordingly, I found it rather
bizarre that Mr. O'Brien, a Mitchell man. would suggest that I seek
lielp from Colson, inasmuch as Mr. Mitchell had been the progenitor
of the Gemstone plan and was, at least in theory, responsible for seeing
that the assurances that were implicit and explicit in Gemstone were
carried out.
Mr. Bittman, to my knowledge, did get in touch with the office of
<-he — the law offices, for by then Mr. Colson was in private practice —
with the law offices of Colson and Shapiro, and made the representa-
tions in my behalf; that is. that I desired a meeting with Mr. Colson.
A day or so later, I was informed by Mr. Bittman that although Mr.
Colson would not see me, his partner, David Shapiro, would see me.
He would see me the following Friday, I believe February 16, early
in the afternoon.
Mr. Dash. And did you have that meeting with Mr. Shapiro?
]Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. And did vou tell Mr. Shapiro substantially the same
things that you told Mr. O'Brien ?
3706
Mr. TTuNT. T did.
Mr. Darti. Including the other activities that you engaged in on
bohiil f of the White House ?
Mr. TTuNT. T did not specify thorn. T referred to them.
I miglit add that the context of our meeting was entirely different.
Whereas ]\fr. O'Brien had approached me, T might say, almost apolo-
getically, Mr. Shapiro approached me rather aggressively and sub-
jected me to a lengthy monolog which I considered to be highly self-
serving. My response was that I had expected actually to see Colson,
although I could understand that for purposes of record, they might
want it to appear that I had met only with Shapiro rather than with
Colson. I had not reallv expectx^d to be served by a Colson surrogate.
Mr. Dastt, Now, did you make it clear to Mr. Shapiro and ^Ir.
O'Brien that vou needed to get the money prior to the date of sentence ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Wliy was that?
Mr. Hunt. That if it was to be of any assistance to me in terms of
making prudent distribution of that among the members of my
family, my dependents, taking care of insurance premiums and that
sort of thing, that it would have to be delivered to me before I was in
jail. This was not only implicit but explicit as well, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Now what did Mr. Shapiro say to you when you made
those representations to him?
Mr. Hunt. He indicated to me that he would use his own discretion
as regards such portions of my conversation as he chose to convey to
]Mr. Colson. I responded rather angrily that I felt that he should
convey all of what I had to say to Mr. Colson.
]Mr. Dash. But despite what you consider to be an unsatisfactory
reception by Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Shapiro, you in fact did receive a
large sum of money prior to being sentenced ; is that not true?
Mr. Hunt. Yes.
Mr. Dash. How much did you receive?
Mr. Hunt. $75,000.
Mr. Dash. And do you remember when you received that? Would
it refresh vour recollection if the record would show that you received
it on March 20?
Mr. Hunt. T would have said 20th or 21st. If the record shows the
20th, that is perfectly satisfactory.
l\f r. Dash. Just a few, a couple of days before the sentencing ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And what did you do with that monev, Mr. Hunt?
Mr. Hunt. I put it in a safe deposit box eventually.
Mr. Dash. Did you eventually pay Mr. Bittman some of that money ?
Mr. Hunt. No.
Mr. Dash. Did vou pav Mr. Bittman anv monev out of that sum?
Mr, Hunt. I paid Mr. Bittman 5ft80,000 that derived from the pro-
ceeds of my late wife's insurance policies.
Mr. Dash. I have no further ouestions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sachs. May I have the indulgence of the committee for just 1
second ?
Mr. Hunt fconferrins- with counsel]. Mr. Sachs has su.o-.o-ested to
me that I have myself spoken a moment or so ago, in which case I
«
3707
want the record to reflect, that I did in fact inform Mr. O'Brien of
the fact that I had taken part in other seamy activitie.s in behalf of the
White House. I hope the record :s clear in this. I do not believe that
I specified to Mr. O'Brien what they were. However, I made a generic
reference to them. Is there any question on this ?
Mr. Dash. I think the response was clear. By the way, that $75,000
you received just before you were sentenced, in what manner did it
come ? Do j'ou know how vou received it ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir, it came in an unopened envelope that was
handed me by Mr. William Bittman.
Mr. Dash. Did he indicate to you how he received it ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes : he did.
Mr. Dash. Will you tell us what he said ?
Mr. Hunt. I received a telephone call from him at my residence
indicating that he had received telephonic notification that an envelope
would be left in his mailbox for me at a certain time. He inspected his
mailbox following that particular time and found that envelope there
and telephoned me. I then went to his home, which is a short distance
from my own residence, and received the envelope from him.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Erm:x. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunt, you state in your opening statement that in your opinion,
the Watergate break-in was an unfortunate use of executive power.
What executive power are you referring to ?
Mr. Hunt. I am referring to power delegated to the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States by the President of the United .States.
Mr. Thompson. Who involved in the Watergate break-in or the
planning of the break-in had that power, in your opinion ?
Mr. Hunt. Well, are you referring to the Watergate break-in solely ?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir. Your statement refers to the Watergate
break-in solely, I believe.
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
The Watergate break-in was a part of the Gemstone operation, an
integral part of the Gemstone operation. It was financed out of Gem-
stone funds, Gemstone personnel accomplished it.
The concept, as I understood it from Mr. Liddy. and again I must
be very clear that this is hearsav information, that the project, pro-
gram, if you will, had been conceived, proposed, and engendered by the
Attorney General of the United .States with the assistance of the coun-
sel to the President. Mr. John W. Dean III, and with a former and
very recent White House aide. Mr. Jeb Stuart Magruder. The pro-
posal had been put to me at the time by Mr. Gordon Liddy, who was a
full-time White House employee and with whom I had worked in the
field and other operations.
Mr. Thompson. Did you consider the Watergate break-in then, a
legitimate Government operation ?
Mr. Hunt. Excuse me.
[Conferring with counsel.]
Mr. Hunt. In the context in which the break-in requirement was
levied on me I did. yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. What context was that ?
3708
Mr. HrxT. It was that fofoicrn moneys were renoi-ted to be — to liave
been sent or receJA-ed by tlie Democratic National Committee.
Mr. Tttompso^". And wlicn was tliat information related to you?
Mr. Hunt. In April of 1972.
Mr. Thompson. April of 1972?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Had the Watergate plans, to your satisfaction, been
approved prior or subsequent to that time ?
Mr. Hunt. The actual AVater^ate break-in was not approved. That
aspect of the Gemstone prop^ram was not approved until the time co-
incident with my receipt of the information concerning the report
havinof to do with the receipt by the Democratic National Committee
or the probable receipt of foreign moneys.
Mr. Thompson. But the discussion about the Gemstone plan had been
takino^ place prior to that time, had it not, according to your informa-
tion?
Mr. Hunt. Beginning in November of the prior year.
Mr. Thompson. In yoiu- mind, when did you agree to become part
of that plan?
Mr. Sachs. Could you specify what plan? Do you mean the Gem-
stone or Watergate?
Mr. Thompson. I am talking about the Gemstone plan.
INIr. Hunt. Almost as soon as Mr. Liddv made the proposal to me.
He having invoked the names of the Attorney General and Mr. Dean
at that luncture.
Mr. Thompson. That would have been in December of 19
Mr. Hunt. Late November.
Mr. Thompson. 1971 ?
JNTr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Late November ?
Mr. Hunt. I had no hesitation in associating myself in the operation.
Mr. Thompson. I see. When did it first come to your attention that
the Democratic National Committee headquarters was going to be
broken into?
Mr. Hunt. Not until April the following year.
]Mr. Thompson. Was this before or after j^ou were informed that
foreign money was coming into the DNC ?
Mr. Hunt. Not until — ^perhaps I misunderstood you. Senator, the
Watergate
Mr. Thompson. I am not a Senator, T appreciate it anyway.
INfr. Hunt. I beg your pardon, Mr. Thompson, excuse me, sir.
We did not begin to formulate plans for the Watergate break-in
until after recention of the report to the effect that foreign moneys
were being received bv the Democratic National Committee.
Mr. Thompson. But a plan was underway which included the pos-
sibilitv of surreptitious entry before that time.
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. And in your mind you associated with that plan the
authority of the Attorney General, although you did not know the
specifics at that particular time as to why he was authorized to set
such a plan in motion. What I am gettinc: at, Mr. Hunt, is, I wonder
what was in your mind at that time as to what the Attorney General
3709
could do and could not do. Surely anything that he decided to do
would not necessarily be a legitimate activity, whether or not the
President went along with it. I am wondering what justification you
had in your mind for subscribing to a plan which was designed toward
an opposition party in an election year.
Mr. Hunt. I can really say only this, Mr. Thompson. Having spent
21 years in the CIA following orders without question and a prior 5
years with the armed services following orders without question, it
never occurred to me to question the, if you will, the legality, the
propriety, of anything that might be ordered by the Attorney General
of the United States.
Mr. Thompson. And you took Mr. Liddy's word for that?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Thompson. The other activities that you were engaging in dur-
ing the time that you worked at the Wliite House, I believe you men-
tioned the entire Ellsberg situation, which I believe you said was a
matter of national security at that time, and the Greenspun situation ;
information that you understood he might have on Senator Muskie.
I believe the overall Gem.stone plan also included, perhaps, an airplane
surveillance of opposition planes or something of that nature.
Mr. Hunt. It did at one point, yes, sir. ]\Iay I specify that anything
having to do with electronics was drawn up by Mr. Liddy in conjunc-
tion with a specialist whom I later came to know as Mr. McCord, I had
nothing to do with that budget.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Also your activities included the convention situation that you re-
ferred to, getting people up, rooting people, down there in a political
context. I was just wondering if the foreign money situation was the
only thing outside of a political context that came to your attention as
the justification for the Gemstone operation.
Mr. Hunt. I was never given any other.
Mr. Thompson. Who told you
^Ir. Sachs. Will you excuse me for just a minute.
;Mr. Thompson. Wlio told you that foreign money was coming into
theDNC?
;Mr. Hunt. ^Mr. Liddy.
Mr. Thompson. AVhere did he get his information ?
Mr. Hunt. I believe that he was receiving it from a Government
agency.
Mr. Thompson. From a Government agency ?
^Ir. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Did he specify which agency ?
^Ir. Hunt. No, sir.
Mv. Thompson. Did you have an opinion as to which agency ?
^Ir. Hunt. Yes, sir.
]Mr. Thompson= A'\niat was your opinion ?
Mr. Hunt. My opinion was that it came from the FBI.
Mr. Thompson. Did you have any independent corroboration of that
assertion ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
iSIr. Thompson. Did you make any inquiry ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
3710
^Ir. Thompson. Do you bolievo you remember whether or not he
told you the particuLir agency or you just conchided that in your own
mijid? Did he tell you that it was an agency or did you conclude that
in your own mind ?
Mr. Hunt. I would go back to our mutual experience in the Plumbers
organization at which time we were receiving daily reports from most
of the investigative agencies of the Government with relation to the
Ellsbcrg case. Mr. Liddy had on the basis of prior associations with
the FBI a private channel, a person or persons who would telephone
or send him memorandums from time to time, providing him with in-
formation which was not distributed generally within the AVliite
House, that is to say there were really two channels of rei>orting from
the FBI into the White House. There was the J. Edgar Hoover chan-
nel to, let us say, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Krogh, who would see copies
of those memorandums. There were also materials that were coming to
Mr. Liddy from INIr. Mardian in the Justice Department, and I believe
telephonip information that came to INIr. Liddy from close and old-
time associates of his at the FBI. So I had every reason to believe that
he was still well plugged into the Bureau.
Mr. Thompson. Did he tell you precisely the source of these foreign
moneys, the country ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
]Mr. Thompson. And the individual, what did he tell you?
Mr. Hunt. Cuba.
Mr. Thompson. What would be the normal procedure with regard
to investigating a matter like that, if any organization in this country
was receiving money from a foreign country, especially a Communist
country ?
Mr. Hunt. The practice normally would be to lay a requirement
on the CIA abroad and the FBI at home. However, the President had
established the Plumbers unit because certain traditional agencies of
the Government had been deemed inadequate in the performance of
their duties.
]Mr. Thompson. Was the Plumbers unit in any way operative in
April of 1972?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know whether or not they were looking into
this matter?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. You don't know whether or not they were ?
Mr. Hunt. I am quite sure they were not.
Mr. Thompson. Nobody else was, as far as you know ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. With legard to the actual scene, who was in charge
of the various operations on the night of the break-in, the early morn-
ing hours of June IT, 1972 ?
Mr. Hunt. The responsibilities were the same as they were during
the prior break-in on May 27. and that is to say I was in OA'erall charge
of the entry operation. I planned it. and with Mr. McCord's help
surveyed the groundwork, developed the operational plan. Mr. Mc-
Coixl had certain electi'onic responsibilities, the precise nature of which
I was unaware. My team, that is to say, the four men from Miami,
3711
were charged with photographing documents that would bear on the
object of our search while Mr. McCord went about his electronic
business.
Mr. Thompson. Did you tell any of the Cuban- Americans about the
foreign money information that you had ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Thompson. Who did you tell ?
Mr. Hunt. I told Mr. Barker, and this was the basis on which I
secured his cooperation initially.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know whether or not he related this to the
people he enlisted to assist him in the operation ?
Mr. Hunt. I believe he may have. If I can amplify a bit, Mr. Thomp-
son, when I approached Mr. Barker with the requirement for an entry
into Democratic national headquarters I told him that we wanted to
verify a report to the effect that Castro money was reaching the Demo-
cratic National Committee coffers, and Mr. Barker's immediate re-
sponse was "there are rumors all over Miami, I have heard all about
it, you don't need to tell me anything more."
]NIr. Thompson. Did you tell him anything more about it?
Mr, Hunt. I knew nothing more about it.
Mr. Thompson. He operated then on your information?
Mr. HuxVt. He did.
Mr. Thompson. Was there any financial reward in any way for Mr.
Barker or any of the other Cuban-Americans out of the Watergate
break-in ?
Mr. Hunt. There was compensation for them for time lost from
their normal businesses, yes.
Mr. Thompson. Was there anything additional to that ?
Mr. Hunt. Not that I know of ; no, sir.
Mr. Thompson. What about the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office,
was there any pecuniary benefit coming out of that for them other than
just expenses, time, or monev for time lost from work, that sort of
thing?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir, that was all.
]Mr. Thompson. "WHiat was told the Cubans with regard to that op-
oration, with rearard to the reason and necessity for the break-in in
Dr. Fielding's office.
ISfr. Hunt. T told Mr. Barker originally in INIiami that a break-in
would be necessary ; an entry operation w^ould be necessary on the
west coast as we had information to the effect that a man whom I
b-^lieve I described as a traitor to the United States was passing classi-
fied information to a foreign power.
Mr. Thompson. Were you the one who enlisted Mr. Barker's aid to
come to Washington during Mr. Hoover's funeral ?
Mr. Hunt. I was.
Mr. Thompson. Did he in turn enlist the aid of other Cuban-Amer-
icnns to come with him ?
Mr. Hunt. He did.
Mr. Thompson. ^Y[vdi: was the reason for your arrangements for
them to come to Washington ?
Mr. Hunt. This was in response to an urgent renuirement by Mr.
Liddy who indicated to me that he had information, and again I
3712
assiimo it to be from a U.S. Govornnient ao^ency — to the effect that
in conjunction with a peacenik demonstration on Capitol Hill premises,
that an effort Avould probably be made to desecrate the catafalque of
J. Ed<;ar Hoover who was then lyino; in state here in the rotunda of the
Capitol. It was desired that perhaps as many as 10 or 12 men be broufi:ht
up from Miami so that they could circulate throujjh the crowd, sense
their temper, and if a sur<re Avas made from the focus of the demonstra-
tion then in projjress that these men could post themselves around the
casket of J. Edjjar Hoover and prevent its desecration.
Mr. Thompson. Did they further
Mr. Hunt. If a Vietcong; flajj was unfurled by the demonstrators,
who included such notables as INIessi-s. Kunstler and Ellsberg, Jane
Fonda, Sutherland, and so forth, that that flag be obtained, taken
from them and turned over to Mr. Liddy.
Mr. Thompson. Did they come ?
Mr. Hunt. They did.
Mr. Thompson. Did they subsequently engage in fisticuffs with some
of the demonstrators ?
Mr. Hunt. I have heard that alleged.
Mr. Thompson. Did they receive any financial aAvard or benefit out
of that operation except for their expenses coming and going?
Mr. Hunt. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Thompson. With regard to the break-in of the DNC, as far as
you know their motivation was, first of all, that they were doing some-
thing to expose a traitor and, second, that they were trying to uncover
or verify reports that Castro money was coming into the Democratic
National Committee headquarters.
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. So far as you know that is the sole basis for their
action ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir, although there was sioeculation that Hanoi
money might be coming in as well.
Mr. Thompson. "What?
Mr. Hunt. There was some speculation among us that money from
Hanoi was also coming in as well. This was not part of the corpus of
Mr. Liddy's representations to me.
Mr. Thompson. Who told you that ?
Mr. Hunt. Nobody told it to me, Mr. Thompson. Senator McGovern,
though, for some time had been saying that he Avould in effect crawl to
Hanoi if it meant the release of our prisoners, and we felt that if
Castro money might be coming into the Democratic National Commit-
tee coffers that money might also be coming from Hanoi as well.
Mr. Thompson. Did you tell Mr. Barker to look for any particular
kind of documents when he entered the DNC that night ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. ^Y[\at did you tell him to look for?
Mr. Hunt. Financial documents, ledgers, account books, that sort
of thing.
Mr. Thompson. AVould ISIr. Barker know if he came across signifi-
cant documents in this regard, do you think? Did he have any back-
ground in political campaigns or finances ?
3713
Mr. HuxT. My presumption or our operational presumption was,
Mr. Thompson, that during the course of his search Mr. Barker would
come across ledgers and account books of some kind, all political par-
ties being required to keep tliem. His instructions were to photograph
in effect any page with a figure on it. Later on a determination would
be made as to the significance and validity of those figures, the sources
of the funds and contributions.
Mr. Thompson. We have heard testimony about how the entry was
carried out that night. Will you correct me if I misstate it? I believe
Mr. McCord first taped the locks on the door, returned, found the tape
had been removed. Then there was a discussion among the people there
as to whether or not entry would be made after finding that situation
there. Do you recall such a discussion among yourself and Mr. Liddy,
Mr. McCord, and the Cubans?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Relate to us that discussion as best you can re-
member.
Mr. Hunt. Mr. INIcCord came np to room 214, where we were wait-
ing — I am speaking now of the Watergate Hotel — and said that he had
]:!reviously taped the locks on the entry door of the basement of the
Watergate office building. He said that on returning just prior to our,
to the meeting that was then in progress, he had noticed that the tape
had been removed and he had retaped the door.
I asked him why he had done that and he said that he had noticed
a large pile of mail sacks in the vicinity and he felt that the mailman,
on exiting the Watergate office building premises, had taken off the
tape.
]Mr. Thompson. He told you that he had already retaped the door?
Mr. Hunt. He had retaped the door ; yes.
At that point, I said, let us junk it, meaning let us scratch the
operation.
Mr. Liddy and Mr. jMcCord talked between themselves and the
decision was made to go.
Mr. Thompson. Did you hear the conversation between Liddy and
:\IcCord?
Mr. Hunt. I walked away. As I recall, I walked over to the window.
I thought that it was very foolhardy to proceed on that basis.
I might add that I had argued for 8 days in advance ineffectively
with Mr. Liddy prior to June 17 against the second entry of the
Watergate.
Mr. Thompson. AVhy ?
Mr. Hunt. Because it had been known to me through reports Mr.
McCord had made that :Mr. O'Brien was no longer in residence there,
that t]iere was evidentlv a large-scale movement of books, files, call it
what you will, from the Watergate office to the convention head-
quarters of the Democrats in Miami. I felt that in effect, the bird had
flown.
Mr. Thompson. Did you hear any of the conversation as to who made
the final decision or who was for or against reentry? _
:Mr. Hunt. I think it was a mutual decision, a common decision be-
tween Mr. Liddy and Mr. McCord.
3714
Mr. Thompson. And Mr. McCord gave what reason in his mind for
the tape having been removed, as to who removed it ?
Mr. Hunt. That he had seen immediately adjacent to that door a
pile of large mail sacks, which he felt had been collected by the mail-
man and on exiting the building, the mailman must have noticed that
the lock was taped and had removed the tape. Mr. McCord was con-
vinced, he told us, that it was just happenstance.
He thereupon retaped the lock, came up to our room, and said, in
effect, I am ready to go, let's go.
Mr. Thompson. How did he get the door back open to retape it?
Mr. Hunt. I do not know.
Mr. Thompson. Was there any discussion about buying off the guard,
perhaps ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir, but there was money available for that.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know why that was not carried out?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir. I do not believe that it — it had not been necessary
in our first entry. We did not even attempt it the second time around.
Mr. Thompson. Did you know at the time that some of the people
who were going to make the entry were carrying $100 bills in numeri-
cal sequence that could be traced ?
IVIr. Hunt. I do not think I knew that they were carrying sequential
bills on them, no, sir.
Mv. Thompson. Was any check made of things of that nature —
what was on the persons of the people making entry and what would
be done or what could happen ?
Mr. Hunt. They were told to take their personal wallets, billfolds
and so forth, and put them or leave them behind in room 214, which I
believe they did. They were then provided, a couple of them were pro-
vided with false documentation which I had received from the CIA.
We felt the false documentation plus the money that they had on them
would be sufficient to get them out of a local guard-type situation.
]Mr. Thompson. After the break-in, did you have occasion to call
Mr. McCord and talk to him about Mr. Baldwin, about hiring Mr.
Baldwin?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Thompson. Would you relate that conversation ?
Mr. Hunt. At about the time that Mr. Baldwin began telling his
story to the Los Angeles Times
l^ir. Thompson. When was that ? How long after the break-in would
you say ?
]\f r. Hunt. May I consult my notes ?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunt. It should be a matter of record.
ISfr. Thompson, I would have to place it as a guess at some time
toward mid-July, or even late July, at a time when !Mr. ISIcCord was
no longer in the District of Columbia jail and the time when ]Mr.
Baldwin had begun, so to speak, to sing.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Would you relate the conversation?
Mr. Hunt. I was quite disturbed by the revelations that Mr. Bald-
win was makins:. I telephoned ^Ir. McCord and asked him to explain,
in effect, the circumstances surrounding this apparent disloyalty on the
part of a man he had hired. Mr. McCord said that he, himself, Mr.
3715
McCord, was short on funds. I suggested that he sell the van which
Mr. Baldwin had, for some reason, driven to Mr. McCord's home in
the wake of the operation against my instructions to take it elsewhere.
Mr. Thompson. Pardon me. You say against your instructions ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes. Following the break-in — and I probably should go
back to clarify the record. In a very minor way, I had been asked be-
fore the lunch break to recount my own movements following the
"Watergate, the arrest of the five men. I did not go directly to the White
House. I went over to the Howard Johnson Motel and spoke with a
man whom I had not previously seen or met, but whom I knew to be
an employee of Mr. McCord's, and told him to load all of his equip-
ment into the van that McCord had and to drive away, get away from
the premises.
He said : "Where shall I go, shall I take it to Mr. McCord's home?"
I said : "No, any place but that, I do not care where you take it.
Drive it into the river, I do not care."
In any event, it developed that Mr. McCord — Mr. Baldwin took
the van to Mr. McCord's house and left it there.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know how far his house was from the
Howard Johnson's Motel ? Was it close by ?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. McCord's house?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Hunt. No, it was a substantial drive. I would guess 15 or 16
miles.
Mr. Thompson, Go ahead. You were talking about your conversa-
tion — that is all you have to relate on that ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Pick up your conversation now with Mr. McCord
about that.
Mr. Hunt. I was rather critical with Mr. McCord about the per-
formance of his employee and Mr. McCord, on his part, was rather
defensive. He indicated to me that in the wake of the arrests, Baldwin
had felt himself abandoned and had gone directly to the Committee
for the Re-Election of the President to seek instructions and/or finan-
cial assistance and he had been rebujffed.
Feeling himself thus abandoned and cast upon his own resources —
I am again quoting Mr. McCord to the best of my recollection — Mr.
Baldwin sought counsel in Connecticut and retained two attorneys,
who, in whose hands he subsequently remained. It was on the basis of
their advice that he began giving interviews, the first of which was,
I believe, with the Los Angeles Times.
Mr. Thompson. Was that the only conversation you had with Mr.
McCord about Baldwin?
Mr. Hunt. To the best of my recollection ; yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. You didn't know Baldwin except through McCord,
I take it?
INIr. Hunt. I saw him at 2 :30-odd hours on the morning of June 17
in the darkened room. I would never have been able to identify him
except through a photograph I saw in the newspaper.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Hunt, you have been asked this morning about
what, in your opinion, Mr. Colson knew about an overall plan, or a
Gemstone plan. I am not sure that I have that straight in my mind.
3716
You referred, first of all, to the conversation yon had with ]\Ir. Col-
son in January of 1972, 1 believe, when you told him that you were, in
effect, going to the Committee To Re-Elect.
Then we referred to a conversation you had with Mr, Liddy after
the meeting that you had with Liddy and Colson in Colson's office,
when Mr. Liddy said that he thought Colson would help. Just what,
in your opinion, did INIr. Colson know ?
Mr. Hunt. I beg your pardon ?
Mr. Thompson. Just what, in your opinion, did Mr. Colson know
about the Gemstone operation and what is the basis of that opinion ?
Mr. Hunt. Would you excuse me a moment?
Mr. Sachs. Excuse us, please, just a moment.
Mr. Hunt. To address myself to your question, ]\Ir. Thompson, and
I am reading through some notes that I have compiled — is that per-
missible ?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir. When did you compile them ?
Mr. Hunt. Within the past 10 days.
Mr. Thompson. Was it before or after the grand jury session when
you first related to the staff' the fact that in your opinion, Mr. Colson
did know about the Gemstone operation ?
]\Ir. Hunt. It was in connection with that.
Mr. Sachs. Mr. Thompson, that was not a grand jury session.
Mr. Thompson. I am sorry. I meant the executive session of the staff.
Do you recall whether it was before or after that session?
INIr. Hunt. It was at the same time.
Mr. Thompson. It could not have been exactly the same time.
Mr. Hunt. In order to make my presentation t<) the committee in
executive session, I prepared the notes that I have now requested per-
mission to read.
Mr. Thompson. Had this question that I just posed to you or similar
questions concerning his knowledge been posed to you in executive
session before you made these notes?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. All right, go ahead.
Mr. Hunt. In late January 1972 I told Colson that as a result of my
increasing involvement with Gordon Liddy, I would be unable to give
anything like as much time to Colson as I had in the past. Colson said,
that is all riglit, you can be a lot more useful over there ; that is, work-
ing for Liddy.
I remarked that he was probably aware of the large-scale intelli-
gence program that had been conceived and which INIr. Liddy was
heading. Colson said, I had much preferred that you head it.
He indicated at the same time that he had already provided bona
fides on my part to Mr. Mitchell.
I replied that I liked the arrangement with Liddy, that I had worked
with and had full confidence in Liddv. At the same time, I had a
rather demanding job at Mullen and Co. I told Colson that I would
like to be able to be available to him, Colson, within the limits of my
phx-sical capacities and said that I assumed that I would maintain
my White House office and safe.
Colson said that was no problem.
3717
This is the background for Colson's perceptions when I called on
him with Liddy about a month later. Colson knew that I had been
engaged in covert activities with Liddy. He in fact, I have been given
to understand, actually financed the Fielding entry.
Mr. Thompson. M^ien did you learn that ?
Mr. Hunt. I learned that in conjunction with an appearance I made
before the Watergate grand jury.
Mr. Thompson. You were told at that time ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. About financing the Fielding entry. Could you be
a little more specific as to what he actually told you he did?
Mr. Hunt. He provided the moneys which were used by JNIr. Liddy
for that purpose.
Mr. Thompson. Were you told who he gave the money to ?
Mr. Hunt. I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Were you told who he gave the money directly to ?
Mr. Hunt. Who is "he'' ?
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Colson.
Mr. Hunt, I have testified that I saw Mr. Krogh give money to
Mr. Liddy, but it was not until recently that I learned that Mr. Krogh
received the money apparently from the hands of INIr. Colson.
Mr. Thompson. And you don't know anything about the circum-
stances of his giving money to Krogh otlier than
Mr. Hunt. No, sir ; I do not.
Mr. Thompson. All right, sir. Go ahead.
Mr. Hunt. Colson also acknowledged that he was aware of a plan
conceived by the Attorney General to secure intelligence on radical
groups and democratic candidates, that being the general tone pro-
gram, and that I was working on this with Liddy as a covert
collaborator.
Mr. Thompson. This was in January, the January meeting?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir, the January meeting.
Mr. Thompson. So he actually said, he used the word Gemstone?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Would you read that last portion again?
Mr. Hunt. I was not reading, I was interpolating.
]Mr. Thompson. I see.
"V^Hiat, exactly, did he say in response to your inquiry as to whether
or not he was aware of a large scale intelligence plan other than what
you have already related ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir ; this is my summation of the conversation. I had
said earlier, I remarked to Mr. Colson that he was probably aware of
the large-scale intelligence program that had been concei^-ed and which
Mr. Liddy was heading. He said that he was and in fact, that he had
checked my bona fides in behalf of the Attorney GeneraL
Mr. Thompson. '\^nien did you conclude in your own mind that he
was in fact aware of it? As soon as he said it at that meeting?
Mr. Hunt, Yes.
Mr. Thompson. All right, what about the meeting in Februarv.
after you left? I believe vou had a conversation with Mr. Liddy. If
my memory serves me correctly, I believe in executive session you said
96-296 O— 73— pt. 9-^-21
3718
something to tlie effect that that was the first time that you really
became aware or that you concluded in your own mind that Colson
must have been aware of exactly what was going on regarding the
Gemstone plan
Mr. Hunt. I said that, Mr. Thompson, at an earlier executive session.
However, subsequently, to a different line of questioning by counsel
to this committee, I was able to reconstruct events that had not at that
point been fresh in my mind.
Mr. Thompson. Let's see if this is the line that you are referring to.
I am referring to the transcript of September 20, 1973, Thursday.
I will start reading at line 11 :
"It was in late January"
Mr. Sachs. What page, Mr. Thompson ?
Mr. Thompson. I'm sorry, page 467.
I will start reading about line 11 and I will be skipping some. If you
want to take the time to read the parts in between, of course, that is
perfectly all right.
In late January. 1972, I told Charles Colson that as a result of my increasing
involvement with Gordon Liddy I would be unable to give anything like as miieh
time to Colson as I had in the past. Colson said, "That is right. You can be a lot
more useful over fhere." That is to say working for, or with Liddy. I remarked
they, Colson, was probably aware of the large scale intelligence program that had
been conceived and which Mr. Liddy was heading. Colsnn .snid. "T would hnve
much preferred that you head it." I replied that I liked the arrangement. I had
worked with and had confidence in Liddy. Besides, I had full time work with Mul-
len and Company. I told Colson I would continue to be available to him within
the limits of my time and assumed I would maintain my White House office and
safe. Colson said that was no problem.
Then, if I may, I would like to move over to page 471.
Senator Ervtn. That is a vote signal, so we will have to take a tem-
porary recess to go over there and vote.
[Recess.]
Senator Er\t[n. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Thompson. IMr. Hunt, without readinar it, let me see if I can
summarize the situation, and you correct me if I am wrong. I got the
impression from reading the transcript that the question was posed to
vou as to how it could be that such a conversation could come about
between !Mr. Liddy and ]\rr. Colson: what would be a plausible ex-
planation for that; and also your being there; what kind of an ex-
planation would be plausible with regard to what Mr. Liddy told you
aftenvard, and vou in effect concluded that the onlv plausible explana-
tion must have been that Mr. Colson had known about it beforehand.
Would that be a fair summary of what you stated in executive session ?
]\Ir. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tno^rpsoN. Well, if that is the case, then that would indicate
that it was after the February meeting that you concluded, in your own
mind anyway, that Mr. Colson was aware of the Gemstone plan and
not before that time.
I got the impression that you were saying that the first time you
realized in your own mind that Mr. Colson must have been aware of
the overall plan, was after the February meeting.
Mr. Hunt. At that time, yes, sir.
3719
Mr. Thompson. Well, when you had the January meeting; with Mr.
Colson did you discuss the reason for ^oing to tlie Conmiittee To Re-
Elect? I assume you did not come away from that discussion witli the
feeling that he had an awareness of the overall Gemstone war.
Mr. Sachs. I am sorry, Mr. Thompson, I am sorry I do not know
whether you say awareness or unawareness so I missed that.
Mr. Thompson. Awai-eness.
Mr. Hunt. I believe I am having difficulty now in discriminating
between questions, Mr. Thompson, I am terribly sorry. I am not trying
to be obstructive, I want to be responsive. Could you restate the ques-
tion as it stands?
Mr. Thompson. Let me put the question to you just the way it was
put in executive session then, Mr. Hunt. I have already related where
you stated that you had a conversation in January with Mi-. Colson
about the overall intelligence plan. Mr. Dash asked you :
Other than the particular intelligence plan that yon were working with Mr.
Liddy on, which Mr. Liddy was getting approval from Mr. Mitchell which i.s
known, as we know now, as the Gemstone plan, was there any other plan in
effect?
Mr. Hu^fT. No, sir.
Mr. Dash. So in restating it the Gemstone plan was the only large-scale intelli-
gence plan which was in existence at that time, so Mr. Colson's statement to you
that he was aware of their plan could only further the Gemstone plan.
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And that is what led you to believe that when you, in Feb^-uary,
introduced Mr. Liddy to Mr. Colson that Mr. Liddy on his own while you were
there in the rear of the room urged Colson's a.ssistance on this plan that Mr. Col-
son was already aware of the Gemstone plan and did not need any further infor-
mation provided but he per.sonally, he would entrust, and this was the basis on
which he made the telephone call to Mr, Magruder.
Mr. Sachs. Mr. Thompson, T am sorry we do not have the page, and
we are not following, and it is going a little too fast. If you would
direct us to the page.
Mr. Thompson. I am reading from pages 471 and 472.
Mr. Sachs. I think our problem is that Mr. Hunt does not quite
know what the question is.
Mr. Thompson. When did you first become aware in your own mind,
that Mr. Colson knew about the Gemstone plan ?
Mr. Hunt. In January.
^Ir. Thompson. In January ?
]\rr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Now, ISIr. Dash has referred to an executive session
on May 14, 197:3. Would it be fail- to say that at this executive
session, the statement which he referred to, where he questioned you as
follows :
Mr. Dash. Actually, when did you first learn from Mr. Liddy that the sign was
OK, the go sign, referring to the approval by the Attorney General.
Mr. Hunt. Well, 1 would put it very late in March, very late in February, if
not in early >Larch.
Mr. Dash. And it was around that time when you met with Mr. MeCord in
March.
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. During that time did you ever indicate in the pre.sence of
Mr. McCord that these plans would have— that you were in touch with other
persons yourself and the White House, Mr. Colson or anybody el.se concerning
these plans.
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
3720
I would not have done this hecause it was true to the hest of my knowledge.
Mr. Colson had no specific knowledge. He had no knowledge of my dealings with
Mr. Liddy from me. Now, if Mr. Colson ha.l collateral knowledge or awareness
he did not confide in me.
Mr. Dash. Reside the.se people who were meeting, that would he Mr. Mitchell,
Mr. Dean, Magruder and yourself and the Cuhans who came up for that, who else
to your knowledge, was aware of this activity?
^Ir. Hunt. Of the overall project?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Hunt. I have no personal knowledge of anyone.
Would you say that that is inconsistent with your present testi-
mony ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir, Mr, Thompson, and let me try to reconcile this
as best I can, as I believe I have in subsequent testimony.
That until a matter of some 2 weeks ago and perhaps less it had been
my firm conviction that there had been no substantive knowledge on
the part of Mr. Colson concerning the Gemstone, with the overall intel-
ligence plan.
However, following a line of questioning embarked upon by Mr.
Dash, a train of thought was parked which led to my recollection of the
January meeting with INIr. Colson which then became significant to me.
On that, the basic of my — of my reconstruction of our January meeting
I was able to postulate what Mr. Colson's perceptions might have been
during his meeting with Liddy and myself in February, and it is to
that that I gave, have given my most recent testimony.
Mr. Thompson. So you, in effect, did not remember up until the time
Mr. Dash embarked upon that line of question
Mr. Hunt. That is correct.
]Mr. Thompson f continuing! . That you had discussed this matter in
Januarv with Mr. Colson and he indicated that he was aware of it?
ISIr. Hunt. That is correct.
Afr. Thompson. Would you not consider that a significant piece of
information?
Mr. Hunt. I consider it to be a piece of significant information now ;
yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Well
Mr. Hunt. In January I was not acutely conscious of it in terms of
significance.
Mr. Thompson. Well, did you realize the sismificance of it on Mav 14
when you stated that so far as you knew, Mr. Colson and no one else
had knowledge of the plan ?
Mr. Hunt. May 14. 1 did not recollect it, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Since your testimony here and the testimony in
executive session when this was brought out, vou have filed a motion to
set your plea of guilty aside, I believe ; have you not?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. And if I understand it, that motion is based in part
upon what you might say, is some kind of executive approval of the
plan, which would justifv the plan at least in vour mind at that time,
and you mentioned Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Mitchell, I believe.
and also Mr. Colson in your pleadings with regard to your motion that
you filed to set your plea aside, is that correct ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir. With all deference, Mr. Thompson, let me point
out that Mr. Dash had previously asked me in effect the same question
3721
and I responded, I belieA-e, the record will show, that my plea is not
based substantivel}' upon Mr. Colson's involvement or noninvolvement.
Mr. Thompson. My failure to understand it is based upon what I
understood your original testimony to me ; this latest information in
response to Mr. Dash, this additional information, was not inconsist-
ent. Now I understand you to say it is inconsistent but it is based upon
your failure to previously remember.
I also would like to ask you concerning a letter which you wrote to
Mr. Colson on Augrist 9, which I would like to furnish you a copy of
at the present time if you don't have it. This is an exhibit, a jiart of the
record, and was furnished to us by Mr. Colson, I believe. It is a letter
to Colson dated August 9, 1972. I won't go into the first part of it
unless you care to — it has to do with the fact that you were removed
from Mullen's HEW account. Xow in the last paragraph you say :
Let me say I profoundly regret your being dragged into the case through asso-
ciation with me, suiierfioial and occasional though the association was. What
small satisfaction I can dredge up at the moment is the knowledge that I was
not responsible for the affair or its outcome. All this pales, of course, beside the
overwhelming importance of re-electing the President, and yon may be confident
that I will do all that is required of me toward that end.
Was it your opinion at that time that Mi-. Colson was being dragged
into the case solely because of his prior friendship with you or clo you
now feel that he was possibly being dragged in because he knew of the
plan from the vei*}^ inception ?
Mr. Htjxt. Because of his what with me, sir ?
Mr. Thompsox. Because he knew of the Gemstone plnn and some-
what participated in that.
Mr. Hunt. He was being di-agged into the Watergate case by the
press because he had been my sponsor in the White House, and be-
cause my, one of my alternate telephone extensions was ou^ of his
office. Thnt was how the connection had ijiitinlly been established. I
regretted that.
Mr. Thompson. So that was the soIp basis, in your mind at that time,
for feeling that he was being dragged into the case. Would that he a
fair statement ?
Mr. Hunt. We are talking Watergate case now, yes, sir.
INlr. Thompson. All right.
With regard to the telephone conversation that was recorded by
"^fr. Colson in late November of 1972, if I can refer to page 6 of that :
I believe in restrospect you probably feel you were being set up with
reo-ard to that and, of course, Mr, Colson's statement could havebeen
self -serving. Do you have that before you ? I believe that was furnished
a moment ago.
Mr. Sachs. We will in 1 second.
Mr. Thompson. Page 6, about the sixth sentence down, ]\rr. Colson
states and I will leave out some of the laiiguage here, he said :
If I ever had known it was coming T wou^d have said to you as a friend, if
some asshole wants to do this, fine, but don'f you ge< involved. T mean, if you and
I, if we'd ever had a conversation like that. T would have said, my God, * * * but
the point I've made is that you're a smart * * * among many other qualities, you
are a brilliant operator and brilMant operators just don't get into this kind of a
thing, so I've held and I was asked * * * and this is why I don't want 1"0 know
anv different, this is why I was asked by the Bureau, well, what about Hunt.
And I could honestly say, look, I've known this guy a long time, he's a very smart
3722
fellow and I can't for the life of me conceive that he would ever get himself into
this kind of situation, so I want to be able to stay in that position. That's why
I don't want you to tell me anything beyond that. Give my love to Dorothy, will
you?
And you responded : "All right, I will."
Of course here, Mr. Hunt, he not only presumably would be denying:
any knowledge about any such operations or plans himself but he is
denying knowledge of your participation in such plans. Why did you
not respond at that tinie and refer to some of the previous conversa-
tions you had had with ]\Ir. Colson if he knew about the Gemstonc
plan and you knew of your participation in the Gemstone plan ?
Mr. Hunt. I believe that our conversation was focused on Water-
gate, on the Watergate entry that failed.
Mr. Thompson. So your testimony is that, as far as you know,
although he was aware of the overall Gemstone plan, he was not aware
of the Watergate break-in ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. Now, who were the members of the Plumbers ?
Mr. Hunt. The unit was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh, Jr. His deputy
was Mr. David Young. Mr. G: Gordon Liddy was a full-time member
of the unit. The stenographer-typist was Miss Kathleen Chenow, and
I was a part-time consultant.
Senator Ervin. Did the Plumbers have a secretary named Miss or
Mrs. Chenile?
Mr. Hunt. I am not aware of anybody by that name.
Senator Ervin. Chenow, C-h-e-n-o-w ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, I just gave her name. Miss Kathleen Chenow,
C-h-e n-o-w.
Senator Er\t:n. Now, the telephone that the Plumbers used was
listed in her name and at her home in Alexandria, wasn't it?
Mr. Hunt. So I understand.
Senator ER^^N. Yet it was in the offices which the Plumbers occupied
in the Executive Office Building?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. That is where the phone was but it was listed in
Alexandria. "\^niy was that?
Mr. Hunt. That was the inadequate response by the communications
unit at the Wliite House to my request for a sterile telephone.
Senator Er\tn. A sterile telephone is one that can't be found readily
or traced, isn't it ?
Mr. Hunt. Tt can't be found at all.
Senator Ervin. So you used that telephone to have conversations,
receive long distance calls, and make long distance calls to Bernard
Barker, didn't vou ?
Mr. Hunt. Amonir others, yes, sir. Senator.
Senator Er\tn. How long have you known Bernard Barker?
Mr. Hunt. Since 1959-60.
Senator Ervin. And vou made arrangements with Bernard Barker
and Martinez and Sturp-is and Gonzales to participate in the entry of
the Watergate, didn't you ?
3723
Mr. Hunt. To be precise, Mr. Chairman, I made arrangements with
Mr. Barker, Mr. Barker made subsequent arrangements with the other
gentlemen.
Senator Ervust, Now, we have evidence before this committee to the
effect that the four Miami residents had in their possession, either in
their pockets or in their hotel rooms in Watergate, 53 $100 bills at the
time they were apprehended at the Watergate.
Do you know where that money came from ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator ER\^N. "WTiere did it come from ?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Gordon Liddy.
Senator Er\tn. Do you know how — we have testimony here also to
the effect that this money was part of a deposit that was temporarily
made in Mr. Barker's bank account or his firm's bank account in
INIiami, Fla., consisting of four Mexican checks totaling $89,000 and
one from Kenneth Dahlberg in the amount of $25,000.
Do you know how that money happened to be deposited in Mr.
Barker's bank account or his firm's bank account in Miami?
Mr. Hunt. In this way, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Barker was per-
forming a service for Mr. Liddy in negotiating checks, that is to say,
passing them through a bank account and delivering the proceeds to
Mr. Liddy.
Senator Erm^n. How long had ]Mr. Liddy known Mr. Barker, to
vour knowledge?
Mr. Hunt. Since December or January — December 1971, January
of 1972.
No, I beg your pardon. I would have to go back to the Ellsberg
entry. He knew through the summer, the summer months of 1971.
Senator Ervin. Now, j^ou worked under Mr. Colson in the White
House, didn't vou?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator ER\aN. And when you were operating the Plumbers there,
you made reports to Mr. Colson, did you not, of what you were doing,
what you recommended ?
^Ir. Hunt. Occasionallv : yes, sir.
Senator Ervt^n. Well, I have in mv hand here what purports to be
a coin' of a report from you to Charles Colson dated July 28, 1971, in
which vou recommend to him — well, I will hand this to the witness.
You have a copy of that ?
]Mr. Sachs. Yes, we have a copv of that July 28 memo.
Senator ER\^N. Can vou identify that as being a copy of a report
you made to Mr. Colson ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Er\tn. And in that report, you recommend among other
things to Mr. Colson that he should obtain Mr. Ellsberg's files from
his psvchiatric analyst, did you not, among other recommendations?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervtn. And vou knew that there was no way in which you
could obtain tliat report except by surreptitious entry, did you not?
Other than what you knew, it was privileged under the law of Cali-
fornia ?
3724
Mr. Hunt. Senator, I was not limiting my options at that point
simply to a surreptitious entry. What I had described here was a de-
sirable product. The means of obtaining it had not yet clarified them-
selves and were not to, for, in fact, a month.
Senator Ervin. Well, now, you thought it was desirable to get his
files from his phychiatric analyst in order that the CIA might use
them to carry out your second recommendation in that letter, to per-
form a covert psychological assessment evaluation on Ellsberg.
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And the objective of the surreptitious entry into the
office of Dr. Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist, was for the purpose of
getting at his records concerning Ellsberg?
Mr. Hunt. Photographing them ; yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Photographing them.
Do you have a copy of the memo from Bud Krogh — is that the
nickname of Egil Krogh ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And David Young to Charles Colson in which they
were also joining in the recommendation for a complete psychological
assesment and evaluation of Ellsberg by the CIA?
Mr. Hunt. Under what date, Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Ervin. August 3, 1971.
ISIr. Hunt. I have such a memorandum.
Senator Ervin. So Mr. Colson did know about the operations being
carried on by the Plumbers, did he not, back in July and August 1971 ?
ISIr. Hunt. I would not, on the basis of this memorandum alone, Mr.
Chairman, want to presume that Mr. Colson had comprehensive knowl-
edge of everything the Plumbers were either doing or contemplating
as of that date.
Senator Ervin. Well, you did know as early as July 28 that you
thought that they ought to have the files — obtain the files of Ellsberg's
psychiatrist, Dr. Fielding?
Mr. Hunt. Obtain access to them.
Senator Ervin. Did you ever talk to Colson about this matter?
Mr. Hunt. I recall no further conversation with Mr. Colson other
than the memorandum of suggestion to him which was responsive to a
suggestion which he made to me.
Senator Ervin. Now, did you make a report to John Ehrlichman
about the surreptitious entry into the psychiatrist's office?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Ervin. He testified before this committee that after it was
done, you made a report.
Mr. Hunt. INIr. Chairman, if I may clarify.
Senator Ervin. I wish you would. It is confusing.
Mr. Hunt. Following the surreptitious entry into Dr. Fielding's
office, Mr. Liddv and I compiled a very brief report which we presented
to Mr. Kroffh. Whether it went to Mr. Ehrlichman is another matter.
Senator Ervin. You do not know about it ?
Mr. Hunt. I have no personal knowledge of that.
Senator Ervin. Now, you spoke about Mr. Bittman telling vou that
he had received a telephonic communication which was followed by the
deposit of $75,000 in an envelope for you, I believe at his home. Did
he tell you who he received the telephone call from ?
3725
]\Ir. Hunt. Are you referring to Mr. Bittman, sir ?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
jNIr. Hunt. No, he did not.
Senator Ervin. Did you have any knowledge of the source of that
$75,000?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Ervtn. I understood you to state that you had been promised
on or about June 21, 1972, that you would have money furnished to
you for your support and also for counsel fees, that you were given
assurances to that effect at that time ; is that correct ?
]Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Who gave those assurances?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Gordon Liddy.
Senator Ervin. My 10 minutes are up.
Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. INIr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am sure I
can finish the line of questioning I have in mind in about 10 minutes
and we will be able to proceed to finish possibly this afternoon's in-
quiry fairly early today. I understand that is the wish of the counsel
and of the witness.
Mr. Hunt, you have already testified about how you were employed
as a "WHiite House consultant and I won't extend our conversation
about that much further except to say that you were employed first
by Mr. Colson. I believe you and Mr. Colson had been associated in or
had been togetlier in the Alumni Association of Brown University,
that you were both alumnae of Brown ?
INIr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And that Mr. Colson was aware of your previous
history and background with the CIA and its predecessor ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Would you briefly tell us of your CIA and intelli-
gence background, or if you want me to, I can briefly read the resume
the staff has supplied me and you correct me. Would you prefer that
I do it that way ?
Mr. Hunt. I prefer that you do it, sir.
Senator Baker. The information we have is that you graduated
from Brown in 1940 and entered the Navy. You were discharged after
being injured in an accident at sea. In 1942-1943, you were an editor
for the Marcli of Time and a war correspondent for Life magazine.
From 1943 to 1946, vou worked with the Office of Strategic Services,
using the Army Air Force as a cover. You trained people in clandes-
tine intelligence work in Orlando, Fla. Then you were assigned to
work with Chinese guerilla bands behind the Japanese lines.
You were based for a while in Kunming in southern China and your
OSS unit won a Presidential citation.
In 1946, vou obtained a (rucfirenheim fellowship and spent a year in
Mexico readinji, learnins' Spanish and writing, and for 2 years, you
were a movie scriptwriter.
The CIA was created in 1947 a^id in early 1949, you joined that
asfencv. After a short period at Washintrton headquarters, you were
sent to Paris as an attache at the American Embassv.
3726
During? 1949 and 1950, yon were in Vienna, Austria. From 1950 to
195,*^, you wore in INIexico City and from 1953 to 1950, your cover posi-
tion was tliat of political adviser to the Defense Department in Latin
America, Japan, Spain, and several European countries. Durinc; this
period, you were actively involved in the overthrow of the Guate-
malan rcfjime.
From 1957 to 1900, you- were CTA station chief in Montevideo, where
your cover was first secretary at the Ameiican consul. When the CTA
sought to reassifrn you from that position, there was a^ood bit of dis-
pute over wliptlier you should or should not be reassi^jned and there
were rumors that President Benito Nardone, the President of ITi-u-
guay, was asked to intervene in your behalf to keep the station there.
At any point of this summary ,\'hich is a staft' summary, if you have
any reason to disagree, feel free to do so.
Your cover was as consultant for Department of Defense from
1960-65. In April 1960, you were ordered back to Washington from
Uruguay to pai'ticipate in preparations for tlie Cuban invasion. You
resigned from the Foreign Service in 1960 for purposes of obtaining a
more effective cover, moved to Mexico, and then to Miami, posing as a
writer who suddenly comes into an inheritance.
For the next 19 months, your alias was Edwardo; you acted as the
CIA's representative to the Cuban Eevolutionary Council, the pros-
pective post-Castro government in whose name the invasion brigade
was being trained in Guatemala. You resigned your job when certain
disputes arose after you were assigned with certain i)eople to the Pro-
visional Government of Cuba and went to Miami to serve witli the
Cuban Council.
After the invasion of Cuba failed, you served as personal assistant
to CIA Director, Allen W. Dulles. Your subsequent activities are not i
entirely known.
In 1963, the American Ambassador in Madrid refused to accept you
as deputy chief of the local CIA station. However, you were in
Madrid on unknown business from 1965 to 1966. According to infor-
mation staff supplies, the 1966 to 1967 edition of Who's Who listed
3^ou as a retired Government official living in Madrid.
You returned to Washington in 1968, purchased a home in Potomac,
Md., and retired from the CIA on April 30, 1970.
From 1970 to 1971, you were vice president of the Eobert R. Mullen
& Co., where you continued to work until you became a White House
consultant in July 1971 until your dismissal on July 2, 1972.
Is that a fair sketch of your activities or your career?
Mr. HuxT. Reasonably fair, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Was Colson aware of this rather extensive intelli-
gence — OSS, Bay of Pigs and CIA involvement?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator I^aker. Did you discuss that as a precondition of your
employment ?
Mr. HuxT. I had discussed it with him over a period of years.
Senator Baker. At the time you went to work with Mullen & Co.,
were you aware of or is it a fact that Mullen & Co. had ever been
cooperative with or had any connection with the CIA ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Were you aware of that ?
3727
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. After you became a consultant at the "White House,
did you contact the CIA about your new position ?
]Mr. HrxT. I certainly let former associates know of my new ^Vhite
House connections ; yes, sir.
Senator Baker. "(^Hio? Did you talk to General Cushman?
Mr. Hunt. General Cushman in a different context, sir.
Senator Baker. Had you served with General Cushman in the OSS
or CIA? For instance, did you ever share an office with him?
yir. Hunt. We had back in the fifties at the CIA headquarters in
Washington.
Senator Baker. Did you talk on a number of occasions to CIA
officials about your duties and responsibilities to the "White House
during your tenure as a consultant there ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Bakep. On more than one occasion ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. On how many occasions?
Mr. Hunt. Well, including the staff people, I would say half a
dozen.
Senator Baker. Could you name them ?
Mr. Hunt. I would say a half dozen occasions.
Senator Baker. All right.
Could you name the people you talked to ?
Mr. Hunt. Dr. Bernard Molloy of the ^Medical Office.
Senator Baker. Was that in conjunction with the Ellsberg profile?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Go ahead.
Mr. Hunt. I may have spoken in the same connection with Mr.
Howard Oslxjrne, Director of Security.
Senator Baker. AMiat was that in connection with?
Mr. Hunt. Also the Ellsberg profile.
I spoke to Mr. John Caswell in connection with a refreshment of
m}' memory concerning the French leak scandal that seemed to be a
parallel with the Ellsberg affair.
I spoke with Director Helms' secretary about
Senator Baker. What was that about ?
Mr. Hunt. Simply notifying her and asking her to pass along to
Mr. Helms the fact that I now held a consultancy at the I^Tiite House.
Senator Baker. "\^niat support did you receive from the CIA ?
Let me ask you this to begin with. Did you ever seek or were you
ever given or have access to CIA personnel records for the sake of
achieving your assignment at the "\^niite House ?
Mr. Hunt. Xot in the broader sense, Senator. I had asked the place-
ment service to pi'ovide me with resumes of retirees who possessed
certain limited qualifications.
Senator Baker. What were those qualifications ?
Mr. Hunt. They had to do with photography and surreptitious
entry.
Senator Baker. Did the agency from their employment office pro-
vide you with that in.fonnation ?
]Mr. Hunt. Some information : yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did vou use that as a basis for recruiting?
3728
Mr. Hunt. As a basis for attempted recruiting.
Senator Baker. But it was used for the purposes it was sought for,
to get people who might be useful in this purpose ?
Mr. Hunt. Exactly.
Senator Baker. Did they also supply you with such things as wigs,
with false identification papers, with cameras, with tape recording
devices, with photographic processing and printing? Were these things
all supplied to you by the agency ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Did anyone ever protest that the agency ought not
to be involved in this ?
Mr. Hunt. Not in my hearing.
Senator Baker. Did you ever discuss it with Director Cushman or
Dr. Helms?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did any of those
Mr. Hunt. I am sorry, I drew a false inference from your prior
question.
Senator Baker. Let me break it into two parts. Did you ever discuss
with Director Helms your request for personnel information or logis-
tical and technical support ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Ever?
Mr. Hunt. Never.
Senator Baker. Or with his secretary ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Did you ever discuss it with General Cushman?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Why did you not discuss it with Helms? He was
the Director.
Mr. Hunt. I was directed to consult with General Cushman.
Senator Baker. You were what ?
Mr. Hunt. I was directed to consult with General Cushman.
Senator Baker. By whom ?
]\Ir. Hunt. This requires a little bit of telling, Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. What, sir ?
INIr. Hunt. I am sorry. Senator. This requires a little bit of telling,
of explanation.
Senator Baker. Oh, I see. Go ahead.
How much telling? How much time do I have left ? I have 3 minutes.
Why not save that ? I have a few other things I would like to get to.
There was a tape made of your conversation with General Cushman
on one occasion and we have had a transcript of it. Have you seen that
transcript?
Mr. Hunt. I have, sir.
Senator Baker, You will notice, I am sure, from a reading of it that
there are substantial portions of the transcript which are incomplete.
Some of them are assigned to interference from aircraft noise. Can
you help supply some of those omissions? Can you tell us what you
talked about?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
3729
Senator Bakep. Why can't you ?
Mr. Hunt. lam unable to.
Senator Baker. You are unable to because you don't know or unable-
to for some other reason ?
INIr. Hunt, No, sir; unable to because I don't know.
Senator Baker. And have no recollection ?
Mr. Hunt. And have no recollection now.
Senator Bakep. You don't recall who told you to see Cushman
instead of Helms?
]\Tr. Hunt. I received a call from General Cushman's personal as-
sistant or his principal administrative assistant, ]Mr. Carl Wagner, on
one occasion, shortly after I had had a conversatio7i with ISTr. Colson
relevant to the acquisition of certain technical material. It was Mr.
Wagner who told me that I should meet with General Cushman. I
assumed this to be responsive to a call which General Cushman had
received from some member of the "^^Hiite House staff.
Senator Baker. But you don't know who ?
Mr. Hunt. At the time, I did not know.
Senator Baker. Do you know now ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir. ,
Senator Bakep. A^Tio ?
Mr. Hunt. John Ehrlichman.
Senatoi- Bakep. Can you give us the date and the circumstances of
that call?
Mr. Hunt. I don't believe I can, no, sir.
Senator Baker. Have you seen the xeroxed copies of the photo-
graphs taken in Dr. Field ing's office that were supplied for this record ?
Mr. Hunt. Taken in his office, sir ?
Senator Baker. Yes, sir, they were xeroxed copies of photographic
prints that were taken in Dr. Fielding's office.
Mr. Hunt. I believe 1 have only seen xeroxed copies of photographs
taken externally.
SenatoT- Baker. Have you seen any copies of photographs taken
inside ?
Mr. Hunt. I may have, sir, but I do not recall. I will be very happy
to identify them.
Senator Baker. This is what I want to find out. You delivered pho-
tographic film, or somebody delivered it for you, to CTiV to be proc-
essed and printed, is that correct, sir ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. And they did process it and print it and gave you
the prints and the negatives, I understand.
Mr. Hunt. They certainly gave me the prints. As to the negatives,
I am not sure.
Senator Baker. Do you know whether the CIA still has copies of
those prints or the negatives ?
Mr. Hunt. I have no idea.
Senator Baker. Mr. Hunt. I am dealing now in language that I am
not totally familiar witli, but I am given to believe they are works of
art or phrases of art in the intelligence community. Did you have a
letter of instructions or its equivalent with respect to your general
3730
operations in the intelligence field and with the Watergate and Field-
ing's situations particularly?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Baker. Do you understand what I am speaking about ?
Mr. Htjnt. Yes, sir.
Senator Baker. A letter of instructions means what in your terms?
Mr. Hunt, It is a brief.
Senator Baker. It is instructions in writing on the general descrip-
tion of the job you are about to undertake?
Mr. Hunt. And an authorization.
Senator Baker. And an authorization. Does it also include what to
do in case you get caught ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Baker. There was a conversation by General Cushman, I
believe, about certain paraphernalia that was given to you and not used
in the Ellsberg situation and we have had material described, which
I will describe to you — different items of identification, tape recorder,
cameras, and the like. If they were not used in Ellsberg what were they j
used for? «
Mr. Hunt. I believe everything was used with the exception of the
tape recorder.
Senator Baker. T\Tiere was the tape recorder used ?
Mr. Hunt. The tape recorder was used for the transcription of overt
interviews.
Senator Baker. Overt interviews of whom ?
]\Ir. Hunt. In one case with INIr. Clifton De Motte.
Senator Baker. Who is that ?
Mr. Hunt. He is a Government employee, former Government em-
ployee, at least, who was a contact and former employee of Mr. Robert i
Bennett, my one-time employer.
Senator Baker. Do you know anything about the Dahlberg checks
and the ^Mexican money? M
Mr. Hunt. Melj I inquire, sir ? ■
Senator Baker. Let me just ask you a specific question.
Do 3'ou know whether or not, from your experience with the CIA
or other operations, ISIr. Dahlberg was ever considered as a CIA
contact ?
Mr. Hunt. I have no knowledge of that ; no, sir.
Senator Baker. I am told, Mr. Chairman, that my time has expired.
I thank you, ISIr. Hunt.
Senator Erm:n. I have been requested by the witness and his counsel
to recess at this time. Before we do, however, I would like to put in the
record the memorandum of August 3, 1971, for Charles Colson from
Bud Krogh and David Young. That will be appropriately numbered
as an exhibit.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 154.*]
Senator Er\^n, The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock
tomorrow.
[Whereupon, at 4 :20 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at
1 a.m., Tuesday, September 25, 1973.]
*See p. 3893.
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee ox
Presidextial Campaigx AcTI^^TIEs,
WasMngton^ D.C.
The Select Committee met. pursuant to recess, at 10 :10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate OflBce Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present : Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inom'e, Mont ova, Baker, Gur-
ney and Weicker.
Also present : vSamuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred D.
Thompson, minority counsel ; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief coun-
sel ; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant : Jed Johnson, consultant ;
David ^I. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels: Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet. assistant ma-
jority counsels : Eugene Boyce. hearings record counsel : H. William
Shure. and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O.
Dement, research assistant: Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye:
Bruce Jaques, Jr., office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant
to Senator Baker: A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator AVeicker:
John AValz. publications clerk.
Senator ER^^x. I ani going to request the photographers not to dis-
tract Mr. Hunt's attention by taking pictures while he is testifying.
Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Hunt, I believe you are now under sentence
to the Federal prison for some .30 years for your part in the breaking
and entering of the Watergate complex, are you not ?
TESTIMONY OF E. HOWARD HUNT— Resumed
Mr. HrxT. Yes. sir.
Senator Talmadge. Also, vou have been indicted for the breaking
and entering of the offices of Dr. Fielding but have not yet been tried,
is that correct ?
Mr. Sachs. ]May I interrupt. Senator, I am soriT. As I reflected on
the hearinof yesterday. I am afraid that I have — I mav have left an
inaccurate impression about the sentence. I do not have the statute -with
me this morninof but my recollection of it is that it is bv virtue of the
statute that the sentence of 80 years was imposed not by \nrtue of the
jud<ie's sayinsr 'T sentence vou to 80 years.''
Senator Talmadge. Provisional sentence subject to change, as I
recfill.
Mr. Sachs. That is riffht. But I think that the maximum is imposed
bv the statute when that provisional statute is used. The fact reniains
that he is. that evervthing we said vesterday about the sentence he is
facing is accurate but it is not because the judge said "I sentence you
to 30 years."
(3731)
3732
Senator Talmadge. The statement the attorney has made is also my
understanding in the situation. You also have been indicted, I believe,
in the breaking and entering of the office of Dr. Fielding and have not
yet been tried, is that correct, a correct statement ?
Mr. Hunt. That is not correct, Senator.
Senator Talmadge. You have not been indicted ?
Mr. Hunt. I have not been indicted. I testified both before the Fed-
eral grand jury and the Los Angeles grand jury under a grant of
immunity.
Senator Talmadge. Does it not strike you as a strange commentary
of justice that you who were relatively low on the totem pole here to
be sentenced to" 30 years in prison and those that planned, organized,
and directed this clandestine organization could be walking the streets
free today?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. T may say it does me also.
Now, you related yesterday about the fabrication of cables from this
country to Saigon, relating to the Diem government. Could you state
who directed you to go to the State Department and look at those
cables?
Mr. Hunt. It was my suggestion initially. I was authorized to do so
by the State Department itself at the request of Mr. David Young.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Young contacted the State Department and
the State Department authorized you to go over and look at cables
between the Government of the United States and various officials in
Saigon, is that an accurate statement ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Were those cables labeled top secret ?
Mr. Hunt. Some of them are.
Senator Talmadge. And some were not ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. An ordinary American citizen did not have an
opportunity to look at those cables, did he ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. In fact, he would have to have a higher clearance
for top secret matters in the Government in order to see them, would
he not?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, he would.
Senator Talmadge. Do you think Mr. David Young of his own
accord could obtain that top clearance from the State Department for
you?
^Ir. Hunt. Senator, it was mv understanding that short! v prior to
my joining the "White House staff I was the subject of a full field in-
quiry and clearance by the FBI. At the same time I understood that
because I had been out of CIA only a relatively short period of time
ihat all of the top level clearances that I had held at CIA had been
reinstated.
Senator Talmadge. Even under those conditions, assuming someone
was cleared for top secrecy m.atters in the Pentagon they could not go
to the State Department and look through top secret papers there,
could they?
3733
Mr. HuxT. Not without the permission of the Department of State.
Senator Talmadge. That would be my understanding.
Now, you got there and you found that you thought some of those
f-able^ needed beefing up a little to implicate the Kennedy administra-
tion ; is that what you recited ?
Mr. Hunt. In effect. Senator, yes.
Senator Talmadge. Xow, what did you finally do? You got there
and you fabricated some cables, what was the nature of the fabricated
cables and what did they say ?
]Mr. Hunt. Of course, Senator, I do not have the cables available
to me
Senator Talmadge. I do not expect you to relate it word for word
but. the general tenor.
Mr. HuxT. As I recall it, one, the text of one cable which I fabricated
was a query or an inquiry from the Saigon Embassy, which Ambassa-
dor Lodge then headed, postulating a course of action such as granting
l^olitical asylum to Diem and to his brother-in-law in the event that
they should seek asylum, and the second cable that I fabricated was
an alleged response from the White House to that inquiry.
Senator Talmadge. What was the reason ?
Mr. HuxT. It was a negative response.
Senator Talmadge. In other words, it was alleged to be President
Kennedy speaking for this Government that political asylum would
not be granted ; is that it ?
Mr. HuxT. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Now were there any other cables fabricated ?
Mr. HuxT. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. How did that relate to the implication of Presi-
dent Kennedy and the assassination of President Diem?
Mr. Hl'xt. The mere withholding of asylum would have resulted in
the deaths of the two men who sought it, should they have sought it.
Senator Talmadge. In other words, this was the only way out of
assassination, as you saw it ?
]Mr. HuxT. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And the object of that fabrication was to alien-
ate the Catholic vote in the Presidential election of 1972.
Mr. HuxT. That would have been a part of the thrust of the cable ;
3'es, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Who worked with you and directed your efforts
in that fabrication?
Mr. Htjxt. I was directed solely by Mr. Charles Colson. No one
worked with me.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Colson authorized, directed it and condoned
it. is that your testimony ?
Mr. HuxT. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And also sought to get wide dissemination in the
press relating to those fabricated cables, is that correct?
Mr. HirxT. Through Mr. William Lambert of Life magazine.
Senator Talmadge. Now you put these cables, I believe, the fabri-
cated cables in vour safe in the "VMiite House ?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
96-296 O— 73— pt. 9 22
3734
Senator Talmadge. And left them there and those cables ultimately
were turned over by Mr. Dean and others in the Wlnte House to
Mr. Gordon Gray who ultimately burned them at his country resi-
dence, is that correct ?
Mr. Hunt. So it's been alleged, yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. That is Patrick Gray.
Senator Talmadge. Patrick Gray, I stand corrected.
Senator Ervin. My fellow North Carolinian.
Senator Talmadge. Did you participate with Mr, Liddy in drawing
up the Gemstone plan ?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Senator Talmadge. Did you participate in the presentation of tnat
plan to Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Magruder ?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Now they first turned that plan down, as I recall,
because it was too expensive, is that what was reported to you by
Mr. Liddy?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, Senator.
Senator Talmadge. They did not state they turned it down because
of the nature of the plan, is that a correct statement ?
Mr. Hunt. That is a correct statement.
Senator Talmadge. Who authorized the breaking and entering into
the Watergate complex ?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Liddy told me that his superiors had ordered it.
Senator Talmadge. You didn't think Mr. Liddy organized it on his
own, did you?
Mr. Hunt. Under no circumstances.
Senator Talmadge. You wouldn't have participated in it had you
thought it was a solo flight on the part of Liddy and no one else,
would you?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Now, you have mentioned that you operated in
a number of areas and projects with Mr. Colson.
Would you relate exactly what they were? I believe one was the
Fielding break-in, his office, is that a correct statement?
Mr. Hunt. Ma}'^ I consult with counsel, sir ?
Senator Talmadge. Certainly.
Mr. Hunt [consulting with counsel]. Senator Talmadge, could I
solicit your indulgence in the repetition of that question?
Senator Ta 
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